[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PERSPECTIVES ON 9/11: BUILDING EFFECTIVELY ON HARD LESSONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 10, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Charles Gonzalez, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Kay Granger, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Pete Sessions, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman Select Committee on
Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Dave Camp, Chairman Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security............................................ 10
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in Congress
From U.S. Virgin Islands....................................... 62
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 48
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 8
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable James S. Gilmore, Former Governor of the
Commonwealth of Virginia & Chairman Advisory Panel to Assess
the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
The Honorable Porter Goss, Chairman Select Committee on
Intelligence................................................... 10
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 9
Ms. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Intelligence Committee
Inquiry
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congresss From
the State of New York.......................................... 56
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 16
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 59
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State New York............................................. 12
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 68
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Representative in Congress
From the District of Columbia.................................. 15
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 11
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connnecticut................................. 51
The Honorable Louise McIntosh Slaughter, a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi.................................. 54
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Questions and Responses submitted for the Record................. 72
PRESPECTIVES ON 9/11: BUILDING EFFECTIVELY ON HARD LESSONS
----------
Wednesday, September 10, 2003
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:45 p.m., in Room
345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Smith, Shays, Goss,
Camp, King, Linder, Thornberry, Gibbons, Granger, Sessions,
Sweeney, Turner, Thompson, Sanchez, Dicks, Harman, Cardin,
Slaughter, DeFazio, Lowey, Norton, Lofgren, McCarthy, Jackson-
Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas, Langevin, Meek,
Weldon and Diaz-Balart.
Chairman Cox. This hearing will come to order. The full
Committee on Homeland Security is meeting today to consider
perspectives on September 11th, one day before its anniversary.
Our hearing is titled ``Building Effectively on Hard Lessons.''
Our witnesses will be Ms. Eleanor Hill, the Staff Director of
the Joint Intelligence Committee inquiry, and the Honorable Jim
Gilmore, former Governor of Virginia and Chairman of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
We will shortly welcome our witnesses after brief opening
statements.
I think everyone recognized what a beautiful day it was
today in Washington, D.C. in fact, the weatherman, as I drove
in this morning, said it was the nicest day that he remembers
in our Nation's Capital. Two years ago it was very different.
The view across the Potomac, as I evacuated as a Member of the
House leadership down 295, was all black over the Pentagon and
it appeared in fact that the entire cityscape of Washington,
D.C. was aflame in smoke and that our government was threatened
as we had witnessed only in featured films.
I don't think we will ever forget, any of us, where we were
that day or what went through our minds. And in that sense, 2
years ago was very recent. We can always draw it back. For my
part, I spent the morning of September 11th, as it happened, at
the Pentagon in the private dining room of the Secretary of
Defense, Don Rumsfeld. Paul Wolfowitz was there as well, and we
were discussing how important it was for Congress to take a
different look at our national security to prepare for
unconventional threats, not to fight the old wars of the past
but to deal with the future. And Secretary Rumsfeld told me
that day he expected another unexpected event, that that is
always what brings America to its attention, and of course his
words could not have been any more prophetic. Just minutes
later, the Pentagon itself was attacked.
Those catastrophic terrorist events of September 11th that
killed thousands of Americans exposed the vulnerability of our
own country and the shortcomings of U.S. intelligence services
whose mission it is to prevent such attacks.
Today, on this sad anniversary, in the midst of our war on
terrorists worldwide, our questions have become more seasoned,
or less raw, than they were just 2 years ago.
We are here today to ask what lessons our intelligence
services have learned and how they can be applied to protect
the American people from another terrorist attack. We ask what
went wrong in order to make sure that we now have it right, or
nearly so at least. We ask what has been done these last 2
years to make us safe against our new everyday reality that
terrorists will always, have us, our children, our homeland,
and our way of life in their murderous sights until they and
their supporters are eradicated. We must live with that. And we
know how much has been done, but today we ask can it be even
better.
Many of us were stunned by the coordinated nature of the
attacks, which immediately suggested training at a remarkably
sophisticated level and elaborate planning on an international
scale. We were also stunned by the devastating impact of these
attacks. In a little more than an hour and a half on that
beautiful, clear, early autumn morning, 19 hijackers
successfully converted four heavily fuel-laden commercial
aircraft into deadly missiles that destroyed the majestic World
Trade Center in New York City. They blew a massive crater into
what many thought was the impenetrable Pentagon, and they
brutally took the lives of 3,000 innocent people.
That day brought the worst from heartless terrorists and
the best in the American people. We still vividly recall the
courageous acts of the passengers of United Flight 93 who,
responding to Todd Beamer's charge, ``Let's roll,'' attacked
the terrorists who commandeered the plane.
We saw first responders, police, firefighters and emergency
medical personnel in New York and Washington act with great
skill and selfless dedication to protect people, to relieve
suffering, and to contain its damage. As we know, many of
them--too many of them--lost their own lives in this noble
service to others. We have not forgotten them.
As President Bush stated on that awful day, we owe it to
these victims and to all Americans to ensure that no such
attack will ever occur again on our soil. The President moved
quickly to provide our intelligence services with the
capabilities they would need to prevent terrorism, and he
established, with the leadership of the Congress, the
Department of Homeland Security to develop an essential new
capability to enhance our security, including promoting the
integrity of the critical infrastructure on which we so heavily
depend.
We won't know how far we have come without recalling where
we began. The Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees recently published its declassified
version of its report. The bottom line is that we did not know
what we needed to know, and what we did know did not get where
it was needed most when it was needed.
The Joint Inquiry produced detailed factual findings as
well as a number of systemic findings. We are fortunate to have
Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Joint Inquiry, here today.
She is unequaled in her ability to discuss all aspects of the
Inquiry's conclusions, but since we are here to consider our
progress in fighting terrorism and securing our homeland over
the past 2 years, I want to highlight a half dozen of the
Inquiry's systemic findings this afternoon:
First, the CIA's failure to watch list suspected terrorists
aggressively.
Second, the CIA's lack of a process designed to protect the
homeland from the terrorist threat.
Third, the Intelligence Community's insufficient analytical
focus on al Qaeda and the insufficient quality of that
analysis, particularly in terms of strategic analysis.
Fourth, the failure of the U.S. Government to bring
together in one place all terrorism-related information from
all sources.
Fifth, information was not sufficiently shared not only
between different Intelligence Community agencies but also
within individual agencies. Nor was information sufficiently
shared between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Communities.
Sixth, while technology remains one of this Nation's
greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively
applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
The report makes many additional points, of course, but I
have chosen these six because each of them points to a solution
the Department of Homeland Security was created to address. The
Department of Homeland Security is intended to bring together
and focus the efforts of 22 formerly distinct and disparate
agencies across the Federal Government. All those agencies and
their employees now have a single, shared, and overarching
mission of preventing terrorism, protecting our Nation, our
people, territory, critical infrastructure, and way of life and
preparing to respond to another attack should one occur.
We now talk about State and local governments as partners,
not as distant, little known, and inconvenient civic cousins.
The private sector and the government now share a mission: to
protect the critical infrastructure on which our dynamic
economy depends. And more than ever before, we look for the
answers to the otherwise intractable problems of maintaining
our security to the creativity of our own private sector.
The Department is, in a sense, the hub of the wheel. It
holds our entire homeland security enterprise together, focuses
it and gives us strength, but we must make it still stronger.
We on this committee have from the outset been pressing for
full implementation of the Department's statutory mandate. The
Homeland Security Act requires that there be an intelligence
analytic unit in the Department, entitled by statute to
receive, quote, ``all reports, including information reports
containing intelligence which has not been fully evaluated,
assessments, and analytical information relating to threats of
terrorism against the United States.'' That appears in section
202.
That the purpose of this is to identify--and now I am again
quoting from the statute--``and assess the nature and scope of
terrorist threats to the homeland, detect and identify threats
of terrorism against the United States, and understand such
threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the
homeland.'' That is section 201(d)(1).
But what is happening now is that the Department currently
is relying upon a nonstatutory construct called the TTIC, the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to serve the all-source-
based analytic function. The Department is merely one of its
customers. That--and I believe my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle share this view--may be a useful interim approach but
it is certainly no part of the Homeland Security Act nor the
intent of Congress in passing it.
We must use the hard lessons of 9/11 to look forward. We
all can use the factual and systemic findings of the Joint
Inquiry's report as a road map, a basis for asking where we are
and whether we are well on the way to where we must go. We
think, for example, of two of the 9/11 terrorists slipping in
and out of the United States, and, 2 years later, ask do we in
fact have a single consolidated watchlist now; and if we don't,
why? And where better to place that responsibility than in the
Department of Homeland Security? We consider the report's
finding that there were, quote, ``serious problems in
information sharing prior to September 11th between the
Intelligence Community and relevant nonintelligence community
agencies, including other Federal agencies as well as State and
local authorities.
We ask 2 years on, has the culture of the Intelligence
Community adapted to the information sharing requirements of
the post-9/11 world? Is the Department of Homeland Security
receiving all the terrorism-related information to which it is
entitled, regardless of its source? Is the Department getting
that information to those who need it in order to protect us,
wherever they are? And this committee will go on, because it is
the responsibility of our committee, the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, to assist the new Department in developing
these capabilities. We will exercise our oversight role
constructively and responsibly and effectively, because the
security of the American people depend upon it.
I want to welcome again Governor Gilmore and Ms. Hill here
today, and I look forward to your testimony.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
The catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed
the vulnerability of the American homeland and the shortcomings of US
intelligence services whose mission it is to prevent such attacks.
Today, on this sad anniversary of the ``9/11'' attacks, in the midst of
our war on terrorists worldwide, our questions have become more
seasoned, are now less raw, than they were just two years ago.
We are here today to ask what lessons our intelligence services
have learned and how they can be applied to protect the American people
from another terrorist attack. We ask what went wrong in order to make
sure that we now have it right--or at least nearly so. We ask what has
been done these last two years to make us safe against our new everyday
reality: that terrorists will always, until they and their supporters
are eradicated, have us, our children, our homeland, and our way of
life in their murderous sights. We must live with that. And we know
much has been done, but today we ask: can it be even better?
In little more than an hour on that beautiful, clear early autumn
morning, nineteen Middle Eastern hijackers successfully converted four
heavily fuel laden commercial aircraft into deadly missiles that
destroyed the majestic World Trade Center in New York City, that blew a
massive crater into what many thought was the impenetrable Pentagon,
and that brutally took the lives of 3,000 innocent people. A day that
brought out the worst from heartless terrorists also brought out the
best in the American people. We still recall vividly the courageous
acts of the passengers of United flight 93, who responding to Todd
Beamer's charge, ``Let's roll,'' attacked the terrorists who had
commandeered the plane. We saw first responders--police, firefighters,
and emergency medical personnel--in New York and Washington act with
great skill and selfless dedication to protect people, to relieve
suffering, and to contain its damage. As we know, many of them--too
many of them--lost their own lives in this noble service to others; we
have not forgotten them.
As President Bush stated on that awful day, we owe it to these
victims and to all Americans to ensure that no such attack will ever
occur again on our soil. The President moved quickly to provide our
intelligence services with the capabilities they would need to prevent
terrorism. And he established with Congress, the Department of Homeland
Security to develop an essential, new capability to enhancing our
national security, including promoting the integrity of the critical
infrastructure on which we so heavily depend.
We won't know how far we've come without recalling where we began.
The joint inquiry of the House and Senate intelligence committees
recently published its declassified version of its report. The bottom
line is we did not know what we needed to know--and what we did know
did not get where it was most needed when it was needed.
The joint inquiry produced detailed factual findings, as well as a
number of systemic findings. We are fortunate to have Eleanor Hill,
staff director of the joint inquiry, here today; she is unequalled in
her ability to discuss all aspects of the inquiry's conclusions. But,
since we are here to consider our progress in fighting terrorism and
securing our homeland over the past two years, I want to highlight a
half-dozen of the inquiry's ``systemic findings'' this afternoon.
1. ``The CIA's failure to watchlist suspected terrorists;''
[#1]
2. ``[T] lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the
homeland from the terrorist threat;'' [#1]
3. ``Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community's
understanding of al Qu'aida was hampered by insufficient
analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of strategic
analysis.'' [#5]
4. The failure of the U.S. Government to ``bring together in
one place all terrorism-related information from all sources''
[#9]
5. ``Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between
different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within
individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law
enforcement agencies.'' [#9]
6. ``While technology remains one of this nation's greatest
advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively applied
in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.'' [#4]
The report makes many additional points, of course, but I have
chosen these six because each of them points to a solution the
Department of Homeland Security was created to address.
The Department of Homeland Security is intended to bring together
and focus the efforts of 22 formerly distinct and disparate agencies
from across the federal Government. All those agencies and their
employees now have a single shared and overarching mission: Prevent
terrorism, protect our nation--our people, territory, critical
infrastructure, and way of life--and prepare to respond effectively to
any attack.
We now talk about State and local governments as partners, not as
distant, little known, and inconvenient civic cousins. The private
sector and the Government now share a mission--to protect the critical
infrastructure on which our dynamic economy depends. And more than ever
before, we look for the answers to the otherwise intractable problems
of maintaining our security to the creativity of our private sector.
The Department is, in a sense, the hub of the wheel. It holds our
entire, homeland security enterprise together, focuses it and gives it
strength.
But we must make it still stronger. We, on this committee have,
from the outset, been pressing for full implementation of the
Department's statutory mandate.
The Homeland Security Act requires that there be an analytic unit
in the Department entitled, by statute, to receive:
``all reports (including information reports containing
intelligence which has not been fully evaluated), assessments, and
analytical information relating to threats of terrorism against the
United States .. . ,'' [sec. 202]
in order to
``identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to
the homeland; detect and identify threats of terrorism against the
United States; and understand such threats in light of actual and
potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.'' [ 201(d)(1)]
We have, instead, been hearing that a non-statutory construct
called the ``TTIC''--the ``Terrorist Threat Integration Center''--is
going to serve the all-source-based analytic function, with the
Department as one of its customers. That--and I believe my colleagues
on both sides of the aisle share this view--was certainly no part of
the intent of Congress in passing the Homeland Security Act.
But we must use the hard lessons of ``9/11'' to look forward. And,
while we can have mixed views of some of the recommendations of the
joint inquiry, we all can use the factual and systemic findings in the
joint inquiry's report as a roadmap--a basis for asking where we are
and whether we are well on the way to where we must go.
We think, for example, of two of the 9/11 terrorists slipping in
and out of the United States and, two years later, ask: Do we, in fact,
have a single, consolidated watch-list now? And if we don't, why--and
where better to place that responsibility than in the Department of
Homeland Security?
We consider the Report's finding that there were ``serious problems
in information sharing ... prior to September 11, between the
Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community
agencies,'' including other federal agencies as well as state and local
authorities? [# 10]. We ask, two years on: Has the culture of the
Intelligence Community adapted to the information sharing requirements
of the post-9/11 world? Is the Department of Homeland Security
receiving all the terrorism related information to which it is
entitled, regardless of its source, and is the Department getting that
information to those who need it in order to protect us, wherever they
are?
I yield now to the distinguished ranking member of this
committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know as you opened
your remarks discussing the events of your day on September
11th of 2001, everyone here also recalled our own experiences.
And it is still hard to comprehend that we lost over 3,000
lives, the largest loss of life in a single day in the history
of our country. We all remember those pictures of the Twin
Towers, pictures of the Pentagon, the pictures of that gaping
hole in the ground in the field in Pennsylvania, and we all
remember the determination in the eyes of those firefighters
and those rescue workers who went into those infernos to save
people they did not know. It truly was a dreadful day in
America, and I think we will all recollect that on that day
each of us said to ourselves and collectively that never again
would we be caught unprepared. Never again would we send some
of our bravest citizens, our police, our firefighters, our
emergency crews into harm's way, unable to do the basic things
like communicate with one another. We said never again would we
allow security gaps to be exploited by those who seek to do us
harm.
We have learned a lot over the last 2 years about how
vulnerable we are to terrorist acts. Our eyes clearly were
opened on September 11th to the malice and the evil and the
capability of our enemies, and we also have learned that that
threat will not abate.
We have taken important steps over the past 2 years to
protect America. The men and women of our armed services and
intelligence services have dismantled the Taliban regime and
disrupted the senior leadership of al Qaeda. In Congress we
have taken measures to fortify our seaports, our borders,
overhaul airport security, provide intelligence and law
enforcement agencies with tools they need to track down
terrorists here and abroad.
We have also created the new Department of Homeland
Security in an effort to make America more secure. We must do
all that we can as a committee and as a Congress to ensure that
that Department is successful. Yet, we all know that much
remains to be done. It is the goal of this committee, a goal
that I share with the Chairman and every member, to ensure that
America is as secure as it can be. We must accept nothing less.
Today we are doing exactly what we as legislators must do;
that is, to learn everything we can about the failures that
enabled the attacks to occur 2 years ago, and then to take
absolutely every measure possible to prevent it from happening
again. This hearing is an important part of achieving that
goal.
We will hear from two very distinguished experts today
whose experience in how to prevent and prepare for, and, if the
worst befalls us, to respond to terrorist attacks have meant
much to all of us, and I am pleased to welcome each of our
witnesses.
Ms. Eleanor Hill comes highly regarded by both sides of the
aisle in directing the enormously challenging work of the
Congressional Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11. The report of that Inquiry led by our colleagues
Porter Goss, Jane Harman--who serves with us on this
committee--and minority leader Pelosi propose 19
recommendations to prevent further terrorist attacks. I have
read the report and I commend you on the work. And I look
forward to the thoughts of our witnesses today on how the
report's recommendations have been implemented over the past 8
months and what work remains to be done.
This committee stands ready to work alongside others to
make whatever change is necessary to meet the difficult
challenge of preventing and responding to terrorist attacks.
Governor Gilmore was studying and advocating for homeland
security before it became a household word. He presided over
four reports to date as Chairman of the Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and we look forward to the fifth
report. It is a testament to the value of these reports that
the Congress continues to reauthorize your work, Governor. I
look forward to hearing your testimony on the findings and
recommendations of the Gilmore Commission. Your recommendations
have already been incorporated in much of our thinking, and it
will be helpful to hear from you to allow you to discuss what
government organizational changes needed to be made now and
what investments we must make to improve our defenses.
Homeland security is not a partisan issue, it is an
American issue, and we all share the same goal: to do all we
can to prevent terrorist attacks and to fulfill our
constitutional duty to provide for the common defense.
Protecting America is the first responsibility of government,
and nothing else matters if we fail to achieve that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentleman.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JIM TURNER
Tomorrow our nation commemorates the attacks on America that
changed the history of our nation and the world. Today, and every day,
we honor the memories of those we lost by redoubling our resolve to do
all we can to protect America, said Congressman Jim Turner, Ranking
Member of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security.
Turner spoke before a meeting of the Committee to discuss the
results of the Joint Congressional Inquiry on the Attacks of September
11th.
We remember the horror of the Twin Towers, the Pentagon and the
crash in an open field in Pennsylvania. We remember the determination
on the faces of the firefighters and workers who entered the fiery
inferno in a valiant attempt to save people they did not know.
Never again, we said, would we be caught unprepared. Never again
would we send some of our bravest citizens--our police, firefighters
and emergency crews-into harm's way unable to communicate with one
another. Never again would we allow large gaps in our security that
could be exploited by those who seek us harm.
?It is our duty to move faster and stronger to protect America. We
have been told we are safer than we were on September 11, 2001. But
that is not the test we must pass. The question before us is ``Are we
as safe as we must be to protect the American people?''
Today's hearing is an important step in achieving that goal. We
will hear from two experts who have significant experience in
understanding how to best prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorist
attacks on our nation.
Today, we are doing exactly what we as legislators must do--learn
everything we can about the failures that enabled the attacks of two
years ago to succeed, and then take absolutely every measure in our
power to prevent them from happening again.
That is our solemn vow to the American people.
Chairman Cox. The Vice Chairwoman of the full committee,
the gentlelady from the State of Washington, Ms. Dunn, is
recognized for purposes of an opening statement.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome
our witnesses today and look forward to what they have to say.
We have come together today, on the eve of the second
anniversary of 9/11, determined to honor the lives lost on that
horrible day by continuing our discussion about how to best
ensure that we don't ever witness another September 11th, 2001.
The President and Congress have shown an unfaltering
commitment to this effort. Over $75 billion have been spent
making our airports safer, securing our seaports, protecting
our citizens against biological attacks. Everyone recognized
that reform was needed to coordinate overgrown Federal agencies
so that critical intelligence would no longer fall through the
cracks. On March 1st of this year, the Department of Homeland
Security came to life, harmonizing the efforts of 22 Federal
agencies all sharing a common mission to wage the war on terror
here at home.
The Department of Homeland Security's job is no small one.
This committee's role is to oversee the Department as it
organizes and spends resources to protect every aspect of
security on the homefront, and so far we have been successful.
There have been no further attacks on United States soil.
However, we know from reports issued by experts such as the
witnesses who sit before us today, as well as from firsthand
knowledge as an oversight committee, that there always is room
for more improvement. That is why we have made it a priority to
find out what is working well in this effort and what needs to
be changed in the first stages before we devote endless amounts
of resources.
Like any other Federal Government undertaking, our
oversight of DHS includes practicing fiscal responsibility and
continuing to look for the most efficient ways of getting money
from Washington, D.C. directly to the people who need it. This
committee must and always will be open to constructive
discussion about how the homeland security effort can be made
more efficient and more effective.
On this day we also recognize how far we have come in
securing America against terrorism, whether it be as we enter
the airport gate or as we walk our children to the baseball
stadium. The permanent safety of the American people is
paramount to any other responsibility of the Federal
Government, and Congress will continue to demonstrate, through
resources appropriated and responsible oversight of the
Department charged with carrying out that responsibility, our
commitment to this most critical duty.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today, and
I yield back.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlelady.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from the State of Washington,
Mr. Dicks, is recognized for purposes of an opening statement.
Mr. Dicks. I don't have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to reserve my time for additional questions.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman reserves his time, and the
Chair reminds all members that in lieu of making a 3-minute
opening statement, it is the member's option to add that time
to the 5-minute rule for purposes of questioning the witnesses
if you so desire.
Next in order of appearance, the Chair would recognize for
purposes of an opening statement the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Harman, if you wish to make an opening
statement.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. And as you do that, I want to thank you for
your role in the preparation of this report. And as I recognize
each of the members, including Chairman Goss who serves on this
committee, for the purposes of their opening statement, I will
do the same. But we are deeply indebted to you for your service
on this committee, because it will make our coordinating
function work so much better. Thank you for your service there
and here.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. I
would also note, as Ms. Hill knows, that the Joint Inquiry was
the product of 37 members, on a bicameral, bipartisan basis,
coming together to slog through the tough issues and to produce
something that is not only readable but extremely useful. Ms.
Hill had to do the hard work of getting it declassified, and I
think it would take too many hours to relate all those wars,
but the recommendations are very valuable, as are the
recommendations in the four Gilmore reports to date, which I
also have here, and the one to come, as are the recommendations
in a lot of other reports that are out there, one of which is
called the Bremer Commission. That was a commission on which I
served, and I just hope we all take advantage of the
information out there that highlights problems and directs us
to the right fixes.
Let me make one more comment, which is that on the way over
here, we all voted on a motion to instruct conferees on the
homeland security spending legislation. That vote was 347 to
74. The House can be a bipartisan place, let us remind
ourselves. What that instruction motion does is to instruct
conferees to take the highest possible level of funding and
also insist on the Markey amendment on screening all cargo
carried on passenger aircraft. I am very pleased that we were
able to find such a large margin to approve that motion to
instruct.
I just have a few brief comments in my remaining minute or
so, and the first is that good intelligence now more than ever
is the key to security, internationally and domestically.
Intelligence is crucial to preventing another deadly terrorist
attack on America and to winning the war on terrorism. It is
also crucial to persuading our citizens and other nations of
the correctness of our policies and actions.
With respect to the events of September 11, no one will
ever know what might have happened had more dots been connected
between the disparate pieces of information, but we do know now
of the systemic failures that caused a breakdown in our
intelligence systems, and we are on notice of what it will take
to fix those failures. And we haven't yet done enough.
The current instability in Iraq should instruct us that
good intelligence is more critical than ever in Iraq, and as
the Ranking Member on the House Intelligence Committee, I am
absolutely determined to complete our full and unbiased review
of what went wrong with prewar intelligence and to make sure we
fix the problem, not in the regular order, but immediately.
I see Mr. Gibbons here. He is another member of our
committee. We have a bipartisan culture there, and hopefully it
will work.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just say to you that this
committee has a huge opportunity, not just to make the
Department of Homeland Security work, which is a critical
assignment, but also to get it right in terms of the strategy
that we need to protect the homeland. More Americans will die
here if we have another major terrorist attack than will die
probably in Iraq or other places around the world. So we are
rightly focused here, and I commend you for holding this
hearing. Thank you.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentlelady.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. I would like to reserve my remarks.
Chairman Cox. All right. The Chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Goss, to whom this entire committee and the American people as
well, I am sure, owe a debt of gratitude for your work in
conducting this Joint Inquiry, the gentleman is recognized for
purposes of an opening statement.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to reserve
my time but extend some of that gratitude to Ms. Hill.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Michigan, the subcommittee
Chairman on Infrastructure and Border Protection, Mr. Camp.
Mr. Camp. I will reserve my time, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVE CAMP, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a brief statement and
begin by thanking our witnesses, Ms. Eleanor Hill and former Governor
Jim Gilmore, for joining us for this important hearing.
September 11th forced our nation to take stock of the international
threats and our vulnerabilities to those threats. The Gilmore
Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Joint Inquiry, along
with other government and private sector studies and working groups are
providing new ideas and proposals to address the problems identified by
the September 11th attacks.
Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, there has been a major
shift in focus on and within the Intelligence Community. Although
international terrorism has been a major concern for the last decade,
the Intelligence Community did not provide a specific warning of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Intelligence agencies face an enormous
challenge in acquiring information about the composition, location,
capabilities, plans, and ambitions of terrorist groups. Meeting this
challenge requires unique and specialized skills.
Counterterrorism requires strong human intelligence, the use of
agents to acquire information and, in certain circumstances, to carry
out covert actions. The importance of recruitment and training has been
highlighted and need continual support and attention from Congress.
Countering terrorism also requires close cooperation between law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. While the bureaucratic obstacles
that have previously hampered information sharing between different
intelligence agencies are being addressed, more work needs to be done,
while remaining watchful of civil liberty and privacy protections. The
network between federal intelligence agencies and our state and local
first responders can be strengthened.
Congress and the Administration created the Department of Homeland
Security a little over six months ago and tasked the new agency with
the large responsibility of intelligence analysis and evaluation.
While, DHS is still organizing and restructuring, Congress has the
responsibility to provide a clear framework to guide the unprecedented
and uncertain evolution of intelligence sharing and organization.
Today's hearing is another step in this oversight process.
I would again like to thank Ms. Hill and Governor Gilmore for their
participation and willingness to testify before the Select Committee on
Homeland Security. Your past experiences in evaluating and in-depth
analyses of the intelligence environment prior to the terrorist attacks
are of great value to this Committee.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Cox. Let me ask this. Does any member on this side
wish to be recognized for purposes of an opening statement?
Does any member on the minority side--oh, I am sorry. Mr.
Linder. No. I am sorry. Does any member on the minority side
wish to be recognized for purposes of an opening statement?
Mr. Pascrell wishes to be recognized and is recognized for
3 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The anniversary of the terror attacks against our American
family looms over us this week, its presence felt in everything
we do, but I am glad that, along with the congressional
tributes and remembrances, that this committee is focused on
specific issues and ideas designed to make Americans safer and
more secure from those who wish to bring us suffering and pain.
The victims of September the 11th came from 735 towns and
cities in 40 different States, all members of one American
family. My district, like so many others, lost wonderful
people, brothers and sisters and mothers and fathers, dear
friends. Fifty-four people from the Eighth Congressional
District died that day, so I take my role on this committee
very seriously, as all of you do. And it is with great
frustration that we sit here, 2 years after the attacks, with
much more still to do. There is still no single database or an
integrated list of suspected terrorists for the worldwide use
of intelligence officers, Federal, State and local law
enforcement, border inspectors and immigration officials. State
and local law enforcement officials, at least in my district,
currently receive inadequate levels of information from the
Federal Government. And there is still no threat vulnerability
assessment. Yet, we are spending money, perhaps much of it
being misused.
These are things that must be completed. One could argue
that all other items on the agenda should not have been up for
discussion until we took care of these national security needs
earlier. So before us today are two distinguished professional
people who have given up large portions of their lives to study
homeland security. I appreciate their willingness to be before
us today.
In the report, Mr. Chairman, on page 5 in the Executive
Summary, we talk about the Intelligence Community failed to
capitalize on both the individual and collective significance.
And I take issue with that, because the Intelligence Committee
really is a reflection of those in Washington who determine
foreign policy for this Nation. And it would seem to me that if
we are going to direct criticism at that Intelligence
Committee, we ought to be a lot more careful in examining the
very foreign policy which created and precipitated terror
throughout this country and continues to do throughout this
world.
A foreign policy to a point should not be color-blind,
culturally blind, or spiritually blind. And if it is, we must
understand what the consequences may be. What in foreign policy
stimulated perhaps and precipitated terror? What in our foreign
policy continues to do that? And I mean this for both political
parties.
Which leads me to a final point, Mr. Chairman, if I may.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Pascrell. I make a suggestion to this committee that we
change what we look like. And my suggestion today through the
Chair, and not for discussion but hopefully would be
considered, that this committee which is statutorily--which
statutorily exists, fashion itself after the Ethics Committee,
which is the only other committee that I know of in the
Congress of the United States which is split 50-50 where we
have co-chairmanships. If the issue of protecting our children
and our grandchildren and our neighborhoods is so significant--
and I believe it is, and all of us here think that it is--then
this committee should be absolutely bipartisan and we should
have shared chairmanships in order to move on. This is a
disservice to the majority and a disservice to the minority
where we move more political than in the public's interest, Mr.
Chairman, and I ask that this be taken under consideration at a
proper time.
Chairman Cox. I appreciate the gentleman's suggestion. The
gentleman's time is expired.
Chairman Cox. Does any other member on the minority side
seek to be recognized? The gentlelady from New York, Mrs.
Lowey, is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join
you in welcoming our witnesses, and we look forward to your
testimony.
Tomorrow many of us will return home to commemorate
September 11th in our communities, and as I meet with my
constituents, with first responders and doctors, school
superintendents and parents, those families and that day are
always in our minds.
Today we will discuss opportunities and challenges to
increase homeland security, but we must remember the people we
represent, and on Sept. 11th as today, our communities depend
first and foremost on firefighters and police to protect them
and to help them in times of crisis. And I believe it is the
responsibility of this Congress to make sure that local
communities are prepared to prevent or respond to an attack.
So as we look through this material, we always have to keep
our local communities in mind. And with this hearing, I hope we
have time to address intelligence as it relates to local
communities. It is extremely important that first responders be
integrated into our national intelligence network, and this has
been discussed at previous meetings, but with the information I
have to date, it has not been done effectively.
So as far as I am concerned, it is important that they can
also contribute to intelligence gathering, prevention and
response to an attack in ways that are both smart and
effective. They must be able to communicate quickly with
Federal, State, and other local officials in order to have a
clear understanding of the situation and to react in the best
and fastest possible way.
And there are many lessons, as we know, that we learned
about September 11th. Let's have no doubt that one of the most
important one centers on people; within the buildings and
cities targeted on September 11th were people from all over the
world. Our community, the idea of America, was attacked. We are
here today to make our country better prepared, and to do that
we must make sure that our communities are better prepared.
So I want to thank the witnesses once again for joining us,
and I will save the balance of my time for questions. Thank
you.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentlelady.
Chairman Cox. Who seeks recognition?
Ms. Slaughter. Mr. Chairman, I have an opening statement,
but in the interest of time I would ask unanimous consent to
just insert it in the record.
Chairman Cox. By all means. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
With this anniversary, we remember one of the greatest tragedies in
our nation's history. We commemorate the three thousand innocent lives
that were lost when terrorists murdered in the name of hate. We pay
tribute to the bravery and courage displayed by the first responders
who served in New York City, at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania. We
pray for the families who lost loved ones on that terrible day.
From the calamity emerged strength, hope and an outpouring of
charity that could happen only in America. All Americans came together
to support each other and aid victims. In my district, thousands opened
their hearts to help the harmed. Without a second thought, dozens of
firefighters, paramedics and other first responders rushed to New York
City. Ordinary citizens got in their cars and drove for hours to offer
their help.
Businesses and citizens gave whatever they could. Wegman's Food
Markets literally sent tons of food and supplies to New York City.
LaRocca's restaurant in Rochester opened up on their day off and gave
all their profits to the Red Cross. Mitchell Green, a 5-year-old from
Rochester, raised $50 for the Red Cross by selling American flags he
printed out. Hundreds of other children in Western New York collected
pennies, washed cars or sold lemonade to raise money for victims.
Acts likes these helped our nation to emerge stronger and more full
of pride than ever before. We stand unified in the war against terror
and the battle to protect/maintain America's freedom.
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Even as we pause to
remember so must we move forward. Duty obliges us to prepare, prevent,
and protect. This committee and this Congress must remain ever vigilant
in our ongoing efforts to secure this great nation. Thank you for
taking the time to appear before us today and share the results of your
hard work.
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from--oh, I am sorry, Mr.
Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask--
Chairman Cox. Mr. Etheridge is recognized for 5 minutes for
purposes of an opening statement.
Mr. Etheridge. I ask unanimous consent that the balance of
my statement be included in the record.
Chairman Cox. Without objection.
Mr. Etheridge. I have a brief opening statement.
Let me welcome our witnesses today, and like all Americans
I will never forget the experience of 9/11 and where I was. We
were having our annual meeting of roughly 200 business people
from North Carolina who were here in Washington that day, and
they were in a seminar at the time that a plane crashed into
the World Trade Center. I remember seeing with my own eyes the
smoke pouring out of the Pentagon as we walked out of the
building to evacuate it. And I will never forget the sight of
that proud building, which represents so much of our Nation's
strength, charred and wounded. Among all of us there was fear
for our own situation and grief for those that we had lost, but
there was an underlying defiance that we would never be
cowered.
Since then, Congress has made great strides in our efforts
to protect our Nation. Last year we passed a Homeland Security
Act which established the Department of Homeland Security. This
year saw the formation of this Select Committee on Homeland
Security which has been charged with the oversight of that
newly created Department.
However, my service on this committee has given me the
opportunity here in all of the evolution of the Department and
meet with many first responders, as my colleague first talked
about, and we need to do more in this area. We aren't doing as
much as we need to. I am afraid that our progress is slowing,
and other events are drawing attention away from the critical
need to secure our Nation from terrorist threats.
Ms. Hill has appropriately pointed out that the
administration has not learned the right lessons from the al
Qaeda terrorists. The American people deserve to know that the
leaders of the Federal Government are taking all appropriate
actions to protect them from harm, and this administration's
effort has been inadequate thus far.
Recent news reports as well of the two distinguished
witnesses today clearly indicate the need to make the Select
Committee on Homeland Security permanent, and clarifies
jurisdiction and oversight function. And I would trust the
leadership of this House would move forward and ensure that
this body will be permanent and empower the committee to carry
out its necessary functions.
I will reserve the balance of my time and insert the
balance in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. BOB ETHERIDGE
Thank you, Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner, for giving
members of the Homeland Security Committee the opportunity to speak
about our experiences on 9/11 and share some thoughts on the progress
our nation has made in the areas of domestic security.
Like all Americans, I will never forget my experiences on 9/11. We
were in the middle of our annual Washington meeting with members of
North Carolina's business community. There were about 200 people from
across North Carolina in a seminar with us, when we learned that a
plane had crashed into the World Trade Center.
I remember seeing with my own eyes the smoke pouring out of the
Pentagon. I will never forget the sight of that proud building, which
represents so much of our nation's strength, charred and wounded. Among
all of us, there was fear for our own situation and grief for those who
had been lost, but there was an underlying defiance that we would not
be cowered.
Since then Congress has made great strides in its effort to protect
our nation. Last year we passed the Homeland Security Act which
established the Department of Homeland Security. This year saw the
formation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, which was
charged with oversight of the newly created Department. It is an honor
to join so many other distinguished members of the House and to serve
under the solid leadership of Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner.
However, my service on this Committee has given me the opportunity
to hear a follow the evolution of the Department of Homeland Security
and meet with first responders from all over my state. I'm afraid that
our progress is slowing, and other events are drawing attention away
from the critical need to secure our nation from terrorist threats.
Ms. Hill has appropriately pointed out that the Administration
still has not learned the right lessons about the Al Qaida terrorists.
The American people deserve to know that the leaders of the federal
government are taking all appropriate actions to protect them from
harm, and this Administration's effort has been inadequate at best.
Recent news reports, as well as the reports of the two
distinguished witnesses today clearly indicate the need to make the
Select Committee on Homeland Security permanent and clarify its
jurisdictional and oversight functions once and for all.
Unfortunately, the Republican leadership in the House has failed to
provide the assurance that this body will permanently empower the
Committee to carry out these necessary functions.
On Sunday the President indicated that terrorists continue to
threaten our nation, so we must put aside our differences and give this
committee the authority it needs to provide effective oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security's critical functions.
I also want to take this opportunity to mention the need for our
leaders to recognize the danger terrorists pose to our nation's
agricultural system and food supply. A bioterror attack could have
devastating and far-reaching consequences on our nation's economy.
Although people would not lose their lives, the impact on the
agricultural and transportation systems could bring our economy to its
knees, and it is already crouching now.
Agriculture is hugely important to North Carolina and this nation,
and I want this committee to conduct a field hearing in my district to
hear from folks on the front lines of what could be one of our most
vulnerable soft targets for terrorist attack.
Finally, I would like to close by thanking our witnesses for their
testimony here today, and to remember the victims, and heroes of that
tragic day two years ago.
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia,
Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, is recognized for purposes of
an opening statement for 3 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome
today's witnesses and look forward to clarifications from them
in light of their most important reports.
9/11 is likely to be for this generation what the
assassination of President Kennedy was for my generation. That
is to say, the event by which other events will be measured,
the event that makes you ask where were you on that date. But I
know where I was: with three school children and three teachers
who went down in that plane in the Pentagon along with a
significant number of other D.C. residents, the school children
and the teachers who were being rewarded for good marks and for
service to their schools.
Of course today we are told that we should direct ourselves
to the threat against our homeland in Iraq. Maybe so. But this
committee is going to be held accountable for vulnerabilities
to the homeland right under our nose. That is why the two
reports are so important.
I want to raise two issues right under our noses, not in a
faraway land, that concern me and that are simply
representative, I think, of the plethora of outstanding issues:
the absence of clear intelligence priorities based on threats
and vulnerabilities. What am I to do when the security chief at
Union Station comes to see me and says that there is nothing
that has been done about security in the train system? The
station is the center of the commuter train travel across
boundaries. He talks about tracks, passengers, cargo. How am I
to assess whether that--whether we are where we should be in
that regard, with no sense of what the priorities in homeland
security are in the first place? I can't tell him, well, we are
going to get to that. I can't tell him that is happening. This
is the kind of problem that I think that--and he comes to see
me in part because I am a member of the Homeland Security
Committee.
Or, let's take charter service. It is down in this region.
But generally it is a part of airline service. We haven't even
gotten to that yet. When are we going to get to it? Where does
it stand in the priorities?
Or, you look at television, and somebody says that there is
construction and an airport is wide open. Very different from
if you happen to be an employee at the airport. How am I to
measure whether that is good or bad if there are no priorities
that exist that I can point to that I know we are getting to or
we have gotten there?
Finally, let me say a word about watchlists. If you happen
to represent the Nation's Capital, you live here and you know
that 2 years after 9/11 there still isn't any database of
suspected terrorists from around the world, you really don't
feel safer than you did on 9/11. I don't want to oversimplify
this, but we are not asking that all the terrorists in the
world be identified, just that they be put in one place on the
same list, and that local and State officials have access to
them. I know this is more than pushing a button or doing a
computer run, but it does seem to me that 2 years later, one
list somewhere where local law enforcement officers or people
at ports of entry can go to is not too much to ask.
Those are representative of the kind of tasks, issues, that
I think need to be raised here this afternoon. And I thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentlelady.
Chairman Cox. Does any other member seek recognition?
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to--
Chairman Cox. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 3 minutes for
purposes of an opening statement.
Mr. Langevin. Could I just ask unanimous consent to insert
my statement into the record?
Chairman Cox. All members are advised that the record will
be left open for the balance of the week, until the close of
business on Friday, for purposes of additions to the record.
Without objection.
Chairman Cox. Does any other member seek recognition? If
not, I invite our witnesses to the table. And while our
witnesses are taking their seats, I want to thank all of the
members of this committee--Mr. Goss, Ms. Harman, Mr. Boehlert,
Mr. Gibbons-- who served on the Joint Inquiry for your work in
getting us to this point. We look very much forward, Governor
Gilmore, Ms. Hill, to your testimony today.
Normally we ask that witness statements be limited to 5
minutes, but by prior arrangement with the committee, Ms. Hill,
your testimony is going to be summarized in something more like
7 to 8 minutes. Take the time that you think is necessary for
that purpose, because this is an important topic.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ELEANOR HILL, STAFF DIRECTOR, JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE INQUIRY
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have--
Chairman Cox. We need your microphone.
Ms. Hill. Thank you. I have a long written statement which
I would like to offer to be included for the record, but I am
going to try to briefly summarize it.
Part of the hazards of writing a report that is 800 pages
and is full of facts is that it is very difficult to summarize
that in a few minutes, but I think I can do that.
So with that preface, good afternoon, Chairman Cox, Ranking
Member Turner, and members of the committee. I appreciate your
invitation to discuss with you the final report of the Joint
Inquiry by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees which,
as you know, focused on the activities of the Intelligence
Community as they related to the terrorist attacks of September
11th and, as such, is clearly relevant to your focus on
homeland security.
Several members of this committee, as you know--Mr. Goss,
Ms. Harman, Mr. Boehlert and Mr. Gibbons--also served on our
Joint Inquiry. They have considerable familiarity with these
issues, and I am sure they will prove tremendously helpful to
you as this committee considers how to best apply the lessons
of September 11 to the challenges of homeland security.
Our unclassified version of the Joint Inquiry's report was
released on July 24th, 2003, and it numbers over 800 pages in
length. That report was the culmination of a tremendous and I
believe unprecedented amount of joint work and joint effort by
two permanent congressional committees, which included review
of 500,000 pages of relevant documents, investigative
interviews and discussions with over 600 individuals, testimony
and evidence produced at 13 closed sessions of the two
committees, and 9 public hearings and nearly 7 months of
difficult and often frustrating declassification negotiations
with the Intelligence Community.
From the outset, the inquiry faced considerable, even
daunting challenges: a huge amount of investigative work in a
limited time frame, undertaken by two House and Senate
committees with a single nonpartisan investigative staff,
during a period of unquestioned national crisis, emotional
upheaval, and open skepticism about the effectiveness and the
objectivity of a congressional review. Given all those
circumstances, any chance of success would have been impossible
absent strong, steady, and committed leadership at the helm.
In the House we were very fortunate to have Chairman Goss
and Ranking Member Pelosi, and, in the Senate, Chairman Graham
and Vice Chairman Shelby. I cannot tell you how important their
support and their constant determination to work together was
to our ability to uncover the facts and to achieve bipartisan
consensus on recommendations.
Let me just say a few words about Chairman Goss, who is a
member of your committee and is here this afternoon, and with
whom I have had the very great pleasure and privilege of
working throughout the course of this Joint Inquiry. Much of
the Inquiry's success can be and should be credited to his very
hard work, his unflagging support, and his strong commitment to
follow the facts thoroughly and objectively throughout the
entire effort. In short, he made my job far easier, and I thank
him again for his help and support.
With that, let me skip over some of this and focus on three
of the repeated themes that I think run through the systemic
findings. My statement goes into much more detail as to the
factual systemic findings and also the recommendations.
The report does have 16, what we term systemic findings,
which identify and explain systemic weaknesses that the
committees felt hindered the Intelligence Community's
counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11th. Many of those
findings relate in whole or in part to three problem areas
that, at least in my view, are critically important and
repeatedly surface throughout the course of the Inquiry. Those
three are a lack of access to relevant information, a lack of
adequate focus on the terrorist threat to the domestic United
States, and a lack of sufficient quality in both analytic and
investigative efforts.
On the topic of access, even the best intelligence will
prove worthless if our Intelligence Community is unable to
deliver that intelligence to those who need it in time for them
to act on it. The report finds that within the community,
agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism
information for a host of reasons, including differences in
missions, legal authorities, and agency cultures.
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted
between Intelligence Community agencies and other Federal
agencies as well as State and local authorities. The report
contains numerous examples of these problems. The information
on al-Midhar and al-Hazmi's travel to the United States,
despite numerous opportunities, never reached the San Diego FBI
in time for them to capitalize on their informant's contacts
with the two hijackers.
Prior to September 11th, the Phoenix electronic
communication was not shared with the FBI agents handling
Zacarias Moussaoui or with the FBI agent whose informant knew
that al-Hazmi was taking flight training in Arizona which, of
course, was part of the subject of of the Phoenix memo.
The Phoenix memo was also not shared even with the FAA. The
FAA also did not receive all of the intelligence reporting on
the possible use of aircraft as weapons. The CIA also did not
provide the State Department with almost 1,500 terrorism-
related intelligence reports until after September 11th. Other
nonintelligence Federal agencies as well as State and local
authorities complained about their lack of access to relevant
intelligence. Even Intelligence Community analysts complained
about their inability to have access to raw but highly relevant
intelligence information held within other Intelligence
Community agencies.
Lack of focus. Even in instances where relevant information
was available, there was a lack of sufficient focus on the bin
Laden threat to the domestic United States.
The report concludes that the U.S. foreign intelligence
agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for a
domestic attack, and that, at home, counterterrorism efforts
suffered from the lack of an effective domestic intelligence
capability.
Again, examples are plentiful in the report. While the DCI
had declared war on bin Laden in December of 1998, the Director
of the National Security Agency at the time told the Inquiry
that he believed, quote, ``The DCI was speaking for CIA only.''
The report found that prior to September 11th neither the FBI
nor NSA focused on the importance of identifying and then
ensuring coverage of communications between the United States
and suspected terrorist facilities abroad. And the report goes
on to state that, in fact, we now know that one of the
hijackers did communicate with a known terrorist facility in
the Middle East while he was living in the United States.
Former Secretary of Defense John Hame told the Inquiry that
he could not recall ever seeing an intelligence report on the
existence of terrorist sleeper cells in the United States. He
noted, ``We thought we were dealing in important things, but we
missed the domestic threat from international terrorism.''
Former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Richard
Clark, stated that when he visited FBI field offices to
increase their focus on al Qaeda, quote, ``I got sort of blank
looks of what is al Qaeda.'' The FBI counterterrorism agent
responsible for the informant that had contacts with the
hijackers told the Inquiry he never discussed bin Laden or al
Qaeda with that informant before September 11th, because that
was, quote, ``not an issue in terms of my assignments.''
The former chief of the Counterterrorist Center's bin Laden
unit testified that between 1996 and 1999, ``the rest of the
CIA and the Intelligence Community looked on our efforts as
eccentric and at times fanatic.''
Finally, lack of quality. The report cites quality problems
in two critically important areas: analysis and investigation.
In analysis, the report concludes that there was a dearth of
creative, aggressive analysis targeting bin Laden and a
persistent inability to comprehend the collective significance
of individual pieces of intelligence. There was little or no
analytic focus on, for example, reports about terrorist
interests in aircraft as weapons and reports on the likelihood
that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was recruiting individuals for
terrorist activity within the United States.
The former FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism,
quote, ``could not recall any instance where the FBI
headquarters' Terrorism Analytic Unit produced an actual
product that helped out.''
Richard Clark testified that the FBI, quote, ``never
provided analysis to us even when we asked for it, and I don't
think that throughout that 10-year period we had any analytical
capability of what was going on in this country.''
In investigations, the report concluded that the FBI was
unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of
activity by al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups
operating in the United States. While in the United States, a
number of hijackers successfully eluded FBI detection despite
their interaction with subjects of FBI counterterrorism
investigations. Even after the CIA watch-listed al-Midhar and
al-Hazmi on August 23, 2001, there was less than and all-out
investigative effort to locate what amounted to two bin Laden
associated terrorists in the United States during a period when
the terrorist threat level had escalated to a peak level.
While the Inquiry found, in its own review of CIA and FBI
documents, information suggesting specific sources of foreign
support for some of the hijackers while they were in the United
States, CIA and FBI officials were unable to definitively
address the extent or the nature of such support despite the
serious national security implications of that information. The
FBI Director acknowledged that it was the Joint Inquiry's
report that brought some of these facts, which were found in
CIA and FBI documents, to his attention.
The Inquiry referred this material to the FBI and CIA for
further investigation, and the report notes that only recently
and in part due to the Inquiry's focus on the issue did the CIA
and FBI strengthen efforts in those areas.
In closing, let me underscore the importance of the thought
conveyed by the title of today's hearing, ``Perspectives on 9/
11: Building Effectively on Hard Lessons.'' Those of us
associated with the Joint Inquiry are convinced that there is
indeed much to be learned from the story of September 11th,
both for the Intelligence Community and for our Nation. The
lessons are hard, they are bitter, and they are tragic, but the
importance of their message is undeniable. They are our
clearest road back to a far safer and brighter future for all
Americans. The Joint Inquiry's report can, I believe, serve as
an excellent road map for that journey.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be, obviously, glad to
answer any questions.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Ms. Hill.
[The statement of Ms. Hill follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ELEANOR HILL
Good afternoon, Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, and Members of
the Committee. I very much appreciate your invitation to discuss with
you the Final Report of the Joint Inquiry by the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees. That Inquiry focused on the activities of the
Intelligence Community as they related to the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001 and, as such, is clearly relevant to this
Committee's focus on homeland security. Several Members of this
Committee--Mr. Goss, Ms. Harman, Mr. Boehlert, and Mr. Gibbons--also
served on the Joint Inquiry. Their considerable familiarity with these
issues will also, I am sure, prove tremendously helpful as this
Committee considers how to best apply the lessons of September 11th to
the challenges of homeland security.
As you know, on July 24, 2003, an unclassified version of the Joint
Inquiry's Report, numbering over 800 pages in length, was publicly
released. That Report was the culmination of a tremendous, and
unprecedented, amount of joint work and joint effort by two permanent
Congressional Committees, including: the review of 500,000 pages of
relevant documents; investigative interviews and discussions with over
600 individuals; testimony and evidence produced at 13 closed sessions
and 9 public hearings; and nearly seven months of difficult and often
frustrating declassification negotiations with the Intelligence
Community. I served as the Joint Inquiry's staff director and, as a
result, this report, and the investigation and hearings on which it is
based, consumed most of my focus and my life for the last year. It was,
in all respects, an intense and extraordinary experience for me. I am,
in short, grateful and glad to have been a part of the Committees'
historic and bipartisan effort to move the country forward, in a
constructive manner, from the trauma of September 11th.
From the outset, the Inquiry faced considerable, even daunting,
challenges: a huge amount of investigative work in a limited timeframe,
undertaken by two House and Senate Committees with a single nonpartisan
investigative staff, during a period of unquestioned national crisis,
emotional upheaval, and open skepticism about the effectiveness and
objectivity of a Congressional review. Given all those circumstances,
any chance for success would have been impossible absent strong,
steady, and committed leadership at the helm: - in the House, we were
fortunate to have Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Pelosi, and, in the
Senate, Chairman Graham and Vice Chairman Shelby. I cannot tell you how
important their support and their determination to work together was to
our ability to uncover the facts and to achieve bipartisan consensus on
recommendations of substance for needed reform. Let me say just a few
words about Chairman Goss, who also serves on this Committee, and with
whom I have had the great pleasure and privilege of working throughout
the course of the Joint Inquiry. Much of the Inquiry's success can be
credited to his hard work, his unflagging support, and his strong
commitment to ``follow the facts'' thoroughly and objectively
throughout the entire effort. In short, he made my job far easier and I
thank him again for his help and his support.
Let me now turn to the unclassified version of the Joint Inquiry's
Report, which is the focus of today's hearing. As I mentioned, the
Report is quite lengthy and sets forth numerous findings and
recommendations, along with a considerable amount of supporting
discussion and factual detail. My testimony is intended to highlight,
as you requested, some of the Report's central themes and some, but not
necessarily all, of the findings and recommendations. For a more
complete picture, I encourage the Members of this Committee to read the
findings, discussion, and recommendations sections of the Report.
Taken together, those findings and recommendations reflect, to a
large degree, the Joint Inquiry's three principal goals:
- Determine what the Intelligence Community knew or should have
known prior to September 11th, regarding the international terrorist
threat to the United States, including the scope and nature of any
possible terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests;
- Identify any systemic problems that may have impeded the
Intelligence Community's ability to discover and prevent the September
11th attacks in advance; and
- Make recommendations for reform to correct those problems and
thus improve the Intelligence Community's ability to prevent similar
attacks in the future.
Factual Findings
The Report begins with a series of ``factual findings'', which
speak to the question of what the Intelligence Community did or did not
know, or should have known, prior to September 11th, 2001, regarding
the attacks. Supported by discussions of specific facts, documents, and
testimony compiled by the Inquiry, these findings include:
- While the Community had amassed a great deal of valuable
intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities,
none of it identified the time, place and specific nature of the
September 11th attacks. While there was no single ``smoking gun'', the
Report confirms that the Community had various other information that
was both relevant and significant;
- During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community
experienced a significant increase in the information indicating that
Bin Ladin intended to strike United States interests in the very near
future. The National Security Agency (NSA), for example, reported at
least 33 communications indicating a possible, imminent terrorist
attack in 2001. Senior U.S Government officials were advised by the
Intelligence Community on June 28 and July 10, 200l, for example, that
the attacks were expected to ``have dramatic consequences on
governments or cause major casualties'' and that ``[a]ttack
preparations have been made.'' An August 2001 Assessment by the DCI's
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) reported: ``for every UBL operative that
we stop, an estimated 50 operatives slip through our loose net
undetected. Based on recent arrest, it is clear that UBL is building up
a worldwide infrastructure which will allow him to launch multiple and
simultaneous attacks with little or no warning''. Some Community
personnel described the 2001 increase in threat reporting as
unprecedented;
- Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady stream
of reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within
the United States. A 1998 intelligence report, for example, suggested
``UBL is planning attacks in the U.S. [---------] says plans are to
attack in NY and Washington. Information mentions an attack in
Washington probably against public places. UBL probably places a high
priority on conducting attacks in the U.S. ...CIA has little
information on UBL operatives in the U.S.'' In August 2001, a closely
held intelligence report for senior government officials advised that
al-Qa'ida members had resided in or traveled to the United States for
years and maintained a support structure here. The same report
included, among other things, FBI judgments about patterns of activity
consistent with hijackings or other forms of attacks as well as
information acquired in May 2001 that indicated a group of Bin Ladin
supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives.
Nonetheless, the predominant Community view, during the spring and
summer of 2001, was that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would occur
overseas. The FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism,
for example, testified that, in 2001, he thought there was a ``98
percent'' chance that the attack would be overseas;
- From at least 1994, the Community had received information
indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of
attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. In 1998, for example,
information was received about a Bin Ladin operation that would involve
flying an explosive-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and, in summer
2001, about a plot to bomb a U.S. embassy from an airplane or crash an
airplane into it. There was also information suggesting Bin Ladin's
interest in targeting civil aviation within the United States. In 1998,
for example, intelligence information indicated that ``...member of UBL
was planning operations against U.S. targets. Plans to hijack U.S.
aircraft proceeding well. Two individuals [-------------] had
successfully evaded checkpoints in a dry run at a NY airport.'' This
kind of information did not, however, stimulate any specific
Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. government
reaction to, the possible use of aircraft as weapons in a terrorist
attack;
- Although, prior to September 11th, relevant information that is
significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was available to the
Intelligence Community, the Community failed to focus on that
information and to appreciate its collective significance in terms of a
probable terrorist attack. As a result, the Report concludes that the
Community missed opportunities to disrupt the September 11th plot by
denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least try to
unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work
within the United States, and to generate a heightened state of alert
and thus harden the homeland against attack. The Report details the
information which the Community failed to capitalize on, including:
- information, which lay dormant within the Community for as long
as 18 months, that two Bin Ladin associated terrorists would likely
travel to the United States. The two were Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi, who would ultimately be among the hijackers that crashed
American Flight 77 into the Pentagon on September 11th. Although the
CIA knew in January 2000 of al-Mihdhar's likely travel to the United
States and in March 2000 of travel to the United States by al-Hazmi,
the CIA missed repeated opportunities to act on this information and
did not watch list those individuals until August 23, 2001. Despite
providing the FBI with other, less critical information about the
Malaysia meeting of al Qa'ida associates attended by the hijackers, the
CIA did not advise the FBI of their travel to the U.S. until August 23,
2001. The DCI acknowledged in his testimony that CIA personnel ``did
not recognize the implications of the information about al-Hazmi and
al-Mihdhar that they had in their files''. A CIA analyst told the
Inquiry that he did not tell New York FBI agents, whom he met with in
June 2001, about al-Mihdhar's and al-Hazmi's travel to the United
States, because the information ``did not mean anything'' to him, since
he was interested in terrorist connections to Yemen;
- during the summer of 2000, a longtime FBI counterterrorism
informant had numerous contacts with hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi,
while they were living in San Diego, California. The same FBI informant
apparently had more limited contact with a third hijacker, Hani
Hanjour, in December 2000. The San Diego FBI office, which handled the
informant, did not receive, prior to September 11th, any of the
intelligence information on al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi that the CIA had as
early as January 2000 and that FBI headquarters had in August 2001. The
FBI agent responsible for the informant testified that, had he had such
information, he would have canvassed sources, found the hijackers, and
``given them the full court press? in terms of investigation and
surveillance. He believes he could have uncovered the hijackers''
future plans through investigative work. The Report concludes that
``the informant's contacts with the hijackers, had they been
capitalized on, would have given the San Diego FBI field office perhaps
the Intelligence Community's best chance to unravel the September 11th
plot;
- information indicating, prior to September 11th, the existence of
an al-Qa'ida support network inside the United States. Consistent with
that information, the Report illustrates not only the reliance of at
least some of the hijackers on the potential support network, but also
the ease with which they operated despite the FBI's pre-- September
11th domestic coverage. While former National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger testified that the FBI had advised policymakers that ``al-Qa'ida
had limited capacity to operate in the United States and [that] any
presence here was under [FBI] surveillance'', the Report confirms that
at least some of the hijackers operated well within the scope of the
FBI's coverage of radical Islamic extremists within the United States
and yet completely eluded FBI detection. Several hijackers, including
Hani Hanjour, Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and
Khalid al-Mihdhar may have had contact with a total of 14 people who
had come to the FBI's attention during counterterrorism or
counterintelligence investigations prior to September 11, 2001. Four of
those fourteen were the subjects of active FBI investigations during
the time the hijackers were in the United States. In one of those
cases, the FBI closed the investigation despite the individual's
contacts with other subjects of counterterrorism investigations and
despite reports concerning the individual's ties to suspect
organizations. In another case, the FBI closed its investigation of one
of the hijackers' contacts during a phone interview, after the
individual said it would be a ``strain'' to travel to Los Angeles for a
personal interview and declined to give the FBI his home address;
- the July 2001 ``Phoenix Electronic Communication'', in which an
FBI agent expressed concerns that there was a coordinated effort
underway by Bin Ladin to send students to the United States for civil
aviation training. In the EC, the agent expressed his suspicion that
this was an effort to establish a cadre of individuals in civil
aviation who would conduct future terrorist activity. Despite the high
threat level in the summer of 2001, this communication generated almost
no interest at FBI headquarters or at the FBI's New York field office.
In fact, one of the individuals named in the Phoenix EC was arrested in
2002 at an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Pakistan with Abu Zubaida. The Report
concludes that the Phoenix EC, produced by an FBI field agent rather
than a ``seasoned'' Intelligence Community analyst, was the best
example of the creative, imaginative and aggressive analysis of
relevant intelligence that this review has found;
- the investigation and arrest, in August 2001, of Zacarias
Moussaoui, whom Minneapolis FBI agents suspected was involved in a
hijacking plot, possibly involving ``a larger conspiracy'' to seize
control of an airplane. At the time, CIA stations were advised that
Moussaoui was a ``suspect airline suicide attacker'' ``who might be
involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to
the U.S.'' The FBI agents investigating Moussaoui knew nothing about
the Phoenix Communication or al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. The FBI agent who
wrote the Phoenix Communication had never heard about Moussaoui or the
two future hijackers. Neither FBI headquarters nor the DCI's
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) linked the information about Moussaoui to
the elevated threat warnings in the summer of 2001, to the Phoenix
Communication's suspicions about Bin Ladin's interest in civil aviation
training or to information available on August 23, 2001, that two Bin
Ladin operatives had entered the United States; and
- information linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now believed to
be the mastermind of the September 11th attacks, to Bin Ladin, to
terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity
in the United States. CIA documents in June 2001 indicated that KSM
``was recruiting persons to travel to the United States and engage in
planning terrorist-related activity here. [----------], these persons
would be `expected to establish contact with individuals already living
there.' '' The documents also noted that KSM ``continued to travel
frequently to the United States, including as recently as May 2001''.
The Report concludes that this information did not ``mobilize'' the
Community and that the ``Community devoted few analytic or operational
resources to tracking KSM or understanding his activities. Coordination
within the Community was irregular at best, and the little information
that was shared was usually forgotten or dismissed.'' His role in the
September 11th attacks was a ``surprise'' to the Community and the CIA
and FBI were unable to confirm whether he had in fact been traveling to
the United States in the months before September 11th.
Systemic Findings
The Report also includes sixteen ``systemic findings'' which
identify and explain those systemic weaknesses that hindered the
Intelligence Community's counterterrorism efforts prior to September
11th. Some of these findings address specific shortcomings in various
aspects of Intelligence Community counterterrorist efforts, such as the
inability of the Community to develop and use human sources to
penetrate the al-Qa'ida inner circle; the Community's excessive
reliance on foreign liaison services; difficulties with FBI
applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
surveillance; a reluctance to develop and implement new technical
capabilities aggressively; a shortage of language specialists and
language-qualified field officers and backlogs in materials awaiting
translations; and a reluctance to track terrorist funding and close
down terrorist financial support networks. Many of the systemic
findings relate, in whole or in part, to three problem areas that, in
my view, are critically important and repeatedly surfaced throughout
the course of the Inquiry: a lack of access to relevant information; a
lack of adequate focus on the terrorist threat to the domestic United
States; and a lack of sufficient quality in both analytic and
investigative efforts.
Lack of Access
Even the best intelligence will prove worthless if our Intelligence
Community is unable to deliver that intelligence to those who need it
in time for them to act on it. The Report finds that within the
Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant
counterterrorism information for a host of reasons, including
differences in missions, legal authorities, and agency cultures.
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted between
Intelligence Community agencies and other federal agencies as well as
state and local authorities. Unquestionably, this breakdown in
communication deprived those other entities, as well as the
Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable information
in the ``war'' against Bin Ladin.
The Report contains numerous examples of these problems. The
information on al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi's travel to the United States,
despite numerous opportunities, never reached the San Diego FBI in time
for them to capitalize on their informant's contacts with the two
hijackers. Ironically, the CIA employee who, in January 2000, briefed
FBI personnel about al-Mihdhar, but not about his visa and potential
travel to the United States, told the Inquiry that his assignment, at
the time, was to fix problems ``in communicating between the CIA and
the FBI''. The FBI agent responsible for the informant, in his
testimony, candidly described information sharing problems between the
FBI and CIA: ``If I had to rate it on a ten-point scale, I'd give them
a 2 or 1.5 in terms of sharing information....Normally,...you have some
information you want the Agency to check on. You end up writing it up,
sending it back through electronic communications or teletype,...or
memo...And then the Bureau, FBI headquarters, runs it across the street
to the Agency. And then, maybe six months, eight months, a year later,
you might get some sort of response.''
Prior to September 11th, the Phoenix EC was not shared with the FBI
agents handling Zacarias Moussaoui, or with the FBI agent whose
informant knew that al-Hazmi was taking flight training in Arizona, or
even with the FAA. In fact, FAA officials first learned of the Phoenix
EC from the Joint Inquiry in early 2002. The FAA also did not receive
all of the intelligence reporting on the possible use of aircraft as
terrorist weapons. Beyond the failure to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi, the CIA also did not provide the State Department with almost
1500 terrorism-related intelligence reports until after September 11,
2001. Other non-intelligence federal agencies as well as state and
local authorities complained about their lack of access to relevant
intelligence information. Even Intelligence community analysts
complained about their inability to have access to raw, but highly
relevant, intelligence information held within other intelligence
community agencies.
Lack of Focus
Even in instances where relevant information was available, there
was a lack of sufficient focus on the Bin Ladin threat to the domestic
United States. The Report concludes that the U.S. foreign intelligence
agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for a domestic
attack and that, at home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from the
lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The Report found
gaps between NSA's coverage of foreign communications and the FBI's
coverage of domestic communications that suggested a lack of sufficient
attention to the domestic threat. There was no comprehensive
counterterrorist strategy for combating the threat posed by Bin Ladin
and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was ``either unwilling
or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community resources
to combat the growing threat to the United States.''
Again, examples are plentiful in the Report. While the DCI had
declared ``war'' on Bin Ladin in December 1998, insisting that no
resources be spared in the effort, the Director of the National
Security Agency at the time told the Inquiry that he believed ``the DCI
was speaking for CIA only''. The Report found that, prior to September
11th, neither the FBI nor the NSA focused on the importance of
identifying and then ensuring coverage of communications between the
United States and suspected terrorist facilities abroad. The Inquiry
determined that one of the hijackers did communicate with a known
terrorist facility in the Middle East while he was living in the United
States. The Intelligence Community did not, however, identify the
domestic origin of those communications before September 11th, so that
additional FBI investigative efforts could be coordinated. There was,
in short, insufficient focus on what many would have thought was among
the most critically important kinds of terrorist-related
communications, at least in terms of protecting the Homeland.
Former Secretary of Defense John Hamre told the Inquiry that ``he
could not recall ever seeing an intelligence report on the existence of
terrorist sleeper cells in the United States'' and noted ``we thought
we were dealing in important things, but we missed the domestic threat
from international terrorism''. Former National Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Richard Clarke stated that when he visited FBI field
offices to increase their focus on al Qa'ida, ``I got sort of blank
looks of `what is al Qa'ida' '' The FBI counterterrorism agent
responsible for the informant that had contacts with the hijackers said
he did not discuss Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida with the informant before
September 11th because that was ``not an issue in terms of my
assignments''. The former chief of the Counterterrorist Center's Bin
Ladin Unit testified that between 1996 and 1999 ``the rest of the CIA
and the Intelligence Community looked on our efforts as eccentric and,
at times, fanatic''.
Lack of Quality
The Report cites quality problems in two critically important
areas, analysis and investigation. In analysis, the Inquiry found
quality was inconsistent, and many analysts were ``inexperienced,
unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical
information.'' The Report concludes that there was ``a dearth of
creative, aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent
inability to comprehend the collective significance of individual
pieces of intelligence''. There was little or no analytic focus on, for
example, reports about terrorist interest in aircraft as weapons and
the likelihood that Khalid Shaykh Mohammed was recruiting individuals
for terrorist activity within the United States. The former FBI
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism ``could not recall any instance
where the FBI Headquarters terrorism analytical unit produced `an
actual product that helped out' ''. Richard Clarke testified that the
FBI ``never provided analysis to us, even when we asked for it, and I
don't think that throughout that 10-year period we had an analytical
capability of what was going on in this country.''
In investigations, the Report concluded that ``the FBI was unable
to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa'ida
and other international terrorist groups operating in the United
States.'' While in the United States, a number of hijackers
successfully eluded FBI detection despite their interaction with
subjects of FBI counterterrorism investigations. Even after the CIA
watchlisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi on August 23, 2001, there was less
than an all-out investigative effort to locate what amounted to two Bin
Ladin-associated terrorists in the United States during a period when
the terrorist threat level had escalated to a peak level. In conducting
that search, the FBI never sought relevant information from FBI
counterterrorism sources, including the California informant, or from
relevant databases held by other federal agencies. Representatives of
those agencies testified that, had the FBI done so, they believe they
might have been able to locate the two hijackers using those agencies'
databases.
While the Inquiry found, in its review of CIA and FBI documents,
information suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of
the September 11 hijackers while they were in the United States, CIA
and FBI officials were unable to definitively address the extent or
nature of such support. Despite the serious national security
implications of the information, the FBI Director acknowledged that it
was the Joint Inquiry's work that brought some of these facts, found in
CIA and FBI documents, to his attention. The Inquiry referred this
material to the FBI and CIA for further investigation and the Report
notes that only recently, and in part due to the Inquiry's focus on
this issue, did the CIA and FBI strengthen efforts in this area.
Related Findings
Finally, the Report includes three ``related findings'', at least
two of which appear directly relevant to this Committee's focus on
homeland security. These findings address issues that, while not
entirely within the scope or control of the Intelligence Community,
impacted the Community's counterterrorism efforts before September
11th. They are:
- Despite intelligence reporting that Bin Ladin's terrorist network
intended to strike within the United States, the United States
Government did not undertake a comprehensive effort to implement
defensive measures in the United States;
- Between 1996 and 2001, the counterterrorism strategy adopted by
the U.S. government did not succeed in eliminating Afghanistan as a
sanctuary and training ground for Bin Ladin's terrorist network; and
- Prior to September 11th, U.S. counterterrorism efforts operated
largely without the benefit of an alert, mobilized and committed
American public. The assumption prevailed in the U.S. government that
attacks of the magnitude of September 11th could not happen here and,
as a result, there was insufficient effort to alert the American public
to the reality and the gravity of the threat.
Recommendations
The Report also looks beyond the mistakes of the past to the
future, and the need to strengthen our ability to combat the
international terrorist threat that still faces this nation. Noting
that ``the cataclysmic events of September 11th provide a unique and
compelling mandate for strong leadership and constructive change'', the
Committees agreed on nineteen recommendations for reform which are set
forth in the Report. Among other things, the recommendations propose:
- the creation of a statutory, Cabinet level, Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), vested with the full range of management,
budgetary, and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire
Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole. No person could
serve as both the DNI and the DCI or head of any other intelligence
agency;
- the establishment and enforcement of clear, consistent and
current priorities throughout the Intelligence Community and an annual
review and update of those priorities;
- preparation of a U.S. government wide strategy for combating
terrorism for approval by the President;
- creation of a National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism on the
National Intelligence Council;
- full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an
effective all-source terrorism information fusion center, with full and
timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information,
including ``raw'' supporting data, as needed. This fusion center is
intended to ``dramatically improve the focus and quality of
counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of
relevant intelligence information, both within and beyond the
boundaries of the Intelligence Community'';
- implementation, at the FBI, of numerous specific improvements in
its domestic intelligence capability, with a report to the President
and the Congress on the FBI's progress on implementing those reforms;
- prompt consideration by the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees
of the Congress, in consultation with the Administration, of the
question of whether the FBI should continue to perform the domestic
intelligence function or whether legislation is necessary to create a
new agency to perform these functions;
- actions by the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI and
reviews by the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the Congress to
ensure the fuller and more effective use of FISA authorities to assess
the threat of international terrorists within the United States;
- implementation of specific measures to greatly enhance the
development of a workforce with the intelligence expertise needed for
success in counterterrorism, including expanded training programs;
greater development of language capabilities; the use of personnel and
expertise from outside the Community as needs arise; expansion of
educational grant programs focused on intelligence-related fields; and
consideration of legislation, modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986, to instill the concept of ``jointness'' throughout the
Intelligence Community;
- reviews by the President and the Congress of the authorities that
govern the national security classification of intelligence
information, in an effort to expand access to relevant information for
federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, for state and
local authorities, and for the American public. The Committees believe
that Congress should consider the degree to which excessive
classification has been used in the past and the extent to which the
emerging threat environment has greatly increased the need for real-
time sharing of sensitive information;
- implementation, by the DCI and heads of the Intelligence
Community agencies, of measures designed to ensure accountability
throughout the Intelligence Community;
- reviews by the relevant agency Inspectors General of the Inquiry
record to determine whether and to what extent personnel at all levels
should be held accountable regarding the identification, prevention, or
disruption of the September 11th attacks;
- the full development of a national watchlist center responsible
for coordinating and integrating all watchlist systems and ensuring a
comprehensive flow of terrorist names into the center from all points
of collection; and
- aggressive action by the FBI and CIA to address the possibility
that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved in
terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests and
vigorous and continuing oversight of those efforts by the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees. The FBI and CIA should ``aggressively
and thoroughly pursue'' related matters developed through the Inquiry
that have been referred to them for further investigation by the
Committees.
While these recommendations do not have the force of law, Senators
Graham, Rockefeller, and Feinstein recently introduced legislation in
the Senate intended to statutorily implement the Report's
recommendations. In the House, I understand that the Intelligence
Committee is actively addressing those aspects of the recommendations
that pertain to the Intelligence Community through hearings, continuing
oversight of the intelligence agencies, and provisions in the
Intelligence Authorization bill. Even absent legislation, there are
indications that other efforts are underway to implement reform in at
least some of the areas addressed by the recommendations. FBI Director
Mueller, for example, has said that the FBI is addressing the need for
internal reform in the areas identified by the recommendations. The
President, as you know, announced the creation of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC) as a way of achieving greater sharing and
better analysis of counterterrorism intelligence. At least some of the
relevant agency Inspectors General are conducting accountability
reviews, as recommended by the Committees. Absent more detailed
information about the scope and nature of these efforts, I cannot say
to what extent they reflect the specific actions called for in the
recommendations.
In closing, let me underscore the importance of the thought
conveyed by the title of today's hearing, ``Perspectives on 9/11--
Building Effectively on Hard Lessons''. Those of us associated with the
Joint Inquiry are convinced that there is indeed much to be learned
from the story of September 11th, both for the Intelligence Community
and for our Nation. The lessons are hard, they are bitter, and they are
tragic, but the importance of their message is undeniable: they are our
clearest road back to a far safer and brighter future for all
Americans. The Joint Inquiry's Report can, I believe, serve as an
excellent roadmap for that journey.
Chairman Cox. Governor Gilmore. We have also received your
written statement, and you are invited to summarize your
testimony as you see fit.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM GILMORE, FORMER GOVERNOR OF
VIRGINIA AND CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, Congressman Turner, distinguished Congressmen and
women of this committee and of the House, thank you for the
opportunity to appear here with you today, and I request that
my more extensive statement be put into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
This Commission is your advisory panel. This advisory panel
was established by the Congress of the United States, Senate
and the House, in 1999, or 1998 I believe was the public law
that established this Commission. It is your official advisory
panel on domestic response capability involving terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction.
By your statute, we have reported each year on December the
15th since 1999. I was approached in 1999, after the passage of
the law and the establishment of the Commission, to chair the
Commission by the previous administration's Department of
Defense and National Security Council.
The Commission was set up not of your standard people out
of Washington, D.C., that perhaps you would see, but instead
police, fire, rescue, emergency services, health care,
epidemiologists, some retired general officers, some key people
of this nature in the Intelligence Community.
The alumni, if you will, of this Commission over the nearly
now 5 years of its existence include Paul Bremer, General
Clapper, who now heads the National Mapping and Imagery Agency,
Ray Downey, a top official with the New York City Fire
Department until he was killed at the World Trade Center, Rich
Fairbank, who serves on the staff now in the current White
House on Homeland Security.
The Commission went to work, and in 1999 in our first year
we reported an assessment of the threat to the Congress, which
was widely reported, and of course copies were sent to each
Member of the Congress and to the President each year.
We did a threat assessment in that year, and in the second
year we did perhaps some of our best policy work. We
recommended that there be a national strategy. We were
concerned about the strong probability of conventional attack
in this country. We recommended that there be a national
strategy to combat terrorism. We recommended a strategy that
was national, was not Federal, and remains not Federal. It is
Federal, State and local, and must contain all three levels of
government in order to be able to respond to the terrorist
threat.
We recommended a need for a national office to establish
such a strategy, and we had recommendations on intelligence
sharing and expressed concern about the inability, particularly
of Federal agencies, to share information back and forth, and
absolutely the inability to share information up and down the
Federal structure with Federal, State and local people
together.
In the third year, 2001, we focused our attention, as we
were going out of business under your statute and sunsetting
after 3 years, we focused our attention for our December the
15th report in five areas: How to use the local and State
responders, how to equip them, border controls, health care and
the public health system, how you use the military in a
domestic setting, and cyber security.
This Commission was very largely established under the
leadership of a Member of this House, Curt Weldon, of the State
of Pennsylvania, who was very strongly leading in the
establishment of the Commission, and then we were done. We were
going out of business just about the time that we sent it up to
the printer when the 9/11 attack occurred.
There has been some discussion in opening statements of
where you were. Ladies and gentlemen, I was Governor of the
State of Virginia at the time the attack occurred. I was
Governor of one of the two States directly attacked that day,
of course New York and Virginia, because that is where the
Pentagon is, and the responders were Arlington, Alexandria,
Fairfax, Prince William, later Montgomery County, and then as
the days wore on people from all across the Nation, local
responders who came into the Pentagon.
In 2000, of course this body and the Senate then extended
the Commission for 2 additional years, for 2002 and then 2003.
In 2002, we did another extensive report in which we
focused our attention on some directional areas, particularly
with respect to the intelligence issues, the Intelligence
Community. We recommended that there be an intelligence fusion
center to begin to find some vehicle for drawing together and
connecting the dots on the intelligence that needed to be done
in order to connect the FBI, the CIA, the National Security
Agency, and State and local people who pick up most of the
information on the street in the first place, and to try to
create all of this in one place where information could be
shared.
We also addressed the issue of the appropriate agency to
conduct domestic counterterrorism operations here in the United
States, in the homeland.
That gives you a quick history, Mr. Chairman, of the
Commission. It is all fully set out in the statement that we
put in. Let me speak to you now very quickly as an opening
statement about the upcoming report. It is still in progress.
It will be under your statute on December the 15th of this
year. That will be the fifth report. Then under your statutory
provisions we will again go out of business and we will not
exist any longer.
But we will have done 5 full years of material on this,
which we hope has been of value to this Congress. It has been
very extensive, very dispassionate, not grandstanding, as
professional as we can be, in giving you the information we
believe necessary for you to make good judgments as a
legislative body.
This fifth report as we look ahead, as we are anticipating
the end of our Commission, we have asked ourselves the
questions: What should the country look like in 5 or 10 years?
With all of this that we are doing now, all this legislating
and all of this administrating and all of this work that is
being done, and all of this money that is being spent, what do
we want the country to look like? Jersey walls? Statues all
over the place? Security everywhere? What do we want the end
state to be? What is the definition of preparedness? We do not
today still have a definition of preparedness. What is it? How
do you implement an appropriate national strategy? How do you
define readiness? Until you do that, how do you know what to
spend the money on? How do localities know what they are
supposed to do and how they are supposed to fit in? Do they
simply ask for money for their own local priorities or does it
fit into a national strategy.
These are the kinds of questions that have to be asked.
Last week, we did a 2-day meeting, Mr. Chairman, in
Sacramento, where we held a normal third quarterly meeting. We
will have one more last meeting, probably in Washington, D.C.
The RAND Corporation staffs us pursuant to your authority. And
in that meeting in Sacramento, we had video conferenced in
Admiral Jim Loy of the Transportation Safety Administration,
who answered the two fundamental questions that we were asking,
what do you want the country to look like, and how we protect
our civil freedoms here in this country while we are doing it?
We had Mike Armstrong, a representative of the Business
Roundtable come in and talk to us about how we hook in the
private sector. We had representatives from the major responder
and emergency services organizations come in and speak to us in
Sacramento.
Then I was invited personally to come the next day to
Seattle in order to speak to a summit conference of the local
responder organizations. It was held the following day on
Friday, and then I think through the weekend, in order to
discuss where they fit in, because they are trying to
understand how they should work within the national strategy.
Let me read, if I could, one or two paragraphs in closing
from my opening remarks. While the statement is extensive, I
have written something just for this hearing here today, which
I think will capture where I think we will be on December the
15th, even though it is still a work in progress.
We believe that the national goal must be to implement a
true national strategy that assesses the true risk to the
Nation, and reasonably prepares for those risks. Complete
security is not possible against a terrorist attack, but a good
national strategy can reduce the risk and direct our resources
to the correct priorities.
Only then can we manage the cost of homeland security, and
know that the money we are spending is effective within a
national strategy. We must then have a frank dialogue with the
American people that all risk cannot be eliminated. Everything
is vulnerable in a free society. All risk cannot be eliminated.
We must decide what roles are appropriate for Federal,
State and local governments, the private sector, and the people
themselves. Then we should return to normalcy. And understand
our definition of normal. Normalcy will never again be an
unguarded, inattentive state, but we also must decide how much
is enough and continue on with the array of priorities that we
will pursue as a Nation.
Defining preparedness and the roles of States and
localities will be a key part of our fifth and final report. We
also will draw attention to the need to maintain our civil
freedoms as we make the Nation more secure. Our traditional
values of liberty cannot be balanced against or traded off for
security. We must be cautious that those responsible for
security, all of us who are responsible for security, do not
simply redefine away our freedoms in the name of security.
It is preparedness that must be defined, not our definition
of freedom that has already gained its meaning from the blood
of American patriots, including those who died on September the
11th, 2001, and this too will be discussed in the final report
this December.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JAMES S. GILMORE
Chairman Cox, Representative Turner and distinguished Members of
this Committee, I am honored to be here today. I come before you as the
Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities
for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Thank you for the
opportunity to present the views of the Advisory Panel. This is the
national commission on terrorism (a.k.a the Gilmore Commission) and we
have been influential in the development of a national ``Homeland
Security'' strategy--a strategy that is not federal--but is focused on
federal, state, and local capabilities to respond to the unthinkable
acts of terrorism on our homeland.
On September 11th, our nation saw the unlimited imagination of
these terrorists. That defining moment in our shared history as
Americans has forced all of us to recognize that we must be better
prepared at the state, local, and federal level.
Gilmore Commission Backgrounder
The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105?261
(H.R. 3616, 105thCongress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act
directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks. It
said:
The panel shall--
Assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness
for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
Assess the progress of Federal training programs for local
emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction;
Assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of
unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements,
and the needs of maritime regions;
4. Recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination
with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction
response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local
response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction
incidents; and
5. Assess the appropriate roles of State and local government
in funding effective local response capabilities.
That Act required the Advisory Panel to report its findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and
local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction to the President and the Congress three
times during the course of the Advisory Panel's deliberations?on
December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001.
The Advisory Panel's tenure was extended for two years in
accordance with Section 1514 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1358, Public Law 107-107, 107th Congress,
First Session), which was signed into law by the President on December
28, 2001. By virtue of that legislation, the panel is now required to
submit two additional reports?one on December 15 of this year, and one
on December 15, 2003.
Panel Composition
Mister Chairman, as I usually do on occasions like this, please
allow me to pay special tribute to the men and women who serve on our
panel.
This Advisory Panel is unique in one very important way. It is not
the typical national ``blue ribbon'' panel, which in most cases
historically have been composed almost exclusively of what I will refer
to as ``Washington Insiders''--people who have spent most of their
professional careers inside the Beltway. This panel has a sprinkling of
that kind of experience--a former Member of Congress and Secretary of
the Army, a former State Department Ambassador-at-Large for
Counterterrorism, a former senior executive from the CIA and the FBI, a
former senior member of the Intelligence Community, the former head of
a national academy on public health, two retired flag-rank military
officers, a former senior executive in a non-governmental charitable
organization, and the head of a national law enforcement foundation.
But what truly makes this panel special and, therefore, causes its
pronouncement to carry significantly more weight, is the contribution
from the members of the panel from the rest of the country:
Three directors of state emergency management
agencies, from California, Iowa, and Indiana, two of whom now
also serve their Governor's as Homeland Security Advisors
The deputy director of a state homeland security
agency
A state epidemiologist and director of a state public
health agency
A former city manager of a mid-size city
The chief of police of a suburban city in a major
metropolitan area
Senior professional and volunteer fire fighters
A senior emergency medical services officer of a major
metropolitan area
And, of course--in the person of your witness--a
former State governor
These are representatives of the true ``first
responders''--those heroic men and women who put their lives on
the line every day for the public health and safety of all
Americans. Moreover, so many of these panel members are also
national leaders in their professions: our EMS member is a past
president of the national association of emergency medical
technicians; one of our emergency managers is the past
president of her national association; our law officer now is
president of the international association of chiefs of police;
our epidemiologist is past president of her professional
organization; one of our local firefighters is chair of the
terrorism committee of the international association of fire
chiefs; the other is chair of the prestigious national
Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability.
Read our reports and you will understand what that expertise has
meant to the policy recommendations that we have made, especially for
the events of last year.
Those attacks continue to carry much poignancy for us, because of
the direct loss to the panel. Ray Downey, Department Deputy Chief and
chief-in-charge of Special Operations Command, Fire Department of the
City of New York, a friend of many members of Congress, perished in the
attack on the New York World Trade Center. Although we continue to miss
Ray's superb advice, counsel, and dedication to these issues, we trust
that Ray knows that we are carrying on in the tradition that he helped
us to establish.
Our Continuing Mission
Mister Chairman and Members, this Advisory Panel continues to work
hard to develop the best possible policy recommendations for
consideration by the President and the Congress. Now, of course, people
and organizations are coming out of the woodwork, claiming to be all
manner of ``experts'' in homeland security. At the same time, this
panel is toiling away, seeking neither fame nor credit for its work,
simply trying to find some rational and feasible solutions to many
problems and challenges that still face us.
Observations about Terrorism Preparedness
In the course of our deliberations, the Advisory Panel has been
guided by several basic observations and assumptions that have helped
to inform our conclusions and policy recommendations for improving our
preparedness to combat terrorism.
First, all terrorism is ``local,'' our at least will start locally.
That fact has a lot to do, in our view, with the emphasis, the
priorities, and the allocation of resources to address requirements.
September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks were further proof of
that basic assumption.Second, a major attack anywhere inside our
borders will likely be beyond the response capabilities of a local
jurisdiction, and will, therefore, require outside help--perhaps from
other local jurisdictions, from that jurisdiction's state government or
multiple state resources, perhaps from the Federal government, if the
attack is significant enough to exhaust other resources. That principle
was likewise validated last September.
Given those two factors, our approach to combating terrorism should
be from the ``bottom up''--with the requirements of State and local
response entities foremost in mind. Then national leadership should
harmonize those local requirements into a true national strategy.
We note that we have many existing capabilities that we can build
on in an ``all-hazards'' approach, which can include capabilities for
combating terrorism.
Our thorough research and deliberations have also led us to observe
that there is great apprehension among States and localities that some
Federal entity will attempt to come in and take charge of all
activities and displace local response efforts and expertise.
That was not and likely could not, because of the actual
circumstances in New York, have been the case in September. But all
events may not unfold in that fashion.
Based on a significant amount of analysis and discussion, we have
been of the view that few if any major structural or legal changes are
required to improve our collective efforts; and that the ``first
order'' challenges are policy and better organization-not simply more
money or new technology.
With respect to Federal efforts, two years ago we concluded that,
prior to an actual event, no one cabinet department or agency can
``supervise'' the efforts of other federal departments or agencies.
When an event occurs, response will be situational dependent; federal
agencies can execute responsibilities within existing authority and
expertise, but under established ``Lead Federal Agency'' coordinating
processes
Support for Panel Activities and Reports
Mister Chairman, it also says something about the foresight of this
committee that you directed in legislation that analytical and other
support for the Advisory Panel would be provided by a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center. We have been exceptionally fortunate
to have that support provided by The RAND Corporation. The breadth and
depth of experience at RAND in terrorism and policy issues across a
broad spectrum have made possible the panel's success in accomplishing
its mandate. Its assessments of federal programs, its case studies and
hundreds of interviews across the country and around the world, its
seminal work in surveying state and local response entities nationwide,
its facilitation of our discussion--leading to near unanimity of
members on this broad spectrum of recommendations, its work in drafting
reports based on our extensive deliberations, all have combined to make
this effort a most effective and meaningful one.
Our Reports
In our first three reports, the advisory panel has, through its
assessments and recommendations, laid a firm foundation for actions
that must be taken across a broad spectrum of threats in a number of
strategic and functional contexts to address this problem more
effectively.
First Report--Assessing the Threat
The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment in its first
report of the terrorist threat inside our borders, with a focus on
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The
very thorough analysis in that report can be summarized:
The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the
entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats-both the
unprecedented higher-consequence attack, as well as the
historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist
attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near
term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of
the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon of
choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale CBRN or
conventional, any such lower-consequence event--at least in
terms of casualties or destruction--could, nevertheless,
accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting
response capabilities, instilling fear, undermining government
credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the government.
With that in mind, the Panel's report urges a more balanced
approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be
considered, but that increasing attention must now also be paid
to the historically more frequent, more probable, lesser-
consequence attack, especially in terms of policy implications
for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, to
optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on
preparing for an event potentially affecting thousands or tens
of thousands may result in a smaller, but nevertheless lethal
attack involving dozens failing to receive an appropriate
response in the first critical minutes and hours.
While noting that the technology currently exists that would
allow terrorists to produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons,
the report also describes the current difficulties in acquiring
or developing and in maintaining, handling, testing,
transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the
capability to cause ``mass casualties.''
We suggest that that analysis is still fully valid today.
Second Report--Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
By the second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis to specific
policy recommendations for the Executive and the Congress and a broad
programmatic assessment and functional recommendations for
consideration in developing an effective national strategy.
The capstone recommendation in the second report was the need for a
comprehensive, coherent, functional national strategy: The President
should develop and present to the Congress a national strategy for
combating terrorism within one year of assuming office. As part of that
recommendation, the panel identified the essential characteristics for
a national strategy:
It must be truly national in scope, not just Federal.
It must be comprehensive, encompassing the full
spectrum of deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response
against domestic and international threats.
For domestic programs, it must be responsive to
requirements from and fully coordinated with state and local
officials as partners throughout the development and
implementation process.
It should be built on existing emergency response
systems.
It must include all key functional domains--
intelligence, law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical
services, public health, medical care providers, emergency
management, and the military.
It must be fully resourced and based on measurable
performance.
Of course, the Panel recognizes that in light of September 11, 2001
this objective has been difficult to achieve. However, the principles
contained within this strategy and their requirements remain the same.
The Second Annual Report included a discussion of more effective
Federal structures to address the national efforts to combat terrorism.
We determined that the solutions offered by others who have studied the
problem provided only partial answers. The Advisory Panel attempted to
craft recommendations to address the full spectrum of issues.
Therefore, we submitted the following recommendation: The President
should establish a senior level coordination entity in the Executive
Office of the President. The characteristics of the office identified
in that recommendation included:
Director appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, at ``cabinet-level'' rank
Located in the Executive Office of the President
Authority to exercise certain program and budget
controls over those agencies with responsibilities for
combating terrorism
Responsibility for intelligence coordination and
analysis
Tasking for strategy formulation and implementation
Responsibility for reviewing State and local plans and
to serve as an information clearinghouse
An interdisciplinary Advisory Board to assist in
strategy development
Multidisciplinary staff (including Federal, State, and
local expertise)
No operational control
We included a thorough explanation of each characteristic in our
Second Annual Report. For instance, we determined that this office
should have the authority to direct the creation, modification, or
cessation of programs within the Federal Interagency, and that it have
authority to direct modifications to agency budgets and the application
of resources. We also recommended that the new entity have authority to
review State and geographical area strategic plans and, at the request
of State entities, to review local plans or programs for combating
terrorism for consistency with the national strategy. Although not
completely structured around our recommendations, the model for the
creation of the Office of Homeland Security came from this
recommendation.
To complement our recommendations for the federal executive
structure, we also included the following recommendation for the
Congress: The Congress should establish a Special Committee for
Combating Terrorism--either a joint committee between the Houses or
separate committees in each House--to address authority and funding,
and to provide congressional oversight, for Federal programs and
authority for combating terrorism. The philosophy behind this
recommendation is much the same as it is for the creation of the office
in the Executive Office of the President. There needs to be a focal
point in the Congress for the Administration to present its strategy
and supporting plans, programs, and budgets, as well as a legislative
``clearinghouse'' where relevant measures are considered. We recognize
that Congress is still in the process of working towards this
objective.
In conjunction with these structural recommendations, the Advisory
Panel made a number of recommendations addressing functional
requirements for the implementation of an effective strategy for
combating terrorism. The recommendation listed below are discussed
thoroughly in the Second Annual Report:
Enhance Intelligence/Threat Assessments/Information Sharing
-- Improve human intelligence by the rescission of that portion of
the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the Director of Central
Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign
intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human
rights violations
-- Improve Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) through
an expansion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of
reliable sensors and rapid readout capability and the subsequent
fielding of a new generation of MASINT technology based on enhanced
RDT&E efforts
-- Review statutory and regulatory authorities in an effort to
strengthen investigative and enforcement processes
-- Improve forensics capabilities to identify and warn of terrorist
use of unconventional weapons
-- Expand information sharing and improve threat assessments
Foster Better Planning/Coordination/Operations
-- Designate the senior emergency management entity in each State
as the focal point for that State for coordination with the Federal
government for preparedness for terrorism
-- Improve collective planning among Federal, State, and local
entities
-- Enhance coordination of programs and activities
-- Improve operational command and control of domestic responses
-- The President should always designate a Federal civilian agency
other than the Department of Defense (DoD) as the Lead Federal Agency
Enhance Training, Equipping, and Exercising
-- Improve training through better coordination with State and
local jurisdictions
-- Make exercise programs more realistic and responsive
Improve Health and Medical Capabilities
-- Establish a national advisory board composed of Federal, State,
and local public health officials and representatives of public and
private medical care providers as an adjunct to the new office, to
ensure that such issues are an important part of the national strategy
-- Improve health and medical education and training programs
through actions that include licensing and certification requirements
-- Establish standards and protocols for treatment facilities,
laboratories, and reporting mechanisms
-- Clarify authorities and procedures for health and medical
response
-- Medical entities, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations, should conduct periodic assessments of
medical facilities and capabilities
Promote Better Research and Development and Create National
Standards
-- That the new office, in coordination with the Office of Science
and Technology Policy, develop a comprehensive plan for RDT&E, as a
major component of the national strategy
-- That the new office, in coordination with the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) establish a national standards
program for combating terrorism, focusing on equipment, training, and
laboratory processes
Third Report--For Ray Downey
Our Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress
builds on findings and recommendations in our First and Second
Annual Reports delivered in 1999 and 2000. It reflects a
national strategic perspective that encompasses the needs of
all three levels of government and the private sector. It seeks
to assist those who are dedicated to making our homeland more
secure. Our recommendations fall into five categories:
Empowering State and Local Response by ensuring the
men and women on the front line of the war against terrorism
inside our borders have the tools and resources needed to
counter the murderous actions of terrorists;
Enhancing Health and Medical Capacities, both public
and private, to help ensure our collective ability to identify
attacks quickly and correctly, and to treat the full scope of
potential casualties from all forms of terrorist attacks;
Strengthening Immigration and Border Controls to
enhance our ability to restrict the movement into this country,
by all modes of transportation, of potential terrorists and
their weapons and to limit severely their ability to operate
within our borders;
Improving Security Against Cyber Attacks and enhancing
related critical infrastructure protection to guard essential
government, financial, energy, and other critical sector
operations against attack;
Clarifying the Roles and Missions for Use of the Military for
providing critical and appropriate emergency response and law
enforcement related support to civilian authorities. Mister Chairmen, I
should note that the substance of all of the recommendations contained
in the third report were approved by the panel at its regular meeting
held on August 27 and 28, 2001--Tuesday the 28th being exactly two
weeks prior to the attacks of September 11. Although we thoroughly
reviewed those recommendations subsequently, the panel unanimously
agreed that all were valid and required no supplementation prior to
publication.
The recommendations contained in that report, listed below in
summary form, are discussed in detail in the body of the report, and
further supported by material in the report appendices, especially the
information from the nationwide survey of State and local responders
covering an array of preparedness and response issues.
State and Local Response Capabilities
-- Increase and accelerate the sharing of terrorism-related
intelligence and threat assessments
-- Design training and equipment programs for all-hazards
preparedness
-- Dedesign Federal training and equipment grant programs to
include sustainment components
-- Increase funding to States and localities for combating
terrorism
-- Consolidate Federal grant program information and application
procedures
-- Design Federal preparedness programs to ensure first responder
participation, especially volunteers
-- Establish an information clearinghouse on Federal programs,
assets, and agencies
-- Configure Federal military response assets to support and
reinforce existing structures and systems
Health and Medical Capabilities
-- Implement the AMA Recommendations on Medical Preparedness for
Terrorism
-- Implement the JCAHO Revised Emergency Standards
-- Fully resource the CDC Biological and Chemical Terrorism
Strategic Plan
-- Fully resource the CDC Laboratory Response Network for
Bioterrorism
-- Fully resource the CDC Secure and Rapid Communications Networks
-- Develop standard medical response models for Federal, State, and
local levels
-- Reestablish a pre-hospital Emergency Medical Service Program
Office
-- Revise current EMT and PNST training and refresher curricula
-- Increase Federal resources for exercises for State and local
health and medical entities
-- Establish a government-owned, contractor-operated national
vaccine and therapeutics facility
-- Review and recommend changes to plans for vaccine stockpiles and
critical supplies
-- Develop a comprehensive plan for research on terrorism-related
health and medical issues
-- Review MMRS and NDMS authorities, structures, and capabilities
-- Develop an education plan on the legal and procedural issues for
health and medical response to terrorism
-- Develop on-going public education programs on terrorism causes
and effects
Immigration and Border Control
-- Create an intergovernmental border advisory group
-- Fully integrate all affected entities into local or regional
``port security committees''
-- Ensure that all border agencies are partners in intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination
-- Create, provide resources for, and mandate participation in a
``Border Security Awareness'' database system
-- Require shippers to submit cargo manifest information
simultaneously with shipments transiting U.S. borders
-- Establish ``Trusted Shipper'' programs
-- Expand Coast Guard search authority to include U.S. owned--not
just ``flagged''--vessels
-- Expand and consolidate research, development, and integration of
sensor, detection, and warning systems
-- Increase resources for the U.S. Coast Guard for homeland
security missions
-- Negotiate more comprehensive treaties and agreements for
combating terrorism with Canada and Mexico
Cyber Security
-- Include private and State and local representatives on the
interagency critical infrastructure advisory panel
-- Create a commission to assess and make recommendations on
programs for cyber security
-- Establish a government funded, not-for-profit entity for cyber
detection, alert, and warning functions
-- Convene a ``summit'' to address Federal statutory changes that
would enhance cyber assurance
-- Create a special ``Cyber Court'' patterned after the court
established in FISA
-- Develop and implement a comprehensive plan for cyber security
research, development, test, and evaluationSec. Use of the Military
-- Establish a homeland security under secretary position in the
Department of Defense
-- Establish a single unified command and control structure to
execute all military support to civil authorities
-- Develop detailed plans for the use of the military domestically
across the spectrum of potential activities
-- Expand training and exercises in relevant military units and
with Federal, State, and local responders
-- Direct new mission areas for the National Guard to provide
support to civil authorities
-- Publish a compendium of statutory authorities for using the
military domestically to combat terrorism
-- Improve the military full-time liaison elements in the ten
Federal Emergency Management Agency region
Status of Our Recommendations
Mr. Chairman and Members, I can tell you that, according to our
most recent count, of the 79 major policy recommendations made by the
Advisory Panel in the first three reports, at least 64 have now been
adopted in whole or in major part. One major recommendation from our
fourth report, for an intelligence fusion center, was adopted by the
President in his State of the Union address and has now become the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Having said that, there are
other recommendations that continue to need to be addressed, and some
that could still use additional resources or policy direction.
Fourth Report--Implementing the National Strategy Strategy and
Structure
Briefly, the `Strategy and Structure'' Chapter recommends:
That the President create an entity that will become
the all-source fusion and analysis center for potential
terrorists attacks inside the United States from foreign
terrorists and their supporters. That center would also house,
in a separate component, the intelligence collection against
such terrorists currently in the FBI.
That more comprehensive assessments of threats to the
homeland be developed
That the new DHS have the necessary capability and
authority to perform the critical infrastructure vulnerability
and warning functions envisioned in its enabling legislation
That the President clearly define the responsibilities
of DHS and other federal entities before, during, and after an
attack has occurred, especially any authority for directing the
activities of other federal agencies
That the President direct a restructuring of the
Federal interagency mechanisms to ensure better coordination
within the federal government, and with states, localities, and
the private sector, to avoid confusion and to reduce
unnecessary expenditure of limited resources at all levels
And to repeat an earlier recommendation of the panel:
That each House of the Congress establish a separate
authorizing committee and related appropriation subcommittee
with jurisdiction over Federal programs and authority for
Combating Terrorism/Homeland Security.
I will be happy to address any questions that Members may have
concerning those recommendations.
Use of the Military
The panel continues to address issues involving the use of the
military inside the United States for various responses to terrorism.
In its next report, the panel will make recommendations dealing with:
Command and control issues involving the new U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
Developing a more comprehensive, coordinated process
to identify the potential needs of States and localities, as
well as other Federal agencies, for military support against
terrorist attacks
Additional authority for use of the National Guard in
a Title 32 status
New roles and missions for certain National Guard
units
Better training and exercise programs for military
units for performing homeland missions
Better structure and policies for DoD civilian
oversight of the military
Clarification, consolidation, and explanations of laws
for use of the military domestically
Health and Medical
The panel continues its efforts to address the important issues in
health and medical planning, preparedness, and response to terrorism
and will make recommendations on the following subjects:
Sustaining and prioritizing resources to improve the
public health and medical infrastructure
Exercising and training health and medical response
entities in the larger emergency management context of
terrorism response including exercising the use of the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile
Centralizing, coordinating, and simplifying Federal
information on resources, best practices, and research for
state and local access
Implementing the full range of research to improve
health and medical detection of and response to terrorist
attacks
Developing and operationalizing the laws and
regulations for health and medical response to a terrorist
attack including the clarification of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) guidelines and the
rules for quarantine
Defining who is in charge in response to a
bioterrorist attack
Developing a strategic information plan for educating
and communicating with the public and the media before, during
and after an attack
Improving intelligence collection related to health
and medical issues
Establishing a national vaccine strategy
Responding to the threat of a smallpox attack
Critical Infrastructure Protection
For the Fourth Report, the panel has expanded its consideration
beyond cyber security to include issues of physical protection of
critical infrastructure. It will make CIP recommendations in the
following areas:
Federal reimbursement for certain costs incurred by
States, localities, and the private sector for improvements to
infrastructure security
Improved training, standards, and protocols for
government and private sector responders, to include
facilities, responder equipment, and communications
compatibility and interoperability
More comprehensive and concise policies and enhanced
capabilities for intelligence and information sharing involving
critical infrastructure among government entities and with the
private sector
Improvements in security measures for and in the
screening of non-passenger cargo aboard commercial aircraft
Development of significantly enhanced security
measures for general aviation aircraft, passengers, and
facilities
Expanded research and development into CIP security
measures
Comprehensive revamping of Federal laws to address
privacy, freedom of information, liability, anti-trust,
indemnification, insurance, and related issues
Enhanced security for agriculture and the food supply
structure
Agroterrorism
The panel once again addresses the issue of Agroterrorism, and will
make recommendations in the following areas:
Developing threat assessments for potential terrorist
attacks against U.S. agriculture
Including Agroterrorism as an Emergency Support
Function in the principal Federal response plan
Improving processes for testing for and identifying
agroterrorism attacks
Creating a system of fair compensation for losses due
to an attack
Enhancing education, training, and exercises on
attacks to agriculture
We must develop processes that help us understand better how we set
priorities for homeland security. We must answer some fundamental
questions about preparedness, including the overarching one:
``Preparedness for what''? Without a firm grasp on how to answer that
question, how will we know that we have out priorities set forth
correctly, and that the expenditure of scarce resources at every level
of government is appropriate. A more educated and enlightened
assessment of the threats we face is critical to answering that basic
question.
An integral part of that issue is the absolute necessity to have
national standards for how entities at all levels of government and in
the private sector train, equip, and plan for, and then coordinate
responses to attacks. We are still a long way from having any standards
for a variety of these issue related to homeland security.
Mister Chairman, in the panel's second report, submitted in
December of 2000, we addressed this issue head on. We did so in the
context of our recommendation at that time for the creation of an
office in the White House, very similar but not exactly like the Office
of Homeland Security (OHS) headed by my friend Tom Ridge. We called it
the National Office for Combating Terrorism, rather than ``Homeland
Security.'' We would have placed some very specific responsibilities in
that Office and in other entities for the development of national
standards and for processes for research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) to further the implementation of those standards.
Those recommendations are worth repeating. (To avoid any confusion, the
references to the ``National Office'' and ``Assistant Director'' are to
the specific construct that we recommended in 2000, not to anything
that currently exists in OHS). We said in 2000:
``Improve Plans for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation for
Combating Terrorism''
``The national strategy developed by the National Office for
Combating Terrorism must contain a clear set of priorities for
RDT&E. The program and budget authority of that office must be
exerted to ensure effective application of Federal funds
devoted to this purpose.
``The White House Office of Science & Technology Policy should
play a major role in the effort. We recommend that the
Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards of the
National Office for Combating Terrorism either enter into a
formal relationship with OSTP or have appropriate members of
the OSTP staff detailed to the National Office for Combating
Terrorism on a rotational basis.
``Wide varieties of equipment that have potential application for
combating terrorism are available from commercial vendors.
Nevertheless, many local responders have told us that some equipment
they purchased does not meet the specifications described by the
vendor. At present, no viable program is in place for testing and
evaluating the effectiveness of equipment for combating terrorism. We
recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards
develop equipment testing protocols and continue to explore the
prospect of financial support from vendors for equipment live agent
test and evaluation, leading to Federal certification. We recommend
that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards develop,
as part of the national strategy, a comprehensive plan for long-range
research for combating terrorism; this should include better
coordination among the National Laboratories. The focus of those
efforts by National Laboratories should be dual- or multi-purpose
applications.
``The National Office for Combating Terrorism should also integrate
other indirect, yet applicable, research and development projects into
its information-dissemination process. For example, the Deputy
Directorate for Operations (Combating Terrorism) within the Joint Staff
provides executive seminars on its Best Practices Study for anti-
terrorism and force protection. This program also collects information
on ``commercial off the shelf'' resources and equipment to support its
anti-terrorism mission. These studies and resources may not directly
relate to policy and standards for combating terrorism at the State and
local level but may well contribute to State and local preparedness.
``The top priorities for targeted research should be responder
personnel protective equipment (PPE); medical surveillance,
identification, and forensics; improved sensor and rapid-readout
capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications
interoperability.
``Develop National Standards for Equipment, Training, and
Laboratory Processes
``One of our basic assumptions is that no single jurisdiction is
likely to be capable of responding to a major terrorist attack without
outside assistance. That leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
development of national standards is a critical element of any national
plan. Firefighters or EMS technicians in the jurisdiction where an
attack takes place must not be concerned that responders from other
jurisdictions, providing ``mutual assistance,'' will arrive with
equipment of a different standard than local responders, even at risk
of becoming casualties themselves.
``We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National
Standards in the National Office for Combating Terrorism establish a
national standards program for combating terrorism, focusing on
equipment, training, and laboratory processes. The fundamental
objectives for equipment standards will be nationwide compatibility,
and dual-/ multi-purpose applications. For training, they will be
interdisciplinary curricula, and training exercises based on realistic
scenarios. For laboratories, the focus should be clear, strict
protocols for identification, forensics, and reporting. The ultimate
goal of the national standards program should be certification of the
specific equipment, training, or laboratory and a recapitulation of
certifications in a ``Consumers Digest,'' for use by response entities
nationwide.
``We recommend that the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) be designated as Federal ``co-lead agencies'' for
the technical aspects of standards development. The Executive Branch
and the Congress should provide resources for the development of
national standards, and Congress should be presented with a detailed
budget request for that purpose at the earliest opportunity. In
addition, the Interagency ``Board for Equipment Standardization and
InterOperability should be subordinated to the National Office for
Combating Terrorism.
``The Federal co-lead agencies should develop certification
standards in coordination with appropriate Federal agencies and with
advice from State and local response entities, professional
organizations that represent response disciplines, and private and
quasi-public certifying entities.''
Mister Chairman, those functions that we recommend now almost two
years ago still need to be performed, now obviously more urgently that
before. Unfortunately, we are still a long way from achieving any
coherence in standards and testing, especially for ``first responder''
equipment and communications capability. It is still the case that the
only ``standards'' available are what vendors say are the capabilities
of their wares. We continue to need something like an ``underwriters
laboratory'' for a wide variety of protective equipment and
communications. We have before and will again recognize the efforts of
the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
InterOperability, National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory
(in the Chairman's home state of Pennsylvania) and the Technical
Support Working Group. Those efforts will not, however, be nearly
enough, at least not at the level of current resources.
For training, the panel is encouraged that the majority of Federal
training programs, at least those currently in FEMA and DOJ, will
apparently be combined in the new DHS. Nevertheless, other Federal
agencies--EPA, DOE, DoD, DHHS as examples--will continue to conduct
training that will need to conform to a set of national training
standards. That effort has not yet been undertaken, but it should be
required on an urgent basis.
Fifth Report--A Return to Normalcy
The Commission will end its five years of work on behalf of the
Congress with its final report on December 15, 2003 to the Congress and
the President.
Mister Chairman, in our second report in 2000, we recommended a
Director of Homeland Security in the Executive Office of the President
to develop a national strategy, and to direct its implementation among
the array of cabinet departments and agencies. We recommended that the
Director have great authority over the Federal bureaucracy, including
budget certification authority. We did not recommend a separate
Department of Homeland Security because of concerns that delays
resulting from setting up the new Department would slow the
implementation of the national strategy. It has been decided that the
advantages of a Department organization outweigh that risk, and our
goal is to assist the new Department and the federal, state, and local
governments by strategic thinking on Homeland Security.
We believe that the national goal must be to implement a true
national strategy that assesses the true risk to the nation and
reasonably prepares for those risks. Complete security is not possible
against a stealth terrorist attack, but a good national strategy can
reduce that risk, and direct our resources to the correct priorities.
Only then can we manage the costs of Homeland Security and know the
money we are spending is effective within a national strategy.
We must then have a frank dialogue with the American people that
all risk cannot be eliminated. We must decide what roles are
appropriate for federal, state, and local governments, the private
sector and the people themselves.
Then we should return to normalcy, and understand our definition of
normal. Normalcy will never again be an unguarded or inattentive state,
but we also must decide how much is enough, and continue on with the
array of priorities we will pursue as a nation. Defining preparedness
and the roles of states and localities will be a key part of our Fifth
Report.
We also will draw attention to the need to maintain our Civil
Freedoms as we make the nation more secure. Our traditional values of
liberty cannot be balanced against or traded off for security. We also
must be cautious that those responsible for security do not simply
redefine away our freedoms in the name of security. It is preparedness
that must be defined, not our definition of freedom that has already
gained its meaning from the blood of American patriots, including those
that died on September 11, 2001. This, too, will be discussed in the
final report this December.
Conclusion
The Advisory Panel will continue to be relentless in pursuing
appropriate solutions to these difficult issues, even if our
recommendations are controversial and cross some ``turf'' boundaries.
We will always--always--consider as an overarching concern the impact
of any legal, policy, or process changes on our civil rights and
liberties. Our Constitution, our laws, our judicial system, our
culture, our history all combine to make our way of life unique in all
the world.
Thank you again for this opportunity.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Governor. Thank you both for your
outstanding testimony, for the work that you have done in
preparation for it and for your assistance to the Congress and
to the President in our work.
Ms. Hill, one of the Joint Inquiry's recommendations that
you cited in your own testimony today is for, quote, full
development within the Department of Homeland Security of an
effective, all-source terrorism information fusion center.
That all-source center is supposed to have--continuing to
quote the recommendation--full and timely access to all
counterterrorism related intelligence information, including
raw supporting data as needed.
We share that view. I stressed in my opening statement that
I believe this is a bipartisanship view of virtually every
member of this committee. That is what we think we legislated,
having read the statute many times over, in creating the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
within the new Department. We want that mandate implemented,
and we are somewhat troubled by the implications that perhaps
it isn't.
Your testimony notes, for example, creation of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, not within the
Department of Homeland Security but as a nonstatutory DCI-
supervised interagency joint venture.
Can you outline the reasons that the Joint Inquiry
specifically recommended full development of an effective, all-
source terrorism information fusion center, quote, within the
Department of Homeland Security?
Ms. Hill. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the reason for a
fusion center, wherever it is, was the numerous examples, in
the hearings and our work, of the failure to bring all of that
information into one place to look at the big picture, to
connect the dots, to analyze it the way it should be analyzed
and then to get it to the people who need it.
So any fusion center is hopefully designed to do that. The
reason, as I recall that-the recommendation speaks specifically
to the one in the Department of Homeland Security--was because
at the time the committees considered these recommendations
that had been statutorily enacted. They were aware that there
was a statutory provision to set that up in the Department of
Homeland Security.
I think the National inclination was Congress has decided
that is where it is going to go. If it goes there, it needs to
be effective. I think a large part of the thrust of the
recommendation was not just that you should have it at Homeland
Security but that whatever is set up there should be done the
right way, specifically, to include things like access to raw
data, which had been a problem, and a whole host of other
issues that we had heard about that were problems for the
analytical community.
Chairman Cox. Now, I strongly support the use of TTIC as an
interim step. I don't want us to drop a stitch while we are
building something new at the Department of Homeland Security,
and obviously TTIC is an executive creation without any
Congressional authorization whatsoever. But it is filling a
gap, and it is ensuring that we are doing things
professionally, immediately not eventually, and there is some
eventually when it comes to the creation of this brand new
Cabinet department.
But my concern runs to the longer term, because the statute
hasn't changed since you wrote your report. The very reason you
made your recommendation, as you have just explained it,
obtains today. The statute says the same thing now that it did
then, the legal requirement is exactly the same now as it was
then.
And so I am concerned now that there is a risk that the
DCI, who has pledged his support to TTIC, is now going to have
to provide support both to TTIC, and to whatever might go into
Homeland Security. If we want a fusion center, having two of
them doesn't exactly fit the bill, does it?
Ms. Hill. No. The whole point is to get it all in one place
so we make sure that it is analyzed the right way and it is
disseminated to the people who need it. I do want to just
clarify that TTIC, as it exists now or is being talked about
now, did not exist at the time the committees made this
recommendation.
So they were making their recommendation based on what they
saw as a huge problem pre-9/11 and knowing that the Congress
had put in this provision about a fusion center at the
Department of Homeland Security.
Chairman Cox. Well, I think all of us can agree, and it is
a strong inference that I draw from your testimony, that we
should not, if we are anxious to fuse intelligence data, create
competing sources of focus of effort, that we should not draw
Intelligence Community assistance in providing analysis of
terrorists threat related information, and so on, to TTIC as
well as to the Department and dilute that purpose.
Governor Gilmore, you have been not only spending the last
several years studying counterterrorism and our
counterterrorist capabilities, but you have also been a
Governor of a State with major technological, economic and
military significance from a standpoint of defending ourselves
against terrorism.
You were one of the three States that the terrorists
thought important enough to attack. The homeland security
advisory system is supposed to give us strategic and, whenever
possible, tactical advance warning of terrorist threats, but it
has been criticized. I would like to have your views on whether
the security advisory system is effective, on whether the color
system which has been derided in some corridors is working, on
whether this can be improved.
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the color
code is a shorthand. It is intended to be a quick, simple way
of communicating a simply concept of what exactly level the
country is in at any particular point in time. It has been
derided because it doesn't give any information to tell anybody
what to do. That is accurate. And there is also a challenge
too. And that is that as we go forward and we don't have
information that leads us into a red situation or a highly
dangerous situation, then we are in a constant yellow state,
and so there are challenges on all of that.
It would be good to have a system that can convey the most
information possible, if not to the general public, at least up
and down the line to appropriate elected officials, people who
would have responsibility, particularly in the communities,
which means that you have to give good information, to the
greatest extent you can, into the States and into the
localities. It doesn't have to be something where you go on the
radio and define it with a color code, but the best possible
information should be given to the States and to the
localities. This is the challenge.
There are cultural challenges. There are cultural
challenges, by the way, in the fusion center. We recommended
that and examined it in the year 2002. The challenge to it is
cultural less than structural.
And likewise here with this type of response, the question
is, what kind of information can you get into the hands of the
people who need it under the people who are actually patrolling
the chemical plants and patrolling the critical infrastructure
areas and watching out for the streets.
To the greatest extent possible, we should give the best
possible system to get the maximum information to them, and
culturally there are obstacles to do that.
Chairman Cox. I appreciate that. One final question for Ms.
Hill. The Joint Inquiry report notes that two of the 9/11
hijackers had numerous contacts with a longtime FBI informant,
yet despite this and earlier information linking them to
suspected al-Qaeda members no further action was taken to
investigate, detain or question either of them.
Can you explain to us in this open setting, to the extent
possible, the problems that the FBI encountered within its own
structure, how these men were able to hide not only from our
own intelligence but from paid informants within the Islamic
community as well?
Ms. Hill. Well, let me just start out briefly, and it is a
complicated story. But briefly, part of what the Inquiry found
was that these two individuals, Mihdhar and Hazmi, were known
to the CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community as
early as January of 2000, and there was information in January
of 2000 that Mihdhar had a visa to come to the United States,
would likely come here. That information, as best as we can
tell, was not passed to the FBI, from the weight of the
evidence the Inquiry found, until August of 2001.
The CIA had information in March, I believe, of 2000 that
Mr. Hazmi had in fact traveled to the United States. That
information, as best as we could tell, the weight of the
evidence was that it was not passed to the FBI until August of
2001.
The informant had contacts with those two individuals in
the year 2000, after that information was in the CIA. However,
the San Diego office of the FBI did not know about those two
individuals. They didn't know the full names of the
individuals, they didn't know they were coming to the United
States. They had no reason to be looking for them. The
informant had given the names, the first names, of the two
individuals to the FBI agent that was responsible for that
informant. But according to the FBI, and according to the
agent, there was no reason for them to focus on those two
individuals. I believe the informant described them as young
Saudi youths by first name only. The agent testified he never
got their last names. In August, 2001, on August 23rd, when the
FBI learned the full name of the these individuals and that
they had come to the United States, there was an effort, an
investigation by the FBI, to find them in the United States.
However, that effort did not entail tasking FBI informants
for information about those two individuals. So the informant
in San Diego was not asked at that point whether that informant
knew those two individuals. And it also did not entail any
information about them being sent the San Diego FBI office.
The agent in San Diego who was responsible for the
informant testified that had that agent gotten those names at
that point, even at that late point, the agent believes he
could have found them. He believes he could have, through the
informant and his other sources found those individuals. He
also testified that had the CIA gotten that information to the
FBI and had the FBI, in turn, gotten it to their San Diego
office back in the year 2000, that FBI agent in San Diego
strongly believes that if he had had the names he would have
tasked his sources, and he would have found them at the time
living in San Diego. Because that office would have had the
tremendous opportunity of having a long-time FBI informant
having contacts with those two individuals, he thinks through
that informant and through surveillance, both physical,
electronic, whatever, he would have used the ``full-court
press'' in investigative techniques on those two individuals,
and he believes that he would have found them.
He believes that he would have had a very good chance to
crack open what the plot was and what they were doing in this
country. Obviously it didn't happen. He didn't have that
information. The information never got to the San Diego FBI
until after September 11th.
Chairman Cox. Well, I can't think of a more compelling
illustration of why we need intelligence fusion and sharing of
information within Washington between intelligence and law
enforcement between Washington, State, local governments at all
levels.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner, is recognized for his
questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor, you have
been working on homeland security for about as long as anyone I
know, and you have certainly been able to develop insights that
many of us have not had the opportunity to develop. I think it
is always helpful to us, even though I know this calls for some
value judgment here, but it is always helpful to us if you can
just share with us what you think might be the two or three or
four or whatever is on your priority list of homeland security
tasks, that you think we really need to get done as soon as
possible to make this country more secure.
Where would you tell us to place our priorities? What needs
to be done that is not being done? And I heard this same
question posed the other day in the Senate committee where
Chairman Cox and I were kindly invited to testify. The same
question was posed to Senator Rudman and Richard Clarke, and I
suspect you probably won't give the same answers, but it was
insightful just to hear their views, and I would like to hear
yours.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, one could go burrow down into
this issue a level and begin to address some of the specific
vulnerabilities. Ports comes to mind. While our Commission
doesn't think that it is a high likelihood that we would see a
classic weapons of mass destruction used in this country, it is
clear that we have to be very cautious about the issue,
particularly of bioterrorism.
So one can go down and begin to address this, but--and you
should, one should do that. But you arrive at a point where you
begin to catalog lists of vulnerabilities. And this nation--any
nation really--most authoritarian nations are not free from
threat, much less free countries, such as the United States,
and one as big as this country is.
So it seems to me that we have to focus on several more
strategic points, and that comes down to the big question of
trying to get everybody placed into a national strategy so we
understand what everybody's function is. Even to this day the
localities are still divided as to whether they are going to
try to get grants that come directly to them or whether they
are going to go through the States.
It is clear that the national strategy and structure that
has been set out would be to have that organized on a State
basis. What good does it do to talk about--to argue over the
question of whether chemical plants are the most vulnerable,
because they are very vulnerable, but lots of things are
vulnerable, railroads, bridges. One can talk all day and create
a parade of potential horribles.
I think what we really have to do is focus our attention on
trying to make some policy decisions. The Congress, it seems to
me, and the executive branch have to make policy decisions
about how you set up the proper national strategy in order to
deal with what is most likely that could occur, threat
assessment, as one of the Congressman said a little while ago,
and then playing off that. You understand that you may not be
able to foresee every evil thing that a well-financed,
militarily trained enemy could do, but you can foresee
reasonably what they may be prepared to do and then prepare
against that to the greatest extent possible.
The most important thing is this. How do you develop a
national strategy that works with the States and create the
State plans which have been directed and to make sure that
those State plans take into consideration what the locals
believe that they have to have in order to respond to
reasonable risks, which they don't know what they are, by the
way.
It seems to me that the national government has to help
identify what the real threats might be so that the localities
can respond and say, well, we don't need a fire truck, we need
something else, and to make sure that the money that is
requested and the grants that go on are appropriate to a
genuine overarching, hanging together national strategy that
puts money into the proper places so that you can train and
exercise and prepare in that way, and that is the overarching
need that we see right now.
Mr. Turner. Well, I appreciate that observation. I know on
this committee we have all shared the concern that the first
task that our new Department of Homeland Security must complete
as soon as possible is that national threat assessment,
assessment of our vulnerabilities, so that we can develop some
prioritization of what we need to be doing first, because you
are correct, there are many risks that we can face, many
vulnerabilities out there. But selecting the ones we need to
deal with first cannot be successfully done unless we have that
national threat assessment, that vulnerability assessment, and
the matching of the threats and the vulnerabilities.
So I think that is a number one. I am also impressed with
your comments about developing the necessary definition of
preparedness. One of the things that I think we must have is a
clear definition of what are the essential capabilities that
our States and local governments need to respond, and I know
you have spent some time working on that. I would welcome your
comment on that issue as well.
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, sir. And let me refer you, Congressman,
if I could, to our 1999 report, which was virtually exclusively
a threat assessment. After the 2001 attack we heard a lot of
things in the papers, on the radio and TV and in the halls of
Congress and everywhere about threat that did not match up to
what we had said in 1999, and the Commission suggested that we
do a reassessment of the threat, which we did again in our
report of 2002.
So I would direct you to those. And, by the way, we didn't
feel the threat was different at all when we took a second look
at it in 2002.
And, Congressman, your specific question was?
Mr. Turner. Well, I picked up your remark earlier about
trying to establish a definition of preparedness, I believe is
the way you expressed it. I have thought of it in terms of
establishing those essential capabilities to respond that we
need to have available in our States, and in our communities
that would protect us in the event of--
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, sir. The strategy, Congressman, is
everything. If you understand what it is you are trying to
protect in this country, specifically and you understand what
the locals need, only then does the grant to them make any
sense. Otherwise you end up with local agencies and
organizations simply following their old priorities they have
always followed. That then becomes what we all know as pork
barrel. I guess there will be plenty of that.
But the fact is it would be nice if we can get most of this
money focused into an actual direction of a strategy against
real threats. Now, that means that of course the threat picture
in Montana will look different from the threat picture in
Virginia, for example.
But the locals working together with the executive branch
within the respective States ought to be able to create a State
plan. That isn't the end of it, however. I am one who believes,
that while you can create things from the bottom down, you
really need top up, top down leadership also, to then make all
of that harmonize so that we all understand that we are playing
on the same sheet of music, and that is where I think the
direction is that we are going and where we should go.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Gilmore. I hope that was responsive.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman. The vice chairwoman,
Ms. Dunn, is recognized for questions.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much. Ms. Hill, I wanted to ask
you a question. In your recommendations for reform it
emphasizes the need for the development of a national watch
list for terrorists. It is my understanding that the
development of this watch list has not yet happened, and I am
wondering how important this component of reform is, how close
are we to making it reality, what obstacles exist in its way,
and ought we, DHS, ought the Department of Homeland Security,
actually be its home?
Ms. Hill. Well, I think it is very important. I mean, one
of the things that we saw when we did our investigation was
that there were many different watch lists. As with a lot of
other things in the government, we have more than one agency
handling one watch list. And I think, like the fusion center
the important point the committees wanted to make is that we
should have all of this information together in one place. We
should have a watch list in one place that people can go to and
everyone can get access to those names so that we can be sure
that people do not fall through the cracks.
I have not, since the conclusion of the Inquiry, continued
to work on this at the committee. I am no longer with the
committee. So I have not addressed what is the current status
of the watch list situation. So I really cannot, you know,
speak to how far they have come along in correcting that and
getting it into one agency.
But it is extremely important, because of what we found.
Not only did Mihdhar and Hazmi not make it to the watch list
until very late in the game, we found that after September 11th
the CIA provided a lot more information to the State Department
for the watch list and more individuals were watch listed after
September 11th. So there was clearly some, you know, lack of
getting those names to the list for use by the other agencies
at a time when obviously it could have made a big difference,
particularly with those two individuals.
So it is extremely important. We were told during the
course of our investigation that there was anything from
several watch lists to 50, 60 watch lists in the U.S.
Government. So it is a big job to put it all in one place, but
it should be done.
Ms. Dunn. And it is a scary term, isn't it? I think it
frightens people out there until they understand how the lack
of such a watch list caused us huge horror the last time.
In your testimony, you also outlined your findings that
clearly point to systemic communications problems across the
Federal intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies.
On the Federal level has the Intelligence Community
responded to correct those situations? And would you suggest
that Congress exercise more aggressive oversight in this area,
in this area or some other area, to help in the effort?
Ms. Hill. Well, both Director Tenet and Director Mueller
testified in front of our inquiry, and both stated that they
were doing everything in their power to increase communication
and cooperation between the two agencies, and between the rest
of the Intelligence Community. So we clearly were told that
things were changing and things had improved.
Part of the problem is we have a huge Intelligence
Community. We have, I believe, 13 different agencies and you
need to have good communication and good exchange of
information. Not just the top leaders have to agree to do it,
but it has to filter all the way down through these agencies to
the people on the front lines, to the field agents who are in
the offices dealing with the Intelligence Community. As
Governor Gilmore knows, it is also critically important to then
get cooperation and exchange of information between our Federal
community, law enforcement and intelligence, and the State and
locals, who we also heard from in our investigation.
So I believe, and again, as I said, I have not continued to
update and focus in depth on what is happening right now, but I
believe that given the events of 9/11, given the focus and the
level of interest in that, that people are clearly more alerted
now to the need for that kind of exchange. I would be surprised
if every piece of the problem has been eliminated, just simply
because of the size of the problem. We are talking about all of
the Federal intelligence agencies, the rest of the Federal
Government, the gap between law enforcement and intelligence
and then the State and local. So it is a huge area where we
need to focus attention.
I think there is more attention now, more direction to
share information, but we need to sustain that emphasis on
information sharing.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you. May I ask the Governor a question, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Cox. Without objection.
Ms. Dunn. Governor, let me just ask you one question. We
heard testimony yesterday from former Speakers Tom Foley and
Newt Gingrich that was very useful in laying out why they
believed this committee, the Select Committee on Oversight of
the Department of Homeland Security ought to be made a
permanent standing committee.
The most recent report of your panel includes the
observation that Congress is, quote, still not well organized
to address issues involving homeland security in a cohesive
way, and certainly we have seen that overlapping jurisdictions
lead to lack of focus.
I am wondering if you could expand on your recommendation
for improving this oversight aspect.
Mr. Gilmore. See, Congresswoman, that is the trouble with
the Commission, it just doesn't mince words. The Commission
believes and has discussed over years and still believes that
there needs to be the greatest concentration possible in both
Houses of the Congress of oversight and budgetary authority of
the Department of Homeland Security.
It is hard to set up a new department. That also has been
discussed extensively in our reports, very difficult to do. Our
emphasis has been on the implementation of appropriate strategy
and policy. That has to be the focus, not so much the
organizational aspects that can in fact get in the way of that.
If the Congress contributes to that, by having so many
different committees that are dealing with different monetary
aspects or different aspects of the organization, and so on, it
is going to be even harder for Governor Ridge to make that
Department the effective tool that I believe that he will make
it be.
So, yes, our recommendation is the greatest possible
concentration of these resources and assets into one, even a
joint committee, but at least one committee in each House.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from the State of Washington,
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I would point out that both of the
Appropriations committees, House and Senate, have created
subcommittees to do that. I think that brings some focus,
though I strongly support the effort of having this as a
permanent committee. You know, the one thing that always
worried me about this, your Inquiry, Ms. Hill, was that there
was some good work done and in one of the findings it talks
about the July 10th, 2001, Phoenix FBI field office agent who
sent an electronic communications to four individuals in the
Radical Fundamentalist Unit, and two people in the Osama bin
Laden Unit at FBI headquarters, and two agents on international
terrorism squads in the New York field office.
In the communication the agent expressed his concerns,
based on his firsthand knowledge, that there was a coordinated
effort underway by bin Laden to send students to the United
States for civil aviation related training. He noted that there
was an inordinate number of individuals of investigative
interest participating in this type of training in Arizona and
expressed his suspicions that this was an effort to establish a
cadre of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct future
terrorist activity.
The Phoenix EC requested that FBI headquarters consider
implementing four recommendations: Accumulate a list of civil
aviation university colleges around the country, establish
liaison with these schools, discuss the theories contained in
the Phoenix EC with the Intelligence Community, and consider
seeking authority to obtain visa information concerning
individuals seeking to attend flight schools.
However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the
action requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11th,
2001. The communication generated little or no interest at
either FBI headquarters or the FBI's New York field office.
In your inquiry, what was the reason for that? That still
to me is so shocking that--even though they had information
going back to 1994 that an aircraft could be used, and you had
these people who were highly questionable, that this did not
spark any interest in either the FBI national headquarters or
at their New York office, which was in charge of
counterterrorism. Why is that?
Ms. Hill. Well, there were several, I guess, contributing
factors. The agent who wrote that communication told us that he
knew how big the FBI is, how many other things were going on. I
think he used the words that he thought it would go to ``the
bottom of the pile,'' which it pretty much did. It didn't get
much attention.
Part of the problem was the FBI's electronic systems for
data and sending data. There are questions whether or not it
went to all of the people it should have gone to. It went to
some intelligence specialists in FBI headquarters. They told us
they were going to act on it, but that they didn't get around
to getting back to it.
They looked at it more in terms of what case would this be
relevant to. And they sent it to one field office where there
was a case where it might have potentially been relevant. They
weren't looking at it as a national kind of analytical product.
The New York FBI office, which was heavily involved in
counterterrorism, did get it but it wasn't considered
particularly unusual to the New York agents, because they knew
through, I believe some of the testimony in the embassy bombing
case, for example, that pilots or al-Qaeda related pilots had
come to light before.
So they didn't focus on whether the pilot might be for
another reason, or this might be something else. Basically, it
didn't get a lot of attention. And the FBI agent in Phoenix who
wrote it, of course, I don't think he expected it would get a
lot of attention. That is what he told us. But he sent it up
anyway.
Mr. Dicks. Did he try to follow up or go back a second
time?
Ms. Hill. No, he didn't. Well, that memo went out in July
of 2001. So it was within a month or two of the September 11th
bombings. And he did not. Because he--as I said, he thought it
would take a long time.
One of the things that we heard repeatedly throughout the
whole course of this was how long it took for things to get
turned around, the problems with the FBI's data systems and
electronic messaging and all of that.
Mr. Dicks. What is wrong with a phone call? What is wrong
with picking up the phone and calling somebody if you have a
very strong suspicion? Did he ever think about that? I know we
live in an era of e-mail, but I think that sometimes people
forget that you can pick up the phone and call your superior
and say, why are we not doing something about this?
Ms. Hill. Well, I don't believe that he did that. And I
think he would tell you, you know, that he felt he did what he
could. It was about his theories. It was a theory to him. He
was kind of saying, this is what it looks like to me, and sent
it up with some recommendations. But I don't think--
Mr. Dicks. We had a similar situation in Minneapolis, isn't
that correct?
Ms. Hill. Well, Minneapolis was a little bit different.
That relates to Moussaoui, the arrest of Mr. Moussaoui in
Minneapolis. And the agents, they were very concerned that he
might be involved in some sort of terrorist plot with airlines.
And they went back and forth with FBI headquarters on the issue
of whether or not they could get a warrant and whether or not
they had enough on him to move forward under FISA, and there
was a misconception of what they needed to allege under FISA.
They spent a lot of time looking for some connections that they
actually didn't need legally. So there was a lot of that back
and forth and their request never went, as I remember, never
went beyond the FBI to the Justice Department.
But the interesting thing about both of those cases, and
what concerned I think our two committees, was that, number
one, they both occurred in the summer of 2001, which was a time
when there was a very high peak threat level for some sort of
terrorist attack against U.S. interests.
The Phoenix agent did not know about Zacarias Moussaoui.
The agents handling Zacarias Moussaoui didn't know about the
Phoenix electronic communication. And neither of them knew
about Mihdhar and Hazmi, before August, coming into this
country. And, of course, the FBI didn't know that in June and
July because they hadn't got the information from the CIA.
So, you know, what we found, and that is the classic
example of it, is we found all of those pieces, these threads
of information, that if somebody had been able to see the whole
picture and put this together, you know, you would have known,
here we have a huge threat. We have two guys, al-Qaeda
associates, coming into this country. We have another
suspicious individual in Arizona, we have a memo out of Phoenix
saying that he believes bin Laden is sending people for civil
aviation related training.
None of those people knew all of it, none of the people who
had one piece knew what all of the others had, including the
agent in California who had the informant. That informant knew,
among other things, and told the FBI after September 11th,
that, for instance, Mr. Hazmi was going to, of all places,
Arizona for flight training, for civil aviation training.
And that is where the Phoenix agent--at that time was
sitting there in July of 2001 and later, with that information.
None of that was connected. And Moussaoui wasn't connected to
it. So, you know, we will never know what would have happened
if they had put it all together. But they certainly would have
been a lot closer to seeing the big picture than what history
shows that they were.
Mr. Dicks. What worries me here is you can have very good
field work, but you have to have people in the supervisory
level who take that information and act upon it. There have
been so many situations in our history where we had the
information but the people at the higher levels didn't respond
to the information and didn't act and didn't do anything.
And, you know, first--President Bush I, the first thing he
said after Desert Storm/Desert Shield, when the Iraqis attacked
into Kuwait, was that it was not an intelligence failure, it
was a failure of his administration to act because he was told
by all of the leaders of the governments in the area that
Saddam Hussein wouldn't make this attack. And even though we
had the information, we didn't act on it.
So I bring this up, I think this is an important part of
this committee's deliberations. We have got to get all of this
information and do a better job of collecting, but you also
have to have some people with judgment who analyze and then get
it to their superiors to act upon.
And I think these examples that we discussed here show an
example in this very important situation, where we had good
information, but we didn't have people who acted on the
information or didn't recognize the importance of the
information, and I hope it is something that we continue to
consider in our committee deliberations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Shays, is recognized for questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you
for conducting this hearing and thank you to our very
distinguished witnesses.
When my National Security Subcommittee was holding hearings
before September 11th, we had you, Governor, before our
committee on more than one occasion, along with Hart, Rudman
and Bremer, and all three of you agreed on the following: We
have a terrorist threat. We need to develop a strategy to
respond to the terrorist threat. And you only disagreed really
on the nuances of how you reorganize, because you all said we
needed to reorganize to implement that strategy. So we had a
loud message from three very distinguished commissions.
My first question to you is: When we did reorganize, we
basically did it before we really described what the threat was
or developed a strategy, and do you think that we have been
hindered and maybe didn't reorganize the way we should have
because we did not do what we needed to do--in my judgment--
which was state the strategy and state the threat and develop
the strategy?
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, Congressman. I think that is a pretty
good summary of where I think that strategically we may have
fell behind a little bit. I would point out that there is still
not a consensus yet as to the nature of the threat. Our
Commission does not believe that threat of a classic weapon of
mass destruction is as great as frankly has been discussed in
the newspapers and perhaps in this body as well.
But on the other hand, we have hedged. We have not ruled it
out. We believe that the consequences would be so great that we
have to at least take it into consideration. But the thrust of
our Commission has been that we need to think more about what
the capability, the true capability of the enemy is, and the
true capability of the enemy is more along the lines of
conventional weapons, an explosion, a bomb, hijacking a plane,
hijacking a train, something of this nature, not a nuclear
device or something of that nature here in the homeland.
But, yes, thinking through the strategy then lends itself I
think very well to the proper type of structure that needs to
go into place.
Mr. Shays. I had hoped that having reorganized that the
Department of Homeland Security would then, even though it
seemed to follow, have stated threat analysis and its strategy,
to my knowledge, this has not been done.
Ms. Hill, to your knowledge has this been done?
Ms. Hill. Mr. Shays, I am not--as I said, I have not been
following what has been going on within the--what we looked at
was what happened before 9/11. I haven't been following up on
everything that has happened since.
Mr. Shays. I hear you. Governor?
Mr. Gilmore. Strategy or a threat assessment?
Mr. Shays. Well, both the threat assessment--to--I had
hoped by now the Department of Homeland Security would have
stated clearly what the threat was and what our strategy is. I
have not yet seen a document that does either. Have you?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, there are about eight strategies, as you
know, that are in print right now: Critical infrastructure,
cyberterrorism, bioterrorism, a general overarching national
strategy as well. So there is a lot of work.
Mr. Shays. Based upon a response to what they stated is the
threat?
Mr. Gilmore. Not so much. I think that we probably do need
to have a clearer thought through threat assessment. Again, we
have taken a couple of cuts at it for you--
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Gilmore.--as a foundation. But that I think lends
itself to--the strategy comes into clearer picture. It makes no
sense to spend a lot of money preparing against something that
is unlikely, when the very likely is right before you.
Mr. Shays. I hear you.
Ms. Hill, on the whole issue of fusion and the issue that
we have one place, and it seems to me that should be the
Department of Homeland Security. It is one of four pillars. It
gets information from our security folks. But I happen to
believe, and I am curious if you do as well, that had we just
paid attention to what was said in public that we would have
known about the terrorist attack?
I base that based on our hearings, but also my travels,
particularly to Israel and the documents that we saw, the
articles in the Egyptian newspaper about a debate among
scholars before September 11th about whether it was a religious
doctrine that would allow for a Muslim to, in fact, attack the
Twin Towers.
So when we talk about fusion--and Governor Gilmore as
well--we are not just talking about Federal, State and local.
We are also talking about providing public documentation in it
as well.
Would you comment, Ms Hill?
Ms. Hill. I think that public documentation and open source
information is very important. I mean, ideally you would want
all of the information. Because, you know, we found there was a
tremendous amount of informationSec. . You know, we didn't have
one single piece of intelligence that said: It is going to
happen on September 11th with planes at the World Trade Center.
We don't have that, but we had a whole lot of little pieces. We
had a tremendous amount of information out there on the scope
of the threat, on tactics. We knew these specific individuals,
two of them at least, were coming into this country that
ultimately ended up on these planes.
So, you know, we did have a lot of information, but it
wasn't brought together. And I think open source information is
also critically important. And, you know, ideally if you had a
fusion center, not only would that brings in intelligence
information, but also law enforcement information.
As Governor Gilmore points out, and he is absolutely right,
State and local law enforcement can be a tremendous source of
valuable information.
Mr. Gilmore. The central problem--first of all, you are
correct, Congressman Shays, absolutely correct, about the need
for open source material. Not all intelligence is secret
intelligence. In fact some of the best intelligence is what the
enemy tells you.
But put that aside for a moment. The critical problem is
culture. The problem is within the fusion center and within
intelligence organizations we have ingrained in for many
decades a reluctance to share information. Hopefully the fusion
center, the TTIC or whatever format ultimately survives, will
gain the esprit de corps, confidence and team work to give
information back and forth and to bring in the States and
locals.
The central concern we hear is the States and locals say we
are happy to give the feds information, but it is a one-way
street, after a while we get tired of it.
Mr. Shays. Would either of you comment on what former
Senator Hart has done with the Council on Foreign Relations in
the whole sense that we are underfunding our first responders
because we have not created standards, and therefore don't know
how to judge what they need, and their estimate that we could
be a hundred billion dollars short in 5 years?
Ms. Hill. I have--we did not look at first responders. We
looked at intelligence. And I would defer to Governor Gilmore.
Mr. Gilmore. We have extensively discussed standards in our
reports over the years. Yes, standards are necessary, because
you have to know what kind of gas masks, what kind of materials
you need and so on. But that isn't so much the central point.
It is standards to do what? It is buy personnel to prepare for
what? It isSec. ut together organizations to respond to what
threat, and to what type of response is necessary? What kind of
vehicles do you need? It is not just a matter of which vehicle.
Mr. Shays. Now, follow up with my yellow light. Should we
require the Department of Homeland Security in the next 9
months to do that? They are giving out money and should we be
saying you are giving it out under what basis?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, they are not giving much money out, and
you hear that from the locals all of the time, and I am not so
sure that is bad, to tell you the truth, and it ought to go out
sparingly.
Mr. Gilmore. The answer is--the question is, should the
Department do it? Yeah, but they have got a lot on their plate.
It is hard to put together these agencies--these disparate
agencies with different cultures. I think the administrative
burden is enormous, but to the extent that strategic thinking
could be done by the Department under your direction, I think
it should be.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, is recognized
for purposes of questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, have enjoyed
the testimony of both witnesses.
Taking off from Congressman Dicks' comments earlier, Ms.
Hill, if that agent sent that same memo today, do you think it
would be treated any differently?
Ms. Hill. I certainly hope it would. I think Director
Mueller is very much aware of that situation and is very much
aware of our report and has indicated in his statements that
the FBI is taking our recommendations very seriously. The
committees have made a long list of things that we pointed out
in this report to the FBI that need to be done to improve their
own internal communication and their focus this these kinds of
intelligence issues.
As I understand it, Director Mueller has said that they are
in fact very actively implementing reforms that he says are
designed to address the same areas of problems and reform that
we have recommended in this report. So I obviously have not had
the opportunity since I have left the committee to be briefed
on what the FBI is doing, but my understanding is that that is
certainly his intent.
The other thing I would say is that, hopefully, if nothing
else, by making the facts of the missteps and the lack of focus
that happened before 9/11 very public and having discussed it
with the agencies many times, I would certainly hope that all
of them are very sensitive to these kinds of issues and are
doing their best to try and prevent a similar problem in the
future.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
On a broader note, if we take the 13 intelligence gathering
agencies from Congress and say, well, you all should cooperate
and get along and share information, do I hear from your
testimony that that is only as good as the people who work for
those agencies agreeing to do that?
Ms. Hill. Well, ultimately, it depends on people. It is
like any part of government. It is basically made up of people.
A lot of it is what Governor Gilmore has said. It is culture.
Lot of the issue between intelligence and law enforcement,
which has been part of this problem, was historically based on
some valid legal reasons. There were some concerns. The
Intelligence Community has always been very concerned about
protecting their sources. They don't want to give too much to
the law enforcement side, because they don't want it to end up
in a courtroom where they are going to have to disclose their
sources, those sorts of legitimate concerns.
We heard, for example, that analysts in the law enforcement
side were being told not to write down analysis, because
analysis really is not always fact. It is analyzing and
theorizing about what all of these facts may mean. We were
told, and I can understand this, that sometimes analysts at the
FBI were told not to write down paper analysis because the
prosecutors did not want that in their files when they go to
try criminal cases. Having been a prosecutor years ago, I know
that there is a legitimate concern there.
So some of these things were driven by the law, by the
differences between the mission and the function of law
enforcement and intelligence. Some of it was driven simply by
agency cultures, by agency turf. There are a lot of reasons.
Also, I think in the Intelligence Community, as the
Governor said, it is true that they have a culture that is
grounded in secrecy, for some very good reasons, and it is
difficult for them I think to go too far beyond that. They
guard their information very carefully because of the
sensitivity of that information.
So there are a lot of reasons, some of them very valid, for
all of this, but I think the agencies have to recognize--and I
hope they do now--that we are living in a world where things
changed after 9/11. We are living in a different time, and
there is now a need, a very real need, for realtime information
not just for people in the Intelligence Community but also in
law enforcement and in State and local governments and State
and local law enforcement. So we have to somehow get beyond
those cultures and those legal issues.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Governor, do you think as we move forward in this country
is there ever or will there ever be a time when we could
consider ourselves safe? And, if so, help frame how we measure
it.
Mr. Gilmore. Well, as I have said in other forums,
Congressman, I don't believe that the country can ever be
completely secure, and I think there is a real risk here, a
dramatic moment in time I think in this country when there is a
dramatic risk that we will work so hard to create security that
we will overlook everything else that is of value in the
American system, and I am concerned about it. And the
Commission I think will have more to say about this in December
as well.
I don't believe that you can be completely secure. We don't
think that that is the right approach. The correct approach, it
seems to us, is to not focus on vulnerabilities, because
everything is vulnerable unless you put it inside a wall, and
even then it may be vulnerable. Instead, focus on risk. Focus
on the capability of the enemy. What can they actually do? And
that means that you circle back to the intelligence issue,
because the better your intelligence, the better your knowledge
of what the enemy can actually do, what their capability is,
and then you begin to know what you need to protect against.
That is the assessment that needs to be done.
In terms of measurement, I think that it can be measured. I
think that the intelligence organizations, the 13 or so
organizations, when they trade notes and they exchange
information in a TTIC or another fusion center and reach
consensus as a group, can come to policymakers and make good
decisions about the level of security of the country.
Understand, Congressman, that we can never be completely
secure, and a well-financed, militarily trained enemy will try
to find the vulnerabilities to the greatest extent they can,
but we can reduce the risk, and we can make the country
reasonably secure.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have one other question.
Chairman Cox. Without objection.
Mr. Thompson. Governor, you now moved on to another point
in your life, and part of it is dealing with issues of homeland
security in the private sector. I would like to know, have we
established within the Department of Homeland Security the
opportunities for private business to come and explain their
products and wares good enough to move the issue alongSec. Do
you understand what--if we have someone who has an idea that
may or may not fall within the area of homeland security, have
we created within that Department a willingness to accept a
point of entry for those individuals to come?
Mr. Gilmore. Let me try to answer this on two levels, if I
can hold this in my mind. The direct answer is I think we are
doing pretty well with that now. Governor Ridge has said that
he wants to consolidate that into one office and one intake
point where people can come in and look at this, and I think
that we are making progress on that.
We still haven't answered the question, the relevancy of
any particular product that is coming in the door. That is the
challenge. Unless the strategy is set and we understand that we
need sensors or we don't need gas masks as the best and highest
use of our money and priorities, then there is no way for a
government official to make a good priority decision about what
to spend the money on. That is the central challenge I think.
Organizationally, I think Governor Ridge is pulling that
together pretty well, and we all know that what is really at
work here is that everybody that can create anything at this
point related to homeland security is sure trying to sell it to
the Federal Government as hard as they possibly can.
The second level, though, of discussion is more intricate,
and it is the question of how you tie in the private sector,
the owners of all the critical infrastructure in this country
into a homeland security strategy when they don't work for the
government. This is a more difficult issue. They actually want
to do things, but there aren't a lot of systems in place to fit
them in very, very well. At the end of the day, they are still
accountable to their bottom line of their shareholders, and
that is a different priority from the government. So that
challenge remains ahead of us, and that is why we took
testimony from Mike Armstrong from the Business Roundtable.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. King, is recognized for
purposes of questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, if I could make a remark to Governor Gilmore, I lost
more than a hundred constituents in my district. Ray Downey
didn't actually live in my district, he was in the adjoining
district, but he certainly was a legend, and I thank you for
paying tribute to him in your statement today. It was well
deserved, and I thank you for that.
Ms. Hill, I want to commend you for the work you did on
this report. One of the things that struck me in reading the
report and listening to your testimony today and also thinking
back to September 11th is that certainly I think most Members
of Congress, if not all, and many people in the executive
department were also taken totally by surprise by the type of
attack that occurred on September 11th, the fact that it was so
coordinated, planes being used as missiles. You mention here on
page 7 of your statement today that there was no--little or no
analytical focus about reports of terrorist activity and
aircraft as weapons. I know that Congressman Dicks touched on
this.
But what I would like to follow up on is, what is your
concern that there can be something going on out there today
that we haven't even conceived of or is almost off the charts
as this type of attack was? We hear so many random type of
attacks--bridges, tunnels, subways, et cetera, agriculture--but
is there--and I guess--I don't know. Maybe the question answers
itself. But could there be things out there that aren't even
being conceived of right now by the intelligence agencies or by
the policy planners?
Ms. Hill. You know, this is just my personal opinion. I
think 9/11 has shown they can think totally out of the box and
they can think of things that are unimaginable to many people.
So I would say, you know, yes, it is very possible they could
be thinking of something. I mean, I don't know that for a fact,
but I am just going by what they have done before. I think they
would look for our vulnerabilities and look for things that we
are not looking at.
So part of the problem is this is a huge country. We have
many ways of people coming into this country, of container
cargo coming in ports and airports and we have huge borders and
everything else. Plus we have the issue of whether there are
people already here that are working for groups like al Qaeda.
So there are tremendous vulnerabilities, and I don't think you
can guarantee that even the best intelligence is going to
absolutely know every single possible tactic that some
terrorist out there has thought up.
It is a very scary thing, it is a very hard thing to defend
against, and you just have to have the best intelligence, the
best sources, the best cooperation and sharing of information
that people can have and look at it all and put it all together
the best you can and look for what makes sense in terms of
where will they go next.
Mr. King. You have spoken about trying to change the
culture in various agencies and departments. There was a story
in this week's Newsweek where it talks about how many people in
the FBI, CIA over the years became gunshy, the fact that they
are afraid of doing something this year which will be
questioned later on.
How much fear is--how much of a problem do you think it is,
let's say, that an agent or an analyst would be afraid to
propose something in the fact that it would be ridiculed or put
down as crazy and the impact of that? Has that mentality
changed at all?
Ms. Hill. Well, I don't know that the mentality has
changed. I will tell one of the issues that we saw on analysis
was not so much that they were gunshy, but one of the things we
heard complaints about was that there was a tendency in
intelligence to go with the majority view on analytical
product. In other words, if there was a dissent, the dissent
would not be fed into the final product, so that what
ultimately would come out would be an analysis based on what
most people thought made sense.
The problem with that in intelligence, is that because
intelligence is a dynamic thing, it changes, you keep getting
new intelligence every day. What happens if you lock it into
the majority view at that point and it continues to go down the
chain like that, later when some new intelligence comes in that
may actually change the whole picture if you had linked it with
what they were saying originally, you have lost that ability to
do that. You have kind of locked yourself into a view that may
not get to the whole picture and may not get the most creative
way to look at intelligence.
So we heard about that as a problem, and we also heard, and
the committees found, that there just was not a lot of real
creative, aggressive analytical products on this particular
issue.
Mr. King. One final question. I know it opens up a whole
new area, and maybe we can talk about it some other time, but
the whole issue of sleeper cells. I have had numerous
discussions with police intelligence people in New York City
who say that they are getting very little cooperation from, for
instance, people within the mosques. Again, I know that opens
up whole other issues about separation of church and state, et
cetera, but how significant an issue do you believe the sleeper
cells are, and from your analysis, is there any way of
estimating, again, the extent of it, how many of them are out
there, what parts of the country?
Ms. Hill. Well, that I probably cannot do. What I can do is
tell you, certainly based on what we saw and what we have--
Mr. King. Do you think it is a real threat, I guess?
Ms. Hill. Yes. What I was going to say was, yes, I do. I
think there was intelligence before 9/11, and we cite it in the
report, that suggests that. For instance, regarding Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed there was a June, 2001, report that said that
he had been travelling to the United States recruiting
individuals to come here and to establish contacts with
colleagues already here.
There was also an FBI analysis that we cite in the report
that talks about the hijackers having a web of contacts in this
country. The Phoenix agent testified that he believed his
theory that there was a support network in this country for al
Qaeda. There was information the FBI received--it is mentioned
in the report--after September 11th from an al Qaeda associate
who said that basically he believed they were trying to do
multiple attacks in this country and that there were people
positioned in--already positioned in this country--that they
could call on to assist for those types of plans.
So there is a wealth of information I think, based on what
we saw, indicating that there very well may be terrorist
sleeper cells or a support network in this country. The report
goes on in great detail about the fact that we found, from our
review of FBI and CIA files, that the hijackers had contacts
with at least 14 different individuals in this country, all of
whom had been known to the FBI previously through FBI
counterterrorist investigations or inquiries. So these were not
just individuals that had perfectly clean backgrounds. These
were individuals that the FBI had reason to believe were
connected with terrorist groups to start with. Lo and behold,
what we found in those files was that the hijackers themselves
were having contacts with those individuals.
So I think it is a very serious issue, and I think it needs
to be absolutely prioritized in terms of investigation and
focus by our law enforcement community and our Intelligence
Community.
Mr. King. Thank you, Ms. Hill. Thank you, Governor.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Florida is no longer with
us. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee, is recognized
for purposes of questions.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and
thank the witnesses very much for the work that you have done.
Forgive those of us who have been in and out because of other
meetings and hearings that we have had to participate in.
But I do want to raise the question and probe what probably
has been probed during my absence by other members, and that is
what the Intelligence Community knew and how they acted upon
it. In particular, Ms. Hill, I would like to refer to the
testimony and statement that you presented and just explore
that with you a little bit.
The paragraph that I am reading now--and I would like to
even--I am not sure if you read verbatim your statement, but I
would like to refer to it on page 3:
``Although prior to September 11th relevant information
that is significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was
available to the Intelligence Community, the Community failed
to focus on that information and to appreciate its collective
significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. As a
result, the report concludes that the Community missed
opportunities to disrupt the September 11th plot by denying
entry to or detaining would-be hijackers, to at least try to
unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative
work within the United States and to generate a heightened
state of alert and thus harden the homeland against attack.''
Let me just add a few more comments before I ask you to
respond. On page 8, I think something positive occurred, or at
least you noted something that we have improved on, from my
perspective. Because my perspective is that we are not safer
than we were after 9/11. We are certainly more aware. We are
far more aware than we have ever been. So that is a positive.
On page 8 you note, ``Prior to September 11th, U.S.
counterterrorism efforts operated largely without the benefit
of an alert, mobilized and committed American public. The
assumption prevailed in the U.S. Government that attacks of the
magnitude of September 11th could not happen here and, as a
result, there was insufficient effort to alert the American
public to the reality and the gravity of the threat.''
I think the establishment of the Homeland Security
Department, this Homeland Security Committee which I am hoping
and praying will be a committee of action, and also what has
occurred in our local jurisdictions on the home front, the
neighborhoods, the cities, the counties, is a great success. We
are aware, we are alert, we are sensitive, but it begs the
question whether or not we have made any strides as relates to
this singular question of whether or not September 11th could
have been prevented, not whether it could have been prevented 2
months out, 3 months out, but let's just take the whole ball of
wax. Let's take it on several years of encountering and asking
the question whether or not it could have been prevented.
I say that because parallel to this hearing--and might I
say a day before the second anniversary of September 11th--we
certainly owe those who lost their lives not a tribute that I
know that they will get but certainly a response that their
lives were not lost tragically in long, extended--in vain.
So I believe we are at a point that gives me discomfort
that we have not yet answered the question. I believe that this
whole issue warrants public hearings around the Nation, in
large cities, in small cities, that the classified
information--I wonder the basis of its classification inasmuch
as the tragedy has already occurred. I might be convinced if
some of that classified information triggers into ongoing
investigations.
But the bottom-line question of this, we have, as my
colleague noted, several intelligence entities that exist. We
do have sort of this infrastructure that is across the street
from the Homeland Security or the Pentagon, which I am not sure
anyone understands what they do or what they do. So the
question to you is, have we answered this question of complete
absence of connectedness with the Intelligence Community?
General Sanchez said, ``I don't need more troops.'' And
whether I disagree or agree with him, I need better
intelligence in Iraq. We need better intelligence here in the
United States, and I don't see where we have made the
improvement where the action items have occurred on this.
My last point is I note in this material that the
individuals, two of them, that came over did not get on a watch
list to the FBI until August of 2001. What a tragedy. What a
crisis. Where are we today in terms of correcting that and
paying true tribute to the thousands who lost their lives of
whom we will pay tribute to tomorrow on 9/11, the anniversary?
Ms. Hill. I can talk about--certainly you have raised a lot
of the issues that were problems before 9/11. What has happened
today, are we there, have we fixed all those problems, I do not
know to what extent all the reforms have been put into place,
because my job was looking at what occurred before 9/11. I have
not done the same kind of in-depth scrub that we did on pre 9/
11 on the issue of what has happened since 9/11. That was not
our mandate.
I can tell you several things that are positive.
One is I would agree with what you said. One of the
problems we noted was that the American public was not really
alert to this threat, and I think the American public is now,
if for no other reason than because of September 11th, very
alert to this, as is the law enforcement community and the
Intelligence Community. So our alert level has clearly risen.
In terms of sharing information and actual reform at the
FBI, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, Director Mueller has
stated he is very familiar with our report and what we have
found and the problems, and he has said that he is actively
pursuing reform within the FBI in the areas the committees have
recommended.
Again, I have not had the opportunity to be briefed as to
what is being done, so I can't speak to that, but I know that
is his stated intent.
On intelligence, I believe Senator Graham in the Senate has
actually introduced legislation that would implement the actual
recommendations of the report. In the House I believe Chairman
Goss and Ms. Harman, the ranking member, are actively pursuing
with the agencies through oversight hearings and through the
authorization bill ways to address the issues that we raised
concerns about in the report. So there is a lot of activity
focusing on this.
Again, I feel really unqualified to give you a flat opinion
as to whether what is going on is actually solving the problem,
because I have not examined it and I haven't done the type of
review that I would feel more comfortable with before I made
that conclusion. I do know that people are aware of what we
have said and they are addressing it and they are saying they
are addressing it. Now, how good that is, I can't tell you at
this point.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, Governor Gilmore would like
to--he is raising his hand to answer.
Chairman Cox. By all means.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Gilmore. To Congressman Jackson-Lee, we had a raging
debate on this topic in the year 2002 on the Commission, and
the issue was what type of reform needs to be done in order to
bring better domestic intelligence into play. There was a--
usually, our Commission operates on a consensus. The goal is to
achieve consensus. That is usually the right answer. We failed
on this one.
The argument had two camps. The one camp was led by me that
believed that the FBI should be reformed and made to create a
real intelligence division instead of the simple law
enforcement function that it seems to specialize in.
The other camp was led by Paul Bremer, who said that we
should not have the FBI do this, that they are not capable of
doing it and never will be, and therefore we should create an
MI-5 organization akin to the British model to conduct domestic
terrorist information in this country.
Bremer won that debate. I put a dissent in the report. It
is actually very entertaining stuff, if you wanted to take a
look at it.
But the fact of the matter is that since that report was
published the Director has appeared twice before our
Commission. I think he is very concerned about the report of
the Commission and the recommendation. He has been over to
explain to us that he is trying to change the culture at the
FBI, not to diminish its law enforcement capacity but to add to
it a domestic intelligence capacity.
But the jury is out. They will need to change their way of
thinking about this. They will need to put good agents into
counterterrorism and give them good career paths and promote
them just the way that they would somebody that wants to bust a
counterfeiter or a drug addict.
So there is a lot to be done here, and we will have to see,
but it is clear that Director Mueller intends to create that
capacity to make it a success in the United States.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, if I would, I will end. I
don't know if you were listening, and I just hope that this
might be the work of the committee. I think this is a very
striking point that the Governor has made, despite the debate
in his committee.
I can't imagine the FBI in the 21st century without an
antiterrorism or intelligence component balancing--and maybe
where Ambassador Bremer was going was civil liberties and our
concerns there, but we can balance that. But here is a domestic
Federal law enforcement that we have always looked to for
excellence and that they are deprived of the opportunity to
create an excellent intelligence unit that really would have
been helpful pre-September 11 so they would have been able to
digest what they have gotten even though they got it a few days
out, 2 days out, they might have been able to move quickly.
I don't think we can operate without that kind of
component, and it is interesting that that is one aspect that
maybe has been dragging its feet because of this debate that
has been going on. I think it is crucial for this committee.
I thank the chairman very much. I don't know your comment
on it, but I hope we can work on it and the ranking--
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlelady.
The chairman recognizes himself for 5 minutes. I would like
to return to this question of the fusion center.
I was recognizing a member on this side, but there isn't
any reason. You are quite right. I will yield instead to the
gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Dr.para.hristensen, for 8
minutes of questions.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was encouraged to see the Governor raise his hand to
answer a question after almost 3 hours. I am glad to see that
you are still being patient with us and willing to answer.
I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for
holding this hearing on this very appropriate day, the eve of
the second anniversary, and I would say certainly it is
important on this second anniversary for us and the American
people to know what has been done to reduce our risk of a
terrorist attack and to improve our ability to respond. I just
wish that we had a better report 2 years out.
Governor, I will say I agree with you on your priority of
the need for structure and framework, for assessment and a
clear definition of what capabilities are needed for us to
develop. I think that has been a great source of frustration to
us on the committee but even more so of course to those who are
on the front lines.
I have about two or three questions, and I think they are
pretty brief.
The first one, the Commission recommended that the
President clearly define the responsibilities of the Department
of Homeland Security and other Federal entities. He noted that
this was especially important in the case of a bioterrorist
terrorist attack. To your mind, have these roles and
responsibilities been clarified? Specifically, if we were to
have a bioterror attack today, would we know who was in charge?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, that is really an excellent question and
one that has troubled the Commission greatly. In the very first
year of our Commission, in 1999, when we did the threat
assessment we raised that fundamental question, who is in
charge, because we didn't think that answer existed at that
time.
I think that you have today a dual role in the bioterrorism
area, and that is the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Health and Human Services at the same time. We
made a recommendation that I think that HHS--I will have to
look back now and make sure my memory serves correctly. I think
we recommended HHS be the lead agency in conjunction with DHS,
or it may have been the other way around. I am not sure. But we
have to define this. We have to define exactly who will, in
fact, be responsible in a bioterrorism attack.
If I could just take one moment, Mrs. Christensen, to say
this, that while we think it is exceedingly difficult for a
terrorist organization to get their hands on a bioterrorist
weapon, we think that is a hard thing to do and hard thing to
deliver and there has been a history of it being difficult to
do, if it did occur it would be the worst possible thing that
could happen. You could put a police tape around a nuclear
explosion, but you can't around a contagious disease that was
put into the population.
There are ways of dealing with us. HHS is certainly the
agency with the greatest expertise. I think the correct answer
would be to have a clear designation as to which agency will be
in response and which one will be in support. Clearly, the
expertise rests with HHS.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Being representative of a U.S. territory, I wanted to also
ask, based on the Commission reports and the one to come, are
you satisfied that the needs of territories and also native
American reservations are being adequately factored in as we
assess where we are and where we need to be?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, that is another excellent question. The
Indian reservations ought to be part of the State plans
developed wherein those reservations reside. They ought to be
included within those State plans, as to whether or not there
is a substantial risk that needs to be taken into consideration
in the State plans.
Territories are a different issue, and I am afraid I can't
answer whether the territories have been included in the
structure and planning for a territorial plan which would then
fit into the national strategy when it finally emerges, but I
will say that I think you are right. They should be. And I
suspect they are.
Mrs. Christensen. We are. I just want to always make sure
that we are considered when all of the discussions are taking
place, because many times we are an afterthought, and this is
too important for us to be an afterthought.
One recommendation involved fund reimbursement to State and
localities and the private sector for expenditures to increase
security. I am a ranking member on National Parks, Recreation
and Public Lands, and they were recently cited for their lack
of security, not providing adequate security. I have heard from
the Director that they may take up to $65,000 a day during an
Orange Alert to beef up security, and that comes from other
funding needs within the Park Service.
Is it also your recommendation that agencies include in
their budget a specific set-aside for homeland security in
addition to the regular costs that they need to cover?
Mr. Gilmore. You mean for national parks?
Mrs. Christensen. Well, I think other agencies face the
same problem. There hasn't been anything in their budget for--
when the need arises, for them to increase security because we
are on a higher alert, and that is what has happened in the
Park Service. And it is a significant amount of money that is
expended. You talked about States, locality and the private
sector, but the departments haven't--they have been taking it
out of their normal budget.
Mr. Gilmore. I think that--I am not sure the Commission has
heard this, in all honesty, but my reaction is I think I am at
this from a little different direction, and it is not simply to
fund everybody that feels like that they have a security need.
To the contrary, I think you have to instead look at the
national strategy and ask yourself where your priorities are
and then what you can reasonably afford to fund without
breaking the back of the economy of the Nation.
The enemy has said that they wish to break the economy. We
can do that for them by spending ourselves into oblivion trying
to protect every vulnerability. So I think that a careful
assessment has to be done as to the greatest vulnerabilities
and the greatest priorities so that we move down the line until
we run out of money and then at that point we just have to stop
and say that we are stopping.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Governor. I agree with you.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentlelady.
Governor Gilmore, your fourth report describes the
importance of a fusion center located outside the CIA. You went
so far as to recommend that the CIA analysts that work for the
fusion center should not be detailed but permanently employed.
As you know, we have TTIC up and running. We have referred to
it throughout this hearing. We also have an intelligence
analytical capability being built at the Department of Homeland
Security in response to the statutory command that the fusion
center be constructed there. What do you make of the fact that
we have two competing fusion centers now under construction?
Mr. Gilmore. The Commission's report recommended--it was, I
believe, the first to recommend a fusion center, I think, and
we did that on December the 15th of 2002, prior to the
President's State of the Union address. We always envisioned
that there would be one, that it would not be centered in any
one agency.
Now I happen to be a personal fan of the CIA, but the
concern that the Commission has expressed is that the fusion
center should not become loyal to one agency only but instead
should be an independent stand-alone with the capacity to do
the kind of independent work with people permanently detailed
to it so that they were not accountable to or answerable to
some other agency somewhere and that all agencies of the
Federal Government should then become customers of the one
independent stand-alone. That is the recommendation of the
Commission, and duplication we think would be
counterproductive.
Chairman Cox. That goes to the nub of my question, because
there is, quite obviously, duplication in construction of a
fusion center in DHS and construction of a fusion center at
TTIC. Your recommendation--because it made clear that this was
not supposed to be under the direction of the CIA--also is not
therefore reflected in TTIC which is under the direction of the
DCI.
The President, when he announced in his State of the Union
in January of this year the creation of TTIC, also put out
materials from the White House contemporaneously that stated
that TTIC would not be headquartered at CIA. But of course it
is, and it will be until sometime next year under current
plans.
When the Congress wrote the Homeland Security Act, we
considered at great length many of the issues that undoubtedly
you wrestled with when you were debating, for example, whether
to have an MI-5 in the United States. Homeland security is
about what goes on here inside the United States domestically.
Homeland Security, the Department, is going to have an enormous
liaison function with State and local agencies, law enforcement
and otherwise. So the question arises, if this is going to be
CIA, would we want the CIA to be more involved in our domestic
life for a variety of reasons which you would immediately
recognize. The Congress chose not to do that and yet we find
ourselves now with--despite a Presidential promise that TTIC
would not be headquartered at the CIA, despite the legislation
that is on the books, something running persistently in the
opposite direction.
From a policy standpoint, the easiest way to capitalize on
this, look at it as a glass half full, it strikes me, is that
we can appreciate what is being built at TTIC, recognize that
if it is not going to be permanent it certainly is substantial
and of indefinite duration and that perhaps this should be made
to fulfill the mandate of the Department and that TTIC and what
the Department is building could be merged so that ultimately
TTIC can fulfill the statutory mandate in the Homeland Security
Act if it is under the control not of the DCI but the
Secretary. What is your view of that?
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, let me be very clear. The
Commission has never for an instant lost sight of the fact that
it is a recommending body only, that the policy decisions have
to be made by the elected officials in the Congress and in the
executive branch, and we have no priority ownership on any of
this.
We recommended an independent body and stated our reasons
as to why we did that. If it is the wisdom of the Congress to
place in the Department of Homeland Security in order to
centralize those functions in one place, that is a decision
that rests with the Congress.
Chairman Cox. Let me ask the question, then--and I
appreciate that response, and I recognize that neither what has
happened nor what seems likely to happen in the future is a
precise reflection of your recommendations, although having
recommended a fusion center early on, I think you can take
great credit for what--as a result of Ms. Hill's work--is
obviously a recommendation that solves a lot of problems we
have experienced.
But let me ask both of you this question. Is there any role
assigned to TTIC at present that DHS could not itself perform?
Ms. Hill. Again, I am not--I have not studied in depth how
TTIC is being set up or what they precisely are doing, so I
don't know that I am the best person to answer that. I do agree
that we need to have one center. I don't see much point in us
having two. And wherever that center is, it needs to have the
authority and the clout, if you would, to get the agencies to
share information. That is the most critical thing.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, this is a very complicated
question, because a fusion center clearly can do what it is
supposed to do wherever it is if it is properly managed and
given very specific direction. I guess our concern has been
that if it is placed in one location that other agencies will
not get the same dibs on the capacity that others might or the
same access to it or the same attention from it that others
might.
Clearly, we all understand the importance of the Department
of Homeland Security having total access and, furthermore, even
tasking capabilities we believe for gathering information and
having information analyzed. We place a great high value on the
Department of Homeland Security and certainly we would
understand the Congress's approach on that. Our only
reservation just is simply to make sure that whoever is in it
that they--within their culture--provide the same access and
information and attention to all the agencies in equal measure.
Ms. Hill. Mr. Chairman, I would just add one thing on this
and just point out that our report does point out, at least
before 9/11, that the DCI, even though he was the head of the
Intelligence Community, was--I believe the words the report
uses, was ``unable or unwilling to marshall all the resources
of the Intelligence Community.'' So the point being that, at
least prior to 9/11, the DCI was not able even to bring the
Intelligence Community together, let alone those beyond the
Intelligence Community. So perhaps that has been fixed, but
that was certainly the case before 9/11, and we need to make
sure whoever runs the fusion center has a much better ability
than that, at least in terms of what was going on before 9/11,
to bring together all of that information.
The other issue that did come up that is I think relevant
to this point, we heard from many Intelligence Community
analysts some concerns about the CIA was not really taking in
their viewpoints on analysis. There was some, I guess, agency
back and forth between CIA and other parts of the Intelligence
Community in the analytical area. So that--if the CIA is going
to run TTIC, that has to be addressed and fixed, because that
was a problem before 9/11.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, if I could add to that thought. I
guess the concern is that, knowing the intelligence agencies,
including the FBI, they are going to be very excited about the
prospect that analysis is going to be done elsewhere. The FBI
was most unhappy with the idea that their information would be
analyzed elsewhere, and I think that is just going to be a
problem that you are going to have to confront and cope with
and find the best possible solution. If you place it in DHS, at
least surely they will get access to the information which they
must have. What you have to guard against then is all the other
agencies that contribute to us decide to go their own way and
the fusion center just becomes basically a sterile function. I
think that is the administrative challenge.
Chairman Cox. Finally, Governor Gilmore, shifting gears
dramatically, your Commission has recommended concerning
immigration and border control as an element of our national
security strategy, of our antiterrorism strategy and you have
served as Governor of Virginia which issued fraudulent drivers'
licenses to the 9/11 terrorists. I know you have an abiding
interest as a result of that because so many of them did have
Virginia driver's license, and the GAO yesterday issued a
report that many States now have a problem with their drivers'
licenses being easily forged and that if the driver's license
is going to serve as identification to buy weapons, to board
airplanes and so on, we have got to take this much more
seriously.
They issued a classified report. Some of it was made public
yesterday. I wonder if you wanted to comment on that.
California, as you know, legislation was just signed on
Friday that in my view takes a giant leap backward, that
liberalizes the requirements for obtaining a driver's license
and does away with the only reliable identifier that was part
of the California system which was a social security number,
substituting an IRS-issued number which the IRS says it can't
back up. I wonder if you want to comment on that.
I know also the White House has an ongoing effort to look
at the question of uniform Federal minimum standards for State
drivers' licenses.
Mr. Gilmore. The irony is that the policy of my
administration was to be as public service oriented as we could
possibly be, and then that opened up a vulnerability which the
enemy exploited.
I think that it is common sense that you would want to have
a reliable identity indicator before a driver's license is
issued.
Chairman Cox. Governor, let me interject. I don't want
anyone to infer from the way I put the question that the
driver's license requirements in the State of Virginia were
anything that you constructed as Governor. I mention only that
you have an interest in this because you are from Virginia.
Mr. Gilmore. I understand.
Chairman Cox. You are the leading expert in our
counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. Gilmore. It seems to me that the objective here is to
make sure that there is an identifier, and I would think that
it becomes a Federal issue, doesn't it, as to whether the
Federal Government is going to require a certain base level
requirement to the States on a driver's license. That becomes a
pretty tough Federalism issue.
But if some States are moving to the point where they are
basically going to not have reliability indicators, then they
are going to raise a public policy issue that the Congress
probably has to address.
Chairman Cox. I appreciate that.
Mr. Turner, would you like to be recognized for a second
round of questions?
Oh, I am sorry. Mr. Meek has returned.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek, is recognized for
purposes of questions.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to apologize for dipping in and out, and I kind of
faked you out to the fact that I was back in, but I want to
thank both of our panelists for being here, and I want to
apologize. I have been trying to squeeze in a few meetings on
the side here, but I have been watching on the monitor some of
your responses that have been responsive--responses to
questions that I had prior to reading your prepared statements.
I know that we are here today to really talk about the
functions of government and how can we work together to prevent
terrorist attacks in the future. As we start looking at
communications, that was one of the main functions, I would
assume, even breaking through the walls of who is talking to
who as it relates to our intelligence institutions. But I know
that the people of this country place a very strong role in
being able to help the Intelligence Community as it relates to
our information about strange events that may take place,
either local government or Federal Government.
Y'all have listened to--you have had hours and hours and
hours of hearings, different individuals coming in to testify,
either be it classified or unclassified. I am very concerned
about the communications from not only our Intelligence
Community but I would say our law enforcement community to
general Americans about what is going on.
I know that the Department of Homeland Security has
performed many test sites throughout the country in trying to
get our first responders in practice to be able to respond to
the different terrorist events that could take place in this
country. We want to prevent that from happening. But what is
going to happen as it relates--and I think the biggest exercise
we have had thus far was the power outage in New York and the
Northeast. I saw via television many individuals not knowing
where to go, what to do or how to leave Manhattan, since it was
the most televised city in the Northeast due to the fact that
it is the hub for many of the national television and cable
outlets. No one knew what to do and when to do it.
Now, law enforcement did the best that they could do by
directing individuals to either take a ferry, or whatever the
case may be, but there was a lot of what we saw on 9/11, a lot
of folks standing on the corner telling people where to go, how
to get there, people not knowing what to do. They had phone
service.
I introduced, with some other Members of this Congress, a
bill called the ready-call bill that would allow the Homeland
Security or local law enforcement to contact people at work,
contact individuals at home or wherever they may be to give
them some instructions about, number one, what is going on,
number two, what they should do to protect themselves and
hopefully, number three--not necessarily in this order--not to
hinder first responders from responding to wherever they need
to respond to.
I want to talk a little bit about--I wanted you to respond
a little bit to the fact, both of you, of what you heard out
there and how we can communicate better with Americans, number
one, as it relates to knowing about terrorist events or them
reporting possible terrorist individuals or sleeper cells or
what have you to our Intelligence Community; and, number two,
as it relates to how can we communicate with the public better
so it doesn't hinder first responders being able to contain a
possible terrorist event that may take place.
Ms. Hill. I would only say--you know, just comment that one
of the things that we did find in the 9/11 inquiry was that, in
fact, before 9/11 the American public had not really been
sufficiently alerted to the threat of bin Laden and the very
high, immediate, peak-level threat that we had in 2001.
The committees drew the conclusion--and this was an area
where we got a little beyond intelligence, because it was more
a policy issue and we didn't dwell at length on it, but they
did make the comments that an alert American public is a
tremendous benefit to our intelligence and law enforcement
authorities.
It is not just that the public has the right to know. It is
also that the public can help in the fight against terrorism by
simply being alert to things that they may see that otherwise
may go unnoticed by our law enforcement and intelligence
people.
So that is an area before 9/11 where we found more could
have been done to alert them to the type of threat we were
facing, the immediacy of that threat and how serious it was.
Having said that, in terms of what we can do the next time
for when something happens to better prepare people, my own
personal viewpoint is I think a lot of it must be in educating
the public not just on the scope of the threat but on the
emergency preparedness regarding what they should be doing
before the event happens. And we obviously didn't look at that
in the course of our review. That is something I am sure
Governor Gilmore can speak more to.
But it is important to keep the public alert. It is
important to let them know what some of the intelligence is to
the extent you can do it without harming national security, and
that is where the whole issue, that we saw again and again, of
classification comes in. There were so many threats coming in
about bin Laden in 2001. Yet a lot of that was lost in terms of
getting it to the public, and I think part of it was because of
classification. Most of that information was classified until
we had our hearings in 2002 and got some of that information
declassified to release to the American public, but it was late
in coming.
Mr. Meek. Very quickly, how do you see--Mr. Chairman, if I
may, how do you see that--our government preventing that from
happening in the future? Because, as a past law enforcement
individual, no one wants to tell the next person about what
they know, especially after Director Tenet was kind of thrown
from the train earlier this year as it relates to information
that he provided to the White House. And that is so very, very
important.
Sometimes we hold things so close to our chest to the
detriment of the country, and we have to make sure that we get
that information out. Because just like in Iraq when we were
able to find Saddam Hussein's sons by someone just walking into
one of our task forces and saying, guess what, I know where
they are, maybe they walk into wherever it may be, could be
somewhere in Florida, a police department, somebody will say,
well, carry on about your business, sure.
Ms. Hill. Right. An alert public can really provide a lot
of valuable information, but they have to be alert to do it.
They have to know there is a threat.
The committee has recommended--there is a recommendation in
the report-that the whole issue of classification be reviewed
both by the President and the Congress, with an eye towards
looking at ways to get more realtime information not only to
our State and local authorities, our law enforcement agencies,
our intelligence agencies, but also to the public.
You know, having just gone through 7 months of the
declassification of this report, I can tell you, my own
personal view is that we classify an awful lot of material
beyond where we need to classify it.
In my prior life, when I worked on the Senate Subcommittee
on Investigations years ago, we did a hearing on security
clearance and classification I believe in the mid 1980s, and
one of the findings at that hearing was that too much was
classified. I think that is still true, and it is very hard to
get some of this stuff declassified, but there are valid public
interests in getting a lot of this information out to the
American public. That is what these committees felt was the
case, and that is why we spent 7 months trying to get a lot of
this declassified in our report.
But that needs to go beyond the post mortem and go to
threat information. The danger is that you never want to give
people threat information that causes them to later doubt your
credibility and say, well, you were overdoing it. You are
scaring people. So there is a very fine line, and I am not
saying it is easy. It is very difficult, but we need to find
that fine line so that the public gets an accurate and clear
picture of what the threat level is.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman Meek, if I could just add to that,
I would certainly concur that we have to find the best ways to
communicate the best information we can to the locals so that
they are in a position to communicate to the public with their
feet on the street when the time comes that the crisis occurs,
that they are alert to the plan and exactly what type of
planning is necessary, and they have to be heads up. They have
to know earlier than just all of a sudden it falling on them.
So that ability to communicate up and down the line, Federal,
State and local, is very critical.
The second piece is the complicated question of how do you
deal with the communication with the public. This is going to
continue to be a matter of a lot of discussion about how you do
this. I personally think that the best thing to do is to give
the best possible information we can as to what the actual
threat is so that the public is aware of what the actual threat
might be.
We are not doing that in--the popular media is not doing
that today. They are focusing on the vulnerability, and instead
saying to the American people, we are vulnerable, we are
vulnerable, we are vulnerable. And we are, but unless the enemy
can actually use that vulnerability against us, it is not
really a threat.
So, for example, I have seen an awful lot of hyping on a
lot of these popular shows about certain things that could
happen theoretically, but unless the Intelligence Community
believes that there is a practical reason to believe that the
event could occur, it is not fair to the American people to
tense them all up and make them think they are going to die
next morning from a contagious disease when there is no
evidence that there is one that is possible against the
American people. This is complicated stuff, the second half of
it.
Mr. Meek. Just in closing, Mr. Chairman, Governor, I know
exactly what you are saying; and, Ms. Hill, I hear what you are
saying also as it relates to tensing the American people up. I
mean, my constituents, they don't know what color it is. They
just know we went up a color and what does that mean. Do I fly?
Do I stay home? Do I pray? What do I do?
But I think that the real issue is making sure that we can
break through and allow the American people to play a role in
this. What works for local law enforcement in any given
community in preventing crime is an educated and also
responsive public. The public doesn't feel that they can
communicate not only with our Federal agencies, because people,
nine times out of ten, they don't know who to call or where to
go.
Making sure that we work with those agencies and sharing
information, not putting anything to the side, number two,
being able to--when I mention communicating with the public, if
the power went out, we don't know why it went out, but this is
what you should do, and this is where you should go.
I mean, in New York, the City of New York, they are putting
together a report--and I am interested in seeing it--they did
have phone service. Someone could have called them from an
emergency center and said, this is the way you leave the island
of Manhattan, and this is what is working, these are the
outlets that are taking place. And they have a plan.
So that is what I was mainly addressing. I was thinking
through the hours and hours of testimony that y'all have heard,
and if your staff or anyone has heard anything to what I am
trying to get more information on as it relates to
communications, I will be more than happy to have that, because
I think that it is important that we inform the American people
on what they should do in a time of national emergency.
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, sir. I think we can agree that people of
New York did awfully well in that blackout. That could have
been a really bad situation, and the people in the City of New
York took it in stride. I guess they are used to seeing
everything, aren't they?
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman. This brings our
hearing to a conclusion. The September 11 anniversary is a
particularly poignant and sad remembrance, but your work has
helped us bring constructive change out of tragedy, and I want
to thank you for that.
Ms. Hill, your leadership on the Congressional Joint
Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees has
been extremely valuable. To the extent you have been able to
declassify your work, the public can now access it on the Web.
It is very a unhappy document to read but a very instructive
one as well.
Governor Gilmore, your continued leadership as chairman of
the Congressional Advisory Panel is a most welcome
contribution. You have contributed to the Congress in so many
ways and to the executive branch. Even during your tenure as
Governor you were moonlighting in other capacities, and I just
am amazed at your ability to do so much and to carry so much
responsibility. I want to thank you for it.
I can't think of any better way to summarize and conclude
our work today than to read the conclusion of your testimony in
which you admonish us to always be cautious as those who are
responsible for the Nation's security not to simply redefine
away our freedoms in the name of security. It is preparedness
that must be defined, not our definition of freedom that has
already gained its meaning by the blood of American patriots,
including those who died on September 11th.
Many of the members of this committee when you said those
words commented, you have got it just right. That is why we are
here. So we shall, of course, meet again between now and the
next September 11th, but thank you in realtime for what you
have done and for the help that you have given the Congress and
the American people.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Materials for the Record
Questions submitted for the Record for the Honorable Jim Gilmore, III
Questions from the Honorable Dave Camp
1. In your opinion, do we have adequate recruitment and training
capacity to meet human intelligence needs? What are your
recommendations for improving our human intelligence capacity?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
2. How can Congress assist DHS and intelligence agencies in
creating ``a seamless system for the intelligence community and law
enforcement for storing and exchanging information''?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
3. Governor Gilmore, your commission noted the importance of
coordination with the private sector in preparing and responding to
terrorist attacks. Could you please comment on your recommendations for
improving participation, inclusion, and communication between DHS and
the private sector?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
Questions from the Honorable Jim Turner, Ranking Member
1. Several agency officials from the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, the CIA, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
have testified to this Committee that information sharing between
government agencies is improving. However, state and local officials
who have appeared before our Committee have pointed to continuing
problems, a position borne out in a GAO report issued on August 27,
2003 that shows that no level of government is satisfied with the
current status of information sharing. In addition, there remain
questions on how many security clearances are needed for state and
local officials to handle sensitive intelligence information.
Based on your commission's work, who at the federal level needs to
make the changes necessary to improve the flow of information to state
and local officials? Are there barriers to information sharing that the
Commission has identified that Congress can help to remove?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
2. You recommended that DHS should be able to levy requirements on
other intelligence agencies to help it carry out its mission. To your
knowledge, has DHS levied such requirements on the Intelligence
Community? What types of requirements should the DHS be developing?
What is your sense of how DHS is interacting with other members of the
Intelligence Community? Has this been done adequately?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
In addition, , which should DHS be able to levy the same type of
requirements for information from the private sector owns and operates
many of the potential terrorist targets in the country? If so, how
should DHS go about getting that information? Has such information been
flowing to date?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
3. The Homeland Security Act included several mechanisms for the
Department to conduct various analytic tasks. These include providing
Secretary Ridge with an Advisory Committee, calling for a ``Homeland
Security Institute'' to perform studies like RAND did for the Pentagon
in the Cold War, and drawing upon academic expertise by establishing
university centers. From your expertise as Chairman of a terrorism
advisory commission, what recommendations do you have for gathering and
implementing suggestions from the private sector and academia to
improve DHS operations?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
Questions for the Record for Ms. Eleanor Hill
Questions from the Honorable Dave Camp
4. In your opinion, do we have adequate recruitment and training
capacity to meet human intelligence needs? What are your
recommendations for improving our human intelligence capacity?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
5. How can Congress assist DHS and intelligence agencies in
creating ``a seamless system for the intelligence community and law
enforcement for storing and exchanging information''?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
6. The Joint Inquiry reported that there was a lack of
implementation of new technology within the Intelligence Community and
a lack compatible technologies and databases between agencies. I would
appreciate your comments on achievements being made in these areas and
recommendations for further progress.
[No Response received by the Committee.]
Questions from the Honorable Jim Turner, Ranking Member
1. The Joint Inquiry found problems with classification and
information sharing. This Committee has heard from several agency
officials from DHS, FBI, CIA, and the TTIC about how information
sharing is improving and how they are disseminating threat information
to state and local officials. But the Committee has received a
different impression when speaking to state and local officials. On
August 27, 2003, GAO released a report with detailed surveys that show
that no level of government is satisfied with the levels of information
sharing.
First, how did the Joint Inquiry determine that information
sharing, especially with non-federal entities, was inadequate? Based on
your investigations, how might the Department of Homeland Security and
the rest of the Intelligence Community, implement better information
sharing measures? According to the Joint Inquiry, are there steps that
this Congress can take to remove barriers to information sharing and/or
excessive classification?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
2. Which of the Joint Inquiry recommendations could be implemented
in the short term--say, in the next year? Do you see evidence that this
is happening?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
3. The Joint Inquiry found that our domestic intelligence
capability was lacking, but didn't recommend a clear course of action
in response. While the FBI is nominally in charge of domestic
intelligence collection, DHS is, at least in theory, building the
relationships with first responders and the general public that you
would want for domestic intelligence. What specific lessons on the
collection and dissemination of domestic intelligence emerged from the
Joint Inquiry's recommendations as relate to the Department of Homeland
Security?
[No Response received by the Committee.]
4. The Joint Inquiry called for a government-wide strategy for
combating terrorism. The Administration has produced eight strategies,
including ones for homeland security, national security, and combating
WMD. A strategy sets priorities and should have some connection to
budgets and resources. Do you believe that the existing strategy
documents constitute the government-wide strategy for combating
terrorism called for by the Joint Inquiry?
[No Response received by the Committee.]