[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRATEGIC WORKFORCE PLANNING AT USAID
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-113
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
92-392 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Columbia
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota ------
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Peter Sirh, Staff Director
Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota CHRIS BELL, Texas
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Thomas Costa, Professional Staff Member
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 23, 2003............................... 1
Statement of:
Marshall, John, Assistant Administrator for Management, U.S.
Agency for International Development, accompanied by Rose
Marie Depp, Director, Office of Management of Human
Resources, U.S. Agency for International Development, and
Barbara Turner, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Policy and Program Coordination; and Jess T. Ford,
Director, International Affairs and Trade Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office, accompanied by Albert
Huntington, Assistant Director, and Audrey Solis, Project
Manager.................................................... 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 18
Marshall, John, Assistant Administrator for Management, U.S.
Agency for International Development, prepared statement of 8
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Turner, Barbara, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Policy and Program Coordination:
Information concerning general talking points............ 53
Letter dated October 20, 2003............................ 50
STRATEGIC WORKFORCE PLANNING AT USAID
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays and Turner.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A.
Briggs, clerk; Chris Skaluba, intern; David Rapallo, minority
counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations hearing entitled,
``Strategic Workforce Planning at USAID'' is called to order.
According to the President's management agenda, in most
agencies, human resource planning is weak. Workforce
deficiencies will be exacerbated by the upcoming retirement
wave of the baby boom generation. Approximately 71 percent of
the government's current permanent employees will be eligible
for either regular or early retirement by 2010, and then 40
percent of those employees are expected to retire.
Without proper planning, the skilled mix of Federal work
force will not reflect tomorrow's changing missions. This
strategic human capital time bomb described by the
administration has been ticking at the U.S. Agency for
International Development [USAID], for some time. For the
better part of the last decade, both the General Accounting
Office [GAO], and the USAID Inspector General have reported a
failure of USAID to plan for the impacts of downsizing,
employee demographics and the changing needs of a more
dangerous world.
Today GAO updates those earlier findings and answers our
questions about the impact of work force planning lapses on the
ability of USAID to perform critical missions in places like
Afghanistan and Iraq.
At USAID, the mission has changed. The manpower has not.
New laws, regulations, policies and host-nation expectations
have not prompted corresponding reforms of USAID personnel
practices.
For a variety of long evident reasons, the core function of
USAID has evolved from that of direct aid provider to one of
contract or management. Skilled and dedicated veterans at USAID
have done their best to adapt, but the lack of a clear plan to
identify and deploy the skilled sets demanded by a fast-
changing world leaves the agency hard pressed to meet current
missions and ill-equipped to face a demanding future.
The GAO report released today notes 47 of 77 USAID
positions in Kabul remain vacant. The agency is also finding it
difficult to place Foreign Service Officers in Iraq where
unaccompanied tours and harsh living conditions do not attract
many takers from among a predominantly married, over 40 talent
pool.
According to GAO, efforts to address strategic human
capital management weaknesses at USAID have had limited impact.
To meet its important mission in places like Afghanistan, Iraq
and other development frontiers, the agency needs a
comprehensive work force planning system and similarly expanded
method of calculating the true cost of doing business.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.002
Mr. Shays. We welcome our panel of witnesses from the
General Accounting Office and the Agency for International
Development this morning, and we look forward to their
testimony.
At this time, the Chair will welcome our two panelists. We
have Mr. John Marshall, Assistant Administrator for Management,
U.S. Agency for International Development. We also have Mr.
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Is there anyone else, gentlemen, that may respond to some
questions that we should swear in when we swear you in? Anyone
that you might call on that might respond? If so, I'd like them
to stand as well.
Mr. Marshall. If needed, our Chief Human Capital Office,
Rose Marie Depp, from the Agency as well as our Assistant
Administrator for Planning Budget and Policy Coordination,
Barbara Turner.
Mr. Shays. Great. Why don't you both stand as I swear you
in, and then we may call on you. We may not.
Mr. Ford. I'm going to have my two staffers be sworn in as
well. Albert Huntington, Assistant Director for this project.
Audrey Solis, Project Manager.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. That helps us out. Raising your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record our two witnesses and
potential witnesses have responded in the affirmative.
Mr. Marshall, thank you. We will have another Member join
us, and then I will go through the household requirements of
asking unanimous consent that your statement may be part of the
record even if you don't actually give all of it in your
testimony.
At this time Mr. Marshall, thank you, and you may begin.
You know what? Just do me a favor. Tap that mic and see if
it actually--yes. It's pretty delicate. You're going to have to
have it pretty close to you, I'm afraid. Bring it a little
closer if you would.
Mr. Marshall. My voice carries pretty well.
Mr. Shays. It does. Here's what I'd like, though. You will
not offend me if in the back row you do not hear, if you raise
your hand, I'd like to make sure you can hear in this room. So
if you can't hear and I don't see any hands, that is your
fault.
OK. Mr. Marshall.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN MARSHALL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
MANAGEMENT, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
ACCOMPANIED BY ROSE MARIE DEPP, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
AND BARBARA TURNER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR
POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION; AND JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ALBERT HUNTINGTON, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, AND AUDREY SOLIS, PROJECT MANAGER
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to testify to USAID's efforts to reshape its work force to
better meet new and evolving global challenges. With increasing
responsibilities overseas, the need for effective work force
planning is more critical than ever. When Administrator Andrew
Natsios arrived at USAID in 2001, he found all of the Agency's
management systems in a state of disrepair. He directed me to
develop plans to overhaul and modernize all five of the basic
systems of the management bureau; human resources, financial
management, procurement, information technology services and
administrative services.
Reforms in each of these areas are well underway. Most have
been integrated with the President's management agenda, and
many are being coordinated with similar efforts in the State
Department. Like many Federal agencies, USAID is experiencing
serious human capital challenges. As a result of new program
demands around the world, deep staffing cuts and decisions to
effectively shut down recruiting and training in the 1990's,
our work force is stretched thin, rapidly graying and lacking
in critical skills.
Our work force planning challenges are complicated by a
unique approach to planning and budgeting for the agency's
administrative requirements. According to GAO, USAID is the
only agency in the government with an operating expense account
that funds most but not all of the Agency's administrative
needs. This account has been tightly controlled. So the Agency,
with the consent of OMB and Congress, has had to use program
funds to meet administrative needs directly associated with the
actual delivery of foreign assistance.
For example, we make use of over a dozen different hiring
authorities to meet our work force needs. Some of which use
program funds. This has complicated our work force planning
enormously, because each of these work force components has
different competencies, cultures and administrative
requirements. Therefore, our HR staff must understand not just
one but multiple HR systems, and our leaders must blend them
into a single uniform foreign assistance delivery system.
Our work force challenges are also compounded by new and
growing challenges to respond to the war on terrorism and the
continuing threat that hunger, poverty and the HIV AIDS
epidemic pose to our national security.
President Bush's national security strategy acknowledges
these threats and places the strategic importance of foreign
assistance alongside that of the other two essential pillars of
U.S. foreign policy, defense and diplomacy.
To address these challenges, USAID is taking aggressive
steps to strategically manage our human capital by adopting
best practices from the private sector including those endorsed
by GAO in the President's management agenda. Workforce planning
is an area where we have much room for improvement. Past
efforts have been segmented by type of employment category and
have not examined the entire work force in the context of
agency wide strategic planning.
USAID is now initiating the first ever comprehensive
competency-based work force analysis focusing on three major
organizations as pilots; our human resources organization,
procurement and global health.
The Agency has recently completed an overseas staffing
assessment to rationalize the deployment of approximately 700
Foreign Service Officers in overseas missions. This is the
first step in an overall right-sizing effort designed to
establish necessary skills and staffing levels and appropriate
headquarters to field ratios.
The next steps will be to determine whether some of the
functions should be managed regionally and to apply in a
systematic way the right-sizing framework developed by the
General Accounting Office. This framework is designed to link
staffing levels to three critical elements of overseas
operations. One, physical security and real estate; two,
mission priorities and requirements; and third, operational
costs.
We are simultaneously ramping up recruitment efforts to
create a 21st century Foreign Service corps. The centerpiece of
this effort is our so-called development readiness initiative
that parallels the Department of State's diplomatic readiness
initiative. We are successfully recruiting at the mid levels
through our New Entry Professional [NEP] program and have
reinstituted recruitment of junior officers as International
Development Interns [IDIs].
Since the inception of the net program in 1999, we've
recruited over 260 mid-level Foreign Service Officers.
Establishing a surge capacity to meet emerging needs is
essential to USAID success. The development readiness
initiative was created to address this need. Without this
capacity, USAID has few ways of responding rapidly. For
example, we're stuck with reassigning staff from existing
missions and hiring contractors as two of our best responses.
We are also improvising other ways of addressing urgent
needs, including developing rosters of personal service
contractors with past experience and security clearances who
are available for short-term deployments--excuse me,
deployments on short notice. And we're cross-training direct-
hire employees and making greater use of limited non-career
appointments.
While shortfalls in our operating expense account have
presented enormous challenges in managing our human resources,
much progress has been achieved this year through our efforts
to identify the full cost of doing business and to present them
in more transparent ways, and through our efforts to seek a
better means of financing these costs in the future.
As part of our human capital initiative, we have partnered
with the Office of Personnel Management to more effectively
analyze our human capital strategies and address gaps in our
critical competencies. We expect to have a comprehensive human
capital strategy in place by the end of the first quarter of
2004, and it will be adapted based on our experience--ongoing
experience with work force planning analysis as we move into
the future.
We are also working diligently to incorporate suggestions
from GAO, OPM and other experts and to institutionalize our
strategy to rebuild our work force. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today, Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to
answer any questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.010
Mr. Shays. We've been joined by Mr. Turner. At this time
I'd ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee
be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and
the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record,
and without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. I'm pleased to be here today to discuss our
report on USAID's work force planning----
Mr. Shays. If you'd turn the mic at an angle so at least it
will get--exactly.
Mr. Ford. OK.
Mr. Shays. Even more so. Thank you.
Mr. Ford. Today I'm going to talk about our report that
we're issuing today on work force planning that we conducted
for this subcommittee, and I'm going to highlight the
preliminary findings from another report that we hope to issue
in the next couple of days on USAID's operating expense
account.
The work force report, as I mentioned, has been released
today, and I'm going to briefly summarize some of our main
points.
Humanitarian and economic development assistance is an
integral part of U.S. global security strategy, particularly as
the United States seeks to diminish the underlying conditions
of poverty and corruption that may be linked to instability and
terrorism.
In fiscal year 2003, USAID expects to obligate about $13
billion to manage programs in about 160 countries. Agency staff
often work under difficult environments and under evolving
program demands. More will be demanded of USAID staff as they
implement large-scale relief and reconstruction programs in
Afghanistan and Iraq while continuing to administer their
traditional long-term development assistance programs.
As a result, it is essential that USAID develop a strategic
approach to its work force planning so that it can identify and
attain the essential skills it needs to accomplish its goals.
It is also important that USAID identify and report accurate
costs on administrating its foreign aid programs.
I'm going to summarize briefly points on both. First, I
will focus most of my statement on USAID's work force planning.
I will discuss some of USAID's human capital challenges,
including its recent efforts to staff missions in Afghanistan
and Iraq and the status of its efforts to develop a strategic
work force planning system.
Regarding USAID's operating expense account, I will also
discuss how the Agency's reporting of operating expenses does
not always capture the full cost of administering foreign
assistance.
USAID's work force has undergone many changes over the
years. For example, as noted on our chart that we--over on my
right, in the past decade, USAID has had a reduction in their
U.S. direct-hire work force of approximately 37 percent from
about 3100 to almost 2,000 direct-hire employees. At the same
time, USAID has been involved in operating in more countries
overseas, and most recently, its program funding levels have
increased significantly as much as 78 percent in the last 2
years.
Moreover, the Agency has increasingly relied on personal
service contractors and institutional contractors which account
for over two-thirds of USAID's work force to implement its
humanitarian and development assistance projects and manage the
day-to-day activities of its overseas missions.
At the same time, program funding levels have grown
significantly over the last 2 years. However, as we reported in
1993 and still find today, USAID has not fully developed the
comprehensive strategic work force planning system that would
help it manage these changes. As a result, the Agency faces a
number of human capital challenges, such as difficulties in
filling overseas positions, a lack of mentoring and training
opportunities for new staff, a lack of a surge capacity to
quickly respond to post-emergency and disaster situations.
Over 50 percent of USAID's Foreign Service staff are
eligible to retire in the next 5 years. With fewer and less
experienced staff managing more programs in more countries,
USAID's ability to oversee the delivery of foreign assistance
is becoming increasingly difficult. These vulnerabilities are
reflected in the Agency's difficulties and staffing missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
As of early September, in both places USAID has had
vacancies in Foreign Service staff and foreign national staff.
Recently and particularly in response to the President's
management agenda, USAID has taken a number of preliminary
steps to determine the work force it needs now and in the
future and is now devising strategies to achieve these goals.
However, in comparing USAID's efforts to the proven
principles of strategic work force planning, more work needs to
be done. Accordingly, we are recommending in our report that
USAID develop a comprehensive strategic work force planning
system and institutionalize that system to help it manage the
changes in its work force.
With regard to the issue of USAID's operating expenses,
which is currently a separate line item appropriation intended
to clearly identify the Agency's cost of doing business, we
will be reporting that the current operating expenses do not
always reflect all the costs associated with managing its
foreign aid program, primarily because missions sometimes pay
contractors performing administrative or oversight duties with
program funds.
Distinguishing between funds spent on operating expenses
and funds benefiting foreign recipients is not always clear,
and as a result, the amount spent on program funds may be
overstated.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary. I'd be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.024
Mr. Shays. I believe that Congressman Platt's subcommittee
is going to be looking at the financial side of this tomorrow.
So I intend to focus primarily on the personnel side.
I found it close to shocking to think that we have only
filled 47 of 77 USAID positions in Kabul, and I need to have
that in some detail, explained to me. And by the way, this
isn't lobbing stones here. We're just trying to understand what
is going on, and I'm going to say to you part of my concern has
been that when we were in Iraq just very recently, we learned
that in the northern province, that Mr. Bremer's staff person
there was supposed to have 75 and he only had 15. He needed 60
and when the Marines left, he said he needed another 60. And
it's kind of in the same issue of concern.
These are extraordinarily important positions. So sorry for
the long explanation, but walk me through that.
Mr. Marshall. We share your concern, Congressman. We need
to get staffed up. We have work to do. We have unmet needs. The
problem in Afghanistan, I can give you the breakdown. I shared
some of this with your counsel a few minutes ago. On the
direct-hire side, we have 7 out of 10 individuals in place.
Mr. Shays. Slow down just a little bit; 7 out of 10 where?
Mr. Marshall. Of direct-hires, of U.S. direct-hire
positions that have been authorized, 7 out of 10 are in place.
And this, again, alludes back to the different categories of
our work force; 7 out of 10 direct-hire authorized positions
are filled. We have personal services contractors, USPSCs; 13
out of 17 of those positions are filled. The gap occurs on the
Foreign Service National side. Much of our work force, as you
know, is comprised of residents of the countries we do business
in. Only 10 out of 50 authorized FSN positions have been
filled. The gap there is 40 positions. The reason those haven't
been filled is we have a very complex, very tight interagency
security process to do the background clearances,
investigations on those individuals before they're placed.
We also have physical--very limited physical space, again,
due to the security requirements and working with the
interagency--the other agencies involved to provide adequate
space and secure space. Because of those limitations we just
haven't had the room and we haven't had the clearances process
rapidly enough to fill those positions, but it is a big
concern.
Mr. Shays. How long have we been in Kabul? I'm just losing
track given our focus on Iran.
Mr. Marshall. Two years.
Mr. Shays. How long? I'm sorry.
Mr. Marshall. We've been in Afghanistan for a couple of
years. The positions--all these positions have not been
authorized for 2 years.
Mr. Shays. Walk me through what that means, and then I want
to know the impact of not filling these positions. What do you
mean they haven't been authorized?
Mr. Marshall. Well, some of the positions were authorized
in previous budget years and----
Mr. Shays. You mean not authorized by Congress?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Wait. I can't have two--why don't you step--pull
your chair up, ma'am. And then if you would state your name and
title and leave your card with the reporter.
Ms. Turner. Barbara Turner. I'm the Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau for Policy and Program
Coordination at USAID. For our in-country presence, our
positions need to be authorized by the Ambassador. We make a
case each year for the number of positions we need, because
we're required, especially in Afghanistan, to be within the
Embassy compound. The Ambassador makes those sets of decisions
for the number of people. So we do that on an annual basis.
When we first went into Kabul about 2 years ago, we had a
much smaller number of people authorized. In particular, there
was a question about the local-hire Foreign Service Nationals
that would be permitted in the Embassy at all, and so those 50
were not authorized at that time. I think there might have been
only two or three. I don't have the exact number with me today.
I can find that.
Only in the last year have these additional numbers been
approved as a part of the fiscal 2003 budget and as a part of
the fiscal 2003 discussion with the Embassy for approval.
Mr. Shays. Stay there just a second.
Mr. Marshall, 7 out of 10 direct-hires, I assume these are
folks that are in the primary administrative functions, are the
top administrators of the program.
Mr. Marshall. These would be career Foreign Service
Officers.
Mr. Shays. How many were authorized last year?
Ms. Turner. Six were authorized last year.
Mr. Shays. And how many of those were filled?
Ms. Turner. They're all filled at the present time. I don't
know the dates they were exactly filled. We can find that for
the record.
Mr. Shays. Walk me through, if you would, either one of
you, the challenge you've had with the foreign nationals, and
then I want to know the consequence of being three short in
direct-hires, four short in--and the other one is--the 13 out
of 17, what are those hires?
Mr. Marshall. U.S. personal service contractors.
Mr. Shays. So these are contractors?
Mr. Marshall. That's right.
Mr. Shays. The impact of that and then the 10 only out of
50. Walk me through first the 10 out of 50, why we're so short
there, and then the consequences of not having full complements
in each of these three areas.
Mr. Marshall. Sure. In the first case, it's finding the
right skills, individuals in those countries, foreign nationals
who are residents of Afghanistan who have the sets of skills we
need. These are people with economic development, humanitarian
assistance, the full scope of our programmatic expertise.
In addition to having limited supply of those skill-sets,
there's a security requirement, and they have to pass muster to
make sure they are the kind of people we'd want to hire.
We also have limitations on building space, office space,
where we can set up work stations in safe areas for these
individuals, and that whole security requirement is something
that's worked through an interagency process with ourselves and
the State Department and the other agencies, the part of the
reconstruction team. And we don't always have control over
that, but we do our best to articulate our needs and work
through the interagency process to accommodate our needs. Those
are constraints, though, that are not always under our direct
control.
Mr. Shays. So now tell me the consequences.
Mr. Marshall. We're understaffed.
Mr. Shays. I know that. Tell me the consequences of being
understaffed.
Mr. Marshall. Well, our program objectives aren't being
fulfilled to the degree that they would be if we were fully
staffed and fully operational.
Mr. Shays. As a Peace Corps volunteer, I'm struck by the
fact that--well, let me back up a second. How many of the seven
speak the native tongue in Afghanistan?
Mr. Marshall. I don't have that information.
Mr. Shays. Do you know?
Ms. Turner. I don't know.
Mr. Shays. You don't know on any of them?
Mr. Marshall. We could find that out for you.
Mr. Shays. Why don't you have someone call up now and
report so we can know during this hearing how many speak it.
OK?
Mr. Ford, tell me what you think the consequences are. Tell
me what you think these numbers, 7 out of 10, 13 out of 17, 10
out of 50. Does this relate to your report directly, and then
tell me the consequences.
Mr. Ford. Well, first of all, I want to acknowledge that we
did not include either Iraq or Afghanistan in any depth in the
report that we just released. We visited 6 countries, but
neither of those----
Mr. Shays. Would you identify those countries.
Mr. Ford. We went to Egypt, Mali, Senegal, Ecuador, Peru
and the Dominican Republic.
So, you know, I don't know the circumstances there. I think
my concerns would be from an oversight point of view
particularly with the shortage in Foreign Service Nationals who
can speak the language. I'd be concerned whether they--we can
effectively oversee what's going on there, but I don't have any
direct knowledge over the particular programs at this point.
Mr. Shays. All right. I'm happy to give you time, Mr.
Turner.
Mr. Turner. In reviewing the terms that we have, one of my
concerns has been in the area of the foreign personal service
contractors that USAID is employing. If you look at the reports
that we've received concerning the work force shaping, the lack
of necessary skills at USAID for managing contractors for
outsourcing work and then you compound that with the fact that
60 percent of your work force currently are foreign personal
service contractors, you really get to the heart of whether or
not USAID is going to be able to achieve its goals. And the
goal specifically that I'm concerned about is that there is a
nexus in your operations between the U.S. relationship within
countries, with individuals and with those countries that's
separate from just a programmatic goal of democracy or any
other issues. I mean, we can put a very impressive list of the
benevolent goals of USAID to achieve in other countries, but if
that does not have a direct nexus or connection between
promoting relationships with the United States, the goals are
hollow. They don't achieve the obvious reason why those
programs are funded.
A greater reliance upon foreign personal service
contractors, specifically where they're not being appropriately
managed, means that the communication of the message of the
U.S. support for these programs can be lost. In other words, in
some areas, you may be empowering individuals where the receipt
of their services are acknowledged only at the foreign personal
service contractor level and not at the U.S. level, that the
relationship would not be enhanced between the United States
and the host country in which you are conducting activities.
I served as a mayor for two terms and my city participated
in USAID programs. We were a recipient of exchange personnel.
The Dayton Peace Accords occurred in the city of Dayton, those
negotiations. So the USAID and their efforts in Bosnia brought
some Sarajevo police to meet with our police to learn on crime
homicide detecting, things like that, crime solving, crime
fighting.
So I certainly support the overall goals that you're trying
to achieve, but I see this as a glaring hole that I'd like you
to comment on, because I think this diminishes what we
obviously need in promoting relationships with the United
States.
Mr. Marshall. You're really getting at the impact of our
message and our branding, to what effect are we making contact
with the--with foreign countries on the man-on-the-street
level, and that's something we're very concerned about. We have
efforts in our--through our communications team to develop a
more effective branding strategy and to communicate that these
are gifts indeed, that the people of the United States care and
to communicate at the grassroots level in these countries. So
that's something we're very concerned about and trying to
address as best we can.
Mr. Turner. Because just beyond communication, though, it
goes to the heart of--I mean, it's not just having a
communication plan. It is something that needs to be managed
from inception through implementation, and I see in the
materials that we have here that's something that you currently
don't have the ability to do.
Ms. Turner. I wonder if I might just comment a little bit
further on that, because there's been a dramatic change at
USAID since September 11, 2001. Afghanistan is exactly the
perfect microcosm of that. In Afghanistan prior to 2001, we had
no U.S. Government presence. We actually had no Embassy. We had
no USAID at all there. After September 11th you'll recall we
went into Afghanistan, both with troops and with USAID.
We had to build up a Foreign Service National Corps from
zero, which is difficult, but around the world--we usually have
a strong Foreign Service National Corps and build that up. What
we are suffering from after September 11th, however, is an
incredibly heightened security situation. Obviously we're
benefiting from that as Americans in our Embassies, but in many
countries, including in the past in Afghanistan when we were
there many years ago, we were not physically located in the
U.S. Embassy. We were outside of the Embassy, so we were
allowed to have lower levels of security clearances. We had a
lower security presence. Of course we had USAIDs employees
targeted because of that and we've now had to move into Embassy
compounds wherever possible and especially in places like
Afghanistan where security threat is high.
That means that it's much harder to hire Foreign Service
Nationals in the number that we need and as rapidly as we need
in Afghanistan. So to go from zero to 50 in really less than 2
years where you have to get security clearances, training--and
you have to find space within a packed Embassy. It's really
made it very difficult for us, and we're really concerned
ourselves looking at that situation as to how we still build on
those fabulous local employees who do work very closely with
us, who are an important part of our understanding both
culturally, politically, but also from an oversight
perspective, the people who really go out and find the problems
directly because they speak the local language--the culture. I
just think this is something we're aware of, working on it.
Afghanistan is one of our most difficult cases at the present
time.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Marshall, if you could elaborate a little
bit more on the need. I mean, obviously, you said we're going
to work on it, we're going to work on a communications plan.
This has not been--I mean, this goes to the crux of the heart
of the purpose of your organization, and the--I guess I would
like to hear a little bit more from you as to how you see your
organization and its role in promoting relationships with the
United States versus just process-wise and functionally
executing the task set forth in your contracts that you're
outsourcing.
Mr. Marshall. Well, as you say, it gets to the crux of the
program mission. This gets well beyond the human capital
management challenges of the Agency in staffing and identifying
skill-sets and effectively delivering foreign assistance
through people, but of course it's critically important, and
it's something that we're aware of and addressing as
effectively as we can.
Barbara, would you like to take a shot at that? Barbara
Turner represents the program policy side of the Agency. I
represent the administrative side of the Agency. The question
you're getting at is really more of a program policy issue.
Ms. Turner. There's a variety of things we have underway.
In fact, we--just as we speak right now, there's a conference
going on in Eastern Europe with what we call our local public
affairs officers from Eastern Europe including Bosnia who we've
been training and working with to try to have in our USAID
missions better communications, locally in the country, about
what USAID is doing.
We have not been a very good PR firm. We're kind of
operational people who go do things and we've been trying to
develop within countries the capability to actually communicate
with the people the----
Mr. Turner. If we could just stop there for a second. You
just said we're operationally focused, and that's--and in
reading these materials, the issue of staffing skill-sets, work
force shaping, clearly the element that you get is how it
impacts issues of operations, but it also impacts the issue of
the overall policy of USAID, and that's why I asked the
question is because if you answer our questions focusing only
on how do we get the function of these programs to work through
work force shaping and work force planning without a large
component being how does this relate to and what are our work
force shaping goals need to include to make certain we achieve
the goal of promoting relationships with the United States,
we're going to have done a whole lot of good without having any
of the relationship building that I believe USAID is about.
Ms. Turner. We agree with that, and we are working both to
improve our communications locally and to train our own staff
in better communications. For the first time this year, we've
developed a joint strategic plan with the State Department. So
we might look both at how we promote it, as how the State
Department as well helps us promote what we are doing in the
country with the leaders and the contacts that the State
Department has.
We do, indeed, recognize this is an issue. We are working
toward that. One of the things that we also are concerned about
in terms of the number of Americans overseas, they also--the
technical staff we have do a lot of good in promoting knowledge
and know-how from the United States to those countries and
linking cities, universities, NGO's and other groups in the
United States there. To the extent that our budget doesn't
accommodate additional staff and the right kind of skills for
those staffs, we're very concerned about that, and that needs
to be a significant part of our work force planning.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman--Mr. Ford, do you have any
comments on that?
Mr. Ford. Well, I think we have some concerns. If you look
at the numbers, the number of U.S. direct-hires overseas has
declined significantly in the last 10 years. Those are the
people who are supposed to represent U.S. foreign policy
interests for AID overseas. They're the ones who provide the
leadership. They're the ones who provide the institutional
knowledge, provide the mentoring to staff overseas to make sure
that they gain experience, and I think our concern is that the
Agency, through the process they're going through now, needs to
clearly identify whether they've got the right numbers of
people there to carry out that function. I can say anecdotally,
based on years of working on AID projects from GAO's
perspective, there are many instances where missions overseas
appear to be understaffed from our direct-hire perspective,
that people are swamped with administrative tasks. They don't
get out as often as they would like.
I've had several personal cases where GAO team would come
out and we'd be going out to see something and they wanted to
tag along because they never get a chance to go out very often,
and it provided a basis for them to say, well, watch the GAO
guys, but at the same time they get to meet some of the local
people they're supposed to be interacting with.
So we have a general concern about it, and we hope that
their new plan that they're working on now is going to address
this.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. We're going to have staff ask some
questions to make sure that we are covering the areas that we
need to cover, but I want to walk through a few things.
GAO has noted that USAID has not integrated strategic goals
and objectives into a comprehensive work force, and I need to
know why we don't have a strategic work--first, is it true, and
second, if it is true, why don't we have a strategic work force
plan?
Mr. Marshall. Well, we are approaching the requirements of
the President's management agenda human capital initiative,
which includes work force planning as a central component. But
there's more to it than just that; and the nexus needs to be an
integration between the Agency's strategic planning process and
the work force planning process so that the needs of the work
force are being driven by the programmatic needs of the Agency.
And as Barbara Turner just described, we are in a new process
this year of doing a joint strategic plan with the State
Department. That information is driven down into our work force
planning needs.
We have taken a few steps toward doing what's meant by work
force planning, and that is we're doing some right-sizing
initiatives. We've developed a template for rationalizing our
overseas work force, the number of assignments by country, the
ratio between staff and headquarters. We're now starting to
look at how we can do business differently from regional
platforms. We're initiating our development readiness
initiative.
We have in place E-world which is an electronic work force
reporting system that's captured most of the elements of our
work force; and so these are all tools or pieces of a
comprehensive work force planning system. There are a couple
more pieces that are under development we expect to get in
place within the next year, but from starting from where we
were, sir, when this became a crucial issue in the last
couple--when it really became a front and center issue in the
last couple of years, you know, this isn't something that you
can put in place overnight.
We're making the transition from being an agency coming out
of the 1990's where the focus was on--our HR apparatus was
focused on downsizing and outplacement of employees to
completely repositioning into a growth mode where recruitment
and leadership development and work force planning, training,
all of these capacities are being almost reinvented from
scratch.
We're trying to develop, as we described in the testimony,
a surge capacity so that we have the bench strength to meet new
rapidly evolving needs, and a float capacity, and these are,
again, pieces of the puzzle that we're putting together. But
we're still several months away from having a comprehensive
work force planning system in place.
Mr. Shays. When do you intend to have it? Several months is
what?
Mr. Marshall. Within--well, we'll have a couple more pieces
within the next couple of months, and I would expect by the end
of the year we will have a pretty complete system in place.
In the meantime, we are continuing to give priority----
Mr. Shays. I don't think it hurts to be more specific. You
know, specifically, when is it going to happen?
Mr. Marshall. Well, the three pilots that I mentioned on
global health work force, procurement and human resources will
be completed by the end of this year. The entire agency,
though, that's the rest of the puzzle, and it will take several
years to get a complete work force planning analysis completed
and all the pieces in place.
Mr. Shays. Because I don't do that kind of planning, I
don't know why it would take several years. Explain to me why
it should take several years.
Mr. Marshall. Well, there's a lot of analysis that needs to
be done. You begin by examining your as-is work force. You
inventory all your employees, and, again, we have multiple
categories we're looking at and these 13 different
classifications of employees, and we now have a system in place
that's captured most of those individual employees, and we
flesh out the system with information on their skills, the
requirements of our Agency, this is where the strategic--it
becomes integrated with strategic planning.
So we identify what are the emerging needs, what are the
as-is competencies we have, what are the gaps, and then we
develop strategies to address the gaps by either recruitment or
training or tapping one element of our work force, contractors,
outsource, in-source, a lot of----
Mr. Shays. If you were to hire the consulting firm
MacKenzie, would they take 2 years, or what would they take?
Mr. Marshall. It all depends on funding, Congressman. We
could accelerate this more rapidly if we had funding to pay for
it, but you're talking about a multimillion dollar effort with
a firm like MacKenzie.
Mr. Shays. So are you doing it in-house?
Mr. Marshall. A combination of in-house and contractor
resources.
Mr. Shays. Because you use a lot of contractors, so it just
surprises me you wouldn't use a contractor in this case.
Mr. Marshall. We are using contractors. We don't have these
competencies in-house. We're using what we can do in-house, but
there's a skill-set here that's missing, and frankly, this is
something we need to do a better job of recruiting for and
institutionalizing in our HR.
Mr. Shays. Am I getting a feeling that--because you used
the word you were focused on operations. Am I to get the
feeling basically your folks just don't have the time because
they're overworked, so they're not focused on the more long
term?
Mr. Marshall. We've had so many staff cuts over the last 10
years, that our HR office was pretty much stripped to the bone,
past the bone, and we have so many people that are just focused
on--just on outgoing operations, that we don't have the
capacity to step back and do the analysis and the long-term
strategy that this kind of work requires.
Mr. Shays. Let me just respond to that. You were cut back,
but you made decisions that you would cut back in the areas
that you described. You didn't have Congress necessarily saying
you had to cut back your personal--your resource areas.
Mr. Marshall. I wasn't there when those decisions were
made, sir, but I think that's a fair assumption, yes.
Mr. Shays. According to you all, the Agency is having
trouble attracting staff to those posts where the conditions
are the most difficult, like Afghanistan and Iraq.
Mr. Marshall. Yes.
Mr. Shays. And do you have the capability to require staff
to move to more pressing regions and difficult areas?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, we do.
Mr. Shays. And what does that mean? You just tell them?
Mr. Marshall. We can direct reassignments, yes.
Mr. Shays. And if they don't want to go, they have to
leave?
Mr. Marshall. Yes. They----
Mr. Shays. Do they have an appeals process, or what do they
have? Why don't you step up. Maybe you could exchange seats
there.
Ms. Depp. Rose Marie Depp, Chief Human Capital Officer.
Yes. We have, under the Foreign Service Act, the ability to
direct assignments. As in any government agency, management can
assign work. All Foreign Service Officers sign an agreement for
worldwide availability.
The change in recent years is because of the human capital
challenge. In the past we were pretty much able to match
employees' first choices for assignments with receiving
missions, but as we have more and more challenging assignments,
we are having to direct employees to non-preferred bidding
choices. But we do have the ability to do----
Mr. Shays. How often have you used this power in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Ms. Depp. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we've been very
fortunate with volunteers. Because it is a 1-year tour, we are
on a continuous recruitment mode where we continually advertise
and actually keep a roster of all individuals that have
expressed willingness or interest. So to my knowledge, I could
stand to be corrected on this, to my knowledge, we have not had
to direct any assignments.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Turner, do you have any questions you want
to ask?
Mr. Turner. It's almost asking the same thing over again.
It just strikes me, Mr. Marshall, that when you say that
because of the pressing nature of the work that you have to do,
you don't have the ability to put in place the proper
procedures for planning. It seems to me that basically what
you're saying is, is we're going to continue to provide
services that don't meet our overall goals, because we're not
going to take the time to do that.
It just seems as if it's not a priority, and I think the
thing that's being missed here, which is why it's so important
for this hearing, is that your organization is not going to be
effective in delivering the services or the goals of the United
States if its view is we don't have time to strategically plan
to make certain that we achieve or function in the best way.
It's like saying, well, 75 percent is OK as long as I complete
the test, and the opportunities lost, both to your agencies and
to this country, is huge; and when we are dealing in an
environment where every day the question comes up how is the
United States perceived in foreign countries, the concept that
your answer would be we're too busy to plan to be effective is,
I think, you know, shocking and disturbing.
Mr. Marshall. I appreciate your concerns.
Mr. Shays. Would you talk through the mic. I'm sorry, Mr.
Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. I appreciate your concerns, Congressman, but
it's not--I would take issue with the conclusion that we don't
take this planning seriously. We take it very seriously. We
take all of our requirements around the world seriously. We
take Iraq and Afghanistan extremely seriously. We take the HIV
AIDS epidemic extremely seriously. We take disaster recovery
efforts very seriously. This is an agency that has a limited
capacity of human capital.
Mr. Turner. Let's pause right there. Your budget in fiscal
year 2002 was $10 billion. Correct?
Mr. Marshall. Roughly.
Mr. Turner. All right. So when the answer is yes and I hear
that we don't have enough human capital, that we don't have
enough ability to plan, and then you list for me operationally
a bunch of tasks that need to be done and diminish the
importance of planning, I believe that we have a huge miss in
the overall foreign policy goals of the United States. If
you're telling me HIV AIDS is important and therefore you have
to get on that, but you don't have time to plan so the overall
goals of the United States are achieved, I question whether or
not your agency is taking the adequate role in serving--as we
have discussed and you have knowledged, its core function.
Mr. Marshall. Let me try and answer that, Congressman. We
take the planning extremely seriously. When Mr. Natsios arrived
in 2001, he found the systems to be completely eroded and
dysfunctional. When I arrived in December 2001, there was no HR
Director. There was no HR Deputy Director in place. It took 6
months to recruit an HR Director. It took another 9 months or a
number of months to recruit an HR Deputy Director. That's the
leadership on our HR----
Mr. Shays. Are those political appointees?
Mr. Marshall. No, sir. Those are career appointments. And
the staff that was running the HR organization was dedicated.
They were answering the mail, keeping the gears of the process
going, but there was no in that HR office leadership at the top
level in place to redirect and prioritize and do the work force
planning that's required. That's in place now. We're giving it
all the emphasis we can. We're bringing in contractors. We're
recruiting for the expertise that we lost.
But Rome wasn't built in a day, sir, and a turnaround of an
organization in a state of dysfunction that USAID was and has
been doesn't happen overnight either. This is a 4 or 5-year
project to turn around an agency at this----
Mr. Turner. And why would that be? Why would it be? You
know, and I hate to keep citing the fact that I was a mayor,
but I can tell you that you can go to any city or any other
organization that has significant do-it-now goals to achieve
and nobody is going to tell you it's 4 or 5 years, because, you
know, the world changes in 4 or 5 years. In 4 or 5 years, any
planning that you're going to be doing is going to be, all
right, let's start this process again.
Why would it possibly, with $10 billion, take 4 or 5 years
to accomplish something that goes to the crux of whether or not
you're going to be successful? Because, let's see, 4 or 5
years, we're talking 40 to $50 billion more that would be spent
while you're beginning the process to plan to be effective.
Mr. Shays. If the gentleman would yield.
The one thing I can't do and maybe Congressman Turner would
agree, I know that looking to the future and planning has to be
one of the most difficult things and I know sometimes in my own
staff we know that we're putting out fires and we're not
planning ahead, so, Mr. Marshall, I don't think we're lobbing
bombs here.
We're trying to understand something, but what I think you
may not realize from what we've heard you say is that you are
so overworked, this is what I am basically hearing, that office
was in a disastrous state. That's kind of what your testimony
is that I'm getting, that many people contributed to that,
maybe even Congress. You've been off since December 2001, and I
get the feeling like you're trying to keep your head above
water so you don't drown, and yet you know conceptually the
importance of planning, but you are basically saying it's going
to be sometime way off in the future that it's going to be
done. That's the feeling I'm getting, and I can understand why
that could be the case in one sense, but in the other sense, if
it's $40 billion being spent and particularly given Iraq and
Kuwait, and I know, Mr. Ford, you haven't looked at these two
countries, but I would have thought we would have been
oversubscribed, not undersubscribed.
Given the importance of the work that we're doing there, I
mean, this is where someone said to me just recently it must be
an extraordinary time to be in Congress because the stakes are
so high. I think the stakes are extraordinarily high in Kabul
and in Iraq, and so I think that's why you're here and, Mr.
Ford, as you hear this, what do you think the solution is?
Mr. Ford. I don't work for AID.
Mr. Shays. No, no. That's not an answer at all. I just want
to interrupt. This is why we hire you, not just to be critical
but to say how you walk your way out and let me say something
because I know you want to say something. This is not uncommon
with other government agencies, but where have the successes
been in the past, how do we help Mr. Marshall and others move
along more quickly?
Mr. Ford. Well, I think, first of all, the first point is
you have to have leadership and you got to make it a priority
and you got to put the resources in to get the job done. I
don't know if that takes 3 or 4 years or not. You know, we made
the same recommendation that we're making in this report 10
years ago to AID.
Now, they went through a difficult time for the last 10
years, but I find it hard to believe that they couldn't set
aside some time during that timeframe to have undertaken the
kind of----
Mr. Shays. Well, they didn't.
Mr. Ford [continuing]. They should have done. I don't think
it should take another 10 years to do that.
Mr. Shays. Come on, let's be precise here. They're not
saying it's taking 10 years.
Now, really, I want you to be a little more precise and
we're not talking about the last 10 years because we know it
happened and Mr. Marshall wasn't there 10 years ago. He's
there, now, though, so it's on his shoulder.
What would you be recommending they do? First off, should
it take even a year?
Mr. Ford. You know, I would--I'm not an expert in
personnel. I think they could do it in a year, yeah. What they
need to do is they need to identify the core competencies for
all of their work force. They got a pilot on the way where
they're looking at three functions in AID. I don't know why
they couldn't expand that effort to include a wider range of
the people that they work for, so I think--you know, I don't
think it should take that long, certainly 4 or 5 years, to do
the whole analysis that they need to do. I think they got all
the right steps in place, I think they've got the right
concepts in place, based on the models at OPM and looking at
the government as a whole, but they've got to implement the
analysis and they've got to move on with it.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Marshall, what can we do to help speed up
the process?
Mr. Marshall. Well, we have discussions under way within
the administration, to--regarding the OE requirements that it
takes to get this work done. We have in our HR shop presently--
--
Mr. Shays. Are you saying the budgetary requirements?
Mr. Marshall. Our operating expenses.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Marshall. That's the constraint we're under.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry to interrupt, but so I'm understanding
you, is OE funding consulting services, is that----
Mr. Marshall. For managing consulting services of this
type, yes, that would come out of operating expenses, yes.
That's a very constrained resource in our environment, and it
funds our outside expertise, our IT, our administrative
personnel. We have one work force planner on the staff now.
We're just acquiring the tool. We have procurement under way, a
work force planning tool, we have allocated some money for
consulting expertise. If we had more, we could move faster.
Mr. Shays. OK. What I would like to think is that when you
go before the Appropriations Committee, you basically say we
have an agency that was in meltdown, we had a chair report in
the early 1990's that said we have this problem, we still have
this problem, and then I blame Congress, frankly and fully, and
if I were running the organization, I would be trying to take
money out of the account and pressing the envelope because I
would feel it is so important.
Mr. Marshall. I understand. We have so many mandates and so
little funds. We're always robbing Peter to pay Paul to address
priorities. You, too, Congressman. It's a matter of priorities.
In our Federal agency, everything is urgent, and everything is
a priority.
Mr. Shays. I think that's a fair comment and I think what
we're going to do is get together with you privately. We're
going to have a candid conversation with you about how you sort
that out, because I do think everything is a priority right
now. I do think that's fair.
I think that you are--but I also think this: I think it's
one of the most exciting jobs you can have in government,
frankly.
Mr. Marshall. It is. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Shays. And I know as a former Peace Corps volunteer,
there are a lot of Peace Corps volunteers who would love to be
doing this work, and if we're not able to hire younger folks
along the way and we've got a work force--gosh, given that I'm
in higher ranks than that, we have very competent staff at
USAID, but we need some younger folks as well, and I'd like to
see how we resolve that. Should I go to staff or do you have
another comment? So at this time I will go to our professional
staff.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First question for both of you, if I could.
What, exactly, are you doing to identify core competencies?
What's the importance of that, and how do you ensure that
you're hiring people with the skills you need now? Why don't we
go with Mr. Ford first and then Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Ford. I think that the key is you got to go through a
process and I think Mr. Marshall's already described it well.
You have to know what kind of skills you need first, so you
have to identify what your requirements are. You have to know
what you already have in place, so you have to do an analysis
of what you already have. Then you got to see what the gap is
and then you got to find a development strategy to develop that
gap. Then you have to have a system after you hire the people.
So you make adjustments as you go along. So as you find some of
those skills are not necessary, you make adjustments. That's
basically the process that I believe AID is now trying to get
to.
Mr. Marshall. That's right, and we're beginning to baseline
those existing skill sets and identify the gaps, and the
initial organizations we're piloting are: Global Health Bureau,
again taking into consideration the sensitivity, the urgency of
the HIV/AIDS response, we're looking at procurement; and we're
looking at HR. Because, again, getting back to Congressman
Turner's concerns, do we have an organization, the capacity
within our human resources organization, the capacity to
conduct work force planning in a systematic way. And on the
implementation side, our procurement organization, are we
providing contract administration oversight, and is our
contract process working or are our business systems and
procurement as responsive to our needs in the field as
possible?
Mr. Costa. And what are you doing now to handle skill gaps
in the existing work force? Is there a training program under
way? State has a little more capacity now that they're building
on what USAID does not have yet.
Mr. Marshall. They do. Our training budget has been cut to
the bone, was cut to the bone. We requested significant plus-
ups in the past couple of years. We'd like to double it in the
next couple of years to get to the level we think we need.
We are recruiting through our new entry professional, our
mid-career entry, we are looking for the skill sets that we
need in the most critical areas, and we're instituting our IDI
program to get young talent in at the entry levels, and so
we're doing as best we can, work force planning, again in kind
of an ad hoc way, focused on the needs that we're most aware
of, but the systematic process that we're putting in place,
piece by piece, is over the next year or so.
Mr. Costa. Talk a little bit about surge capacity. I was
struck by both your testimony and GAO's testimony. One of the
things that struck me is that you say that it has merged more
with the State Department.
Has there been any discussion in making assistant
management, contract management, into a cone in the State
Department, and so staff from State and USAID can travel freely
between both organizations. Do you think that would help at all
with creating the surge capacity for USAID? Is there a
discussion of that and what are both of your thoughts on how
that would work, if it would work, and what problems might----
Mr. Marshall. Those discussions with the State Department
are just beginning, and that's a good example that we need to
look at. If you're talking about procurement expertise, it's
possible that we could work with each other, although our
procurement requirements for development assistance,
humanitarian assistance are pretty different from theirs. So I
think that could be a long term fix. Cross-training and other,
you know, cross-agency and training initiatives would have to
be done to make sure that would work, but it's a possibility.
Mr. Shays. Let me just interrupt here to have you react.
When I've gone out in the field, and I get out in the field a
lot, I am struck by the fact that the USAID folks want to tell
me that they're not part of the State Department. The company
culture must be very different and they don't like the thought
that they are viewed as an instrument of our diplomatic corps.
Maybe I didn't say it's an instrument, but they want me to
know that they are very definitely separate but the only
difference is that they come up with the unified budget--excuse
me, not unified budget, but they are basically under the
auspices of the State Department.
Can you react to that?
Mr. Marshall. Well, there is that, too. Yes, the cultures
are different and they had a history of some cultural
differences, you might say, and conflicts, but I think that
varies too from post to post. I think at a lot of locations
they work very collegially together, although they do have
distinct competencies and programmatic missions.
Mr. Shays. Go on.
Mr. Marshall. That's the point. They do have their
differences, but I think they do, in most cases, work pretty
well together.
Mr. Shays. Is USAID under the Gramm-Rudman Act?
Mr. Marshall. Yes.
Mr. Shays. So when I am told that they are 60 short in the
Northern Province, they only have 15 instead of 75, are some of
those 60 short viewed as USAID folks?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know what those numbers are, sir, and
I don't know how he's counting.
Mr. Shays. Probably, not likely. That may be separate. I'll
find out that.
Are we getting the number that I asked for?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, sir, we're asking for that and we'll
provide that for the record. One piece of information we have
for you though is that Afghanistan is a non-language country,
where speaking a native language is not a requirement.
English works there, so we have some of our employees there
who do speak English.
Mr. Shays. English works everywhere, but with all due
respect, it does, but----
Mr. Marshall. We understand that several of the local PSCs
do have the native language.
Mr. Shays. I mean, given USAID is in the field interacting
a lot with Afghans and Iraqis in both countries, the ability to
speak the language is huge, and as it relates to Afghanistan
there are so many Peace Corps volunteers I run into who have
wanted to go back to their country it does surprise me we're
having a hard time filling these positions.
Anyway, we'll go back to you.
Mr. Costa. Mr. Ford, if you could talk a little bit about
integration with the State Department and what that might mean?
Mr. Ford. Well, first of all, I'm not aware of any formal
discussions of whether or not that's actually being considered.
I think the State department, the type of activities that
they're involved in are--for the most part, are not typical of
what USAID is involved in, so the skill sets for creating a
cone I think you'd have to take a hard look at, because I'm not
sure the Department does a lot of hands-on implementation of
programs. They have a few programs that I'm aware of where
they're involved, but for the most part they're not involved on
the ground, programmatic oversight, as AID employees are.
Mr. Costa. Thank you. Mr. Marshall, what's the current
status of E-World? I know it's supposed to be growing out in
two phases, and the information is supposed to be all done at
the end of this month; is that correct?
Mr. Marshall. It is a Web based system. It is up and
running. We have about 7,700 employees captured in there and
all elements of our work force, with the exception of
institutional contractors.
Mr. Costa. OK. Just for the record, could you just say a
little bit about what E-World is?
Mr. Marshall. It's a work force tool that captures the
numbers, head counts of individuals, of employees, by work
force element, by country and mission worldwide, organizational
elements, yes.
Mr. Costa. And is it up and running now? Are you still
experiencing problems?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, it is. There have been some startup
issues along the way, but it's up and running.
Mr. Costa. I know you had mentioned moving from other
locations to staff Iraq and Afghanistan. What's the
implications for doing that in the countries where those folks
have come from?
Mr. Marshall. That's a very good question. Unfortunately,
too often we're robbing Peter to pay Paul. Unfortunately, it's
a fact of life for the agency. We do our best, of course, to
backfill and regroup, and so forth, but it takes a while.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Go to minority counsel.
Mr. Rapallo. Mr. Marshall and maybe also Miss Turner. In
terms of planning for your work force, it would help to know
the amount and types of funding that AID is delivering.
In the latest supplemental budget request for Iraq, did you
at AID headquarters prepare any sort of estimate or analysis or
proposal for the funding that would be delivered and also how
the work force would be set up to deliver that?
Ms. Turner. Yes. For Iraq, specifically, the supplemental
that just came up last week from the President has $40 million
in it for what we call the operating expenses of USAID. That
includes physical infrastructure in the country to house the
employees, etc., as well as their salaries, and the number of
the employees, I don't have with me the work force plan, but we
can provide that for the record. We have put together the work
force plan for Iraq, which is done in consultation with State
and OMB for the implementing of that supplemental corporation,
but it is a pretty good example of the problems that we face.
Our funding for operating expenses and the salaries that we pay
are not a part of the $10 billion program. We have a separate
account that pays for our salaries and occasionally we use--dip
into the program fund to provide contractor salaries, but we're
not allowed by law to pay any of our American direct hire
salaries out of the programs. It's all out of the operating
expense budget. That budget has been relatively static for
quite a number of years. We did request in fiscal 2004 an
increase in the budget in order to allow us to hire at least 50
additional overseas officers, but that did not anticipate the
increase in Iraq at that time.
What has happened over the years is, as there is a
supplemental for HIV/AIDS, for Hurricane Mitch several years
ago, for Afghanistan, for Iraq, a one-time only amount of money
is put in to transfer from program to operating expenses to
allow us to cover those salaries for that year, but it really
is a negative incentive to work force planning because it's
one-time only. You don't know how many years you'll have it, so
looking ahead, it makes it impossible to estimate the budgets
that you're going to have available.
For fiscal 2005, we have submitted to the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of State has transmitted to OMB a
significant 25 percent increase in our operating expense
account, almost entirely dedicated toward additional staff that
we need to bring in. It is not yet through OMB and presented to
Congress, but it is the only major increase with the exception
of HIV/AIDS outside the supplemental that we have requested,
and it was the only 25 percent increase that the Secretary of
State sent forward to OMB as a part of the entire State
Department foreign operations budget. So we have recognized it
as an absolutely critical priority that needs to be ratcheted
up, ratcheted up significantly, and every time there's a
supplemental, last year's supplemental for Afghanistan and
Iraq, we had that in the HIV supplemental, we had money in for
that for obvious reasons.
Mr. Rapallo. Let me just ask a little about the process for
the supplemental. Prior to the supplemental coming to Congress,
did AID itself, headquarters, work up a sort of analysis
proposal on the amount of funding AID believed would be
necessary in Iraq?
Ms. Turner. Yes, we did.
Mr. Rapallo. And did you submit that to OMB?
Ms. Turner. Yes, we did.
Mr. Rapallo. And what happened to that?
Ms. Turner. It was reduced by about 50 percent as to what
we sent forward.
Mr. Rapallo. Why was it reduced or what reasons were given?
Ms. Turner. The reasons were that they didn't think we
would be able to, for a variety of reasons, put that many staff
in country and hire as many local staff as we got.
Mr. Rapallo. So currently the supplemental, is it $1.5
billion that would be delivered through AID?
Ms. Turner. It's not fully decided. There's $21 billion for
reconstruction efforts. We estimate at least $1.5 to $2 billion
will come through AID but the full decisions are not made on
who will implement each one of those pieces and a complete
decision between infrastructure, which more likely would be
done by Defense, and the more software side of the training and
education that would be done through USAID.
Mr. Rapallo. So where did that number come from, $1.5, that
amount? Is it an AID number?
Ms. Turner. That is an AID number, roughly what we would
estimate as being under the current arrangement.
Mr. Shays. Let me just followup and I know you have another
question, but so we're understaffed in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. But in addition, given what your request was,
we're even more underfunded.
Now, I realize that agencies, we'll always ask what we
think they need and it's also up to Congress to say what we can
afford to do, but your testimony basically as it relates to--
which was it, Afghanistan or Iraq?
Ms. Turner. Actually both, a combination, but it was mostly
Iraq.
Mr. Shays. Basically you were looking to do twice as much
as you are doing or 50 percent more?
Ms. Turner. We were looking to do approximately, spend
approximately twice as much, as to what the supplemental came
up with.
Mr. Shays. But not just in the supplemental. I think the
question also related to the original.
Just so you understand where I'm coming from, I'm wrestling
as a Member of Congress with the fact that we haven't asked--
and I'm vice chairman of the Budget Committee--we haven't asked
for a full accounting of the budget expenses in Afghanistan and
Iraq both in the short term and the long term, and I was
thinking that if it was the previous administration I would be
more persistent, so I'm having to candidly look at myself and
say am I doing my job. So having said that, what I'm realizing
of course is that you would have to submit what your requests
are.
Did you submit both a 1-year request and a long-term
request for both countries?
Ms. Turner. No, we did not. We submitted a 1-year request
for the life of the supplemental. Actually, I think the
supplemental is proposing 2 years.
Mr. Shays. Are we talking about the first supplemental or
the second?
Ms. Turner. The current supplemental. The first
supplemental was only a 6-month supplemental, and we were only
permitted to submit for that what we thought it would take in
the first 6 months.
Mr. Shays. The 6-month supplemental.
Can you tell me did you get 50 percent of what you
requested?
Ms. Turner. For the first supplemental we got 100 percent
of what we requested.
Mr. Shays. What I'd like is if you would submit the
original proposal for USAID, if you would provide it for this
committee.
Ms. Turner. OK.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.025
Mr. Shays. This is for the second supplemental, OK?
Ms. Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And if that's a problem you need to tell us
right away; otherwise we'll assume that won't be a problem.
Ms. Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Do you have a question?
Mr. Costa. Yes, one quick question, I think.
Mr. Ford, you talked a little bit about the operating
expense account and how originally it was intended to cover the
cost of doing business, but over time and because of budget
constraints you say it has essentially started putting things
that probably should be in the operating expense account into
the program funds.
Could you talk a little bit more about that and, Mr.
Marshall, if you could talk a little bit about what you say you
plan to do in response to the GAO report? I know the GAO report
is not quite finished yet, I don't know if you had an
opportunity to see it, and it's my understanding that both OMB
and you all agree with the crux of it. If you could talk a
little bit more about that.
Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. Yeah, basically, you summarized what our report
is going to say, which is essentially that in the mid-1970's
Congress passed some laws which in effect created the operating
expense account, and the intent back then was that AID try to
separate out its administrative costs versus its program
delivery so there would be a clear distinction between what
we'll call, let's say, overhead versus the actual program being
delivered.
Over time what's happened is because it is a separate
appropriation AID has struggled to try to pay for the
administrative costs, which it's required by law to pay, which
is direct higher salaries, rents, utilities, things of that
nature. They've struggled to have enough money to do that, so
they've used program funds to help pay those types of costs,
and over time it's become the--I guess I'll call it a confused
state in terms of how much money is actually being spent for
administrative expenses. So what we're going to be recommending
to AID is essentially to try to clarify that and come up with a
better, clearer system of identifying those costs.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Ford.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Your question was what are we doing about
that.
Mr. Shays. The mic.
Mr. Marshall. Yes, we read the GAO report and we think it
was a contribution to the ongoing dialog that we're having
within the agency and State Department and OMB on the subject
and we're actively considering alternatives for dealing with
this issue.
Now, in the short-term we're working very hard to be fully
transparent, report all of our costs through OE as well as
administrative costs that are program-funded, be very up front
and transparent about that and we're getting the facts on the
record and considering options and ways of handling it, but
we're not prepared to endorse any particular proposal at this
point.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Ford, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rapallo. Maybe just one clarifying: In your original
request, what was the amount that you requested?
Ms. Turner. The Iraq request?
Mr. Rapallo. Yes.
Ms. Turner. I'm sorry, I don't have that with me. I'm
sorry, for the second supplemental?
Mr. Rapallo. Yes.
Ms. Turner. I'm sorry. I need to check that, double-check
that number, and I'll be happy to provide that.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.029
Mr. Shays. I'm going to try to summarize what I've gotten
from this hearing, and then I want your reaction, and then you
can make any other comments you want, and then we'll adjourn.
What I basically think I've learned from this hearing and
from the report is that USAID has been a troubled agency for a
long time. In terms of understanding--in terms of having
resources, in terms of allocating resources in a way that's
clear, that it has lacked a long term planning, that it has a
very--a personnel highly qualified but getting older, that a
large number potentially could retire, up to 70, as we think 40
may of the 70, and that Congress and others are saying you need
to have a strategic plan on what your needs are, not just now
but in the future, and that it is going to take longer than we
would like because--not because it has to take longer in terms
of capability, but in terms of resources to--in terms of the
financial resources to hire internal staff and external
consulting, to get it done as quickly as it could be done. And
what I have learned from listening to Mr. Turner is if you're
going to be spending $10 billion a year and if it's going to
take 3 or 4 years to do, we are simply not going to be
allocating resources in an optimal way.
And what I was thinking as well is that each year we may be
losing our ability to hire some capable young people that we
should have hired 3 or 4 years ago, that would now be in the
stream and learn from these skilled workers. And it explains
what has been a shocking thing for me to learn, is that what I
believe is the most important thing in Afghanistan and Iraq--I
realize, Mr. Ford, this wasn't your focus, but it's where I've
kind of headed, given that I know Mr. Bremer is understaffed
significantly. That whether USAID is under Bremer, and they're
calling that part understaffed, we may even have a bigger
problem because USAID may not be getting the people in the
field that they need to. And that, for me, it's calling out
that this committee needs to be weighing in as fairly quickly
as possible with the administration that we've got to speed up
this process and provide the resources. So one thing I intend
to do is have a conversation with Mr. Kolbe, who's head of the
funding--of approps--see if he agrees that these resources have
been requested and are needed and I'll go from there. But our
committee may also issue some kind of report as well.
Respond to what I've said, Mr. Marshall, if you will.
Mr. Marshall. I think that's a fair take there,
Congressman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. I agree with everything you said and the quicker
it can be done, the better.
Mr. Shays. OK. You think the quicker it can be done, the
better?
Mr. Marshall. I agree with that, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Well, let's see how we can all work together and
help you all out and work in the same direction.
Is there any other comment, question?
Mr. Costa. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Any comments you want to end up with, just to
put on the record?
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Well, we'll close here and adjourn.
Thank you very much.
[Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``Foreign Assistance,
Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and
Future Challenges,'' may be found in subcommittee files.]
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information sumitted for the hearing record
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2392.051