- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

[Senate Hearing 107-696]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 2225

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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PART 7

STRATEGIC

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MARCH 7, 13, 20; APRIL 10, 11, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003--Part 7 STRATEGIC

S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 2225

__________

PART 7

STRATEGIC

__________

MARCH 7, 13, 20; APRIL 10, 11, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-928 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2003
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
------

Subcommittee on Strategic

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida BOB SMITH, New Hampshire,
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Ballistic Missile Defense Program and Budget
march 7, 2002

Page

Aldridge, Hon. E.C. ``Pete'', Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 9
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 10

Ballistic Missile Defense Acquisition Policy and Oversight
march 13, 2002

Aldridge, Hon. E.C. ``Pete'', Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 72
Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 76
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 78

National Security Space Programs and Strategic Programs and Systems
march 20, 2002

Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander in Chief, United States
Space Command.................................................. 137
Teets, Hon. Peter B., Under Secretary of the Air Force and
Director, National Reconnaissance Office....................... 142
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 165

Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program and the
National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Program and Other
Weapons Activities
april 10, 2002

Roberson, Hon. Jessie Hill, Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management....................................... 253
Beckner, Everet H., Ph.D., Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration............. 280
Erickson, Ralph E., Associate Administrator for Facilities and
Operations, National Nuclear Security Administration........... 291

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Programs
april 11, 2002

Stenbit, Hon. John P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence............. 330
Newbold, Lt. Gen. Gregory S., USMC, Director of Operations, J3,
the Joint Staff................................................ 334
Szemborski, Rear Adm. Stanley R., USN, Deputy Director for
Resources and Requirements, J8, the Joint Staff................ 334

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

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THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM AND BUDGET

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:57 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Byrd, Bill
Nelson, Inhofe, and Allard.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Professional staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswait
and Richard W. Fieldhouse.
Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
minority counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member;
and William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert and Thomas C.
Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson;
J. Mark Powers and John A. Bonsell, assistants to Senator
Inhofe; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Kristine
Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

Senator Reed. Let me begin the hearing. Senator Allard, our
ranking member, is on his way, and I believe others may be
joining us, but I want to welcome General Kadish and Secretary
Aldridge. Thank you for appearing this afternoon. I will give
my opening statement and when Senator Allard arrives, recognize
him for his opening statement as well as other Senators. At the
conclusion of our statements, we would ask General Kadish and
Secretary Aldridge to make their opening statements.
Mr. Secretary, I am told you did not submit a statement for
the record.
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir. I have one for next week when
we talk about the management issues. I just have a very short
verbal presentation.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
The Strategic Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive
testimony on the Department of Defense Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) program and budget. Our two witnesses today are
the Honorable E.C. Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Lt. Gen. Ronald
T. Kadish, Director of the newly organized Missile Defense
Agency (MDA).
Secretary Aldridge is in charge of all major defense
acquisition programs for the Department, including missile
defense programs. I want to thank him for being here today to
help us put the missile defense budget in the context of the
overall acquisition budget. General Kadish is, of course, well-
known to members of this subcommittee. I welcome you here once
more, General.
This is the first of two scheduled hearings this
subcommittee will have on the subject of missile defense. This
hearing will focus on how the Defense Department plans to spend
the $7.5 billion it has proposed for ballistic missile defense
in fiscal year 2003, as well as how it intends to spend over
$40 billion it has planned for fiscal years 2003 through 2007.
The second hearing, scheduled for next week, will focus on
the changes in oversight and acquisition policy the Department
is implementing for ballistic missile defenses. I have
substantial concerns with the large scope of these changes in
oversight and policy, and I believe a number of my colleagues
have similar concerns. However, I would urge my colleagues to
save oversight-related questions until next week's hearing. We
have plenty on our plate today in establishing a fair
understanding of this large and complex missile defense budget
proposal.
It is, indeed, critically important to understand the
budget that has been proposed for missile defense, and to make
sure we are spending our money wisely and efficiently in this
area. The theater ballistic missile threat to our deployed
forces exists today, and it has existed for over a decade. A
ballistic missile threat to our homeland could materialize as
well, although the likelihood and timing of such a threat, and
its magnitude, are subjects for debate.
The administration has proposed spending a prodigious sum
of money on missile defense in fiscal year 2003, as it did for
the current fiscal year, but spending vast amounts of money
does not guarantee anything but expensive operations of
government contracts. Unless that money is spent wisely, this
country will not proceed expeditiously on a course to either
effective theater missile defenses for our troops or an
effective national missile defense (NMD) for our homeland.
Increases in funding do not guarantee success for programs
as complex and difficult as missile defense, and unfortunately
an example of this is the much-touted PAC-3 missile defense
program. It had a string of notable test successes which led to
the administration's proposing a $300 million increase in the
program for fiscal year 2002, mostly to buy missiles. Congress
enthusiastically added $82 million more to the administration's
request, but the $382 million in additional funds did not
prevent a PAC-3 system from missing two out of three targets
during its last flight test on February 16.
This is not an indictment of PAC-3, but it should awaken us
all to the fact that funding itself does not ensure success,
and nothing can replace realistic flight tests to determine the
operational effectiveness of a missile defense system. That is
why I am encouraged by the administration's new focus on
ballistic missile defense testing.
We must keep in mind that every billion dollars spent on
missile defense is a billion not spent on counterterrorism
efforts, on increased protection for our ports and borders, on
biowarfare defenses, on vaccines for our citizen soldiers, on
cooperative programs to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction, on transformation of the
Army into a more mobile, lethal, and relevant force, on our
much-needed Navy ships, and on a host of other crucial
programs.
Last year, the administration's missile defense program was
long on funding but short on details. Despite numerous hearings
on missile defense and a very long briefing that General Kadish
was gracious enough to provide members of this subcommittee, we
were left with a number of important unanswered questions, such
as: What is the administration's overall plan for missile
defense? What does it mean to say that the administration has a
goal of employing a ballistic missile defense system that
layers defenses to, ``defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies,
and friends?'' When might such a vast defensive network be
deployed? What would it look like? How much would it cost?
As I mentioned before, our troops overseas are facing the
threat of hundreds of short- to medium-range theater ballistic
missiles right now. When will effective theater defenses, such
as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Navy Theater-
Wide, and the Navy Area-Wide be deployed? How many such systems
will be bought?
As for national missile defense, why does the
administration plan appear to be at odds with its rhetoric? In
testimony before the full committee last year, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz sounded positively alarmed about
the prospect of imminent ballistic missile attacks from North
Korea. He said, ``in 1998, North Korea surprised the world with
its launch of a Taepo Dong missile over Japan with a previously
unknown and unanticipated third stage. If we do not build
defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers will soon
have or may have already the ability to strike the United
States and allied cities with a nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapon.'' But the administration is not building
missile defenses now.
Under President Clinton's national missile defense plan,
construction of an extant radar in Alaska would have been done
this spring. The construction of this radar, coupled with
continued flight tests and the eventual production of
interceptor missiles, would have provided the best defense
against North Korean missiles. Yet last year, the
administration requested no funding for such a radar. It will
not be built this year.
With the huge amount of funding it received last year for
missile defense, why didn't the administration begin to build
the best national missile defense we know how to build? Now
that the ABM Treaty issue is decided, for better or worse, does
the administration intend to start building our best available
defensive systems next year? Is it funded in the fiscal year
2003 request? It appears that the answer to these questions is
no.
Other questions on national missile defense that remain
unanswered include the following: How much might the
administration's national missile defense plan cost? The
Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that a layered
national missile defense system could easily exceed $150
billion. How effective will the administration's national
missile defense be? How will it be tested, and how realistic
will the tests be? Will realistic countermeasures be used, and
will our system be able to overcome them?
One reason the administration gave last year as to why they
could not answer these questions was that their approach to
missile defense was evolving, with no plan yet in place. How
much do we want to spend just on evolution? The administration
has now been in office for over a year, and is well into
spending the nearly $8 billion for missile defense Congress
provided in fiscal year 2002.
Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, I hope you will
provide better and more complete answers to these types of
questions this year than we were provided last year.
I should add that our staff will coordinate closely with
the Senate Appropriations Committee staff this year, as we did
last year, so the answers you provide to our questions will
also help the appropriators do their job. I would note not only
the presence of my colleague, the ranking member, Mr. Allard,
but also the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Senator Byrd.
I strongly support rapid deployment of theater ballistic
missile defenses for our troops as soon as we can prove these
defenses will work. I also continue to support research and
development of a national missile defense for our homeland, but
I also want that system to be proven to work before we deploy
it.
Finally, I believe ballistic missile defense funding should
be balanced with other pressing national security needs. The
events of September 11 have changed attitudes on our security
and missile defense. The American people, both Service members
and citizens, want and deserve protection from the most likely
and dangerous potential threats. It is up to both the
administration and Congress to be smart about how to best
protect them.
Now, before we turn to our witnesses, let me recognize the
ranking member, my colleague, Senator Allard, and then Senator
Byrd.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
our witnesses today. Secretary Aldridge, it is a pleasure to
have you here today, and General Kadish, it is good to see you
again. We appreciate your willingness to take time out of your
busy schedules and your efforts to assure that all Americans
are protected from weapons against which we do not yet have an
effective defense, ballistic missiles.
How, and even whether, we should develop and deploy such
defenses has been a matter of serious controversy for nearly 20
years. In many ways, the debate on missile defense represents a
fundamental difference in approach to national security. One
relied on arms control and special bilateral arms control
agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States as
the central aspect of our defense. From this perspective, the
ABM Treaty was consistently described as ``the cornerstone of
strategic stability.''
The other view is that the United States needs to provide
for its own defense and cannot afford to rely exclusively on
agreements with adversaries to limit the threats it has to
face. From this perspective, arms control agreements such as
the ABM Treaty are less significant, and the development of
military capabilities needed to meet threats, including the
ballistic missile threat, is paramount.
I believe that the end of the Cold War has strengthened the
argument that bilateral arms control with the Soviet Union no
longer addresses our central security concerns. Ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction have proliferated,
posing significant and increasing threats to the United States,
its allies, friends, and deployed troops. An arms control
agreement that prevented the development of effective defenses
seems to me to be increasingly out of touch with our security
needs. It was in this context that President Bush last December
13 made the courageous decision to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty.
Some will no doubt continue to believe that this decision
was mistaken, but the decision has been made. Russia and our
allies have accepted the decision, and predictions of Russian
withdrawal from other arms control agreements and an
unconstrained arms race appear to have been inaccurate, and the
means and the nature of the BMD debate have changed.
This is not a philosophical argument any more. The passions
generated by a commitment, well-meaning and honestly held, to
an arms control framework at the center of which stood the ABM
Treaty must be replaced by rational consideration of how to
achieve effective ballistic missile defense capabilities as
efficiently and promptly as possible.
I fear, however, that the emotion of the past debates
continues to play a large role in the shaping of the
subcommittee agenda. The chairman has decided that we will have
two hearings on the Missile Defense Agency and its budget of
about $6.7 billion.
As important as the ballistic missile defense program is, I
must note that the subcommittee's jurisdiction is broad, and
includes many difficult issues that we need to address, some of
which we will now in all likelihood give insufficient
attention. Indeed, I had hoped for a separate hearing on space
programs and management, since a number of space programs have
run into technical, schedule, and cost challenges, and the
management and oversight processes for space programs are going
through a period of substantial reform. Instead, all space and
strategic programs, with a combined budget of about $40
billion, will be covered in one hearing.
I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that we have reached an
agreement to schedule time to deal with issues related to the
Department of Energy environmental management (EM) programs.
The EM budget request for fiscal year 2003 is $6.7 billion,
almost exactly the same as MDA's request, and includes a major
reform initiative that promises to speed the cleanup of former
nuclear weapons facilities by decades. This initiative is
important not only to the Department of Energy but to all
Americans who live near these sites, and it deserves our
attention.
I look forward to working closely with you to find a time
convenient not only to you and me but all our interested
subcommittee members, Mr. Chairman. While I am still not
satisfied that the subcommittee is pursuing a more balanced
approach to the broad and complicated issues over which we
exercise our authority, I respect the majority's right to have
the hearings they want to have. I do not question in any way
their motives, and I understand that they have serious concerns
about the missile defense program.
Thus, we will hear over the next two subcommittee hearings
many criticisms from some of our colleagues about the priority
accorded to missile defense, the efficacy of missile defense
programs, and the approach taken to the development of missile
defense capabilities. I believe that most of these criticisms
are baseless. For example, critics of missile defense often
maintain that ballistic missiles pose the least likely threat
that the Nation must face. This is simply false. Ballistic
missiles pose the most likely threat we must face. Indeed, we
face it today.
Missiles and weapons of mass destruction are meant to
deter. I know my colleagues on the other side of the aisle
believe this. They have often argued that our own nuclear force
levels are too high, and that effective deterrence does not
require that many nuclear weapons. According to the latest
national intelligence estimate (NIE), our Nation faces a likely
ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea, and a possible threat
from Iraq. Dozens of nations have short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles already in the field that threaten U.S.
interests, military forces, and allies.
The clear trend in ballistic missile technology is toward
longer range and greater sophistication. Once deployed, these
missiles threaten the United States, its allies and friends,
and its deployed troops. No one has to fire them to be
effective. I want to repeat that. No one has to fire them to be
effective. They are effective by their mere presence.
The NIE does conclude that other forms of attack are more
likely than missile attack, but it also concludes that nations
hostile to U.S. interests are developing these capabilities
precisely to deter the United States, and that the likelihood
that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction would be used
against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during
most of the Cold War, and will continue to grow as the
capabilities of potential adversaries mature.
The NIE simply reinforces the conclusion presented by our
committee chairman last May when he said, ``the question is not
whether there is or will be a threat to the United States from
ballistic missiles. There is, or probably will be soon, from
North Korea.'' Still, some critics may continue to argue that
such nations would never dare attack, knowing that our vastly
superior forces could destroy them. Again, I disagree. We
already know that our adversaries believe that we can be
deterred from pursuing our interests.
A week ago, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee received some remarkable testimony from Mr.
Charles Duelfer. In his capacity as the Deputy Executive
Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, known as
UNSCOM, he had the opportunity to interview senior Iraqi
ministers on Saddam Hussein's perceptions of the Persian Gulf
War.
Now, many of us are aware the United States threatened Iraq
with extraordinary, regime-ending consequences should that
nation use chemical or biological weapons against coalition
forces during the conflict. The use of this threat has been
seen as triumph of deterrence, but according to Mr. Duelfer,
Iraq loaded chemical and biological warheads on ballistic
missiles, and authority to launch those missiles was delegated
to local commanders with no further intervention or control by
higher Iraqi authorities, with orders to launch if the U.S.
moved to Baghdad, and we never attacked Baghdad. The Iraqi
regime survived, and survives to this day, and they would
attribute that survival to the deterrent effect of missiles and
weapons of mass destruction.
The argument that missiles pose the least likely threat, or
that we can deter all of our adversaries, is a precursor to the
contention that Missile Defense Agency funding could better be
spent on other defense programs. This, too, I think is
incorrect. How should we compare it? We have only very limited
capability to defend against ballistic missiles, and the
current BMD program is attempting something that we have never
done before: an effective missile defense system that
integrates the capabilities of dozens of projects.
We propose to spend $6.7 billion this year to do this, less
than requested last year by about $300 million. We have
substantial legacy capabilities in every other mission area,
yet the budget request proposed to spend over $35 billion to
counter the terrorist threat. We will spend $11.3 billion on
three tactical aircraft programs in 2003, and probably about
$350 billion over the lifetime of these programs. We will spend
about $20 billion on space programs in 2003.
I do not argue that funding other systems is unjustified.
Indeed, I support robust programs in all of these areas. I
argue that spending on missile defense is not out of line,
given the magnitude of the challenge and the severity of the
threat. I confess that the logic of the argument that we are
short of ships and airplanes so we do not need missile defense
escapes me.
Again, to quote our committee chairman, Senator Levin,
speaking specifically about our national missile defense
system, ``I do not believe that cost will be a major
impediment,'' but that raises another point of the critics that
we may hear today, that the focus within the missile defense
program is wrong. Thus, we need to spend less on national
missile defense and focus more on theater missile defense that
would protect our allies, friends, and deployed troops.
Of course, last year, our colleagues sought to cut $1.3
billion from missile defense, about half of which could be
reasonably defined as theater missile defense, but
fundamentally we have to recognize that there is no clear
dividing line between national missile defense and theater
missile defense. A system like THAAD, the theater system for
the United States, might be the German national missile
defense, or perhaps THAAD will contribute to the U.S. national
missile defense mission by protecting U.S. territories, or if
the system is upgraded, protecting the U.S. from long-range
missiles.
What we used to call the ground-based national missile
defense system could, depending on where it could be based,
defend Northern Europe from intermediate-range missile threats
from the Middle East. Some boost-phase systems could shoot down
missiles at any range. The whole notion behind the proposed
ballistic missile defense program is to develop a single
integrated missile defense system that can deal with threats of
all ranges, and an architecture that is determined by threat
assessments and technical maturity, and we need to move beyond
terms that have largely lost their meaning.
There is no doubt that we will hear from many members
concerns about specific programs. No doubt the missile defense
program will have its share of failures, as well as successes.
I would remind my colleagues that very few programs are
strengthened by deep funding reductions. While the challenge of
producing effective missile defense is daunting, I would also
remind my colleagues of the statement by our committee
chairman, ``do I believe we can achieve an operationally
effective national missile defense system?'' and his answer
was, ``I do.''
Finally, I understand that the chairman's intent is to
focus this week's hearing on Missile Defense Agency budget and
programs, and next week's hearing on MDA organization and
management processes. Mr. Chairman, I will try to abide by your
desires. Nevertheless, as MDA management processes are
reflected in its programmatic request, we will quite possibly
hear criticisms of these processes today as well. I am afraid
these criticisms will devolve into a fundamental disagreement
that some of our friends on the other side of the aisle may
have with the direction of the entire Department of Defense.
The Department is embracing capabilities-based spiral
development as a means of putting militarily useful capability
into the hands of the warfighter faster than we have in the
past. This is an approach based on commercial best practices,
and it is endorsed by GAO in studies solicited by this
committee.
My colleagues who take issue with capabilities-based spiral
development may find themselves in the awkward position of
endorsing the old Pentagon acquisition system, complete with a
rigid, demanding requirements process that leads to concurrent
development of systems and technology, high technical risk,
schedule delays, cost increases, and weapons-systems cycle
times measured in decades--a system that for years this
committee has sought to improve.
The capabilities-based spiral development approach, as I
understand it, is intended to be an incremental, disciplined,
and realistic approach to the development and deployment of
weapons systems. As it pertains to the Missile Defense Agency,
the process is not devoid of oversight by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and will not deny Congress insight into
missile defense project activity, but these are not issues
unique to the missile defense program.
I am grateful that we have Secretary Aldridge with us
today, and next week as well, to deal with these Department of
Defense acquisition issues. I know I have taken more time than
usual for my statement, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
members of the subcommittee for their patience. Again, welcome
to the witnesses, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
As Senator Allard indicated, we are trying to concentrate
in this hearing on the budget applications and in the next
hearing on management. With that, Senator Byrd, do you have a
statement?
Senator Byrd. I do not have a statement, Mr. Chairman. I
have some questions. Shall I wait?
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a 25-minute
opening statement. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Senator Nelson, forgive me. Go ahead.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the nature of
Senator Byrd's questions, but I wonder if maybe we should not
hear the testimony from the witnesses first.
Senator Reed. I understand that. I thought the Senator
might have questions that he would make in lieu of the
statements. Obviously, we will wait until after the statements.
General Kadish, your testimony, or Secretary Aldridge. Who
prefers to go first?

STATEMENT OF HON. E.C. ``PETE'' ALDRIDGE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Secretary Aldridge. Mr. Chairman, I will go first if you do
not mind.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Allard, members of the
subcommittee, Senator Byrd, Senator Nelson, it is an honor to
have the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to
discuss the President's fiscal year 2003 defense budget request
as it pertains to ballistic missile defense. I am most
fortunate to be here today with Lieutenant General Kadish,
Director of the Missile Defense Agency and, consistent with his
newly defined authority, I will defer questions on program and
budget to him. I have read his written testimony and fully
endorse it.
Because the hearing on acquisition policy and oversight
will be held next week, I will be pleased to provide written
testimony on those topics at that time. I have a very short
opening oral statement today, sir.
Last year, the President announced our intention to
withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. He
observed the self-evident fact that our greatest threats no
longer come from Russia but from terrorists who strike without
warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.
He also said that these new enemies actively seek the ability
to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via a missile.
The four priorities of our missile defense program speak to
these dangers. They are: (1) to defend the United States,
deployed forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile
attack; (2) to employ a ballistic missile system that layers
defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight,
i.e., boost, midcourse, and terminal, and against all ranges of
threats; (3) to enable the military departments to field
elements of the other ballistic missile defense systems as soon
as practicable; and (4) to develop and test technologies, use
prototypes, and test assets to provide early capability, if
necessary, and improve the effectiveness of deployed capability
by inserting new technologies as they become available, or when
the threat warrants an accelerated capability.
These objectives are challenging, but by no means
impossible. We have experienced significant and meaningful
successes in hit-to-kill technologies, the latest generation
Patriot missile, and the Airborne Laser (ABL) program. We have
also had some problems, as should be expected in any effort to
develop new kinds of technology to counter new kinds of
threats.
As for my role as the defense acquisition executive, let me
just say that the starting point for further testing and
implementation successes is this fiscal year 2003 budget. I
have every confidence that it will advance our efforts as we
work to solve these technical challenges and to mitigate these
very real threats.
I would like to turn the floor over to General Kadish, and
if you desire, we can respond to questions after his testimony.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Kadish.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY

General Kadish. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here
today to explain our fiscal year 2003 missile defense budget.
To allow more time for questions, I would like my prepared
statement entered into the record. We have made considerable
progress in our programs since I last testified, and we spent
the past year testing key technologies and their integration,
and restructuring our program to better address the challenges
we face.
Since I will be here next week to address some of the
changes in our restructured program, I will confine my remarks
this afternoon to testing. I would like to provide a quick
video report card, as awkward as it is in this forum, on the
moneys that were spent last year and this fiscal year on our
test results. I would also like to discuss the objectives of
the missile defense program. Those objectives that Secretary
Aldridge has outlined have not changed.
Our goal is to develop a single integrated ballistic
missile defense system to defend the populations and forces of
the United States, its allies, and friends against all types
and ranges of missiles. Based on the results of last year's
missile defense review, the Department has moved away from an
independently managed element-centric approach and established
a single program to develop an integrated system.
This system will consist of elements configured in layered
defenses for integrated and autonomous operations and mutual
support. This will give us multiple engagement opportunities,
along the threat missile's flight path in boost, midcourse, and
terminal phases. Our testing program is currently focused on
individual elements, their performance within the proposed BMD
System, and their testing is certainly gaining momentum. We
conduct many kinds and levels of tests during the development
of this technology, including models and simulations, ground
testing, risk reduction flights, intercept flights, and system-
wide tests and exercises. We have done almost a test a month
since I was here last summer, and we expect to stay at least on
that pace this year, testing in a very aggressive way.
Now, with your indulgence, I would like to show a
relatively short film, a little over 8 minutes long on our test
results last year.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Copy retained in committee files.]

It will include some ground testing of the Airborne Laser,
as well as some flight testing of all the different activities
that we have. It will also show some of our failures this past
year.
What you will see here in the beginning is a description of
the types of threat missiles we face, and the time span is from
January 2001 through January 2002. You can see the layered
defenses and the way the threat missiles are constructed. I
would like to just point out right now you have boost phase,
when it is boosting, midcourse, when it is coasting to the
target, and terminal, when it is actually attacking the target,
and you get long-range, medium-range, and short-range threats.
No one system as we currently understand it can attack in each
one of those phases.
The first test is a ground test of the Airborne Laser,
which is in the boost phase of the attack, and we had something
called first light, and what you are going to see here is not
very spectacular, but it is to an engineer. It is the actual
heating up of the surfaces of the different lenses of the
laser, and we got significant performance out of that laser the
first time we lit it up, so that is on track.
We had a Patriot test, and this was very complex. We shot
two Patriot 3s and one Patriot 2 at incoming missiles, and you
can see the Patriots, both the 3 and 2, actually doing the
intercepts.
Now, we have had some failures in Patriot, as was noted in
your opening remarks, Senator Reed, but I believe that those
are at the edge of the envelope, and we will be able to
structure those tests in the future to be effective.
I also include Arrow here, because we spent a considerable
amount of investment in the Arrow system, and we did a test of
the Arrow, which is a system in the terminal phase against
shorter-range missiles. The target was launched from an F-15
off the coast of Israel, and you will see the Arrow rising to
the intercept point.
This is a blast fragmentation warhead, but is almost
accurate enough to be hit-to-kill. The crosshairs are on the
Arrow interceptor rising to meet the target, and you can see
the target there, and it was destroyed, so the investment in
Arrow was and continues to be fairly effective.
Now I would like to talk about a non-intercept test against
long-range missiles in the midcourse, where we are developing
the booster to actually boost to kill vehicles. We have done
two tests of this technology, one last August and one in
December. This is the August test, and this is basically the
booster, the rocket stack, if you will. It was successful. We
did not have any intercept tied to it, but that encouraged us.
As you might recall, we were behind in this development,
and this test was pretty effective. However, in December of
this past year we did another test just of the booster without
an interceptor attached to increase our confidence, and to our
chagrin we were not successful in this test. I would like to
show you what an unsuccessful booster test looks like.
This is about 13 seconds into flight. As you can see, it
will self-destruct, basically, in the process, and then tumble
to Earth. We believe we know what caused that. That is why we
do testing, and we will fix it in the process.
Now I would like to talk about the two ground-based tests
we have done. They are identical. We are three-for-five in
these types of tests. The last two were successful. This was
the one done in July last year. You can see the interceptor
rising to meet the target that was launched from Vandenberg Air
Force Base, about 4,800 miles away, and the intercept occurred
about 140 miles into space, and this is a view that we have not
shown you before of the actual interceptor video as it came in
and hit the target.
This is another view from a different sensor, and the radar
track on the right confirmed the actual intercept.
The test we did after that was in December. We are starting
to build a track record on this. It was identical to the one we
did in July to confirm our confidence in the hit-to-kill
technology. I will note that we have the next one scheduled for
March 15 of this year and right now we are just a few days away
from that intercept test.
Again, the target launched from Vandenberg and the
interceptor from the South Pacific, and it rose to meet the
target, and you can see the things the seeker saw. This is the
way it approached the actual target at 7\1/2\ kilometers per
second. That is the last thing you saw before it hit, and we
confirmed the actual intercept through other sensors, and you
can see that here.
Now, I am pleased to show the first sea-based intercept by
a standard missile. This is in the midcourse against medium or
intermediate-range missiles. It is done from an Aegis cruiser.
We did this test twice, once last year, and we did not have an
intercept attempt, it basically flew by the target to gather
data, and that is what this shows right here. This is a fly-by.
We were going to do it again this January, a year later, but we
were able to get the missile in such a position that it
actually intercepted the missile that you will see here in a
minute, although that was not the primary objective of the
test.
The target was launched out of Kawai in the Hawaiian
Islands, an intermediate-range target. The Aegis cruiser with a
standard missile was about 450 kilometers away. You can see the
launch of the standard missile to rise and meet that missile in
outer space, a very exciting launch from that standpoint. This
is what the kill vehicle actually saw as it was coming in for
the intercept, so you can see how accurate we are getting in
the overall approach that we are using.
So that video report card shows how we have been spending
the money Congress has allocated to us over the past year to
year-and-a-half, and you can see, our tests were some obvious
successes and some failures, but from a testing point of view
we learn a lot from our failures as well.
Both the pace and complexity of our testing are going to
pick up, and we will have 12 more flight tests scheduled for
the remainder of this fiscal year, together with 14 ground
tests and 13 system-wide tests.
Now, just a brief word about the budget. As you pointed
out, the fiscal year 2003 budget is substantial, but it
continues in the same range as last year to provide us the
stability we need in this aggressive development program, and
in so doing it supports our program objectives. We have asked
for a total of $6.7 billion for fiscal year 2003, which is
slightly less than last year. This amount reflects the decision
by the Department to transfer to the Army all the funding for
fiscal years 2003 to 2007 for Patriot 3 and the other program
called MEADS.
We plan to continue PAC-3 operational testing in our
development of THAAD and ground and sea-based midcourse defense
as well as the Airborne Laser. I expect that experimental work,
especially in the area of boost-phase defense, will continue
aggressively, and our 2003 funding will help us reach our goal
for initial test bed capability for the ground-based system by
calendar year 2004.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my
remarks. The details of our program have been provided to you
and the rest of the members and staff. Over the past year, we
have made some significant strides in our development, as some
of our major test events have shown, yet we also have some
significant challenges ahead to ensure our missile defenses
will become effective as soon as possible, and will remain so
throughout their life. With your continued support and that of
the American people, I have every confidence we can do it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

Good morning. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
present the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2003 missile defense
program and budget.
The Department of Defense is developing effective missile defenses
for the territories and deployed forces of the United States, allies,
and friends. Ballistic missiles already pose a threat to the United
States and to U.S. interests, forces, allies, and friends. The missiles
possessed by potential adversaries are growing in range, reliability,
and accuracy. The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies,
materials, and expertise can also occur in unexpected ways, enabling
potential adversaries to accelerate missile development or quickly
acquire new capabilities. Missiles carrying nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons could inflict damage that far surpasses what we
experienced last September 11. The events of that day underscored the
vulnerability of our homeland, even to assault from distant regions.
Defensive capabilities to counter this threat cannot be deployed
overnight. We also recognize that the threat is continually changing.
So we are taking an approach to build missile defenses that will allow
us to put capabilities ``in play'' as soon as practicable to provide
the best defenses possible against the projected threat, based on
technological progress and success in testing. After nearly a decade of
steady developmental progress, we are deploying the first Patriot
Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3, missiles to give our forces protection
against short-range threats. In the coming years we plan to introduce
new capabilities to defeat medium- and even longer-range ballistic
missiles.
Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in
demonstrating key missile defense technologies and integration
concepts. This past January we took a significant step forward and
broke new ground with the successful midcourse intercept of a medium-
range ballistic missile target using a sea-based interceptor. Following
successful intercepts of long-range targets in July and December of
last year, we gained further confidence in our Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) design and capability. With the Airborne Laser, or ABL,
we are making steady progress in the development of directed energy
technologies by achieving record power levels in the last two tests and
successfully completing the final lasing test for Laser Module-1.
Some of our tests showed we need more work to achieve our design
objectives. The third test late last year of the boost vehicle under
development for the GMD element failed to launch as planned. Because a
faster ground-based interceptor will increase significantly our
engagement envelope, we are focusing intently to resolve the associated
development problems. Recently, PAC-3 began a series of operational
tests. In mid-February, PAC-3 teamed up with PAC-2 in a multiple
simultaneous engagement test to intercept three air-breathing targets,
but intercepted just one. Despite some setbacks, we continue to make
remarkable strides, Mr. Chairman, and we grow increasingly confident in
our ability to deliver effective missile defense capabilities over the
next few years. Yet, we should all recognize that there remains a long
road ahead.

APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will develop incrementally a
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System that layers defenses to
intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight--
boost, midcourse, and terminal.\1\ These increments will be transferred
to the Services for production and deployment as soon as practicable.
We are working with the warfighters, the CINCs, and the Services
throughout this process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On January 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense established the
Missile Defense Agency to manage the development of effective missile
defenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the results of last year's rigorous missile defense
review, the Department has moved away from an independently managed,
element-centric approach and established a single program to develop an
integrated BMD System. The BMD System will consist of elements
configured into layered defenses to provide autonomous and mutual
support, including multiple engagement opportunities, along a threat
missile's flight path. The missile defense program supports numerous
risk reduction activities, including flight tests, ground simulations,
and hardware-in-the-loop demonstrations.
Engineering complexities and operational realities associated with
missile defense require operational and system integration as well as
an ability to operate elements autonomously. Therefore, a key tenet of
the missile defense program is robust, realistic testing within the BMD
System Test Bed. This Test Bed is an integrated set of components that
are widely dispersed among operationally realistic locations primarily
throughout the Pacific and continental United States. While its
specific components have independent utility, the Test Bed is designed
to support development of missile defense elements and demonstrate an
integrated, layered missile defense system. We will use the Test Bed
over the next few years to validate the midcourse, boost, and terminal
elements, including supporting sensors, and the necessary BM/C\2\ and
communications components. This Test Bed was most recently used to test
the Standard Missile-3 interceptor for Sea-based Midcourse Defense
(SMD) and in fiscal year 2002 it will host additional GMD and SMD
intercept flight tests and a major System Integration Test.
The BMD System Test Bed includes prototypes and surrogates of the
System elements as well as supporting test infrastructure to provide
trajectory, sensing, interception, and BM/C\2\ and communication
scenarios that resemble conditions under which the system might be
expected to operate. It will enable testing against faster, longer-
range target missiles than we are using today, and it will allow us to
test using different geometric, operational, and element
configurations.
As they become available, we could use prototypes and test assets
to provide early capability, if so directed. A decision to employ test
assets would depend upon the success of testing, the appropriate
positioning of Test Bed components, the availability of test
interceptors and other assets, and the international security
environment. Our test infrastructure, in other words, will have an
inherent, though rudimentary, operational capability.
Our program is now entering a new phase, moving from technology
development to system engineering, and we face a very significant
challenge of integrating many diverse elements into one system. We
employ thousands of individuals throughout the United States. We are
also collaborating extensively with all of the Military Departments and
the Joint Staff as we investigate different basing modes and deal with
associated operational and planning challenges. Our approach to
managing resources is clearly an important element of our approach to
missile defense. This committee's support for the President's Freedom
to Manage Initiative will reduce statutory requirements that can
restrict management flexibility, allowing us to more efficiently and
effectively execute the Missile Defense program.

ACQUISITION STRATEGY

The BMD System is highly complex, so we are using an acquisition
approach that capitalizes on advances in missile defense technology and
continually adjusts to changes in external factors (e.g., threat,
policy, and priorities) as appropriate. We are following an aggressive
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) acquisition
strategy that allows us to respond to changes in the threat, manages
changes in system technologies, and ensures progress in development and
testing.
The BMD System architecture will take shape based on periodic
decisions and assessments within the MDA and the Department's Senior
Executive Council (SEC). Annual assessments will include evaluations of
element test performance, system architecture, technological and basing
alternatives, and the threat. The initial goal is to provide limited
protection against long-range threats for the United States and
potentially our allies within the 2004-2008 timeframe, while delivering
more advanced capabilities against shorter-range threats.
The traditional requirements process has not worked well for
missile defense. Missile defense is a cutting-edge development effort
and an area where we have very little operational experience. The
requirements definition process typically leverages operational
experience to set system specifications many years before actual
deployment, a process that can lead to a less than optimum deployed
capability that does not take advantage of the most advanced
technologies.
Let me illustrate what I mean. The B-52 bomber that first flew in
1952 is hardly the same aircraft that dropped bombs over Afghanistan in
the war against terrorism. The original B-52 design, which gave us an
early intercontinental bombardment capability, was enhanced over time
through hardware and software improvements to meet evolving operational
challenges. It may look the same, but today's B-52 is a very different
aircraft.
Similarly, we enhanced over many years the Patriot batteries we saw
in the 1991 Gulf War. Although its capability to defend small areas was
improved during Operation Desert Shield, performance against Iraqi
Scuds was not impressive. As a result, the Department initiated a
follow-on enhancement program and replaced the original missile with a
completely new interceptor.
These examples illustrate that in today's dynamic security
environment, a requirement written in a system's development phase can
quickly become irrelevant or a one-way street that leads developers
into a technological cul-de-sac. Five years ago, nobody could have
written a requirement for today's Internet and gotten it exactly right.
We, therefore, have modified our acquisition approach. In line with
the Secretary's decision to cancel the current Operational Requirements
Documents (ORDs) related to missile defense, we are using the ORDs as
reference documents, but not as the final measures of development
progress. Instead of developing a system in response to a clearly
defined threat from a known adversary, we are looking at missile
capabilities that any adversary could have in a given timeframe. We
also continually assess missile defense technology options and
availability. Using a capability-based approach to ensure that a
militarily useful BMD System can be deployed as soon as practicable, we
are setting initial capability standards and engaging the CINCs,
Services, and industry. This acquisition approach supports the
effective engineering and integration of the BMD System and ensures a
transition of effective, threat-relevant system capabilities to the
Services for production, deployment, and operations.
While we are moving away from some of the rigidities associated
with the traditional acquisition process, we are not abandoning
discipline in development. Capability-based acquisition requires
continual assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the
element and BMD System levels. We will build what we can
technologically, and improve it as rapidly as possible. Configuration
management and risk management will continue to guide the engineering
processes.
In a capability-based approach that pursues parallel development
paths, a risk management program is essential. To execute BMDS level
risk management, we are identifying risk issues and an analytical basis
for modifications and enhancements. This disciplined risk management
process supports the annual review and assessment of the BMD System and
accommodates significant user participation at the appropriate times
during development.
The missile defense acquisition strategy engineers and tests the
system using a 2-year capability ``block'' approach, with the initial
introduction of elements into the expanded Test Bed starting as early
as fiscal year 2004. The initial BMD System capability (Block 2004)
will evolve as technologies mature and are demonstrated satisfactorily
in the BMD System Test Bed. This capability will be increased
incrementally in future blocks through the introduction of new sensor
and weapon components, and by augmenting or upgrading existing
capabilities.
Each BMD System Block is comprised of selected element
configurations integrated into the overall System BM/C\2\. There will
be annual decision points at which time assessments will be made on the
basis of: effectiveness and synergy within the system; technical risk;
deployment schedule; cost; and threat. This assessment of progress will
determine whether a given developmental activity will be accelerated,
modified, or terminated. Implementing changes expeditiously and
prudently maximizes value from our investments and allow more rapid
program adjustments based on threat projections and technological
progress.
Each subsequent block will build on and be integrated into the
capabilities provided by predecessor blocks that make up the BMD
System. This evolutionary strategy allows us to put the high
performance technologies ``in play'' sooner than would otherwise be
possible. Once they have been demonstrated, elements or their
components will be available for emergency use, if directed, or for
transfer to the Military Departments for production as part of a
standard acquisition program.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

Our approach to developing missile defenses builds on the
technological, engineering, and integration progress we have made to
date. We are currently pursuing parallel development efforts in order
to reduce risk in the individual RDT&E efforts and aggressively
demonstrating technologies for integration on land, sea, air, and
space-based elements. When a capability is sufficiently validated, that
element or component will be ready for a decision regarding transition
to production.
We are also exploring new concepts and experiments for the
development of advanced sensor suites and kinetic and directed energy
kill mechanisms for potential sea, ground, air, and space deployment.
In line with our disciplined walk-before-you-run, learn-as-you-go
approach to testing, we are incorporating more realistic scenarios and
countermeasures into the missile defense development test program. The
Test Bed will be expanded to accommodate this aggressive and robust
testing approach.

The Missile Defense Program allocates resources required for the
BMD System, including the integration of individual elements into a
single, synergistic system to defend the territories and deployed
forces of the United States, allies, and friends. The BMD System
segment comprises System Engineering and Integration (SE&I), BM/C\2\,
communications, targets and countermeasures, test and evaluation,
producibility and manufacturing technology, and program operations
(which includes Management Headquarters and the Pentagon Reservation).
Funding in this segment provides resources to define, select, test,
integrate, and demonstrate the elements in the Terminal Defense,
Midcourse Defense, Boost Defense, and Sensor segments. The tasks
included in this segment are those that will benefit the entire BMD
System, not just a particular element or program. This segment also
includes management efforts to ensure architectural consistency and
integration of missile defense elements within the overarching missile
defense mission.
The President's budget requests $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2003
for RDT&E in the BMD Segment, an increase of $255 million over the
fiscal year 2002 enacted funding level. RDT&E and military construction
funding in this segment across the fiscal years 2003-2007 FYDP is about
$6.0 billion.

As the central engineering component within MDA, the Systems
Engineering and Integration activity provides the overall system
engineering development and integration of the BMD System. SE&I
activities will define and manage the layered BMD System
collaboratively by providing detailed systems engineering and
integration across the entire spectrum of system capabilities.
Capability-based acquisition requires continual assessment of technical
and operational alternatives at the component, element, and system
levels. The systems engineering process involves setting BMD System
Technical Objectives and Goals; addressing existing, emerging, and
postulated adversary capabilities; assessing and determining system
design and element contributions; synthesizing system blocks;
introducing new technologies and operational concepts; conducting
system risk analyses; and considering impacts of potential foreign
contributions to BMD System capabilities.
The BM/C\2\ activity will develop and integrate the BM/C\2\ and
communications functions for the BMD System. To provide maximum
flexibility to the warfighter, this activity includes the development
of specifications needed to ensure Terminal Defense, Midcourse Defense,
Boost Defense, and Sensor segments are properly integrated and
interoperable with external systems, to include those of allies.
Communications funding consolidates and refines BMD System-wide
communication links to allow components of the BMD System to exchange
data and to permit command and control orders to be transmitted to
weapons and sensors.
The Targets and Countermeasures program provides capability-based
ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and other payloads to
support system-testing as well as element testing across the segments.
Standard interfaces are being defined between payloads and boosters, so
that we can introduce different targets into BMD System flight test
scenarios with greater efficiency. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, we
are establishing an inventory of target modules (boosters, reentry-
vehicles, countermeasures, and instrumentation) to shorten the build-
cycle and support more frequent flight tests.
The Test and Evaluation program includes the test and evaluation
infrastructure, tools for program-wide use, and execution of system-
level testing. Individual BMD System elements will conduct risk
reduction, developmental, and operational testing. System level tests
go beyond these, testing synergy, interoperability, BM/C\2\ and
communication links across the elements. Also resourced are those tests
conducted for the purpose of making critical measurements required
across the missile defense regime, for example, measurements of
adversary missile characteristics such as plume signatures, lethality
measurements, and characterization of potential countermeasures. Such
data collection becomes an important input to the design and
development of effective defenses.
Supporting robust, realistic testing requires a significant
investment in the development and maintenance of the requisite test
infrastructure, analytical tools, and computational capabilities.
Because this supports both the system and all of its elements, it is
resourced centrally at the system level. The BMD System test
infrastructure includes a number of critical, specialized ground test
facilities, test range facilities, launch capabilities, and
instrumentation, such as several airborne sensor platforms and other
mobile capabilities unique to missile defense testing. Core models and
simulations, both for engineering and integration purposes, are also
developed, validated, and maintained. These range from detailed
phenomenology and lethality codes used by all the system elements to
large-scale wargaming simulations required for BM/C\2\ and operational
concept of operations development. A number of computational
facilities, data libraries, and simulation facilities are also
resourced at the System level.

Terminal Defense Segment (TDS)
The Terminal Defense Segment involves development and upgrades of
missile defense capabilities that engage short- to medium-range
ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their trajectory. The
missile or warhead enters the terminal phase when it reenters the
atmosphere. This is a short phase, lasting less than a minute. Elements
in this defense segment include Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD), PATRIOT Advanced Capability Level 3 (PAC-3), Medium Extended
Air Defense System (MEADS), and a sea-based terminal concept definition
element (successor to the Navy Area activities). Additionally, other
elements funded by the MDA are the Israeli Arrow Deployability Program,
which includes the Israeli Test Bed (ITB), Arrow System Improvement
Program, and studies via the Israeli Systems Architecture and
Integration effort.
The MDA budget allocation for TDS activities in fiscal year 2003 is
$1.1 billion, which includes funds for RDT&E and military construction.
The MDA budget includes about $5.8 billion in fiscal year 2003-2007 for
the terminal defense segment. These figures reflect a decision by the
Department to transfer to the Army all funding for PAC-3 and MEADS from
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.
Congress returned PAC-3 and MEADS to MDA for fiscal year 2002
pending the fulfillment of congressionally mandated requirements. Upon
satisfaction of all congressional directives, we will transfer the PAC-
3 to the Army.

TDS Elements
THAAD is designed to defend against short- to medium-range
ballistic missiles at endo- and exo-atmospheric altitudes, which can
make effective countermeasures against THAAD difficult to employ. It
also allows multiple intercept opportunities, and can significantly
mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction. THAAD will protect
forward-deployed U.S. and allied armed forces, broadly dispersed
assets, and population centers against missile attacks.
In fiscal year 2003, we will complete missile and launcher designs
and initiate manufacturing of missile ground test units, continue
fabrication of the first and second radars, and continue to fabricate
and test the BM/C\2\ hardware and software. We will support robust
ground-testing and flight-hardware testing in preparation for missile
flights in fiscal year 2004 at the White Sands Missile Range. The
element development phase will refine and mature the THAAD design to
ensure component and element performance, producibility, and
supportability. There are five major THAAD components: missiles,
launchers, radars, BM/C\2\, and THAAD-specific support equipment.
PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability to protect U.S.
forward-deployed forces, allies, and friends. PAC-3 can counter enemy
short-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft
employing advanced countermeasures and a low radar cross-section. PAC-3
successfully completed development testing last year, during which
there were three intercepts of ballistic missiles, two cruise missile
intercepts, and four multiple simultaneous engagements of ballistic and
cruise missiles. The start of PAC-3 operational testing in February
2002 shows that we still have work to do. In fiscal year 2003, we will
execute activity to develop, integrate, and test evolutionary block
upgrades. Plans include transitioning PAC-3 to full rate production to
build up PAC-3 missile inventory and field additional PAC-3
capabilities.
The Department decided in December 2001 to cancel the Navy Area
program after a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Nonetheless, the need for timely
development and deployment of a sea-based terminal ballistic missile
defense capability remains. We have initiated the sea-based terminal
study directed by the Department, which we expect to conclude this
spring.
MEADS is a cooperative effort between the U.S., Germany, and Italy.
MEADS will provide robust, 360-degree protection for maneuver forces
and other critical forward-deployed assets against short- and medium-
range missiles and air-breathing threats, such as cruise missiles and
aircraft. In fiscal year 2001, the trilateral MEADS activity embarked
on a 3-year risk reduction effort. In fiscal year 2003, MEADS will
continue design and development activities for key system components,
which includes efforts to integrate the PAC-3 missile with MEADS.
The Arrow Weapon System (AWS), developed jointly by the United
States and Israel, provides Israel a capability to defend against
short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The Arrow Deployability
Program allows for Israel's acquisition of a third Arrow battery and
Arrow's interoperability with U.S. systems. The Arrow System
Improvement Program will include both technical cooperation to improve
the performance of the AWS and a cooperative test and evaluation
program to validate the improved AWS performance. We will support
additional flight testing and supply of components for additional
missiles to be built in Israel. Continued U.S. cooperation with Israel
will provide insight to Israeli technologies, which may be used to
enhance U.S. ballistic missile defenses.

Midcourse Defense Segment (MDS)
Midcourse Defense Segment elements engage threat ballistic missiles
in the exo-atmosphere after booster burnout and before the warhead re-
enters the Earth's atmosphere. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense and
Sea-Based Midcourse Defense elements of the MDS are the successors to
the National Missile Defense and Navy Theater Wide programs,
respectively. The Sea-based Midcourse activity includes a cooperative
missile technology development effort with Japan. Our budget for this
segment in fiscal year 2003 (RDT&E and military construction) is almost
$3.2 billion, or $570 million less than the funding enacted for fiscal
year 2002. MDS funding is about $14.8 billion across the FYDP.

MDS Elements
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) will engage threat
missiles primarily during the descent phase of midcourse flight. Our
GMD development activity has three main objectives: (1) demonstrate
hit-to-kill; (2) develop and demonstrate an integrated system capable
of countering known and expected long-range threats; and (3) develop
infrastructure and assets for the initial GMD components of the BMD
System Test Bed to conduct realistic tests using operationally
representative hardware and software and produce reliable data for GMD
and BMD System development.
During fiscal year 2002, the GMD element will build upon the
successful intercept tests of July and December 2001 by further
demonstrating hit-to-kill and discrimination capabilities using
increasingly complex and realistic test scenarios. Development of the
2004 BMD System Test Bed continues with an upgraded Cobra-Dane radar in
Alaska as a temporary surrogate for Upgraded Early Warning Radars
(UEWRs); an accelerated version of the In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System (IFICS) and Battle Management, Command, Control
and Communications (BMC3) capability; five ``common'' silos with
sparing; Command Launch Equipment (CLE); and software upgrades.
In fiscal year 2003 five Ground-Based Interceptors using a
precursor of the objective booster and an operationally representative
kill vehicle will be developed for installation and testing in fiscal
year 2004. MDA will continue to develop the objective booster and
continue with the complementary EKV activity. This objective may allow
for a common EKV for Ground and Sea-based Midcourse Defenses. BM/C\2\
and communications incremental prototypes will be integrated and
demonstrated at multiple locations and assessed with user
participation. The Prototype Manufacturing Rate Facility will continue
in fiscal year 2003 to support a wide range of interceptor needs for
the increased rate of flight tests. Research and development efforts
for Block 2004 and subsequent blocks will support the development of
the initial GMD parts of the Block 2004 BMD System Test Bed. This
facility will also support continued development and testing of more-
capable interceptors, sensors, and targets.
Sea-based Midcourse Defense will develop a ship-based capability to
intercept threat missiles early in the ascent phase of midcourse
flight. SMD continues to build upon the existing Aegis Weapons System
and Aegis Light-weight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Intercept
(ALI) activities while pursuing alternative kinetic warhead
technologies.
In January 2002, we conducted the first of many flight tests for
the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) in order to demonstrate kill vehicle
guidance, navigation, and control against a live ballistic missile
target. The SM-3 launched from the U.S.S. Lake Erie, which was
positioned in the BMD System Test Bed more than 500 kilometers away
from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, and successfully collided with
its target missile in space using infrared sensors. This was the first
intercept for the hit-to-kill SMD element.
Funding in fiscal year 2003 continues for concept definition, risk
reduction, and testing to further the development of a capability to
defeat medium- to intermediate-range threats. The SMD project has three
primary objectives in fiscal year 2003: (1) continue testing and
complete ALI Flight Demonstration Project; (2) design and develop a
contingency ship-based ascent and midcourse ballistic missile intercept
capability based on ALI and associated technologies; and (3) continue
an effort initiated in fiscal year 2002 to provide a ship-based missile
defense system designed to provide an ascent midcourse phase ``hit-to-
kill'' technology in the fiscal years 2008-2010 timeframe.
The United States and Japan, under a 1999 Memorandum of
Understanding, are conducting a cooperative systems engineering project
to design advanced missile components for possible integration into the
SMD element. This project leverages the established and demonstrated
industrial and engineering strengths of Japan and allows a significant
degree of cost sharing.
Boost Defense Segment (BDS)
The Boost Defense Segment addresses both directed energy and
kinetic energy (KE) boost phase intercept (BPI) missile defense
capabilities to create a defense layer near the hostile missile's
launch point. To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, quick
reaction times, high confidence decision-making, and multiple
engagement capabilities are desired. The development of high-power
lasers and faster interceptor capabilities are required to engineer
kinetic and directed energy capabilities to provide options for
multiple shot opportunities and basing modes in different geographic
environments. MDA RDT&E funding in the Boost Defense Segment is $797
million in fiscal year 2003, an increase of $197 million over fiscal
year 2002 enacted funding, and is approximately $7.5 billion from
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.

The BDS employs multiple development paths. Information derived
from this approach will help evaluate the most promising BPI projects
to provide a basis for an architecture decision. The BDS will
demonstrate the ABL for the Block 2004 Test Bed. It will define and
evolve space-based and sea-based kinetic energy BPI concepts. Also, we
will evaluate Space-Based Laser technologies. At the appropriate time,
based on mature system concepts and technologies, we will initiate a
focused demonstration of this concept in the Test Bed.
BDS Elements
ABL will acquire, track, and kill ballistic missiles in their boost
phase of flight. Management and funding responsibility for ABL has
officially transferred from the Air Force to the Missile Defense
Agency. ABL integrates three major subsystems (laser; beam control; and
battle management, command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (BM/C\4\I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F
aircraft. ABL-specific ground support equipment also will be developed.
Building on successful sub-system testing and the modification of
aircraft structures, in fiscal year 2003 we will commence major
subsystem integration and testing activities. The ABL Block 2004 phase
culminates in a lethality demonstration (missile shoot-down) against
boosting ballistic missile threat-representative targets and delivers
one aircraft for integration and testing. If directed, this aircraft
could also provide an emergency defensive capability. We plan to
develop a second test aircraft, which will further develop this new
technology.
The Kinetic Energy Boost defense activity reduces the technical and
programmatic risks of fielding a boost phase intercept capability. The
KE Boost strategy is to define and assess militarily useful boost phase
concepts, invest in focused risk reduction activities, and execute
critical experiments. We will tap the brightest minds in the public and
private sectors to define the most effective approach to killing
ballistic missiles as they boost. We identified several lucrative
technology candidates for immediate investment, including fast burn and
flexible axial propulsion technologies, agile kill vehicles, early
detection and track sensors, quick-reaction BM/C\2\, and affordable
weapons platforms. We will assess these component technologies through
rigorous ground and flight tests.
We will evaluate prototype component and element configurations
under realistic operational conditions. We will experiment using
emerging component technologies and test infrastructure to resolve
tough technical challenges, such as predicting the point of intercept
and finding the missile tank in the presence of hot exhaust. When
possible, we will exploit targets of opportunity by tracking space
launch vehicles and test missions launched out of Vandenberg, Air Force
Base. The test data we collect from our risk reduction work and
critical experiments will help guide decisions concerning focused
demonstrations in fiscal year 2005.
We are evaluating options for continuing SBL activity. The SBL
project involves technology development and risk reduction activities
in the key areas of laser output, beam control, and beam director
design to demonstrate feasibility of boost phase intercept by a high-
energy laser in space. These efforts leverage work started under
previous SBL-funded technology development programs.
Sensor Segment
Sensors developed in this segment will have multi-mission
capabilities intended to enhance detection of and provide critical
tracking information about ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request for RDT&E in this segment is $373
million, which represents an increase of $38 million over fiscal year
2002 funding. The MDA budget provides $3.9 billion for the sensor
segment during fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.

The Space Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low) element will
incorporate new technologies to enhance detection; improve reporting on
ballistic missile launches regardless of range or launch point; and
provide critical mid-course tracking and discrimination data for the
BMDS. When SBIRS-Low is integrated with other space-based infrared,
interceptor, and surface-based radar sensors, the BMD System will have
a capability to counter a broad array of midcourse countermeasures.
Moreover, SBIRS-Low will not carry many of the risks associated with
forward deployed ground-based sensors, which can be vulnerable to
attack and for which foreign basing rights must be negotiated.
Per direction in the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense
Appropriations Conference Report, plans for Satellite Sensor
Technology, including SBIRS-Low, will be provided to congressional
defense committees by May 15, 2002. The restructured SBIRS-Low activity
will support numerous risk reduction activities, including technology
maturation, ground simulations, and hardware-in-the-loop
demonstrations. Based on cost, schedule, capability, and threat
assessments, decisions will be made regarding production of a
demonstrated SBIRS-Low capability.
The international component of the Sensor Segment is the Russian-
American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) project. We are cooperating with
the Russian Federation in the area of early warning missile defense
technologies. RAMOS is an innovative U.S.-Russian space-based remote
sensor research and development initiative that engages Russian early
warning satellite developers in the joint definition and execution of
aircraft and space experiments.
The Russians continue to review the agreement to execute the RAMOS
project presented last July by the United States. Assuming agreement is
reached this summer, in fiscal year 2003 we will complete detailed
designs of the satellites and sensor payloads, begin fabrication and
assembly of U.S. sensors and ground support equipment, and continue
sensor software and modeling and simulation development. Launches of
the first and second RAMOS satellites are projected to occur in fiscal
year 2006.
Technology
The Technology effort will develop components, subsystems, and new
concepts based on high-risk, high-payoff approaches. The primary focus
of this effort is the development of sensors and weapons for future
improved missile defense platforms. Investments maintain a balance
between providing block upgrades to current acquisition programs and
developing the enabling technologies for radically new concepts.
Our budget for the Technology segment in fiscal year 2003 is $122
million (RDT&E), a reduction of $18 million from fiscal year 2002
enacted level. Funding from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007 is
projected to be about $697 million.

To enable the BMD System to pace the threat, the Advanced
Technology Development (ATD) effort is focused in four primary areas:
(1) Terminal Missile Defense, (2) Midcourse Counter-Countermeasures,
(3) Boost Phase Intercept, and (4) Global Defense. In addition to these
tasks, investments are made in a strong technology base to move beyond
the state-of-the-art in radars, infrared sensors, lasers, optics,
propulsion, wide-band-gap materials, photonic devices, and other
innovative concepts. The ATD office also works with the Systems
Engineer and other segments to ensure seamless transition of proven
advanced technology products into the BMD System.

SUMMARY

The BMD System will counter the full spectrum of ballistic missile
threats, capitalize on existing technologies and capabilities, and
foster innovation. It will incrementally incorporate capabilities
needed to detect, track, intercept, and destroy ballistic missiles in
all phases of flight using kinetic and directed energy kill mechanisms
and various deployment approaches. We have implemented a disciplined
and flexible acquisition strategy to provide a timely, capable system.
This approach protects against uncertainty by ensuring that the United
States will have the ability to defend itself, its deployed forces,
allies, and friends from a ballistic missile attack should the need
arise.
I believe the approach I have outlined here toward developing and
deploying missile defenses can meet the growing threat and provide for
the earliest possible fielding of effective defensive capabilities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Senator Reed. Thank you, General Kadish. Thank you,
Secretary Aldridge. We will have 6-minute rounds of questions
and if necessary conduct second and third rounds.
In your statement, General Kadish, you state that, instead
of developing a system in response to a clearly defined threat
from a known adversary, we are looking at missile capabilities
that any adversary could have in a given timeframe. Would that
include the potential to defeat a missile with several warheads
and with sophisticated countermeasures, such as the Russians
might have?
General Kadish. The basic thrust of this development
approach is not against those kinds of threats per se. It is
against what we have been referring to as rogue states, or
states of concern, but against the proliferation of missile
attack, and the accidental launch issue of the Russian and
Chinese arsenals is embedded in there, but the primary thrust
is against the proliferating states.
Senator Reed. I think this is stated rather broadly, any
adversary could have any capability at any given timeframe, and
we have at least the potential for much more sophisticated
missiles that you are preparing our counterdefense for, is that
correct?
General Kadish. That is correct.
Senator Reed. There is some issue about this capability
analysis in my mind. Basically, you define the threat, and you
are trying to design a system against that threat, and it is
not the comprehensive threat of any missile, it is the threat
of rogue nations. Isn't that fair?
General Kadish. Well, Senator, it is hard to distinguish.
At some point the basic missile technology is the same, and
whether it is sophisticated, with integrated countermeasures
and finely honed, machined warheads, or whether it is basically
crude missile construction presents us all sorts of different
problems, so eventually you have to assume that whoever the
adversary might be, they are going to have sophisticated
missiles.
Senator Reed. So you are designing a system today that will
counter the very sophisticated threats we know are possible to
deploy?
General Kadish. We are designing a system that will be
increasingly capable over time to handle threats that come up.
That does not mean we have a grand design against all threats
right out of the package, and that is the very essence of
capability-based approaches, that we can build what we can
against a reasonable threat projection and then build on it as
rapidly as possible.
Senator Reed. Let us turn now just to both you and
Secretary Aldridge. In the general outline of the budget last
year and the first year of the Bush administration, there was a
57 percent increase, almost $8 billion was provided, total, for
missile defense. This is a significant increase, and it raises
questions about how one can effectively spend that amount of
money in a short period of time. Again, in this budget you are
requesting about the same level of funding, and in following
budgets it looks like the same level. This could be an odd
funding profile for a major system that usually requires
different levels of funding as the system matures, and the
system tests out.
Secretary Aldridge, what can you accomplish at this level
of funding for the next several years?
Secretary Aldridge. First of all, this funding does not
include any deployment. The decision is made that this is an
R&D effort, that if the decision is made to deploy something,
to begin the production of some piece of equipment that would
be fielded, it would be moved to the appropriate Service who
would have that responsibility, just as we have done for PAC-3,
that is give it to the Army. You see the funds transferred
basically to the Army, even though General Kadish shows it as a
line item, because it was transferred.
So a normal acquisition program that, as it phases through
development and starts into production, you expect the budget
to increase, but because this is basically an R&D effort which
has been laid out for a variety of technologies for a variety
of missile ranges, level funding is not unexpected in the first
few years, as we put this program together, so it does not
follow the same characteristics as you would see under a normal
acquisition, where production is included in the cost
estimates.
Senator Reed. General Kadish, do you have a comment?
General Kadish. That is exactly right, and I would use an
analogy to show how we would spend within that $8 billion
allocation, and that would be, if you took an analogy of an
airplane, you have hydraulics, you have the landing gear, you
have avionics, wings, and the cost of those things varies over
time based on the development and maturity of the parts, and
that is how we are actually managing the program.
Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, you anticipated my next
question. There is no deployment money in this profile for the
next several years, and General Kadish in his statement was
talking about deploying a system over the next few years. Your
prepared statement is optimistic about our ability to deliver
effective missile defense capabilities over the next few years.
That raises a question of whether or not, within the 5-year
defense plan, you are considering whether you transfer to the
Services the cost of a deployed system, how much it might cost,
and where does the money come from?
Secretary Aldridge. You are correct, there are no
deployment dollars included in the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The reason is, we do not know what we are going to buy.
We do not know where to put the money, and whether it is going
to be an Army budget, an Air Force budget, or a Navy budget.
When we get to the point of making a decision to deploy, which
we will get into next week in looking at the management
structure, there is a board of directors that oversees the
activities of the Missile Defense Agency.
When a decision to deploy is made we will have to determine
where the funds come from for that deployment based upon what
it is we are going to deploy, but it really is impossible to
provide you with a realistic estimate at this point as to what
kind of money it would be, whether it is a ground-based, long-
range interceptor, a national system, whether it is an Aegis
sea-based, or whether we want to do more PAC-3s, or THAAD.
We have no estimate because we have not made that decision
yet, so we cannot tell you what something will cost if it
cannot be defined. When it is defined, we will have to come
forth and tell you what the budget will be for that purpose.
Senator Reed. My time has expired in this round.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. General Kadish, I thought your illustration
on the video was pretty remarkable. It looks to me as though
you have made some significant progress in this last year.
Based on your assessment of the BMD technology and your
understanding of current intelligence, how confident are you
that you can deliver a timely warfighting capability based upon
what you think are the possible threats out there? I do not
expect you to get into intelligence, but just based on what you
know.
General Kadish. I think the first substantiation of that is
our recommendation to procure the initial quantities of Patriot
3 that we started asking for last fiscal year and will continue
to ask for. We have enough confidence right now that for
deployed forces in whatever area, which we could actually
protect with a PAC-3, that we will have an effective defense
for theater ballistic missiles. That is the first step.
Then as we look at the various elements of the BMD System
that we hope to test and have confidence in, we will be
increasingly more capable over time against all ranges of
threats. At this point in time we have a situation where the
hit-to-kill technology I think is reaching the point where we
can judge it reliable enough to be effective. We then have to
judge the countermeasure systems that might be used against it
and put in counter-countermeasures to handle that. As we then
go over time I believe we can have an effective missile defense
against ranges of threats that we are concerned about, but
there are still many challenges ahead on that.
Senator Allard. Various critics, like the Union of
Concerned Scientists, have maintained that relatively
inexpensive countermeasures easily acquired or developed by
rogue nations can defeat the BMD Systems you are trying to
field. You refer to that in the latter part of your comments.
Would you please describe the efforts you put into place to
judge likely countermeasures, assess their effectiveness, and
develop possible countermeasures against that, and who heads
this effort?
General Kadish. We have spent a great deal of time talking
internally about and deciding how to manage this countermeasure
issue. I guess the best way to describe it is that we have a
group of people that retired Gen. Larry Welch is heading up for
us whom we call the red, white, and blue team, for lack of a
better term, where the red team conjures up countermeasures,
the blue team responds with the potential counter-
countermeasures, and the white team referees any testing that
we do along those lines.
Now, we have not fully implemented all the different facets
of that approach, but we are well on our way. In fact, we have
some money in the budget allocated for that effort this year,
so given the threat documents that we have, the intelligence
that we have, and the effort by this group and internal to the
agency itself with our contractors, I believe we will have a
very good handle on the countermeasures problem, but again, you
are never certain about something like that. This is a game
that is played in every military system, but I believe that we
will not be in a situation, especially with layered defenses,
where we will be easily defeated by simple countermeasures.
Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge, I have no doubt some
missile defense technology efforts will run into unexpected
challenges on occasion, and it seems apparent to me that you
intend to exercise close scrutiny over the MDA program elements
and technology development. You have been a stern judge of some
of these efforts already, including the Navy Area defense and
SBIRS-Low. Yet some of our colleagues express a continuing
concern that the various offices of acquisitions, technology,
and logistics will be cut out of MDA program oversight, and I
have a couple of questions in that regard. Can you assure us
that the MDA efforts will get sufficient independent review
from your offices?
Secretary Aldridge. Absolutely. As we will discuss in great
detail next week, we have a process in place to continue to
provide that oversight responsibility both to the Office of
Secretary of Defense, through the Senior Executive Council,
which will be the board of directors, as well as independent
advice to General Kadish that will provide him the viewpoints
of the various offices within OSD.
You can be assured that I have a personal stake in this
matter. General Kadish can attest to the fact that I get
heavily involved in two major programs, both Navy Area and
SBIRS-Low, which you have mentioned. I do not think there is
any doubt in their mind that OSD has sufficient oversight of
those programs.
Senator Allard. What formal mechanisms do you have in place
to find out about program problems after a decision has been
made to move a project to a Service for procurement?
Secretary Aldridge. When it goes into the normal
procurement process, it will go into our normal defense
acquisition system. There will be a Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB). Once a decision is passed for deployment, which we would
call milestone C, the normal process will occur, just like it
does in any other weapons system. When it transitions from R&D,
which General Kadish will perform in his Missile Defense
Agency, if the decision is made to deploy, we will select the
Service.
There will be a transition period in which the Service will
become involved, but then it will be in the normal process.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kadish and Secretary Aldridge, on February 16,
2002, The Washington Post carried an article titled: ``Rumsfeld
Pares Oversight of Mission Defense Agency.'' Are you familiar
with that article, Mr. Secretary?
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I have heard about it.
Senator Byrd. The gist of the article was that the Pentagon
will not hold national missile defense programs to the same
reporting and oversight standards as other major weapons
systems. Secretary Aldridge, what is so important about
national missile defense technology that exempts it from the
same kind of rigorous review that is expected of other weapons
systems?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, Senator Byrd. That article is
wrong. We have a process in place through which the OSD will
provide oversight. Again, we are getting into next week's
issues, but let me go ahead. There is a Senior Executive
Council that is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the three Service Secretaries, and
myself. They will act as a board of directors for any decision
that is made regarding deployment and the stopping or starting
of any program within missile defense.
In addition to that, we created a Missile Defense Support
Group (MDSG), which consists of all the OSD offices that have
any degree of oversight over the Missile Defense Agency or its
budget. It is also supported by a Missile Defense Working
Group, which has the key technical analysis of all the
organizations, including the Services, out of which the MDSG
reports directly to me. It has a function to supply input into
the Missile Defense Agency to General Kadish. It is also the
body which will provide input to the Senior Executive Council
when they make decisions regarding the deployment of missile
defense.
Once the R&D program is over, any program in missile
defense that goes to a Service will go into the normal
acquisition system, as any other weapons system in the
Department of Defense. It will act the same way, so there is no
credibility to the article that we are losing oversight to the
Missile Defense Agency.
Senator Byrd. Will Congress continue to receive cost
estimates, testing goals, and other important information about
missile defense programs with respect to national missile
defense technology?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Last year, the Defense Authorization Act
included a provision that requires the Department of Defense to
report to Congress on annual program goals for national missile
defense research. It may be that this information is buried in
the thousands of pages in budget documentation that the
Pentagon has given to Congress, but I do not know of any clear,
concise report of that information.
Mr. Secretary, has the Department complied with the
provisions of law that require the Department to give this
information to Congress?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I will let General Kadish
answer that question.
General Kadish. Senator Byrd, we believe we have and will
continue to. We have submitted many hundreds and thousands of
pages of support documentation, and I have gone through, I
think, 25 or more hours of briefings of the personal and
professional staff members, and I am hoping through that
process we have answered not only the intent but the letter of
the request of Congress last year. If that is not the case,
then we need to go back and make sure that we do.
Senator Byrd. Do you plan to give Congress briefings or
supply a clear report of the annual program goals for missile
defense programs?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Secretary Aldridge, you just said that
missile defense programs will receive rigorous independent
review. My concern is that Congress has access to this critical
information in a timely manner. Can this information be
supplied, and will it be supplied, to Congress so that it can
act in a timely manner?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Last year, you canceled the Navy Area
program, but for months the Pentagon claimed that this program
was a success. Why did it take so long to tell Congress that
you were wrong, and that the program was a failure? Is this the
sort of independent review we can expect?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir. We did notify Congress--the
Nunn-McCurdy Act has a requirement that we live by. We did
notify Congress of a cost breach of over 25 percent. I think it
was at the normal time when we have to notify Congress.
There is a period of time which elapses for us to have to
recertify the continuation of that program. In the process of
working through to get the details of the recertification
process, we found that the costs were increasing beyond the 25
percent threshold that we were required to notify Congress of
ahead of time. That deadline for certification ran out on
December 13, 2001.
The Secretary of Defense has delegated to me the
authorization to recertify if we believe the program should
continue. At that point I have to make certification on four
criteria. First, is this program in the Nation's interest.
Second, there is no other alternative to the program. Third,
that the costs are under control. Fourth, the management system
is in place to keep the costs under control.
From the time we notified Congress of the time when I had
to make the certification, the cost estimates had grown from
roughly 25 percent to over 70 percent. I could not sign a
letter that said I believe these costs were under control, and
by law the funding must terminate. That is an indication of the
kind of oversight we will continue to have for missile defense,
but it was clear that we could not continue the program under
the conditions that the law has dictated to us.
Senator Byrd. So Congress is and will be apprised of the
results as stage to stage is reached, and the final result,
what the money is for.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. The process we have in place
will clearly provide Congress with the information they need to
carry out your duties.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired.
May I ask another question?
Senator Reed. Yes, Senator, please.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Allard.
Mr. Secretary, do you believe that providing this
information to Congress constitutes an incumbrance, or
constitutes an excessive burden on the Missile Defense Agency?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir.
Senator Byrd. Categorically, are you saying no?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Byrd, would you like my time?
I would yield to Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Senator. That is very kind of
you. I am quite willing to stay and take my turn again.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead.
Senator Byrd. In the past, the GAO has had trouble getting
documents about missile defense programs in a timely manner--
and excuse my voice. I do not have the voice I had when I was
21.
Senator Bill Nelson. But you have a lot more power than
when you were 21. [Laughter.]
Senator Byrd. Which was a long time ago.
The GAO has reported that it took as long as 4 months for
the Department of Defense to fulfill some of the document
requests. These delays hinder efforts to expose the inner
workings of the Pentagon to even a small bit of daylight.
General Kadish, what measures have been taken to make sure that
the General Accounting Office has access to the information it
needs to complete its reports?
General Kadish. Senator, we have a process that we use for
all kinds of information exchange, either with the GAO or any
agency, and we try to do it as expeditiously as possible. That
process is a continuing effort, and we make, in my view, a good
faith effort to get those documents out.
The bureaucracy, however, does turn at its own rate, and we
try to expedite it as much as possible. There are many people
who get involved in that type of delivery mechanism throughout
the Department of Defense.
Senator Byrd. The General Accounting Office is an arm of
Congress. You recognize that?
General Kadish. Yes, Senator.
Senator Byrd. So when the GAO requests information, it is
Congress that is requesting the information. That is
understood, is it not?
General Kadish. Yes, sir, and we have long-established
procedures for dealing with that, and we follow them as
religiously as possible.
Senator Byrd. But my question is, does the Department
recognize that the General Accounting Office is an arm of
Congress, and when the Comptroller General asks for information
that is helpful to Congress in its conduct of the oversight of
these programs and the appropriations therefore, is it not
recognized that this request from GAO is in essence a request
from Congress?
Secretary Aldridge. Senator, let me answer that for the
Department of Defense. The answer is, absolutely. We have a
very good relationship with David Walker and GAO. I was with
him all morning on a panel that we both sit on, and it is clear
that the GAO is an arm of Congress and provides information to
you just like any other agency would.
Senator Byrd. Very well. I have one more question.
General Kadish and Mr. Secretary, would you provide the GAO
with the information it needs in a timely and complete manner?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, do I have any of my 6
minutes left?
Senator Reed. You have 1 minute.
Senator Bill Nelson. In that 1 minute, could you explain to
us what happened to the old space-based system? Mr. Secretary,
we were going to develop a space-based missile defense system.
Whatever happened to that, and how does that compare with this?
Secretary Aldridge. The program that General Kadish has
outlined has a part of it called the boost-phase intercept, and
parts of the technology he is looking at are space-based
elements either kinetic kill vehicles or Space-Based Lasers and
things of that nature. That is a little further out in time,
but it is an element of his program.
Senator Bill Nelson. But that was not what you were testing
here?
General Kadish. That is correct. The tests that I showed
you here were ground-based and sea-based intercept attempts. As
we get further down in our program execution, starting
basically in 2003 and out, we will be doing increasingly more
experiments in the space arena.
Secretary Aldridge. But the hit-to-kill technology, even
though it is on an interceptor going up, is not very much
different than an interceptor coming down. It is the same
technology, and the progress that is being made in hit-to-kill
technology has a wide application across boost, midcourse, and
terminal phases.
Senator Reed. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Byrd had
expressed his interest in the Navy Area defense, and I want to
express my interest in SBIRS-Low, both of which I mentioned
earlier. I want to pose this question to both General Kadish
and Secretary Aldridge.
SBIRS-Low ran into some heavy political opposition in
Congress last year, and some opponents questioned both the
technology and the requirements of the program.
First of all, I would like to know whether you are both
supporting SBIRS-Low or not, and what are the continuing needs
for the capability that would be provided by SBIRS-Low?
Secretary Aldridge. First, Senator, I clearly support
SBIRS-Low. It is quite disappointing that we had to take the
action that we did take on the program. It is going to be an
essential part of the future missile defense capability, and
unfortunately it ran into some problems such that I could not
come forth and tell you honestly that we could deliver the
weapon or the spacecraft on the schedule that was provided at
the cost that we were given.
Again, that is what I am paid the big bucks for, to make a
decision on these kinds of programs. It was clear that program
was unexecutable with the cost and schedule that was being
developed, and therefore I had to make a decision that we were
going to restructure the program so that when we do come back
to Congress with a program for SBIRS-Low, it is one that I can
tell you honestly we can deliver on schedule, with the
performance, on the cost that we tell you it is. I could not do
that with the SBIRS-Low program that was being developed.
The money that was provided for in fiscal year 2002 was
reduced in conference, and we are using those dollars to
restructure the program. General Kadish has been requested to
come back to me with a restructured program, I think in a month
or so, so that we can determine where we go at this point in
time and what kind of program is going to be viable, but we
have to have something like this program to make our missile
defense program viable.
Senator Allard. General Kadish?
General Kadish. I would endorse exactly what Secretary
Aldridge said in terms of the support of SBIRS-Low. I think we
need a space sensor in order to bring along the effectiveness
of all the missile defense elements, and we are attempting now
to restructure the SBIRS-Low program to meet those requirements
as best we know how and to orient it to a capabilities-based
approach.
One major debate that will go on, I think, for some time is
whether we need a space-based sensor, or can we do it with
radars alone on the ground or at sea. I think at this point the
evidence and the studies that I have seen are not compelling
enough to make such a stark choice, certainly at this time, and
the belief I have currently is that we are going to need to
have both radar and space-based sensors to do this job
effectively, we still have a lot of work to do, but in the
meantime, SBIRS-Low is a critical space-based element of our
sensor suite.
Senator Allard. General Kadish, you mentioned other systems
that may provide some of the capability we have in SBIRS-Low,
but are we moving ahead with those systems, or are we pretty
much focusing on SBIRS-Low?
General Kadish. We are moving ahead with both. The problem
we have with terrestrial-based sensors is geography. They have
to be in the right spot. The advantage of space is that we have
the ability to have a wide-ranging view of our threats base.
Senator Allard. The thought is that it is probably not to
our advantage to have those kinds of facilities where you would
have to ask permission in other foreign countries for those
facilities.
General Kadish. The unfortunate part of ground-based
systems is you cannot base them on U.S. territory and be
totally effective in missile defense.
Senator Allard. So you have a problem there, using it on
foreign soil?
General Kadish. Correct.
Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, you
are both probably aware that the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) was recently asked by Senators Levin, Conrad, and Daschle
to estimate the cost of several of the BMD Systems that could
protect the U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic missiles.
The Senators who requested this study estimated the cost of a
modest defense to our homeland at $150 billion. Can you comment
on the relevance of the CBO study and the specific systems it
analyzed?
General Kadish. Sir, if I might take that question, the CBO
study was well done for the assumptions that it made. The
problem is, the assumptions on which it was based could
potentially give an inaccurate picture of what any of these
systems might cost. The definition of life cycle, the
definition of the systems that were actually in that report at
this point in time, do not bear a resemblance to anything we
are working on in detail, so the art of cost estimating could
get a little bit out of whack from that standpoint.
It is useful information for illustrative purposes, but we
do not have a force structure defined well enough to tell you,
as Secretary Aldridge pointed out earlier, exactly what these
things are going to cost at this point in time. As we define
our production and deployment efforts, we will have those cost
estimates, and at that time I think we should have that debate.
Senator Allard. So valid assumptions are important and,
based upon that, you do not believe the $150 billion estimate
is valid?
General Kadish. There are a lot of problems with that
estimate, and we are not building those configurations, so I do
not think it is valid.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. As I understand both of you, you
subscribe to the doctrine that you cannot deploy something that
has not been developed, and as I understand both of you, you
are saying that the matter of deployment is something that you
will come to Congress to get the appropriations for?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is it, then, about the R&D
program that in your mind caused a violation of the ABM Treaty
that thus required a withdrawal from the treaty?
Secretary Aldridge. Let me start, and General Kadish can
maybe come in on this.
When the President asked us, General Kadish and the
Department, to develop a missile defense program, it was under
the assumption that program would proceed without the
constraint of an ABM Treaty. We were heading toward developing
the most effective missile defense system we could build with
the resources made available to us.
As that program was proceeding, we were running into
constraints of the treaty that were prohibiting us from making
progress in the R&D phase, such as, we were trying to use the
Aegis radar to track some targets and some interceptors, which
was clearly a violation of the ABM Treaty. We were trying to
get data, data that would help us in looking for midcourse
capabilities, for radar technology that would help us in the
future. In fact, we did, we eliminated certain aspects of those
tests because we were living under the ABM Treaty, and the
decision was made to do so, but as you continue to proceed
developing a wider range of testing, more capability, it was
clear we were losing ground relative to getting more and more
data that would give us the confidence to proceed because of
the ABM Treaty.
In addition to that, if there was a need to deploy for some
emergency reasons, which we are looking for, like the 2004
timeframe, it was relatively clear that if we started to deploy
a national system there would be arguments that that was a
violation of the ABM Treaty, so we were restricting the
President's options. I think the combination of restricting his
options and prohibiting us to do a thorough testing program, a
judgment call was made that the strategic situation has changed
sufficiently that missile defense is the right way to go, given
the other strategic conditions, such as nuclear warheads and so
forth, that the President made the decision to withdraw from
the treaty. We are still living by the treaty up until June 13,
and we are still having to restrict the number of tests.
Senator Bill Nelson. So there is not a part of your testing
right now that you consider a violation of the treaty?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, we are not violating the
treaty.
Senator Bill Nelson. You mentioned the Aegis system. Is
testing on that in the future going to violate the treaty?
Secretary Aldridge. If you use the Aegis radar as a ship-
based missile defense system for national purposes, that was a
violation of the ABM Treaty, and I do not remember the article.
I think it is Article VII which says you cannot test mobile ABM
systems.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, given the delicacy of the
situation with the Russians, there is a joint program that you
requested money for, RAMOS. Have the Russians given any
indication that they intend to continue the program since your
announcement to withdraw from the ABM Treaty?
Secretary Aldridge. I have not talked with them. Maybe
General Kadish can answer that.
General Kadish. We have been in discussions with the
Russians over the RAMOS program activity, as well as other
cooperative efforts, to some degree, and at this point in time
I cannot tell you what their final decision is going to be in
terms of participating. We have been at this I think almost 7
years, trying to get this particular effort off the ground with
the Russians. At some point here in the next 6 to 8 months, I
would expect we are going to have to make some major decisions
on that program, but right now we are still in discussions, and
things are proceeding and we are waiting for a final go-ahead
from the Russian Government.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is a program of small satellites,
so that you have a canopy up there that would detect through
infrared any kind of missile launches?
General Kadish. It is an experimental set of satellites to
do what you describe, so it is not a constellation. It is two
satellites to experiment in technically interesting
wavelengths.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would we go it alone, without the
Russians, if they pull out?
General Kadish. My recommendation to the Secretary would be
no.
Senator Bill Nelson. Why is that?
General Kadish. We have some mutual benefit out of the
program, but when I look at the scheme of things there are
other ways we could accomplish that if we had a unilateral
approach.
Senator Bill Nelson. As I understand it you are going to
have a hearing on this next week.
Senator Reed. I am, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. A continuation of this?
Senator Reed. A continuation, but more a focus on program
management.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have to run to a meeting with
Senator Graham right now, and I will save questions for next
week. I would like to get into it. I happen to think Secretary
Aldridge is about one of the best appointments in this
administration, and I think that he has a great deal of wisdom
and experience, and I want to poke and probe it a little
further.
Secretary Aldridge. As you have done many times before.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Also, thank you
for your graciousness in yielding to Senator Byrd.
Secretary Aldridge, just for the sake of clarification, I
know we are going to get into program management in the next
hearing, but in a dialogue between Senator Byrd and yourself,
you pointed out that Navy Area was canceled as a result of
Nunn-McCurdy. Would Nunn-McCurdy apply to this new review by
the Senior Executive Council? Would you feel compelled to apply
that there?
Secretary Aldridge. The Nunn-McCurdy applies to programs,
and we would like, if we got into SBIRS-Low, for example, as
part of the missile defense program, Nunn-McCurdy would apply
to that. If it is just an R&D program without development, or
deployment, I think it would not apply. I would have to go back
and look at the language, but I think it only gets into
programs when we have procurement.
Senator Reed. As you stated today, everything you proposed
in this $8 billion budget is RDT&E, it is not deployment, so
effectively with regard to Nunn-McCurdy, which has proven
useful at least in one circumstance, if not several, you are
not only forcing a decision but also making a tough decision
about a program that would no longer be operative.
Secretary Aldridge. I think that is true, but again, I do
not know. I cannot recall the details of Nunn-McCurdy in this
particular instance with the Navy Area, which we had, in fact,
started into a deployment mode. It did apply, but I do not know
exactly what the degree of threshold would be for R&D.
Senator Reed. We will give you an opportunity in the next
hearing.
Secretary Aldridge. I will check into that beforehand.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another question along the lines
of deployment and RDT&E. General Kadish, you have spoken a
number of times about a possible contingency deployment at Fort
Greeley, Alaska, of five prototype test missiles in conjunction
with the Cobra-Dane intelligence radar. In your view, is that
an RDT&E which you could do now if sufficient resources were
appropriated this year?
General Kadish. That is a part of the test bed that we
talked about during last year's hearings and discussions as
well as this year. The primary use of those assets would be a
part of this test bed, which would be both ground-based test
activity and used in flight tests, depending on how we actually
do it. The contingency capability that I have talked about is a
decision yet to be made, whether or not we would activate that
capability.
Senator Reed. But you would put in place five missiles at
Fort Greeley?
General Kadish. That is correct.
Senator Reed. Is the Cobra-Dane radar a pilot test bed?
General Kadish. Plus many other things.
Senator Reed. Is it a part of research and development?
Would you at some point say, is it now contingently
operational?
General Kadish. If it is judged effective enough for what
we think it could be used for, and the Secretary judges it to
be so.
Senator Reed. I understand that, and please correct me if I
am wrong, you cannot actually launch the missiles from Fort
Greely, since the debris from the missiles could fall on
populated areas.
General Kadish. Initially, we have not specified that we
would launch from Fort Greely. We have environmental
regulations and rules that we have to evaluate before we would
make such a decision. I would not, however, rule out that
capability. In fact, it would be very desirable we do that type
of thing now, even in the continental United States, at the
White Sands Missile Range, where we could actually move people
off of the endangered area of the range to do the missile test.
We have some environmental restrictions, and we will go through
those in a very disciplined way to make those types of
decisions should we decide it is in our best interest to do
that.
Senator Reed. But you have already decided, I presume, to
put the Test Bed up at Fort Greely, even though there is a
question whether or not the missiles can be fired?
General Kadish. That is correct, because the value of the
Test Bed should not be underestimated from the physical
location of those assets where we might be using them in an
operational mode. We have taken some heavy criticism about not
being operationally representative in the phasing of our
testing, not just flight testing, i.e., having the actual
infrastructure hooked up with the communications links, the
computer systems, and those types of things. Just as we build
prototype F-15s and ships and tanks, we want to do the same for
missile defense.
Senator Reed. One other question with respect to Fort
Greely. I also understand that because of geometric
considerations you will not have an ICBM-class target with
which to test the Fort Greely missiles and Cobra-Dane radar,
even if you could launch from Fort Greely.
General Kadish. We are still looking at the target
situation. We have a long-range, air-launched target under
development. We have not fully defined what that requirement is
going to be. It would certainly not be in place for the 2004
timeframe, but we have some decisions to make for the outyears
as we go into further testing.
Senator Reed. But just to conclude, there is a possibility
that you could declare a contingent deployment by 2004, even
though there is a question whether the missiles can actually be
fired from that location, and you have not yet defined a target
missile to test against and are unlikely to do so before 2004.
General Kadish. I think embedded in that statement are a
number of incorrect assumptions. First of all, we will continue
our testing out of Kwajalein and Vandenberg and other areas
aggressively over the next few years. That gives us confidence
that no matter where we launch the interceptor from, it will be
effective against the target that we are aiming at, and
therefore, having the missiles in the Test Bed, should we judge
them effective enough through that other testing, it does not
matter whether we have fired them out of that location,
although we would like to.
I will point out that our strategic missile offensive force
has not, to the best of my knowledge, been fired out of the
locations they have been deployed at in the United States. It
is the same issue.
Senator Reed. Let me reserve some additional questions for
a third round. I recognize Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
apologize, Mr. Chairman, for not being here for the entire
hearing. We had two amendments on the floor that we were busy
with.
I do not know what has been asked, but I have worked with
both of you before and, quite frankly, it is a relief that we
are where we are today, and where I think we should have been
several years ago. I am sure you have discussed the options of
sea-based and land-based missile defense.
Most of us who have been pushing for this for a long time
have come to the conclusion that we need to do something with
the Aegis investment we have right now, given the high tier
capability, in terms of the flexibility, and also capitalizing
on an investment that has already been made with the Aegis
system.
Where are you on that particular system right now? What are
your thoughts for the future?
General Kadish. Senator Inhofe, I was very pleased to have
in my opening statement a video showing our first intercept of
the Aegis Leap Intercept (ALI) program, and that was a very
exciting event for a lot of us who have been laboring in this
program for sometime. I expect that we will have our challenges
technically with that, but it is a key part of our program
because of the mobility that Aegis provides, as well as the
capability.
Senator Inhofe. About how many ships would you be wanting
to get to become capable with this?
General Kadish. Senator, I am unable to answer that
question now because we will have to make some judgments when
the testing gets a little further along and how effective is it
versus the threats we are going after, and then provide
recommendations to the Secretary as to the force structure.
Senator Inhofe. When you think about the changing threat
that is out there, last time we had a meeting like this we
would never have thought that we would be in Afghanistan today,
and when you think about the flexibility and the places that it
can be put, that is something that I think is the most flexible
for these threats that we cannot anticipate.
Now, it is my understanding that in terms of the ABM Treaty
we are going to be able to go ahead and not worry about that
after about July or August. What is the timeframe?
Secretary Aldridge. I believe it is June 13.
Senator Inhofe. There are several of us who have felt for
quite a number of years that this is something, a step that
should have been taken a long time ago, and it is interesting
because even the architect of the ABM Treaty of 1972, Henry
Kissinger, has said that it is insane to make a virtue out of
your vulnerability, which is exactly what we have done.
Secretary Aldridge. Senator, I was part of the negotiating
team 32 years ago.
Senator Inhofe. I knew that you were. Let me ask you this,
then. Do you agree?
Secretary Aldridge. It sounded like a good idea at the
time. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I hate to tell you this, Mr. Secretary, I
did not think it was a good idea at the time, but certainly
with two superpowers, and with the environment we were in
there, it was certainly a good argument. Are you pretty much in
agreement now with Henry Kissinger and his new view?
Secretary Aldridge. Sir, I support the President very
strongly on this one.
Senator Inhofe. There are a lot of others that came forth,
Condoleezza Rice and others, who were very forceful in thinking
sooner or later we are going to have to put that relic to bed
and start defending America.
One of the problems I have had over the last few years is
how bad our intelligence has been in determining when countries
are going to have this capability. I remember the August 1998
inquiry we made. We asked General Shelton, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, how long it would be until North Korea
would be able to accomplish a multiple-stage rocket, and the
response we received was, it is going to be somewhere between 5
and 10 years, and then 7 days later, one was fired from North
Korea.
Then I recall the NIE of 1995, when they said how many
years it was going to be, but then they put the word indigenous
in, and I always felt that does not make any difference. If
Iraq has the capability of a missile that will reach the United
States of America, whether it is indigenous or not does not
make any difference to me. It still does the same damage. Are
you satisfied that since we have progressed to the point where
we are now, that you are going to be able to move forward, and
that there are not any other obstacles, major obstacles in the
way, as the ABM Treaty was, for quite a while?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. Well, obviously we still have
to live with the treaty through June 13. There are certain
things we cannot do during the testing process, but at that
point in time I do not anticipate we will have any difficulty
doing the tests we need to do to prove the system.
Senator Inhofe. I am very proud of all of you who had the
fortitude to stay with it. I am satisfied with where we are
today. Thank you very much.
One other question on the budget, and I think that is what
we should be talking about today. Are you having serious
problems in getting the budget that is necessary to reach our
deployment when we want to?
Secretary Aldridge. So far we have not heard of any major
cuts in the request that the President has made. That does not
preclude that happening as we go down through these hearings,
but so far I guess I have not heard of anything at this point.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Kadish and Secretary Aldridge, Senator Byrd raised
questions of compliance with informational requirements to
Congress, and in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, one of the important requirements was the one to include
total life cycle cost for each missile defense program that
enters the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)
phase. This is section 232 of the act.
I understand the THAAD missile defense program is in the
EMD phase, yet its life cycle cost estimate was not provided to
Congress. Can you explain why those costs were not given to us?
General Kadish. Senator, I would like to take that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The life cycle reporting requirement of Sec. 232(d)(2)(A) calls for
life-cost information on Missile Defense programs that enter EMD or the
equivalent phase. Under the new acquisition management strategy for
Ballistic Missile Defense System elements, life cycle costs will be
developed to support the decision process to move a block configuration
of an element into production and operations. The old EMD phase for
THAAD was cancelled. Life cycle costs for a block configuration of
THAAD will be developed at the appropriate time as part of the decision
to procure a quantity of that configuration and these costs wil be
provided to Congress accordingly.

General Kadish. There are some technicalities here. We
certainly want to follow the letter as well as the spirit of
the law, but right now the way the program is constructed we
have nothing technically in engineering and manufacturing
development. It is all in R&D, so THAAD is no different in
technical terms from SBIRS-Low or Aegis Leap Intercept.
However, that may be a distinction without a difference for the
intent of the question, so I would like to make sure we go back
and answer what we really can do along those lines.
However, I will say this. No matter what answer we give you
from an overall perspective, the force structure that we will
buy as a basis for that life cycle cost estimate is not
settled. We originally had an inventory objective of 1,200
missiles. As Secretary Aldridge pointed out, that may or may
not be the right quantity based upon where we think we are
going to go with that particular element of the program, so
since life cycle costs are inherently based on things like the
quantities you are going to buy, how many of them, where you
are going to put them and so forth, we may have a situation
where we cannot accurately give you those costs at this point
in time.
Senator Reed. Is it your contention that THAAD is not in
any part in the EMD phase?
General Kadish. Again, that may be a distinction without a
difference. It is certainly in the development phase, and what
we would like to do is supply you the cost numbers that will
get at the spirit as well as the intent of the question, but we
have severe limitations in telling you what the life cycle cost
is over 20 years, when we do not have a basically agreed-to
force structure like how many missiles we are going to buy, and
so that is going to be a problem. We could probably tell you
what the first missile is going to cost.
Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, you have done a lot of
research and development and bringing products to the field. Is
it difficult to calculate life cycle costs for a system, even
though you might not know how many F-22s you are going to buy,
or how many of anything you are going to buy?
Secretary Aldridge. Normally when we enter what used to be
called EMD, which is now called system development and
demonstration (SDD), we have a program that is usually laid
out, as we have for Joint Strike Fighters. When we entered the
SDD just last October, we have an inventory objective set up
and we can tell you, we have a schedule, we have a production
schedule, we know how many we are going to build, and we can
tell you what the life cycle cost is going to be.
There has been no decision, a Milestone B Decision, to
enter SDD for THAAD. We have not made a decision on that. We
have not made an inventory, so I cannot tell you what the life
cycle cost is going to be without an inventory objective. As
soon as we get there, we will. There is no attempt to try to
not comply with Congress on this, but we have no objective in
mind.
We do have an inventory objective for PAC-3. We have an
inventory objective of 2,200 missiles. We can lay out a life
cycle cost for that, but I think THAAD is in this gray area and
we have not made a decision on how many we are going to build,
when we are going to build it and so forth, so it is hard to do
that. But when we do, when we get to that point, there is no
doubt that we can give you a life cycle cost.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another question about the
overall budget, and that is, you have proposed to fund the BMD
System element at over $1 billion for this year, fiscal year
2003, and this element provides integration of the individual
ballistic missile defense elements, but the design and
architecture of these individual ballistic missile defense
elements is not yet known. I think the testimony this afternoon
reflects that. In response to practically every question we
have raised you said we just do not know yet, we do not know
what it is going to look like, and yet you are asking for $1
billion to integrate elements which you have not committed to
do yet, roughly one-seventh of the total request. What is your
rationale?
General Kadish. The rationale is quite simple. We have to
fund the infrastructure to do that thinking and development
effort to give ourselves those answers, so those particular
funds buy an awful lot of the infrastructure that underlies our
elements, including the integration engineering that answers
the very questions you are posing.
Senator Reed. But $1 billion? We are not talking about
infrastructure in terms of the hardware, the missiles
necessarily.
General Kadish. No, but we are talking about test
infrastructure that is common for a lot of our elements. We are
talking about system-wide tests that we get data for that are
applicable to our elements. We are talking about the
engineering required for us to develop the specifications for
the integration and interoperability, and so there was an awful
lot of work that underlies the other element activities if we
are going to achieve the vision of a BMD System against all
threats.
Senator Reed. When you talk about what the common Test Beds
for the elements are, one would presume you know what your
elements are, not perhaps fully defined, but to integrate
something I think you have to have something to begin with, and
a lot of your responses today are, we have not decided yet. We
do not know. It could look like this.
General Kadish. Again, I think the assumption you are
making that we do not know what we have so we cannot integrate
it, or we do not know what we should integrate if we do not
have it, is incorrect because it is a multifaceted problem. We
have a situation where we will specify integration requirements
that elements have to adhere to as well as taking where they
are and integrating them with the basic specifications they are
already working under, and so it is a mixed bag of things that
have to be done, and we need the best talent we can find to do
that, because it is very complicated.
Senator Reed. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on the Chairman's excitement over this program, I
think I have to ask this question. If Congress were to give you
more dollars, could you spend them?
General Kadish. Yes, sir, I could.
Senator Allard. I guess the bottom line in missile defense
is do you have some unfunded requests?
General Kadish. We have tried to strike a balance to do all
the things that we think we need to do to bring this
development program in. There will always be unfunded
requirements of different parts of the structure because time
passes and we learn more about it, and we may have missed the
mark on certain levels of funding for certain things. It is a
continuous process of adjustment, so I do not think you would
find the answers different from any program brought before you.
If you asked, are there unfunded requirements, the answer would
be yes, but we think we have the priorities set correctly.
Senator Allard. Can you provide me at least with some of
those unfunded requests, prioritized?
General Kadish. Certainly, Senator. We can do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

We have tried to strike a balance to do all the things that we
think we really need to do to bring this program in and we think we
have the priorities set correctly. However, in balancing what we can
do, invariably there are activities where we could use additional
resources. In addition, conditions change as time passes and we find
that there are opportunities we were not fully aware of at the time of
the President's budget request that could use budget-year resources.
Based on our current view of potential unfunded requirements, we show
potential funding shortfalls in SBIRS-Low for $50 million.

Secretary Aldridge. Can I just make one point here? There
is a funding profile that is laid into the budget, and as we
have talked about the various boost phase, midcourse, terminal
phase, and the ranges of missiles we have to defend against,
there are multiple technologies that are associated with each
of those elements, and some of those technologies are going to
work, and some are not.
When we got the Navy Area, there was some funding that was
reduced. We reallocated some of that funding back to other
priorities. That will happen in the budget as we go forth, and
then it may be we get to the point of deployment, one of the
technologies is not working, there are funds available to maybe
reallocate to the deployment from the missile defense budget.
It may not have all of it, but I think we have to anticipate,
as we go over with time, these funding profiles will change as
programs succeed and some fail.
The way we have laid out the program, we should expect some
of those to happen. We should expect some failures, we should
expect some high successes, and when we do, we reallocate that
funding, and so to say that there is a program profile that
starts in fiscal year 2003 and goes to fiscal year 2007, and
that is exactly what you are going to do, may not be the case.
It may be that something changes as time goes on, and we should
expect that.
Senator Allard. I appreciate candid remarks on that from
both of you, because I think that adds credibility as far as
your request before Congress.
Now, one thing I did want to clarify for the record, there
is the THAAD request. I understand that includes a request for
10 additional missiles, and for the record I just wanted to
clarify that these are test missiles, is that correct?
General Kadish. That is correct, Senator. We have a little
bit of confusion in this terminology between contingency and
test. The request is for test missiles for test purposes.
You will also see in the documentation that, even though
that is the primary use, we may use them all up in tests, but
if an emergency arises, a theme throughout the entire program
is that we may use our test assets for operational use, but
primarily they are test assets, and bought for that purpose.
Senator Allard. I want to move to a couple more questions,
and I think we will just wrap it up on my side, Mr. Chairman.
The ABL, I believe personally that the ABL is still a very
important effort, is that working out on the scheduling for
ABL?
General Kadish. Senator, we basically have gotten the
responsibility for ABL because it is so important to missile
defense purposes. In that process, as with any development
program, we took a hard look at what the schedule was, what
risks were involved, and we have adjusted the schedule with the
moneys required to handle that adjustment.
I think it is absolutely remarkable the progress that
program has made, with its very revolutionary technology, but
we have those struggles in the development program, and they
are complex, but I am very confident at this point we know as
much as we can know about the reasonableness of that schedule.
I have good confidence in our ability to estimate that.
Now, as time goes on, whether that schedule will actually
come to fruition is the trick in this business. I cannot
guarantee we are going to meet it, but we have the best handle
on it that we can have on it today. I have confidence we are on
track to meet it.
Senator Allard. So the plane is pretty close to flying, or
is it flying yet?
General Kadish. There are two parts of that flying
equation. The first part is the first flight of the aircraft
without the mission equipment operational. I think that will
occur hopefully in June, probably in July of this year, and
then the first shootdown, which would occur in the fall of
2004, if not earlier, should we have some successes in the
early testing, so that is what we are working on right now.
Senator Allard. On the Space-Based Laser (SBL), obviously I
was pleased, I mentioned earlier, with your demonstration, but
can you comment a little bit on the next generation as far as
the SBL? I know Senator Inhofe asked that question. Is there
further comment you want to make on that particular program?
General Kadish. We took a funding reduction in last year's
appropriation for the SBL experiment that we had ongoing in
2012, and that reduction was significant enough for us not to
be able to make that experiment work, so what we have done in
this budget is bring the SBL activities back down to
technologies that we are trying to put together to support
that, and we will be looking for the way ahead with the actual
experimentation here over the next year or so with Secretary
Aldridge, but no decisions have been made how to recover that
experiment yet.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Let me just pursue a few final
questions following up on Senator Allard's questions about the
Airborne Laser. You now hope, I believe, to test in 2005 a
laser on a prototype aircraft, is that correct?
General Kadish. No, that is not correct. I think we are
heading towards testing in calendar year 2004, the fall of
calendar year 2004, with a half-power laser, that is correct.
Senator Reed. When do you expect to have a full-power laser
capable of testing and deployment?
General Kadish. As soon as we can do it, Senator, but I
cannot give you a date right now. A lot will depend upon how
successful we are marching to that 2004 date with the half-
power laser. The achievement which that represents is rather
significant. Whether it is half-power or full-power is an issue
with the operational capability of the airplane, but the very
fact that we could achieve a shootdown of any magnitude with
that particular power laser is a major technical
accomplishment.
Senator Reed. With respect to Navy Theater-Wide, General
Kadish, there has been the need to develop radar for the
theater-wide system, and there has been a debate about the X-
Band radar and alternative radars. Are you committed to
developing an X-Band radar for the Navy theater-wide radar, or
now the sea-based midcourse system?
General Kadish. I do not believe I am committed to do
anything in terms of the selection of those radars at this
point in time. I think one of the things you have to understand
as we begin to look at the environment outside the treaty
constraints, is that one of the things we are looking very hard
at is the value of having autonomous radars, integrated into a
shooting system, if you will, and relying only on those radars.
The treaty will allow us to look at off-board cuing and
different types of configurations of sensors, so it throws a
different light on the selection that we might have with any
particular technology.
However, I will say this. We have had ongoing for many
years a development program with what we call S-Band radar
which is already on the Aegis cruiser, and then the X-Band,
that gives us better discrimination capability for missile
defense efforts, and we have to decide what to do about that.
We have funded the programs, I believe, in the 2003 budget
for continuation, but we have some big decisions. We would
recommend to Secretary Aldridge, probably in the next 6 to 8
months, in the 2004 deliberations on exactly which way we are
going to go.
Senator Reed. Last month, the Navy announced a contract
worth $420 million to develop an S-Band radar component for
sea-based midcourse defense. Why would the Navy be initiating
this contract rather than the Missile Defense Agency?
General Kadish. We still have components of our program
being managed by the different Services. What has changed in
the Missile Defense Agency management structure is that now we
have direct control of the programs through the Services, as
before they were reporting through different chains to the
Services using our dollars allocated by Congress.
So it is a different management structure, but you can
expect that the Services, where they are doing that work on our
behalf, will be letting the contracts. Some will be let out of
the Missile Defense Agency direct. Some will be done by the
Services.
Senator Reed. A final question. We have talked before about
countermeasures, and General Welch is leading your efforts on
the countermeasures. How much are you requesting this year in
terms of funding for research on countermeasures?
General Kadish. I would like to take that for the record,
but when you say research on countermeasures there are
different ways we can answer that question, and we will try to
do it for the record. If you are talking about dollars spent on
actually developing the countermeasures themselves to test
against, that is one number. If you are talking about the
additional dollars that we are spending to develop our systems
to deal with those countermeasures, that is a different number,
and a lot harder to segregate, because we do that altogether in
our development program, but it is a major part of our
development effort to deal with countermeasures.
[The information referred to follows:]

In the fiscal year 2003 President's budget, the Missile Defense
Agency's planned spending for countermeasure/counter-countermeasure
research and development is $219.967 million. The planned allocation of
the requested funds is:

$72.013 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1050 Advanced
Concepts
$60.279 million--PE 0603175C BMD Technology, 6010 Advanced
Technology Development
$30.000 million--PE 0603882C Midcourse Defense Segment, 3050
Common SE&I
$26.475 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1030 Targets and
Countermeasures
$30.000 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1060 Test and
Evaluation
$1.200 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1050 Intelligence

Secretary Aldridge. Just a comment. The concept that we
have applied for missile defense, which is looking for boost
phase, midcourse, and terminal phase by itself is a
countermeasure program, because it is very difficult for any
adversary to build countermeasures to deal with each one of
those phases. In the boost phase you do not have to worry about
warheads or decoys. You try to go after the booster. There is
very little they can do for countermeasures. During midcourse
phase there is a different set of circumstances. Terminal is
another set of circumstances.
So by the way we are designing the program--and of course
we are employing spiral development of the capability with
time--it has a natural countermeasure sense to the program that
I think is important for us to realize.
Senator Reed. Senator Allard, do you have any more
questions?
Senator Allard. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. If there are no further questions, we will
recess the hearing. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

NEED FOR FOREIGN-BASED RADARS

1. Senator Reed. General Kadish, during the hearing you stated that
foreign radars were necessary to provide for adequate missile defense
coverage if SBIRS-Low was not deployed. I understand, however, that a
recent Pentagon study showed that a combination of new and existing
radars, all based CONUS, would provide adequate coverage for a national
missile defense system. Could you please clarify why you asserted at
the hearing that foreign radars were necessary, given the results of
the recent study?
General Kadish. If the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-Low is
not deployed, a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system consisting of
non-U.S.-based radars is necessary to provide adequate coverage.
The referenced study is the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) SBIRS
study directed by the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The study
states that a Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) missile defense system is
effective against the less sophisticated threats that rogue nations
could pose in the near term. The study also states that in addition to
CONUS-based radars, non-U.S.-based radars would be needed to handle
more challenging threats.
Ground-based radar is inherently limited to line-of-sight,
restricting range and delaying acquisition of the threat target until
it rises above the radar horizon. The more time the BMDS has to
evaluate the target, the better discrimination and targeting will be.
Radars based overseas extend the horizon and the time available for
defenses to mitigate the impact of evolving adversary countermeasures.
An effective defense requires that threat missile complexes be observed
soon after the last rocket stage burns out. In the absence of SBIRS-
Low, only radars based beyond CONUS borders can do this.

PRESIDENTIAL ALLOCATION OF FUNDING

2. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, the Fiscal Year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act reduced the administration's 2002 ballistic
missile defense request by $1.3 billion, and then made that amount
available for combating terrorism or ballistic missile defense. The act
required the President to determine how to use the $1.3 billion, based
on the national security interests of the United States, and required
the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report describing the
Secretary's plan for use of the funds. Has the $1.3 billion been
allocated by the President, and if so, what is the status of the report
to Congress?
Secretary Aldridge. Congress chose not to appropriate funds in a
manner that would have required the allocation contemplated by Section
1010 of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act.
Therefore, the authorization has not been allocated.

PROCUREMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSES

3. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how early could we begin procuring
missile defense systems for deployment, and which systems might we buy?
General Kadish. This budget request contains funds for the Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC-3) production, so we have already begun the
process. We have not, however, completed our Block 2004 and 2006
definition and configuration that will provide the basis for any future
production decisions.
Based on continued testing success and capability assessments, we
could procure small quantities of the Theater High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), as well as a rudimentary ground- or sea-based
midcourse capability in 2005-2006.
The GMD test assets we are acquiring for use in the BMDS Test Bed
are just that, for testing, with the potential for contingency
employment. They are not operational systems for deployment.

FISCAL YEAR 2002 FYDP DATA

4. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, one of the principal ways we
use to understand a new budget is to compare it to the old one. For
programs such as missile defense with long development times, it is
critical to understand the budget for the outyears as well as for the
next year. To help our understanding, the Department of Defense
invariably presents last year's 5-year budget plan, or Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP), as it is called, along with this year's FYDP,
so comparisons can be made. I understand that this was, in fact, done
this year for virtually all defense programs except for MDA programs.
Could you please provide last year's FYDP for all MDA programs and
projects to help us complete our review of the fiscal year 2003 budget
submission?
Secretary Aldridge. The Fiscal Year 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO) budget was originally prepared and submitted by the
previous administration for $4.5 billion. The current administration
revised the fiscal year 2002 ballistic missile defense budget and
program significantly during last summer. That revised fiscal year 2002
budget request was $7 billion and was submitted during June 2002. The
Department did not issue fiscal guidance for fiscal years 2003-2007
until August 2002, so no official out-year fiscal information was
available to support the amended request.
Other DOD programs may have been able to provide approximate out-
year detail for the amended budget, but this data is unofficial and
would closely match current planning figures only because those
programs were not substantially revamped last summer. However, at the
time the amended budget was submitted, BMDO was still exploring, with
the Department, alternative BMD programs plans, strategies, and funding
levels for fiscal years 2003-2007. Refinement of these strategies and
plans continued until submission of the fiscal year 2003 budget
request.

OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES DATA FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

5. Senator Reed. General Kadish, reporting of obligations and
expenditures data for current and previous years is one way to gauge
the top-level health and progress of a program. Such obligations and
expenditures data are typically provided to Congress as part of routine
staff briefings by DOD program managers. However, they were not
presented this year for MDA programs. Could you please provide
obligations and expenditures data and projections for each budget
project in the MDA for fiscal years 2001 and 2002?
General Kadish. See attached charts.

NMD COUNTERMEASURES

6. Senator Reed. General Kadish, there are a number of simple
countermeasures discussed by organizations and individuals such as the
Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Independent
Review Team previously led by General Welch, and others. The most
notable of these include tumbling re-entry vehicles with tumbling
conical balloon decoys, and re-entry vehicles disguised by simple
balloons. Are you aware of these?
General Kadish. Yes.

7. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how do you intend to defeat such
countermeasures with a midcourse system and do you intend to flight
test against all of these countermeasure types, and if so, when?
General Kadish. MDA, with special focus on its GMD activity, has
implemented countermeasure and counter-countermeasure processes to
ensure the BMD System can negate not just simple threat
countermeasures, but will continue to develop the BMD System to counter
more complex threat countermeasures as they evolve.
The approach the Department has taken towards missile defense is to
have redundant capabilities by deploying different elements. The BMD
System will consist of elements configured into layered defenses to
provide autonomous and mutual support, including multiple engagement
opportunities, along a threat missile's flight path. Common sense tells
us that the more shots we can take, the better will be our overall
chance of success. It will also make it more difficult for the enemy to
use countermeasures against us, because he will have to design
countermeasures for the midcourse stage of flight, as well as the boost
and terminal stages of flight.
The capability-based, block delivery approach to development of the
BMD System has been formulated to take the greatest advantage of
available countermeasure and counter-countermeasure technology. The MDA
Targets and Countermeasures project funds targets and countermeasures
in support of BMD programs, including the GMD element. Major efforts
include maintaining a required inventory of major target components
such as boosters, reentry vehicles countermeasures, and developing and
incorporating countermeasures into targets for testing against BMD
elements and components.
The MDA countermeasure/counter-countermeasure effort identifies and
prioritizes solutions to credible countermeasures and incorporates
robust testing against a broad range of threats. Results of the testing
program help develop additional algorithms to mitigate these threats.
Threat estimates are being changed from point-designs to capability-
based. Solutions with potential counter-countermeasures effectiveness
will be evaluated through the MDA Red-White-Blue team process for
incorporation by block upgrades into the midcourse segment (both ground
and sea).
A key element of our counter-countermeasures program is Project
Hercules. This is a national effort to develop a broad range of robust,
adaptive, physics-based algorithms designed to defeat nominal and off-
nominal deployments of reentry vehicles and associated countermeasures.
The initial focus of Project Hercules has been midcourse discrimination
for the GMD element. In fiscal year 2002, Project Hercules expanded its
scope to include all phases of missile flight. In cases where credible
countermeasures discussed by outside reviewers in the unclassified
community were not already under investigation by Project Hercules, the
Project has focused resources on mitigations strategies.
For the midcourse BMD elements, in fiscal year 2002, MDA initiated
advanced development of discriminating seeker components including
multicolor focal plane arrays and laser radars, as well as beginning
advanced development of transportable discriminating radar and
miniature kill vehicle concepts. These efforts will continue in fiscal
year 2003. Additionally, interactive discrimination concepts are being
pursued.
MDA plans to test all BMD elements and BMDS blocks against a
variety of increasingly complex countermeasures. While definitive
flight testing dates have not been set, this testing will evolve as the
initial GMD parts of the BMDS Test Bed are developed and constructed.

8. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much funding are you proposing
in fiscal year 2003 to develop counter-countermeasures to these simple
types of countermeasures?
General Kadish. The BMDS budget for fiscal year 2003 includes $153
million to fund efforts related to the development of counter-
countermeasures. The GMD portion of that is $30 million.

ABL COUNTERMEASURES

9. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the ABL is a revolutionary
technology that could give this country a powerful defense against both
theater and possibly long-range ballistic missiles. However, as with
all technologies, there are countermeasures that could be used by an
adversary. For the ABL, some of these potential countermeasures are
quite simple, such as reflective paints. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 required the Department to set
up a countermeasures test and evaluation effort for the ABL. What is
the current status of that program, and how much funding does that
program have this year and how much funding do you propose for this
program for fiscal year 2003?
General Kadish. The Directed Energy Countermeasures Assessment Team
(DECAT), set up while the ABL program was under Air Force management,
continues to be the only countermeasures effort for ABL. With the
transition of ABL to the MDA, the ABL program will continue the DECAT
effort and will also rely on the MDA Targets and Countermeasures and
MDA Test and Assessment offices for internal countermeasure analysis.
MDA did not fund any independent analysis of countermeasure for ABL in
fiscal year 2002 or fiscal year 2003.

10. Senator Reed. General Kadish, what products are planned for
this effort in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003?
General Kadish. We would be glad to address this effort in a
classified briefing at your convenience.

11. Senator Reed. General Kadish, in 1998, the Department set up a
DECAT to evaluate potential ABL countermeasures. Does this team still
exist, are its members the same, and how have the results of the DECAT
been folded into ABL designs or operations?
General Kadish. The DECAT continues to function and its membership
is unchanged. How the results of the DECAT have been folded into ABL
design will be answered in a classified briefing at your convenience.

ABL FUNDING INCREASE

12. Senator Reed. General Kadish, both the fiscal year 2002 and the
proposed fiscal year 2003 budgets for the ABL have had $200 million
increases from the previous year. The fiscal year 2003 budget also
indicates that the first test of the ABL has slipped by a year, to
fiscal year 2005. What specific technical challenges have caused the
program to slip and why do you need another large funding increase for
the program?
General Kadish. The technical challenges that caused program
slippage include additional time and effort to incorporate lessons
learned from the January 2002 Laser Module 1 test that produced 118
percent of expected power. Furthermore, the original vendors supporting
coatings in beam control optics turned to commercial markets, and
additional time was needed to find and qualify new competent vendors.
Finally, the test schedule, cramped because of these delays, had to be
restructured to allow sufficient time both for the conduct of each test
and analysis between tests.
Funding increases reflect this program stretch out, as well as
added work to structure the program into block increments of increased
capability for integration into the BMDS.
In addition, the fiscal year 2003 budget request reflects the
incorporation of a more robust advanced technology development effort
to include a system integration laboratory (SIL) at Edwards AFB. The
SIL will be used to prove out and mature technologies as well as
troubleshoot any issues on the Block 2004 system and subsequent blocks
to reduce risk, provide phased build-up of the Iron Bird, and address
lethality.
Both the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 budgets fund
additional spares for the optical and laser systems to reduce schedule
serialism and risk of excessive schedule delays during integration and
testing.

- Beam control efforts include critical beam transfer assembly
flight spares, duplicate flight processor diagnostic system,
flight processors, and spare flight turret ball assembly
components.
- Laser efforts include additional plumbing, integrating
support structure, optical hardware, electronics and actuators,
fluid products, turbopump, gain generator subsystem, singlet
oxygen generator, pressure recovery subsystem, and mechanical
hardware.
- Test and Integration funds provide for hardware and software
for secure communications system throughout the ABL test
facilities.

13. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much of this funding is
needed specifically to work on the technical challenges that need to be
solved in order to get the first test aircraft to actually work, how
much is for other activities, and what are those activities (e.g.,
design and purchase of a second aircraft)?
General Kadish. For fiscal year 2003, total ABL funding request is
$598 million; $338 million is for the first aircraft, Block 2004.

$280 million will be used for the Block 2004 contract
efforts
$58 million in government costs associated with Block
2004 test operations at Edwards AFB, modeling, simulation, and
analysis, target purchases for the Block 2004 aircraft, and
program office operations
$105 million is budgeted for the Block 2008 efforts to
include completing a system requirements review and preparation
of the preliminary design
$50 million for the systems integration laboratory
$20 million for advanced technology development
$55 million for long lead components for Block 2008
$30 million for the initial payment on the Block 2008
aircraft

ABL TARGETS

14. Senator Reed. General Kadish, according to your budget
documents, a total of 18 target missiles are to be bought for the ABL
between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003. Please identify for
which test each of these targets is being bought, state the purpose of
the test, and the currently planned date for the test.
General Kadish. The MDA reduces risk inherent in this unprecedented
and revolutionary development effort by incrementally building and
testing segments until the ABL weapon system is completely integrated
and tested. Using this approach, we will ``build a little, test a
little.'' The target set ABL will use has been developed in order to
meet the requirements for verification of element performance. Each
series of tests has a unique set of technical verifications for the
specific segment being tested.
Missile Targets
15 Lance missiles will be used in a number of tests:

1. Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers
and Intelligence (BMC\4\I) to verify the proper operation of the active
Ranging System (ARS) and Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems by
tracking the Lance upon boost and comparing data to range tracking
data.
2. Beam Control/Fire Control (BC/FC) to ensure ABL fine tracking
capability (tracking illuminator laser (TILL)) and adaptive optics loop
closure (beacon illuminator laser (BILL)) on a boosting missile target.
3. Full-Up system to ensure full system engagement against a
boosting missile. No target data is collected. Tests ensure ABL runs
the entire timeline through High Energy Laser (HEL) laze (HEL flash)
with a boosting missile target (no destruction of target).

Three Terrier Lynx will also be used in multiple tests:

1. BC/FC to ensure ABL fine tracking capability (TILL) and adaptive
optics loop closure (BILL) on a boosting missile target.
2. A Full-Up system to ensure full system engagement against a
boosting missile. Tests ensure ABL runs the entire timeline through HEL
engagement.
Together, the Lance and the Terrier Lynx bound Foreign Military
Asset performance provide a full system demonstration against a
realistic missile target threat. The progressive testing schedule is
not yet firm. Currently the BMC\4\I testing is scheduled for 1QFY03.
All other testing is scheduled for 4QF04-1QFY05 timeframe.

NAVY THEATER-WIDE RADAR DEVELOPMENT

15. Senator Reed. General Kadish, your budget documentation for
last year indicated you planned to spend $67 million in fiscal year
2002 on X-Band radar development for Sea-based Midcourse. Do you still
plan to spend that amount in fiscal year 2002 on X-Band development for
this program and if not, what amount do you now plan on spending in
fiscal year 2002?
General Kadish. Congress made an unspecified $100 million reduction
in the fiscal year 2002 budget for the Sea-based Midcourse Program
Element. MDA spread the $100 million reduction across the program
element, which resulted in X-Band radar development funding being
reduced from $67 million to $12 million.

16. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much do you propose to spend
for X-Band development for Sea-based Midcourse in fiscal year 2003 and
what is the basis for this amount?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget is $15
million for the fiscal year 2003 X-Band solid-state radar development.
This figure is based on funding availability, as other elements require
funding earlier in our program's development process.

ATTACKING BALLISTIC MISSILES BEFORE THEY LAUNCH

17. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, our experience with Unmanned
Air Vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator in Afghanistan has proven that
we now have the capability to destroy moving targets, such as trucks
and SUVs, with a high level of confidence. This experience indicates
that were Operation Desert Storm to occur today, we would have much
better success attacking Scud launchers than we did then. The benefit
of getting the launcher is that there are far fewer launchers than
missiles. How much funding is devoted to maximizing our ability to hit
missile launchers before or after the launch of a missile, and who is
in charge of developing the plans and technology for this? How is this
effort coordinated with our missile defense efforts?
Secretary Aldridge. We do have more capability now to destroy
moving targets than we did during Operation Desert Storm; however,
there are no single-point solutions to attacking such time-sensitive
and mobile targets. The solution to the problem rests in an across-the-
board increase in capability associated with intelligence operations,
battle management, and attack execution to shorten the joint targeting
cycle. The presence of persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and immediately available attack weapons
are an important cornerstone to this capability. Although it is
difficult to determine an exact funding amount across the entire
spectrum of platforms and programs related to this capability, one can
highlight a few programs related to this mission. For example, in the
President's budget submission there is $230 million allocated across
the FYDP for accelerated Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicle programs and,
as indicated in Program Decision Memorandum IV, there is significant
funding allocated for Global Hawk and space-based radar across the
FYDP. These programs will help to attain the persistent ISR required to
detect and prosecute targets such as SCUD launchers. There is also
funding allocated to increase the accuracy of our weapons by
modernizing GPS ($727 million across FYDP) and fund Advance Concept
Technical Demonstrations (ACTDs) that would, for example, arm the next
generation of Predator with new capability.
All of the Services and unified commands, in coordination with the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Defense agencies, and OSD
(AT&L) are working to develop the plans and technology for our future
capability. The Joint Theater and Missile Defense Organization is a key
stakeholder in this process and plays a vital role in the DOD
coordination of these issues.

FUNDING FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES

18. Senator Reed. General Kadish, besides the two new boost phase
programs you started last year, how much of the requested fiscal year
2003 funding is being applied to new technologies that weren't
previously being pursued under the previous administration and what is
the basis for your technology program element funding level?
General Kadish. The program includes $12.3 million for new projects
that were not pursued under the previous administration, and $34.7
million in additional intensified funding for projects, consistent with
the changes in focus between the prior and current administrations,
with the following breakout.
In fiscal year 2002, MDA realigned its technology program under
Program Element 0603175C. This continues with the fiscal year 2003
request. The technology program is aligned to the BMD System's boost,
midcourse, and terminal layers, with particular emphasis on boost-phase
intercept and midcourse counter-countermeasures. In addition the
program has been reoriented to conduct high-risk, high-payoff work
intended to achieve breakthrough results, whereas previous efforts
focused on nearer-term technology insertion for theater ballistic
missile defense programs.
The fiscal year 2003 technology program includes $8.3 million for
Boost-Phase Intercept, $2.0 million for interactive discrimination, and
$2.0 million for long-range atmospheric (terminal) defense. The
previous administration did not pursue these. The boost phase work
includes $3.6 million for early launch detection and tracking; the
balance of $4.7 million is for high-energy laser weapons work.
The fiscal year 2003 technology program also includes $12.0 million
for Miniature Kill Vehicles, an increase of $11.0 million relative to
the previous administration, and $14.2 million for Global Defense, an
increase of $4.7 million that covers a $3.5 million active laser
tracking project and $1.2 million for smaller efforts. Finally, the
$19.0 million discriminating seeker program has been significantly
reoriented towards technology insertion for midcourse defense against
long-range threats.
The MDA Technology Program Element funding level is $121.8 million
for fiscal year 2003. MDA deems this sufficient in view of the high-
risk, high-payoff nature of this work and because a significant
fraction of the MDA overall budget of $7.6 billion pays for technology
work that is done under other Program Elements.

NAVY AREA PROGRAM TERMINATION

19. Senator Reed. General Kadish, Navy Area was our only ballistic
missile defense system to employ an explosive warhead to kill the
target missile, rather than employing so-called ``hit-to-kill''
technology. Hit-to-kill technology requires extremely accurate aiming,
which is difficult at best, and may not work against excessively
maneuvering missiles, some of which we saw during Operation Desert
Storm. What is your new plan to replace Navy Area, and do you plan on
continuing the explosive warhead approach?
General Kadish. When the Navy Area program was canceled, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, USD
(AT&L) tasked the Missile Defense Agency, in close consultation with
the Navy, to address sea-based terminal ballistic missile defense
capability as part of the integrated BMDS. We have completed an in-
depth review of potential options for development and fielding of a
sea-based ballistic missile defense capability. We assessed both
explosive warhead and hit-to-kill options during this review and will
provide you with detailed plans of the new effort upon departmental
approval of the way.

FUNDING FOR EXTRA THAAD MISSILES

20. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much of the fiscal year 2003
funding request for THAAD is for production of extra missiles, or even
radars, or other components that are not essential for the currently
planned Block 04 flight test program of five flight tests, but will
likely be available assets after the currently planned block 2004
flight test program ends in fiscal year 2006?
General Kadish. There is $40 million in fiscal year 2003 funding
associated with the THAAD element allocated to acquiring 10 additional
test configuration missiles for the BMDS Test Bed. These test missiles
will include telemetry/safety instrumentation, which was originally
planned to be acquired later in the baseline approach. Fiscal year 2003
funding is needed to meet a delivery schedule in fiscal year 2006
versus fiscal year 2008, as defined in the current baseline approach.
There is no fiscal year 2003 funding for extra radars or other non-
missile components that are not essential for the currently planned
Block 04 flight test program of five flight tests.

SEA-BASED MIDCOURSE FLIGHT TESTS

21. Senator Reed. General Kadish, your current budget documents
indicate that three Sea-based Midcourse flight tests are planned for
2002. What is the total cost of the three flight tests planned for
2002?
General Kadish. The cost for each SMD flight test is as follows:

[In millions of dollars]
Target........................... 9 (includes indirect
target costs)
Test Conduct..................... 6 (test planning,
execution, and
analysis)
SM-3 Missile..................... 20 (recurring
manufacturing)
-------------
Total.......................... 35

The total cost for three flight tests is $105 million.

ALTERNATE BOOSTER PROGRAM

22. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you have announced the award of a
contract worth $425 million for development of an alternate booster for
the Ground-based Midcourse program. How much funding are you proposing
for this effort in fiscal year 2003 and when do you expect the
alternate booster will be available?
General Kadish. We have asked for $216.3 million in fiscal year
2003 for Prime Contractor dual booster development.
Test Bed versions of the boosters will each be tested in two non-
intercept tests beginning in 2003. Additionally, MDA plans to fly these
vehicles against targets in Integrated Flight Test IFT-14 and IFT-15,
planned for fiscal year 2004, respectively.

23. Senator Reed. General Kadish, when do you expect the objective
(vice the alternate) ground-based Midcourse booster to become
available?
General Kadish. Test Bed versions of the dual objective boosters
will be used for Integrated Flight Test (IFT) -14, -15, -16, and -17.
The full objective boosters are planned for flight scheduled no earlier
than late 2004.

24. Senator Reed. General Kadish, are we also considering use of
existing assets such as the Peacekeeper as an alternate booster and if
so, when might they become available?
General Kadish. No. Missile stacks using various stages of the
Peacekeeper combined with other stages were considered during the
alternate booster competition by the bidders. They were eliminated from
consideration because of performance, size, and system cost
considerations.
Neither the Orbital Sciences nor Lockheed Martin configurations use
Peacekeeper assets. Boeing has selected Orbital Sciences Corporation
and Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space as its subcontractors for the
GMD dual booster strategy. Orbital will build and integrate a second
source booster vehicle using existing or slightly modified versions of
existing Orbital boost vehicles. Boeing intends to have Lockheed Martin
build and integrate a high performance boost vehicle (HPBV)
configuration.

ACQUISITION AND TESTING OF ACTUAL FOREIGN COUNTERMEASURES

25. Senator Reed. General Kadish, I understand that the BMDO used
to fund a modest program to acquire and test actual foreign missile
defense countermeasures. This program was known as QP. Is this program
still being funded by the MDA and if so, how much funding is being
provided in fiscal year 2002, and how much is proposed for fiscal year
2003? Alternately, if not, why not?
General Kadish. To date, there have been no fiscal year 2002 funds
obligated toward QP. MDA representatives met with the Space and Missile
Defense Command and the QP contractor on March 12, 2002. MDA is
currently evaluating QP proposals and gathering internal information
establish requirements for the remainder of fiscal year 2002 and fiscal
year 2003.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FUNDING

26. Senator Reed. General Kadish, your budget proposal for fiscal
year 2003 funds program management-related activities such as systems
engineering and integration, support, and program operations. What
specific products are expected to be contracted for with this funding?
Could you please provide a breakdown of the specific products, and each
product's expected 2003 cost?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2003 MDA Systems Engineering and
Integration (SE&I) budget of $371.149 million funds Systems Engineering
and Architecture (SE&A), Threat Systems Engineering (TSE), Advanced
Concept, Intelligence System Threat, Joint Warfighter Support, Joint
National Integration Center, Cooperative Programs and Allied Support,
and BMD Information Management efforts. The funding and products for
each of these areas is as follows:

$192.307 Million Systems Engineering and Architecture/
Threat Systems Engineering

Update the Ballistic Missile Defense System
Technical Objectives and Goals and System Capability
Specification.
Continue to define and develop the BMDS System
Evolution Plans.
Continue to develop new/alternative concepts
and conduct trade studies to support system evolution
and risk mitigation.
Update standards and orchestrate activities
across all BMDS elements to ensure system integration.
Continue the establishment of BMDS level
criteria, metrics, and Technical Performance
Measurement and assess progress, identify risks,
support selection of alternatives, establish capability
increments, and ensure system integration.
Maintain risk mitigation activities.
Continue to execute the Corporate Lethality
program to support effective intercepts and establish
collateral effects.
Conduct force-on-force level and detailed
element level analyses to assess system effectiveness,
ensure robust performance, and establish expected
capabilities to incorporate in future blocks.
Support analysis of system alternatives
involving potential coalition partners that explore
interoperability concepts, Battle Management/Command
and Control (BM/C\2\) alternatives, and associated
engineering requirements.
Continue to establish requirements for and
provide engineering support to System verification and
testing.
Provide for the development and analysis of
the BMD System architecture with multiple layers
including boost, mid-course, and terminal intercept
capabilities and employing multiple sensors integrated
by BM/C\2\ and Communications segments.
Conduct the Corporate Countermeasures/Counter-
Countermeasures (i.e. Red-White-Blue) program.
Maintain an Adversary Capability Document
definition necessary to support BMD System design,
development, and testing.
Maintain a number of reference scenarios
illustrative of the threat space, for use in assessment
of BMDS capabilities.
Perform threat modeling and simulation to
characterize the threat, providing digital data to
support BMDS analyses.
Update modeling and simulation capability and
provide threat media to support analyses.
Produce quick reaction assessments for the
Director of potential impacts to BMDS capabilities.
Support focused BMD efforts such as Project
Hercules and targets and countermeasures.

$79.501 Million Advanced Concepts

Develop, evaluate, and promote integration of
Advanced Concepts and Technologies into the BMDS.
Mature advanced concepts to assess their
viability for BMDS.
Develop advanced technologies for missile
defense.
Maintain cognizance in leading edge concepts
that could contribute to revolutionary BMD capability
enhancements.
Develop and improve decision and
discrimination algorithms supporting the BMDS.
Develop decision architecture for implementing
the next generation BMDS BM/C\2\.
Define and lead the BMDS Battlefield Learning
and Adaptation to respond to unexpected battlefield
events.
Lead Advanced Concept Studies as directed by
MDA/D, DD, DT.

$12.615 Million Intelligence Systems Threat

Foreign missile characteristics and
performance analysis.
Foreign missile booster analysis.
Foreign missile payload analysis.
Foreign missile countermeasures analysis.
Foreign missile signatures analysis.
Foreign missile lethality analysis.
Foreign missile proliferation analysis.
Adversary Capability Document (ACD) support.
Threat Description Document (supports the
ACD).
Capabilities-based Scenarios.
Intelligence-based Scenarios.
Scenario Modeling Software Updates/
Maintenance.
Intelligence assessments work.
Scenario support.

$16.407 Million Joint Warfighter Support

Joint Warfighter Support Program provides BMD
expertise to the Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs), brings
Joint/Combined/Coalition lessons learned to the
developer, coordinates block contingency deployment
plans, engages CINCs in C\2\ development, facilitates
intra/inter theater CONOPS developments, facilitates
program transition to Services, maintains interaction
with the transitioned programs, and supports CINC BMD
exercises, wargames, and tabletops. This will be done
in fiscal year 2003 by funding the BMD portion of the
following seven Theater CINC exercises:

Roving Sands 03 (JFCOM),
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement
and Integration/Foal Eagle 03 and Ulchi Focus
Lens 03 (USFK),
Juniper Cobra (EUCOM) for 2 years (03
and 04),
Terminal Fury (PACOM), and
Lucky Sentinel and Eagle Resolve 03
(CENTCOM).

$47.937 Million Joint National Integration Center

Operations of the Joint National Integration
Center.
Environment, Information Management, and
Facility Modernization.
BM/C\2\ Development and Integration.
Exercise Support.
Support to Wargames and Wargames 2000.
Ground-based Midcourse Defense
Interoperability, Multi-Mission Integration Cell,
Theater Missile Defense Interoperability, Special
Programs Center.

$1.435 Million cooperative program and allied support

Develop and evaluate non-U.S. operational
concepts created in conjunction with supported country.
Examinations of U.S. and foreign assets in
extended air defense scenarios.
Develop potential foreign military sales
opportunities.

$20.947 Million information management systems

Wide area network management activities such
as network security and continuity of Operations.
Contract support for Enterprise Information
Architecture.
Enterprise information applications: email,
collaboration tools, and enterprise portal.
BMD Data Center activities: Data storage,
archival, retrieval.
BMD Information Resource Center.
Information Assurance Operations Center
Definition and Testbed.
BMD Information Management/Information
Technology Plans, Policies, and Analysis.

PROCUREMENT FUNDING

27. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the MDA acquisition plans
envision ``transitioning'' missile defense programs to the Services
when they are ready. Once this happens, how will procurement funding
across the FYDP be provided and will the Services be asked to fund the
procurement of the missile defense system out of their top-line budget
or will funding be transferred from the MDA budget to the Services?
General Kadish. In his Missile Defense Program Direction memorandum
of January 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense prescribes that the MDA is
responsible for planning and budgeting for missile defense RDT&E
activities and that the Services are responsible for budgeting for
missile defense procurement and operations. MDA will share the
responsibility for planning and budgeting during the Transition Phase
with the appropriate Service. We will work with the Department to
develop specific procurement alternatives for BMDS elements as part of
our fiscal years 2004-2009 Program Objective Memorandum.

[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ACQUISITION POLICY AND OVERSIGHT

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Ben
Nelson, Warner, Smith, Inhofe, Allard, and Sessions.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member; and
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority
counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; William C.
Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward,
professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Thomas C.
Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; J. Mark
Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; and Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. We will be
joined shortly by Senator Allard, and I thank Senator Inhofe
for joining us.
I want to welcome back Secretary Aldridge, Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L),
and Lieutenant General Kadish, Director of the newly organized
Missile Defense Agency (MDA). I would also like to extend a
warm welcome to the Honorable Thomas P. Christie, Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) for the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Christie, you have a very important statutory role. You
provide Congress and the American people the assurance that our
military systems are well tested and that they are
operationally effective before they are fielded to our fighting
forces.
Last week, we had the opportunity to examine the
significant budget request for missile defense. This is the
second year in a row that there have been significant requests
for missile defense budgets.
This week we focus on the sweeping changes in ballistic
missile defense management and oversight that the Defense
Department has begun to implement. These changes raise
questions about whether there will be appropriate checks and
balances for the Department's missile defense programs to help
ensure both program success and the wise use of defense
resources.
The most fundamental question is, are these changes
necessary to produce effective ballistic missile defense as
soon as practicable?
Every day we see the technological superiority of our
Nation's fighting forces, the accuracy of our long-range
weapons, the ability to provide incredibly detailed videos from
above the battlefield in real time to command centers thousands
of miles away, and the ability to fight nearly as well at night
as we do in the day. All of these capabilities put us decades
ahead of all of our nearest potential rivals and all of these
capabilities were developed using our existing disciplined and
proven policies for acquisition and oversight.
The second major question is, are the proposed changes
consistent with maintaining meaningful congressional oversight
over missile defense programs?
Congress by itself does not have the resources to oversee
every individual military program in detail. That is why
Congress codified in statute the roles and responsibilities of
positions such as the one which Mr. Christie now fills and many
others. It is clear that under the new rules for missile
defense, these organizations will not be performing their
traditional roles. One of the areas we will explore today is
what roles, if any, these oversight organizations and others
will play in the new Missile Defense Agency.
Before recognizing our witnesses, I would ask if Senator
Inhofe or Senator Smith has an opening statement.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
statement. I am ready to go to the witnesses.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Smith
Senator Smith. I do not have one either. Let us go.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Smith and Senator Inhofe.
Before we proceed to our witnesses, and without objection,
I would like to place in the record at this point Secretary
Rumsfeld's January 2, 2002, memorandum establishing the Missile
Defense Agency, as well as Secretary Aldridge's two memoranda
of February 13, 2002, providing plans and implementation
guidance for the new agency. I do so because this information
will, I think, be a significant part of the discussion at our
hearing today and well in the future.
[The information referred to follows:]

------

Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. E.C. ``PETE'' ALDRIDGE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Secretary Aldridge. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members
of the subcommittee. I again thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the management and oversight
of the Department of Defense's missile defense program.
On January 2 of this year, Secretary Rumsfeld issued his
direction to the Department for the missile defense program.
His stated objectives included the establishment of a single
program to develop an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) under the authority of a single organization, the
Missile Defense Agency.
Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement I would submit for
the record, and I will briefly summarize it today.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
Secretary Aldridge. Redesignation of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization as the Missile Defense Agency provides
greater authority to Lieutenant General Kadish and his staff to
manage the rigorous and complex technical challenges associated
with developing missile defenses.
Ballistic missile defense requires scientific and
engineering breakthroughs on many different fronts at once,
launches from both land and sea, space-based, ground-based, and
vehicle-based sensors, warning satellites, lasers, hit-to-kill
systems, decoy discrimination, and guidance and targeting
systems that have to be accurate within inches at closing
speeds of 20,000 miles per hour impacting their targets
thousands of miles from where they were launched. We have to
integrate all these systems into one system requiring
extraordinary computing power and communications capabilities
that must themselves be safe from interference and attack.
The Secretary of Defense directed the use of a streamlined
oversight process for the BMDS, and he has indicated his
intention to look to the Department of Defense Senior Executive
Council (SEC) for oversight and recommendations for decision
making in this area. The SEC is chaired by Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz and includes the Service Secretaries and myself.
In turn, I recently issued implementation guidance based on
Secretary Rumsfeld's direction. I tasked the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, who reports to me, to plan and execute
a single missile defense program, structured to integrate work
and enable capability trades across different elements of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System and to facilitate decisive
action in response to program events.
To advise the Director of MDA on management of the missile
defense program, and to aid the SEC in executive decision
making on missile defense, I have formed a Missile Defense
Support Group (MDSG) which consists of 13 designated senior
experts from selected staffs within the Department. They will
be supported by a working group of individuals from their
support staffs. The Chairman of the Missile Defense Support
Group is the Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense, AT&L. He will report
directly to me on all Missile Defense Support Group matters. A
list of the MDSG principals and working group members can be
found in my written statement.
Finally, MDA will manage these programs during the research
and development phase only. They will be transitioned to the
military departments for deployment, at which time the normal
acquisition process will take effect.
The objectives of this reorganization of our ballistic
missile defense efforts are to integrate programs, centralize
their management, elevate the authority, responsibility, and
flexibility of that management, and to provide a more
streamlined oversight process. It will be characterized by
extensive OSD oversight and congressional visibility. I contend
that it will advance ballistic missile defense toward its
intended role as one of the greatest peacekeeping technologies
ever created.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer
questions of members of the subcommittee at the appropriate
time.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Aldridge follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. E.C. ``Pete'' Aldridge

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the fiscal
year 2003 Department of Defense missile defense program and budget. It
is my goal to address the new management structure of the missile
defense program and discuss the new, more flexible oversight process
which is being adopted by the Department.
On January 2, of this year, Secretary Rumsfeld issued his direction
to the Department for the missile defense program. His stated
objectives included the establishment of a single program to develop an
integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System under the authority of a
single organization, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). He directed that
a capability-based requirements process be adopted and that streamlined
oversight be incorporated to facilitate the earliest possible
deployment of missile defense capabilities to the Services.
Redesignation of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the
Missile Defense Agency provides greater authority to Lieutenant General
Kadish and his staff to manage the rigorous technical challenges
associated with developing missile defenses. The additional authorities
are necessary due to the magnitude of the program, and the high
priority placed on this effort by the President. It is for these same
reasons that the Secretary directed the use of a streamlined oversight
process. The Secretary has indicated his intention to look to the DOD
Senior Executive Council (SEC) for oversight and recommendations for
decision-making in this area. The SEC is chaired by Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz and includes the Service Secretaries and myself.
In that regard, I recently issued implementation guidance based on
Secretary Rumsfeld's direction. In this guidance, I directed the
Director of the MDA to plan and execute a single missile defense
program, structured to integrate work and enable capability trades
across different elements of the BMDS and to facilitate decisive action
in response to program events. This single program has the same
reporting requirements to OSD and Congress that all other programs
have. The Director of the MDA has been given full authority to execute
a capability-based acquisition approach that will produce missile
defenses at the earliest feasible date. He will have the authority and
responsibility to develop all associated technologies and conduct
developmental testing. He will interface with the warfighter community
to determine desired operational features and to develop strategies for
introducing developed capabilities into the fighting forces. He will
have the authority to manage the acquisition strategy, make program
commitments, award contracts, make affordability tradeoffs, and
exercise milestone decision authority up to, but not including,
Milestone C (the beginning of the production and deployment phase).
The unique management and oversight processes described above apply
only to the development phase, when the configurations of missile
defense systems are still being defined and production and deployment
considerations are unknown. At the point where an individual element of
the BMDS progresses to the point of demonstrating useful capability,
the Director of the MDA will recommend that the SEC consider it for
transition to production and deployment. Transition to procurement will
create an acquisition program in its own right and activate the
management, oversight, and reporting processes used for traditional
defense acquisition programs. I will establish the necessary product
teams and processes needed to support a Milestone C production decision
by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Following the Milestone C
decision, the designated Military Department will manage the program
following standard acquisition processes and reporting.
To advise the Director of the MDA on management of the Ballistic
Missile Defense program and to aid the SEC in executive decision-making
on missile defense, I have formed a Missile Defense Support Group
(MDSG) of designated senior experts from 13 selected staffs within the
Department. The Chairman of the MDSG is the Director of Strategic and
Tactical Systems. He will report directly to me on all MDSG matters.
The MDSG consists of senior and experienced individuals who will be
able to provide useful insights and recommendations on policy,
operations, acquisition, and resource matters that affect the BMDS.
Members of the MDSG will be supported by a Working Group of individuals
from their support staffs. They will promote the success of the BMDS by
providing informed constructive advice on the program and keeping their
principals advised of program progress and developments. They will
perform independent reviews and studies of the ballistic missile
defense program where needed. A list of the MDSG principals and working
group members is as follows:

MISSILE DEFENSE SUPPORT GROUP MEMBERSHIP
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organization MDSG MDSG (WG)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OUSD(AT&L)S&TS.................. Dr. Spiros Pallas. CAPT Michael
Dr. Kent G. Cregge
Stansberry. LTC(P) Stephen
Kreider
Secretary of Army............... BG(P) John Urias.. COL Jeff Horne
Secretary of Navy............... Mr. David M. Ms. Denise Del
Altwegg. Camp
Secretary of Air Force.......... MG(S) John Corley. COL Bo Reese
COL(S) Rex Kiziah
USD(P).......................... Mr. David Dr. Peppi DeBiaso
Trachtenberg. Dr. Rob Soofer
USD(C).......................... Mr. Ron Garant.... Mr. Tom Kerr
VCJCS........................... Brig Gen Rick Dr. Barry Fridling
Lewis. CAPT Roger Easton
ASD(C\3\I)...................... Mr. John Landon... Mr. Jim Martin
COL Brian Robinson
DOD(GC)......................... Mr. Doug Larsen... Ms. Shauna Russell
Mr. Charles
Bidwell
DOT&E........................... Mr. Larry Miller.. Mr. Mario Lucchese
CDR Barry Haynie
D, MDA.......................... Dr. Glenn Lamartin Mr. Robert Brown
D, (PA&E)....................... Dr. Michael Dr. James Brooks
Ioffredo. Dr. Dennis Evans
C, (CAIG)....................... Dr. David McNicol. Dr. Richard Burke
Mr. Steve Miller
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The first task of the MDSG will be to review the MDA plan to
implement Secretary Rumsfeld's January 2, 2002, missile defense program
direction, and the implementation guidance issued by me. That plan will
address matters of great importance to the success of the BMDS,
including the program structure and funding allocations, the management
structure, acquisition strategy, program documentation, and interfaces
with the Services. The first combined MDSG and MDSG Working Group
meeting occurred on Friday, March 8, to start the process of oversight
and review. They will meet as required and will have access to the
information they require to perform their responsibility.
The Department is making these changes in response to the high
priority for missile defense articulated by President Bush. We believe
that integrating several programs into one, centralizing their
management within a single defense agency with greater authority,
responsibility, and flexibility, and providing a more streamlined
oversight process will cause missile defenses to be developed and
deployed in a much more efficient manner than would be possible under
the former structure. The SEC has already conducted six meetings to
discuss the MDA, which is significantly more high-level oversight than
other programs that normally only see this level of oversight at a DAB
once every few years.
Congress will have the same visibility into the Ballistic Missile
Defense System program that it has with other programs. In this
context, some of the classical metrics of progress are affected by the
adoption of an RDT&E-only approach to the development phase. To ensure
that Congress has a full understanding of the program, we are committed
to provide necessary details of how the program will be structured and
managed.
The Department provided four information briefings to the defense
authorization and appropriations committees staff, plus one to the
House Government Reform Committee staff. During these first five
briefings, which occurred shortly before the Secretary issued his
direction on missile defense, we committed to provide details on how we
planned to implement the Secretary's direction prior to issuing
implementation guidance. On February 11 and 12, 2002, we provided four
more briefings to each of the defense authorization and appropriations
committees staff, presenting the implementation plans. The MDA has
already conducted over 25 hours of briefings on the Ballistic Missile
Defense System to members of the congressional staff. Those briefings
provided specifics on the planned development activities for each
element of the system this year. MDA will continue to provide Congress
with detailed information to satisfy its oversight responsibilities.
The annual Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress will be
submitted on the BMDS with a separate SAR for the PAC-3 program,
because procurement activity for PAC-3 has begun. Providing separate
SARs will ensure full visibility into the transition of the program to
the the Military Departments after a deployment decision, just as it
will be done for the Army's PAC-3.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions
you and the members of the subcommittee might have.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Christie, do
you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. CHRISTIE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Christie. Yes, I do, a very short one.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I also thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you and discuss our role, the role of the Office of the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), in
overseeing the planning and execution of a robust test and
evaluation strategy for the various components that comprise
our ballistic missile defense program.
As we have heard, the Missile Defense Agency is embarking
on a new and aggressive approach to the development and
acquisition of missile defense capabilities. The traditional
paradigm of developing and producing weapon systems based on a
set of user and technical system-level requirements is being
transformed. This new approach is evolving to provide for the
successful development of capabilities that are responsive to
imminent threats and can be readily deployed while, at the same
time, maintaining essential operational effectiveness and
suitability standards for equipment that is fielded with our
operational forces. As this MDA acquisition and oversight
process evolves, DOT&E, my office, is adjusting the way we will
execute our responsibilities to accommodate this new approach.
I use the word ``evolving'' in my references to this new
process because I view that evolution as not yet complete. My
staff and I have been given access to the MDA's initial plans,
which are still in the early stages of implementation. My staff
has been working with their MDA counterparts for some time now
to assure that DOT&E will have access to MDA's plans and
programs, and that that access will be adequate to accomplish
our oversight mission. We have agreed at this point to an
oversight approach where we are broadly involved at the MDA and
element levels during the early research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) phases.
Our level of involvement will increase appropriately as the
programs mature and progress through to the transition and
procurement phases. We plan to monitor significant testing and
technology interchange activities at the project level
throughout all the phases of these programs. We will provide
the results of our evaluations directly to the MDA, General
Kadish, and to the senior leadership of the Department through
the Missile Defense Support Group and its Working Group, both
of which, as Secretary Aldridge stated, include members of my
staff.
As the programs move through the transition phase, we will
increase our involvement in test planning and execution
activities, especially as appropriate to support both live-fire
test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation. We
plan to provide an independent operational assessment that
addresses the operational effectiveness and suitability for
each capability at each of its major decision points.
DOT&E will also prepare an annual report for the Department
and for Congress on each of the MDA programs. As required by
congressional language, this report will provide our assessment
of the adequacy and sufficiency of MDA's testing program over
the previous year.
In addition to missile defense program redirection, MDA is
redefining the ballistic missile defense architecture to
provide a system-of-systems approach to a layered missile
defense. The new approach integrates the old national and
theater ballistic missile defense initiatives into an
integrated layered approach now called the missile defense
system. We will closely monitor testing of the individual
elements within the missile defense system, as well as the
testing of the integrated elements, including the battle
management, command, control, communications, and intelligence
(BMC\3\I), which will tie all the individual elements together
to provide a robust, integrated, layered missile defense system
capability.
A key aspect of the development and testing of the new
missile defense system is establishing the missile defense
system testbed and its supporting infrastructure. This
integration of both existing and new facilities and equipment
is planned to support the execution of more operationally
realistic ground and flight testing. The testbed, as we know
it, should mitigate many of the existing test limitations that
have prevented operationally realistic flight testing of the
old national missile defense system. As a result of phasing in
new launch and tracking facilities, future ground-based
midcourse system flight testing can gradually increase in
realism and complexity at a pace consistent with disciplined
engineering practice and fiscal responsibility. I strongly
concur with the funding and development of this vital testing
asset.
I intend to work very closely with both Under Secretary
Aldridge and General Kadish to support the development and
adequate testing of a capability that will secure the defense
of our Nation and its fighting forces while, at the same time,
maintaining our responsibility for acquisition oversight.
Mr. Chairman and Senators, I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christie follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. Christie

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the role of the
office of the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) in
overseeing the planning and execution of a robust test and evaluation
strategy for the various components that comprise our ballistic missile
defense (BMD) program.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is embarking on a new and
aggressive approach to the development and acquisition of missile
defense capabilities. The traditional paradigm of developing and
producing weapon systems based on a set of user and technical system-
level requirements is being transformed. The new approach is evolving
to provide for the successful development of capabilities that are
responsive to imminent threats and can be readily deployed, while at
the same time maintaining essential operational effectiveness and
suitability standards for equipment that is fielded with our
operational forces. As this MDA acquisition and oversight process
evolves, DOT&E is adjusting the way we execute our responsibilities to
accommodate this new acquisition approach.
I use the word ``evolving'' in my references to this new process
because I view that evolution as not yet complete. My staff and I have
been given access to the MDA's initial plans, which are still in the
early stages of implementation. My staff has been working with their
MDA counterparts to assure that DOT&E access to MDA's plans and
programs is adequate for us to accomplish our oversight mission. We
have agreed to an oversight approach where we are broadly involved at
the MDA and element levels during the early RDT&E phases.
Our level of involvement will increase appropriately as the
programs mature and progress into and through the transition and
procurement phases. We plan to monitor significant testing and
technology interchange activities at the project level throughout all
the phases. We will provide the results of our evaluations directly to
the MDA and to the senior leadership of the Department through the
Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG) and its Working Group, both of
which include members of my staff. As the programs move through the
transition phase, we will increase our involvement in test planning and
execution activities, especially as appropriate to support both live
fire test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation. We plan
to provide an independent operational assessment that addresses the
operational effectiveness and suitability for each capability at each
of its major decision points. DOT&E will also prepare an annual report
for the Department and Congress on each of the MDA programs. As
required by congressional language, this report will provide our
assessment of the ``adequacy and sufficiency'' of MDA's testing program
over the previous year.
In addition to missile defense program redirection, MDA is
redefining the ballistic missile defense architecture to provide a
system-of-systems approach to a layered missile defense. The new
approach replaces the old national and theater ballistic missile
defense initiatives with an integrated, layered approach, now called
the missile defense system. We will closely monitor testing of the
individual elements within the missile defense system, as well as the
testing of the integrated elements, including the battle management,
command, control, communications, and intelligence (BMC\3\I), which
will tie the individual elements together to provide a robust,
integrated, layered missile defense system capability.
A key aspect of the development and testing of the new missile
defense system is establishing the missile defense system testbed and
its supporting infrastructure. This integration of both existing and
new facilities and equipment is planned to support the execution of
operationally realistic ground and flight-testing. The test bed should
mitigate many of the existing test limitations that prevented
operationally realistic flight-testing of the old national missile
defense system. As a result of phasing in new launch and tracking
facilities, future Ground-based Midcourse System flight-testing can
gradually increase in realism and complexity at a pace consistent with
disciplined engineering practice and fiscal responsibility. I strongly
concur with the funding and development of this vital testing asset.
I intend to work very closely with both Under Secretary Aldridge
and General Kadish to support the development and adequate testing of a
capability that will secure the defense of our Nation and its fighting
forces, while maintaining our responsibility for acquisition oversight.
Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
have.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Christie.
General Kadish.
General Kadish. I have submitted a statement, I would like
it included in the record, and I have some opening remarks.
Senator Reed. General Kadish, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY

General Kadish. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee.
We have modified our approach to the acquisition of missile
defenses to reflect the reality of change and surprise in our
world today. September 11 brought home this reality very
forcefully to all of us in the Missile Defense Agency. The
Department has restructured the missile defense program as a
national priority with focused management attention so that we
can reduce our decision cycle time during development to handle
a very complex set of challenges.
I believe we can meet those challenges if we do two things.
First, make sure our technologies are mature enough to begin
development and testing, and second, take an evolutionary or
phased approach to development, production, and deployment.
To support this approach, on January 2, of this year, as
Secretary Aldridge alluded to, the Secretary of Defense
redesignated the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the
Missile Defense Agency and changed the responsibilities and
authorities of the Director. While some of these authorities
given to the Director are new, all of them are within the
Secretary's existing statutory powers. Moreover, our activities
will be just as apparent, I believe, and our accountability to
you and the American people just as assured as they have been
in the past.
The Secretary has set up a formal oversight process for the
missile defense program, as described by Secretary Aldridge. As
Director, I will continue to report to the Under Secretary, and
the SEC, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, which will provide
executive oversight of the program. The SEC provides guidance
regarding policy, planning, and programming, and makes
decisions on whether to stop, start, slow, or accelerate
activities, and approves recommendations on the fielding of
system elements. SEC members demand high standards of
accountability, as was made clear with the Department's
decisions to cancel the Navy area program and restructure the
space-based infrared radar system (SBIRS)-Low program. I have
briefed the SEC six times since last August on the status of
our plans.
There is also a standing Missile Defense Support Group, as
described by Secretary Aldridge. Its chairman reports directly
to the Under Secretary, and all members are senior and
experienced in missile defense.
In my view, there are two major reasons for these changes.
The first is to provide more focused executive oversight and
reduce decision cycle time throughout the development process.
Program reviews in the traditional world of acquisition are
episodic and subject to individual program events or
milestones, which may be separated by months and years. Our new
procedures provide for more frequent and comprehensive
departmental oversight and will allow us to better respond to
changing conditions and emerging events throughout the program.
The second reason we have changed our processes is that the
existing departmental procedures were designed for a single
service acquisition. When we are dealing with very complex
programs, such as the F-22, the DDG-21, or the Comanche attack
helicopter, ultimately we are looking at one service to operate
and deploy the system.
Missile defense is very different. We have three military
departments, the Joint Staff, and the regional commanders in
chief all deeply involved. System integration requires that we
cross Service boundaries at the outset of development, as well
as many technical boundaries. Even at the mission execution
level, no one Service will operate this system as a total
system. The Missile Defense Agency, I believe, was established
to pull these strands together and make an effective system.
Now let me turn to the subject of congressional oversight
very briefly. We will continue to provide Congress annual
budget justification materials supporting the President's
budget submission. Detailed budget and schedule summaries for
all major budget projects within the system will be part of
this submission, and will include our extensive engineering and
rigorous testing activities as well as infrastructure plans for
such development activities as THAAD and the Ground-based
Midcourse system.
In addition to the annual schedule of program hearings, we
have provided extensive briefings and numerous briefing
opportunities. So far, during January and February of this year
alone, we have concluded 25 hours of briefings to congressional
professional and personal staffs, and these briefings will
continue as you desire.
In order to deal with threat uncertainty, we are looking at
a broader range of capabilities an adversary might have in a
given time frame, and then developing defensive capabilities
incrementally and in blocks. In simple terms, capability-based
development means looking at the threats we face and building
and deploying what we can in the shortest possible time. We
accept that the capability we put in the field initially will
be imperfect, but we can advance it and enhance it over time.
This requires that the user and the developer work closely
together in a disciplined way throughout the developmental
process. It requires rigorous testing to see what works best
and to see what might help improve the deployed system. In
short, it allows requirements to be flexible by putting the
user and the developer on the same page in understanding how to
develop a product like missile defense using unprecedented and
very complex technology. This is the best way I can think of to
build a complex missile defense system.
This approach is not really new. Our Nation has used it
successfully in the past to develop the Polaris submarine-
launched ballistic missile and the SR-71 reconnaissance
aircraft. We are certainly familiar with upgrading systems over
time. The B-52s that flew over Afghanistan last fall were far
different aircraft than those that first rolled off the
production lines 5 decades ago.
The authorities that the Secretary has given me are
important to our success in my opinion. Reporting on the
missile defense program will continue, and we will continue to
pass to Congress and this subcommittee the information it needs
to do its job.
Clearly, our ability to react rapidly to the swift-moving
international security environment, while at the same time
reforming how we do business within the Department, is a
central challenge for us all. This committee's support for the
President's Freedom to Manage Initiative will reduce statutory
requirements that restrict management flexibility, allowing us
to more effectively and efficiently execute the missile defense
program with which we have been entrusted.
At the end of the day, however, it is very important that
whatever we deliver actually improves our security. With your
support, I am committed to making sure that happens, Mr.
Chairman.
That concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Kadish
follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. It is a
pleasure to appear before you today to testify on the recent
establishment of the Missile Defense Agency and reorganization of the
missile defense program. I welcome this opportunity to describe our
reorganization.
On January 2, of this year, the Secretary of Defense redesignated
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the Missile Defense
Agency and changed the responsibilities and authorities of the
Director. Your staff is familiar with the Secretary's directive.
The Secretary gave the Agency--and me as Director--new priorities
and direction, and expanded responsibilities and authority to execute
the missile defense program. Some of these new authorities differ from
traditional departmental processes, but all of them are within the
Secretary's existing statutory powers. Our activities will be just as
apparent, and our accountability to you and the American people just as
assured, as they have been in the past. We are developing a detailed
plan by April to implement the Secretary's guidance. We believe that
the changes we are instituting will provide for a better structure to
manage and execute the missile defense program and will enhance our
performance as responsible stewards of the resources entrusted to us.

PROGRAM DIRECTION

The Secretary spelled out four top priorities for missile defense.
They are:

First, to defend the United States against limited
missile attack, as well as to defend U.S. deployed forces,
allies, and friends;
Second, to employ a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
System that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases
of their flight against all ranges of threat;
Third, to enable the Services to field elements of the
overall BMD System as soon as practicable; and
Fourth, to develop and test technologies, to use
prototypes, and to test assets to provide early capability, if
necessary, and to improve the effectiveness of deployed
capability by inserting new technologies as they become
available or when the threat warrants an accelerated
capability.

The Secretary also provided specific objectives for the program to:

Establish a single program to develop an integrated
system under a newly titled Missile Defense Agency (MDA);
Assign the best and brightest people to this work;
Apply a capability-based requirements process for
missile defense; and
Direct the MDA to develop the missile defense system
and baseline the capability and configuration of its elements
and the Military Departments to procure and provide for
operation and support.

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

We are developing a single integrated BMD System to counter all
ranges of ballistic missiles.
Let me clarify some of the terms we use. When we speak of one BMD
System, we refer to the operational integration of all missile defense
elements, including sensors, weapons, and battle management/command and
control capabilities, regardless of which Service operates them. We
speak in terms of three defense segments that categorize the
capabilities to intercept a hostile missile during each phase of its
flight: a Terminal Defense Segment, a Midcourse Defense Segment, and a
Boost Defense Segment. We group sensors under a fourth segment.
Some of the terminology has changed. For example, the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense, or GMD, replaces the former National Missile Defense
designation as a better descriptor of what it is--a capability to
destroy missiles in the midcourse phase of flight using a ground-based
interceptor.
Each defense segment is made up of elements, which correspond
roughly to the old Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Within
the Midcourse Defense Segment, for example, GMD is an element, and
within the Terminal Defense Segment, THAAD is an element. Below the
element level, we have components--THAAD is an element, while its
radar, for example, is a component.
In programmatic terms, we no longer speak of national or theater
missile defense. Operationally, the terms can take on different
meanings depending on where you live. The distinction between them made
sense a decade ago, when we faced the stark difference between a Soviet
ICBM threat and an Iraqi Scud. Now it no longer does. The same North
Korean missile aimed at Japan could be a national threat to our ally,
but a theater threat to us--unless it were retargeted toward the United
States, in which case it would become national again. Furthermore, at
some point in time, a short-range missile could threaten our homeland
just as well as an ICBM could, if, say, it were launched from the sea
off our coast.
Especially after September 11, from my point of view, we want to
make sure that we are effective against all ranges of threats. It is a
national decision as to where and when we deploy our capabilities. We
face the complex task of integrating many elements, because the flight
physics of the variety of missile speeds, trajectories, and the
environments through which missiles travel preclude our having one
defensive technology that can do it all.

DEPARTMENTAL OVERSIGHT

The Secretary has set up a formal oversight process for the missile
defense program. As Director, I continue to report directly to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
The Senior Executive Council, or SEC, chaired by the Deputy Secretary,
provides executive oversight of the program. Permanent members are the
Service Secretaries and the Under Secretary (AT&L). Other Department
officials will be included as needed, depending on the subject at hand.
This Council conducts periodic formal and informal reviews of the
program. I have already met with the SEC six times since last summer,
including several to provide formal briefings of our status and plans.
Planned reviews include such topics as program plans, management
approaches, test performance, system architecture, technological
alternatives, basing options, and the threat. The SEC provides guidance
regarding policy, planning, and programming; makes the decisions as to
whether to stop, start, slow, or accelerate efforts; and approves
recommendations on fielding elements of the system. This group demands
high standards of accountability. You have seen some of this recently
regarding Department decisions to cancel the Navy area program and
restructure SBIRS-Low.
Additionally, the Department has created a new, standing Missile
Defense Support Group, the Chairman of which reports directly to the
Under Secretary. This Support Group provides advice both to the Under
Secretary and to me, as well as input to the SEC. It performs
independent assessments, and is supported in turn by a working group.
The members of the Support Group are all senior and all experienced in
missile defense.
Why these changes? There are two major reasons. The first is to
provide more direct and focused executive oversight and reporting. We
need to reduce decision-making cycle time, and we are looking for real-
time involvement. If we went through the normal departmental processes,
the reviews would be episodic, subject to individual program events or
milestones, and there could be years between these events. Our new
procedures provide for more frequent and more comprehensive oversight
of the missile defense program than we currently have and can better
respond to changing conditions and emerging events. They provide for
more internal accountability at a more rapid pace than we have had in
the past.
The second reason we have changed our processes is that existing
departmental procedures were designed to satisfy the needs of single
Service acquisition. Even when the Department deals with very complex
programs, such as the F-22, the DDG-21, or the Comanche attack
helicopter, ultimately we are looking at one Service to operate the
deployed system. Our acquisition procedures have been designed over
time to provide oversight for that one Service. Very seldom have
Service boundaries been crossed.
Missile defense is different. In missile defense, we have three
Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and the warfighting commanders
in chief, all deeply involved in providing the kind of layered defenses
we need. Service boundaries are crossed from the start to provide for
integration within the BMD System. Even at the operational level, no
one Service will operate missile defenses. That is why the Missile
Defense Agency was created in the first place, to pull all these
strands together, regardless of whether the basing mode of any single
element was on the ground, at sea, in the air, or in space. Oversight
for the missile defense program under these circumstances requires a
new approach. I can assure you the work on this approach has already
been rigorous.
Let me describe some other features of the restructured program and
processes, and then I will come back to the important issue of
congressional oversight.

CAPABILITY-BASED ACQUISITION

There appears to be confusion about what capability-based
acquisition is. Some have interpreted this as doing away with
requirements. That is not the case. We are not doing away with
requirements. We are, however, changing how we derive, define, and deal
with them.
Instead of developing systems to respond to a narrowly defined
threat from a known adversary, we find we cannot know with confidence
what specific adversary might pose what specific missile threat and
when. Hence, as a starting point, we are looking at the broader range
of capabilities an adversary might have in a given time frame and then
developing defensive capabilities based on technological maturity in
blocks that will evolve over time.
The traditional development process started with specific military
requirements generated by the user and became formalized in the
Operational Requirements Document, or ORD. This traditional ORD
approach has generally served us well, especially in procurements
involving well-known technologies, proven systems, sizeable production
runs, and established operational experience. None of these yet exist
in missile defense.
For us, the strengths of the traditional requirements generation
process can also be its weaknesses. It is rigorous, but that very rigor
translates into a lack of the flexibility needed to deal with
unprecedented technology development. Requirements defined in ORDs are
typically set many years before actual system deployment, and can often
lead to less than optimum capability against a threat that exceeds the
description specified earlier.
Furthermore, at the moment, we do not yet know all the technical
approaches that will work best. Five years ago, we could not have
foreseen, let alone written down, all the uses that define today's
Internet. It would not be prudent to lock in our development path now
and find out some years down the road that we have weakness in the
system. This could come about because of an unexpected technical
obstacle, because of some new development in the threat, or because we
failed to exploit some practical technical innovation that we might
otherwise have captured with our incremental acquisition approach.
Yet we always face the risk of being surprised by changes in the
threat. Missile defense has perhaps more uncertainties in this regard
than many other mission areas. We do not want to alter our baseline
every time we recognize a change in the threat. Such changes could
ripple through the program and likely cause significant delay and cost.
So instead of a point threat, we are setting a wider range of
boundaries for adversarial capabilities over time in defining our own
needed capabilities. The baseline we set must be able to deal with
surprises and changes in the threat. A capability-based approach allows
us to adjust to those changes in ways that the traditional requirement-
based approach does not.
These capability definitions act as formal requirements, with one
key difference--they can be changed as necessary during the
developmental stages to reflect changes in the threat or to take
advantage of technical or engineering breakthroughs. Since they evolve
in parallel with capabilities, they allow us to reduce cycle time,
schedule risk, and cost risk.
While we are moving away from some of the rigidities of the past,
we are not abandoning rigor in development. In my opinion, far from it.
A capability-based approach provides for significant discipline. It is
just guided by different mileposts. Instead of the traditional process
where users define the requirement in great detail, then, subsequently,
developers translate the requirements into specifications, we intend to
do both at the same time. In so doing, we can accrue the same
advantages that the commercial world enjoys.
We are bringing together users and developers under our Agency's
lead--the warfighters, the Services, and industry. Together, all of
them will have a continuous and constructive role in establishing the
mission requirements for missile defenses, unlike that under the older
process. The warfighters will not disengage after setting the
requirements at the outset, and industry will not be brought in at the
last moment--they will both be present from the start. This partnership
will be continuous and remain vital throughout the whole development
process. This focused, unbroken interaction will allow us to make more
timely capability trades, explore a broader range of options, and
upgrade our capabilities to keep them current.
The developmental goals drawn up by this interaction are
periodically reassessed until a decision is made to capture them and
fix the characteristics of each 2-year block increment of capability.
That is our plan--to be able to field, when directed, an effective
capability, proven through rigorous testing, in 2-year blocks and to
upgrade it incrementally and continually as the need arises. This
aspect is called evolutionary acquisition.
In sum, capability-based acquisition is a flexible approach to the
acquisition of complex systems, incorporating advanced technologies,
that permits the early deployment of a limited but effective capability
that can be progressively enhanced over time as needed. It provides for
continuous warfighter involvement and disciplined development aimed at
reducing cycle time. It stays relevant to the threat and remains
technologically current. That is our vision for the capability-based
approach and also how we intend to execute it.
This approach is not really new. Our Nation has used it
successfully in undertaking previously unprecedented technological
endeavors. Among other programs, we used this approach for making the
trade-offs and accelerating the schedule to develop the Polaris
submarine-launched ballistic missile and the SR-71 reconnaissance
aircraft. We are certainly familiar with upgrading systems over time.
The B-52s that flew over Afghanistan last fall were far different
aircraft than those that first rolled off the production lines five
decades ago.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

As we changed our approach to development, we found we also had to
change our approach to management. The program is moving from being
element-centric to system-centric, and the transitions during the
acquisition cycle are more complex, especially in the hand-off from
development to production. Our program has entered a new phase, having
moved from technology development to systems engineering and the very
significant challenge of integrating many diverse elements, including
battle management, into one BMD System. This management challenge is at
least equal to our technical ones, and it is no less urgent.
This challenge of systems engineering is unprecedented because not
only do we have thousands of individuals involved in hundreds of
efforts at dozens of locations, but we also are dealing with cutting-
edge technologies at varying levels of maturity, involving all Services
and their doctrines, investigating four different basing modes, and
making it all work together. The systems engineering task for the BMD
System involves, among other aspects, developing interface
requirements, element design requirements, verification methodologies,
and assessments needed for recommendations on system progress.
Our revised approach to acquisition now specifies three broad
phases: Development, Transition, and Procurement. As Director of the
MDA, I have oversight and responsibility for managing the first two
phases, Development and Transition. The SEC, upon my recommendation,
approves progression between the two.
During the Transition phase, the Services take on increasing
responsibilities, as elements move closer to production and possible
deployment. At the start of the third phase, Procurement, the Services
pick up responsibility for managing the production, fielding, training,
and support of the elements of the BMD System and their components.
Budgeting during this phase is divided. The MDA will budget for RDT&E
funds, and the Services will budget for procurement, operation, and
support funds.
Managing the transition between the Development and Procurement
phases will be complex, but it can be done efficiently and effectively.
While MDA retains system oversight, responsibility for each element is
shared by MDA and the Service that will operate it once deployed. We
will baseline the capabilities and configurations during transition,
and the Services will develop capability-based ORDs around performance
that, by this stage in development, has been characterized for a
particular element. These ORDs will become effective on transfer of the
element to the gaining Service.
MDA has overall responsibility for designing and maintaining the
integrated Missile Defense System. For this reason, MDA retains
responsibility for those element specifications that contribute to
ensuring full element integration into the initial system block and in
all subsequent blocks.
When ready, I will make recommendations for the procurement of
elements or their components. Only the SEC can approve the move to
production, and the associated budget and force structure objectives.
This decision point is not exactly equivalent to any milestone in
the traditional acquisition framework, but is tailored to be a decision
to transfer to a Service the responsibility for producing a particular
configuration of an element and operating it in a quantity appropriate
to the maturity of the system and its military utility. Should the SEC
approve the move, elements entering the procurement phase would fall
under the formal purview of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
or JROC, and traditional oversight and reporting mechanisms come into
play. As is the case now, the Under Secretary (AT&L) will continue to
oversee Service procurement activity.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Let me turn to the subject of congressional oversight. In the near
term, changes to the missile defense structure will lead to changes in
the information Congress had previously seen, since the former Major
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are now elements within the
overall BMD System. For example, prior reports included details for the
PAC-3, THAAD, NMD, Navy Area, ABL, and SBIRS-Low. These now lie within
the overall missile defense program. Additionally, these former reports
also included RDT&E, military construction, and procurement
information. Yet since the missile defense program is now primarily an
RDT&E program, unit cost information will be available only after
production decisions have been made. Thus while we have unit costs for
PAC-3 this year, the unit costs for other elements will come later.
That underscores the difficulty of estimating system or even
element costs at this time. RDT&E costs are expected to continue,
although future levels may vary depending on which elements and
components are chosen for full development. This parallels our RDT&E
experience in other systems as well, as we move to upgrade the right
capabilities in response to changes in the threat and technology.
Similarly, procurement costs and life cycle costs cannot be estimated
with precision at this time, because force structure decisions on the
elements or the components eventually chosen have not been made.
Nonetheless, we will submit to Congress a Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR) for the BMD System RDT&E program, to include major program
schedule objectives and an estimate of the BMD System and RDT&E program
funding. Without procurement, the report cannot address production unit
costs, but it will, however, include major prime contractor cost
performance data. Congress will receive unit costs to support planned
procurement once the SEC decides to start that procurement.
Additionally, we will be supplying--as we have this year--Congress
with annual detailed budget justification materials supporting the
President's budget submission. For example, this year's R-2 budget
document describing the details of our request is over 400 pages long.
The information is consistent with the BMD System work breakdown
structure, legislated program elements, and special interest items.
Included are detailed budget and schedule summaries for all major
budget projects within the system, such as the extensive engineering
and rigorous testing infrastructure and activities needed for THAAD and
Ground-based Midcourse Defense development.
Furthermore, in addition to the annual schedule of program
hearings, we have provided extensive briefings--and briefing
opportunities--to both Members of Congress and congressional staff
members. So far, during January and February of this year alone, we
have had over 25 hours of briefings on the program to personal and
professional staff. These briefings will continue as needed.

OPERATIONAL TESTING

During the development phase, MDA will be responsible for
conducting developmental testing with the purpose of characterizing the
capability and military utility of the technologies and their
integration, and for making recommendations for transition. As Director
of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, I was responsible for
that. As Director of the Missile Defense Agency, I remain so. That has
not changed. Moreover, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
is represented on the Missile Defense Support Group and as such will be
in a position to advise the Under Secretary and me throughout the
development and transition phases.
During the transition phase, an operational test agent will be
designated and focused operational testing will be conducted to
characterize the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
element block configuration under consideration. This operational
testing will be conducted under the oversight of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation and in accordance with a Test and
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) that he and I will jointly approve. Based
on the results of that operational testing and other inputs, the SEC
will decide whether to transfer the tested configuration of the element
to the Service for procurement and operation. All statutory
requirements relative to operational testing will be met. Our fiscal
year 2003 budget, presented separately, details our plan to expand the
BMD System test bed, useful for both developmental and operational
testing.

RELATIONSHIP WITH INDUSTRY

A final important facet of our restructured program is how we will
work with our industry partners to develop capability.
In many ways, our relationship with industry is even more complex
than with the Services. To help us find the right solution, we looked
at how other unprecedented programs had been managed in their day, and
these included such diverse and pioneering efforts as the Manhattan
Project, the Mercury, Apollo and ICBM program, and the experience with
the Space Shuttle. In each case, government maintained total program
responsibility, but what became clear was that the government, too
often, did not have a detailed enough understanding of either exactly
what to buy or what industry could offer. The solution lay in forging a
much closer relationship between government and industry than normal
practice entails.
This is the approach we are taking: to bring together as a national
team the best and the brightest from the government, academia, and
industry, so as to ensure timely and effective development of missile
defense capability. This management approach will provide significant
value to the missile defense program in bringing the best talent, the
essential capabilities, the right process methodologies, and all of the
pertinent proprietary information to bear on our solutions. It will
provide a strong, disciplined approach with incentives for high
performance and quality output.
To recap, government has total system responsibility. Industry
teams are responsible and accountable for block capability design, BMD
System integration, and the tough challenge of ensuring effective and
positive battle management, command and control. In addition to the
standard mechanisms of traditional program oversight, I intend to meet
regularly with the CEOs of the relevant firms. I have already met with
them, both singly and together as a group. They are on board.

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman, we have modified our approach to the acquisition of
missile defenses because of the changes in our world. September 11
brought home the lesson forcefully. As Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``We're
at a moment where we no longer have the margin for error [that we] . .
. had decades ago where our weapons were relatively short range and
where the warheads were relatively modest.\1\ '' We can expect to be
surprised again, and the consequences could be grave.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Interview with [Britain's] The Daily Telegraph, February 25,
2002.
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The Department has restructured the missile defense program so that
we can reduce our decision cycle time during development to handle a
very complex set of challenges and to react better and faster to
changes in the threat. The authorities granted to me as Director are
limited by checks and balances. They are monitored by a responsive
oversight process that will ensure accountability and visibility for
missile defense development both to the administration and to Congress.
Clearly, our ability to react rapidly to the swift-moving
international security environment, while at the same time reforming
how we do business within the Department, is a central challenge for
all of us. This committee's support for the President's Freedom to
Manage Initiative will reduce statutory requirements that can restrict
management flexibility, allowing us to more efficiently and effectively
execute the missile defense program with which we have been entrusted.
What is important is that, at the end of the day and with your
support, what we in the Missile Defense Agency deliver must be of use
to the warfighter and must improve our Nation's security. I am
committed to making sure that happens.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I welcome your and the
subcommittee's questions.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Your statements will all
be included in the record.
Let me also state that we are extremely fortunate to have
gentlemen like yourselves with experience and the dedication
that you bring to this endeavor. So, thank you.
Now let me recognize Senator Allard for any comments he
might have.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have some comments I would
submit for the record. I would like to get moving ahead with
the hearing. I ask unanimous consent that my remarks be made a
part of the record.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses today.
Secretary Aldridge, General Kadish, it's good to see you again, and Mr.
Christie, it's a pleasure to have you here today.
The Department of Defense is embracing capabilities-based, spiral
development as a means of putting militarily useful capability into the
hands of the warfighter faster than we have in the past. This is an
approach based on commercial and public sector best practices, and
consistent with recommendations in General Accounting Office (GAO)
studies solicited by this committee.
The Missile Defense Agency appears to me to be at the leading edge
of these broader changes within the Department of Defense. This past
year was a challenging one in many ways for the missile defense
community. General Kadish, you had the extraordinarily difficult task
of trying to manage very demanding programs, even as those programs
were being reoriented in a series of wrenching policy, organizational,
and management shifts. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization was
transformed into the Missile Defense Agency. You changed the whole
approach of your BMD program, from one built around stove-piped
elements to a single integrated BMD System to provide layered defenses
against missiles of all ranges. You have established a national team to
provide the expertise and insight to help integrate all the elements of
this system. You have had to adapt your management processes as
directed by Secretary Aldridge. You've had to alter program content to
reflect an acquisition approach that emphasizes technical maturity and
proven capability prior to deployment. That is a daunting agenda for 1
year, but one I think you handled well.
Successful acquisition and technology development organizations, as
documented by GAO, separate technology development from product
development and mature technology by using integrated engineering
prototypes before proceeding with production decisions. Many of these
approaches are being adopted by DOD. In practice, the spiral technology
development approach should allow for technology to mature under the
Missile Defense Agency to the point that it can be incorporated into a
program run by the Services without many of the problems associated
with past acquisition programs.
Will this approach be successful? No one can say. Acquisition
reform is always difficult. It will depend on good management
discipline at DOD. DOD's unreformed requirements and budget processes
will also challenge this new acquisition approach. I expect our
witnesses will have something to say about how the MDA will define BMD
requirements and how that will differ from the process as it applies to
other programs. In addition, the appropriate level of developmental
testing necessary to mature technology, as well as the level of
operational testing for each production spiral still needs to be worked
through. While the information I have seen to date leads me to believe
that the operational test and evaluation community will get visibility
and input into MDA programs, I look forward to our witnesses shedding
some light on how they anticipate this approach will work.
I know some critics may simply have a fundamental disagreement with
the direction of the entire Department of Defense acquisition reform
movement. Yet unless someone proposes a better alternative than this
new approach, we all may find ourselves in the awkward position of
having to live with the old Pentagon acquisition system, a system that
led to concurrent development of systems and technology, high technical
risk, schedule delays, cost increases, and weapons system cycle times
measured in decades--a system that for years this committee has sought
to improve. Personally, I don't believe that such a result would be
desirable.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for your patience today. I look
forward to working with you in the future in what I hope will be common
cause to improve the defense acquisition system and assure that
effective missile defenses are deployed as soon as practicable. I look
forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Senator Reed. I presume there is no other member who wants
to make an opening statement.
Senator Smith. I have one for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Without objection, it will be included in the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Bob Smith

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen, for taking time
out of your busy schedules to appear in front of this subcommittee. I
have long been a staunch and vocal proponent of missile defense. I want
to congratulate the administration for its total ``reinvention'' of the
missile defense program. I think it is exactly the right thing to do to
view ballistic missile defense from a single, integrated, layered
approach, and the elevation and renaming of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization to the Missile Defense Agency is a positive step.
I believe this approach best enables the MDA to drive toward its
priorities of defending the United States homeland, our deployed
forces, allies, and friends; providing layered defenses in the boost,
midcourse, and terminal phases of flight against all ranges of threats;
enabling the Services to field elements of the system as soon as
practicable; and to develop and deploy prototypes should the threat
warrant.
I applaud the progress that has been made. I also applaud the
innovative acquisition and programmatic review structure that has been
defined to assist this program through its development. I believe the
evolutionary spiral development process acknowledges that early in the
development phase it is impossible to define the end state of an
operational system, to be developed and fielded in an incremental
fashion which allows ``small steps'' to be taken first and lessons
drawn from them before requiring the system to ``run.''
Mr. Chairman, far too often the Services, with the best interests
in mind, develop Operational Requirements Documents much too early in
development and then spend money trying to drive to those requirements
with blinders on before seeing that the development path should be
driving towards alternative requirements.
This has been especially the case in space programs. The
evolutionary spiral development process will enable a prudent,
thoughtful approach to instituting increased requirements in the
program versus the traditional ``requirements creep.'' I believe the
programmmatic and acquisition review structure you have instituted is
very well thought out and is the right structure for an ambitious
missile defense program. There have been criticisms levied against the
program that somehow the program will have less oversight and will be
in the hands of a small group that will run rampant. Those arguments
are unfounded.
The review and oversight of the missile defense program, in fact,
will be far more robust than that on traditional programs. The program
will be reviewed by the DOD's Senior Executive Council at least
annually, where other programs are reviewed only at major milestones or
events. Both the Missile Defense Support and the Working Group,
consisting of membership form the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
operational test and evaluation, and other offices that normally are
represented on Defense Acquisition Boards, will review the program at
far greater intervals than normal programs. Congress will also be
affored many opportunities to review the program.
Again, I applaud you gentlemen, and the administration, for showing
the courage to revamp the missile defense program into one that has the
highest probability for success. I look forward to working closely with
you to help make it happen.

Senator Reed. We will conduct 6-minute rounds of questions.
Let me begin, and we will take as many rounds as necessary to
answer all of our questions.
Gentlemen, section 232 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 states the following:
``Officials and elements of the Department of Defense specified
shall, on an ongoing basis, review the development of missile
defense goals and the annual missile defense program plan and
provide to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, now the Missile Defense
Agency, any comments on such matters as considered
appropriate.''
Included among that group of designated agencies is your
agency, Mr. Christie. Did you have an opportunity, prior to the
submission of the program plan and defense goals to Congress,
to provide any comments on the development of the goals and
program plan in accordance with section 232?
Mr. Christie. To be brutally frank, I did not have that
opportunity this year. I will have that opportunity in the
future. I think the plans were put together toward the end of
the year, and I had made arrangements with General Kadish to
begin our process of oversight and interaction with his staff
once the process of restructuring the MDA programs and
organization was completed. Unfortunately, we did not have the
opportunity to look at the budget preparation before it was
submitted to the Hill.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Christie.
General Kadish, did you provide your goals and program plan
to all of the organizations, stipulated in section 232, prior
to submitting them to Congress?
General Kadish. We made the normal budget submission
through the departmental process. I would have to go back and
check to make sure of all the areas in that section. I am not
familiar with them at this point. But we went through the
normal process within the Department in a very expedited manner
because of the time lines we were facing.
Senator Reed. Could you, for the record, indicate whether
or not you provided those goals and plans?
General Kadish. I would be happy to, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
[The information referred to follows:]

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 was
signed into law on December 28, 2001. By that date, the Missile Defense
Agency's fiscal year 2003 budget estimate had already been prepared by
the agency and forwarded through Department of Defense channels to the
Office of Management and Budget. Consistent with Department processes
in effect prior to the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act, the
budget estimate and the accompanying goals and program plan were
reviewed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics and the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, but
not by the other three offices identified in Section 232(e).
Processes for the fiscal year 2004 budget estimate will include the
five offices identified in Section 232(e). In addition, all are members
of the Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG). The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics established this
group in February 2002 to provide a continuing role in providing
insights and advice throughout the development of the Ballistics
Missile Defense System (BMDS). In this role, the MDSG will have regular
access to BMDS program information on an ongoing basis.

Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, just a follow-up point,
if those goals and plans were not provided, are you going to
follow through and ensure that this section of the law has been
complied with in this budget cycle and in the future?
Secretary Aldridge. Absolutely. The process last year was
somewhat rapid and condensed, based upon a lot of reasons,
starting with September 11. So, a lot of things we would
probably have done in a normal year were not completed to the
degree we would like.
I would just say the program content that has been
submitted to Congress has gone through the Senior Executive
Council, which is the Deputy Secretary, myself, and the Service
Secretaries, along with the management structure. We all
supported that particular activity.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you indicate that the new
missile defense program has the same reporting requirements to
Congress that all other programs have. Section 2430 of Title 10
defines a Major Defense Acquisition Program, or an MDAP, as
``an acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive
classified program that is estimated by the Secretary of
Defense to require an eventual total expenditure for research,
development, test, and evaluation of more than $300 million.''
Virtually all major missile defense programs fall into that
category, and in fact, as of December 2000, all major missile
defense programs were MDAPs.
Section 2413 of Title 10 requires submission each year of
an MDAP for the development schedule, including estimated
annual costs until development is completed, the planned
procurement schedule, including the best estimate of the
Secretary Defense, and the annual cost and units to be
produced.
It is my understanding that this information was not fully
submitted to Congress. Why not?
Secretary Aldridge. I think there is a definition problem
with what a Major Defense Acquisition Program is. In the
ballistic missile defense program we have laid out, it is
undefined that any one of the elements is an MDAP until there
is a decision to proceed with a deployment or some plan to
proceed with the deployment in some future year. At this point
in time, it is undefined as to what it is that we are going to
build, what are the technologies we have in place. Right now,
we are just working through a research and development program.
In any event, let me just say that there is no intent to
deny Congress any information and that the plan is to provide
all information required by Congress, by whatever provisions
there are, both in terms of Selected Acquisition Reports,
detailed budget information, and that type of data.
So, at this point, I think the question is a definition of
an MDAP and what is the precise reporting requirement for the
Department. Whether or not it is an MDAP, the data will be
provided to Congress, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Again, just to clarify my understanding, many of these
programs in the missile defense area were MDAPs as of December
2000 and became transformed into something other than an MDAP
after that. Is that correct?
Secretary Aldridge. That is correct. We terminated those
programs as MDAPs because they did not fall into the definition
of what a Major Defense Acquisition Program would be. But we
certainly continue the program and keep the contracts, and we
will report those to Congress whether or not they are MDAPs.
Senator Reed. Well, you are as experienced as anyone, and
you understand that this is one of those baseline information
requirements that is not only helpful to Congress, but helpful
to the management of the Department of Defense.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, I do know that.
Senator Reed. That raises a second question, which is, is
it your position that the law is satisfied by your simply
giving us the information? Or do you feel that you have to give
this information to us?
Secretary Aldridge. We have to give the information to you,
sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Now I would like to recognize Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Aldridge, General Kadish, and Mr. Christie, I
want to welcome you.
Secretary Aldridge, one of the criticisms that seems to be
creeping up from time to time in the press--I think following
the last hearing, maybe we read a little bit about it--is that
there are those who are suggesting that the way the Missile
Defense Agency has been reorganized reduces or even negates
independent oversight of some missile defense programs.
Would you generally discuss the effectiveness in the past
of OSD oversight for development and acquisition programs and
talk about the need to improve or streamline the oversight
processes?
Secretary Aldridge. All right, sir. First of all, most of
the activities in the Department of Defense on acquisition are
associated with a single program, whether it is an F-22 or a
Joint Strike Fighter, a ship, a tank, or a combat vehicle, and
the process that occurs under those is very well-defined in
milestones of A, B, and C. There are groups inside of the
Department of Defense called Overarching Integrated Product
Teams (OIPTs) that consist of individual members of the various
organizations who look at these programs together and then make
recommendations as they move through the milestones and through
the decision process, usually through Defense Acquisition
Boards (DABs). But those are associated with essentially a
single type of program in which the individuals involved can
talk to a program manager. He has a very specific thing to do,
and the process works, I would say, well. We have done some
things to improve it--and maybe we will talk about that later
on--in trying to streamline that process even more.
In missile defense, it is a different issue. We have a
program that is highly complex with a series of programs with
sensors, with interceptors, with the command and control
system, it is what we define as a system of systems. It is not
any one program. It is a system of systems, which makes the
acquisition process very difficult. What we were trying to do
with this process is to try to keep the focus on getting a
system deployed, but doing it in a way that takes into account
that there are multiple systems that have to be reviewed from
multiple offices.
We have 13 individuals through the Missile Defense Support
Group that have equities in missile defense, but we have
brought them together into a single team so that they have
access to the same information from the MDA and they all are
not going to the program individually at different times asking
for different types of information. It is our view that with
this Missile Defense Support Group, by having its 13 members
working together, there is a synergy between individual members
hearing things, hearing the thoughts of the other people on the
team that can provide better oversight of what is going on in
the missile defense program.
There is one other point, and that is that this is only
during the research and development phase when this activity
will be undertaken. When there is a decision to move a
particular system, as we have done for the Army's PAC-3 system,
then the acquisition system goes back to the normal process of
the Defense Acquisition Boards. As these programs come out of
missile defense and go to production and go to deployment, the
normal DAB process will continue. So, the oversight
responsibility we are talking about is that which exists only
during the research and development phase.
I think what we have done here is to provide a unique
ability to monitor this very complex system in a way that is
going to give General Kadish the responsibility and authority
to manage his program efficiently and yet still provide the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services,
which are members of this team, including DOT&E, including the
Joint Staff, the ability to see into the program for the
purpose of advising me, the Missile Defense Agency, and the
Senior Executive Council on new things to do.
Let me just say one short thing about acquisition
streamlining. We have mandated now that spiral development
shall be one of the milestones and characteristics of programs
that we produce. What do we mean by spiral development? That is
the ability to deploy something that is maybe not the 100
percent solution, but it is the 80 percent solution with an
architecture that would allow that capability to be improved
with time as technology matures. That is a way to get these
systems in the field sooner with less risk, less cost
uncertainty, change uncertainty, and it allows us to, in some
cases, get older systems out of the field quicker or, in the
case of missile defense, to get the system in the field
quicker. So, that is one area that we have been focused on to
streamline the process.
The other is in the Defense Acquisition Board, where we
have reduced the size of the Defense Acquisition Board from 16
members to 10, and we now have included the Service
Secretaries. So, the DAB is now the decision board of the
Department for defense acquisition, and because the Service
Secretaries sit on that board, the process works extremely well
and much faster because they are the decision makers. We do not
have to staff decisions after the board meets.
We are seeing the acquisitions process go much faster. In
fact, in some cases, we do not have to have DAB meetings
because the process does work.
Sir, that is probably a long answer to your short question.
Senator Allard. You took up all my time. [Laughter.]
Secretary Aldridge. I am sure you will go around again.
Senator Allard. We wanted to have a full response and I
appreciate your full response. When my time allows, I will come
back with a follow-up question to Mr. Christie as to how he
views his role.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too
appreciate you gentlemen being here today to help enlighten us
as to the process with respect to budgeting for missile
defense.
As you may recall from previous hearings and meetings, one
of my concerns has been knowing when we are moving from
research and development to deployment. I asked some of your
colleagues will we know when we are there, because it was very
difficult to try to dissect and delineate in the budget what
was purely research and development and those elements that
began to blur potential deployment or readiness for deployment.
We have gone 6 more months since those questions were
appropriate, so what is the distinction between deployment and
research and development?
Obviously, the concern is treaty obligations, but I think
it is also a matter of budget concern even if we did not run
the risk of being in violation of a current treaty. I would ask
you, General Kadish, because we have had this sort of
conversation previously.
General Kadish. Senator, the way the program is
constructed, with the exception of PAC-3, which is in the early
phases of procurement and deployment, all our efforts are
oriented to research and development and the test
infrastructure in order to support to that. We have not
proposed to Secretary Aldridge or the Department specific
deployments other than in PAC-3.
I suspect, however, that as we go forward in the coming
months and years, we will be proposing those efforts based on
the success or lack thereof of our research and development
program.
I would also say that everything we are doing in terms of
the application of the budget to fiscal year 2002 is still in
compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty until June 13
or 14 of this year. We will continually evaluate that.
But our efforts right now are not to specifically produce
elements for deployment activities, except for PAC-3.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, with the suggestion
that success may or may not be defined as the 100 percent
solution, has there been any further effort to define what
might be considered success in terms of testing that might lead
to a request for deployment? What I am asking for is a
percentage. Would it be 80 percent, 90 percent, or 50 percent?
Give me some idea of what we would consider successful in terms
of moving forward.
General Kadish. Senator, we are now in the process of
refining our definitions, our understanding, but basically I
think they are going to stay pretty much the same in terms of
what we used to call single-shot probability of kill and the
different measures we use for effectiveness. Rather than give
you specific numbers in open testimony, I would rather provide
them in a classified arrangement at the appropriate time.
Senator Ben Nelson. That would be fine. But are you working
on what constitutes sufficient success so as to lead to a
recommendation to deploy the system?
General Kadish. That is correct. This gets to be a very
important part of this evolutionary capability approach that we
are taking because success definitions will be an important
part of the decision to move forward. Let me put it this way:
Right now we have zero probability of intercepting a ballistic
missile. Some judgment will have to be made as to whether or
not anything greater than zero is useful, and those things will
be a part of not only the technical judgments, but the
operational judgments made by a larger group within the
Department, in my view.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that very much. Obviously,
I think all of us are hoping that the program can be successful
and be a part of our national defense, certainly against the
kind of weapons of mass destruction that may come our way, and
being able to prevent that from happening is in everybody's
best interest. I also think, though, given the fact that we are
stretching dollars to do a lot of different things in the
military budget, you can appreciate the fact that we are always
going to be a little bit concerned about how much of our budget
we put in missile defense. Certainly, research and development
is one thing, but the standard has to be relatively high for us
to be able to deploy a system. I appreciate the fact you are
working on it.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me echo what the chairman and others
said. How great it is to have you three people in the positions
that you are in at this time of great threat to our Nation. I
appreciate your service very much.
This hearing is on acquisition and oversight. I would like
to talk about the oversight portion of that.
First of all, General Kadish, just for clarification, you
made reference in your testimony to the contingency
capabilities of THAAD and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense.
Now, some of the missile defense opponents out there seem to
have misunderstood that this contingency capability is
equivalent to operational deployment capability in these
systems. I wonder if we could clarify this. My understanding is
that if you have something that is not yet fully developed, it
could still be used in the event that we have nothing else to
use at that time. Would you clarify this?
General Kadish. Senator, there has been a lot of
misunderstanding about this contingency capability, and you are
right to try to clarify it.
Whether we are talking about missile defense or not,
whether it is a Global Hawk or any other system, whenever you
have a testing asset or something that is in testing for
developmental purposes, you have an inherent capability because
nothing existed before you built that. The question comes, in
the way we have constructed our program, at what point in time
would you be able to use a missile defense asset that is in
testing to protect ourselves or deployed forces if the need
arose and we were in some extreme situation? I think that the
answer to that question is whenever we have a test asset that
is under testing, if it is in the right position, if it could
be used in an operational mode, just as we are using the Global
Hawk today, which is in development, in Afghanistan for
operational purposes.
The very fact that a test activity exists could be used for
operational capability, but it will not be up to what the
original standards that we were trying to develop a particular
system for. You would pay a high price in a sense because you
would not be able to do much more testing with that asset.
So, the idea of test assets being used in contingency
operations when there is a wartime need, or in the case of
missile defense, when there is a peacetime need to have that
capability as a deterrent or otherwise, will always be there in
our development process.
Senator Inhofe. The way I have stated it before is that if
it is not perfect, it is better than nothing if nothing is what
we have right now.
General Kadish. That is exactly right.
Senator Inhofe. I have gone through 8 or 9 years of being
really distressed about the continued underestimating of the
threat that is out there. I began to get concerned about this
when President Clinton vetoed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, and in his veto
message, he said that the major reason was that there is money
in there for a missile defense system and there is no threat.
Of course, the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, of 1995
said that before a rogue nation would have any kind of
capability, it would be many years. It was way out into the
future, which we know, now, was not the case.
Later on we found that they used the word ``indigenous.''
Well, to me it makes no difference whether a rogue nation
develops a missile that can reach Washington, DC, that is
indigenous or whether they buy it with technology from China or
somebody else.
It was music to my ears on July 12, 2001, when Secretary
Wolfowitz said, ``While we have been debating the existence of
the threat for nearly a decade, other countries have been
busily acquiring, developing, and proliferating missile
technology. We can afford to debate the threat no longer. We
are in a race against time, and we are starting from behind,
thanks in no small part to the constraints of the antiquated
ABM Treaty.''
Could you share with us your views on the growing
likelihood of rogue nations having missile capability that
would be a threat to us?
General Kadish. I guess the way I would like to start the
answer to that question is that I review the intelligence data
every day to make sure that we have consistency with our
developmental program, and that we can be responsive to what we
are actually designing against the threat. From a missile
proliferation standpoint, the threats we see that are
developing outside of Russia and China, they are significant,
especially in the short-range and intermediate-range missiles,
and moving very rapidly in my opinion to long-range missiles.
So, we have a threat that is somewhat unprecedented for us in
terms of missile proliferation and weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Aldridge, do you have any
comments on that?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. Just to highlight what
General Kadish says, this is a missile defense program that is
not just aimed at national missile defense. This is defense of
our troops in the field, in addition to national missile
defense. There is no doubt that there are threats of short-
range, medium-range, and long-range. So, the threats that this
system must deal with are there. They are being tested today in
a wide variety of ways. So, there is no doubt that there is a
threat. The threat is here. It is growing and the program we
have laid out is a way to try to handle that.
The program is also dealing with intercepts at various
stages of the missile's trajectory, in the terminal phase, in
the midcourse phase, and we are working on the boost-phase
intercept, which makes it very difficult for an adversary to
design a countermeasure against all types of intercepts that we
could employ in our system. So, not only must we deal with the
current threat, we must think about the future threats as they
evolve. Our program, as it is laid out, is designed exactly for
that reason.
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired and I do want to follow
through with this later. I am glad we are no longer talking
about a national missile defense system and a theater missile
defense system as though they are unrelated but we are talking
about a defense system against a missile.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. That is a long time coming. I am glad to
hear we finally are talking about it that way.
Gentlemen, the Department has canceled these Operational
Requirements Documents (ORDs) as they pertain to missile
defense programs. They defined in some detail, or tried to,
just what the capabilities of the system would be at the time
it was developed and deployed. It seems to me that is
consistent with what you are trying to do in terms of the
flexibility for a spiral development process.
Let me ask you first, Mr. Secretary, what is the
alternative process here to ensure that the architecture of
missile defense will head us toward an integrated solution? You
have at least some idea down the road where we are headed. I do
not think I can think of any particular system, from some
military requirement or even building a car, for that matter
where if you do not have some idea of what your end goal is as
to what its function is, how you can continue to develop it?
Secretary Aldridge. Sir, I believe we are taking a slightly
different approach in missile defense, and the approach we are
taking is called capabilities-based. It is different from an
ORD that would say to you, you would not deploy a system until
it achieves a .95 kill probability against 10 rockets or 10
ballistic missiles within 5 minutes. If General Kadish could
say I can shoot down 8 of these missiles, it is going to take
me 6 minutes with a kill probability of .9, it may be
sufficient that we say that is a capability we believe we need.
It is adequate for our needs to protect our country at this
time against that threat.
Then what we would do is, if we deployed it, because it was
a capability that we believed we needed, we could improve it
with time so that pretty soon it could do 10 missiles in 5
minutes and then maybe 50 missiles in 1 minute. So, the idea of
a capabilities-based decision to deploy is that it gives us
what we need at the time, irrespective of whether or not we had
an operational requirement for certain probabilities.
This is not serving our needs at this time for this
program. It serves other programs perfectly fine where there
may be a more well-defined threat, a certain armor plating
thickness, and things of that nature. For this system, that is
not appropriate.
Senator Smith. General Kadish, with respect to the
warfighter, how are we going to ensure that he believes that it
is going to be militarily useful for him?
General Kadish. The essence of the capability-based
approach and spiral development is that we have a tight linkage
with the warfighter and the developer at the same time.
Traditional ORD documentation gives you a time period where
warfighters specify a requirement and then give it to the
developers that write them in the specifications and then we
give it to a contractor.
This effort is for us to try to do that together, given the
fact that we can now make trades among different system
elements that we did not think about before because we had an
ORD for a Navy Theater-Wide system and we had an ORD for a
national missile defense system. Now we can look at sensors and
missiles, interceptors, and communications systems that bring
these together, and our hope is that we are going to be able to
make a better system among those elements doing it without the
ORD specifications and in a faster time line.
Senator Smith. I do not think it is arguable that probably
the most mature BMD System that we have now is the PAC-3.
Right? I think we would all agree on that.
Just using that as a yardstick, did the PAC-3 ORD that was
laid out a few years ago accurately or inaccurately come close
at all to reflecting the threats that we now expect the PAC-3
to deal with?
General Kadish. It put us in the ballpark, but we are
dealing with threats now that are much different than what PAC-
3 was originally specified to counter. That is part of the
problem with threat-based, ORD-based requirements because you
have to deal with an exquisitely defined intelligence threat
that may or may not be wrong. So, although we have a general
capability with PAC-3 that is pretty good, we still do not meet
all the definitions of threats that we had set out to
accomplish with that particular effort.
Now, we are going to upgrade it over time. That is the
whole idea with all our elements, but that is the nature of the
threat that we have to deal with. If a threat was specified in
the ORD document to go 1,000 kilometers and we find out it goes
1,200 kilometers, that is a difference in the requirement.
Senator Smith. A lot of criticism was thrown out there,
over the past 12 years that I have been on this committee. The
term ``redundancy'' has been used a number of times in terms of
the systems, which I never really believed was the case. But if
there was some redundancy--and apparently that seems to be the
conclusion now because of the way we are moving toward
elimination of some of these systems--was any of that caused
by, in your opinion, the demarcation that we used with the ABM
Treaty between theater and national missile defense systems?
Could we have avoided a lot of wasted money and perhaps gone
quicker toward the more integrated system if we had not been
dealing with trying to finesse that ABM Treaty as to what was
theater, what was not theater, et cetera?
Secretary Aldridge. That is a hard one.
Prior to this time, prior to the time that General Kadish
and the Secretary reorganized the program to include a much
broader scale of intercept zones, as well as ballistic missile
ranges that we wanted to detect, the program was designed with
the ABM Treaty in mind, with its restrictions. Since that time,
we have designed the program without the ABM Treaty, although
we are abiding by the provisions of the treaty and we are not
doing things that we could be doing in the test program that
would give us additional information that would aid decisions
for the future. We are not now doing those until we get to June
13. So, there has been some degradation of the information that
we would have available because of the ABM Treaty, and I
believe the President, looking at that and the needs for the
future--that is the reason he has made the decision to withdraw
from that treaty because it will, in fact, impede us in the
future.
Senator Smith. Thank you. That is a good answer. I
appreciate it.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Smith.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
make a brief statement and have my full statement placed in the
record.
Senator Reed. Without objection, Senator.
Senator Akaka. On Monday, I chaired an open session of the
International Security and Proliferation Subcommittee of the
Governmental Affairs Committee, at which the Central
Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic and Nuclear Program's, Robert Walpole, testified. Mr.
Walpole made three points in that hearing which are worth
repeating today.
First, the immediate threat to American forward-deployed
forces and allies comes from short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles and land attack cruise missiles.
Second, United States territory is more likely to be
attacked with weapons of mass destruction using non-missile
means.
Third, some countries with ballistic missile systems, such
as Iran and North Korea, are upgrading their capability to
launch ICBMs, but Iran is not likely to attempt to test launch
an ICBM until the last half of the decade.
These conclusions suggest our missile defense program
should concentrate on the immediate threat while designing and
testing the capability to address the long-term threat from
rogue states.
I thought I would share that in this meeting.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. This is a
critical issue that deserves all the attention you are giving it.
On Monday, I chaired an open session of the International Security
Subcommittee of the Governmental Affairs Committee at which the Central
Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
Nuclear Programs, Robert Walpole, testified.
Mr. Walpole made three points in that hearing which are worth
repeating today:
First, the immediate threat to American forward-deployed forces and
allies comes from short- and medium-range ballistic missile and land-
attack cruise missiles.
Second, United States territory is more likely to be attacked with
weapons of mass destruction using nonmissile means.
Third, some countries with ballistic missile systems, such as Iran
and North Korea, are upgrading their capability to launch ICBMs, but
Iran is not likely to attempt to test launch an ICBM until the last
half of the decade.
These conclusions suggest our missile defense program should
concentrate on the immediate threat while designing and testing the
capability to address the long term threat from rogue states.
I am concerned that the new, $7 billion ``capabilities-based''
program being proposed by the administration for missile defense does
not ensure that we will have a missile defense system capable of doing
anything well. Rather than taking a targeted approach which would
ensure the development of a missile defense capability, the proposed
program seems to take a shot-gun approach, scattering our money and
technical expertise across a range of too many technologies.
In addition, the budget documents presented to Congress so far seem
more notional than real. This would not be of concern if the
administration was presenting us with a hypothetical program, but
unfortunately these are real dollars which the President wants Congress
to approve now and commit to in the out-years. Without more specific
justification and numbers, it is hard to understand how the
administration has arrived at this $7 billion-plus program.
Moreover, the administration wants to remove this program from the
normal checks and balances of a major acquisition program, cancelling
the Operational Requirements Documents and excluding the Pentagon's
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from his usual oversight.
Instead, the administration is proposing that part of the job of
overseeing whether or not the program is functioning properly be done
by the major industry contractors involved in developing the program.
This is a bit like putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. Enron did
this with its outside auditors, and we know how well that worked.
We need a missile defense capability. We need it sooner rather than
later, but we need it to work against real world enemies. I am not
certain that the approach being proposed by the administration achieves
either objective.
Thank you, and I look forward to the testimony.

Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, according to a memorandum
from the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency will
no longer rely upon system threat assessment reports developed
by the Defense Department's intelligence agencies, but will
develop a unique document called an adversary capabilities
document.
My question is, will the preparation of the adversary
capabilities document require that the Missile Defense Agency
duplicate functions performed by other parts of the Department
of Defense?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir. The threat capabilities
document will be based upon the work of multiple defense
agencies as inputs. It is really the document that the Missile
Defense Agency needs to have with that type of data so they can
design missile defense systems against these capabilities, but
there is no intent to duplicate what is going on in the other
agencies, certainly in the intelligence agencies.
General Kadish. If I could add to that, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Yes, General.
General Kadish. Where we have an intelligence estimate that
defines the threat, it will include automatically that
intelligence estimate. But what we are trying to do is work
with the capabilities-based approach, where we define
parameters larger than that threat estimate, for instance. They
tend to be point-designed solutions given to us about what the
threat looks like. We would like to hedge the uncertainty of us
making a mistake in that area, and go to what we call physics-
based assessments and look at the physical parameters that
could be around that threat and design, as best we can, for
those parameters which would include the specific definition by
the intelligence community. So, it is a much more effective way
in my view of defining the threat for our purposes.
Senator Akaka. The Secretary's memorandum directs the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
to base production decisions on initial performance
demonstrated through credible testing, availability of system
alternatives, and threat evolution.
Would initial performance be based on developmental
testing, operational testing, or some other form of testing?
Secretary Aldridge. It will be based on the developmental
testing to date, but it will continue after that decision to
ensure that when we get to the point of becoming operational,
there will be additional tests to be done. That will become
part of Mr. Christie's office, to look at the operational side
of things, while he is continuing to oversee the development
testing as well through our Missile Defense Support Group.
Senator Akaka. In that memorandum too, the Secretary
directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to plan and execute work such that it
may be truncated or stopped under certain circumstances.
What metrics will be used to determine which programs will
be truncated or stopped?
Secretary Aldridge. Sir, we have laid out a program for
missile defense that, in some cases, has multiple or parallel
technology paths that may or may not work. If at any point we
see that the technology is not performing at the level that we
desire, the cost is growing too large, or the schedule is not
sufficient to meet the architecture we laid out for missile
defense, we will make a decision as to whether to proceed on
that program or not.
There is a process in place by which that is done. Major
decisions of that kind will be made by the Senior Executive
Council, which essentially will be the board of directors. They
will make a recommendation. Of course, the Secretary of
Defense, the President, and ultimately Congress have to support
that decision of whether or not to deploy where a capability
that has been demonstrated is sufficient to meet the needs of
the Nation at that time. So, it is elevated at a higher level
and a variety of metrics will be determined.
We were faced with a problem just recently with the Navy
Area terminal defense system, which exceeded its cost
estimates, and we faced up to that decision and decided to
terminate that program because it was not under control, as it
was defined, and it violated the Nunn-McCurdy Act. It was given
to me for the purpose of certification that the program should
continue, and I could not meet the certification criteria to
continue the program and I terminated it.
Senator Akaka. In the January 2, 2002 memorandum, the
Secretary directed the Missile Defense Agency's director to use
transactions other than contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements to carry out applied and advanced research. So, what
selection criteria will determine whether the agency uses other
transactions for a project?
Secretary Aldridge. I would like to ask General Kadish to
address that, if I could.
Senator Akaka. General.
General Kadish. We intend to use the other transactions
authority based on the authority being granted in the first
place for prototyping and rapid acquisition activities. For the
most part, however, I see us, at least at this point in time,
using the traditional authorities for our major efforts. But
where it is appropriate--and it gets to be a judgment call at
some point in the process--we will use the other transaction
authority for our beneficial purposes. But as a matter of fact,
I think that over time we will basically use the contracting
authority that is in the Federal acquisition regulations, but
we will look every time at whether other transaction authority
makes sense.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing a
former member of this subcommittee to join you today. Senator
Allard, you do a fine job as ranking member for this
subcommittee and I commend you and Senator Reed. I have sat in
both of those seats in years past.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. You are an old friend and an old
colleague.
Senator Smith asked a key question relative to the ABM
Treaty, and I have propounded that same question I think for
almost 24 consecutive years to previous panels here.
Consistently impartial observations by your predecessors, both
uniformed and civilian, have been that this Nation was going to
comply with the ABM Treaty, but that we recognized that the
treaty imposed, in all probability, delays, higher costs, and
the possibility of, in the end, getting a system which was more
expensive, took longer to build, and could not be as efficient
and as effective. Therefore, I commend the President for his
decision to withdraw from the treaty, and hopefully you will
reappear before this subcommittee after the withdrawal date and
we will look at what your new ideas are.
I would like to ask you about the Arrow program. Congress
has been supportive of the Arrow program. Mr. Secretary, what
provisions do we have this year, in terms of funding and
sharing of technology, for Arrow? General, what is your
professional view as to the effectiveness of the Arrow system,
because I think there has been a rather dramatic breakthrough
in missile defense in Israel.
Secretary Aldridge. Senator, we certainly have been
following that program for quite a few years and it has been a
successful program. We have funding in the budget request to
continue that. We have also provided co-production for
producing that missile in our country. I do not recall the
numbers. General Kadish can address that, but it is certainly
something that has been supported by previous administrations,
and this administration, and I will let General Kadish talk
about where we think we are headed.
General Kadish. Senator, I think we have close to a billion
dollars in investment in the Arrow program with the Israelis.
They declared it operational, I think 8 or 9 months ago. I
would have to get you the exact date. It is the only blast
fragmentation, non-nuclear missile defense system deployed in
the world today.
It is effective. The flight tests have shown that they can
reach the parameters that they are going after and they can
destroy the missiles. As Secretary Aldridge said, we have a
continuing relationship with the Israelis. I believe the number
is on the order of $60 million in this budget request. I would
have to get you the exact number for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Successful tests of the Arrow Weapons System, particularly the
September 14, 2000, intercept flight test, prompted the Israel Defense
Force (IDF) to declare the Arrow operational effective October 17,
2000.

[In millions of dollars]
The fiscal year 2003 funding breakout is as follows:
Arrow System Improvement Program....................... 55
Co-manufacturing....................................... 5
Israeli Test Bed....................................... 3
Israel System Architecture & Integration............... 2
Program Support........................................ 1
Total.............................................. 66

Section 8112 of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Appropriations Act
provided additional funds for establishing an Arrow production
capability in the United States, and MDA has programmed $40 million for
this purpose. In response to that direction, the U.S.-Israel Arrow Co-
Production Capability Development (ACCD) program will provide for
establishing in the United States, by the end of fiscal year 2004, the
capability of U.S. co-produced Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Category II and non-MTCR controlled Arrow missile components to assist
Israel with Israeli co-produced components, assembled by Israel into
prototype Arrow missiles, and tested in Israel to qualify both nations'
Arrow missile component co-production lines. The MDA has programmed $45
million ($40 million in fiscal year 2002 and $5 million in fiscal year
2003) for the ACCD which includes only pre-production activities.

Senator Warner. I think that is correct. But their test
program has been exemplary.
General Kadish. Yes, it has. They have had their failures
just like we have, but the record of success has proven the
adequacy of the program.
Senator Warner. Is it a system that has the potential to
augment our own PAC-3 and other defensive measures?
General Kadish. Yes, Senator, it does. We have done
numerous interoperability demonstrations with Israel to ensure
that we can have interoperability and provide a layered-like
defense using Patriot, and those have been very successful.
In the future, we are going to be looking harder at this as
time goes on and as we look at the overall Ballistic Missile
Defense Systems that we are going to be investigating from a
technical standpoint. So, it certainly has a large impact and a
large usefulness for the Israelis, and other uses of it will
have to be determined in the future, if any.
Senator Warner. Is another use possibly incorporating it in
our own inventory of defenses?
General Kadish. I would not rule that out, but from a
technical standpoint, there are other issues associated that
are programmatic, and budgetary, and it would have to go
through a review. But anything that contributes to our missile
defense capability is a good thing from my perspective.
Senator Warner. I think it is worthy of that consideration.
I thank the chairman and the ranking member.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Mr. Christie, in your statement for today's hearing, you
said that you wanted to assure that DOT&E's access to Missile
Defense Agency plans and programs is adequate for us to
accomplish our oversight mission, which is a sentiment I
certainly applaud. Can you ensure that proper robust testing is
planned and executed for the missile defense system if you and
your staff and support contractors are not involved in test
planning?
Mr. Christie. I did not say that we are not involved in the
test planning.
Let me back up a little bit to last summer. Shortly after I
was confirmed, I met with both Secretary Aldridge and General
Kadish about how we would go about executing our oversight
responsibilities as General Kadish was restructuring the
program. By mutual agreement, I backed off until the programs
were restructured before my staff became more intimately
involved. Now, we continued to exercise our oversight on PAC-3,
since that was entering operational testing, but heretofore
until the first of the year, we had not been intimately
involved.
We are involved now, and I have no reason to believe that
we will not be able to carry out our normal oversight
responsibilities to include being involved with the MDA in
their test planning activities, as well as observing the tests,
evaluating the results, and providing an independent evaluation
of those results.
Senator Reed. But at this point, with the exception of PAC-
3, you are not personally, nor is your staff, intimately
knowledgeable about the details of these programs?
Mr. Christie. Oh, I would not say that. I am not sure I am
intimately knowledgeable on all those programs, but I think we
have had access to all of their documentation since it was
presented to Congress. So, we are getting into the details of
all the programs. Accordingly, I would not characterize us as
not having access.
Senator Reed. Would you characterize your access as
unfettered, not just yourself but all of your staff members and
relevant contractors, anyone that you would want to have
access?
Mr. Christie. I cannot answer that in a positive manner at
this point because we are still evolving in this process. My
agreements with General Kadish and the work between my staff
and his show no indication that that is not going to be case. I
cannot say at this point in time that we have unfettered access
to what is going on there, but I have no reason to believe that
we will not as time evolves.
Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, Secretary Aldridge, and General
Kadish, as I understand Title 10, the Director is given
specific statutory authority, access to all records and data in
the Department of Defense, including the records and data of
each Military Department that the Director considers necessary
to review in order to carry out his duties under the section.
So, it would appear to me, statutorily, that Mr. Christie can
have access to any data, without agreements, from anyone in the
Department. Is that your understanding, Secretary Aldridge?
Secretary Aldridge. That is my understanding.
Senator Reed. That is, indeed, the policy.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me return to an issue that was raised previously about
contingency deployments and General Kadish's explanation of the
confusion. But let me take it from this perspective.
The administration proposes to buy hardware in 2003 to
support contingency deployments in 2004 for a number of missile
defenses, including national missile defense, THAAD, Navy
Theater Wide, and the Airborne Laser (ABL).
In the past, for virtually all major defense programs, a
rigorous set of operational tests has been performed prior to a
deployment, contingency or otherwise, and it was done for
obvious reasons, to make sure the systems actually work before
you raise not only the expectations that they will work among
the American public, but also the reliance that the military
will put upon these systems.
Now, Mr. Christie, you are in charge of operational
testing. Are there any plans to conduct any operational testing
on any of these missile defense programs prior to 2004?
Mr. Christie. The programs you mentioned? I do not think
so. I think a 2004 decision, if it happens, will be based
primarily on technical testing, if such a decision to deploy is
made. My view is at that point in time I will be called upon or
my office will, in fact, have the responsibility to report to
General Kadish and to Secretary Aldridge and to the Secretary
our view, based on the testing to date, of what capability we
have attained or demonstrated, so to speak, so that the
decision makers can, in fact, make an informed decision as to
whether to deploy that capability.
On the matter of operational testing before deploying for
contingencies, I think as General Kadish mentioned, over the
years I can mention several systems that have been deployed
operationally: JSTARS in the Persian Gulf War, Predator in both
Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in Afghanistan, and Global Hawk.
We have done that in the past. We have done that based on an
evaluation by the decision makers of the technical testing up
to that point. There had been no operational testing of those
systems in their initial deployments.
I am not advocating that is the way to go. I am just saying
that is just a fact of life.
Senator Reed. But those operational tests were not
performed. I presumed they were being planned, though?
Mr. Christie. Oh, yes. There are operational tests planned
with the midcourse system that we are talking about here, which
could be deployed with a decision in 2004. There are
operational tests planned. As I recall that data, I do not
think they will take place before a possible decision in 2004
is made.
Senator Reed. With all of the systems you indicated, was
their deployment driven by a conflict?
Mr. Christie. Or a perceived need, yes, in a conflict.
Senator Reed. Here, it seems to me, an arbitrary date has
been selected of 2004 that will preclude operational testing
before that date. Is that true?
Mr. Christie. Well, I do not think in the progress of the
program that we will have come to the point where we will be
planning to execute operational testing. I think we are
planning a series of technical tests, flight tests, as a matter
of fact, with this system, with an average of four tests a year
up to that point.
Senator Reed. Senator Allard, can I ask your indulgence to
ask General Kadish a question? I will let you respond. But can
I have an additional minute?
Senator Allard. Yes, that will be fine.
General Kadish. You mentioned 2004. That is where we are
working on the ground-based system against long-range threats
to have our testbed in place, which would include up to five
missiles available. We expect that we could make that date for
the testbed purposes. As we go further in time from now on,
based on the testing and developmental testing that we intend
to do, there may be a decision at some point to actually use
those assets. But the date that we have is for the testbed
capability to be put into place so we can add it to our test
requirements.
Senator Reed. Then we are talking now in terms of national
missile defense, the old land-based system, if you will.
General Kadish. It is the land-based system, right.
Senator Reed. Do you have any operational test plans for
the land-based system prior to 2004?
General Kadish. We have plans for developmental testing
that the operational testers will participate in. They are not
classified as operational tests. We expect to do operational
testing in our planning as we transition to procurement, and
that is usually when it is done in any program.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a follow-up question just so I
understand. In one of your previous comments, talking about the
contingency deployment, you said you suffer a loss because you
cannot use them as you would a normal test item?
General Kadish. That is correct.
Senator Reed. So, we face the possibility of declaring a
deployment of the land-based system in 2004 without operational
testing and, as a result of that deployment, not being able to
fully test those deployed missiles. Is that a possibility?
General Kadish. When you say fully test, the fact that it
is actually being used is a test in and of itself. But it would
not be according to our original test plans, if that is the
concern that you have.
But just like anything else, if we use JSTARS, Global Hawk,
or Predator, the using community and the developing community
on those systems learn an awful lot that they would not have
learned in a very sterile test program. So, the operational use
of those systems in my view leads to a better follow-on
improvement of the system.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to a question, Mr. Chairman, that you
asked Mr. Christie. Mr. Christie, you had indicated that you
had not reviewed the Missile Defense Agency program goals,
according to a question from the chairman early on, in this
year's budget as required by section 232 of last year's defense
authorization bill. I would just like to note for the record
that our bill was not passed until late December, and was that
the reason why the required review was not done this year?
Mr. Christie. Well, that contributed to it, but I think the
major reason was that they were still in a state of flux in
getting their budget materials together until the last moment.
Senator Allard. But you would not go and begin to apply the
law before it was signed by the President and had become law,
would you?
Mr. Christie. That is right.
Senator Allard. So, then a plausible explanation for that
is the President's budget process was on the way. When do you
start the budget process? In the middle of the year, June?
Mr. Christie. The summer, yes.
Senator Allard. You need to have it ready by December in
order for the President to present his budget when we come back
into session. Is that correct?
Mr. Christie. Yes.
Secretary Aldridge. Well, in fact, this year we did not
even start the budget process until October for lots of
reasons. One, getting the team. The team for Secretary Rumsfeld
was not even on board until June.
Senator Allard. Congress had not passed the defense
authorization bill providing for the section 203 compliance.
So, I would suspect that this year you will have an opportunity
to review it. Correct?
Mr. Christie. Absolutely.
Senator Allard. I also wanted to follow up a little bit on
discussions that I was having earlier with Secretary Aldridge.
I asked him to give a general overview about the development
and acquisition programs and whether they needed to be
streamlined or not, if you will recall.
Mr. Christie, are you satisfied that you had adequate
insight and input into missile defense test programs? Will your
role differ in the Missile Defense Agency technology
development efforts compared to other technology development
programs?
Mr. Christie. Well, in answering the latter question, I
would answer that we are dealing with what is called a
capabilities-based process here, and I envision my
responsibilities at various points, at least annually and
certainly in response to congressional requirements, to
evaluate what testing has taken place, what testing is in fact
planned, and to provide an independent assessment to the
decision makers as to what capabilities we have, in fact,
demonstrated in testing, whether it be technical or operational
at that point, against what threats. We will address what kind
of capability will we have if we were to, in fact, produce this
system or deploy it. So, that is how I envision our working in
this context.
That is certainly different than the large programs such as
F-22 or the other standard Major Defense Acquisition Programs
where we have a statutory responsibility for deciding or
evaluating the effectiveness and suitability of a system and
the adequacy of the operational testing that took place before
a system is, in fact, produced and deployed. So, it is
different.
We are evolving. We will evolve in this process. We have
not been there before.
Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, I am
looking at a chart here about flight and major ground tests
which are slated for 2002, 2003, and 2004. This is the Missile
Defense Agency program overview report issued February 22, of
this year, by Dr. Lamartin. I am looking at this chart, and it
looks to me like we have a large number of Midcourse Defense
segment tests designed from 2002 to 2007. A large number of
those have a ground-based element in them, and then we even
have a sea-based element in those also. This is on the flight
and major ground tests. I would like to make it a part of the
record and perhaps maybe you would like to comment further on
these planned flight and major ground tests.
Secretary Aldridge. I think General Kadish is probably
better able to answer that question, sir.
General Kadish. Senator Allard, I think that the schedule
we have in testing reflects the fact that we took action to
make our test program much more robust than it has been in
previous years, and to put the testbed and the infrastructure
in place to do it. We put a lot of money in the budget to do
that.
I might say that we welcome Mr. Christie and his
organization's involvement in this. In fact, if you go back and
trace the heritage of that test program that you alluded to,
that heritage is built on the fact that there was an awful lot
of input from DOT&E and others inside and outside of the
Government about the inadequacy of our test plans because of
budgetary and other limitations. We have addressed that in
great detail, and frankly, it would surprise me if we had those
kinds of criticisms again as a result of any review of our test
program. We are trying very hard to make sure that we can test
realistically, that we can test frequently, and that we can
test to our own satisfaction that these systems will work as
intended. There is no intent on our part--and it is certainly
reflected in the large amount of dollars allocated in this
budget for testing and research and development--to avoid any
kind of accountability in testing.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make that
chart a part of the record.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, if I might have a little
indulgence from you.
Senator Reed. Please.
Senator Allard. Then I am going to wrap it up here.
Senator Reed. I have additional questions.
Senator Allard. The General Accounting Office has put out a
series of studies at the request of this committee--and I am
going to address this to you, General Kadish--that detail how
the defense acquisition system might be improved based on
commercial and public sector best practices. Some of these
practices included separating technology development from
product development, maturing technologies before using them in
programs, using prototypes to demonstrate design stability, and
proving through testing that the design is capable.
General Kadish, are you familiar with these reports? Could
you describe the areas of consistency between the GAO
recommendations and the Missile Defense Agency acquisition
process?
General Kadish. Senator, I am familiar with the reports,
and if I could, I would like to take that question for the
record to be more detailed in answering the question.
But in general, it is my view that we took an awful lot of
best practices all the way from the National Reconnaissance
Office early operational methods to many different ways of
adopting best practices. I am confident that if we laid out
those issues pointed out in the GAO reports on improving
management, we would have a high percentage of those
recommendations adopted in our approach.
Senator Allard. I understand that is a complex question.
Would you submit a written answer in more detail to the
subcommittee, and then also not only talk about where the
similarities are but point out some areas where there might be
some differences, if any?
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The GAO has developed several reports on the topic of ``Best
Practices.'' The GAO testimony of May 10, 2000, focused on best
commercial practices for developing new products and provides a summary
of those practices. The testimony acknowledged that DOD has taken steps
to reflect best commercial practices in its acquisition policies. MDA
has also adopted many of those recommendations in its acquisition
approach.
The major theme of GAO's assessment is the management of
technology; specifically separating technology and product development.
The BMD program is structured to target technologies for production
only when sufficient maturity is reached. The effort is based on a
``fly before buy'' strategy. Multiple technologies will be aggressively
demonstrated and subject to early, robust, and realistic testing.
Parallel development is used to reduce risk in the RDT&E effort.
Progress in testing will influence the decision process to stop, slow,
or accelerate individual projects. Robust testing, modeling, and
simulation are key tenants of MDA's strategy to increase knowledge and
reduce risk. Only when a capability is sufficiently verified will that
element or component be ready for a production decision. MDA's approach
clearly helps to isolate technology development from production.
Additionally, procurement decisions will be further assessed on
performance relative to the overall integrated system construct.
GAO found that most successful firms limit production timelines
from 18 months to just over 4 years. This limitation kept companies
focused on delivering a product. The missile defense evolutionary
acquisition strategy uses a capability, biannual ``block'' method that
reflects a similar approach. Under this strategy, blocks of operational
system capabilities based on demonstrated, mature technology are
developed, produced, and fielded in increments. This approach keeps the
program focused on delivering advanced capabilities to the field as
quickly as possible. BMD biennial blocks also capture pre-production
capabilities that are available for contingency/emergency fielding.
Successive increments integrate improved technology to upgrade the
system and improve existing capabilities.
According to GAO, matching customer need with proven technology is
an important success factor. MDA's evolutionary acquisition strategy
will provide proven mature technology and capabilities. User needs will
be addressed by an ongoing analysis of potential adversary missile
characteristics determined by existing evidence and technically-
feasible engineering limits. The assessment to optimize the system
against the need and match required performance with the capability of
technology is made in collaboration with research centers, industry,
and the Services.
GAO found that making production a concern during development
forces discipline and trade-offs in design. This environment encourages
realistic assessments of risks and costs. Production is always a
concern in the commercial sector because unless a product can be
produced at a cost that the customer will buy (and make the company a
profit) it makes no sense to pursue development. While the profit
motive is not a issue in DOD, production is still a major concern
because failure to both control production costs and meet performance
needs puts the project at risk.
One approach MDA has pursued to manage those two goals is to
improve communication and cooperation among RDT&E, production, and user
groups to better focus the development process. In support of that
concept, MDA has established a collaborative effort, the National Team,
to better leverage industry (production) talent and innovation at the
very beginning of the development effort. In addition to defense
industry leaders, the National Team is bringing together federally
funded research development centers (FFRDC) and support contractors to
share information and bring creative solutions to problems early in the
design process. The National Team adds industry rigor to the
engineering process by addressing prodution and supportability issues
while focusing on integrating elements into a cohesive single system.
This multidisciplinary team also addresses critical issues such as
system specifications and block configurations. The approach balances
the ``future focus'' of research groups with the industry focus of
preventing overreaching and getting a useful product delivered to the
user.
Underlying MDA's management approach is a commitment to
successfully deliver affordable and effective missile defense
capabilities to the Nation as quickly as possible.
MDA's management approach reflects the intent behind the best
commercial practices reported by the GAO. Overall, two factors result
in some differences between commercial practices and those used by MDA.
Private sector companies function in a different, more ``closed''
environment than Government agencies. Profit--not development--is the
critical success factor that drives decisions. Multiyear capital
resources commitments are the norm. Government agencies function in
more open environments with more diverse ``stakeholder'' interests to
address. Also, Government capital resources are committed and justified
on a yearly basis.
Commercial development is usually an incremental improvement to an
existing product. There is considerable high-fidelity predecessor in-
house knowledge in all areas of development. While MDA's ``block''
strategy will eventually get to the same point, we are not there now.
In many areas we have to manage more technology risk than we prefer,
particularly as we develop initial capabilities. That is why robust
testing, modeling, and simulation are key to our effort.
The GAO's overarching recommendation is to structure programs to
support research and development to advance technology and then to
establish a basis for determining which technologies and subsystems
meet performance standards for development. MDA's capabilities-based,
evolutionary acquisition clearly parallels that approach. MDA is
committed to vigorously investigating and pursuing any practices that
will improve the outcome of this critical national priority.

Secretary Aldridge. Senator, if I could just comment. It is
not often I agree with GAO reports, but in this particular
case, many of the recommendations there do follow along with
what we are trying to do in the acquisition business across the
Department of Defense.
In fact, this idea of not doing technology until it is
available is in fact the essence of spiral development. We will
deploy those technologies which are available and we will wait
for those technologies to evolve before we try to enter them
into new equipment in the future.
Prototyping is clearly something that is on our list. In
fact, we have increased the funding request for doing advance
concept technology demonstrators this year from $159 million
appropriated last year to $200 million. We are going to start
to do some new things, especially as those apply to
counterterrorism prototypes.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit to the
witnesses maybe one or two questions after the hearing. I think
it is standard that we can do that.
Senator Reed. It is standard procedure. The record will
remain open for additional questions and also for the
statements of members.
Senator Allard. Yes, I will submit some more. I have
wrapped up my questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Chairman Levin.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first start with Secretary Aldridge. When we
questioned the Service Chiefs at last week's full committee
hearing, each of the Services said that they had not been
consulted at all on the level of funding in the missile defense
budget. Can you tell me why they were not consulted?
Secretary Aldridge. Sir, we have a process in the
Department where the Service Secretaries were involved with the
budgetary process. If they did not share that information with
their Service Chiefs, that was perhaps something they could
have done and should have done.
The Senior Executive Council of the Department has reviewed
the missile defense program. It has been reviewed in detail by
the Secretary of Defense. We went over the management
functions. We went over the budgetary items, the concept of the
missile defense program, and that was reviewed and approved by
the Senior Executive Council which results in the budget that
has been submitted.
But the Service Secretaries were involved. I was heavily
involved, the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary, and the
program of record is the one that we have agreed is the right
thing for us to proceed with. I do not know why the Service
Secretaries did not share that information with the Service
Chiefs.
Chairman Levin. Is it a little unusual, in your view, that
the uniformed Service Chiefs were not involved in this
consideration of the budget on missile defense?
Secretary Aldridge. I would have thought that the Service
Secretaries would have shared that information. Since this is a
separate defense agency that deals with a variety of Services
and activities, I cannot answer why they did not share that,
sir.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Aldridge, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, the JROC, which is headed by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, is required by law to ``assist the Chairman
in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military
requirements to meet the National Military Strategy.'' The JROC
is also required by law to evaluate ``the cost, schedule, and
performance criteria of acquisition programs.'' Finally, the
JROC is required by law to provide oversight information to
Congress, and thus, like Mr. Christie, is an important avenue
for Congress to gain independent insight into these defense
programs.
One of the most important functions that the JROC provides
is review and approval of the program's Operational
Requirements Document, which establishes the performance goals
that a system has to meet in order to make it useful to our
military.
Was the JROC formally asked to provide written comments on
the memorandum that abolished the Operational Requirements
Documents, and if so, would you send us those comments?
Secretary Aldridge. Sir, I would like to answer the
question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did comment on
program management for missile defense. The JROC itself did
not. JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman, sir, of the Joint
Chiefs. That is not part of the process by which we are
undertaking missile defense. The JROC has a very firm
requirements process of determining what is absolutely
essential for the military to deploy.
The approach we are taking on missile defense is a
capabilities-based approach. General Kadish, as he develops the
program in its R&D state, if it is in fact ready for production
and deployment, will advise the Senior Executive Council
whether that capability is sufficient to proceed.
At that point, when there is a decision to proceed to a
production and deployment, it does go into the JROC process.
The normal deployment process enters into the regular
acquisition system, but not before that time. Prior to that
time, the Missile Defense Agency is involved with research and
development only to develop a capability that is desired by the
country.
Part of what the Missile Defense Support Group does, in
fact, is include the Joint Staff as members of that group, and
the process by which advice is given both to the Director of
MDA, as well as to the Senior Executive Council, goes through
the Missile Defense Support Group, which does include not only
the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also DOT&E. It also includes the
Comptroller and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). All the
agencies of the Department that have an equity in missile
defense are included within that support group, which does
provide the independent advice.
Chairman Levin. Well, I think our top military leaders
ought to have a very deep involvement in this assessment. The
JROC is required by law to evaluate the cost, schedule, and
performance criteria of acquisition programs. I think that
there needs to be a much deeper involvement in it, and I think
this subcommittee and our full committee is going to work to
assure that that in fact happens.
I am wondering, Mr. Christie, if you would tell us whether
or not you and your office are acting in ways, relative to the
missile defense, differently than your predecessor Mr. Coyle
acted. Do you know?
Mr. Christie. I think in earlier discussions I made the
point that a year ago, or last summer after I was confirmed, I
discussed our involvement with both of the gentlemen here at
the table, as I knew they were totally restructuring the set of
programs in this Missile Defense Agency. By mutual agreement,
we backed away until all of these programs were properly
structured and we would have something to begin to look into. I
stated earlier that PAC-3 was not one of those because that
program was proceeding into operational testing.
We have worked over the last couple of months to come up
with a working arrangement whereby we will be involved in the
testing that takes place and the planning for tests, and I am
confident that our involvement will, in fact, probably come
close to whatever Mr. Coyle was doing before. His office was
quite heavily involved, I think, in the technical testing that
was going on because most of the evaluations that he was doing
were based on technical testing. We will be involved also.
Chairman Levin. When do you expect the details of that
arrangement would be worked out?
Mr. Christie. We have pretty well worked them out now.
Chairman Levin. Are they in writing?
Mr. Christie. We have a set of charts that provide that
detail. My staff is a member of the Missile Defense Support
Group. However, we do not have a memorandum of understanding or
anything like that that the two of us have signed.
Chairman Levin. You think there are written charts.
Mr. Christie. Yes, we have charts. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Could you submit them to this subcommittee?
Mr. Christie. I will do so.
[The information referred to follows:]

The information referred to appears in question for the record
number 9.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
I would like to finish up a series of questions.
Going back to the discussion of the contingency deployment
for the land-based system, General Kadish, if you declared this
system contingency deployed, would you be operating the system
and running it or would it be transferred to a Service?
General Kadish. That is a great question.
Senator Reed. Well, you keep asking questions all
afternoon, and you finally get a great one. [Laughter.]
General Kadish. The reason I say that is we are dealing
with trying to understand how that operates now. It is clear,
at least at this point in time, that any kind of contingency
operation of any system that we would have in missile defense
needs to be done by operators who are the warfighting experts.
However, just as we did, and I hate to go back to other
analogies, but as I recall, when we deployed JSTARS during the
Persian Gulf War, we still had contractors operating parts of
that system because they were not ready for trained airmen to
actually operate them. So, I would expect that elements of our
contractor and Missile Defense Agency personnel would be
involved in the operation, but the actual warfighting decision
making is done by the proper chains of command.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Aldridge, you stated last week that all of the
internal oversight organizations of the Pentagon are to be
involved in the Missile Defense Support Group. You reaffirmed
that today.
But your memorandum of February 13 severely restricts the
number of personnel from these organizations to be allowed
access to missile defense program information. I understand
that the limit is two or three people from each organization,
and in any case, your memorandum allows you and General Kadish
to personally approve each person to be allowed access. I also
understand that prior to this current administration, there
were dozens of people who on an as-needed basis had access to
the information.
With such limited access, how do you expect the Pentagon's
oversight organizations to operate fully, completely, and,
indeed, independently if in fact you and General Kadish can
veto people who might be looking over your shoulders?
Secretary Aldridge. Well, the intent is that the individual
offices nominate the people that they want to put on the
program, and that nomination is for the senior person which is
the Missile Defense Support Group individual. In addition to
that individual, we allow two more technical people to
participate.
We just did not want hundreds of people who show up at
meetings to hear data. We think that 13 organizations that can
have 34 people, essentially full-time, working on this problem
is probably enough to make sure that all the equities of all
the offices are sufficient without it getting out of hand. That
was the rationale.
The individuals who are nominated are, in fact, approved by
us because we felt that we wanted to make sure people had the
experience, that they have an understanding of missile defense,
they have the expertise to be valuable, and that offices are
not just nominating people because they are trying to get rid
of somebody who is not a productive part of their organization.
So, we want to have some say-so that the 34 people who were, in
fact, involved were capable individual people who could
contribute to the job.
Now, once the Working Group members have access to data,
what they do with it and how they deal back at their
organizations, that is up to them. They can bring in other
people to discuss, seek advice, and things of that nature. But
we believe that 39 people to provide for the oversight of this
organization was sufficient to meet the needs of the
Department, meet the needs of the Missile Defense Agency, and
meet the needs of the Senior Executive Council, which have to
make independent judgments. That was the rationale.
Senator Reed. Well, one could raise the question of a lack
of confidence in the judgment of people like Mr. Christie to
appoint people to this group.
Secretary Aldridge. I think we took Mr. Christie's
nominations.
Senator Reed. Well, you could have said no.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, if he would have submitted someone
who we believed in our judgment was not going to contribute to
this process, yes, sir, we could say no.
Senator Reed. But I still think the point remains that you
reserve the right to contradict or veto the decisions,
including those of the JROC, for example. You essentially take
who was sent to you, and that might be for many reasons, some
you alluded to, but there might be other reasons.
Secretary Aldridge. It could, based on the reasons I
stated, but we did not.
Senator Reed. Is there any other program that is managed or
run in this way in the Department of Defense?
Secretary Aldridge. The only one that can be identified as
closest is probably the National Reconnaissance Office, which
deals with systems of systems, and one coming, which will be
the Army's Future Combat System. It is going to have similar
characteristics of multiple pieces of programs that have to be
highly integrated.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Aldridge, last week we discussed the application
of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which establishes cost control
mechanisms for major defense programs. There was some ambiguity
about its application. In support of the annual reviews of
missile defense programs, one of which is scheduled for this
fall, what sort of cost control mechanism will be applied and
what specific data and documentation will be reviewed to
understand whether the programs are on target if not Nunn-
McCurdy?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I did go back and look at
Nunn-McCurdy. It does not apply to R&D programs until you get
to a decision point for actual deployment. So, in the R&D
effort, Nunn-McCurdy would not apply in this particular case.
So, we will have to find other mechanisms to ensure that the
programs remain under cost control.
As they are going through R&D, it is very difficult to
identify what the end state is going to be, and so it is not
until we have a program that can be defined and an end state of
the R&D program, and if we are successful, this is when we will
actually enter into full-scale engineering development, and
this is when we will start production, and then we can lay out
a cost of a program and check its milestones. Until we make
that full decision, it is very difficult to track program
content in the sense of a Nunn-McCurdy certification, but we do
track the program in terms of what we expect the R&D to cost
and what it is really costing.
We ran into one. It was not a Nunn-McCurdy breach, but it
was the SBIRS-Low program in the missile defense program. It
was going up in cost at a significant rate, and we decided that
this was a program that was unexecutable, and we have asked it
to be restructured. So, the process will continue to look at
programs in the normal way. It just does not have the Nunn-
McCurdy tool, as one of many tools, of monitoring cost,
performance, and schedule.
Senator Reed. But you will be developing documentation and
data to support reviews?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. There will be a Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) that will be written in that way. As
we have done for PAC-3 as it moves out, there will be a
separate SAR for each of those programs.
Senator Reed. Congress will have access to that data and
documentation?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, also in your February 13,
memorandum to General Kadish, you requested that he send you,
within 60 days, a program implementation plan to address in
part the following: program structure with funding allocations;
the Ballistic Missile Defense System program baseline;
technical and program management structure; acquisition
strategy; planned program documentation and reporting to OSD,
Services, and Joint Staff interfaces; the approach to test and
evaluation; and a transition plan for transfer of programs to
Services.
General Kadish, are you on schedule for delivery of that
plan?
General Kadish. We are in the process of putting it
together right now. Given the complexity of some of the things
we are doing, I am a little bit worried about the deadline that
Secretary Aldridge has set. But our intent is to fully
document, as best we can, and have the Missile Defense Support
Group review that plan in some detail, and then we would
respond to that advice out of the MDSG. So, we are underway
with the implementation plan right now, and I am hoping that it
will be, if not on time, very close to being on time.
Senator Reed. When you send it to Secretary Aldridge, may
we also see it in Congress?
General Kadish. Yes, sir. I defer on that question to
Secretary Aldridge.
Secretary Aldridge. I do not see any reason why you cannot.
It should be available to you. Once we go through the process
that we all agree to, the Missile Defense Support Group has
agreed to it and the SEC agrees this is the plan we are on, I
do not see why it should not be available to you immediately.
Senator Reed. It might be interesting to see the plan
before the MDSG agrees to it. Sometimes the changes are more
illustrative than the actual substance.
Secretary Aldridge. We will reserve it for next year's
testimony, sir. I will tell you how it turned out. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Well, or the next hearing.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, the next hearing.
Senator Reed. Let me conclude with a comment as much as a
question. We have heard a lot about capabilities-based
development. Frankly, I have a list of different descriptions
by General Kadish and yourself, Mr. Secretary, of what
capabilities-based means. They are not entirely identical.
Secretary Aldridge. Oh, yes, sir, they have to be.
Senator Reed. They have to be. [Laughter.]
Do you want me to read them? All right, here we go.
In your testimony, General Kadish, you said it meant ``a
flexible approach to the acquisition of complex systems,
incorporating advanced technologies that permit deployment of a
limited but effective capability that can be progressively
enhanced.'' In today's testimony, you mentioned the word
``threat,'' which was not part of the previous exposition, at
least to my recollection.
In your testimony, Secretary Aldridge, you said it ``would
procure missile defenses at the earliest possible date.''
Mr. Christie, you said the new approach ``is evolving to
provide for the successful development of capabilities that are
responsive to threats while, at the same time, maintaining
essential operational effectiveness for equipment that is
fielded.''
Page 14 of the Department's Quadrennial Defense Review,
defined it as ``focusing more on how an adversary might fight
than who the adversary might be.''
Then Secretary Rumsfeld, in his testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee last June, said it meant we would
``work to select, develop, and sustain a portfolio of U.S.
military capabilities to help us prevail against current
threats and dissuade potential adversaries from developing
dangerous new capabilities.''
My sense is that, at least in terms of the expression,
there are slightly different views and maybe even significantly
different definitions. But when we engage on these questions,
the ultimate answer always seems to be, well, we are doing a
capabilities-based assessment and it is different and you do
not understand because it is capabilities-based.
I am concerned that this is just a new buzz word, new
jargon, and there is, I think, a consequence, as you, I think,
would admit, of moving away from the old system. A requirement
target was set and you pretty much knew if you measured up to
what the requirement was. Here, that requirement is very
flexible. It can move around, and I think you would say that
you have to do it that way. But it also invites the possibility
that you can dumb-down standards. You can deploy things for
reasons unrelated to the quality of the system, just because
you feel compelled to do it. That, I think, takes away from
some of the rigor that we normally see in defense programs.
That is a comment. If you would like to rejoin, I would
invite you to do that, but that is my final comment.
Secretary Aldridge. I will try to do this with a short
comment. All those statements you read are not inconsistent.
Senator Reed. No, but they are not precise, not as precise
as saying we are going to build a system.
Secretary Aldridge. Right, but I also notice that in many
of the statements, you were mixing up spiral development with
capabilities-based development. What we are talking about in
terms of capabilities is the future. We may not know who we are
going to fight, when we are going to fight, or where we are
going to fight. Therefore, we must design a capability that
says this is what we want to do in spite of this uncertainty. I
think that is one approach.
Once we do define what capability we want, the issue of
spiral development now enters the picture, what we want to
improve with time, and that is what spiral development does. It
allows that initial capability to be improved in time.
They are related but they are in fact separate. I think we
have described capabilities, and maybe that is all I should
say.
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary, staff has selected
descriptions of what was purported to be the capabilities-based
approach, not the integration of both.
This leads to a few questions. If you are doing
capabilities, there are some very simple measures. One is, what
missiles are you going to defend against and in what time
frame? When are you going to deploy? Those are the types of
answers that ultimately we are going to have to come to. At
this point, I have not heard those answers, and we are spending
a great deal of money in the process.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. We have not made those
decisions.
Dumbing down the requirements and perhaps doing some things
that are less capable than we would like is not the intent of
any of this. I am an American. I am a taxpayer and want to make
sure that what we get for our country is the very best we can
provide at the right cost and schedule and performance. So, the
issue of trying to institute a process that is going to allow
perhaps less capability than we would otherwise desire is
certainly not what we are intending to do here. We are trying
to do it faster, quicker, and certainly with the oversight of
the Department of Defense, and we always have to come to
Congress when it comes to a decision to deploy. We have to get
the funding to make that happen.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Secretary Aldridge. Mr. Christie,
General Kadish, thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
required congressional information
1. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing you
committed to sending Congress such information on missile defense as is
required to be submitted for Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This
information includes the development schedule, including estimated
annual cost until development is completed, the planned procurement
schedule, including the best estimate of the Secretary of Defense of
the annual cost and units to be produced. Please provide this
information for all missile defense programs that were previously Major
Defense Acquisition Programs as soon as possible in order to support
congressional reviews of the fiscal year 2003 budget request for
missile defense.
Secretary Aldridge. The fiscal year 2003 budget estimate
documentation together with the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
provide the most up-to-date information available regarding cost,
schedule, and development, including those previously identified as
Major Defense Acquisition Programs. Specifically, the estimate provides
funding requirements for the next 6 years, by year; schedule, including
hardware and software deliveries, to the extent known; and planned
decision points and test events for all program activities at least
through completion of planned testing and evaluation of the prototype.
Developing a single, integrated missile defense system is a vast
technical challenge that will take time and effort to mature. We are
working hard toward the important goal set forth for us by the
Secretary of defending the United States, deployed forces, allies, and
friends by developing a system that layers defenses to intercept a
ballistic missile in all phases of flight against all ranges of
threats. The system will add capability over time. We will deploy
individual elements and components of the system only once their
technological maturity and military utility have been clearly
demonstrated. Until that time, we will not know how many units should
be produced or their cost. We will deploy those components in an
architecture that allows our capability to be improved as the
technology matures.
We have provided Members and their staffs documentation and
briefings on our strategy and our progress. We will continue to provide
that information to Congress as we develop the system and the
information becomes available.

STATUS OF DOT&E ACCESS TO MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY PROGRAMS

2. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, during the hearing, Secretary
Aldridge agreed with me when he said that ``statutorily, Mr. Christie
can have access to any data without agreements with anyone else in the
Department.'' Do you, your staff, and your support contractors now have
unfettered access to all information you and your staff deem necessary
in order for you to perform your oversight responsibilities for Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) programs, especially the responsibility you
committed to at the hearing of independently assessing the capabilities
of the 2004 ``contingency deployments'' for missile defense?
Mr. Christie. As of this point in time, DOT&E and our federally-
funded research and development contractor (FFRDC) support staff have
not gained unfettered access to the MDA programs. The various MDA
programs are still undergoing the process of restructuring. In the
meantime, we have obtained for review some reports on the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense System. Additionally, we have regular access to the
Patriot PAC-3 program that is currently in operational test and
evaluation being conducted by the Army. We have also had some insight
through the Missile Defense Steering Group into the restructure of the
SIBRS-Low program. We have been awaiting delivery of the MDA
Implementation Plan to ascertain how they propose the OSD staff
(including DOT&E) will carry out its oversight of the MDA programs. In
the meantime, DOT&E has proposed a T&E implementation plan that spells
out the access we need in order to perform our oversight and
independent evaluation responsibilities. This proposal includes details
on the types and level of access needed by ourselves and our FFRDC
support staff in interacting with the MDA, the various program offices,
and the system contractors. Our plan identifies the types of
information, documents, and meetings we need access to in order to
adequately evaluate the MDA programs and prepare our annual assessment
reports for the MDA and Congress. This plan has been provided to MDA
for comments or acceptance. We anticipate that we will have access to
all requisite information and participation in meetings to perform
DOT&E's mission.

RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS

3. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, have you rejected any request
for a particular individual to be a member of the Missile Defense
Support Group (MDSG)? If so, which organization was affected and what
was the basis of the rejection?
Secretary Aldridge. I accepted the nominations from the Secretaries
of the Services, the Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the senior members of the other organizations from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for their representatives to the Air Force request
for a second seat on the MDSG. Although I have delegated Milestone
Decision Authority for Space to the Air Force, I did not feel one
Service deserved more representation on the MDSG than any other
Service. The Missile Defense Agency has established a board of
directors (BOD) with each of the Services, and the Air Force BOD
ensures both space and other procurement programs are integrated and
addressed.

ACCESS OF SUPPORT STAFF AND CONTRACTORS

4. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, you testified that the rules
you have established for the MDSG allow at most three people from any
given independent oversight organization to participate in the MDSG.
Three people is not a sufficient number for substantial independent
analysis to be performed by any of these independent organizations. Do
your rules, therefore, allow for the independent oversight
organizations' staff and contractor support personnel, who are not
members of the MDSG, to have access to MDA programmatic information,
either via the MDSG process of via other means? If not, how do you
expect meaningful independent analyses to be conducted by these
organizations?
Secretary Aldridge. The Missile Defense Support Group and
associated Working Group comprise a total of 34 individuals. This is an
efficient size to allow independent analysis and to conduct dialogue
leading to sufficient advice to the Director of the MDA, the Senior
Executive Council, and me. Individual members may distribute MDA
information as they deem necessary within their own organization to do
their job as long as it is controlled according to its security
classification (as a minimum For Official Use Only) and is considered
pre-decisional, and the individuals have a need to know. If an
organization requires additional people to have access directly with
MDA to fulfill a specific requirement this is agreed to between the MDA
and the individual organization. Each MDSG principal has a
corresponding senior level point of contact within the MDA for
coordination and interactions on a daily basis.

5. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, could you please provide, as
soon as possible, the rules of access for non-members of the MDSG?
Secretary Aldridge. The MDSG meetings are closed to non-members to
allow open dialogue and efficient operations dealing with pre-
decisional information. Non-members are allowed access on an
invitational basis controlled by the chairman for specific activities
as deemed necessary by the MDSG body as a whole.

OPERATIONAL TESTING FOR 2004 DEPLOYMENTS

6. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, it was established at the hearing
that no operational tests were planned for any of the missile defense
systems for which there is a potential 2004 ``contingency deployment.''
Although other systems, such as JSTARS and Predator were in fact
deployed prior to the completion of operational testing, it is my
understanding that these systems did not pre-plan such ``contingency
deployments.'' Thus, the pre-planned nature of the proposed missile
defense contingency deployments, and the fact that we are budgeting
extra funding for them now, makes them unique. Do you believe that
preplanning on these contingency deployments for 2004, and buying extra
hardware now to support such a deployment, is a prudent action without
plans for any operational tests prior to the deployments and if not,
why not?
Mr. Christie. Historically, acquisition programs have not pre-
planned contingency deployments. JSTARS and Predator are two recent
examples of programs among many others over the years that were taken
out of an ongoing development and test and evaluation program to
support an urgent operational need. However, planning for an early
contingency deployment should not be any different from planning for an
initial block capability. Plans for developing and acquiring systems
that address an imminent or volatile threat, where contingency
deployment is likely, should include a strategy that builds basic
operational utility testing into the engineering and development
process. This is precisely what capabilities-based acquisition is
supposed to accomplish, by involving all stakeholders early in the
design process and sharing information about the eventual required
capability. Under this approach, we could deploy at any time in any
design increment and be assured that our confidence in operational
capability, while not complete, is balanced with respect to our
confidence in other critical design factors. Our goal is to assist the
MDA in developing a strategy that builds basic military utility
assessments into the engineering, development, and testing processes
for each of their programs. This will allow DOT&E to provide the best
possible assessment of capability and provide higher confidence in the
2004 contingency system. While not as rigorous as a full operational
test and evaluation plan, this strategy balances confidence in
operational effectiveness against the risk posed by an emerging and
evolving threat.

7. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, if so, why should other, less
complex defense programs not also begin to plan, and budget for, such
contingency deployments with no prior operational testing and what
should the criteria for pre-planning such contingency deployments be?
Mr. Christie. In general, all systems should employ a strategy
where operational test requirements, along with other requirements for
training, logistics, tactics, etc., are developed early on, such that
an intermediate decision to deploy could be made at any time. For most
military systems with a moderate level of complexity, this is a prudent
approach. The more complex a system is, the higher the risks of using
this approach in lieu of adequate operational testing. There is an
important distinction between emergency deployment and planned
contingency deployment. Planned contingency deployments reflect
deliberate efforts to exploit capabilities that are demonstrated during
early system development. This includes the development of associated
operational concepts and tactics. An emergency deployment is
characterized by very rapid configuration of a system to address a
specific need with little planning, confirmation of capability, or
tactics development.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE GOALS AND ANNUAL PLAN

8. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the preamble to your fiscal year
2003 budget estimate documentation states that the ``program goals and
detailed test and expenditure plans'' required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 are contained in the
documentation. However, the documentation provides detailed information
only for fiscal year 2003, and virtually no information on longer-term
program goals. To assist in congressional review of the fiscal year
2003 missile defense budget proposal, could you please provide the
missile defense goals and program plans as soon as possible?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2003 budget estimate does provide
information on long-term program goals. Specifically, the estimate
provides funding requirements for the next 6 years, by year. It also
provides schedule, including hardware and software deliveries, to the
extent known, and planned decision points and test events for all
program activities at least through completion of the planned element
or component testing.
Our overarching goal is to defend the United States, deployed
forces, allies, and friends by developing a system that layers defenses
to intercept a missile in all phases of flight against all ranges of
threats. The system will evolve over time. We will deploy elements or
individual components of the system when their technological maturity
and military utility are clearly demonstrated. Additionally, we will
deploy those components in an architecture that allows our capability
to be improved as the technology matures.
We have provided members and their staffs documentation and
briefings on our strategy and our progress. We will continue to provide
that information as we develop the system.

WRITTEN INFORMATION ON OVERSIGHT PROCESS

9. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing, Mr.
Christie said that he would submit the charts that document the
arrangement that has been worked out for how DOT&E will be involved in
missile defense test planning. Could you please provide, as soon as
possible, any documents or charts presented to the MDSG which deal with
how MDA programs will be overseen?
Secretary Aldridge. The following charts were developed and
approved by DOT&E and presented to both the MDSG and the MDSG Working
Group once they were formed. They were also presented to members of
congressional staff prior to my signing the February 13, 2002,
Implementation Guidance. Currently DOT&E and MDA are working the
specifics of the MDA implementation plan concerning DOT&E planning,
oversight, and responsibilities.

DOCUMENTATION ON R&D COSTS

10. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing you stated
that the Department would ``track [missile defense programs] in terms
of what we expect the R&D to cost and what it's really costing.''
Furthermore, you committed to providing this data to Congress. Could
you please provide the current estimated costs and original costs for:
(1) the following prototype items; and (2) the research and development
costs associated with development of the prototype items: Airborne
Laser prototype; each SBIRS-Low prototype satellite; THAAD prototype;
Sea-based Midcourse prototype; and the Space-Based Laser prototype?
Furthermore, could you please provide this information as soon as
possible to support congressional review of the fiscal year 2003
missile defense budget?
Secretary Aldridge. Prototypes are interim engineering units, which
by their nature, do not have firm ``production unit'' baselines.
Technical specifications, purpose, and fidelity of a prototype are
continually adjusted to match the development need. As a result,
prototypes are unique to both individual programs and to the stage of
that program's development. Prototype costs cannot be measured like
production units, their costs are embedded in the element and program
development costs. Those costs are estimated in the fiscal year 2003
budget request.

DOCUMENTS USED FOR MANAGEMENT

11. Senator Reed. General Kadish, given that Operational
Requirements Documents (ORDs) have been abolished, as well as program
baselines and production unit cost estimates, it is unclear what
documentation you are currently using to manage your programs. Could
you please provide, as soon as possible, a list of the documents you
are currently using to monitor and manage MDA programs, and a
description of what each document contains?
General Kadish. ORDs have been canceled only for missile defense
elements in development, not for those ready to be transferred to the
Services. Capability-based ORDs will become operative upon transfer of
capabilities to the Services.
Under the Department's traditional acquisition process, development
started with specific military requirements generated by the user.
These requirements were formalized in the ORD. Following the ORD, Key
Performance Parameters (KPP) were established and used to define
contract requirements and deliverables. Contract performance was
reported using the Earned Value Management System (EVMS). Department
and congressional oversight was afforded through the Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and the SAR, respectively.
For MDA, the strengths of the traditional requirements generation
process were also its weaknesses. It is rigorous, but that very rigor
translated into a lack of the flexibility needed in missile defense
development to deal with unprecedented technology development,
uncertain threats, and complex multi-system integration. Requirements
defined in ORDs are typically set years before actual system
deployment, and can lead to less than optimum capability against a
threat that exceeds that description. Furthermore, we do not yet know
all the technical approaches that will work best.
MDA's capability-based strategy implements acquisition discipline
during development from a top-down perspective. This top-down approach
promotes optimal system performance, maintains developmental
flexibility, and ensures a high-level system integration. MDA's system
engineering process begins with the development of System-wide
Technical Objectives and Goals (TOG) to communicate expectations for
evolving BMDS capabilities. This document will provide metrics for
comparing alternatives and high-level strategy for development. Because
specific threat identification, as previously captured in the System
Threat Assessment Report, is no longer possible, the Adversary
Capability Document (ACD) provides the range of capabilities a
potential adversary might be able to deploy. Subsequently, more
detailed System Capability Specifications (SCS) will provide capability
requirements for the overall system, elements, components, and
interfaces. The TOG and SCS will help define the overall system
configuration and architecture.
From the TOG and SCS, MDA will develop capability specifications
for individual elements and components. These two documents are
respectively known as the ECS and the CCS. Capability specifications
will include hardware and software descriptions as well as interface
design requirements. These detailed specifications will be reflected in
traditional cost, schedule, and performance metrics used to define
contract requirements and deliverables. Contract performance will still
be managed using the traditional Earned Value Management System (EVMS)
practices. Traditional `control' documents such as Risk Management
Plans and Cost Analysis Requirements Descriptions (CARDs) remain in use
for each individual program element. Congressional oversight will still
be afforded through the SAR. In place of the Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary (DAES) report, we submit an MDA Quarterly Report that
contains an overall BMDS status and assessment for use by the Missile
Defense Support Group. We are also developing a BMDS Integrated Master
Schedule (IMS) for internal use. The IMS will capture key schedule
information from the element programs and certain MDA business and
functional processes for use in preparing a BMDS-level schedule
assessment that will be included in the MDA Quarterly Report.
In sum, the key documents MDA uses to management development are:
the TOG, ACD, SCS, ECS, and CCS, in addition to the MDA Quarterly
Report and SAR. At the execution level there is no change between
requirements-based and capability-based acquisition approaches. Using
capability-based acquisition, baselines will still be in place to
determine if programs are running on cost and on schedule. Reporting
requirements will still be available to judge the trade off of
additional developmental risk for additional performance or additional
cost. The Department will still be able to determine if a missile
defense program should be accelerated, decelerated, modified, or
terminated. After a program completes the development phase and moves
into the transition phase prior to procurement, the military Services
will prepare the normal acquisition documentation.

PAC-3 TRANSITION

12. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the PAC-3 system has been
transitioned to the Army for procurement. Is the system meeting its
threshold ORD performance and if not, why not?
General Kadish. The Secretary of Defense has canceled missile
defense ORDs, including the PAC-3 ORD, thereby removing the former
threshold ORD performance parameters as go/no-go criteria for the
purpose of electing to produce and field missile defense systems. This
provides greater flexibility for the application of military judgment
in delivering capability to the field. Our testing to date indicates
PAC-3 is meeting almost all of the former threshold ORD performance
requirements. Rather than delay fielding this critical warfighter
capability, we have opted to proceed with limited procurement supported
by a disciplined program to continue enhancing system performance
against existing and emerging threats. Once the PAC-3 system completes
operational testing we will be positioned to evaluate, along with the
warfighter, the level of performance this system provides and whether
to proceed with a full-rate production decision.

13. Senator Reed. General Kadish, is a new ORD being developed for
PAC-3, and if so, by whom?
General Kadish. The Army Combat Developer, the U.S. Army Air
Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH) is presently recasting the
existing PAC-3 ORD into a capability-based ORD.

14. Senator Reed. General Kadish, who is in charge of approval of
any new PAC-3 ORD, and who will have to concur with it?
General Kadish. The JROC is responsible for approving the
capability-based ORD. MDA will cooperate in developing the document and
will provide concurrence before it is submitted for formal review and
approval by the JROC.

ARROW SYSTEM TESTING

15. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, the test program for the Arrow
system was a subject of discussion during the hearing. What is your
assessment of the Arrow test program?
Mr. Christie. Since Arrow is not designated a Major Defense
Acquisition Program, DOT&E has not had visibility into the program to
date. As directed in the fiscal year 2002 appropriations language, we
plan to review Arrow program plans, reports, and test activities and to
provide our assessment of the program in this year's annual report.

ORD RESTRICTIONS

16. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, one reason given for
abolishing missile defense ORDs is that they are ``too restrictive.''
Can you provide some examples of defense programs that have not been
fielded because their ORDs were too restrictive?
Secretary Aldridge. We know of no system that has not been fielded.

CAPABILITY TO DO POST-ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS

17. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you stated at the hearing that
one of the benefits of deploying a contingency operational capability
is that we will learn more than we would have in a ``very sterile test
program.'' However, one of the areas test programs focus on is data
gathering--usually much more so than deployed programs. What
information will not be available in the contingency deployment that
would be available during an operational test, e.g., do you plan on
actually flying missiles against targets as part of any of the
contingency deployments or do you plan on embedding test
instrumentation into the contingency deployments to get data for post-
engagement assessment?
General Kadish. Operational testing is typically of short duration
and, while it is designed to be as realistic as possible, it does not
substitute for the knowledge gained about using the system after it is
deployed. Deployment provides opportunities to see how hardware and
software work in many different situations that could not be fully
explored during limited operational testing. For example, integration
of battle management command and control with the existing command
structure can be much more thoroughly demonstrated, particularly with
the built-in test capability that the BMDS will have. Even if a
contingent operational capability is deployed, MDA's capability-based
acquisition program will continue to evolve the BMDS through spiral
development to a more capable system. In support of this ongoing RDT&E
program, a full spectrum of testing and data collection will continue,
particularly focusing on target intercepts and post-intercept analysis.
However, we have yet to fully define the details on what data will be
collected from a BMDS that is contingently deployed and what data will
be collected during the concurrent RDT&E program. They will depend in
part on the BMDS Block capability that is deployed. In any event,
contingency deployment, if it occurs, is expected to supplement and not
eliminate test information collected on BMDS capabilities.

CONSULTATION OF SERVICE CHIEFS

18. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing you stated
that you did not know why the Service Chiefs were not consulted on the
missile defense budget, and you did not explain why the JROC was not
consulted on the memorandum that abolished ORDs for missile defense.
Could you please now answer these questions, and indicate if you plan
in the future to obtain the opinions of these groups regarding missile
defense programs and if you do plan to obtain the opinions of the
Service Chiefs and the JR0C in the future, could you please explain the
process by which this will be accomplished?
Secretary Aldridge. Both the Secretary of Defense January 2, 2002,
Directive and my February 13, 2002, Implementation Guidance Memorandum
were coordinated with the Service Secretaries and the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to signature. Since that time these
organizations have been represented by their nominated principals on
the Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG). This group will be used to
provide advice to the Director, Missile Defense Agency, me, and the
Senior Executive Council that is composed of the Service Secretaries,
me, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the course of its work, the
MDSG will review the missile defense budget and other priority issues.
The Director of the MDA will obtain the advice of the warfigther
community on desired operational features and approaches to system
deployment. The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
(JTAMDO) will serve as the voice for the combatant commanders and
Services to lead the collaborative effort with the combatant commanders
and Services on operational matters. JTAMDO will also develop
operational concepts, develop the operational architecture, and assess
military utility, during Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
development and transition. Further, MDA will work closely with JTAMDO
in developing the joint command and control architecture for the BMDS
and integrating it into the applicable joint command and control
architectures for missile defense. Further, the Director of the MDA has
created a board of directors with each of the three Military Services
to facilitate interaction and solicit advice to ensure that system
development activities are closely coordinated with the needs of the
warfighter.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

SYSTEM THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS AND ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES DOCUMENTS

19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, according to Secretary
Rumsfeld's memorandum dated January 2, 2002, the MDA will no longer
rely upon System Threat Assessment Reports developed by the Defense
Department's intelligence agencies, but will develop a unique document
called an Adversary Capabilities Document (ACD). Are there specific
reasons why the Department's intelligence agencies cannot prepare the
ACD, and will the ACD be coordinated with the Department's intelligence
agencies?
Secretary Aldridge. The intelligence agencies are chartered to
provide intelligence data and assessments that are based on data that
are collected, processed, and analyzed from a variety of intelligence
collection assets. These data are evidence-based. The ACD is not
limited by evidence-based capabilities and assessments. It will be
based on the limits of technological capabilities and physics, not
simply the limits of intelligence-projected capabilities. A task such
as the ACD is outside mission statements and charters for the
intelligence agencies, as currently defined
However, intelligence data is also included in the ACD. For each
parameter in the ACD, intelligence data is always the inner bound or
starting point in determining the theoretical minimum and maximum
value. Every effort is being made to coordinate the development of the
ACD with the intelligence agencies. The Missile and Space Intelligence
Center, the National Air Intelligence Center, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency have been represented at every review meeting thus
far. Their participation is critical to the success of the ACD.

20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, General Kadish said in his
testimony that the ACD will be ``physics-based and look at the physical
parameters that could be around the threat.'' Could you detail which
physics-based parameters will now be included in the ACD and if that
information will require detailed knowledge of an adversary's missile
and warhead configuration?
Secretary Aldridge. The set of parameters emphasizes what is
possible to observe directly, starting from DIA missile modeling
parameters. Parameters derived or inferred from these, and missile
technology and warhead data, are included as warranted. While specific
instances of adversary information are useful as examples, or as the
first step in locating certain parameter boundaries, detailed knowledge
about adversary missiles and warheads is not required and is not the
focus of the ACD. Additional detail will require a classified setting.

JANUARY 2, 2002 MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY MEMORANDUM

21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in a memorandum dated
January 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the MDA to create an
acquisition process separate from the Defense Department's traditional
acquisition process. Does the MDA intend to seek legislative relief to
accomplish the goals and direction of the Secretary of Defense and with
this phased approach to deployment, is there a risk that too many
programs will enter the pipeline driving up the need for resources
downstream beyond what can be expected to be available?
Secretary Aldridge. The Missile Defense Agency and the Department
of Defense see no need to seek legislative relief to accomplish the
goals and direction of the Secretary of Defense concerning missile
defense. The Senior Executive Council will continuously review the
missile defense program, and revise it to ensure that risk is managed
within appropriate resources.

22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in the January 2, 2002
memorandum, the Secretary directed the MDA's Director to use
transactions other than contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements
to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research. You indicate that
at least some contracts, such as those being awarded to establish
``National Industry Teams,'' will be awarded outside of the authority
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. If so, doesn't this remove a
significant amount of oversight over contracts worth billions of
dollars, and could you provide a list and the amounts of contracts
which to date have been or to which there is an intent to award outside
the authority of the Federal Acquisition Regulations?
Secretary Aldridge. There are two types of other transaction
authorities under 10 U.S.C. 2371. One type is to carry out basic,
applied, or advanced research and the other, known as Section 845, is
to carry out prototype projects directly relevant to weapons or weapon
systems proposed to be acquired or developed by the DOD.
The authority to use ``other transactions'' (OTs) in accordance
with Section 845 was delegated to the Directors of all the Defense
Agencies in December 1996, providing the authority to enter into
transactions (other than contracts) under prototype projects.
The Secretary of Defense memorandum dated January 2, 2002,
encouraged ``flexible acquisition practices,'' and delegated to the
Director of the MDA, ``authority to use transactions other than
contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to carry out basic,
applied, and advanced research.''
To date, only two OTs have been awarded by the Missile Defense
Agency, both using the Section 845 prototype authority. HQ0006-02-9-
0001 was awarded in the amount of $23 million to the Boeing Corporation
as the lead of the Missile Defense National Team (MDNTS(I)) for Systems
Engineering and Integration; and HQ0006-02-9-0002 was awarded in the
amount of $23 million to Lockheed Martin Corporation as the lead of the
Missile Defense National Team (MDNTB(I)) for Battle Management,
Command, Control, and Communications. The period of performance for
both OTs is through June 2002; however, it is anticipated that they
will both be extended to December 2003, with an estimated increase in
total value to $141 million and $141 million respectively. It is also
anticipated that 2-year increments for the block evolution of the BMDS
may continue through December 2011 for a total potential value of $950
million per OT.
In order to ensure that adequate oversight was provided for in
these agreements, the OTs were awarded using the guidance provided by
the DOD Other Transaction Guide dated December 2, 2001. The MDA OTs
include an oversight provision titled ``Comptroller General Access''
which provides the Comptroller access to the contractors records Other
oversight, which is similar to FAR contracts, comes through OT Annual
reporting to Congress, Defense Contract Audit Agency review of invoices
and allowable costs, and Defense Contract Management Agency
Administration and review of accounting systems.

23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in the January 2, 2002
memorandum, the Secretary stated that he would decide, with input from
a Senior Executive Council, to use test assets for emergency or
contingent capability. The test assets referred to in the memo are
scheduled to be available in a little more than 2.5 years. What
criteria will the Secretary use to determine if a test asset should be
used as a contingent or emergency capability?
Secretary Aldridge. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Senior
Executive Council have established specific criteria at this time for
determining if test assets can be used as a contingency capability. It
will be a case-by-case decision based on operational needs, ballistic
missile defense element capabilities, test results, and other criteria
deemed appropriate at the time of the decision.

OPERATIONAL TESTING AND CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES

24. Senator Akaka. Mr. Christie, if test assets are not
operationally tested before they are determined to be available as a
contingency or emergency capability, how can the Secretary be sure that
the assets will work in an operational environment?
Mr. Christie. As I stated in a previous response, I recommend that
operational utility be addressed throughout development, so that
capabilities may be deployed at any time without a disproportionate
risk of operational difficulties. Under this approach, interim concepts
of operation would be developed which account for the current state of
system development. Putting together an operational capability and
concepts of operations using components that are at various stages of
maturity is risky. Previously, I pointed out the distinction we see
between contingency deployments and emergency deployments. We believe
that the philosophy we have described will balance the risk of either
eventuality. By definition, an operational testing program, supporting
a full-rate production decision or Initial Operational Capability,
should employ production representative hardware. However, since such
hardware is generally not available during development, interim
deployments will exploit hardware built for testing. This strategy will
put low-rate initial production equipment into service and may require
a higher degree of interoperability or different interfaces than the
final system concept, as required inputs from immature elements may
have to be provided by a combination of other systems. The Secretary
will have to weigh the relative risks of deploying an immature system
against the risk posed by the given emergency. Addressing operational
issues early and continuously in the development process will provide
the best possible information to support decisions for contingency
deployment.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND FISCAL YEAR 2003 OMB ASSESSMENTS

25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in the President's fiscal
year 2003 budget, the administration presented the results from its
ongoing review of programs throughout government to identify strong and
weak performers. Often, the budget request sought to redirect funds
from lesser performing programs--or programs with unknown performance--
to higher priority or more effective programs. How did MDA's programs
rank in the OMB assessment?
Secretary Aldridge. OMB did not publish a rating of the Missile
Defense Agency programs in the fiscal year 2003 President's budget.

MATURE TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES-BASED ASSESSMENTS

26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, my understanding of your
``capabilities-based'' methodology is that once you have considered all
mature technologies that can be used in a missile defense system, you
will determine the military application of each capability. Have you
completed a survey of all mature technologies to determine what
capabilities exist and how do you define a mature technology?
Secretary Aldridge. MDA continuously monitors and assesses
technology developments to identify new and maturing opportunities that
could materially improve the capability of the BMDS. This is not a one-
time or episodic process.
MDA is in the process of refining a technology maturity evaluation
process for the BMDS program. This process is being patterned after
NASA's Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) and the DOD 5000.2-R
acquisition regulation.

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TESTING AND EVALUATION ROLE

27. Senator Akaka. Mr. Christie, the administration has given the
Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation a role in determining
whether or not missile defense programs are functioning properly with
the major industry contractors involved in developing the program. In
addition, the Secretary proposes establishing ``National Industry
Teams'' through transactions other than contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced
research. If these transactions are outside of the authority of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, what oversight will anyone have over
the contractors?
Mr. Christie. We have not had access to details on the roles and
responsibilities of the ``National Industry Teams,'' and, thus, are
unable to address this question explicitly. If the intent of the teams
is to perform basic, applied, and advanced research, then the Services'
R&D laboratories or national FFRDCs are the right organizations to
provide oversight. Even if these efforts were funded by traditional
contracts, DOT&E does not have adequate resources to evaluate the
delivery of research products unless they are incorporated into a
system concept with mission requirements and measurable performance
characteristics.

28. Senator Akaka. Mr. Christie, the Secretary's January 2, 2002,
memorandum directs the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, to base production decisions on initial
performance demonstrated through credible testing, availability of
system alternatives, and threat evolution. Secretary Aldridge stated
that the initial performance decision on which production decisions
would be based would come during the developmental testing phase. If
that is the case, then by definition some initial deployment decisions
would be made during the developmental testing phase. In that
situation, why aren't you involved at an earlier stage in order to
ensure operational decisions are consonant with performance
capabilities and if you are not involved, then would deployment
decisions be made based on the developmental testing phase with no
assessment by you of the adequacy of the performance criteria in
meeting the capabilities based design?
Mr. Christie. Production decisions have historically been tied to
demonstrations of operational effectiveness and suitability through
operational test and evaluation. Under the MDA acquisition strategy,
they will perform ``credible testing'' in order to access an element's
capability prior to recommending a production decision. DOT&E will have
insight into this ``credible testing'' through my participation on the
Missile Defense Support Group. Through this forum, I will offer my
advice to the Director of the MDA and to the Senior Executive Council
as to what testing should be performed and whether the testing
performed adequately demonstrates operational capability consonant with
the maturity of the element and the magnitude of the production or
deployment decision.

PROGRAM STOPPAGE CRITERIA

29. Secretary Akaka. General Kadish, in his January 2, 2002
memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to plan and execute work such
that it may be truncated or stopped under certain circumstances. Under
the capability-based model, when will the criteria for continuing or
stopping a program be established--before development begins, prior to
testing, or after completion of testing?
General Kadish. Under our capability-based approach, we do not plan
to pre-determine specific criteria for continuing or stopping a
program. Instead, we will establish metrics by which we will measure
each element's or concept development's progress. We will use those
metrics, covering cost, schedule, and progress versus risk, as part of
our on-going assessment process for the entire BMDS.
Our recommendation to continue, accelerate, modify, or stop a
particular element or concept will consider those metrics, but will
also consider changes to an adversary's potential capability, as well
as changes in policy, operational considerations, and affordability
considerations. We will bring our assessment and recommendations to the
SEC at least annually for their review and approval.

TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS

30. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, the MDA is currently doing a
technology readiness level assessment of all system elements of
critical technologies. Standard practice is to not enter into an
acquisition program for a system until it reaches Technology Readiness
level (TRL) 7. Generally, system requirements are used in determining
the level of maturity of the system. How are you determining the TRLs
for missile defense if operation requirements have been canceled?
General Kadish. MDA continues to use the DOD approved definitions
of TRLs. MDA is establishing a detailed checklist to move elements/
components and new technologies from one TRL to the next that focuses
on whether specific engineering and production milestones have been
achieved during development in lieu of operational requirements. For
example, a checklist to determine whether the development of a
technology has reached TRL 3 could include assessment categories such
as ``Integration and production issues have begun to be addressed'' and
``Components of technology have been identified and have been partially
characterized.''

31. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, how is the MDA assessing the
readiness level of the different software components critical to
missile defense systems? Will MDA's assessment of technical readiness
levels include as assessment of how well the multiple systems work
together? How will you address integration concerns?
General Kadish. MDA assesses software readiness based on
progressive tests conducted throughout the development cycle. This
testing is conducted throughout development at the element and
integrated system level. Thus, MDA's assessment of technology readiness
levels includes assessments of how well the multiple systems work
together. MDA's approach to addressing integration concerns is to test
top-level system performance starting as early as possible with
software algorithm benchmark and constructive simulations, then
proceeding through Hardware-in-the-Loop, System Integration Tests, and
Integrated Flight Tests.

32. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, one of the significant
differences between TRL 7 and TRL 8 is that the latter uses an
operational environment for testing rather than a relevant environment
that might involve proxies and idealized conditions. How will you be
able to specify an ``operational environment'' if you have not
committed to an architecture, quantities, fielding requirements, or
some expectation of how the system must operate?
General Kadish. MDA does plan to demonstrate specific sets of
system capabilities, defined as blocks. Each block configuration of the
BMD System consists of a number of elements with a range of system
capabilities, architectures, and operational concepts to guide testing
of the system capability. These architectures and operational concepts
will evolve over time and are developed with input from the CINCs and
Services. As the BMDS evolves and these blocks are defined, appropriate
operational environments will be developed and instituted within the
BMD Test Bed, against which each block capability can be demonstrated.
Tests will consider the operational environment appropriate to each
block at the time of testing. Full operational testing of the element
or component capabilities will be conducted prior to transferal to a
Service for procurement.

LOW-EARTH ORBIT SATELLITES

33. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, a successful missile intercept
by an NMD exo-atmospheric kill vehicle could result in the detonation
of the nuclear charge due to salvage fusing. A low-yield (10-20
kiloton), high altitude (125-500 km) nuclear explosion could disable--
in weeks or months--all low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites not
specifically hardened to withstand radiation generated by that
explosion. Is your office working with NASA, Intelsat, NRO, and the
satellite industry to ensure LEO satellites and the international space
station would not be affected by a possible nuclear explosion resulting
from a mid-course interception?
General Kadish. MDA has met with many organizations, to include
those mentioned, to discuss the potential effects of exo-atmospheric
intercepts of ballistic missiles. One of the benefits of a layered
missile defense system is the potential to intercept ballistic missiles
in the boost phase, so that the scenario described could be avoided
altogether.

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

34. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, have you done any preliminary
engineering studies for the various capabilities you are trying to
develop, e.g., have you calculated the minimum speed required for an
ICBM defense interceptor for boost, mid-course, or terminal phase, and
have you applied these minimum requirements to the systems that you are
attempting to expand from theater defense to ICBM?
General Kadish. The Missile Defense Agency has conducted
engineering studies and architectural trade studies for many years.
These studies have been instrumental in providing an understanding of
the major element and component parameters affecting overall system
performance. Commensurate with a capability-based acquisition approach
to the BMDS, the MDA will use these results to guide the pursuit and
selection of concepts, technologies, and solutions to the missile
defense problem as soon as they become mature enough and provide a
sufficiently useful military capability to include in the evolving
system. Existing capabilities for missile defense will be adapted and
integrated for their inherent capabilities against ballistic missiles
of all ranges.

35. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, how much of the theater defense
system will have to be redesigned to meet the new requirement?
General Kadish. None of our existing systems must be redesigned. We
will assess the capability of each element and component to contribute
to the overall missile defense mission, and accelerate, truncate,
modify, or initiate efforts to improve our mission capability over time
based on the maturity and availability of technology to support that
evolution. This is the basis of the capability-based acquisition
approach we are applying to missile defense.

FUTURE TESTING

36. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, you have stated that you plan to
be able to deploy an emergency system in 2004. According to the current
testing matrix, how many integrated flight tests should be completed by
then and will any of these tests be in an operational environment?
General Kadish. We are planning to complete four integrated flight
tests of the GMD element per year. All testing will develop and
demonstrate inherent operational capability at increasingly higher
levels of performance. The location and layout of the BMDS Test Bed has
been selected in order to simulate as closely as we can an operational
configuration of sensors, weapons, and BMC3. To the extent that the
operational environment can be defined today, the MDA is designing and
using the BMDS Test Bed to represent it and demonstrate system
capabilities.

37. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, how realistic will the testing
conditions, support systems (radars), target cluster, etc., be by then?
General Kadish. The development of BMDS will proceed on a step-by-
step basis, rigorously demonstrating system capabilities through
increasingly more realistic testing against a widening variety of
threats displayed in a variety of relevant operational environments.
The realism of testing conditions at the BMDS Test Bed for a particular
stage of block development will pace the evolutionary spiral
development of the BMDS. As the threat evolves, testing and the
necessary test infrastructure will be adapted to reflect the need to
demonstrate capability over a wider threat space. In the end, realism
would be a factor in the assessment of whether or not an emergency
system should be deployed. Deployment will depend on specific threats
and available resources.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

SBIRS-LOW

38. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, both of
you indicated your belief that SBIRS-Low will be a critical component
of a missile defense system. At the same time, critics continue to
question the need for SBIRS-Low and its capabilities. Is there a
continuing need for the capabilities provided by SBIRS-Low?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, there is still a critical need for SBIRS-
Low in the BMDS. Specifically, SBIRS-Low is being designed to:

provide 24/7 global coverage, and bridge gaps in
ground-based sensor systems
assure midcourse tracking
discriminate warheads from countermeasures by
mitigating the effectiveness of radio frequency (RF) and high
traffic countermeasures that negate or seriously challenge
radar sensors
mitigate risk to forward-deployed assets

overcomes political sensitivity with regard to
basing rights
is less vulnerable to attack

provide vital midcourse signature data to support all
ballistic missile defense sensors and interceptors.

General Kadish. Yes, there is a continuing need for the capability
provided by SBIRS-Low. SBIRS-Low is intended to provide the BMDS with
global, continuous (24/7) surveillance and infrared midcourse tracking
of ballistic missiles. Currently, no other system exists or is planned
that can ensure this kind of seamless coverage and tracking.
SBIRS-Low's ability to detect, track, and discriminate lethal
targets and associated objects in the infrared spectrum complements
radar performance and protects the BMDS against the effects of radar
countermeasures. Using its ability to perform these functions over the
radar's horizon SBIRS-Low extends the BMDS battlespace by providing
early precision cues to radar and interceptors prior to launch. SBIRS-
Low continues its critical functions, by providing target information
to the in-flight interceptor and assessing the success of the
engagement.

39. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, why is
the capability provided by SBIRS-Low important?
Secretary Aldridge. SBIRS-Low is critical to an effective missile
defense because it is space-based, infrared, and in low earth orbit:

Because it is space-based, SBIRS-Low can continuously
monitor all of the earth's surface. This means there will be no
blind spots or safe havens from which missiles can be launched
without the U.S. detecting them. Earlier tracking allows
earlier interceptor commitment and an increased opportunity for
multiple engagements. A SBIRS-Low could provide key threat
development information from inland test ranges which are
currently inaccessible. It also provides the capability to
track missiles along their entire trajectory from launch to
intercept or reentry regardless of launch point or missile
trajectory. No other BMDS sensor provides this capability. The
extended viewing times make precise tracking and discrimination
techniques possible based on long-term observations such as
heating or cooling trends.
Because it employs infrared sensors, SBIRS-Low adds
robustness to the BMDS, complementing radar systems in several
ways. Compared with radars, infrared sensors can more
effectively provide wide area surveillance. Infrared sensors
provide a second phenomenology--reducing the effectiveness of
radar countermeasures. Because interceptors employ infrared
seekers, the target information handover is simplified. A mix
of infrared and radar sensor assets provides the ballistic
missile command and control (BMC2) with a variety of options to
optimize allocation of sensor to target.
Because it maintains a low earth orbit and employs
highly sensitive sensors, SBIRS-Low is capable of midcourse
tracking and discrimination that can't be done by the Defense
Support Program (DSP) or SBIRS-High. SBIRS-Low also simplifies
target information handover because it passes target
information from the same viewing angles achieved by the
interceptor seeker.

General Kadish. SBIRS-Low is critical to an effective missile
defense because it provides a continuous capability to do global
surveillance and midcourse tracking of ballistic missiles.
Because it is space-based, SBIRS-Low, in sufficient orbiting
numbers, can continuously monitor the earth's entire surface. This
means that there will be no blind spots or safe havens from which
missiles can be launched without detection by the United States. SBIRS-
Low's ability to detect and track targets over the radar's horizon
provides the BMDS earlier tracking, which allows earlier interceptor
commitment and an increased opportunity for multiple engagements.
SBIRS-Low could provide key threat development information from inland
test ranges that is currently inaccessible. It also provides the
capability to track missiles along their entire trajectory from launch
to intercept or reentry regardless of launch point or missile
trajectory. No other BMDS sensor provides this capability. The extended
viewing times make precise tracking and discrimination techniques
possible based on long-term observations such as heating or cooling
trends.
Because it employs infrared sensors, SBIRS-Low increases the
probability of BMDS engagement's success and complements radar systems
in several ways. Compared with radars, infrared sensors can more
effectively provide wide area surveillance. Infrared sensors provide a
second phenomenology--reducing the effectiveness of radar
countermeasures. Because interceptors employ infrared seekers, the
Target Object Map (TOM) handover is simplified. A mix of infrared and
radar sensor assets provides the BMC2 with a variety of options to
optimize allocation of sensor to target.
Because it maintains a low earth orbit similar to the viewing
geometry of the kill vehicle sensor and employs highly sensitive
sensors, SBIRS-Low is capable of midcourse tracking and discrimination
that cannot be done by DSP or SBIRS-High.

40. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, can
other systems provide the same or better capabilities as SBIRS-Low?
Secretary Aldridge. Not entirely. While large, land-based X-Band
radars placed at strategic locations around the world could provide
much of the coverage, they would not provide the total coverage
required for an effective BMDS. SBIRS-Low will be able to view missiles
launched anywhere on the globe without any dependency on foreign
basing, thus reducing the sensors' vulnerability to direct attack and
mitigating the geographic viewing limitations of surface-based radars.
That is precisely why the SBIRS-Low capability is key to an effective,
reliable sensor suite. In addition, a balanced infrared and radar
sensor suite mitigates the effectiveness of adversary countermeasures
against the BMDS. Complementary sensors based on different
methodologies (i.e., radar and infrared) create a capability that is
highly effective against a wide variety of countermeasures.
General Kadish. No single sensor alternative can replace a space-
based infrared sensor for global, continuous surveillance and infrared
tracking capabilities.

HIT TO KILL AND DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

41. Senator Allard. General Kadish, with the termination of the
space based laser integrated flight experiment, the Airborne Laser is
the only major laser technology development effort being pursued by the
MDA. Is it your view that laser or other directed energy weapons
represent the next generation of missile defense technology after
``hit-to-kill?''
General Kadish. Directed energy technology may be the next
generation of missile defense technology. Clearly, we are pursuing
relatively mature ``hit-to-kill'' technologies because we believe they
can contribute capability during the midcourse and terminal phases of a
ballistic missile's flight. Intercepting missiles during their boosting
phase has many advantages. Unfortunately, the short burn times for many
of the threat missiles make it difficult for a ``hit-to-kill'' vehicle
to reach the target while it is boosting. The short time lines and
accessibility to the launch regions make the ABL and the Space Based
Laser (SBL) directed energy concepts attractive for boost phase
defense. We are exploring these technologies to add to the missile
defense system.

42. Senator Allard. General Kadish, are directed energy
technologies mature enough and promising enough to warrant greater MDA
focus?
General Kadish. MDA is interested in directed energy technologies
for missile defense. Several demonstrations in the past (e.g., the
Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) and the Theater High Energy Laser
(THEL)) lead us to believe directed energy technologies may soon be
available to contribute useful capability to the BMDS. The MDA budget
submittal for fiscal year 2002 contained a large increase in funding
for directed energy technologies such as the ABL and SBL. Unfortunately
due to the reduced fiscal year 2002 funding for the SBL flight
experiment, we have had to restructure the SBL from a flight experiment
project to a component technology project.

43. Senator Allard. General Kadish, what role does the MDA
anticipate playing in the development of directed energy technologies?
General Kadish. MDA and its predecessor organizations, SDIO and
BMDO, have a long history of funding and managing directed energy
technology development projects. Unfortunately, funding limitations and
changing mission priorities caused us in the mid-1990s to select the
SBL as our sole investment. However, due to the reduced fiscal year
2002 funding for the SBL flight experiment, MDA has had to restructure
the SBL from a flight experiment project to a component technology
project. The ABL was added to MDA funding and management
responsibilities during the past year. MDA is committed to the flight
of the first aircraft and to the first lethal shoot down of a missile
target. MDA will remain involved in defining, guiding, and setting
priorities for the Department's directed energy technology projects.

NUNN-MCCURDY AND MDA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA

44. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, you
indicated during your testimony that the Nunn-McCurdy law would not
apply to the MDA's research and development efforts. At the same time,
you clearly indicate the intent to continue successful technology
developments and turn off those efforts that do not live up to
expectations. What criteria will the MDA use in determining which
technology efforts to continue, which to discontinue, and will these
criteria be formalized in any way?
Secretary Aldridge. Each of the BMDS elements, and the overall
program, will be managed by Missile Defense Agency using internal
baselines. Progress of each development activity will be monitored
against its baseline to show how each element and its technology
efforts are progressing relative to expectations. Periodic reviews will
focus on the progress of each effort and produce recommendations that
an effort be continued, accelerated or terminated. The metrics for such
a recommendation will consider cost, schedule progress, technology
maturity and risk. The Director of the MDA will make any such
recommendation to the Senior Executive Council at least annually.
General Kadish. Under our capability-based approach for acquisition
we are establishing metrics by which we will measure each element's or
concept development's progress. Those metrics, covering cost, schedule,
and progress versus risk, are a part of our ongoing assessment process
for the entire BMDS.
We still use internal baselines for measuring element and
aggregated system progress. We will maintain visibility and controls to
adjust, stop, slow, or accelerate a program based on routine
assessment. This is similar to how we have supported such decisions in
the past.
Our recommendations will also consider changes to an adversary's
potential capability, as well as changes in policy, operational
considerations, and affordability considerations. We will bring our
assessment and recommendations to the SEC at least annually for their
review and approval.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND SYSTEMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Inhofe, Allard, and Sessions.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
minority counsel; Brian R. Green and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff members.
Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Thomas C. Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; and Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator
Allard.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order and welcome
both Secretary Teets and General Eberhart as well as my
colleagues Senator Inhofe and Senator Nelson. Senator Allard
will join us momentarily.
The Strategic Subcommittee meets this afternoon to discuss
national security space programs and strategic programs. We
have two panels today. On the first panel, we will discuss
space programs and issues with Gen. Ralph Eberhart, the
Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command, and Peter Teets, the
Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO). On the second panel we will
discuss strategic systems and issues with Adm. James Ellis, the
Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command. Admiral Ellis
will be accompanied by Maj. Gen. Franklin Blaisdell and Rear
Adm. Dennis Dwyer.
We have a lot to cover this afternoon, particularly in the
area of space programs. The Defense Department's space
satellites provide our Nation's military with precise guidance
for our weapons, navigation for our troops, sophisticated
intelligence, and other critical data. Given the importance of
space to our current and future military operations, it is
troubling that a number of our major space acquisition programs
have cost and schedule concerns.
Lt. Gen. Brian Arnold, the new commander of the Air Force's
Space and Missile Systems Center, was recently quoted as
saying: ``In virtually every one of our major space programs,
we are out of control on cost and schedule.'' Unfortunately,
basic problems with the way some space programs are managed
appear to have contributed to these cost and schedule problems.
Against this backdrop, the Pentagon has begun a major
overhaul in how it manages and oversees its space programs. It
has delegated much of the oversight for both Air Force and NRO
space programs to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. While
this may help coordinate the space efforts of these two
organizations, which I support, I am concerned that the
historical oversight provided by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) for Air Force space programs may not be as strong
as it should be. The inherent jointness of all space programs
and the current problems with these programs argue for
stronger, not weaker, oversight by the OSD.
In addition, a certain level of oversight is required by
law for all major defense acquisition programs, including space
programs.
Today we will discuss how the Defense Department plans on
providing oversight for its space programs, as well as look at
some of the specific programs that have run into trouble as
well as the Department's actions to implement the
recommendations of the Space Commission's report.
Now I would like to recognize the ranking member, Senator
Allard. Senator.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like
to welcome our witnesses today.
Today we have the challenging task of reviewing the full
range of policies, programs, and budget requests for space and
strategic systems. Both of these areas have been marked by
controversy and change in the recent past. Today I believe
everyone recognizes that space is becoming more and more
important to our military and indeed to the well-being and
prosperity of all Americans. Navigation, weather,
communication, and imagery satellites enable the full range of
modern military capabilities that allow our forces to
thoroughly dominate the modern battlefield.
Yet, with this increasing significance, we must pay
attention to the safety and security of our Nation's space
assets and our ability as a Nation to sustain these
capabilities in the near term and expand them in the future. We
have serious reason to be concerned. First, U.S. space assets
are increasingly vulnerable to attack. Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet, and Vice Adm. Thomas
Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
testified just yesterday before the full committee that a
number of nations and non-state entities are developing the
means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat U.S. space systems.
Our increasing reliance on space-based capabilities makes
these vulnerabilities all the more disturbing. Indeed, the
Space Commission chaired by now-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
noted that we are ripe for a ``space Pearl Harbor.''
Second, space programs have not had a stellar management
record in the recent past. Key programs such as the Space-Based
Infrared Systems (SBIRS)-High early warning satellite system
have suffered developmental difficulties, schedule delays, and
cost increases. Yet, the requirements for these programs remain
compelling and I am not aware of viable alternatives to meet
these requirements.
Third, while senior DOD leaders have identified space
capabilities that could transform how our military fights, I am
not yet convinced that the Department has fully embraced these
efforts or that congressional critics of space programs are
ready to fully support them. For example, the Air Force
supports a transformational communications architecture that
could allow much more efficient use of communications
satellites and greatly increase communications bandwidth. But I
am concerned that this new architecture is not well understood
and could have a ripple effect on communications satellites now
being developed.
Space-Based Radar (SBR) and the Spare-Based Infrared System
(SBIRS)-Low are both systems that promise tremendous new
capabilities and are strongly supported by our military
leaders. Last week, in fact, Secretary Aldridge, General
Kadish, and General Eberhart all endorsed SBIRS-Low as an
important priority. But congressional support for these key
efforts has been problematic.
Fourth, organization and management processes are going
through a period of substantial change. On the one hand, I
applaud the initiatives to correct poor management of the space
programs in the past. On the other hand, we all need to be
concerned during any period of change that these changes are
responsive to past problems and effective in correcting them.
Any time bureaucratic interests are challenged during a
reorganization, good intentions can be derailed both subtly and
quickly.
Likewise, how we think about strategic systems is changing
dramatically. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in
January is a truly radical document. It addresses the
tremendous changes in the international security environment
over the past decade by reformulating the nuclear triad into a
new triad that includes not only nuclear forces, but precision
conventional munitions, active and passive defenses, and the
defense industrial infrastructure.
This formulation represents a fundamental shift in how we
look at strategic issues, a significant step away from mutually
assured destruction (MAD), less reliance on nuclear weapons,
increasing reliance on missile defenses, and a range of options
to deal with a range of threats to and attacks on the United
States and its forces and interests by any of a number of
potential adversaries.
This dramatic reformulation brings with it new questions
about the role of Strategic Command, the role of nuclear
weapons, and Strategic Command requirements. These questions I
think were inevitable, given how much the world has changed
since the end of the Cold War. But the NPR has brought them
into sharp focus, and today's hearing will provide us some
opportunity to address them.
We are fortunate to have Under Secretary Teets and General
Eberhart for the space panel and shortly thereafter Admiral
Ellis, Major General Blaisdell, and Rear Admiral Dwyer for the
strategic panel to talk about these critical issues.
Again, I thank each and every one of you for taking the
time out of your busy schedules to join us today and I look
forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Nelson, do you have a statement?
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too
want to thank both panels of witnesses for appearing here today
to discuss our nuclear security, space, and strategic programs.
I especially would like to thank Admiral Ellis from Offutt Air
Force Base, Strategic Command, in Nebraska for being here
today. General Eberhart, I very much appreciate the opportunity
to visit with you today about space assets.
This year we are again trying to determine whether the
budget provides enough for our strategic policy and protection.
There is also added concern because we realize that we are no
longer, if we ever were, a fortress that cannot be penetrated.
With the limited resources and the prioritization that have to
go on, we must, in fact, raise questions.
But some of our adversaries continue to pursue nuclear
technology and, if gained, will not hesitate to use it. Saddam
Hussein has stated that as long as other countries possess
ballistic missiles he is going to continue to attempt to gain
the same leverage. So it is imperative that our expenditures
are both cost effective and are carefully allocated so our
children and grandchildren can enjoy the same sense of security
that we have enjoyed in the past and look forward to having in
the future.
So I look forward to hearing your testimony, your comments,
and the opportunity to raise some questions as we go along.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
statement, but I agree with what Senator Nelson said in his
remarks. Saddam Hussein also said that at the end of the
Persian Gulf War, if we had waited 10 years to go into Kuwait
the Americans would not have done what they did because he
would have a missile that could reach them. Here it is, 10
years later.
So I want to get into a line of questioning as to the
immediacy of threats and where they are, as much as we can do
it in an open session like this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Eberhart, we will begin with you and then we will
turn to Under Secretary Teets for his opening statement. Both
of you have submitted prepared statements. Both will be
included in the record, and you may summarize as you wish.
General Eberhart.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

General Eberhart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a
pleasure to be back with this subcommittee. It is also a
pleasure to represent the wonderful young men and women in the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), U.S. Space
Command, and Air Force Space Command. They are doing remarkable
things in both Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring
Freedom.
When I talk of these individuals, I am talking about a
truly joint combined team of Canadians and Americans, soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and our contractors, all
doing what is necessary to make sure we succeed in these very
important mission areas.
In Operation Noble Eagle, to date, we have flown over
19,000 sorties in support of Operation Noble Eagle, making sure
it is safe for people to fly in our airspace. We have done this
without incident or accident, which speaks to the
professionalism and the skill of those aviators--once again,
they are aviators of all Services--and to those who generate
the sorties, maintain the aircraft, and make it possible for
them to fly.
I would also offer that we have achieved a new level of
jointness in this operation, also reflected in Operation
Enduring Freedom. But this one is special in terms of the
cooperation that exists between the Services and the FAA,
Customs, the Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agencies.
This is a sense of jointness that we must continue to cultivate
as we move ahead in terms of homeland security.
We have flown over 19,000 sorties, at a cost on the order
of $500 million. I think that we have done this very
professionally. It has served its purpose, but in the long run
this is not the right way to work this problem. The right way
to work this problem begins right on the ground. It begins
right at our airports, our airfields, in terms of improved
security, the steps that we have already taken, the steps that
we are committed to take in the future.
It is also in improved security on board our aircraft in
terms of air marshals, in terms of briefings to crews to
actively resist, in terms of cockpit doors that are secure and
cannot be penetrated by a terrorist, in terms of improved
cooperation, as I said, with the FAA, so that when there is an
anomaly, it is immediately shared with NORAD and collectively
we take the appropriate action. It is also the ability for
NORAD now to not just look out for external threats, but also
have a radar picture so we can see threats in the internal, the
interior of the United States. We are working that connectivity
as we speak. So that is the way to work this problem in the
longer term.
Let us now turn to what we are doing in terms of Operation
Enduring Freedom to support Gen. Tommy Franks and those brave
young men and women who go in harm's way. Our primary
contribution has been in the mission area of force enhancement.
We do things like improve satellite communications. To give you
a feel for how far we have come since Operation Desert Storm,
we are providing Tommy Franks today about seven times the
bandwidth that was available to General Schwarzkopf in
Operation Desert Storm, seven times.
So that allows you to do a lot of things through reachback,
that cuts down on your footprint in the theater. If you look at
people deployed in this conflict versus Operation Desert Storm,
there is about 322 times as much bandwidth available per person
deployed--that's very impressive.
So we must stay the course in terms of the Advanced EHF,
the wideband gap-filler, and the UHF capability for our mobile
users. I believe that that is a good investment in terms of
situational awareness, command and control, and in terms of the
effectiveness, efficiency, and lethality of our forces.
We provide weather support. We provide updated weather
information. We do that essentially on the half hour, as
opposed to in the past where we would have done it on the hour
for General Franks and his folks. So not only observations, but
forecasts, and also space weather and what effect that space
weather might have on their operations. In most cases we are
referring to their communications capabilities.
Next, missile warning. We do this through the Defense
Support Program (DSP). Thank goodness we have not had to call a
missile shot to Tommy Franks or his forces, but we are watching
closely to make sure the enemy has not launched a Scud or
similar type short-range ballistic missile.
We also use this DSP for battlespace characterization, so
we can essentially do some combat assessment, and some bomb
damage assessment, using this system. Bright young men and
women out there have figured out how to use a system that was
designed to detect ICBM launches in these and other exciting
ways.
That is why we need the Space-Based Infrared System
referred to by Senator Allard. That is so very important, not
only for the national mission, but also for operational and
tactical levels of warfare, to support all warfighters
regardless of the medium in which they fight.
Finally, in terms of computer network operations, we
immediately went to Information Condition (INFOCON) Alpha,
which I believe paid off in terms of securing our networks. I
believe it also sent a valuable message in terms of deterrence.
We actually saw for the first few months after this horrific
event on September 11 that the number of attempted probes
actually dropped by half. I think that is for several reasons.
I think, one, because we went to INFOCON Alpha. I also believe
that it was not patriotic at that time to try to hack into our
system. I also believe that offshore hackers knew we were mad
and decided not to test us during this period of time. I am sad
to report that those probes have now returned to the level that
we saw before September 11.
So in summary, your air and space warriors out there of all
Services, to include our very important civilian complement,
are working hard to ensure that we succeed in both Operation
Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. On their behalf, I
thank this subcommittee for your continued support over the
years, but more importantly for what you will do for us in the
future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Eberhart follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today
representing the outstanding men and women of North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Space Command (USSPACECOM).
The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, reservists, and
guardsmen serving in NORAD and USSPACECOM have been instrumental in our
success to defend the homeland and attack terrorist factions in the
global war on terrorism. At home or abroad, the commitment of our
Service men and women to the Nation's security has been nothing less
than phenomenal.

PEOPLE--OUR NUMBER ONE PRIORITY

Our first priority is our people. Our warfighting edge depends on
the dedication, professionalism, and sacrifice of the men and women in
our Commands. Without them, even our most effective weapon systems are
of little value. As always, we need to continue to recruit, retain,
equip, and train our entire force.
We appreciate the critical role the members of this subcommittee
have played to improve their quality of life. The Fiscal Year 2002
National Defense Authorization Act reflected the country's confidence
in and concern for the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. Our
people have heard your message and are grateful for your actions. This
year's Defense Authorization Act provides many important quality of
life improvements such as needed pay raises, more robust health
benefits, improved housing benefits (better on-base housing and
increased off-base housing allowance), and greater educational
opportunities. All of these are key to helping us retain and recruit
the quality force our Nation needs.
The men and women of our Commands serve in virtually every location
where U.S. and allied forces operate. To the best of our ability, we
are safeguarding our people and facilities by continuing to conduct
regular anti-terrorism training, assess and correct our own
vulnerabilities, and educate our people to be constantly on guard. We
do not view force protection as a mission unto itself, but inherent in
all we do.

NORAD

For 44 years, NORAD has adapted to the changing threats by
transitioning from an initial ``air'' defense orientation to a broader
``aerospace'' dimension--one that also provides surveillance and
warning of ballistic missile attacks and space events. Our ability to
provide surveillance and control of U.S. and Canadian airspace remains
vital and constitutes a critical component to the defense of North
America. The unprecedented attacks on September 11, 2001 were a
reminder to the United States of the need to detect, assess, and warn
of hostile aircraft or missile attack against North America.
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). Prior to September 11, 2001, our air
defense posture was aligned to counter the perceived external threats
to North America air sovereignty--we considered flights originating
domestically as ``friendly by origin.'' Within this context, our
aerospace warning and control missions were oriented to detect and
identify all air traffic entering North American airspace, and if
necessary, intercept potentially threatening inbound aircraft. In
response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, NORAD's mission has
expanded to protect North America against domestic airborne threats.
On September 11, 2001, we quickly transitioned to an interoperable,
joint, and interagency force consisting of active, Reserve, and
National Guard units, and U.S./Canadian military aircraft and naval
vessels. Over 13,000 men and women are participating in ONE activities
on a day-to-day basis. For the first time in NATO's history, Article V
of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked in defense of the U.S.
homeland. As a result, seven NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft and
nearly 200 people from 13 nations are serving side-by-side with our
forces to ensure the safety of our citizens.
NORAD forces remain at a heightened readiness level to counter
potential threats. In all, over 19,000 sorties have been flown over the
U.S. and Canada in support of ONE. By contrast, only 147 sorties were
flown as part of the NORAD air defense mission during all of 2000. To
the credit of the outstanding men and women involved in this critical
homeland defense mission, all sorties to date have been executed
without a mishap. Our success is the result of the professionalism of
our people and cooperation between the U.S. and Canada.
In addition, we have partnered with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and NAVCANADA to streamline notification between
regional and sector operations centers, to improve communications
connectivity, and to deploy additional portable radars in ``blind
spots'' across the country for better interior coverage. The result is
a more rapid, reliable response to FAA requests for assistance as
incidents unfold. With the approval of the President and Secretary of
Defense, we have also developed effective rules of engagement for
hostile acts over domestic airspace to ensure the safety of our
citizens and the protection of critical infrastructure.
We continue to improve our procedures and coordination with the
Office of Homeland Security, the FAA, civilian law enforcement
organizations, and other government agencies from the U.S. and Canada.
Feedback regarding our air defense support to National Security Special
Events such as the Super Bowl and 2002 Winter Olympics has been very
positive.
We are heartened by the progress made to improve security at our
airports and aboard aircraft. Measures such as new passenger and
baggage screening procedures, heightened terminal security, hardened
cockpits, and more air marshals are our first, and best, defense. This
increased vigilance should deter foul play on the ground and reduce the
need to commit fighters in the air. We believe our NORAD air defense
capabilities are the last line of defense; when NORAD interceptors are
called to action, we are exercising the Nation's option of last
recourse. This progress made to secure our airports, aircrews, and
aircraft has made flying in the U.S. and Canada safer than at any time
in aviation history.
Low-Altitude Air Threat. In addition to traditional air defense
threats, we need the capability to defend North America against low-
altitude, air-breathing threats such as cruise missiles, crop dusters,
and general aviation traffic traveling below 5,000 feet. This is a
significant challenge in congested population areas due to volume of
air traffic, as well as the northern regions in which general aviation
serves as the primary means of travel between remote communities. We
advocate a three-pronged approach to counter this evolving threat.
First, through the efforts of the North American Aerospace Surveillance
Council, we will continue to improve our wide-area surveillance around
the perimeter and internal regions of North America. Our goal is to
provide a single, integrated air picture of North America that is made
available to NORAD, FAA, NAVCANADA, and other government agencies.
Second, we will support an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration to
assess alternative surveillance technologies that can support this
goal. Finally, we will leverage law enforcement initiatives related to
general aviation (specifically for indications and warning of potential
incidents), emerging command and control capabilities, and other
research and development efforts.
Resources. We appreciate your quick passage of the Defense
Emergency Response Fund. As a result, we have been able to address
several critical command and control shortcomings highlighted by the
terrorist attacks. Specifically, we are upgrading our Battle Control
System from vintage 1970s technology to enable us to provide real-time
display of North American airspace, and provide effective command and
control of our air defense aircraft. Additionally, we will be able to
tap into a more extensive array of radars and sensors, process data
more timely and accurately, and monitor a larger number of aircraft
across a broader area, which will improve our situational awareness at
all levels. In the long term, we remain committed to the sustainment
and modernization of our air defense command and control
infrastructure.
Homeland Security. We remain engaged as the DOD explores options
for the formation of a new command for homeland security. Our focus is
to maintain current readiness and meet the requirements of this vital
mission, regardless of the command option selected.

USSPACECOM

Established in 1985, USSPACECOM is charged with the missions of
force enhancement, space control, space support, planning for force
application, and most recently, the DOD's computer network operations.
While we prosecute the war on terrorism, the decisive advantage space
and information-based capabilities provide to our warfighters will
continue to be critical to our Nation's success.
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). We continue to bring every space
and information operations (IO) capability to bear for General Tommy
Franks at CENTCOM and the other Combatant Commanders. Currently, we
have people deployed in support of OEF to include a robust Space and
Information Operations Element (SIOE) forward at the CENTCOM
Headquarters. In addition, we are leveraging an SIOE reachback
capability at Peterson AFB to provide additional space and IO expertise
and planning support to CENTCOM and the other Combatant Commanders in
support of the global war on terrorism.
Force Enhancement. Our force enhancement efforts over the past
decade have helped us integrate space into joint and coalition
operations. OEF has illustrated again the effectiveness of, as well as
our reliance on, these systems.
Over 50 percent of the precision-guided munitions employed in OEF
are Joint Direct Attack Munitions, guided by Global Positioning System
(GPS). The all-weather, day-night accuracy of these weapons gives our
warfighters a decisive advantage. Similarly, GPS has become a necessity
for civil authorities and commercial industry around the world. From
precision farming to financial transactions to surveying remote parts
of the earth's surface, every sector of our society relies on the
navigation and timing services provided by this system. As a result, we
have initiated a modernization program to provide a more robust anti-
jam capability for our military forces, and additional signals for
civil and commercial applications. We appreciate Congress' continued
support to properly sustain and modernize this national resource.
Missile warning continues to be one of our top priorities. The
Defense Support Program (DSP) has served as our mainstay for strategic
missile warning for over three decades. Through innovative
improvements, we have successfully fielded new theater missile warning
and battlespace characterization capabilities to provide direct support
to theater commanders and deployed forces. While DSP has served us
well, we need the improved detection capabilities of the Space-Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) to counter emerging strategic and theater
ballistic missile threats. The SBIRS system-of-systems will be
essential to our future early warning and space surveillance
capabilities, ballistic missile defense systems, and will provide
commanders better battlefield situational awareness. We are aware of
the SBIRS acquisition difficulties. However, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council's revalidation of our warfighter requirements in
January 2002 reconfirmed the urgency to develop and field this critical
capability. Reliable and secure satellite communications (SATCOM)
systems are also vital to our military's readiness. In OEF, we are
providing 322 times the communications bandwidth per person deployed
compared to Operation Desert Storm a little over a decade ago. This
exponential growth reaffirms our need to modernize our capabilities
with a blend of military, civil, and commercial systems.
Computer Network Operations. On April 2, 2001, we activated the
Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) to better align
our computer network defense and attack missions and improve unity of
command. In addition, the JTF-CNO makes more efficient use of available
resources, establishes a clear cross-agency coordination process, and
eases integration with the intelligence community and other mission
partners. Computer Network Defense continues to be our top priority,
with the goal to ensure stable, effective networks for the Department
of Defense. Our experience with the Code Red Worm and its variants
underscored our reliance on Internet connectivity and the vulnerability
of our gateways. While the effects of many viruses and intrusions
caused considerable damage to the commercial sector, we have been able
to keep our networks operating at peak performance. In OEF, we have
sustained proactive defensive postures based on potential threats,
verified Information Assurance Vulnerability Assessment compliance, and
maintained heightened operational security levels. For the long term,
we are assessing technical and operational solutions to further
strengthen the Defense Information Infrastructure and develop computer
network attack capabilities for all our warfighters.
Space Control. The political, economic, and military value of space
systems makes them attractive targets for state and non-state actors
hostile to the U.S. and its interests, especially as an asymmetric
method for leveling the playing field. Not only are threats emerging on
a daily basis, but access to advanced commercial space services
continues to chip away at our information superiority edge.
In response, our first priority should be to field effective space
situational awareness capabilities that enable us to identify, track,
and characterize potentially hostile threats. We must understand
potential adversaries' intent and be capable of warning of hostile acts
before they occur. We will also need to develop new capabilities for
operations through, to, from, and in space. Along with increased
vigilance on our part, these efforts will serve as a deterrent to
would-be attackers.
Space Support. The path for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles
(EELVs) is clear as we prepare for the first commercial launches of the
Atlas V in May 2002 and the Delta IV in July 2002. Our first DOD EELV
launch is scheduled for September 2002. By contrast, we still have much
work to do to determine our long-term strategy and the investments
needed for Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs). We are partnering with the
Air Force and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to
develop an RLV Roadmap that will be released within the next few
months. We are excited about the potential military application of RLVs
and believe early missions could include satellite reconstitution,
refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. RLVs
hold tremendous promise as we strive to better meet warfighter needs by
providing a ``launch on demand'' capability in the future.
Space-Based Radar (SBR). The requirement for a SBR capability
remains valid. Our military operations require the day-night, all
weather, broad-area surveillance capabilities a SBR system offers. In
response to the Fiscal Year 2001 DOD Authorization Conference Report,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense has recently signed a multi-service,
multi-agency SBR roadmap, which brings together requirements for DOD
and national users. As part of the SBR roadmap implementation, we are
involved in an analysis of alternatives to allow DOD leadership to make
SBR decisions as we consider other intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance needs.
Radio Frequency Spectrum. Access to the radio frequency spectrum is
considered essential to our success in all future military operations.
We depend on the 1755-1850 MHz band to perform a host of critical DOD
command, control, and communications functions, as well as to operate
many of our military satellites. It is also the preferred operating
band of the U.S.-based communications industry as they develop the
third generation wireless services. Without question, limiting our
access to this band or forcing our move to another band could have
serious consequences in terms of combat capability. We need to achieve
the right ``win-win'' solution and will continue to work with all
parties to find the best answer to this challenge. We ask for your
support to protect the spectrum needed to execute critical warfighting
missions.
Space Commission. We continue with implementation of the Space
Commission Report recommendations. Specifically, we are preparing for
the split off of Air Force Space Command from NORAD and USSPACECOM on
April 19, 2002. We believe the changes being made will help ensure our
military and national space communities are ready to meet the
challenges ahead.
Partnerships. Effective partnerships across the entire space and
information communities--military, intelligence, civil, and industry--
are essential to better leverage our space and information
capabilities. We continue to work with the NRO, National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA), and National Security Agency (NSA) to seek new
avenues to improve support to warfighters and national decisionmakers.
In addition, we are working with the NASA to explore common space
systems, increase our space surveillance capability, and improve human
spaceflight safety. Finally, through our partnerships with other
agencies, we are investigating ways to collectively support our
computer network operations mission.
We need to balance the advantages of commercial partnerships with
the inherent risks associated with expanding our use of commercial
systems. We do this by assessing our vulnerabilities and ensuring
protected military systems are available for our most critical military
missions.

CONCLUSION

We believe the NORAD and USSPACECOM missions will continue to grow
in importance as the Nation responds to current and emerging threats.
Our capabilities will help build the foundation needed to fulfill DOD's
transformational goals to protect the U.S. homeland and critical bases
of operation, deny sanctuaries to our enemies, as well as project and
sustain combat power. We will also serve a central role as the DOD
leverages information technology, conducts effective information
operations, and strengthens space operations in the future.
We continue to find new ways to improve these unique capabilities
by integrating them into all aspects of our military missions. As we
develop our next generation systems, we should invest the necessary
resources, energy, and intellectual capital to protect our vital
interests and sustain our lead in the space and information domains. We
appreciate Congress' continued support of our people and to maintain
our high state of readiness. With your help, we will ensure our air
defense, space, and information forces continue to play a key role in
our Nation's defense.
Again, I am honored to appear before you and look forward to your
questions.

Senator Reed. Thank you, General Eberhart.
Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER B. TEETS, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Secretary Teets. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
afternoon to you. I would like to start by thanking the Armed
Services Committee for their support of my nomination and then
subsequently the Senate for confirming my nomination last
December 7. I was subsequently sworn in as Under Secretary of
the Air Force on December 13 and want to assure you I have been
working hard ever since.
I find that I have arrived on the scene at what I would
call an opportune time. I am the beneficiary of the results of
three important commissions that were established to look at
the national security space situation. One has been referred to
widely, the National Security Space Commission, chaired by
Secretary Rumsfeld, and I will have more to say about that in a
moment or two and also be happy to take questions about
implementing those recommendations.
There were also two other important commissions. There was
an NRO Commission. Senator Allard participated in that as well,
of course, and that was an important piece of work which gave
some recommendations for the NRO. I have taken those
recommendations seriously and we are in the process of
implementing that commission's results as well and
recommendations as well.
Then lastly, perhaps you are familiar with the fact that
Don Kerr headed up a remote sensing panel that provided an
important database to the intelligence community regarding
remote sensing capabilities and the future of remote sensing in
our country.
So I really have had the benefit of all three commissions'
results completed and I find all three to have very valuable
recommendations for implementation. All of it leads in a way to
a situation where I think we can realistically look forward in
the relatively distant future toward a situation in which the
United States can achieve something that I would call universal
situational awareness. We can in fact have collection
activities going on in space which, when properly merged with
air assets, properly merged with activity on land and on the
sea, we can indeed find ourselves in a situation where we can
know what is going on around the Earth. Obviously, this war on
terrorism has taught us that this is a vitally important goal
to try and strive toward.
At this point in time, I would tell you that I have four
immediate priorities, however, that will stop far short of the
ultimate vision that I just described. The four priorities are:
first of all, getting our space acquisition programs on track.
We have heard already today references to our SBIRS-High
program, and it is a program that is experiencing considerable
difficulty and trauma.
Since taking on the job, I have had a number of intensive
reviews on the subject of SBIRS-High and we are currently on a
path, a parallel path really, of trying, number one, to see if
we can properly restructure the contract that is in place to
provide a contract that can be executed and that can deliver a
system that can meet all the requirements that have been
specified for it.
In parallel with that, however, I have been asked to look
into an alternate option using some NRO people and assets to
see if we can find an alternative which can provide the
necessary and vitally important information that will come from
SBIRS-High.
I will be more than pleased to answer additional questions
about SBIRS-High and how we are proceeding with it. But I would
like right now to point out simply that as the newly named
executive agent for DOD space I work and will continue to work
extremely closely with Secretary Aldridge as the Under
Secretary of Defense and the senior defense acquisition
official. I have and will continue to work closely with John
Stenbit, the Assistant Secretary for C\3\I.
There is no desire on my part to try and exclude the Office
of the Secretary of Defense or any of the necessary components
that can add value to the process, and I would certainly want
them to continue to have an oversight role. I do think,
however, that as we have been trying to implement the National
Security Space Commission recommendations, we have an
opportunity to put together an organization which can look at
the intelligence community activity in the NRO as well as Air
Force and become excellent stewards of Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps space requirements.
Of course, as we have started to create this new national
security space organization, we have included within it the
national security space architect, who happens at this point in
time to be Army General Steve Farrell. So we are doing
important architectural work that crosses the entire national
security space community and we have an opportunity now to also
put together another organization called the Directorate of
National Security Space Integration, which can migrate best
practices, if you will, across all the national security space
community. Again, I will be more than happy to answer more
questions on that as we move forward.
Now, another very important priority is to drive hard on
the issue of assured access to space. I think it's clear that,
from the results that have come back from the current war on
terrorism, our space assets are more important than they have
ever been. We need to be in a situation where we can sustain a
launch failure. After all, I think we all know that the highest
risk part of a space mission is in its initial deployment. The
space launch event is a traumatic event, it is a high energy
event, failures sometimes occur.
We need to be in a position to be able to sustain a failure
and still provide the next launch in a short period of time. So
in looking at that, one of the things we want to do is drive
hard on the Enhanced Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
to make certain that there are not single point failures which
could cause both launch systems to be down in the event of the
failure of one of them, and we will be looking hard at that.
An additional priority that I have is to really look hard
at how we can apply best practices across the national security
space community, and I offer just a couple of examples. The NRO
over a period of some 40 years has developed a solid system of
acquisitions that has thorough oversight and yet which can be
implemented in an expedited fashion. Typically speaking,
milestone decisions can take place in a period of 90 days,
rather than 180 days, and we can improve the cycle time by
getting the right people together, sitting around the table,
and addressing problems in real time. So I think this whole
idea of national security space integration can lead to
spreading best practices across the community.
Another example would be in the launch system process for
actually preparing systems for launch. It turns out that the
Air Force and NRO have classically had two different processes
or practices for readying launch systems for the launch event.
We can rapidly change that. We can drive hard on a single
practice and process that can increase reliability and give us
more confidence in our space launch capability.
Lastly then, another immediate priority that has come from
the many commissions that have looked at the space situation is
the need to develop a professional cadre of people across the
space community. I know that General Eberhart at Air Force
Space Command has been working extremely hard to make that a
reality. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the last Corona
meeting that we had focused on that very event, and General
Eberhart presented his views on how the Air Force could move
forward on that.
I have had several discussions with Under Secretary
Livingstone and Under Secretary Brownlee relative to Navy and
Army participation in developing this cadre of space talent
across all the military services and think we can make some
strong progress there.
I would close my remarks by simply saying that in this
roughly 3 months that I have been in the job I have received
terrific support from General Eberhart and Space Command. I
have received great support from Secretary Roche and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force General Jumper. Secretary Rumsfeld has
also provided strong support.
Frankly, I feel as if I am in a situation where I have been
empowered to make a difference in this national security space
arena and I look forward to that. I should also add that the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, has been
enormously supportive in helping to merge NRO activity with DOD
activity. I do think we have an opportunity to make a
difference in the national security space arena.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Teets follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air
Force

It is my distinct honor to be before the subcommittee today
representing the ``space side'' of the world's greatest air and space
force. You have previously heard from the Secretary of the Air Force
and the Chief of Staff about the state of affairs of the Air Force as a
whole. I believe the ``Top 4'' of the Air Force--the Secretary, the
Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief, and I--make a good team. We are of one
mind regarding the vision of a Total Air and Space Force providing
global reconnaissance and strike across the full spectrum of operations
in the service of this great Nation. Given the focus of this
subcommittee, and my role in the implementation of the National
Security Space Commission, I plan to focus my remarks today on the
space responsibilities and capabilities of the Air Force.
The commission Congress chartered to assess the organization and
management of national security space, commonly referred to as the
Space Commission, recommended several changes in the way the Department
of Defense (DOD) is organized to perform the national security space
mission. Secretary Rumsfeld chaired that commission before he became
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and he's provided the Air Force with
tremendous support in our implementation efforts. Secretary Roche and I
are in lock step with his directions for implementing the Commission's
recommendations.
I am delighted to report that the Air Force has made good progress
with the tasks assigned to it by Secretary Rumsfeld. In order to apply
the ``cradle-to-grave'' approach recommended by the Commission, we have
transferred command responsibility for the Air Force's Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) from the Air Force Materiel Command to the
Air Force Space Command to align space research and development efforts
and operations under one organization. We have also made the SMC
Commander the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space. I have
been jointly named Director of the NRO by the DCI and the SECDEF.
Serving jointly as the Under Secretary of the Air Force and as the
Director of the NRO is not without precedent. The first Director of the
NRO, Dr. Charyk, served in this dual role capacity, as have several of
our Nation's previous national security space leaders including Mr.
Aldridge, our current Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. I have also been asked by Secretary Roche to
assist him by serving as the Air Force's acquisition executive for
space related systems. Secretary Rumsfeld's request that Mr. Aldridge
delegate Milestone Decision Authority for major DOD space programs to
the Under Secretary of the Air Force has made me the senior civilian
responsible and accountable for managing the Nation's national security
space program for the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community. In my view, the buck stops with me for national security
space issues--and I am thrilled and honored to have been asked to take
on this important challenge.
We are in the midst of an epic struggle of good versus evil in the
war on terrorism. To date, our space-based systems have performed
incredibly well in support of our troops engaged in Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. Air Force aircraft have dropped nearly 7,000
tons of munitions in Afghanistan with 73 percent of that tonnage being
precision guided. A good portion of that 73 percent would not be
possible without today's space-based assets such as the GPS. In
addition to the precision guidance supplied by GPS, our military SATCOM
systems form the backbone of the information pipeline providing
critical data to U.S. and allied soldiers operating in that theater.
Furthermore, our satellite collection systems for weather and
intelligence data have been more responsive to our warfighters on the
ground than in any time in our history.
The ever-increasing significance of the Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) contribution to operational and tactical
warfare is simply phenomenal. We can finally assess the effects of our
attacks in near real time because of the contributions of GPS, SATCOM,
and space-based ISR systems and all the hard work that has been done to
integrate space with airborne ISR and airborne strike systems. In the
near-term we will continue to focus on improving the integration of our
space-based systems across the full spectrum of joint operations.
The execution of the war has demonstrated once again how critical
space dominance is for successful force projection and force
application. In addition, we continue to recognize the need for
persistent, 24/7, all-weather, surveillance collection capabilities. We
talk on the ``air'' side about the number of sorties generated as a
measure of support and effort to a campaign. One of the best features
about a space-based asset is that it doesn't require additional sorties
in wartime--it's already there, on-orbit, ready when called upon. Of
course, with the limitations of today's imaging satellite
constellations, we aren't able to stay at any one place for very long.
My vision for national security space includes leading the
transformation from a reconnaissance to a surveillance mindset in order
to provide persistent on-demand space-based capabilities to achieve
universal situational awareness for our warfighters and our Nation's
leaders.
That is a brief assessment of how I see the current national
security space environment and a bit of our vision for the future. I
would now like to talk about my four immediate priorities for
addressing the near-term needs of the Nation's national security space
portfolio. These are: (1) Getting space acquisition programs on track;
(2) Providing assured access to space; (3) Integrating black and white
space, applying ``best practices'' where applicable; and (4)
Establishing a career path for space professional and leadership
development.

GETTING SPACE PROGRAMS BACK ON TRACK

As the subcommittee is no doubt aware, the Air Force is facing
significant challenges in several of our most important space
acquisition programs. Our biggest challenge is in developing the SBIRS-
High program, which is designed to provide the Nation with the next
generation of missile warning capability as well as enabling missile
defense. In January of this year, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) revalidated warfighter requirements for the SBIRS
system-of-systems, reconfirming the need to field this capability as
soon as possible. At the same time, however, the Air Force-chartered
Independent Review Team examining SBIRS-High reported a number of
deficiencies in the program. It found that the program was too immature
when it entered the system design and development phase, that higher-
level system requirements were not properly allocated into lower-level
requirements, and finally, there was a significant breakdown in
execution management. These findings concern me not only because of the
importance of SBIRS but also because these problems may afflict other
space programs. One of the common threads of the review team's findings
was that inadequate systems engineering contributed to the problems
affecting SBIRS-High. So in response, I am currently examining other
space acquisition programs to see if they suffer from the same problem.
It is clear that the Air Force must address these deficiencies wherever
they exist in order to be a good steward of space programs and the
taxpayers' money. Later in my statement I will discuss reforms we are
pursuing in order to improve the stability of space acquisition
programs.
As for SBIRS-High, on 31 December 2001 Secretary Roche reported a
Nunn-McCurdy cost breach requiring that the Secretary of Defense, or in
this case his delegate, Secretary Aldridge, certify by 3 May 2002 that:

The program is essential to national security;
That no less costly alternatives that provide equal or
greater military capability exists;
That new cost estimates are reasonable; and
The management structure is adequate to manage and
control the program.

It is obvious that both the contractors and the government have
made mistakes with this program. I have asked my staff to prepare
alternative solutions that may satisfy these criteria if it is
determined that the SBIRS-High program cannot meet them. Secretary
Aldridge will chair a meeting, in late April, to review both the
current SBIRS-High program as well as the alternatives, and to make a
decision whether to continue or cancel the existing program. I cannot
stress strongly enough the need to field a system that delivers the
required capabilities in time to replenish the existing Defense Support
Program constellation. If the current SBIRS-High program cannot meet
those requirements, it is my priority to deliver a system that can.
While we are working hard to address the problems with SBIRS-High,
I would like to highlight an emerging success story in the area of
military satellite communications. In the war in Afghanistan we are
providing 322 times more communications bandwidth per person when
compared to Operation Desert Storm 10 years ago. However, even this
increased capacity is not enough to meet projected requirements. My
highest priority is making certain that warfighters have the space-
borne capabilities necessary to fight and win our wars, and MILSATCOM
is one of those areas where the warfighters need as much capability as
we can give them. To that end I have directed the National Security
Space Architect office to conduct a Transformational Communications
Study examining what the next generation of SATCOM systems must provide
in order to meet future requirements. This study is examining a variety
of capabilities and architectures that will help us achieve our goal of
eliminating communications as a constraint on the warfighter. Among
other things, we are looking at cutting-edge areas such as laser
communications, optical links, and the development of a network-centric
architecture integrating satellites and terminals to replace existing
stove-piped systems. The final architecture will deliver orders-of-
magnitude increase in capability over the systems in service today. I
anticipate that the study, expected to be complete in July 2002, will
give the military space community an integrated roadmap showing how we
can deliver transformational communications capabilities to warfighters
and national users in the near term.

ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE

In delivering those kinds of capabilities to the warfighter, it is
my job as the chief acquisition executive for military space programs
to ensure that the United States has assured access to space. We have a
lot of hard work to accomplish to make sure we have the access we need
and desire.
The phrase ``access to space'' historically has meant launch
operations and, in partnership with the commercial sector, the Air
Force is striving to fulfill this mission. The Atlas V and Delta IV are
expected to have their first commercial launches this summer, with the
first DOD launch scheduled for later this year. The EELV is already
projected to save the taxpayer well over 25 percent of the costs
typically associated with our legacy launch vehicles, and it will do so
while meeting our stringent requirements for safety and reliability.
Beyond EELV, the Air Force continues its relationship with NASA in
developing a RLV technology roadmap. We welcome the opportunity to
exploit a future RLV to conduct military missions ranging from
reconnaissance to on-orbit satellite support and, potentially, even
force application if directed by national leadership.
In support of these launch efforts, the spacelift ranges at Cape
Canaveral and Vandenberg AFB continue to be modernized to become more
responsive to users and easier to maintain, while becoming less
expensive to operate. These national assets are becoming increasingly
valuable to both government and commercial users, and the Air Force is
actively seeking new ways to exploit our civil and commercial
partnerships in spacelift to increase efficiencies and reduce costs.
However, even these efforts are not enough to provide assured
access to space. We are not where I want to be yet, but we are taking
steps to get there.
For instance, access to space extends beyond spacelift--it also
means making sure that once we get into space we stay there for the
duration. As the global environment grows increasingly dangerous, we
are exploring new systems, tactics, and policies that can guarantee the
security and performance of our space-based assets. Our space control
efforts are developing new space surveillance software that,
extrapolating from existing telemetry, can tell us when our satellites
are being attacked, and how. This universal situational awareness
capability is vital to ensure that we cannot only rapidly identify the
enemy attacking us, but also can take the appropriate measures in
response. By also developing offensive space control capabilities--
including counter-communications, counter-surveillance, and counter-
reconnaissance systems, as well as a new ``space range'' to test and
exercise these capabilities--the Air Force will provide our national
defense leadership with a number of options in the event that our
defensive systems fail to guarantee our access to space.
We are also pursuing methods of protecting the integrity of our GPS
signal for both military and civil users alike. As the war in
Afghanistan demonstrates, weapons like the GPS-guided Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) are absolutely critical to winning battles. We
must not forget that delivering this all-weather, day-and-night attack
capability to the warfighter requires a modern and secure GPS
infrastructure. Our GPS modernization efforts, including our GPS III
satellite program, will result in a more robust signal providing the
warfighter with more accurate location and targeting information. They
will also give theater commanders more options to protect the signal
from disruption by hostile forces, enabling our units to successfully
continue the fight even when faced with a jamming threat. While the
improvements to GPS are critical to our military, it must not be
forgotten that a better GPS system also provides numerous benefits to
civil authorities and commercial industries in America and worldwide.
GPS is truly a modern American success story, and the Air Force is
working hard to guarantee its performance in the future.
Guaranteeing GPS performance, as well as providing increasingly
capable MILSATCOM, requires that the U.S. military maintain access to
critical sections of the radio frequency spectrum. We are seeing a
number of proposals to develop new wireless services using frequency
bands currently required for a number of critical U.S. military
capabilities. It is obviously of critical importance that we achieve a
solution which meets the need of all interested parties to ensure that
the U.S. military retains use of the spectrum frequencies critical to
our warfighting capabilities.
Due to our increasing dependence on access to space for military,
commercial, and civil missions, the Air Force must remain in the
vanguard in developing innovative, reliable, and affordable space
capabilities. In the future, we must do more to assure our access to
space, and I am committed to a thorough review of what systems,
strategies, and policies this access requires.

BLACK/WHITE SPACE INTEGRATION AND BEST PRACTICES

As our SBIRS experience clearly demonstrates, existing Air Force
and DOD acquisition practices are too inflexible to address the unique
requirements of space system acquisition. As part of the Air Force's
Space Commission implementation planning during the summer of 2001, a
series of ``Best Practice'' teams composed of both NRO and Air Force
members were formed to align Air Force and NRO space programs and
practices in various areas. As you might expect, one valuable team
focused on the critical area of acquisition practices.
Over the course of this investigation, the team made a key
discovery: the Air Force and the NRO already share many of the same
``Best Practices.'' The team did find a number of areas, three on the
NRO side and two on the Air Force side, that required relatively minor
administrative changes to the way the NRO or Air Force did business.
However, they discovered one additional, substantial difference between
the way the NRO and Air Force operates. The NRO's acquisition milestone
decision cycle time was much shorter than the typical DOD milestone
decision cycle time for programs of similar magnitude and complexity.
Obtaining a decision at a Defense Acquisition Board via the process
described in the DOD 5000 series documents typically takes 8 to 12
months to get through the Integrated Product Team structure. In
contrast, historical data on NRO programs shows the nominal time
required to get through the NRO's Independent Program Assessment
process is only 8 to 12 weeks. Months to weeks--that's a significant
reduction in decision cycle time!
I'll be the first to admit that making bad decisions quicker than
before would not be an improvement, but decision delays often impose
unintended costs on a program just as surely as requirements creep and
program mismanagement do. Faster decisions by senior leaders can
actually help provide program stability, a key ingredient to program
success, by allowing the program office and contractor to spend their
time performing actual development work instead of preparing for overly
burdensome oversight. Faster decision cycles also support agile and
flexible acquisition practices because they allow for direction from
the real decisionmakers when needed, thereby enhancing our ability to
make timely adjustments to our plans. This is the best way to enable
our system program offices to deliver the most cost-effective
capability possible to the warfighter in a timely manner.
To that end, we have adapted the NRO process to fit DOD statutory
requirements and allow full involvement by OSD and the other Services.
I plan to approve several ``pathfinder'' activities using this NRO-like
acquisition oversight process to assess how this NRO process can be
best applied to DOD space programs. A ``pathfinder'' activity for GPS-
III is already underway and I expect to be able to report on its
results this summer. This ``streamlined'' process has worked for the
past 7 years at the NRO, and I see no reason why it won't work for DOD
space systems.
The establishment of similar processes between black and white
space is a terrific first step toward integration, but we will continue
to explore other ``Best Practices'' and diligently implement associated
findings. I'm not picky about where we find these ``Best Practice''
ideas. We started this effort by focusing on the Air Force and the NRO,
but we are now in the process of expanding our vision to include the
practices of the other Services and from industry. The motto ``not
invented here'' will not apply on my watch--a good idea is a good idea.
The establishment of Joint Program Offices (JPO) between the Air
Force, the NRO, and the other Services is also on my agenda in order to
foster further continued black and white space integration. The first
evidence of this will be the establishment of a JPO for Space-Based
Radar in the very near future.

SPACE CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND SPACE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Implementing these best practices and improving National Security
Space management both depend first and foremost upon great people doing
great work.
As part of the Space Commission implementation, we are working to
describe and define the appropriate set of education, training,
experience, and personnel policies needed to develop a cadre of Air
Force space professionals. Air Force Space Command, under the
leadership of General Ed Eberhart, has taken the lead on this very
important task. The plan they are putting together focuses primarily
upon the Air Force and Air Force elements of the NRO, but we are
working to share our ideas, problems and our potential solutions with
the other Services to create the necessary construct that will build
and maintain the quality of our Nation's National Security Space
personnel. Secretary Roche is expending significant energy to build a
space community equal to the pilot community. I am wholeheartedly
committed to putting the appropriate structure in place to make sure we
continue to have the world's best space personnel.

CONCLUSION

Since becoming the Under Secretary of the Air Force in December
2001, I have tried to follow a rule that Stephen Covey identified in
his book: ``The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People'' which is
``Seek first to understand, then to be understood.'' I have spent some
time getting up to speed on the issues, and we are now beginning to
move out in earnest in making the changes that need to be made to
transform our Nation's national security space capabilities and
organizational constructs.
These are exciting times for national security space as we
transform, reorganize, and establish roles, missions, strategy,
streamlined acquisition policies, and space career guidelines. The Air
Force and the NRO are going to lead this effort with the full
integration and inclusion of our sister Services and other applicable
government agencies. We obviously have received tremendous
encouragement from Congress in this effort, and I thank you all for
your continued guidance and support.
I am on a great team with great support from General Eberhart,
General Jumper, Secretary Roche, Secretary Rumsfeld, and DCI George
Tenet. When I look at the superb quality of the people that work as
part of the NRO, Air Force Space Command, and the Air Force in
general--I don't see how we can fail at anything that we put our effort
against.
America is currently the preeminent spacefaring nation in the
world. It is imperative that the national security space capabilities
support our troops and national leaders. I will strive with your help
and support to ensure we maintain our dominant position.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General
Eberhart, both for your excellent testimony.
Let us proceed with two rounds both of 6 minutes each. I
will begin. You have already noted, Mr. Secretary, the problems
of SBIRS-High. It appears to be about $2 billion over budget, a
slip of 18 to 24 months in schedule. It is a critical system.
You obviously need this system, as General Eberhart has
indicated in his testimony also. So we have to proceed and try
to, as you are doing, reform the acquisition process to get it
back on track.
General Eberhart, are the original requirements for SBIRS-
High still valid, and could you briefly summarize those
requirements?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. If you look at the record since
about 1994, since we decided the way ahead in terms of the
SBIRS program, we have first established, then periodically
reviewed those. Most recently, we reviewed those requirements
in January of this year once we knew that there was a problem
with the SBIRS program, to make sure that in fact those
requirements were still valid, that we were not marching to
Cold War requirements or requirements that could have caused
cost or schedule problems.
We have also done this through senior warfighters forums,
where the Deputy Commanders in Chief of the unified commands
get together, and then we finally go to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). So we did that in January, formally.
Then we did that again just last month, after the February
meeting with Mr. Aldridge and Secretary Teets.
So I believe those requirements are valid. They are valid
in terms of timing. They are valid in terms of sensitivity.
They are valid in terms of what we believe we should be able to
do with this system as you look across from the mission areas
of strategic warning, theater warning, technical intelligence,
and finally battle space characterization.
So I believe in every case, we have concluded that those
requirements are valid and when we presented those requirements
again when all the stakeholders were in the room with the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we did not get any
pushback, Mr. Chairman. Everyone agreed.
Senator Reed. General, when do you conclude that a
replacement must be in operation for the DSP program, which is
our major form of national warning?
General Eberhart. Sir, we have flowed out, based on
optimistic views of the health of the DSP constellation,
assumptions that the next two launches will be successful,
which are key. We have also looked at in case one of those
launches is not successful. The details of that, Mr. Chairman,
are classified. We will be able to provide that for the record,
in a classified format.
But we have to stay pretty much on the revised schedule we
have outlined today. If not, we in fact will have degraded
capability in both theater warning and possibly in strategic
warning.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, can you give us some details about how we go
about fixing this problem in terms of not only substantive
changes, but also the likely schedule of activities that you
are anticipating?
Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, we are currently
in the midst of a dual-forked, parallel path to look at the
SBIRS program. As you indicated, we are talking about a very
serious problem that was discovered, which has created the
likelihood of an 18- to 24-month slip, the likelihood of a very
significant $2 billion cost overrun.
One of the things we have done is establish an independent
review team (IRT) to look at and find the root cause of how
this could possibly happen. I think the results of that IRT
have been helpful in trying to establish rapidly corrective
action and put in place a program that can be properly
executed.
But because of the critical nature of the SBIRS program, we
also want to have an emergency or an alternative path that,
should we find ourselves in a situation where we are not
confident that SBIRS-High can be put back together again, so to
speak, and put on a restructured course, that we would have an
alternative way of proceeding.
Now, all of this is leading up to an early May Nunn-McCurdy
certification by Secretary Aldridge. So again I would
reemphasize, we are not trying to take Secretary Aldridge or
the defense acquisition community out of the picture. We are
working with that community. The current path that we are on is
to put forth, in late April, a solid look at what would a
restructured SBIRS program look like. The prime contractor in
this case is Lockheed Martin and Lockheed Martin has made some
significant management changes at its Sunnyvale facility. They
have brought in additional resources from satellite operations
to bolster the management team. They brought in additional
systems engineering talent. They have responded strongly, with
the president of the corporation taking a strong hand in
overseeing the activity that is going on.
Meanwhile, our system program director, Colonel Mark
Borkowski at the Space and Missile Center, is working very hard
to restructure the contract. One of the things that the IRT
found is that there were some problem clauses in the contract.
The contract had been made in a way that provided total system
performance responsibility to the contractor. The fact is that
the government needs to be the total system requirements owner
and to exercise proper oversight. So the contract that we are
in the process of trying to restructure will have that clause
removed and the government will have total system performance
responsibility and the contractor will have clear requirements
laid upon him for the system, but then also a clear requirement
to manage his subcontractors.
So we are putting that revised or restructured contract
together right now. We would hope by the 1st of May, give or
take a few days, to have that restructuring complete, go forth
to Secretary Aldridge, and it is my hope that we will be able
to recommend to Secretary Aldridge that he be able to recertify
the program.
At the same time, however, because it is a difficult
situation, we have embarked upon an alternate course, a backup
course if you will, where the NRO is working diligently to look
at alternative architectures which could meet fundamental
requirements that General Eberhart has spoken of in perhaps
some spiral development way, but in a way that we can have high
confidence that we will not be left out in the cold should we
determine that SBIRS-High as it is currently defined cannot be
done.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have had an opportunity to visit with some of the
commercial imagery people. I think we have two-thirds of the
industry in Colorado. They tell me that they were used quite a
bit after September 11 and that the military generally
appreciated their up-to-date, very current information and
data.
Secretary Teets, I am under the impression that you believe
that commercial imagery can be a valuable adjunct to government
imagery assets, is that correct?
Secretary Teets. That is correct, Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Do you believe that the promise of funding
for commercial imaging products in Future Years Defense Program
will be sufficient to convince commercial imagery firms to
proceed with the development of next-generation imagery
satellites?
Secretary Teets. Yes, I do think it will. I think that
commercial imagery can play an important role for government
users and that includes the national security space community.
Senator Allard. They do not see anything in the budget that
makes them think that the money is going to be out there in the
future, and when they go for money to borrow to continue
operations they are looking for some assurance that they are
going to be able to receive financing if they can provide a
service which we seem to use, particularly at times of crisis,
like we did during the terrorist attacks.
So I am interested to know why you think this would be
available for them?
Secretary Teets. Well, I think that one of the important
uses for commercial imagery can be in fact the intelligence
community. I think that, while in an open forum I am not at
liberty to talk about the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP), I think you would find that there is a desire at least
to use some of the commercial imagery to provide some important
capability or collection requirements for the intelligence
community.
Senator Allard. I am amazed at how many other countries
seem to be getting into commercial imagery to one degree or
another, and I think that there is a certain advantage to
having that type of business here and not having to rely on
foreign countries. So I keep looking for ways in which we can
keep that as an adjunct to what our military does.
Sometimes systems are not always perfect, but if they do
not work there needs to be a reliable backup. I think that we
need some sort of insurance policy to make sure they are there.
On space systems acquisition, the commander of the Air
Force Missile Center was quoted recently as saying that all his
major space development and acquisition programs were in
trouble. Secretary Teets, do you agree with that statement?
Secretary Teets. I think it would need to be taken in
context. I do think that there are serious acquisition problems
within the national security space community. I would say that
I have tossed and turned on numerous nights thinking how we
could find ourselves in the situation we do right now.
My own analysis of that is that perhaps we had in the time
of the 1990s some significant budget pressures and yet had a
desire to continue on with a robust space constellation, and in
so doing I think, perhaps not consciously, we assumed more risk
than we have in earlier times. I find that in some of the space
programs we experimented with contract clauses. We experimented
with things like handing risk off to the contractor, thinking
that that would somehow make the risk go away. This total
system responsibility clause that I mentioned before could be
an example of that.
I think other contracts have other innovative ideas to try
and lower costs of the programs. On the other hand, I think we
find ourselves in a situation right now where you would have to
say that some of those things have not worked. So I do think
that the time has come for us to get back to basics and put
together contracts which are well understood by both contractor
and government and can in fact be executed. While that is going
to require some financial resources to achieve, I think it is a
necessary ingredient and we are proceeding accordingly.
Senator Allard. General Eberhart, the Chairman asked most
of the questions on SBIRS-Low and SBIRS-High, so I am going to
ask another question here to Secretary Teets. So I am not
ignoring you. I am not picking on you, Mr. Secretary.
General Eberhart. I will not take that personally.
Senator Allard. I do not want anybody to feel neglected
here.
In response to the recommendations of the Space Commission,
there have been changes in space management and organization. I
have been particularly interested in this. Some of those are
related to the oversight role of the OSD. This committee
apparently has been getting mixed messages about what this role
will be.
Secretary Teets, I am wondering if you can clarify that and
share with us what your understanding is of the role of
Secretary Aldridge, his staff, and his organization in the
oversight of space programs.
Secretary Teets. Sure. I have been designated as the DOD
executive agent for space and as such have milestone decision
authority. On the other hand, as I mentioned earlier, I intend
to stay very closely coupled with Secretary Aldridge and his
office. I also intend to stay closely coupled to John Stenbit,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C\3\I. They have
important contributions to make.
Virtually all of the military space programs have been put
in this national security space organization that now is in
being, with the exception of SBIRS-Low, and I do want to just
say a word about that if I may. General Kadish at the Missile
Defense Agency has acquisition authority for SBIRS-Low. I met
with General Kadish just yesterday, as a matter of fact, and we
talked about how that acquisition would proceed and how we
would work together to make sure that SBIRS-Low does indeed
complement SBIRS-High and how the whole missile defense
equation can come together.
The bottom line is that we are going to form a board of
governors, if you will, that all participate in, General Kadish
will participate, Dr. Marvin Sambur, the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition will participate, and we will
regularly take an oversight role of what is happening on the
SBIRS-Low program. That will then be reported right up through
General Kadish's chain of command, which is straight to
Secretary Aldridge.
So again, I think what we are trying to do is work closely
together, not trying to exclude the Office of the Secretary of
Defense from any oversight responsibility for space programs,
but rather have a focused national security space program where
we can implement unique contracting arrangements, we can
implement best practices from operations as well as from
acquisition to get these space programs back on track.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your responses to my
questions. My time is expired.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nelson from Nebraska.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Eberhart, in our conversation earlier today we
discussed the potential threats to America's critical
infrastructure, including systems of satellites, which could
obviously threaten the military and, more likely as well,
commercial use of such applications. I am hoping that maybe you
could speak to the subcommittee today about those threats, to
the extent that you can in this open session, and what kinds of
steps we are taking to protect against that kind of threat.
General Eberhart. Yes, Senator. As we discussed earlier, we
are concerned about our space control mission. One of the
pillars of that mission is the protection of our space assets,
it was one of the transformational goals, goal number six that
the Secretary of Defense outlined at the National Defense
University several weeks ago, essentially ensuring that we can
operate in space, that our space capabilities are not at risk.
There are technologies available out there where a foe,
whether it is a nation state, a terrorist, or anybody who
wishes us ill, could in fact jam uplinks, downlinks from our
communications satellites. Obviously, they could attack the
ground station with terrorist attacks or a military attack.
They can use blinders of sorts to try to interrupt our imaging
satellites.
So those capabilities are out there and those are
capabilities that concern us. As we look to the way ahead,
first of all we need to understand the space order of battle.
We need to understand who truly has these capabilities and the
details involved.
Second, we need to build not only a good defense, but in my
view we need to build a good offense. Defense comes in the way
of alarms so that we in fact know that somebody is tampering
with our systems; two, to some extent hardening those systems
so they cannot tamper with them; or three, making them
redundant enough so if they take out one part of that
capability, we have a backup capability that we can use or
having such a robust constellation that we can use other
satellites. It's also protecting our ground stations, making
sure they are secure, good force protection, if you will.
I believe that over time you could even see microsatellites
in escort mission roles. Those are the kinds of things that we
have to understand. Those are the kinds of things we have to
explore to make sure that we have space supremacy in the
future.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Now, probably the most
difficult question is does the budget that is before us help us
achieve these goals?
General Eberhart. Sir, when you look at the additions over
the last year across the budgeted program years, we have made
significant increases in the amount of money that we have
committed to space control. So with the support of this
subcommittee and others, we believe that we will be taking the
proper steps to ensure that we have protected our space assets.
Senator Ben Nelson. So you think that there is enough in
research and development to continue to remain on the cutting
edge and ahead of our adversaries?
General Eberhart. Sir, obviously that is a loaded question
for CINCSPACE. CINCSPACE never thinks you spend enough money on
space. But realistically, I think it is an amount that is
satisfactory at this time, until we better understand some of
these technologies and the way ahead. Then we are going to have
to spend more money in terms of procurement.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will only be able to stay for this one round, so let me
do as much as I can. General Eberhart, since Senator Allard
spent all his time with Secretary Teets, I will spend my time
with you. I agree with your written statement on Global
Positioning Systems, satellite navigational systems, when you
said it gives our warfighters a decisive advantage.
This has been true to an extent in civilian aviation, that
a lot of pilots have ignored other resources that are there or
forgotten how to use them, I suspect. I have been told by some
people in the Air Force that this same thing is true with them.
My personal experience was flying an airplane around the world
and never losing a satellite. That was 10 years ago. So I have
a great appreciation for it, but I also know the dependence we
have on it.
So it gets to the issue of jamming. How confident are you
right now that, if you get into something more sophisticated
than al Qaeda and the Taliban, do you agree that locating some
kind of a jamming system or anti-jamming system is something
that we need to really proceed on rapidly?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. We have a program called
NAVWAR, which stands for Navigational Warfare, that talks about
the way ahead in terms of ensuring that people cannot deny us
the use of this GPS that, as you have said, we have become so
reliant on. So we have to do two things in my view. We have to
be able to burn through the jamming, so we have to develop the
capability to burn through the jamming; and second, we have to
identify the source of the jamming so we can take it out.
Senator Inhofe. Timing-wise, though, it just seems that I
have talked to some people in DOD that do not seem to be in as
big a rush for this, and I think you have expressed a sense of
urgency, too. When do you think we can have something that will
work?
General Eberhart. Sir, I believe that on the current path
we will have some capability in this area in terms of burn-
through in about 2010. A full-up capability will be a little
bit later than that, depending on if it is 10 dB or 20 dB.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz said, ``the program we inherited''--
talking about ballistic missile defense--``was designed not for
maximum effectiveness, but to remain within the constraints of
the ABM Treaty. As a result, development and testing of
programs for defense against long-range threats were limited to
ground-based components, ignoring sea, space, and so forth.''
Since we are going to be out of the treaty on June 13, are
you satisfied with the pace that we will have once we can start
aiming at space-based missile defenses and be able to get
there?
General Eberhart. Sir, I must admit that I was very
disappointed in terms of what happened to the space-based laser
program in last year's deliberations, which I think will set
back the space capability quite some time. I believe that we
need to resurrect that capability once we all agree on what the
requirements are and the way ahead.
But in terms of doing this from space, if we are not
pursuing a space-based laser program then we are not getting
any closer.
Senator Inhofe. What this leads to, of course, is your
views on the growing likelihood of a rogue nation attack or of
blackmail of the U.S. using ballistic missiles. We had a
hearing the other day with George Tenet, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and Admiral Wilson, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. They talked about the National
Intelligence Estimate, the current one that says: ``As outlined
in our recent National Intelligence Estimate, most intelligence
community agencies project that by 2015 the U.S. most likely
will face an ICBM threat from North Korea and Iran and possibly
Iraq.''
Well, turning that around, it is implying that that threat
is not there until 2015. I was trying to get this question
asked at that last hearing, but my time expired. In fact, I
went quite a bit over my time. I remember so well what happened
on August 31, 1998, when, much to our surprise, they did fire
from North Korea a Taepo Dong I missile that actually had three
stages. The third stage was a defective stage, but nonetheless
it had the capability or would have had the capability of
reaching orbit and, even with the defective stage, would have
reached Alaska.
Now, that happened almost 4 years ago. How do they justify
talking about 2015 when that demonstration took place 3\1/2\
years ago?
General Eberhart. Sir, I am not in a position to say what
George Tenet had on his mind when he gave this date. I think it
was probably a collective date for those countries. Without
getting into a specific date, I can tell you that I am
concerned about North Korea, specifically for the reasons that
you have outlined.
I am also concerned because, as we know, their testing and
deployment schedules are not usually consistent with what you
and I would do in terms of probability of success. Sometimes
they will deploy a system when it has not enjoyed the same
success that we would want to see in this country.
So I do believe that North Korea could have that capability
much before 2015, without getting into a specific date.
Senator Inhofe. That is my feeling, too. Of course, it is
the Space Command's responsibility to be able to be prepared
when that time comes. This has been something that has bothered
a lot of us who have read some of these estimates. I think the
National Intelligence Estimate of 1995 was certainly flawed in
my opinion, and I think it has now proven, looking back, that
it was not that accurate.
I thank you for that answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Nelson of Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. It is good to see both of you. Of
course, I think that you are doing the Lord's work, and so I
would like to pick up from my colleague from Nebraska and ask
you, if we had a pot of money and it were available, where
would you put significant improvement and increase to this
existing budget. You mentioned the Space-Based Laser, that you
were disappointed that it was cut. Both of you, if you would
respond to that.
Secretary Teets. I think there is strong reason to want to
push forth some R&D aggressively in the field of space control.
I for one am an advocate of wanting to see us move faster than
we currently are on track to do. I would think that is an area
for pursuing with some vigor.
I would say--and I fully recognize now, though, that all of
these budget considerations get into the matter of priorities
and judgmental factors. I do know that the fiscal year 2003
budget, the President's budget that we have submitted, does
call for significant increases in the amount of resources that
we are requesting be spent on space. I think we have done a
reasonable job of sorting through those requirements.
We will be, as you probably know, requesting funds to start
a space-based radar system, and space-based radar system will
be focused on the need for providing ground mobile target
indications to warfighting equipment and do it in a way that,
if other assets for identifying mobile targets are denied to
us, we will have an overhead system that can do it. So I do
think it is a high priority for us to properly start to develop
this space-based radar system.
We also will be requesting or having requested in the 2003
budget resources for what we would call a Transformational
Communications System. This is going to be an aggressive system
that will hopefully give us the capability to essentially
remove communication bandwidth constraints from the warfighter
and ultimately be able to field a communications system that
can provide necessary information and intelligence and
communications capability to all of our warfighters where they
need it.
Senator Bill Nelson. So that each of them can talk to each
other?
Secretary Teets. Each of them can talk to each other and
they can provide, I will say, first-rate information, visual as
well as voice, into the cockpit of an airplane and get it
straight to the warfighter.
We are in the process right now, the National Security
Space Architect is running this Transformational Communications
System study. We have participation, by the way, from the Navy,
Army, Marine Corps, NRO, and NASA, as a matter of fact. NASA's
requirements are playing into this Transformational
Communications Architecture.
What we hope to do is be able to build a system which will
provide for truly joint warfighter operations and provide
information to all elements of the warfighting activity where
needed, and in a very timely way.
Senator Bill Nelson. General.
General Eberhart. Sir, if you will allow us to be partners
here, if the Secretary is going to spend his money that way, I
will complete the board here and I will make sure that SBIRS is
properly funded. I also would advocate that we start taking
some significant steps in terms of developing a RLV program. We
are going through a study with NASA right now in terms of the
way ahead. From what we have seen right now it looks very
promising to leverage NASA's SLI, their Space Launch
Initiative, and to come up with almost a JSF-type arrangement,
where we can use common technology, common parts, so that we
can develop a reasonable launch vehicle that would have utility
for NASA and the military.
But if you only gave me $1 to spend, I want to be very
clear, I would spend it on the wonderful men and women out
there serving day in and day out.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, I am glad you brought up the
follow-on man-rated launch vehicle, because we have had so many
starts and stops on that. Right now in the NASA budget over the
next 5 years there is a $5 billion program for developing the
technologies for whatever this new launch vehicle is going to
be. Of course, what happens is the space shuttle just keeps
getting stretched out and out and we are really looking,
practically speaking, for another 15 years on the shuttle.
Can you tell me some more about the joint cooperation and
participation, since such a reusable vehicle would clearly be
something that the Department of Defense would have need of as
well as NASA? Is that cooperation there and is there a
consideration on joint funding so that NASA does not have to
bear the full cost of the development of the technologies with
NASA's little budget compared to the DOD budget?
General Eberhart. Sir, we have been looking at this now
almost a year because initially what spurred us was the fate of
the X series that was being pursued by NASA. As we got together
collectively and looked at if there was any military utility in
any of those vehicles to try to keep those alive, we decided
that essentially we had wrung out all we could in terms of
lessons learned, technology, et cetera, and it was time to
start afresh, if you will, with those lessons learned.
As we look at this 120-day study, I think our goal is
clearly to do just what you say: first and foremost, to be good
stewards of the taxpayers' dollars and to see where we can
better leverage the dollars available. I think as a result we
will field a capability eventually that would be much cheaper
than if we pursued it individually.
So in general terms, that is exactly where we are headed.
The devil is in the details and there is a lot more work to be
done here, but at least we have decided that this is the right
thing to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I
just want to say this as a parting statement in corroboration
of the General's statement: It is very important to this
country that we have a workable and efficient follow-on, man-
rated vehicle to the shuttle at such time that it can be
developed. What I would not want to see is this Nation
penalized by not developing it because it is being developed
out of a small budget of NASA, when in fact the need is so much
greater than that.
The fact is that NASA is trying to get 10 pounds of
potatoes in a 5 pound potato sack and it cannot do everything
it has to try to do. I think there is going to have to be some
direct major participation by the Department of Defense in
funding of this replacement vehicle for the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Secretary Teets, I am encouraged by your comments
indicating your intention to cooperate with OSD and to work
closely with Secretary Aldridge particularly. Let me ask two
specific questions along this line.
There are numerous reviews required both by regulation and
by statute, including the integrated product team reviews and
defense acquisition executive summary reviews. Will space
programs continue to be subject to reviews by the Office of
Secretary of Defense using the existing review process?
Secretary Teets. No. I think that there are changes afoot
in that acquisition process as it relates to space programs.
When I say changes afoot, what I mean is that we are in the
process of trying to outline a defense space acquisition board
activity which can operate on a compressed time scale, time
frame, from today's defense acquisition board timeframe.
I think there are characteristic differences in space
programs from most major defense programs that warrant some
special considerations. One of the things that we are going to
try to implement is, and we are going to try it first as
essentially a pathfinder with GPS III this spring and summer, a
way to have--instead of sequential review, we are going to have
review in parallel.
We are going to have stakeholders sit at the same table and
review the current status of the acquisition program or the
plan as it may well be and make decisions in a much faster way.
So as I mentioned before, rather than having a major milestone
requirement a 6-month or more period of time from the start of
the time until the acquisition decision can be made, we are
going to try and compress that to something more on the order
of a 3-month period of time.
We are going to try and accelerate independent cost
estimates. We are going to try and use a database that, very
frankly, has been built up by the NRO over the years for cost
estimating in space programs, sophisticated space programs, and
be able to bring that to the table in a way that we can see the
necessary oversight activities happening, but do it quicker.
In all of that activity, though, we will be asking for
representation from OSD, from Secretary Aldridge's operation,
and also from John Stenbit's operation. So we are not trying to
exclude them. We are trying to involve them. But we are not
wanting to do it in series or sequential review. We want to try
and do this in a parallel fashion.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Obviously, we would
be very interested in the details of this new approach, and
particularly if there are any type of statutory issues raised
in your proposed new approach to the acquisition process.
Secretary Teets. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is modeled on
something that is called NRO Directive 7, that has been in use
for a while. I would be pleased to provide you with some of
those details.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, one other question, which is, on February 14
Secretary Aldridge delegated milestone decision authority for
DOD space systems to you. This gives you a great deal of
discretion to waive certain requirements or to make judgments
about whether they have been accomplished. I understand there
may now be a proposal in the Pentagon to take back this
discretionary authority, back to Secretary Aldridge. Could you
give us a sense of the current status of this authority?
Secretary Teets. Yes. I believe that the paperwork has been
completed that does in fact designate the Air Force as DOD's
executive agent for space, and in turn the Secretary of the Air
Force has delegated that responsibility for space programs to
me. So I believe that I am currently the DOD executive agent
for space with milestone decision authority.
There are a number of other recommendations coming out of
the Space Commission that are in progress. For example, the
assignment of the national security space architect to my
organization is in progress, but I have not seen that formal
piece of paper signed yet. I have created an organization that
has a national security integration directorate and it is in
place. We had some time ago moved the Space and Missiles Center
Command away from Air Force Material Command to Air Force Space
Command. As a result, General Arnold reports now directly into
General Eberhart as Air Force Space Command CINC.
In addition to that, you probably have seen that General
Lord has been named as the next Air Force Space Command
Commander in Chief as a four-star appointment. That change of
command will take place some time in the spring.
So implementation of all of the National Security Space
Commission recommendations are in work and we are moving out
aggressively on them.
Senator Reed. The September 14 memo stands, then, as the
main directive?
Secretary Teets. When you say ``the September 14 memo,'' I
am sorry, sir, but I am not that familiar with a September 14
memo.
Senator Reed. In that case, Mr. Secretary, we will clarify
it by placing it in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary Teets. OK. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I just have one remaining
question. I understand we are not too far away from the vote,
about 4 o'clock or so.
Senator Reed. 4 o'clock.
Senator Allard. In the Defense Authorization Act last year,
we established a new space career field, which included
development of space doctrine and concepts of operations in
space and development and operation of space systems. I am
interested to know what the status of this effort is and when
will we see the implementation instructions for the career
field. Maybe both of you could respond? General Eberhart?
General Eberhart. To be very candid, that is all a work in
progress, Senator Allard. We are committed to this in terms of
space doctrine, since we have published our space doctrine. At
Air Force right now, the joint doctrine is under review. So
since the subcommittee looked at that, the Air Force has
published, I think, some very worthwhile and useful space
doctrine.
Second, we have worked hard to operationalize and normalize
the operation of the command and control of our space assets
and our space capabilities. We do this predominantly through an
air and space operations center out at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, where SPACEAF, Space Air Forces, is assigned, now under
the command of Major General Looney.
In terms of developing space professionals, we have been
working this very hard. We have been working this with all the
stakeholders in the room. It is very important that we not only
address officers, but also address the very important enlisted
and civilian members of our team.
Also, as the Secretary has indicated, we focus
predominantly upon development of Air Force space
professionals, but we also have to make sure that there is some
consistency there as we look at space professionals in other
Services. We in the Air Force have decided essentially that the
Space Commission is right, the Authorization Act is obviously
correct, and that we need to focus our efforts and truly ensure
we have the space professionals obviously with the space
expertise we need here in this new century.
So I guess to draw an analogy, we have been looking at both
the Nuclear Navy, the Rickover Navy model, and also what we
have been doing for decades in terms of developing our pilot
force in terms of periodic upgrades, periodic education,
periodic training, and spending more time in that career area
than any other area as you progress through the ranks.
So as the Secretary mentioned, this was a topic of the most
recent senior-level meeting that we had with the Secretary, the
Chief of Staff, all four-star commanders, the Under Secretary,
and all Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. Everybody was
committed. Now, there will be some dollars involved with this
because we are developing syllabuses to make sure that we have
the right training. Again, this is training over a career. You
are trained once at a basic level, then you go back for
graduate training, if you will, as you progress through the
ranks.
I think that we have the concept now. We are putting it on
paper. We will soon brief it through the executive agent for
space and then to the Secretary of Defense. But I think
everyone agrees that we are headed in the right direction here
and we are committed to that.
Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, do you want to comment on
that?
Secretary Teets. I think General Eberhart covered it
extremely well. I can tell you that Secretary Roche, I, and
Secretary Rumsfeld are strongly committed to making certain
that we develop this cadre of talent across not just the Air
Force, but across all Services as well. I think, frankly, some
of the expertise that has developed over the years in the NRO
can be brought to bear in a helpful way here.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I thought of another question
just briefly. What is the relationship between George Tenet and
the Secretary of Defense? Do we have a good relationship there?
Secretary Teets. We have an excellent relationship there.
The two speak frequently.
Senator Allard. Do they have breakfast occasionally?
Secretary Teets. I believe so, indeed.
Senator Allard. Very good.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Just for the information of my colleagues, the vote is
scheduled at 4:25 on final passage of the Campaign Finance
Reform Bill. I recognize Senator Nelson of Nebraska. We should
be able to conclude this round and introduce our second panel
before the vote.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. I will forego a question at this time.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Nelson of Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, you spoke earlier
about the explosion of commercial imagery. Is part of that
enhanced capability of commercial imagery, is that in China and
India, and what kind of problem does that pose for us?
Secretary Teets. Commercial imagery availability is
worldwide, if that is what you mean. Now, there are two U.S.
companies. There is a French company. There is an Israeli
company. They are all engaged in commercial imagery. If you
want to buy a satellite image of some place in China, you
certainly can do so. You give them the coordinates and you will
get a satellite image back.
Now, there are questions as to its operational use that
need to be worked through. Timeliness is an issue. If you are
going to actually depend on this kind of imagery for
warfighting purposes, you need it on a very short time scale
and you need it deliverable to the right set of people. So I do
think timeliness is an issue as it relates to commercial
imagery.
But clearly it is worldwide coverage and those images are
available.
Senator Bill Nelson. With the foreign companies, such as
the French that you mentioned, how quickly can two nations, for
example that are now facing each other at the Kashmir border,
obtain imagery so that they know what the other side is doing?
Secretary Teets. I do not want to say that I have looked
into this situation to the extent that I can give you a precise
answer, but I would say to you that if the price were right,
the physics are such that it could be delivered soon. I mean,
you could redirect, recommand a satellite. If the weather is
good, you could get an image of that border within a matter of
hours.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, one of the priorities for future
funding you mentioned was the Space-Based Radar.
Secretary Teets. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us some more about that. That
would allow you to know what is going on regardless of the
cloud cover, is that correct?
Secretary Teets. Yes. The Space-Based Radar that we are
talking about initiating a program for, is really intended to
provide ground mobile target indications. That is its primary
function. Its primary function is not as an imaging synthetic
aperture radar (SAR). So what this system will be able to do
will be to provide these ground mobile target indications so
that if you have something on the ground that is moving you can
identify it with GPS coordinates and take rapid action against
it.
This Space-Based Radar that I am referring to is not so
much an intelligence collection device as it is a warfighters'
targeting system.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us some more about these
microsatellites?
Secretary Teets. I would turn to General Eberhart for that,
because it is a concept that I read a little bit about, but I
know General Eberhart has looked at it.
General Eberhart. Sir, we have several pilot programs over
the next 2 years where we will do microsatellite work, sort of
proof of concept. One will be fairly short-lived orbit and be
later this year. Another one will stay up there for a while
longer as we demonstrate the capability to allow this
microsatellite to do a variety of things: first of all, to show
the ability to have a very robust constellation, so therefore
it would be difficult from a space control vantage point to
knock out. Second, that you can use these satellites possibly,
depending on how you control them, for on-orbit maintenance, if
you will. You could use these satellites for on-orbit escort.
You are limited only by your imagination here in terms of
how you could use these satellites. Obviously, the cost to get
them on orbit, the cost of the satellite, is reduced based on
the size that we are talking about. You could put many in orbit
with the same launch. So I think that there is exciting
opportunities here that we will better understand after we do
our first couple of proof of concept demonstrations.
Senator Bill Nelson. These microsatellites could be at any
altitude?
General Eberhart. I guess they could, sir, but I think
initially more the LEO and the GEO type orbits is what we would
be talking.
Senator Bill Nelson. You said GEO?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General, for your excellent
testimony, and we will excuse you and ask the second panel to
come forward. Thank you very much. [Pause.]
We will resume the hearing. Welcome, Admiral Ellis. Good to
see you again.
Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. General Blaisdell and Admiral Dwyer, thank
you for being with us this afternoon. We look forward to
hearing from each of you today. Admiral Ellis, now that the
Nuclear Posture Review has been completed, we would like to
hear from you as to the next steps the Department of Defense
will take as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review. We
especially want to know how this policy document gets
translated into meaningful guidance for you as you execute the
duties of your command.
Major General Blaisdell, you have begun to retire the
Peacekeeper missile and have a number of modernization programs
under way. We would like to discuss these issues as well as
other areas of concern to you.
Admiral Dwyer, my congratulations to you on the 95th
successful Trident II missile test in a row. Fortunately, the
Navy football team is not as proficient. Now that the Navy has
determined that it will rely on 14 Trident submarines that will
last 44 years with one refueling, we would like to hear about
plans to implement this approach with respect to the Trident II
missile program.
I would like to recognize Senator Allard if he has a
comment at this time.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any comments
now, but if they get proficient at football what happens to
West Point?
Senator Reed. We have to come up with an even more
destructive system. [Laughter.]
Senator Allard. Better thank your lucky stars.
Senator Reed. I guess if they apply their energy to Trident
submarine that is fine, that is okay. But football is something
else.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson likes to bet.
Senator Reed. We do not play Nebraska.
Senator Allard. Thank goodness.
Senator Reed. Thank goodness, that is right.
Admiral Ellis, I note that you have submitted an opening
statement on behalf of the panel and it will be included in the
record. Please go ahead.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Allard, Senator Nelson, I am honored to appear once again
before you today to address the posture of the United States
Strategic Command. I am also pleased, as you have noted, to
have with me today Major General Blaisdell, who is the Director
of Nuclear and Counterproliferation on the Air Force Staff, and
Rear Admiral Dwyer, who is Director of the Navy Strategic
Systems Program.
Thanks to their efforts and your continued support, I am
proud to report that our Nation's strategic forces remain
ready. As they have been for the past 56 years, they are manned
by true professionals who stand ready with the Nation's
ultimate deterrence against major military attack on the United
States and its allies, while also serving in new roles
reflective of a dramatically changed set of national security
challenges.
I am pleased with the increased focus on and resources
being invested in our strategic capabilities, particularly as a
result of the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. More
than a much-needed capabilities assessment, the NPR brings
increased emphasis to ensure our streamlined strategic forces,
weapons, infrastructure, communications, intelligence, and
planning receive the resources required to ensure their
effectiveness and in many cases extend them well beyond their
original design life.
We are reshaping our national strategic capability in
response to a dramatically changed international environment.
We will integrate improved strategic strike forces, both
nuclear and conventional, active and passive defenses, and a
renewed and responsive infrastructure. This so-called new triad
will be enabled by improved command and control systems as well
as robust, adaptive, and responsive intelligence and planning
capabilities.
To become a reality, this effort will require sustained
support from the Services and, of course, from you and your
colleagues. Success in this effort will allow us to continue to
reduce the Nation's reliance on nuclear weapons and enable us
to confidently meet the President's goal of 2,200 to 1,700
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2012.
As the joint commander of the Nation's strategic forces, my
focus has been on working with the Department of Defense and
the Services, particularly the Navy and the Air Force, on
ensuring this year's budget and the Future Years Defense
Program provides the support necessary to meet the requirements
for our new strategic capabilities. For fiscal year 2003, the
President's budget funds the highest priorities for our
strategic forces and for capabilities supporting these forces.
Increased funding has also been directed towards
infrastructure, defenses, and development of new supporting
capabilities.
My most pressing concern for the strategic forces is
modernizing and sustaining an aging force structure, including
our delivery platforms, their weapons systems, and warheads.
From the venerable B-52 bomber to the newest Trident missile
submarines, each platform and weapons system has a scheduled
life extension program designed to keep it in service for at
least the next 20 years. Some will be expected to serve well
beyond that time.
In addition to modernizing existing systems, we must also
improve our strategic capability through modernizing and
developing new supporting capabilities. These capabilities
include our command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR)
capabilities, our war-planning systems and processes, and our
nuclear weapons infrastructure.
We are also pursuing new strategic capabilities in
conventional strike, non-kinetic options, and advanced
intelligence. The Nation is also developing missile defenses as
an integral element of our strategic capability.
As always, our people will continue to be the foundation of
our military success. I appreciate your continued efforts to
improve the quality of life for our military and their families
as well as our civilian professionals.
All of these issues and concerns are interrelated.
Together, the sustained investment in our people and in our
existing systems and in developing broad new non-nuclear
strategic capabilities are required to realize the President's
goal of reducing our operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons to the lowest levels consistent with our national
security. I am firmly committed to reaching that goal with your
continued support.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN

Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, distinguished members of the
subcommittee:
It is an honor to appear before you representing the outstanding
men and women of United States Strategic Command. I appeared before the
full Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the policy issues
associated with the Nuclear Posture Review, and I welcome this
opportunity to address the Strategic Subcommittee on the programmatics
and requirements supporting my command's posture.
I appear before you today to report that our Nation's strategic
forces are ready. As they have been for the past 56 years, they are
manned by true professionals, trained and ready to respond when called,
yet hopeful that our efforts of dissuasion and deterrence prevail to
prevent military attacks against the United States and our allies.
Nonetheless, the renewed focus on supporting and modernizing aging
strategic systems and infrastructure must be sustained to ensure our
forces remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our Nation's
security posture. Thank you for your sustained support of our strategic
forces and your commitment to a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear
weapons stockpile.

EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC POLICY

Since the end of World War II, the United States has had forces
postured to conduct long-range strategic operations in support of our
national defense. The creation of Strategic Air Command in 1946
integrated the impressive conventional long-range strike capabilities
developed during World War II with the emergent capabilities of nuclear
weapons. As the Cold War developed and simmered, our strategic forces
assumed a decidedly nuclear focus in order to deter the imposing threat
of nuclear war with the Soviet Union and her allies. The enormous
responsibility of safeguarding, maintaining, and, if needed, employing
nuclear weapons demanded a culture of rigorous discipline and
professional excellence that continues to this day both in our
strategic task forces and in our headquarters.
With the development of both land-based and sea-based ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads, our war planning
process, already complex to support our strategic aviation forces,
required significant improvements in capability to ensure the triad of
sea, air, and land forces could be effectively employed in support of
our national defense. At the same time, we realized the strategic
mission required joint cooperation for effective integration. That was
achieved through the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff which, in
1960, effectively formed the first joint organization with global
responsibilities. Strategic Air Command and the Joint Strategic Target
Planning Staff served the Nation well during the Cold War. Today's
culture of excellence, complex weapons, and our existing triad of
operating forces that make up U.S. Strategic Command were all forged
during that period.
The end of the Cold War provided an imperative to reevaluate the
organization and focus of our strategic forces. In 1992, our nuclear
forces were integrated under one Combatant Commander charged with
planning and, if directed by the President, executing our Nation's
strategic warplans. What had been a large element of our national
strategy during the Cold War, became a more streamlined, and focused,
but still essential element of our national strategy. Forces allocated
to U.S. Strategic Command now represent less than 3 percent of all DOD
personnel and expend less than 3 percent of the DOD's total
obligational authority.
The mission of our Nation's strategic forces over the last 56 years
has been enduring: to deter a major military attack on the United
States and if necessary employ strategic forces to defeat any
adversary. While that specific purpose is unchanged, our methods of
meeting that mission have changed dramatically.
During the Cold War, we fielded increasingly complex weapons
focused on a specific group of states, the Soviet Union, and its
allies. Our war plans were developed to counter these states and the
threat they represented. Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists. None
of its successor states are considered our enemy. Yet, the specter of a
major attack using weapons of mass destruction remains and is growing
more complex. The key difference between the international environment
today and the environment during the Cold War is that the United States
cannot predict with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or
non-state actors may pose a threat to our vital interests or those of
our friends and allies decades from now. As a result, our war plans and
operating forces must be postured to assure our allies, dissuade
potential enemies, deter those countries that threaten us, and, with
Presidential direction, defend our Nation and defeat those that may
choose to attack us.

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

As I noted in my testimony before you last month, I welcome the
results of the Nuclear Posture Review. More than a much needed
capabilities assessment, it brings increased focus to ensure all our
strategic forces, weapons, infrastructure, communications,
intelligence, and planning receive the resources required to enhance
their capabilities and, in many cases, extend them well beyond their
original design life. Over the next decade, our national strategic
capability will integrate improved strategic strike forces, both
nuclear and conventional, active and passive defenses, and a renewed
and responsive infrastructure. This new triad will be enabled by
improved command and control systems as well as robust, adaptive, and
responsive intelligence and planning capabilities.
To become a reality, this new triad will require sustained support
by the Services and Congress. Success in this effort will allow us to
continue to reduce the Nation's reliance on nuclear weapons and enable
us to meet the President's goal of 2,200-1,700 operationally deployed
strategic nuclear weapons by 2012. For fiscal year 2003, the
President's budget includes increased funding to cover the highest
priorities for our strategic forces and for capabilities supporting
these forces. Increased funding has also been directed towards
infrastructure, defenses, and development of new capabilities. Taken
together, these funding increases put us on the path of refocused
strategic capability and the lowest number of nuclear weapons
consistent with our national security.

STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE

To address a broad range of threats, our Nation's security rests on
several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and capability
to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. Our
declaratory policy communicates costs to potential adversaries. Our
warfighting capability, including a robust triad of strategic forces,
conveys credibility across the full spectrum of conflict--conventional
to nuclear. The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the wisdom of
preserving the complementary strategic triad of land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and strategic bombers as the backbone of our strategic strike
forces.
Each leg of the Nation's offensive strike forces possesses unique
attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk. Intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) provide prompt response; strategic
submarines (SSBNs) provide survivability; and bombers provide
flexibility. The diversity of our strategic forces and the synergy
created by these attributes are designed to complicate any adversary's
offensive and defensive planning calculations while simultaneously
providing protection against the failure of a single leg of the triad.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable,
low cost, prompt response capability with a high readiness rate. They
also promote stability by ensuring that a potential adversary takes
their geographically dispersed capabilities into account if
contemplating a disarming first strike. Without a capable ICBM force,
the prospect of destroying a significant percentage of America's
strategic infrastructure with a handful of weapons might be tempting to
a potential adversary in a crisis.
Ballistic missile submarines continue to carry the largest portion
of our strategic strike force. With approximately two-thirds of the
force at sea at any one time, the strategic submarine force is the most
survivable leg of the triad, providing the United States with a
powerful, assured response capability against any adversary. Submarines
at sea are inherently survivable and hence stabilizing. Submarines in
port, however, are more vulnerable and could offer an extremely
lucrative target in crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable force structure,
the United States must preserve a sufficiently large strategic nuclear
submarine force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets
to ensure an at-sea response force capable of deterring any adversary
in a crisis.
Strategic bombers are the most flexible element of our strategic
strike forces. The ``man in the loop'' allows force dispersal to
improve survivability and aircraft recall during mission execution. The
low-observable technology of the B-2 bomber enables it to penetrate
heavily defended areas and hold high-value targets at risk deep inside
an adversary's territory. In contrast, the B-52 bomber can be employed
in a standoff role using long-range cruise missiles to attack from
outside enemy air defenses. This mixed bomber force can generate to
alert status when necessary to deter escalation or provide assured
response should deterrence fail.
In accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review our strategic forces
are proceeding to the following levels:

500 Minuteman III ICBMs
14 Trident SSBNs equipped with Trident II (D-5)
missiles
76 B-52 and 21 B-2 bombers

In addition, the Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the plan to
deactivate our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, eliminate the nuclear re-role
requirement for the B-1 bomber, and remove four Trident SSBNs from
strategic service.
With no new forces in development, this triad of strategic strike
forces will remain the backbone of our Nation's strategic deterrent
capability for at least the next 20 years. As such, we must ensure
these forces remain robust, reliable, and secure.

STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION AND SUSTAINMENT

Today we have no new strategic systems under development. With the
exception of the Trident II (D-5) missile, which is still in low-rate
production, the United States has in-hand all of its major strategic
systems. Therefore, as our Nation comes to rely on our existing
strategic force, the imperative for modernizing and sustaining that
force becomes even more critical. Since we must maintain these existing
systems for at least the next 20 years, it is also crucial to sustain
the industrial base that provides key components and systems unique to
our strategic forces.
Sustainment and modernization of the strategic bomber force is
critical to provide a force that can support our strategic strike
requirements as well as the conventional needs of our regional
Combatant Commanders. The B-52 is projected to remain the workhorse of
our bombers through 2040. That will make it an 80-year-old aircraft
when it is finally retired. Based on current trends, the critical focus
for sustaining the B-52 is upgrading electronic components to ensure
command and control capability and platform survivability in future
conflicts. The Advanced EHF communications upgrade for the B-52 is
vital to maintaining a capability across the spectrum of conflict and
executing the flexible, adaptable plans necessary to address a wide
range of threats. We cannot afford to slip this upgrade any further
without adversely impacting combat capability when the UHF Milstar
communications constellation begins to lose capability. In addition, we
will need to monitor the impacts of unforeseen aging problems with the
airframes themselves as we continue to use these venerable aircraft in
the global war on terrorism.
The B-2 bomber is similarly projected to remain in service through
2040. While certainly a newer aircraft, the B-2 must also receive the
same command and control capability as the B-52, allowing flexible
targeting. This will require an Advanced EHF suite to ensure the
capability for in-flight retargeting and recall in both nuclear and
conventional roles.
U.S. Strategic Command relies heavily on air refueling forces to
support both bomber and airborne command and control aircraft. We are
facing similar challenges in sustaining the aging KC-135 aircraft which
are committed to direct support of our strategic forces. I fully
support the Air Force's continuing efforts to sustain these aircraft
while pursuing a follow-on capability which will remain critical to our
strategic mission.
Our ICBM force will undergo significant transition over the next
decade. The Peacekeeper ICBM system is programmed for deactivation
beginning in the first quarter of fiscal year 2003 and aggressively
continuing over the following 3 years. This retirement program is fully
funded in the President's budget and phased to meet our warfighting
requirements while adhering to the highest standards of safety and
security requirements. The Minuteman III missile system is also
undergoing comprehensive inter-related modernization programs designed
to extend its service life through 2020. The President's budget funds
the guidance and propulsion replacement programs at procurement rates
that ensure the overall readiness, reliability, and capability of our
ICBM forces into the next decade. Equally important, the safety
enhanced reentry vehicle program will allow us to use the Peacekeeper
W87 warhead on the Minuteman III ICBM as the Peacekeeper leaves
service. This modification enables us to retain the capability of one
of our newest warheads with its modern safety and reliability features
while retiring the W62, the oldest ICBM warhead in our inventory later
in this decade.
Our ballistic missile submarine force is also in the midst of
significant transition. The Navy is in the process of converting four
of our older Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry the Trident
II (D-5) missile system. This conversion will provide us with 14 D-5
equipped SSBNs while making 4 Trident I (C-4) missile equipped
submarines available for conversion to cruise missile and special
operations capable submarines. The program for D-5 conversions is fully
funded and on track.
On a very positive note, our Trident submarines' hull lives have
been extended from 30 to 44 years. Although the Navy must procure
additional missiles and conduct a D-5 missile life extension program,
this will ensure sufficient missiles are available throughout the
Trident submarine service life. This program was fully funded in the
President's budget, however, last year's $25 million reduction in the
D-5 missile program budget will result in an overall $60 million cost
associated with the shutdown and restart of three critical component
production lines during fiscal year 2002. I am working with the Navy to
address these impacts in their future years defense program for the D-5
missile.
In regards to our nuclear weapons, my overall assessment is that
our stockpile is reliable and safe. I have concerns, shared by NNSA's
John Gordon, that the stockpile is showing signs of aging, and
manufacturing defects are being discovered which indicate that previous
reliability assessments were optimistic. This is due, in part, to the
success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in expanding our knowledge
of warhead performance through the development of improved
surveillance, modeling, and simulation tools. This greater scientific
understanding has enabled us to identify potential problems and
uncertainties of which we were previously unaware. The ongoing
refurbishment of the W87 warhead has marked an important technical
milestone for stockpile stewardship, as it is the first major
refurbishment of a nuclear warhead in a non-testing environment.
Approval has also been given for several critical warhead life
extension programs--the B61, the W76, and the W80. Together these four
systems will comprise a significant portion of our country's enduring
nuclear stockpile.

COMMAND, CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE, AND PLANNING SUSTAINMENT AND
MODERNIZATION

Our command and control, as well as intelligence and planning
capabilities, are essential ``force multipliers'' and serve to enhance
and unify our forces. As we transition to the broader range of
deterrent capabilities suggested by the Nuclear Posture Review, we must
ensure new C\4\ISR capabilities are available across the range of
strategic options. Our current C\4\ISR capabilities include a robust
war planning capability, fixed and mobile command and control
facilities, and a joint intelligence center. As with our other
strategic forces, these systems must be modernized in terms of
capabilities and capacity.
The security challenges of the next decade require that we become
more flexible and adaptive in our shift from a specific state, or
threat-based strategy, to a capabilities-based strategy. U.S. Strategic
Command has begun development of a planning system that retains the
rigor and expertise developed over the last several decades, yet
employs modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to
significantly improve our planning capability. This effort is a
critical element in enabling rapid, flexible crisis response that
integrates nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic weapons into our war
plans. This new approach to planning will require significantly more
collaboration with the regional Combatant Commanders as we continue to
better integrate our military capabilities across the spectrum of
conflict. Our goal is to remove inefficiencies between current theater
and strategic war planning development by eliminating seams and
expanding available options for our senior leaders in future crises.
This is a significant change and will be facilitated by a comprehensive
review of our current war planning processes.
I am pleased with the increased attention given to the long-term
modernization and sustainment of our two airborne command and control
systems. The National Airborne Operations Center, the E-4, is operated
by Strategic Command as an airborne element of the National Military
Command System. As with most of our strategic forces, it requires
sustainment and modernization investments into current capability while
integrating new command, control, and communications requirements.
Increased senior leader attention during the last year has resulted in
significant improvements in E-4 modernization funding in the
President's budget. This vital funding ensures these aircraft have the
required capabilities to support our senior leadership in any future
national crisis. Similarly, the E-6B airborne command and control
aircraft modernization is funded by the fiscal year 2003 budget
submission. The funding requested corrects demonstrated operational
deficiencies impacting aircraft mission capability rates.
As the combatant commander of strategic forces, I am very
interested in the replacements for our Defense Support Program (DSP)
constellation and Milstar communications satellites. The successful
fielding of these systems directly affects our strategic warning and
communications requirements. The SBIRS-High capability is vital to our
warning timelines and ability to execute our strategic forces when
under attack. Similarly, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellite system is necessary to ensure global, secure, survivable
communications between our senior leadership and strategic forces. I
understand the concern with the costs and schedule progress of both of
these systems, however, the current DSP and Milstar systems have finite
lifetimes, and we must preserve the requirement for replacement of
these critical capabilities as they approach the end of their
technological life. If current legacy satellite systems degrade
significantly without replacements, we are seriously affecting the
ability to capably respond with our strategic assets, as well as with
all of our modern, networked military forces.
Our Strategic Joint Intelligence Center is tasked with a wide range
of intelligence requirements supporting development of our strategic
and theater war plans. It also supports all regional Combatant
Commanders in the global war on terrorism through participation in a
federated intelligence process, where we apply our imagery analysis
expertise in such areas as weapons of mass destruction proliferation,
hard and deeply buried targets, and battle damage assessment. I
personally benefited from this expertise in 1999 as the commander of
forces during Operation Allied Force and today I'm sure Central Command
similarly appreciates their significant contribution to the ongoing
campaign in Afghanistan.
As you may know, the current system of managing our intelligence
information is reaching its maximum capability. This tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) system is a limiting
factor and has been previously identified as a problem area but still
requires significant effort to correct. The President's budget includes
funds to address this area. However, I believe an uncertainty still
exists over the future years defense program to meet intelligence
community requirements. This limitation will be exacerbated by the
increased flow of intelligence information envisioned by emerging
capabilities. Similarly, the intelligence information infrastructure is
currently vulnerable to single-point failures. Now is the time to
address these critical vulnerabilities as we expand our intelligence
requirements against new threats. Given our military's growing reliance
on network-centric warfare, we must keep pace in developing TPED
systems if we are to prevent the fog of war from becoming digital.
I am very concerned about the future plan for equipment used to
enable secure encrypted communications with not only our strategic
forces and command and control aircraft but the entire military as
well. Equipment used on our strategic forces will require replacement
beginning in fiscal year 2005.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

As we transition into the future, it is essential that we sustain,
modernize, and enhance our existing strategic systems. The Quadrennial
Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review also direct investments in
new capabilities that will support and enhance the national security
elements of assure, dissuade, deter, defend, and defeat. Some of these
investments include advanced strike capabilities, defenses,
intelligence and planning capabilities, and command and control
improvements.
The Department of Defense is pursuing advanced precision strike
capability to support our combatant forces throughout the spectrum of
conflict. Our strategic forces will take advantage of these
capabilities to replace certain missions previously assigned solely to
nuclear weapons and provide non-nuclear options to our senior
leadership as well. I support these initiatives. I also support the
focus and resources expended on ensuring our Nation's command and
control systems are an enabler for our joint warfighters and not a
constraint. General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
is leading the charge on developing joint C\4\ISR that closes the gaps
and seams between the combatant commands and the Service provided
forces. In addition, I fully support Under Secretary Aldridge and
Assistant Secretary Stenbit in their efforts to ensure that enduring
national command and control requirements of global, secure, survivable
communications are maintained in any future satellite architecture.
The challenges of hard and deeply buried targets, strategic
relocatable or time critical targets, advanced conventional weapons
employment, and offensive information operations targeting require a
much greater fidelity in intelligence than we currently possess. There
are no immediate solutions to these challenges. I fully endorse the DOD
systems approach to address these requirements, since it is far more
than just a hardware or resource issue. We need to comprehensively
assess our intelligence capability from our hardware, to our people,
organizations, and processes to ensure we develop a robust system that
supports the full range of our Nation's warfighting capabilities.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

This year's Nuclear Posture Review officially recognized a
responsive infrastructure as one of the critical elements of our
strategic posture. The safety, surety, and reliability of our strategic
nuclear arsenal depend heavily on the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Your continued support
of NNSA is vital to ensuring they can support our strategic forces.
They are making great strides in improving the nuclear weapons complex.
As does John Gordon, I fully support current efforts to revitalize the
laboratory and production infrastructure, and increase our nuclear test
readiness.
Our nuclear weapons production complex has deteriorated to the
point that significant investment is required in order to effectively
refurbish our active stockpile. Without sustained investment in the
NNSA infrastructure, we risk losing confidence in our nuclear stockpile
and eliminate any possibility of accelerating retired warhead
dismantlement. We must realize that a robust, agile, and flexible
nuclear weapons complex--comprised of both infrastructure and talented
people to research, design, develop, and manufacture or refurbish
nuclear weapons as necessary--provides us with the ability to respond
to a changing national security environment and is itself a deterrent
which complements our military forces. To this end, the need for
sustained support of NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program has never
been greater.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program provides no concrete assurance
against the need for a nuclear weapons test in the future. As General
Gordon stated in his testimony to the full committee last month:

``Over time, we believe that the stewardship program will
provide the tools to ensure stockpile safety and reliability
without nuclear testing. But there are no guarantees. It is
only prudent to continue to hedge for the possibility that we
may in the future uncover a safety or reliability problem in a
warhead critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent that could not
be fixed without nuclear testing.''

There is currently no need to conduct a test today, however, our
current test readiness posture of 24 to 36 months does not provide for
a timely and effective response to unexpected events, whether internal
(related to problems with the stockpile) or external (related to
foreign actions). Both the Nuclear Posture Review and the report of the
fiscal year 2000 Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security
of the United States Nuclear Stockpile identified the need to improve
test readiness. I fully support this effort.
A less visible, yet equally vital, element of a responsive
strategic infrastructure is the industrial base supporting our
strategic systems. One of the inevitable results of having no new
development or production of strategic systems for almost 10 years is
the decline of critical industrial capabilities unique to strategic
systems such as hardened electronics, solid rocket motors, and reentry
system technology. The President's budget includes funding for programs
sustaining strategic systems technology and I appreciate your continued
support in this area.

OUR PEOPLE

As General Myers stated in his testimony before the full committee,
the success in all our missions depends on our number one asset--our
people. Maintaining our culture of excellence at U.S. Strategic Command
depends on recruiting and retaining the best and brightest. Working
with nuclear weapons demands nothing less. I am grateful for the
continued emphasis Congress and this administration have placed on
raising the standard of living of our Service members and their
families.
Strategic Command has always had a strong relationship with the
Nation's Guard and Reserve personnel who support our strategic mission.
The Guard and Reserve operate almost 75 percent of our designated
tanker forces. In addition, we have 84 reservists recalled to active
duty at our headquarters primarily supporting our dedicated efforts in
support of the global war on terrorism.

FORCE PROTECTION

Our people have unique responsibilities for stewardship of our
nuclear weapons. They are dedicated and devoted professionals who take
very seriously the development of our strategic war plans and the
safeguarding and security of the nuclear weapon systems that provide
the deterrent force for our Nation. The events of September 11 only
served to heighten our keen sense of awareness of our responsibility.
Your committee has already received testimony from the Services and the
National Nuclear Security Administration regarding ongoing efforts to
increase our already high levels of nuclear weapons security. I
appreciate your support of the President's budget request to increase
funding for additional security personnel and force protection
initiatives for our task forces and the Department of Energy.

CONCLUSION

I assure you that Strategic Command is ready now and I am
personally committed to sustaining that readiness into a challenging
future. I am pleased with the current focus on and resourcing of our
strategic forces. Continued attention in the Future Years Defense
Program is required to address previous reductions in the Trident II
(D-5) missile life extension program, funding replacements for
encryption equipment, and fully funded upgrades to the intelligence
TPED system.
Reshaping our strategic capabilities will require sustained support
in the years ahead. As the Secretary of Defense stated in the foreword
to the Nuclear Posture Review:

``Constructing the new triad, reducing our deployed nuclear
weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture
has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons
systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense
infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses,
improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and
non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives
and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S.
more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.''

I appreciate your continued support for the men and women of U.S.
Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they make
to our Nation's security. I look forward to reporting our progress to
you in the future.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral Ellis.
General Blaisdell, do you have a comment, or Admiral Dwyer?
General Blaisdell. It is a pleasure to be here, Mr.
Chairman, again. I do not have an opening statement. I am here
to support Admiral Ellis.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Dwyer.
Admiral Dwyer. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here. I
also note that you won this year.
Senator Reed. You are already ahead of the game, Admiral.
Admiral Dwyer. But I have no comments, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Let us proceed with a round of 6 minutes and if we have
additional time before the vote perhaps ask individual
questions as the case may warrant.
Admiral Ellis, as I indicated in my opening statement, the
Nuclear Posture Review has been completed. Could you explain
the process that follows the Nuclear Posture Review that will
actually provide your command with the guidance it needs to
develop target plans?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, certainly. I would be glad to. The
Nuclear Posture Review was a congressionally-mandated review
chartered or undertaken by the Secretary of Defense and he has
submitted that report to Congress as directed. It is
anticipated that that will be followed by presidential
guidance, as Secretary of State Powell mentioned to you in the
colloquy that you had before your Appropriations Committee
subcommittee hearing. The President will make the decision on
what elements of that are to be emphasized and provide his
guidance in turn to the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense then will add to that guidance
with more specificity, provide it to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and, through him, to me for ultimate
implementation in future planning efforts.
Senator Reed. Admiral, I notice in the new triad, which is
one of the marquee elements of the Nuclear Posture Review, that
there are conventional forces. Does that mean that Strategic
Command will be, in fact, conducting non-nuclear war planning
as part of this new approach?
Admiral Ellis. What that implies, sir, I think, is that we
find that a new strategic concept of deterrence is appropriate.
Such a concept has to be broadened beyond strategic equaling
merely nuclear and a broader range of options and possibilities
needs to be presented to the President and the rest of the
Nation's leadership. That could and should include non-nuclear
kinetic capabilities, the advanced conventional weapons, if you
will, and even ultimately, if and when they deliver or are
developed, non-kinetic capabilities.
So over the long term, over the next decade, I expect that
that is a direction that we at Strategic Command will be going
in the future.
Senator Reed. Admiral Ellis, is there in your estimate a
validated requirement for a new nuclear weapon?
Admiral Ellis. No, sir, at this time there is no
requirement for new design or creation of new nuclear weapons.
Senator Reed. General Blaisdell, Admiral Dwyer, is that
your view also?
General Blaisdell. That is also my view. There is no new
requirement for nuclear weapons.
Senator Reed. Admiral Dwyer?
Admiral Dwyer. That is our view. We are extending the life
of our current warheads, Senator.
Senator Reed. How would such a requirement be developed if
in fact a new requirement would emerge? Admiral Ellis?
Admiral Ellis. The established processes by which military
requirements are generated and then options are reviewed by
which those requirements could be met, would be the system by
which that would come forward, sir. Clearly, that would involve
the classic procurement processes and the appropriate levels of
oversight and scrutiny during that effort.
Senator Reed. Now, is there a validated requirement for
providing new capabilities to an existing nuclear weapon?
Admiral Ellis?
Admiral Ellis. There are ongoing studies, as you are aware,
Senator, to deal with a broadened and increased target set,
particularly the hard and deeply buried targets which we have a
proliferation of around the world. Advanced conventional
weapons are certainly a part of that assessment, but a full
spectrum of assessments is under way as to how that capability
could be used or employed.
Clearly, there are no decisions. There are only studies
under way, as you have been briefed, I think, by the Secretary
and at the staff level.
Senator Reed. General Blaisdell, Admiral Dwyer, do you have
anything to add?
General Blaisdell. On the Air Force side, in partnership
with DOE, there is a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)
program that I believe has been brought over to you, still a
study program. It does use existing resources, and we are
partnering with the Department of Energy in that effort.
Senator Reed. Admiral Dwyer.
Admiral Dwyer. Mr. Chairman, we are participating also in
the studies with DOE and the Air Force.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Blaisdell, as the Peacekeeper is retired the
warhead from the Peacekeeper will be available for the
Minuteman III ICBM. This will allow retirement of the older of
the two Minuteman III warheads, the W-62. Does the Air Force
have any plans to extend the life of the W-62?
General Blaisdell. No, Mr. Chairman, we do not. It was
decided not to extend the life of the W-62. So as the Mark 21
warheads which are on the Peacekeeper, as we proceed through
Peacekeeper retirement we will store those and then start to
take down the W-62 warheads and then replace those W-62s with
the Mark 21s from Peacekeeper.
Senator Reed. Does the Air Force have any continuing
military requirement for the W-62?
General Blaisdell. We do not at this time.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me ask you just a general question, General Blaisdell.
Does the budget request fully support the Peacekeeper ICBM
retirement program?
General Blaisdell. Yes, sir, it does. We are fully funded
as far as Peacekeeper, $4.9 million in 2002 and $537 million
over a total program cost for Peacekeeper. So we are funded. We
are prepared to take that down as we have indicated, 17, 17,
and then 16, over 3 years, and then 2 years to clean up what is
left of the program.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, I am looking here at an
article on March 16 from the International Herald Tribune and
it prompted me to ask a question: Apparently there was at one
point considerable concern expressed after the release of the
Nuclear Posture Review that Russia might feel compelled to
respond by sustaining a larger nuclear force than it would have
otherwise.
How do you perceive the Russian reaction to the Nuclear
Posture Review from your perspective and your contacts with
Russian defense personnel?
Admiral Ellis. Sir, I have not had contact with them since
the release, or the leak, of the Nuclear Posture Review. But I
can only draw on the public statements that have been made by
the Russian authority, Minister Ivanov, who was in this country
recently and appeared jointly with the Secretary of Defense in
a press conference that addressed these issues. It is apparent
from my reading of his statements and answers to questions that
were posed to him that they understand our legitimate defense
requirements as we understand their national security
requirements. Each of us is committed to substantial reductions
in our strategic nuclear forces. That effort is continuing and
that dialogue and the strengthening of our relationship is also
progressing, as I read the statements that have been made in
the press.
Senator Allard. You and I both come to the same conclusion
on that. They did not seem to have any kind of angry response
as far as Russia was concerned.
Admiral Ellis. That is correct, sir. I saw no indication of
that in the press or elsewhere.
Senator Allard. Admiral, how will the changes in the NPR
affect STRATCOM's role in planning and implementing military
operations?
Admiral Ellis. As we were discussing with the Chairman, as
additional capabilities deliver and STRATCOM's inclusion of a
broader range of capabilities and presenting strategic options
for the Nation's leadership, our planning is going to have to
become more robust and also more responsive to a growing range
of contingencies, at both the strategic and potentially the
regional level.
Senator Allard. Let me get a little more specific.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Particularly as it would apply to rogue
states, what would be our deterrent possibilities there? Do you
think that there is something we can do to deter rogue states?
Admiral Ellis. I think as we have discussed the drawdown in
operationally deployed nuclear weapons in the wake of the NPR,
it is clear that we have redefined or expanded the capabilities
that have to be a part of deterrent concepts. The Nation has
long had a policy related to those who might employ weapons of
mass destruction against us, against our forces, or against our
allies, in which, while we will not specify precisely what our
response would be, it would be overwhelming and it would be
devastating to those who might consider such an option. That
deterrent statement posture still stands.
Senator Allard. Talk a little bit about your confidence in
the stockpile remaining safe, viable, and effective in the
short-term, mid-term, and the long-term.
Admiral Ellis. Sir, as the old sage said, predictions are
difficult, particularly when they concern the future. I think
the important element about the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program is that when it is fully in place it will
give us the tools to more precisely assess and examine the
aging stockpile as we move into the future years.
Obviously, the average age of the stockpile is approaching
20 years. There are elements to that that will logically be of
concern to us, as there are with any aging system. So I believe
that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will give us a better
capability to identify problems. That is not the same as the
ability to correct them or to guarantee, with certainty, that
in the event of some unexpected wide-ranging and wholesale
problem associated with the stockpile, that correction of such
a deficiency might not ultimately call into question its
reliability and then force us to address the issue of whether
or not testing would be required.
But we are learning more about that stockpile every day. We
are developing more and more tools, NNSA and the Department of
Energy are, to more accurately assess and predict the effects
of aging on that stockpile. So I have confidence in our ability
to find the problems. But their correction and how large they
are and what that does to our confidence in the systems is yet
to be determined.
Senator Allard. Do not these considerations support the NPR
recommendations that we sustain a substantial responsive force
of warheads, that we improve nuclear test readiness, and that
we rebuild and sustain a capable nuclear weapons
infrastructure?
Admiral Ellis. I think, as you are well aware, sir, we have
approached this in the United States' standpoint from exactly
the posture that you describe. In other words, we have elected
not to produce new designs or to produce new copies of old
designs of nuclear weapons, and to rely on the weapons that are
currently in existence to sustain us through the future years
and requirements for this essential element of our deterrent
posture.
All of the pieces that you describe are necessary elements
to ensure that that capability is safe, secure, and credible
for the future.
Senator Allard. My time has just expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Nelson of Nebraska.
Senator Ben Nelson. You may have been saved by the bell,
Admiral.
Strategic Command relies heavily on the National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) ability to ensure the safety
and reliability of our Nation's stockpile. Since 1992 explosive
tests have not been conducted. I understand you have indicated
that you do not necessarily think that they are required, but
instead a lengthy and tedious process of disassembly and
inspection, to include the refurbishment, is under way.
Do you think that the development of this effort is
effective at the present time? Can we develop improved
surveillance, modeling, and simulation tools to show that
earlier reliability assessments were optimistic? In other
words, can we second-guess and improve our original
predictions?
Admiral Ellis. I think you are exactly right, Senator. The
development of more sophisticated tools is going to give us the
ability to more precisely monitor and assure ourselves exactly
what the true status of the stockpile is, and that is the
essential element in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
Program. That effort continues. There are very sophisticated
modeling techniques under development. There are very complex
and sophisticated tools that are being developed in the
laboratories to give us a more complete understanding of the
physics and the effect of age on these weapons.
All of that will give us more knowledge, more insight, more
understanding, and then more confidence in what we know about
the stockpile. So we will know more and not know less about
this vital capability as we look to the future.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is the current funding adequate for us
to be able to continue to improve the tools to go back and
check the effectiveness of our predictions?
Admiral Ellis. I certainly would not presume to speak for
General Gordon, who heads NNSA, and say that his budget is
entirely adequate. I suspect, like all folks, he has adjusted
the pace of his programs as a reflection of the funding that is
available. But in balance, clearly the additional focus and the
additional resources that have flowed to the entire body of our
strategic deterrent program, which includes the infrastructure,
its upgrade and modernization, is a very positive step and will
assist greatly in our pursuit of those objectives in the
future.
Senator Ben Nelson. If we will reduce our warheads to a
level of between 1,700 and 2,000 or in that range, is that
possible within the time frame of 2012?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The 1,700 to 2,200 number is
achievable. All of those elements have to come together
appropriately. As I say, the resources and attention that are
being devoted to that give us some cause for optimism. The
program is under way, and indeed the reductions and a number of
the elements that are part of the NPR have already begun. So I
think that is a very positive sign.
As with all programs that have a decade-long life or
longer, the sustainment of that effort, the continued support,
not just financial but also in terms of the intellectual
capital, the people, the challenges we face in retaining and
attracting new talent as the brain trusts in the laboratories
approach retirement, those types of things have to be addressed
as well as we look to the future.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate it very much. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Let me note that the vote has begun on campaign finance
reform. I propose to recognize Senator Sessions for his
questions and when he concludes at that point we would likely
have additional questions which we would submit to you in
writing and ask for your response.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I
have not been able to be here as much as I would like.
Admiral Ellis, thank you for your leadership and work. I
have great respect for you. I support the substantial reduction
in our nuclear weaponry. We want to do that. But we do not have
the capacity to build any new ones. We have completely
eliminated our capacity to build new ones, have we not, Admiral
Ellis?
Admiral Ellis. That is correct, sir. We do not have the
ability currently to build a complete nuclear weapon.
Senator Sessions. How many other countries in the world
still have a capacity to build at this time, do you know?
Admiral Ellis. I think all of those that are recognized as
nuclear powers obviously have the ability to build them,
because they have them currently. We elected to approach, as we
were saying earlier, our sustainment of the stockpile in a
different manner and that is to refurbish and sustain the older
weapons rather than design and build new ones, which would
require testing. This was a choice that the Nation made.
Senator Sessions. I believe that is a minimal step. If we
are not going to have the capacity to build new ones, we ought
to have a reserve capability. Else we freeze ourselves in a
position where we cannot advance. It is critical that we not
give our adversaries in the world a target of equality, a flat
number that they know if they reach they would have equality
with us.
Would you not agree that that is something we need to
avoid?
Admiral Ellis. Certainly, Senator, some element of our
strategic deterrence contributes to all elements of our
national strategy. It assures allies, it dissuades those who
might choose to compete with us, it deters those who wish us
ill, and those are significant elements of all our military
forces, be they conventional or nuclear. Certainly, the nuclear
structure still plays a role in that deterrent policy.
Senator Sessions. I know we have to go. I would just note
that to me we are the premier nuclear power, the premier
military power in the world. We need to use that power
responsibly, wisely, for the benefit of ourselves and the
world. But it would be a colossal error if we were to create
constraints on our military that encourages our adversaries to
attempt to reach parity. That to me is more important or as
important as anything else we discuss.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Gentlemen, thank you for your outstanding testimony. I
particularly want to thank Admiral Ellis because I know you had
to adjust your schedule mightily to be here today. I appreciate
it very much. We all do. We also appreciate the great
leadership you are showing at Strategic Command. Keep up your
good work.
We will keep the record open for 2 days and if there are
additional questions we will present those questions to you in
writing. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE PROGRAMS

1. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, according to current DOD
regulations, all new major defense programs must conduct an Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA), led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
to determine whether there are more cost effective alternatives than
the program being proposed. This helps fulfill the statutory
requirement for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to
perform an assessment of such alternatives. OSD has conducted AOA for
all major Air Force space programs in the past. Do you plan to have OSD
conduct AOAs for space programs in the future, and, if not, why not;
how will the statutory requirements for JROC assessments of program
alternatives be met?
Secretary Teets. First, let me say that we will fully comply with
all applicable statutes. Second, I anticipate that the JROC will
continue to conduct assessments in fulfillment of its statutory
responsibilities. With regard to AOAs, I expect the OSD staff will
continue to be involved and participate in the conduct of AOAs;
however, the effort will be led under my authority as the DOD space
milestone decision authority and the leader of the Nation's national
security space efforts.

DESCRIPTION OF ``PATHFINDER'' PROCESS

2. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, in your testimony you described a
``pathfinder'' acquisition process for GPS-III that is underway. This
pathfinder process is intended to allow ``full involvement by OSD and
the other Services,'' and ``fit DOD statutory requirements.'' Could you
please provide details as to how this pathfinder process works, and how
it has been received, for example, what sort of meetings have you held
with OSD personnel, at what management level, and has the response from
OSD participants been positive?
Secretary Teets. The GPS-III program was identified as the
``pathfinder'' for the streamlined DOD space acquisition process by Mr.
Aldridge. Our goal is to reduce the workload and shorten the decision
time for key acquisition milestones while still ensuring appropriate
insight and oversight. A key aspect of the streamlined process is the
use of a single, focused, Independent Program Assessment (IPA) Team in
place of multiple Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), thereby allowing
stakeholder participation and insight while decreasing the amount of
time involved by reducing the number of IPTs and the hierarchical
coordination approach. I would be happy to provide additional details
in a briefing at your convenience.
Since being confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Air Force, I
have had the privilege to talk with Mr. Aldridge, who is fully
supportive of the space commission implementation, on several occasions
concerning our efforts to streamline the DOD space acquisition process.
Members of my staff have also met with OSD staff to provide information
on how the streamlined process would work for GPS-III and/or other DOD
space-related programs and encourage their participation throughout. In
addition, members of the OSD and Joint Staffs have participated as part
of the GPS-III IPA Team. Reaction to the idea of a streamlined approach
to acquisition oversight for DOD space systems has been mixed. I
believe we are in the initial stages of making change happen. As we
work to define and refine the new process, we will involve the
appropriate parties to ensure that their views are heard.

3. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, what is the forum for OSD
participants to ask and receive answers to programmatic questions, what
new GPS programmatic issues have been raised as a result of the new
process, and how are they being resolved?
Secretary Teets. There are four forms in which OSD participants can
ask and receive answers to programmatic questions. The first is the
normal day-to-day conduct of business. Members of my staff are
available to answer OSD questions regarding any DOD space program and
the OSD staff has access to the same data from the Program Executive
Office (PEO) that my staff uses. The second forum is part of the normal
budget cycle activity whereby the Department makes its funding
decisions in preparation for the eventual submission of the President's
budget. Third, when a program is under review in preparation for a
milestone decision or key decision point, an IPA Team will be formed to
review that program. Members of OSD will participate as part of that
IPA Team so their issues can be brought forward and properly addressed
as part of the program review. Lastly, the meeting where a DOD space
program milestone decision is made will be known as a Defense Space
Acquisition Board (DSAB). I will invite the appropriate OSD principals
to attend the DSABs so that I can gain the benefit of their counsel
prior to making milestone decisions for the DOD space Major Defense
Acquisition Programs.
In answer to the second part of your question about ``new GPS
programmatic issues raised as a result of the new process,'' we have
not yet completed the GPS-III pathfinder activities, so I am not aware
of any new GPS programmatic issues at this time. I do expect to conduct
a DSAB for GPS-III in the late summer, early fall timeframe and will be
in a better position to answer your question at that time.

RAPID OSD REVIEWS

4. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, you noted in your testimony that
a major goal for you is reducing the decision cycle time for space
programs, noting that the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process, with
its associated IPT meetings, takes ``months not weeks,'' and that you
are aiming for a much shorter process. It is my understanding, however,
that the reason the IPT process takes as long as it does is because the
program and the OSD oversight organizations are working to resolve
issues, some of which require additional analysis and time to reach a
mutually acceptable outcome. Furthermore, I understand it is highly
unusual for a program to actually be delayed during this period,
because the contractors continue to work as the government deliberates.
Can you please identify which space programs have experienced delays in
actual contractor progress as a result of the current DAB/IPT process,
how long those delays were, and could you also please explain how,
under an expedited decision process, there will be enough time to
perform requisite analyses to resolve issues in a mutually acceptable
way?
Secretary Teets. While there are always issues that need to be
resolved on any major acquisition program, successful resolution of
these issues is not necessarily directly related to a lengthy review,
coordination, and consensus process. The NRO has had success utilizing
a focused program review process for complex space programs that
appears to be more timely than the current DOD IPT process. Since the
NRO is able to make decisions of the same quality as the DOD on complex
space systems, but can do it in 8-12 weeks instead of 8-12 months, I'm
very interested in using that decision process. It is difficult to
explicitly name for you the programs that have experienced delayed
progress as a result of the DAB/IPT process--mainly due to the fact
that the blame for programmatic delay can be accurately shared amongst
many parties. However, we can definitely begin to address reducing the
imposed instability caused by our current lengthy decision process by
changing the process itself and reducing its timeline. I believe this
is important because the crafting of a realistic program schedule is
the first step for cost control. Decision delays cause program
schedules to be lengthened for reasons beyond the program's control.
The end result of a lengthy decision making process and the resulting
stretch of a program's schedule can be to cause the total cost of a
program to increase. My goal is to reduce, if not eliminate, this self-
imposed instability factor.

PLANNED WAIVERS

5. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, do you currently anticipate
waiving, or recommending waiving, any DOD regulations for space
programs, and if so, which regulations and why would you want to waive
them?
Secretary Teets. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has given me the authority to
waive and/or grant exemptions to DOD instructions and publications, for
DOD space-related programs, that are under the authority of his office.
I am to inform him of the waivers and exemptions I have granted.
I anticipate granting the appropriate waivers and exemptions to DOD
Instruction 5000.2 and DOD Regulation 5000.2-R. These DOD documents
describe an acquisition oversight process meant to cover a wide variety
of items (e.g., helmets to F-22s) and are focused on making the most
cost-effective production decision. While this process may fit a good
number of DOD system types, the acquisition of space programs--
especially satellite systems--is different. The focus of the current
DOD 5000 process is not the most appropriate construct for acquiring
space-related systems.
My staff is in the process of developing a document to be used in
place of the DODI 5000.2 and DOD 5000.2-R that will be written to
address the nuances of acquiring DOD space systems. The new document
will comply with existing acquisition related statutes just as the DOD
5000 series does today. The difference is that the process described in
the new document will be focused on how best to acquire space-related
systems.

HOW TO PREVENT ANOTHER SBIRS-HIGH

6. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, in the 1990s, the SBIRS-High
satellite program was touted as a ``lead program for acquisition
reform.'' ``Acquisition reform,'' as applied to the SBIRS-High program,
involved a conscious decision to minimize the amount of government
oversight. It was recently revealed that the SBIRS-High program has
experienced billions of dollars of cost growth, and the program is 4 to
5 years behind its original schedule. As a result, the Air Force set up
an independent review team to assess the corrective actions required to
get the program back on track. Many of these corrective actions involve
restoring appropriate government oversight to the program. You stated
in your testimony that you were going to review other current space
programs to ensure they have an appropriately robust level of
government oversight. Could you please describe this review process,
what the results are to date, and how you intend to assure robust Air
Force and OSD oversight will occur for space programs; and could you
also indicate what input and comments OSD oversight organizations have
provided on this issue?
Secretary Teets. The ``corrective actions'' of ``restoring
appropriate government oversight'' to the SBIRS-High program have been
taken at all levels of government and contractor management. Due to the
Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) clauses that were part
of the SBIRS-High contract, the System Program Office (SPO) did not
have the ability to appropriately monitor and control contract work.
The removal of those TSPR clauses on the SBIRS-High effort will enable
the SPO to establish the necessary access, insight, and control
required to appropriately manage the SBIRS-High program. The Air Force
senior leadership is directly involved with the ongoing corrective
actions and assessment of alternatives.
I have already begun the effort to reestablish program stability
and management discipline within Air Force space programs. In the past,
increased management discipline was accomplished through the addition
of oversight layers within the Air Force and OSD. However, instead of
adding additional oversight layers, I am personally focusing on the
major space programs and working closely with the Program Executive
Officer for Space, Lt. Gen. Brian Arnold, to ensure senior management,
outside program offices, is actively engaged on all our space
acquisition efforts. I believe the resulting streamlined process will
facilitate timely senior-level decisions and provide space-oriented
expertise and direction when needed.

SPACE CAREER AND CADRE DEVELOPMENT

7. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, could you please outline the plan
you have for developing the ``cadre of Air Force space professionals''
that you describe in your testimony?
Secretary Teets. In response to the Space Commission Report and a
memo from the Secretary of Defense, dated October 18, 2001, Air Force
Space Command is developing a Space Career Management Plan. This plan
establishes a deliberate and repeatable process, driven by requirements
and based upon competencies, to ensure we can place the right people,
with the right skills in the right positions to achieve national
security space objectives. The development process spelled out in the
career management plan is built upon three major pillars: education,
training, and experience. These pillars are provided as methodology to
attain leadership skills and levels of certification that will ensure
we properly develop our space professionals through increasingly
advanced education, training, and experience.

8. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, how much funding is being
allocated to new effort, what types of training do you plan to provide,
and who will be trained?
Secretary Teets. Air Force Space Command is requesting funding for
the career management plan in the fiscal year 2004 Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) process. Their POM submission will identify funds
necessary to fully develop and implement the new education and training
requirements outlined in the career management plan. These requirements
include common initial education and training for all space
professionals entering the career field. This common initial training
will provide space professionals with a single foundation of knowledge
spanning all aspects of military space--from concept through
acquisition, to operations and eventual disposal of space systems. The
plan also identifies a continuum of follow-on education and training
requirements to increase technical depth and breadth for all space
professionals throughout one's career.

9. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, will this effort focus on
military officers, civilians, or both, and will there be incentives for
people with solid technical backgrounds to join the space acquisition
community to help oversee the programs and prevent future problems?
Secretary Teets. The Space Career Management Plan identifies all
personnel considered to be space professionals--officers, enlisted, and
civilians. As previously mentioned, the plan ensures a blend of
expertise within the space professional career field to support a
``cradle to grave'' organizational philosophy while, at the same time,
providing solid military space capabilities. Not only will this plan
permit those with solid technical backgrounds to flourish, it
encourages them by providing leadership opportunities at various levels
and providing many opportunities to apply their technical expertise
throughout their space professional careers.

ADVANCED WIDEBAND SYSTEM CONCEPT AND FUNDING

10. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the Air Force has proposed
almost $200 million of basic technology funding to begin development of
something called the ``Advanced Wideband System'' of communication
satellites. This system is supposed to be launched in 2009, but as of
now I understand there is no description of exactly what the system is.
Furthermore, I understand the first study to begin to define what it
is, is not due until June 2002. Just what is the Advanced Wideband
System, and why do you think you need a full $200 million next year for
it, and particularly when the system has yet to complete its first
concept study?
Secretary Teets. Early transformational success depends on the
convergence of several technological and engineering challenges. The
$200 million in technology funding will be used to provide the
technology pipeline for the Transformational Communications Enterprise
(TCE). Additionally, it will fund both the concept definition phase of
a network centric architecture of SATCOM systems and later in the
fiscal year, the beginning of pre-acquisition studies at a detailed
engineering level. It is anticipated that the concept definition phase
will produce several pre-acquisition programs with multiple contractors
engaged in concept exploration in fiscal year 2003 to cover strategic
and tactical user needs, backbone and relay functions, and associated
terminals. We will also be funding multiple technology developments to
mature useful technologies for the TCE. The study currently underway,
and planned for a July 2002 final out-brief, analyzes several
alternative architecture approaches with the goal of removing
communications as a constraint to the warfighter. Some of the problems
that we are working to resolve are more timely support for airborne
ISR, greater connectivity between joint warfighters, and more simple,
standardized terminals. The vision for the effort is an enduring
enterprise that will provide secure, internet-like communications
services.

SPACE-BASED RADAR

11. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the Space-Based Radar roadmap
study, submitted to Congress in February, states that DOD has
established a goal to deploy a Block I Space-Based Radar system by
fiscal year 2008 or fiscal year 2010. The study also states that fiscal
year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 will be ``dedicated to crafting [Space-
Based Radar] requirements, assessing architectures, accomplishing
[Analyses of Alternatives], and defining the concept of operations.''
The proposed fiscal year 2003 budget for the Space-Based Radar is about
$100 million, four times the fiscal year 2002 level. Why was 2008
picked as the goal for a Block I Space-Based Radar and what are the key
requirements a Block I system must fulfill; and why do you need $100
million, quite a substantial sum, just to complete studies and analyses
on the proposed system?
Secretary Teets. The current SBR funding profile in the fiscal year
2003 President's budget request represents a focused risk-reduction
approach to fielding an operational SBR as recommended in the SBR
report to Congress (signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense on 22
February 2002). The program emphasizes risk reduction and initiates the
Concept Definition phase. The efforts entail manufacturing non-flight
prototype hardware and software by contractors skilled in space system
integration to confirm system performance. This moves beyond studies
and analyses of the proposed system. The earliest opportunity for
Initial Launch Capability (ILC) provides a SBR program focused on a
Ground Moving Target Indication (GMTI) capability with inherent
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Digital Terrain Elevation Data
(DTED) functionality. The key requirements a ``Block I'' system must
fulfill are being defined under the current requirements effort. We
will use the Operational System Acquisition approach to implement
spiral development. The capability to be launched at ILC will provide
some operational utility, but exactly what will be provided against
which requirements is still in work. Since the warfighter needs these
capabilities as soon as they can be made available, launch dates will
be determined by technology maturity, technical risk, and available
funding. We will shape the requirements and initial operational
capability so the warfighter has some useful operational capability.
This block will reflect the results and insights gained from the
requirements, architecture, and AOAs work and initial technology
investments. We anticipate an ongoing system requirements process that
will further refine SBR requirements as well as flow-down system-of-
systems requirements. These requirements will be evaluated and
considered for inclusion in the first block SBR or deferred to a second
block SBR system.

NPOESS AWARD FEE OF 20 PERCENT

12. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, I understand that the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
weather satellite program office plans on providing an award fee of up
to 20 percent to the program's contractor. I further understand that
this award fee is significantly higher than the minimum award fees
typically given to defense space programs, which range up to 15 percent
at the highest. The total program is over $6 billion. If a 20 percent
award fee were applied to the whole program, it would cost taxpayers
over $1 billion. Is the NPOESS maximum award fee to be 20 percent, and
if so, why is it so much higher than that of other major defense space
contracts?
Secretary Teets. The acquisition strategy includes a maximum fee of
20 percent. However, the 20 percent fee does not apply to the whole $6
billion program, but only to portions of the System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) and production phases. It does not apply to
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) after Initial Operational Capability
(IOC), to the launch services, to the government program office costs,
or to any of the nearly $1 billion of development in the Program
Definition Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase. In addition, not all the fee is
an ``award fee.'' The fee structure is intended to incentivize critical
elements of the program to assure success. Significant portions of the
fee are specifically tied to key events that demonstrate the system's
performance.
Fee breakdown:

Development (Cost Plus Award Fee): 2 percent base fee,
13 percent award fee, and 5 percent mission success fee
Production (Fixed Price Incentive Fee/Award Fee): 10
percent target profit, 5 percent award fee, and 5 percent
mission success fee

Furthermore, all of the fee is held at risk until the satisfactory
performance of the system over a specified number of years. Therefore,
in the event the system does not meet all the requirements (including
satellite on-orbit longevity), the government will receive some or all
of the fee back from the contractor.
The 20 percent level was judged appropriate for the level of risk
the contractor is going to undertake. The November 2000 Defense Science
Board (DSB) study found that historic fees are insufficient to make
defense work profitable and are contributing directly to the decline of
the high technology industrial base. The 20 percent maximum fee
provides a commercially competitive rate of return for the system
contractor who will deliver the complete NPOESS. The complete system
includes the ground data processing system; all the software; the
complete command, control, and data relay system; satellite coverage in
three orbits; the satellites; all the sensors; and operation of the
satellites (including the NPOESS Preparatory Project) through IOC.
The maximum 20 percent fee is one of the innovative tools the
NPOESS program is using to ensure the developed system is capable and
reliable. The benefit of more reliable and longer-lasting satellites is
considerably more than the marginal cost of the higher fee.

13. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, who made the NPOESS award fee
decision?
Secretary Teets. The level of fee is part of the NPOESS Acquisition
Strategy, which has been fully coordinated through the Air Force
Headquarters Staff, OSD, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and approved by me.

ADVANCED EHF PROGRAM STATUS

14. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, late last year press reports
indicated that the Advanced EHF satellite program, which is the follow-
on to the MILSTAR system, was running as much as $1 billion over
budget, partly because of increased performance demands being made by
the Pentagon. You are asking for almost $1 billion for this program in
fiscal year 2003. What is the current status of this program, what
program activities are you planning to fund in fiscal year 2003, and
are the requirements for the program now stable or are they still being
debated?
Secretary Teets. The AEHF program awarded the System Development
and Demonstration (SD&D) letter contract in November 2001 and is
currently in negotiations for contract definitization which should be
completed by July 2002. The issues involving increased performance
demands against an acceptable funding level have been resolved. The
program is currently in the midst of preliminary design reviews. Of the
$825.8 million requested in fiscal year 2003 for AEHF, $777.4 million
is planned for the SD&D effort with the primary contractor, $19.4
million for cryptographic development, $25.5 million for technical and
program office support, and $3.5 million for the Joint Terminal
Engineering Office efforts. Over half of the $777.4 million SD&D effort
is planned for work associated with the EHF payload (e.g., antenna
subsystem, RF subsystem, and crosslink subsystem design) with remaining
funds identified for efforts involving the mission control system,
spacecraft bus, and overall systems engineering.

SBIRS-HIGH

15. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the High Component of the Space-
based Infrared System, or SBIRS-High program, is being designed as a
more-capable replacement for our current system of early-warning
satellites, to provide notice of a missile launch against us. It was
recently revealed that the program is over cost by more than $2
billion, and will incur a schedule slip of 18 to 24 months. Equally
disturbing is the fact that, as I understand it, this large cost and
schedule growth was not anticipated by the Air Force--it came as a very
unwelcome surprise. I also understand that because of these problems,
the Department may decide to terminate it, after spending well over $1
billion on it. What were the technical reasons that caused the problem
and were there underlying management failures which contributed to the
problem?
Secretary Teets. A 2-year delay in development and fielding of the
Increment 1 ground system impacted the System Program Office's (SPO's)
ability to focus on later phases of development. Recovery from the
initial failure and achieving Increment 1 Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) became an imperative for SPO and Lockheed Martin
management focus.
Likewise, the need to redesign the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)
spacecraft to maintain Operational Requirements Document (ORD) key
performance parameters also had a significant impact on cost control.
This solar-flyer redesign activity resulted in a 6-month slip to the
spacecraft and payload critical design reviews last year and drove
additional ground processing functionality to a much greater extent
than originally anticipated.
At Secretary of the Air Force direction, and in concert with
Lockheed Martin, an IRT was formed in November 2001 to review the
program and diagnose the root causes and contributing factors of the
significant cost growth. Three root causes were identified, as follows:

The program was too immature to enter the detailed
System Design and Development phase. In general, faulty and
overly optimistic assumptions laid the groundwork for SBIRS-
High program activation in 1996. These included: extensive
software reuse; high software productivity levels; commercial
practice benefits; economic order efficiencies with satellite
lot buys; availability of technical models; mature
understanding of requirements, Concept of Operations (CONOPS),
and interface specifications; and management stability.
The system requirements and their flow-down into
engineering solutions were not well understood. The systems
integration effort on the SBIRS-High program was significantly
underscoped, both in terms of complexity and the associated
impacts. In effect, the requirement refinement process was ``ad
hoc,'' created uncertainty on the status of program priorities,
and impacted cost and schedule.
A significant breakdown in execution management
occurred, within both the government and the contractor teams.
The optimistic assumptions that were not borne out, and the
flux in the program requirements, as well as the 2-year delay
to the program in fiscal year 1999 due to other higher budget
priorities, eventually overwhelmed the management of the
program. Under pressure, the process discipline failed and the
processes in place failed.

16. Senator Reed. General Eberhart, how important is the SBIRS-High
program, and what requirements will it fulfill?
General Eberhart. SBIRS-High is critical to our Nation's ability to
detect emerging strategic and theater ballistic missile threats. It
will replace the 30-year-old Defense Support Program and will support
warfighters' requirements of missile warning, missile defense,
technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization.

17. Senator Reed. General Eberhart, would a evolutionary approach
to meeting the requirements be acceptable, and if so, should the
current Operational Requirements Document for the system be revisited?
General Eberhart. We believe an evolutionary acquisition approach
for SBIRS is acceptable. The Operational Requirements Document was
revalidated in January 2002 and accurately reflects the requirements
for SBIRS-High.

SBIRS-HIGH FUNDING

18. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the SBIRS-High satellite program
has recently experienced significant cost growth, schedule slippage,
and concerns over program management. I understand the Department is
still considering whether or not to proceed with this program at all,
or to cancel it and begin a replacement program. Why then does the
proposed budget include over $800 million for this program, almost
double last year's funding level, and how can you be sure such a
troubled program will effectively execute such a large increase in
funding?
Secretary Teets. The SBIRS-High program was certified by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) on 2 May
2002, as required by the Nunn-McCurdy Act to continue the program. The
certification affirms that the program is essential to national
security, that there are no alternatives to the program that provide
equal or greater military capability at less cost, that the cost
estimates are reasonable, and that the management structures are in
place to manage the program and control costs. There is particularly
strong consensus among our most senior military leaders that the SBIRS-
High program is essential to national security based on the advanced
capabilities it provides for Missile Warning, Missile Defense,
Technical Intelligence, and Battlespace Characterization.
The fiscal year 2002 approved program will be increased to $526.9
million upon congressional approval of the $88.3 million above
threshold reprogramming (ATR) request has been delivered to Congress.
The fiscal year 2003 increase will then be $288 million over adjusted
fiscal year 2002 program funding. The basis for the funding requested
in fiscal year 2003 is as follows:
$814.9 million--Total fiscal year 2003 RDT&E budget request, broken
out as follows:
$749.2 million--Continue Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) contract for Space and Ground segment development (includes
Government Furnished Equipment; Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)
development; GEO 1&2 integration, assembly and test; Highly Elliptical
Orbit (HEO) 1 development/delivery; HEO 2 integration, assembly, and
test; Ground System development; System Engineering and Program
Management, Increment 1 Pre-operations support)
$39.9 million--Host program office support (includes payload to
spacecraft integration, common satellite bus services, communication
links)
$6.2 million--Continue Air Force System Program Office support
$19.6 million--Continue technical analysis and independent
verification and validation of contractor by federally Funded Research
and Development Contractor (FFRDC)
The fiscal year 2003 budget request supports delivery of the
following SBIRS capabilities:

Interim Mission Control Station Backup Oct. 2002
(IMCSB) Certification.
HEO 1 Payload Delivery.................. Jan. 2003
HEO Launch & Early on Orbit Test Capable Sept. 2003
Integrated Training Suite Initial Oct. 2003
Operational Capability.

In addition to specific deliveries, development work on the GEO
payload, spacecraft and ground software, HEO payload integration and
system compatibility tests, payload factory support capabilities, and
software sustainment activities will continue in fiscal year 2003 to
support subsequent years critical program milestones.
The Air Force has restructured SBIRS-High to make it executable. We
have established a realistic baseline; to ensure we effectively execute
that baseline, we have implemented management changes based on senior
Air Force, DOD, and Independent Review Team findings. Key changes are
outlined below:
A tiered management oversight structure has been established to
focus senior Air Force and corporate leadership review on program
progress and resolution of critical program issues. The objectives of
these reviews are to assure management effectiveness; cost, schedule,
and technical performance; and rapid program decision-making. The
reviews include quarterly Chief Executive Officers (CEO) meetings,
bimonthly President's meetings, and monthly Executive Committee
meetings. Specific membership on the boards varies, but always includes
senior leadership from the acquisition and operational communities, as
well as industry.
The Program Executive Officer for Space and I review aspects of the
program even more frequently. Significant changes in program management
philosophy and structure have been implemented to improve program
performance. The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
contract was awarded in 1996 with a total system performance
responsibility (TSPR) clause. However, the TSPR concept has not
achieved the desired result. Consequently, the clause has been removed
from the contract. The program office will play a proactive role in the
day-to-day management of program activities and acknowledges
responsibility for system performance, cost, and schedule management.
The program office will resume leadership of functions that had been
relinquished to the contractor under TSPR. The SBIRS management
philosophy is predicated on integrated government/contractor teams
functioning under a unified systems engineering approach. The
integrated master plan (IMP) has been restructured to provide cross-IPT
emphasis. Contract management oversight and contractor incentives will
be tied to major milestone accomplishments through the Award Fee Plan.
Greatly increased government oversight and involvement should preclude
further precipitous cost increases.
The System Program Office (SPO) established a Program Management
Board to control content changes and disposition any future cost
variances. Should issues arise, alternatives will be fully assessed to
address cost offsets with joint contractor, user, and SPO
participation. Additionally, new requirements will be controlled to
avoid cost growth without associated budget. The contractor has also
established a weekly Systems Engineering Review Board that addresses
program issues and coordinates interfaces and interdependencies across
IPTs to reduce potential surprises or minimize their impact.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

DETERRING ROGUE STATES

19. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, is STRATCOM confident that it
understands how to deter rogue states? What steps are being taken to
better understand how rogue states are deterred?
Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command recognizes deterring rogue
states is clearly different than deterring the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. As articulated in the NPR Report to Congress, terrorists and
rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction are likely to test
America's security commitments to its allies and friends, and a broader
array of capabilities will be needed to deter these actors from
undertaking the political, military, or technical actions that would
threaten U.S. and allied interests. Currently, we are examining the
policies and capabilities required to deter rogue states. Specifically,
my Strategic Advisory Group is studying the policy and intelligence
perspectives of rogue state deterrence, and will report back to me over
the next 6 months. Also, we are working closely with the national
intelligence community to best posture and plan for the expanding
deterrence mission.

MISSILE DEFENSE

20. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, how will STRATCOM integrate
missile defense into its planning processes?
Admiral Ellis. Many variables associated with missile defense
remain undefined at this early stage, and it is difficult to foresee
with any degree of certainty the final impact missile defenses will
have on offensive planning. However, one aspect is absolutely clear;
offensive and defensive operations must be fully integrated to support
timely and effective national-level decision making. In addition, the
U.S. will conduct continuous assessments of its new strategic
capabilities, to include the fielding of missile defense systems, as it
sizes its offensive strategic forces.

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

21. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, there has been substantial press
coverage in recent days of the NPR that has suggested that the U.S. now
targets a number of nations with its nuclear weapons, that U.S. nuclear
weapons use is somehow more likely because they will now be used to
deter the use of chemical and biological weapons, and that the NPR
calls for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Has STRATCOM engaged in contingency planning against a range of targets
in the past, and was it the policy of the Clinton administration to
deter rogue states from using chemical and biological weapons with the
threat of nuclear retaliation?
Admiral Ellis. There is no change in the U.S. deterrent strategy
with respect to rogue states and their weapons of mass destruction. As
was the case in the previous administration, the President retains all
appropriate options to protect the American people and our friends and
allies. For example, in his final report to Congress in January 2000,
then-Secretary of Defense Cohen declared we must ``maintain nuclear
forces sufficient to deter any potential adversary from using or
threatening to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against the
United States or its allies.'' Also, in 1996 then-Secretary of Defense
Perry stated, ``. . . we continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent . . .
absolutely devastating in its destructive power. Anyone who considered
using a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or its
allies must first consider the consequences.''

22. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the NPR recommends that the
offensive leg of the new triad include both nuclear forces and advanced
conventional munitions to provide options over a broader range of
contingencies. To what extent will STRATCOM be engaged in planning and
executing conventional force options and is STRATCOM interested in the
development of advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems,
potentially including conventional payloads for missiles?
Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command currently has a small, but
growing role in supporting regional combatant commanders with
conventional weapons planning. We expect this role to expand
substantially in the future, and will pursue those capabilities, to
include advanced conventional forces, which provide global reach, rapid
response, and strategic effects.

23. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the NPR seeks to provide
improved flexibility and a broader range of options to deal with
unexpected contingencies. This in turn will require better
intelligence, planning capabilities, and command and control. How long
is STRATCOM's current planning cycle, what is STRATCOM's goal, and what
are the key programmatic elements of an improved planning capability
and are they fully funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget and throughout
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command's current adaptive planning
cycle timelines are dependent on the size and scope of the task. The
shortest reaction time is possible when an existing option can be
modified to strike targets already in the command's target data base.
This process would be measured in hours for one ICBM/SLBM, or one
bomber delivered weapon. If a new option is required and the targets
are not in the intelligence community's worldwide data base, the
development time is increased substantially. U.S. Strategic Command's
goal is to provide effective adaptive nuclear planning and surety in
the minimum possible time. Modeling and simulation indicate the
command's future planning timelines can be reduced up to 75 percent
with enhanced system integration, optimization, and process
reengineering. Although these initiatives are not funded in fiscal year
2003, the fiscal year 2004-2009 POM initiative submitted to the Air
Force will incrementally deliver improved capabilities. If fully
funded, an improved planning process integrating military capabilities
across the entire conflict spectrum is forecast to achieve Full
Operational Capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2010.

24. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, what are the key programmatic
elements of an improved command and control system and are they fully
funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget and throughout the FYDP?
Admiral Ellis. World-wide survivable communication capability for
strategic forces and nuclear command and control system (NCCS) elements
is dependent on a seamless transition from the current MILSTAR
satellite communications constellation to the follow-on Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) constellation. The fiscal year 2003
budget supports this transition and funds a transformation
communications study to examine alternative architectures that meet
strategic and tactical needs. A critical component of this architecture
is the development and fielding of AEHF terminals on all NCCS elements
before the existing MILSTAR constellation degrades. In addition, the
recent, significant funding improvements in E-4B National Airborne
Operations Center (NAOC) and E-6B Airborne Command Post long-term
modernization and sustainment programs will ensure these vital airborne
command and control platforms can support national-level decision
making and force direction in future crises. U.S. Strategic Command's
Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC) is funded in the fiscal year
2003 budget but has significant shortfalls across the FYDP. The
Department is conducting a review of the overall MCCC program.
Additionally, I am working with the Services on modernization of the
equipment used for secure encrypted communications with not only our
strategic forces but also the entire military. This equipment will
require replacement beginning in fiscal year 2005, but remains unfunded
in the FYDP.

25. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the NPR indicates that DOD will
conduct regular reviews of the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces and
assessments of the viability of the NPR-recommended nuclear force
reductions. Will the criteria STRATCOM uses to reassess the sufficiency
of nuclear force levels recommended by the NPR include the health and
capabilities of the other legs of the new triad?
Admiral Ellis. Future assessments of the adequacy of U.S. nuclear
forces will be conducted using several complementary criteria. Among
them will be the global security environment, the emerging capabilities
of nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces, our progress in developing
active and passive defenses, and the health of our research and
development efforts and industrial infrastructure.

26. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis and General Blaisdell, the
Minuteman III will be modernized in a number of efforts that are
currently planned to proceed more or less in unison to maximize
efficiency, minimize cost, maximize security, and minimize disruption
to forces in the field. Delays or complications in any of these
programs could impact cost and schedule for the other efforts. Are
STRATCOM and the Air Force confident that multiple, simultaneous
upgrades to the Minuteman is a prudent, low risk approach to preserving
ICBM capability?
Admiral Ellis. Minuteman III modernization programs are
synchronized to field upgrades in a series of just-in-time deployments.
A prime example is the synchronization of the guidance replacement
program (GRP) and the propulsion replacement program (PRP). The PRP
booster requires a GRP guidance set, and as a result, the stability of
GRP is key to maintaining on-time deployments of PRP boosters. As you
stated, the primary risk to the overall Minuteman III program is a
change to one of the interlocked, supporting programs. The Air Force
aggressively worked the technical issues that have occurred during
design, test, and deployment, and I am confident, if individual program
stability and funding levels are maintained, the approach to Minuteman
III modernization is appropriate.
General Blaisdell. The Air Force regards the Minuteman III
modernization approach as overall low risk. The primary risk associated
with our interdependent system upgrades is largely based on maintaining
required funding to support projected delivery schedules to the field.
This risk has been successfully mitigated through consistent support by
U.S. Strategic Command, OSD, Congress, and the Air Force. In addition,
any potential risk that may arise due to the interdependence of
programs (for example, the propulsion replacement and guidance
replacement programs) is mitigated by careful synchronization and
planning by our logistics, maintenance, and security force
professionals. The plan minimizes maintenance and security forces
deployments by maximizing delivery and install trips to the field.

27. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis and General Blaisdell, are
STRATCOM and the Air Force confident that the operational availability
of the Minuteman force throughout this process can be sustained at
acceptable levels and will these levels vary significantly from the
availability levels achieved historically?
Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command actively monitors and
coordinates with the Services on force modernization, and we are
confident Minuteman III operational availability will be sustained at
acceptable levels, similar to those sustained historically. Air Force
Space Command is committed to providing the required number of
strategic alert ICBMs, and the ongoing modernization processes will be
accomplished within those current and future ICBM alert commitments.
Historically, modernization processes have not significantly interfered
with Minuteman alert rates.
General Blaisdell. The Air Force coordinates very closely with U.S.
Strategic Command to ensure the historically high ICBM alert rate of
approximately 99.6 percent continues to provide the warfighter with the
most effective and reliable weapon system in our nuclear inventory. Due
to the carefully planned integration and synchronization of the
Minuteman III modernization programs, the Air Force is committed to
ensuring operational availability will remain at consistently high
levels throughout force modernization.

BOMBER ROADMAP

28. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the Air Force bomber roadmap
indicates that the current nuclear capable bomber force will remain in
place, with no additional procurement, through about 2040. At that
time, the average age of the B-52 fleet would be about nearly 80 years
and the B-2 fleet would be about 45 years. Are you satisfied with this
roadmap?
Admiral Ellis. I fully support the Air Forces' bomber roadmap, to
include full funding and timely fielding of various B-2 and B-52
modernization and sustainment programs and the goal of starting a new
bomber acquisition program not later than the 2012-2015 timeframe.
However, we will need to monitor the impacts of unforeseen aging
problems with the airframes themselves as we continue to use these
venerable aircraft in the war on terrorism. I support the Air Force's
ongoing comprehensive review of the bomber roadmap and look forward to
reviewing the results.

29. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, do you believe that the
modernization plans for the bomber force are adequate, given STRATCOM's
requirements?
Admiral Ellis. I fully support current Air Force bomber
modernization plans and believe the program is structured to meet
current and future U.S. Strategic Command requirements. Of particular
interest is full funding and timely fielding of survivable
communications upgrades in the B-2 and B-52. In addition, ongoing and
planned avionics upgrades and situational awareness and electronic
countermeasures improvement programs are essential to ensure the
effectiveness of the bomber force for the next four decades.

ADVANCED EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY

30. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, the committee has been
informed that U.S. allies who were contributing to the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program have not provided expected
fiscal year 2002 funds because of their concerns that the new
transformational communications satellite strategy may result in a
smaller AEHF constellation that will not meet their needs. Will you be
taking steps to assure our allies involved in this program that the
AEHF program will remain responsive to their needs?
Secretary Teets. The AEHF International Partners (IPs) did voice
concerns over resource assurance. To alleviate this concern, ASD/C\3\I
has prepared a letter to assure the IP's access to all space segment
resources. The letters to Canada and the United Kingdom have been sent,
and the letter to the Netherlands is in final DOD coordination.

31. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, is the AEHF program
technically sound and are you satisfied with the industry management
structure?
Secretary Teets. The AEHF program is quite challenging but appears
technically sound. I am satisfied with the industry management
structure.

EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

32. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Eberhart, the Air
Force decision to support two competitive EELV launch vendors was based
in part on projections of a robust commercial launch market. These
projections have been overly optimistic as a result of the failure of a
number of commercial low earth orbit communications satellite programs.
Are you concerned that the decline in the commercial launch market will
undermine the viability of the two EELV launch vendors?
Secretary Teets. Yes. However, maintaining two viable launch
service providers is essential if we are to have assured access to
space for our critical national security space sensors. Competition
produces savings and flexibility in addition to more reliable access to
space for our nationally critical payloads. The EELV program is a
partnership with industry in which the Government shares in both the
significant savings and the potential risks. Due to the downturn in the
commercial market, it is reasonable to expect the overall cost to
provide assured access to space may increase.
General Eberhart. Yes, we are concerned and will continue to assess
the situation to do what is right for our national security and the
vendors involved.

SPACE-BASED RADAR

33. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Eberhart, what
factors give you confidence that technology and cost challenges can be
met successfully to achieve the 2010 time frame for first launch of a
SBR satellite?
Secretary Teets. First, since 1992 over $500 million has been spent
by the Air Force, the NRO, and other agencies to assess Space-Based
Radar utility and develop enabling technologies. The Discoverer II
program, in particular, accomplished significant technology risk
reduction and worked detailed system engineering solutions for the now-
canceled two-satellite demonstration. Second, there are many other
operational or research programs ongoing with technology that directly
translate to a future Space-Based Radar. Some examples include both
airborne and space-based data dissemination and exploitation technology
work by Air Force labs, FFRDCs, the NRO, and others. Third, OSD led an
in-depth study over 7 months including services, the intelligence
community, and other agencies resulting in the Deputy Secretary of
Defense-signed SBR Roadmap (22 Feb 02). In the roadmap process, the
team carefully assessed the current technology readiness levels versus
where we need to be to deploy SBR, and developed plans to ensure we do
everything needed to properly mature the technology. In addition, the
NRO has continued work on radar payload technology since Discoverer II
cancellation, and we've seen some excellent and promising results not
only with the potential radar payload performance, but also in areas of
affordability and producibility. Over time we've also continued to use
independent teams to check our work and ensure we're doing everything
possible to maximize future SBR program success.
General Eberhart. Our confidence is based on the promising results
of technology investment in prototype radar payloads and the DOD's
experience with past programs such as Discoverer II. Preliminary data
supports the performance and cost estimates that have been developed
for SBR.

34. Senator Allard. General Eberhart, what progress has been made
in integrating SBR into a coherent architecture including national
assets and airborne platforms?
General Eberhart. At the present time, we are working with key
stakeholders in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community to develop a Concept of Operations to fulfill warfighter
requirements. In addition, we have broadened the scope of traditional
pre-acquisition activities to plan for an integrated system of systems
solution that effectively incorporates existing and future airborne
collection platforms, as well as national assets.

SPACE SURVEILLANCE

35. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, space surveillance is a key
element of space control, and space control is taking on increasing
significance as U.S. reliance on space increases over time. An August
2000 study of the space surveillance system found that current space
surveillance is not adequate to meet military needs, and that the
system today is a collection of dedicated, contributing, and collateral
components that are not adequately integrated as a coherent
architecture. Are you satisfied with current space surveillance
capabilities? What improvements to current capabilities would you
prioritize?
Secretary Teets. Today's space surveillance capabilities do not
meet national requirements and need to be improved. We cannot at this
time fully support the other space control missions of offensive
counterspace (OCS) and defensive counterspace (DCS), nor can we fully
support other customers who rely on space surveillance data for their
own space operations (i.e., NASA).
We are working to transform space surveillance operations to
broaden space situational awareness (SSA) operations. SSA not only
includes traditional space surveillance, but also space reconnaissance,
space intelligence, and space weather functions.
The first and most important need is to prevent an upcoming gap in
space-based space surveillance. Currently, the Mid-course Space
Experiment/Space-Based Visible sensor (MSX/SBV) is expected to end life
in 2005. The follow-on to this system, the Space-Based Space
Surveillance (SBSS) System, is not scheduled for Initial Operational
Capability until 2010--resulting in a 5-year gap which will degrade
current SSA capabilities and result in the loss of crucial operational
experience in space-based operations. We are working hard to accelerate
SBSS.
Other necessary improvements include the sustainment of critical
elements of the current Space Surveillance Network (SSN), particularly
some of our ground-based radars that provide very precise observations.
Many of these assets are over 30 years old and need to be modernized.
The development and integration of improved Space Control C\2\ and data
fusion of information (like space intelligence) into SSA is also a
critical need.

36. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Eberhart, is the
National Security Space Architect examining future space surveillance
architectures?
Secretary Teets. The National Security Space Architect (NSSA)
examined the future needs of space surveillance as part of a 1997 Space
Control Architecture study. This effort eventually led to the August
2000 Space Surveillance Task Force study report cited in Question #35.
The NSSA also began an effort in 2001 to develop a top-level
operational architecture specifically for Space Situational Awareness
(SSA), which will include space surveillance. In addition to this work,
the Space Situational Awareness Integration Office (SSAIO) was
established in 2001 as the executing office for the Air Force, the lead
service system integrator for SSA as directed by ASD(C\3\I). The SSAIO
has developed a detailed methodology on how to evaluate future space
surveillance system architectures and is preparing to conduct
evaluations of mid-term capabilities.
General Eberhart. Yes, the NSSA is conducting a study of SSA to be
completed later this year. This study will define an architecture that
leverages all space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and
intelligence activities to provide an SSA common operating picture.

SBIRS-LOW

37. Senator Allard. General Eberhart, do you believe that SBIRS-Low
could contribute to the space surveillance mission? If so, how?
General Eberhart. Yes, we believe SBIRS-Low will be a contributing
sensor to the Space Surveillance Network. Specifically, it will collect
infrared and visible signature data to identify, track, and monitor
space objects.

SATELLITE CONTROL NETWORK

38. Senator Allard. General Eberhart, commercial antennas could
potentially be used to supplement (or even potentially replace some)
Air Force owned and operated equipment. Limited demonstrations of
commercial antennas have been done and have demonstrated the
feasibility of the concept. Further demonstrations have not been
funded. Are you concerned about the obsolescence of the satellite
control network and do you believe that commercial antennas could
supplement Air Force capabilities in this area?
General Eberhart. Yes, we are concerned about the aging Air Force
Satellite Control Network. However, we have implemented a long-term
improvement and modernization program that includes commercial off-the-
shelf technology. This program will expand the network's operational
capabilities and high level of performance well into the 21st century.
In addition, commercial networks do not meet our critical
operational requirements, such as timing, accuracy, and high-power
commanding. Recent demonstrations of commercial antennas were not as
promising as we hoped.

INTEGRATION OF BLACK AND WHITE SPACE

39. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, the Space Commission
recommended that NRO and Air Force space programs be appropriately
aligned. Part of this recommendation included the designation of Under
Secretary of the Air Force as the Air Force space acquisition executive
as well as the director of the NRO. That has happened. But, the most
recent organization chart shows Under Secretary Teets at the top of an
NRO (black space) structure and an Air Force (white space) structure,
with an integration office in between them--something that looks like a
stovepipe connecting two stovepipes. Would you describe in more detail
how you intend to achieve this integration and how the organization you
have established will support that integration?
Secretary Teets. The Space Commission report indicated that the
integration of military space efforts and the NRO was a desired goal,
but that it was a far-term goal and should only happen after certain
changes had occurred within the Air Force--namely the establishment of
a ``cradle-to-grave'' construct and the creation of a ``space
professional cadre.'' In the meantime, the NRO will need to do the work
that they do, and the Air Force will need to do the space-related
efforts they are responsible for. That being said, I have organized my
top level staff to move forward and directly facilitate what I believe
was the intent of the Space Commission in terms of integrating
``black'' and ``white'' space. With the combining of both the Director
of the NRO and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, there is now one
person with the clear authority to make the space programmatic
decisions across Air Force and NRO space programs. The role of the
office you mentioned, NSSI, as well as my two deputies is to work
across existing organizations of the Air Force and the NRO such that,
while there are multiple decision execution or implementation arms
(i.e., the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center and the NRO's
Directorates) at the top, we can function as a single coordinated
National Security Space entity.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith

SPACE CONTROL

40. Senator Smith. Secretary Teets, according to General Eberhart,
space control, the ability to protect one's own space assets while
denying an adversaries use of in-orbit resources, is ``still at idle.
It's time to move that up.'' Our reliance on space is unquestioned and
fully understood by the world. General Franks in his February 7
statement in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee said the use
of unmanned aerial vehicles, precision guided munitions, and C\4\ISR)
systems proved to be ``very effective'' in the prosecution of what he
considered to be ``the most accurate war in the history of the United
States.'' All of these assets rely on space systems, such as global
positioning satellites and the satellite communications network, to
operate and function. Without them, we would have had a much rougher
time prosecuting the war, and undoubtedly more lives would have been
lost. Our dependence on space is not limited to defense purposes,
however. Our economy is increasingly dependent on space. Our enemies
understand this, and it is only a matter of time before an adversary
figures out how to deny us the use of these systems, such as a pop-up
nuclear or large conventional explosion in space. Our defenses against
this are limited at best, and more focus is needed. What is being done
to ensure not only that we have the assets to ensure our
vulnerabilities are minimized, but also to ensure we have an overt
deterrent to others trying to develop such systems?
Secretary Teets. Measures being taken to defend against attack of
U.S. space systems are in two space control submission areas: defensive
counterspace (DCS) and space situational awareness (SSA). Planned
developments will provide satellite operators, users, and decision-
makers the information to respond to unintentional interference or
deliberate attack against U.S. space systems. We are now developing the
rapid attack identification and reporting system (RAIDRS), integrated
DCS capabilities addressing threat detection, identification, location/
classification, and attack reporting. RAIDRS will initially consist of
distributed terrestrial elements, future satellite-hosted sensors,
centralized data fusion and analysis, and communications
infrastructure.
RAIDRS will work in concert with SSA assets to allow us to timely
detect space events and respond defensively. Expanded SSA capabilities
will include migration of space surveillance to space basing,
inspection of space-based objects, and more responsive interfaces to
the national intelligence community to locate and characterize
terrestrial threats. The combination of enhanced SSA and focused threat
detection and warning through RAIDRS will enable satellite developers
and operators to effectively employ a full range of defensive measures
in response to interference or attack on our systems. These defensive
measures include, but are not limited to, maneuver to avoid threats,
anti-jam capabilities, satellite hardening, sensor filters, redundant
communications, and electronic warfare defenses.
We are exploring the feasibility of requiring satellite buyers to
include attack detection capabilities at their ground sites and host
sensors on board satellites that support critical missions. In
addition, we are evaluating the utility of fielding escort satellites
capable of detecting threats and actively defending our space assets.
While terrestrial-based interference or attack on our satellites can be
accomplished with modest capabilities, attacking our space assets from
space is a very expensive and high technology capability, requiring
significant resources by any adversary. Developing comprehensive
defensive capabilities will deter nations from committing high value
resources to an attack that would have a low probability of succeeding.

SPACE FORCE APPLICATION

41. Senator Smith. Secretary Teets, to date, space has been
relegated to a support role. The ``weapons in space'' issue has
paralyzed the country and prevented it from moving out on systems which
would protect the American people. A key component of boost-phase
defense is the space based laser, which was on course for a 2012
demonstration. Recently the Department cut the program's budget from
$200-$300 million per year to $50 million per year, effectively killing
the program. The program was cut in fiscal year 2002 ($170 million to
$50 million) as a bill payer for other issues. There has been no overt
congressional opposition to the program. Why didn't the administration
defend the program and restore it to its previous levels in the
President's budget?
Secretary Teets. The Space-Based Laser program is run by General
Kadish at the Missile Defense Agency and I would ask that any
programmatic questions be presented to him.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

42. Senator Smith. Secretary Teets, the cost of entry for companies
into the space arena is very high, and the current companies seem to
not be finished yet with consolidation. There are several new companies
and with fewer and larger programs it is difficult for a smaller
company to compete for the larger programs. Are you concerned that the
large companies will starve innovation (which will ultimately have an
adverse impact on the industry attracting new college graduates) in
favor of maximizing the ``bottom line''?
Secretary Teets. Space industrial base issues are always a concern.
Space systems are expensive and the risks and consequences of failure
are substantial. The government must work to mitigate risks, control
our costs, and meet operational needs. It can often be a fine line
between prudent risk mitigation and the elimination of innovation. I
think the real area that is ripe for small and/or new companies with
innovative ideas for space-related applications is space science and
technology. In fact, the small business innovation research program is
intended to cultivate such companies. Secretary Rumsfeld has, in his
fiscal guidance to the Department and in his 18 October 2001 memo
regarding Space Commission implementation, made it clear that space-
focused science and technology is a high priority area for this Nation.
Opportunities and avenues for truly promising ideas are there.

NORTHERN COMMAND

43. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, I understand that DOD is
reorganizing the joint warfighting commands to add the new ``Northern
Command'' for homeland defense. I understand that the Unified Command
Plan and the details of the reorganization are not out yet; however,
can you give me any insight into how roles and responsibilities will
change among U.S. Space Command, NORAD, and Strategic Command and how
are we going to maintain our focus on the space and missile defense
missions in our shuffle to take on the important homeland security
mission?
General Eberhart. Unified Command Plan 2002 does not contain new
mission requirements or change the focus of NORAD, U.S. Space Command
or U.S. Strategic Command. It does establish a new unified command,
U.S. Northern Command, which will be responsible for U.S. homeland
defense and support to civil authorities.

GPS

44. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, with the increasing reliance
on GPS, both in terms of our military and in the civilian sector, it
seems we should be very clear in our minds where we are headed with
GPS-issues such as frequency protection, military versus civilian
control, signals, power, accuracy, international involvement, etc.
There doesn't seem to be a clear plan for the future of GPS and how it
will continue to support national security objectives while the
commercial use of the system expands. Are we working on one, and are we
making sure we focus on all elements of the system, both long- and
short-term?
General Eberhart. U.S. Space Command has worked with the Air Force
to ensure GPS will continue to meet the many needs of the military,
civilian, and commercial communities for the short- and long-term. For
example, to address immediate requirements, we are currently launching
two to three Block II-Replenishment satellites per year. Next year, we
will launch the first ``modernized'' replenishment satellite that will
feature new signals for civilian and military users.
In approximately 2009, we will introduce the new Block III GPS
satellite which will feature improved accuracy, new cross-link
commanding, and have an additional antenna to provide increased power.
We will also improve the ground control element of GPS constellation.

SBIRS-LOW

45. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, the SBIRS-Low has been plagued
with overruns and poor program management, both on the government and
the contractor sides. ``Requirements creep'' is always difficult on
space programs, and is a cause of the problems on SBIRS-Low. In
addition, the Department is mulling a potential shift in strategy on
SBIRS-Low which would combine the two currently competing prime
contractors into a single team. How will you ensure space requirements
are set and don't creep and will there be a ``Space Requirements
Oversight Council'' that will validate requirements?
General Eberhart. We will continue to use the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council to validate warfighter requirements for space-based
assets.

46. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, what are the prospects that a
``national team'' will be able to produce a better team than a winner
of the competition, and how are you going to ensure the government gets
a ``good deal'' from the resultant business/contractual arrangement?
General Eberhart. We defer to the Missile Defense Agency, since
they have the lead on SBIRS-Low acquisition.

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND THE
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE PROGRAM AND OTHER
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Inhofe, Allard,
and Sessions.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
minority counsel; and Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Thomas C. Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; John Gastright, assistant to Senator
Thurmond; and Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. The
Strategic Subcommittee meets today in two panels to discuss the
Department of Energy's Environmental Management (EM) program
and weapons activities at the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). The witness on the first panel is Ms.
Jessie Roberson, the Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management. Secretary Roberson, welcome.
The witnesses on the second panel will be Dr. Everet
Beckner, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and Mr.
Ralph Erickson, the Associate Administrator for Facilities and
Operations, both at the NNSA.
In the past, the Strategic Subcommittee has had the
opportunity to discuss EM programs and weapons activities in
two separate hearings. At the EM hearing, we would ususally
have the opportunity to hear from the major prime contractors
responsible for implementing the DOE cleanup programs.
In past hearings we have had the opportunity to hear from
the operating contractors at the NNSA weapons plants and the
directors of the three laboratories. Unfortunately, the
committee's schedule this year does not permit us to hear from
the contractor-operators and lab directors of these facilities
in person. Nevertheless, it is important that we hear from
these contractors as they are charged with implementing the
various programs that we will discuss today.
For that reason, I would like to extend to these
contractors the opportunity to provide testimony to be included
in the subcommittee's record of this hearing. Several NNSA
contractors have submitted testimony for the record already.
The testimony that we have will be included in the record. Any
testimony from any other NNSA or EM prime contractors will also
be included in the record provided such testimony is submitted
by 6:00 p.m. Monday.
[The information referred to follows:]

Prepared Statement by John C. Browne

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Strategic
Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit this report on the status of
national security programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los
Alamos is one of three multi-program scientific institutions supported
by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), and has been operated by the University of California since its
inception in 1943. Seventy percent of the work at Los Alamos supports
the NNSA mission. Eighty percent of our work is directly related to
national security. All of our work stems from our historic public
service and national security mission. We appreciate the support this
subcommittee has given us in carrying out our mission.
The new threats of the 21st century--worldwide terrorism and the
daunting possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction--cannot
be met by nuclear deterrence alone. With the formation of the Office of
Homeland Security and the issuance of the Nuclear Posture Review and
the Quadrennial Defense Review, our country is developing new national
security policy directions for the 21st century that will require a
broad array of scientific and technological innovations in the coming
decades. The NNSA weapons laboratories will provide the Nation with
many of the needed science and technology capabilities that will
support our Nation's needs in nuclear deterrence, conventional defense
and homeland security.
Our stockpile stewardship mission is directly linked to the urgent
national security priorities of our country. We are aligned with the
new nuclear strategy set forth in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
which outlines a deterrence strategy based on a new triad of non-
nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, a strong defense capability,
and a responsive defense infrastructure. The active support of the new
triad by healthy and responsive national laboratories, as well as the
DOD, will be key to the success of this deterrence strategy. We are
committed to:

Ensuring the safety, reliability, and responsiveness
of the U.S. nuclear-weapon stockpile;
Reducing threats to U.S. and global security, with a
special focus on countering proliferation and possible
terrorist acquisition, threats, and use of weapons of mass
destruction; and,
Providing technical solutions to long-term national
security problems in infrastructure vulnerabilities, energy,
environment, and health.

We are as focused and committed today to our mission and purpose as
we were 60 years ago. The stockpile stewardship mission--maintaining
the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile without
nuclear testing--is one of the most difficult technical challenges this
Nation has ever attempted. As our nuclear weapons age beyond their
design lifetimes, Directed Stockpile Work--surveillance, assessment,
and response--will increase. Certification of nuclear weapons in an
environment without nuclear testing requires the best science in
modeling and simulation, dynamic material behavior, special nuclear
materials and explosives, and experimentation. Therefore, our weapons
activities must focus on ensuring a balanced and sustainable
stewardship--between direct stockpile work and the campaigns that
support the underlying science needed to certify stockpiled weapons and
to meet future nuclear weapon requirements--for this decade and beyond.
To meet the technical and operational challenges posed by our
demanding mission, last September I appointed a new nuclear-weapon
program management team and restructured the laboratory to be more
focused on execution and product delivery. There are several structural
changes in the NNSA being implemented in the field and site offices.
These changes should strengthen our partnership with the NNSA, at all
levels, which already has improved markedly under General Gordon's
tenure. The University of California (UC) has appointed a new vice
president for laboratory management and has increased its oversight and
involvement in improving laboratory performance and operations. We are
operating under a new 5 year contract between UC and DOE/NNSA that
requires us to perform against rigorous technical and operational
standards that will serve the Nation well.
We have made great progress during this past year. I will highlight
some major accomplishments in our Stockpile Stewardship Program, our
threat reduction program, and in our operations. I will also review key
issues and challenges with respect to our mission that face us in the
future--and to the science, the workforce and the infrastructure that
underpin that mission. In the attached addendum, key elements of our
nuclear weapon and threat reduction programs are addressed in greater
detail.

PROGRESS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: HIGHLIGHTS

I. Stockpile Stewardship Program
In 1995, we were tasked to conduct a stockpile stewardship effort
to sustain the enduring nuclear-weapon stockpile without nuclear
testing. Sustaining the nuclear deterrent under these conditions
continues to pose a grand challenge. It is my primary responsibility to
position the laboratory and provide the people and tools to ensure that
we are equal to this challenge. The requirements of stockpile
stewardship are technical, determined by the science of nuclear
weapons, by the processes of aging affecting both the workforce and the
weapons, and by required levels of confidence. It is essential that we
meet these requirements. I would like to highlight a few of our
achievements in meeting these requirements.
Annual Certification. For the sixth consecutive year, I have been
able to certify to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy that the five
Los Alamos designed weapons (the B61 family, W76, W78, W80, and W88) in
the U.S. nuclear stockpile remain safe and reliable and that a nuclear
test is not required at this time to resolve any of the issues that
exist for these weapons. Although I am concerned about a growing number
of issues identified by our ongoing surveillance activities, to date we
have been able to resolve most of the issues through assessments,
changes in operating conditions, or refurbishment plans. In the past
some of these issues would have required nuclear tests to resolve. The
challenge we face is to have certification tools and trained people
adequate to address these issues.
We have strengthened our certification approach each year since
beginning this process in 1996. In the past year, Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories reached agreement on an
approach for certification that utilizes similar methodologies while
maintaining independence for peer review purposes. In addition, we are
planning to phase in internal ``red teams'' or ``fresh-eye teams'' at
Los Alamos designed to look for the issues that might have been
overlooked by the responsible warhead design and refurbishment team.
Reports from both teams will be submitted to me for incorporation into
my annual assessment of the stockpile.
Pit Manufacturing and Certification. One of our highest priorities
at Los Alamos National Laboratory is to re-establish the Nation's
capability to manufacture plutonium pits, the heart of nuclear weapons.
The W88 has been selected as the crucial prototype for restoring the
Nation's nuclear manufacturing capability. Producing a pit for a
nuclear weapon involves two distinct but intertwined activities:
manufacturing and certification. Significant progress in this program
has been made in this last year. We are well along in establishing a
limited manufacturing capacity for pits. Eleven developmental units
have been produced to date. We are on schedule to deliver a certifiable
W88 pit, defined as one that meets all manufacturing requirements and
specifications, by April 2003.
Even though we will provide a key capability in a timely fashion,
the laboratory will not have sufficient capacity to meet envisioned
future pit production requirements. We support NNSA's pit production
strategy, which is based on an assessment of pit lifetime and numbers
of weapons projected in the stockpile, to reestablish industrial-scale
pit production in the longer term.
Certification of the pit is an extremely challenging process that
requires both highly specialized equipment and expertise. Los Alamos
has identified a series of laboratory and sub-critical experiments that
are designed to test and validate our computer simulations that will be
needed to ensure that the pit will perform as designed. Based on
improved planning and better certification methodology, we have been
able to move up our schedule for certifying these pits for war reserve
use from the previously scheduled date of 2009 to 2007.
Directed Stockpile Work. In addition to our pit manufacturing
responsibilities, we are also responsible for neutron target tube
loading, detonator fabrication for all the weapons in the stockpile,
Beryllium component manufacturing, pit and valve surveillance testing,
and high fidelity mock pits for joint test assemblies (JTA) used in
flight testing.
In the area of stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs), we began
engineering development for the Navy's W76 warhead and will proceed
toward production development and certification with the first
production unit (FPU) scheduled for 2007. Evaluation of the condition
and life expectancy of the materials in the nuclear explosive package
is being addressed. A major refurbishment is planned to support the
extension of the lifetime of this warhead to 2042. We also have
finalized plans with NNSA, Pantex, and Y-12 to begin refurbishing
canned subassemblies of the B61 Mod 7 and 11 in 2006. In support of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory W80 Life Extension Program, we
are developing the Acorn gas transfer system with the Sandia-California
site. With Sandia, we have completed the W80 baseline program and
continue to support knowledge transfer to LLNL.
As part of the enhanced surveillance program, Los Alamos continues
to be a national leader in materials characterization and aging
studies. We are developing non-destructive technologies for
surveillance and diagnostics on components and systems that will help
us improve our understanding of nuclear weapons aging.
Advanced Simulation and Computing. The Advanced Simulation and
Computing (ASC) program of the NNSA is an essential element of the
nuclear-weapons program. The objective is to provide greater computing
power and to develop new computational models that will allow weapons
designers and other nuclear weapons experts to use validated modeling
and simulation to assess changes in the stockpile to determine if the
existing weapons remain safe and reliable without nuclear testing.
We continue to make rapid advances in the ability to simulate
nuclear explosions faster and with greatly increased detail. During
this past year, we completed the first three-dimensional simulation of
a full nuclear weapon system explosion using the LLNL 12 TeraOps White
computer. This calculation represents the first time that we have been
able to compute a fully-coupled primary and secondary explosion to
analyze weapon performance. It represents a breakthrough for the
program and unprecedented detail for designers and analysts.
The Strategic Computing Complex (SCC) was completed on schedule and
under budget. We are installing the first phase of 10 of the 30 TeraOps
computers that were purchased for this ASC program. We are installing
the full capability in ``phases'' in order to facilitate performance
testing to connectivity requirements. The computer will provide the
computing power required to run the new computational tools to support
the Stockpile Stewardship Program mission. These new weapon-system
simulations will replace the less-predictive legacy based models.
Hydrodynamic Testing. The nuclear weapon primary is the most
critical component of the weapon. Understanding its performance is
essential to confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile.
Hydrodynamic tests of primary systems--non-yield experiments measuring
the implosion characteristics of primary systems using simulated
nuclear materials--enable us to evaluate some crucial aspects of
nuclear weapon performance. Completion of the first axis of the Dual
Axis-Radiographic Hydro-Test (DARHT) facility has enabled us to perform
these tests with outstanding spatial resolution of the imploding
surrogate pit. We performed five major hydro tests (four at DARHT) in
the last quarter of fiscal year 2001 directly related to stockpile
systems and in support of certification activities and plan six more
later this year. Following commissioning and optimization of the second
axis of DARHT, the facility will provide an enhanced diagnostic
capability in fiscal year 2004. We are also continuing to develop
proton radiography as an advanced capability in order to maintain our
ability to certify the refurbished nuclear weapons, and to validate the
predictive capabilities of next-generation designers.
Test Readiness. The Nuclear Posture Review has called for enhanced
test readiness. We support test readiness through a number of
collaborations with the Nevada Test Site. The most prominent
collaboration is that of sub-critical, non-yield, underground tests
that address key dynamic materials issues and exercise the
infrastructure required, should a return to underground nuclear testing
be needed. In February, we conducted a successful collaborative sub-
critical experiment in Nevada that yielded significant data. Although
we see no reason to do a nuclear test today, we support General
Gordon's direction to reduce the timescale required to resume nuclear
testing as a prudent measure.
Advanced Concepts. The Nuclear Posture Review identified a need for
the nuclear-weapons design laboratories to maintain their design
expertise through the study of advanced concepts that could meet
changing weapon requirements in the future. These studies include new
and extended concepts (those that may have been developed and tested in
the past, but not deployed). At Los Alamos, we have an NNSA-approved
effort evaluating robust earth-penetrating weapons and a small study
group looking at past R&D efforts that could be developed to meet
changing national needs for nuclear deterrence. If the country requires
a vigorous effort, we will need explicit support and funding for such
advanced concepts.
II. Threat Reduction Programs: Non-proliferation, Counterterrorism,
Homeland Security, and Defense Transformation
As a result of shifting national security priorities since
September 11, the newly created Office of Homeland Security has been
charged with protecting the United States from terrorist attack. We are
strongly committed to supporting this effort and are participating with
Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories in an effort to
defend the U.S. against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorist
attacks.
For example, our pioneering work on sequencing the human genome
helped not only to develop technologies and breakthroughs, but also to
grow a unique bioscience base at the laboratory. Because we had
developed this capability, in the aftermath of September 11 we were
able to play a key role in analyzing DNA of anthrax samples from the
mail attacks. We were able to determine that these samples came from
the common Ames strain, which assisted in efforts to respond to and
treat victims. With Livermore, we deployed a biological agent detection
system at the Salt Lake City Olympics. The multi-spectral thermal
imager (MTI) satellite, developed in a joint project with Sandia
National Laboratories, was re-deployed to help analyze the destruction
and the dispersal of potentially harmful debris from the attacks on the
World Trade Center.
We currently are working with Sandia to develop a critical
infrastructure analysis capability, which derives from an innovative
simulation and modeling approach originally developed for understanding
and improving large-scale transportation networks. The National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) will use this
approach for government planning and analysis of vulnerabilities and
responses to terrorist attacks.
We have provided the Nation with our expertise and special
equipment for over 25 years in addressing threats of stolen or
improvised nuclear devices through our NEST teams that continue to
serve today. We also have been working since the early 1990s to help
secure vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia, and have supplied
technologies for decades to help the International Atomic Energy Agency
and other governments control nuclear materials.
III. Laboratory Operations
During the past year, we rigorously continued our efforts to
integrate safety and security into our programmatic work. We have
fortified our physical and cyber security, and have increased security
still further since September 11. Our guard force is over 500, with a
large contingent of SWAT teams; our defense against a terrorist attack
has been significantly enhanced; our special nuclear materials are in a
safe and secure configuration. Because of the rapid pace of change in
technology, maintaining an appropriate level of support for cyber
security will be critical to our ability to meet the challenges
presented by this continuing threat.
Laboratory safety performance has markedly improved compared to
national benchmarks--total recordable incidents have decreased over the
past 4 years from over 4.0 per 200,000 hours worked to less than 2.0
this year. In the same time frame, lost work day cases have decreased
from over 3.2 per 200,000 hours worked to 0.90. Waste generation and
radiation exposures have all been significantly reduced, and we have
moved some of our transuranic waste off site from Area G to WIPP,
although I believe that the DOE could increase the priority to ship
more waste.
Project management improvements at Los Alamos continue to build on
a strong foundation we established 3 years ago. We presently have three
major construction projects that either have finished or will finish
significantly ahead of schedule and under budget.
major challenges: ensuring the future
I. Science: Achieving Program Balance
The biggest challenge facing the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
developing a balanced program within the budgets provided by Congress.
The balance that must be struck is between warhead life extension
programs, infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization, sustaining a
preeminent capability in weapons-relevant science and experimentation,
test readiness, and exploration of advanced concepts. The Future Years
National Security Plan (FYNSP) that NNSA submitted to Congress this
year is a good start toward providing a process for achieving this
balance. At present, scientific investments needed to ensure that the
next generation of weapons designers will be able to certify the
stockpile in future decades are under stress due to the focus on the
refurbishment of three weapons systems in the coming decade. The
predictive assessment tools currently available to certify these
planned LEPs are not yet adequate for the scope of these
refurbishments. The addition of new production facilities, such as the
Modern Pit Facility, will add to that stress unless the future year
budgets accommodate such large expenditures.
II. Threat Reduction
NNSA, working with LANL and the other NNSA Laboratories, has had
many successes with the existing Chemical and Biological National
Security Program (CBNP), but the important research in this area needs
to be expanded to include a broader range of biological threats. On the
nuclear side of the equation, however, no CBNP-like program currently
exists. Because of the threat posted by nuclear and radiological
terrorism, we believe that creation of a broad-based nuclear threat
program is critical to meeting the challenges in this area. A new
program within NNSA could be modeled upon the already successful CBNP
program. Lastly, in order to tie all of these activities together, I
believe that NNSA should take on a major responsibility for homeland
security research and development.
III. Workforce
A large number of personnel at Los Alamos are nearing retirement,
and it is critical that we effect the transfer of technical and
programmatic knowledge that they embody. We must attract and retain the
next generation of stockpile stewards. We are planning to hire
approximately 1,000 employees during fiscal year 2002--600 to meet
workload requirements and 400 to address attrition. We are aggressively
recruiting, and are strategically focusing these hiring efforts to
attract 80 percent of new hires at the entry-level. To date, this
fiscal year we have hired over 300 new employees. To attract the most
outstanding scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel
we must focus our efforts on sustaining and improving the quality of
life for our employees. We must redouble our efforts in areas that
impact our ability to attract and retain a diverse and high quality
workforce--by ensuring that we retain our ability to pursue cutting
edge science and research, by improving our infrastructure and
facilities, and through a continued focus on and investment in
education, the environment, and economic development.
Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) is a key tool
that I have available to help attract and retain the best scientists
and engineers. LDRD is a well-managed program as indicated by a recent
GAO audit of the program. I strongly recommend that Congress continue
its strong support for LDRD. Continued support of the Los Alamos
schools and Los Alamos National Laboratory Foundation also is key to
employee recruiting and retention, as well as to education and economic
development in the region.
IV. Infrastructure
We continue to experience deterioration of our infrastructure and
facilities, which may serve to undermine our long-term ability to
fulfill stockpile stewardship objectives. We have developed a Ten Year
Comprehensive Site Plan that NNSA has approved as a guide for
prioritizing maintenance and facility replacement at our site. In
addition, I have chartered an external review of our facilities and
infrastructure to determine where and how we might shrink our footprint
for today's mission.
In particular, we need your support for the replacement of our 50-
year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building, which is
planned for relocation within an Integrated Nuclear Complex at our TA-
55 site. We strongly support General Gordon's 10 year Facilities and
Infrastructure Revitalization Initiative. Congress provided an initial
appropriation last year ($200 million), but this will continue to be a
critical issue in fiscal year 2003 and the outyears. Without your
continuing and strong support of this initiative, we will not be able
to carry out either the manufacturing or certification efforts for the
stockpile.

CONCLUSION

For more than a half a century, the Nation's investments in Los
Alamos have helped ensure our National security. We face ongoing and
new challenges--a new Nuclear Posture with fewer deployed nuclear
weapons, certification of an aging stockpile without nuclear testing;
the need for a balanced program ensuring science in our programmatic
endeavors; and the need for new technologies to address non-
proliferation, threat reduction and counter-terrorism. We are committed
to meeting these challenges to our Nation's security.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you for your past support.
Your continued support is critical to our ability to meet the
technically demanding and vital national security challenges we face
today and in the future.
______

Addendum to the Prepared Statement by John C. Browne

The following information supplements the laboratory report
submitted by Director John C. Browne of Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL).
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

The purpose of the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is to
maintain high confidence in the continued safety and reliability of the
Nation's nuclear weapons arsenal without returning to underground
nuclear testing. SSP consists of several integrated sets of activities:
surveillance, life extension, manufacturing, design capability,
infrastructure revitalization, workforce regeneration, and
certification. Each of these depends on and contributes to the others
and success requires that there be a reasonable balance among and
between them--suggestions that the SSP should be skewed to place
significantly more emphasis on one over the others put the overall
success of SSP at risk.
As the gap between the time when the last nuclear test was
conducted and the date of each annual certification grows, our ability
to successfully execute the stockpile stewardship mission becomes more
difficult. We will not be able to do the job if we do not reverse the
aging of our infrastructure or the aging of our workforce. Nor can we
expect success if we do not systematically improve the scientific and
technical tools and machines that allow weapons technical experts to
advance their understanding through experimentation, computation, and
simulation. These issues are discussed in greater detail below.
Surveillance
Surveillance occurs year-round on all weapons systems in the active
stockpile, including the five systems for which Los Alamos is
responsible: B61, W76, W78, W80, and W88. Its purpose is to identify
indicators of existing, or impending, conditions that could impact
safety, reliability, or performance, with the goal of developing a
predictive capability. This is accomplished by using a suite of tests,
including:

Functional testing of selected components;
Destructive analysis of components to identify defects
or failures in individual nuclear and non-nuclear parts;
Flight testing of warheads in which nuclear material
has been removed and replaced with precision instrument
packages that match the critical features of weight and moment
of inertia; and
Nondestructive evaluation of selected components.

Results of these tests are combined with data collected over the
life of each weapon system for analysis by nuclear weapons experts who
use expert judgment to determine impacts. Defects from aging, design or
production that are revealed through surveillance activities are
formally addressed via ``significant finding investigations'' (SFI).
Significant Finding Investigations
SFIs are conducted in accordance with formal, NNSA-established
protocols whenever a condition is found in a stockpiled weapon that
does not meet the original weapon condition or design intent. Multi-
disciplinary expert review teams begin by assessing the potential and
immediate impacts of the identified condition. The results of this
initial assessment determine the priority assigned to resolution of the
SFI. Safety-related SFIs automatically receive top priority.
On average, LANL conducts about 500 surveillance tests per year on
weapons drawn from all stockpiled systems. We expect to conduct 650
surveillance tests in fiscal year 2003. The number of weapons systems
in the nuclear stockpile is the primary basis for selecting the level
of surveillance activity; the number of individual weapons is a
secondary consideration. Thus, surveillance activity is not projected
to decline as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review and its goal to
achieve significant reductions in the number of weapons in the nuclear
stockpile.
The ratio of SFIs in LANL-designed systems to surveillance tests
since the end of underground nuclear testing is 65:5000. At the current
time, LANL has 30 open SFIs, ranging in age from 1 to 65 months; none
of these are safety-related. LANL's average time to complete and close
an SFI is 34 months, depending on the extent to which large-scale
experiments such as hydrodynamic tests or detailed computer simulations
are required.
SFI protocols provide a flexible, risk-based approach that assures
immediate attention and highest priority for real or potential safety-
related problems and provides that other SFIs will be prioritized with
other ongoing SSP work. This approach assures the best use of available
resources. Significant acceleration of the rate at which SFIs are
completed and closed would require considerably increased funding, or
significant reductions in funds currently devoted to other SSP work, or
both. Absent specific evidence that the safety, reliability or expected
performance of any stockpiled weapons system is in doubt, LANL would
not advocate such acceleration.

STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

Even in storage, nuclear weapons have dynamic properties that cause
changes and deterioration of some parts and components over time. To
address these changes and to assure continued safety and reliability,
NNSA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC) have agreed on specific life extension programs for selected
weapons systems.
Two LANL-designed systems--the B61 and the W76--have been
designated for life extension programs. Based on a process (Phase 6.X)
that mimics the management framework for designing and building nuclear
weapons and that was used by the DOE Office of Defense Programs (now
NNSA/DP) for over 40 years, both systems will be refurbished.
B61 LEP
Refurbishment of the B61 Mods 7 and 11 canned subassemblies is
scheduled to begin in 2006. A feasibility and cost study was authorized
last year. Planning, risk assessment, scheduling and cost estimating
are in progress at LANL; material tests are being performed at Y-12 and
at Los Alamos. The Kansas City Plant will evaluate the manufacture of
new components with substitute materials. The Certification Plan, Test
and Evaluation Plan, and Weapon Design and Cost Report are scheduled to
be released in July 2002. The B61 LEP is on track to meet its scheduled
commitments.
W76 LEP
Extension of W76 warhead life through 2042 has been established by
the Department of the Navy. A comprehensive evaluation of the condition
and life expectancy of the materials in the nuclear explosives package
has been completed. Engineering development was begun last year and
will continue through production development and certification. LANL's
W76 LEP is on track to meet its scheduled commitments.
Manufacturing
In addition to its responsibility for the B61 and W76 LEPs, LANL
contributes to the overall sustainment for all nuclear weapons via
various manufacturing activities. These include manufacture of
beryllium parts in the new Beryllium Technology Facility at LANL, which
was qualified last year and is the only such capability in the country.
LANL also makes tritium-loaded neutron sources for Sandia National
Laboratories and supplies detonators to the Kansas City Plant. LANL
also is responsible for producing joint test assemblies (mock pits for
field test devices) as well as packaging and transportation materials
for shipping explosives components. All manufacturing commitments have
been met on time and to specification; we expect to continue this level
of performance in fiscal year 2003.
The largest and highest priority manufacturing activity at LANL is
pit manufacturing. LANL is on track to produce a certifiable pit for
the W88 in 2003. ``Certifiable'' means that we can demonstrate that the
pit has been fabricated according to design specifications, can be
manufactured in a reproducible process, and that necessary quality
systems are in place. Associated safety, security, and technical
requirements are demanding. Specific processes include materials
purification and alloying, machining, welding, and inspection. While we
have made every effort to duplicate what was done in the original
manufacture of pits at Rocky Flats, changes in environmental
requirements and other factors have necessitated some modifications.
More than 40 separate processes have to be documented and individually
qualified.
To date, LANL has produced 11 pits for engineering development and
testing purposes. The production schedule for the remainder of the year
will include 3 more pits, 19 hemi-shells for testing and analysis, 4
subcritical components, and many small parts for certification.
Pit manufacturing is a multi-purpose effort that is designed to:
(a) reestablish the capability to manufacture plutonium pits in limited
(10- to 20-year) quantities; (b) prototype processes and configurations
for use in a Modern Pit Facility; and (c) produce replacement pits for
those destructively tested in the annual surveillance of the W88
system.
Taken together, all manufacturing activities at Los Alamos make
LANL the second largest production site in the NNSA complex.
Certification
LANL and Sandia National Laboratories jointly share the
responsibility for continually assessing the safety and reliability of
the nuclear weapons for which we are the joint design agencies.
Annually, LANL and SNL issue annual assessment reports that summarize
the laboratories' knowledge about the health of our warheads. These
reports, in conjunction with the annual assessment letters issued by
the President of SNL, and myself to the Secretaries of Energy and
Defense, constitute the formal evaluation of the safety and reliability
of the nuclear weapons in the Nation's stockpile. This annual
certification is currently being accomplished without nuclear testing
and represents one of the most technically challenging tasks ever
assigned to the laboratories. Although there are no guarantees that
certification without testing will always be possible, I am confident
today that the warheads remain safe and reliable.
A second certification responsibility that applies uniquely to LANL
is the requirement to certify pits manufactured here. Pit certification
involves three types of certification activities:

Production certification--assurance that the pits are
made according to design specifications;
Engineering certification--assurance that the pit will
endure the ``Stockpile-to-Target-Sequence environments''
encountered during storage, handling, and delivery; and
Physics certification--assurance that the pit will
produce the required yield to perform its mission.

Los Alamos has identified a series of laboratory and subcritical
experiments that are designed to provide the necessary data, within the
limits of non-nuclear tests that will allow our technical experts to
certify the pit will perform as required. We have also obtained NNSA
approval of a baseline change that will allow the certification date to
move forward from 2009 to 2007.

WEAPON'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

All of the foregoing accomplishments and potential for future
achievements are attributable to and depend on the availability of a
robust, continually advancing science and technology base. I am
concerned that near-term and competing demands often appear to be more
immediately urgent than new investments in science and technology and
that the temptation to balance today's budgets by postponing such
investments is often too great to resist. Three subjects are worth
mentioning in particular:

Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC);
Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT); and
Proton Radiography (LANSCE, AHF)
Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
The ASC program is intended to provide via computation and
simulation the types of information previously obtained via underground
nuclear testing--although it must be noted that ASC is not and is not
intended to be a substitute to replace all testing. The objective of
the program, which is a joint effort among the three NNSA Laboratories,
is to provide by fiscal year 2005 validated 3-D, high-fidelity physics,
full-system simulation codes required for engineering, safety and
performance analysis of the stockpile.
At all three laboratories, we continue to make rapid advances in
our ability to simulate nuclear explosions more quickly and with
greatly increased detail. Earlier this year, LANL completed its first
3-D simulation of a full nuclear weapon system explosion. The
calculation was run remotely from Los Alamos on the ``White'' machine
at Livermore Laboratory. In about 4 months of around-the-clock
computing, the simulation used more than 480 million cells on 1,920 of
the White machine's 8,000 plus processors. Actual time on the central
processing unit was the equivalent to computing continuously on a high-
end home computer for more than 750 years. This first-ever 3-D
simulation represents significant advances in visualization techniques
as well as in computing power.
The ultimate objective of the ASC program is a 100-teraflop machine
which we believe is necessary to provide timely weapon system
simulations for the weapons design community. The next step beyond the
White machine at Livermore is acquisition and installation of the 30-
teraflop ``Q'' machine at LANL, which is currently underway.
Hydrodynamic Testing and DARHT
The most critical component of a nuclear weapon is the primary.
Hydrodynamic tests--non-yield experiments that measure implosion
characteristics--enable us to examine and more fully understand primary
performance.
To date, one axis of the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
(DARHT) facility has been completed and the second axis is scheduled
for completion at the end of calendar year 2002. Commissioning of the
second axis will take place during fiscal year 2003 and the full 2-axis
capability will become available in fiscal year 2004. LANL has
successfully operated the first axis for experimental purposes while
continuing construction on the second axis, thus capitalizing on the
initial investment of taxpayer dollars before the entire facility has
been completed.
Using a single axis, DARHT has enabled us to image hydrodynamic
tests with unprecedented resolution and clarity. The second axis will
enable stereoscopic and time-sequenced views of hydrodynamic
experiments, which are vital to supporting life extension programs, W88
pit certification, and validation of new modeling tools for simulating
weapons safety and reliability. We expect that DARHT will be the
primary test facility for the Stockpile Stewardship Program for the
coming decade.
Eventually, however, advanced radiography capabilities will be
needed to address future challenges of stockpile stewardship and to
train and qualify the next generation of weapons designers who will be
the first generation required to certify the nuclear stockpile having
had no direct nuclear test experience.
Proton Radiography, LANSCE, and AHF
In a no-test environment, high-fidelity radiographic motion
pictures of hydrodynamic tests will be the next best means of
understanding weapon performance. The most promising technology--
developed by scientists at Los Alamos via the Laboratory Directed
Research and Development (LDRD) program--is proton radiography.
Proton radiography is already an operational tool at the Los Alamos
Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and has been used to make quantitative
measurements of high explosive and other weapon relevant material
behavior under extreme dynamic conditions. The capability is used by
weapon designers and by other research collaborators on a variety of
science undertakings. Proton radiography has already provided data that
has influenced stockpile decisions. Its availability supports and
strengthens LANSCE as the laboratory's flagship user research facility.
LANSCE just completed one of its most successful and productive
running periods, operating with greater than 90 percent availability, 7
days/week, 24 hours/day. This rate of availability allowed LANSCE to
support more than 200 experiments and over 300 users. In this respect,
LANSCE is a key element in LANL's efforts to provide the intellectual
capital that we will need over the next decade. By providing an
exciting experimental tool to address basic science and stockpile
issues, we are continuing to attract early-career scientists who bring
fresh approaches to LANL's mission and related tasks. Historically,
LANSCE has been the entry point for over 1,000 of our scientific and
technical personnel.
Advancing radiographic capabilities to accurately image
hydrodynamic experiments with sufficient detail to address long-term
certification and assessment requirements is critical. A high-
resolution radiographic motion picture of a hydrodynamic test provides
us with a means of understanding weapon implosions. Data obtained from
these experiments will provide the strongest technical justification
for determining nuclear weapon performance, short of a nuclear test.
High-energy proton beams delivered with flexible time-sequencing (tens
of pulses) will provide an unprecedented capability to directly image
very thick complicated geometries of surrogate weapon configurations.
The most promising technology for establishing this capability through
the creation of an Advanced Hydrodynamic Facility (AHF) is based on
high-energy protons. Current efforts are underway to evolve the
technically essential tool of radiography based on the current x-ray
facilities to an AHF based on protons. This work is essential to ensure
that this critical prediction validation and precision design tool can
be developed to maintain future nuclear-weapon expertise. An AHF
designed to address design physics requirements in the 2015-2020
timeframe must be started soon. The Nation's investment in this area is
both prudent and timely.

THREAT REDUCTION AND HOMELAND SECURITY

For decades, the U.S. has invested in tools to respond to a nuclear
accident or guard against a surreptitious nuclear weapon threat and has
provided help to the International Atomic Energy Agency and other
governments to safeguard and control nuclear materials. Since the early
1990s, we have helped secure vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia.
Dating to the early 1980s, LANL has conducted research in biological
sciences--research initially supported via LDRD funding--which led
directly to our ability, post-September 11, to support deployment of
the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS) system,
developed with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and to
provide forensic expertise in analyzing anthrax samples. Obviously,
these efforts have taken on new and urgent priority since September 11.
NNSA has unique expertise, resident at Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories, in nuclear, chemical, and
biological technologies. That expertise has a long and successful
history of supporting the intelligence community. In light of the new
priorities and challenges following September 11, I believe that the
NNSA Laboratories can and should play a central role in providing the
science and technology for countering the terrorist threat and
protecting the U.S. and its allies against weapons of mass destruction.
Three key near-term challenges are particularly suitable for NNSA
laboratory attention:

Preventing and responding to threats of nuclear
terrorism;
Detecting and countering biological weapons; and
Analyzing and protecting the Nation's critical
infrastructure.

Programs already are underway in all of these areas, including our
work in biological research and in the National Infrastructure Security
Analysis Center (NISAC), which we are conducting in cooperation with
Sandia National Laboratories.
Tightly controlling nuclear and radioactive materials continues to
be the key to preventing terrorists or rogue states from creating
radioactive dispersal devices--so-called ``dirty bombs''--or nuclear
weapons. The demonstrated global reach of terrorists and states that
sponsor terrorism and their interest in weapons of mass destruction
call for enhanced protection and management of nuclear and radioactive
material inventories.
The goal of a strong, integrated, NNSA-led program is a global web
of protection that:

Ensures nuclear and radioactive materials are
protected from theft and misuse;
Responds to thefts of materials and threats involving
nuclear and radioactive materials;
Interdicts illicit trafficking in nuclear and
radioactive materials;
Detects and responds to non-nuclear-weapon states'
attempts to produce or acquire materials for nuclear weapons
programs;
Promotes responsible management of existing military
and civilian nuclear and radioactive material inventories; and
Provides international confidence in the global
systems of protection and control.

We should seriously consider a specifically defined role for the
NNSA and its laboratories as principal R&D support to reducing the
threat and securing our homeland from terrorists and their potential to
use weapons of mass destruction whether nuclear, chemical or
biological, against us. A streamlined, integrated approach to funding
and program development that would ensure needed state-of-the-art
technologies and a longer-term R&D program to address future
contingencies would contribute significantly to our ability to
effectively counter terrorist threats.

LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD)

The LDRD program enhances the scientific and technical capabilities
of national laboratories to meet long-term science and technology needs
of the Nation. This means being able to explore new developments in all
relevant areas of science quickly and develop ideas that eventually
serve the policy objectives of the Federal Government. Throughout the
history of the LDRD program the laboratory has focused a significant
portion of these resources on important scientific questions that
underpin our nuclear weapons mission. LDRD investments have produced
innovations essential to the ability of the laboratories to continue to
accomplish our long-term programmatic missions. The program has a clear
reputation for attracting high-caliber staff needed to meet the science
and engineering challenges of stockpile stewardship, reducing the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, homeland defense, and other
missions. LDRD advances the frontiers of knowledge in scientific fields
vital to the laboratories' missions, future, and effectiveness in
serving the Nation. Some examples of success and clear benefit follow.
In the absence of testing for nuclear weapons, more detailed
knowledge is needed on nuclear and other key materials contained in
weapons systems in order to better understand how they age. We recently
invested in work exploring issues such as the interactions of a
plutonium surface with its surrounding environment. Such studies help
us understand what might happen as a weapon ages, and also inform us
about better ways to store nuclear materials or even to clean up
environmental legacies from the Cold War. In addition, we have
identified opportunities for additional research on nuclear materials
and their properties, based on novel experimental approaches and new
capabilities in materials modeling. The investment in these research
topics does and will have direct impact on our ability to perform our
mission.
In the area of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), the Nation faces potentially devastating new weapons
systems based on chemical or biological weapons. LANL is seeking ways
to detect the development or use of such weapons. Several new ideas
have been proposed and funded to explore fundamental science and
technology needed to combat the development and use of WMD. For
example, researchers are exploring the fundamental mechanisms that
produce virulence in pathogens. Understanding these mechanisms should
enable us to design new sensors for rapid and early detection of the
use of biological weapons.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

The entire nuclear weapons complex managed by the DOE/NNSA--the
production plants and laboratories--is faced with serious aging
problems that threaten our ability to carry out the stockpile
stewardship mission. To continue to work effectively on these DOE/NNSA
missions, our laboratory needs outstanding scientists and engineers
working in state-of-the-art facilities. Our facilities have badly
deteriorated buildings, roads, sewer systems; electrical power grid and
other critical infrastructure are approaching 50 years old and are
crumbling at an alarming rate. A dedicated and enduring revitalization
effort is crucial for the long-term viability of this laboratory and
the weapons complex as a whole.
We believe that there are three distinct areas that must be
addressed in order to ensure infrastructure sustainability to meet our
mission. Those three areas include: implementing formal facilities
consolidation efforts and cost reduction initiatives; addressing high-
priority facility maintenance backlogs; and investing in new
construction projects, where appropriate and economically feasible.
Each of these areas requires commitments to achieve positive results.
Each area addresses safety and security needs and allows laboratory
facilities to be sustainable over the next 20 to 40 years.
Ten or more years ago, the long-term outlook for the nuclear
weapons complex and budget was uncertain, but the requirement to ensure
the safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrent remains.
During this period, Los Alamos and much of the rest of the nuclear
weapons complex sacrificed continual reinvestment for the future in
favor of short-term operational needs. With existing operating funds,
we have been able to complete some urgent maintenance at our aging
facilities, but this only scratches the surface. Only the utmost top-
priority issues have been addressed, while the backlog of unfunded
maintenance continues to grow as facilities age. The demands placed on
the safety and security infrastructure from increased regulation and
oversight have also stressed our resources. We are still running many
buildings to failure.
We strongly support General Gordon's 10-year Facilities and
Infrastructure Revitalization Initiative. Congress provided an initial
down payment last year, but continued support is critical in fiscal
year 2003 and beyond. Without continuing and strong support of this
initiative, we will not be able to carry out either the manufacturing
or certification efforts for the stockpile. Furthermore, we request
your strong support for General Gordon's Five Year Defense Plan for
NNSA at a level that can support the growing requirements and need for
development of new tools and experimental facilities for certification
of an aging stockpile.
______

Prepared Statement by C. Paul Robinson

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to submit this statement. I am Paul Robinson,
director of Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is managed and
operated for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of
the Lockheed Martin Corporation.
Sandia National Laboratories is one of the three NNSA Laboratories
with research and development responsibility for nuclear weapons.
Sandia's job is the design, development, qualification, and
certification of nearly all of the non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear
warheads. Our responsibilities include arming, fuzing, and firing
systems; safety, security, and use-control systems; engineering support
for production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; field support to
the military; and surveillance and support of weapons in stockpile. We
perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear
weapons, including intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty
verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory,
Sandia also conducts research and development for DOE's energy and
science offices, as well as work for other national security agencies
when our special capabilities can make significant contributions.
I will begin my statement by reviewing highlights of Sandia's
recent accomplishments in the nuclear weapons program and other
national security programs, including Sandia's contributions to
homeland security and the war on terrorism. I will then discuss issues
of concern to Sandia in fiscal year 2003 and address in detail Sandia's
responsibilities in NNSA's stockpile stewardship and nonproliferation
missions. Before concluding, I will comment on the NNSA Administrator's
governance initiative for improving the NNSA-contractor relationship.

HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT SANDIA ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The NNSA Laboratories accomplished much during fiscal year 2001.
The investment the Nation makes in these unique institutions yields
valuable results for national security.
At Sandia National Laboratories, we perform our scientific and
engineering work with the mission in mind--never solely for its own
sake. Even the fundamental scientific work that we do (and we do a
great deal of it) is strategic for our mission needs. Sandia's
management philosophy has always stressed the ultimate linkage of
research to application.
We sometimes hear the phrase ``science-based engineering'' to
describe our approach, but this term is really a solecism: Engineering
is inherently scientific and cannot be practiced with excellence unless
it is deeply integrated with its supporting sciences and employs
scientific methodology. When someone refers to Sandia as ``the Nation's
premier engineering laboratory,'' that statement does not tell the
whole story: We are a science and engineering laboratory with a focus
on developing technical solutions to the most challenging problems that
threaten peace and freedom.
Sandia's unique philosophy of research and development--which
derives from its heritage of 50 years under industrial management--
yields significant results for its sponsors. I will briefly highlight
some of the outstanding achievements from our work portfolio of fiscal
year 2001 in the areas of nuclear weapon activities, nuclear
nonproliferation, homeland security, and combating terrorism.
Salient Accomplishments in Weapons Activities
Sandia completed work to qualify the B61-11 earth-penetrating bomb
as meeting all requirements, resulting in its acceptance as a standard
stockpile item. We made alterations to enhance the safety and security
of all B61 bombs at field locations. In recognizing the efforts of the
B61-11 certification team, the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command
cited the weapon's many advantages over the retired B53-1 bomb.
Similarly, we concluded a 3-year testing and evaluation program
resulting in acceptance of the Alt. 342 W87 Life Extension Program
warhead for the Air Force by the Nuclear Weapons Council as a standard
stockpile item.
A significant milestone in directed stockpile work in fiscal year
2001 was our progress in redesigning the integrated arming, fuzing, and
firing system (AF&F) for the W76 warhead for the Trident missile. We
recently completed the redesign of a Joint Test Assembly for the W76,
which will be used to periodically assess the conformance of the de-
nuclearized version of the actual war-reserve warhead.
Sandia played a major role on the NNSA's B83 Systems Engineering
Group, which completed development of Alt. 355 for the B83 modern
strategic bomb. Alt. 355 is a near-term field retrofit kit that
incorporates design modifications to certain hardware.
We completed the Warhead Simulator Package for the Type 3E Trainer
for the B61-4 bomb. The Warhead Simulator Package simulates the
electrical functionality of the real war-reserve weapon. The new
trainer allows military personnel to realistically practice lock/unlock
and arming/safing operations without exposing a real nuclear weapon to
vulnerabilities. The first production unit of the trainer has been
delivered.
Sandia has major responsibility in nuclear weapon use-control
systems, which are designed to allow arming of the warhead by national
command authority only. We completed a 4 year, full-scale, code
management system engineering project, which delivers a significant
security enhancement to weapon code operations in Europe. The system
enables recoding of nuclear weapons in a fully encrypted manner and
greatly simplifies use and logistics.
We have also achieved many important advances in the science and
engineering campaigns that enable our successes in directed stockpile
work, including radiation-hardened microelectronics, above-ground
experimental physics, and advanced simulation and computation.
Accomplishments in Nuclear Nonproliferation
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials or weapons to
dangerous regimes or terror groups has become a matter of great
urgency. NNSA's role in nonproliferation is acknowledged in its mission
statement: ``To strengthen United States security through the military
application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.'' Sandia's recent
contributions have strengthened this effort.
As nuclear fuel reprocessing is adopted by more nations, the
proliferation risk associated with fissile materials increases. To
evaluate the risk, Sandia developed a proliferation analysis
methodology for quantifying the proliferation resistance of nuclear
power production fuel cycles. The methodology uses the tools of
probabilistic risk assessment to identify proliferation pathways for
various definitions of proliferators.
NNSA's ``Second Line of Defense'' (SLD) program for the security of
fissile materials provides consultation to customs agencies to combat
trafficking of nuclear material across international borders. In 2001
we assisted 26 site surveys performed at Russian airports, seaports,
railroad checkpoints, and border crossings to evaluate strategies for
minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. These site
surveys included the deployment and acceptance of systems installed at
eight Russian Federation State Customs Committee facilities to detect
and deter illicit movements of nuclear materials out of Russia. The
program has been successful and is growing to include other countries.
Also with Russia, after 4 years of negotiation and collaboration
with the All Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), we
kicked off a joint facility-to-facility remote monitoring project in
June 2001. The project will evaluate advanced fissile material
monitoring and communications technologies in a bilateral verification
regime.
Sandia is responsible for satellite-based sensors for detecting
nuclear detonations in the atmosphere. We developed a new space-to-
ground communication path for monitoring Nuclear Detection System
sensors onboard the Department of Defense Global Positioning System
(GPS) satellites. The launch of a GPS satellite equipped with the
Nuclear Detonation Detection System Analysis Package in January 2001
significantly enhanced the Nation's ability to detect nuclear
detonations occurring anywhere in the earth's atmosphere.
Contributions to Homeland Security and the War Against Terrorism
Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories
responded to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound
resolve on both a personal and professional level. As a result of our
own strategic planning and the foresight of many sponsors to invest
resources toward emerging threats, Sandia was in a position to
immediately address some urgent needs.
For example, by September 15, a small Sandia team had instrumented
the K-9 rescue units at the World Trade Center site to allow the dogs
to enter spaces inaccessible to humans while transmitting live video
and audio to their handlers. This relatively low-tech but timely
adaptation was possible because of previous work we had done for the
National Institute of Justice on instrumenting K-9 units for SWAT
situations.
You may not be aware that a decontamination formulation developed
by Sandia chemists was one of the processes used to help eliminate
anthrax in the Hart, Dirksen, and Ford buildings on Capitol Hill, and
at contaminated sites in New York and in the Postal Service. Sandia
developed the non-toxic formulation as a foam and licensed it for
industrial production.
Sandia engineers worked around-the-clock to modify the ``Steel
Eagle,'' air-dropped, unattended ground sensor for deployment in
Afghanistan. Originally designed under sponsorship of the Defense
Intelligence Agency in the 1990s to identify mobile missile launchers,
we modified the system to detect light trucks and armored vehicles. The
sensors can be deployed from F-15E, F-16, and Predator unmanned
aircraft.
Speaking of the Predator, this unmanned aerial vehicle has gained
recognition for its ability to capture and transmit in real time high-
quality radar images of terrain, structures, and moving vehicles
through clouds and in day or night conditions. You may perhaps not be
aware that the advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability on
the Predator was substantially developed by Sandia National
Laboratories. We began working on miniature radars based on synthetic
aperture concepts in 1983 in the nuclear weapons program. In 1985 we
became involved in a special-access program for the Department of
Defense (DOD) to develop a one-foot-resolution, real-time SAR suitable
for use in unmanned aircraft. Sandia flew the first real-time, one-
foot-resolution, SAR prototype in 1990. Follow-on work sponsored by DOD
continued to improve the system, and a partnership with an industrial
firm, which shared program costs, transitioned the technology into the
field-deployable systems used in Afghanistan.
In addition to our contributions to the military toolbox for
counter-terrorism, Sandia has responded to urgent needs in the arena of
homeland security. An array of devices invented by explosives experts
at Sandia have proved to be effective for safely disarming several
types of terrorist bombs. For the past several years, our experts have
conducted training for police bomb squads around the country in the
techniques for using these devices for safe bomb disablement. The shoe
bombs that Richard Reid allegedly tried to detonate onboard a trans-
Atlantic flight from Paris to Miami were surgically disabled with an
advanced bomb-squad tool originally developed at Sandia. That device,
which we licensed to industry, has become the primary tool used by bomb
squads nationwide to remotely disable handmade terrorist bombs while
preserving them for forensic analysis.
Detecting explosives in vehicles is a major concern at airports,
military bases, government facilities, and border crossings. We have
developed and successfully tested a prototype vehicle portal that
detects minute amounts of common explosives. The system uses a Sandia-
patented sample collection and preconcentrator technology that had
previously been licensed to industry for use in screening airline
passengers for trace amounts of explosives. The Technical Support
Working Group and DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security funded this
research.
Sandia is a partner with Argonne National Laboratory in the PROTECT
program (Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
Chemical/Biological Terrorism), jointly funded by DOE and the
Department of Justice. PROTECT's goal is to demonstrate systems to
protect against chemical attacks in public facilities, such as subways
and airports. For more than a year, a Sandia-designed chemical detector
test bed has been operating in the Washington, DC Metro. The system can
rapidly detect the presence of a chemical agent and transmit readings
to an emergency management information system. We successfully
completed a demonstration of the PROTECT system at a single station on
the Washington Metro. The program has since been funded to accelerate
deployment in multiple metro stations. DOE has also been requested to
implement a PROTECT system for the Metropolitan Boston Transit
Authority.
Another major worry for homeland security is the potential for acts
of sabotage against municipal water supplies. In cooperation with the
American Water Works Association Research Foundation and the
Environmental Protection Agency, Sandia developed a security risk
assessment methodology for city water utilities. This tool has been
employed to evaluate security and mitigate risks at several large water
utilities. We have used similar methodologies to evaluate risks for
other critical infrastructures such as nuclear power-generation plants
and chemical storage sites.
These and other contributions to homeland security and the war
against terror are possible because of early investment in the
capabilities that were needed to respond to emerging threats. The
outstanding technology base supported by NNSA for its core missions is
the primary source of this capability. We also made strategic decisions
to invest laboratory-directed research and development funds (LDRD) in
the very things that we knew were urgent needs: items to the
Afghanistan theater, the decontamination foam, the sensors we have
deployed, and special-purpose robotics that we have developed. In
addition, requests for Sandia services from Federal agencies other than
DOE for work in emerging areas of need have increased. Approximately 28
percent of our total laboratory operating budget is provided by Federal
agencies other than DOE.

BUDGET-RELATED ISSUES OF CONCERN

Sandia National Laboratories is very busy with work for its core
mission responsibilities in nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship. We
have a substantial workload of life extension programs for stockpiled
systems that requires refurbishment or complete re-design of electronic
subsystems and other components. In addition, the responsibility for
stockpile certification as weapons age is an ongoing challenge that
engages our science and engineering campaigns.
Significant changes will be required to weapon systems that are
scheduled to remain in the deployed stockpile or responsive force for
decades. This workload is not materially affected by the recent Nuclear
Posture Review. Life extension activities require substantial resources
of people and facilities. In addition, several studies \1\ have
repeatedly shown that the infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex
has eroded significantly and needs refurbishment. These and other
requirements will demand their share of resources from a program that I
described last year as ``wound too tight.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study; Complex 21;
Defense Programs Phase I and II Maintenance Studies; Energy Federal
Contractor Organization Group Study; Office of Secretary of Defense
Program Analysis and Evaluation Review; Stockpile Stewardship Program
30-Day Review; DOE Inspector General's Defense Programs Production
Facilities Assessment; Fiscal Year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to
Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States
Nuclear Stockpile (Foster Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to relax this tension, the Defense Programs
laboratories worked closely with NNSA during the last several months to
create a multiyear plan to prioritize and integrate programmatic needs
within a defensible appropriations profile. The funding levels of the
multiyear estimates in that plan reflect our consensus estimate of
resource requirements under the guidance provided by Presidential
directives, DOD requirements, and the recent Nuclear Posture Review.
The plan is a significant milestone inasmuch as NNSA has for the first
time outlined a multiyear planning basis agreement with the
administration. With careful management, we believe that NNSA's major
deliverables can be completed within the Future Years National Security
Plan schedule and budget profile.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request is generally consistent with
NNSA's Future Years National Security Plan, and it should provide
adequate resources for Sandia National Laboratories to meet its mission
obligations as currently defined. Four issues of concern to Sandia that
I would like to bring to your attention are: the Microsystems and
Engineering Sciences Application (MESA) Complex; the refurbishment of
NNSA's Z Accelerator; a joint Air Force/NNSA initiative in advanced
physical security research and development for nuclear weapons; and the
problem of cyber security against sophisticated network attacks.
Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Application (MESA) Complex
Sandia's Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA)
complex is the cornerstone of our initiative to address the need for
microelectronics and integrated microsystems to support a certifiable
stockpile for the future.
Microelectronic components are critical to the NNSA Defense
Programs mission. Several key components in deployed nuclear weapons
will need to be replaced within the decade. In most cases, components
cannot be replaced with replicas of the originals because they are
technologically obsolete and the supplier base, materials, and design
tools to support them no longer exist. Moreover, competent designers
would not elect to use decades-old electronic technology, even if it
were available. Sandia has little choice but to meet component
replacement needs using the latest microsystem technologies.
In addition, Sandia has a requirement to preserve critical
competencies in radiation-hardened microelectronics for defense and
space hardware. In accordance with the congressional mandate for a
national defense electronics partnership,\2\ Sandia retains the
capability for radiation-hardening technology and sustains a supporting
infrastructure for developing and producing radiation-hardened
microelectronics. MESA will provide the infrastructure to meet that
mandate for future decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 105th Congress, 1st Session, National Defense Authorization Act
For Fiscal Year 1998, Report 105-29 to Accompany S. 924, June 17, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am pleased to report that the preliminary engineering design
(Title I engineering) of the MESA complex has been completed and that
final engineering design (Title II engineering) is well underway. We
are working hard to bring this facility into operation on a schedule
that would allow it to contribute to the scheduled stockpile
refurbishment programs approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council and
supported by the Department of Defense, but it is not yet clear whether
that will be possible.
Z Accelerator Refurbishment
NNSA's Z Accelerator at Sandia National Laboratories has proved to
be an important and unique asset for the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Still the world's most powerful and energetic source of x-rays,\3\ Z
supports NNSA campaigns in nuclear weapon primaries and secondaries,
dynamic materials, nuclear survivability, and inertial confinement
fusion. Moreover, the recent demonstration of short-pulse, high-power
\4\ lasers and the installation of the Z-Beamlet laser at Sandia has
created the opportunity to cost-effectively explore new mission
applications, including advanced radiography of laboratory experiments
for stockpile stewardship, the fast ignition inertial confinement
fusion concept, and the science of materials under extreme conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Power: 230 trillion watts. Energy: 1.6 megajoules.
\4\ On the order of 1015 (thousand trillion) watts, or ``petawatt''
(PW).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pending the completion of the National Ignition Facility, Z will
continue for many years to be the most capable U.S. facility for
producing the high-energy-density environments required for studying
the phenomenology of nuclear explosives. A refurbishment project to
replace aging components and increase the capability of Z by over 50
percent was initiated with an appropriation of $10 million in fiscal
year 2002. Those incremental funds allowed us to address a backlog of
experimental requests in this current operating year.
Physical Security Research and Development
For the past three decades, Sandia National Laboratories has made
unique contributions to both the Department of Energy and the
Department of Defense for the security of nuclear weapons. Currently,
both NNSA and the Air Force have designated Sandia as their weapon
security systems engineer.\5\ Sandia is assisting the NNSA's Defense
Nuclear Security Office in assessing and engineering security systems
so that there is consistency in the approach used for security across
all NNSA facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Through the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Security and the
USAF Force Protection Command and Control System Program Office,
Electronic Systems Center (ESC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both NNSA and USAF maintain high security for the nuclear weapons,
materials, or facilities under their control, and they have steadily
improved security during the past two decades. I am confident that the
recent allegations that security may be lax at NNSA nuclear weapon
facilities are incorrect. However, we must not be satisfied with the
status quo. NNSA and DOD are responding to the increased terrorist
threat by examining how security systems can be significantly enhanced
with new technology. Numerous upgrades at Air Force nuclear weapon
sites are under consideration. Unfortunately, those upgrades may be
forced to employ older technology that is actually more expensive and
offers less capability. Just as new technology has revolutionized war-
fighting, so it offers an opportunity for a similar revolution in
security systems.
Past investments by DOE in Sandia's security systems research and
development program have yielded crucial technology for the protection
of DOE and DOD nuclear assets. In recent years, Sandia's extensive
security expertise has been widely sought by other Federal agencies and
public entities, including, for example, the Secret Service, the
Department of Defense, State and Federal prison systems, Dade County in
Florida, many public school systems, the National Institute of Justice
(in support of local law enforcement), and the 2002 Winter Olympic
Games.
A robust program of security research and development can adapt new
technological capabilities for security applications. We have proposed
a joint Air Force/NNSA research and development program in nuclear
weapon security technology, to be established under the leadership of
Sandia National Laboratories. Such a program will result in greater
protection for our nuclear weapons and, ultimately, reduced security
operational costs. We anticipate joint annual funding by the Air Force
and NNSA to raise the existing programmatic effort at Sandia to the
level required for this initiative.
Cyber Security
During the past several years, Sandia has experienced an increase
in the level, intensity, and sophistication of network attacks directed
against our computer resources. We have significant concerns about the
ability of any cyber security system to withstand the very
sophisticated attacks that are emerging. These developments cause us to
worry that the sophistication of these threats are growing at a faster
rate than we are able to respond in hardening our systems against
intrusions. This remains one of my most critical concerns.

WEAPONS ACTIVITIES

At Sandia, weapons activities include directed stockpile work,
campaigns to advance the scientific and engineering capabilities
required for weapons qualification and certification, and readiness
programs for NNSA's technology base, facilities, and infrastructure.
Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review
The Secretary of Defense released the NPR in January. It was
conducted in response to a congressional request to lay out the
direction for American nuclear forces for the next 10 years. The full
implications of the NPR will not be known until the final configuration
and schedule for the Nation's nuclear arsenal is worked out. However,
the NPR calls for sustaining a responsive nuclear force and maintaining
a robust and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure for the long
term. It is clear that any savings that may result from the NPR will
not be realized for many years.
The NPR calls for reducing operationally deployed nuclear weapons
to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade. Most warheads
that will be removed from the operationally deployed stockpile will be
maintained as a ``responsive force'' in case of a major change in the
global security environment. The intent is to maintain the warheads of
the responsive force in a condition that would permit them to be
redeployed in a matter of weeks or months. Consequently, warheads in
the responsive force will require a level of maintenance and
surveillance not substantially different from that required for
deployed systems. Their limited-life components will need periodic
replacement, and their electronic subsystems will have to be upgraded
so as not to become obsolete with the passage of time.
Thus, the warheads of the responsive force will require life
extension activities similar to what they would receive if they were in
the active stockpile. Only one warhead, the W62, is proposed to be
retired. The NPR calls for retiring the Peacekeeper (MX) inter-
continental ballistic missile, but the relatively modern W87 warhead on
that system will be retained as a replacement for the aging W62 on the
Minuteman III. The B61 and B83 bombs also will be retained and may
require modifications.
The NPR also calls for NNSA to improve its test readiness program
for contingent resumption of underground nuclear testing. Adhering to
the test moratorium continues to be U.S. policy, but should a need to
test arise, the current preparation time of 2 to 3 years is considered
unacceptable.
In summary, I do not expect the Nuclear Posture Review to
materially impact the workload of Sandia National Laboratories in
stockpile stewardship in the next several years.
Directed Stockpile Work
Directed Stockpile Work encompasses all activities that directly
support specific weapons in the nuclear stockpile. Those activities
include current maintenance and day-to-day care as well as planned
refurbishments. This work includes research, development, engineering,
and qualification activities in direct support of each weapon type both
in the present and future. Directed Stockpile Work maintains a balanced
effort of near-term weapon activities and long-term research and
development supported by campaigns.
Stockpile Research and Development
Stockpile Research and Development includes the engineering
development and exploratory research and development to support near-
and long-term requirements of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This
activity includes development of new weapon designs when needed and
authorized, preproduction design and engineering activities, design and
development of weapon modifications, and safety studies and
assessments.
Specific focal areas anticipated for the next 2 fiscal years
include support for system studies, mutual defense agreements, and
U.S./foreign weapon cooperative safety exchanges; development of
specified components and subsystems; improved engineering business
practices and information systems; modernized flight test assemblies
and instrumentation; refurbishment of several enduring stockpile
systems; and continued vigilance through exploration of future system
concepts.
Engineering Development. The bulk of the engineering development
planned in stockpile research and development will support life-
extension refurbishments. The objective of the stockpile life extension
effort is to improve and extend the safety and reliability of U.S.
nuclear weapons 20 to 30 years by upgrading or replacing components and
subsystems rather than entire warheads. Sandia has been identified by
NNSA to be the systems integrator for refurbishments.
Two refurbishment programs are in the engineering development
phase: the W76/ Mark 4 (Trident), with a first production date of
fiscal year 2007; and the W80 warhead for Air Force and Navy cruise
missiles, with scheduled first production in 2006. We are also engaged
in a study of technical feasibility and cost for possible refurbishment
of the B61 strategic bomb, with first production in fiscal year 2004.
These refurbishments will replace critical components to ensure decades
of life extension.
Exploratory Research and Development. Sandia's advanced warhead
concepts group participates with similar teams at the other Defense
Programs laboratories and NNSA headquarters to assess nuclear weapon
modernization options for emerging military requirements under the
advanced concepts initiative headed by NNSA. DOD and NNSA jointly
review requirements and identify opportunities for further study.
Stockpile Maintenance
Sandia's responsibilities in stockpile maintenance include design
and production of certain components for system life extension
programs, limited-life component exchange and repairs, as well as other
engineering activities that directly support maintenance of nuclear
warheads in the stockpile. For each weapon in the inventory, we must
understand and resolve defects (called ``significant findings''),
maintain use-control equipment, and replace hardware consumed by the
surveillance function. During calendar year 2001 we completed and
closed 18 significant finding investigations. Because the service lives
of many nuclear weapons have been extended well beyond their original
intent, we are exhausting the supply of surveillance units available
for flight testing. More flight test units must be produced, but the
instrumentation to measure performance in joint flight tests with DOD
must be redesigned using electronics technology available today.
We have finished a complete redesign of the W76 joint flight
vehicle and are currently working on redesigns of the W78 and W87 joint
flight vehicles. In addition to these complete redesigns, we have added
functionality to the B61 joint flight vehicle by developing and
incorporating spin sensors. We are now in the process of incorporating
this technology in the B83 joint flight vehicle.
Neutron Generator Production
Sandia has the production mission for neutron generators, an
essential component of U.S. nuclear warheads. Sandia manages two pieces
within its total production mission: (1) neutron generator production,
including both the recertification of neutron generators from the field
that have remaining service life and the new neutron generator build;
and (2) the Concurrent Design and Engineering (CDM) production
assignment. As neutron generator production ramps up and the CDM
program grows to support the W76 and W80 life extension programs,
production operating funds will require an increase over fiscal year
2002 of approximately $45 million by fiscal year 2005. Estimates are
still being generated as the refurbishment programs continue to define
the CDM components they will need.
Stockpile Evaluation
Stockpile evaluation includes laboratory tests, flight tests,
quality evaluations, special testing, and surveillance of weapon
systems to assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapon
stockpile as a basis for the annual certification to the President.
Surveillance testing frequently results in recommendations for
repairs and upgrades to the stockpile. Last year, following Sandia
procedures, DOD replaced limited-life components in several weapon
systems to add what we believe will be significant periods of
maintenance-free service while the weapons are in DOD custody.
I am happy to report that we have completed Title 1 (design) of the
new Weapons Test Evaluation Laboratory construction project that
Congress funded as a line item 2 years ago. This state-of-the-art
facility will replace our 40-year-old building at the NNSA weapons
facility near Amarillo, Texas. Completion is scheduled for Fall 2004.
We are developing advanced diagnostic tools to update existing test
equipment, and we hope to incorporate other enhancements from the
Enhanced Surveillance Program. Our goal is to move the surveillance
program toward a predictive capability that will allow us to replace
components in our aging stockpile before they affect reliability.
DOD and DOE annually conduct joint flight tests on weapons of each
weapon type in the enduring stockpile. Historically, flight tests have
uncovered about 22 percent of the defects in surveillance databases.
After a hiatus in Air Force cruise missile testing due to missile
problems and infrastructure renewal, I am happy to report that we have
begun flight testing again with two successful air-launched cruise
missile tests, although it will take us several years to catch up with
our desired level of testing. As we work with the Air Force on flight
testing for existing warheads and determine their future needs for an
upgraded system, we are desperately short of Air Force test hardware
for the air-launched cruise missile. We face a near-term problem of
having limited opportunities for both flight testing of existing
systems as well as proving the interfaces necessary to field our
proposed life extension program for the W80 warhead.
To help compensate for shortfalls in flight tests and a dramatic
reduction in the number and variety of reentry vehicles that can be
flown if the W87 is deployed on Minuteman III, on-board instruments
must be improved to provide additional performance information in fewer
tests. This past year, we successfully flight-tested an enhanced-
fidelity instrumentation package in the W87 reentry vehicle.
The Tonopah Test Range, which Sandia operates under agreement with
the Air Force, is absolutely irreplaceable as a flight-test site for
air-delivered bomb systems. Without it, we could not continue to assess
and certify systems nor perform research and development on new
delivery systems. I urge continued congressional support for joint use
of the Tonopah Test Range and the proper level of funding support for
range infrastructure to ensure its viability.
I would like to address the two reports issued by the DOE Inspector
General this past year on the surveillance program--one on the testing
backlog for flight and laboratory tests, and the other on the
significant findings investigation process. While I do not believe that
the situation is as dire as the headlines might have suggested, there
was action necessary on the part of NNSA and the laboratories to
improve performance. I assure you that we at Sandia are taking this
matter very seriously. We are working with the Navy and Air Force to
ensure the availability of samples and flight-test vehicles to
eliminate the identified backlogs. As you might expect, as a result of
the tragedy of last September and the focus on prosecuting the war,
this may take longer than any of us might desire, but I can assure you
that we have everyone's complete cooperation. The laboratories fully
support the actions being directed by NNSA in response to the IG's
reports, and I believe that future reviews in this area will show
improvement.
The surveillance program is the foundation for maintaining the
aging stockpile. We believe that the surveillance program should
maintain an adequate number of flight tests each year using military
personnel, procedures, and hardware. Therefore, I urge you to assure an
appropriate level of support for the joint surveillance flight test
program, for both NNSA and the DOD, to sustain confidence in the
reliability of our strategic nuclear deterrent.
Campaigns
Campaigns are multifunctional efforts across the NNSA Defense
Programs laboratories, the production plants, and the Nevada Test Site
that, in aggregate, constitute an integrated weapons science and
technology program for developing critical capabilities for weapons
qualification and certification. The goal of the NNSA Defense Programs
campaigns is to address current or future capability needs by employing
the best scientists and engineers and using the most current scientific
knowledge and technologies. Many of the campaigns are interrelated and
establish a foundation for future deliverables in directed stockpile
work. Without a robust campaign program, our ability to support
stockpile stewardship would be seriously harmed.
Engineering Campaigns
NNSA's engineering campaigns strengthen the science and engineering
competencies that directly support mission responsibilities in enhanced
surety (comprising safety, use-control, and reliability), annual
weapons system certification, nuclear survivability for nuclear weapons
and other military systems, enhanced surveillance of the nuclear
weapons stockpile, and advanced design and production technologies to
support system life-extension programs.
Enhanced Surety. This campaign provides the most modern surety
possible for nuclear weapons during replacement, refurbishment, and
upgrades of weapon components. Specifically, this campaign is
developing surety options and technologies for the B61, W76, and W80
weapon life-extension programs. It is also developing new surety
assessment methodologies and supporting the integration of microsystem
components into surety components, subsystems, and architectures.
Weapon System Engineering Certification. This campaign develops
validated computational models and a suite of tools to support
certification of the B61, W76, and W80 life extension programs.
Nuclear Survivability. Nuclear weapons must be able to survive and
function in severe environments. Radiation produces thermal and
mechanical stresses that may impact the reliability of weapon
components. Although large fluxes of radiation would result from
hostile attacks, disruptive levels of radiation are also present in
natural environments, such as space. Also, periodic weapon diagnostics
and exposure to radioactive decay from the nuclear explosive package
can produce lower radiation levels of longer duration. Radiation can
deform, spall, or degrade materials; change the conductivity of
electronic components; generate and transmit shocks in materials; and
release trapped gases. Microelectronic components are especially
vulnerable to these effects.
This campaign develops microelectronic technologies and
certification tools to ensure that refurbished stockpile weapon
components satisfy their radiation survivability requirements as
defined in each weapon's stockpile-to-target sequence. These
capabilities are being developed for immediate application to the W76
life extension program, which is critically dependent on their timely
development and validation.
Sandia operates a number of test facilities that provide intense x-
ray, gamma-ray, neutron, electron, and mechanical environments to
support the qualification of weapon systems and components and to
validate simulation codes.
Our goals for the next several years include demonstrating the
maturity of next-generation, radiation-hardened microelectronics by
designing and fabricating test devices and circuits and characterizing
their performance in radiation environments. We will also conduct
experiments to validate mechanical response models, mature our
understanding of radiation-induced damage mechanisms in semiconductor
materials, improve our diagnostic capabilities to support material
characterizations, and investigate radiation hardening phenomena in
microelectromechanical systems.
Enhanced Surveillance. The Enhanced Surveillance campaign develops
tools, techniques, and models to measure, qualify, calculate, and
predict the effects of aging on weapon materials and components and to
understand how those effects impact weapon safety and reliability.
One enhanced surveillance project uncovered unexpected behavior in
desiccants designed to maintain a non-corrosive internal weapon
atmosphere. Our new understanding of desiccant behavior is guiding the
formulation of new desiccants for weapons refurbished under stockpile
life extension programs. Another project discovered problems with newly
procured material for replacement o-rings. The problems with the
incoming material were assessed, and a negative impact on the stockpile
was averted.
In the future, enhanced surveillance techniques will strengthen the
credibility of the deterrent by warning of manufacturing and aging
defects in time to schedule weapon refurbishments before performance is
impaired.
Advanced Design and Production Technologies. The Advanced Design
and Production Technologies (ADAPT) campaign provides technology
maturation and integration of modern product realization tools and
methods across NNSA's product realization enterprise, including
laboratories and plants.
Science Campaigns
NNSA's science campaigns advance our understanding of the physical
principles of nuclear explosive systems and support weapons system
certification activities.
Dynamic Materials Properties. The Dynamic Materials Properties
campaign develops physics-based, experimentally validated data and
models of all stockpile materials under a broad range of dynamic
conditions found in nuclear explosions.
Primary Certification. The Primary Certification campaign includes
experimental activities to develop the capability to certify rebuilt
and aged primaries to within a stated yield without nuclear testing.
Sandia's efforts in this area focus on the development and
implementation of advanced compact flash radiographic sources for use
on subcritical experiments.
Secondary Certification and Nuclear Systems Margins. The Secondary
Certification and Nuclear Systems Margins campaign includes
experimental and computational activities that will determine the
minimum essential factors for producing an effective weapon.
Sandia's contribution is to support the development of
computational models to predict the performance of nominal, aged, and
rebuilt secondaries and perform collaborative experiments with the
other NNSA laboratories in radiation case dynamics, radiation flow, and
secondary performance.
Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign
To achieve simulations with sufficient complexity and fidelity to
support stockpile stewardship, NNSA must increase computational
capability and capacity tremendously. The Advanced Simulation and
Computing (ASC) campaign will hasten advances in computational science
to enable the shift from test-based methods to computation-based
methods.
ASC activities at Sandia consist of code development for stockpile
applications; problem solving environments; maintenance of sufficient
on-site computational, networking, and communication capabilities; and
partnering alliances with university and industry researchers. We are
working on new mathematical methods, algorithms, and software for
solving large-scale problems on massively parallel, often distributed
systems. Areas of importance include mechanical and thermal response of
weapons, shock physics, chemically reacting flows, electromagnetics,
and the computational analysis and design of materials. As these
techniques are developed, they are incorporated into codes relevant to
stockpile applications. ASC simulation tools are being used to support
design and certification activities for the W80 and W76 life extension
programs.
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign
This campaign includes activities to support ignition implosions on
the National Ignition Facility and to enhance experimental capabilities
for stockpile stewardship on Sandia's pulsed power facilities. A fusion
yield of 200 to 1,000 megajoules in the laboratory is a long-term goal.
We are providing intense x-ray sources for weapon physics and weapon
effects testing, evaluating high-yield inertial confinement fusion
concepts in the laboratory using z-pinches, and developing
sophisticated diagnostics for the National Ignition Facility and Z
Accelerator to support stockpile stewardship.
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities provides physical
infrastructure and operational readiness at the laboratories, the
Nevada Test Site, production sites, and other NNSA sites where the
scientific, technical, and manufacturing activities for stockpile
stewardship are conducted.
Operation of Facilities
Operation of facilities includes NNSA Defense Programs' share of
the costs to operate and maintain programmatic facilities in a state of
readiness at which each facility is prepared to execute programmatic
tasks identified under directed stockpile work and the campaigns. These
costs include the structures, equipment, materials, procedures, and
personnel necessary to provide program sponsors with a facility that is
safe, secure, reliable, and ready for operations.
Sandia has a large number of facilities supported by the Readiness
in Technical Base and Facilities subcategory:

The Microelectronics Development Laboratory maintains
radiation-hardened integrated circuit technologies.
The Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory
generates new technology options in semiconductor materials,
processes, and device technologies to support directed
stockpile work.
The Tonopah Test Range in western Nevada provides
Sandia with essential flight test capabilities (including those
for joint test assemblies) as part of the stockpile
surveillance effort.
The Albuquerque Full-Scale Experimental Complex
comprises Sandia's Technical Area III experimental facilities.
The facilities and most of the test equipment they house range
from 30 to 50 years old. An RTBF construction project, Test
Capabilities Revitalization, is planned to renovate and
refurbish the complex.
Sandia's Z Accelerator is the world's most powerful
laboratory x-ray source. It supports directed stockpile work
and NNSA campaigns in dynamic materials properties, secondary
certification and nuclear systems margins, inertial confinement
fusion ignition and high yield, and nuclear survivability.
NNSA's Neutron Generator Production Facility at Sandia
manufactures neutron generators, a limited-life component
required in U.S. nuclear warheads.
Program Readiness
Program Readiness includes activities that support more than one
directed stockpile work activity, campaign, or facility and that are
essential to achieving mission objectives. Sandia has numerous projects
and programs covered by this budget subcategory. They include the
following:

The Defense Nuclear Materials Stewardship project
develops materials management systems to enhance the safety,
security, and accountability of nuclear weapons, nuclear
materials, and weapon components during storage, handling, and
transportation.
The Knowledge Management Program develops workforce
stewardship strategies to recruit and retain staff with
essential skills, enhance career development, and improve
access to retirees and other resources of knowledge for active
weapon professionals.
The Microsystems Infrastructure Readiness Project
maintains Sandia's microsystems capabilities, with a secondary
role of developing capabilities to support fabrication of war-
reserve microsystem components.
The Pulsed Power Technology Project maintains our
capability for designing a wide variety of pulsed power
drivers, ranging from high-impedance accelerators for gamma
rays and radiography to high-power drivers for z-pinches.
Construction
Sandia's construction plan is designed both to provide the
facilities we need to support programmatic objectives and to eliminate
excess and substandard space.
Sandia's Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Application (MESA)
complex, discussed earlier, is the top priority in our construction
plan. Other vital line-item construction projects include the
following:

The Weapons Evaluation Testing Laboratory at NNSA's
Pantex Plant will provide a state-of-the-art facility for
testing weapon components and implementing advanced diagnostic
techniques developed by the enhanced surveillance campaign.
Funded as construction under the Advanced Simulation
and Computing campaign, two key facilities supporting the ASCI
program are under construction at Sandia laboratory locations:
The Distributed Information Systems Laboratory (DISL) at
Sandia's site in California will develop distributed
information systems for enabling collaborative computational
work across the nuclear weapons complex. The Joint
Computational Engineering Laboratory (JCEL) at Sandia's site in
New Mexico will support multi-physics code development on
massively parallel computers.
The Model Validation and System Certification Test
Center will provide testing facilities to continue providing
data for weapons certification; enhance capabilities to
facilitate large-volume data delivery; and replace an aging
communications infrastructure with integrated command and
control, data collection, processing, and distribution systems.
The Test Capabilities Revitalization project will
modernize Sandia's nonnuclear field testing and experimental
infrastructure and our diagnostic capabilities to perform
weapons qualification, development, surveillance, and model
validation. The project will renovate existing facilities and
provide new facilities, subject to cost-benefit studies.
General Plant Projects
General Plant Projects Program funding is essential for managing
our facilities and conducting safe and reliable facility operations.
This change has given laboratory management some flexibility in
determining the amount of general plant project and capital equipment
funding needed to maintain infrastructures and to respond to changes in
infrastructure maintenance requirements. The funding limit for general
plant projects is $5 million per project. The new flexibility we have
to determine the best use of general plant funds has enabled us to
improve administrative and support facilities that have been neglected
far too long.
Sandia received DOE approval in fiscal year 2001 to fund and
construct an Institutional General Plant Project (IGPP) building. IGPPs
are construction projects for general-purpose institutional space
funded through indirect cost recovery rather than by direct funding
from a programmatic sponsor. Sandia was the first DOE contractor to
pilot this alternative that is now permitted by new regulations. We are
seeking approval to construct two additional buildings through the IGPP
mechanism in fiscal year 2002.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Sandia's support for the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (NN) includes research and development on systems for
detecting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, verifying
international arms agreements, enhancing the protection of nuclear
material and weapons in Russia, eliminating surplus inventories of
fissile materials in Russia, protecting against chemical and biological
incidents, and providing mechanisms to enhance regional stability.
I am pleased that the fiscal year 2002 budget reversed a downward
trend in NNSA's programs for nonproliferation and verification research
and development. This important investment yields leading-edge
prototypes and demonstrations that serve our national security
interests exceptionally well.
The greatest successes coming from this program are the result of
persistence in providing support over long periods to allow for the
full development and demonstration of applied technologies. We
appreciate your trust in the laboratories to take technical risks that
have yielded innovative solutions for monitoring treaties, protecting
nuclear materials, and protecting against threats of chemical and
biological terrorism. I urge your continued strong support for this
important research and development program.
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
Sandia is developing a new generation of satellite-based sensors to
detect low-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. We also are
developing a seismic data processing system to enhance detection of
underground nuclear explosions. Our activities are part of a
multilaboratory effort to develop affordable, deployable, and flexible
sensors for seismic, hydro-acoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound data
acquisition and processing. These activities are coordinated and, in
many cases, co-funded by the Department of Defense, which has the
operational nuclear-test monitoring responsibility for the U.S.
government.
We are developing airborne and satellite-based systems for
detecting and characterizing proliferation-related activities involving
chemical weapons, biological weapons, and missiles. Sandia coordinated
the integration of NNSA's Multispectral Thermal Imager Satellite
research project, which has recently completed its second year of
successful operation and research. We are also developing a laser-based
system for remote detection and identification of chemical and
biological species in effluent plumes. We will conduct flight tests
this year of the integrated system on an unmanned aerial vehicle. We
have made impressive progress toward developing specialized chemical
and biological microsensors, bioinformation systems, and
decontamination technologies for nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and for detecting nuclear material smuggling. With regard to
the microsensors, we are currently conducting field trials, and
preliminary results are very promising.
Nonproliferation and Arms Reduction Transparency
NNSA's Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National
Laboratories assists a number of countries and agencies in evaluating
the applicability of arms control technologies and protocols for
regional security issues. Export-approved monitoring equipment is
available for representatives of regional parties from areas such as
south Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Korean peninsula, to
evaluate for application to specific regional problems. For example,
the CMC is currently engaging Pakistan and India in a cooperative
boundary monitoring project. The CMC also supports technical analysis
of policy options for DOE and provides national security insight to
other organizations. CMC staff also provide technical consultation to
U.S. negotiating delegations.
In an effort to extend the accessibility of the CMC to an affected
region, a similar institute is being established in Amman, Jordan. This
development is a cooperative effort of the Department of State, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA. It is a significant
cooperative development involving the United States and Jordan and
represents an opportunity to foster stability in that region through
the integration of technology and policy.
In other activities, Sandia assists with the evaluation of export
licenses for technology with possible uses for weaponization
activities. We also help develop technology for International Atomic
Energy Agency remote monitoring and inspections. Sandia develops
remotely accessed, unattended cooperative monitoring systems for
applications in foreign states without nuclear weapons that are party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. These
activities typically support the International Atomic Energy Agency and
bilateral safeguards agreements between the United States and foreign
states with nuclear materials of U.S. origin. Other work is conducted
for the physical protection of nuclear materials in the Baltic and
independent states of the former Soviet Union and in states that are
party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
These activities include the International Atomic Energy Agency
International Physical Protection Advisory Service, training classes,
and physical security upgrades.
U.S./Russian Nuclear Security Programs
Sandia supports a broad range of cooperative programs with Russia
in nuclear security. These programs, funded by NNSA, DOD's Cooperative
Threat Reduction program, and the Department of State, address the
safety and security of nuclear weapons, the security of fissile
materials, verification of fissile materials, and defense conversion.
I want to make special note of the importance of the activities
with Russia. The terrorist attacks last September have made us all
acutely aware of the catastrophic potential of weapons of mass
destruction should they end up in the wrong hands. The cooperative
efforts to protect nuclear materials and maintain state control over
nuclear capabilities and assets in Russia are important initiatives
that must continue. We promote a vision called ``Global Nuclear
Management'' that, if realized, would assure the control of all nuclear
materials in the world. However, the current state of protection for
nuclear materials in Russia, while improved through the past efforts of
this program, is an important indication of the potential for nuclear
material proliferation. We must continue these efforts with Russia.
Russian Transition Initiatives
In support of defense conversion programs, Sandia has been an
active participant in the Russian transition programs, including the
International Proliferation Prevention Program, which engages weapons
scientists, engineers, and technicians from the former Soviet Union in
nonmilitary projects. This program provides seed money for nonmilitary
research and provides links with U.S. industry to commercialize the new
activities. In a particularly effective case, Sandia engineers worked
with Spektr Conversion LLC, a company formed by scientists at the
Russian nuclear weapons laboratory, the All-Russian Scientific Research
Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), and a U.S. manufacturer,
Numotech Inc., to design and build a wheelchair seat cushion to prevent
pressure sores. The prototype cushion was clinically tested at a VA
hospital and is approved by the FDA. The program provided employment
opportunities in an area of civilian need for Russian technical
personnel.
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
A major Sandia program that addresses the security of nuclear
weapons and fissile material in Russia is the Materials Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program. Since 1993, Sandia has
participated in this multi-laboratory effort to reduce the threat of
diversion of Russia's nuclear weapons and weapon-usable nuclear
material to rogue states or terrorist groups. This program, which
originally included projects in Russia and a number of the newly
independent states, now focuses on Russia in the areas of nuclear
material and nuclear facilities operated by the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and smaller independent
ministries. Activities include vulnerability assessments, protection
system design, training, and support for hardware installations and
maintenance. Assistance is also provided to states other than Russia to
protect fissile materials, on-site and in transit, against theft.
Protecting U.S.-origin nuclear material in other countries is a
particular concern. A related activity provides assistance to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop physical
protection guidelines.

GOVERNANCE REFORM

A very important initiative by the NNSA Administrator is an effort
to redesign the NNSA contractor relationship through a new approach to
governance. The goal is to implement a simpler, less adversarial
contracting model capitalizing on the private-sector expertise of the
management and operating contractors while increasing contractor
accountability for performance and responsiveness to NNSA requirements.
The current governance structure for the NNSA Laboratories is
broken. I doubt that any of my lab director colleagues would disagree
that the current governance regime unreasonably constrains us from
exercising prudent management authority and bold leadership in
accordance with best industrial practices; and yet, that kind of
leadership was precisely what the Federal Government bargained for
under the original GOCO (government-owned, contractor-operated)
contracting model. The influential Galvin Report \6\ was perhaps the
most adamant of several studies that have been critical of the
excessively bureaucratic nature of DOE governance of the laboratories.
The Galvin Task Force found that the GOCO model has been so encumbered
with bureaucratic accretions that it would be better to scrap it
altogether and privatize the laboratories. While that is probably too
drastic a remedy, we should all be concerned that the current
laboratory governance regime fails to encourage management initiative
for superior performance beyond mere compliance with an array of
bureaucratic prescriptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National
Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Task Force on
Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories.
Robert Galvin, Chairman, et al., February 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As originally conceived, the GOCO model was a strategic partnership
between a Federal agency and a premier industrial or academic entity.
In simple terms, the key operating concept was that the Federal sponsor
articulated WHAT was to be achieved (the mission and its programmatic
deliverables) while the contractor determined HOW to achieve it, in
accordance with best industrial practices. The laboratory governance
reform initiative that the NNSA Administrator proposes includes an
assurance strategy that will employ several private-sector assurance
systems such as comprehensive internal auditing, oversight by boards
and external panels, third-party certifications, and direct engagement
between oversight bodies and NNSA's leadership.
The first phase of this initiative will attempt to reduce
contractual prescriptions that exceed those mandated by law and
regulation. The second phase will design and demonstrate a new
governance model, conducted as a pilot program at Sandia National
Laboratories. If the subsequent appraisal of the pilot phase is
positive, the new model would likely be implemented at other NNSA
Laboratories and plants.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In my view, the National Nuclear Security Administration, under the
businesslike leadership of General John Gordon, has made significant
progress during the past year in its organizational effectiveness. The
agency is now functioning with evident coordination and teamwork,
attributes which will likely be strengthened even more as the
administrator's organizational and operational plans are implemented.
To assure continued success, however, the agency needs long-term
support from Congress and sustained resources to meet the formidable
requirements of stockpile stewardship in the years ahead.
On behalf of the dedicated and talented people who constitute
Sandia National Laboratories, I want to emphasize our commitment to the
NNSA mission to strengthen United States security through the military
application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is our highest goal to be
a national laboratory that delivers technology solutions to the most
challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom.
______

Prepared Statement by C. Bruce Tarter

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to provide a statement on the budget request for fiscal
year 2003 for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I am
the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
Livermore is committed to maintaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile as a principal participant in the Nation's Stockpile
Stewardship Program. The laboratory is also engaged in vital national
programs to reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and to provide for homeland security.
My statement discusses Livermore's accomplishments in NNSA programs
as well as the technical and programmatic challenges we face. But
first, I want to thank Congress for your continuing support of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program and our nonproliferation and threat
reduction activities. The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to
make excellent technical progress in the face of many challenges, some
of the toughest of which likely lie ahead as weapons continue to age. A
strongly supported and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program is
clearly needed to ensure that this Nation can maintain the safety,
security, and reliability of its nuclear deterrent over the long term.
The 5-year plan of the National Nuclear Security Administration details
the need for a strong program, and I support NNSA's plan and the budget
request for fiscal year 2003.
Strong and sustained support is likewise needed for programs aimed
at providing technologies to reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) through nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
counterterrorism activities. Because Livermore and our sister NNSA
Laboratories had been working for the past decade to develop technical
capabilities to detect, counter, and mitigate WMD proliferation and
terrorism, we were able to respond rapidly and effectively to the
events of September 11 and its aftermath. Although those investments
are paying great dividends in the newly declared war on terrorism,
substantial investment is needed to develop vastly improved warning and
responsive capabilities to protect the U.S. against these threats, now
and in the future. We are fully committed to this long-term national
security endeavor.

INTRODUCTION

Exactly 1 year ago, NNSA Administrator General John Gordon, head of
the NNSA, and Admiral Richard Mies, Commander in Chief of U.S.
Strategic Command, were at Livermore to commemorate the certification
of the refurbished W87 ICBM warhead. Speaking as the ``customer,''
Admiral Mies called the occasion an ``historic event'' and ``the first
real test of stockpile stewardship.'' The W87 life-extension program
challenged all elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Devising
the engineering improvements to the warhead, going into production in a
less than fully functional weapons complex, and certifying the
performance of the refurbished warheads without nuclear testing were
all major accomplishments. It is an important success story, but in the
words of General Gordon, ``we still have a long way to go.'' More
challenging technical issues are on the horizon as the weapons continue
to age, as other weapon systems are refurbished, and as new needs
emerge.
Weapon-refurbishment decisions and actions bring into play the full
spectrum of capabilities that we are striving to attain through the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. First, to recognize and evaluate aging
problems (and other defects) in weapons and devise remedies, we must
understand in detail the science and technology that govern all aspects
of nuclear weapons. We are making progress here, but we need even
better investigative tools. Second, the nuclear weapons production
complex must be able to remanufacture parts and refurbish weapons as
needed. Currently the complex is far from fully functional. Third, we
must be able to certify with confidence the performance of both the
refurbished warheads and the other weapons in the stockpile. This task
requires the application of expert judgment, together with the advanced
experimental and computational tools we are using to improve our
fundamental understanding of nuclear weapons. Finally, acquisition of
this spectrum of capabilities is time urgent to meet existing
requirements for weapon refurbishment and to deal with other weapon
performance issues as they arise.
Thus a principal goal of the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been
to expeditiously put into place a set of vastly improved scientific
tools and modern manufacturing capabilities, including 100-TeraOps
supercomputers, advanced radiography capabilities to take three-
dimensional images of imploding mock primaries, a high-energy-density
research facility (the National Ignition Facility) to study the
thermonuclear physics of primaries and secondaries, and efficient and
flexible manufacturing facilities. These investments are very demanding
of resources, as is the need to meet requirements imposed by the
Department of Defense (DOD). The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review provides a
high-level policy perspective of what will be demanded from the NNSA
Laboratories to sustain the Nation's nuclear posture. Concurrently,
NNSA has developed a 5 year plan for its Defense Program activities.
The proposed budget for fiscal year 2003 and succeeding years is larger
than recent budgets, but there is much to be done and we must manage to
achieve our critical milestones with the resources provided.
Livermore has major responsibilities within the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, and our successes in 2001--as well as the
challenges that lie ahead--provide a snapshot of the overall program. I
already mentioned the successful certification of the W87 warhead,
refurbished through a life-extension program (LEP). In addition,
Lawrence Livermore and Sandia/California are starting the LEP for the
W80 cruise missile warhead, designed by Los Alamos. This program will
implement refurbishment options defined in a formal DOD/DOE study
completed in 2000. It builds upon a modern baseline understanding of
the W80 and its performance, which was developed cooperatively by the
New Mexico and California laboratories during the DOD/DOE study and
through significant additional work performed during 2001. At this
time, there is a congressional hold on NNSA work for the LEP while the
Air Force defines its plans for life-extension work on the cruise
missiles themselves. Prompt agreement on the path forward is needed if
we are to be able to meet the directed date for the W80 first
production unit (FY 2006). Also in fiscal year 2001, we completed a
pilot project to demonstrate the capability to conduct warhead pit
surveillance operations, and we are now performing full surveillance on
two warhead pits. Transfer of certain pit surveillance responsibility
for LLNL-designed warheads to Livermore makes the work load at the TA-
55 facility at Los Alamos more manageable.
Lawrence Livermore is also responsible for a number of state-of-
the-art experimental and computer facilities--in operation and in
development--that are essential for stockpile stewardship. Construction
of the Contained Firing Facility for hydrodynamic testing at Site 300
is now finished. Qualification testing has been completed to assure the
facility's ability to contain debris from experiments that use up to 60
kilograms of high explosives. The first stockpile-related experiment
was executed last month, and an active testing schedule is now under
way.
Construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore
is now more than 60 percent complete. I am extremely pleased to report
that NIF remains on track and is meeting its baseline cost and schedule
as provided to Congress in September 2000. We expect to have NIF's
first laser beams delivered to the target chamber within the next year.
Over the past 2 years, regular reviews of the NIF Project have been
held every 6 months. Among other positive findings, the most recent
review concluded that ``The project has made impressive progress and
has been responsive to previous review team recommendations.'' NIF
remains a funding-constrained project that could be completed earlier
and at significantly less total cost if more of its total project
funding were to be made available in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year
2004 rather than in later years.
The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program is central to
many of the success stories of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Last
summer, we took delivery from IBM of ASCI White, the world's most
powerful computer, capable of 12.3 TeraOps (trillion operations per
second). This machine has been used intensively by all three weapons
laboratories to support stockpile stewardship through a variety of
applications. For example, in the fall of 2001 both Livermore and Los
Alamos used this machine to complete the first-ever fully three-
dimensional simulations of a complete warhead explosion. We are
earmarked to take delivery of our next ASCI computer in fiscal year
2004, a machine that will be capable of 60 to 100 TeraOps. The
groundbreaking ceremony for construction of the Terascale Simulation
Facility (TSF) to house this computer was held just last week.
The events of September 11 highlighted the immense value of the
NNSA Laboratories' technical capabilities and their activities to
reduce the threats posed by the proliferation or terrorist acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction. These efforts are part of a
comprehensive set of activities aimed at proliferation prevention
(e.g., through cooperative programs with Russia), detection and
reversal, response, and avoiding surprise (including support to the
U.S. Intelligence Community).
Post-September 11, Lawrence Livermore provided analysis and
assessments as well as information-operations tools and expert
personnel to the Intelligence Community. Our Nuclear Threat Assessment
Center operated 7 days a week to evaluate numerous smuggling incidents
and nuclear-related threats. Miniaturized DNA analysis technology
pioneered by Livermore made possible several biodetectors with vastly
improved capabilities which are being commercialized and are at the
core of the Nation's biodefense capabilities. In addition, our
Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS), extensively
used by the DOD, supported U.S. military efforts with evaluations
focused on sites of concern in and around Afghanistan. Later in my
statement, I provide many other examples of the capabilities and expert
assistance we are providing to help government entities defend against
WMD terrorism.
In short, Livermore's assessment capabilities and technologies are
contributing to homeland defense in manifold ways. We were able to
respond immediately because we had begun to address the threat of WMD
terrorism long before September 11. We take a comprehensive approach to
the problem, developing technologies and tools to counter threats and
working closely with Federal, state, and local response agencies to
ensure that our technological solutions meet real-world operational
needs. In several key areas, the research programs benefited greatly
from the use of Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD)
funding for exploratory efforts that led to technologies that are now
being deployed; for example, without the head start provided by LDRD,
the advanced biodetection systems that are now being fielded would
still be in development. We are poised to contribute to homeland
defense in the long-run through the development of more advanced
technologies to defend against both current and future threats. The
nation would greatly benefit from sustained funding for long-range
research and development activities at the NNSA Laboratories to improve
homeland security.
One area of concern is the proposed fiscal year 2003 budget for
Environmental Management efforts at the Laboratory, which constitutes a
reduction of about 27 percent from the fiscal year 2002 allocation of
$40.9 million. The Laboratory requires an additional $17.5 million
above the budget request to maintain its existing Environmental
Management program, which consists of two parts. The first is
Environmental Restoration--the clean up of groundwater and soil
contaminated from past operations. Considerable work has been done in
remediating contamination at the laboratory's two sites. However, with
the proposed cuts, Livermore will miss critical cleanup milestones that
have been negotiated by DOE with the State of California and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. In contrast, the laboratory strongly
believes that we should accelerate our cleanup activities, and we are
again proposing this initiative to DOE as we have in past years. The
second part of the program, Waste Management, involves the treatment,
handling, and disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste from ongoing
and past operations. Under the current proposed budget, it will be
impossible to support the laboratory's programmatic needs with a safe,
compliant waste management program. This will have severe impacts on
the national security mission and will cause certain programmatic
activities to be deferred and/or cancelled.
On a positive note, from Livermore's perspective, I am very pleased
with the progress that General Gordon is making at NNSA and with
changes at the University of California in its role as manager of the
Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories. Preparation of the 5
year plan for NNSA's Defense Program activities is the first of what I
expect to be many tangible benefits from NNSA organizational changes.
General Gordon's plan to eliminate a layer of field management and to
reengineer operations at NNSA sites are other important steps. We at
Livermore are working with NNSA to find ways to significantly reduce
the administrative workload. As part of the University of California's
management and operations contract extension, the position of Vice
President for Laboratory Management was created and John McTague was
selected to serve. Dr. McTague is providing outstanding leadership in
efforts to strengthen management accountability, institute more uniform
best practices in operations at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos, and
foster even greater cooperation between the laboratories.
As you may be aware, I will be leaving my position as laboratory
director soon, when my successor has been selected. I appreciate the
support that this committee has provided to Lawrence Livermore and to
me during my tenure. I also appreciate having had the opportunity to
serve our Nation in this manner. I look forward to the very positive
future that I believe Lawrence Livermore will have with your continued
support.

THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to ensure the safety
and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile required to meet
national security needs of the 21st century. Confidence in the safety
and reliability of the weapons is to be maintained through an ongoing
and integrated process of stockpile surveillance, assessment and
certification, and refurbishment. Stockpile stewardship is a principal
mission of the NNSA. NNSA began operation in March 2000.
Earlier this year General John Gordon, Administrator of NNSA,
announced organizational changes to enhance NNSA's performance in core
mission areas. The changes realign and separate programmatic and
operational functions within the agency. The organizational and other
positive changes adopted by General Gordon will clarify lines of
communication and authority, which should improve overall efficiency
and performance. Execution of the Stockpile Stewardship Program remains
the primary responsibility of the NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs (NNSA/DP).
The changes being made at NNSA will facilitate long-range planning
and the preparation of a comprehensive 5 year budget, which are
critically important. The Stockpile Stewardship Program faces many
competing demands for available resources. Difficult trade-off
decisions will have to be made. NNSA must balance evolving requirements
for directed stockpile work, the need for vigorous campaigns to prepare
stockpile stewards for the more challenging issues that will arise as
weapons continue to age, and required investments in research and
production facilities and people.
We will greatly benefit from enhanced 5 year planning because it
will establish reliable future program bases at each of the
laboratories and production facilities, which greatly helps in
resource, workforce, and facility planning. Completion of the Nuclear
Posture Review has also been an important step in defining future
program policy direction. Livermore's expertise in many nuclear-weapons
issues is a national resource that has contributed to these
deliberations. Enhanced 5 year budget planning and the outcome of high-
level reviews are also important for the future of our laboratory's
nonproliferation and arms control programs.
Integrated Program Management and Execution
Integrated program management and execution is critical to the
success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The three major program
elements--surveillance, assessment and certification, and
refurbishment--are tightly interconnected. So are the activities of the
three laboratories, the production plants, and the Nevada Test Site.
Livermore has many close partnerships and working relationships with
other sites in the weapons complex. As one of the two nuclear design
laboratories, we have particularly important formal certification
responsibilities. The laboratory also operates a number of unique,
state-of-the-art experimental and computer facilities that are
essential for both assessment of stockpile performance and
certification of refurbishment actions.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program is formally managed by NNSA/DP
through three overarching sets of activities: Directed Stockpile Work,
Campaigns, and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities. NNSA/DP uses
this breakout to make evident program integration, establish more
clearly program goals and budget priorities, and help to identify
program risks if there are budget shortfalls. The integrated program
activities include:

Directed Stockpile Work. Directed Stockpile Work
supports the readiness of weapons and includes activities to
meet current stockpile requirements. The effort includes weapon
maintenance, comprehensive surveillance, weapon baselining,
assessment and certification, supporting research and
development, and scheduled weapon refurbishments. It also
includes other stockpile commitments, such as dismantlement and
information archiving.
Campaigns. Campaigns are directed at making the
scientific and technological advances necessary to assess and
certify weapon performance now and over the long-term. They
develop and maintain specific critical capabilities that are
needed to sustain a viable nuclear deterrent. Each campaign has
milestones and specific end-dates designed to focus advanced
basic and applied science, computing, and engineering efforts
on well-defined deliverables related to the stockpile. The
current set of 17 campaigns provides a planning framework for
the program's research and development activities.
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities.
``Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities'' ensures that
necessary investments are made in people and their supporting
infrastructure. Readiness includes the fixed costs and the
investments of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and it aims
to ensure the presence of: (1) high-quality, motivated people
in the program with the needed skills and training; (2) a well-
maintained, modern infrastructure--to support the activities of
these people--that is operated in a safe, secure, and
environmentally responsible manner; and (3) special
experimental and computational facilities that must be
developed and brought on line for stewardship to be successful
in the long term.

A rigorous planning process has been established to clearly define
programmatic milestones to be achieved within each of these program
areas. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is now defined by a series of
5-year plans, one for each program element, describing goals and
objectives. The 5-year plans, which were developed with participation
by the laboratories, plants, and the test site, are accompanied by
annual implementation plans with detailed milestones.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN DIRECTED STOCKPILE WORK

Livermore is the design laboratory for four weapon systems in the
stockpile: the W87 and W62 ICBM warheads, the B83 bomb, and the W84
cruise missile warhead. They are expected to remain in the stockpile
well past their originally anticipated lifetimes; the W62 already has.
Significant effort is being expended on weapons surveillance and
baselining, on assessing the weapons' performance, and on maintenance
and selective refurbishment. We have just completed a major effort to
extend the stockpile life of the W87 warhead, and Livermore and Sandia/
California have been assigned the responsibility for the engineering
development work to refurbish the W80, a Los Alamos-designed weapon.
Stockpile Surveillance and Baselining
Our stockpile surveillance efforts focus on assessing the condition
of Livermore designs in the stockpile and on understanding the effect
of aging on weapons in the stockpile. Aging is important because it
affects the physical characteristics of materials, and we must
determine how these changes impact weapon safety and performance. With
a better understanding of aging, our stockpile surveillance can be more
predictive, making possible systematic refurbishment and preventative
maintenance activities to correct developing problems. An important
factor here is to be able to detect subtle changes to the weapon system
well in advance of the change causing a safety, reliability, or
performance issue. This is essential to prepare for upgrades or life
extension efforts that may take many years to fully implement.
As we gather more data and gain experience, we review and upgrade
our surveillance programs--refining sampling plans, measuring
additional attributes, introducing new diagnostic tools, and improving
analysis methods. We are also taking on responsibility for surveillance
of pits from Livermore-designed weapons in the stockpile to better
balance the workload. These activities had been conducted at Los
Alamos.
In addition, we are improving the sensors and techniques used to
inspect all stockpiled weapons. In concert with the Enhanced
Surveillance Campaign and as part of the Directed Stockpile work, we
have developed processes to deploy newly emerging diagnostics into the
core surveillance program. These diagnostics are enabling us to better
diagnose and quantify the condition of the stockpile, and to identify
aging characteristics at the earliest possible time. For example,
Livermore, in cooperation with Y-12, has completed the development of
an analytical model and the development and deployment of a suite of
diagnostic tools that enable us to understand the aging behavior of
secondary assemblies. We are also completing development of high-
resolution x-ray tomography for imaging weapon pits; first phase
deployment at LLNL is complete and has been demonstrated, and
deployment at Pantex is continuing. Furthermore, development continues
of high-energy neutron radiography for nondestructively detecting small
voids and structural defects in weapon systems.
Stockpile Safety and Performance Assessments
Assessments of the safety and performance of stockpiled weapons and
modification actions must be demonstration based--that is, grounded on
existing nuclear test data, non-nuclear tests, fundamental science
experiments, and simulations using validated computer models. To the
extent possible, non-nuclear tests are used to assess weapon safety and
performance. Together with past nuclear test results, they also are
used to validate computer simulations. Once validated to the extent
possible, these simulations guide expert judgment in making complete,
integral assessments of stockpile issues. Such demonstration-based
assessments underpinned Livermore's W87 stockpile life extension
program (discussed below) and will provide similar support to our W80
life extension work. In addition, this methodology is applied to the
assessment of issues that arise in the course of ongoing stockpile
surveillance and is the foundation of our annual certification
assessments.
Annual Stockpile Certification. Annual certification of the
stockpile is fully reliant on the laboratories' assessment
capabilities. Formal review processes for certification of weapon
safety and reliability in the absence of nuclear testing have been
established as part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is
essential that judgments and decisions made by the stockpile stewards
are credible among themselves, to DOD and others in the nuclear weapons
community, and to the administration and Congress, and the annual
certification process is an essential means to that end.
Annual certification is based on the technical evaluations made by
the NNSA Laboratories and on advice from the laboratory directors, the
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, and the Nuclear
Weapons Council. In the course of annual certification, our laboratory
collects and reviews all available information about each stockpile
weapon system, including physics, engineering, and chemistry and
materials science data. This work is subjected to rigorous, in-depth
review by scientists, engineers, and managers throughout the program.
In addition, it is reviewed by several DOD groups. Livermore completed
its support of the 2001 annual certification cycle in September 2001,
when I sent my annual certification letter to the Secretaries of Energy
and Defense. In conjunction with their colleagues at Sandia, Livermore
personnel are now well into the 2002 cycle and are on a pace to
complete our support of that cycle on schedule.
Stockpile Maintenance and Refurbishment
Each year, the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan sets the requirement
to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, and it
specifies the number of weapons of each type to be in the stockpile.
Among other responsibilities, the DOD establishes military
requirements, which are incorporated into the plan. These requirements
drive the Directed Stockpile Work workload for NNSA, particularly in
the resource-intensive area of refurbishment activities and life-
extension programs. The W87 life-extension program is in its production
phase and activities are planned for the B61, W76 and W80 systems.
The W87 Life Extension Program. In April 2001, Admiral Richard Mies
(Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command) and General Gordon
visited Livermore to celebrate certification of the life-extension
refurbishment of the W87 ICBM warhead. Formal certification was
completed with signing of the Final Weapon Development Report by Sandia
Director Paul Robinson and myself. This first completed certification
of a warhead refurbished through a life-extension program (LEP) is a
groundbreaking milestone for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It
demonstrates effective cooperation of the laboratories and the
production facilities to overcome physics, engineering, and
manufacturing challenges to meet DOD requirements without conducting a
nuclear test.
The development activities for this program included extensive
flight testing, ground testing, and physics and engineering analysis.
High-fidelity flight tests, incorporating the latest technological
advances in onboard diagnostic instrumentation and telemetry, provided
added confidence in the reliability of the design modifications.
Assessment of nuclear performance is based on computer simulation, past
nuclear tests, and new above-ground experiments that addressed specific
physics questions raised by the engineering alterations and computer
simulations.
The objective of the W87 LEP was to enhance the structural
integrity of the warhead so that it may remain part of the enduring
stockpile beyond the year 2025 and meet anticipated future requirements
for the system: the W87/Mark 21 is planned as a single RV option for
the Minuteman III ICBM. The first production unit was completed at the
Pantex Plant in February 1999, and production is proceeding on schedule
for completion early in 2004.
Life Extension of the W80. Under the direction of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, the W80 Project Officers Group (POG) is pursuing an
LEP for the W80 cruise missile warhead, which was developed by Los
Alamos and Sandia/New Mexico. A formal study that defined refurbishment
options and their feasibility (known as a 6.2 study) was completed in
2000. Livermore and Sandia/California participated as an
Interlaboratory Peer Review team. In this role, the California team
evaluated proposed modifications to the warhead for feasibility, aging
effects on the modifications, impact to the DOE complex, and production
issues. The W80 POG has selected a final refurbishment option for the
LEP, and NNSA has assigned the associated engineering development task
to Livermore and Sandia/California. This assignment better balances the
workload among the laboratories and provides a vehicle for the
laboratory to develop the skills of the next generation of stockpile
stewards. The California laboratories will also be the design agencies
for certifying the safety and reliability of the refurbished warheads,
the W80 Mods 2 and 3. Los Alamos and Sandia/New Mexico will continue to
be responsible for certification of the W80 Mods 0 and 1.
During 2001, the New Mexico and California teams completed a
baselining study to establish a modern understanding of the current W80
and its performance. Livermore is now continuing to conduct above-
ground experiments and simulations on the current warhead in
preparation for beginning work on the LEP modifications. At this time
there is a congressional hold on NNSA work for the LEP as the Air Force
defines its plans for parallel life extension work on the cruise
missiles themselves.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP CAMPAIGNS

As I have earlier described, stockpile stewardship campaigns are
focused, technically challenging, multifunctional efforts that address
critical capabilities that will be needed to achieve certification of
stockpiled weapons as more challenging issues arise. Eight campaigns
are aimed at providing the scientific understanding needed to certify
the nuclear weapons stockpile and to support required weapon
modernization in life extension programs. Three additional campaigns
focus on weapon engineering. They provide specific tools, capabilities,
and components in support of weapon maintenance, modernization, and
refurbishment, as well as certification of weapon systems. The final
six campaigns support readiness by focusing on sustaining the
manufacturing base within the weapons complex. Examples of Livermore's
major contributions to these multi-site campaigns are highlighted
below.
Experiments, Theory, and Modeling to Better Understand Plutonium
One of the major success stories of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program is the significant improvement we are making in understanding
the properties of plutonium. This is a very important issue--we need to
understand aging in plutonium and the effect of aging-related changes
on the performance of an imploding pit of a stockpiled weapon. The
required capacity of the production complex depends on the anticipated
lifetime of plutonium pits in the stockpile. An accurate assessment is
necessary. If we under estimate the lifetime of pits, we may over
invest in facilities to remanufacture plutonium parts. If we over
estimate the lifetime of pits, the Nation could find itself critically
short of capacity for plutonium operations when it is vitally needed.
Laboratory Experiments and Modeling. Available information
indicates that plutonium used in pit applications is stable; however,
we must assess the effects of long-term aging. Plutonium's properties
are among the most complex of all the elements. To study the subtleties
of plutonium, we have combined advances in theoretical modeling with
the use of sophisticated experiments. For example, we are using old
pits and accelerated-aging alloys to determine the lifetime of pits.
Accelerated-aging samples are plutonium alloys with a mixture of
isotopes to increase the rate of self-irradiation damage so that the
material ``ages'' faster.
Data from our materials, engineering, and dynamic experiments show,
so far, that pits are stable. Livermore has conducted important
experiments on old pits using advanced materials characterization tools
such as our Transmission Electron Microscope, the most powerful such
instrument in the NNSA complex. Using the Transmission Electron
Microscope, we have discovered nanoscale (10^-9 inch) bubbles
that are likely filled with helium in the microstructure of aged
plutonium. The plutonium appears to be accommodating the helium, which
is created through self-irradiation, in a stable form. The presence of
these bubbles was predicted theoretically using computer simulations of
the radiation damage process.
Experiments at the Nevada Test Site. Livermore is conducting sub-
critical experiments at the Nevada Test Site to investigate the
properties of plutonium shocked and accelerated by high explosives.
Matter can be ejected from the free surface of materials that undergo
shock. The experiments characterize ejecta, which is thought to affect
the performance of primaries in weapons. Performance is being studied
as a function of plutonium age as well as surface finish and
manufacturing technique. Results will affect estimates of pit lifetime
and decisions about future production of replacement pits, and improve
our fundamental understanding of performance.
Unlike our first three subcritical experiments, tests in the
current Oboe series are performed inside individual confinement
vessels. Eight of the nine planned Oboe experiments have been
completed, two of them in 2001. By using small expendable vessels, up
to 12 separate experiments can now be conducted in the same underground
test chamber--the zero room--over several years. Following the test,
after the chamber is determined to be contamination-free, personnel are
allowed to enter the zero room to retrieve films and data. The use of
the vessels for subcritical experiments is resulting in significant
cost reduction and improved data return. In the past, each subcritical
experiment followed a complex schedule with time-consuming
preparations, and after each test, the zero room, with all its
diagnostic equipment, was permanently contaminated and could not be
reused.
In addition, we are bringing into operation the Joint Actinide
Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility at the Nevada
Test Site, a two-stage gas gun for performing shock tests on special
nuclear materials. JASPER experiments, which are planned to start
during this fiscal year, will complement other experimental and
modeling activities by providing scientists more precise equation-of-
state data at extreme conditions than can be obtained from other types
of experiments. To support the planned JASPER experiments, two inert-
atmosphere gloveboxes have been installed in the Device Assembly
Facility (DAF). These gloveboxes will be used to assemble the special
nuclear material targets into their final experimental configuration.
We are now performing the final design modifications to the target
chamber necessary to qualify the facility for use with plutonium.
Modeling and Experiments to Probe Weapon Performance
The Contained Firing Facility/Flash X-Ray Facility. Hydrodynamics
testing is the most valuable experimental tool we have for diagnosing
device performance issues for primaries in stockpiled weapons. Through
hydrodynamics experiments conducted at Livermore's Site 300 and the
Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at Los
Alamos, weapon scientists are able to characterize the energy delivered
from the high explosives to a mock pit, the response of the pit to
hydrodynamic shocks, and the resulting distribution of pit materials
when they are highly compressed. These three pieces of information are
critical for baselining weapons, certifying stockpile performance, and
validating hydrodynamics simulation codes.
Over the past decade, we have made tremendous advances in the
development of diagnostics capabilities and experimental techniques
used in hydrodynamic testing. We are now able to gather far more
revealing data from hydrodynamic tests than was possible when we
developed the weapons that are now in the stockpile. The most
sophisticated type of hydro experiment is the ``core punch,'' in which
scientists use high-energy radiography to record a digital image of the
detailed shape of the gas cavity inside a pit when it is highly
compressed. In 1998, we carried out the first core punches on two
important stockpile primary devices: the W76 SLBM warhead and the B83
strategic bomb.
The Flash X-Ray Facility was shut down in 1999 and work began on an
upgrade that will contain the debris created by explosive testing.
Construction of the Contained Firing Facility is now finished, and the
qualification testing has been completed to assure its ability to
contain debris from experiments that use up to 60 kilograms of high
explosives. The first stockpile-related experiment was executed last
month. Livermore is now able to conduct these critically important
experiments with isolation from the surrounding environment.
Three-Dimensional Simulation of a Nuclear Weapon Explosion. Our
hydrodynamic testing of mock primaries is complemented with a vigorous
simulation program that achieved a remarkable milestone in October
2001. The first-ever three-dimensional simulation of a full-system
nuclear weapon explosion was completed using the ASCI White computer at
Livermore. Demonstrating the ability to use a single code to simulate
in three dimensions the operation of a full weapon system, from primary
implosion through secondary explosion, marks a major step forward in
our weapon simulation program. This achievement demonstrates an
unprecedented capability for addressing the complex 3D behavior
expected from an aging stockpile.
The complex computer model that was used, called a ``burn code,''
employs tens of millions of zones--hundreds of times more than a
comparable two-dimensional simulation. The work was completed through
an intense, sustained effort that involved weapons code developers and
computer support personnel. It required innovative three-dimensional
algorithms able to represent the relevant physical processes and run
efficiently on the machine's parallel architecture. The simulation ran
a total of 43 days on 1,024 processors of the ASCI White computer and
produced tens of terabytes of data. Analyzing and preparing the data
for visualization again required the parallel processing capability of
ASCI White. This post-processing enabled our weapon scientists to get
an accurate and detailed picture of the full operation of the weapon
from beginning to end.
Modeling and Experiments of High-Explosive. Some of the most
technically challenging problems involve modeling the chemistry of
detonation occurring at conditions up to 500,000 atmospheres pressure
and many thousands of degrees centigrade. Conventional explosives have
been successfully modeled in the past using the assumption of
instantaneous reaction rate. The most advanced weapons in the stockpile
use insensitive high explosives in which the detonation reaction rates
are much slower. Livermore scientists have now linked a sophisticated
chemistry code, Cheetah, to the hydrocode ARES. In the simulations of
detonation, ARES determines the motion of the materials, Cheetah
provides at each time step the state of chemical reactions and
equation-of-state data for the relevant intermediate and final reaction
products, which affects subsequent hydrodynamic performance. Although
the work is in the early stages, simulations are identifying detonation
phenomena not previous resolved.
The safety of the stockpile continues to be of paramount
importance. Although we believe that the stockpile is safe, the
vulnerability of nuclear weapons to complex stimuli involving fire,
mechanical crush, and shock remains a critical issue. To help meet this
assessment challenge, we have developed the capability in the ALE3D
code to simulate a weapon in a coupled thermal-chemical-mechanical-
hydrodynamic environment, which is typical of a weapon in a fire
scenario. An experimental effort is collecting fundamental material
property data from which models are developed and then implemented in
ALE3D. This capability is being used to help assess both weapon safety
and safety issues at the Pantex Plant.
High-Energy-Density Weapon Physics (HEDP) Calculations and Experiments
To determine the performance of thermonuclear weapons, we need to
accurately model how various types of radiation interact with their
surroundings. The fundamental physical processes are particularly
complex in the dynamic high-energy-density conditions present during
the functioning of a weapon. Materials behave very differently at star-
like pressures and temperatures. Modeling weapon performance is made
even more difficult by the fact that many of the issues we need to
consider are inherently three-dimensional. Weapons have been designed
as one- or two-dimensional objects but they are in detail three-
dimensional and age three dimensionally (e.g., cracks or other
irregularities). To address these issues in the absence of nuclear
testing requires high fidelity three-dimensional modeling that requires
the computing power that ASCI promises to deliver. It also demands
experimental facilities and capabilities that can generate data in the
relevant regimes to develop and validate these models.
High-Energy-Density Physics Experiments. Extraordinary progress
continued to be made during the past year toward developing
quantitative metrics for stockpile assessment and warhead
certification. Analysis based on these metrics has been the basis for
defining a detailed experimental weapons-physics program to be
conducted at HEDP facilities. The Omega laser at the University of
Rochester and the Z Machine at Sandia continue to be used effectively
to examine physics issues important to improving our understanding of
weapon performance, and to aid in the design and planning of future NIF
experiments. For NIF, which will deliver nearly 60 times the energy
density of Omega, we are actively working to develop the associated
experimental infrastructure required to support those experiments.
Although the assessment and warhead certification approaches of the
national laboratories differ, they all require an enhanced
understanding of HEDP weapon behavior as an essential component of
their Stockpile Stewardship Programs. We are jointly exploring ways to
collaborate closely on topics of mutual interest in this area while
attempting to maintain a necessary level of independence in order to
assure independent peer review of critical stockpile issues.
High-Energy-Density Physics Modeling. Livermore researchers
achieved a number of major three-dimensional HEDP simulation milestones
during the past year. Two major milestones in 2001 were the first-ever
three-dimensional simulation of the thermonuclear performance of a
weapon secondary and the three-dimensional simulation of the integrated
performance of a modern two-stage nuclear weapon. In addition to the
codes developed to simulate nuclear weapon performance, the laboratory
continues to develop the three-dimensional code HYDRA. In 2001 HYDRA
was used to simulate the performance of targets being designed to
achieve ignition and thermonuclear burn on the NIF in three dimensions.
The simulations conducted this year included the first ever-integrated
three-dimensional simulation of the entire ignition target (hohlraums
and fusion capsule). All of the work cited above was carried out at the
laboratory using the ASCI White supercomputer.
accomplishments and challenges in technical base and facilities
Assessments of weapon performance and certification of weapon
refurbishments must be based on scientific and engineering
demonstration to be credible. In the absence of nuclear testing, we
rely on data from past nuclear tests as a benchmark, component-level
experiments and demonstration, and advanced simulations for an
integrated assessment of weapon performance and safety. This approach
has enabled us to successfully certify the W87 life-extension
refurbishment and address stockpile issues that have emerged to date.
However, as the stockpile ages, we anticipate that more difficult
issues will arise.
These needs--to be able to assess and certify both weapon
performance and refurbishment actions--drive the Stockpile Stewardship
Program's investments in much more capable experimental facilities,
such as the NIF, the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility
and even more advanced hydro-test capabilities, and greatly enhanced
numerical simulation tools developed through the Advanced Simulation
and Computing (ASCI) program. We are not progressing as quickly as we
could to acquire these greater capabilities because of competing needs
for Stockpile Stewardship Program resources that must be balanced. The
program must meet requirements for Directed Stockpile Work (e.g., life-
extension programs) and pursue vigorous campaigns in weapons science
and technology. In addition, the nuclear weapons complex is in need of
infrastructure recapitalization to support all of these activities.
Program success requires both efficient, flexible, and modern
manufacturing facilities and a work environment at the laboratories and
production facilities that makes it possible to attract and retain an
exceptional staff. Here, the discussion focuses on two areas where much
more capable research facilities are required--NIF and ASCI--and on the
need for infrastructure reinvestment.
The National Ignition Facility
Construction is continuing at Livermore on the NIF, a major
research facility housing a 192-beam laser and associated experimental
capabilities. NIF will be the world's largest laser, delivering 60
times more energy density than the Omega laser at the University of
Rochester (and the previous Nova Laser at Lawrence Livermore),
currently the largest laser in the NNSA High Energy Density Science
program. NIF will provide 1.8 megajoules of ultraviolet laser energy
that can be used to compress and heat a small capsule filled with
deuterium and tritium to conditions at which thermonuclear fusion
occurs. NIF is a cornerstone and essential element of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. It will also provide scientific and technical
information that may eventually lead to practical fusion energy
production.
The baseline plan and schedule for NIF was included in General
Gordon's certification of the NIF project, provided to Congress on
April 6, 2001. The schedule provides for project completion at the end
of fiscal year 2008, and the NIF team's goal in the coming year is to
achieve ``first light'' by delivering four laser beams to the target
chamber. The fiscal year 2002 budget provides $245 million for
continued NIF construction and the fiscal year 2003 budget provides the
requested $214 million. The pace of construction has now been
constrained over the past 2 years by available annual funding in the
overall NNSA/DP budget, and the project could be completed
significantly earlier at a lower total cost if more funding were
available in the near term.
The Importance of NIF to Stockpile Stewardship. NIF is vital to the
success of stockpile stewardship. It will be the only facility capable
of well-diagnosed experiments to examine thermonuclear ignition and
burn and to study the high-energy-density properties of primaries and
secondaries in nuclear weapons. We need the facility for experimental
study of key issues related to the effect of aging on weapons and for
certification of the performance of refurbished weapons. In addition,
NIF experiments provide the only available means for advancing critical
elements of the underlying science of nuclear weapons. NIF experiments
will provide necessary data for sophisticated computer simulation
models being developed for stockpile stewardship, and the models
themselves need to be tested in the physical conditions that only the
NIF can provide. Finally, NIF will help to attract and train the
exceptional scientific and technical talent that is required to sustain
the Stockpile Stewardship Program over the long term.
In April 2001, NNSA released the report of the High-Energy-Density
Physics (HEDP) Workshop, held January 30-February 2, 2001. This report
reconfirmed NIF's essential role in the Stockpile Stewardship Program
and recommended that NIF be completed to its full 192-beam
configuration on its baseline schedule. The Workshop Panel included
representatives from DOE, NNSA, DOD, the three NNSA Laboratories, and
Argonne National Laboratory. They reviewed presentations by experts in
weapons design, high-energy-density science (HEDS), and Inertial
Confinement Fusion (ICF) from the three laboratories that discussed
options for NIF deployment, other HEDS facilities that can complement
NIF, and Stockpile Stewardship Program needs for HEDS and weapons
experiments/calculations for future stockpile certification.
NIF Project Technical Progress and Accomplishments. Overall the NIF
project is more than 60 percent complete. Major progress continues to
be made and at a rapid pace. In September 2001 the NIF conventional
facilities construction, a $270 million project, was completed on
schedule and on budget. In October, the Project completed installation
of one-quarter of NIF's beampath infrastructure. Now in place are the
precision-cleaned enclosures for the components of 48 laser beams. A
strong partnership between the laboratory, Jacobs Facilities Inc. (the
contractor for installation, management, and integration), and the
local building and crafts trade unions have enabled the Project to
achieve these key milestones. We are continuing to install NIF
infrastructure and at the end of March we have nearly one half or 96
laser beams worth of precision-cleaned enclosures installed.
The NIF team continues to make outstanding technical progress. Last
year I cited numerous examples of progress on crystals, laser amplifier
glass and optics damage mitigation. Now nearly 80 percent of the
required 3,072 high-quality laser-glass slabs are in hand, and over
half of the large crystals used for optical switches and frequency
conversion have been grown. This year we have made even greater
progress on the development of new optics polishing techniques that can
reduce the damage potential of NIF optics much more than our
requirements. We are currently implementing these new techniques at our
vendors to provide the first optics for NIF's final focusing systems.
NIF's clean-room facilities are being commissioned, and production
has begun on some components. Validation of NIF's clean assembly,
transport, and installation requirements was demonstrated with the
installation of a laser-glass slab assembly into NIF's main amplifier.
In addition:

We have begun installing equipment into NIF's core
area for generating seed laser pulses, controlling the entire
laser system, and powering the laser amplifiers.
We are nearing the point where we will begin
installation of actual laser components, glass, optics,
crystals, flashlamps, etc. for the operation of the first four
laser beams in the coming months.

In the coming year the NIF team's goal is to achieve ``first
light'' by delivering four infrared laser beams through the entire
laser chain into a diagnostics station. Soon after, these four laser
beams will be transported to the final optics assembly where they will
be converted to ultraviolet light and focused to the center of the
target chamber. This achievement will serve to provide validation and
confidence in all of NIF's systems and will allow operational
activities to commence. As more of NIF comes on line, fundamental
physics regimes for materials science, high-energy-density science, and
thermonuclear ignition and burn will become accessible for study. NIF
will provide temperatures and pressures needed to validate computer
codes and address important issues of national security and basic
science.
Reviews of the NIF Project. Over the past 2 years, regular reviews
of the NIF Project have been held every 6 months. These reviews are
managed by NNSA Office of Defense Programs and bring together experts
in a variety of technical, fiscal, and project management fields to
thoroughly review the status of the NIF construction project. The most
recent review was held in November 2001. Mr. Willie Clark, from NNSA's
Office of Project Management and Engineering Support, led this review.
The findings and conclusions of this review included:

The project has made impressive progress and has been
responsive to previous review team recommendations.
A strong management team is in place; the NIF Project
organization is functioning very effectively.
Significant safety improvements have been made.
Effectiveness of NNSA oversight has improved.

In addition to these semi-annual reviews, NNSA staff in the Office
of the NIF Project attend regular monthly Project reviews held at
Livermore. These reviews provide detailed status reports and
assessments of cost and schedule for the Project. We also provide
quarterly reports on the NIF's construction project to the Deputy
Secretary of Energy.
Preparation for NIF's Experimental Program. With the rapid progress
being made on the NIF Project, we are at once pleased and concerned
that experiments on NIF are becoming a reality in the coming year. We
are pleased because NIF's promising role in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will become evident even with the first few laser beams, which
will provide more energy than the entire Omega laser, the world's
largest currently operating laser system. We have planned a campaign of
experiments for the first phase of NIF operations that will help
provide important scientific data on stockpile-relevant materials and
that may help us to enhance our ability to reach fusion ignition using
large short-pulse laser systems.
I am also concerned because the experimental program for NIF and
for other high-energy-density science facilities is being placed under
great pressure because of reductions in funding in the fiscal year 2003
budget. These reductions place our experimental program in jeopardy by
preventing the timely development and fielding of NIF's core diagnostic
systems that are essential for collecting the data from experiments. We
are also facing delays in the development and fabrication of the
cryogenic target systems required for ignition experiments on NIF.
Delay of these critical programs reduces our ability to provide NIF as
a key facility for stockpile stewardship and impacts scheduled
availability for upcoming Stockpile Life-Extension Programs.
We are currently working with NNSA and General Gordon to better
understand our options for fiscal year 2003 for these programs. Current
projections, however, are not positive for providing for the effective
utilization of NIF as it comes available in the next year.
The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) Program
The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program (formerly
called the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative) is greatly
advancing our ability to computationally simulate the performance of an
aging stockpile and to certify the details of refurbishment projects.
To make the needed major advances in weapons science and engineering
simulation codes, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national
laboratories are obtaining from U.S. industry dramatic increases in
computer performance and information management. The ASCI program is
integrating the development of computer platforms, simulation
applications, and data management technologies. It will take a string
of successive investments to achieve ASCI's long-term goals.
Livermore's partnership with IBM has been highly successful. We
took delivery of ASCI Blue Pacific in fiscal year 1998 and then ASCI
White in fiscal year 2000. Both machines exceeded their performance
requirements and are being used to support stockpile stewardship
through a variety of applications, some of which I have discussed. The
important next step in ASCI at Livermore is a supercomputer capable of
60 to 100 TeraOps (trillion operations per second). It is planned for
late 2004. Necessary funding was received in fiscal year 2002 to begin
construction of the Terascale Simulation Facility to house this
computer. The building will be available in time to accept it.
ASCI White Successfully Meets Tri-Laboratory Needs for Stockpile
Stewardship. In 2001, the laboratory was home to the world's most
powerful supercomputer, the IBM ASCI White machine, which is capable of
12.3 TeraOps. It was the latest step in ASCI's ambitious efforts to
rapidly advance the state-of-the-art in computers, computational
models, and data management tools needed to simulate the performance of
nuclear weapons. It represented the first ``most capable'' system in
the NNSA complex, a system of unique capability and the major resource
for all three laboratories, two computing at a distance.
ASCI White is based on the next-generation IBM processor, node, and
switch technology. It consists of 512 nodes, each with 16 processors.
Exceeding its contractual performance requirement of 10 TeraOps, the
machine is about a factor of three faster than Livermore's Blue Pacific
computer, which was used to perform the first ever 3D simulation of the
full functioning of a nuclear weapon primary. The machine also provides
over 8 trillion bytes (terabytes) of main memory and about 110
terabytes of global disk space. This system was successfully used and
shared since early 2001 by all three NNSA Laboratories. To meet each
laboratory's requirements to run problems, calculations were
interleaved in an integration schedule for the machine. Livermore
successfully completed a three-dimensional secondary burn simulation in
June 2001. The calculation demonstrated the modeling of 3D features at
unprecedented resolution and validated scaling for several physics
algorithms.
Calculations done by Los Alamos and Livermore for the three-
dimensional prototype full-system coupled simulation were both
completed on ASCI White in late 2001. The size and scale of ASCI White
allowed the two laboratories to employ a level of spatial resolution
and depth of physics models that were heretofore completely beyond
reach in 3D. The speed, large memory, and stability of White were
essential elements contributing to the successful series of
calculations executed to accomplish these calculations. Similar
problems are now being run in support of additional calender year 2002
and calendar year 2003 programmatic deliverables. Sandia also used ASCI
White to perform structural dynamics calculations for different
environments that weapons might encounter. One terabyte of core memory
was used on each structural dynamics calculation in simulations that
were completed in late September 2001 and set many world records. These
calculations demonstrated effective use of computing capabilities at a
distance.
Simulation Modeling and the Problem-Solving Environment. ASCI is
more than powerful computers; it is the development of advanced
simulation techniques as well as data management and visualization
tools. Three Gordon Bell Awards, two in 1999 and one in 2000, exemplify
the outstanding simulation development capabilities at Livermore and a
growing base of expertise in using the machines. Most notable was the
1999 Gordon Bell Award for best performance in supercomputing. A team
led by Livermore researchers, with collaborators at the University of
Minnesota and IBM, solved a supercomputer problem with broad
applications.
Work by Los Alamos scientists provides a directly relevant example
of data management progress in 2001. They were able to use
visualization techniques developed by ASCI for the three-dimensional
full system coupled simulation mentioned earlier. These tools allowed
the scientists to run this calculation of unprecedented size on the
Livermore 12-TeraOps system and then utilize the 32-node visualization
partition on that computer to distill the data, send it back to Los
Alamos, and interactively visualize the simulation results at Los
Alamos. This capability was critical to enable Los Alamos' effective
use of the system. The data not necessary for visualization was stored
at unprecedented rates on the Livermore archive. For this particular
calculation, Los Alamos stored 12.6 terabytes (roughly equivalent to 12
million novels) in 13 hours in the Livermore archive, approximately 50
times faster than would have been possible just 2 years earlier. Such
advances in storage capability were necessary for the environment to
function. They demonstrate the inherent balance necessary and careful
planning undertaken in the ASCI simulation enterprise.
Beyond ASCI White and the Terascale Simulation Facility. The next
supercomputer at Livermore after ASCI White will move us much closer to
ASCI's goal of full-scale simulation of weapons performance using
advanced physics models with data derived from extensive, first-
principles physics simulations. The threshold for that capability is
100 TeraOps, and reaching the goal quickly is vital to success in
stockpile stewardship. Plans call for ASCI ``Q'' (30 TeraOps) to be
operational at Los Alamos in 2002, a 20-TeraOps machine at Sandia in
2003, and a 60- to 100-TeraOps machine for Livermore late in 2004. At
the onset of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, ASCI set as a goal the
delivery of a 100 TeraOps computer by 2004. The machine at Livermore
will be as close to 100 TeraOps as can be afforded within budget
limitations. It is important that plans for the 60- to 100-TeraOps
machine not slip.
The 60- to 100-TeraOps machine will be very large, and will require
the Terascale Simulation Facility (TSF) to house it. The congressional
line-item funding for this project was sufficient to enter into a
construction contract this year. This contract was recently signed and
the groundbreaking ceremony occurred on April 4, 2002. The TSF will
consist of a two-story computing facility with power and space to
accommodate a 100-TeraOps-class system; assessment areas and networking
control areas necessary for direction and assimilation of data; and a
four-story office structure for staff to manage and utilize the
simulation environment. We expect about 24,000 square feet of the
machine room (of the 48,000 square feet planned) to be available and
fully equipped to accept an ASCI-scale system by June 2004, just a few
months ahead of the arrival of the system.
The two machine rooms in TSF will guarantee our capability to site
any system required by the program. The TSF will function more like an
experimental facility than a computer center by supporting very close
cooperation between staff and analysts. Round the clock support for
major runs, restart capability for huge simulations, vast storage
archives, first-class data assessment facilities and on-the-fly trouble
shooting will support a mode of operations where ``runs'' will be
viewed as ``shots,'' analogous to nuclear tests, requiring intense
support to succeed. This was the model adopted by Livermore to support
the White system, and it proved to be extremely successful.

Infrastructure Recapitalization
Stockpile stewardship requires major investments in new facilities
and capabilities to make it possible for scientists and engineers to
more thoroughly understand the performance of nuclear weapons. As
discussed above, at Livermore these investments include construction of
NIF and acquisition of ASCI supercomputers and the TSF. The Stockpile
Stewardship Program will not succeed without the new-facility
investments that are being made at the NNSA Laboratories. Scheduled
programmatic work at the laboratories and the plants has also placed
exceedingly high demands on provided funding. The cumulative effect of
necessary continuing attention to the highest and most immediate
priorities over the course of the Stockpile Stewardship Program has
been shortage of funds to recapitalize NNSA's underlying
infrastructure.
In fiscal year 2002, funding began for NNSA's new facility
reinvestment initiative. The initiative focuses on those underlying
infrastructure needs at NNSA sites in support of directed stockpile
work and campaign programmatic requirements. Livermore fully supports
the initiative and is already working on several high-priority
recapitalization and disposition projects utilizing first year funding.
At Livermore, only 68 percent of our employees currently reside in
permanent space, and 53 percent of the temporary office space (trailers
and modular buildings) is nearing or beyond end-of-service life.
Overall, over 35 percent of Livermore's office and laboratory space is
less than adequate and in need of rehabilitation. Our overall
maintenance backlog is about $420 million if directly funded (with
programmatic dollars, for instance). In addition, obsolescent equipment
needs to be replaced. For example, the laboratory struggles to keep
pace with rapid advances in telecommunications capabilities, which are
critically needed to use our supercomputers efficiently and securely
and to upgrade our business operations. In addition, we have legacy
facilities from long-discontinued programs as well as unusable or
unsafe laboratory space that must be decommissioned, decontaminated
(where necessary), and demolished. Our legacy facilities and other
excess marginal space require considerable up-front investments to
rectify. We also have to invest so that buildings at Livermore meet
present-day seismic safety codes and the latest, more demanding safety
criteria.
Currently, we invest $8 to $10 million per year of overhead into
reducing our maintenance backlog. Over the next 10 years, we estimate
that Livermore will need an additional $25 million per year in new
funding to apply to maintenance deficiencies, $10 million per year for
demolition of its excess facilities, and $15 million per year to keep
pace with technological changes. We will be working with NNSA to
develop appropriate funding levels to address these concerns through
the facility reinvestment initiative.
Our overall infrastructure recapitalization goal is to provide and
maintain high quality, technologically state-of-the-art facilities
capable of meeting current and future mission requirements effectively
and efficiently. It is also important to note that sustaining the
quality of our workforce is a particularly challenging task in view of
the high demand in the private sector for skilled people. These
upgrades will provide quality facilities in order to attract and retain
the exceptional workforce that we need to accomplish our missions.

REDUCING THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OR TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

National security is threatened by the proliferation and potential
use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively referred
to as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD). The events of September 11,
2001, clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of free societies to
devastation as a result of concerted efforts of extremists. Adding to
this vulnerability are indications that terrorist groups, including the
followers of Osama bin Laden, are attempting to acquire WMD. In
addition, at least 20 countries, some of them hostile to U.S.
interests, are suspected of or known to be developing WMD.
Livermore's Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Program
Livermore is applying its nuclear expertise to the challenge of
nuclear weapons proliferation. Because the threat of proliferation is
not restricted to nuclear weapons and in response to legislation
calling for enhanced U.S. capabilities against WMD proliferation, we
are also developing the technologies, analysis, and expertise needed to
help stem the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. These
activities build on the large investment in chemical and biological
sciences at Livermore.
Our program in nonproliferation, arms control, and international
security is tackling the problem of WMD proliferation across the entire
spectrum of the threat. We take a comprehensive approach to the problem
with activities to prevent proliferation at the source, to detect and
reverse proliferant activities, and to counter WMD terrorism.
Improved scientific and technical capabilities are essential for
WMD threat reduction. The NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation supports the bulk of the research and development
activities that provide the technological base for those U.S. agencies
with operational responsibility for characterizing foreign weapons
programs and detecting proliferation-related activities, for detecting
and mitigating the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S.
civilians, and for negotiating and monitoring compliance with arms
reduction and other agreements.
Two aspects of the laboratory's contributions in 2001 to the
National WMD nonproliferation effort are highlighted here:

Assisting Government Agencies Defend Against WMD
Terrorism. Long before September 11, 2001, Livermore was
addressing the threat of WMD terrorism. We have developed
technologies and tools to counter nuclear, chemical, and
biological terrorist threats and are working closely with
Federal, State, and local response agencies to ensure that our
technological solutions meet real-world operational needs. Many
of our counterterrorism technologies and technical capabilities
have been deployed, before September 11 and in its aftermath,
to assist State and local governments defend against WMD
terrorism.
Preventing Proliferation at the Source. Proliferation
is most effectively halted at the source--of weapons-usable
nuclear materials, of weapons-related technology, and of WMD
expertise. We are a major player in the U.S.-Russian
nonproliferation programs. These programs consist of an
integrated set of activities to secure at-risk nuclear material
in Russia, dispose of excess highly enriched uranium and
plutonium, and assist in downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons
complex by helping the Russian closed cities and weapons
institutes develop self-sustaining commercial applications of
their scientific and technical expertise.
Assisting Government Agencies Defend Against WMD Terrorism
Countering terrorism has been a central element of Livermore's
national security mission for many years. The events of September 11
have lent new urgency to our efforts to apply the laboratory's
technologies, tools, and expertise to assist state and local
governments in preparing to defend against and respond to WMD
terrorism. Effective defense against terrorism requires the integration
of science and technology with emergency response operations, which in
turn requires coordination and collaboration between research and
development (R&D) institutions like Livermore and the various Federal,
State, and local emergency response agencies. We have made important
and unique contributions to counterterrorism preparedness, and with
increased resources we could do even more.
Countering the Nuclear Threat. Our Nuclear Threat Assessment
Program has provided comprehensive assessments of nuclear threats for
more than 20 years. This program is also the Department of Energy (DOE)
lead for assessing illicit trafficking in alleged nuclear materials. We
apply long-standing Livermore expertise in nuclear materials, nuclear
weapons, and device diagnostics to develop improved capabilities for
dealing with radiological emergencies, including terrorist events. We
are also a key participant in the DOE's national nuclear incident
response groups, including the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (which
deals with nuclear terrorism or extortion threats), the Accident
Response Group (which responds in the event of an accident involving
U.S. nuclear weapons) and the Radiological Assessment Program (which
assists State and local agencies). Livermore maintains a deployable
response capability, called HOTSPOT, which can be deployed to any
location by military aircraft to provide local radiological field
support.
Specifically, the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP) provides
technical and operational expertise to State and local agencies to
mitigate the consequences of a radiological incident or emergency. It
uses DOE and national laboratory experts with skills in assessing
radiological and toxic contamination and the attendant risks to human
health. The Livermore RAP team has primary responsibility for
California, Nevada, Hawaii, and the U.S. Pacific Rim territories. It is
called upon, on average, three to five times per year. In 2001, it
responded to three requests for assistance along with normal exercises
and training. Typically, RAP investigates containers suspected of
housing radioactive materials, seeks the location of lost industrial or
medical radioactive sources, and advises Federal, State, and local
authorities on the consequences of a radioactive release or personnel
contamination. RAP regularly drills with similar teams from other
Federal agencies, State, local, and tribal governments as well as
private companies and organizations. To deal with the latest emerging
threats, RAP now includes training to recognize and respond to nuclear
terrorism within the ``nuclear triage'' program being developed at DOE
headquarters.
Livermore has developed a concept for correlated sensor networks
for detecting and tracking ground-delivered nuclear devices or nuclear
materials. A novel algorithm integrates data from the various sensors,
together with information from other sources (e.g., an intelligent
traffic system) to identify sources of concern, track their movement
through the road network, and guide responders in intercepting the
suspect vehicle. This concept has been successfully demonstrated in an
urban environment. We have had discussions with the County of Los
Angeles concerning deploying a prototype system in the county in order
to gain real-world experience with the network in a congested
metropolitan area and to work with the appropriate response agencies to
develop a concept of operations.
Defending Against Bioterrorism. The biodefense capabilities that
have been deployed in the wake of September 11 have, at their core,
advances in biological detection instrumentation and DNA signatures
made at Livermore and its sister laboratory at Los Alamos. We are
developing gold-standard DNA signatures of top-priority threat
pathogens (anthrax, plague, etc.) and are working with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to validate these signatures and
distribute them to public health agencies nationwide.
We have made technology breakthroughs in biodetection
instrumentation, pioneering the miniaturization and ruggedization of
both flow cytometry and DNA identification devices. Our miniature
thermal cycler unit makes possible DNA amplification via polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) and identification in minutes rather than the
hours and days previously required. Livermore's miniaturized PCR
technology has been licensed to private industry and forms the basis of
today's most advanced commercial biodetection instruments (e.g.,
Cepheid's Smart Cycler, ETG's handheld biodetector).
The Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS),
developed jointly by Livermore and Los Alamos, was deployed as part of
the overall security strategy for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt
Lake City. (Cepheid Smart Cyclers are the heart of the BASIS field
laboratory.) In developing BASIS, Livermore and Los Alamos worked
closely with the many law enforcement, emergency response, and public
health agencies that would be involved in dealing with a bioterrorism
event to develop appropriate sample handling (chain of custody),
communications, and response protocols.
Atmospheric Modeling for Consequence Management. The Atmospheric
Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), located and operated at the
laboratory, is a national emergency response service for real-time
assessment of incidents involving nuclear, chemical, biological, or
natural hazardous material. ARAC can map the probable spread of
contamination in time for an emergency manager to decide whether
protective actions are necessary. ARAC is on call to respond to real
incidents and can also be used to evaluate specific scenarios for
emergency response planning, such as optimizing the siting of
bioaerosol samplers or determining evacuation routes.
Since it was established in 1979, ARAC has responded to more than
70 alerts, accidents, and disasters and has supported more than 800
exercises. In addition to accidental radiological releases (e.g.,
Chernobyl, 1986; Three Mile Island, 1979), ARAC has assessed natural
and manmade disasters (Mt. Pinatubo volcanic ash cloud, 1991; Kuwaiti
oil fires, 1991). ARAC has also provided assessments to State and local
responders to toxic chemical accidents (e.g., Richmond sulfuric acid
cloud, 1993; Sacramento River Spill, 1991). State and local agencies
can request ARAC support for actual releases or planning by contacting
DOE's Office of Emergency Response or the ARAC program office at
Livermore.
Chemical Analysis for Forensic Attribution. Timely and complete
analysis of suspect chemicals can answer important questions related to
nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Our Forensic
Science Center has assembled a unique capability for detecting and
characterizing ultratrace levels of virtually any compound in any
sample matrix. Expertise and instrumentation are available for complete
chemical and isotopic analysis of nuclear materials, inorganic
materials, organic materials (e.g., chemical warfare agents, illegal
drugs), and biological materials (e.g., toxins, DNA). The Forensic
Science Center also develops advanced laboratory and field capabilities
for ultratrace analysis, including a portable (55-pound) gas
chromatograph/mass spectrometer, field kits for thin-layer
chromatography, and novel sample collectors using solid-phase
microextraction.
The Forensic Science Center has begun the rigorous testing required
to become the second U.S. laboratory certified by the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under the terms of
the CWC, all samples collected from inspected facilities must be
analyzed at two OPCW-designated laboratories. The U.S. Congress
mandates that all U.S. samples be tested in the U.S. Currently, the
U.S. has only one designated laboratory, the Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Forensic Analytical Center. Livermore will provide the
second required facility.
Over the years, the Forensic Science Center has responded to many
requests from law enforcement for assistance in forensic analysis of
unique samples. The Center has been brought in to analyze the ``cold
fusion'' explosion at SRI International, Supernote counterfeit bills,
methamphetamine samples, biotoxins, suspect chemical-warfare specimens,
and nuclear contraband. It has characterized explosive traces from the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Unabomber case, and the Fremont
serial bomber; performed forensic sleuthing related to the Riverside
``mystery fumes'' case; and analyzed samples for the Glendale ``Angel
of Death'' case. Locally, the Center assisted Livermore police by
rapidly identifying a vapor that sickened response personnel at the
scene of a suicide; once the chemical was identified (malathion), law
enforcement agencies were able to take appropriate personnel-protection
measures and complete their investigation.
At the height of the anthrax incidents, the Forensic Science Center
was called upon to analyze a suspect powder found at a local business.
Livermore scientists worked through the night to complete the analysis,
confirming that the powder was harmless.
New Search and Inspection Technologies. There is a pressing need
for technologies to improve the screening of passengers, baggage, and
cargo. Candidate technologies, in various stages of development at
Livermore, include computed tomography (CT), x-ray scanning, gamma-ray
imaging, neutron interrogation, and ultrasonic and thermal imaging. We
have recently established a national test bed for cargo container
experiments. This facility will provide a nationally available test bed
for determining whether inspection technologies in use and under
development can be scaled to the magnitude of the shipping container
problem. Outside agencies will be able to make measurements, using
national laboratory or their own equipment and measurement techniques,
on actual and mock weapons materials in actual cargo containers. Under
DOE direction, Livermore will operate this test bed as a national
service, providing a common basis for the comparison and evaluation of
alternative approaches.
Two laboratory-developed search technologies demonstrated their
applicability to counterterrorism response when they were deployed to
the World Trade Center. The first, a micropower radar, can ``see'' many
feet into concrete rubble and could be a valuable tool for search and
rescue operations. The other, a remote monitoring instrument that uses
hyperspectral data to detect and identify trace gas emissions, was
flown over Ground Zero to characterize hazardous gases emanating from
the rubble pile.
Avoiding Surprise about Adversaries. One of the most critical, yet
difficult, elements of homeland security and counterterrorism is
gaining insight into the capabilities, intentions, and plans of
persons, groups, or States hostile to the U.S. Our International
Assessments Program (Z Division) is one of the strongest capabilities
in the country for analysis and research related to foreign nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including early-stage
foreign technology development and acquisition, patterns of
cooperation, and foreign cyber threats. This capability is more
important than ever before, as the bipolar (U.S.-Soviet) world has
disintegrated into a melange of traditional allies, regional and tribal
allegiances, and transnational extremist groups. In the aftermath of
September 11, we provided intelligence analysts and assessments as well
as information-operations tools and expert personnel to the U.S.
Intelligence Community. Our assessments of foreign weapons programs and
activities provide important input to policy makers and diplomats as
they develop strategies for U.S. responses to events affecting national
security.
Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of Critical Facilities. Through
our participation in DOE's Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Program,
we have made systematic assessments of the threat environment, cyber
architecture, physical and operational security, policies and
procedures, interdependencies, impact analysis, risk characterization,
and possible mitigation measures for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in
Salt Lake City, 11 electric and gas infrastructures, and several
independent service operators (ISOs), including the California ISO
during the past summer's electrical energy crisis.
We have analyzed the vulnerability of buildings, dams, and other
structures to catastrophic damage from earthquakes and explosive
events. For example, we have also evaluated the earthquake
vulnerability of major bridge structures (including the Golden Gate and
San Francisco-Oakland Bay bridges), the structural integrity of nuclear
material shipping containers for a variety of impact scenarios, and the
likely damage resulting from the explosion of natural gas storage tanks
in a suburban environment.
Expert Personnel Assisting Homeland Security Agencies. A number of
Livermore scientists serve on various task forces, committees, and
advisory groups dealing with aspects of homeland security and
counterterrorism. For example, a Livermore expert on x-ray imaging is a
member of the National Academy of Science Committee on Assessment of
Technology Deployed to Improve Commercial Aviation Security. Other
laboratory scientists serve as technical advisors to the U.S. Customs
Service, the National Guard, and the Los Angeles Emergency Operations
Center, and as members or advisors to various Defense Science Board
task forces addressing homeland defense. Still others are assisting the
California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) with training
related to weapons of mass destruction and as members of the California
Council on Science and Technology, which is providing technical advice
to the OES's State Strategic Committee on Terrorism.
Engineering a Novel Truck-Stopping Device. In October 2001, the
Governor of California contacted Livermore requesting assistance to
develop a means of stopping tanker trucks, to keep hijacked trucks from
becoming motorized missiles. The objective was to make it possible to
stop these large trucks using equipment readily available to peace
officers, namely their vehicles and their weapons. A retired Livermore
engineer and consultant teamed with laboratory engineers, technicians,
and heavy equipment operators to develop a simple mechanical device to
accomplish this. It can be readily attached to the back of a tanker
truck. When bumped from the rear by the patrol vehicle, the device
would cause the trailer braking system to lose air pressure
automatically locking the trailer brakes. A prototype was demonstrated
in Oakland in late November, and remote-controlled testing at high
speeds was conducted at the Nevada Test Site in February and March.

Preventing Proliferation at the Source
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 10 years ago, arose the
threat of materials and expertise related to WMD leaking from Russia to
terrorists or countries of concern. Lawrence Livermore is a major
player in the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs, which are
striving to stem proliferation at its source. These programs consist of
an integrated set of activities to secure at-risk nuclear material in
Russia, dispose of excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and
assist in downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons complex by helping the
Russian closed cities and weapons institutes develop self-sustaining
commercial applications of their scientific and technical expertise.
In light of the current focus on countering terrorism, we must not
lose sight of the importance of these and other nonproliferation
programs. By securing weapon materials, technologies, and expertise at
the source, we keep the raw ingredients for weapons of mass destruction
out of the hands of proliferators and terrorists. Attempts to counter
WMD terrorism without simultaneously working front-end issues will not
solve the problem.
Protection and Control of Nuclear Materials and Accounting (MPC&A).
The security of Soviet-legacy nuclear materials is critical to the
security of the U.S. Through the NNSA's MPC&A Program, we are helping
various Russian sites improve the protection of their fissile
materials. Livermore specializes in vulnerability assessment, gamma ray
spectroscopy, access control and security system integration, and
information systems. We lead the MPC&A project teams for Chelyabinsk-
70, Sverdlovsk-44, Bochvar Institute, and Krasnoyarsk-45 and provide
project support for seven other sites.
Of the various laboratories involved in the MPC&A Program,
Livermore is unique in its role with the Russian Navy. Since the work
began in 1997, MPC&A upgrades for four nuclear refueling ships have
been completed and commissioned. Our activities at the Russian Navy
facilities have been some of the most successful of the entire MPC&A
Program. Success is attributable to the combination of a highly focused
user (the Russian Navy), an excellent subcontractor and system
integrator (the Kurchatov Institute), and a highly trained team of NNSA
and national laboratory personnel that has built an excellent working
relationship with the Russian personnel. In September 2000, MPC&A
cooperation was formalized through an implementing agreement between
the Russian Navy and the NNSA that included further cooperation at
Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. Work at a number of these sites
is under way and is meeting with the same success as previous
activities with the Russian Navy.
We participate in the NNSA's Second Line of Defense Program,
designed to curtail the illicit transport of items of nuclear
proliferation concern from Russia. Together with other participating
DOE laboratories, we are working with the Russian Customs Service to
equip high-risk border crossings with radiation detection equipment.
Moscow's Sheremetyovo International Airport complex and a port on the
Caspian Sea were equipped in October 1998. Seven other sites (including
several possible transit points to Iran or North Korea) have been
identified as high priority, and equipment is being installed. This
past year, we completed, jointly with our Russian collaborators, a
training manual and curriculum that will be used by more than 30,000
front-line Russian customs officials. In addition, several training
courses on dual-use export controlled items were developed and
incorporated into the Russian Customs Academy's professional
curriculum.
Downsizing the Russian Nuclear Weapon Complex. To help accelerate
the downsizing of the Russian weapons complex and to prevent displaced
weapons workers from seeking employment with potential proliferators,
the U.S. and Russia have launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI),
a cooperative program to create self-sustaining civilian jobs for
displaced workers in the closed nuclear cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and
Zheleznogorsk.
We are leading a medical technology development project with the
Avangard Electromechanical Plant (a weapons assembly facility) at
Sarov. In September 2001, lengthy negotiations led by Livermore
scientists culminated in a formal partnership agreement between the
Avangard Electromechanical Plant and Fresenius Medical Care (the
world's largest provider of products for individuals with chronic
kidney failure) to establish a commercial medical products
manufacturing facility at Sarov. Eventually, the Avangard/Fresenius
project will employ hundreds of former weapons workers in the
production of dialysis equipment and treatment kits. This agreement
represents a major milestone in U.S. efforts to engage a Russian serial
production facility.
We are also involved in the NNSA's Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention (IPP), which focus on helping Russian research institutes
find commercial nonweapons applications of their technical specialties.
In spite of difficulties created by limitations on LLNL's ability to
establish new contracts and requirements that IPP payments be free of
Russian taxes, progress has been made on many existing projects. For
example, LLNL has teamed with Cyclotec Medical Industries and the
Biophysical Laboratory (Biofil) Ltd., a spin-off from the Russian
Federal Nuclear Center Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF,
Arzamus-16), to develop and manufacture transcutaneous electrical nerve
stimulation (TENS) devices for noninvasive treatment of traumatic
short-term pain. TENS devices deliver low levels of electrical pulses
that inhibit or interfere with the transmission of pain signals to the
brain. Under this IPP project, TENS devices have been miniaturized and
incorporated into adhesive-bandage- and orthotic- (splint and brace)
type materials. The IPP-developed device is an order of magnitude
smaller and lighter than products with similar functionality at one-
quarter of the cost. The components for these devices will be
manufactured in Russia and then shipped to the U.S. for testing and
assembly. The total U.S. market for pain control products,
pharmaceuticals, therapy, devices, and implants is estimated to be more
than $2 billion. The U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) has
advised Cyclotec that it will recommend the use of the company's TENS
products as ``viable alternatives to drugs for pain relief.''
Promoting Regional Security through Science and Technology
Cooperation. As the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Israel
highlight, regional conflicts are fraught with the potential to
escalate rapidly, both in the level of violence and in the number of
players. This escalation potential is particularly worrisome when the
participants already possess or are striving to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. In order to promote security and stability in these
regions of concern, rather than attempting to intervene once conflict
has spiraled out of control, we are supporting science and technology
cooperation as a mechanism of engagement that is nonthreatening and
beneficial to all involved.
Together with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and under the aegis
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), we have collaborated with seismological
organizations from Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Oman in a seismology
technical working group. This topic is of widespread concern in the
area, given its active seismicity and recent damaging earthquakes in
Turkey, Greece, India, and Afghanistan.
We are also participating in a number of projects in Central Asia.
Some of these projects involve collaboration on radiation detection
technologies, with the goal of improving border security in the region
to prevent illicit smuggling of nuclear materials. Other projects are
characterizing the composition and flow of groundwater and associated
contaminants in an attempt to improve the preservation and use of
regional water resources. Water--quality and quantity--is an important
transboundary issue in Central Asia, affecting decisions related to the
transport of oil and natural gas across the Caspian Sea, hydroelectric
versus agricultural use of water, and contamination due to Soviet
legacy issues.
These collaborations leverage Lawrence Livermore capabilities in
seismic monitoring and event analysis, radiation detection
technologies, modeling of the flow of water and contaminants in
underground aquifers, atmospheric science, biology and genomics, and
energy resources. The projects can provide real benefits in, for
example, interdicting illicit smuggling associated with weapons of mass
destruction and reducing environmental stresses that undermine public
health and regional economics. By speaking the common language of
science and promoting cooperation on relatively ``safe'' transboundary
issues, these projects can also help to develop indigenous capabilities
that improve the regional standard of living, thereby enhancing
stability and security in critical areas of the world and, ideally,
removing motivations for the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction.

POST-SEPTEMBER 11 SITE SECURITY

Our response to the terrorist attacks on September 11 included
swift actions to enhance the security of the laboratory and to
reevaluate what additional security measures are appropriate in view of
the changed threat. Livermore's Safeguards and Security program is
designed to protect special nuclear materials and classified
information as well as personnel, property, and the public. A layered
approach is used to both physical and cyber security with the amount of
protection and the types of access controls provided depending on the
relative attractiveness of the asset.
Post-September 11, we quickly took effective steps to provide a
more robust site security posture at the laboratory. Livermore now
operates routinely at heightened security. Closure of non-essential
perimeter gates and roadways near the nuclear materials ``Superblock,''
increased patrols and random searches, additional armed officers at
perimeter entry points, 100 percent search of all truck deliveries are
among the measures being taken. To meet staffing needs to sustain the
posture, we have embarked on an aggressive hiring and training effort.
We also continue to improve our cyber security defenses, and the
laboratory has received funding to implement several physical security
enhancements.
It is important that funding keep pace with the demands for greater
security. In the area of cyber security, the threat continues to grow
in sophistication while funding levels to implement upgrades remain
nearly flat. As for physical security, the laboratory has aggressively
pursued technology solutions as a cost-effective alternative to
increasing staff. An example is our development and continual
improvement over the past 14 years of the Argus system for access
control and alarm station management, which is now widely used in the
DOE complex to significantly reduce staffing needs. The ``Smart
Camera'' technology that Livermore developed is now being applied at
the laboratory, and other NNSA sites are eager to install it. There are
numerous other areas where research and develop funding is needed to
make technological advances that would reduce staffing requirements
and/or provide greater security without increasing workforce size.
One factor that could radically modify workforce requirements and
budgets for Safeguards and Security at the laboratory is DOE's policies
with regard to protection strategies, the Design Basis Threat (DBT),
and the capabilities afforded potential adversaries. The DBT is being
reexamined post-September 11.
In addition, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia/California national
laboratories are taking steps to deal with a long-standing issue--the
physical proximity of East Avenue. The road runs between the two
laboratories and both have significant facilities close to it.
Controlled access to East Avenue would provide enhanced security for
facilities and personnel. We have DOE, political, and public support
for moving forward on closure of East Avenue. Alameda County, the City
of Livermore, and our neighbors are receptive to the proposal, and we
are looking at methods to fast-track the project. NNSA has given the
project high priority and is providing funding for a conceptual design.

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AT THE LABORATORY

We are very concerned about the proposed fiscal year 2003 budget
for Environmental Management efforts at the laboratory, which
constitutes a reduction of about 27 percent from the fiscal year 2002
allocation. The laboratory requires an additional $17.5 million above
the budget request to maintain its existing Environmental Management
program. Specifically, $8.1 million must be added to maintain the
baseline groundwater cleanup program, and $9.4 million must be added
for activities to manage newly generated wastes.
Environmental Restoration. Considerable work has been done to
remediate soil and groundwater contamination at the laboratory's main
site and Site 300 to reduce risks, meet community interests, and
satisfy regulatory requirements under Federal Facility Agreements. Both
sites are on the Superfund list. The majority of the contamination at
the main site occurred during World War II when it was a Naval Air
Base. Solvents used to clean airplane engines were spilled on the
ground, and they eventually leaked into the groundwater resulting in
the current contaminant plumes. Discontinued Laboratory operations also
contributed to the contamination, which threatened the drinking water
for the nearby City of Livermore. Site 300, located 13 miles from the
main site, has been used for high-explosives research and testing. Past
operations resulted in the release of hazardous and radioactive
materials.
Specific actions such as characterization of suspected contaminated
areas, as well as the design, construction, and operation of treatment
facilities have been negotiated and agreed to with the regulators and
stakeholders in order to accomplish satisfactory cleanup.
Unfortunately, shrinking budgets in recent years have made it extremely
difficult to maintain the level of progress and to meet all of the set
requirements and schedules despite the laboratory's best efforts to
accomplish needed work using innovative and cost-effective methods. As
a result, regulatory commitments are not being met in as complete and
timely a manner as desired, and contamination may continue to spread,
increasing the magnitude of the problem and cleanup costs.
With the proposed cuts in the fiscal year 2003 Environmental
Restoration budget, Livermore will miss critical cleanup milestones
that have been negotiated by DOE with the State of California and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Much of the existing groundwater
cleanup equipment and operations will be shut down, leaving potentially
contaminated areas unevaluated and allowing some areas with known
contaminated groundwater plumes to continue to spread unchecked toward
farming and residential areas. The amount of sampling, analysis, and
regulatory reporting will decrease significantly; and there will be a
significant delay in the cleanup of both the main Livermore site and
Site 300.
Waste Management. Despite successful efforts over the last 5 years
to reduce waste management costs, increases in DOE and regulatory
requirements, coupled with yearly budget reductions, have put the
laboratory in a difficult position. The proposed reduction for fiscal
year 2003 is particularly large--$14.8 million compared to $21.3
million authorized in fiscal year 2002 and $23.7 million required to
sustain waste management activities at the laboratory, which must meet
State and Federal regulations.
Hazardous waste management has two components to its budget. There
is the basic cost of maintaining day-to-day operations and managing
wastes of all types in a safe and compliant manner. There is also a
proposal to clean up the laboratory's legacy waste. Livermore has over
2,200 cubic meters of legacy mixed, low-level, and transuranic wastes
in storage in facilities that should be relocated. Some of this
material has been in storage for over 15 years; most of the waste has
been stored outside and exposed to effects of weather; and container
integrity is a looming issue.
Under the current proposed budget, it will be impossible to meet
the laboratory's programmatic needs with a safe, compliant waste
management program. This will have severe impacts on the national
security mission and will cause certain programmatic activities to be
deferred and/or cancelled. In particular, because of Livermore's
limited waste management handling capabilities, a number of critical
research and development programs that generate RCRA-regulated waste
will be put on hold to maintain compliance. In addition, all stored
radioactive waste will remain at Livermore because there will not be
funding available for disposal off site. Lack of space will prevent the
laboratory's Hazardous Waste Management Department from accepting newly
generated radioactive waste. This will shut down critical work on
stockpile stewardship. Furthermore, the proposed budget does not
include sufficient funding to begin waste management operations in the
new $62-million Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF),
which features modern and safer technologies. Mixed and radioactive
waste that has been stored on site for many years will continue to be
stored outdoors instead of in the new facility.
The DOE Environmental Management Cleanup Reform Fund. The
laboratory has submitted a proposal to obtain an additional $30 million
for accelerated environmental cleanup from the Environmental Management
Cleanup Reform fund, which DOE proposes to create as part of the fiscal
year 2003 Environmental Management budget. We believe our proposal to
be very competitive; however, an award from this fund will not
adequately replace the $17.5 million shortfall in funding needed to
maintain our existing Environmental Management program. For Livermore
to qualify for any of the funds, the State of California will have to
renegotiate its compliance agreements, which is one of the
requirements.

SUMMARY REMARKS

The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to make excellent
technical progress in many areas, some of which I have highlighted
here: notably, the W87 ICBM warhead life extension, completion of the
Contained Firing Facility, progress on construction of the National
Ignition Facility, the dedication and use of the ASCI White
supercomputer, progress on future ASCI plans at Livermore, and numerous
scientific and technical achievements that are improving our
understanding of the aging of nuclear weapons and weapon performance.
However, many difficult challenges lie ahead. There is continuing need
for a strongly supported and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program to
maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear
deterrent over the long term. The NNSA's 5 year plan for Defense
Programs reflects the need for a strong program, and I support NNSA's
plan and the budget request for fiscal year 2003.
Strong and sustained support is likewise needed for our activities
directed at reducing the threat posed by the proliferation and
terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. As I have
highlighted, Lawrence Livermore and our sister NNSA Laboratories made
unique and important contributions to homeland security post-September
11. We were able to respond so rapidly and effectively because of the
technical and operational capabilities we had developed over the past
decade and more to deal with the WMD terrorist threat. Although these
technologies and systems performed extremely well, surpassing our
highest expectations in many cases, still-better capabilities are
needed to effectively protect the U.S. homeland from the threat of WMD
terrorism. September 11 demonstrated the high level of technical
innovation, operational sophistication, and determination of today's
terrorists. The challenge we face in defending against such determined
adversaries will only grow greater in the years to come. The Nation
must make a sustained commitment and long-term investment in the
research and development required to create the improved warning,
detection, and response capabilities needed tomorrow and in the future.
Post-September 11, we quickly instituted a more robust site
security posture at the laboratory. This heightened level of security
has become the norm, and we have embarked on an aggressive hiring and
training effort to meet staffing needs to sustain this posture. It is
important that funding keep pace with demands for heightened security.
Funding is also a concern in the area of Environmental Management. The
progress we have made in remediating soil and groundwater contamination
is in jeopardy with the proposed fiscal year 2003 budget. At the
proposed funding level, we will be unable to meet currently negotiated
Federal Facility Agreements or to operate a compliant waste management
program that meets facility infrastructure needs. It will also be
impossible to support Livermore's programmatic needs with a safe,
compliant waste management program. This will have severe impacts on
the national security mission and will cause certain programmatic
activities to be deferred and/or cancelled.
Finally, I wish to express my appreciation again for the support
that this committee has provided for the important national security
work that Lawrence Livermore performs for the country, during my tenure
as director and throughout the laboratory's history. We are celebrating
our 50th anniversary this September and looking forward to the next
half-century of service to the Nation. Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory has a bright future with your continuing support.
______

Prepared Statement by Dennis R. Ruddy

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that my written testimony be
included in the record.
My name is Dennis Ruddy. I am President and General Manager of BWXT
Pantex, which manages the National Nuclear Security Administration's
Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas.
Since BWXT Pantex assumed operations of the plant a little more
than a year ago, we have made significant progress in fulfilling the
site's important national security missions:

Evaluate, retrofit, and repair weapons in support of
both life extension programs and certification of weapon safety
and reliability;
Dismantle weapons that are surplus to the strategic
stockpile;
Sanitize components from dismantled weapons;
Develop, test, and fabricate chemical and explosive
components; and
Provide interim storage and surveillance of plutonium
components.

BWXT Pantex is preparing to accomplish future work that will
provide a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile for many years to
come. That preparation involves improving our infrastructure and
technology within a new security environment to ensure our ability to
meet Stockpile Life Extension Program objectives.
I believe we all recognize the challenge of providing for the
security of our facilities and our personnel in the wake of the events
of September 11, 2001. Immediately after the tragic events of that day,
we implemented a contingency plan to ensure the security of the site
and our personnel. Since that time, we have enhanced security in a wide
variety of areas. We increased security patrols around the site,
tightened our requirements to access the facility, improved our
physical security systems and replaced equipment that was beginning to
show its age. While our workforce, and particularly our security force,
has responded admirably, these enhancements have not come without
costs. This fiscal year, more than $16 million in supplemental funding
has been given to Pantex to cover these expenses. This amount is over
and above the $68 million originally earmarked for Pantex security.
Much of this funding has been used to cover overtime for our
security force. Before September 11, our security guards normally
worked 12 hours a day, on 4 consecutive days. Then, they had 4 days
off. Since September 11, they have worked 6 consecutive 12-hour days,
then been given 2 days off. In order to meet the NNSA's new security
requirements, reduce our overtime, and put our guards back on a more
reasonable work schedule, we established a target to hire 140
additional security officers by the end of this fiscal year. Through
operational efficiencies and other security enhancements, we are
seeking to reduce this new staffing to 109 additional officers. Either
number will be a significant increase in security personnel compared to
our staffing before the terrorist attacks. In addition to personnel
additions, we are currently considering other security enhancements and
their associated costs. In order to develop these security improvements
and retain our new personnel, permanent increases in security funding
will have to be made a priority.
Despite the increased attention that we have given to security, our
mission to support stockpile stewardship remains our primary focus. The
Nation still depends on a reliable nuclear deterrent to protect our
country and our allies, and BWXT Pantex is committed to safely
providing weapons of the highest quality to our customer. As we look
ahead, we see that the majority of our weapons dismantlement workload
will be complete by 2008. Our weapons evaluation workload remains
steady for the foreseeable future. Beginning in 2005, we are planning
for a surge in work to support the Stockpile Life Extension Program
(SLEP) effort. The additional SLEP workload will involve modifications
to nine weapon systems and will bring with it additional evaluation
requirements.
Unfortunately, projected budgets in fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2007 do not currently correspond with our projected workload.
Beginning in fiscal year 2005, we see a $12 million to $16 million per
year difference between our budget needs and the NNSA's FYNSP funding
targets for weapons work. The FYNSP targets in the Campaigns area are
$2 million to $7 million per year less than needed beginning in fiscal
year 2003, a shortfall that impacts technology developments necessary
to complete SLEP work. However, the largest reductions are seen in the
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) area. Beginning in
fiscal year 2004, shortages ranging from $32 million to $42 million
each year will severely impact our ability to meet NNSA workload needs.
Although much of the budget shortfall is seen in later years, we
have particular concern over the effect of Campaigns and RTBF funding
in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 on SLEP work. The military is
depending on SLEP to provide a safe, secure nuclear deterrent for many
years to come. We see that reductions in Campaigns and RTBF funding in
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 will delay or eliminate
technological and facility improvements needed to implement the SLEP
schedule on time.
As I have testified to this group before, we have significant
infrastructure needs at Pantex. I am happy to report that thanks to the
increased funding that we have received, we have made progress in
improving our infrastructure. The fiscal year 2001 plus-up and
supplemental funding of approximately $15 million allowed us to make
some roof repairs to prevent leaks in weapons production facilities and
replace some aging equipment necessary for our work. In fiscal year
2002, we are receiving $22 million in Facilities and Infrastructure
Recapitalization Program (FIRP) funds and a plus-up of at least $20
million. These monies will be carefully used to make additional roof
repairs, replace obsolete fire alarm systems, and carry out much-needed
maintenance in a wide variety of areas.
Still, there is much to be done. We had a $218 million backlog in
infrastructure needs in fiscal year 2000. That number increased to $262
million in fiscal year 2001. The FIRP funds mentioned earlier will
allow the fiscal year 2002 infrastructure backlog to decrease to
approximately $248 million. (See Figure 1.) As this chart shows, we
have turned the corner and are beginning to decrease the deferred
maintenance backlog. While we are spending our infrastructure funds on
the highest-priority items, the fact remains that more than 50 percent
of the plant's square footage is over 25 years old. Many building
elements are at the end of their service life and require restoration.
We cannot meet the future infrastructure requirements of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program without continued expenditures to keep our
facilities in the condition necessary for high-quality, safe nuclear
weapons work.

Another key factor in our ability to support stockpile stewardship
in the long term is the recruiting and retention of employees with
critical skills. BWXT Pantex has taken a proactive approach to
recruiting, retaining, and developing the critical skills necessary to
accomplish future weapons work. We have identified the critical skills
in engineering, science, and other areas necessary for us to maintain
and grow our technical basis for weapons work. Of the 1,174 positions
we consider to be critical, we have only 78 vacancies. This is an
improvement over the 200 critical skill vacancies we had 1 year ago. In
addition to outside hiring, we have initiated two new programs to
develop our employees from within. Late last year, BWXT Pantex
announced the development of an Engineering Graduate Studies Program in
conjunction with Texas Tech University, West Texas A&M University, and
the Amarillo Economic Development Corporation. This program is allowing
our employees and other workers in the community to earn advanced
engineering degrees locally. We also worked with West Texas A&M to
develop an Employee MBA program to allow our workers to receive
advanced instruction in business. Both of these programs have been very
well received by our employees and will provide us with a higher
quality workforce in the years to come. As long as our budgets remain
stable, we will be able to offer a working environment that helps
attract and retain people with the key skills that we need.
As our workload at Pantex increases, so does the amount of
oversight at our plant and other sites around the Complex. While we
recognize and agree with the need for independent evaluation of our
results, the growing oversight into our processes and activities
detracts from the attention we are able to give to the day-to-day work
that the NNSA requires of us. In this fiscal year alone, we have
already had 25 audits from the Inspector General, DOE/NNSA, General
Accounting Office, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
This trend is sharply up from fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001.
Looking to the future, we believe that positive gains will be
realized as the reorganization of the NNSA continues. A streamlined
path of communication will improve our business and make us more agile
in responding to requests. The ability of NNSA to use its resources to
better support the sites will increase efficiency. Movement of more
decision-making responsibility to the field offices will also lead to
more efficient operations. We fully support these changes and look
forward to the reorganization being implemented as soon as possible.
As I said at the outset, BWXT Pantex is laying the groundwork for
important stockpile stewardship work to extend the life of our nuclear
weapons stockpile. Improvements in technology and infrastructure will
prepare the site to meet NNSA's Stockpile Life Extension Program goals.
In the interim, we will work with NNSA and Congress to address the
challenges that we currently face.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present these views
to you today. I look forward to continuing to work with you and the
members of this committee to ensure the safety and reliability of the
stockpile in the future. I will be happy to answer any questions the
subcommittee may have.
______

Prepared Statement by John T. Mitchell

Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, thank you for the
opportunity to update you on Defense Programs activities at the Y-12
National Security Complex in Oak Ridge and to provide you my views on
our near-term and long-term ability to meet the challenges of the
Stockpile Management Program. We have made considerable progress at Y-
12 over the past year, but still face significant challenges in meeting
the expectations of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
over the long-term.

OVERVIEW

The past year at Y-12 has been one of renewal and change. Many
longstanding challenges have been met head-on and significant progress
has been made. New management systems and processes have started to
take effect and increased effectiveness and control are clearly
visible. Our emphasis on Safety and Security as the cornerstones of our
operations have resulted in satisfactorily completing both the
Integrated Safety Management Phase II review and the security review
performed by the NNSA/DOE Office of Assessments this fiscal year. Both
in our response to the events of September 11 and the measurement of
our safety performance, it is clear that the groundwork laid in 2001
has supported improved execution of these key responsibilities.
Aided by the funding identified through the Facilities and
Infrastructure Initiative, we have commenced a long-term plan to
consolidate the active functions of Y-12 into a reduced footprint
through a balanced program. Our approach includes reducing the occupied
building inventory, removing unoccupied buildings from the inventory,
reusing major facilities where possible, and the selective investment
in re-capitalization where long-term efficiencies result.
We have re-energized the planning and execution of an aggressive
technology infusion program at Y-12 to both optimize support for the
upcoming defined workload and to assure long-term, safe, secure, and
efficient modern capabilities to meet the Nation's security needs. We
have started the renewal of the dedicated Y-12 workforce through major
increases in college-level recruiting, cooperative university programs,
and emphasis on increasing the technical and managerial competence
level of our workforce. Throughout these focused efforts, we have
placed great value on detailed program planning and a project
management culture for execution effectiveness. Site-wide integration
in resource planning and prioritization has assured a balance in
investments and a clear definition of needs versus wants.

INFRASTRUCTURE

BWXT Y-12 has been implementing its strategy for infrastructure
improvement--intense planning focused on scientific and manufacturing
needs, definition of equipment, facilities and skills, and alignment of
technology development. Our goal is to create a consolidated
manufacturing footprint, with a central hub of secure operations
surrounded by the developmental, technical, and other support functions
needed to execute the mission.
Y-12 has begun the process of removing non-essential facilities.
This removal will make room for beneficial upgrades to the plant and
reduce cost for surveillance, analysis, maintenance, and security. The
Facilities and Infrastructure (F&I) Initiative has been pivotal to our
demolition efforts, as well as providing critical support for much-
needed maintenance and facility repairs.
Y-12 has also begun the first major steps in deploying key
investments in the future of Y-12. We are beginning the preliminary
design for high enriched uranium materials facility, the next major
step in improving the storage of the Nation's inventory of highly
enriched uranium. We also have received approval to begin preliminary
design of the purification prototype facility, the first element of the
Special Materials Capability Program. The architect-engineering
contracts are in place for both these projects. In addition, prototype
development of a new beryllium manufacturing capability is underway and
we are ready to begin conceptual design for a production utilities
project.
Following these projects, we need to move forward on plans to
consolidate depleted uranium operations, upgrade enriched uranium
operations, relocate quality evaluation operations, and upgrade
safeguards and security systems by reducing the protected area of the
plant. There will also be continued emphasis on use of F&I to make
critical facility repairs and to continue the infrastructure reduction
activities to consolidate and disposition excess facilities.
Achieving and sustaining infrastructure improvements within the
NNSA funding forecasts continues to be a challenge. The cost to operate
aging facilities increases as demands for maintenance and capital
replacement expand. Sustainable support will be necessary for Y-12 to
meet mission requirements while resolving problems caused by years of
deterioration at Y-12. The trade-off between operations, maintenance,
and capital investments must continue to recognize the long-term
interests of Y-12.

TECHNOLOGY

Y-12 has begun two important initiatives over the past year that
will improve the way technology is introduced in the plant and its
missions. The introduction of new technologies must be managed from a
different perspective today than was the historic norm for the
production complex. The stockpile stewardship paradigm may well require
a higher level of technology for refurbishment than was required for
the original build. When a flaw is identified, the resolution of that
flaw will be reverse-engineered from test data. The tolerances for that
new part can be much more exacting than was originally required. In
addition, today's technology introduction may be based on the ability
to achieve substantial efficiencies in mission execution. These
efficiencies may stem from the introduction of technologies that were
not previously available or concepts that were previously discarded
based on then-valid mission requirements that are no longer appropriate
(e.g., stockpile size).
The first initiative, technology roadmapping, has the goal of
modernizing the processes, equipment, and supporting systems (e.g.,
computing and information management systems). The roadmap would
identify the strategies and direction of the technology program. These
strategies would be screened against the time to bring them to the shop
floor, cradle-to-grave cost estimate, potential for success, and return
on investment.
In a second initiative, BWXT-Y12 has begun a technology partnership
with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The technical needs of
Y-12 are heavily weighted toward ORNL's R&D agenda (i.e., materials
science, modeling/computational science, and instrumentation and
control). In these key areas, ORNL provides access to state-of-the-art
facilities, leverage for Y-12's development funds, and a pathway to the
broader technical community--private industry, the science
laboratories, and academia.
The introduction of technology into Y-12 will be critical to the
future economical execution of our mission. Again, the trade-off
between operations, technology introduction, and capital improvement
will require a sustained commitment to the long-term interests of Y-12
and its mission.

MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

BWXT Y-12 is bringing fiscal discipline to Y-12. We have
established a centralized planning function to include estimating,
schedule planning, resource budgeting, strategic baseline planning,
performance measurement and reporting, and systems management. A common
tool-set has been established to provide the planners consistent
planning software across the Y-12 site.
Using these tools, we have developed schedules and resource
requirements for all work activities, including work breakdown
structure (WBS) elements, and the estimated costs, schedule, duration,
resource loading, and the required earned value protocols for each
element. The 10-year baseline is complete covering all major projects
planned at Y-12, including future weapons programs, modernization
programs, infrastructure reduction projects, and technology development
activities.
Currently, we are focusing on several key upgrades to our process.
While standard estimating procedures and formats have been established
for all work done across the site, we are working to improve the
accuracy of our estimates. Also, we are working to improve our
production control systems, including the recent completion of a pilot
project. The resulting schedules will provide the required integrated
planning for preventative maintenance, operations, inventory, and
facility maintenance efforts.
These initiatives provide managers the visibility to effectively
manage cost, control scope, and maintain schedule commitments. We are
working hard to assure that the resources placed in our care are well
spent on activities of highest importance to our mission.

WORKFORCE

Y-12 is taking action to assure the technical base is available to
carry out its mission in the future. We have defined our critical skill
needs and initiated the hiring of entry level, technical talent to
prepare them to be tomorrow's leaders. In order to attract the best
talent, we have initiated cooperative education programs, including the
establishment of internal mentors to maximize the benefit of their time
at Y-12. We are now developing a program of partnerships with
universities in the region and preliminary response to the concept of
these partnerships has been enthusiastic. Our objective is to assure
the best people are attracted to Y-12 as a vibrant workplace whose
mission is important to national security.
Safety is the responsibility of all employees and important to
everyone. BWXT Y-12 has been working to bring the commitment to safety
to be a first principle at Y-12. All supervisors and managers completed
safety leadership training followed by rolling safety focus meetings
with all employees. The routine employee interaction on safety issues
has begun to show improvement in our safety metrics for the plant.

MISSION PERFORMANCE

Y-12 continues to meet the direct needs of the nuclear weapons
program with timely delivery of products and execution of a wide
variety of supporting activities. Shipments of fuel for the nuclear
Navy have been accomplished on time. Planning for the near-term needs
has resulted in restarting several needed capabilities as well as the
introduction of several new technical capabilities. Y-12 has also
participated with ORNL to provide centralized and integrated
capabilities critical to the success of our national commitment to non-
proliferation. A strong and refocused capability to perform work for
the full range of government and commercial customers supportive of
base Y-12 mission needs has been initiated in partnership with ORNL.
This growing and diversified work mix is vital to the retention of
critical capabilities and the development of those required for the
future.

SUMMARY

While Y-12 has made major steps forward in the past year, there is
still a long road ahead to achieve long-term, sustainable capabilities
to meet national security needs with confidence, including management
leadership and execution effectiveness. Consistent, balanced funding
support for operations, technology introduction, and infrastructure re-
capitalization will be required. Consistent, timely, and visible
definition of program requirements will be needed as well as commitment
to stand behind initiatives and investments until they are completed
and have produced the expected results. Y-12 must continue to be fully
supported in all areas for it to continue to meet long-term national
security needs.
______

Prepared Statement of David S. Douglass

Mr. Chairman, my name is Dave Douglass. I am President of Honeywell
Federal Manufacturing & Technologies, which manages the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) facility in Kansas City,
Missouri, and facilities supporting transportation safeguard activities
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Kansas City Plant today is an active,
safe, secure, and reliable facility that serves as one of our country's
most unique and valued national security assets. Our diversity of
sophisticated, complex, and leading-edge manufacturing capabilities is
equaled by few facilities in the country, and the fact that these
capabilities are housed under one roof in a secure environment is
rivaled by no other manufacturer in the world.
We bring to the nuclear weapons complex and our Nation expertise in
science-based manufacturing; supply chain management; e-business
systems; sophisticated electronic, mechanical, and rubber and plastics
manufacturing; and a consistent reputation as one of the NNSA's
highest-rated contractors. The nonnuclear components we produce
comprise 85 percent of the parts manufactured within the nuclear
weapons complex, as well as 85 percent of the components that
constitute a nuclear weapon.
With the help and support of this subcommittee and Congress over
the past 4 years, we have begun to address issues impacting our talent
pipeline and critical skill needs, infrastructure deficiencies, and
recapitalization concerns at the Kansas City Plant. Since last year's
testimony, we have used the $12 million in plus-up funding you provided
to hire 300 people, keep our critical skills filled at a 99-percent
level, and meet urgent infrastructure and recapitalization needs,
including equipment upgrades, critical roofing repairs, and renovations
to air handling systems in our production areas. In each case, we were
able to maximize the dollars we spent by focusing on the highest
priorities, however unglamorous they may have been. However, while we
may have begun to turn the tide, we have not fixed the problems; and we
continue to seek your support in addressing on-going, long-term issues
facing the Kansas City Plant.
Mr. Chairman, as both a taxpayer and a contractor, I believe we
should be held accountable for the highest standards of performance.
This includes driving efficiency improvements throughout our
organization. To this end, Honeywell has implemented a number of
efficiency improvements at the NNSA's Kansas City Plant that embrace
commercial best practices and ensure ever-increasing value for NNSA
investments. Honeywell treats Federal Manufacturing and Technologies
the same as its commercial businesses, holding us to the same standards
of performance. This includes achieving 6 percent year-over-year
improvement in productivity, qualifying for and maintaining ISO quality
and environmental system certifications, implementing cost-saving
digitization applications, achieving safety metrics that are
significantly better than national or NNSA standards, and training
employees in the use of continuous improvement tools such as Six Sigma.
All 2,000 of our salaried associates are Six Sigma Green Belt
certified, plus more than 150 of our employees are certified in Six
Sigma Black Belt productivity tools. Furthermore, when we were awarded
the contract to continue operating the Kansas City Plant in 2000, we
committed we would achieve $25 million in efficiency improvements at
the Kansas City Plant in the first 2 years of the contract. Last year,
our first year, we achieved $20 million. By the end of this year, we
fully expect to meet and far exceed the remaining $5 million
commitment.
As part of our vision of the Kansas City Plant as a multi-mission,
national security asset, we have grown our Work-for-Others program by
42 percent in 2 years. Other government agencies, including military,
law enforcement, and intelligence organizations, are finding increasing
value in our combination of advanced technology solutions and a high-
security environment. Our robust Work-for-Others program helps offset
overhead costs and retain critical-skill associates by offering them
new technical challenges. This value benefits both the government and
the taxpayer.
A natural question is: If we have derived these millions of dollars
of efficiency improvements, why do we require sustained funding
support? It is well-documented that the Department of Energy made a
conscious decision in the 1990s to focus investment on science and
defer investment in production. Our efficiency improvements during this
decade gave us flexibility to balance near- and long-term needs. Thus,
the savings generated by our efficiency improvements were factored into
our budget forecasts, allowing us to augment NNSA funding to support
infrastructure improvements, critical skill needs, and high-priority
programmatic requirements. However, continued investment at 2.4 percent
created a substantial backlog of infrastructure needs, compared to an
industry standard of 5 percent.
The Kansas City Plant is at a juncture: We are inhibited by funding
pressures and modernization issues from achieving the full readiness
needed to accomplish our task at hand. We will meet our directed
stockpile work obligations, but we will do so at the expense of
preparing for the future. Over the next 2 years, our workload will
begin to escalate as we prepare for full-scale production for the
Stockpile Life Extension Programs. Yet, as the adjacent infrastructure
requirements chart indicates, at the same time we gear up for new work,
our infrastructure and recapitalization backlog reaches peak levels.

As the chart also indicates, we require $65 million a year to
sustain investment in the Kansas City Plant, and limited funding has
pushed the backlog into the next 5 years. The additional Facilities &
Infrastructure Recapitalization Program funding is significantly
helping us lessen the backlog, and I strongly endorse continued support
of this important effort.
The Government has a very capable, diverse, experienced, secure
manufacturing facility: the Kansas City Plant. It makes good business
and economic sense to invest in it and push this national security
asset to its highest potential. No other facility is as diverse as the
Kansas City Plant. Unlike commercial manufacturers, we are in a
position to manage the NNSA's requirements to produce high-quality,
low-volume components; retain skills to sustain aging or obsolete
technologies; and warehouse parts needed to maintain the 25 year life
expectancy of the stockpile--at an affordable cost to the government.
We strongly support General John Gordon in his efforts to simplify
and streamline the NNSA and implement a new governance model for
management and operating (M&O) contracts. In keeping with the premise
behind M&O contracts--to select contractors based on their operational
and management experience and provide them with the objectives of what
needs to be accomplished--we have taken several steps to simplify and
streamline operations at the Kansas City Plant. These steps include
introducing commercial industrial standards, including manufacturing,
procurement, and human resources best practices. For the new governance
initiative to improve performance and reduce costs successfully across
the complex, we believe the initiative must radically change M&O
operations in four key areas: culture, core processes, performance
management, and the government/contractor relationship.

Culture Change: M&O employees should be treated no
differently from employees who work for the contractor at other
locations. Contract and other DOE requirements and programs
that make the M&O employee a unique employee, and that
consequently limit the contractor's ability to rotate in talent
from other parts of the corporation, are unnecessary and should
be revised or eliminated.
Core Processes: The NNSA should require contractors to
bring robust core processes to M&O operations, particularly in
the areas of strategic planning, continuous improvement,
leadership development, and performance management. NNSA
requirements and practices that dictate the processes to be
applied in M&O contracts should be eliminated.
Performance Management: Core processes should be
assessed by independent and knowledgeable third-party sources,
and contractors should be judged by the NNSA based on the
maturity of their processes rather than isolated and unexpected
incidents.
Government/Contractor Relationship: A partnering
relationship should create alignment in business imperatives
for NNSA facilities and a clear understanding of roles and
responsibilities. We support the concept that it is the role of
the Government to identify what needs to be done and the role
of contractors to determine how the work should be done, based
on the expertise that caused them to be selected in the first
place. We envision NNSA personnel working in concert with the
contractor to accomplish mission objectives by eliminating
barriers to the contractor's tasks, working with stakeholders
to resolve community concerns, and working within the
Government to ensure program alignment with overall Government
needs.

Finally, it is imperative that we maintain balance between science
and production. Scientific advancement is vital. We must develop our
manufacturing technologies, train our employees, and maintain our
facilities. However, it is just as important that the skills and
capabilities needed to turn science into reality--real robust
products--keep pace with technological advancements. This brings us
full circle to the issue of long-term reinvestment in and value of the
Kansas City Plant as a national security asset.
Mr. Chairman, you may also ask about the impact of the
administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for a reduction in
our nuclear stockpile, on the Kansas City Plant. Our volumes will
eventually fall, but the need for components will not be diminished.
However, the more volumes fall, the less attractive this work will be
to commercial industries that must maintain profit margins. These
companies cannot afford the overhead needed to sustain aging or
obsolete technologies, warehouse parts, or retain expertise in critical
skills needed to maintain the 25-year life expectancy of the stockpile.
Reinvesting in the Kansas City Plant, and allowing us to defray
overheads costs by expanding use of the facility, will address both
short-term and long-term nuclear weapons complex needs.
The Kansas City Plant is busy. We support 42 product families and
120 advanced technologies, shipping more than 60,000 product packages
annually. We are producing components for every weapons system in the
active stockpile. We are hiring new associates and actively addressing
critical skill needs. We have begun to increase infrastructure
investments to recover from funding shortfalls in the 1990s. We are
developing new manufacturing capabilities and suppliers required to
support the upcoming Life Extension Programs. The next few years will
see significant challenges as we continue to address critical skills,
and upgrade our infrastructure while preparing for sizeable new
production requirements driven by the Life Extension Programs. Our
success is directly tied to a sustained funding profile, which fully
accounts for these challenges.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present these views
to you. Honeywell is committed to our national defense mission and to
the future success of the Kansas City Plant and nuclear weapons
complex. I look forward to continuing to work with you and the members
of this subcommittee to address these challenges.

Senator Reed. I would like to add that submitting testimony
is completely optional. Senator Allard and I would have
preferred the opportunity to hear from the contractors in
person, but, as I indicated, the committee's schedule this year
just does not allow this opportunity.
At $7.1 billion, the EM program is the single largest
program at the Department of Energy. Of that amount, $6.4
billion falls within the jurisdiction of this subcommittee. The
expenditures and schedules for this program are largely derived
from a series of enforceable agreements that the DOE has
entered into with the relevant States and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
For the most part, the States and communities that host
these DOE sites feel strongly that these agreements protect the
health and well-being of the communities and the employees who
work there. These agreements have been the driving force to
remedy the well-documented history of environmental
contamination by DOE and its predecessor agencies. These
agreements have in some instances limited the ability of the
DOE and the contractors to introduce innovative cleanup
approaches and to change how the cleanup is conducted.
On the other hand, the States and the EPA are also
interested in having cleanup progress quickly and in the most
cost-effective way.
Roughly 12 years of experience with this program has taught
that where there is cooperation and a partnership among DOE,
the States, and the EPA, progress is made. Faced today with
growing cleanup costs, DOE has proposed in the fiscal year 2003
budget a new program called the Cleanup Reform Initiative. The
budget request is short on details for this $800 million
initiative, but my preliminary understanding is that this
account would be available to any site that submits a proposal
for accelerated cleanup.
While on its face this appears to be a creative approach to
cleanup, it also appears that this account was created by
underfunding the baseline cleanup accounts. Thus, the fiscal
year 2003 President's budget request will not allow the DOE to
meet the requirements contained in all the agreements.
Moreover, I understand that to qualify for the funds in this
account the States and the EPA have to modify the agreements in
ways that may reduce the overall level of cleanup.
The implementation of this new initiative is complicated
further by the recent announcement of an agreement with the
State of Washington to provide $430 million of the $800 million
to the Hanford site. One of the main topics on which I want to
focus today, Secretary Roberson, will be the new Cleanup Reform
Initiative and the plans to implement it.
Over the past few years, DOE has made substantial progress
in cleaning up the contaminated sites, treating and safely
storing waste; yet, much remains to be done. Some of the
achievements have been possible using new technology. At many
of these sites, new or improved technologies will continue to
be needed to sustain progress.
The second issue that I want to discuss today is the
significant reduction in research and development funds in the
fiscal year 2003 budget request. How does this reduction square
with the continuing requirement for new technologies? The EM
program is a complex and challenging program that will remain a
challenge for many years to come. I share your fundamental goal
of getting cleanup accomplished sooner and at a reduced cost.
Secretary Roberson, we welcome you to the subcommittee
today and note that this is your first opportunity to testify
since your confirmation last year. Now I would like to
recognize Senator Allard.
Senator.
Senator Allard. Welcome, Madam Secretary. Good to have you
before the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank
our witnesses for appearing before the Strategic Subcommittee
today and providing testimony on some very challenging issues
facing the Department of Energy.
Our witnesses today will be speaking about challenges that
initially arose out of the Manhattan Project when our Nation's
very existence was at stake, almost 60 years ago. World War II
led to the creation of the nuclear weapons program, which
required enormous cooperation among many sites and States. In
an effort to keep the mission secret, security architects of
the Manhattan Project used multiple sites, with each site
responsible for its own individual scientific task or weapons
components for the larger mission.
The success of the Manhattan Project required intricate
planning and enormous cooperation among the various sites and
the States where they were located. Now, why am I reflecting on
those early days of our Nation's nuclear weapons program? I do
so because today we again find ourselves facing enormous
challenges. Today we have an aging nuclear weapons complex
filled with an aging nuclear weapons work force, both requiring
resources and attention to reinvigorate the program. We have
inherited environmental challenges from the legacy of our
Nation's nuclear weapons program, from a time when we were not
as knowledgeable, concerned, or careful.
Cooperation between the sites and their States is still key
to maintaining our national security requirements and to meet
our environmental responsibilities. Today I am concerned that
cooperation between some of the sites and the States where they
are located is strained at best and perhaps even broken.
Cooperation is being traded in for opportunity, intrigue, and
politics.
If we cannot work together across the Department of Energy
complex, then each site in each State will find themselves
isolated, unable to interact as the complex was designed. No
individual site can be successful as its own entity. Each site
is dependent on the other sites to make their mission relevant
and successful.
There are both benefits and burdens in working with the
other sites and States. Some sites have expanding national
security and environmental missions for the future. Others are
being closed. Their mission has been transferred and it is time
to clean them up and move their funding to the remaining sites.
I have worked tirelessly to make sure the Rocky Flats site
will be cleaned up and closed as an EM site by 2006. The
surrounding communities have worked together and exhibited as
great a spirit of cooperation as I have ever seen. They were
communities that were at odds on how to proceed, but decided to
set aside obstacles and opposition and move forward with focus
and determination to get the site cleaned up.
I have worked with the Department of Energy and the site
manager to make sure they had everything they needed to make
this job move forward. They have been extremely dedicated to
this mission. I worked with other members of this subcommittee,
including Chairman Reed, the Senate, and the House to try to
make the process work instead of getting bogged down in
bureaucratic gridlock. I have worked with the State of Colorado
and other Federal agencies, including the EPA and the
Department of the Interior, to make sure the 2006 date would be
kept on track.
Remember, in 1995 the Rocky Flats site had a baseline for
closure of 70 years, costing over $30 billion. We are now
trying to reduce that to 10 years and $7 billion. The workers
at that site have been tremendous. Just last week I was at a
Rocky Flats meeting with the union membership, and I can tell
you that I have never been prouder of a group of workers. They
are making history, and we should provide these union members
the tools and opportunity to succeed. Their dedication and
determination has been absolute.
Although we do not have a future mission at Rocky Flats,
completing the cleanup is important for the rest of the complex
for several reasons. First, it is the responsibility of the
Federal Government to return that land to the people of
Colorado in an environmentally safe and desirable manner. The
site will be designated a national wildlife refuge once the
cleanup is completed.
Second, we have agreements with Russia to reduce the amount
of weapons-grade plutonium in both of our stockpiles in an
effort to promote international nonproliferation goals.
Third, the more than $650 million that goes to Rocky Flats
each year for cleanup will become available upon closure to
fund ongoing and future missions at the other sites. Rocky
Flats costs $1 million a day just to turn on the lights, and I
am not sure they ever do shut off all the lights. So it is easy
to see why it is important to close this site, which has no
future mission.
Finally, it is important to demonstrate to the Nation and
the world that such a cleanup is possible and attainable.
Mr. Chairman and this subcommittee, I regret to inform you,
that today the closure of Rocky Flats is at risk. Instead of
following the proud vision and model of the Manhattan Project,
the Governor of South Carolina has decided to play politics. As
a result of his dangerous gamesmanship, our Nation's security
and our Nation's environmental security have been placed at
risk.
Specifically, the Governor of South Carolina has
effectively closed his State's borders to shipments of nuclear
materials, and by doing so, threatens to bring our nuclear
weapons program, our EM program, and perhaps our nuclear
nonproliferation program to a screeching halt. How short-
sighted these actions are. It is not just Rocky Flats that is
directly impacted. By design, all of the sites are
interconnected and interrelated. Beyond the direct impacts
caused by one State's action, there is a domino effect in which
the other States may follow suit and thereby threaten both the
nuclear weapons program and the EM program.
For almost a year, the administration has been trying to
work with South Carolina to keep a strong future mission for
the Savannah River Site (SRS) while also cleaning up the EM
facilities. I believe in the mission being conducted at
Savannah River. There currently is a new tritium extraction
facility (TEF) under construction. A new mixed-oxide plutonium
(MOX) facility is being designed. Several other waste
processors and storage facilities are either in the design
phase or the construction phase. The work force at the site is
doing a great job in conducting the mission.
However, the commitment by the State of South Carolina does
beg a question for this committee: Why are we spending or
considering spending so much money on projects in South
Carolina, including processes which require the shipment of
nuclear materials into South Carolina, if the border has been
closed to such shipments?
I will not even begin to get into the amount of nuclear
material and waste currently in South Carolina that is already
designated to be shipped out of that State. The Governor is
picking and choosing which materials can come into South
Carolina and which ones cannot, and he demands that material
already there be shipped to other States. He wants a guarantee
unlike that which has been given to any other State, that any
waste that comes into South Carolina in the future will leave
South Carolina, and it is my understanding DOE has offered such
an agreement.
In fact, the Governor has been offered both a legislative
guarantee and a guarantee in the form of a record of decision.
Either approach would be enforceable by the State. But every
time the Department of Energy met a demand, another one would
appear, pushing the threshold even higher.
I am very sympathetic to the State's situation, but through
negotiations we must produce results. Compromise is a two-way
street. Up until now, I have tried to be patient, waiting and
watching as DOE kept offering more and more to the Governor's
increasing demands. Today, Mr. Chairman, my patience is gone.
When a State unilaterally shuts their borders, they should be
aware that their borders can be shut down in both directions.
Perhaps they can for a time keep materials from coming into
their State, but also can find materials no longer have a path
out, either. If other States in turn shut down their respective
borders, our national security environmental responsibilities
may hang in the balance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
Senator Inhofe, do you have an opening statement?
Senator Inhofe. I do not have an opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, but I have a great deal of concern. I served as
Chairman of the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee
for 4 years. One of the problems we have is the cost of
cleanup, the cost of compliance with environmental regulations.
It is my understanding that the administration has been working
on legislation that might address this in that they might
exempt some installations from some of the EPA regulations.
I wanted to just mention that to you now in case you are
not familiar with the status of that. Maybe one of your staff
people could find out before the question and answer period,
because that is something I think is very critical, very
significant to our state of readiness, and I want to ask that
question.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Madam Secretary, your statement is a part of the record.
You may proceed to summarize your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSIE HILL ROBERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman Reed,
Senator Allard, Senator Inhofe, and other subcommittee members
that may arrive.
I am here today to ask for your support for the
Department's efforts to reform the Environmental Management
program. I am pleased to report to you that the transformation
of the Environmental Management program has begun. DOE has
already taken the first steps to change our focus from risk
management to risk reduction and elimination, to shift our
focus from process to product, and to instill in this program
the kind of urgency necessary to clean up and close the nuclear
legacy of the Cold War to protect and secure the homeland.
We have already taken several steps to immediately
implement proposals for reforming and revitalizing this
program. We have developed special teams and deployed those
teams to most of our sites in combination with our field
elements, our contractors, State and Federal regulators. We
have also involved other stakeholders in the communities around
those sites to develop accelerated cleanup plans.
We have taken actions to further augment the Nation's
security through the consolidation of nuclear material at EM
sites, a key recommendation of the Top-To-Bottom Review of the
Environmental Management program. We are working in partnership
with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure
that our nuclear material is safe and secure. This accelerated
effort will lead to more secure protection of our nuclear
material inventory while reducing the cost of storage and
protection at multiple sites.
DOE has also taken the initial steps to align our internal
processes and management to enable a streamlined, more focused
approach to cleanup. EM has begun reviewing our contracts to
ensure that they are effectively meeting our cleanup and
closure needs. We have also begun reviewing existing systems
and, where necessary, developing new systems for managing our
contracts to ensure effective government oversight.
The progress we have made so far is very significant. It
would not have been possible without the active support of the
members of this subcommittee. I appreciate your support and
your confidence.
As far as we may have come to date, the unfinished work
ahead of us is great. Most of the hardest work and the toughest
challenges are still before us. The EM budget request for
fiscal year 2003 contains key initiatives and tools we need to
help us continue the work of reforming this program. Our budget
request for $6.7 billion is about the same amount as
appropriated last year. However, if we can achieve agreements
for accelerated closure at our sites around the complex, we are
prepared to amend our request consistent with the funding needs
of those agreements.
Our fiscal year 2003 request has two components, a base
budget of $5.9 billion and a new cleanup reform account. This
new account is proposed specifically to fund projects and
activities at sites that achieve agreements with their States
to enable accelerated cleanup and closure.
More details of our fiscal year 2003 request are contained
in my formal statement, so I will not go over those. I
recognize that there have been many questions, many that you
cited in your opening comments, that have been raised about
this new cleanup reform account: How will it be allocated? What
criteria will be used? What happens if DOE cannot propose a
specific site allocation after the markup?
I want to make several broad points at the outset. First,
this account is critical to the success of our efforts. Second,
it is our intent to look for more efficient and effective ways
of achieving cleanup and risk reduction in the base budget of
$5.9 billion, thus to demonstrate more visible and tangible
results for the entire budget request.
Third, it is not our intent to get out of compliance with
any of our regulatory agreements. This is not an assault on our
cleanup agreements. These agreements are living documents with
processes to enable improvements and revisions to achieve our
mutual goals.
Fourth, DOE is looking not only to States, but even more so
to ourselves. We cannot achieve the results we want unless we
address our own business practices.
Fifth, DOE is not seeking any new authority from Congress
at this time to achieve our accelerated objectives. We believe
we have adequate authority within the current statutory
framework. If in the future we believe we need new authority
from Congress to carry out reforms of this program, we will
inform Congress at the appropriate time.
Members of this panel have appropriately demanded more of
DOE, more accountability, more fiscal responsibility, more
tangible results. We are strongly aligned with your efforts to
improve our work. The fiscal year 2003 budget request is based
on a simple premise: that Congress, the States, and the
communities that host DOE sites all want accelerated risk
reduction and cleanup. This budget request will put into place
a valuable set of tools and instruments we need to achieve this
mutual goal.
I do not come before you claiming that we have all the
answers. In many respects, this is possible because of the work
of those who have come before us. Nonetheless, we feel a sense
of urgency that requires that we forge ahead in spite of the
uncertainties. I am confident that we can, working together, be
successful.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Roberson follows:]

Prepared Statement by Jessie H. Roberson

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of Energy's
Environmental Management (EM) program and its fiscal year 2003 budget
request.
We meet today at an historic moment for the Environmental
Management program. This is no ordinary year. This budget request does
not come at an ordinary time. This administration has just completed a
comprehensive review of EM and has concluded that this program is badly
in need of repair. For 10 years we have spent tens of billions of
dollars but have failed to make commensurate progress towards cleanup
and risk reduction. If present trends continue unchecked, we will
squander taxpayer money and make only minimal progress towards cleanup
and risk reduction. This is unacceptable. This administration is
determined to make changes.
This budget represents the first step towards addressing the
fundamental problems facing EM. DOE has analyzed what is wrong and has
taken the first steps forward. To go further, we need the help and
support of Congress. We need the help and support of States and our
State and Federal regulators. We need the help and support of
stakeholders and communities throughout America. We can turn this
program around and produce real progress towards cleanup, but only if
we all work together towards our common goals.
The Department is requesting $6.714 billion for the EM program for
fiscal year 2003. This is approximately the same level as Congress
appropriated for the program in fiscal year 2002. In a year when
demands for Federal dollars are particularly high, this request
demonstrates the administration's commitment to cleaning up the
contamination resulting from Cold War nuclear weapons production and to
ensuring that our surplus nuclear materials are safe and secure to
protect the homeland.
The budget request before you begins to fundamentally change the
way the cleanup is carried out. We have proposed structural changes in
our request to enable us to begin these badly needed changes. The
request provides ``base funding'' to ensure safety and security, and to
support on-going cleanup activities at the sites. But it also includes
a new and separate $800 million EM cleanup reform account. These funds
will be made available to those sites that can in partnership with
their regulators, their contractors, and their communities change their
way of doing business to provide more tangible progress towards cleanup
and risk reduction. If the vast majority of sites agree to the reforms
we think are necessary, it is possible that the $800 million may become
over-subscribed. In this event, the administration is prepared to
support additional resources to complete reforms at remaining sites.
The reforms proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget request do not
fully meet my own or the Secretary's expectations of an effective and
revitalized EM program. Rather, it is a transitional budget. It
contains some elements of the changes we plan to put in place, but it
is really only a first step in the transition toward a more risk-based
and efficient cleanup program. Therefore, in my testimony, I would like
to take a step back from the details of the request to discuss the
current circumstances of the EM program, the conclusions of the
recently completed program review, and key elements of my
implementation strategy. I will then address the priorities used to
formulate the fiscal year 2003 request and provide highlights of the
critical work we plan to accomplish in fiscal year 2003.
laying the groundwork for fundamental change--the challenge before us
The EM program is responsible for cleaning up the environmental
legacy of the Nation's nuclear weapons program and government-sponsored
nuclear energy research. The cleanup program is one of the largest and
most diverse and technically complex environmental cleanup programs in
the world. Responsible for the cleanup of 114 sites across the country,
the EM program faces the challenge of:

safely dispositioning large volumes of nuclear wastes,
including over 340,000 cubic meters of high-level waste stored
at the Hanford, Idaho, West Valley and Savannah River sites;
safeguarding materials that could be used in nuclear
weapons, including over 2,000 tons of intensely radioactive
spent nuclear fuel, some of which is corroding, and more than
18 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium;
deactivating and decommissioning several thousand
contaminated facilities no longer needed to support the
Department's mission; and
remediating extensive surface and groundwater
contamination.

The painful truth is that EM has not effectively managed this
daunting task. Ironically, EM's own indicators would say we are doing
well. We have met over 90 percent of our regulatory milestones, and our
contractors routinely receive over 90 percent of their available fee.
In large part, however, we are measuring process, not progress. This
must change.
To illustrate the magnitude of the challenge, EM's own internal
estimates of what it will cost to complete cleanup continue to grow.
EM's most recent life-cycle cost estimate, based on current plans, is
$220 billion, an estimate that could easily increase to more than $300
billion without breakthrough changes in the program. Additionally, only
about one-third of the EM program budget today is going toward actual
cleanup and risk reduction work. The remainder is spent on maintenance,
fixed costs, and other activities required to support safety and
security.
The schedule estimates from just a few years ago have also proven
to be overly optimistic. Over just the past few years, the estimated
closure or cleanup completion dates have slipped for numerous sites.
Moreover, the three largest sites--Savannah River, Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, and Hanford--have such long-
term completion dates (2038, 2050, and 2070, respectively) that the
estimates for cost and schedule are highly uncertain and subject to
change.
While most of the risks at these contaminated sites do not pose an
imminent threat to public health and the environment, the complacency
and inaction of the status quo will eventually have startling
consequences. DOE spends billions of dollars each year simply to keep
these materials safe and secure. Each year we do not move aggressively
to reduce and remove these risks, they become costlier to manage and
maintain. On the present course, we face the real possibility that we
will never meet our cleanup and closure goals.
While these outcomes are not acceptable, they are also not
inevitable. This administration believes firmly that reform of the
complex is possible, as well as urgent. We have seen examples even
under the current approach where an accelerated risk-based approach has
yielded concrete results that have served the public interest in
cleanup and closure. At Rocky Flats in Colorado, a risk-based
management approach, effective contracting strategies, and an overall
sense of urgency have produced real progress towards cleanup and
closure. This site has worked hard and struggled to be at the point it
is today. That same effort is needed throughout the DOE complex.
I believe with appropriate management and with your support, we can
replicate these successes throughout the Nation.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW

Last year, the Secretary of Energy told Congress that the status
quo in the EM cleanup program was unacceptable. He directed me to
conduct a comprehensive review of the cleanup program with the goal of
quickly improving performance. The team I formed to conduct the review
concluded that there are numerous structural and institutional problems
that are driving EM's poor performance. The report also included
several specific calls to action to remedy this situation. In the
broadest sense, the report urged that the EM program transform its
mission from managing risk to reducing and eliminating risk. The report
was issued on February 4, 2002. I am moving out aggressively to
evaluate and act on the recommendations of this report and work with
Congress, the States, and stakeholders to develop mutually acceptable
approaches.
The recommendations, and the problems they address, generally fall
into four areas:
1. Improve DOE's Contract Strategy and Management. The issue here
is both our overall contracting strategy and how we manage contracts.
The report concludes that EM's contracting approach is not always
focused on accelerating risk reduction and applying innovative
approaches to doing work. Effective contracting practices are essential
to improve program performance. The EM review concluded that the
processes for contract acquisition, establishment of performance goals,
funding allocation, and government oversight are managed as separate,
informally related activities rather than as an integrated corporate
business process. This results in performance standards that are
inconsistently and ineffectively applied. The report recommends that
EM:

Improve the quality of the contract solicitation
process to attract broader contractor participation.
Require clarity in contracts with respect to work
scope, regulatory requirements, and end points.
Clearly identify the nature and extent of uncertainty
and risks, and align the type of contract accordingly.
Increase emphasis on real risk reduction by focusing
fees on end points rather than intermediate milestones.
Eliminate the use of subjective performance measures.

The report recommends that DOE undertake a review of all existing
contracts for their alignment with these principles and revise or amend
those contracts to improve this alignment. Our point here is not to
criticize or penalize contractors. Obviously, they did what DOE asked
for. But I do not believe that we asked for the right things, and we
did not create contract vehicles that pushed them to perform. We must
begin implementing more aggressive contracts--ones that genuinely
challenge them to achieve and to shoulder more risk--while providing
significant profit for truly outstanding performance. But, conversely,
it means that mediocrity will reap no rewards.
2. Move EM to an Accelerated, Risk-Based Cleanup Strategy. EM's
cleanup strategy is not based on a comprehensive, coherent,
technically-supported risk prioritization. The framework, and in some
cases, the interpretation of DOE orders and requirements, environmental
laws, regulations, and agreements have resulted in the diversion of
resources to lower-risk activities and over-emphasis on process. To
move towards a more risk-based approach:

Cleanup work should be prioritized to achieve the
greatest risk reduction at an accelerated rate.
Realistic approaches to cleanup should be based on
technical risk evaluation, anticipated future land uses, points
of compliance, and points of evaluation.
Cleanup agreements should be assessed for their
contribution to reducing risk to workers, the public, and the
environment.

The report recommends that DOE initiate an effort to review current
DOE orders and requirements as well as regulatory agreements, and
commence discussions with States and other regulators with a view to
achieving regulatory agreements that accelerate risk reduction based on
technical risk evaluation. The issue here is not to avoid compliance
with regulatory agreements. The issue here is that we need to work with
States and regulators to ensure that these agreements truly match up
with a risk-based approach. We are determined to begin this effort now.
3. Align DOE's Internal Processes to Support an Accelerated, Risk-
Based Cleanup Approach. The review concluded that EM's internal
business processes are not structured to support accelerated risk
reduction or to address its current challenge of uncontrolled cost and
schedule growth. We must instill a sense of urgency in the system. If
we are to accelerate the cleanup and reduce risk, we must transform
EM's processes and operations to reflect this urgency and time
sensitivity. Some specific actions include:

Improve work planning to increase the up-front
understanding and planning of work and apply project management
principles to all core work areas.
Expand the application of Integrated Safety Management
(ISM) to higher-level work planning, where decisions are made
about what work is appropriate and desirable and breakthrough
safety improvements may occur.
Develop ``lessons learned'' at a corporate level to
provide a frank description of significant project issues, with
corporate lessons learned required for all EM managers.
Apply DOE requirements in a manner consistent with the
work at hand, clarifying requirements relevant to cleanup and
streamlining the process for interpreting DOE orders and
requirements for more complex cleanup projects.
Accelerate the closure of small sites. With relatively
little additional investment, the risks at remaining small
sites can be eliminated sooner, and the life-cycle costs
reduced.

4. Realign the EM Program so its Scope is Consistent with an
Accelerated, Risk-based Cleanup and Closure Mission. The current scope
of the EM program includes activities that are not focused on or
supportive of an accelerated, risk-based cleanup and closure mission.
EM should redeploy, streamline, or cease activities not appropriate for
accelerated cleanup and closure. Specifically, EM should:

Accelerate the consolidation of activities that
require safeguards and security infrastructure to enhance
safety and security, reduce threats, reduce risk, and save
money.
Refocus the EM technology program to directly address
the specific, near-term applied technology needs for cleanup
and closure.
Eliminate or transfer from EM those activities not
directly supporting an accelerated, risk-based cleanup and
closure program.

MAKING CHANGES ON A FAST TRACK

The review identified specific issues and recommendations that will
allow us to move aggressively to change the EM program's approach to
its cleanup and closure mandate. Similarly, the sites have contributed
their own site-specific strategies and proposals to refocus and
accelerate their efforts. All the recommended changes are designed to
focus the program on one primary result--reducing risk to public
health, workers, and the environment on an accelerated basis.
We have already instituted some changes, and will continue to take
action as soon as possible and practicable to bring about the changes
that are needed. We have deployed special teams to most of our sites to
work with DOE, our contractors, State and Federal regulators, and other
stakeholders to develop revised cleanup plans. I am very pleased that
we signed a letter of intent with the Hanford site in Washington that
will enable us to significantly accelerate our work there and achieve
more risk reduction. We are engaged in similar discussions at the
Savannah River, Oak Ridge, and Brookhaven sites, and I expect to
achieve similar results at these sites over the next few months.
Additionally, we are already acting to ensure our contracts align
with and support our accelerated cleanup mission. We recently announced
that a new contract will be competed and awarded for cleanup of the
Mound Site in Ohio. The new contract, streamlined and focused on
reducing risk, will emphasize completing cleanup safely and more
quickly, with a goal of transferring the site to the community by 2006
or earlier.
Similarly, as the review makes clear, EM needs to get its own house
in order to ensure its internal processes and policies support the
urgency of its mission. As part of our human capital strategy, we have
just completed a reassignment of 40 percent of the program's 70 Senior
Executives in order to strengthen, streamline, and remove unnecessary
layers from the leadership of the program. Our purpose is to better
leverage the unique talents of these executives, force better
integration between the field and headquarters on the challenges
confronting the program, and to stimulate new thinking and creative
solutions to the cleanup.
We are taking actions to further augment the Nation's security
through the consolidation of nuclear material at EM sites, a key
recommendation of the top-to-bottom report. We are working in
partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure
that our nuclear material is safe and secure. This accelerated effort
will lead to more secure protection of our nuclear material inventory
while reducing the expensive cost of storage and protection at multiple
sites.
This is just a beginning. We will continue to work quickly to
implement the recommendations of the top-to-bottom report.

THE FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET REQUEST

A key element for implementing the review's recommendations is to
ensure that the program's funding is properly aligned to support needed
change. The fiscal year 2003 budget request is a first step towards
achieving that alignment. It incorporates some new ways of doing
business and includes a significant structural change designed to
foster agreement on expedited, more risk-based cleanup approaches.
EM's fiscal year 2003 budget request of $6.7 billion is essentially
the same level as appropriated for fiscal year 2002. The budget request
is composed of two parts: a base budget request and a new Environmental
Management Cleanup Reform Appropriation request of $800 million to
implement fundamental changes to the cleanup program.

CLEANUP REFORM APPROPRIATION

EM is requesting a new Cleanup Reform Appropriation that is
critical to beginning implementation of the recommendations of the top-
to-bottom review. While the overall size of the request is consistent
with past years, DOE is requesting from Congress new discretion in
allocating this money among the sites, and for specific projects within
sites. We believe that this approach is essential to meeting the common
goal of States, taxpayers, and DOE accelerated cleanup and risk
reduction. DOE realizes that we are asking a great deal from Congress
with this request, and we are eager to work with you to accomplish this
goal.
The Cleanup Reform Appropriation would in essence be a performance
tool--a pool of funds available to those sites that both demonstrate
their ability to realign to a more accelerated risk-based approach, and
provide to DOE specific proposals consistent with this new approach
that achieve greater risk reduction, faster.
We are now in the midst of reassessing and realigning our
activities to enable a more risk-based, accelerated cleanup approach.
It is our goal to develop agreements at each site on a specific set of
changes and commitments by all parties that will reflect this new
approach. I have no doubt that this process may often be difficult.
Everyone will have to let go of certain things they favor in the
broader public interest of achieving more risk reduction faster.
Indeed, the top-to-bottom review concluded that every player in the
cleanup business needs to make changes to enable a more effective
cleanup strategy.
Once these strategic agreements are reached, we will develop
specific plans that implement this new approach. These plans should be
supported by the State and Federal regulators, should align with a
revised contract and regulatory strategy, and should reflect a risk-
based accelerated approach. These plans might be new projects not
previously in the sites' baselines. They might be modified, accelerated
versions of existing projects. I am also open to supporting projects
that already reflect an accelerated risk-based approach, but where
additional funds can achieve even greater risk reduction at a lower
life-cycle cost. Each project proposed for the cleanup fund would have
a new cost savings and funding profile. Funds from the Cleanup Reform
Appropriation would then be made available to fund or supplement
existing funding from the base budget for the project. The appropriate
congressional committees will be informed of the agreement and the
commitment of funds from this appropriation. The funds identified with
the acceleration will be merged with the funds in the parent
appropriation (e.g., Closure, Site/Project Completion, Post-2006) of
the old activity.
This new appropriation will provide the stimulus necessary to
encourage our sites, our contractors, DOE headquarters and program
elements, and State and Federal regulators to quickly forge agreements
to enable more effective cleanup approaches. An example of the
candidate projects identified during the review for alternate
strategies that should produce results quicker and with substantial
life-cycle savings are high-level waste vitrification projects. The
review identified alternative approaches to treating high-level waste
that would limit vitrification to the high-risk component and pursue
alternative treatment approaches for lower-risk components. These
alternative approaches offer the potential of earlier true risk
reduction and could save the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars.
In summary, this Cleanup Reform Appropriation provides EM with the
tool we need to jump-start our reform agenda. It enables DOE, Congress,
communities, regulators, and contractors to work together to achieve
our common goal of accelerated cleanup and risk reduction. It also
maintains for Congress the necessary oversight and checks and balances
to ensure that this fund is managed prudently, and consistently with
our common goals.

BASE BUDGET REQUEST

The base budget request would protect our workers, the public, and
the environment while continuing cleanup progress across the DOE
complex. As I said earlier, this fiscal year 2003 budget is a
transitional budget. It does not fully reflect the changes we have
proposed and will be implementing throughout the DOE complex over the
next several months. The progress towards cleanup and risk reduction
reflected in this request does not meet either my, or the Secretary's,
expectations for this program. But it does provide us with the set of
tools we need to begin the process of improving EM's performance. In
building the request, the Department applied the following principles
and priorities:
Protect human health and the environment: The budget request
continues to place the highest priority on protecting the health and
safety of workers and the public at all DOE sites. We expect
outstanding safety performance as a matter of course. We demand this
from our contractors and ourselves, and we will accept nothing less.
Surveillance and maintenance: Surveillance, maintenance, and
support activities needed to maintain waste, materials, facilities, and
sites in a safe and stable condition are fully funded in the base
budget. This funding maintains the sites in an operating and safe
condition. Examples of these types of activities in the request
include:

Safe storage, configuration, and accountability of
nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel at sites such as the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL), the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and the
Hanford Site in Washington;
Safe storage of high-level, mixed, and low-level
waste, as well as management and disposal of hazardous and
sanitary waste, across the DOE complex, including tank safety
activities at the Hanford, INEEL, and Savannah River high-level
waste tank farms;
Long-term stewardship at more than 35 sites where
cleanup has been completed but where some contaminants still
remain. In fiscal year 2003, this will include Weldon Spring in
Missouri, which is expected to complete cleanup and transition
to long-term stewardship by the end of fiscal year 2002;
Maintaining the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in
Ohio in cold standby, including uranium deposit removal;
Surveillance and maintenance of more than 62,000
depleted uranium hexafloride and other uranium cylinders
located at gaseous diffusion plants in Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee;
Surveillance and maintenance of facilities, including
excess contaminated facilities pending deactivation and
decontamination;
Groundwater monitoring and continued operation of
treatment systems; and
Essential landlord functions.

Safeguards and security: This is first EM budget request since the
events of September 11. Our Nation is more aware than ever before of
the critical need to maintain vigilance in our domestic security and to
protect against terrorism. The EM program is responsible for many tons
of surplus nuclear material. The budget request provides funding at
approximately the fiscal year 2002 appropriation, reflecting both
increased and decreased safeguards and security needs. In particular,
reduced requirements in Environmental Management Defense Facilities
Closure Projects are commensurate with the planned removal of special
nuclear materials from Fernald and Rocky Flats sites, and reflect
completion of security upgrades in Miamisburg this year.
Accelerated cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound:
The request supports the work necessary to continue accelerated cleanup
and closure of the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in
Colorado. The request maintains a focus on closure of the Fernald
Environmental Management Project and the Mound Site in Ohio. Closing
these sites will eliminate significant risk and financial liabilities
that EM cannot afford to maintain. Our base budget request also funds
supporting activities at sites such as the Savannah River Site and Oak
Ridge in Tennessee that are critical to achieving closure of these
three major sites.
At Rocky Flats, the fiscal year 2003 request keeps the site on
track for closing in 2006. In fiscal year 2003, it supports:

Eliminating the Security Protected Area. In fiscal
year 2001, special nuclear material was consolidated into a
single building, significantly reducing the size of the
Protected Area. This both reduced security costs for the
buildings being dismantled and improved productivity by
reducing the time it takes work crews to gain access to these
facilities. In fiscal year 2003, based on the current estimates
for shipping nuclear material off-site, we will be able to
eliminate the Protected Area entirely. Cost savings can than be
shifted to active cleanup, rather than maintaining costly
safeguards and security measures;
Shipping 3,700 cubic meters of transuranic waste to
WIPP, and 35,000 cubic meters of low-level waste and 3,600
cubic meters of low-level mixed waste for disposal, subject to
receiver site availability;
Completing shipments of plutonium metals and oxides
off-site; and
Continuing deactivation and decontamination (D&D)
activities for Buildings 371, 707, 771, and 776/7, and
associated remediation work.

At Fernald, the fiscal year 2003 request supports:

Continuing remediation of the silos;
Shipping about 93,500 cubic meters of waste to a
permitted off-site commercial disposal facility; continuing
packaging and on- or off-site disposition of mixed and low-
level wastes; and placing 43,000 cubic meters of remediation
waste in the on-site disposal facility; and
Continuing D&D of the Pilot Plant Complex and
Multicomplex, and initiating D&D of the Liquid Storage Complex.

At Miamisburg (Mound), we will continue efforts to cleanup
contamination and transfer land to the community for economic
development. We have already transferred 121 acres, or about 40 percent
of the site, for this purpose. The fiscal year 2003 request supports:

Continuing acceleration of site cleanup and transfer
of site properties by completing ``critical path'' deactivation
and decontamination activities in the Main Hill Tritium
facilities (i.e., R, SW, and T Buildings);
Completing site preparations and beginning excavation
of thorium- and polonium-contaminated soil (i.e., Release Site
66), the largest contaminated soil excavation project at Mound;
and
Shipping over 19,000 cubic meters of contaminated soil
and debris for off-site disposal.

Increased shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): The
request maintains support for a significantly increased rate of
shipments of transuranic waste to WIPP. The WIPP facility in New Mexico
is critical to EM closure and completion goals at other sites. For
example, WIPP is critical to the Department's commitment to the State
of Idaho to ship 3,100 cubic meters of transuranic waste out of the
State by December 2002, and to meeting the schedule for closure of
Rocky Flats. In fiscal year 2002, the Department provided an additional
$12 million to WIPP to increase by almost 50 percent the rate of
shipments. The fiscal year 2003 request supports:

Continued increased shipments of contact-handled
transuranic waste; and
Continued progress toward beginning shipments of
remote-handled waste, including submission of regulatory
documentation to the New Mexico and EPA regulators and facility
upgrades and modifications needed for remote-handled disposal
operations.

Continuing progress: EM will continue to make progress in
completing cleanup projects in accordance with existing approaches and
under existing agreements. The Department will continue efforts to
clean up release sites; to treat, store, and dispose of hazardous and
radioactive waste; and to decontaminate and decommission facilities at
many sites. However, we expect to accelerate the pace of progress of
many of these projects as we begin to implement the top-to-bottom
review recommendations. For example, the request provides funding to:

At the Hanford site, continue construction of the
Waste Treatment Plant to vitrify high-level waste. By the end
of fiscal year 2002, we will have begun construction of two of
three major facilities, and completed 50 percent of the
engineering and design for all three. Work in fiscal year 2003
will focus on continuing construction of the vitrification
facility, starting construction of the pretreatment facility,
and purchasing major equipment, as well as designing the feed
delivery system.
At INEEL, begin operation of the Advanced Mixed Waste
Treatment Facility, treat about 1,625 cubic meters of
transuranic waste, and complete construction and begin
operation of the CERCLA disposal facility for remediation
waste, as well as continue operations to move spent nuclear
fuel to safer storage.
At the Savannah River Site, continue stabilization of
high-risk nuclear material solutions in the canyons; continue
activities to suspend and deactivate F-Canyon; complete
construction work to stabilize and package plutonium for long-
term storage, and the transfer of americium/curium solutions to
the high level waste tanks for eventual vitrification.
At the Oak Ridge Reservation, complete major risk
reduction remediation projects, including excavation,
treatment, and off-site disposal of highly contaminated
sediments from ORNL surface impoundments, and excavation of
uranium contaminated soils from the Y-12 Boneyard/Burial site
and disposal in the new on-site disposal cell. The request also
continues D&D work at East Tennessee Technology Park, including
completing the dismantlement of two of the three remaining
cascade units in Building K-31.
At the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky,
complete high priority remedial actions, including cleanup of
the North/South diversion ditch and continue scrap metal
removal and groundwater actions, as well as characterization of
high priority DOE Material Storage Areas.
At the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, complete
high priority remediation projects, and continue groundwater
remediation, storage yard removal, and disposal of mixed low
level waste.
At West Valley in New York, continue decontamination
of spent fuel processing and storage facilities, and continue
construction of the Remote-Handled Waste Facility that will be
used to prepare transuranic and other high-activity waste for
shipment and disposal. We will complete all vitrification
processing operations and deactivation of vitrification
facilities, including shutdown of the melter, by the end of
fiscal year 2002.
At the Nevada Test Site, continue low-level waste
operations in support of the DOE complex and priority
remediation work, including modeling activities at the
Underground Testing Area, and remediation of 13 industrial
sites.
At Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York,
continue high priority groundwater monitoring and remediation,
and finalize and begin implementing the cleanup plan for the
Peconic River.

Focusing on cleanup: This budget request is the first reflection of
a key tenet that success for the EM program requires a laser-like focus
on its core mission of cleanup and closure. If activities do not
support that mission, then EM should not be doing them. This budget
request begins to implement this tenet by shedding several activities
traditionally funded by EM, but which are not essential to achieving
the Department's cleanup goals. For example:

The request reflects a significant reduction in
funding in headquarters-controlled and -managed accounts.
Overall, funding for such headquarters-based programs and
support services will be reduced to almost 50 percent of the
fiscal year 2002 levels. While our request significantly
reduces support services for headquarters-directed activities
related to such programs as pollution prevention, hazardous
worker training, and long-term stewardship, these functions
will continue at some level as appropriate, but will be carried
out by Federal employees rather than contractors.
The budget request also reflects major shifts in the
structure of the EM technology program to focus efforts on
specific, short-term applied technology needs for cleanup and
closure. These changes are discussed below.
refocusing science and technology
EM's fiscal year 2003 request of $92 million for science and
technology is significantly less than the $204.7 million appropriated
in fiscal year 2002. This is the result of a dramatic shift in the
program structure to ensure it is clearly focused on meeting cleanup
and closure needs.
In parallel with the broader review of the EM program, we have also
undertaken an in-house evaluation of EM's Science and Technology (S&T)
Program. As a result of this review, we concluded that an integrated
technology program is an essential element for successful completion of
the EM cleanup effort and for post-closure requirements. However, for
the program to have maximum impact, it must be streamlined and highly
focused on a limited number of critical, high-payback activities where
real, measurable improvements can be gained versus a larger number of
activities that offer only marginal improvement. It must be end-point
and risk-driven to provide the necessary technical basis for future
decision making.
Toward this end, we are reorienting the S&T program to focus on two
primary areas: (1) direct technical assistance to closure sites to
ensure they have the necessary technology and technical support to meet
closure schedules, and (2) alternative approaches and step improvements
to high-risk, high-cost baselines to ensure all possible alternatives
have been evaluated and that workable alternatives are available and
used as the cleanup progresses. EM will execute this new approach using
streamlined management structures and processes.
As the first step, we are thoroughly reviewing ongoing activities
to determine their applicability to the new areas. By June 30, 2002, we
expect to have decisions on these activities and an operational plan
for transitioning and managing S&T activities in fiscal year 2003 and
beyond. We believe this realigned S&T program will better suit the
Department's needs.

CONCLUSION

The changes that I envision are not changes on the margin. The
reforms undertaken thus far are but a beginning, and must permeate the
entirety of the scope and management of this program to create and
sustain meaningful measurable success. They are a complete overhaul of
the Department's environmental cleanup program that cannot afford to
wait.
I believe we face an historic opportunity to refocus, reshape, and
transform this program. All of us, and all of our regulators and
stakeholders throughout the country, want the same things from this
program: accelerated cleanup and risk reduction. Making the changes we
propose will not be easy. It will involve painful changes in the way
all of us do business. I believe we have no alternative. The status quo
is not an option. Muddling through and hoping for something different
later is not an option. We cannot wait for a future time in the hope
that making these changes might be easier.
This is our moment. If we do not start to do what is needed now, we
will have failed the taxpayers of today and the future generations of
tomorrow.
This is a marathon, not a sprint. This is not a process that will
be completed overnight, but neither can we afford to delay. Delay only
leads to increased cost and lack of real risk reduction. Eventually,
delay will turn festering high cost problems into immediate public
health risks.
If we are ultimately to be successful, we need your help. I ask
your support for the budget request before you. It is a critical first
step to achieving our mutual goal of completing the cleanup of the
nuclear weapons sites. I look forward to working with Congress and
others to achieve this goal.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
We will have a round of questions for 6 minutes each and,
if appropriate, a second round. Let me begin by focusing again
on the new cleanup reform initiative. Could you give us a
description of the goals of this account, this new program?
Ms. Roberson. In general terms, the goal of this account is
to reinvigorate our efforts to learn from past experience and
past investments. For instance, you cited our science and
technology program. We have a number of technologies that we
have made investments in, and we want to evaluate those
investments and their results and determine whether those
technologies are ready to be deployed to help address existing
problems that we have otherwise not been able to overcome.
So the focus of the program is to provide the opportunity
to reinvigorate the program, refocus on our priorities,
streamline and de-layer the organization, and apply our
resources more directly and visibly to the work before us.
Senator Reed. There is some discussion or at least the
suggestion that $430 million of this $800 million fund has been
committed already to the Hanford site in Washington. Is that
correct?
Ms. Roberson. We have reached an agreement with the State
of Washington and the Environmental Protection Agency on an
accelerated strategy for cleanup at the Hanford site and we
have costed that out and our estimate is that it will require
an additional $433 million.
Senator Reed. Now, that leaves approximately $370 million
in this new account. Is that enough to help meet compliance
agreements or create incentives for the States and contractors
to make additional progress at all the sites you have to deal
with?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, we believe it is. The
administration's commitment is to amend its request if we reach
agreements at more of our sites and the $800 million is not
sufficient.
Senator Reed. It also raises the question that the
resources that you are targeting for this new initiative almost
necessarily come in part from reductions in other areas. Does
that leave you vulnerable to not meeting the court-ordered,
court-mandated requirements that you face around the country?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, we believe that we can meet our
cleanup agreement milestones. But our obligation is to go
beyond that and address our environmental obligations more
broadly and integrate all of our activities. The additional
funding that we ask for allows us to meet our legal commitments
as well as advance the cleanup more broadly.
Senator Reed. So you are confident that you have enough
resources to meet all of the ongoing legal obligations you have
and that this $800 million is in effect a new initiative that
would allow you to do things differently, accelerate cleanup,
apply more effort at sites that are already being handled; is
that fair?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, yes, I believe so. But I would
also emphasize that we are not viewing the $800 million in
isolation from the base budget. We believe it provides us the
opportunity to also look at the activities built within the
base budget, and that the cleanup strategies that are being
developed at our sites across the complex look at the totality
of the environmental obligations we have at each site.
Senator Reed. Now, essentially, because the $800 million
cannot possibly cover every site in this country, what are the
criteria you are using to determine, for example, that the
Hanford site would get $433 million and perhaps another site
would get $20 million or $30 million or nothing?
Ms. Roberson. Well, I would like to address that in general
terms, but I would be glad to provide more detail in writing,
because we have looked at each site. I am sure you are aware we
have a baseline cleanup program at each site. So the primary
criteria is more direct and timely resolution of those issues
based upon experiences we have had, both successes and failures
and lessons learned.
So it would be different depending on the environmental
issues at each site. But acceleration is the key.
Senator Reed. Now, to qualify for this new money in this
new cleanup reform account, must the States renegotiate their
agreements with the Federal Government in some way? Is that
part of the quid pro quo?
Ms. Roberson. No, sir, that is not. No, sir, Mr. Chairman,
that is not a requirement. Let me say two things. The
agreements that we speak of in this program are not the Federal
facilities agreement on cleanup. This is not an assault on
those agreements. However, I will say, as in Hanford, in
working with the State Department of Ecology and the EPA, the
opportunities to accelerate that impacted milestones on those
commitments we believe should be addressed and I believe that
the regulators and States have agreed with that.
But that is not the going-in position we have. We are not
starting with the regulatory agreements. The scope that we are
trying to reach strategic agreement on is our total
environmental obligation at a site.
Senator Reed. But is it implicit in your discussions with
the States that they have to be flexible in terms of not only
the agreements, but also perhaps the standard of cleanup, to
get this extra money?
Ms. Roberson. That is not implicit in our process. I can
tell you what is implicit is that in many of our agreements we
have fairly difficult processes to work through, and so there
are cases where we are suggesting modifications to the
structural processes.
Senator Reed. But no modification to the standards? The
standards remain the same?
Ms. Roberson. I do not believe we have suggested in any
State that we change the standard.
Senator Reed. Just a final point, then. Essentially you are
looking at a range of different facilities that have to be
cleaned up. You are not implicitly or explicitly going in and
demanding any changes in the cleanup agreements, any lowering
of standards, anything else. How does the State then
distinguish themselves, make themselves eligible for this
money?
Ms. Roberson. Well, what we are doing is sitting down with
the regulators, both State and Federal, at each site and
proposing and in some cases actually developing in conjunction
with them a strategy to accelerate the cleanup. There will be
cases where that does in fact affect milestones or structural
processes built into the cleanup agreements. We would hope that
they would consider those.
But we are not coming in and plopping something down on the
table and saying, you take it or leave it. That is not the way
this process works.
Senator Reed. In terms of this, the request for research
and development, there is a substantial decrease, it appears,
in the budget submission. One of the points that I made in my
statement was that the future depends a great deal on new,
innovative, and cost-effective techniques, and if we do not
fund that type of research we will end up doing the same thing
we did last year and the year before and spending probably more
money.
Why are we decreasing the research and development so much?
Ms. Roberson. Well, our science and technology program is a
key constituent of the accelerated cleanup and accelerated
cleanup reform. In structuring our fiscal year 2003 budget and
reforming the program, we placed our emphasis on integration of
technology investments and accelerated cleanup. Our goals in
that were to optimize the investments previously made in
science and technology, to concentrate on high-risk, high-cost
problems, and to streamline and delay the science and
technology organization and processes both at headquarters and
in the field.
Second, consistent with this philosophy, the Environmental
Management Science Program, which is focused on long-term
research and development, has been transferred to the Office of
Science's newly created environmental remediation program. The
Science office is making significant investments in
environmental research and will continue to work closely to
meet EM's basic research needs for the future.
Senator Reed. You seem to have anticipated that question,
Madam Secretary.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to just reiterate again for the record, Madam
Secretary, that the Rocky Flats site is scheduled to be cleaned
up and closed by 2006, and in fact upon closure the site will
be designated as a national wildlife refuge for generations to
enjoy in the future. The 2006 closure date is about 60 years
earlier than the baseline closure date that was anticipated in
1996.
Additionally, the 1996 baseline budget anticipated the
Rocky Flats site spending over $30 billion to be cleaned up and
closed. The 2006 closure plan will cost about $7 billion.
I have about 15 questions I want to ask you in relation to
Rocky Flats. I would just request that you simply give us a yes
or no answer if you can. I do not mean to be hostile--lawyers
use that with a hostile witness. I certainly do not view you as
a hostile witness. In fact, I view you as a friend, but time
may not give us an opportunity to get into a lot of the detail.
But elaborate briefly, so I can just get it on the record here
and stay within my time limit. I want to keep the chairman
happy here.
If all issues outside of Rocky Flats were kept on schedule,
are there any issues specifically on the site that would cause
a 2006 closure date to be missed?
Ms. Roberson. The project currently is on schedule and
slightly under cost, so we believe that we could achieve the
intended scope.
Senator Allard. Is the contractor completing their work on
time and within budget to complete the cleanup and closure of
Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Is there adequate funding to complete the
cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. With the continued support of Congress, yes,
sir.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
technical obstacles which would delay the completion of cleanup
and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. Briefly, the project is very challenging.
There are still some small waste streams that we are working
on, but they are not critical to the schedule right now.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated safety
issues which would delay the completion of cleanup and closure
of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. No, sir.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
problems with the work force at Rocky Flats which would delay
the completion of cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
problems with the State of Colorado which would delay the
completion and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
problems with the Department of Energy field office in Colorado
which would delay that 2006 closure?
Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
problems with the Department of Energy's Office of Environment,
Safety, and Health (ES&H) which would delay completion?
Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
problems with any other office within the Department of Energy
which would delay the closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. At this time, none that I am aware of, sir.
Senator Allard. Thank you. Are there any current or
anticipated problems with the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) or the White House which would delay the completion date
scheduled for 2006 on Rocky Flats?
Ms. Roberson. None that I am aware of.
Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
problems with the EPA or the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (DNFSB) which would delay that closure beyond 2006?
Ms. Roberson. No, sir.
Senator Allard. Are there any problems occurring in either
the Hanford site, Idaho, Oak Ridge, WIPP, or Yucca Mountain
which you anticipate will delay the competition of cleanup and
closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. None that I am aware of.
Senator Allard. Other than issues within the State of South
Carolina, are there issues associated with any organization,
State, nation, or other entity which you anticipate will delay
the completion of cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
Ms. Roberson. None that I am aware of.
Senator Allard. So as I understand it, Madam Secretary,
other than some issues not impacting the critical path, the
only issue that will delay the closure of Rocky Flats past
2006, and in fact places closure at risk for the foreseeable
future, is the inability to ship certain materials to South
Carolina?
Ms. Roberson. Yes.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, in my view the responsibility
for failing to clean up and close Rocky Flats by 2006 falls
directly on the Governor of South Carolina. He not only puts
the closure of Rocky Flats at risk, but the entire nuclear
complex.
Moving on to another question, the National Nuclear
Security Administration has responsibility of shipping many of
the EM waste types, including surplus plutonium. With the
closure of sites like Rocky Flats and the proposed acceleration
of cleanup of the four major EM sites, I think it is a very
important thing that the shipping of those wastes occur on
schedule.
Are you confident that NNSA will keep the shipping of
plutonium and other special nuclear material from EM sites on
schedule?
Ms. Roberson. Senator Allard, is this a yes-no?
Senator Allard. No, you can elaborate on this one if you
would, please.
Ms. Roberson. OK. I have the opportunity and pleasure of
working very closely with Dr. Beckner, and I believe they are
committed. We are working very aggressively. Clearly, delays in
this schedule can continue to challenge their ability to
support the shipping campaign from Rocky Flats to Savannah
River on the schedule that we have asked them to, but we
clearly still have the opportunity to do so.
Senator Allard. How do the delays caused by the State of
South Carolina impact the shipping schedule of materials coming
out of Rocky Flats?
Ms. Roberson. Well, I think Dr. Beckner will be prepared to
respond to that.
Senator Allard. OK.
Ms. Roberson. But continued delays simply put us in a
position of having to make choices between how to use the
transportation resources.
Senator Allard. It looks like my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Reed. Do you want a second round?
Senator Allard. Yes, in the second round I will catch up.
Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I hope everyone is observing a record has
now been set. I spent 8 years in the House and now nearly 8
years in the Senate. That was a total of 18 questions that were
asked and answered in 6 minutes. That has never happened before
in the history of the institution, and I do not know which one
to compliment. But I make a request, Madam Secretary, that you
not be so short and brief in response to my questions.
First of all, I want to get back to what I said. I
recognize also that some of the problems in the environmental
standards and rules and regulations that we are experiencing on
our various military installations are not on your end.
There are some that are like water runoff. When you get
into endangered species, for example, and the endangered
species program in the Southeastern United States, the better
job we do, the more serious the problem becomes. Camp Lejeune
and Fort Bragg, where they have red ribbons around training
areas because it is a suspected habitat of the red-cockaded
woodpecker, and so the better job they do the more red ribbons
there are.
But there are many areas that do affect you. So what I
would like to do is ask you for the record: When I heard that
the legislation is being considered by the administration--and
I have been talking about that and actually opposing it for
quite some time. I am very interested in the status of that. It
is something that directly affects the readiness of our
military.
I can tell you right now, in many areas the cost of
compliance with environmental regulations in our training areas
exceeds the cost of ammunition. So I see that as something that
is very serious.
Following up a little bit on what the chairman talked about
on the adequacy of the budget, I have to ask the same question.
You mentioned in your opening statement the $6.7 billion is
essentially the same as last time, and yet the problems we know
are greater now than they were last time. I took some time and
went around to various installations such as the closing and
the cleanup of McClellan, plutonium being the main villain
there, and the guys that do not come here to testify but talk
to me on the ground say that they do not know what kind of an
end is in sight, but it was dramatically underestimated as to
what the ultimate costs would be.
I know it is very difficult to do that, but I think it is
important for this committee to know as early as possible if
you think it is not going to be adequate, the amount that is
there. It just seems to me that if the amount is essentially
the same as it was last time that it would be a problem.
Is there anything you want to add to what you said about
the budget and about problems that you see coming up?
Ms. Roberson. Senator Inhofe, we are working very
aggressively to do just as you just noted. We have deployed
teams all over the complex and I personally am engaged in
evaluating and discussing the strategy to accelerate the
cleanup at every site. We are not at this moment in a position
to identify whether more funds will be needed than the $6.7
billion, but we are working very aggressively and we expect
that we would be within the next 30 days.
Senator Inhofe. I think it is important for another reason,
too. There has been a lot of discussion about future BRAC
rounds. One of the arguments against it is that we know that
there is some time in the future when you close an installation
where money savings will be achieved, but we know for sure that
in the first 3 and 4 and 5 years it will be very expensive.
So it is important for those of us who are going to be
making a decision at a time when our military needs much more
than the budget that the President has talked about, which I
think he feels is the best he can do under the circumstances,
that we be able to make that evaluation so we will know what
that cost is going to be. So I think it is important for us to
hear from you the unvarnished truth on these things.
What was the statement you made when you said the cleanup
of the environmental legacy of the Nation's nuclear weapons
program and government-sponsored nuclear energy research? How
critical is the role of Yucca Mountain in cleaning up these
sites?
Ms. Roberson. Well, we are clearly counting on opening up
Yucca Mountain in our plans for disposition of certain
materials in the Environmental Management program. The
Department's long-term plans for high-level waste and spent
nuclear fuel requires the opening of Yucca Mountain. Where the
opening of the repository may be delayed, EM cleanup plans
therefore might not be immediately affected, but clearly it
would require some additional investment to look at storage and
other alternatives for disposition, because we have no other
alternatives right now.
Senator Inhofe. The cost to that, have you done some
analysis? Let us say for some unforeseen reason, which I do not
think is going to happen, it should not become available; then
what would the cost be?
Ms. Roberson. I am sure the Department has, but I do not
have that at hand with me, sir.
Senator Inhofe. That would be a good thing for the record,
to give some approximate cost there.
[The information referred to follows:]

Cost to EM Program if Yucca Mountain is not Developed

The Department of Energy assessed the costs of not opening a
geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel. The life cycle cost impacts to the DOE's Environmental Management
program for not opening a repository are estimated to be $12.1 billion
(in fiscal year 1998 constant dollars) over the next 100 years (Final
Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at
Yucca Mountain, February 2002). These costs are primarily to place DOE-
owned spent nuclear fuel in safe long-term storage. After that 100 year
period, the cost would be approximately $110 million per year (in
fiscal year 1998 constant dollars), in perpetuity.

Senator Inhofe. Lastly, let me read a statement here, which
you have read, I am sure, a written statement made by Bruce
Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Lab. He says:
``All stored radioactive wastes will remain at Livermore
because there will not be funding available for the disposal
offsite. Lack of space will prevent the laboratory's hazardous
wastes management department from accepting newly generated
radioactive wastes. This will shut down critical work on
stockpile stewardship.''
I guess the question I would have is, do you feel that this
could have an effect on some of the programs such as stockpile
stewardship? What effect do you see?
Ms. Roberson. I am not sure if he is referring to hazardous
wastes, mixed waste, or transuranic (TRU) waste.
Senator Inhofe. Hazardous waste.
Ms. Roberson. Hazardous waste. The Department has actually
invested in processing and treatment capability at Lawrence
Livermore, which has not yet been started up. We are in the
process of trying to accomplish that. So we do believe we will
provide some relief for that site and for the lab with the
startup of those operations.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Madam Secretary, I just have one question and then I will
turn to Senator Allard. In our previous discussions you
indicated that if there was a shortfall of funding that there
would be a commitment or that it would be the commitment of the
administration to get additional funds. How would those
additional funds be authorized and appropriated? Are you
considering, at least as a contingency, a supplemental
appropriation for this year or next year?
Ms. Roberson. As the administration identified in its
budget submission to Congress, I believe that the Office of
Management and Budget is considering both options, depending on
how far along we can get in the development of these agreements
and what the funding needs are. If we have agreement and can
identify the funding need before the appropriations process
proceeds too far, we would amend our request.
Senator Reed. Very good. Let me ask an additional question.
If the Price-Anderson indemnification authority is not extended
for DOE defense contractors prior to August, will you be able
to enter into any new contracts after August?
Ms. Roberson. Well, should Price-Anderson expire without
reauthorization, we would have to look to authority under other
statutes to provide protection for the contractors. However, it
is my understanding that authorities under other laws are
limited and that authority comparable to that available under
Price-Anderson does not exist.
If the Department's Price-Anderson authority were not
available for an extended period of time, we would have to
reevaluate some of our planned procurement actions and
strategies. Termination of existing contracts in favor of a new
renegotiated competed contract may have to be postponed until
that is resolved.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, if I could follow up on your
Price-Anderson question. I had two and you asked one of my two
questions. The second one I have is are there any national
security missions that would be at risk if Price-Anderson is
not authorized?
Ms. Roberson. Well, I think for the Environmental
Management program the primary concern would be securing
contract services to carry out the mission. So, with the
assumption that the current contracts would stand, any new
procurements we think would be at risk.
Senator Allard. Your fiscal year 2003 budget requests
greatly reduced funding for the long-term stewardship program.
However, the DOE will not be able to walk away from its sites
without putting in place long-term monitoring and surveillance
plans which are accepted and approved by the host States. What
are the anticipated costs associated with the long-term
stewardship responsibilities and give us some insight into the
program, if you would?
Ms. Roberson. Again, I do not have a handy estimate for the
total long-term stewardship program. The total I would like, if
we can, to provide that to you in writing, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Long-term Stewardship

The fiscal year 2003 budget request for long-term stewardship
provides the Department the resources necessary to perform the required
post-cleanup remedy monitoring and maintenance activities at our
completed sites. The Department cost-effectively manages over 30
completed sites through our Long-term Surveillance and Maintenance
program. Funding for this program has been consistent at approximately
$5.5 million per year, which is sufficient to maintain our current
long-term stewardship requirements at our sites.
In addition, the fiscal year 2003 request allocates $1 million for
long-term stewardship policy and guidance development. This level of
funding is sufficient based on the technical capacity and performance
of the Federal long-term stewardship staff. Previous year funding
requests contributed to the successful completion of the report to
Congress in fiscal year 2001, the National Long-Term Stewardship Study
in fiscal year 2002, and the Strategic Plan in fiscal year 2002. We
also expect to complete the Science and Technology road map in fiscal
year 2003. Together these documents complete the foundational basis for
our long-term stewardship efforts.
Costs associated with managing the long-term stewardship at sites
include both the remedy monitoring and maintenance costs as well as the
land management/land ownership costs. The Department is evaluating the
possible transfer of Department-owned land, including land with
associated long-term stewardship responsibilities, to Federal land
management agencies, interested local or tribal governments, or
appropriate private entities. Regardless of the ultimate disposition
path, the Department will assure the land is managed consistent with a
Federal land management mission and/or consistent with local values and
needs (e.g., economic development, natural resource protection, or open
space).
In January 2001, the Department provided to Congress a report on
long-term stewardship that included an estimate of approximately $100
million (in fiscal year 2000 constant year dollars) per year for post-
closure care after cleanup at all sites had been completed. There are,
of course, significant uncertainties associated with the estimate.
Moreover, we are in the process of developing accelerated cleanup plans
for the DOE sites that may change the cost of post-closure care.

Ms. Roberson. We have not reduced our effort in long-term
stewardship. The reduction in funding that we see in the fiscal
year 2003 request is a reflection of our commitment to carry
out our Federal responsibility in the long-term stewardship
area. We have a team of Federal employees carrying out the work
that had been distributed among a host of contractors, to
refocus that program.
We also refocused the policy-setting for long-term
stewardship in headquarters to allow us to bring about
effective lessons shared and consistency in the way we carry it
out. So our emphasis on long-term stewardship has not been
reduced one bit. In fact, it has increased.
Senator Allard. I would like to go back to the chairman's
comments on money that you set aside for cleanup reform. What
you propose will require each site to review their current
cleanup proposal and then to present to DOE an accelerated
cleanup proposal. Can you summarize the administration's
reasons for proposing the accelerated cleanup initiative?
Ms. Roberson. The primary reason for proposing the
accelerated cleanup initiative is a result of the insights
gained in the evaluation of the program that Secretary Abraham
commissioned that we titled the ``Top-To-Bottom Review.'' There
were a number of insights in the Top-To-Bottom Review which led
to this structured proposal. In simple terms, those were that
we had opportunities to accelerate the work that we were not
taking advantage of, that we had an infrastructure built up in
the program that should be streamlined and refocused on getting
the work done, and that in general terms the employees in this
program and our contractors have to be reminded that our job is
actually to reduce risk and complete the cleanup, and that
these programs, although there are other obligations that come
as the weapons program modernizes and other things happen, the
Environmental Management program certainly has other projects,
that we are not proceeding aggressively to address those
environmental problems captured in the program today.
Senator Allard. What has been the response by the States
and regulators to this initiative?
Ms. Roberson. I think the response has been cautious
optimism. We have had discussions, I believe, with just about
every State, with the regulators in every State in which we
have a site, not just the large sites, the small sites as well.
I have had the opportunity to speak with the regulators myself.
At most of our sites there is a proposed accelerated
strategy that has been put on the table. In many States it has
been developed in conjunction with the regulators, and it is
undergoing evaluation. In some cases it is undergoing
evaluation by DOE because it was proposed from the site rather
than with the involvement of headquarters.
So I believe the reception has been cautious optimism, and
I am appreciative of that and I think that Congress and the
Department will benefit from that.
Senator Allard. I am assuming that with this new
accelerated cleanup you are going to rely on new technologies
for waste processing. If so, how will the feasibility of these
new approaches be tested without a strong science and
technology program within EM?
Ms. Roberson. We think we are maintaining a strong science
and technology program. We also believe leveraging that
research, basic research side of the program, with the Office
of Science, who have the ability to look across all of DOE and
help us identify those opportunities to advance, will help us
even more.
So even though the dollars are less, we actually believe
our actions are strengthening our effort and our ability to
invest in those science initiatives and technologies that are
going to advance the program. There are two things we are
doing: one, we are trying to leverage in the basic science area
with the science program; and two, we are going through a
review out there at the sites today, to be completed by the end
of April, where we look at application of those technologies
that we have already invested in.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, that completes my
questioning.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony today and
your work, not only in the past but in the days ahead. Thank
you very much.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me call the second panel forward.
[Pause.]
Our second panel today consists of Dr. Everet Beckner,
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and Mr. Ralph
Erickson, the Associate Administrator for Facilities and
Operation of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for joining us today.
In addition, we have written testimony from Admiral Bowman,
the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors, that will be
included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Bowman follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. Frank L. Bowman, USN

Thank you for inviting me to submit a statement on Naval Reactors'
fiscal year 2003 Department of Energy budget request.
Let me also thank you for the faith you continue to place in my
program and for protecting the core values that have been the hallmark
of the program's success for more than 50 years. Through your diligent
efforts and support, our nuclear fleet remains deployed around the
world, fully engaged in the war on terrorism.
We all recognize that the threats our country faces today are as
great as anytime in the past. We also know these threats are not
limited to hostile nations with fixed borders but can come from
organizations with no fixed borders, operating under a veil of secrecy
and outside the international community.
Our ongoing campaign against terrorism underlines the importance of
nuclear-powered ships in defending our national interests and in
responding to aggression against the United States. As our Nation was
being attacked on September 11, U.S.S. Enterprise was headed home, by
way of a planned port visit. Upon seeing the attack on our country on
CNN at sea, the captain ordered the rudder hard over and U.S.S.
Enterprise reversed course and prepared for action as the first
aircraft carrier in position to respond to the attack. Also, a nuclear-
powered submarine was within striking distance to attack targets in
Afghanistan on September 11.
When the President did order our military forces into action,
aircraft from the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Enterprise and
Carl Vinson, along with Tomahawk missiles launched from submarines and
surface ships, carried out the initial attacks on targets in
Afghanistan without any of the restrictions imposed on most land-based
aircraft. Our nuclear fleet again demonstrated its capability to
operate freely over much of the globe within striking range of the
majority of targets.
It is more than a commercial--our aircraft carriers are 4\1/2\
acres of sovereign U.S. territory from which we can conduct sustained
combat operations quickly and without having to negotiate staging
rights on foreign soil. Nuclear power enhances these warships'
capability and flexibility to sprint where needed and arrive ready for
around the clock power projection and combat operations. Sustained
high-speed capability (without dependence on a slow logistics train)
enables rapid response to changing world circumstances, allowing
operational commanders to surge these ships from the United States to
trouble spots or to shift them from one crisis area to another. Nuclear
propulsion helps the Navy stretch available assets to meet today's
worldwide commitments.
Our 54 operational nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) in the Navy's
inventory possess inherent characteristics such as stealth, endurance,
mobility, firepower, and multimission flexibility. These
characteristics allow submarines unfettered access to contested
battlespace 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for as long as required.
Once there, submarines can covertly monitor adversaries without risk of
political or military escalation--a particularly valuable capability
since adversaries understand and can sometimes avoid reconnaissance.
Should tensions escalate, submarines can also execute Tomahawk strikes
from undisclosed locations without warning, often from inside an
adversary's defensive umbrella.
The Nation's 18 strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
continue to form the bedrock of the country's strategic deterrence.
These submarines carry the majority of our nuclear triad's warheads and
are the most survivable units in this force, at the least cost.
Many of the impressive capabilities these ships possess were
developed with funding that was supported by this subcommittee.
While new development is important, the number-one priority is
ensuring the officers and sailors that are out there defending our
Nation's interests are operating safe, effective nuclear propulsion
plants. This is where most of Naval Reactors' funding goes. Today, the
Naval Reactors program supports 102 reactors in 54 operational attack
submarines, 18 ballistic missile submarines, 9 nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers, 4 training and prototype platforms, a deep submergence
vehicle, and 1 attack submarine undergoing inactivation.
The average age of these ships today is 16\1/2\ years, but this
average will exceed 22 years by the end of the decade because so few
new ships are being added to the fleet. As these ships age, they place
a greater and greater demand on Naval Reactors' DOE budgets.
Also, with the funding authorized by this subcommittee, we are
designing better, more cost-effective nuclear propulsion plants for the
future. When the Navy's new Virginia-class attack submarine is
delivered, it will provide needed capability for the 21st century at an
affordable price. The reactor plant design uses advanced component and
systems technology--including the first core designed from the start to
operate throughout the life of the ship. The Virginia-class also has a
simplified plant arrangement with fewer components compared to previous
designs, which reduces construction costs and will reduce future
maintenance costs.
The nuclear propulsion plant design of the new CVNX-class aircraft
carrier is well underway. The CVNX reactor plant will provide 25
percent more energy than Nimitz-class ships and substantially more
electric generating capacity than the reactors and electric plant used
in Nimitz-class ships. The extra energy will support higher operational
tempos and future electrical load growth in the CVNX-class or longer
life. We are designing and developing the CVNX nuclear propulsion plant
without an increase in our DOE budget.
To meet the increasing demands on our submarine fleet, Naval
Reactors is working on a Transformational Technology Core (TTC) to
deliver a significant energy increase to future Virginia-class ships
with minimum impact to the overall ship design.
New transformational capabilities will soon be coming to the
nuclear-powered submarine fleet through the conversion of four Trident
submarines into SSGNs. With these ships, the Navy will be able to give
theater CINCs an extraordinary strike/Special Operating Forces
capability with a flexible, survivable platform that simultaneously
relieves the operational strain on our naval forces. Surface ships and
attack submarines now carrying Tomahawks can be freed up for other
missions--a force multiplier. To this end, we are on course for a UUV
and Tomahawk demonstration in December 2002 on an Ohio-class submarine.

NUCLEAR FLEET ISSUE

Let me briefly discuss the most important issue I see with our
submarine fleet today--put simply, we do not have enough of them:

Today, we have only 54 operational SSNs--not enough to
meet all of the Unified CINCs' and the national intelligence
community's highest operational and collection requirements as
identified in the 1999 Joint Staff SSN report on force level.
Fleet operational data and Joint CINC demands clearly
show the mismatch between current force structure and
requirements. With force structure decreasing over the past
several years, submarine operational commanders have had to
reduce the number of deployed ships. In spite of the fact that
fewer SSNs have been available to deploy, the demand for
submarines continues to increase, especially since September
11.
The Navy is doing what it can to stretch existing
assets to meet requirements within today's budget and overall
priorities. For example:

We are refueling the first generation of the
Los Angeles-class submarines and extending these
submarines from 30 to 33 years. However, pushing the
hull life comes at a cost. Life extension exacerbates
the ``aging fleet'' problem. As the fleet ages, more
resources are required for support, and we have our
young submariners out there with outdated technology.
Additionally, to improve the operational
effectiveness of the submarine fleet, we have taken
steps to forward-base three submarines in Guam to
maximize their effectiveness by putting them closer to
the action.
To meet just the highest priority requirements
being placed on the submarine fleet, we should refuel
all remaining Los Angeles-class submarines. Two are
currently scheduled for inactivation. While this is the
right near-term decision to stem the bleeding for
submarine force restructure, refueling Los Angeles-
class submarines does not solve the longer-term problem
with submarine force structure. Next decade, we will
decommission three or four Los Angeles-class submarines
per year as the boats built in the 1980s reach end of
service life.

The only long-term solution to meeting force level requirements is
to build more submarines. As we consider future budgets, we must
include increasing the Virginia-class submarine build rate to meet the
Nation's long-term force level requirement for attack submarines. The
force level issue is ultimately a resource question. The practice of
buying submarines one at a time will not achieve the submarine numbers
we need for the future and is not a cost-effective way to buy anything,
including submarines. Multiyear procurements of more than one ship per
year would provide significant savings compared to one per year.
Coupled with leverage from buying material in Economic Ordering
Quantities, real savings can be achieved. Innovative contracting
approaches should be encouraged in this period of tight resources for
ship construction.
As my good friend, Admiral Bob Natter, our Atlantic Fleet
Commander, says, ``We can fight 'em here or we can fight 'em over
there. I prefer to fight them over there.'' Well, me too. Everyone
knows and agrees submarines will be an absolutely necessary part of
fighting them over there. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
recently said we must exploit our military strengths as the war on
terrorism continues. These strengths, he said, are intelligence,
precision strike, and the ability to operate underwater. Well, that
sounds just like submarines to me. We need to get going.

FISCAL YEAR 2003 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET REQUEST

Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2003 DOE budget request is $708
million, an increase of only $5 million after inflation from fiscal
year 2002 to fiscal year 2003. To put my budget request in perspective,
it is less than 4 percent of the DOE budget. From the early 1990s to
2000, Naval Reactors' budget has declined 32 percent in real terms, and
has remained fairly steady for the last 3 years.
Naval Reactors supports the 81 nuclear-powered warships that make
up over 40 percent of the Navy's major combatants. This responsibility
includes ensuring safe and reliable operation of reactor plants in
these ships, enhancing the reactor plants' performance, as well as
developing improved reactor plants to support the Navy's needs for the
future.
Sustaining today's 102 operating reactors requires continual
analysis, testing, and monitoring of plant and core performance.
Nuclear propulsion is a demanding technology--the harsh environment
within a reactor plant subjects equipment and materials to the harmful
effects of irradiation, corrosion, high temperature, and high pressure
over a lifetime measured in decades. In addition, Naval Reactor plants
must be rugged enough to accommodate ships' pitching and rolling; have
the resilience to respond to rapidly changing demands for power; be
robust enough to withstand the rigors of battle and shock; and be safe
and easily maintainable by the sailors who must live next to them.
Naval Reactors' DOE laboratories have made significant advancements
in components, materials, core lives, and predictive capabilities.
These advancements allowed the Navy to extend the service life and
intervals between major maintenance periods for nuclear-powered
warships and to reduce ship off-line time for maintenance. Increasing
ship availability also increases the Navy's warfighting capability,
while reducing maintenance costs. Added ship availability is
particularly important in the face of fleet downsizing, because the
operational demands on each remaining ship continue to increase. In the
same vein, some development effort is devoted to ensuring Naval
Reactors can meet the Navy's need to extend warship lifetime. Longer
ship lifetimes are achievable because we are able to extend reactor
plant lifetime. But longer lifetimes require more resources to support
an older fleet.
We are able to extend the lifetime of existing reactor plants
because of the robust designs that resulted from solid engineering and
design work done upfront. After significant additional engineering
work, we determined that those reactor plants will be able to stay in
service longer than we had originally intended. The engineering work to
support those ships in their extended lives will continue during that
period of life extension. For new reactor core and reactor plant
designs, we are using the experience of the past 50+ years to
incorporate improvements into both design and construction. It is
imperative that we continue to deliver robust designs. It is equally
important that we do the necessary engineering work now to ensure that
those reactor plants are able to meet the needs of national defense
now, and for the next several decades.
New plant development work at the program's DOE laboratories is
focused on completing the design of the next-generation submarine
reactor for the Navy's new Virginia-class attack submarines and on
continuing the design for a new reactor plant for the Navy's new CVNX-
class aircraft carriers.
The design of the reactor plant for the Virginia-class submarine is
nearly complete. Today, 100 percent of reactor plant components have
been delivered--all on schedule to support ship construction, and
within budget. The pre-reactor-fill testing and initial reactor fill
for the lead ship have been completed. Reactor plant construction is
over 98 percent complete, and overall lead ship construction is over 70
percent complete and on schedule. Virginia is expected to go to sea in
fiscal year 2004 and will provide needed capability for the Navy at an
affordable price.
CVNX is the first new carrier designed since the 1960s Nimitz-
class. The CVNX reactor plant will build on three generations of
nuclear propulsion technology developed for submarines since Nimitz.
This plant will incorporate needed advancements in warfighting
capabilities and significantly reduce lifecycle costs.
Reactor plant design work is on schedule to support the long design
and manufacturing lead-times of reactor plant components needed for the
CVNX ship construction schedule. Current design efforts include general
arrangement design, system description and diagram development, and
component design (such as final sizing and system interface
evaluations). Long-lead reactor plant forging procurements began in
fiscal year 2001, and the first reactor core procurements will begin in
fiscal year 2003. Necessary system descriptions and general
arrangements required for later design activities have been
established.
Major inactivation work on shutdown prototype reactors is nearly
finished. The last of the prototype reactor plants at the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho was defueled in fiscal year 1999.
Inactivation and cleanup work at the Windsor site in Connecticut is
complete, and regulatory approval for unrestricted release has been
requested. The two shutdown prototype reactors at the Kesselring site
in New York have been inactivated and defueled, and major dismantlement
work will be completed in fiscal year 2002.

PROGRAM BUDGET REQUIREMENTS

Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2003 DOE budget request of $708 million
is adequate to meet Program requirements for now. To live within our
means over the past several years, Naval Reactors has eliminated
infrastructure, consolidated functions and facilities, revised work
practices to become more efficient, and downsized the nuclear
industrial base. To support higher priority efforts--fleet support,
CVNX- and Virginia-class reactor plant designs, spent fuel processing,
and prototype inactivation work--I have deferred important work, such
as advanced reactor technology work and technology development for a
submarine with electric drive, dismantlement and clean up of shutdown
facilities and laboratory facility upgrades. It is not healthy to defer
advanced concept development for a long period. This is the seed corn
to meet future requirements and to ensure that we maintain our
preeminent position in naval power. In addition, my laboratory
facilities are approaching or exceeding the 50 year point and need
upgrading and refurbishment. Also, we are beginning development of a
new, high-energy core to meet fleet demands in the future. I am
reviewing future resource requirements to determine what will be
necessary to deliver technology the fleet will need in decades ahead.

NAVAL REACTORS FISCAL YEAR 2003 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET DETAIL

Naval Reactors' technical budget request is categorized into four
areas of technology: Reactor Technology and Analysis, Plant Technology,
Materials Development and Verification, and Evaluation and Servicing.
This approach supports the integrated and generic nature of our DOE
research and development work. The results of Naval Reactors DOE-funded
research, development, and design work in the following technology
areas will be incorporated into future ships, and retrofitted into
existing ships.

The $228.6 million requested for Reactor Technology
and Analysis will fund continued work on the next generation
reactor for the Virginia-class submarine and development work
on the new reactor for CVNX-class aircraft carriers, and will
ensure the safe and reliable operation of existing reactors.
The reduction in operating plant maintenance periods places
greater requirements on thermal-hydraulics, structural
mechanics, fluid mechanics, and vibration analysis work to
accurately predict reactor performance and to identify and
avoid problems. Also, the continued push for longer life cores
means we will continue to operate reactors beyond our
operational experience base for many years to come. Developing
improved analysis tools and a better understanding of nuclear
data will allow us to predict performance more accurately
throughout extended core life. Other efforts in this area
include improving and streamlining core manufacturing processes
to reduce cost and hazardous waste, performing reactor safety
analyses, developing components and systems to support the
Navy's acoustic requirements, and developing improved shield
designs to reduce costs while preserving our record of
excellence in radiological and environmental control. In
addition, Naval Reactors is beginning concept studies on a new
high-energy core, the transformational technology core (TTC),
to support increased fleet operation requirements.
The $112.1 million requested for Plant Technology
provides funding to develop and analyze those systems that
transfer, convert, control, and measure reactor power to
maximize plant performance. The request reflects the goal of
enhancing steam generator performance, which will benefit CVNX
steam generators--the largest components developed to date by
Naval Reactors. Development of technologies in the areas of
chemistry, energy conversion, instrumentation and control,
plant arrangement, and component development will continue to
improve performance and support operational requirements. Naval
Reactors is also developing components to address known
limitations or to improve reliability of instrumentation and
power distribution equipment to replace older, technologically
obsolete equipment that is increasingly difficult to support.
The $136.2 million requested for Materials Development
and Verification will fund essential material analysis and
testing as ships are kept in service longer than originally
intended as well as part of Naval Reactors' share of the
Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). Reactor core and reactor plant
materials will have to perform safely and reliably for a longer
time. Work on the core and core structural materials includes
testing and analysis of fuel, poison, and cladding materials to
verify acceptable performance, as well as developing materials
with improved corrosion resistance. Testing and development of
reactor plant materials also ensures reliable performance and
leads to improvements such as reduced cracking and stress.
The $144.4 million request for Evaluation and
Servicing sustains the operation, maintenance, and servicing of
land-based test reactor plants and part of Naval Reactors'
share of the ATR, a specialized materials testing facility
operated by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and
Technology. Materials, components, cores, and systems in these
plants provide important technical data and experience under
actual operating conditions, thus allowing potential problems
to be identified and addressed before they occur in the
operating fleet. With proper maintenance, upgrades, and
servicing, the two operating test reactor plants and the ATR
will continue to meet testing needs for quite some time.
Evaluation and servicing funds also support
initiation of a dry spent fuel storage process line that will
allow for placement into dry storage at Naval Reactors Facility
(NRF) of naval spent nuclear fuel currently stored at the Idaho
Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC).
Additionally, these funds support ongoing cleanup of facilities
at all Naval Reactors sites to reduce hazards to personnel, and
reduce potential liabilities due to aging facilities, changing
conditions, or accidental releases.
program infrastructure and administrative requirements
In addition to the budget request for the important
technical work discussed above, infrastructure and
administrative funding is also required for continued operation
of the program. Specifically, the fiscal year 2003 budget
request includes:
Facility Operations: $50.0 million in funding is to
maintain and modernize the program's facilities, including the
Bettis and Knolls laboratories and the Expended Core Facility
(ECF).
Construction: $11.3 million in funding is to refurbish
and replace program facilities. This includes the continuation
of the ECF Dry Cell project in Idaho, which will significantly
improve Naval Reactors' ability to process naval spent fuel for
dry storage. (As identified and agreed to in a Settlement
Agreement signed by the Department of Energy, the Navy, and the
State of Idaho, Naval Reactors fuel must be among the early
shipments of spent fuel to the first permanent repository or
interim storage facility.) The requested funding also enables
the continuation of the Major Office Replacement Building
project.
Program Direction: $25.4 million in funding is to
cover Naval Reactors' 191 DOE personnel at headquarters and the
program's field offices, including salaries, benefits, travel,
and other expenses. This staff maintains oversight of the
program's extensive day-to-day technical and administrative
operations, while continuing to ensure compliance with growing
environmental, safety, and other regulatory requirements, all
of which, notwithstanding our excellent record, necessitate
substantial effort.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS, GOALS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

My program has a long history of operating with the highest levels
of integrity and operational accountability. Our husbanding of taxpayer
dollars provided by this subcommittee has been positively recognized in
two very recent reports. In forwarding my fiscal year 2003 budget
request to you, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rated Naval
Reactors as ``Effective'' the highest adjectival rating on OMB's scale
and noted: ``Outputs are identifiable and make key contributions to
national security. Delivery schedules are consistently met. Contracts
have positive and negative incentives, and include performance
requirements.''
Furthermore, in a report dated December 12, 2001, the General
Accounting Office recognized Naval Reactors' strong performance within
DOE and NNSA. The report stated: ``The Office of Naval Reactors, which
is a part of NNSA, has long been recognized as having a focused
mission, strong leadership, clear lines of authority, long-serving
employees, and a strong set of internal controls, as well as a culture
that enhances accountability and good control over its costs and
contractor performance.'' The Naval Reactors program has always been
dedicated to continual improvement. We use semiannual reviews of short-
and long-range plans to rebaseline work and revisit program priorities.
Monthly financial reports from contractors are used to compare actual
performance against short- and long-range plans. Additionally, Naval
Reactors headquarters maintains close oversight of its management and
operating contractors through periodic reviews, formal audits, and
performance appraisals.
For fiscal year 2001, my program met or exceeded all three major
performance targets. We ensured the safety, performance, reliability,
and service life of operating reactors for uninterrupted support of the
fleet. We exceeded 90 percent utilization availability for test reactor
plants, and by the end of fiscal year 2001, U.S. nuclear-powered ships
had safely steamed over 122 million miles. Naval Reactors developed new
technologies, methods, and materials to support reactor plant design,
which included surpassing the fiscal year 2001 goal of 93 percent
design completion of the next generation submarine reactor. We
initiated detailed design on the reactor plant for the next generation
aircraft carrier, which is on schedule to meet the planned ship
construction start. Additionally, Naval Reactors maintained its
outstanding environmental performance--no personnel exceeded Federal
limits for radiation exposure, and no significant findings resulted
from environmental inspections by State and Federal regulators.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing support of the Senate Armed Services Strategic
Subcommittee is one of the most important factors in our success story.
The subcommittee has recognized the requirements and demands the
program confronts daily: a growing need for power projection and
forward presence far from home, which strains our dwindling number of
nuclear ships; an aging nuclear fleet; and the funding required to meet
these commitments today and in the future.
The unique capabilities inherent in nuclear power have played a
vital role over the past 50 years in our Nations' defense. This legacy
is as strong and vibrant today as it ever has been. Actions in the
Persian Gulf, peacekeeping actions in Eastern Europe, and, most
recently, the war against terrorism have demonstrated the value of
nuclear power. With your continued support, this legacy will continue
far into the future as the Nation meets each new threat with strength
and resolve. Naval Reactors' record is strong, the work is important,
and the funding needs modest.
I thank you for your support.

Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, Mr. Erickson, again we welcome
you to today's hearing. We look forward to discussing with you
the weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, at $5.8 billion the second largest program at
the Department of Energy.
Dr. Beckner, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has raised
more questions than it has resolved, not the least of which are
the responsibilities of NNSA from now through 2012. While the
NPR directs a reduction in the operationally deployed levels of
nuclear weapons from the number deployed today, the NPR also
directs that all of those 8,000-plus warheads be stored. The
NPR does not say, however, how those warheads are to be
maintained.
Is it NNSA's obligation to maintain all the warheads in a
fully modernized and ready status or something else? What does
the NPR mean for the stockpile life extension program? Must
your agency extend the life of the total stockpile? Must your
agency maintain tritium for all of the stockpile?
The NPR also talks about developing a capabilities-based
approach. What does that mean for your responsibilities with
respect to the stockpile? Does that include the development of
new nuclear weapons?
The NPR also discusses the status of test readiness, the
ability to conduct a nuclear test. Retaining the ability to
conduct a nuclear test is not a new responsibility for your
complex. Retaining this capability was required by President
Clinton and included in President Clinton's enumerated
safeguards for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty along with
maintaining a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program.
What is an appropriate test readiness posture and how is it
achieved? Does it entail the assignment of arbitrary time lines
or is it something that must be served by maintaining defined
skills and capabilities?
The NPR also recognizes the importance of the
infrastructure of the NNSA and the need to ensure that the
infrastructure is capable in all aspects of maintaining the
stockpile in the absence of nuclear weapons testing.
Over the past 2 years your agency has started to make
progress in addressing the needs of its facilities and
infrastructure. Dr. Beckner, we look forward to addressing
these issues with you and Mr. Erickson. You have both submitted
prepared written statements which will be part of the record.
Now let me turn to Senator Allard and ask for any opening
comments he might have.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like
to welcome our second panel of witnesses, Mr. Erickson and Dr.
Beckner.
Let me briefly mention my interest in making sure the
weapons activities within the National Nuclear Security
Administration are receiving the focus and leadership they
require to make sure our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and
reliable, now and in the future. With an aging infrastructure
and an aging work force, we need to make sure we are putting
resources into our nuclear weapons program to make sure we
continue to attract the best and the brightest and that they
have the necessary facilities to conduct their important work
for our Nation's security.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Included in
your testimony I hope you will discuss NNSA's plans for a
Modern Pit Facility (MPF). As mentioned in the recently
released third Foster panel report, they mention the future
years budget commitment for a full-scale pit production
facility is still in doubt. The Foster panel report went on to
urge that the Nuclear Weapons Council, NNSA, and DOD should
establish a requirement that NNSA expeditiously produce an
approved design, make a site decision, complete safety studies,
and obtain environmental permits for pit production and
secondary production facilities.
It appears to me that we should at least be moving out with
an initial conceptual plan to determine some of the technical
obstacles for such a facility and the best options.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Dr. Beckner.

STATEMENT OF EVERET H. BECKNER, PH.D., DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Dr. Beckner. Thank you. I am pleased to be here this
afternoon. I am deeply appreciative of your support. The work
of the subcommittee is gratifying for the thousands of men and
women across the country who have dedicated their professional
lives to making the Stockpile Stewardship Program a success. We
recognize the importance of this, as do you.
As I said in my confirmation hearing, I believe in systems
analysis and using the best information available to find the
right solutions, not by intuition or accommodation, but by
hard-headed analysis. That is what we are doing with all the
elements of the stewardship program.
Stockpile Stewardship is delivering results today.
America's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable.
Since the end of underground testing, using the tools of
stewardship we have successfully certified the B61-11 and we
have recertified several warheads with components that have
been modified, replaced, or in some cases redesigned.
A number of problems uncovered by the surveillance program
have been solved without recourse to nuclear testing. The
President's fiscal year 2003 budget will allow us to invest the
resources and the tools and experimental capabilities that we
must have in the future to deliver on our commitments to our
customers, the Department of Defense, and the citizens of the
United States.
This afternoon I will talk about several stewardship
programs that are of particular interest to this subcommittee
and ones that I focus on regularly. First and most important
are the life extension programs for the W87, the W76, the W80,
and the B61. Second, W88 pit manufacturing and certification at
Los Alamos and our planning for a Modern Pit Facility. Third,
enhanced test readiness. Fourth, the advanced strategic
computing initiative. Fifth, the NIF under construction at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Finally, the commercial
light water reactor program and the production of tritium to
support the stockpile.
First let us talk about getting work done. The men and
women of the Stockpile Stewardship Program continue to meet
their formidable day-to-day challenges with ingenuity and
innovation, both in the way we do science, and in the way we
organize the work we do. Without the critical work of our
stockpile stewards at the labs, plants, and in the Federal
structure, we could not perform our mission. Our people remain
our number one resource that must be carefully attended now and
into the future.
To that end, the NNSA must and is working to improve the
infrastructure across the complex. This subcommittee has heard
and seen firsthand some of the antiquated working conditions we
ask our people to work in. The $242 million in the President's
budget for this year for the Facilities and Infrastructure
initiative will begin to correct this problem. You will hear
more about that from Mr. Erickson. This will have a direct
impact on worker morale and productivity.
On the life extension program: As members of this
subcommittee are well aware, the NNSA labs and plants have a
validated requirement from the Nuclear Weapons Council to
extend the service life of the W87, the W76, the W80, and the
B61. These requirements were, if you will, revalidated by the
Nuclear Posture Review, which lays out the direction for this
Nation's nuclear forces for the next 5 to 10 years.
Life extension work involves all the elements of the
weapons complex. For the last several years we have been
extending the life of the W87 warhead for the Air Force. This
work is ongoing at Y-12, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and
Pantex. We are more than halfway through this effort and expect
to wrap up the work by late 2004.
Life extension for the W76 involves a comprehensive
overhaul of the warhead, including replacement of the arming,
fusing, and firing set. We will also be requalifying the weapon
primary. For the W80 we will be replacing the trajectory
sensing signal and the neutron generators, the tritium bottles,
and incorporating surety upgrades. For the B61 we will be
refurbishing the secondary.
These life extension programs will ensure that these
weapons will remain safe, secure, and reliable in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal for the additional 30 years once the work is
complete.
Over the last several years the NNSA has been implementing
a pit manufacturing and certification program to restore the
capability of the U.S. to manufacture and certify this critical
component without nuclear testing. This project is a pivotal
challenge to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. I am pleased
with the high level of management attention this program
continues to receive at Los Alamos and the progress made in
meeting this important national security objective. We remain
on track to deliver a certifiable W88 pit in fiscal year 2003.
Headquarters and Los Alamos staffs have been able to accelerate
the date for a certified pit to fiscal year 2007 from fiscal
year 2009, which I believe was the date given you last year,
resulting in a savings for the taxpayers.
While the Los Alamos facility, TA-55, for making W88 pits
is adequate for the task at hand, it lacks the capacity and
flexibility to manufacture pits in sufficient quantities to
support the entire stockpile. So the NNSA is working on a
longer-term solution. We have a project team in place that has
undertaken the required preconceptual planning work. During
this phase we are carefully examining a number of issues,
including technology development to ensure that the facility
will meet both current and future requirements to fabricate
replacement pits for the current nuclear stockpile or pits for
new designs if required.
Our next decision point for the Modern Pit Facility will be
later this month, at which time we will decide on proceeding to
conceptual design.
As members of this subcommittee are well aware, the NNSA is
maintaining a capability to conduct an underground nuclear test
within 24 to 36 months based on existing presidential
direction. The Nuclear Posture Review, however, raised several
concerns about our test readiness posture, which we are
addressing in a study to be completed later this spring.
DOD and NNSA will work together to refine nuclear test
scenarios and evaluate cost-benefit tradeoffs in order to
determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness
time to support the policies of the Nuclear Posture Review.
The President's fiscal year 2003 budget has requested an
additional $15 million to implement the results of the
aforementioned study once the administration determines the
best path forward. We will of course keep Congress fully
informed on this important national security activity as we
proceed.
The ASCI program, working with America's leading computer
manufacturers, is developing the three-dimensional simulation
capabilities based on advanced weapons codes and high-
performance computing that the Stockpile Stewardship Program
needs to support stockpile refurbishment activities and other
analyses. The supercomputers at all three weapons labs are
fully utilized to meet the needs of the scientists and
engineers. Later this year we will bring on line our newest
machine, a 30 TeraOps machine, at Los Alamos.
One of the most important science and engineering programs
we have in the program is the NIF. I know that this
subcommittee has been a strong supporter of the NIF and we are
grateful for that support. In 2002 the NIF team at Lawrence
Livermore is continuing to make steady progress toward its
milestones. We have recently reported to the committee and
others that several important milestones were met on or ahead
of schedule, including completion of conventional construction
and positioning in seismic tiedown of the target chamber.
The program remains on track to begin stewardship
experiments in 2004 with 8 beams and by the time 192 laser
beams are brought up in 2008 we will have conducted some 1,500
stewardship experiments.
We are continuing to make progress in establishing the new
source of tritium. We have in place a multiyear contract with
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to provide irradiation
services. We expect the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
will grant license amendments this fall to the TVA reactors,
Watts Bar and Sequoyah, that will be used for tritium
production. Commercial vendors across the country are
manufacturing parts for the tritium-producing rods that will go
into the reactors in fiscal year 2004.
I am concerned, however, with the TEF at Savannah River.
While construction of the civil and structural portion of the
tritium extraction facility is well along, it is several months
behind schedule. In addition, the bids on the rest of the plant
contract were well above the baseline estimate.
As a result of these and other factors, we are carefully
reviewing and revising our cost and schedule estimates for
completion of the facility. We will be coming to Congress with
a new baseline in a reprogramming package later this spring.
Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress wants less bureaucracy
and more output from this program, with fewer problems along
the way. You want a program output that enhances security,
which maintains and enhances the safety, reliability, and
performance of the nuclear stockpile, and which bolsters U.S.
leadership in science and technology. I am convinced that the
management reforms that the NNSA is implementing will address
your first concern. I am also convinced that the stewardship
program is today ensuring that America's nuclear deterrent is
safe, secure, and reliable. Of equal importance, the science
and engineering campaigns of stewardship are advancing the
frontiers of science and technology to help the country meet
the economic and security challenges of this new millennium.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Beckner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. Everet H. Beckner

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the fiscal
year 2003 President's budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) with a focus on our weapons work and the budget
needed to ensure that we can meet our commitment to provide the Nation
with a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile. The fiscal year 2003 NNSA
budget request for Defense Programs weapons activities totals $5.11
billion, representing an increase of $305 million over the fiscal year
2002 enacted appropriation, which includes $25 million supplemental
appropriation for the Secure Transportation Asset. I would like to
begin my testimony here today by setting a policy framework and
discussing the issues faced by NNSA.

TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

President Bush is transforming U.S. national security strategy to
meet the threats of the 21st century. The NNSA is intimately involved
in the formulation of the administration strategy through participation
in the Strategic Review and Nuclear Posture Review. We responded
swiftly and comprehensively to the terrorist events of September 11,
protecting our valuable national security assets and employees, and
offering our unique capabilities to the national response. We have
contributed directly to the homeland security needs of Governor Ridge
with our technology and scientific staff. Work such as this will extend
into fiscal year 2003 and beyond.
While the policies and priorities established by the President, the
Secretary, and Congress will determine the scope of our work over the
years to come, nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of our
national defense strategy. The NNSA will make significant contributions
to the administration's new capabilities-based national security
strategy that requires us to maintain our military advantages in key
areas while developing new capabilities.
The NNSA faces major challenges during the next 5-year period in
responding to evolving customer requirements while maintaining and
improving the health of the Nation's national security enterprise. The
expanded focus on international terrorism following the September 11
attacks underscores the importance of maintaining a strong capability
in the science and technology of national security.
NNSA's ability to perform its national security functions depends
upon revitalizing our scientific and engineering expertise to ensure
the reliability, safety, and security of the Nation's nuclear weapons.
Much of the physical and intellectual infrastructure of the national
security enterprise was built during the era of underground nuclear
testing, and has eroded to the point that we are no longer able to
perform some essential tasks. It is imperative that we address these
issues during the upcoming 5-year period. NNSA's program and budget
planning emphasizes maintaining an adequate workforce of scientific,
technical and business skills, and building a diverse, multi-talented
leadership. We must be able to recruit, train, and develop highly
skilled employees throughout our organizations in a highly competitive
employment environment. We must implement our plans to renew the
physical infrastructure to ensure adequate capability and capacity, as
well as compliance with environment, safety, health and security
standards.
Another key element to NNSA's ability to perform its national
security functions is an organizational plan to achieve greater
effectiveness and efficiency. On February 25, NNSA submitted its
``Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA''
describing our accomplishments to date and our strategy for operating
an integrated national security enterprise.

BUDGET SUMMARY

By way of summary, the NNSA fiscal year 2003 request supports the
recommendations from the Nuclear Posture Review to assure the continued
safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile without underground
nuclear testing, develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base,
refurbish and extend the lives of selected warheads, and maintain the
science and technology base needed to support nuclear weapons. The
request protects the operational readiness of the nuclear weapons
stockpile through surveillance, experiments, and simulations for
individual weapons and weapon systems, and investment in advanced
scientific and manufacturing for the future.
The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request for Defense
Programs was developed based on two primary resource drivers. First,
the strategic reviews of national security-related activities conducted
this past year. The NNSA actively participated in the President's
strategic review of deterrence and missile defense policy and was a key
participant in the NPR which lays out the direction for this Nation's
nuclear forces over the next 5 to 10 years. These reviews reaffirmed
NNSA's stockpile refurbishments and the need for a robust, responsive
research and development and industrial base of which the nuclear
weapons enterprise is a key element. The NNSA laboratories are on the
cutting edge of technology and have a vital national security role to
play in combating terrorism. The other is the President's Management
Initiatives on the human capital management and competitive sourcing
initiatives which serve to focus our fiscal year 2003 activities,
particularly in the NNSA restructuring of the headquarters and field
offices and in the Federal program direction budget. Recruitment,
retention, and skill mix are critical to NNSA's success in the future
and are key to our plans for re-engineering the workforce.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

In spite of the many challenges we are facing, the NNSA has
continued to meet the core stockpile stewardship mission--that is, to
maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile
to meet national security requirements.
As I stated earlier, the NNSA actively participated in the
strategic reviews of national security related activities conducted by
the administration. Participation by NNSA ensured that the choices,
plans, and requirements being developed were within the realm of the
technical and production capabilities of the NNSA. It also increased
the awareness of our issues and technical capabilities within the
administration's national security senior management team.
While there are many important points and conclusions in the NPR
including the goals to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by calendar year 2012 and the
maintenance of a ``responsive force'' for use as a hedge against
unforeseen problems, several points are of particular relevance to the
NNSA.
First, nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, remain a key
element of U.S. national security strategy. The NPR reaffirms that
NNSA's science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is necessary to
ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile in the
absence of nuclear testing. This includes surveillance of our aging
weapons, weapon refurbishment, chemistry and metallurgy of materials
aging, detailed understanding of weapons physics, reestablishment of
warhead advanced concepts teams, and development of additional
diagnostic and predictive tools for long-term stewardship. The NPR
revalidated the stockpile refurbishment plan previously developed and
approved by the NNSA and the Department of Defense. The fiscal year
2003 budget request for Directed Stockpile Work is $1.2 billion, an
increase of $190 million, or about 18 percent over last year.
Principally, this increase allows us to support life extension
activities for the W80, W76, and B61 warheads, including supporting
research and development and additional hydrodynamic testing for
assessment and certification. Also, $2.1 billion is requested for the
16 scientific and engineering campaigns that provide the knowledge,
technologies, and capabilities to address current and future stockpile
issues.
Second, more than any previous review, the NPR's concept of a new
triad emphasizes the importance of a robust, responsive research and
development and industrial base. This calls for a modernized nuclear
weapons complex, including contingency planning for a Modern Pit
Facility, which would provide the Nation with the means to respond to
new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. The fiscal
year 2003 budget request supports our industrial base through a request
of $1.7 billion for Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, a 10-
percent increase supporting the operations of weapons complex
facilities. In addition, the NNSA has requested $243 million for the
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization program to continue this
important multiyear initiative into its third year. This program is
managed by Mr. Ralph Erickson who serves as the Associate Administrator
for Facilities and Operations.
Third, a study examining the aspects of reducing test readiness
lead time below the existing 24- to 36-month requirement for a fully
diagnosed test. The NPR states that the lead time needs to be shortened
out of prudence, not because there is a current need to test. In fiscal
year 2002, the NNSA and the DOD will study the optimum test readiness
time that best supports the new triad, as directed by the NPR. Pending
the outcome of the study, the fiscal year 2003 request includes $15
million for Enhanced Test Readiness activities at the Nevada Test Site.
It is NNSA's judgment, at this time, that a resumption of
underground nuclear testing is unnecessary, because stockpile
stewardship is working and is on track to deliver scientific tools
needed for certification into the future. Since the end of underground
testing, the U.S. successfully certified the B61-11 and has recertified
several warheads with components that have been modified, replaced, or
in some cases redesigned. A number of problems uncovered by the
surveillance program have been solved without recourse to nuclear
testing.
The NPR calls for increased emphasis on the reducing the time
required for a nuclear test, if directed by the President at some
future date. This may call for NNSA contractors to recruit and train
new staff to become skilled to support fielding and performing nuclear
experiments and or tests. Additionally, NNSA would acquire specific
long-lead-time equipment needed for testing, such as field-test neutron
generators and certain test diagnostic equipment. Another important
aspect of enhancing test readiness is to revise testing procedures to
make them compliant with current safety and environmental regulations.
Finally, high-fidelity field exercises would be conducted to
demonstrate the ability to field a nuclear test.
The NPR states that the number, composition, and character of the
Nation's nuclear forces ought to reflect the reality that the Cold War
is over and that required capabilities may now need to be different.
For example, current weapons in the stockpile cannot hold at risk a
growing category of potential targets deeply buried in tunnel
facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear, or
command and control facilities. As a result the NPR endorsed NNSA's
Advanced Concepts Initiative that could provide the Nation with options
that could be considered for future production and deployment. Also, as
required by the NPR, it would provide an opportunity for NNSA and its
contractors to exercise critical skills necessary for the long-term
sustainment of the Nation's defense.
By direction of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and in response to an
Air Force requirement, the initial focus of the Advanced Concepts
Program will be the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), for which
$15.5 million is requested in fiscal year 2003 as part of the Directed
Stockpile Research and Development activity. The 3-year RNEP
Feasibility Study will assess the feasibility of modifying one of two
candidate nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile to provide
enhanced penetration capability into hard rock geologies and develop
out-year costs for the subsequent production phases, if a decision is
made by the Nuclear Weapons Council to proceed. This work complies with
existing legislation, including Section 3136 of the Fiscal Year 1994
National Defense Authorization Act. The fiscal year 2003 budget
contains no other funds for Phase 6.X advanced concept study
activities.
Finally, the NPR calls for a stable, adequately funded FYNSP. The
NNSA's costs will not be reduced in the immediate future as a result of
NPR, since near-term costs are driven by restoring production
capabilities and revitalizing the infrastructure, not by the number of
warheads in the stockpile or even the number to be refurbished.
However, we do expect that cost savings from refurbishment of a smaller
number of weapons will be realized beginning about fiscal year 2010.
Also, workload analysis shows that the NNSA enterprise's capacity will
be stretched, approaching maximum capacity while our systems are on the
process line for refurbishment, thereby limiting our ability to
dismantle significant numbers of weapons over the next 10 years. The
FYNSP for the NNSA was provided to Congress on March 26, 2002.
A less obvious, but significant result of the NPR is the improved
cooperation and coordination between the NNSA and DOD. The Nuclear
Weapons Council is working, policy levels between the agencies are
effective, and the DOD has offered strong support for needed programs
in NNSA.
I would now like to turn to several specific programs that make up
the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The success of these programs will
be central to our ability to continue to support and certify the
stockpile in the years to come.

STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

Our most important responsibility is to deliver on our commitments
to our customer, the Department of Defense. The NNSA has a validated
requirement from the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to extend the
service life of the W87, W76, W80, and B61. This requirement was
revalidated by the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. The life
extension work will involve the entire weapons complex. The Kansas City
Plant will manufacture the non-nuclear components; Y-12 National
Security Complex will refurbish the secondaries; Savannah River Tritium
Facility will supply the gas transfer systems; Sandia National
Laboratory will produce the neutron generators and certify all non-
nuclear components. Pantex Plant will serve as the central point for
all assembly and disassembly operations in support of the refurbishment
work. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will continue to certify the
nuclear package.

W87

The life extension program on the W87 warhead was authorized by the
NWC in fiscal year 1994. The program achieved First Production Unit
(FPU) in the second quarter of fiscal year 1999. The ongoing work at
Pantex enhances the structural rigidity of the warhead and is
increasing the service life by 30 years. The warhead will be mated to
the Minuteman III missile following deactivation of the Peacekeeper
missile. The NWC accepted the refurbished W87 as a standard stockpile
item in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002. NNSA has completed work
on over half of the W87 inventory and the remaining W87 stockpile will
be refurbished by the first quarter of fiscal year 2004

W76

The NWC approved the Block 1 refurbishment plan for the W76 in
March 2000. The Block 1 refurbishment of the warhead (about one quarter
of all W76 warheads) will focus on the high explosive, detonators,
organic materials, cables and addition of a new Acorn gas transfer
system. The Block 1 refurbishment will also add a new arming firing and
fusing (AF&F) system. The FPU of Block 1 will be available by the end
of fiscal year 2007, and Block 1 production is planned for completion
in fiscal year 2012. During the Block 1 production, a decision will be
made to either continue Block 1 retrofits on the entire W76 stockpile,
change to a Block 2 retrofit that could include other options, or stop
the retrofit altogether. The Block 2 effort, if approved by the NWC,
would continue from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2022 to refurbish
the remaining W76 warheads.

W80

The NWC approved the refurbishment of the W80 in the beginning of
fiscal year 2001. The Block 1 refurbishment of the warhead (about one
third of the warheads in the stockpile) will focus on replacing the
current gas transfer system with an Acorn design, new neutron
generators, redesign of the warhead electrical system, addition of
improved surety features and replacement of other associated
components. The need to perform refurbishment work is driven by several
factors including: age related effects that must be addressed to ensure
the continued performance of the warhead, minimizing weapon movements
between DOD and DOE, and infrastructure and capacities issues within
the weapons complex. The FPU of the Block 1 design will be available in
the second quarter of fiscal year 2006, and Block 1 production is
scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2010. During the Block 1
production, a decision will be made to either continue Block 1
retrofits on the entire W80 stockpile, change to a Block 2 retrofit
that could include enhanced surety options, or stop the retrofit
altogether. The Block 2 effort, if approved by the NWC, would continue
from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2017 to refurbish the remaining
W80 warheads.

B61-7/11

NNSA and DOD are working to identify refurbishment options for the
aging B61-7/11 Canned Subassembly (CSA) and associated cables,
connectors, some limited life components, and foam components. The
study effort is expected to be completed in late fiscal year 2002.
Development Engineering will begin following Nuclear Weapons Council
approval in late fiscal year 2002. This program will use systems
engineering approaches, and the planned FPU of the refurbished B61-7/11
will be in the third quarter of fiscal year 2006. Production of these
refurbished CSAs is scheduled to continue to the end of fiscal year
2008. The plan also calls for some selective non-destructive evaluation
(NDE) and screening of CSAs as a risk mitigation effort for other
warheads during fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004.
I would like to note that, for the first time in a number of years,
weapons systems cost data is included in the fiscal year 2003 budget
request, as requested in the conference report accompanying the fiscal
year 2002 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (107-66). The
weapons systems cost data for fiscal year 2003 are provided in the
Directed Stockpile Work section of the budget. In addition, we have
resumed reporting for nuclear weapons acquisition costs for weapons
systems in Phase 6.3 and beyond (W87, W76, and W80 Life Extension
Programs) in a separate, classified document.

PIT MANUFACTURING AND CERTIFICATION CAMPAIGN

The reestablishment of a plutonium pit manufacturing capability, a
capability that the United States has not had since the cessation of
manufacturing at the Rocky Flats Plant in 1989, is a key national
security challenge that the NNSA must meet. The W88 pit is a primary
focus of NNSA's pit campaign because an insufficient number of W88 pits
were produced to support pit surveillance activities prior to the
closure of Rocky Flats.
The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is focused on the
near-term development of manufacturing processes at Los Alamos and a
certification methodology applicable to the W88 pit, with a long range
goal of reestablishing the capability to manufacture all pit types
within the stockpile. The program remains on track to deliver a
certifiable W88 pit in fiscal year 2003. Over the last year
Headquarters and Los Alamos staffs have worked aggressively and have
been able to accelerate the date for a certified pit to fiscal year
2007. The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign budget request
for fiscal year 2003 is $194 million.
Program accomplishments in fiscal year 2001 include:

Accelerated the certification date for a manufactured
W88 war reserve pit from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2007.
Manufactured three development and three standard W88
pits in fiscal year 2001; one of the development pits was
completed more than a year ahead of schedule.
Projectized W88 activities are on-track, with all
major milestones for fiscal year 2001 accomplished.
Reorganized W88 Pit Manufacturing and Certification
Activity at Los Alamos to increase management attention and
resources on the project.
Provided documentation required to support a fiscal
year 2002 decision on Mission Need for a Modern Pit Facility.

The fiscal year 2003 budget will allow the program to:

Manufacture a development pit and the first
certifiable pit in fiscal year 2003.
Conduct two integrated physics tests and pit
engineering tests in fiscal year 2003.
Establish production controls and quality
infrastructure in fiscal year 2003 to support the manufacture
of the first certifiable pit in fiscal year 2003.
Establish and implement a peer process that includes
at least one technical data exchange between Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in fiscal year 2003.

While the Los Alamos facility (TA-55) for making W88 pits is
adequate for the task at hand, it lacks the capacity and flexibility to
manufacture pits in sufficient quantity to support the NPR
requirements. Therefore, the NNSA is working on a longer term solution
for a modern pit manufacturing facility. A project team is in place and
has undertaken the required preconceptual planning work. During this
phase we will carefully examine a number of issues, including
technology development to ensure that the facility will meet both
current and future requirements. NNSA's next decision point for the
Modern Pit Facility will be later this spring when we will decide on
whether to proceed with conceptual design.

TRITIUM CAMPAIGN

In addition to restoring the Nation's ability to manufacture
plutonium pits, the NNSA is proceeding with plans for producing new
tritium to support the stockpile. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of
hydrogen which decays at a rate of about 5 percent per year. All
weapons in the stockpile must have tritium to function as designed. The
United States has not manufactured new tritium since 1988 and has been
relying on recycled tritium from retired weapons to meet stockpile
requirements. To manufacture new tritium, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) will be irradiating tritium producing burnable absorber
rods (TPBARS) in the Watts Bar and Sequoyah 2 reactors. Irradiation of
the TPBARS remains on schedule for the fall of 2003. The rods will
remain in the reactors throughout the plants' normal 18-month operating
cycles. The fiscal year 2003 request for the tritium campaign totals
$126.2 million.
In order to irradiate tritium-producing rods, the TVA reactors must
have approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The TVA submitted
formal requests in August-September 2001 asking that the reactors'
operating licenses be amended to permit tritium production. In December
2001 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a Federal Register
notice proposing to issue a ``no significant hazards consideration
determination'', which means that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can
issue the license amendments without first holding hearings. We expect
that the Commission will issue the license amendments by this fall.
While the recent Nuclear Posture Review reduces the number of
active, deployed nuclear weapons, it also requires that NNSA support a
responsive reserve of warheads. This support would include maintenance
of tritium inventories for the reserve. When all these factors are
considered, the impact is small on the date when new tritium will be
needed.
While the civil/structural portion of the Tritium Extraction
Facility is well along, it is several months behind schedule. In
addition, the bids on the rest-of-plant (installation of all the
equipment) contract came in well above the baseline estimate. As a
result of these and other factors, NNSA is currently reviewing and
revising the cost and schedule baselines for the facility. We expect to
be coming to Congress with a reprogramming letter following the
completion of these cost and schedule reviews. We have asked the
Department's Inspector General to review this program and ensure that
we have taken all the necessary corrective actions to get this program
back on track. We are still aiming for its completion in fiscal year
2006.

ADVANCED SIMULATION AND COMPUTING CAMPAIGN

The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) campaign is developing
the simulation capabilities, based on advanced weapon codes and high-
performance computing, that incorporate high-fidelity scientific models
validated against experimental results, past tests, and theory. The
fiscal year 2003 budget request for the ASCI campaign is $725 million,
which includes $55 million for line-item construction projects at LLNL
and SNL. This is an increase of $8 million from fiscal year 2002.
The long-term ASCI objective is to provide the validated three-
dimensional, high-fidelity physics, full system simulation codes
required for engineering, safety, and performance analysis of the
stockpile and to develop the computing resources with sufficient power
(speed, memory, and storage capacity) to support stockpile analyses.
The schedule for developing three-dimensional weapons simulation
capabilities is tightly integrated with the certification of the
refurbished W87, W76, W80, and B61 warheads. Requirements for
predictive weapons simulations determine the acquisition strategy for
increased computing capability and capacity. University partnerships
have also been developed through five Alliance Centers at leading
research universities.
Program accomplishments in fiscal year 2001 include:

Three dimensional simulations of key mechanical
responses of a re-entry vehicle system to normal flight
environments, and of the performance of a full weapons system.
Being able to simulate a complete weapon system allows
laboratory researchers to examine key physics issues through a
combination of simulation, precision experiments, and analysis
of data from past nuclear tests. These codes are playing a
major role in the plans for the remanufacture of the W76 AF&F.
Completion of the Strategic Computing Complex at Los
Alamos National Laboratory in December 2001 provides the
facilities necessary to accommodate the 30-TeraOps Q
supercomputer. The Q machine is now being delivered to Los
Alamos. We expect to have the first portion of the machine
running by June 2002 and the full system will be running by the
end of the 2002.
A comprehensive external review of all five Alliance
Level 1 Centers was completed in October 2001. Accomplishments
include the development of scalable, multi-physics codes,
successful advanced degree programs and graduates, as well as
world-class science measured through peer-reviewed
publications.

The fiscal year 2003 budget will allow the program to:

Release enhanced ASCI 2-D primary design capability,
Demonstrate three-dimensional safety simulation of a
complex, abnormal explosive-initiation scenario,
Demonstrate three-dimensional coupled electrical
response of a weapon system in hostile (nuclear) environments.

HIGH-ENERGY-DENSITY PHYSICS

The High Energy Density Physics Campaign advances U.S. capabilities
to achieve high-energy-density physics (HEDP) conditions, including
inertial confinement fusion ignition and thermonuclear burn in a
laboratory setting, to support Stockpile Stewardship Program science
and engineering requirements. The capability to achieve physical
conditions nearing those produced during nuclear weapons detonations,
including extremely high temperatures and pressures, is critical for
conducting experiments to verify physics theory underlying nuclear
weapons design code predictions, to validate advanced computer models
being developed for stockpile stewardship, and to more accurately
characterize the performance of materials exposed to a nuclear
environment.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request for HEDP is $452 million, which
includes $215 million for NIF line-item construction and $76 million
for NIF Demonstration and Operations. These funds will maintain the NIF
project schedule. Because of overall NNSA budget priorities, only $161
million is requested for the HEDP Core Research and Operations account.
This is a reduction of $26 million, which will delay some long-term
aspects of the NIF experimental program including progress toward
ignition. However, our assessment of program impacts across all budget
elements indicates that this is a necessary decision this year.
The program is carried out at the three weapons laboratories as
well as the laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE) at the University of
Rochester, and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Existing major
facilities for conducting HEDP research are the OMEGA laser at LLE, and
the Z pulsed-power facility at SNL, the Trident laser at LANL, and the
Nike laser at NRL.
The most important new facility for the HEDP is the NIF, under
construction at LLNL. NIF will provide the capability for weapons
scientists to undertake experiments to address high-energy and fusion
aspects that are important to the primaries and secondaries of nuclear
weapons. Several important milestones for the NIF program were met on,
or ahead of, schedule, including completion of conventional
construction and positioning and seismic tie down of the target
chamber. The program remains on track to begin stewardship experiments
in 2004 with 8 beams, and by the time all 192 lasers beams are brought
up in 2008, some 1,500 stewardship experiments will have been performed
on this important, one-of-a-kind tool.
The fiscal year 2003 budget will allow the program to:

Operate the NIF Optics Assembly Building,
Demonstrate multiframe backlighting capability on Z,
Install the NIF target positioner in support of first
light to the target chamber center and start of stewardship
experiments in fiscal year 2004,
Utilize radiation transport experiments on Z and OMEGA
for validation of specific aspects of Advanced Simulation and
Computing (ASCI) radiation transport and hydrodynamics
modeling, and
Demonstrate filling of prototype NIF indirect-drive
ignition capsules and quantify key characteristics.

NNSA ORGANIZATION STANDUP

NNSA's organizational objectives are to improve effectiveness and
efficiency. We approached the NNSA organization standup by implementing
a two-phase plan. The first phase, essentially complete, focused on
creating an integrated headquarters organization, and defining the
structural relationship between the Federal elements at headquarters
and the field locations. The second phase focuses on realigning our
field structure and improving efficiencies by eliminating overlaps in
responsibilities within the Federal structure and reducing unnecessary
administrative burdens placed on those performing the mission.
The recently released report summarizes our first-ever NNSA
Strategic Plan, provides a detailed plan for assigning roles and
responsibilities between headquarters and field elements, and discusses
our objectives for fiscal year 2002 and beyond. We will eliminate a
layer of management and oversight over the nuclear weapons complex by
removing the Operations Offices from the NNSA chain of command and
converting these offices to service centers that provide support
services such as procurement and human resources. Each of the eight
NNSA M&O contractors will report to its respective site offices which
will, in turn, report to the Administrator. This locates NNSA support,
decision making, and oversight close to the contractor, consolidates
service functions, and allows staff reductions downstream.
Local contract and project management will rest with each NNSA site
office. Integration of weapons production activities will be performed
for headquarters from the Albuquerque, New Mexico NNSA office.
Headquarters staff will continue to be responsible for program
planning, budgeting, policy development, and management of weapons
research and development and nonproliferation activities.
NNSA will launch a systematic re-engineering effort to reduce the
number of separate offices and layers of Federal management, reduce the
overall number of Federal employees, and identify and correct skills
mismatches. Federal staff not performing core functions will be
redeployed and retrained as necessary. We intend to use incentives to
encourage higher-than-average attrition, career development, and
retention of highly skilled employees to right size and reinvigorate
our staff.
NNSA has instituted an Administrative Workload Reduction Initiative
using comprehensive input from the laboratories and plants, with task
forces identifying specific improvements and reducing administrative
burdens. As a result, NNSA contractors will be given clearer and more
consistent responsibilities and authorities. They will also continue to
comply with all environment, safety, health, and security policies.
When these changes are fully implemented, we will realize the goals
set by Congress in establishing the NNSA. By clearly defining roles and
responsibilities, we will increase accountability and reduce
duplication. By reducing administrative burdens on the NNSA
contractors, we will operate more effectively and efficiently.

CONCLUSION

This concludes my written testimony on the policy framework and
issues that shaped the formulation of the unified NNSA budget request
for fiscal year 2003. The continuing support of this committee and the
entire Congress is essential as this program continues to move forward.
Additional information on all aspects of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program are contained in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the
Future Years National Security Program, and the classified Nuclear
Weapon Acquisition Reports which have been provided to Congress. Now, I
will be pleased to answer your questions.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Beckner.
Mr. Erickson.

STATEMENT OF RALPH E. ERICKSON, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Erickson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
to discuss the facilities and operations organizations and the
facilities infrastructure recapitalization program.
A year ago General Gordon, the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, described the
condition of the nuclear weapons complex during testimony
before this subcommittee. He said then: ``What I found, I must
confess, was remarkable. Almost half of our structures are over
50 years old, old in the sense of safety, security,
reliability, and mission effectiveness. Many facilities do not
meet modern health, environmental, or energy conservation
standards.''
I am here to say I strongly support that view and have been
asked by General Gordon to remedy that situation. The
priorities in the nuclear weapons complex are being refocused
to assure a viable production and laboratory capability while
meeting the mission requirements of our customer. The Office of
Facilities and Operations has been established to ensure the
vitality and the readiness of the nuclear security enterprise.
We have wide-ranging responsibilities to focus attention on
the physical assets of the nuclear weapons complex. Some of
these responsibilities include institutionalizing professional
and accountable corporate facilities management activities,
setting policy and guidance for facilities management, and
assessing the implementation of that policy, advocating the
programs provide appropriate resources to restore the
infrastructure of the complex, and developing and managing the
facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program.
In the facilities and operations organization, NNSA
established the Office of Infrastructure and Facilities
Management to oversee the implementation of corporate
facilities management and act as the program manager for
recapitalization activities. Bruce Scott, the Director, is a
seasoned, experienced leader with a proven track record. I have
tasked him directly with the responsibility to establish the
proper level of resources necessary to restore the complex to a
condition that supports the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
His staff represents some of the finest facilities
professionals we have across the complex, that have significant
weapons program knowledge. This staff clearly understands the
role of its mission to assure a nuclear weapons complex of
acceptable capability and capacity.
Responsible corporate facilities management within the NNSA
is built upon proven industry practices, successful facilities
programs throughout the government, academia, and the private
sector. This together with my position as an equal member of
the NNSA Management Council ensures that the decisions made
concerning the physical requirements of the complex are founded
in fact, with the understanding and agreement of the risks and
benefits, so that we truly are managing our $25 billion
physical plant as one corporate enterprise.
I will now address the specific program created to help
assure the long-term health of the enterprise. The facilities
and infrastructure recapitalization program has been
established to ensure that the physical infrastructure of the
nuclear weapons complex is restored, rebuilt, and revitalized.
The base maintenance and infrastructure is funded within
Defense Programs, Readiness, and Technical Base and Facilities
(RTBF) activity that Dr. Beckner has touched on. The mission of
the RTBF program is to ensure the facilities necessary for
immediate programmatic activities are maintained to support
that workload. Given the variety of programmatic issues, this
funding has not been able to focus on improving the condition
of a deteriorating nuclear weapons complex.
Sustained incremental, preventative, and other maintenance
and infrastructure investments above this base are needed to
extend the facilities' lifetimes, reduce the risk of unplanned
system and equipment failures, increase operational efficiency
and effectiveness, and allow for recapitalization of aging
facility systems.
The program will direct a portion to address an integrated,
prioritized list of maintenance and infrastructure activities
above current operating levels. That will increase the
operational efficiency and effectiveness of the NNSA weapons
complex. These activities are intended to increase the
operational effectiveness of the entire enterprise and
recognize our landlord responsibilities at multi-user sites,
such as Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia National
Laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, the Kansas City Pantex and
Y-12 plants, and the Savannah River tritium facilities.
This program alone will not refurbish the enterprise, but
it performs a vital function to help size and complete the set
of requirements necessary to restore the enterprise to an
acceptable condition. It is key to maintaining the facilities
housing the activities conducted in support of the nuclear
weapons life extension program.
The facilities infrastructure program has three components:
first, recapitalization, which funds projects to significantly
improve both facility condition and facility mission
availability; second, facility disposition, which provides
guidance and resources to dismantle and dispose of excess non-
process-contained facilities; and third and just as important,
the facility planning, which ensures the requisite planning for
the next year's recapitalization and disposition projects are
done in a timely and cost-effective manner.
Before addressing the fiscal year 2002 program, I would
like to thank the subcommittee for their support of the $8.7
million provided in the fiscal 2001 supplemental appropriation
to begin the facilities and infrastructure recapitalization
program. These funds were used to initiate the program, to
establish the necessary processes, and basically give us a leg
up to be prepared for the larger funding that followed in this
fiscal year.
This was followed by the $200 million provided in fiscal
year 2002, which was supported by your committee, and we
appreciate that. The objective of the 2002 program is to arrest
the deterioration of the nuclear weapons complex that is
occurring this year. We have identified 81 recapitalization
projects costing approximately $137 million. Our program goals
this year are to address the areas of failed roofing, to
correct urgent atmospheric control, water, and electrical
system repairs, and to address a significant level of deferred
maintenance activities.
Upgrading and replacing the HVAC systems in central
manufacturing and laboratory facilities are in progress. We
have begun renovation of mission-essential buildings to permit
more effective and efficient operation and consolidation of
personnel. We have scheduled 19 planning projects costing
approximately $9 million. These are high-priority
recapitalization and facilities disposition projects which are
scheduled for execution in the following fiscal year.
With regard to facilities disposition, we have begun 33
projects costing approximately $50 million that will eventually
reduce the footprint of the NNSA enterprise by some 500,000
square feet.
Looking ahead to fiscal year 2003, we plan to undertake the
following: fund the recapitalization at approximately $180
million, which will continue to stabilize the overall condition
of the nuclear weapons complex. Projects will be funded from an
integrated, prioritized list using the 10-year comprehensive
site plans for input from each site.
Planning conducted in fiscal year 2002 will lay the
foundation for the recapitalization projects to be executed in
2003. Planning and project preparation completed at this point
saves time, money, and effort in the coming year.
Facilities disposition will continue at the same pace as
fiscal year 2002, supporting a further footprint reduction by
at least another 500,000 square feet of excess facilities.
The NNSA approach to management of its facilities and
infrastructure is a corporate one. Dr. Beckner has described
the programmatic approach and the use of Readiness and
Technical Base and Facilities funding. I have just covered the
facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program. He is
the line program manager for the sites. I support his program
needs. This is a team effort to improve the NNSA Stockpile
Stewardship Program.
The path forward: Let me describe it briefly. The various
assessments, both ours and independent parties', clearly
describe the general long-term financial commitment and
management effort required to establish a capable and credible
physical complex to continue to support the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. These assessments make a strong case for
continuation of this program. Our program this year will begin
to correct the deteriorations we have seen over the past
decade.
Over the next several years we will ensure the
stabilization of the condition of the complex and in places
actually make a marked improvement. As an example, we need to
target significant deferred maintenance backlogs which we have
built up over the last decade. This area costs us dearly in
current corrective maintenance and threatens unacceptable
mission down time. It is NNSA's intent to stabilize our
deferred maintenance backlog by fiscal year 2005 and
aggressively reduce it to within industry standards by fiscal
year 2009.
We want to return our facilities' condition to a level of
good to excellent, not where we are today. Likewise, we need to
dedicate the resources to maintaining the new facilities that
we are bringing on line at the same assessment level. Dr.
Beckner has talked about NIF and the other two facilities that
currently are in process. We must continue the efforts we have
underway to reduce the significant amount of excess facilities.
We owe our work force, which is our most valuable resource,
a professional working environment in which to carry out our
national security mission. I am convinced this program will be
able to execute the foregoing deliverables within the funding
levels and the time lines we propose. We will ultimately close
out this program by merging it into the core NNSA programmatic
components. Given the continued support by this committee, my
vision is to complete this activity within the next 15 years.
The most challenging issue facing General Gordon and the
NNSA is to maintain your continued support. The NNSA critically
assessed itself. The complex was determined to be failing. We
have taken responsible actions by citing the problem and
providing a reasoned and thoughtful solution. Money, though
very important, is not the complete solution. Under General
Gordon's leadership, we have refocused our management on the
importance of maintaining the weapons complex.
Fiscal visibility and accountability are in place to manage
and allocate scarce resources. Close cooperation with the
programs serves as a check and balance on proposed project
priorities. Metrics are in place to determine our progress.
Finally, the merging of all this forms a solid program
facilities management.
The nuclear weapons complex is a vital component of our
national nuclear security strategy. The NNSA has organized and
managed this challenge. Long-term funding support is crucial to
our success. We expect to be held accountable.
Thank you for the opportunity to report our progress and
make our case for fiscal year 2003 funding. I will be happy to
answer any questions that you may have now or for later
submission. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Erickson follows:]

Prepared Statement by Ralph E. Erickson

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to come before you to discuss the condition of the
facilities and infrastructure of our vital nuclear weapons complex.
With your support, we have begun the tough, but crucial, road to
recovery of the complex. While only in the first stage of a long
journey, probably of some 10 years or so, I feel we have a solid story
to tell you. Let me explain about the start of the recovery of the
nuclear weapons complex, and especially the improved management and
accountability with which we are undertaking the recovery.

CONDITION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

Approximately a year ago, General Gordon, Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, testified before this
subcommittee and others describing the condition of the nuclear weapons
complex. At that time, he provided his assessment of what he had seen
following visits to each site in the nuclear weapons enterprise. Some
of his words and findings bear repeating. ``What I found, I must
confess, was remarkable. Almost half of our structures are over 50
years old--old in the sense of safety, security, reliability, and
mission effectiveness. Many facilities do not meet modern health,
environmental, or energy conservation standards. They are costly to
maintain, and difficult to keep in regulatory compliance. It is in such
facilities we ask some of the most brilliant scientific and technical
minds and some of the most productive people in the country to work.''
He added, ``The physical complex requires attention and we must act
soon, because it is unprofessional, it's inefficient, it's wasteful of
resources, it's potentially dangerous, and it sends exactly the wrong
message to the professionals we want to attract and keep in this
endeavor.''
His assessment built upon the findings of studies of which you are
aware--all reaching the same conclusions. Defense Programs, in their
Facilities and Infrastructure Assessment 2000; and the Foster Panel's
February 2001 assessment of the ``Reliability, Safety, and Security of
the United States Nuclear Stockpile'' found that ``the nuclear weapons
complex is old, the infrastructure, a necessary part of the complex,
has been neglected, and is not funded adequately.'' Specific details
focus the concern: maintenance backlog is increasing by well over $100
million a year, and has reached some $700 million; unfunded priority
facility requirements are still increasing by about $200 million a
year; and, possibly of greatest concern, facility and infrastructure
conditions of the complex continue to deteriorate. In 1995, 57 percent
of the complex was in an ``excellent to good'' condition, but by 2000
had deteriorated to only 27 percent. ``In addition, facilities
management is fragmented, is without uniform standards and in difficult
times has served as bill payer for higher priority science and
production programs across functional areas.'' These studies make the
clear case that additional funding must be committed annually for at
least 10 years to restore, rebuild, and revitalize a very fragile
nuclear weapons complex.
The recent Nuclear Posture Review highlighted concerns over the
inadequate condition of the nuclear weapons complex in its report to
Congress: ``A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over the
next two decades will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of,
at least seven types of warheads. . . . In order to carry out this
plan, NNSA has initiated efforts to recapitalize deteriorating
facilities (or build entirely new facilities), restore lost production
capabilities and modernize others. . . Initiatives to restore the
production infrastructure will represent a sustained long-term effort
and will be critical to ensuring an effective, balanced stewardship
program for the Nation's nuclear deterrent and for the New Triad.''
In the final Foster Report, Dr. Foster builds on the NPR finding.
He reported to Congress in March 2002, alluding to the decision to
conduct ``extensive refurbishment in the coming decade'' of additional
warhead types that ``This work entails new materials and production
methods and modified designs. It must be done in a weapons complex that
has atrophied to a point not fully appreciated by many.''
In today's world, irredeemably changed by the horrors inflicted
upon our Nation last September, the question of whether a revitalized
nuclear weapons complex is worth an investment of this magnitude is
self-evident. As long as nuclear weapons remain a component of this
Nation's strategic response, then the capability to develop and
reliably produce nuclear weapons is critical. A diminished capability
and capacity within the physical complex undermines the deterrent value
of the weapons programs developed there. This is not just an
undermining of the strategic interest of the Nation, it could invite an
adversary to either question our resolve or believe in the viability of
a nuclear arms race. Dr. Foster's compelling report frames the issue
clearly in technical, strategic, and political terms. He concludes,
``But we don't have an alternative. We have to maintain the deterrent.
It is decaying and has to be replaced.''
General Gordon clearly understands that the facilities,
infrastructure, maintenance, and recapitalization have been under
funded far too long. The priority earlier had been properly given to
establishing the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Attention to the
infrastructure was put on hold while the science based stewardship
program was formulated, funded, has taken hold, and is now working. He
recognized in his report to Congress last year that the time had come
to refocus on the physical complex, which houses the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. Setting the scene for what I will report on today,
he gave his commitment to provide the necessary leadership to improve
the condition of the complex, ``Our facilities require attention.
Others have found, as we have, shortcomings, regarding the condition of
the complex. Improving the facilities and infrastructure of the NNSA is
a high priority, but we need your help, and I am prepared to work with
you to this end. I have a detailed plan of how to proceed. Dollars
alone, while vital, are only one part of the solution. As significant,
possibly more, is my plan to bring focus, process, rigor, and
accountability to our work of recovering our facilities and
infrastructure. Facility management is a standard business practice of
most major organizations. It is being reengineered within the NNSA. We
have established an office to manage the facilities and infrastructure
of the nuclear weapons complex. We are refocusing on long term
planning, establishing the processes--absent too long--that will
institutionalize the procedures, standards, and expectations for the
complex.''
General Gordon's message was heard, understood, and decisively
responded to by Congress. Some $8.7 million was provided in the fiscal
year 2001 Supplemental Appropriation. The Fiscal Year 2002 Energy and
Water Development Act provided $200 million to the NNSA's Facilities
and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP). At the same time,
the NNSA is furnishing visibility and accountability in the execution
of these resources, which serve as the basis for its corporate
management approach to restoring the weapons complex to an acceptable
condition.
This significant funding, which you have provided, allows us to
begin the long, tough effort to restore, rebuild, and recapitalize the
nuclear weapons complex. My objective today is to provide you an
explanation, in some detail, of what actions we in the NNSA have put in
place over the last year. Since General Gordon last discussed his
facilities and infrastructure requirements with you, he has directed a
series of major changes to ensure that we will successfully and
responsibly manage this major undertaking.

REORGANIZATION

As explained in the February 25, 2002, Report to Congress on the
Organization and Operations of the NNSA, a new organizational
component, Facilities and Operations, which I head, has been
established to ensure the vitality and readiness of the nuclear
security enterprise. Facilities and Operations have a series of wide-
ranging responsibilities, which will allow the requisite attention to
be placed on the physical assets of the nuclear weapons complex. Some
of these responsibilities include: institutionalize professional and
accountable corporate facilities management activities throughout the
NNSA; setting policy and guidance for facilities management, and
assessing the implementation of these across the complex; advocating
that the programs provide appropriate resources to restore the
infrastructure of the complex; and developing and managing the
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, which I will
explain in more detail a bit later. Responsible corporate facility
management within the NNSA is built upon common industry practices of
successful facility programs throughout the government, academic, and
private sectors. Possibly the most important changes General Gordon has
effected is to bring focus to the condition of our facilities and
infrastructure, and tasking my organization to be ``the empowered
advocate for the stewardship of the complex.'' This, together with my
membership on the NNSA Management Council, ensures that decisions made
concerning the physical assets of the complex are founded in fact, with
understanding and agreement of the risks and benefits, so that we are
truly managing our $25 billion physical plant as a corporation.
To assist me in managing this undertaking, NNSA established within
my component the Office of Infrastructure and Facilities Management.
This office specifically oversees the implementation of corporate
facilities management, and is the program manager for the
recapitalization of the complex. To lead the program, the NNSA has
selected a seasoned, experienced, leader--Bruce Scott. Mr. Scott
trained outside the Department and has a proven track record. He is
chartered with establishing a robust corporate facilities management
process across the complex. I have charged him with the responsibility
for establishing the proper level of resources necessary to restore the
complex to a condition that supports the deterrent value of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. His staff represent some of the finest
facilities professionals we have across the complex at all levels of
seniority, and are a welcome blend of headquarters and field, with
significant weapons program knowledge. The office clearly understands
the support role of its mission, where its efforts are, from a
strategic sense, to ensure a nuclear weapons complex of acceptable
capacity and capability.
The NNSA has initiated a corporate rededication to our core values,
mission, and vision. NNSA has formalized this in our recently published
Strategic Plan of February 2002. Within this plan is a strong statement
as to the importance of our facilities. We note, ``substantial effort
is required to restore our facilities to ensure adequate capability . .
.'' NNSA has codified its expectations that we are corporately
committed to professionally manage our facilities and infrastructure.
In the Strategic Plan infrastructure and facilities are addressed by
Strategic Goals 4: ``Ensure the Vitality and Readiness of the NNSA's
Nuclear Security Enterprise.'' Our strategy is to ``Provide state-of-
the-art facilities and infrastructure supported by scientific and
technical tools to meet operational and mission requirements''. To
support this strategy are two strategic indicators: ``Ensure facilities
are available to perform our mission'' and ``Implement NNSA's
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program.''
The NNSA reorganization has also significantly improved our
corporate planning, programming, and budgeting. The reorganized budget
processes provide significant benefit to our recovery efforts for the
complex by ensuring a focused and corporate approach. You are aware of
our efforts at establishing a longer term funding plan for the NNSA
enterprise, codified in our FYNSP. Within this plan are included our
specific direction for our recapitalization of the complex, the
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP), which I
describe below. We have laid out a credible and responsible funding
program for the FIRP:

FUTURE YEARS NATIONAL SECURITY PLAN ESTIMATES
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
--------------------------------------------
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program............. 243 290 340 390 440
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fiscal year 2002 funding of $200 million provided a start-up
that was large enough to make a clear positive impact across the entire
complex, yet also manageable for a beginning program. I would add that
the $8.7 million supplemental at the end of fiscal year 2001 was an
excellent device to allow us to pilot in a hands-on manner, to prepare
to execute professionally the current program. We have requested a
ramp-up of some $50 million annually which we think is mandatory to
effectively recover the complex. This ramp-up will allow NNSA to ensure
processes are in place across the complex so that we demonstrate to you
credible deliverables, efficiently managed, and fiscally accountable.
It is easy to throw money at projects, it is hard work to manage them
responsibly, and harder still to infuse accountability in an
organization, which has been criticized for many years for weaknesses
in this area.
So far, I have explained the NNSA organizational restructuring that
allows a professional focus on our facilities, and the near-term
funding we have planned to begin the recovery of the complex. I'll now
address the specifics of the recovery plan itself.
the facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program (firp)
The Recapitalization Program is established to ensure that the
NNSA's contribution to the administration's strategic goal of
maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrence is fully
supported. Its mission is to restore, rebuild, and revitalize the
physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. The base
maintenance and infrastructure efforts at NNSA sites are primarily
funded within Defense Programs' Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities and through site overhead allocations. These efforts focus
on ensuring that facilities necessary for immediate programmatic
workload activities are maintained sufficiently to support that
workload. Given the divergent requirements of programmatic issues, this
funding has not been able to focus on improving the condition of a
deteriorating nuclear weapons complex. Sustained, incremental, and
preventive and other maintenance and infrastructure investments above
this base are needed to extend facility lifetimes, reduce the risk of
unplanned system and equipment failures, increase operational
efficiency and effectiveness, and allow for recapitalization of aging
facility systems. This is the specific focus, attention, and management
responsibility of the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization
Program. It will apply new, increased, direct appropriations to address
an integrated, prioritized list of maintenance and infrastructure
activities, above current operating levels, that will significantly
increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the NNSA
weapons complex sites. FIRP activities are intended to increase the
operational effectiveness of the entire sites and will recognize NNSA's
landlord responsibilities at these multi-user sites: the Lawrence
Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; the Nevada
Test Site, including the North Las Vegas Facility; the Kansas City,
Pantex, and Y-12 Plants and the Savannah River Tritium Facilities. The
FIRP alone will not refurbish the complex, but it performs a vital
function to help size the complete set of requirements necessary to
restore the complex to an acceptable condition. It is key to
maintaining the health of the facilities that house the activities
conducted in support of the life extension programs. These programs are
supported by the Defense Department as vital to deterrence and the
strategic force multiplying effect it has regarding the stockpile.
The program has three interlocking and complimentary components.
The major effort identifies recapitalization projects, which will
significantly improve both facility condition and facility mission
availability. Criteria for the selection of these projects are those
maintenance backlog and infrastructure activities, currently unfunded,
that will significantly improve the physical conditions and mission
availability, as well as address the infrastructure responsibilities,
of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex. These activities are vital to the
accomplishment of program, yet they are not tied to a specific Campaign
or Directed Stockpile Work. Because of their cross cutting nature, they
have not previously achieved priority within strictly programmatic
budget reviews, with adverse impact to the complex. Recapitalization
targets specific, individual projects to ensure clear visibility of
improvements: discrete backlogged maintenance projects; non-
programmatic General Plant Project (GPP) improvements and construction;
capital equipment purchases; etc.
An additional important consideration of the program is the
inclusion of projects that provide cost saving and investment payback.
NNSA's analysis of facilities and infrastructure identified in their
assessment report--2000 that, too frequently, due to the absence of
preventive maintenance, facilities were being run to failure. Projects
in this program provide an immediate positive effect on the condition
of a given facility, and result in the saving of maintenance dollars--
in the long term, preventive maintenance costs are significantly less
than corrective maintenance actions.
The second component, Facility Disposition, provides funds to
dismantle and dispose of excess non-process contaminated facilities.
Disposition reduces environmental, safety and health, and safeguards
and security challenges, and thus costs for those deactivated
facilities and infrastructure that are excess to current and future
mission requirements. These actions are taken at the end of the life of
a facility to retire it from service, to reduce the overall footprint
of the complex, and to reduce safeguards and security requirements and
long-term costs. These actions will improve our ability to manage the
facilities portfolio. They enable the necessary footprint reduction of
the complex. The Fiscal Year 2002 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act conference report directed the NNSA to allocate 25
percent of the appropriated dollars for the recapitalization program to
reduce the NNSA footprint by the elimination of excess facilities.
The third component, facility planning, ensures the requisite
planning for next year Recapitalization and Disposition projects, to
include project base lining and readiness to obligate funds. It also
funds assessments to support the prioritization of backlogged
maintenance and facility consolidation efforts. Finally, it provides
for planning and conceptual design of high priority general
infrastructure projects. Within this effort is the development of
analytical methods and tools for establishing credible restoration
plans for each NNSA site using the newly-revised 10-year comprehensive
site plans; infrastructure assessments to support the FIRP
prioritization of maintenance and facility consolidation efforts; and
planning and conceptual design activities for future priority landlord
infrastructure line item construction projects, specifically targeting
utilities improvements.
With the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program at
work, the nuclear weapons complex is on the verge of realizing
improvements, upgrades, and facility life extensions that can be
measured. Nuclear deterrence through capability is established on the
bedrock of a reliable complex. Possibly for the first time within the
NNSA, corporate facility management is coming on line; it has the
potential to enable and empower governance and stewardship of the NNSA
for the physical complex.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM EXECUTION FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2002

The principal objective of the fiscal year 2002 FIRP is to arrest
the deterioration of the nuclear weapons complex occurring this year.
The NNSA has identified 81 recapitalization projects for execution in
fiscal year 2002, costing $137.7 million. The principal thrusts of the
fiscal year 2002 program are to attack the areas of failed roofing;
correct urgent atmosphere control, water, and electrical system
repairs; and address a significant level of deferred maintenance
issues. Upgrading and replacing HVAC systems for essential laboratory
and manufacturing facilities are planned. We begin general plant
construction projects; and renovation of mission essential buildings to
permit more efficient operations and consolidation of personal are
undertaken. Some specific examples, site-by-site, follow:

Kansas City Plant--Replace and upgrade chillers, air
handling, and dehumidification systems supporting essential
production buildings. These projects provide environmental
controls related to manufacturing processes, in support of
reservoir and Lifetime Extension Programs for the W-76 and W-80
weapons programs. Execute the new Tri-Plant Roofing Partnership
for repairs to Kansas City, Y-12, and Pantex roofs.
Los Alamos National Laboratory--Construct four new
buildings that consolidates laboratory and support functions
into modern, safe, and efficient spaces and removes costly, old
temporary structures.
Pantex Plant--Undertake the most critical of a large
backlog of essential roofing repairs for vital production
buildings. Begin to work down the large deferred maintenance
backlog throughout the plant; and complete repairs and upgrades
to essential emergency and life safety systems. These projects
support the Life Extension Programs, High Explosive Operations,
and the W-76 and W-80 weapons programs.
Sandia National Laboratory--Refurbish three critical
laboratory and test facilities, including their structural,
utility, and power systems and test equipment. These facilities
were at risk of losing capabilities supporting the Defense
Programs mission in weapons qualifications, development,
investigation, modeling, and simulation.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Building
improvements include the replacement and upgrade to mechanical
systems, including HVAC units, air conditioners, air handlers,
fans, HEPA filters, and fan controls; electrical systems, and
other components. Process improvements include an upgrade to
the operational capability at the S-300 high explosive
facility, to improve the processing of high explosive parts,
and the integration of new computer controls. These projects
also provide for improved machine tool reliability, new high
explosives equipment and tools in support of mission essential
weapons qualifications activities.
Nevada Test Site--Projects concentrate on improvements
to communications and safety systems. Older communications
systems are being replaced with fiber optic cable, and upgrades
are planned for emergency, fire, and remote radiation alarms at
test facilities.
Savannah River Site--Projects at the Savannah River
Site include the improvement to the telecommunications
distribution network within the tritium area. These projects
also replace and upgrade the hydride bed portion of the thermal
cycling absorption process necessary for tritium production.
Y-12--Large scale roof repairs and addressing the
significant maintenance backlog throughout the site are
underway. Other repairs and improvements will be made to
incinerators, steam coils, power panels, oil storage
facilities, transformer stations, lighting, and flooring
systems. Specific facilities upgraded include the nitric acid
pickling tank, and the replacement of bond strand piping, which
transports waste effluents from the steam plant to the
treatment facility. The concrete spalling from the ceiling of
part of the production complex, discussed as a striking example
of our facility concerns by General Gordon in his earlier
testimony, is being addressed. These activities support, among
others, the W-87 Weapons Programs, and production work for the
Joint Test Assemblies.

We have scheduled 19 infrastructure planning projects, costing
approximately $9.2 million. These are high priority FIRP
recapitalization and facility disposition projects scheduled for
execution in fiscal year 2003. A representative sample of these
projects includes: design of chilled water, steam, and condensate
piping systems at Kansas City; corrective maintenance projects for Los
Alamos; Sandia is designing HVAC, reactor cooling system replacements
and upgrades. At the Nevada Test Site, major improvements are planned
for the Test Site water system, including refurbishing multiple tanks
representing some 2 million gallons of potable water, replacing
pipeline and upgrading electrical support services, and addressing
seismic and structural issues. Savannah River projects include
electrical component replacements and communications upgrades.
The FIRP is conducting 33 facility disposition projects this year,
at an estimated cost of $50 million. The funding level is directed by
the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act. Execution of
these projects reduces the footprint of the overall NNSA holdings by
some 500,000 square feet. The projects selected will remove about 217
buildings and structures. The largest footprint reductions will be at
Y-12 and the Nevada Test Site. One-third of the facility disposition
funding was allocated to Y-12 ($17 million) given the NNSA's commitment
to aggressively reduce the footprint at that site. Security
improvements at Y-12 and Pantex accrue due in part to a smaller
``limited area.'' At Savannah River Site, Sandia National Laboratory,
and Los Alamos National Laboratory, footprint reductions free up key
locations. Once cleared new programmatic needs will be satisfied and
facility consolidation can occur. Reductions to environmental, safety,
and health risks are achieved at Nevada Teat Site (reducing worker
exposure to rodent borne Hanta Virus), Y-12 (safety issues due to
deteriorating structures), and at Lawrence Livermore and Sandia
National Laboratories (structural roofing concerns). In addition,
savings will begin to accrue for many sites as the disposition of
excess facilities reduces the NNSA's burden of surveillance and
maintenance operations currently required to ensure these excess
facilities remain in a safe condition.

INTENTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

The NNSA is shaping the foundation for a professionally managed
infrastructure. Many aspects of our approach to corporate facility
management are undergoing process improvement. This includes those
processes used to manage the Recapitalization Program. The successful
implementation of 10-year comprehensive site plans (TYCSP) forms the
foundation for bottoms-up recommendations for recapitalization
projects. Looking ahead, in fiscal year 2003, the program plans to
undertake the following:

Fund the recapitalization component at about $180
million, which will begin the stabilization of the overall
condition of the nuclear weapons complex. Projects will be
funded from an integrated, prioritized list using the fiscal
year 2003 TYCSP inputs from each site.
Planning conducted in fiscal year 2002 will be
executed in fiscal year 2003, allowing acceleration of the pace
of conducting the recapitalization projects (e.g. long lead
materials are ordered, cost estimates are more accurate,
management is in place).
Facility Disposition will continue at the same pace as
fiscal year 2002, supporting a further footprint reduction of
some 500,000 square feet of excess facilities.

CORPORATE APPROACH

The NNSA approach to management of its facilities and
infrastructure is corporate. Dr. Beckner has described his programmatic
approach, and the use, which he makes of his Readiness in Technical
Base and Facilities funding. I have just covered my Facilities and
Infrastructure Recapitalization Program. He is the line program manager
for the sites, I support his program needs. Our efforts meld well
together for the improvement of NNSA's corporate governance. For
facilities especially, our programs are truly complimentary. The FIRP
provides the ability to plan in advance which major projects the sites
can undertake on an annual basis, without the risk of internal
reprogramming to non-facility issues. It makes significant, visible,
and very positive differences at the sites, supporting program and
mission. This is a major improvement in the management of facilities.
Previously, sites could rarely undertake large scale improvement
efforts because the dollars to do so never seemed to make the priority
``cut.'' Since FIRP is a stand alone program, directly focused on
facility improvements, it compliments Defense Programs activities.
Close cooperation exists among the field professionals, headquarters,
and with the scientific and production program offices of Defense
Programs and Facilities and Operations to corporately restore the
complex. This is as true in my corporate facility management
responsibilities as it is with the funded programmatics such as FIRP
and RTBF. A specific example will be illustrative.
TYCSPs are the foundation for NNSA complex-wide facilities and
infrastructure strategic planning, and the cornerstone of the effort to
restore, revitalize, and rebuild the complex. The TYCSPs focus
management attention on current and future facility and infrastructure
needs at each site in support of Directed Stockpile Work and campaign
programmatic requirements. It provides a resource-constrained plan
consistent with site-specific funding profiles provided by the NNSA
from the FYNSP for meeting these needs. We have not really had credible
site planning tools before. These TYCSPs are one of a series of
corporate facility management processes which my organization is
bringing on line as part of the NNSA reorganization. It allows NNSA to
make comparisons and informed corporate planning; and empowers the use
of metrics, benchmarks, and performance objectives complex-wide. The
ability to realistically plan and execute toward the desired and
intended complex of the future is possible. Formal feedback between
headquarters, field, and the contractors, linking budget realities with
technical requirements, allows NNSA to begin managing our physical
complex as a corporation. Institutionalizing the TYCSPs into NNSA's
business ethic across the complex is a major step toward corporate
governance and accountability. I mentioned that this is a corporate
approach: The TYCSPs provide both Dr. Beckner, who has the line
responsibility for the sites, and myself, who provides support and
manages the FIRP, information we both need in our separate areas. I
manage the TYCSP process, and Defense Programs is the major customer of
the deliverables. There are close working partnerships between our
organizations throughout the TYCSP process. This allows each to focus
on our areas of expertise, and is truly a success for the NNSA.

FIRP--THE PATH FORWARD

I have explained the significant efforts the NNSA has underway to
address the recapitalization of the nuclear weapons complex. Let me lay
out the path ahead, as we see it today. The various assessments, both
ours and of independent parties, clearly describe the general long-term
financial commitment and management effort required to establish a
capable and credible physical complex to support the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. These assessments make a strong case for a minimum
effort of some additional $500 million annually for 10 years or more.
Our efforts with the FIRP recovery program to date fall in line with
this programmatic level of effort. It is quite apparent that our
program this year, our $200 million, will probably arrest the
deterioration we see occurring on an annual basis. Over the next
several years of the ramp-up of the FIRP program, we will ensure the
stabilization of the condition of the complex, and in places begin to
make marked improvements in discrete areas. As an example, we need to
target the significant deferred maintenance backlog which we have built
over the last several years. This area costs us dearly in corrective
maintenance and threatens unacceptable mission downtime. It is the
price we now pay, along with many other undesirable effects, from large
scale chronic underfunding of facilities. It is the NNSA's intent to
stabilize our deferred maintenance backlog by fiscal year 2005, and
aggressively reduce it to within industry standards by fiscal year
2009. This is not just a funding issue, it is also a significant
management effort to address this competently--but without the funding,
no management program would succeed. We want to return our facility
conditions, for our programmatic facilities and specific other
important infrastructures at a minimum, to an assessment level of
``good to excellent.'' Likewise, we need to dedicate the resources to
maintaining the new facilities we are bringing on line at that same
assessment level. We must continue the efforts we have underway to
reduce our significant amount of excess facilities. Beyond the costly
surveillance and maintenance bills that accrue, and the long-term risks
and hazards involved, we owe our work force, our most valuable
resource, a professional working environment in which to carry out the
national security mission. Finally, but most important, we will have
institutionalized responsible and accountable facility management
processes, including budgetary ones, so that the NNSA does not revert
to the practices of the past that have given us the results currently
seen at Y-12, Los Alamos, Pantex, and others.
The NNSA feels that this program will be able to execute the above
deliverables within the funding levels and timeline we propose. We will
close out this program, merging it into the core NNSA funding
components, when we accomplish our mission. I must caution that this
undertaking is only in its infancy. We have the situation currently,
the major recovery challenge, because of long-term inattention. It will
take long-term attention, managed on a day-to-day basis, to recover. I
would offer that until we truly begin to turn the corner on the
recovery of the complex, any more specific plans on the end game, as it
were, for this program would be premature.

ISSUES

The issues that face the NNSA as it executes the Facilities and
Infrastructure Recapitalization Program are typical of any large
corporation undergoing change. Principal among them is the challenge of
changing the culture of the past. We are dedicated to the principle
that the past is not prologue to the future. As outlined, policies,
plans, and actions are being put in place to embed the culture of
professional corporate facility management. The new NNSA offices that
manage this effort are populated with dedicated facility professionals.
For the most part, this program is being embraced. Among some, a wait-
and-see reaction is manifest. General Gordon's commitment to you is
that we are prepared to prevail over our critics, and maintain the
program at a very high level for a very long time. I am confident that
through demonstrated performance, corporate facility management will
thrive.
However, the most challenging issue facing us is to convince you
and your colleagues that despite the expense and length of the FIRP,
the NNSA is earning and warrants your continued support. Simply stated,
the NNSA has critically assessed itself: the complex was determined to
be failing. We have taken responsible action by citing the problem and
providing a reasoned and thoughtful solution. Money, though very
important, is not the complete solution. Management, if not broken, was
certainly unfocused and inattentive, having lost sight of the
importance of maintaining the weapons complex. Today, we report that
responsible management practices are established, operating, and
showing results. Fiscal visibility and accountability are in place to
husband scarce resources. Close cooperation with the programs serves as
a check and balance on proposed project priorities. Metrics are in
place to determine progress. Finally, the merging of all this combines
to a solid program of corporate facilities management comparable, we
believe, to the best programs in government.

SUMMARY

The nuclear weapons complex is a vital component of our national
nuclear security strategy. In its current condition it is potentially a
weak link, which is receiving immediate attention. Congress has taken
the first restorative steps. The NNSA is organized to manage the
challenge. Long-term funding support is crucial to our success. We
expect to be held accountable. Thank you for the opportunity to report
our progress and make the case for the future.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Erickson.
We will engage in at least one 6-minute round of questions.
Let me begin by asking a question of Dr. Beckner. In your
formal testimony you state that NNSA has started an advanced
concept initiative because current nuclear weapons in the
stockpile cannot ``hold at risk a growing number of targets
deeply buried in tunnel facilities.'' Is the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator (RNEP) the first of the projects in this
initiative?
Dr. Beckner. Yes.
Senator Reed. What do you mean by the term ``hold at
risk,'' Dr. Beckner?
Dr. Beckner. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has
determined, after receiving input from various parts of the
Government, that a target set, generally defined as deeply
buried and hardened, cannot presently be held at risk with the
arsenal that is available, or you might say is not easily held
at risk with that present arsenal, and has instructed the
laboratories through the NNSA and the Air Force as the DOD
agent should explore the modification of two existing weapons
to determine if they could be used against such targets
effectively.
That is the program that has been authorized by the NWC and
the one that we are presently contemplating getting started.
Senator Reed. It seems, if you listen to the response,
doctor, that you defined ``held at risk'' as ``hold at risk.''
Are we talking about totally destroying a target? Are we
talking about closing the earth so that whatever is down there
cannot emerge?
Dr. Beckner. You are getting into an area that we do not
normally take responsibility for. Generally, we are requested
to develop the understanding of the performance of a nuclear
device under certain conditions. The effectiveness of that
device against a particular target is ``not our business.''
What is our business is responding to the requirements that are
specified to us.
In this case, the requirements are that such a weapon would
be able to penetrate to a certain depth in a certain form of
earth and still operate successfully.
Senator Reed. Do you have other projects that will be
included in this initiative?
Dr. Beckner. Not at this time. It is quite specific as to
what they have asked us to do.
Senator Reed. Now, I know your response was essentially
that you have been given some very specific parameters and you
are really modifying a weapon to conform to those parameters.
Dr. Beckner. That is correct.
Senator Reed. But certainly this whole project raises an
issue that, if a conventional weapon could not either
penetrate, destroy, or seal an underground passage, would a
relatively small nuclear weapon, one kiloton or less, be able
to address the problem? I presume that is the range you are
operating in.
Dr. Beckner. No, it is not. The two weapons (B61, B83) that
we have been asked to consider are both relatively higher yield
weapons. They are not low-yield weapons.
Senator Reed. But again, from your response, the specific
target or the effect on the target is something that you just
do not know? It is not part of your responsibility?
Dr. Beckner. That is not part of what we have been assigned
to do at this time. This is specifically to explore the ability
to survive the environment as specified and to function.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Beckner, turning for a moment to the Nuclear Posture
Review, there are various categories of nuclear weapons. They
have been discussed generally, and indeed the stockpile is
generally divided into two broad categories, active and
inactive. Can you define the active stockpile from the DOE
perspective, and are there differences between the number of
warheads in the active stockpile according to the 1994 review
and the number of warheads in the active stockpile in the
December 2001 review?
Dr. Beckner. Well, there are certainly differences in that
the category that was previously described as active, I think
within the context of today's understanding of the NPR, is
larger than what we would now identify as operationally
deployed. It has more or less been put into two parts, one part
being operationally deployed and the other part being the
responsive force. In the past, we might have viewed those as
all part of the active stockpile. Then as you say, there is yet
a third part, described as inactive; and finally, those weapons
that are retired. But the difference that has occurred as a
result of the NPR is largely in the distinction between those
that are operationally deployed and those that are in the
responsive force.
Senator Reed. Well, perhaps another question. The active
stockpile, they will be fully maintained, modernized, and
loaded with tritium?
Dr. Beckner. Yes.
Senator Reed. Will there be any subcategories, any
differences in the active stockpile, or they will all be
treated the same?
Dr. Beckner. Let me answer in a fairly complicated way. For
the active, the operationally deployed, those will be fully
prepared, tritium, everything ready to function. In the case of
the responsive force, it is our understanding that there would
be some flexibility, depending on the time required for those
weapons to be moved from the responsive force back to the
delivery system that they are associated with, if that were
required.
In some cases that would be a very short period of time and
in other cases it is a rather long period of time, due to the
nature of the way those weapons are uploaded. In either case,
if they were called upon they would have to be fully
functioning at the time they were mated with the delivery
system. So the task that is put to us is to be able to meet
that requirement, and it is a little different depending on
which delivery system you are talking about.
Senator Reed. Without getting into any specifics,
obviously, it seems that the response force will have various
response times.
Dr. Beckner. Yes.
Senator Reed. You have to be prepared in your planning to
accommodate those response times.
Dr. Beckner. Yes.
Senator Reed. Some of those weapons systems will have
relatively short response times, so in effect they will be
fully modernized?
Dr. Beckner. As far as the requirements that would be
placed on us to supply tritium and other components, the answer
to that is yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me turn to Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask a question about your shipping of nuclear
material and weapons. When you are shipping your nuclear
material and weapons, what are the goals of NNSA when you try
and determine the best routes? Then a second part to that, are
there certain driving conditions NNSA tries to avoid?
Dr. Beckner. First let me say that, as I believe you know,
we do not publicize the routes that we use, for obvious
reasons, when shipping weapons or weapons parts. We do select
routes that are the safest possible. They might not be the
shortest routes. So we make those kind of decisions.
We also do planning so that we do not have to conduct
shipments into areas at the wrong time of year, for instance
shipments into the northern midwest in the winter time. We just
plan to do those in the summer rather than the winter because
it is a better idea.
So all in all, we make those choices so that the shipments
will be safe, so that the routes are the safest possible. We
try to avoid congested areas so that we do not get
inadvertently stopped for long periods of time when we were not
planning on such things, and generally try to keep ourselves in
a position so that the mission will be successful.
Senator Allard. Mr. Erickson, I do not want you to feel
neglected over there. We have not asked you any questions. You
are next.
Mr. Erickson. Not a problem.
Senator Allard. Has the funding authorized and appropriated
for fiscal year 2002 been used in a productive manner according
to NNSA's plan for improving the facilities and infrastructure?
Mr. Erickson. Yes. We have obligated all those funds to
date and the plants and labs who have received funds are in the
process of executing the projects to go along with that.
Senator Allard. So there will not be anything left over at
the end of this year?
Mr. Erickson. All the money has been obligated. It probably
all will not be spent, simply because of delivery of material,
authorization of contracts, and the fact that the second $100
million was held until we delivered a report to Congress in
February. Therefore, those monies were not available to us to
obligate or to begin costing until that time.
So all the money will be obligated, all $200 million.
Certainly not all $200 million will actually be costed. It will
flow over into the succeeding fiscal year.
Senator Allard. How do you envision this program proceeding
over the next 10 years in light of the Foster panel
recommendation and the administration's request within the
Future Years National Security Program, as the program is often
referred to, FYNSP?
Mr. Erickson. We have a sustained growth over that period
of time, over the FYNSP period of time, taking us to what we
believe are acceptable levels of the program. It is a reasoned,
well-planned approach. It goes up approximately $50 million a
year for each of those years, allows us to establish a good
program, a process in place to effectively and judiciously
spend that money.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Dr. Beckner, concerning shipping plutonium and other
special nuclear materials, can we be sure that NNSA will keep
the shipping of plutonium and other special nuclear materials
from EM sites on schedule? Then has the NNSA prepared a
realistic plan to keep up with the anticipated schedule of
shipments within both Defense Department and EM during the next
several years?
Dr. Beckner. We do have a plan. In fact, we have more than
one plan because of the uncertainty about the date when
shipments may start from Rocky Flats. The situation is getting
to be difficult as time goes by and those shipments do not
begin. At this time we see every passing week as additionally
troublesome.
We will do our very best to meet the schedules of both our
military customers as well as moving the waste out of Rocky
Flats. However, I must say that the conflict becomes more
obvious, rather pressingly so, during the next 2 months, and
beyond that there is no question there would be serious
conflicts between those two programs.
So on a week-by-week basis this is getting to be a more
difficult problem. At this time we believe it is manageable,
but it will not be manageable indefinitely. There will have to
be selection made on how those assets would be used one program
versus the other if this delay goes on much longer.
Senator Allard. Now, on the issue of safeguards and
security, do you intend to request additional security funding
from Congress for fiscal year 2003? Can you give us an idea of
how much and for which sites?
Mr. Erickson. Senator, if I may, actually safeguards and
security falls under my purview.
Senator Allard. OK.
Mr. Erickson. In answer to your question, we do not intend
at this time to ask for additional funds.
Senator Allard. Well, how is this going to affect security
at the various sites?
Mr. Erickson. We are in the process of going through a
rather extensive review at our sites to evaluate the changes
due to September 11, the activities and the safeguard and
security responsiveness at those sites. That review is under
way at our various sites. We will have a better feel for that
towards the summer, the latter part of the summer. At that
point in time, it will be what it will be and we will have to
make a judgment at that point in time.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has
expired.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Erickson, one of the issues that is of great concern to
me is the fact that the United States is the only nuclear power
in the world that has no capability of producing a nuclear
weapon today. While I am not advocating that we need to produce
a weapon now, I do find it disturbing that we do not have the
capability to produce one if the President determined that such
production was in the national interest due to some emergency.
I have heard testimony this year and in the Foster report
of 2000 that it will take between 10 and 15 years to design and
build a new Modern Pit Facility which would give us the
capability to build a new weapon. The Nuclear Posture Review
calls for the design and construction of a Modern Pit Facility.
The Nuclear Posture Review called for that.
My question is, can you explain the decision in the fiscal
year 2003 budget submission to postpone the critical decision
on mission needs, also known as CD-0, by 1 year? Why was that?
Dr. Beckner. If I could, sir, I think I should try to
answer that question.
Senator Sessions. All right.
Dr. Beckner. In fact, we are moving ahead with those
decisions. There are ways, utilizing existing facilities at Los
Alamos, to produce a limited number of pits. We are in the
process of proving that out now around the program for the W88
warhead where we need to provide additional pits.
Having gone through that process, as long as the production
requirements were quite modest, we could produce other pits for
other weapons, I believe. In the long run, however, I think we
all agree we need a better capability. That does call for a
Modern Pit Facility or some capability that is substantially
beyond any that exists today.
So we are setting about to make those decisions and to get
that program underway, and we will be making the first of those
decisions within the next few weeks.
Senator Sessions. Well, is that not the purpose of the CD-0
plan?
Dr. Beckner. Yes, it is. We are going to move ahead with
that decision.
Senator Sessions. But this would be a delay?
Dr. Beckner. No.
Senator Sessions. In what we expected?
Dr. Beckner. I know that we are going to make the decision
within the next several weeks and move ahead with the early
work on that facility.
Senator Sessions. Since we have such a long lead time if we
were developing a new pit facility, in one sense it seems we do
not have much to worry about, that takes a long time. But in
another sense, every year that goes by delays even further,
does it not?
Dr. Beckner. Yes, it does.
Senator Sessions. Could the gap, the delay period, be
shortened?
Dr. Beckner. There is no question that if we must build a
new facility that it will take more than 10 years from today to
completion. It is probably closer to 15 years than 10 years. As
long as the stockpile is as presently configured and as large
as it presently is, and as long as we have to contemplate the
possibility of replacing some large number of those pits over
the next 20 or 30 years--and as yet we do not know if that is
necessary, but we have to believe that we should be prepared
for it--then I think that does call for a new facility.
So we will set about to go through the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process within the next 2 to 3
years, to get site selection, and to move ahead with a design.
Now, should the stockpile become much smaller, then I would
say we would rethink some of that, and there is the opportunity
to do that. But, based on the present planning, we will go
ahead.
Senator Sessions. It is this CD-0 study that is supposed to
guide us on that?
Dr. Beckner. Yes. There are two things that it would do, it
starts the NEPA process and conceptual design.
Senator Sessions. I understood that there was a delay by
one year in the decision, postponing the decision on mission
need.
Dr. Beckner. It might have been--I confess, I have not been
around long enough, that I do not quite bridge all of the
history here. There may have been a delay from a previous date
that might have been planned. I cannot say for sure. But I do
know what our present plan is. Our present plan is to go ahead
with that decision within the next several weeks.
Senator Sessions. All right, that is good.
Now, if we decommission or dismantle an existing nuclear
weapon--either one of you can answer this--is the pit
preservable?
Dr. Beckner. Yes, it is.
Senator Sessions. Unless we destroy it.
Dr. Beckner. Yes, it is.
Senator Sessions. The President has decided to maintain
those pieces, at least so they can be reassembled if needed,
but to decommission the weapon otherwise; is that the way you
understand it?
Dr. Beckner. Yes. There has been a large number of weapons
already disassembled and the pits are indeed in storage right
now.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that points to the
criticality of this whole circumstance, in which we are the
only nuclear power that does not have the capacity to go
forward, and we cannot afford to place ourselves at risk by
destroying all the component parts. So we can decommission,
certainly fulfilling, I believe, the spirit of our commitment
to reduce nuclear weapons, but at the same time say to a
potential adversary: If you think you are going to take
advantage of our freeze and reduction, do not think you can get
ahead of us just because we do not have a production
capability.
So I just think we are stuck. I think the President is
correct on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Dr. Beckner, the NPR directs improvements in the test
readiness posture, and I understand that you are studying the
test readiness posture. When you conduct this study, I presume
also you are including the cost of various options, the
benefits to the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and also
essentially whether or not the time limits or time frames are
appropriate.
Can you comment on that, your current review of the test
readiness?
Dr. Beckner. Yes. The present posture is that we would be
able to conduct a test, if so instructed, within 24 to 36
months. There has been some criticism of that by various
learned bodies. The Nuclear Posture Review suggested that we
should take a fresh look at that situation and decide if that
is the appropriate posture or not, to do the proper analyses,
to assess the cost-benefit of changing it. Almost certainly, if
it were to be changed it would be shortened. The suggestion has
been made by some that it should be as short as perhaps a year
or a year and a half or 2 years. So that is what we will study.
There are costs associated with changing that configuration and
so it will in effect become a cost-benefit tradeoff. We will
develop the information and we will provide it to the people
who have requested it, and some new decisions will be made as
to what that future readiness state will be.
But indeed, we have been instructed to begin those studies
and we will do them.
Senator Reed. So you have not--you are not evaluating any
specific time frame? You are simply looking at a whole range of
options, is that fair?
Dr. Beckner. Well, we will probably select three or four
that seem to be the most obvious and work on those. There is a
limit on the short side as to what is possible. So you will
start with the possible and move up from there. You have to
realize the purpose of this would be to put ourselves into a
configuration across our facilities so that we could execute
whatever that new response time might be. Those costs get to be
considerable if you shorten it greatly.
Senator Reed. Thank you, doctor.
Mr. Erickson, so that you will not be totally neglected by
my questioning: You received your new facilities and
infrastructure account full funding in the fiscal year 2002
budget, but you had about a year to plan for it. As a result,
your office was ready to begin almost from the day the money
was available. When did you get the release from DOE to begin
the work?
Mr. Erickson. We got our release on the first $100 million,
as I said in my earlier answer, in November. Obviously, because
of the appropriations process, it was later than October 1. We
received that and began to immediately start to send out the
work authorizations to the sites. That has added a little bit
to, as I say, the reason why we are not going to cost all of
the money. We will have it all obligated, but not costed. So
there was a delay.
Senator Reed. But you will fully obligate the funds, the
2002 funds?
Mr. Erickson. They are fully obligated today.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
On the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Dr. Beckner, are we
adequately funding the key weapons program activities, namely
the directed stockpile work and the science-based campaigns?
Dr. Beckner. We believe we are. If you look in detail at
the profiles of those programs, comparing, for instance, the
2002 budgets to the 2003 budgets and then the out-years as
well, since we have provided 5-year profiles, what you see is
more growth in the directed stockpile work than in the science
program. That is the choice we have made. We believe it is
proper. We know it is necessary in order to maintain the
schedules that we are committed to on the directed stockpile
work and we believe the science programs are adequate to
support those. It is a tight fit, but we believe it is
adequate.
Senator Allard. So you spent twice as much on the science-
based stewardship actually in your budget as compared to your
stockpile work; is that correct?
Dr. Beckner. We have to be a little careful. Much of what
is in the science programs is in direct support of the
stockpile program. You essentially have the several budget
areas that we like to manage by. But much of the work down in
those science programs in fact specifically supports the
directed stockpile work, so that you can get the work done at
the time that it is required. So there is a lot of mixing of
the budget from those two areas.
Senator Allard. From what I have seen as far as our
educational efforts, we are graduating more and more
individuals that are trained in what I would call the leisurely
sciences and fewer and fewer people graduating as engineers in
the hard science degrees. I do not think they are meeting the
demands out there for a lot of our scientific endeavors
throughout the country.
What is DOE doing to make sure that it attracts, trains,
and provides the experience for the next generation of
technicians and engineers and whatnot within the weapons
programs?
Dr. Beckner. The main attraction, quite honestly, is the
facilities that are available and the opportunities to do the
work that are there as a result of those facilities. In many
cases we have capabilities at the laboratories and at the
plants which are unmatched anywhere else in the country. For
instance, take the NIF that is presently under construction.
That is a one-of-a-kind in the world.
Take the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro Test (DARHT) facility
that has just been completed at Los Alamos. That is
unparalleled in terms of its capabilities. You can go to each
of the laboratories and you will find that kind of capability,
due to the foresight, I think of this subcommittee and others
in Congress to provide those facilities. That is the real
attraction and that is what makes it possible to hire great
people, is if they have a good place to work and the
opportunity to do challenging work. The reality is it works
very well.
Senator Allard. Now, in December of 2001 the DOE Inspector
General report criticized DOE for ``not meeting internally
established time frames for initiating and conducting
investigations of defects and malfunctions in nuclear
weapons.'' Then, the DOE IG went on further to state that ``If
these delays continue, the Department may not be in a position
to unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons
stockpile.''
What are the DOE and NNSA doing to address those concerns
raised by the DOE Inspector General?
Dr. Beckner. Indeed we are concerned by that report. We are
concerned by the fact that in some cases the delays were
unnecessarily long. We expect to have a lot of so-called SFIs,
significant findings investigations, from the program. That is
the purpose of it, to find things and then set about to correct
them. The part that was not getting as much attention as needed
was the part of setting about to correct them. We have put new
emphasis upon that. We are developing a schedule to more
rapidly close those SFIs and get on top of the problem. I think
by the time we are here next year the record will show that we
have done that. It has our attention and the situation will
change.
Senator Allard. Apparently one of the problems is having
somebody who will centrally track the investigative process. Do
we have somebody who is going to be tracking, be using a
central tracking system?
Dr. Beckner. Yes.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I am finished.
Senator Reed. Senator Sessions, do you have additional
questions?
Senator Sessions. Well, I just noticed that the fiscal year
2002 funding for Modern Pit Facility was $4 million. The 2003
request is $2 million. Does that indicate a slowing down of
interest or more delays out there?
Dr. Beckner. No, I think it just recognizes the fact that
there are a lot of things going on here in parallel. I would
encourage you to look at several elements of the pit
fabrication and certification program in combination with the
Modern Pit Facility. Look at all of those budget lines in
combination. We are taking all of those parts and looking out
over the next 5 years and fit them together so that this
program will proceed. I know you look at a budget and you see
one number smaller than the other one and you think the program
must be slowing down. It is not.
Senator Sessions. Well, we certainly do not believe that
money means that we are making progress. Sometimes money does
not mean that.
Dr. Beckner. Well, that is right. But we are entering a
point here where much of what will be going on is the
initiation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
process and getting started on the initial design studies.
Senator Sessions. When do you think you might start the
NEPA process?
Dr. Beckner. As soon as we get the CD-0 decision, which
does require the full action on the part of the DOE, which is a
bit of a big deal within the building. But we expect that in
the next several weeks and that will kick it off. We require
that before we can begin the NEPA process and before we can
begin the conceptual design. But once we have that, we are on
our way.
Senator Sessions. Well, I know Congress has an interest in
getting moving along. The report language in last year's
defense bill authorized $10 million in report language if you
chose to move this project forward.
So I just hope that do not let it slip and we keep our eye
on the ball and keep it moving.
Dr. Beckner. I agree.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Allard, did you have a comment?
Senator Allard. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I understand you are
getting close to concluding this hearing. First of all, I
wanted to thank you and your staff. I know that you personally
are interested in improving the environment in the country and
particularly have been supportive of trying to get sites
cleaned up throughout the country, not just in Colorado. You
have been very supportive of my particular project and I
appreciate that, and so has your staff.
I just want to recognize in a public way your commitment to
getting these sites cleaned up and your working with your
staff, and I appreciate that very much.
I also wanted to recognize Senator Strom Thurmond, who
represents the State of South Carolina. He has been a mediator
in our negotiations with what is happening at the Savannah
River Site and the Governor there. Again, he understands
basically that all these sites interact and when you have
problems at one site there is a chain effect and it spreads all
over the country. He has been very sensitive and taken a view
that I think has been very responsible from a national
perspective, and he has indicated how important it is to have
cooperation among the various States.
So Senator Thurmond has been spending a considerable amount
of time working between our two staffs as a mediator and I just
wanted to recognize his efforts, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. I have a joint
statement from Senators Thurmond and Sessions, for the record.
Without objection, I will place it in the record.
[The joint prepared statement of Senator Thurmond and
Senator Sessions follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Jeff
Sessions

Sustaining our nuclear weapons at the highest state of readiness is
central to the Nation's security and military strategies of deterrence.
However, for the past 3 years the Panel to Assess the Reliability,
Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, better
known as the Foster Panel, has produced alarming reports that stated in
part, ``we already see worrisome signs of deterioration in some nuclear
components.'' Even Gen. John Gordon, of the NNSA, highlighted the
concerns associated with this deterioration when he testified before
this subcommittee that ``unanticipated events could include the
catastrophic failure of a deployed warhead type.''
Although the Foster Panel provided a series of recommendations, its
primary recommendation each and every year has been to immediately
begin conceptual design of a full-scale plutonium pit production
facility for the long-term support of the stockpile. Unfortunately, the
Department of Energy has delayed action on this matter at every
opportunity. This year, DOE has again deferred conceptual design until
fiscal year 2004 with fiscal year 2003 funding used to continue
manufacturing concepts.
The Panel consistently recommends immediate action on conceptual
design for a number of reasons. First, design and construction of this
facility will take between 10 and 15 years. Even if the most basic
conceptual design activities began today, this full-scale facility
would not be ready at the earliest until April 2012.
Second, the facts are that our nuclear components are aging, and we
have no capability to replace them. As the Panel's 2000 Report stated,
``the missing production capabilities . . . leave us even more
concerned about our ability to respond to crisis.'' The report
continued, ``we can significantly increase our readiness with
relatively small expenditures on needed conceptual design.''
Third, in this year's Foster Report, the Panel noted that,
``Restoration of complete production capability has a strategic import.
We can more confidently build down if we know that we can build back if
necessary. Restored production capability might be the enabling
condition for some future stockpile reductions.''
With these factors in mind, the Foster Panel, for the third
straight year, recommended that the ``NNSA expeditiously produce an
approved design, make a site decision, complete safety studies, and
obtain environmental permits for pit production and secondary
production facilities.''
Mr. Chairman, it is time we heed the warning of the Foster Panel
and direct the NNSA to immediately begin conceptual design of a full
scale plutonium pit production facility. We owe it to our Nation as
well as the security of future generations to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Beckner, Mr. Erickson, thank you very much. The hearing
is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS

1. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, recently there have been press
reports questioning the Department of Energy's (DOE) ability to comply
with the various compliance agreements under the budget as requested
for each site. If the Environmental Management (EM) program received
the funding that has been requested, other than the cleanup reform
funds, would the DOE be able to comply with all of its agreements other
than the agreement with the State of Washington for the tanks at
Hanford?
Secretary Roberson. I believe the base budget meets the legal
commitments in our environmental compliance agreements. However, we
can't continue to do business as usual under any funding scenario. We
must be focused not only on meeting our legal commitments, but also on
addressing our other environmental obligations to the communities and
the American taxpayer. With the additional funding from the EM Cleanup
Reform Account, we will be able to pursue cleanup approaches that will
produce more real risk reduction, accelerate cleanup, or achieve much
needed cost and schedule improvements, as well as maintain compliance
with legal requirements.

2. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, would the DOE have to
renegotiate the various agreements and consent orders with the States
and the EPA if the funding requested by the DOE for fiscal year 2003 is
the amount authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 2003?
Secretary Roberson. If funds are authorized and appropriated
consistent with our request, we would not anticipate the need for
renegotiation of our legal agreements. However, our request is
structured to provide an incentive for our sites and regulators to
review the cleanup approach to ensure it is focused on reducing risks
and accelerating cleanup. As a result of this effort, it may be
necessary to work with DOE's regulators to modify the milestones and
commitments in some agreements and orders to reflect new cleanup
approaches.

3. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, what are the DOE's liabilities
if it intentionally asks for less money than is needed for
environmental compliance?
Secretary Roberson. Compliance with environmental requirements is a
primary consideration and high priority for the Department in
formulating its budget request. The Department includes in its budget
requests to the Office of Management and Budget sufficient funds to
comply with applicable environmental requirements. Moreover, the
Department generally is subject to the same types of enforcement
actions, including fines and penalties in many cases, as private
entities that fail to comply with environmental requirements.

OPERATING CONTRACTS

4. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, over the course of the past 2
to 3 years, the DOE has renegotiated or entered into new contracts at
almost all EM sites. These contracts were designed to provide
incentives to the contractors to do more work with less money, but were
all predicated on a predetermined funding profile. It now appears that
one requirement for participation in the cleanup reform fund is to
renegotiate or even recompete the existing contracts. Has the decision
been made to terminate for convenience and recompete any or all of the
existing contracts? What sites and what contracts are included in this
decision?
Secretary Roberson. We have decided to recompete the Mound Site
contract. We do not anticipate that a wholesale renegotiation of all
current EM contracts will be necessary; however, most will require
modification. Any decision to recompete a contract will be made on a
case-by-case basis.

5. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, has a cost analysis been
conducted to determine that the cost savings achieved from
recompetition exceeds the cost to terminate the contracts early?
Secretary Roberson. In making a decision to re-compete a contract,
DOE would consider any additional costs that would be incurred should a
termination for convenience be required. It can be difficult to
estimate the cost of changing to the new contract. If the incumbent
contractor wins the award, the current contract may be modified, and a
termination action would not be necessary. If a new contractor wins the
award, the incumbent contractor would present a termination for
convenience proposal, and the government will audit it and negotiate a
fair and equitable settlement. However, a decision to recompete is not
taken lightly and is made to achieve specific results. A decision to
recompete will be made for three possible reasons:

1. the current contract expires;
2. the desired or necessary changes are so significant that
competition is warranted; and
3. confidence in and performance under the current contract is
such that it does not appear that continuing the contract will
render the necessary results.

6. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, does the DOE have to modify
the terms and conditions of some or all of these contracts if fiscal
year 2003 funding is appropriated at the requested level?
Secretary Roberson. It may be necessary to modify existing
contracts to reflect not only any differences in the funding level
compared to anticipated levels when the contract was initially
negotiated, but also to properly align the scope of work and
performance incentives with the cleanup approach that results from our
discussions with regulators.

7. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, has this renegotiation process
started?
Secretary Roberson. While some of our contractors have been
involved in discussions and planning for accelerated cleanup
approaches, we would not begin formal discussions to modify a contract
until it is clear what the resulting funding appropriation level and
performance requirements for fiscal year 2003 will be.

SURPLUS FACILITIES

8. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, do you have any plans to stop
taking contaminated surplus buildings and facilities from other
components of the DOE?
Secretary Roberson. We do not have plans to stop taking
contaminated facilities into EM. However, for those contaminated excess
facilities currently managed by other programs, acceptance into the EM
program will be a very conscious decision. Any additional facilities
added to the EM program will be clearly identified and segregated from
the current baseline, cleanup costs and schedules for those facilities
will be determined, and cleanup of those facilities will be prioritized
according to the principles of the Top-to-Bottom Review.

9. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, the budget request for fiscal
year 2003 does not appear to include funds for EM to accept any new
excess facilities, is this correct?
Secretary Roberson. In fiscal year 2003, the Tritium Systems Test
Assembly (TSTA) at Los Alamos National Laboratory will transfer from
the Office of Science to EM. The fiscal year 2003 budget request
therefore for EM includes $460,000 for surveillance and maintenance for
TSTA to support this transfer. No funding to decontaminate and
decommission the facility is requested in fiscal year 2003.

EXISTING COMMITMENTS

10. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, does the EM budget for fiscal
year 2003 continue to fund previous commitments to manage newly-
generated wastes?
Secretary Roberson. The EM fiscal year 2003 budget request
continues to fund previous commitments to manage newly-generated wastes
at Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory. Although EM may consider negotiating the
transfer of responsibility for newly-generated waste back to the
generator program(s), the fiscal year 2003 congressional request does
not assume these transfers.

11. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, does the fiscal year 2003
budget request fund the new waste storage building at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, because our information is that the
building has been completed but there is no money to move the wastes,
which are currently stored outside, into the new building?
Secretary Roberson. Yes, funds are available within the
Environmental Management fiscal year 2003 budget request for Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory to initiate movement of waste into the
new waste storage building, focusing as a first priority on removal of
low-level waste currently stored in temporary structures.

CLOSURE SITES

12. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, the Closure Account was
established to provide flexibility to sites that were closing by 2006
to accelerate the closure where possible. As we approach 2006 and those
sites are closed, does it make sense to establish a new closure account
for those sites that will be closed in the 5 years following 2006 and
to allow those sites that will be closing in that time frame the same
flexibility afforded to those sites closing by 2006?
Secretary Roberson. The fiscal year 2003 budget request was
structured to provide incentives for DOE and its State and Federal
regulators to reach agreement on new cleanup approaches to accelerate
risk reduction and cleanup at all DOE sites. EM is making progress in
our discussions with States. As of the end of May 2002, the Department
has signed Letters of Intent with the appropriate regulators for
accelerated cleanup of sites in the States of Washington, Tennessee,
Idaho, New Mexico, and Nevada. We expect to sign letters for additional
sites soon.
Once we have completed cleanup acceleration plans at the sites, EM
intends to re-examine the EM budget structure and to propose changes as
appropriate so that the budget structure will correspond to the new
cleanup plans. We will focus on a structure that supports acceleration
and ensure it supports the needed integration. We are considering
appropriation accounts that align with site closures in our accelerated
cleanup program.

MINI-NUKES

13. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, there has been much recent
discussion of mini-nukes. Is the NNSA working on anything, or have
plans to work on anything, that could lead to a weapon (new or
modified) that would be designed to produce a yield of less than five
kilotons?
Dr. Beckner. No. The NNSA has no validated requirement from the
Nuclear Weapons Council to work on a new or modified weapon that would
produce a yield of less than 5 kilotons.

14. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is NNSA working on, or is there
money in the fiscal year 2003 budget to work on new concepts in weapons
that could have application to conventional weapons?
Dr. Beckner. The President's fiscal year 2003 request for stockpile
stewardship is focused on ensuring the continued safety, security, and
reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. Applications of
nuclear weapons technologies to conventional weapons are, of course,
possible, but the NNSA weapons programs focuses its funds on nuclear
weapons activities.

TEST READINESS

15. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, the NNSA has been criticized for
having the ability to conduct a test in 24 to 36 months, even though
this level of test readiness was approved by the Nuclear Weapons
Council. The NPR directs the NNSA to improve its test readiness. What
does a 24- to 36-month test readiness posture mean to you and how is it
different from 20 to 32 months or 30 to 36 months or 18 to 24 months,
and do these arbitrary time frames have any real meaning, i.e., does it
make a difference what and how you test?
Dr. Beckner. The NNSA, consistent with existing Presidential
direction, is maintaining the ability to conduct a limited series of
nuclear tests within 24 to 36 months of a Presidential order to do so.
The purpose of this test readiness program is to identify and complete
long lead-time items required to conduct a test, and to ensure that we
maintain the key skills and capabilities that would be difficult to
reconstitute. We have not identified a particular test and have not
prepared specific devices or diagnostics in a test configuration.
The NPR raised several concerns about the current test readiness
posture. The NNSA's ongoing study is reviewing: (1) the shortfalls or
additional steps required to continue to meet 24-36 month readiness;
and (2) the actions and resources required to shorten the test
readiness posture to 18 months or less.
A 32-month program or 30- to 36-month test readiness program would
differ little from the current posture. If the readiness time were
shortened from 24 months to 20 or 18 months, the level of preparation
would change. Substantial additional work would be required on long-
lead items (field test neutron generators, authorization safety basis
documentation and nuclear explosive safety studies) to ensure
readiness. Some of these items are even required for 24 months (the
short end of our current 24- to 36-month readiness) so we have begun to
invest in those areas. Shorter times than 18 months would require the
selection of a particular device to test and preparation of the device
and diagnostics in a test-ready configuration.
We believe that 18-month readiness is achievable for well-defined
tests of weapons currently in the stockpile. But, historically, even
with a vigorous testing program, a complex experiment could take well
in excess of 2 years to prepare, so 18 months would not be achievable
for every conceivable experiment. It does matter what we test.

16. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, to conduct a nuclear test requires
certain skills and abilities. Have you identified all of the needed
skills and abilities and a plan to maintain them and what elements of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program maintain these skills?
Dr. Beckner. Subsequent to the initiation of the current test
moratorium, we have made a considerable effort to catalog and archive
procedures, capabilities, and personnel requirements to conduct an
underground test. Those skills related to fielding a test at the Nevada
Test Site are maintained through the test readiness program and
substantially exercised through the execution of the stockpile
stewardship experimental programs, in particular subcritical
experiments, hydrodynamic testing at the laboratories, and a broad
range of other experiments at both the laboratories and the Nevada Test
Site. These experimental programs address both the required test
execution skills and the diagnostics. Laboratory and plant skills
involved in preparation of a test device are exercised through
stockpile maintenance and stockpile life extension activities.
Laboratory design and test analysis skills are exercised through
experimental programs. The nuclear diagnostics capabilities will be
partially exercised in the High-Energy-Density Physics program, as
methods and techniques are similar. The principal skills that cannot be
exercised are containment, radiochemistry, and some aspects of high
speed nuclear diagnostics.

17. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what is NNSA studying in the current
review of test readiness and will this study include the costs of
various options and the benefits to the Stockpile Stewardship Program
of these options?
Dr. Beckner. The NPR raised several concerns about the current test
readiness posture. The NNSA's ongoing study is reviewing: (1) the
shortfalls or additional steps required to continue to meet 24- to 36-
month readiness; and (2) the actions and resources required to shorten
the test readiness posture to 18 months or less. The results of this
study will be shared with Congress once the administration has
determined the best path forward.
While test readiness is a part of the stewardship program, we must
carefully balance the available financial and human resources to ensure
that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable.

18. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is there any real value gained from
conducting mock test exercises?
Dr. Beckner. We are considering the use of exercises to enhance
certain aspects of test readiness, primarily those areas which are not
practiced through the execution of the stockpile stewardship
experimental programs. We expect to conduct exercises of some portions
of the nuclear test process, such as drill-back for radiochemistry
samples. Larger exercises that approach something related to a full
underground nuclear test remain under study. We must weigh the research
and readiness benefits against the resource costs.

DISMANTLEMENT RATES AT PANTEX

19. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, I believe there is some confusion
about the ability of the NNSA's Pantex facility to dismantle nuclear
weapons. I have heard statements that Pantex has no ability now and
could not in the future have an ability to dismantle nuclear weapons
because of the pressures the Stockpile Life Extension Program places on
the Pantex Plant. Could you please explain what Pantex is currently
dismantling and what is the potential ability of Pantex to dismantle
nuclear warheads between now and 2012?
Dr. Beckner. The current production complex is limited in the
number of weapons that can be processed at the Pantex Plant, with the
work split among units undergoing surveillance, refurbishment, or
dismantlement. Planned renovations of existing facilities at Pantex
will expand capacity sufficient to meet the anticipated Nuclear Posture
Review workload. During the period fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year
2010, when three refurbishments (W80, W76, and B61) are underway, there
would be a small reserve capacity available to address unanticipated
problems in the stockpile, respond to new warhead production
requirements, or handle a potentially increased dismantlement workload.
That reserve capacity would increase after fiscal year 2014. Under
current planning assumptions, NNSA would not define a firm schedule for
dismantlements, rather it would ``load level'' the Pantex operation by
scheduling dismantlements in a way that does not interfere with ongoing
refurbishments or new production. Currently, Pantex is disassembling
the W56 Minuteman II warhead (expected to be complete in fiscal year
2005) and the W79 Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile (expected to be
complete in fiscal year 2003). Pantex also has plans to disassemble
some excess B61 bombs and all remaining B53 bombs in the next few
years.

20. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, could Pantex dismantle the W-62
between now and 2012?
Dr. Beckner. The decision to retire the W62 warhead by 2009 was
reaffirmed by the Nuclear Posture Review. No further decisions were
made on dismantlement. With the currently planned workload at Pantex,
including three new refurbishments and facility renovations, there is
insufficient capacity to dismantle all the W62 warheads between now and
2012 without rearranging priorities. Instead some would have to be held
in an ``inactive'' status in storage at either Pantex or in a military
storage site until they could be dismantled.

EFFECT OF NPR ON THE STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION REQUIREMENTS

21. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, the decision in the December 2001
NPR was to maintain all of the current stockpile of nuclear warheads.
What does this decision do to the need to conduct life extensions on
each of these nuclear warheads and the block approach?
Dr. Beckner. The NPR which lays out the direction for this Nation's
nuclear forces over the next 5 to 10 years reaffirmed NNSA's stockpile
refurbishment plan (which includes the block upgrade approach) for the
W87, W76, W80, and B61. The plan had been approved by the NNSA and the
Department of Defense. Therefore, no changes are required as a result
of the NPR.

22. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what does this decision (to maintain
all warheads) mean to the tritium supply?
Dr. Beckner. The NPR does not change the current plan for the date
when NNSA needs to begin irradiating tritium producing rods in the
Tennessee Valley Authority's reactors. Irradiation will still begin in
the fall of 2003 as currently scheduled, particularly because the
initial core loads of tritium rods will be ``transition cores'' that
will not contain nearly as many tritium rods as will be utilized for
steady state production. The requirement to maintain a 5-year reserve
has not been affected by the NPR. We have contracts with the TVA to
produce tritium in the amounts required to support the NPR stockpile,
whatever the details of that stockpile turns out to be.

23. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what does this decision do to the
cost of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the near and long terms?
Dr. Beckner. The workload direction in the NPR is consistent with
current assumptions and is reflected in the fiscal year 2003-2007 FYNSP
document provided to congressional committees in March 2002.

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

24. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, the committee has received testimony
that the DOE and the DOD will continue to review the decisions made in
the NPR. Is this or is this not the case?
Dr. Beckner. Section 1041 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398) required
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy,
to ``conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the
United States for the next 5 to 10 years'' and to report to Congress on
the results of the review. The December 2001 NPR establishes our
strategic posture for the 21st century, preparing America for a new and
rapidly-evolving international security environment. As such, the NPR
is a foundation on which more detailed planning can be based; NNSA and
the DOD are jointly engaged in fleshing out the details. Thus, our
focus is not on reviewing the decisions made in the NPR but in
implementing them.

25. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, would it be fair to characterize the
NPR as a living document?
Dr. Beckner. The NPR, per congressional requirement, reviewed the
nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. The
review established our strategic posture for the rapidly changing and
unpredictable world in which we now live. The NPR provides high-level
guidance for planning the direction and makeup of the strategic forces
and capabilities the U.S. will need to assure our national security
through this decade. Again, our focus is not on reviewing the decisions
made in the NPR but in implementing them.

26. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what are the next steps in the
review process?
Dr. Beckner. The DOD and NNSA will, in coming months, jointly
address, among other things, the size and makeup of the stockpile
needed to support a force of 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads.
NNSA will continue, as affirmed by the NPR, to maintain the nuclear
stockpile through surveillance, refurbishment, production,
dismantlement, transportation, and storage.

27. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is there a schedule to re-examine
the decisions and to make decisions to retire warheads or to destroy
warheads?
Dr. Beckner. The President announced in November that the United
States would reduce its operationally-deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 10 years. Some of the
warheads removed from operational status will become part of the
responsive force. Some will no doubt be retired and dismantled. We will
be making decisions on these and related matters in coming months and
years. Among other things, the NPR reaffirmed the earlier decision to
retire the W62 warhead by 2009.

ACTIVE NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE

28. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, can you define the inactive
stockpile from the DOE perspective?
Dr. Beckner. From the DOE perspective, the inactive stockpile are
those warheads in DOD custody in order to augment the active stockpile,
if necessary; to replace active stockpile warheads withdrawn for
surveillance testing; and to replace warheads of a particular type,
should there be a serious degradation in their reliability.

29. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, how will the nuclear warheads in the
inactive stockpile be maintained, modernized, and loaded with tritium?
Dr. Beckner. All inactive stockpile warheads have their limited
life components (e.g., tritium bottles) removed upon expiration and not
replaced unless the warhead is returned to the active stockpile.
Inactive stockpile warheads typically remain in DOD custody and are
refurbished (modernized) on a case-by-case basis.

30. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, how does the total number of nuclear
warheads relate to the tritium requirement and when must the NNSA
resume tritium production to support the NPR and how will the size of
the tritium reserve be determined?
Dr. Beckner. NNSA must support all operationally deployed and
augmentation (responsive) warheads with tritium. Some augmentation
warheads may be in the inactive stockpile, but we must have enough
tritium to support them in the event they are brought back to the
active stockpile. The remainder of the inactive stockpile warheads do
not require tritium support. The DOD and NNSA have not yet determined
the exact number of warheads that will be in the active and inactive
stockpiles. While the changes in the force structure impact the tritium
``need date'' and, therefore, the number of tritium rods that must be
irradiated in the TVA reactors, the fall 2003 initial irradiation date
is not affected. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the
initial core loads of tritium-producing rods in each TVA reactor will
be ``transition cores'' that will not contain nearly as many rods as
will later be utilized for steady-state production. The requirement to
maintain a 5-year reserve has not been affected by the change in force
structure in the NPR.

NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

31. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, has the DOE been told by the Defense
Department to work on the development of any new nuclear weapons?
Dr. Beckner. The NNSA has no requirement from the Department of
Defense to work on the development of any new nuclear weapons. Any new
requirement to develop a new nuclear weapon would have to be approved
by the Nuclear Weapons Council consistent with Section 3152 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.

32. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, was this direction approved by the
Nuclear Weapons Council?
Dr. Beckner. If and when the NNSA is asked to work on the
development of a new nuclear weapon it will be approved by the Nuclear
Weapons Council consistent with Section 3152 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.

33. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is there money in the fiscal year
2003 budget request for this work?
Dr. Beckner. For fiscal year 2003, the NNSA has no requirements
from the Department of Defense to initiate any development activities,
including the design of a new nuclear weapon. However, funds are
included to maintain a capability to explore technical options that
would enhance the security posture of the United States.

34. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, how much will the DOE spend in
fiscal year 2002 on development of any new nuclear weapons or new
nuclear-weapons concepts?
Dr. Beckner. While there are no funds in fiscal year 2002 for the
development of any new nuclear weapon or new nuclear-weapons concept,
the NNSA is planning to spend $7.4 million (of which $500,000 is from
USAF) in fiscal year 2002 from Directed Stockpile Work R&D to conduct a
3-year study on the possibility of modifying either the B61 or B83,
both existing warheads in the stockpile, to provide the United States
with Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator capability. This research activity
will be carried out because current weapons in the stockpile cannot
hold at risk a growing category of potential targets: deeply buried in
tunnel facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear,
or command and control facilities.

35. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, there was no request for money for
new weapons development in the fiscal year 2002 budget request. If 2002
money is going to be used to begin work that leads to the development
of a new nuclear weapon, when will the Department submit a
reprogramming request seeking congressional approval for this new
effort?
Dr. Beckner. There are no plans to use fiscal year 2002 funds for
the development of new nuclear weapons. The Department is planning to
spend $7.4 million (of which $500,000 is from USAF) in fiscal year 2002
from Directed Stockpile Work R&D to conduct a 3-year study on the
possibility of modifying either the B61 or B83, both existing warheads
in the stockpile, to provide the United States with Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator capability. This research activity is within the scope
for funds appropriated for stockpile R&D; however, we are also
preparing a notification to congressional committees to keep them
current and informed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman

ADVANCED CONCEPTS INITIATIVE

36. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Beckner, can you please explain what new
warhead programs you are pursuing in the Advanced Concepts Initiative
and how does this interface with the Nuclear Weapons Council
requirements?
Dr. Beckner. The NPR states that the number, composition, and
character of the Nation's nuclear forces ought to reflect the reality
that the Cold War is over and that nuclear deterrent capabilities may
now need to be different. The NPR endorsed NNSA's Advanced Concepts
Initiative that could provide the Nation with future options for
meeting new or emerging requirements. This work also provides an
opportunity for NNSA and its contractors to exercise critical skills
necessary for the long-term sustainment of the Nation's defense.
The initial focus of the Advanced Concepts program will be the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), for which $15.5 million is
requested in fiscal year 2003 as part of the Directed Stockpile
Research and Development activity. This study was approved by the
Nuclear Weapons Council, and in response to a JROC validated
requirement. The 3-year RNEP feasibility study will assess the
feasibility of modifying one of two candidate nuclear weapons currently
in the stockpile to provide enhanced penetration capability into hard
rock geologies and develop out-year costs for the subsequent production
phases, if a decision is made by the Nuclear Weapons Council to
proceed. This work complies with existing legislation, including
Section 3136 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994. The fiscal year 2003 budget contains no other funds for Phase 6.X
advanced concept study activities.

ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

37. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Beckner, regarding the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, what specifically are you doing to the B83 bomb, are
any of the warhead components besides the casing being modified, and
could it eventually require testing?
Dr. Beckner. The potential modifications to both the B61 and the
B83, based on the limited analysis done in 1999 entail case
modifications and structural reinforcement of various portions of the
weapons package (nuclear explosive package and associated weaponization
subsystems such as the bomb electrical system) to improve their impact
survivability. The specific modifications required will not be known
until the Feasibility Study (6.2) is completed. Guidance to the labs
from the start has been that no envisioned modification can require an
underground nuclear test to certify the modified weapon system. There
will be no modifications to specifically alter yield.

A-76 PROGRAM AT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE

38. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Beckner, why does the DOE have an A-76
program to reduce to Albuquerque Field Office when your reorganization
plan is also reducing it and what staffing levels do you expect when
all this is done?
Dr. Beckner. President Bush has challenged all agencies to review
functions that are not an inherently governmental function and subject
them to an ``A-76'' review process, to assess whether these functions
can be done more effectively and efficiently by the private sector. The
functions that the DOE has identified for review include information
technology, human resources, and financial services. These functions
are present at the Albuquerque Field Office.
We are supporting the overall crosscutting review of these
functional areas throughout the DOE. We would expect that this review
will feed into our reengineering efforts for the specific functions
being reviewed under A-76. Until these reviews are complete the impact
on staffing levels cannot be determined.

LONG-TERM WASTE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

39. Senator Bingaman. Secretary Roberson, who is going to conduct
the long-term waste management research and development?
Secretary Roberson. The Department's Office of Science (SC), that
has been partnering with EM on this activity since 1996, will conduct
the basic research that addresses the environmental cleanup mission. We
believe this will result in more efficient research management and
better leveraging of other basic science tools within SC. SC and EM
will continue to work closely to ensure the research supports cleanup
as it evolves.

40. Senator Bingaman. Secretary Roberson, I understand it may be
the Office of Science, but will the reduction in funds from your office
be transferred to the Office of Science or will they pick up an
unfunded mandate?
Secretary Roberson. No, in developing the fiscal year 2003 budget
request, funds were effectively transferred from EM, so that SC will
not acquire an unfunded mandate. The request for the Environmental
Management Science Program, which now appears within SC's budget, fully
satisfies funding commitments on multiyear projects that extend into
fiscal year 2003. However, it does not provide for any new research
projects.

41. Senator Bingaman. Secretary Roberson, will you continue to use
the National Academy of Sciences for outside scientific peer review of
the waste management program?
Secretary Roberson. Yes, it is the Department's intent to continue
to commission the National Academy of Sciences for outside, independent
reviews on environmental scientific and technical matters.

CLEANUP AT SANDIA

42. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, as recently as 2 years ago in
its fiscal year 2001 budget request, the Department of Energy committed
to finish the cleanup of the Sandia National Laboratories site in New
Mexico by the end of fiscal year 2003. This year's DOE request is
silent on the issue of a completion date. It appears to me that DOE
plans to extend the cleanup date indefinitely. As you know from your
experience at Rocky Flats, delaying cleanup schedules is in the long
run more expensive than applying the extra resources needed to get the
job done on schedule. Could you please explain why the Department has
backed away from its commitment to clean up the Sandia site, and why
the Department believes this is a cost-effective approach?
Secretary Roberson. Please be assured that the Department of Energy
is fully committed to the cleanup of the Sandia National Laboratory
(SNL), as well the other large cleanup project in New Mexico at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory.
During the past 2 years, SNL has aggressively pursued the
excavation of several major landfills. During these cleanups,
additional quantities of contamination than what were thought to be
present were discovered. This type of uncertainty is unavoidable at
landfill excavations regardless of how thoroughly the landfill is
characterized. Because of this increase in the scope of the project,
the fiscal year 2003 cleanup completion date for the Sandia site that
you referred to could not have been achieved.
One of the recommendations included in the Top-to-Bottom Review is
to ``accelerate the closure of small sites.'' On May 30, 2002, the
Department, the State of New Mexico officials, and EPA signed a Letter
of Intent that establishes goals and identifies activities that would
complete cleanup at Sandia National Laboratories by 2006.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond

INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

43. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, Section 3008 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 requires the Secretary
of Energy to prepare an infrastructure plan for the Nation's nuclear
weapons complex. Although the report is not due for some time, what is
your current assessment of the adequacy of the complex to support the
current and future nuclear stockpile requirements?
Dr. Beckner. NNSA's ability to support the nuclear weapons
stockpile depends upon renewing industrial and engineering capabilities
across the complex. Much of the infrastructure of the national security
enterprise was built during the era of underground nuclear testing, and
has eroded to the point that we are no longer able to perform some
essential tasks. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget address
supports our industrial base in two key ways: a request of $1.7 billion
for Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, a 10 percent increase
supporting the operations of weapons complex facilities; and, a $243
million request for the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization
Program to continue this important multiyear initiative into its third
year to help restore the weapons complex.

44. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, the Department of Defense uses
the Installation Status Report to identify the condition of its
facilities. What are the DOE's installation measurement tools?
[Dr. Beckner did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.]

SERVICE CENTERS

45. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, the Department plans to
eliminate a layer of management and oversight by establishing eight
site offices collocated with the eight NNSA contractors. How will these
eight offices differ from the field offices that the Department
previously used to manage operations?
Dr. Beckner. As described in the ``Report to Congress on the
Organization and Operations of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, February 25, 2002,'' the NNSA is significantly changing
its field structure. In the past, operations offices managed, on behalf
of NNSA, field offices whose basic role was operations, particularly
occupational safety and nuclear safety. Most other functions in support
of Defense Programs were performed within the operations offices and
headquarters. A primary change will be that the field offices will
assume a role in overseeing the execution of programs. Another
significant change will be the further empowerment of the site manager
through delegation of significant contracting authorities. On the other
hand, operations offices will transform into service centers, whose job
will be to provide support to the field offices and the weapons complex
more broadly, primarily in administrative, financial, and contracting
areas. These and other changes will be clearly mapped through an
extensive re-engineering activity, now underway, which will complete
this fall.

WORK FORCE

46. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, you testified that the
Department is aggressively starting a program to retain highly-skilled
employees, retrain employees with skills mismatches, and recruit the
right technical skills. What programs does the Department have to
recruit graduate students who will be the seed corn for developing and
maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons technology?
Dr. Beckner. The DOE/NNSA has two programs that are utilized to
employ college students and graduates. The Career Internship Program
(CIP) and the Student Career Experience Program (SCEP) are critical to
NNSA work force recruitment and retention efforts. CIP is utilized more
throughout the weapon complex as it is designed to employ recent
college graduates in scientific and engineering entry-level positions.
The program trains and develops the interns in special skills and
knowledge that are required to fill critical positions such as weapon
program engineers and weapon program management. These positions have
the responsibility to develop and maintain the U.S. nuclear weapon
technology.
Weapon program engineers oversee all aspects of the development,
production, and modifications of components in support of the Nation's
nuclear weapon stockpile. Program management positions oversee the day-
to-day construction of the facilities to include reviewing and
approving engineering plans and specifications for NNSA owned nuclear
and non-nuclear facilities. The CIP ensures that DOE's corporate
structures and functions are learned through a comprehensive training
program, which includes rotations through offices in nuclear weapons,
program management, and environmental safety and health. These
rotations can be between 2 to 6 months in duration, thus allowing the
interns to work on projects and shadow senior engineers and scientists.
Another important program is the SCEP. This program allows student to
be employed during 2 years of college and allows for conversion to a
full time federal position after graduation. The students are given
projects and are encouraged to shadow technical staff.

47. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, in its recruiting efforts does
the Department of Energy face the same anti-military sentiments on some
university campuses as the Department of Defense? If so, what are your
suggestions on how to overcome this problem?
Dr. Beckner. The DOE's corporate recruiters face anti-government
sentiments on college campuses across the Nation. In light of the
terror attacks, DOE is focusing its recruitment strategy and building
on the Nation-wide sense that serving the Government is honorable and
noble. Our office is exploring a partnership with the new non-profit
organization ``Partnership for Public Service.'' The organization is
dedicated to recruiting and retaining excellence in Federal service.
The organization encourages qualified men and women to choose Federal
service for some or all of their career.

MODERN PIT FACILITY

48. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, last year this committee
expressed great concern about the lack of progress being made with
regard to a Modern Pit Facility. The Panel to Assess the Reliability,
Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, or simply,
``the Foster Panel,'' provided striking evidence that we must take
aggressive action in this regard. In fact, in both the 1999 and 2000
reports, the Foster Panel made as its most significant recommendation
that the United States must ``Immediately begin conceptual design of an
adequate pit production facility.'' In response to this compelling
evidence, this committee included in the report accompanying the Fiscal
Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act the following guidance:
``The committee notes the panel's estimate that it will take 10 or more
years to build an adequate pit production facility. The pending NPR is
expected to outline such critical concerns as the size of the future
arsenal and mix of weapons. . . . Conceptual design should proceed at
the conclusion of this study to facilitate a timely decision on
facility construction.'' Furthermore, the committee recommended ``an
additional $10 million be available to select an architect-engineering
organization to begin the conceptual design and report process, in
order to keep the new pit production facility on schedule.''
Unfortunately, your fiscal year 2003 budget calls for the design of
this facility to be ``deferred until fiscal year 2004 with fiscal year
2003 funding used to continue manufacturing concepts.'' Do you disagree
with the findings of the Foster Panel with regard to a Modern Pit
Facility?
Dr. Beckner. NNSA is currently taking steps to proceed with an MPF
including formal approval of mission need, Critical Decision-0 (CD-0),
which is required to start conceptual design of a MPF. Following CD-0
approval by the Department, anticipated yet this month, the NNSA will
initiate a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process to obtain a
formal Record of Decision that is required to both select a site for an
MPF and to proceed with a detailed facility design after completing
conceptual design. The NNSA will expedite the NEPA process while
simultaneously developing technology required to evaluate conceptual
designs for an MPF.

49. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, why was the design of the Modern
Pit Facility deferred to fiscal year 2004?
Dr. Beckner. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee
recommended an additional $10 million in fiscal year 2002 for the MPF,
only $4 million was appropriated. Based on this $4 million
appropriation and consistent with direction provided by the Senate
Armed Services Committee, the NNSA has completed pre-conceptual
planning activities and is prepared to start conceptual design of an
MPF following approval (spring 2002) of Critical Decision-0, mission
need.

NEED FOR MODERN PIT FACILITY

50. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, in 1996 the DOE called for
developing a contingency plan to establish a large scale pit
manufacturing facility within 5 years. Does your research on the
deterioration of nuclear components support your decision to delay the
1996 plan? Do you have new evidence contradicting the concerns of the
Foster Panel with regard to the ``worrisome signs of deterioration in
some nuclear components?''
Dr. Beckner. Research to date on plutonium aging and pit lifetimes
does not show significant deterioration that would raise concern about
the safety, security, or reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
The weapons laboratories are continuing to conduct experiments at the
laboratories and the Nevada Test Site to further improve our
understanding of the lifetime of nuclear components such as pits. At
the same time the NNSA is proceeding, on a prudent pace, supported by
the Nuclear Weapons Council, with plans to develop a Modern Pit
Facility that will meet the needs of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
NNSA is aggressively monitoring the aging phenomenon through the
core surveillance program and enhanced surveillance campaign. An
ambitious refurbishment program to replace some of the components of
the weapons systems that have higher risk to safety or reliability has
been instituted. These life extension programs (LEPs) have extremely
high priority and management attention at NNSA, the design
laboratories, and the production plants. As a direct result of input
from the core surveillance program and the enhanced surveillance
campaign, the strategy and tactics for the LEP implementation have been
focused to address the concerns of an aging stockpile.

MIXED OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY

51. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, last year you assured me that
the mixed-oxide (MOX) plant was your top nonproliferation priority.
Thank you for all you have done with regard to moving this program
forward. However, a few matters need to be resolved in order to
guarantee the success of the program. Specifically, I have been
informed that you are currently negotiating with the Governor of South
Carolina to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement for the DOE and
South Carolina. While a number of my colleagues addressed this matter
at today's hearing, it was my understanding that this agreement may
require legislation. Do you believe that it would require legislation
to implement it?
Dr. Beckner. The administration supports a legislation approach
designed to assure the people of South Carolina that there will be a
path for surplus plutonium to be shipped to its Savannah River Site.
The administration considers Section 3182 of S. 2514 adequate to
achieve this objective.

52. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, would you please provide
suggested legislative language? As this is a time-sensitive matter,
could you accommodate this request immediately?
Dr. Beckner. The Department supports the legislation introduced by
Congressman Lindsey Graham and Senator Strom Thurmond. I believe that
this legislation addresses all of the concerns the State of South
Carolina has raised regarding the plutonium disposition program.

CURRENT PLANS FOR MOX FABRICATION FACILITY

53. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, you are no doubt aware that a
MOX lead test assembly (LTA) program is needed before the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) will approve the use of significant
quantities of MOX fuel. The initial plan for the fabrication of these
units--fabrication at LANL--was terminated by the DOE in May 2000,
reportedly due to cost and schedule concerns. I have been informed that
there is a possibility that there may be a lag between the MOX
fabrication facility startup and large scale use of MOX. The potential
startup delays would mean that large scale use of MOX fuel would not
begin until 2012, 2013, or later. Consequently, the lag between MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility and full production requires maintaining the
facility with no production for a number of years, a cost impact to the
taxpayer of potentially $200 million. Can you detail the current plan
as well as the schedule of that plan? Can you assure me that there will
be no delay due to LTA approval delays?
Dr. Beckner. The options for fabrication of MOX lead assemblies are
still under consideration. One option the Department is currently
examining is the early fabrication of MOX lead assemblies in Europe.
The Department is meeting with European Government officials to
determine the necessary measures to pursue this option. Detailed plans
will be developed if an agreement can be reached by all parties.
If successful, lead assemblies will be fabricated and irradiated
before the completion of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, and the
Department's contractor, DCS, should be able to obtain Nuclear
Regulatory Commission approval for large-scale use of MOX fuel in the
Duke energy reactors on the desired schedule.
I am optimistic that there will be no significant delays in Nuclear
Regulatory Commission approval of the lead assemblies. However, it is
simply not possible to guarantee that there will be no delays as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission exercises its statutory responsibilities
to confirm the safety of the use of lead assemblies in licensed
reactors.

FULL-TIME MANAGER

54. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, I believe it would be helpful
and assuring to have a DOE manager to take charge of the MOX fuel LTA
project on a full time basis to perform DOE activities, coordinate
interagency activities, such as Department of State, Department of
Defense, etc., as well as oversee contractor activities. I also believe
a full time manager could open and maintain a dialog between the United
States, France, and Belgium, initiate National Environmental Policy Act
activities, and prepare an export license application to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Do you believe these activities could be better
managed by a full-time manager, and if so, will you support creating
such a position?
Dr. Beckner. The Department has assigned a full-time engineering
manager at headquarters with the primary responsibility for lead
assembly activities. One of the priorities for this position involves
coordinating lead assembly activities and maintaining communication
between the various agencies and contractors involved in this effort.

ACCELERATED CLEANUP

55. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roberson, I fully support the
Department's initiative for accelerated cleanup of the DOE sites. My
concern is that you will not have sufficient resources to fulfill all
the expectations. What assurance can you provide us that once the
additional $800 million allocated for the program has been committed,
you will be able to obtain additional funding to support the program?
Secretary Roberson. The administration is prepared to support a
request for additional funds, up to $300 million, if needed for cleanup
reform. I am personally committed to the success of this initiative to
refocus and accelerate the cleanup and will work within the
administration and with Congress to ensure that the Department receives
the funding that is needed to carry out agreements that will
successfully accelerate risk reduction and cleanup.

56. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roberson, what is the status of the
program in regard to the Savannah River Site?
Secretary Roberson. The Department has developed a number of
specific initiatives for the Savannah River Site that could potentially
be funded from within the cleanup reform appropriation. These
initiatives would enable a significant acceleration in the timetable
for completion of EM's cleanup work at the site with a corresponding
significant reduction in risk and in the overall cost of cleanup. We
have been discussing these initiatives with state officials and their
Citizen's Advisory Board. In parallel, we have developed a draft
performance management plan in support of implementing the accelerated
cleanup program to effectively manage this work. We are working closely
with State and Federal regulators to reach agreement on an accelerated
cleanup plan, and I am optimistic we will reach that agreement soon.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Bunning

PUBLIC LAW 105-204 \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ S. 2316, ``A bill to require the Secretary of Energy to submit
to Congress a plan to ensure that all amounts accrued on the books of
the United States Enrichment Corporation for the disposition of
depleted uranium hexafluoride will be used to treat and recycle
depleted uranium hexafluoride.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
57. Senator Bunning. Congress passed P.L. 105-204 in 1998. The
intent of the bill was to ensure that the construction of DUF6
conversion facilities would be built at two sites, one at Paducah and
one at Portsmouth, and that by 2004 cleanup of the DOE's depleted
uranium hexafluoride would be completed. The DOE has now decided not to
select a contractor for this project and to delay the selection until
October 2003 to study whether two facilities are necessary. I know that
the OMB has refused to provide funding for this project. I believe that
two facilities are necessary to eliminate the hazardous waste at the
sites. Will the intent of P.L. 105-204 be followed by constructing two
DUF6 facilities, one at Paducah and one at Portsmouth?
Secretary Roberson. After careful consideration of options, the
Department has decided not to make a selection decision or to award the
contract to design, build, and operate DUF6 conversion facilities at
both the Paducah and Portsmouth sites at this time. Rather, the
Department plans to consider alternatives in the number and location of
conversion facilities before continuing with the evaluation of
proposals and subsequent award of a contract. We plan to make that
decision by January 2003.

58. Senator Bunning. Secretary Roberson, the DOE's new tactic with
the contractor selection process appears to make it impossible to
finish construction of the DUF6 facilities by 2004. Do you think
construction of a DUF6 facility will ever begin and when do you think
it will commence?
Secretary Roberson. By January 2003, the Department plans to
announce its decision as to the number and location of DUF6 conversion
plants. DOE will evaluate its schedule requirements for construction as
a part of its consideration of the number and location of plants.

59. Senator Bunning. Secretary Roberson, in the President's fiscal
year 2003 budget, the Paducah cleanup fund received $73.4 million,
which is $20 million less than the fiscal year 2002 appropriated amount
of $93.4 million. How do you plan to finish cleanup at the Paducah
Plant in a timely manner if funding continues to be cut?
Secretary Roberson. The Department is committed to cleanup of the
Paducah site, and is working to identify ways to achieve more risk
reduction and accelerate the cleanup. We do not view the fiscal year
2003 budget as a budget cut for the Paducah site or for any other DOE
sites. The total budget request of $6.7 billion, including the $800
million requested for EM cleanup reform, is approximately equal to
fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, the administration is willing to support
up to 5,300 million more if needed for cleanup reform. We have
structured the budget in a manner to provide the necessary incentives
to revise the cleanup strategy at our sites to achieve an accelerated
risk reduction strategy. The budget includes funding to continue
ongoing cleanup work until an agreement on a revised cleanup strategy
is reached. Once a new strategy is defined, we intend to provide
additional funds as appropriate to those sites.
Based on the results of the Secretary's Top-to-Bottom Review, the
Department is developing an accelerated cleanup approach for the
Paducah site that could significantly accelerate risk reduction. We are
working with the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the EPA's Region IV on
the proposal and, upon agreement with the regulators, the Paducah site
would be eligible for additional funds from the EM cleanup reform
account to implement the agreement. In addition, we will continue to
look for ways to reduce costs and accelerate schedules through the use
innovative technologies, fixed price contracting and improvements in
project management.

60. Senator Bunning. Secretary Roberson, do you plan for the
Paducah Plant to be part of the DOE's proposed Accelerated Cleanup
Program, and if so, how will this affect the time line for cleanup at
the Paducah Plant, and if the Paducah Plant becomes part of the
program, will it remain a cleanup priority for the DOE?
Secretary Roberson. Yes, the Department has proposed an accelerated
cleanup strategy for the Paducah site and, upon agreement and joint
commitments by the regulators, the site would be eligible for
additional funds from the EM cleanup reform account to ensure
successful implementation of the strategy. This strategy, if accepted
by the regulators, could complete EM's current cleanup scope of work at
Paducah as early as 2006. Discussions with the State and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency are continuing.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed and Allard.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Christina D.
Still, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, minority
counsel; and Brian R. Green, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Thomas C. Moore and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; and Douglas Flanders, assistant to
Senator Allard.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

Senator Reed. Let me call this hearing to order. The
Strategic Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive
testimony on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) programs of the Department of Defense. We will conduct
this hearing in open and closed sessions. At the conclusion of
the open session, we will adjourn and reconvene in room S-407
of the Capitol for the closed session.
Our three witnesses today are the Honorable John Stenbit,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C\3\I); Lieutenant General
Gregory Newbold, Director of Operations for the Joint Staff,
(J3); and Rear Admiral Stanley Szemborski, Deputy Director for
Resources and Requirements for the Joint Staff, (J8). Welcome,
gentlemen, and thank you for joining us this afternoon.
Secretary Stenbit is responsible for enabling the military
forces of the United States to use and share the information
gathered by the formidable collection of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets at our Nation's
disposal. This is a difficult and extremely important task.
General Newbold serves as the operational link between the
commanders in the field and the National Command Authority. His
responsibilities include positioning military forces,
monitoring world-wide military conditions, and conducting
operational briefings for the national leadership.
Admiral Szemborski is the deputy in charge of the analysis
and requirements developments arm of the Joint Staff. We have
asked Admiral Szemborski to provide his insights into the
current and future requirements for ISR systems.
The ISR assets of this country have been instrumental in
the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
while continuing to support the wider needs of the Department
of Defense and the intelligence community. They have performed
very well, the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) being one
of many high profile examples of success. Operation Enduring
Freedom has also, however, demonstrated some of the limitations
of the Nation's ISR assets when they are stressed and exposed
in crisis.
Following September 11, when the requirements for airborne
surveillance were stretched beyond the limit of our current
Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) fleet, our NATO
allies came to our assistance. The NATO AWACS aircraft
maintained surveillance over the United States helping to guard
against further terrorist strikes when our aircraft were sent
to support operations in Afghanistan. The attack of September
11 itself tragically revealed that despite all of our ISR
capabilities, significant weaknesses remain in our ability to
detect and prevent the actions of terrorists acting alone or in
small groups.
We welcome all of our witnesses today and thank you for
being here. Thank you also for your service to the country and
to your respective service. Each of you is important to
ensuring that the necessary ISR assets are in place, delivering
information where and when needed. This hearing is an
opportunity to discuss both our ISR strengths and weaknesses,
and to ensure we are making the most of the former while
improving on the latter.
Senator Allard, at this time would you like to make an
opening statement?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Senator Allard. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
the three distinguished witnesses from the Department of
Defense, and applaud your forward thinking in holding this
important hearing. Mr. Chairman, before I get to the formal
part of my statement, I wanted to congratulate you on sticking
to a very ambitious subcommittee schedule. I know how difficult
it is and appreciate the fact that you have been fighting for
times and dates to hold all these hearings. You have done a
good job with your leadership of this committee, and I also
appreciate your commitment and dedication to the subcommittee's
work.
When I think about my responsibilities on the subcommittee,
we deal with nuclear programs, space and intelligence programs,
and all those other uncontroversial items. So seriously, Mr.
Chairman, while we do not always agree on these issues, I do
want to publicly acknowledge you and acknowledge the working
relationship that we have here.
Also, I would like to acknowledge both our staffs for all
their hard work over the last week to prepare these hearings.
It is their dedication that allows these hearings to go as well
as they have. So, to the staff--the professional staff and
staff assistants and personal staff--a big thank you.
Now, to get to the subject of this hearing. We are all
thankful for the initial success of our forces in Afghanistan,
and around the world in this global war against terrorism.
While much will be debated in the months and years ahead about
the relative value of airpower, seapower, and ground operations
in Operation Enduring Freedom, one thing is clear: All our
forces are dependent on timely, accurate information to
succeed. The ISR assets available to the theater and
subordinate commanders have done a remarkable job in delivering
that information.
We have often heard our civilian and military leaders in
the Pentagon talk about the importance of information
superiority in future warfare. We have now seen a pragmatic
demonstration in Afghanistan. This has not always been the
case.
During the 1990s, the regional commanders in chief (CINCs)
routinely acknowledged that they had significant concerns about
the availability of ISR assets to support both their peacetime
and wartime operations. Most of these concerns were focused on
airborne reconnaissance assets, the manned and unmanned
aircraft with various intelligence sensors that are allocated
to theater commanders. The numerous global requirements
combined with the very limited numbers of these aircraft led to
their being designated as high-demand, low-density (HDLD)
assets, requiring special intensive management by the Pentagon.
Recently, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the very existence
of the term high-demand, low-density assets means that our
priorities were wrong, that we didn't buy enough of what we
needed. Based on the testimony of the regional CINCs and
various intelligence officials, Congress directed the
Department of Defense to assess the adequacy of its ISR assets
in fiscal year 2000. The Joint Airborne Reconnaissance
Assessment, completed in 2001, concluded that additional assets
were in fact needed, including additional Joint Surveillance
and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Rivet Joint, and EP-3
aircraft, and a well-defined unmanned aerial vehicle
architecture.
Similar reviews of our national intelligence needs have
also been undertaken, examples are the NIMA and NRO
commissions. All have recommended changes and enhancements to
our overall ISR capabilities at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels. Our purpose here today is to better
understand this complex ISR enterprise and determine if the
investments we are making are adequate.
Furthermore, we want to understand if the policies
associated with these very essential and special assets are
appropriate to ensure our warfighters and our national decision
makers have the best possible information. Finally, we need to
hear what progress you have made in implementing the prudent
recommendations made by these various assessments and
commissions.
The world has been amazed at pictures of soldiers on
horseback directing 21st century weapons with devastating
precision. We see images of AC-130 gunships firing at ground
targets identified by unmanned aerial vehicles. We see
silhouettes of parachutes, through night vision goggles,
descending on distant airfields.
How did we find these targets, these threats to our
national security? How will we know if Saddam Hussein plans to
attack his neighbors again, or if al Qaeda terrorists begin to
congregate in new locations? The answers to these questions
reside in having a capable, well-coordinated ISR system. This
is our first line of defense and it must detect current and
future threats.
I look forward to hearing our panel's testimony on the
performance of our ISR systems, especially in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism. I
am also most interested in their view of the future, of what
our ISR system needs to be prepared for. What gaps or
challenges may be anticipated, and what can we Congress, do to
help?
As we consider the fiscal year 2003 budget request, we must
be mindful of the critical role information superiority plays
in our current and future military operations, and how
intimately connected our ISR assets and weapons systems have
become. This is clearly the future of warfare. We must ensure
that our ISR systems continue to be the best in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard, not only
for your statement but for your very kind words. Let me say
that it has been a pleasure working with you, and your effort
together with your staff has been absolutely critical to
meeting a very demanding schedule of hearings. If there is any
praise, it has to be shared equally, and I thank you very much.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Secretary Stenbit, you are free to proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. STENBIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Stenbit. Senator Reed, it is a pleasure to meet you and
have the opportunity to be here this afternoon. Senator Allard,
it is my pleasure to see you again. I appreciated your support
in our hearings back not quite 9 months ago, when I was, in
fact, before the committee for confirmation.
I would like to summarize a bit of the big picture of where
I am coming from. The closed statement for the closed session,
which I have submitted, has some more details in terms of the
answers to the questions that you asked. But it is always
important in my mind to share also the context in which I am
working. So with that, I will do a brief, open summary.
First, I think it is important to recognize that the
Secretary has identified three clear priorities, one of which
is to deter and prevent other occurrences of terrorism against
the U.S. and our interests wherever they are in the world. His
number two priority is to improve the flow of information and
intelligence and to make sure that these things are
transformed. Then third, he talks about the transformation of
the entire Department.
I am happy to say that the goals that I have in my world
are clearly aligned with all three, but in particular the last
two. In that sense I too have basically three goals. I really
want to get the Department to a network-centric view of the
world, and I will describe that in a second.
If I ever get us to a network-centric view of the world, I
need to populate the network with good information. Then third,
if I ever did both of the two, I need to make sure that we
protect that information and protect the network, at the same
time making sure we can keep somebody else from doing the same
thing to us. So those are my three goals: Create a network,
populate it with information, and make sure that we can depend
on it and that nobody else can. That sounds, perhaps, a little
simple but let me see if I can elaborate a bit.
Point number one, with respect to the network, I was in the
Pentagon in a job very close to the one I have now, 25 years
ago. In those days in the communications business it was a
telephone system. Somebody found something out from any kind of
a system, whether it was a person, airplane, or whatever, in
effect they had to dial up through a telephone system to tell
somebody what they found.
If you think about that for a while, that does not work
because the person who is dialing needs to know the total state
of the universe. He needs to know who might be interested in
the information he has. What is their phone number? Who are
they? How fast do they need it, with what kind of precision and
so forth?
We struggled mightily in that kind of a world because that
was the technology we had in those days. We ended up with some
really big problems, not the least of which was the ill-fated
Pueblo capture in North Korea where we found out 4 days later
that there were actually Marine Corps aircraft that were
available that could have gone and intercepted that particular
issue within the allotted time, but not 4 days later. We had a
similar issue where the Israelis gave us 24 hours to move a
ship off of their coast or they were going to sink it. It took
us over 24 hours to get the order back to move, and when we got
back there it was a wet order.
So, those telephone-based systems just did not work. The
key to all of this is that we adjusted and we made it all work
by having the bureaucracy that found a target to be the
bureaucracy that shot it. There just wasn't enough coordination
capability to be able to separate those two--with the one
exception of Strategic Air Command (SAC). When SAC was handed
targets, they put together a war plan for the Air Force and the
Navy, and it took 18 months. If we changed our mind it took 18
months.
That is not an acceptable tactical environment, to wait 18
months to change the idea of who is going to shoot what target.
In the intervening 25 years we have made a tremendous step
forward with this general issue of distribution of information
by going to broadcast means. Today, if you go into any active
area, there are global broadcast systems, there are defense
dissemination programs, there are multiple kinds of broadcast
systems.
If you think about a broadcast system, what it does is it
allows that person who finds something out not to have to know
to whom they may need to send the data. All they have to do is
get it on the broadcast, because it is going to be broadcast to
everybody and people who are interested will listen more than
those that are not interested in it. That is the way our
systems work today.
It has held us in good stead. It came to fruition in the
Persian Gulf War environment, and it really has come into
fruition here recently. So, when we talk about a Predator we
are talking about TV that is seen in multiple places around the
world at the same time, including multiple places in
Afghanistan, in the theater of operations. That is the
broadcast, if you wish. The guy driving the Predator does not
need to think about whom he must tell if he sees something. It
is a broadcast system.
Now, that leads to a whole bunch of things that we spend a
lot of money and time on these days, called fusion centers.
Because, the key here is that as you are listening to a
broadcast in whatever form it is, mostly satellite-based, it
gets broadcast. It gets broadcast once and then that is it. So
you had better be listening to all the broadcasts at the same
time, and then you had better be able to fuse together the
information--this one, and that one, and this other one.
Perhaps that is through intelligence. Perhaps that is by
Service. Perhaps that is from different countries.
But the point is we then gather all these broadcast sets of
data, multiple channels if you wish, it is like when you watch
football games on Sunday afternoon, you would like to have a TV
that had six little boxes so you could see all of them at the
same time. I mean, that is fusion. That is NFL fusion.
The problem with that is we still have a very complex set
of folks who decide what is important and what is not and then
pass it on. They have to do it in real-time. Where I would like
to go in a network world, is a pull-world, where everybody has
access into a--think of it as an Internet--where the bandwidth
is not a constraint, that it is a reliable system that people
count on, that it is trustworthy, and the data are available
whenever and wherever you want.
You can call it power to the edge if you wish. That is one
of the phrases I use. But the edge in this case is whoever does
not know what they do not know, and they have a problem. They
need to go find out what is available. They need to be able to
reach out wherever they go to find it.
Creating such an environment is one of the major
transformational goals of both my office and the Department. We
have in front of you, in the fiscal year 2003 budget,
significant investments in laser-based communications, both on
the ground and in space, to create the beginnings of this
network. That is point number one, create a ubiquitous,
trustworthy, dependable network where bandwidth is not a
problem and people can, in fact, get the information they want
wherever they are, whenever they need it.
As I said, if you are going to do that you have to then put
information on that network. There I would like to make two
points. One, I cannot prove this, but my impression over the
last 7 months, looking at what has happened over the last 15
years or so in the ISR business, in the information gathering
business, in the secrets stealing business, is we have not
covered the depreciation of our assets, if I were to use a
business term.
Every time we use a secret to do something we start the
process of somebody avoiding having that happen to them again.
As such, there is a depreciation over time in the value of the
information we gather, no matter what we do about it, because
the more we use it the more people get used to our using it and
the more they tend to avoid it. There are real businesses out
there that warn people these days about when satellites are
coming overhead, for example.
So, one of the things we need to do to populate this
network is to get back to the investment in new ways to steal
secrets. This is not the appropriate forum for that, at this
unclassified level, but there is a lot of money for programs in
the 2003 budget to start this process of what I call
recapitalizing the accounts to go steal secrets.
Second, we can use the information we already have better.
There is a lot of information that is available that is not on
the network today. So one of the things I am trying to push is
procedural changes. One of the big ones has to do with ISR,
where there is a buzzword called TPED, task, process, exploit,
and disseminate. I would like to turn that on its head and not
use that word anymore. I would rather use a word I have
invented which is TPPU, task, post, process, and use.
By that, I mean anybody who has anything to say posts it to
the network first, and then go process it. Somebody else might
actually want to do something with it in addition to you. We
actually had this the other day. We are making some progress, I
am happy to say. Joanne Isham, who is the deputy at NIMA, came
over and said, ``I have done it. I have done it. I am in your
network world.''
Somebody from CENTCOM called up and complained because they
had called the NIMA analyst to help them with this image, to
interpret it, and the NIMA analyst had not looked at it yet. So
we are in this post before we process mode and that is good,
because somebody at CENTCOM was able to have a different
priority, a different tolerance for ambiguity or whatever, and
was able to use the information.
So with respect to populating the network, I think there
are two things we need to do. We need to basically invest in
the recovery of the depreciation of our ability to steal
secrets. We need to post all the information we have so that we
do not lose it in the flow. That applies equally to the
business side of the Pentagon, no question about it. That is
not only a targeting issue.
The third, which is the protection of the systems that
create the network and find the information, we have put
resources in--for instance, to increase the jam resistance of
the GPS satellites--the 2003 program. We have become very
dependent on the GPS satellites. We might as well treat it as
if we really need it and start to invest as if it really needed
to be there. We need to do that for information assurance and
some other issues with respect to the network and crypto-
modernization. But more importantly, we also need to move
forward with information operations to make sure we can
preclude somebody else doing that to us.
So that is the context that I deal with these issues. My
closed statement goes into some more detail. I would be happy
to answer questions as we move forward. But thank you for the
opportunity to give you my big picture.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I would
note that General Newbold and Admiral Szemborski have a
combined statement. But I presume that both of you would like
to testify this afternoon, so let me turn to General Newbold
first.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GREGORY S. NEWBOLD, USMC, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, J3, THE JOINT STAFF

General Newbold. Sir, thanks, also we are honored to be
here this afternoon to have an opportunity to testify. I would
like to submit our statement for the record.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
General Newbold. Just a quick comment, sir, you have
indicated the position I occupy is a linkage between the
combatant commanders, the warfighters, and Washington. The role
involves the distribution of assets, in this case very scarce
and precious assets: intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms.
We have had some wonderful successes in Afghanistan, but we
can expand it beyond Operation Enduring Freedom to successes in
virtually every corner of the world, including the United
States. We have also revealed some additional requirements, or
some weaknesses. We have grown and adapted as we have learned
quite a bit about our own systems and how we use them.
The future is as Mr. Stenbit indicated, but we have to be
agile enough to adapt today. I think we have shown some of that
and we need to show a good bit more. So, our job in the
operations department is to ensure that we are not content with
the present and can adapt to the future. I look forward to
questions, sir, and the opportunity to try and address them.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General. Admiral
Szemborski, your comments.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. STANLEY R. SZEMBORSKI, USN, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FOR RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS, J8, THE JOINT STAFF

Admiral Szemborski. Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, I am
honored to be here today before this distinguished
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In my current
assignment, I am responsible to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, General Myers, for requirements, acquisition, and also
the program budget system. My job is to try to keep all three
of those processes rolling in the same direction.
In that assignment, I spend quite a bit of time working on
bringing programs to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
or JROC. I look forward to testifying today and I will forgo
the rest of my oral statement. I am prepared to answer any of
your questions. Thank you.
[The combined prepared statement of General Newbold and
Admiral Szemborski follows:]

Combined Prepared Statement of Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, USMC, and Rear
Adm. Stanley Szemborski, USN

Members of the Senate Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee, we are
pleased to provide this statement regarding the status of our
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and their
importance to the breadth of our military operations. We will address
two general areas that I believe require particular attention: first,
the means by which we allocate ISR assets among competing requirements;
and second, the importance of the systems that process, analyze, and
forward collected intelligence to our combatant forces.
We must first thank Congress for its sustained support to our Armed
Forces. This committee's support has been instrumental in our forces'
impressive performance in recent operations. Your continued support is
instrumental to our efforts in the war against global terrorism.
Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are more
critical to operations today than ever. We rely on timely,
comprehensive information collection complemented by rapid analysis and
high speed distribution to optimize force employment. The 21st century
has seen the warfighter's need for intelligence expand and delivery
times shrink. Today, timeliness of intelligence is as important as its
accuracy. Many of the targets we now face are small, mobile, and well
concealed. Their fleeting nature often affords us scant opportunity for
targeting. Successful ISR translates into proper use of precision
weapons, focusing maximum destructive efforts and minimizing collateral
damage.
We utilize a scarce inventory of intelligence collectors ranging
from national collection capability to airborne platforms such as the
Air Force U-2, Rivet Joint and Predator UAV, Navy EP-3 and P-3, and
Army Guardrail and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), to ground-based
collection and processing capability. We remain concerned about the
effects of a sustained high operations tempo on the force and about
shortages of ISR assets. With congressional support, the Department
continues to address critical readiness concerns, (e.g. RC-135 Rivet
Joint number 17 plus TC-135 and two RC-135 flight simulators, Predator
systems numbers 6 through 12, and EP-3 numbers 12 through 16). As we
address current ISR shortages, we are working to maintain an
appropriate balance between near- and long-term readiness initiatives
through incremental improvements which serves as a hedge against both
near-term readiness shortfalls and failures of unproven technologies as
we pursue more radical technologies to transform our forces for the
21st century. A case in point are our UAVs.
UAVs have validated their potential in Afghanistan for
reconnaissance and surveillance and have demonstrated potential for an
increased role in combat missions. We are continuing to experiment with
additional roles and missions for these vehicles, improve their
communications reach-back capabilities, and develop and acquire them at
greater rates. The President's 2003 budget funds a number of
transformational programs designed to help meet the objective. $141
million is funded to accelerate development of UAVs with new combat
capabilities. $629 million is funded to procure three Air Force Global
Hawk high-altitude unmanned vehicles and accelerate improvements such
as electronics upgrades and better sensors, and begin development of a
maritime version.
The President's 2003 budget also funds a number of transformational
programs to address intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and
reporting requirements. One such investment is $136.5 million for the
next-generation joint ground system Automated Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance System.
In the discussion of intelligence gathering, one must not overlook
the critical contribution of human intelligence (HUMINT). Quite often,
HUMINT proves to be an invaluable source of intelligence, unmatched by
any other source.
Our ISR forces provide support across the globe and are in
extremely high demand. ISR support is usually the first request to come
from the Combatant Commander. In addition to Operation Enduring
Freedom, we are currently supporting Balkan operations, Operations
Northern and Southern Watch, Korea, and operations in support of our
forces in South America. These assets also help maintain awareness of
potential threats in other areas around the globe. Most ISR assets are
characterized as Low Density/High Demand--requirements exceed the
current availability of platforms and/or personnel. AWACS, U-2s, and
RC-135s are all examples of LD/HD assets.
We seek to balance unified commanders' ISR requirements with
sustainment of long-term capabilities. We achieve this through global
military force policy or Service-specified employment limits that set
limits for the maximum pace of operations that can be sustained without
imperiling an asset's ability to train or surge for contingencies.
These limits help decision-makers better understand the costs of
employing these assets. As you may expect, post-September 11 operations
have pushed some of our ISR LD/HD assets into maximum surge levels. To
mitigate shortfalls in low-density/high-demand airborne ISR assets, the
Department created, implemented, and is now refining a revolutionary
process for matching intelligence requirements with existing airborne
ISR assets during steady-state peacetime operations and emergent
crises. The new methodology focuses on satisfying the commands' highest
priority information requirements and allows us to assess various
allocation options and the risk associated with requirements that
cannot be met with available assets.
This new process involves four distinct steps: First, each command
identifies information requirements and submits them to the Joint
Staff. Second, those requirements are prioritized based on criteria
linked to existing policy directives and Joint doctrine. Third, all
requirements undergo review from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
National Security Agency (NSA), and National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) for potential satisfaction by other, non-airborne collection
means. Fourth, the resultant prioritized requirements are matched to
existing ISR assets based on a hierarchical system.
Where appropriate, we actively coordinate the use of allied
platforms in lieu of U.S. capabilities. In addition, since September
11, we have deployed some assets outside their traditional role to
satisfy unmet ISR tasking, freeing up other ISR assets.
Employing the proper sensor at the right place is only part of the
challenge. Just as important are the systems and personnel that support
the transformation of raw sensor data into actionable intelligence. All
systems must provide a comprehensive, flexible, and supportive analysis
and dissemination architecture that gets our forces the information
they need, when they need it. This doesn't come automatically. The
communications channels that get information to the analysts and back
out to the warfighter and the priorities assigned to this analysis
effort must be well thought out before it is needed. Accurate and rapid
interpretation of intelligence is a highly refined skilled that can
take years to develop.
Your continued support is imperative to the success of our ISR
efforts. Our reliance on ISR capabilities, critical to today's
operations, will only grow in the future. We look forward to your
questions regarding the status of our ISR forces today and impact on
current operations.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Let me begin a
round of about 6 minutes, and then turn to Senator Allard.
The Air Force plans on procuring some 50 Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicles in the coming years, and this is
something on which our committee has been very supportive. In
fact, Senator Warner has been particularly encouraging in this
regard. So we would commend the Air Force for this. In
addition, the Navy now appears to be interested in acquiring a
variant of Global Hawk.
Each Global Hawk can gather a large amount of data, but
typically all that data has to be sent via satellite to remote
ground stations for processing, which raises the question, Mr.
Secretary, can you tell us how you plan to ensure we have the
satellite communications capability we will need to support the
Global Hawks and other UAVs we plan on buying in the coming
years? Is this capability, the satellite capability, properly
phased with the UAV acquisition program which, as a final point
I might add, seems to be accelerating rapidly with every
Service and every contractor?
Secretary Stenbit. Let's see, to go to your last question
first, of course it's not properly phased but it's actually not
that bad for a poor reason. I was chagrined to read in The Wall
Street Journal yesterday a front page article talking about
this subject. I was relatively pleased that somewhere around
September 13 we actually did go out and have a competitive bid
with CNN for satellite services. At that time, we obtained and
still have today 500 megahertz of additional commercial
channels which we use quite effectively to move the data from
the Predators and other ISR assets in the theater. So, we were
fortunate and it was part of the plan at the time that we would
use surge capacity within the commercial satellite world.
I think if we were to look at that plan today, seeing the
financial stress--that is probably a kind word for the long
haul telecommunications business--we would have to be less
optimistic today that things like Iridium, ICO, Teledesic,
AstroLink, CyberStar, and all of those programs that everybody
thought were going to launch in the next 5 years will actually
get there. So, part of the problem of the phasing over the next
several years that the assumptions of how many companies will
go bankrupt were too optimistic.
On the other hand, the good news, which is not very good at
all, is that that meant there was excess capacity. We were able
to get 500 megahertz and we have. In fact, we put in play the
ability to continue those services through the transition of
the fiscal year. It is interesting to note how awkward our
funding mechanisms are compared to businesses, because we have
to do it by fiscal year, by appropriation, and making the
peanut butter and jelly come out right is sometimes difficult.
But we believe we are in good shape at approximately the
level we are at now. We are going to launch three satellites
called ``wideband gap fillers'' over the next 3 years, starting
in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Those are follow ons to DSCS, which is
the existing military wideband satellite, which has nowhere
near enough capacity to handle Global Hawks and Predators and
things like that.
The wideband gap fillers have a lot more capacity. They
have added one more frequency which is called the Ka-band,
which is up at about 20 gigahertz, probably too much detail.
But in any case, because it is a higher frequency, it has wider
bandwidth and it can handle more information.
In my summary of my statement, I talked about the use of
laser technology, both on the ground and in space, as a
transformational issue with respect to where we want to go.
This is really for the end of the decade. But I was happy you
asked the question because I think that is an extremely
important issue.
The commercial telecommunications people have learned how
to put multiple colors of light down a fiber. So if you want
some more bandwidth you add a color. It is called dense-wave
division multiplex. We intend to equip about 90 facilities in
the Defense and intelligence departments over the next 2 years,
one color per facility. That is 10 gigabits per second. That is
called an OC-192.
We want to go to an all-optical, very wideband, as global
as we can, ground-based network. The money for that is in the
request. Half of it is in the request for 2003, and it is
called the Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion program.
We intend to use that same technology in space. By that I
mean building laser crosslinks and laser communications to read
from the Predator up to the satellite, laser from the satellite
over to another satellite, and then a laser back down to the
ground and into this network. Without doing that I think we
will never solve the problem that you just described.
I was at a review of that program the other day. They are
making progress at bounding how many laser heads we can put per
satellite and still maintain the communications capacity. It
looks as if that particular transformation is going to be well
within the technical state of the art and also feasible with
respect to time and money.
So, I believe we are moving forward and this network that I
was describing is fundamental to the question you just asked.
Because not only do we need the bandwidth, we need the people
to be able to process the information. We cannot spray that all
over the world in small little clumps. It just will not work.
So part of the real advantage of this TPPU or the issue of
building this network, is we can exfiltrate that data to
wherever we need it. Then people can retrieve it as if it were
an Internet, back through the same lasers and up to a radio in
space and back down to their work stations. So we think that is
probably the most transformational thing we can do in the
Defense Department, let alone in the ISR world.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Related to your
comments, Admiral Szemborski, you would, I assume, be
responsible for the Joint Chiefs' developing the requirements
first for the number of UAVs, and second how that is tied into
the satellite architecture. If that is the case, can you
comment upon this process and the requirements?
Admiral Szemborski. Yes sir, the JROC has taken this on and
over the last several years they have commissioned several
studies, both in the satellite area and the UAV area, in trying
to bring this together. We have been very involved in what the
C\3\I staff is doing and we continue to assess it. We have also
designated one joint warfighting capabilities assessment team,
or JWCA team, to specifically look at this area.
That team has been assigned over the next year to do a
complete assessment and do an operational concept for this
area. We believe that by starting with the operational concept
and then going to an architecture below that, we will be able
to identify the key communications nodes and the key
interoperability requirements that will allow us to take a step
forward to a more integrated infrastructure in the future. The
JROC started this a couple of years ago with the JTAMDO
organization, the Joint Theater Air Missile Defense
Organization, for cruise missile defense. The benefits of that
have just been tremendous so far.
So with this effort that is going on right now, we believe
that we will be able to really get a handle on the architecture
of the future, be able to then hand that operational
architecture over to the smart folks in C\3\I to be able to do
the technical architecture. With that, bring together something
that we think will lead to a much better capability for the
warfighter in the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. In laying out this integrated ISR
architecture, it looks to me like we have a huge task ahead of
us. We have land, sea, and air, and then we have space on top
of that. Then we have the tasking, the processing, and the
communications parts of it. It is going to be a substantial
undertaking.
But I am not discouraged because I see things that are
encouraging. Mr. Stenbit, what is your assessment of progress
being made in development and implementation of this integrated
ISR architecture?
Secretary Stenbit. As I said, I think that the use of
broadcast capability, and that is really what I did when the
Air Force requested, and DISA did it, and I got my approval
about the money, to get these satellite channels. I mean, we
are now used to going into this broadcast mode. If we were not
used to it and if we had not distributed common ground station
programs to do interoperable analysis of it, and we did not
have the wherewithal to use such information, we would have
been dead.
Senator Allard. Talk to me a little bit about the
institutional barriers, the stovepiping and that kind of thing
that may add to complications.
Secretary Stenbit. I want to refer that to General Newbold,
but my view is that the ISR assets, whether they are Service by
Service or whether they are space or air or under the water or
on top of the water, or whether they are intelligence or not,
are actually being used in an integrated way. There is a
process that is run by General Newbold that tiers those assets
between that which is appropriately done at the theater level
and that which is more appropriately looked at at a higher
level.
Actually, my personal observation is, given that we do not
have enough of some of the things we would like to have, the
allocation is done through a process which General Newbold is
responsible for that looks to me like it works pretty well. It
is not that we do not have disagreements, but there is a good
management process to work them out.
Senator Allard. Lieutenant General Newbold.
General Newbold. Sir, I think the point is a very valid
one. I think stovepiping seems to be human nature and we have
to overcome cultural obstacles that lead to that dynamic. I
think we are doing a good job of that. Things like Goldwater-
Nichols made a step toward the cultural shift by making people
understand things beyond their realm.
We have to go beyond that as well. We slowly adapt to the
potential of new systems and platforms. Predator is a good
example but there are other ones. I would like to think that
with the advent of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the way in
which we support the warfighter encourages people to break down
some of these barriers within the Department of Defense that
would mean that the information does not get to the warfighter
as rapidly as they might.
I would submit as well, sir, that outside the Department of
Defense, particularly with some of the other agencies in town,
we have probably been more integrated than we ever have been in
the past. Not good enough yet, very clearly, but I am in nearly
daily communication with the Central Intelligence Agency, as an
example. But I or my people are also in daily communication
with the FAA, with the FBI, and the alphabet soup of other
agencies. We are growing in this, but I think I would be
dishonest if I did not say that those stovepipes still exist to
some degree.
Senator Allard. Let me move to commercial imagery. This
year there was a proposal to include additional funding for
commercial imagery in the budget request. I am concerned that
perhaps we are not committed enough to going ahead with the
commercial side as to what is happening in NIMA. It seems to me
a fair amount of that can be contracted out. Does the
administration still believe that encouraging the development
of second generation commercial imagery satellites is
important? Then the follow-up question would be, do you think
these satellites could represent a useful ISR capability?
Secretary Stenbit. Let me start from the budget request. We
have come to the conclusion--which is not quite the question
you asked, but let me at least say where we were--we would like
to take value-added products from the industrial base that use
commercial imagery as their source, as opposed to using our
imagery as their source, and not do this middle-man thing,
which is buy the picture and then hand it to somebody else to
make a map.
So where we are headed with the money that is on the table,
and I believe that NIMA is with the program, is we are moving
towards using the commercial imagery base as the source for
value-added products, which are basically maps, charts, the
TPED data base, and the program which I can never remember the
old acronym nor the new one, but it is basically the
computerized representation of the earth.
It has turned out as well that some of the images coming
from commercial satellites have been used for ISR purposes as
well. So, that has been an interesting surge capability, but I
think that probably is not the long-term stable way to use the
industrial base. Now, do they need a second generation set of
imagery satellites in order to provide the maps with the
precision that we need is a technical issue? Certainly at the
level where we have the job today, we can already do it with
the existing systems.
So, we are going to count on the existing systems being at
least as good as and perhaps better into the future in order to
accomplish this goal of having the value-added services come
from commercial satellites.
Senator Allard. Are you talking about the existing systems
within NIMA or existing commercial systems?
Secretary Stenbit. No, no, no, existing commercial systems.
Maybe I over-listened to what you said.
Senator Allard. No, you are right.
Secretary Stenbit. We do need at least as good as we have
now, but we are fully capable and have processes to accept now,
through a measured process, that somebody can deliver maps at
the required accuracy to meet the NIMA requirements. NIMA is
now prepared to have people bring their processes forward to
evaluate them, to do the quality control, and then take the
maps from those people. So what we are trying to do is to get
the people that do the processing of the images to make the
maps or the charts, buy the commercial images from the
companies, and that we end up with the maps. Because that is
what we are after. We are after the maps, not necessarily the
picture.
That is where we are headed. That is the plan. We have a
lot of money programmed both into the 2003 budget but also into
the out years to really execute on that.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your clarification of your
answer. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. General Newbold,
Senator Allard in his opening comments touched upon the issue
of these low-density, high-demand assets, for example JSTARS
and other systems. Could you outline for us which ISR platforms
were classified or would be classified as low-density, high-
demand during Operation Enduring Freedom?
General Newbold. Yes sir, the fact that we are using them
in Operation Enduring Freedom leads them to have a global
deficiency, so we look at it globally. Among those platforms,
the two that trouble me the most are the AWACS and the U-2. The
AWACS because, frankly we did not anticipate we would need 15
AWACS in the defense of the continental United States. We have
been fortunate to have the NATO AWACS supplement our
requirements there.
In the case of the U-2, it is not so much the platforms as
the crews that are in short supply. We are about to alleviate
that stress to some degree by bringing some of those assets
home. We have other platforms that are in a surge or in fact
even beyond the surge stage, above max-surge stage. They
include things like the Rivet Joint aircraft, the RC-135.
We have used more Predator systems than we had available at
the beginning of the conflict. Of course, Global Hawk is still
a developmental system, so the fact that it is deployed in a
developmental status is straining the system. Other platforms
include JSTARS, EP-3s, all of them used in innovative ways,
non-traditional ways, in deployments that have exceeded the
peacetime metrics. That is a main point I would like to
emphasize in my response.
When we establish metrics for low-density, high-demand
assets we did it to be able to sustain the deployment of these
assets during peacetime. So while our terminology is that we
are above a surge capacity in those, in wartime the pilots, the
maintainers, those that source them like a Service, and in fact
the warfighting CINCs, all recognize that in wartime much of
the traditional terminology that applies to surge status does
not apply anymore.
We have been able to maintain aircraft beyond our
expectations, probably through the hard work of individuals. We
have been able to keep assets deployed and people deployed more
than we would on a peacetime basis. Over time, this will all
cause us to pay a price.
Fortunately, we have some more platforms that have been
either requested, sir, that you have authorized, and over time
will have less strain on the system. Of course, rising
expectations may mean more requirements, but in essence we have
a complete spectrum of assets that are in surge status. We are
managing those and we will change the way we distribute these
in the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, following on the
General's comments, over time you are going to have to develop
a plan to address these surge assets. Could you give us an idea
of your thinking in that regard now?
Secretary Stenbit. There is actually quite a lot of
activity, as I said, in the fiscal year 2003 budget and also in
the planning for the out years, where in each of the cases that
we were faced with in the Defense Emergency Reserve Fund (DERF)
request and in the supplemental request and then the fiscal
year 2003 budget, many of these kinds of questions come up
about do we buy more of the old ones or do we get on with
transforming to the new ones? We did our best to come to those
kinds of conclusions.
For instance, in the Rivet Joint case, the JCS wanted two
of the old ones as fast as possible. We, not for bureaucratic
reasons but I think for good sound reasons, split the baby in
half and bought one old one and said the first new one is going
to get there as fast as possible. That then begs the question
about what platform does it go on? Is the platform the same for
the Navy and the Air Force or can they be on different
platforms?
Those issues are really very vigorously under debate at the
present moment. There is no question in anybody's mind that we
are going to recapitalize the aircraft carriers of the ISR, and
it will be a commercial system that has commercial kinds of
maintenance and support issues. So we are not talking about
whether we are going to build one or use a commercial version.
Is it a 767? Is it a 737? Is it two of them? How does that go?
What is the relation to the tankers, et cetera?
Those are very real questions that cannot be answered
instantaneously. But from my point of view, in the how do you
put the things inside those airplanes that make them work, we
have some major issues that we have been moving forward for a
while. One is an upgraded radar which is called RTIP, and that
is programmed to go into Global Hawks and other platforms and
in the new ones as well.
In the airborne SIGINT world we had a failure in the low-
band subsystem and we are currently running a competition
between the Army and the Air Force to determine which will be
the lead Service to go get that thing back on track. But we do
have a high-band system that can be the basis of an
architecture to move forward. So, we are moving forward as the
requirements are moving and as the platform choices are being
made to make sure that there are the appropriate sensors and
communications that go in those aircraft.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me ask one more
question and then turn to Senator Allard for his round. General
Newbold, I understand that the Services are the organizations
which nominate these systems or these platforms to go on the
list of low-density, high-demand assets. As a result, I am also
told that the EP-3, which you mentioned, is not on the formal
list, which raises the question: Are the Services the
appropriate entities to make these nominations? Might it not be
the CINCs or might it not be some other agency within the
Department of Defense that could better do that?
General Newbold. I'd like to provide a couple of comments
in response. One of them is a very specific one, sir, and that
is on the EP-3. The EP-3 has been nominated recently by the
Navy to be an HD/LD platform.
But the essence of your question is do we have a central
authority who will look more broadly to establish what is in
short supply or not? It could be, as a matter of fact I would
submit, that it probably is the Joint Staff who has to take a
more active role in management. In truth we have since
September 11, sir.
We need to formalize the expanded role that we have
undertaken since then. The Services will always have an
appropriate role in that. They have texture that we do not to
the wear and tear on individuals because, sir, what goes into
establishing the strain on a system is not only the degree to
which we can sustain the platform, but the air crews. Beyond
the air crews to the maintainers of the aircraft. For example,
on the U-2 when we will upgrade the sensor package, and on the
RC-135 when we will complete the engine rebuilds on those or
replacement of the engines on that.
So, I think it is a combination, sir. The Services have a
role that we cannot duplicate. We need to take a more active
role in defining the requirements from the CINCs, and probably
in a collaborative way, sir, we will come up with a better
system.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Where do you see the gaps in our ISR
capabilities; and apply those to your fiscal year 2003 budget
proposal. Where do you think the greatest shortfall might be in
the fiscal year 2003 budget proposal? Lieutenant General
Newbold, it looks like you are first.
General Newbold. Yes, sir, I noticed that.
Senator Reed. You have been nominated.
General Newbold. The gaps--I am an authority--probably a
surprise sir, first of all I'd like to mention something and
then I will get to the detailed question as it relates to the
ISR platforms. HUMINT, human intelligence, probably preoccupies
my thoughts as much as any platform. I think there have been
some notable improvements, and the Secretary of Defense has
some initiatives under way to improve DOD capabilities in that
regard. But, to supplement the enormously expanded capabilities
we have in the air, space, and ground-based technology, there
are some things we cannot accomplish, and human intelligence in
that regard, native or U.S., has to be a robust capability.
So, the obvious one beyond that in the technological realm
is the UAV. A grand success story, not only in Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, but of course before that
going all the way back to the Persian Gulf War and to the Iraq
units that surrendered to one to Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo with the first use of the Predator. They have been
invaluable in Afghanistan.
Gaps and seams result from the paucity, the relative
scarceness of those. That is being addressed, but there is a
significant demand from the other combatant commanders in chief
for UAVs in their areas, whether they are European Command,
Southern Command, Pacific Command, and in fact in the United
States. So, I would call the UAVs a gap which is being
corrected.
I would say that some of the satellite platforms, the
fragility of that system concerns me a bit, sir. The airborne
platforms, I think Mr. Stenbit talked about the replacement of
the platforms themselves, not just the systems that go on them.
I would like to start off with those off the top of my head,
sir, and then pass it back.
Senator Allard. Well, I am not at all surprised about your
comments about HUMINT, considering what has happened over the
last 3 or 4 years. But if you look at the 2003 budget, in your
view, what do you think are the key shortfalls that we have,
and please just pull one out that strikes you as perhaps a
mistake that we should better fund.
General Newbold. Sir, the 2003 budget is addressing
adequately things like the UAVs. As a matter of fact, I think
Admiral Szemborski will tell you that the production line is at
capacity with the 2003 expectations. Frankly, sir, I think the
2003 budget has done a good job of addressing the shortfalls in
a reasonable way. Applying more money to some of the systems
would not result in a cure.
On the HUMINT side, the problem there, as you know better
than I do, is the time it takes to grow capability. Although
money is applied, it can take up to 5 years to have a
reasonable expectation of a good capability on the ground.
Senator Allard. We understand there is increased funding
for UAVs, and also DOD has created a UAV planning task force.
Can you share with this subcommittee the charter of this task
force and what do you expect it to achieve?
General Newbold. I am going to see if Admiral Szemborski is
looking my way, sir. Stan, are you?
Admiral Szemborski. Yes, let me start out by saying in the
area of ISR, several years ago the JROC commissioned the ISR
JWCA team to conduct a study called the Joint Airborne
Reconnaissance Assessment. That assessment was completed before
September 11, but the primary recommendations out of that
assessment were that 18 Rivet Joints and 16 EP-3s are required
to really source our assessment of what we needed in those
areas. That was the primary recommendation.
Between what was submitted in the fiscal year 2002
supplementals and the fiscal year 2003 budget, we have
submitted requests for those platforms to come on line. Now we
are in the process of reassessing that entire study right now,
post-September 11. We expect that that study will be completed
around the July time frame.
Now as far as UAVs go in this task force, there is a task
force that has been formed by OSD in C\3\I to start that and we
have teamed our JROC members with that study so that we can
together assess where, from an operational and a technical
standpoint, we can go with UAVs in the future. We are very much
with C\3\I in that effort and expect in the next several months
we will be able to come up with some conclusions from it.
Secretary Stenbit. It is not only C\3\I, it is AT&L as
well, because basically they worry about the platforms and we
worry about what goes in them. But to get to your first
question, in my opening statement I told you what I thought the
big gap was, which is we have failed to spend money to
recapitalize the depreciation on new ways to steal secrets.
There is quite a list that is inappropriate at the open level
to go through, but in the fiscal year 2003 budget and with some
kicking off earlier in fiscal year 2002 through the DERF, we
really did fund some of these new ideas. I would be happy to
talk about that in a slightly different context.
Almost all of the decisions on which I participated in the
fiscal year 2003 budget came--went and looked down these
items--some of them where we needed more of what we already
have, we have talked about some of those. There were some
satellite cases that have gone into the DSRP where the Defense
Department felt that we needed more than what would have
naturally have come out of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), for instance. We put the money in for those.
In the case of--whether it was UAVs or whether it was some
of these other new systems, we really took a hard look at what
would it take to do a reasonably aggressive program, but not be
getting ourselves into too much of an over-hasty view of what
we could accomplish. There is a lot of effort moving into
addressing shortfalls in the sources of information.
But I must second what General Newbold said about the human
aspects, and I am not talking about the analyst part and I am
not only talking about people out in embassies and doing
spying. There are a lot of things that we need to be doing with
people on the ground that we have not done as much as we should
have. That is another big area where there is funding provided.
Senator Allard. The Chairman has been very gracious with my
time and I appreciate that. I want to wrap up with this
question: You talked about your interest in maps as opposed to
images, and my question is how will we get these commercial
products without commercial imagery satellites? Are we going to
be using satellites that are built and operated by American
companies or foreign companies? How do we establish that?
Secretary Stenbit. We cannot do it without the commercial
satellites. The intent is that the infrastructure of people
that NIMA has and their rather broad base of contractors who
can, in fact, manipulate images to do maps. They used to do
that by taking our pictures and doing it.
What we are trying to do is to get them to go to Iconos and
the newly launched one, which I forget the name of, which are
both American-based and get their source material from those
two companies. So the answer is yes, we definitely need the
commercial imagery sources to do what I said. What we are
trying to do is not buy the pictures and hand it to somebody,
but let them buy the pictures.
Senator Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. We have now
concluded the open session of the hearing. The record will
remain open until close of business Monday for any questions
for the record that any members may wish to submit. We will
adjourn and reconvene in S-407 in 10 minutes. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson

CYBER ASSET PROTECTION

1. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Stenbit, we have learned that
China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and other nations are attempting to
develop cyber-attack capabilities that could threaten our military's
information technology on which many of our surveillance assets are
based. Where do we stand on development of a more robust system to
protect these assets and what is in this year's budget request that
will help get us there?
Secretary Stenbit. A cyber-attack on our military's information
technology would not affect our surveillance assets. The systems that
control the surveillance operations are tightly controlled and
completely isolated from any outside connection that could provide a
cyber-attack access to the system. In addition, the actual control
links are encrypted with NSA approved, Type 1 cryptography, and
commands are authenticated. During platform development, there is a
significant system security engineering effort between NSA and NRO to
make sure that all avenues of attack, including cyber-attack, are
addressed and countermeasures developed.
A cyber-attack on our military's information technology, though,
would affect the ability to process, analyze, and report information
collected from these assets. We have a number of efforts underway to
develop protection, as well as detection, technology to help us address
these concerns. Our Information Assurance and Information Operations
programs are addressing just these issues. The Department is
modernizing the strongest encryption technology to keep pace with the
rapid changes in information technology. Network sensor development and
deployment is helping us identify attacks before they cause us damage.
Pervasive use of our defense-in-depth strategy, constructing defenses
and safeguards in successive layers, is improving our protection from
cyber-attack.
Overall funding in the fiscal year 2003 President's budget for
Computer Network Defense programs has increased more than 50 percent
compared to fiscal year 2001. Cyber-attack prevention is one of the
Department's highest priorities, which presents a formidable challenge.
We will continue to work at meeting these challenges head-on.

BANDWIDTH CAPABILITIES

2. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Stenbit, we need equipment that
allows us to locate and maintain surveillance of the enemy while
preserving American lives. It appears that a limiting factor in ISR
equipment is bandwidth, as it was in Kosovo in 1999. We have the
technology for the sensors, the surveillance platforms, and the
munitions but the real problem is bandwidth, which has been hindered by
a slowing satellite industry. What are we doing to increase our
bandwidth capabilities and does this budget support increasing those
capabilities?
Secretary Stenbit. The 2003 budget contains significant investments
in laser-based communications, both on the ground and in space, to
create a ubiquitous, trustworthy, dependable network where bandwidth is
not a constraint for users. The Global Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth
Expansion program will provide some key DOD sites with very wideband
terrestrial-based capability starting in fiscal year 2003. When
completed in fiscal year 2004, this initiative will provide assured,
high bandwidth terrestrial network access to DOD's highest priority
locations. The transformational communications satellites will provide
the space-based part of this optical network. These investments, along
with investments in Wideband Gap-filler and Extended Tether Program
will ensure that bandwidth is not a limiting factor in ISR collection,
processing, or dissemination capabilities in the future.

RIVET JOINT

3. Senator Ben Nelson. General Newbold, precision engagement
technology and ISR assets rely heavily on the RC-135 (Rivet Joint) as
well as other platforms. We await delivery of Rivet Joint numbers 17
and 18 as well as their trainers. Does this budget support the high
demand for this air frame?
General Newbold. Yes. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget
request, the fiscal year 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the U.S., and
fiscal year 2002 Defense Budget provide significant investments in the
RC-135 fleet. When taken together, these investments will yield long-
term operational benefits and solve systemic training deficiencies.
Consistent with the findings of the 2000 Joint Airborne
Reconnaissance Assessment (JARA) and a subsequent Air Force report, the
Department requested funding for two additional Rivet Joints in the
first Combating Terrorism Supplemental. Congress agreed to the
acquisition of one additional RC-135. Rivet Joint number 17 has been
funded and is under construction. In addition to this welcome fleet
increase, additional training resources were also fully funded. These
training resources include one additional TC-135 training aircraft and
a new full-motion simulator for flight crew training.
The resulting fleet of Rivet Joint aircraft will be 17 RC-135
mission aircraft and 3 training aircraft. The RC-135 program to re-
engine aircraft should provide additional capacity. In the meantime, we
will carefully manage the distribution of RC-135 aircraft to meet CINC
demands.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m, the subcommittee adjourned.]