[Senate Hearing 107-708]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-708
AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY,
AVOIDING CHAOS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 26, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State, Department
of State, Washington, DC....................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 2
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 63
Grange, Brig. Gen. David L., U.S. Army (Ret.), Chicago, IL....... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Tomsen, Hon. Peter, Special Envoy to Afghanistan (1989-1992) and
former Ambassador to Armenia, ambassador-in-residence,
University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE..................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense, Washington, DC........................................ 8
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Responses to additional questions for the record submitted by
Senator Biden.............................................. 63
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY, AVOIDING CHAOS
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Wellstone, Boxer, Bill Nelson,
Lugar, Hagel, Chafee and Allen.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. We
have two very distinguished witnesses in our first panel, and I
will get to that in just a moment. I would ask unanimous
consent, in the interest of time, that my formal statement be
placed in the record at this moment as if read. Let me just
very, very, very, very briefly summarize it, because I want to
have as much opportunity to get to the issue of discussing
Afghanistan with our first two witnesses.
Whenever anyone asks me about Afghanistan, and whether or
not we should be there, and should we expand the force, and so
on, I always say, ``Everybody ought to try to think back why
did we go in the first place. Why did we go in the first
place?'' Interestingly enough, I think, as usual, the American
people are way ahead of the political leaders in both parties,
the administration, the Congress throughout the country, in
that in a recent Gallup poll, 80 percent think the United
States should keep troops in Afghanistan, while 16 percent of
the U.S. population thinks we should take the troops out. The
bottom line is, they understand why we went in the first place.
What I want to examine today, because I have had, and I
want to say it publicly, absolute cooperation, as chairman of
this committee, from the State Department and from the White
House. I do not interface as well, and I always--anything with
Secretary Wolfowitz has always been responded to, but I do not
interface with Defense as much in my capacity as chairman of
this committee. But two things have emerged, and I just want to
give the witnesses a heads-up of the direction I would like to
take this hearing.
I know I am a broken record to both of them about the need
to expand the international security force. It seems as though
we have replaced the strategy--not replaced; we have, instead
of a strategy of an international security force being extended
beyond Kabul, that we basically have, my phrase, not yours, a
warlord strategy, which is, if there is peace and calm in any
of the four major sectors of Afghanistan, even though it is
imposed by and/or is primarily accountable to the fact that a
warlord is in charge, that--that constitutes stability.
I also want to talk about the time needed to buildup an
all-Afghan army and police force, its status, its personnel,
its timing. Because as I understand the basic underlying
premise of the administration, one that I do not disagree with,
is that there is a need to have a central government, have a
security force that is made up of all factions, all of the
major tribes represented in Afghanistan, and a police force,
and that the notion would be that they would be the ultimate
stabilizers of a government.
But there is sometimes, as my grandmother would say,
something missed between the cup and the lip, and we have to
get to that point. How long is it going to take us to get to
that point, what kind of progress are we making to get to that
point, and what is the structure for stability in the meantime?
That is what I want to talk about today.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Over the past half-year we have achieved great battlefield success
in Afghanistan. Our servicemen and servicewomen have defeated the
Taliban, and gotten al-Qaeda on the run. We haven't yet captured bin
Laden, but I'm confident that we'll achieve this goal.
As we reach the next stage in the war, several questions arise:
What is status ongoing operations against al-Qaeda presence in
Afghanistan? What is the humanitarian situation? What is our assessment
of the loya jirga process?
Perhaps the most important question, however, is one of commitment:
Will we stay the course and build security in Afghanistan, or will we
permit this country to relapse into chaos?
President Bush has often promised that America will lead the way in
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. His April reference to the Marshall
Plan was particularly apt: After World War II, America used its
soldiers as peacekeepers and its dollars as peacebuilders.
This may have been the wisest investment of the past century: We
turned our most bitter foes into our staunchest allies.
But if we're going to talk about a new Marshall Plan, we should be
willing to back up our words with deeds.
The original Marshall Plan cost $90 billion in today's dollars. Our
total pledge for Afghan reconstruction is less than 1 percent of that,
and we've only delivered a fraction of this pledge.
All the money in the world, however, won't do much good without
security. Absent that, any reconstruction funds will be siphoned into
the pockets of greedy warlords. And that, in fact, is exactly what
we're seeing right now.
In Mazar-e Sharif recently, a U.N. worker was gang-raped by seven
armed men--in a part of the country controlled by two warlords, one of
whom serves as the government's Deputy Defense Minister.
In the eastern portion of the country, a warlord named Bacha Khan
seized control of an entire province in April, and still stands in open
defiance of the legitimate government in Kabul.
In Herat, the warlord Ismail Khan has invited Iranian agents to
help him consolidate power, while reports of human rights abuses
skyrocket.
What do these cases--typical of the situation throughout the
country--have in common? These warlords are all on the U.S. payroll.
Maybe I'm missing something here, but I just don't think this makes
sense. Asking warlords to uphold law and order is like asking the Cali
cocaine cartel to be our partners in the drug war.
Warlords aren't the solution to Afghanistan's problems--they're the
cause of Afghanistan's problems.
The long-term solution is to rebuild Afghanistan's army and police
force--but that can't happen overnight.
In the meantime--at least a year, and probably longer--there are
only three alternatives:
Use American troops as peacekeepers. Build up a robust
international force. Or let Afghanistan revert to chaos.
U.S. forces seem to be involved in de facto peacekeeping right now.
Wouldn't it be better to clarify the mission, and let our allies share
the burden?
Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and
nearly every expert on the region has called for expansion of the U.N.-
mandated security force, ISAF, both in scope and tenure. In my view,
this is clearly in our national interest. We should view ISAF as a
force-multiplier.
Without U.S. or U.N. peacekeepers, we're left with the third
option: letting Afghanistan degenerate into the state of lawlessness
that made way for the Taliban. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989,
America turned its back as the country disintegrated.
President Bush has rightly promised not to repeat this mistake. If
we fail to uphold the President's promise, Afghanistan will again
become a den of terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and exporters of
violent insurgency.
One other factor makes such a failure unacceptable to our national
interest: Afghanistan is a test case for Iraq.
Anyone who wants to see Saddam Hussein removed from power in Iraq--
as I do--will be looking very closely at the administration's game plan
in Afghanistan. Simply put, if we can't demonstrate long-term
commitment in Afghanistan, nobody will trust us to make a long-term
commitment in Iraq.
Ousting Saddam, like ousting the Taliban, is only the first step in
a long process. Everyone knows we can remove an evil regime. The
question is, are we willing to expend the security, financial,
diplomatic, and political resources to make the successor regime a
success?
The U.S. has power--but do we have staying power?
We have with us today several highly distinguished witnesses.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has recently returned
from a mission to South Asia, where he successfully averted a nuclear
war--not bad for a few days' work.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has been one of the
administration's leading architects of strategic planning for
Afghanistan; I am particularly looking forward to his detailed
discussion of these plans for assuring Afghan security in the months to
come.
Ambassador Peter Tomsen knows the political landscape of
Afghanistan inside-out. As special envoy to Afghanistan for the
previous President Bush, he dealt with many of today's power-brokers
long before they had any real power to broker. He is currently
ambassador-in-residence at the University of Nebraska, Omaha.
Brig. Gen. David Grange earned three Silver Stars and two Purple
Hearts during his service in Vietnam, and has served in Delta Force,
Ranger and other Special Operations units during his 30-year military
career. As commander of Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, he is particularly
well-equipped to comment on U.S. participation in peacemaking
operations.
Up to now, the administration's plan has seemed to focus on the
hope that warlords, if properly motivated with cash and weapons, will
become reliable partners for peace.
But as Secretary of State Powell once said, in his capacity as a
military planner, ``Hope is not a strategy.''
Perhaps today's hearing will give us a clearer picture of the
strategy underlying this hope.
The Chairman. I am anxious to hear from both our witnesses,
and with that, I will yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
would like to join you in welcoming Deputy Secretary of State
Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to this
committee. I look forward to their testimony and reviewing with
them Afghanistan's prospects for the future.
I am hopeful that we are witnessing the emergence of a free
and stable Afghanistan from more than two decades of war and
instability, but it is clear that at least for the foreseeable
future, Afghanistan's evolution will be marked by both advances
and setbacks. And since the commencement of offensive military
operations in Afghanistan, I have urged the administration to
think simultaneously about what steps will be necessary to
rebuild the nation after the Taliban and al-Qaeda were removed.
I was pleased that, early on, President Bush stated that
the United States would, and I quote, ``Not just simply leave
after the military objective has been achieved.'' The
administration correctly recognized that, without providing the
people of Afghanistan with an environment in which the
construction of a democracy and market-based economy was not
only possible, but likely, the country would remain a source of
insecurity and terror.
The United States' international efforts have permitted the
people of Afghanistan to begin rebuilding their economy, their
government, and personal liberties, and I applaud the role that
the international coalition has played in carrying out the
reconstruction efforts, and the provision of humanitarian
assistance. Unfortunately, despite this strong record of
success, the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain. Without a
strong international commitment to the reformation of a
representative and effective government, our efforts could go
to waste.
The loya jirga recently completed its work, selected Hamid
Karzai to be President. Karzai continues to construct a broad-
based representational government to rule Afghanistan. Pundits
here in Washington and around the world are debating the
criteria employed in selecting cabinet members of the new
government, and it is clear to most that the current security
situation in Afghanistan was the primary determination in the
selection process.
I am supportive of efforts underway to expand training and
equip a new Afghan national army. A successful transformation
is one of the most important elements of long-term security,
but in the meantime I continue to be concerned that the
International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, may not be up to
the task of ensuring the requisite amount of security for
Afghan reconstruction to continue.
The ability of ISAF to maintain peace and security, and to
project power into the farthest region of Afghanistan, is
vitally important if the international community is to assist
Karzai in enforcing the rule of law, and defending the threat
posed by extremists, warlords, and terrorists. Only then can we
replace Afghanistan's despair with a genuine future of hope.
Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts have benefited, for
the moment, from the capture of major al-Qaeda operatives as
well as the dispersal of other major players around the world.
Their likely strategy is to prepare and to undertake suicidal
attacks against Western and Jewish targets, especially in Arab
states allied with the West, while larger operations are
prepared for the United States, such as the so-called ``dirty
bomb'' plots.
Though relatively small and widely dispersed, the al-Qaeda
strikes appear to be coordinated by a senior group of leaders.
In short, al-Qaeda's command structure may have survived the
United States' military campaign in Afghanistan, even though
its base in the country was eliminated.
Instances like the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue and
French and American targets in Karachi do not have the profile
or drama of past military clashes in Afghanistan, but al-Qaeda
attacks are likely to occur at any time and almost anywhere,
including Afghanistan. Countering them has become as much a
task for police and intelligence as a military operation. Help
from other governments, especially in the Islamic world, is
vital, as is effective monitoring of potential targets,
including infrastructure and weapon sources.
We know that a substantial number of al-Qaeda operatives
managed to escape Afghanistan, and travel undetected, at least,
at first, to countries around the region. We also believe a
substantial number will look for opportunities to infiltrate
back into Afghanistan. Most seriously, the alleged plot
involving Jose Padilla, the alleged al-Qaeda recruit arrested
in Chicago, has the evidence that al-Qaeda is determined to
strike with weapons of mass destruction, and is actively
seeking to procure or steal them.
It is that concern that has led a number of us to recommend
to the Bush administration that the United States formulate a
new global coalition designed to keep nuclear and bioweapons
out of the hands of al-Qaeda and other terrorists. In short,
Afghanistan is not out of the woods yet, any more than
terrorist threats to the United States involving weapons of
mass destruction have lessened since September 11.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the
United States can assist in bridging the gap in ISAF's
abilities and capabilities, and the threats posed to Karzai's
young and still fragile government, even as the Bush
administration focuses on preventing terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I might note that there are a number of people in the
audience who have been keenly interested in this subject. Among
them, as working with the President, have been women's groups
in the United States, who have testified before this committee
about the security question, and today the Feminist Majority,
now the Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in
Afghanistan, and NOW Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund, and
the Equality NOW, are all represented here in the audience, and
have importuned this committee and this chairman on occasion,
and I am sure they have at the State Department. I know they
have spoken with the Secretary.
Today's paper, the New York Times, and other major papers
are full of stories relative to the assertiveness of women in
Afghanistan, taking significant risks to make sure they do not
go back to the Dark Ages that they just came out of. So I
welcome them and others that are here today.
We have two very distinguished witnesses. Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage recently returned from a mission in
South Asia, where he successfully averted a nuclear war. Not
bad for a few day's work. You did a hell of a job, Rich;
congratulations. I want to state again publicly, I think the
administration, and you in particular, played a very
significant role in diffusing the single most dangerous
circumstance that exists at the moment.
We also have Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
who has been one of the administration's leading architects of
strategic planning for Afghanistan. I am particularly looking
forward to his discussions on plans for sharing security in the
months to come, and I want to thank him again, not only for his
being publicly available, but privately available whenever we
have sought, or I have sought, at least, any information from
him.
I invite you to make any comments you wish in your
statements, and do not worry about the clock. We are anxious to
hear what you have to say. So as fully as you think you need to
speak, please feel free. Do not worry about these lights going
on. They will go on for us, not for you. Mr. Secretary, you can
begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
Senators.
Paul and I have, in our professional lives, spent a
considerable amount of time in this very room in front of this
panel, and we have come to realize, at least I have, that the
patience of the committee is in inverse proportion to the
length of my opening statement. So I am going to keep it very
short, and I know you will allow me to have my comments
submitted for the record.
I just thought I would mention briefly the winners and the
losers in the recent loya jirga, and what is left to do. I
think the winners, first of all, are pretty easy to enumerate:
the Afghan people and, particularly, women. This committee--the
whole Congress, but this committee in particular, has been very
interested in all the women in Afghanistan. I think the
newspaper article in the New York Times, to which you referred,
Mr. Chairman, is witness to the fact that in 6 months' time,
women have gone from being held basically in contempt in Afghan
society to a role where they felt secure enough to take part in
a very robust and boisterous loya jirga. So the Afghan people,
and women in particular, are the first winners.
Second, Hamid Karzai is clearly a winner. He is a much
better politician than any of us knew 6 months ago, and he
managed competing pressures very, very well. He has to be
considered in the winner's category.
Another is a Tajik by the name of Fahid Khan, who is the
First Vice President and still the Minister of Defense. He
would have to be considered to have come out a winner.
Fourth, the international community has been a winner,
because we have been part of, thus far, what is a great success
story, and I think it far outstripped in pace any ideas that
any of the pundits had about the ability to resolve the
questions of Afghanistan in anywhere near this rapid timeframe.
The fifth winner are the coalition forces. Primary among
them, of course, the United States and the ISAF, because in the
minds of many in Afghanistan, there is not much difference
between the coalition and ISAF. And we are the ones who made it
possible for the Afghan people to eschew the role of the gun
and the rule of the gun.
Now, who are the losers? Well, I think you have to
consider, at least in the short term, that the conservatives
are the losers. They lost some serious altitude during the loya
jirga. They were boisterous. There was some intimidation, or at
least attempts at it, mostly verbal, but they lost ground.
The second people who lost ground were some of the families
of Zahir Shah, who envisioned a much greater role, a more
active role for the former king, and they did not have their
dreams realized.
I think, third, one has to realize that there are some in
the Pushtun community who feel that they lost ground, or they
did not command as many portfolios as they might have hoped.
There is a lot of misinformation in the public about what the
makeup of Afghan society really is. In percentage terms, we
have not had a census since 1979, so any numbers that anybody
talks about are extrapolations from 1979. We do not know what
percentage the Pushtuns or the Tajiks really have in the
overall population, but I think it is fair to say that some in
the Pushtun community are a little disappointed.
Now, what is left for President Karzai to do? Well, I
think, first and most importantly, he has to consolidate the
instruments of power and he has to extend them out into the
countryside to get to the very thing you mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, and that is warlords and warlordism.
Second, I think Afghanistan's society has to come to grips
with the role of Islam in their nation. Do they envision
themselves as a Turkey, or a Pakistan, or what? And I think
that is a debate that we are going to see and witness as we
move to the future.
Finally, Mr. Karzai and the 29 ministers who make up his
cabinet have to very definitely be seen in relatively rapid
fashion, not only formulating a constitution to be voted on in
about 18 months, but to be able to extend the fruits of the
international community's largesse, particularly in terms of
reconstruction aid to far-flung areas in Afghanistan. Those are
three pretty big challenges for any cabinet and any President.
Mr. Chairman, I will stop there, and turn it over to my
colleague and friend, Paul Wolfowitz.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Armitage follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of
State
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the
Committee on recent developments in Afghanistan. We have a good story
to tell. For hope is returning to Afghanistan. It is no longer the
country it was on September 11--a haven for terrorists, suffering from
tragic social decline and serious abuses of human rights, especially
women's rights.
There is still much work to be done but, as President Bush has
emphasized, the United States is committed to Afghanistan for the long
haul. We will continue to work closely with the international community
to help the Afghans help themselves in building a stable, broadly
representative Afghanistan that can never again be a haven for
terrorists.
Our focus in Afghanistan continues to be on conducting the war on
terrorism, putting in place security arrangements, fostering
Afghanistan's internal governance, and providing humanitarian and
development assistance.
Let me briefly review each in turn.
The war on terrorism is based on bringing the international
community's combined strengths to bear against terrorism in its many
manifestations throughout the world. In Afghanistan, Operation Enduring
Freedom is not over and will not be finished until the last remnants of
al-Qaida and the Taliban are flushed out and destroyed. Still, we are
already taking up the tasks that will ensure that Afghanistan is never
again a base for terrorism.
With respect to security arrangements, the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) is performing a very positive role by helping
provide security in and around Kabul--through joint patrols with local
police; security for special events, such as the loya jirga; and the
rehabilitation and operation of Kabul International Airport. ISAF
includes some 5,000 troops from 19 countries, with Turkey having
recently taken the lead from the United Kingdom.
The backbone of Afghanistan's future security structure must be the
new Afghan National Army (ANA). The United States has taken the lead,
working closely with ISAF, the French, and other coalition partners, in
training and equipping troops for the ANA. Germany has the lead, with
United States and other international assistance, on developing a
viable police force.
Afghanistan has also made large strides in opening up its politics
and improving its governance. The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), which
governed for the six months before the loya jirga, was a multi-ethnic,
broadly representative government that succeeded in establishing a
basis for a central government that will remain responsive to the will
of the Afghan people.
The AIA ably performed the role that the Bonn Agreement laid out
for it. It was responsible for many successes, such as reopening
schools, including schools that educate girls; putting in place the
starting points for building national security institutions;
establishing judicial and human rights commissions; reintegrating women
and ethnic minorities into society; and announcing and beginning to
implement a ban on opium cultivation and harvesting. We will continue
to work with the Afghan Transitional Administration to protect the
rights of women and encourage their effective participation in civic
life.
Significant progress has also been made in creating an inclusive
political process that generates incentives for groups and individuals
to give up armed struggle for political goals. The Emergency loya jirga
began the process of healing the country's wounds by bringing together
Afghans from all ethnic groups, religions, and political persuasions to
discuss Afghanistan's future. It elected Chairman Karzai to continue to
lead Afghanistan for the next two years, the cabinet has been selected,
and steps have been taken toward creating a National Assembly.
Nonetheless, the road ahead is long, as demonstrated by the sharp
political disputes at the loya jirga and continuing concerns about the
security of international assistance workers, particularly in northern
Afghanistan.
There has also been progress in meeting the humanitarian needs of
Afghans and beginning the process of reconstruction, but gaps remain.
The new Transitional Authority faces major challenges, beginning with
the need to fill the gap between needs and pledged resources. The
Afghan government predicts a $390 million budgetary shortfall this
year.
The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP estimate
reconstruction needs of $1.7 billion over the next year, while
humanitarian and security assistance needs could raise this figure to
$2.9 billion. The long term costs of this project over the next five
years are going to be tremendous, perhaps as much as $10 billion.
Refugees are returning at a faster rate than expected--more than
one million to date, with up to two million expected by the end of the
year. While this is a welcome sign of the return of normality, UN and
other agencies tasked with helping refugees and displaced persons are
facing potentially crippling funding shortfalls as the higher refugee
inflow has driven costs faster than predicted.
U.S. contributions to Afghanistan have already exceeded the $297
million pledged earlier this year in Tokyo. Appropriated funds for
fiscal year 2002, plus requested funds for FY 2003 and a $250 million
supplemental request currently before Congress, would boost official
American assistance to over $900 million for FYs 2002 and 2003
combined. This does not include funding for U.S. military operations.
Mr. Chairman, the United States, the Afghan people and the
international community have undertaken an enormous job, but one that I
believe is critical to our national goals and well worth the costs. We
must stay the course, and with your continued support, Mr. Chairman,
and that of this Committee, I am confident we will succeed.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
This distinguished committee has long provided our country
strong leadership and bipartisan support, especially now that
we are waging this war on terrorism, and I thank you for that.
I thank you also for the opportunity to come here today to
discuss the Department of Defense's perspective on how the
campaign in Afghanistan to kill, capture, and disrupt
terrorists has helped us to protect the American people, and
also to discuss how we are helping the Afghan people help
themselves, to ensure that their country does not, once again,
become a terrorist sanctuary.
To chart the way ahead, Mr. Chairman, it is important to
understand how we got to where we are, so let me spend a moment
on the early parts of the military operation. From the
beginning of the war on terrorism, President Bush emphasized
that the United States must apply, as he said, every resource
at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every
financial influence, and the President concluded, every
necessary weapon of war to the destruction and defeat of the
global terror network.
Each of those instruments has a role. Each one reinforces
the other. The military is only one of the instruments that we
need to wage this war on terrorism. The military cannot do its
job without the support of other elements, particularly
intelligence and diplomacy, and its role is frequently to
support the efforts of those other instruments of national
power.
This hearing is focused, and appropriately so, on
Afghanistan and on our military effort there, but it is
important to emphasize, as we have done from the beginning,
that this campaign is not about a single country or a single
terrorist network. Al-Qaeda alone has spread throughout the
world. It is a network. A network by its very nature is based
on the idea that should one node be eliminated, the network can
still continue to function.
Well before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had burrowed into
some 60 countries, including the United States, Germany,
France, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines. It had
critical nodes in Hamburg, Germany, and Jacksonville, Florida,
as well as in Afghanistan. The pilots who flew the suicide
attacks were not trained in Afghanistan. Many got their
training right here in the United States.
So Afghanistan was an important node in the network, but by
its nature, a network does not have a headquarters. So while we
focus on Afghanistan today, we must understand that it is only
one node of that terrorist network. The very name of the
organization, al-Qaeda, which means ``base'' in Arabic,
indicates that the entire organization is the base of terrorist
operations. It is spread throughout the world, and it needs to
be eliminated, root and branch.
In Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda's plots and plans flourished
under the protection of the tyrannical Taliban, America's Armed
Forces went to work to root out both. Our intention, as
Secretary Rumsfeld said, was not only to deprive the terrorists
of a sanctuary in Afghanistan where they could safely plan,
train, and organize, but also to capture and kill terrorists,
and to drain the swamp in which they breed.
Over the last 8 months, with our coalition partners, we
have defeated a vicious regime that gave refuge to evil. We
have killed or captured many of its ringleaders, and we have
others on the run. Even in Afghanistan, however, our work is
far from complete, but we are encouraged by the many truly
remarkable aspects of this campaign to date.
Our military campaign in Afghanistan has had some striking
features, some surprising, others less so. Not surprisingly at
all, we have seen America's men and women in uniform conduct
their operations with great bravery and great skill, as we saw
at Mazar-e-Sharif and Tora Bora, and in Operations Anaconda and
Mountain Lion.
What may have been a surprise to some was the remarkable
speed with which the military plans were put together, the
swift success of the military operations, measured in weeks,
rather than months, and with relatively few troops on the
ground. On September 11, let me remind you, there simply were
no war plans on the shelf for Afghanistan. General Franks was
starting from scratch on September 20, when he received the
order from the President to begin planning a campaign. Less
than 3 weeks later, on October 7, we commenced military
operations, and less than 2 weeks after that, we had troops
operating on the ground with General Dostam in the north. In
many ways, it was a remarkable feat of logistical and
operational utility.
If you would permit me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read
from an actual dispatch that we received from one of those
Special Forces captains on the ground, or more accurately, on
horseback, in northern Afghanistan. This is from October 25,
shortly after he and his unit were inserted:
``I am advising a man on how best to employ light infantry
and horse calvary,'' he said, ``in the attack against tanks,
mortars, artillery, personnel carriers, and machine guns, a
tactic which I thought had become outdated with the invention
of the Gatling gun. The Mujaheddin have done that every day we
have been on the ground. They have attacked with 10 rounds of
ammunition per man, little water, and less food. I observed one
man who walked 10-plus miles to get to the fight, who proudly
showed me his artificial right leg from the knee down.
``There is little medical care if injured, only a donkey
ride to the aid station, which is a dirt hut, but the Muj are
doing very well with what they have. We couldn't do what we are
doing,'' he went on, ``without the close air support.
Everywhere I go, the civilians and Muj soldiers are always
telling me they are glad the USA has come. They all speak of
their hopes for a better Afghanistan once the Taliban are gone.
Better go,'' he concluded, ``General Dostam is finishing his
phone call with a Congressman back in the United States. Yes,
we had that element of this fight as well.''
Another dispatch from one of his comrades on November 10,
after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, reads in part: ``We rode on
begged, borrowed, and confiscated transportation. While it
looked like a ragtag procession, the morale into Mazar was
triumphant. The locals loudly greeted us, and thanked all
Americans. Much waving, cheering, and clapping, including from
the women. The U.S. Navy and Air Force''--this from an Army
man--``did a great job. I am very proud of my men, who
performed exceptionally well in extreme conditions. I have
personally witnessed heroism under fire by two U.S.
noncommissioned officers, one Army, one Air Force, when we came
under direct artillery fire last night, less than 50 meters
away. When I ordered them to call close air support, they did
so immediately without flinching.''
``As you know, the U.S. element was nearly overrun 4 days
ago, but continued to call close air support and ensured the
Muj forces did not suffer defeat.'' He concluded, ``These two
examples are typical of the performance of your soldiers and
airmen. Truly, uncommon valor has been a common virtue.''
In many ways, those two dispatches, I think, capture the
ingredients of an extraordinary military success. But another
element of our success, which was undoubtedly a surprise to the
terrorists but barely noticed by many others, was something
that did not happen, something that calls to mind Sherlock
Holmes' famous observation about the dog that did not bark. We
did not become bogged down in a quagmire, unlike the British in
the 19th century, or the Soviets in the 20th. Nations that
arrive in Afghanistan with massive armies tend to be treated as
invaders, and they regret it. Mindful of that history, General
Franks has deliberately and carefully kept our footprint small
to avoid just such a situation. On balance, our partnership
with indigenous forces has been very positive and continues to
be so.
From the beginning of the war on terrorism, we have
stressed the importance of understanding the nature of our
enemy as a network. Al-Qaeda is not a snake that can be killed
by lopping off its head. It is more analogous to a disease that
has infected many parts of a healthy body. There is no one,
single solution. You cannot simply cut out one infected area
and declare victory, but success in one area can lead to
success in others, and our success in Afghanistan has
contributed to the larger campaign.
In Afghanistan itself, through actions there, somewhat less
than half of the top 30 or so leaders of the al-Qaeda
organization have already been killed or captured. Well over
500 enemy are currently detained in Guantanamo or in
Afghanistan as a direct result of our operations in that
country. But equally important, if not more so, the worldwide
efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in
cooperation with more than 90 countries, have resulted in the
arrest of some 2,400 individuals.
Our military success in Afghanistan has contributed to that
larger success, both indirectly, by encouraging others to
cooperate, and also more directly. Abu Zubayda, for example,
one of bin Laden's key lieutenants, was driven out of his
sanctuary in Afghanistan, and as a result, was captured last
March. His partial cooperation, in turn, contributed to the
detention of Jose Padilla, who came into the United States with
the intention of planning and coordinating terrorist attacks.
A Moroccan detainee in Guantanamo led us to three Saudis
planning terrorist attacks in Morocco, all of whom were
subsequently arrested, including one top al-Qaeda operative. In
December, the discovery of a videotape in a safe house in
Afghanistan led to the arrest of an al-Qaeda cell in Singapore
that was planning to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier and U.S.
personnel in that country. The cooperation of Pakistan under
the leadership of President Musharraf has been extraordinary,
leading to nearly 400 arrests in that country alone.
These developments are encouraging; however, it is
important to remember that al-Qaeda is still dangerous and
active. This network still poses threats that should not be
underestimated.
Let me talk now about our efforts to build a more stable
Afghanistan in the long term. Because while our primary mission
in that country has been to kill or capture terrorists who
threaten the United States, or those who have harbored them, it
is also important to help the Afghans establish long-term
stability in that country, so that it does not once again
become an outlaw country that provides sanctuary for
terrorists.
While the success of those efforts will depend most of all
on the Afghans themselves, the United States and its coalition
partners have a critical role to play in achieving that goal.
In shaping that role, and as in shaping the military campaign
itself, we are very mindful of that historical Afghan animosity
to foreign armies and foreign occupiers. We have always viewed
our mission in Afghanistan as one of liberation, not
occupation. So with this in mind, we have tackled the challenge
of striking the balance between keeping Afghanistan from
reverting back to a terrorist sanctuary, and at the same time,
keeping our footprint small.
Afghans are an independent, proud people, and we have
worked from the beginning to minimize the number of our troops
there, and to focus instead on helping the Afghan people to
help themselves in their journey to representative self-
government. We have made it clear, and we need to continue to
do so, we have no intent of colonizing Afghanistan. We have
been careful through our actions and our words to avoid
creating the expectation that the United States can solve all
of that country's problems, and we have made a determined
effort not to take sides in Afghanistan's internal quarrels.
But we have, in fact, seen that Afghans are good at solving
problems when they must, and we must help them to deal with as
many as they can.
There are positive signs that Afghans are making progress.
Secretary Armitage described in his testimony how the Afghan
people made a significant step forward with the successful
convening of the loya jirga. But along with self-government
must come self-sufficiency, in terms of Afghanistan's security.
That task is made more challenging by the formidable geography
of Afghanistan. It is a country roughly the size of Texas, with
peaks in the Hindu Kush Range, which translated, by the way,
means ``Hindu Killer,'' that reach some 24,000 feet, 10,000
feet higher than the highest of the Rockies.
If I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put up a chart.
When we say that it is roughly the size of Texas, at least for
those of us who are not natives of Texas, it may not carry
enough meaning. I found it more meaningful to look at a map of
Afghanistan superimposed on the southern United States, and you
can see that it would stretch from Washington, DC, down almost
to New Orleans, and from St. Louis, Missouri, down past
Atlanta. It is huge.
It is not only large, but if I could show you another
chart, it has incredible terrain. This is a satellite
photograph of Afghanistan, and the neighboring regions of
Pakistan. You can see the enormous expanse of mountains, and
down in the southwest corner, that formidable desert, which, in
the Afghan language, is called the Desert of Death.
The sheer size and unforgiving terrain of the country has
been a major factor in planning our military operations, and it
must remain a key factor in planning long-term security
arrangements; but, encouragingly, the situation is becoming
more stable. Out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces
have experienced harassment mainly in only 5. The Taliban has
so far failed to mount their often predicted spring offensive,
and loya jirga convened with no serious security incidents,
despite numerous threats.
Our coalition partners are contributing to stability
through their humanitarian work. It is especially worth noting
that Jordanian personnel have been running a field hospital,
which by itself, to date, has treated some 77,000 Afghan
civilians. The overall improvements in conditions in the
country are perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that people
are voting with their feet. In just the first 5 months of the
year, 1.2 million refugees are recorded as having returned to
Afghanistan. That was the U.N.'s projection for the entire year
of 2002. The U.N. has now doubled its target to 2 million
refugees that they hope will return in this calendar year.
On the security front, we are committed to working with the
Afghan Transitional Authority and the international community
to find effective solutions to the remaining challenges to that
country's security. One of the most important pieces is
training the Afghan army. At the beginning of May, U.S. Army
instructors took on the task of helping to build an Afghan
national army by initiating the training of the first group of
Afghan recruits. Coalition partners are also assisting in this
effort. France has already begun training a battalion, and
others, including the United Kingdom, Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland,
Korea, India, and Romania, are assisting with personnel, or
funding, or equipment.
I would appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, and all of the Members
of the Senate and of the House, to approve as rapidly as
possible our supplemental request for fiscal year 2002. It
contains a request for $50 million in FMF and $20 million in
peacekeeping operations funds that would permit us to
accelerate the training and equipping of an Afghan army.
The biggest gap, I must say, in this effort has been the
lack of authorities for funding. Even though we have a lot of
money for other purposes, we have to scrape around and go to
some of the countries I just mentioned in order to get the
funds for salaries or equipment.
To further enhance regional stability, the 18-nation
International Security Assistance Force has been helping to
stabilize the situation in the capital of Kabul. The British
did a splendid job leading that effort in its first 6 months,
and we expect the same from our Turkish allies who have now
agreed to take over the lead.
Last month, the U.N. Security Council extended ISAF's
mandate in Kabul until the end of the year. ISAF forces helped
to train the Afghan national guard that protected Kabul during
the loya jirga. Other important efforts to provide a more
secure environment include the very important German-led effort
to train a police force, and British counterdrug operations.
However, the most important instrument that the Afghan
Authority and we have to establish a stable security situation
is the leverage provided by economic assistance. It is in our
interest to provide such assistance, and to help the Afghans
rebuild their country after almost a quarter century of war so
that it will not once again become a haven for terrorists.
The leadership provided by the State Department, as
described by Secretary Armitage, has been key to that effort.
Particularly important was the organization of the Tokyo Donors
Conference that Secretary Armitage described. In support of
those reconstruction efforts, the U.S. Central Command
[CENTCOM] is also executing a plan to collocate personnel from
the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State
Department besides our Special Forces and civil affairs teams
that are operating throughout the country. This will allow
USAID people to get out beyond Kabul and better monitor U.S.
assistance, while providing them some protection in what
remains an insecure environment.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the campaign in Afghanistan,
along with many other efforts now underway by many instruments
of our government, has contributed to the disruption of the
global terror network in tangible and far-reaching ways. Our
task extends well beyond Afghanistan, and even in Afghanistan
it will still be a long and difficult one, but the stakes are
enormous.
As President Bush said, speaking to the cadets at West
Point 2 weeks ago, ``We have our best chance since the rise of
the Nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the
great powers compete in peace, instead of prepare for war.''
We can do this not by imposing our own model of human
progress on other nations of the world, but, as the President
said, ``we can support this effort when we reward governments
that make the right choices for their own people.''
In our development aid, in our development efforts, in our
broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United
States will promote moderation, tolerance, and human rights,
and we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.
In Afghanistan today, we see a democratic spirit rising
from the remnants of a once-failed state that is trying to defy
the ravages of decades of war and misrule. Despite a beginning
that will at times be rocky, and no doubt suffer some setbacks,
the Afghan people are hopeful for a new tomorrow, hopeful that
they, too, can have a chance at peace instead of war. We remain
committed to doing our part to help them on that journey, and
we want history ultimately to judge us as having been dedicated
to liberation, not occupation. We appreciate the continued
leadership of this committee and the support of the Congress in
these ongoing efforts. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee: This
Committee has long provided our country strong leadership and
bipartisan support, especially now as the United States wages the war
against terrorism. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you
today the Defense Department's perspective on how the campaign in
Afghanistan to kill, capture and disrupt terrorists has helped us
protect the American people, and how we are helping the Afghan people
help themselves to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a
terrorist sanctuary.
i. how the campaign in afghanistan has helped protect the american
people
From the beginning of the war on terrorism, President Bush
emphasized that the United States must use ``every resource at our
command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every
necessary weapon of war, to the destruction and defeat of the global
terror network.'' Each has a role; each reinforces the others. The
military is only one of the instruments that we need to wage this war
on terrorism. The military cannot do its job without the support of
other elements, particularly intelligence, and its role is frequently
to support the efforts of those other instruments of national power.
This hearing is focused--and appropriately so--on Afghanistan and
our military effort there, but it's important to emphasize, as we have
from the beginning, that this campaign is not about a single country or
a single terrorist network. Al-Qaeda alone is spread throughout the
world; it is a network. A network, by its very nature, is based on the
idea that should one node be eliminated, the network can still continue
to function.
Well before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had burrowed into some 60
nations, including the United States and Germany, France and Morocco,
Saudi Arabia and the Philippines. It had critical nodes in Hamburg,
Germany and Jacksonville, Florida as well as Afghanistan. The pilots
who flew the suicide attacks were not trained in Afghanistan; many got
their training in the United States.
Afghanistan was an important node in the network, but by its nature
a network does not have a headquarters. So, while we focus on
Afghanistan today, we must understand that Afghanistan is only one node
of this terrorist network. The very name of this organization, al-
Qaeda, which means ``base'' in Arabic, indicates that the entire
organization is the base of terrorist operations. It is spread
throughout the world and it needs to be eliminated, root and branch.
In Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda's malignant plots and plans
flourished under the protection of the tyrannical and corrupt Taliban,
America's armed forces went to work to root out both. Our intent, as
Secretary Rumsfeld said, was to deprive the terrorists of a sanctuary
in Afghanistan where they could safely plan, train and organize--not
only to capture and kill terrorists, but to drain the swamp in which
they breed. Over the last eight months, with our coalition partners, we
have defeated a vicious and repressive regime that gave refuge to evil.
We have killed or captured many of its ringleaders. And we have others
on the run, where they are more vulnerable.
Even in Afghanistan, our work is far from complete, although we are
encouraged by the many truly remarkable aspects of the campaign to
date.
Our military campaign in Afghanistan has had some striking
features, some surprising, others less so. Not surprisingly, we have
seen America's Armed Forces conduct their operations with great bravery
and skill, as we saw at Mazar-e-sharif, Tora Bora and in Operations
Anaconda and Mountain Lion. What may have been a surprise to some was
the remarkable speed with which military plans were put together, the
swift success of the military operations--in weeks rather than months,
and with relatively few troops on the ground. On September 11th, there
simply was no war plan on the shelf for Afghanistan. General Franks was
starting from scratch on September 20 when he received the order to
begin planning, but less than three weeks later, on October 7th, we
commenced the military operations. And less than two weeks after that,
troops were operating on the ground. In many ways, it was a remarkable
feat of logistical and operational agility.
Another element of our success, which was undoubtedly a surprise to
the terrorists and barely noticed by many others, was something that
did not happen, something that calls to mind Sherlock Holmes' famous
observation about the dog that didn't bark. We did not become bogged
down in a quagmire--unlike the British in the 19th century and the
Soviets in the 20th century. Nations that arrive in Afghanistan with
massive armies tend to be treated as invaders, and they regret it.
Mindful of that history, General Franks deliberately and carefully kept
our footprint small to avoid just such a predicament. On balance, our
partnership with indigenous forces has been very positive.
From the beginning of the war on terrorism, we have stressed the
importance of understanding the nature of our enemy as a world-wide
network. Al-Qaeda is not a snake that can be killed by lopping off its
head. It is more analogous to a disease that has infected many parts of
a healthy body. There is no one single solution. You can't simply cut
out one infected area and declare victory, but success in one area can
lead to success in other areas as well. The bottom line, as President
Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have repeatedly cautioned, is that this
campaign will be a long and difficult one.
Coalition forces have eliminated the secure operating environment
that al-Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan and degraded cohesion of the
worldwide network. Well over 500 enemy--including somewhat less than
half of the top 30 leaders--have been killed or captured--as a result
of operations in Afghanistan and are currently held in Guantanamo or in
Afghanistan. Equally important, if not more so, the world-wide efforts
of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in cooperation with
more than 90 countries, have resulted in the arrest of some 2,400
individuals.
Our military success in Afghanistan has contributed to that success
by encouraging others to cooperate. Our efforts in Afghanistan have
also helped law enforcement actions more directly. Abu Zubayda, one of
bin Laden's key lieutenants, driven out of his sanctuary in Afghanistan
and was captured last March; his partial cooperation in turn
contributed to the detention of Jose Padilla, who came into the United
States with the intention of planning and coordinating terrorist
attacks. A Moroccan detainee in Guantanamo told of three Saudis
planning terrorist acts in Morocco, all of whom were subsequently
arrested, including one top al-Qaeda operative. In December, the
discovery of a videotape in a safe house in Afghanistan led to the
arrest of an al-Qaeda cell in Singapore that was planning to attack a
U.S. aircraft carrier and U.S. personnel in that country.
President Musharraf's leadership has made Pakistan a much less
friendly environment for Taliban and al-Qaeda. Since last fall, the
U.S. has sent the government of Pakistan about 1,500 requests for
assistance on terrorist suspects. They have responded to most of them
and continue to work on others. In the course of numerous raids on
foreign terrorist suspects, some 370 arrests have been made.
These developments are encouraging. However, it is important to
remember that al-Qaeda is still dangerous and active. This network
still poses threats that should not be underestimated. However, when
the network as a whole is under pressure and on the run, it becomes
harder for them to carry out their evil plans and more likely that they
will make mistakes that permit us to capture more of them.
ii. helping to build a stable afghanistan
While our primary mission in Afghanistan has been to kill or
capture terrorists who threaten the United States or those who have
harbored them, it is also important to help the Afghans establish long-
term stability in that country, so that Afghanistan does not once again
become an outlaw country that provides sanctuary for terrorists. While
the success of those efforts will depend most of all on the Afghans
themselves, the United States and its coalition partners have a
critical role to play in achieving that goal. In shaping that role, as
in shaping the military campaign itself, we have been very mindful of
the historical Afghan animosity to foreign armies and foreign
occupiers.
We have always viewed our mission in Afghanistan as one of
liberation, not one of occupation. So with this in mind, we have
tackled the challenge of striking the balance between keeping
Afghanistan from reverting back to a terrorist sanctuary, and keeping
our footprint small. Afghans are an independent, proud people. For that
reason, we have emphasized from the beginning that we intend to
minimize the number of troops there, and to focus instead on helping
the Afghan people to help themselves in their journey to representative
self-governance.
We have made it clear, and we need to continue to do so: we have no
intent of ``colonizing'' Afghanistan. We have been careful, through our
actions and through our words, to avoid creating the expectation that
the United States is going to solve all of the Afghanistan's problems.
We have made a determined effort not to take sides in Afghanistan's
internal politics. In fact, we have seen that Afghans are good at
solving problems when they must; and we must let them deal with as many
as they can.
If a representative government is to take hold, Afghans themselves
are the only ones who can make self-government a reality. President
Bush has said that the United States does not intend to create the
future government of Afghanistan. ``It is up to the Afghans
themselves,'' he said, ``to determine their future.'' As they do, the
United States and our allies will continue to support the new
Transitional Authority and the people of Afghanistan. Their success
will contribute, not only to the long-term stability of Afghanistan,
but to the peace and security of the world at large.
There are positive signs that the Afghans are making progress. Just
last week, the Afghan people made a significant step forward when more
than 1,500 delegates from all 32 provinces and ethnic backgrounds came
together under one roof. When this traditional loya jirga, or Grand
Council, elected Hamid Karzai president of the new two-year
transitional government based on Western-style ideas of control and
accountability. A Karzai senior advisor captured how extraordinary was
this first step, saying that, for the first time in 23 years, the
people of Afghanistan are acquiring a voice.
Along with self-government must come self-sufficiency in terms of
Afghanistan's security. That task is made more challenging by the
formidable geography of Afghanistan. It is a country roughly the size
of Texas, with peaks in the Hindu Kush (or ``Hindu Killer'') Range that
reach some 24,000 feet--ten thousand feet higher than the highest of
the Rockies. The sheer size and unforgiving terrain of the country has
been a major factor in the planning of our military operations and
remains a key factor in planning long-term security arrangements.
Encouragingly, the situation is becoming more stable. Out of 32
provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have experienced harassment
attacks mainly in five provinces, in the Taliban heartland of southern
and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban have so far failed to mount their
often predicted spring offensive. The loya jirga convened with no
serious security incidents--despite numerous threats--and clashes among
militia leaders have been limited.
The Taliban regime collapsed quickly with no successor. Not
surprisingly, criminal activity revived faster than police forces could
be created. This activity tends to be localized along routes through
which international aid flows: from the North and from Pakistan--
incidentally, traditional areas for banditry.
Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure is another hindrance, not only
to maintaining security, but also to distributing humanitarian aid.
From the beginning, humanitarian operations were a key part of our
military operations--a concerted effort to reverse the desperate
conditions created by the Taliban regime. Just one week before
September 11th, the U.N. warned that 5.5 million Afghans, surviving on
cattle feed, grass and insects, were facing death without immediate
help. The defeat of the Taliban and the ending of civil war conditions
have brought food to more than five million people who were facing
famine last fall.
Even before last September, the United States was the largest
contributor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. When military
operations began last October, those efforts were stepped up, and, from
the beginning, humanitarian missions were an integral part of our
military missions. Today, the picture is vastly different. Easing the
plight of widespread starvation was a humanitarian duty before the war.
Today it is one of the keys to bolstering political and civil
stability.
Coalition partners are also contributing to stability through their
humanitarian work. It is especially worth noting that Jordanian
personnel have been running a field hospital that, to date, has treated
77,000 Afghan civilians. The Spanish and others have also provided
assistance through their military hospitals. The Indians have provided
a contingent of military medical personnel.
The improvement in the situation is demonstrated by the fact that
people are voting with their feet. In just the first five months of the
year, 1.2 million refugees are recorded as having returned to
Afghanistan already, which was the UN's projection for all of 2002. The
UN has now doubled the target to two million.
One crucial factor in the success of a representative government in
Afghanistan is, first and foremost, a stable and secure environment in
which it can gain a firm hold and ultimately flourish. The U.S. is
committed to working with the Afghan Transitional Authority and the
international community to find effective solutions to the remaining
challenges to Afghanistan's security.
One of the most important pieces is training the Afghan army. At
the beginning of May, U.S. Army instructors took on the task of helping
build an Afghan national army, by initiating the training of the
initial group of Afghan recruits for the new Afghan National Army
(ANA). Coalition partners are assisting in this effort. France has
already begun training a battalion, and other countries, including the
U.K., Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Korea, India, and Romania, are
assisting with personnel or funding or equipment. In the process, we
are also ``training the trainers'' so that the process can become self-
sustaining.
To further enhance regional stability, the 18-nation International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been helping to stabilize the
situation in the capital city of Kabul since January. The British did a
splendid job leading that effort in its first six months, and we expect
the same from our Turkish allies who have now taken over the lead.
Last month, the United Nations Security Council extended ISAF's
mandate in Kabul until the end of the year. ISAF forces helped train
the Afghan National Guard to protect Kabul during the loya jirga, which
was held without incident. Other important efforts to provide a more
secure environment include the German-led police training program and
British counter drug operations.
However, the most important instrument that the Afghan Authority
and we have to establish a stable security situation is the leverage
provided by economic assistance. It is in our interests to provide such
assistance, and to help Afghans rebuild their country after almost a
quarter century of war so it will not again become a haven for
terrorists.
The leadership provided by the State Department as described by
Secretary Armitage, has been key to that effort. Particularly important
was the organization of the Tokyo Donors Conference that Secretary
Armitage has described.
Our troops on the ground are also making a direct contribution to
economic assistance, implementing humanitarian projects across
Afghanistan that include repairing hospitals, digging wells, and
repairing irrigation canals. We repaired or built 48 schools in eight
different regions of Afghanistan. And for over 30,000 children for whom
the sound of gunfire was a natural part of life, school is open,
certainly one of the most far-reaching ways we have helped shape their
future. In Herat, with just a few U.S. personnel, a U.S. Civil Affairs
project, using local labor, de-silted over 250 kilometers of irrigation
canals, allowing thousands of farm families to do their spring
planting. The Department is allotting $10 million dollars for more than
75 such projects, anticipated to continue through the next 12 to 18
months. These activities have been coordinated with civilian relief
organizations and have already begun to positively impact the lives of
many Afghans.
In support of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, CENTCOM
is also executing a plan to co-locate personnel from the U.S. Agency
for International Development and the State Department with our special
forces and civil affairs teams that are operating throughout
Afghanistan. This will allow USAID's people to get out beyond Kabul and
better monitor U.S. assistance, while also providing them some
protection in what remains an insecure environment.
CENTCOM's humanitarian efforts have been undertaken to reduce the
suffering of the Afghan people, and in the process, have helped build
the conditions for a stable peace--an outgrowth of health, food,
educational, and economic security. The. U.S. military is proud of its
contribution to the important efforts of USAID, the U.S. Department of
State, the U.N. and other international agencies and non-government
organizations to provide a better life and a better future for the
people of Afghanistan.
conclusion
Along with the many other law-enforcement, diplomatic, financial
and intelligence efforts now underway, the campaign in Afghanistan has
contributed to the disruption of the global terror network in tangible
and far-reaching ways. But, our task extends well beyond Afghanistan
and will be a long and difficult one. The stakes are enormous.
As President Bush said, speaking to cadets at West Point two weeks
ago, ``we have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in
the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in
peace instead of prepare for war.'' We can do this is not by imposing
our own model of human progress on other nations of the world. But, as
he said, we can support this effort ``when we reward governments that
make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in
our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our
educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and
tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all
progress possible.''
In Afghanistan today, we see a democratic spirit rising from the
remnants of a once-failed state that is trying to defy the ravages of
decades of war and misrule. Despite a beginning that will, at times, be
rocky and no doubt suffer some setbacks, the Afghan people are hopeful
for a new tomorrow--hopeful they, too, can have a chance at peace
instead of war. We remain committed to doing our part to help them on
their journey. And we want history ultimately to judge us as having
been dedicated to liberation, not occupation. We appreciate this
Committee's continued leadership and guidance in these ongoing efforts.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We will take 7-minute rounds so everybody gets in, and then
if you have time, we will try for a second round.
Let me begin by saying to you both that, speaking for
myself, I think it is a remarkable military undertaking. Having
spent 4 or 5 days down on the ground, it was impressive. It
continues to be impressive, and I think, notwithstanding the
fact that it is going to be fairly easy to Monday morning
quarterback everything about every operation, I think we should
all be very proud of what you have put together, and what our
fighting women and men did.
I must tell you, I have had this conversation with
Secretary Armitage. I wish every American could see those young
women and men. I mean they are incredible and will make
everybody proud.
But what I want to talk about is not to second-guess
anything we have done so far, I want to figure out what we do
from here. Would one of you, or both of you--I will just ask a
generic question, rather than the finely tuned questions my
staff have developed here, and that is: Explain to me what the
role is of the warlords. In Mazar, Dostam is obviously the guy
in charge, but there is a power struggle going on up there. In
Herat, there is--obviously, you have a guy named Ismail Khan,
who is a tough actor, and there seems to be some more to that.
I am going to put a map up here, in the absence of my ranking
member. This is too hard to see from here, but these various
indications show armed clashes, attacks against minorities,
attacks against refugees, attacks and intimidation of loya
jirga candidates, and attacks and intimidation of women, and
attacks on international humanitarian NGOs.
Now, over in Iraq, there is not a lot happening there,
which is good, on the surface; but when I was there, the talk
was that we were all concerned about each of these warlords
having their own sponsors. In Herat, we were worried about the
Iranians and their cooperation with Ismail Khan. I spent hours,
and hours, and hours, literally, I mean 6 or 7 hours with the
now officially near-term elected President and his people,
including Tajiks in the administration.
The concern was that these warlords all had their own
agendas, and that although they could maintain peace, there
would not be any loyalty to and/or allegiance to a central
government. I thought--and it may be able to be done anyway, I
thought our purpose here was not only to drain the swamp, but
as--the Congressional Research Service, we asked them to look
at this for us, and they came up with the following summary.
It says, ``U.S.-led efforts to end Afghanistan's role as a
host for Osama bin Laden and other anti-Western Islamic
terrorists requires not only a defeat of the Taliban, but also
the reconstruction of a stable, effective, and ideologically
moderate Afghan state.''
Now, do we think that is true? I mean do we think--
obviously, defeating Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, everybody
agrees on that one, but is it important, is it important that
we be responsible for, the world community and us included, the
reconstruction of a stable, effective, ideologically moderate
Afghan state? Is that part of our charge? If it is, what role
do these warlords play in bringing that about?
Mr. Armitage. Mr. Chairman, I will give it a go first. You
asked at the beginning what is the warlords' agenda. In effect,
it is the same as it has been in the past. It is to hold on to
power and be able to collect revenues. They want to be a large
factor in whatever the future holds for Afghanistan.
No. 2, you would have a very good sense of this after your
excellent trip in January out there. The warlords, particularly
the one to whom you referred, Mr. Dostam, feels that he and
some of his Tajik colleagues have had the majority of the
burden in the fighting, and they want the majority of the
spoils.
The latter question about is it our role to be involved in
reconstruction, it seems to me that the President has made the
decision that it is. He said that we are going to be involved
for a long time and he made that very clear. We are going to be
involved for a long time, not just in the sphere, which Paul
and Secretary Rumsfeld are so responsible for in the military
sphere, but in the reconstruction, along with the international
conference.
I think the fact that it was the United States, which was
the convener, if you will, of the Tokyo Conference, it
indicated that we are not going to have a half-measure. We are
not going to make the mistake we made in 1989 and allow what is
a very nation-state to backslide into becoming a swamp again.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I will just add to that, I agree with
everything that Secretary Armitage said. I think the basic
strategy here is, first of all, to work with those warlords or
regional leaders, whatever you prefer to call them, to
encourage good behavior. I think we have a number of means for
doing so. Some of them include local diplomacy. We have been
engaging, particularly up in the Mazar-e-Sharif area, where you
pointed out there have been some recent incidents, due to
fighting between two different warlord factions, with our
Special Forces who have considerable influence to encourage
better behavior.
As I mentioned in my testimony, we are arranging to have
State Department people out in some of the provincial areas
with our Special Forces, so that they can begin to exercise
their good offices. I think it underscores the importance of
economic assistance. Because, as Secretary Armitage said, at
the end of the day, what these people want, among other things
and perhaps most of all, are money and resources to help their
people.
The long term solution is to shift the balance of forces
between the central government and the regions--training the
Afghan army is a key element of doing that. Again, I cannot
emphasize enough how important economic assistance is, because
the more real resources that flow through Kabul, through the
Transitional Authority, the more those local leaders have to
look to Kabul.
The Chairman. Well, is it not flowing directly, some of it
directly to these warlords? In other words, one of the things
we spent a lot of time talking about in Kabul, in Afghanistan,
and here, with you, with the State Department, with the White
House, is that Karzai's popularity and support rest on a couple
of factors.
One, he is viewed by all the parties--and when I met with
Kanoni, and all the rest of these guys, they all said,
basically, ``We are not crazy about the guy, but he is the best
thing we have to get aid. He is a magnet for us.'' Two, he does
not have an army. He does not have any guys. He cannot control
it by himself. No. 3, he is the guy who represents the
majority, but is going to count us in on the deal.
So I thought, initially, the notion was that in order to
give him some heft, we had to make sure that everybody
understood that they had to go through him to get that road
built in Herat, go through him to get that school reconstructed
in Mazar, and as I understand it, that is not--let me just ask
the question. Is that happening? How much goes directly, so
that you have a guy like Birkat Khan who seized control of the
whole province, being the guy who is building the road for the
folks down the street?
Mr. Armitage. First of all, Mr. Chairman, these warlords
have access to their own resources for a lot of different
reasons, some of them very bad, like drugs, and they can do
anything with that, such as build roads, or anything else that
they are able to.
Our money goes into the central government, and we have
relatively little, thus far, representation in the far-flung
locations. This is why I put a lot of stock in what Paul was
saying, by attaching USAID and State officers to the Special
Forces units, whether they be in the number of a dozen or
several dozen in various areas, so they can give us better
advice on what sort of projects might reasonably be funded out
of the central government's coffers.
The Chairman. Well, I will come back to that. My time is
up.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As both of
you mentioned, the work of our military has been tremendous,
and almost semi-miraculous from a standing start, as Secretary
Wolfowitz said. General Franks only started the planning on
September 20, that part of the situation was unavoidable, but
we quickly picked up our pace and succeeded.
What is occurring now, it seems to me, does not necessarily
have to be improvised in the same way, but I have a sense that
it is being improvised. Let me review items that you both have
discussed as objectives. One is democracy building respect for
human rights educational opportunities, and economic
assistance. We hope the latter leads to at least a reasonable
economy, even if not a vibrant economy, as is often mentioned
as the goal. It is not clear to me how much of that is
occurring in Afghanistan; but some may, and probably a lot
should.
There must be a security framework around, so that as the
democracy, the economy, and public diplomacy begin to work, it
does not fall part at the fringes, outside of Kabul at the
country's extremities. Likewise, how this fits with what we are
doing. Do we have a plan or plans for Pakistan? Our commitments
there are very substantial, or at least have been implied that
way. Similsrly what are our commitments in Tajikstan,
Uzbekistan and other countries nearby.
My hope would be that at some point the administration
would be able to provide, if not a book, at least a report as
to how all of this is likely to be achieved over the course of
an intermediate period of time. What I think we are getting,
essentially, are reports of very commendable activities, but I
do not have a confident sense of exactly where all of this
leads, except that we are hopeful for the best.
In part, there has to be improvisation. We have the 18
members of ISAF, and they have their own agendas, although they
are coincident by and large with ours. We are committed, as
Secretary Wolfowitz said, not to become bogged down, and there
is a lot of thoughtfulness about how you do this without
becoming bogged down. Likewise, how do we run military
operations, the cleanup situation, or the activities at the
border, even as we try to establish peace.
Can either one of you give some idea as to what the
thinking is in the administration pulling together State,
Defense, Treasury, et cetera, and in some coherent plan that
all of us could understand and support give some idea of what
kind of financial commitments are required, not just for this
year, but for several years down the trail?
Mr. Armitage. Senator Lugar, I will commit to sending a
letter to the committee, outlining just this, but I want to
respond directly to your question, but it would be necessarily
a lengthy response, and we'll do it.
To the extent we have well developed thinking, and I
appreciate your comments about the need for a little improv
along the way, security is the overarching necessity. And,
underneath that, we have agriculture, for the obvious reasons,
and health, the next two in order of priority, and the reasons
are quite obvious, because one half of the 26-plus million
people in Afghanistan have a need either in the health area or
in the food area. They have malnutrition, et cetera.
So that gives you a pretty good idea of your next two
priorities, and after that, education, which is right up next
to it, and then infrastructure development. That is just sort
of the priority, as we see it, and we are trying to put our
money against it.
Right now, Senator, in answer to your specific comments
about democracy, human rights, et cetera, we have 21 State
people at our embassy in Kabul, and seven USAID people, one
person who covers human rights, and one who covers religious
freedom and democracy. So I think, given the 10 percent of our
staffing there, that will give you an idea of the emphasis we
are putting on it.
In terms of public diplomacy, I am pleased with our story.
You are the ultimate judge, and I appreciate your comments
about Under Secretary Beers, but in the last 4 months, we have
increased Radio Free Afghanistan broadcasting to 7 hours a day.
We have Voice of America, up from 2.5 to 6 hours a day. We have
two transmitters being built, which will provide 24/7 coverage
for radio, the principle means of communications in
Afghanistan.
We have exchange programs, one ongoing now with young
students, called the Seeds of Peace program, and we have 12
participants here in the United States, and in August, we will
have 18 women from the Women in Government group visit. We
could have had it earlier, but we did not know who was going to
be in government, and who was going to be around. So now that
they have had their loya jirga, we are bringing them in August.
We are dealing in the country with a literacy rate that is
about 15 percent above the age of 15. So printed materials are
not a desired medium across the board, unless they are very
much pictographs. So I think we are alert to the problems of
public diplomacy. I will send a letter to the committee with
our full thinking and the numbers we think would be associated
with this over the next several years, Senator.
Senator Lugar. Well, that would be very helpful, because
the letter apparently would be the plan.
Mr. Armitage. Indeed.
Senator Lugar It would illustrate the necessary elements
that are important in all of this, and have money attached to
it. That is important in giving us some idea of where we are
headed in all this.
Having said that, you mentioned you have an employee
devoted to democracy and one devoted to human rights. Granted,
the State Department might not have resources for more people
there, but organizations like the National Endowment for
Democracy, or others can be engaged. We must utilize all the
tools at our disposal. It is extremely important, in terms of
our national security, that Afghanistan be a success, so that
there is, in the Muslim world, a success?
In other words, the overall public diplomacy message that
keeps coming to us is that polls of countries indicate people
do not like us, and in some cases, that understates it. To what
extent does success in Afghanistan help turn that around, offer
a model of a better life for people, that represents our ideals
and our country?
Mr. Armitage. Sir, we are very bullish on the National
Endowment of Democracy, as a general matter. We are going to
make use of them in many countries around the world. I have
Ambassador David Johnson with me here today, and he can provide
the specifics about whatever contracts we may have with them
right now. I do not know.
Of the 21 people, as I mentioned, in the embassy now, we
have two devoted to the issues that you mentioned. We are going
up to 31 State people over the summer. We are only limited by
the fact that they are living in trailers, and we have a
chancery that partly works and partly does not. We do not have
any living quarters, et cetera.
The Chairman. Do the toilets flush yet?
Mr. Armitage. They do, sir. I will not tell the story you
told us about it.
The Chairman. No, no, no. I want to make sure--well, do we
need to provide money so you can build something else? I mean--
--
Mr. Armitage. We have the money in the supplemental, sir,
for that, and I am anticipating no problem, other than getting
the supplemental voted on.
On the larger question of the necessity of a success,
particularly in the Muslim world; absolutely, but it is tied, I
think, to the country you mentioned earlier, Pakistan. I do not
think we are actually going to have a success, unless we are
successful in both countries.
President Karzai has informed us that he is quite convinced
of the sincerity of President Musharraf, and the fact that
notwithstanding 10 or 11 years of a failed policy in Pakistan
regarding support for the Taliban, that right now, Pakistan is
on the right side of the ledger, President Musharraf is moving,
I think, quite assiduously against madrasses, making them at
least registered, if not getting rid of those that are beyond
the pale. You saw in today's news broadcast that by virtue of
the fact that he has ordered his soldiers into the heretofore
forbidden tribal areas, they are suffering casualties very much
at our behest, but I think the success has to be the success of
both countries.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Lugar, if I might just make a point,
on the security front. We do have a plan to train 14,400
soldiers for the Afghan army over the next 18 months, and quite
frankly, we are looking at whether that number might be
increased. The two biggest issues are recruitment and funding.
I would appeal once again for congressional action on the State
Department supplemental, which contains $50 million for
training and $20 million for peacekeeping operation funds. The
sooner we get that money, the sooner we will be able to look at
expanding recruitment.
Also, in our request for fiscal year 2003, we requested
$100 million in authority to move DOD funds, if appropriate,
from other programs or operational funds into this kind of
training. I would appeal to get--I think it is not so far made
it through the budget process up here--but I would appeal to
you to try to consider that, because I think it would give us a
great deal more flexibility if the opportunities develop to do
more training.
Senator Lugar. Thank you for those specific suggestions; we
appreciate it.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer has to leave, and Senator
Nelson has been gracious enough to----
Senator Boxer. Well, I got here before he did.
The Chairman. Of course, but I go by the seniority rule;
but go ahead.
Senator Boxer. No; I am senior to him.
The Chairman. I know you are.
Senator Boxer. So what is the problem?
The Chairman. No problem.
Senator Boxer. Thanks.
The Chairman. I thought I was just being nice here.
Senator Boxer. Senator, you are always nice.
Senator Boxer. I just want to say to both of you, thank you
very much for your focus on this. I could not agree more with
Senator Lugar, as far as making Afghanistan a success, and it
is in our hands, and that is the burden of being the leader of
the free world, and we are, and in this particular case, we
cannot afford failure. It is not an option, as they say. I also
wanted to note again the presence of the women's groups who are
here today, and to thank them from the bottom of my heart.
Mr. Chairman and our Ranking Member, Senator Lugar, I think
it is important to note what Bernard Lewis said, who is a great
historian, and a pretty conservative one at that, and when
asked by Charlie Rose if he could name the one reason that the
Muslim countries have not been able to be successful, the
answer came back without a moment's pause, ``The women. They
have not allowed the women to be part of the society.'' This
was quite an eloquent statement, I think, from him.
So what I want to spend my time doing, and I hope to be
able to do it on a one-on-one with you, Secretary Wolfowitz, if
we have a chance, is to plead the case, make the case for
immediate expansion of the international force. That does not
mean our troops. It does not mean occupation. Of course, you
are right on the point, it means protection, and protection is
not occupation.
When you have Hamid Karzai asking for this, and when you
have Dr. Sima Samar, who the President was so gracious to put
in the gallery, the First Lady's box, during the State of the
Union Address, asking for this, and when you have the women
coming to us via these women's organizations, and also in
person, taking the risks of travel, to tell us this is their
highest priority, and I would say, Secretary Armitage, you are
right, they list security first, then they talk about
education, health, and the rest.
I just want to put into the record, Mr. Chairman, a couple
of third party quotes from my position here. The international
think tank, the International Crisis Group, wrote, ``The
security situation outside Kabul remains tenuous, and roadside
banditry and flare-ups of fighting between rival military
factions have been common. Many unemployed former fighters,
with weapons and time on their hands, represent a dangerous
element.'' And they say, ``It is deeply troubling that some
Afghans are expressing nostalgia for the relative security and
stability that were present before.''
I think it is important, because we have to know history,
that it was this very lack of security that led to the Taliban
coming into power in the first place. The Taliban first gained
the support of Pakistan in 1994, when they rescued a 30-truck
Pakistani convoy that was hijacked by a warlord just south of
Kandahar. The Taliban gained popularity throughout Afghanistan
at that time by continuing to eliminate roadblocks that were
set up by local warlords, where hijackings and extortion were
common, and we know what happened then. Osama bin Laden was
given haven, et cetera. None of us wants it to happen. You do
not. We do not. It cannot happen. But I say that there is this
lack of security.
The International Crisis Group has recommended that force
be increased from its current level of 4,500 to 25,000 troops,
and other respective organizations, the Stimson Center called
for 18,000 troops. I guess I am puzzled, because on this issue
we have been so close together, people from different sides of
the aisle, why there seems to be this hesitancy when it is not
going to be American troops. Karzai is asking for it, and we
know in 2 years, hopefully, the Afghan people can protect
themselves. This is an interim kind of solution.
During February and March of 2002, Human Rights Watch
documented cases of sexual violence against Pushtun women,
perpetrated by the three main ethnically based parties, and
then militias in the north. Many women describe how they have
to fight off attackers, or hide young female relatives out of
fear of rape. We know Sima Samar herself had threats. She had
to spend one night at the United Nations guest house. And
outside of Kabul, it is far worse.
Reuters reported in April an acid attack on a female
teacher in Kandahar after handwritten pamphlets were found,
circulating in the city, warning men against sending their
daughters to school or their wives to work. I have heard first
hand from Afghan women, who call my office, who say that
security is their No. 1 concern.
So I would say one more thing here. Bernette Rubin, an
expert on Afghanistan, wrote the following in the New York
Times, ``Both Afghans and international officials see the
refusal to expand the international force as the start of
American disengagement repeating the mistake of the 1990s,
despite promising to learn from that experience. Providing
security for rebuilding Afghanistan is now the front line in
the war against terrorism. Failure here will undermine all
other commitments, and many fear failure has already started.
There is still time to prove them wrong.''
Now, I do not believe that failure has started. I see so
many wonderful, good things, and when Secretary Armitage talked
about the loya jirga, and the women's voice, and the fact that
in this amazing setting, things got accomplished, and got done,
and Karzai was--these are all wonderful things.
I am just concerned that for some doctrinaire reason--
occupation, that is not what we are asking for. We are saying,
protection of the people. It is a short-term thing. I would
hope we could get past this idea that if we do support a larger
troop deployment, it is occupation, because I do not see that
at all. I see it as an interim measure, and I--in the time
remaining, I wonder if you could comment, is your mind opened
at all to this?
Mr. Wolfowitz. First of all, let me say, I agree with a
great deal of what you said, particularly about the importance
of women, both in Afghanistan and in the Muslim world, in the
larger sense. There are a few things that are just factually
wrong, and it is important to start from the right set of
facts.
Whoever referred to the relative stability and security
that were provided by the Taliban obviously did not read about
the 5 million people on the verge of starvation, or the civil
war that was raging in that country.
Senator Boxer. No, no. You misunderstood. Those were people
who were telling reporters this. Of course, it is ridiculous,
but if even some people think that, it is dangerous.
Secretary Wolfowitz. But there has been a huge improvement
in the situation. That it is not perfect is not surprising. It
is a country that has been through 25 years of civil war, and
it is going to take time. Things are not going to change
immediately.
But the other one is, there is no refusal to expand the
Afghan force, whether it is referring to the Afghan army, where
I have been saying over and over again, we would like more
money to be able to expand it faster, or whether it is
referring to ISAF, where there is absolutely no doctrine. I
mean, no one is saying that we are opposed to expanding ISAF,
or opposed to having it play other roles. Our biggest problem
so far has been sustaining ISAF in its present role.
One of our big diplomatic challenges of the last few
months, which we were successful at, was finding someone to
take over the lead from the British in ISAF. When the Turks
agreed to take it over, they expressed extreme reluctance to
take on missions outside of Kabul. That does not mean that we
are holding a doctrine opposed to looking at other roles, but
it is important to remember both the magnitude of the problems
that this government has inherited, and the sheer size and
unruliness of the country.
Are there going to be problems? We are going to make
progress on them, it seems to me, step by step. I think we are
making steady progress, but one of the reasons why we say it is
going to be a long road is that there is a lot of work to do.
But there is no doctrine involved here at all. We are trying to
do whatever makes sense to stabilize that country.
Mr. Armitage. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Armitage. You have an exquisite understanding of the
problems of women in Afghanistan, but I want to get on the
record about this. Security is the overarching one, but 23
years of war, the years of Taliban rule, have all brought other
things to the fore that we have to be attacking simultaneously.
It is not just a matter of empowerment of women, which is
important in and of itself. We have an education problem.
During the Taliban rule, of those eligible for primary
school, 39 percent of boys went to school, only 3 percent of
women were enrolled in school. Right now, out of 4.4 million
primary school-eligible kids, we have over 3 million enrolled,
so almost 75 percent. Now, women, or girls, lag behind boys,
but we are well up to the 60 percentile mark of girls going to
school.
If you look at the health care area, one in 15 Afghan women
dies as a result of a pregnancy, or a post-natal problem. That
compares to one in 3,000 here in the United States. One in four
kids in Afghanistan die before they are 5 years old. So we have
a whole bunch of problems to attack at the same time, and not
just the ISAF ones.
Senator Boxer. Right. Mr. Chairman, I am going to end here
and just say this. I sense a little bit of spark of hope there
when you say there is no doctrinaire approach to this, you are
going to look at this. So I feel that it is hopeful.
Let me just say, you cannot go to the doctor, and you
cannot go to school, indeed, you cannot go out of your house if
you do not feel safe; so protection, it seems to me, is the key
here. I hope we will listen more to the voice of the women
there, because that really is the voice of the people, I think.
And if we do that, I feel so confident that this will, in fact,
be the model that Senator Lugar is looking for.
I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me make sure about, I guess,
something factual. There is no doctrinaire position, but we
did--I met with the British one-star who was in charge of that
operation, and with our military there. We are not opposed to
expansion of ISAF, but we made clear we would be no part of it;
is that right?
Mr. Wolfowitz. The ISAF leadership was held by the British
and then by the Turks, and we are trying to keep our forces
focused on their job of finding terrorists and finding Taliban.
The Chairman. That is not my question, Paul. I know that.
That is our first job. But did we not--I was told by the Brits
that we explicitly said we would not be part of an ISAF force,
period; is that right or wrong?
Mr. Wolfowitz. And we are not part of ISAF.
The Chairman. No, not that we ``are not,'' we would not,
under any circumstances be part of an ISAF force; is that
correct?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, actually, Secretary Armitage is
reminding me, we have 36 people in the headquarters helping to
advise them. There is a very close relationship between ISAF
and CENTCOM. We provide a lot of the basic support that makes
them safe and secure. They are really two operations that are
connected to one another.
The Chairman. Well, let me say it another way, and you
sound like your State Department guy now; no offense, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. What does the State Department guy sound
like, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Not like you.
Thank, God. I mean thank God, you do not sound like him.
Let me make sure I understand this. I was told the
following, with a U.S. colonel standing with me, who was a
liaison to the ISAF force, and a captain. After a 2-hour brief,
I was told in February and then again in May, that we said we
would not be a part of an expansion of ISAF, no U.S. boots
would be on the ground with an ISAF force, if it expanded.
Second, I was told by, and I do not want to--I was told by
ISAF officers that they thought that would be all right, if we
had made a commitment to be an extraction force, if they
expanded, or if we were prepared to provide other guarantees of
participation with them. As the British one-star, whose name
escapes me now, said, ``Senator, how long do you think my
Parliament will let me stay here, absent your full
participation with us?''
I then met with Mr. Brohimi, who indicated that the Turks
had told him that they were looking forward to this command, as
long as the ``big dog'' was with them--us. When the President
stated, as I thought I heard him say, we would not be part of
ISAF, the Secretary of Defense said, I thought, I stand to be
corrected, we would not be part of ISAF.
It is not at all surprising to me that the little dog said,
``Well, wait a minute. We are not interested in expanding.'' So
I am trying to get that connection. Did we or did we not say we
would be part of ISAF, if it expanded? The way I got it was
basically, ``If you guys want to expand, you go ahead, but do
not count us in on the deal.''
If that is what we said, there is no question no one is
going to expand ISAF. I am trying to get a sense here of what
the real story is.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, we have been crucial to making that
operation work. The British were in at the beginning. They
stayed for 6 months. They did not leave because we were not
participating. They left because they could not sustain it
longer than 6 months, just as they cannot sustain some of their
operations on the other side with our coalition forces.
Our people have important work to do that only American
forces can do, or a few allies in small numbers, and that is
rooting out terrorists and capturing them. It is difficult
work, and it is work that is uniquely suited to the U.S.
military. As you mentioned, the Turks said they would not come
in without the ``big dog'' around. We gave them the assurances
they needed to come in, and we will give whatever assurances,
if those are needed, for other countries that want to
participate.
Our biggest problem to date has been that even the
countries that started out there, like the U.K., cannot sustain
those commitments for logistical or other reasons, and there is
not a huge number of countries signing up to volunteer.
The Chairman. I apologize to my colleague for interrupting.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I appreciate
you asking the question, because I think we could probably take
that down two or three more levels, and maybe some of our
colleagues will do that, and if I have time, I will come back
to that.
Gentlemen, thank you both. As always, we are grateful for
your leadership.
Secretary Armitage, you mentioned that you believe the
success in Afghanistan and Pakistan was tied together. I assume
what you were referring to was our success in the overall
region of our policies. My question is this: Does the
administration have an integration of policies that, in fact,
builds on your observation that you just shared with us a few
minutes ago, that would, in fact, enlarge just the Afghanistan/
Pakistan relationship?
For example, do you believe, do you have a policy, and is
it so integrated, and how are you doing it, that the success,
and the relationship, and our involvement in Afghanistan and
Pakistan have an impact on, are tied to, and coordinated with
our policies in the Middle East, Indonesia, other trouble spots
in the world? Do you believe, as we reverse the optics here,
which has been mentioned this morning, Senator Lugar talked
about it, why is it people seem not to care for us, some
people?
Do we have an integrated policy that reverses those optics
to say the Muslim world is looking at us, or the Arab world, or
any world, through their optics, not America's? Your comment
led me to believe, and I want you to respond to this, that, in
fact, the administration does have a policy to understand that
these areas are all linked together, Iran, Iraq, that you
cannot, in fact, deal in this universe without having some
certainly spillover, symbolism, words, deeds, actions, that, if
you do one here in Afghanistan or Pakistan, that it is tied, in
fact, to how the world sees us and our actions in the Middle
East, or in Indonesia, or anywhere else.
So I would appreciate it if you could take that a little
further and explain to me if we have such a policy, and how it
works.
Mr. Armitage. Senator Hagel, I think Paul and I would say
we have an integrated policy and strategy. I think he would be
a better judge of it, and you can tell us after you have
examined this. I mentioned two states, but I think you
immediately could expand it to the Central Asia region, the so-
called front line states in the war on terrorism. We have
everything from the supplemental to our appearances here in
front of the committee and other committees. We have made it
very clear that we see it as a total package.
I think when you talk about Indonesia and others, it gets
back to our joy and pleasure with Turkey leading the ISAF,
because it makes the point, here is a Muslim country that's
leading, not a foreign occupier trying to put some other
religion on top of the nation's religion. It was a very
deliberate choice of ours to go after Turkey, to make the point
that we are trying to make through public diplomacy, that Paul
was so eloquent about up there. We do not want to occupy, we
are not here to change your way of life, other than a few
items, and that once we have completed our task, we will leave.
The public diplomacy aspects are, I think, the area where
it is almost tied together. We are able to make the point in
the Muslim world, and Indonesia, which you mentioned, is the
largest Muslim country in the world, that we are not opposed to
the great religion of Islam. We do this in a number of ways we
think are integrated.
It is quite clear that terrorists themselves are not bound
by any geographic region. We have recently seen al-Qaeda--or
have reports of al-Qaeda meetings in Indonesia. Malaysia has
accomplished, I think, a magnificent endeavor on the arrest of
the 15 terrorists, along with Singapore, and arrested a bunch
more. So I think we are pretty integrated.
We are not as far along in our public diplomacy strategy as
we ought to be, and I am sure Under Secretary Beers was quite
open about that. But if understanding is the beginning of
wisdom, we understand that, and then we will go ahead and try
to get smarter on it.
Senator Hagel. Paul, would you like to respond to that?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I agree with everything that Rich just said.
It is important, the President has said this, not just to kill
terrorists, but to build a better world beyond this war on
terrorism. And I think a key part of that is reaching out to
the Muslim world. My own experience as an American Ambassador
in Indonesia, with some 200 million Muslims, the largest Muslim
population of any country of the world, convinces me that the
great majority of the world's Muslims would like to be part of
successful, free democratic, prosperous societies, those that
embody what might be called Western values, but that are, in
fact, universal values.
I think whoever made the point earlier, that success in
Afghanistan can be a useful model, I think was on the right
track. I think success in moderate countries, like Turkey or
Indonesia, can contribute to a larger dynamic, but we need to
work on the positive side of this as well as the more negative
side of fighting terrorists.
Senator Hagel. A followup question to that point. Is it
just our interpretation or understanding, as you just said has
been said here, that the role model for Muslim countries really
would be Turkey, for other nations? Is that not the designation
of the other Muslims/Arabs to decide, rather than for us to
decide for them, ``Now, you want to be like Turkey?''
I have heard from other Arabs/Muslims from around the world
that Turkey is not necessarily the secular country that many
Muslims would emulate. I happen to be a great supporter of
Turkey. My bigger question is: Are we making these
determinations through our optics, or trying to understand the
optics of the others, how they see it, and not just how the
United States sees it?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think those lines I quoted from the
President indicate it is up to people to choose their own
futures. I think where they are going on paths that are
embracing democracy and freedom, then it is in our interest to
support them. It is their decision, if they are Muslims, to
decide what they think Muslim values are.
My comment about Turkey, my comment about Indonesia--they
are very different countries, by the way. The Indonesians would
emphatically reject the idea that it is a secular country, but
it recognizes five different religions, not just a single one.
Senator Boxer referred to Bernard Lewis--many years ago, he
came to visit me in Indonesia when I was Ambassador. We had a
long discussion late one evening with a group of some dozen
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. At the end of it, he said,
``You are Indonesians. You are Indonesian Muslims. You have to
decide for yourselves the place of religion in society. But
after what I have heard this evening, I hope someday you will
send missionaries to other Muslim countries.''
There are things that people have to decide for themselves,
but I think what we can decide for ourselves is that those
countries that choose to be on the path of democracy, that
choose to be on the path of freedom, that choose to be on the
path of economic growth, fueled by private enterprise, those
are countries that I think represent the future, and a future
we want to support.
Mr. Armitage. I think the way that I look at it, Senator,
is there is nothing necessarily contradictory about Islam and
democracy, and beyond that, I agree with Paul, that they can
choose their own brand or form, et cetera, but that is, I
think, kind of the basic----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, sometimes people suggest that if
Islam is a state religion, that somehow that is inconsistent
with our outlook. I ask people to stop and think how many
European countries have Christianity as an official state
religion. There are many ways to pursue paths that represent
democracy and freedom. There are many different ways, but I
think we can tell the difference between those who are on that
path and those who are not.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Senator Biden is temporarily out
of the room, and has asked that I preside temporarily, and in
that role, I recognize Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Both of you know how personally I am a fan of the job that
both of you are doing. I think you and your respective two
bosses are some of the finest appointees in the whole
administration. I would use this subject of Afghanistan just
simply to say to Secretary Armitage, as I have already said to
Secretary Wolfowitz, let us do not make the mistake that we
made in Iraq when we left the downed pilot, who happens to be
from Jacksonville, Florida, who was declared dead, Commander
Scott Speicher.
We did not go back to get him. There were a series of
mistakes. Then after a live sighting, his status has been
changed to MIA, and there is consultation now going on as to
whether or not his status ought to be changed to POW. But in
the meantime, a few weeks ago, we have confirmed his
appointment to captain. I take every opportunity as I can to
remind you all of this, on behalf of Senator Pat Roberts,
Senator Bob Smith, and myself. I will be offering an amendment
to the DOD authorization bill today, again, putting this issue
front and center.
Now, what I want to talk about Afghanistan, I would like
you all to respond, please, is that in my case, having been to
Afghanistan twice since the first of the year, having talked to
our troops, having seen that inhospitable kind of environment,
having been so proud of the phenomenal military success that
our Nation had at the outset, as summarized by that photograph
on the front pages of marrying high tech and low tech of the
special operations troops, on horseback, with the Northern
Alliance calling in the pinpoint air strikes. We had this
phenomenal success, to begin with, and then we came to Tora
Bora, and it looks like that we let the back door stay open so
that they could get out; and our prime objective of al-Qaeda,
bin Laden himself, escaped, and part of trying to remedy that
is us trying to help close that border, or have hot pursuit.
I have spoken directly with the President of Pakistan about
that issue, and he has to say one thing publicly, and I
understand that, but it's just like Bonnie and Clyde in the
1920s, they would rob a bank, and they would go across the
state line, and the sheriff that was pursuing them could not go
after them. He would have to stop at the state line. Well, we
need to be able to pursue. But there was a lot more involved in
Tora Bora.
There were questionable loyalties; why did we, for example,
go with a guy named Hazret Ali, instead of Ghamsharik, and then
he hired a guy named Ilyas Knel, and there is some question
about them actually giving cover to the retreating al-Qaeda, so
that they got across the border.
Can you enlighten us, in light of our phenomenal military
success, how did we goof there? And then further answer the
question, if you would, I take it that we tried to correct some
of our mistakes when we went in on the Anaconda mission?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, as I understand it, there are a
couple of tactical considerations that have to be kept in mind,
and then a larger strategic one. From a tactical point of view,
first of all, it has to be underscored just how quickly
everything was happening. This operation in Tora Bora took
place, I think, only 3 weeks after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif,
and even less time than that after the fall of Kabul.
General Franks was assembling what he could assemble very
quickly. It was his judgment, and the judgment of tactical
commanders, that to do that operation alone in that incredibly
difficult terrain would have required a massive highly visible
buildup, and a major logistic undertaking, which would have
ensured the departure of many more enemy forces before we even
arrived.
Second, and related to that point, is, I would like to go
back to my satellite photograph of Afghanistan. We are talking
about an incredible country. You do not seal borders there. It
is not even clear that if we had had an all-American operation,
and the time to assemble people, that we would have done a
better job. It is true, they would not have been bribed, that
was a problem; but on the other hand, they would not have known
the terrain as well, they would not have known the local
people.
The net effect of that operation was, in fact, the
capture--both in Afghanistan and Pakistan--and killing of
several hundred al-Qaeda, so I would not judge it a failure. In
fact, under the circumstances, the speed at which it was put
together, I think, is pretty impressive. So when in Anaconda we
relied more heavily on American and coalition forces, it was
not because we had, quote, ``learned a lesson,'' but we had
more capability available.
I would also think that this discussion and many others
would benefit from recognizing the strategic point that I made
in my testimony, which is that we deliberately did not plan an
operation in Afghanistan to put in 100,000 or 150,0000 American
troops along the model of the Soviets. I think that is what the
terrorists expected us to do--they expected us to get bogged
down, and to have opportunities to kill us in great numbers,
and for us to make a lot of new enemies in Afghanistan.
Not everyone that we enlisted at Tora Bora were people we
wanted to enlist; but on the whole, we have had a good deal of
success in enlisting local forces to do our work for us, and in
the process, do some of their own. It is imperfect. I think
anyone who sets a standard of perfection really does not
understand anything about the history or the geography of that
country. Against a reasonable standard, I believe that General
Franks and his people have been remarkably successful and shown
remarkably good judgment.
Senator Nelson. Well, as a matter of fact, in Anaconda, it
is my understanding that you actually ran a feint of the old
Soviet model of the frontal attack, and when that was repulsed,
the al-Qaeda were high-fiving about how they had done it again,
just like they had done to the Soviets over a decade earlier,
but then you swooped in on them from the rear, and you are
certainly to be commended for that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. It is our military that deserves to be
commended, but I think they have learned either by studying or
by intuition a great number of the lessons from the terrible
experience of the Soviets there; and I think, as you correctly
point out, it took the terrorists by surprise. I think they
expected us to repeat some of what they had seen 20 years ago,
and we did not let them do that.
Senator Nelson. Did over 1,000 al-Qaeda get away in Tora
Bora?
Mr. Wolfowitz. It is very hard to determine numbers. The
numbers I have seen are less than that. We think hundreds got
away, but many more hundreds were killed or captured. Even
those estimates are a bit uncertain, because some of those
killed people are still buried in the bottom of caves and
tunnels that we will never find out about.
Senator Nelson. Did many get away in Anaconda?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would like to answer that for the record.
My impression and recollection from that time--and, again, let
me start out by saying that there was an awful lot we did not
know about that terrain and those conditions. Our estimates--
and they are estimates--I believe were much smaller.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
chairman of this committee for holding this timely hearing.
And I want to thank both these gentlemen, these two
Secretaries, for their just truly exceptionally, outstanding
leadership. It has been magnificent listening to you. I
continue to be impressed with your leadership, in that you have
an understanding of situations. You are principled, but you are
also very pragmatic.
In following up on part of the answer that was to Senator
Nelson's question, we are running into a lot of history here,
history and geography, and for everyone, and I am glad to hear
your positive outlook, and it is good to be optimistic.
But let us recognize the history of the instability, and
violence, and the lack of democracy in this country just in the
last 100 years of Afghanistan. In the last 100 years, they have
had 12 rulers, most of which ended their terms being
assassinated, deposed, or exiled.
I could go through them. You ought to go through them all,
from 1919, Durani Pashtun, Hadid Bula Khan, assassinated,
because too much British influence, Amanulah Khan, deposed and
exiled in 1929 due to a revolt by the Ghilzias, in opposition
to his modernization ideas; 1929, one that did not even last 1
year, another, a Tajik overthrown and killed; another one
assassinated; next one, deposed and exiled; overthrown and
killed after that; next one, killed in a shoot-out.
From 1978 to 1979, Hafizullah Amin, overthrown and killed,
invading Soviet military forces; Karmal, 1986, replaced and
exiled. Another Pushtun in 1992 overthrown and killed. The
Mujahadeen retreated to the extreme northeast. And, of course,
Mullah Omar fled in the face of the United States' attacks and
bombings, and also attacks by anti-Taliban forces.
This is what you all are facing, as we are trying to bring
some stability and concepts of universal freedoms and human
rights to this country, which has no history of it. In fact,
when it was ever tried, it ended up being to the detriment,
extreme detriment of whomever was trying to move it that way.
Now, we are talking about draining this swamp. The people
of Afghanistan are fortunate that the good leadership and
efforts of our military forces have removed from that swamp the
Taliban forces, their repression and intolerance. What we now
need to do is fill in that swamp with soil, so that these
concepts of security, and freedom, and individual liberty can
take root and grow.
Now, in doing so, we first have to install security and a
structure that will endure, so that you can have this concept
of individual rights, and a concept put into a constitution
that one's group rights, or ethnic rights, or tribal rights are
protected, and that individual rights are protected, and also,
obviously, a constitution.
Now, how this is going to be formed? I would like to hear
your views as whether this is a federation or a confederation
that secures security, No. 1. You talked about agriculture and
health, economic development, education, and opportunities
through individual freedom. Some of the more powerful warlords
have expressed reservations about the loya jirga, and have
intimated that they would resist any control, centralized
control, from Kabul. This is not at all surprising, again,
looking at Afghanistan's history; but it does certainly present
a problem, as far as having a unified country.
So what we are going to end up with? And this is my
concern, and I would like you all to address it, is whether we
are going to end up with all of these--you will try to get a
regional force, or a national force, but you may end up with
regional forces, and you are either going to have this current
regime being a transitional regime, hopefully, to a pluralistic
democracy, with respect and protection of individual rights,
thereby securing all ethnic groups; or you are going to end up
with a divided country, with the Northern Alliance group, the
Tajiks, and the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks, and then the southern
part, generally by Pushtuns, or the third approach is going to
be a very long-term caretaker ward of the international
community of obviously all the bordering neighboring countries,
as well as others, which means a very, very long deployment,
and probably not very satisfactory.
Now, where do you see this moving? In the short term, I see
this as a Balkanized country. How do you see our ability to
influence people to actually join a national force, as opposed
to being in a regional, or tribal, or warlord force, and how do
you see us, as well as our allies, trying to be James Madisons,
in a different sense, in structuring a constitution that has
buy-in from all the people, and all the factions, and the
warlords of Afghanistan?
Mr. Armitage. Well, Senator, neither Paul or I are people
who look at the world through rose-colored glasses; and if we
were, your short history would certainly take care of that. But
there is one difference, and I will go through it now, and all
of the 12 leaders who you mentioned.
First, we are trying to bring about several things at once.
We are trying to reduce the availability of money to certain
warlords, the eradication of the poppy and heroin crop, which
will have, I think, a positive effect on the country. We are
trying to develop simultaneously a national army, the French
are training the battalion. We are in the midst of our second
battalion training, or will be on 1 July, to be a multi-ethnic
national force. So that is part of it as well.
I think on the diplomatic side, the one difference from the
previous 100 years is that, at least for a time, and this is at
play now, the great powers play the great game as something
other than zero-sum. That was certainly the case in Petersburg,
the Bonn agreement, where the Russians, the United States, the
Iranians, the Pakistanis, all worked positively toward
Afghanistan, rather than in a more traditional way.
Now, our job in diplomacy is to try to make sure that
prevails. Now, there are some bad straws in the wind. The
Iranians, as the chairman mentioned, are busy in Herat. Thus
far, the Russians have been pretty good. We think the
Pakistanis are playing the game straight with us now, but it is
something that is going to take constant attention. Because if
we are not successful in keeping this as something other than
zero-sum, then the Balkanization to which you refer will be a
fact.
Now, with regard to the constitution, over the next 18
months, as the transitional government writes its constitution,
I do not know what they are going to come up with, but we are
going to make available to help them groups like the National
Endowment for Democracy. We have used the Asia Foundation for
some activities, up through the loya jirga, NGOs such as that,
to try to give them exposure to the best possible advice; but I
do not know what they are going to come up with at the end.
Senator Allen. Well, will we be insisting that, regardless
of how they form this confederation, or federation, or
constitution, that, obviously, security matters, but also that
these universal rights are respected----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Absolutely, and----
Senator Allen [continuing]. By law.
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. I think the two things we do
not want them, I think your phrase was to become a permanent
ward of the international community, and we do not want them to
descend back into the kind of lawlessness and violence that
made them a sanctuary for terrorists. I do think it is
important that we help them find their own way, but while the
history is important, I believe in many places around the
world, over time, the United States has been able to use its
influence to work with local people, whether it is Korea, or
the--I happen to think of Asian examples, because Rich and I
have worked a lot in Asia. But if you think about Korea, or the
Philippines, or Taiwan, American influence over a period of
time has greatly strengthened those people who favor freedom,
and democracy, and progress over those who do not, and there is
not an instant fix, especially not for a country with
Afghanistan's problems.
I believe whatever fix they come up with is going to
involve some considerable degree of regional autonomy. We had
it ourselves, especially in our founding. It does not mean
lawlessness; but hopefully, even the regional governments will
begin to be held to higher standards, and standards of how they
treat their people.
I would like to repeat again, I do not think it can be said
often enough, security is not just a matter of guns, it is also
a matter of money, that when people are rewarded financially
for good behavior, or have those resources withheld when they
do not. It is a major instrument in the hands of a central
government.
And that is why, at the same time that we in DOD are
putting a big emphasis on training an Afghan army, we support
in every way we can the efforts of the State Department and
Secretary Armitage to raise as much support as we can from the
international community and the United States to give that
central authority more leverage over the regions.
Senator Allen. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I think it is important to note that those
three examples you gave, Korea, Philippines, and Taiwan, we
invested about 50 years, I hope we understand that we are in
for a long haul, and no one calls for a timetable for
withdrawal.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing on building stability and avoiding chaos in
Afghanistan. It is a tall order, and as Senator Lugar said, it
has the opportunity to be a model, if we are successful. I
commend you on the hard work you are doing.
In reading through both your testimonies, and during the
hearing thus far, I have not heard one mention of the United
Nations yet. Have we had a bad experience in our relationship
with the U.N.? Why has the U.N. not yet been mentioned here in
our hearing?
Mr. Armitage. Well, we make great use of the United Nations
Special Representative, Ambassador Brahimi, who has worked very
closely with us. Secretary Powell speaks to Kofi Annan, the
Secretary General, regularly about Afghanistan. So we have not
had a bad experience.
We have found them very helpful in the political buildup
through Bonn, the Petersburg Agreement, and laterally, as we
went through the loya jirga. But the structures that exist for
reconstruction, et cetera, are the G-8, the Afghan Support
Group for Humanitarian Aid, and the Afghan Reconstruction
Support Group, co-chaired by the United States. So there are a
bunch of ad hoc groups that are responsible for the money, but
there is no bad odor associated with the United Nations, quite
the contrary.
Senator Chafee. Secretary Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I even mentioned them in my testimony. As
the Secretary of the Army said, Brahimi's role is quite key as
a coordinator of all international support to the Karzai
government, and we view him as really crucial in that effort.
On the military security side, the ISAF operates under U.N.
Security Council mandate, in fact.
Senator Chafee. If I could take more of my time.
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Chafee. We have talked about the size of
Afghanistan, trying to understand how an organization such as
the Taliban could control such a large amount of territory.
Senator Lugar noted the miracle of our successful military
campaign naturally leads one to wonder what happened to the
Taliban. In your testimony, you say we have arrested 2,500 al-
Qaeda members worldwide. In the worst-case scenario, did the
enemy just melt into the mountains? Are they currently intact
in their sanctuaries they might have prepared there? Is that
still a concern?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think they are all over the place. Some of
them just changed uniforms, and others did not even have to
change uniforms, because it was the same uniform. They changed
sides. It was inevitable, as in a country like that, that you
lose structure. We have tried to focus on those people that we
really think are hard core. Any number of people, I think, have
actually come over to the new authorities, which also is a
warning. They could be rented by a different side under
different circumstances.
So you have the combination of people who have been killed
and captured, some numbers who were still very hostile to us,
who were in hiding, or in the mountains, and we have had rocket
attacks, which we assume probably come from people like that,
but so far, these attacks have been small scale.
But as I mentioned in my testimony, there has been a fear
all spring, and predictions from some quarters of our
intelligence community, that there would be a major Taliban
offensive. I think they were trying to mount one. They were not
successful. That does not mean they are not out there, still
trying.
I could not agree more strongly with what the chairman
said. This is a long-term project. There is still a lot of work
to do, not only in reconstructing a stable Afghanistan for the
future, but also in clearing out those bad elements that caused
us so much grief.
Senator Chafee. You say they might have just changed
uniforms. Is there also a fear that there are still sanctuaries
in those very rugged mountains that we saw from satellite
images?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would not call them sanctuaries. I mean,
if it is large enough to be identifiable as a training area or
a base of operations, I think we can be pretty sure about
finding them and going after them; but for individuals to hide
all over the place is a fairly simple thing. We are
accomplishing a lot also by keeping them in that condition, as
opposed to organizing and fighting.
Senator Chafee. So if they are not in sanctuaries in the
mountains, are they then still amongst the general population?
Mr. Wolfowitz. In some numbers, I am sure----
Senator Chafee. A followup question would be: You talked
about not being in a quagmire. In Vietnam, one of the problems
was that our enemy was everywhere. They were simply members of
the general population. Is that a fear in Afghanistan?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Not in most parts of the country. As I said
in my testimony, there are only 5 provinces today where we find
significant pockets of hostile people, so that tells you that
the problem is confined geographically. I think it is confined
in size, but most importantly, regarding the allusion you made
to Vietnam, these are not, in the old guerrilla phrase, fish
swimming in a friendly sea.
I think most of the population is not very friendly to
them, and one of the ways in which we find their hiding places
is because they are very frequently turned in by local people,
and that is a major part of our effort. Sometimes it is
lubricated with money, but sometimes I think it is simply
because they earned the hostility of a great many of the local
populations around the country.
Mr. Armitage. You will see, Senator Chafee, press reports
of some arms caches being identified by local populations, too;
or the coalition forces, or ISAF, and I think this is
indicative of just what Paul is saying.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Chafee, I might say, I think your
questions bring out what a complex environment it is there. And
I must say that one of the things that was so impressive to me
and Secretary Rumsfeld in the briefings that we got from our
Special Forces people who operated there, it was not only the
extraordinary level of military skill that they display, but
their sophistication about local customs, and local languages,
and local politics; and they have to have it, but they seem to
have it, and they seem to find their way through that
complexity with a great deal of skill and effectiveness.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, how many al-Qaeda do you
estimate are left in Afghanistan or on the border with
Pakistan?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I do not know of a reliable estimate. It is
easier to estimate the numbers that we have captured and killed
than to know how many are left. I can try to get you a
classified answer for the record.
The Chairman. That would be helpful, if you could. Well, I
will refrain from any more questions. Do you have any
questions? I know that the Senator from Florida had another
question. Go ahead and finish.
Senator Nelson. The last time that I was in Afghanistan, I
was just struck with the enormity of the task that we have in
trying to bring about stability there, the lack of
infrastructure, the lack of law and order. The United States,
in a heroic effort, not only in our military operations, but
then in our military operations as an outreach to the
community, helping them build institutions, you know, it came
foursquare.
To me, as we went from Baghram to Kabul, to visit with our
Ambassador, and they were still trying to de-mine the grounds
of the U.S. Embassy, and as we proceeded from where we landed
in the helicopter to the embassy, suddenly someone stopped us
in the road and said, ``Wait a minute, we just found a mine a
hundred yards up the road, on the side of the road.'' And they
blew it up.
We are in this now so much for the long haul, and yet it is
so important to us. They had a huge drought there when I was
there in January----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Still do.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. And that is going to make it
difficult to try to get farmers to grow crops, instead of
growing poppies, and so forth. Give me some reason to have
optimism.
Mr. Armitage. I wish you had not asked the question. You
can be optimistic, sir, if you stop the car in time.
Senator Nelson. I am grateful for the little things, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. That is a big thing. The point of our program
is to get people out of the poppy business and get them back in
the farming business, and we have supplied 7,000 metric tons of
seed, and 15,000 metric tons of fertilizer, getting ready for
the fall planting season, which would be realized, of course,
in the spring.
At the same time, USAID and the international community are
trying to put together, again, the infrastructure for the
delivery of water. The drought has continued and, at least in
my building, they say now it is a drought of almost biblical
proportions; but there was a water system that transferred
water from the mountains, where there were snows, et cetera, at
one time. We are trying to rebuild that.
Along with talking people out of growing poppy, there are
other ways to get them out of the business, and to dissuade
them from poppy cultivation. Some of it is covert, obviously,
but part of it is international. We have worked very closely
with the Russians, who realize they have a huge problem in
Moscow, because that is where the heroin goes first now, to
have them do a better job with the border control, and to be
more of a prosecutorial mind set, in terms of drug flow, and
this is happening to some extent.
I do not want you to accuse us of being optimists. We
realize just what the chairman and others have said, this is a
long, tough slog, and we have started on the journey, and the
good news is that the President of the United States has said
we are in it for the long run. We realize it is not going to be
a 1, 2, 3-year fix. If you look at 23 years of war and 3\1/2\
years now of drought, it gives you an idea of the enormity of
the task, and the fact that literally a generation is without
education. So we are going to be at it for a long, long time.
It is not a matter of optimism or pessimism, I think, Senator,
it is a matter of just realism, and willingness to put the
shoulders to the grindstone.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, on the optimistic side, I am
impressed by that statistic about the 1.2 million refugees who
have come home, which was the goal the U.N. had set for the
entire calendar year, and they reached it in May. I think
people are voting with their feet, and there is still an
enormous amount of work to be done, but it is worth remembering
how far that place has come in a relatively short time.
Senator Nelson. When Senator Shelby and I were last there,
we found ourselves in the unusual situation--as we were having
our luncheon meeting with Chairman Karzai in the old king's
palace, with the plaster cracking on the ceilings, and so
forth, we found ourselves in the unusual situation of
impressing upon him the need for him to be more careful about
his personal security. We urged the same thing when we met with
President Musharraf.
What can you tell me about our attempts there to surround
him with troops that would be loyal, and to get him to stop
from wading in the crowds, and that kind of stuff?
Mr. Wolfowitz. There is not so much I think we would want
to say here, other than the fact that we have noticed the same
phenomenon, and we have been involved in some training. It is
very difficult to persuade natural politicians from wading into
crowds. We have seen that happen even closer to home. It is a
natural impulse of a born politician, but we would be more than
happy to provide on a classified basis just what efforts have
gone into this, sir.
Senator Nelson. Well, I figured that Senator Shelby and I
were instruments to be used by you in trying to convey that
message when we were meeting with him. This was several months
ago.
Let me ask again about how, Secretary Wolfowitz, did we get
in the situation where we were having to decide on the Tora
Bora assault between two warlords, one of whom seemed not to
provide the closure of that rear exit, and what did we learn
from that, that we can avoid those kind of mistakes in the
future? Tell me just what you can for the record here, as we
prepare for the future on trying to go get the No. 1 guy, who
we still do not have.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Yes, but I guess do not accept the premise
that General Franks' people made a mistake. They made judgments
in circumstances, as I said earlier, of a very rapidly evolving
tactical situation. They obviously know things now about the
particular individuals that they did not know at the time; and
with that knowledge, they would rely on some of them and not
rely on others.
But I think the notion that we somehow could have avoided
relying on local forces is false. If we had not used local
forces, I think even more people would have gotten away. That
is certainly General Franks' judgment, and everything that I
have seen reinforces that.
If there is a lesson there, it is that you can never have
enough good intelligence on the people that you are working
with. You need to learn from experience. We were there
basically for 3 weeks when all of that happened. I think we
have a much better read on who we can work with and who we
cannot work with now; but look, betrayal is part of that
culture, as well. People fight for one side one day and another
side the next day.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I followup with one
additional comment? I want to commend you all for your success
in the diffusing the extremely high tensions--they are not
completely diffused--between India and Pakistan.
But I bring that up, having been there myself, having gone
from Islamabad to New Delhi with Senator Shelby, arguing the
same things that you all have done very successfully recently,
and I congratulate you on that. But I bring up this issue in
terms of not only what that would mean to world peace, were
they to get into an exchange of nukes, but what that would do
to our effort to go after al-Qaeda. Because I believe that
porous border of highly mountainous terrain, with Pakistan/
Afghanistan, is where a lot of the al-Qaeda still are; and yet,
we see the troops at least being threatened to be pulled off of
there, the Pakistani troops, to the Kashmir border, and,
therefore, not guarding that rear door. Tell us what you can
about that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. You are absolutely right in expressing that
concern. I would say it is one of several reasons why we in the
Defense Department were very appreciative of Secretary
Armitage's diplomatic efforts. If that conflict breaks out into
war, not only will it be terrible for the people involved, but
it will be a real setback for our effort to get terrorists in
some significant numbers, or in these very wild tribal areas of
Pakistan, where, by the way, the Pakistani Government has never
exercised a great deal of authority.
They have made significant efforts over the last few months
to put more people in there, but some of those people were
diverted by the building crisis on the Indian border. If it
were to break out into war, I think it would seriously degrade
those efforts.
So far, I must say that the troops that are there seem to
be doing a very aggressive job of going after al-Qaeda. It is
wild country, it is difficult country, but I think they are
making progress. We would like to see that progress continue.
Mr. Armitage. It is a generally held view, Senator Nelson,
that nothing would represent success in a greater way for al-
Qaeda than a dandy little war between India and Pakistan. They
would be the only beneficiary.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you
very much. We will have a few written questions, if that is OK.
Let me say in your parting here that I think you have done an
incredible job. I do think, one area of disagreement,
personally, is that I think that U.S. leadership is still
possible to expand ISAF beyond Kabul. I think absent doing
that, and relying on warlords as much as we do while we are
trying to set up this interim government, is a judgment call. I
respect the call, but I think we are making some mistakes.
Every time I see the President, the first thing he says to
me, ``Do you have anything to say, except about Afghanistan?''
So I am a broken record on this, but I appreciate your answers,
and I appreciate you making yourself available.
You are excused, unless you have any closing comment either
one of you would like to make.
Mr. Wolfowitz. No. Thank you.
Mr. Armitage. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. You guys are like good trial lawyers. Never
ask a question to which you do not know the answer. Thank you
both very much.
We have a second panel, and I would like now, while some
are leaving the room, Ambassador Peter Tomsen knows the
political landscape of Afghanistan inside and out. As Special
Envoy to Afghanistan for the previous President Bush, he dealt
with many of today's power brokers long before they had any
real power to broker. He is currently the ambassador-in-
residence at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. It seems to
me, that in my former capacity as the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, I kept calling people from the University of
Nebraska at Omaha, and I do not know what the deal is here, but
it must be a real sanctuary there.
Senator Hagel. I am a graduate, believe it or not. It
probably takes that idea out of your mind, but----
The Chairman. No, no.
In my mind, that elevates it considerably.
The thing I know most about Omaha is that it is very close
to Iowa. It is a long story; it is an inside joke.
Brigadier General David Grange earned three Silver Stars
and two Purple Hearts during his service in Vietnam. He has
served in Delta Force, Ranger, and Special Forces operations
during his 30-year military career, and as commander of Task
Force Eagle in Bosnia, he is particularly well equipped to
comment on U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.
Now, I would invite you, Mr. Ambassador, if you have an
opening statement, and then General Grange, and then we will go
to questions. And I thank you for your patience.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. PETER TOMSEN, SPECIAL ENVOY TO
AFGHANISTAN (1989-1992), FORMER AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA,
AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA,
OMAHA, NE
Mr. Tomsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the panel, too. I would also like to thank the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff, because we meet periodically, and I
must say that you have a lot of Afghan experts on your staff,
on both sides of the aisle.
There is an old American saying that posits, ``The biggest
enemy of better is best,'' and that applies to Afghanistan. If
you go for the best, as you, Senator, and others were
commenting, you are not going to get there. All we can hope for
is steady, incremental improvement, given the horrendous
situation after 25 years of war, and the many problems,
economic, security, et cetera, that rock that country.
The loya jirga was, in my opinion, a success overall. There
were setbacks, there were complaints, and you can read about
them in the New York Times op eds; however, again, ``the
biggest enemy of better is best.'' Hamid Karzai was selected by
secret ballot, which he insisted on, by a great majority of the
delegates. The cabinet that he has represents diversity, the
different ethnic groups, broadly speaking, in the country.
Actually, probably not even the Almighty could satisfy all
Afghan groups that they are fairly represented. But I think
there is a broad representation of all ethnic and religious
groups in his cabinet. I think he has done very well. The three
Vice Presidents represent the main ethnic groups in the
country, Pushtun, Hazara, and Tajik.
The challenges of reconstruction now are before us. I wrote
a May 17 editorial published in the Wall Street Journal on some
problems in the reconstruction process. Hamid Karzai gave a VOA
interview yesterday, in which he says, ``Foreign aid continues
to be a trickle, and now that the loya jirga is finished, we
have to deliver. Our honeymoon is over,'' is what he told VOA.
There has been a lot of talk about $4.5 billion going out
there, but, in fact, as I mentioned in that Wall Street Journal
editorial, a lot of it is captured and snarled in aid
bureaucracies, the United Nations, our own, British. It is not
getting down to the lowest level. In fact, the only
reconstruction activity that we have seen has been the Special
Forces civil action teams out in the villages, building wells,
schools, roads. The money that is for reconstruction, that has
been promised and appropriated, is not there. The traction is
not there. Something has to be done.
The four strategic reconstruction goals are mentioned, I
will not go into them in my statement, which I would point to.
The most important by far is the revival and modernization of
Afghan national self-governing institutions, democratic,
economic, administrative, and military. There was a lot of--
sort of skeptical comments on Afghan's ability to govern
themselves in this session, but I would underline that from
1933 to the Soviet invasion there was stability in Afghanistan,
there was progress along the democratic path. Unlike South
Korea, Taiwan, this did not come because of sustained American
pressure. It came from an Afghan elite in Kabul, including the
former king, Zahir Shah, who introduced a democratic
constitution in 1964, and then implemented that democratic
constitution, including two parliamentary elections, which were
held in 1965 and 1969.
It was outside interference by the Soviet Union, primarily
the KGB operating through Communist parties inside Afghanistan,
who were situated in the military as well as the civilian side,
that overthrew this democratic process; but these institutions
were building in the 1960s and early 1970s. Well, we should go
back to them. Hamid Karzai's father was Speaker of the
Parliament during that period.
Success or failure of the massive historic reconstruction
process in Afghanistan will depend mainly on implementation of
this first strategic goal. Revival of Afghanistan's ability to
govern itself when foreign aid tapers off in 5, 7, or 10 years'
time.
Nation building, a la Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, is
not necessary in Afghanistan. They were never nations.
Afghanistan has been a nation for 300 years. It was never
colonized. In the 20th century, it sprouted its own self-
governing institutions. In my opinion, the centerpiece of the
international community's reconstruction efforts should,
therefore, be to aid and facilitate the reestablishment of
Afghanistan's governing institutions, equipping them to operate
in today's 21st century environment. The U.S.-led coalition and
the current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this
endeavor. The stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out
and render Afghan institutions effective is key. Failure would
lead to renewed fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted
foreign investment, and the resumed exploitation of Afghan
territory by terrorists.
Only an Afghan government, standing once again on its own
two feet, can keep the peace internally and resume a
constructive role in the international community. In this
connection, I urge positive consideration by the Senate for the
Henry Hyde House bill, the Freedom Support Act, which is
modeled on the Freedom Support Act for Newly Independent
States, passed in the early 1990s by Congress. You took the
initiative; you should take it again. It is going to establish,
if it is approved, a separate budget, like the Freedom Support
Act budget.
It will have a separate budget for Afghanistan. It will not
be, as has been the case so far, taking money incrementally
from different pots around the Federal Government, but
establish structurally a budget, establish the position of
coordinator, which Rich Armitage first held in the early 1990s
for the NIS Freedom Support Act budget, and is now ably carried
out by Bill Taylor, Ambassador Taylor, in the State Department,
a coordinator to bring together all of the different agencies
in the U.S. Government in a coordinated way, who are involved
in Afghanistan, and I believe there are over 20 today.
Let me just end by commenting that I support the expansion
of ISAF to regions inside Afghanistan, particularly Mazar-e-
Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. I would underscore what
you said, Mr. Chairman, if you look at that area of Mazar-e-
Sharif, the Tajik commander, Atef Mohammed, and Dostam are at
each other's throats. Mohakek is a Hazara warlord; he is also
involved. They have all agreed that they support the deployment
of an ISAF contingent, and it only has to be a couple hundred
to Mazar-e-Sharif.
That would definitely assist stability and security in the
area, and reconstruction in the area; otherwise, without this
foreign sort of referee presence, until the central government
is able to establish the military with a reach across the
country and security from the center, the fighting in the
region is going to continue, the attacks on refugees and also
on women are going to continue, and that applies, to a lesser
extent, to Kandahar and Jalalabad.
It would not take much, you are not going to be deploying
thousands to these different urban centers of Afghanistan. You
are going to be deploying tens or hundreds, but it would
accomplish a great deal in bringing security to these areas.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Tomsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter Tomsen, Ambassador-in-Residence,
University of Nebraska at Omaha; former Ambassador and Special Envoy to
Afghanistan
american policy on afghanistan
An old American saying posits: ``the biggest enemy of better is
best.'' It is worthwhile for Americans to keep this practical guideline
in mind when evaluating the just-completed Afghan loya jirga. There
were setbacks, unfulfilled objectives, and many would argue harmful
decisions at the loya jirga. In general, however, the positive
outweighed the negative. And, in the months and years ahead, there will
be plenty of time to shave away the negative.
The December, 2001 Bonn accords laid out an ambitious roadmap to
achieve peace, stability, democracy, human and gender rights, and
reconstruction in Afghanistan. The June, 2002 loya lirga, like the
June, 2004 parliamentary elections, is a critical milestone to realize
these goals.
In Afghan history going back to the eighteenth century, the
selection of a legitimate Afghan leader during times of trouble has
been the principal mission of Afghan loya jirgas, with only a few
exceptions--such as the 1964 loya jirga convened to approve a
democratic constitution. The just completed Afghan loya jirga
accomplished that main task--selection of Hamid Karzai to head the
Afghan transitional regime until the June, 2004 parliamentary
elections.
Criticism of the loya jirga by Afghans and non-Afghans has centered
on non-selection of a mini-legislature called for in the Bonn accords,
and correcting the imbalance in the cabinet stemming from the Northern
Alliance's unfortunate unilateral seizure of Kabul last fall.
Mr. Chairman, each of these criticisms has some validity; however,
demanding the ``best'' in the current Afghan environment is folly. Not
even the Almighty could have satisfied all Afghans in the distribution
of cabinet portfolios.
Overall, the loya jirga successfully maintained essential progress
along the Bonn roadmap. The expectation that 1,500 representatives of
Afghanistan's varied groups and factions could agree on a mini-
legislature in this brief period was, frankly, unrealistic from the
beginning. The larger (but not majority) Pashtun group can point to
Pashtun Hamid Karzai at the top of the transitional regime, plus one of
the three Vice Presidents, Pashtun Abdul Qadir (the brother of renown
Afghan commander Abdul Haq), as substantial Pashtun representation in
the Afghan leadership. Pashtun Zahir Shah will play an important
symbolic role as ``father'' of the nation. Structural ethnic balance at
senior levels is largely rounded out by a Tajik and Hazara filling the
other two Vice Presidential posts. Hamid Karzai's twenty-eight member
cabinet also reflects broad Afghan ethnic-religious balance. A well-
known Afghan woman is Minister for Women's Affairs. The outspoken Sima
Samar will head the Human Rights Commission.
Challenges of Reconstruction
There are four strategic reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. The
goals should be viewed--and implemented--along an integrated path. Each
goal is linked with the other three.
Revival and modernization of Afghan national self-governing
institutions; democratic, economic, administrative and
military.
Implementation of ``bottom up'' community-based
reconstruction through Community Reconstruction Centers.
Rebuilding Afghanistan's macro-infrastructure, including
roads, bridges, agriculture and telecommunications.
Humanitarian relief for endangered sectors of the Afghan
population.
Success or failure of the massive, historic reconstruction process
in Afghanistan will depend mainly on implementation of the first
strategic goal: revival of Afghanistan's ability to govern itself when
foreign aid tapers off in five to ten years time. Nation building a la
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor is not necessary in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has been a nation for 300 years. It was never colonized. In
the 20th century, it sprouted its own self-governing institutions, and
slowly modernized them during the forty years prior to the Soviet
invasion.
The centerpiece of the international community's reconstruction
effort should therefore be to aid and facilitate the re-establishment
of Afghanistan's governing institutions, equipping them to operate in
today's 21st century environment. The U.S.-led coalition and the
current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this endeavor. The
stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out and render Afghan
institutions effective is key. Failure would lead to renewed
fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted foreign aid investment
and the resumed exploitation of Afghan territory for international
terrorist and narcotics operations. Only an Afghan government standing
once again on its own two feet can keep the peace internally and resume
a constructive role in the international community.
The Senate's support of the House Henry Hyde bill will give a great
boost to meeting the reconstruction challenge in Afghanistan. Even
today, there is no American reconstruction strategy, fund to support
the strategy, and efficient executive branch machinery to implement the
strategy.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in December, 1991, Congress wisely
established the Freedom Support Act to give sustenance to our political
rhetoric of support for the transition to free market democracies by
the Newly Independent States (NIS). Deputy Secretary of State Armitage
became the first NIS aid coordinator. He and his successors, Ambassador
Morningstar and Taylor, have extremely effectively piloted Freedom
Support Act programs. The Senate's support for the Henry Hyde
initiative will fill the confusing vacuum in the Administration on
strategy, funding and program implementation for Afghan reconstruction.
Congress rose to the occasion in the 1990s by passing the Freedom
Support Act. It is time to take a similar step in 2002 to accomplish
U.S. interests in Afghanistan.
American Regional Diplomacy
There is need for a comprehensive U.S. diplomatic policy on
Afghanistan and the region. American goals of combating terrorism,
promoting peace, stability, democracy, human and gender rights, and
fighting narcotics trafficking must have a broader regional scope. We
need to remember that Afghanistan's horrendous condition has mainly
been created by outsiders--the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent
eight-year brutal occupation, followed by another invasion by foreign
Muslim extremists from Pakistan and the Gulf, supporting their own
Afghan surrogates to reign from Kabul.
A creative American diplomatic architecture for the region should
strive for a consensus among the ``outer ring'' of powers surrounding
Afghanistan to respect Afghanistan's independence, neutrality and
sovereignty. Such an approach, perhaps modeled on the 1955 Austrian
State Treaty, could restrain the states in the ``outer ring'' from
attempting to manipulate Afghanistan to serve their competing strategic
objectives in the Central-South Asian region.
Afghan Legitimacy
Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by stressing the significance of
avoiding ``Mother Hen'' tactics toward Afghan politics. As you know,
Afghans are a proud, independent people, inured historically to
resisting outside attempts to dominate Afghanistan. They have recently,
with our help, thrown off the yoke of first Soviet, then radical
Muslim, control. We must not establish an American image of just the
next outsider trying to dictate who rules in Afghanistan. Outside arm-
twisting on behalf of preferred political power arrangements may be
effective for days or a few months, but it is doomed to failure in the
long run.
The overarching intention of the Bonn accords has been to help the
Afghans to form the legitimate Afghan regime, chosen by Afghans, which
has been missing for a quarter century. Conflict will continue to tear
Afghanistan as long as this void in legitimacy exists. American and
other outsiders can discreetly advise Afghans on how to govern
themselves. The decision-making in Afghan politics, however, must be,
and be seen to be, done only by Afghans.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. General,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID L. GRANGE, U.S. ARMY (RET.),
CHICAGO, IL
General Grange. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to share some thoughts today with the committee. I
have no access to any classified information on this subject,
and, in fact, I am serving now as a philanthropist for the
McCormack-Tribune Foundation in Chicago. Any free time I have--
--
The Chairman. Maybe we can talk after this.
General Grange. Sir?
The Chairman. I said, maybe we can talk after this.
General Grange. Yes; absolutely. But my free time is spent
really on my John Deere tractor on my farm in Illinois. But I
would like to speak from experience serving in heavy, light,
and special operating units in combat and also in peace support
operations, especially challenges after the main fight, where
the entry into the country has occurred.
I believe that you always have to back up and ask, like
someone said earlier, why are we in Afghanistan? What is the
purpose of the United States in this commitment? I understand
that the mission is to disrupt, if not destroy, the al-Qaeda
terrorist organization, to deny them the sanctuary in
Afghanistan, and to remove the Taliban from power.
Our military has removed the Taliban from power. I do not
believe that we have destroyed, but we have disrupted the al-
Qaeda operations, and we have denied the sanctuary in
Afghanistan, though it has probably moved to Pakistan.
But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is
to Afghanistan. Any military operations consolidation phase or
a country at war reconstruction phase is the most difficult
aspect of any operation. If we expect to see some semblance of
rule of law, democratic government, or a free market economy,
and an institutional capacity of Afghanistan, though not
necessarily a replica of the United States of America, we have
a long way to go.
I have submitted enclosure one \1\. It is the international
community's challenge to a peace support operation, and it was
discussed a little bit by the earlier panel about military
objectives, and other than military objectives to reach goals
set by the national command authority. It is something that can
be discussed later during our questions following this
testimony; but this chart shows the challenge, and it has to do
with not just the military, but it has to do with money, it has
to do with other organizations that have a very big role in
achieving our goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The enclosure is a chart that can be found on page 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If these are the criteria to define winning, and that is
the democratic society, a free market economy, some type of
institutional capacity, then we must stay the course and commit
the time and the resources, and see the mission through. I
believe that our responsibility is not only to destroy the
enemy and make Afghanistan safer, but I think we have a
responsibility to make it better.
Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, to the
honor, and the credibility of the United States of America than
not to accomplish what we have set out to achieve. We must
fulfill what we promised to others. In essence, I believe we
must walk our talk.
Our Nation also has the responsibility to our military, and
I really appreciate the remarks that Senator Nelson mentioned
earlier about leaving a fallen comrade in the status of a
prisoner of war, or an MIA. I think that is extremely important
to our Armed Forces. I do not think that we should ever send
our Armed Forces into harm's way unless we maintain the will to
win, and that means to complete the mission.
It is very important to the American people that those who
have already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in
vain. What hurts a soldier more than austere conditions, fear,
loneliness, and even wounds, is the lack of will to follow a
mission through.
It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick-start our
form of government. We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or
any other country, torn by war, to do so in 1 or 2 years. That
is why we should never put a time limit on an operation, but
maintain the resolve for as long as it takes to reach our
stated objectives. After years of murder, rape, and destruction
in any country that we have been involved in, to love thy
neighbor takes time. We Americans are attuned to the 100-yard
dash, not a marathon, and this particular operation is a long
run.
The enemy has a vote when this victory is decisive. We are
not fighting a nation state in this case. The enemy is a
terrorist organization. Who decides on surrender? Who decides
that they are defeated? What are our measures for mission
accomplishment? A very tough situation.
This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists
not only sets the example for the world of America's
determination, and I think Senator Hagel asked this question,
but it is also critical to the region's stability. What is
their perception of what we are doing? What happens in
Afghanistan affects the overall security of southwest Asia.
This fight is not defined only by Afghanistan's national
borders. If so, it would be like our fighting in South Vietnam,
which at times had total disregard for Laos, Cambodia, and
North Vietnam.
The enemy does not recognize the borders, but takes
advantage of the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and
continually creates negative influences on our campaign; for
example, one that was brought up earlier were paramilitary
operations in Kashmir, to distract our efforts.
The United States and our coalition have deployed a
powerful military force in Afghanistan, and power does matter.
But power is relative to the situation at hand, especially in
unconventional warfare. Tangible power, bombs, tanks, infantry
battalions, are easy to quantify, but intangible power is hard
to quantify, and though relative to this kind of conflict, it
must be considered. Propaganda, disinformation, black market
payroll, and the manipulation of religious beliefs are as
powerful as any B-52.
We must be able to apply various means of power, and not
only the physical and organizational domains of an operation,
but particularly in the moral domain, where we achieve the most
effect.
In your packet, I have enclosure two, and it talks about
conflict resolution and the time it takes to meet an objective,
operating in the physical, organizational, and moral domain.
The biggest payback is in the moral domain, but the experts
operate in all three domains to achieve their objectives.
It is imperative that the coalition can strike hard with
one hand and provide humanitarian assistance with the other.
The people of Afghanistan, like any other people around the
world, respect strength, magnified by compassion. Our mission
in Afghanistan requires a robust civil affairs, public affairs,
psychological operations, and engineering effort to provide the
humanitarian assistance, and development projects critical to
reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.
Operation Anaconda, I believe, got the attention of the
enemy. The Taliban and the al-Qaeda spent a lot of time
preparing a firesack to trap and destroy coalition forces in
the valley. They wanted to bloody Americans, to challenge
America's resolve to continue this fight. They lost the battle.
They now have reassessed their strategy and are now lying low,
conducting reconnaissance and small-scale guerrilla operations,
influencing the peoples of remote villages, and waiting us out.
In their minds, we will not stay the course.
It is imperative that we sustain our efforts. In fact, I
recommend we increase them if we expect to win. It can be done,
I believe, without the appearance of an occupation force.
Aggressive coalition, and eventually combined with Afghanistan
army patrolling must continue to maintain pressure on the
enemy, especially in the eastern provinces. Our forces and
efforts must adapt to the various regions of Afghanistan, with
a holistic strategy using military, other government agencies,
non-governmental agencies in a synchronized campaign. We have
had a hard time doing that in the past.
A robust, credible Afghanistan army cannot be built without
money, quality weapons, a multi-ethnic force mix, a sense of
pride of being a part of that army, and a sense of purpose in
support of the country. The army should have a fair
representation of not only Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also
Pushtuns. The benefits of being a part of this army must
outweigh anything that the warlords, terrorists, or black
marketeers can offer them. Our advisory efforts to this army
will be critical to success.
The international security force, along with the Afghan
army, eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no
credibility unless they do. To avoid confrontation, though
there are always risks involved in this strategy; this force
must work as combined patrols with the regional warlord
militias. Regional coalition liaison teams are critical to the
success of these combined patrols, and that includes Americans.
We must recognize the warlords have special powers, and the
Karzai government, as well as the coalition leaders, must
establish a cooperative relationship with them. It is like
dealing with any faction leaders in any other conflict we have
been involved in. Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The
warlords' militia should be made an auxiliary part of the
national army, paid to protect regional infrastructure, with
emphasis on ``we are all Afghans.''
Without this cooperation, the road networks and bridges
will never truly be developed and open for trade, and the
establishment of a free market economy. Humanitarian relief aid
will never get to remote sites, and water wells, schools,
hospitals, and communication infrastructure will never be
constructed, critical to the refugee return.
Right now, the lifeline for coalition forces is the air
bridge. This cannot be sustained forever. As you all know, the
wings are being flown off our aircraft. Ground lines of
communication must be opened to continue military and non-
military efforts in Afghanistan. The construction of major
public works should not be done with a Brown and Root model,
though I must admit, I have had great success with their
support in other operations. It is very effective, but it does
not facilitate the commitment of the Afghanistan people.
Reconstruction projects are a great opportunity, providing
work and a sense of pride to the local communities. What we
want is an employed work force, not trigger pullers carrying
AK-47s. A series of regional arsenals should be established to
contain heavy weapons, still belonging to the regional
warlords, as I think it would be a mistake to try to take them
away, and maintained and inspected by the national government
and coalition advisors. An inspection program of these arsenals
among warlords, supervised by the national army, should be
instituted.
The U.S. military contribution to a sustained campaign to
bring a chance of lasting peace to Afghanistan and the region
should be as follows, and this is my summary: special operating
teams, consisting of civil affairs, public affairs,
psychological warfare, and engineers should be collocated with
regional warlords, and tribal chiefs at key villages and nodes.
Military advisors should be integrated throughout the
Afghanistan army. Rapid reaction force to respond and support
the coalition/national/Afghan army should be established and on
hand. At least a combined arms brigade, American, to continue
search-and-destroy operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban
remnant forces should remain a robust infrastructure and
institution support elements, i.e., civil affairs, public
affairs, engineers, medical, communications, et cetera, need to
be there to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction efforts.
In closing, our Nation has committed itself to the
accomplishment of this mission. We have spent considerable
resources to date, and we have sacrificed human life. We are
obligated to stay the course and win this fight. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Grange follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, U.S. Army (Ret.)
I appreciate the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today
on a security plan for Afghanistan. I have no access to classified
information and my thoughts are a result of my experiences serving in
heavy, light and SOF forces around the world, being a part of both
victory and defeat.
Why are we in Afghanistan? What's America's purpose? I understand
that the mission is to disrupt if not destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization, deny them the sanctuary of Afghanistan, and remove the
Taliban from power. Our military has removed the Taliban from power. We
have not destroyed but we have disrupted al-Qaeda operations. We have
denied sanctuary in Afghanistan, though be it, it has moved to
Pakistan. But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is to
Afghanistan. Any military operations' consolidation phase, or a country
at war's reconstruction phase is the most difficult aspect. If we
expect to see some semblance of rule of law, democratic government,
free market economy, and institutional capacity--though not necessarily
a replica of the U.S. model--we have a long way to go. (Enc--IC
Challenge During PSO) If these are the criteria to define winning, we
must stay the course and commit the time and resources and see the
mission through. I believe that our responsibility is not only to
destroy the enemy and make Afghanistan safer, but also to make it
better.
Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, honor, and
credibility of the USA than not to accomplish what we set out to
achieve. We must fulfill what we promise to others--in essence, to walk
our talk. Our nation also has a responsibility to our military. Never
send our Armed Forces into harm's way unless we maintain the will to
win. It is very important to the American people that those who have
already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in vain. What
hurts a soldier more than austere conditions, fear, loneliness and even
wounds is a lack of will to follow a mission through.
It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick start our form of
government. We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or any other country
torn by war to do so in one or two years. That is why we should never
put a time limit on an operation, but maintain the resolve for as long
as it takes to reach our objectives. After years of murder, rape, and
destruction, to love thy neighbor takes time. We Americans are attuned
to the 100-yard dash, not the marathon. In Afghanistan's case this is a
long run.
The enemy has a vote on when victory is decisive. We are not
fighting a nation state; in this case, the enemy is a terrorist
organization--who decides on surrender? Who decides they are defeated?
What are our measures for mission accomplishment?
This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists not only
sets the example to the world for America's determination, but is
critical to this region's stability. What happens in Afghanistan
affects the overall security of Southwest Asia. This fight is not
defined by Afghanistan's national borders; if so it would be like our
fighting in South Vietnam, which at times had total disregard for Laos,
Cambodia and North Vietnam. The enemy does not recognize borders but
takes advantage of the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and
continually creates negative influences on our campaign, (i.e.--
paramilitary operations in Kashmir, to distract our efforts). We have
to conduct our campaign regionally as well.
The United States and our coalition have deployed a powerful
military force in Afghanistan. Power matters, but power is relative to
the situation at hand. Tangible power--bombs, tanks, and infantry
battalions--are easy to quantify. But intangible power is hard to
quantify, though relative to this kind of conflict. Propaganda,
disinformation, black market payroll, and the manipulation of religious
beliefs are as powerful as a B-52. We must be able to apply various
means of power in not only the physical and organizational domains, but
particularly in the moral domain, where we achieve the most effect.
(Enc--Conflict Resolution--PSO/Combat) It is imperative that the
coalition can strike hard with one hand and provide humanitarian
assistance with the other. The people of Afghanistan, like any other
people around the world, respect strength magnified by compassion. Our
mission in Afghanistan requires a robust civil affairs, public affairs,
psychological operations, and engineering effort to provide the
humanitarian assistance and development projects critical to
reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.
Operation Anaconda got the attention of our enemy. The Taliban and
al-Qaeda spent a lot of time preparing a firesack to trap and destroy
coalition forces in the valley. They wanted to bloody Americans, to
challenge America's resolve to continue the fight. They lost the
battle. They have reassessed their strategy and are now laying low,
conducting reconnaissance and small-scale guerrilla operations,
influencing remote villages, waiting us out. In their minds, we will
not stay the course.
It is imperative that we sustain our efforts, in fact increase
them, if we expect to win. Aggressive coalition and eventually,
combined Afghan Army patrolling must continue to maintain pressure on
the enemy, especially in the Eastern provinces. Our forces and efforts
must adapt to the various regions of Afghanistan with a holistic
strategy using military, other government agencies, and non-government
agencies in a synchronized campaign.
A robust, credible Afghan Army cannot be built without money,
quality weapons, a multi-ethnic force mix, sense of pride, and a sense
of purpose. The army should have a fair representation of not only
Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also Pashtuns. The benefits of being a part
of this army must outweigh anything warlords, terrorists, or black
marketeers can offer. Our advisory efforts to this army are critical to
success.
The international security force, along with the Afghan Army
eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no credibility
unless they do so. To avoid confrontation, though there are always
risks involved, they must work as combined patrols with the regional
warlord militias. Regional, Coalition Liaison Teams are critical to the
success of these combined patrols.
We must recognize that warlords have special powers, and the Karzai
government, as well as coalition leaders, must establish a cooperative
relationship with them. Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The
warlords' militias should be made an auxiliary part of the national
army, paid to protect regional infrastructure, with emphasis on ``we
are all Afghans.'' Without this cooperation, the road networks and
bridges will never truly be developed and opened for trade and the
establishment of a free market economy; humanitarian relief aid will
never get to remote sites; and wells, schools, hospitals and
communication infrastructure will never be constructed. Right now, the
lifeline for the coalition forces is the air bridge. This cannot be
sustained forever. Ground LOCs must be opened to continue military and
nonmilitary efforts.
The construction of major public works should not be done with a
Brown & Root model. Though effective, it does not facilitate the
commitment of the Afghan people. Reconstruction projects are a great
opportunity providing work and a sense of pride to the local
communities. What we want is an employed work force, not ``trigger
pullers'' carrying AK-47s.
A series of regional arsenals should be established to contain
heavy weapons, still belonging to the regional warlords, but maintained
and inspected by the national government and coalition advisors. An
inspection program of these arsenals among warlords, supervised by the
national army, should be instituted.
U.S. military contributions to a sustained campaign to bring a
chance of lasting peace to Afghanistan and the region should be as
follows:
SOF teams (SF, CA, Psyops, Eng) co-located with regional
warlords and tribal chiefs at key villages and nodes.
Military advisors integrated throughout the Afghan Army.
Rapid Reaction Force to respond and support the coalition/
national Afghan Army.
At least a combined arms brigade to continue search and
destroy operations against al-Qaeda/Taliban remnant forces.
Robust infrastructure/institution support elements (i.e.--
civil affairs, public affairs, engineers, medical,
communication, etc.) to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction
efforts.
Our nation has committed itself to the accomplishment of this
mission. We have spent considerable resources to date, and have
sacrificed human life. We are obligated to stay the course and win this
fight.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, general.
Mr. Ambassador, in my foray into Afghanistan and the
region, as well as following it very closely here, I have not
met anybody in uniform in place in Afghanistan, nor have I met
anyone engaged on the ground in Afghanistan in a civilian
capacity, who says anything other than what both of you just
said, there is a need to expand the security force.
Now, I think that the team the President has put together
in his administration is made up of an awful lot of bright
people. What is the disconnect here? What is the disconnect?
How do you explain--and I am not suggesting you have any inside
information, but how do you explain this, at best, reluctance,
and most probably outright hostility to the notion of expanding
ISAF?
Does it relate to the conviction that we do not have enough
reliable partners, and we will end up having to do it all? Does
it relate to your opening comment, that the enemy of the good
is the best, or however you phrased it? Try to give me some
insight, knowing the country, and having worked in the last
Bush administration. I am not trying to be critical; I am
really not.
Let me say one other thing. When I got back from
Afghanistan, like everyone who makes the trek, I wrote a
report; my staff and I wrote a report and discussed it with the
administration. I was initially very hopeful that the
President's assertions about a Marshall Plan, coupled with the
recognition on the part of White House personnel in the country
and from the National Security Agency, as well as folks at the
State Department, that there is a recognition, there was a need
for expanding any security--whatever you want to call it,
security force beyond Kabul. To tell you the truth, I was a bit
surprised when that battle seemed to be lost by those
proponents who said that is the way to go. Help me out. What is
this all about?
Mr. Tomsen. I will try to. I want to repeat what you said,
though, echo what you just said there, that we have to give the
utmost praise to our military for what they have done in
Afghanistan, and this brilliant victory, and what they are
doing now. I mentioned the civil action groups that are right
now out in the villages and towns, the only ones really in the
whole international aid establishment community that I have
seen doing work at the village level, with villages, in a
practical domain.
The Chairman. It is amazing.
Mr. Tomsen. Yes. It is also unfortunate that--that is why I
think this Henry Hyde Freedom Support Act initiative is so
incredibly important. It will give a framework to a Marshall
Plan-type initiative for Afghanistan. It gives it focus, it
gives it a budget, and it gives it a coordinative mechanism
inside the U.S. Government, like Rich used to do, and Bill
Taylor does today, to make sure that those countries, 12 of the
countries, which came out of the former Soviet Union are
getting assistance in a coordinated way from our government.
I was asked to appear on Christiane Amanpour's CNN show a
number of times, and one time she asked me, this was in
November, ``Why is CENTCOM, including General Franks, opposing
the deployment of ISAF to Kabul.'' This was not to the other
urban areas. It was to Kabul.
I said, I think it is a mistake. You have just heard in the
testimony division between, we have to go after the bad guys,
which we do, al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and on
the other hand, on this other track, we have to assist
Afghanistan to come back to the track of a normal country.
The fact of the matter is that there is a thick linkage
between these two, and you are only going to succeed in the
first area if you have a functioning government, with military
security, economic, political arms that work, which has the
support of the people, and that is the Bonn track, and it is
working. The loya jirga worked. They are going to have
elections. Again, they are going to have parliamentary
elections in 2004. That is the long-term answer, that is the
moral domain, as my colleague stated here in his testimony.
But I think what we are seeing, what the hangup is, it is
from--within the Pentagon, there is this feeling that expanding
ISAF is going to interfere with going after Taliban and al-
Qaeda. I think that is mistaken, and also there is a problem,
and I think the Pentagon has a point here, that we have to get
support of our allies to do this. But you are absolutely right,
Mr. Chairman, unless the United States shows leadership, there
is no chance we are going to get support of our allies.
We can do it, if we show leadership, and we should have
done it, in my opinion, 2 months ago. Indeed, the three
commanders squabbling among themselves around Mazar-e-Sharif,
causing so much friction up there, they have requested ISAF
deployment to their region, because they know that they cannot
continue.
As the attacks were going on in November and December, some
French and Jordanian contingents were deployed up there,
working with these various groups, and their fighting stopped.
Then the French and Jordanians left, and now the friction has
resumed. So I just end up where I began. I think in answer to
your question that the problem is coming from our uniformed
services, who have performed so brilliantly and are still
performing so brilliantly, I just think here it is political,
and I am afraid that they are able to carry the day inside the
Pentagon.
The Chairman. Well, the irony is, and I do not--I mean you
have been there, in terms of an administration working on this,
this kind of reminds me, general, of, I was a broken record
with the Clinton administration about exercising force in the
Balkans. I will never forget, I came back from my first trip in
1992 having met with Milosevic, where I had the interesting
conversation, when he asked what I thought of him, and I said,
``I think you are a war criminal and I am going to spend the
rest of my career seeing that you get tried as one.'' It was a
very nice conversation. I mean he looked at me like, ``lots of
luck in your senior year,'' and that was it.
But I came back, and at least in the Oval Office convinced
the President that we should lift the arms embargo, and he
turned to Christopher, who did not think that was a good idea,
and he said, ``OK. We will do that, but we will not do it
unilaterally, so Chris, head to Europe and talk them into
this.''
Christopher went to Europe, he was a fine Secretary of
State, and a fine man, I am a great admirer of his, and
basically said, ``You guys really do not want to do this, do
you? We think we should lift the arms embargo, but you guys do
not really want to do this, do you?''
Everybody said, ``No, we do not want to do this,'' and that
was the end of it. He came back and reported that no one wanted
to lift the arms embargo.
This reminds me of the same thing. I do not see, in my
experience, where the uniformed military is objecting to
expansion. I think the civilian military is objecting to the
expansion, in country, in country. I am not going to get
anybody in trouble, but in country, I could name you the
highest ranking military officials, and they all think we
should expand ISAF. This idea of legitimate concern, of
interfering with the efforts of going after al-Qaeda--the
remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, that is arguably true in
one of the three parts of the country.
You might be able to describe this policy as sort of
paraphrasing Julius Caesar, all of Afghanistan is divided into
four parts. In one part, that is arguably the case, but it sure
as heck is not the case over in the Iranian border. It sure in
heck is not the case up in Mazar. It is not the case in other
places. So I am confused here as to why, why there is this
resistance, when on the ground with our military, there is not
resistance.
I mean I could--again, I do not want to get people in
trouble, but I spent hours, and they say, no, no, no, look, it
has to be expanded, and asking the Europeans and other allies
to expand, and say we are unopposed to expansion is very
different than saying, ``I want to make clear to you, we are
not going to be any part of it. We are not going to supply any
forces. We are going to stay here and concentrate on this, but
we encourage you to expand.'' It is sort of like Christopher's
trip to Europe. So, I still am somewhat baffled.
I am going to come back in the next round, general, to you,
I want to talk to you about the Bosnia experience, and whether
or not it applies in any way. But, Mr. Ambassador, I do not--I
think it has to do with this overwhelming and overarching fear
and concern, practically and politically, about nation
building, and about us being engaged there.
Mr. Tomsen. Could I comment just briefly?
The Chairman. Please.
Mr. Tomsen. I think the President himself has come out
forcibly in underscoring that we are going to stay, for a
Marshall Plan. We are in there for the long haul. What you are
getting at, I think, and what I was trying to get at is this
misconception that there is an internal contradiction between
going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and
helping the government develop the institutions that it needs
to in helping the country move back onto a free market
democracy track, which it was on in the 1960s and early 1970s,
that there is a contradiction here. And the answer to this is,
there is not a contradiction, and that is what I mentioned on
the Christiane Amanpour show, that one supports the other, and
ultimately if you have a central government that is functioning
with democratic institutions, it is going to help in the task
of going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban. There is a
misunderstanding of this.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was interested in
your support of Senator Hyde's Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.
I will look at his bill and see what he has done. It may help
satisfy the question I raised with the first panel, and that
is, is there an overall plan that lays out a course of action,
at least one that is coherent enough for us as lay people to
read and understand? Secretary Armitage said that he would send
a letter outlining these elements, and he went through a number
of prerequisites. So there may be something there, but I am not
sure, and that is why I have asked the question. Now you are
suggesting that this legislation, may serve a similar purpose
as the Freedom Support Act did at the time of the fall of the
Soviet Union. This might be helpful in laying out a strategy
and a plan.
I would like to see a small book, and maybe this would be
just for my own edification, in which we recite the very
important history of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a sovereign
state, unlike Palestine, or other states we are talking about
at the current time.
Afghanistan seemingly governed itself reasonably well for
much of this century before disruptions occurred. So that is
encouraging as a background. Because most of us hearing all the
testimony and the current events see a chaotic situation of
near anarchy, of warlords at each other's throats. There is
almost denial of the central government, and you are saying
that was not always the case, and that there at least is some
experience in this area, and the question is how you get back
to that.
Now, if we did get back to that, without knowing the
history of the country, my guess is that our expectations would
be greater for the people of Afghanistan. We have discussed the
role of women, democracy, freedom, education, health, and so
forth. It is clear we must help establish standards well beyond
those that existed in the 1930s. This will require assistance,
economic assistance, technical assistance, and that must be
part of the plan, and an Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.
The problem with the former Soviet Freedom Support Act was
that ultimately most of the pieces sort of fell off the wagon,
because there was lack of support in Russia. The institutions
there were so forbidding that even though we were talking about
agricultural reform, they were not, and we are still discussing
this in a rudimentary way today. So even here, it is not
skepticism, but some sense of limitation as to how much occurs
how fast. I ask this question as a preface.
Clearly, there is a debate going on in our administration
on how involved we should be in Afghanistan. It started with
the war, and the thought was that our role should be limited to
the fewest people, helicopters, et cetera, instead we hoped to
rely upon Afghans on the ground, and others. This phobia may be
well-founded, in the past others had got bogged down, and we
would not. So that is the way we fought it, and it was
successful. It was remarkable.
Now, the problem of governance after all this is a
different sort of issue. And the feeling is, still, you might
get bogged down almost in the same way, caught between warlords
and ethnic leaders. Many feel this is untenable, and would not
be supported by the American people for very long. Therefore,
you keep walking around the problem and studying it to
determine how can you do this with the least number of people
on the ground, maybe even money?
I am trying to come to grips with how we move beyond that.
I share the chairman's anxiety in many ways, that somehow or
other the Marshall Plan idea, the President's commitment, all
these things have been enunciated in a fairly bold way. But I
am still looking for the plan, and a structure of how this
occurs, and some dollar amounts attached to it, with numbers of
American military forces as well as diplomatic presence in
conjunction with allied contributions necessary to accomplish
our goals.
Mr. Tomsen. To answer the first part of your question, my
testimony has three elements that are there in the Freedom
Support Act. One is what you were getting at earlier in the
hearing, a strategy, a reconstruction strategy, which is
missing, an umbrella, and from democracy, to women's rights, to
infrastructure, to education, you want to see a structure and a
strategy, and if you look at the material that has come with
this Henry Hyde bill, it describes that strategy objective.
Second, it is a separate budget. You will have a press
conference in the administration, and somebody wants to say
something nice, it is going to be on Afghanistan, so it is
announced that $100 million has been allocated for refugee
assistance, but it has already been allocated; or say, $10
million is taken from another pot of money in the
administration for announcement of this press conference. There
is not the overall coherence you need which would come with
something like the Freedom Support Act. Most important, and I
noticed this when I was the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia for 3
years, the presence of this coordinator mechanism in the State
Department, not in one of the elements of the aid community,
but right there in the State Department, the last stop before
the budget goes to the Hill, the final budget, was of an
advantage to ambassadors, because we could talk to our staff,
and I had 12 agencies at post, and put together an integrated
plan, and then send it to this coordinator mechanism,
Ambassador Taylor now, and then the budget would go up to the
Hill.
So in the field, we were coordinated, and in Washington
there was coordination, because USAID and USIA, and other
elements of the aid community, had to be coordinated by this
coordinator. So you need that for Afghanistan, since so many
agencies and departments now are involved in Afghanistan.
Congress took the lead on the Freedom Support Act. It did
not come out of the administration. You guys said, ``Hey, there
is a problem here,'' and you resolved it, and you did. So I
would argue that you should do it again.
Senator Lugar. I applaud each of those three steps, because
I think that is really the heart of the strategy, to begin
with, and not improvisation with funds, and which somehow you--
there is something from some other account, which we cannot
possibly follow, as you say, it was already there, maybe. It
would be hard for us to be bookkeepers. There just is not a
discreet plan, or financing, or coordination, so I really
appreciate those answers, because they are really a rifle shot,
it seems to me what we ought to be about in our questioning and
our oversight.
General Grange. Mr. Chairman, can I add a quick comment to
that question?
The Chairman. Sure.
General Grange. Because I think Senator Lugar hit on two
key things that I associate with from my experience in the
military. One is this overarching strategy. In the military we
have something called the commander's intent, and that really
sets the purpose, and what has to be done, what is the end
state of any operation, and commander's intent is something
that goes to everyone who is involved, and everyone then is
supposed to understand it, to execute it properly. So I think
that that is essential, a strategy, a commander's intent.
The other piece that you mentioned was the phrase ``bogged
down.'' We are associating that with the Soviet experience when
we use that phrase. But if it has to do with time, we are going
to be there for some time. So the point is, why do it on the
cheap? Why not do it right, and set it up as an example for the
world to see that we do follow through with what we say we are
going to do, and complete the mission?
Mr. Tomsen. Could I have 20 seconds to followup on this?
The Chairman. Sure.
Mr. Tomsen. Thank you. More than 20 seconds?
The Chairman. Sure.
Mr. Tomsen. Thank you. The Afghans want the United States
to be intrusive; they do not want thousands and thousands, say
10,000-20,000 U.S. troops with fire support, and bases like in
Vietnam. I think General Franks and CENTCOM have, again, have
just performed brilliantly in keeping us at the 7,000 or below
level, but they want America there symbolically, and in
substance.
And it does not matter how many Americans are there in an
aid capacity, or, say, nonmilitary capacity. They see us as
having given them the wherewithal to defeat the Soviets, which
we did. They defeated the Soviets. They saw us as helping them
throw off the yoke of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which our
military did. So we have a very good image and reputation in
Afghanistan. We should not worry too much about intrusiveness,
if we stay away from deploying tens of thousands of troops
there, as the general and others have mentioned.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to each of you.
As you, Senator Lugar, and you, Chairman Biden, know each
of these individuals, I do, and I am a friend of each, and I am
an admirer of each, and not just is it a result of my narrow
parochial interests that Ambassador Tomsen resides at the
University of Nebraska at Omaha.
I think these two witnesses have laid out the best dynamics
of understanding of what is going on that I have yet heard and
have yet read. I think both of you, each of you, have it right,
exactly right, and I am not sure I would disagree with a
sentence in any of this.
Now, with that, and I am just sorry that our two Deputy
Secretaries are not here to hear this, and I am going to send
them each a note today with copies of your testimony, and
request that they take the time to read, which you have each
written.
Senator Lugar is, I think, on track with his general
question that he has just proffered, and it resembles somewhat
the line of questioning that I had for Secretary Armitage. When
I asked the question, what is the integrated overall policy of
this administration, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
which he acknowledged are interrelated, and when I developed
that a bit, the Secretary did not give me a very good answer,
and I had 7 minutes, so I did not have a chance to come back
and talk more about it.
But here is the point, I am concerned with what we are
doing in Afghanistan, because I fear it is being seen and will
be seen as kind of a glancing blow strategy, not our role, not
our responsibility kind of strategy, and we heard remnants of
that from both the Secretaries this morning. That was not our
intent when we went to Afghanistan, be in for the cheap, get
out for the cheap, and, of course, we declare war on Iraq
weekly, and threaten to invade, and I am not sure that helps
our overall focus and discipline and resources.
And it is like the general knows so well, resources matter;
but what matters most is where you apply those resources and
how you use those resources. Because even America--in America,
we have finite military capabilities and assets, and the
general knows that, as well as do you, Mr. Ambassador.
The general's comments here about the blow to American
prestige and honor, aside from what this would do, unravel our
war against terrorists, and our overall objective, and partly
why I asked Secretary Armitage that question about reversal of
the optics. And do you think that anything we do in that
region, Afghanistan and Pakistan is in any way interpreted by
anybody else around the world, that we may not just be, and I
know this is a concern, trying to do too much, in one sense,
but at the same time, too little?.
I think there is a conflict, that my sense is that Senator
Lugar was getting to a little bit, as well as Chairman Biden,
there is a bit of a schizophrenic kind of approach to all of
this. I am one who believes and have believed, believe more
today than I did a few months ago, that our commitment in
Afghanistan must include exactly what the two of you have laid
out here, and it cannot be done on the cheap.
There is just too much writing on this, and I would be
interested in your defining, each of you, a little bit deeper
than your testimony in any way that you want to take this,
numbers, aid. You mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, that you have
heard and know of in your constant relationships and contacts
with people over there, that the aid is not getting done. That
cuts right to the credibility of our word, our commitment.
Now, we can come up and testify at all these fancy
hearings, and say, ``Oh, no, we have $4.5 billion,'' but, in
fact, when you get on the ground over there, do they really
have $4.5 billion, and where is it going? The unraveling
process will come quickly, as each of you know, because each of
you had real-life experiences in these kinds of things.
So I throw out to each of you, as I have made some comments
overall, but to take my thoughts, comments, questions, and
proceed in any direction you wish to go, because I do not think
either one of you overstates the concerns you have, based on
not just your own experience and knowledge, but on a perception
and a perspective that few of us have.
So go ahead, Mr. Ambassador, you begin.
Mr. Tomsen. Thank you, and thanks for all your help,
Senator, at UNO, University of Nebraska, and our Center for
Afghanistan Studies, too.
I want to answer the general question about what influence
this is having internationally and regionally, what we are
doing in Afghanistan. I would give a positive and a negative
side to that. On the positive side, if we succeed in
Afghanistan, we will be creating a model of an American-led
international operation, helping a Muslim population to throw
off extremism, Muslim extremism, and returning to the road of
democracy, and economic development, and moderate Islam.
So Afghanistan could be a model for the Muslim world, and
internationally, a country that was sunk into the abyss of
radical extremism, al-Queda, and the Taliban, but its
population did not want it. Its population was moderate Islam,
and we helped them get back on the track, and prosper. So that
would have a ripple effect, I think.
One of the reasons why the Iranian clerics--I would not say
the Foreign Minister or the President of Iran, I would say the
Iranian clerics--are interfering against Hamid Karzai, because
they are worried that this model might succeed.
Also, if Afghanistan, given its location, can get back on
the right track, it will be a crossroads for global corridors
of trade, and commerce, and telecommunication connecting
Europe, and China, and Russia, and South Asia.
On the resources, doing it right, if you want to build a
well, for example, or reconstruct a school, or road as our
Special Forces are doing, it only cost $200 or $5,000. Not
much, but we have to do it right, and we will not be spending
that much at the local level. Unfortunately, the way the aid
bureaucracies are organized, internationally and in our own
country, is that 80 percent of the money gets sopped up by
salaries for expatriates, the Americans, or U.N. types, as the
case may be, trips to the region, and in the end, there is not
much action on the ground, in terms of actual projects. The
Armenian Prime Minister used to complain to me all the time
about international aid projects in his country.
I guess I have run out of time, so I will stop there.
The Chairman. General?
General Grange. I think that actually goes back to all the
questions that have been brought up, and that is, I believe our
concern is three major things. One that I will just disregard
right away is: I do not think we are hung up on this aversion
to have casualties like we used to be. I do not think that is
really the big issue now, but I think these are the issues of
maybe the hesitant nature of what is going on.
One is that getting in a fight with others, as you expand
out of Kabul with a security force, no one wants to get into a
fight with others while we are still fighting the Taliban and
the al-Queda. I think that is a concern.
No. 2 is that the commitment, as this broad front with the
war on terrorists, it is a broad front. It is a global
commitment. And I believe, when I left the military at the end
of 1999, we worked pretty hard, and we did not have the war on
terrorism yet. The division I commanded, when we went those 2
years--and some of you visited our units. We were all over the
map. And it is hard to say what mission could be eliminated,
and what you continue on with.
But it was quite a lot of commitment, not only in time, but
people, and, of course, resources, ammunition, equipment, et
cetera. So there is a concern on commitment with more in
Afghanistan. I think those are the two main issues of concern.
To solve that, one is that, in my mind, I would think
Afghanistan was the main effort. We are not fighting Iraq right
now. I mean we may be gathering intelligence and that in other
places around the world, and we have other things, the Republic
of Georgia, Yemen, Philippines, Colombia, et cetera, but the
main effort in my mind, I would think, would be Afghanistan.
And if that is your main effort, that is what you resource to
accomplish the mission.
And I agree with what the ambassador said, if that is
successful, I believe through the optics of others in that
region with different cultures, that some of the other people
we have problems with will fall in line, because it will be a
model, it will be a success story, and success stories, people
want to emulate.
So I really think there is something there, and if we win
that, it will have a great effect on what we are trying to do
globally. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Gentlemen, we have kept you a long
time. I just want to make two relatively brief comments.
First, I think your experience in Bosnia showed you,
general, that all the protestations by elected officials up
here turned out to be wrong. From 1993, on, I heard from
everyone that the American public will never sustain the
allocation of forces, and the deployment of forces in the
Balkans. It will not happen. I do not know anybody who ran a
campaign for Congress or the Senate who won or ran on the
ticket, ``Bring the boys home.'' I have not had anyone come up
knocking on my door or out there saying, ``The most important
thing is get out of Bosnia, get out of Kosovo, bring the boys
home.''
Second, the polling data overwhelmingly sustains the
position that the American people understand that we have to
keep forces in Afghanistan. The job is not done, and we have a
long way to go. They are pretty smart. They have it figured
out.
I think that part of the problem here is that there is a
disconnect with some, both a hangup and a disconnect. Some of
our--what is left of the left, and what is the furthest of the
right seem to have gathered together to conclude that we are
overextended, and nation building is not something we should be
involved in.
I had a long meeting with the President where he outlined
for me for an hour and 45 minutes what we had to do, and I was
impressed. In walking out--I will not mention the official's
name, as I got from the Oval Office out into the West Wing, but
we were outside and this particular official came running down
the hall and said, ``Are you going to stop at the stakeout?''
Meaning where the press is.
I said, ``Not if you do not want me to,'' and they wanted
me to, because it was a bipartisan effort here.
They said, ``Not that we want you to, but you are not going
to mention nation building, are you?''
I said, ``You mean what the President has spoken to me
about for the last hour and 45 minutes?'' I said, ``No, I won't
mention that.''
There is an incredible hangup on this notion about ``nation
building,'' just the use of the phrase, in my experience.
Second, I really do think that there is a disconnect among
some in the Congress and the administration, between our
objectives with regard to Iraq and the unfinished business in
Afghanistan. I have had numerous world leaders and counterparts
in parliaments in Europe say, ``You want to go in and take down
Saddam, and you are not even going to stay in Afghanistan.''
The greatest worry I find, Mr. Ambassador, is they are
worried about not whether we can take down Saddam, but what do
we do after we take him down? I facetiously say, ``Your old
boss stopped for a simple reason. He didn't want to stay for 5
years in Baghdad.''
So I hope we can begin to articulate this correlation
between getting the job done properly in Afghanistan and our
flexibility and ability to deal in other parts of the world,
and what impact failure to do that might have on interest in
other parts of the world, but both your testimonies have been
extremely helpful.
General, you headed up Task Force Eagle in Bosnia. Do you
think it is time for us to get out of the Balkans and out of
Bosnia?
General Grange. No, but I would like to--I think we can do
it better. I have looked back hard at peace support operations,
whether they be chapter six peacekeeping, chapter seven peace
enforcement, et cetera.
When I got to Bosnia, I believed we were in a reactive
mode. You do not win. You do not accomplish a mission in
reactive mode. You have to be proactive, and we moved to a
proactive mode. But then if you are really good, you then go to
the next phase, which I call interactive. And that is some of
the things that I think the ambassador, and myself, and others
laid out in our testimony, and that is how you integrate with
the communities involved in the operation, and with the people
that you are dealing with, the people of that nation.
You interact, so you really have a taste, a feel, you see
what is going on, and you know what to do, and when. And we got
pretty good at it at the end of our tour. But you cannot do
that with a base camp mentality, giving soldiers, hamburger
joints, and cappuccino stands. You have to do that by getting
out, not sitting in base camps, but getting out with the
society that you are dealing with.
I would do the MFO different. I would use that as an
emergency deployment, readiness exercise, live-fire training, a
dessert training area for the United States Army. And if Israel
and Egypt did not like that, then I would pull out. I would tie
the requirement into some of the things we are supposed to be
ready to do for war. There is just a lot of things we can do to
make these missions better, more effective for our readiness.
Any of these missions, any of these missions that I have
been on--and in Bosnia I had 29 different units working for me,
not counting the allies. Any of these missions, when some kid
looks up at the American flag on the right sleeve of the
soldier, you know you are making a difference, because a lot of
people hate that flag, but I think more love it, and it makes a
difference.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your time, your
testimony, and your input. Hopefully together--we are joined
together bipartisanly here, and hopefully together with the
administration we can develop or be part of implementing that
agenda, that plan, but like the Senator from the great State of
Indiana said, I have not seen it yet, and I am anxious to see
it.
I thank you both very much, and we are adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 1:51 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I am pleased to be here today to consider the status of our efforts
in Afghanistan. In particular, I am grateful for the opportunity this
hearing provides to discuss some of the specific diplomatic and
humanitarian efforts that will be necessary to build a more secure and
prosperous future for the people of Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, we have witnessed nearly all of the alarming
characteristics of many of the world's weakest states. Such states
attract terrorists and other international criminals who depend for
their survival on manifestations of lawlessness such as piracy, illicit
air transport networks, and trafficking in arms, drugs, gems, and
people. The terror that accompanies these shadowy groups further
weakens the integrity of the host state, while encouraging grave human
rights practices on an ever larger scale. We saw this on September 11,
but the suffering caused by such terrorist groups runs much deeper.
Indeed, such networks fuel conflict, inhibit legitimate economic
development and provide a breeding ground for increasingly dangerous
terrorist activities world-wide. Afghanistan proves why such weak
states must not be allowed to threaten our global order. But now,
Afghanistan must also stand as a testament of the international
community's commitment to securing and rebuilding those same societies.
At the same time, no hearing on Afghanistan could overlook the
rights of women and girls who have suffered so ferociously under the
Taliban regime. In recent months we have watched with horror as the
women of Afghanistan have emerged from their enforced seclusion to
describe years of abuse. The world has witnessed few more egregious
examples of institutionalized discrimination against women, although we
must recognize that women in many other societies are living equally
restrictive lives. Once again, our progress in promoting the re-
integration of women into the public life of Afghanistan will long be
viewed as a test of our global commitment to the advancement of women's
rights.
I firmly believe that a secure future in Afghanistan depends on the
ability of the international community to promote human rights and
democratic governance during this crucial transition period. This will
not be an easy task in the aftermath of so many years of segregation,
violence, and institutional collapse. But our efforts in Afghanistan
will serve as a much larger measure of our commitment to building a
more secure global environment. We are a strong and prosperous nation.
And we must understand that our security ultimately depends on our
ability to build similarly prosperous, democratic societies around the
world.
----------
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr.
afghanistan
Question. Are there any circumstances under which the United States
would be willing to consider participation in the expansion of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)? If so, what are those
circumstances?
Answer. The Bonn Agreement asserted the Afghans' responsibility for
providing their own security, and established the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist them. The ISAF serves in
Afghanistan under authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 1386
(20 December 2001), which limits ISAF to Kabul and its surrounding
areas. UN Security Council Resolution 1413 extends the same mandate
under Turkish lead through December 2002.
The United States already supports ISAF in several ways, including
through our position on the UN Security Council, which specifically
authorizes the extension of the ISAF operating mandate, most recently
through December 2002. Through a liaison cell in Kabul, the U.S.
Central Command assures deconfliction of military activities. The U.S.,
through a bilateral Letter of Arrangement with the ISAF lead nation
(currently Turkey), is committed to provide certain other kinds of
backstopping support, as needed in emergencies and depending on
available resources.
The U.S. is not opposed to ISAF expansion. However, other countries
have not been willing thus far to provide the resources, logistical
support, and personnel sufficient to support expansion outside of
Kabul. We have also believed that security outside Kabul could be
assisted through other means. We continue to monitor the situation.
Question. Are there any circumstances under which the United State
would be willing to consider active diplomatic and military support for
the expansion of ISAF? If so, what are these circumstances?
Answer. The U.S. does not oppose ISAF expansion. However, other
countries have not been willing thus far to contribute the resources,
logistical support, and personnel needed to support expansion of ISAF's
mandate outside of Kabul. We have also believed that security outside
Kabul could be assisted through other means. We continue to monitor the
situation.
ISAF operates in Afghanistan under authorization of the UN Security
Council (Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001). Should the UN decide to
expand the ISAF mission, the U.S. would work in the Security Council to
craft a sustainable mission. Complicated issues of command and control
for ISAF deployments outside of Kabul would also need to be resolved.
Question. Are U.S. forces currently tasked with the mission of
upholding internal security and maintaining law and order in
Afghanistan? Are there any contingency plans to task U.S. forces with
this mission?
Answer. U.S. forces are not tasked with the mission to uphold
security and law and order. Maintenance of security is the
responsibility of the Afghans. However, small numbers of U.S. Special
Operations Forces and Civil Affairs teams have on a number of occasions
acted as intermediaries and exerted a constructive influence to dampen
conflicts among regional leaders. These personnel are stationed around
the country and interact with key regional leaders. They have proved
extremely effective also at delivering humanitarian aid, getting
infrastructure projects identified and started, among other tasks.
Question. Have any government officials, or U.S. military
personnel, instructed Pacha Khan Zadran (and other recalcitrant
warlords on the U.S. payroll) to accept the authority of the central
government?
Answer. Yes. Pacha Khan Zadran has been urged by U.S. Special
Operations Forces personnel on a number of occasions to accept the
authority of the Afghan Transitional Authority.
Question. There are numerous reports of interference with and
attacks against staff engaged in delivery of humanitarian assistance,
especially in the area around Mazar-e Sharif. In the wake of the rape
of an aid worker and attacks on relief vehicles, international NGOs
this weekend issued a strong plea for expansion of international peace
keeping forces. What is the administration's plan for dealing with
these law-and-order failures in the near term?
Answer. The Afghans acknowledge their responsibility for providing
security in Afghanistan. Law-and-order issues fall outside the DOD
mission in Afghanistan. The U.S., however, is fully engaged in
addressing these issues and concerns. We support the UN--in New York
and through its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)--in helping
the Afghans to address these outrages.
UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi (UNAMA's head, and in
conjunction with the Afghan government, and the international
community) is working with regional leaders in Afghanistan to ensure
they honor commitments to facilitate provision of assistance to
communities in need.
As noted, the NGO community in northern Afghanistan has confronted
local leaders about security conditions, and has undertaken a local
media campaign to explain the risks of decreased aid if these abuses
continue.
Our Ambassador in Kabul and the Director of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have also expressed directly to
regional leaders the U.S. government's concern about the security
situation in their areas, and have called on them to fulfill
commitments to provide proper security, and to hold accountable those
responsible for recent attacks.
Training and deploying Afghan military and police forces will
mitigate many of these concerns.
Question. How long is the training and equipping of an independent
Afghan national army and police force expected to take? How much money
has the administration requested for these operations, and how much
will be required in the coming year?
Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) training program began in
May 2002.
The U.S. Central Command projects that the U.S.-led effort will
train over 14,000 soldiers in light infantry and border guard units in
approximately 18 months (provided adequate numbers of recruits),
creating the largest army in Afghanistan. In December 2003, Afghan
trainers--already being prepared--will take the lead in this training
program. The first ANA battalion will graduate on July 23, 2002.
The State Department supplemental appropriation request seeks $70
million for ANA training and recruits' salaries ($50M in Foreign
Military Financing and $20M in Peacekeeping Operations funds). In the
DOD supplemental, we requested authority to move up to $100 million in
DOD funds from other programs or operational funds into ANA training,
if appropriate. Passage of DOD's supplemental funding request will help
ensure that the ANA training program can fulfill its mission of
fielding a military force that can provide security in Afghanistan over
the long term.
The German government has the lead for Afghan police
reconstruction. Within the U.S. government, the State Department
manages U.S. contributions to the police reconstruction effort and can
best address this issue.
Question. What provisions are in place to maintain security during
the interim period before an Afghan army and police are fully
operational? If the administration does not support ISAF expansion, and
if U.S. forces are not being used as peacekeepers, what is our
strategy?
Answer. The Afghans acknowledge their responsibility for providing
security in Afghanistan. We are working with them to build their
capacity to take on this responsibility. Through the training of the
Afghan National Army (ANA), border guards (included as part of the ANA
training program), and police, the Afghan government will become better
able to provide broader security on its own.
In those areas where trained Afghan national forces have not yet
been deployed (or will not be available for some time), local
commanders are using their own men and resources to provide security.
That is the commitment they have made to the Afghan Transitional
Authority that emerged from the June loya jirga.
The U.S. and international community are working to give Afghans
the training and equipment they need to solve these problems on their
own--effective military and police forces.
The U.S. is not opposed to ISAF expansion. No nation has come
forward with the numbers of men and other resources necessary to
support a sustained mission outside of Kabul however.
As an interim measure, the U.S. is using combined teams of Special
Operations Forces, Civil Affairs, U.S. Agency for International
Development and State Department personnel, working with regional and
local leaders, to assist in maintaining stability in the regions. On
numerous occasions, these U.S. personnel, though few in number, have
exerted their influence effectively to help dampen conflicts among
regional leaders and to promote national unity.
Question. The current ethnic makeup of the Afghan army, under the
control of Marshal Muhammad Fahim, is overwhelmingly skewed toward
Panjshiri Tajiks. What safeguards will the United States put in place
to insure that the Afghan army we are training will adequately reflect
the ethnic makeup of the country?
Answer. The Afghan government has made the commitment to provide
Afghan National Army recruits that reflect the ethnic mix of the
country. This is an Afghan responsibility, but one that we support as
part of our efforts to help field a credible national army. So far, the
ethnic breakdown of the first two battalions trained by the U.S.
Central Command has roughly corresponded to the ethnic makeup of the
country.
Question. Throughout Afghanistan, many regional commanders allied
with the United States have perpetrated abuses on the Pashtuns, who
form the largest ethnic group in the country. What actions are being
taken to prevent a Pashtun backlash against the United States?
Answer. Ultimately, ethnic harmony in Afghanistan depends on the
success of the Afghan Transitional Authority, with its balance of
ethnic, political, and regional forces as developed by Afghans
themselves in the June loya jirga. In the meantime, the U.S. response
to human rights abuses has been swift and vocal. Through our embassy in
Kabul, the U.S. government has sought to promote better human rights
observance across Afghanistan. Whenever and wherever abuses have been
committed, the U.S. has denounced the acts publicly, to President
Karzai, and to regional or local leaders where such abuses have
occurred. The U.S. also supports public awareness campaigns promoting
human rights in Afghanistan, and highlighting our leading role in
helping the Afghan government build a new, tolerant state where such
abuses are a relic of the past.
Unfortunately, many groups harbor long-standing feuds and hatreds
against one another, and some are tempted to settle old scores.
The U.S. has also supported UN Special Representative Lakhdar
Brahimi's efforts to bring such abuses to an end across Afghanistan.
Question. What is the United States doing in response to acts of
violence against women in the north and intimidation tactics against
employment and education of women in the south? What has the U.S. done
to address the physical intimidation of Sima Samar?
Answer. The U.S. response to human rights abuses--including abuse
of women and girls across Afghanistan--has been swift and vocal. Our
embassy in Kabul has been involved in efforts to promote better human
rights observance across Afghanistan. Whenever and wherever abuses
against women have occurred, the U.S. has denounced the acts publicly,
to President Karzai directly, and to regional or local leaders where
such abuses took place. We have also approached the Afghan government
to improve security for women officials and international workers in
Afghanistan.
In addition to policy pronouncements, the U.S. has sought to
improve the material lot of women and girls in Afghanistan through
practical measures. The U.S. was actively involved in promoting the
establishment of a cabinet-level Ministry of Women's Affairs in the
Afghan government, as well as a Human Rights Commission. Through our
aid and funding, the U.S. provides broad institutional and program
support that improve the lives of Afghan women and children. The U.S.
is involved in a public-private partnership activity--the U.S.-Afghan
Women's Council--which focuses attention on women's issues in
Afghanistan. The U.S. also supports public awareness campaigns
promoting human rights in Afghanistan, and highlighting our leading
role in helping the Afghan government build a new, tolerant state where
such abuses are a relic of the past.
Concurrent with our work with Afghan government officials, the U.S.
has supported UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi's efforts to
bring such abuses to an end across Afghanistan. In this, Brahimi is
joined by the UN Commission for Human Rights, which monitors violence
in Afghanistan.
The State Department has released a report to Congress, ``U.S.
Support for Afghan Women, Children and Refugees,'' that addresses in
greater detail U.S. government efforts in this area. See
.
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