[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WILL RELIGION FLOURISH UNDER CHINA'S NEW LEADERSHIP?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 24, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
DAVID DREIER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
FRANK WOLF, Virginia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania GORDON SMITH, Oregon
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
DAVID WU, Oregon BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State*
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce*
D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor**
LORNE CRANER, Department of State*
JAMES KELLY, Department of State*
John Foarde, Staff Director
David Dorman, Deputy Staff Director
* Appointed in the 107th Congress; not yet formally appointed in
the 108th Congress.
** Resigned July 2003.
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Opening statement of Hon. James A. Leach, a U.S. Representative
From Iowa, Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 1
Schriver, Randall G., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC....... 3
Gaer, Felice D., Co-Chair, the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, Washington, DC.............................. 14
Fewsmith, Joseph, professor, director of east Asia
interdisciplinary studies, Boston University, Boston, MA....... 20
Lovejoy, Charles D., Jr., associate, U.S. Catholic China Bureau,
Princeton Junction, NJ......................................... 24
Aikman, David B.T., former senior correspondent, Time magazine,
Lovettsville, VA............................................... 27
Armijo-Hussein, Jacqueline M., assistant professor, department of
religious studies, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.......... 29
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Schriver, Randall G.............................................. 38
Gaer, Felice D................................................... 42
Fewsmith, Joseph................................................. 46
Lovejoy, Charles D............................................... 49
Aikman, David B.T................................................ 52
Armijo-Hussein, Jacqueline M..................................... 55
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator From Nebraska, Co-Chairman,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 59
WILL RELIGION FLOURISH UNDER CHINA'S NEW LEADERSHIP?
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THURSDAY, JULY 24, 2003
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:40
a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office building,
Representative James A. Leach, [Chairman of the Commission]
presiding.
Also present: Senator Gordon Smith and Representative
Joseph R. Pitts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. LEACH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM IOWA, CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Chairman Leach. The Commission will come to order.
Let me first make a comment. Senator Hagel cannot be with
us this morning. He is meeting in a sudden circumstance with
the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority.
In addition, Secretary Powell is meeting--and I just broke
up with it and he is not finished yet--in the International
Relations Committee room on the Liberian matter.
Without objection, I am going to place in the record a
statement of Senator Hagel.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Let me just say, in terms of opening, that
the Commission convenes this morning to hear several
distinguished witnesses give us their thoughts on the current
condition and treatment of religious believers, practitioners,
and groups in China.
We have asked them to look ahead to the potential of change
under China's new leadership and explore the options open to
the United States to prompt the development of new attitudes
and policies toward religion in China.
Religious freedom around the world remains among the most
important issues of concern for most Americans. For that
reason, freedom of religion has been a central topic in our
human rights discussions with China for many years.
Religious freedom issues, for example, were a key part of
discussions last year between President Bush and then-Chinese
President Jiang Zemin in Crawford, TX. Following that meeting,
President Bush told reporters that he had reminded President
Jiang of the importance of China freeing prisoners of
conscience and giving fair treatment to peoples of faith.
President Bush also raised the importance of respecting
human rights in Tibet, and encouraging more dialogue with
Tibetan leaders.
This year, the State Department included China in its list
of countries that deny religious freedom, a finding that the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom [CIRF] also
supported. We are happy to welcome witnesses from both
institutions this morning.
China's Constitution guarantees protection of normal
religious activity. Despite this guarantee of the Chinese
Government, the Communist Party requires that religion be
congruent with patriotism, which has resulted in widespread
repression of religious practice.
In Tibetan and Uighur areas where separatist sentiment is
often interwoven with religious conviction, repression of
religion is particularly harsh.
Chinese authorities often see separatist sentiment as a
precursor to terrorism, even when religious practitioners
express such sentiment peacefully.
The Chinese Government requires religious practitioners to
meet in government-approved mosques, churches, monasteries, and
temples. Authorities oversee the selection of religious leaders
and monitor religious education.
The Chinese Government often labels unregistered religious
groups and movements as cults, and those who engage in such
activities can be arrested with charges of disturbing social
order. In many cases, local authorities enforce regulations
that are more restrictive than those enforced at the national
level.
Despite these risks, a growing number of religious
believers choose to worship outside the government-controlled
religious framework.
More broadly, the Commission is particularly keen to learn
from our witnesses whether or not they think that the rise of a
new group of Chinese leaders in the past few months holds any
promise of a change in government policy toward religion.
Some observers, for example, have commented that the new
leadership group may wish to encourage the social services
activities of religious groups so that faith-based groups would
take up some of the critical social services that governments
at all levels in China can no longer sustain.
While we all might prefer that religious beliefs,
practices, organizations, and social action be allowed on their
own merits, the Commission, for its part, would welcome any
significant relaxation of current strictures, whatever their
motive.
With these comments in mind, let me welcome our panel of
distinguished witnesses. The first panel is composed of the
distinguished Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Randall Schriver, who will
present the Department's perspective.
Mr. Schriver.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
work of the Commission, and thanks for inviting me here this
morning to discuss this very important topic of religious
freedom in China.
I do have a full statement. I might ask that that be
submitted for the official record, and I will just make a few
observations this morning.
Chairman Leach. Without objection, your full statement, and
those of all of the other panelists, will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you.
Chairman Leach. You may summarize and commence as you see
fit.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I will make a few observations in
just the following areas. First, just a general description of
the current conditions in China as we see them, and then
addressing very specific areas of interest and concern.
I will then talk about the issue you just mentioned, the
Chinese leadership transition, and the prospects that may hold
for a change in how China deals with religion.
Then, finally, I will talk briefly about the U.S.
Government, our policies and our actions and what we plan to do
in the near term.
Let me say up front that President Bush and this entire
Administration are deeply committed to achieving progress on
religious freedom in China. We are very concerned about the
situation, as we see it.
The President and Secretary Powell often raise this in
their meetings with the Chinese interlocutors. You noted, of
course, that the President raised this in Crawford.
The President has also been very public about this. In his
speech at Qinghua University in February 2002, the President
said the following: ``Freedom of religion is not something to
be feared, it is to be welcomed, because faith gives us a moral
core and teaches us to hold ourselves to high standards, to
love and to serve others, and to live responsible lives.''
This is something that should be endorsed by all
governments around the world. This is not just an American
value, not only a Western value. What the President noted is
something that should be embraced by everyone.
So with the President's lead and with this Administration's
commitment, freedom of religion is a top foreign policy goal
for us, and in the case of China, one of the highest priorities
in the bilateral relationship.
So let me briefly summarize the current state of religious
freedom in China as we see it. Mr. Chairman, you noted that the
Secretary of State did designate China as one of six countries
of particular concern under the International Religious Freedom
Act. I think it is important to know that the other countries
are North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Burma, and Sudan.
The company that China is keeping here does not reflect
well on her. This exclusive club is made up of some
objectionable countries. It is also interesting to note that
there is also reason to believe that Iraq will be coming off
this list before China. So, again, this does not reflect well
on China.
The Secretary made this designation because we found the
government in China ``is engaged in or tolerates particularly
severe violations of religious freedom'' in a manner that is
``egregious, ongoing, and systematic.'' Those are pretty
powerful words. I think the evidence that we observed in China
supports that kind of powerful language.
What we have seen in the last 12 months, the government's
respect for freedom of religion, freedom of conscience remains
very poor overall, especially, as you mentioned, for
independent, unregistered groups and spiritual movements such
as the Falun Gong.
Thousands of believers, Catholics, Protestants, Tibetan
Buddhists, Muslims, members of the Falun Gong, and other groups
remain in prison for seeking to exercise their religious or
spiritual views, some of them tortured, and many have been
abused.
Given that very poor backdrop, there are some modest
positive signs which I would also like to highlight, because
this is important work. We need to find the opportunity to
highlight areas where there are positive developments and see
if we can get further progress in those areas.
One of those areas, as you mentioned, is the growing number
of believers in China. We believe the official documents
suggest the numbers of people who are practicing and exercising
their religious faith is growing. We believe the unofficial
numbers are probably much higher than that, and we take that as
a positive sign.
So although the overall record is certainly poor, it is a
situation that we hope to find areas of progress and where we
can get even further progress in the near future.
Let me address some of the specific areas. The registration
requirements, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned. The government
does require all religious groups to register with state-
sanctioned religious organizations. These organizations, of
course, monitor and supervise religious activities.
Naturally, this makes people very uncomfortable in China.
Many believers feel that they would have to either make
compromises, or even worse, would be subject to state action
and oppression if they did register, so many choose not to, for
understandable reasons.
Officials have continued the selective crackdown on these
unregistered or underground groups, churches, temples, and
mosques.
We have found, however, that the degree of restrictions
does vary significantly depending on the region in China. In
some localities in southeastern China, for example, some
underground churches have been allowed to operate without
registering in sort of a tacit acquiescence on the part of the
Chinese. But even in those cases, often the leadership is
informally vetted by the Chinese Government.
We have asked the government to relax or eliminate this
registration requirement and to allow any religious or
spiritual groups who wish to practice their faith to do so
freely.
We view the increase in the number of unregistered groups
being allowed to operate freely and without oppression is a
positive intermediate step before the government eventually
does away with these restrictions.
Another area of particular interest is concerning minors
and their ability to practice religion in China. Religious
education for young people is necessary to ensure vibrancy and
continuity in the religious community.
I think it is particularly crucial that families be allowed
to transmit their faith and values to their children in certain
ethnic minority communities, such as Tibetans and Uighurs,
because this allows them to transmit the core elements of the
culture.
Thus, prohibitions on minors practicing religion or
receiving religious education have been a longstanding issue
for us. We have raised this question many times. The Chinese,
in response, back in December at the human rights dialogue and
in other fora, have expressed that they do not have an official
policy that bans religious practice for minors.
However, we do know that there are many obstacles to young
people practicing religion freely. For instance, we observed in
mosques in Xinjiang actual signs saying, ``No One Under 18
Permitted.'' So again, there's an imbalance between actual
practice and the stated policy, but certainly there are
obstacles that the Chinese Government has put in place.
I just mentioned Xinjiang. Chinese officials there have
ramped up a crackdown against ethnic Uighurs, a Muslim minority
group. This is really a misguided effort to curb what they call
``separatism.''
Senior officials in China have closed mosques. We
mentioned, of course, that they make it very difficult for
minors to engage in religious activities. They have taken other
steps to limit the practice of Islam.
As we have often stated, China has nothing to fear from the
practice of religion, whether it is Islam in Xinjiang, Buddhism
in Tibet, or Christianity throughout China.
The situation in Tibet, I think, is a mixed picture. We
have observed that in many ways practitioners are able to
worship relatively freely, but that Tibetan Buddhist monks and
nuns continue to face restrictions on their ability to pursue
religious education and to practice religion.
There is a case of a very particular concern. A number of
monks in Sichuan Province were arrested in connection with some
bombings. We have evidence to suggest that certainly at least
one of them was not involved in the bombings, but is still
being held.
One of the former monks was quickly put to death, despite
promises from the Chinese Government that he would be allowed
to appeal his case. So, China has not conducted these cases in
an open, transparent manner. Unfortunately, they have not given
us any
indication that they want to do that.
Elsewhere in Sichuan, there is a case involving a dozen or
more Tibetans who were arrested in conjunction with a public
``long life'' ceremony for the Dalai Lama. Obviously, we fail
to see any reason why they should be imprisoned or punished for
such activity.
I mentioned the Falun Gong. It is an issue that is well
known to all of us. The Chinese have determined this group to
be a cult and, as a result, has taken some brutal measures
against the Falun Gong.
We have sources reporting that thousands of Falun Gong
adherents have been arrested, detained, imprisoned, and that
several hundred or more Falun Gong adherents have died in
detention since 1999.
I am sad to say that these reports of repression continue.
We do continue to raise this as an issue that is important to
us, and we will continue to do so.
Another case of very particular interest is that of the
South China Church. This is another group that China has deemed
to be a cult and, as a result, has taken some unfair measures
against it. Many of its members have been arrested.
Egregiously, we have credible reporting that four young
women have indicated that security forces tortured and abused
them in order to obtain evidence against the group's founder.
We have raised this case, of course, in great detail with
the Chinese and remain deeply concerned over continuing reports
of abuse and continuing reports of unfair detention.
Let me also note China's relations with the Vatican. China
still refuses to acknowledge the Vatican as the supreme
authority for Chinese Catholics in many matters of faith and
insists on controlling the appointments of Catholic clerics in
China through the government-controlled Catholic Patriotic
Association.
Many Chinese Catholics who remain loyal to the Pope do so
in an underground fashion, a non-transparent fashion, or they
face reprisals from the government. We continue to urge the
Chinese to move forward in allowing people to practice freely,
legitimize their relationship with the Pope and the Vatican,
and resume its own official dialogue with the Vatican.
We also mentioned briefly North Koreans in China. This is
something that we spent a lot of time on, but I think in this
forum it is also important to note that North Koreans who
practice Christianity face severe risks if they are
repatriated. We are concerned about reports that China does
continue to force repatriation of North Koreans.
We have urged China to treat those who flee North Korea in
a humane way. We have urged them to allow the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] into these areas to do
appropriate refugee screening of North Koreans. We have asked
them if they would liberalize their policies on allowing NGOs
to work there, some of the NGOs that we fund quietly.
Unfortunately, we have not seen the progress we would like
to see, and the willingness of the Chinese to be cooperative on
this issue, to date, has been minimal.
Just a couple of what I would characterize as modestly
positive notes. The number of believers in China and those that
practice, we understand, are rising. This is, I think, a
testament to the important role that faith can play in China,
where people are hungry for a spiritual life and want this.
There is potential for improvement, if the Chinese Government
makes the decision that they are willing to let that happen.
Mr. Chairman, you also mentioned community activities. In
some localities, officials do work closely with Buddhist,
Catholic, and Protestant groups to build schools, build medical
facilities, and retirement centers for poor communities. So
this is encouraging.
In some cases, Catholics and Protestants have been
encouraged by local officials to work with Western religious
groups to continue these kinds of activities and these
services. This is something President Bush has noted and
encouraged in his talks with the Chinese leadership.
Let me briefly mention the other topic, Mr. Chairman, that
you were interested in having us address. That is the new
leadership and what potential there may be for change.
I think it is important to note that, in the Chinese
system, when people come to power, we tend to have unknown
quantities on our hands because their system, as they are
waiting in the wings and waiting to assume power, their role is
very much not to make news, not to make headlines, not to let
people know that they have any views that may or may not be
different than the Communist Party and the leadership that
precedes them.
So I think the first point is, we have a group that is
largely an unknown quantity. I think at this point, at this
early juncture, we have yet to see clear signs that the new
leadership plans to move in any significant new directions
related to religious freedom and in the treatment of religious
believers.
That said, let me point to a few areas that might give us
windows on this new leadership. At last December's human rights
dialogue, China did make a commitment to host visits by some of
the U.N.'s Special Rapporteurs, for instance, the Rapporteur on
Religious Intolerance, and Rapporteur on Torture, and the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
China promised to invite these groups to visit China. That
has not come to fruition yet, and we have urged the Chinese to
move forward. They have cited SARS and have given us other
explanations which we find uncompelling. So, we urge them to
move forward. I think that would be a positive development if
these U.N. officials were allowed to visit China and to engage
in their work there.
In addition, the Chinese leaders, last December, invited
the Congressionally chartered U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom to visit China. I know just following me will
be the CIRF commissioner, and I believe there is a plan for
China to host a visit. I look forward to hearing her comments
on that. I think that would be a positive development.
In the area of Tibet, the Chinese did invite the elder
brother of the Dalai Lama to visit China last year and has
hosted the official emissaries of the Dalai Lama from the
United States and Europe to visit China. One visit just
concluded at the end of June.
This is something that we are cautiously optimistic about.
As a matter of policy, we want to encourage this dialogue and
want the Chinese to be engaged directly with representatives of
the Dalai Lama.
Unfortunately, on the broader questions, though, about the
willingness of China's leaders to take steps to relax their
treatment of practitioners and religious institutions, we just
do not have enough data to suggest that there is going to be
significant movement.
We might even speculate that, at a time when new leadership
is in power, this kind of risk taking might not be something
they want to engage in. I think that type of speculation would
be misguided.
I think this is a time for the leadership to show that it
is willing to create a confidence and trust in the people, and
to recognize the valuable role that religion can play for its
citizenry, making them good citizens of China and the world.
Finally, let me briefly address U.S. Government actions and
what we plan to do. As I mentioned earlier, this is an
extremely high priority. Religious freedom is raised at all
levels of the government.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the President raising it in
Crawford. I think it is significant, when we have important
bilateral issues that we are working on with the Chinese, that
religion is almost always placed alongside issues such as North
Korea and Iraq.
I think that sends a signal to the Chinese that, if we are
willing to take the time of the senior leadership to mention
two or three issues and one of them is freedom of religion, I
do think that has an impact. They understand that they do not
get a free pass from us.
Our Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom, Ambassador John Hanford, has traveled to China twice.
This is the only country he has made a return visit to so far
on his watch. He has had regular visits with Chinese officials
here in Washington. Of course, all of the other senior
officials raise this as well.
The issue of religious freedom was raised in the U.S.-China
human rights dialogue last December. Ambassador Hanford and
Assistant Secretary Craner were part of that team.
There are many specific things that the Chinese gave us the
impression--or even more than the impression, led us to
believe--that there was going to be forward movement. One is
the area of religious freedom for minors.
That, in particular, was an important issue to us that we
just have not seen progress on yet. We will continue to press,
but that will continue to be part of the human rights dialogue
and any dialogue on religious affairs.
I think there has been some payoff due to these diplomatic
efforts, mostly in the form of individual prisoner releases.
Although we know it can be a practice of the Chinese to release
one and then arrest another, still, these are significant
developments. For instance, the Tibetan nun, Ngawang Sangdrol,
who was released last year.
I and others from the State Department were able to meet
with her. It only reinforced the importance of this work to see
this impressive woman, to hear what she had endured, and to
recognize her as somebody who is going to continue to have a
voice in these affairs now that she is free to do so.
Let me just close and reiterate that the situation in China
is certainly, on balance, poor, and we do not want to leave you
with
another impression at all. But we do think that there are some
positive signs. We want to be optimistic about this new
leadership. We want to believe that they can take a more
enlightened approach, a more constructive approach. Until they
do, China will
remain a country of particular concern in that exclusive club
of objectionable countries that I mentioned.
We do not have any illusions about their history and how
they have treated religious groups, but nevertheless this will
continue to be part of our dialogue and continue to be a
priority. As I said, it is certain that China will not get a
pass from us on religious freedom issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to any questions
you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you very much.
Let me just begin with a couple of questions and then turn
to my colleagues.
First, let me just say that there are always exceptions to
all rules. But, as a general rule, religion is a socially
conservative institution. It becomes radical when it is
repressed or lacks respect. The history of America is that the
more freedom, the greater the vibrancy of the church, but also
the greater the social cohesion of the church.
In radically changing times--and China is facing that, as
we do--churches play a greater role in helping individual
citizens deal with social change. So, as an institution of
society, I think all societies have an interest in respecting
the church. But I think the case for China is one of the most
radically changing societies in the world, of greater interest
than, conceivably, most others.
Here, I would like to ask a question about dialogue with
the Catholic faith. A fundamental aspect of freedom of religion
is not only can people choose to worship, but who leads the
worship.
The notion that a state would dictate who the leaders of
the faith are is anathema to the mind, not of a Westerner
alone, but of anyone who believes in freedom of religion.
We all know that one of the aspects of systems that are
either still profoundly Communist, or have remnants in
Communism, is that there is some antagonism to religion and
some utilization of the state as leadership of the faith, as in
the old Soviet Union.
Is there any hint from this new leadership that they can
accept the leadership of the faith's choosing, in this case the
Holy See's, instead of the government's?
Mr. Schriver. Again, we do not have enough evidence to make
a solid judgment one way or the other. We do know that Chinese
officials are willing to talk about the idea of having visits
from representatives of the Holy See. We do know that they
understand this is an issue of importance to us, to Catholics
worldwide, and they know it is something that people are paying
attention to.
There is some evidence that Catholics in certain regions
are allowed to practice a little more freely and are not
necessarily part of the officially sanctioned Catholic Church.
It is always a question in China, how much is this sort of
tacit acquiescence or how much is this going on underground and
the authorities are not fully aware. So, it is a difficult
thing to speculate on.
Again, I think a great first step China could take would be
to have an ongoing dialogue with representatives of the Holy
See, and at some point be engaged with the Pope himself.
I think there can be no better way for the actual Catholic
Church, the official Catholic Church, to have an opportunity to
express why this is not something to be feared, why this is, in
fact, something that can definitely play a constructive role in
China's future, as you noted, and as I said in my statement,
the role that they can play in social work and communities.
So I think an excellent first step, if China is willing to
take it, would be to engage in a robust dialogue with the Holy
See.
Chairman Leach. Well, I certainly support the idea of a
robust dialogue, but I think we should be very careful of
accepting as a significant step the idea of a respectful
dialogue in contrast with acceptance of the right of a church
to designate its own leadership.
I think that anything short of that is basically something
that is an umbrage to the mind of anyone who believes in
freedom of religion. So, there are certain things in Chinese
history that are of a step-by-step nature.
There are other things that I think are of a principle
nature, that have to be wrestled with on absolute principle
terms. Leadership of a church is one of those. I would hope
that our government would indicate that as strongly as they
can.
Let me just ask one final question before turning it over
to my colleagues.
As we followed the old Soviet Union, and I used to be in
Soviet Affairs at the State Department, we used to look at
certain leaders and whether or not they were people of faith,
and wondered. We also looked at church movements in Russia and
found that they became institutions of change because the
institutions in government were intransigent.
Do you have any sense that the typical members of the
government elite are people of faith of any variety, or are
people of doubt, or people that are questioning the
circumstance? Do they ever indicate to such to our government
or to others?
Mr. Schriver. I think you can say that within China there
is great evidence that people desire to have a life where they
are free to practice religion and express their faith.
Certainly, within the Communist Party, this has not been
allowed, even the new generation of leadership that was raised
through the Party and worked its way through the ranks.
However, occasionally you do get a private conversation or
private statement that gives some evidence that a Party member
is a person of faith and that it plays an important role in
their life. But it is not something even today that I think
they feel free to express. It certainly gets much worse if
there is a suspicion on the part of the government that they
are associated with certain groups.
We know that there has been a campaign in China related to
the Falun Gong where Party members, even members of the
military, have been arrested and otherwise removed from their
official positions.
So I think what you have is a little bit of an uneven
approach, where in certain areas for certain religious groups
there may be a tacit acquiescence, and other cases where the
government feels more threatened--in my view, wrongly--and they
would be less tolerant.
I think, over time, there is some room for optimism just
because we know the numbers are growing in China. Naturally,
people of faith are going to be entering the Party, they are
going to be entering the military, they are going to be in
other institutions. So, I think that over the long term, there
is room for optimism. That is always the case with China.
If you look at human rights in China or religious freedom,
you can say, over 25, 30 years--and almost no one would dispute
this--the situation gets better and better, and slowly better.
But it is just not happening fast enough.
As you said, there is a missed opportunity. These are
institutions that can play constructive roles in the
modernization of China and the betterment of people's lives
there, and it is an opportunity that has been missed.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Congressman Leach. I am pleased
to be here with you as a new commissioner. I can think of no
other bilateral relationship that is more important than that
of the United States and China. There are many important
bilateral relationships, but clearly this one ranks perhaps
highest among them.
I suppose every one of us who is on this Commission and who
cares about China and the United States' relationship with
China has some passion on this, and religious freedom is one of
the values of the American people that I find the most
valuable.
So, Mr. Schriver, we thank you for your work in the State
Department, and ask that as you pursue America's national
interests you do not forget America's national values.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, sir.
Senator Smith. I think it is very, very important that, as
we engage China, that we not lose sight of the importance of
one of the founding principles of this country, which is that
people have freedom of conscience and there is no room for
government between one's conscience and one's God, however the
individual defines that.
I am pleased that President Clinton, President Bush,
Republican and Democrats alike, have spoken eloquently to the
Chinese on this subject and I hope they will continue, through
the State Department, to keep this in the forefront of our
discussions with them.
I look with concern on the restrictions placed on house
churches and the other restrictions you have described here
with respect to the people of Tibet. I look with interest, and
even a little bit of alarm, certainly concern, for the Chinese
people, what is developing in Hong Kong.
I hope that the leadership will respond peacefully and
thoughtfully. I truly think what happens in Hong Kong is a
harbinger of what may happen to China more broadly.
I have, frankly, just one question. I have taken the tack,
as a U.S. Senator, that the best way to change China, to be a
friend of China, is to engage this country. So, I have voted
fairly consistently for engagement for trade in the hopes that
the Chinese Government would respond by respecting these
Western values, while we respect their Eastern values as well.
But it is discouraging to hear many parts of your report.
It seems so typical of one-party rule, that there is one-party
paranoia that even extends to concern over a person's faith.
My question to you, as someone who has voted as I have for
engagement, has my hope been misplaced? You mentioned that
change is coming. It is not happening fast enough.
But, clearly, as China gets involved in WTO, as China asks
for greater respect from the world, as China deals with its
situation in Hong Kong, are its leaders aware of this concern
and what a threshold standard and value it is in the community
of civilized nations, that we respect religious freedom,
religious conscience? Has my hope, my faith been misplaced in
the way I have voted?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator. I think everyone who has
supported engaging China can feel that, though the progress
might not be what we hoped for, we have had a relationship that
has encouraged forward movement over a period of time.
As I said, any observer from China would note that in the
past 25, 30 years, human rights, religious freedom, it is all
moving in a positive direction. The quality of life and the
freedoms that individuals enjoy in China today are
unquestionably better than 25 years ago.
I have heard people say it is kind of like watching an
iceberg, though. You stare at it, you do not see the movement.
If you look away and look back some period of time later, you
notice that it has inched along. Maybe that is what we are
looking at.
But I do believe that this period of 25 years of modest,
gradual improvement has definitely come as a result of
engagement with the outside world, and I think through U.S.
leadership.
The timing when this progress began very much relates to
when China allowed itself to open up to the outside world after
the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao Zedong, in the period
after about 1976. When China became more open to engagement
with the West, that is when changes started to occur. So, I
think those who have been proponents of engagement can feel
good about it. It is not going fast enough.
Many of us believe very deeply that the future of China
could be so much better if the government were encouraging,
rather than oppressing, religious institutions, a free press,
and other elements that are important and core to Americans. It
is a frustrating thing, because the Chinese people are the ones
paying the price, and the international community also pays a
price by not having the kind of quality citizenship that we
would like to see from the Chinese.
So it is a frustrating experience. We would like to see
greater progress. But I think there is no question that
engagement with the United States and the outside world has had
a positive impact over a period of time.
Senator Smith. Well, I hope you emphasize in your work with
them a point that Congressman Leach made. That is, that
religions can be the greatest strength of secular societies if
they are given respect and a place of protection under law. But
they can be radicalized by oppression, by lack of respect, by
lack of rule of law that includes people's faith.
That does not suggest that the Chinese Government, or any
other government, needs to tolerate criminality masking in the
robes of religion. Criminality is one thing. Faith and
mainstream kinds of religious practices are entirely supportive
of good civilization, good government, and a progressive state.
So, I thank you for your testimony and your time.
It is a pleasure to be here with you, Mr. Chairman. I have
no other questions.
Chairman Leach. Thank you very much, Senator.
We are also joined by Congressman Pitts, who is, I daresay,
the leading spokesperson in the Congress on a variety of
religious issues. We are honored that you are with us, Joe.
Representative Pitts. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, for this very important hearing.
I will submit my opening statement for the record.
Chairman Leach. Without objection, yours and all other
members' will be submitted for the record.
Representative Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Representative Pitts appears in
the appendix.]
Representative Pitts. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned there
have been prisoner releases. One thing I have been very
interested in concerning China and the Commission, is that we
develop a data base, a prisoner list, and encourage members, as
they travel or meet with officials, Ambassadors, to engage just
in a respectful way and ask for status reports on some of these
prisoners. Many of them are what we would call prisoners of
conscience or prisoners because of their religious beliefs.
What is your assessment of the possibility of a continued
pattern of prisoner releases under the new leadership in China?
Is there a difference between previous cooperation of the
Chinese leadership and the actions of the new leadership
regarding prisoner releases?
Mr. Schriver. Congressman Pitts, thank you. The issue you
raise is one that we recognize to be important as well. We have
been engaged through officials channels to try to develop
prisoner lists and data bases. We have been engaged with NGOs
who have their own lists so that we can compare the data. Other
governments have lists.
I think Assistant Secretary Craner has been really
effective in taking this approach that ``everybody has got a
little piece of the picture,'' and that our best opportunity to
draw attention to the issue, find the most egregious cases of
unfair detention and imprisonment, is to first have the
information. He has been very vigorous at that.
But there just is not enough information yet about the new
leadership. The small windows we have had into their thinking,
I am sorry to say, have not been encouraging. We had some cases
of individual prisoners who we were optimistic might be
released.
I might just mention one, a Uighur businesswoman, Rebiya
Kadeer. I believe the Chinese made their policy statements and
led us to believe that she would be released. They may have
been timing that release to coincide with a particular
bilateral visit, and that would be unfortunate because she
should be released now. But again, I am sorry to say we have
not seen a change yet.
Let me also note that it is extremely important to get
people out, but we are also aware that the Chinese have the
ability, if they would like, to release one, arrest one,
release one, arrest two.
So it is important that, as we do the work to get the
individuals out who should not be imprisoned, we also pursue
broader systemic change in China. That has also been very much
a part of the work of the State Department under Lorne Craner's
leadership.
Representative Pitts. During the Soviet Union period, some
of us used to organize prisoner writing opportunities to
communicate with wardens and prisoners. I am told by those now
who were in prison then that this made a difference in their
treatment.
Do you see the opportunity for engagement? For instance,
sister city relationships or provinces or organizations that
have relationships with organizations or government entities in
the United States. Would that be an appropriate forum to
inquire concerning some of these types of prisoners of
conscience?
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir. Thank you. First of all, as a
general point, when we have had the opportunity to talk to
former prisoners who have since been released and they are
willing to speak with us, we have found that a variety of
things can help improve their conditions just by virtue of us
raising their case in official channels.
We have reason to believe that their condition may improve,
so it is important that we continue to do that. In terms of the
direct communication you mentioned, we are aware that such
activity is taking place with wardens.
It appears that the response you get is uneven and it is
not clear why that is, if it is a different regional policy, if
it is particular individual wardens who feel more comfortable
responding to an inquiry. We just do not really know the reason
why this might be.
But we do have some encouraging results through this
approach, and I think it is a worthy thing to do. We work
closely with one particular NGO that has recently started this
practice and is getting some encouraging results. So, I thank
you for that question and raising the issue.
Representative Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Schriver.
We will now turn to our next panel.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you.
Chairman Leach. Our next witness is Ms. Felice D. Gaer, who
is the Co-Chair of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom.
Ms. Gaer, welcome. As with your predecessor, your full
statement will be placed in the record and you may proceed as
you see fit.
STATEMENT OF FELICE D. GAER, CO-CHAIR, THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Gaer. Thank you, Congressman.
The Commission on International Religious Freedom [CIRF] is
grateful for the opportunity to testify. Since it was created,
the Commission has spoken out on the widespread and serious
abuses of the right to freedom of religion and belief in China,
and has provided numerous policy recommendations regarding the
steps that the U.S. Government should take.
This hearing is particularly timely because in less than 2
weeks our Commission expects to travel to China for the first
time. We plan to visit Tibet as well as other parts of China.
On our return, of course, we look forward to briefing the
Congress on our findings.
We have been asked to address a few issues: leadership
changes, religious freedom conditions, and recommendations for
U.S. policy.
With regard to political leadership changes and their
impact on issues of freedom of religion and belief, the face of
China's political leadership has undergone major changes in the
last year, as you well know.
The transition from the leadership of Jiang Zemin to Hu
Jintao has gone smoothly, but it remains unclear to many
observers whether the change in power will impact the policies
of the Communist Party at all. If the past is any guide, we
cannot be very
optimistic.
In the area of human rights, we also know that severe
restrictions on religion and political freedoms are authorized
at the highest levels of the Communist Party, and many of
China's new leaders, including Hu Jintao himself, have been
intimately involved in formulating and implementing the
government's repressive policies on religion and ethnic
minorities.
This fact, along with the fact that many of Jiang Zemin's
allies continue to occupy key positions overseeing religious
affairs and legal reform, signals little prospect for immediate
improvement. In fact, our Commission fears it may even
deteriorate. However, with the recent transition and the visit
coming, we may have a different assessment on our return.
Now, as to the question of religious freedom conditions in
China, the overriding issue, as indicated in our testimony and
I think everyone else's, is the question of control. The
government sees religion as an area that must be subjected to
government control, and from that follows a lot of the forms of
repression and limitations that we have seen.
The government claims the right to control, monitor, and
restrain religious practice, purportedly to protect public
safety, order, health, and so forth. However, the actions to
actually restrict religious belief and practice go far beyond
what is necessary or legitimate under international law and
China's obligations.
China's Constitution provides its citizens with freedom of
religious belief, but does not provide freedom to manifest
religious
beliefs. This highlights the importance of China's signature
and ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. It has signed, it has not ratified.
The Covenant contains explicit provisions on the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, so we look to
that issue as a harbinger of protection on the legal level.
Now, the crackdowns against religious believers in China
are believed to be sanctioned at the highest levels of
government. This has led to the imprisonment of clergy, even
the disappearance of key clergy.
I need only draw attention to the young boy, Gendun Choekyi
Nyima, who ``disappeared'' in 1995, days after he was
recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, the
second-highest ranking leader in Tibetan Buddhism.
The Chinese Government continues to insist that the young
boy is well and is with his parents, and that they are
protecting his privacy. That is a different interpretation of
his status than certainly our Commission has, and I am sure
your Commission as well, Congressman.
Bishop Su Zhimin, the Catholic bishop, was detained on
questionable charges. The government claims it does not have
knowledge of where he is. We would have to count him as a
``disappeared'' person.
The question of how to find, see, and interact with leading
clergy who have been imprisoned is one of the highest
importance, we believe, because it reveals repression
sanctioned by China's leadership.
The Chinese Government has also reserved for itself the
right to determine the legality of religious activities and the
legitimacy of religious leaders across the board. As a result,
the government has banned what is called ``heretical cult
organizations.''
Criminal law provides for extensive punishments for those
organizing and utilizing ``superstitious sects, secret
societies, evil religious organizations'' to commit crimes.
Now, it is under these laws that groups like Falun Gong and
several unregistered Christian Churches have been designated as
cults by the government, and their practitioners have suffered
tremendously.
Imprisonment, often without trial. Falun Gong practitioners
tell us that as many as 100,000 of their practitioners have
been sent to labor camps without trial, and hundreds have died,
they claim, either in prison or after their release.
Now, the written testimony gives a little bit more detail
about repression against Protestants and repression against
Catholics. We speak to the issue of women believers, and also
the practices that have been used against them and that they
are vulnerable to when imprisoned.
We note the concern expressed by the committee monitoring
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women in the United Nations regarding
the violent and coercive measures being used by government
officials in the conduct of the population policy.
The questions of Xinjiang and Tibet loom large whenever one
looks at issues of religious freedom. The government has linked
religion with separatist or terrorist acts, and particularly
with regard to these regions and the Muslim religion and the
Tibetan Buddhist religion. Again, I speak about this in my
written testimony. The picture is not one of great hopefulness.
Finally, the issue of North Korea, which Mr. Schriver spoke
about before, and the issue of North Korean refugees in China
is one that our Commission has paid much attention to.
China is a party to the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees. Under this treaty, it should not be expelling or
returning refugees to a country where they would suffer
persecution on return. The forcible repatriation of the
refugees is a very serious denial of their freedoms and of
their rights.
On the issue of U.S. policy, the Commission has identified
three aspects that have characterized recent U.S. policy to
advance religious freedom and other human rights in China.
First, the treatment of religious persons has been raised
by President Bush and Secretary Powell directly with the senior
Chinese leadership. Second, the United States has raised cases
and sought the release of imprisoned individuals who have been
detained in violation of their rights, including on account of
religion or belief. Third, the United States funds a multi-
million dollar program to promote democracy and the rule of
law.
These efforts contributed, in 2002, to the Administration's
determination that there had been positive developments,
particularly with regard to Tibet. In that year, six Tibetan
political prisoners were released from imprisonment. The
Chinese Government invited the older brother of the Dalai Lama
to visit, paving the way for the Dalai Lama's special envoy.
Citing significant but limited progress, the State
Department announced in April 2003 that it would neither
propose nor sponsor a resolution censuring China's human rights
practices at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
One development cited as a reason for the State
Department's decision was the Chinese Government's reported
agreement to invite U.N. human rights mechanisms and special
rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, to visit China without conditions. However,
as indicated by Mr. Schriver, these have not yet taken place.
We would go further and say even the invitations have been
questionable. Conditions on those visits remain, as in the
past. The reality of those requests is not what has been said.
Now, I see the red light is on, and I would just say very
quickly that we recommend that the Department use the full
range----
Chairman Leach. Do not feel hurried.
Ms. Gaer. Pardon?
Chairman Leach. Do not feel hurried.
Ms. Gaer. Oh. All right.
Chairman Leach. Go ahead.
Ms. Gaer. Thank you.
We note the Department has changed its assessment of human
rights conditions in China. We believe the continued lack of
systemic changes in this area does raise questions--and must
raise questions--about the effectiveness of U.S. policy during
a period like the present one.
We think that any reassessment of policy should take into
account past failures on the part of the U.S. Government to
condition the expansion of the bilateral economic relationship,
and China's entry onto the international scene through the
hosting of such public events as the Olympics, on substantial
improvements in China's religious freedom and human rights
practices.
The policy options our Commission would like to stress in
terms of U.S. actions to advance protection for freedom of
religion or belief in China include the following three.
First, that the State Department should use the full range
of policy tools available under the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 [IRFA] so that it takes additional actions
with respect to China.
The Secretary has designated China as a ``country of
particular concern'' for its egregious violations, but the
Secretary has determined that preexisting sanctions satisfy the
IRFA requirements.
While the reliance on preexisting sanctions may be
technically correct under the statute, our Commission believes
it is not defensible as a matter of policy. Moreover, reliance
on preexisting sanctions provides very little incentive for
governments like China to reduce or end severe violations of
religious freedom. There is simply no added value.
Second, the Department should provide to the Congress its
evaluation of the impact of current U.S. rule of law and
democracy programs on the promotion of religious freedom and
other human rights in China.
According to the recent, new State Department report on
U.S. efforts to promote human rights and democracy in China,
the U.S. Government supports a wide range of programs designed
to promote, among other things, respect for freedom of
religion.
Yet, there is no information about specific religious
freedom programs in the report, and there is no information
about the impact that the broader rule of law and democracy
programs supported by the government have had on the actual
advancement of freedom of religion or other human rights in
China. We would welcome attention to that and attention by the
Congress as well.
Third, the U.S. Government should enhance its public
diplomacy efforts focusing attention on the plight of the
Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists. The U.S. Government
should seek expanded opportunities to speak frankly and
directly to the Chinese people to express why the U.S.
Government is concerned with violations of internationally
recognized human rights, and why the American people are
concerned about them.
President Bush and Assistant Secretary Craner have done so
during their visits to China. Our Commission is seeking a
similar opportunity during the upcoming visit. We think that
expansion of broadcasts by Radio Free Asia and Voice of America
are also important to this effort. The number of hours put to
these programs is, in our judgment, inadequate at this time.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Commission on International
Religious Freedom recommends that the United States be more
consistent in our message that religious freedom is, and will
remain, a priority in U.S. foreign policy and in our assessment
of progress on China's human rights practices. China must know
that we will continue to raise this issue until they fully
comply with their international obligations.
As a key component of this effort, until China
significantly improves its protections of religious freedom,
systemic improvements that will prevent further serious
violations, the United States should propose and promote a
resolution to censure China at the United Nations and at its
Commission on Human Rights.
This is extremely important, as the United States stands
virtually alone in striving to focus world attention on China's
specific violations of human rights. Invitations alone are not
progress. Systemic progress is what is needed, and we promise
you we will be pursuing that issue. We look forward to doing so
in collaboration. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gaer appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much. Let me just say
that I appreciate the existence of your institution, as well as
your leadership. I would stress that, in the history of the
20th century in particular, we have found a great circumstance
develop where the importance of referencing individuals is
critical to both changing circumstances and holding governments
accountable.
I remember as a college student reading probably the first
seminal philosophy book on the subject of totalitarianism,
Hannah Arendt's famous volume. Arendt talked about the
commonality of themes between fascism and Communism and said
the principal thing was the loss of individual identity.
When people were given numbers, when people were taken from
homes and there was no accountability, no reporting back, no
dignity to the individual even in death, that this had a
dispiriting effect on society at large and really defined
totalitarianism.
So when institutions like yours take this charge, that of
looking for accountability for individual human beings, I think
it is something that is one of the really impressive aspects of
democratic sensitivities to freedom of religion. So, I want to
thank you very much for that.
Ms. Gaer. Thank you.
Chairman Leach. Mr. Pitts, do you have any questions?
Representative Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Commissioner, for your very thorough
testimony. I just wanted to follow up on one thing. You said
you were going to be visiting China soon.
Have you considered, or would you consider, requesting
status reports on religious prisoners or to visit with
religious prisoners while you are there, to request to actually
be able to visit some of them if you have any names that would
interest you in the prisons? I do not know what their reception
might be, but it might be a possibility for you to consider.
Ms. Gaer. We have lists, I can assure you. We are familiar
with the lists of the Department of State, and NGOs as well.
This would be a first visit for our Commission. We are seeking
to understand better what the status of freedom of religion is,
what has improved, and what has not. In that context, we
certainly will request access and visits.
I think, as indicated by my testimony, the issue of the
young Panchen Lama--he is now almost 14 or 15, perhaps not so
young. But we certainly have lists. We certainly will be
raising these questions. Whether or not we will have access or
not, stay tuned.
Representative Pitts. I understand. Thank you very much.
Appreciate it.
Ms. Gaer. You are welcome.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much. We appreciate
your testimony.
Our third panel is composed of Dr. Joseph Fewsmith who is a
professor, as well as director of East Asia Interdisciplinary
Studies at Boston University; Mr. Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr., who
is an associate with the U.S. Catholic China Bureau; Mr. David
B.T. Aikman, who is a former senior correspondent with Time
Magazine; and Dr. Jacqueline M. Armijo-Hussein, who is an
assistant professor, Department of Religious Studies at
Stanford University.
In terms of order, I will suggest the way I have
introduced, unless, by agreement, you have made any other
decisions. Is that all right with you? Fair enough. All right.
Then let us begin with Dr. Fewsmith.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH FEWSMITH, PROFESSOR, DIRECTOR OF EAST ASIA
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA
Mr. Fewsmith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do
appreciate the opportunity to come down here and speak to your
Commission. I have been, of course, asked to testify about
political trends in contemporary China, leadership transition,
their implications for state-society relations, including
religious affairs.
That is a very large menu. I will not get too much of that
in depth. All I can do, is hit some of the major trends and
hope that that makes some contribution.
As you know, China has undergone a major leadership
transition over the past year. It is really the first political
transition that China has undergone since the revolutionary
generation, the Mao Zedong and the Deng Xiaopings. Deng liked
to call himself second generation, even though he was a first
generation revolutionary. Since that generation has gone, this
is the first real leadership transition.
I think that we see some glimmers of hope in terms of
trends toward moderation. I would agree with Randall Schriver
that it is too early to judge these sorts of issues. Leadership
transitions, you know, start a couple of years before they take
place and continue a couple of years after they take place. It
is a long transition. So, we will have to sit and observe these
sorts of things.
But what I would like to stress is that whatever leadership
China is going to have is going to have to follow some socio-
economic trends in China that are going to drive whatever
leadership comes to the fore. I think that gives you at least
some glimmer of hope for the long term. And I would stress the
long term.
As you all know, just a couple of years ago General
Secretary Jiang Zemin called for admitting private
entrepreneurs--capitalists--into the Chinese Communist Party.
We sort of absorbed that and said, ``Yes, sure.'' This is a
shocking change in China, and it suggests a depth of the
economic and social change that has taken place.
According to Chinese data, some 20 percent of private
entrepreneurs are already members of the Chinese Communist
Party. By the way, most of them join the Party first and then
go into business, which is not necessarily a clean and
wonderful way to do things, but it suggests the extent of
change.
In recent months, under the leadership of General Secretary
Hu Jintao, there has been emphasis on the masses on the people.
Those emphases that we have seen, I think, are speaking to a
lot of the problems facing China as it goes into the 21st
century, including tremendously rapid growth of inequality.
China used to be the most egalitarian society in the world.
Today, it is one of the least. That is a change within a two-
decade period. The social stress is enormous. The corruption is
terrible. The unemployment rates would shock anybody who was
running for office. The emergence of urban poverty, something
that China has never had, at least in the last 50 years. The
abuse of authority, social disorder, and so forth.
The result of that, I think, is that you are beginning to
see some new demands for accountability of the leadership at
different levels, and to expand decisionmaking authority within
the Party itself, so-called intra-Party democracy. I will grant
you quite readily that this development is a poor substitute
for the real thing, but it is a change that is occurring on the
horizon.
These changes reflect a realization within the Chinese
Communist Party that Chinese society is changing and that the
Party itself has to change or it will give up power. So, it is
beginning to change.
One of those changes is the very rapid growth of non-
governmental organizations, of which I think religion is a
specialized type. There were virtually no NGOs in the 1980s in
China. By the latter half of the 1990s, you had some 700,000
NGOs.
As has been mentioned earlier today, these are at least
supposed to register with government bodies. Frequently, they
are funded, at least in part, by the government, and therefore
they are often referred to as government-organized non-
governmental organizations, GONGOs, for short. A wonderful
term.
In any case, this growth of intermediary organizations has
led many in the West to argue that China has been developing
some form of civil society. That is one of the issues that I
would actually like to dispute, at least in the Western sense
of the term.
Intermediary associations in China just do not fit easily
into Western categories. We tend to distinguish between the
state, the public and private spheres, seeing intermediary
organizations as distinct from government on the one hand and
articulating the demands and hopes of the people on the other.
In China, the idea of social organizations articulating
private interests against the government has never been
accepted on a normative level. To take the example of China's
final dynasty, the Qing dynasty, there were specific
prohibitions against scholarly associations--which I would
deeply oppose--fearing that they would become the basis of
factual intrigue against the government as they had in the late
Ming dynasty. There was an historical basis for that.
A couple of points here that I think are worth considering.
First, the notion of ``private'' has traditionally been
understood quite differently in China than in the West. We tend
to see private as good. As the expression of private interest
is absolutely central to our notion of pluralism, the basis of
our form of government, our society.
In traditional China, the term ``private,'' ``si,'' was
generally viewed as the antithesis of ``public,'' or ``gong.''
The more private you had, the less public you had. These were
like phases of the moon, one expanding, the other contracting.
The government itself, and specifically the figure of the
Emperor, was supposed to represent and body publicness.
Second, Chinese governments throughout the 20th century--
and here I have heard the focus several times on the Communist
government since 1949. One of the things I want to do is try to
get you to focus on what is Chinese and not just on what is
Chinese Communist.
Throughout the 20th century, the Nationalist government,
the Communist government, previous other governments have
forced voluntary associations into established hierarchical,
corporatist structures, or tried to abolish them altogether.
The first pattern was very distinctly followed by the
Nationalist government in the 1920s. There is a wonderful set
of laws that outline a corporatist structure that Mussolini
would have been proud of. The other pattern of abolishing them
is what the Chinese Communist government did, particularly
after 1956, after the so-called Socialist transition.
With the onset of reforms--and this is where you have seen
this tremendous change over the last 25 years--the state has
once against been adopting corporatist structures. This is
where intermediary associations are supposed to register with
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and accept state supervision.
This does not mean that they are, by the way, simply
extensions of state power. Frequently, they are able to inject
local interest and concerns into the policymaking process, so
it is a very complicated situation.
Religious organizations and activities are special types of
intermediary associations, based as they are on the spiritual
needs of their adherents, their tendency to absorb large
numbers of believers, and their ability to mobilize large
numbers of adherents around a cause.
As with other forms of intermediary associations, the
Chinese state has had long experience with religious
organizations, much of it unhappy from the state's point of
view.
Scholars who study the origins of the Chinese state and the
monarchical system note that the authority of all emperors was
based on the idea that the emperor was the link between the
human world and the heavens. Ancestor worship played an
absolutely central, critical role in this.
The emperor's family tablets established a legitimate and
sacred line. There was a religious foundation to the Chinese
state, something that many Chinese intellectuals these days do
not even recognize.
The current repression that we have heard so much about
today is, indeed, I think, rooted in the 5,000 years of
imperial history. In other words, the Chinese state at no point
has taken the type of perspective toward religious organization
that you indeed--and I would agree with you--hope that China
some day will.
There were periods in Chinese history when Buddhism and
Daoism occupied important places in the polity. Nevertheless,
the state ultimately asserted its authority over these
religions.
The Chinese state could patronize religions. It could
incorporate them. It could co-opt them. But it never allowed
independent, powerful religious organizations to develop, at
least if it could help it, or a powerful, organized clergy to
develop, or at least over a long period of time. That was true
traditionally, and I am sorry to say it remains true today.
The hostility of the Chinese state toward religious
organizations--and here I want to be very clear that what the
Chinese state opposed was not the practice of religion--I think
that gives you some window of hope there--but the emergence of
powerful religious organizations that could challenge the
authority of the state. That policy was rooted in painful,
historical experience.
Repeatedly, religious organizations of one sort or another
have been used to mobilize peasant revolts against the state,
some of which were successful. This stems from the Yellow
Turban Rebellion of the Han dynasty, to the White Lotus, the
Taiping, and Boxer rebellions of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Such experiences left a very, very deep imprint on Chinese
political culture and one that is, I think, as distinct from
our Western traditions as I can think of.
If there is a positive side to this, it is that although
the claim to legitimacy of the Chinese state was anchored in a
religious understanding, its administration of society was
largely secular. Today, the inheritors of this system, the
government officials, are relentless modernizers.
I think that that is good in the sense that they do not
have problems with the broader issue of modernity. You do not
see the religiously inspired rejections of modernity in China
that you see in some parts of the world.
On the other hand, the Chinese state has continued to see
religious activities that are organized outside of state
control as potential sources of social instability. As with
other forms of voluntary associations, the Chinese state has
tried to force religious adherents to participate in one or
another of these state-organized and controlled religious
associations.
As Randall Schriver testified, many religious adherents
have not been willing to accept these restrictions. That, of
course, is the basic conflict that we see and where the
suppression of religious freedom comes from.
I will conclude very quickly. One might add, perhaps on a
discouraging note, that many government officials who are also
modernizers do see religious organizers as inimicable to their
goals of economic development and, therefore, see little wrong
with their suppression.
Let me just conclude by saying that I think that there is
very little academic research that has been carried out on the
sociology of religion in contemporary China. We know very
little about who converts to what religion and for what reason.
We do know that in some parts of the country the growth of
religion co-exists surprisingly well with the state, and in
other parts of the country religious organizations are
suppressed. Serious research on these sorts of issues, I think,
is desperately needed.
So, I think I will just conclude on that note.
Chairman Leach. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fewsmith appears in the
appendix.]
Representative Pitts. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Leach. Yes.
Representative Pitts. I do apologize. I have to leave for
another meeting. But I do have some follow-up questions I will
provide to you for the panelists, if that is all right.
Chairman Leach. Would that be all right if you responded in
writing?
Representative Pitts. I very much wanted to hear them, but
I do have another commitment.
Chairman Leach. Thank you, Joe.
Mr. Lovejoy.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES D. LOVEJOY, JR., ASSOCIATE, U.S. CATHOLIC
CHINA BUREAU, PRINCETON JUNCTION, NJ
Mr. Lovejoy. Congressman Leach, thank you very much for
allowing me to be here today to represent the U.S. Catholic
China Bureau.
I currently work at Princeton University as the director of
University Development for Asia, but I have been associated
with the Bureau since its inception in 1989. Sister Janet
Carroll, who many people in this room know, could not be here
today. She is the executive director. She did ask me to express
her appreciation for the work of this Commission and for
allowing her statement to be entered into the record.
Chairman Leach. And your full statement, as with everyone
else's, is entered in the record.
Mr. Lovejoy. She also asked if I would just remind people
of the function of the U.S. Catholic China Bureau which was
founded in 1989, with encouragement of the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, and is sponsored by a cross-section of
Roman Catholic organizations and various individuals who share
its purposes and goals, the main ones of which are to promote
the development in China of a fully indigenous local Catholic
Church with adequate leadership and resources for the pastoral
service of all the Chinese people, to foster reconciliation and
unity of the Chinese Catholic Church within the universal
church under the Apostolic See, and finally, to promote
understanding among American Catholics about the Catholic
Church and the situation among Catholics there in China.
Let me briefly highlight key points in that statement that
we have submitted. As many have cited here, there has been a
well-recognized tremendous growth and upsurge in religious
activity in China at all levels--institution, community, and
personal--since the early 1980s. The Catholic Church has been
the beneficiary of that growth. In fact, it has grown at least
fourfold since 1949 or 1950.
There is potentially disturbing recent evidence, however,
of government efforts to tighten restrictions on the registered
Catholic Church and to put more pressure on the unregistered
church in China.
The direct, verifiable evidence of individual abuses,
however, is hard to come by. It is even more difficult
sometimes to fully understand and appreciate the complexity of
local situations.
The Holy See continues its efforts to have a dialogue with
the Chinese Government and to reconcile internal church
differences.
With regard to the Commission's second issue under
consideration here, the impact of China's new leadership, we
also agree it is too early to tell just what direction that
will take.
Finally, with regard to U.S. policy, we believe it should
continue to take very strong, principled stands on issues of
religious freedom while respecting basic Chinese values.
The attached statement, of course, does show the statistics
that reflect the growth of the Catholic Church. I might note
that these statistics are indicative of the courageous efforts
of Chinese Catholics to restore, renew, and develop their
church, both as an institution and a community of faith.
I might also note, that a recent edition of Maryknoll
Magazine shows a very interesting example of the positive
aspects of this church growth. In fact, it showed a vibrant
Catholic community in Shanxi Province that had just completed a
very stunning new church in a very traditional Chinese design.
We believe this church was actually an unregistered church,
but much of the artwork had been done by people who were part
of the registered church.
However, recent evidence of tightened controls is found in
three interesting draft documents that have been circulated.
These are called: ``The Method of Management of Catholic
Dioceses in China,'' the ``Rules for the Work of the Patriotic
Association of Catholic Catholics,'' and, finally, the ``Method
of Work of the Unitary Assembly of the Patriotic Association of
Chinese Catholics and of the Chinese Catholic Episcopal
Conference.'' These were issued by the State Administration for
Religious Affairs.
The last one's purpose is worth quoting. It has been
``formulated . . . to make more complete and to intensify the
Chinese Catholic independent enterprise in accordance with the
democratic principles of administering the church, namely,
collective leadership, democratic supervision, mutual
consultation, and joint decision.''
The ostensible purpose of these documents could be
interpreted as to provide guidelines for church work that will
help by defining more clearly the relationship of local
governments with the Catholic Churches, both registered and
even unregistered.
However, they probably reflect a general tightening up, and
in
effect renewed efforts to strictly enforce religious policy and
regulations regarding places of worship, and also appears to be
pressuring unregistered leadership and communities to join with
the registered communities of Catholics in each diocese.
The former director of the Vatican agency Fides, in May of
this year, expressed his concern that these documents, when
describing the democratic concept of the church, actually run
the risk of destroying the apostolic and sacramental dimension
of the Catholic faith, thus reducing the church to the rank of
a sect.
This third document, when making reference to the ``Chinese
Catholic independent enterprise,'' certainly raises some very
serious concerns, especially if the term ``independent'' is
used to be interpreted as cutting off the Catholic Church from
its communion with the universal church.
However, if it is intended to mean an authentic autonomy
vis-a-vis both external and internal intrusion into the affairs
of the church, then we might applaud this as a positive goal.
Reconciliation and unity among Chinese Catholics and with
the universal church is certainly a long-desired goal. But if
this is done by coercion or force, as could be indicated by
these documents, let alone with violence in any given
situation, it obviously would be reprehensible and
unacceptable.
Let me cite one recent example. I think it was also cited
in one of the other documents. The Union of Catholic Asian News
[UCAN] has reported, just in June, the arrest of Reverend Lu
Xiaozhou, a priest in Wenzhou Diocese who was associated with
the unregistered church, while he was en route to visit the
sick in the city hospital. He was then transferred to the
custody of the local Religious Affairs Bureau and probably has
been pressured to join the registered church. This tends to be
a typical way that Chinese authorities will operate.
However, despite such reports, it is important to point out
that it is difficult to cite specific instances of repression
which occur frequently in remote areas, or even to validate
reports in the religious and secular media of such instances of
force, coercion, and violence. The local security authorities
often use these as a pretext for other actions.
Sister Janet asked me to nuance these remarks by admitting
that our organization does not have the resources to staff or
to closely monitor these developments on the ground, and we
have deferred in these matters to Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, UCAN, and so forth. We never rely on news media
reports, which we find to be frequently unreliable.
I would also like to note here that the Catholic China
Bureau does follow the direction of the Holy See in promoting
efforts for reconciliation.
I should note that in the presentation last year to this
Commission by Thomas Quigley, he cited the statement by Pope
John Paul II at the Ricci Symposia of 2001 in which John Paul
expressed the hope that the church would contribute toward
China's social development, and that it apologized for past
errors which have frequently been the source of problems with
the church in China.
Since then, the Holy See has continued to pursue its
dialogue with the Chinese Government. It continues efforts for
reconciliation and unity. It is continuing to identify bishop
candidates to succeed some of the elderly bishops, both
official and unofficial, who will be acceptable to all segments
of the Catholic Church in China and merit the recognition of
their rightful ecclesiastical role by the authorities of the
State Religious Affairs Administration.
Hopefully, this initiative by the Catholic Church
authorities may lead to deeper reconciliation and, thus, to the
removal of one proximate cause of the severe crackdowns and
abrogation of rights of believers that are guaranteed by
constitutional provisions.
As noted, with regard to policies and programs with China's
new leadership, it is really too early to tell. Transition is
usually a time of uncertainty. The three recent draft documents
on the church probably reflect an inherent tendency toward
restriction during periods such as this one, as we see it.
We believe, therefore, that the options to be pursued by
the U.S. Government should be in the context of policy
consistency, justice, and honesty in dealing with the Chinese
in the political, social, religious, and economic areas.
The Chinese Government respects and works best when
confronted with principled, well articulated, and consistent
positions that respect basic Chinese values and are based on
commonly accepted international principles.
We also strongly urge you to continue support for a wide
range of academic and social exchanges that have emerged over
the past 10 years. We note with some encouragement that there
is increased interest in Christianity in academic circles, and
the fact that U.S. Christian universities now sponsor programs,
though many are secular in nature, in collaborating with major
Chinese universities.
While modernization and globalization definitely pose
serious challenges to the faith and practice of the religious
beliefs and convictions of Catholics in China, ironically, this
continued political pressure on bishops, priests, religious
sisters, and lay leaders in
effect hinders them from properly dealing with the challenges
of contemporary Chinese society as it undergoes rapid
transformation.
Therefore, we urge this Commission, as well as the current
administration of the U.S. Government, to seek to identify and
encourage leaders in the PRC who are working to bring about
positive change in a manner that will preserve social stability
and well-being. We certainly will join with collaborative
efforts to realize these developments.
In concluding, let me add a commercial for a conference
that the Bureau is sponsoring in November, which is our 20th
National Catholic China Conference. It is called ``The Role of
Religion in China's Emerging Civil Society.''
Thank you very much for this opportunity to address the
state of the Catholic Church in China to this Commission.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lovejoy appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you for those thoughtful
observations.
Our next witness will be Dr. David B.T. Aikman.
STATEMENT OF DAVID B.T. AIKMAN, FORMER SENIOR CORRESPONDENT,
TIME MAGAZINE, LOVETTSVILLE, VA
Mr. Aikman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the
privilege and the honor of being here today. Because of the
shortness of time, I will try to make my remarks as short as
possible. I believe my written statement is already accepted
into the record.
My specialty, my expertise, has been the Protestant house
churches of China, which I have been familiar with for the last
30 years, including 2 years' residence in China, and then
several months last year of collecting material for a book.
I am somewhat familiar with the situation of the Roman
Catholics, and also somewhat familiar with the situation of
other religious groups, including Buddhists and Muslims.
To answer the very first question that the Commission is
concerned with, has the leadership change in China portended
any changes in religious policy, I would give a flat ``no,''
for one very specific reason.
The head of the Religious Affairs Bureau, or as it has now
renamed itself, the State Administration of Religious Affairs,
Mr. Ye Xiaowen, who is a self-professed militant atheist, is a
holdover from the former regime of President Jiang Zemin, also
former General Secretary of the Communist Party. Mr. Ye is
known to be rather close to Mr. Hu Jintao.
When I was in China at the time of the political changes
taking place, I was told by high officials within one of the
officially registered Christian groups that Mr. Ye's stock had
risen in light of the new political change.
Mr. Ye Xiaowen has stood for a policy of extremely tight
control of all religious groups in China, Protestant, Catholic,
Buddhist, Muslim, and Daoist. In fact, this control has
amounted to the continued interruption of religious services,
religious ceremonies, worship ceremonies carried on by both
Catholics and Protestants. We have already heard from the Roman
Catholic side of the equation.
The overall effect has been to suggest that the new
political leadership has absolutely no interest whatever in
modifying the situation of religious believers in China,
especially Christians.
However, within the Chinese academic and political
establishment there are remarkable signs of change. First of
all, I have met a number of Communist Party members who are
Christian believers, some of them fairly high up. I know of
several children of top Chinese political leaders who, outside
of China, have been baptized as Christians, obviously with the
knowledge of their parents.
Within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, there are
strong efforts to abolish the Religious Affairs Bureau as
reactionary and not conducive to China's peaceful civil
development and the emergency of a civil society.
The notion is that what China should adopt is simply a law
on religious freedom, and that religion should be supervised
according to the rule of law, without any attempt to control
them or administer them on theological or other doctrinal
grounds as promoted by Communist Party authorities.
The concern has been expressed sometimes by the Chinese
authorities that religious groups may not be patriotic. In the
case of the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, you have
had a situation where some practitioners have, in fact,
demonstrated openly, in political terms, against the
government.
But as far as the Protestant house church Christians go, at
least the vast majority of them, they are very patriotic. For
example, they do not support the independence of Taiwan. They
do not support the independence of Tibet. They support the
notion of a central government controlling a unified China,
albeit in the future, perhaps, in a federal form.
But there is an interesting washover of religious belief
into political opposition at the non-violent level. And here, I
would like to raise the question of two prominent U.S.
permanent residents, Dr. Yang Jianli and Dr. Wang Bingzhang,
both of whom have been held for extremely long periods of time.
In the case of Dr. Yang Jianli, 15 months without any access to
a lawyer, without any contact with any of his relatives.
In the case of Dr. Wang Bingzhang, he was actually
kidnapped in Vietnam, brought into China on a boat in the
custody of men who were wearing Vietnamese police uniforms, but
were speaking fluent Mandarin Chinese.
He was discovered tied up in a Buddhist monastery in Hunan
Province where, providentially, the Public Security Bureau
showed up and discovered that there was a warrant for this
gentleman's arrest in Guangdong Province.
He was then held for several months. Finally, he was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to life in prison in February of this
year.
Dr. Wang Bingzhang is interesting for one reason, and I
will conclude with this. In 1896, a prominent political
oppositionist was kidnapped in London and held in the Chinese
legation, where plans were being made to ship him back to
China, where of course he would have been executed.
His name was Sun Yat Sen. Sun Yat Sen was a political
oppositionist, for sure. He was also a physician, and he was a
Christian. Dr. Wang Bingzhang is certainly a political
oppositionist, he is a physician, and he is a Christian.
I would like to suggest that the Congress devote attention
to the way in which political opposition in China, in many
ways, is being modulated by those in the community who are
Christian who understand, as Mr. Nelson Mandela did in South
Africa, that when you have political change, which these
oppositionists are aiming for you need to have a climate of
mercy and forgiveness so that you do not have just a repetition
of the violent revolution that brought the previous regime into
power.
I would encourage the U.S. Government to raise issues of
suppression of religious captives on the grounds of denial of
freedom of conscience at every opportunity where American
officials are in contact with their counterparts in China.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aikman appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you very much.
Our final witness is Dr. Jacqueline M. Armijo-Hussein.
STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE M. ARMIJO-HUSSEIN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, PALO
ALTO, CA
Ms. Armijo-Hussein. I would like to thank the Commission
for inviting me to share my knowledge of the history and
contemporary situation of the Muslim peoples of China.
This knowledge is based on more than 20 years of research
on this highly important, but neglected, topic, and more than 7
years lived in China.
With the Muslim population conservatively estimated at 20
million, China today has a larger Muslim population than most
Arab countries. Yet, little is known about this community.
Of China's 55 officially recognized minority peoples, 10
are primarily Muslim. The largest group, the Hui, are spread
throughout the entire country, while the other nine live
primarily in the northwest region.
I will begin by concentrating on the Hui, and then address
the situation of the Uighurs in Xinjiang.
Shortly after the advent of Islam in the seventh century,
there were Muslims in China, for sea trade networks between
China and Southwest Asia had existed for centuries. Small
communities of Muslim traders and merchants were established in
port cities along China's southeast coast.
This very early interest in China as a designation for
Muslim travelers is reflected in the famous hadith of the
Prophet Muhammad, ``Utlub al-'ilm wa law fi Sin,'' which means,
``seek knowledge, even unto China.''
Although Muslim communities were established in China as
early as the 7th century, it was not until the 13th century
during the Yuan dynasty that tens of thousands of Muslims from
Central and Western Asia settled in China. Most of the Hui
population today are descendants of these early settlers.
Despite centuries of relative isolation from the rest of
the Islamic world, the Muslims in most regions of China have
managed to sustain a continuous knowledge of the Islamic
sciences, Arabic, and Persian.
Given extended periods of persecution, combined with
periods of intense government efforts to legislate adoption of
Chinese cultural practices and norms, that Islam should have
survived, let alone flourished, is an extraordinary historical
phenomenon.
Although some scholars have attributed the survival of
Muslim communities in China to their ability to adopt Chinese
cultural traditions, when asked themselves, Chinese Muslims
usually attribute their survival to their strong faith and
God's protection.
I am now going to skip the history, which, as an historian,
is painful. [Laughter.]
During the Communist rise to power in the 1940s, many
Muslims agreed to support them in exchange for guarantees of
religious freedom.
Although in the early years of the PRC these promises were
respected, during subsequent political campaigns culminating in
the cultural revolution, the Muslims of China found their
religion outlawed, their religious leaders persecuted,
imprisoned, and even killed, and their mosques defiled, if not
destroyed.
In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution,
the Muslims of China lost no time in rebuilding their
devastated communities. Throughout China, Muslims began slowly
to restore their religious institutions and revive their
religious activities.
Their first priority was to rebuild their damaged mosques,
thereby allowing communities to create a space in which they
could once again pray together, but also so that mosques could
reassert their roles as centers of Islamic learning.
Over the next two decades, mosques throughout most of the
country organized classes for not only girls and boys and young
adults, but also for older men and women who had not had the
opportunity to study their religion.
Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s,
Islamic colleges have been established throughout most of
China, except Xinjiang. Within China, when asked how to explain
the recent resurgence in Islamic education, community leaders
cite two main reasons: a desire to rebuild that which was taken
from them, and the hope that a strong religious faith would
help protect Muslim communities from the myriad of social
problems presently besetting China in this day and age of rapid
economic development.
Chinese Muslims studying overseas reiterate the need to
equip themselves and their communities for their future in a
state which seems to be ideologically adrift.
After many years of living in China and interviewing
religious leaders and students, I am convinced that these
studies have an overwhelmingly positive influence on Chinese
society.
Older Muslims are finally able to study their religious
traditions and young people are able to learn the guiding moral
traditions of Islam, including a respect for the state and its
laws.
As both of my daughters attended the public Hui preschool
in Kunming for several years, I can attest to the extraordinary
degree to which the teachers promoted civic responsibility and
community values, and their American teachers here have
actually noticed that in them.
Moreover, Muslim religious leaders have been able to assist
in the national government's efforts to stem the increasing
number of rural households who are sacrificing their children's
education, particularly their daughters, as recent economic
reforms have resulted in school fees that are crippling
families' incomes.
Imams have worked together with the All-China Women's
Federation to remind peasants in rural areas of their religious
obligation within Islam to educate all their children.
Women have played a very active role in the revival of
Islamic education, both as students and as teachers. The women
are well aware of the importance of educating girls, for as one
of them said to me, ``educate a man, educate an individual;
educate a woman, educate a nation.''
The Muslims' emphasis on education, both secular and
religious, is not a surprise. As other minority groups who have
survived the vicissitudes of state persecution over time, they
have learned the one thing that cannot be taken away from them
is their education.
At present, the government still maintains a very strict
control on all aspects of public religious practice and
education throughout China. The government controls the
faculty, students, and curriculum of Islamic schools, and
controls the appointment of imams in mosques, and decides which
ones will be allowed to lead the Friday prayers.
I will now turn to the condition specifically of the
Muslims in Xinjiang. Although Muslims throughout China face a
variety of challenges and are subject to a wide range of
discriminatory
actions, the situation for the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang
is unprecedented in its severity, to my mind surpassing even
the repressive policies facing Tibetans.
Muslims who hold official positions, including faculty at
the universities, are forbidden to carry out any religious
activity in public. They are not allowed to attend mosques,
fast during Ramadan, or in any other way respect their
religious traditions in public. There are signs on mosques
refusing entry to anyone under 18 years of age. Islamic
education outside the one officially controlled school is
forbidden.
The state has conflated the practice of Islam with
separatist
activity and overreacted, and is prohibiting almost all forms
of Islamic education and public religious practice.
Once the overwhelming majority in Xinjiang, Uighurs and
other Muslim peoples will soon be outnumbered by the Han
Chinese immigrants. And although the government is committed to
spending millions of dollars on development projects there, the
primary beneficiaries in virtually every major industrial and
development project have been the immigrant Han Chinese
population, and often with tremendous negative environmental
impact on the region.
Some policies which I would hope that our government would
encourage within China are:
All Muslims should have the freedom to practice their
religion, and all parents should have the freedom to bring
their children with them to the mosque.
All Muslims should have the freedom to take part in Islamic
studies classes and pursue a deeper understanding of their
religion.
All schools in predominantly minority areas should be
allowed to teach their cultural traditions and history.
The current quota of only 2,000 people being allowed to
make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca should be increased to at
least 20,000, which is the normal amount allowed using the
Saudi calculation of one hajj visa for every 10,000 Muslims in
a given country.
The government is making it increasingly difficult for
Muslims to receive a passport, thereby limiting their ability
to take part in hajj or study overseas.
Over the past decade, throughout China mosques and Muslim
neighborhoods dating back centuries have been destroyed as a
result of real estate and public development projects. Efforts
should be made, ideally through international organizations
like the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization [UNESCO], to protect Muslim neighborhoods and
preserve historic mosques as national heritage sites. These
communal spaces are of fundamental importance to the survival
of these communities.
I think the United States should also support the
establishment of local non-political NGOs by indigenous peoples
to promote economic, educational, and public health
developments.
In conclusion, at the present time Muslims in China
continue to hope and pray that the U.S. Government will use its
influence to persuade the Chinese state to uphold its moral and
international obligations to allow for the freedom of religion
and the survival of indigenous cultures.
Recent actions by the United States, including the decision
to acquiesce to Beijing's labeling a small, obscure Uighur
group, the ETIM, as a ``terrorist organization,'' has done much
to undermine Chinese Muslims' faith in the United States as a
protector of basic human rights.
And although there are numerous reports made by the Chinese
state and often repeated in the Western press that radical
separatism is a common desire in Xinjiang, in fact, in dozens
of conversations, spanning 20 years now, I have never heard a
Uighur call for violent attacks on the Chinese state.
They have spoken with increasing despair that they simply
be allowed to practice their religion, continue to use their
language in their studies, and uphold their traditional
cultural practices as citizens of China.
Our government should encourage the Chinese state to uphold
the basic rights of the Muslims in China. Current repressive
tactics not only undermine the Muslims' right to pass on their
religious and moral values and cultural practices to their
children, they also undermine the Muslims' trust in the Chinese
state.
In conclusion, although maintaining their religious beliefs
and practices over the centuries has been a continual
challenge, Muslims in China have always been confident of their
identities as both Muslims and Chinese.
Although many have presumed that these identities were
somehow inherently antagonistic, the survival of Islam in China
for over a millennium belies these assumptions. Islamic and
Chinese values have both proven to be sufficiently
complementary and dynamic to allow for the flourishing of Islam
in China, and God willing, will continue to do so.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Armijo-Hussein appears in
the appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you very much for that thoughtful
testimony.
Let me be very clear that we all know that there are
problems of U.S. policy in the Muslim world, but the U.S.
Congress has to be unequivocal in supporting the religious
rights of Muslims in this country, and anywhere else. I
appreciate very much your testimony in that regard.
Let me first, at the risk of some presumption, turn to the
Catholic faith for a second, just an aspect of my time in the
U.S. Congress, as a reflection of one policy of the Holy See.
At one time I served with two Members of the U.S. Congress
who were Catholic priests, but the Pope made a decision that it
was inappropriate for a member of the Catholic clergy to be an
elected Member of the Congress or in politics.
I stress this, because that is part of the tradition of the
separation of church and state in historical ways that really
reflected a very modern decision. I think it is very
impressive, and I think that is something that should be noted
by the church in a Chinese context.
Second, I am reminded of listening to a lecture by a noted
Catholic theological historian, Garry Wills. I hope that is a
fair description of his field of study. But he commented on the
life of St. Ambrose, who was an early figure in the church. St.
Ambrose was considered the most competent individual in a given
area of Italy and was the equivalent of a Governor. A week
after accepting the Catholic faith, he was named a bishop.
But I raise this to suggest that the issue is not so much
going from the church to government. Here is an example of
going from the government to the church. Granted, it was the
early church, and it was a somewhat different phenomenon.
No one is suggesting that Jiang Zemin should become a
bishop of the faith. But it is still an interesting phenomenon
in terms of separation of church and state.
Dr. Fewsmith, I want to ask you, because you made a quick
reference, and quick because you had such limited time, to
certain aspects of Chinese history and where religion and
social disorder had become synonymous.
As a former student of Chinese affairs, I found very
remarkable the issue of the Taiping Rebellion in 1851 to 1864,
where someone who claimed to be the younger brother of Jesus
Christ, possibly an epileptic, in one of the least--in terms of
recent times--historically understood events, because there is
staggeringly little history that is available to study, but
apparently the largest civil war in world history occurred.
Is this kind of event influencing the Chinese leadership
today or is this one of those anecdotal circumstances that
people do not refer to? For being a seminal event, a larger
civil war than the American civil war, which has had a century
and a half influence in the United States, one has the sense
that I have never heard a Chinese leader speak to it. I have
never heard Chinese commentary about the Taiping Rebellion. Is
this an important event or is it an incidental event, in your
view?
Mr. Fewsmith. I think it is an enormously important event.
There is a real irony here, though, that the Chinese Communists
used to see themselves as the inheritors of the Taiping
Rebellion. This was the rebellion that was overthrowing so-
called feudalism, if you will excuse the misuse of the word.
Chairman Leach. Yes.
Mr. Fewsmith. And what they lacked, of course, was the
scientific knowledge of Marxism, which is also problematic. But
in any case, they used to see themselves as very much the
inheritors of that tradition.
Now, when they look at phenomenon like the Falun Gong, they
see that same dynamic. They know what happens. They were the
leaders of it. They tapped into the same sorts of social roots.
So, yes, when they suppress movements such as the Falun
Gong, they see the Taiping Rebellion, they see the Yellow
Turban rebellion. I am afraid these things are imprinted very
deeply on the political culture of China.
Chairman Leach. Let me turn to the Muslim situation in
China. Are there similarities in attitudes toward the Muslims
to the Tibetans, and are there dissimilarities?
Ms. Armijo-Hussein. I think, to my mind, the major
similarity is the extent to which the government feels so
threatened by the idea that here is an area with historically a
very specific cultural group living there that may want some
sort of separate state.
In that sense, it is the extreme reaction that the state
has to the idea of these groups being autonomous. Technically,
they are given a fair amount of autonomy, but in reality they
have minimal actual autonomy.
For example, oftentimes with an important political
appointment, a leadership position, they will allow that
position to go to, let us say, a Uighur, or a Kazakh in
Xinjiang or Tibet.
But oftentimes the Party secretary position that is
associated with the official position, goes to a Han Chinese.
And as the Party secretary positions are so powerful, the
result is that actual power is still controlled by the Han
Chinese. Consequently, in most minority regions, including
Tibet and Xinjiang, the indigenous peoples have not been able
to assert any real autonomy or control.
So the main similarity, I think, has to do with a fear on
the part of the state that here is this very large indigenous
group that claims an identity to a specific region. For
example, with the Hui, it is very difficult, because the Hui
are all over China.
Chairman Leach. In the Muslim areas, are there any directed
immigration flows from other parts of China to weaken
numerically or percentage wise the Muslim population?
Ms. Armijo-Hussein. No. Historically, there has been
movement of Muslims to different regions of China, but at this
present time, none. For example, during massacres in the past
people have fled from northwest China to southwest China.
But then when there were massacres in southwest China,
Muslims fled either to Burma, Thailand, or other areas of
China. But recently there has been no mass movement of Muslims
in any particular direction.
Chairman Leach. Sir, you are the expert on the Protestant
Church. Numerically, how strong is it in China?
Mr. Aikman. I would estimate about 70 million.
Chairman Leach. That many? How do you break it down?
Mr. Aikman. About 20 million who are attending Three Self
Patriotic churches, and about 50 million who attend essentially
unregistered house churches, private Christian groups.
Chairman Leach. In Russia, there was a phenomenon in the
late 1960s through early to late 1980s in which the Baptist
Church--they were called the Baptisti--came to play a large
churchly growth role. It was the modern church in contrast with
the Russian Orthodox Church.
There was a sociological phenomenon for a period of time,
for a decade or two, that if one were a member of the church in
any institution of the economy and were dealing with another
member of the church, one had an automatic kind of trust level
that did not exist within the Communist Party. This was a kind
of bonding circumstance of trust.
Is there such a phenomenon in China today?
Mr. Aikman. Well, it is much harder for a Chinese in an
official position to identify himself as a Christian to
somebody else in the same way that a Baptist did, for example,
in the former Soviet Union. And, of course, the Pentecostals
played a similar role.
Baptists were prized in the Soviet Army as drivers because
they did not drink, and therefore they did not get drunk.
Generals, on the whole, preferred to be driven by sober drivers
rather than drunken drivers.
I think what you do see is a sort of networking that is
developing in China among prominent cultural and academic
figures who are Christian. Several Chinese universities have
faculty members who are professing Christians and are known as
Christians by fellow faculty members.
Peking University has a significant group of graduate
students, professors, and undergraduates who are known to be
Christian. People's University conducted a poll of its students
and came up with a figure that 3.6 percent of the student
population actually called themselves Christian, but that about
60 percent of the student population were quite interested in
Christianity.
Again, at People's University, several of the faculty
members were known to be Christian and were encouraging their
students to take part in Christian activities.
Chairman Leach. Well, I know in the Soviet environment
during this period of some transition that churches had a
defined membership. But the assumption was, when you talked to
the leadership, that the fellow traveler/religious person would
increase the numbers four- or five-fold. Is that a phenomenon
in China?
Mr. Aikman. Are you asking if people exaggerate the numbers
of believers?
Chairman Leach. No, this was another phenomenon. No
exaggeration that I am implying one way or another. But if you
had a membership of a church that worshiped on Sunday of, let
us say, 1,000, it was the belief of the church leadership that
they really had four to five times that figure that identified
very much with the church, although they might not come to the
service.
Mr. Aikman. Right. I would not say that is quite analogous
to the Soviet situation, because if you are interested in
Christianity you can, in China, legally go to a Three Self
Patriotic Protestant Church or a Catholic Patriotic Association
Church. Unless you are observed by your office supervisor, you
are not likely to come to any harm, or unless you are a
Communist Party member and are recognized by somebody else
there.
I think what is true, is that the interest in Christianity
at a cultural level is at a very high level. You find large
numbers of people in China who call themselves cultural
Christians.
These are academics who are interested initially in the
role that Christianity played in the formation of the success
of Western culture and civilization, and wonder if there are
any potential analogies for China.
There are others who are simply attracted by some aspects
of Christianized culture, whether it is the novels of
Dostoyevsky or Handel's ``Messiah.'' Handel's ``Messiah'' was
performed for the first time in Chinese in the year 2001 in the
center of Beijing with a huge audience of enthusiastic people.
Even the China Daily reported on this event and interviewed the
conductor, who happens to be a Christian and was quite open
about his faith.
Chairman Leach. Other than the ties that are kind of
Russian-Chinese-American of emigres from Russia that came
through Shanghai and Hong Kong, such as former Treasury
Secretary Michael Blumenthal, how large is the Jewish faith in
China?
Mr. Aikman. Well, the last story I ever did when I was a
reporter based in China was about the Jewish community in
Kaifeng. The indigenous Chinese Jewish community is pretty
small and was, at least until the reforms started in 1978,
1979, somewhat unsure of itself, but willing within reason to
identify itself.
I would say, in terms of those who would identify
themselves as Jews but are of Han Chinese ethnic origin, it
probably numbers a few thousand. There are still a number of
Jews of Russian background living in places like Harbin, and
probably in Xinjiang, but a dwindling number. In Shanghai, I
think there are a number of Jews.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you all very much. I am
particularly impressed with the expertise on the Muslim
population in China. That is, I think, of great import to the
Commission.
Thank you all very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver
JULY 24, 2003
Chairman Leach, Chairman Hagel, and other Members of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the current State
of religious freedom in China and the prospects for improvements in the
situation under China's new leadership. I would also like to discuss
the many efforts the Administration has taken to push for greater
respect for religious freedom in China. Finally, I look forward to
hearing from other speakers their views on options open to the United
States to prompt the development of new policies toward religion in
China.
As you know, President Bush is deeply and personally concerned over
the state of religious freedom in China, and he has raised his concerns
in his meetings with Chinese leaders and in public remarks in China.
Addressing Chinese students at Beijing's Qinghua University in February
2002, the President said, ``Freedom of religion is not something to be
feared, it's to be welcomed, because faith gives us a moral core and
teaches us to hold ourselves to high standards, to love and to serve
others, and to live responsible lives.'' Speaking to the strong
interest we have over the situation in China, the President added, ``My
prayer is that all persecution will end, so that all in China are free
to gather and worship as they wish.''
These concerns are shared by all of us in the Department of State,
and in our mission in China. Promoting respect for religious freedom is
one of our top foreign policy goals. So I welcome today's hearing on
this important topic, and look forward to continuing the dialogue in
the future.
I. CURRENT CONDITIONS
Let me start by describing our assessment of current conditions in
China. As you know, the Secretary of State has designated China one of
six ``countries of particular concern'' under the International
Religious Freedom Act. The other five are North Korea, Iraq, Iran,
Burma, and Sudan. We made this designation because we found that the
Government of China ``is engaged in or tolerates particularly severe
violations of religious freedom'' in a manner that is ``egregious,
ongoing and systematic.''
During the last 12 months, the government's respect for freedom of
religion and freedom of conscience remained poor overall, especially
for many unregistered religious groups and spiritual movements such as
the Falun Gong. Thousands of believers--Catholics, Protestants, Tibetan
Buddhists, Muslims, or members of the Falun Gong and other groups--
remain in prison for seeking to exercise their religious or spiritual
views. Some have been tortured; many have been abused.
But at the same time, we have seen some positive developments that
may suggest a possibility of increasing tolerance for religious
activity. China has seen progress since the late 1960s, when religious
activity was entirely proscribed. The growing number of believers in
China is a testament to the hunger of Chinese people for religious
faith. It is also a testament to the greater space given to some
religious organizations by the government. While we seek to highlight
and encourage the positive trends that we see, this does not mean that
the overall situation is good. It clearly is not, and we remain very
disturbed at the harassment and serious
mistreatment of many religious believers in China, as well as by the
Chinese Government's continued insistence on controlling religious
activity.
Let me discuss a few specific areas of concern to illustrate this
complex picture.
A. Registration requirements
The government requires all religious groups to register with
state-sanctioned
religious organizations, which monitor and supervise religious
activities. Many believers feel they would have to make compromises in
what they believe or how they worship in order to register and have,
therefore, chosen not to register. Officials have continued a selective
crackdown on unregistered or ``underground'' churches, temples, and
mosques. Members of some unregistered religious groups, including
Protestants and Catholics, are subjected to restrictions, including
intimidation, harassment, and detention. However, the degree of
restrictions varies significantly from region to region. In some
localities in southeastern China, some ``underground'' churches have
been allowed to operate without registering--though often only after
their leader has been vetted by officials. While we have urged the
government to relax or eliminate the registration requirements and to
allow any religious or spiritual group to practice their faith freely,
any increase in the number of unregistered groups allowed to operate is
a positive intermediate step.
B. Minors
Religious education for young people is necessary to ensure the
vibrancy and continuity in a religious community; it is crucial that
families be allowed to transmit their faith and values to their
children, and that ethnic minority communities such as Tibetans and
Uyghurs be allowed to transmit core elements of their culture.
Therefore, prohibitions on minors practicing religion or receiving
religious education have been a long-standing concern for us. In
response to our inquiries, senior government officials claim that China
has no restrictions against minors engaging in religious activity.
Nonetheless, observers have witnessed local officials in some areas
preventing children from attending worship services, and some places of
worship--especially mosques in western China's Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region--have signs prohibiting persons younger than 18 from
entering. At the U.S.-China human rights dialogue session held in
Beijing last December, senior Chinese Government officials told us they
would consider taking steps to clarify state policy on minors and
religion, but this has not yet occurred.
C. Xinjiang
I just mentioned Xinjiang. Let me discuss in somewhat more detail
additional problems of deep concern. Under the mantle of ``counter
terrorism,'' Chinese officials have ramped up a brutal crackdown
against ethnic Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group. Uyghurs enjoyed two
brief periods of independent statehood during the last century.
Convinced that Uyghurs again seek independence, Beijing pursues a
policy of such tight control that it may be stoking the very separatist
sentiment and instability it fears. In a misguided effort to curb
separatism, officials have closed some mosques, forbidden minors from
engaging in religious activities, and taken other steps to limit the
practice of Islam. I say this effort is misguided because we do not see
a link between nationalist aspirations of some Uyghur groups and Islam
per se.
The way to deal with dissatisfaction among minority peoples is not
through crackdowns, but through allowing Uyghurs and others the high
degree of autonomy guaranteed them under Chinese law. For the Uyghurs,
as for Tibetans and other minority groups, this means having a greater
voice in decisions affecting their lives--for example, greater respect
for their rights to decide when, where and how to worship. We urge
Chinese officials to recognize what President Bush has repeatedly
stated: that religious faith is a source of strength for any community,
and that China has nothing to fear from the free and unhindered
practice of religion, whether Islam in Xinjiang, Buddhism in Tibet, or
Christianity throughout China.
D. Tibet
The situation in Tibetan regions is a mixed picture. In many areas,
Tibetan Buddhist lay practitioners are able to worship relatively
freely and engage in religious celebrations, but Tibetan Buddhist monks
and nuns continued to face restrictions on their ability to pursue a
religious education. A number of monks in Sichuan Province were
arrested in connection with a series of bombings, and one former monk
was quickly put to death despite promises from the Chinese that he
would be allowed to appeal his case and that the Supreme Court would
review the sentence. China has not conducted open trials in any of
these cases, and we have seen no evidence to suggest that Tenzing Delek
Rinpoche, a senior religious figure who remains in jail, was in any way
connected to the bombings. Elsewhere in Sichuan, a dozen or more
Tibetans were arrested in conjunction with a public ``long life''
ceremony for the Dalai Lama. We fail to see why such activity merits
arrest and imprisonment, and we call on China to follow its own laws on
freedom of expression and freedom of religion.
E. Falun Gong
An issue well known to all of us is China's continued harsh
repression of groups that it has determined to be ``cults,'' including
the Falun Gong. Various sources
report that thousands of Falun Gong adherents have been arrested,
detained, and imprisoned, and that several hundred or more Falun Gong
adherents have died in detention since 1999. I am sad to report that
the repression of the Falun Gong continues, and continues to be an
issue of great concern internationally and in Washington. We have
raised these issues with the Chinese repeatedly, and will continue to
do so.
F. South China Church
Another group China deems to be a cult, the South China Church, has
seen its members arrested in large numbers. Credible reports from four
young women indicate that security forces tortured them to obtain
``evidence'' that was then used against the group's founder. We have
raised this case in great detail with the Chinese and remain deeply
concerned over reports of continuing abuse of other
followers still in detention.
G. Relations with the Vatican
China still refuses to acknowledge the Vatican as the supreme
authority for Chinese Catholics in many matters of faith, insists on
controlling the appointments of Catholic clergy, and only recognizes
the government-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). Many
Chinese Catholics who remain loyal to the Pope are forced to conduct
their religious activities surreptitiously or risk arrest. Dozens of
``underground'' clergy remain in detention or under house arrest,
including Bishop Su Zhimin, a senior bishop who has been missing since
1997. We continue to urge the Chinese Government to release these
detainees, and to resume its dialogue with the Vatican, in hopes that
China will acknowledge Rome's unique role in the spiritual lives of all
Catholics around the world, including in China.
H. North Koreans in China
We are aware that many North Koreans cross into China fleeing
famine and persecution, and others come seeking work. South Korean
missionaries are active along China's border with North Korea, and the
number of Chinese-Korean and North Korean residents of China who are
Christian is growing. North Koreans who practice Christianity face
severe risks if they are repatriated, and we are concerned about
reports that China continues to forcibly repatriate North Koreans. We
have urged China to treat those who flee from North Korea in a
humanitarian way. This Administration has also worked to increase basic
humanitarian aid being provided to this vulnerable population and to
secure PRC permission for individual North Koreans to depart China for
South Korea, and we have been funding various organizations that work
quietly in northeastern China providing North Koreans there with food,
medicines, and shelter.
I. Numbers of believers
Despite all the problems I just mentioned, officials, religious
professionals, and persons who attend services at both officially
sanctioned and underground places of worship all report that the
numbers of believers in China continues to grow, and credible reports
place the number of worshipers in the tens of millions. An increasing
number of these religious adherents also report they are able to
practice their faith in officially registered places of worship and to
maintain contacts with those who share their beliefs in other parts of
the world without interference from the
authorities. These are hopeful signs.
J. Community activities
In some localities, officials worked closely with Buddhist,
Catholic, and Protestant groups building schools, medical facilities,
and retirement centers for poor communities. In cases involving
Catholics and Protestants, local officials frequently encouraged
Western religious groups to work in their communities to provide much-
needed social services, provided that the groups did not proselytize
openly. President Bush made clear in his talks with Chinese leaders
that religion can act as a stabilizing force in any society, and we see
that this is true in the Chinese context.
II. POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE UNDER NEW LEADERSHIP
At this point, let me turn to another important question: the
potential for change under China's new leadership. The changeover in
leadership of the Communist Party took place last November, and the new
government lineup emerged in mid-March. Hu Jintao has taken over the
top slots in both party and government, and most other senior
portfolios also switched hands. But while we have a clear picture of
who is sitting where, we have not yet seen a clear sign that the new
leadership plans to grant significant new freedoms to religious
believers, or even to work with the international community on concerns
over religious freedom, or concerns over human rights more generally.
At last December's human rights dialogue, China committed to
cooperate with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious
Intolerance, as well as with the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Chinese leaders promised that all
three groups would soon be visiting China, but to date no such visits
have been scheduled. Some of this can be attributed to the SARS
outbreak, and we acknowledge that the epidemic created obstacles to
many types of exchanges. However, the worst of the outbreak is behind
us, and we now expect China to move forward quickly on its commitments
to work with these international bodies.
In addition, Chinese leaders agreed last December to invite the
Congressionally chartered U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom to visit China. I believe that Commissioner Felice Gaer, who
will speak later, plans to go on the trip. We understand that this trip
is scheduled to take place next month. We look forward to hearing the
Commission's findings upon their return.
China invited the elder brother of the Dalai Lama to visit last
summer, and then invited emissaries of the Dalai Lama to visit last
September. Another visit by the Dalai Lama's emissaries took place
again 2 months ago, which suggests the new leadership may be willing to
keep the dialogue going. We have long pressed for resumption of
dialogue between the Government of China and the Dalai Lama or his
representatives, so we are encouraged that the exchanges continue to
take place. We urge that the two sides continue to work toward a
negotiated settlement on issues of mutual concern.
As for the broader question on the willingness of Chinese leaders
to take steps to address restrictions on religious activity in China, I
can only say that we are waiting for progress in a number of key areas.
Moments ago, I discussed the problems surrounding the registration
requirements, and we have repeatedly urged China to liberalize--or drop
altogether--these requirements, and to stop arresting those who do not
register. We continue to make this demand, and to watch for a clear
policy shift in this area. In addition, Chinese officials repeatedly
told us that minors are free to participate in religious activity
anywhere in China--to participate in programs of religious training,
and to enter places of worship. While no policy statement has emerged
from Beijing, we expect China to honor its pledge to address this
issue.
So whether or not the Chinese people will enjoy greater freedom to
practice and express their faith under the new leadership remains an
open question. We have seen a few positive developments, but these take
place in an environment where
respect for religious freedom remains poor overall. We call again on
Chinese leaders to honor the commitments they made to the United States
last December, and to address the concerns of the international
community in a more systemic, comprehensive manner.
III. USG ACTIONS
Finally, let me discuss actions we have taken to increase respect
for human rights generally, and religious freedom in particular. As I
mentioned at the start, the Administration has made this an extremely
high priority. The U.S. Government raises religious freedom issues with
Chinese leaders on a regular, frequent basis, and at all levels.
President Bush discussed religious freedom in his meetings with former
President Jiang Zemin. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom John Hanford has traveled twice to China--the only country he
has returned to so far--and meets regularly with Chinese officials in
Washington. Other senior officials, including Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lorne Craner, and U.S. Ambassador
to China Clark Randt have all repeatedly called on China to halt the
abusive treatment of religious adherents and to respect religious
freedom. Ambassador Randt also raises our concerns in almost all of his
public speeches, on both sides of the Pacific. The Department of State,
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and the U.S. Consulates General in
Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenyang all make concerted efforts
to encourage religious freedom, repeatedly urging Chinese officials to
respect citizens' rights to religious freedom and release those
detained for the practice of their faith.
The issue of religious freedom also was raised during the official
U.S.-China human rights dialogue in December, which was conducted by
both Assistant Secretary Craner and Ambassador Hanford. Part of the
U.S. delegation, led by the Assistant Secretary, traveled to Xinjiang
to meet with Muslim clerics and government officials and to express
concern that authorities were using the war on terrorism as an excuse
to persecute Uyghur Muslims. Another part of the delegation, headed by
Ambassador Hanford, engaged in a roundtable discussion on religion and
held several in-depth meetings on religion with key policymakers.
These diplomatic efforts have led to some progress. Several
religious prisoners were released during the last 12 months, including
a number of Tibetan nuns. The most prominent is Ngawang Sangdrol. She
was released last October, and the new leadership permitted her to
leave China and travel to the United States in late March. Ngawang
Sangdrol and the other nuns detained with her should never have been
arrested in the first place; their ``crimes'' were to demonstrate for
greater freedom for Tibet and for Tibetan Buddhists. The physical abuse
they suffered in prison in Lhasa is shocking and totally unacceptable.
Nonetheless, their releases are significant, and we again call for
China to release all persons detained for the nonviolent expression of
their religious views.
Let me close by saying again that the situation of religious
freedom, as with many things in China, is a decidedly mixed picture.
China's new leadership has not yet made clear what its policy toward
religious freedom in particular, and human rights in general, will be.
China remains a country of particular concern, and yet we have seen a
few hopeful signs. We have no illusions about China's history of
hostility to religion--and in particular to religious groups that
refuse to take direction from the State.
Nevertheless, we will continue to call for China to make the right
choices here, and to understand clearly the President's message that
China has nothing to fear from the unfettered worship of people of
faith. We will also continue to make clear to our interlocutors that
this is an issue that will not go away for us, that concerns over human
rights and religious freedom will remain an obstacle to closer ties
between China and the United States, and between China and the rest of
the world.
______
Prepared Statement of Felice D. Gaer
JULY 24, 2003
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Commission on
religious freedom conditions in China. The members of the Commission
are to be commended for holding this important hearing. I would like to
submit this statement for the Commission's record.
Since its establishment, the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has spoken out about the
widespread and serious abuses of the right to freedom of religion and
belief in China. It has provided numerous policy recommendations
regarding the steps that the U.S. Government should take to
encourage the protection of religious freedom in China.
The topics discussed here today are particularly timely. In less
than two weeks, the USCIRF will be traveling to China for the first
time. We plan to visit Tibet as well as other parts of China. On our
return, we look forward to reporting our findings to the Congress.
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CHANGES
The face of China's political leadership has undergone major
changes in the past year. The transition from the leadership of Jiang
Zemin to Hu Jintao has gone smoothly, but it remains unclear to many
observers whether the change in power will impact the policies of the
Communist Party. If the past is any guide, we can expect the party to
pursue a policy of gradual economic liberalization coupled with severe
restrictions on political dissent and religious freedom.
In the area of human rights, we know that severe restrictions on
religious and political liberties are authorized at the highest levels
of the Communist Party. Many of China's new leaders, including Hu
Jintao himself, have been intimately involved in forming and
implementing the government's repressive policies on religion and
ethnic minorities. This fact, along with the fact that many of Jiang
Zemin's allies continue to occupy key positions overseeing religious
affairs and legal reform, signals that the prospect is poor for
immediate improvement in China's record on religious freedom. Indeed,
we fear it might even deteriorate.
However, the recent transition offers us a chance to reassess the
U.S. Government's approach toward protecting and promoting religious
freedom in China.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS
Today, Chinese Government officials continue to claim the right to
control, monitor, and restrain religious practice, purportedly to
protect public safety, order, health, and so forth. However, the
government's actions to restrict religious belief and practice go far
beyond what is necessary to legitimately protect those interests; in
other words, far beyond what is permissible under international law.
While China's Constitution provides its citizens with the ``freedom of
religious belief,'' it does not protect the right to manifest religious
beliefs, highlighting the importance for China to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
contains explicit provisions on the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion, and which it signed in 1998.
The crackdowns against religious believers are believed to be
sanctioned at the highest levels of government. Indeed, Chinese laws,
policies, and practices severely restrict religious activities,
including contact with foreign religious organizations, the training
and appointment of spiritual leaders, and religious education for
children in accordance with the convictions of their parents. As a
result of government policies and practices, persons continue to be
confined, tortured, imprisoned, and subject to other forms of ill
treatment on account of their religion or belief. Prominent religious
leaders such as the Tibetan Buddhist teacher Tenzin Delek Rinpoche and
Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin remain detained on questionable charges for
one and 6 years, respectively. A young boy, Gendun Choekyi Nyima,
``disappeared'' in 1995 after he was recognized by the Dalai Lama as
the 11th Panchen Lama--the second highest-ranking leader in Tibetan
Buddhism. The Chinese Government continues to insist that it does not
have knowledge of Bishop Su's whereabouts. The government also
continues to deny foreign diplomats and human rights monitors,
including UN representatives, access to the boy. Tenzin Delek Rinpoche
was reportedly denied access to legal representatives. In July 2003,
local officials reportedly raided a house church in Zhejiang province,
arresting at least six leaders, including the 80-year-old founder of
the church, Shao Cheng Shen.
The Chinese Government has also reserved for itself the right to
determine the legality of religious activities and the legitimacy of
religious leaders. In 1999, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress adopted a resolution, which has the force of law, to
ban all ``heretical cult organizations.'' Judicial explanations issued
by the Supreme People's Court defined ``cult organizations'' as
``illegal organizations that are set up using religions, qigong, other
things as a camouflage . . . confuse, poison, and deceive people . . .
and endanger the society by fabricating and spreading superstitious
heresies.'' Article 300 of the Criminal Law as amended in 1997 provided
punishments for those ``organiz[ing] and utiliz[ing] superstitious
sects, secret societies, and evil religious organizations'' to commit
crimes. Under these laws, groups like the Falun Gong and several
unregistered Christian churches that have been designated as ``cults''
by the government have suffered tremendously.
According to Falun Gong practitioners, as many as 100,000 have been
sent to labor camps without trial. They claim that as many as 700 may
have died as a result of police brutality either while in prison or
after their release. Protestant church leaders have been arrested and
sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for engaging in ``cultic''
activities. In December 2001, for the first time since the adoption of
the 1999 ``evil cult'' law, a Protestant pastor, Pastor Gong
Shengliang, was sentenced to death for founding an ``evil cult'' and
questionable criminal charges of rape. The terms off the sentence were
only reduced after U.S. intervention at the highest level. In July
2002, three priests affiliated with the underground Catholic Church
were reportedly sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp after having been
convicted of practicing ``cult'' activities.
In many parts of China, even when religious organizations wish to
register with the government, they face resistance and oppression from
local officials. For example, in June 2003, 12 members of a house
church in Yunnan province were reportedly arrested for engaging in
``feudalistic superstition'' after they officially sought registration
with the government with the local government. Eight members of the
church are reportedly being detained indefinitely.
The Chinese Government has ratified and reported on compliance with
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW). However, the government continues to violate the
human rights, including religious freedom, of Chinese women. Female
religious persons, including Falun Gong practitioners such as Zheng
Donghui and Yang Jinxing, were reportedly stripped, beaten, and
subjected to other forms of ill treatment while in detention. There
continues to be concern, as enunciated by the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, that
government officials are engaging in violent and coercive measures,
including ``forced sterilizations and abortions, arbitrary detention
and house demolitions,'' as a part of the population control policy,
``particularly in rural areas and among ethnic minorities.'' In April
2003, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women expressed
concern that the Chinese Government has continued to engage in such
practices in Tibet.
In Xinjiang and Tibet, religious freedom is severely curtailed by
the government, which linked religion with ``separatist'' or
``terrorist'' acts. In January 2003, Wang Lequan, Xinjiang's Communist
Party Secretary and a member of the Politburo, reportedly stated the
government's resolve to wipe out ``religious extremists,''
``splittists,'' and ``terrorists.'' As a result, Uighur Muslim clerics
and students have reportedly been detained or arrested while ``illegal
religious centers'' were closed. In July 2003, in an effort to draw
attention to the plight of the Uighur Muslims, the USCIRF held a
roundtable discussion among senior U.S. officials, experts, and NGO
representatives, where, among other things, we learned about the extent
of the government's tight control over religious affairs in Xinjiang,
which was carried out through the close supervision of all mosques in
the region by local Communist Party officials. Meanwhile, hundreds of
Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns remain in prison for voicing their
allegiance to the Dalai Lama and their opposition to Chinese rule.
According to the Tibet Information Network, the State Department, and
the testimony of former Tibetan nuns like Ngawang Sandrol, many of them
have been severely beaten and subjected to other extreme forms of
punishment. Some of them have died in prison.
The USCIRF has focused considerable attention on the plight of the
North Korean refugees. Through its public hearing in January 2002,
investigative trips to South Korea and Japan, and regular consultation
with policy experts and human rights advocates, the USCIRF has received
numerous reports concerning the conditions North Korean refugees in
China. The USCIRF has also testified before the Congress on this issue.
China is a party to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to that convention. Under these
treaties, China has committed to not expel or return refugees to a
country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of
their religion or other status. However, since 2000, Chinese officials
have forcibly repatriated many of the 30,000--300,000 North Korean
refugees who are now in China to escape the dire conditions in North
Korea, including the denial of religious freedom in that country. Not
only does the Chinese Government refuse to grant refugee status to
these North Koreans, it also does not allow the UNHCR to conduct
interviews to assess refugee status or to provide services to them.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Three aspects have characterized recent U.S. policy to advance
religious freedom and other human rights in China. First, the treatment
of religious persons has been raised by President Bush and Secretary
Powell directly to the senior Chinese leadership. Second, the U.S. has
raised cases and sought release of those detained or imprisoned in
violation of their human rights, including on account of their religion
or belief. Third, the U.S. funds a multi-million dollar program to
promote democracy and the rule of law.
These efforts contributed to the positive developments of 2002,
particularly with respect to Tibet. In that year, six Tibetan political
prisoners were released from imprisonment. The Chinese Government
invited the older brother of the Dalai Lama to visit China, paving the
way for a visit by the Dalai Lama's special envoy in fall 2002. Indeed,
citing ``significant but limited progress'' in a number of areas
stemming from the December 2002 human rights dialogue, the State
Department
announced in April 2003 that it would neither propose nor sponsor a
resolution censuring China's human rights practices at the 2003 U.N.
Human Rights Commission meeting.
One development cited as a reason for the State Department's
decision was the Chinese Government's reported agreement to invite U.N.
human rights mechanisms and special rapporteurs, including the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, to visit China without
conditions. However, these have not taken place and there are reports
that the conditions remain the same as in the past.
Furthermore, even as some religious and political prisoners were
released, during this entire period, there has apparently not been any
systemic improvement in
China's protection for freedom of religion or belief. Despite the
efforts of senior U.S. officials like the Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom John Hanford, who has pressed the
Chinese Government to agree to the establishment of an inter-agency
working group of appropriate Chinese Government agencies that will
serve as points of contact with the U.S. Government to address
religious freedom violations, the Chinese Government has reportedly not
taken any meaningful actions to bring about substantial improvements in
the conditions of religious freedom in China. In fact, since the
conclusion of the national religious affairs work meeting in December
2001, experts and others have said that the central government has
tightened its control over religious affairs.
The State Department has recently changed its assessment of the
human rights conditions in China. By the Department's own admission,
China's conditions of human rights, including religious freedom, have
deteriorated, citing the execution of Lobsang Dondrup, the arrests of
pro-democracy activists, the forced repatriation of Tibetans in Nepal,
and other human rights violations.
This continued lack of systemic changes in the religious freedom
conditions in China raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the
U.S. policy during a period when the U.S. has sought Chinese support in
the U.N. on Iraq and to help defuse the nuclear crisis in North Korea.
Any re-assessment of U.S. policy must also take into account of past
failures on the part of the U.S. Government to condition the expansion
of the bilateral economic relationship and China's entry onto the
international scene through the hosting of such public events as the
Olympics on substantial improvements in China's religious freedom and
human rights practices. In the remainder of this presentation, the
USCIRF would like to offer some policy options for what the U.S.
Government can do to advance protections for freedom of religion or
belief in China.
First, the State Department should use the full range of policy
tools available under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(IRFA) to take additional actions with respect to China. The Secretary
of State has designated China as a ``country of particular concern''
(CPC) under IRFA for its egregious violations of religious freedom.
However, the Secretary has determined that pre-existing sanctions
satisfied the IRFA requirements. While the reliance on pre-existing
sanctions may be technically correct under the statute, it is not
defensible as a matter of policy. Moreover, reliance on pre-existing
sanctions provides little incentive for governments like China to
reduce or end severe violations of religious freedom.
Second, the State Department should provide to the Congress its
evaluation of the impact that current U.S. rule of law and democracy
programs have on the promotion of religious freedom and other human
rights in China. According to the
recent State Department report on the U.S. efforts to promote human
rights and democracy in China, the U.S. Government supports a ``wide
range of programs''
designed to promote, among other things, ``respect for freedom of
religion.'' Yet, no information about religious freedom-specific
programs was provided and there is no information in that report about
the impact that rule of law and democracy programs have had on the
actual advancement of religious freedom, or other human rights, in
China.
Third, the U.S. Government should enhance its public diplomacy
efforts, focusing serious attention on the plight of the Uighur Muslims
and Tibetan Buddhists. The U.S. Government should seek expanded
opportunities to speak frankly and directly to the Chinese people to
express why the U.S. Government, on behalf of the American people, is
concerned with violations of internationally recognized human rights,
including freedom of religion or belief. President Bush and Assistant
Secretary Craner have done so during their visits to China, and the
USCIRF is seeking a similar opportunity during its upcoming visit.
The expansion of broadcasts by Radio Free Asia and the Voice of
America are also important to this effort. In addition, the U.S.
Government should support exchanges between Chinese, including Tibetans
and Uighurs, and U.S. scholars, experts,
representatives of religious communities and non-government
organizations, and appropriate officials regarding the relationship
between religion and the state, the role of religion in society,
international standards relating to the right to freedom of religion
and belief, and the importance and benefits of upholding human rights,
including religious freedom.
Fourth, the U.S. must be consistent in our message that religious
freedom will remain a priority in U.S. foreign policy and in our
assessment of progress in China's human rights practices. China must
know that we will continue to raise this issue until they fully comply
with their international obligations. As a key component of this
effort, until China significantly improves its protection of religious
freedom--systemic improvements that will prevent further serious
violations--the U.S. should propose and promote a resolution to censure
China at the U.N. and its Commission on Human Rights. This is extremely
important as the U.S. stands virtually alone in striving to focus world
attention on China's specific violations of human rights.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, as China continues its political and economic
transformation, the United States must consistently remind the Chinese
Government that the protection of human rights, including religious
freedom, is critical to strong and vibrant society and economy. The
rights of the Chinese people must be protected, and the United States
should be prepared to assist in this regard.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Prepared Statement of Joseph Fewsmith
JULY 24, 2003
I have been asked to testify about political trends in contemporary
China and their implications for state-society relations, including
religious affairs. This is an enormously complicated topic, and this
short discussion can hardly cover it adequately. All I can do is to try
to pick out some trends and identify their importance for understanding
contemporary Chinese society, including the place of religion.
As you know, China has undergone a major leadership transition in
the past year. This is really the first political transition China has
had since the revolutionary generation has left the scene. Although I
believe that we have seen signs of tension within the leadership--not
unexpected--so far the transition has gone well and the new leadership
is moving forward on an agenda that seeks both to build on the
successes of the past decade and more and to correct the excesses that
have emerged.
On the one hand, in response to the very rapid growth of the
private economy over the past decade, the former general secretary of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Jiang Zemin, on July 1, 2001, called
for opening up the CCP to ``outstanding elements'' from the new social
sectors that have emerged in recent years, including private
entrepreneurs. This call, which was endorsed by the Sixteenth Party
Congress last November, was in part a ratification of de facto
changes--in fact, some 20 percent of private entrepreneurs are already
CCP members (most of them joined the party first, then ``jumped into
the sea'' of business). It was also a recognition that economic change
and technical innovation are not being driven forward by the sorts of
industrial workers depicted in traditional Marxist-Leninist literature
and art but rather by the technically trained people being generated by
Qinghua and other elite universities.
The change here that strikes me as really important is that by
drawing party membership from all segments of society--not only in
practice but in doctrine--the CCP is rejecting the notions of class
struggle, both domestically and internationally, on which it was built.
This change, it strikes me, is critical for building a more tolerant
and democratic future.
On the other hand, the new leadership under general secretary Hu
Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao have been emphasizing such issues as rule
by law, opposition to corruption, social equality, and concern for the
``masses.'' These emphases speak to major problems facing China in the
early twenty-first century, including growing inequality, corruption,
unemployment, the emergence of urban poverty, the abuse of authority,
social disorder, and a general sense that the party is remote from and
not concerned with the people. In response, the party has been
exploring ways to increase accountability and to expand decisionmaking,
at least within the party. In recent years there have been calls for
``inner party democracy.'' There is much talk these days in party
journals about setting up a system in which a standing committee of the
party congress--a body that normally meets only every 5 years--would
stay in session to supervise the implementation of policy. There is
also much talk of institutionalizing procedures in which the whole
membership of the party, not just the standing committee or top leader,
would vote on major issues. There is also talk and some experimentation
with trying to separate the powers of decisionmaking from
implementation and supervision--in other words of creating some sort of
check and balance system within the party. Finally, there have been
regulations issued to expand the number of people involved in promoting
party officials in an effort to break up small cliques of people and to
enhance accountability. Such changes, still very nascent, reflect as
realization within the CCP that Chinese society is changing--the
populace is increasingly well educated and has a greater sense of its
rights and accordingly demands greater accountability from its leaders
and greater adherence to law.
Such changes in the party are interesting precisely because the
party is the most conservative organization in China. It very much
desires to stay in power and to maintain control over Chinese society.
But if it is to have any chance to do so, it must change.
It must change because of the rapid expansion of the private
sector, the large-scale immigration of workers from the rural
agricultural areas to the cities, changes in social values, and the
expansion of societal organizations.
In the 1990s there was a very rapid growth of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in China; by the latter half of that decade they
numbered over 700,000. Most of these are affiliated in some fashion
(and all must register) with a government office, from which they
typically derive at least some of their funding. Thus, many people
speak of these organizations as ``government organized non-governmental
organizations,'' or GONGOs for short.
The rapid growth of such intermediary organizations led many in the
West to argue that China was developing a civil society similar to what
has taken place in many parts of the world. Civil society is frequently
seen as a necessary precondition of democratization.
But intermediary associations in China do not fit easily into
Western categories. In the West we tend to distinguish between the
state, the public, and the private spheres, seeing intermediary
organizations as a distinct from the government and articulating social
demands against the government. China has a very long history of
intermediary associations if such phenomena as clan associations and
guild associations are taken into account. Although scholars debate the
role of such organizations, it seems that a clearly articulated public
sphere never emerged. The idea of social organization articulating
private interests against the government was certainly never accepted
normatively; China's final dynasty (the Qing), for instance, had a
specific legal prohibition against the formation of scholarly
associations, fearing that they would become the basis for factional
intrigue against the government, as they had in the late Ming dynasty.
There are at least two points here that I think are worthy of
consideration. First, the notion of ``private'' has traditionally been
understood quite differently in China than in the West. We have tended
to see ``private'' as good; the expression of partial interests is
central to our notion of pluralism. In traditional China, the term
``private'' (si) was generally viewed as the antithesis of ``public''
(gong). The government, specifically the emperor, was supposed to
embody notions of ``public.'' China has a long history of supporting
remonstration against the wrong policies of the emperor but such
protests always had to be coached in terms of ``publicness;''
articulating a private, partial interest was taken as by definition in
opposition to ``public.'' Even when China witnessed the development of
chambers of commerce and other intermediary associations in the early
part of the twentieth century, the issue of their representing private
and partial interests was fudged. Writers generally depicted merchants
as coming together to decide on the one correct policy, ignoring the
inevitable differences between large and small merchants, importers and
exporters, manufacturers and distributors, etc.
Second and relatedly, Chinese Governments throughout the twentieth
century have either forced chambers of commerce and other voluntary
associations into established hierarchical, corporatist structures or
abolished them all together. The first pattern was adopted by the
Nationalist government after it was established in 1928; the Communist
government after 1949, and particularly after 1956, abolished most
intermediary associations and those that were retained were expected to
play the ``transmission belt'' role assigned to such organizations in
Leninist systems. With the onset of the reforms, and particularly with
the changes in state-society relations in the 1990s, the State has on
again been adopting corporatist structures. Intermediary associations
are supposed to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and accept
State supervision. This does not mean that they are simply extensions
of State power; frequently they are able to inject local interests and
concerns into the policymaking process. But it does mean that the whole
conception of a sharp distinction between public and private that we in
the West are accustomed to and the corresponding notion that public
policy is and should be derived from the push and haul of interest
group politics is very foreign from the Chinese experience, both in the
Communist era and before.
Religious organizations and activities are special types of
intermediary associations, based as they are on the spiritual needs of
their adherents, their tendency to absorb large numbers of believers,
and the ability to mobilize large number of adherents around a cause.
As with other forms of intermediary associations, the Chinese State has
had long experience with religious organizations, much of it unhappy
from the state's point of view. There is a certain irony in this in
that scholars who study the origins of the Chinese State and the
monarchical system note that the authority of early emperors was based
on the emperor as the link between the human world and the heavens.
Ancestor worship played an important role in this regard, and the
emperor's family tablets established a legitimate and sacred line. In
other words, monastic political authority was anchored in religious
concepts.
Other families or religious organizations that challenged the
central role of the emperor's family tablets were seen as a threat to
the state, and dealt with accordingly. Although there were periods in
Chinese history when Buddhism and Daoism occupied important places in
the polity, the state ultimately asserted its authority over these
religions. Thus, the Chinese State never allowed a powerful, organized
clergy to develop.
The hostility of the Chinese State toward religious organization--
and here I want to be very clear that what the Chinese State opposed
was not the practice of religion but the emergence of powerful
religious organizations that could challenge the authority of the
state--was rooted in painful historical experience. Repeatedly
religious organization of one sort or another has been used to mobilize
peasant revolts against the state, and some of these have been
successful. Examples of such revolts stem from the Yellow Turban
Rebellion of the Han Dynasty to the White Lotus, Taiping, and Boxer
rebellions of the late 18th and 19th centuries. Such experience has
left a very deep imprint on Chinese political culture.
One might say that there is both a positive and a negative side to
this political culture. On the one hand, the Chinese state,
particularly in its modern form, is staunchly secular. Most (but not
all) intellectuals in China today reject religion. The upshot of this
is that they are relentless modernizers. One does not see the
religiously inspired rejections of modernity in China that one sees in
some parts of the world.
On the other hand, the Chinese State has continued to see religious
activities that are organized outside of State control as potential
sources of social instability. As with other forms of voluntary
associations, the Chinese State has tried to force religious adherents
to participate in one or another of the state-organized and controlled
religious associations. Many religious adherents have not been willing
to
accept these restrictions, and that is where one sees the suppression
of religious freedom. One might add that many government modernizers
see religious organizations as inimical to their goals of economic
development and therefore see little wrong with their suppression.
I should add that I know of very little academic research that has
been carried out on the sociology of religion in contemporary China. We
know very little about who converts to what religion and for what
reason. We do know that in some parts of the country, the growth of
religion coexists surprisingly amicably with the state. As I stated,
the Chinese State can be tolerant of religious beliefs as long as it
does not challenge state authority. But in other parts of the country,
religious organizations are suppressed harshly. Sometimes these
different responses seem to depend on such ad hoc factors as the
relations between the local party cadre and the religious leaders; in
other instances, different patterns appear to reflect different socio-
economic conditions. But as I say, we know too little about this to
draw strong
conclusions. Serious research is needed.
The difference in attitudes about religious expression is one of
the most sensitive and difficult gaps that exist between the United
States and China. The United States was founded upon the idea of the
free expression of religious beliefs, and we have witnessed a
resurgence of religious feeling in recent years. The Chinese State has
never condoned the free organization of religious communities, and the
political elite remains rather hostile to religious beliefs and
movements. It is important to bear in mind, however, that these
attitudes are rooted not just in the authoritarian rule of the Chinese
Communist Party but also in millennia-old cultural attitudes.
I am not one to argue that cultures cannot change--they do. But one
cannot simply disregard them and expect that they can change over
night. Indeed, I think that if one looks seriously at the magnitude of
changes sweeping Chinese society over the past two and a half decades,
one has to be impressed by the breath, depth, and speed of the changes.
It is not just that the economy has grown, but that the organization of
the economy and society have changed and new ideas and attitudes have
emerged. The very rapid growth of intermediary associations is a case
in point. There is a new emphasis among younger people on individualism
and consumerism that shocks their elders. Attitudes change, but they do
so over time and within their own context.
I think that the greatest hope for new attitudes toward
intermediary associations and religious expression lies in the growth
of a middle class in China. Historically China has never been a middle
class society (another contrast with the United States which has always
been a middle class society). It is only in the past two decades that
we have seen a semblance of a middle class emerge in China. Estimating
the size of this class is difficult, but a recent study in China
projected it at 15 percent of the population. This is far from enough
to call China a middle class society. Income distribution still tends
to look more like a convex curve (with a small wealthy class at the
top, almost nothing in the middle, and a very large group of people
with average incomes or less) than the olive shaped pattern associated
with middle class societies. Given the huge size of the Chinese
population and the great disparities between the urban areas and the
countryside, it will take a very long time--decades--for China to
become a middle-class society. But I would guess that as that 15
percent figures grows toward, say, 25 percent over the next decade or
so, one is likely to see a better social framework for social stability
and hence greater tolerance toward a variety of attitudes--
intellectual, social, religious, etc.
______
Prepared Statement of Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr.
JULY 24, 2003
Let me first thank the Commission for this opportunity afforded the
US Catholic China Bureau to offer some brief comments on the issue of
religious freedom in China today with special reference to the Catholic
Church.
Since the late eighties, there has been a tremendous upsurge of
activity both on the institutional and community levels in the
Christian churches in China. The Catholic Church, while continuing to
struggle with solutions to its own internal problems of division,
caused in the main by external political pressures, has grown fourfold
since 1949, even by conservative estimates.
Despite strict oversight of religious believers of all traditions--
which varies in implementation from region to region, and from time to
time--the statistics for the Chinese Catholic Church are indicative of
the courageous efforts of Chinese Catholics to restore, renew, and
develop their Church, both as an institution and as a community of
Faith. A recent edition of Maryknoll Magazine, for example, featured a
short article on a vibrant Catholic community at Taiyuan in Shanxi
Province that had just completed a stunning new church of traditional
Chinese design. Submitted with this statement as Attachment A is a
statistical profile which attests to the vibrancy of the Catholic
Church in China today.
Recently, the State Administration for Religious Affairs [SARA]
issued three draft documents to ``solicit opinions,'' with these
ostensibly stated purposes as follows:
1. Method of Management of Catholic Dioceses in China: ``formulated
for the purpose of spreading the Gospel, to put into practice Christ's
redemptive love and to adapt to the needs of the times and requirements
of social development.''
2. Rules for the Work of the Patriotic Association of Chinese
Catholics: ``to completely bring into play the functions of the CPA on
the national and local levels, and to promote the standardization and
systematization of the CPA.''
3. Method of Work of the Unitary Assembly of the Patriotic
Association of Chinese Catholics and of the Chinese Catholic Episcopal
Conference: ``formulated . . to make more complete and to intensify
the Chinese Catholic independent enterprise . . . in accordance with
the democratic principles of administering the church, namely,
collective leadership, democratic supervision, mutual consultation and
joint decision.''
However, these regulations actually reflect a general tightening up
and, in effect, renewed efforts to strictly enforce existing religious
policy and regulations regarding registration of places of worship.
Another major objective appears to be pressuring unregistered
leadership and communities to join with the registered communities of
Catholics in each diocese.
The 3rd document in making reference to ``the Chinese Catholic
independent enterprise'' raises some concerns--if the term
``independent'' is to be interpreted as cutting the China Catholic
Church off from communion with the Universal Church. If it is intended
to mean an authentic autonomy vis-a-vis both external and internal
(i.e., domestic) intrusion into the affairs of the Church we would
applaud it as a goal.
While reconciliation and unity among Chinese Catholics and with the
universal Church is a long-desired goal, when this is done by coercion
or force, let alone with violence in any given situation, it is very
reprehensible and unacceptable to all partners in the dialogue.
The Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN), has reported numerous
instances of such use of force and coercion increasingly in the past
year or two--especially selected dioceses in Hebei, Fujian, and
Zhejiang Provinces. UCAN, reported the arrest on June 16, of Rev. LU
Xiaozhou, a priest in Wenzhou Diocese, associated with an unregistered
Catholic Church, as he was en route to visit the sick at the city
hospital. He was then transferred to the custody of the local Religious
Affairs Bureau. Frequently, such detentions are reported to be used to
force people to sign agreements to join the Catholic Patriotic
Association.
It is always difficult, to cite specific instances of repression,
which occur more frequently in more remote areas in China; or even to
validate reports in the secular/religious media of such instances of
force, coercion or violence against those who, for legitimate reasons
of conscience, find themselves unable to comply with official and
religious regulation and policies. These situations are usually very
volatile and ambiguous; and often, local security authorities claim
another pretext for action, than strictly religious grounds; for
example, violations of building codes; or unapproved contacts with
certain people or groups. In this regard, China continues to deny that
it persecutes religious groups as such; and stands by the ``religious
freedoms'' guaranteed in Article 36 of its Constitution.
I wish to nuance these remarks by admitting here that USCCB does
not have the resources or staff to closely monitor these developments
on the ground. We defer in these matters to reputable sources like
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch/Asia and so forth. We never
rely on media reports which we find frequently unreliable. Second, our
priority and programs are dedicated to enabling the Church in China and
its leadership to restore, renew and develop as a truly authentic Local
Roman Catholic Church--in full communion with the Universal Catholic
Church [cf. USCCB mission statement--submitted as Attachment B].
As noted in our statement to this Committee last year, ``USCCB
seeks to promote full exercise of human rights and religious freedom of
all religious believers in China; and takes as its special mandate the
provision of services and programs to empower Chinese Catholics to be
able to assume and exercise their religious rights and freedoms, as
such rights of citizenship, guaranteed in the Constitution, are
implemented in every sector and at every level of Chinese society.''
At the CECC hearing on this issue last year, the statement
submitted to this Committee by Thomas Quigley of the US Catholic
Bishop's Conference highlighted major recent initiatives by the Holy
See to improve relations with China, including the Ricci Symposia of
2001 at which Pope John Paul II expressed his hope that the Church
would contribute toward China's social progress; and graciously offered
an apology for ``errors and limits of the past'' in the pursuit of
Christian Mission in China.
The Holy See continues to pursue its dialogue with the Chinese
government in several quarters; and continues efforts for
reconciliation and unity in the Church in China. For example, it is
seeking to identify bishop-candidates [to succeed elderly bishops, both
official/unofficial] who will be acceptable to all segments of the
Catholic Church in China, and merit recognition of their rightful
ecclesial role by the authorities of SARA. Hopefully, this initiative
by the Catholic Church authorities may lead to deeper reconciliation;
and to the removal of one of the proximate causes for these severe
``crackdowns'' and abrogation of the rights of believers, guaranteed by
the aforementioned Constitutional provisions.
With regard to the policies and programs of the China's new
leadership, it is too early to determine what direction these may take.
Transition is usually a time of uncertainty and the three recent Draft
documents on Church Regulations mentioned above may simply reflect an
inherent tendency toward restriction during such periods of transition.
We believe therefore that options pursued by the US Government
should be in context of a policy of consistency, justice and honesty in
dealing with China in the political, social/religious and economic
arenas. The Chinese government respects, and works best when confronted
with, principled, well- articulated and consistent positions that also
respect basic Chinese values and are based on commonly accepted
international principles.
We also strongly urge continued support for the wide range of
general academic and social exchanges that have emerged over the past
10 years. We note with some encouragement the increased interest in
Christianity in academic circles and the fact that US Christian
universities now sponsor programs, though secular in nature,
collaborating with major Chinese universities.
Historically, China did not develop the tradition of Civil Society,
let alone a democratic political ethos. Therefore, education and
gradual fostering of social consciousness among the people must go
first toward these noble ends. Understanding of the positive role of
religion in society should increase as the general understanding of the
nature of a civic society increases in China.
Modernization and globalization pose serious challenges to the
faith and practice of their religious beliefs and convictions for
Catholics in China. Ironically, this continued political pressure on
bishops, priests, religious sisters and lay leaders in effect hinders
them from properly dealing with challenges of contemporary Chinese
society, as it undergoes rapid transformation in the economic and
social fields. As our Holy Father, Pope John Paul II has repeatedly
stated, Chinese Catholics, faithful to their Church and loyal to their
nation, as patriotic citizens, can make a great contribution to
strengthen the ethical and moral fiber of the Chinese Nation--so it may
play its rightful role in the Family of Nations--in quest of world
peace and justice for all peoples.
We are convinced that encounters between the American and Chinese
people demand respect for China's culture and social mores, which are
different from those of the West. In such encounters, it is always
helpful to acknowledge one's own shortcomings, especially when
challenging others. One should also try to avoid confrontation; and
making harsh judgments that unduly simplify complex realities; and even
unjustly disparage different, but equally legitimate options. As such,
USCCB would urge the committee, and through it, the present
administration of the USA government, to seek to identify and encourage
those leaders in the PRC who are working to bring about positive change
in a manner that will preserve social stability and well-being. We
should join our collaborative efforts to realize the development of a
Civil Society, able to positively exploit the best of modernity for the
Chinese people.
This is the approach USCCB strives to take in working with the
catholic communities and their leadership in China, to assist them to
prepare for a role in the New China, and indeed to engage in programs
to bring it about. By way of illustration, I would refer you to the
theme of our 20th National Catholic China Conference, ``The Role of
Religion in China's Emerging Civil Society,'' to be held this coming
November. Information is available on our website at www.usccb.net and
on the attachments submitted with this intervention.
We thank the commission and its members for this opportunity to
comment on the general situation of religious freedoms in China, and in
particular, the prospects for the flourishing of religion under the new
leadership. We applaud its continued efforts to promote understanding
of the critical issues facing the Roman Catholic Church and indeed all
the religious traditions in China today.
ATTACHMENT A: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA PROFILE
ATTACHMENT B: THE US CATHOLIC CHINA BUREAU/MISSION STATEMENT
Attachment A
The Catholic Church in China
Since the early eighties, the People's Republic of China has
continued to initiate contacts and respond to overtures of the
international community in political, social, cultural, economic and
other sectors, including the religious arena. Many segments of U.S.
society are re-engaged with China and the Chinese people, as they meet
the challenges of modernization in the Third Christian Millennium.
Since the late eighties, the tremendous upsurge of activity on both
the institutional and community levels in the Christian churches has
been an amazing and inspiring discovery for many. Since the Chinese
Catholic Church was cutoff from relationships with the Universal Church
for more than thirty years, accurate, reliable information was not
easily available. The Catholic Church--while continuing to struggle
with solutions to its own internal problems of divisions [caused by
external political pressures]--has grown fourfold since 1949, even by
conservative estimates. In the past 20 years, it has experienced a
phenomenal interest in religious vocations to priesthood and religious
life. Widespread interest in Christianity in intellectual circles is
manifested by establishment of Religious Studies Departments in many
major universities in China.
Despite strict oversight of religious believers of all traditions--
implementation of which varies from region to region, and from time to
time--the statistics for the Chinese Catholic Church for 2002 are
indicative of the courageous efforts of Chinese Catholics to restore,
renew, and develop their Church, both as an institution and as a
community of Faith.
A Profile of the Roman Catholic Church in China
Catholics............................................... 12,000,000
Dioceses................................................ 138
Churches................................................ 5,000+
Bishops................................................. 117
Priests................................................. 2,650
Sisters................................................. 4,900
Seminaries.............................................. 34
Seminarians............................................. 1,670
Novitiates.............................................. 40
Sisters in Formation.................................... 1,800
[Figures are for both the registered and the unregistered Catholic
communities--Tripod Dec. 2002]
In the tradition of the long missionary relationship between
Chinese and American Catholics, it is important for the U.S. Church to
be sensitive to these developments and seize the opportunity of this
new moment in history to work together as Sister-Churches to witness
and to serve the Gospel in 21st Century China.
If you would like to assist the Church in China, please contact:
U.S. Catholic China Bureau, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ
07079-2689.
Tel: 973-763-1131; Fax: 973-763-1543
E-mail: [email protected]; Web: www.usccb.net
______
Attachment B
United States Catholic China Bureau
MISSION STATEMENT
The U.S. Catholic China Bureau exists to foster communication and
friendship with the people of China through sharing the values of the
Gospel of Jesus Christ.
Founded in 1989, with the encouragement of the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, the Bureau is sponsored by a cross-section of
Roman Catholic organizations and individuals in the United States who
share its purposes and goals.
GENERAL PURPOSES
To promote understanding among American Catholics about
the Catholic Church and the situation of the Catholic communities in
China.
To engage the American Catholics in a new missionary
partnership with the Catholics in China.
GOALS
To promote the development in China of a fully indigenized
Local Church with adequate leadership and resources for the pastoral
service of the Chinese people.
To foster reconciliation and unity of the Chinese Catholic
Church within the universal Church and under the Apostolic See.
To foster mutually beneficial relationships between
Catholics in the sister-churches of China and the USA.
To enable the American Christians to encounter and
understand the experience of Christians in China in the second half of
the 20th century so as to deepen and strengthen our own faith
commitment and the missionary dynamism.
To collaborate ecumenically, and with other religious,
educational and cultural programs and organizations consonant with the
purposes and goals of USCCB.
To promote the full exercise of human rights and religious
freedoms for people in China.
MAJOR ACTIVITIES
Publication of the China Church Quarterly distributed on a
subscriber basis.
Organization of the National Catholic China Conference
annually.
Sponsorship of Religious Study Tours to the PRC.
Recruitment and screening of qualified persons from the
U.S. Church to give Christian witness and service in tertiary
educational institutions in China.
Providing lectures, seminars and workshops on topics of
interest to persons in the U.S. regarding religion and Christianity in
China.
Resourcing the religious news services and secular media
with accurate and documented information on religious issues in China;
the history and contemporary developments of Christianity in China; and
news and information about the Catholic Church in China.
Providing consultation and referrals on other China-
related programs and activities of religious and non-profit
organizations.
Channeling material resources and provision of services
which address expressed needs of Catholics in China.
The Bureau is incorporated as a non-profit, tax exempt organization
in the State of New Jersey. It maintains an office on the campus of
Seton Hall University. Contributions to the Bureau are deductible for
Federal income tax purposes.
______
Prepared Statement of David B.T. Aikman
JULY 24, 2003
China's Approach to Religion During the Hu Jintao Era
Political change, even in a country like China that has a one-party
political system, often raises hopes for change in many other areas of
society. Whether the issue is environmental policies, foreign affairs,
or education, people often assume that a new leader will bring new
perspectives to old problems. But in the case of China, the elevation
of Hu Jintao to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and to
the highest State office offers little immediate promise that the
approach of the Chinese government to religious practice will change.
Hu, believed to be from a family with strong Buddhist leanings, was
at one time responsible for the implementation of Communist policy in
Tibet. During his years there, it became apparent that the priority of
China's leaders was to maintain the primacy of Han Chinese political
control and to prevent the emergence of any Tibetan groups that might
articulate Tibetan national and religious aspirations. Whether then or
later, Hu seems to have become acquainted with Mr. Ye Xiaowen, since
the early 1990s the director of China's Religious Affairs Bureau, later
renamed the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). Mr. Ye,
a self-professed atheist and committed Communist, has demonstrated
throughout his leadership of RAB/SARA a commitment to vigorous
implementation of China's religious policies at the grass-roots level.
Ye has expressed the opinion, for example, that Christianity has been
growing ``too fast'' in some parts of China, and at different times he
has tried to insert his own opinions of Protestant theological issues
into the administration of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM),
China's officially approved agency for the implementation of State
religious policy in respect to China's Protestants.
Even officials of the China Christian Council, the ecclesiastical
structure that determines personnel and theological issues within the
TSPM, have privately complained that RAB/SARA consistently interferes
with ordinary church work. RAB/SARA officials at the provincial level,
for example, sometimes arbitrarily determine how many graduates of the
theological colleges may actually be ordained within a specific time-
frame.
The government policy on how to deal with religion in China was
inherited by Hu Jintao from a top-level Communist Party conference on
religion that convened in December 2001; in effect 3 months after the
implications of the September 11
terrorist attacks on New York had been digested in Beijing. Though
Islam was not specifically mentioned in published reports of that
conference, China's political leadership appears to have decided that
any religion in China, if not strictly supervised, could turn into the
regime's Achilles heal. ``The Party and Government,'' the official
People's Daily account of the conference said, ``can only strengthen
their leadership over religious work and their supervision over
religious affairs. They cannot allow them to weaken.'' China's then
Communist leader President Jiang Zemin was quoted as saying that the
``gist'' of supervision of religious affairs was: ``Protect the legal,
Wipe out the illegal, Resist infiltration and attack crime.''
In fact, Jiang's speech at this December 2001 conference reiterated
points previously articulated by RAB/SARA director Ye Xiaowen. Ye has
said: ``Following the ever-greater progress in human society, religions
will more and more absorb certain secular moral values and rational
elements, and leave behind their fanaticism and fervor, and gradually
conform and adapt to real society.'' In effect, Ye seemed to be
asserting the right of China's Communist and State authorities to force
religious thought into a mold compatible with the official socialist
and secular world view of China's ruling Communist Party. That approach
seems to have been continued during the administration of Hu Jintao.
For example, efforts to force Protestant Christianity to ``absorb
certain secular moral values'' have been underway for nearly half a
decade at the Jinling Theological Seminary in Nanjing, the national
seminary of China's officially recognized Protestantism. Under the
direction of China's most prominent Protestant leader, Bishop Ding
Guangxun, former head of both the TSPM and the China Christian Council
and still, in his late eighties, president of the Nanjing Theological
Seminary, teachers and students at the seminary have been subjected to
a campaign to impose upon them a ``theology of reconstruction.'' In
essence, this ``theology'' is a repudiation of the conservative
evangelical viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of China's
Christians. Efforts to thrust this new theology down the throats of
pastors, officials, teachers, and seminary students associated with the
China Christian Council appears to many a throwback to the ugly,
coercive political campaigns orchestrated by Chairman Mao Zedong in the
1950s. At that time Bishop Ding was a leader in efforts to humiliate in
the public media all Protestant Christians who were unwilling to be
associated with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement.
The actual implementation of policies to control religious
expression at China's grass-roots has certainly been deeply affected by
the campaign to eliminate the meditation group Falun Gong. It is
unfortunate that the unusual teachings of Falun Gong, and in particular
the near-divine status attributed to the group's founder, Li Hongzhi,
now resident in the U.S., have deflected what might have been popular
disapproval among Chinese of the brutal methods used against Falun Gong
practitioners. The vast majority of ordinary Chinese, including Chinese
Christians, believe that Falun Gong is indeed an anti-social cult with
potentially dangerous implications. However mistaken or unfair such
apprehensions of Falun Gong may be, they have had two results: a broad
disapproval of Falun Gong among most Chinese, and an energized
suppression of all religious groups with even the remotest possibility
of being called a ``cult.'' An indirect consequence has been an intense
suspicion by the authorities of any Chinese politically opposed to the
government who also have strong religious convictions.
In May 2003, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
noted in its annual report that there had been a ``deterioration of
protections for religious freedom in China.'' It went on: ``The Chinese
government commits numerous egregious violations against members of
many of China's religious and spiritual communities, including
Evangelical Christians, Roman Catholics, Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur
Muslims, and other groups, such as the Falun Gong, that the government
has labeled 'evil cults.''
To itemize just a few of the ``ordinary'' harassment of China's
Protestant and Catholic Christians in the past several months, here are
some incidents:
July 1, 2003--Authorities arrested 5 Roman Catholic clergy
at Siliying in Boading, Hebei province, approximately 70 miles from
Beijing. The five priests were all on their way to visit another
Catholic underground priest, Fr. Lu Genjun, who had just been released
from 3 years' imprisonment in labor camp.
June 16, 2003--A Catholic priest, Fr. Lu Xiaozhou, was
arrested in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, as he was about to administer
the Sacrament of Anointing for the Sick to a dying Catholic.
June 15, 2003--Authorities raided a house church in
Liaoning province. 40 Christians were tied up and arrested. They were
told their gathering had been ``illegal.''
June 11, 2003--Reports from the Jingzhou prison where
imprisoned South China Church leader, Gong Shengliang has been held,
said that Gong had been repeatedly beaten and was passing blood and
urine as a result of his injuries.
June 6, 2003--Some 12 Christians were arrested in a raid
on four homes in Yunnan province. At least eight of the 12 have been
sent to re-education through labor camps. This punishment can be meted
out without any court procedure up to a maximum of 3 years at a time.
April 4, 2003--120 house church leaders from the Local
Church were arrested in Henan province. Twenty were later released,
leaving the remaining 100 in custody.
There are certainly other incidents for which there is insufficient
space here to provide details.
Meanwhile, though the incidents do not relate directly to religious
practice in China, but to their political activities, there are two
very prominent cases of Chinese Christians who have been held for
months without charge or trial, or at the very least held under very
suspicious circumstances.
The first incident concerns a prominent Chinese physician,
permanent resident of the U.S., Dr. Wang Bingzhang. Dr. Wang, who has
lived in the U.S. since the early 1980s, has been active in China's
fledgling democracy movement among Chinese in exile or temporarily
outside China. Wang has been a leading figure in the Free China
Movement, an umbrella grouping of some 30 organizations advocating
democracy and human rights in China.
Wang and two Chinese traveling companions were kidnapped in broad
daylight outside their hotel in the northern part of Vietnam in June
2002. Their kidnappers were men wearing Vietnamese police uniforms but
speaking fluent Mandarin Chinese. Wang and his companions were taken by
car to a waiting boat which then took them across the border to China.
Wang was found tied up in a Buddhist temple in Yunnan province. The
Chinese police asserted that he had been kidnapped by a gang that was
demanding $10 million in ransom money.
The Chinese police who supposedly came upon Wang Bingzhang and his
companions providentially learned that Wang was wanted on ``terrorism''
charges in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. After several months of being
held in Shenzhen incommunicado, during which the Chinese foreign
ministry repeatedly denied having any knowledge of Wang's whereabouts,
Wang's two companions were released. Wang himself was sentenced in
February 2002 to life imprisonment on charges of ``terrorism.''
Wang was a qualified physician and a deeply committed Protestant
Christian. The notion that this 55-year-old churchgoing medical
professional was engaged in terrorism is as plausible as the notion
that China's political authorities are willing to implement legal due
process in the country.
The other case of egregious persecution of a political
oppositionist of Christian faith is that of Yang Jianli. Arriving in
the U.S. in 1986, Yang earned a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the
University of California at Berkeley and a Ph.D. in political economy
from Harvard University. A winner of numerous academic and other
awards, Yang was the founding president of the Foundation for China in
the 21st. Century, a non-profit organization dedicated to the
establishment of democracy in China. He has appeared several times to
give testimony before numerous Congressional hearings on Capitol Hill.
He was an eyewitness of the June 4 Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing. In
June 2003, the House passed Resolution 199 condemning the fact that
Yang had already been held for nearly a year without criminal charges
being filed, or access to a lawyer, or any contact with his family or
relatives. Finally, after nearly 15 months of incarceration, he was
formally charged last week with spying for Taiwan and permitted for the
very first time to see his lawyer. He was also a devout Christian and a
member of All Saints' Episcopal Church in Brookline, MA.
Wang Bingzhang and Yang Jianli were certainly opposed to the
current political system in China and did their best to advocate
change. To that extent, there were no friends of China's Communist
Party leadership. It is true that they were not specifically charged
with any crime related to religious practice. But their desire to see a
more open China, a China in which freedom of conscience would be
written not just in the heart yearnings of their compatriots but in the
manuals of China's police authorities is one which all men and women of
faith can and should support. It is my hope that the Congressional
China Commission will look broadly into statements and actions that
uphold the American conviction of the inviolability of freedom of
conscience and religious practice.
______
Prepared Statement of Jacqueline M. Armijo
JULY 24, 2003
I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to share my
knowledge of the history and contemporary situation of the Muslim
peoples of China. This knowledge is based on more than 20 years of
research on this highly important, but neglected topic, and more than 7
years lived in China.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ I first studied in Beijing from 1982-83 while an undergraduate,
and returned in 1993 to complete my doctoral dissertation on the early
history of Islam in China. I subsequently worked as a consultant on
HIV/AID prevention projects, and minority education projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With a Muslim population conservatively estimated at 20 million,
China today has a larger Muslim population than most Arab countries,
and yet little is known about this community. Of China's 55 officially
recognized minority peoples, 10 are primarily Muslim: the Hui, Uighur,
Kazak, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan, and Tatar. The
largest group, the Hui, are spread throughout the entire country, while
the other nine live primarily in the northwest. I will begin by
concentrating on the Hui, and then address the situation of the Uighurs
of Xinjiang.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ According to the 2000 China national census, the Hui population
of China is approximately 9.2 million and the Uighur population is 8.6
million. The other Muslim populations are: Kazak 1.3 million; Dongxiang
400,000; Kyrgyz 171,000; Salar 90,000; Tajik 41,000; Uzbek 14,000;
Bonan 13,000; and Tatar 5,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the advent of Islam in the seventh century, there
were Muslims in China, for sea trade networks between China and
Southwest Asia had existed for centuries. Small communities of Muslim
traders and merchants survived for
centuries in cities along China's southeast coast. This early interest
in China as a destination for Muslim travelers is reflected in the
famous hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, 'Utlub al-'ilm wa law fi Sin,
``seek knowledge, even unto China.''
Although Muslim communities were established in China as early as
the seventh century, it was not until the thirteenth century, during
the Yuan dynasty, that tens of thousands of Muslims from Central and
Western Asia settled in China. Most of the Hui population today are
descendants of these early settlers. Despite centuries of relative
isolation from the rest of the Islamic world, the Muslims in most
regions of China have managed to sustain a continuous knowledge of the
Islamic sciences, Arabic, and Persian. Given extended periods of
persecution combined with periods of intense government efforts to
legislate adoption of Chinese cultural practices and norms,\3\ that
Islam should have survived, let alone flourished, is an extraordinary
historical phenomenon. Although some scholars have attributed the
survival of Muslim communities in China to their ability to adopt
Chinese cultural traditions, when asked themselves, Chinese Muslims
usually attribute their survival to their strong faith and God's
protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ During the early part of the Ming period (1368-1644) China's
cosmopolitan and international initiatives gave way to a period of
conservatism and the redirection of imperial resources toward domestic
issues and projects. During this period numerous laws were passed
requiring ``foreigners'' to dress like Chinese, adopt Chinese surnames,
speak Chinese, and essentially in appearance, become Chinese. Despite
these restrictions and requirements, the Muslims of China continued to
actively practice their faith and pass it on to their descendants. By
the end of the Ming dynasty there were enough Chinese Muslim
intellectuals that were thoroughly educated in the classical Confucian
tradition, that several scholars developed a new Islamic literary
genre: religious works on Islam written in Chinese that incorporated
the vocabulary of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist thought.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1644, the Qing dynasty was established, marking the beginning of
a period of unparalleled growth and expansion, both in terms of
territory and population. Travel restrictions were lifted, and the
Muslims of China were once again allowed to make the pilgrimage to
Mecca and study in the major centers of learning in the Islamic world.
During this period several Hui scholars studied abroad and upon their
return they started a movement to revitalize Islamic studies by
translating the most important Islamic texts into Chinese and thus
making them more accessible.
However, despite the opportunities for travel and study that arose
during this period, the Qing dynasty also represented a period of
unparalleled violence against the Muslims of China. As reform movements
led by Muslims who had studied overseas spread, conflicts arose between
different communities. In several instances the
government intervened, supporting one group against another, leading to
an exacerbation of the conflict, outbreaks of mass violence and the
eventual slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Muslims, and several
rebellions.
One of the most common stereotypes of the Muslims is that they are
an inherently violent people. In order to show how such prejudices
evolve I would like to briefly summarize the events leading up to the
slaughter of as many as 750,000 Muslims in southwest China in the
1870s. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China
experienced a massive population explosion resulting in millions of Han
Chinese moving into the frontier regions. As more immigrants moved into
Yunnan province along the southwest frontier, there were increasing
clashes with the indigenous peoples, and the Hui who had settled there
in the thirteenth century and whose population is estimated to have
been one million. The Han settlers, not unlike white settlers
throughout much of colonial history, did not view the local peoples as
full humans, and citizens with equal rights under the law. In a series
of disputes between these immigrants and the Hui, local Han Chinese
officials (who themselves were not local residents), repeatedly decided
to support their fellow Han Chinese against the local residents. The
Muslims sent envoys to Beijing seeking justice to no avail. Fighting
escalated and after a government led massacre of the Muslim population
of the provincial capital Kunming, a Chinese Muslim scholar started a
rebellion and in 1856 established an independent Islamic state centered
in northwest Yunnan. The state survived for almost 16 years, and the
Muslims worked closely together with other indigenous peoples. However,
following the quelling of other major rebellions, the Chinese Emperor
ordered his troops to concentrate their efforts on Yunnan; the
massacres that ensued wiped out the majority of Muslims in the region.
Estimates of the percentage killed range from 60 to 85 percent, and
more than a century later, their population has still not recovered its
original number. Another consequence of the rebellion was a series of
government regulations severely restricting the lives of Muslims.\4\
From a Han Chinese perspective, the
insistence on the part of the Muslims to fight for their rights even
against overwhelming odds, was a sign of violent tendencies, rather
than a desire for justice
regardless of the consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Muslims were no longer allowed to live within city walls, were
restricted to certain occupations, and in most cases lost all their
personal property, businesses, farm land, and communal property, such
as schools and mosques.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the communists rise to power in the 1940s, many Muslims
agreed to support them in exchange for guarantees of religious freedom.
Although in the early years of the PRC these promises were respected,
during subsequent political campaigns, culminating with the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976), the Muslims of China found their religion
outlawed, their religious leaders persecuted, imprisoned and even
killed, and their mosques defiled, if not destroyed.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ During this period all worship and religious education were
forbidden, and even simple common utterances such as insha'allah (God
willing), or al-hamdulillah (thanks be to God) could cause Muslims to
be punished. Despite the danger, Muslims in many parts of China
continued their religious studies in secret.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the
Muslims of China lost no time in rebuilding their devastated
communities. Throughout China, Muslims began slowly to restore their
religious institutions and revive their religious
activities. Their first priority was to rebuild their damaged mosques
thereby allowing communities to create a space in which they could once
again pray together, but also so that the mosques could reassert their
role as centers of Islamic learning. Over the next two decades mosques
throughout most of the country organized classes for not only girls and
boys, and young adults, but also for older men and women who had not
had the opportunity to study their religion. Beginning in the late
1980s and continuing to the 1990s Islamic colleges have also been
established throughout most of China.
Within China, when asked how to explain the recent resurgence in
Islamic education, community members cite two main reasons: a desire to
rebuild that which was taken from them, and the hope that a strong
religious faith would help protect Muslim communities from the myriad
of social problems presently besetting China in this day and age of
rapid economic development. Chinese Muslim studying overseas reiterate
the need to equip themselves and their communities for their future in
a state which seems to be ideologically adrift.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Over the past decade an increasing number of Chinese Muslims
have decided to pursue their religious studies at Islamic universities
overseas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After many years of living in China and interviewing religious
teachers and students, I am convinced that these studies have an
overwhelmingly positive influence on Chinese society. Older Muslims are
finally able to study their religious traditions, and young people are
able to learn the guiding moral traditions of Islam,
including a respect for the state and its laws. As both of my daughters
attended the public Hui preschool in Kunming for several years, I can
attest to the extraordinary degree to which the teachers promoted civic
responsibility and community values.
Moreover, Muslim religious leaders have been able to assist in the
national government's efforts to stem the increasing number of rural
households who are sacrificing their children's education, particularly
their daughters', as recent economic reforms have resulted in school
fees that are crippling families incomes. Imams have worked together
with the All-China Women's Federation to remind peasants in rural areas
of their religious obligation within Islam to educate all their
children. Women have also played a very active role in the revival of
Islamic education, both as students and as teachers. The women are well
aware of the importance of educating girls, for as one said to me,
``educate a man, educate an individual; educate a women, educate a
nation.''
The Muslims' emphasis on education, both secular and religious, is
not a surprise. As other minority groups who have survived the
vicissitudes of state persecution over time, they have learned that the
only thing that cannot be taken away from them is their education.
Consequently, Muslims in China have always be over represented among
teachers, professors and college graduates.
At present the government still maintains very strict control on
all aspects of public religious practice and education throughout
China. The government controls the faculty, student and curriculum of
Islamic schools. It controls the appointment of imams in mosques, and
decides which ones will be allowed to lead prayers at the Friday
services. I will now turn to the situation of Muslims in Xinjiang.
CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG
Although Muslims throughout China face a variety of challenges and
are the
subject of a wide range of discriminatory actions, the situation for
the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang is unprecedented in its severity,
surpassing even the repressive policies facing the Tibetans. Muslims
that hold official positions, including faculty at the universities are
forbidden to carry out any religious activity in public. They are not
allowed to attend mosque, fast during Ramadan, or in any other way
respect their religious traditions in public. There are signs on
mosques refusing entry to anyone under 18 years of age. Islamic
education outside the one officially controlled school is forbidden.
The state has conflated the practice of Islam with separatist
activity and completely overreacted in its illegally prohibiting almost
all forms of Islamic education and public religious practice. Large
numbers of Muslims in Xinjiang have been thrown in jail and sentenced
without public trial. And an untold number have been executed for
accused political crimes.
Once the overwhelming majority in Xinjiang, Uighurs and other
Muslim peoples will soon be outnumbered by Han Chinese immigrants. And
although the government is committed to spending millions of dollars on
development projects there, the primary beneficiaries in virtually
every major industrial and development project, have been the immigrant
Han Chinese population, and often with tremendous negative
environmental impact on the region.
SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
All Muslims should have the freedom to practice their
religion, and all parents should have the freedom to bring their
children with them to mosque.
All Muslims should have the freedom to take part in
Islamic studies classes, and pursue a deeper understanding of their
religion.
All schools in predominantly minority areas should be
allowed to teach the cultural traditions and history of the minority
people there. At present the curricula of all primary and secondary
schools in China are controlled at the national level, and minority
peoples are not allowed to study their own history and culture.\7\
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\7\ Outside of Xinjiang, Chinese Muslims are able to offer classes
for preschool students, and in after school programs and summer
programs for older children.
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The current quota of only 2,000 people being allowed to
make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca should be increased to at least
20,000 (which is the normal amount that would be allowed using the
Saudi calculation of one hajj visa for every 10,000 Muslims in a given
country); and there should be no age restrictions (presently only
people 60 and older are allowed to make the pilgrimage).
The government is making it increasingly difficult for
Muslims to receive a passport, thereby limiting their ability to take
part in the hajj, study overseas, and take part in business activities.
Religious belief should not be used as a reason for denying an
individual a passport.
Over the past decade, throughout China mosques and Muslim
neighborhoods dating back centuries have been destroyed as a result of
real estate and public development projects. Efforts should be made,
ideally through international organizations like UNESCO, to protect
Muslim neighborhoods and preserve historic mosques as national heritage
sites. These communal spaces are of fundamental importance to the
survival of these communities.
Muslims in official and public roles should not be coerced
into publicly renouncing their religious obligations, for example being
forced to eat during daylight hours during Ramadan, the month of
fasting.
Remove ethnicity from national id cards as it leads to
discrimination in employment, housing, and traveling.
RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFIC TO XINJIANG
The government should allow Uighurs and other indigenous
peoples to freely study and learn their own languages and history.
The decision to discontinue the use of the Uighur language
at all universities in Xinjiang should be rescinded. According to
numerous reports, last summer thousands of books in the Uighur language
were burned by government officials in Xinjiang.
Although Radio Free Asia broadcasts in Uighur, VOA does
not.
The US should support the establishment of local non-
political NGOs by indigenous peoples to promote economic, educational
and public health development projects.
CONCLUSION
At the present time many Muslims in China continue to hope and pray
that the US Government will use its influence to persuade the Chinese
state to uphold its moral and international obligations to allow for
the freedom of religion and the survival of indigenous cultures. Recent
actions by the US, including the decision to
acquiesce to Beijing's labeling a small obscure Uighur group, the ETIM
(Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement) as a ``terrorist organization,''
have done much to undermine Chinese Muslims' faith in the US as
protector of basic human rights.
And although there are numerous reports made by the Chinese state,
and often repeated in the Western press that radical separatism is a
common desire in Xinjiang, in fact in dozens of conversations, spanning
20 years now, I have never heard a Uighur call for violent attacks on
the Chinese state. They have spoken with an increasing despair that
they simply be allowed to practice their religion, continue to use
their language in their studies, and uphold their traditional cultural
practices, as citizens of China.
I entreat our government to encourage the Chinese state to uphold
the basic rights of the Muslims in China. Current repressive tactics
not only undermine the Muslims rights to pass on their religious and
moral values and cultural practices to their children, they also
undermine the Muslims' trust in the Chinese Government.
In conclusion, although maintaining their religious beliefs and
practices over the centuries has been a continual challenge, Muslims in
China have always been confident of their identities as both Muslims
and Chinese. Although many have presumed that these identities were
somehow inherently antagonistic, the survival of Islam in China for
over a millennium belies these assumptions. Islamic and Chinese values
have both proven to be sufficiently complementary and dynamic to allow
for the flourishing of Islam in China, and God willing, it will
continue to.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator From Nebraska,
Co-Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing. China's
progress on human rights has unfortunately not matched its economic
progress over the last few years. While the Chinese Government has
begun to address questions regarding human rights abuses, significant
issues remain.
The Chinese Government severely restricts religious freedom,
despite guaranteeing it in the Chinese Constitution. Members of
religious groups not recognized by the government are routinely
subjected to intimidation, harassment, and detention. Although Chinese
law expressly prohibits religious persecution, the devout are often
punished while their persecutors' crime is overlooked.
Despite the Chinese Government's repressive actions, membership in
unregistered churches, mosques, and temples is growing in China. More
Chinese citizens practice a religion today than ever before.
However, there are signs that the Chinese Government is becoming
more receptive to a dialogue on religious issues. The United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom has been invited to visit
China--the trip is planned for the next 2 weeks. Beijing has hosted the
Dalai Lama's special envoy to China twice in the past 11 months. These
are welcome developments.
The United States cannot impose its own standards and values on
China, or any nation. But we also cannot ignore China's failure to deal
with this problem. We can encourage and work with the Chinese
Government to help improve the condition of its citizens. Expanding
religious freedom is one such action.
In the coming years, President Hu and Premier Wen must sustain
China's unprecedented economic growth as well as expand religious
freedom and other basic human rights. The U.S. challenge is to convince
China that economic strength and religious freedom are not
contradictory; but complementary paths to prosperity.