PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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CONTENTS

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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING
THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) Presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Ruppersberger and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Richard Lundberg, fellow; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, "Public Diplomacy in the Middle East," is called to order.

The end of the cold war was seen by many as the ultimate victory in the global ideological struggle. Using words as weapons to kindle the spark of liberty and oppressed peoples, the forces of freedom helped defeat communism in the decisive battle without firing a shot. Public diplomacy, the cultural exchanges, education programs and broadcasts used to promote U.S. interests to foreign audiences, pierced the Iron Curtain more effectively and efficiently in some ways than missiles.

But then the tools that helped bring down the Berlin Wall and splintered the Soviet Union were allowed to rust in the mistaken belief that the battle of ideas was over. Subsumed within the State Department's "stifling culture and starved for resources," public diplomacy was left to wither without strategic focus or organizational direction. So when the United States needed a strong voice to counter the toxic antipathy emanating from radical factions and terrorists in the Middle East, the world often heard only a hoarse, fragmented whisper.

Studies and analyses done inside and outside the Federal Government concluded our public diplomacy capacity lagged far behind the critical requirement to counter terrorism on the rhetorical and ideological battlefields of that volatile region. According to the State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, "The United States today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic depravation and ex-

tremism." Others we will hear from today have been equally critical of U.S. public diplomacy as lacking strategic cohesion and sustained leadership.

Nowhere is our stunted reach into the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims more obvious and perilous than Iraq. All public diplomacy in this region today should be keenly focused on persuading Iraqis and their neighbors that we are there as liberators, not as occupiers, and that's the truth. They need to know it. But halting efforts by the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA], and a lack of coordination between the other Federal organs of public statecraft have left control of the airwaves and the debate to al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya and the purveyors of the rampant anti-Americanism.

Last month in Iraq, CPA officials told us they were accelerating efforts to build U.S. and indigenous media capacity to balance the current one-sided public discourse. But as if to underscore the second-class status of public diplomacy in the interagency realm, neither CPA nor the Department of Defense chose to provide a witness or testimony today. They will evidently do so at a future hearing. Their absence speaks volumes to me.

However, we do welcome testimony today from the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Margaret Tutwiler. Although only recently confirmed, and without a full team of deputies in place, she waived the usual protocols to join us today. Madam Secretary, thank you for coming.

Words matter. The language of liberty, equality and opportunity liberated us from the royalist yoke. With the right message conveyed through culturally attuned media, the revolutionary message of freedom and democracy has the extraordinary power to accomplish what guns cannot: transform subjects into citizens, victims into voters. U.S. public diplomacy now has to rise to meet that challenge.

Our witnesses today bring impressive expertise and important recommendations to our discussion of public diplomacy reforms. We welcome them, and we look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
February 10, 2004

The end of the Cold War was seen by many as the ultimate victory in the global ideological struggle. Using words as weapons to kindle the spark of liberty in oppressed peoples, the forces of freedom helped defeat communism in the decisive battle without firing a shot.

Public diplomacy – the cultural exchanges, educational programs and broadcasts used to promote United States interests to foreign audiences – pierced the Iron Curtain more effectively and efficiently than missiles.

But then the tools that brought down the Berlin Wall and splintered the Soviet Union were allowed to rust in the mistaken belief the battle of ideas was over. Subsumed within the State Department's stifling culture and starved for resources, public diplomacy was left to wither without strategic focus or organizational direction.

So when the United States needed a strong voice to counter the toxic antipathy emanating from radical sects and terrorists in the Middle East, the world often heard only a hoarse, fragmented whisper. Studies and analyses from inside and outside the federal government concluded our public diplomacy capacity lagged far behind the critical requirement to counter terrorism on the rhetorical and ideological battlefields of that volatile region.

According to the State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, "The United States today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation and extremism...." Others we will hear from today have been equally critical of U.S. public diplomacy as lacking strategic cohesion and sustained leadership.

Nowhere is our stunted reach into the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims more obvious, or more perilous, than in Iraq. All public diplomacy in the region today should be keenly focused on persuading Iraqis and their neighbors we are there as liberators, not occupiers, and the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam. That's the truth and they need to know it. But halting efforts by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and a lack of coordination between the other federal organs of public statecraft, have left control of the airways and the debate to al-Jezeera, al-Arabiya and the purveyors of rabid anti-Americanism.

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U.S. public diplomacy now has to rise to meet that challenge. Our witnesses today bring impressive expertise, and important recommendations, to our discussion of public diplomacy reforms. Welcome. We look forward to your testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you for this hearing. It's very relevant at this time and what's happening in the world.

Following the events of September 11, the need for strengthening public diplomacy became that much greater as the administration started to make Muslim peoples in the Middle East and elsewhere aware that America's war on terrorism is not a war on Islam.

The war in Iraq has exacerbated our public diplomacy challenges in the region. Public diplomacy is defined as cultural, educational and information programs, citizen exchange programs or broadcasts used to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences. Last year the House recognized need to increase and improve understanding of the United States among overseas audiences and change attitudes. In the Freedom Support Act of 2002, adopted by House vote on September 22, 2002, was a comprehensive attempt to restructure and refinance public diplomacy and rationalize the diverse elements making up U.S. international broadcasting.

This is an important hearing. We cannot win the engagements that are within our world now, such as terrorism, the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, by just going to war with our military. We need to work the diplomacy side also. So I'm looking forward to this hearing, and I hope we will learn so that we can help and gain world peace.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to take care of a little housekeeping here first. I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statement in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I would welcome our first witness, Margaret Tutwiler, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Department of State. I said to you that she has a lot of fans in and outside of the State Department, and one of the many compliments to her is her straight talking, so we look forward to that.

As you know, we swear in all our witnesses and I will just ask you to rise.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Our witness has responded in the affirmative. There is only one person in my many, many years as chairman that we didn't swear in, and I was a coward, and that was Senator Byrd.

So, Madam Secretary, you have the floor. What we are going to do is have a 5-minute clock, but we are going to roll the clock over so you will have 10 minutes if you need it. You will see a green light and then another green.

STATEMENT OF MARGARET TUTWILER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. TUTWILER. Good afternoon. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I experienced September 11 and all that has come afterwards from the perspective of living and working overseas in an Arab nation. Regrettably, as both of you have said, today too many nations and their citizens have a very different view of the United States than we would desire. Much of what I have learned about foreign views of our country has been from listening, engaging and interacting with Arabs from all walks of life, and much of what I have learned was troubling and disturbing.

I have a much better understanding of how our country is viewed, both the positives and the negatives, because of my recent service overseas. In the brief time that I have been serving as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have gained a greater understanding and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, the three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices of the regional bureaus and our overseas posts do.

Over the past 2 years, as you point out, much has been written and debated about the effectiveness or noneffectiveness of the U.S. Government's public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports by my friend Ambassador Ed Djerejian's advisory committee, by Dr. Abshire's Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Heritage Foundation have served to help us examine that which our government does well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations we can all agree upon.

As we all know, unfortunately, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world today, especially in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, a problem we have regrettably developed over many years through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix, a single solution or a simple plan. Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, it is my opinion that it will take many years of hard, focused work to get out of it.

I believe that our strategic goals are very clear. We need to continue to focus and deliver meaningful programs and activities in those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration in the view of our Nation. That deterioration is, of course, most stark in the Arab and Muslim world. At the same time, we must work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We should listen more not only to foreign audiences, but to our own PD overseas. Shortly all public diplomacy officers will be able to communicate and share ideas and information across all regions through a new interactive Web site devoted to public diplomacy.

Effective policy advocacy remains a priority, and I believe we basically, as government officials overseas, do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including the foreign

media. Our senior officials, Ambassadors and embassy staff, are out there explaining U.S. policy goals and initiatives.

We can, of course, do better. We must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials overseas. We have not, in my opinion, placed enough effort and focus on the nonelites, who, today, much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future. We only have to look at the outreach activities of many U.S. corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we in government have for too long neglected.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, is this activity or program still effective in today's world. If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go. We must develop effective mechanisms for evaluating program impact and effectiveness of all our programs and activities.

We must continue to pursue new initiatives and improve older ones in the hopes of reaching younger, broader and deeper audiences.

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans and foreigners together, whether in person or in a video or press conference, creates greater understanding. We have numerous activities and programs which are doing just this. I have highlighted and give details of many of them in my written testimony, programs such as School Internet Connectivity Program; Partnerships for Learning, which reaches high school exchange students.

We started a new initiative since I have been here which are microscholarships for English learning and attendance at our American schools overseas; American Corners; virtual consulates; English teaching; book programs; private sector cooperation; Culture Connect; television, Internet and numerous exchange programs. However we do it, we must engage, listen and interact, especially with the young and nonelites. They are the key to a peaceful future.

Interagency coordination is, of course, essential to the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The new State USAID-Joint Policy Council and the State-USAID Management Council are intended to improve program coordination and public diplomacy, as in other areas, and help ensure the most effective use of program resources in both the Department and at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Regrettably, all too often our important and meaningful assistance to the developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Governmentwide we have to do a much better job of ensuring that the U.S. efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials that we interact with every day. We can no longer afford the recipients overseas to have no idea that the people of the United States provide assistance to their country and to their citizens.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say again we all know there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interest and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people. In a world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize and ask ourselves, is the activity I am doing getting the job done. We must listen to our field force. Today the State Department has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I also maintain that every American, regardless of agency or department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, listen and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to an audience to whom we previously have not given as much effort or time. We must simply move beyond the walls of our embassies overseas and spending time in foreign government offices.

I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve over time a better, healthier and much more accurate impression of our Nation and people. No one, most especially myself, underestimates the challenge and difficult task at hand. The public diplomacy officials that I work with are reaching, questioning and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood. We will continue to make mistakes, but I truly believe we will all ultimately get there. We have no choice, and, in my opinion, we must. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tutwiler follows:]

Opening Statement

Under Secretary Margaret DeB. Tutwiler

House Committee on Government Reform
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
Subcommittee

February 10, 2004

Good Afternoon. Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I experienced September 11th and all that has come afterwards from the perspective of living and working in an Arab Muslim country in North Africa. In Morocco, a strong ally of the United States and a nation of 30 million Muslims, regrettably, as in many nations today, too many of their citizens have a different view of the United States than we would desire.

Much of what I learned about foreign views of our country was from listening, engaging and inter-acting with Moroccans from all walks of life, and much of what I learned was troubling and disturbing. I would never have known how our country is really viewed - both the positives and the negatives - had I not been serving overseas for the last two turbulent years.

In the two months that I have been serving as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have gained a greater understanding and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, our three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices of the regional bureaus, and our overseas posts do in the field of public diplomacy.

Over the past two years, much as been written and debated about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the U.S. Government public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports by Ambassador Ed Djerejian's Advisory Group, Dr. Abshire's Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Heritage Foundation have served to help us examine that which our government does well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations we can all agree upon.

As we all know, unfortunately, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world today, especially in the Middle East and South East Asia, a problem we have regrettably developed over many years through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix or a single solution or a simple plan. Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, so too will it take many years of hard focused work to get out of it.

I believe our strategic goals are clear. We need to continue to focus on those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our nation. That deterioration is most stark in the Arab and Muslim world. At the same time, we must work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own PD personnel overseas. Shortly, all PD Officers will be able to communicate and share new ideas amongst ourselves and across all regions through a new interactive website devoted to the concerns of public diplomacy.

Effective policy advocacy remains a priority, and I believe we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. Our senior officials, Ambassadors and embassy staff are out there explaining U.S. policy, goals and initiatives. We can all, of course, do better.

We must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials. We have not placed enough effort and focus on the non-elites who, today much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future. We only have to look at the outreach activities of many U.S. corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we in government have for too long neglected.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, "Is this activity or program still effective in today's world?" If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go. Developing effective mechanisms for evaluating program impact and effectiveness is a priority.

We must continue to pursue new initiatives and improve older ones in the hopes of reaching younger, broader and deeper audiences.

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans and foreigners together, whether in person or even in a video or press conference, create greater understanding.

As Under Secretary, I would like to see us expand our exchange programs however we can. Last year, the State Department directly sponsored over 30,000 academic, professional and other exchanges worldwide. Exchange programs constitute the single largest part of the State Department public diplomacy budget, $316,633,000 in FY-2004, which regrettably is $28,713,000 less than the President's request including a rescission of $3,367,000. Within this amount, we must set priorities.

Allocation of exchange resources already reflects the priority of the Arab and Muslim world. 25% of funding for exchanges will go to programs in the Middle East and South Asia in FY 2004, compared to 17% in FY 2002. We have restarted the Fulbright program in Afghanistan after a twenty-five year hiatus. Twenty Afghan Fulbrighters will arrive next month. Just a few days ago, 25 Iraqi Fulbright students arrived here for orientation prior to beginning their regular studies.

Through our School Internet Connectivity Program, 26,000 high school students from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus currently collaborate in online projects on current affairs, entrepreneurship, health, and civic responsibility with U.S. students.

Expanding the circle of opportunity is the concept behind Partnerships for Learning (P4L), an initiative of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which seeks to extend our exchange programs to undergraduate college students and also high school students. P4L has initiated our first high school exchange program with the Arab and Muslim world. Today, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come here in 2004 for the next academic year. Small numbers, but a beginning.

In addition, seventy undergraduate students, men and women, from North Africa and the Middle East will come to the U.S. beginning next month for intensive English language training prior to their enrollment in university degree programs.

In other forms of engagement, since 9/11, the Bureau of Public Affairs has organized over a thousand digital video conferences between American officials and experts and foreign audiences. In the past year, we facilitated nearly 500 interviews and press conferences with senior officials from the Department of State for foreign media outlets.

Public Affairs worked with our Embassy in Jakarta to broadcast this year's State of the Union Address live, with simultaneous interpretation in Bahasa Indonesian. Print and broadcast media covered the address extensively. One national radio station carried the entire broadcast live, reaching millions in this predominately Muslim nation.

These are exactly the kinds of initiatives I believe we should be pursuing. A new initiative which I am exploring is the idea of micro-scholarships for English learning and to attend our American Schools overseas. The U.S. has been incredibly successful with micro-credits for entrepreneurs and small businesses. Why not take that same concept and apply it to education and English language learning?

Another program which holds promise is American Corners. In recent years we have had good results from our American Corners program which as you know constitutes partnerships between our embassies and local institutions like libraries, universities and chambers of commerce. These corners are a source for information outreach at the grassroots level.

We currently have more than 100 American Corners around the world. In FY04, we are planning on opening 194 more in 64 countries. Of these 194, we will establish 58 in the Middle East and South Asia, including ten in Afghanistan and fifteen in Iraq.

Just last month, we opened two new American Corners in Bosnia, Herzegovina, in Zenica and Tuzla, cities with sizeable Muslim populations and religious teaching centers.

Virtual consulates, could be another tool for reaching wide audiences. The virtual consulate concept is a commitment by personnel in a U.S. Mission overseas to periodically travel to a chosen outlying district in order to make live personal presentations and informally mix with the people of the visited region. The travel is supported by a special website that celebrates connections between the Americans and the people and institutions of that region.

English teaching: To strengthen English teaching programs, ECA is devoting an additional $1,573,000 to these programs. This is not enough, but it is a start. Whether through direct teaching or training instructors, English language programs offer great scope for advancing public diplomacy objectives. For example, over the past five years, Embassy Damascus estimates that it has trained over 9,000 of Syria's 12,000 English-language teachers, a excellent example of meaningful outreach.

Book Programs: The Department has developed "book sets" about American history, culture and values for younger audiences around the world. Embassies donate the "book sets" to local libraries and primary/secondary schools. As of September 2003, embassies worldwide had distributed over $400,000 worth of book sets. We are examining our overseas book buys and journal publications as well.

Private Sector Cooperation: We have created a new position in my office to explore ways to draw on the expertise of the private sector to advance our public sector objectives. We can expand public-private partnerships, initially focusing on key industries such as technology, health care and education.

There is much more we can do in the field of sports. We know from past experience that an effective outreach to youth is through sports activities.

Through ECA's new Culture Connect program, America's cultural leadership directly communicates with elite and non-elite foreign youth about our country and values. We currently have ten CultureConnect Ambassadors, and we are going to expand the program this year.

Television offers a powerful tool for public diplomacy and public affairs. We are using co-operative programming with local broadcasters and exploiting new distribution channels and technologies to create a fuller, more accurate picture of the U.S. for general audiences abroad. Over the past two years, we have funded several hundred foreign journalists both for broadcast and print media overseas,

more than half of which have been in Muslim majority countries. We intend to increase these types of journalist tours.

However we do it, we must engage, listen and interact -- especially with the young. They are the key to a future peaceful world.

Interagency coordination is essential to the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The President's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), whose mission is to support economic, political and educational reform in the Middle East and North Africa, integrates policy, public diplomacy, development and technical assistance programs throughout the region. We will continue working with the White House to insure close coordination of our messages. The White House coordinates a daily conference call on public diplomacy vis-à-vis Iraq. The new State-USAID Joint Policy Council and the State-USAID Management Council are intended to improve program coordination in public diplomacy, as in other areas, and help ensure the most effective use of program resources in both the Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Regrettably, all too often, our important and meaningful assistance to developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Government-wide, we have to do a much better job of insuring that the U.S.'s efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials. We can no longer afford for recipients overseas to have no idea that the people of the United States provide assistance to their country.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say again that we all know that there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interests and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people.

In a world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize and ask ourselves, "Is the activity I am doing getting the job done?" We must listen to our field force. Today the State Dept has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I maintain that every American, regardless of Agency or Department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, listen, and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to audiences to whom we previously have not given as much effort and time. We must move beyond the walls of our embassies overseas and foreign government offices.

I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve over time a better, healthier and much more accurate impression of our nation and people. No one, most especially myself, underestimates the challenge and the difficult task at hand. The public diplomacy officials I work with are reaching, questioning and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood.

We will continue to make some mistakes but I truly believe we will ultimately get there. We have no choice. We must.

Thank you – I will be happy to take your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Before asking Mr. Ruppersberger to ask questions, I need to know if it is better to call you Ambassador or Madam Secretary.

Ms. TUTWILER. You can call me Margaret, whichever you prefer.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Ambassador, first, it's rare that I agree with everything a witness has said, but I agree with everything you have said. We have a lot of challenges there. We know the future of our world is based on diplomacy.

Couple of things. First thing, I want to give you a little story. I had an experience about 12 years ago in another local elected capacity. I went to Israel with the Baltimore Jewish Council, and they allowed our group to spend a day with the leadership in the Palestine community. And this one individual who was very high up, close to Arafat—and one of the things he pointed out a story, he said, you know what I'm worried about more than anything, and we all eventually want peace, every time there is a strike or whatever, and the borders close, and the military, usually 19, 20-year-old Israeli soldiers, are very touchy because they are concerned about anybody having a bomb, they become very arrogant to Palestinian families that come to Jerusalem every day, where you have grandparents, parents, grandparents, children—children, 9, 10, 11 years old. And when these young children see how their parents and grandparents are treated and humiliated, they will be our terrorists of tomorrow.

And you mentioned the issue of the youth. Just like we do in America, if we don't get to the youth, they could be our future criminals of tomorrow. And I think it is very important to address that.

And is there a program specifically just to address the younger generation and the youth that exists now? And how do you feel about that, or what are you doing with respect to the youth?

Ms. TUTWILER. I agree with you, and there are a number of existing programs where the State Department traditionally has reached out to youth. I will tell you that since September 11, there has been a reallocation of resources in some different programs up to the point in scholarships of a 25 percent reallocation to high school and undergraduates. Traditionally we had done a lot of graduate work. And I fully support that. We are going to continue it. Hopefully we will be able in the existing budget to do a little bit more reallocation.

And as I mentioned, we have literally in the last 2 weeks started something that I think has enormous benefit for our country, and that is basically taking the concept that you all are very familiar with—we all are—that worked so well for our country overseas, the microcredit loan structure, and take it and apply it in a way to microscholarships for young people and not the elites. The elites, after all, have access to information. They travel. They have an opportunity for a very good education; and to try, sir, as you are pointing out, to get into neighborhoods that we traditionally as Americans, regardless of party affiliation, have been in. And I think it is very important that we engage and participate in those particular neighborhoods, which happen to be quite large.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What concerns me especially with the Wahabiism and religious schools throughout the Middle East, there's a lot of radical teachings that are going on, and there needs to be a program to counter that, and that is education. And that indoctrination, forget it. Do you think we are getting anywhere to counter the religious schools that are existing now?

Ms. TUTWILER. I know in one or two countries, I have met with the U.S. Ambassadors when they have been back here, and they are doing very innovative things along those lines. I cannot speak to every embassy, but I am aware of one or two that actually are trying to tackle that. And we also, sir, are looking at—as you know, the U.S. Government has a fairly large role in the American schools overseas, almost in every post on where we have an embassy. Many of them are not at full occupancy, and I am looking at, and have people right now, can we not fill up existing structures that we already have, and they are under the umbrella of the embassy, and take young people and give them a true American experience in one of our American schools overseas.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. One of these issues is communication. There has been a lot of money spent on the message being sent out through TV or communication, but that is one-way communication. I think experts in some of the articles I have read said probably the most effective way to communicate, especially in the Middle East where the Muslim communities are, is face to face. Do you agree with that, and what programs do we have that we are attempting to communicate on more of a face-to-face basis than actual mass media?

Ms. TUTWILER. I agree with your statement that the situation we find ourselves in does not lend itself to a single-source solution. I think there are a number of things that we are doing that we should continue doing.

I am in the process of trying to give guidance to a very serious look at what are the things that we have been doing that really are no longer effective, and it is multimedia, and it is across the board. And I can't answer for you today where I believe where we should be putting, within the existing budget, additional resources.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is our actual message the problem?

Ms. TUTWILER. No. I will tell you as a sitting Ambassador, sitting in a country of 30 plus million Arabs and Muslims, I had to wrestle with that, and I believe that each of us, whether in private sector or governmental public service, we handle complex portfolios. Part of my job as Ambassador, and I hope—I certainly tried to do it aggressively, is the defense and articulation aggressively with the local media, and I definitely tried to do that on a daily basis. But in addition, I decided—well, some people will say you can't do anything. That is the policy. I fundamentally disagree. If you accept that, in my opinion, then we accept we cannot do anything. So I tried most sincerely to find ways that we could do what we are paid to do as public servants, articulate and defend the policy of the U.S. Government, but also do exactly what you are saying and most sincerely engage as Americans regardless of title in that country in which we were serving in. And I believe that both are effective. I believe that personnel overseas have to do both.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Getting back to the face-to-face issue, which seems to be the most effective, and whether it is Iraq, Israel or whatever, it seems to me—and you have to refocus—we are looking for the ultimate quick fix, and it is not going to happen, and it takes a long time. And we have teams of military where they should be, and we have other teams of diplomats where they should be.

But it seems to me we are going to have to get into individual communities such as in the southwest or southeast of Washington, and what you might need is a combination of a team of—a political team, an economic team and a social team, who literally will deal with all three of those issues and can start developing those relationships and buildup the trust, because a lot of times issues that occur is whether it relates to lack of trust with a community or those individuals that could be recruited into terrorism or al Qaeda. If you get to them at that level—because there is a lot of poverty throughout the world, and those people are vulnerable to problems that exist. And you know, is there a plan to do the type of thing that I just talked about, or is there money and resources?

Ms. TUTWILER. You are absolutely right. And you and I never met, and you said that you rarely agree with everything a witness says, and I have tell you that I agree with everything you were saying. It is exactly the model that I brought back here based on experience that I am trying, to the best of my ability, to get us to participate in more.

And all of us in this room are in some shape or fashion political. We understand grass-roots, door-to-door politics. And I know at the State Department that we are nonpartisan. But it is that type of activity, in my mind, in addition to the other activities that we are doing that I have mentioned and that others will testify today are responsible for, it is exactly the kind of thing that I believe we should be doing and that we are very effective at as Americans and know how to do.

And so I can't tell you today exactly what my plan is, but I can tell you in the short time I have been here—I will mention it again, these microscholarships, I am talking about coming from the very neighborhoods you are concerned about, nontraditional neighborhoods that we have not reached into, we have not been in, we don't know the people, we don't know the neighborhood captains, etc. So it's an attempt. We are starting in five Arab countries, and I hope to be in a whole host of countries. And I can also assure that you every child who receives such an opportunity is going to know that it came from the U.S. people.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this, and this is my last question. Since we agree on most things so far, how would you implement, or where are we implementing, or if you were the Secretary of State and you had the budget to do what you wanted to do, what would your plan of implementation be to do the things you just talked about? More money, more trained personnel, all different parts of the world? I mean, we are focusing on the Middle East, but what countries in the Middle East? What would you do if you could press a button and get everything you want?

Ms. TUTWILER. I take it seriously, and it doesn't lend itself to a simple answer, most sincerely. Part of it is, as you say, if you were

king of the world, it would be competent staff overseas, more, that would be in situations that we all have real security concerns, as we know.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You talk about staff, but does that mean people who have expertise as social workers in creating jobs? That's where we are looking, because you probably don't have that much.

Ms. TUTWILER. To be really candid, people have good old common sense, and that is—honestly, you don't have to be extremely intellectual to be able to do the types of things that I believe you and I are both on the same wavelength over. So that is—again, I want to be clear, I am planning to work within existing personnel and existing budget.

You asked me what if, so I am going on the limb here in answering you. One of the issues is additional manhours, and I say that because in the cuts that went on in the 1990's—I now have mentioned in my statement we have 1,200 personnel overseas. In the 90's, it used to be 2,500. It shows you the reduction in numbers. Just on manpower, it doesn't necessarily solve it, but the manpower that is out there today has additional administrative burdens that were not on them before. I am trying to eliminate, where I can, admin burdens on personnel that are serving overseas so they can be out in the field and in the neighborhoods. That is one part of this.

No. 2 is to look at most sincerely without threatening a very large, stable bureaucracy, honestly asking ourselves what programs are effective; what activities that we are doing today are making a difference for the United States overseas. That's going on right now. Within the existing budget, if you believe that the United States should be paying a larger percentage of our time to nontraditional neighborhoods, I have already found funds, and I hope to find more with the cooperation of my colleagues at the State Department, to get into those neighborhoods in various ways. The first way I have identified in the 5 weeks I have been in office is through scholarships to learn English. It's a window on the world. It's access to the cybernet cafe, to get on the Internet. It opens up a whole flock of avenues that I think are in our self-interest. So I will continue to really and truly search and probe for activities that make a difference.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you for your professional testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Tierney, thank you for joining us. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for your testimony and candor. You answered mostly everything we have asked you, and I don't want to prolong this.

You mentioned the security concerns are real for the people working over there, and we have had other hearings that have mentioned these issues. Are we being so security-conscious in some of the more delicate areas for our diplomacy that our diplomatic corps and people associated with those efforts aren't getting enough contact with the local people, that we are not getting out and listening, and not interacting, and when we do get out, we are so overwhelmingly protected by military or other security people that there is no real chance to connect?

Ms. TUTWILER. It is a problem, and I can tell you as Ambassador, the No. 1 priority for me, most sincerely—and it is a very serious responsibility—for the decisionmaking concerning an American community overseas; should we be out, should we be in shutdown, should we be in the Medinas, should we not, etc. There are also times, sir, they don't want to be with us; when their situations and their streets are tense, and they will—really don't want to be seen with us. So it is a problem. But there are many, many times when it is perfectly safe, calm, etc., to be out.

And it's a large bureaucracy. There are lots of people who enjoy engaging. There are lots of people who want to stay within the walls of an embassy. But I believe there are ways to encourage people to go out and to—as an ambassador or senior leadership at the embassy—to take a leadership role and take yourself out and ask others to go with you. But it is a problem, and there is not an easy solution, and it is usually dictated by the situation on the ground and also an ambassador's leadership.

Mr. TIERNEY. We have wrestled with that same problem. Obviously the first concern is security, but the mission is also a problem. And in your mind it is the Ambassador's decision, and he or she has to exercise the leadership or tone.

Ms. TUTWILER. They get advice from the regional security officer, from others on the country team. But it's basically—it is really true, and I learned it—an ambassador sets the tone and the priorities.

Mr. TIERNEY. Question arises, sometimes we see with the new embassies that are being built, some of them are so well protected they are almost set apart by moat. And if people don't come out, you wonder how you are going to get out there and get that interaction where it is real and feedback on that.

How much listening do you think we do in terms of developing our message for the other aspects that you are trying to do in terms of promoting the American position and policy? Are we listening to people so that they know we are listening? Do they feel they are getting a sense of being able to express the satisfaction with our policies or practices? Is there an opportunity within the context of our work to do that?

Ms. TUTWILER. There are 57 countries, as you know, where the majority of the population is Muslim. I can't comment to the degree to which American personnel overseas are or are not listening, but I can attest to since I have been back, I believe we are doing a better job of listening as we formulate product to people who live in the region versus thinking we here know how, with our cultural Western American model, know how to make product that works in another person's culture. So I believe we are doing a better job of asking before we produce, and I think that is a step, obviously, in the right direction.

Mr. TIERNEY. Last my question would be in terms of evaluation, what are we doing to evaluate our work product on that and then determine if we are in the right direction or wrong direction, and how we can improve?

Ms. TUTWILER. It's very tricky. I cannot measure in 30 years a high schooler who came here and had a terrific experience with a family in your home State. We are trying, but I believe the benefits

of that show up year after year when challenged or tested. We are, in the three bureaus, actively pursuing and in some instances implementing—and I will get you the details of it instead of going through the tick tock here of programs—to try to do a better job of measuring and evaluating those activities and programs that we do. I am not ducking your question, but to avoid going through all the tick tock, I would rather get it for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

February 11, 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee this week. During my testimony, I committed to providing the subcommittee with additional information about the evaluation and measurement process of the three public diplomacy bureaus.

Developing a culture of measurement for public diplomacy and public affairs programs is a priority for me as Under Secretary. The three public diplomacy bureaus currently use various mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of their programs.

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) budgets $1.5 million and dedicates a portion of its program budget annually for evaluations, which are contracted to independent, private sector professionals. ECA also dedicates an office to program evaluation and measurement. For the FY 2005 budget, OMB evaluated exchange programs in the Middle East and South Asia and ranked ECA as "effective" using its Program Assessment Rating Tool, and gave exchanges the highest score for the Department of State, based largely on ECA's evaluation and performance measurement processes. The score ranks ECA in the top three percent of all programs assessed so far. GAO has also recognized ECA as leaders in the U.S. Government for the quality of its evaluation program.

The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) has hired *NewsMarket,* an internet-based partner, to monitor and evaluate the use of PA's new Video News Releases, which are distributed to broadcasters and news agencies worldwide. In 2003, PA also contracted for an independent evaluation of the Shared Values television campaign in Indonesia.

The Honorable
Christopher Shays, Chairman,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives.

The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has created a unit to develop mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs. IIP manages a RESULTS database that currently collects information on programs carried out by field posts. This database is used to support evaluation of field programs. Through the RESULTS database, posts provide a wealth of anecdotal evidence about the success of specific programs. IIP is currently developing a new output database that, when used with RESULTS data, will allow bureau to undertake cost/benefit analyses of its programs.

I hope this information proves useful to the subcommittee. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Margaret DeB. Tutwiler

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador, how would you describe the differences between U.S. communication style and that of the Arab world? I realize that could be a long answer, but in general, what would you describe are the differences?

Ms. TUTWILER. What I learned, and one of my good friends in the news media will not like this, we in the West, or in—at least in America, to a certain degree have a sanitized visual. And by that I mean I learned and watched, whether it was newspaper or TV, horrific, I mean seriously horrific, visuals on the front pages of newspapers, not rag sheets, responsible newspapers. I have seen on TV, in color, visuals and film footage that I simply could not believe. And we sit here and wonder how it pushes emotional buttons. There is no doubt in my mind if you watch this over and over and over, it would push anybody's emotional buttons.

And so where we use—I don't know the correct technology or term—fuzzy pictures to black out something that would be horrifying, a decapitated head, a baby that is blown up, etc., they just put it all out there. And I don't know which system is right or wrong to be perfectly honest with you, but it is very different and visual.

I will also say that we have, what, 228 years' worth of incredible journalism and the standards that we expect. If you take only in the last 10 years electronic media, that's been their experience of nongovernment control, and much of it, as we know, is on the verbal side of this and in many instances irresponsible, and others, alarmists. And they have a lot of rhetoric going in their newly found, through the last 8 or 9 years, independent media. So it is definitely different.

And I will be very honest with you, and I won't take very much time, I used to get in the car every morning with Moroccan gentlemen. One was university-educated, and one was not—my security detail. And I would ask every morning, what did the Arab television tell you last night about what is going on in Iraq? And more mornings than not—and I would watch ours through AFN, because I had a direct feed to America. What America was seeing, they were 360 degrees away from each other.

And 1 day, one of these gentlemen said, how do you know what you are being told is the truth? So in their heads—we keep saying, you are just being fed all this stuff. They have to learn, which I said, you will find out that I am telling the truth and that our media is telling the truth, but it is a long, drawn-out process and can take many days for the truth to finally get onto their outlets.

Mr. SHAYS. That begs the question, why aren't they telling the truth?

Ms. TUTWILER. I can't answer that. I don't know—and I believe you will have other people who will be testifying, so I will not get into their testimony or their questions, but I actually believe—I know there are some that are critical of the U.S. efforts in radio and television. I happen to believe they are wrong. I think we should have been in this game. I know we are in radio, but we certainly should have been in TV when access to information was greater 8 or 9 years ago, and we weren't, and I think we are paying a price for it.

And I believe that this is an admirable thing we are trying to do. We are 8 or 9 years behind the loop. But if one person listens to our version in their language of rational, honest journalism, I happen to actually believe there is a good likelihood that the irrational on their channels will be forced to become more rational because people are people in the world over. These people are not stupid. So if there's nothing that has been countering it for all these years, they get away with it. But all of a sudden we have a shot of us saying, here's what really went on today, and at some point the other will have to get more in line with what's real.

Mr. SHAYS. I am struck by a number of issues I would like to talk to you about. I have been to Iraq four times and three times outside the umbrella of the military. And there was a gentleman named Muhammad Abdullah Asani, and he almost grabbed me by the shoulders and he said, you don't know us, and we don't know you.

To what extent do you think the United States has ignored cultural differences in its public diplomacy initiatives in the region of the Middle East?

Ms. TUTWILER. I think what we have done, and I don't think there was any malice intended with this—I think as a Nation we are problem solvers. We are impatient people, and we like to get in, solve a problem and move on. And I believe what we did not do as an effective job that we could have was to ask people who live in that particular country, not people who live in parts of our country, but people who actually live there, if you were going to make a pamphlet, if you were going to make a book, if you were going to do the following, how would you do it.

The other day I met for almost 2 hours with the 25 Iraqi Fulbright scholars that are here. I asked to meet with them. I wanted to ask them very specific questions and listen to their answers. And I asked each one of them to tell me how did you learn about my country, through what medium? They said, it was from someone who had been in the West or in your country and would come back and tell us about it. The second way they said was through movies, U.S. movies. So I actually learned something.

So I believe that when we make product, that we have to be asking the recipients for genuine, honest input over what is it that will work in their culture.

Mr. SHAYS. You may have answered this in a different way, but I actually had someone tell me I needed to ask you this question.

Ms. TUTWILER. I hope it's a friend.

Mr. SHAYS. He said what did you learn while you were Ambassador of Morocco that you didn't know, and was that the experience about getting in the car? When you were actually Ambassador of Morocco, what did you learn that shaped how you feel today about this whole issue?

Ms. TUTWILER. I think what I learned the most, and it was not from government officials, but from real people, is that the portrait that regrettably has been painted of us is very flawed. And I found it very troubling and very disturbing that people do not know us. And I was very—I really struggled with this, and I really, really tried to the best of my ability to understand this. Some of it regret-

tably has been through our own product. But the picture of us is a cartoon, is an exaggeration, is in large measure false.

At the same time, having said that, as we all know, everybody wants a visa to come here; everybody listens to our music and movies and blah, blah, blah. But it was probably to me—I think what motivates me the most is the realization that we really and truly have a problem, not alarmed, but a problem that is going to take all of our efforts and a long time to get out of, and we have to focus and pay attention, in my personal opinion.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to describe four reactions that I had in Iraq the last time I was there, and I want to know what the antidote to it is. One reaction is that I realized that you have this dichotomy between Iraqis wanting us to stay and they want us to leave. I mean, it's like both show up high on the surveys. The majority want us to go, and majority want us to stay. Figure that one out.

One observation I realized is that the Iraqis are angry at us for a few things. They are angry that we weren't there after we had encouraged them to rebel after the Gulf war, and the Republican Guard had been left intact and annihilated the Kurds and a lot of Shiites. They were angry and annoyed with the embargo because they didn't blame Saddam, they blamed us and the U.N. They are angry in another way because they don't think we are going to stay, and they think we are going to leave. And their anger is I don't know whether to be a friend to you, because I'll befriend you, and then you'll leave, and then I will have to deal with what happens afterwards. They were angry in a way because we are the government now, and they never had a government that they can like or trust.

Does public diplomacy have a role to play in any of the issues I mentioned.

Ms. TUTWILER. We absolutely have a role to play. And I, too, served in Iraq, in Baghdad, and went all over and had an opportunity to ask questions and listen to them, and I agree with you on exactly what you are saying.

We absolutely have a role to play, and it is not just the State Department. There are many, many things that I know that you know of that our military is doing every day in the 18 regions all over that country to help people, whether it is to put in their gas lines, to rebuild schools, to reinstitute hospitals, and the people are aware of that, and they are watching us.

As you know, or may not know, the State Department is going to have shortly the largest contingent of public diplomacy officers deployed anywhere in any country in Iraq working on various sundry things that I hope are effective and do help educate many of these people over the very things that you were talking about, and there is much that we are doing there that is to the good. I hope it's getting out. As you know, the Fulbrighters are here, and I hope you had an opportunity to meet with them. We just had the Iraqi Symphony here. And Americans, as Americans are, we are so generous; we sent them back each with a new instrument, including a new Steinway piano, and an American company volunteered to pay to get that piano back to Iraq. Their libraries have been destroyed, their musical libraries, and the Kennedy Center put out

calls to our American music libraries and shipped back some 500 new sets of classical music.

There are many, many things that Americans are doing in Iraq that I hope over time will buildup what I think you are basically asking me is trust.

Mr. SHAYS. I just have two more questions. Why don't I go to you and come back.

Mr. TIERNEY. My question was rather general. As members of this panel were to travel to Morocco, what should they see and do there, and what would benefit their understanding about the things we discussed today?

Ms. TUTWILER. One of the things I am urging all U.S. officials when they travel and you, Congress, when you travel, in addition to the standard CODEL or the standard U.S. official visit in a place, push back on embassy personnel and say, I want to have a meeting with normal—in this case, it would be Moroccans. I want to have a dialog. I want to be able to have an unstructured conversation so that I can listen.

Obviously, it is very important each time you travel and makes a huge impact for our country most sincerely when you meet with the leaders and with the officials. But to be able——

Mr. TIERNEY. I'm only smiling because we are running up against the same things we ran up before. There is so much caution on the security things. But I agree with you, I think that is absolutely essential.

Ms. TUTWILER. The impact it makes. Plus we become more educated by having the opportunity to have a dialog and listen to people who are not government officials. I think it is really useful for all of us.

Mr. SHAYS. I am trying to visualize broadcasting just for a second. You have al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. Do you visualize an organization that would compete head to head with these two organizations? Would you visualize that we would have a broadcasting capability by satellite that would be able to go head to head with these organizations?

Ms. TUTWILER. Well, we are getting ready to. The curtain is going up this Saturday, I believe, at 10:30 a.m., and these gentlemen are going to testify about this. I mean, we are going to try. And I know and have read all the back and forth in the press, but I again ask those who are criticizing this to sincerely think about it; is it better 20 minutes of a different view and balance than not at all? And maybe we will get better and there will be 6 hours of us and 6 hours of them.

I don't think the issue most sincerely is trying to make them go away. That's not going to happen. They have emotionally engaged and internalized these channels. This is not going to happen. So, in my mind, how do we get on the playing field? And I only know one way, which is what is getting ready to happen.

Mr. SHAYS. When I was coming back in January, we met with the King and Queen of Jordan, and Queen Rania expressed absolute amazement that this country, with all its capabilities and talents, has taken so long to have done this, because in April we were talking about it. And I just am delighted that you will be focused on this issue.

And I guess I want to ask as my last question—what kind of control does a Secretary have in D.C. over this issue worldwide, the whole issue of public diplomacy? Do you have direct ability to replace people in various countries that you do not think—who you think may not be performing the way they need to be?

Ms. TUTWILER. No. I don't know of any under secretary in any department that has that authority over the career establishment. I'm just not aware of it.

What you have to do in this vast bureaucracy that is worldwide is work very, very hard to try to formulate a plan, a strategy, whatever you wish to call it, that's credible, and then try to get buy-in. Because if you get buy-in from the field force, then they are obviously going to implement it. And that takes a lot of effort, and it takes a lot of focus and time to try to get that to happen.

I don't know whether I will be successful or not, but I know that when I came here one of the complaints I heard was in the integration of USIA, that no one listened to the field. Well, I've changed that. We are listening. I have created—or, having created this new site for public diplomacy, officials, regardless of rank or tenure, can all communicate, including myself. So that's across all regions. So if there is a young Foreign Service officer that is really doing a really effective program in, say, South Africa, and he views that it might be effective in other countries, all of a sudden we can share this with every public diplomacy official.

Well, I think this has potentially some benefit and that we can get something done, but it is something that—as you know, I served previously in the State Department, and it is something that you have to get buy-in from the field force and from personnel.

Mr. SHAYS. You have been great. Is there anything that you wish we had asked that you want to put on the record, because we would love you to put it on the record. Is there anything that you think needs to be said that hasn't been put on the record by you?

Ms. TUTWILER. Not that I can think of. Thank you for the opportunity, and thank you very much for caring and for your interest, all of you, most sincerely, because it really does matter, and we are all in this together, and we have all got to try—like when you take your next trip, push back on here are some things that I want to do, and I am in X, Y, Z country.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we agree. And you do very important work, and we wish you well.

Ms. TUTWILER. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Hold on just 1 second.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you just tell me quickly when that system for all the DP offices to interconnect is going to be up and running?

Ms. TUTWILER. We started—I learned about it during my confirmation preparations, and I've got a gentleman in the African Bureau who is helping me. And he told me within 2 weeks we will be doing this. So that's pretty fast for State—for any large bureaucracy.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you so much.

Ms. TUTWILER. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. We will go to our second panel here.

Thank you Ambassador.

Our second panel is Kenneth Tomlinson, chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors, accompanied by Norman Pattiz, founder and chairman, Westwood One, and member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and Harold Pachios, chairman, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. We welcome them. And I am going to have you gentlemen stand so we can swear all of you in. And we have two testimonies and three answering questions is how we are going to proceed.

Raising your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record that all of our witnesses have responded affirmatively.

And, Mr. Tomlinson, we will start with you.

STATEMENTS OF KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, CHAIRMAN, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, ACCOMPANIED BY NORMAN J. PATTIZ, FOUNDER AND CHAIRMAN, WESTWOOD ONE, MEMBER, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS; AND HAROLD PACHIOS, CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Mr. TOMLINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am joined here today by two splendid gentlemen, Norman Pattiz, the father of Radio Sawa and an irrepressible force for international broadcasting; and Harold Pachios, the former chairman of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. He is still a member, and a man who's credited years ago with proposing that we do Middle East television.

In recent months and years, we've heard a great deal about public diplomacy from think tanks and study groups and academia. They speak of strategic direction and process and policy coordination. I submit, with all due respect, we should be focused on vision and leadership and action. That is why, with the enthusiastic support of President Bush and key leaders of the administration and Congress, the BBG will be launching later this week an Arabic-language satellite television service to the Middle East.

It is no accident that President Bush speaks of open debate and truth when he describes what this network will be to the people of the Middle East. The network will be called Alhurra, Arabic for "the free one." We will challenge the voices of hate and repression with truth and voices of tolerance and reason. The people will hear free and open discussions, not just about the conflict in the Middle East, but also about subjects critical to that region's future. We are talking about economic development and human rights and respect for minorities.

I wish I could take you this afternoon out to Alhurra's broadcast complex in northern Virginia where in a little more than 4 months an abandoned building has been transformed into a state-of-the-art broadcast facility. The set designs are magnificent, worthy of what the world would expect from the United States. Since October, some 900,000 feet of cable have been installed in this facility.

Look over there. Norm, you're to be congratulated. This is just extraordinary progress forward of where we need to be.

But what is also truly extraordinary is the sea of Middle Eastern faces, newsmen and newswomen enthusiastically preparing amidst

the work of carpenters and electricians to launch this network. Some have said Alhurra will be the most significant development in international broadcasting since the launch of Voice of America during World War II, and I believe that will be the case.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has been in business for less than 10 years. We were created by Members of Congress led by Delaware Senator Joe Biden who understood the role broadcasting played in our victory in the cold war. Solidarity founder Lech Walesa once was asked, is there a relationship between Radio Free Europe and the fall of communism and the rise of free and democratic institutions in Poland? And he replied: Would there be an Earth without the Sun?

Our competitive edge in the Middle East is our very dedication to truth and free and open debate, and we will stand out like a beacon of light in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion, as we heard earlier today. That is what brought immediate success to the Voice of America's new Persian-language satellite television program, "News and Views," that's broadcast to the people of Iran.

Typical of what creative broadcasting can do is the new segment launched by News and Views called Your Voice. Iranian viewers were invited to submit e-mails on the controversy surrounding the February 20 Parliamentary elections, from the banning of candidates to calls for election boycott. We opened a dialog that is allowing Iranians to share their view with other Iranians, and the response has been extraordinary. Allow me to pay tribute to Blanquita Cullum, one of our board members who played such an important role in the establishment of this service last summer.

It is no accident that satellite television is a vehicle for our latest broadcast initiative. As Thomas Friedman has explained, satellite television is not just the most important media phenomenon in the Middle East, it is also the most important political phenomenon. That is why we at the BBG believe that satellite television is to our future what shortwave radio was to our past.

My predecessors likewise brought great innovation to radio broadcast that proved vital to the success of our Afghan radio network which broadcasts in Dari and Pashto and our youth-oriented Radio Farda to Iran and Radio Sawa to the Arab world.

When Norman Pattiz was in the process of creating Radio Sawa, he traveled throughout the Middle East to negotiate heretofore unattainable agreements for American AM and FM transmitters in Middle Eastern countries so that we could be heard on radios of choice in the region. And the same is true with our Internet technology.

Radio Sawa has been a phenomenal success. I have submitted for the record a comprehensive ACNielsen survey which demonstrates Sawa's market dominance and other documents, but I will submit that accurate news and serious content is equally important in defining the success of Sawa. Under the leadership of Mouafac Harb, Sawa's outstanding news director who will assume the same post for Alhurra, the station has been a source of a host of shows that explore freedom and democracy. Typical of these are the Free Zone, a 30-minute weekly review and discussion of democracy and freedom as they relate specifically to the Middle East; Ask the World

Now, where U.S. policymakers respond to questions from Middle East listeners; and Sawa Chat, where reporters go to the streets in the Middle East with a question of the day. And, of course, the latest initiative that we are pursuing is a youth-oriented Urdu broadcast to Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, critical to this initiative is one of your constituents, Steve Simmons, a vital member of our board.

You asked that I address coordination among Federal agencies, and I do so in my testimony that I submitted for the record.

As much as we value coordination, we also appreciate this administration's dedication to the firewall that separates the short-term policy objectives of instruments of government and our responsibility to journalistic independence in order to achieve audience credibility. We believe it is important to maintain the strength of public diplomacy and the traditions of international broadcasting. I am convinced that we will not be successful in our overall mission to deliver our message to the world if we fail to grasp that these are two independent spheres, and they operate according to two sets of rules.

It is very important that those who speak for our government take America's message to the world passionately and aggressively. We should not be ashamed of public advocacy on behalf of freedom and democracy in the United States.

International broadcasting, on the other hand, is called upon to reflect the high standards of independent journalism as the best means of demonstrating to international audiences that truth is on the side of democratic values. These arms of public diplomacy should be parallel pursuits, because the effectiveness of either is adversely affected when one attempts to impose its methods on the other.

I remember 30 years ago when RFE/RL and VOA began broadcasting the Watergate hearings. Those broadcasts caused heartburn for many in Washington. But looking back we see they constituted a veritable civics lesson on the importance of separation of powers and rule of law and aspects of democracy you have to understand to understand our system. Over the years I've heard so many citizens of post-Communist countries tell us how these broadcasts helped them understand the real meaning of freedom and democracy.

I would like to conclude with a word about our future. In the years between the end of the cold war and September 11, international broadcasting saw its budget reduced 40 percent in real terms. Cuts in personnel followed numerically close behind. Today, less than 3 years after September 11, with the administration's and Congress' support for expanding broadcast efforts in the Middle East and Muslim nations, the BBG has established a record of success that is a sturdy foundation for future growth. This record points toward our global broadcasting vision of 2010 that is currently in the works.

We must build on our achievements and reach out to others in the world of Islam and beyond whose sources of information about the United States and democracy have misled them and continue to do so today. Again, the truth remains our constant guide. When others have the assets to have access to the facts for which BBG

stands, we believe that we will have made a material and lasting contribution to the security of the United States.

Again, I thank you for allowing this statement, and I look forward to hearing from my colleagues.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Tomlinson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tomlinson follows:]

Testimony of
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Chairman
Broadcasting Board of Governors before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
February 10, 2004

Mr. Chairman, we greatly appreciate this Subcommittee's focus on public diplomacy in the Middle East, and we welcome the opportunity to tell you what the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is doing in this critical and troubled region. I am joined at the hearing today by fellow board member Norman Pattiz, the father of Radio Sawa and an irrepressible force for international broadcasting.

In recent months and years, we have heard a great deal about public diplomacy from the think tanks and study groups and academia. They speak of "strategic direction" and "process" and "policy coordination." I submit that we should be focused on vision and leadership and action.

That is why, with the enthusiastic support of President Bush and key leaders in the Administration and Congress, the BBG will be launching later this week an Arabic-language satellite television service to the Middle East.

It is no accident that President Bush speaks of "open debate" and "truth" when he describes what this network will mean to the people of the Middle East. The network will be called Alhurra—Arabic for "the free one"—and there we will challenge the voices of hate and repression with truth and the voices of tolerance and moderation. The people will hear free and open discussions not just about conflict in the Middle East, but also about subjects critical to that region's future. We are talking about economic development and human rights and respect for minorities.

I wish I could take you this afternoon to Alhurra's broadcast complex in Northern Virginia where in little more than four months a building has been transformed into a state-of-the-art broadcast facility. The set-designs are magnificent—worthy of what the world would expect from the United States. But what is truly extraordinary is the sea of Middle Eastern faces—

newsmen and newswomen—enthusiastically preparing, midst working carpenters and electricians, to launch the network. I'm told that since October some 900,000 feet of cable has been installed in this facility. Some have said Alhurra will become the most significant development in international broadcasting since the launch of the Voice of America during World War II—and I believe that will be the case.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has been in business for less than ten years. We were created by Members of Congress led by Delaware Senator Joe Biden who understood the role broadcasting played in our victory in the Cold War. Solidarity founder Lech Walesa once was asked if there was a relationship between Radio Free Europe and the fall of communism and the rise of free and democratic institutions in Poland. He replied, "Would there be an Earth without the sun?"

BBG's founders believed that a Board with Americans distinguished in the fields of communications, print and broadcast media, and foreign affairs, would bring the drive and innovation of the private sector to government. These founders also knew the credibility of our broadcasts would depend on this Board serving as a firewall protecting our government-paid journalists from the nation's foreign policy establishment.

As I said when the New York Times first reported about Alhurra: "The people aren't stupid. If we are slanting the news, they'll figure it out. If we establish long-term credibility, people will begin to turn to us with serious questions. What went wrong? What retarded a civilization that was once far ahead of the West? And we'll be there to answer them."

Our competitive edge in the Middle East is our very dedication to truth and free and open debate. And we will stand out like a beacon of light in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion.

That is what brought immediate success to the Voice of America's new Persian-language satellite television program "News and Views" to the people of Iran. Less than three months after that program was launched last summer, one independent survey showed "News and Views" was reaching a remarkable 12 percent of the country's over-18 population.

Typical of what creative broadcasting can do is the new segment launched by "News and Views" called "Your Voice." Iranian viewers were invited to

submit e-mails on the controversy surrounding the February 20th parliamentary elections—from the banning of candidates to calls for an election boycott. We opened a dialogue that is allowing Iranians to share their views with other Iranians—and the response has been extraordinary. Allow me to pay tribute to Blanquita Cullum who played such an important role in the creation of this service.

It is no accident that satellite television is the vehicle for our latest broadcast initiative. As Thomas Friedman has explained, satellite television is not just an important media phenomenon in the Middle East, it is also the most important political phenomenon. That is why we at the BBG believe that satellite television is to our future what shortwave radio was to our past.

My predecessors likewise brought innovation to our radio broadcasts that proved to be vital to the success of our Afghan Radio Network which broadcasts in Dari and Pashto and our youth-oriented Radio Farda to Iran and Radio Sawa to the Arab world. When Norm Pattiz was in the process of creating Radio Sawa, he traveled throughout the Middle East to negotiate heretofore unattainable agreements for American AM and FM transmitters in Middle Eastern countries so that we could be heard on the radios of choice in the region.

Radio Sawa has been a phenomenal success. A survey by ACNielsen research last fall demonstrated that Sawa has achieved market dominance—an average listenership of 42 percent in the important age group between 15 and 29—in key Middle Eastern countries.

Skeptics conceded Arabs might listen to our music but would never pay any attention to our news. Yet this same ACNielsen survey found that in a region where skepticism towards the U.S. is high and boycotts of U.S. products are common, Radio Sawa, clearly identified as a U.S. government broadcaster, was found to be a reliable source of news and information by 73 percent of its weekly listenership.

In a matter of months, Sawa built the largest radio news gathering operation in the Middle East presenting up-to-the minute news 24 hours a day and over 325 newscasts per week. It was the very reliability of our Sawa news that made us the leading source for news in Iraq even as we went to war there.

News also accounts for the surprising audience that ACNielsen documented for Sawa among older listeners in target countries in the Middle East—better than 20 percent among the general population over 30. Adults know the time of scheduled newscasts, and they tune in.

Mr. Chairman, I will submit for the record highlights of the ACNielsen survey as well as material from another independent survey documenting Sawa's success in Iraq.

Accurate news and serious content is the real success of Sawa. Under the leadership of Mouafac Harb, Sawa's outstanding News Director who will assume that post for Alhurra, the station also is the source of a host of shows that explore freedom and democracy. Typical of these: "The Free Zone," a 30-minute weekly review and discussion of democracy and freedom as they relate specifically to the Middle East; "Ask the World Now," where U.S. policy makers respond to questions from Middle East listeners, and "Sawa Chat," where reporters go to the streets of the Middle East with a question of the day.

The latest initiative we are planning is a new youth-oriented Urdu broadcast to Pakistan where listeners will be served contemporary Pakistani and western music along with news and current affairs features and subjects ranging from education to business to health. We hope this service, called Radio Aap ki Dunyaa [Your World Radio], will begin seven-day-a-week, 12 hours a day of AM broadcasting this spring, and we believe we will soon add FM affiliates in Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, critical to this initiative is one of your constituents, Steve Simmons, a valued member of our board.

By spring, we also expect to have a 10-hour per day Iraqi stream for Middle East television that will be available through terrestrial transmitters.

Allow me to pause to pay tribute to Representative Frank Wolf who is the guiding force behind this initiative.

Cynics demand proof of the effectiveness of our broadcasting, and I say that is difficult to measure though the ACNielsen survey showed that Sawa's listeners had a more positive view of the United States than the general population. It is important to understand that the payoff for our investment

in international broadcasting will not be found in the short term, but in the long haul.

What we can give to the Middle East is the same gift that we gave to the former Soviet Union and the people of Eastern Europe during the Cold War—accurate information they need to compare their political, economic, and social system to those that exist successfully elsewhere in the world. If they can accurately assess their own leadership, if they can distinguish between the truth and the propaganda of our enemies, the people will have the tools that will lead to change.

Lessons from U.S. broadcasting during the Cold War also may be applied to what we hope to achieve in the Middle East. When that wall finally came down, populations in many of those countries in Eastern Europe were prepared for change in no small part because they had been informed about the outside world through international broadcasting. This we hope to do for the people of the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, you asked that I address coordination among agencies that are responsible for explaining and advocating U.S. policies and values to foreign publics. As you know, the Secretary of State is an ex-officio member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the newly confirmed Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Margaret Tutwiler has already demonstrated a great deal of interest in our Board's work. Our diplomats overseas also have helped us gain valuable transmission resources in countries to which we broadcast. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has from time to time provided important financial support for broadcasts—support that was critical in our recent ability to expand our programming to Zimbabwe.

Let me also pay tribute to the White House Office of Global Communications under the leadership of Tucker Eskew and its new Director Mary Catherine Andrews. Their support has been critical to the development of a number of our initiatives—specifically Middle East television—and their coordination of the Administration's support for what we do has been essential to our success.

But as much as we value coordination, we also appreciate this Administration's dedication to the firewall that separates the short-term

policy objectives of the instruments of government and our responsibility to journalistic independence in order to achieve audience credibility.

We believe it is important to maintain the strength of public diplomacy—and the traditions of international broadcasting. I am convinced that we will not be successful in our overall mission of delivering our message to the world if we fail to grasp that these are two different spheres and that they operate according to two different sets of rules.

It is very important that government spokesmen take America's message to the world—passionately and relentlessly. We should not be ashamed of public advocacy on behalf of freedom and democracy and the United States of America.

International broadcasting on the other hand is called upon to reflect the highest standards of independent journalism as the best means of demonstrating to international audiences that truth is on the side of democratic values.

These arms of public diplomacy should be parallel pursuits because the effectiveness of either is adversely affected when one attempts to impose its approach on the other.

I remember 30 years ago when RFE/RL and VOA began broadcasting the Watergate hearings. Those broadcasts caused heartburn for many in Washington, but looking back we see they constituted a veritable civics lesson on the importance of separation of powers and rule of law. Over the years I have heard so many citizens of post-communist countries tell how those broadcasts helped them understand the real meaning of freedom and democracy.

We in America are fortunate that telling the truth works to our long-term advantage. That is why international broadcasting is so important to this country.

I would like to conclude with a word about our future. In the years between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, international broadcasting saw its budget reduced by 40 percent in real terms. Cuts in personnel followed numerically close behind. Today, less than three years after 9/11, with the Administration's and Congress's support for expanding broadcasting efforts

in the Middle East and Muslim nations, the BBG has established a record of success that is a sturdy foundation for future growth. This record points toward our Global Broadcasting Vision of 2010 that is currently a work in progress.

We must build on our achievements, and reach out to others in the world of Islam and beyond whose sources of information about the U.S. and democracy have misled them and continue to do so today. Again, the truth remains our constant guide. When others have the access to the facts for which the BBG stands, we believe that we will have made a material and lasting contribution to the security of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal statement, and I will be happy to answer any questions that your Subcommittee might have.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Pattiz, I was just reading your incredible resume, and we look forward to having your participation in these questions in just a little while.

I will go first to you Mr. Pachios. And you have a statement, I believe. Correct?

Mr. PACHIOS. I just have a relatively short statement, Mr. Chairman.

First, thank you for inviting a member of our Commission, the U.S. Commission on Public Diplomacy, to testify here. We have been around for 50 years. All the members are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate. And this has been our focus since shortly after World War II.

I am no longer the chairman. A very distinguished woman from Arizona, Barbara Barrett, is now chairman; I am now a member. And I am accompanied by another member from Florida, Tre' Evers, who is sitting just behind me.

I want to say from—I've been on this Commission for 11 years, and I've traveled around the world, and I've talked to a lot of people about public diplomacy long before September 11, and there weren't a lot of people paying much attention to it. Radio Sawa and Middle East television network Alhurra are extremely important initiatives. I served on the Djerejian Task Force on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world with many, many distinguished people. I differ from their conclusions mostly in the area of Sawa and Middle East television network. I think they are extremely important.

Ninety-seven percent of the people in the Middle East get news and information from television, and Members of Congress who travel to the region get in the car and drive around and see all of these television receivers on every balcony everywhere. People in every village get their news and information from television.

And I would also say as an aside here that Members of Congress probably understand opinionmaking better than anybody in this town. They understand how to reach people, how to deliver a message, and how to have people understand what they are saying. So there is no mystery to this. It is in many respects the power of television and the communications revolution, including the Internet, because the Internet will become as important as television.

Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya present some opportunities. We have to do a much better job of booking people and coordinating the booking of people on these television stations. We don't use third-party validators very well. We don't have anybody in our government charged with just doing that, and they ought to be. But there is an anti-American bias, and everybody recognizes it, with those stations. And keep in mind, when Charlotte Beers had this advertising campaign, it was ill-fated, when she wanted to put ads on television, these stations wouldn't carry the ads; it was paid advertising, and they wouldn't accept it.

So, if Sawa and Middle East television only broadcast objective news, over time, as the VOA did after World War II and during the cold war, it will be effective and important.

Face to face is good, I agree with what the Under Secretary said. Face to face is good, but most face to face is with elites. And the Under Secretary stressed that we have to begin changing public di-

plomacy, we have to maintain what we have traditionally done with elites, but we have to redirect our focus to nonelites and the masses, and you can only do that effectively through radio and television. It's the same way we affect public opinion in our own country.

A couple of other quick points. Since September 11 there have been innumerable studies and reports issued by a great number of organizations, and they all generally say the same thing: More money for the State Department to do traditional public diplomacy programming such as exchanges, information programs, books, magazines, more people. And we should continue to do that. Long-term public diplomacy is important; over the last decade we let it slip. But we have to emphasize communication with mass audiences and to use the most effective tools we know of today, which is television and, in the future, the Internet, and I think what these gentlemen have done in a very short time is remarkable.

One final thing. It is true that our image abroad is tied to a large degree to what we do and what we say. We need to elevate this process of determining what we are going to say to mass audiences in the Middle East and elsewhere to the White House. I worked in the White House in the Johnson administration; I was the assistant White House press secretary. We knew how to coordinate a message to domestic audiences. Global audiences are now as important as domestic audiences; they affect everything we do, and so we need to do for global audiences what we have done for domestic audiences in the White House all these years.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pachios follows:]

Harold C. Pachios

Commissioner
United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

Opening Statement

to the
Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
United States House of Representatives

Tuesday, February 10, 2004

Chairman Shays and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I want to thank you on behalf of our chairman, Barbara Barrett, and the five other members of the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for this opportunity to share my thoughts on U.S. government efforts to inform, engage and influence audiences in the Middle East and around the globe. I would also like to recognize my fellow commissioner, Tre' Evers, from Florida who is here with me today.

As this subcommittee has noted, over the past two years, several significant studies have been issued dealing with the conduct of public diplomacy. I most recently served as my commission's representative on the Djerejian Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. I think the Djerejian group made some important points, but I do have some differences with some of the group's observations.

Having served on this nearly 50 year-old commission for eleven years, I believe that our public diplomacy programs need to be divided distinctly between two areas, immediate communications and long-term communications.

Our long-term communications include professional and student exchanges, American libraries and cultural programs. We know these programs work. They are some of our most effective. In fact, while they were young, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Afghan President Hamid Karzai both participated in our international visitor efforts. We know that both of these men are friends of America today. Because of the efficacy of these long-term efforts, we must continue to fund them. However, many of these programs are the same projects the United States Information Agency (USIA) used to win the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of people throughout the world during the Cold War. These programs are expensive, and to succeed they require the strategic placement of participants to have success. We often do not see results until at least 10 years into the future.

If we really want to improve our long-term communications, we need to encourage more American businesses to conduct their own professional exchanges, streamline our visa process for student visitors and call on more American citizens to represent the United States abroad.

While constituting a core of what the State Department does to influence international public opinion, the world has changed in a way that requires us to look beyond the influence of elite audiences and the influence of people over the long term.

Here's what has changed. First, even people in the remotest villages throughout the world receive satellite TV

broadcasts. Second, as the world's only superpower, and an active one at that, everything our leaders say and do is of consequence to ordinary people everywhere. Third, the new technology of broadcast journalism ensures that when our leaders make statements, villagers in Jordan, Indonesia and Pakistan will see and hear it simultaneously with people in Wichita, Portland, and Louisville. Same message, same time.

No longer do we have the opportunity to separate our messages, as we did when I served in the White House many years ago as associate press secretary to Lyndon Johnson. Now, the same words and ideas reach our global audience, sometimes with unflattering editing, as quick as it reaches domestic audiences.

Since international public opinion does have the power to interfere with our foreign policy objectives, the process for unveiling new foreign policy goals, new visa rules or other matters that the global press corps may cover needs to be coordinated and communicated by skilled public relations professionals who serve and have access to the President and other key administration officials.

It is true; the apparatus of public diplomacy at the State Department has proven inadequate, especially in the Arab and Muslim World. The solutions for running a coordinated and agile communications campaign are not yet robust. Now don't get me wrong, we have some very dedicated men and women at the State Department and elsewhere who practice public diplomacy on America's behalf around the world, but this system has become outmoded and lacks a cohesive corps of devoted messengers within the foreign and civil service. To really communicate our messages, we need the means to spread our ideas and policies throughout the globe from one source through dedicated teams of communicators skilled in media relations and local languages and equipped with modern public relations tools.

It is our short-term communications efforts that must be improved to change public diplomacy in the short-term. I do not believe this takes a vast amount of money to fix, just a reallocation of priorities. Of course, we need to hire and train more people who can advocate for the United States in relevant languages around the world, and we need to have the proper mechanisms for these people to communicate.

We are making progress and improvements through new thinking and coordination. The Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs is now taping television footage that can be utilized by outlets all over the world and frames the United States positively. The International Information Programs bureau has developed a new magazine, Hi, which targets youth in the Arab and Muslim World. And, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural affairs is conducting new

journalist exchanges and reaching out to young audiences through prominent Cultural Ambassadors, like NBA star Tracy McGrady and R&B great Mary Wilson. Additionally, the State Department now has a Media Outreach Center in London that utilizes a spokesperson fluent in Arabic to communicate with Arabic-language media and advocate the merits of American foreign policy and values.

The main problem that I see in the State Department is that our people do not have the ability to communicate with media audiences in the native language of the land in which they serve. For instance, there is only one spokesperson in that entire Media Outreach Center. Additionally, we have a very small capacity to engage third party validators to speak out on our behalf. For example, if we sponsor a Fulbright scholar, we should place that scholar's name in a database. Once this person returns to their native land, he should receive mailings and invitations from the U.S. Government. This will help foster a long-term relationship. And just maybe, in the future, this Fulbright Scholar can advocate for America in front a television audience or civic group in his home country. Currently, we do not do this.

But as I stated before, in the information age, the message that originates from this country and is delivered to the world comes from more than just the State Department. Messages are heard around the globe from the White House, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, even Congress. And, this White House has set up the proper infrastructure to communicate a global message. We must, however, utilize these new mechanisms fully.

We now have a White House Office of Global Communications, which draws on many agencies, and Americans to convey a few simple but powerful messages. These messages are designed to combat misunderstanding and conflict, build support for and among United States partners, and better inform international audiences.

We also now have a Policy Coordination Committee of the National Security Council to ensure that all agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President's messages across the globe. It is supposed to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy and a Special Assistant to the President. In an effort to fully harness the power of this Policy Coordination Committee, it must meet regularly with the most senior members of the Administration.

To help get these messages out we have Radio Sawa, the popular Arabic-language radio station and the new Middle East Television Network, Alhurra (The Free One) to be launched this month. These stations help offer accurate, balanced and

comprehensive news and information programming with high-quality production values. These stations endeavor to broaden the viewers' perspectives, enabling them to think for themselves and inspiring them to make better decisions. The media filter in the Middle East is so thick that it is almost impossible to get a fair and objective story aired about the United States on independently run channels. That is why these popular forms of broadcasting, which are gaining significant audience share, are such an important part of public diplomacy.

Some of our policies may not be popular in some areas of the globe, but there is no excuse for public diplomats to give up on their war of words and communications when we are engaged in a war on terrorism.

Exchanges, libraries, pamphlets, and brochures are useful and necessary over the long term, but it is short-term public diplomacy that will make a difference in the short-term. Whenever the President's media and political advisors consider what might be an appropriate message for the domestic audience, there needs to be a powerful public diplomacy advisor at the President's side assessing the impact of that message on the foreign audiences who are exerting significant influence these days.

Public opinion is always going to ebb and flow in the course of making tough foreign policy decisions. It is the job of the public diplomat to provide the proper mechanisms to enable the proper people to advise the President and key administration officials. These professionals must keep an eye out for the international perspective when rolling out a policy to an audience, whether that audience is in Topeka or Thailand.

International opinion should not change our policy, but it should inform how we communicate strategic objectives. I do not suggest that we modify the direction this government takes based on international public opinion. However, if we are going to succeed in a global media market, we must understand that we can utilize a different phrase or a different word to make a great deal of difference in a foreign land.

Thank you, and I am more than pleased to answer any of your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Am I pronouncing your name correctly? I want to say Pachios.

Mr. PACHIOS. Yes, you did.

Mr. SHAYS. Am I pronouncing your name—Pattiz? Is that the way I say it?

Mr. PATTIZ. Right on the money.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Pachios, I just want you to know, your most important job that you ever had was when you worked for the Peace Corps.

Mr. PACHIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was actually the very best job I ever had, and I was the 35th employee of the Peace Corps in 1961, actually before it was authorized by Congress.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say job well done.

Mr. PACHIOS. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Pattiz, I'm thinking of how you set up an extraordinary network, both you and Mr. Thomas. I just want to thank you both for serving on the broadcast board, the Broadcasting Board of Governors. You know, this isn't something you have to do, and it is very appreciated. But I am amazed, frankly, that it has taken us so darned long to have involved you in this process. And I need to know, was that Congress's fault? Was that DOD's fault? Was that State Department's fault? Was it the White House's fault? Was it your fault? I mean, it just stares us in the face. You should have been there; you should have been there a long time ago.

Mr. Pattiz, I'm going to start with you.

Mr. PATTIZ. Thank you very much.

When I joined the Broadcasting Board of Governors in the year 2000, I was appointed by President Clinton, I was then reappointed by President Bush. I was the only broadcaster on the Broadcasting Board of Governors. I'm happen to say that under Chairman Tomlinson's leadership, we have several broadcasters on the Broadcasting Board of Governors and a lot of folks who are very savvy with the media.

I'm not a government person, I'm a broadcaster by trade. Because I was the only broadcaster on the board, I was given the assignment of being the chairman of the language review subcommittee, which is the subcommittee that is mandated by Congress to, on an annual basis, take a look at how we spread our resources over the 60-plus languages that we broadcast in. And in doing that, one particular area of the world stood out to me not because of what we were doing, but because of what we weren't doing, and that area is the Middle East. Our total commitment to the Middle East was 7 hours a day of Arabic language programming from the Voice of America in a one-size-fits-all approach to the entire region broadcast primarily on shortwave, which nobody listened to. I reported that back to the board, and I think it was, "Congratulations, Norm. You are now the chairman of the Middle East committee. Go fix it."

So we jumped on a plane with some staffers and visited a number of countries in the region, and have since visited that region in the last year and a half three times, and found out that we could get 21st century distribution, AM/FM, digital stereo distribution, throughout the region. And in doing some research—and let me

just say that Radio Sawa and now Alhurra, our television network, are the most research-driven media projects, I think, in the history of international broadcasting.

For Radio Sawa, we do weekly research every week to determine what will resonate with our audience. You know, we have a saying which is, marry the mission to the market. We need to know—very much in keeping with what Secretary Tutwiler was saying, we need to connect with our audience and determine how we are going to attract them to listen to what our message is. This isn't like the cold war in the Middle East where there were lots of people yearning to hear what we had to say who are under the thumb of oppressive dictatorships. In the Middle East we are very unpopular.

There is a wide variety of news organizations, and they believe that they are getting plenty of information. But that media environment is characterized by hatespeak on radio and television, incitement to violence, disinformation, government censorship and journalistic self-censorship. So it is within that environment that the Arab street gets its opinions not only of U.S. policy, but of our people, of our culture, of our society, of all things American.

So we didn't have a horse in this race, we were not on the playing field, and we put together the plan for Radio Sawa, which is to focus on the under–30 audience with a primary objective of really establishing that core 15 to 30 audience by using American and Arabic hit music to attract the audience, with about 25 percent of our programming devoted to news and informational programming. And I'm happy to say that wherever Radio Sawa is heard on FM, and in many, many other places, it is not only the most listened to and most popular radio station in those markets, but it also has a very, very large percentage of people who feel that the news is reliable and credible. And, more important than that—and then I will stop talking—in the latest survey that was done by ACNielsen—not our internal research, but by ACNielsen—and in other research projects that were not started by us, but where the information was shared with us, by a margin of 3 to 2, Sawa listeners have a far more positive view of the United States of America than do non-Sawa listeners.

Mr. SHAYS. But before going on to Mr. Tierney, because I want him to get active in this, and then I will come back, I want to know your reaction, all three of you, to the fact that you knew that we simply weren't stepping up to the plate to counteract al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, and you had to know that we could do a good job to respond. And so maybe you can't tell me why it didn't happen, but give me some confidence that this was something that you guys were thinking about.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Mr. Chairman, we had to change the way this town reacts to broadcasting and all we do. As I said, in the cold war and September 11, there was a 40 percent reduction in spending on broadcasting.

Mr. SHAYS. So it was somewhat a funding issue?

Mr. TOMLINSON. It was absolutely a funding issue.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. TOMLINSON. You know, the great movie The Right Stuff, no bucks, no Buck Rogers. And it's also—it's more expensive to produce information-driven programming than it is to play music.

Mr. SHAYS. But I happen to believe that if we are spending billions, that there are probably some American soldiers who are dead today because we just didn't, frankly, deal with the issue of diplomacy, the public diplomacy, in a much more effective way.

Mr. TOMLINSON. And if I can say one more thing. It's so hard in this town to get around traditional views of public diplomacy. Sometimes some of my colleagues are involved in trying to hang onto old ways of doing things in public diplomacy. They are kind of like whipmakers in 1920 when faced with the automobile, saying, no, we need these whips. Well, we also need broadcasting, we need television, we need radio, we need radio people will listen to. Television is expensive.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. PACHIOS. Bureaucracy is risk-averse. And in this town, as all of you know very well, it is hard to change things. There are entrenched interests. It moves very, very slowly. Very slowly.

I happen to agree with what Mr. Tomlinson said. It's—a lot of things were overdue. You just don't change the way things are done very easily.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm looking for someone to describe their reaction, though, to how—you must have felt, my God, why aren't we there? What do we need to do to get there? Why isn't DOD saying get there? Why did they sign a contract with an outfit that had basically no experience?

I mean, tell me that these were things that you were thinking. Mr. Pattiz.

Mr. PATTIZ. Oh, absolutely I was thinking about that. I am still thinking about it today. But there has been a—you know, a lot of people are very concerned about change when they have been with an institution for 30 or 40 years and always done it exactly the same way. It's pretty commonplace. The chairman is fond of saying, you've got to crack a few eggs to make an omelette. Believe me, doing Radio Sawa we had to crack a few dozen eggs. And a lot of criticism of Radio Sawa comes from people within our own family; you know, within international broadcasting from other services and from people who have worked in international broadcasting in the past who believe with great conviction that using 21st century broadcasting techniques is somehow anathema to the mission that we have at hand. My feeling is where the crime lies is going out and having journalists put themselves in harm's way to tell important stories and have nobody listen.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me just say—I'm going to give you the floor. I'm going to make one observation. And I hear you loud and clear. I think the thing I am remembering most from what the Secretary said to us is that—what I'm going to take from this is that al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are going to become better in the competition, and that they are not going to disappear, but they are going to be forced to be more realistic, more straightforward. And the sooner that happens, the better, obviously.

I am excited if that will be the result because, in essence, it won't be two positions versus one, it will be one position that will help make maybe those other two programs you can watch and feel like you are getting more accurate information from.

Mr. PATTIZ. You know, Mr. Chairman, a lot of the criticisms that I am hearing in advance of the launch of Alhurra, our television network, are exactly the same criticisms that I heard prior to the launch of Radio Sawa, our television—I mean, our radio network. In the case of Sawa, we have research to back it up. In the case of Alhurra, we think that in short order people will understand why it's important for us to be there.

But there are a number of people—and I read it in the Arabic Press all the time because I get copies of the Arabic Press, and they are translated and what have you. There is an attitude that because we are going to put on a television station, that somehow that means that we don't think they have a free press because there is a tremendous feeling of victimization within the region on a number of different issues.

The fact of the matter is that al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are in the early stages of being a free press. They feel that they are free to report it the way they see it; they just don't feel like they are obligated to present any balance or maybe the opposite point of view like they really ought to do it.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Or truth.

Mr. PATTIZ. Well, in some cases absolutely. But I think, when the history of Middle East broadcasting is written, that they will show—there will be a time when you will see these outlets of networks move toward a more generally accepted journalistic approach to what it is that they do. And I think the fact that we are there will help spur that on. So I agree 100 percent with what you said.

Mr. SHAYS. I will just say, given that we don't have those two networks here, I want to acknowledge the fact that there are some in the Arab community who can draw on past experiences and be very suspicious of the Western world, to some measure obviously the United States, and that is a reality, too. And I have empathy for how they could have a view today that maybe we won't be what we know we will be.

I really appreciate you all being here.

Mr. Tierney, you have the floor for as long as you would like.

Mr. TIERNEY. I won't need that long. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen. When you finish trying to lift the discourse from hatespeak radio over there, I hope you come back over here and do a little work. There's a tremendous amount of work to be done on hatespeak radio that can be accomplished and maybe lift us to a better discourse. And the same goes to balance in all our media.

Mr. Pattiz, I don't want to be repetitive, but your report made a statement, and I would like you to just extrapolate on it or expand a little bit on it. You said that an attractive, less costly alternative or supplement to METN may be the aggressive development or programming and partnership with private firms, nonprofit institutions, and government agencies both in the United States and the Arab and Muslim nations. This programming can then be distributed through existing channels in the region.

Mr. PATTIZ. Yes. That's a recommendation from the Djerejian report. And I would say that's just an erroneous conclusion. It presupposes that the indigenous media is not the problem, that it's the solution. I mean, if we were going to take our programming and

present it to the indigenous media, I mean, first of all, why would they carry our news? They have their own news. And second, if they won't even carry the "shared value" commercials that were paid for by Under Secretary Charlotte Beers when she was doing it, what makes us think that programming of substance that we feel it is important to communicate to the Arab world would even be given a fair chance to be on the air; and even if it was on the air, that it wouldn't be buried? And if it was on the air and it wasn't buried, we can't control what goes in front of it or behind it.

It's incredibly important that we control our own distribution pipeline so that we can program this in the same way they can program theirs. If we are going to compete, don't tie one hand behind our back.

So the model of using a Corporation of Public Broadcasting-type model, to me, is foolhardy because that simply means we are in the syndication business depending upon independent or indigenous broadcasters to carry our program as opposed to being a legitimate network that controls its programming from start to finish so that we can compete effectively with other networks that do exactly the same thing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I would like each of you to respond to my next questions.

How are we going to have a network that's balanced between a positive message about the United States, which some would term propaganda, and the objectivity in such a way that we'd foster trust? Who is going to determine what is objective, or the objectivity, and how is an audience going to be persuaded that, in fact, it is objective?

Mr. TOMLINSON. I believe we did that consistently throughout the postwar years on Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, and you saw the results with the end of the cold war. It's tough, but it's not rocket science. First of all, you go with the truth; you report what's going on. And second, you focus on what the real issues are. And as I said before, I think the real issues involve economic development and—for example, in the Middle East they are every bit as important as the issues that inflame.

Mr. PACHIOS. Congressman, I think that both of you asked a question that's important here. There is controversy over this. I mean, the report you cited, I happen to be a member of that group that issued the report, and they were terrific people; one of them here, a person who I have enormous respect for. People think, well, this television or—this television initiative won't have enough propaganda in it. Why are we spending $65 million if we are really not going to sell America, if we are just going to be an objective organization? And the people say the same of Sawa. They say, well, how is it moving the needle? That was what people on our commission said. How is it moving the needle if you have all this music and then some straight news?

But VOA is a good example. There are many people who matured in the years of the cold war in Eastern Europe who were moved by VOA and objective news.

There's more to do. I mean, actually one of my colleagues and I traveled to Hollywood last year. We met with Norm, we went to

television programming people, people that do A&E, the History Channel, biographies. They want to participate in this, too. And we can get Arab producers, people in the Middle East to produce programming about America through their eyes to put on these stations. So there is a lot that we can do to show our culture and not be a biased organization.

Mr. TOMLINSON. The debates between moderates and radicals on Alhurra are going to be critical. I believe the moderates will win those debates. I believe that the people of the Middle East have rarely heard the truth about what's going on in the region, the underdevelopment, the lack of freedom and democracy, and all these things will become naturals for our talk shows, for our call-in shows.

Mr. PATTIZ. If we are perceived as a propaganda organization and we are perceived——

Mr. SHAYS. Is your mic on?

Mr. PATTIZ. Sorry. If we are perceived as a propaganda organization or simply a mouthpiece of the U.S. Government, we will—the same fate will befall us that's happening to IMN right now. Our stock in trade is credibility.

Let me give you a quick example with Sawa, because we have, you know, almost 2 years of Sawa to look back. When we first started, the first place we started broadcasting was Amman, Jordan; 60 percent Palestinian either by birth or heritage, not a place that any of the polls lately have shown has a particularly——

Mr. SHAYS. If you could just speak a little slower. I'm actually interested in what you are saying.

Mr. PATTIZ. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. And my mind is——

Mr. TIERNEY. The weird part of that is that most of us in New England speak that fast all the time, and it isn't a problem for us.

Mr. PATTIZ. I will do that. But in the case of Sawa, when we launched in Amman, Jordan, which was the first place that we launched, and we did research immediately thereafter, within 30 days, in its target audience 30 and under, Sawa was viewed by the 30 and under population as their favorite radio station among 50 percent of those surveyed. And among 90 percent of those surveyed, they indicated that they had listened to the station within the last 24 hours. But at that time, 30 days after we launched, only 1 percent of the audience said that they listened to the news or that they thought the news was reliable and credible. A few months later, 50 percent still said it was their favorite radio station, 90 percent still said they listened to it within the last 24 hours, but 40 percent said that the news was reliable and credible and that they listened to Sawa most for news.

That's an incredible, I think, example of what we can accomplish—of what we have accomplished on radio, but what we now need to accomplish on television. They are two entirely different mediums; they are very compatible, and I think we've learned a lot of good lessons, and we know a lot about what we are doing in this area.

Mr. TIERNEY. You answered my next question, which was, you had made a statement that the large number of people who listen to Sawa thought it was credible, and I was going to ask you how

that was measured. I guess by surveys. Who's conducting the surveys?

Mr. PATTIZ. We have our own internal research that we do on a weekly basis, which is put together by Edison Research here in the United States. Edison Research is a company that is used heavily by commercial television and radio stations and television networks to do audience research to determine what their programming is going to be and what their formats are going to be. They subcontract out with local research firms in the region to go out and actually physically do that. We also commissioned ACNielsen to do a study for us. And there were two other studies that have been done, one by the Oxford Research, and the name of the third escapes me.

But the important point about all of these studies is they all showed the same thing: The numbers may vary a little bit, but they all show that Sawa is very important and most listened to among the target audience listeners that we are focused on.

Mr. TIERNEY. Were any of those not commissioned by you?

Mr. PATTIZ. Oxford Research was not commissioned by the BBG, and then there is another one which name escapes me, its initials.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that was also independent?

Mr. PATTIZ. That was independent, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I am exposing my ignorance, which I sometimes do in chairing the committees or asking questions, but I always made an assumption that Voice of America was propaganda. I do accept, Mr. Pattiz, your point that honesty attracts, but let me understand the format. Is it conceivable that this program will—this new Alhurra—that's the name, correct——

Mr. PATTIZ. That's correct.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Will be critical of something that happens by U.S. officials if criticism is deserved?

Mr. PATTIZ. Mr. Chairman, let me just say this. I think it's fortuitous that we will be launching this channel on Tuesday—pardon me, on Saturday—and that we are right now in the middle of an election year. We will cover what's going on in the elections over here, so I think there will be a number of things said by a number of people that will make everybody equally concerned on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. SHAYS. So how do you do that? In other words, you give total independence to this group, or what happens?

Mr. PATTIZ. Well, first of all, we have professional journalists who run this operation, who use professional journalistic standards. And, Mr. Chairman, maybe you want to talk a little about those standards being a career journalist yourself?

Mr. TOMLINSON. Mr. Chairman, when the Voice of America went into business in World War II, we said the news may be good from the standpoint of the United States, and the news may be bad from the standpoint of the United States, but we are going to give you the truth, and that's been our tradition through the years. I was director of the Voice of America in the first Reagan term, and as I say, in the decade before that we had the Watergate hearings; we broadcasted the Watergate hearings. You have to cover the news.

But you can also cover the stories behind the stories. And it's very, very important to, as I say, cover the economies in the Middle East as well as the human right records, all the records that all fit within the journalistic blanket.

Mr. PATTIZ. Oh, come on. Ask it.

Mr. SHAYS. Come on, John.

Mr. TIERNEY. We have some stations in this country that aren't all that objective. I hope you're not subcontracting it out. That's all I'm saying.

Mr. PATTIZ. I don't know about those, but I supply them with a lot of programming.

Mr. SHAYS. Would this be fair to say that—staff is saying Voice of America strove to be balanced; Radio Free was considered more a propaganda broadcaster?

Mr. TOMLINSON. No. I served on the board of Radio Free Europe for 8 years.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So he said it, not me.

Mr. TOMLINSON. But the difference is——

Mr. SHAYS. What a coward. I take full credit for that comment. I am really embarrassed, blaming the staffer.

Mr. PATTIZ. Just give him a good recommendation for his next job.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm sorry, sir.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I was just about to say, Radio Free Europe, much like Radio Free Asia today, covers the local news with much more scholarly research, with much more focus on totalitarian societies, what's actually going on in totalitarian societies. And because of that, Radio Free Europe was frequently viewed as more aggressive and also much more of a threat to totalitarians because it was Radio Free Europe that was staffed to research what was actually going on, whereas Voice of America gave news, but was not always able to go inside societies.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me just ask this last question here. To what extent do you perceive duplication of effort and expenditure with both the Iraqi media network and the Middle East television network operation in Iraq?

Mr. PATTIZ. We have two different missions. Our mission is the same as it's always been in international broadcasting: to promote and sustain freedom and democracy through the free flow of accurate, reliable, and credible news and information about America and the world to audiences overseas. That is a long-term, continuing, sustaining mission. Their mission, as I understand it, and I'm—but as I understand it, and I think I'm right about this, is to create an indigenous Iraqi media, kind of like their own public broadcasting, which will eventually be turned over to the Iraqis, and I think that may be soon to run themselves.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I would like to pay tribute to Chairman Frank Wolf, who returned from Iraq saying people in Iraq need what the BBG is doing; I'm going to put money in this appropriations bill so that there will be an Iraq stream to Middle East broadcasting. In fact, in 2 months the BBG will have an Iraqi stream flowing there.

Mr. SHAYS. Frank Wolf has been a real hero on this and so many other issues that he doesn't get credit for, so I'm happy you are putting that in the record.

Mr. Pachios, do you want to make any comments?

Mr. PACHIOS. I have no further comment, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me do this. Is there any question that we should have asked you or any question that should have come out? Any question we asked the previous panel that you would have liked to have answered before we go to the next?

All three of you have been terrific witnesses. Thank you.

Mr. PACHIOS. No; thank you.

Mr. TOMLINSON. We just appreciate you focusing on this issue because I think one of the problems is public diplomacy's always been off to the side in this town. And I think, by focusing on what we need to do in public diplomacy, you will stimulate us all to do good, because people should be ashamed that here we are going up at this time when we should have been before.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. PATTIZ. Mr. Chairman, my only comment would be that there are a lot of groups looking at public diplomacy today and who are unhappy with the job of public diplomacy as a whole. My point would be don't throw the baby out with the bath water. In the last 3 years, we put Radio Sawa on the air as well as Radio Farda, which is a similar type of formatted radio broadcasting to Iran in the Farsi language, which is having great success. We are about to launch the Middle East television network Alhurra where we will be—and this may very well be because we are the last television network that was built—the most technologically advanced television network in the world.

So when people are talking about the way to deal with public diplomacy, I think the BBG—and it's not just because I'm on it, because, you know, we are all part-time board members, and we come from the private sector, so we don't fit in a lot of the boxes that a lot of people like to put us in, in government: You should report to this guy, and this guy reports to that guy, and then there is, you know, a nice comfortable little chart. The BBG has functioned extremely well. I think it continues to function extremely well, and I would hope that we can continue to function that way in the configuration that we have now existing.

Mr. TOMLINSON. And don't forget the success of Persian television. There were people who said that the Voice of America couldn't do television, and this Persian television service has been a terrific success. We have had to change the way we dealt with calling back from Prague to Voice of America headquarters to say we found the money for Persian television, we can go on the air, let's get on the air 7 days a week; and on the other end of the line, someone said, well, we were actually planning 5 days a week. And I said, well, what happens if the revolution occurs on the 6th day or the 7th day? And, by the way, let's launch it next Sunday. We've got to get on the air. Events are coming down in Iran that need to be covered. And, says, well, Sunday, Sunday is a day we don't like to do a lot of work around here. And I said, for God's sake, we have to go on Sunday. And we did, and it's been wonderful to see the enthusiastic response of people in the trenches at the Voice of America. They want to do the job, they just have to be faced with the challenge.

Mr. SHAYS. Gentlemen, you have been wonderful witnesses. We appreciate your service to your country and to our society and to the world community. Thank you very much.

Our last panel is Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, General Accounting Office; Stephen Johnson, senior policy analyst, the Heritage Foundation; David E. Morey, president and CEO of DMG, Inc., and member of the Council on Foreign Relations Public Diplomacy Task Forcel; and Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, president, Institute for Middle East Peace and Development, and member of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.

Gentlemen, I am going to have you stand. Are we missing anyone? OK. I'm going to wait then. Why don't you just sit a second, because I am going to swear you in all at once. We will wait for our panelist.

Gentlemen, you can have a seat for a second because I'm going to wait. We will just be in a slight recess here until our panelist is here.

You know what I will do? I will swear the three of you in, then we can just get started, and then I will swear him in before he speaks. If you would stand, raising your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record all three have responded affirmatively. We will swear in our fourth witness in a second.

We will start with you, Mr. Ford. And thank you, Mr. Ford. Sometimes we have you go first in the first panel, and sometimes we have you come in the second, and sometimes you are in the third. You are very flexible. It's a good thing. Thank you. Mr. Ford, we are going to have you start. I'm feeling pretty good, so I hope you guys make me feel good by the end of your testimony. I have hope.

Mr. FORD. I'm sure we will.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; STEPHEN JOHNSON, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION; DAVID E. MOREY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, DMG, INC., AND MEMBER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TASK FORCE; AND STEPHEN P. COHEN, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, AND MEMBER, ADVISORY GROUP ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, members of this subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues surrounding U.S. public diplomacy particularly in the Middle East.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent public research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably.

Last September we reported for the House International Relations Committee on the State Department's public diplomacy efforts. Earlier in July of last year we also issued a report for the

same committee on the progress that the BBG, the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting, has made in developing a new strategic approach aimed at reversing declining audience trends in supporting U.S. strategic objectives such as the war on terrorism.

The State Department and the BBG share an annual budget of more than $1 billion for public diplomacy activities. Although neither of our reports focused exclusively on the Middle East, each identified systematic problems which would apply for public diplomacy activities there.

Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss our conclusions and recommendations from those reports and, where possible, to cite specific examples of public diplomacy actions and issues observed during our field work in the Middle East. Today I am going to talk a little bit about the changes in public diplomacy that have occurred since September 11th, the government strategies for public diplomacy programs, and how it measures their effectiveness and the challenges that remain in executing U.S. foreign policy efforts.

Since September 11th, both the State Department and the Board of Broadcast Governors have expanded their public diplomacy efforts in Muslim majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years since the terrorist attacks, the State Department has increased its public diplomacy funding and staffing and expanded its programs in the two regions with significant Muslim populations, South Asia and Near East.

Among other efforts, the State Department is emphasizing exchange programs targeted at young and diverse audiences, including high school students. The State is also expanding its American Corners program, which provides information about the United States to foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. embassies and local institutions. In addition, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has initiated several new programs focusing on larger audience in priority markets including Radio Sawa, the TV network that they are going to start this weekend, and Radio Farda in Iran. Estimated startup and recurring costs for these three projects for fiscal year 2003 total about $116 million.

Although State and the BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, we reported that the State Department had not developed a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither State nor the BBG has focused on measuring progress toward long-term goals. The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder the State Department's ability to channel its multifaceted programs toward concrete measurable progress. In comparison, the Broadcasting Board of Governors issued a strategic—5-year strategic plan in July 2001 called Marrying the Mission to the Market, which emphasizes the need to reach large audiences by applying modern broadcast technologies and strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast markets such as the Middle East.

Since the State Department and the BBG and other entities in the U.S. Government conducting public diplomacy have different roles and missions, it is important to note that there is currently

no interagency public diplomacy strategy setting forth the messages and means for governmentwide communication to overseas audiences. According to State Department officials, without such a strategy the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy efforts could be high. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that the State Department and the Board for Broadcast Governors was not systemically and comprehensively managing progress toward goals reaching broader audiences and increasing public understanding of the United States. Since our reports have been issued, both agencies have taken a number of steps to address recommendations we have made in these areas.

In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, the State Department and the BBG face a number of internal problems. According to public affairs officers at the State Department, these challenges include insufficient resources to effectively conduct public diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with foreign language proficiency.

More than 40 percent of the Public Affairs officers we surveyed said the amount of time available to devote exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. More than 50 percent reported that a number of Foreign Service officers available to perform these tasks was inadequate. Another 20 percent posted overseas lacked the language capabilities necessary to carry out their tasks.

The Board of Governors also faces a number of media market organizational resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. These challenges include better programming, targeting audiences, addressing transmission quality and managing disparate structure consisting of seven separate broadcast entities.

Mr. Chairman, we made several recommendations to the State Department and the BBG to correct and to improve on all of these deficiencies. I would be happy to discuss these in further detail in the question and answer period. That concludes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives

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U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-04-435T

February 10, 2004

GAO Highlights

Highlights of GAO-04-435T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11 within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies did not focus exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.

GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning and performance issues. For example, GAO recommended that State develop a strategy to integrate its public diplomacy efforts and direct them toward common measurable objectives, and that BBG revise its strategic plan to include key measurable objectives. Both agencies have made some progress toward implementing our recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-435T

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges

What GAO Found

Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. Also since September 11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran.

State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism. However, State does not have a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives. In addition, we found that while the BBG did have a strategic plan, the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and all federal agencies' communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States.

In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets.

Public Opinion of the United States in Selected Muslim-majority Countries (percent favorable view)

Countries	1999/2000	Summer 2002	Spring 2003
Morocco	77%	*	27%
Lebanon	*	35	27
Indonesia	75	61	15
Turkey	52	30	15
Pakistan	23	10	13
Jordan	*	25	1

*=no data available

Source: GAO, developed from The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press information.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues surrounding U.S. public diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. Last September, we reported for the House International Relations Committee on the State Department's public diplomacy efforts.[1] Earlier, in July, we issued a report for that committee on the progress that the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)—the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting—has made in developing a new strategic approach aimed at reversing declining audience trends and supporting U.S. strategic objectives such as the war on terrorism.[2] The Department of State and the BBG share an annual budget of more than $1 billion for public diplomacy activities. Although neither of our reports focused exclusively on the Middle East, each identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.

Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss our conclusions and recommendations from these reports and, where possible, to cite specific examples of public diplomacy actions and issues we observed during our fieldwork in the Middle East.[3] Today I will talk about (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11; (2) the government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. As part of our work, we surveyed top officials of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide on such issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure performance.[4] We met with cognizant State officials, individual members of the BBG, and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss management issues. We also met with academics specializing in public diplomacy and international affairs issues, and private sector officials from U.S. public relations and opinion research firms with international operations. While several government entities conduct public diplomacy

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[1]U.S. General Accounting Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges,* GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003).

[2]U.S. General Accounting Office, *U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audience but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives,* GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).

[3]We conducted our Middle East fieldwork in Morocco and Egypt. We also conducted fieldwork in the United Kingdom.

[4]GAO surveyed 156 public affairs officers from March through May 2003, of which 118 completed their responses for a 76 percent response rate.

activities, my comments will focus on State's and the BBG's efforts since they were the subject of our work.[5]

Summary

Since September 11, both State and the BBG have expanded their public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years since the terrorist attacks, State increased its public diplomacy funding and staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with significant Muslim populations—South Asia and the Near East. Among other efforts, State is emphasizing exchange programs targeting young and diverse audiences, including high school students. State is also expanding its American Corners program, which provides information about the United States to foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. embassies and local institutions. In addition, since September 11, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has initiated several new programs focusing on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and Radio Farda in Iran. Estimated start-up and recurring costs for these three projects through fiscal year 2003 totaled about $116 million. The Board is also scheduled to launch an Arabic language television network in the Middle East in mid-February 2004.

Although State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, we reported that State had not developed a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither State nor the BBG has focused on measuring progress toward long-term goals. The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder State's ability to channel its multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. In comparison, the Broadcasting Board of Governors in July 2001 initiated a 5-year strategic approach to international broadcasting known as "Marrying the Mission to the Market," which emphasizes the need to reach large audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques and strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast markets, such as the Middle East. However, the plan lacked a single goal or related program objective to gauge its success in reaching larger audiences in priority areas. While State, BBG, and other entities in the U.S. government conducting public diplomacy have different roles and missions, it is important to note that there also is no interagency public diplomacy strategy setting forth the messages and means for governmentwide communication to overseas audiences. According to State officials, without such a strategy, the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy efforts is high. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. Since our reports were issued, both agencies have taken steps to address our recommendations.

[5] We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. According to public affairs officers at the State Department, these challenges include insufficient resources to effectively conduct public diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with foreign language proficiency. More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed said the amount of time available to devote exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and more than 50 percent reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform such tasks was inadequate. Further, about 21 percent of the officers posted overseas in language designated positions have not attained the level of language speaking proficiency required for their positions, hampering their ability to engage with foreign publics. In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct public diplomacy. The Broadcasting Board of Governors also faces resource issues, as well as a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. These challenges include outmoded programs and poor signal quality; the disparate structure of the agency, which consists of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal and grantee organizations collectively managed by a part-time Board; and the resource-intensive job of broadcasting 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide.

We made several recommendations to the Secretary of State and the BBG to address planning and performance issues that they generally agreed to implement but progress to date has been mixed. Among other things, we recommended that State develop a strategy that considers private sector public relations techniques in integrating its public diplomacy efforts; improve performance measurement; and strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy. In response to our recommendations, State is currently studying how to integrate private sector techniques into its programs. State also plans to establish a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. Regarding our recommendation to strengthen performance measurement efforts, State officials told us they are exploring ways to do so and State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has, among other things, begun conducting limited pre- and post-testing of its program participants' understanding of the United States. State acknowledged the need to strengthen training of Foreign Service officers and told us that the primary obstacle to doing so is insufficient staffing to allow time for training. Officials said they have already begun to address staffing gaps by stepping up recruitment efforts as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.

In response to our recommendations to the BBG, the Board has revised its strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of maximizing impact in areas of priority U.S. interest and made audience size a key performance measure. The Board has added broadcast credibility and, according to Board officials, plans to add audience awareness and whether broadcasting entities are achieving their mandated missions. Finally, the Board recently completed a review of language service overlap that identified about $9.7 million in potential savings. However, the Board has yet to revise its strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project time frames for the various initiatives supporting its strategic goal of maximizing program impact.

Background

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S. public diplomacy focused on foreign elites—current and future overseas opinion leaders, agenda-setters, and decision makers. However, the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG, as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports U.S. public diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate information about the United States, while maintaining its journalistic independence as a news organization. The BBG manages and oversees the Voice of America (VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Free Asia. Radio Sawa and Radio Farda (Iran) provide regional and local news to countries in the Middle East.

Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of $1 billion on public diplomacy programs each year. State's public diplomacy budget totaled an estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or $320 million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and cultural exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and expenses incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs, publications, and other activities. BBG's budget for fiscal year 2004 is $546 million. This includes more than $42 million for radio and television broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the language service review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the scope of operations of more than 25 language services and reallocated about $19.7 million in funds, with the majority redirected toward Central Asia and the Middle East, including $8 million for Radio Farda service to Iran. Figure 1 shows the key uses of public diplomacy resources by State and the BBG.

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2003 Estimates



Source: State Department and BBG.

[a]Estimate includes $11 million for Radio Sawa.

[b]Estimate includes $3 million for Radio Farda.

More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim-Majority Countries

Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war on terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries—that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. In addition, the Board plans to further expand its presence in the Middle East through the launch of a Middle East Television Network scheduled for launch in mid-February 2004.

State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim countries. For example, while State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia still receives the largest overall share of overseas

public diplomacy resources, the largest percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in State's bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where many countries have significant Muslim populations.[6] Public diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 million and in the Near East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58 percent, respectively, from fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same period, authorized American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from 27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27 percent, respectively.

Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning Program—designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor, and Citizen Exchange programs. According to State, under this program, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries have already arrived and are living with American families and studying at local high schools. State has also carried out increased exchanges through its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer and English language training for women newly employed by the Afghan government and a program to assist women from Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S. electoral process. In addition, State is expanding its American Corners program, which uses space in public libraries and other public buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In fiscal year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in the Middle East and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to open 10 in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.

State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and electronic pamphlet titled *The Network of Terrorism*, distributed in 36 languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al Qaeda; and a publication titled *Iraq: From Fear to Freedom* to inform foreign audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq.

New BBG Initiatives Target Large Audiences in Priority Markets

Several of the BBG's new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences in priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of these programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March 2002 using modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such as the extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the poorly performing VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at around 2 percent of the population. According to BBG survey research, Radio Sawa is reaching 51 percent of its target audience and is ranked highest for news and news trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite such results, it remains unclear how many

[6]These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

people Radio Sawa is actually reaching throughout the entire Middle East because audience research has been performed only in select markets. Further, the State Inspector General and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have raised questions about whether Radio Sawa has focused more on audience size and composition than on potential impact on attitudes in the region. The BBG has also launched the Afghanistan Radio Network and a language service to Iran called Radio Farda. Estimated costs for these three initiatives through fiscal year 2003 are about $116 million. In addition, the Board is launching an Arabic language television network in the Middle East in mid-February 2004.

Strategy Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts

While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks State's recognition of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, State still lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide these programs. In contrast to State, the BBG has a strategic plan that focuses on a market-based approach to increasing audience size in priority markets. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to guide State's and all federal agencies' communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition, State and the BBG lacked adequate measures of progress toward reaching its public diplomacy goals. Since our report, State and the Board have focused on improving their performance measures.

State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide its Operations but BBG Does

After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the development stage. State officials told us that such a strategy is particularly important because State's public diplomacy operation is fragmented among the various organizational entities within the agency. Public affairs officers who responded to our survey indicated that the lack of a strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute public diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs officers in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance from the Office of the Undersecretary in the last year and a half (October 2001 through March 2003) was generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in another region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former public affairs officer stated that so little information had been provided from Washington on State's post-September 11 public diplomacy strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.

In contrast to State's lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-based approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate large listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes it must reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of this strategy has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism, in particular the Middle East. The Board's vision is to create a flexible, multimedia,

research-driven U.S. international broadcasting system that addresses the many challenges we noted in our report, including that the Board is faces a diverse organizational structure consisting of several broadcast entities with differing missions, broadcast approaches, and constituencies.

Interagency Public Diplomacy
Strategy Has Not Been Established

Mr. Chairman, we believe it is especially important to emphasize as of February 4, 2004, no interagency public diplomacy strategy has been implemented that lays out the messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts to overseas audiences. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. State officials told us that, without such a strategy, the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy efforts.

Our overseas fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance of interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S. assistance being provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more than an estimated $13 million in 2003.

Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in recent years. Immediately after September 11, the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable to U.S. efforts.

In January 2003, the President established a more permanent coordination mechanism, the White House Office of Global Communications, which is intended to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S. government to overseas audiences. The President also established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council and to work closely with the Office of Global Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in disseminating the American message across the globe. Although it is the committee's long-term objective to develop a National Communications Strategy, according to State officials, the committee has not met since March 2003.

State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals

Mr. Chairman, in addition to deficiencies in public diplomacy strategies, we found that State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign publics' understanding and attitudes about the United States. Some posts judge the effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts by simply counting the number of public diplomacy activities that occur in their host country—for example, the number of speeches given by the ambassador or the number of news articles placed in the host-country media. While such measures shed light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they reveal little in the way of overall program effectiveness.

State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine whether posts' performance targets are actually met. At one overseas post we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only 22 percent of the host country's citizens had a favorable view of the United States—a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly percentage increases set as targets. However, the former public affairs officer at the post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the post had actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited the lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether they met their annual performance targets. An official in State's Office of Strategic and Performance Planning said that they have now begun to require posts to report on whether they have met performance targets.

Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations and many officers also reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry out the long-range monitoring required to adequately measure program effectiveness. Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would still have difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants because it lacks a database with comprehensive information on its various exchange program alumni. State had planned to begin building a new worldwide alumni database with comprehensive data linking all of its various exchange programs. However, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs officials told us they had received insufficient funds to do so, and thus are seeking to improve existing information systems for individual exchange programs.

Private Sector Public Relations Tools Could Be Relevant to State's Needs

Mr. Chairman, during our audit work, we learned that private sector public relations efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated strategies to integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players. Although State's public diplomacy efforts extend beyond the activities of public relations firms, many of the strategic tools that such firms employ are relevant to State's situation. While it is difficult to establish direct links between public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government agencies and the private sector have best practices for assessing information

disseminating campaigns, including the need to define success and how it should be measured. Executives from some of the largest public relations firms in the United States told us that initial strategic decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the target audience, determining the core messages, and defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting research to validate the initial decisions, testing the core messages, carrying out pre-launch activities, and developing information materials. Each of these elements contains numerous other steps that must be completed before implementing a tactical program. Further, progress must be measured continuously and tactics adjusted accordingly.

BBG Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance

In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. We also found that the plan lacked measurable program objectives to support its strategic goals, including a measure of broadcaster credibility. The Board has taken several steps to address the recommendations we made in our report. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the key objective of maximizing impact in areas of priority interest to the United States and made audience size a key performance measure. Second, the Board has added broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional performance measures we recommended, including audience awareness and whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.

A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with measurable indicators of progress. There are other challenges our government faces in executing successful public diplomacy activities. According to public affairs officers, these challenges include insufficient time and staffing resources to conduct public diplomacy tasks. In addition, many public affairs officers reported that the time available to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate. Furthermore, a significant number of Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. The Board's key challenge in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues.

Insufficient Time and Staff

More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed reported that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to interact with ordinary citizens. More than 50 percent of those responding to our survey reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform public diplomacy duties

was inadequate. Although State increased the actual number of Americans in public diplomacy positions overseas from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected needs identified in State's 2002 overseas staffing model. In 2002, State's overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were not filled.[7] In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct public diplomacy.

We reported in 2002[8] that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the department's total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158 new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and according to State officials, the department has met its hiring goals under this initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, it does not have numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as language proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right skills needed to meet specific critical shortfalls.

Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills

Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy positions overseas did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their positions.[9] The highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in the Near East, where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the requirement. Although State had no language-designated positions for South Asia, it had eight language-preferred[10] positions, none of which was filled by officers who had reading or speaking capability in those languages. It is important to note that most of the foreign languages required in these two regions are considered difficult to master, such as Arabic and Urdu. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French language-designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish language-designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions on the quality of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by region.

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[7]State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal year 2002was the latest year for which data were available on the numbers of positions actually filled.

[8]U.S. General Accounting Office, *State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts*, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002).

[9]Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and reading proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do not meet the other one either, so the percentages are similar. For purposes of clarity, our figures refer only to the requirements for speaking proficiency.

[10]These are positions for which language capability is preferred but not required.

Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country's language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where English is widely understood, speaking the host country's language demonstrates respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in the public affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because their ability to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy business in French. French is widely used in that country, especially in business and government. However, embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would provide superior entrée to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak country-specific forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would generate even more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.

According to the department, the largest and most significant factor limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-standing staffing shortfall, which State's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is designed to fill. Other planned actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job candidates with target language skills, sending language training supervisors to posts to determine ways to improve training offerings, and developing a new "language continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the need for higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those critical to national security concerns.

Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in Priority Markets

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy challenges, key among them is how to achieve large audiences in priority markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. Although its strategic plan identifies a number of solutions to the competitive challenges the Board faces and provides a new organizational model for U.S. international broadcasting[11], we found that the Board's plan did not include specifics on implementation strategies, resource requirements, project time frames, or a clear vision of the Board's intended scope-of-operations. The Board recently completed a review of the overlap issue and identified six approaches to addressing the problem while still meeting the discrete missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast entities. All of the Board's overlapping services were assessed against this analytical framework and over $9.7 million in potential savings for priority initiatives were identified.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

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[11]The Board views the separate entities as part of a "single system" under the Board's direct control and authority.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Lyric Clark, Janey Cohen, Michael Courts, Melissa Pickworth, Edward Kennedy, and Michael ten Kate.

(320251)

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson. Move that mic over there.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to share my views on America's public diplomacy efforts toward the Middle East. I commend you for undertaking this important review of the U.S. public diplomacy process and for your efforts to improve it. I also commend the efforts of the leaders in the Bush administration, career officers, retirees, Members of Congress and their staffs, particularly those of Senator Richard Lugar, Representative Henry Hyde and Representative Frank Wolf. I also acknowledge the thoughtful suggestions of leaders and researchers in my foreign policy community to which I belong and whose experience in many cases far exceeds my own.

Public diplomacy began losing substantial resources and effectiveness in the early 1990's. In 1999, the tightly managed U.S. Information Agency was folded into a more bureaucratically oriented U.S. Department of State and foreign broadcasting operations were spun off under a newly independent Broadcasting Board of Governors. Today, efforts to reorganize U.S. public diplomacy in the State Department still have yet to gel. The U.S. military and Broadcasting Board of Governors have become the lead communications agencies in the Middle East and cooperation between all these agencies awaits marching orders from the White House.

Although it made economic sense, the merger of USIA into the State Department created some disarray and negotiators unfamiliar with its proactive mission carved up the agency and placed various parts under the authority of State's geographical bureaus, functional bureaus and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. A small staff remained and a new under secretariat to handle cultural affairs, news dissemination and policy. The under secretary had no reporting or budgetary authority over public diplomacy officers and State's geographical bureaus or embassies. As a result, public diplomacy offices have integrated into some bureaus and not others, where as the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs has a proactive diplomacy program, the Bureaus of European Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs have resisted accepting public diplomacy into their routines. Today the Near East Bureau is considering replacing its public diplomacy office with a $129 million civil society initiative more suitable for the National Endowment for Democracy. Lacking a guiding doctrine, consistent strategies and a set of priorities, the Department of State is not yet a major player in Middle East public diplomacy, at least not like the Broadcasting Board of Governors or the Pentagon.

Six months after the attacks on New York and Washington, the Broadcasting Board of Governors aggressively launched Radio Sawa and its new Middle Eastern Radio Network. Radio Farda beamed to Iran in 2003, and in 2004 the Middle Eastern Television Network, as we have just learned, is starting up in Virginia. In Iraq, the Department of Defense is disseminating information from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi people and at the same time trying to develop independent media using private U.S. contractors.

While State is still worrying how to do its job, both of these agencies are proactively pursuing the mission before them, although not perfectly. The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors is still meeting its challenges despite a congressionally mandated makeshift structure of broadcasting entities, Federal agencies and grantees directed by part-time Governors. And sadly, core Voice of America language services to Eastern Europe and Latin America have suffered cuts to free up resources for the Middle East. Such reallocations ignore the Voice's unique role in explaining U.S. policies and the need to reach regions where democracy and free markets are barely getting started.

As for the Pentagon in Iraq, military civic action teams have a legitimate combat role in distributing information from command authorities. But turning that into free media is not a military affair, rather it is a political and social enterprise that involves establishing a regulatory framework and encouraging local entrepreneurs to develop outlets for news and opinions. To my knowledge, that has not been done. More tax dollars will not help unless they are carefully earmarked, which I don't recommend, or unless public diplomacy is better organized.

Toward that end, I would say that the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy must have more authority over her personnel from Washington to the field. Our military should refocus its communication activities more appropriately on combat-related objectives. USAID should fund media development in civil society projects through the National Endowment for Democracy. A streamlined Broadcasting Board of Governors should provide a more balanced menu of policy versus entertainment programming to the Middle East and to the rest of the world. And finally the White House must ask Cabinet agencies who now operate in separate universes to cooperate with each other. Perhaps then U.S. public diplomacy will get back on track.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East

Testimony of

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The Heritage Foundation

Before the

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations

Government Reform Committee

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Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to share my views on improving America's public diplomacy (PD) efforts toward the Middle East. I commend you for undertaking this important review of the U.S public diplomacy process and your efforts to improve it. To do so does not in any way denigrate the efforts of policymakers now directing this mission or of the officers in the field who meet, communicate with, and listen to foreign audiences. But as in all endeavors, times change and past decisions do not always reflect the needs of the present. It is only natural that we make course corrections along the way.

In my work as a regional analyst assigned to Latin America, I have studied public diplomacy as it has facilitated the development of democracy and markets where military dictators once ruled. But I could not do so without attempting to grasp the PD mission as a whole. Moreover, I could not suggest improvements without considering how foreign communication programs operated and interfaced with other missions in the federal bureaucracy.

The research that Heritage Foundation colleague Helle Dale and I conducted revealed that U.S. public diplomacy began losing substantial resources, personnel, and effectiveness in the early 1990s. Many in Congress including some fellow conservatives—I'm sorry to say—believed that the end of the Cold War meant the end of America's need to communicate with the rest of the world. In 1999, the relatively well-managed United States Information Agency was folded into the U.S. Department of State—a bureaucracy with serious personnel, management, and financial challenges.

Since then, observers in and out of government have expressed concern over the further decay of this important function. They include public diplomacy leaders, career officers, retirees, Members of Congress and their staffs, and leaders and researchers in the foreign policy community to which I belong. Many have suggested ways to fix the problem. Their recommendations stem from genuine worries. Where I differ and criticize, I only mean to be constructive and not to cast doubt on the thoughtful ideas and good will of colleagues whose experience, in most cases, far exceeds my own.

My analysis will cover the following points:

- Official efforts to reorganize U.S. public diplomacy functions have yet to gain traction;
- The United States lacks clear communications objectives in the Middle East;
- Improving inter-agency cooperation depends on clear marching orders from the top; and
- Restricting the dissemination of public diplomacy products at home ignores their common availability through international communications channels.

Reorganization, Revitalization at a Standstill

As detailed in many reports, including The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," funding cuts and inadequate leadership dramatically reduced the overseas impact of the independent U.S. Information Agency during the 1990s. As of October 1, 1999, the agency was officially merged into the State Department and its foreign broadcasting service was placed under a new, independent broadcasting board of governors. The

original target was the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but effective self-advocacy saved it from the chopping block. Restricted by the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, which prohibited the domestic distribution of materials produced for foreign audiences, USIA was unable to mount a defense.

Its merger into the State Department devastated USIA. Department negotiators unfamiliar with its mission or its pro-active programs carved up the agency and placed various parts under the authority of State's geographical bureaus, the functional bureaus, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. A small staff remained in a newly created Under Secretariat to handle cultural affairs, news dissemination, and policy. However, Department planners gave the Under Secretary no reporting, or budgetary authority over public diplomacy officers in State's geographical bureaus or embassies.

To understand why this happened one must consider the Department's culture that values process over product. My theory is that it derives from State's 200-year-old mission, to represent the United States before foreign governments, to craft agreements, and seek consensus to defuse international conflict. To do this well, diplomats must follow protocols that respect turf and personal rank and satisfy the demands of pre-existing stakeholders. Dismembering USIA largely obeyed this etiquette, which is deeply ingrained into the Department's management style.

The State Department's concern for process probably explains why the White House would turn to the Department of Defense in addressing media challenges in Iraq. America's armed forces are mission oriented. Their commands and units are established to deliver results and are regularly tested to make sure they do so. Unlike State Department personnel, soldiers are trained and retrained from the moment they are recruited. And while Department assistant secretaries puzzle over whether to share resources with strange, new public diplomacy units they barely understand, DoD does not shy away from missions involving communication—long considered an integral part of military operations and whose combat and peacetime uses are largely guided by doctrine.

To be fair, many improvements are taking place at State. Under the leadership of Under Secretary Margaret Tutwiler, foreign exchanges are inching up from a recent low of 29,000 to 30,000—but still well below a high of 45,000 in the early 1990s. Public diplomacy training for new officers is expanding at the Foreign Service Institute. The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs has established a promising exchange program aimed at foreign high school and college students. Mini-libraries called American Corners are being located in foreign universities to compensate for larger storefront versions defunded by Congress more than 10 years ago.

Yet, one of State's geographic bureaus is considering folding its PD office into a temporary civil society project, possibly crippling headquarters-to-field coordination of routine but necessary public diplomacy activities. Because such decisions can be entertained by regional bureau assistant secretaries, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy must regain directorial authority over PD personnel and resources to ensure that the whole mission is consistently and pro-actively accomplished. If the White House and Secretary of State are not willing to shift that

responsibility, no amount of money will make State PD programs effective. Nor will the Department ever be taken seriously on foreign communication matters.

Finally, the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is managing to meet today's broadcasting challenges thanks to the dynamism of some of its leaders and employees, not because Congress organized it to do so during the 1990s. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) points out that its makeshift structure consists of "seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency and grantee organizations that must be collectively managed by a part-time Board of Governors." Individual governors have the authority to micro-manage pet projects within the BBG which leads to a lack of coordination, poor morale, and duplication of services—many of these do not adhere to the Voice of America Charter which guides the core of BBG operations. The GAO suggests consolidating these entities into one organization to streamline and unify the management structure as well as eliminate unnecessary overlap.

Sadly, core Voice of America language services to Eastern Europe and Latin America have suffered cuts to free up resources for surrogate services in the Middle East. Such reallocations ignore the Voice's unique role in explaining U.S. policies, possibilities for using programming to support development objectives, and the need to reach regions where democracy and free markets are barely getting started and where problems are likely to resurface.

No Clear Objectives toward the Middle East

On February 4, 2004, former U.S.Ambassador Edward Djerejian, who chaired the Advisory group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, warned the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies that Arabs and Muslim societies "are trapped in a dangerously reinforcing cycle of animosity" responding in anger to "what they perceive as U.S denigration of their societies and cultures." Why is this the case if State Department public diplomacy funding rose for the Near East and South Asia by an average of 60 percent since September 11? Obviously, money is not the only answer.

The Administration still needs a strategy and priorities to tie together various public diplomacy activities and use its resources wisely. Arab speakers are scarce within the Foreign Service and in even shorter supply in the public diplomacy field. Meanwhile, resources are available for special projects. The White House has dedicated $129 million for its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to foster a higher profile for women and children in Arab and Muslim societies as well as link U.S. civil society organizations and businesses with those of the region to develop political and economic reforms.

Normally a project of this kind would be funded by USAID through the National Endowment for Democracy with work distributed to private sector grantees. Instead, the State Department's Near East Bureau will manage its policy and programs, while the public diplomacy office could well be disbanded. Who will direct the embassies' traditional public diplomacy programs or whether they will continue at all remains a question mark.

However, the real tug of war in the Middle East is over broadcasting. The State Department made an early attempt to reshape America's image through television but quickly abandoned it. Its "Shared Values" initiative, conceived by former Under Secretary for PD Charlotte Beers

featured a series of mini-documentaries on Muslim life in America. Placed on foreign television stations, they reached an estimated audience of 288 million people. But they were widely criticized as simplistic propaganda. The project died and, possibly as a result, Ms. Beers resigned.

For its part, the BBG launched Radio Sawa and the Middle Eastern Radio Network with Arabic programming six months after September 11. Radio Farda—with Persian language service—beamed to Iran just a year later. Featuring mostly American pop music and a smattering of news, the radio stations attracted substantial audiences in eight Arabic countries, including Iraq. Now that they have won acceptance, news content is gradually increasing. In January 2004, the Middle East Television Network, called Al-Hurra, or The Free One, is starting up at a cost of about $102 million.

But television may prove an expensive boondoggle. A 24-hour TV channel is a voracious consumer of content and programming costs much more than radio. A number of prominent Middle East experts, including Ambassador Djerejian have asked why the region needs another state-run TV network and whether placement of U.S.-produced programs on existing Arab channels might not seem less heavy-handed. Dr. Rhonda S. Zaharna, a Middle East communications authority at American University, points out that face-to-face dialogue is the preferred means of serious communication in the Arab world.

In Iraq, the Department of Defense is the main actor. Through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), it has rebuilt Saddam Hussein's broadcasting system, partly destroyed by the U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom. Early on, the Department contracted Scientific Applications International Corporation, a defense contractor, to restore Iraq's television and radio network. In January 2004, DoD hired the Harris Corporation, a firm that develops products for wireless, broadcast, network communications systems, to run the network along with a national newspaper once published by Uday Hussein. In doing this, the CPA appears to have two goals: to disseminate information from the Authority to the Iraqi public and to provide a jump-start for the development of new free media.

However, disseminating information from the occupying force and creating free media are conflicting challenges. The first is better suited to a military civic action team that has a legitimate combat role in distributing information from governing authorities. Fostering free media is not a military matter, but rather a political and social enterprise. It involves establishing an interim regulatory framework and encouraging local citizens and investors to develop their own outlets for news and private opinions—another project suitable for the National Endowment for Democracy. To my knowledge, that has not yet been done and in the rush to get outlets up and operating, we have blurred the distinction between a state and private press by attempting to force a variety of programming content through what Iraqis see as a command channel. Unless, CPA and private communications are put on separate tracks, neither will be very successful.

Getting Agencies in Sync

Reports by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (initiated by the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies), by the Council of Foreign Relations, and by the Center for the Study of the

Presidency have criticized the lack of coordination between U.S. Cabinet agencies on foreign outreach. But public diplomacy is not the only inter-agency mission affected. Foreign assistance programs, especially those targeted toward non-industrialized countries, are frequently out of step with modern foreign policy goals, in part, because the USAID bureaucracy grew up supporting 1960s-era agricultural development programs.

Within the Department of Defense, an emerging combat capability called *information operations* or *information warfare* could overstep a number of inter-agency boundaries as well as those between the government and the private sector. An outgrowth of the familiar mission to safeguard military command and control systems, information ops seeks to protect friendly information systems as well as command and control elements while targeting those of our adversaries. What "information systems" means is not precisely defined, but it could include commercial telecommunications and media. U.S. military efforts to establish new media in Iraq might fall under that rubric.

How such a mission supports the mandates of the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, USAID, or U.S. international broadcasting is unclear. Its relation to the traditional barrier between military public affairs and psychological operations or *psyops* is similarly vague. Public affairs officers are supposed to tell the truth all of the time to the American public and U.S. troops, while *psyops* units try to influence the behavior of foreign populations to support certain battlefield objectives.

Coordinating all these efforts is key to achieving foreign understanding of U.S. policies and improving America's image. Early in the Bush Administration, the White House promised to improve cooperation by creating an Office of Global Communications to help craft, approve, and disseminate messages intended for overseas audiences. But so far the office has done little to provide guidelines or direction to Cabinet agencies on how to accomplish their public diplomacy missions. The Center for the Study of the Presidency recommends a new Special Counselor to the President and dedicated staff to accomplish the task. But renaming the office and changing position descriptions will not help unless the President makes inter-agency cooperation a priority. He should direct his Cabinet Secretaries to ensure coordination occurs and finally invest the of Global Communications staff or a new Special Counselor with the charter and resources to harmonize varied programs. The structure is there, but is not being used.

Updating Smith-Mundt—a Minor but Important Point

The 1948 U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (Public Law 402), known as Smith-Mundt, after its sponsors Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) and Representative Karl E. Mundt (R-SD), established the legislative basis for America's foreign communication and cultural exchange programs. But more famously it prohibits the domestic distribution of materials produced for overseas audiences.

Under Smith-Mundt, Voice of America editorials condemning communism could not be replayed in the United States. USIA pamphlets on the dangers of international drug trafficking could not be redistributed domestically by the State Department. The Department's Public Affairs Bureau could not even use the photographs within them, unless they came from a commercial image library. Dissemination of the results of public opinion polls conducted

overseas was similarly restricted. At a time when the United States government was fighting a propaganda war against the Soviet Union, lawmakers did not want their own government propagandizing the American people—Soviet style.

Back then, broadcasting and print was mostly domestic and local. There was no internet and few cigar stores carried *Le Figaro*, *Die Welt*, or the *London Observer*. Now American travelers can see and hear Voice of America programs on local media overseas. Opinion polls conducted in foreign countries are readily available on the World Wide Web as are most public diplomacy publications intended for international readers. In today's communications environment it is impossible to convey something to one audience that will not be consumed by another.

In that sense, overseas and domestic messages need to be one and the same. And they are becoming so. But if Smith-Mundt is to remain relevant, it must be amended to reflect reality. It should not restrict third-party distribution of public diplomacy products to the American public, but insure that as they are produced, they are directed first toward overseas audiences. Above all they should not be crafted or used to propagandize or lobby the U.S. Congress or the American public. It is not the spirit of Smith-Mundt that needs to be changed, only its technical specifications.

Conclusion

From the mature stages of the Cold War to the attack on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon, public diplomacy never enjoyed a domestic constituency. The Smith-Mundt Act insured few Americans knew about the mission. Now public diplomacy has a constituency because Americans realize that U.S. policies are often misunderstood in various parts of the world and that we are poorly regarded among peoples with whom we have had little traditional contact. As Administration officials, career professionals, members of Congress, and communications experts have pointed out, the $1 billion annual budget directed at public diplomacy is probably insufficient—particularly as it relates to exchanges and balancing foreign broadcasting needs across the globe, not just in the Middle East.

But if more tax dollars are going to do any good, public diplomacy must be better organized and more tightly managed. The White House must make inter-agency coordination a priority. Cabinet agencies that now operate in separate universes must be tasked to cooperate with each other. If the Department of State is to take the lead in foreign communications, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs must serve in more than an advisory capacity. The incumbent must have authority to assign personnel, receive reports, provide general guidance, and direct adequate resources to public diplomacy offices in various bureaus as well as to PD field units at U.S. embassies. Leaving public diplomacy sections to the mercy of regional and functional assistant secretaries will kill off the function.

Other agencies must fall in line. U.S. AID should fund media development projects through the National Endowment for Democracy, a job that the Pentagon is doing right now in Iraq. Our military should refocus its communication activities more appropriately on combat-related objectives. Finally, a streamlined Broadcasting Board of Governors could provide a more balanced menu of independent news and pro-American programming to audiences in closed societies and conflicted areas of the world. While some critics have called for a new

independent, public foundation to fund and distribute pro-American television programming overseas, the BBG could accomplish the same task, if its governors played more of an advisory role, and its various entities were consolidated under unified management.

Looking back, public relations and vigorous advocacy are traditions that have roots in the founding of our country. President George Washington once counseled "as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion be enlightened." Today, his advice should apply to U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds overseas.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. We could have rotated that over. Did you have anything more that you wanted to say?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would yield to the more in-depth testimony that is printed up.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your thoughtful statement.

Mr. Morey.

Mr. MOREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here. I am a cochair of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Public Diplomacy and founder of DMG, a company that was borne from our work advising a number of international Presidential campaigns around the world, Corazon Aquino's in the Philippines, Kim Dae Jung's in Korea, Vincente Fox's in Mexico. Over the last 15 years, we have transferred that knowledge and experience to the corporate battlefield working with Microsoft, Coke, Nike, and a number of superb marketing and branding companies, advising them on communications. And we have learned a lot because we operate inside the context of the information revolution, which has changed everything. We have learned all the rules have changed for these entities, including the rules by which the United States must play by to communicate effectively in terms of public diplomacy around the world.

For example, the velocity at which communication moves today, the degree to which government-directed communications are not as credible as they used to be, and the degree to which negatives can become entrenched. We see this from the task force appointed by Secretary of State Powell that found a shocking, I am quoting, level of hostility toward the United States. We all know those numbers. So our task force therefore concludes public diplomacy is in a state of crisis, a crisis by which we can't do anything less than revolutionizing, reenergizing and reforming and rethinking the way we go about the task. There are two traps, one, that it doesn't matter; two, that we fixed it. We argue that you can't step into either; that both statements are completely untrue.

Let me briefly summarize what we recommend in dealing with this crisis and within this context of the information revolution. Three things: Prioritizing public diplomacy; finding ways to revolutionize the way it operates; and looking at ways to privatize some of the functions. And let me detail each very briefly.

In terms of prioritization, we recommend a new Presidential directive. We recommend that specifically to encapture—to capture what Edward R. Murrow said, public diplomacy has to be involved at the takeoff, not just the crash landing; to bring it, if you will, into the center of the policy process, particularly at the White House. And there has been a very good step last year in the creation of the Office of Global Communications, but it's just a step, to form a public diplomacy coordinating structure, to institute a number of State Department reforms, which are detailed in the testimony. For example, the creation of a Quadrennial Public Diplomacy Review, modeled after the Quadrennial Defense Review, which elevates the role of strategic planning and which helps to create and empower a culture of measurement. We think that's very important, all those things in terms of prioritizing, upgrading the efforts of public diplomacy.

Second, we recommend looking at ways to revolutionize the way we think about public diplomacy, emphasizing two-way and not just one-way communication. For example, upgrading research efforts. The U.S. Government through the State Department spends approximately $7 million on foreign public opinion research. We have worked on political campaigns that have spent a lot more. U.S. corporations today spend over $6 billion on foreign public opinion research. We have to get in that game and upgrade and make more sophisticated those efforts; training, exchanges. Mr. Chairman, your experience with the Peace Corps by some calculations, since 1993, exchanges have been reduced in terms of moneys by an inflation-adjusted figure of 40 percent. We have to do more in terms of the television network and radio network that were testified about on the previous panel, specifically in terms of the Internet, which we can't ignore; admittedly it is only 2 percent penetration with respect to the region we are dealing with today, but think of the future and think how powerful—we call them in corporate strategic terms, early adopters and influential end users are in that mix, so that has to be rethought.

And just a word about money and I will stop. Money isn't the answer. Of the hundreds of recommendations we offer, most of them can be done without spending more money. But in fact, for every dollar of military spending today, 7 cents is spent on diplomacy and a quarter of a penny on public diplomacy.

A final point which we can come to in questions and answers: We finally recommend exploring ways to privatize, specifically to act as a magnet, to attract private sector talent, tools, resources, some of the best practices from the private sector that can take us to a new level in public diplomacy, not to compete with public diplomacy funding that is already out there today, not to cost taxpayers more money, but rather to take advantage of all the outside private sector talent and help that wants to come to bear on this problem.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morey follows:]

Testimony of David E. Morey
President and CEO, DMG
And
Co-Chairman, Public Diplomacy Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations

Delivered to the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
U.S. Congress
The Honorable Christopher Shays, Chairman
February 10, 2004

Mr. Chairman, distinguished representatives, good afternoon. I'm David Morey, founder and CEO of DMG, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relation's Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy and Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University.

My company, DMG, specializes in developing and executing communications and marketing strategies for some of the world's best corporations—Microsoft, The Coca-Cola Company, Verizon, McDonald's, Nike, Visa, Procter & Gamble, Texas Pacific Group and many others. It grew from our experience in advising insurgent political campaigns around the world, and from another company we helped create in the 1980s, the Sawyer-Miller Group, a pioneering think tank of global economic democracy. Our lucky job was managing winning presidential campaigns of Corazon Aquino in the Philippines, Kim Dae Jung in South Korea and Vicente Fox in Mexico, among other world leaders.

This was a remarkable learning experience—because the dynamics of democratic change around the world were and are driven by a remarkable

revolution. It's a revolution that has changed literally everything within the grasp of human endeavor: Politics, business, education, entertainment, science, the arts, media, culture, warfare and national security. It's the information revolution. And today, it's this revolution that forms the context in which America must communicate in a transformed world.

This information revolution, in fact, ensures the rules of leadership and communications have completely changed. The old rules are over. Moreover, it ensures that successful leaders must think and communicate not as an "incumbent"—big, bloated, change-resistant and defensive-minded—but rather as an "insurgent"—mobile, agile, pro-change and offensive-minded. Make no mistake: This is the age of insurgent communications—and we in America must understand and play by these new rules as we articulate our values, policies and ideas to the rest of the world.

Mr. Chairman, over many years, United States public diplomacy has been neglected and is now in a state of serious disrepair. Today, resentment, rage and deep misunderstanding of the U.S. and its policies are widespread. Hostile propaganda and systematic information campaigns harmful to American interests are directed at the U.S. and its allies by many countries, non-state organizations and individuals. Clearly, the September 11 attacks and the war against terrorism are defining events in our relationship with the world and in the nation's public diplomacy.

Today, the seriousness of this challenge is measurable by frightening polling results—in many cases, fueled by widespread propaganda spewed by America's enemies. For example, even before the war in Iraq, polls showed 88% of Saudi Arabians and 82% of Jordanians had a favorable opinion of Osama Bin Laden—higher approval ratings than President George W. Bush.

Surveys such as this, and the recent Pew Center study, show a widening opinion gap between America and its strongest allies on issues that include the war on terrorism, violence in the Middle East, trade policy and the war in Iraq. Even allowing for the effect of policies and politics, public diplomacy is broken now—at just the time we most critically need effective communications about the United States. Ironically, the nation that literally invented the information revolution has been flat-footed when it comes to its own communications.

These and other realities demand nothing less than a new public diplomacy paradigm. The challenge is not simply to adjust U.S. public diplomacy—but rather to revolutionize it. We must redefine the role of U.S. public diplomacy: From the way we tie it to foreign policy objectives to the way we formulate a comprehensive strategy to the way we recruit and train public officials to the way we define U.S. diplomats' missions.

A fair question to ask is why the U.S. should care about what the rest of the world thinks. The answer: 9/11 changed forever a way of thinking in the U.S.—in many ways, forcing America from any tendency toward isolationism. Today, it is a truism to say the world has become increasingly interdependent. Ironically, as this world's only superpower, the U.S. remains vulnerable as the terrorists' only super target. Terrorist attack against the homeland makes clear that America's national security cannot rest on favorable geography, military strength and economic power alone. It depends on a long-term process to shape an international environment that builds credibility and trust and serves our interests.

Today, however, we must recognize that U.S. foreign policy has been weakened by a failure to include public diplomacy systematically in the policy making process. Past examples of misunderstood policies include rejection of the Kyoto treaty, the treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, the agreement to create an International Criminal Court and the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. The point here is not that these are flawed policies or that foreign public opinion should drive policy. Rather, it is that foreign attitudes can affect the success or failure of policies, the willingness of allies and others to join coalitions and the depth and breadth of support for American interests and values.

Across different Administrations, on many issues, strong disagreements and misunderstandings have existed between America, her allies and other nations. How we explain and advocate policies matters. In the 21st century, the world is becoming more democratic. People are influencing what governments can do more than at any time in history. And policies and negotiated agreements will succeed only if they have the general support of opinion makers and the masses—and only if public diplomacy is a central consideration in all policy decisions.

In fact, public diplomacy should be a powerful asset in pursuit of America's interests around the world. It is central to national security—and must be involved, to borrow Edward R. Murrow's famous phrase, in the "take-offs and not only the crash landings." In today's information age, it is simply not enough to explain our national policies only to world leaders. America's problems surely are in the streets of foreign capitals. Moreover, because the campaign of hate and misinformation against the U.S. is concerted and coordinated, it is time for street smart public diplomacy to counter America's enemies.

So, Mr. Chairman, it is hard to dispute that public diplomacy is broken and in need of a new strategic direction, new ideas, new approaches and new energies. The Council on Foreign Relations report and a string of subsequent analyses by politically divergent groups—such as the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the Defense Science Board, the Djerejian Commission, The Center for the Study of the Presidency, Heritage, CSIS and the GAO—all conclude that public diplomacy's status quo is absolutely unacceptable. But where do we best go from here? What are the priorities? And what are the strategies, tactics and structures we need to win?

In short, our Council on Foreign Relations Task Force believes the answers are that we must do three things urgently: **prioritize**, **revolutionize** and even **privatize** public diplomacy.

First, we must **prioritize** public diplomacy through a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) to garner public and private sector attention. And we must centralize it strategically by upgrading and further empowering the White House's Office of Global Communications and the Policy Coordinating Committee on Strategic Communications through creation of a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure (PDCS), led by the President's personal and cabinet-level designee.

Moreover, we must increase public diplomacy funding and enhance key areas such as field staffing, exchanges and U.S. international broadcasting via the Middle East Radio Network and the new Middle East Television Network, al-Hurra. And we must embark upon a series of State Department

reforms to significantly improve strategic and structural effectiveness—including instituting a "Quadrennial Public Diplomacy Review", modeled on the Quadrennial Defense Review, to help create and empower a culture of long-term strategic planning, measurement and success.

Second, we must **revolutionize** public diplomacy by augmenting traditional "one-way" mass communications with an increasingly customized "two-way" dialogue. This means, for example, investing in public diplomacy's future by forming an "Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute" to help the public sector recruit and **train** a new generation of foreign affairs professionals who can better take the conversation of what America stands for out into the world.

In fact, properly trained government officials who understand the critical role of public diplomacy in foreign policy must be given sufficient latitude to engage directly with the media in their respective regions, develop proactive and grassroots communications programs and react to rapidly changing events.

While it has improved, the State Department must further expand and upgrade its public diplomacy training. Last year, this training included only a two-week training seminar for new ambassadors, with only a small amount of time devoted to public diplomacy. For new Foreign Service officers, for example, only one hour of a seven-week entry-level course was devoted to public diplomacy. Furthermore, Foreign Service officers entering the public diplomacy field itself were not actually required to participate in a three-week public diplomacy tradecraft course.

Another example of revolutionizing our public diplomacy approach involves public opinion **research**—because effective persuasion begins with careful listening. So we must increase both the amount and effectiveness of our public opinion research around the world to improve our ability to listen and engage in dialogue. Specifically, the U.S. Government, through the State Department, spends approximately $7 million annually on foreign public opinion polling. That kind of investment does not even cover the research costs of many U.S. senatorial, gubernatorial and other campaigns. Moreover, perhaps a dozen foreign nations spend more than $7 million annually on researching perceptions of their countries inside the U.S. And

the U.S. private sector spends $6 billion annually on overseas public opinion and market research.

Recent White Houses have organized well-funded and highly effective public opinion research operations for their own domestic purposes. Similarly, in the area of global attitudinal research, it is critical that additional moneys be allocated, techniques and methodologies modernized and intra-governmental coordination improved. We must utilize the most cutting-edge qualitative research to shape effective quantitative research. Moreover, this upgrading of research efforts should assist in evaluating various programs' effectiveness so adjustments can be made where necessary. And, very importantly, it should help us find and use innovative methods to support voices of moderation.

A final example of revolutionizing public diplomacy involves dramatically expanding the State Department's multi-language **Internet** websites, streaming audio and video and web-based communications. Given the automatic discounting by listeners and viewers of state-sponsored radio and television, and the higher credibility levels the Internet breeds among an important "early adopter" group, web-based communications must play a significantly more important part in our mix of public diplomacy tactics. Such communications provide relative bang for the buck.

Third, we must explore ways to **privatize** public diplomacy—including creation of a new entity or "Corporation for Public Diplomacy." This new entity should require little governmental involvement. Its purpose: Attract superb private sector talent, techniques and people from U.S. corporations and the research, marketing, campaign management, non-profit and other fields. Moreover, this new entity could attract and apply private sector "best practices" in areas such as public opinion research, cultural and attitudinal analysis, segmentation, data base management, strategic formulation, political campaign management, marketing and branding, technology and tactics, communications and organizational planning, program evaluations and studies on media trends.

We all know innovation and adoption of the most modern methodologies and technologies do not easily happen inside large governmental bureaucracies. Rather, such innovation happens further out in the

periphery—out away from centralized and highly regulated entities. Thus, a Corporation for Public Diplomacy could be a constant recruiter of these innovative communications and communicators—seeking the best from every part of the arts, education, religion, media, science, and, importantly, seeding worthwhile and independent projects.

Furthermore, this new private entity might mobilize independent views and alternative spokespeople such as mullahs, popular figures, American Muslims, Arab-American firefighters and police officers, sports figures, business leaders, scientists, healthcare leaders, writers, academics, entertainers, etc. These sources can communicate effectively American and family values and religious commitment and, in so doing, supplement and reinforce the U.S. Government's public diplomacy initiatives.

Our Task Force concluded, then, that America's image and perception abroad and the function of public diplomacy itself are in a state of crisis—given significant entrenched negative opinions, challenges among even our allies and the diminished level of credibility of government-sponsored communications. Put simply: Our Task Force believes public diplomacy will deliver far more bang for the government buck if there is a much expanded role for the private sector. And we have several reasons for this firm conviction:

> **First**, the U.S. Government has traditionally targeted foreign officials as its audience abroad and must inevitably observe diplomatic protocols in communicating with these counterparts. Often, U.S. diplomats feel quite constrained when it comes to making public statements explaining U.S. policy—diplomats are often expected to clear their speeches, for example, with Washington. Independent messengers can be more agile in their ability to target and engage varied audiences.
>
> **Second**, private sector participation in public diplomacy adds, to some extent, a "heat shield" that can be useful when tackling controversial issues that might have negative political or diplomatic repercussions.
>
> **Third**, it is important to communicate America's belief in democratic and open debate—the give and take of a culture that thrives on

> legitimate critiques and, at its best, admits weaknesses and uses truth as the most powerful form of public diplomacy. Carefully selected private messengers can engage in debates that the U.S. Government might often shrink from for fear of political backlash.
>
> **Fourth**, the U.S. Government is unlikely to attract a sufficient number of truly creative professionals who can utilize the most cutting-edge media or communications technologies. Furthermore, media or entertainment spokespeople may be more likely to cooperate with private sources, such as NGOs, than with an effort directly funded by the U.S. Government.

We therefore recommend creating an independent, not-for-profit "Corporation for Public Diplomacy" (CPD). Moreover, we believe the experience of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) is highly relevant and propose launching a four-month study to create a somewhat similar entity as a focal point for private sector involvement in public diplomacy:

> The CPB is not part of a cabinet-level department and is therefore somewhat independent of direct political influence. This structure permits the CPB, as a corporation with tax-exempt status under Section 501C3 of the U.S. tax code, to receive private sector grants, which have been substantial. The CPB has a seven-member board of directors appointed by the President; four directors come from the President's party, and the other three must be of the opposing party
>
> The CPB has been deeply involved in the establishment or support of such programs as *Sesame Street*, *The News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, Bill Moyers' documentaries and American Playhouse. Many of the most widely acclaimed public television programs would likely not have arisen nor flourished had they been the sole prerogative of the U.S. Government.

In an analogous structure, an organization or foundation such as the Corporation for Public Diplomacy would likewise seek to leverage private sector resources, creativity and flexibility. It could receive private sector grants and, again, attract media and personalities that might be less willing

to work directly with U.S. Government agencies. Moreover, its proposed structure takes advantage of the fact that private media often communicate American family values, religious commitments and the merits of democracy more effectively than do government officials. Groups such as the Advertising Council and others should be enlisted to help the CPD.

In projecting America's messages we must be especially mindful of something every good salesman understands—if you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message. I believe strongly that we can avoid this problem by using private sector partnerships and new approaches such as a Corporation for Public Diplomacy. The public-private messengers will be especially effective among Muslim and Arab Americans who seek to build bridges and improve cross-cultural relations, but who might sometimes be reluctant to work for the U.S. Government, or who may be dismissed by foreign audiences if they are seen to do so.

Finally, a CPD would be well–positioned to support or provide programming and content for independent, indigenous new media channels—i.e., satellite, Internet, radio and TV networks—or think tanks focusing on important domestic issues within Muslim and Arab countries.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, public diplomacy is in crisis due to several decades of neglect and the changing nature of the challenge of protecting America's national security. Today, therefore, we must invest in both public and private sector initiatives; we must mobilize strong leadership and imaginative thinking and planning. And we must upgrade the role of public diplomacy to serve as a strategic instrument of foreign policy—because reformed and re-energized public diplomacy is as important to national security as political, military and economic power. In the end, reformed and re-energized public diplomacy can save the lives of America's military personnel and innocent civilians here and abroad. And it can help protect and preserve American values and interests in an increasingly dangerous world.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. I enjoyed reading all of your resumes and this is going to be a fun panel to ask questions of. Dr. Cohen, good try. I already said there is one person I haven't sworn in and that was Senator Byrd and you, sir, are no Senator Byrd. I have no fear in swearing you in.

[Dr. Cohen sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I am very impressed. If it is all true in your biography, I am very impressed with the people you have brought together over your lifetime.

Dr. COHEN. It is an honor to appear before your important subcommittee on this subject, which is the highest importance to American national security. The highly negative attitude of much of the Arab world and Muslim world toward the United States in the last few years represents an underlying source of threats to American national security, which is often referred to only by its overt manifestation in the war on terrorism. This widespread animosity must become a special target of our international relations foreign policy efforts, not only a focused target of our armed forces and intelligence agencies.

I want to say to you that it is not hard to imagine a more positive attitude toward the United States than presently exists. It was not so long ago after World War I when the United States was the most preferred foreign country in many parts of the world that now exhibit this great animosity toward us. When President Woodrow Wilson articulated the 14 points on which the United States entered World War I and when he came to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the United States was greatly admired and loved as a new kind of force in world politics and a great source of hope for the still unfree peoples of the Ottoman Empire and other parts of this world. Our values and leadership were so much admired, there was as yet no experience nor propaganda that spelled out what is presently the widespread damaging theory that America has good universal values, but that we practice those values only for ourselves and violate them with determined hypocrisy when we act abroad, especially in relationship to Arabs and Muslims. These hostile theories must be addressed and public diplomacy must address them or else we are leaving the basic source of threat to our national security unchanged.

Now the Working Group on Public Diplomacy on which I was proud to serve, which was headed by Ambassador Edward Djerejian, traveled to many countries in the Muslim and Arab world and we learned several things. There was one thing we learned above all, focus on the young people, the younger generation of Arabs and Muslims, millions of young men and women in this part of the world who presently have no realistic prospect of ever receiving a modern education, ever holding a good job or ever earning a decent income. This lack of hope is the critical issue we must address through our public diplomacy.

Hating us is a decidedly second choice for most of these young people in the Arab and Muslim world. They would prefer and they hope for a good or at least decent life. Many of these people, these young people, see American and Americanstyle education as the key to their ever having a different future. Their present education is most likely to be rogue learning with inadequate preparation in

the basic skills necessary for a competitive chance at employment in the world economy today. They learn nothing about critical thinking, but only rogue education. We found in many of the countries we visited young men and women, not even at the age when you call them men and women, but still boys and girls, dreaming of learning English, getting a chance to study, even temporarily, in American universities and playing a role through their lives and peacefully changing their own societies so that their own peers will have a future to look forward to.

The amazing thing is that we in America hold a key to this door of hope and opportunity. We need to learn to use that key more effectively, more widely and in a more targeted manner for these young men and women from the Arab and Muslim world, and that key is the aberration of our educational system, our universities and our form of education to produce critical thinking and an open mind. Let us learn to use that key. It is not important only that we communicate in a public dramatic way through the media of television and radio. That is very important as well. But it is also very important and we must do as dramatic a change as we have made in creating Middle East television. We must create a major effort at reaching those young men and women.

The second thing we learned everywhere and in no uncertain terms, and which is too often pretended not to be the case here in Washington, was that we have to focus on solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem. This issue has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of young people and old every where in these countries as a basic point of departure for hostility toward the United States, never mind Israel, and is an issue of intellectual and emotional centrality. We cannot afford to pretend otherwise. Even those who see that the conflict is a diversion for more pressing domestic problems in these societies must recognize how much this issue colors the perception of the United States, how much it prevents them from seeing the United States as anything but an impediment to the improvement of their own lives in the Arab and Muslim world. We need not be afraid to discuss this issue openly and we need to be forthright in expressing our concerns in identification with Israel together with our commitment to a dignified two-state solution. But most of all we need to be able to show that we are constantly day in and day out working toward a peaceful solution and we will make this a core purpose of our foreign policy.

The third thing that I think we learned——

Mr. SHAYS. You have about 2½ minutes left. How many points do you have?

Dr. COHEN. I am planning to finish in 2 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. This is magnificent. I want to make sure we don't lose any of your points.

Dr. COHEN. I won't be able to do everything I have in my written testimony, but I will get through what I can.

The third thing that we learned was that, as I said earlier, there has to be a mix of public media and mass communication on the one hand and the most intimate and intensive exchange programs on the other. The possibility of intensive exchange programs penetrates into the most important sectors of these societies. It is true of the most—of the professionals who are most hostile to us, wheth-

er the legal profession, which has organized boycotts against the idea of normalization in Jordan or Egypt, whether it is the media, people in journalism, editors and so on, or as I said, especially young people who are about to enter college or who are seniors in high school and early stages in college education.

I would also emphasize that we should do this with people who are training to be clergy in the Arab and Muslim world. We too much run away from the religious dimension of this problem. And I do believe we would do something very important if we had a focused program in which we brought young students who are learning to be clergy in the Muslim world in their early years to meet with counterparts in the United States and to talk about how to advocate religious conviction in your society without ethnocentrism and without adding the element of contempt for the other monotheistic religions. I believe we could play a very important role in this, and what I would like to report to you is that people in these institutions are now willing to contemplate such exchange and contact with our people.

Too much of the time and in too many contexts, we, the United States and Americans, are simply outside the conversation that is taking place within these societies, even the conversation about us. We need to learn to hear those conversations, to speak clearly, forthrightly and emphatically within the conversation, and most of all we need to learn to hear and to get to be heard in those conversations. Showing up is the first principle.

My last point in this section is to emphasize the importance of bringing Arab Americans into the conversation and into our public diplomacy as well as bringing American Jews into greater and more frequent contact with the Arab and Muslim world. The strong, hostile stereotype of Jewish control of America so widely held in the Arab and Muslim world is something that we can only counter by real contact with Jews in the United States in all their variety and diversity and for them to learn about the real role of Jews in America as a minority, not as a controlling element.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

Hearing on "Public Diplomacy in the Middle East"
Tuesday, February 10, 2004
Rayburn House Office Building Room 2154

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Written Testimony of Professor Stephen P. Cohen

Member of the Djerejian Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (Report entitled *Changing Minds, Winning Peace)*

President, Institute for Middle East Peace and Development

Visiting Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University

National Scholar, Israel Policy Forum.

Chairman Shays,

It is an honor to appear before your important sub-committee on a subject of the highest importance to national security and emerging threats to the United States and to its homeland security. The highly negative attitude of much of the Arab world and the Muslim world towards the United States in the last few years represents the underlying source of threat to American national security, often referred to only by its overt manifestation in the war on terrorism. Terrorism is born in an atmosphere in which organized groups of individuals take the hatred of the United States to a vicious extreme, but they act in an atmosphere of hostile attitudes to American policy that is widely shared in their societies and loudly blared forth on their television and radio as well as given religious sanction in many sermons in their mosques.

This widespread animosity must become a special target of our international relations and foreign policy and not only a focused target of our armed forces and intelligence agencies. We cannot hope to kill every mosquito unless we dry up the swamps in which they breed in profusion; nor can we expect to dry them up by ourselves or even to fully grasp how the swamps fester or how the mosquitoes breed without the help and understanding of those who live on the land and whose life and livelihood are most directly threatened by the poisonous bite of terrorism. In other words, we need to be focused on building bridges of cooperation with those in these countries who share our abhorrence of terrorism and wish to reach a stage of peaceful interaction between their peoples and our own.

It is not so hard to imagine a positive image of America. One hundred years ago America was the most preferred foreign country in many parts of the world that now exhibit this great animosity. When President Woodrow Wilson articulated the Fourteen Points on which the United States entered World War One and when he came to the Paris Peace Conference the United States was greatly admired as a new kind of force in world politics and a great source of hope for the still unfree peoples of the Ottoman Empire and other parts of the world. Our values and leadership were so much admired; there was as yet no experience or propaganda that spelled out the present widespread damaging theory that America has good universal values, but that we practice those values only for ourselves and violate them with determined hypocrisy when we act abroad especially in relation to Arabs and Muslims.

The spread of these hostile attitudes towards the United States not only provides for easy recruitment to violent groups, but creates an atmosphere in which they can move more freely and with more local help and approval. We need to narrow the support for these hostile ideas and strengthen the standing of those within these societies who would oppose them and who could eventually marginalize them.

Terrorism and other symptoms of hatred cannot be defeated unless we change the balance between the support and opposition to the terrorists and their actions within their societies. We cannot do it directly and we cannot replace the essential internal forces which are the only forces that have the long term staying power and the authenticity and legitimacy to marginalize and defeat haters willing to engage in terrorism.

The working group on Public Diplomacy, on which I was proud to serve, traveled to many countries and we learned one thing above all: The focus must be on the younger generation, the millions of young men and women in the Arab world and Muslim world who presently have no realistic prospect of ever receiving a modern education, having a good job and earning a decent income.

Hating us is a second choice for most of these young people. They would prefer and they hope for a good or at least decent life. Many of these young people see American and American-style education as the key to a different future. Their present education is most likely to be rote learning with inadequate preparation in the basic skills necessary for a competitive chance at employment in the global economy. We found young men and women dreaming of learning English, getting a chance to study in American universities, and playing a role in peacefully changing their own societies.

We in America hold the keys to this door of hope and opportunity; we need to learn to use these keys more effectively, more widely, and in a more targeted manner for these young men and women from the Arab and Muslim world.

The second thing we learned everywhere and in no uncertain terms, was that we had to focus on solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem. This issue has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of young people everywhere in these countries as a basic point of departure for hostility towards the United States and as an issue of emotional and intellectual centrality. We cannot pretend otherwise. Even those who see that the conflict is a diversion from more pressing domestic problems in their societies must recognize how much it colors the perception of the United States and how much it angers those in the Arab and Muslim world. We need not be afraid to discuss this issue openly and we need to be forthright in expressing our concern and identification with Israel together with our commitment to a dignified two-state solution. We need to be able to show that we are working toward a peaceful solution on a continuous serious basis and will make this a core purpose of our foreign policy. We need to recognize that the hostility to Israel and the ignorance of Judaism is not only an Israeli problem, but an American problem. This problem makes it much harder to enlist leaders in the Arab and Muslim world and their people as a part of the solution to the war on terrorism and the search for peace. The challenge is to help them be part of the solution and not part of the problem, apologizing for terrorism and resisting fair and just peace proposals and steps.

Third, our approach has to be a strong mix of public media and mass communication, on the one hand, and the most intimate intensive exchange programs, on the other hand, with emphasis on the opportunity for interaction between young people of the region and young Americans. We do not yet have the subtlety of understanding and expression to compete with the myriad of local media and satellite channels that are poisoning the public against us, but we have to try and be in the game. At the same time we have to invest much more in face-to-face communication including direct visits to America by people of the Arab and Muslim world as well as of Americans to them. A big part of this exchange has to be education-related.

Most of the time and in most contexts we are simply outside the conversation that is taking place within these societies. We need to learn to hear those conversations and to speak clearly, forthrightly and empathically in that conversation. Right now we mostly do not show up and we do not get heard or even get to hear.

My last point in this section on public diplomacy is to emphasize the importance of bringing Arab Americans into the conversation and into our public diplomacy as well as bringing American Jews into greater and more frequent contact with the Arab and Muslim world. The strong hostile stereotype of Jewish control of America is matched by total ignorance of the diversity of American Jews and the nature of their real but minority role in American political and economic life.

I must also emphasize the critical need to focus these efforts at the White House and to make structural changes which would allow the private sector and the foundation world to play a much more active and central role in changing the relationship between the American people and the Muslims and Arabs of the world community. All of these recommendations require firm strategic coordination with our President's foreign policy and national security policy along with the President's clear articulation of those policies and value choices to the people of the Arab and Muslim world. This is not a problem that will be solved only on a lower level. We must be aware that we live in a world in which a Presidential remark in Des Moines can be headlines in Riyadh or Cairo before the American reader wakes up the next morning.

PART TWO:
TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

In inviting me to testify, the Chairman of the sub-committee asked me to reflect also on the twenty nine years of my work traveling to Arab capitals and to Israel in an attempt to facilitate readiness for peace-making on the part of Israelis and Arabs from intellectuals to political leaders and heads of State. This is often called Track Two Diplomacy. My interlocutors have included Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese as well as many Arabs from countries not on the front lines of the conflict from Morocco to Kuwait and including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, Oman and Qatar.

Track Two Diplomacy used to be about bringing Israelis and Palestinians together to discuss their conflict and to try to problem solve to the point of reaching agreements on any issues that would help to resolve the conflict or at least to move it toward resolution. Over the years however the problem of reaching a conceptual solution or even an outline of a full agreement has been achieved and the main problem now is to create the political will among the leadership and a critical mass of political society to move to implement a solution. We need to move toward a negotiated peace and end the practice of unilateral actions which undermines any possibility of building such political will. Leaders must feel empowered and even impelled to reach for coordinated solutions. Moreover, it has become evident that a big part of the problem is the lack of internal unified political vision within each party. There is a need for Arab national support to help the Palestinians reach such a positive peace unity as well as to help convince the Israeli people that there will be a real end to conflict once the Palestinians have a viable independent state in more or less the borders of June 4, 1967 with agreement to live side by side in permanent peace with Israel.

At this time I think it is important to point out that those of us engaged in peace-making efforts were having much greater success in balancing hostility with support and friendly relations when we were actively engaged in positive regional change efforts such as the MENA conferences and the multilateral working groups of the Madrid process. These ancillary efforts to the political and diplomatic tracks allowed many Arabs and Israelis in civil society, those without a global voice and without an avenue for contact with us, to find Americans and others of shared interests and common professional involvement. Whether they were business people, politicians or water technologists they began to find a counterpart in America and elsewhere and so were less isolated within their own cultural and political cognitive ghetto. We did not deal adequately with issues of culture, religion and education in the decade after Madrid, but we were getting to those core issues by beginning with the less emotionally explosive issues of water, economy and environment.

I have found that maintaining long-term relationships allows a person to gain not only access to people of authority and decision making in the local societies, but to have the type of access that leads to deeper and more truthful conversations. These types of relationships allows continued communication even in hard times when hope is being lost as well as in moments of hopefulness when it seems progress can be made. The unofficial contact can be especially helpful when formal communication is blocked by crisis and by mutual recrimination as is so often the case between Arabs and Israelis and even between Americans and the Arab leaders and their key advisors.

I have learned that the informal and unofficial channels allow the exploration of new ideas and new approaches with deniability to leaders and with the advantage of having people involved with a greater than average commitment to peace and reconciliation. These long term informal relationships afford a much deeper opportunity for mutual education across the divides of culture, language and political systems. I have often found that the lack of mutual understanding about political systems and decision making systems is one issue that is easier to talk about in unofficial discussion than in formal negotiations. Across the divide between democracy and monarchy and democracy and military rule these issues create deep misunderstandings about intentions and about the range and limits of flexibility in negotiations.

Over the years I have had the privilege and opportunity to get to know the keys leaders of many important countries in the region and to develop close relationships with their, top advisors and confidants. I have tried to use these channels to facilitate better understanding and better communication between and among the parties and with the United States as well.

The American not-for-profit world of NGO's, think tanks, universities, foundations and peace and development oriented organizations can establish a wide range of relationships in countries with which the United States has official difficulties or barriers. These relationships can be based on shared commitments to peace and stability and economic growth and not simply political negotiations. Through this community of NGOs we can reach individuals reluctant to make contact with American officials or those officials not known to the American government because of their informal social and political influence. We extend the reach of our country and the possibilities for peace when we utilize these types of informal, track two relationships.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Dr. Cohen, we will stop right there. And let me first ask you, Mr. Morey, I am always fascinated when Americans tell people in other countries how to win elections. And there has to be some basic principles that exist that allow you to be able to go into a country where the culture is different—and I mean you were in some places where the culture was different. How do you have confidence that you can be—make a thoughtful contribution? Obviously, you have but how do you have the confidence?

Mr. MOREY. That's a good question and it relates to public diplomacy. We found the strategic denominators of campaigns in countries are more alike than they are unalike. We have a saying that every campaign is the same. Every campaign is different. But you can take the common denominators of a political campaign, a marketing campaign, in fact a public diplomacy campaign that has a penchant for playing offense, if you will, going on the attack, to control the dialog, to use strategy as the guiding principle. I think if there was one point I would make at the end of all of these excellent testimonies it is to elevate the role of strategic planning in the process of public diplomacy. We all know to the degree people have had campaign experience they have won or lost on strategy. And public diplomacy is so challenged today in this complicated world with enemies propagandizing against the United States, if we don't have a smart strategy we are in big trouble. And strategy doesn't cost money. Great strategy makes better use of existing resources.

So that's probably the central lesson we have learned in advising political campaigns around the world, taking an outside strategic perspective that works on the ground.

Mr. SHAYS. It's just the culture—isn't there sometimes you go there and say I don't know what I'm talking about in the sense that a firm handshake in one society is appreciated, a firm handshake in another society is considered aggressive and distasteful?

Mr. MOREY. You have to be extremely careful about making that kind of mistake. You have to have many interpreters on the ground. You have to get smart very quickly about a country's culture and unique aspects of that. But what you bring to the mix is the strategic lessons you have learned across many campaigns and they tend to be very similar across many cultures that have any kind of democratized aspect to them. Things that work in campaigns in one country tend to work in another country, as long as they are adjusted and as long as they are sort of refined in terms of the local realities and cultural aspects of that country. Again, we have learned essentially that strategy has many common denominators. Successful strategy has many common denominators across those experiences.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Johnson, when you were speaking, I was thinking where he is going to come from coming from Heritage. And I was thinking, my gosh, I hope he sees the value in public diplomacy and clearly you do. The message I'm getting from you, I think, and I wanted to be corrected if I'm wrong, is that there's so much we should be doing that we are not doing, that we—I mean, frankly, was it my own Republican Congress that shortchanged public diplomacy? You say 1990's. Was it like 1995, thereafter?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the blame for——

Mr. SHAYS. What I am wondering is, Republicans sometimes don't like the National Endowment for the Arts and you know the government doesn't have a role to play there, and Heritage would probably be down on that side of the spectrum. And yet I don't hear you saying that when it comes to public diplomacy the government does have a role. I think I'm hearing you saying that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Not necessarily. It depends on how these bureaucracies are used and if they are used in a way that fits in our democracy and conservative principles. In the case of the National Endowment for Democracy, it's done yeoman's service. In years past and over 2 decades, it has, through its daughter organizations, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, done fine service in helping to birth democracies in Latin America and Africa and in Asia and other parts of the world. So they do this job very well. The question is whether you coordinate with them, whether you work with them, whether you look at the various missions that they have and try to leverage these efforts in the best way that you can. I think what David was saying a little bit earlier about the need for strategy is very important, because when you look at the way we have handled it so far since September 11 it doesn't look like there's a guiding light there or strategy, and you have a lot of players in this. Not only do you have the BBG, State Department, but you also have USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, which hasn't been utilized very well in Iraq. And you also have the Department of Defense in its role in creating what is known as an "information warfare" or "information operations" capability that may transcend or overstep some of these boundaries that we now recognize between the BBG and State and other government agencies and even the private sector. And whether this has all been fleshed out and directed toward solving some of the problems we have in communicating with other cultures, I'm not sure has been done in a coherent way. It worries me a little bit because there is also the potential of waste in there, but there's also the potential of misusing some of these very valuable tools that we have.

Mr. SHAYS. By the way, if I ask one individual a question and someone else wants to jump in, I am happy to have anybody else jump in.

Dr. Cohen, one thing is pretty—there are a number of points—and I did want to make sure you did get through your four points, because I thought they were very important for us to think about, but focusing in on the young, I am struck by the fact that in most Arab communities there are a heck of a lot of young. And I'm told that the young don't think ill of us like we think they may. But I'm also told that the young don't see in some cases any hope of a better life. I mean I am admittedly talking somewhat in stereotypes. Particularly in Saudi Arabia, the wealthy who come to the United States, they tell their society how to live one way. They come to the United States and do it differently. But for those who are in Saudi Arabia that is the way they have to live and don't have the flexibility of going somewhere else. Is it your opinion that the young in general—let me back up and say, I went to—I voted to go—to allow force to be used in Iraq. I had a committee meeting and my constituents said you haven't interacted much with the

Palestinian community. And I thought about it. I have been to Israel so many times, but only met with the Palestinian leaders a few times and much more with the Israelis. So I spent 5 days. And I went to Jericho and Hebron and Ramallah and Gaza each different day. And I met with school kids the whole time and I asked them—it was really thrilling. I asked them their happiest moment and their saddest moment. I kicked the teachers out, the administrators, so it was just the students and one or two people to translate. The thing that I was struck by—I will just mention the thing that touched me was that at one point there was all this buzz and then they said, Congressman, they are very impressed that you are here today because it happened to be Easter Sunday and that you had honored them on a day that would be most special to you. And I thought, you know, how easy it is to have a positive impact on people by just some gesture, which wasn't planned. It just happened to be the day I was there. And I think someone like—President Kennedy had his picture taken in African huts all around Africa because he did something that was so simple and so remarkable. When the head of the African States came to visit, instead of having a ceremony in the East Room or the West Room, he brought them up to his own personal quarters. In their society—he brought them up to the third floor. That electrified Africa. That one little gesture had so much impact over so many people. I am getting into a little bit of a digression.

Dr. COHEN. I don't think it is a digression, Mr. Congressman, because I think you are putting your finger on a very important part of what creates the image of America, which is are we really showing presence in the lives of these young people. And are we giving them an indication that we respect them, that we are not only trying to control them. When our public diplomacy commission went into classrooms, talked to teachers, talked in young sports clubs, it made a huge difference to their feeling that we were taking them seriously, that we were coming to hear what they had to say, that they mattered to us. And I think we shouldn't underestimate how much that basic human sense that they matter to us is going to make a difference in bringing about the readiness for change.

I am not trying to underestimate the importance of policy, but I do believe taking people seriously, treating them with respect, showing some dignity is a critical aspect of what's going to have to change.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there any question that any of you wanted to answer—any of the four of you want to answer of what was asked of the first panel or the second panel?

Dr. COHEN. There is a question that you asked on the second panel, you and one of the other Congressmen that was here then, that I would like to make a comment on. You asked about with Radio Sawa and the new Middle East television network about their evaluation of their audience and how their audience responds to them. And I just want to suggest to you, I think it is a wonderful thing that the U.S. Congress has decided to make a major investment in trying to communicate in the Arab world through these radio and TV networks. But I think it's only appropriate that the evaluation of their impact be independent. And I think that it would be a terrible thing if after we invested all of these tens of

millions of dollars, we did not have a serious independent evaluation of what they are achieving. And I think that many of the issues that separated my group on public diplomacy from the present effort would be dealt with if there was a serious independent, evaluative mechanism.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other questions that were asked before that any of you would like to respond to?

Mr. MOREY. I would like to respond to one that wasn't quite asked, very briefly.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there any question you want to ask yourself?

Mr. MOREY. Exactly. I just want to make a point. The question is how do you involve the private sector that wants to be involved constructively? And it's the argument of this Council Task Force that this job is so big that government alone can't do it. And since September 11, there are so many private sector people—there is money, talent and resources that want to help, but there is no place for them to help. We ought to study hard how to draw in those best practices. Innovation is hard, as you know, Mr. Chairman, to generate inside government. It tends to happen in the private sector out in the periphery. To pull it in, I mean, research, segmentation, campaign planning, grass roots communication, training, recruiting, all of those things. Creating some kind of entity, studying the construction of it, the commission of it over the next couple of months. We think it is very important because we think, again, this is not to take more taxpayer's money, but to make more efficient use of what we got.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I would make one comment, I commend Ambassador Tutwiler for her testimony and her frankness in talking with your committee. I would take issue with the point that in order to change things in State that you need "buy-in" from the field. It is not necessarily the field you have to get buy-in from, but it is the senior culture in the organization. And oftentimes the senior culture is the most resistant to these kinds of changes. One of the problems that State has had for many, many years comes from its diplomatic mission. It does not welcome public communication. It has never welcomed public communication with the American public. It has had a weak Public Affairs Bureau for many years and public diplomacy——

Mr. SHAYS. When you say public communication, you mean what?

Mr. JOHNSON. Talking with the public, communicating its mission.

Mr. SHAYS. To the United States public?

Mr. JOHNSON. To the U.S. public. Those two goals have been subsumed in the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, those two missions. USIA and the Bureau of Public Affairs and State now are together. But the Department of State and its culture have to learn to be more open, to learn to utilize the tools of communication to communicate its mission and also in public diplomacy to do a better job of communicating policies overseas, and it may end up being dragged kicking and screaming to do this. I know Ambassador Tutwiler put a good face on this, on what's going on over there in some of the reforms she has been able to make since she's arrived there. But the Department itself has got to come

around to becoming more aggressive in communicating openly with the American public.

Mr. SHAYS. This may be a little bit off the subject, but some of the most impressive people I have met have been people who work in the State Department, particularly the people that will go into Gaza City, the person who will accompany me from the State Department. And they're really sharp, energetic, opinionated people, but there is something that happens when you get higher up in rank or what is it?

Mr. JOHNSON. My own opinion, when you move through the ranks you go along to get along. And what happens is that because of the diplomatic nature of the mission—in terms of communicating with people in a diplomatic way, which is usually in private and massaging things and obeying the needs of stakeholders—that what happens is that you apply that behavior to your management principles and then it becomes core culture. But you can't manage an organization in secret, at least an open bureaucracy or a government organization in this country today or even in the world today. It just is impossible.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Ford, any observation?

Mr. FORD. I just want to comment on the State Department, the view that the field needs to take the lead. We did a survey on our public diplomacy work and we actually had an 80 percent response rate. We sent it to 160 relatively senior Public Affairs officers overseas and we were struck by some of the results that showed that, for example, 60 percent of them said they didn't feel like they had a clear sense of direction coming out of Washington in terms of what their duties were. A large percent of them claimed they didn't have enough time to go out and conduct their basic job, which is to go and interact with the public they are supposed to serve in those countries. Many of them complained about a lot of bureaucratic procedures they had to go through. An example I recall is a case where they wanted to hire a TV crew to go out and take pictures of an AID project so they could communicate that to the local community. And to make a long story short, they had to cancel it because they couldn't get the bureaucratic rules about procuring services and everything else taken care of in a timely fashion to go out and do that.

It's clear to me that Ambassador Tutwiler, who we did meet on that project, is going to have her hands full because the key people, the senior people, there is clearly some frustration on their part of being able to carry out what they perceive to be their basic job.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you want to make a comment?

Dr. COHEN. I find that my colleagues on this panel and on other panels are very reluctant to raise the issue of money. And I think it's very important for us to recognize that the ratio of money spent on the American military presence in the Middle East compared with our public diplomacy presence in the Middle East is ridiculous. And we must recognize that the national security problem that we face is first of all, a problem in the minds and hearts of the people of the region and that the 100 and more million young people who are now easily recruited to hate us could be changed before they become a problem if we devoted the adequate resources to this rather than to sending our young people into danger in

order to kill those who have already turned against us. And I don't think that we should be afraid to say that because we are devoting now a huge amount of our national security resources to thinking about the Arab world and the Muslim world, and we need to go to the root of that, which is communicating to these people, helping to change their education and their public media and the way they think about themselves, about their future and, in that context, about us as well.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to have Tom Costa ask a question. But I want to make sure I ask this so I don't leave wondering if I am being naive here. Is it naive to think that our eventual effort on satellite TV, if presented in an honest and open way, will have a positive impact on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya as well? Is it naive to think that? I will ask you, Mr. Morey, first.

Mr. MOREY. I don't think it is naive to think that. Let's be honest. And I think the previous panel acknowledges that we face significant obstacles and challenges—it is hard to take viewers from all the other media outlets. But in my judgment, we have to try, because it is going to make some difference over the course of the effort. I don't think it is naive, but I think it's a very long-term challenge.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Cohen, when we do have an appraisal of how they are doing, we have to give them a little time?

Dr. COHEN. Yes, but we got to do it independently.

Mr. SHAYS. Tom.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a basic question just to bring us back a bit. Why has the message of Osama bin Laden, a man ambassador Holbrooke termed a man in a cave, resonated so much more strongly in the Arab world than the message being projected by us? If you could briefly say, in your opinion what is it about Osama's message and his way of communicating versus what we are doing, and what can we learn from that?

Mr. SHAYS. Whoever has an answer first, answer. Dr. Cohen.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will be real quick. Because bin Laden is one of them. That is one thing. And the other is because people can see in that one person their lives being changed or the personification of some of their dreams, though they may be misinformed. They look at something like the United States, of which they're not a part, as a very different matter. You have the same problem with Fidel Castro. He is not a very nice person and he does a lot of bad things, but there are a lot of people around the world, even in this country, today that are fascinated by his personality and the things that he does. I think it is in some measure a challenge of psychology. But in second measure, it means that we have to use multimodal means of communicating and not necessarily arm's-length communication, which is broadcasting, as good as it is, but also exchanges. Face-to-face contact, as Dr. Cohen suggests, is very important in having people get to know us in a personal way.

Mr. MOREY. I agree. One of the more shocking statistics we saw over a year ago, before the invasion of Iraq, found that 88 percent of Jordanians polled, and 82 percent of Saudi Arabians polled, had a favorable view of Osama bin Laden, which was quite shocking. And Iagree with the points Mr. Johnson made. I think it is a challenge. There are a lot of reasons why it has happened: Feelings of

humiliation and the fact that the United States wasn't in this game, as we learned from the last panel. The challenge, it seems to me, is to separate the extremists who are receptive to that message from this next generation of sort of undecided soft supporters about this issue—and we have to think very aggressively about that kind of segmentation, as if it is a political campaign.

Dr. COHEN. I want to say two things. One is to remember that there was a time when it was an American President who was just about the most popular person in that whole part of the world. So it has a lot to do with message, and that's the second thing. We need to take more seriously an analysis of what was the message that was delivered by Osama bin Laden and by his main intellectual development person, Ayman Zawahiri. And that has a lot to do with the fact that they are much more conscious of the history of their decline than we are conscious of what has happened in the last 100 years. I would give the best example of that is for us in America learning about World War I is a very low priority. And the sense that World War I can be understood by America's entry into the war compared to the implications for these people of the loss of their hopes for independence as a result of what happened after World War I with the occupation of Iraq and Syria and Palestine by the great powers. And by the end of the dream of independence, we are simply not aware of that history which has changed their perspective about the West and us and how we went from being so popular to being so reviled by many people. We just don't have it in our consciousness. And I think that's an important part of it, is that when we think about preparing ourselves for public diplomacy we have to be thinking about how we not only talk to them, but also how we prepare Americans to be aware of the fact that they are having a big impact by what they say here on what is heard there. Statements made in the United States can be replayed again and again in the Arab world long after they have no importance here and are completely forgotten here, but can be quoted to you as indications of what we supposedly believe when they are actually the belief of a small minority of people. And that can have an enormous effect. A good example of that is people in America who have spoken disparagingly of Islam and the prophet Muhammed. These remarks made in America don't last a day in the American press, but they are quoted for months and even years and they are attributed not only to the person who spoke them, but as if they are the views of the majority of Americans and certainly the majority of American Christians and American Jews. And I think we must be aware of the fact that we are communicating even when we are inadvertently communicating our attitude of respect or disrespect to those millions of people who now matter to us in a way that they didn't before.

Mr. FORD. I think that the comment that was made I believe in one of the earlier panels is part of this process and that is from our perspective what our target audience has been over the years. I think that many of our public diplomacy programs were geared for elite audiences. And that frankly, I don't think we paid a lot of attention to mass audiences and what the potential consequences of what we say here in this country and what we communicated abroad, how that could be impacted on people's atti-

tudes. I think we heard this morning we are now going to pay attention to the mass audience because we are more concerned about how people view us overall.

This gets back to the point that several members talked about. We need to have some sense of a coherent strategy on what we want to convey to foreign audiences and it may require us to rethink some of the things in the past we tried to do because the world has changed since 9/11. And it's not clear to me, at least in the work we have done, everybody clearly understands what we are trying to achieve. I think part of the reason people are reacting the way they are is that we may not have focused on some of those issues in the past.

Mr. COSTA. What should our strategy be, and how do we coordinate that strategy among all the various agencies involved? Mr. Ford, do you want to start again?

Mr. FORD. I am going to repeat what I said in my testimony, is that we have several different Federal agencies that are involved in conducting public diplomacy activities, but there doesn't seem to be a broad focus on what each of them should be achieving. And we have examples where from our work that we have shown where they don't always know what each other is doing. It seems to me we need to have something that provides some focus to our overall efforts, because we are investing, at least on the State Department and BBG side, $1 billion. So I think that, you know—we don't know what that policy ought to be, but we certainly believe it ought to be better articulated.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is a two-prong strategy. I would think that it has, first of all, the intent of communicating what our policies are in trying to engineer some consensus for those policies in the world community. The second thing is to let people in other countries know who we are and get to know us in a long-term effort to build friends and bridges of understanding with them, and also to listen to them to know what their concerns are so we can tailor some of our policies and our messages to them to build tighter bonds. I think key to doing that, though, is doing something that David's organization mentioned earlier on and certainly the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and that is develop some sense of coordination. That has to happen in the White House. President Bush created the Office of Global Communications ostensibly to craft and disseminate messages intended for overseas audiences. But still someone needs to coordinate public diplomacy activities between various agencies. That office could do it, but it's not doing it right now. Somebody needs to do that job.

Mr. MOREY. It's too good and complicated a question to answer briefly and a lot of it is in the testimony in terms of prioritizing, revolutionizing, even privatizing some of this. I would just flag one point in terms of what the strategy ought to be. The strategy, front and center, and back to political campaign experience, ought to be doable, something we can actually do in terms of its objective. It is undoable, certainly in the short term, for the U.S. public diplomacy efforts to get the rest of the—or this part of the world to love us. It is doable and it is a hard mission to drive a wedge between the extremists, the Osama bin Ladens, and the moderate, young next generation of Muslims around the world—to separate the hard

opposition, if you will, from other parts of the segmentation, the attitudes they have about the United States. That ought to be a front and center priority within our strategy, particularly among the next generation.

Dr. COHEN. I think there are two parts of the answer that I would like to mention. One is that we need to get the President of the United States to understand that in the present world that he is not only the commander in chief but he is the public spokesman of the United States to the world in chief and that when he speaks, he speaks to the whole world, not only to the American people. And I think that that's why it's necessary that the strategy be centered in the White House and be an important part of the way the President thinks about the way he's formulating his foreign policy, his security policy, his operations within the world.

The second thing I would say is we need to focus on the people of the region, not only the regimes of the region. And in focusing on the people of the region, I think it will teach us to put a lot of our emphasis on the fact that there is a huge population. So we are dealing with a part of the world where over 50 percent of the people are under the age of 25. And in some cases, we are dealing with populations which are 50 percent in their teens and younger, and we need to reach out and affect that group.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Dr. Cohen.

Mr. SHAYS. I think we are going to conclude here. Just asking, is there any point that you want to put on the record before we adjourn? Any comments here? You have been a wonderful panel and I am just very grateful that you took the time to participate. Thank you so very much. With that, we will hold this hearing up.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Contact: Joan Mower
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E-mail: jmower@ibb.gov

BBG Press Release

Radio Sawa Is The Number One Station in Iraq; Adds New Program

Washington, D.C., January 23, 2003 – Radio Sawa, the U.S. Government-funded, Arabic-language station, is the most listened to station across Iraq, according to a new survey which was released as the station launched a daily interview program for Iraqis.

Some 23 percent of Iraqis over the age of 15 listened to Radio Sawa in the last seven days, and 35 percent have listened to the station in the last 12 months, according to an Oxford Research International survey conducted in October and November, 2003. The national survey included 3,244 respondents over the age of 15. Among radio listeners between 15 and 29, Radio Sawa is even more dominant, with 54 percent weekly listenership.

The survey showed 23 percent weekly listenership for Radio Sawa, compared with 18 percent for Radio Monte Carlo; 12 percent for BBC and 9 percent for Radio New Iraq, which is overseen by the U.S.-based Coalition Provisional Authority. The survey was acquired by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) from the European firm.

"The Sawa numbers are all the more impressive when you consider that in the core target audience, we are dominating the field with more than half the young radio listeners in Iraq tuning in to us weekly," said Norman J. Pattiz, a member of the BBG, which oversees all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting, including Radio Sawa. Pattiz spearheaded the creation of the station across the Middle East.

Meantime, Radio Sawa recently inaugurated "Straight To The Point," a new show broadcast to Iraq five days a week dealing with political and social issues.

The program has dealt with subjects such as why Saddam Hussein is a prisoner of war and not a war criminal; the de-Baathification process; the return of sovereignty; why the Iraqi dinar is appreciating relative to the dollar, and how new civil laws affect women's human rights. Guests include Iraqis from all walks of life, including intellectuals, professors and government officials.

The new show complements Radio Sawa's twice-hourly newscasts to Iraq, and four daily news shows featuring local Iraqi news. Radio Sawa also broadcasts special programs on democracy-building, and man-on-the-street interviews. Radio Sawa has more than two dozen correspondents in Iraq, who regularly file stories about events in the country.

Radio Sawa, a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week Arabic-language network, broadcasts objective, balanced, up-to-the minute news and news analysis combined with an upbeat mix of the best Western and Arabic pop music. It is targeted at the Middle East.

Listeners in Iraq can hear Radio Sawa on FM transmitters in Baghdad, Erbil, Sulimaniya and Basra. The service is transmitted on an AM frequency from Kuwait. In addition, Iraqis can access Radio Sawa on shortwave, via the Internet (www.radiosawa.com) and on digital audio satellite.

The BBG is an independent federal agency which supervises all U.S. government-supported non-military international broadcasting, including the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL); Radio Free Asia (RFA); Radio and TV Marti, Radio Sawa and Radio Farda. The services broadcast in 65 languages to over 100 million people around the world in 125 markets.

Nine members comprise the BBG, a presidentially appointed body. Current governors are Chairman Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Joaquin Blaya, Blanquita W. Cullum, D. Jeffrey Hirschberg, Edward E. Kaufman, Norman J. Pattiz, Veronique Rodman and Steven Simmons. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell serves as an ex officio member.

BBG Press Release

Radio Sawa: Progress Report

Based on July-August 2003 surveys conducted by ACNielsen in Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait



September 2003

Where We Started

- Prior to Radio Sawa, VOA had a one-size-fits-all Arabic service for the entire Middle East delivered largely via ineffective short-wave with average weekly audience reach of just 1-2%.
- Meanwhile, a media war was raging in the region. Weapons included hate media, incitement to violence, disinformation, state censorship, and journalistic self-censorship.
- We saw the need to establish a credible channel of communication with Arab listeners, using proven private-sector broadcasting techniques to target the 70% of the region's population under 30.

Where We Started

- Our mission: to promote freedom and democracy through accurate and objective news and information -- in short, to be a free press in the American tradition.

- Our market: the most skeptical and anti-American in the world. While Arabs are drawn to the American values of individual choice and freedom, they fiercely oppose U.S. policies and are increasingly doubtful about our intentions in the region.

- Our challenge: to take our mission and make it resonate despite the market difficulties. We call it "marrying the mission to the market."

- While we continue to build out the Radio Sawa network, research results just in from the region show that after just 18 months of broadcasting our strategy is working.

The Sawa Strategy

- Reach the largest possible audience for the news and information mission by attracting listeners with a unique Arabic-Western music format presented in a fresh, upbeat American style.
- Broadcast unvarnished, unbiased news.
- Cover U.S. policies and actions in full, including newsmaker interviews.
- Create customized programming streams for the different sub-regions of the Arab world.
- Engage the audience with dynamic, interactive features such as "Sawa Chat."
- Become part of the daily lives of our listeners with the 24/7 presence of a modern radio station.
- Deliver the programming via the channels -- FM, AM, digital satellite -- that the audience uses and we control (while ensuring appropriate redundancy).

Radio Sawa Distribution Network



Radio Sawa Weekly Listenership
(% listening among the general population 15+)

Radio Sawa is now the leading international broadcaster in each of these countries and competes head to head with the top domestic stations. (Radio Sawa reaches Egypt via AM and digital satellite audio only).



Radio Sawa Weekly Listenership

(% listening among the general population 15-29)

Radio Sawa is even stronger with its 15-29 core target audience.



Radio Sawa Weekly Listenership

(% listening among the general population 30+)

Radio Sawa goes well beyond its target, reaching substantial audiences above the age of 30.



Radio Sawa Weekly Listenership
(% listening among "elites" -- social classes "A&B")

Radio Sawa also delivers the elite listeners. Social classes 'A&B' refer to society's well-educated managers and professionals *per* the industry-standard A-E classification of the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR).



Radio Sawa as a Reliable News Source

Q. "How reliable is the news and information one can hear on Radio Sawa?"

% of weekly listeners answering 'very or somewhat reliable'

Radio Sawa not only delivers large audiences but succeeds in fulfilling its core news mission.



Views of the USA among Radio Sawa Listeners and Non-Listeners

Q. "How favorably or unfavorably inclined are you personally toward the USA?"

% responding 'very' or 'somewhat favorable' among weekly Sawa listeners and non-listeners

(Question not asked in Egypt because of political sensitivities)



Notes on the Research

- Face-to-face interviews conducted in Arabic July-August 2003.
- Sample size of 5737 adults 15+, distributed as follows: Egypt (1522), Jordan (1251), UAE (1200), Qatar (998), and Kuwait (768).
- 50% men and 50% women representative of key demographic groups in terms of social class, education, employment, size and type of household.
- Margin of error: +/- 2.9%.

Local 1418/AFSCME
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
Council 26, Capital Area Council of Federal Employees
202-619-0126

February 17, 2004

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
Room B-372, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please find attached a Statement for the Record to be included with the testimony given before the Subcommittee in its hearing of February 10, 2004.

Respectfully,



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Statement For The Record
Gary A. Marco
President, AFSCME Local 1418
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
Christopher Shays, Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
Hearing Date: February 10, 2004

February 17, 2004

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for this opportunity to submit a written statement for the record in conjunction with the subcommittee's February 10, 2004 hearing concerning U.S. Government public diplomacy in the Middle East. The focus of my statement will be on the U.S. Government's international broadcasting component of public diplomacy.

I support many of the conclusions found in the reports of the Heritage Foundation, the Pew Research Group and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, chaired by Ambassador Edward Djerejian and reported to the House Committee on Appropriations.

In reading these reports and listening to the testimony given in the hearing, it is difficult to have confidence in the broadcasting projects of the International Broadcasting Bureau's Board of Governors (IBB/BBG) in the Arab and Muslim world.

The reason for this lack of confidence comes from the Board's own pronouncements. What we hear from the Board is sloganeering. For example, we hear about "marrying the mission to the market." The Middle East is not a market in an advertising campaign. It is a region of complex nationalities and divergent interests. Unfortunately, as research independent of the Board notes, the one thing that binds these peoples, nations and interests together is a sustained dislike for the United States and its policies.

The first part of dealing with a problem is acknowledging that one exists.

The Board speaks to the "phenomenal success" of Radio Sawa. As an entertainment medium, maybe this is so. However, we question what the relationship of Radio Sawa is to U.S. public diplomacy.

We question how the Sawa project, overwhelmingly based on a pop music format, can be considered a serious medium for the explanation of U.S. policy in the Arab and Muslim world. How is Radio Sawa effective with Palestinians who witness the Israeli government building a wall that is sectioning off their towns and villages? How is Radio Sawa effective with Iraqis who view Coalition forces as an army of invasion and occupation and are violently resisting the Coalition presence? How is Radio Sawa relevant to Muslim clerics who believe that the Iraqi people have a right to elections, self-determination and self-government, possibly leading to the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist state? How does Radio Sawa resonate with the tens of thousands of Muslims who make the haj to Mecca every year? Unfortunately, we do not see the relevance of Radio Sawa in any of these critical areas or populations or in explaining U.S. policy as relates to these issues.

In addition, the Board's projects, in the Middle East and elsewhere, need fair, objective and impartial research and evaluation that is independent from the Board, to determine their effectiveness, before the Board commits to projects costing millions in taxpayer dollars.

With that in mind, the Board has now begun television broadcasts in the Middle East. The Board claims that this gives the United States "a horse in the race," in the Middle East television arena.

To this we submit that it is not merely enough to have "a horse in the race," if the horse is not competitive with the field. The Middle East television environment is arguably the most intense and volatile of all media in the region, combining words with images. In our view, the Board's television project will be costly in the extreme to the American taxpayer. If there was a reasonable expectation of success, within a reasonable amount of time, it may be worth the effort. However, the question is how will this television project play out with Arab audiences? Much as we wish it to be otherwise, the content of the existing local and regional television networks in the Middle East, as might be found with Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, appears to resonate with the Arab "street." There should be no illusions...the Board has a long, steep and slippery slope to climb in challenging the dominance of the indigenous Middle East media, particularly if the Board's radio and television broadcasts do not or cannot reflect conditions on the ground in various Arab/Muslim flashpoints.

As noted in Under Secretary Tutwiler's statement and testimony, we have "...a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix, a single solution or a simple plan..."

What is clearly needed is an integrated public diplomacy effort. We do not need special projects by the Board of Governors, which, in our view, are inconsistent with and irrelevant to daily events in the Middle East, have no meaningful connection with U.S. public diplomacy objectives and have an overly simplistic view of what constitutes "success." As troubling as it is to us, we must recognize that the Arab/Muslim world is on the receiving end of American policy, has a negative view of this policy and reacts accordingly. At present, we do not appear to have the right mechanisms in place to change these views and reactions.

In order to be part of the solution and not part of the problem, language service broadcasts of the Voice of America must be strengthened and fully funded, including a full-time 24/7 English language broadcast operation, recognizing the global scope of negative opinion toward the United States and its policies. Further, steps should be taken to reestablish an Arabic service of the Voice of America, demonstrating American commitment to the region and acknowledging the importance of the region to peace and security.

In our view, recognizing and addressing these issues creates an effective public diplomacy initiative that reduces the level of animosity that exists toward the United States and reduces what is a high intensity environment of conflict.

Respectfully Submitted in the National and Public Interest.

Gary A. Marco
President, AFSCME Local 1418
Voice of America
Washington, DC.

Public Diplomacy in the Middle East

Testimony of Tim Shamble, President

American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812

Voice of America
International Broadcasting Bureau

For the

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations

Chairman, Christopher Shays

Government Reform Committee

U.S. House of Representatives

February 10, 2004 Hearing

Statement
for the Record

American Federation of Government Employees Local 1812

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations

AFGE, Local 1812, the union local representing the rank-and-file broadcasters and journalists at the Voice of America wishes to thank the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations for the opportunity to submit a written statement for the record in conjunction with the hearing held on February 10, 2004 chaired by Representative Christopher Shays.

For the record, the union believes that the mechanism of U.S. public diplomacy and its sister function, international broadcasting, is broken, and in the interests of national security, must be fixed.

Sadly, the public diplomacy tools that were so effective in bringing down the Berlin Wall and shattering the Soviet Union are now being dismantled in the mistaken belief that the battle of ideas is over, leaving public diplomacy to wither without strategic focus, funding, and organizational direction. Nowhere is this more evident than in U.S. international radio broadcasting, a vital arm of global public diplomacy.

In the decade following the collapse of communism, Congress and the Executive Branch unwisely reduced the Voice of America's budget by 40 percent, as the BBG Chairman testified. Closing down many of its best language services, the Agency also diminished the English-language broadcasts, RIF'd hundreds of employees and devastated the Agency's mission. With the corresponding shrinkage of the worldwide audience for U.S. international radio broadcasting, an unprecedented and alarming rise in anti-Americanism engulfed the world as U.S. prestige plummeted and virulent antipathy from terrorists in the Middle East reverberates throughout the region.

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, brought global anti-Americanism into sharp focus as together with most of the world, Americans watched in horror as the twin towers fell and thousands of innocent men, women and children perished.

In the face of this horrible event, the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), formed 10 years ago by Congress under the leadership of Senator Biden, as the BBG Chairman testified, responded to this terrorist attack with an array of short-sighted projects including the "Shared Values" initiative conceived by former Under Secretary Beers which targeted countries refused to broadcast, a magazine called "Hi!" whose circulation, according to various reports, is negligible and with *Radio Sawa*, a 24/7 radio service featuring primarily Arab and Western pop music interspersed with short news headlines. By the Board's

own admission, and contrary to its original pledges to the Congress, only 25% of *Radio Sawa* programming contains news or any explanation of U.S. policy.

Quo Vadis

In the union's opinion, the report commissioned by Congressman Frank Wolf, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace" by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World under the chairmanship of former U.S. Ambassador, Edward Djerejian, is an honest and accurate assessment of the current situation in U.S. public diplomacy and international broadcasting. The recommendations of this Advisory Group are most necessary not only for the viability of the public diplomacy and international broadcasting missions, but also for the national security interests of the United States of America. Together with other substantive reports on Public Diplomacy recently issued by the Heritage Foundation, the Pew Research Group and the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States has an explanation of the problems and a blueprint of potential solutions. The union agrees with Under Secretary Margaret Tutwiler who called these reports helpful and responsible in contrast to the Broadcasting Board of Governors which dismissed these observations as cynical.

In order to decisively counter the terrorism enveloping the world, Congress and the Executive Branch must act expeditiously to implement the recommendations of these studies. Our institutions and Congress must not sit paralyzed in the face of the deteriorating state of global affairs and continuously experiment with projects of dubious value which do little or nothing to change the mindset of the nations in the Middle East.

The WHAM (Winning Hearts and Minds) Factor

The BBG states that *Radio Sawa* is a phenomenal success. Claims of this success are based on research directly commissioned in most instances by the Board. In this regard, the union agrees with the comments of Stephen Cohen, a participant in the Djerejian task force and a member of the panel testifying before the Subcommittee who emphasized the critical need for objective, third party research on the effectiveness of the BBG's radio and TV endeavors. Only with independent research can the Congress and the Administration know with any degree of certainty whether or not *Radio Sawa* measures up to the claims of the Board and to the ultimate goals of public diplomacy.

At the hearing, Subcommittee member, Congressman Ed Tierney, posed the question to the BBG about the independence of the research regarding the impact of *Radio Sawa*. In response, the Board mentioned the Edison Media Research Group which, as the Edison Group's website mentions, has as a client Westwood One, owned by one of the BBG governors. Inquiring minds may question whether or not the research conducted by Edison would be as objective as it could be.

Even if we accept the fact that Radio Sawa may be popular, as the Djerejian report states, how does this relative popularity translate into the ultimate goal of public diplomacy which is to win the hearts and minds of the listening public? As Stephen Cohen testified: "the problems are

in the hearts and minds and that is what we must reach." Unfortunately, because of the ratio of news to music in the *Sawa* format, listeners in the Middle East do not have the opportunity to learn the essential facts about the cornerstones of American social, political and economic policies, about the goodness and generosity of its people or the revolutionary message of freedom and democracy, as they did in the past. Even the BBG has acknowledged that it is not yet clear to what extent the new programming has produced significant changes in views about the United States.

Furthermore, in Jordan where the BBG's research indicated that *Radio Sawa* was immensely popular, the positive attitudes of Jordanians toward the United States have dwindled to a lowly 1% at the present time down from 25% in 2002 when *Sawa* was first initiated.

As far as limiting the *Sawa* format exclusively to pop music, the BBG ignores the incredible diversity of American musical culture including the magic of jazz and the genius of its performers dominated by black Americans. It forgets that for 40 years through the Voice of America's jazz commentator, Willis Conover, American jazz music conquered the world, particularly the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In emphasizing only pop and rock, the BBG robs the world of any knowledge of our indigenous Nashville country music whose artists enjoy global recognition as well as the dozens of marvelous American symphony orchestras which rank among the best in the world. Moreover, the union believes that publicizing one music genre to the exclusion of all others constitutes a violation of the VOA Charter, the document representing the principles of U.S. international broadcasting.

Regardless of the studies and recommendations of several credible and solid organizations from within and without the federal government, the BBG, rushed headlong into expanding the *Sawa* model into Iran and will soon do the same in its Urdu broadcasts to Pakistan.

The Djerejian report on Public Diplomacy in the Middle East recommended the expansion of English-language training. In her testimony, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Margaret Tutwiler, was very supportive of a variety of programs expanding English-language training. In this regard, it is interesting to note that at the same time the State Department is encouraging the spread of English-language training, the BBG last year decided to curtail the 24/7 English language broadcasts by the Voice of America (VOA), reducing broadcast hours from 24 hours daily to 19. The BBG has further plans in FY 2005 to reduce English broadcasts even more. This decision comes at a time when English has become the most popular second language among the peoples of the world.

Cuts in broadcast time result in lapses in news coverage. When English broadcasts were cut in October it created a five-hour gap in the transmission of English news broadcasts to our network of 24-hour affiliates around the world including a new FM in Kuwait which was quite popular with American armed forces personnel stationed in the region. Wouldn't it be ironic if, because of these VOA English cuts, that our armed forces in Kuwait would have missed the first news from the United States about the capture of Saddam Hussein?

Together with the Heritage Foundation and the many ethnic communities in the United States, we regret that the BBG eliminated its VOA programs to Eastern Europe and the Baltics which leaves an informational vacuum in those countries by transferring its resources to surrogate services for the Middle East.

As the Heritage Foundation stated, such reallocations ignore the VOA's unique role in explaining U.S. policies and ignores the need to reach regions where democracy and free markets are barely getting started as in the newly-emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, and in all likelihood, problems are very likely to resurface.

Middle East Television Broadcasting

The other major component of the BBG's initiatives in the Middle East is its television project. Although the union believes there is a need for some TV presence in the Middle East, the regional experts on the Djerejian task force suggested that it might be more cost-effective to place U.S.-produced programs on existing Arab channels rather than to rush into 24/7 TV broadcasts. Echoing these concerns, the Heritage Foundation in its testimony questioned whether TV's programming costs, which exceed those of radio, could be justified.

In the search for solutions to the monumental problems of public diplomacy, we do not agree with the Council on Foreign Relations task force's proposed solution that the administration form a new Corporation for Public Diplomacy. In this regard, we are in agreement with Under Secretary Tutwiler. Such an entity would only open up a new Pandora's box of problems. Better to fully utilize and coordinate America's message through the recently established Office of Global Communications which could help craft, approve and disseminate public diplomacy messages for overseas audiences, as the Heritage Foundation testified.

As Under Secretary Tutwiler remarked, the United States has "a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix or a single solution or a simple plan." However, in this turbulent world, the clock is ticking. We urge the Congress to move expeditiously on many fronts to strengthen public diplomacy weakened so drastically by the Foreign Relations Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. The national security interests of the United States are at stake.

This concludes the formal statement of the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812, representing the dedicated employees at the Voice of America which for sixty-two years, through the dark days of World War Two and the Cold War has been America's broadcasting voice to the world. We submit that our broadcasters should be allowed to continue this proud tradition in the new and awful war on terror.

We thank the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations for this opportunity to present the union's comments for the record.

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NOV 20 2003

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The GAO report, U.S. Public Diplomacy - State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges (GAO -03-951), contains recommendations for the Department of State. Chapter 7 of Title 31 (31 USC 720) requires that the head of an agency submit to the Committee a written statement on action taken on the recommendations directed to that agency by the Comptroller General. This letter is intended to comply with that requirement.

Recommendations #1 & #2

1. Develop and widely disseminate throughout the Department a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State's public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives.

2. Consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research.

The Department plans to establish a new Office of Strategic Planning and Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The office will handle the further development and maintenance of a long-term strategic planning and analysis capability for public diplomacy. The office will draw on outside experts and consultants from the private sector for support. These private sector experts will use their expertise to develop new methods to systematically and comprehensively measure the progress of public diplomacy programs. In addition, they will design a new comprehensive strategy to integrate diverse public diplomacy.

The Honorable
Thomas M. Davis III, Chairman,
Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives.

Recommendation #3
Designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden.

In our August 20 response to the GAO's draft report, we agreed that the regional executive directors would follow-up with the respective posts to determine the most efficient allocation of resources to meet the administrative requirements of overseas public affairs sections. Posts will conduct the resource review of all mission sections during the Mission Performance Planning cycle in the early Spring of 2004. That information will be provided to the Regional Bureaus for review and consolidation in the Bureau Performance Plans and International Cooperative Administrative Support Services staffing reviews. At that time, the regional executive directors will review the resources allocated to public diplomacy functions as they review the resources allocated to all posts and domestic offices within the bureau.

Recommendation #4
Strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service Officers in foreign languages.

The Department is making considerable progress in this area. The GAO stressed the importance of language fluency for PD officers, and we agree that we must be able to meet the language proficiency levels posts deem necessary for the position. The Department believes that the largest and most significant factor limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-standing staffing shortfall. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is correcting this shortfall. With increased staffing, the Department has also been able to change its policy to allow certain Junior Officers up to 44 weeks of language training versus 24 weeks formerly.

The Department has also bolstered efforts to recruit candidates with language skills. A new "language continuum" plan was implemented to guide our efforts to meet higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those critical to national security concerns. The Department already has a language incentive program that encourages acquisition and use of critical languages.

Recommendation #5
Program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State's assignment process.

The Department's three-year Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is dramatically serving to remedy the shortfall by filling critical requirements overseas and by creating training positions to allow staff sufficient time to receive training not only in public diplomacy but in foreign languages and other key skills. With continued Congressional support, we will be able to fully staff our overseas requirements and program adequate time for training.

Additionally, the Department launched a new public diplomacy training program in September 2003, increasing the current 3 weeks of available public diplomacy training to 19. The Department has also added public diplomacy components to its training curriculum for certain officers outside the public diplomacy cone, including economic and political officers, ambassadors, and deputy chiefs of mission. None of this expanded training would be possible without sustained hiring under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and will not be sustainable without continued support to maintain a "personnel complement," even while staffing emerging priorities.

We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,



Paul V. Kelly
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

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