[Senate Hearing 107-750]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-750
BALANCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL
ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CENTRAL ASIA
AND SOUTH CAUCASUS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 27, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CENTRAL ASIA
AND SOUTH CAUCASUS
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, statement
submitted for the record....................................... 51
Courtney, Hon. William H., former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan
and Georgia, former Senior Advisor to the National Security
Council, senior vice president, National Security Programs,
Dyncorp, Washington, DC........................................ 29
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Craner, Hon. Lorne W., Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to additional questions from Senator Torricelli.... 52
Responses to additional questions from Senator Gordon Smith..53, 57
Response to an additional question from Senator Brownback....58, 59
Crouch, Hon. J.D. II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, former Primer Minister of Kazakhstan,
letter to Senator Barbara Boxer regarding concerns about civil
rights......................................................... 4
Olcott, Martha Brill, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC............................ 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Pascoe, B. Lynn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC...... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Responses to additional questions from Senator Gordon Smith..54, 57
Response to an additional question from Senator Brownback....58, 59
(iii)
BALANCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND
SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CENTRAL ASIA
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Central Asia
and South Caucasus,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert G.
Torricelli (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Torricelli, Lugar, and Brownback.
Senator Torricelli. The subcommittee will please come to
order. I am pleased today to convene this hearing to consider
United States policy in one of the most vital regions of the
world. Since the Subcommittee on Central Asia and South
Caucasus was created last August, the region it covers
unexpectedly has taken on a role at the very center of our
Nation's foreign policy. Five central Asian nations are now key
partners in our diplomatic and military campaign to destroy
global terrorist networks. These partnerships offer the
prospect of deepening security and economic ties which will
benefit all nations involved. At the same time there are
potential dangers which must be addressed.
Prior to September 11, United States policy in the region
was largely focused on promoting democratic reform, increasing
respect for human rights and encouraging economic growth. Many
observers of the region now believe that that agenda is in
jeopardy, and are concerned that the United States will hold
back from promoting democracy and human rights to avoid
friction with the central Asian leaders. None of us question
the vital importance of the military actions the United States
is undertaking in Afghanistan, and the indispensable role that
central Asian nations have played in supporting our operations.
I have been a strong supporter of the American military
campaign currently underway, indeed I went to Afghanistan in
April to assess its progress and to meet with our Armed Forces.
But it would be a serious mistake if we were to sacrifice our
agenda for the promotion of democracy and human rights in
exchange for security cooperation. Rooting out terrorism,
promoting democracy and human rights are not mutually
exclusive. Indeed, they are probably mutually reinforcing.
Granted, there are regimes that do not allow for full
democratic participation or are marginalizing or radicalizing
segments of their population. This not only potentially creates
new terrorists, but can pose threats to stability of regimes we
are relying on as security partners.
As the United States witnessed in 1979 in Iran, and may
soon see in some other nations, oppressive regimes that do not
have public support can quickly collapse, and they are likely
to be replaced by anti-American regimes. I do not suggest that
any of the central Asian regimes are on the verge of collapse.
I would prefer to see a democratic evolution in those nations.
Yet as these nations continue to find their post-Soviet
identity and develop democratic institutions, it is important
that people in the region recognize the United States is on
their side and does not identify itself only with oppressive
governments. As we engage more deeply with central Asian
nations, and our security relationship grows, our diplomats
will have increasing contacts and opportunities to raise human
rights concerns with our partners.
It will be important to convey to the political leaders of
those nations that they need not view our human rights and
democracy agenda as a threat. Establishing the rule of law,
more open independent judicial systems and protections for
citizens is essential for creating a favorable climate for
foreign investment and tourism.
Our hearing today is intended to explore the success of
American policy in simultaneously pursuing both our human
rights and our security agenda. The balance is not easy; some
will urge us to emphasize one aspect of our policy over
another. In the long run, our engagement in central Asia will
only serve our national interests if it is carried out in
accordance with American values.
Today I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel from
the State Department and Defense Department. From the State
Department we will hear Assistant Secretary Lorne Craner,
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, and from Deputy Assistant Secretary Lynn Pascoe, who is
responsible for central Asia, in the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs. Both have been in central Asia very recently
and met with leaders throughout the region, and we look forward
to hearing their views.
From the Defense Department we will hear from Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D.
Crouch. Secretary Crouch has also been to the region and will
be able to provide an overview of United States security policy
in the region.
We will also have a second panel with the former Ambassador
to Kazakhstan, William Courtney, and Martha Brill Olcott, from
the Carnegie Endowment. We look forward to hearing your
testimony.
Senator Lugar, would you like to make opening comments.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you for calling this meeting, for summoning two panels of
excellent witnesses.
Today we seek to address one of the most difficult policy
questions in American foreign policy, and that is, how does the
United States continue to advance its national security
interest while preserving its commitment to human rights and
the values we hold so dear.
During the cold war, U.S. policy required the maintenance
of the balance wherein we worked closely with nations with a
different level of commitment to basic human values and
freedoms. This challenge required a constant call for
improvements in areas such as freedom of speech, assembly,
religion, while working closely with governments to stop and
reverse the spread of communism.
The current war on terrorism presents a similar challenge.
The front lines of today's war require relationships with a
number of culturally diverse countries with histories and
backgrounds very different than our own. The threats associated
with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction necessitate
American engagement and security cooperation, and provision of
military assistance with countries that would otherwise be
subjected to a very different policy approach.
Following the attacks of September 11, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan burst into
American living rooms on CNN and nightly news broadcasts, and
for most Americans, this was the first they ever heard of these
former Soviet states. Many were surprised to learn of the
tremendous geostrategic importance these nations held in the
war against terrorism. Americans quickly understood the
important role these countries play in providing U.S. and
coalition members with critical military bases and overflight
rights. They saw the successful conclusion of military
operations in Afghanistan depended largely upon our allies in
that region.
But there was considerable unease, and people began to dig
a little deeper into the background of these nations. Concerns
were expressed about their commitment to democracy and human
rights, and the poor to very poor to extremely poor grades
given to the states of central Asia in the State Department's
annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practice was cause for
concern.
This is a challenge of United States policymakers seeking
to increase cooperation in the fight against terrorism and to
address the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
Striking the right balance between human rights and security
cooperation is not a new challenge in central Asia. The United
States has been working cooperatively with Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan in particular for more than a decade in an effort to
secure and then dismantle the Soviet nuclear, chemical and
biological legacy.
Immediately after the states of the former Soviet Union
declared their independence, the United States began an intense
diplomatic effort to secure Kazakhstan's residual of nuclear
weapons and materials. Many forget that Kazakhstan inherited
the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world after the fall
of the Soviet Union.
Equally disturbing was the existence of Stepnogorsk, the
largest anthrax production facility in the world, and
Semipalatinsk, the Soviet Union's nuclear testing area.
American experts have also been active in the Aral Sea region,
off the coast of Uzbekistan, where we discovered a place called
Voz Island. It was the Soviet Union's main chemical and
biological weapons testing facility which Ken Allenbach
described so vividly in his book, ``Biohazard.''
In the 1990s, the program staff were among our most
successful emissaries to these new states and laid the
groundwork for the kind of cooperation that came to light with
the war in Afghanistan. The United States continues to
cooperate closely with these countries to eliminate the threats
these sites pose, not only to international security but to
local populations.
The United States and the states of central Asia have
enjoyed considerable diplomatic success. Kazakhstan's decision
to join the nonproliferation treaty, along with Ukraine and
others, as non-nuclear states are one of the great achievements
of the last decade. Together we must set out with the same
purpose to achieve equally important gains in the areas of
human rights and democracy. We can and should build on our
successes in addressing weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism, but we must understand that to strengthen these
binds to a level similar to that which exists with our NATO
allies requires more than just security and military
cooperation, it also requires like minded approaches to social
issues.
My concern is without progress across the full breadth of
policy issues, our relationships will hit a glass ceiling in
the absence of success in broadening the rights and freedoms of
the people of central Asia. United States involvement with and
commitment to the states in central Asia has seen tremendous
growth since my first visit to the region in 1992.
At that time, newly appointed leaders struggled to come to
grips with the responsibilities of a civil democracy while
addressing the specters of their Soviet past. The last decade
has brought progress. We have a long way to go and I look
forward to working with the administration, Senator Shelby, our
chairman, and the leadership of these central Asian states to
take the next step at deepening the relationship these
countries have with the United States.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Senator
Boxer, a member of the subcommittee, could not be here today
but wanted to express her concern about the human rights
situation in Kazakhstan. At her request I am going to enter
into the record, without objection, at this point a letter sent
to her by the former Prime Minister of Kazakhstan that details
some of those issues.
[The letter referred to follows:]
The Honorable Barbara Boxer
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Boxer:
Let me first thank you and Senators Torricelli and Lugar for your
concern about the situation regarding human rights and freedom in
Kazakhstan, and for your leadership in holding a hearing on June 27,
2002. I want to express my gratitude on behalf of all Kazakh democratic
parties, members of the Democratic Forces Forum and common citizens of
my native country.
On several occasions, I have had the privilege to testify before
the U.S. Congress' Committees about human rights violations,
persecution of the media, and reprisals against the democratic movement
carried out by authoritarian and corrupt President Nazarbayev. When in
1997 opposition members mentioned them for the first time, the
credibility of their words was met with great skepticism in the West.
Today the U.S. and Western European governments, as well as their
populations are aware of those abuses. The renowned human rights
organizations and most influential newspapers have been highlighting
attacks on journalists, politically motivated charges brought against
opposition members, and the multi-million dollar foreign accounts
blocked in Swiss banks--including those seized on request of the U.S.
Justice Department.
U.S. Congressmen and senior officials in the U.S. Administration
have also harshly criticized the Nazarbayev policy. There must be
dozens of resolutions and statements in this regard. There is no need
for me to attract your attention to those facts; although the situation
is becoming increasingly grave. The Kazakh people will eventually
decide their fate themselves and choose such a government that will
respect human rights and the rule of law. I believe that this will
happen very soon.
Let me bring to your attention some aspects related to security and
stability in central Asia, which, as your hearing indicates, are of
deep concern not only to us, but also to U.S. We can see this from
media publications and the Congressional statements. The United States
has built and led the international coalition against terrorism because
today your country is the world's leader. At the same time (or,
perhaps, for this reason), the U.S. has become the main target for
terrorists. The American political elites--its lawmakers and the
Administration--have found themselves shouldering a double
responsibility for security: to their own citizens and to the
international community.
In spite of its strength, the U.S. needs allies in their fight.
Central Asian governments have pledged their support. But can you rely
on allies who do not share your fundamental values like freedom,
equality, and justice? Saddam Hussein could be one of the counter-
terrorism coalition foes. Does he radically differ from Turkmenbashi or
Nazarbayev? Here we see the same authoritarian rule, the desire to
remain in power indefinitely, family control of the economy, and
control of the press. And, simultaneously, we see their people living
in poverty, the two-faced government propaganda, and the terror of
special services. These presidents-dictators have rewritten their
nation's constitutions to bear no responsibility for any of their
actions. In Kazakhstan, for instance, President Nazarbayev has pushed
through a special law on himself, which he believes to guarantee him
immunity from persecution for life.
The allies who need support in the fight against their own citizens
are not just unreliable. They are dangerous. Just look at Kyrgyzstan.
People have been holding rallies and demonstrations for months there.
The authorities shoot at them; several people were killed. At the same
time, counter-terrorism coalition troops have been stationed in
Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev seeks to use this fact to convince Kyrgyz
people that the West supports him and is even ready to defend him. By
doing so, he has been fueling the anti-American sentiments and protest
movements against the military base at Manas airport. According to
media publications, the Kyrgyz government uses foreign economic aid to
equip special services, in particular, to pay for 300,000 handcuffs.
With or without the handcuffs, President Akayev's has been rapidly
losing his grip on power. He most probably will have to step down in an
attempt to escape responsibility for the murders and the corruption.
There is a pressing need to urgently support the Kyrgyz opposition in
order to ensure that a public confidence government, which will replace
President Akayev, will be friendly towards the U.S. and its western
allies. Long ago, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright publicly
promised to open U.S. printing houses in Almaty and Bishkek, which
would print independent media outlets.
Three years have passed. Since then, only in Kazakhstan has the
President's puppet courts shut down dozens of newspapers. Editorial
offices of the newspapers ``XXI Vek'' (21st Century) and ``Delovoje
Obozreniye'' (Business Review) were set on fire. The Propaganda
Ministry closed down ``Vecherny Atyrau'', many other papers and several
television channels. However, no printing houses have been established
thus far and no one is confident that there ever will be. The same goes
for the Internet providers promised by the Department of State, because
of the Kazakh government's censoring of the Internet.
Thus emerged a false alternative: security or democracy. Your
society has awaked to its internal policy risks. However, this choice
is equally dangerous in foreign policy. Only democracy can provide
security. All the regimes that constitute a terrorist threat are
authoritarian and corrupt. The countries, which sponsor international
terrorism, resort to terror in their internal policy to crack down on
their opponents.
Central Asian presidents do not share democratic values. Moreover,
they despise the western political system for what they see as a
weakness. Some of them, like Turkmenbashi, do it openly and blatantly.
Others prefer lies and hypocrisy. Last December, President Nazarbayev
signed a joint declaration with President Bush, in which he pledged
allegiance to democracy, swore to protect independence of the media and
respect human rights, including the right to political activity. Since
that time, the situation in Kazakhstan has deteriorated dramatically.
The authorities have adopted a law that bans all opposition parties
from participation in the political life. Obviously, they will be
dissolved.
I would like to draw your attention to the fate of Mukhtar
Ablyazov, a former minister who joined the democratic opposition and
was immediately committed for trial for alleged corruption. The
authorities have jailed Galymzhan Zhakiyanov. He was a governor for
five years. In Kazakhstan, governors are appointed directly by
President Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev is also the person who fires them. The
moment Zhakiyanov stopped being loyal to the President, he was arrested
too. Now he awaits trial in a prison hospital. Several days ago, the
daughter of Lira Baiseitova, a well-known woman-opposition member and
editor of the shut down newspaper ``Respublika'' (Republic) was killed.
The police have refused to investigate the case. Lira Baiseitova is
convinced the crime was committed by the Nazarbayev secret services as
a vengeance for her activity.
Killings, beatings, arsons, political trials. What can the United
States set against all this? Unfortunately, to persuade the dictators
and make arrangements with them would be most inadequate. The U.S.
government and dozens of organizations render assistance to the Kazakh
government, pay to bring the MPs from pro-governmental parties to the
United States, hold seminars and conferences for the state-sponsored
NGOs. What are you trying to convince the authoritarianism advocates
of? They clearly see everything themselves. Stop persuading them, it's
time to make the central Asian regimes give up their unlimited power.
The opposition proposed a national-wide dialog to Nazarbayev, which
could suggest a procedure to step down. In 1999, Nazarbayev assured
Vice-President Gore in writing that he would commence such a dialog. He
lied to the U.S. Administration. Make him meet his OSCE commitments and
fulfill his promises, including those made to the previous
Administration. The central Asian nations must see that no one can
easily deceive the government of the world's most powerful state.
In recent years, I met many senior U.S. officials. I told them of
my point of view and never came across strong opposition. Everyone see
that the situation is deteriorating. Foreign investment laws are
constantly revised; the Nazarbayev family strives to eliminate their
rivals with the help of their puppet courts; corruption is rampant at
all levels, including the President himself. At the same time, it's
widely believed that a favorable investment climate and a stable
political system could permit Kazakhstan, together with Russia, to play
a key role in ensuring western energy security.
Dear Senators, on behalf of the popular democratic movement in
Kazakhstan, on behalf of the opposition movements in Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, I urge you to regard our nations, not
their dictators, as your allies. The developed and democratic
societies, the legitimate and elected governments will help to secure a
true stability in the region. They will root out the environment that
has become a fertile ground for terrorists and extremists.
Dear Members of the United States Senate, after the September 11
attacks, everybody has realized that borders that separate countries
and continents are futile in the face of a terrorist threat. We live in
the region where this threat is ever present. Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are the neighboring states. Each of these
countries has seen more or less serious fighting; each of them has lost
people.
Kazakhstan remains peaceful. It's not, however, because its regime
is better than those in the neighboring countries, it's because the
country has got a mature democratic opposition, which unites people not
under the military banners, but through peaceful meetings and fair
elections. Our intention is to print newspapers, not leaflets. Our aim
is a secular and social state. We urge you to assist us in working
towards this aim, and the world will get a new nation, a new culture.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Sincerely,
Akezhan Kazhegeldin.
Senator Torricelli. I would also like to recognize several
guests who are with us today. We are very honored and pleased
to have with us the Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Mr. Khamrakulov;
the Ambassador to Turkmenistan, Mr. Orazov; and a guest from
Finland, Mr. Ari Vataner, who is a Member of the European
Parliament and has been involved in human rights issues in
Kazakhstan.
With that, if I could, perhaps we could take in order, Mr.
Craner, if you would begin, then Mr. Crouch and Mr. Pascoe.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORNE W. CRANER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Craner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank
you again for your well-timed invitation to testify on the very
important question of whether the U.S. Government has the right
balance between military assistance and human rights in central
Asia.
September 11 dramatically changed the focus of U.S. foreign
policy. We are now engaged in a global struggle against terror
that requires working in close cooperation with an array of
governments, some of which have as you mentioned, by our own
accounts, have poor human rights records and with whom we have
not had close relations in the past. Some individuals both here
and abroad have expressed concern that as a result of the
September 11 attacks on America, the administration has or will
abandon human rights. This is not the case.
Indeed, human rights and democracy are as essential today,
if not more so, than they were before the terrorist attacks on
America. As Colin Powell has stated, ``freedom fights
terrorism, instability and conflict.'' Time and again
experience has shown that countries which demonstrate high
degrees of respect for human rights are also the most secure
and most successful. In short, we will not win a war on
terrorism by diminishing the universal observance of human
rights. To do so would merely set the stage for a resurgence of
terror in another generation. In fact, in central Asia, in
terms of intensity, attention and funding, the region is
receiving far more attention to human rights than it was before
the 11th.
In my remarks I will focus on our efforts to encourage and
support human rights and democracy in the region. I will be
very frank about the situation in those countries and I will
also make clear what progress we have been able to make to date
in promoting democracy and respect for human rights.
The proximity of central Asia to Afghanistan has made
nations in the region particularly vulnerable to terrorist
activities, and the assistance the central Asian governments
have rendered to Operation Enduring Freedom has been
invaluable. Our strong message in turn to the governments and
their leaders has been that close relations with the United
States brings with it a heightened level of scrutiny and that
therefore, any deepening and broadening of our cooperation will
depend on continual progress in respect to human rights and
democracy.
The message has been conveyed on our side by the President,
by the Secretary of State, and officials on down the line. It
has been conveyed as a principle, but it is also contingent on
the defense of individual human rights activists, and in urging
better human rights and democracy practices.
I have traveled to the region twice this year as part of
this effort, most recently earlier this month, where I met with
government authorities and ordinary citizens. In Uzbekistan the
human rights record remains very poor. Human rights abuses by
law enforcement authorities are widespread, including the use
of torture. Due process is not respected. Arbitrary arrests and
detentions continue. We also remain very concerned about the
treatment of observant peaceful Muslims.
We have used the enhanced cooperation of the war on terror
to push for dialog for me and our Ambassador and others with
the government authorities with whom we had little prior
contact, such as the Interior Minister and Prosecutor General.
This increased contact has been granted since January. Positive
steps by Uzbekistan's Government since that time include
renewing International Committee of the Red Cross access to
prisoners, including those held in pretrial detention centers;
the unprecedented punishment with long prison sentences of law
enforcement officials who are found guilty of torturing several
prisoners to death; the registration for the first time ever of
an independent human rights NGO; and this month the issuance by
authorities or an invitation to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture.
These are important developments. That said, we still have
a very long road ahead in Uzbekistan. We are therefore
substantially expanding our support for human rights groups by
providing them with the space and resources they so badly need
to carry out their work. My bureau is also funding the creation
of resource centers for human rights in the area so they can
meet freely and gain access to computers, the Internet, and
other needs. We are also providing for further training in how
to conduct human rights observance and monitoring.
My bureau will also soon establish a human rights clinical
program at the Tashkent Law School. Part of this program will
train students in basic international human rights standards
and will provide legal consultations to the public on human
rights matters in cases. This will be the first university
human rights program in the region.
In Kyrgyzstan where the government's human rights record is
poor, we have seen some major disappointment since September
11, including the tragic events of March when police fired on
unarmed demonstrators. During this time the state run printing
press in Bishkek also refused to print two independent
newspapers and the government had introduced strict controls on
ownership, import and operation of printing presses by decree.
We are pleased that Kyrgyz authorities have since taken
some steps to restore public confidence, but public protests
continue, with citizens calling for greater accountability and
transparency in their government.
To aid citizens to act more effectively at the grass roots
level, we are supporting a program to provide citizens groups
with resources and training. Our project will establish a
nationwide network of regional information centers, each of
which will provide access to international and local
independent news, and information on current events, as well as
information on international law regarding human rights and
democracy.
After much urging by the international community, led by
our Ambassador John O'Keefe, the decrees I mentioned before
restricting printing equipment has been repealed. Even before
these events, my Bureau had identified a lack of access to free
media as a problem in Kyrgyzstan and we decided to address
directly the problem of independent media being dependent on
state-controlled infrastructure. We are now in the process of
establishing an independent printing press in Bishkek that will
serve independent newspapers and publishers to insure that the
people of Kyrgyzstan will have access to free and independent
information. We also have plans to promote the growth of
democratically oriented political parties in Kyrgyzstan.
In Kazakhstan the government's human rights record remains
poor. The government actions since September 11 have been at
best, mixed. An encouraging development was the formation in
November of a major new nongovernmental political movement, the
Democratic Choice in Kazakhstan, and their first national
meeting in January.
We're deeply concerned, however, that recent incidents
suggest an effort to intimidate political opposition leaders
and the independent media. Founding members of Democratic
Choice of Kazakhstan were fired from their government jobs and
Kazak authorities have detained two prominent members of
Democratic Choice on long-standing corruption charges. These
actions suggest an effort to intimidate political leaders.
Of equal concern has been the negative developments in
freedom of media in Kazakhstan. Newspaper offices have been
fire bombed, journalists threatened and harassed, and an
independent TV station has been off the air since its
transmission tower was vandalized in February. We therefore
plan to increase U.S. support for political party development
work in Kazakhstan and are seeking approval for a project to
support an extensive training program for independent
journalists in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in the region, to train
and support journalists to increase coverage of human rights
issues and expose corruption in the region.
In Turkmenistan, the human rights record of the government
remains extremely poor. Government repression of political
opposition and civil society remains a particular concern, as
does abuse by law enforcement officials. Freedom of speech and
the media are severely restricted.
There are well-known problems that you have been hearing
about in particular from your constituents concerning religious
freedom. Under their highly restrictive law on religion, only
the Russian Orthodox church and Sunni Muslim groups feel free
to worship. Other groups in past years have had their churches
torn down and property confiscated.
Since September 11, there has been only the most minor
improvements. As elsewhere, promotion of democracy and human
rights remains an important right of our engagement, and we
regularly push for changes in Turkmenistan's human rights
practices. The U.S. Government has expanded its exchange
program for Turkmen youth, and my Bureau is providing small
grants to human rights and democracy NGOs. We are also in the
process of supporting a regional program for all of central
Asia, particularly Turkmenistan, to provide direct support for
human rights and democracy activists, independent journalists,
and NGOs affected by government persecution.
Finally, about 2 weeks ago the International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights, in part with our funding, brought
together for the first time political and NGO leaders from the
country in Vienna, and they issued a set of recommendations to
the United States and other countries about further policy
inside Turkmenistan.
In Tajikistan, the government's human rights record remains
poor. However, 5 years after a protracted and brutal civil war,
it is taking steps to accommodate the political opposition.
There are opportunities for freedom of public expression and
dissent, and political debate is allowed. We've also witnessed
the establishment of many local NGOs. However, we remain
concerned about the need for reform of cumbersome election and
party registration laws, and we will continue to engage with
the government to bring that into accord with the international
standards.
While an independent media in Tajikistan does not yet
exist, journalists practice self censorship as a way of
avoiding government harassment. We are disappointed that the
recently introduced media law does not go far enough in
protecting freedom of the media.
Tajikistan will benefit from one of our projects mentioned
earlier to support an extensive training program for
independent journalists in all of central Asia. We are also
planning a human rights program for the entire region that will
create a network of advocates to address the issues and demands
of citizens who are currently unable to advocate effectively on
their own behalf.
In conclusion, let me once again stress this
administration's firm belief that our fight against terrorism
is also a fight for democracy. Finding a proper balance between
military assistance and support for human rights when engaging
in a country such as those in central Asia, it need not be a
question of balancing competing interests, but can as we're
attempting, be an issue of mutually reinforcing goals. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for your kind
and well-timed invitation to testify on the very important question of
whether the U.S. Government has the right balance between military
assistance and human rights in central Asia. The Committee's interest
in this question is certainly understandable as the importance of
universal human rights has been brought sharply into focus by global
terrorism.
September 11 dramatically changed the focus of United States
foreign policy. We are now engaged in a global struggle against terror
that requires working in close cooperation with an array of
governments, some of which have, by our own accounts, poor human rights
records and with whom we have not had close relations in the past.
However, despite this increased focus on terrorism in our foreign
policy, these new relationships remain anchored by the solid bedrock in
our foreign policy, namely, a strong emphasis on promoting democracy
and human rights.
Some in the human rights community here and abroad have expressed
concern that as a result of the September 11 attacks on America, the
Administration has or will abandon human rights. This is not the case.
Indeed, human rights and democracy are as essential today, if not more,
than they were before the terrorist attacks on America. We cannot win a
war on terrorism by diminishing the universal observance of human
rights. To do so would be merely to set the stage for a resurgence of
terrorism in another generation.
President Bush and Secretary Powell have been unhesitating in their
support of human rights and democracy throughout the world. In his
State of the Union Address, President Bush made the point that the
fight against terrorism is part of a larger struggle for democracy:
America will lead by defending liberty and justice because
they are right and true and unchanging for all people
everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is
exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture.
But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable
demands of human dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power
of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech,
equal justice and religious tolerance.
Secretary Powell has been equally adamant in calling on our new
partners to respect human rights and democracy. At the release of our
annual Human Rights Report he said:
The United States welcomes the help of any country or party
that is genuinely prepared to work with us to eradicate
terrorism. At the same time, we will not relax our commitment
to advancing the cause of human rights and democracy. For a
world in which men and women of every continent, culture and
creed, of every race, religion and region, can exercise their
fundamental freedoms is a world in which terrorism cannot
thrive.
But I think it is fair to say that the U.S. commitment to human
rights and democracy has become a bipartisan tradition that reflects
not only U.S. values, but also 50 years of international acceptance and
support for the universality of human rights. That is why I welcome
this opportunity to testify before you today, and I look forward to
continuing to work with this Committee to promote human rights and
democracy in this region.
Specifically with regard to central Asia, I will focus my remarks
on our efforts to encourage and support human rights and democracy in
the region. I will he frank about the situation in those countries but
will make clear what progress we have made in promoting democracy and
respect for human rights. For details on military assistance and
bilateral relations, I will defer to my colleagues, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Crouch and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs Pascoe.
In the case of the five central Asian republics, the assistance the
governments of these countries have rendered to Operation Enduring
Freedom has been invaluable. Promoting democracy and human rights is
even more important, for these countries are frontline states in the
struggle against terrorism. Their proximity to Afghanistan and their
own tragic experiences with indigenous terrorism make them particularly
vulnerable to future terrorist activities. There is a firm consensus
among all U.S. decision-makers that a broadening of cooperation will
only be possible if these same governments undergo political reforms
that will allow the emergence of democratic institutions, without which
there can be no lasting stability in the region.
Promoting religious freedom in central Asia has also become one of
our most difficult tasks given the sensitivities of the issue in the
post 9/11 context of a war against terrorism. Many non-Orthodox
Christians and especially Muslims find themselves the object of
repressive legislation, or of prison sentences. We continue to make it
clear in our discussions with each country and its citizens that even
though the U.S. was attacked by Islamic extremists, we are not in a war
against Islam. We still believe the best approach is to permit all non-
violent, unregistered religious groups to exist without government
interference. We believe government repression of its observant Muslim
believers, as if they were all violent extremists, will bring about
that very state which the government seeks to avoid.
As they celebrate their tenth anniversary of independence, the
central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union continue to present
some of the greatest challenges to U.S. efforts to enhance stability in
the region, which can only be achieved through democracy and respect
for human rights.
enhanced engagement
Our approach to these overwhelming challenges has been to enhance
engagement with the governments and societies of central Asia. As Dr.
Condoleezza Rice said only a week after the horrific September 11
attacks, ``Civil liberties matter to this President very much, and our
values matter to us abroad. We are not going to stop talking about the
things that matter to us, human rights, [and] religious freedom . . .
We're going to continue to press those things; we would not be America
if we did not.''
Even while we ramp up our military cooperation with governments
that have troubling human rights records, we also see this as an
opportunity to enhance our engagement and impact on issues of democracy
and human rights. Our firm message to the governments and their leaders
has been that closer relations with the United States brings with it a
heightened level of scrutiny and that, therefore, any deepening and
broadening of our cooperation will depend on continual progress in
respecting human rights and democracy. Our policy of enhanced
engagement has taken many forms. However, as my colleagues will testify
about their activities, the message from all of us has been
consistent--democratic states that respect the human rights of their
citizens are anchors of stability and motors of prosperity. Therefore,
the governments of central Asia must keep moving down the path to
greater democratization. At every level, from President Bush on down,
we have taken every opportunity to express this message when meeting
with senior government officials from central Asia, whether in the
capitals of the region or in Washington, D.C.
A good example of our coordinated efforts was the Joint Security
Cooperation Consultation in Tashkent in January that resulted in the
initialing of the Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and
Cooperation Framework Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the United
States. Present at this consultation were not only representatives from
the Department of Defense and the State Department's Bureau of European
Affairs, but also representatives from my Bureau as well as the
Treasury Department. This comprehensive approach to security was
concretely reflected in the final document, in which our countries have
agreed to cooperate not only in matters of military security but,
equally important, in matters of political and economic reform, because
security also comes from a free market-based economy and an open,
democratic system. Indeed, in this document the government of
Uzbekistan reaffirmed its commitment and intentions to further
intensify the democratic transformation of its society in the political
and economic areas. And the U.S. government has agreed to provide them
assistance in doing so.
We also closely coordinate our HRDF-funded projects with the wide
range of ongoing U.S. government-funded democracy programs in central
Asia, particularly in such areas as support for independent media and
non-governmental organizations. USAID is implementing a wide array of
democracy programs in these and other areas, including civic advocacy,
the rule of law, political party development and local government
reform. State Department public diplomacy programs are reaching out to
the next generation of central Asian leaders by bringing young, reform-
minded people to the United States on academic and professional
exchanges. This year, the Department is also providing additional
funding to expand the grant-making activities of the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED) in central Asia.
As a sign of our concern I have traveled to the region twice since
9/11, once in January and again two weeks ago, to meet with government
authorities to impress upon them the need to meet their commitments to
respect human rights. I have also devoted a significant portion of my
Bureau's Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) to projects supporting
democracy and human rights in central Asia and plan on increasing our
programming there substantially. I would like to speak briefly to some
of the overriding problems we see and how we have addressed them since
September 11.
In Uzbekistan the human rights record remains very poor. Human
rights abuses by law enforcement authorities are widespread, including
the use of torture. The judiciary is not able to function independently
and due process is not respected--arbitrary arrests and detentions
remain problematic. We continue to raise concerns about the treatment
of observant, peaceful Muslim groups.
As a result of these serious issues, we have developed a multi-
pronged approach to tackle these human rights problems. In the context
of 9/11, we have used our enhanced cooperation to push for greater
dialogue with government authorities with whom we had had little prior
contact. As a result, I have been able to meet with officials from
those government agencies where the worst abuses occur, including the
Ministries of Justice and Interior as well as the Procurator General.
With our Ambassador, John Herbst, in the lead, we are making progress.
Uzbekistan has publicly expressed its commitment to internationally
recognized human rights and since September 11 has taken several steps
to act on that commitment. Limited but positive steps include
permitting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to
prisoners, including those held in pre-trial detention centers; the
punishment with long prison sentences of those law enforcement
officials who were found guilty of torturing several prisoners to
death; the amnesty releasing nearly 800 political prisoners; and for
the first time in the history of independent Uzbekistan, registration
of an independent human rights NGO. We understand that the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture has received an invitation to visit Uzbekistan.
It is our hope that the long-banned opposition party, Birlik, will be
able to re-register soon.
While these are important steps, we still have a long way to go in
Uzbekistan. We are under no illusion that the human rights abuses have
ended. We know there to be about 7,000 political prisoners and will
continue to urge the government to release them. While arrests have
declined significantly, we know they continue. Just four weeks ago
Yuldash Rasulov, a human rights activist whose work for the still
unregistered Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) focuses on
government repression of practicing Muslims, was arrested. For this
reason, we are substantially expanding our support for human rights
groups by providing them with the physical space and resources they so
badly need to carry out their important work. With our implementing
partner, Freedom House, my Bureau will be establishing resource centers
for human rights NGOs to use as meeting rooms, to gain access to the
Internet, computers and independent newspapers and other media. We are
also providing them further training in how to conduct human rights
monitoring and reporting. With another of our implementing partners,
ABA/CEELL, my Bureau will soon establish a human rights clinical
program at the Tashkent law school. As part of this program we will
train students in basic international human rights standards and
provide legal consultations to the public on human rights matters and
cases. This will be the first university human rights program in the
region.
In Kyrgyzstan, where the government's human rights record is poor,
we have seen some major disappointments since September 11 but are
cautiously hopeful that after the tragic events of March 17-18 in Aksy
district where police fired on unarmed demonstrators, the government of
Kyrgyzstan is once again headed in the direction of greater
democratization and respect for human rights. On May 22, Kyrgyzstan's
government resigned following the report of a special state commission
investigating the deaths of five civilian protestors. The commission
ruled that senior government officials were at fault and recommended
specific actions be taken to address the situation, including
expediting court and legal reforms in the country. We hope that these
recommendations will be implemented. While we are pleased that the
Kyrgyz authorities have taken some steps to restore public confidence,
public protests continue, with the people calling for greater
accountability and transparency in their government. We stand ready to
assist the Kyrgyz government take even more concrete measures to expand
dialogue and address the grievances of civil society.
To aid citizens to act more effectively at the grassroots level, my
Bureau is supporting a program to provide citizen groups with resources
and training. Our project will establish a nationwide network of
regional information centers with corresponding discussion clubs and
reading rooms. Each of these establishments will provide access to
international and local independent news and information on current
events as well as information on international and local laws regarding
human rights and democracy. DRL also plans to promote the growth of
democratically-oriented political parties in Kyrgyzstan.
Public discontent in Kyrgyzstan arose over the arrest of
parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov in January on charges stemming from
incidents that had occurred 7 years earlier. The U.S. had credible
concerns that this arrest may have been linked to his public statements
critical of government policy and our Ambassador, John O'Keefe,
publicly pushed for his release throughout the spring with final
success. One of the issues that exacerbated the situation there was the
lack of sufficient access to independent media; during this time the
state-run printing press in Bishkek was refusing to print two of the
independent newspapers, ``Moya Stolitsa'' and ``Res Publica,'' and the
government had introduced strict controls on the ownership, import and
operation of printing presses. Here, too, Ambassador O'Keefe publicly
raised the issue of the need to respect freedom of media. I am pleased
to report that the decree restricting printing equipment has been
repealed.
Even before these events, my Bureau had identified lack of access
to free media as a problem hampering democracy in Kyrgyzstan and we
decided to address directly the problem of independent media being
dependent on state-controlled media infrastructure. DRL is now in the
process of establishing an independent printing press in Bishkek that
will serve independent newspapers and publishers to help ensure that
the people of Kyrgyzstan will always have access to free and
independent information.
In Kazakhstan the government's human rights record remains poor and
government actions since September 11 have been very mixed. A positive
note is that Presidents Bush and Nazabayev stated in a joint
declaration in December their ``desire to strengthen democratic
institutions and processes, such as independent media, local
government, pluralism, and free and fair elections'' in Kazakhstan.
Yet we are deeply concerned that recent incidents suggest an effort
to intimidate political opposition leaders and the independent media
and raise serious questions about the safety of the independent media
in Kazakhstan. An encouraging development was the formation in November
of a major new nongovernmental political movement, the Democratic
Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK). While the movement was able to hold public
meetings, its founding members were subsequently all fired from their
government jobs at the direction of the Prime Minister. In March Ak
Zhol, a new democratic party affiliated with the DVK, was able to
register. However, Kazakhstani authorities have detained two prominent
members of Democratic Choice, Mukhtar Ablyazov and Galymzhan
Zhakiyanov, on long-standing corruption charges. While we cannot
comment on the veracity of the charges against them, these actions
taken together suggest an effort to intimidate political opposition
leaders.
Of equal concern have been the negative developments in freedom of
the media in Kazakhstan. On May 21, several unidentified men apparently
robbed the editorial office of the independent Kazakhstani newspaper,
``Soldat.'' On May 22, the Almaty office of another independent
newspaper, ``Delovoye Obrozreniye Respublika,'' was firebombed and
destroyed. Broadcast rights have been suspended since March for the
independent television state ``TAN,'' and its primary feeder cable has
been vandalized three times since it went off the air. Ambassador Larry
Napper has made our concerns clear to Kazakhstani authorities and urged
them to conduct an independent and transparent investigation into the
firebombing incident as well as the other attacks on independent media.
Despite this harassment, we see the emergence of nascent, fledgling
democratic forces and DRL therefore plans to increase U.S. support for
political party development work in Kazakhstan, and are seeking
approval for a project to support an extensive training program for
independent journalists in all of central Asia. This program will train
and support journalists to increase coverage of human rights issues,
allowing them to monitor human rights abuses and expose corruption in
the region, providing the information citizens need to judge those in
authority.
In Turkmenistan the human rights record of the government remains
extremely poor. Government repression of political opposition and civil
society remains a particular concern as does abuse by, and impunity of,
police and other law enforcement officials. There are severe
restrictions on freedom of speech and media. Since September 11 there
have been only the most minor improvements. The government announced
that exit visas are no longer required; additionally, at year's end
9,000 prisoners were amnestied and released and another 9,000 received
reduced sentences. Although possibly motivated by internal reasons,
recently there have been massive internal investigations and
prosecution of the KNB and other security ministries for human rights
and other abuses.
Also in Turkmenistan, there are the well-known problems that you
have been hearing about from your constituents concerning religious
freedom. Under their highly restrictive law on religion, only the
Russian Orthodox and Sunni Muslim groups feel free to worship. Other
groups in past years have had their churches torn down or property
confiscated. Some Protestant faithful were harassed, detained, and
beaten. On a more positive note, the government released Baptist
Shageldy Atakov and several Jehovah's Witnesses (imprisoned for
conscientious objection). There were no reports of torture this year,
and the end to exit visas has been a great benefit to the religious
community. President Niyazov also went on record to make new
commitments on religious rights in his letter to President Bush.
Promotion of democracy and human rights remains an important part
of our multifaceted engagement there, and we regularly raise
Turkmenistan's human rights abuses bilaterally. The U.S. government has
expanded its exchange program for Turkmen youth and my Bureau is using
HRDF to support democracy by providing small grants to human rights and
democracy NGOs via our implementing partners. DRL is also in the
process of supporting a regional program for central Asia to provide
direct support for human rights and democracy activists, independent
journalists, and NGOs affected by government persecution related to
their work.
In Tajikistan, the government's human rights record remains poor;
however, five years after a protracted and brutal civil war, it has
taken steps to accommodate the political opposition, conclude and
implement a peace accord in a power-sharing agreement, and include the
opposition in elections that unfortunately remain flawed. There are
opportunities for freedom of public expression of dissent and political
debate is allowed. We have also witnessed the establishment of many
local NGOs. However, we remained concerned about the need for reform of
cumbersome election and party registration laws and we will continue to
engage with the government on bringing them into accord with
international standards.
In Tajikistan, despite some local incidents with respect to
Protestant churches, the government of Tajikistan generally respects
the rights of observant Muslim believers. In a delicate balancing act,
the government has permitted a religiously oriented party, the Islamic
Renaissance Party, to field two members to the lower house of the
national parliament since 9/11, and there are several deputies from
this party in regional and district parliaments around the country.
While independent media in Tajikistan does exist, journalists
practice self-censorship as a way of avoiding government harassment. We
were disappointed that the media law recently introduced in parliament
does not go far enough in protecting freedom of media. Because of DRL's
deep commitment to freedom of the media, my Bureau recently decided to
seek approval for a project to support an extensive training program
for independent journalists in all of central Asia. This program will
train and support journalists to increase coverage of human rights
issues, allowing them to monitor human rights abuses and expose
corruption in the region, providing the information citizens need to
judge those in authority.
conclusion
In conclusion allow me to stress once again this Administration's
firm belief that our fight against terrorism is part of a larger fight
for democracy. Finding the proper balance between military assistance
and support for human rights when engaging with countries only at the
threshold of respect for human rights and democracy is not a question
of balancing competing interests, but a question of mutually
reinforcing goals. In this new world of greater vigilance against
wanton terrorist attacks, we are as convinced as ever that democratic
freedoms, political and economic stability, and human rights are key to
a world free of terrorism. Societies that respect human dignity and the
integrity of the person are societies that adhere to the rule of law
and provide no opportunity for terrorism to take hold. A stable
government that is accountable to its people and respects their rights
and that shares power and practices pluralism can deal more effectively
with extremist elements in its society. These are the societies we are
striving for in central Asia, with both our policies and our assistance
programs.
Thank you.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you very much, Mr. Craner.
Mr. Crouch.
STATEMENT OF HON. J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Crouch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank
you for the opportunity to address this subcommittee. I regard
the work of the subcommittee generally, but to focus on the
human rights issue is particularly helpful to the work that the
Department is undertaking in central Asia, both prior to 9/11,
but certainly since 9/11.
My remarks today will focus on U.S. Department of Defense
cooperation with the countries of central Asia. The
administration's policy toward central Asia falls generally
into three broad categories, internal reform, security
promotion and energy development. All three are interrelated
and we coordinate our activities to advance U.S. interests, but
the Defense Department's primary responsibility falls into the
security area.
Although the Department of Defense was actively involved in
central Asia prior to September 11, my remarks today will
emphasize our Operation Enduring Freedom cooperation with
central Asian states. Even after the Taliban are eliminated, we
will share important security interests with central Asian
states which will merit our continued cooperation.
Our bilateral initiatives with the countries in the region
prior to September 11 laid the groundwork both politically and
militarily for coalition military operations in central Asia in
support of the global war on terrorism. Prior to September
2001, our military to military cooperation was aimed at
eliminating the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction,
strengthening these states' sovereignty and independence and
supporting defense reform; namely helping these states reform
their militaries to transition from the Soviet era legacy of
top heavy bloated militaries to smaller more professional
forces capable of supporting legitimate defense needs,
encouraging participation in NATO's partnership for peace
program, promoting regional peacekeeping capabilities and
fostering greater regional cooperation. These goals remain
today.
The list of these specific activities and programs is long,
and includes activities under the cooperative threat reduction
program as well as exchanges and training on issues relevant to
reform and modernization. For example, central Asian officers
and soldiers attend U.S. military schools and participate in
our training programs. These include courses and seminars at
the Marshall Center in Germany and courses sponsored by the
International Military Education and Training Program, or IMET.
These activities introduce central Asian military personnel
to national security functions and military roles and
responsibilities in a democratic society. They are instructed
in the rule of law, the role of the armed forces within a
constitutional framework, and rational decisionmaking models
based on accepted human rights norms.
A number of central Asian states have started developing
professional noncommissioned officer corps and other programs
integral to military personnel reform. Additionally, some
central Asian states have played active roles in the NATO
partnership for peace program and in regional cooperation
exercises.
Today the United States and our coalition allies have
forces in central Asia because of Operation Enduring Freedom
and the need to position U.S. and coalition troops and
equipment close to Afghanistan. However, we were able to gain
access quickly because of the relationships that we had formed
with military and national leaders in the region prior to
September 11.
Another key factor contributing to the willingness of
central Asian leaders to cooperate with the United States and
others in Operation Enduring Freedom is that our military
operations are enhancing their security too. I think this is an
important point. All of the central Asian countries have told
us that OEF directly addresses their security concerns, namely
terrorism and religious extremism, both home grown and
imported, narco traffickers and their close opportunistic
collaboration with violent groups, and the transnational threat
of weapons of mass destruction materials and crossing
international borders. And I think that because our actions are
in their security interest, this provides us more leverage,
frankly, on the human rights side than we would have if we were
in a position where they were simply doing us a favor, if you
will. They are not doing us a favor by having us involved
there. Our interests are I think complementary.
Our military relationships with each nation have matured on
a scale not imaginable prior to September 11, and I would like
to review those for you.
The Kyrgyz Republic has proven to be a critical regional
partner in the war on terrorism. OEF coalition activities are
centered on air support operations from facilities at Manas
International Airport. Prior to the onset of operations, we
needed rapid parliamentary action approving a status of forces
agreement, which was granted by the government. Further, the
Kyrgyz Republic has approved all U.S. requests to date in
relation to OEF issues, to include basing of combat and combat
support units at Manas. This basing is not limited to U.S.
forces. France, Italy, Turkey, Norway, Canada and South Korea
are also basing units at Manas.
Uzbekistan was one of the first supporters of the U.S.
global war on terrorism, providing a base for U.S. operations
and supporting humanitarian relief operations into Afghanistan
at the Friendship Bridge at Termez. German units supporting the
international security assistance force in Afghanistan have
established a northern base in Termez. Uzbekistan's President
Karimov has strongly advocated active U.S. and coalition
involvement in central Asia. Uzbekistan's own struggle against
an indigenous terrorist group, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan [IMU], contributes to a keen awareness of the threat
facing the region and the world.
Kazakhstan has also played a significant role. It has
agreed to blanket over-flight clearances for U.S. and coalition
aircraft, waiving the normally associated over-flight fees;
offered the use of its airfield facilities; expedited rail
transshipment of supplies to our bases at Karshi-Khanabad in
Uzbekistan and Manas, Kyrgyzstan. The Kazakhstanis have stated
their desire to increase their cooperation with the United
States, specifically in support of their efforts to restructure
their Armed Forces and develop the capability to secure their
oil pipelines and Caspian energy resources. They too are
concerned about terrorist activities and groups originating
from the south and are reorganizing their forces to address
this threat. Finally, they plan on using U.S. security
assistance funds to upgrade facilities in the western part of
their country to support naval and military operations designed
to enhance Caspian Sea security.
Turkmenistan has worked with the United States in
overflight and refueling operations for humanitarian flights in
support of OEF. Eventually we expect up to 10 aircraft a day
will be refueled in this operation, with blanket overflight and
landing clearances. Turkmenistan has also played an important
role in facilitating humanitarian aid shipments into
Afghanistan.
The Government of Tajikistan has likewise been a supporter
of Operation Enduring Freedom. Its primary contribution has
been the use of its international airport at Dushanbe for
coalition refueling and basing. To date, the United States Air
Force has refueled over 400 C-17 sorties at Dushanbe, with
British and French air forces also refueling and basing at the
airport.
This provides a brief overview of the contributions that
central Asian states have made to support the United States in
the war on terrorism. The events of September 11 clearly
highlighted the fact that the United States and the countries
of central Asia have significant mutual security interests. The
continued stability and security of this region remain an
important U.S. interest. In this regard, the United States must
continue cooperative efforts with central Asian states to help
them secure their independence and territorial integrity by
eliminating terrorism, eliminate the threat posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and encouraging
reform, both democratic and human rights reform and stability.
For the foreseeable future, the United States defense and
security cooperation in central Asia must continue to support
actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats. Over the past 4
years the IMU has posed a considerable threat to countries in
the region. The IMU, an al-Qaeda affiliate, lost one of its two
primary leaders in December in Konduz, Afghanistan, when he was
reportedly killed while fighting for the Taliban. The IMU's
planned campaigns have been severely disrupted through
coalition military activity. Nevertheless, the organization
remains a threat not only to Uzbekistan but to Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. The IMU's stated goal is to overthrow the
Government of Uzbekistan and to create a regionally based,
religious government, founded on its conception of pure Islamic
law, a conception not unlike that of the Taliban.
The cooperative threat reduction programs in Kazakhstan are
focused on dismantling the former Soviet biological and
chemical agent production facilities located there, upgrading
security and biological institutes storing dangerous pathogens,
and securing radioactive and fissile material.
In Uzbekistan, we have just completed two projects,
demilitarizing the former Soviet chemical research and
production institute Nukus, and destroying residual anthrax
buried in pits at Voz Island. Already, our scientists are
preparing to engage in cooperative research projects with Uzbek
bioscientists and we are initiating projects to enhance
security of dangerous pathogen collections at biological
institutes.
All of the central Asian states face the same challenge, to
reform Soviet style institutions while creating effective
capabilities to defend against transnational threats. It is our
intent to provide them a democratic model, sound military
advice and tailored assistance. Extremist violence fueled by
narcotics and overlaid on a population struggling with poverty
are real obstacles to stability and security.
The broad range and depth of our cooperation with the
countries in central Asia was unimaginable before the tragic
events of September 11. What is clear today, however, is that
the defense and military to military relationships we forged in
the years following the independence of the central Asian
states have made it possible for us to conduct these vitally
important military operations for the war on terrorism with
their full cooperation and support. At the same time, U.S.
Department of Defense programs, contacts and activities are
furthering significant defense reforms and the establishment of
effective military forces under the control of civilian
authorities. The U.S. Department of Defense will continue both
the global fight against terrorism and its efforts in support
of genuine and positive change in the military structures of
the central Asian states.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crouch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address this
subcommittee. My remarks today will focus on U.S. Department of Defense
security cooperation with the countries of central Asia.
The Administration's policy towards central Asia falls into three
categories: internal reform, security promotion, and energy
development. All three are inter-related and we coordinate our
activities to advance U.S. national interests. The Defense Department's
primary responsibilities fall in the security area.
Although the Department of Defense was actively involved in central
Asia prior to September 11th my remarks today will emphasize our
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) cooperation with central Asian states.
Even after the Taliban are eliminated, we will share important security
interests with central Asian states, which will merit our continued
cooperation.
Our bilateral activities with the countries in the region prior to
September 11th laid the groundwork both politically and militarily for
coalition operations in central Asia in support of the Global War on
Terrorism. Prior to September 2001, our military-to-military
cooperation was aimed at:
Eliminating the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction;
Strengthening these states' sovereignty and independence;
Supporting defense reform, namely, helping these states to
reform their militaries to transition from the Soviet-era
legacy of top-heavy, bloated militaries, to smaller, more
professional forces capable of supporting legitimate defense
needs;
Encouraging participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace;
Promoting regional peacekeeping capabilities; and,
Fostering greater regional cooperation.
These goals remain today.
The list of these specific activities and programs is long, and
includes activities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program as well as exchanges and training on issues relevant to reform
and modernization. For example, central Asian officers and soldiers
attend U.S. military schools and participate in our training programs.
These include courses and seminars at the Marshall Center in Germany,
and courses sponsored by the International Military Education and
Training program, IMET. These activities introduce central Asian
military personnel to national security functions and military roles
and responsibilities in a democratic society. They are instructed in
the rule of law, the role of the armed forces within a constitutional
framework, and rational decision-making models based on accepted human
rights norms.
A number of central Asian states have started developing
professional Non-Commissioned Officer corps, and other programs
integral to military personnel reform. Additionally, some central Asian
nations have played active roles in the NATO Partnership for Peace
(PIP) ``CENTRASBATS'' (Central Asian Battalions) and Regional
Cooperation exercises.
Today we have forces in central Asia because of OEF and the need to
position U.S. and coalition troops and equipment close to Afghanistan.
However, we were able to gain access quickly because of the prior
relationships we had formed with military and national leaders in the
region prior to September 11th.
Another key factor contributing to the willingness of central Asian
leaders to cooperate with the United States in OEF is that our military
operations are enhancing their security, too. All of the central Asian
countries have told us that OEF directly addresses their security
concerns, namely: 1) terrorism and religious extremism, both home-grown
and imported; 2) narcotraffickers and their close, opportunistic
collaboration with violent groups; and 3) the transnational threat of
WMD materials crossing international borders.
Our military relationships with each nation have matured on a scale
not imaginable prior to September 11th.
kyrgyz republic
The Kyrgyz Republic has proven itself to be a critical regional
partner in the War on Terrorism. In the Kyrgyz Republic, OEF coalition
activities are centered on air support operations from facilities at
Manas International Airport. Prior to the onset of operations we needed
rapid parliamentary action approving a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA), which was granted. Further, the Kyrgyz Republic has approved
all U.S. requests to date in relation to OEF issues, to include basing
of combat and combat support units at Manas. This basing is not limited
to U.S. forces: France, Italy, Turkey, Norway, Canada, and South Korea
are also basing units at Manas.
uzbekistan
Uzbekistan was one of the first supporters of the U.S. Global War
on Terrorism, providing a base for U.S. operations and supporting
humanitarian relief operations into Afghanistan at the Friendship
Bridge at Termez. German units supporting the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan have established a northern base in
Termez. Uzbekistan's President Karimov has strongly advocated active
U.S. and Coalition involvement in central Asia. Uzbekistan's own
struggle against an indigenous terrorist group--the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU)--contributes to a keen awareness of the threat facing
the region and the world.
kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has also played a significant role. It has: 1) agreed to
blanket over-flight clearances for U.S. and Coalition aircraft, waiving
the normally associated over-flight fees; 2) offered the use of its
airfield facilities; and 3) expedited rail transshipment of supplies to
our bases at Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan, and Manas, Kyrgyzstan. The
Kazakhstanis have stated their desire to increase their cooperation
with the United States, specifically in support of their efforts to
restructure their Armed Forces and develop a capability to secure their
oil pipelines and Caspian energy resources. They, too, are concerned
about terrorist activities and groups originating from the south, and
are reorganizing their forces to address this threat. Lastly, they plan
on using U.S. security assistance funds to upgrade facilities in the
Western part of the country to support naval and military operations
designed to enhance Caspian Sea security.
turkmenistan
Turkmenistan has worked with the United States in overflight and
refueling operations for humanitarian flights in support of OEF.
Eventually, up to 10 aircraft per day will be refueled in this
operation, with blanket overflight and landing clearances. Turkmenistan
has also played an important role in facilitating humanitarian aid
shipments into Afghanistan.
tajikistan
The Government of Tajikistan has likewise been a supporter of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Its primary contribution has been the use
of its international airport in Dushanbe for coalition refueling and
basing. To date, the U.S. Air Force has refueled over 400 C-17 sorties
in Dushanbe, with British and French air forces also refueling and
basing at the airport.
This is an overview of the contributions central Asian states have
made to support the U.S. in the war on terrorism. The events of
September 11th clearly highlighted that the United States and the
countries of central Asia have significant mutual security interests.
The continued stability and security of this region will remain an
important U.S. interest. In this regard, the U.S. must continue
cooperative efforts with central Asian states to help them secure their
independence and territorial integrity by: (1) eliminating terrorism;
(2) eliminating the threat posed by the proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD); and (3) encouraging reform and stability.
eliminating terrorism
For the foreseeable future, United States defense and security
cooperation in central Asia must continue to support actions to deter
or defeat terrorist threats. Over the past four years the IMU has posed
a considerable threat to countries in the region. The IMU, an Al Qaeda
affiliate, lost one of its two primary leaders in December in Konduz,
Afghanistan, when he was reportedly killed while fighting for the
Taliban. The IMU's planned campaigns have been severely disrupted
through coalition military activity. Nevertheless, the organization
remains a threat not only to Uzbekistan but to Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan as well. The IMU's stated goal is to overthrow the
Government of Uzbekistan and to create a religious-based government
founded on its conception of ``pure Islamic law''--a conception not
unlike that of the Taliban.
halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
The Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in Kazakhstan are focused
on dismantling the former Soviet biological and chemical agent
production facilities located there; upgrading security at biological
institutes storing dangerous pathogens; and, securing radioactive and
fissile material.
In Uzbekistan, we have just completed two projects: demilitarizing
the former Soviet chemical research and production institute Nukus and
destroying residual anthrax buried in pits at Vozrozhdeniye Island.
Already, our scientists are preparing to engage in cooperative research
projects with Uzbek bio scientists, and we are initiating projects to
enhance security of dangerous pathogen collections at biological
institutes.
encouraging reform and stability
All the central Asian states face the same challenge: to reform
Soviet-style institutions while creating effective capabilities to
defend against transnational threats. It is our intent to provide them
a democratic model, sound military advice, and tailored assistance.
Extremist violence, fueled by narcotics and overlaid on a population
struggling with poverty, are real obstacles to stability and security.
The broad range and depth of our cooperation with the countries in
central Asia was unimaginable prior to the tragic events of September
11th. What is clear today, however, is that the defense and military to
military relationships we forged in the years following the
independence of the central Asian states have made it possible for us
to conduct vitally important military operations in the war on
terrorism with their full cooperation and support. At the same time,
U.S. Department of Defense programs, contacts and activities are
furthering significant defense reforms and the establishment of
effective military forces under the control of civilian authorities.
The United States Department of Defense will continue both the global
fight against terrorism and its efforts in support of genuine and
positive change in the military structures of the central Asian
nations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my remarks.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Pasco,
there is a vote in progress, but I would like to get your
testimony in and then we will return for any discussion or
questions afterwards, so as not to interrupt you in mid-
testimony. We could try to do this in 5 to 7 minutes so we
don't have to interrupt you.
STATEMENT OF B. LYNN PASCOE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Pascoe. Mr. Chairman, that's very good, because
actually, I was going to ask your permission if I could just
enter my statement in the record.
Senator Torricelli. Without objection, it will be entered
in the record.
Mr. Pascoe. First off let me say, I really want to
congratulate you and the subcommittee for holding these
hearings. Those of us who work on central Asia deeply
appreciate what Congress has done, what the Senate has done and
this committee has done. One of the ways that the engagement
has been very important in the region is travel that the
Senators and Congressmen have taken to the region. Sometime
with the past, I think for the first decade, the State
Department had a reputation of being the one who sort of
carried the negative water, and everybody else had nice things
to say, and not too many people really went out there in the
first place, so they could very selectively pick from what they
wanted to hear, and it made the message much more muffled.
Since last September, the large number of Senators and
Congressmen who have gone to the region at considerable effort,
because it's not too easy to get there sometimes, I think has
had an extraordinary positive effect on promoting the kind of
human rights and democracy issues that we are talking about
today, because when they hear it from you directly, it is very
important in its strong support for our efforts.
Let me just say in general that I think in the period for
the first decade, we tried to be there very early in central
Asia and we saw that the independence of these states were
quite important and we tried to do much on the humanitarian
side and we certainly worked, and Senator Lugar was deeply
involved in all of the efforts on weapons of mass destruction,
and we worked to see what we could do in the building of civil
society areas.
I think we had some successes. Some of it was impressive.
What was clear, I think though after 9/11, that one is, we
needed bases, we needed to be able to operate from the region.
As Mr. Couch has stated quite clearly, we got very fast, very
good cooperation, and it remains so to this day. The other side
of it was the question of how do we avoid the kind of problem
we had in Afghanistan, and I think that goes to the very heart
of the question of whether there is a conflict between the
human rights democracy side and our cooperation in Operation
Enduring Freedom.
And from our point of view, there is no conflict
whatsoever. I listened to both of you gentlemen's opening
statements very carefully, and it occurred to me how closely we
agree on this question, because our message at all levels, from
the top on down, in every meeting that we had and as Lorne
said, as J.D. said, as I was saying last week when I was out
there, that you have to have the economic and political reform,
the modernization if you're going to make it in the real world
of the global economy, and that's what we're trying to do for
these countries out there, we're trying to give them a chance.
They have to have political stability, they have to have
democracy, they have to have human rights and they have to have
economic development.
We're working at that each day. We want to work very
closely with you Senators on this issue, and I thank you very
much. Did I make my 7 minutes, sir?
Senator Torricelli. You did.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pascoe follows:]
Prepared Statement of B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is my
pleasure to appear before this subcommittee. I have just returned last
week from visiting each of the central Asian capitals. My purpose this
afternoon is to attempt to bridge the presentations of my two
distinguished colleagues, who will be speaking about military
assistance and human rights in the region. I will attempt to answer the
question, ``Why is it so important that we engage these countries at
this juncture?''
Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
moved to establish embassies and to engage the strategically placed
states of central Asia. Their weaknesses were evident from the
beginning, but we believed it important to shore up their independence
and provided modest assistance to help them to develop into stable
modernizing countries. Key elements in this strategy included multiple
pipelines to help the countries of the region benefit from their energy
wealth, humanitarian efforts to stave off the collapse of some of the
countries' social structure, civil society programs to develop modern
political structures, cooperative efforts to obstruct the export of
weapons of mass destruction, and some development aid to help economic
modernization. As security tensions nurtured by terrorist groups formed
in Afghanistan late in the decade, the United States also provided a
modicum of security assistance.
The attacks of September 11 made it clear that our policies in the
region had not gone far enough. We needed the assistance of the states
of the region (through bases, overflight rights, supplies, etc.) to
prosecute Operation Enduring Freedom; even more critically, the attacks
brought home the danger that fragile countries like Afghanistan and
potentially some of the states of central Asia could become the
breeding ground for international terrorist groups aimed at the United
States. It was critical to the national interests of the United States
that we greatly enhance our relations with the five central Asian
countries and help them find ways to take the political and economic
reform measures necessary for long-term prosperity and stability.
The Presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were invited to the
United States, numerous Congressional delegations and cabinet
secretaries have visited the region, and government ministers from
these countries now regularly visit Washington. Our assistance budgets
for most of the countries have increased significantly. The states of
central Asia have been excellent partners in the war against terrorism
and they have welcomed our contribution to their security.
Experience proves that individual liberty, free markets, good
governance, and international peace are interconnected and mutually
reinforcing. The challenge before us is how should we engage with these
regimes to move them in the right direction toward greater personal
freedom, rule of law, and economic openness.
We have a vision for this region--that it become stable, peaceful,
and prosperous--and that this is achieved through political and
economic reform. These reforms are the only way to bring these states
into competitive global economy. Without it, they cannot survive as
modern states. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many hoped that the new
countries that emerged would quickly embrace pluralistic democracy and
market economy. We now know that those expectations of the pace and
scale of democratic and economic change in the early 1990s were
unrealistic. Not because democracy isn't right for central Asia. Not
because the citizens of these countries wouldn't prefer to exercise the
everyday political freedoms democracy affords. Indeed, it would be
folly to assume that the universal human desire for freedom and dignity
that has swept the whole world somehow comes to an abrupt stop at the
borders of the central Asian region, skirts them briefly, and rushes on
elsewhere. It is not their ``Central Asianness'' that has held back the
growth of democracy in that region, but the leadership and socio-
economic structures of these countries which have so far kept them
frozen in a Soviet past. We understand that major transitions in the
basic nature of these regimes may require generational change and we
are invested in political and economic reform in this region for the
long term.
Authoritarian governments and largely unreformed economies, we
believe, create the conditions of repression and poverty that could
well become the breeding grounds for further terrorism. And this is
what we tell the central Asian leaders. Al-Qa'ida and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan have only been disrupted, not destroyed. And the
radical Hezb ut-Tahrir is increasingly active in central Asia,
especially in the Fergana Valley shared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan.
Thus, not only do we believe it is strongly in our national
interest to engage fully with these governments to urge the political
and economic reforms that we judge are essential to alleviate the
conditions that breed terrorism, but we also firmly believe it is in
these countries' own national interests. When citizens, and especially
youth, feel that they have a voice in how they are governed, when they
believe that they have an economic stake in the future, then they will
less likely to be attracted to a radicalized path cloaked in Islam that
offers a utopian solution to their discontent.
It is extremely difficult to convince central Asian leaders that
long-term economic and democratic reforms are necessary to eliminate
the roots of terrorism if we are not willing to help them counter
terrorism in the short term and prove that we will be engaged for the
long term. Our assistance in the areas of military infrastructure,
training, military exchanges, and development of interoperability with
U.S. and international forces help to establish their short-term
capability to cooperate in the global war on terrorism, instill
confidence in our partnership, and give them reason to believe that
political and economic reforms will lead to greater cooperation,
sustained assistance, and concrete enhancements to their security and
sovereignty.
Our enhanced engagement has been in place for only a short time. It
is too early to tell if our calculated risk will lead to success--
politically and economically reformed governments that will be
responsible and prosperous members of the world community. We are,
however, confident that this path has led to success in many regions of
the world and our ambassadors and their staffs strive daily to nudge
these governments in the direction we know can work. So far, this early
in the game, the results are promising but mixed.
Press freedoms are suffering in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two
most politically advanced states in central Asia. Across the region,
leaders prosecute political opponents for corruption as a way to
sideline them from competing for power. While we strongly oppose
corruption, we object to the selectivity of some of these prosecutions,
and we tell the leaders so. Free and fair elections have not yet
occurred, let alone peaceful transfers of power and some of the leaders
have extended their tenures through decrees and referenda.
While we recognize that serious problems continue in central Asia,
we believe that our policy of enhanced and long-term engagement has
already begun to show some results.
Uzbekistan is the most intriguing test case of our policy of
enhanced engagement. As a result of our intense economic dialogue and a
renewed calculation of Uzbekistan's interests, the country has
reestablished its relations with the International Financial
Institutions and is moving slowly toward economic reform that it had
previously rejected.
Uzbekistan has also taken steps to improve its human rights record.
In March, for the first time ever, Uzbekistan registered an indigenous
human rights organization; the government also has stated its
willingness to register more of them. Also, for the first time the
government successfully prosecuted and convicted four police officers
charged with beating to death a man suspected of Islamic extremist
activities, and another such trial of three National Security Service
officers yielded convictions and sentences of five to 15 years. The
government has released about 860 political prisoners, and local human
rights activists report that new arrests have dropped to the single
digits in most cities. Furthermore, after Assistant Secretary Craner's
last visit, the Uzbek government has extended an invitation for the UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture to come to Uzbekistan. Independent
international organizations are working with the Interior Ministry on
prison reforms and have visited prisons, including pretrial detention
centers. The parliament is moving on a number of fronts to develop a
more humane criminal code, to address abuse of power at the local
level, to make prosecutors more accountable, and to create a more
independent judiciary. The long-banned political opposition party,
Birlik, is openly holding congresses around the country and moving
toward re-registration.
Taken together, these individual achievements are adding up to an
impressive beginning on reform, but they have not been broadly reported
in the United States. As our engagement with the Uzbek authorities on
human rights and religious freedom issues intensifies, the government
of Uzbekistan has taken several notable steps. There is a long way to
go, but we are encouraged.
Kyrgyzstan, which has retreated from its early promise, reached a
crisis point this year. Some argued that the government may have
believed it had carte blanche to restrict human rights because it was
permitting the coalition military base at Manas Airport. We have not,
of course, backed off In fact, we increased our engagement on human
rights. Kyrgyzstan's well-developed civil society mounted largely
peaceful public protests against the government's selective prosecution
of popular opposition politicians and limitations on freedom of the
press. During these protest, police killed five demonstrators. In an
attempt to defuse the ensuing crisis, the government resigned, and
President Akayev has appointed several reformist ministers to key
positions. He also rescinded a government decree, which had earlier
resulted in printing presses refusing access to independent newspapers.
The give and take between the government, the opposition, and other
elements of Kyrgyz society is a dynamic one, confirming again the
strong roots of civil society.
Kazakhstan is currently undergoing worrisome developments. There
has been a spate of unsolved attacks and government restrictions
against the independent media, and the government continues selective
corruption prosecutions against opposition politicians when they appear
to be gaining political influence. Furthermore, the Kazakh lower house
of Parliament recently passed a law on political party registration
requiring that each party have no less than 50,000 members; greatly
hindering the formation of opposition parties. However, there have also
been success stories. The Constitutional Court struck down restrictive
amendments to the Religion Law, and President Nazarbayev upheld this
decision. Also, the government has registered an opposition political
party, although it is prosecuting two of the leaders of one of the
parties. The trend in Kazakhstan in recent months has been generally
disappointing. We will continue to press for improvement.
In Tajikistan, an Islamic opposition party plays a responsible role
in government, and the International Committee of the Red Cross has for
the first time attained access to prisons. Even in isolationist
Turkmenistan, non-governmental organizations--the foundation of civil
society--are beginning to take hold, and the government appears to
recognize that the stranglehold of the Committee for National Security
(the KGB's successor) needs to be relaxed, and the abolishment of exit
visas has eased the flow of citizens in and out of the country.
I have gone to some length about each of these countries to
demonstrate the complexity of the human rights issues in the countries
of central Asia. While there continue to be real problems, there have
also been successes since September 11. Our enhanced engagement is
helping to break the habit of repression and stagnation.
The challenges facing the central Asian countries are indeed
daunting. But if the countries of the region are now willing to
undertake political and economic reforms that will lead to greater
freedom and opportunity for their citizens, then we are prepared to
support those efforts. We have increased our assistance to the region,
and are working closely with the governments, private sector, and
NGO's. If the actions of the governments fail to match their words on
reform, then we will reassess the assistance we provide. central Asia's
stability also is threatened by fundamental problems of poverty,
unemployment, political oppression, and isolation from the rest of the
world. These problems can make the region potential breeding grounds
for religious extremism and ethnic conflict.
While addressing these problems requires a long-term vision and
commitment of resources, we already have increased our effort in
several key areas, such as improvements in local infrastructure and
social services, job creation through provision of microcredits and
small business training and assistance to support accession to WTO and
to promote trade, investment, and economic development through fiscal
and accounting reform. We have also expanded exchanges to show central
Asians, particularly young people, how our society has worked to
promote religious and ethnic tolerance, educational reform, and
strengthening of NGO's, the independent media, and human rights
monitors to urge greater government transparency. We continue to
support the independent media, and are helping improve primary health
care, with a particular focus on fighting tuberculosis. We also are
working with the five central Asian countries to improve regional water
resource management, and have supported NGO's in each country to help
build and strengthen civil society.
In closing, let me reiterate that the steps we have taken to
greatly enhance our ties with the countries of central Asia have been
taken because they are in the U.S. national interest. We need to work
closely with these countries to prosecute the war against terrorism,
but we also need to do what we can to ensure that this becomes a
stable, prosperous region, not a threat to international society. To
this end, we are seeking to use our influence to promote the political
and economic reform necessary for them to prosper. What we want is for
these governments to exercise power wisely, responsibly, and humanely
so that these nations can attain stability, security, and prosperity.
This is our vision for central Asia. We believe we are on the right
track.
Senator Torricelli. We will recess briefly for the vote,
and then return promptly to resume.
[Recess.]
Senator Torricelli. The subcommittee will come to order
please. Mr. Crouch, I understand that you have to leave shortly
and if indeed we don't finish by then, I will certainly
understand that, please just excuse yourself.
I would like to begin by asking Senator Lugar to proceed.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to play the
devil's advocate for a moment, we have all, as suggested by
Secretary Pascoe, been in reasonable agreement about our ideals
and objectives in the region. But let's say a diplomat from any
of the five states we're talking about today comes to pay a
visit on a Congressman behind closed doors. This diplomat says
the war on terrorism is serious in our country, so serious as a
matter of fact that we could be destabilized, overthrown by
terrorists, and so as a result we take a dim view of that and
we have tried to round up these terrorists, put them in jail so
they are not out there to create some difficulty in our
country, your country, or anybody else's country.
So we take your point about human rights and due process
and all the rest of it, and we're all learning about these
things, we're involved with institutions and we think they're
doing a pretty good job given where we started from with our
Soviet past. But we are coming to appreciate it.
But as a practical matter, what would you have us do? You
know, you write reports and talk about how many people are in
our jails and how many didn't have due process, and infer
they're being tortured and otherwise mishandled. But what would
you have us do?
This I ask of each of you, because you must have had
similar conversations. As veteran diplomats out in the field,
without naming any one country one or the other, this
conversation may have taken place several times, and what do
you say? Are we for incrementalism, gradualism, or do we have a
program whether it's through the National Endowment for
Democracy or Democratic Public Institutes, or Center Democracy,
or outside the State Department or Defense. You know, give us
some guidelines as to how this idealism and these objectives
might be reached in an intermediate period of time.
Mr. Craner. Senator, I think we probably all have had
variations on that conversation, and I will let Lynn and J.D.
talk for themselves. We make a couple points. No. 1 is, they
have been living in a bad neighborhood. In some cases there are
bad governments in the neighborhood and in some cases there are
terrorists in the neighborhood. In many cases, it's both.
We make the case that as J.D. said, this is not a one-way
relationship, that they are not the ones doing us favors, we're
doing each other favors. And in a real sense, we have
eliminated to a large degree the terrorist threat in their
neighborhood. They have made the case for some years that it is
that terrorist threat that has caused them to have closed
political systems, and even they will now say to a large degree
that threat has been eliminated.
So what we wish them to do is to open up their political
systems to allow human rights activists or innocent people out
of jail, to begin to allow openings to reform their judicial
processes, and certainly to open up the political system so
that political parties can begin to form. We are backing that
up, as I noted, with exactly the kind of program that you
mentioned, on a wide variety of fronts and with large amounts
of money.
These are all things to get to what Senator Torricelli was
talking about. These are all fronts that are getting a lot more
attention than they did before the 11th. In a sense, I think a
lot of people did not want to get involved with central Asia
before September 11. I was guilty myself. I had to run the
International Republican Institute and I had real problems with
central Asia in the late 1990s, because I thought this
political space was frozen, and I didn't think it was worth
staying there.
I think what the 11th has given us is a new opportunity for
us to press the issues that we care about, but it's also a new
opportunity for the leaders in the region. Again, they live in
bad neighborhoods, and they have a new opportunity to have, if
things go well, a longstanding and steadfast ally. But finally,
we can make very, very clear to them, if you want that kind of
deep relationship, you're going to have to open up your
societies, because that's part of the bargain.
Mr. Pascoe. The only thing I would add to that, and it fits
in very well with what was said, is that as the situation has
been changing, many of the governments in the region really do
want to join the global economy, they do want to be part of the
modern world. The last 10 years were not exactly a golden age
for them either as they look at it, and so they do look to us
to see what we can do to some degree to help.
One of the surprising things to me is how willing they are
and open they are to aid programs that really go into the
judiciary and into some of these other programs where they're
sometimes asking us, almost pleading with us, will you do
something to help with our judges, or would you do something to
help with the kind of police training that we need so that we
don't have people beaten up when they go into jails. Now, some
of that may be just eyewash, but I do think there is a genuine
desire to use this new relationship with the United States to
get at a different stage than where they were before and that
requires quite a few changes in their societies, and I think
they recognize it.
Senator Lugar. Just a quick followup on that, because
that's a good point. They say give us some help with police
training for example. It occurs to me from the experience our
country had in many Central American countries in the 1980s
that there were pleas of a similar nature, but they also in a
more sophisticated way, pled for some help in building a
legislative capacity. As some political scientists have pointed
out, every country has an executive, maybe a king, dictator,
tsar, and not so well developed often are constituencies and
people who represent them in a legislative branch.
In Central America, I can recall that frequently people
were elected to a legislative assembly, they had no offices, no
books, quite apart from copy machines or pencils or paper, that
sort of thing. The things that we could do as a country almost
as a standard package, it seems to me, were very profound, they
were rudimentary.
But Members of Congress who visited those countries found
that many people yearned to find out what the congressional
experience was like, what do you do as a legislator, physically
how you would handle your day and these sorts of thing. And I'm
just wondering with regard to the countries that we are
discussing today, if it's not possible to think in terms, if
not a standard package, but something approximating this, of
assistance to develop a legislative system. This could be
supplemented by European friends or people around the globe who
also have experience in these areas. It's important, it seems
to me, even as we are evaluating on a human rights basis how
well you're doing, that we offer an opportunity, and a fairly
inexpensive one, to improve their governmental structures.
Mr. Craner. I think a lot of people who deal with this
issue are bringing a lot of experience to bear from the years
you talked about, from the 1980s. But also, what kind of
political democratic development was undertaken around the
world in the 1990s. And that's the kind of experience that, as
I outlined, we're offering. And certainly in countries that
have a semblance of free elections, working with the
legislatures is something that we want to do over time. But
you're right, with all the experience we bring to bear, with
all the experience the Europeans have brought to bear for the
last few decades, and finally, with the experience of the new
democracies, these are all things that we would like to see
undertaken in central Asia. And as Lynn said, to a greater
degree than one might expect, we are being asked to do that.
It doesn't mean things are going to always progress in one
direction. As we've seen in the last couple of months, there
will be some stumbling blocks. But it is interesting that we're
being asked to do these things and are not discouraged from
doing them.
Mr. Crouch. I would just have one quick point, and I agree
with what my colleagues say here, that what we hear time and
again in talking to the countries in the region is how improved
the security relationship is, but they are also cognizant of
the fact that one of these days operations in Afghanistan will
wrap up and one of these days we will be reconfiguring
ourselves for other challenges, and they're very concerned that
the United States will sort of leave them holding the bag, if
you will.
We have reassured them it is in our interests not to do
that and there's a long-term security commitment there, that
we're interested in the region, we're interested in developing
military to military cooperation and the like. But that also
provides us, I think, a lot of leverage in this area, and we've
made it very clear, even in our defense discussions, that if
they're going to be successful, if they're going to integrate
with the global economy, they have to attract investment and
they have to have sustained interest, if you will, from the
outside world, and the only way they can do that is to move in
the democratic direction. And so, I think that message slowly
is sinking in.
Senator Torricelli. Secretary Craner, access of American
officials to opposition leaders in many of these countries, is
access generally available?
Mr. Craner. Yes, I think it's fair to say across the board,
and even in Turkmenistan. I certainly had no problems in
Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan.
Senator Torricelli. No problems with access to human rights
organizations, to opposition political leaders or even
political prisoners? Were human rights organizations generally
allowed in each of the nations we've discussed to have access?
Mr. Craner. I think that's probably a little tougher. Human
Rights Watch was based in Uzbekistan some years ago as part of
the deal with the OSCE. I don't think they gain regular
unfettered access around the country.
Senator Torricelli. They do not?
Mr. Craner. No.
Senator Torricelli. And Secretary Crouch, you listed an
element of military cooperation. Is there anything in a public
setting that you can recite that the United States has sought
militarily that has not been provided for access in any of
these countries?
Mr. Crouch. No. I mean, I think there have been
opportunities that we've had to pass up, would probably be a
better way to characterize it.
Senator Torricelli. But generally there's no public
complaint about any request from any nation?
Mr. Crouch. No. And our approach has been to kind of let
these countries kind of characterize the ways in which they are
cooperating, and at various times they have been willing to be
more public about this than not, depending on the stage of the
war in Afghanistan, but other than that, no.
Senator Torricelli. And Secretary Craner, to return to you,
in any of these countries, are there numbers of people who
would actually classify as political prisoners, people being
held not with any other criminal charge?
Mr. Craner. Definitely.
Senator Torricelli. In each country?
Mr. Craner. Certainly in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. I
would say some in Kyrgyzstan. So, in each country I would say
yes, but much larger numbers toward the back of the pack.
Senator Torricelli. Toward the back of the pack?
Mr. Craner. Those with much less democratic practices.
Senator Torricelli. I thank you each for joining us today.
Your testimony was very helpful. Thank you.
At this point the committee would like to hear from the
former Ambassador to Kazakhstan, William Courtney, and from
Martha Brill Olcott, Carnegie Endowment. Thank you, gentlemen.
Welcome. Thank you very much for joining us today, and Mr.
Courtney, if you might begin please?
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. COURTNEY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO KAZAKHSTAN AND GEORGIA, FORMER SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAMS, DYNCORP, WASHINGTON, DC
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that Mr.
Courtney's family might be recognized. I see that they have
accompanied the Ambassador here today.
Senator Torricelli. Fine. If you would like to do the
honors of the recognition.
Ambassador Courtney. My wife Clarissa, my son Will and my
daughter Allison.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you very much for being with us
today, and I hope you're pleased with your front row seats.
Ambassador Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor
to be here before this committee again. I will offer a
perspective on U.S. security interests in central Asia and the
south Caucasus and their relationship to U.S. human rights and
democracy interests. For convenience, I will call the whole
region southern Eurasia.
I will focus on two main questions: Now that the war in
Afghanistan is winding down, how should America insure its
long-term security interests in southern Eurasia? How should
the United States do this while advancing other U.S. interests,
such as human rights and democracy?
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait a decade ago and the terrorist
attacks of September 11 remind us that U.S. interests can be
challenged by surprises, or by events thought to be improbable.
The United States could face a wide range of potential threats
in southern Eurasia. They include nuclear weapons smuggling,
large-scale terrorism, and attempts to choke off Caspian oil
exports through the south Caucasus. The range of these
potential threats shows the value of pursuing long-term U.S.
security interests through means that are potent, flexible and
geographically dispersed. The metaphor for U.S. defense
transformation--changing from a threat-based to a capabilities-
based strategy--is apt for how America should protect its
security interests in southern Eurasia. I will suggest 7
principles for U.S. policies to secure these interests.
One, continue the U.S. policy of active engagement pursued
by three administrations with bipartisan congressional support.
A decade ago America installed embassies in southern Eurasia
and launched generous aid programs. Today, U.S. engagement
remains vital. The United States should not write off any state
as hopeless or failed. A decade ago, some experts asked why
America had an embassy in Tajikistan; it was remote and
irrelevant. Today, no one would say this.
Two, bolster U.S. security assistance. U.S. security
assistance programs, including Nunn-Lugar threat reduction
programs, are a tremendous success. They have helped eliminate
major threats to U.S. security interests. To cite one example,
in 1994, the United States removed 600 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. Were it not for U.S. threat
reduction programs, the uranium might still be there in unsafe
storage--where an Iran or a North Korea might seek to acquire
it.
U.S. programs have fostered a better understanding in the
region of U.S. security goals. One example is the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency's program to train and equip border
security and law enforcement personnel to detect and interdict
smuggling of nuclear weapons and other sensitive items.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, militaries in southern
Eurasia had little experience with how a Ministry of Defense
was supposed to function, or deal with Presidents, parliaments,
and publics. The Soviet military had assigned many soldiers in
central Asia to construction units, partly because of limited
Russian language skills. The first Defense Minister in
Kazakhstan had been a specialist in military motor pool
operations. As Assistant Secretary Crouch pointed out, U.S.
programs help new ministries of defense and security to develop
the leadership skills necessary to run their respective
ministries.
For a decade prior to September 11, U.S. programs helped
condition audiences in southern Eurasia to understand U.S. and
Western security priorities. Goodwill for these programs paved
the way for military and security officials in southern Eurasia
to accept U.S. requests for access and other help in
prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. But some in the region
worried that the United States might not be committed to
winning in Afghanistan or that the Taliban or al-Qaeda might
later take revenge on those who had aided the United States.
Once B-52s started flying over Afghanistan, concerns
diminished. Continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan will build
further confidence in southern Eurasia of American power and
will.
Three, maintain a near constant but flexible security
presence in southern Eurasia, but without establishing large
U.S. bases. America has filled a security vacuum in southern
Eurasia and Afghanistan. This has met with regional support. An
American pullout from southern Eurasia when events in
Afghanistan allow it, would recreate a destabilizing vacuum.
Care must be taken, however, to structure a U.S. presence that
is strong, fluid, and not too dependent on any one country.
In southern Eurasia, the United States should seek broad
access to host country military bases. With such access, the
United States will be more agile in addressing unpredictable or
dispersed contingencies. For example, the United States will be
better able in a crisis to deploy mobile defenses in the region
to counter missile threats from Iraq or Iran, conduct nuclear
emergency search operations, or help protect Caspian oil
pipelines. U.S. forces should make appropriate investments at
host country bases to which they have access, and sustain them
through low-profile contractor support.
Four, work to change the underlying conditions that give
rise to extremism. Promoting democracy and respect for human
rights in southern Eurasia is the most effective way to solve
separatist disputes and lessen support for Islamic extremism.
One risk in southern Eurasia is that disenfranchised groups
will revert to force to overturn governments, but another risk
is that governments facing crises of legitimacy will seek to
stay in power too long. The two risks feed each other.
In southern Eurasia where Soviet-era leaders remain in
power, transitions are looming. America can do much to
encourage movement toward more democratic systems of
government. For example, in some cases where elections were
rigged or governments are losing legitimacy, it may make sense
to urge early or more frequent elections combined with vigorous
monitoring.
Five, pursue specific human rights and democracy goals as
an integral part of U.S. security assistance and cooperation
programs. U.S. efforts in recent years have shown that this can
be done. In one case a regional country gave new prison access
to the International Committee of the Red Cross. In southern
Eurasia U.S. security cooperation boosts governmental
legitimacy, which offers a source of leverage for promoting
democracy and human rights.
Six, multilateralize security cooperation. Working with
European allies and friends, the United States has gained
increased cooperation in southern Eurasia on common security
goals, such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism and
counternarcotics. European and American cooperation to help
Kazakhstan to safely dispose of large quantities of former
Soviet military equipment would be helpful.
Successive U.S. administrations have stressed to Russia
that it has an interest in prosperous neighbors and stable
borders in southern Eurasia. Except in Abkhazi in 1992-1993,
Russia has generally respected borders in southern Eurasia. A
decade ago, many experts did not expect such restraint.
President Putin seems to have decided that Russia has a large
stake in its relationship with the West, and that intimidating
poorer neighbors in southern Eurasia is an unhelpful draw on
Russian energies and prestige. Russian military and security
elements have different views, however, and the pendulum could
swing back.
Seven, increase programs to promote long-term change. A
decade ago, the United States had undue expectations for early
reform in the former Soviet Union. Aid programs over-invested
in trying to reform the statist and corrupt ways of Soviet-era
mandarins. For example, with rare exception, U.S. defense
conversion programs were unsuccessful. U.S. aid programs under-
invested in programs with a long-term payoff such as education
for young people. They are a receptive audience and the best
hope for dramatic change in the future. They want more
freedoms. Young people in their 30s were largely trained in
Soviet-type environments and their attitudes toward change and
risk taking differ from the attitudes of those who are younger.
U.S. programs should focus on student-age youth.
In conclusion, I believe that U.S. engagement in southern
Eurasia has been a remarkable success. The task now is to take
engagement to a higher level and sustain it. The war against
terrorism has brought home the importance of this distant
region. In a world of global terrorism, drug trafficking, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, distant and
remote places can be as strategic as neighboring and familiar
ones.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Courtney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William H. Courtney, Former U.S. Ambassador
to Kazakhstan and Georgia, Former Senior Advisor to the National
Security Council, Senior Vice President, National Security Programs,
DynCorp
It is an honor to appear before you today. I will discuss long-term
U.S. security interests in central Asia and the South Caucasus and
their relationship to U.S. human rights and democracy interests. For
convenience I will call the whole region ``Southern Eurasia.'' My
perspectives have been influenced by my tenure as Ambassador to
Kazakhstan (1992-95) and Georgia (1995-97), and more generally, by a
27-year Foreign Service career devoted mostly to politico-military,
Soviet, and Eurasian affairs. I am now Senior Vice President for
National Security Programs at DynCorp. The views I am expressing today
are personal.
I will focus on two main questions:
Now that the war in Afghanistan is winding down, how should
America ensure its long-term security interests in Southern
Eurasia?
How should the United States do this while advancing other
U.S. interests, such as human rights and democracy?
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait a decade ago and the terrorist attacks
of September 11 remind us that U.S. interests can be challenged by
surprises, or by events thought to be improbable. The United States
could face a wide range of threats in Southern Eurasia. They include
nuclear weapons smuggling, large-scale terrorism, armed separatism, and
attempts to choke off Caspian oil exports though the South Caucasus.
The wide range of these potential threats shows the value of pursuing
long-term U.S. security interests through means that are potent,
flexible, and geographically dispersed. The metaphor for U.S. defense
transformation--changing from a threat-based to a capabilities-based
strategy--is apt for how America should protect its security interests
in Southern Eurasia. I will suggest seven principles for U.S. policies
to secure these interests.
One, continue the U.S. policy of active engagement pursued by three
administrations with bipartisan Congressional support. A decade ago
America installed embassies in Southern Eurasia and launched generous
aid programs. It supported IMF and World Bank aid for countries that
help themselves by reforming. Early U.S. humanitarian shipments of
medicine and food saved lives and won friends. Today, U.S. engagement
remains vital. The United States should not write off any state as
hopeless or failed. A decade ago some experts asked why America had an
embassy in Tajikistan; it was remote and irrelevant. Today no one would
say this.
Governments in the region seek better ties with the United States
as a source of domestic legitimacy and economic improvement. Inadequate
reforms, however, have weakened states and diminished opportunities for
stronger U.S. ties. For example, the absence of free and fair elections
hobbles governments and saps investor confidence. Energy-rich
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have attracted large-scale foreign
investment, but othenvise most foreign investors have been wary of the
region. In Georgia the lack of consensus for reform and conflict
resolution, compromised elections, and misplaced hopes that energy
pipelines are a panacea have led to stagnation. In the mid-1990s
Georgia was the fastest-growing economy in the former Soviet Union and
reforms had momentum. Then leaders lost confidence and failed to build
a multi-ethnic consensus to move the country ahead. In these and other
countries, internal reforms are vital and they will not come without
American and European engagement and strong support.
Two, bolster U.S. security assistance. U.S. security assistance
programs, including Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programs, are a
tremendous success. They have helped eliminate major threats to U.S.
security interests, such as large biological weapons facilities in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and SS-18 ICBM fields in Kazakhstan. In 1994
the United States removed 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from
Kazakhstan. The uranium was weapons-grade material that had been left
behind and forgotten by Moscow when the USSR collapsed. Were it not for
U.S. threat reduction programs, the uranium might still be there in
unsafe storage--where an Iran or a North Korea might have sought to
acquire it.
U.S. programs have fostered a better understanding in the region of
U.S. security goals. One example is the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency's program to train and equip border security and law enforcement
personnel to detect and interdict smuggling of nuclear and other
sensitive items. U.S. programs help regional soldiers learn defense
skills suitable to democratic circumstances. They learn the value of
civilian leadership, and how to distinguish combatants from civilians
and improve treatment of prisoners. U.S. training can help regional
forces conduct more focused anti-terrorism campaigns.
Military and security establishments in the region face Herculean
reform tasks, and progress is hindered by undemocratic environments and
regional conflicts. The CENTRASBAT initiative--to form a regional
peacekeeping force that could perform U.N. peacekeeping chores around
the world--fell victim to rivalries. Robust U.S. military-to-military
relationships in the region can lessen these obstacles.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, militaries in Southern Eurasia had
little experience with how a ministry of defense was supposed to
function, or deal with presidents, parliaments, and publics. The Soviet
military had assigned many soldiers from central Asia to construction
units, partly because of limited Russian language skills. Military
officers from the region were often pigeonholed in assignments that
prevented them from gaining a broad understanding of defense policy-
making and management. The first defense minister in Kazakhstan had
been a specialist in military motor pool operations. U.S. problems help
new ministries of defense and security to develop the leadership skills
necessary to run their respective ministries. The International
Military Education and Training program and the Marshall Center in
Germany have provided valuable leadership, management, and democratic
law training to mid- and senior-level officers and civilians.
For nearly a decade prior to September 11, U.S. programs helped
condition audiences in Southern Eurasia to understand U.S. and Western
security priorities. Goodwill from these programs paved the way for
military and security officials in Southern Eurasia to accept U.S.
requests for access and other help in prosecuting the war in
Afghanistan. Many regional military leaders had served in Afghanistan
during the USSR's ill-fated war, however, and wondered whether the
United States would fare better. Some in the region worried that the
United States might not be committed to winning in Afghanistan, or that
the Taliban or al Qaeda might later take revenge on those who had aided
the United States. Once B-52s started flying over Afghanistan, concerns
diminished. Continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan will build further
confidence in American power and will.
Some threats in Southern Eurasia will challenge U.S. interests but
not occasion a U.S. military response. Counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, nonproliferation, and threat reduction programs often are
the best instruments. They can help regional countries tighten borders,
fend off rebels engaged in terrorism and narcotics, and deny terrorists
opportunities to acquire sensitive materials for weapons of mass
destruction. Nonproliferation cooperation with Kazakhstan prevented the
shipment of advanced air defense missiles to a Persian Gulf state. In
some cases preemptive acquisition by the United States can prevent
dangerous proliferation. Tailored security cooperation can sensitize
regional services to U.S. priorities and provide them with the
resources to cooperate with us.
Three, maintain a near-constant but flexible security presence in
Southern Eurasia, but without establishing large U.S. bases. America
has filled a security vacuum in Southern Eurasia and Afghanistan. This
has met with regional support. An American pullout from Southern
Eurasia after the new government in Kabul consolidates control of
Afghanistan would recreate a destabilizing vacuum. Care must be taken,
however, to structure a U.S. presence that is strong, fluid, and not
too dependent on any one country. Unstable governments in the region
are the norm. A U.S. base could become a lightening rod for protests if
the U.S. presence were seen as propping up a dictatorship or if large
numbers of American troops were based at a facility. Finally, a U.S.
base in one place may not be useful for meeting threats elsewhere.
Establishing a U.S. base in Southern Eurasia modeled after, say,
Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey would be ill advised. At the same
time, U.S. bases close to the region, such as Incirlik, are truly
indispensable in supporting U.S. interests in Southern Eurasia.
In Southern Eurasia the United States should seek broad access to
host country military bases, and use this access for joint training,
exercises, and planning. Access must benefit both U.S. and host country
forces. With wide base access, the United States will be more agile in
addressing unpredictable or dispersed contingencies. For example, the
United States will be better able to deploy mobile defenses in the
region to counter missile threats from Iraq or Iran, conduct nuclear
emergency search operations, or help protect Caspian oil pipelines.
U.S. forces should make appropriate improvements at host country bases
to which they have access, and sustain them through low-profile
contractor support. Base access in Southern Eurasia will benefit U.S.
troops by enabling them to gain a broad range of experience and develop
personal relationships with host country personnel.
Four, work to change the underlying conditions that give rise to
extremism. This principle is equal in importance to any of the other
six I will discuss today. Promoting democracy and respect for human
rights in Southern Eurasia is the most effective way to solve
separatist disputes and lessen support for Islamic extremism.
One risk in Southern Eurasia is that disenfranchised groups will
resort to force to overturn governments, but another risk is that
governments facing crises of legitimacy will seek to stay in power too
long. The two risks feed each other. Instabilities are mounting in such
countries as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Both were once reform leaders but
have lost their way. They share problems of massive corruption, rigged
elections, unpopular rule, pressure against the media, and economic
stagnation. In Georgia, only democratic and economic reforms can unify
a country with so many ethnic minorities that Andrey Sakharov once
called it a ``little empire.''
In Southern Eurasia where Soviet-era leaders remain in power,
transitions are looming. America can do much to encourage movements
toward more democratic systems of governance. For example, in some
cases where elections were rigged or governments are losing legitimacy,
it may make sense to urge early or more frequent elections combined
with vigorous monitoring. Elections held according to the original
constitutions of the regional states--which generally provide for
presidential elections every five years--would be a major improvement.
In the South Caucasus America is working to resolve the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, and the more intractable Abkhazia conflict. But
undemocratic governments have lacked the confidence to make compromises
needed to reach negotiated agreements. Abkhazia has few incentives to
come under Tbilisi's authority if Georgia remains an economic basket
case. Support by Russian military and security elements for the Abkhaz
separatists undermines prospects for a negotiated accord. By
encouraging internal reform in the states involved, the United States
improves prospects for dispute settlements.
More democracy in China may lessen the risks of Uygur separatism
and terrorism that could enmesh Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan
opening the political process to wider participation will lessen the
appeal of separatist or terrorist groups. Although the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, or IMU, has suffered great losses in the Afghanistan
war, it or similar groups may still attract youth looking for
alternative means of political expression. The problem of openness is
even more serious in Turkmenistan.
Water disputes are a major source of potential future conflict in
the region, and Aral Sea desiccation is a monumental environmental
tragedy. Experience suggests that weak and authoritarian governments
may not have the legitimacy required to negotiate compromise solutions
with neighbors while maintaining internal peace. Water sharing
agreements are signed but not implemented. America may not have much
influence on the resolution of water rights issues, but it can
contribute by working for open political systems in the region.
In northern Kazakhstan, Slays tend to emigrate rather than protest
their unequal access to the political process and its benefits. The
construction of the new capital in the northern city of Astana could be
an effort to make it harder for northern oblasts to secede to Russia
should they seek to do so. A better way to ensure Kazakhstan's
integrity is to give Slavs equal access to an open political process.
Five, pursue specific human rights and democracy goals as an
integral part of U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs.
U.S. efforts in recent years have shown this can be done. In one case a
regional country gave new prison access to the International Committee
of the Red Cross. In Southern Eurasia U.S. security cooperation boosts
governmental legitimacy, which offers a source of leverage for
promoting democracy and human rights. Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs have explicit human rights criteria. Whatever the legal
restrictions, applying human rights criteria in specific--not just
generic--ways serves long-term U.S. interests. This is not to deny,
however, that in some short-term circumstances security and human
rights goals may conflict.
Six, multilateralize security cooperation. For a decade the United
States has strongly backed active involvement by the countries of
Southern Eurasia in the Organization for Cooperation and Security in
Europe and its predecessor. The OSCE provides a broad framework for
advancing U.S. security and human rights interests in the region. In
the mid-1990s all but one country of Southern Eurasia joined NATO's
successful Partnership for Peace Program; Tajikistan joined last year.
Working with European Allies and friends, the United States has gained
increased cooperation in Southern Eurasia on common security goals,
such as nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics.
Regional states have intercepted sensitive technologies bound for Iran,
and arms on their way to North Korea. European and America cooperation
to help Kazakhstan safely dispose of large quantities of former Soviet
military equipment would be helpful.
Successive U.S. administrations have stressed to Russia that it has
an interest in prosperous neighbors and stable borders in Southern
Eurasia. Excepting the rebellion it fomented in Abkhazia in 1992-93,
Russia has generally respected borders in Southern Eurasia. A decade
ago many experts did not expect such restraint. President Putin seems
to have decided that Russia has a large stake in its relationship with
the West, and that intimidating poorer neighbors in Southern Eurasia is
an unhelpful thaw on Russian energies and prestige. American and
Western presence in the region helps Putin stabilize Russia's southern
flank and enables Russia to focus attention on economic development and
ties with more prosperous countries. Russian military and security
elements have different views, however, and the pendulum could swing
back.
Seven, increase programs to promote long-term change. A decade ago
the United States had undue expectations for early reform in the former
Soviet Union. Aid programs over-invested in trying to reform the
statist and corrupt ways of Soviet-era mandarins. For example, with
rare exception U.S. defense conversion programs were unsuccessful. U.S.
aid programs under-invested in programs with a long-term payoff, such
as education for young people. They are a receptive audience and the
best hope for dramatic change in the future. They want more freedoms.
Young people in their 30s were largely trained in Soviet-type
environments, and their attitudes toward change and risk-taking differ
from the attitudes of those who are younger. U.S. programs should focus
on student-age youth.
The United States should bring far more students here for
education and training. Graduates of these programs offer the
best hope for building market democracies. A decade ago such an
investment seemed too expensive. Today, the alternative seems
more expensive.
Since most young people in Southern Eurasia will never get
to the West for education, America should enhance programs to
reach these students. Especially in rural areas, inadequate
resources have created an educational vacuum, including about
moderate Islamic traditions. Extremists may seek to fill
vacuums, as they did in Pakistan and Afghanistan. U.S. programs
should bring greater resources to rural educators.
Americans need to be educated more about Southern Eurasia
and its diverse peoples, cultures, geographies, and rivalries.
Few Americans--among them Martha Olcott, and Fred Starr and
Fiona Hill who testified in December--know much about these
matters. America's knowledge base is simply inadequate to
sustain its engagement in the region. This year the Smithsonian
Folklife Festival, which for the first time explores a region
outside the United States, celebrates the Silk Road and the
countries and cultures along the ancient trading route. I
encourage you to visit the exhibitions over the coming days and
talk with people whom America is helping.
In conclusion, I believe that U.S. engagement in Southern Eurasia
has been a remarkable success. The task now is to take engagement to a
higher level and sustain it. The war against terrorism has brought home
the importance of this distant region. In a world of global terrorism,
drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
distant and remote places can be as strategic as neighboring and
familiar ones.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ms. Olcott.
STATEMENT OF MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Olcott. Thank you. I'm going to start by saying I agree
with virtually everything that has been said before me in
testimony today but because of my orneriness, I am going to be
much more pessimistic than those who have preceded me. I want
to thank you in the beginning of my remarks for inviting me to
testify today, it's truly an honor.
I would argue--and I'm going to be very brief because of
the interest of time and submit fuller remarks to the record--
that at the very time when U.S. interests tied it most closely
to the states of the central Asia region, some of these states
are becoming more internally driven, in most cases precisely
because human rights and basic political freedoms have been
trodden on over the past 10 years. Unfortunately, there's no
easy fix for many of these problems, no easy fix available for
either U.S. policymakers or for the leaders themselves. If
changes don't occur soon, peace and security in the region
could be at risk.
Some have expressed hope that long-term cooperation with
the United States will give these leaders more respect for
human rights and for democratic political institutions. I agree
with Ambassador Courtney that long-term policies can have real
payoff in the next generation. But at the same time, I'm very
pessimistic that the current situation gives us a long-term
perspective without major dislocation in these states.
Certainly in the short term and medium term, there is unlikely
to be any major political redefinition in the region. Moreover,
unless the United States finds a more effective means of
leveraging these states, there could be some highly undesirable
and even violent and at least unscheduled regime changes
throughout the region.
It would be far more preferable obviously, as Ambassador
Courtney says, for us to successfully encourage some of these
states to move toward early election, but I see little evidence
of this in recent activities of the leaders of the regimes in
this region to broaden political participation or to support
democratic political institutions. If Presidents flee for their
lives, or worse yet, lose them in an effort to prevent regime
change, unpredictable forces could be unleashed in any of the
countries of this region.
This said, few leaders of the region seem interested in
broadening the basis of participation in their society, and all
but one, I would argue, seems unaware of the potential
political risk that he is under.
Let me turn very briefly to a tour of the region. I would
argue that the situation throughout central Asia with regards
to human rights has not improved significantly since September
11, and in most places it has even deteriorated, as the point
was made by the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Assistant
Secretary earlier.
In Uzbekistan there has been at least the beginning of a
willingness of the regime to say some of the right things,
talking about free and fair elections, promising some
elimination or modifications, but Uzbekistan has such a long
way to travel. The human rights situation there was truly
abysmal prior to September 11. In Uzbekistan, I think the real
test will be whether the regime will engage in meaningful
economic reform, because these tentative steps toward
modernization will be much too little much too late.
Other states have also been willing to give renewed lip
service to democratic goals. The process of democratization in
Kazakhstan has slowed since September 11 and it was in deep
retreat before that time. We've already heard about major
political opposition figures who have been arrested in recent
months, the attack on Kazakh media has been a really savage one
in several cases.
Unfortunately today, there are very few political leaders
that the United States can exercise to effect these kinds of
outcomes in the short run. The only potentially decisive levers
would be to limit U.S. access to the Kazakh energy reserves and
this is something we clearly don't want to do.
One leader who has had virtually no interest in trying to
please the United States or even a rhetorical level with regard
to democratic reform is Turkmenistan's Niyazov. In the past
decade Turkmenistan has experienced the strongest erosion of
intellectual freedom and political freedom anywhere in the
region. Quite literally, President Niyazov has succeeded in
isolating virtually every member of the elite willing to show
any creativity or independence of thought, and the situation
has only grown worse in the past 6 months. The brain drain from
this country is becoming irreversible, putting the ability of
the Turkmens to effectively govern themselves in the post-
Niyazov world at real risk.
And I would say that's true regardless of the degree of
engagement by the United States which I certainly support
bringing over young people to be educated, et cetera. It will
be very difficult to get many of those people to return to
Turkmenistan or if they do return, to be given positions of any
sort of responsibility.
I'm going to skip Tajikistan in the interest of time,
because I too agree that the status quo there is relatively
unchanged, and just highlight the fact that the increased drug
trade through that country creates greater stress on that
country's very fragile and early stage political institutions.
I will make my closing remarks about Kyrgyzstan. The
political fragility of Kyrgyzstan, where we have our largest
military presence in the region, has become much more apparent
in recent months. Demonstrations that are occurring in southern
Kyrgyzstan have mounted steadily for the past several weeks,
though they seem to be on hold at this point in time, but the
Kyrgyz opposition could easily get another wave of energy
before this summer is over.
It is really unclear how the regime of President Akayev
will be able to reestablish political trust. There is a new
government, but it is not a coalition government. The United
States has succeeded in pressuring President Akayev, and our
ambassador there has succeeded in pressuring President Akayev
on many small changes that were highlighted today that are very
important, media, there was a new ruling today on freedom of
assembly, possibly creating an ombudsman, but it's very
unlikely whether these political changes will keep up with the
sharply deteriorating political environment, and they don't
speak to the major issues that have been posed by the Kyrgyz
opposition, things that have in one case nothing to do with
human rights, it's a treaty with China, the release of former
Vice President Kulov, greater discipline of corrupt official,
escorting the official family from economic life or removing or
minimizing the influence of President Akayev's family on the
economy.
These are all things that the opposition talks about and
all things that are not very likely to change in the near
future and as long as these remain, pressure on the Kyrgyz
Government will remain very very strong, and this I would argue
makes it imperative that the United States do whatever possible
to help President Akayev make good on his promise to hold free
and fair Presidential elections in 2005 and to work with him
quite aggressively right now to show signs of facilitating an
orderly transfer of power in the hopes that this may well work
to quell the opposition.
A disorderly transition in Kyrgyzstan would really be very
bad news for the whole region. It would certainly be an
embarrassing situation for the United States to be forced to
watch this regime be ousted if the regime itself does not
become a supporter of pre-term elections. And certainly it
would be unsettling to the United States to become a physical
guarantor of an undemocratic regime in central Asia.
This takes me to my concluding point, that U.S. human
rights policy and democracy building strategy more generally in
central Asia is unlikely to lead to any major change in the
nature of our partner regimes in central Asia. Undemocratic
regimes are deeply rooted throughout the region and always face
difficult political succession. This does not mean that the
United States should abandon its human rights policy. On the
contrary, I would argue that we should spend more money on it
and that we are moving in the right direction, but we should be
cognizant if we do of the kinds of challenges and risks that
await us in this part of the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Olcott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
Since the attacks of September 11, and the emergence of a U.S.
security partnership with several of the states of the central Asian
region, there has been lots of speculation about what this means for
the prospects of democratic reform in all five of these countries.
Now that there are US bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the
possibility of facilities in at least two more countries, there is
concern that the US and other Western nations may be more reluctant to
hold the states of the region to democratic norms and that, given the
political uncertainty it could occasion, holding them to these norms
may not be in our best interest. After all, as it is sometimes crudely
put, better to deal with the ``devil'' you know than the unknown one
which might be lurking out there.
Personally, I believe that this argument is very dangerous. In some
cases, closer cooperation with the US is making these ``devils'' more
willing to at least experiment with limited democratic reform, but in
other parts of the region, the devils we know are becoming more rather
than less recalcitrant political figures. This in turn seems likely to
fuel and exacerbate the security risks that these states could pose to
their neighbors in the future.
The power-void and collapse of civil society that made Afghanistan
an attractive environment for the al-Queda network took years to
develop and helped fuel instability in neighboring states. Cleaning out
the remains of the tenor network in Afghanistan gives the central Asian
states a brighter future, but this action in itself does not eliminate
or even substantially minimize the dangers that they confront from
their own largely internally generated security risks.
It is my deeply-rooted hope that we will continue to hold these
states to these norms. This is the best way to advance U.S. national
security interests, especially over the medium and long-term, and it is
the best way for these states to secure their long-term survival.
This author vehemently rejects the often argued position that the
people of central Asia are somehow unfit to live in a democratic
society, that they are unable to sustain democratic institutions
because of their history or that it is too soon in their history of
statehood to expect them to develop democratic norms. Ten years may be
a short time in the life of a nation, but the rulers and the ruled seem
to tell time in different ways. Most people need the hope that things
will improve either in their lifetime or that of their children. Those
born in the Soviet Union were raised on a diet of ``deferred
gratification,'' and all independence seems to have brought is a new
version of the old dietary staple. Those born later are likely to have
even less patience.
While independence may indefinitely benefit the ruling classes,
over time, the masses are likely to see independence as something of a
trick. For them, the only real difference in their lives is a change in
psychological status, and the ephemeral benefits that it provides. But
this perception of psychological empowerment is diminishing with time.
Those who live in a country should feel some sort of stake in its
future, or failing that, feel some hope for their own future or that of
their children.
Decolonization in central Asia is becoming increasingly more
reminiscent of what occurred in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where a
number of states have spent the past forty years stepping backwards
from the levels of development that characterized their country and its
population at the time of independence or in the first decade after
independence was achieved.
It is fashionable for central Asian leaders to argue that it took
over two hundred years for the US to develop its democratic form of
government, that we must be more patient with them. It is true that
every nation has to evolve democratic or participatory political
institutions that are suited to their cultural and historical
background, and that this is a slow and oft times messy process.
However, these political systems must be based in large part on the
prevailing democratic norms, and on a basic respect and observance of
human rights.
Now, more than ever before, we live in a global information era,
and people throughout central Asia are able to tie into the political
values of that global culture. Of course, people can be frightened into
submission and if this generation of human rights activists in central
Asia are decimated, either literally or figuratively, it will be that
much harder to create stable secular societies in this part of the
world, not to mention democratic ones.
It is easy to find non-democratic or authoritarian episodes in the
history of any people, and of course the histories of those living in
central Asia are no exception. But it smacks of racism to argue that
one people is more or less fit for democracy than another, and such an
argument is usually a convenient one for those who do not wish to share
power. The central Asian states could have had a pattern of political
institutional development that was more like that of Russia and the
other post-Soviet states (excepting the three in the Baltic region).
After years of repression, even now, throughout central Asia a
committed minority remains in place, eager to see democratic
development move forward. Nowhere is this more true than in Kyrgyzstan,
where the informal political organization movement is much more firmly
entrenched and widely dispersed than anywhere else in the region. But
developments in Turkmenistan over the past eight months make clear that
no country should be written off. This is a lesson that we should have
drawn from the relative success of power-sharing relationships in
Tajikistan, which is now experiencing a degree of political and
economic recovery after several years of civil war.
The specter of the Tajik civil war continues to haunt central Asian
leaders. The current level, or illusion, of political stability will
prove to be short-lived if the rulers of the region do not take
seriously the need to create safety valves in their societies such as
political institutions at the national and/or at the local level that
create opportunities for ordinary citizens to become political
stakeholders. This is all the more necessary given that the process of
economic reform has had very uneven effects across society. Many more
people have been denied the sense of being economic stakeholders than
those who have felt increasingly empowered.
Even before the attacks of September 11, the leaders of the central
Asian states all championed the cause of stability over that of
democraticization or political reform. None of the country's have yet
to hold a free and fair presidential election, although all but Niyazov
of Turkmenistan have competed in ``contested'' elections.
Over the past decade, much of the stated reason against political
liberalization on the part of central Asia's leaders has been the risks
posed by the region's religious revival, and the increased popularity
of radical Islamic groups, which might be further empowered by a more
open political process.
Uzbek fears date from the time of the Tajik civil war, in the early
1990s. These fears were compounded as the situation deteriorated in
Afghanistan, which was a source of seditious ideas, arms and narcotics
even before the Taliban took power and allowed al-Queda to establish a
training ground for international terrorism. The disorder in
Afghanistan complicated the process of state-building throughout
central Asia. In general, Uzbek domestic and foreign policy was
probably most shaped by the developments in Afghanistan, especially
after the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent. The Uzbek government was
determined that IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) militants should
never be able to enter their country at will and they recognized that
the training that they were receiving in Afghanistan was transforming
the nature of the Islamic threat confronting the regime. This further
hardened the Uzbek government's determination to both delineate and
defend its national boundaries (which were mined in some areas
inhabited by Tajiks and Kyrgyz). The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz also began to
better protect their borders (although they did not mine them).
Not all of Uzbekistan's fears were imaginary. The threat from Juma
Namangani and his IMU were real, although quite possibly exaggerated,
as many have held that the February 1999 bombings would not have
occurred without collusion of those close to Karimov himself Namangani
may or may not have been killed in Afghanistan and the camps of the IMU
were at least partially destroyed. However, all of central Asia's
leaders are warning of the possibility of new IMU incursions and,
should these occur, not only the regimes, but the cause of democratic
reform will also be further imperiled.
The Karimov regime has agreed in principle to support democratic
reforms as part of the strategic partnership framework. While the US
agreed to ``regard with grave concern any external threat to the
security and territorial integrity of the republic of Uzbekistan,'' and
promised the country ``dynamic military and military-technical
cooperation,'' the Uzbek government made a lot of political promises.
In the area of political relations, ``Uzbekistan reaffirmed its
commitment to further intensify the democratic transformation of its
society politically and economically.'' The United States will provide
the Government of Uzbekistan assistance ``in implementing democratic
reforms in priority areas such as building a strong and open civil
society, establishing a genuine multi-party system and independence of
the media, strengthening non-governmental structures and improving the
judicial system.'' In the area of legal cooperation, the Uzbeks
recognized ``the need to build in Uzbekistan a rule by law state and
democratic society,'' and agreed to ``improve the legislative process,
develop a law-based government system, further reform the judicial
system and enhance the legal culture.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See http://www.state/gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736pf.htm for a copy
of the complete test of the United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the
Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of these reforms remain for the future. The Uzbek government
has made a lot of promises about what it will do at a later date,
including the election of a bicameral legislature elected in 2004, but
the President did extend his term to 2007 through the use of
referendum. The government has promised to eliminate formal press
censorship, has registered at least one previously banned human rights
group, and has made other small symbolic steps showing the Uzbek
government's commitment to introducing rule by law, including the
prosecution of police officials for the use of excessive force in
interrogating accused religious extremists.
However, the Uzbek government's policy toward religion remains
largely unchanged, and it has been behaving much like its Soviet
predecessors, believing that it can dampen the fires of religious
ferment by state regulation of religious practice. This has served to
push extremist groups underground. Given Uzbekistan's current
demographic and social situation, the potential for new recruits
remains high.
The government in Tashkent faces the challenge of educating,
integrating and employing a new generation of Uzbeks--nearly forty
percent of the population is under 14--and given how little economic
reform has occurred in the country it really still is the government's
challenge, as there is still only a tiny private sector to draw on for
assistance. Today's Uzbek youth is generally poorer and sicker than
their parents were. Although less well educated, they are far more
knowledgeable about Islam and far better integrated into global Islamic
networks. The same pattern is repeated everywhere in the region, except
in Turkmenistan, where there is no shortage of poverty, but where the
country's Islamic revival has proceeded in more traditional channels.
The proceeds of central Asia's burgeoning drug trade, the source of
which is being revitalized from the current harvest of poppies in
Afghanistan, has help fund the perpetuation of militant Islamic groups
that have been proliferating in Uzbekistan and throughout central Asia.
The largest of these, the Hezb-ut Tahrir, call for believers to unite
and return Islam to the purity of its founding through the creation of
a new Caliphate. It is outlawed everywhere but Turkmenistan, where it
seems to lack a significant presence (unlike the drug trade, which does
have a significant presence and is said to be directly benefiting the
leader of the state).
Following massive arrests, adherents of the movement have gone
underground in Uzbekistan, but their numbers are increasing in the
border regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, particularly among
unemployed youth who are paid to distribute the movement's religious
tracts. These people are poised to return to Uzbekistan if any
opportunity to do so appears.
Throughout the region, groups like the Hezb-ut Tahrir are
benefiting from the failure of all of these countries to create any
real secular institutions for channeling opposition. The case of
Turkmenistan is most extreme as the national authorities have been
determined to carve out a model of political and economic development
that is supposedly in keeping with national cultural specificity's and
largely focuses on making a secular religion or cult around the person
of the country's first president.
Throughout the region, failures of state-building are creating
future security risks. Unlike a few years ago, when the situation in
Afghanistan could be blamed as a root source, the current crisis in
political institution-building is very much a product of decisions made
in the national capitals themselves. It would be a very large mistake
on the part of the governments in the region to assume that the growing
US security presence in the region will serve to shield them from the
consequences of their decisions.
The honeymoon period associated with independence is coming to an
end and, comparatively speaking, it has also been a honeymoon period
here. Notwithstanding the civil war in Tajikistan, the situation in
central Asia has been far more peaceful over the past decade than many
observers initially anticipated. However, as the region's leaders age
and tire, the frustration of their politically isolated and, in some
cases, increasingly impoverished populations seems sure to grow.
Advocates of democracy building may be frustrated by some of the
changes occurring in Russia or in Ukraine, but the situation there is
quite positive in comparison to that found in central Asia. Governments
in states like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which had initially given at
least limited endorsement to the ideals of democratic reform are now
sharply restricting the freedom of action of their citizens and are
eliminating any meaningful role political opposition groups can play.
As a result, many are growing more frustrated by the increasing social
and economic inequalities that now characterize their societies and by
the diminishing opportunities to express their dissatisfaction through
legal channels in the existing political system.
In recent months, we have seen signs of restiveness among the elite
and masses in several central Asian countries. The situation in
Turkmenistan is most noteworthy. There is little prospect of even
symbolic change in Turkmenistan as long as Niyazov remains in office,
something that is leading to the mobilization of the Turkmen elite.
Like Stalin, Niyazov fears disloyalty on the part of his government and
rotates state officials in and out of office with regularity. Moreover,
when someone is let go, the full savagery of the President's power is
unleashed on him.
A good example of this is the campaign against Niyazov's former
security chief, Muhammad Nazarov, dismissed in March 2002, and charged
in May 2002 with ``premeditated murder, procurement of women, abuse of
power, bribe-taking, illegal arrests, the manufacture and sale of
counterfeit documents, seals, stamps and blank forms, embezzlement and
the abuse of power,'' charges which collectively could get him 25 years
in prison. Moreover, 22 men formerly under his charge also face
prosecution. In March 2002, the head of the border guards, Major
General Tirkish Tyrmyev, was also dismissed. In May 2002, the Turkmen
Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the financial sector, Khudaiberdy
Orazov, and the head of the central Bank, Seitbai Kandymov, were both
dismissed. The latter faces a host of criminal charges, including that
of ``immodesty,'' according to the country's official newspaper
``Neitralnyi Turkmenistan'' (Neutral Turkmenistan). Niyazov also
announced plans to increase the size of the national security service
to some 5000 people in a reorganization that will both expand its reach
and make the existing leadership more vulnerable to removal in rather
Stalinesque ways.
Turkmenistan's government has been almost inflexible on issues of
political and economic reform. Moreover, those who formally break with
Niyazov, like former foreign minister Boris Sheikhmuradov who resigned
from his post as Turkmenistan's Ambassador to China in October 2001,
have a price put on their head. Since going into opposition
Sheikhmuradov has formed a political party, The Peoples Democratic
Movement of Turkmenistan, which manages a very active opposition
website. This opposition group seems to have much greater energy, and
hence potential, than earlier opposition efforts in Turkmenistan. A
small group of pro-democracy activists known as Azadliq (freedom) was
organized during the Gorbachev reforms, and the United Turkmen
Opposition, was formed in Russia by Turkmenistan's first Foreign
Minister, Abdi Kuliev and former Oil and Natural Gas Minister Nazar
Suyunov. While these two groups failed to gain support from
Turkmenistan's ruling elite, Sheikhmuradov's movement now includes
Turkmenistan's former ambassadors to Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates, a former deputy prime minister, and the former number two man
in Turkmenistan's embassy in the US.
There have been disturbing developments in Kyrgyzstan as well.
Although President Akayev promises that he will step down when his term
expires, the range of acceptable political activity has been narrowing.
The trial of a Kyrgyz legislator, Azimbek Beknezarov, led to peaceful
demonstrations in his home town of Dzhellabad in March 2002, that were
broken up by the police leaving seven dead. A month later, one of the
demonstrators died of a stroke during a hunger-strike. The district
administrator, Shermamat Osmonov, of the village where the
demonstrations occurred, Aksu, was fired by President Akayev, almost
immediately, despite repeated protestations by the State Secretary,
Osmonakun Ibraimov, and the Minister of Interior, the newly appointed
Temirbek Akmataliev, that the police opened fire in self-defense. As a
result of international pressure, the police officers themselves now
face prosecution. In what definitely has the feel of an official cover
up, Beknazarov was arrested in January 2002 and charged with exceeding
his official powers seven years before while he served as an
investigator in the Toktogul regional prosecutor's office. Beknazarov,
who was Chairman of the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) committee on
Judicial and Legal Affairs, had been a very vocal critic of the Akayev
government's negotiated border with China, in which the Kyrgyz ceded
125000 hectares of previously disputed territory to Chinese control,
and had called for Akayev's impeachment. This treaty, and the fate of
Beknazarov and the pro-Beknazarov demonstrators, has become a cause
celebre in Kyrygzstan and has led to mounting numbers of demonstrators
in southern Kyrgyzstan in particular, who gather daily to call for
President Akayev's resignation. In May 2002, the Prime Minister
resigned and in June a new government was named, but this itself has
not led to an appreciable change in the political environment.
Although there has been strong pressure from the various OSCE
states on Kyrgyzstan to have President Akayev pardon or otherwise
release his former Vice President, Feliks Kulov, now head of the Ar
Narmys party, just the opposite has occurred. Kulov, whose family now
lives in exile, was convicted in May 2002 of three separate charges of
embezzlement, and sentenced to serve a new 10 year term, concurrent
with his previous seven year sentence, for abuse of an official
position. Kulov was also barred from holding office for 3 years
following his release.
The situation in Kyrgyzstan is probably the most disturbing, as it
seems to have few easy solutions. The ideal would be for the US to work
with the current Kyrgyz government to help it find ways to successfully
increase public confidence, through the release of Kulov and the
creation of a broader coalition, etc. If Akayev is able to get to the
end of his term, there is a very good chance that the country will
stage something which at least has some of the features of a free and
fair election, providing an important example for the rest of the
region.
Hopefully, this would be a situation that would have some influence
on both Kazakhstan's and Uzbekistan's rulers. Despite the fact that
Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has continued to provide
strong rhetorical support for the need for democraticization in
Kazakhstan, actions taken by Kazakhstan's president and the country's
senior officials provide little evidence that the country's leaders
intend to take seriously a commitment to democratic reform.
A group of key reformers left the government in November and formed
a political movement called Democratic Choice, in part over a spat with
the president over the role played by one of his son-in-laws, Rakhat
Aliyev. Aliyev himself was pushed out and lost a number of his
holdings. His media holdings Karavan and Kazakh Commercial TV (both
owned by Alma-media) were temporarily suspended and the chief editor of
the former, Aleksandr Shukhov, has been brought in for questioning by
the Almaty police.
The Democratic Choice movement itself proved relatively shortlived
as two of its organizers, Mukhtar Ablyazov and Gaklimzhan Shakiyenov,
former Akim of Pavlodar Olbast, were arrested for various forms of
malfeasance. Two other organizers, former first deputy Prime Minister
Uraz Zhandosov and Alikhan Beymanov, created the ``Ak Zhol'' (White
way) party, but it has yet to be demonstrated that this is a credible
and independent opposition force.
While these developments do not in and of themselves change the
face of poliltical life in the region, they do show that the alliance
with the US has done little to make the region's leaders feel compelled
to introduce democratic reforms in their societies. Partly this is
because they feel that they are largely able to get away with whatever
behavior they want--that there will be neither internal nor external
consequences. They might be right about the latter--the international
community might quietly sit back and let these men do as they wish as
the priorities of the US in particular currently lay elsewhere--but
international inactivity is not synonymous with indefinite local
acquiescence.
Over the past several years, the region's leaders have begun to age
and in some cases become noticeably physically frailer, but the pace of
institutional development has slowed in key countries like Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. As already noted, there are some hopeful
signs in Kyrgyzstan, which if born out would have enormous impact on
the entire region. President Askar Akayev has been signaling that he
doesn't plan to press for further constitutional modifications to
enable him to continue to run for reelection. However, the only way
that Akayev can convince observers of his sincerity is to make
determined steps to free up the political process and create new
institutions for elite recruitment.
Positive too are plans to turn ever more control in the country
over to popularly elected local governments. This would have enormous
benefit in Kyrgyzstan, creating new arenas of competition throughout
the country and reducing the expectations of the central government. It
too would serve as a model and potential spur to reforms throughout the
region.
At the same time, all in the region are watching with interest
efforts by Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliev to have his son, Ilham,
designated as his heir. Many in Kyrgyzstan believe that President
Akayev will also try to arrange a transfer of power to one of his
children, especially if distant relative Nursultan Nazarbayev in
Kazakhstan successfully pursues such a strategy. Akayev is rumored to
be grooming his young son, Aidan, who was educated in the United
States.
Efforts to reinstate some sort of modern-day princely system are
very dangerous. Over the past five years, central Asia's leaders have
been honing their ``winner-take-all'' philosophy. But the societies
that they rule are complex, filled with populations that are reluctant
to accept a loss of the benefits that they are used to enjoying and
former political and economic stakeholders who are used to being
accommodated. Throughout central Asia, members of the elite from
disfavored clans and families have been sitting by, waiting for the
opportunity to grasp more economic and political power. As institutions
to ensure a peaceful transfer of power do not exist, there is no
foundation on which for them to rest their hopes.
In the absence of a civil society, there are few secular political
institutions around which opposition can coalesce. Islam, especially
the mosque and the medresseh, is increasingly becoming a more
attractive organizational center for ethnic Kyrgyz as well as ethnic
Uzbeks, and it is very difficult to restrict popular access to it. As a
result, the advocacy of Islamic goals can be useful for both the
regime's supporters as well as for its detractors. Everything depends
on the rules of the game and these are still in flux.
The challenge posed by Islam remains particularly acute in
Uzbekistan. Islam is particularly deeply rooted in many parts of the
country, and the precedent of competition between Islamic
fundamentalists, modernists, and Islamic conservatives is a well-
established one. All three traditions withstood the vicissitudes of
Soviet rule. Some of today's radical groups even have their roots in an
anti-Russian uprising that occurred in the Ferghana Valley in 1898 and
a few of the leaders have even studied with a ``holy-man'' who
witnessed the revolt as a young child, and who--much to Soviet
displeasure--survived to a very old age. This revival easily reaches
into Kyrgyzstan, through the Ferghana Valley. Throughout the region,
governments mistakenly believe that religion can be managed by the
state, as can the development of Islam, and that governments are
competent enough to influence the social evolution of society.
The central Asian elite, of course, is not formally against Islam,
but is very wary of revivalist or fundamentalist Islam and people who
are eager to live by ``the exact teachings of the book.'' What they
want is to keep these republics as secular states and to prevent devout
Muslims from forcing all of their co-religionists into public
observance of the faith. Even in Kyrgyzstan, pressure on secular
elements to conform to religious precepts is strong.
The relationship of religion to mass belief is much more complex
and interactive than the region's leaders credit it with being. Though
the governments of central Asia are in no position to regulate the
religious beliefs of the masses, they may exert their influence on
social processes. But in trying to do so, these governments could
inadvertently trigger social explosions.
It is for this reason that central Asia's governments must once
again broaden the political sphere available to most ordinary citizens
to include a host of secular alternative. For without this, the country
has no real safety valve to use to release social pressure.
But political liberalization alone is not the answer. The region's
social pressure cooker must be dealt with more directly as well,
through programs that will effectively help alleviate the region's
poverty, through nationally based economic projects, and an effort to
capitalize on the potential of a central Asian regional market.
Moreover, economic reform will create a new and more persistent group
of claimants for the extension of rule of law into the political sphere
as well and the kind of popular support base that is necessary for
sustaining democratic political developments over the long haul.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you both very much. Let me
begin by picking up the point you made, Ambassador Courtney,
about the Russian influence in these countries. Their approach
has changed to a point of accommodation as a result of the war
against terrorism. I understand that President Putin overruled
the opposition of many officials in Russia who really did not
want that degree of United States access to these countries,
war on terrorism or not, but apparently persuaded the people in
Russia that it would be in their interests. But it is clear
this has been very recent, the thought that we would have these
opportunities we're discussing today. These countries are not
in our hemisphere; as a matter of fact, they are in what Russia
would have viewed as its sphere of influence. But to what
extent does that specter overhang the picture? In other words,
is there a feel in these countries that despite the fact we've
had a temporary interest in the region the United States may
say we've settled what we came to do militarily in Afghanistan,
we've trained an Afghan group of people to police the country,
which was our objective, and now we must leave because you have
other problems here.
What happens to these five countries if such a shift should
occur or even let us say the United States as a matter of fact
said well, we do in fact have more interest there, more staying
power, despite official opposition of our government to
expanding the international security force outside of Kabul,
and United States participation. We heard this in the hearing
yesterday so it's fairly firm that we're going to move that
way, but we might change our mind and say Afghanistan is
important, its success is important, that might have an
influence on the other countries in the region.
Can you give us some flavor as to how these tilts might
occur, because in the last year we have had a very big tilt,
one which we and everybody, I suppose, questioned both staying
power as well as the future of Russian cooperation as we have
seen this past year?
Ambassador Courtney. The Russian shift does seem to be
sudden. Going back to the early Yeltsin era a decade ago, the
reformers in Russia in Yeltsin's government were focused mainly
on dealing with the West and moving their country toward the
West, and a decision was made consciously, or de facto, to
leave the CIS up to retrograde officials in the Yeltsin
government. So by and large the reformers whose names that we
know, Guydar, Chubias, Yavlensky, people like that, they were
associated with dealing with CIS issues.
Senator Lugar. That's a very important point which I don't
think I've heard made publicly as often as it needs to be.
Ambassador Courtney. It was a way for the Yeltsin regime to
protect its rights plan by leaving less important matters but
matters that were emotional to people who were from a more
conservative bent. So the debate has been going on for a long
time.
The view that we expressed, the United States expressed a
decade ago, from the very outset, Secretary Baker and President
Bush, was that Russia had an interest in secure and stable and
prosperous borders all the way around, was something that
intellectually some of the leaders understood but they didn't
seem to be able to internalize. I would like to think that over
the last decade, more and more Russians have indeed
internalized that and seen that they do have a greater stake in
their own internal conditions, economic and political, and that
means moving toward more open societies and more contacts with
the West, and I think we're seeing some of that just today and
yesterday in Canada in the discussions.
As to what would happen if we pulled out of southern
Eurasia, I think that would be destabilizing, in part because
the countries of the area would wonder whether we were
interested in them or interested in them only as a vehicle to
serve some other interest, and as I indicated, there are so
many potential security threats out there. For example, if a
nuclear weapon gets stolen from a Russian nuclear facility, one
possible way it would go out would be the least guarded border,
which is the border with Kazakhstan, and go down to the south.
Biological weapons activities out there, although
tremendous accomplishments have been made with the reduction
program to eliminate them but there are still, as you know, a
host of military biological weapon systems in Russia and a lot
of people hovering around, including organized crime groups,
that would possibly be interested in one or another aspect of
the weapons of mass destruction establishment.
So we have a lot of very specific interests such as
enhancement of border security so they can detect and
interdict, so I think it's very important for the United States
to remain and staying involved in Afghanistan, whether it is
the ICAF in Kabul or some other way, the key is that the United
States stay and finish the job and remain in southern Eurasia.
How often in human history was a security vacuum created as
large as was created when the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan
and then the Soviet Union collapsed? There's been a vacuum
there for a decade. The United States has filled it, and again,
probably remarkably in history, very few countries in the
region seem to have objected, most everyone seems to like that.
So this is clearly stabilizing and we should stay.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask, let's say that the situation
remains stable in the sense that we stay and there is not
additional pressure coming from Russia on these states. There
is the problem clearly in all of them if there is to be the
sort of reform that we're talking about, the need for income,
that is, not a vibrant economy, but at least some improvement.
I had a good visit with the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan and
I was impressed with the fact that there is very little money
in the country, the per capita income is very small.
Now in the case of Kazakhstan, with the energy resources
there, see some revenue stream coming. It may or may not be
productive for all the people, but nonetheless there is some
stream there that is possible. What are the prospects for the
other four countries? Can you outline any hope in terms of the
revenue stream in the next decade, quite apart from next year?
Ms. Olcott. I think there is some potential for a revenue
scheme, particularly if the customs barriers that exist within
the region are eliminated or are sharply reduced. The region
that includes southern Russia as well as central Asia really
could form a natural market for a whole host of job creating
activities in textile industry and in food processing, and
support by the United States and the international financial
institutions of more rapid entrance of all these states to the
WTO I think would help facilitate it.
That requires Uzbekistan seeing through its currency
reform. Certainly it would be nice if Turkmenistan had similar
steps, but I think there is some prospect of job creation
through regionally focused projects that are driven at the
entrepreneur level rather than at the head of state level; the
head of state level has had a more dismal success rate.
Senator Lugar. That's an interesting point you're making.
How severe are these barriers between these states, leaving
aside between anybody else? Describe what the customs or the
tariff business is between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
Ms. Olcott. Kyrgyzstan is the only state that is a WTO
member, and it has been very difficult for Kyrgyzstan to trade
with Uzbekistan. The customs barriers, it depends upon the
goods, what they are, and it has been even more difficult in
some ways for Kyrgyzstan to reach its market in Russia across
Kazakhstan. There have been a series of tariffs, especially on
agricultural good, levied.
In addition to the existence of these tariffs and there's
great difficulty in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in addition to
these kind of barriers, the corruption of moving goods is
really problematic. It costs between $1,000 and $2,000 to move
a truck across Kazakhstan.
Senator Lugar. With customs officials, or where is the
corruption?
Ms. Olcott. The corruption is police officials, customs
officials, you name it, it's there. And this is, I think, the
single biggest thing that we could do for these states is in
the next 5 years move toward working with them for much better
management of trade. I think it would lead to a healthy cross-
fertilization of investment across the region. There is capital
in some of these countries, and there's Russian capital as well
that would come in and do some very healthy things.
Senator Lugar. That's a very significant point that I have
not heard explored before. We have not really thought of trade
among the countries. We keep thinking of each in isolation. We
discuss individual governments and their contributions
security-wise or reliability human rights wise, but this seems
to be unrealistic, people move. We've talked about nuclear
material moving, but likewise we must discuss trade, food and
material. As you point out there are all sorts of barriers and
corruption. Tariffs are high, obstruction to access in the
Russian market. There are a number of factors here which in
terms of our state craft really need to be considered more
heavily.
Ms. Olcott. I agree. We have to remember that the
overwhelming majority of the population of these countries is
under 21 and in every case except Kazakhstan, over a third are
under 14. That means that we have to look at government revenue
bases but we also have to look at opportunities of employment,
of how families have life, because we don't want a new
generation of terrorists to be born.
Senator Lugar. Let me just followup with two questions on
that point. You mentioned the desirability of exchange programs
in which young people might come from these countries to the
United States. But you say it's not very clear how they get
out, and second, do they ever return. And that's rather bleak
to say the least. We haven't done enough in this area, and I
fear with a number of exchange programs, it's really getting
off the mark.
Try to help me. If you were to have the money to do so, how
extensively would you begin to try exchange programs? How many
students would be candidates for entry into American
universities? Or stretch it the other way, how many American
students might want to go to any of these countries? Do you
have any feel as an academic in this area?
Ms. Olcott. I don't have a feel for how many Americans
would want to go there to study, but there are at this point
thousands if not tens of thousands each year that would come
from central Asia. One of the things that I think we have to be
careful of in stimulating exchange programs is not to forget
the need to help support educational reform on the ground,
because it's going to get harder and harder for rural youth to
have access to these exchange programs regardless of how many
slots we make available to them, because the differential
between elite education and mass education is growing
throughout these regions.
So, exchange programs are great, but more work on the
ground with educational reform working with these states, with
programs like the Peace Corps, and more directly target
educational projects, I think are equally, if not more
important for the longer term trends.
Senator Lugar. How important is our public diplomacy
efforts? In the State Department we had testimony a couple
weeks ago of five different programs of various areas. When you
talk about focusing on young people, this is what our public
diplomacy is aimed at. Charlotte Beers and other people came to
say that they are broadcasting messages, usually through the
broadcast of American music, with 5-minute newscasts and other
informational efforts in the midst of the program. This is a
new tactic as opposed to the Voice of America or more
conventional broadcasting that we have done in the past. And it
seems to have caught the favor of people who are say from 15 to
25 years of age.
Now, I am not acquainted with how much of that may be
occurring in any of the five countries we're considering today
or how much should be focused there. These states do have a
majority of young people and there probably are some messages
of either hope or information, that we should be sending. Do
you have any impression about what we should do in terms of
public diplomacy?
Ms. Olcott. I think one of the problems these regimes face,
especially in rural areas, is the declining numbers of
functioning TV sets and radios, so it's getting harder and
harder to get to some more distant areas. I think the most
valuable thing we do in media is training independent
journalists. That is not to speak against public diplomacy or
the radios that we support, but I see the greatest long-term
payoff to us by working with independent media.
Similarly with regard to public diplomacy programs, I think
the longer term exchanges and training programs are really
valuable, and I really advocate doing them with government
people and not just with the nongovernmental sector. We have to
increase the confidence of the generation that's already in
positions of responsibility, even if we don't really like their
views on a lot of questions.
Senator Lugar. Ambassador Courtney, when you were
Ambassador to Kazakhstan, how did you work with the State
Department on public diplomacy? How did you try to express
American ideals and morals to all the sectors of society?
Ambassador Courtney. Most Ambassadors discover when they go
to post that the public diplomacy section is the most important
in the embassy. In Kazakhstan the country was by and large a
joint military test range in the Soviet era, they had very few
contacts with the outside world. When the United States came in
and opened up the embassy just weeks after Gorbachev signed the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhstanis welcomed us
with open arms.
They very quickly saw America as a protector against a
larger set of neighbors or unstable neighbors, and were very
receptive to public diplomacy programming, and that included
Radio Liberty, Voice of America, the journalist training
efforts that we did, all forms. There was an independent
newspaper started in Kazakhstan, which suffered a $1 million
fire when I was there, at one of its major newsprint
warehouses. A similar fire has occurred at another independent
newspaper more recently in Kazakhstan. That says something
about how leaders who are less than democratic see the power of
the media. So I would agree very much with Ms. Olcott that this
is an area in which we should concentrate a great deal of
resources and more resources.
Senator Lugar. I'm just trying to think with you. Given our
exhortations for leaders to reform and so forth, in fact it's
the constituency of people, the base population in these
countries that want changes. Now that may not mean they get
them, but it's difficult to see a greater appreciation or
yearning for democracy without sharing views of the benefits.
That's why it seems to me speaking through public diplomacy a
fairly large number of people eventually receive the message.
This is extremely important for the future.
Ms. Olcott. I think we should also not minimize the size of
the constituency for change in any of these countries. If we
listen to the leaders, we really have a vision of the
populations as being rooted in the past and not really
understanding what participatory societies are about. The
tragedy is that all these countries were more participatory in
1991, 1992 and 1993 than they are today, and that's what we
suffer as our risk in these societies.
Senator Lugar. Why is that so? Why has 10 years made a
difference to the worse?
Ms. Olcott. Because the regimes in power virtually
everywhere have reduced the sphere of political life. The media
is less free in most of central Asia than it was at the time
that independence was granted. Parliaments have less political
power today than they did in the early 1990s. Presidents are
much more powerful figures than they were in the early 1990s.
The judiciary was not independent then and it is making some
strides in some places.
But what we stand to lose, and we have lost a lot of that
momentum from the late Gorbachev period and the early period of
independence, and what we risk is a generation that has never
seen that political dynamism coming to maturity without the
conditions of it ever being instituted. That triggers the kind
of radicalism that we see in parts of the Islam world and we
see in parts of central Asia.
Senator Lugar. What other countries are likely to help us
in this endeavor? Do you see coming on the horizon some
increase in, say, the interest of NATO nations or the European
Union or Australia? Are there others who might have an
influence toward democratic governance.
Ms. Olcott. Europeans are very active throughout central
Asia. The Germans are particularly active in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan. The French are visible virtually everywhere.
Senator Lugar. Why are they active? What interests do they
have?
Ms. Olcott. The Germans had an interest in keeping the
German population from emigrating to Germany. There was a
historic German population in Kazakhstan, about 6 or 7 percent
of the population containing German ethnicity, and they were
given the right to be repatriated under Soviet rule, and the
German Government after reunification tried to dampen that by
encouraging investment programs in Kazakhstan that were geared
toward getting these people to stay by giving them a greater
role in the economy. So they have a traditional interest in
both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
But the European, the French and Italian oil companies are
really active throughout the Caspian. The Japanese have had
periods of great interest in central Asia and that interest I
think could be revived.
Ambassador Courtney. The issue of the expansion of the
European Union throughout much of the 1990s caused a certain
paralysis in Western Europe about how actively they should get
involved to the east. In Georgia, for example, which is closer
to Europeans in several ways, the Europeans made a significant
investment in energy, but it tailed off as we went further
east.
I think the Europeans have come a long way since then and
after 9-11, they realize that to a greater extent they should
be there with us, but we should always remember that these
challenges for the Europeans are always going to be something
that will require U.S. encouragement to get them involved.
I understand that something like 90 percent of the heroin
in Britain comes from Afghanistan and half of that may come
through central Asia, so concrete specific interests are
playing a role as well.
Senator Lugar. Recently we've had visits in Washington from
NATO ambassadors and Lord Robertson. I had a long discussion
last Thursday with them about NATO's future in this area. This
is purely out of area, but the war on terrorism is out of area,
by definition. Some NATO nations are prepared to work for us in
a fairly long-term way when it comes to fighting this war
against terrorism. Others are feeling their way along in this,
they are not really sure how long, how far, they are willing to
go. Some would prefer to hunker down back on the European
Continent, as opposed to addressing the threats that may come
to all of us, including them.
But to the extent they do begin to look at this, then they
might take a look at the drug trade and see this is a greater
part of the situation, and I see possibilities of an extension
of European interests the same as our own. The pessimists would
say only for a short time, you know, there will come a time
when work in Afghanistan, is done.
But then we heard from Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Armitage here
in this subcommittee that it's not just Afghanistan, it's
Pakistan. This is very, very critical. That's another fact we
haven't talked about today, but it's certainly in the area, a
source of considerable interest in our diplomacy, both for
security purposes as well as commitments. There are other
reasons for staying in the area that may lead to greater
longevity for us and for the Europeans. But we're breaking new
ground.
As you pointed out, prior to September 11, the degree of
interest in all of this was unfortunately minimal. Now it's
substantially greater. Let me just ask one more question along
this line. For American business, obviously we're aware of the
extraordinary energy interest in Kazakhstan. What sort of other
activity is occurring in other industries, or what might be
encouraged? What is logical in terms of American business
investment? Frequently that is a point of leverage and a point
of democratization in its own way, as people come and go with
the flow of commerce. Do either one of you have any idea as to
what the openings might be in that area?
Ambassador Courtney. In addition to energy, and to go back
to your earlier question about income in the countries, if one
takes a look at Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the
three countries that have substantial energy income in the
region, and the income distribution of that impact in terms of
how much of that income reaches down to the poorer people, the
issue is that broad based economic growth and investment is
required there, and it has to be done under circumstances that
are less corrupt. Corruption is probably the No. 1 issue that
harms economic development in the region.
The second part of it really has to go to agriculture. If
you look at every single one of those societies, agriculture
including husbandry, they all have comparative advantages from
the economic perspective in those areas, but in none of those
countries are people able to buy and sell land freely or to use
it as collateral to obtain a mortgage so that a farm credit
activity can get going. And we know from our own history in
America that without being able to collateralize land, you just
can't have strong agricultural credit. If I could pick one
single thing that the United States business could do beyond
energy, it would be the focus in the agricultural sector, and
that would cover all aspects of that, including food
processing. But that requires the opportunity for
collateralization.
Senator Lugar. This is another legacy from the Soviet
period. We just saw the Duma take some preliminary steps to
permit the sale of lands to Russians within Russia. This is a
big step even 10 years after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Ms. Olcott. Kyrgyzstan actually does allow private land
ownership and this year they are beginning to allow some
collateralization with U.S. assistance. But I agree, I think
agricultural reform is really a key to survival of societies,
and also, agricultural equipment sales is really one area of
potential U.S. engagement. The mineral extraction sector,
Uzbekistan, one of its biggest projects is mineral mining, you
know, working in the gold sector. Service providers throughout
the mining sector may have a market there, but it's very
difficult to get the kind of return on capital from these
small- and medium-size enterprises that U.S. firms are used to,
and the kind of management time that has to be invested there
is really enormous. So except for the big projects, I think
it's going to be hard to encourage too much U.S. participation.
Senator Lugar. Especially with the customs problems, the
difficulty in getting across borders. For example in Eastern
Europe, discussion would focus on the Czech Republic or
Slovakia. They were small markets but they were profitable.
American companies could produce steel in Slovakia and export
it to several surrounding countries. But that gets back to an
earlier point that you made, that the market has to be
enlarged. It is enlarged by barriers coming down and access to
Russia as a very large potential customer in the area should be
encouraged.
Ms. Olcott. And we can help them more through technological
training than through investment, and what we should be more
interested in is facilitating economic stability.
Senator Lugar. I thank both of you. I'm hopeful that the
record of our hearing will be helpful to other colleagues,
likewise to our administration and to others in the NGOs who
are working these problems intensively, as both of you have
throughout much of your career.
Let me ask on behalf of the chairman that we have unanimous
consent, which I will give being the surviving Senator here, to
keep the record open until the close of business tomorrow, and
this for the benefit of those who have additional comments as
witnesses or Senators who wish to raise questions, issue
statements or what have you. Thank you very very much for being
with us today, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Sam Brownback
I would like to first address the title of this hearing to clear up
any misunderstandings. ``Balancing Military Assistance and Support for
Human Rights'' makes it sound like there is a choice to be made between
the two. Nothing could be further from the truth. Military assistance
takes many forms. Training of soldiers requires human rights vetting.
Human rights training and democracy programs are conducted concurrently
with train and equip programs. Through various engagement activities,
our military is assisting in the development of democracy throughout
the world.
Balancing human rights concerns with strategic and economic
concerns is always a difficult task--and a subject worthy of inquiry.
Central Asia is comprised of a set of new nations--barely over a decade
old, which are dealing with a number of difficult issues. These nations
are the first to admit that there remains work to be done in the area
of human rights--just as our own nation did not have a perfect human
rights record for many years after our creation. The task of building a
new nation from scratch is difficult enough, but when you are
transforming from a system that did not respect the rights of
individuals, did not place a premium on human rights and in fact,
inherited a tradition of political repression--as these post-Soviet
nations did, the challenge is all the greater.
This does not mean we should refrain from examining this important
topic, but we should take note of the fact that many of these nations
have made conscious choices to move toward the West, toward democracy
and away from the radical extremist elements we see in a number of
other countries.
Which brings me to a critical point: we should be examining this
important topic with a broader lens. What about human rights issues in
Saudi Arabia and Egypt? These too are alliances that we have had for
various strategic reasons--but we have shied away from critically
reviewing. These countries certainly deserve as much scrutiny as
central Asia--we send them more aid or sell them more weapons, we have
had longer relationships with these countries--and by all rights, the
abuses in these countries, at least the descriptions I have seen, are
significantly worse than central Asia--particularly for women.
If we are to examine this important topic with the depth it
deserves, we should make sure that we do not cast our focus too narrow.
I realize that this subcommittee is tailored to central Asia--but if we
are to have a hearing on this important topic, then I hope we will also
have the opportunity at the full committee level, to delve into the
concerns about human rights abuses in with our other allies. For that
matter, we should also be scrutinizing the axis of evil: Iran, Iraq and
North Korea--where human rights are all but an unknown concept.
I hope this will be a balanced hearing. In light of the great
cooperation we have received from central Asia post 9/11, it would not
serve us well to treat our new friends unfairly.
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Robert G. Torricelli
Question. Secretary Craner, I want to raise with you a case you are
familiar with involving a constituent of mine from New Jersey, Mr.
Mansur Maqsudi. As you know, last July, Mr. Maqsudi decided after
roughtly ten years of marriage to seek a divorce from his wife, Gulnora
Karimova, the daughter of President Karimov. Since then, the Uzbek
government has imprisoned and mistreated a number of Mr. Maqsudi's
relatives, expropriated without any compensation his business in
Tashkent, and deprived him of having any communication with his two
children; now ages nine and four. In March of this year, you publicly
promised the chair of the House International Subcommittee on Human
Rights, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, that you would personally raise this issue
at the highest level with the government of Uzbekistan. Recently you
were in Tashkent and I would like you to describe concretely to the
subcommittee what you have done to help Mr. Maqsudi, an American
citizen, in freeing his three relatives who are still in jail, all of
whom have serious health problems and have committed no crime other
than being related to Mr. Maqsudi, and in helping to make sure that Mr.
Maqsudi is not unlawfully deprived of his right to be in touch with his
children, who are also U.S. citizens.
Answer. I appreciate your attention to and share your concern on
this very difficult issue.
Since my March testimony, when Rep. Ros-Lehtinen asked for and
received my assurance ``that this issue will be raised at the highest
level with the government of Uzbekistan'', I have worked to ensure that
the case was receiving such attention here at the State Department.
Ambassador John Herbst has raised the issue repeatedly with the
highest levels of the Uzbek government. Beth Jones, our Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs, on a number of occasions has also
conveyed our views on this issue to the highest Uzbek officials here
and in Tashkent. Officials of the Bureau of Consular Affairs in
Uzbekistan and Washington, who have the primary responsibility on the
portion of the case involving the children and one parent who are
American citizens, also continue to pursue it. We have also pushed the
Government of Uzbekistan, again at the highest levels, to respect the
rule of law and to provide the Uzbek relatives who are not American
citizens access to their lawyers and their family members. Secretary of
State Powell and I have repeatedly emphasized to the highest levels of
the Uzbek government, here and in Tashkent, that respect for citizens'
individual liberties, the rule of law in Uzbekistan and international
law are a precursor for deepening and broadening the relationship
between our two countries. As we have made clear to the Uzbeks from the
attention we have devoted to it and the levels at which we have raised
it, resolution of this case would send a strong signal of movement in
this direction.
On May 3, 2002, after Ambassador Herbst had met with the Uzbek
foreign minister and negotiated with Mr. Maqsudi's estranged wife, a
U.S. consular officer received her consent to visit with her children.
Our consular officials for many months had been trying to arrange such
a meeting to determine the children's well-being. The results of this
visit, subsequently reported to the Maqsudi family, were that the
children are healthy and receiving much attention and care. We
understand the families themselves are attempting to resolve the issue
of family visits. We also recently requested information, through our
Embassy, on the health of the imprisoned relatives and to confirm that
they are able to receive needed medications even as we continue to
press the government of Uzbekistan to treat them in accordance with
international law.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Gordon Smith
Question. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Beth Jones has been clear that in central Asia the administration is
placing equal emphasis on issues of military cooperation and the
promotion of democracy and human rights. However, in your testimony you
state that ``any deepening and broadening of our cooperation will
depend on continual progress in respecting human rights and
democracy.'' Are you suggesting placing conditions on our assistance to
these central Asian republics?
Answer. Senator Smith, thank you for a question that addresses an
important issue of U.S. foreign policy. Since September 11 I have taken
two trips to central Asia and have met with many officials from the
region here in Washington, D.C. My message to government authorities
and to the people of the region has been consistent--that in order to
receive the continuing support of the American people, who above all
value respect for human rights and democratic institutions, the
governments of central Asia will have to demonstrate in concrete
measures their commitment to democracy and human rights. This is a
message that has been conveyed by all U.S. government authorities.
The governments of central Asia are at a critical juncture in their
relations with us. If they want to go further and broaden their
cooperation with us beyond security matters, they will need to
institute political reforms, otherwise our relations will not be able
to progress and instead will remain limited in their scope.
DRL's assistance via the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF)
will continue to remain focused on targeted opportunities where we can
make a difference through innovative programs. We will continue our
support for civil society, including human rights activists, NGO
leaders, independent journalists and other democratic forces, to enable
them to hold their governments accountable and advocate for peaceful
change.
Question. Deputy Assistant Secretary Pascoe suggests that to bring
democracy to central Asia ``may require generational change.'' How
much, and what percentage of the total of your HRDF is directed towards
this audience?
Answer. I agree with Deputy Assistant Secretary Pascoe that a full
transition to democracy in central Asia with the consolidation of
democratic institutions is a long-term proposition. However, with the
exception of Turkmenistan, there are strong, viable democratic forces
in the central Asian countries and these forces are deserving of our
support. We believe it is important in the short, medium and long term
to encourage democratic opposition and human rights activists in their
courageous battle to bring about peaceful change.
In terms of funding programs with DRL's Human Rights and Democracy
Fund (HRDF), allow me to clarify what HRDF is, and is not, about. In my
confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary I pledged to reform HRDF,
and in particular, to make it a fund that distinguished itself as a
resource for cutting-edge programming. I am happy to report that I have
done so; HRDF funds are reserved for targeted, innovative projects that
will have a direct impact in countries of U.S. foreign policy
significance.
Using these new criteria, I am pleased to note that we have indeed
allocated a substantial portion of HRDF to $3,045,000 (23% of total)
for democracy and human rights programs in central Asia and for fiscal
year 2002 we have notified to Congress $1,996,000 for central Asia,
which represents 33% of the $6 million earmark for Muslim countries.
While all of our programs will ultimately effect a generational
change, HRDF is not specifically designed for long-term programs. To
achieve such generational change we work closely with our colleagues in
the Department of State and USAID who are engaged in supporting
complementary long-term exchanges and training programs. The programs
most targeted at generational change are exchange programs administered
by the Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA).
In FY 2002, ECA received approximately $19.25 million in FREEDOM
Support Act funding to support academic and professional exchange
programs for approximately 850 citizens from the central Asian
countries. This number includes academic year or longer stays in the
U.S. for approximately 260 central Asian high school students on the
Future Leaders Exchange Program (FLEX), some 55 central Asian students
on the FSA Undergraduate program, and some 68 central Asian graduate
students on the FSA Graduate/Muskie program. ECA also supports
approximately 30 open access internet sites throughout central Asia
which are used heavily by young exchange program alumni to keep open
ties to their U.S.mentors and host families, and to obtain access to
information not otherwise available in their countries.
Question. What is your view of working with the political parties
in Tajikistan? As Tajikistan is the only country in the region with a
vocal opposition in the Parliament will U.S. financed training be open
to the Communist Party and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)?
Answer. During the past five years since the peace accord ending
their brutal five-year civil war, the government of Tajikistan has
taken soma steps to accommodate a political opposition. While the
elections in 1999 and 2000 were indeed an improvement from civil war,
they were neither free nor fair and electoral legislation is in need of
reform, especially regarding party and candidate registration. Lack of
war, however, is not democracy, and we would like to see Tajikistan's
governing institutions continue to improve.
While Tajikistan is indeed the only central Asian republic that has
a government with an opposition party represented (and notably the only
republic to permit political parties of a religious character--Islamic
Renaissance Party), we would like to see more parties able to receive
training and actively participate in government, especially those who
are having difficulty registering. We commend the government's
demonstrative commitment to establishing democratic institutions, and
look forward to working with them as they continue to improve.
DRL is currently not funding from HRDF any political party programs
in Tajikistan. However, we would like to do so in the future as we view
Tajikistan as a country with many opportunities to promote democracy
and human rights. If we should fund political party building programs,
they would be open to all democratic, reform-oriented political
parties. Currently, USG assistance programs administered by USAID
support the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in
providing technical assistance to the full range of democratic
political parties, focusing on improved communication between
headquarters and regional party branches and the development of
membership recruitment strategies. The assistance also concentrates on
women's political participation and has resulted in a protocol drawn up
by political parties representing all sides of the political spectrum
that expands the role of women and youth in their respective parties.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Lynn Pascoe to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Gordon Smith
hizb-ut tahrir
Question. The Hezb-ut Tahrir (HUT), the underground group that
favors the creation of a new Caliphate is often mentioned as a point of
concern by visitors from central Asia. Yet little is known about its
strength, where its finances come from and what if any connections it
has with terrorist organizations. What can you tell us about the Hezb-
ut Tahrir? Is it a threat to U.S. interests in the region? Is its
repression by the governments of the region of concern?
Answer. Unlike the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-
Tahrir al-Islami (HT-The Islamic Liberation Party) is a transnational
organization--with support among Muslims in Europe and an
organizational base in London. It has urged the non-violent overthrow
of governments across central Asia and the establishment of an Islamic
caliphate throughout the Islamic world.
HT was founded in the Middle East (reportedly Jordan or Saudi
Arabia) in the 1950's. It promotes a utopian view of political Islam
under which social problems like corruption and poverty would be
eradicated by the application of sharia. Although HT has not been clear
how this would be achieved, its idealistic vision has taken on
increasing saliency because of the region's economic problems and
social discontent. The organization uses a mixture of local history and
socio-economic and political arguments, combined with calls for
international religious solidarity to promote its cause against
authorities.
HT is organized in secretive five-member cells whose members later
form their own groups or halkas. Only the leader of each halka has a
connection to another halka. (This method has helped HT spread rapidly,
reportedly doubling in size each year in certain parts of central
Asia.) Public expression usually is conducted through leaflets.
Recruitment generally is conducted through friends and family,
mirroring traditional social constructs. Members often emphasize the
``inner jihad'' or a psychological transformation as the impetus for
joining the group.
In central Asia, HT members are generally ethnic Uzbeks as HT
focuses primarily on removing Uzbekistani President Karimov.
Nevertheless, HT has been more active recently in recruiting in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, perhaps due to repression of its members in
Uzbekistan and these countries' sizeable Uzbek population. Outside
Uzbekistan, HT's appeal has centered on discontent with Kyrgyz and
Tajik government policies toward religious practices.
Much of HT's appeal reportedly is based in its rejection of
violence. This is probably especially attractive in areas that have
suffered purported inter-ethnic violence such as the Ferghana Valley.
HT's propaganda, however, remains virulently anti-Western and anti-
Semitic, and post-September 11 HT rhetorically has supported action
against the ``infidel'' powers fighting in Afghanistan. Some of the
attraction to HT is its forbidden nature, the opportunity it presents
for the alienated to express discontent, and the historical tradition
of expressing dissent through religion in the Ferghana Valley.
It is unclear what the group's future plans are and researchers
have noted conflict among some members about the efficacy of violence
such as used by the IMU--with which many members sympathize. Indeed,
differences over HT tactics--and perhaps its rejection of violence--
reportedly led to factions splitting off in 1997 and 1999.
Overall, neither Hezb ut-Tahrir nor the IMU has extensive support
in the region. The tri-border area encompassing the Ferghana appears to
be the most fertile ground for HT, with some researchers estimating
that up to 10 percent of the local population are supporters. Although
the number of HT's recruits continues to increase, the vast majority of
believers in the region do not necessarily share HT's radical program
of politicization of Islam. Journalist interviews with recruits suggest
the decision to join an extremist group--HT or otherwise--is driven by
disappointments of the post-Soviet era rather than an attachment to
radical Islam. Therefore, HT's focus on ending corruption and abuse by
powerful rulers appeals to the more secular as well.
Government response to HT growth varies in the four countries
(Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and, less so, Kazakhstan) in the
region where HT is actively recruiting. The Karimov government has
taken the hardest line, having arrested and reportedly tortured
thousands of HT members, their friends and family--and others who are
simply devout believers. Jailed HT members reportedly find fertile
recruitment inside prisons. The Uzbekistani government's inability to
differentiate between radical and moderate Islamic groups probably
pushes more people to extremist groups.
The Kyrgyz government is less strident in its dealings with HT.
Jail terms for those convicted of ``anti-government behavior'' are
relatively lenient at two to four years. Most members appear to be
Uzbek and are concentrated in the Osh area--the site of extreme Kyrgyz-
Uzbek clashes during the late Soviet era. The government's treatment is
likely intended to avoid a repeal of these clashes.
Tajikistan has seen recruitment primarily in the heavily Uzbek-
populated north. The Rahmonov government's uneasy alliance with its
Islamist opposition party (IRP) has translated into harsher treatment
for HT members, who are sentenced to an average of 8-12 years for
``anti-government activities.'' In fact, the IRP's decision to join the
Tajik government--and its subsequent marginalization--has reportedly
led to an increase in HT recruitment among Tajiks, although the IRP
denies this.
HT's presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has led to regional
tensions as well. The Karimov government has pressured both its
neighbors to crack down on militant Islamic organizations it believes
seek shelter in it weaker neighbors.
nato involvement in central asia
Question. Lord Robertson went on to say ``Ask yourself whether the
countries of central Asia would have been so ready, willing and able to
offer the critical assistance that helped us bring down the Taliban
without 10 years of cooperation with the United States and its allies
in NATO's Partnership for Peace. These relations were critical. Now
they are about to get an upgrade.'' Could you describe the growing
relationship between NATO and central Asia?
Answer. We are seeking to develop immediate and practical programs
within the Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
to further strengthen the relationship between NATO and central Asian
partners.
We are encouraging more active central Asian participation
at NATO and will continue to support greater central Asian
involvement in the full spectrum of NATO Partner activities.
We will seek enhanced individually tailored Individual
Partnership Programs to assist central Asian states in priority
areas such as combating terrorism, drug trafficking and border
controls.
PfP enhanced efforts in central Asia will be aimed at
expanding central Asian familiarity with NATO's military
practices in the same way it has promoted understanding and
reform in central Europe.
We favor the creation within the framework of the EAPC of an
ad-hoc central Asian working group as a means of promoting
stability and combating terrorism.
Our ultimate goal is to do for central Asia and the Caucasus
in this decade what we did for Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
central asian cooperation on wmd proliferation
Question. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson was in Washington
last week. In discussing what NATO hopes to achieve at the Prague
Summit in November he stated that NATO will ``take a decisive step
forward in our relations with countries across Europe and into central
Asia. The logic is clear. Meeting challenges such as terrorism and
proliferation requires the broadest and deepest possible cooperation.
What are the Governments of central Asia doing to help NATO and the
United States with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)?
Answer. The central Asian countries have been strong partners in
the disposal and counterproliferation of WMD, and have engaged closely
with the United States in a number of programs in this area. Some of
the more prominent programs and/or areas of cooperation with the
central Asian countries which were host to former-Soviet weapons
programs (Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan) are:
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A): The MPC&A
program, managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, is
helping to secure weapons-useable are underway with key central Asian
countries like Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan is the newest member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. There they have made a commitment to apply export
controls on nuclear and nuclear related equipment, materials, software,
and technologies. Kazakhstan is also a State Party to the NPT.
BN-350 Spent Fuel Disposition Program: The United States and
Kazakhstan continue to work towards agreement on a U.S.-proposed
approach for the safe and secure transport and long-term storage of BN-
350 spent nuclear fuel (weapons-grade plutonium) from Kazakhstan to
Bailkal-1. Current joint efforts include a technical feasibility study
of the U.S. dual-use cask approach and visits to the proposed Russian
cask designer.
There are additional efforts between the United States and
Kazakhstan to decommission and decontaminate the BN-350 reactor and
also ensure its safety in the meantime.
Russia Fuel Return Program: The United States Government continues
to work with Russia and the IAEA on a plan to repatriate to Russia
civil HEU fuel from Soviet or Russian-supplied research reactors in
approximately 16 countries, some of which are in central Asia.
Uzbekistan: Under the Russia Fuel Return Program, the United States
and Russia agreed that shipment of nuclear fuel from Uzbekistan back to
Russia is a priority. Technical experts from Russia, the United States,
and Uzbekistan continue discussions toward this goal.
The United States and Uzbekistan have necessary agreements in place
to allow for shipment of the nuclear material from the Tashkent
reactors. (Specifically, the United States Government signed a
Nonproliferation Agreement with Uzbekistan in March 2002 which included
the necessary protections and provisions for such a shipment).
Nuclear Safety: U.S. and Uzbek experts also are currently upgrading
the reactor facility to permit the safe and secure loading of spent
fuel.
Central Asia and the United States also cooperate in the areas of
redirecting former-weapons scientists and establishing/implementing
effective export controls and border security.
kyrgyzstan
Question. In Mr. Craner's testimony his characterization of the
current situation in Kyrgyzstan appears to differ from that in your
testimony. In Assistant Secretary Craner's testimony he states that
``Kyrgyzstan is once again headed in the direction of greater
democratization and respect for human rights.'' That the `The Kyrgyz
authorities have taken steps to restore public confidence.'' While
Ambassador Pascoe states that the situation in Kyrgyzstan has ``reached
a crisis point this year.'' What is your view of recent events in
Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. I think Assistant Secretary Craner was correct when he used
the words ``cautiously hopeful'' in his testimony to describe the
current situation in Kyrgyzstan regarding progress towards democracy
and human rights. He did so because Kyrgyzstan, despite some recent
political unrest and the government's backsliding on commitments to
fundamental freedoms like freedom of press and freedom of assembly,
continues to have the most potential, largely because it has the most
vibrant civil society in central Asia. During the first six months of
this year, Kyrgyzstan suffered its most significant political crisis
since independence ten years ago. Although calm currently prevails,
dissatisfaction with the Government's handling of events remains
widespread and many observers expect protests to resume in the fall. In
order to advance national reconciliation, President Akayev has begun a
constructive dialogue with the moderate opposition, the non-
governmental organization community, and the independent media.
However, the Administration continues to press the Government of
Kyrgyzstan to be more inclusive and transparent as well as to implement
the recommendations made by the State Commission investigating the
tragic events of March in which five unarmed protesters were killed. To
assist Kyrgyzstan to make further progress with its reforms, we are
expanding our engagement to alleviate growing poverty and stem
extremism through job creation, to enhance democracy by promoting
greater citizen involvement in civil society, an independent media with
the establishment of an independent printing press, and accountable
governance, to increase protections for basic human rights, and to
eliminate corruption. Assistant Secretary Craner and I both agree that
promotion of human rights and democracy remains a priority for U.S.
foreign policy and that continual advancement is necessary for the full
flowering of United States-Kyrgyz relations.
______
Response of Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner and Deputy Assistant
Secretary Lynn Pascoe to an Additional Question for the Record
Submitted by Senator Gordon Smith
caspian basin and u.s. energy security caucasus
Question. The Vice President's National Energy Strategy pointed to
the importance of the exploration, development and transportation to
market of Caspian energy. The importance of multiple pipelines was
again referenced in the summit between President Bush and Russian
President Putin last month in Moscow. How does central Asia and more
specifically those central Asian Republics that are contiguous to the
Caspian factor into our need for energy diversification? In light of
difficulties with OPEC and instability in the Middle East has the
Caspian basin become more important to U.S. energy security?
Answer. Caspian oil--from central Asia and the Caucasus--is key to
maintaining our strategy of diversification of energy sources to ensure
U.S. energy security. The Caspian basin holds roughly 4% of the world's
oil reserves, and is potentially a significant source of non-OPEC oil.
In central Asia, Kazakhstan has the potential to be one of the five top
exporters of oil in the world in fifteen years. This year's production
will likely exceed 900,000 barrels a day, increasing to as much as 5
million barrels per day in 2015, more than Kuwait or Iran. Turkmenistan
has one of the world's largest deposits of natural gas--estimated at
101 trillion cubic feet--and oil production of about 160,000 barrels a
day. While Caspian resources will not render Middle East difficulties
irrelevant, over the coming years the region's oil and gas producers
will become much larger players on the world market.
Our policy objective is to encourage production and export of
energy resources in the region in the most efficient manner possible.
We agree with the Congress that, multiple pipelines will be crucial to
ensuring energy security. Our Caspian energy policy for multiple
pipelines will help the countries in the region secure their economic
and political sovereignty and is showing some real successes. The CPC
pipeline opened and is shipping Kazakh oil from Tengiz to the Black
Sea. We expect the construction phase of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
oil pipeline to start next month, with a groundbreaking ceremony
scheduled to take place in Baku, Azerbaijan, on September 18. The
pipeline received final approval on August 1 by the participating
companies and two new companies have been set up to manage the
construction and financing. The Kazakhs are ready to start negotiations
on sending future oil shipments into that line. The BTC pipeline will
be a major step forward in shipping Caspian oil to global markets.
Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan are also working with the Asian
Development Bank and World Bank to examine a trans-Afghan gas pipeline,
but the economics will be difficult absent a market in India. We
continue to urge Russian support of our multiple pipelines policy.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Sam Brownback
Question. Watching the continuing violence and bloodshed between
Israelis and Palestinians makes me wonder how Jews are treated in the
Muslim states of central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, and how will the
violence in the Middle East influence the future of these historic
Jewish communities?
Answer. Although we hear very few reports of anti-Semitic actions
against Jews in central Asia by the general population, we monitor this
issue closely and report on it in the Department's annual reports to
Congress on religious freedom and human rights. Posts and visiting
representatives from the Department regularly meet with members of the
Jewish communities in each country. When we hear reports of acts of
vandalism against cemeteries or of the distribution of anti-Semitic
leaflets, we raise these concerns with appropriate government
officials. There are reports of anti-Semitic pamphlets printed abroad
being circulated by members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. In general, the
governments of central Asia treat the Jewish communities with respect
and appear responsive to any concerns we raise on their behalf.
In Kazakhstan, the government donated land in 2002 for the
construction of a synagogue in the new capital, Astana. Government
officials attended a groundbreaking ceremony in May of 2002. A
synagogue opened in September of 2001 in the city of Pavlodar, also on
land the government had donated. Thus, even in a country where the
Jewish population is well below one percent of the population, the
Jewish community in Kazakhstan continues to remain vital.
In Uzbekistan, there are more Jews than in any other central Asian
country. Roughly 30,000 Ashkenazy and Bukharan remain concentrated in
the bigger cities of Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand. Almost 70,000
emigrated to Israel or the U.S. since independence, largely because of
bleak economic conditions. Those that remain are often the elderly who
complain of not having enough younger members of the community to
maintain Jewish cemeteries. There is no pattern of discrimination
against Jews. Synagogues function openly; Hebrew education, Jewish
cultural events, and the publication of a community newspaper take
place undisturbed. Although the Hizb ut-Tahrir has circulated
throughout the country anti-Semitic pamphlets, the government has
confiscated them, arresting the Islamic extremists associated with the
distribution when it can. Except for these extremist groups, there are
amicable relations among the various religious communities. In October
of 2000, there was a synagogue fire in Tashkent that authorities
believe was arson. Authorities were quick to investigate, and the
Jewish community indicated that it did not believe the attack was anti-
Semitic in nature. The Government of Uzbekistan maintains good
relations with Israel.
In Turkmenistan, the Jewish community is said to be under 1,000
individuals, some descendants from families that came to the country
from Ukraine during World War II, and some Bokharski Jews living near
the border with Uzbekistan. There were no complaints received from
these communities during the past year. There is no rabbi and synagogue
in the country. The numbers continue to decrease as a result of
emigration to Israel, Germany, and the U.S.
In Tajikistan, Jews are less than 1 percent of the population, and
there is only one registered Jewish religious organization. There were
no complaints reported to our mission last year.
In the Kyrgyz Republic there is one Jewish synagogue registered and
a small Jewish congregation meets in Bishkek. In March 2002, members of
the Jewish Cultural Society reported that they had heard calls for
violence against Jews in Russian and Kyrgyz from a loudspeaker at a
mosque in central Bishkek. According to the Israeli Embassy in Almaty,
the Kyrgyz Government is investigating and will file a report.
We do not expect the violence in the Middle East to impact very
much on the Jewish communities in central Asia. There is little
societal support for ethnic/religious violence, except where Muslims
have converted to another religion, such as Christianity. The
governments have not encouraged the distribution of anti-Semitic
literature, and generally have paid close attention to those extremist
elements that could represent harm to the Jewish community.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner and Ambassador B. Lynn
Pascoe to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Sam
Brownback
Question. Kazakhstan seems to be the leader in central Asia in
terms of reforming its economy. As you know, the Commerce Department
recently designated Kazakhstan as a market economy. Is the United
States planning to ensure that economic reform spreads through the
other nations of central Asia, which seem to be lagging behind?
Answer. The United States Government supports a wide range of
programs that directly promote market reform in all five of the central
Asian states. A series of complimentary programs in economic,
democratic and humanitarian assistance indirectly reinforce market
reforms. A comprehensive listing can be found in the ``Annual Report on
U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia''
prepared by the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe
and Eurasia. Illustrative examples of such activities follow.
In Kazakhstan, our economic reform assistance helped the Government
improve its business and investment legal and regulatory environment
(key for accession to the WTO), strengthen the country's banking
sector, and improve insurance, customs, mortgage, and private pension
systems. USG training and technical assistance helped the Government of
Kazakhstan to create a National Fund designed to shelter Kazakhstan's
economy from the destabilizing effects of sharp fluctuations in
international oil prices. Also with the help of U.S. assistance,
Kazakhstan's banks adopted international standards such a system of
deposit insurance.
In 1998, Kyrgyzstan became the first country in the former Soviet
Union to join the WTO, with considerable help from the United States.
Kyrgyzstan is continuing to strengthen its market reforms and, with
U.S. assistance, is establishing the most advanced institutional
infrastructure for private land ownership in central Asia. U.S. aid is
also helping the State Customs Inspectorate modernize and simplify
customs procedures. This modernization will result in cost-savings, as
computerization and selective inspection procedures based on specific
risk parameters will expedite the customs clearance process and
stimulate regional cross-border trade.
The Government of Tajikistan is enthusiastic about on-going USG
assisted banking and fiscal reform efforts. We plan to engage further
with the Ministries of Economy, Finance and State Revenues, and the
National Bank should our supplementary budgetary request be approved.
We closely coordinate our assistance with other donors in
Uzbekistan. The USG is preparing to provide macroeconomic technical
assistance to the Government of Uzbekistan, provided the Uzbeks
implement necessary economic reforms.
We stand ready to provide economic reform assistance to the
Government of Turkmenistan as soon as it demonstrates its commitment to
reform. Until then, USG assistance will focus on security, health care
reform, and the next generation of leaders through educational
exchanges and civil society development.