[Senate Hearing 107-1110]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1110
S. 1447, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 21, 2002..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Allen....................................... 28
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Letter, dated May 17, 2002 from John L. Martin, Airport
Director, San Francisco Airport............................ 21
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 26
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 37
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 13
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 5
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 30
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 3
Witnesses
Mineta, Hon. Norman Y., Secretary, Department of Transportation,
accompanied by Hon. John W. Magaw, Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security.................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Appendix
Rockefeller IV, Hon. John D., U.S. Senator from West Virginia,
prepared statement............................................. 43
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Max Cleland to:
Norman Y. Mineta............................................ 49
John W. Magaw............................................... 52
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John F. Kerry to
Norman Y. Mineta and John W. Magaw............................. 55
Response to written questions submitted to Norman Y. Mineta by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 44
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 62
Hon. John McCain............................................. 58
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 54
S. 1447, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
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TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ernest F.
Hollings, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. I am
reminded of President Reagan. When he would go in the Cabinet
Room he said, as the Good Lord said at the Last Supper, if you
want any picture, everybody on this side.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We are delighted to have the hearing with
respect to the implementation of airport security. Secretary
Norman Mineta and the Under Secretary in charge of security,
Mr. John Magaw. I am going to file my statement for the record.
I would yield to Senator Burns.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Good morning Secretary Mineta and Under Secretary Magaw. It has
been six months since the passage of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, which symbolized a complete change in the way we approach
and conduct security for our nation's air transportation system. We
have asked not only you, but travelers all throughout the country to
accept a new reality--one where everything is searched, and people are
randomly checked.
In the name of security, we have asked people to give up some of
their personnel freedoms to protect our country. The American public
has shown great faith in our efforts--passengers are accepting the new
process and returning to airports, which has allowed air carriers to
resume flights at near normal levels--but we must be more vigilant than
ever to ensure that ``normalcy'' does not translate into
``complacency'' as we move forward with implementing the requirements
of the Security Act.
We set a series of tough deadlines in the Security Act--we knew
they were hard to meet when we set them, but we did not want to let
anything stop the moment to make changes. While you have generally met
the requirements of the Security Act to this point--which I commend you
on--two significant deadlines are looming by the end of the year. In
particular, TSA is required to have Explosive Detection Systems or EDSs
in use at all commercial airports and screening every bag that goes on
a passenger airplane by December 31st, or use alternative means until
EDSs are installed. The Security Act also mandated that the Federal
government assume control of all airport security personnel by November
19th. I have concerns about your approach and timing to ensure these
milestones are reached.
I have heard your views on EDS, Secretary Mineta, and I believe we
must proceed with great caution not to set up a security system that
appears strong, but offers a backdoor which leaves us extremely
vulnerable to attack. In announcing that you would purchase 1100 EDSs
to be used in conjunction with Trace Detection for large airports and
trace only, for now, at small airports, you must make sure that you
follow up and upgrade all of the airport security systems as soon as
the next generation of EDSs are available. I also urge you to use
additional procedures for small airports so that large and small
airports receive equal levels of security.
However, when the Senate passed the Security Act by a vote of 100-
0, it was mindful of not setting up a dual-tiered approach that would
provide such a backdoor. We want one level of security, a system where
large airports get better security than small airports is not
acceptable to us. The picture of the hijackers going through Portland,
Maine, remains clear to everyone. Nothing could be worse than a false
sense of security that lulls us into lowering our guard.
With the success that the terrorists had on September 11th, they
will undoubtedly try to find our weakness again. News reports are
already indicating the likelihood of another attack, and this time we
must be ready. The Israeli onion ring of security, a layered approach,
constantly shifting to keep the terrorist of guard, is what I know you
want to establish. I need you to convince me that your plans for EDS--
short--and long-term--are viable. Time is of the essence.
Other matters also remain to be addressed. It seemed to me that you
were off to a strong start in deploying a Federal screener workforce to
every commercial airport in the country, but with the number of
employees that you will require more than doubling by most accounts, I
would like to hear about the status of these efforts as they now stand.
I am also increasingly concerned about the security of the cockpits on
passenger airplanes, so much that I recently introduced a bill, S.
2497, which will require that cockpit doors remain closed while in
flight unless the plane is fitted with mantrap doors which provide
secure entrance and exit for the flight deck.
These concerns are just the tip of the iceberg. I realize the
enormity of your task. You can not fail. You must continue to work with
us about your thoughts, your concerns, and your needs. The challenge
remains to develop a system of security which considers all potential
targets, recognizes every potential threat, and justifiably restores
the confidence of the American people. We continue to expect this
challenge to be met.
Finally, I have been reading with keen interest about the lack of
coordination between the intelligence agencies. In the Security Act, we
specifically included all of these groups so that you had the best
information available. If you have any problems, please, I urge you to
let us know.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a statement to
be filed.
The Chairman. Do you want me to make one for you?
Senator Burns. That sounds like being the auctioneer, and
you sell some of the sales, and the buyers and the bidders are
a little bit draggy. I offered to handle their bid for them. I
would go much faster, and the prices would improve with it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I think
its timing is good. We have all experienced new airport
regulations and the implementation of those regulations. I can
say that some of them are working. It cost me seven pairs of
socks, Mr. Secretary. You cannot get through there with boots
on. They always take your boots off. Now, you can have no holes
in your socks, and for us who wear boots, the socks must match.
Up until this point we have never had that problem. You just
pick out two socks, put them on and come to work. I think the
story has been reported they would not take my Senate ID card,
but they did take my Sam's Club. I thought that was a step in
the right direction.
But other than that, things are going pretty well. I want
to hear from the witnesses today, Mr. Chairman, and get their
assessment of how things are being implemented. I think it is
going to become very costly, and we must be aware of that, but
also what price do we pay for security of our flying public,
and I thank both of you for coming today.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wyden.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing. The freeze-frame picture of Mohammed Atta
breezing by the security checkpoint is now seared into the
minds of the American people, and in recent days there have
been new questions about the process for sharing information
between intelligence and the aviation community that in my mind
raises questions about whether the system is to a great extent
dysfunctional.
The public, and it comes up at all of the meetings that I
hold at home, wants answers, and particularly they want
accountability. Those are going to be the questions that I zero
in on this morning, and I very much thank you for holding this
hearing, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full statement
be entered into the record.
The Chairman. It will be included.
Senator Boxer. First of all, welcome. I know you are
working very hard, and we all must, because of the world we
live in. As I think everyone knows, all four hijacked planes on
9/11 were headed for California. Thirty-nine Californians were
simply trying to make their way home and they lost their lives.
We know we were caught off-guard. We know we cannot be
caught off-guard again, and that is why I am so glad the
chairman is holding this hearing, because every one of us has
to keep each other's feet to the fire. You need to keep ours,
Mr. Mineta, we need to keep yours.
I hope that we will discuss two major issues today. One is
the notifications of airlines and airports of terrorist threats
prior to the attacks on 9/11. Some people said, do not talk
about that. Well, I am sorry, I am going to talk about that. I
am going to ask questions about it. I have written to all of my
airports asking them, did you get warnings that there could be
hijackings in America by Osama bin Laden's people? That is my
understanding of what the administration knew. So far, they did
not get anything specific. American Airlines has put out a
statement they never got anything that specific, either. United
has told us verbally they never did.
So I want to know what guides us when it comes to telling
the airlines and the airports. It seems to me if they knew
hijackings in America by Osama bin Laden, and that is my
understanding that they did have that information, maybe things
could have been different, and as Condi Rice has said to us in
our caucus, well, we did not know they were going to use the
planes as weapons, and she said, we could not shut down the
whole system.
Well, that is a straw man, Mr. Chairman. There is a lot
between shutting down the whole system and telling airlines
that now there are alot of potential hijackings coming our way,
so that is one area.
The other is the air marshals. Mr. Mineta, I wrote the
language with my chairman and Senator McCain dealing with air
marshals, that they are supposed to be on all high-risk
flights, and priority given to nonstop long distance flights.
Now, I have been briefed by Mr. Magaw on this a while back.
I cannot go into where we are with air marshals, because that
is nothing you want to discuss. I just want to know if you are
satisfied with where we are, because I ain't, and I want to
know when you feel you will meet the spirit and the letter of
the law that we passed.
I have been troubled about buying enough machines to check
for bombs. I think you have moved on that, but I still want to
talk more about that, because bag match does not do it for us.
Lastly, CBS News investigation that showed people getting
through security with fake ID's. I introduced legislation to
provide for training of airline personnel to detect these false
ID's, and I think it is very important that we move on that, so
those are my concerns. I have deep concerns. I think we are
safer now than we have been in a long time, but I do not think
we are safe enough, and I am glad we are holding this hearing.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
Good morning. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding this hearing.
On September 11, all four hijacked planes were headed for
California. Consequently, 39 Californians who were simply trying to
make their way home lost their lives in these attacks along with
thousands at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Terrorists transformed our aviation system into a weapon. The
United States was caught off-guard. And we should never be caught off-
guard again.
I want to address two major issues today. First, the notification
of airlines and airports of terrorist threats prior to the terrorist
attacks on September 11. I am greatly troubled that the Administration
had warnings of potential hijackings and did not notif5i American or
United Airlines or the airports of these specific threats.
The Administration has claimed that the airlines were notified.
American Airlines has publically said that they ``received no specific
information from the U.S. government advising the carrier of a
potential terrorist hijacking in the United States in the months prior
to Sept. 11, 2001.''
Today, I want to learn whether the procedures for notifying
airlines and airports of potential threats have improved since
September 11. My information is that the President knew that hijackings
were being planned by Osama bin Laden to take place in America. Steps
could have been taken to strengthen airport security.
Second, I want to discuss the implementation of the security
legislation passed last fall. As we get further and further from
September 11, we should not forget the importance of ensuring that our
aviation system is secure.
Following the attacks, it was clear that Congress needed to act
swiftly to make our nation's aviation security system the best it could
be. And that is what Congress did when it passed the Aviation Security
Act--which President Bush signed with flourish.
Air travel today is more secure than it was last September. But it
can be made more secure.
I am concerned that we still don't have enough air marshals on
planes. I know the number of air marshals is classified for security
reasons. But, as the Senator who wrote the provision to ensure that air
marshals are on board all high-risk flights, with priority given to
nonstop, long-distance flights, I will continue to actively monitor the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) progress on this issue--which
doesn't currently meet my idea of what is necessary.
I am also concerned that the baggage detection machines will not be
in place by the end of this year. We need to ensure that these baggage
detection machines are in place by the deadline if not sooner.
Finally, I was troubled by a CBS news investigation that showed
people getting through security with fake IDs. Therefore, I introduced
legislation to provide for training of airline personnel and the
deployment of technology to address this problem. I trust this training
will begin even before my legislation passes.
The United States has proven that we can successfully fight a war
half a world away against tremendous odds, including rough terrain,
bitter weather, and a fanatic enemy. We have been successful. And, we
continue to be successful beyond all measure because of one thing: we
have the will to win. We need that will to win in ensuring that our
nation's aviation system is secure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer, you are right on target. I
really resist this idea about second-guessing, as it becomes
second nature. That is one of the primary functions of a
Congress, is to second-guess, and oversight, and to find out
how to second-guess, and that is what we are trying to do.
I can tell you here and now that was a tremendous,
unfortunate, of course, intelligence failure. I could go into
it very thoroughly, but let me recognize Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, as you know, Florida was the
unfortunate site of aircraft flight training for terrorists. As
a result, when you brought your bill through the Committee and
took it to the floor, I was able, fortunately, to amend a part
of that bill last fall that would require background checks on
foreign students at flight schools, and it has been some 6
months since that bill became law, and it needs to be
implemented.
As of today, the information that I have is that through
the executive branch of Government that law has not been
implemented. I think it is important that we bring that up
today so that the Secretary, as he oversees this Goliath, and
what a huge job you have, Mr. Secretary, it is all the more
important, because now it has just come to light, the FBI
Phoenix memo that specifically noted that Middle Eastern men
were doing flight training at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University at Prescott, Arizona. All the more underscoring the
importance, as we approach terrorism in the future, of having
these background checks done pursuant to the law that we
passed, and that I had some little part of simply because of
Florida being so vividly in my mind, what happened down there.
So I call that to the attention of the Committee. I call
that to the attention of the Secretary and all the other
thousands of things that he has to do, but I think this might
be worthwhile, Mr. Secretary, for you to double-check that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we in the Congress have been
dragging our feet. We have not really gotten serious about the
war on terrorism. I say that advisedly. While we did pass
airline security immediately, the seaport security has
languished in the House of Representatives since before
Christmas, the rail security has languished on the calendar
since before Christmas. We have not gotten serious about it at
all.
We had a terrorism insurance bipartisan bill that was ready
to go in this particular committee. Nothing has been done
there, and yet they are over here talking about cloning and
estate taxes. That is a real emergency? We need to hurry up and
get the estate tax law made permanent from 10 years from now? I
mean, that is the kind of nonsense we are going through
politically, and some of that spills back into the Departments
of Government.
So we welcome you here this morning, and I know we have
both got a job to do. We would recognize now Secretary Mineta.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY
HON. JOHN W. MAGAW, UNDER SECRETARY OF
TRANSPORTATION FOR SECURITY
Secretary Mineta. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
just parenthetically say that we strongly support your bill on
port security.
The Chairman. And we appreciate that.
Secretary Mineta. We were able to get the administration's
statement of the administration policy on that.
The Chairman. The White House will stand up to bin Laden,
but they will not stand up to DeLay and Armey.
Secretary Mineta. On the rail security bill we tried to get
Minority Leader Daschle to move on that bill, and hopefully we
will still get action on that.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am very
pleased to appear before you to give this update 6 months after
President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act into law. Accompanying me today is John W. Magaw, our Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security, and the head of the
Transportation Security Administration.
As you know, John has the day-to-day responsibility to
build the Transportation Security Administration, or TSA up to
full strength, and he is doing so under extremely tight
statutory mandates.
Mr. Chairman, with respect to aviation security, much has
changed in the last 6 months. My written testimony provides
details about many of these changes, and I would like to
highlight a few of them for you.
On 17 February of this year the Transportation Security
Agency, or Administration, took over all civil aviation
security functions that had previously been performed by
private enterprises and overseen by the Federal Aviation
Administration. As we complete the transition to Federal
security screeners for all 429 commercial airports, the TSA has
entered into contracts with many private companies to provide
interim screening services, and we have begun the Herculean
task of recruiting over 50,000 Federal passenger and baggage
screeners for the 429 airports around the country.
We have already hired some 900 skilled individuals slated
to fill transportation security screener supervisory positions.
We have awarded a contract to train these new screeners in
accordance with strict standards established by the law and by
our procedures. The screeners will receive some 40 hours of
classroom, five times what they did previously, and 60 hours of
on-the-job training in the use of sophisticated x-ray
equipment, conflict resolution, sensitivity training, civil
rights and customer service.
We are well on our way to hiring the Federal Security
Directors for the major airports around the country, and these
highly qualified FSD's provide the day-to-day operational
leadership for security responsibilities at their assigned
airports. They will answer directly to Under Secretary Magaw,
and during a time of crisis they may be able to exercise the
authority of my office, effectively closing and sealing
airports pending resolution of the airport crisis.
Congress established an ambitious schedule for the
screening of all checked baggage with explosive detection
systems by December 31, 2002, and we fully intend to meet that
goal. We have awarded contracts for the acquisition of both
bulk EDS, the mini-sized machines, and the smaller explosive
detection, trace detection machines, and both types of machines
will enhance our capability to screen all checked baggage.
We also face a significant challenge, not fully
contemplated during the legislative debate on this issue,
namely, hiring the necessary employees to operate explosive
detection equipment at airports. We estimate that we will need
approximately 21,500 employees to operate this equipment in a
manner that allows the aviation system to function without
massive delays.
We will complete the phaseout of National Guard deployments
by May 31, when all of the remaining 4,600 NET Guard personnel
will be released, and I join with the rest of the Nation in
thanking them for their faithful service. State and local law
enforcement offices will replace the guard pursuant to
agreements entered into with the Transportation Security
Administration, and as we place TSA law enforcement officers at
airports, we will phase out these agreements as well. We
continue working aggressively to put in place a robust Federal
Air Marshall program, and will remain exactly on track with the
targets that we earlier provided to Congress in closed
testimony.
Of course, executing changes of this magnitude requires the
allocation of adequate resources. We have made great progress
in implementing the statutory responsibilities that have been
assigned to us for collecting security fees from certain
airline passengers and domestic and foreign carriers.
Unfortunately, some Members of Congress have signalled a
hesitancy to allocate the resources necessary to properly
secure America's aviation system. They say we cannot afford the
security commitment that was made some 6 months ago. The truth
is, we cannot afford less than the $4.4 billion that the
President proposed. TSA will fulfill all of its statutory
requirements, but without the full level of funding requested
by the President, passengers at the Nation's airports will face
long lines and flight delays.
And finally, let me say a few words about intelligence-
gathering and sharing. Although I cannot disclose the details
of our efforts in a public forum, I can assure you that the TSA
remains focused on generating the best possible data on
domestic and international terrorist threats in the aviation
world and continues our longstanding commitment to share all
credible information with appropriate parties.
While the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gage the
TSA broad authority for security responsibilities over modes of
transportation other than aviation, it did not delineate
specific authorities.
Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, I appreciate the work of
this Committee in moving S. 1214, the Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2001, through this Committee and through the
Senate. The administration strongly supports this bill, and so
I look forward to the House passing its version so that the
Senate and the House may proceed to conference.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I ask unanimous
consent that my full statement be made a part of the record,
and Mr. Magaw and I will be pleased to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mineta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of
Transportation, accompanied by Hon. John W. Magaw, Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security
Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and Members of the
Committee. I am pleased to appear before you to give you an update on
where we are, six months after the President signed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law. Accompanying me here today
is the Honorable John W. Magaw, my Under Secretary of Transportation
for Security and the head of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). John has the day-to-day responsibility to build TSA up to full
strength, perhaps the largest undertaking to create a new Federal
agency since the Second World War, and he must do this under extremely
tight mandates that you established last year in ATSA.
On February 5th of this year my deputy, Dr. Michael Jackson,
appeared before you and gave you a detailed briefing midway between the
60th and 90th day following ATSA's enactment on November 19, 2001. Much
has occurred since then.
When we last testified before this Committee, John Magaw had only
recently been confirmed by this Committee and the full Senate. We had
few staff on board TSA. We had not yet taken over the screening
functions at airports throughout the United States. We had no federal
screeners at all. We had not yet hired any Federal Security Directors
(FSD) for our airports. We were in the process of evaluating bids for
important contracts, including hiring and training of airport
screeners, and the purchase of equipment to allow us to meet our
mandate for screening checked baggage. We had not yet collected any of
the security fees that Congress authorized in ATSA, from either
passengers or air carriers. National Guard troops were on the scene at
airports throughout our Nation. On the local scene, Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport was still under restricted flight
schedules, causing what we all realized was economic dislocation to the
area.
I am pleased to report that aviation transportation security is
much better today than it was prior to September 11. It will be better
next week, and will be better still once the Department's new,
nationwide system stressing consistent and common sense security is
fully in place.
On February 17th of this year, TSA took over all civil aviation
security functions that had previously been performed or overseen by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Until Federal security
screeners can be hired at all commercial airports, TSA entered into
contracts with many companies that provide screening services . At some
locations, TSA also entered into other transactional agreements with
some air carriers to reimburse them for screening services. In doing
so, we increased the pay scale for many of these employees to induce
them to remain at their posts until Federal screeners are in place. We
had great concern that many of the contract screeners would leave,
particularly since many of them do not qualify for Federal screener
positions because of their citizenship status. This would have greatly
disrupted the commercial air transportation system.
We have published a rule requiring certain aircraft operators using
aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more to implement a strengthened
security program that includes criminal history records checks on their
flight crews and restricted access to the flight deck. These security
regulations apply to both all-cargo and small scheduled and charter
passenger aircraft not already covered by a security program. These new
requirements will take effect on June 24, 2002.
We have begun the Herculean task of hiring over 30,000 federal
airport passenger screeners for the 429 airports around the country. We
have advertised these positions throughout the country and by the
Internet. We awarded a contract to NCS Pearson to assist us in
reviewing the applicants' qualifications and in testing the applicants
for the screening positions. Through them we have hired 900 skilled
individuals who are slated to fill Transportation Security Screener
Supervisory positions. We awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to
train the screeners in accordance with the new, strict standards
established by ATSA and our procedures. The screeners will receive 40
hours of classroom and 60 hours of on-the-job training. We are using a
``train-the-trainer'' concept where a core group of contract employees
are first trained. They in turn train other contract employees who
serve as the cadre of trainers to train the prospective TSA airport
screeners. The training will be rigorous. It is preparing the TSA
screeners in use of sophisticated X-Ray equipment, conflict resolution,
sensitivity training, civil rights, and customer service. The students
are taught in a classroom setting, in a lab using real world scenarios,
and with computer-based training. The students must pass a two-part
examination that includes both a written exam and the use of the X-Ray
equipment.
On April 30th we reached a watershed at Baltimore / Washington
International Airport (BWI). At 4:00 a.m., TSA screeners from our
Mobile Screening Force (MSF) took over responsibility for passenger
screening at Piers A & B. These were the first fully TSA manned
checkpoints in the Nation. BWI is serving as our laboratory as we begin
to fully federalize the workforce. It is also where we are testing new
procedures that will make the screening process not only more effective
from a security standpoint, but more passenger friendly and efficient.
On May 14, TSA assumed authority over all checkpoints at BWI. The MSF
will later move around the country as we continue what we call our
``Roll Out'' strategy to bring all of the airports on line by the
statutory deadline of November 18, 2002. My goal is to set in place a
screening system that will effectively screen passengers and move them
through the system in 10 minutes or less. BWI Airport is serving as the
locale to test this goal. I am encouraged that a recent passenger
survey at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport showed that 93
percent of the participants had a security check-in process of 10
minutes or less.
As part of our goal to educate the flying public and minimize
delays in the screening process, we recently published a revised set of
``Prohibited Items'' that passengers may not take through a security
checkpoint. We have clarified those certain items that previously might
have been prohibited, like nail clippers, nail files and tweezers, are
now permitted. We are urging passengers to familiarize themselves with
this list and to leave these items at home. We want to remind the
traveling public of our motto: ``No weapons, no waiting''. To emphasize
the importance of educating the public not to bring prohibited items
through airport security checkpoints, from February 17 through April of
this year, over 977,000 prohibited items were intercepted, resulting in
302 arrests. We will work hard to educate the public on this.
I am very pleased that we are rapidly hiring our Federal Security
Directors for the major airports around the country. Those that have
been selected so far are without doubt men and women of distinction. We
are fortunate to have them. They come with extensive backgrounds in law
enforcement, security and management. We have people like George
Nacarra, a retired Coast Guard rear admiral at Boston's Logan
International Airport, Gail Linkins of the U.S. Secret Service at
Mobile Regional Airport, Leopoldo Vasquez, Jr. retired U.S. Army at the
San Antonio Airport, and Willie Williams, former Chief of Police of the
Philadelphia and Los Angeles police departments, at Hartsfield Atlanta
International Airport, to name just a few. We have awarded a contract
to Korn/Ferry International to assist us in the executive search for
more of these fine managers. The FSD will provide the day-to-day
operational leadership for Federal security responsibilities at the
assigned airports. During a time of crisis, the FSD may be required to
exercise the authority of my office, and effectively close and seal an
airport, pending resolution of the event or crisis. I am confident that
we have the right men and women for this critical job. While we are
selecting the permanent FSD's for the larger airports, we have
appointed Interim Federal Security Representatives for all U.S.
airports having scheduled passenger service.
Congress established an ambitious schedule for us to provide for
screening of all checked baggage with Explosives Detection Systems
(EDS) by December 31, 2002. We are working hard to meet that
requirement. We have awarded contracts for the acquisition of both bulk
EDS, the so-called minivan sized equipment, and the smaller Explosives
Detective Trace (EDT) machines. Both machines will enhance our ability
to screen all checked baggage and meet the December deadline. We plan
to purchase approximately 1100 bulk EDS machines this year. We have
already ordered 500 machines and we have assurances from the suppliers
that they can meet our needs.
We have also purchased and deployed more than 1100 EDT machines and
we expect to acquire a total of between 4,600--4,800 for all airports.
I realize that the physical installation of the bulk EDS machines is an
issue at many airports. We have allocated $350,000 per airport to help
airports offset these costs. We understand that some airports have
concerns that this is insufficient. If Congress provides additional
direction and funding to increase the amount available for
reimbursement we will follow this direction.
We are also facing a great challenge in hiring the necessary
employees to operate the explosives detection equipment at the
airports. This requirement was not fully considered when ATSA was
drafted and the estimates of the number of proposed TSA employees were
made. We estimate that approximately 21,500 employees will be required
to properly man this equipment so that the aviation system functions
on-time. Ultimately, we hope to be able to rotate baggage screeners and
passenger screeners so that neither group of employees suffers from
boredom and fatigue, a common problem with repetitive tasks.
We have also instituted or planned pilot projects to test different
ways to screen all checked baggage at the Nation's 429 commercial
airports. The pilot project locations were chosen to provide a cross-
section of American airports and to test different configurations of
equipment and procedures. We have selected 5 airports in Michigan,
Virginia, Maryland, Texas and Florida.
As I testify before you today we are in the process of phasing out
National Guard deployments throughout the country. Many have already
left. We will complete the phase-out by May 31, when all of the
remaining 4600 National Guard personnel will be released. I, along with
the Nation, thank them for their faithful service. They have been or
will be replaced by state and local law enforcement officers pursuant
to agreements that TSA has entered into. These agreements will ensure
the traveling public that we have trained law enforcement officers
available to handle any crisis that might develop. We may phase-out
these agreements as more and more TSA law enforcement officers are
hired and placed at airports. We are aggressively moving forward on
this front too. We selected the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
in Glynco, Georgia as the home of the new TSA Law Enforcement Academy.
We are ramping up its training capability., We will be able to begin to
train 200 Law Enforcement Officers a month by July.
I would like to briefly mention the Federal Air Marshal program.
Although there is little that I can and should disclose in public, I
can assure you that we are working aggressively to put in place a
robust Air Marshal program. This will provide another layer of added
security during flight operations. We are exactly on track with the
targets that we provided to Congress in closed testimony.
We are also working hard in the difficult area of perimeter
security at airports. We have convened a Perimeter Security TSA
Advisory Council that includes TSA and airport personnel and we
commissioned a dedicated perimeter security group to assess security
gaps and develop recommendations. We are coordinating with other
federal agencies in this task.
I am pleased to report to you that on March 13, I ordered the
resumption of full commercial flight operations into Reagan National
Airport by April 15, 2002. This is occurring with heightened security
measures in place. Now we can move on to restoring General Aviation and
charter airlines operations as well. My Assistant Secretary for
Aviation and International Affairs testified two weeks ago before the
House Government Reform Committee on this subject and we announced that
by the end of this month we plan to publish proposed rules in the
Federal Register to allow this to occur, again with appropriate
security measures in place.
I am also pleased to report to you that we have made great progress
in implementing the statutory responsibilities assigned to us for
collecting security fees from certain airline passengers and domestic
and foreign carriers. We began collecting the September 11 passenger
security fees for February 2002 in March. For February we collected
$106 Million, and we collected $146 Million for March. We expect to
receive $125 Million for the April fee, which is due on May 31st. The
amount of this fee that we expect to collect each month is variable and
is directly related to the number of qualifying passenger tickets that
are sold each month. The first payment of the Aviation Security
Infrastructure fee imposed on air carriers is also due on May 31st .
The amount of this fee is based on data that the airline carriers are
in the process of providing to us. We expect that the first payment,
which will cover the period from mid-February through April 30th will
be significantly larger than the monthly fees that we will collect
thereafter.
While I am on the subject of money, I would note that I fully
support the President's Supplemental Appropriations request that will
provide much needed funds not only for TSA but also for the Coast Guard
and other modes of transportation. I hope that the Congress will
provide these much needed funds so that we can fulfill our statutory
obligations.
Up until this point, I have only addressed aviation security
issues. I would like to just briefly mention our continuing concern and
responsibility for cargo and passenger security in all modes of
transportation. We are fortunate to have succeeded in inducing Rear
Admiral Richard Bennis, recently retired from the U.S. Coast Guard, to
join TSA as the Associate Under Secretary for Maritime and Land
Security. Admiral Bennis is assembling a staff of similarly outstanding
professionals that will put together a comprehensive plan to ensure the
safety of cargo from its point of origin to its point of destination.
This will cover many different modes of transportation and will require
the close cooperation of not only other Federal agencies, public port
authorities and privately owned railroad, air cargo and trucking
companies, but other national governments. We are working closely with
the International Maritime Organization to begin the important effort.
While the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave TSA broad
authority for security responsibilities over modes of transportation
other than aviation, we realize that specific authorities were not
delineated in that Act. Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, I appreciate
the work of this Committee in moving S. 1214, the ``Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2001'' through this Committee and through the Senate.
The Administration strongly supports this bill. I look forward to the
House passing its version so that the Senate and House may proceed to
Conference.
This concludes my statement. Mr. Magaw and I will be glad to answer
any questions of the Committee.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Magaw, we can have a statement
from you, or you can assist as we move along in the hearing
here and with the answers.
Right to the point, on the $4.4 billion, this Committee
will work and make certain that you get sufficient money.
Congress can readily vote $190 billion for the farmers. I think
it can find $4 billion for security here, in the airline
business, otherwise on the one hand--we have got to have, Mr.
Magaw, better coordination with these airports. I have sort of
faulted the FAA because it has been run by the pilots and the
airlines.
On the other hand, what we have now is your security group
in all the airports wondering where the machines are going to
go and how they plan for it, and they are being told, well,
when we decide, we will come and tell you, and that kind of
thing. I think we can do a little bit better if we can
coordinate it and give them some idea of the size, the location
and everything else, get a team working on that so that when it
comes about they will have a better idea on security.
But Mr. Secretary, on the other hand, with the FAA and the
pilots and everything else like that, I have noticed with
frustration this intramural about, first the pilots wanted
guns, no, we will give them stun guns, then the flight
attendants wanted metal bars 18 inches long, crowbars, and I
guess we are going to give the passengers machetes and all and
let them all just fight it out in the cabin.
If I was a terrorist I would say, whoopee, we do not have
to worry about all the security and your EDS system and
whatever else. They have got all the weapons on board for me.
All I have to do is grab a bunch of them and take the plane
over. It is intramural. It has been going on and on.
I sat at that table, Mr. Secretary, right where you sat.
Senator Burns I know was with me, and we listened to the chief
pilot of El Al, and he was worth listening to, because they
have not had a hijacking in 30 years on El Al, so he was
talking about the onion ring of security and how it all worked,
and then he said, and Senators, by the way, when I get to that
cockpit door, once it is secured, it is never opened in flight.
They can be assaulting my wife in the cabin. I go straight to
the ground, and law enforcement meets me.
You and I know if a hijacking was attempted, whoopee, let
us go to Havana, Cuba, I always wanted to go, and that kind of
thing. Now the signals have entirely changed, and the
terrorists know they may blow up a plane through the luggage
and get past there, they might cause a fight and some injury
back in the cabin itself, but they never can--let us see what
happens. They never can take and come off of Reagan and go into
the White House, come off of Reagan and go into the Capitol,
come off La Guardia and go into the Empire State, or O'Hare and
go into the Sears Building, go into a nuclear power plant.
If you just put in that rule, you do not have to have the
planes flying all around, the National Guard supplementing
everything. You do not have to have the pilots worrying about
whether I can turn around in the seat quick enough before I get
knocked on the head. I mean, they are all strapped up. What am
I going to do with a pistol? They are to fly and not to fight.
You do not have to have this--I was on a plane yesterday
coming in from Charlotte, North Carolina, and the pilot came on
the loudspeaker system and says, now, folks, anybody who wants
to go to the bathroom, hurry up, because once we take off,
nobody is allowed to stand. If somebody stands in this flight
we immediately, under the law, go to another field and land,
and whoever stands is going to be taken off and arrested, to
jail, yes, siree. I think that is the Magaw Secret Service
rule, about \1/2\ hour after take-off and \1/2\ hour before
landing.
None of that is necessary. None of that is necessary if you
put in the tried and true method, so--everybody has got to go
to the bathroom, but the astronauts do not say let us go back
to Canaveral I have got to go to the bathroom. Come on, let us
get with it. This is serious business.
The Vice President finally recognized the day before
yesterday, he said, we are at war. Do not be asking about your
President when we are at war. Well, why don't they act like it?
It is so easy to put in the rule, and for the ones, the distaff
side that wants privacy, fine, they can be assigned--these
planes can be outfitted.
Yes, it is going to take some time. Right now, you might
have to give them a ball job, but what we have got to do is
have a rule, certainly on the short flights. You can put that
rule in right now and cut out all the argument about stun guns,
pistols, 30 minutes before, 30 minutes after, what about the
buildings, and everything else like that, for a tried and true
system, and you folks continue to debate it in my newspaper.
Why the debate, Mr. Secretary? Why don't we act?
You know, this is our problem. We have a good memory, and
the reason that the Republicans said that wait a minute, let us
give this to Justice Department and not to Transportation is
that Transportation crowd will debate with the pilots and the
airlines, and debate with the pilots and the airlines, and
nothing gets done. That is why it passed 100 to nothing to go
to the Justice Department.
What is your comment?
Secretary Mineta. First of all, I still feel that the
decision that the Transportation Security Administration be
within the Department of Transportation was the right one.
These kinds of debates are not done in a vacuum, and they have
got to be made given the realities of life, and to me, whether
it is a log cabin or an astronaut that has to go back to
Canaveral to go to the bathroom, pilots still have to go to the
bathroom as well.
The Chairman. They can hold it for a flight. I can tell you
that right now, we had two coming from Charlotte for an hour.
Yes, siree, if somebody stood up we have to go to another
airfield and land and anyone stood up is to be arrested.
Secretary Mineta. Senator, the original requirement on 1/2
hour going out of Reagan, or the 1/2 hour coming into Reagan
was a Secret Service requirement for flights in and out of
Ronald Reagan Airport.
The Chairman. That is right, and that is not any good. It
is not even necessary. Just keep the cockpit door closed. You
say the reality. The reality is, we have got a 30-year track
record of success. You can put up a sign in Arab--that is
typecasting, let us say, try to hijack, go to jail, put that in
every one of the airports in America so they will all know
hijacking is over with. You can get it over with, but you all
continue to debate stun guns or real pistols.
Secretary Mineta. Well, a debate on that issue, of course--
and I will let John speak to that, because we are about to make
an announcement, but----
The Chairman. 6 months later you all are about to make an
announcement. That is wonderful. Do not let it come out too
quick.
Secretary Mineta. Just like legislation takes time,
decisions coming out of the executive branch also require
thought as well, and so we are not quick to jump to
conclusions, and we are trying to balance the interests
involved. I do not think we can be faulted on that. Maybe
sometimes a little slow in making the decision, but in terms of
trying to balance the interest, I think that is in the interest
of public policy.
The Chairman. Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. Thank you, sir. I take it from the last
conversation that you are about to make a decision. Is that
right, Mr. Magaw, on the guns?
Mr. Magaw. Concerning firearms in the cockpit, yes, sir,
after a lot of consultation and months of work.
Senator Burns. Do you want to pull that microphone a little
closer.
Senator McCain. That will come out of Mr. Burns' time. Go
ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Magaw. Utilizing the experience of my 40 years in law
enforcement, and consulting with all of the interested parties
and having our staff with a lot of experience look at this
issue, and obviously consulting all along the way with
Secretary Mineta, I will not authorize firearms in the cockpit.
Senator McCain. You will not?
Mr. Magaw. No.
Senator McCain. I thank you. The administration's
supplemental funding request indicates there will be
approximately 41,000 passenger and checked bag screeners at
TSA. However, that report was issued over the weekend
indicating that TSA will need 57,000 such screeners. It is a
large disparity. How many screeners will the TSA need?
Secretary Mineta. Well, I have heard about this 57,000
figure, and I am not sure where it comes from. We have been
using 51,232 as the number of FTE's for passenger screening,
and this morning on WTOP I heard the figure 57,000, and I am
not sure where that comes from, but in any event, what we are
looking at for 2002 is 51,232 for fiscal year 2003. We are
looking between 65 and 67,000 FTE's for fiscal year 2003.
Senator McCain. Mr. Magaw, about what percentage of your
staff is in place at this point within the TSA?
Mr. Magaw. In terms of our headquarters, we expect to try
to administer to the organization with about 1,300 people. We
have about, a little over 400 presently.
Senator McCain. About what percentage are we talking about
that are in place, or you expect to be in place overall in
America?
Mr. Magaw. In our headquarters it would be a third. In the
field, in the Federal Security Directors, we are about a third
of that also. Screeners, we are well below that, but there are
thousands of them in training, hundreds of them in training. On
the Federal Air Marshalls, that schedule is right on board, as
discussed with Senator Boxer a number of months ago, and that
is right on schedule.
Senator McCain. Thank you. Can we realistically expect all
airports to have EDS equipment by the end of the year?
Mr. Magaw. All airports would not have EDS equipment, as I
think the Committee is referring to, and that would be the CAT-
scan procedure. They will have either the EDS or the EDT, the
trace equipment, or a combination of both in most cases.
Senator McCain. Secretary Mineta, at a recent hearing
before the Appropriations Committee, you announced you have no
problem with diverting AIP funds, the airport improvement
program funds, from capacity projects to security items in the
short term. Do you have any estimates how much AIP funding will
be required in 2002 or 2003?
Secretary Mineta. In terms of the total amount, it probably
amounts to about 10 percent of the AIP funds that we would be
using for security and operational requirements. Without a
doubt, the airports have been telling us that their need for
construction and other security requirements imposes this, and
because from our perspective right now demand is down in terms
of travel, so we have said okay, go ahead and use AIP for the
security requirements.
Senator McCain. Well, I think it is a little dangerous,
because there are ongoing projects and proposed projects which
exceed, frankly, the amount of AIP funds available, so I think,
Mr. Chairman, we ought to look at that situation over time.
I want to get back, Mr. Magaw, to this issue of the EDS
equipment being installed. I am not sure I really understood
the answer. In other words, according to the legislation, EDS
equipment was going to be installed by the end of the year in
every airport. That is not going to happen, is it?
Mr. Magaw. The explosive detection equipment--there are two
different kinds. There is the EDS, which is basically a CAT-
scan type, and also trace. Using those two in combination, we
expect to meet the commitment that that equipment will be in
place by the end of the year, 31 December. If you were talking
about all CAT-scans, which are the big SUV type, they will not
all be there, because a lot of airports cannot even handle that
kind of equipment.
Senator McCain. It is kind of the argument that there will
be different quality of equipment, depending upon the size of
the airport.
Mr. Magaw. Not so, sir. We have been working with our
experts in the lab in Atlantic City and also with various
company representatives. We have worked out pilot programs both
at Salt Lake City--we are doing one now in Norfolk, and we are
finding with the proper protocol, which I would be happy to
discuss with you in confidential briefing, that these two
technologies are comparable.
At the same time, as the Secretary said, we are looking for
what also can come down the road from entrepreneurial work,
smaller, better, accurate.
Senator McCain. Well, I want to thank you for the work you
are doing, both you and the Secretary, and this issue of guns
in the cockpit is going to be a very controversial one, and I
know you will explain all the factors that went into making
that decision, and there is one other point. I and others have
sought a review of policies overall, not just intelligence, but
diplomatic, economic, and the role of the executive branch as
well as the Congress in its oversight of functions of
Government that led to 9/11. Part of that may have been a
responsibility melee with this Committee and me personally.
I hope you will keep us very well-informed, not just in
formal hearings but through periodic briefings, as to the
measures that are being taken, particularly in light of the
recent statements by the Director of the FBI and others about
the, quote, inevitability of an attack on this country, so I
think it really lends great urgency to us being kept informed
quite frequently, and in some detail, otherwise we will have
failed in our responsibilities perhaps, again, and as one of
the architects of this legislation along with the distinguished
chairman, I feel a special responsibility in this area, which
was designed to cure many of the problems we saw were
responsible for the tragedy of 9/11.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We get bogged down
in this issue of screening for explosives. That is not what
happened on 9/11. Explosives were already on board. We had
better get in the people business, and finding out where they
come from and where they are going and this type of thing, if
intelligence tells us so.
The explosives on an airplane right now are not really of a
concern to me. It is the kind of people who are determined to
use the airplane as a weapon, and that is where I think we
should be focused. Right now, I do not know how many people you
are going to need for this. The cost is going to be monumental,
but that is the cost of security, and we have to understand
that.
Are you still going to use some funds out of the AIP trust
to do some of this work around the airports?
Secretary Mineta. The construction for the explosive
detection systems will still be done from the AIP.
Senator Burns. Mr. Secretary, we are getting a lot of push
back on that a little bit from our airports. Those funds have
been designed for airport construction and infrastructure
around that, and I guess if we could stretch the term,
infrastructure, that could also be included, and I would
imagine you have heard the same complaints whenever you hear
from your airports.
Secretary Mineta. Having been just prior to 11 September
talking about delays and capacity problems, I am very sensitive
to that, but it is just that since September 11 we have gone
from capacity and delay now to security, and to the extent we
want to plug the security hole I am saying okay to this, but I
want to get back to the legitimate capacity and delay issues
for which the AIP was created as soon as possible.
Senator Burns. Have you done any kind of study of what the
impact on AIP that will have?
Secretary Mineta. The total amount, I believe it is
somewhere in the area of about, I believe around $600-$700
million, I believe. I will have to look at that and see, and
get back to you.
Senator Burns. I think the Committee would be interested on
the impact of that trust fund, because I think all of us have
gotten about the same letters and everything like that.
Mr. Magaw, you made the announcement now that you are not
going to allow firearms on the flight deck or the pilots to
possess firearms on board an airplane. Are your air marshalls
armed?
Mr. Magaw. They are, sir.
Senator Burns. What is the difference?
Mr. Magaw. Training. The pilot flying the aircraft, the
marshall taking care of business as it occurs in the passenger
cabin. These marshalls are trained not only in the use of a
weapon, but all of the kinds of things that would build up to
that they can handle a lot of times by being in the right place
at the right time with the proper physical leverage.
It is in a much narrower area, so they have to practice all
of these things in a tight aircraft. They have to be
recertified every 90 days, and if they are not recertified they
do not fly. They have a special firearms training which is much
more difficult, much more strenuous than any other firearms,
save maybe our Delta Force and a few of those special units in
the military, because obviously if that firearm is discharged,
obviously we do not want them under the normal circumstances to
hurt or kill an innocent person, but we certainly also do not
want them shooting that firearm with the possibility of
bringing that airliner down.
So their total function and total training and total
commitment is the security of all of us who are on that
aircraft, not only as we board the aircraft, but a presearch of
that aircraft, conferring with all of the attendants on that
aircraft, a number of what-ifs planned, and seated in a place
where they can respond, also procedures with the crew so that
they do not respond if it is a ruse, so it is a total
commitment to that function, the security of that aircraft as
we move forward.
They will do whatever they have to, to the point of giving
up their own life to make sure that that cockpit stays safe,
and the cockpit and the aircraft is for the pilots to maintain
positive control of that aircraft, and the positive control to
them, and what is to me, is, get it on the ground as quickly as
you can regardless of what is happening back there.
They also tell me that with slight maneuvers, you cannot do
a lot with a big aircraft, but unless you are seatbelted in,
they can make your equilibrium so that you cannot function. I
am looking also at putting cameras back there so they can see
what is happening, and see how they are making these people
fall and move.
I know we have a short time here, but that is a fairly
short answer to that question. It is really a detailed answer
that needs to be there.
Senator Burns. Well, are there more than one air marshall
on a flight?
Mr. Magaw. There is always more than one. When there are
air marshalls on an aircraft, there would never be one by
themselves. It would be more than one, and it could be more
than that.
Senator Burns. Whatever, and I do not want to bring
anything to light here, but can both pilots fly the airplane?
Mr. Magaw. Both pilots can fly the airplane.
Senator Burns. You see, it just seems to me, when push
comes to shove, and the element of surprise, and having
qualified pilots that I entrust my life to up there, also go
through the same training procedures, and I think the majority
of them that want to be armed will submit themselves to that
training, the same training you are putting your air marshalls
through, and yes, they can make conditions back there
unlivable, and a lot of things, but there are only certain
things they can do, because there is always the possibility of
passengers not being in the same condition physically or
mentally than the people who fly and guard the airplane, and so
I wish you would reconsider that, I really do.
I am a cosponsor on a bill that is going to allow them to
do that, and if we have people on that airplane who are willing
to die in the commitment of such an act, I see no reason why
they should not do it a little bit before they get it done, and
that is kind of a Marine way to look at it, but that is just
the way I think, and I think if push comes to shove--and I like
the idea of the cameras. I think they can be installed rather
inexpensively, and there are companies now, one being in my
State, who have already designed cameras and surveillance
equipment that would tell the pilot what is going on in the
cabin.
So I would ask you to reconsider that, with some strings
attached. I think we should continue to look at that.
I thank the chairman.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, the American people are now being barraged
with reports that the Government warned the airlines in April
of 2001 and again in June of 2001 that terrorists might be
plotting to hijack or blow up an aircraft. I would like to know
what the airlines were told by the Government, when they were
told it, and in particular what guidance did the Government
provide to the airlines about steps that they could take to
address these threats in those three areas.
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, information circulars
and security directives were issued by the FAA, probably
starting in the April-May time frame and continuing on through,
to the airlines and to the airports, but in reviewing all those
reports, they really are of generalized information gleaned
from the intelligence reports, and very little in terms of
specificity about the method or kind of things that might take
place.
I get an intelligence briefing on a daily basis, and I
remember asking one time soon after September 11, is there a
way of taking all the pieces of information that we have heard
since I have been here on 20 January and putting those dots
together to have anything point to anything? It is very, very
difficult to do that.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary, do you know if any of these
warnings were shared with the security screening companies? The
reason I am asking is that as I look at these reports with
respect to how the process works between the intelligence
agencies and the aviation sector, I just see a process that
seems dysfunctional, and what I want to do is work with you and
the administration to repair it.
I think we have got a structural problem here, and I think
it would be very helpful in particular to see if these warnings
are transmitted to the people on the frontlines, and that is
why I would like to know, in particular, whether the warnings
got in a specific way to the security screening companies,
because obviously, before September 11 they had a very key
role.
Secretary Mineta. As to whether they were specifically, I
know that my previous discussion had been with airports and
airlines. In looking at a report here, it says, aviation
industry security professionals. Now, whether that means
screening companies, I cannot answer that, but I do know they
were shared with airports and airlines. I will have to check to
see whether or not they went specifically to the screening
companies.
Senator Wyden. Yesterday's Wall Street Journal, Mr.
Secretary, reported the FBI informed the FAA a week before
September 11 of the arrest of Mr. Moussaoui, the terrorist who
wanted to learn, obviously, to fly large planes. The FAA chose
not to pass along this information to the airlines, I gather
because the individual was arrested. I think it would be
helpful, though, to have you outline what are the criteria that
are used to make these kinds of decisions, because again it
goes to this process of how information is shared.
Secretary Mineta. Well, with regard to the September 5
cable, I had our FAA take a look at, our staff take a look at
this. Our records clearly indicate that the FAA was not given
any information at the time that would have required the
issuance of a special alert. The FBI sent the FAA the following
information in a cable June 5. It was a classified cable,
meaning its contents were not to be widely shared.
It said that Moussaoui's arrest was part of an ongoing FBI
investigation. It stated that the only suspect was in custody,
indicating any threat that he might have created had been
removed. Nothing in the cable indicated that an event was
imminent, and nothing in the cable indicated that the suspect
had ties to any terrorist group.
Finally, one important point about the cable sent to the
FAA by the FBI, I do not know what the FBI learned in its
investigation, but the cable it sent to the FAA simply said
that Mr. Moussaoui wanted to learn how to, quote, take off and
land a 747, unquote. It did not--and I repeat, it did not say
that he only wanted to learn how to take off, and was not
interested in learning how to land.
The cable to the FAA said, rightly or wrongly, the only
pilot training he wanted was how to take off and land, so take
off and landing are the only two things that a suicide bomber
is not interested in, and so based upon the nature of all of
this information, the FAA decided the threat was general and
nonspecific enough that it would wait for further information
from the FBI before it should notify stakeholders in the
aviation community.
Senator Wyden. Let me ask you one other question, if I
might, Mr. Secretary. As of today, Mr. Secretary, do you
believe that the intelligence agencies are giving you
sufficient information to evaluate these threats and to be able
to make informed decisions concerning the precautions?
Secretary Mineta. I think in my daily briefings with the
CIA they are, in fact, giving me the wide range of information,
and that I am well-served by that daily briefing.
Senator Wyden. One other question if I might, Mr. Chairman.
I know the light is on.
Mr. Magaw, central to really strengthening this system for
the future is accountability, and I am of the view that one of
the key ways to do that is on an airport-by-airport basis. Do
you plan on using undercover audits to look at the practices of
airports on an airport-by-airport basis with respect to
security?
Mr. Magaw. Yes, sir, I do. In the structure of TSA is a
unit that will, among many other things, do just that. The
Department of Transportation Inspector General has already been
doing some of that, and we encourage him to do continue that.
Senator Wyden. I know my time has expired. I am going to
follow up further with what is going to happen with those
audits, and whether there are going to be consequences, because
in the past we really have not seen those consequences. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you say you have been briefed
by the CIA. Is that ongoing with respect to the FBI? Does the
FBI brief you with respect to terrorist activities?
Secretary Mineta. On counterterrorism, Mr. Chairman, they
do.
The Chairman. Because the act itself says seven-man
committee. You have got Justice Department, Homeland Security,
DOD, NSC----
Secretary Mineta. On the domestic I get briefings from the
FBI, and on the international I get briefings from the CIA.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, just in case I might have
misspoken, I meant September 5 and not June 5, just in case, in
my reference to the cable.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that the issue of protecting
the American people at airports belongs with Justice and that
is to say nothing bad about my friends. They are terrific
people, but that is not their job, but that is a whole other
day, I hope maybe. We should revisit this, but be that as it
may, it is where it is, and we have got to deal with it now.
I want to pick up on Senator Wyden's questioning about the
warnings and what we did with it. The Wall Street Journal says
a week--they are not talking about a June memo. They are
talking about a week before.
Secretary Mineta. I meant September 5.
Senator Boxer. Now, they say investigators told the FAA
that student pilot Zaccarias Moussaoui had been arrested and
was under investigation as a potential terrorist with a
potential interest in flying 747's. It said, the agency was
told--that means the FAA--by the FBI that Mr. Moussaoui was
being investigated after his instructors at a Minnesota flight
school reported that he paid in cash to learn to fly Boeing
747's, and it goes on to say, the logic at the time--this is a
senior law enforcement official--was that he intended to hijack
a plane.
Now, I guess the answer that we did not have enough
information is--it sounds a little bit weak to me. When
someone's arrested and is being investigated for paying cash to
learn to fly a jet, and the FBI is saying, a hijacking, and the
fact is, we know that the President had a briefing that talked
about hijacking, that talked about Osama bin Laden, that talked
about on American soil, so looking ahead, not to look
backwards, which I want the commission to do--I am supporting
Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman. We have got to look at
this, because this is a democracy and we should look at it, and
I take great offense at those who say we cannot, we cannot look
at mistakes, because if we take that route we are no better
than dictatorships as far as I am concerned, so we need to look
at that.
But looking ahead, what kind of warning do you need to
have? It would seem to me the President knew, and as I
understand it, he was in Texas at the ranch, and he could not
do an oral briefing. They had a piece of paper that said Osama
bin Laden, hijacking, American soil.
Now, when Condoleeza Rice was asked about it, her answer
was, well, we could not shut down the whole system. Well, that
is setting up a straw man, if you will. No one is suggesting
shut down the system, but if you know Osama bin Laden,
hijacking, American soil, it seems to me there could have been
some specific warnings.
Now, American Airlines, we asked them did they get any
warnings. They put out a press release. They said they receive
FAA security bulletins, but they are extremely general in
nature, do not identify specific threat or recommend--and this
is the important thing--any specific security enhancements.
The FAA at that time closely regulated airline security,
and the Federal security standards were not changed during the
summer of 2001, so you had the briefing on Moussaoui, the
President had the other briefing, and yet American Airlines
never was told to do anything different. This is not about
shutting down the system. It is just looking a little harder at
people, so I am--I mean, Mr. Mineta, are you saying that you
did everything right, I mean, I would like to ask you that
question, after you received those warnings?
Secretary Mineta. I am not sure I can make that statement.
Senator Boxer. I asked San Francisco Airport. They heard
nothing.
Secretary Mineta. I am not sure. I do know that we issued
information circulars. We issued security directives.
Senator Boxer. I have a list of those.
Secretary Mineta. Now, whether that went specifically to
San Francisco Airport, I am not sure, but as you go back over
all of the intelligence reports of 2001, they are general.
There is nothing in terms of specificity.
Senator Boxer. Wait a minute, I am confused. Isn't when
they say, we have this person we have arrested, and he has
taken flight school lessons, and we are worried about
hijacking, that you do not consider that specific, that is
general?
Secretary Mineta. So what does that tell you? Does that
tell you----
Senator Boxer. I will tell you what it tells me, and I am
trying to be fair here, I think, knowing what the President
knew and what you knew, it seems to me that at the minimum we
just give a more specific alert to the airlines and the
airports. I have here, and I would ask unanimous consent to
place in the record, a letter I received from San Francisco
Airport showing the things that they got, the type of
generalized circulars that they got.
The Chairman. That will be included.
[The information referred to follows:]
San Francisco International Airport
San Francisco, CA, May 17, 2002
Hon. Barbara Boxer,
United States Senate,
Hart Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Boxer:
In response to your request for information regarding warnings from
the federal government of threats prior to the attacks of September
11th, I want to provide you with a series of Department of
Transportation notices received by San Francisco International Airport
(SFO).
Eight Information Circulars and Emergency Amendments were received
from the period of April 18, 2001 through September 11, 2001.
April 18,2001--Information Circular
Subject Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation
June 22, 2001--Information Circular
Subject Possible Terrorist Threat Against American Citizens
July 2, 2001--Information Circular
Subject Possible Terrorist Threat Against American Citizens
July 12, 2001--Information Circular
Subject Man-Portable Air Defense System (MAN PADA) threat to Civil
Aviation
July 18, 2001--Information Circular
Subject Possible Threat--Arabian Peninsula
July 31, 2001--information Circular
Subject Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation
July 27, 2001--Civil aviation Security Emergency Amendment
Subject: Additional Security Procedures
August 16. 2001--Information Circular
Subject: Disguised Weapons
Please note that SFO, and all U.S. Commercial Airports, routinely
receive both Civil Aviation Information Circulars and U.S. DOT/FAA
Civil Aviation Security Emergency Amendments which notify and advise of
potential aviation security concerns. In addition to these notices, the
FAA issues further information exclusively to U.S. air carriers.
Very truly yours,
John L. Martin,
Airport Director
Senator Boxer. Without beating a dead horse, I just believe
we should have done, it seems to me, a little more than the
general. I would have told, for example, the airlines, they
have this guy who is going to flight school, we have another
memo--why not share that type of information? It seems to me
that you should share specific information, and I believe you
had specific information.
Secretary Mineta. I understand what you are saying now in
terms of the wider distribution of the information that is
available.
Senator Boxer. Well, not wider. How about to the airports?
How about to the airlines? Look, there is a lot of flap because
Attorney General Ashcroft--it was announced on a news show
before 9/11 that he was now no longer going to fly
commercially, and on that same broadcast it said they knew of
no specific threat against him, it was just a general thing. He
was going to no longer fly commercial.
Now, it is a big flap, and now they are saying, well, there
was a specific threat. I do not know, but I have got to tell
you something, we all represent the people whose lives are very
important. It just seems to me that when we have specific
information--when I say that, I look at this as specific. An
individual, we know his name. We know he is taking flight
school training. He is paying in cash. We have other
information on the other side that says hijackings could be
expected on our soil, Osama bin Laden, and everyone knew about
Osama bin Laden.
So enough. Enough said. I just think we need to do better
in the future. I want to follow up on Senator McCain, the
remaining minute I have, on the EDS machines. I know that we
are not going to have as many as we need to have to do all the
bomb check, and I think Senator Burns is right, the last time
it was not about bombs in suitcases, it was about using an
airplane as a bomb. Hopefully that day is over, but they will
look at these other things.
Now you are using these trace--what do you call those
machines?
Secretary Mineta. Trace detectors.
Senator Boxer. Are those certified?
Mr. Magaw. They are certified.
Senator Boxer. Who certified them and when, because my
information is, they are not certified.
Mr. Magaw. They are certified, and they were certified by
our Technology and Scientific Group in Atlantic City, so both
technologies are certified.
Senator Boxer. Can you send me a copy of that
certification, because I have not seen it. Will we have another
round?
The Chairman. We can have another round.
Senator Boxer. I will hold, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cleland.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,
distinguished panelists, ladies and gentlemen, I am deeply
disturbed. I have to admit that. First of all, in terms of pre-
9/11 I do not think this Committee or any committee of the
Congress or combination of committees is ever going to get at
the totality of what really happened, so I do support--and I am
an original cosponsor of Senator McCain's legislation, and
Senator Lieberman's legislation to create an independent
commission of stature and credibility that looks at the buildup
to 9/11 and what happened and has the power of subpoena and has
the power to access classified documents and find out exactly
what happened, and inform the Congress and the American people
so we can make sure it does not happen again.
We did this after Pearl Harbor. It worked. We should do
that now, and so I am somewhat frustrated as an individual
Member of this Committee, getting at the story of pre-9/11. My
concern and my fear now is that we still have not sorted out
who is in charge of alerting the American people to a domestic
threat, a threat to our homeland.
Mr. Mineta, Mr. Secretary, I have to ask you this. Given
the fact that before 9/11 various pieces of information were
stovepiped and not communicated, and the dots were not
connected so a decisionmaker could understand what was going
on, and given the fact that now the Vice President of the
United States in the last few days, and now the head of the FBI
just in the last day or so has given warnings to the American
people that there might be another terrorist attack on this
Nation, is there anything you want to share with this
Committee, based upon your understanding of the threat to this
country, the threat to the airlines, the threat to the
traveling public? Is there anything you want to share with this
Committee now, and the American people, particularly the flying
public, that you know that we might be able to take into
account in our daily lives? Is there a threat to the flying
public now, or is there not?
Secretary Mineta. Well, I think in terms of security, the
security today is much better. It is good, and I am completely
satisfied and comfortable with where we are in terms of
security.
From the perspective of intelligence, again, I think, given
what the Office of Homeland Security is doing, and in terms
of--and that is where it is presided by the President. I am a
member of the Homeland Security Council, and George Tenet of
CIA and Bob Mueller, head of FBI, the Attorney General, Tommy
Thompson from HHS, and General Downing from NSC, a number of us
are sitting at the table and meeting on a regular basis, and so
I think to the extent that we are around the table, commonly
getting this information, is a good thing.
I think in the absence of the ability to reorganize into
some kind of Homeland Security Agency, I think what we have to
be able to do is to have a data-mining and data dissemination
mechanism. What I referred to in my suggestion was a data
fusion center that would be headquartered probably within the
Attorney General's Office in the Department of Justice, and
that would get information from INS, Customs, Border Patrol,
DEA, FBI, everybody, and become a repository for all this
information.
It will take quite a while to put that kind of data fusion
center together, but I think that is something that is needed,
and something that would address a concern that you have.
Senator Cleland. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think it is needed,
too, which is why I support a Homeland Security Agency that has
a Secretary that sits in the President's Cabinet and has access
to intelligence from many sources, and has actually troops,
they command troops, Customs, the Border Patrol, INS and other
agencies, and they can be that nerve center domestically where
that information is congregated and collected and ultimately
disseminated, like we have a nerve center in the Pentagon that
keeps us informed about information around the world.
I just think we need that. I think you are right on about
aggregating intelligence information in a nerve center for
domestic protection at least.
That leads to my second question. If there were to be a
known threat to airlines, airline safety as we saw it earlier,
before 9/11, would we under the current organization, or lack
thereof, hear from you that there was a threat to the traveling
public and therefore take precautions, or would we hear it from
the Vice President, or would we hear it from the head of the
FBI, or would we hear it from the Homeland Security Director?
Who would we hear it from?
Secretary Mineta. I think under the present procedures you
would hear it from the Homeland Security Director.
Senator Cleland. Well, that is a real concern, but I
understand where you are coming from. Can I ask you one more
point here? We had an incident in Atlanta, at Hartsfield. They
are a busy airport, where a young man broke through
intentionally aviation security. We found out later, after he
was apprehended, that breaking through aviation security at an
airport is a misdemeanor. If you interfere with or breakthrough
security in an aircraft, that is a felony.
Mr. Magaw, do you have an opinion here, with 40 years in
law enforcement--I have legislation making the deliberate
breach of security at an airport a felony, so we are able to
treat that with the seriousness that it now deserves. Is that
something you would like to see in law?
Mr. Magaw. Yes, sir. If you remember back when I was
testifying for my confirmation, the subjects came up, look at
all the different issues you are dealing with, come back and
tell us some of the things we need to do. You have already
addressed that issue, which is important.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cleland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Max Cleland, U.S. Senator from Georgia
Mr. Chairman, on December 10th, over 5 months ago, this Committee
held its first hearing on aviation security since the landmark Aviation
and Transportation Security Act was passed into law. I chaired that
Atlanta field hearing in which we heard the Deputy Secretary of
Transportation, Michael Jackson, describe the security safeguards which
DOT and the FAA put in place after 9-11 and the first steps taken by
his Department to implement the new law. Today, six months after
President Bush signed the most sweeping aviation bill ever enacted into
law, we will hold the third hearing on where the Department stands in
the law's implementation. We'll get an update on two of the law's most
formidable requirements: the conversion to a federal security workforce
and the installation of explosive detection systems and explosive trace
detection machines in every airport.
I think I can say that each Member of this Committee understands
and appreciates the enormous challenges facing the Department of
Transportation. To create a new agency from scratch. To lay the
groundwork for the largest civilian workforce in more than half a
century. To put in place a security safety net at 740 passenger
screening checkpoints and 429 airports nationwide. To screen one
billion bags for explosives by the end of this year. To balance
efficiency and customer service with a new and higher standard of
security nationwide. To ensure that the events of September 11th are
never, ever repeated.
While we appreciate the challenges, we also have to address the
problems in such an ambitious undertaking. The TSA budget has almost
tripled over the past few months--from $2.4 billion to more than $6.8
billion. The number of TSA security personnel has more than doubled. In
fact, the latest estimate of 70,000 has spurred the House
Appropriations Committee to prohibit funds for more than 45,000 staff
at the agency in the FY 2002 Supplemental. And just yesterday, at BWI,
the TSA's test airport, large numbers of flights were delayed. I have
heard that the reason for these delays was because the Transportation
Security Administration, which has now taken over security at the
Baltimore airport, did not have sufficient staffing to handle the
passenger loads.
In light of the recent revelations--including information that as
early as June 22 of last year the FAA issued a circular to the carriers
warning of possible airline hijackings--we will have questions on what
the DOT and FAA knew and when, on what the airlines knew and when, and
who gave the directive not to share this information with the public
and why. After September 11th, the government has shared information
with the public about possible terrorist attacks--possible attacks on
bridges in the West, for example, possible infiltrations of apartment
buildings by terrorists, and now possible attacks by walk-in suicide
bombers. To my knowledge, there have been no public warnings about
possible attacks involving airlines, or any other mode of
transportation for that matter. If such information comes to light,
will the DOT and TSA choose this time to release the information to the
public? Let me say that these questions will be asked with the full
knowledge of this Committee that our panelists cannot divulge certain
information which could compromise national security by benefitting
those who wish America harm.
In closing, I am forcefully reminded of a briefing given to the
Commerce Committee by officials from El Al shortly after September
11th. At that briefing El Al recommended a security model to the U.S.
that puts the government in control of a multi-layered security net
that relies on the sharing of information all the way up the ladder--
from the screener who checks passengers and baggage to the airport
operator, all the way up to the top government officials in the Israeli
chain of command. El Al compared the various levels of intelligence
sharing to the layers of an onion. The recent revelations here in the
U.S. underscore in red the imperative in this country to coordinate not
only our intelligence communities, the Department of Defense, our
Homeland Security Office, the TSA and the DOT, but also our
intelligence network in the aviation system as well--from the federal
screeners at our checkpoints, to the local airport law enforcement
personnel, to our federal airport directors, to John Magaw at the
Transportation Security Administration, to Jane Garvey at the FAA, to
Secretary Mineta. So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on
this and other vitally important issues of aviation security.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Dorgan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
First, Secretary Mineta, Mr. Magaw, let me thank you. I
think you have taken some action that relates to an
understanding that one size does not fit all with respect to
threat assessments and threat evaluations. The first missive
was a 300-foot rule at airports, and you know Dickinson, North
Dakota. 300 feet took out their entire parking lot, so you
begin to take steps dealing with different airports and
different threat assessments, and I think you have used some
common sense there. I, for one, appreciate that, and thank you
for taking a good look at it.
Second, I think the chairman and others have said in
different ways that we are busy in many ways preventing the
last terrorist act, when our job really is to prevent the next
terrorist act, and there is a big difference here. I would like
to ask a question about the hundreds and hundreds of workers at
many of the big airports that are doing catering, cleaning, a
whole series of things on and around the airport, on and around
the airplanes. That is also a very important security issue.
What kind of progress are you making with that?
The reason I ask is, there have been some investigations
that suggest that people have been walking on and off the
tarmac dealing with airplanes that have not been secured, that
have criminal records and so on. Mr. Magaw, can you tell me
what kind of progress we are making in those areas?
Mr. Magaw. The entire package you have described is a
concern to us. It is a concern to the airport managers. It is
also a concern to the airlines, and so what we have now that we
did not have a few months ago is all of these entities talking
about how we can close that.
Do we use technology to close some of it? Do we use manned
human posts to close others? How do we secure the ramp, and
when our Federal Security Directors are arriving there, they
are discussing this, the whole airport, to include cargo, to
include the overnight storage of the aircraft, to include the
back gates and the parking for employees, and you are right,
the catering units, all of those issues are being addressed.
Some of the catering ones have been tightened up some, and we
are looking at each one as we can get some personnel and people
there to work with the airports in each of those areas.
And I visited a number of airports to look at the cargo
situation, to look at the back gate, to look at the surrounding
fence. We just talked with Dallas-Fort Worth yesterday. They
just put miles of fence around that airport with barbed wire on
the top and those kinds of things, so every area is being
looked at, sir.
Senator Dorgan. Well, let me send you some questions on
that, because I think when you talk about the catering
companies, we are tightening up some. I think this has to be
tight as a drum, because terrorists will find the weakest link.
But let me ask another question, Mr. Magaw, and perhaps it
goes to Secretary Mineta. We in our Aviation and Transportation
Security Act created an oversight board. Mr. Mineta, you
indicated you are getting daily briefings on foreign and
domestic security issues. Is the oversight board working? That
is supposed to be the Attorney General, DOT, Defense, National
Security, Treasury, and Homeland Security.
The reason I ask that question is, I think what we have
learned in recent days is that the bureaucracy and turf battles
really have clogged the information systems that you need to
have working, and so the question is, is the oversight board
working? Are you a part of that? How often do you meet, and so
on.
Secretary Mineta. We did have a meeting in, let us see, I
believe it was in early April. Frankly, it has not been
convened since, but it does meet quarterly, so right now we are
not scheduled to meet until the end of July, but to that
extent--and it is an oversight board, really, on the
operational nature of the airport security, rather than on the
intelligence side.
Senator Dorgan. I understand that, but airport security is
reliant on the intelligence coming in to describe the potential
threat to you, and it seems to me that it is obvious terrorists
do not operate on a quarterly schedule, so I am a little
concerned that this oversight board that Senator Hollings and
Senator McCain have created, I am a little concerned that they
have only met once and plan to only meet quarterly.
Now, Senator Hollings can better interpret that, but I do
not think that was the intent of the legislation. My sense is
that what we have learned in recent days is that there were
disparate pieces of critical information in various places of
the Government, but somehow it never came together, and the
oversight board would bring all of that together, get rid of
the turf battles, get rid of the bureaucracy that prevents
information from flowing, essentially unplug these arteries of
information.
So I think I will want to submit some questions there as
well, but my sense is there is an urgency here, and I am a
little concerned. I appreciate your frankness here. I know you
are perhaps not the one that is describing how the oversight
board, or the information works, or how often you meet, but I
think the intention was to bring these people together
frequently to evaluate what exists out there.
Now, let me ask you a question with respect to that. There
has been a lot of discussion in the last 48 hours or so that
Vice President Cheney and FBI Director Mueller and others have
sort of said, not quite in these words, but it feels like
something is about to happen. It feels like there is a greater
urgency here. It feels like something is coming. I mean, that
is what I get from all of this, including reading the paper
this morning.
If that is the case, and if that is the message we are
getting from everybody, is there something that is happening
internally with your organization, Mr. Mineta, or your
organization, Mr. Magaw, that reflects this new and changed
reality in the last 48 hours, and if so, what is happening that
reflects that changed reality?
Mr. Magaw. Each morning and each afternoon the groups that
you are talking about, whether it is the National Security
Council, whether it is Homeland Security, or CIA, or FBI have a
classified briefing. We get together over secure voice
telephone and talk about these particular issues.
The concern, while not being as specific as we might like
it, is a case where over the years, because of the way our
country has functioned in terms of a very open democracy, cells
of terrorists are virtually throughout the country, so the
constant awareness of what they are doing, how they are doing
it, why they are doing it is what the attention is on now, to
try to not be caught like we were the last time, but to have
the information and then act on it so that potential terrorist
attacks can be stopped in their early nature.
So there is clearly much more attention to having all of
these agencies on the line talking together. There is much more
interest now in putting a person from TSA in each one of the
organizations, and vice versa, so that they are right there,
making sure--so those kinds of things are tightening up. The
feeling is that with that much spread of intelligence cells
throughout the country and throughout the world, that the 9/11
was not the only plan.
Now, what are the other plans? If you remember, in 1995, in
the Philippines, a plan was uncovered there that was going to
blow a number of United States commercial aircraft up as they
came across the ocean, so there are bits and pieces of planning
around let us dig into it more, just as you are suggesting in
all your conversations here, to make sure it is pieced together
and to make sure that we are deciphering better when warnings
are needed.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Magaw, just a final comment. Mr.
Chairman, do not misunderstand our questions, or my questions.
We want you to succeed. It is imperative for this country that
you succeed in your mission, and it is a very, very difficult
and daunting mission, so understand the questions are about
wanting to figure out how we help you do your job and how we
help you on behalf of this country succeed in that mission.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Allen.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask
you all some questions here. Let me say first I very much agree
with Chairman Hollings' view on the importance of the cockpit
being secure. I think that is the most important thing that can
be done. I also want to commend you all. You have a very
daunting task in improving security, as well as the economic
viability of commercial aviation.
Security does have to improve, and the more expeditious
deployment of personnel and new technology is important for
commercial aviation. People will choose not to fly if given an
opportunity, and that directly impacts our economy as well as
security.
I want to inquire about a few things. First, let me make a
statement. The small airports do have inadequate staffing. I do
hope to work with you all for the small airports and their
needs and their funding.
First, I want to inquire about Reagan National Airport. I
want to commend you, Mr. Secretary, as well as Jane Garvey, for
your advocacy of reopening Reagan National Airport. It is
important for our economy here, for access to our capital and
the 10,000 people that work there. The restoration of general
aviation at Reagan National is the last step toward 100 percent
operation.
As you know, Senator Warner and I have written the
President on this. Can you share with us any progress toward
reopening general aviation opportunities at Reagan National?
Secretary Mineta. I think we have worked out all of the
procedures now, and hopefully by the end of May we will be able
to announce the opening of Ronald Reagan to general aviation
and the return of Signature as the fixed base operator at
Reagan National Airport.
Senator Allen. Great. That is good news.
Secretary Mineta. We are now trying to put the dots on the
I's and cross the T's on that.
Senator Allen. That is good news. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I have stated on previous hearings my belief that modern-
day aircraft could be operated remotely if a pilot was in
extreme circumstances. In other words, turn the aircraft over
to a remote location.
For example, there is research which would effectively
limit where a plane may go. A topographic computer model of any
route of any flight could be built that could designate any
area off-limits. You could have a virtual fence around a city.
You could have a virtual dome around a building that you wanted
off-limits, such as nuclear power plant or the United States
Capitol building.
Do you think that we could make use of this kind of
technology in tandem with your security precautions you are
talking about, which would serve as a protective model for
aircraft? Have you done any research, study, or evaluation of
these technologies to determine the economic and technological
feasibility?
The New York Times just recently, on April 22, had an
article on these new technologies that I think could help us
become safer and certain, with off-limit areas.
Mr. Magaw. In terms of the areas that you are talking
about, there needs to be research in those areas. With
everything else we have been getting started with at TSA, we
have not started a specific study on those particular areas,
but we have clearly identified more importance in terms of
hiring technology research personnel to strengthen our efforts
where it is located in Atlantic City.
We have been talking about the secure communications
between the cockpit and the ground. I know that is not what you
are dealing with now.
All the technology that is out there, and all the
entrepreneurialship that we can bring forward, technology is a
huge part of our answer. Where we will end up on those issues,
Senator, I do not know, but I can guarantee you we will be
looking at every piece of technology that is out there to see
if it can work in a passage as you are describing.
Senator Allen. Thank you.
There is one final area I would like to discuss with you
since you announced the position regarding pilots being able to
carry firearms. As Senator Dorgan said we are looking at the
future, not the past, but obviously you do have to do a post
mortem, an analysis of what has happened in the past.
If the pilots on those commercial airlines which were
commandeered on September 11 had had pistols to defend
themselves and their planes, would that have made a difference?
I think in particular, if Captain Burlingame, the pilot of
Flight 77 which hit the Pentagon, who was a Navy Reservist, had
fought for our country, obviously trained in firearms, and able
to land a wounded F-4 Phantom on the deck of a rolling aircraft
carrier had had a firearm to protect himself and that plane,
would that have made a difference in those situations?
Mr. Magaw. Well, it may have, but that is a lot different
today than it was then. My feeling is, is that you secure the
cockpit as much as you possibly can, make it a secure area for
them to function in, and then if something does happen on that
plane, they really need to be in control of that aircraft,
whether it is getting it on the ground, whether it is
maneuvering it so it knocks people off-balance that are causing
the problem, and to introduce that now, to put a weapon in
there, there is a lot of discussion, areas that we have that
would take too long here today, but the situation is different.
You now have the hardened doors, even more highly
technological doors coming on board next year. Some cameras
have been put in aircraft right now that the pilots can see
what is going on back there. We are working through that. The
air marshall program is a very large program now and getting
larger, and so the air marshall program will be very helpful.
It also is a case of where we are still looking at in
detail--and I need more time here--and that is less than lethal
force for those pilots, and so I am looking at all of that
technology at the same time, but it is clear in my mind, when I
weigh all of the pros and cons, pilots should not have firearms
in the cockpit.
It can be everything from what we have been discussing here
to the type weapon, the training, 14,000 more pilots in
airplanes carrying weapons, how many of them will want to do
that, and how many will be able to pass the qualification? If
they cannot pass the qualification, do they now not fly? I
mean, there are huge issues here.
When I weighed all of them, I made a decision, and stick by
that decision, because it has taken me long enough to make it,
that I will not permit firearms in the cockpit. Obviously, if
the Congress overrules that, or there is a law made, I will
stand up and abide by it, and do everything I am asked to do.
Absent that, I am not going to permit firearms in the cockpit.
Senator Allen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
The Chairman. Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Mr. Magaw, thank you for being here today. I
certainly appreciate it.
There has been a lot of discussion about who knew what and
when. I was interested to read in William Safire's column
yesterday that there was a report of a suicide bomber belonging
to Al Qaeda's martyrdom battalion, which went to the National
Intelligence Council under the previous administration, warning
of crash-landing of aircraft packed with high explosives into
the Pentagon, the headquarters of the CIA, or the White House,
and this report was dated in September of 1999, and nothing was
done with that report in the previous administration, and it
was deemed not actionable, so obviously the notion was out
there.
Mr. Secretary, were you briefed in any way by your
predecessors about this report, about this potential threat?
Secretary Mineta. No. I have no knowledge of this.
Senator Snowe. None whatsoever?
Secretary Mineta. None.
Senator Snowe. So this was not an issue within your
Department when you assumed your position as Secretary of
Transportation?
Secretary Mineta. Frankly, I missed yesterday's column,
too. I did not see it.
Senator Snowe. Well, I just think it is very interesting,
because this was done with the National Intelligence Council,
and that was back in September of 1999, and obviously nothing
had happened then, and President Bush requested within 6 months
a briefing on preexisting threats on domestic targets by
potential terrorists. I just think it is interesting that it
had been out there for 2 years on that whole notion, and
nothing had been done previously.
Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you would describe the
process on aviation security at this point, given the mandates
under the law, which are obviously numerous, but do you think
that we are making excellent progress, good progress, fair
progress? Where do you think we are?
Secretary Mineta. Well, I think we are making very good
progress, and the only thing that is concerning me right now is
the supplemental appropriations that is in the House, and the
fact that they have cut back from the President's request, and
so to the extent that they have cut back from the President's
request, it just seems to me that the logical follow-on is
either delays in implementing the program, or the fact that we
will have longer lines at the airports in dealing with
passengers.
Senator Snowe. This summer?
Secretary Mineta. Yes, because right now by the end of May
we will run into an Antideficiency Act problem, and so we will
at that point start slowing down signing contracts on employing
baggage screeners and passenger screeners, and equipment that
we have purchased already will remain in the warehouses because
we will not have money for installation or the people to
operate those machines.
Senator Snowe. So that is something we obviously have to
address very quickly here.
Secretary Mineta. That is right.
Now, on the other hand, we will meet the dates that are
mandated under the law, so that all it means is passenger
delays rather than delays in meeting what is in the law.
Senator Snowe. Now, on the baggage screening, what
percentage of bags are being screened today with explosive
detection devices?
Secretary Mineta. Well, because now we probably only have
35 percent of the machines online, I would say that roughly 35
percent of the bags are getting checked right now. The bag
requirement is December 31, and so to the extent that we have
that number of bag explosive detection systems either in terms
of EDS or ETD, I would say it is somewhere between 30 and 35
percent.
Senator Snowe. Now, I do have some concerns about setting
up a two-tiered system for security with respect to these
detection devices, the EDS at the larger airports and the trace
detection devices for the smaller airports. Is that a concern
to you?
Secretary Mineta. It is not. We have gone through this over
and over again, because I had that same concern that you have
about a two-class citizen approach on security, and that is
something that we do not want to have, and so one of the things
that we have done is to make sure that in running the protocol
on the EDS, and the EDS and the EDT go together, or having the
EDT as a stand-alone, and in doing this over and over again, I
am totally satisfied that the equivalency in terms of security
is there, and that there is no less security because of the use
of the ETD at the smaller airports.
Now, the explosive detection system, because it has such a
high rate of false positives, has to have the ETD to check on
it, and so again, I do not feel that the ETD is any lesser a
machine.
Mr. Magaw. Senator, may I say something just a moment? I
apologize for taking your time to correct a mistake I made to
Senator Boxer, but I have just been informed that the ETD
machine, and correcting the record, the ETD machine has been
qualified for use by FAA and use by TSA, but it has not been
formally certified, as you indicated. It has met the
performance standards. The formal reports and the formal, final
approval for that is not yet done, but it is well underway, so
I wanted to correct my statement. I apologize for that.
Senator Boxer. I appreciate that.
Senator Snowe. On security personnel, the Washington Post
described how many restricted areas at Dulles Airport are not
guarded by security personnel and equipped with screening
devices. Obviously, that poses a significant and potential
threat. Do you plan or contemplate the idea of doing any audits
with respect to this, these individuals and the personnel that
have access to the planes and to the tarmac that also could
pose a serious risk?
Mr. Magaw. Yes, ma'am. As we work with the airports we are
looking at airports, every airport as a single entity, and
trying to determine not only the front door but all around the
back door and the fence line and the people that come through
it, and the cargo and equipment that comes through it. It has
to be an entire package.
Right now, a lot of the attention is on the screeners and
on the baggage, but as our Federal Security Directors arrive at
the airports, which they are all over the country now,
virtually a few each week, is that we are looking with all the
airport personnel, the law enforcement, the airport manager,
and taking the whole package, and is some of this being done by
the local law enforcement, do we need more Federal personnel to
help in that particular area, so everything from the control
tower through the fence line, through all of the gates, through
every entity has to be looked at, to include the passengers,
observing as they are arriving in front of the building,
because sometimes you can pick up unusual action that would
cause you then to be suspicious, so we are going to take it as
an entire package at every airport.
Senator Snowe. And what about cargo?
Mr. Magaw. Cargo is a huge concern. You know, we talk about
the Pan Am 103 was a bomb in the cargo hold. None of that is
going to go away, and so we have to close those loopholes, and
we have to deal with each one of those areas, and at the same
time we are doing that, we cannot ignore the other areas of
transportation, maritime, pipelines----
Senator Wyden. Let me announce there is a vote on the floor
now, and gentlemen, I have some additional questions, I think
Senator Boxer has some additional questions, certainly the
Senator from Maine can have another round as well, and so we
are going to adjourn.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, because I cannot return, can I
just make 1 minute's worth of comments as a close?
Senator Wyden. Absolutely, and then after Senator Boxer's 1
additional minute, we will return for some additional
questions.
Senator Boxer. I so appreciate it. I just want you to think
about a few things. The video camera in the cockpit that you
are thinking about, make that mandatory, please, because here
is the point, it is like a rear view mirror in a car, right? I
mean, I am driving a car. I have got to know what is going on
behind me. These pilots, they are concentrating on their work,
as they should be. They have no idea of what is going on back
there.
And frankly, you know, in the issue of a gun in the
cockpit, I respect your decision. I hope you will look at stun
guns, but I have to say, I can understand where the pilots are
coming from if there is no air marshall on the plane, and so I
want to reiterate my concern about the long-haul flights, and
Conrad Burns and I are going to have a briefing with you, a
private briefing with you on that point.
So just in terms of the video camera, as you say, it is not
expensive. It is not a new tech or high tech situation. It is a
rear view mirror. Please do it. Do not wait. It is easy, do it.
I will feel better. We will all feel better if we know that the
pilot knows what is happening in his or her aircraft.
Mr. Magaw. The ones, the aircraft that it is in now, they
like it very, very much, so I expect us to move fairly quickly
on that.
Senator Boxer. It is a good thing. Thanks.
Senator Wyden. Gentlemen, we will reconvene in no more than
10 minutes.
[Recess.]
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Magaw, the history
and the past with respect to aviation, particularly on safety
and security is that laws get passed, and then there is not a
whole lot of follow-through and implementation, and that is why
I am especially interested this morning in hearing what steps
are going to be taken to ensure accountability at airports and
with airlines that do not measure up in terms of aviation
security.
Now, in response to the earlier question I asked of you,
Mr. Magaw, you said that you were going to do undercover
audits. Those strike me as useful, and I would like to ask you
next what is going to be done with that information?
For example, if one of those undercover audits finds that
an airport does not have adequate security, are you going to
make a recommendation at the airport Security Director be
fired?
Mr. Magaw. If it is a case where it is a violation, or it
is an oversight that should have been noted and should have
been taken care of, clearly we expected them to take care of
it, they would have been fired.
Senator Wyden. You would make a public recommendation in
that kind of case?
Mr. Magaw. The inspection unit would go out there, whether
it be the IG or our inspection unit, and report back to me what
their findings were. In the case of the IG they would report
back to Mr. Mead, and he and I confer on all of those issues
and would consult with each other on what action should be
taken.
Senator Wyden. But would it get out to the public? In other
words, I am looking for your ideas on how you are going to put
the heat on the airports and the airlines with respect to
making sure that these security changes are put in place. Is
this going to be a private conversation between a handful of
fellows, or how is it going to get followed through on?
Mr. Magaw. Well, in terms of your specific question, if we
fired a Federal Security Director at an airport, as I sit here,
I am not sure whether we would make that a public announcement
or not. I would have to confer with legal counsel and our
personnel laws and rules and regulations, but it would be clear
throughout the organization that you perform or you are not
going to be in that position.
Senator Wyden. Earlier on, when we had the debate on the
Hollings-McCain legislation, I was very interested in actually
grading airlines and airports with respect to how they were
doing, and my goodness, the hubbub that idea raised, I mean, it
was sort of like western civilization is going to end because
the country is going to find out about these deficiencies, and
that will be a magnet for terrorists in and of itself, and so I
held off.
But what are your ideas for holding airports and airlines
accountable so that the security changes actually get put in
place?
Mr. Magaw. Well, you know, with the regulatory laws and
regulations we have, we certainly on most violations have the
ability to fine that airline. I want to see that when those
decisions are made, that they are carried through very quickly,
but more important than that, I want to work closely with those
airlines, because none of them are really trying to be less
safe, or be less concerned about security. It is a matter of
their business of working with passengers and moving passengers
at the same time, that that is a high priority for them.
Security has to be a high priority, and it has to be in their
intention span at all times, so I will work very closely with
every airport and the entire airline industry and airline
managers to make sure the entire package at that airport meets
the standard.
Senator Wyden. Well, Mr. Magaw, I think it is very
constructive you are going to work with the airlines, but I
will tell you a big part of the problem that I saw over the
past, and year after year there would be this pattern, is
basically the Government was too close with the airlines, and
too close with the airports, and I do not want to see us go
back to those cozy days, so work with the airlines to try to
push them, and the airports, and push them hard, but when they
do not measure up, then you have got to send a strong message,
and you are indicating that with respect to the Federal
Security Director, and that is constructive.
Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you about this data fusion
center that you talked about, because it seems to me that is in
a measure an admission that the Government system of tracking
terrorists is pretty fragmented. I mean, it is poorly
coordinated, and pretty fragmented, and that is why we have got
to have this data fusion center, which even by Government lingo
sounds like a fairly exotic kind of concept.
But tell me a little bit more why, in your view, such a
system is needed now.
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, just from my own
experience as a military intelligence officer during the Korean
War, in 1977, Speaker O'Neill did away with the House
Intelligence Committee because it was roughly 46 members, and
it was leaking like a sieve, and he reconstituted the
Intelligence Committee in 1977, August of 1977, with seven
members chaired by Eddie Boland and Ken Robinson from Virginia,
and I was privileged to be one of the seven, and so I would
like to think I have had some background in intelligence over
the years.
As you know, the CIA is basically foreign intelligence, and
does not dabble in domestic. The FBI has the responsibility for
domestic intelligence, and so when you think about all the
information that we are getting, it really became one of, how
do we make sure that all these points of information are
somehow being brought together in one place, and that is why,
as a member of the Homeland Security Council, I was suggesting
that we have a data fusion so that we could do the mining, the
data mining and the data dissemination of all of this
information, whether from domestic or foreign intelligence, and
I just felt that something like that would be helpful.
We get it all right now, but it comes in a two-track system
through the FBI and through the CIA channels, whereas this
would give it the ability to have it in one place.
Senator Wyden. Well, I will tell you, I think frankly this
should have been done many months ago, and I sit on the Senate
Intelligence Committee as well as serve on the Commerce
Committee, and about 10 days ago I was able to add to the
intelligence bill--and this is something that can be talked
about publicly--legislation that would create a data base of
known terrorists, known and suspected terrorists, and that
information would be shared throughout the Government, and in
doing it, the only thing that really seemed of special concern
to me is, this should have been done months ago.
And I will tell you having a data fusion center sounds like
a constructive step as well, but there is no question in my
mind that the current system of sharing information is
fragmented and poorly coordinated at best, so you go full steam
ahead in terms of setting up a better and improved system in
this area, and you will have my full support in it, because I
think it is right at the heart of what we are challenged with
in this country right now.
Let me ask one additional question at this point, then
recognize the Senator from Texas. As you know, the airports
prior to 9/11 indicated a variety of machines that were out
there, were not being fully used, a variety of the security
machines that were already in the airports that were just
essentially sitting idle, or being used only a fraction of
their capacity. Have you all monitored this particular issue,
and what progress can you report as of this morning with
respect to whether this idle machinery of the past is now on
deck to protect the public.
Secretary Mineta. In terms of the use of the various
machines the CTX machines that are available, it was in the low
twenties, and that has now increased. To the extent that we now
have more machines on board, they are probably, in terms of
utilization, up in the 60, 65 percent range, so that we are
getting better use of the machines that we do have, so
therefore that also means that there is more luggage being also
checked by the EDS system.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary, if you came to a town hall
meeting in Oregon, if you went to Coos Bay, Oregon, and you
said, given all that this country is facing with respect to
aviation security, these machines, machines that are actually
out there now are only being used 65 percent of the time, I
think people would be incredulous, and very, very unhappy. What
is it going to take to get those machines fully utilized, and
how long?
Mr. Magaw. Senator, the problem that we have in increasing
it much more than that is that these machines, SUV in size, and
I know you well know that, are placed in particular airline
areas, and what we are trying to do is get those machines used
by other airlines where we can, but it is almost, in a lot of
areas you almost cannot get there from here. It becomes hugely
difficult for them to transport bags from one terminal to
another in order to do this, so it is more the location that is
not allowing us to get up any higher. As the Federal Security
Directors go in, as the Federal screeners go in, as these
machines go in, they are going to be in most cases repositioned
where they can get much better use.
Senator Wyden. One last question. You touched briefly on
the issue of cargo carriers, and I would like to know about
charter carriers with large aircraft. This is another area
where there has been significant public concern. What progress
has been made on this front?
Mr. Magaw. The large charter carriers, your concern is
correct, because there are some that are almost exactly as the
ones that were used on 9/11, and some even larger than that,
and they do make long hauls, and so they are full of fuel. We
are moving very rapidly towards requiring them to do the same
thing, virtually the same as the passenger aircraft.
Senator Wyden. When do you think that could be put in
place?
Mr. Magaw. Can I get back to you on that, Senator?
Senator Wyden. Do you think that can be in place within 90
days? Do you think you can make the decision within 90 days?
Mr. Magaw. I believe we can, yes, sir.
Senator Wyden. The Senator from Texas.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your continuing the hearing, and I am sorry that I
was late, and I hope that my line of questioning will not be
duplicative.
I just came in this morning from Dallas, where I attended
the Airport Executives National meeting where Mr. Magaw also
spoke, and of course security was the number 1 issue on their
agenda. Mr. Magaw, because you have just met with the airport
executives, and I know some of their concerns, let me start out
by saying that on April 26 you said that within 2 to 4 weeks
Raytheon would visit all 426 airports to determine what mix of
equipment would fit each airport's needs to meet the December
31 deadline for checking screened baggage. Where are you in
that process?
Mr. Magaw. The statement that I made then proved to be an
inaccurate statement, because in the meantime what we decided
to do was to do it differently. Rather than spend the funds to
send teams to virtually every airport in the country, at least
at that time to get the equipment ordered by taking a sampling
of 25 of the various size airports. We were able to get what we
feel is a proper number and balance of those that are ordered.
Within the next 6 weeks, they will have a person there
working specifically with them. Some of them are arriving at
different airports today. I think today DFW has theirs in
today.
So my statement in terms of the time was off, but the
machines in terms of order, in terms of the number, a they are
being built, they will be deciding with the airports where they
are placed. Places like DFW, a number of other airports who are
in a real bind in terms of space and moving walls and things,
we are trying to address first, but as you can imagine, it is a
huge undertaking, and we are trying to make sure that as we do
it there is a plan that agrees--those people, we are going to
join their family, not vice versa, and so they already have a
lot of plans at DFW, and others have terrific plans to show
what they do, what they cannot do, and how it can be worked
out, and so we will get that done as quickly as we can.
Senator Hutchison. Well, one of the concerns that the
airport executives expressed is that they do not see enough of
a plan on what the mix would be, and they know that part of the
mix is going to be manual screening, and they do not see how
they would be able to get from you the mix requirement and the
manpower to do a mix by the end of the year, so can you
reassure them that we will have plans in place for each
individual airport, and a strategy to meet this year-end
deadline?
Mr. Magaw. Every airport is reporting in to us. There are a
few airports around the country that figure that in moving
walls, doing the construction that they have to do, they are
going to need a specific mix, and even with that specific mix
there is a concern as to whether they can meet the deadline, so
what we are trying to do is identify those particular airports
that need a little bit more time in trying to address those
issues first, so we do have more time.
Secretary Mineta. Senator, if I might interject on that,
that is really very, very dependent on the ability to get our
$4.4 billion, and the President's request of $4.4 billion in
the supplemental has been short-changed by the House
appropriations bill, and so to the extent we have been
shortchanged--not only the $400 million, but the additional
$542 million that they have now earmarked for other purposes,
so that we have been shortchanged, we will not be able to come
up with the machines, or we will get the machines. We will not
have the people to be able to adequately staff the passenger
screening and the baggage screening responsibilities that we
have under the law.
Senator Hutchison. Will the baggage screeners be temporary
until you have the equipment for checked bags?
Secretary Mineta. In some instances, we are gearing up for
the baggage screeners. Hopefully, as we get to better
equipment, that we will be able to back off on the number of
screeners, but we do need that initial ramp-up, and then as we
get our experience down, then we can back off of that number,
but we do have to ramp up, and the number we use for fiscal
year 2002 in terms of full-time equivalents is 51,232.
Senator Hutchison. But break that out between the ones who
would be permanent, screening people going into the terminal,
versus checked baggage screeners.
Secretary Mineta. Okay. I will have to get that for the
record.
Senator Hutchison. I assume the checked baggage screeners
are going to be temporary until you have the full equipment for
checked baggage screening.
Secretary Mineta. Right.
Mr. Magaw. But you will still have to have screeners,
Senator. This equipment does not work by itself. These
screeners have to look at the machine, read the machine, what
it says.
Senator Hutchison. That is correct, but the part that you
are using as backup, because we do not have the equipment,
should be a large number of manual screeners making up for the
fact that we do not have the equipment that could then be
temporary in nature and let go, or put into another part of the
workforce, but the 51,000 it seems to me should be a more
permanent force, and then you have to ramp up, but it would be
temporary, and I would like to know how many of the 51,000
would be more temporary.
Secretary Mineta. We will get that broken out for you in
terms of the total number between the passenger screeners and
baggage screeners.
Senator Hutchison. I understand you are still going to have
to have someone working the equipment, but it would be one or
two people, as opposed to people actually doing----
Secretary Mineta. It will not vary that much. It will not
vary that much, but we will get that broken out for you.
Senator Hutchison. Well, common sense would say that it is
going to take more people to back up the lack of equipment than
it will take to operate a piece of machinery.
Mr. Magaw. At these checkpoints, a lot of the checkpoints
are just before you get on the aircraft. Some of that will be
reduced also, so there will be some numbers less.
Senator Hutchison. By the way, since you mentioned the
checking at the gate, has that brought forth anything that was
not caught at the first stage, going into the terminal?
Mr. Magaw. Yes. I think if we go much farther, we should do
it in classified briefing, but the answer is yes, and once the
Federal force is in place and functioning, I want to monitor
that some more. If it goes away, which I believe it will, then
we will be able to reduce numbers we were talking about before.
Senator Hutchison. Because it looks redundant, but if you
have actually had catches, because it is a backup, then it
looks as if that were a good decision.
Speaking of that, I had mentioned before that as soon as
the major job of securing the terminal is done, and you do away
with long lines, and things are smooth, that I would hope you
would look at allowing nontraveling people who are accompanying
passengers to go into the terminal, both for passenger
convenience and for the retail people who have made an
investment in the airport retail shops, who have certainly lost
business as a result of the smaller number of people going
through. Is that on your radar screen?
Mr. Magaw. Yes, it is on our radar screen, and just as you
have stated it, once the new procedure Federal force gets in
there and is functioning, moving lines, not having some of the
problems we are having today, then we would look at each
airport. Some airports do not survive because of that, and
others do not have the problems, so we are certainly going to
look at that.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman, or Mr. Secretary, the last
question I have once again regards the experience of some
airports, who have been wanting to invest in the equipment to
screen checked baggage, but they have not gotten clearance from
you. I think a good part of it is also that you are looking at
new and better technology, perhaps, to replace or supplement
these bigger, more unwieldy machines.
What do you think the timetable would be for getting the
next generation of technology, which presumably would be more
accurate and hopefully less cumbersome for these airports. Many
airports are not configured for this type of machine, so maybe
they would not have to make a major investment in something
that is only going to last a few years?
Mr. Magaw. In terms of looking throughout the country, and
virtually throughout the world, and talking to people who are
technology experts from MIT and other organizations, we do not
see anything that is sitting out there now. Their belief is, my
belief because of talking through the issue is that when we put
research money out there, and there is now a demand for that
equipment--you see, there has not been a demand up until now--
that the entrepreneurialship will take place, and we will see
some technology, but most of the experts that I have talked to
figure that it is at least 3 or 4 years down the road. It could
be available in 2-1/2 or 3 years, and probably 4 years before
it is put in airports.
Senator Hutchison. Do you foresee, then, a system with the
variety of trace detection and manual screening backing up
these bigger pieces of equipment to really be a fix that would
go through, rather than making a huge investment in a machine
that is going to last 3 or 4 years, maybe doing the backup
piecemeal system until the better equipment is going to be a
more sound investment?
Mr. Magaw. We are thinking exactly the way you are in each
airport, what makes sense in terms of the things you are
talking about, and in terms of the long run for each airport.
This equipment is going to be much better if it ends up in
line. That is, after you check it, and they turn and put it on
that baggage compartment, that it goes down into the basement,
or another level of the airport, and that is where, in the long
run, the in-line screening will take place and will work much,
much better.
I was meeting yesterday with the minister of Britain. It
took them 11 years after Pan Am 103 to get that done, and it is
working very well for them, but now they are facing the huge
change of the update in equipment, and so we are trying to look
at all those things as we move forward.
Senator Wyden. Let me announce to the Senator that the
Secretary has got to go in just a minute or two. I have one
additional question.
Senator Hutchison. I am finished, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say that I really appreciate your coming here. I
hope you will continue to communicate with Congress as we go
down the road on your problems on the deadlines and on the
appropriations issues. Let us try to be helpful so that we can
meet these deadlines and assure the traveling public that they
are safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wyden. I thank my colleague. One question for you,
Mr. Secretary, and then we will let you go, then I have one
additional question for you, Mr. Magaw.
Mr. Secretary, were there any concerns specific to
aviation, concerns that you can discuss in a public forum like
this, that led to the Vice President's comments on Sunday?
Secretary Mineta. Not really, no. I am not aware of
anything that would have prompted that.
Senator Wyden. So no new developments with respect to
aviation security that you are aware of?
Secretary Mineta. That is correct.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary, you have been very patient.
We will excuse you at this time.
Secretary Mineta. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Wyden. One question for you, Mr. Magaw, if I could.
When a warning goes out, what is done to monitor whether the
airlines respond appropriately?
Mr. Magaw. In each of the airports throughout the country
there used to be FAA regulatory inspectors. Now they are TSA
regulatory inspectors. There is well over 900 or 1,000 of those
throughout the field. They then are responsible not only to
make sure that they got the advisory, but also talking with
them about what it is that they are going to do about it, and
each of the airline security personnel in their main
headquarters discusses it with their personnel in the field.
There clearly needs to be more coordination with that, and you
will see it once our Federal Security Directors get there,
because that will be one of their key daily responsibilities.
Senator Wyden. What are the shortcomings in the system now,
if you feel there needs to be more coordination? Again, I am
looking for those kinds of areas where you can really ensure
accountability, and what I want to know is, when a warning goes
out, that something is really done to make sure that the
airlines carry it out appropriately, and I appreciate your
answer. You have said it is going to be better coordinated.
What seems to be the problem now?
Mr. Magaw. Well, I think right now what you have is the
notice going out to the airlines, and then leaving it to the
airlines as to what they do within their own system. What will
change is that when they go out, that Federal Security Director
will be responsible in each of the airports to talk to those
who service that airport and discuss the issues with them as to
what they are doing, and also look at what we are doing there
in terms of security. What do we have to change with that
alert?
Senator Wyden. Let me just wrap up by way of saying, Mr.
Magaw, I started off 3 hours ago talking about that picture of
Mohammed Atta, the one that is just sort of etched in the minds
of the American people permanently now, as he breezed through
that security checkpoint in Maine. After the Vice President's
warning on Sunday I got calls, and people asked yesterday, is
it safe to fly now, should I be flying, should I just stay
home?
What I have said is that we have got a lot of work to do. I
think that people like you are putting in a lot of hours, and
making a very sincere and very dedicated effort to get this job
done, but I think there are structural and organizational
problems here that are very deep. They are very, very deep, and
as highlighted to me on why we would need a data fusion system
now, I mean, why was that not in place October 15? Why wasn't
the legislation that I added to the Intelligence Committee bill
to set up a terrorist tracking system, why wasn't that in place
on October 15?
So what we need are the officials like you and Secretary
Mineta and Mr. Ridge to basically cut through some of this
bureaucratic paralysis--I do not know any other way to describe
it--that keeps these changes from being put in place, and that
is what the American people want, that is what they deserve. We
know you are sincere in the views you express today, but you
have got to step up the pressure. You have got to step up the
pressure because people want results, and they want changes,
and they want them quickly.
So unless you have anything to add further, we will excuse
you at this time. Is there anything you would like to add?
Mr. Magaw. No, sir. Thank you.
Senator Wyden. The Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the Committee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Secretary Mineta and Undersecretary Magaw, welcome.
Two months ago, Mr. Magaw and Ken Mead came before this Committee
to update us on implementation of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA). By and large, I think most Members of this
Committee walked away from that hearing impressed with the progress
that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made under
difficult circumstances.
And the difficulty of your jobs should not be underestimated. When
we passed ATSA, we demanded no less than fundamental changes in every
aspect of aviation security. We have given you extraordinarily tight
deadlines to (among others): check every bag, federalize screeners, and
install explosive detection equipment at every airport. I know that all
of you have been working around the clock to accomplish these goals
prior to the deadlines we set. All of us on the Committee appreciate
the efforts you've made.
That having been said, I want to point out that many of us on the
Committee have real concerns with the TSA and its implementation of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Indeed, you've likely already
heard some of these concerns before other congressional committees. My
goal for today's hearing is for us to have a good discussion about
these concerns so that we can, if necessary, make any necessary mid-
course adjustments.
Specifically, I would like to discuss four issues: ensuring a
single level of security for all airports; developing technology to
detect and track terrorists; information sharing between agencies; and,
finally, communication with Congress.
One Level of Security for All Airports
You recently announced that you intend to meet the December 31
deadline for installing Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) at all
airports by using a two-pronged approach. For larger airports, you plan
to use a combination of the larger EDS machines and trace detection--
technology that collects tiny samples of air or material, through the
swiping of clothing or baggage, from which the presence of explosives
can be detected. But, for smaller airports, you plan to use trace
detection alone--at least until smaller, less expensive EDS machines
can be developed. I understand that you hope to have developed and
deployed such smaller machines in two years.
I am, needless to say, concerned with any plan that appears to
create a two-tiered system of security. Smaller airports deserve the
same level of security as larger airports. Moreover, considerations of
national security demand a single, high level of security for all
airports. At the same time, I understand there simply may not be enough
larger machines available by December 31. And I also understand that
larger machines may be impractical to deploy at some smaller airports.
Finally, I am told that, at least under some scenarios, trace detection
can provide a comparable level of security as the larger machines.
Given the above, a temporary deployment of trace detection with
other procedures at smaller airports might be acceptable. But only if
there is an actual commitment to deploy next-generation EDS to smaller
airports, not just a vague promise to do so. I have been told that you
`hope and expect' these machines to be available in two years. That is
not good enough. We need to know more about how you plan to get EDS
machines to all airports.
Technology for Detecting and Tracking Terrorists
Among ATSA's many mandates and deadlines are a series of
requirements to deploy next-generation technologies to detect potential
terrorists. Although many of these do not have specific deadlines, they
are among the most important of ATSA's requirements, and must be
treated as such.
I understand that efforts are underway to modernize the Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), so that every
passenger's name will be automatically checked against a series of law
enforcement and intelligence databases. I also understand that efforts
are underway to use biometric technologies to verify that pilots,
flight crews, and law enforcement personnel are who they say they are.
These are important and worthwhile endeavors. But they leave a
potential hole in the system--we have no way of knowing that airline
passengers are who they say they are. Checking names against databases
is good, but not if passengers are using false identification, as did a
number of the September 11 terrorists. We need to develop and deploy
authentication technologies, including biometrics, so that we know who
is getting on board aircraft operating in the United States.
This will, of course, make air travel more secure. But, just as
importantly, it will enable law enforcement authorities to apprehend
those who would use our aviation system to travel to locations where
they plan to commit non-aviation-related acts of terrorism. The fact
is, foreign terrorists come to the United States from somewhere else,
and most do so through air travel. We must use the technological tools
available to us to find these people before they do us harm.
Information Sharing
There have been a number of disclosures this week about the
Administration's collection and distribution of security information. A
number of important questions will be asked about what you knew, and
when, and how you and your staff made the decisions not to distribution
information you received. I think it appropriate that these questions
be asked, not to assign blame or find a scapegoat, but to help ensure
that the events of September 11 are not repeated.
But the disclosures that have come to light this week raise
larger--and, to me, more fundamental--questions about how sensitive
information is shared among the various intelligence, law enforcement,
and other entities in the government. As a member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, this issue has been a priority of mine, because
it is clear to me after September 11 that we all must do better. I'm
eager to hear your perspective on, and experience with, these issues.
Communication with Congress
My final concern is perhaps the most basic--I'd like to see some
improvement in communication between the Department of Transportation,
the Transportation Security Agency, and the Congress. We want to help
you do your job. But, at times, we have not been fully informed about
your activities. We have also given you, and are willing to give you,
vast resources to ensure aviation security. And we have a
responsibility to our constituents and the American people to make sure
that you are doing the job. Just as we are here to help you, we need
your help to enable us to fulfill our responsibilities.
Again, Secretary Mineta and Undersecretary Magaw, I want to
emphasize that we on the Committee really do appreciate the difficulty
of the jobs we have assigned you. You are working around the clock to
do them, and we appreciate it. I and my colleagues on the Committee
have raised a number of concerns on our minds. But we share with you a
desire, and indeed, a determination, to see you succeed. I look forward
to helping you do so.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Norman Y. Mineta
EDS/Trace Detection
Under the law, TSA is required to install Explosive Detection
Systems (EDS) at all 429 commercial airports. You can use alternative
screening methods, such as Explosive Trace Detection, until EDSs are
deployed.
Secretary Mineta has announced that TSA will deploy 1100 EDS
machines and about 5,000 trace machines nationwide. Larger airports
will get both systems, and smaller ones will get only trace for now.
The DOT JO originally estimated, in testimony before the Committee,
that it would take more than 2,000 EDSs nationwide to fully deploy them
at all 429 airports. At the time, the production rates for the two
companies--InVision and L-3--were not capable of manufacturing all of
the equipment by the end of the year.
One major airport did a cost analysis comparing EDS with trace and
determined that trace, in the long run, would cost substantially more
(operating costs primarily). The airport is in the middle of a major
construction project and can put in the EDSs, if DOT/TSA made a
decision. They were preparing to spend $193 million in airport money to
put in the EDSs.
DOT/TSA is undertaking a research and development effort, working
with several large companies, to develop better, cheaper, and lighter
EDS machines. The machines in many cases may require substantial
redesign of airports prior to installation. The machines cost about
$700,000 per machine, and installation, according to the DOT 10, runs
about $350,000 per machine. The EDS has a bag throughput of 125 per
hour. Multiple machines are needed for large airports.
According to most experts, when an EDS machine alarms--a picture is
presented and the potential item is highlighted--Trace can analyze the
hem. Both types of machines have advantages and disadvantages (e.g.,
for trace the outside needs to be swabbed, and the inside opened for a
more thorough check).
Question. What is the next step and when does TSA expect to meet
the 100 percent EDS target?
Answer. The next step is full deployment and installation of
equipment and the hiring and training of screeners. TSA will soon award
a contract to a major firm for assessment of airport facilities,
submission of design plans, and needed construction. At this time, TSA
expects to meet the December 31, 2002, target date.
Question. Trace has traditionally been used at passenger
checkpoints, or in combination with EDS (the Europeans use this
configuration). Why did you decide to use it as a stand alone system
now?
Answer. Foremost, with appropriate protocols BID provides
explosives detection capability that is comparable to EDS. Given EDS
availability and airport space constraints, ETD became the natural
option.
Question. How much are you prepared to spend on research, and what
companies will be involved?
Answer. TSA has allocated $50 million to research and development
of next-generation explosives detection equipment. Our approach will be
to establish a consortium of companies and international partners in
coordination with academia and national laboratories to bring the best
minds to bear on this effort.
Question. Why has it taken so long for the TSA to get the ball
rolling on EDS installation?
Answer. TSA took swift action to plan and implement the EDS
requirements of ATSA. Contracts were awarded to original equipment
manufacturers InVision in February and L-3 Communications in April, and
another major contract will soon be awarded.
Question. Do you have any idea when those Federal officers will
arrive to relieve the local LEOs?
Answer. The TSA Police Officers will begin arriving in October. Our
first training class is scheduled to begin at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center on August 12 and graduate in early October.
We have a recruit, select, hire, train, deployment schedule for each
airport which runs through Fiscal Year 2003.
Question. If you can give them an idea of timing, it may present
different options--for example, adding more part-time officers--if they
know that the responsibility will last 6 months or 2 years. Have you
reimbursed the local airports for their security costs?
Answer. Federal Security Directors, who will be located at airports
across the country, will coordinate with local law enforcement agencies
to implement TSA's deployment schedule. TSA is not reimbursing airports
directly for their security costs but has been reimbursing local law
enforcement agencies for state and local law enforcement services and
will continue this practice.
TSA Budget Issues/Funding
Current estimates are that the new passenger security fee will only
generate revenues of $1 billion, which is $5.8 billion short of the
agency's current budgetary requirements.
Question. What are the personnel costs associated with deploying
the EDS and trace equipment? How does that breakdown for each type of
equipment?
Answer. In order to effectively staff an explosives detection
machine combined with the trace equipment, approximately seven staff
will be required. For stand alone explosive trace equipment, TSA
estimates that approximately five will be required. Personnel costs
associated with deploying the equipment include salaries and benefits
as well as recruitment, training, and uniform costs.
Question. Have the carriers been reimbursed in full for their costs
to date? If not, when is reimbursement expected? Will reimbursement to
carriers include leasing costs for space at the airports? Which costs
will the carriers be required to include in their 2000 cost data that
will be used to determine the amount of the Security Infrastructure Fee
that the carriers must pay?
Answer. TSA has entered into reimbursable agreements with carriers
where their employees are providing passenger screener functions in
advance of a Federal screener workforce. In addition, TSA has assumed
maintenance costs for screening equipment owned by the airlines but
provided to TSA under no-cost leases. FAA is still working on
distributing funding made available for the hardening of cockpit doors.
TSA continues to work with the carriers regarding any issues with
reimbursement. Costs that are to be included in the Security
Infrastructure Fee are itemized below, from Appendix A for 49 CFR Part
1511. *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This form will be available electronically from the Department of
Transportation's website at www.dot.gov.
A) Screening Personnel and Supervisors. --These are costs that the
air carrier incurred directly. Includes costs incurred for air carrier
personnel salaries and benefits, equipment owned, leased or rented
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
directly by that air carrier and any other costs directly incurred:
1. Checkpoint Screening Personnel (Salary, benefits, overtime,
retirement and other costs of checkpoint screening personnel.)
2. Exit Lane Monitors (Salary, benefits, overtime, retirement and
other costs of exit lane monitors.)
3. Cargo Screeners (Salary, benefits, overtime, retirement and
other costs of cargo screeners.)
4. Checked Baggage Screeners (Salary, benefits, overtime,
retirement and other costs of checked baggage screeners.)
5. Baggage Runners (Salary, benefits, overtime, retirement and
other costs of all baggage runners who move property such as baggage to
and from screening areas.)
6. Supervisory Personnel (Salary, benefits, overtime, retirement
and other costs of all supervisory personnel, including Checkpoint
Screening Supervisors.)
7. Non-Labor Costs (All associated expensed non-labor costs
including computers, communications equipment, time management systems,
supplies, parking, identification badging, furniture, fixtures, and
travel.)
8. Background Checks (All costs of performing required background
investigations on all screening personnel and supervisors. Screening
personnel and supervisors includes checkpoint screening personnel, exit
lane monitors, cargo screeners, checked baggage screeners, baggage
runners, and their supervisors.)
9. Training and Testing (All costs incurred for the training and
testing of all screening personnel and supervisors, including initial,
recurrent and remedial training. Includes any computer-based training
and the development of training programs for the screening of persons
and property as well as any travel, room and board, and all other such
expenses related to training.)
10. Training Records (The costs of implementing and maintaining
training records for all screening personnel and supervisors.)
11. Evaluations (The costs of completing evaluations for all
screening personnel and supervisors.)
12. Drug and Alcohol Testing and Treatment (All costs for drug
and alcohol testing as well as any associated counseling and/or
treatment for all screening personnel and supervisors.)
13. Uniforms (All costs of renting, purchasing, maintaining, and/
or cleaning of uniforms and any related equipment such as flashlights
and batons for all screening personnel and supervisors.)
14. Canines (All costs incurred by air carriers for the use of
canines and their handlers used for the screening of persons and
property.)
15. Cost of Obtaining Security Clearances (All costs associated
with obtaining security clearances for personnel relating to the
screening of persons and property.)
B) Equipment and Procedures. --These are costs that the air carrier
incurred through contracts with security firms. Includes personnel,
equipment and other costs incurred through contracts with third party
security companies:
16. Screening Equipment Installation (All costs associated with
the purchase, installation, and testing of all screening equipment. In
instances where the equipment is capitalized, provide the depreciation
expense in lieu of costs associated with purchase, installation, and
final acceptance testing. This includes such equipment as Metal
Detection Devices, Hand Wands, X-ray screening machines, Explosives
Trace Detection Devices, Explosives Detection Systems, or any other
such similar technologies. Includes any costs incurred or depreciation
costs recognized in calendar year 2000 for the modification and/or
construction of any facility needed to accommodate screening, including
architecture and engineering. Also includes the costs of any
refurbishment and/or modernization of the equipment.)
17. Operating, Operational Maintenance and Testing of Installed
Screening Equipment (Costs of operating, maintaining, and calibrating
installed screening equipment. This includes such equipment as Metal
Detection Devices, Hand Wands, X-ray screening machines, Explosives
Trace Detection Devices, Explosives Detection Systems, or any other
such similar technologies. Includes such costs as test objects and X-
ray radiation surveys, electricity costs and maintenance contract costs
incurred for the operations of such equipment.)
18. Maintenance of Sterile Areas (Costs of maintaining integrity
of sterile areas. Includes costs of opening sterile areas, emergency
evacuations of sterile areas, and re-screenings not included
elsewhere.)
19. Checkpoint Signs and Related Equipment (The cost of purchase
or rent, installation, testing, and maintenance of checkpoint signs,
barriers, lane markers, and exit lane doors.)
20. Exceptional Screening for Persons and Property (Any
additional costs for special screening such as for disabled passengers,
VIP passengers, classified and/or high value items.)
21. Security Company Contracts (All security company contract
costs for the screening of persons and property that cannot be detailed
into any other cost category.)
C) Property and Plant. --These are costs that the air carrier
incurred through other means. Includes costs incurred through air
carrier security consortiums:
22. Real Estate (All direct costs for the real estate utilized
for the screening of persons and property. Includes space at airports
for the performance of these functions, as well as such space used for
break rooms, private screening rooms, storages space, training moms,
and office space. Also includes appropriate space for the oversight of
the screening functions outside of airports such as in headquarters or
regional offices.)
23. Utilities (All costs for utilities used for screening.
Includes electricity, heating/ventilation/cooling, and
telecommunications costs not elsewhere specified.)
D) Program Management and Contract Oversight:
24. Ground Security Coordinators (All costs incurred for the
Ground Security Coordinator's oversight of the screening functions.
Includes personnel salaries, benefits, retirement, training, and non-
labor costs.)
25. Security Program Management (All air carrier head office,
regional, or airport specific costs associated with the administration
and oversight of screening not elsewhere specified. Includes personnel
salaries, benefits, retirement, training, and non-labor costs.)
26. Security Contract Administration and Oversight (All costs
associated with the administration and oversight of screening
contracts. Includes personnel, benefits, retirement, training, and non-
labor costs.)
27. Screener/Supervisor Background Check Audits (All costs not
elsewhere specified for background audit checks for all screeners and
supervisors.)
28. Legal Support (All legal support costs incurred during
calendar year 2000 relating to aviation security screening. Includes
legal assistance for the implementation and execution of security
screening contracts.)
29. Accounting Support (All costs for accounting and financial
services incurred for the support of the screening functions.)
30. Other Administrative Support (Includes all labor and non-
labor costs for such items as human resource administration, clerical
assistance, information technology, and other support functions related
to screening.)
31. Insurance (All insurance costs relating to screening.
Includes worker's compensation and general liability insurance.)
32. Law Enforcement Costs (All costs incurred by the air carriers
for law enforcement personnel costs that were reimbursed by the air
carriers for services performed in connection with the screening of
persons and property.)
33. Recruitment Expenses (All costs associated with the
recruitment of screening personnel and supervisors. Includes signing
bonuses, travel, and other recruitment expenses.)
E) Security Consortium Costs:
34. Management Fees for Oversight of Consortium Contracts (Any
costs incurred for fees charged by other organizations for the
management of contracts for the screening of persons and property.)
F) Other:
35. Other (Any costs incurred not elsewhere specified during
calendar year 2000 for the screening of passengers and property. These
costs should be itemized on a separate sheet. Includes any fines or
monetary penalties incurred for screening as well as any profit/bonuses
paid to contractors for screening services not included elsewhere on
the form.)
Currently, the carriers are also performing catering screening.
Congress intended for the TSA to assume this responsibility but they
have not.
Question. Does TSA intend to provide federal employees to perform
this function? If so, when will they be put in place? If not, will they
continue to use the carriers to screen catering? Will the carriers be
reimbursed for these costs? If so, when?
Answer. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) does
not require TSA to directly perform or pay for the screening of
catering supplies prior to their placement aboard aircraft. ATSA does
require that security measures be in place for persons and property
entering secured areas of airports and requires that TSA establish
procedures to ensure the safety and integrity of catering and passenger
amenities. TSA is authorized and responsible to determine, through
issuance of orders, regulations, or security directives or through
approval of security programs, the entities that are required to carry
out these requirements at non-Federal expense.
At this time, air carriers are responsible to ensure required
security procedures are implemented for catering services. Currently,
we are working on establishing uniform requirements for catering
security in order to assure consistency across the commercial aviation
system. Costs to carry out these measures rest with the parties made
responsible for these measures, not with the TSA.
TSA also issued a security directive to airport authorities
requiring the use of Local Law Enforcement Officers to replace National
Guard troops at airport security screening checkpoints by May 10, 2002,
and on May 31, 2002, all National Guard troops will leave their
stations at the airports.
Question. What is the deployment plan/timeline for federal TSA
officers to replace the LEOs? how many TSA armed law enforcement
officers will be hired? Will the $73 million requested in supplemental
funding for FY 2002 fully cover the agreements negotiated with airports
for reimbursement of LEOs? Under the negotiated agreements, how much
funding will the TSA need for LEO reimbursement in FY 2003?
Answer. The deployment plan for TSA Officers includes a schedule to
select, hire, train, and deploy 3000 personnel through Fiscal Year
2003. The deployment at each airport will be coordinated by the Federal
Security Director with local authorities in order to fully utilize all
available law enforcement resources to enhance overall security. We
believe that the requested level of supplemental appropriations would
fully cover the negotiated agreements for FY 2002. For FY 2003, TSA
will need and has requested $264 million to support negotiated
agreements for LEO reimbursement.
Many local governments have expressed their concern about the
liability implications of placing local law enforcement at airport
security checkpoints.
Question. Will the Administration offer local governments liability
protection for officers acting in a federal capacity?
Answer. We are coordinating Special Deputation requests through the
U.S. Marshals Service when a local law enforcement agency requests such
coverage. Only 4 police departments out of 429 have requested the
coverage. Most agencies do not consider the coverage necessary as they
were already responding to incidents at airports prior to posting at
the checkpoints. In the event a Federal violation occurred, and no
local or state laws covered the act, they detained the suspect until a
Federal law enforcement officer arrived or guidance was received from a
Federal prosecutor.
Question. Has TSA negotiated liability coverage for any of the 429
commercial airports for LEOs?
Answer. No. However, some airports have increased their liability
insurance coverage and added the costs as overhead to their agreements.
Question. Does TSA have the authority to negotiate liability
protections for LEOs?
Answer. No, we coordinate Special Deputation through the U.S.
Marshals Service.
Question. Can local officers be designated as federal officers in
the same manner that the FBI or DEA operates when they use LEOs for
conducting law enforcement activities?
Answer. Yes, as noted, TSA coordinates Special Deputation requests
through the U.S. Marshals Service.
Question. Would that designation provide the officers liability
protection?
Answer. It provides the same protection as that provided to Federal
employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act when they are properly
exercising Federal authority or acting under the direct supervision or
control of a Federal official within the scope of employment as defined
by the memorandum of agreement between TSA and the local authority.
Question. Is the TSA considering alternative deployment plans for
LEOs at Category I and II airports?
Answer. Alternative deployment plans will depend on the total
number of LEOs authorized for TSA and costs associated with local law
enforcement officers at individual airports.
Question. Will the option of response time be extended to all
airports?
Answer. At the present time, current security directives must be
complied with. This requires law enforcement officers at the
checkpoints.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Max Cleland to
Norman Y. Mineta
Question. The TSA's process for replacing airport screeners has met
with some criticism for being inflated, costly, and confusing. For
example, originally the agency expected to hire about 30,000 new
screeners for the nation's 429 airports. Now I understand that number
is closer to 70,000. Can you please tell the Committee why the number
of screeners has more than doubled? Do you believe doubling the number
of screeners will impede the TSA from meeting the November 19 deadline
for federalizing the security workforce?
Answer. The requirements to perform passenger screening have not
changed. TSA requires screening personnel at both passenger checkpoints
and checked baggage screening locations. TSA requires 33,000 screeners
and supervisors to staff the checkpoints for screening passengers to
meet the November 19th deadline. Additionally, in order to meet the
December 31st deadline to screen 100 percent of checked baggage, a
workforce of 22,000 baggage screeners and supervisors is required. The
total staff requested in 2003 for TSA is 67,200. In addition to the
passenger and baggage screening workforce, this includes federal law
enforcement officers, support staff; and staff for TSA's maritime and
land intelligence, and research and development programs.
Question. Can you justify why the Senate shouldn't follow the lead
of the House Appropriations Committee and cap the number of security
employees that can be hired at the TSA?
Answer. TSA needs as much flexibility as possible with its
workforce in order to meet the ambitious deadlines set forth in ATSA
and will continue to work with Congress to ensure that resources, such
as personnel, are used efficiently.
TSA has thoroughly examined and assessed the personnel requirements
to successfully meet the mandates contained in ATSA for the
federalization of all passenger and baggage screening. At this time,
TSA expects to hire roughly 50,000 employees to perform the screening
function. TSA also intends to hire several thousand law enforcement
officers and federal air marshals (FAM) to effectively enforce the
numerous aviation security laws and regulations. Any reduction in the
anticipated number of employees TSA can hire could inhibit our ability
to meet the statutory requirements in ATSA.
Question. On a related issue, there has been confusion over the
amount of money the TSA plans to spend on salaries for screeners and
checkpoint guards and the fact that these salaries, at least at one
point in time, appeared to change on a daily basis. Could you please
clarify for us the TSA's salary scale for both screeners and guards?
For managers and supervisors?
Answer. Please find attached TSA's salary levels.
Transportation Security Administration--Salary Levels for TSA
Employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Salary Range \2\
Position Pay Band \1\ --------------------------------------
Minimum Midpoint Maximum
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger and Baggage Screeners \3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Screeners D $23,600 $29,500 $35,400
E $27,100 $33,900 $40,700
Lead Screeners F $31,100 $38,900 $46,700
Screener E $27,100 $33,900 $40,700
Supervisors
F $31,000 $38,900 $46,700
G $36,400 $46,400 $56,400
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA Law Enforcement \4\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uniformed F $31,100 $38,900 $46,700
Officers
G $36,400 $46,400 $56,400
Federal Air F $31,100 $38,900 $46,700
Marshals and
Criminal
Investigators
G $36,400 $46,400 $56,400
H $44,400 $56,600 $68,800
I $54,100 $69,000 $83,900
Law Enforcement G $36,400 $46,400 $56,400
Supervisors
H $44,400 $56,600 $68,800
I $54,100 $69,000 $83,900
Law Enforcement J $66,000 $84,200 $102,300
Management
K $78,900 $100,600 $122,300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Security Directors \5\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Airports H $44,400 $56,600 $68,800
I $54,100 $69,000 $83,900
Medium Airports J $66,000 $84,200 $102,300
K $78,900 $100,600 $122,300
Largest Airports TSES-3 $99,000 $122,400 $145,800
\6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\TSA is using FAA's pay bands as directed in section 101 of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act: The personnel management
system established by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration under section 40122 shall apply to employees of the
Transportation Security Administration . . . As TSA gains experience
with this system, it expects to make changes to it to reflect the
needs of its mission. The salary levels shown do not include locality
pay.
\2\In pay banding systems employees, other than new hires, tend to
cluster around the midpoint of the band. As TSA stands up the airport
security organization in 2002, virtually all of the screening
employees will be paid at the low end of the D Band.
\3\It is the intention of TSA to hire a mix of full, part-time, and
seasonal screeners to accommodate seasonal and daily variations in
airport passenger flows.
\4\Law enforcement availability pay (LEAP) will be provided to criminal
investigators and Federal Air Marshals, but not to uniformed officers.
Uniformed officers and law enforcement supervisors of uniformed
officers will be paid overtime rather than LEAP until a review of
actual practices allows TSA to determine whether LEAP or overtime is
more cost effective. Law enforcement management will not be eligible
for LEAP pay unless their primary function is criminal investigations
or they are air marshals.
\5\Federal Security Directors do not get LEAP pay.
\6\Approximately 50 airports.
\7\These charts do not inctude pay levels for TSA headquarters staff or
for TSA support staff at airports.
Question. Shortly after September 11th, El Al gave a briefing to
Members of the Commerce Committee, At that briefing El Al recommended a
security model to the U.S. that puts the government in control of a
multi-layered security net that relies on the sharing of information
all the way up the ladder--from the screener who checks passengers and
baggage to the airport operator, all the way up to the top government
officials in the Israeli chain of command.
As you know, the new aviation security law establishes a
Transportation Security Oversight Board which will work with the
intelligence community in coordinating intelligence information. In
addition, will the DOT and the TSA take a page from the El Al book and
ensure the coordination of intelligence information throughout the
layers of our aviation system, including our screeners, law enforcement
personnel, federal airport directors, the TSA and DOT?
Answer. Through the use of CAPPS-II, the security processing
required of each passenger on a by-name basis will be available to
airline check-in agents, screeners at the checkpoint, the Federal
Security Director, and where appropriate, law enforcement personnel.
The Federal, State and local law enforcement officers and the
screening checkpoints they monitor are our first and last line of
defense at our airports. Our intelligence organization publishes a Roll
Call daily update for airport security and screeners providing
information on concealed weapons and security bypass techniques based
on actual incidents and intelligence sources. The Federal Security
Directors (FSDs) lead and manage the personnel and operations at the
airport. Our intelligence organization also publishes a classified
Daily Intelligence Summary and frequent Intelligence Circulars to
update airport security, thereby providing them timely information on
threats, concealed weapons and security bypass techniques based on
actual incidents and intelligence sources. We are evaluating a Remote
Access Security Program to improve their access to classified
information. Additionally, they will have personal digital assistants
that will be used to provide them the same capability as their law
enforcement personnel.
Question. As you know, last November 16th an individual breached
security at Hartsfield and the airport was shut down. I later found out
that federal criminal penalties are on the books for anyone willfully
violating security aboard an airplane--but not for someone
intentionally violating an airport checkpoint. For example, in Georgia
an individual who willfully violates the secure area of an airport is
only subject to a misdemeanor which means a maximum penalty involving a
civil fine up to $1,100 and a year in jail. Accordingly, to close the
loophole and to help deter similar acts in the future, I have
introduced legislation, S. 1794, to make the willful violation of an
airport security checkpoint a federal crime. My legislation will mean
that violators could face up to 10 years in prison. What are your views
on my legislation and its purpose?
Answer. There is no Federal penalty for violation of an airport
security checkpoint. A standardized Federal penalty could give LEOs at
the airport the authority and means to enforce security procedures at
airports with greater consistency.
Question. What standards have been created for the closure of a
terminal or emptying of a plane or delay in departure? Who has the
authority to make such a decision? Are these decisions discussed with
airline and airport officials?
Answer. In late October, 2001, Transportation Secretary Mineta
launched a ``Zero-tolerance'' policy concerning security breaches at
U.S. airports. At the time, passenger screening responsibilities were
still under the direct control of U.S. airlines but the move to
Federalize the process was already underway. The announcement of the
strict policy was aimed at strengthening safeguards to stop weapons and
prohibited items from passing security checkpoints. We defined a
security breach so that all TSA employees were using the same
definition.
A security breach occurs when a person, who is unauthorized or an
object that has not been screened, bypasses screening procedures or is
improperly admitted to the sterile area.
On March 25, 2002, TSA published Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) for Interim Federal Security Representatives (IFSRs) overseeing
the security at each of the airports in the U.S. That SOP provides
guidance and direction for TSA security personnel in managing emergency
evacuations of airport sterile areas, recall of flights, and the
rescreening of passengers for cause. This practice continues today.
The Federal Security Director or Interim Federal Security
Representative has authority to determine when a security breach
occurs.
When a breach in security occurs, the IFSRs have been advised that
coordination with the airports, air carrier, law enforcement, and TSA
management must be accomplished to limit the impact of the situation.
Question. As you well know, pilots' licenses are paper certificates
with no identifying photo, and they are therefore easier to counterfeit
than are drivers' licenses. In order to make it harder to forge these
licenses, I offered an amendment which was included in the new aviation
security law that requires safeguards to be put in place, including a
requirement for a tamper-proof color license photograph.
I'd like your comments on the need to produce pilots' licenses in a
highly secure format, given the fact that pilots use these licenses to
help identify an individual who desires to ride the jump seat.
Answer. TSA has been studying the idea of a universally recognized
biometric card for any transportation worker who has unescorted access
to secure locations within a transportation facility, including
commercial pilots.
An FAA rulemaking team with TSA membership considered a petition
from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to require pilots to
carry a valid photo identification card with their pilot certificates.
The FAA is considering whether it should incorporate a photo
requirement for the licenses it issues to general aviation pilots. In
the general aviation pilot community, considerable anecdotal evidence
suggests that for many pilot transactions, such as leasing an aircraft,
there is a commonplace practice of requiring a pilot to show a
government-issued identification together with a pilot license.
Until an improved airman certificate can be developed and issued,
we can fully justify a requirement that pilots carry valid photo
identification with their pilot certificates.
Question. The TSA will require administrative office space at each
commercial airport. For example, its estimated that at Mansfield the
TSA will require several thousand square feet. Not surprisingly, most
airports feel that the TSA should pay rent for this space. Secretary
Mineta, it is my understanding that as part of your supplemental budget
request, you asked for $36 million to pay for the TSA's use of space
both at airport facilities and off-airport locations for FY 2002.
Given your experiences at BWI Airport in terms of the TSA's use of
space, do you believe you have budgeted enough for this purpose? Mow
much do you plan to budget for the agency's use of space in fiscal year
2003?
Answer. Yes, we believe that we have adequate funding to cover
office and support space to house the Federal Security Directors and
their staff the 429 airports. The FY 2003 rent projection is roughly
$50 million. Unless major increases are made to the number of staff and
type of staff at each airport, the rent projection for FY 2003 is
adequate.
Question. How are you ensuring that each airport has consistent
security standards? Are standards described to carriers?
Answer. Part 1542 of Title 49 C.F.R. (Airport Security) requires
airport operators to adopt and carry out a security program that
provides for the safety and security of persons and property on an
aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation against an act of criminal violence, aircraft piracy,
and the introduction of an unauthorized weapon, explosive, or
incendiary onto an aircraft. Airports are required to submit for
approval Airport Security Programs describing the procedures to be used
to implement security at each specific airport. Required contents of
the programs are specified under 49 C.F,R. 1542.113. Airports share
with air carriers those elements of their security programs that are
necessary for air carriers to fulfill their security responsibilities.
In addition, airports meet with consortia made up of a wide range of
airport stakeholders, including air carriers, to discuss security
programs and issues.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted as calling for a 10 minute
check-in standard. Where are you on that goal?
Answer. We are committed to measuring wait time as airport rollout
continues by collecting baseline information from airports that are
beginning the Federalization process as well as measurement information
from Federalized airports.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Max Cleland to
John W. Magaw
Question. Congress presented you with a very formidable challenge
in implementing the new aviation security law, and to your credit the
TSA has come up with a very aggressive security plan. By necessity, our
new aviation security system will not be cheap. However, the TSA's
budget has almost tripled over the past few months--from $2.4 billion
to $6.8 billion. Specifically, I have heard concerns over what, for
lack of a better term, might be called ``bureaucratic bloating.''
Is it true that the federal security director at each of the top 81
airports will have his own personnel department, his own legal staff,
and his own public relations staff? If true, do you have any estimates
for what this will cost? How do you answer criticism that some of these
81 airports will have to rent space in order to accommodate all these
additional staff?
Answer. The FSDs at each of the top 81 airports will initially have
a small staff from human resources, training, customer service,
engineering, administration and screener scheduling operations. This
staff is the minimum we believe we need to initiate the security
coordination and workforce security requirements of the FSDs at each of
our largest airports. As FSDs assume their full range of security
responsibilities, they will need to add legal, budget, and community/
stakeholder positions. While the three largest airports will have one
assistant FSD for screening in each airport with a salary range
beginning at $78,900, the balance of the staff representatives will
normally begin at lower pay ranges.
The 2003 budget assumes a total of 2,500 support positions at the
airports. The number of staff and type of staff at each airport will
vary based on size and need. Among other things, we anticipate that the
largest airports will likely have legal, budget, human resources
support as well as community/stakeholder positions. The budget also
includes funding to support space for these personnel.
Question. Under the new law what security functions at Hartsfield
will still be performed by local law enforcement? What functions will
be performed by federal law enforcement? How will the Department of
Transportation ensure there is coordination and information-sharing
between local and Federal law enforcement?
Answer. The deployment of the TSA officers will not replace local
officers at Hartsfield but supplement the existing law enforcement
presence. The deployment will be coordinated by the FSD with local
authorities in order to fully utilize all available law enforcement
resources to enhance overall security.
Question. On a related note, many airport operators feel that
protection of airport perimeters should remain in the hands of local
airports and local law enforcement. What is TSA's view?
Answer. TSA is preparing plans for conducting security
vulnerability assessments at every airport covering the entire airport.
This activity will be conducted jointly with local law enforcement
officers working at the airports. lie results of the vulnerability
assessments will be used to develop a security plan specific to each
airport, including which functions will be performed by Federal law
enforcement officers and which will be performed by local law
enforcement officers.
Question. Now that the National Guard is about to conclude its
duties at the nation's airport security checkpoints, I understand that
the TSA has mandated that these Guardsmen be replaced by local law
enforcement personnel. I also understand that the TSA has offered to
enter into reimbursable agreements with airport operators to cover
these increased costs and that agreements with the largest Category I
airports will get first consideration.
As you know, our smallest airports often have very little, if any,
cash reserves available to ``weather the storm'' while waiting for
reimbursements from federal agencies. When do you anticipate our
Category III and IV airports--like the Augusta airport, for example--
will get financial assistance from the TSA on this issue?
Answer. TSA will reimburse airports/police departments on a monthly
basis for law enforcement services at the screening checkpoints only.
The amounts paid vary at each airport depending on the number of hours
the checkpoints are staffed and the hourly amount agreed to in the
Memorandum of Agreement with each individual agency or airport.
Question. On Monday at BWI, large numbers of flights were delayed.
I have heard that the cause of the delay was because the TSA, which has
taken over security at the airport, did not have the staffing to handle
the passenger loads. As peak summer traffic builds, these types of
problems could have devastating results.
Can you tell us what happened at BWI yesterday? What steps have
been taken to address the problem?
Answer. On Monday, May 20, 2002, delays were experienced at BWI,
chiefly on Pier D. TSA Federalized BWI on May 14, when flight loads
were average to minimal. However, this week loads greatly increased to
over-capacity. TSA was adequately staffed the entire day with 30
screeners and supervisors per shift. However, additional flights were
added by airlines due to the May schedule change. As a result, there
was a significant increase in passenger loads on Pier D. The increase
in passengers, coupled with the fact that there were only 3 security
lanes, increased line wait times.
TSA is working with all airlines to identify the critical nature of
communications on a daily basis when flight schedule changes occur. In
addition, airlines have collectively developed a customer metering
system to ensure all airline passengers are moved through checkpoints
in time sequence. TSA has discussed the efficient use of this system
for appropriate checkpoints with all airlines. Also, construction is
ongoing at the Pier D checkpoint. The completion date is scheduled for
August 1, 2002. The number of security lanes will then be expanded from
3 to 7 lanes.
Question. As you know, the new aviation security law mandates that
by December 31st baggage at all commercial airports must be screened by
explosive detection equipment. However, I have heard that the majority
of the nation's airports have not been consulted or told what mix of
equipment--explosive detection versus trace detection, or a mix of
both--they can expect in order to meet the year-end requirement.
What is your plan for consulting with airports on the mix of
equipment that best serves individual airports? Can all airports--even
smaller facilities--expect some sort of decision in the near future?
Answer. Our deployment process calls for appropriate coordination
with all airports, large and small, and air carriers at both
preliminary design and final design decision points. This will cover
both equipment mix and layout.
Question. When do you hope to finalize your plans for EDS
installation? Can we realistically expect all airports to have EDS or
ETD equipment by the end of the year, given the fact that we need 1,100
new EDS and 4,800 more new ETD machines and we are only seven months
away from the deadline?
Answer. Larger airports should achieve preliminary design decisions
by September. Smaller airports will be staggered between July and
November. We have a commitment from our supply lines for availability
and from our contractors for deployment, installation, hiring, and
training. TSA is taking all appropriate actions to meet the year-end
mandate.
Question. I understand that earlier this year, the TSA proposed a
``National Transportation Worker ID Card'' for workers who have
unescorted access to a transportation facility or who have access to
control of a transportation conveyance. Could you provide us with a
status update of this effort and indicate whether any decisions have
been made regarding who will have access to the confidential
information that might be included in such a card?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has been working
on a variety of means to enhance the security of our nation's
transportation system. One of the initiatives TSA has studied is the
idea of a universally identifiable biometric card for any
transportation worker who has unescorted access to secure locations
within a transportation facility, such as an airport. Regarding who
would have access to confidential information, final decisions have not
been made, but the system would be designed to protect the privacy of
confidential personal information and limit the number of people with
access to the information.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Norman Y. Mineta
Budget/Personnel/Supplemental Appropriations
The House Appropriations Committee last week reported a Fiscal Year
2002 Supplemental bill which includes $3.85 billion for TSA, $550
million below the overall request. Moreover, that bill prohibited funds
for more than 45,000 staff at the agency, as opposed to reported TSA
estimates of up to 70,000.
Question. If the limit of 45,000 personnel holds, how will that
affect your plans?
Answer. Should a 45,000 cap be placed on the agency, TSA will be
forced to maintain security with fewer personnel. This could lead to
significant wait times and airline delays to accommodate a longer
security process.
TSA must deploy 33,000 passenger screeners and supervisors to the
passenger checkpoints at the 429 commercial airports across the country
to meet the November 19th deadline. Additionally, 22,000 baggage
screeners and supervisors are needed throughout the commercial airports
to meet the Aviation and Transportation Security Act requirements of
screening 100 percent of checked baggage.
These staffing levels were developed to ensure that the security
requirements are met by the mandated deadlines and will not adversely
affect the amount of time a traveler must spend to pass through the
federal security process. TSA intends to continuously monitor the
workload requirements to take advantage of all efficiencies within the
processes in order to respond quickly to changes in staffing
requirements. Initial checkpoint redesign efforts have improved
efficiency by over 40 percent.
Question. Press reports suggest that you are having difficulties
finding screeners. Can you comment on these reports?
Answer. Some areas, particular large, high cost cities, have
presented recruitment challenges. However, outreach and additional
marketing efforts are resulting in sufficient applicant pools.
Question. Can you break your employee estimates down further? Why
have these estimates increased from those you submitted last Fall?
Answer. The requirements to perform passenger screening have not
changed. TSA requires screening personnel at both passenger checkpoints
and checked baggage screening locations.
TSA requires 33,000 screeners and supervisors to staff the
checkpoints for screening passengers to meet the November 19th
deadline. Additionally, in order to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage, a workforce of 22,000 baggage screeners and supervisors is
required.
The total staff requested in 2003 for TSA is 67,200 which in
addition to passenger and baggage screening workforce includes federal
law enforcement officers, support staff as well as staff to support
TSA's maritime and land intelligence, and research and development
programs.
Question. Can you specifically describe the impact on your
personnel needs of your decision to employ trace detection exclusively
at many small airports? How would this compare to combining trace
detection and EDS machines at all airports?
Answer. As a general rule, the operation of trace detection
machines requires more personnel than the operation of EDS machines.
For instance, at a category III airport where the baggage volumes are
high and either an EDS or ETD machine can be used, it takes
approximately 5 more individuals to screen baggage using ETD machines
because it takes 3 ETD's to obtain the equivalent throughput of 1 EDS.
However, for smaller airports (category IV), the throughput
requirements are lower so that the difference between EDS and ETD is
negligible. Also, due to lower throughput numbers at these airports,
EDS machines would likely be underutilized, resulting in a negative
cost to benefit ratio.
TSA will meet the statutory requirements through a mix of EDS and
ETD machines with protocols to assure the requirements are met. To
date, TSA has not calculated the difference in personnel between
deployment of ETD at exclusively small airports as opposed to combining
trace detection and EDS machines at all airports.
Question. Airports and airlines have raised a number of issues
about delays in getting paid. Can you provide further information on
how you are providing reimbursement of airports for activities such as
law enforcement?
Answer. TSA is currently reimbursing airports and/or police
departments on a monthly basis for law enforcement services at the
screening checkpoints only. The amounts paid vary at each airport
depending on the number of hours the checkpoints are staffed and the
hourly amount agreed to in the Memorandum of Agreement with each
individual agency or airport.
EDS and Trace Detection
A few weeks ago. Secretary Mineta announced that, while large
airports will receive both EDS and trace detection, smaller airports
will, at least for now, receive only trace detection. Consistent with
this announcement, DOT has ordered only 1100 EDSs and more than 5,000
trace detection systems.
Question. If you go through with your deployment decision, will you
commit to deploying lighter, cheaper, and faster ``next generation''
EDSs at all airports? Do you have a specific time frame for deployment?
Answer. Deployment of next-generation EDS will be driven by the
economic and operational impacts at individual airports. Deployment
decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Our expectation is that
deployment may begin two to three years from initiation of research and
development efforts.
Question. What research and development resources will you commit
in order to accomplish this?
Answer. A significant portion of TSA's research and development
resources will be committed to this effort, and we expect this to be
supplemented by resources and funding from our partners.
Passenger-matching and authentication technologies
TSA is working on technologies that would (I) match passengers'
names with law enforcement, intelligence and other databases; and (2)
authenticate the identities of pilots, flight crews, and law
enforcement personnel with access to secure areas.
Question. How far away are we from being able to usc technologies
such as biometrics to authenticate passengers' identities are we?
Answer. TSA is exploring the use of technology for the
authentication of identities of pilots, flight crews, and law
enforcement personnel with access to secure areas.
Biometric systems are being tested in conjunction with airport
pilot programs. Some appear to work well, and others are just now
evolving to the point of maturity with acceptable rates for false
positives and false negatives.
We need to conduct more research on this issue and explore the
legal, operational, and procedural issues surrounding the use of
biometrics prior to reaching a conclusion regarding the use of this
technology for either transportation personnel or passenger
authentication, We will continue to examine many technologies and
technical solutions in our ongoing effort to improve security. The data
from the pilot programs will determine next steps and the timeline.
Question. What policy issues are you working through as you
consider the deployment of such technologies?
Answer. TSA is investigating both policy and legal issues
surrounding the deployment and use of biometrics technology. Before
reaching a conclusion regarding the use of this technology, the
following areas are being examined: (1) access control and security of
privacy data; (2) background checks; and (3) claimed identity
documentation requirements.
Question. Will you consider a pilot program to test such
technologies?
Answer. Yes, pilot programs will be an important part of TSA's
incremental approach to resolving issues of scale and complexity in
current and projected programs. TSA will ask airport managers to submit
pilot proposals by August 1, 2002.
Question. What safeguards are you considering to ensure protection
of confidential information collected using passenger-matching and
authentication technologies?
Answer. Every effort is being made to secure confidential
information. Subject matter experts and need-to-know personnel are
keenly aware of the sensitive nature of this information and are
applying the appropriate technologies and policies. Both the
information and physical architecture upon which it resides are locked
down.
Question. More generally, when background checks are conducted on
airport personnel, what safeguards have you put in place, or are you
considering, to ensure that the information contained in these checks
is not distributed or used for non-authorized purposes?
Answer. This information is protected under the Privacy Act. Under
the current process for performing background cheeks on airport
personnel, fingerprints are submitted to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and then transmitted to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). Returns from the FBI are routed through OPM, where
a record of the inquiry is created before the information is forwarded
to the FAA.
Question. The new Federal security employees--who will be the front
line of defense against terrorism--cannot be threatened with
disciplinary action or reprisal for reporting legitimate safety and/or
security threats. At the same time, you must have the flexibility to
discipline those who do not perform up to the highest standards. Can
you elaborate on your plans to implement whistleblower protections for
security screeners?
Answer. Although the Federal Security Screeners arc not covered by
the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), TSA will soon finalize a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Office of Special Counsel
(OSC) which will ensure that Federal Security Screeners have a
mechanism for raising claims of retaliation for whistleblowing similar
to that afforded employees covered by the WPA. Pursuant to the MOU,
OSC, the independent Federal investigative and prosecutorial agency
charged with responsibility for enforcing the WPA, will receive and
investigate any allegations of retaliation for whistleblowing filed by
Federal security screeners. OSC will utilize procedures similar to
those applicable to employees covered by the WPA. Security screcners
may file a complaint with OSC alleging that a personnel action was
threatened or taken against them because they made a protected
disclosure of information which they reasonably believed evidenced a
violation of law, rule or regulation, gross mismanagement, gross waste
of funds, an abuse of authority or a specific and substantial danger to
public health and safety. OSC will conduct an investigation of the
complaint to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to
believe that retaliation has occurred. In appropriate cases, OSC may
recommend that TSA stay a personnel action pending completion of its
investigation. If upon completion of its investigation OSC concludes
that retaliation has occurred and if the matter cannot be settled
informally, OSC will send a formal report of its findings to the Under
Secretary recommending corrective action.
Question. As you have gone through the process of federalizing the
airport security workforce, how are you dealing with labor and
employment issues such as pay, benefits, and collective bargaining? Do
you believe security personnel should be treated similarly to other
federal employees with respect to these issues, or are you considering
different treatment?
Answer. Federal security screeners will receive most of the same
rights and benefits afforded other Federal employees, including
retirement, health insurance, life insurance, paid vacation and sick
leave. Their pay system is the same core compensation system applicable
to all FAA and TSA employees. Screeners will also have protection from
unlawful employment discrimination, whistleblower protection (pursuant
to a memorandum of understanding with the Office of Special Counsel),
and due process procedures for disciplinary actions. A decision has not
yet been reached on collective bargaining rights to be afforded Federal
security screeners.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John F. Kerry to
Norman Y. Mineta and John W. Magaw
Question. Mr. Secretary and Undersecretary Magaw, especially in the
post-September 11 world, it is essential that workers--who are the
front line of defense against terrorism--not feel threatened in any way
with disciplinary action or reprisal for reporting safety and/or
security threats.
Why is this Administration so reluctant to grant whistleblower
protections for federal airport security screeners? They already exist
for workers elsewhere in the aviation industry, and for government
employees in comparably sensitive jobs.
Answer. I agree that our Federal security screeners must feel free
to report safety or security concerns without fear of retaliation. This
is why TSA will soon finalize a memorandum of understanding with the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC) pursuant to which allegations of
retaliation for whistleblowing may be filed with the OSC by Federal
security screeners. Although these employees are not covered by the
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), we will enter into this agreement
so that OSC may investigate claims of retaliation under procedures
similar to those applicable to employees covered by the WPA. This
memorandum of understanding, and the informational efforts about
whistleblower protection we will undertake, will ensure substantial
protection to our Federal security screening personnel.
Question. Trace detection systems can and should play a meaningful
role in aviation security. But I am concerned that trace is now being
considered as stand-alone explosive detectors for checked baggage at
smaller airports. Now, I am very sensitive to the enormous logistic and
cost challenges that you face in trying to meet the December 31
deadline. But it is also clear to me that deployment of trace alone is
insufficient. Frankly, I think that we ought to strive for, ultimately,
a system similar to the Israeli model, where trace and EDS are
complementary.
If trace deployment is to be an interim step, that maybe
acceptable, as long as we have a clear and reasonable timetable for the
full deployment of EDS equipment. Can you provide us with such a plan?
Answer. Full deployment of EDS equipment is predicated on our
ability to achieve next generation equipment and capabilities.
Deployment of next-generation EDS would be achieved by gradually
replacing and redeploying current EDS equipment to maintain the base of
EDS coverage.
Question. It is with great concern that I have heard rumors: that
the Administration plans to draw-up rules that would, essentially,
allow trace detection systems to be treated as providing equivalent
capability as EDS.
At the same time, I understand that the first system--developed
through the ARGUS program--designed for explosive detection screening
at smaller airports will soon be certified. It is my strong hope that
trace and EDS equipment will be part of a complementary, layered system
of explosive detection. But in light of the role that trace is expected
to play at smaller airports, how will the new ARGUS systems be used?
And, furthermore, is the ARGUS program even worth continuing? It
seems to me that if trace is considered equivalent, and used as a
stand-alone security technology, we will destroy incentive to industry
and the scientific community to develop new and better technologies.
Personally, I believe we need to keep encouraging exactly this kind of
research and development. But based on the rumors I have heard about
plans to treat trace and EDS as equivalent, I am not sure that is the
Administration's belief. Can you please clarify?
Answer. The first ARGUS system has been certified. The ARGUS system
is designed for low throughput applications but at this time has not
met cost objectives and has not been proven in operational utility
testing. ARGUS may indeed be appropriate for smaller airports or
smaller throughput applications but validation of this has not been
completed. Our major focus remains development of next-generation EDS
capability.
Question. Part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
called for the increased sharing of information among intelligence
agencies through the Transportation Security Oversight Board. I favor
the development of a database that compiles FBI, CIA and INS watch
lists. The airlines would then check their manifests against this
database. It is clear that such a system could have prevented at least
two of the September 11 hijackers from boarding aircraft.
Again, Mr. Secretary, I am aware that this matter is not entirely
within your purview, but you are the Chairman of the ISOB, and as we
cannot hear from Mr. Ridge, would you explain how the TSOB is
proceeding, and whether you are getting the kind of adequate
cooperation you need from other members of that Board?
Answer. As you are aware the TSOB was developed to increase
intelligence sharing among agencies and to oversee implementation of
transportation security issues. Members of the TSOB include officials
of the Dept of Treasury, Office of Homeland Security, Dept of Justice,
Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the National Security Council.
The TSOB has principally focused on the stand-up of the Transportation
Security Administration and completion of congressionally mandated
deadlines, though in the future I expect to utilize the Board to
address any identified shortcomings in intelligence information
sharing.
In regards to watch lists, one planned component of the CAPPS-II
functionality will involve checking the full names of all passengers
against a government-maintained terrorist watch list. The principle is
that such passengers would not be permitted to board the flight unless
cleared to do so by law enforcement. (This reverses the process now in
use, whereby the airlines are responsible for checking names provided
by government against the passenger name record of their passengers.)
It has not yet been determined which watch list(s) will be used (or
which agencies will he responsible for generating and maintaining it).
In the meantime, we continue to improve and strengthen our
intelligence information sharing with the agencies represented on the
Board, as well as the rest of the intelligence and law enforcement
community. We do feel we are receiving the cooperation from members of
the Board that is so critical to securing our transportation system.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Norman Y. Mineta
Question. Personnel estimates for TSA have ranged as high as
70,000, and it has been reported that 50 percent of that total would be
needed for baggage screening.
What are your estimates for the number of personnel needed for the
operation of trace-devices compared to the number needed for EDS
equipment?
Answer. In order to effectively staff an explosives detection
machine combined with trace equipment, approximately seven people will
be required. For stand-alone explosive trace equipment, TSA estimates
that it will take approximately five staff.
Question. A recent news article reported that Dallas-Fort Worth
Airport estimated that trace devices would require about 2.5 times the
number of workers needed to screen the same number of bags using EDS.
Do you consider that a reasonable estimate? If so, what are the longer
term cost implications of deploying such a large number of trace
devices?
Answer. TSA is unable to judge the reasonableness of this news
article estimate or its longer-term cost implications without having
the benefit of knowing the detailed assumptions on which it is based.
Question. I have further concerns that such a large screening
workforce will lead to a sizeable bureaucracy to oversee it. How many
of the total number of TSA personnel will be located in headquarters
and what. in general, will their functions be?
Answer. TSA plans to have a flat organization, with most of the
personnel in the field but reporting to headquarters. Efforts have been
made to hold headquarters staffing at minimum levels. We anticipate a
headquarters staff of approximately 1,355; 1,175 in Washington and 180
trainers and attorneys located in the field, but reporting to
headquarters. The headquarters staff will support a wide range of
functions including legal counsel, strategic management, information
technology, and budget and financial management, as well as program
specific policies and guidelines.
Question. How will TSA oversee the screening workforce and ensure
that a top-heavy bureaucracy does not develop.
Answer. In order to streamline the administrative operations at the
airports, key airports have been designated as hubs. These hubs will
provide security direction, administrative support, and staff as needed
to smaller, less staffed airports. TSA plans to hire in the range of
160 Federal Security Directors nationwide to oversee security at the
429 commercial airports. All federal security directors will report
directly to headquarters. TSA believes that this is consistent with a
flat organization.
Question. What are TSA's total workforce needs and how does that
break down in terms of baggage screening, passenger screening, and
other categories?
Answer. TSA must deploy 33,000 passenger screeners and supervisors
to the passenger checkpoints at the 429 commercial airports across the
country to meet the November l9th deadline. Additionally, 22,000
baggage screeners and supervisors are needed throughout the commercial
airports to meet the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
requirements of screening 100 percent of checked baggage by December
31, 2002.
These staffing levels were developed to ensure that the security
requirements are met by the mandated deadlines and will not adversely
affect the amount of time a traveler must spend to pass through the
federal security process. TSA intends to continuously monitor the
workload requirements to take advantage of all efficiencies within the
processes in order to respond quickly to changes in staffing
requirements. Initial checkpoint redesign efforts have improved
efficiency by over 40 percent
Question. About what percentage of your staff is in place at this
point within TSA?
Answer. Not including FAMs, approximately 2 percent of TSA's
workforce is in place based on the staffing level requested for 2003.
Question. In the TSA's recent screening deployment report, there is
a comment that the agency may rely on local airport personnel to assist
in carrying out checked bag screening functions at the Hagerstown test
bed. I believe the law is clear that screening is to be performed by
Federal employees, except for the pilot programs that cannot yet be
undertaken. How would local airport personnel be used in this
situation?
Answer. Screening must be performed by Federal employees after the
statutory deadline. Because we are still operating before the deadline,
there is no requirement that the test be performed by Federal employees
at the Hagerstown test bed.
Question. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act authorized
DOT to allow pilots to use either firearms or less-than-lethal weapons
under certain circumstances. This issue has generated considerable
controversy. Do you intend to allow pilots to carry weapons aboard
aircraft under any of the conditions described in the law?
Answer. As noted, the use of weapons on aircraft has been
controversial. TSA continues to examine the ramifications of proposals
to allow pilots to carry firearms and may conduct a technical review of
this matter. A similar technical review on ``less than lethal'' weapons
has already begun. We expect it to be competed in September.
Question. I understand that TSA has been developing models and
plans for how the agency will take over control of security operations
at individual airports. I am informed that one of the midterm
capabilities that TSA hopes to have at airports is government issued
cars with emergency lights for any staffer designated by the Federal
Security Director. In addition, an item on the agency's long term wish
list is a gym area at each airport. While I support giving the agency
adequate resources to handle its core mission, these are the types of
things that have the look of bloated bureaucracy. What steps are you
taking to ensure that the cost and size of the TSA does not begin to
spin out of control?
Answer. TSA is committed to responsible stewardship of the public
funds appropriated for airport security operations TSA is vigorously
reviewing all budget and funding requests to assure that only basic
operational needs are met. The budget request does not include any
provision for cars with emergency lights or gym facilities. Allocations
and spending guidelines are being developed to ensure that TSA's core
mission can be met within the funding appropriated.
Question. I recognize that explosive trace detection (ETD) devices
are relatively inexpensive and can be deployed quickly. However, there
may be significant long-term cost issues associated with the use of
ETDs. If it is true that it requires more screeners to use several ETD
devices instead of one explosive detection system (EDS) machine, any
short term cost savings will lead to larger personnel expenses in later
years. Will these cost issues influence decisions regarding the use of
ETD equipment as a permanent solution?
Answer. ETD's are not anticipated to remain as the permanent
solution, except in the smallest of airports where passenger and
baggage throughput requirements are minimal. Although detection
capability is the primary consideration in developing a permanent
solution, minimizing total life cycle costs, including staffing
resources required to perform checked baggage screening, is a major
consideration in the decision process.
Question. Concerns have been raised about potential reliability
problems with EDS and trace equipment. For example, it has been
reported that trace devices are frequently not operational, mostly
because of maintenance related problems. Complaints have also been made
about the availability and reliability of trace equipment, the intense
maintenance effort required to keep units operating, the lack of vendor
support, inadequate training, and the high cost of replacing consumable
items.
What are the maintenance needs of both trace and EDS? Have regular
maintenance schedules been developed?
Answer. New EDS machines are deployed with a one-year warranty; new
ETDs are deployed with a two-year warranty. Maintenance schedules have
been developed for both ETD and EDS equipment. The TSA will be
transitioning the management of its responsibilities for ETD and EDS
maintenance from reimbursable agreements with the air carriers to a
contractor. The contractor will be responsible for setting up a 24-hour
call center for unscheduled maintenance events as well as managing a
preventative maintenance program. Further, much of the routine ETD
daily and preventative maintenance can be performed by properly trained
TSA baggage screeners.
Question. Who will be in charge of equipment upkeep and maintenance
and who will pay for it? If airports are responsible, will the
associated costs be reimbursable by Federal funds?
Answer. A contractor to TSA will manage and/or perform routine and
major maintenance on TSA security equipment.
Question. How much of the time does TSA anticipate EDS and trace
equipment will be offline due to the maintenance related or reliability
problems?
Answer. The average operational availability for currently deployed
EDS equipment is approximately 95 percent. Current EDS equipment
purchase contracts call for operational availability to be improved to
96 percent or greater. Indeed, some models of EDS equipment already
average greater than 98 percent operational availability. EDS equipment
vendors arc cooperating on a continuous improvement program to
significantly improve EDS reliability. Regarding ETD availability, when
properly maintained the average operational availability is greater
than 98 percent.
Question. Has TSA developed backup systems that may be used in the
event that a sufficient number of explosive detection units are not
available at a particular airport due to maintenance needs or other
reliability problems?
Answer. The current operational availability and downtime of the
equipment will be factored into the design plans and equipment
requirements for deployments at each airport. Equipment redundancy,
alternative screening equipment backups and contingency measures will
be established for each airport installation commensurate with the
average amount of downtime anticipated for the model(s) of equipment
used as the primary baggage screening device(s). TSA has also developed
ETD equipment supply options as a contingency in the event that the EDS
equipment manufacturers cannot provide all of the equipment needed on
schedule.
Question. Under Secretary Magaw, we are more than six months beyond
enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and there
are seven months until the year-end deadline that baggage at all
commercial service airports be screened by explosive detection
equipment. And yet, today, the majority of the nation's airports have
not been consulted with or told what mix of equipment will be deployed
at their facilities.
What is your plan for consulting with airports on the mix of
equipment that best serves the individual facilities?
Answer. A contractor team will be deployed to 429 airports to
consult with the airport operators. federal security directors, and air
carrier stakeholders to develop a plan to meet the December 31 deadline
for 100 percent checked baggage screening. When an airport has already
developed a plan, the team will analyze this plan and consider all
available alternatives. Once the initial assessment is performed, TSA
will be consulted and options evaluated, The contractor and TSA will go
back to the airports to present the results of their evaluation and the
preferred options to secure stakeholder concurrence prior to full-scale
design, permitting and site preparation activities.
Question. When do you hope to finalize your plans for EDS
installation?
Answer. All airport plans will be completed by the end of October.
Plans for some complex, larger airports have already been formulated as
a result of initiatives by local airport authorities and their
consultants.
Question. Can all airports--even smaller facilities--expect some
sort of decision in the near future?
Answer. Smaller airports will be assessed in parallel with the
assessments at larger airports.
Question. Since DOT announced its plans to use trace devices,
several security experts have been quoted in the press stating that
trace is not as effective as EDS in detecting explosives, especially
when only the outside of the baggage is swabbed. They indicated that
opening baggage to swab the interior provides more effective screening,
but is obviously intrusive and time-consuming.
What protocol--open or closed--do you plan to have screeners use
when trace devices are used alone?
Answer. Based on the projected availability of equipment and
operators, TSA intends to implement a multiple procedure screening
solution. During peak times, a portion of all bags will receive an
outside trace; another portion of bags will receive an open-bag trace
with sampling of selected objects within the bag; and, the remaining
bags will receive an aggressive open-bag search where all objects
within the bag will be independently swabbed. The bags to be subjected
to each type of search procedure will be chosen randomly, and no more
than 40 percent of the total bags will receive an outside trace search.
In addition, all CAPPS selectee bags will all receive an aggressive
open-bag search.
Question. Will the protocol be different at locations where trace
is used with EDS vs. stand alone?
Answer. When EDS is present, the portion of bags subject to open-
bag aggressive search, plus all selectee bags, may also be screened
through the EDS. Any EDS alarm bags will be subject to the aggressive
open-bag search.
Question. What are TSA's plans beyond December 31 for screening
baggage? Will trace devices that are used as the primary baggage
screening method eventually be replaced by EDS? If so, when does TSA
plan to begin phasing out the use of trace only and what is the cost
associated with that activity? Is there a long term plan to deploy EDS
machines at all airports?
Answer. TSA intends to begin pursuing a long-term explosive
detection system strategy that emphasizes in-line installations
integrated into the baggage handling systems. ETD equipment used as a
primary screening device at larger airports will eventually need to be
replaced by partially or fully integrated equipment. Airports
undergoing terminal construction or renovation would be among the first
to receive in-line EDS equipment. For smaller airports, TSA may begin
operational testing of the ARGUS EDS equipment, developed for lower
cost, lower throughput applications. TSA is pursuing the development of
a faster, cheaper, more nimble explosive detection system to replace
the current EDS equipment. It is anticipated that a next generation of
EDS will be available in 5 years.
Question. At present, the financial situation of the airline
industry is dismal. Furthermore, rural airports in some parts of the
country have been struggling to retain air service at affordable
prices. Because passengers may prefer to drive a few hundred miles to
their destinations or to larger airports that have less intrusive
security, what does TSA intend to do to make sure that the use of trace
devices at smaller airports does not drive away business?
Answer. TSA believes 100 percent ETD checked baggage screening
solutions will result in minimal or no adverse impact on passenger
processing times. The intrusiveness of die ETD search has not been seen
as a major issue of concern to most passengers. The time it takes to
process passengers, including situations where bags are screened in
airport lobbies, appears to be more closely correlated to the number of
airline ticket agents staffing available positions. `The equipment
deployment models are designed to accommodate peak passenger processing
times.
Question. Under Secretary Magaw, it is my understanding that, on
April 26, you said that within two to four weeks Raytheon teams would
visit all 429 commercial airports to determine the appropriate mix of
equipment to meet the year-end requirement for screening check bags.
Could you please provide us with a status report of those Raytheon
visits.
Answer. Raytheon was tasked to perform security equipment design
and installation activities under the old FAA integration contract.
Work performed under the Raytheon task will be transmitted to TSA's
contractor, both in writing and in a series of technical interchange
meetings.
Question. When do you expect them to be completed?
Answer. TSA's contractor assessment task is more comprehensive than
Raytheon's original task, TSA's contractor will gather sufficient data
to model passenger and baggage flow to assess various equipment
configuration options at the larger airports. Site survey and planning
activities will be completed by the end of October.
Question. Will the Raytheon teams visit all 429 airports?
Answer. TSA's contractor will visit all 429 airports,
Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that any new types of
explosive detection equipment, systems, or procedures will provide a
level of security that is at least as good as currently accepted
measures? Will there be any type of independent verification of the
performance standards if such new means of detecting explosives are
employed?
Answer. TSA employs an independent operational test and evaluation
contractor tasked with continuous assessment of security equipment,
systems, and procedures. The DOT Inspector General also provides
oversight and independent verification of performance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Norman Y. Mineta
Question. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act enacted on September 22, 2001, acknowledged the devastating
economic effects of the events of September 11 on both the airline
industry and related businesses, including airport security companies.
The legislation capped liability for claims relating to the terrorist
attacks of September Ii at the limits of available insurance coverage
at that time. This liability protection was afforded to air carriers
and their employees and agents.
However, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act amended the
Stabilization Act to exclude the airport security industry from
liability protection previously afforded under the Stabilization Act.
As a result, the airport security companies that TSA relies upon for
the transition to a federalized system are in jeopardy from potential
exposure to liability claims arising from terrorist attacks of
September 11. Does the Department of Transportation support extending
the coverage of the liability cap to airport security companies in
order to ensure a smooth uninterrupted transition?
Answer. Yes. Presently the airport security companies performing
under contract with the Transportation Security Administration are
operating under either the extended war risk insurance coverage or
under indemnification provided for under Public Law 85-804. Extending
the coverage of the liability cap should ensure a smooth uninterrupted
transition since it will enable many of the TSA's largest airport
screening companies to continue as viable businesses.
Question. Failure to restore the liability cap could possibly
incapacitate the security companies at some point in the near future
and could cause severe interruption during the transition to the
federalized system. Do you think exposure to unlimited liability from
the events of September II threatens the viability of these aviation
security companies? If this situation occurs, how does the DOT plan to
deal with a situation where one or more current contractors providing
security services succumbs to the expected onslaught of these
lawsuits'?
Answer. l'he unlimited liability exposure may have a detrimental
impact of several of the more viable aviation security companies who
perform services other than passenger screening. In other cases,
security companies will be going out of business solely because the TSA
is taking over the only services which they perform. In these cases
there will be no impact on aviation security.
Question. Does the Administration support reinstating the liability
cap for aviation screening companies currently under contract with the
Transportation Security Administration as a part of the FY02
Supplemental Appropriations Bill, which is currently in conference?
Answer. Yes
Question. Three of the largest 10 cities in the United States are
in Texas, and three major airlines are headquartered in my state. Many
of my constituents work in the aviation industry and must pass through
security checkpoints as part of their daily routines. The increased
security measures employed since September 11 have had the unintended
effect of lowering the efficiency and productivity of airline employees
because they must spend a great deal of time waiting to pass through
these checkpoints. Pilots have been particularly vocal about these
delays and their consequent loss of productivity. When TSA begins
testing a Trusted Traveler Program, I would hope that airline employees
could be part of the test group. Can you comment on the idea of
including airline employees as part of your pilot program?
Answer. TSA is open to the idea of a ``smart'' card, the so-called
``trusted traveler'' card, and is currently working on a potential
concept for such a program. TSA will take into consideration all
proposals, including those concerning the participation of airline
employees as part of the pilot program, prior to making a decision. Our
concern is that the level of security and confidence it brings be high
enough to rule out anyone who might be a threat. The card would have to
be a reliable method of positively identifying an individual through
biometric or other technologies; and would have to be difficult or
impossible to forge or tamper with.