[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPROVEMENTS TO DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING
CAPABILITIES--VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL
INTELLIGENCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
of the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERROSIM
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 24, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-21
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff
UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director
MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada, Chairman
JOHN SWEENEY, New York, Vice KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
Chairman EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky JANE HARMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut NITA M. LOWEY, New York
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
PETER KING, New York District of Columbia
JOHN LINDER, Georgia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JIM TURNER, Texas, ex officio
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex
officio
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable John Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism.............................. 3
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington 4
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 41
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island...................................... 44
The Honorable Edward J. Marky, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 56
The Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Missouri
Oral Statement................................................. 60
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 5
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
WITNESSES
Mr. Darin Daniels, Preparedness Planning and Training Manager,
Maricopa County, Arizona
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Mr. George W. Foresman, Deputy Assistant to the Governor on
Counterterrorism
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. James Kallstrom, Senior Adviser to the Governor on
Counterrosim
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. V. Phillip Lago, Deputy Executive Director, Central
Intelligence Agency
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Steven McCraw, Assistant Director Office of Intelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. William Parrish, Acting Assitant Secretary, For Information
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
APPENDIX
Questions and Responses for the Record
Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. William Parrish.. 73
Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. Steven C. McCraw. 75
Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. James K.
Kallstrom...................................................... 78
IMPROVEMENTS TO DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION
SHARING CAPABILITIES VERTICAL
AND HORIZONTAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNICATIONS
----------
Thursday, July 24, 2003
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
Room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Gibbons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gibbons, Sweeney, Dunn, Cox (ex
officio), McCarthy, Langevin, Markey, Lowey, Meek and Turner
(ex officio).
Mr. Gibbons. The House Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism for the House Select Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
I would like to begin by welcoming everybody here to our
hearing today. We are going to start, and hopefully my
colleague and friend Karen McCarthy from Missouri will be here
shortly for our statement as well, and what I will do is begin
my statement and then allow for Ms. McCarthy to enter her
statement. Hopefully she'll be here by then and then we will
open it up for other members of panel statement and then we
will turn to our witnesses.
This looks like it is going to be a great hearing for us,
very interesting panel we have before us today, and we are all
looking forward to the information we are going to receive.
Let me begin by saying that since September the 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, Congress has focused on the performance of
the Intelligence Community and whether intelligence and other
information are effectively shared to prevent or respond to a
terrorist attack.
Today governments at all levels recognize that they have a
greater role to play in protecting the Nation from terrorist
attacks, and to achieve this collective goal, homeland security
stakeholders must effectively work together to strengthen the
process by which critical information can be shared, analyzed,
integrated and disseminated to help prevent or minimize
terrorist activities.
The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the
ability of all levels of government to communicate and
cooperate effectively with one another. Activities that are
hampered by organizational fragmentation, technology
impediments or ineffective collaboration blunt the Nation's
collective efforts in this matter.
As it is with so many other homeland security areas, it is
also the case for intelligence and information sharing that
there are many stakeholders who must work together to achieve
common goals. Effective analysis, integration and dissemination
of intelligence and other information critical to homeland
security requires the cooperative involvement of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and a myriad of other agencies.
State and local governments have critical roles to play as
well. Information is shared--is already being shared between
and among numerous government agencies, information sharing
practices benefit critical infrastructure protection by
establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of Federal
and nonFederal entities that may be in a position to provide
potentially useful information and advice on vulnerabilities
and incidences, to develop standards and agreements on how
information will be used and protected. It also establishes
effective and appropriate secure communication mechanisms and
finally takes steps to ensure that sensitive information is not
inappropriately disseminated, which may require a statutory
change in some cases.
Clearly, these practices are applicable to intelligence and
information sharing in the broadest sense. To optimize such an
information sharing network, it is important to have a strong
strategic planning framework and a supporting policy structure.
The national homeland security strategy describes a number of
incentives to better develop opportunities for leveraging
information sharing among stakeholders, including integrated
information sharing across the Federal Government, integrated
information sharing across State and local governments,
improved public safety emergency communication and reliable
public health information and communications, all of which
needs to be shared both horizontally and vertically.
Improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are rapidly
occurring and are expected to continue for the long term, but
there are costs and requirements as the new department faces
communications, human capital, information technology and other
integration challenges.
All of these changes of course will take time to fully
implement. Today we focus on how effective the Department of
Homeland Security is in information sharing, both vertically
and horizontally. I would like to welcome the following
witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security, acting
Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, Mr. William
Parrish. From the Central Intelligence Agency, deputy executive
director Philip Lago. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
assistant director, Office of Intelligence Steven McCraw. From
the State of New York, senior adviser to the governor on
counterterrorism, James Kallstrom, which I will turn for
further introduction to my cochairman here in a minute. And
from the State of Virginia, senior adviser to the governor for
commonwealth preparedness George Foresman. And from Maricopa,
Arizona, preparedness planning and training manager Darin
Daniels.
That looks exactly like the number of people I have in
front of me, and I will turn now to the vice chairman of the
subcommittee, Mr. Sweeney from New York, for any comments he
may have and an introduction of his special guest.
[The statement of Mr. Gibbons follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress has focused
on the performance of the intelligence community and whether
intelligence and other information are effectively shared to prevent or
respond to a terrorist attack.
Today, governments at all levels, recognize that they have a greater
role to play in protecting the nation from terrorist attacks. To
achieve this collective goal, homeland security stakeholders must
effectively work together to strengthen the process by which critical
information can be shared, analyzed, integrated and disseminated to
help prevent or minimize terrorist activities.
The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the ability of
all levels of government to communicate and cooperate effectively with
one another. Activities that are hampered by organizational
fragmentation, technological impediments, or ineffective collaboration
blunt the nation's collective efforts.
As it is with so many other homeland security areas, it is also the
case for intelligence and information sharing that there are many
stakeholders who must work together to achieve common goals. Effective
analysis, integration, and dissemination of intelligence and other
information critical to homeland security require the cooperative
involvement of the Department of Homeland Security, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a myriad
of other agencies. State and local governments have critical roles to
play. Information is already being shared between and among numerous
government organizations.
Information sharing practices benefit critical infrastructure
protection by:
- Establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of
federal and nonfederal entities that may be in a position to
provide potentially useful information and advice on
vulnerabilities and incidents;
- Developing standards and agreements on how information will
be used and protected;
- Establishing effective and appropriately secure
communications mechanisms; and
- Taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not
inappropriately disseminated, which may require statutory
change.
Clearly, these practices are applicable to intelligence and information
sharing in the broadest sense.
To optimize, such a information sharing network, it is important to
have a strong, strategic planning framework and a supporting policy
structure.
The national homeland security strategy describes a number of
initiatives to better develop opportunities for leveraging information
sharing among stakeholders, including:
- Integrated information sharing across the federal
government.
- Integrated information sharing across state and local
governments.
- Improved public safety emergency communications.
- Reliable public health information and communications.
Improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are rapidly occurring and
are expected to continue for the long term, but there are costs and
requirements, as the new department faces communications, human
capital, information technology, and other integrationchallenges.
All of these changes of course, will take time to fully implement.
Today we focus on how effective the Department of Homeland Security is
in information sharing, both vertically and horizontally.
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say
that--congratulate you on your leadership and thank you for
your leadership in putting together this fine panel and say
that in a year and a half's time, I have been, in one form or
the other, whether it is the appropriations process or the
authorization process, participating in a variety of hearings
and oversights into the questions of homeland security, the
questions of intelligence gathering and counterterrorism, the
linkages, the connecting of the dots that needs to happen, and
I don't think I have ever been as excited about a panel as I am
about this one, because I think that this panel and opportunity
we have here today is really to do some constructive planning
forward by virtue of the testimony that each of you have
already submitted and that is all be submitting.
I am going to use my statement to introduce a friend and a
fellow New Yorker and someone that we are very proud of, and I
am particularly proud that he is here, because Jim Kallstrom is
a model for the country to help us win the war on terrorism. He
served in the Marine Corps. He has had a distinguished career
at the FBI and was stationed in New York on three tours in
1971, 1976 to 1990, 1993 to 1997, including a special agent in
charge and assistant director in charge of the largest bureau
in the country, and including in that, overseeing the
operations of a Joint Terrorism Task Force in one of the most
critical areas of this Nation.
He has worked in the private sector as a senior vice
president for security and management, committee member of the
MBNA of America, and this is the part that I am most
particularly proud of Jim Kallstrom. He was asked by Governor
Pataki to be New York's first director of the Office of Public
Security. He has left his private sector responsibilities and
dedicated himself once again to public service. He is still
serving his State and his country as a senior adviser for
counterterrorism to the governor, and most importantly, he was
ahead of the curve on the terrorist threat and knows from the
inside what is needed to strengthen the intelligence and
information sharing, and he will share with us today his
realistic initiatives that I believe the country should accept
and I think this is a good--as is the case with each of you,
this is a good opportunity to start down a very constructive
path, and I thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Sweeney, and let me
turn to the vice chairman of the full committee, Jennifer Dunn
from Washington, if she has any remarks or opening statement.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. While I too am
looking forward to your testimony, we have heard Mr. Parrish
most recently, I think. He gave excellent testimony and
answers, and today is a chance for us to investigate how we
communicate all this information that you all have access to.
Unfortunately, we are going to be interrupted by a series
of eight votes, and so don't know how the chairman is going to
handle that, but we will have to leave you hanging for a while.
Please understand it is not our choice. It is the last couple
of days of our session, and a lot is being accomplished in
these days. A lot of it I think is going to be helpful to us if
we get our appropriations right and make sure that homeland
security is funded to the degree it should be.
Thanks for being with us.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Ms. dunn, and I will turn
to the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Turner of
Texas, for any remarks he may have, opening remarks.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be
brief, because I do know we have votes. In the nearly two years
that have expired since September 11th, I think we have
identified a number of things that we all can agree we must do
to protect our homeland, but it seems at the heart of the
effort has to be an improved effort to share information about
the terrorist threat. Our committee has had a lot of hearings
on this particular subject, and it seems to me that we could do
a lot better job than we are doing defining our
responsibilities and determining who it is at the Federal level
that our State and local law enforcement and other officials,
as well as the private sector, is supposed to be communicating
with, whether providing information up the chain or receiving
information back from the Federal Government.
So I am pleased today, Mr. Chairman, that we have on this
panel officials from three different States who can talk to us
about the information flow issue and how we can improve it. It
seems to me that there is some confusion here that we ought to
be able to easily clear up. I have no doubt that everyone
involved at the State, Federal and local level has good
intentions, but I think it is our responsibility as a committee
to be sure that we ask the right questions and help you
accomplish the tasks that I know each of you are jointly
committed to achieving for us. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Gibbons. And Mr. Meek of Florida for any opening
remarks he may have.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it will definitely
be brief. I am excited about being here and getting an
opportunity to hear all of your perspectives as it relates to
intelligence. As you know, the great debate here on the Hill
and in Washington is good intelligence, what is good and what
is bad. I am hoping as we go through that struggle of finding
out what is good and bad, that it doesn't jeopardize the
security of the homeland, and State, Federal, me being a
creature from the State Legislature in Florida myself, being
able to share information, being a past law enforcement person
myself, is sometimes very difficult as it relates to the
different entities and agencies; but I am interested to hear
the camaraderie that you have now, and hopefully the
camaraderie that you will have in the future in the times of
doing a good job and being able to seek out and find out and
flush out individuals that are going to harm the homeland.
Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward after
our series of eight votes to hear from our witnesses.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Meek. And to our
witnesses, first of all, let me extend the apology of the
subcommittee, because as you realize, the series of votes that
are being called call us away from our duty here, and all of us
are here to hear your testimony, and we know that this is going
to inconvenience you by delaying your ability to communicate
with our panel. I want to advise the committee here we have a
series of eight votes. There is about 8 minutes remaining or 7
minutes remaining on the first vote followed by seven 5-minute
votes. So as we can see, that is about--it is going to be about
40-some minutes, 45 minutes from now before we can get back
here. So I would like to apologize once again and just recess
the committee until we return from this vote. And we ask for
your patience and your indulgence in the process here today,
and we will be right back. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Mr. Gibbons. The subcommittee will come back to order and
first again let me apologize to our witnesses. There were three
dilatory motions that were held that cost an additional 15
minutes per vote, and there were three of them. So it took an
extra 45 minutes, and I do apologize for that.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, CHAIRMAN, SELECT
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Good afternoon. I join Chairman Gibbons and Ranking Member McCarthy
in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon to what should be a
significant and informative discussion. Our topic today--``Improvements
to DHS Information Sharing Capabilities--Vertical and Horizontal
Intelligence Communications''--has a variety of dimensions--and could
be no more timely than to fall on the very day the intelligence
committees have released their joint report on the 9/11 attacks. [Our
own committee looks forward to exploring aspects of that topic in a
hearing later this year.]
We are, today, first talking about information sharing. If it is
true that, as the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks teaches, information--
good intelligence--is the lifeblood of homeland security, then it is
also true that information must move, must circulate. Sadly, that
hasn't always happened. An article in this morning's New York Times
states that the 9/11 investigation found that ``key National Security
Agency communications intercepts never were circulated.'' We must,
today, talk about the timely sharing of all relevant information--about
where it goes and how it gets there.
The purpose of today's hearing is to look forward. We want to
ensure that key information, regardless of its origin, now can and will
get to the right place at the right time. We are here to probe, not to
politicize; to point the way, not to point fingers.
We are focusing on the Department of Homeland Security and its
capabilities--both human and technical. The Department is the very core
of the solution to the 9/11 information sharing problem. It is the tool
Congress and the President devised soon after the 9/11 attacks in order
to make absolutely certain that all information that might shed light
on terrorist capabilities, intentions, plans, and activities is
comprehensively analyzed and moves in the ways and to the places it
must go, if we are to frustrate the intentions of those who seek to
mount the next massive terrorist attack. The Department--in particular,
its Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate--
must, in short, succeed. And, on behalf of the President and the
Congress, this committee will do everything in its power to make sure
that it does.
I will say again: What we don't know empowers our enemies--and what
we do know will help defeat them. In this new war--the ongoing battle
for our future--knowledge is the very essence of power. If information
doesn't move, people may die--it's that simple--that's the lesson of 9/
11. We simply must get key information to those who need it most, and
we cannot be satisfied with inefficiency or delay. What must happen
must be made to happen.
We in the Congress and on this committee will also do our part. We
will insist on breaking down barriers, on revising the ill-fitting
regulations of the past so as to enable, rather than impede, the flow
of information. Our ability to defend the American people, our homeland
and interests, our economy and way of life depend on it. We have
learned the lesson of 9/11. We will insist on effective information
sharing. There is no acceptable alternative.
Let me be clear. In this new world--in this great battle to protect
our people, homeland, and way of life--we cannot tolerate parochialism.
We cannot allow the information taxpayer dollars have bought to be held
by Government agency collectors as their exclusive property, protected
behind a wall of antique regulations. All the information we have must
be used to protect us all. The President recognized that long since,
and we in the Congress have acted upon it in passing the Homeland
Security Act and the USA-PATRIOT Act. Barriers are coming down--but
stove-piped cultures and proprietary habits die far harder.
Today's witnesses represent both ends of a new spectrum, a new two-
way information sharing partnership in which federal agencies that
collect and provide information--through the new Department--to their
new state and local government customers also wait eagerly to receive
the information those same customers provide to them.
In this new war, federal, state and local officials are equal
players. We must overcome the notion that the federal Government is the
source of everything worth knowing--federal agencies must learn to
listen. State and local governments, as well as businesses may also be
sources of key information. That, of course, makes sense, since they
are where the action is, out where the rubber hits the road--as they
will always be. Federal government agencies must support them. State,
local, and private sector officials are now among the Intelligence
Community's key customers--and each federal agency represented here
today must learn to serve them well--largely through the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI. Where homeland security is concerned, it
is not an act of largesse for the federal government to share threat-
related information with state and local officials; it is essential--
and the Homeland Security Act requires it.
We must also discard the common assumption that the most important
information is classified--because in this new world, it may not be.
The long-haul trucker in the small hours of the night may be the only
one who sees the critical, anomalous act that indicates a possible
terrorist attack--and we must have a system to ensure that what that
trucker sees moves upstream quickly and reliably to the local, state,
and federal government officials for whom it may be the critical,
missing piece of a complex puzzle. Information sharing is not, in
short, some grand gesture of noblesse oblige by a privileged coterie of
federal agencies. To indulge the assumption that the federal
Government--including CIA and FBI--has collected, and therefore knows,
all that is most worth knowing at any given time is dangerous
paternalism. But where state and local officials--including our ``first
responders'' and law enforcement officers--do need access to classified
information in order to protect us, they must have it--period. We must
speed the clumsy clearance processes that keep them from the
information that they need.
Each of today's federal government witnesses represents a member
agency of the Intelligence Community. Each is involved in the federal
government's effort to implement the Homeland Security Act. It was, in
fact, last October, testifying before joint intelligence committees
during their investigation into the 9/11 attacks, that the Director of
Central Intelligence expressed the critical new commitment we stress
today. He said:
``We must move information in ways and to places it has never
before had to move. . . We need to improve our multiple
communications links--both within the Intelligence Community
and now in the Homeland Security community. . . . Now, more
than ever before, we need to make sure our customers get from
us exactly what they need--which generally means exactly what
they want--fast and free of unnecessary restrictions.''
He was right. And we need to make sure that the implications of
that statement are well understood. Because the implications of full
commitment to information sharing in the homeland security context--the
kind of commitment Congress intended and the Homeland Security Act
requires--are enormous. It may even mean that an agency must, to
protect the American people from attack, ``lose control of'' the
information it originates--for example, in a networked environment
where each recipient of a piece of information can, in turn, augment
it--as the Markle Foundation suggested in a report last year.
The good news is that we're not starting from scratch. In early
March, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
the Director of Central Intelligence took a major step towards
implementing the information sharing requirements of the Homeland
Security Act. They signed a Memorandum of Understanding binding all
Intelligence Community and federal law enforcement agencies, as well as
the disparate entities that comprise the Department of Homeland
Security. They didn't blink; they knew the stakes. They stated that:
``Providing all timely and relevant [homeland security-related
information] to those who have a need-to-know it in order to
assist them in meeting their homeland security-related
responsibilities is fundamental to the success of the
Department and [to] all other efforts to ensure the security of
the homeland from terrorist attack. Delay in providing such
information risks frustrating efforts to meet these critical
responsibilities and could result in preventable attacks
against U.S. persons or interests failing to be preempted,
prevented, or disrupted.'' [MOU at sec. 3(h)]
The information sharing MOU commits intelligence, law enforcement,
and homeland security agencies alike to certain core principles and
specific actions to implement the Homeland Security Act. It provides,
for example, that those entities must generally disclose homeland
security-related information--and intelligence is just relevant
information--``free of any originator controls or information use
restrictions.'' (3(k)] It says that providing homeland security-related
information to one organization does not discharge or diminish the
originating agency's obligation to share that same information with any
other entity that has responsibilities for protecting the homeland.
(3(m)]
The MOU goes on to say that ``homeland-security related analytic
efforts. . . must be informed by the most comprehensive, accurate, and
timely information available, regardless of its nature and source,''
and it recognizes that ``the Federal government must, to the greatest
extent possible, speak with one voice to state and local officials,
private industry, and the public, in order to prevent confusion, mixed
signals, and, potentially, dangerous operational conflicts.'' (4(b)] It
requires that classified homeland security-related information
``reaches DHS promptly with accompanying high-content `tear lines'
suitable for onward passage at an unclassified level.'' (6(a)(i)]
And the MOU states that if this new mission requires ``more
expansive'' information sharing than existing departmental policies and
procedures do, then the MOU's more expansive information sharing
mandates will prevail. These are new standards for our new, post-9/11,
reality. They recognize that the irreducible minimum any government
owes its citizens is to protect them--that homeland security is now
everyone's number-one priority.
To prevent the unthinkable, we must, in short, reach beyond the
limits we have tolerated in the past. It is a message worth stressing
today, as we absorb the report of the intelligence committees'
investigation into the 9/11 attacks.
And I am grateful to our witnesses for giving us their agencies'
status report today--and grateful to Chairman Gibbons and Ranking
Member McCarthy for convening this important hearing.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Today's hearing of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism continues the Committee's focus on how we are sharing
information about terrorists intending to attack America.
In the nearly two years following the attacks of September 11, we
have identified a number of things we need to do to protect the
homeland, such as improved border security and preparing first
responders. But even if we make these improvements, we will not be safe
unless we are effectively sharing information about the terrorists'
intentions against us.
The Committee has held a number of hearings to address whether
terrorism information is being provided to all those who need it,
whether they serve at the Federal, State or local level. Earlier this
week, the Committee heard from the Department of Homeland Security, the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and the FBI. My impression from
the hearing was that while the federal agencies were working hard to
improve performance, their roles were not clearly defined. This was
especially true with respect to the responsibilities for communicating
information to state and local officials. Both the FBI, through its
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the Department of Homeland Security
are providing terrorism information to state and local governments, but
there did not appear to be a clear division of responsibility or
established mechanisms for coordinating the flow of information.
Today we have the opportunity to find out from officials from three
different states whether the information really is flowing, and whether
it is useful.
According to one of our witnesses, Mr. Foresman, there is currently
more confusion than clarity. As a Cabinet-rank state homeland security
official for Virginia, he has found a lack of clarity in the
coordination of information and intelligence flow, and that the current
confusion only adds to the dangers we face.
For example, he finds that the Department of Homeland Security has
become a new layer in the communication between the federal agencies
and the states. But this new layer has not been coordinated with
existing channels of communication, and has resulted in more confusion.
He is receiving information from the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and
then finding that Department of Homeland Security officials are unaware
of the information. On other occasions, he has received information
about potential security threats from the Department of Homeland
Security and then finding that other federal officials in the field did
not have the same information.
The confusion sometimes extends to the quality of the information.
Mr. Foresman's written testimony relates one instance when he received
information from the Department of Homeland Security, only to have
another federal agency attack that information as ``old news'' and
unreliable, having been over taken by events. As a state homeland
security official, Mr. Foresman was then left to try to determine
whether this was a case of ``turf war'' or whether there were
substantive problems with the information.
As we have learned from the report released today from the
congressional intelligence committees, one of the contributing factors
to 9/11 was the failure of federal agencies to share and act upon
information about the hijackers in their possession.
We know that we are a nation still at risk, as terrorists could be
plotting another attack on the United States. In order to thwart the
next attack, we must ensure that information about terrorist threats
gets to every official with homeland security responsibilities. That
can only happen if everyone involved has a clear understanding of
standards that define the movement of information across all levels of
government.
I am very pleased that we have the officials representing the
federal agencies as well as the state and local homeland security
offices here with us today to speak on this vital issue. I look forward
to your testimony.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KAREN McCARTHY,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERERRORISM, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that we have the
opportunity today to examine the issue of information sharing within
the federal government and with state and local officials.
One of the many tragic aspects of the attacks of September 11 is
that the federal government did have some information about the
hijackers in the files of various agencies. Although we cannot be sure
that we could have prevented the attacks by connecting these dots, we
must do everything in our power to make sure that information about the
next plot does not slip through the cracks.
We as a nation have taken a number of steps to get at this problem.
We have created a Department of Homeland Security, and the President
ordered the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. We
have also emphasized the importance of the federal government sharing
terrorism information with the officers at the state and local level
who have responsibilities for the security of their communities.
But do we actually have improved information sharing, as we
approach the second anniversary of 9/11? That is what I hope this
hearing will answer. On Tuesday, we heard during the full Committee
hearing on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center that threat
information is being fed to both the TTIC and the Department of
Homeland Security. We did not get a clear answer on what TTIC and the
Department of Homeland Security do with the information. As for sharing
with the state and local officials, we heard that the FBI shares
information through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and that Homeland
Security also pushes information to its state and local ``customers.''
What we did not learn was whether the FBI and Homeland Security are
coordinating what they provide to state and local governments, or if
there is a clear understanding of the roles of each agency.
The basic problem is very simple. If all the players in homeland
security, at whatever level of government, do not have the same
understanding of their roles and responsibilities, it will be all too
easy for another failure in information sharing to occur. The
consequences of such a failure, as we know, are grave.
I am very pleased to have representatives from the Federal, State,
and local levels of government with us today so they can inform us on
the status of information sharing and to alert us to problems that
remain. Hearing from those on the front lines will assist us to do our
part in breaking down barriers to sharing information critical to our
homeland security. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. I am going to turn now to the witness
statements and I will begin with Mr. William Parrish from the
Department of Homeland Security. Welcome, Mr. Parrish. The
floor is yours. We look forward to your testimony. And to all
our witnesses, your full complete and written statement will be
entered into the record. If you wish to summarize and shorten
your statement, that is okay too, because we realize the time
is short and you have been here a while, and it is only getting
longer each day.
So Mr. Parrish, welcome.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PARRISH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FOR
INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
Mr. Parrish. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
that, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
delighted and honored to be here this afternoon. This hearing
is very important to the Department of Homeland Security, as I
too believe it presents an opportunity to provide the status of
a critical element within the Department, and that is the
information analysis directorate.
It is also a special hearing, as it represents the 100th
Congressional hearing for the Department of Homeland Security,
since our beginning on March 1st, something I will proudly be
able to share with my grandson. I am the Acting Assistant
Secretary for information analysis in the Information Analysis
and Insfrastructive Protection Directorate. Prior to assuming
that position on July 3rd of this year, I was the senior
Department of Homeland Security representative to the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center. In this capacity, I served in the
senior leadership position as the Associate Director for
Homeland Security, and prior to my assignment with DHS, I
served as the first Executive Director for the Office of
Antiterrorism at U.S. customs.
During my tenure with Customs, the importance of
information sharing became more evident. What I saw firsthand
was the amount of information that Customs inspectors were able
to acquire on the movement of people, goods and materials
entering into our country.
Information that when analyzed could produce critical
pieces of intelligence that may lead to connecting the dots and
the detection or prevention of terrorist attacks to our
homeland.
Today, within the Department of Homeland Security, we have
the operational organizations that have access to potentially
valuable information, such as that acquired by Customs. For
example, today with the integration of the Customs and Border
Protection Organization, the opportunity to acquire critical
pieces of information enhances the analytical process within
the information analysis directorate. Our ability to assess and
then correlate this information against other agencies'
information both within the Department and external to the
Department supports our ability to connect the dots.
For example, on a daily basis, the Customs and Border
Protection entities process over 1.1 million passengers
arriving into our Nation and seaports, inspecting over 57,000
trucks daily and 580 vessels, 2,500 aircraft and over almost
325,000 vehicles across our borders.
Significant amounts of information could be acquired
through each and that data could provide information that may
tie it to potential terrorist nexus. The Immigration and
Customs Enforcement entities investigate cases involving alien
smuggling, terrorist financial operations and other crimes
associated with terrorist organizations, and the Transportation
Security Administration screening approximately 1.5 million
passengers aboard commercial aircraft.
To further enhance the process of correlating information
from other agencies, we have within IAIP the Homeland Security
Operations Center, with representation from over 15 Federal
agencies. Their presence, their connectivity back to their
parent agencies, provides a very robust and comprehensive
exchange of information, both horizontally and vertically.
IA has initiatives underway to reach out to another very
important and relevant source of information, and that is our
customers and our partners at the State and local government,
as well as the private sector receiving reports from these
organizations regarding suspicious activities, surveillance
operations or stopping suspect individuals with potential
terrorist nexus.
As these reports are received into Homeland Security
Operations Center, they are passed to the information analysis
directorate where we analyze the information and coordinate
with other agencies including the FBI in order to identify any
possible correlation or ties to terrorist activities.
For example, a report of a suspicious person videotaping
the entrance to a nuclear power facility in one location and
two days later a similar description is reported at another
facility 100 miles away. In order to assess if there is a
correlation to these incidents, the information analysis
directorate will coordinate with appropriate State, local and
Federal agencies to assess any and all information that may be
related to these two incidents.
IAIP is working aggressively to implement the necessary
information technology connectivity as well as the associated
logistics requirements for this initiative to begin.
Currently within our Homeland Security Operations Centers,
we are communicating with members of the State, and local
governments as well as the private sector as our IT program
continues to expand. The processes and procedures that I have
described will further enhance our efficiency and analysis and
assessment of potential terrorist activities.
I am confident, sir, that the procedures and the process
that I have described ensures that IAIP is in full compliance
with the legislation passed by Congress in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002.
Each day we are making further progress to enhance our
capabilities in the 19 functions outlined in the Homeland
Security Act. Secretary of Homeland Security has placed the
highest priority on expeditiously completing the new home for
IAIP, and when completed will give us more personnel, and
appropriate electronic connectivity.
However, in the meantime, we have identified procedures to
ensure we are meeting our tasks and accomplishing our mission.
Procedures such as employing liaison personnel from other
agencies, bringing in members into our Homeland Security
Operations Center, as well as into the information analysis
directorate.
I have recently initiated a program for our analysts to be
able to coordinate directly with analysts of the FBI, the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and other members of the
Intelligence Community. This exchange of personnel and direct
access to other analysts will provide the face-to-face and the
voice-to-voice connectivity that provides essential
connectivity to ensure that all information is shared.
I am confident that these work-around measures are
succeeding in ensuring a timely and efficient flow of
information both into as well as out of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Hearings such as yours today provides each of us an
opportunity to look back at where we have come from since the
Nation's dark day in our history on September 11th.
We need to recognize and extend thanks to you, to your
staffs, our Federal agencies to include our law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, the dedicated State and local
authorities and the private sector and the American people in
general. We have all risen to the challenges of combatting the
new enemy threatening our security. Because of the coordinated
efforts of all of us in sharing challenges as well as the
responsibilities, we have made a difference in our Nation--and
our Nation has not suffered another attack.
However, we must not become complacent nor tired nor weary.
The dedication and commitment must continue and above all,
continue as prayers for the safety and security of this great
Nation.
Sir, I thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Parrish, and we do
appreciate your testimony. It is always a pleasure to have you
before the committee, and especially your agency, and we have
always felt that it has contributed to our better understanding
of how the progress is going of this important agency as we
move along.
[The statement of Mr. Parrish follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. PARRISH
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. I am delighted to appear before you today to discuss The
Department of Homeland Security's responsibility in information sharing
both vertically and horizontally.
I am currently the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (IAIP). Prior to assuming this position on July 3rd of this
year I was the Senior DHS representative to the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). In this capacity I served in a senior
leadership position as the Associate Director for Homeland Security. My
tenure in US Customs as the Executive Director of Anti-terrorism
provided the opportunity to gain an appreciation for the criticality of
information sharing and the necessity for recognition and understanding
of individual agencies' capabilities in the fight against terrorism.
Although only four months old, I can assure you that IAIP is moving
forward in carrying out our statutory responsibilities, and the key
missions of Information Analysis which include:
Providing the full range of intelligence support to
senior DHS leadership
With IP, mapping terrorist threats to the homeland
against our assessed vulnerabilities in order to drive our
efforts to protect against terrorist attacks
Conducting independent analysis and assessments of
terrorist threats, including competitive analysis, tailored
analysis, and ``red teaming''
Integrating the work of all of DHS' components as well
as managing the collection and processing of information into
usable and actionable information from DHS' intelligence
components, e.g., the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security
Administration Coast Guard, and Secret Service
Working closely to maintain transparent information
exchange between those DHS/IA officers assigned to work on DHS'
behalf at the TTIC, IA officers conducting the threat analysis
mission at DHS Headquarters, our TTIC partners and Federal
Agencies, state and local officials governments and the private
sector
Disseminating time sensitive alerts and advisories to
federal, state, local governments and private sector
infrastructure owners and operators
IAIP is unique among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement elements
in authority, responsibility, and access to information. IAIP has
robust, comprehensive, and independent access; as mandated by the
President and in the law, to information relevant to homeland security,
raw and processed, collected domestically and abroad. Accessing the
information and intelligence from this mosaic of programs and systems
of federal, state and local agencies supports our mission to analyze
data and take action to protect against terrorist attacks directed at
the U.S. homeland. IA has the ability to conduct its own analysis and
to leverage the information of the FBI, CIA, and the remainder of the
Intelligence Community and federal government, plus state and local law
enforcement and private sector entities, to protect of the homeland.
Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working
relationship between the Office of Information Analysis (``IA'') and
the Office of Infrastructure Protection (``IP'') to ensure threat
information is correlated with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
and protective programs. This threat and vulnerability information can
then be used to recommend preventative and protective measures. The
integration of information access and analysis on the one hand, and
vulnerabilities analysis and protective measures on the other, is the
fundamental mission of the IAIP Directorate.
Beyond the unique IA-IP partnership; the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC) serves as a focal point for the Nation's
efforts to protect our homeland. The HSOC is a 24 x 7 x 365 days a year
Watch Center and is comprised of members from over thirteen federal
agencies from the Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement Agencies,
emergency preparedness organizations and entities focused on
infrastructure protection. Given the information provided from the
parent organizations of these entities, and the all-source data
provided by other DHS partners; information and intelligence relating
to threats to the homeland is analyzed from multiple arenas. This all-
source data-fusion performed at IAIP allows products to be tailored to
address a specific threat to allows DHS constituents to prioritize
resource allocations in the enhancement of their security posture to
counter potential terrorist acts.
IAIP is the central information nerve center of DHS' efforts to
coordinate the protection of U.S. homeland security. As such, IA
supports DHS's law enforcement components through timely and integrated
analytical support. For example in a single day:
In coordinating with BCBP which process over 1.1
million passengers arriving in our Nation's airports and
seaports, inspection of over 57,006 trucks and containers, 580
vessels, 2,459 aircraft, and 323,622 vehicles coming into this
country, IA has immediate access to valuable information of
potential terrorist activities which further enhances our
ability to develop threat plot lines--connecting the dots
In coordinating with BICE; which investigates cases
involving alien smuggling, terrorist financial dealings and
other crimes associated with terrorist operations, IA analysis
and assessments have the ability to identify potential trends
of terrorist related activity
In coordinating with the Transportation Security
Administration; which screens approximately 1.5 million
passengers before they board commercial aircraft, IA assists in
determining individuals to be entered on the ``No-Fly list''
and Watch Lists
IA ensures that homeland security products derived from the fusing of
disparate types of information is shared with Federal, state, and local
governments, as well as the private sector. Recent products include;
Information Bulletin discussing July 4th General
Awareness issues
Advisory on the Potential Al Qaeda Threats to the U.S.
Water Supply
Advisory on reconnaissance tactics and techniques
operatives have employed in attacks overseas; i.e. Riyadh
Bombing of 12 May
Information Bulletin discussing Compromised Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) and Telephone Voicemail systems
Information Bulletin speaking to Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Materials and Effects
Information Bulletin speaking to Potential Indicators
of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIEDs)
Additionally, IA coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in publishing combined DHS-FBI Intelligence Bulletins.
In addition to mapping terrorist threats to the homeland, and carrying
out its many other intelligence-support and analytic functions, IA is a
full participant in the TTIC, with IA personnel physically located at
the TTIC. The assignment of IA analysts to assist in the carrying out
of DHS' analytic mission as full partners in TTIC ensures the timely
and relevant information flow to and from the IAIP directorate. This is
not a substitute for the receipt of information directly at DHS
Headquarters, but rather represents a recognition that, as provided by
Congress and the President, authorities and capabilities to deter and
disrupt terrorist threats, particularly overseas, are shared among a
number of departments and agencies and such activities often must be
undertaken in concert with state, local, and foreign governments.
Recent experience has shown that terrorist groups may attempt to
coordinate multiple attacks, both overseas and within the United
States, and that threats that appear to be directed overseas may
actually be directed towards the homeland, and vice versa. The threat
information integration and analysis that is the beginning, not the
end, of DHS' protective mission, will most effectively be carried out,
as Congressional and other reviews have recommended, when all terrorism
threat-related activities of the U.S. Government work together
seamlessly. This includes counter-terrorism activities directed against
threats overseas, as well as criminal investigation and prosecution
activities, which the President and Congress did not, and, as a matter
of effective government and common sense, should not, direct be carried
out exclusively by DHS.
The direct receipt at DHS Headquarters of information provided by
statute and Presidential direction to DHS, the complimentary work of IA
personnel assigned to TTIC, IA analysts detailed to other Intelligence
Community partners, coupled with the multi-agency representation in the
HSOC, ensures IA a robust, comprehensive, and independent access to
information; raw and processed, collected domestically and abroad;
relevant to analyzing terrorist threats to the homeland
I come before you today to tell you that progress has been, and
continues to be made on a daily basis in the IAIP Directorate. As with
any new organization, there is work to be done. I will be the first to
admit that we are not where we wish to be, but we are moving rapidly in
a well-conceived and strategic way to get there in the very near
future. IAIP is building a strong team of professionals and assigning
dedicated and knowledgeable individuals in key liaison positions within
our partnering agencies. This will further enhance the timely access to
critical information that when placed in the hands of the dedicated and
competent members of DHS serving at our borders, airports, seaports
across America, will increase our ability to detect, prevent and deny
terrorists from striking our Homeland. With the continued support of
Congress, I am confident that IAIP and our partners in the war against
terrorism can succeed in meeting the challenges presented before us.
As Secretary Ridge has stated on numerous occasions, ``When our
hometowns are secure, our homeland will be secure.'' That is not merely
rhetoric, but a fundamental principle of the nation's homeland security
effort. Everyone is a partner in the effort. We must be aggressive in
connecting and staying connected with our partners to provide an
extraordinary and unprecedented exchange of information. This
information must be actionable by local law enforcement and first
responders, but must also empower the average citizen to do their part
in assisting with securing our homeland.
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Mr. Gibbons. Gentlemen, if I may, I have been advised that
Mr. Kallstrom has a time constraint that is going to affect his
time that he can be before us, and with that and your
concurrence, I would like to invite Mr. Kallstrom to submit his
testimony right now, and then we will move back for the rest.
So Mr. Kallstrom, I apologize for the delay in getting to you.
I appreciate the fact that you have come down to testify and
would welcome you to speak now, and we are looking forward to
hearing what you have to say.
STATEMENT OF JAMES KALLSTROM, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE GOVERNOR ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
Mr. Kallstrom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
great service. I was reading your bio. It is quite impressive.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, Mr. Kallstrom that and about $3.50 at
any Starbucks Coffee will buy you the regular decaffeinated
version. So thank you.
Mr. Kallstrom. Thank you Congressman Sweeney, who I have
had a great year and a half working with in New York, and
Congressman Meek, thank you for being here.
Good afternoon. I would like to begin by thanking you for
inviting me to participate I think in this very important
hearing. From those terrible moments on September 11th, the
security of the United States and its interests has become our
Nation's highest priority. Some 22 months later, our country's
most urgent objective remains the prevention of another
devastating terrorist attack. In meeting this immense
responsibility, we must immediately recognize that the
extraordinary security challenges we face, in large part, can
best be met by implementing an effective and workable
intergovernmental approach. We must align the walls separating
Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies and State and
local law enforcement. We must redefine the appropriate roles
for authorities at all levels of government and in so doing,
give State and local law enforcement the tools they need,
timely and relevant counterterrorism information to partner in
the national effort to protect our country and our citizens. We
must find ways to empower State and local police and others to
identify indications and warnings of potential terrorist
activity.
Although many challenges lie ahead, much has been
accomplished since September 11th. Within weeks of the attacks,
Governor Pataki created one of the Nation's first State
homeland security offices, the New York State Office of Public
Security. He asked me to become the Office's first directorate
and tasked us with developing a comprehensive statewide
strategy to prevent, deter and respond to terrorist threats and
events. He asked us to do everything we could do as a State to,
in his words, never let this happen again.
Our first order of business was to more fully engage the
State's 75,000 sworn law enforcement officers. Our eyes and
ears in our neighborhoods and communities in the war on
terrorism. To do this, we divided our State into 16
counterterrorism zones. Within each zone, law enforcement
agencies now operate in a coordinated manner to best share
resources, information, training and best practices relevant to
counterterrorism.
In addition, we developed and deployed a New York State
counterterrorism network throughout these zones. This network
has effectively linked all of our State's police and sheriffs
in a secure stand-alone counterterrorism information-only
communications system.
In a little over a year and a half, more than 350 dedicated
counterterrorism network computer terminals have been installed
in virtually every corner of the State. To date, almost 200
terrorist-related advisories and alerts have been disseminated
to local law enforcement and related health, education, fire,
first responder and private sector communities.
In August, New York State will open its Counterterrorism
Center. The Center will serve as a central State clearinghouse
for information sharing and in particular, counterterrorism
information at all levels.
As we recognize in our State, the inclusion of the
country's 700,000 sworn State and local police officers and
sheriffs in a systematic information-sharing loop is critical
for us to succeed in the national war on terrorism. But in the
loop, it is not necessary that all police officers receive
access to everything, including classified documents within
secure Federal databases. Rather, the Federal Government must
provide the police officer on patrol with the ability under
controlled and orderable circumstances to request a
comprehensive search of Federal databases, including
outstanding warrants and intelligence indices, including
terrorist watchlists in order to receive a green light, yellow
light, red light indication regarding a subject of interest as
a possible link to terrorist activity.
By means of connectivity with a central clearinghouse like
the New York State Counterterrorism Center, the cop on the
street could receive focused and vetted guidance as to the
immediate action he or she should take with respect to the
individual in question. This can be done without providing the
details of sensitive information or the methods and sources of
collection. Better decisions can and will be made on the street
in realtime.
We advocate the creation of a green light, red light,
yellow light system that would make lawful use of the
information currently maintained by relevant Federal agencies
coupled with State information, and thus provide local law
enforcement with the timely answer to a very basic question,
does this individual have a known or suspected relationship to
terrorism? And if so, what are my next steps?
The September 11th hijackers lived among us before they
perpetrated their lethal attacks. Several of those hijackers
had interception with State and local law enforcement officers
during traffic stops. If the officers involved in these
incidents were fully aware of the patents and indications of
the terrorist threat to the United States and had appropriate
and timely access to the Federal Government's various databases
and watchlists, the September 11th attacks just might have been
uncovered.
We will never know this for sure, but one lesson learned is
that local and State law enforcement officers in the field must
have access to a one-stop shopping resource where in realtime
they can query an individual's name or identity against all
terrorism-related databases.
We are well aware that this system must be appropriately
tailored to be used only in connection with counterterrorism
efforts. Comply with existing law and be subject to audit and
review.
I must stress that the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces have
been at the forefront and instrumental in handling terrorism-
related investigations on a nationwide basis and have
successfully apprehended individuals with a nexus to terrorism
or organized terror groups on many, many occasions. I can speak
from personal experience that these task forces are absolutely
vital in the war against terrorism.
However, we have found important information obtained from
these national investigations does not reach the offices
responsible for patrolling the cities, towns, highways,
villages and neighborhoods of our country in all cases. State
and local police officers comprise far less than 1 percent of
these task forces. Their scope and breadth of mission and their
ability to learn what they now do not know mandates the use of
State and local police as eyes and ears in their support.
To use a military metaphor, State and local police can be
effective listening posts and forward observers for the task
forces. Our concern is not only what the task forces do not
know. It is what we as State and local communities have not
been empowered to do to assist these task forces.
With means readily and routinely at our disposal, they will
know more and be better positioned to protect our country.
Almost one year ago, the ten northeastern States from
Delaware to Maine, including New York form the northeast region
of homeland security agreement as a consortium to combine the
homeland security efforts of our States. The northeast regional
agreement has focused on developing, among other things,
regional information and intelligence sharing strategies. We
have worked diligently with the Department of Homeland Security
on these concerns, and strongly believe the northeast regional
agreement would make an excellent starting point for a pilot
project envisioned in the recently passed Intelligence
Authorization Act of 2004, H.R. 2417.
At the State level, intelligence centers like the New York
State Counterterrorism Center can be created, either within
each State or as appropriate on a regionalized basis. A staff
of cleared personnel assigned to the center while maintaining a
direct secure line of communications with a Federal
coordination center would interact both with State police and
all local police departments.
Partnering with the Federal Government effective
counterterrorism information sharing could be almost
immediately accomplished on a regional basis.
As the Department of Homeland Security becomes increasingly
operational, we must continue to connect the counterterrorism
pipes to enable interagency and both international and national
information on intelligence sharing on a regular basis.
America's State and local police officers are one of our
country's first lines of defense against another terrorist
attack. They are our forward observers. They are our boots on
the ground. In this extraordinary and historic effort, they
must be fully empowered and given the necessary tools to wage
this great fight of our times.
We look forward to continuing to work with you to meet this
challenge. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Kallstrom, and I
appreciate that.
[The statement of Mr. Kallstrom follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES KALLSTROM
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.
I would like to begin by thanking you for inviting me to
participate in this important hearing.
From those terrible moments on September 11th, the security of the
United States and its interests has become our nation's highest
priority. Some twenty-two months later, our country's most urgent
objective remains the prevention of another devastating terror attack.
In meeting this immense responsibility, we must immediately recognize
that the extraordinary security challenges we face in large part can
best be met by implementing an effective and workable intergovernmental
approach. We must realign the walls separating federal intelligence
agencies and state and local law enforcement. We must redefine the
appropriate roles for authorities at all levels of government and in so
doing, give state and local law enforcement the tools they need--timely
and relevant counter-terrorism information--to partner in the national
effort to protect our country and citizens; we must find ways to
empower state and local police and others to identify indications and
warnings of potential terrorist activity.
My remarks today will concentrate on the significantly enhanced
function state and local law enforcement must assume in matters related
to homeland security. In addition, I will outline the need to
expeditiously build a bridge over the information-sharing gap that
exists between the federal and state and local governments. I will
share several positive and innovative steps New York State has already
taken to close that gap. But because the states cannot do this alone, I
will ask your support to enable a unified and workable plan for the
prevention of terrorism in our country, states, cities and
neighborhoods.
Although many challenges lie ahead, much has been accomplished
since September 11th. Within weeks of the attacks, Governor Pataki
created one of the nation's first state homeland security offices, the
New York State Office of Public Security. He asked me to become the
Office's first Director and tasked us with developing a comprehensive
statewide strategy to prevent, deter and respond to terrorist threats
and events. He asked us to do everything we could do as a state to, in
his words, ``Never let this happen again.''
Our first order of business was to more fully engage the state's
75,000 sworn law enforcement officers, our eyes and ears in our
neighborhoods and communities, in the war on terrorism. To do this, we
divided our state into 16 Counter-Terrorism Zones. Within each zone,
law enforcement agencies now operate in a coordinated manner to best
share resources, information, training and best practices relevant to
counter-terrorism. In addition, we developed and deployed the New York
State Counter-Terrorism Network throughout these zones. This Network
has effectively linked all of our state's police and sheriffs in a
secure, stand-alone counter terrorism information-only communications
system.
In a little over a year and a half, more than 350 dedicated
Counter-Terrorism Network computer terminals have been installed in
virtually every corner of the state. The Counter-Terrorism Network has
become a national model for counter-terrorism information sharing among
state and local law enforcement authorities. To date, almost 200
terrorism-related advisories and alerts have been disseminated to local
law enforcement and related health, education, fire and first responder
and private sector communities.
In August, New York State will open its Counter-Terrorism Center.
The creation of this Center is part of an integrated program that will
provide for the routine and coordinated exchange of information and
intelligence between federal, state and local law enforcement. The
Center will serve as a central state clearinghouse for information
sharing and in particular counter-terrorism information.
As we recognized in our state, the inclusion of the country's
700,000 sworn state and local police officers and sheriffs in a
systematic information-sharing loop is critical for us to succeed in
the national war on terrorism. By ``in the loop,'' it is not necessary
that all police officers receive access to everything, including
classified documents, within secure federal databases. Rather, the
federal government must provide the police officer on patrol with the
ability, under controlled and auditable circumstances, to request a
comprehensive search of federal databases, including outstanding
warrants and intelligence indices (including terrorist watch lists) in
order to receive a ``green light--yellow light--red light'' indication
regarding a subject of interest's possible link to terrorist activity.
By means of connectivity with a central clearinghouse like the New York
State Counter-Terrorism Center, the cop on the street could receive
focused and vetted guidance as to the immediate action he or she should
take with respect to the individual in question. This can be done
without providing the details of sensitive compartmented information or
the methods and sources of collection. Better decisions can and will be
made on the street in real time.
We advocate the creation of a ``green light--yellow light--red
light'' system that would make lawful use of the information currently
maintained by relevant federal agencies coupled with state information
and thus provide local law enforcement with the timely answer to a very
basic question--``Does this individual have a known or suspected
relationship to terrorism and if so, what are my next steps?'' With
guidance and information already maintained by the government and
provided through contact with such a center, a state or local police
officer could then be guided to take appropriate action.
The September 11th hijackers lived among us before they perpetrated
their lethal attacks. Several of those hijackers, including Mohammed
Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah had interaction with state and
local law enforcement officers during traffic stops. If the officers
involved in those incidents were fully aware of the patterns and
indications of the terrorist threat to the United States and had
appropriate and timely access to the federal government's various
databases and watch lists, the September 11th attacks just might have
been uncovered. We will never know this for sure, but one lesson
learned is that local and state law enforcement officers in the field
must have access to a "one stop shopping" resource where in real time
they can query an individual's name or identity(s) against all
terrorism-related databases. We are well aware that this system must be
appropriately tailored to be used only in connection with counter
terrorism efforts, comply with existing law and be subject to audit and
review.
At the Federal level it is essential that various agencies that
constitute the intelligence community create one central repository for
terrorist-related information or a method to rapidly check these
repositories. The post September 11th investigation has exposed
examples where critical information was ``stovepiped'' in the hands of
one agency failing to get to appropriate people in another agency. The
most telling example of such a case is information collected on
September 11th hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi Midhar.
Sectors of the federal intelligence community had determined the two
men were al Qaeda operatives. One carried a U.S. multiple-entry visa
and there were indications the two might attempt travel to the United
States. However, other relevant federal agencies were not fully
enlisted in the effort to track these individuals. In hindsight, it is
evident that agencies like the FAA and INS might have been able to
thwart entry of the hijackers into this country if there had been
broader knowledge and access to just a portion of this information.
I must stress that the FBI-Joint Terrorism Task Forces have been at
the forefront and instrumental in handling terrorism-related
investigations on a nationwide basis and have successfully apprehended
individuals with a nexus to terrorism or organized terror groups on
many, many occasions. I can speak from personal experience that these
Task Forces are vital in the war against terrorism.
However, we have found important information obtained from these
national investigations does not reach the officers responsible for
patrolling the cities, towns, highways, villages and neighborhoods of
our country. State and local police officers comprise far less than one
percent of these Task Forces; their scope and breadth of mission and
their ability to learn what they now do not know mandates the use of
state and local police as eyes and ears in their support. To use a
military metaphor, state and local police can be effective listening
posts and forward observers for the Task Forces. Our concern is not
what the Task Forces cannot do; it is what we, as a state and local
community, have not been empowered to do to assist these Task Forces.
With means readily and routinely at our disposal they will know more
and be better positioned to protect our country.
The Department of Homeland Security is now the cabinet-level agency
responsible for coordinating the protection of America's citizens and
infrastructure from the threat of terrorist attacks. Charged also with
coordinating state and local government efforts for that purpose, it is
logical that the DHS take the initiative in accomplishing this mission.
Under whose auspices the system would fall should not be the crucial
issue - the quick creation of such a system and the capacity to render
it fully functional must be our ultimate goal.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R.
2417), which recently passed the House by an overwhelming margin, moves
toward the goal of greater information sharing between the federal,
state and local governments. Section 336 of the bill would amend the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the DHS Undersecretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) to conduct 3
year pilot projects in several cities to encourage state and local
governments, and representatives of various industries with critical
infrastructure in the project areas, to collect and pass on counter-
terrorism information to the federal government. As part of the
proposed pilot projects, DHS would be allowed to share with state and
local governments intelligence information in its possession through
the use of tear-line reports. The bill would also allow the Director of
Central Intelligence to establish an orientation and training program
for certain state and local officials. The Director of the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center would be mandated to establish two advisory
councils, one of which would have as its primary focus privacy and
civil liberties and the other would focus on the information needs of
state and local governments. While this bill and its companion, S.1025,
will need further strengthening, it provides a suitable template for
airing the concerns of the intelligence communities of both state and
local governments and would greatly facilitate the exchange of
information between the different levels of government.
Almost one year ago, the ten northeastern states from Delaware to
Maine, including New York, formed the Northeast Regional Homeland
Security Agreement as a consortium to combine the homeland security
efforts of our states. The Northeast Regional Agreement has focused on
developing, among other things, regional information and intelligence-
sharing strategies. We have worked diligently with the Department of
Homeland Security on these concerns and strongly believe the Northeast
Regional Agreement would make an excellent starting point for a pilot
project envisioned by this bill. At the state level, intelligence
centers like the New York State Counter-Terrorism Center can be
created, either within each state or as appropriate, on a
``regionalized'' basis. A staff of cleared personnel assigned to the
center, while maintaining a direct, secure line of communication with a
federal coordination center, would interact both with state police and
all local police departments. Partnering with the federal government,
effective counter-terrorism information sharing could be almost
immediately accomplished on a regional basis.
In preparation for effective and meaningful sharing of sensitive
information, New York State agencies have been working with the
Department of Homeland Security to obtain varying levels of security
clearances to appropriate personnel. It is imperative that selected and
cleared individuals on a state level receive tear line intelligence
reports relevant to terrorist activity so they can prepare appropriate
response action plans and overlay them with the ``fabric of their
community.'' Working in tandem with select local officials awarded the
same security clearance will help coordinate counterterrorism efforts
from the federal level down to police officers on the street.
Currently, a top-secret clearance issued by the Department of Defense
may not be recognized or deemed comparable by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, thus halting the flow of vital and often timely
intelligence. Therefore, New York State supports federal efforts to
streamline and standardize security clearances among all Federal
agencies.
Just as the federal government relies on state and local
communities to be the primary first responders to a scene, we must
continue to work toward the empowerment of state and local police to
play a necessary role in assisting the Task Forces in the prevention of
future acts of terrorism. Simply stated, we must have the ability to
share what we gather on the streets and thereby materially bolster JTTF
counter-terror investigations. As the Department of Homeland Security
becomes increasingly operational, we must continue to connect the
counter-terrorism pipes to enable interagency and both international
and national information and intelligence sharing on a regular basis.
America's state and local police officers are our country's first
line of defense against another terrorist attack. They are our forward
observers, and our ``boots on the ground'' in this extraordinary and
historic effort. They must be fully empowered and given the necessary
tools to wage the great fight of our times. We look forward to
continuing to work with you to meet this challenge.
Mr. Gibbons. We have been joined on the panel on the dais
today by the ranking member, Karen McCarthy from Missouri, and
the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Chris Cox of
California. Welcome, and we appreciate their being here as
well.
Ms. McCarthy indicated that she will submit her opening
remarks for the record, and they will be entered into the
record.
Right now we will turn to--back to the schedule of
witnesses, and thank you, Mr. Kallstrom, for your remarks. Very
helpful and enlightening as well. We are pleased to see New
York is out there on the leading edge in doing what they are
doing, and we certainly look forward to studying more of what
you are doing an how it is working out and--.
Mr. Kallstrom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. We will turn now to Mr. Lago for your
comments.
STATEMENT OF V. PHILLIP LAGO, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Lago. Good afternoon, Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Member
McCarthy, Chairman Cox and members of the subcommittee. I thank
you for the invitation to come here and speak with this
distinguished panel. The discussion on the information flow and
how it gets to the people who need it most is at the heart of
defending the homeland. I also thank you for the break we have
had. We have managed to get a lot of business done while you
were gone.
Mr. Gibbons. That is making lemonade out of lemons. Right?
Mr. Lago. We do the best we can, sir.
I also appreciate the fact that you really want to get to
the question and answer period, and since I have submitted a
detailed written statement, I am going to keep my opening
comments very brief. I believe we have some good-news stories.
I believe we are clearly not there yet. We have a long way to
go, and we have a lot of challenges ahead of us. I believe that
the information flow between the CIA and the Department of
Homeland Security is good. It is getting better, and it will
continue to get better.
We are working with our colleagues in the Department and
the Bureau to work with the State and locals to ensure that we
get the information flowing both ways to get the right
information to the right people at the right time.
If I accomplish nothing else today, I would like to leave
you with three messages. First--and let me be clear on this--
the CIA is committed to providing all of the information
required by the Department of Homeland Security to do the
mission that it was asked to do in the Homeland Security Act of
2002.
Second, we are working with our partners to ensure that the
flow of information goes both ways to ensure that we have the
maximum amount of usable, actionable information at the right
place, at the right time.
And third, the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security
have a unique relationship. The missions are complementary. The
relationship has been interactive. We will not simply throw
information across a transom and walk away. We are going to
work with them. We have been working with them from the
beginning to ensure that the flow of information is as best as
we can get it. We supported then-Governor Ridge when he was
made the special assistant to the President. We sent CIA
officers immediately to help him.
When you enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we
immediately sent officers to the transition teams to support
the transition to the Department of Homeland Security. We have
CIA officers embedded into the Department of Homeland Security
today. These people have been there to facilitate the flow of
information back and forth. We were there at the beginning. We
are going to be there now, and we are going to be there in the
future.
We believe we are off to a good start. You could argue it
is not fast start and you could argue it was not a pretty
start, but it is a good start. We have had interactions at all
levels of the organizations. We are working desperately to find
the seamless movement of communications from all Federal
entities to the State and local entities. We clearly are
smarter today than we were 6 months ago. We are going to be
smarter 6 months from now.
I tell you the only thing with certainty that I can project
in the future is we are going to make changes. The way we look
today is going to be different tomorrow. If we are good, it
will keep evolving until we get a seamless mechanism to make
this second nature to us.
As you know, to the Central Intelligence Agency, this is a
new mission, to have mission partners in a domestic entity has
been something that is very, new to us. Before it was very
difficult to find foreign information and understand that the
information could be used to defend New York, Reno, Kansas
City. It was very important for us to turn our direction. We
have turned. Our director has been very clear to us. We will
lean as far forward as possible. We will make sure that we work
with the Department of Justice and make sure we protect the
civil liberties and don't get caught in those issues, but we
will lean as far forward as possible to ensure that the right
information is with the right people at the right time.
I look forward to this process. I look forward to the rest
of this hearing today, and I again appreciate the invitation. I
thank you for your time.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Lago. We appreciate
your consideration of all this, and we also appreciate your
taking time to share with us those highlights. They will be
very helpful.
[The statement of Mr. Lago follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF V. PHILLIP LAGO
Good afternoon Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Member McCarthy and the
Members of the Subcommittee on the Intelligence and Counterterrorism of
the House Select Committee on Homeland Security.
I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues from the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the state and local law enforcement community
to discuss information sharing with the Department of Homeland
Security.
At the outset, let me be clear that the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) is committed to providing all of the information required for the
Department of Homeland Security to execute the mission assigned to it
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In fact, there are significant
initiatives underway within the CIA and across the intelligence
Community aimed at providing intelligence support to the national
effort to protect our homeland. This support is evolving over time, and
through an interactive partnership, we are all learning as we go.
The CIA and DHS have a very unique relationship. While our mission
has always been to collect information upon foreign threats to our
nation and, as directed by the President, take appropriate action to
negate or reduce that threat, we now also have the responsibility to
support DHS in its new mission to protect the homeland. Our missions
are complimentary, and reflect the intent of Congress in both the
National Security Act of 1947 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. We
work together to ensure that no gaps exist in our defenses. For many
years, the CIA has had relationships with several of the major
organizations that were brought together to form DHS. As DHS stands up
and evolves, our relationship with it is also evolving. Under Secretary
Libutti and Acting Assistant Secretary Parrish have already made great
strides in defining the type of information that the department needs
to ensure it can perform its mission. We have been addressing those
issues, we are addressing those issues today, and we will continue to
address them in the future. One of the truths about the future that I
am sure of is that this relationship will continue to evolve and change
over time as we, as a nation, continue our discussions on how to keep
the homeland secure while protecting civil liberties.
Let me quickly walk you through the evolution of our relationship
with DHS. Shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001, Director
Tenet designated a focal point for coordinating DCI support to this
vital mission. CIA has taken an active interest in identifying the
needs of the homeland security community and improving the availability
of information on terrorism. For example, the CIA significantly
increased the number of reports and products that not only had
compartmented information but also versions that could be released in
collateral or unclassified formats. The CIA sponsored numerous, non
Intelligence Community individuals for expedited security clearances to
ensure that critical personnel in high-risk areas could have access to
information. We provided officers to certain FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Forces to help prevent the terrorists from finding a seam in our
defenses. When the President named, then Governor Ridge as his Homeland
Security Advisor, and established the Office of Homeland Security, we
made immediate contact with Governor Ridge and contributed personnel
and resources to help stand up this vital office.
We went through our next budget cycle projecting the need for us to
support Governor Ridge and an Office of Homeland Security that would
have about 300-400 officers. In early 2002, we announced the creation
of the position of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Homeland Security (ADCI/HS) including a small staff to help focus CIA
and Intelligence Community support to this Office. Shortly after the
announcement, the nation evolved in its planning and established a
Department of Homeland Security with over 170,000 officers. Clearly we
had to resize our efforts. Initially, CIA officers were assigned to
both the former Office of Homeland Security and the transition team for
the new Department. Since the activation of DHS on 1 March, CIA has
expanded the range of products and services provided to DHS. CIA
officers are assigned to the Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and other elements of DHS, working to
provide both a core analytic capability and establish an infrastructure
for the care and feeding of the new Department. These officers have
supported tasks as diverse as information analysis, information system
management, security oversight, and watch center operations management.
In addition, CIA provides DCI Representatives to both the Homeland
Security Advisor and Secretary Ridge. The representatives are senior
officers who serve as the primary conduits for the Homeland Security
Advisor, Secretary Ridge, and their staffs to raise issues of concern
and identify topics of special interest for the Intelligence Community
to address, as well as providing a mechanism for providing DHS
requirements to the Intelligence Community.
Secretary Ridge and his senior advisors receive daily intelligence
briefings. The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) is also
available to numerous officers at the department.
CIA is responding to intelligence requirements issued by DHS in
addition to the standing intelligence requirements received from
several organizations and components that were incorporated into DHS.
We will continue to provide information directly to DHS/IAIP, in
addition to information provided via the DHS representatives at TTIC
and to DHS component agencies, while working with the Department to
better synchronize and streamline the disparate requirements that were
generated from legacy agreements.
DHS is on the distribution list for all of CIA's raw terrorism
reporting, which it began to receive directly immediately upon the
implementation of their communications system. Prior to that capability
existing, CIA reporting was sent via indirect channels. In addition,
all subordinate organizations continue to receive CIA reporting based
on their requirements--as they did prior to the creation of DHS--via
their existing communication chains, to ensure that the information is
received by the action elements as well as DHS headquarters.
Finished intelligence products and analysis are also shared with
DHS and their components. CIASOURCE provides direct, immediate access
to the Directorate of Intelligence's finished intelligence products.
Access to these products is determined by the reading requirements
established by the requesting organizations. In the case of DHS, we are
providing intelligence products based upon two distinct categories of
requirements. Prior to the creation of DHS, CIA had established
relationships with a number of organizations that were incorporated
into the new Department. These organizations included the U.S. Secret
Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the old U.S. Customs Service, the
Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Protective Service,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Although these organizations are now part of
DHS, we continue to satisfy their intelligence requirements that were
established before the activation of DHS. In some cases, such as the
new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and FEMA,
these requirements lists are more than 80 pages in length. In addition,
the Intelligence Directorate of the U.S. Coast Guard is separately a
member of the Intelligence Community and has access to intelligence
products available to the Intelligence Community.
We are committed to providing all necessary and relevant
intelligence to the Department of Homeland Security. It is our intent
to create a dialogue with DHS and help drive out a meaningful,
manageable way to flow information, in both directions. We will not
simply throw information over the wall and walk away declaring that our
job is done. Our goal is to develop a full and interactive partnership
with the DHS.
In addition to our multiple avenues of support to DHS Headquarters
elements, we also support the work of the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC), a shared partnership including DHS, CIA, FBI, DOD and
the Department of State, by providing: CIA staff officers assigned to
TTIC--including managers, analysts, and support personnel--the CT-Link
information system, personnel positions, and funding, as legally
permissible.
The TTIC partner elements use these resources, in part, to carry
out the mission of directly supporting DHS and other organizations.
Also, the Community Counterterrorism Board and its community warning
function, with eight staff positions, has been transferred from the
DCI's Counterterrorist Center to TTIC. The mission of TTIC does not
transfer our responsibilities to report directly to DHS.
Thank you for this opportunity to describe CIA's role in the
evolution and support of DHS. I would be pleased to answer your
questions.
Mr. Gibbons. We will turn now to Mr. McCraw from the FBI
and ask for your testimony. And welcome before the committee.
We look forward to hearing what you have to say.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN McCRAW, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. McCraw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be
here today and I will dispense even with my prepared oral
testimony and just get to the--first, I want to commend Mr.
Parrish's agency and certainly the CIA. I did in my written
testimony. I meant it. It is earnest. At the horizontal level,
there is unprecedented sharing of information. I would contend
that it is seamless. I mean, we are side by side, whether it is
out in the field or whether it is at FBI headquarters, the CTC,
TTIC, that day-to-day information sharing is happening, and it
is nice to see. It is critical that we do it, because as I
pointed out in my written testimony, I mean, the greatest force
multiplier unquestionably is the sharing of information.
As Mr. Kallstrom pointed out, which I will kind of divert
to the vertical sharing--I just came back from an assignment as
SAC in San Antonio, Texas and had, you know, three JTTFs
working under me, and of course, I would like to state for the
record some of the best investigators I have ever supervised in
counterterrorism weren't necessarily FBI agents. They were
State and local officers. They were Customs, INS analysts from
the agency, and they do a tremendous job. And clearly it
requires a combined effort.
One of the things when I was out there, it was obvious to
me was that we weren't doing the type of work that we needed to
do to get information into State and local, the vertical side
of it. Tommy Davis, the head of the Texas Department of Public
Safety, former agency before I got into my bureau, made it
quite clear to me in terms that he didn't have a shared
comprehensive view of the threat, and it is important to note
that it is these men and women that are charged and responsible
for protecting the community.
So they need information, and they need it fast. They need
security clearances, because they don't need just unclassified
information. They need it up to certainly the top secret level
many times, because they are charged with protecting public
safety in their cities.
Also as Mr. Kallstrom pointed out, which I think is
absolutely right on target, you know, we are blessed in this
Nation to have an army of dedicated professionals, men and
women--the army is up to 700 authorization, or it is over
700,000 now, and if we can arm them, they need to be armed with
information, because they need to know about trade craft. They
need training, and that training needs to incorporate in terms
of the latest trade craft, and the more we can do, the better
we can do, the better educated that we can use them out on the
particular streets because they are collectors of information.
Not only the first line of defense.
Moreover, the advantage of plugging into them is that if
they know what the requirements are, what the collection
requirements are, then guess what, they are going to be better
armed to collect that type of information that goes back and
gets integrated, again, into that shared threat. And we need to
leverage them.
Now, the FBI, I am proud to say, has always been great
collectors of information. In fact, I would argue that we have
always had a great intelligence program that has been organic
to our investigative mission. What we haven't done, though,
however, there has never been a core competency to sharing
information. We have never had an enterprise-wide plan to share
information in the FBI. It has been done on a case-by-case
basis. It has been done with the JTTFs person to person.
However, we have not mastered that process.
Right now we are in a 10-week program. We fortunately stole
someone from a--a 24-year veteran from the Intelligence
Community, because we are not afraid to take advice. We are
working right now instituting in the FBI an enterprise-wide
intelligence program, and of one of the core, basic principles
that you have to address, and it is critical, is information
sharing, which is forcing us to look at and where we need to be
is at a customer driven or customer centric place.
Now, I have laid out a number of things that the FBI has
done. Certainly I am a big believer in the reports officers
function that we have got trained professionals to extract the
essential elements of information, get it out, intelligence
reports back to the community, but also we need to put those
people out in the field so they are also supporting that
customer at the State and local level.
And chiefs of police and sheriffs and heads of State police
departments, they need a global view of the particular threat,
because if you happen to be the chief of police in San
Francisco, and there is a global threat that includes bridges
in New York, you need to know that too. You need to see it. I
mean, the world has changed. Events that happen in Pakistan and
Yemen can make a difference to a chief of police in Paducah,
Texas and also the sheriff. That is just the way it is now.
So the director is clearly committed to doing that, and
thankfully with the support of Congress, we have been blessed
in a situation now to transform our entire information
technology system, because that is an important part of
information sharing, finding the information, the critical
information that has to be shared and also pushing it to the
community and pushing it to State and locals, leveraging the
Internet, leveraging the technology that is out there. Post
that information. Let them have access to it, because they are
going to put a tremendous center--and I am very impressed with
the testimony here in this 10-state initiative, and they are
going to dedicate full-time resources into the intelligence
process. That is good for the Nation. That is great.
The FBI has to come through and deliver on feeding their
requirements in terms of information and us letting them know
what our requirements are so they can collect information. And,
again, thank you, Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much Mr. McCraw.
[The statement of Mr. McCraw follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. McCRAW
Good afternoon Chairman Gibbons and members of the Subcommittee. On
behalf of the Federal Bureau of ITIvestigation (FBI), I would like to
thank you for affording us the opportunity to speak to you today on
this very important matter, Information Sharing. First, I would like to
publicly acknowledge the outstanding support the FBI receives from the
Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and our
nation's over 17,000 local and state law enforcement agencies. Our
ability to share information with all of our partners has been and will
continue to be a key factor in neutralizing many threats through a
variety of means.
Mr. Chairman, your Subcommittee is evidence that the threat to our
homeland is far different than ever before. Worldwide economic,
political, social, and technological changes have resulted in a more
dispersed, complex, asymmetric threat to our nation. Terrorists,
criminals, and foreign intelligence collectors have significantly
benefitted from these rapid changes, which have permanently shrunk the
world. Yesterday, the most significant threat to the homeland was from
nation states that were geographically distant and contained. Today,
global networks (terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and
foreign intelligence operations) are no longer distinct activities, but
rather fluid enterprises that pose a significant threat to the security
of our homeland. 1As you are aware, Director Mueller is reshaping the
FBI to meet these new threats.
The FBI has always been a great collector of information; however,
the sharing of information was primarily case oriented rather than a
part of an enterprise-wide activity. Prior to 9/11/2001, statutory and
other legal restrictions limited to some extent the degree of
information sharing between the FBI and our Intelligence Community
partners. Thanks to the enactment of the Patriot Act, the FBI now can
clearly share information much more robustly than ever before.
Moreover, in today's threat environment, cooperation rather than
competition must be the guiding principle and the recognition that the
benefits of sharing information far exceed the risks. We and our
partners must have transparency in our knowledge of terrorist threats
to the United States. In fact, it is Director Mueller's view that
information sharing is the greatest force multiplier in the defense of
our nation. For example, the globalization of crime and terrorism poses
unique challenges to local and state law enforcement agencies. Chiefs
of Police and Sheriffs need access to information far beyond their
jurisdictional boundaries to protect the citizens of their communities.
Today, events in Pakistan and Yemen can have a public safety dimension
in San Antonio, Texas, that the Chief of Police, the Sheriff, and the
Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety must know about in
order for them to effectively discharge their responsibilities.
Since 9/11/2001, the FBI has implemented several information
sharing initiatives and others are underway. Collectively, when fully
operational, these initiatives will provide an integrated system to
quickly deliver information to our law enforcement and Intelligence
Community partners. All who are involved in the war on terrorism are
continuing to work through very real problems, without preventing in
any way the full sharing of terrorism threat-related information. We
must not only collect and share more, we much collect and share
smarter. Collecting and sharing vast amounts of information without any
thought being given to the usefulness of the information collected is
counterproductive and wastes precious collection resources, while at
the same time drowning the end user, whether he or she is a Chief of
Police, Department Head, or Intelligence Community Analyst.
The Intelligence process when properly executed ensures that the
information shared is useful and meets the needs of the customer.
Intelligence has always been a core competency of the FBI and organic
to the FBI's investigative mission. The Patriot Act has created new
opportunities to strengthen and expand the FBI's Intelligence
capability and allowed us to move from thinking about ``intelligence as
a case'' to finding ``intelligence in the case'' and sharing it widely
with our Intelligence and Law Enforcement Partners.
The collection and timely dissemination of the right information to
the right people as part of an enterprise-wide business process is so
critically important, the Director has elevated intelligence to program
status in the FBI and hired a senior intelligence professional from the
National Security Agency. Under her leadership, the FBI has embarked on
a 10-week program to develop and implement Concepts of Operations for
all nine key intelligence functions. We have already completed a
concept of operations for dissemination that focuses on both the form
and substance of FBI raw intelligence reports. Our aim is to move from
individual production processes to a single process that will be
imbedded throughout the FBI. One of our first improvements to our
already strong Intelligence Program will be to explicitly link the
requirements to the raw product and produce metrics to measure our
performance against the information requirements of local and state law
enforcement agencies, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Intelligence Community, and those of DHS officers, our Special Agents,
and other Intelligence Community officers assigned to the newly
established Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), in which we,
DHS, CIA and others are full partners.
Before I proceed with the remainder of my testimony, I would like
to take this opportunity on behalf of every FBI employee to thank you
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and your colleagues for the
support you have provided the FBI that is enabling us to overhaul its
information technology infrastructure. When completed, every aspect of
FBI operations including the sharing of information will be
significantly improved.
The most productive exchange of information occurs at the people
level working side by side. Currently, there are 84 Joint Terrorism
Task Forces throughout the United States with participation from 25
different Federal gencies and hundreds of local and state law
enforcement agencies in the 84 Task Force locations. Every JTTF
Officer, Agent, and Analyst has a Top Secret clearance and unfiltered
access to all of the information.
The National Joint Terrorism Task Force located in the Strategic
Information and Operations Center at FBIHQ is comprised of
representatives from 35 different Federal agencies. Like the JTTFs, the
NJTTF benefits from the combination of experience, diversity of mission
and access to the databases of each member agncy.
Even prior to 9/11/2001, the FBI benefitted from the assignment of
Special Agents to the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and the CIA
assignment of case officers and analysts to the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division. Since 9/11/2001, the exchange of personnel has dramatically
increased as has the timely flow of information. The benefits of co-
location cannot be overstated. This is why the Administration made the
extraordinary decision to co-locate the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division, the CIA's Counterterrorism Operations and TTIC in the same
facility next year.
The TTIC has already had a positive impact on information sharing
throughout the community. As the Subcommittee is aware, TTIC is an
interagency joint venture of its partners. The TTIC members include,
but are not limited to, the Department of Justice/FBI, DHS, CIA,
National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. Through the input and
participation of these partners, TTIC integrates and analyzes terrorist
threat-related information, collected domestically and abroad, in order
to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture, and disseminate
such information to appropriate recipients. TTIC, through its
structure, draws on the particular expertise of its participating
members, thereby ensuring that the terrorist analytic product takes
advantage of, and incorporates, the specialized perspectives of
relevant federal agencies. In addition, TTIC will have access to, and
will aggressively seek to analyze, information from state and local
entities, as well as voluntarily provided data from the private sector.
TTIC will work with appropriate partners to ensure that TTIC's products
reach not only federal customers, but also state and local, as well as
private sector, partners. TTIC provides comprehensive, all-source
terrorist threat analysis and assessments to U.S. national leadership.
Mr. John Brennan, the Director of the TTIC, and his staff have done a
tremendous job in quickly standing up this vital center. The FBI is
proud to be full partners in this effort.
I would now like to provide you a quick overview of other FBI
information sharing initiatives.
In 2002, the FBI established the position of Reports Officer whose
job is to extract pertinent information from FBI investigations and
analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible. Currently,
the FBI has 18 Reports Officers that have already disseminated nearly
2,000 Intelligence Information Reports to the Intelligence Community.
We are in the process of hiring 120 more Reports Officers 90 of whom
will be assigned to the field, where they will support both local law
enforcement and Intelligence Community information needs.
Since 2002, the FBI has sent to approximately 17,000 law
enforcement agencies a weekly bulletin concerning terrorism-related
information. However, the FBI is not yet satisfied with its ability to
provide our law enforcement partners a comprehensive view of the
threat. As a result, we are currently establishing an executive
briefing capability in the field to ensure senior law enforcement
officials receive more detailed threat briefings tailored to their
needs.
In addition, senior law enforcement officials need access to
classified U.S. Governmnt information and to do so they are required to
have a security clearance. As you are aware, security clearances are
both costly and time consuming. Nevertheless, since 9/11/2001, the
FBI's Security Division has favorably adjudicated over 2,686 security
clearances for local and state law enforcement personnel and another
823 are pending approval. This is so important the FBI established an
entire Unit to focus solely on the security clearances of local and
state law enforcement executives and JTTF members.
Prior to the Winter OlYmpics, Director Mueller mandated that all
domestic and international subjects of FBI terrorism investigations be
entered into the National Crime Information Center, providing the over
700,000 police officers in the U.S. query access to the names of known
and suspected terrorists. This information is also available to Federal
law enforcement agencies and the Department of State.
Training must also be considered as an important mechanism for the
sharing of essential information. The better we educate ourselves and
our colleagues about the enemy the better we are able to defend against
them. All JTTF members receive specialized counterterrorism training;
however, local, state, and Federal officers not in the JTTFs also need
this type of information including knowledge about the latest trade
craft employed by terrorists. We have expanded our counterterrorism
training to include another estimated 27,000 local and state officers
and are currently evaluating other training initiatives to further
increase training opportunities.
An essential component of the FBI's information sharing strategy
occurs overseas with our law enforcement allies. Only by sharing
information and working directly with law enforcement abroad will we
have the opportunity to stop criminal and terrorist threats before they
reach our shores. The FBI has 46 offices overseas where we have
established solid cop-to-cop information sharing and working
relationships, and provided training and forensic support.
The internet provides a cost-effective means to quickly share
unclassified information. The FBI's Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
provides a secure and easily accessible gateway to this information.
Using individual log on accounts, dual certificate authentication, and
point to point encryption, LEO will provide a host of information
services and enable the FBI to push information over the internet in a
cost-effective manner. To further expand its reach, LEO connects to the
Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) which is widely used by
local and state law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, through LEO,
users will soon have access to OSIS.4
Certain information must be immediately brought to the attention of
senior local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. The FBI is
now implementing a National Alert Notification System which provides us
the ability to instantly send text page messages throughout the nation
alerting law enforcement agency heads or their designees through their
cell phones and two way pagers.
The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) is working with
local and state law enforcement to capitalize on pre-existing data
agreements to address its crime statistics reporting mission while at
the same time provide a national indices that will enable police
officers to link subjects and modus operandi throughout the U.S.
Another information gap is the inability to access wide information
on suspicious surveillances. The counterterrorism Report System on
Suspicious Surveillance (CROSS) was developed by Department of Defense
and is being piloted in the National Capitol Region. CROSS will be
accessible through LEO and it enables police officers and Agents to
report hostile surveillance activity in a Web environment and receive
instant notification on similar activity elsewhere in the U.S.4
The St. Louis Gateway project was conceived by the local law
enforcement leadership in the St. Louis area to provide law enforcement
investigators and analysts easy access to unclassified criminal and
terrorism investigative reports from multiple agencies. This initiative
will employ link analysis tools and geo-spacial mapping. During the
testing phase, previously unknown links between criminal and terrorism
reports were identified demonstrating the efficacy of this concept.
When successfully completed, this project will be expanded to other
parts of the country based upon previously arranged agreements with law
enforcement leaders in different areas of the country.
The FBI is also in the process of establishing FBI web pages on Top
Secret and Secret Intelligence Community and Department of Defense
systems so that it can ``post'' information on FBI web pages that is
easily accessible to the entire community. The FBI also has several
ongoing classified information sharing initiatives with its partners in
the Intelligence Community that are providing tangible results.
Finally, it is critically important that the FBI leverage the
outstanding work that has already been done in the intelligence and
information sharing arena. Long before 9/11/2001, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) were working on intelligence led
policing and the information sharing issue. In August 2002, the IACP
published a report recommending the creation of a national criminal
intelligence sharing plan. As a result, the Global Intelliqence working
group comprised of leaders from local, state, and Federal law
enforcement agencies was formed to address the goals and objectives
outlined in the IACP report. The FBI is essentially a small but
determined organization and we recognize that our future success will
in large part be as a result of our ability to leverage one of our
nation's greatest assets, the over 700,000 dedicated men and women who
serve in local and state law enforcement.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today and I
look forward to any questions you may. have.
Mr. Gibbons. And we will turn now to Mr. Foresman.
Commonwealth of Virginia, thank you and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. FORESMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR FOR
COMMONWEALTH PREPAREDNESS, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Foresman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, vice chairman,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today.
I currently serve as a cabinet ranked State homeland
security official in Virginia and was responsible for directing
State-level response and recovery actions to both the Pentagon
and anthrax attacks that directly impacted the commonwealth in
2001. I am also completing my fifth year as a member of the
advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, the Gilmore
Commission, created by the Congress in 1999 to advise both this
body and the President on strategies to improve America's
preparedness for terrorism. I also am a former first responder.
My detailed testimony has been submitted, and I will attempt to
be brief and within the time constraints.
Since the attacks of September the 11th, America has made
great progress in our collective preparedness for emergencies
and disasters of all kinds, including terrorism. Much work
remains. There is no more fundamental obligation for government
than to protect its citizens. Our collective ability to meet
that obligation to prevent and deter terrorism and if required,
to rapidly respond and recover requires new and innovative
thinking coupled with good old fashioned commitment no nowhere
is this more evident than in the areas of intelligence and
information sharing.
We have merged entire or parts of 22 Federal agencies into
a single organization and now named it the Department of
Homeland Security. With the goal of improving coordination of
effort to make America more secure. The Department of Homeland
Security mission continues to evolve. However, one thing is
clear. There appears to be ambiguity across the entire Federal
Government about the DHS role when it comes to the intelligence
sharing responsibility. This is evidenced in almost the daily
news articles and my discussions with officials from all levels
and areas of government, the media and the private sector.
But this ambiguity about intelligence and information
sharing frankly is not limited to the Department of Homeland
Security. It extends across and within a multitude of Federal
agencies with intelligence responsibilities. It affects how
effectively they work with each other, equally important it
affects how well they work with local, State and private sector
players.
I would highlight three points in my written submission.
The problem is not with the people, and clearly the testimony
today underscored that, and interestingly enough the
discussions during the break further emphasized that for me.
Clearly, there is a commitment on the part of individuals
across the Federal agencies to achieve synchronization of
effort, but it is clear we are not achieving that as part of a
national focus. We have no macro strategic view of how our
intelligence and information sharing needs can and should be
accomplished with all relevant stakeholders irrespective of the
level or function of government. This is a government-wide
strategic-wide issue.
The confusion among Federal agencies filters to the State
and local level and into the private sector. This confusion is
not the fault of any one person, agency or branch of
government. It comes from years of ad hoc fixes and changes to
many individual components of the Nation's intelligence
enterprise without having viewed them as part of a whole.
The result is unintended, but very real patchwork approach
that is a threat to the security of the Nation and our ability
to move information to relevant officials at the local, State,
Federal level.
Second, technology, new statutes or even organizations are
not the end-all answer to the problems we face. We need to
commit our Nation, that is Federal State and local officials
and certain private sector elements, to defining what
intelligence needs to be shared and identify existing and new
pathways to make it happen.
In short, we need a set of business rules with supporting
planning effort. We must then focus on clarifying everyone's
expectations and focus on achieving improved movement of
information and intelligence among all levels, branches,
disciplines, functions, areas of government in key private
sector entities.
Third and finally, we must always preserve the democracy
and our core civil liberties.
Security at the expense of personal freedoms and rights
will accomplish exactly what the 19 hijackers intended. From my
way of thinking, for our way of thinking in Virginia and in
parting with 49 other States, 6 territories and thousands of
Federal officials, we cannot allow this to happen.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I will
be happy to take your questions.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Foresman, for your
enlightened comments. They are very helpful indeed.
[The statement of Mr. Foresman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE FORESMAN
Mr. Chairman, Madame Ranking Member and Members of the Committee
thank-you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the issue
homeland security related intelligence and information sharing with
state and local officials.
Three perspectives inform my comments today. I currently serve as a
Cabinet-rank state homeland security official in Virginia and was a
senior state emergency management official at the time of the September
11, 2001 attacks and subsequent anthrax incidents. I also am completing
my fifth year as a member of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, created by Congress in 1999 to advise this body and the
President on strategies to improve America's preparedness for
terrorism. Finally, I should note I am a former first responder.
We are approaching several milestones in the next several months.
We will soon commemorate the second anniversary of the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 and the one-year anniversary of Congress having
passed legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security.
Congress has already held joint hearings to examine intelligence issues
surrounding the attacks and the independent September 11th Commission
is expected to deliver its final report in May of next year. I remind
you of these to make the point that in the context of having just
celebrated our 227th anniversary as a nation, two years is a narrow
window in time.
I would like to address three issues to the Committee today.
First, has the flow of information from the federal government to
states and communities improved since the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Secondly is the quality of information sufficient to support the
daily efforts of thousands of local and state officials who are on the
front line of making our nation safe and secure.
Finally, I want to offer some perspective as to whether we are we
making progress.
The great challenge we face in the post September 11th environment
is achieving common definitions of homeland security and intelligence.
In response to the extraordinary events of September 11th, we have
merged entire or parts of 22 federal agencies into a single
organization called the Department of Homeland Security. Their mission
continues to evolve reflective of statutory language and the National
Strategy for Homeland Security. However, there appears to be great
ambiguity about their roles within the entire federal family,
especially when it comes to the intelligence sharing responsibilities.
This is evidenced in the almost daily news articles about competing
intelligence activities within the federal government.
Each day states and communities are confronted with a multitude of
sources of so called intelligence information. This is information that
may originate at the federal level from within the intelligence,
defense, law-enforcement or other federal communities. Some methods for
passing information to communities and states were well established
prior to the September 11th attacks and worked well, while others are
less than efficient. Among the cornerstone arguments articulated in
creating the Department of Homeland Security was to provide ``one stop
shopping'' for states, communities and the private sector.
In my opinion we have not achieved the most fundamental agreement
and education concerning what is ``homeland security'' or
``intelligence''. Does the term homeland security describe our response
to the threat of terrorism or is it something more. Today the Federal
Emergency Management Agency is a core element in the Department of
Homeland Security Emergency Response and Recovery Directorate. FEMA's
role in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies is clear.
However, is disseminating precautionary information in advance of a
hurricane making landfall a homeland security or an emergency
management function. Is the data they utilize from the National Weather
Service intelligence in the context of homeland security. If so what
``pathways'' should it follow in being disseminated to state and local
officials. Are the pathways and business rules for moving the data
sufficiently clear that critical information is being moved in a timely
fashion. Today there appear to be no clear answers to these questions.
The same challenge remains true when we discuss those things that
tend to more accurately fit into the category of intelligence. But
again, defining intelligence tends to be in the eye of the beholder.
Each day law enforcement agencies at all levels of government
investigate crimes amassing volumes of data. Is this data intelligence,
especially when it may have tangential relationships to the threats we
face from our enemies. If the information potentially has direct or
indirect relationships to America's war on terrorism is there a well
organized structure that provides for the integration, passing and
analysis of this data by responsible local, state and federal officials
in a comprehensive fashion. I do not believe that is the case.
I offer both of these examples to make the point that the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security and its intelligence
responsibilities add yet another layer to the communication process
between federal agencies and with states, communities, the private
sector and citizens. This new layer, especially if it improves and
better coordinates the flow of information and intelligence, is not the
problem. The major obstacle that we face is adding these new
responsibilities without first de-conflicting them with the long-
standing communication pathways between the federal government and
states and communities. I believe we have unintentionally added
confusion because of the ambiguity of the Department of Homeland
Security's intelligence function as it relates to other federal
agencies as well as state, local and private sector stakeholders.
One would hope that among the successes we might obtain from
lessons learned of the events of September 11th is that we must rethink
our approach to defining the intelligence enterprise. Between elements
of our federal intelligence, law enforcement and defense community's
primary responsibilities for components of our ``national intelligence
enterprise'' exist. Throughout history the Congress and Administrations
have made adjustments to pieces and parts, usually in response to real
and perceived shortcomings, without a seemingly comprehensive analysis
of how these individual changes impact on the enterprise as a whole.
The result is a patchwork approach that has created often times
conflicting responsibilities, ambiguity and further intensified turf
between responsible organizations at the federal level.
Furthermore, prior to the events of September 11th, state and local
agencies were not viewed by federal agencies as part of America's
``national intelligence enterprise''. In the aftermath of the attacks
leaders proclaimed the critical importance of police officers,
firefighters, public health officials and other state and local
officials being key to our war on terrorism. There have been great
proclamations about the need to get critical intelligence to those who
are on the front lines of keeping our communities and states safe.
These same ideals have not been embraced by the rank and file staff in
federal agencies. My experience tells me that it is not because of a
lack of desire, but rather it again comes back to the ambiguity that
exists within the federal intelligence enterprise as it relates to the
role of the Department of Homeland Security and what needs to be
communicated to local and state agencies.
This is not a criticism of any one federal organization. Rather it
points to the larger issue of overall federal coordination. There does
not appear to be any overall federal vision and coherent plan across
the entire federal government that articulates exactly what we are
trying to accomplish in terms of information and intelligence fusion,
analysis and sharing, especially related to the involvement of state
and local government. My perception is that it does not appear to be
clear within and between federal headquarters offices as well as with
field personnel on the front lines of moving critical information and
to us at the state and local level. In short there is no clear plan and
direction.
Let me be clear. These challenges at the federal level are
replicated at the state and local level. Agencies and entire
disciplines at the state and local level have managed the flow of
information and intelligence for years in a manner that best suits
their purposes. Law enforcement agencies tend to focus on ensuring the
quality of intelligence more for the purpose of prosecution. Public
health agencies have a focus that is on preventing the spread of
disease and protecting patient confidentiality. Other emergency
response agencies use information and intelligence to ensure rapid
response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters. Each is
legitimate within their individual context. However, when viewed as
part of a larger enterprise these current approaches have the potential
to create confusion and conflict.
It is clear that state and local level government has a
responsibility to effectively integrate information from federal
intelligence, defense, law enforcement and other federal communities
for its use. A single pathway is not going to work and is not
appropriate. Whether it is the threat of terrorist groups, disease
outbreak or even a severe storm our continuing focus is on the
maintenance of a well-defined set of business rules at the state and
local level that outline the pathways for moving information between
those who will respond. We are seeking to enhance this in Virginia
through the integration of multiple information sources into a single
multi-agency center. But our efforts are challenged by the lack of
clarity at the federal level among other issues.
My impression is that the Department of Homeland Security is making
every attempt to capture significant intelligence currently available
at the federal level and, where needed, putting the material in a
useable form that can be passed to local, state and private sector
organizations. My experience tells me that they are inhibited in their
efforts by being a new organization that is still working through
start-up, merger and acquisition issues. Furthermore, I get the
impression that cooperation of other federal agencies is superficial.
But this misses the larger point of coordination. The Department of
Homeland Security's most important function may be to bring the
multitude of federal players together with state and local stakeholders
are develop a comprehensive approach to defining what is meant by
information and intelligence sharing. This must be a priority. The
products are not the answer. A clear set of business rules for
describing the vertical and horizontal flow of information across the
national enterprise--local, state, federal and private sector is the
essential first step. This has not yet to my knowledge been done.
Technology and methods of protecting classified information can then be
applied to meet defined objectives for rapid transfer and protection of
critical national security data.
When I began my state career nearly 20 years ago doing contingency
plans for nuclear attack there was a two-page description of how
information should flow in the aftermath of an attack, taking into
account the three levels of government and the multitude of
disciplines. I have not seen a similar plan today. Effectively sharing
intelligence is less an issue of technology and more good old-fashioned
planning and commitment.
The flow of information must be vertical between federal
headquarters offices, field and or regional offices, states,
communities and the private sector and of course citizens. It is
imperative that federal information reflects a coordinated and not
conflicting approach, less we add to the confusion. When we evaluate
the flow of federal information we see clear disconnects between that
received directly from Washington headquarters and what is known by
field personnel of the various federal agencies. In Virginia's case our
proximity to the District of Columbia and presence of key federal
operations necessitates a close working relationship with a wide range
of agencies and their field personnel. It remains surprising how many
times data is received from the Department of Homeland Security, or
other federal headquarters functions, that is unknown to the its
personnel in the field. This again points to an enterprise wide
analysis and defining of who needs to get what and how.
More is not necessarily better. Clearly the flow of information
increased since the attacks of September 11th. With each passing day
more information flows from federal agencies into communities and state
agencies. But the simple flow of more information does not equate to
better intelligence sharing. I would offer that the almost reactive
nature of sharing information may be leading to a well intentioned push
by federal agencies that floods state and local officials with often
times conflicting data, or so much volume, that reasonable analysis is
impossible. This type of visceral reactive approach often adds
confusion rather than clarity to the efforts of state and local
officials to meet their homeland security responsibilities. Ensuring
the quality of information, assignment of priority for its movement and
training and education of those who are to receive it remains critical.
We have had mixed experiences with the quality of data received. In
one case critical information being passed to us through the Department
of Homeland Security was almost immediately attacked by field personnel
from another federal agency as being ``old news'' and, therefore,
unreliable having been over taken by events. We were then confronted
with the challenge of validating through unofficial channels what had
been provided to us to determine if the disagreement was based in
``turf'' or substance. In another case, the Department of Homeland
Security provided us information in advance of Operation Iraqi Freedom
concerning potential security concerns on selected sites. This
information was passed to local officials but it was clear from
discussions with federal field personnel in the affected area that they
had not been made aware of these same concerns. Again it posed a vexing
question for us as to its authenticity and quality.
Most recently, I am pleased to report, that limited knowledge was
made available to state and local law enforcement officials concerning
an on-going investigation with alleged terrorism related ties. This
occurred within the context of one of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
But unfortunately the information was not disseminated within the
federal agency community and when we inquired with an official at the
Department of Homeland Security they seemed unaware of the
investigation. These types of events, while understandable given the
complexity of the issue, leave significant room for doubt about the
quality of any intelligence received.
I would suggest it is to early to make wholesale judgments if the
quality of information we are receiving is sufficient. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that we have much more work to do and that we must
place a premium on ensuring integration between disciplines,
organizations, levels of government, the private sector. If the
Department of Homeland Security is to be at the forefront of
intelligence and information sharing with states and communities
several actions will be needed.
First they must continue their efforts to capture and move critical
federal information and intelligence to communities and states. This
effort must separate they inevitable general information flow and time
sensitive intelligence into two distinct categories. Information and
intelligence that demands immediate attention must not be sent in the
same manner as ``good to know'' data.
Secondly, a clear set of business rules must be established that
defines the movement of information horizontally and vertically across
all areas and levels of government and with appropriate private sector
elements. Right now each agency, and in some cases elements within
agencies, acts very much on their own and there appears to be no
centralized authority for ensuring the development of a strategic
approach, that takes into account existing pathways, the multitude of
disciplines and organizations, the levels of government and the private
sector. This must be an effort free of the day-to-day crunches of
moving information and with sufficient authority to make it happen.
Agencies and organizations need not give up their individual ``turf''
but rather all of these components must be deigned to operate in
harmony. This effort, whether led by the Department of Homeland
Security or other federal agency must have the active involvement of
knowledgeable local, state and private sector stakeholders. This, I
believe, will have profound positive impact on our national
intelligence structure including local, state and private sector
entities.
Finally, we must begin to educate. There is a fine line between our
intelligence and information sharing needs and our desires. I note with
interest virtually every day a new technology initiative designed to
speed and empower the movement of intelligence and information. While
these efforts may reflect the technological opportunities of today,
they do not always reflect a comprehensive understanding of the
significant policy implications of how information and intelligence is
gathered, stored and used, especially as it relates to ordinary law
abiding Americans.
More importantly, we find that federal agencies are operating under
antiquated assumptions about sharing classified information with state
and local officials. There has been only minimal progress in obtaining
security clearances for state and local officials. We seem compelled to
operate in an environment that seeks to empower restrictions to
effectively sharing critical intelligence and information rather than
promoting best practice solutions that get needed information and
intelligence to those who must act to save lives. Our experience has
been that when the chips are down and the crisis is at its highest
point the information will be shared irrespective of clearances. But
this point is too late. This approach precludes state and local
officials from having digested the complexity of information and
developed well-formulated response strategies. Right now the release of
secure information and intelligence is built upon individuals rather
than a well-defined process with auditable standards that lay a clear
framework for sharing sensitive information. If we can quickly share
sensitive information with our Allies then we can surely find a way to
share it with state and local officials who are responsible for keeping
our citizens safe and secure.
We cannot underestimate the cultural challenges of having thousands
of officials in differing fields change the mentality about the sharing
of information and intelligence. But this is essential to our ultimate
success. The most significant impediment we face in this regard again
goes back to the lack of a clear national strategic approach, one that
describes what information needs to be shared and pathways for
accomplishing its movement. Virtually every official that I have spoken
to understands that they are part of a larger need, but in an absence
of a global understanding of the enterprise or their part in it, they
find it difficult to adjust their thought process. If I were to point
to a major failing to date in our national reaction to the events of
September 11th it is that we have not taken the time and energy to
train and educate everyone from first responders to elected officials
about the critical importance for effectively sharing information and
intelligence. We have chosen to think of our enterprise as thousands of
separate organizations with a similar intelligence and information
requirements rather than a single enterprise with thousands of
components. Consequently, each continues to look at its own and not the
whole.
I need to underscore that my comments do not mean centralizing all
responsibilities in a single agency. But there should be clarity
regarding the coordination of information and intelligence flow and
better methods for ensuring accountability among federal agencies that
needed information is being appropriately shared. Core in our national
belief is the preservation of civil liberties. One could argue that
current vexing confusion only adds to the dangers we face. Our
inability to produce a comprehensive set of business rules about what
information should be shared and how, inhibits our ability for
appropriate oversight and increases the potential that we may
unintentionally undermine our core national values in the name of
security. The zeal of securing our nation must not trample on the
ideals of living as a democracy with individual rights.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I will be happy
to address any questions you may have.
Mr. Gibbons. And finally, we have gotten to Mr. Daniels who
has come a long way and has waited patiently for his
opportunity to speak and all the way from Arizona. We want to
welcome you to Washington, D.C., and we look forward to your
testimony. Mr. Daniels, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DARIN DANIELS, PREPAREDNESS PLANNING AND TRAINING
MANAGER, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA
Mr. Daniels. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to
address this committee today. I share the subcommittee's
concerns about the preparedness of public agencies charged with
protecting the security of our Nation and our communities and
offer my comments and insights from the local public health
perspective.
The most critical issue in preparedness today relates to
the need to share information openly and on a timely basis.
This must be done both vertically and horizontally, vertically
between governments at the Federal, State and local level and
horizontally across local public and private agencies. Indeed
open and timely sharing of information is essential to the
ability of State and local medical personnel to respond
effectively as a principle line of defense against a disease
outbreak, regardless of whether the outbreak is an act of
nature or an act of terrorism.
Unfortunately historically, this has not been the case for
Maricopa County. Prior to the historic events of September
11th, 2001, communications were, at best, spotty and
uncoordinated. Thankfully that has changed for the better. Now
with the assistance of Federal funds, Maricopa County has been
able to build programs and manpower dedicated to surveillance
and response to any emergency situation. At Maricopa County
Department of Public Health, we believe the key to successful
information sharing is trust, respect and shared goals. These
elements are the foundation of the partnerships and cooperative
spirit needed to ensure community preparedness.
To that end, we have focused on developing strong
partnerships with a wide variety of Federal, State and local
agencies, including the fire departments of the cities of
Phoenix, Glendale, and Mesa, local hospitals, tribal
governments, the Arizona Department of Health Services and the
United States Department of Health and Human Services.
As a result of our efforts, we have achieved a high level
of interagency cooperation. Examples of this cooperation
include shared training and table-top and field exercises.
Examples which were the statewide strategic national stockpile
exercise, a full-scale chemical and biological table top
exercise.
This was made possible through the full cooperation of the
four metropolitan medical response system cities in Arizona.
These joint exercises have resulted in open lines of
communication and more responsive decision making.
At public health, we understand the agencies must work
together on an organized regular basis to create and maintain
the communication links needed to share information. The
Federal MMRS program has enhanced the relationship-building
process by bringing together various agencies within the region
and fostering their cooperation in creating a sense of
inclusiveness among our partners.
These relationships enhance the 24-7 response capabilities
locally by allowing leaders and decision makers to know who
their partners are prior to any event. Public health has
benefitted directly from Arizona's statewide communication
system that has been developed to send information through
secure and unsecured channels. The secured Internet-based
communications network allows sharing of information among
local governments and health care facilities. We have focused
on changing the dynamics of information sharing.
An example is the sharing of epidemiological disease
surveillance information. During the past few months, the
public has lived with the threat of sudden acute respiratory
syndrome, monkey pox, West Nile virus and the potential threat
of smallpox.
Combatting these diseases requires an effective disease
surveillance program and the sharing of the results through all
vertical and horizontal channels.
The electronic disease surveillance system being developed
in cooperation with the State and CDC will be integrated into
the statewide health alert network system. This system relies
on the cooperation of agencies at State and local level,
including county public health departments, hospitals and
infection control practitioners.
When this system is fully operational, surveillance data
will be collected from these multiple sources, permitting early
identification of potential public health threats and
coordination of an effective response for disease control.
In conclusion, Maricopa County Department of Public Health
is committed to building and maintaining the partnerships and
the vertical and horizontal communication links needed to
ensure open and timely sharing of information. The funds we
have received from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention through the State of Arizona have improved
communications. More importantly, the funding has allowed us to
rebuild an infrastructure that has been allowed to deteriorate
and to respond more effectively to public health emergencies.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I thank
you for the privilege of addressing the subcommittee, and would
be happy to respond at this time to any questions you or any
other members have.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Daniels, thank you very much for your
testimony as well. Bringing in a perspective from your point of
view is just critically important for how this committee learns
more and understands more about information sharing.
[The statement of Mr. Daniels follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DARIN DANIELS
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
It is an honor and a privilege to address this Subcommittee. My
name is Darin Daniels. I am the Preparedness Planning and Training
Manager for the BioDefense Preparedness and Response Division of the
Maricopa County Department of Public Health, in Phoenix, Arizona. I
share your concerns about the preparedness of public agencies charged
with protecting the security of our communities and our nation and
offer my comments and insight on this matter from the local public
health perspective.
The most critical issue in preparedness today relates to the need
to share information openly and on a timely basis. This must be done
vertically and horizontally--vertically between governments at the
federal, state, and local level and horizontally across local public
and private agencies. Indeed, open and timely sharing of information is
essential to the ability of state and local medical personnel to
respond effectively as a principal line of defense against a disease
outbreak, regardless of whether the outbreak is an act of nature or an
act of terrorism.
The state of Arizona has 5.6 million people, most of whom reside in
either Maricopa or Pima County. Maricopa County, located in the central
part of the state, has 3.3 million people or about 60 percent of the
state's population. The majority of the county lives in the Phoenix
metropolitan area which is the state's population, economic, and
political center. Pima County, located in the southern part of the
state, has about 1 million people, the majority living in the Tucson
metropolitan area.
Arizona has the distinction of having four cities that are part of
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), which was created in
1996. These cities are Mesa, Glendale, Phoenix, and Tucson. Maricopa
County Department of Public Health, which established its BioDefense
Preparedness and Response Division one year ago, is active partner with
these MMRS cities and other public and private agencies in building a
high quality emergency medical response system.
Unfortunately, however, partnerships and good communication have
not always been the case in Maricopa County. Prior to the historic
events of September 11, 2001, communications were at best spotty and
uncoordinated. An incident occurred in late 1997 that demonstrates this
point. An aircraft returning from Mexico arrived at Sky Harbor Airport
with 28 very sick passengers. The airport emergency medical staff
responded properly, and all the ill passengers were triaged and
transported to local hospitals. There was a large failure in
communications as no call was placed to Public Health. Without
notifying Public Health and properly screening passengers on that
flight, a very infectious and contagious disease could have been
transmitted to the next city by that aircraft and its unknowing
passengers. Thankfully, that has changed for the better. Now, with the
assistance of federal funds, Maricopa County has been able to build
programs and manpower dedicated to surveillance and response to any
emergency situation.
At Maricopa County Department of Public Health, we believe
information sharing--vertically between governments and horizontally
across local public and private agencies--requires three things:
Trust that information will be shared appropriately and
without impediments;
Mutual respect between individuals and the organizations they
represent; and
Shared commitment to the goals of preparedness and protecting
the public.
These three elements are the foundation of the partnerships and
cooperative spirit needed to ensure community preparedness. To that
end, we have focused on building and maintaining strong partnerships
with a wide variety of federal, state, and local agencies--including
the fire departments of the cities of Mesa, Glendale, and Phoenix,
local hospitals, tribal governments, Arizona Department of Health
Services, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
As a result of our efforts, we have achieved a high level of
interagency cooperation, reinforcing the fundamental concepts of
emergency response and incident and consequence management. Examples of
cooperation include shared training, tabletop drills, and field
exercises; these are illustrated by the following:
Joint incident management systems training is provided
regularly to Maricopa County Department of Public Health, MMRS cities,
law enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical response,
emergency management, hospitals, and public schools. Since many
agencies function as secondary responders, the MMRS cities have brought
valuable information to the table, expanding the understanding of the
secondary responder agencies.
A statewide Strategic National Stockpile exercise was held in
November 2002. This event incorporated training, tabletop drills, and
field activities and provided an opportunity for the different levels
of government to interact and coordinate vertically and horizontally.
The exercise involved the state's two largest counties (Maricopa and
Pima), and included Maricopa County Department of Public Health, Pima
County Health Department, Arizona Department of Health Services,
Arizona Department of Emergency Management, the Tucson MMRS, the Mesa
MMRS, the Mesa public school system, the Red Cross, and other private
and volunteer agencies. This exercise provided the participating
agencies with a hands-on experience in a real-time multi-agency
emergency response situation.
The city of Glendale sponsored a full-scale chemical exercise
to replicate the interagency response capabilities that would be needed
in the event of a deliberate release of sarin with an explosive device.
Communication between the hospitals and the Department of Public Health
was evident at the outset of the exercise; information sharing from the
infection control practitioners and the Department of Public Health
reinforced the routine communications that occur regularly.
The city of Glendale also sponsored a biological tabletop
drill with the Maricopa County Department of Public Health to test
leadership actions and the responses to the decision-making process. .
The benefits of this joint exercise were opened lines of communication
and more responsive decision-making.
With all exercises, we learned many lessons and our systems were
tested on many levels. The most important lesson learned from these
exercises is that some agencies communicated well with one another, but
others did not--either they did not receive needed information or did
not know where to send it. As a result, Maricopa County Department of
Public Health and its partner agencies now have a better understanding
of the role of various agencies in incident management and what
information must be communicated. This understanding is key to the
information sharing and relationship building that is now on-going in
Maricopa County and throughout the state.
Maricopa County Department of Public health has also benefited
directly from Arizona's statewide redundant communication system that
has been developed to send information through secure and unsecured
channels. The secured Internet-based communications network, developed
by Arizona Department of Health Services as part of the Health Alert
Network, enhances the notification and information sharing process used
by local agencies and healthcare facilities. This system will provide
security, secure messaging, a public health directory, and some data
translation while serving as the gateway for a statewide system with
direct access by local health departments. In addition, the MMRS
notification network is a system that provides immediate notification
of events to the necessary agencies at a moment's notice. This system
has the capability to provide critical information and directives for a
collaborative and coordinated response regardless of the event.
The technical side of communication would not be effective without
a strong connection between the users of the system, and the federal
MMRS program has enhanced that connection. Advisory committees,
subcommittees, task forces, and planning groups have served to build a
response network and good relationships among public and private
agencies by creating a sense of inclusiveness. These networks enhance
the local 24/7 response capabilities by allowing leaders and decision-
makers to know who their partners are prior to an event. These systems,
alone or combined, allow for the exchange of information vertically and
horizontally.
In partnership with the state, we have worked aggressively to
change the dynamics of information sharing, based in part on a new
understanding and respect for roles and responsibilities. An example is
the sharing of epidemiological disease surveillance information..
Epidemiological investigations and disease surveillance conducted by
the Maricopa County Department of Public Health have only recently
received the attention they deserve. A prior lack of understanding of
the critical nature of this work resulted in diminished resources and
reduced capacity within the public health system. As the role of
surveillance has become better understood, public and private agencies
have better acknowledged how this everyday function protects the public
from the silent invasion of diseases. This is evidenced in new support
for epidemiology and surveillance.
Recent events have shown the importance of open and timely
information sharing between agencies. During the past few months, the
public has lived with the threat of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS), monkeypox, West Nile virus, and the potential threat of
smallpox. Combating these diseases requires an effective disease
surveillance program and the sharing of results through vertical and
horizontal channels. The electronic disease surveillance system being
developed in cooperation with the state and CDC will be integrated into
the statewide Health Alert Network system. This system relies on the
cooperation of agencies at the state and local level, including county
public health departments, hospitals, and infection control
practitioners. When this system is fully operational, surveillance data
will be collected from these multiple sources permitting early
identification of potential public health threats and coordination of
an effective response for disease control.
In conclusion, preparedness for a terrorism event requires solid
partnerships and open, timely communication. Maricopa County Department
of Public Health is committed to building and maintaining the
communication links needed vertically between federal, state, and local
government and horizontally across public and private agencies. The
funds we have received from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention through the state of Arizona have improved communications.
More importantly, the funding has allowed us to rebuild an
infrastructure that had been allowed to deteriorate and to respond more
effectively to public health emergencies.
Mr. Gibbons. What I am going to do now is turn to the
members of the committee for 5 minutes each for questioning and
I will do so in the order of their arrival with one exception.
I am going to turn now to the chairman of the full committee
and yield my 5 minutes to Chairman Cox so that he may have the
first round of questioning. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome again
to our witnesses. Thank you very much for your participation on
this panel. Mr. Parrish, thank you again for coming twice this
week. I would like to begin with Mr. Foresman and Mr. Daniels,
because I think you might be able to help us with questions we
have about how the Washington system is working in
disseminating information. When you get threat information,
this question is for both of you, for example, concerning
change in the threat level, where exactly does that come from
in each of your cases?
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Cox, I would like to be able to say that
it has been the same every time it has happened, but even as
recently as in the last 24 hours we had yet a new process which
was used to communicate information to us. Typically we find
our best notification coming directly through the Department of
Homeland Security into the Governor's office into the Homeland
Security function.
Mr. Cox. How does that work? Who is contacting you from--.
Mr. Foresman. Typically what is happening is the watch
center is making notification to us of a conference call in the
case of something that is a nationwide alert and we are doing
it in conference call fashion. In the case of specific
intelligence relating to the Commonwealth of Virginia we
typically will receive a call from the Secret Service and they
will then be the relayer of critical intelligence from the
Department of Homeland Security to our office which creates a
little bit of a conundrum because frequently we get that
information prior to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces having it
over at the FBI.
Mr. Cox. Do you have any contact with the Under Secretary
for Information Analysis, or with the Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection?
Mr. Foresman. No, sir. Typically the direct relationship
has been through the Office of State and Local Coordination up
to this point.
Mr. Cox. Okay. Mr. Daniels.
Mr. Daniels. Mr. Cox, the information that we receive in
Maricopa County comes directly from the Arizona Department of
Health Services and we actually have a very good relationship
with our State partners as well as our local Federal
representatives.
Mr. Cox. So you don't have any contact directly with the
Federal Government when it comes to threat advisories?
Mr. Daniels. We have limited contact with the Federal
Government.
Mr. Cox. I ask these questions because the Homeland
Security Act gives the Department of Homeland Security Under
Secretary for IAIP primary responsibility for public advisories
related to threats to homeland security, and it requires that
he provide specific warning information and advice to State and
local government agencies and authorities as well as the
private sector and the public. And, Mr. Parrish, I wonder if
you could explain why that isn't happening exactly that way.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if I may, let me just explain a little
bit about the organizational structure. Certainly the State and
local advisor to the Secretary is a separate position. Within
the Operation Center of Homeland Security there is a desk which
is part of the operation center that is titled State and Local.
The operations center belongs to the Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The
message, the report, the information that is received by the
Commonwealth of Virginia is coming from the operation center in
the form of a document that is prepared in the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, so I think
it is a little bit of just an organizational understanding of
how the process works.
Mr. Cox. I want to jump to something that is very topical.
It is in the news today. I am not going to rely on this open
hearing for purpose of the questioning on an Associated Press
and New York Times account of the 9/11 report that you are all
aware is now released. One of the things we have learned in
this report is that NSA intercepts that were in hindsight
relevant to what happened on September 11 were not translated,
not only were they not disseminated but they weren't
translated, and I wonder, Mr. Lago, if you can address that
question. I know you are not here to represent NSA. But this is
not the first time this has been a problem. In another capacity
at another select committee chairmanship I ran into this
problem of untranslated intercepts that were materially
relevant to things that we cared about, and part of it was we
didn't have the trained linguists, we didn't have the
translators. Is this still a problem?
Mr. Lago. Sir, there is always going to be a problem for
that skill set. There is a finite number of people who can
perform that service and there is a large body of us trying to
go after these individuals. We have a number of programs in
place. We are better than we were then. To get into more detail
we would have to take this for the record and get back to you
in another session, and we would be happy to do that.
Mr. Cox. And let's quickly switch to dissemination. This
stark example that for that reason made the news was an
illustration of both failure to translate and failure to
disseminate. But let's assume that it had been translated and
now the only remaining problem is that we didn't disseminate
it, and that of course is one of the reasons we formed the
Homeland Security Department. We want to make sure that we have
shared all of this information. At CIA, at FBI, how far along
are we to building IT systems that will permit the Department
of Homeland Security to have access to what you have got and
how much are we reliant today still on people flagging
information that DHS might be interested in? We have a
statutory system that contemplates that it is all shared. We
have real life and we are getting there in real life, but how
far along are we?
Mr. Lago. Yes, sir. First of all, if it wasn't translated
it would not be disseminated. I mean that is just a given.
Mr. Cox. I didn't ask that question but I am not sure that
needs to be the case. We have a lot of resources in the Federal
Government and, you know, to the extent that for years now, and
at least in my oversight experience it has been years, we keep
bumping into the same problem. I wouldn't want to foreclose an
agency giving up ownership of something that it doesn't have
the resources to translate. But that is not the question I
asked you.
Mr. Lago. Yes, sir. We have developed a couple of parallel
processes to share information with the Department of Homeland
Security. One, if you will, is a push process where the
information is in mass pushed over to the Department and they
hold their hands out with a system try to catch it and put it
in the proper bins. The second, which is probably going to be
more beneficial in the long run, is the pull capability where
the analysts and the Department can pull the information. We
have given--we are giving analysts in Homeland Security access
to CIA source, a database that they can pull from. They have
the same user profile capability as the CIA analysts and they
can go in and pull information, it is a more manageable
process. They are both up and running as we are defining the
profiles and we are providing the clearances for the analysts.
They will have the same access that the CIA analysts have who
work in the Directorate of Intelligence.
Mr. Cox. Mr. McCraw.
Mr. McCraw. Yes, sir. From--I can't give you the exact date
when Trilogy will be fully implemented, because I am new on the
design, and one of the exciting things about the design is the
investigative data warehouse of XML tagging of data, and the
normalization of data. We can actually take all the information
that is legally allowable and, with the protocols that Mr. Lago
pointed out, push that information not just to the CIA, but
also the Department of Homeland, because sometimes they don't
know what information it is that they want, but actually
provide them investigative data, investigative reports, 302s,
things that can go back, all of that stuff we are allowed to
and push it to it. Moreover, you know, often it is the FISA
take or it is the stuff that has been translated and sometimes
not been translated and be able to get multi-media and to be
able to allow, you know, them access to that as well is also
part of the Trilogy buildout, and of course it is exciting for
anybody that has been in the FBI as long as I have and having
to do without and to be able to have that capability and then
maximize, to actually pushing information, giving information
out is also exciting because it certainly does--what we are
moving to is a more customer concentric type of model where we
are actually, you know, putting performance metrics on how well
we are doing and pushing information out.
Mr. Cox. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are important
questions, but as much as I would like to pursue them beyond
the time allotted I think I should yield in favor of the other
members and seek possible questions on a second round. I think
that is as long as I can talk before getting the chairman's
attention.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen, I
want to thank you for being here today for your testimony. If I
could, I would like to start with Mr. Parrish.
And just so you know, one of my very first meetings with
Secretary Ridge I had the opportunity to introduce him to a
regional information sharing network that is used in Rhode
Island and surrounding States known as RISSNET, and it is
ostensibly a tool that law enforcement uses to securely share
information about criminal activity. Information that is going
to be on RISSNET doesn't rise to the level of the information
that would be on, for example, BCI or NCIC records, but it
ostensibly is an intelligence sharing network among law
enforcement. And I provided the Secretary with a pretty
detailed memo on what the system is, and I also provided a copy
to Chairman Gibbons and I note that he has had an opportunity
to review it.
I guess if I could, Mr. Parrish, I would just ask you, I
would like to know--actually I do know that you briefly
mentioned the RISSNET system during Tuesday's hearing in
response to a question from Mr. Etheridge about the
Department's efforts to provide information to and gather
information from State and local first responders, and I have
to say that I am a very big fan of RISSNET and I am excited
about the demonstration project that is going on between
RISSNET and the Department of Homeland Security. And I guess if
you could provide my colleagues with a description as you
understand RISSNET to be and the ways in which DHS is working
with the network, I would be interested to hear about what has
been learned from the partnership thus far because I believe
that RISSNET could be an excellent model for regional
cooperation across the country. And I would just like to hear
your thoughts on that.
Mr. Parrish. Congressman, I am indebted to you then for
bringing that to the Secretary's attention. I think the RISKNET
program does offer a capability that we are excited about in
the pilot program. In April of this year the Global
Intelligence Working Group met here in Virginia, in Alexandria
I believe, and my predecessor Paul Redmond spoke to that group.
That is comprised of numerous organizations throughout the law
enforcement community, International Association of Chiefs of
Police, Sheriffs Association, major city police chiefs, a wide
audience of the law enforcement community across the country.
One of the things we discussed in that, I should say that Paul
Redmond discussed along with the FBIs in attendance was the
RISSNET program, and as we got into that, looking at could we
develop a pilot program that might enhance the information both
from the Department of Homeland Security as well as getting the
information back, as Mr. Kallstrom said earlier, the listening
posts, the eyes and the ears that are out there 24/7 across
this great country.
So we have a pilot program beginning and we are going to
start with--any time you do a pilot we want to start a little
small and not get too large. But essentially we are going to
connect with the nuclear power facilities in six States. What
we will get from that then is a potential surveillance
operation that may come in and, as you indicated, RISSNET
provides--it is not a classified system but it is a secure
Internet program. It also has a great backbone that we look
upon possibly building a Web-based site which would be password
protected of which now IAIP could then put out its daily
intelligence bulletin that would go across the country to all
of its subscribers. I think the significance about RISSNET is
that it reaches out in addition to your major metropolitan
areas, but more critically to your small rural areas, areas
that sometimes are overlooked when we get into some of these
big programs. So your small police departments that may not be
on a system would be able to get this critical information.
So again, sir, we appreciate you bringing that to our
attention and we look forward to this pilot program. We hope to
turn a switch August 15. I am not big on long, elaborated
tests. I want to see quick results and then let's move on with
this and hoping we will have that program, the pilot over with
by the first of October, to press on. And again, sir, we thank
you for your bringing that to our attention.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I appreciate your comments and I
look forward to monitoring the program to see how it
progresses. I know that our first responders across the country
are hungry, are anxious to be as connected with the Department
of Homeland Security and both share and receive as much
information as possible, and it is obviously going to be
critical to the success of the Department of Homeland Security
and ultimately our ability to protect the country from
terrorists. So thank you for the work that you are doing and I
look forward to working with you.
Mr. Parrish. Thank you, sir. We will certainly get back to
you and keep you informed on the pilot program.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. Turn now to Mr.
Sweeney of New York.
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me note that
Mr. Kallstrom is staying here for as long as he can, running
the risk of not being able to get back home because of flight
pattern problems. Jim, if you need a place to stay tonight you
are always welcome at my place. And I will get the questions to
you as quickly as I can.
We have had a lot of discussion, in particular leading up
to this hearing, about the horizontal system. It is a great
challenge. I salute you folks for all of your work. It is what
the President talked about when he talked about the need for
America to remain vigilant, and I think some of the work that
you have done is the best example of the successes we have had.
I want to talk a little bit more about the vertical system, and
therefore I will start with my friend Mr. Kallstrom. And as it
relates to your idea about the Northeast Regional Consortium,
it sounds to me to be a very solid proposition that offers us
great opportunity on this dual track to really try to expedite
the kind of dissemination and a two-way process. I am wondering
if you have ever asked Secretary Ridge to obtain DOD authority
to let individuals who have DOD clearances use them once a
State has given individuals a formal need to know authorization
for the purposes of homeland and maybe just very quickly tell
us what the status--what the response you are getting from DHS
on the idea.
Mr. Kallstrom. Well, yes, sir, we have. First off let me
say our number one priority is the same as everyone else here,
and that is to stop the next event. Clearly it is important to
clean it up if it happens. And that has to all happen. But I
believe that we could, together, have a much higher percentage
of chance of stopping the next event. We have worked greatly
with Governor Ridge when he was the adviser to the President
and now that he is the Security Secretary. I can't--we have had
hundreds of meetings on this issue. He has been very
supportive. But like this big aircraft carrier we are trying to
turn around in this country, now that we are all pretty much
awake as to what we have to do, it is going to take some time.
We have got a lot of this put together. What hasn't been put
together in fact, the recess you took to vote I think was
incredibly important, because we solved about 90 percent of our
problems right here while you were voting, at least at his
level.
Mr. Sweeney. We might keep you here a little longer.
Mr. Kallstrom. But there has been great cooperation. The
Department has only been stood up for what, two or 3 months or
whatever it is. So I think now we are in the position to
connect the pipes to the States in the test bed or in a
regional or however we want to do it. I can tell you the cops
are ready to play a role, and a focused role, a role that is
sensitive to our privacy, the privacy that we fight and die for
in this country. But they are ready to play an important role
and we have the hooks and the wires hooked up in New York State
to do that. And what we really need to do now is have that pipe
and have that ability to pick up the phone and talk to people
that are in the know about actions that we are seeing in front
of our eyes and some training that we can give. And I think,
you know, in the next few months if we can put this together we
will add another whole layer of protection for our society.
Mr. Sweeney. Is there interest among the other States? Has
there been an exchange of ideas among States?
Mr. Kallstrom. Well, the 10-State consortium is just
totally, totally interested in doing this. We sent a letter to
Governor Ridge signed by all 10 States, and I would guess if we
talked to 50 States, the 50 States would all be interested in
having, you know, a better hookup, a better arrangement so that
we can vet and train and be better eyes and ears.
Mr. Sweeney. Mr. Foresman, I was interested in something
you said just a second ago that typically primarily that the
information on threats comes from DHS and that was actually
good news, I think, for those of us here. And I am wondering,
Mr. Parrish, Mr. Lago and Mr. McCraw, and maybe Mr. McCraw the
most, by virtue of sort of the interaction with general law
enforcement and such, have you developed similar kinds of
models, or are you in the process of developing models that,
you know, relate to that issue of the vertical transference and
I am interested in your response and your thoughts on the
Northeast Consortium.
Mr. McCraw. Well, first of all, my thoughts. I think it is
outstanding. In fact the more of groups that set up
intelligence components in those types of arrangements,
fantastic. The Bureau's job has been strictly to address local
and State law enforcement and feed them intelligence and we
have done it in a number of ways. We are not satisfied that we
have met our obligation to provide them the type of information
that they need to do their jobs, and we have got a number of
initiatives that I detailed in my testimony. But I am convinced
that when we take this as the whole and look at it from an
integrated standpoint it will do the job.
Now we have to, you know, we have to make it--you know
obviously not treat it as just a by-product of what we do, but
actually make it a core function and have performance metrics
and talk to the customer and treat, you know, individuals like
Mr. Kallstrom and treat others that are involved in the State
and local law enforcement as customers, whether it is a
briefing program, whether we are pushing information, whether
it is LEO, whether it is RiskNet, which finally surprisingly we
have actually for good government's sake combined or provided
connectivity between LEO and RiskNet so that customer on
RiskNet has access to the same information, and I can assure
you in week seven of our concept of operations it will become
an enterprisewide activity.
Mr. Sweeney. Let me thank you. I have to go preside over
the House. Let me say I am glad we were productive, at least
bringing you together. I look toward to working with each of
you and all of you and I thank you for your service. I thank
the chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney. And Ms. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. I am delighted to welcome the panel, and I
guess Mr. Kallstrom is the man of the hour. We are two New
Yorkers here today and thank you so much for appearing before
us. And I apologize, we are all running from one hearing to
another. But I would like to pick up on where our Chair Chris
Cox left off and I think because I have 5 minutes, and I know
you are a quick study, I am going to just go through a series
of questions and then if you can respond to the whole issue I
would be most appreciative, Jim. That would be great.
One of the questions was, number one, who provides you with
information about terrorist threats? The Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, another agency? And if you receive the
information from both, can you determine what types of
information are being channeled through DHS or the FBI? And is
it a problem to receive--I don't want you to take notes, but I
think you can kind of get it as I am going down. Is it a
problem to receive terrorism information from the Federal
Government through more than one channel?
Following up on that--.
Mr. Kallstrom. No, it is not.
Mrs. Lowey. Then we can go back to the other, and if you
can compare as you are talking about this. Can you compare the
status of information sharing prior to the passage of the
Homeland Security Act to the present situation? Has anything
changed? Do you have a sense that the information you receive
from the Federal Government is coordinated? Do you ever receive
conflicting information from different Federal agencies? If you
care to provide some examples, you certainly can. And how do
you do deal with it, and has the Information Analysis Office
ever contacted you to coordinate training for your employees
regarding information sharing? Has another Federal agency
provided such training?
Maybe I will stop at that point. You get what I am trying
to say.
Mr. Kallstrom. We work a lot together so>
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I appreciate it.
Mr. Kallstrom. We love getting information from multiple
sources. We would like it by the wheelbarrow full. I have to
congratulate the Federal Government and maybe it is a function
of the fact that I spent my whole life in the FBI and have
personal relationships and have maintained a security
clearance. But the CIA, for instance, has been incredibly
responsive.
George Tenet sent someone to New York--maybe I shouldn't
say that--but for the sole purpose of sharing information with
us, and it couldn't be better.
Mrs. Lowey. On a regular basis?
Mr. Kallstrom. On a regular basis. Of course it doesn't
solve the bigger problem, but the cooperation has been great.
The people trying to, you know, hook up the wires in a system
that isn't quite organized yet the way it needs to be. Everyone
is interested in doing that. The three FBI task forces in New
York State have been great in sharing information about their
investigations although they don't have, in my view, the bigger
picture that they need. So we have had those great
relationships. What I--and Homeland Security has been great. I
mean since they have been stood up, since Bill Parrish has been
over there, Frank Libutti is a 20-year friend of mine back from
the Marine Corps, we talk almost every day. And we talk about
the issues, the priorities that were faced. So I think the
intent, the human heart throb intent emotion to fix this thing
is there. What we have to do now with the help of Congress is
figure out a way of more systematically and routinely and real
time--I mean, yes, there is a need to go to a Web site and look
at stuff and that is all part of training. But I need a cop on
the Taconic Parkway tonight that has got a car pulled over with
a potential terrorist in it. We don't know. But for whatever
reason his suspicion has been raised as we trained him to be a
more observant person. I want that person to call a center in
New York State, or if he is in Boston to call a center, you
know, in Massachusetts or whatever State, and to put that
information into the center which is connected to Washington,
all these guys and others that aren't here, and get some real
information in the center about the, you know, how important it
is that we have this guy on the side of the road. Do we let him
go, do we bring him in, do we do something else because of the
information that we have so we can make better decisions. And
then the flip side of that is in New York State we have got
75,000 cops, and you know a lot of them. They talk to you all
the time in Westchester.
Mrs. Lowey. I was going to let you finish the sentence
because if you could expand on that, because I hear that over
and over again.
Mr. Kallstrom. Right. And there is about less than 1
percent of them that are part of the three terrorist task
forces and that is through no fault--I mean that's the amount
of local police, State police, local police we have on the task
forces. I ran the one in New York City for 4 years, and it is a
very effective, it is a fabulous thing to do. The problem is
the other 74,750 that are on the streets were not effectively
using their eyes and ears.
So we need to train them. We need to enable them. We need a
system so we can communicate, you know, right from the street
down to Washington and from Washington back again in the
counterterrorism business only. You know we are not looking to
make cops a new band of intelligence gatherers at political
events or any of that stuff. I am talking about countering
terrorism. And we can do this. They are ready to do it. In New
York State we have hooked up all the cops. We have secure
communications with every police chief, every sheriff in the
State, and so we are ready. We have got the pipe. And now we
want Washington to organize themselves so we can talk to them
and, yes, we need archived information. Yes, we need stuff that
we can go to Web sites and find stuff. But we also need to pick
up the phone and talk to someone that has access to all this
information so we can make better decisions.
I see the State center as being sort of a tangent to
Washington, sort of their guys in the State that are trained,
have the right security clearances, understand the
sensitivities of this information, understand the legal rules
of how we store information, how it is retrievable and we can
let cops without top secret clearances, without secret
clearances communicate with us with real time information. And
guess what? We can all be safer because we have got 700,000
more pairs of eyes and ears out there that are being more
effective to protect us against the next act.
So, you know, I don't know if I answered your question.
Mrs. Lowey. You sure did, Jim.
Mr. Kallstrom. But that is what we are trying to do.
Mrs. Lowey. You sure did. And rather than my going through
more questions I really want to pursue that for a minute,
because you know I have been meeting with the police, the
firefighters, everybody. Now, I heard that a year ago. I heard
it 6 months ago. I am hearing it now. We just appropriated on
our committee, on which Sweeney and I--well, we all, many of us
serve, $39 billion for Homeland Security. The gentleman--I
forgot his name--who appeared before us was telling me on the
interoperability issue, which is a little different from the
issue you are presenting, that they are going out with an RFP
within a year. We will get the equipment so everyone can talk
to each other. And I said great. Are you going to have a
buyback program because my guys aren't waiting for you to go
out with the RFP 6 months from now, a year from now. You will
get back the information. How--.
Mr. Kallstrom. Just give us some secure phones.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, how can we be of help to, I mean, the
problem--you and I have talked. This is an issue we have been
hearing a long time. Charlie Cole in Yonkers is still
complaining about this. How can we help you?
Mr. Kallstrom. Congresswoman, I think we are on the verge
of making this happen. I think, you know, the Homeland Security
Act I think that the House Intelligence Appropriations Act of
2004, with some work, it needs a little bit of work, is a good
vehicle for authorizing this type of exchange if we need
authorization. I don't see any legal impediments to doing this.
I just think we need to get everyone down here to hook this
thing up. And if we start off at, you know, if our engine can
go 10,000 RPM and we start off at 2000 RPM, that is okay. We
can make this thing work and we can develop it along the way.
And I think we are ready to go. I really do.
Now, are all the States, have they done what New York state
has? I don't know. But I mean we are willing in our 10-State
consortium--I don't know if you were here when I talked about
that. We got all the New England States and New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware and New York, that have formed a group
just to share information. They are ready to go and they are
ready to use a regional center for this very reason. So I think
this is not that hard to do. I think we just have to get
everybody in the same room and do it.
Mrs. Lowey. I am probably out of time, but I just--I see
the red light. I just wanted to thank you very much and thank
you all and hope with the efforts of all you good people you
can push us and help us move this forward so a year from now we
are not still talking about how we can get it through.
Mr. Kallstrom. Yeah, and money would be helpful at some
point.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Ms. Lowey.
Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like I started out in
the opening statement, I am glad to be here today because I
have been wearing many hats over there the last couple of years
in Florida. We followed New York as relates to passing Homeland
Security legislation in the legislature there. Also, in my past
I have been a first responder, and now I have had an
opportunity to serve with these very fine men and women in the
Congress. I have been in a lot of circles where folks are
saying that they are sharing information and we are all getting
along and we are all hugging and carrying on and saying good
things about one another.
But I think, like I said at the beginning, of some of the
events that have recently taken place in the area of
intelligence. Is it good or is it bad? Who is sharing it with
what and who said what? I watched Director Tenet's body taken
from the Senate intelligence chairman over in the Senate,
thrown from the train as it relates to who gave what bad.
Neither here or there, no one will ever know the prevention
that all of you provide every day of being able to seek and
find out and inform law enforcement agencies on what they need
to know as it relates to potential terrorists in this country.
But also I want to direct my question towards the fact that
what are we doing as it relates to individuals, especially as
it relates to State and local law enforcement and even the FBI
who--what I may call home grown terrorists those individuals
that are in the heartland and in Miami and in Chicago and these
individuals that prey upon us not being prepared? I don't know
how they play into this bigger role. Many Americans feel that
our counterterrorism efforts are targeted towards individuals
from the Middle East or targeted from individuals that may be
from a country or a state outside of our homeland here that may
bring about a threat to our country. And I think that it is
important because when it comes down to homeland security,
unfortunately, and folks from New York here, I want to
apologize for the events that took place in the city yesterday,
but automatically the thought that it was a terrorist attack.
So I want to find out how does that play into the role of some
of you that are sitting at the table, number one. Number two,
as it relates to the front line guy or gal that is in the
patrol car like the Oklahoma situation, it was an officer
pulling an individual over. How are they getting that
information because I guarantee you this committee room may not
be full today, but let something happen and someone knew
something and someone else didn't know it, and I guarantee you
could get members who don't even serve on this committee trying
to get into this room because they are looking at who is going
to be at the lynching at high noon the next day because they
don't want the burden to be on them.
So I am saying a lot, but I want to make sure that we are
actually talking. I take some comfort in the fact that y'all
were able to complete some business while we were on the floor
voting, but I want to know outside, and the people that serve
under you, is there real communications, you feel comfortable
with those communications? Because I don't believe that is
something that we can legislate, to be honest with you. We can
try, but I don't believe that is something that we can
legislate. Historically in law enforcement or any sense of
power or even here in the Congress, there is some information
that even we don't share with one another, but in this case it
is imperative.
Mr. Parrish. Let me if I could just open up because in your
opening remarks you made a very relevant and germane statement
when you said that the information that is provided to the
State and local authorities must be relevant. One of the things
that we do in the Information Analysis Directorate is we take
in volumes of intelligence at the very sensitive level. In
reviewing that with our counterparts at the CIA, at the
Terrorist Threat Interrogation Center or the FBI, what we are
looking for is getting something that is relevant in the hands
of a police officer on the street and working with the FBI to
get that information to him, something that is relevant to a
private sector to enhance their security posture at either a
chemical facility or a shopping mall. The intelligence that we
get sometimes is very general in nature. What we try to do is
to take a look at it and pull out what can be actionable
intelligence to get out there to the people to look at.
One of the initiatives I have now is to draw upon the
successes of our country's great Americans wearing a uniform
serving in the military and the captured individuals involved
with terrorist organizations from Afghanistan. Also the FBI has
made numerous arrests and the CIA has seized many. Our allies
in some other countries have picked up significant members of
the al Qaeda leadership organization. What the IA is doing
right now is reaching out to the CIA, to the FBI and coming
together to sit down and analyze the intelligence that is being
pulled from these individuals. What I want to be able to do is
to assess the capabilities of the threat that they say they
have to take down a bridge, to take down a tall building. What
were the skill sets taught in the training camps? Did they in
fact really have that capability? Did they really analyze and
take a look at the amount of resources required to do that?
Those to me are the nuggets of information that we can get out
to our State, local, and private sector when we put out a
threat against a bridge, against a tall building, against an
apartment complex. Help them prioritize the expenditure of
their minimum resources they have in a prioritization of how to
expend that. Working with the FBI, again, their information is
getting out to the State and local law enforcement entities.
Our customer base is a little bit different, but yet it is
important we get that information out there.
So we are taking a very close look at this very sensitive,
classified information. We must realize we have to protect
sources and we are sensitive to that. But we want to get that
down to the level that a police officer on the street, a
Wackenhut security guard actually understands what this means
to him or her in the performance of their duties. And I think
probably, Steve, I would turn it to you.
Mr. McCraw. Yeah. I think that is a very astute
observation. We must be mindful, you know, prior to 9/11 that
Oklahoma City took more lives on American soil than any other
international terrorist act and that Eric Robert Rudolph was
caught by a State and local officer, a local officer in
Andrews, or in fact Murphy, North Carolina and not by the
Federal Government. You know, point in case why you want to
leverage those opportunities. The FBI still has domestic
terrorism. The JTTF still works domestic terrorism. We still
are focused on the Phineas Priesthood, the Aryan Brotherhood,
the ALF, ELF and the myriad of other domestic terrorist
organizations that have been documented that are out there that
are active and in conducting day-to-day investigations on
those. And it has to be done that way and we have to be mindful
and we have to infiltrate them as well to prevent the next act
of terrorism.
So I think that is an outstanding point. And again you do
it the same way, you know, working relationships, cop to cops,
and what is good for international terrorism in terms of
information sharing that the FBI is doing and adopting is also
the same for domestic terrorism. It has to be shared to the
widest extent possible. And thank you.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman, just a closing comment. I know that
I am out of time, but I just want to say I think we have two
choices here, one, to work together in times of prevention and
when the waters are calm, and to work together but somewhat be
suspicious of one another in a time of crisis. And after 9/11 a
lot happened. This Congress moved in an unprecedented way in
passing legislation, authorizing dollars, flying and having
special meetings and joint sessions. And I think it is
important that we do everything we can do and while the waters
are calm to get--pay justice to that individual out in the
patrol car, at the same time pay justice to those individuals
in State agencies that are trying to do the best they can do to
be able to make things happen. And I know that the FBI, CIA,
you know, after the joint commission and the 9/11 report and
all of that from out of this Congress, from Mr. Porter Goss'
committee, that you are now working together. We are all better
now. We want to make sure that we get better.
One of you made the comment--I am sorry I had to step out
for a minute--of the fact that we are better now than we were 6
months ago and hopefully we will be better as we move along. We
hope that that is the case. Please let us know if there is
anything that we can do to make sure that the line of
communications are there. But I think only the people in the
law enforcement and prevention agencies that are out there,
even within the Department, can even move better than we can
because we can't legislate that. That is something that just
has to come together on behalf of our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cox. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. Chairman
recognizes himself for 5 minutes. I want to talk about
clearances.
Mr. Foresman, Mr. Daniels, are you finding that the people
at the local level are able to get clearances in a timely
fashion?
Mr. Foresman. No, sir.
Mr. Cox. What has been your direct experience?
Mr. Foresman. We have had a multitude of direct experiences
and, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to say I don't think
clearances are as much the issue as developing an auditable
process to share information much the same way we do with our
allies on a day-to-day basis because we don't clear our allies
to get classified information but we do have an auditable
process that allows us to share it with them. But having said
that, I think the big challenge that we run into is just the
length of time that it takes to clear individuals. We happen to
have one-term governors in the Commonwealth of Virginia. We
started this process, I had a clearance previous to coming into
this Cabinet position. Others who are in this office did not.
We are just now getting the first of what are supposed to be
seven or eight clearances. We have not cleared our Chief of
Staff. We do have a clearance for the Governor. We are doing
the Governors much the same way that we do Members of Congress.
Mr. Cox. How long did it take the Governor to get cleared?
Mr. Foresman. Interestingly enough, Mr. Chairman, we
suggested at a hearing up here on the Hill, and this is a prime
example of where Congress stepped up to the plate, that if you
as Members of Congress could receive classified information by
signing a nondisclosure agreement certainly Governors could as
well, and DHS moved rapidly to get the Governors to sign
nondisclosure agreements.
Mr. Cox. And that was all it took?
Mr. Foresman. That was all it took.
Mr. Cox. But, now, with respect to the seven or eight
clearances that are coming to the floor as we speak, how long
has that process taken?
Mr. Foresman. We have been in the process for over a year,
Mr. Chairman. And again, the issue is if you look across the
universe of people who have a need to know information in
Virginia, it is in the hundreds if not thousands. And the
simple fact is developing a process to clear all of those
individuals may not be as important as developing a process to
sanitize information as appropriate and to rapidly get it into
their hands in a form and fashion that they can act on it
quickly. Because with even the simple turnover, if it is taking
a year or 18 months to clear an individual, we could
theoretically start a state police superintendent today and in
18 months have to start over again because he or she has left
the job.
Mr. Cox. Now, when Secretary Ridge was in California we had
a discussion with the California law enforcement officials in
Los Angeles. It was suggested, and nobody objected to the
notion, that we could democratize the process a bit, share the
workload. Obviously it is a Federal function to clear people,
but there isn't any reason in the world that we cannot rely on
the manpower in the States to do some of this work. If you have
got requirements, if not in the hundreds then possibly over a
thousand people that have a need to know in Virginia, need to
know something, and it would be useful to have access to
information at those levels, then surely the Virginia State
police or Virginia law enforcement can do some of the knocking
on doors and interviewing and so on that comprises a large part
of this burden. Has anybody suggested to you that we have a
joint Federal-State arrangement for clearances?
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, we have actually suggested that
on a number of occasions, but I think what we are finding now
is that the background can be done quickly, whether we are
using retired FBI agents or other Federal law enforcement
personnel, State law enforcement personnel. But then we have to
adjudicate the clearances once the background information has
been done by the Federal agencies. But this points to a larger
issue, Mr. Chairman, that if I get a clearance through the
Department of Defense, is it going to be recognized through the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and is it going to be
recognized by the CIA and is it going to be recognized by the
Department of Homeland Security, and I will tell you the simple
answer is today still no.
Mr. Cox. And so the seven clearances that you have gotten
or about to get are valid where and invalid where?
Mr. Foresman. It depends. It is in the eye of the beholder,
Mr. Chairman. And again that is not an indictment of the fact
that we have got a very diffused enterprise across the Federal
Government in how we manage the clearance process in much the
same way that we have a very diffused enterprise in terms of
how we manage the flow and the movement of intelligence and
information horizontally or vertically.
Mr. Cox. For your purposes and for purposes of the
clearances that we are using as examples in this question, who
is the Federal agency with which you are dealing?
Mr. Foresman. It has transformed over a period of time
because in one case, and this is actually a little bit
interesting, DHS is on the front of seven of them. For a period
of time before the merger and acquisition went through it was
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Those individuals who
were associated with our Joint Terrorism Task Forces it is
being done through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Those
individuals with--that have to work closely on DOD
installations across the Commonwealth on response issues, it is
being done by DOD. And the most recent is the U.S. department
of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety is currently in the
process of doing some folks.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Parrish, let me ask you that. You may not know
or you may know precisely the answer to this question. But does
the Secretary or his delegate within the Department have the
authority to grant clearances to State and local officials?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, I will get you a definite answer back to
you. We do work the process with Secret Service to coordinate
the issuances of clearances. We are looking at that. With
regard to Mr. Foresman's comments of different Federal agencies
granting clearances, my experience holding a Top Secret/SCI for
as long as I can remember, when I was in the military, I worked
in the counter drug business with the FBI and DEA. All of that
was honored as well as with the CIA, so that is one I think we
need to get back to Mr. Foresman and the Commonwealth on, and
we will follow up on that.
I would like to say if I could, I think Mr. Foresman is
exactly right. It is the process of information sharing that
goes back to what I commented to Congressman Meek, is one of
the things that IA is doing right now, is taking a look at this
sensitive information to see what is relevant, what really
could a State and local authority do with this piece of
information when it is analyzed and assessed. Some of this
intelligence at the very sensitive level is so general that it
is really when they get it they say what does this mean to me,
Patrolman Smith, in Topeka, Kansas. One the things we have in
IA's initiative as we are following up is to get a training
program to train the intelligence analysts within State and
local communities so that when they do get this intelligence
they know what the method of looking at it as well as following
up and going back and asking for what we call RFIs, requests
for information, additional requirements that they may have
germane to their mission. The other piece we are looking at is
a fellowship program within our, Fusion cell. It will probably
become the information fusion cell within IA where we will have
DHS law enforcement personnel from the Customs and Border
Patrol, Immigration and Customs enforcement, but also a
fellowship to bring in analysis from Stat/Local Agencies from
around the country to spend perhaps 2 weeks in our operations,
than having just rather the fusion cell looking at this
intelligence at the classified secret level. We would get them
interim secret clearances to come in there to be able to
understand our operations. Part of the problem when we deal
with this information is analysts have to understand when they
look at a report ``they must ask themselves what is it that I
know and who needs to know it.'' And that is the essence of
information sharing, is getting people trained to understand
what it is they are looking at, understand who needs to get
this information.
Mr. Cox. I want to take us back, although I certainly think
that your point about information sharing as against clearances
is a transcendent one, is the purpose of today's hearing fact
in fact. I want to take us back to this clearance question,
because the question that I asked, I don't know the answer to
either, a moment ago, about whether the Secretary or his
delegate has the authority to grant clearances to the State and
local officials. The reason I don't know the answer is that the
best we have been able to come up with on the committee is the
President's executive order of January 23 of this year, which
gives to you, gives to the Secretary--I will read the
categories of people: The Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under Secretary for
Information Analysis Information Protection and the Assistant
Secretary for Information Analysis, Department of Homeland
Security, each shall be considered a senior official of the
Intelligence Community for purposes of Executive Order 12-333,
and then you know, on and on. And then it goes on to say that
specifically you have the authority to recognize and give
effect to and make clearance and access determinations pursuant
to Executive Order 12-968 back in 1995 with respect to all
employees of the Department of Homeland Security, all
applicants for employment at the Department of Homeland
Security and all people in the private sector. It doesn't say
anything about State and local governments. Now this is an EO
and it is not perfect, obviously, but I don't know whether that
loophole or that gap is filled somewhere else, whether you
think you have the statutory or executive authority to do this.
But surely we would like the Department of Homeland Security to
be able to address the problem of clearances among State and
local law enforcement, public health officials, and the
harmonization of those clearances for Federal purposes because
we are trying to share here. That is the main purpose of
Homeland Security, and it remains a puzzlement to you as you
sit here at this hearing and to me as chairman and to our
staff, and so it probably requires a little bit of work.
Mr. McCraw.
Mr. McCraw. Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind, from the local
and State law enforcement standpoint the FBI has taken on that
responsibility. In fact, if it is not working well, I mean we
are the ones that need to be held accountable as it relates to
local and State law enforcement specifically and we--I know we
have made a number of gains under Assistant Director Senser's
leadership. We stood up a unit just specifically to address
State and local law enforcement clearances, and I know close to
3,000 have been cleared and another 800 are in background right
now. We see for a secret clearance we can make it as quick
right now, in terms of setup, 60 days for a secret clearance.
And as most of the gentlemen know at this table, the secret
clearance will get you to where you need to be most of the time
and top secret takes much longer obviously for the JTTFs.
Mr. Cox. Would the support of State and local law
enforcement assets and resources help speed up the FBI process?
Mr. McCraw. I think we are in good shape right now. There
are some things that can't go any faster. You can't force it
through even with more people, Chairman. However, when we can
make that 60-day to 90-day window for the secret clearance for
State and locals and the chiefs of police, that works real
well. And they have been very vocal. The chiefs of police are
not very shy about letting us know when we are falling down on
that, on getting their clearances through. And so the good news
is it is one clearance for all. I mean whether you are in the
Homeland Security, the agency, the military or if you are a
Governor given a clearance, that counts across the board. It
doesn't matter who got it for you.
Mr. Cox. Mr.Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lago, the now
declassified National Intelligence Estimate said that if we
didn't attack Saddam then it is unlikely that he would use
biological, chemical, nuclear materials, but if we did attack
and we destabilized the government that there would be a
significant increase in the likelihood that he would align with
al Qaeda, he would align with other terrorist groups. In view
of the fact that we have yet to find the chemical, biological,
nuclear materials that were reported to be there before our
attack upon that country and that the scenario which the
National Intelligence Estimate is most concerned about is now
in place; that is, that he is not in government, is he telling
you, you are not authorized to this question that--have you
changed now your recommendation, for example, Mr. Daniels, over
here? Have you told him to be on the alert for biological,
chemical, and nuclear materials that might be in the hands of
al Qaeda?
Mr. Lago. Congressman, we should be on the alert today
regardless of the information--.
Mr. Markey. Have you notified Mr. Daniels that he should be
on higher alert because the scenario in the national
intelligence estimate has now unfolded?
Mr. Lago. No, sir.
Mr. Markey. You have not. Why is that?
Mr. Lago. Congressman, again, we should be on the alert for
those attacks today. We have no specific information, no
specific actionable information--.
Mr. Markey. The national intelligence estimate said that
there would be a significant increase in the threat if we went
in and we did--.
Mr. Lago. Sir, I understand that. We have no specific
actionable information to pass on to Mr. Daniels today.
Mr. Markey. You do not. So has there been a change in the
national intelligence estimate now in terms of what the threat
is that is posed to our country? Was that wrong? Was the
information prior to the war wrong?
Mr. Lago. Sir, I--.
Mr. Markey. You can answer.
Mr. Lago. I am not an expert in this field. I will take
that back for the record and we can get back to you.
Mr. Markey. I think America has a right to know whether or
not the national intelligence estimate on that subject was
correct; and if it wasn't, then they probably should say that
the Intelligence Community has changed its mind, that there is
no heightened risk now that the uranium, the biological and
chemical materials are not accounted for.
Mr. Lago. Sir, as I said, I will take that back for the
record.
Mr. Markey. Because it seems to me that was the major
justification for the war.
Colonel Parrish, I am interested in finding out the process
by which the Homeland Security Department's information
analysis and infrastructure protection unit operates under
various scenarios. As you know, 22 percent of all cargo is
transported on passenger planes and isn't physically screened
at all. In fact, packages and mail weighing less than 16 ounces
aren't even subject to the Bush administration's flawed known
shipper program which relies on the shipper's paperwork as a
guarantee that the cargo was safe. It just goes right on the
passenger plane unscreened.
As you know, Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over
Lockerbie, was brought down with a small quantity of plastic
explosives in an unscreened bag. Richard Reid had 10 ounces of
plastic explosives.
So let me ask you these questions, if I may, Mr. Parrish.
If IAIP received intelligence indicating that there was a
credible threat that the terrorist was planning to use the
security holes in the cargo screening program to use plastic
explosives to blow up a passenger plane, who would IAIP inform?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, for intelligence received on that
information, we work very closely with the Transportation
Security Administration with that regard. At the same time, if
there is indication of potential smuggling operations to move
those materials in across the borders of our country, this
information is conveyed to the Customs and Border Protection.
Mr. Markey. So would you inform FBI?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, that would be done in coordination with
the FBI. Again, the FBI is represented within IAIP at our
headquarters.
Mr. Markey. If the CIA receives intelligence about a
terrorist threat against a commercial airline using an
explosive device in the cargo, who would you inform, Mr. Lago?
Mr. Lago. Sir, we would use the same mechanism that is set
up to inform all members of the community to pass information
to the Bureau, to pass information to the Department so they
can pass information to the channels that have been established
for the necessary individuals to be notified.
Mr. Markey. Would you pass it directly to homeland security
automatically?
Mr. Lago. Absolutely.
Mr. Markey. If you were instructed by your CIA supervisors
not to share that information, what would you do?
Mr. Lago. Sir, that is a hypothetical. I have never been
asked not to share information like that. I imagine if I was, I
would share it.
Mr. Markey. Mr. McCraw, if the FBI received intelligence
about an explosive threat against a commercial airline using an
explosive device in the cargo, who would you inform?
Mr. McCraw. All involved parties, including homeland
security, the Agency, the entire Intelligence Community, and
certainly the local and State law enforcement officials in that
area that have a vested interest in that geography.
Mr. Markey. So you automatically, under the law, have to
deliver it directly to Homeland Security?
Mr. McCraw. Well, I don't know the law, but from the FBI's
standpoint, we are going to, whether the law says we are going
to or not. We are absolutely going to. In fact, the example
used in such specificity, I can absolutely guarantee you that
that information would get out to all those individuals, and
under that scenario, probably the head of the airline company
as well.
Mr. Markey. If IAIP received intelligence about an Al Qaeda
potential attack against U.S. nuclear facilities, who would
IAIP give that information to?
Mr. Parrish. That piece of intelligence that comes in would
go to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is responsible
for the security of the nuclear facilities. At the same time,
sir, we would reach out to the private sector within that
geographic region. Certainly at the same time all of those
communities, if we could narrow down the location, reach out to
the governors and the State and local authorities within that
region. First would be the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
responsible for the security of the nuclear facility to enhance
their security posture.
Mr. Markey. Would you give it to TTIC as well
simultaneously?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. That information--and that scenario
you present would be coming in simultaneously to all those
organizations. They would be assessing it at the same time as
IA.
Mr. Markey. So there would be no additional screening of
the information after you were passing it on to the NRC? If the
NRC asks you not to pass it on to others until they had time to
investigate, would you wait or would you automatically give it
to TTIC and to the FBI and to others?
Mr. Parrish. No, sir. That would be automatic.
Mr. Markey. You would give it to the governors
automatically even if the NRC said wait?
Mr. Parrish. No, sir. That would go out to the State and
local authorities as well in a timely fashion. The relationship
we have with the NRC, I do not see that as a realistic
scenario.
Mr. Markey. And finally, if I may, on the question of
staffers, Mr. McCraw, how many FBI staffers are qualified to
administer polygraph tests in Arabic?
Mr. McCraw. I don't have that answer for you, but I will
find out. Not nearly enough.
Mr. Markey. Are we talking about ten or 100?
Mr. McCraw. I don't know. I know it is not 100.
Mr. Markey. You really don't know the answer to that?
Mr. McCraw. I absolutely don't know it.
Mr. Markey. How about you, Mr. Lago? How many are trained
to conduct those kinds of polygraph tests in Arabic?
Mr. Lago. Sir, I don't know the answer to that question. We
will take it for the record and get back to you.
Mr. Markey. And has there been a damage assessment done to
determine how costly our failure to collect information from
walk-ins and other sources pre9-11 from Arab sources was in
protecting Americans from terrorist attacks? Either one of you.
Have you guys done an assessment of that, going through the
volume of information. I know that a lot of information was
never actually translated, and I am just wondering have you
done an assessment now in retrospect of how serious that was as
a whole in our intelligence gathering that all of that
information remained untranslated?
Mr. Lago. Sir, we will take that for the record.
Mr. Markey. Mr. McCraw?
Mr. McCraw. Obviously we didn't have enough sources to
prevent the act, which clearly that is the basis we do all
damage now is prevention of the act, not in terms of what we
figured it out after the fact, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. You haven't determined after the fact that you
actually didn't have enough people who can actually speak
Arabic in order to actually read all of the translations or to
translate all of the information that was being gathered?
Mr. McCraw. As it relates to the translations, that has
occurred on that. I thought you meant, more importantly, the
walk-ins, whether we had source coverage, whether we have
infiltrated the particular cells, and the answer is clearly we
know right now we did not.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that
has been always puzzling to me is why we have had such a
difficulty coming up with a single consolidated watchlist. I
know the General Accounting Office recently issued a report,
and they say we have 12 different terrorist watchlists
maintained by nine different Federal agencies. If any of you
disagree, please advise me, but I think everyone agrees that we
should work from one watchlist. But it appears that there is
some confusion about who is supposed to be creating this
consolidated, single watchlist.
I noted that in July of 2002, the President's national
strategy for homeland security stated that the FBI would
establish a consolidated terrorist watchlist. Then in February
of 2003, the White House issued the fact sheet on the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center, and it stated that the center would
maintain a database of known and suspected terrorists. And
finally, in April of this year, the General Accounting Office
report indicated that the Department of Homeland Security had
taken the responsibility for creating the consolidated
watchlist.
Who among you can tell me who is supposed to create the
consolidated watchlist, whose responsibility is it: the FBI,
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, or the Department of
Homeland Security? It seems totally unacceptable that we can't
solve what would appear to be a simple problem.
Mr. Parrish, do you want to start?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. First, there is the term
``watchlist,'' and then the term ``database.'' The multiple
databases that existed by the independent agencies--they had
those databases based on their mission of their organization.
From these databases, then you could produce the watchlists of
the names of the individuals that you were looking for or to be
aware of.
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is in the process
now of developing the identities tracking database, which will
be, if I could I guess, describe as the mother of all databases
as we talked about over at TTIC, of integrating all of these
databases of the Federal agencies into a single database.
Obviously that is resource-intensive. When you start
integrating this to maintain this database, one of the things
we learned is that people's names got on lists early on, and
there needs to be a mechanism to get their names off once it is
proven that individuals are not associated with the terrorist
nexus.
But when you take a look at the resources that are out
there to bring these databases together, and once that is done,
then the concept of a national watchlist center, which is
really kind of the switchboard that people would call into to
be able to determine if an individual they have in front of
them is someone that they need to be concerned about. This will
really fall into alignment with the discussion that Mr.
Kallstrom is talking about in these regional operation centers
that we are talking about.
Using that scenario, when this process is in effect, when
that patrolman out there in Lackawanna pulls someone over and
calls back into that regional operations center of New York and
says, I have in front of me a certain individual by the
following name, that center calls into the National Watchlist
Center--which currently is under review right now regarding
should it reside in the Department of Homeland Security under
our umbrella, or is it more appropriate in the FBI, we hope to
come to a rapid decision on that in working with the White
House. But under that scenario, then this National Watchlist
Center would pull that name from this integrated tracking
database to say here is the background on this individual.
Now, what that does then is give that patrolman on the
street a little bit more information of what he should be
looking for. Again, to be consistent with the privacy laws, but
he may now be able to take a look and gain a little bit more
information about this individual that allows us to take a look
at connecting the dots.
So the database, you are right, sir, it requires the
integration. We are looking at databases from State Department
and TOPOFF. We are looking at Treasury Enforcement
Communication Systems and their database and the FBI database.
You are exactly right, but I think there is a process in place,
and we are moving fast on this to be able to get this up and
running.
Mr. Turner. It just seems to me that in the short term,
untilthere is a National Watchlist Center, set up in the manner
that you suggested, that there should be some entity that you
create that everybody goes to. We should be capable of at least
having having the same terrorists on all the watchlists. And
apparently we don't do that. So I am not sure when you talk
about the local patrolman on the beat; I guess he goes to the
FBI watchlist. I guess that is where he turns, I would assume.
I don't know.
Mr. Parrish. His initial entry point would be--and I will
let Mr. McCraw talk about that, but as he goes in, it would be
through the national criminal index computer system. You are
right.
If I could, even though it seems there is a disparity here
with the databases, there are success stories. You all may
recall reading in the paper of an individual by the name of
Omar Shishani in Detroit, and I will quickly tell you in
January of 2002, when the FBI called me from one of the
document exploitation centers and said I have a roster here of
about 150 names that was found in the terrorist training camp
in Kabul, would you be interested in it? And I said, sure.
Bring it over.
As we looked at it, very generic names, Al Hindi the
Indian, Mohammed the Egyptian, Omar Shishani, the Chechnyan. I
said, let's put it in the TECS computer system, the Treasury
Enforcement Computer System, with a footnote on the bottom that
says, ``name associated with terrorist training camp,'' and as
you know how that system works, we then do our advanced
passenger information system sweeps on all international
flights coming into the United States.
In July of 2000, a flight coming in from Tokyo to Detroit
ran through that sweep, and on it appeared Omar Shishani. No
date of birth, no passport number, but on the bottom was ``name
associated with terrorist training camp.'' An astute Customs
inspector pulled him aside in a secondary and opened his
suitcase, and we found $12 million of counterfeit checks with
an individual who has a long history of association with the
Russian Mafia and some of the terrorist activities in Chechnya.
So there are systems that are working in place. You are
right, sir, we need to integrate these databases to become more
efficient, and I think the plan is in place to make this
happen.
Mr. Turner. I think that is an excellent example of why we
need watchlists. You mention Omar Shishani and how putting him
on the list resulted in something positive occurring. But, my
question would be was Omar Shishani on everybody's watchlist,
the 12 different watchlists that are maintained by apparently
nine different agencies?
Mr. McCraw. Congressman, I can go ahead and try to answer
your question. First of all, as important it is to improve it--
and there is a plan in place and TTIC is going to play an
important part of that plan, the situation is not as bad as it
appears on the face. First of all, there is really two actual
lists, and everything else are extracts thereof. The no-fly
list is an extract of information provided either by the FBI or
the intel community that is either maintained in tipoff or
vigtoff, which is a file system within NCIC. Is that perfect?
No. Clearly there needs to be and they are working towards it,
and Mr. Parrish talked about the plans in place for a watchlist
center, and I think appropriately briefed you in terms of where
we are going.
Tipoff right now will be incorporated into TTIC, and they
will take over that particular responsibility. And all of that
information will go into that particular place, and one of the
plans in which needs to happen--although the FBI subjects now
appear in NCIC for access to over 600,000 state police
officers, that information in tipoff is under review that will
also be included so that that state police officer has access
not just in terms of the FBI subjects, but in terms of the
collective wisdom or about bad guys involved in terrorism by
the Intelligence Community and the FBI.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Foresman, you might want to weigh in on
this. You are down there at the local level. Where would you
call if you were trying to identify someone and wanted to look
at a watchlist? Where do you go?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, this is probably a bad day to
ask me this question, because we just spent the last week
trying to get someone off of a watchlist only to find out it
wasn't an FBI watchlist but someone else's watchlist that
really wasn't a watchlist, and I think that part of the issue
here is definitional in nature and centralizing in nature.
Right now we would probably go to the Joint Terrorism Task
Force through the Bureau as the basis for doing that, but I
think what is more important is if I have a trooper who is
sitting on the Capital Beltway around Washington who stops a
vehicle, he has no way to query the system today, and I think
when we critically talk about the 700,000 law enforcement
personnel, those at the local level, those at the State level,
Federal law enforcement personnel, the bottom line is the beat
cop on the street is not having access to the information to be
able to do a rapid check against it.
And while I understand that we are certainly making
progress towards planning for integration, I remain
fundamentally concerned we don't understand what we are
designing, because we haven't really mapped out the larger
strategic picture as of yet.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cox. Ms. McCarthy.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much, panelists, for sharing your thoughts with us once
again today.
Mr. Cox. Would you yield for just a moment?
Ms. McCarthy. Of course.
Mr. Cox. I would like to ask unanimous consent to include
my opening statement in the record, and I believe you wanted to
make a similar request.
Ms. McCarthy. I would like to make that request, Mr.
Chairman, that my opening remarks be placed in the record as
well.
Mr. Cox. Does any other member wish to make a similar
request?
Mr. Turner. I will make a similar request, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cox. Without objection, the opening statements of all
members shall be included in the record. Thank you for
yielding.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foresman, I very much appreciate your experience at the
local and State level, and I testify there is confusion in the
movement of information from the Federal Government to the
State and the local level, and I wondered if you could share
some examples with us and ideas on what needs to be done to
clear that up. I know from my own experience with local
responders, they are experiencing that in Missouri as well. And
I know, Mr. Parrish, based on your testimony and your comments
yesterday, and today that you are very sensitive to this need,
but the sources aren't quite there yet to enable the training
and other things that need to go on.
But Mr. Foresman, if you would speak to that. I know in
your testimony you indicated there does not appear to be any
overall Federal vision and coherent plan across the entire
Federal Government that articulates exactly what we are trying
to accomplish in terms of information and intelligence fusion,
analysis and sharing, especially related to the involvement of
State and local governments.
How should the Department of Homeland Security and TTIC and
any other agency optimize information sharing? Because I am
quite concerned and agree with all of you that the people who
are going to carry this out are at the State and local level.
The knowledge is here in Washington, but the people on the
front lines, those homeland security police and fire and
ambulance drivers and others are out there all over America.
And how best do we get the information to them that they need
so they can do the job when called upon?
Mr. Foresman. Well, I will come back and do the two
examples last and maybe address the latter part of your
question first with your indulgence.
I think this is very much an issue of empowering the
Department of Homeland Security with clear authority and
responsibility for bringing all the relevant stakeholders to
the table in crafting a national vision, one that includes all
those Federal agencies with component pieces in the
intelligence enterprise as well as the local stakeholders and
the relevant private sector partners.
There have been a plethora of efforts, both through the
Bureau, through the Central Intelligence Agency and through the
Department of Homeland Security, but they still lack that
overarching strategic national focus, and I think very much so
that whether it is the Department of Homeland Security or any
other Federal agency, we very much need to lock ourselves in
the room and actually as we talked about earlier, about another
3 hours' worth of break and we may have solved about everything
here today.
But I think it is critically important that we sit in the
room and define expectations, do the education, define the
business rules for sharing information that allows the Bureau
to protect that information that it feels like it needs to
protect, the Agency, State and local governments. There is
certain information that State and local governments have that
should, because of the provisions of Congress, not be
warehouseable at the Federal level. And we all recognize all
those things, but we have not sat everybody down and created
that vertical and horizontal picture in the most macro of
sense.
The specific examples I would cite, I would like to go back
to the fact that we are very much early in this process of this
post September 11th environment, but I still--and the
challenge--I have a great deal of faith in the people sitting
at this table, whether it is my counterparts in Arizona or New
York or the Federal agencies that we work with, but remember, I
am just one person and I have to work with a plethora of local
officials, whether they are law enforcement, public health, I
have to work with elected officials.
The two examples that come to mind is the Department of
Homeland Security in advance of operation Iraqi Freedom was
quite active in providing threat information to all of the
States and specific threat information to the Commonwealth of
Virginia. They provided that information in rapid fashion and
form, and when we attempted to do that level of local level
collaboration as we brought our local stakeholders to the
table, I will tell you that the level of zeal of security of
certain sites was not necessarily represented in the field
agents of the various Federal agencies in the affected area,
and so we were faced with the conundrum and a legitimate
conundrum of a police chief saying what do they know in
Richmond that the field offices don't know, or what do they
know in Washington and so what is the quality of the
intelligence.
A second example actually goes back prior to that when we
had some credible information that we were dealing with with
regard to the Commonwealth of Virginia and to DHS's credit,
they went to great pains to get that information to us rapidly
and succinctly. They were good about making sure that all those
folks that need to be briefed were briefed.
The problem end is again that there was good agreement
between the principals, i.e., those folks who now make up the
TTIC, the Bureau, headquarters in DHS, headquarters offices
about the information; but, again, when it went down to the
field, the response that we got from the field personnel was
that this is old information. This has already been vetted. We
sent it to Washington. Someone got excited about something that
they shouldn't have gotten excited about.
Well, from my standpoint, I am left with the challenge of
articulating to a governor and to local officials is this
credible quality information that you should act upon and do
certain measures? I think in large part, those were early
incidentals in this process, and things are beginning to
improve, but just as we talked about a number of regional
initiatives across the northeast, things that we are doing in
Virginia, things that are going on within Federal agencies, who
is the air traffic controller for all of these different
things, and how are we making sure that we are making this
whole effort operate in harmony and in a synchronized fashion?
Mr. Parrish. If I could just add, one of the things, an
initiative of Under Secretary Libutti is we need to go out and
hear from our customer base in a follow-up to Congressman
Markey's scenarios that he presented. For example, I know that
you have interest with regard to water supplies. On June 23rd,
we put out an extensive threat advisory to all States with
regard to water safety--water supply threats with some
protective measures on what they should be looking for to
handle that.
It will be valuable for us to get the feedback from Mr.
Foresman's office, how did the Commonwealth--how do they use
that? Was it valuable to them? Was it a good product? What
else, additional information?
To Congressman Markey's scenarios, as I mentioned it had
other day, the morning following the attack on Riyadh as I was
sitting at TTIC looking at the sensitive intelligence traffic
going back to TTIC and to the CIA, I said I needed a downgraded
product at the unclassified level. IA began writing protective
measures against this new tactic and technique employed by Al
Qaeda in those attacks.
Again, a lengthy document that assessed and analyzed the
actual tactics and techniques employed against an installation,
breaking through the fence, assault teams coming in, we took
that intelligence, got it unclassified the same day, and we put
out a product that gave protective measures to State, local and
private sectors on things they should consider in enhancing
their security posture.
So we put products out there like that to the State and
locals, but we need feedback to see if that is relevant to
them, is it useful to them. So, again, it is an initiative of
the Under Secretary. We are going to get out there and find out
exactly has needed.
Ms. McCarthy. Anyone else wish to comment? I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I thank the panel.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. I want to take the opportunity, Mr.
Kallstrom, to ask you prospectively about how the
Counterterrorism Center that you describe in your testimony
might operate when it opens in August and thereafter.
Specifically we heard from Mr. Lago that a CIA source is an
IT solution that deliberates finished intelligence products. Is
this something that you would expect to take advantage of at
that center?
Mr. Kallstrom. Sir, I think we would see the center as sort
of the filter or the go-between between all the collaborative
agencies in Washington and internationally, for that matter. To
the myriad of people in the State, probably the law enforcement
people first, and then there is obviously other people that
need to know things. And we would be in a position at that
center, because we would have trained the people, they would
have the proper clearances--and I must just divert and tell you
something in my view of 28 years in the FBI, I see virtually no
reason for but a handful of people in any State to have a top
secret clearance, by the way, because the only reason it is top
secret is the information is not anything that anyone needs to
know. It is--secret is adequate. But the center would then take
the information through collaborative efforts between the
people in the center in Washington, discussions, phone
discussions, summary reports, different types of intelligence
that is put out periodically, and we would then put that into
real words and real action for the cops in a different form to
educate them as to what they should be looking for, what
indications might be, what warnings might be so that their eyes
and ears work better. That is one thing.
The second thing is a point someone made here earlier, I
think the gentleman from Texas. A police officer is someone on
the side of the road that for whatever reason his level of
suspicion is raised. Maybe there is a hidden NCIC, but maybe
just because he presents some documentation that looks a little
strange or maybe this thing is in plain view or whatever the
reason, that police officer just radios in to the center in New
York who has connectivity with Washington and says, I have this
guy and maybe there is a code word for an all sources check,
please give a check on that, and then instantaneously within
minutes, you know, our people in New York who are sort of an
extension of Homeland Security/FBI/CIA, are looking at
databases to see if this person is of any interest. And then
the center and Washington together craft what we want that
officer to do without divulging the sensitive information. Hold
the guy? Let him go? Delay him? You know, whatever it is, make
note of whatever is in plain view, blah, blah, blah. And that
is how we see the process working.
The other point I want to make is I think it is imperative
on the part of all of us, particularly in Washington, to break
this issue of the protection of us as a people into two
categories. Category one, those things we need to do to stop
the next event, to not have another event happen on the soil of
this country or against American interests elsewhere. Number
two, if it does happen, clean up the mess. And those things
obviously we have to be prepared. Our first responders need the
right equipment. We need the right protocols. They need
information. But it is critically important to do a dozen
things--maybe it is 14. Maybe it is 10--to add the State and
local resources to this problem, this challenge of not having
another event happen, and I think we can easily do it, ladies
and gentlemen. I think we can do it. I think we need to focus
on it, though, and not combine all this stuff into one big pot
and call it homeland security. I think we have to talk about
those issues we do to stop the event and those issues we do to
mitigate if an event happens. I think we would have clearer
direction and clearer solutions to it if we looked at it that
simple way.
Mr. Cox. Well, I couldn't agree with you more on that
point.
Mr. Lago, when you described a CIA source in your
testimony, you had reference to sharing with DHS. Is that
system something that on a classified or unclassified basis
State and local governments can tap into?
Mr. Lago. Today, no. We have nothing in place today. There
are some issues that you would have to work, you will have to
work on, on getting the CIA process that close with the State
and local processes, but as Mr. Kallstrom said--and I think I
would echo that--the first thing you need is to be able to
translate the needs, the requirements needs on both sides. We
could put a box out there and we could give a person a couple
weeks training, but I would suggest that it has taken--it
probably takes us 4 to 6 years to train an analyst to be
proficient in doing the modeling and using the tool to the best
of their ability. We have tried to come and work our way around
that relationship. We have deployed a CIA officer to New York.
We are fairly proud of the information flow that has gone both
ways because of that. It clearly has given us more insight into
their specific requirements. And quite frankly, we spoke
different languages when we started this relationship, today we
have an individual to help translate.
Now, does that mean to say that we couldn't put some kind
of a system in that would allow them the access to those things
or maybe send an analyst to help them? There are other ways of
doing it. But I am not sure that just sending a system to them
would help most of the States.
Does that answer your question?
Mr. Cox. Well, it certainly raises an important aspect of
the question, which is that there is judgment involved in
determining what is reasonably likely to require onward passage
to State, local, and so on, law enforcement and intelligence.
The MOU obviously contemplates this and states that
information that is classified or otherwise subjected to
restricted dissemination but which reasonably appears likely to
require onward passage to State, local or private sector
officials, the public or other law enforcement officials goes
to DHS with accompanying high-content tear lines suitable for
onward passage at the unclassified level. That would
certainly--and run a lot of the tougher problems that we have
just been talking about.
And the question is whether there is an IT solution to that
or whether this--how is this being done? Is it being done
literally with tear lines where pieces of paper are being
faxed, or how does this work?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if I could on the access, the CIA source,
CT link, some of those systems, IA has access to that with our
analysts. As I say, we go into those systems daily. We receive
that information. We analyze those pieces of intelligence to
say what do I have here and who needs to know it, what State
and local authorities need this, is this regionally oriented to
the Northeast sector? Do we need to get that to California?
We then go back in through the process to get that tear
line if required, and then that information is provided to us.
Now, oftentimes we will go back and say we need more
information, that this tear line does not meet the needs of our
constituents, and we have had success with that with the CIA to
go back and get that.
Then--and going back to the concept of RISSNET as we
implement this, this will be a secure Internet system not at
the classified level but it will be password protected. We
envision this to be posted on a Web site or we will send it
directly via e-mail up to that operations center in New York to
convey this information to them.
So that is our job. That is our mission in IA to make sure
that we are pushing the IC, the Intelligence Community for
every piece of information that is there that is classified
sensitive at a level that we deem essential to get out into the
hands of the State and locals, and right now the system is
working. We are working it with TTIC, reaching back through
CTC, and I am here to say that so far, Parrish has never been
told no.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Kallstrom.
Mr. Kallstrom. If I can just add one thought to close the
loop on it. You know, I think we have a very good vehicle in
place now to stop the next attack, and that is the terrorist
task forces that comprise all the Federal agencies and some
select State and local police. There is just not enough people
on these task forces to know what they don't know, and the
missing piece as we talked about earlier I think before you
came in was we need to find a way from the--I am talking about
prevention now. We need to find a way to let State and local
resources be more effective eyes and ears for those task forces
so we can broaden their knowledge base of what is going on in
our communities, our towns, our neighborhoods, you know, some
little town up on the northern border where maybe some
terrorists are living. The targets may be in New York. They may
be in Washington. They may be a few other places. The
terrorists aren't necessarily there.
So I think we will go a long way. I think the Federal
Government appears to be fairly well coordinated now. We have
got problems with these watch lists. We have got problems with
computers, but if we can figure out a way of harnessing the
State and local assets, the law enforcement assets and other
assets to be more effective lookouts, watchdogs or listening
posts for the task forces we already have, I think we will make
a geometric leap in the ability to protect our society.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could, another
question for Mr. Parrish. I have to admit that many of us I
think were surprised when the TTIC was created, because I think
many of us had expected and wanted to have that type of an
entity, that function performed by the Information Analysis
Directorate, but at this point I think many of us are just
withholding judgment as to whether that is going to work and we
will take a wait and see attitude.
I am concerned, though, and just want to touch on the topic
of the type of information again that you are receiving, and I
know this has been discussed, but I want to look at it again.
Are you receiving the raw intelligence or mainly the analyzed
product? And if you are receiving analyzed product rather than
the raw intelligence, are you concerned that something might be
missed that you would have picked up on had your analysts
looked at--had direct access to the raw intelligence? And do
you feel that the TTIC analysts are looking for the same things
that you would be at the Information Analysis Directorate?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir, and I recognize your concern. First,
again, as we mentioned the other day, is that we are a part of
TTIC, the Department of Homeland Security. IAIP is a
partnership with TTIC. We have Department of Homeland Security
analysts, the IAIP analysts working in TTIC that come there
with an operational understanding, I should say--or rather, an
understanding of the operational environment of the Department
of Homeland Security. A TSA analyst is located there. A Customs
and Border Protection analyst is there, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.
So they are looking at all of that raw intelligence, all of
that information that is filtering through TTIC that is coming
from the entire Intelligence Community, looking at it through
the lenses of what is relevant to the Department of Homeland
Security from the standpoint of what is needed for the State
and local and private sector.
We are also receiving that information within IA, and we do
conduct independent assessments on that intelligence to
identify if in fact there are credible threats that we need to
get out to the private sector, which is State and local.
Mr. Langevin. The raw intelligence as well as analyzed
intelligence?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. Again as I said the other day, you
know what you know. I know that we are getting reports. Again,
I have analysts from those agencies of the IC that have access
to their systems within IAIP, members of the NSA, from the CIA.
So at this point in time, I think your assessment is right, is
that TTIC is a force multiplier right now. It is doing what the
administration intended. At the same time IAIP is certainly in
compliance with those 19 functions of the Homeland Security
Act, of which we are charged.
Mr. Langevin. Well, thank you. We will be monitoring its
progress, and I certainly would hope that you will share with
this committee if you have concerns that that arrangement is
not working.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if it is not working, I will be right
back here to tell you.
Mr. Langevin. I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. McCarthy. [Presiding] the Chair recognizes Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. Thank the Chair very much. Back to
you, Mr. Lago, if I could. Back in October 7th, 3 days before
the Congress voted on the resolution authorizing the President
to go to the UN and then to use force if necessary, the
President said in that speech to the American people and to the
Congress at that time--he said that--he said, we have learned
that Iraq has trained Al Qaeda members in bomb making and
poisons and deadly gases and we know that after September 11th
Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist
attack on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to
provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or
individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the
Iraq regime to attack America without ever leaving
fingerprints.
Then in the State of the Union Address that the President
delivered this year, which laid out the case for why we might
have to go to war against Saddam Hussein, the President said to
the American people as he was concluding the State of the Union
address, he says, evidence from intelligence sources, secret
communications and statements by people now in custody reveal
that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including
members of Al Qaeda; secretly and without fingerprints he could
provide one of his weapons to terrorists or help them develop
their own.
I am continuing the President's State of the Union Address.
This is how he is concluding now. Before September 11th, many
in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained,
but chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist
networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers
with other weapons and other plans, at this time armed by
Saddam Hussein. It would take only one vial, one canister, one
crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like
none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to
make sure that that day never comes.
Now, we know that on Friday a senior White House official--
and we know who that is. We just won't say his name. We know he
doesn't want his name mentioned--said that in response to the
questions about the National Intelligence Estimate that was
revealed on Friday that he publicly released, showed that--and
I will read this now from the National Intelligence Estimate:
Saddam if sufficiently desperate might decide that only an
organization such as al Qaeda, already engaged in a life or
death struggle against the United States, could perpetrate the
type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct. It went
on to say that Hussein might decide to take the extreme step of
assisting al Qaeda in a terrorist attack against the United
States if it, quote, would be his last chance to exact
vengeance or by taking a large number of victims with him.
So thus far the intelligence assessment that Hussein might
be a potentially bigger threat now than before the United
States attacked has yet to be retracted if he wasn't captured
and if these materials went into the hands of al Qaeda.
That being the case, Mr. Lago, again, it is hard for me to
understand why a warning hasn't been passed on to Mr. Daniels,
Mr. Foresman and others to be on high alert, given the fact
that al Qaeda has not been yet captured in that country and the
materials are at large, none of them have yet been identified.
Can you explain to me why we are not now giving warnings that
reflect the National Intelligence Estimate that was used by the
President both on October 7th and in the State of the Union as
a justification for me?
I voted for that resolution, Mr. Lago. So I was relying on
the President's holding out. So why isn't it now being
communicated to the public that this risk is real, since we
haven't identified either al Qaeda or the terrorists which the
CIA said was there?
Mr. Lago.
Mr. Lago. Congressman, again, we do not have specific
threat information. If we were to give warnings on every piece
of general information that we have, we would be warning people
24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We need specific actionable
information to put out those warnings. We don't want to be in a
position of spooking people, and we do that without specific
actionable intelligence.
Mr. Markey. I understand what you are saying, but doesn't
this intelligence reflect a greatly heightened sense of concern
which we should have? Now we have--the basic intelligence said
he is more dangerous if we attack in terms of these materials,
and he feels desperate, which obviously he does, and these
materials would then be much more likely to be put into the
hands of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
Mr. Lago. Congressman, again, to warn--we are at an
elevated level of warning today. To warn specific events, we
have to have actionable intelligence. We do not have specific
actionable intelligence.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Kallstrom.
Mr. Kallstrom. I can only speak from New York State, but we
are at a high level of alert. New York City is still at Orange.
We have done numerous things throughout the State, which I
don't want to discuss here, but involving sensors, involving
special precautions around special sites. So Congressman, we
actually are, and just before we went into Iraq, we went up to
Orange, as I am sure you remember.
In the New York State, we really have not come down much
from that from the standpoint of the potential of somebody
actually doing that, so we have taken it very, very seriously,
and we continue to.
Mr. Markey. See, the problem that I have, Mr. Kallstrom, is
this, is that I agree with this conclusion, and of course the
reason that I voted for the resolution was that I am from
Boston. They took over the two planes in Boston. It was
Bostonians who were on those two planes, and now the Bush
administration is opposing any attempts to screen cargo that
comes onto planes coming out of Logan Airport, and if this
biological or chemical or nuclear material tied to an explosive
is out there at heightened risk and the administration is still
opposing the screening of cargo going onto passenger planes,
then that means that the entire intelligence assessment before
October 10th, when we voted here in Congress, was wrong and
that the information the President was communicating in the
State of the Union was in fact wrong.
Then the question is was it knowingly wrong, or was it just
very bad information which the President was relying upon? But
I know that people in my district are still relying upon these
representations by the President based upon CIA and other
intelligence agencies, but you can't have it both ways. You
can't say that it is a greater risk and then at the same time
you are saying the very planes that the President said would be
at greater threat if 19 terrorists had these greater weapons
aren't going to screen the cargo that is going on passenger
planes. You can't have it both ways. It is either one or the
other, and the very fact that you don't have the specific
threat yet doesn't mean that there isn't a plan in place.
You know, we still haven't found anybody in Boston helping
those terrorists that killed all those people from my district.
They haven't found anybody even helping them yet. So wouldn't
it be wise for us, Mr. Lago, to take the precaution of
screening all cargo that goes on planes that have passengers on
them in the United States given the President's representation?
Mr. Lago. Congressman Markey, I am not an expert in that
area. I do think it is wise for us to be at the elevated state
of alert. I do think it is wise for us all to take precautions.
Again, if we don't have specific actionable information--.
Mr. Markey. I understand that, but I am saying to you--.
Mr. Cox. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired, but
let him answer the question.
Mr. Lago. There is--.
Mr. Markey. --if you wait until that point in time, you are
going to have a recurrence of September 11th in Boston, okay.
That is all I am saying to you. They will put the cargo on the
same planes, maybe with the same number on the flight and send
it off. We don't screen cargo for biological, chemical or
nuclear materials that would go on in the cargo to find an
explosive.
Mr. Lago. Sir, again, that is out of the scope of my
expertise--we don't screen domestic cargo at the CIA, sir. I
can't answer that question.
Mr. Markey. I understand, but I think your analysis before
that the President relied upon is either accurate or
inaccurate. I hope the President used accurate information. If
he did, there is a natural consequence of that to passengers on
domestic planes.
Mr. Cox. Mr.Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Parrish, you have
been with us several times. You know where the sentiment of
this committee is with regard to the role that the new
department should play in information, collection and analysis.
I think it is fair to say, at least on the part of the chairman
and I, that we have a view based on the reading of the Homeland
Security Act that your role is very broad, and I certainly
appreciate the fact that we are at a somewhat early stage in
the evolution of these relationship. I am glad when I hear Mr.
Kallstrom talking about the relationship that he has with the
Department. It is based on in many cases longtime friendships
with Mr. Libutti, and those kinds of things are important. But
with a country as large as we have, we have got to create a
system that works for everybody, including Mr. Foresman. I see
him shaking his head down there.
And I guess what I hope is that at some point we will be
able to arrive at such a system, and I hope it is sooner rather
than later, because I think it is important to our security.
Just a minute ago I was listening to you talk about your
relationship to teinnst the threat integration center. You said
we have analysts there, and of course when I hear that--and I
think my chairman shares this view--I mean, we think maybe
those analysts are supposed to be at your shop and what is
happening in terms of information flow at TTIC is supposed to
be coming to your shop at DHS.
You made a comment that you are pushing the agencies for
every bit of information when the Homeland Security Act by its
very words really shouldn't require you to have to push anybody
for information. The statute says you are to get it whether you
ask for it or not, and you said a moment ago that when you have
made these requests you have never been told no. Under the
Homeland Security Act, nobody has the right to ever tell you
no, and so I think that we can get there. If somebody says no,
no, we went down the wrong road, the Congress passed this
legislation, and it gave you this authority, but that was a
mistake, then I hope at some point somebody would come to us
and say we need to change the law. Because we all come to this
table from different perspectives, and many of you have worked
on behalf of the people of America for many, many years and you
do an outstanding job. We like to think that we come to this
table with the same motivation, and our job is oversight, and
our job is to read the statute that we pass and see if it is
being complied with. I guess many of the frustrations that we
probably exchange back and forth relates to that different
perspective, because I know each of you are doing the very best
you can to get to the desired goal, and that is making America
more secure. But I hope you will work with us, because if what
we put in the statute is wrong, we need to hear that from you
as well. I would welcome your comment with respect to that if
you feel I am off base with regard to that observation, I would
welcome it now.
Mr. Parrish. No, sir. I do not think you are off base. As I
said the day before yesterday, it is not a push-pull system at
this point. It is still a pull system, but I am telling you
that it is working and it is getting much better. In my short
tenure as the Acting Assistant Secretary, I have received phone
calls from members of the Intelligence Community that have said
I need to make sure that you got this message.
Again, we are standing up. Some of the IT connectivity is
not there. We have the work-around because we have
representatives from the other communities. I can tell you that
I worked very late last night on some things, and the system
was working very well, and it continued to work this morning
when I got back into work at 6 o'clock to follow up on where we
ended last night.
Let the record show, sir, that when I am told no and if I
ever am told no, I will be back to this committee to let you
know that I was told no. The law is very clear. Under Secretary
Libutti has made that very clear to his counterparts within the
Intelligence Community, but at this point in time I have to
admit I have seen nothing but cooperation from--again, there
are personalities involved in this, and I have established some
strong relationships with senior leadership in the FBI, senior
leadership at the CIA, at the National Security Agency and
other agencies which I meet with on a weekly basis, and the
system is working right now.
I think the legislation that this Congress passed is on
target. I think the list of the 19 functions of which we are
held responsible for, we are implementing those functions, and
I think that legislation as it is written right now is going to
be the things that Mr. Kallstrom has alluded to in the
preventive measures to stop a terrorist attack.
Mr. Turner. Well, let me thank all of you for your patience
with us today and for your time. I know it has been a long day.
You had to wait for us to go through a series of votes, and we
had lengthy questions, even though perhaps we haven't been as
well attended in the subcommittee as the panel has, but you
have been very generous with your answers to our questions.
And, again, each of us greatly appreciates your dedication to
our country, your deep sense of patriotism and your devotion to
the task that we know is important to the future of the
country.
Thank you so much.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. I want to join my ranking member in
thanking each of you, Mr. Daniels, Mr. Foresman, Mr. Kallstrom,
Mr. McCraw, Mr. Lago, Mr. Parrish, for your extended duty
today. We have benefitted greatly, not only from the time and
the resources that you have committed to this hearing but from
the fact that you have been here together so that we could
learn jointly from your presentation.
I think you have inferred from our questions today that the
kind of commitment, the full commitment to information sharing
that Congress intended in the Homeland Security Act, in our
view at least, requires enormous changes in the way the
government at all levels does its business, and it may require,
for example, that agencies be willing to give up ownership and
control of information that they generate and through IT permit
not only sharing that information but also its augmentation by
government at all levels in a networked environment.
These are things that are under construction. It is work in
progress. It is a new way of looking at the world, but I think
that protecting the American people from attack necessitates
these things in this if not strange new world in which we live,
difficult new world in which we live. So what you are doing
seems to be exactly the right thing. The fact that you are
doing it together is more important still.
We are going to cut you loose. We know some of you have to
go, and, again, thank you very much for your extended stay
today. It has been enormously beneficial to this committee.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Questions and Responses for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record by Willam Parrish, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, Department of Homeland
Security from the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
hearing titled ``Improvements to Department of Homeland Security
Information Sharing Capabilities'' held on July 24, 2003
Status of Information Analysis Office
Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act requires the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate to
disseminate information analyzed by the Department within the
Department, to other Federal government agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector, in order to assist in the
prevention of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United
States.
Question: 1. How many products, and what types of products, has IAIP
disseminated to other parts of the Department as of today? To other
federal government agencies? To state and local governments? To the
private sector? Do you consider this number to be adequate? If not,
when will you be able to disseminate the desired number of products?
Response: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection has
disseminated 46 products to other federal government agencies, 48 to
state and local governments, and 41 to the private sector. Procedure
dictates that a draft of a bulletin or advisory is vetted through
twelve internal DHS divisions, as well as through outside sources, for
approval. Once the product has been vetted, it is then disseminated to
DHS. At no point has the necessary information or a needed product not
been distributed. The figures above, therefore, accurately represent
the number desired.
Question: 2. How frequently does IAIP disseminate intelligence
products? Can you give some examples of the products? Will you provide
them to the Subcommittee?
Response: The Homeland Security Information Summary (HSIS) is briefed
and distributed electronically daily to DHS leadership and component
intelligence chiefs, as well as to selected members of the intelligence
community. Additionally, IAIP compiles the information received from
DHS operational elements into the Homeland Security Intelligence Report
(HSIR) or into a restricted version (the HSIR-R). IAIP also produces a
Spot Report in advance of the daily report when it is necessary to
begin processing critical material immediately. Lastly, IAIP produces
the Secretary's Morning Brief, a daily compilation of in-depth
analytical perspectives on significant recent, and developing, issues
affecting homeland security and DHS. Although some products have been
provided to Congress in the past, DHS, Office of Legislative Affairs is
developing a more formal and automatic process to pass appropriate
level products to a variety of committees in Congress. These products
will be provided to the Committee as appropriate to their level of
classification.
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
During the joint hearing held on Tuesday on the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, you testified that you hope to have about 150
analysts in your office by next year. Mr. Brennan, the Director of
TTIC, testified that TTIC will have about 300 analysts when fully
staffed.
Question: 3. Will 150 analysts be adequate to carry out all the
missions of the Information Analysis office? How did you determine what
the correct number should be? How does that mission compare to the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which will have 300 analysts when
fully staffed? If TTIC will have 300, how can IA only have 150 in light
of its broad mission?
Response: Yes. One hundred and fifty analysts is an adequate number to
carry out the missions of Information Analysis. The number was
determined by Information Analysis Division Chiefs based on years of
experience in the Intelligence Community. The missions of TTIC and
Information Analysis differ in that IA deals only in intelligence that
involves threats to the Homeland. TTIC deals in all threat-related
information and therefore has more information flowing in on a daily
basis. Information Analysis also has the added benefit of analysts in
other DHS component entities that pass threat-related information to
IA.
At the hearing on TTIC on July 22, Mr. Brennan testified that an
agency, such as the CIA, that has threat information provides it to
both TTIC and the Information Analysis office of DHS simultaneously.
Question: 4. Can you explain what happens at that point? What does your
office do with the information that is distinct from what TTIC does?
Response: Information that comes into Information Analysis is
independently analyzed and assembled with all domestic threat-related
information flowing into the Department. This information is matched
with known capabilities and vulnerabilities to produce an overall
threat picture that allows IA to issue warning products to other
federal government agencies, state and local governments and the
private sector. TTIC receives all domestic and international threat-
related information and sends reports to IA regarding domestically
relevant intelligence, particularly to support its critical
infrastructure protection responsibilities. TTIC does not communicate
with anyone outside of the Intelligence Community.
Question: 5. After TTIC and the Information Analysis office both
process the information, what happens then? What is the ``output'' of
the Information Analysis office? Who receives this output? How is it
different from what the TTIC would do with the same information?
Response: The ``output'' of the Information Analysis office is the
afore-mentioned warning and intelligence products, based on information
from DHS entities and members of the Intelligence Community. IA differs
from TTIC in that all IA products deal solely in threats to the
Homeland while TTIC deals in the overall threat picture. IA delivers
its ``output'' to other federal government agencies, state and local
governments and the private sector. TTIC does not communicate with the
public.
Responsibilities of the Information Analysis Office
The Information Analysis office, in particular its Information &
Warnings Division, is responsible for administering the Homeland
Security Advisory System. Many state and local officials have
complained that there is little guidance accompanying changes in the
threat level.
Question: 6. Can you describe, specifically, what guidance the
Information Analysis office provided to state and local officials
during the recent changes in the threat level form yellow to orange and
back to yellow? Did the office recommend that state and local officials
take any specific actions other than be at a higher state of alert?
Response: When the threat level was changed from yellow to orange on
May 20, 2003, specific protective measures were included in the
Advisory that was widely disseminated. Upon deciding to lower the alert
level back to yellow on May 30, 2003, DHS/IAIP distributed a product
that included an overview of the existing situation and suggested that
those receiving the product maintain surveillance of critical
locations, assess emergency plans, and provide a visible presence as a
viable form of deterrence. The report detailed such actions as the use
of random or rolling patrol operations and encouraged individuals to
report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to law
enforcement. Specific suggestions regarding what type of threat exists,
recommended increased security measures, and as many details regarding
suspicious activity as can be reported continue to be included in
products issued by IA.
Question: 7. Who do you believe your ``customers'' are? Do you intend
to develop intelligence products tailored to each type of ``customer''
of the Information Analysis office?
Response: Information Analysis is dedicated to sharing information with
the Intelligence Community, TTIC, DHS entities, and to serving other
federal government agencies, state and local governments and the
private sector as is relevant. Information Analysis, through these
bodies and through its cooperation with other DHS entities,
consequently serves the public at large.
Question: 8. Have you met with the officials and agencies that are your
``customers'' to determine what information they need from your office
and in what form?
Response: Information Analysis receives feedback on its communication
with its ``customers'' through a variety of channels. The State and
Local and Private Sector Directorates within the Department of Homeland
Security convey the feedback they receive from their components and IA
is in regular communication with the federal government agencies and
Intelligence Community members it works with.
In your testimony, you discussed that DHS has operational personnel,
such as Border Patrol and Customs inspectors, who are in positions to
collect information that could be useful to the rest of the Department
and the government as a whole.
Question: 9. What systems are in place for regular reporting from those
on the front lines to IAIP? Do the personnel on the front lines know
what they should report? Can you give some examples of information that
has been collected by Border Patrol or Customs that has been reported
to IAIP and shared with other agencies?
Response: The operational personnel within DHS entities such as Border
and Transportation Security operate through their own intelligence
components. IA receives threat information from these components.
Personnel on the front lines diligently observe and report intelligence
and threat-related information such as suspicious activity at the
nation's borders and suspect names discovered through daily activity.
You testified that there is work being done on a national watchlist
center, and that there has not been a final decision on whether it
would be at the Department or the FBI.
Question: 10. What is the time line for this process? When will the
national watchlist be in place? What agencies are working on the
problem?
The Terrorist Screening Center, now in existence, is a central point at
which the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) will be consolidated and
administered. TSC operations were phased in and became operational 1
December 2003. The TSC, a multi-agency effort, involves the expertise
of the FBI, DHS, and State Department.
Responses to Questions from Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
1. The FBI has been criticized in the past for its unwillingness to
share information. The March, 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between
the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Homeland Security provides that the FBI is to provide
Electronic Communications (ECs) and interview summaries known as
``302s''?
Question: Is the FBI currently providing ECs and 302s to the Department
of Homeland Security? If not, why not?
Response: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is sharing a very
large amount of information and intelligence with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), primarily through electronic cable message
traffic. The FBI also provides information and intelligence through
Electronic Communications (BCs) and FD-302s when these documents can
independently fulfill a Request for Information (RFI) without revealing
protected sources or methods. In either instance, the intelligence
contained in FBI documents/ communications is made available to DHS, as
provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). To further
assist in the flow of information, two FBI Supervisory Special Agents
have been posted to DHS since April 2003.
Due to the internal structure of DHS, a determination was made to
create two parallel RFI channels to ensure the proper sharing of
information. The first channel was the RFI process for ``emergent
threat'' information. Because of the time sensitivity of this type of
RFI, the system calls for direct connectivity between the DHS Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC) and the FBI Counterterrorism Watch.
The majority of these RFIs are either by telephone or by facsimile. The
HSOC now assigns a tracking number to all RFIs.
The Director of the HSOC has initiated a program whereby a DHS Senior
Watch Officer (SWO) is detailed to the Counterterrorism Watch on a 90-
day rotating basis. The SWO educates the Counterterrorism Watch on the
mission and needs of the HSOC and, by learning how the Counterterrorism
Watch defines and manages emergent threat matters, is additionally able
to serve as the ``eyes and ears'' of the HSOC.
The second channel of information sharing is the method by which all
requests for nonemergent (i.e., routine) information, such as
investigative updates and analytical products, are processed.
Procedurally, these requests are collected and sent via cable from the
DHS Information Management and Requirements Division (IMRD) to FBI
Headquarters (FBIHQ), where they are received by the Executive Staff of
the Counterterrorism Division. Responses are sent by FBIHQ via cable
back to IMRD for dissemination to the request's originator.
In addition to these RFI processes, information sharing initiatives
have included numerous briefings and meetings both at DHS and the FBI,
including weekly Intelligence briefings at the FBI's Strategic
Information and Operations Center where DHS selects the topic to be
covered and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division provides the briefer.
The FBI provides to DHS virtually all of its terrorism analytical
products that are disseminated externally.
2. The same Memorandum of Understanding indicates that the TTIC and the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) will have a role in the
information sharing.
Question: Can you explain what the current roles of TTIC and JTTFs are?
Does the FBI share information directly with the Department of Homeland
Security, or only through the TTIC and JTTFs?
Response: The mission of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
is to enable full integration of terrorist threat information and
analysis. It is a multi-agency joint venture that integrates and
analyzes terrorist threat-related information collected domestically
and abroad, and disseminates information and analysis to appropriate
recipients. TTIC sponsors a website that increasingly includes products
tailored to the needs of state and local officials and private
industry, so that DHS and the FBI (who are the designated conduits of
information to these entities) can readily pass this information along.
The 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are the United States
Government's primary counterterrorism operational entities throughout
the United States. The JTTFs team FBI Agents with state and local law
enforcement officials, as well as representatives of DHS and other
federal agencies, to coordinate counterterrorism investigations and
share information. The JTTFs investigate and follow up operationally on
leads provided by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the FBI,
and other intelligence agencies. The JTTFs also serve as conduits of
state and local law enforcement information to the FBI.
In accordance with the Homeland Security Act of November 2002 and other
statutory requirements and interagency agreements, the FBI furnishes
information directly to the Department of Homeland Security, as
discussed in response to Question 1.
3. Your office in the FBI is a new one, and was created as a response
to the criticism of the FBI's weaknesses in analysis.
Question: Can you explain the role of your office in relation to the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of DHS,
and the TTIC? For instance, if a FBI field office has terrorism
information, is it reported to your office and then in turn to DHS and
TTIC?
Response: The Office of Intelligence (OI) is the program manager for
the FBI-wide Intelligence Program. As such, the OI manages intelligence
requirements, collection tasking, information sharing policy,
standards, the analytic cadre, and oversight of the FBI's distributed
intelligence production mission. The core principle of the FBI
Intelligence program is the integration of intelligence with FBI
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal operations.
The actual intelligence production mission takes place within those FBI
investigative programs and in all operational divisions both at
Headquarters and in the Field. The OI ensures that intelligence
production is accomplished against a common set of priorities and
according to a common set of protocols and policies regarding analysis
and dissemination. Additionally, the OI develops training and
certification standards for intelligence professionals, both analysts
and agents.
The FBI produces two types of intelligence: 1) raw intelligence in
response to intelligence requirements from the National Security and
Homeland Security Councils; and 2) assessments to support FBI
operations and those of our partners in the larger National Security
Community, to include our state, local, and tribal law enforcement
partners. Both raw intelligence and assessment reports are passed from
01 elements embedded in HQ divisions and the field to our customers
according to a common set of standards and policies.
TIIC is an intelligence analysis organization with two core functions.
First, it directs the work of raw intelligence producers like the FBI
by identifying gaps in our knowledge and issuing requirements for
intelligence collection and production with respect to key threat
areas. Second, it produces all-source threat analyses for the larger
National Security Community. The OI ensures that TIIC intelligence
requirements are tasked to FBI collectors and that assessments
requested by TIIC are produced in a timely fashion. In addition, the OI
manages the FBI analytic cadre embedded in TTIC. FBI analysts bring the
authorities and intelligence information produced by the FBI directly
to TTIC by virtue of their access to FBI systems and databases from
TTIC space. In this way, the FBI is able to apply all its information
to TTIC's mission of providing consolidated terrorist threat
information to the National Security Community.
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) component
of DHS is an information and analysis organization with two core
functions. First, it overlays threat information from all producers in
the United States and proposes countermeasures. Second, through its
participation in the larger national intelligence requirements process,
it directs raw intelligence producers to provide information based on
its analysis of vulnerabilities in the U.S. infrastructure. In
addition, like the FBI's OI, DHS IAIP provides a full range of
intelligence support to DHS leadership and manages the collection,
processing, analysis, and dissemination of DHS information from its
operational components (Coast Guard, Secret Service, Transportation
Security Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcemnt, and
Customs and Border Protection). DHS has assigned to the FBI a senior
representative, who is attached to the FBI's OI. That assignment
ensures that all information required by DHS is passed to it
expeditiously by the FBI.
4. The FBI has long established relationships with state and local law
enforcement. The hearing held on July 22 indicated that state and local
officials are receiving information from both the Department of
Homeland Security and through the JTTFs.
Question: What determines whether a piece of .information from the
federal government is shared through DHS or the JTTFs? Are there any
protocols or guidance?
Response: The JTTFs are the operational and investigative arms of the
United States Government in the war on terrorism. Because of this
responsibility, the FBI is tasked with dissemination of information on
terrorism (including operational and investigative information, as
wellas general threat information) to the JTTFs, which utilize the
information to conduct investigations and/or cover leads. This
information is provided through the JTTF structure to state and local
JTTF members who possess the appropriate security clearances. In
addition, FBIHQ distributes weekly intelligence bulletins to all law
enforcement officials through the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System, the Law Enforcement Online program, the
Regional Information Sharing System, and the National Electronic Alert
System. The Special Agent in Charge of each FBI field office is tasked
with further disseminating general terrorism threat information to
members of the state and local law enforcement community through
established methods. These methods may include regularly scheduled
briefings, working groups, newsletters, e-mails, and similar vehicles.
Terrorism threat information is shared on a daily basis between the FBI
and DHS.
DHS passes threat information on to their state Homeland Security
Directors, who are charged with notifying first responders in each
state. Because many of these first responders are members of the law
enforcement community, they often receive information from both the FBI
and DHS.
There is close coordination between the FBI and DHS in the
dissemination of terrorism intelligence information. All weekly FBI
Intelligence Bulletins are reviewed by DHS prior to release by the FBI.
The FBI and DHS have also agreed to protocols requiring coordination of
changes made to the Homeland Security threat level. The sharing of
information on terrorism intelligence was formalized in the March 2003
MOU referenced above.
5. You testified at the hearing that the FBI still has responsibility
for ``domestic terrorism.''
Question: Can you define the term ``domestic terrorism''? For matters
that fall in that definition of "domestic terrorism," is the FBI the
only agency with responsibilities? Does DHS have any role?
Response: As codified at 18 U.S.c. section 2331(5), the term ``domestic
terrorism'' means activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidationor
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
While the overall role of the FBI in coordinating the Federal
Government's response to a terrorist incident has changed pursuant to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (2/28/03), the FBI still
maintains responsibilities regarding domestic terrorism. DHS has
assumed responsibility to coordinate the Federal Government's overall
response to domestic terrorism incidents, including a major terrorist
attack on U.S. soil. The FBI's role in domestic terrorism concentrates
on criminal investigative and counterterrorism intelligence missions,
tactical resolution of terrorist-related incidents, and the
coordination of the law enforcement community's response to a terrorist
incident. The creation of DHS in no way alters the FBI's chain of
command. The Attorney General continues to have the lead responsibility
for criminal investigation of terrorist acts and terrorist threats. The
FBI continues to be the lead law enforcement agency to detect, prevent,
preempt, and disrupt terrorist acts against the United States. While
active coordination with DHS will be maintained, the FBI's
investigative role in domestic terrorism will be preserved.
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FOR JAMES K. KALLSTROM FROM CHAIRMAN GIBBONS
Question: 1. Who provides you with information about terrorist threats?
Is it the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, or another agency?
If you receive information from both, can you determine what types of
information are being channeled through DHS or the FBI? Is it a problem
to receive terrorism information from the federal government through
more than one channel?
Answer: 1. The NYS Office of Public Security (OPS) receives terrorism
threat-related information from a variety of federal sources. DHS and
FBI supply frequent informational bulletins regarding current and
historical terrorist trends, potential targets for terrorism (in
general terms), potential indicators for terrorism, suggested
protective measures for critical infrastructure, etc. DHS and FBI
normally coordinate the dissemination of such information; both
agencies contribute to the content and therefore a specific bulletin/
advisory is only disseminated through one channel. In addition, DHS
distributes related press releases, scripts of counter-terrorism
related testimonies, and daily incident reports indicating possible
terrorist activity nationwide.
As discussed in my testimony, shortly after September 11th 2001, OPS
created 16 Counter-Terrorism Zones for the purpose of facilitating the
dissemination of terror-related information and best practices, while
promoting cooperation and collaboration among local, county and state
law enforcement agencies on a regional basis. OPS also created the
Counter-Terrorism Network, a secure, stand-alone system to distribute
counter-terrorism and threat-based information and intelligence.
Through these developed methodologies of information sharing, OPS
disseminates the above-mentioned advisories from DHS and other federal
agencies, as well as information generated by our office and other
state and local agencies. Therefore, statewide law enforcement is
uniformly kept abreast of current terrorist trends and indicators,
enabling them to play a more effective role in the prevention of acts
of terror in our state and country.
Our office also maintains contacts at other federal agencies, such as
the CIA and the DOD, as well as other state homeland security offices
and law enforcement agencies, and therefore may receive threat
information in a less formal manner (i.e. phone call, fax, etc.) All
information classified above "Law Enforcement Sensitive" is generally
relayed in person or over a secure phone line.
Our office attends meetings and conferences with international
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in effort to share
information across national borders. We maintain contact with Canadian,
British, German and other foreign counterparts.
Question: 2. Can you compare the status of information sharing prior to
the passage of the Homeland Security Act to the present situation?
What, if anything, has changed?
Answer: 2. Information sharing between federal, state and local
governments has improved significantly since the passage of the
Homeland Security Act. The Department of Homeland Security hosts bi-
weekly regional conference calls with state homeland security
representatives, touching base on local, national and international
terrorism issues. DHS formalized a method of sharing terrorism
information on a continual and frequent basis by distributing
information bulletins and advisories (see AI) to our office so we may
further disseminate information to appropriate law enforcement agencies
and private sector constituents within New York State.
In addition, state and local representatives are invited to attend FBI-
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) meetings held weekly to share and
discuss current general and specific threat posture items of concern.
The creation of DHS has sparked the creation of federal information
sharing centers like the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and
the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC). TTIC, designed to serve as a
depot and analytical center for all collected foreign and domestic
intelligence, will facilitate the flow of raw and analyzed intelligence
between federal, state and local law enforcement and intelligence
communities. The TSC is designed to allow a state or local law
enforcement officer to access federal watch list information in ``real
time'' when he/she comes in contact with a suspicious individual during
routine traffic stops, etc. This process can potentially help police
officers intercept a terrorist and prevent the next attack.
However, these federal systems of improved information sharing will be
effective only if the process does indeed work in ``real time'' and is
unhampered by bureaucracy and interagency cultural differences. In
reality, information sharing is often hindered between agencies due to
nonequivalence of security clearance levels. Additionally, some federal
agencies classify information, which is received at an unclassified
level from foreign sources, thus rendering it difficult for us to
further ascertain credibility or corroboration with the help of our
federal intelligence agencies.
New York State and the nine other states comprising the Northeast
Homeland Security Agreement have advanced a feasible system of ``one-
stop shopping'' to enable the realtime dissemination of relevant
counter-terrorism information to law enforcement. As outlined in my
testimony, the Northeast Homeland Security Agreement has proposed the
implementation of this information-sharing pilot program to the
Department of Homeland Security. The currently operational Upstate New
York Regional Intelligence Center (UNYRIC) will serve as the central
hub of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination between law
enforcement agencies in these northeastern states. This facilitated
flow of counterterrorism information will enable state and locals to
assist the efforts of the JTTF's. The proposal has been detailed and
pending with the DHS since November 2003. It is our view that the
conception and approval of this Northeast Regional information-sharing
center, rather than federal intelligence centers, will better serve law
enforcement personnel in New York State and the surrounding region.
Finally, sensitive threat information and information regarding threat
level changes is often prematurely released to the media. This makes it
difficult for our office to share such information in a controlled and
secure environment, leading law enforcement to discredit the
intelligence community's ability to handle and effectively disseminate
sensitive information from the federal to local level.
Question 3. Can you describe what happened when the threat level was
raised or lowered in recent months? How did you find out about the
change in the threat level? What guidance did you receive from the
Department of Homeland Security at the time the threat levels changed?
Answer: 3. The national and New York State alert levels were recently
elevated to Orange on December 21,2003. That day, the Department of
Homeland Security held several conference calls with our office and
other state homeland security representatives. Secretary Ridge and
other intelligence community (IC) representatives shared information
regarding current threat posture, including intelligence indicators
requiring the US to raise its terrorism alert level. Implementing
Operation Liberty Shield at the federal level was discussed on the
call, thus providing guidance to states for implementing their own
deployment plans. The conference call and subsequent DHS advisory
provided detailed information on the types of critical infrastructure
terrorist groups may attempt to target and supplied guidance on the
steps state and local law enforcement should take in protecting such
targets.
When the alert level was lowered to yellow on January 9,2004, DHS
conducted another conference call with state homeland security
representatives to explain the lowering of the alert level and
suggested reducing resources and security personnel deployed at
strategic locals during Orange Alert.
Question: 4. Do you have a sense that the information you receive from
the Federal Government is coordinated? Do you ever receive conflicting
information from different Federal agencies? If so, what examples can
you provide to the committee?
Answer: 4. Since its inception, OPS has received information from a
wide variety of federal agencies. This information usually appears to
have been discussed among the various IC agencies prior to its
dissemination to state and local authorities and there is clearly some
consensus as to the threat/analysis/credibility of the information.
However, on occasion, our office has been in receipt of information
from one federal agency that has clearly not been coordinated with
other appropriate federal agencies prior to dissemination. There has
been occasions where federal agencies are completely unaware of this
information or if it was aware, it had assessed the credibility of the
source or analyzed the intelligence in a drastically different manner.
On occasion, we have had federal agencies contact our office for
information when it would have been more appropriate to reach out
directly to another IC agency.
Question: 5. If you run across information during your duties that
could indicate potential terrorist activity, where would you report
that information at the federal level? Is it the FBI? Do you know if
the FBI shares that information with the DHS or with any other federal
agencies?
Answer: 5. OPS does not have an investigative arm thus the office
reports all terrorist threat related info to relevant counter-terrorism
agencies. For example, if intelligence reporting indicates an imminent
threat, OPS would immediately contact 911 and then the relevant
federal, state and local agencies.
If the threat does not appear imminent, information is distributed
based on jurisdiction. OPS reports information related to New York City
to the New York City Terrorism Tip Line-(888) NYC-SAFE that is handled
out of the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center (UNYRIC).
UNYRIC, based in Latham, New York, serves as a regional center to
facilitate the collection, analysis. and dissemination of criminal and
terrorist intelligence.
If the information is specific to another part of New York State, OPS
reports information to the New York State Terrorism Tip Line--(866)
SAFE-NYS. Both the New York City and the New York State Police evaluate
the information and based on initial investigations, either choose to
conduct further in-house investigations or pass the intelligence to the
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). On occasion, our office has
passed information directly to the JTTF's when it appears very specific
in nature to indicate federal jurisdiction.
When OPS has been in receipt of threat information pertaining to other
states, we have reported said information to the state's respective
homeland security office and/or appropriate law enforcement agencies at
the federal, state or local level.
Question: 6. Has the Information Analysis office ever contacted you to
coordinate training for your employees regarding information sharing?
If no, does another federal agency provide such training?
Answer: 6. Neither the DHS' Information Analysis Office nor any other
DHS division has contacted OPS with regard to training our employees or
providing training to other relevant officials within New York State.
OPS has and will continue to orchestrate and offer counter-terrorism
training for state and local law enforcement officers and first
responders throughout New York State. Our office has taken the approach
that continuing education is essential in this field and has
implemented many programs in this regard. OPS welcomes educational and
training initiatives provided by DHS and other relevant agencies for
both our own staff and other relevant personnel involved in the war on
terror.
Our office encourages DHS to utilize the resources available in the
departments under its command and within the agencies of the
Intelligence Community to coordinate training in a variety of areas.
New York can benefit from additional training in; analytical skills,
the creation of threat matrixes, data mining, first response, chem/bio-
terrorism, radiological terrorism, infrastructure protection, general
aviation threats/security, fraudulent documents, etc.