- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

[Senate Hearing 108-241]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1050

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

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PART 1

MILITARY POSTURE
SERVICE CHIEFS
SERVICE SECRETARIES
UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
HOMELAND DEFENSE

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FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 6, 13, 18, 20; APRIL 8, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004--Part 1

MILITARY POSTURE b SERVICE CHIEFS b SERVICE SECRETARIES b
UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS b BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE b
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY b
HOMELAND DEFENSE

S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1050

__________

PART 1

MILITARY POSTURE
SERVICE CHIEFS
SERVICE SECRETARIES
UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
HOMELAND DEFENSE

__________

FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 6, 13, 18, 20; APRIL 8, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
87-323 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2004
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture
february 13, 2003

Page

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 10
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 25

Service Chiefs
february 25, 2003

Shinseki, Gen. Eric K., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army.. 115
Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............ 184
Hagee, Gen. Michael W., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps..... 203
Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force.......................................................... 217

Service Secretaries
march 6, 2003

White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army..................... 336
Johnson, Hon. Hansford T., Acting Secretary of the Navy.......... 361
Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force................. 375

Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and
Operational Requirements
march 13, 2003

Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
Pacific Command................................................ 495
LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations
Command, U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command Korea...... 519
Hill, Gen. James T., USA, Commander in Chief, United States
Southern Command............................................... 533

Ballistic Missile Defense
march 18, 2003

Aldridge, Hon. Edward C. ``Pete,'' Jr., Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics............. 588
Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 593
Crouch, Hon. J.D., II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 598
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 605

Atomic Energy Defense Activities of the Department of Energy
march 20, 2003

Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary of Energy....................... 677

Homeland Defense
april 8, 2003

McHale, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense........................................................ 751
Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
Command........................................................ 758
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 764

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Allard,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn,
Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson,
Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Brian
R. Green, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt,
professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Scott
W. Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Kenneth M.
Crosswait, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Christina
D. Still, professional staff member; and Bridget M. Whalan,
special assistant.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C.
Brewer, Sara R. Mareno, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to
Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II and Rick
Dearborn, assistants to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney,
Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant
to Senator Talent; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham; Henry J.
Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans
and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Aaron Scholer,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey and Douglas Bush, assistants to Senator
Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd
Rosenblum and Rashid Hallaway, assistants to Senator Bayh;
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive
testimony from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers on
the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces as it affects the budget
for fiscal year 2004 and in the future.
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, we welcome you back
before the committee and commend you once again for the
outstanding service you both continue to provide to our Nation
and to our men and women in uniform. I observe, as one who has
been in that building, a very close and trusting working
partnership between the two of you, and that's for the best
interests of the men and women in the Armed Forces and indeed,
the country. Our Nation could not have a better team guiding
our military during these challenging times.
As we meet this morning, tens of thousands of our service
members have departed their families, their homes, their jobs,
and are engaged around the world in the global war on
terrorism. Indeed, many of them have taken up posts here at
home in defense of our own Nation. Many thousands more are
preparing for possible conflict in Iraq and the Persian Gulf
region. These very men and women in uniform deserve our
strongest support, and their families here at home. They will
get it.
President Bush stated in the new national security strategy
for the United States, ``Defending our Nation against these
enemies is the first fundamental commitment for the Federal
Government.'' Today, that task has changed dramatically.
Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial
capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks have
demonstrated the ability to inflict great chaos or suffering on
our shores for less than it costs to produce a single tank or
airplane. To defeat this threat, we must make use of every tool
in our arsenal.
Clearly, homeland security is now our Nation's most urgent
priority. The active involvement of our Armed Forces in
defending America, supporting the Nation's homeland security
infrastructure is essential. This committee's most urgent duty
in the 108th Congress must be to insure that the land, sea,
air, space, and cyberspace closest to our shores are defended,
and to be prepared, if necessary, to defeat those who would
bring harm to our shores.
At the same time, however, we must remember, the defense of
our homeland begins in the distant battlefields of the world.
Our forward deployed forces are and will remain our first line
of defense and deterrence. The morale and readiness of these
forces are fundamental to the security of our Nation. It's
critical that we fully honor the services of our men and women
in uniform and that we keep faith in their dedication to duty
through the timely modernization of their equipment and
facilities, and sustain investment in those programs that
enhance the quality of life for our service personnel and their
families.
That message was reinforced as I visited each of our
service secretaries, our service chiefs, and their staffs
during December, preparing once again to assume the
chairmanship of this distinguished committee. I'd like to thank
you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for affording me the
complete and open access to each of the services on the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff. The briefings were of
great benefit to me and my staff as we now assume our duties.
I am encouraged by my initial review of the President's
defense budget request. The fiscal year 2004 request of $379.9
billion represents a $15.3 billion increase over the fiscal
year 2003 level. This is a modest real increase in defense
spending, 2.5 percent, but the 2004 budget request is almost
$52 billion above the fiscal year 2002 enacted level, a
significant increase by any measure.
The sustained increases in defense spending we have made
over the past 3 or 4 years are, I think, making real strong
progress to shore up the needs of this country to protect
itself both here at home and abroad. We will begin fielding
components of a national missile defense this year, filling a
key role of President Bush and indeed preceding Presidents and
many Members of Congress have been in strong support through
these years.
The increased use of unmanned systems, a key initiative of
this committee when I was first its chairman, has become a
reality and a substantial funding for these systems in the
budget will build on the initial successes we have seen so
vividly thus far in the global war on terrorism.
Funding for Navy shipbuilding is increasing, not as much as
we wish, but clearly the curve is headed up with construction
of seven new ships in the budget before us.
I am encouraged by what I have seen so far, but I must add
a note of caution. This budget proposes only a modest increase
in defense spending at a time when our military is engaged in
one war, the global war on terrorism; another war could be
lurking; indeed, a third in the Pacific, the Korean Peninsula
poses another growing threat. We are putting extraordinary
demands on our forces around the world. We are blessed with a
military that has responded to these demands with extraordinary
success, and that military is composed not only of the regular
forces, but the National Guard and the Reserves.
Even the best military in the history of the world has its
limits. People, facilities, equipment, and families can only do
so much with limited resources. As we review the budget request
over the next few years and months, we need to carefully
analyze the effect of this long-term stress on our men and
women in uniform and their families, and consider the
investments needed to ensure we have the people and the
capabilities to carry on the objectives that have been laid
down by our courageous President.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service, and your
continued commitment to the uniformed and civilian personnel of
your department. All you've given in protecting our homeland
and your focus on preparing our Armed Forces to meet the
expected and unexpected stress of the future have greatly
enhanced our national security.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join
you in thanking our witnesses today, thanking you for your
service, and thanking you for coming to share with us your
thoughts on the issues which face our Nation and the world.
Our Armed Forces stand on the brink of possible military
action in the next few weeks. As many as 250,000 of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will be in the Persian
Gulf region preparing for a possible war against Iraq. Almost
40,000 more stand on the front lines in Korea, within range of
North Korean artillery and rockets. Thousands of additional
American troops are risking their lives every day in continued
operations in the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
other hot spots around the world. Of course, many more continue
to work to keep the peace and work to build a more stable
future in the Balkans and elsewhere. To support these efforts,
the President has already called up more than 100,000 members
of the Reserve component to active duty.
Many questions have been raised in recent months about our
policy moves on Iraq, Korea, and elsewhere. Concerns have been
raised about our proclivity to proceed unilaterally; about a
rising tide of anti-Americanism overseas; about the risk that
the focus on Iraq has reduced our focus on the war against
terrorism, which has to be fought and won here at home as well
as overseas; about whether our refusal to talk directly with
the North Korean regime as urged by our South Korean allies may
be undermining our interests in that area of the world; and
about the degree of our commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan
and the possible consequences of a similar lack of follow-
through in Iraq.
I share many of those concerns. I believe that America is
at its strongest and at its best when we make common cause with
other nations in pursuit of common goals. I believe that the
path to a safer world and a more secure America rarely comes
from a go-it-alone approach. Specifically, I believe that in
the absence of an imminent threat, it is in our interest to
have a U.N. resolution authorizing member states to take
military action before initiating a preemptive attack against
Iraq.
If there is any chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without
war, it is for the United Nations to speak with one voice. If
military force is used, the best way of reducing both short-
term risks, including the risks to the U.S. and the Coalition
Forces, and the long-term risks, including the risk of
terrorist attacks on our people throughout the world, is also a
U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force.
Supporting U.N. inspections is an essential step if we're
going to keep the Security Council together. We can show
support for those U.N. inspections by sharing with the U.N.
inspectors the balance of our significant intelligence
information about suspect sites, by quickly getting U-2
aircraft in the air over Iraq without condition, with or
without Saddam Hussein's approval, and by giving the inspectors
the time they need to finish their work, as long as the
inspections are unimpeded.
Yesterday I talked about statements by the administration
that all useful intelligence information in our possession has
now been shared with the U.N. inspectors. Condoleezza Rice told
us exactly that at the White House 10 days ago. George Tenet
told us at an open Intelligence Committee hearing 2 days ago
exactly that. They were in error. Director Tenet acknowledged
yesterday right here that we still have information and we will
be sharing it.
The premature declaration that we've already shared all
useful intelligence makes us seem excessively eager to bring
inspections to a close. Top administration officials from the
beginning said inspections were useless and that inspectors
couldn't find anything without Saddam showing them where it
was.
That's what he's supposed to do, but there is at least a
chance inspections will prove useful even without his
cooperation. Inspectors caught him in lies about his biological
weapons programs in the 1990s, and in this morning's papers it
appears they're catching him in lies about the range of
missiles that he is currently developing.
Another way to support the inspectors is to back up their
request for U-2 surveillance planes with a U.N. resolution that
says that any interference with those planes by Saddam Hussein
will be considered an act of war against the United Nations.
During the State of the Union speech President Bush noted that,
``Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the
United Nations.'' Secretary Powell, during his address to the
U.N. Security Council a week ago, noted that ``Iraq has also
refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would
give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved
before, during, and after inspections.''
In The New York Times on January 30, a senior White House
official is quoted as describing Iraq's refusal to allow the U-
2 surveillance flights, ``the biggest material breach of all,
so far.''
I met with Dr. Blix and his staff on January 31 in New
York. They told me that U-2 flights would be very useful
because of their ability to observe large areas of Iraq over
extended periods of time. U-2 flights would be particularly
helpful to track trucks that appear to be moving items from one
suspicious place to another and to track mobile labs.
Satellites can't track suspicious vehicles; U-2s can.
For this reason, I was astonished to read on Tuesday that
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher characterized what
appeared to be an agreement to implement U-2 flights as,
``nothing worth getting excited about.'' If Iraq's refusal to
allow U-2 surveillance is cited by the President, characterized
by the White House as a big material breach, if Secretary
Powell is right when he says that U-2 surveillance flights
would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved
before, during, and after inspections, then minimizing their
usefulness at this point can only be explained as further
disdain for the inspection's effort.
It may be unlikely that inspectors will catch Saddam with
the goods without his cooperation. It's at least possible,
however, and we should increase that possibility by sharing all
our useful intelligence and using the U-2.
Supporting the inspectors in these and other ways is not
inconsistent with the position that the administration has
correctly taken that the burden is on Saddam Hussein to show
where the prohibited material is or what he's done with it. The
fact that he hasn't carried his burden is undeniable but how
best to deal with his deceit and deception is still ours and
the world's challenge.
At the same time that our Nation faces these vital issues
of war and peace, our committee will be asked to address a wide
range of other issues affecting the Department of Defense over
the next year, including many of the budget issues which the
chairman has just gone through. But we're also told that the
administration is considering a wide array of far reaching
proposals that would change the way the Department of Defense
operates and the role of Congress in overseeing these
operations.
For example, we're told that the administration is
considering a proposal--I emphasize the word considering--that
would:
One, alter congressional oversight and control over defense
expenditures by putting the Department on a 2-year budget cycle
or raising the threshold for reprogramming funds without
congressional approval.
Two, that they are considering a proposal to change the
role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by replacing the
current 4-year term served by the service chiefs with 2-year
terms renewable at the discretion of the Secretary; requiring
the Joint Staff to report to the Secretary of Defense, rather
than to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and requiring
secretarial approval of all appointments to the Joint Staff and
by striking the statutory requirement that the Joint Staff be
``independently organized and operated.''
Three, that's apparently under consideration, we're told,
is to change the role played by the Reserves in our Armed
Forces by, for instance, making it easier to shift money from
Reserve Forces to Active-Duty Forces without the need for
congressional approval, and eliminating the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the highest ranking advocate
for the interests of the Reserve Forces in the Department.
Four, we're told that under consideration is altering the
treatment of the Department's civilian employees by denying
them the right to union representation, eliminating grievance
procedures, making it easier to fire them, and making it easier
to transfer work currently performed by civilian employees to
the private sector without allowing them to compete for their
jobs.
Finally, we're told that under consideration is a proposal
to give the administration the authority to reorganize the
Department without regard to legislative requirements and to
abolish a significant number of positions, including the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict, the DOD official responsible for
coordinating the Department's efforts to combat terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I emphasize that these proposals are
apparently only under consideration. Many of them may never
become formal legislative proposals submitted to Congress. But
in view of the far-reaching impact that they could have if
enacted, our members should be aware that we may have to
address some of them in the coming year.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to utilize the presence of
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers to extend our gratitude to
the men and women of the Department of Defense, military and
civilian alike, for the extraordinary work that they do for us
every hour of every day to ensure our Nation's security.
There may not be unanimity around here on a number of
issues, but there is unanimity around here on at least one
thing. All of us and the American people will stand behind our
uniformed forces if they are engaged in military conflict.
Should they be so engaged, we will provide our men and women in
uniform with everything that they need to ensure that they
prevail promptly and with minimal casualties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
During the course of the hearing this morning, I will
introduce into the record a letter from the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with regard to his
perspectives on the very important matter that my colleague has
raised concerning the flow of intelligence information from our
Government to the Security Council and to Hans Blix'
organization.
I have been present at I think most of the meetings that my
distinguished colleague has had with the director and/or his
staff. I have views somewhat different on the same facts; I
basically believe there has been a very orderly and carefully
prepared flow of information from our Government. That flow is
controlled only in a manner to enhance and to support the work
by Blix and his team.
But nevertheless, I felt it important and I asked the
director to prepare a letter, which he ensured me about 20
minutes ago would be forthcoming, and I will share it with you
and we may have further comments on this important subject as
the day goes on. But I just wanted to tell Secretary Rumsfeld,
this is a matter which is being addressed by Director Tenet and
his staff.
[The information referred to follows:]

Gentlemen and ladies of the committee, we now have a quorum
present. We have a very important piece of business, and I ask
your support, Mr. Secretary and General, for a minute while we
attend to the following.
I ask the committee now to consider a resolution for the
committee funding and committee rules for the 108th Congress.
Senator Levin and I have worked together on both of these
items. Under Senate rules, each committee of the Senate is
required to report out a resolution at the beginning of each
Congress authorizing that committee to make expenditures out of
the contingent funds of the Senate to defray its expenses,
including staff salaries and administrative expenses for a 2-
year period.
The committee staff has worked together to prepare this
resolution on the committee budget and it is before us today.
You and I, Senator Levin, have reviewed that and have
authenticated this work. The proposed budget is in line with
the funding guidelines provided by the Rules Committee. If
there are no questions before the committee, I proceed to seek
a vote.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I support this and thank you
for you and your staff's great work on it.
Chairman Warner. Would you then, Senator Levin, make the
motion to report out the committee's funding resolution?
Senator Levin. So moved.
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Warner. The motion is agreed to.
In addition, the committee must adopt its rules for the
108th Congress. Senator Levin and I have reviewed the rules and
have agreed that no changes from the previous Congress are
required. Therefore, I recommend that the committee adopt the
rules that were followed by the 107th Congress. A copy of the
rules has been provided to each member. Any questions? Hearing
none, I turn to Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I move the adoption of the rules.
Senator Allard. Second.
Chairman Warner. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.]
Both motions are voted in block. Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd. The chair didn't ask for the negatives.
Chairman Warner. Very well, I will repeat that again. Is
there any objection? Hearing none, the rules are adopted in
block, the budget is adopted in block, and I thank our
distinguished former president pro tempore, who is always
correct.
Senator Levin. Even when he's not correct, he's always
correct, which is rarely. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Now, Mr. Secretary, we anxiously await the
message by yourself and your distinguished Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. My understanding, as we discussed this
morning, is that you have a very lengthy statement, which you
have now condensed, and you will give us the condensed version,
but we accept into the record the full statements by all
witnesses present today.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I appreciate this opportunity to update the
committee on our progress in transforming the Department of
Defense and to discuss the President's budget for fiscal years
2004 to 2009.
We are, of course, engaged in a war on terror in an effort
to protect America and our allies in a time when terrorist
networks and terrorist states are trying to get weapons of mass
destruction. Our Nation is fortunate to have so many brave men
and women who voluntarily risk their lives to defend our
country. Sixty-three American service members have died since
the global war on terror began. Already this year, six have
given their lives. We are grateful to all who serve and to
their families who worry about them understandably, and endure
the separations from them. The families also serve our country.
We have a responsibility to give them the resources they need
to defend the country in this new century.
We have entered what may very well prove to be the most
dangerous security environment the world has known, and the
more we learn, the more we realize how large and demanding
these new challenges are proving to be.
The 2004 numbers represented our best estimate at the time
the budget was developed. It may well change over the coming
period as we learn more about the demands of safety on a
worldwide basis. There is no doubt in my mind, for example,
that we will be back with a supplemental, and reasonably soon,
to fund the global war on terrorism as well as the cost of
flowing forces in connection with support to the diplomacy in
Iraq.
We also have intense efforts underway to transform the
Department and streamline and modernize to save the taxpayers
money. As those efforts succeed, we ought to be able to shift
some of those resources towards more urgent and more productive
uses. President Bush vowed that on taking office he would order
an immediate comprehensive review of our military. He said he
would give his team at the Department a broad mandate to
challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of
American defense for the decades to come.
Mr. Chairman, for the past 2 years we have pursued the
goals he set out. We have fashioned a new defense strategy, a
new approach to sizing our forces, a new approach to balancing
risks. We have reorganized the Department to better focus on
space activities. We've adopted a new unified command plan
which establishes a new Northern Command to better defend the
homeland, a Joint Forces Command that focuses on
transformation, and a new Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
responsible for early warning of and defense against missile
attack and the conduct of long range attack.
We have expanded the mission of the Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) so that it can not only support missions
directed by regional combatant commanders, but also plan and
execute its own missions in the global war on terror.
We have reorganized and revitalized the missile defense
research, development, and testing program, freed from the
constraints the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We have
completed a nuclear posture review with a new approach to
deterrence that will enhance our security while permitting
historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
We have moved from a threat-based to a capability-based
approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who might
threaten us or where we might be threatened, or even when, but
more on how we might be threatened and what portfolio of
capabilities we will need to deter and defend against these new
threats. These are critically important accomplishments. They
will benefit our national security for many years to come.
But as important as these changes are, they must be only
the beginning. To win the global war on terror, our Armed
Forces need to be flexible, light, and agile so that they can
respond quickly to sudden changes. The same is true of the men
and women who support them in the Department. They also need to
be flexible, light, and agile so we can move money and shift
people, and design and buy new weapons more quickly and respond
to the frequent sudden changes in our security environment.
Today we simply do not have that kind of agility. In an age
when terrorists move information with the speed of an e-mail,
money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed
of a commercial jetliner, the Defense Department is still
bogged down in micromanagement and bureaucratic processes of
the industrial age, not the information age. Some of these
difficulties are self imposed to be sure, some of them are the
result of law and regulation, but together they have created a
culture that too often stifles innovation.
Consider just a few of the obstacles that we are faced with
every day. Think of this 2004 budget that we consider today. It
was developed by the Department from March to December of last
year, the year 2002. This is for the 2004 budget. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) considered it from December to
February of this year when the President presented it to
Congress this month. Congress will be likely considering it
from now until October or November of this year, and if as in
the past, changing 10 or 20 percent of what the President
proposed. DOD will then live with what's left during the period
from October of this year to September 2004. That means that at
any given time during the fiscal year of that budget, that
plan, it will be between 14 and 30 months old while we're
trying to implement what Congress provides.
We will be doing this in a world that's changing more
rapidly than that. At a minimum, the budget will be something
like a year to 2\1/2\ years out of date at any given time. The
Department spends an average of about $42 million an hour. If
we are permitted to move $15 million from one account to
another, nothing more than that without getting permission from
between four and six different congressional committees, a
process that can take several months to complete.
Today we estimate we have some 300,000 uniformed people
doing non-military jobs. Yet, we're calling up Reserves to
fight the global war on terror. We need to prepare and submit
some 26,000 pages of justification and over 800 required
reports to Congress each year. Many have, I believe, value at
the outset but have only limited value years later. These
reports consume many thousands of hours on the part of the
Department personnel. These problems make it increasingly
difficult to balance risks.
Consider these facts. I am told that the last time I was
Secretary of Defense, the 1977 Defense Authorization Bill was
16 pages long. In 2001, it has grown to 534 pages. In 1977,
Congress made a total of 46 changes to the Army and Defense
Agency research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
programs. In 2001, that number had grown from 46 to 450
individual changes made by Congress. Every change that Congress
makes in a program to increase something, there is a cost
elsewhere in the budget that has to be subtracted. For example,
we add something one place, we may have to reduce funding for
housing, spare parts, or transformation. Of course it makes it
very difficult to balance risks.
But the point is this: We're fighting the first wars of the
21st century with a Department that was really fashioned to
meet the challenges of the mid-20th century, and we need
together to find ways that we can fix that.
Last year Congress enacted historic legislation to create a
new Department of Homeland Security and rearrange the
Government to be better prepared for attacks against our homes,
schools, and places of work. I hope we can now address the
Department of Defense. We're already working with a number of
you on the committee, through your staffs, to fashion
legislation to present to you to bring the Defense Department
into the 21st century, and to transform how it moves money, how
it manages people, and how it buys weapons.
I must say, at this point, that I listened to Senator Levin
and I have not heard of many, if not most, of the things that
were being cited by the Senator, and I wouldn't want any
impression to be left that that litany of items are things that
we've concluded, because we haven't. Indeed, we decided to work
with your staffs and work with the members in this body and the
other body so that we can fashion some sort of an omnibus bill
that has a reasonable chance of being approved.
We're looking at, among other things, proposals to
establish a national security personnel system that could give
us somewhat greater flexibility as to how we handle and manage
our civilian personnel. A nonintuitive effect is the difficulty
in managing wonderful people on the civilian side. It's a
difficult element of the Department to manage, and as a result,
we find that people are constantly using people in uniform
instead of civilians, which wasn't the intention at all.
They're using them because they can move them in and move them
out and direct them better than they can the civilian force.
We find that people are also using contractors much more
than probably makes sense to avoid the difficulties in having a
civilian population that the Department really doesn't manage.
They are more managed by the Office of Personnel Management.
We are talking about the possibility with your staffs and
members about a one-time reorganization with fast track
approval procedures.
We think we need to establish more flexible rules for the
flow of money through the Department. We're talking about the
possibility of establishing a 2-year budget cycle, so that the
hundreds of people who invest time and energy to review each
major program each year can be freed up to consider in 1 year
the tasks of implementation and performance and methods.
We're trying to figure out ways that we can eliminate some
of the regulations that make it difficult for many small
enterprises to do business with the Department. We think it's
important that they have the opportunity to do business with
the Department.
We're looking at ways to expand our authority for
competitive outsourcing so that we can get military personnel
out of non-military tasks and back into the field. We are also
trying to establish more flexible military retirement rules so
those who want to serve longer may have the option to do so.
We're consulting with all of you as I said, and I hope we
can find some approach that will help us achieve those goals.
Where we have authority to fix problems, we're working hard
to do so, but to get the kind of flexibility that we're
required to have in this new security environment, I believe
we're going to end up needing legislative relief and we will
need your help in working with us on that.
As to the defense budget, last year's budget, the fiscal
year 2003 request, was finalized just as our review process was
nearing completion. We were able to begin funding some
transforming initiatives as the new defense strategy came into
focus. But it is this year's budget, the fiscal year 2004
budget request before you, that is really the first to reflect
the new defense strategies and policies.
Balancing risks between near- and long-term challenges is
difficult. It's difficult in peacetime, but today to best serve
our country we need to accomplish three challenges at once. To
successfully fight the global war on terror, prepare for near-
term threats by making long delayed investments in readiness,
people, and modernization, and also preparing for the future by
continuing the process of transforming.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request before you is designed
to help do all three. Our defense review identified six goals
that drive our efforts.
First, we have to be able to defend the homeland and bases
of operation overseas.
Second, we have to project and sustain forces in distant
theaters.
Third, we have to be able to deny enemy sanctuary.
Fourth, we have to improve our space capabilities and
maintain unhindered access to space.
Fifth, we must harness our country's advantages in
information technology to link up different kinds of U.S.
forces so they can truly fight jointly.
Sixth, we have to be able to protect U.S. information
networks from attack and to be able to disable the information
networks of our adversaries.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request has funds to support
each of these important tasks. Over the next 6 years, we have
proposed a 30-percent increase in procurement funding and a 65-
percent increase in funding for research, development, testing,
and evaluation, above the fiscal year 2002 baseline budget, a
total investment of about $150 billion.
The total investment in transforming military capabilities
in the fiscal year 2004 budget request is estimated at $24.3
billion, and about $240 billion over the next 6 years.
To prepare for the threats we will face later in this
decade, the fiscal year 2004 budget request increased
investments in a number of areas. Over the next 6 years, the
President has requested a 15-percent increase in military
personnel accounts above the 2002 baseline budget, and an
increase in funding for family housing by 10 percent over that
period. Over the next 6 years, we have requested a 20-percent
increase for operations and maintenance accounts above the 2002
baseline budget. We've added $40 billion for maintenance for
all services and $6 billion for facility sustainment over that
period.
These investments should help to put a stop to the past
practice of raiding the investment accounts to pay for the
immediate operation and maintenance needs.
The fiscal year 2004 budget does not, I repeat, does not
include funds for operations for the global war on terror. Last
year we requested, but Congress did not provide, the $10
billion that we knew we would need for the first few months to
conduct the global war on terror, including the combat air
patrols over the United States, the force protection in the
United States, and the other aspects of it. Because we're still
without those funds, every month since October 2002--October,
November, December 2002, January, and now February 2003, we've
had to borrow from other programs to pay for the cost of war,
robbing Peter to pay Paul. That does not include the cost of
preparations for a possible contingency in Iraq and the cost of
the flow of forces that has taken place thus far in support of
the diplomacy.
Indeed, shifting money around in this way is we believe
inefficient and ultimately the most expensive method possible
for funding. We will be coming to you later this year for a
2003 war supplemental to get the money we had wanted a year ago
and we knew would be necessary. In the end, to make up for the
cost of having to shift funds, we will probably need somewhat
more money than would otherwise have been the case. This
pattern has been fundamentally harmful to our ability to manage
the Department and show respect for taxpayers' money.
In the fiscal year 2004 request, we've increased the
shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion, making good on our hope
expressed last year that we could increase shipbuilding from
five to seven ships per year. We increased the special
operations budget by $1.5 billion to pay for equipment that was
lost in the global war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and an additional 1,890 people.
We increased military and civilian pay by $3.7 billion.
We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion, including
increased funds for research and development (R&D) of promising
new technologies and to deploy a small number of interceptors
beginning in 2004.
The President asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion
for fiscal year 2004. That's a $15.3 billion increase over last
year's budget. That's a large amount of the taxpayers' money
but even with that increase as large as it is, we still have to
make some tough choices between competing demands.
Let me state it straight out. Despite the significant
increase in shipbuilding, we did not get the shipbuilding rate
up to the desired rate of close to 10 ships per year. Because
of planned retirements of other ships, we will drop below a 300
ship fleet during the course of the Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP).
The Navy is in the process of transforming and we have had
increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do not want to lock
ourselves into a shipbuilding program until we know more
precisely which ships we will want to build in the outyears.
We have not been able to modernize our tactical air forces
fast enough to reduce the average age of the Defense
Department's aircraft fleet. We have not fully resolved our so-
called high demand low density problems, systems like Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which because
they have been chronically underfunded in the past will still
be in short supply in this budget.
We opted not to modernize a number of legacy programs,
taking on some near-term risks to transforming capabilities
that we will need in this fast moving world.
We did not achieve the level of growth in science and
technology (S&T) accounts that we had hoped for. Our request is
$10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent of the 2004 budget. That's below
the goal of 3 percent, although because the budget is up, the
actual amount is rising.
Now that's the bad news, but there's good news as well. In
making difficult choices between competing priorities, we made
better choices because we followed the new approach to try to
balance risks that we developed in last year's defense review,
an approach that tries to take into account not just the risks
in operations and in contingency plans but also the risks to
people, modernization, and to the future. The result is a more
balanced approach and we hope a more coherent program. As such,
it's a program that can be adversely unbalanced unintentionally
unless we are careful and work together as you and the
Appropriations Committee in the other chamber of Congress
complete your work.
While we're requesting increased funds, the services have
stepped up to the plate and will be cancelling, slowing, or
restructuring a number of programs. In all, the Army, Navy, and
Air Force have achieved savings of some $80 billion over the
FYDP, money that will be reinvested by the Services in
capabilities they believe are important for this new security
environment.
As a result of these strategic investments and decisions,
we can now see the effects of transforming beginning to unfold.
Consider some of the changes that are taking place.
Today the missile defense research, development, and
testing program has been revitalized and we are on track for a
limited land-sea deployment in 2004 and 2005.
Today we're converting four Trident submarines into
conventional nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines
(SSGNs) capable of delivering special forces and cruise
missiles, a part of the nuclear posture review.
Today we're proposing to build the nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier CVN 21 in 2007, which will include many, if not all, of
the new capabilities that were previously scheduled to be
introduced only in 2011.
Today we have seen targeted pay raises and other reforms
help retain mid-career officers and non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) so that fewer of them leave the Service while still in
their prime, and so the country can continue to benefit from
their enormous talents and skills.
These are positive changes that will ensure that future
administrations will have the capabilities they need to defend
the country.
Finally, I believe that the transparency of the process
that we've used to develop this budget has been unprecedented.
For several months now we have been providing detailed
briefings to those interested in defense here on Capitol Hill
so that Congress is not simply being presented with the
President's budget today but has been kept in the loop as
decisions have been made. Our goal was to ensure that Members
and staff had every opportunity to better understand the
thinking that lies behind these proposals. I'm told that the
extent of consultation from the Department to Congress this
year has been unprecedented.
We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation can
continue in the period ahead. We need to work together to bring
DOD out of the industrial age and help get in range for the
fast paced security environment we live in.
I close by saying that transformation is not an event,
there is not a point at which the Defense Department will move
from being untransformed to transformed. Our goal is to set in
motion a process of continuing transformation in a culture that
will keep the United States several steps ahead of potential
adversaries. To do that, we need not only resources but equally
we need the ability to use them with speed and agility, so that
we can respond quickly to the new threats we will face as the
century unfolds.
I feel deeply about the urgency of seeing that we transform
the Department and enable it to serve the American people and
our friends and allies in a responsible way in the 21st
century. We will have to work together if we are to best serve
the country.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to update the committee on our progress in transforming the
Department of Defense for the 21st century and to discuss the
President's budget for fiscal year 2004-2009.
President Bush vowed that, on taking office, he would order ``an
immediate, comprehensive review of our military--the structure of its
forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement.''
He warned of new dangers--of ``barbarism emboldened by technology,''
the proliferation of ``weapons of mass destruction . . . car bombers
and plutonium merchants give his team at the Department of Defense ``a
broad mandate to challenge the status quo and envision a new
architecture of American defense for decades to come.''
The goal, he said, would be ``to move beyond marginal
improvements--to replace existing programs with new technologies and
strategies.'' Doing this, he said, ``will require spending more--and
spending more wisely.''
Mr. Chairman, for the past 2 years, we have pursued the goals he
set out. We have:

Fashioned a new defense strategy.
Replaced the decade-old two Major Theater War approach
with a new approach to sizing our forces that allows us to
provide for homeland defense, undertake a major regional
conflict and win decisively, including occupying a country and
changing the regime if necessary, simultaneously swiftly defeat
another aggressor in another theater, and in addition have the
capability of conducting a number of lesser contingencies.
Developed a new approach to balancing risks that takes
into account not just the risks to immediate war plans, but
also the risks to people and transformation.
Reorganized the Department to better focus our space
activities.
Adopted a new Unified Command Plan, which establishes
the new Northern Command to better defend the homeland; a Joint
Forces Command that focuses on transformation; and a new
Strategic Command responsible for early warning of, and defense
against, missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks.
Expanded the mission of the Special Operations
Command, so that it can not only support missions directed by
the regional combatant commanders, but also plan and execute
its own missions in the global war on terror, supported by
other combatant commands.
Initiated work with Allies to develop a new North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure and begin
work on a new NATO Response Force.
Took steps to attract and retain talent in our Armed
Forces, with targeted pay raises and quality of life
improvements.
Made a number of tough program decisions, including
replacement of the Crusader, B-1 modernization, and the Navy
``area-wide'' restructuring.
Instituted ``realistic budgeting,'' giving Congress
more realistic estimates of what programs can be expected to
cost, rather than coming back for annual non-emergency
supplementals.
Reorganized and revitalized the missile defense
research, development and testing program, freed from the
constraints of the ABM Treaty.
Completed the Nuclear Posture Review, with a new
``approach to deterrence that will enhance our security, while
permitting historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear
weapons.
Moved from a ``threat-based'' to a ``capabilities-
based'' approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who
might threaten us, or where, or when--and more on how we might
be threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities we will need
to deter and defend against those new threats.

These are important accomplishments. They represent some of the
most significant changes in the strategy and structure of our Armed
Forces in at least a generation.
But as important as these changes are, they must be only the
beginning. Because transforming is about more than developing new
strategies and structures--it is about changing culture, about
encouraging new ways of thinking, so we can develop new ways of
fighting and provide our Armed Forces the tools they need to defend our
way of life in the 21st century.
We are working to promote a culture in the Defense Department that
rewards unconventional thinking--a climate where people have freedom
and flexibility to take risks and try new things. We are working to
instill a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military
capabilities, one that encourages people to behave less like
bureaucrats; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be
``validated,'' but rather anticipates them before they emerge--and
develops and deploys new capabilities quickly, to dissuade and deter
those threats.
Most agree that to win the global war on terror, our Armed Forces
need to be flexible, light, and agile--so they can respond quickly to
sudden changes. Well, the same is true of the men and women who support
them in the Department of Defense. They also need to be flexible,
light, and agile--so they can move money, shift people, and design and
buy new weapons quickly, and respond to sudden changes in our security
environment.
Today, we do not have that kind of agility. In an age when
terrorists move information at the speed of an email, money at the
speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial
jetliner, the Defense Department is bogged down in the micromanagement
and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age--not the information
age. Some of our difficulties are self-imposed, to be sure. Some are
the result of law and regulation. Together they have created a culture
that too often stifles innovation. Consider just a few of the obstacles
we face each day:

Think of this fiscal year 2004 budget--it was
developed by the Department of Defense from March 2002 to
December 2002. OMB considered it from December 2002 to February
2003 when the President presented it to Congress. Congress will
be considering it from February 2003 to probably October or
November 2003 and, as in the past, making 10-20 percent changes
in what he proposed. DOD will then try to live with what's left
during the period October 2003 to September 2004. That means
that at any given time during the fiscal year of that budget,
it will be 14 months to 30 months old while we are trying to
implement what Congress gives us. All this in a world that is
changing monthly before our eyes.
The Department of Defense spends an average of $42
million an hour--yet we are not allowed to move $15 million
from one account to another without getting permission from 4-6
different congressional committees, a process that can take
several months to complete.
Today, we estimate we have some 320,000 uniformed
people doing non-military jobs, yet we are calling up Reserves
to fight the global war on terror.
We must prepare and submit 26,000 pages of
justification and over 800 required reports to Congress each
year--many of marginal value and most probably never read--
consuming hundreds of thousands of manhours.
Despite 128 acquisition reform studies, we have a
system in the Defense Department that since 1975 has doubled
the time it takes to produce a new weapons system--in an era
when technology moves so fast that new technologies often
become obsolete in months and years, not decades.
Since September 11, our force protection costs have
gone up by some $5 billion annually. But because we are
required to keep some 20 percent plus more facilities capacity
than are needed to support the force, we are effectively
wasting something like $1 billion every year on force
protection alone for bases and facilities we do not need. We
need to follow through with the base closure process that
Congress authorized last year without changes.
We have to contend with growing micromanagement of the
Defense budget, making it increasingly difficult to balance
risks. Consider these facts:

The last time I was Secretary of Defense, the
1977 defense authorization bill was 16-pages long--in
the year 2001 it had grown to 534 pages.
In 1977, Congress made a total of 46 changes
to Army and Defense Agency research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs; by 2001 that
number had grown to 450 individual changes. For every
change Congress makes in a program, there is a cost
elsewhere in the budget--every plus-up in one place
means we must reduce funds for something else, be it
housing, or spare parts or transformation--making it
exceedingly difficult to balance risks.

We spend millions of taxpayer dollars training top-
notch officers and senior enlisted, giving them experience--and
then we shove them out the door in their 40s and early 50s,
when they are at the top of their game--and we will be paying
60 percent of their base pay and providing them with
comprehensive healthcare for the rest of their lives. The loss
in talent and experience to the Department and the country is
sizable.
We bounce officers around from assignment to
assignment every 16, 18, 22 months, so many end up skipping
across the tops of the waves so fast they don't have time to
learn from their own mistakes.
We rely on almost 1,800 antiquated legacy information
systems to run the Defense finance end accounting systems--
ensuring we cannot produce timely and accurate management
information.
We have the equivalent of an Army heavy division's
worth of auditors, inspectors, and investigators.
We have thousands of people focused on developing and
justifying budgets, and a fraction of those focused on ensuring
effective implementation and desired outcomes.

The point is this, we are fighting the first wars of the 21st
century with a Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the
challenges of the mid-20th century. We have an industrial age
organization, yet we are living in an information age world, where new
threats emerge suddenly, often without warning, to surprise us. We
cannot afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to live in that
world.
Some of the fault for this lies with the executive branch; some
lies with the legislative branch, and some is simply due to the fast
pace of events. But the American people do not care about blame--for
their sake we need to get to work fixing the problems.
Last year, Congress and the administration did just that, when we
faced up to the fact that our Government was not organized to deal with
the new threats to the American homeland. You enacted historic
legislation to create a new Department of Homeland Security and
rearrange our Government to be better prepared for potential attacks
against our homes and schools and places of work.
We must now address the Department of Defense. We are already
working with a number of you to fashion legislation to bring the
Defense Department into the 21st century--to transform how it moves
money, manages people, and buys weapons. We are looking at, among other
things, proposals to:

Establish a National Security Personnel System that
will give the Department of Defense greater flexibility in how
it handles and manages its civilian personnel--so we can
attract and retain and improve the performance of our 700,000-
plus civilian work force. Today it is managed outside the
Department. The unintentional effect has been that the
Department uses military personnel and contractors rather than
civilians, since they can be more easily managed.
A one-time reorganization of the Department, with
``fast track'' approval procedures.
Move a number of the non-military functions that have
been thrust on DOD over the years to other Departments that can
provide similar or better services, so DOD can focus on the
tasks where it must excel: defending our country in a dangerous
new century.
Transfer some 1,800 personnel who conduct background
investigations to the Office of Personnel Management. Since the
President has no authority to transfer functions across the
executive branch, we will urge that he be given that authority.
Establish more flexible rules for the flow of money
through the Department, giving us the ability to move larger
sums between programs and priorities, so we can respond quickly
to urgent needs.
Streamline acquisition rules and procedures, to give
the Department greater speed and flexibility in the development
and deployment of new capabilities.
Establish a 2-year budget cycle so that the hundreds
who invest time and energy to rebuild major programs every year
can be freed up and not be required to do so on an annual
basis.
Eliminate some of the onerous regulations that make it
impossible or unattractive for many small enterprises to do
business with the Department.
Expand authority for competitive outsourcing, so we
can get military personnel out of non-military tasks and back
into the field. There is no reason, for example, that the
Defense Department should be in the business of making
eyeglasses, when the private sector makes them better, faster,
and cheaper. But we are. That needs to change.
Clarify environmental statutes which restrict access
to, and sustainment of, training and test ranges essential for
the readiness of our troops and the effectiveness of our
weapons systems in the global war on terror.
Expand our flexibility to extend tour lengths for
military leaders, and fully credit them for joint duty
assignments.
Establish more flexible military retirement rules, so
that those who want to serve longer have the option of doing
so--so we can retain talent instead of automatically pushing it
out the door.
Establish sunset procedures for the hundreds of
required reports so that we can discontinue those that have
outlived their usefulness. We simply must find better ways to
exchange data between DOD and Congress, so that you get the
information you need to assess performance and we do not have
to employ armies of personnel and consultants preparing
information you no longer need.

Let there be no doubt, some of the obstacles we face today are
self-imposed. Where we have authority to fix those problems, we are
working hard to do so. For example, we are modernizing our financial
management structures, to replace some 1,800 information systems so we
can produce timely and accurate management information. We are reducing
staffing layers to increase speed and efficiency. We are modernizing
our acquisition structures to reduce the length of time it takes to
field new systems and drive innovation. We are working to push joint
operational concepts throughout the Department, so we train and prepare
for war the way we will fight it--jointly. We are taking steps to
better measure and track performance.
We are doing all these things, and more. But to get the kind of
agility and flexibility that are required in the 21st century security
environment, we must have legislative relief. We must work together--
Congress and the administration--to transform not only the U.S. Armed
Forces, but the Defense Department that serves them and prepares them
for battle. The lives of the service men and women in the field--and of
our friends and families here at home--depend on our ability to do so.
2004 Defense Budget
At the same time, we are taking steps to implement the changes
agreed upon in the defense review. Last year's budget--the fiscal year
2003 request--was finalized just as that review process was nearing
completion. It included a top-line increase, and made important, and
long-delayed investments in readiness, people, maintenance, and
replacement of aging systems and facilities. We were able to begin
funding some transforming initiatives as the new defense strategy came
into focus.
But it is really this year's budget--the fiscal year 2004 request
before you today--that is the first to fully reflect the new defense
strategies and policies.
We submit this budget to you at a time of war. Our experience in
the global war on terror has validated the strategic decisions that
were made.
When our Nation was attacked, there was a great deal of pressure to
put off transformation--people cautioned, you can't fight the global
war on terrorism and simultaneously transform this institution. The
opposite is the case. The global war on terror has made transforming an
even more urgent priority. Our experience on September 11 made clear,
our adversaries are transforming the ways in which they will threaten
our people. We cannot stand still.
The reality is that while the global war on terror is an impetus
for change, it also complicates our task. Balancing risk between near-
and long-term challenges is difficult even in peacetime. But today, we
must accomplish three difficult challenges at once:

(1) successfully fight the global war on terror;
(2) prepare for near-term threats by making long delayed
investments in readiness, people, and modernization; and
(3) prepare for the future by transforming for the 21st
century.

The 2004 budget request before you today is designed to help us do
all three.
Our defense review identified six goals that drive our
transformation efforts:

First, we must be able to defend the U.S. homeland and
bases of operation overseas;
Second, we must be able to project and sustain forces
in distant theaters;
Third, we must be able to deny enemies sanctuary;
Fourth, we must improve our space capabilities and
maintain unhindered access to space;
Fifth, we must harness our advantages in information
technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces, so they
can fight jointly; and
Sixth, we must be able to protect U.S. information
networks from attack--and to disable the information networks
of our adversaries.

The President's 2004 budget requests funds for investments that
will support each of these. For example:

For programs to help defend the U.S. homeland and
bases of operation overseas--such as missile defense--we are
requesting $7.9 billion in the 2004 budget, and $55 billion
over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
For programs to project and sustain forces in distant
theaters--such as new unmanned underwater vehicle program and
the Future Combat Systems--we are requesting $8 billion in
2004, and $96 billion over the FYDP.
For programs to deny enemies sanctuary--such as
unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and the conversion of SSBN to
SSGN submarines--we are requesting $5.2 billion in 2004 and $49
billion over the FYDP.
For programs to enhance U.S. space capabilities--such
as Space Control Systems--we are requesting $300 million in
2004 and $5 billion over the FYDP.
For programs to harness our advantages in information
technology--such as laser satellite communications, Joint
Tactical Radio, and the Deployable Joint Command and Control
System--we are requesting $2.7 billion in 2004 and $28 billion
over the FYDP.
For programs to protect U.S. information networks and
attack those of our adversaries--such as the Air and Space
Operations Center--we are requesting $200 million in 2004 and
$6 billion over the FYDP.

Over the next 6 years, we have proposed a 30-percent increase in
procurement funding and a 65-percent increase in funding for RDT&E
above the 2002 baseline budget--a total investment of around $150
billion annually.
In addition to these increases, RDT&E spending will rise from 36
percent to 42 percent of the overall investment budget. This shift
reflects a decision to accelerate the development of needed next
generation systems, and by accepting some near-term risk.
Among the more important transformational investments we propose is
our request for funds to establish a new joint national training
capability. In the 21st century, we will fight wars jointly. Yet our
forces still too often train and prepare for war as individual
services. That needs to change. To ensure that U.S. forces train like
they fight and fight like they train, we have budgeted $1.8 billion
over the next 6 years to fund range improvements and permit more of
both live and virtual joint training--an annual investment of $300
million.
The total investment in transforming military capabilities in the
2004 request is $24.3 billion, and about $240 billion over the FYDP.
But even as we continue to transform for the future, we must also
recognize that new and unexpected dangers are waiting for us over the
horizon. To prepare for the threats we will face later in this decade,
the 2004 budget requests increased investments in a number of critical
areas: readiness, quality of life improvements for the men and women in
uniform, and increased investments to make certain existing
capabilities are properly maintained and replenished.
Over the next 6 years, the President has requested a 15-percent
increase for military personnel accounts, above the 2002 baseline
budget, and an increase in funding for family housing by 10 percent
over the same period. The 2004 budget includes $1 billion for targeted
military pay raises, ranging from 2 percent to 6.25 percent. Out of
pocket expenses for those living in private housing drop from 7.5
percent to 3.5 percent in 2004, and are on target for total elimination
by 2005.
Over the next 6 years, we have requested a 20-percent increase for
operation and maintenance accounts above the 2002 baseline budget. We
have added $40 billion for readiness of all the services and $6 billion
for facilities sustainment over the same period. These investments
should stabilize funding for training, spares, and tempo of operations
(OPTEMPO), and put a stop to the past practice of raiding the
investment accounts to pay for the immediate operation and maintenance
needs, so we stop robbing the future to pay today's urgent bills.
This 2004 budget does not include funds for operations in the
global war on terror. Last year, we requested, but Congress did not
provide, the $10 billion we knew we would need for the first few months
of the global war on terror. Because of that, every month since October
2002--October, November, December in 2002 and January and now February
in 2003--we have had to borrow from other programs to pay for the costs
of the war--robbing Peter to pay Paul. That does not include the costs
of preparations for a possible contingency in Iraq. This pattern is
fundamentally harmful to our ability to manage the Department. It
causes waste and harmful management practices which consume management
time that we cannot afford in a time of war and which are unfair to the
taxpayers.
In our 2004 request:

We increased the shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion
making good on our hope last year that we could increase
shipbuilding from five to seven ships.
We increased the Special Operations budget by $1.5
billion, to pay for equipment lost in the global war on terror
and an additional 1,890 personnel.
We increased military and civilian pay by $3.7
billion.
We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion,
including increased funds for research and development of
promising new technologies, and to deploy a small number of
interceptors beginning in 2004.

The President has asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion for
fiscal year 2004--a $15.3 billion increase over last year's budget.
That is a large amount of the taxpayer's hard-earned money. To put
it in context, when I was in Congress in the 1960s, the United States
had the first $100 billion budget for the entire U.S. Government.
Nonetheless, for 2004, the DOD budget will amount to roughly 3.4
percent of Gross Domestic Products (GDP)--still historically low. In
the mid-1980s, for example, the U.S. was dedicating around 6 percent of
GDP to defense.
Nonetheless, it is a significant investment. But compared with the
costs in lives and treasure of another attack like the one we
experienced on September 11--or a nuclear, chemical, or biological
attack that would be vastly worse--less than 3\1/2\ cents on the dollar
is a prudent investment in security and stability.
But even that increase, as large as it is, only gets us part of the
way. Our challenge is to do three difficult things at once:

Win the global war on terror;
Prepared for the threats we will face later this
decade; and
Continue transforming for the threats we will face in
2010 and beyond.

Any one of those challenges is difficult--and expensive. Taking on
all three, as we must, required us to make tough choices between
competing demands. Which meant that, inevitably, some desirable
capabilities did not get funded.
So let me state it straight out:

Despite the significant increase in shipbuilding, we
did not get the shipbuilding rate up to the desired steady
state of 10 ships per year. Because of planned retirements of
other ships, we will drop below a 300-ship fleet during the
course of the FYDP. The Navy is in the process of transforming,
and has two studies underway for amphibious ships and for
submarines--we have increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do
not want to lock ourselves into a shipbuilding program now
until we know precisely which ships we will want to build in
the outyears.
We have not been able to modernize our tactical air
forces fast enough to reduce the average age of our aircraft
fleet.
We have had to delay completing replenishment of all
inadequate family housing by 2007--though we got close!
We have not fully resolved our so-called ``high-
demand/low-density'' problems--systems like JSTARS, which,
because they have been chronically underfunded in the past,
will still be in short supply in this budget.
We opted not to modernize a number of legacy
programs--taking on some near-term risks to fund transforming
capabilities we will need in this fast moving world.
We did not achieve the level of growth in the science
and technology (S&T) accounts we had hoped for. Our request is
$10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent of the 2004 budget. That is
below the goal of 3 percent.
We have delayed investments to completely fix the
recapitalization rate for DOD infrastructure. We are reviewing
out worldwide base structure, and starting the basic steps to
prepare for the 2005 BRAC. We want to think carefully about how
best to match our base structure and force structure. We still
intend to get the rate down from 148 years to 67 years by 2008,
and we expect to accelerate facilities investments in 2006
after we have made the needed decisions with respect to our
base structure at home and abroad.

That's the bad news. But there is the good news as well: in making
difficult choices between competing priorities, we made better choices
this year because we followed the new approach to balancing risks that
we developed in last year's defense review--an approach that takes into
account not just the risks in operations and contingency plans, but
also the risks to people, modernization, and the future--risks that, in
the past, had been crowded out by more immediate pressing demands. The
result is a more balanced approach and a more coherent program.
While we are requesting increased funds, the Services have stepped
up to the plate and will be canceling, slowing, or restructuring a
number of programs--to invest the savings in transforming capabilities.
For example:

The Army came up with savings of some $22 billion over
the 6-year FYDP, by terminating 24 systems, including Crusader,
the Bradley A3, and Abrams upgrades and reducing or
restructuring another 24 including medium tactical vehicles.
The Army used these savings to help pay for new
transformational capabilities, such as the Future Combat
Systems.
The Navy reallocated nearly $39 billion over the FYDP,
by retiring 26 ships and 259 aircraft, and merging the Navy and
Marine air forces. They invested these savings in new ship
designs and aircraft.
The Air Force shifted funds and changed its business
practices to account for nearly $21 billion over the FYDP. It
will retire 114 fighter and 115 mobility/tanker aircraft. The
savings will be invested in readiness, people, modernization
and new system starts and cutting edge systems like unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UCAVs).

In all, by retiring or restructuring less urgent programs, we have
achieved savings of some $80 billion over the FYDP--money that will be
reinvested by the Services in capabilities necessary for the 21st
century.
Finding those savings is important, both in terms of freeing up
resources for more urgent priorities, and because it is respectful of
the taxpayers' hard-earned money. We feel a deep obligation to not
waste the taxpayers' dollars. We need to show the taxpayers that we are
willing to stop doing things that we know we don't need to be doing,
and take that money and put it into investments we need.
Some critics may argue we cut too deeply. We did cancel a number of
programs that were troubled, to be sure, but also others that were not
troubled--but which simply did not fit with our new defense strategy.
In a world of unlimited resources, they would have been nice to have.
But in a world where needs outstrip available funds, we cannot do
everything. Something has to give.
Still others argue from the opposite direction--saying that we did
not cut deeply enough. They ask: what happened to your hit list? The
answer is: we never had a ``hit list.'' What we had was a new defense
strategy, and we reviewed all the programs in the pipeline to see if
they fit into that defense strategy and the new security environment we
face.
Some were eliminated. In other cases, it made more sense to scale
them back or change them. For example, the Comanche helicopter program
was born in the 1980s, and the Army planned to buy around 1,200 of
them. But in the interim, the Army decided to change its structure. In
the way the Army plans to fight in the decades ahead, the role of the
helicopter changes--it will be used more for reconnaissance and light
attack. For that mission 1,200 helicopters weren't needed--so we
brought the number down to about 650.
In still other areas, we set up competition for future missions.
For example, in tactical aircraft, by 2010 the F-22 will be nearing the
end of its planned production run, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will
be coming on line, a number of UCAVs will be ready, and hypersonic
systems could be within reach. As a result, future Presidents will have
a rich menu of choices for strike operations we don't now have.
We are transforming the way we develop new systems. The old way was
to develop a picture of the perfect system, and then build the system
to meet that vision of perfection, however long it took or cost. The
result was that, as technology advanced, and with it dreams of what a
perfect system could do, capabilities were taking longer and longer to
develop and the cost of systems increased again and again--time is
money.
Our approach is to start with the basics, simpler items, and
rollout early models faster--and then add capabilities to the basic
system as they become available. This is what the private sector does--
companies bring a new car or aircraft on line, for example, and then
update it over a period of years with new designs and technologies. We
intend to do the same.
Take, for example, our approach to ballistic missile defense.
Instead of taking a decade or more to develop someone's vision of a
``perfect'' shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place
a rudimentary system by 2004--one which should make us somewhat safer
than we are now--and then build on that foundation with increasingly
effective capabilities as the technologies mature.
We intend to apply this ``spiral development'' approach to a number
of systems, restructured programs, and new starts alike over the course
of the FYDP. The result should be that new capabilities will be
available faster, so we can better respond to fast moving adversaries
and newly emerging threats.
As a result of all these strategic investments and decisions, we
can now see the effects of transforming begin to unfold. Consider just
some of the changes that are taking place:

Today, the missile defense research, development, and
testing program has been revitalized and we are on track for
limited land/sea deployment in 2004-2005.
Today, the Space Based Radar, which will help provide
near-persistent 24/7/365 coverage of the globe, is scheduled to
be ready in 2012.
In this budget, we believe SBIRS-High is properly
funded.
Today, we are converting four Trident SSBN subs into
conventional SSGNs, capable of delivering special forces and
cruise missiles to denied areas. Today, we are proposing to
build the CVN-21 aircraft carrier in 2007, which will include
many new capabilities that were previously scheduled to be
introduced only in 2011.
Today, instead of one UCAV program in development, the
X-45, which was designed for a limited mission: suppression of
enemy air defense, we have set up competition among a number of
programs that will produce UCAVs able to conduct a broad range
of missions.
Today, we are revitalizing the B-1 fleet by reducing
its size and using savings to modernize remaining aircraft with
precision weapons, self-protection systems, and reliability
upgrades--and thanks to these efforts, I am told the B-1 now
has the highest mission capable rates in the history of the
program.
Today, in place of the Crusader, the Army is building
a new family of precision artillery--including precisions
munitions and Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon for the Future Combat
Systems.
Today, we have seen targeted pay-raises and other
reforms help retain mid-career officers and NCOs, so that fewer
of them leave the Service while still in their prime, so the
country can continue to benefit from their talent and
experience.

These are positive changes that will ensure that future
administrations will have the capabilities they need to defend the
country, as well as a menu of choices which they can then select from
to shape the direction of the Department a decade from now, as the 21st
century security environment continues to change and evolve.

CONCLUSION

Finally, I believe that the transparency of the process we have
used to develop this budget has been unprecedented. For several months
now, we have been providing detailed briefings to those interested in
defense here on Capitol Hill, so that Congress is not simply being
presented with the President's budget today, but has been kept in the
loop as decisions were being made. Our goal was to ensure that Members
and staff have had every opportunity to better understand the thinking
that lies behind these proposals. I am told that the extent of
consultation from the Defense Department to Congress this year has been
unprecedented.
I hope you will take this as evidence of the fact that we are
serious about our commitment to transform not only our Armed Forces,
but to transform DOD's relationship with Congress as well. Whether each
Member will agree with each of the individual decisions and
recommendations that have been made in this budget, the fact is that it
has been developed in an unprecedented spirit of openness and
cooperation.
We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation can continue
as Congress deliberates this year both the President's budget and the
legislation we are now discussing with you and will be sending to
transform the way the Defense Department operates. We must work
together to bring DOD out of the industrial age, and help get it
arranged for the fast-paced security environment of the 21st century.
I close by saying that transformation is not an event--it is a
process. There is no point at which the Defense Department will move
from being ``untransformed'' to ``transformed.'' Our goal is to set in
motion a process of continuing transformation, and a culture that will
keep the United States several steps ahead of any potential
adversaries.
To do that we need not only resources, but equally, we need the
freedom to use them with speed and agility, so we can respond quickly
to the new threats we will face as this century unfolds.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Before I go on to General Myers, you said
the level of consultation was unprecedented, and that was in a
positive vein. I assure you that we have achieved a high water
mark of any President and his team of trying to keep Congress
informed. Thank you.
General Myers.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Myers. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and to report on the
state of the United States Armed Forces. Mr. Chairman, you have
already said that my prepared remarks will be entered in the
record and I thank you for that. I will just make a few short
introductory remarks and we'll get on to questions.
Today around the world our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and coastguardsmen remain engaged in a wide variety of
missions. Many of these missions are done far from the public
eye. Yet, there is no more important task before them than to
bring the fight to the terrorists. Active duty, Reserve, and
DOD civilians, together with members of the interagency and
coalition partners, form one team in this effort.
Our service men and women remain a highly effective
instrument of national power. Every day this team helps disrupt
and capture terrorist cells around the world. In addition, our
combined efforts in Afghanistan have accomplished a great deal
over the past year. We have restored hope to the people of
Afghanistan and that nation is on the way to recovery. Clearly,
there is still much work to be done in Afghanistan, as there is
on the war on terrorism.
As the President and Secretary of Defense have said, this
war will last a long time. But let there be no doubt, we will
win this conflict. No matter what task we in the Armed Forces
confront, I am convinced that improving our joint warfighting
capability will be central to our future success.
So let me take a minute to share with you what we are doing
in that area. As you look at joint warfighting today and
tomorrow, improving our command and control capabilities is the
single most essential investment we can make, in my view.
Enhanced command and control combined with intelligence that is
rapidly shared among the warfighters will allow our joint
commanders to integrate and unite separate service capabilities
in a single operation or across the campaign. In my view that
translates directly to increased efficiencies but more
importantly to increased effectiveness.
To reinforce this potential, the President directed Joint
Forces Command to focus on transforming our joint team to meet
the challenges of this new century. As a result, this command's
efforts included the first major joint field experiment,
Millennium Challenge 02. This experiment demonstrated a variety
of new concepts and systems that enable critical command and
control, collaborative information sharing and time sensitive
targeting capabilities. Investment in these capabilities is
essential to winning in combat today and particularly in the
future.
In fact, General Franks and Central Command are using
concepts, technologies, and capabilities from Millennium
Challenge 02 in their current operational planning for Iraq.
One of the positive results from Millennium Challenge 02 is
the potential for a joint commander to communicate with his or
her forces while en route to a crisis area. Near-term technical
solutions will allow the joint team to keep situational
awareness of the battlefield while converging from dispersed
areas. Most importantly, they will allow a commander to employ
forces without sectors or deconfliction matrices we've used in
the past, making us much more efficient and effective on the
battlefield.
Joint Forces Command's efforts in these areas will help us
ensure that operational concepts and technical command and
control solutions that we develop in the future are in effect
born joint.
Our emerging command and control, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities must allow the
Services to rapid and repeatedly plug into each other's
information and then play or operate as one joint team. As
such, future weapons systems and delivery platforms must be
weighted towards what they bring to the joint warfighting team.
Our approach to improving command and control networks reflects
our larger approach to upgrading our forces in general.
Clearly, we must balance near-term recapitalization and
modernization with long-term investments to transform the force
for the future. In the first case, we are ensuring our joint
team is as capable as possible for today's missions, and in the
second case, we are ensuring we are relevant to dominate a
range of military operations for tomorrow.
With your support, we can ensure our men and women in
uniform have the best tools and technologies possible.
Investments in hardware are only part of the task to keep
our force ready. To meet these challenges, we must continue to
invest in our people and their skills. Your commitment to
improving joint professional military education will be one way
to ensure our warfighters have the intellectual foundation to
meet the unknown challenges they will face, and your support to
fund the training and to equip our troops with the most capable
systems sends a very powerful message of support.
You also demonstrated your commitment by ensuring they have
the quality of life they deserve, in terms of pay, housing, and
medical care. This committee, along with the rest of Congress
and administration, has made quality of life improvements a top
priority.
Our world class troops and their families deserve first
class support and you have always been there for them, and on
their behalf I thank you for your continued support.
[The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
It is an honor to report to Congress on the state of the U.S. Armed
Forces.
Today, our Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coastguardsmen operate in an environment characterized by opportunity
and danger. In the wake of September 11, U.S. forces are now deployed
to an unprecedented number of locations. Our forces also operate with a
wider array of coalition partners to accomplish more diverse missions.
These operations are required, as the world remains a dangerous
place. In recent months, terrorists have successfully conducted
numerous attacks--in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The
loss of innocent lives serves as a poignant reminder that terrorists'
evil has no moral or territorial limits. Coalition discoveries in
Afghanistan and other places confirm that al Qaeda actively seeks
weapons of mass destruction. This network remains active and determined
to conduct more attacks against the U.S. and our allies.
At the same time, other threats to U.S. interests have not abated.
U.S. Armed Forces remain focused on preparing for potential regional
conflict. The proliferation of advanced technology, weapons, and
associated expertise has increased the probability that our adversaries
will be capable in the future of fielding significantly more robust and
lethal means to attack the U.S. and our interests. In December 2002,
North Korea announced that it would resume its nuclear program. Iraq
has used chemical and biological weapons in the past and would likely
use them again in the future. Iraq is also aggressively seeking nuclear
weapons. These facts create imperatives for our Nation's Armed Forces.
All the while, U.S. forces remain prepared to confront the consequences
of factional strife in distant lands and respond to humanitarian
disasters.
The President's National Security Strategy provides a new focus for
our Nation's Armed Forces. Based on detailed analysis in the most
recent 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Department adopted
a new defense strategy. Today, we must be ready to assure our allies,
while we dissuade, deter, and defeat any adversary. We possess the
forces necessary to defend the United States homeland and deter forward
in four critical regions. If required, we will swiftly defeat the
efforts of two adversaries in an overlapping timeframe, while having
the ability to ``win decisively'' in one theater. In addition, our
forces are able to conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies,
maintain a sufficient force generation capability, and support a
strategic Reserve.
At home, the establishment of the United States Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) has significantly improved the preparedness, responsiveness,
and integration between the U.S. military and other Federal agencies
defending our homeland. NORTHCOM is an integral part of the rapidly
expanding interagency network supporting homeland defense.
Our Nation's entire Armed Forces remain as engaged today as at any
time since the Second World War. The war on terrorism remains our
primary focus. In concert with other instruments of national power, our
Armed Forces are tracking down al Qaeda in Afghanistan and around the
world. Simultaneously, we are operating in the No-Fly Zones over Iraq,
enforcing U.N. sanctions in the Arabian Gulf, facilitating
reconstruction in Afghanistan, conducting peacekeeping operations in
the Balkans, supporting our partners in South America against narcotics
trafficking and terrorist cells, preserving stability in the Korean
Peninsula, and defending the American homeland. Clearly, the American
people should know that their Armed Forces are operating at a high
tempo.
As a result of this unprecedented strategic environment, I have
established three priorities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
To win the war on terrorism, to improve joint warfighting, and to
transform our Nation's military to face the dangers of the 21st
century. These priorities also reflect the priorities of the Secretary
of Defense. Combined with the President's vision, the Secretary's
leadership, the support of Congress and the selfless service of our
Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and
civilian workforce--our Nation's Armed Forces are making progress in
each of these areas.
Al Qaeda was not created in a single day. It formed over the course
of a decade or more prior to September 11, 2001. It cannot be destroyed
in a day or a year--it will require a commitment of many years. We
recognize that dangerous and difficult work remains. The following
highlights recent successes and describes what additional actions are
required to protect our Nation in our dynamic security environment.

WAR ON TERRORISM

For the past 16 months, the U.S. Armed Forces, in concert with
other Federal agencies and our coalition partners, have conducted a
determined campaign to defeat the most potent threat to our way of
life--global terrorist organizations. Operation Enduring Freedom has
dealt a severe blow to the al Qaeda transnational network. About 50 key
al Qaeda officials, operatives, and logisticians have been killed or
captured. Numerous other operatives have also been removed; however, al
Qaeda remains a formidable and adaptive peril to our Nation and our
partners.
Our successes reflect the careful integration of all instruments of
national power. This war against terrorists requires the inclusive
commitment of the military, financial, economic, law enforcement, and
intelligence resources of our Nation. On the international level, the
military support and cooperation has been remarkable. Until August of
last year, when we determined it was no longer required, NATO provided
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to supplement our E-3 aircraft
patrolling over American cities. NATO allies remain with us in
Afghanistan and patrolling the oceans to interdict terrorists and their
weapons or resources. More than 90 nations share our resolve and
contribute daily to the goal of destroying al Qaeda. As part of this
effort, numerous bilateral counterterrorist exercises and exchanges
have been conducted around the world.
At the national level, the Defense Department has made numerous
adjustments. The creation of the Joint Interagency Task Force for
Counterterrorism enables the rapid flow of information and analysis
from national resources to the battlefield. Likewise, Combatant
Commanders established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to share
information, coordinate actions, and streamline operations among
military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. At U.S. Special
Operations Command, the Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group
combines the expertise and resources of the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Justice and the CIA with our Special Operations warriors
at the operational level. The Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group
fuses intelligence, interagency, and military activities in a seamless
organization.

CURRENT OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

In Afghanistan, our greatest success has been to deny al Qaeda an
operating haven. Today, Afghanistan has the first true chance for peace
in 23 years. More than 2 million Afghan people have returned home. We
are in the final stages of Phase III (Decisive Operations). Phase III
has severely degraded al Qaeda's operational capabilities and their
ability to train new members. Their support continues to decline among
the Afghan people. Pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda resistance remain
within Afghanistan primarily along the Pakistani border. Nonetheless,
overall conditions may permit us to soon shift to Phase IV (Stability
Operations). Once the President decides to move into Phase IV, we will
increase the civil and reconstruction assistance to the Afghan
government. Stability operations will require a great deal of support
from the international community to be successful.
This past year, a key task to promote stability began with training
of the Afghan National Army. The U.S. spearheaded the development of
this force with training, equipment, and force structure requirements.
The Afghan National Army's first five battalions have completed basic
training at the Kabul Military Training Center. More than 1,300 troops
began advanced training as of December. The sixth battalion is
currently in basic training and soon we will begin select officer
training. The French have funded the initial salaries for the recruits
for all six battalions and provided half of the training. Recently
trained forces are integrating with our forces throughout the
countryside. To date, the international community has donated $40
million worth of equipment. Our military forces will be part of an
ongoing commitment to provide equipment and expertise.
The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
continues its role mandated by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security
Council resolutions. Today, Germany and the Netherlands are preparing
to share leadership responsibilities of the International Security
Assistance Force as they take over in February 2003. They follow the
example set by the United Kingdom and Turkey. Twenty-two nations
contribute more than 4,500 troops to this vital mission.
In January 2002, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) proposed a
concept of operations to disrupt terrorist operations in and around
Yemen. Central to this plan, CENTCOM proposed to strengthen Yemeni
Special Forces, capability for counterterrorism operations and expand
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Yemeni
Special Forces have been trained on counterterrorism tactics and
procedures and are currently receiving maritime counterterrorism
training. The working relationship between the U.S. and Yemeni
Government has greatly improved as a result of this training program.
CENTCOM also established Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA)
as part of its Theater Counterterrorism Campaign. In December 2002,
JTF-HOA stood up while embarked on U.S.S. Mount Whitney. JTF-HOA
provides CENTCOM a regional counterterrorism focus in East Africa and
Yemen. It exercises command and control of counterterrorism operations
for this area. The JTF-HOA staff will remain embarked on U.S.S. Mount
Whitney for 4 to 6 months until the infrastructure is in place ashore
at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.
Meanwhile, CENTCOM and Allied Forces continue Maritime Interception
Operations in the Arabian Gulf to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
In 2002, Coalition Forces diverted over 800 vessels suspected of
carrying illegal Iraqi oil. This reflects a significant increase over
the 115 vessels diverted in 2001.
United States European Command (EUCOM), through its Special
Operations Command, Europe, began the Georgia Train and Equip Program
to build a Georgian capability to deal with the terrorist presence in
the Pankisi Gorge. EUCOM developed a plan to train three staffs, four
battalions and one Mechanized/Armor company team. EUCOM has completed
training the Georgian Ministry of Defense staff, the Land Forces
Command staff and the first battalion. In December, Commander, EUCOM
directed Marine Forces Europe to assume the Georgia Train and Equip
Program mission, which will resume training in February. Six other
allies contributed nearly $2 million in materiel reflecting the
international nature of this program.
In July, the President approved Expanded Maritime Interception
Operations to interdict terrorists and their resources. With this
order, the President authorized commanders to stop, board, and search
merchant ships identified to be transporting terrorists and/or
terrorist-related materiel. Expanded Maritime Interception Operations
are focused on EUCOM and CENTCOM's Areas of Responsibility (AORs) while
PACOM and the other Combatant Commanders are developing Expanded
Maritime Interception Operations plans. Eleven nations provide forces
for Maritime Interception Operations within the CENTCOM AOR. German and
Spanish senior officers command parts of these operations--reflecting
the coalition commitment to the war on terrorism. So far, EUCOM's
Maritime Interception Operations have stopped 14 ships. NATO maritime
and air forces support the Maritime Interception Operations within
EUCOM's AOR.
In Europe, we support NATO's plan to transition Stabilization
Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a minimal presence and Kosovo forces to
a reduced presence by the end of 2004. In the spring of 2003, the NATO
Military Committee will review the proposed force structure reductions
and restructuring for Bosnia and Kosovo. Our presence in the Balkans
has not only promoted peace in the region, it has also enhanced our
ability to conduct counterterrorism operations.
During this past year in support of Operation Enduring Freedom--
Philippines, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has provided the Armed Forces
of the Philippines military advice and assistance in targeting Abu
Sayyaf Group terrorist activities in the Philippines. U.S. forces could
be available to provide follow-on advice and assistance if requested by
the Government of Philippines, and approved by the President and the
Secretary of Defense. In concert with these efforts supporting
Operation Enduring Freedom, Congress has approved the Security
Assistance Funding necessary to provide counterterrorism training for
the armed forces of the Philippines. Training will begin in the
February/March timeframe.
United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) continues to support
counter-narcotics trafficking and counterterrorism efforts in South
America. In accordance with new Presidential policy and expanded
legislative authority, we are assisting the Colombian military in its
fight against designated terrorist organizations by providing advice,
training, and equipment. Our current operations are built on
preexisting counter-narcotics missions. U.S. troops are currently
training the Colombian military to protect critical infrastructures,
such as the Cano Limon Pipeline. In addition personnel will deploy in
fiscal year 2003 to serve as Operations and Intelligence Planning
Assistance Teams at selected units to assist the Colombian military in
its fight against terrorism. This assistance will continue over the
next several years. The U.S. military presence in Colombia is limited
to the troop caps established by Congress, in terms of uniformed and
contract personnel.
The Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is a focal
point of increased drug and arms trafficking, money laundering,
document fraud, and Islamic terrorist-supported activities. U.S. and
Brazilian officials estimate that between $10-$12 billion USD/year
flows through the Tri-Border Area, some of which is diverted to known
terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas.
Commander, SOUTHCOM continues detainee operations (detention and
intelligence collection missions) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While the
detainees are not entitled to the status of Enemy Prisoners of War, the
President and the Secretary of Defense have directed that the U.S.
Armed Forces treat them humanely and to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, consistent with the principles of
the Geneva Conventions. SOUTHCOM has constructed an additional 190
medium security units to augment the 816 holding units and fortified
billeting structures for U.S. military personnel assigned. Almost 2,000
U.S. military personnel are deployed to Guantanamo Bay in support of
detainee operations. The President issued an order on November 13,
2001, authorizing use of military commissions to prosecute individuals
subject to the order for offenses against the laws of war and other
applicable laws. To date, no one has been made specifically subject to
the order, and therefore, no one has been prosecuted by military
commission. The Secretary of Defense appointed the Secretary of the
Army to lead war crimes investigations. A few of those detained at
Guantanamo determined to be of no intelligence or law enforcement value
or threat to the U.S. or its interests, have been released and returned
to their countries of origin.
We view Guantanamo Bay as a national asset that supports our work
in securing intelligence vital to success in the war on terrorism and
protection of our homeland. It also supports interagency and
international intelligence and law enforcement efforts. Interrogations
at Guantanamo Bay have resulted in intelligence of high value.
Information gathered from known terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay has
helped us to define and disrupt the global terrorist threat.

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 2002

On 1 October 2002, we implemented the 2002 Unified Command Plan, as
directed by the President. The 2002 Unified Command Plan, and its
subsequent Change 1, created United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM),
disestablished United States Space Command (SPACECOM) and combined
SPACECOM's missions and forces with United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), thereby establishing a ``new'' STRATCOM.

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND HOMELAND SECURITY

NORTHCOM's mission is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the U.S. and its territories. When directed,
NORTHCOM provides military assistance to civil authorities, including
consequence management. Commander, NORTHCOM is dual-hatted as
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD has
control of the air defense of CONUS. Land and Maritime operations are
controlled by NORTHCOM.
NORTHCOM stood up its combatant command staff and accepted Homeland
Defense missions and tasks from United States Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) and other combatant commands. It has also developed a plan to
reach its full operational capability. Currently, NORTHCOM is engaged
with Federal and State agencies, the National Guard and NORAD to plan
and exercise a variety of homeland defense and civil support tasks.
Simultaneously, NORTHCOM is cultivating closer relationships with our
North American neighbors.
As part of this effort, NORTHCOM's Standing Joint Task Force Civil
Support provides command and control for DOD forces supporting the lead
Federal agency managing the consequences of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents in addition to
natural disasters. As such, Joint Task Force Civil Support provides a
sustained planning staff that has formed a habitual relationship with
key Federal and State agencies plus communities nationwide.
NORAD's responsibilities for air and ground early warning systems
and alert fighter support in defense of CONUS, Canada and Alaska remain
unchanged. In addition, NORAD is identifying the infrastructure needed
for the defense of the National Capital Region.
On December 9, 2002, the U.S. and Canada agreed to create a new bi-
national land, maritime, and civil support military planning group at
NORAD to help examine potential responses to threats and attacks on the
U.S. or Canada. This initiative will advance our ability to defend our
Nation.
Last year Operation Noble Eagle flew over 14,000 sorties even while
our current operations overseas required key resources. These sorties
represent NORAD's contributions to Operation Noble Eagle and defense of
the American homeland.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

United States STRATCOM's mission is to establish and provide full-
spectrum global strike, coordinate space and information operations
capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security
objectives. STRATCOM retains its nuclear triad of submarine, bomber,
and missile forces.
On 10 January 2003, the President signed Change 2 to the Unified
Command Plan. This latest change assigned four emergent missions to
STRATCOM and reflects the U.S. military's increased emphasis on a
global view. These new missions include missile defense, global strike,
DOD information operations and global command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Missile
defense is an inherently multi-command and multi-regional task.
STRATCOM will serve as the primary advocate in the development of
missile defense operational architecture. With its global strike
responsibilities, the Command will provide a core cadre to plan and
execute nuclear, conventional, and information operations anywhere in
the world. STRATCOM serves as the DOD advocate for integrating the
desired military effects of information operations. These initiatives
represent a major step in transforming our military and in implementing
the new strategic triad envisioned in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.
STRATCOM will also continue the former U.S. Space Command's legacy
of providing space support for our joint team. The Global Positioning
System (GPS) offers an excellent example of how space systems enhance
our Joint Warfighting Team. The GPS's worldwide position, navigation,
and timing information give U.S. forces an all-weather, precision
engagement capability. As an example of one application, the U.S. Army
fielded a blue force tracking system--a space-based tool that gives
commanders awareness of their units' locations.
U.S. military space superiority requires continued advances in
space control and access along with the cooperation of our allies. The
European Union, for example, is developing Galileo, a civil satellite
navigation system that risks our enhancement to military GPS. As
currently designed, the Galileo signal will operate in the same
bandwidth as our GPS system's civil and military signals. When Galileo
begins operating, its signals will directly overlay the spectrum
associated with our new GPS military code. Continued negotiations to
resolve this political issue with the European Union is essential to
ensuring our joint team maintains the advantages of GPS in combat.
Concurrent with these ongoing operations, the Services, Joint
Staff, and Combatant Commands have pursued a 15-percent major
headquarters reduction. To date, DOD headquarters personnel have been
reduced by more than 11 percent. Given commitments around the world
today, any further reductions beyond those already taken could
adversely impact our ability to meet the demands of the war on
terrorism, Homeland Security, global military presence and respond to
any new threats. Nonetheless, the Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders,
and I continue to explore ways to reduce and streamline headquarters
functions.

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION

Antiterrorism/Force Protection remains a top priority for all
commanders. Our adversaries--unable to confront or compete with the
United States militarily--have and will continue to use terrorist acts
to attack U.S. citizens, property, and interests--to include military
bases and personnel. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Antiterrorism/
Force Protection portion of the Combating Terrorism budget totaled $9.3
billion. The terrorist threat environment has forced us to maintain a
higher worldwide Force Protection Condition for longer periods of time.
In the short term, this task is being met with an increase in manpower.
For example, EUCOM is currently at Force Protection Condition
Bravo. In the short-term, additional troops are required to guard U.S.
military bases throughout EUCOM's theater. In the long-term, the
Secretary of Defense directed us to pursue new technologies that will
reduce the manpower footprint while improving force protection, as well
as seeking host nation support for the force protection mission.
The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund helped provide
immediate Antiterrorism/Force Protection off-the-shelf technology to
Combatant Commanders to satisfy emergent requirements that could not
wait for the normal budget process or long-term technical solutions.
Last year's funded systems included explosive detection systems that
enhanced access control, intrusion detection systems that provided
broader perimeter security while reducing manpower requirements and
chemical/biological (Chem/Bio) detection systems to improve
installation defense capabilities. The Department authorized $47
million this past year for the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative
Fund, nearly twice the fiscal year 2000 expenditure.
To support the Combatant Commanders' Antiterrorism/Force Protection
efforts, the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams will
visit 95 military installations worldwide this year. Joint Staff
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams assess physical security
measures, infrastructure support and structural vulnerabilities,
intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities and the
installation's ability to respond to terrorist incidents. Over 500,000
personnel received ``General Antiterrorism Awareness'' training last
year. This on-line training is now also available to DOD family
members.
The Defense Department also finalized prescriptive antiterrorism
engineering and construction standards to improve survivability of our
personnel from the effects of an explosive device. In large part
because the Pentagon renovation project followed design strategies
based on these new antiterrorism construction standards, the damage and
loss of life from the Pentagon attack was significantly reduced.
U.S. forces' antiterrorism capabilities are seen as a standard
worldwide. NATO sought U.S. military expertise to improve antiterrorism
training for all NATO forces. As a result, last summer, NATO approved
policy guidance that clarified antiterrorism responsibilities for non-
Article 5 operations, delineated minimum unit antiterrorism plan
requirements and increased emphasis on weapons of mass destruction
defense and consequence management planning. The U.S. will assist NATO
to implement this important guidance.
We are working hard to expand and improve our capabilities to
protect our personnel against chem/bio agents. DOD initiated
vaccinating select segments of the force against anthrax and smallpox.
Our medical treatment capabilities must expand to include improved
treatment against weapons of mass destruction while providing
additional medical countermeasures, surveillance systems and response
teams.
We improved overall joint force readiness by our recent procurement
of improved chem/bio defensive protective clothing, masks, and
detection systems. This equipment is significantly more reliable,
better at agent detection and further enhances our forces' overall
capability to operate in the chem/bio environment.
In the area of installation protection, we have improved detection
systems plus consequence management assessment and training
capabilities at 23 of our overseas bases. In addition, we performed a
thorough assessment of our detection and first responder capabilities
at nine key CONUS installations. These lessons learned will guide
development of a comprehensive plan to improve chem/bio defense at more
than 200 bases over the next 6 years. Although we improved our chem/bio
capabilities, fighting a war in this environment remains a serious
challenge. Therefore, we must continue to fund research, development,
and acquisition projects that ensure our forces can operate
successfully in this adverse environment.

READINESS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

The readiness of our general-purpose forces, whether forward
deployed, operating in support of contingency operations or in Homeland
Defense, continues to be solid. U.S. forces are well trained and in
general, possess the personnel, equipment, and resources needed to
accomplish the military objectives outlined in the Defense Strategy.
In light of the current pace of operations, it is notable that
active U.S. Army divisions maintain high readiness levels. U.S. Air
Force aircraft mission capable rates improved over the past 6 months.
U.S. Navy forces continue to meet readiness goals for both the deployed
and non-deployed segments of the force. The U.S. Marine Corps is ready
to meet the demands of current and potential operations. While ongoing
global operations increased the workload on the Nation's military
focus, these forces remain prepared to accomplish their wartime tasks.
Material readiness has improved substantially in part, due to the
tremendous support of Congress. One example is munitions, where recent
supplemental measures have allowed Combatant Commanders to increase
stockpiles of key all-weather and advanced precision-guided munitions.
These munitions enable the joint team to place at risk a wide array of
enemy targets. Funding increases this past year dramatically increased
precision-guided munitions production rates, and selected production
rates should be near maximum capacity by August 2003. Continued
congressional support is critical to build munitions and materiel
inventories to levels that meet warfighting requirements.
While the force is ready, this past year significantly stressed the
readiness of several critical enablers. Our intelligence forces operate
under increased pressure as a result of the war on terrorism. Key skill
sets (like targeteers, linguists, and police-like investigative skills)
are in short supply. Recognizing this fact, our intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance forces must mature into a more
adaptable and flexible contingency collection capability. Many systems
were developed to meet a cold war threat and provide excellent force-
on-force collection capability. The ingenuity of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen has allowed many systems to perform
a valuable role in the war on terrorism.
The present posture of the military intelligence forces, for the
long-term war on terrorism is improving, but many challenges remain.
This global war clearly demonstrates the need for persistent long-
loiter intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.
Military intelligence also requires low observable unmanned aerial
vehicle systems, close-access sensors, and a greater emphasis on human
intelligence collection. In addition, all intelligence communities must
provide an information architecture that provides a ``push and pull''
capability for the joint warfighter, law enforcement and counter-
intelligence personnel. We must shift our attitudes away from the
mindset of a ``need to know'' to one of ``need to share.''
Our strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and prepositioned
materiel) provides us the capability to swiftly move forces around the
world. The U.S. remains the only nation who can routinely move units
and materiel globally with confidence and speed. While our airlift and
air refueling assets performed magnificently in support of the war on
terrorism, this high operational demand is accelerating the aging of C-
5 and tanker aircraft and created unanticipated wear and tear on our C-
17 fleet. As a result, strategic airlift remains one of our top
priorities. The C-17 multi-year procurement plus the C-5 Re-engining
and Reliability Enhancement Programs are major steps to meet the
minimum wartime airlift capacity of 54.5 million ton miles/day. The
follow-on multi-year procurement with Boeing for 60+ C-17s will bring
the total C-17 fleet to 180 aircraft in 2007. As a corollary priority,
replacing the 40-year-old KC-135 air refueling fleet is an essential
joint warfighting requirement.
With congressional support, our strategic sealift achieved the
Mobility Requirements Study-05 goals for surge and prepositioned fleet
sealift requirements. The maintenance of our organic sealift fleet
remains a high priority to ensure we can deploy sufficient force to
support routine and contingency operations. To support greater levels
of mobilization, DOD can also access additional U.S. commercial
shipping through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. This
agreement is critical to ensure that adequate sealift capacity (and
associated mariners) is available to support DOD requirements during
wartime. We are working closely with the Department of Transportation
to ensure these requirements can be met.
Our prepositioned material reduced response time in key theaters.
This critical readiness program enables our success in the war on
terrorism and other contingency operations.
For intratheater mobility, the Department recognizes the Joint
Venture, High-Speed Vessel as a promising delivery platform. This
vessel employs off-the-shelf technology and can operate in austere
locations where mature seaports do not exist. Combatant Commanders
praise this vessel for rapidly and efficiently moving personnel and
equipment. Future operations will also rely on strong enroute
infrastructures that support strategic mobility requirements. The
dynamic nature of the war on terrorism and other potential
contingencies dictates that we be prepared to establish new enroute
bases to support deployments to austere locations. In addition, we must
fully fund the existing enroute infrastructure to sustain its
capability. Future success in operations depends upon effective
training today and tomorrow.
Last May, I wrote Congress about my grave concern over the adverse
impacts and unforeseen consequences that the application of various
environmental laws are having on military training and testing
activities and consequentially on the readiness of our Armed Forces.
Last year, Congress provided temporary relief, but only for one
statute. While measuring the impact of inflexible or overbroad
environmental requirements is difficult, my professional assessment is
that the impacts and consequently the challenge we face in providing
the most effective training weapons and sensors, has grown. Enough is
known right now to convince me that we need relief. We are not
abandoning our outstanding stewardship over the lands entrusted to us
or retreating from environmental protection requirements. We are trying
to restore balance when environmental requirements adversely affect
uniquely military activities necessary to prepare for combat. I ask
that you carefully consider the proposed changes that the DOD brings
forward and provide the tailored relief we seek.
The current pace of operations and future potential operations
continues to require the Services and Combatant Commanders to carefully
manage assets and units that are in high demand, but in small numbers.
The demand for critical capabilities (such as manned and unmanned
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, special
operations forces, intelligence analysts and linguists and command and
control assets) increased significantly as a result of multiple
contingencies. We will continue to prioritize the tasks given these
critical units to preserve our surge capability for future operations.
Our number one asset remains the men and women serving in the Armed
Forces. They have the educational depth, the innovative spirit and
mental agility that transforms technology into an effective military
force. Their service and dedication deserve our full support to seek
ways to improve their quality of life. The administration, Congress,
and DOD made raising their standard of living a top priority. This
year's legislation provided an across-the-board military pay raise of
4.1 percent and targeted increases of up to 6.5 percent for junior
personnel. This year's out-of-pocket housing expense reduction from
11.3 percent to 7.5 percent is a sound investment, as are future
targeted pay increases based on the Employment Cost Index plus one half
percent. Our troops and their families greatly appreciate continued
congressional support for these initiatives, plus efforts to improve
family and unaccompanied housing. Such congressional action directly
impacts recruitment, retention, and family welfare. I view these all as
inseparable from operational combat readiness.
No discussion of those who serve is complete without mentioning the
exceptional service of our guardsmen and reservists. In the first 15
months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), nearly 85,000 of them
served on active duty. Like their active duty counterparts, their
service balances their duty to the Nation and their commitment to their
families. These citizen-warriors, however, must also balance an
obligation to their civilian employers. These past few months
demonstrated our increased reliance on our Reserve components to defend
the Nation's coastlines, skies, and heartland, as well as protect our
interests worldwide. We also gained a deeper appreciation that today's
Reserve personnel have the competence, dedication, and leadership that
make them indistinguishable from their active-duty counterparts.

IMPROVING JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES

The U.S. Armed Forces' ability to conduct joint warfare is better
today than anytime in our history, due in part to the tremendous
support of Congress. Nonetheless, many challenges remain. Our joint
team is comprised of the individual warfighting capabilities of the
services. To improve our joint warfighting capability, we must maximize
the capabilities and effects of the separate units and weapons systems
to accomplish the mission at hand--without regard to the color of the
uniforms of those who employ them. This challenge demands that we
integrate service core competencies together in such a way that makes
the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Our operational
architectures must be inclusive and not exclusive in terms of
capabilities and desired effects. We must integrate--not deconflict--
our operations.
To support these efforts, on 1 October 2002, we changed the mission
and focus of JFCOM. Today, the men and women of JFCOM concentrate on
improving our Joint Warfighting capability as we transform to meet the
challenges of the 21st century. In the future, they will be converting
strategy and policy guidance into fielded capabilities at the
operational level through the development of joint concepts and
integrated architectures.
JFCOM is contributing to the efforts that develop and define the
Joint Operations Concept, and the related operational concepts, that
will link our defense strategy and our emerging Joint Vision with
service operational concepts. It will help senior military and civilian
leaders synchronize service modernization, guide experimentation and
inform acquisition strategies that will guide materiel and non-material
improvements for the joint force. In support of this effort, JFCOM
conducts joint experimentation to validate the operational utility of
joint concepts. The results will drive changes across all areas of
doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities.
To improve joint warfare, we must focus on improving the accuracy
and timeliness of the Combatant Commanders information used to command
and control the joint force. With shared information, commanders can
integrate discrete capabilities; without it, they must segregate
operations into time and space. For these reasons, we must emphasize
the Joint Operations Concept to solve the interoperability challenges
of our legacy command and control, communication, and computer systems
and ensure future systems are ``born joint.''
JFCOM is working aggressively towards our goal of seamless C\4\ISR
interoperability by fiscal year 2008. To achieve that goal, JFCOM will
set the operational requirements and prioritize the integrated
architectures under development for future battle management command
and control systems. In addition, JFCOM will exercise oversight and
directive authority of three major interoperability efforts: the
Deployable Joint Command and Control system, Single Integrated Air
Picture, and Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures. The Services
and Defense agencies, in coordination with JFCOM, will retain
acquisition authority for these and all other battle management command
and control programs and initiatives.
We are convinced that the Deployable Joint Command and Control
system under development by the Navy is the materiel and technological
solution to provide intelligence processing, mission planning, and
control of combat operations for the standing joint force headquarters.
The first Deployable Joint Command and Control suite is scheduled for
delivery in fiscal year 2005. Together with the Air Force's Family of
Interoperable Operational Pictures, the Army's Single Integrated Air
Picture, and JFCOM's Joint Interoperability and Integration programs,
this effort will allow the joint force to truly transform the way it
plans, coordinates, and executes joint operations. We need continued
congressional support for these critical battle management command and
control programs.
Our experiences in Afghanistan illustrated how important timely and
responsive command and control was to control sea, land, and air forces
in areas with primitive or nonexistent communications infrastructures.
To meet this challenge in the Arabian Gulf area of operations, CENTCOM
deployed a prototype battle management command and control system to
support its Internal Look exercise in Qatar and for potential future
operations. DOD will leverage the lessons learned from this prototype
to help guide the development of future battle management command and
control systems.
We must also develop command and control systems that can rapidly
deploy anywhere in the world, to support joint and coalition forces
with ``plug and play'' ease and that are also scalable to respond to
changing circumstances. Programs such as the Joint Tactical Radio
System, Mobile User Objective System, and the Joint Command and Control
capability (the follow-on to Global Command and Control System) are
systems that were truly ``born joint.'' We also must ensure that we
have the necessary military satellite communications systems that can
provide the high bandwidth required to support our forces in austere
environments such as Afghanistan.
The role of command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance underscores the
importance of managing and developing the radio frequency spectrum.
Highly mobile, widely dispersed forces require significant radio
frequency spectrum to operate effectively and efficiently. This
military requirement is increasing at the same time that the private
sector's demand for spectrum is growing. While it is important to
provide additional spectrum to meet growing industry requirements, we
must ensure the availability of spectrum to provide future military
requirements.
In today's dynamic strategic environment, events in one area may
quickly affect events in another. This reality requires a more
responsive planning process to capitalize on the improved C\4\ networks
and where deliberate- and crisis-action planning complement each other.
Improvements in war planning are required to close the time gap between
deliberate- and crisis-action planning. These initiatives range from
changing doctrine to developing new automated planning tools for Time-
Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development. The Joint Staff, in
collaboration with the Combatant Commanders' staff, is developing a
single shared planning process for deliberate and crisis planning. This
initiative will develop tools and processes to reduce the deliberate
planning cycle, facilitate the transition to crisis planning, and
exploit new technology to respond to evolving world affairs. The end
results will be greatly improved flexibility for the President and the
Secretary of Defense.
Improving Joint Warfighting requires more than technical solutions.
My exercise program supports the Combatant Commanders' ability to
sharpen our soldier, sailor, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen's
warfighting edge. It enables operational commanders to better train
their battle staffs and forces in joint and combined operations while
evaluating their war plans. It also allows DOD to enhance and evaluate
interoperability among the Services. Exercises focusing on strategic,
national, and theater-level joint tasks consistently challenge leaders
throughout DOD, interagency and allies with timely and relevant
scenarios--including terrorism, cyber attack, continuity of government,
and operations. Routinely, these exercises provide access to critical
bases of operation around the world as venues for practicing impending
joint/combined operations. These exercises also allow the opportunity
to enhance the capabilities of the military forces of allied nations
and ensure their continued support in the war on terrorism. The U.S.
military is advancing and transforming at a rate that greatly outpaces
our allies. We must work hard to help them close that gap.
Since fiscal year 1996, the number of joint exercises decreased
from 277 to 191. This resulted from the reduction of joint exercise
transportation funds to $319 million. In order to balance operational
and exercise requirements, DOD limits C-17 support to 34,000 equivalent
flying hours and roll-on/roll-off ships to 1,100 steaming days. Any
further decrease in funding will force major reductions or
cancellations of high-priority joint/combined exercises and have a
detrimental impact on our joint warfighting capability.
The Defense Department will establish a Joint National Training
Capability to support joint operations by leveraging live, virtual, and
constructive technologies. As a first step, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness and I will identify specific
capabilities for the establishment of the Joint National Training
Capability by 1 October 2004. The Joint National Training Capability
will then exercise DOD's ability to execute key joint training tasks
through several scheduled annual events.
We must improve our joint warfighting capabilities by learning from
previous operations. The Combatant Commands, Services, and Joint Staff
continue to capture and apply lessons learned from Operation Enduring
Freedom. One of the key lessons learned was the positive impact Theater
Security Cooperation had on our operations in Afghanistan. It helped
create the foundation that allowed our air, naval, and ground forces to
gain access to the region's airspace and basing. Another valuable
lesson was the tremendous force multiplier of merging Special
Operations Forces on the ground with space forces' communications and
navigation capabilities to the air and naval forces' precision attack
capabilities.
In addition to meeting other objectives, Joint Professional
Military Education is one means to ensure that future warfighters
capitalize on the lessons of the past to improve joint warfighting.
Joint Professional Military Education develops U.S. military leaders
capable of executing the war on terrorism, improving joint warfighting,
and transforming the force. Currently there is an ongoing
congressionally-mandated independent study of Joint Officer Management
and Joint Professional Military Education. This study will provide
valuable insights on ways to improve and expand joint officer
development. We anticipate completion of this study in early 2003.
In concert with the independent study, the Joint Staff is also
exploring ways to improve Joint Officer Management and Joint
Professional Military Education. We identified requirements to provide
joint distance-learning programs to our Reserve components and to
active duty Non-Commissioned Officers to improve their expertise in
joint operations. In a similar fashion, I directed the National Defense
University to revise the CAPSTONE curriculum for newly selected Flag
and General Officers. My goal is to ensure our new Flag and General
Officers gain a better foundation of joint, interagency, and multi-
national operations at the operational level.
I charged the Joint Staff with developing recommendations for
several areas of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional
Military Education that I believe need to be revised. We need one set
of effective and enforceable rules for how the Services assign and
manage joint billets. We must also bring the tour length requirements
and recognition of joint credit in line with current operations. The
Combatant Commanders and I should be the driving force in the
production of Joint Specialty Officers. Finally, my goal is to make the
annual report to Congress a more meaningful set of metrics that more
accurately reports each Service's support of the joint community. We
look forward to working with you and your staffs this year, to
incorporate these changes along with those of the independent study.
In addition, joint doctrine provides the foundation for joint
education, training, and exercises. We are developing joint doctrine
for Homeland Security, Civil Support, Joint Close Air Support, Joint
Planning, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield
Explosives Consequence Management; and Intelligence Support to
Targeting. The new Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System ensures
the warfighters have the most current joint doctrine. This system also
provides joint doctrine to education and training audiences. Joint
doctrine continues to improve the readiness of the joint warfighter to
operate effectively and efficiently in a complex operational
environment.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

As the U.S. military meets the challenges of the 21st century, we
must transform how we organize, support, and fight as joint
warfighters. Transforming the joint force requires embracing
intellectual, cultural, as well as technological, change. We are in the
process of revising our Joint Vision. This new vision will provide a
broad description of what our Armed Forces must and can become. From
our Joint Vision and the Defense Strategy, we are crafting a Joint
Operations Concept. It will link the tasks given our Armed Forces to
the Joint Vision, joint operating concepts, and Joint Warfighter
architectures. These joint concepts and architectures will provide
further guidance to each Service.
In its broadest sense, the Joint Operations Concept will describe
how the joint force will operate, while helping transform the U.S.
Armed Forces to a capabilities-based force.
The Joint Operations Concept cannot shape the future joint force
alone. It requires experimentation and assessment to determine the
value of the Service and joint warfighting concepts in the context of
future joint operations and the future environment. From these efforts,
we will identify the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities changes needed to
create the future joint force. In this manner, we can scrutinize
current capabilities and proposed systems to highlight gaps and
identify overlapping capabilities.
Using these architectures, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
will implement methodologies to assess both legacy and proposed systems
in the aggregate. As a result, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
will define and validate desired joint capabilities and derive mission
area requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council shall
consider the full range of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities solutions to
advance joint warfighting. In this manner, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council will further reorient our force planning to a
capabilities-based framework. The Joint Operations Concept will allow
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to adopt a synchronized,
collaborative, and integrated systems engineering approach to sizing
and shaping our forces.
In support of our transformation efforts, JFCOM spearheaded the
Nation's first major joint field experiment with Millennium Challenge
02. Millennium Challenge 02 demonstrated a variety of new concepts and
systems that enabled critical command and control, collaborative
information sharing, and time-sensitive targeting capabilities. These
systems are essential to the fielding of the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters. While Millennium Challenge 02 focused on materiel
capabilities, it yielded insights critical for non-materiel changes in
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities.
One example was the Joint Fires Initiative, which offered an
interim automated capability to manage time-sensitive target
engagement. The Joint Fires Initiative enabled the Joint Task Force,
Component Commanders and their staffs to use available information
technology, web-based collaborative tools to accelerate the joint
force's ability to identify, attack, and assess priority targets. It
blended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources,
combat units and Commanders' decision processes to permit real-time
execution.
A second initiative in Millennium Challenge 02 was Joint Enroute
Mission Planning and Rehearsal System--Near Term. This system enables
Theater and Joint Task Force Commanders to remain connected with their
forward and rear headquarters when enroute to or from contingency
locations. It permits a wide scale of communications and collaborative
tools to prevent a ``leadership blackout'' during a commander's travel.
The Joint Fires Initiative and Joint Enroute Mission Planning and
Rehearsal System--Near Term are part of fielding a broader
Collaborative Information Environment. Today's Collaborative
Information Environment is powered by high-speed connectivity and real-
time collaborative tools to share information in an unprecedented
manner. This environment will permit commanders to receive more
accurate information faster. As such, it will be critical part for U.S.
forces to operate faster than our adversaries.
To meet this challenge, the joint force must have access to
superior information. This requires long-term investment to meet the
demands of responsive, targeted, intrusive, and persistent collection.
Our current operational environment and the nature of these dynamic
threats demand that our joint force have the real-time ability to
monitor, track, characterize, and report on moving objects and events.
We must capitalize on emerging technology such as small, expendable
satellites, and long-dwell UAVs. These promising platforms will enable
the joint force to gain persistent surveillance. The information gained
from these platforms must not flow into stovepipes, but must be part of
a ``system of systems'' that blends with human and technical data from
strategic, theater, tactical, and commercial programs.
With this improved and more complete data, the Intelligence
Community must develop tools to assist in information management that
can accommodate ``analytic discovery'' and data visualization
techniques. Our military intelligence community requires a highly
skilled work force trained to mine, manipulate, integrate, and display
relevant information. To effectively employ these collection
opportunities, new techniques and tools must be developed.
While we are expending considerable effort to make sure we procure
systems that are interoperable across the Services, we must continue
placing emphasis on systems that allow interoperability with our
allies. A way to do this is to allow allies to participate in many of
our procurement projects. This will have the dual advantage of helping
to lower project cost to the American taxpayer and increasing
interoperability with those allied forces that will accompany us into
the breach. The Joint Strike Fighter reflects one success story of
allied and U.S. combined procurement. The Joint Strike Fighter set the
standard for how we should approach new procurements, welcoming key
allied participation in the development and production of future
systems. Such an acquisition strategy will increase interoperability,
help allied transformation, and reduce direct U.S. development costs.
Transforming military forces to meet a dynamic 21st century
security environment is not a unique American task. At the Prague
summit, NATO leaders agreed to establish an allied command for
transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. The proposed NATO Command will
work with JFCOM. This close and cooperative relationship will allow the
U.S. and our NATO allies to keep abreast of advances in contemporary
warfare.
Our efforts to improve our allies' warfighting capabilities reach
far beyond NATO. The Combatant Commanders and I share the Secretary of
Defense's vision of a long-term plan to balance burden sharing,
leverage U.S. technological superiority and use a proactive Theater
Security Cooperation strategy to transform allied forces into lethal,
offensive-minded, combined-arms forces. This initiative is as much
about doctrine, warfighting mindset and organizational structure as it
is about platforms and weapon systems. Theater Security Cooperation
will allow the U.S. to modify force structure and posture to optimize
the mobility, lethality, and interoperability of our forward forces.

CONCLUSION

With Congress' support, this past year we have made progress in the
war on terrorism, specifically, and overall capabilities. Al Qaeda and
their global network were not created in a single day, but over a
decade. At the same time, the Nation's Armed Forces must be prepared
for other threats to our interests. Confronting them will require
determined and disciplined use of all instruments of American power.
Congressional support ensures that our military forces are the most
competent and capable military tools possible.
The men and women of our Armed Forces have performed in a
magnificent manner this past year. They stand ready for the challenges
ahead. They deserve our best efforts in training, equipping, and caring
for them and their families. Thank you for the opportunity to provide
my report on our Nation's finest--our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and coastguardsmen.

Chairman Warner. General, let me initiate the first
questions here for a 6-minute round. We have excellent
attendance by our committee.
So I start with you, General, and I ask for just a short
answer to this question, which is important to this record. Is
it your professional judgment that the Armed Forces which are
under your supervision are prepared to meet any contingency for
the use of force that may be required in Iraq and/or Korea, and
hopefully will not be required in either Iraq and/or Korea, and
to continue the high level of activity against worldwide
terrorism?
General Myers. I will give you a real short answer.
Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. Now Mr. Secretary, it was reported in the
press this morning that Secretary Powell appeared before
committees of Congress yesterday and said that an Army general
would be the person that would be placed in charge should we
have to use force in the Iraqi situation and in the aftermath
of what we all anticipate would be a successful military
operation.
The distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Lugar, is reported to say we are way behind
here, between the administration and Congress, in understanding
what would take place in the aftermath of such use of force.
Now in my judgment, our President has in a very courageous
and proper manner pursued the diplomatic route to resolve this
problem in Iraq. He is continuing to do that with the
leadership of the Prime Minister of Great Britain and other
world leaders. I think progress is being made. We will know
more after tomorrow's report by Hans Blix. But it is clear that
we have forward deployed our forces first and foremost to
support the diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy will not succeed
unless it is clearly perceived by the enemy that frankly we
mean business if diplomacy fails. So I commend the President
and others.
But I think given that we are about to go out for a recess
here in a week or so amidst a rapid progression of events, that
should force be used to bring a conclusion to that conflict,
what is the likely scenario involving your Department? Will
other militaries of the world be involved and is it just a role
of security or will the U.S. military be placed in a position
of a high commissioner and/or governor of some type of the
territory of Iraq in order to keep the integrity of that
territory as it exists now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments
to try to respond to that. The Government has spent a good deal
of time over many months thinking these various elements
through. The answer to your question depends to some extent on
what takes place. Your question suggested no decision has been
made to use force but in the event force were used, it could
happen in several ways.
For example, Saddam Hussein could leave today, and the
question would be how does the United States then act to see
that the principal goals of the United States are achieved,
namely that the weapons of mass destruction are found and
destroyed, that they're disarmed. That whatever government
takes over is a government that does not develop weapons of
mass destruction, the government does not help terrorists, does
not threaten its neighbors, and puts the country on a path
towards appropriate representation and protection for the
various religious and minority elements in the country. Those
are the principal goals.
So that is one way it could happen, he could leave. Another
way is that he could leave and turn it over to somebody else
who is equally unacceptable. Another way would be that someone
could help him leave and take over control. A third is that
force would have to be used. Depending on what happened and the
circumstance in the country, we would determine how long and in
what role the military would have to play.
Clearly, the goal would be to go in and see that what
resulted was better than what was there beforehand. That means
that the United States simply has to be willing to stay there
as long as is necessary to see that that is done, but not one
day longer. We have no interest in other people's land or
territory. We have no interest in other people's oil, as some
articles seem to suggest. So exactly how long it would be and
what it would look like would vary.
The principles that would pertain insofar as the Department
of Defense is concerned: First, we would have military
capability in there sufficient to find and destroy the weapons
of mass destruction and to find and deal with any terrorist
networks that exist in the country, which we know is the case.
It would be my goal to internationalize it as rapidly as
possible, to have other countries participate. Very likely the
participation would be in the humanitarian, civil, and
reconstruction areas earliest, as opposed to finding the
weapons of mass destruction, for example. There just are not a
lot of countries that really would be involved in that that I
can think of, although we would welcome help from a number that
have already offered assistance.
The next task would be to put the country on a transition
so that the outsiders are not running it. That means you would
have to find a way to see that the Iraqi opposition from the
outside, the Iraqis from the inside who had not been a party to
the repressiveness of this regime, and the weapons of mass
destruction programs of this regime would in a different way
have an Iraqi solution, just as Afghanistan had an Afghanistan
solution. So the goal would be to get them on a path so that
increasingly more and more was handled and managed by the Iraqi
people themselves and that less and less was managed by the
international community.
Chairman Warner. I think your response reflects that we
have given this a good deal of consideration and that we have
clear plans in place and are ready to proceed.
Quickly to a second question, and that involves the very
disturbing news with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) thus far being unable to reconcile
differences among the member nations as to NATO's ability to
provide such security as the government of Turkey feels is
essential, given the fluidity of this situation. I commend you
for stepping up to say if NATO doesn't, the U.S. will. That's
proper.
But does not this action thus far violate the time tested
fundamental belief of NATO of over a half century, that an
attack on one is an attack on all, and could not a persistence
of this type of policy by member nations begin to erode NATO so
it becomes a less effective organization?
Lastly, the United States is the major financial
contributor to NATO, the major troop contributor, and the major
technical contributor--particularly the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS)--and now the American taxpayers will be
required to foot an additional bill of the costs associated
with our proper decision to place such forces in the position
of Turkey to protect their interests. So we're getting hit
twice as a consequence of the inability of NATO to reconcile
this issue. Do you have some views?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I do and I expressed them in a
recent meeting and I might add that a member of the committee,
Senator McCain, also expressed some opinions over there that
were very much on the mark, in my view.
The situation is that the vote was 16 to 3 in favor of
initiating planning to send defensive capabilities to Turkey so
that they would be protected. You can't do anything at the last
minute in life. You have to plan it, you have to get things
moving, things moved by ship. The position of the three
countries that it was premature to plan, it seems to me, was
unfortunate.
We did say that the United States and the other 16
countries would step forward and see that Turkey, in fact, had
AWACS, chem-bio detection, and Patriot batteries. It would not
be simply the United States that would provide that. We decided
immediately that Turkey must have those capabilities and we
must begin the planning. My feeling is that it's unfortunate
that the three countries have delayed us this long.
There's no question, as you suggest, that to the extent we
do not interest ourselves in every 1 of the 19 members, but
goodness, Turkey is a moderate Muslim country, the only country
in NATO that borders Iraq. To not behave in a way that
recognized that and allowed for that planning, I think was most
unfortunate.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Levin.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, General Myers has some news
that I didn't have time to read and I will let him comment on
it.
General Myers. As we're speaking, I think NATO is also
looking at ways to deploy the help that Turkey needs, at least
part of AWACS and the missile defense assets in a way that
would not require political approval. They think they may have
that legal authority without going through the political
process. They are looking at that. There may be an announcement
here at about 11:00 on those issues.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, the
administration's Nuclear Posture Review called for improving
our nuclear weapons capability, and the administration
requested funds in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to
study a so-called nuclear penetrator.
If the United States sends signals that we're considering
new uses for nuclear weapons, isn't it more likely that other
nations will also want to explore greater use or new uses for
nuclear weapons, and that other nations won't listen to our
pleas to stay non-nuclear or to stay in the nonproliferation
treaty, but rather would say you're even relying on them more,
you're looking at new ways to use nuclear weapons, so why
shouldn't we?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think that the first thing
we have to say is that the task of the Department of Defense,
indeed the first responsibility of a President of the United
States, is to provide for the security of the country. The
Department of Defense assists the President in developing
contingency plans and studying a variety of things on a
continuing basis. To not do so, it seems to me, is to misserve
the country.
The world is experiencing an enormous amount of underground
tunneling and activities, activities underground that are for
production, for manufacturing, they are for development, for
storage. The problem of not having visibility into them and
when one has visibility, not having the ability to penetrate
and reach them creates a very serious obstacle to U.S. national
security.
To the extent that we say to ourselves, that this is going
to be the ultimate solution, we're unwilling to even study the
idea of penetrating capability and therefore we make it
advantageous for people to engage in that type of tunneling, I
think that it would create an incentive rather than a
disincentive.
Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, Title 10 requires the
Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, which is our independent test authority at the
Pentagon, to certify that appropriate operational testing has
been completed prior to putting weapon systems into production.
That law exists to prevent the production and fielding of a
weapon system that doesn't work right.
Your budget request seeks a waiver of the operational
testing requirements to enable you to implement your plans to
deploy a national missile defense system in 2004. How do you
justify bypassing operational testing requirements?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess I would justify it very easily
in this sense. If you think about it, it is a perfectly
rational thing to have a testing requirement. So if you take
the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, for example, and it is
moving along the track and it has not been fully tested and
it's not ready for deployment, and you start using it because
you're in a conflict, you find that it's advantageous to use
it. In the process of using it you find things that could be
changed and improved on it. Now it has never been fully
completed through the process with the stamp of approval of the
testing organization.
The same thing happened during Operation Desert Storm as I
recall, or Kosovo, with JSTAR.
General Myers. Joint Stars.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Joint Stars, the exact same thing.
So on the one hand, it makes sense to have the requirement.
On the other hand, it makes sense to waive it when reasonable
people look at the situation and say that it's time to do that.
Now, why do it with respect to missile defense? Well, I
happen to think that thinking we cannot deploy something until
you have everything perfect, every I dotted and every T
crossed, is probably not a good idea. In the case of missile
defense, I think we need to get something out there in the
ground, at sea, and in a way that we can test it, we can look
at it, we can develop it, we can evolve it, and learn from the
experimentation with it. It happens that it also provides a
minimal missile defense capability.
Senator Levin. If it works.
Secretary Rumsfeld. If it works, of course. The same thing
with Predator. I mean, Predator--things do not tend to work or
not work; they tend to work either as well as you hoped or
somewhere less well than you hoped. In the case of Predator, it
didn't work or not work, it did an awful lot that was very
valuable in Afghanistan and is still doing it today, but it
didn't do a lot of things that it might have done, because
people didn't ever have that experience in using it, and the
same thing would be true with missile defense.
Senator Levin. Thank you. General Myers, we have a copy of
a draft legislative proposal that has been circulating inside
the Department of Defense. If this legislation were passed, the
Joint Staff would report to the Secretary instead of to the
Chairman, and the Secretary would have to approve all
appointments to the Joint Staff. The draft amendment would
strike the statutory requirement that the Joint Staff be
``independently organized and operated.'' Then we also have the
memorandum signed by David Chu requesting a legislative
proposal be drafted that would reduce the term served by the
service chiefs from 4 years to 2-year renewable terms.
It seems to me that these proposals taken together or
separately would lessen the ability of the uniformed military
to provide independent military advice to the civilian
leadership in the executive branch and Congress. That's my
view, but what is your view of these proposals?
General Myers. Senator Levin, I'm at a little bit of a
disadvantage because I haven't seen the drafts yet, and I don't
know if we will, because the Secretary and I have talked in
general about how better to arrange ourselves, if there are
ways to make ourselves more efficient and effective. As far as
I know, we have just had some preliminary discussions, we've
talked about maybe having somebody look at this from the
outside that might be able to provide some help in that area.
Senator Levin. Would you be supporting these proposals?
General Myers. Well, I would have to look at them. I have
not seen the draft proposals. I think the way we're arranged
today is fundamentally sound, so I'd have to look and see how
they want to change that.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, do you have a comment on
that important question?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I haven't seen the draft either,
and therefore I don't know really how I could comment because I
am not familiar with it. General Myers and I have talked about
the way the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) function, and in some cases it's my personal view
that it looks like it duplicates things and requires things to
go through double chops. At least the thought has been
expressed to me by a number of people who have looked from the
outside as to whether there might be a way to merge some of
those pieces in a way that did not in any way inhibit the
Chairman's responsibility under the law to be able to provide
military advice to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. We talked about getting
together some folks to look at this and examine it.
Chairman Warner. So you promise to keep Congress and this
committee fully informed, should this thing begin to take on a
life of its own?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed. I take it somebody was up
talking about it already.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to say this
about the comments by the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
Every time I hear the argument that we don't want to enhance
our nuclear capability because they will do the same thing, if
you carry that to its logical conclusion, if we just disarmed,
then everyone else would disarm too and we wouldn't have these
problems.
I'm very proud of you, Mr. Secretary, for using the words
that you used. I wrote them down. You said we are in the most
dangerous security environment the world has ever known, and I
agree with that. Just yesterday, when Director Tenet called to
our attention the capabilities of what the North Koreans have
right now, a missile that could reach the United States of
America, and we know that they are trading systems and
technology with countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and
Pakistan. It's a very frightening thing.
I carry with me a veto message by former President Clinton
of our 1996 Defense Authorization Bill wherein he states his
justification for vetoing it: ``First, the bill requires
deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system able to
defend all 50 States from a long-range missile threat that our
intelligence committee does not think exists.'' I wish that
veto had not taken place.
I would single out this one thing in here as the most
significant thing, and I say that not so much as a Senator, but
my wife and I have 19 kids and grandkids, and I am deeply,
gravely concerned. Do you feel that this budget give you all
the money necessary for you to get something deployed against a
missile attack, at least a partial missile attack, or do you
need something more in there? Can you share with us what you
have?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we spent a good deal of time
looking at the issues of missile defense of various ranges:
short, medium, and ICBM range. We ended up creating a budget
that we believe at this state of our knowledge is appropriate.
It will do what I said. It will give us something in the ground
that will serve as a test bed so we can evolve it. It will give
us the capability to look at the sea based option, which I
believe is important. It will also give us as a result of that
test bed some minimal capability. To have gone further at this
stage, we felt would have been invalid. So I'm comfortable with
this level of funding in this particular instance.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
Myers, I chair the Environment and Public Works Committee and
there's an issue that will come before it and this committee
and that is encroachment on our ranges. I guess going a little
overboard on my concern on our ability to train our kids, I was
deeply concerned when you took away the live-fire training
capability at Vieques. At the UDARI range in Kuwait, we lost
five lives, four of whom were Americans, and the accident
report said that they did not have that live-fire training. I
look at what the environmental encroachment is doing to our
different ranges.
Just a few minutes ago, I had General Kelley from the
Marines talking about Camp Lejeune and Pendleton. Right now,
only 30 percent of Camp Pendleton can be used for training. At
Camp Lejeune, the red cockaded woodpecker is using up so much
of the range.
You are such good stewards of the environment that you're
your own worst enemy because the better job you do, the more
endangered species there are out there. I am very much
concerned about it and I would like to have you share with us
very briefly your concern. I do have one quote that you made
which is rather lengthy, so I know what your concern is. Would
you do that briefly?
General Myers. Senator Inhofe, I will try to do it as
briefly as I can. I don't think you can be too concerned about
this subject. I think the best quality of life you can provide
for our Armed Forces is proper training so if they are used in
combat or peacekeeping or whatever, they are prepared for that
task. Some of the uses of the environmental laws that we see
today, where groups will now bring the Department of Defense
into court, were never intended, I don't think, by the folks
who drafted the environmental protection statutes. They can
bring us into court and can stop training, whether it's
aircraft or land or on the sea for that matter, and it can be
very detrimental to our effectiveness and in the end will put
our men and women in harm's way simply because they haven't
been properly trained.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I know before this
committee a couple years ago, they testified that we were
spending more money in Camp Lejeune to protect the species than
we were on ammunition. It has to be addressed and I'm hoping
that we will be doing that.
Lastly, Secretary Rumsfeld, when you go back, and I'm going
from memory now, but as I recall in terms of percentage of GDP,
during the entire 20th century, during each year at peace,
defense spending represented 5.7 percent of GDP. We went down
to an all time low during the Clinton administration of about
2.8 percent. Even with this enhanced budget it's only 3.3
percent. When you look at the proliferation that's out there
and the fact that maybe we should relook at our strategy, maybe
we should be able to defend America on three regional fronts.
But as you have looked at this and look into the future in
terms of a percentage of GDP, what do you see in the future,
number one? Number two, in spite of all the problems you have
right now, will you be considering that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it's something that someone in
our position has to consider. It is hard to fully appreciate
the magnitude of the change that's taken place in terms of our
security and the difficulty. If one just takes the intelligence
task, we had the luxury, it sounds funny to use the word
luxury, of watching the Soviet Union, a closed society, and not
having to worry about very many other things. We could learn
about it, know about it, and over time we found it quite
predictable.
Today we're dealing with not one target for intelligence,
but dozens. We're looking at ungoverned areas all across the
globe where the governments simply do not control their own
real estate. We're dealing with countries that are every bit as
closed or more closed than the Soviet Union was. We're getting
information on North Korea, for example, that is just
enormously difficult.
So instead of at the end of the Cold War dropping the intel
budgets down and changing the projection by some $35 billion
over that period, I'm told, from what the pre-Cold War budgets
had been directed or projected to be for intelligence, it's
something like $35 billion less, while the task has gotten much
greater. So the question is, how do we adjust our thinking in
that regard and how do we see that we gain the kinds of
knowledge and information and have the kinds of not just
technological but human intelligence capabilities? That's true
in other areas as well. I just take that one example since it's
such an important one.
Senator Inhofe. I thank both of you for your courageous
answers. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. We
are of course proceeding under the early bird rule, and the
first early bird to arrive this morning was our distinguished
Senator from Massachusetts.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
join as I am sure all of us do with the words of Senator Levin
in commending you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for all
that you're doing for the service men and women of this
country. It is enormously impressive.
Let me move to the issue I mentioned prior to the start of
these hearings, Mr. Secretary, and that is the Nuclear Posture
Review. Many of us are concerned about the position of the
administration on nuclear weapons. Over the last half century
we have made great strides on arms control. We signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the ABM Treaty, the
START-I Treaty, and the START-II Treaty, creating an arms
control regime that has successfully prevented the use of
nuclear weapons for more than half a century.
Despite this progress, the Bush administration seems to be
taking us in a new direction. The administration has presented
a Nuclear Posture Review that suggests grave changes in our
policy on the use of nuclear weapons and the dangers that this
administration may well be igniting a new arms race.
Under the Nuclear Posture Review as reported in The Los
Angeles Times January 25, Strategic Command is developing plans
for the use of nuclear weapons against nations like Iraq that
do not have nuclear weapons. They mention other countries as
well, such as Syria, Libya, and Iran.
As you well understand, a nuclear weapon is not just
another weapon in an arsenal. Until now we have always kept
them in a class of their own for good reasons, because of their
enormous destructive power and our profound commitment to do
all we can to see that they are never used again. So wouldn't
the action in the Nuclear Posture Review violate a long-held
commitment under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to not
attacking non-nuclear states that are not aligned with nuclear
states?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I have no idea what you're
reading from, but I----
Senator Kennedy. Well, the Nuclear Posture Review----
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, no, the news article.
Senator Kennedy. That's what I'm referring to, a very well
publicized article titled: ``U.S. Weighs Tactical Nuclear
Strike in Iraq.'' There have been exchanges on it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exchanges between who and whom? I never
heard of this article.
Senator Kennedy. All right. But you're familiar with the
Nuclear Posture Review?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet. We spent 18 months developing
it.
Senator Kennedy. Did they also consider in the
administration's classified Nuclear Posture Review that said
nuclear weapons should be considered against targets able to
withstand conventional attack, in retaliation for an attack, in
retaliation for attacks with nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons, or in the event of surprising military developments?
It identified seven countries--China, Russia, Iraq, North
Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria as possible targets. That's in
it. If you're not familiar with it, I will move on.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just make a quick comment.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our policy historically has been
generally that we will not foreclose the possible use of
nuclear weapons if attacked. If you think back to Europe, we
always said we would not agree to a ``no first use policy''
because we would have to defend against overwhelming
conventional capability.
The second thing we've had as a general policy of our
country is not to rule out various options.
The third thing we have as a record is that those weapons,
as you said, have not been fired in anger since 1945.
Does the Department have an obligation and have they in
successive administrations of both political parties had
procedures whereby we would conceivably use nuclear weapons?
Yes.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I thought also there were assurances
about non-first use against countries that didn't have nuclear
weapons, that that was included as well.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm familiar with that.
Senator Kennedy. All right. There have been such countries
included, as I understand it, in the Nuclear Posture Review.
That's a change, and that's what I'm asking about.
But let me just go on. Is the United States seriously
considering using any nuclear weapons against Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States has historically had
strategic offensive nuclear weapons and theater nuclear
weapons. As a part of contingency planning, the United States
has in my adult lifetime always had contingency plans to do a
variety of things. The question you asked was not that. The
question you asked was are we seriously considering something.
The only person in the United States who has the power to use
weapons of that nature is the President of the United States.
It seems to me that if one looks at our record, we went through
the Korean War, we went through the Vietnam War, we've gone
through the war on terror and we have not used nuclear weapons.
That ought to say something about the threshold with respect to
nuclear weapons.
Senator Kennedy. On February 4, Richard Pearl, Chairman of
the Defense Policy Board, stated that he believed the military
can win in Iraq with precision bombs, that is his position
about it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's my position.
Senator Kennedy. In the House of Commons, Prime Minister
Blair said, ``the notion that we have plans to use nuclear
weapons in Iraq is completely false.'' Would you agree with
that statement?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree with the statement
made that we have every confidence that in the event force is
to be used in Iraq, that we could do what needs to be done
using conventional capabilities.
Senator Kennedy. Well, just to finish, Mr. Chairman, I'm
concerned that the use of nuclear weapons in Iraq in the
absence of an imminent overwhelming threat to our national
security would bring a near total breakdown in our relations
with the rest of the world, particularly in regards to the Arab
world.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I'd like to just make
sure the record is very clear here. You have raised a very
sensitive subject and the implication of it from the article is
that there is a likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used.
I think that implication is an unfortunate one.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Well, last year the Republicans
attempted to repeal the restrictions on nuclear weapons with a
yield of five kilotons or less, the so-called ``mini-nukes.''
Now what is your position on that? Are you for continuing the
Spratt amendment or are you for repealing it? That is the one
that has had the prohibition about research and development
below the five kilotons. That's a fairly good indication as
well as to where the administration is thinking.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't think it is.
Senator Kennedy. It may not for you but it certainly is for
many of us, if you're thinking of repealing what has been now
for a number of years the restrictions for no testing below
certain kinds of kilotons because of the increased possible use
of them and the dangers of the proliferation of small weapons
like this, getting into the hands of terrorists. Those are
serious policy issues and questions. We were going to continue
the Spratt moratorium, that would certainly send a signal. If
you are for changing or altering that, that would certainly be
an indicator of a changed position of the administration.
Chairman Warner. Senator, your question is important but we
are way over time. I wonder if the Secretary could answer that
for the record.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to. I think it's
terribly important to distinguish between the process of
research and development and analysis, as opposed to the
process of development and deployment, let alone use of a
weapon. Those distinctions, it seems to me, get blurred in a
discussion like this, and I think they need to be in very
separate boxes.
[The information referred to follows:]

The law that the administration has asked Congress to repeal is the
so-called Precision Low-Yield Weapon Development (PLYWD) law
(Sec. 3136, PL 103-160). The PLYWD law prohibits research that could
lead to the development or production of a new low-yield warhead with a
yield at or below 5 Kt. This law is a serious impediment to
intellectual and technical research to explore and understand the
capability of low-yield options in conjunction with advanced technology
to place existing or emerging WMD facilities at risk with relatively
low-levels of collateral damage. Conducting research on potential new
weapons utilizing new technologies will enhance deterrence, not lower
the nuclear threshold.
Repealing the law does not reflect a change in policy; low-yield
nuclear weapons are not new. The U.S. has had low-yield nuclear weapons
for decades. Repeal of the so-called PLYWD law falls far short of
committing the United States to developing, producing, and deploying
new, low-yield warheads. Such warhead concepts could not proceed to
full-scale development, much less production and deployment, unless
Congress authorizes and appropriates the substantial funds required to
do this.
Conducting research and development to hold at risk facilities
associated with weapons of mass destruction will not undermine our
efforts to limit proliferation internationally. Nations seek and
develop nuclear capabilities to address their regional security
concerns, not because the U.S. has low-yield nuclear weapons. Quite the
opposite is true. An effective U.S. deterrent would help deter
potential aggressors from trying to acquire WMD or threatening its use
against U.S. territory, troops, allies, and friends.
Today, as well as in the future, the U.S. cannot predict with
confidence what nations or non-state actors may pose a threat to our
vital interests or those of our allies. The U.S. must possess forces
sufficient to dissuade and deter any potential adversary armed with WMD
and to assure our allies and friends of our commitment to their
security. Research and development aimed at finding ways to place
threatening facilities such as those associated with WMD at risk are
fully consistent with maintaining an effective deterrent. Just because
a nuclear weapon has a relatively low yield, compared to the so-called
``hard target killers'' from the Cold War, does not make them any
easier to use. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. possessed
many types of low yield weapons. Deterrence worked; none were used. As
with all nuclear weapons, the President is the sole authority for
employment. A president would consider use of any nuclear weapon only
in the most grave situations.

Chairman Warner. The Senator from Maine.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, at
the same time that we are deploying troops around the globe for
the war against terrorism, as well as to prepare for a
potential war in Iraq, we have a number of existing deployments
that continue to require extensive resources to maintain. We
have, for example, some 37,000 troops in Korea and more than
70,000 troops in Germany. With the increasing demands on our
military, I believe that it is time for us to reevaluate the
need for those existing deployments.
For instance, our large presence in Germany is largely a
legacy of the Cold War, and arguably, that threat no longer
exists. Is the Department reexamining the need for large
deployments in Germany and Korea?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the President asked me, when
he asked me to serve as Secretary of Defense, to review our
defense posture and our circumstance around the world. We have
been doing that. There is no question but that the arrangements
of our current force deployments have an advantage in that they
are forward deployed and they serve to reassure the world and
the nations that we have the ability to deter and defend
against various types of threats.
It is quite clear to me that you're correct, that the
deployments we have, for example, in Korea, which is one of the
places you mentioned, can be reviewed in cooperation with the
South Korean government and, as a matter of fact, the new
President of South Korea has suggested that we look at our
relationship and see that we rebalance it in some way, and I
have accepted that invitation. We had previously been looking
at it on a private basis, a unilateral basis, and General
LaPorte has been working on it now for many months and we will
very soon, as soon as the new government is in place, begin
somewhat more formal discussions about how we can ensure the
defense of the peninsula and still have--for one thing, I would
like to see a number of our forces moved away from the Seoul
area and from the area near the de-militarized zone (DMZ), and
be more oriented towards an air hub and a sea hub, with the
ability to reinforce so that there is still a strong deterrent.
Possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people, some
of those forces come back home. We'll see.
Now General Jones in Europe is doing the same thing. There
is no question but that right now, for example, we're trying to
move some forces from Germany down to Italy, and Austria is
causing a difficulty with respect to moving the forces through
Austria by rail, which means we may have to go up to Rotterdam
or possibly by train through two or three or four countries
instead of directly.
Therefore, it's clear that it's better for us probably not
to have such a heavy concentration. I think it would, however,
be a mistake to suggest that if we do end up reducing some of
those forces or moving them to other countries, that it had
anything to do with our relationships with those countries,
because it simply doesn't. It is something that we have been
involved in over many months now and are in the process of
working with other countries on.
Senator Collins. I would now like to turn to the
shipbuilding budget, which will probably come as no surprise to
you. I'm pleased that the fiscal year 2004 budget submission
appears to turn the corner on shipbuilding and it is a marked
improvement over last year. However, even with budgeting for 7
ships, the Navy's fleet is still going to drop, as you
indicated, below 300 ships in the coming years. The Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) has repeatedly testified, and I talked
to him just recently, that our Nation requires a fleet of 375
ships in order to fulfill all of the Navy's mission
requirements.
Now I appreciate your testimony that you don't want to lock
the Department into a shipbuilding program until you're certain
what kinds of ships you need and what the mix should be. But
how are you going to remedy the deficit we have in coming years
if we don't start making more of that investment now? Again, I
applaud you for putting 7 ships in, that's a big improvement
over 5 of last year, but it still is not at the rate we need,
which is more like 10 or 11 ships a year.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, this is a tough area and we
are pleased that the numbers are coming up but we're
disappointed that the total number of ships are going to drop
below 300 for a period, and then be back up by the end of the
forward year of the defense plan.
The CNO is an enormously able man who is doing a superb job
for the country, Adm. Vernon Clark. I know he has testified to
the number 375 for a number of years, if I'm not mistaken. We
have a group of people that are looking at doing a shipbuilding
study and analyzing not just numbers but, more importantly,
types of ships and capabilities of ships: lethality, what they
bring. That study, I don't know when it will be through. You're
involved in it, Dov.
Dr. Zakheim. Senator, we're looking specifically at issues
like amphibious shipping, forcible entry, and also underwater
requirements. Senator, we have research and development money
for a new Littoral combat ship. That's why we have some
confidence that as the numbers begin to really go up in the
outyears, like 2009, that those are real numbers because those
ships are going to be much less expensive.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr.
Secretary, let me commend you for your representation of our
country. You had not only remarkable eloquence but remarkable
restraint, and both were noted.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm not noted for restraint.
Senator Reed. I agree. [Laughter.]
As we all understand, the American public is terribly
concerned about developments around the globe and even within
the United States with the heightened alerts, with conflicts
potentially in the Persian Gulf, and with the war on terror.
They're also a bit confused. As I go back to my home State of
Rhode Island, one of the confusing elements is the apparent
disparate treatment between the threat posed by Iraq and the
threat posed by North Korea. North Korea has a military force
capable of a surprise attack, clearly Iraq does not. North
Korea has ejected U.N. inspectors, Iraq grudgingly,
reluctantly, and noncooperatively has allowed them into their
country. Our response to the North Korean situation has been to
refer it to the United Nations, our response to the Iraq
situation has been to, we hope, encourage the United Nations
enforcement but prepare to go it alone.
I wonder, Mr. Secretary, since you are responsible for
military planning, are we discounting a more serious threat
posed by North Korea, the threat that they will within weeks
have nuclear weapons or marketable plutonium because of our
concentration or preoccupation with Iraq?
Second, what can we do right now with respect to North
Korea to try to moderate their behavior?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me try and again
demonstrate restraint, since this is a matter that the
President and Secretary Powell are wrestling with extensively.
My impression of these two very different situations, each
dangerous to be sure, is that the U.S. policy over a period of
time has been to some extent the same. Both have gone to the
United Nations.
The difference is in the case of Iraq, it's been 12 years.
They have tried political and diplomatic efforts through the
United Nations, now up to some 17 resolutions. They have tried
economic sanctions and they haven't worked. Iraq over a period
of time has used chemical weapons against its own people and
its neighbors. They have fired Scud missiles at three or four
of their neighbors. They invaded Kuwait. They threatened to
destabilize some of their neighbors. They struck with, as a
terrorist state, and are developing weapons of mass
destruction. It seems to me that that one is at the end of the
cycle.
Conversely, one had hoped that North Korea, as a result of
the Agreed Framework, was at a stop with respect to nuclear
weapons. The public assessment is that they have one or two
weapons. The public assessment is that if they restart the
reprocessing plant, they can have six to eight additional, or
they could have material for six to eight additional weapons
but not have weaponized them immediately. I see North Korea as
a threat as a proliferator more than I see them as a nuclear
threat on the peninsula.
Now, I could be wrong, but they sell almost anything. They
are the world's greatest proliferator of missile technology,
and what concerns me is that risk. I think that the decision by
the President and the Secretary of State to have that problem
seen as a world problem is correct, that it is a problem for
the world, that proliferation represents a terribly dangerous
thing. There are a lot of countries sitting around waiting to
buy that type of material.
We can't unilaterally as a country win things politically
or economically; it takes enormous cooperation from other
nations. It's pretty clear that the proliferation regimes that
exist in the world worked pretty well before, but they're not
working very well right now. For example, we stopped that ship
going towards Yemen, and we had no legal authority to stop it,
so we had to let it go. It was more missile technology coming
from North Korea, and the same thing is going to be true.
Unless the world wakes up and says this is a dangerous thing,
and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get cooperation
to stop those weapons, we are going to be facing a very serious
situation in the next 5 years.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me raise
another issue which is related to North Korea, because reports
today indicate that they have the missile capability to reach
the west coast of the United States, which underscores the
importance of developing and deploying an effective missile
defense system.
You have indicated in your budget that you are proposing a
limited deployment, and I think in response to Senator Levin
you said that this will be done without operational testing.
The first question I have is, can I assume that you will
conduct operational testing even though it will come after the
deployment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course. I don't even know that it's
correct to say it will be deployed without operational testing.
I think this is an unusual situation and I would characterize
what we have proposed as simultaneously a test bed as well as a
minimal deployment. It is both things, and the words are hot
button words because the testing is required before deployment,
but not before a test bed. Yet, the reality is the test bed
offers a deployable minimal capability.
Senator Reed. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, in terms of
these are hot button words and that's why I think it's very
important to pick words carefully, because the last missile
test was a failure; they've had great successes and some
failures, it's still a very primitive system.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator Reed. We need a booster rocket that has not yet
been integrated into the system. My suggestion was that using
the word deployment gives it a little more credibility, the
system that we use today, than in fact it has.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess beauty is in the eye of the
beholder, but let me tell you the dilemma I went through. On
the one hand if you call it a deployment, it has a greater
deterrent effect. If you call it a deployment when in fact it
is very minimal and would, it is what it is, then it's
overstating it. If you call it a test bed, someone who's
against deployment is going to call it a deployment, because
the reality is it has a minimal capability. Then they're going
to say you deployed it before you tested it. So no matter which
way we went, someone wasn't going to like it.
My attitude is, we have an obligation. It is a fact, George
Tenet declassified it yesterday as I understand it, that the
North Koreans very likely do have a two-stage with a kick motor
capability, which could reach the United States. We also
assessed that they have a limited number of nuclear weapons.
Now, that's not a happy combination. Having that test bed, that
minimally deployed system, is not a bad thing, I'd say.
Senator Reed. Thank you for your responses and your
restraint.
Chairman Warner. Senator Ensign.
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make
just a couple of brief comments and then get into a little
questioning.
I have read through your statement and there are a couple
of things I was very pleased about. I think you're right on
target with the idea--and this doesn't just apply to missile
defense, I think it applies to many other weapon systems--the
idea of not waiting until you have a perfect system before
deploying it. I think that our experience is showing us that
weapons systems are taking far too long to develop.
I don't know if it was in your testimony from today or some
of the previous things that I've read from you, but I remember
reading that the length of time today required to bring new
weapons systems on line is two or three times longer than it
was 20 years ago. Yet, technology is advancing the speed with
which new things should be happening and instead, we're going
the other way. So taking a whole new look at the way the
Department of Defense does things is absolutely critical at
this point.
I've said for a long time that the Department of Defense
probably has enough money right now if you were able to do
things the right way. In other words, if you didn't have all
the rules and regulations that you had to do things, and you
could actually get the money to the things that the money needs
to be gotten to, and didn't have all the bureaucratic
procedures and have to spend all of that money doing all the
bureaucratic things that you have to do, you probably--I don't
know that that number is accurate, but you would certainly have
a lot more money to put to weapons systems and quality of life
issues, and taking care of the military the way that it needs
to be taken care of.
So I'm very excited about the new direction, and as the new
chairman for the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee,
I'm committing to work with you on some of these issues. We
have a role. We have to hold you accountable. But at the same
time, we have to recognize that you have a lot more expertise
in these areas and we have to able to take your direction and
empower you to do the things that are going to be necessary to
transform, or at least begin a major transformation of, our
Department of Defense.
Now to get to my first question, do you have any idea how
much money you could save in some of the reparations? I
understand we're probably not going to cut the defense budget,
but how much money from the proposals that you put together,
have you put a number together, or maybe Dr. Zakheim, you can
tell us if there's a total amount estimate of savings if all of
the reforms that you wanted were put through.
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, Senator. First of all, thank you
for your encouragement on the kinds of changes that we really
believe we need, and we look forward to working with you on
that. We have not put together a number. I have kind of off the
top of my head said that in organizations that I have run, I
have generally been able to save something around 5 percent if
you get at it and work at it hard. Now that doesn't sound like
a big percentage, but when you've got a $380 billion budget,
it's a pile of money. I'm just guessing.
But there is no question that we're required to do so many
things we ought not have to do, and people are wasting so much
time doing things they don't have to do, that we could do an
awful lot better job for the country.
Senator Ensign. On the idea of using our resources better,
one concern I have is that, we are taking the bulk of the
responsibility in an area that I consider to be primarily a
European problem. We have been a great friend to the Europeans
in the Balkans. We handled the situation for them and continue
to handle a great deal of that over there, and it seems to have
been taken off the table when we were trying to solve this
situation with NATO and Turkey, the idea of taking our
peacekeepers away from there and allowing the Europeans to
handle the peacekeeping operation. Can you make some comments
on your feelings about that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure. I think what happened in the
Balkans, Europe seemed to need our involvement, to put it
graciously. Fair enough. We decided to get involved, which in
my view was the right decision. We underestimated--as I recall,
in Bosnia they said we'd be out by Christmas. Not so. I think
it's important to be realistic about things, and it takes time.
What you have to do if you put troops in is build up the
civil side, the rule of law, the courts, the police, the border
patrol, they have to have that capability. The U.N. and the
European Union (EU) and the people charged with that
responsibility did not move as aggressively, in my view, as
they might have. Joe Ralston, our European commander during
that period, has done a great job in beginning to pull our
troops--not our troops but all NATO troops that are in there--
down in a measured way. There is a better effort now going on
getting that civil side working.
Now, it's still a dangerous part of the world and we have
to be aware of that. There are countries that have offered to
help back fill some of that, Senator, for us because of our
involvement in the global war on terrorism, and we have looked
at that.
Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Just one
quick comment not requiring a response and that is, I
appreciate you not taking any of our options off the table. I
consider us the good guys, and I would rather have the good
guys having all of their weapon systems and all of their
capabilities far superior to the bad guys in the world. So, I
applaud your efforts and say keep going.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
want to thank you and your colleagues for being with us today.
We know you're busy, and we appreciate your enabling us to do
our constitutional responsibilities here.
General and Doctor, I hope you won't take personal offense
if my inquiries are directed to the Secretary, and Mr.
Secretary, I hope you won't take personal offense at that
either.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will have to hear the question before
I will answer that. [Laughter.]
Senator Bayh. Fair enough. Mr. Secretary, the Cold War
ended 14 years ago and the shifting of the geopolitical, for
lack of a better term, tectonic plates that began at that time
has begun to reveal some fissures that only now are coming to
full relief. That said, I want to follow up on a question that
the chairman asked you about NATO. Simply put, what do you view
as the future mission or role of NATO? Let me follow up on that
just with one other comment that the chairman also alluded to.
We now have an alliance that has a couple major countries in it
that are unwilling to support us in our effort to enforce
United Nations resolutions. Those same countries are apparently
unwilling to take steps to defend another member of the
alliance. What good is an alliance that is willing to take
neither proactive steps nor defensive measures?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have a feeling you're trying to put
me in a position of defending Germany and France.
Senator Bayh. It's hard to defend the indefensible.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But first let me say, if one looked
down from Mars on the globe, we'd find there are several
handfuls of countries that believe in free political
institutions and free economic institutions, and most of them
are in NATO, a large fraction of them in the whole word are in
NATO. Like minded countries working together in a world that's
dangerous and untidy is a good thing. I may as a former
ambassador to NATO, having lived it, have a bit of a bias on
the subject, but I believe that NATO, since the Cold War ended
and NATO has migrated into understanding the importance of
doing things outside of the NATO treaty area, has the potential
to bring a multinational approach to some problems in the world
that can be enormously beneficial.
To get something accomplished it is frequently vastly
better to work with other countries, because things don't fit
solely as political, economic, or military. They tend to be a
blend. Again, we need the political and the economic support as
well as the military support. So I'm disappointed at the
situation in NATO where they have refused to assist Turkey with
planning.
On the other hand, I have been around so long that I have
seen many times in our alliance where we've had bumps. We had
the natural gas pipeline during the Reagan administration, we
had the Mansfield amendment back then, and Senator Warner will
remember back in the 1970s. It's never been perfect, it's
always been a little bumpy. This one is interesting because the
division is not between the United States and Europe, the
division is within Europe.
Senator Bayh. Correct. So your response is that although
occasionally aggravating and not perfect, it's better than the
alternative, particularly when we look at the breadth of
challenges that we face. I think Director Tenet mentioned that
yesterday, that the cooperation continues to be excellent in
the intelligence community. But I thought it was important to
raise this subject. It's something that I think we have to give
some thought to going forward.
General Myers. Senator, can I just--let me----
Senator Bayh. If you can be brief, General, because the
clock is running on me.
General Myers. I will try to do that, Senator. You asked
about the future role and the Secretary covered a part of that.
The other part is that at the time we are discussing this issue
in NATO right now about Article IV and support for Turkey,
we're also redoing the command and control structure that has
to be done to get out of the Cold War model that we've had. The
NATO response force is an idea that we took into NATO that's
being implemented.
I will keep it short, but there are probably 9 or 10 good
things that NATO has done really well lately, to include their
support in Afghanistan.
Senator Bayh. It's important to emphasize this organization
is going to retain its vitality and its mission going forward,
I think is a thought that's in order here.
If I could just move on, Mr. Secretary, I want to second
what Senator Collins said with regard to the role of our forces
in South Korea. I'm delighted to hear that you're giving some
thought to possibly repositioning them. It seems to me right
now that they are insufficient to either fight or deter
successfully. They are not uniformly popular in the country,
and so some rethinking of the presence there is in order.
Just one other question and a couple of quick comments,
because 6 minutes runs by very quickly. Mr. Secretary, we live
in a world unfortunately of multiple threats these days, as you
know better than any of the rest of us. We hope that it doesn't
come to fighting in any of them but we have to be prepared to
take force, if necessary, in more than one place. Specifically
I'd like to ask you, and I know it's not our policy and we've
said repeatedly we don't intend to use force, but I want to ask
you about North Korea in the context of Iraq. If it came to
that, and I know we don't intend to, and I don't want to try
and bait you over that line here, but if we decided that we had
no choice except to take military action against the
reprocessing facility and their launch sites, could we do that
while fully engaged in Iraq? Do we have the capability?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, if I answer that, the
newspapers throughout Asia are going to say that the Secretary
of Defense rattled the sabers, and the President is on a
diplomatic track.
Senator Bayh. Let me step back from the question, but I
think you can understand where we sit. It's important to look
at the potentialities that are out there and be reassured.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Bayh. So let me step back from that specific
question and just say, do we have the ability to act both in
Iraq and in other potential hot spots around the world in a way
that would defend America's security?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we have a defense strategy and
a force sizing construct that says we can win decisively and
conquer a country in one theater, and near simultaneously
swiftly defeat an adversary in another theater, and at the same
time successfully pursue a number of lesser contingencies, for
example, Bosnia or Kosovo, or what we're doing in Afghanistan.
Senator Bayh. I would trust in your budget that you're
embedding additional capabilities to address multiple
situations simultaneously.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, as I indicated, our budget does
not include money for the global war on terror. Nor does it
include money for the force flows in support of Iraq. We're
going to have to have a supplemental for that, which I'm told
is traditional.
Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. If I could
just make two comments without requesting any response. I know
this is a recurring source of aggravation for you, Mr.
Chairman. I couldn't help but notice in The Washington Post
today a front page story saying special operations units are
already in Iraq. It cites sources or experts familiar with
Pentagon planning, and then two military officials with direct
knowledge of their activities, etcetera, etcetera. This subject
of leaks, there was a great deal of hue and cry about a leak
from Congress a while back with regard to a single somewhat
innocuous intercept in Afghanistan.
I know you're doing your best on this, but if this kind of
leaking takes place, it's hard to--I would request that you do
all you can because we are going to try and do all we can from
our end.
Finally, regarding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), I mentioned yesterday to Director Tenet that
there is a potential there, with our growing military
involvement, for that not only to bite our personnel there but
possibly here domestically as well, if you think about this
incident where they had a bombing of a fairly large, a hardened
target in Bogota a few days ago. There is a great deal of
travel back and forth between Colombia and the U.S., and it's
not beyond the realm of possibility that they may decide to
take that conflict at some future date to U.S. soil. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, might I just comment on
that?
Chairman Warner. The Senator's time has almost been double
now.
I want to encourage General Myers to respond to the
important questions about NATO. I do believe you had testified
about nine points. Not now, but in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

1. Every nation that has led ISAF in Afghanistan has been a NATO
Ally. Beginning with ISAF III in January, NATO, as an Alliance, began
supporting the German/Dutch command of the ISAF mission. NATO is
exploring providing increased support, including possibly taking
command.
2. Prague Capabilities Commitment. Heads of state and government
made political commitments to focused, achievable improvements in
military capabilities.
3. NATO Response Force. This will be a driver for force
modernization and will give NATO a credible 21st century military
force.
4. Command Structure Review. Allies made a commitment to joint
operations and a considerably leaner structure that includes an Allied
Command Transformation.
5. NATO Enlargement. We are on the road to successful accession of
seven nations into NATO.
6. NATO-Russia Council. We have seen the development of a
significant relationship between Russia and NATO.
7. Balkans Transition to EU command/control. NATO is developing a
good working relationship with the EU Security apparatus, resulting in
actual military capabilities and EU assumption of the NATO mission in
Macedonia.
8. Political guidance for defense against terrorism. The Alliance
is committed to acting against terrorists, as well as those who harbor
them.
9. European sealift and airlift clearinghouse organizations. These
are nascent means of improving the deployability of European forces.

Chairman Warner. Do you wish to say something, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do. I think the Senator is exactly
correct about leaks. I think they are just dangerous. They put
people's lives at risk, and I think people have a duty to
manage their mouths and not put people's lives at risk. I would
also add that I think it's the obligation of people who find
people leaking to tell responsible authorities because folks
that do it and put people's lives at risk ought to be in jail.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make sure the
record is clear. I thought I heard Senator Bayh say that we
were not able to fight successfully in Korea. You said we were
not positioned to.
Senator Bayh. No, no, I didn't, and I don't want to take
any more time. With 37,000 troops, it seemed to me that they
were unlikely to be essential to fighting a successful war
there.
Chairman Warner. We must turn now to Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pursue
your comment about the capability of Korea to reach the
mainland with a missile strike. We had testimony from Director
Tenet yesterday, and he did make the statement that they have
missile capability to reach the west coast and that's the first
time I'd ever heard that statement. So, you made a statement
here and the nature of your statement that you made, it wasn't
clear to me whether you were just stating a fact that he had
made that statement or whether you have evidence that makes you
believe that Korea can reach the west coast with a missile.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I chaired the Ballistic
Missile Commission back in 1998, I guess it was, or 1997, and
there is no question but that North Korea launched a type of
Dong II, a two-stage ballistic missile with a kick motor on it,
and the kick motor did not work. It apparently did not put it
into orbit or give it the sufficient distance that they needed.
But that was years ago, and they are clearly capable in missile
technology, they sell it all the over the world, and there
isn't a doubt in my mind but that by now they have a capability
to reach portions of the United States.
Senator Allard. In my view, and it must be your view too,
that makes our missile defense system even more critical. As
one American who wants to make sure we protect the borders of
this country, I am very appreciative of you and this
administration for pushing forward on missile defense. If we
had taken the advice of those who opposed missile defense, I
think we'd have a vulnerability today that would have to be of
concern to this country, and I think it still exists, but at
least we have somewhat of a leg up when the administration is
talking about deploying a missile defense system, and I just
want to thank you and the administration for that forward
thinking type of effort on the part of this country. It's that
type of effort that's going to make sure we remain a free
country.
I also would like to compliment you on being willing to
look at many new programs in the Pentagon. I've always viewed
you as somebody who is willing to shake the tree a little bit
and I appreciate that in you. It doesn't hurt programs that
have been around a long time to go back and reevaluate them and
make them rejustify why they have to be there. If we want our
taxpayer dollars to do the most for the American people towards
defending this country, I think that has to happen. Even in an
institution that you and I strongly support, which is the
Department of Defense, we need to look hard to make sure that
we are doing everything we can to do the best in trying to
protect the country with as few tax dollars as we possibly can,
and I commend you for that.
Also, one other thing I wanted to bring up was the Air
Force's evolve expendable launch vehicle (EELV). The market on
launch vehicles and the industrial base associated with that
has really changed dramatically in the last year or 2 and I
have been one that always pushed that we needed to have
competition, because I think it brings the best out and gives
you some choice and some duplication that perhaps maybe we
need. There are some areas in defense where duplication makes
sense and some where it doesn't. This is one of those areas
where I always thought it made a lot of sense. Can you talk a
little bit about what you think might be our capability in
maintaining that competitive system in the expendable launch
vehicle area?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The guy sitting next to me is an expert
on the subject, the former commander of the Space Command, and
I think I will let Dick Myers comment on it.
Senator Allard. General Myers.
General Myers. Senator Allard, I think I can go a little
way towards addressing your question. I don't know if I can go
all the way. Obviously the business case has changed
dramatically since the idea that we would have competition for
our new expendable launch vehicles, and I think both of the
industrial competitors in that program have developed very good
launch systems. They're developing capability on both the east
and west coasts for those systems.
My understanding is given this change in the business case
that was present just 3 or 4 years ago in contrast with today,
the Air Force along with the folks up in the Secretary's office
in acquisition, technology, and logistics are looking at the
way ahead for this program. To my knowledge, they have not made
a judgment in terms of how to handle the competitive piece of
this, but I think that's under a serious discussion right now.
Senator Allard. I understand that in the President's budget
there have been some dollars put in there to try to sustain
this competitive environment, and I would urge you to try to do
that, because I think it's vital that we have some launch
capability out there and if one system goes bad, it's always
nice to have a little bit of redundancy.
General Myers. Well, the EELV, make no mistake about it, is
absolutely essential to our space capability because they are
the launch vehicles for the future. I think we have a handful
of Titan IVs left and a few other kind of rockets, but we're
going to go to the EELV, that's a given. The question is, do we
have enough launches in the cue to sustain the two competitors.
I have to tell you, I'm not totally up to speed on that issue
other than I understand it was being looked at in a very
serious way by the Air Force and by Pete Aldridge.
Dr. Zakheim. Just to be specific, Senator, we have in the
2004 budget funds for four launches, and that's in addition to
the launch that's taking place this month.
Senator Allard. I see, thank you.
Back to missile defense, you've expressed a willingness in
the past to sort of bring in other countries in the missile
defense area, get them involved to a certain degree. Do you
have plans to bring in our closest allies in this effort, for
example, Britain or maybe Canada? Is there any hope at all that
we could get Russia involved in a partnership that wouldn't put
us at increased risk on our technology?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're correct, we are engaged
in discussions with a number of countries, including the United
Kingdom (U.K.). In fact, the U.K. made an announcement within
the last week or 2 about their upgrade and their interest in
cooperating with us in improving their security situation as a
result. But there are any number of countries that come in and
we do discuss these things. With respect to Russia, the answer
is yes, there is a possibility we could cooperate. There are a
number of things we could do with Russia on missile defense.
Indeed, my recollection is there was a working group that was
going back in the 1990s but for some reason it was discontinued
in the late 1990s, and I have had discussions with Minister of
Defense Ivanov on this subject and I suspect we will continue.
Senator Allard. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka.
Before, Senator, you address the witnesses, could I put
into the record following the important questions from our
colleague from Colorado, the communication that I, Senator
Levin, Senator Roberts, and Senator Rockefeller received. I
asked the Director of Central Intelligence to elaborate on the
comments he made about the Korean missile yesterday.
The essence of it is, the testimony is consistent with
previously unclassified judgments, the capability of the Taepo
Dong-2 to reach the United States is not a new judgment, and he
elaborates on that. Without objection, it will go into today's
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome
the Secretary and the Chief here to this hearing.
Mr. Secretary, as mentioned in your answer to Senator Reed,
the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, testified before this
committee yesterday that North Korea has a missile capable of
reaching the west coast of the United States, which means that
obviously they have the capacity to hit Hawaii. It is my
understanding that the current Cobra Dane Radar that is to be
part of the ground based missile defense test bed in Alaska
cannot discriminate warheads on missiles launched from North
Korea. Considering that North Korea is the stated reason for
the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, are you
requesting money in this budget to build a dedicated
operational and X-band radar, which the Department has said is
required for warhead discrimination?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first let me make a comment
and then I would like to get the rest of the question answered
for the record. North Korea is, I don't believe, the stated
single reason for deploying a missile defense capability or a
test bed, depending on which one someone likes to call it. It
is to develop a capability, a missile defense capability more
broadly and to test capabilities, and it would not simply be
the Alaska interceptors or that radar. It would be multiple
radars and multiple interceptors if, in fact, decisions are
made to go forward with a fuller deployment, and it would
require upgrading radars. But we will get you a precise answer.
General Myers. The only thing I would add to it is when we
think about missile defense, the Secretary took the labels off
of national missile defense. Now we have missile defense.
Whether it's strategic or tactical or national or local depends
on where you are and where the missile is coming from. I think
that's very helpful to the folks who we have fielded around the
world and to our allies and our partners as well. So it is
missile defense, it's more than just the pieces we've talked
about.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, we will be looking forward to
hearing more about that.
[The information referred to follows:]

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have developed a
research, development, and test program that focuses on missile defense
as a single integrated ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, no
longer differentiating between theater and national missile defense. In
programmatic terms, we no longer speak of national or theater missile
defense. Operationally, the terms can take on different meanings
depending on where you live. The distinction between them made sense a
decade ago, when we faced the stark difference between a Soviet ICBM
threat and an Iraqi Scud. Now it no longer does. The same North Korean
missile aimed at Japan could be a national threat to our ally, but a
theater threat to us--unless it were retargeted toward the United
States, in which case it would become national again. Furthermore, at
some point in time, a short-range missile could threaten our homeland
just as well as an ICBM could, if, say, it were launched from the sea
off our coast.

Senator Akaka. General Myers, in your posture statement,
you mention the 2002 Unified Command Plan, the plan which
created the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and
determined how it will provide military assistance to the
Homeland Security Department. Given the fact that Hawaii does
not fall within the jurisdiction of NORTHCOM, how will the
Department ensure that there is appropriate coordination
between NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) regarding
homeland security for Hawaii and the Pacific Island
territories?
General Myers. Senator, I can answer the military part of
that. The responsibility that NORTHCOM has is for the
continental 48 States and Alaska, and PACOM has responsibility
for Hawaii. So for the military part of that, PACOM and Admiral
Tom Fargo will handle that portion.
In terms of the relationship between the Homeland Security
Department and Hawaii and those functions, you're going to have
to ask Secretary Ridge. I'm not familiar with how he is going
to work that with your State.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. General Myers, your response to
Senator Warner's question on the readiness of troops was that
our troops are ``absolutely ready.'' You also mentioned the
negative effects of environmental loss on military readiness.
Can you reconcile these two statements? What exactly is the
impact of environmental encroachment on the readiness of our
troops?
General Myers. One of the cases that I think is probably
right before our eyes is the one in Guam where the Navy is
prohibited from flying because of the Migratory Bird Act, and
the case that is being talked about in the sense of a court
case is the chance that an aircraft might hit a bird and that
would be in violation of the act. If that court case shuts down
a training range in Guam, then we're going to have to look for
work-arounds. You might be able to do it in one location, but
as you have to do that in other locations--I mean, I have been
flying for 37 years and we have many bird strikes. It's nothing
against the bird or against the species. [Laughter.]
So we have to find a way to address this in a more rational
way so that an act like the Migratory Bird Act, which is an
important environmental act, does not limit our training.
That's one example. There are some other ones as well, but I
think we need to find some ways to work around it so we can
conduct our military training in harmony with the need to
protect the environment.
I think Senator Inhofe said it well, and I didn't have to
repeat it, but the Department of Defense spends enormous
amounts of money in complying with environmental law. When I
was Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, Vandenberg
Air Force Base sits in a State that is very environmentally
conscious. I think the State of California will tell you that
we were great stewards of the land at Vandenberg. We handle
some very dangerous stuff out there in terms of rockets and the
fuels and the things we do. So, I would just say we go to
enormous effort to try to do this right, but in a few cases
it's inhibiting our training.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses. Mr. Chairman,
my time has expired.
Chairman Warner. We wish to clarify, the ranking member and
myself, this very important exchange on the environment. I hope
you will elaborate in the record as to other problems, but I
believe this committee, under the leadership of our
distinguished ranking member, cured one problem last year.
Senator Levin. That was the Migratory Bird Act.
General Myers. I think that one was----
Senator Levin. Well, the one example you used this morning
is the one we've taken care of, we legislated that issue so
that the Migratory Bird Act no longer applies to military
readiness activities, including training. Not saying there
aren't other problems, but we did at least cure that one.
General Myers. We appreciate that very much. We did make
some headway.
Chairman Warner. More work remains to be done by Congress,
working with the environmental community to try and resolve
other problems, and I think it will be important and
responsive.
General Myers. I will get you a statement for the record of
those other issues that are still outstanding.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]

In February, I expressed my concern over the adverse impacts and
unforeseen consequences the application of various environmental laws
are having on military training and testing activities, and,
consequently, on the readiness of our Armed Forces. These are not novel
concerns. The Vice Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force testified about these issues before the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee in July 2002. Various senior military officers
and political appointees of the military departments and DOD have
testified before the respective Armed Services Committees on these same
concerns over the past 2 years. Although Congress began consideration
of these important issues last year, it was only able to provide
temporary relief with respect to one statute, the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act. While grateful for this support, we believe more needs to be done.
Although measuring the full impact of environmental requirements on
readiness is difficult, my professional assessment is that the impacts,
and consequently the challenges, we face in providing the most
effective training and equipment have grown rather than diminished. For
example, the deployment of a critical new defensive sensor to deal with
the threat of quiet diesel submarines deployed by North Korea, Iran,
and other potential adversaries was recently restricted by court order
despite an unprecedented research program by the Navy to ensure that
marine mammals would not be injured. Diverse examples of encroachment
abound, ranging from our inability to train with smoke on military
ranges to limitations on stationing and use of high performance fighter
aircraft such as the F-22 due to the Noise Control Act.
I assure you, we are working on better ways to quantify how
encroachment affects our ability to train and equip our forces; however
enough is known right now to convince me that we need legislative
relief.
This year, the Services are seeking legislative clarification where
laws are being applied beyond their original legislative intent,
creating a vast amount of unnecessary litigation. Our proposal would
confirm--not change--two Clinton administration environmental policies
that support military readiness, but are threatened by lawsuits.
First, it would confirm the military bases' ``Integrated Natural
Resources Management Plans'' may, if sufficiently protective,
substitute for Endangered Species Act ``critical habitat'' on military
bases. These plans, developed in cooperation with State and Federal
regulators, have made Department of Defense one of the best stewards of
endangered species in the world. Unlike our plans, critical habitat
designation can impose rigid limitations on military use of our bases,
denying Commanders the flexibility to manage their lands for the
benefit of both readiness and endangered species.
The Department of Defense bill would also codify Clinton
administration policies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act that
support vital antisubmarine warfare (ASW) programs. The prior
administration adopted science-based policies under this act that
focused regulation on biologically significant impacts on animals.
Under this policy, the Navy was able to work with regulators to get
permits for ASW technologies needed to protect our carrier battle
groups. But litigants have succeeded in overturning these policies, and
have obtained an injunction limiting testing of this vital ASW
technology.
Our mission is to be prepared to defend the country wherever and
whenever necessary. Readiness requires anticipating conflicts and
developing weapons, sensors, and tactics necessary to prevail. It is
vitally important that we are not constrained in fully training our
Service men and women as we innovate to meet tomorrow's conflicts.
Modern warfare is a ``come as you are'' affair. The soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines who saw action in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001
used the weapons, sensors, and tactics that they trained with the
previous summer. We have learned that a host of factors and decisions,
including urban sprawl, regulations, litigation, and accommodations,
although reasonable when viewed in isolation, have cumulatively
diminished the military departments' ability to train and test
effectively. Our troops are ``ready'' when they deploy, but it is
becoming more and more difficult to ensure this status because we
cannot use the military test and training ranges and at-sea operating
areas for the purposes for which they are dedicated. We have to resort
to ``workarounds'' that are increasingly burdensome.
An equally important encroachment concern is transporting units
away from their home installations for months at a time for necessary
training prior to deployment overseas. This workaround imposes a
particular burden on our military families, not just the troops.
Workarounds also segment training so that we can't ``train as we
fight.'' This makes effective training more difficult and less
realistic. In a world where any country with money can buy the best
weapons, training is critical to victory. We owe this critical edge,
the winning edge, to the young men and women we send in harm's way.
We are not abandoning our outstanding stewardship over the lands
entrusted to us or shrinking from environmental protection
requirements. We are trying to restore balance where environmental
requirements adversely affect uniquely military activities necessary to
prepare for combat. We ask that you carefully consider the proposed
changes that the Department of Defense brings forward and provide the
tailored but effective relief we seek.

Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions, before you begin, the
Secretary must be back at the Pentagon to receive a foreign
minister of defense. I want to conduct this in such a way that
everyone gets one round, so I shall have to be somewhat abrupt
on the 6 minutes.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you can hold me
to my time.
Mr. Secretary, I think it is past time that we evaluate our
force structure and deployment situation, particularly in
Europe. The situation is greatly changed today. We don't have
the same threats, they don't come from the same areas of the
world, and your comments today that Austria is blocking or
refusing to allow the transport of military equipment is just a
stunning development. It must be extremely frustrating for you
and the Department of Defense leadership.
I talked with a number of Senators just briefly yesterday
and will submit a letter to you today that calls on the
Department of Defense to conduct a study of where we are in
Europe, to reevaluate how we should deploy our resources there
to consider first of all our national defense, and second
consider the tempo of deployment of our personnel and
separation from families and that sort of thing.
I guess my question to you would be, would you conduct such
a study? If one is already in the works, would you share it
with us? I would just say that virtually every Senator I've
talked to shared that view strongly. Senator Collins and
Senator Bayh mentioned it, and I think 15 Senators that signed
this letter indicate that we think it's past due. We are doing
that in the United States, let's do it around the world also.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. We have to look at our base
structure across the globe. We're already conducting the study,
it's well underway. We have not only one going on in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, we have one going on with the area
of responsibility from commanders in each case, and it requires
a good deal of sensitivity because it just has--a base in the
United States has to be coordinated with the Congressmen,
Senators, and the local people, and so too with our allies
around the world. We have to make sure we all work off the same
sheet of music and that we bring them along in terms of those
discussions. So we will be happy to have a hearing or share
that, and we don't need to do anything separate because it's
well underway.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, you served in Europe in
NATO, and you served as Secretary of Defense previously and
have observed this whole situation for many years. It's odd to
me and I would like to ask you if you agree, that we talk about
multi-lateralism and unilateralism, whereas at this point it
appears that 16 nations in Europe support our position and only
three oppose our position.
What do you do in circumstances like that? Aren't we
getting to a point in history where we simply have to make sure
we have broad support among nations of goodwill and try to make
sure with that support we defend our just national interests?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We do indeed. I was hoping to come back
to Senator Levin. He kept talking about us proceeding
unilaterally and going it alone in the opening statement. I
didn't have a chance to comment, but you're quite right. We
have today 90 nations in the global war on terrorism. We don't
have a single coalition, we have multiple coalitions. The
mission determines which countries feel they want to
participate in that coalition. We ought not have a situation
where the coalition determines the mission, because then it
stops everything, because there's always somebody who's not
going to like it.
Now, it is of value to have countries. In the case of Iraq,
we have dozens of countries participating already in a variety
of different ways in terms of basing and overflight and what
have you, offering forces, and it seems to me that you're
correct. We do have to think through what we believe is in our
country's best interests and in the world's best interests.
Then what we have to do is go out and persuade other countries
that that is something that needs to be done and then we have
to work with those like-thinking countries to get it done.
In the case of military activity, we can do that without
unanimity. For example, on the Turkey thing, we can go ahead
and help Turkey using the 16 countries and not the 3 that are
blocking it in NATO. Who loses in that case? NATO loses.
Turkey's not going to lose. We're going to see that they get
what they need, the 16 countries are. So it seems to me that
your point is a valid one.
Senator Sessions. As NATO has expanded the consensus or
unanimity rule answers itself. It's very unlikely, it seems to
me, that everyone is going to agree on even important policies.
Of course, in the United Nations, we have the permanent
Security Council veto so one nation there, China or Russia, has
an absolute veto on U.N. military action, so it's just plainly
obvious to me that we need to be respectful of those
organizations, seek their support, confer with them, but
ultimately we're going to have to do what the consensus of the
world believes is good for the world, and our country in
defending our own interests.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That certainly is the obligation of
this body and the President of the United States, to do that. I
will say this. The expansion of NATO has had an interesting
effect. The newer countries coming in are countries that have
lived under dictatorships and under communism, and they tend to
bring an energy and an awareness and a sensitivity to those
dangers that's fresh and helpful to the institution.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Pryor,
to be followed by Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Bill Nelson,
and then I will move down the order from there.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I have a
couple of very quick questions from Senator Robert Byrd, who
could not be here at this moment. Mr. Secretary, what are your
estimates of how much a war with Iraq might cost?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is an answer that unfortunately I
believe is not knowable. I am told there are people at the OMB
that have estimated it at something between $50 and $60
billion. The one thing I do know is it would cost, if the
President decided that it was necessary and force had to be
used--a heck of a lot less than September 11 cost, and
September 11 would cost a heck of a lot less than a chemical or
biological September 11.
Senator Pryor. Thank you for that answer. You have said
that you expect to send a supplemental appropriations request
to Congress soon. How much will the Pentagon request in that
supplemental and are there two variations of that, one in the
event that we continue with weapons inspections and the other
in the event we're at war, or will it just be one supplemental
request?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know. It's a matter that the
OMB and the White House are working on. We do know certain
facts. One fact is that we're spending about $1.5 or $6 billion
a month since October 1 for the global war on terror. So we've
already spent October, November, December, January, 4 months,
which is $6 billion, and a portion of February, and that does
not count the cost of the force flow for Iraq, which is
probably in the neighborhood of $2 billion-plus.
So for the year, if the global war on terror went on at a
billion-five and you had to add some additional force flow,
it's pretty clear that even without a conflict in Iraq, we
would be well short and need a supplemental of roughly that
magnitude, but that's something that depends on what takes
place and we will know more about that as we go forward.
Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to talk about the
C-130J program, which I know General Myers is very familiar
with. As we continue this war on terrorism, the C-130J seems to
me to be a very important part of that effort as well as all
the efforts that the military is involved with. Something that
my staff has talked to me about--and again, I'm new here--but
we talked about the C-130J multiyear proposals and as I
understand it, are you making that proposal because it may help
you plan and even may help you save money on the program?
Dr. Zakheim. Well, we are certainly looking at that. As I
understand it, the current estimate is that it will save some
money. We're refining that as we speak and I have every
certainty that we will be finalizing that very soon.
Senator Pryor. It just so happens that the Little Rock Air
Force Base is the premier training facility for C-130Js, not
just for our forces but for anybody in the world. Do you see
that changing any time in the future? General Myers, you may
want to take a crack at that one.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me make a comment. Congress passed
a proposal for base closings and what we decided to do is to
try to proceed in an orderly way and not comment on individual
bases prospectively. It just seems to me that the process has
to be an open one, it has to be one that is done in a serious
and nonpartisan way. One of the reasons that they didn't have a
base realignment and closure (BRAC) for several years was the
accusations that they were not looked at in a fair and open and
balanced way, and I want to see that this is done that way.
Therefore, I'm not inclined to speculate about the future.
Senator Pryor. General Myers.
General Myers. I think it would be speculation on my part.
I sit here with a blue uniform, but I am not that familiar with
Air Force plans.
Senator Pryor. Another facility that I just want you all to
be sensitized to and know about and be aware of is the Pine
Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. Right now it is in the process of
disposing of chemical weapons. It's the only active chemical
defense arsenal in the Department of Defense, and it also has a
joint venture with the American Red Cross where they do
readiness training for first responders. It seems to have a
very varied and important mission in today's world. Just as you
all are considering your plans in the future, I just want you
to again be reminded of the asset that you have currently in
the Department of Defense and be mindful that it's there and
actually has enough real estate to expand. For example, I think
the DOD made a determination in the late 1990s that if you do a
vaccine program that would be the best facility that you
currently have. So, I just wanted to remind you to be aware of
that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
General Myers, I appreciate very much your being here again
today to help us understand some of the difficulties in the
world today that certainly you face each and every day.
Mr. Secretary, you made a prediction this past weekend that
within a year or 2 or 3, North Korea would become the leading
example of why in your view international agreements designed
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons are failing, and today
you elaborated a bit on your thoughts about cooperation, that
it isn't necessarily working in the world the way that we would
like to see it.
Do you believe that, in many respects, North Korea's
proliferation and supply of weapons and other armaments and
related materials might expand to a more aggressive program
that would ultimately lead to an arms race in Asia, which is
obviously something that we don't want? Do you have any
thoughts about that that you might share? I have a couple of
related questions, but that's my first question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I look at the situation with North
Korea in this way. They will sell anything they have to anyone
who wants it. They have been demonstrating that for years.
You're correct. An announced or demonstrated nuclear capability
and obviously relatively sophisticated ballistic missile
capability on the part of North Korea is something that the
neighbors have to be attentive to. The neighbors to the south,
the neighbors to the north, and to the west, and to the east.
Now, there are a number of states in that neighborhood who
have the ability to have nuclear weapons in relatively short
periods if they wish to have them. That is not a good thing for
the world. I also look at North Korea as a danger, not simply
in Northeast Asia but a danger to the world. I mean, this is
clearly a world problem. If you have a country that is capable
of producing nuclear material sufficient to fashion six to
eight nuclear weapons in a relatively short of period of months
and is known to be selling them, it's a terrorist state, and
that's a problem. It's not a problem to the United States, it's
a problem to the world.
It seems to me that this is the reason I feel that the
President is correct in attempting to see, which is now
successful, in getting that problem put into the United
Nations. Because the solution to proliferation can't be
unilateral, it has to be a strong, fully enforced, agreed upon
set of restrictions so that those kinds of weapons can be
stopped and interdicted.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, obviously the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty that North Korea was the first to
withdraw from is not working today. Do you have any thoughts
about what we might do to bring the rest of the world together
where we could do something to deal with nonproliferation and
nonsupplying of material and materiel to the rest of the world,
particularly to those states and groups that would do harm to
our neighbors and clearly do us harm as well?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do have some ideas. They're not well
developed, but we would not be facing the problem in Iraq today
if the technologically advanced countries of the world had seen
the danger and strictly enforced economic sanctions against
Iraq sufficient that it would cause them to discontinue their
weapons of mass destruction programs. We would not have this
problem today.
Now, how do you get countries to step up and do something
that is against their immediate self-interests in exchange for
something that's in favor of their self-interest over the
longer period? That is to say, stop commercial sales, stop
pretending that dual use things are going to be used for good
things and not bad things, and strictly enforce and prevent a
country that's clearly in violation and clearly engaged in
trafficking in these capabilities in a way that puts the world
at risk.
I think the only way you do that is to go to their publics.
I think the people of those countries have to be sufficiently
concerned that they require their governments to behave in a
rational way and not just a rational way for an immediate self
gratification of some commercial license, but in a rational way
that looks down 5 or 10 years and sees, for example, in the
Middle East the possibility of four, five, or six countries
having nuclear weapons, which is not a pretty picture.
Senator Ben Nelson. It's predictable with the direction
things are going today. Let me commend you for, if not being
patient, acquiring the appearance of patience, and I thank you
for your answers today.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are in the
midst of enormous change and enormous challenge. Thank you for
trying to get your arms around this problem and steering us in
a direction that best protects our country.
On this debate about missile testing, why don't we just
call it what it is instead of getting hung up on the labels?
Say that we're going to deploy while we are still in the
testing phase.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's what I tried to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think it speaks for itself. One of
the policy questions that I think you're going to have to
answer, particularly since it looks like we're going to have
the needs of our United States military overseas for the
foreseeable future in nation building, and if you don't like
that term, then use the term establishing political and
economic stability. We're trying to do that in Afghanistan. We
thought that it might only take us a year in Bosnia and we're
in the seventh year, and clearly that will be the situation in
Iraq as well.
The policy question is, are we going to continue to do that
with other than the active duty military? My wife and I went on
Thanksgiving to have Thanksgiving dinner with our troops in
Bosnia and what I found was a Pennsylvania National Guard unit.
They were pumped, they knew they were there for 6 months and
they were going to rotate back.
I have been going to a lot of our National Guard ceremonies
all over Florida, telling them that I'm there on behalf of a
grateful nation for their service. But they went into the
Guard--as did the Reserves--thinking that when their country
called, that they were ready to respond and they are well
prepared by the way, there is no question about their
professionalism, but there is a question about their obligation
and the length of time. Would you briefly comment and then we
can carry on this dialogue for some period of time, because
this is a policy question we have to ask. Do we up the active
duty troops in order to keep the Guard and the Reserves as what
they were intended to be?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first, thank you for visiting
the troops. They appreciate it and we all appreciate it.
Second, I do worry a bit about the phrase ``nation
building.'' I take it as a little bit arrogant that we think we
might know how to build a nation for somebody else. I like to
think of it as our responsibility. For example, in Afghanistan
we are trying to create a security environment that is
hospitable to their rebuilding their own nation, and do that
with the cooperation of other nations. I think that's what
we're trying to do there, and clearly that's what one would
have to do in Iraq if it came to that.
With respect to the end strength issue, there are so many
things we can do to make better use of the current end strength
we have in uniform. We can pull down in places where they have
been for too long. In the Sinai, we're pulling out about half
of those. There are four other places where we're in the
process of doing the same thing. We're looking at the bigger
chunks in Asia and in Europe, and we're going to do that.
There's also a way that General Myers and I are working
hard on trying to figure out a better way to alert, mobilize,
and deploy Guard and Reserve Forces so that they continue to
feel what they feel now. They're proud to be called, they're
proud to serve, but they want to serve in something that's real
and they don't want to get called up four or five or six times
in a short period of time because it's very difficult for their
families, it's difficult for their employers. But they are
pumped and doing a terrific job.
What we have to do is get a more nuanced system. At the
present time, our deployment system is basically one big switch
over here, peace, and the other is World War III over there,
and you pull it and everything happens. We're trying to figure
out how to disaggregate this thing in a way that's respectful
of the Guard and Reserve and their employers and their
families. If we need additional end strength we will be up to
ask for it, but at the moment I don't think we do. If we can
get the people in uniform that are doing jobs that are not
military jobs, that will save some people right there.
Senator Bill Nelson. If they know they are there for 6
months, they're ready and they're pumped. But if suddenly
that's a year, and then they're coming home after that year and
they suddenly get diverted someplace else, then you have
another whole situation with regard to our promise to them and
our promise to their employers.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're exactly right. The
other thing I didn't mention, which I should have, is that back
in the 1970s after Vietnam, the Department of Defense took
certain skills and put them in the Reserves, 100 percent in the
Reserves. They did it so that if they were ever to go to war
again, there would have to be a major call-up. That's not a
good idea, because we're going to have a series of these things
just as sure as we're sitting here, and what we have to do is
make sure we have people on active duty to do all the skills so
that we do not have to keep calling those same people up four
or five times.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, assured access to space
is another issue, not only what was brought up here earlier on
the EELVs, but the technologies that you all clearly have an
interest in at DOD and other agencies in developing as a
follow-on to the space shuttle. We are at a point that
decisions are going to have to be made over the next several
months on that, and you all at DOD have to weigh in on that,
because it's going to be extremely important to you. You have
to have a backup system other than these two EELVs, and right
now the only capability other than that, once all the EELVs are
gone, is the space shuttle.
Chairman Warner. Senator, thank you. The Senate, indeed
Congress is fortunate to have your services, having given much
of your life and career to this subject. You're following in
the shoes of your distinguished predecessor who was on this
committee, Senator Graham.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, bless you. Mr. Chairman, I would
just conclude by saying two names, Scott Speicher, let's not
forget him.
Chairman Warner. That's an important message and I share
with you that message.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. It
is a perilous irony, the fact that we're talking here about a
$400 billion expenditure for the most overwhelming military
force the world has ever known, and at the same time we're
telling our citizens to go get out and get duct tape and
plastic wrap and water. You said yourself, sir, today, that
this is the most dangerous security environment the world has
ever known.
It reminded me of the ominous forewarnings of condition
orange, what Robert Kennedy said after the Cuban missile
crisis: ``No action is taken against an adversary in a vacuum.
Escalation on one side brings a counter-response. A government
or people will fail to understand this only at their great
peril.''
It seems to me that for the last 55 years our leaders have
understood that. Both Republican and Democratic Presidents also
faced dangerous dictators who had weapons of mass destruction,
the heads of countries that were hostile to the United States,
the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, but none of those
Presidents attacked those countries to eliminate that threat,
and the threat was ongoing, it was dealt with and contained
diplomatically, and the peace and security of this Nation were
preserved.
The principal reason I believe that they didn't do so was
because of mutual assured destruction, because we knew that
their country could inflict destruction on our citizens, our
countryside, our cities, that was intolerable to us, just as we
could annihilate them.
I guess my question, sir, is why would we expect that Iraq
will be any different? If the United States invades that
country, is destroying their cities, their citizens, causing
casualties among their citizens, why won't we expect that they
will retaliate within the United States with every destructive
force that they could marshall, and why wouldn't we expect that
Osama bin Laden would do his utmost to exploit that situation
and to twist it in the eyes of the world to be seen as
something different from what it is? How do you assess our
ability to protect our citizens in their cities and their
schools and their homes from retaliation if we invade Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me say several things
about that statement. First, if one goes back to the Soviet
Union and mutually assured destruction, one thing we know is
that time was on our side. If we could contain the Soviet
Union, which had massive nuclear capability and was attempting
to expand its interests throughout the world, in Africa, Latin
American and Europe, and was a serious conventional as well as
unconventional military threat, we felt if we could contain it
for a long enough period, that their economic situation would
change because it was a rotten system. We were right.
With terrorist states that have demonstrated their
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction on their own
people, that fire ballistic missiles into their neighboring
countries, that invade their neighboring countries, time is not
on our side. These weapons that they have are such enormous
power and they are not constrained. These are single dictators.
These are not--I'm not going to start naming names again, I
just make more news that I don't need to make.
Let me start that sentence over by saying that these are
not democratic systems, they aren't even systems like the old
Soviet Union that had a Politburo where all power was not
concentrated in a single person. They discussed things. You can
go back and read the history books. These people, the dictators
in the terrorist states today, don't have to discuss things
with anybody. They can furthermore act in a way that masks what
they have done. They can use a terrorist network to disseminate
a weapon of mass destruction.
It seems to me that what we need to remember is the last
phrase I believe you used was something to the effect that
Osama bin Laden would conduct a retaliatory attack or
something.
Senator Dayton. I said take advantage of the situation or
exploit the situation.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right. What situation was he taking
advantage of on September 11? I mean my goodness, they don't
need excuses, they just do it. We see threat reports every day,
dozens and dozens of them. In the last 6 months there have been
terrorist attacks probably in what, 8, 10, 12 countries?
Senator Dayton. I would move to my next question. If you
conclude Iraq as synonymous with al Qaeda as an ongoing
terrorist threat, I guess I would make a distinction between
them and just point out--and I don't disagree with your
assessment of the dictator there or the single control that he
apparently has--the actions that you and others have described
essentially took place 12 years ago. I don't think containment
has been the complete failure that you've described it to be
with Iraq, and I would just say that we didn't know time was on
our side when we were dealing with the Soviet Union.
What we did know was that if we went in there militarily,
we were going to experience what Winston Churchill said of
World War I, ``the price of victory is so great as to be
indistinguishable from the cost of defeat.'' We're going to, I
fear, inflict serious damage on this country, and that was my
question. What is our ability to defend this country, protect
our citizens if we go in in the next 2 weeks or 2 months into
that country militarily and start inflicting destruction on
them?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd like to make two points on it.
Number one. Let's go back in time to September 2000, 1 year
before September 11, 2001. What if we had scraps of
information, a telephone call, a credit card, a person learning
how to fly and didn't care about landing, 5 or 8 or 10 of them,
and we started connecting the dots. What would have been
sufficient to cause us to take a preemptive act to stop that
act? This is a society that for decades has thought of itself
as being willing to absorb an attack and not do anything until
after we've taken that attack, then marshall our resources and
go out and do something about it. That's been our way.
I think today, post-September 11, an awful lot of people in
our country properly would say well, by golly, if we had scraps
of information and we could put it together, we should have
preempted that attack. That's my guess.
Senator Dayton. If you could have found al Qaeda and
prevented it, absolutely. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, I want to follow up along the lines of what Senator
Bill Nelson was asking and also Senator Dayton, because I think
that in connected ways, they are focusing on the same issues
with respect to how we are going to defend ourselves at home.
As I understand it, in response to the threat level being
raised to orange, the Pentagon has deployed heat seeking
stinger anti-aircraft missiles at strategic locations around
Washington, DC, and F-16s have been put on 24-hour alert in
Washington, as well as deploying additional detection radars.
Can you tell me whether similar steps have been taken in New
York?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we don't talk about
deployments and I would like to take a minute to explain why.
We change how we're arranged in a defensive and deterrent
standpoint from time to time with respect to combat air
patrols, and I know you're familiar with how we're doing that
with respect to the east coast and other portions of the
country. To the extent we announce them, it demystifies the
problems for others, the people who would attack. To the extent
we regularize them, we demystify them.
So what we do is we do things on an irregular basis. It's
not thoughtless and random, but it is in fact irregular, and
it's designed to do that to maximize the deterrent effect and
to maximize our ability to defend at times when we believe the
threat level requires it.
Senator Clinton. I certainly understand and appreciate that
and would not want to have any specific information, but
clearly some of what has been deployed around Washington is
visible to the naked eye and, therefore, we know it. There have
been no similar reports of anything visible to the naked eye
with respect to New York. Since we also have reason to believe
that New York and Washington remain at the top of the
terrorists' lists of targets, perhaps in another setting, I
could at least be advised as to what if any actions,
irregularly or regularly, are occurring with respect to New
York.
Let me just move on, because I think that it ties into an
ongoing concern of mine which is the readiness of our first
responders here at home, whether they are dealing with an al
Qaeda attack such as we saw on September 11, or a retaliatory
attack in the wake of military action in Iraq. One of the
problems that we are seeing surface that I talked to now
Assistant Secretary McHale about during his confirmation
hearings, is that many of the people who are being called up,
who are pumped, who are ready to go, are first responders.
They're police officers, they're fire fighters, they're EMTs,
they are others who provide the first line of defense here at
home.
Today I sent a letter to you, Mr. Secretary, and I'd like,
Mr. Chairman, to make it part of the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Clinton. That letter requests information as to the
extent to which Reserve call-ups are impacting on our first
responders. Because as we go forward with the planning that I
understand you're doing with respect to how we deal with Guard
and Reserve Forces, whether we confront redeployments of our
end forces abroad, I think we have to recognize that if we're
fighting a multifront war, which we may very well be, we know
we're fighting one here at home already as well as against al
Qaeda, and there may be others to come, we have to be sure that
our first responder front line defenders have adequate force
strength.
There are a number of reports that have surfaced in the
press about what local officials are confronting. A number of
mayors and county executives have said that as many as 10
percent of first responders are also in the Reserves. I know in
New York City, 300 of our fire fighters are in the Reserves.
We also know that the cost to our communities at a time of
decreased budgets, and I would argue inadequate Federal
resources for our first responders, means that the police
department in New York City spends more than $200,000 a week to
cover their reservists, and the fire department spends more
than $100,000 a week. A small community like the Niagara Falls
Police Department spent $350,000 last year.
Nobody begrudges that. We want to continue to support our
first responders. But I think as you look at the connections
between what we have to be ready to do here at home as well as
our force abroad, I hope that you will take that into account.
It's not only at the local level; clearly it affects Customs
officials, FEMA officials, Secret Service and others. I will
look forward to having a response to this letter, because I
know this is an issue that you will have to look into, but I
hope that it is part of what we go forward in planning.
Finally, General Myers, I am concerned, as I was when I was
First Lady, about the unexplained illnesses that many of our
men and women return from the Persian Gulf suffering from. I
was asked by the President to look into this during the last
part of the 1990s and we came up with an independent blue
ribbon commission to investigate the issues raised by these
undiagnosed illnesses and the treatment that many of our
veterans received, and there was a final report submitted to
the President in January 1997, including a slate of
recommendations to ensure that Gulf War veterans received all
the care that they needed.
With U.S. troops once again being deployed to the Persian
Gulf, and without us really knowing what caused a lot of the
problems, we look at a number of sources, and I have to say,
Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area that we want to go into
in some depth in this committee, because we're seeing the same
thing with respect to the first responders who responded to
Ground Zero. The combination of whatever was in the air when
those buildings were attacked and collapsed has caused
extraordinary respiratory, pulmonary dysfunction and distress,
and we're only beginning to try to understand it. Similarly
when we saw our men and women coming back from the Gulf, we
know that similar kinds of issues occurred, and now we have an
added challenge of biological, chemical, and radiological
potential attacks as well.
Now a year ago, in February 2002, a General Accounting
Office (GAO) official testified before the House Veterans
Affairs Committee that while military medical surveillance
policies had been established, much still needed to be done to
implement the system, and I would hope that we could get a
report, General Myers or Mr. Secretary, about what we are doing
to ensure proper implementation. Once somebody is a veteran it
may be too late, so I would like to make sure that our Active-
Duty Forces are getting the surveillance that they need for
medical monitoring and health tracking before being deployed to
the Gulf so that we can know and have a better research base to
understand what they have been and might be exposed to, and I
look forward to getting that information.
[The information referred to follows:]

The DOD has applied medical lessons learned from the Gulf War to
help protect the health of military personnel before, during, and
following deployments.
Subsequent to the publication of the final report of the
Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses on
December 31, 1996, DOD published the following policy: Department of
Defense Directive (DODD) 6490.2, ``Joint Medical Surveillance,'' and
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6490.3, ``Implementation and
Application of Joint Medical Surveillance for Deployments.'' On
December 4, 1998, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OCJCS) issued a memorandum on ``Deployment Health Surveillance
and Readiness'' that supported implementation of the DODD and DODI. On
February 1, 2002, the OCJCS updated the memorandum for health
surveillance and readiness during all deployments. The memorandum
provides standardized procedures, including occupational and
environmental health surveillance procedures, for assessing health
readiness and conducting health surveillance in support of all military
deployments.
The DOD has developed and implemented a Force Health Protection
(FHP) strategy that promotes and sustains the health of service members
during their entire length of service. This adds an additional level of
confidence to the specific programs for promoting and sustaining the
health of military personnel prior to, during, and after deployments.
Programs are in place to promote the fitness and health of personnel
before they deploy, to protect them from disease and injury during
deployment, and to provide comprehensive treatment for deployment-
related health conditions. The DOD has appointed a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness to
assure sustained focus on this strategy.
The DOD has implemented a Defense Medical Surveillance System
(DMSS), which integrates numerous health, personnel, and deployment
data sources. The DMSS database contains longitudinal health data on
Service members (e.g., hospitalizations, ambulatory visits, reportable
diseases), as well as integrated personnel and deployment data. The DOD
has established a Serum Repository to archive periodic serum samples
for all service members.
The DOD has instituted a deployment health surveillance program,
which validates individuals' medical readiness to deploy. It includes
pre-deployment and post-deployment health assessments (with copies
archived in DMSS), complete immunizations, and other protective
measures, and addresses health concerns upon return from deployments.
This is another step in providing periodic longitudinal health
monitoring of service members from the time they enter military service
and includes periodic medical, dental, and readiness assessments;
physical fitness testing; and comprehensive health care through the
military health system.
Improved deployment health protection countermeasures are being
designed to protect our Service members against an increasingly broad
range of threats. Such countermeasures include the fielding of new
biological and chemical warfare agent detection and alarm systems; the
operational testing of integrated electronic medical surveillance and
emergency response networks; current vaccines and anti-malarial drugs;
and research on the next generation of vaccines and pharmaceuticals.
The Department has been conducting ongoing monitoring and weekly
reporting of disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI) during deployments.
We have enabled daily DNBI monitoring in order to increase the
sensitivity of this capability to detect the earliest occurrence of a
natural, chemical, or biological agent exposure. In addition, all
deployed medical units report through command channels at least daily
on their current situation enabling immediate notification of any
potential disease outbreak.
The DOD has implemented improved occupational and environmental
health surveillance programs for protecting Service members' health
during deployment. The DOD has implemented operational risk management
programs throughout the services that provide focus for all commanders
to effectively manage both safety and environmental health risks and to
mitigate the impact on our Service members.
The DOD has implemented improved environmental and clinical
laboratory capabilities in theater. The DOD now routinely deploys
preventive medicine, environmental health, theater medical
surveillance, and forward laboratory teams in support of worldwide
operations.
The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center develops products that
assist our understanding of endemic diseases, vectors, and industrial
hazards worldwide. All Services utilize these products to increase
their knowledge of areas of operations and develop an initial
assessment strategy during bed down operations and incrementally
throughout the deployment. Preplanning and on-site environmental
assessments of staging areas and base sites have been critical to
protecting our Service members and documenting any potential ambient
exposures. The integration of operational risk management provides
field commanders the necessary information upon which they can act.
The DOD has improved health risk communication through the
provision of regionally-specific medical intelligence, environmental
risk assessments, medical threat briefings, pocket-sized health guides,
and deployment-focused web sites.
The DOD has established three deployment health centers for health
surveillance, clinical care, and health research that focus on the
prevention, treatment, and understanding of deployment-related health
concerns.
The DOD has coordinated with the VA to address deployment-related
health concerns of Service members and veterans by jointly developing a
Post-Deployment Health Evaluation and Management Clinical Practice
Guideline (CPG), and by electronically sharing medical information
through the Federal Health Information Exchange.
The DOD has taken steps to improve deployment-related medical
record keeping by developing the Composite Health Care System II (CHCS
II), the Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP), medical evacuation
automated patient tracking and by expanding the electronic tracking and
centralized collection of immunization data.
The DOD is working to improve tracking of individual and unit
locations during deployment and development of a comprehensive Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System.
The joint force is superbly trained and comprised of dedicated men
and women who represent DOD's most vital resource. Implementation of
DOD's Force Health Protection Strategy is a critical component of our
overall Force Protection strategy and is essential to maintaining the
health and fitness of servicemembers during their entire career. Force
Health Protection programs have important life-long implications for
health. The DOD has made tremendous strides since the Gulf War in
monitoring and tracking the health of our personnel prior to, during,
and following deployments. We will continually seek to improve these
programs because Force Health Protection directly improves our
readiness posture and the capability of our servicemembers.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, and I can speak from
firsthand experience, having gone with you out to Walter Reed
to visit the veterans who returned from Afghanistan, of the
depth of your sincerity with regard to the subjects of which
you speak. We thank you, and I do hope that you spearhead on
this committee those efforts.
Senator Levin, I think we have conducted a very successful
hearing. If you have no further comments, we thank you, Mr.
Secretary. We thank you, General, and we thank you, Dr.
Zakheim.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

FAMILY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

1. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, included in
the $4.0 billion request for family housing for fiscal year 2004 is
$346 million for family housing privatization of 36,262 units. This
seems to me to be one of those truly transformational programs that
goes directly to improving morale and helping the troops and their
families make a positive decision about making the military a career.
Inadequate, unattractive housing like the infamous Tarawa Terrace
housing area at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is simply unacceptable
when we ask so much of our military personnel and their families. Is
this privatization program the quickest, most cost effective way to
replace the inadequate housing which exists all across the military?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, housing privatization is
the quickest and most cost-effective approach to addressing DOD's
inadequate housing. Housing privatization is transforming and
revitalizing military family housing at an accelerated pace.
In January 2001, the Department had about 180,000 inadequate family
housing units. Today, primarily through housing privatization and our
military construction program, we have reduced that number to roughly
163,000. This number will continue to come down as we pursue the goal
to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007. As of March 2003, we have
awarded 18 projects totaling 27,884 family housing units. Additionally,
we project that the services will privatize over 38,000 family housing
units during fiscal year 2003, and over 36,000 family housing units
during fiscal year 2004. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget
includes our plan to privatize about 102,000 family housing units by
the end of fiscal year 2004.
Housing privatization is cost-effective and allows DOD to tap the
expertise of the private sector to address a large problem. Our policy
requires that privatization yield at least three times the amount of
housing that would be provided using traditional military construction.
The projects awarded thus far leverage upfront appropriations by a
ratio of 10:1. This means that DOD has invested $290 million, to obtain
about $2.9 billion worth of equivalent MILCON housing improvements.
Finally, our economic analyses indicate that when we look at long-term
costs over the 50-year term of most of our deals, privatization is
about 10 percent less costly.

2. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, what has
been our experience thus far with this housing in terms of quality of
construction and the ongoing maintenance by the contractor?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Surveys of military tenants
living in new and renovated privatized housing have given high marks to
quality of construction and housing maintenance. Privatized housing
must comply with local and State construction codes and standards, as
well as DOD project specifications. In fact, in many of our early
projects, the immediate improvement in housing maintenance won over
residents to privatization well before any new units were constructed.

3. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, are we
devoting enough resources to family housing privatization?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, we are devoting enough
resources to housing privatization. We believe the current number of
privatization projects in the pipeline and our fiscal year 2004 funding
request is sufficient to keep us on track to eliminate our remaining
inadequate family housing.

REFORMING THE WAY THE DEPARTMENT DOES BUSINESS

4. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, regarding that aspect of
transformation which involves reforming the way in which the Department
of Defense (DOD) does business, I understand there is a long history of
disagreements and mistrust between Congress and the Pentagon that
apparently led to all the strings now attached to or perhaps strangling
DOD.
In part based on my own experience running the Departments of
Transportation and Labor, and the American Red Cross, I want to support
you in your desire for a more free hand to make sensible, cost-
effective decisions. However, looking at it from this side of the
table, what your request seems to me to be saying is: ``Trust me.'' How
can we strike the balance that gives you the help you need in your
commendable desire to operate in a more business-like way while not
abdicating our proper congressional oversight role?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We developed the system we live under today
over the last 100 years--it is an industrial age system trying to meet
the needs of an information age security environment.
Times have changed and we need change in order to meet the new
threats we face today and will face in the future. It is imperative
that we move away from industrial age policies to those that would
allow us to face asymmetric threats of today's world. We don't have the
luxury of knowing when and where he will strike next. Common sense
dictates that we be lighter and quicker if we are going to protect the
United States from the cold-blooded killers we face today.
I'm not asking you to ``trust me,'' but instead I'm saying look at
our track record. Our personnel system is based on the performance of
20 years of demonstration projects with over 30,000 employees currently
working in those programs--working in an environment that promotes and
rewards initiative and hard work instead longevity. Our record on the
environment is a strong one. Over the past decade, the department has
spent $48 billion to clean up sites from past activities and invested
in new technology and programs to improve pollution prevention and
ensure compliance with environmental laws. The Department manages 25
million acres of the Nation's land that includes over 300 threatened
and endangered species that are protected on our ranges and
installations. In many cases populations are maintained and restored
under our stewardship. For example, on San Clemente Island in
California's Channel Islands, islands often referred to as America's
Galapagos Islands, the Navy has brought the island's endangered
loggerhead shrike back from the brink of extinction. In the mid-1990s
the population of these birds had declined to 13, making it one of the
Nation's most endangered species. I challenge anyone to compare our
environmental record. No, I'm not asking you to ``trust me'', just
judge us on our record.
We do not challenge or seek to weaken Congress's oversight role. We
welcome your reviews of our programs, understanding it is your
constitutional responsibility. But together we share a common
responsibility to provide the finest defense for the citizens of the
United States. To do that we must shed the policies that have
accumulated in the past and handicap us today.

5. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, among the proposals you have
discussed, could you prioritize them in terms of their importance to
the Department? Which gives the greatest leverage in savings to the
Department?
Secretary Rumsfeld. To completely answer this question, I need to
provide some background on how we got to where we are today. Over a
year ago I challenged my staff to provide me with proposals that would
make the Department more suited to face the challenges we would face in
the 21st century. They did an excellent job. As we gathered all the
inputs, we took a hard look at each proposal to make sure it would have
the desired effect. We thinned the list down to what we considered our
top priorities and worked with the administration to review them.
We worked closely with OMB, OPM, EPA, and other agencies and what
came out of this process were the top priorities for the Department. So
to answer your question, I have to tell you what you have in front of
you are the Department's top priorities.
As far as the greatest leverage in savings, I don't think you can
look at them in that manner. How do you put a dollar figure on a more
motivated employee? How do you measure the life of a soldier, whose
life is saved because of the realistic training he had before going to
war? And finally, what price do you assign the ability to detect the
advanced submarines of today so that a carrier battle group can carry
out its duties in battle? The savings to the Department are real and
tangible, but you cannot assign a dollar amount to them.

JUNIOR ROTC PROGRAM

6. Senator Dole. General Myers, I've long been concerned about the
fact that our young people seemed to have been turning away from public
service in recent years. There's so much cynicism and doubt. I want to
help inspire them to realize that public service, service to their
country, is a noble thing to do and a great way to give back for all
the blessings of this great country.
I have heard many good things about the Junior ROTC program and how
well it has worked, particularly in many challenging inner city
schools. Could you comment on the experience the military services have
had with Junior ROTC?
General Myers. The Services like the Junior ROTC program, and the
program is extremely popular with educators and community leaders.
Junior ROTC was originally an Army program; however, since 1964 all the
Services offer the program and benefit from its instruction designed to
teach citizenship and leadership, while instilling self-esteem,
teamwork, and self-discipline. Although Junior ROTC is not a recruiting
tool, traditionally about 45 percent of high school graduates with more
than 2 years participation in the program end up with some military
affiliation. Recent surveys reveal that youth who have been exposed to
people with military experience enjoy a far greater understanding of
the nature of military life than those who had no such exposure. A
challenge confronted by recruiter's centers on the fact that a smaller
military generates fewer veterans in communities and schools around the
Nation. The Junior ROTC program represents an excellent means to
address that problem. Moreover, the program builds better citizens,
which strengthens the Nation and generates military awareness among
youth and those who influence their career decisions.

7. Senator Dole. General Myers, are we doing enough to make the
Junior ROTC program more widely available, particularly to urban and
inner city schools?
General Myers. All interested schools are urged to apply to the
Department of Defense for this program. Currently 450,000 students in
2,900 secondary schools participate. Additionally, there are more than
750 secondary schools on Service waiting lists with more applying. We
will achieve the previously funded goal of 3,500 units by fiscal year
2006; however, funding for expansion beyond this is not programmed at
this time.

8. Senator Dole. General Myers, is this very cost-effective program
adequately funded?
General Myers. Yes. The Department recognizes the strength of this
program and continues its growth to meet our needs. In fiscal year
2003, the Department budgeted over $252 million in JROTC, a 5-percent
increase from fiscal year 2002.

FORCE READINESS

9. Senator Dole. General Myers, in your prepared testimony you
describe in some detail that U.S. forces are widely deployed and that
threats to U.S. interests have not abated. You add that we have the
capability to be militarily successful across a broad range of
contingencies. As I look at the immense task facing our Armed Forces, I
have some concerns about our ability to maintain the high combat-ready
status of our forces. To consider the possibility of war in Iraq, while
facing the reality of the ongoing war against terrorism focused in
Afghanistan and the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, it
really is daunting. What I want to ask you about is readiness. I know
that you understand the importance of and want to sustain proper levels
of training, ensure adequate supplies of equipment and spares, and
perform needed equipment maintenance. How long can we sustain this
deployment pace? If another deployment is required within the next 6
months, will we be able to support it with trained and ready forces?
General Myers. Our forces are postured and ready to conduct
operations as directed by the President. We can maintain and sustain
this posture for the foreseeable future by maintaining readiness levels
through a variety of measures to include in-theater training and select
unit rotations. However, the current pace of operations and future
potential operations is not cost-free, and requires the services and
Combatant Commanders to carefully manage assets and units that are in
high demand, but in small numbers. The demand for critical capabilities
(such as manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance assets, Special Operations Forces, intelligence analysts
and linguists and command/control assets) has increased significantly
with multiple contingencies. We will continue to prioritize the use of
these critical units to preserve our surge capability to support future
operations with trained and ready forces.

10. Senator Dole. General Myers, are we getting stretched too thin?
Can we feel confident that the safety of the equipment and of our men
and women is not being compromised?
General Myers. While our current posture of engagement is
demanding, we are not stretched too thin. We possess the forces
necessary to meet the demands of the Defense Strategy. Certainly our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are working at an increased
operational pace; a pace we would not want to sustain indefinitely, but
when vital U.S. interests are at risk, our Armed Forces are eager to
meet these challenges. Furthermore, the safety of our Armed Forces
remains a top priority of mine and it is shared by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Our forces have the best training and equipment available to
ensure their safety is not compromised. Finally, we must continue to
fund our forces' training and associated operations and maintenance
accounts, to ensure their continued readiness and safety is sustained.

11. Senator Dole. General Myers, are you seeing an impact on morale
of the troops? How about the families?
General Myers. The morale of troops is high. Service members are
reporting a great deal of satisfaction with military life. Thanks to
the help of Congress, several years of steady improvements in pay,
benefits, and attention to quality of life issues have all contributed
to high morale.
We are aggressively working to ensure families have the support
they need during these stressful times and that the families have been
contacted or receive information as quickly as possible to help them
prepare for mobilization and deployment. Further, the family support
professional and volunteer staffs are making every effort to reach out
to the spouses, children, and parents of our Service members. Military
families come together in times like these. This is part of the
military's true strength.

12. Senator Dole. General Myers, are there lessons that have been
learned from the tragedies which occurred at Fort Bragg? Are the
military services doing enough to ensure family readiness in this time
of rapidly repeated deployments?
General Myers. The Services already have plans to assist Service
members and families with reunion once this contingency is complete.
Helping families reunite is part of our family support tradition. In
the process, if our professionals identify Service members and families
in stress during reunion, we will provide additional professional
resources to assist them.
All the Services have programs in place or have redirected
resources to expand current capabilities to meet a wide variety of
family needs during sustainment and post-operational phases. They are
also using traditional media and technology to reach out to the Total
Force, including those off the installations and Guard and Reserves to
help keep family members connected.

13. Senator Dole. General Myers, how can we in Congress help you?
General Myers. With Congress' strong support, we have made
significant progress in the war on terrorism and our overall military
capabilities. However, maintaining readiness to meet the threats is a
long-term commitment requiring critical congressional support. Timely
approval of Defense budget supplemental funding is essential to
maintaining current operations without negatively impacting readiness,
training, and re-setting the force. With Congress' continued unwavering
support, we will sustain our Armed Forces most decisive element--the
individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine . . . and will ensure we
are prepared to meet all the threats to our national interests.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN IRAQ

14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, any invasion of Iraq
will likely require a large number of U.S. troops to serve in an
occupation/stabilization force after the fighting stops. The size of
this force will be larger if the United States attacks Iraq without
U.N. sanction or NATO cooperation. If a war with Iraq takes place and
substantial U.S. military forces are required to occupy Iraq in its
aftermath, how would providing a large occupation force impact other
operations in the global war on terrorism?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We cannot provide an exact answer to your
question until more is known about the nature of the post-conflict
environment. However, the U.S. Government will continue to pursue the
various elements of this global war on terror simultaneously with any
post-war operations in Iraq. The conflict with Iraq is an integral part
of the larger global war on terrorism. Preventing regimes that support
terror from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective in
this war. The ``Coalition of the Willing'' supporting the war in Iraq
continues to build. We expect both the U.N. and NATO to contribute to
the post-war effort. This participation will relieve many U.S. troops
who participated in the war effort, allowing us to remain prepared for
other contingencies, including other aspects of the war on terrorism.

15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, will the United States
need to mobilize additional Reserve Forces to carry out this occupation
and stabilization mission?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. should not need to mobilize additional
forces to maintain post-war stability in Iraq. We have mobilized
sufficient forces to continue our ongoing operations, meet our
international commitments, and continue to protect the American
homeland. After we have liberated Iraq, we expect a ``Coalition of the
Willing'' will aid the U.S. in maintaining stability in Iraq as a
representative Iraqi government is formed. We expect many nations that
are not currently participating in military operations will support
post-war stability operations in Iraq. Consequently, the U.S. will have
the opportunity to reduce the number of troops committed to Iraq after
liberation is complete.

OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, forces in Afghanistan
continue to conduct dangerous combat operations. In recent weeks, U.S.
forces completed the largest ground battle with al Qaeda and Taliban
elements since Operation Anaconda. Are U.S. operations being hampered
by the ``safe haven'' in the ungoverned areas of western Pakistan that
al Qaeda and Taliban forces are using?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Pursuing the Taliban and al Qaeda elements in
the Afghan-Pakistan border area is an important mission. The U.S. will
not allow elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda operating in this area
to succeed in destabilizing the newly formed Afghan government. U.S.
and Coalition Forces, in close coordination with Pakistani military
forces operating in western Pakistan, will continue to target those
border areas harboring remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. We will
work closely with the Pakistani government to target and destroy the
remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in those areas.

17. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how do you see U.S.
combat operations in Afghanistan evolving over the next year and do you
feel the combatant commander has sufficient forces to accomplish the
missions laid out by the President?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. combat operations will continue to focus
on targeting and destroying the remnants of terrorist forces in
Afghanistan. We are also in the initial stages of increased stability
operations with the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The
Commanding General of Combined Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram has
sufficient forces in Afghanistan to successfully accomplish the
missions laid out by the President.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

18. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President's budget
includes a significant increase in funding for Special Operations
Forces (SOFs). SOFs are busier than ever, but there are real limits to
how big these forces can be without compromising their quality. In
future years, how do you see the Department managing the challenge of
ever-increasing operational tempo for these forces with the inherently
limited size of Special Operations units?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with the basic thrust of this question.
SOF can not be mass-produced. It is the human dimension of Special
Operations Forces, not necessarily the hardware, which makes U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) such a capable command. We are
therefore looking at several ways to mitigate the OPTEMPO impacts the
war on terrorism has on SOF units.
The worldwide operational tempo for SOF has been significant over
recent years. However, the quality of SOF personnel has remained high
and the retention of seasoned professionals has consistently met
readiness requirements, though its something we monitor very carefully.
One reason that SOF personnel growth must be limited is that gaining
the required proficiency and specialization in key SOF capabilities
takes time. This limits how rapidly the force can grow.
Over the past year, we conducted a comprehensive study to review
the alignment of SOFs with the defense strategy. The study underscored
the need to increase the size of our SOFs in a prudent, measured
fashion. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 includes
more than 1,890 new SOF personnel, an increase of approximately 4
percent. These new personnel will be spread among the USSOCOM
headquarters, its component commands, and the regional special
operations commands.
We are also conducting an assessment of both SOF core and
collateral missions and capabilities required for the global war on
terrorism. As we transform the services, it is likely that some
conventional forces could perform missions now commonly associated with
SOF. If other forces become able to perform certain collateral
missions, it should be possible for our SOFs to concentrate more fully
on the core missions needed to win the war on terrorism.
For example, the USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps are examining
how SOF and U.S. Marine forces can operate together to undertake a
range of contingencies that might have been done exclusively by SOF in
the past. Likewise, certain ``train and equip'' missions combined with
a more effective phasing of operations may allow SOFs to be employed
earlier in an operation to set the parameters of the effort, and then
be replaced by conventional forces.

19. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how will managing this
challenge affect the global war on terrorism in the long term?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our strategic focus initially is on disrupting,
defeating, and destroying al Qaeda, with a particular emphasis on its
leadership and operational planning and coordination structure. The
USSOCOM is playing a key role in this effort. As the lead command for
the Department's global war on terror, USSOCOM will plan and
selectively execute combat missions against terrorists and terrorist
organizations around the world.
This expanded operational role is in addition to the traditional
role that the USSOCOM plays (i.e. providing SOFs and materiel to the
various regional Combatant Commanders, who then plan and direct
missions that fall within their purview).
The war against terrorism requires seamless cooperation and
collaboration by the Department of Defense with many Federal agencies
and departments, ranging from the Department of State and our
Ambassadors overseas to the Intelligence Community, the Departments of
Justice and Treasury, and others. USSOCOM has recognized this need for
cross-functional coordination, and has established a planning
capability that is augmented by interagency liaisons. Contingency
planning will be done more rapidly than is traditionally the case since
we often are dealing with fleeting targets and fragmentary
intelligence. Of course, SOFs are not always the best option, or the
only option. Cooperative host nation security forces, other allies, or
other arms of the U.S. Government may prove better positioned to
undertake key missions successfully.
Since the global war on terrorism began, we have pointed out that
it is a war unlike any other war that our country has ever fought.
Victory requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, and a good
deal of patience and fortitude. As we move forward in transforming the
Department, the role of our SOFs--their missions required capabilities,
and organizational structures and manning--will be a core element of
attention. Their effectiveness and the retention and recruitment of
others to join the ranks of our SOFs will not be jeopardized.

RESERVE FORCES

20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, current and future
operations in the global war on terrorism are increasingly requiring
mobilization of large numbers of Reserve component forces. Mobilization
of these patriotic citizen-soldiers is, of course, a burden on
thousands of families and communities nationwide. Looking into the
future, what do you think the long-term impact of extended and frequent
Reserve mobilizations will be on the strength and vitality of the
Reserve Forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Reserve Forces are and will continue to be an
indispensable part of the total military posture of the department. One
of the most immediate factors affecting the long-term impact on Reserve
Forces is how well mobilization and demobilization are managed. In an
effort to limit disruption for reservists, their employers, families,
and communities, DOD policy directed that initial orders to active duty
not exceed 12 months. DOD policy also has stressed the principles of
using Reserve components judiciously, considering the expectations of
individual members, relying on volunteers to the maximum extent
feasible, ensuring guardsmen and reservists are brought on active duty
only to perform meaningful tasks and retaining them on active duty only
as long as absolutely necessary. If history is a predictor of future
success, the steps we have taken should mitigate any adverse impact on
recruiting and retention. In fact, when reservists feel that their
service is meaningful, they are more likely to remain with us.
The frequency and duration of Reserve mobilizations can be reduced
through rebalancing Active and Reserve Force mix and reassigning
missions to take advantage of Active and Reserve core competencies.
Rebalancing the existing force mix can expand and enhance Total Force
capabilities within current end strength. Changes are being considered
across the full spectrum of capabilities in each component, to increase
force agility, enable better management of operational tempo, and to
foster closer integration between Active and Reserve components. These
changes will allow the Services to lessen stress and enhance the
strength and vitality of the Reserve Force.
In addition, current force management policies and systems are not
as efficient or consistent with the way the force is used. Personnel
management practices are being streamlined to achieve greater
flexibility in accessing and managing personnel throughout a military
career that may span both Active and Reserve service--or across a
``continuum of service.'' Creating the conditions for ``seamless'' flow
between regular and Reserve service, and providing for varying levels
of part-time participation will improve efficiency of force management
and provide more flexibility for recruiting and retaining a quality
force.
Financial incentives, meaningful training, and proper use of our
Reserve Force are required to ensure retention of trained human
resources, but, first and foremost, is the need to attract quality
individuals into Reserve military service. Strengthening recruiting
efforts in the college market bolsters the Reserve Force through
improved quality and service, given that there is a direct correlation
between education levels and retention beyond the initial military
enlistment.
In the future, we see the Reserves as a terrific way to bring
diverse skills and experience to the military from the civil sector,
that is hard to grow, train, and maintain in the regular forces. These
may include medical, language, information technology and other
technical skills. This will necessitate innovative affiliation programs
and alternatives for accessing and retaining individuals into the
Reserve components. The result can be a more cost-effective way to
provide the military with cutting-edge technology and exposure to the
new and innovative practices and approaches employed by industry and
the private sector.
The Reserve components will continue to be a significant and cost-
effective part of the Total Force, and force rebalancing and creative
force management can only enhance the strength and vitality of this
essential element of the military and the American society.

21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, in addition, is the
current mobilization causing you to re-think both the size and
structure of the Reserve Forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The current mobilization by itself does not
cause the Department to re-think the size and structure of the Reserve
Forces. What it does do is confirm that the strategic landscape and
evolving geo-political environment, as described in many of our
national security documents, requires that the U.S. possess
capabilities that are responsive, agile, and able to meet these
emerging challenges of the 21st century. The current mobilization also
helps in gaining insight on whether the force size, structure, and mix
are optimized to execute the U.S. Defense Strategy in support of the
National Security Strategy.
The Department has embarked on an ambitious transformation to meet
these challenges. As we continue to progress in our transformation, we
are examining ways to significantly increase the value of each element
of our military, to include exploration of opportunities to restructure
and reorganize our force appropriately. This includes the Reserve
component. In order to ensure that we progress on this path of
transformation smartly, we initiated a series of analytical studies to
determine what is the best force structure to support our strategy for
the 21st century and what is the appropriate mix of the force in our
Active and Reserve components.
The first study, which resulted from the Quadrennial Defense
Review, was the ``Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National
Defense.'' This study focused on how we could best utilize our Reserve
component forces in a more efficient and effective manner. Some
innovative concepts derived from this study include: the establishment
of what we call a ``continuum of service,'' a personnel management
process to better integrate the Active and Reserve Forces by making it
easier for personnel to move back and forth between Active and Reserve
service several times during a career, potentially increasing their
level of participation and resulting in more engaged and longer service
to the Department; increased use of volunteerism for select individuals
and units to expedite the mobilization process making Reserve call-ups
more responsive; and creating Reserve capabilities stateside that
Combatant Commanders can utilize with reach back techniques that reduce
theater footprint, deployment costs, and relieve deployment
requirements and stress in some of our Reserve component forces.
The second study is the ``Operational Availability Study.''
Directed in Defense Planning Guidance 2004, this study assesses how
best to utilize future joint military capabilities and force employment
timelines to execute the Defense Strategy. Emerging insights evolving
from this study include recommendations of future force size,
structure, and mix required to support the Defense Strategy in the 21st
century.
The third study, ``AC/RC Mix and Strategic Surprise'' examines
innovative management techniques and force structure adjustments that
improve the agility and responsiveness of the Reserve components.

22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, are the kinds of units
that are in the various Reserve components the right ones?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The demands on the Department of Defense have
evolved since the end of the Cold War and appear to be increasing
exponentially in the 21st century as we continue the global war on
terrorism. Both Active and Reserve components are being used more
frequently and in a wider variety of missions.
In the past, the Reserve components were structured as a repository
for capabilities needed to meet the later phases of major theater wars.
Due in a large part to the changing strategic landscape and
geopolitical environment over the past years, reliance on Reserve
capabilities has increased dramatically and migrated into every
deployment across the spectrum of conflict. As a result, capabilities
that reside predominantly in the Reserves today, such as civil affairs,
port opening, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies, and Combat Search
and Rescue, are needed early and often, and must be mobilized quickly
in a deployment. This reliance in every operation degrades the
military's responsiveness, flexibility, and agility needed to support
the Defense Strategy and meet the emerging challenges of the 21st
century.
In that regard, the Department is finalizing two major studies that
address this very issue of rebalancing the force to meet the National
Security Strategy. The ``Review of Reserve Component Contributions to
National Defense'' and the ``Operational Availability Study'' will
recommend ways to rebalance the Total Force within current end-strength
to make a more effective and judicious use of all components, not just
for today but also as we transform to the future force.

SPACE ASSETS

23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the recent Space
Shuttle Columbia tragedy has the Nation reassessing the value of space
exploration, experimentation, and operations. Many of us understand the
inherent and essential military value of space as an operational
medium. The President's budget for fiscal year 2004 demonstrates a
significant commitment to upgrading and expanding U.S. military space
assets. Could you expand on the role of space in defense transformation
and how transformation in military space assets will evolve in the
coming years?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It would be difficult to achieve our national
security objectives without the capabilities provided by our national
security space systems. For example: communications, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and precision navigation are all integral to our
peacetime and crisis responsibilities and the effectiveness of our
military forces. We are looking at entirely new areas and technologies
that could transform our military strategies. The modernization
investments we are making are to provide highly advanced space system
capabilities and the science and technology investments are to provide
the technologies that would allow entirely new capabilities to be
developed transforming how we use space to meet our mission needs. We
will be demonstrating, acquiring, and fielding these capabilities over
the years to come. Some examples, not in priority order or inclusive
are:

Developing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), including moving target tracking and
maintaining a common operating picture of the battlefield.
Space-based radar (SBR) is a key element and will provide the
capability to look deeply and persistently into areas that are
inaccessible to current platforms due to political
restrictions, geographical constraints, or the technological
limitations of legacy systems
Developing an advanced space delivery vehicle, the
Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), capable of delivering and dispensing
conventional payloads worldwide from and through space within
minutes of tasking with precision accuracy and an array of
conventional payloads to include effectively attacking soft and
hardened fixed targets, and mobile targets.
Developing a reusable, quick-reaction launch
capability to deploy small satellites required to fill short-
term, focused warfighter needs in ISR and communications.
Developing the capability to perform on-orbit servicing of
satellites (refueling and component change out) to extend
lifetimes and upgrade/fix components.
Providing total space awareness and the ability to
control all areas of space whenever necessary, including
protection of vital space assets and space denial to
adversaries.
Transformational Military Satellite Communications
with laser-com in conjunction with the advanced extremely high
frequency (AEHF) satellites to provide greatly expanded
capacity for survivable and jam-resistant communications and
data throughput for global transmission to tactical joint
warfighters.
Deployment of the Space-based Infrared Satellite
(SBIRS)-High is key to enabling the transformational ability to
defend the United States against ballistic missile attack and
significantly improve our capabilities in the four mission
areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence, and battle space characterization.

24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have long argued
that a national space policy that limits DOD's role in reusable launch
vehicle development may need to be revisited to allow significant DOD
contribution to the Space Launch Initiative. What is your position on
the future of cooperation with NASA for critical common space functions
such as space lift, both expendable and reusable?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The current national space policy does not
preclude or limit DOD investment in reuseable launch vehicle (RLV)
development--it assigns lead responsibility for expendable launch
vehicle (ELV) development to DOD and lead responsibility for RLV
development to NASA. I believe it is vital for DOD and NASA to
coordinate research and development efforts in areas of common need.
The Department of Defense and NASA are collaborating on
technologies supporting the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI)
designed to overcome the barriers of high speed/hypersonic flight,
space access, and space technology. NAI coordinates ongoing and new DOD
investments proposed in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request
with those of NASA under the Space Launch Initiative/Next Generation
Launch Technology (SLI-NGLT) program. This initiative will develop and
demonstrate a portfolio of critical technologies that will enable the
achievement of many common aerospace goals--such as supersonic/
hypersonic capabilities; safe, affordable, launch-on-demand space
access; and responsive payloads for quick deployment and employment of
space capabilities--and help to ensure continued American aerospace
leadership in the 21st century.

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you anticipate
using the shuttle to meet DOD and Air Force space delivery requirements
in the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. At this time, DOD and the Air Force have no
plans to use the space shuttle to satisfy DOD space delivery
requirements. We plan on meeting our assured access to space needs with
the new EELV systems. EELV will satisfy all planned and programmed
spacelift requirements, and has the flexibility and redundancy to
eliminate the need for DOD to maintain the shuttle as a back up
capability. The EELV is less expensive than the shuttle and eliminates
the extensive lead time for payload integration on the shuttle. The
shuttle Columbia was the only orbiter capable of carrying large DOD
payloads; the modifications of the other shuttles to service the
International Space Station limit their payload capacity.
DOD will continue to fly small Space Test Program (STP) experiments
on the shuttle as a means of getting science and technology payloads
into orbit. Flying STP on the shuttle makes use of available cargo
space on the shuttle at a minimal cost to DOD (approximately $3 million
a year for six payloads).

NUCLEAR TESTING

26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, currently, the United
States can perform a nuclear test within 24-36 months of receiving the
applicable Presidential Decision Directive. Do you believe that
nuclear-test-readiness should be shortened? What do you think is the
appropriate time frame: 3 months, 6 months, a year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. Following the 1992 moratorium on
underground nuclear testing, the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
has dealt successfully with problems that were discovered in the
stockpile. There are, however, no guarantees that it can continue to do
so indefinitely. As the stockpile ages, the accumulation of
modifications or the discovery of other latent problems may exceed
SSP's capabilities. Should this situation arise, it may become
necessary to conduct underground nuclear tests to confirm the safety or
reliability of the warhead in question.
Should nuclear testing be required, we must be prepared to conduct
the necessary tests in a timely fashion so that the Department of
Energy's weapon laboratories can resolve a question about stockpile
safety and reliability. We believe that the current 24-36 month test
readiness posture is too long and must be shortened. The Department is
working with the Department of Energy on an initiative directed by
Congress (Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, PL 107-
314, Sec. 3142) to develop plans for moving to higher levels of test
readiness.

27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the chairman of the
Nuclear Weapons Council has established a panel to examine ``the risks
associated with not testing our nuclear weapons.'' Do you believe that
there is currently a reason to be concerned with the long-term
capability of stockpile stewardship? What, in particular, is the cause
for concern?
Secretary Rumsfeld. To date, the experts have not raised any safety
or reliability concerns that would lead me to make a recommendation to
the President that the U.S. should resume testing. Since the United
States conducted its last nuclear test more than 10 years ago,
scientists have relied on a combination of non-nuclear experiments and
computer simulations as part of the SSP to attest to the safety,
security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons. There are no
guarantees, however, that the Department of Energy's scientists and
engineers will be able to depend on SSP indefinitely. It is prudent to
be prepared and thoroughly examine the basis for confidence in the
stockpile and the Nation's ability to continue to certify weapons as
safe and reliable. The purpose of this panel established by the Nuclear
Weapons Council is to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of our
nuclear program, including test readiness.

SCOTT SPEICHER

28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'm sure you are
familiar with the case of Captain Scott Speicher, who was lost over
Iraq in the opening hours of the Gulf War. Is there new information on
the status of Captain Scott Speicher?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We continue to receive new reporting on Captain
Speicher. We thoroughly analyze and review every report for relevancy
to his case.

29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, to your knowledge, are
regional intelligence agencies in the Middle East cooperating with U.S.
efforts to resolve his status?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Intelligence Community requested
intelligence information and assistance on the Captain Speicher case
from numerous countries, including those in the Middle East.

TESTING OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I appreciate the
Department of Defense's efforts to date to investigate and declassify
information on the Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) and Project 112
chemical and biological testing. It is critical that the United States
come clean on this issue and that our veterans who may have been
exposed to dangerous chemicals in these tests are notified so that they
can seek treatment. While the full information on the location, nature,
and military personnel involved in these tests has yet to come out, I
believe we are making progress on this issue and I thank you for your
efforts. In the coming year and in the future, when do you expect full
disclosure of the SHAD/Project 112 testing programs will be complete?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense is committed to
completing its investigation of Project 112/SHAD and releasing all
medically relevant information by June 2003.

31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, beyond the SHAD/
Project 112 disclosure program, do you support expansion of these
efforts into ALL Cold War-era chemical and biological weapons testing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If the Department of Veterans Affairs requests
information from DOD necessary for adjudication of veterans' benefits
claims, DOD would attempt to be responsive, to the extent feasible and
consistent with continuing national security classification
requirements.

32. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what can Congress do
to assist the DOD with these efforts?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs
have all the authority necessary to address these issues.

JOINT SIMULATION PROGRAM

33. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have been made aware
of a DOD Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directing the cancellation
of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) program in fiscal year 2004 and
through the FYDP. I and other members on the Armed Services Committee
who care deeply about the pace and scope of efforts to increase joint
experimentation, joint training, creation of a standing joint
operational headquarters, and joint requirements and acquisition
validation, are troubled by this development.
The program is intended to provide a joint simulation capability to
``integrate'' service simulations allowing for joint training and
experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This
kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the military
establishment to greater joint training, doctrine, and experimentation.
This program has received significant congressional attention and
support over the years, despite its ups and downs. There is great
concern that we have abandoned the single tool essential to successful
joint training and experimentation. What analysis (program management,
operational requirements, etc.) informs this decision and provides the
compelling justification for so dramatic and comprehensive a reduction?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department added significant resources on
three occasions to provide full funding for the JSIMS program and keep
it on schedule. In August 1999, $7.9 million was reprogrammed to ensure
an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of April 2001. In August 2000,
an additional $265.5 million was allocated for fiscal year 2002-2007 to
support a rescheduled IOC of March 2002. Several months later, during
the budget review, a further $7.4 million increase was approved for
fiscal year 2001-2002, to address shortfalls identified late in the
process by the program office.
Several changes also were made to the management structure in an
attempt to improve program performance and keep development on track.
In December 1999, the program was given an ACAT-1D (Acquisition
Category 1D) designation to increase management oversight. In January
2000, the Army was directed to appoint a full-time program manager. At
the same time, the program office was instructed to produce a cost
estimate, split JSIMS development into blocks, and develop appropriate
acquisition documents. Although some of these measures were adopted,
problems persisted. By December 2002, the official IOC date had slid to
March 2005.
In addition to standard ACAT-1D oversight, there were at least four
other reviews to assist program management, two of which were led by
former Directors of Defense Research and Engineering. In December 1999,
the Senior Review Board directed the program office to reconfigure its
development plan around the Department's High-Level Architecture
standard. Then, in 2001, an independent panel led by Dr. Anita Jones
concluded that JSIMS needed to establish sound performance-prediction
capabilities and improve its integration with its major partners, like
the Army's Warfighter Simulation program. That same year, an audit
conducted by the Army Materiel Command concluded that current
engineering practices would not resolve performance issues within cost
and schedule constraints. Finally, in December 2002, another
independent review team, this time headed by Dr. Dolores Etter,
recommended looking externally for commercial technologies and
strategies that support scalability in order to facilitate spiral
development for future JSIMS blocks. Dr. Etter's team also recommended
an independent outside assessment of the JSIMS architecture. All of
these reviews, in addition to numerous ACAT-1D assessments, highlighted
serious concerns about the technical and performance standards for
JSIMS. The decision to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) before
proceeding with further JSIMS development is consistent with the
results of these reviews.

34. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what alternatives are
DOD/JFCOM considering to meet the requirement for a simulation tool
that supports joint training, joint experimentation, and joint program
evaluation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This question will be addressed by the AoA and
cannot be definitively answered before the study is complete. Final
guidance is now being developed, but the AoA will likely consider the
following alternatives: (1) continuing the JSIMS program, (2)
separating the joint and service JSIMS elements and pursuing them as
independent programs, (3) modifying existing simulations, and (4)
commercial sources.

35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how will DOD/JFCOM
support, and who will be responsible for a new joint simulation program
in the fiscal year 2004 request?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A new joint simulation is not funded in the
fiscal year 2004 budget. The Department has initiated an AoA to
identify the most cost-effective approach for meeting joint and service
training requirements. Until the AoA is complete, we cannot say whether
a new program ultimately might be needed.

36. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, Congress appropriated
millions of dollars for JSIMS and its related Service programs in
fiscal year 2003, how does DOD/JFCOM propose to use that funding now
that they are all (with one exception) zeroed in the fiscal year 2004
request and FYDP?
Secretary Rumsfeld. All fiscal year 2003 funds remained with the
program to ensure delivery of Block I software in accordance with
program office estimates. The JSIMS Software Support Facility was
funded at $14 million in fiscal year 2004, using monies originally
planned for the JSIMS Program Office. The remaining $168.6 million in
fiscal year 2004 funding proposed in the fiscal year 2003 President's
budget was allocated to other priorities.

37. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the current
state of analysis and planning leading to creation of a Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC)? What are the overarching challenges
identified at this point to creation of a JNTC? How does cancellation
of the JSIMS and related Service simulation programs contribute to the
challenge or facilitate the creation of a JNTC?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The JNTC program has an approved budget, and
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is setting up a Joint Management Office.
The implementation plan, now being drafted, will define what will be
required to support JNTC certification and accreditation. Fiscal year
2003 activities will include establishing and testing technical support
requirements, determining opposing force capabilities, developing and
testing data collection methods, and establishing and testing the
exercise-control architecture. JFCOM is leading the planning for JNTC
events in fiscal year 2004 and beyond.
The overarching challenge for the program is to create a solution
within a high-level architecture that provides for rapid integration of
live, virtual, and constructive components so that trainees are
immersed in a seamless, combat-like environment, without realizing that
some aspects are virtual or constructive.
JSIMS and JNTC are independent of each other, although JSIMS could
be used by JNTC if it met JNTC requirements. Without JSIMS, JNTC will
use legacy systems, complemented if necessary by new systems, to meet
its objectives.

THE NATIONAL GUARD

38. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, as major contributors
to the force structure and capability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air
Force, the National Guard must be a part of the plan to transform our
military services and the command and control of the Department of
Defense. While holding the National Guard forces in strategic reserve
for the Active components may have successfully maintained a force for
strategic reserve, the National Guard no longer operates only as a
strategic reserve. Now, more than ever, the Army and Air National Guard
are critical components of the Total Force and used in a much different
manner than just 15 years ago. Such ``increased reliance'' upon our
National Guard forces emphasizes that DOD should expand the authority
of the National Guard Bureau within the Department of Defense to that
of a separate entity. What is DOD doing to elevate the status of the
National Guard Bureau to an independent agency status within DOD?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department has no plans to elevate the
status of the National Guard Bureau to an independent agency. The
Department of Defense has sought and continues to stress full
integration of the Reserve components, with each component making up an
integral piece of the parent service. Both the Army and Air National
Guard are essential parts of our seven Reserve components and account
for approximately 33.8 percent and 19.7 percent of their parent service
respectively (combined, 36.2 percent of the two services). We will
continue to work closely with the National Guard Bureau to focus our
efforts on the objective of complete integration of all of our Reserve
components into the Total Force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

NEWPORT CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEPOT

39. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am pleased to see the
accelerated neutralization initiative at the Newport Chemical Weapons
Depot is on schedule to be completed as early as April 2004. What
specifically does the Department of Defense intend to do with the
facility once demilitarization is completed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army is conducting a study to ascertain
reusability of the facilities. We will report our findings to Congress
no later than March 31, 2003 as requested in the Senate Report 107-202
(page 20).
Note: A report was provided to Congress by the Army on March 31,
2003, and a summary of the answer to Senator Bayh's questions from that
report is as follows:
All of the buildings involved with the neutralization process fall
within the RCRA permit area. The chemical defense building (CDB) at
Newport can not easily be fenced off from the rest of the site and
excluded from this permit. As a result, the CDB is not compatible for
any uses other than the demilitarization process.
A portion of the partially completed CDB structure has been
enclosed from the elements, and is now being used by the
demilitarization contractor to support the construction activities
associated with the chemical neutralization process. Once the
neutralization process starts, it is anticipated the building will be
used to support the chemical demilitarization effort.
There are no current or potential Army requirements identified for
any of the facilities at Newport Chemical Depot, IN, including the
Chemical Demilitarization Building. The neutralization process is to
run from September 2003 to May 2004. Until completion, the Army will
not be able to give a full evaluation for other uses of the facilities.
If any facilities remain after the decontamination/clean-up process,
potential reuse by the Army or other entities will be reevaluated.

40. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, I wrote to
you in November 2002 seeking your assistance in strengthening temporary
flight restrictions currently in place over the Nation's eight chemical
weapons depots. Unfortunately, it appears as though nothing has been
done to deter pilots from violating the airspace over these facilities.
In the last year alone, there have been almost 50 incursions of the
airspace above Newport in my home state. I would like to know what
specific steps you have taken to deter such incursions? In addition, I
would like to know what the Pentagon has done to coordinate efforts
with the Federal Aviation Administration to enforce the flight
restrictions, and to report those who violate them?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Bayh, the Department of Defense shares
your concern about violations of temporary flight restrictions over
chemical weapons depot sites. However, DOD is not the lead Federal
agency for either the establishment or the enforcement of temporary
flight restrictions. If a violation occurs while we are flying a combat
air patrol, DOD aircraft can intercept the offending aircraft and force
it to change direction, or, in dire circumstances, shoot it down.
Currently, the only option short of this is the imposition of
administrative sanctions by the Federal Aviation Administration. We
believe that there should be penalty options between these two
extremes, and are working with other interagency members to define what
these might be and how they might be implemented, using the National
Capital Region as a guide.
While DOD's actions are limited during periods of airspace
violations over chemical weapons depots, the Department of Defense has
taken significant steps to accelerate the chemical weapons destruction
process at three of the remaining eight chemical stockpile sites.
Accelerated destruction of these weapons equates to an accelerated
reduction of risk to the public. The Army is implementing accelerated
destruction of bulk chemical agent at the Aberdeen, Maryland and
Newport, Indiana stockpiles. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment
(ACWA) program, under the direction of Under Secretary Aldridge, is
accelerating destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile at Pueblo,
Colorado.
General Myers. The DOD shares your concern about violations of
temporary flight restrictions over chemical weapons depot sites.
However, DOD is not the lead Federal agency for either the
establishment or the enforcement of restricted airspace. If a
restricted airspace is violated, DOD can scramble alert fighter
aircraft or divert fighters flying combat air patrol to intercept the
offending aircraft and attempt to force it to vacate the area. If the
aircraft fails to respond to direction from DOD fighter aircraft and
remains a threat to the protected asset, the DOD fighters could shoot
down the threat as a last resort.
The best way to keep aircraft from violating restricted airspace is
through a thorough education program from the FAA, and establishment of
significant penalties for violators by the FAA and law enforcement
agencies. DOD continues to work with the Interagency, especially the
new Department of Homeland Security, to establish security requirements
and procedures to strengthen these temporary flight restrictions over
sensitive areas.

BASE CLOSURES

41. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have supported your goal
for a new round of base closures in 2005 and applaud your efforts to
bring our military force in line with our infrastructure. Looking ahead
to the base closure and realignment process, and recognizing the
Department's emphasis on joint service training and response, I would
think that multiple service support in our shore establishment is
critical from both a capability as well as an efficiency standpoint. Do
you plan to include base closure criteria in the process that considers
joint service support, and rewards those activities? In addition, as we
examine the vital role that DOD plays in securing the homeland, will
homeland defense capability be included in the base closure and
realignment criteria?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Section 2913(b) of the BRAC statute requires me
to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in the
making of closure and realignment recommendations. The statute further
provides that military value shall include at a minimum the
preservation of military installations in the United States as staging
areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.
Consistent with these statutory requirements, I will make specific
recommendations for military value selection criteria when I publish
the selection criteria for public comment, no later than December 31,
2003.

42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I would like to know how, or
if, September 11 has changed your thinking about the location and
distribution of our military bases and installations in the United
States?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The events of September 11, 2001, have
confirmed in my mind that the Department must act now to review our
basing requirements. We are looking at and experiencing different
threats than we were a decade ago, and our forces must be stationed
appropriately to respond to contingencies and support the global war on
terrorism.

TRANSFORMATION

43. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, it is my understanding that
you are proposing to terminate the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank and the
M-113 family of armored vehicles. I am concerned about this decision
and believe these time proven and effective systems have a critical
role in the transformed Armed Forces. Of particular concern to me is
how you will maintain these systems in outyears. Specifically, can you
tell in detail how you will provide for transmission replacement and
maintenance of these vehicles?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The program the Department plans to terminate
is the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Retrofit Program. The M1A1
Abrams Integrated Maintenance (AIM) program continues. This program
remains effectively the same as planned in the Army's original
recapitalization of the legacy force and modernization strategy. The
AIM program will refurbish 790 M1A1 tanks at a planned rate of 135
tanks per year from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 and 115
tanks in fiscal year 2007. Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, Lima Army
Tank Plant in Ohio, and General Dynamics Land Systems Division, will
perform the work. The M1A1 incorporates rebuilt, service life extension
AGT 1500 engines, and selected subsystem improvements. To control
costs, the AIM program plans to provide the transmission replacement
and maintenance on these vehicles using existing stocks, to develop
innovative repair and rebuild programs, to use excess vehicle line
replaceable units, and to re-engineer components that are no longer
procurable.
The M113 Family of Vehicles system upgrade program is effectively
terminated in fiscal year 2004. The remaining M113 work is the
conversion of 77 M577A2s to M1068A3s (a conversion from an older to the
new command post carrier variant of the M113), the incorporation of
government-furnished equipment transmissions, and 476 sets of track for
1st Cavalry Division M113s.

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

SERVICE CHIEFS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss,
Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Bill Nelson, Dayton,
Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk; and Gabriella
Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Joseph
T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K.
Levine, minority counsel; and Bridget M. Whalan, special
assistant.
Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent, Sara R. Mareno, and
Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator
McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson
Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant
to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to
Senator Collins; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Mieke
Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Terrence E. Sauvain
and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey and Peter A.
Contostavlos, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Randy Massanelli,
assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee
meets this morning to receive testimony from the chiefs of the
military services in their annual posture statement on behalf
of their respective branches to our committee. This is in
regard to the President's fiscal year 2004 defense budget.
Each of you bring great distinction to your Services and we
are proud to have you here today. Last week, Senator Levin,
Senator Roberts, Senator Rockefeller, and I had the privilege
of visiting with U.S. military personnel in the Persian Gulf
region, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I say to you most
respectfully and humbly, you have rightful pride in your men
and women in the Armed Forces.
We met with them at each stop last week, and they are the
best, well-trained force to be found anywhere in the world
today.
We arose this morning to hear about the diplomatic efforts
which are properly being pursued by our President and other
world leaders in this problem with regard to Iraq. But that
diplomacy begins with the men and women in uniform of the
United States and other nations that are trying to secure peace
in that part of the world and the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction from Saddam Hussein and his regime.
We would not see the diplomacy working at its hopefully
best, be it in the Security Council or in the capitals of the
world, had it not been for the foresight of our President and
other world leaders to move in position their best and finest
of the Armed Forces to make possible such progress that we all
hope and pray for in diplomacy.
That reflects directly upon each of you individually and
those of you in your respective branches who made possible
these fine, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
Each year we have this hearing, but today it is a most
important one. The honest and forthright observations of the
Service Chiefs, professional as well as personal, are
absolutely essential for the continuing work of this committee
and the work of the Senate as a body at such times as we bring
forth the bill and, indeed, the nominations that are frequently
before the Senate with regard to the men and women of the Armed
Forces.
Time and time again, you and your predecessors have
summoned the courage to point out the challenges to current and
future readiness. Those of us who have been on this committee
for many years, as Senator Levin and I have, can recall
predecessors who have been in your positions whose forthright
testimony has enabled this committee to give greater support to
the men and women of the Armed Forces, and we are respectful of
what you do to make that possible.
Together you represent more than 120 years of military
experience and distinguished service to the Nation.
Individually, your understanding of what is required to
organize, equip, train, and sustain your service in peacetime
and in wartime is second to none.
When General Myers testified before the committee 2 weeks
ago, I asked him this question. I asked him whether he believed
the Armed Forces were prepared to meet any contingency of the
use of force as may be required in Iraq and continue their high
level of activity against worldwide terrorism. His response was
unhesitating. His response was succinct, one word:
``Absolutely.''
I and many others who have pondered the question over the
past several months were assured by his confidence and his
certainty. Clearly, much of your work and opinions contributed
to the conclusion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Today, homeland security is our Nation's foremost urgent
priority. As Senator Levin and I met with the troops in these
far-most regions, we said to them that homeland defense begins
right where they are, because to the extent they can deter,
interdict, or if necessary, crush terrorists is the extent to
which there is less chance that that terrorism is brought to
the shores of our country against their families, against all
of us here at home. Homeland defense begins beyond the shores
of this Nation.
As we meet this morning, our Armed Forces are fighting the
war with terror with over 40 coalition partners from
Afghanistan to the Philippines. In the case of Iraq, our
President has quite properly, together with other world
leaders, chosen the diplomatic path, working through the United
Nations and the Security Council. But as I said earlier, we
must ever be mindful that diplomacy can only be as effective as
there is a clear and present credible military threat to use
force to back up that diplomacy. Your troops are doing exactly
that.
The President's fiscal year 2004 defense budget request of
$379.9 billion continues to increase in real terms the amount
of funding available for each of the Services in total. This
budget continues the President's considerable progress to date
and continues his ongoing commitment to safeguard America, our
allies, and our friends. It is increasingly clear, however,
that today's global challenges are requiring much more of the
Armed Forces.
It is our responsibility on this committee, and Congress as
a whole, to carefully monitor the degree to which these
increase demands stress the overall readiness of the forces,
the readiness of the individual service person, and the
readiness of their families. We encountered on this trip some
areas that we will bring to your attention this morning, areas
in which we have concern, in all probability you have concern,
and we need to know your recommendations how we can jointly
work with you to correct it.
As we discuss and debate this budget request in the days
and weeks ahead, as is the duty of this committee and Congress,
on one thing we can all agree: the commitment, the dedication,
and performance of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
in service to their Nation and that of their families in
homeland defense is truly a remarkable blessing on this Nation.
I thank you.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we meet and as our troops continue to flow towards the
Iraq region, there are many issues relative to Iraq that are
being debated here at home, around the world, and at the United
Nations. It is appropriate that those issues be debated,
including the question of whether or not it would be wise to
initiate an attack against Iraq without the support of the
world community acting through the United Nations, the fallout
of such an attack long-term and short-term, what the
alternatives are in terms of disarming or containing Saddam
Hussein, and whether the world will be more or less secure if
such an attack takes place without a unified world community
speaking through the United Nations.
There are many issues that are worthy of debate. But one
thing is clear to me, that if in fact such an attack occurs,
the short-term military outcome is not in doubt. I also believe
very firmly that the Iraqi leaders should not infer from these
debates that America will not be united in support of its
forces in the field. Regardless of where we stand on the issues
being debated, this country will be united if and when the time
comes. We will provide our men and women in uniform with
everything that they need to ensure that they prevail.
As Senator Warner has mentioned, Senator Roberts, Senator
Rockefeller, the chairman, and I just returned from the region.
There was no doubt in our mind before we left that our military
is by far the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable
fighting force in the world today, and nothing that we saw on
our trip in any way raises any uncertainty about that
conclusion.
But our visit reassured us that there is a uniformly high
state of morale among our forces and a willingness to implement
orders from the Commander in Chief, whatever those orders may
be. Their readiness can be attributed in significant measure to
the hard work that the Service Chiefs and their staffs have put
forward in support of their responsibilities, and we give to
our Service Chiefs for that our heartfelt thanks for your
efforts.
But I think you would be the first to join us and all the
members of this committee in saying that the real gratitude is
owing to the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces.
I want to join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses here
today. First, I want to extend a special thanks to General
Shinseki, who is making his final appearance before the
committee at a posture hearing. I do not think we can give you
any assurance it will be your last appearance before the
committee, however, so do not relax too much.
Let me put this simply, though. Today our tribute will come
more fully at a later time, but let me just simply say that
you, sir, are the embodiment of service to our Nation and a
commitment to the men and women whom you command. You have been
truly a role model and we salute you for it.
I also want to give a special welcome to General Hagee, who
is making, I believe, his first appearance at a posture
hearing, and we welcome you as well as our other witnesses who
have been here before and will be here again. All of you are
very much in our thoughts these days. We are grateful to you
for what you have done to prepare our troops should war come,
and that service will indeed serve them and our Nation well
should in fact that moment arrive.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
We will have 6-minute rounds. But before I proceed, I join
Senator Levin in acknowledging your service, General Shinseki.
There are moments in one's life that you never forget, and I
recall Senator Inouye introducing you to this committee and I
never have heard a more eloquent, more heartfelt introduction
than that given by our distinguished senior colleague. You have
lived up in every way to what he said. Thank you, sir.
All right, I will start off, ladies and gentlemen, just as
soon as we get organized up here. But we will start with the
opening statements. We will start with you, General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES ARMY

General Shinseki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both you and
Senator Levin, for the kind comments. That moment that you
recollect was a high point as well, as has been the last 3\1/2\
years of my opportunity to work with the members of the
committee. I will always consider that a high point.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, other distinguished members of
the committee: I am honored to be here this morning with the
Service Chiefs and reporting to you on the posture of the Army
and its readiness. Today, as both the chairman and the ranking
member have indicated, across the joint force, soldiers are
serving magnificently alongside their joint brethren, defending
our freedom in this world against terrorism and preparing for
other contingencies. In the Army alone, nearly 220,000 soldiers
are forward stationed overseas and more than 124,000 of our
Reserve component have been mobilized to this point.
In the past 6 months, I have visited a good many of them. I
have stood on the ground with them on their operational
deployments. I have talked with them where they worked, where
they played, and where they ate. I have even visited them here
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. We have had candid and
frank discussions about your Army's readiness to respond to the
Nation's calls.
The Army is ready. We have the best Army in the world, not
the largest but the best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped.
It is about more than just equipment. We have the best soldiers
on top of everything. Their determination and commitment are as
firm as I have seen in my years of service and they are
immensely proud to serve this Nation. They will take any
objective, and they will accomplish any mission that we send
them on.
I am proud of what I have seen and I am daily reassured of
my assessment. Soldiers are standing by for orders in 100 camps
and stations and they will fight and win decisively this war on
terrorism or any other war we might be sent to fight.
We want to project that degree of readiness that is
reflected today, project that readiness into the future, and to
do so we long decided we must have a more responsive, a more
deployable, more agile and versatile, as equally lethal and
survivable a force as we have today. We began that work about
3\1/2\ years ago.
We knew then that there was a war in our future. We just
did not know when, where, or against whom. The relative
predictability all of us had gotten used to during the Cold War
had given way to a continuing chaos of unpredictability. Voices
inside and outside the Army suggested change.
With the unwavering support of the administration and this
Congress, we are transforming rapidly to be more capable of
dominating future crises. To mitigate the risk that is always
inherent any time an institution undertakes comprehensive and
fundamental change, we structured that transformation along
three broad, mutually supporting vectors.
On the near-term axis, we committed to keeping the
readiness of today's legacy combat formations at the
appropriate level. Then, to fix longstanding operational gaps
we have had between our heavy and light components of that
legacy force, we are fielding six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
to give us added capabilities in that midterm axis, even as we
are designing our future force capabilities.
Then finally, it is on that third and final axis that we
are readying the Army for its long-term responsibilities. We
are developing future concepts and technologies that will
provide consistent capability overmatch through the middle of
the century. Our Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision
that is coming up in May of this year is the next major
milestone and we intend to begin fielding this Objective Force
by 2008.
Balancing these requirements over time dictates difficult
but prudent funding decisions and the Army's fiscal year 2004
budget strikes that essential balance to maintain readiness
throughout the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) period and
beyond, and your support remains essential.
We are already seeing dividends from our investments in
future readiness: technologies that are coming on line early,
superior body armor today, robots in caves, antitank warheads
on unmanned aerial vehicles today, and unprecedented Blue Force
tracking capabilities today. During the largest joint exercise
in our history, Millennium Challenge 2002, with the help of the
Air Force we air-delivered a Stryker platoon onto a dirt strip
out at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
Just 3 years after the Army described its requirement for
this interim force, we are demonstrating the increased
strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities the Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams will provide to combatant commanders. This
summer the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team will join us in
the war on terrorism.
So it is not just about capabilities in 2008 and beyond. It
is enabling soldiers today.
People remain the engine behind all of our magnificent
moments as an Army and their well-being is inextricably linked
to our readiness as we describe it today. My thanks to the
members of this committee for your help with pay raises, health
care, retirement benefits, housing, and other well-being
programs that have taken better care of our people than I can
remember. Our soldiers, civilians, retirees, and veterans and
their families appreciate it in more ways than I can describe.
Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for your unwavering support,
unwavering bipartisan support of this committee, and the
leadership of this committee and its devotion to our soldiers.
You keep us the most respected land force in the world. Mr.
Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to your questions and
the questions of the committee.
[The prepared statement of General Shinseki and the Army

Posture Statement follow:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, USA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to report to you today on the posture of the
United States Army.
America's Armed Forces are the most powerful in the world.
America's Army remains the most respected landpower to our friends and
allies and the most feared ground force to those who would threaten the
interests of the United States.
Since before the birth of the Nation, American soldiers have
instilled hope in a noble dream of liberty. They have remained on point
for the Nation through nine wars, and the intervals of peace in the
years between--defending the Constitution and preserving freedom.
Magnificent in their selfless service, long in their sense of duty, and
deep in their commitment to honor, soldiers have kept the United States
the land of the free and the home of the brave. This is our legacy. Our
soldiers who serve today preserve it.
In October 1999, we unveiled our vision for the future--``Soldiers,
on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in
the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant
across the full spectrum of operations.'' The attacks against our
Nation on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism validate
the Army's vision--people, readiness, transformation--and our efforts
to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.
While helping to fight the global war on terrorism, the Army is in
the midst of a profound transformation. Readiness remains our constant
imperative--today, tomorrow, and the day after. Transformation,
therefore, advances on three broad axes: perpetuating the Army's legacy
by maintaining today's readiness and dominance; bridging the
operational gap with an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;
and fielding the Objective Force to fight and win conflicts in the
years beyond this decade.
As they have throughout the Army's 227-year history, soldiers
remain the centerpiece of our formations. Versatile and decisive across
the full spectrum of joint missions, land forces have demonstrated time
and again the quality of their precision in joint operations. Our
responsibility is to provide soldiers with the critical capabilities
needed for the tough missions we send them on.
After 3\1/2\ years of undiminished support from the administration
and Congress, and the incredible dedication of soldiers and Department
of the Army civilians, we have begun to deliver the Army vision. With
continued strong support, we will win the war against global terrorism,
meet our obligations to our friends and allies, remain ready to prevail
over the unpredictable, and transform ourselves for decisive victories
on future battlefields.
We have achieved sustainable momentum in Army transformation; the
framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded, this decade.

THE ARMY--AT WAR AND TRANSFORMING

The United States is at war, and the Army serves the Nation by
defending the Constitution and our way of life. It is our nonnegotiable
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
decisively.
In the weeks immediately following the attacks of September 11,
2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan,
penetrated al Qaida and Taliban strongholds, and leveraged all
available long-range, joint fires, enabling the Northern Alliance to
begin dismantling the Taliban. By January 2002, U.S. and Allied
conventional force reinforcements began to set the stage for Operation
Anaconda, where soldiers, demonstrating courage and determination under
the most challenging conditions, defeated al Qaida at altitude on the
escarpments overlooking the Shah-e-kot Valley.
Today, more than 198,000 soldiers remain deployed and forward
stationed in 120 countries around the globe, conducting operations and
training with our friends and allies. Decisively engaged in the joint
and combined fight against global terrorism, soldiers are serving with
distinction--at home and abroad. Soldiers from both the active and the
Reserve component have remained ``on point'' for the Nation in the
Balkans for 7 years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in the
Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years. At the
publication of the Army Posture Statement, there were more than 110,000
Reserve component soldiers mobilized for active Federal service in
support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. Even
as we transform, soldiers will remain ready to answer the calls of the
Nation to defeat well-trained, determined, and dangerous adversaries
who miscalculate in taking on the best-led, the best-equipped, and the
best-trained Army in the world.
At war and transforming, the Army is accelerating change to harness
the power of new technologies, different organizations, and revitalized
leader development initiatives to remain at the head of the line. To
accomplish this, Army transformation advances along three major axes
towards attainment of the Objective Force. We selectively recapitalize
and modernize today's capabilities to extend our overmatch in staying
ready to defend our homeland, keep the peace in areas important to the
Nation, and win the war against global terrorism. Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams--our Interim Force--will bridge the current operational
gap between our rapidly-deployable light forces and our later-arriving
heavy forces, paving the way for the arrival of the Objective Force. By
2010, the Army's Objective Force--organized, equipped, and trained for
ground dominance, cyber-warfare, and space exploitation--will provide
the Nation the capabilities it must have to remain the global leader,
the strongest economy in the world, and the most respected and feared
military force, by our friends and allies and our enemies,
respectively.
The surprise attacks against our Nation and Operation Enduring
Freedom, in response to those attacks, validated the Army vision and
provided momentum to our efforts to transform ourselves into an
instrument of national power that provides full spectrum operational
capabilities that are strategically responsive and capable of decisive
victory. In a little over 3 years, we have begun to realize the Army
vision--people, readiness, and transformation.
The transforming Army is enriching as a profession and nurturing to
families whose sacrifice has borne the readiness of the force for the
past 10 years. Our well-being initiatives are our commitment to reverse
this trend by giving our people the opportunity to become self-reliant;
setting them up for personal growth and success; aggressively investing
in family housing; and revitalizing single-soldier living space in our
barracks. Our manning initiatives have filled our line divisions and
other early deploying units to dampen the internal turbulence of
partially filled formations and help put a measure of predictability
back into the lives of our families.
The Army has carefully balanced the risk between remaining ready
for today's challenges and preparing for future crises. With unwavering
support from the administration, Congress, our soldiers, and Department
of the Army civilians, the Army has made unprecedented progress in its
efforts to transform.
We will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the first
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) this summer and demonstrate the
increased responsiveness, deployability, agility, verastility,
lethality, survivability, and sustainability that SBCTs provide to
combatant commanders. In a little over 3 years from initial concept to
fielded capability, the SBCTs will allow us to glimpse the potential
for acquisition reform in paving the way for delivery of the Objective
Force.
We have constructed the framework for achieving the Objective Force
this decade: a Transformation Campaign Plan with Roadmap; the Objective
Force White Paper; the Operational and Organizational plans for the
Objective Force Unit of Action; and the Operational Requirements
Document for the Future Combat System of Systems.
Additionally, the Army is poised to fill ground maneuver's most
critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with
Comanche, a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft that is a
cornerstone of the Objective Force.
All along the way, we have tested our concepts in wargames and
experiments, checked and rechecked our azimuth to the Objective Force
weekly and monthly, and look forward to a successful Future Combat
System Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision in May of this
year.
However, we cannot accelerate Army transformation without
transforming the way the Army does business--from transformation of
logistics and acquisition to personnel and installation transformation.
Revolutionizing Army business management practices achieves the best
value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for
investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances
management of personnel systems, installations, and contracting; and
augments our potential to accelerate arrival of the Objective Force.
Changing the Army is first about changing the way we think, and better
business practices represent practical application of common sense
initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation.
We are proud of our progress. We are grateful for the strong
congressional support that has helped put the Army on its approach
march to the Objective Force. The Army 2003 Posture Statement describes
our tremendous progress in transformation--an orchestrated campaign,
synchronized with OSD and joint transformation, to achieve the
Objective Force and keep America's Army the dominant landpower in the
world.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM

During the last two decades of the 20th century, information-age
technologies dramatically changed the political, economic, and military
landscapes. Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and
operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated the requirement
for transforming our forces to meet the evolving, strategic
requirements of our Nation. Survivable and extremely lethal, our heavy
forces effectively met the requirements for which they were designed;
yet, they were slow to deploy and difficult to sustain. Conversely, our
light forces were rapidly deployable, but they lacked the protection,
lethality, and tactical mobility that we seek across the spectrum of
military operations. We were successful in winning the Cold War and, as
a result, smaller than we had been in 40 years. The Army no longer had
the luxury of specialized forces built to confront a single and
narrowly defined threat like the Warsaw Pact countries.
Today's challenges are more complex; threats are elusive and
unpredictable. The fight against international terrorism has
overshadowed, but not eliminated, other potential crises. Tension
between India and Pakistan persists; stability between China and Taiwan
is tenuous; and concern over North Korea escalates. Threats of
transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)--often financed by organized crime, illicit drug
transactions, trafficking in women and children, and the sale of arms--
further complicate the security environment. Geopolitical trends such
as scarce resources, youth population-spike in underdeveloped
countries, aging populations in developed countries, and the growth of
mega-cities, among others, presage a future strategic environment of
diverse and widely distributed threats.
Fully appreciating the internal and external difficulties that
profound change engenders, we assessed the operational challenges of
the new century against the capabilities of our Cold War Army,
recognized the opportunity to leverage the inherent combat power of the
technological revolution, and set a clear path ahead--the Army vision.
The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) reaffirms our military's
highest priority--defending the United States. To do this effectively,
we assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition;
deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. The NSS directs
the military to transform to a capabilities-based force ready to
respond to unpredictable adversaries and security crises. The Objective
Force meets these NSS requirements, and Army transformation will
enhance our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations, achieve
decisive results at the time and place of our choosing, and safeguard
the Nation's ability to exercise our right of self-defense through
preemption, when required.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a capabilities-based
approach to defense planning that provides broader military options
across the operational spectrum, from pre- to post-conflict operations.
The force-sizing construct--1-4-2-1--takes into account the number,
scope, and simultaneity of tasks assigned the military: it sizes the
force for defense of the U.S. homeland (1), forward deterrence in four
critical regions (4), the conduct of simultaneous warfighting missions
in two regions (2)--while preserving the President's option to call for
decisive victory in one of those conflicts (1)--and participation in
multiple, smaller contingency operations.
the army--serving today, balancing risk, managing transformation
Soldiers are the most precise and responsive means to strike and
then control enemy centers of gravity on the ground--where people live,
work, and govern. American soldiers are disciplined, professional, and
trained for success in diverse missions; they are the foundation of a
flexible force that accomplishes its missions in the non-linear
battlespace by integrating new, innovative technologies and techniques
with current systems and doctrine. Our people adapt under the harshest
conditions, whether in the deserts of Kuwait and the Sinai, the
mountains and rice paddies of Korea, or the tropics of the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste.
These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between
current and near-term readiness and our transformation to meet future
challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the
mid-term in order to fund our transformation to the Objective Force. To
avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current
operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in the war
against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term
effort to defeat transnational threats. We have designed and
implemented the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) to provide a
precision, predictive tool with which to monitor the Army and make
appropriate adjustments to preserve current readiness. Our surge
capacity in the industrial base further reduces current risk by keeping
production lines warm and responsive. Our first Stryker Brigade Combat
Team will provide the combatant commanders with a new capability to
further mitigate operational risk--even as we transform to the
Objective Force.

REALIZING THE ARMY VISION--PEOPLE, READINESS, AND TRANSFORMATION

In 1999, the Army announced its vision to transform into a more
strategically responsive force, dominant across the full spectrum of
military operations. The Army vision addresses three essential
components: people, readiness, and transformation. Soldiers are the
heart of the Army, the centerpiece of our formations, and the
foundation of our combat power. Readiness remains our overarching
imperative; it is the means by which we execute our nonnegotiable
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
decisively. To preserve readiness while rapidly changing,
transformation advances on three major axes: preserving our Army legacy
by maintaining readiness and dominance today; bridging the operational
gap with Stryker Brigades, the Interim Force; and fielding the
Objective Force this decade to keep the Army dominant in the years
beyond this decade.
Realizing the Army vision requires the concerted effort of the
entire Army, across all components--from warfighting to institutional
support organizations. The Army published its Transformation Campaign
Plan in April 2001 to synchronize and guide this complex undertaking.
The November 2001 Objective Force White Paper describes the advanced
capabilities and core technologies needed to build the Objective Force.
The Army's June 2002 Army transformation Roadmap defines transformation
as a continuous process--with specific waypoints--that increases our
contributions to the Joint Force while achieving the six Department of
Defense (DOD) critical operational goals. The result will be a more
strategically responsive and full spectrum dominant force capable of
prompt and sustained land combat operations as a member of the Joint
Force.
In support of the emerging joint operational concepts and
architectures, the Army--as the major landpower component--continues to
develop ground concepts for a full spectrum and multidimensional force.
These concepts are producing a Joint Force that presents potential
enemies with multiple dilemmas across the operational dimensions--
complicating their plans, dividing their focus, and increasing their
chances of miscalculation.
In future joint operations, Objective Force units will be capable
of directing major operations and decisive land campaigns with Army
headquarters. Objective Force headquarters at all levels will provide
the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with seamless, joint battle command and
decision superiority. The modularity and scalability of our Objective
Force formations will provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility
and adaptability to the combatant commander--providing the right force
at the right time for decisive outcomes.

PEOPLE--OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE

The Army vision begins and ends talking about people. People are
central to everything else we do in the Army. Platforms and
organizations do not defend this Nation; people do. Units do not train,
stay ready, grow and develop leadership--they do not sacrifice and take
risks on behalf of the Nation. People do. Institutions do not
transform; people do. People remain the engine behind all of our
magnificent moments as an Army, and the well-being of our people--the
human dimension of our transformation--is inextricably linked to Army
readiness.
In our vision, we recommitted ourselves to doing two things well
each and every day--training soldiers and civilians and growing them
into competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders who
succeed in situations of great uncertainty. We are dedicated to
preparing our soldiers to lead joint formations, to enabling our
headquarters to command and control joint forces, and to providing to
those joint formations the capabilities only the Army can bring to the
fight: the ability to control terrain and populations.
Manning the Force
The objective of our manning strategy is to ensure we have the
right people in the right places to fully capitalize on their
warfighting expertise--this is the Army's commitment to the Nation,
Army leaders, soldiers, and our families. Correctly manning our units
is vital to assuring that we fulfill our missions as a strategic
element of national policy; it enhances predictability for our people;
and it ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform their
assigned tasks. In fiscal year 2000, we implemented a strategy to man
our forces to 100 percent of authorized strength, starting with
divisional combat units. The program expanded in fiscal year 2001 and
fiscal year 2002 to include early deploying units. In fiscal year 2002,
we maintained our manning goals and continued to fill our divisions,
Armored Cavalry Regiments, and selected early deploying units to 100
percent in the aggregate, with a 93 to 95 percent skill and grade-band
match. We remain on target to accomplish our long-term goal of filling
all Army units to 100 percent of authorized strength.

RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE FORCE

In 1999, the Army missed its recruiting goals for the active
component (AC) by about 6,300 inductees, and for the Reserve component
by some 10,000. Our recruiting situation was simply unacceptable, and
we committed ourselves to decisive steps and reversed that trend.
In fiscal year 2002, the AC achieved 100 percent of its goal in
recruiting and retention for the third consecutive year. The Army
exceeded its AC 79,500 enlisted accession target in fiscal year 2002
and exceeded our aggregate fiscal year 2002 retention objective of
56,800 soldiers in all three categories by 1,437. We are poised to make
the fiscal year 2003 accession target of 73,800, and we expect to meet
our active component fiscal year 2003 retention target of 57,000. The
fiscal year 2004 accession target is set at 71,500.
The Army Reserve has met mission for the last 2 years, and its
recruiting force is well structured to meet fiscal year 2004
challenges. The Army Reserve continues to maintain a strong selected
Reserve strength posture at 205,484 as of January 17, 2003--over 100.2
percent of the fiscal year 2003 End Strength Objective. Overcoming many
recruiting and retention challenges in fiscal year 2002, the Army
National Guard (ARNG) exceeded end strength mission, accessions were
104.5 percent of goal, and we exceeded reenlistment objectives.
To ensure that we continue to recruit and retain sufficient
numbers, we are monitoring the current environment--the global war on
terrorism (GWOT) and frequent deployments--to determine impact on
morale, unit cohesiveness, combat effectiveness, and support of well-
being programs that draw quality people to the Army. We continue to
examine innovative recruiting and retention initiatives. The challenges
we face in fiscal year 2003 and 2004 are two-fold: increase recruiter
productivity and recruiting resources necessary to maintain recruiting
momentum when the economy becomes more robust. Resourcing recruiting
pays dividends well beyond accessions in the year of execution. For
example, Army advertising in fiscal year 2002 influenced not only
fiscal year 2002 accessions, but also potential recruits who will be
faced with enlistment decisions in fiscal year 2003 and beyond.

RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS)

Today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve
component (RC). The GWOT and homeland defense are significant
undertakings that demand a high level of resourcing. The RC has been
key to our success in these operations. To ensure the Army's RC
continues to meet ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units,
the Army plans to increase full-time support authorizations 2 percent
each year through fiscal year 2012, increasing the FTS from the current
level of 69,915 to a level of 83,046. The Army recognizes additional
full-time support authorizations as the number one priority of the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve leadership.

CIVILIAN COMPONENT

As a comprehensive effort to consolidate, streamline, and more
effectively manage the force, the Army has begun an initiative to
transform our civilian personnel system. High quality, well-trained
civilians are absolutely essential to the readiness of our force and
our ability to sustain operations today and in the future. Recruiting,
training, and retaining a highly-skilled, dedicated civilian workforce
is critical in meeting our obligations to the combatant commanders and
the Nation. Aggressive transformation of our civilian force--in which
projections through fiscal year 2005 indicate a 16-percent annual
turnover due to retirements and other losses--will ensure we continue
to meet those obligations.
As of fiscal year 2002, the Army employed 277,786 civilian
personnel. To forecast future civilian workforce needs with precision,
we developed the Civilian Forecasting System, a sophisticated
projection model that predicts future civilian personnel requirements
under various scenarios. The Army is working closely with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other Federal agencies to
demonstrate the power of this system so they can fully leverage its
capabilities, as well.
The Civilian Personnel Management System XXI (CPMS XXI) has
identified the reforms necessary to hire, train, and grow a civilian
component that supports the transforming Army. To achieve this, we have
redefined the way civilians are hired, retained, and managed. Mandatory
experiential assignments will become the vehicle by which we develop
future leaders. CPMS XXI fully responds to current mandates in the
President's Management Agenda and incorporates the results of the Army
Training and Leader Development Panels. For example, two initiatives
for recruiting well-trained civilians are:

The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development
System--a centrally managed program that accesses and trains
civilian interns and grows a resource pool of personnel who can
accede to senior professional positions.
The DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 and
fiscal year 2003 provided direct hire authority for critical,
hard-to-fill medical health care occupations and enabled the
reduction in average fill-time for these positions to 29 days.
Army Well-Being
The readiness of the Army is inextricably linked to the well-being
of our people, and Army well-being is the human dimension of our
transformation. Well-being responds to the physical, material, mental,
and spiritual needs of all Army people--soldiers, civilians, retirees,
veterans, and their families. We recognize the fundamental relationship
between well-being programs and institutional outcomes such as
readiness, retention, and recruiting. To support mission preparedness
as well as individual aspirations, well-being integrates policies,
programs, and human resource issues into a holistic, systematic
framework that provides a path to personal growth and success and gives
our people the opportunity to become self-reliant. We recruit soldiers,
but we retain families. Well-being programs help make the Army the
right place to raise a family. When our families are cared for,
soldiers can better focus on their mission--training, fighting, and
winning our Nation's wars, decisively.
Soldiers appreciate the Nation's devotion to them, and they are
grateful for the country's recognition of their service and sacrifices.
Recent improvements to the Montgomery GI Bill, Tricare for Life,
Tricare Reform, Retired Pay Reform, the 4.1 percent general pay
increase, and additional pay increases in 2003, are all important to
soldiers and their families. These initiatives have helped the Army
respond to the well-being needs of our people. Army voluntary education
programs improve our combat readiness by expanding soldier skills,
knowledge, and aptitudes to produce confident, competent leaders. Other
well-being initiatives include:

Spouse Employment Summit. The Army is developing
partnerships with the private sector to enhance employment
opportunities for Army spouses and provide improved job
portability for them.
Spouse Orientation and Leader Development (SOLD). SOLD
connects Army spouses and enhances their opportunity to serve
as valued leaders who contribute to the readiness and future of
the Army and our Nation.
Army University Access Online. eArmyU offers soldiers
access to a variety of on-line, post-secondary programs and
related educational services. www.eArmyU.com is a comprehensive
web-portal widely accessible to soldiers, including those in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kuwait.
In-State Tuition. To level the playing field for
access to education opportunities, the Army is working to
encourage States to grant in-State status for military
personnel and families at public colleges and universities in
their soldier's state of legal residence and state of
assignment.
High School Senior Stabilization. This policy enhances
predictability by allowing families to request stabilization at
their sponsor's current duty location if they have a child who
will graduate from high school during that year.
Secondary Education Transition Study (SETS) Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA). Facilitated by the Army, this agreement
among participating school superintendents is their commitment
to partner and improve high school transitions for DOD
children. Currently, over 110 school superintendents have
signed the SETS MOA.

Leader Development--Training Soldiers and Civilians, Our Growing
Leaders
The Army is a profession--the Profession of Arms. Conducting
decisive ground combat operations in defense of the United States and
its interests is a core competency of this profession. The development
of each member of the Army is the foundation of lifelong devotion to
duty--while in uniform and upon returning to the civilian sector.
By its nature, our profession is extraordinarily complex and
dangerous. The American people entrust the Army with the sacred
responsibility to apply lethal force in defense of U.S. interests. As
such, the Profession of Arms must remain firmly grounded in
constitutional values and must constantly change and grow to preserve
its competitive advantage in an evolving strategic environment. At all
levels, our leaders--military and civilian--must apply their
professional knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations
that are characteristic of today's strategic environment. Ultimately,
we must grow professional Army leaders who provide wise and discerning
military judgments founded on long experience and proven professional
expertise. This capacity is developed only through a lifetime of
education and dedicated service--in peace and in war.
Soldiers serve the Nation with the full realization that their duty
may require them to make the supreme sacrifice for others among their
ranks. Soldiers fighting the war on terrorism today, those who will
fight our future wars, and those who have fought in our past wars are
professional warfighters and a precious national asset. To ensure we
remain the greatest landpower in the world defending the greatest
country in the world, the Army and the Nation rely upon their unique
and hard-earned experiences and skills. To develop the operational
skills required to defend the Nation, training must remain our number
one priority.
The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our
responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks the Army performs
require us to review and periodically update the way we educate, train,
and grow professional warfighters. The Army's strategic
responsibilities to the Nation and combatant commanders now embrace a
wider range of missions. Those missions present our leaders with even
greater challenges than previously experienced. Therefore, leader
development is the lifeblood of the profession. It is the deliberate,
progressive, and continuous process that trains and grows soldiers and
civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, and decisive leaders
prepared for the challenges of the 21st century in combined arms,
joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
In June 2000, we convened the Army Training and Leader Development
Panel (ATLDP). The ATLDP's purpose is to identify skill sets required
of Objective Force soldier and civilian leaders. Further, ATLDP
assesses the ability of current training and leader development systems
and policies to enhance these required skills. In May 2001, the Army
Training and Leader Development Panel Phase I (Officer Study)
identified 7 strategic imperatives and generated 89 recommendations.
With those, we validated the requirement to transform our Officer
Education System (OES)--from the Officer Basic Course through the
Command and General Staff Officer Course. Additionally, the panel
reconfirmed the value of Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME
II) in preparing our leaders for joint assignments. The most
significant product of the officer ATLDP is our OES transformation.
ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study) identified three high-payoff
institutional training and education initiatives for lieutenants,
captains, and majors. The first of these is the Basic Officer Leader
Course (BOLC). BOLC will provide a tough, standardized, graduate-level,
small-unit leadership experience for newly commissioned officers. The
second of these initiatives is the Combined Arms Staff Course for staff
officers, and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course for company
commanders. Both courses will capitalize on advanced distributed
learning and intensive resident training methods. The third initiative,
Intermediate Level Education (ILE), will provide all majors with the
same common core of operational instruction, and it will provide
additional educational opportunities that are tailored to the officer's
specific career field, branch, or functional area. Beyond ILE, Army
officers continue to attend Joint or Senior Service Colleges to develop
leader skills and knowledge appropriate to the operational and
strategic levels of the profession.
Completed in May 2002, the ATLDP Phase II (noncommissioned officer
(NCO) Study) resulted in 78 findings and recommendations extending
across 6 imperatives--Army culture, NCO Education Systems (NCOES),
training, systems approach to training, training and leader development
model, and lifelong learning. Among others, the ATLDP Phase II
recommended building new training and leader development tools for NCOs
to replace current methods, as required. The ATLDP Phase III (Warrant
Officer Study) culminated with 63 recommendations extending across 4
crucial imperatives. Recommendations included clarifying the warrant
officer's unique role in the Army and improving the Warrant Officer
Education System to ensure timely training and promotion. The Civilian
Training and Leader Development Panel (Phase IV) study results are
complete, and we are forming the Implementation Process Action Team (I-
PAT). I-PAT will identify actions the Army must take to increase the
professional development of our civilian workforce. At the senior
leader level, the Army initiated the Army Strategic Leadership Course
(ASLC). The program is aimed at teaching principles of strategic
leadership, with emphasis on visioning, campaign planning, leading
change, and transformation. To date, we have completed 12 of the
foundation courses and 3 alumni courses, training the majority of the
Army's general officers.

READINESS--WINNING OUR NATION'S WARS

MISSILE DEFENSE

Robust Missile Defense is a vital warfighting requirement that
protects both our homeland and our deployed forces. Missile Defense
includes far more than a reactive capability to shoot down missiles in
their reentry phase. Missile Defense requires a coherent system of
sensors; battle command; weapons systems; and active, passive,
proactive, and reactive operational concepts, all aimed at destroying
enemy missiles--not only during their reentry phases. Missile Defense
must also be able to destroy enemy missiles on the ground, before they
launch or during their boost phase once launched. Missile Defense is
inherently a joint capability to which the Army is a major contributor.
The Army is deploying and employing Ground Mobile Defense assets to
contribute to this warfighting capability, accelerating the fielding of
the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC3) system, and developing
directed energy weapons that will bring new defense measures to the
Army and the Nation. We are postured to assume control of the Medium
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program in fiscal year 2003 and
intend to begin fielding by fiscal year 2012.
MEADS is a transformational program of Objective Force quality and
a significant improvement on Patriot's capabilities. It will be more
mobile and more deployable (C-130 capable) than Patriot and cover a
360-degree radius to Patriot's 120 degrees. It will be effective
against low radar, cross section cruise missile targets; and require
only 30 percent of Patriot's manpower. MEADS will be more accurate and
more sustainable than Patriot.

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

In Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145, Congress directed the DOD to
destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. In turn, the
Secretary of Defense delegated management of all chemical munitions
disposal to the Department of the Army. On November 29, 2000, the
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, using incineration-based
technology, completely destroyed the last stockpiles stored at the
Atoll, and closure operations began in January 2001. The Tooele
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has incinerated 44 percent of the
chemical agents and 81 percent of the munitions stored there. Disposal
operations at these two sites destroyed 30 percent of the total U.S.
chemical weapons stockpiles. Construction of incineration facilities at
Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is
complete. Systemization activities are ongoing at Aberdeen, Anniston,
Umatilla, and Pine Bluff. The plan to accelerate the disposal of bulk
agents using a neutralization process at Aberdeen, Maryland, and
Newport, Indiana, has been approved. Anniston and Aberdeen are
scheduled to start destruction in second quarter fiscal year 2003, and
Newport is scheduled to begin in first quarter fiscal year 2004.
To comply with treaty agreements and the congressional mandate, we
must complete the destruction of these weapons by 2007. The treaty
allows for a one time, 5-year extension to this deadline. With
continued funding and minimal schedule changes, we will safely destroy
the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions at eight
existing CONUS sites.
Training the Force
In October 2002, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training
the Force. Synchronized with other field manuals and publications being
updated to respond to changes in Army, joint, multinational, and
interagency operations, FM 7-0 is the capstone doctrinal manual for
Army training and leader development. It provides the developmental
methodology for training and growing competent, confident soldiers, and
it addresses both current and future Objective Force training
requirements.
We are transforming the way we fight future wars, and the Army is
participating fully in a DOD-sponsored program to transform how forces
train to fight. This effort involves four major initiatives: building
upon existing service interoperability training; linking component and
joint command staff planning and execution; enhancing existing joint
training exercises to address joint interoperability; and studying the
requirement for dedicated joint training environments for functional
warfighting and complex joint tasks. The Army is scheduled to host the
first joint National Training Center (NTC) event at Fort Irwin,
California, in May 2003. During June 2003, the U.S. Army Forces Command
will execute the second joint NTC event--JCS exercise Roving Sands.
During the late 1990s, funding for the recapitalization and
modernization of the Army's Combat Training Centers was reduced,
eroding their capability to support their critical missions.
Additionally, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment
and current force instrumentation systems have become difficult to
maintain. The Army's Combat Training Center modernization program will
ensure that our premier training areas (NTC at Fort Irwin, Combat
Maneuver Training Center in Germany, the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack Center of Excellence
near Gila Bend, Arizona) are modernized to provide high quality,
realistic, full-spectrum joint training. To address these problems, the
Army will invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize
these training centers.

OPTEMPO

In accordance with congressional directives, the Army developed a
new methodology to prepare budget requests that accurately reflect
operations and maintenance requirements. In the report submitted in
July 2002, the Army outlined updated processes that ensure consistency
in reporting of tank miles and reflect requirements and execution with
more precision. Management controls initiated in fiscal year 2001 to
prevent migration of tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) funds to other areas
were highly successful and remain in effect.
The Army's combined arms training strategy determines the
resourcing requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our forces.
For the AC, the Army requires 800 ground OPTEMPO miles per year for the
M1 Abrams tank and corresponding training support; the AC flying hour
program requires an average of 14.5 live flying hours per aircrew each
month. Both Army National Guard and the Army Reserve aircrew training
strategies require 9.0 hours per crew each month. The ARNG ground
OPTEMPO requirement is a composite average of 174 miles in fiscal year
2004, and the Army Reserve (USAR) ground OPTEMPO requirement is 200
tank-equivalent miles in fiscal year 2004.
While this describes the Army's training strategy, actual execution
levels from unit to unit have varied depending upon factors such as
ongoing operations, safety of flight messages, and adequate manning of
combat formations. To this end, the Army has fully funded its AC ground
OPTEMPO requirement, while its AC flying program is funded to its
historical execution level of 13.1 flying hours. The RC air and ground
OPTEMPO are similarly funded to their execution levels, rather than
their requirement. Although the Army has not always been able to
execute the training strategy, we have taken steps to have all units
execute the prescribed training strategy in fiscal year 2003, fiscal
year 2004, and beyond.
Force Protection and Antiterrorism
Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel and includes
family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. In the
war on terrorism, the area of operations extends from Afghanistan to
the east coast and across the United States. Naturally, force
protection and antiterrorism measures have increased across Army
installations in the Continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.
Findings from the Cole Commission, the Downing Report on the Khobar
Towers bombing, and Army directives to restrict access to installations
have all led to thorough assessments by the Department of the Army
Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and
commanders. Our efforts focus on improved force protection policy and
doctrine; more rigorous training and exercises; improved threat
reporting and coordination with national intelligence and law
enforcement agencies; enhanced detection and deterrence capabilities
for CBRNE threats; increased capabilities and protection for access
control; and expanded assessments of Major Commands (MACOM) and
installation force protection programs. Both operational and
installation environments rely upon secure, networked information
infrastructure to execute daily enterprise-wide processes and
decisionmaking, so the parameters of force protection include
contemporary and evolving cyber threats, as well.
The Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) secures the
Army's portion of the Global Information Grid, secures the digitized
force, and supports information superiority and network security
defense-in-depth initiatives. ISSP provides the capability to detect
system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare
attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. To the greatest extent
possible, it protects warfighters' secure communications--from the
sustaining base to the foxhole.
Soldiers, active and Reserve, are heavily engaged in force
protection and antiterrorism missions. Soldiers guard military
installations, nuclear power plants, dams and power generation
facilities, tunnels, bridges, rail stations, and emergency operations
centers. During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah,
nearly 1,500 ARNG soldiers provided security, and soldiers guarded key
infrastructure sites during Super Bowl XXXVII in January 2003. Over
12,500 RC soldiers are currently mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle to
fulfill force protection requirements, and in February 2003, over 8,000
Army National Guard soldiers will support Air Force security
requirements--a requirement that could reach 9,500 soldiers. Security
of detention facilities and detainees at Guantanamo Bay Detention--a
long-term detainee mission--requires approximately 1,500 Army
personnel, 50 percent of whom are military police. Army Reserve
Internment and Resettlement battalions on 6-month rotations impact
military police availability to CONUS force protection requirements.
Sustainment
The Army is revolutionizing its logistics process. One initiative,
the Single Stock Fund (SSF), redirected more than $540 million worth of
secondary items from stocks to satisfy customer demands between May
2000--SSF inception--and November 2002. During that same period, we
redistributed more than $218 million worth of secondary items from the
authorized stockage levels to meet higher priority readiness
requirements. By extending--national visibility of stockage locations--
and capitalizing inventories into the Army Working Capital Fund--we
reduced customer wait time by an average of 18.5 percent. The SSF will
continue to reduce inventory requirements and generate even more
savings for the Army by creating greater flexibility for the management
of inventories.
Another initiative, the National Maintenance Program (NMP),
enhances weapon system readiness, reliability, and availability rates
by bringing Army Class IX repair parts to a single national standard.
Ultimately, increased reliability will reduce overall weapon system
operating and support cost. Additionally, the NMP centralizes the
management and control of Army maintenance activities for components
and end items. NMP will produce appropriately sized Army maintenance
capacity that still meets total maintenance requirements.
Strategic Readiness Reporting
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive
readiness reporting system that objectively measures readiness to
support the NSS. The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS) responds
to and provides a baseline in achieving this critical initiative.
SRS is a precision readiness measurement tool that provides Army
leadership with accurate, objective, predictive, and actionable
readiness information to dramatically enhance resource management
toward one end--strategic readiness to defend the United States. The
Army Scorecard--a product of SRS--will integrate readiness data from
the business arena and the operating, generating, and sustaining forces
of both the active and Reserve component. Army Scorecard methodology
focuses on four critical areas: People--investing in soldiers and their
families; Readiness--maintaining the support capability to the
combatant commanders' operational requirements; Transformation--
transforming the Army into the Objective Force; and application of
sound business practices.
SRS markedly improves how we measure readiness. It gathers timely
information with precision and expands the scope of the data
considered. We are further developing this system to leverage leading
indicators and predict trends--solving problems that affect readiness
before they become problems, from well-being to weapons platforms. SRS
will help enable the Army preserve readiness to support combatant
commanders, invest in soldiers and their families, identify and adopt
sound business practices, and transform the Army to the Objective
Force.
Installations
Army installations are our Nation's power projection platforms, and
they provide critical training support to the Army and other members of
the joint team. Additionally, soldiers, families, and civilians live
and work on Army installations. The quality of our infrastructure
directly affects the readiness of the Army and the well-being of our
soldiers, families, and civilians.
The Army has traditionally accepted substantial risk in
infrastructure to maintain its current warfighting readiness. However,
a decade of chronic under funding has led to a condition in which over
50 percent of our facilities and infrastructure are in such poor
condition that commanders rated them as ``adversely affecting mission
requirements.'' Our facilities maintenance must improve. Over the past
2 years, with the help of the administration and Congress, the Army has
begun to rectify this situation with significant increases in funding
and innovative business practices. These efforts have been dramatically
successful as we continue to correct a problem that was 10 years in the
making. Thus, in an effort to prevent future degradation of our
facilities, the Army has increased its funding for facilities
sustainment to 93 percent of requirement beginning in fiscal year 2004.

TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM)

Recognizing the requirement to enhance support to commanders, the
Secretary of the Army directed the reorganization of the Army's
management structure. On October 1, 2002, the Army placed the
management of Army installations under the Installation Management
Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). Its mission is to
provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army
installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of
soldiers, civilians, and family members; improve infrastructure; and
preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the
migration of base operations funds to other operational accounts below
the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional
installations to support evolving force structure and Army
transformation needs. The Army is poised to capitalize on opportunities
TIM gives us to provide excellence in installations.
Two programs that significantly increase the well-being of our
soldiers and their families are the Barracks and the Family Housing
programs. The Army established the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) in
the late 1990s to improve single soldiers' housing conditions. Through
2002, we have upgraded or funded-for-upgrade 70 percent of our
permanent party barracks to soldier suites that consist of two single
bedrooms with a shared bath and common area. The Army will continue the
BUP until all permanent party barracks achieve this standard.
With the strong support of Congress, the Army established the
Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) for our families. This program
capitalizes on commercial expertise and private capital to perform a
non-core function for the Army--family housing management. The program
provides greater value to the Army by eliminating the housing deficit
at our first 11 sites, while leveraging a $209 million Army investment
into $4.1 billion of initial private development. The Army's
privatization program began with 4 pilot projects and will expand to 18
active projects by the end of fiscal year 2003. Pending OSD and
congressional approval, 28 projects are planned through 2006 that will
impact over 72,000 housing units or 80 percent of Army Family Housing
in the United States. By the end of 2007, we will have the programs and
projects in place to meet the OSD goal of eliminating inadequate family
housing. We will accomplish this goal through RCI and increased Army
investment in family housing Military Construction (MILCON) at non-
privatized installations. The RC enhances RCI through real property
exchange authority that is only available to the RC. This legislative
authority allows the exchange of RC owned property with public or
private entities and has a tremendous potential to improve future
Reserve component infrastructure at no governmental cost.
The Army has also aggressively reduced its financial burden and
physical footprint by disposing of 34 percent of its facilities from a
1990 high of 116 billion square feet. The Army anticipates that the
congressional fiscal year 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
authority will permit additional appropriate reductions. BRAC will
enable the Army to dispose of excess infrastructure and realign the
remaining facilities with the requirements of the transforming Army and
the Objective Force. BRAC will also allow the Army to re-allocate
resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority
requirements.
The Army continues to improve its utilities infrastructure by
divesting itself of non-core utility systems' operation and maintenance
through privatization. As of December 2002, we had privatized 64 of the
351 systems in the program, and we have an additional 104 presently
under negotiation.
As part of our Army Knowledge Management (AKM)--described later in
more detail--we are modernizing our Installation Information
Infrastructure--info-structure--to support a network centric,
knowledge-based Army. The Installation Information Infrastructure
Modernization Program (I3MP) executes a multi-year, $3.2 billion
program for upgrades to optical fiber and copper cable, installation of
advanced digital equipment, and upgrades to Defense Global Information
Grid gateways. This program will ensure worldwide, high-speed data
connectivity at Army installations. To date, we have completed 22 of 95
CONUS installations and initiated upgrades at four installations
outside of the CONUS. We plan to complete I3MP in 2009.

TRANSFORMATION--CHANGING THE WAY WE FIGHT

The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and creating a
force more responsive to the strategic requirements of the Nation. We
are building a joint precision maneuver capability that can enter a
theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at will to gain
positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if necessary,
close with and destroy the enemy.
The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a
single, networked, integrated C\4\ISR architecture that will link us to
joint, interagency, and multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly
deployable, mounted formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint
force and capable of delivering decisive victory across the spectrum of
military operations. Consolidated, streamlined branches and military
operational specialties comprised of professional warfighters will be
poised to transition rapidly from disaster relief to high-end
warfighting operations.
The Objective Force and its Future Combat System of Systems will
leverage and deliver with precision the combat power of joint and
strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based force that rapidly
responds to the requirements of the strategic environment in which our
soldiers will be the most strategically relevant and decisively capable
landpower--no matter the mission, no matter the threats, no matter the
risks.
In the final analysis, the Army's combat power does not wear tracks
or wheels--it wears boots. No platform or weapon system can match a
soldier's situational curiosity and awareness. It is the soldiers'
ability to discern and to think, their ingenuity and resourcefulness,
their endurance and perseverance, and their plain grit that make them
the most reliable precision weapon in our inventory. Soldiers remain
the centerpiece of our formations.
To help guide our transformation efforts, the Army leverages
lessons-learned from extensive experimentation and wargaming. We are
working to harness the power of knowledge, the benefits of science and
technology, and innovative business solutions to transform both the
Operational and Institutional Army into the Objective Force. The Army's
annual Title 10 Wargames provide critical insights for developing the
Objective Force. Likewise, results from joint experiments--Millennium
Challenge 2002 and other service Title 10 Wargames like Global
Engagement, Navy Global, and Expeditionary Warrior, to name a few--also
inform these efforts.
The Army is fully committed to joint experimentation as a means to
examine and assess Objective Force contributions to the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of joint warfare. The Army has
established a joint/Army Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)
Task Force to ensure that Army CD&E efforts are synchronized with joint
CD&E. This task force makes certain that joint experiment lessons-
learned inform the design and development of the Objective Force. This
year, the Army's Title 10 Wargame--co-hosted by Commander, Joint Forces
Command--will focus on the Joint Force that will fight the next battle.
Linked to Joint Forces Command's Pinnacle Impact 03 experiment, it will
be conducted within the context of a future 1-4-2-1 global scenario and
the emerging Joint Operations Concept. The Army is committed to these
efforts, and in this budget we have nearly doubled last year's funding
of these exercises.
Joint, interagency, multinational, and Army warfighting experiments
provide invaluable opportunities for the Army to experiment with
innovative approaches to warfighting and to test new tactics,
techniques, procedures, organizations, processes, and technology. In
Millennium Challenge 2002, the largest joint experiment in U.S.
history, the Army demonstrated four vital capabilities it brings to the
joint fight:

the ability to attain and maintain information
superiority (knowledge);
the ability to conduct decisive maneuver to enable
dominant joint maneuver;
the ability to defeat the opposition in an anti-access
environment through rapid entry and employment capabilities;
and
the ability to support and sustain rapid combat power
efficiently by reducing the operational and tactical logistics
footprint.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT) concepts for battalion and company operations in a Joint Force,
the Army employed a SBCT unit during Millennium Challenge. Less than 4
weeks after Stryker vehicles were delivered to the first unit at Fort
Lewis, the unit demonstrated rapid air and sealift deployability and--
integrated into the exercise well. Additionally, when given a mission
on short notice to support a Marine Corps unit in ground operations,
the SBCT unit demonstrated its agility and versatility.
Balancing Risk As We Manage Change
Balancing risk is integral to Army transformation. To maintain
current readiness while we transform, we are managing operational risk:
risk in current readiness for near-term conflicts with future risk--the
ability to develop new capabilities and operational concepts that will
dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. The Army has
accepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization, and we
continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the
well-being of our people, transformation, the war on terrorism, and new
operational commitments. Since 1999, the Army has terminated 29
programs and restructured 20 others for a total savings of $12.8
billion. These funds were reallocated to resource the Stryker Brigades
and essential Objective Force research and development.
In Program Budget 2004 and its associated Five-Year Defense Plan
(FYDP), the Army has generated an additional $22 billion of savings by
terminating 24 additional systems and reducing or restructuring 24
other systems. To accelerate achieving the Objective Force capabilities
and mitigating operational risk, the Army reinvested these savings in
the development of transformational capabilities in these and other
programs:

Future Combat System--$13.5 billion
Precision Munitions--$3.2 billion
Sensors and Communications--$2.3 billion
Science and Technology--$1.1 billion
Missile and Air Defense--$1.1 billion

The operational risk associated with the decreased funding for
certain current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker
Brigades on schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force
for arrival this decade. We will continue to reassess the risk
associated with system reductions and related organizational changes
against operational requirements and the strategic environment.
An Information Enabled Army
Achieving the full spectrum dominance of the Objective Force
requires changing the way we fight. Changing the way we fight requires
a holistic transformation of Logistics, Personnel, Installation
Management, Acquisition, Aviation, business practices--every aspect of
the Army must transform. The Objective Force requires innovative
changes and out-of-the-box ingenuity in the way we take care of our
people and manage the information and material that enhances their
readiness and answers their needs--both personal and professional, at
home and in the short sword warfight at foxhole level. Simply put, we
cannot achieve the Objective Force capabilities without leveraging the
full potential of the technological advances that our Nation's
industrial base and science and technology communities are developing.
The Army has consolidated management of Information Technologies (IT)
into a single effort--Army Knowledge Management (AKM). AKM capitalizes
on IT resources unique to our Nation and harnesses them for
transformation, for the Army, and for the combatant commanders.
Information management is critical to achieving the Army vision,
and AKM supports transformation through the development and
implementation of a network-centric, knowledge-based Army architecture
interoperable with the joint system. AKM will accelerate the detect-
decide-deliver planning processes and enable warfighters to see the
adversary first--before our forces are detected; understand the Common
Relevant Operating Picture first; act against adversaries first; and
finish the warfight with decisive victories--see first, understand
first, act first, finish decisively. AKM will provide knowledge at the
point of decision for all leaders--from the factory to the foxhole.
Enabling collaborative mission planning and execution among widely
dispersed locations around the globe, AKM will provide a rapid and
seamless flow and exchange of actionable information and knowledge. The
network-centric operations that AKM enables will decrease our logistic
footprint and enhance sustainability of the Objective Force through
multi-nodal distribution networks--reaching forward to the theater and
back to installations. Advanced information technologies will
dramatically enhance Battle Command. Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer (C\4\) decision tools seamlessly linked to Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets produce a radically
improved Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP) and enable battle
command.
AKM will dramatically enhance the warfighter's ability to
distribute, process, fuse, and correlate unprecedented amounts of
actionable data into information--securely, reliably, and quickly
enough to enable leaders to synchronize and mass effects for decisive
results. Network-centric operations enable information awareness,
information access, and information delivery.
The Army Knowledge Enterprise (AKE) construct describes the Army's
process to enable improved strategic and tactical information
distribution and collaboration. In short, AKE leverages the ingenuity
and resourcefulness of our people in shaping the environment to achieve
dominance and helps leaders achieve decision superiority and mission
efficiencies.
Integration and refinement of existing Army networks is the first
step in achieving a network-centric, information-enabled force that
creates efficiencies and provides secure, reliable, actionable
information communications. To this end, the Army activated the Network
Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM is the Army's single
authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend the Army's
information infrastructure. NETCOM has assumed technical control of all
Army networks--active, Guard, and Reserve. This new policy allows
NETCOM to evaluate any system, application, or piece of equipment that
touches the Army Networks. NETCOM will improve the capacity,
performance, and security of our networks at every level.
Among others, one tangible product of NETCOM is the consolidation
and removal of redundant servers across the Army. This example of
better business practice will harvest significant savings in
resources--both dollars and managers--while increasing the
effectiveness of the network. Since the first quarter fiscal year 2002,
we have reduced the number of servers Army-wide by 16 percent--311 in
the National Capitol Region alone.
Army Knowledge Online (AKO) begins to allow the Army to
decentralize the management of information. AKO is the Army's secure,
web-based, internet service that leverages the Army's intellectual
capital to better organize, train, equip, and maintain our force. It
gives our people a means to collaborate, to improve their situational
awareness, and to access their personnel data. Already, hard-copy
processes that formerly took days and weeks can now be accomplished
almost instantly--from pay to personnel actions to assignments, to name
a few. AKO is just an early glimpse of the potential capabilities of a
network-centric, knowledge-based organization that harnesses the
potential of the global infostructure.

OPERATIONAL ARMY--THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The Army is actively engaged in global operations supporting
combatant commanders today, but it is our obligation to prepare for the
future, as well. The Objective Force is the Army's future full-spectrum
force that will be organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more
strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
survivable, and sustainable than we are today--across the full spectrum
of military operations as an integral member of a cohesive joint team.
The Nation will continue to face adaptive, asymmetric threats that
capitalize on the power of information. To dominate and maintain
superiority over these emerging challenges, the Army is changing the
way we fight--a paradigm shift more significant than the 20th century's
introduction of the tank and the helicopter. The Army is changing from
sequential and linear operations to distributed and simultaneous
operations. The Objective Force--characterized by networks of people
enabled with systems that provide actionable information and decision
superiority--will dissuade, deter, or decisively defeat our adversaries
anytime, anyplace, and anywhere.
The Objective Force will consist of command structures scaled to
meet Joint Force Commander requirements and modular combined-arms units
tailored according to each situation. Objective Force integrated,
mobile, air-ground teams will conduct mounted and dismounted operations
and employ both manned and unmanned platforms to achieve decisive
victories. Capable of forcible entry and operations in austere
environments to address the spectrum of military operations--from
humanitarian assistance to warfighting--the Objective Force will
conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations and master
transitions between phases of operations. It will be an offensively
oriented, multi-dimensional force enabled by advanced information
technologies that give soldiers real-time intelligence and actionable
information.
The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat capable--
deployment will be synonymous with employment. The Objective Force will
be strategically responsive and rapidly deployable on the U.S. Air
Force family of inter-theater and intra-theater aircraft. An Objective
Force Unit of Action (UA) will deploy on approximately one-third the
number of aircraft required to deploy a heavy brigade combat team
today. It will be operationally deployable and capable of operational
maneuver over strategic distances by air, land, or sea. Soldiers will
overcome anti-access and area denial strategies and environments
through precision maneuver and decision superiority.
Equipped with new systems designed to meet the needs of the Army's
future fighting formations, the Objective Force will be a networked
system of systems. This system of systems includes soldiers equipped
with the Land Warrior system; a family of 18 integrated, synchronized,
manned, and unmanned Future Combat Systems (FCS); and critical
complementary systems such as the Comanche and the Future Tactical
Truck System. The components of the FCS are being synchronously
developed and fielded as a complete family to achieve the warfighting
capabilities the Nation requires to defeat adaptive, asymmetric
conventional and unconventional adversaries.
Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army's formation--not
equipment. Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant
knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will
seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities
of Joint Forces, Special Operations Forces, other Federal agencies, and
multinational forces. The Objective Force soldiers will enable the
United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis,
rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary. Employing
FCS capabilities in formations called Units of Action (UA) and Units of
Employment (UE), Objective Force soldiers will provide campaign quality
staying power--that means precision fire and maneuver to control
terrain, people, and resources, without having to resort to
indiscriminate collateral damage. The Land Warrior system will
integrate individual soldiers in the network while providing them
increased protection and lethality. FCS will give soldiers the
capability to destroy any adversary in any weather and environment with
smaller calibers, greater precision, more devastating target effects,
and at longer-ranges than available today.
Joint C\4\ISR--a network-centric information architecture nested
within the Global Information Grid--will connect the Objective Force's
system of systems. Capitalizing on the synergistic power of the
information network enterprise, every Objective Force soldier and
platform will be capable of sensing and engaging the enemy while
maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces. Advanced
information technologies and C\4\ISR decision tools and assets will
enhance the Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). The Objective
Force will identify, locate, and engage critical targets with lethal or
non-lethal affects and assess battle damage on those targets. The joint
C\4\ISR linkages will enable the attack of targets with whatever joint
or Army assets are available for immediate employment, whether the
force is in contact or out of contact. Similarly, enhanced situational
awareness will facilitate multi-layered active and passive defense
measures--including both offensive and defensive counter air against
air and non-air breathing, manned, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The CROP and network-centric operations will enhance sustainability
of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks that
reach forward to the area of operations or reach back to the Home
Station Operations Center. Increased reliability through equipment
design and commonality among the FCS family of systems will enhance
sustainability while reducing logistics demands. Advanced technologies
will enable robust Objective Force operations while shrinking the
logistics footprint and lift requirements of deployed forces.
The FCS is a transformational approach to meeting this Nation's
requirements for the Objective Force. We designed and will field the
FCS family in a carefully balanced manner to avoid optimizing a
component at the expense of sub-optimizing the overarching capabilities
of Objective and Joint Forces. The acquisition and requirements
development processes are being updated to accommodate the Department
of Defense's (DOD) direction to field a networked system of systems
rapidly through spiral development and an open architecture that allows
maturing technological insertions as they occur.
The Army embraces the ongoing DOD and Joint Staff Capabilities and
Acquisition processes reform efforts to achieve revolutionary
capabilities in the fielding of a new generation of equipment. This
collaborative DOD and JCS effort enables the Army to design new
information-age capable organizations holistically, use evolutionary
acquisition strategies to equip those organizations, and see the
Objective Force fielded before the end of this decade.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY--MOVING TOWARD THE TRANSFORMED ARMY

Preempting our adversaries' technological surprises over the past 3
years, Army science and technology (S&T) investments are already
providing America's Army with sustained overmatch in all materiel
systems. The Army has increased and focused its S&T investments. We are
demonstrating the enabling joint interoperable technologies essential
for Objective Force capabilities and accelerating their arrival. Our
S&T program is pursuing a wide spectrum of technologies for unmanned
air and ground systems that will expand the range of joint warfighting
capabilities, reduce risk to soldiers, and reduce the logistics
footprint of the force. Realizing the full potential of unmanned
systems requires technological development in sensors that improve
navigation and mission performance, in intelligent systems for semi-
autonomous or autonomous operation, in networked communications for
manned-unmanned teaming, and in human-robotic interfaces, among many
others.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army
partnership contracted for a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to
accelerate the transition of FCS to the System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) Phase, with a Milestone B decision in May 2003. The
Army is on track to achieve first unit equipped in 2008 and an initial
operating capability of one Objective Force Unit of Action (UA) in
2010. To accelerate development and in partnership DARPA, the focus on
key transformation technologies for the FCS has been narrowed to the
systems with the most promise. Our highest priority S&T efforts remain
technological advances for FCS.
The Army will field FCS as a family of systems built on information
age technologies embedded in manned and unmanned air and ground
platforms. Integral to joint fires, the family of systems will
integrate long-range air- and ground-based sensors with long-range
cannon and missile precision munitions. The family of systems will also
provide increased joint capabilities to conduct battle command,
reconnaissance, mounted combat operations, dismounted combat
operations, medical treatment and evacuation, and maintenance and
recovery. To provide decisive lethality, FCS will employ networked,
precision, and loitering attack munitions fired from modular, easily
transportable containers. Finally, FCS will leverage embedded, real-
time interactive, virtual, distributed, collaborative, joint
simulations for training and mission rehearsal.

ENABLING THE OBJECTIVE FORCE SOLDIER

Eighteen systems, both manned and unmanned, the Objective Force
soldier, and C\4\ISR, together, comprise the FCS. Manned and unmanned
reconnaissance capabilities are part of the FCS family of systems'
interdependent networked air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver
support, and sustainment systems.
There are 10 Unmanned Systems: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)--the
Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE), the Armed Robotic
Vehicle (ARV), and the Small (manpackable) Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(MUGV); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); and Unattended Munitions--the
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) and Intelligent Munitions
Systems (IMS).
There are eight manned systems: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV);
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V); Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Vehicle (RSV); Line-of-Sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mounted Combat
System (LOS/BLOS MCS); NLOS-Mortar; Medical Vehicle (MV); the FCS
Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV); and the Non-Line-of-Sight
(NLOS) Cannon.
Decisive warfighting is about fires and maneuver: fires enable
maneuver, and maneuver enables fires. Joint and organic close,
supporting, indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy's
capabilities, protect our forces, and enable ground units to maneuver.
The ICV, the Unattended Munitions NLOS-LS, IMS, C2V, MCS, NLOS-Mortar,
and NLOS Cannon are important elements of the FCS that will enable the
Objective Force to conduct distributed and simultaneous joint combat
operations. With joint fires, the NLOS cannon is critical to support
and protect our land forces in hostile environments. NLOS-LS NetFires
is a platform-independent family of missiles with precision attack and
loitering capability. Both Precision Guided Mortar Munitions and
Excalibur precision cannon munitions will enhance organic maneuver
fires. A new, joint fire support, battle command, and fire support
architecture will allow rapid engagement of targets by any Army or
joint asset.
For over 227 years, soldiers have remained the centerpiece of our
formations. The Land Warrior program--another key S&T initiative--
responds to this legacy and enhances our soldiers combat power
generation capability. The Land Warrior program will develop a
lightweight, low observable, enhanced-armor protection, fighting
ensemble for the individual Objective Force soldier. Through networked
connectivity to the FCS-equipped, maneuver Unit of Action, Land Warrior
soldiers will enable revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability,
and sustainability for the individual warfighter while reducing
logistics demands.
Future Combat Systems are networked in the joint C\4\ISR
architecture--including networked communications, networked options,
sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These networked systems
will dramatically enhance situational awareness and understanding and
operational level synchronization well beyond today's standards.
Improved C\4\ISR capabilities will enable network-centric Objective
Force operations. The results of the investments will allow leaders to
capitalize on sensor and processing technology to see, understand, and
shape the battlespace before the enemy can react--increasing combat
force effectiveness and survivability. The S&T program will develop and
demonstrate real-time, continuous situational understanding by
integrating data from manned and unmanned air- and ground-based
sensors.
S&T investments in military logistics are an important enabler for
the Objective Force. We are placing our emphasis on sustainment's big
drivers--fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and water--to dramatically
reduce our logistics footprint and lift requirements in these areas.
Key technologies include on-board water generation, real-time logistics
command and control processes and distribution management, enhanced
multi-purpose munitions and packaging, efficient propulsion and power
technologies, real-time diagnostics and prognostics, and Micro-Electro
Mechanical Systems (MEMS).

TRANSFORMATIONAL SYSTEMS

Several transformational systems were under development prior to
announcement of the Army vision in October 1999. The Army has completed
an extensive analysis to identify those systems that complement FCS and
the Objective Force system of systems.
The Comanche Helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation
Modernization Plan (AMP) and represents the first new system to reach
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within the Army's Objective Force.
Comanche is our armed reconnaissance platform with attack capabilities.
It will leverage the situational awareness and situational curiosity of
a scout augmented with revolutionary, state-of-the-art ISR
technologies. Comanche supports vertical and horizontal maneuver as an
integral part of network-centric operations and extends human eyes and
decisionmaking beyond the ground maneuver force. Utilizing stealth
technologies, it will network with all joint C\4\ISR and joint weapons
systems. Comanche will leverage maximum effect of future standoff
precision weapon systems such as the Common Missile and allow us to
maneuver ground formations based upon full knowledge of the situation.
Augmented with armed or unarmed UAVs, Comanche will fill ground
maneuver's most critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial
reconnaissance--with a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft.
The Comanche program is already well on its way to giving the Army a
capability pivotal to transforming the way we will fight.
Several other transformational systems will empower the Objective
Force with the knowledge dominance and battle command to provide
decision superiority across the spectrum of operations. The Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) System, Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and the
Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) will enable Objective
Force joint C\4\ISR capabilities. These programs will provide the
tactical enterprise level networks that will ensure seamless, secure,
digital connectivity between the Objective, Interim, and today's
forces. The Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A)
architecture provides Army network-centric ISR connectivity from
national agencies to joint systems to Objective Force Units of Action
as part of the integrated Department of Defense DCGS architecture.
DCGS-A will enable interoperable tasking, processing, and exploitation
capabilities. The Aerial Common Sensor brings improved signal
intelligence collection and precision geolocation capabilities, as well
as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signals (MASINT)
sensor packages. Another system, Prophet, uses communications
intelligence to depict the battlespace and further enhance situational
awareness. These C\4\ISR systems greatly enhance the Objective Force's
ability to gain actionable information superiority and decision
dominance over all adversaries and expand the range of options for the
Joint Force combatant commanders.
Transformational systems will provide the Objective Force with
strategic and tactical maneuver capabilities. The Theater Support
Vessel will support rapid intra-theater lift requirements, provide the
capability to conduct operational maneuver and repositioning, and
enable units to conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal. The
Future Tactical Truck System will have commonality with FCS and will
support the Objective Force by enabling command, control, and
transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel. The Tactical
Electric Power (TEP) generators will provide power to Objective Force
units where fixed power grids are not available.
Transformational systems provide the Objective Force with other
important capabilities, as well. CBRNE effects systems support the
Objective Force across the spectrum of military operations and improve
capabilities to conduct homeland security activities. Engineer, civil
affairs, and psychological operations vehicles will enable mobility and
enhance civil affairs and PSYOPs capabilities. The Up-Armored High
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) will improve Objective
Force soldier survivability and lethality. The Multi-Mission Radar will
provide the capability to detect and track aircraft, artillery, and
other projectiles, then queue appropriate weapons systems and airspace
synchronization systems. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) is a lighter weight, more deployable multiple rocket launcher
capability that will integrate into the joint fires network.
Bridging the Capabilities Gap--Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
Announcing our intent to field an Interim Force in October 1999,
the Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal,
survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable
light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility
that we seek. Just 2\1/2\ years later in 2002, the Army began fielding
the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to bridge that gap. In 2003--less
than 4 years after the announcement--we are on track to achieve IOC
with the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. Stryker Brigades will
provide the combatant commander vastly increased operational and
tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non-contiguous
operations.
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams respond to combatant commander
requirements across the spectrum of military operations. Optimized for
combat in complex and urban terrain, the Stryker Brigades will be
decisive in other major combat operations, as well. The SBCT
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron
provides both organic human intelligence capabilities and UAVs embedded
at the brigade level. Its military intelligence and signal companies--
working through a digitally enabled battle command bridge--leverage
theater and national assets to create an information-enabled force.
SBCTs will use this enhanced joint C\4\ISR capability to revolutionize
combat paradigms from ``make contact, develop the situation, maneuver
the forces'' to ``understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make
contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish
decisively.''
Moreover, leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics
practices and enablers, and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT
is vastly more deployable and sustainable than our heavy forces, while
significantly increasing combat power generating capabilities.
Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer
CSS personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. While capitalizing on
these advantages, developing and available technologies allow us to
mass effects--rather than massing formations--and create a robust,
reliable capability to conduct operational maneuver over strategic
distances.
Finally, SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading
transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned
officers--tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major--in the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the
Objective Force.
The Army has resourced six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to
contribute to fulfilling the 1-4-2-1 defense construct and national
security requirements; however, at this time, the Secretary of Defense
has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The
Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker
Brigades 5 and 6.
Fielding of the SBCTs affects the entire Army: active and Reserve
components; heavy and light forces; CONUS and OCONUS. Current fielding
timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to fight and win the GWOT
and conduct major combat operations. The transformation of four active
component brigades to SBCTs provides a rotational base with three of
the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two SBCTs fielded
at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007. The
Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps'
critical need for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a
Reserve component brigade to an SBCT will enhance our strategic Reserve
and support the GWOT, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense
missions. Additionally, SBCT stationing provides rapid, strategic
responsiveness through power projection platforms capable of supporting
four critical regions described in the 1-4-2-1 defense construct. The
first SBCT will attain Initial Operational Capability in the summer of
2003.
Preserving the Army's Legacy
Today's force guarantees the Army's near-term warfighting readiness
to fight and win our Nation's wars, decisively. Because the Army
bypassed a procurement generation, the Army's Combat Support and Combat
Service Support systems now exceed their 20-year expected life cycle,
and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their expected
half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving
resources for transformation, the Army is recapitalizing and
selectively modernizing a portion of the current force. The
modernization program addresses the critical issue of AC and RC
interoperability and serves as a bridge to mesh these two components
seamlessly. In general, the Army increased funding for programs that
are clearly transformational and support the Defense transformation
goals, sustained funding for high priority systems that will transition
to the Objective Force, and reduced funding for systems not essential
to Army transformation. The Army remains committed to its 17-system
recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized
recapitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two
divisions.
Army Special Operations Forces are an indispensable part of the
Army and will continue to provide unique capabilities to the Joint
Force and Land Component Commanders. In response to the increasing
requirement for Special Operations Forces in support of joint campaign
plans, the Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF
structure. The recent initiatives will transfer 1,788 manpower spaces
to Major Force Program-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003. Since the
commencement of Army Special Operations Forces operations in support of
the GWOT, the U.S. Army has provided over $1.4 billion in new equipment
to enhance Special Operations Forces firepower, communications, and
ground and air mobility.
The Army will remain the largest user of space-based capabilities
among the Services. Army space assets are providing tangible support to
the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom--they ensure Army
and Joint Force Commanders optimize communications, satellite
intelligence, global positioning system, imagery, weather, missile
warning, and other space-based capabilities in every aspect of planning
and operations. We are working diligently with the joint and
interagency space community to ensure that Army and joint space systems
continue to provide their essential capabilities now and for the
Objective Force.

AVIATION TRANSFORMATION AND RESTRUCTURING

Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard
choices in balancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim
plan--now in progress--lowers operating and sustainment costs while
posturing aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache
modernization is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation
Plan. The AH-64D Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of
the maneuver battlespace and provide the ground commander with a
versatile, long-range weapon system against a range of fixed and moving
targets. The UH-60 Blackhawk continues to be the assault workhorse of
Army Aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's annual flying
hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with
capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is
fully committed to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift
capability is invaluable to transforming the Army. As we restructure
and standardize attack and lift formations across the force, we will
also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve component aviation
units to mitigate the near-term risk.
Army National Guard Aviation comprises almost 50 percent of the
Army's aviation force and is one of the Nation's most valuable assets
both for wartime and for peacetime missions. Essential for successful
execution of the Nation's military strategy, the ARNG currently has
aviation units deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, Europe, and
Saudi Arabia, as well as Central and South America.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE (ARNGRI)

ARNGRI seeks to transform a sizeable portion of ARNG combat
structure into more deployable, flexible fighting forces to support
Army requirements at home and abroad. ARNGRI will introduce two new
organizations into the force structure: Mobile Light Brigades and
Multi-Functional Divisions. These organizations will provide full
spectrum capabilities in support of combatant commanders. The Mobile
Light Brigades will operate as a subordinate unit to the multi-
functional divisions, which will also contain two combat support/combat
service support brigades and be capable of supporting either major
combat or homeland security operations.

ARMY RESERVE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVES

By providing responsive force generating capability and technically
trained individuals, the USAR facilitates our capability to conduct
extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint
operations. Army Reserve initiatives ensure the USAR is missioned,
organized, and equipped to provide interoperability across the full
spectrum of military operations. Transformational organizations include
experimentation forces and information operations, joint augmentation,
network security, and interagency units.
The Readiness Command Restructuring initiative and Federal Reserve
Restructuring Initiative will help the USAR fulfill these new mission
requirements. These initiatives lend greater flexibility to efforts
that enhance responsiveness to America's foreign and domestic
protection needs. Regional Readiness Commands will focus on individual
and unit readiness, leader development, training, and growth which will
demand a new personnel system that achieves holistic life-cycle
management for Army Reserve soldiers.

INSTITUTIONAL ARMY--TRANSFORMING THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS

We have made great strides in revolutionizing our business
management practices by starting at the very top. Last year, we
realigned our headquarters by reorganizing and realigning
responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Army Staff--streamlining
coordination, tasking, and decisionmaking--resulting in a more
responsive and efficient organization. This initiative allowed us to
eliminate unnecessary functions and redistribute 585 manpower spaces to
accomplish core competencies.
As previously discussed, the Army has addressed the management of
its installations, personnel systems, and contracting in its
Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). We are aggressively
pursuing efforts to outsource non-core functions. The Army will reap
substantial dividends in efficiency and effectiveness through these
strategic realignments of human and physical capital.

PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION

THIRD WAVE

Because we operate in an environment in which there are increasing
demands for military capabilities--the Secretary of the Army's Third
Wave initiative seeks to ensure that we are achieving the best value
possible for our taxpayers' dollars.
There are three phases to the Third Wave process. First, we
determined what activities were core or non-core to the Army's mission.
In the second phase, we are validating the breakout between core and
non-core functions by determining if any non-core functions should be
exempted. This phase has an anticipated completion date of mid- to
late-February 2003. Upon completion, the Army leadership will notify
Congress of the results of this phase. In the third phase, key Army
leaders will assess appropriate plans to execute non-core functions,
select the best means to proceed, and develop implementation plans. At
this time, we do not know how many of the 214,000 jobs identified as
potentially non-core functions in Phase I will be included in
implementation plans. Although implementation plans will target
execution in fiscal years 2005-2009, some implementation plans may be
delayed beyond that period.
The implementation of competitive sourcing of non-core functions
will adhere to OMB Circular A-76 and related statutory provisions.
Exceptions to the requirement for public-private competition are
limited, such as where 10 or fewer civilian employees perform the
function or where legal restrictions against using the A-76 process
apply to the function. To lower costs for taxpayers and improve program
performance to citizens, OMB has undertaken major revisions to the
processes and practices in OMB Circular A-76 to improve the public-
private competition process.

ACQUISITION TRANSFORMATION

The Army is leading the way in acquisition reform within DOD's
broad transformation of defense acquisition policies and procedures.
The Army's FCS program may prove to be the largest DOD acquisition
effort that fully embraces the concepts of evolutionary acquisition and
spiral development--leveraging the potential of rapid advancement
within individual technologies by allowing for changes within programs
as technologies mature.
The FCS program is evolutionary in its design and incorporates
periodic blocked improvements within its 19 systems--the Objective
Force soldier and 18 manned and unmanned systems. Within these 19
systems are 540 spirally developing technologies. The Army's use of a
Lead System Integrator (LSI) enables a ``best of the best'' approach to
selection from competing industry efforts. Our unprecedented
partnership with DARPA ensures the FCS effort leverages that agency's
DOD-wide perspective and resources to produce the best capability and
value for the Joint Force.
The Army continues to revise its acquisition policies and
applicable regulatory guidance. On October 3, 2001, the Army approved
an acquisition reorganization that transferred control of all
acquisition program management to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
and eliminated duplication of effort in two major Army commands.
Effective October 2002, 12 Program Executive Officers (PEO) report to
the AAE, and their subordinate PEOs assumed management of all Army
acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category. The plan
ensures that there is only one chain of authority for acquisition
programs within the Army. In addition, the plan clearly holds program
managers responsible and accountable for the life cycle management of
their assigned programs.
We have also transformed the way we conduct business through the
organization of the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) that realigns our
previously decentralized installation and information technology
contracting processes into one organization. Responsible for all
contracts over $500,000 and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts,
ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA
supports Army transformation efforts by aligning all base support
contracting into a single organization that best supports installation
management transformation. All of these initiatives use information
technology to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities.
Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form
the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational
support to the warfighting commands. The ACA and other contracting
activities will continue to support small business awards in the
outstanding manner it did in fiscal year 2002.

LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

We cannot transform the Army without a transformation in logistics.
We must incorporate the logistician's view into the design of our
systems even before we begin to build platforms. Collaboration between
the acquisition and logistics communities will give the Objective Force
the rapid deployability and sustainability we demand--by design--
without compromising warfighting capability.
Designing the right logistics architecture--systems, business
processes, enterprise, for example--is fundamental to success. The
Army's logistics transformation will focus on creating an overarching
corporate logistics enterprise that employs industries' best business
practices. Within this enterprise, the Army established three principal
goals for logistics transformation: enhance strategic mobility and
deployability; optimize the logistics footprint; and reduce the cost of
logistics support without reducing readiness or warfighting capability.
The Army's mobility and deployability goals for the Objective Force
are to deploy a combat brigade within 96 hours after lift off, a
division on the ground in 120 hours, and a five-division corps in
theater in 30 days. To achieve this strategic responsiveness, the Army
Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) serves as a catalyst to bring about
force projection changes both in the Army's and in our sister Services'
lift programs.
Platforms like the Intra-Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Inter-
Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) provide
transformational capabilities for operational and strategic maneuver
and sustainment of Army formations.
Because strategic air and sealift cannot meet deployment
requirements, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) ashore and afloat
continue to be a critical component of Army power projection. The Army
is currently participating in a joint-led Worldwide Prepositioning
Study to determine if location, mix, and capabilities in existing
stocks of combat, combat support, and combat service support require
adjustments to meet the defense strategy more effectively.
The Objective Force requires the Army to optimize its logistics
footprint to produce a smaller, more agile, responsive, and flexible
sustainment organization. To achieve this goal, we will leverage
technology and innovative sustainment concepts. The Army is already
developing and integrating key enablers to provide a transformed,
corporate logistics enterprise. Some of these enablers include embedded
diagnostics and prognostics, tactical logistics data digitization
(TLDD), serial number tracking, and the Global Combat Service Support-
Army (GCSS-A) system that utilizes a commercial Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) solution. The ERP approach changes the Army's logistics
automation systems strategy from one of custom code development for
unique Army requirements to adoption of a commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) product.
The selective use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) to augment military logistics force structure provides
commanders with the flexibility to reallocate manpower, resources, and
materiel by adding contractors to the equation of logistics support. In
addition to providing services and some supply support, these
contractors can quickly deploy to establish base camps, receive and
process soldiers as they begin arriving in theater, and reverse the
process when soldiers go home.
Current initiatives that help reduce costs without reducing
readiness or warfighting capability include the National Maintenance
Program and the Single Stock Fund (SSF). As previously discussed,
programs provide two basic building blocks for a revolutionary change
in logistics business practices.

ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

Congress designated the Army as the lead agent for DOD vaccine,
drug, and development programs for medical countermeasures to
battlefield threats. This includes vaccines against naturally occurring
infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care,
military operational medicine, and telemedicine research. The program
also funds Food and Drug Administration requirements for technology
transition to advanced development.
The medical force provides the requisite medical intervention and
care for the Joint Force deployed around the globe. With its Medical
Reengineering Initiative (MRI), the Army Medical Department has
transformed 28 percent of its Corps, and echelon above Corps, force
structure to an organizational structure that promotes scalability
through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. These packages
result in improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased
modularity for flexible task organization. MRI supports both the
current forces and the Stryker Brigades, and is the bridge to the
Objective Medical Force. We have implemented innovative strategies to
make the most efficient use of our budget. Medical modernization, which
includes the acquisition of current medical equipment and technology,
is partially funded within MRI units.

BUSINESS INITIATIVES COUNCIL

In June 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the Department
of Defense Business Initiatives Council (DOD BIC). The DOD BIC's goal
is to improve business operations and processes by identifying and
implementing initiatives that expand capabilities, improve efficiency
and effectiveness, and create resource savings in time, money, or
manpower.
The Army has aggressively explored ways to improve its internal
business practices, and has established the Army BIC, under the
leadership of the Secretary and the G-8. Effective November 13, 2002,
the Secretary of the Army has approved a total of 35 initiatives under
the Army BIC. Subsequently, the Army submitted a number of the
initiatives through the formal DOD BIC process for implementation
across the Services and other DOD activities. The BIC process has
helped to create a culture of innovation and inter-service cooperation.
The superb level of cooperation across the military departments, the
Joint Staff, and OSD has made this possible.

A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE

With the continued strong support of the administration, Congress,
our soldiers, and our Department of the Army civilians, and the
greatest industrial base and science and technology communities in the
world, the Army will field the Objective Force--this decade.
By 2010, we will have fielded the first operationally capable
Objective Force unit equipped with the Future Combat Systems. Our
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be providing to combatant commanders
capabilities not currently available--enhanced strategic responsiveness
and the ability to operate in a distributed, non-linear battlespace.
Through selective recapitalization and modernization of systems that
enable our soldiers to preserve our legacy today, we will have
sustained a decisive-win capability at a high state of readiness as an
integral part of the Joint Force. We will have significantly improved
the well-being of our people and sustainment of Army infrastructure.
We remain committed to our legacy--preserving America's freedoms.
In peace and in war, the Army's soldiers serve the Nation with
unmatched courage, indomitable will, pride, and plain grit--as they
have for over 227 years. Soldiers will continue to fight and win the
Nation's wars, decisively--it is our sacred duty and our non-negotiable
contract with the American people.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS

Admiral Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
members of the committee: Good morning and thank you for the
opportunity to be with you here this morning to talk about our
Navy and the challenges that we are facing today in the world.
Mr. Chairman, I submitted a statement and if we could make
that full statement a part of the record.
Chairman Warner. The full statements of all witnesses will
be included in the record.
Admiral Clark. We are facing a period of great challenge
and a period of great accomplishment. I am proud of what our
people are doing on the point. I could not in fact be prouder
of what our sailors are doing today in the world, involved in
the global war on terrorism. It is hard work. We have great
young men and women who are working the challenge and the task.
They are innovators. They have great ideas. They are making our
Navy better every day, and that is their task.
I also want to make sure that I express my appreciation to
this committee and to Congress at large for the help that you
have played in your support in making our Navy stronger. I am
grateful for the support of this body in the progress that we
have made in improving our Navy. I will tell you that we are
enjoying the best retention that we have ever experienced in my
entire career, and frankly, in our Navy's history. The pay, the
allowances, housing, the readiness that Congress has provided
for our force is making a real difference.
I want to also thank my partners here at the table, my
Service Chief partners. These guys are committed to jointness
and I will tell you, it is a pleasure to serve with them. In my
estimation, our military is more joint than it has ever been
before and I say without hesitation that all of the Services
are needed equally to accomplish the task and the mission that
is before us, and this group of people is working effectively
together to get the job done.
Last year when I appeared before this committee, I talked
about current readiness and manpower as my highest priorities.
I believe those decisions were right. I believe it postured us
for the global war on terrorism. Our recommendations and the
President's submission of the budget and the congressional
affirmation has made a great difference in the readiness of
your Navy.
We have reduced near-term operational risks, we have
deepened the growth and the development of our sailors, and we
are seeing the results in our deployments and in our people
today. Those investments have made today possible. This
morning, 51 percent of my ships are deployed overseas. Of my
306 ships, 195 of them are under way this morning, 6 of the 12
carrier battle groups and two-thirds of the amphibious force
carrying the marines.
They are under way in support of the Nation's interests,
leading the defense of the United States of America away from
our shores, sending, I like to say, the sovereignty of the
United States of America anywhere we have to take it--capable,
persistent, joint, ready forces. They are demonstrating on an
hourly basis the return on investment that this body has made
in our Navy.
I am proud of the budget submission this year. It is not
without debate, to be sure, and I look forward to the
discussion today. This year we seek to sustain the advances
made in current readiness and in manpower and to focus on
future readiness and transformation.
Seapower 21, which is our vision for the future and
detailed in my full statement, is about a dispersed, network-
centric, joint, sea-based force, a force capable of projecting
offensive power, a force capable of projecting defensive
power--I call that Sea Strike and Sea Shield. I talk about that
in terms of being a sea-based force, exploiting our operational
advantage, the largest maneuver space on the planet, the
world's oceans.
In our investment strategy this year, we have assessed the
risks between current readiness and future readiness, and I
believe that it is appropriately balanced. We invest today to
support the global war on terrorism and win today's fight, and
we must invest in the capabilities to win tomorrow's fight as
well. That involves tough decisions, to be sure, and I am
looking forward to talking about them today.
The threat assessment is straightforward. I think we all
understand it. But in my judgment this has allowed us to take
some steps to better prepare for the future. You all know that
my focus in the previous 2 years has been on making sure that
we won the battle for people, making sure that our current
force was really ready to go. I think we have made great
progress in those areas, and I do believe it is time to shine
the spotlight on the future.
The proposals before Congress allow us to divest of older,
less capable equipment and to move toward that future.
Certainly numbers are important and I have talked about them in
my previous 2 years coming before this body to testify. Numbers
have a quality all of their own. We have to buy capability and
lethality into the systems that we field and put to sea.
So, as I understand it, we are going to have a closed
session today. I look forward to discussing the future threat
and our readiness to deal with the future threat.
Last year, our challenge was to find the money to
recapitalize our Navy. I believe that we are on the way and the
budget that is sent before you today increases the number of
ships that we are buying and the number of aircraft that we are
procuring for the future. We are bringing very important
capability into the force like: the heart of our family of
ships for the future, CVN-21, the first new carrier design in
over 40 years; the Littoral Combat Ship, a revolutionary part
of the family of ships, built with plug and play technology, a
ship that will enable us to move rapidly into the 21st century,
conceived with unmanned vehicles in mind.
This budget will continue F/A-18E/Fs, which are deployed
now, Mr. Chairman, for the first time. This budget introduces a
new airplane, the EA-18G, to replace the jammer of old.
LPD-17 is maturing, with multiple ships under construction.
Joint Strike Fighter is in the budget. New helicopters, new
support ships, and major investments in the new Hawkeye will
provide the eyes and ears of the fleet.
With the President's commitment to missile defense, this
budget moves us towards sea-based missile defense in the year
2004. Unmanned vehicles are on the horizon in partnership with
my friend, General John Jumper, sitting at the end of the
table.
In short, this budget continues the commitment to build the
culture of readiness in our Navy. It focuses on people, our
capital asset. It sustains our commitment to the growth and
development of our sailors. It moves us to the future built
upon the principles of Seapower 21, our vision for the future,
with a new focus on future readiness.
This morning, 151 of my 306 ships are deployed. There are
another 170 ships under way as part of the Military Sealift
Command supporting the rest of the military structure: the
Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. This force is ready
and it is the most ready it has been in my entire military
life. I am proud of the accomplishments and the gains that we
have made.
We add to all of that and we look at the challenges that
are ahead of us. Mr. Chairman, I believe that this budget
proposes the right balance as we move to the future engaging in
the global war on terrorism, and I look forward to your
questions as we move forward in the hearing.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear today. The investment you've made in America's
Navy has been vital to the Nation's security and your Navy's ability to
project more power, more protection, and more freedom to the far
corners of the Earth. I speak for the entire fleet in thanking you for
your exceptional and continuous support.

I: YOUR NAVY TODAY--ENHANCED CAPABILITIES FOR THE JOINT FORCE

This is a time of tremendous challenge and accomplishment for our
Navy. Our men and women operating in the air, on and under the sea, and
on the ground are at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism.
Today, there are 151 ships on deployment, fully half of the Navy;
this includes 6 of 12 aircraft carriers, and 8 of our 12 big deck
amphibious ships (LHA/LHD). They are deployed in support of the
Nation's interests in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean, and the Western Pacific. Still others are preparing for
deployment or continuing operations like strategic deterrent and
counter-drug patrols in support of other national imperatives.

The Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) is also actively engaged
in supporting the war on terrorism; today, almost 75 percent of MSC's
total force is carrying combat equipment for land-based forces and
logistics support for Navy carrier battle group and amphibious ready
groups. Nineteen of our 20 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships
(LMSRs), all 8 fast sealift ships, and half of our 72 ship Ready
Reserve Fleet are actively supporting the Joint Force.
These forces are operating with purpose, leading the defense of the
United States away from our own shores and our own homes. After all,
this new century is fraught with profound dangers: rogue nations in
possession of weapons of mass destruction, potential conflict between
regional competitors, widely dispersed and well-funded terrorist
organizations, and failed states that deliver only tyranny and despair
to their people.
We frequently talk about the asymmetric challenges such enemies
might present, assuming these advantages belong only to potential
adversaries. Your Navy possesses asymmetric strengths all its own: its
persistence, precision, independence, and agility are but a few.
More importantly, our naval strengths are critical to our joint
combat effectiveness. Our forward deployed, combat ready naval forces--
sustained by naval and civilian shipmates around the world--are proving
every day the unique and lasting value of sovereign, lethal forces
projecting offensive and defensive power from the sea.
There are numerous recent examples of the enhanced capability our
Navy brings to the Joint Force.

In Operation Enduring Freedom, Navy aircraft carrier-
based tactical aircraft and long range, land-based Air Force
tankers and bombers combined with Navy SEALs on the ground and
Army Special Forces on horseback to deliver devastating strikes
on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. Since then, our
newest combat aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has been
flying combat sorties from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in
Operation Southern Watch, demonstrating its increased range and
payload capability. In combination with Tomahawk missiles from
widely dispersed ships and submarines, this joint power
projection force gives the Nation the ability to reach across
the globe with precise, persistent striking power.
The Peleliu and Bataan Amphibious Ready Groups,
operating in the Arabian Sea, launched and sustained marines
from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units more than 450
miles inland at ``Camp Rhino,'' to support the initial forward
operating base in Afghanistan. This was the longest-range
expeditionary airfield seizure operation ever launched from
amphibious ships at sea. During the same timeframe, the carrier
Kitty Hawk also provided an agile, sovereign Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB) for joint Special Operations Forces and
their lift, attack, and command and control assets. Permanently
installed command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) suites
and information technologies on all these ships enhanced the
entire joint team's knowledge superiority picture and connected
these Joint Forces with other forces and commands in the
theater and around the world, all from the security our ships
enjoy in the maritime domain.
The Aegis cruiser U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG 70) completed
three medium range ballistic missile defense tests last year,
successfully acquiring, tracking, and hitting target ballistic
missiles in the mid-course or ascent phases with a Standard
Missile 3 (SM-3) in all three tests. Lake Erie and the Aegis
destroyer U.S.S. John Paul Jones also supported three
successive Missile Defense Agency intercontinental class
ballistic missile tests; the Aegis system performed exactly as
predicted in each of these tests, acquiring the targets
immediately and passing high fidelity digital track data to
national nodes ashore. These cruisers' and destroyers' organic
Aegis Weapons System and their SPY-1 multi-function, phased
array radars, demonstrate the capability and capacity to
conduct a sea-based missile defense against those ballistic
missiles that can target our homeland, allies, forward
operating bases, and Joint Forces ashore. They could also
provide important surveillance and cueing of intercontinental
class weapons directed at our homeland.
The Navy's Military Sealift Command is actively
providing combat logistics support to U.S. Navy ships, is
prepositioning joint military supplies and equipment at sea,
and is providing sealift and ocean transportation of defense
cargo. MSC's high quality shipping, augmented by charters,
continues its sealift of the Army's 3rd and 4th Infantry
Divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and V Corps.
Fifteen of our deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
provide the majority of combat supplies and equipment for our
Marine force, and 11 of these have already offloaded equipment
in support of contingency operations. MSC is also delivering
fuel and aviation support equipment and supplies to deployed
Air Forces. In short, 95 percent of all equipment and supplies
needed by U.S. forces in time of crisis moves by sea on MSC-
controlled ships.
The U.S.S. Florida (SSBN-728), an Ohio-class fleet
ballistic missile submarine, successfully launched two Tomahawk
missiles, confirming the ability to launch a Tomahawk from a
configuration similar to the tightly packed cluster of Tomahawk
All-Up-Rounds (AUR) we will use in the SSGN. This experiment
was conducted in support of the SSGN program's Sea Trial
experiment, Giant Shadow, which also explored how a network of
forces, including special warfare forces, and various unmanned
aerial, underwater, and ground vehicles and sensors could be
used to provide surveillance, collect real-time intelligence,
and develop and launch a time critical strike in support of the
Joint Force Commander. This included the first vertical launch
of a UUV, testing of nuclear-biological-chemical sensors, and
the insertion of SEALs from one of the submarines we will
convert to an SSGN.

These examples represent the return on investment the American
people have made in our Navy: an agile, connected fleet that enhances
deterrence, sustains our access, conducts precision strikes, exercises
joint command and control, enhances knowledge superiority, responds to
crisis, projects, sustains and operates with the Joint Force ashore,
and leverages the priceless advantage of our command of the seas. It is
why we are a critical component of the Nation's joint defenses in
peace, in crisis, and in conflict.
None of the foregoing would be possible without the energy,
expertise, and enthusiasm of our active and Reserve sailors, and our
marine and civilian shipmates in the Department of the Navy. After all,
it is people that put capability to practice, and it is their dedicated
service that makes these capabilities ready--around the world and
around the clock.

II: A CULTURE OF READINESS--A COMMITMENT TO TRANSFORMATION

This century's dangerous and uncertain strategic environment places
a premium on credible combat forces that possess speed of response,
immediate employability, and the flexible force packaging that brings
the right capability to bear at the right time. It demands forces that
can pair this capability with readiness, both today and in the future.
Readiness is the Navy's watchword. Readiness is the catalyst that
brings combat power, speed of response, and the ability to disrupt an
enemy's intentions in both crisis and conflict. Readiness brings
capability to bear wherever and whenever it is needed. We are making
readiness a key element of our Navy's culture.
The forces we've placed forward today--the 6 carrier battle
groups--the 3 Amphibious Ready Groups, the Amphibious Task Forces
comprised of 14 additional amphibious ships, and the 11 offloaded
Maritime Preposition Ships all supporting a Marine Expeditionary Force
of 50,000 marines--our multi-mission surface ships and submarines--the
dozens of Military Sealift Command ships transporting the rest of the
Joint Force--are the most ready force in our history, properly manned,
superbly trained, and well provisioned with ordnance, repair parts, and
supplies so they can provide both rotational deployment and surge
capability. Our operational forces are ready earlier and are deploying
at a higher state of readiness than ever before.
A greater percentage of our ships are underway today than at any
time in the last dozen years. Our ability to do so is the direct result
of two things: the investment of the American people and the
extraordinary commitment and accomplishment of our men and women in the
Navy this past year. We made a concerted effort in last year's budget
request to improve our current readiness and reduce our immediate
operational risk and I am proud to report to you today that this force
is ready to fight and win!
At the same time, it is apparent that the 21st century sets the
stage for tremendous increases in precision, reach, and connectivity,
ushering in a new era of joint operational effectiveness. We clearly
will be able to integrate sea, land, air, and space through enhanced
network technology to a greater extent than ever before. In this new,
unified battlespace, the sea will provide the vast maneuver area from
which to project direct and decisive power.
To navigate the challenges ahead and realize the opportunities, we
developed this past year a clear, concise vision--Sea Power 21--for
projecting decisive joint capabilities from the sea. It is a vision
that stresses our asymmetric strengths of information dominance,
advanced technology, and highly skilled and motivated professionals.
Sea Power 21 advances American naval power to a broadened strategy
in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations
across this unified battlespace and against both regional and
transnational aggressors. It provides the transformational framework
for how we will organize, align, integrate, and transform our Navy to
meet the challenges that lie ahead.
It also includes the transformed organizational processes that will
accelerate operational concepts and technologies to the fleet; shape
and educate the workforce needed to operate tomorrow's fleet; and
harvest the efficiencies needed to invest in the Navy of the future.
The capabilities needed to fulfill this broadened strategy are
grouped into three core operational concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield,
and Sea Basing, which are enabled by FORCEnet. The triad of transformed
organizational processes that supports these concepts is: Sea Warrior,
Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise.

Together, these concepts will provide increased power, protection,
and freedom for America.

Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent
offensive power. Sea Strike operations are how the 21st century
Navy will exert direct, decisive, and sustained influence in
joint campaigns. Sea Strike capabilities will provide the Joint
Force Commander with a potent mix of weapons, ranging from
long-range precision strike, to clandestine land-attack in
anti-access environments, to the swift insertion of ground
forces.
Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global
defensive assurance. It is about extending our defenses beyond
naval forces, to the Joint Force and allies and providing a
defensive umbrella deep inland. Sea Shield takes us beyond
unit, fleet, and task force defense to provide the Nation with
sea-based theater and strategic defense.
Sea Basing is the projection of operational
independence. Sea Basing will use the fleet's extended reach of
modern, networked weapons and sensors to maximize the vast
maneuver space of the world's oceans. It is about extending
traditional naval advantages to the Joint Force with more
security, connectivity, and mobility from netted forces at sea.
FORCEnet is the enabler of our knowledge supremacy and
hence, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. It is the total
systems approach and architectural framework that will
integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control,
weapons, and platforms into a networked, distributed force and
provide greater situational awareness, accelerated speed of
decision, and greatly distributed combat power.

Our transformed organizational processes are:

Sea Warrior is our commitment to the growth and
development of our sailors. It serves as the foundation of
warfighting effectiveness by ensuring the right skills are in
the right place at the right time.
Sea Trial is a continual process of rapid concept and
technology development that will deliver enhanced capabilities
to our sailors as swiftly as possible. The Commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces Command is leading this effort and developing new
concepts and technologies, such as the Joint Fires Network and
High Speed Vessels.
Sea Enterprise is our process to improve
organizational alignment, refine requirements, and reinvest the
savings to buy the platforms and systems needed to transform
our Navy. It is the means by which we will capture efficiencies
and prioritize investments.

Sea Power 21 is dedicated to a process of continual innovation and
is committed to total jointness. It extends American naval superiority
from the high seas, throughout the littorals, and beyond the sea. It
both enhances and leverages persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities and precision weaponry to amplify the
Nation's striking power, elevate our capability to project both defense
and offense, and open the door to the afloat positioning of additional
joint capabilities, assets, and forces.
Sea Power 21 will extend the advantages of naval forces--speed of
response, agility, immediate employability, and security--to the
unified, joint warfighting team. It will increase our deterrence,
crisis control, and warfighting power. It will ensure our naval forces
are fully integrated into global joint operations to bring more power,
more protection, and more freedom to America.
We will put our Sea Power 21 vision into practice through a new
Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs) to distribute our combat striking
power to a dispersed, networked fleet. This will optimize our flexible
force structure and create additional, scaleable, independent operating
groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world. This
distribution of assets will take us from 19 strike capable groups to 37
strike capable groups with the full implementation of the Global
CONOPs.

Carrier Strike Groups will remain the core of our
Navy's warfighting strength. No other force package matches
their sustained power projection ability, extended situational
awareness, and survivability.
Expeditionary Strike Groups will augment our
traditional Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit
team with strike-capable surface combatants and submarines to
prosecute Sea Strike missions in lesser-threat environments.
When combined with a Carrier Strike Group, the resulting
Expeditionary Strike Force will possess the full range of our
netted, offensive, and defensive power. We will deploy at least
one pilot ESG this year.
Missile Defense Surface Action Groups will increase
international stability by providing security to allies and
Joint Forces ashore from short- and medium-range ballistic
missile threats.
Our future SSGN forces--specially modified Trident
submarines--will provide large volume clandestine strike with
cruise missiles and the capability to support and insert
Special Operations Forces.
An enhanced-capability Combat Logistics Force and
Maritime Prepositioned Force will sustain a more widely
dispersed and capable Navy/Marine Corps team.

It is our intention to continue to nurture this culture of
readiness and invest in this vision in the years ahead.

III. OUR FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

This past year, the Navy improved its current readiness by properly
funding our current readiness accounts, deepening the growth and
development of our people, and developing innovative operational
concepts and capabilities.
This year, we intend to:

Sustain our current readiness gains to support the war
on terror;
Deepen the growth and development of our people into
the 21st century, high-technology personnel force that is our
future; and
Invest in our bold new Navy vision--Sea Power 21--to
recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to
operate as an agile, lethal, and effective member of our joint,
networked warfighting team.

At the same time, we will continue to actively harvest the
efficiencies needed to fund and support these priorities in both fiscal
year 2004 and beyond. Our Navy budget request for fiscal year 2004
supports this intent and includes:

Seven new construction ships, 2 more SSBN-to-SSGN
conversions, 1 cruiser conversion, and 100 new aircraft;
Investment in accelerated transformational
capabilities, including the next-generation aircraft carrier
(CVN-21), the transformational destroyer (DD(X)), and Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS), the Joint Strike Fighter, the Advanced
Hawkeye (E-2C RMP) Upgrade Program, and the EA-18G Electronic
Attack aircraft;
A 4.1 percent average pay increase in targeted and
basic pay raises, and a reduction in average out-of-pocket
housing costs from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent;
Investment in housing and Public Private Venture that
will help eliminate inadequate family housing by fiscal year
2007 and enable us to house shipboard sailors ashore when their
vessel is in homeport by fiscal year 2008;
Continued investment in key operational readiness
accounts that includes an increase in aviation depot
maintenance funding; improvement in our annual deferred
maintenance backlog for our ships, submarines, and aircraft
carriers; and sustained funding for our ordnance, ship
operations, and flying hours accounts;
Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration, a
process that will maximize our forward-deployed combat power,
optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces,
introduce 200 modern aircraft across the fiscal year 2004 to
fiscal year 2009 program and save billions of dollars;
Divestiture of aging, legacy ships, systems and
aircraft, producing nearly $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 for
reinvestment in recapitalization;
Improvements in the quality of our operational
training through a Training Resource Strategy; and
Investment in transformational unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUV), unmanned aviation vehicles (UAV), experimental
hull forms, and other technologies.
A. Sustaining our Current Readiness
Your investment last year produced the most ready force in our
history! Training, maintenance, spare parts, ordnance, and fuel
accounts enabled our fleet to be ready earlier, deploy at a higher
state of readiness, and as we are witnessing today, build a more
responsive surge capability. These investments were vital to sustaining
the war on terrorism, assuring friends and allies and leading the
Nation's global response to crisis.

Ship operations and flying hours requests funds for
ship operations OPTEMPO of 54.0 days per quarter for our
deployed forces and 28 days per quarter for our non-deployed
forces. The flying hours request receives an additional $137
million this year to sustain the investment level we
established in support of last year's budget. This level of
steaming and flying hours will enable our ships and airwings to
achieve required readiness 6 months prior to deployment,
sustain readiness during deployment, and increase our ability
to surge in crisis. However, sustained OPTEMPO at levels above
this force-wide target, as is beginning to occur during fiscal
year 2003's time of accelerated and extended deployments, will
cause our current year execution to run both ahead and in
excess of the existing plan.
Ship and Aviation Maintenance. Last year, we reduced
our major ship depot maintenance backlog by 27 percent and
aircraft depot level repair back orders by 17 percent; provided
32 additional ships with depot availabilities; ramped up
ordnance and spare parts production; maintained a steady
``mission capable'' rate in deployed aircraft; and fully funded
aviation initial outfitting. Our request for fiscal year 2004
aviation maintenance funding adds over $210 million to fiscal
year 2003's investment and will increase the number of engine
spares, improve the availability of non-deployed aircraft, and
meet our 100 percent deployed airframe goals.
Our ship maintenance request continues to `buy-down' the
annual deferred maintenance backlog and sustains our overall
ship maintenance requirement. The aggregate level of funding
for ship maintenance actually declines from fiscal year 2003 to
fiscal year 2004, due in part to the positive effects of the
additional maintenance funding provided in supplemental
appropriations in the previous year, in part to the accelerated
retirement of the oldest and most maintenance-intensive surface
ships, and as a result of scheduling and timing.
Shore Installations. The fiscal year 2004 request
provides 93 percent of the modeled sustainment cost for
facilities, an increase from fiscal year 2003's 84 percent.
Although the overall investment in facility recapitalization
has reduced from last year, slowing the replacement rate of
facilities, our increased investment in sustainment will better
maintain existing facilities as we continue to pursue
innovations to improve our base infrastructure. Our Base
Operations Support funding request is based on sustaining the
current level of common installation and important community
and personnel support functions; we have factored in management
and business efficiencies to reduce the cost of providing these
services. We continue to support a Base Realignment and Closure
effort in fiscal year 2005 to focus our future investment and
improve our recapitalization rate in the years ahead.
Precision-guided munitions receive continued
investment in our fiscal year 2004 request with emphasis on
increasing inventory levels for the Joint Stand-Off Weapon
(JSOW), optimizing the Navy's Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM) production rate and commencing full rate production
under multi-year procurement for the Tactical Tomahawk
(TACTOM). Our partnership with the Air Force in several of our
munitions programs will continue to help us optimize both our
inventories and our research and development investment.
Training readiness. The Training Resource Strategy
(TRS) has been developed to provide for more complex threat
scenarios, improve the training of our deploying ships,
aircraft, sailors, and marines, and support the range and
training technology improvements necessary to ensure the long-
term combat readiness of deploying naval forces. The TRS has
identified the training facilities necessary to provide this
superior level of training as well. Their dispersed character
is more like the battlefield environment our forces will face
today and tomorrow and will better challenge our deploying
forces--before they are challenged in combat. Our fiscal year
2004 request includes $61 million to support the TRS.
At the same time, encroachment and environmental issues
continue to impact our ability to maintain an acceptable level
of access to our valuable testing and training ranges and
operating areas. As a result, we are looking for a balanced
approach that would protect our environmental obligations and
our ability to both train in realistic scenarios and develop
transformational systems for our future. Our approach would be
limited to only the most critical issues, such as the
designation of critical habitat on military lands designated
for military training, and the scientific measurements that
achieve an appropriate balance between our environmental
concerns and our obligation to ensure our sailors are properly
trained and our transformational systems are properly tested.
We will focus the use of our ranges for these purposes while
continuing to be an excellent steward of these environmental
resources. We look forward to working with Congress and the
American people on this important and urgent issue impacting
our sailors and marines.
B. Deepening the Growth and Development of our People
We are winning the battle for people. Thanks to superb leadership
in the fleet and the full support of the American people and Congress,
we are making solid progress in addressing long-standing manpower and
quality of service issues vital to having what it takes to win the
competition for talent today and tomorrow.
We are enjoying now the best manning I have witnessed in my career.
With few exceptions, we achieved C-2 manning status for all deploying
battle group units at least 6 months prior to deployment. These
accomplishments enabled our Navy to develop a more responsive force,
one that surged forward with the right people, at the right time, to
fulfill our national security requirements.

Retention is at record levels and recruiting has never been better.
We achieved a 58.7 percent Zone A (<6 years of service (YOS))
reenlistment rate, 74.5 percent Zone B reenlistment rate (6-10 YOS),
and a Zone C (10-14 YOS) reenlistment rate of 87.4 percent in 2002.
While we are also off to a great start in fiscal year 2003, we are
instituting measures to ensure our annualized reenlistment rate meets
our established goals (Zone A--56 percent, B--73 percent, C--86
percent).
Additionally, attrition for first term sailors was reduced by 23
percent from fiscal year 2001 levels. Ninety two percent of our
recruits are high school graduates and 6 percent of them have some
college education.

These tremendous accomplishments allowed us to reduce at-sea
manning shortfalls last year and reduce our recruiting goals. We were
also able to increase the overall number of E-4 to E-9s in the Navy by
1.3 percent to 71.5 percent working toward a goal of 75.5 percent by
fiscal year 2007. This healthy trend allows us to retain more of our
experienced leaders to manage and operate the increasingly technical
21st century Navy.
Targeted pay raises, reenlistment bonuses, improved allowances,
enhanced educational benefits, retirement reforms, support for improved
family services, and better medical benefits are making a difference
and can be directly attributed to congressional support and the
outstanding work of our Navy leaders in our ships, squadrons, bases,
and stations.
Our fiscal year 2004 request capitalizes on last year's
accomplishments and provides the opportunity to align our manpower and
skills mix to balance our end strength and shape our 21st century
workforce. As part of Sea Power 21's transformed organizational process
improvements we will begin our Sea Warrior process.
Our goal is to create a Navy in which all sailors are optimally
assessed, trained, and assigned so that they can contribute their
fullest to mission accomplishment. It is important that we sustain our
manpower progress by furthering our supporting initiatives to include:

Perform to serve will align our Navy personnel
inventory and skill sets through a centrally managed
reenlistment program. This initiative makes Commander, Navy
Personnel Command the final authority for first term
reenlistments and extensions and will steer sailors in over-
manned ratings into skill areas where they are most needed. It
provides the training necessary to ensure these sailors will
succeed in their new rating. Most importantly, it will help us
manage our skills profile.
Navy Knowledge Online introduces our integrated web-
based lifelong learning initiative for personnel development
and learning management. It connects sailors to the right
information in a collaborative learning environment, tracks
their individual skills and training requirements, and provides
lifelong support between our rating, leadership, and personal
development learning centers and our sailors.
Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through our Commitment to
Education and Learning) is transforming the way we train and
educate our people. A more responsive organizational structure
has been established to include the Navy Chief Learning
Officer, Naval Personnel Development Command, and Human
Performance Center. We also partnered with fleet, industry, and
academia to improve individual training and education as well
as with colleges, through the Commissioned Navy College
Program, to provide rating-related Associate and Bachelor
degrees.
Project SAIL (Sailor Advocacy through Interactive
Leadership) will web-base and revolutionize the personnel
assignment process by putting more choice in the process for
both gaining commands and sailors. It will empower our people
to make more informed career decisions and for the first time,
create a more competitive, market-oriented process.

Our Sea Swap initiative is underway now, with the first crew-change
on U.S.S. Fletcher taking place in the Western Australia port of
Fremantle last month. We will continue this pilot with another crew
change this summer and we intend to continue to examine pilot programs
in optimal manning, rotational crewing, assignment incentive pay,
rating identification tools, and rate training.
Your support of our fiscal year 2004 request for a targeted pay
raise that recognizes and reaffirms the value of our career force and
acts as an incentive to junior personnel to stay Navy is critical to
staying the course. So, too, is continuing the reduction of average
out-of-pocket housing expenses and the extension and enhancement of
essential special pay and bonus authorities. All these efforts enable
our Navy to sustain our forces in the war on terrorism, continue the
increase in our Top 6 (E4 to E9), and develop the 21st century, high-
technology personnel force that is our future.
C. Investing in Sea Power 21
Our 21st century Navy will be a joint, netted, dispersed power
projection force and Sea Power 21 is the framework for how our Navy
will organize, integrate, and transform. It prescribes a strategy-to-
concepts-to-capabilities continuum by which current and future naval
forces will exploit the opportunity that information dominance and
rapid, highly accurate power projection and defensive protection
capabilities bring to us.
Together, these concepts will compress our speed of response and
provide the Nation with immediately employable, secure and sovereign
forward ``capability sets'' from which to project firepower, forces,
command and control, and logistics ashore.
The following describes the core capabilities, and our initial
investments in our highest priority programs that support this vision.
Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent offensive
power. The core capabilities include: Time Sensitive Strike;
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Ship to Objective
Maneuver; and Electronic Warfare and Information Operations. We are
already investing in impressive programs that will provide the
capabilities necessary to support Sea Strike; these include the
following fiscal year 2004 priorities:

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The F/A-18E/F is in full rate
production and when combined with this year's request for the
EA-18G, will be the backbone of Navy sea-based precision and
time-critical strike, electronic attack and airborne tactical
reconnaissance. It is in the fifth of a 5-year multi-year
procurement (MYP) contract (fiscal years 2000-2004) that will
yield $700 million in total savings. The second multi-year
contract for 210 aircraft will yield approximately $1 billion
in savings as compared to the single-year price. The Super
Hornet employs new knowledge dominance technologies, such as
the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Tactical
Forward Looking Infrared System, Shared Reconnaissance System,
and Multi-Informational Display System data link. It provides a
40-percent increase in combat radius, a 50-percent increase in
endurance, 25 percent greater weapons payload, 3 times the
ordnance bring back, and is more survivable than our older
Hornets; most importantly, it has the growth capacity to remain
a mainstay of our tactical aviation for years to come. Three of
these squadrons are already deployed today at one-third the
operational cost of our legacy F-14 aircraft. Fiscal year 2004
budgets for 42 E/F aircraft; this program maximizes the return
on our procurement dollars through a multi-year procurement
contract and a minimum economic order quantity buy.
EA-18G. The EA-18G will replace the aging EA-6B
Prowler for Joint Force electronic attack. Using the
demonstrated growth capacity of the F/A-18E/F, the EA-18G
Growler will quickly recapitalize our electronic attack
capability at lower procurement cost with significant savings
in operating and support costs and 3 years earlier than
previously planned, all while providing the growth potential
for future electronic warfare (EW) system improvements. It will
use the Improved Capability Three (ICAP III) receiver suite and
provide selective reactive jamming capability to the
warfighter. This will both improve the lethality of the air
wing and enhance the commonality of aircraft on the carrier
deck. It will dramatically accelerate the replacement of our
aging Airborne Electronic Attack capability. Engineering and
developmental efforts commence with our fiscal year 2004 budget
request.
JSF. The Joint Strike Fighter will enhance our Navy
precision with unprecedented stealth and range as part of the
family of tri-service, next-generation strike aircraft. It will
maximize commonality and technological superiority while
minimizing life cycle cost. The fiscal year 2004 budget
requests $2.2 billion in accelerated development funds; initial
production is planned for fiscal year 2006.
MV-22. The Joint Service MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor,
Vertical/Short Take-Off or Landing (V/STOL) aircraft represents
a revolutionary change in aircraft capability. It will project
marines and equipment ashore from our amphibious shipping,
operationalizing Ship to Objective Maneuver from the Sea Base
and improving our expeditionary mobility and force entry needs
for the 21st century. The MV-22 program has been restructured,
redesigned, rebuilt, and is undergoing testing to deliver an
operationally deployable aircraft on the restructured schedule.
The MV-22 will replace the Vietnam-era CH-46E and CH-53D
helicopters, delivering improved readiness, upgraded
capability, and significantly enhanced survivability. It is
overwhelmingly superior to our legacy CH-46E providing twice
the speed, five times the range, and three times the payload
capacity.
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). We increased our
commitment to a focused array of unmanned air vehicles that
will support and enhance both Sea Shield and Sea Strike
missions with persistent, distributed, netted sensors. We are
initiating the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV this
year to develop a persistent, multi-mission platform capable of
both Sea Shield and Sea Strike surveillance and reconnaissance
of maritime and land targets, communications relay, and some
intelligence collection. We have provided funding for testing,
experimentation, and/or demonstration of the Fire Scout
Demonstration Systems, Global Hawk Maritime demonstration and
the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle-Navy (UCAV-N) demonstration
vehicle as well.

Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global defensive power. It
will soon enhance deterrence and warfighting power by way of real-time
integration with joint and coalition forces, high speed littoral attack
platforms setting and exploiting widely distributed sensors, and the
direct projection of defensive powers in the littoral and deep inland.
It will enhance homeland defense, assure, and eventually sustain our
access in the littorals and across the globe. Sea Shield capabilities
include Homeland Defense, Sea and Littoral Control, and Theater Air and
Missile Defense.

Our highest priority Sea Shield programs this year include:

Missile Defense. Our Navy is poised to contribute
significantly in fielding initial sea-based missile defense
capabilities to meet the near-term ballistic missile threat to
our homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies
and we are working closely with the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) to that end. As partners, U.S.S. Lake Erie will be
transferred to MDA to facilitate a more robust testing program
for missile defense. In turn, MDA is requesting funds to
upgrade three Aegis guided missile destroyers (DDG) for ICBM
surveillance and tracking duties and procurement of up to 20
standard missile interceptors to help us provide a limited at
sea capability to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles in the boost and ascent phases of flight. Our sea-
based missile defense programs experienced tremendous success
on the test range during 2002, and we look forward to building
on these successes and developing a vital capability for our
Nation.
CG Conversion. The first Cruiser Conversion begins in
fiscal year 2004. The Cruiser Conversion Program is a mid-life
upgrade for our existing Aegis cruisers that will ensure
modern, relevant combat capability well into this century and
against evolving threats. These warships will provide enhanced
land attack and area air defense to the Joint Force Commander.
Core to these conversions is installation of the Cooperative
Engagement Capability, which enhances and leverages the air
defense capability of these ships, and the 5/62 caliber Gun
System with Extended Range Guided Munitions to be used in
support of the Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver
doctrine. These converted cruisers could also be available for
integration into ballistic missile defense missions when that
capability matures.
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). We will continue
development of UUVs for minefield reconnaissance in the
littoral and other surveillance missions, including funding
that will result in initial operating capability for the Long-
term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) in fiscal year 2005.

Sea Basing is the projection of operational independence. Our
future investments will exploit the largest maneuver areas on the face
of the Earth: the sea. Sea Basing serves as the foundation from which
offensive and defensive fires are projected--making Sea Strike and Sea
Shield a reality. Sea Basing capabilities include: Joint Command and
Control, Afloat Power Projection, and Integrated Joint Logistics. Our
intent is to minimize as much as possible, our reliance on shore-based
support nodes.

Our highest priority investments include:

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Our most transformational
effort and number one budget priority, the Littoral Combat Ship
will be the first Navy ship to separate capability from hull
form and provide a robust, affordable, focused-mission ship to
enhance our ability to establish sea superiority not just for
our Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups, but
for future joint logistics, command and control, and pre-
positioned ships moving to support forces ashore. They will be
dispersed and netted, both leveraging and enhancing the
knowledge superiority and defense of the theater Joint Force.
We will separate capability from hull form by developing
`tailorable' mission modules that we can use to ``forward fit
and fight'' these small, minimally manned, persistent, high-
speed vessels across the globe. They will counter anti-access
threats, namely small, fast surface craft carrying anti-ship
missiles, torpedo-armed ultra-quiet diesel submarines, and
large numbers of inexpensive mines. They will be the backbone
of our carrier and expeditionary strike group organic mine
warfare capability. By employing networked sensors, modular
mission payloads, a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles,
and an innovative hull design, they will have the inherent
capacity for further transformation by developing future
modules for other missions. We will capitalize on DOD
initiatives, spiral development, and new acquisition methods to
streamline the acquisition process, and begin construction of
the first LCS by 2005. The fiscal year 2004 budget accelerates
development and construction of nine LCS in the FYDP, key to
ramping surface force structure to Global CONOPs levels outside
the FYDP.
DD(X). The DD(X) advanced multi-mission destroyer will
bring revolutionary improvements to precision strike and joint
fires. Transformational and leap ahead technologies include: an
integrated power system and electric drive; the Advanced Gun
System with high rate of fire and magazine capability; the new
Multi-Function Radar/Volume Search Radar suite; optimal manning
through advanced system automation, stealth through reduced
acoustic, magnetic, IR, and radar cross-section signature; and
enhanced survivability through automated damage control and
fire protection systems. Armed with an array of land attack
weapons it will provide persistent, distributed offensive fires
in support of Joint Forces ashore. The capacity in both hull
form and integrated electric power system will allow us to
spiral its development to CG(X) and other transformational
systems, like the electro-magnetic rail gun, in the years
ahead.
CVN-21. We have accelerated transformational
technologies from the CVNX development plan into CVN-21 while
sustaining the CVNX-1 development schedule submitted last year.
This is the first new carrier design since 1967. The fiscal
year 2004 budget request provides $1.5 billion in RDT&E and
advanced procurement for the first CVN-21 and programs for
split-funded construction beginning in fiscal year 2007. The
transformational technologies include a new electrical
generation and distribution system, improved flight deck design
with Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System, improved sortie
generation, enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and
incorporation of a flexible infrastructure that will allow the
insertion of new capabilities as they evolve. CVN-21 will be
the centerpiece of our Carrier Strike Groups in the future and
will replace U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2014.
Virginia-class submarine (SSN-774). The first four
ships of this class are under construction: Virginia will
commission in 2004; the keel was laid for Texas (SSN-775) in
July 2002; Hawaii (SSN-776) was begun in 2001; and North
Carolina (SSN-777) in 2002. This class will replace Los
Angeles-class (SSN-688) attack submarines and will incorporate
new capabilities, including an array of unmanned vehicles, and
the ability to support Special Warfare forces. It will be an
integral part of the joint, networked, dispersed fleet of the
21st century.
SSGN Conversions. We have requested two additional
conversions in fiscal year 2004; these ships will be configured
to carry more than 150 Tomahawk missiles, enabling covert,
large-volume strike. The SSGN will also have the capability to
support Special Operations Forces for an extended period,
providing clandestine insertion and retrieval by lockout
chamber, dry deck shelters or the Advanced Seal Delivery
System, and they will be arrayed with a variety of unmanned
systems to enhance the Joint Force Commander's knowledge of the
battlespace. We will leverage the existing Trident submarine
infrastructure to optimize their on-station time. The first two
ships, the U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, enter the shipyard
in fiscal year 2003 to begin their refueling and conversion.
U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia will begin their conversion
in fiscal year 2004. We expect this capability to be
operational for the first SSGN in fiscal year 2007.
Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)). MPF(F)
ships will serve a broader operational function than current
prepositioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational
flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force of ships
that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the
at-sea assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives
by high-speed airlift or sealift from the United States or
forward operating locations or bases. These ships will off-load
forces, weapons, and supplies selectively while remaining far
over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground maneuver
forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland. They
will sustain in-theater logistics, communications, and medical
capabilities for the Joint Force for extended periods as well.

Other advances in sea basing could enable the flow of Marine and
Army forces at multiple and probably austere points of entry as a
coherent, integrated combined arms team capable of concentrating lethal
combat power rapidly and engaging an adversary upon arrival. The
ability of the Naval Services to promote the successful transformation
of deployment practices of the other Services will dramatically improve
the overall ability of the Joint Force to counter our adversaries'
strategies of area-denial and/or anti-access. We are programming RDTE
funds to develop the future MPF and examine alternative sea-basing
concepts in fiscal year 2008.
FORCEnet is the enabler of the foregoing capabilities, and the
operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in
the joint, information age. It will allow systems, functions, and
missions to be aligned to transform situational awareness, accelerate
speed of decisions, and allow naval forces to greatly distribute its
combat power in the unified, joint battlespace. It puts the theory of
network-centric warfare into practice. We are just beginning this
effort and we have requested $15 million in funds to administer the
development of FORCEnet, the cornerstone of our future C\4\I
architecture that will integrate sensors, networks, decision aids,
warriors, and weapons. Programs that will enable the future force to be
more networked, highly adaptive, human-centric, integrated, and enhance
speed of command include:

E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Radar Modernization Program. E-2
Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will modernize the E-2 weapons
system by replacing the current radar and other aircraft system
components to improve nearly every facet of tactical air
operations. The modernized weapons system will be designed to
maintain open ocean capability while adding transformational
surveillance and Theater Air and Missile Defense capabilities
against emerging air threats in the high clutter and jamming
environment. The advanced Hawkeye will be a critical
contributor to Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air, and
to Sea Strike and Shield. The fiscal year 2004 budgets over
$350 million for continued development with first production
planned for fiscal year 2008.
Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). NMCI continues
to bring together Navy personnel, government civilians, and
contractors into a single computing environment. This program
is fostering fundamental changes in the way we support critical
warfighting functions, conduct Navy business, and train and
advance sailors. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.6 billion
continues user seat rollout and cutover to the NMCI
architecture, progressing toward a target end-state of 365,000
seats. Although NMCI seat cutover was slowed initially by the
need to resolve the challenges of numerous, disparate legacy
applications, the transition to NMCI has succeeded in
eliminating more than 70,000 legacy IT applications and we are
on track for the future.

Sea Trial. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) is now in
charge of our Navy's revitalized process of experimentation, and is
rapidly developing emergent concepts and experimenting with new
technologies to speed delivery of innovation to the fleet. CFFC will
reach throughout the military and beyond to coordinate concept and
technology development in support of future warfighting effectiveness.
Embracing spiral development, the right technologies and concepts will
then be matured through targeted investment and rapid prototyping.
CFFC is working in concert with the U.S. Joint Forces Command to
refine the Sea Trial process and integrate select wargames,
experimentation, and exercises. We are already testing new operational
concepts and technologies like the Collaborative Information
Environment, Joint Fires Initiative, and the Navy Joint Semi-Automated
Force Simulation in operations and exercises. We will continue to
pursue evaluation of multiple platforms and systems, including
experimental hull forms and electromagnetic rail guns, among others.
The Systems Commands and Program Executive Offices will be integral
partners in this effort, bringing concepts to reality through
technology innovation and application of sound business practices.

IV. HARVESTING EFFICIENCIES FOR TRANSFORMATION

We are working hard to identify and harvest the efficiencies needed
to balance competing priorities and invest in our Sea Power 21 vision.
Called Sea Enterprise, this process is intended to ensure our
warfighting capability both now and in the future. It will help
identify and produce those initiatives that both optimize our
warfighting capability and streamline our organization and processes;
to make it operate more efficiently, to reduce our overhead and to
produce the savings needed for investment in recapitalization and our
future. We have already identified several initiatives that have
produced over $40 billion in savings and cost avoidance across the
defense program--and many more billions outside the FYDP--to help fund
our future. A few of the highlights include:

USN-USMC Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) Integration plan
shows the promise of cross-service partnerships. It will
maximize forward deployed combat power, enhance our
interoperability, more fully integrate our services, and save
$975 million across the FYDP. This aggressive effort introduces
200 modern aircraft in the next 6 years while retiring legacy
F-14, F/A-18A/B, S-3, and EA-6B airframes, and it reduces our
F/A-18E/F and JSF total buy requirements by 497 aircraft while
enhancing our warfighting capability. There is more than $30
billion in projected cost avoidance outside the FYDP as well.

Partnerships. We are pursuing other promising
partnerships to include new munitions with the U.S. Air Force,
common communications and weapons systems with the U.S. Coast
Guard's Deepwater Integrated Systems program, and joint
experiments with high-speed vessels with the U.S. Army. We will
continue to leverage the gains made in programs like joint
weapons development (JDAM, JSOW, AMRAAM) as well.
Identifying savings within the force for
recapitalization. Last year, we promised we would sharpen our
focus on our force structure in the years ahead--to buy the
ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's
Navy. At the same time, we cannot overlook the important gains
our focus on current readiness made these last few years; it
produced the more responsive force on deployment today. As a
result, we are obligated to look hard at the ways we could
balance these priorities and our discretionary investments to
both satisfy the near term operational risks and prepare for
the long-term risks of an uncertain future. This year, we made
some hard choices across the fleet to do more to address our
future risk, sustain our current readiness gains, and strike
this balance. We identified several aging, legacy systems with
limited growth potential and high operating and support costs,
and ultimately, we accelerated the retirement of 11 ships and
70 aircraft, divested more than 50 systems, and eliminated
70,000 legacy IT applications. We are using the savings to
recapitalize, modernize other legacy platforms, and invest in
Sea Power 21. These initiatives result in an acceptable
operational risk in the near term because of our emphasis on
sustaining our current readiness gains. Equally important,
these difficult decisions yielded $1.9 billion for reinvestment
and will do much to help reduce our future risk.
Improved business operations and processes. We are
improving both the way we run the fleet and our ability to
control costs. The LPD-DDG swap produced savings sufficient to
purchase a third guided missile destroyer in fiscal year 2004.
We are using multi-year procurement contacts and focusing where
possible on economic order quantity purchase practices to
optimize our investments. We conducted the Workload Validation
Review, and made Performance Based Logistics improvements.
Other initiatives like piloting mission funding for two of our
public shipyards, Enterprise Resource Planning, strategic
sourcing, NMCI, and eBusiness are helping us find the funds
necessary to emerge with the optimal force structure, a healthy
industrial base and an efficient and appropriately sized
infrastructure.
Installation Claimant Consolidation. In October 2003
we will establish a single shore installation organization,
Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), to globally
manage all shore installations, promote ``best practices''
development in the regions, and provide economies of scale,
increased efficiency, standardization of policies where
practicable and improved budgeting and funding execution. This
initiative has the potential to save approximately $1.6 billion
in the next 6 years.

We will continue to pursue the efficiencies that improve our
warfighting capability. We are committed to producing the level
investment stream that will help implement our bold new Navy vision and
produce the number of future ships, aircraft, and systems we need to
counter the 21st century threat. Harvesting savings for reinvestment is
an important part of that effort, and we will continue to examine the
potential efficiencies while weighing the operational risks, both now
and in the future.

V. CONCLUSION

We are affecting positive change in our Navy. We will continue our
culture of readiness and our commitment to transformation while
pursuing those efficiencies that both make us good stewards of the
public's funds, and improve our warfighting capability. I have made it
plain to our men and women in the Navy that mission accomplishment
means both warfighting effectiveness and resourcefulness.
At the same time, our people remain at the heart of all we do; they
are the real capital assets in our Navy. We have invested heavily to do
what is right for the people who are investing themselves in our Navy.
``Growth and development'' is our byline. As we look to the future, we
will build on the impressive progress we have made in recruiting,
assigning, and retaining our military and civilian professionals.
Active leadership is making it happen today and will do so in the years
to come.
There are still more challenges and opportunities in the year
ahead. We will continue prosecuting the global war on terrorism. This
entails being ready to respond--to surge and sustain warfighting
capabilities--in support of the war, as well as preparing our force for
the battles of tomorrow.
But by implementing our bold new Navy vision, harvesting
efficiencies for reinvestment, adding potent new platforms to the
fleet, and launching an integrated Navy-wide experimentation plan, we
are creating the future capabilities and force structure required to
counter these 21st century threats.
I thank the committee for your continued strong support of our
Navy, our sailors, and our civilian shipmates. Working together, I am
confident we will make our great Navy even better and provide our
Nation with more power, more protection, and more freedom in the years
ahead.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Hagee.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS

General Hagee. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, ladies and
gentlemen of the committee: It is an honor for me to be here
this morning. Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, on behalf of
those marines over in the Gulf, I would like to thank you very
much for you and your delegation's recent visit over there. It
meant a great deal to them to see you there and I thank you for
that.
Chairman Warner. We thank you.
General Hagee. Sir, along with our sister services, the
Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the
global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability
and security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines,
both active and Reserve, are operating side by side with
soldiers, sailors, airmen, NGOs, diplomats, and many others in
diverse locations around the globe from Afghanistan to the
Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the Georgian
Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines.
Today marines are flying from Bagram Air Base in
Afghanistan, from Navy carriers at sea, and from bases around
the Arabian Gulf. In fact, 63 percent of the Marine Corps
operating forces are currently deployed and almost 90 percent
are either deployed, forward stationed, or forward based.
Marine Corps operations throughout the past year have
highlighted the versatility and utility of our expeditionary
forces. Although we have had one of our busiest years in terms
of operational deployments, participation in realistic
worldwide exercises remain critical to supporting the theater
security cooperation plans and ensuring that we maintained a
ready and capable force.
Sir, your marines are ready. Along with the Navy, we are
moving out with new organizational concepts, as mentioned by
the CNO, including TACAIR integration and carrier and
expeditionary strike groups that will make us more responsive
and more flexible.
The fiscal year 2004 budget continues our effort to
modernize and transform the force. Support that you in Congress
have provided over the last 2 years has helped us make real
progress in our modernization, transformation, personnel, and
readiness accounts. Marines and their families have benefited
from targeted pay raises and improved family housing and
barracks. Increases in the basic allowance for housing have
significantly reduced out-of-pocket cost of living expenses for
our marines.
Regarding modernization and transformation, our top ten
Marine Corps ground programs are adequately founded over the
near-term. Among these are the Advanced Amphibious Assault
Vehicle, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the
Lightweight 155-Howitzer. On the aviation side, we are on track
for funding for the V-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the
Four-Bladed Cobra and Huey upgrades. Finally, we continue to
make needed progress in readiness.
Having recently come from the operating forces, I can tell
you there is a marked positive improvement in the way we have
funded for readiness now compared to just a few years ago.
My main concern today echoes one of the concerns of the
Secretary of Defense, in that without supplemental funding, we
are spending tomorrow's dollars today. We are very grateful for
the additional funding provided last week in the fiscal year
2003 omnibus appropriations bill. This funding provides a
measure of relief to those programs that were bearing the costs
of the global war on terrorism. Thank you for your timely
action.
That said, our contingency requirements are significant and
they greatly exceed the funding provided. We ask for your
support and timely passage of the administration's upcoming
supplemental request.
That concern notwithstanding, we are currently doing what
we are trained to do. We are ready to support the Nation
through whatever challenges may lie ahead. We are on solid
ground regarding our mission and our direction. We will remain
your only sea-based, rotational, truly expeditionary combined
arms force ready to answer the call as part of an integrated
Joint Force.
Sir, I would like to thank this committee on behalf of all
the marines for your continued support, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hagee follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
committee; it is my honor to report to you on the state of your United
States Marine Corps. First, on behalf of all marines, I want to thank
the committee for your continued support. Your sustained commitment to
improving the warfighting capabilities of our Nation's Armed Forces and
to improving the quality of life of our Service men and women and their
families is vital to the security of our Nation, especially now, at
this time of impending crisis.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the
global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability and
security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines, both active and
Reserve, are operating side-by-side in diverse locations, from
Afghanistan, to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the
Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. At
the same time, the Corps maintains a host of other commitments around
the world that support U.S. national security, military, and foreign
cooperation and security strategies. The powerful capability that the
naval services bring to our Joint Forces is a central element of our
Nation's military power.
Marine Corps' operations throughout the past year have highlighted
the versatility and expeditionary nature of our forces. Missions in
support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle marked the most
visible accomplishments of our forward-deployed forces. Marine Air
Control Squadrons continue to provide air control, surveillance, and
air traffic control support to Operation Enduring Freedom during their
deployments to the Central Command area of responsibility. Elsewhere,
the Marine Corps continues to support Operation Joint Forge in the
Balkans by sending civil affairs teams to Bosnia.
Even as the Marine Corps saw one of our busiest years in terms of
operational deployments, participation in realistic, worldwide
exercises remained critical to supporting the Combatant Commander's
Theater Security Cooperation Plans and ensuring that we maintained a
ready and capable force. Over the last year, marines participated in
more than 200 service, joint, and combined exercises. These included
live-fire, field training, command post, and computer-assisted
exercises. Participants varied in size from small units to Marine
Expeditionary Forces. Overseas, Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
Operations Capable) conducted exercises in Jordan, Italy, Croatia,
Tunisia, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Kuwait.
At home, Marine Reserve units were designated as ``on call'' forces
to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency's role in homeland
security. In addition, the Marine Corps also conducted numerous
training operations and internal exercises. This important training
helps develop individual and unit proficiency and competency. It also
allows the Marine Corps to examine unit operational skills and ensures
that each unit has the capabilities required to execute our full range
of missions.
The Marine Corps continues to contribute to the Nation's
counterdrug effort, participating in numerous counterdrug operations in
support of Joint Task Force Six, Joint Interagency Task Force-East, and
Joint Interagency Task Force-West. These missions are conducted in the
Andean region of South America, along the U.S. Southwest border, and in
several domestic ``hot spots'' that have been designated as High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Individual marines and task-organized
units are assigned to these missions in order to provide support for
domestic drug-law enforcement throughout the United States, and to
provide conventional training to military forces in South America that
execute counternarcotics missions. Marine operational and intelligence
teams also support Colombian military efforts to combat narco-
terrorism. Marines of our Reserve Forces have executed the majority of
these missions.
Our successes in these global operations and exercises have not
been achieved alone. We have worked closely alongside the Navy, our
sister Services, and Federal agencies to realize the true potential of
joint, interoperable forces in the new environment of 21st century
warfare. The superior operational and personnel readiness levels we
have been able to maintain directly reflect the strong, sustained
support of Congress in last year's National Defense Authorization and
Appropriations Acts. In fiscal year 2004, we seek your continued
support for the President's budget so we can consolidate the gains made
to date, improve those areas where shortfalls remain, and continue
transforming the way the Navy-Marine Corps team will fight in the 21st
century.

II. BUILDING ON SUCCESS

The President's fiscal year 2004 budget, together with your
support, will provide a strong foundation on which we can continue
building on our successes. Our focus is on improving our ability to
operate as an agile, lethal, ready, and effective member of a broader
Joint Force that takes the complementary capabilities provided by each
Service, and blends them into an integrated and effective force for
meeting future challenges.
Increases in our Military Personnel accounts have a positive effect
on the retention of our most valued assets--our marines. Given the
increasing pressure to modernize and transform the force, the Marine
Corps is constantly working to identify and assess program tradeoffs to
enable the most effectively balanced approach between competing demands
and programs. These tradeoffs occur within a larger context of the
Department's overall program tradeoff decisions, which is driving the
Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely than ever before in our
planning, budgeting, and decisionmaking. An additional concern that
complicates this process is the sizeable unfunded cost of the ongoing
global war on terrorism.
Challenges also arise from the changing realities of our national
security environment. The Marine Corps is committed to the idea that we
will fight as an integral part of a joint team. We continue to place
high priority on interoperability, shared concept development, and
participation in joint exercises with our sister Services.
Additionally, the security environment now demands that we pay more
attention to our role in homeland defense, our critical infrastructure,
and force protection--even as we deploy more forces overseas. These
challenges demand that we balance competing priorities while remaining
focused on maintaining excellence in warfighting.
Adapting to a Changing, Dynamic World
While we adapt the advantages of technology to meet the changing
face of warfare, we draw strength from the unique culture and core
values that make us `marines.' We look for innovation in four broad
areas to address future challenges:

Transformational technology
New operational concepts
Refined organizations
Better business practices

Innovative approaches culled from these efforts should provide
insight into new capabilities that we can adapt for future warfighting.
In this regard, we are currently engaged in an immediate and critical
tasking to define how we, along with our partners in the Navy, intend
to project naval power ashore in the 2015-2025 timeframe. This effort
requires the intellectual rigor and participation of all the elements
of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and is influencing the entire
Marine Corps--from our structure and training to the way we will fight
on future battlefields as an integral component of a Joint Force.
Technology and Experimentation
The plan for realizing future joint concepts consists of three
closely related processes: (1) Joint Concept Development, (2) Joint
Experimentation and Assessment, and (3) Joint Integration &
Implementation. The overall process is more commonly known as Joint
Concept Development and Experimentation. In order to ensure support and
engagement throughout this process, the Marine Corps reorganized to
establish three Joint Concept Development and Experimentation divisions
under the cognizance of the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command. These three organizations are key elements of
Marine Corps transformation and enable full Marine Corps involvement in
joint experimentation and transformation as well as the Navy's Sea
Trial process for naval experimentation and transformation.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory maintains cognizance over
Marine Corps-specific experimentation--with a focus on the tactical
level--to develop enhanced warfighting capabilities for the future.
Technologies and procedures are field tested in experiments conducted
with the operating forces. In addition, the lab coordinates closely
with the Office of Naval Research to identify promising technologies
that support the next generation of warfighting capabilities.
New Concepts and Organizations
The Marine Corps is streamlining force development from concept to
acquisition under the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development. Our
Expeditionary Force Development System is a single system of dynamic
functions integrated into a process that produces and sustains
capabilities to meet the needs of the Marine Corps and the combatant
commanders. The Marine Corps advocates for ground combat, aviation
combat, command and control, and combat service support, as well as the
Marine Requirements Oversight Council, are key participants in the
process. The Expeditionary Force Development System continuously
examines and evaluates current and emerging concepts and capabilities
to improve and sustain a modern Marine Corps. The system is compatible
with and supports naval and joint transformation efforts and integrates
transformational, modernization, and legacy capabilities and processes.
This integrated, concept-based driver for transformation is currently
working on several ideas that will influence the future Marine Corps.
Expeditionary Strike Groups. The Marine Corps and Navy are engaged
in a series of experiments that will explore the Expeditionary Strike
Group concept. This concept will combine the capabilities of surface
action groups, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft with those of
Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
Operations Capable), to provide greater combat capabilities to regional
combatant commanders. In the near future, the Navy-Marine Corps team
will conduct a pilot deployment on the west coast to test the
Expeditionary Strike Group concept. Navy combatants have already been
incorporated within the existing training and deployment cycle of the
Amphibious Ready Group. This experiment will also allow us to test
command-and-control arrangements for the Expeditionary Strike Group. It
will provide critical information to support the future implementation
of the concept and highlight any needed changes in service doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities.
Tactical Aviation Integration. The Navy and Marine Corps team has
embarked on a Tactical Aircraft (Strike-fighter) Integration plan that
will enhance core combat capabilities and provide a more potent,
cohesive, and affordable fighting force. This integration is the
culmination of a long-term effort to generate greater combat capability
from naval fixed-wing strike and fighter aircraft, and represents a
shared commitment to employ the Department of the Navy's resources as
judiciously as possible. This integration has been ongoing for several
years, with four Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet squadrons operating as part
of embarked carrier air wings. This Navy-Marine Corps effort will
guarantee that naval aviation will be integrated as never before, and
will effectively support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the joint
warfighter. Specifically, the integration plan:

Reinforces our expeditionary ethos
Provides a smaller, more capable, more affordable
force for the Department of the Navy
Integrates Marine strike fighters in 10 Navy Carrier
Air Wings
Integrates three Navy strike fighter squadrons into
the Marine Unit Deployment Program
Includes the global sourcing of all DON strike fighter
assets and ensures their support to Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces and regional combatant commanders
Provides increased combat capability forward
Complements the enhanced seabasing concept

A cornerstone of this plan is Department of the Navy funding and
maintenance of legacy aircraft at the highest levels of readiness until
the Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18E/F replace them. This requires an
unwavering commitment to level funding of strike fighter readiness
across the Department of the Navy. These integration-driven readiness
levels will allow the Navy-Marine Corps team to surge more aircraft
than what is possible today.
Enhanced Networked Seabasing. Fully networked, forward-deployed
naval forces and platforms that are integrated into our seabasing
capability will provide naval power projection for Joint Force
Commanders. These forces will use the sea as a means of maneuver,
enabling a broad range of joint campaign operations. Sea-based
operations incorporate, integrate, protect, and sustain all aspects of
naval power projection, from space to the ocean floor, from blue water
to the littorals and inland--without dependence on land bases within
the Joint Operating Area. Seabasing will provide enhanced capabilities
to the naval force, such as rapid force closure, phased arrival and
assembly at sea, selective offload of equipment tailored for individual
missions, and force reconstitution for follow-on employment. The
traditional naval qualities of persistence and sustainment--enhanced by
advanced force-wide networks--underpin the staying power and
flexibility of the sea base. Naval platforms can stay on-station, where
they are needed, for extended periods of time. The at-sea
maneuverability of the seabase, coupled with advanced underway
replenishment technologies and techniques, will ensure force readiness
over time.
Integrated Logistics Capabilities. The Integrated Logistics
Capabilities effort began as a unique collection of military, industry,
and academic organizations collaborating to develop a future vision of
Marine Corps logistics processes. The product is a set of
transformational initiatives that will provide better support to the
warfighter. The purpose of the Integrated Logistics Capabilities
concept and process is to implement a transformation strategy, based on
best practices, that provides the framework for the execution of agile,
effective logistics support to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, with
the focus of streamlining the logistics chain.
Capabilities are being conceptually refined and incrementally
validated in the operating forces as they are identified and
recommended. An assessment of the Proof-of-Concept, published in
November 2002 by the Center for Naval Analysis, reflected improved
supply response time (68 percent reduction in time) and overall repair
cycle time (33 percent reduction).
Over both the mid- and long-term, improved combat effectiveness and
efficiencies in the logistics chain are expected. However, efficiencies
cannot be fully realized until the people, process, and technology
changes are applied across the entire operating force. The logistics
transformation and process modernization, together with the cutting
edge suite of technologies provided by the Global Combat Support
System, will greatly enhance the combat capabilities of Marine forces.
Reestablishment of Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies. We have
validated the requirement to reestablish our Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison
Companies (ANGLICO). These companies will provide our commanders a
liaison capability with foreign area expertise to plan, coordinate, and
employ terminal control of fires in support of joint, allied, and
coalition forces. ANGLICO will be reestablished with a company on each
coast and a separate brigade platoon in Okinawa. Each company will have
a habitual relationship with the Reserves. Full operational capability
is expected by late summer 2004.
Marine Corps-U.S. Special Operations Command Initiatives. Today,
105 marines are filling Special Forces billets around the world. In
addition to providing the current Chief of Staff to U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Marine Corps provides support to and
ensures interoperability with Special Forces through the actions of the
SOCOM-Marine Corps Board. That board met twice in 2002 and developed
initiatives in the areas of Operations, Training and Education,
Communications/C\4\, Information Operations, Psychological Operations,
Civil Affairs, Intelligence, Aviation, Future Concepts, and Equipment
and Technology. One of the initiatives, pursued in coordination with
the Naval Special Warfare Command, is the Marine Corps' first sizeable
contribution of forces to the Special Operations Command. Consisting of
81 marines and 5 sailors, a detachment has been organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct special reconnaissance, direct action, coalition
support, foreign internal defense, and other special operations
missions, and will begin training at Camp Pendleton, California, in
June 2003. They will subsequently transfer to the operational control
of USSOCOM during October 2003 and deploy in April 2004 as augmentation
to a Naval Special Warfare Squadron supporting both U.S. Pacific
Command and U.S. Central Command.
Better Business Practices
We continue to seek out and use better business practices to
achieve greater cost-effectiveness, improve performance, and sharpen
our focus on our warfighting core competencies. In line with the
competitive sourcing initiatives in the President's Management Agenda,
we are increasing emphasis across our supporting establishment on
competing our commercial activities with the private sector. We are
complementing this initiative with continued development of an
effective activity-based costing and management initiative across our
installations. This allows us to focus on the true cost of various
functions and services and to develop benchmarks that enable us to
improve performance and to focus analyses on cost-saving initiatives.
This will occur both in commercial areas that we compete, and in non-
commercial areas that cannot be competed. Competitions completed to
date have resulted in saving millions of dollars annually and returning
almost 900 marines to the operating forces. We will continue to seek
additional competition candidates. Activity-Based Costing and
Management initiatives provided our installation commanders with cost
and performance information that enabled them to save over $37 million
last year. As we refine our databases, we expect continuing increases
both in performance and cost effectiveness.
Through all of the efforts outlined above, the Marine Corps is
building on today's success. As we build on our current capabilities,
embrace innovation, and transform to meet the daunting conventional and
asymmetric threats to U.S. security in the 21st century, we will
continue to be the Nation's Total Force in Readiness, fielding warriors
whose unique seabased expeditionary and combined-arms capabilities will
be critical to success in crisis and conflict. In the process of
balancing our programs to meet these goals, we will focus on two
primary objectives: (1) our main effort--maintaining excellence in
warfighting, and (2) taking care of our marines and families.

III. TAKING CARE OF OUR OWN

Providing for the needs of our marines, their families, and our
civilian marines remain among our top priorities. The most advanced
aircraft, ship, or weapons system is of no value without highly-
motivated and well-trained people. People and leadership remain the
real foundations of the Corps' capabilities. It is important to note
that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including elements of
both active and Reserve components. We continue to strengthen the
exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further integrating the
Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing operations and training.
Human Resources
End Strength. The congressionally-authorized increase in Marine
Corps end strength to 175,000 in response to the global war on
terrorism is very much appreciated. This increase of 2,400 marines
allows us to sustain the increased missions associated with the
activation of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (antiterrorism),
enabling us to replace marines in the active units that we ``borrowed''
in standing up the brigade, and continue to provide the Nation with a
robust, scalable force option specifically dedicated to antiterrorism.
Recruiting. Sustaining our ranks with the highest quality young men
and women is the mission of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command.
Recruiting Command has consistently accomplished this mission for more
than the past 7 years for enlisted recruiting and 12 years for officer
recruiting. These achievements provide the momentum fueling the
continuous pursuit to improve the recruiting process and enhance the
quality of life for our recruiters. To continue to attract America's
finest youth, Recruiting Command has provided recruiters with the best
tools available to accomplish their mission. The Marine Corps supports
the National Call to Service Act and continues to work closely with DOD
in developing an implementation policy. We expect to commence enlisting
individuals under this program commencing October 1, 2003. The Marine
Corps Reserve achieved its fiscal year 2002 recruiting goals,
accessioning 5,904 non-prior service marines and 4,213 prior service
marines. With regard to our Reserve component, our most challenging
recruiting and retention issue is the ability to fill out our Selected
Marine Corps Reserve units with qualified officers. The Marine Corps
recruits Reserve officers almost exclusively from the ranks of those
who have first served a tour as an active duty Marine officer.
While this practice ensures our Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit
officers have the proven experience, knowledge, and leadership
abilities when we need it the most--during mobilization--it limits the
recruiting pool that we can draw from to staff our units. As a result,
the Selected Reserve currently has a shortage of company grade (second
lieutenant to captain) officers. We are exploring methods to increase
the Reserve participation of company grade officers through increased
recruiting efforts, increased command focus on emphasizing Reserve
participation upon leaving active duty, and Reserve officer programs
for qualified enlisted marines. We are also pursuing the legislative
authority to provide an affiliation bonus to Reserve officers as an
additional incentive for participation in the Selected Marine Corps
Reserve.
Retention. Retaining the best and the brightest marines has always
been a major goal of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is by design a
youthful service, however, it is of paramount importance to retain the
highest quality marines to lead our young force. History has proven
that leadership in the Staff Noncommissioned Officer ranks has been the
major contributor to the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. The
Marine Corps has two retention standards. Our First Term Alignment Plan
has consistently achieved its reenlistment requirements over the past 8
years. With one-third of the current fiscal year completed, we have
achieved 87 percent of our first-term retention goal. A look at our
Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (second tour and beyond) demonstrates
that we have already retained 51 percent of our goal for this fiscal
year. Both of these trends indicate healthy continuation rates in our
career force.
Current officer retention is at an 18-year high, continuing the
strong performance of the last 2 years. Despite this positive trend, we
cannot become complacent. As a Corps, we will continue to target
specific qualifications and skills through continuation pay. Military
compensation that is competitive with the private sector provides the
flexibility required to meet the challenge of maintaining stability in
manpower planning.
Marine Corps Reserve--Partners in the Total Force. It is important
to note that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including
elements of both active and Reserve components. We continue to
strengthen the exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further
integrating the Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing training and
operations. Concurrent with the various initiatives underway to improve
integration and update capabilities, the Marine Corps Reserve continues
to support its primary mission of augmentation and reinforcement.
Reserve units and marines provided over 1.8 million man-days in fiscal
year 2002. Reserves provided support at all levels within the Marine
Corps and at combatant commands and high-level staffs.
As we enter the 21st century, the overall structure of Marine
Forces Reserve will retain the current basic structure. However, Marine
Forces Reserve is currently working to create new capabilities
identified as part of its comprehensive review. Both as a structural
and an operational change, Marine Forces Reserve is increasing its
operational ties with the Warfighting Commanders by improving lines of
communication with our operating forces. These increased operational
ties will improve interoperability, increase training opportunities,
and enhance the warfighting capabilities of the Total Force.
Mobilization. Since the events of September 11, the Marine Corps
judiciously activated Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) marines in
response to both internal and joint operational requirements. The
Marine Corps has maximized the use of individual volunteers to meet
these requirements primarily in the areas of staff augmentation and
force protection. In addition, Selected Marine Corps Units (SMCR) were
activated for force protection requirements in support of homeland
security. Because of emerging requirements associated with war on
terrorism, we began involuntary recall of some of our IRRs on January
17, 2003.
Stop Loss. On January 15, 2003, the Marine Corps instituted Stop
Loss across the Marine Corps to meet the emerging requirements
associated with the expanding war on terrorism. Stop Loss was initiated
to provide unit stability/cohesion, maintain unit readiness, meet
expanded force protection requirements, and to reduce the requirement
to active IRR personnel. We will continue to make judicious use of this
authority and continue to discharge marines for humanitarian, physical
disability, administrative, and disciplinary reasons. We have
instructed our general officers to continue to use a common sense
approach and have authorized them to release marines from active duty
if it is in the best interest of the Marine Corps and the marine.
Education
Our leaders--especially our noncommissioned officers--throughout
the entire chain of command have kept the Corps successful and
victorious. Their sense of responsibility is the cornerstone of our
hard-earned successes. We will continue to develop leaders who can
think on their feet, act independently, and succeed. In the future, as
today, leaders will continue to instill stamina and toughness in each
individual while simultaneously reinforcing character that values
honor, integrity, and taking care of our fellow marines--including
treating each other with dignity and respect. Aggressive and informed
leadership demands education, training, and mentoring. The importance
of these key elements cannot be over-emphasized, and we must attend to
each at every opportunity.
Marine Corps University has responsibility and authority for the
planning, coordinating, and overseeing all education for our marines.
The university is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools to confer Masters degrees and currently offers a Masters of
Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, and a Masters of
Military Studies at the Command and Staff College. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff currently accredits the War College, Command and
Staff College, and the College of Continuing Education for Phase I
Joint Education. The President of the University also exercises command
authority over the Expeditionary Warfare School and the Staff
Noncommissioned Officer Academies worldwide. Notable accomplishments
include Department of Education approval of a Masters of Operational
Studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting, which is the first step
toward our third Master's degree program.
Plans for the future include providing coordination and continuity
through a coherent education plan for all marines. Our goal is to
develop better warfighting leaders at all levels through an increased
emphasis on relevant, structured education--at the graduate and
undergraduate level--through both resident programs and distance
education. Our intent is to greatly expand beyond the current emphasis
on field-grade officers to support leadership development throughout
the training and education continuum from marine private through
general officer and to specifically bring senior noncommissioned
officers further along the education continuum.
Our lifelong learning mission is to establish an integrated
approach to learning; providing marines with one destination for
enrollment in a college program, access to research tools such as
books, periodicals, and the Internet, basic skills enhancement, and
nonresident courses. In the face of a requirement to increase tuition
assistance from 75 percent to 100 percent of tuition costs, and the
rate from $187.50 per semester hour to $250 per semester hour, the
Marine Corps added the necessary funds to expand the tuition assistance
program in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which provides sustainment until
fiscal year 2009.
Quality of Life/Quality of Service
Congressional support for increases in the Basic Allowance for
Housing, as well as the aggressive Marine Corps use of the Public
Private Venture (PPV) authority provided by Congress 5 years ago, are
resulting in dramatic improvements to the housing of our marines and
their families. Your continued support of our budget to help us achieve
zero out-of-pocket expenses by fiscal year 2005 is greatly appreciated.
The condition of other infrastructure, such as our barracks,
workspaces, and training ranges, are also key factors in overall
quality of life. While our infrastructure budgets reflect only the
minimal essential military construction and re-capitalization
necessary, they will allow us to achieve a re-capitalization rate of 67
years within the FYDP (down from 100 years in fiscal year 1999) and an
improvement of our facilities readiness by fiscal year 2013.
We have been aggressively working to reduce the number of marines
and civilian marines in non-core business areas, reapplying the marines
to other operational requirements, and looking to optimize the use of
civil service/contractor support where appropriate. Our track record is
good. By example, we have reapplied marines in the garrison food
service and mobile equipment areas back to the operating forces and
competed a significant number of civilian positions. We will continue
this process in line with the President's Management Agenda to review
50 percent of our positions by fiscal year 2008. By ensuring that
quality of service remains high, we will help maintain our successful
record of recruitment and retention.
Families
The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force prepared to deploy on
short notice to accomplish assigned missions. While we may recruit
marines, we almost always retain families--it becomes a family decision
for a marine to stay for an entire career. Because of our expeditionary
culture, deployment support is provided to marines and their families
as part of our normal operations, largely through the efforts of Marine
Corps Community Services. In addition to concerted efforts to improve
housing and family services, security and support is offered during
pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment phases of our
operations. The Marine Corps also offers numerous programs focused on
new parent support and the prevention of domestic violence, as well as
services and programs for infants, toddlers, children, and teens. The
Exceptional Family Member Program focuses on assistance to service
personnel who have a family member with special needs before, during,
and after Permanent Change of Station Orders.
Safety
Ensuring a safe command climate and working environment remains a
critical concern for the Marine Corps. Often, the settings and the work
our marines do are dangerous, but effective command climates
continually mitigate those dangers through planning and leadership. Our
safety programs are integral to force protection and operational
readiness. Leadership and programming in safety awareness and standards
are vital to providing marines and their families with a meaningful
quality of life and service. On the heels of a very successful year
prior, fiscal year 2002 was a disappointing year for safety in the
Corps, as we lost more marines to mishaps in fiscal year 2002 than we
had in any single year for the preceding decade. Our aviation mishap
rate increased as well (from 1.40 to 3.9 class A mishaps per 100,000
flight hours).
These results do not indicate a lack of desire to safeguard
marines. Rather, several factors were involved that made it
particularly difficult to prevent mishaps through normal operational
risk management efforts. Demographically, the Marine Corps is a younger
force than the other Services (by an average 6 to 8 years), with
maturity being a contributing factor in many mishaps; however, none of
these factors are excuses for any failure to avoid preventable mishaps.
Our leadership at all levels is deeply concerned about the negative
trend and we are actively involved in multiple efforts to improve
readiness and save our most precious marines and valuable equipment.

IV. OUR MAIN EFFORT--EXCELLENCE IN WARFIGHTING

Marines have a vision for the future, and we are moving forward
with the modernization and transformation efforts needed to make this
vision a reality. We fully understand that our vision cannot be
achieved independent of our sister Services. Each of the Services has
its own critical role to play in providing for our Nation's collective
security; however, it is important that each of our contributions be,
simultaneously, both unique and complementary. In particular, the Corps
stresses the importance of our key partnership with the Navy. The Navy-
Marine Corps team has never been stronger, or more necessary for our
Nation.
We have stated that our first concern is with the care and
stewardship of our people. This philosophy extends to the rest of our
programming in that we focus on procuring the programs and equipment
that will maximize the abilities of our marines to perform effectively
in combat. With the foundation of requirements drawn from our emerging
concepts, the Marine Corps is transforming its warfighting systems and
assets throughout the elements of our Marine forces. The following
examples reflect but a few of our transformation and modernization
efforts. A more comprehensive description of the Marine Corps' entire
acquisition program can be found in the publication entitled Marine
Corps Concepts & Programs 2003.
Training
We believe the enduring wisdom, ``you train the way you fight.''
Because of this, our training exercises are becoming ever more joint
and combined to provide our marines with the experience they will need
when called upon to respond to crises--because there is no doubt that
we will work alongside our sister Services and coalition partners from
other nations in such circumstances. The Marine Corps Combat Training
Center at Twentynine Palms, California, focuses on integrated live fire
and maneuver, as well as combined arms training, and will continue to
play a central role as our foremost training and testing site for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Ongoing initiatives will expand the
role of the Combat Training Center and transform it into a ``Center of
Excellence'' that will focus the training efforts across our operating
forces. The Combat Training Center facilitates and supports the
development of new concepts and capabilities, thereby reinforcing our
combat effectiveness, enhancing joint interoperability, and supporting
Dodd transformation efforts.
The future role of the Combat Training Center will grow beyond its
current emphasis on battalion-level integrated live fire, combined arms
training to support expanded training opportunities for all elements
(ground, air, combat service support, and command) of Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces up to and including a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This
will include enabling multi-site, distributed training evolutions that
tie together units from various bases; and investing in technology that
simultaneously links live, virtual, and constructive training.
Additionally, improvements to the existing Expeditionary Air Field and
construction of a large-scale urban training facility are being studied
as possible ways to enhance training opportunities at Twentynine Palms.
All of these efforts have the potential to increase the capability of
our training center to support evolving training requirements, enabling
the Corps to maintain its focus on uniquely marine training skills,
while providing a vehicle to further integrate Marine Corps
capabilities into those of the Joint Force.
Infrastructure
Marine Corps infrastructure consists of 15 major bases and stations
and 185 Reserve facilities in the United States and Japan. In keeping
with the Corps' expeditionary nature, these installations are
strategically located near air and seaports of embarkation, and are
serviced by major truck routes and railheads to allow for the rapid and
efficient movement of marines and materiel. Recognized as the ``fifth
element'' of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force because of the close link
to the operating forces and their operational readiness, the condition
of the Corps' bases and stations is of vital importance. With the
ability to train as an integrated force being a fundamental requirement
of the Corps, infrastructure development planning is designed to
provide the facilities, training areas, and ranges (both air and
ground) to accomplish this requirement while minimizing excess and
redundant capacities. With increasing encroachment pressures and
constrained fiscal resources, the Marine Corps face significant
challenges to provide and maintain a lean and efficient infrastructure
that fully meets changing mission demands.
Blount Island Acquisition. We are committed to undertake the wisest
possible course to conserve our real property and, when necessary, to
acquire any additional property that is mission critical. The Blount
Island facility in Jacksonville, Florida, is a national asset that must
be acquired to ensure its availability for long-term use. Blount
Island's peacetime mission of supporting the Maritime Pre-positioning
Force is vitally important, while its wartime capability of supporting
large-scale logistics sustainment from the continental United States
gives it strategic significance. The facility will play a vital role in
the national military strategy as the site for maintenance operations
of the Maritime Pre-positioning Force for years to come. The Marine
Corps plans to acquire the Blount Island facility in two phases. Phase
1, funded in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001, is currently in
progress and will acquire interests in approximately 311 acres of land
for the primary purpose of ensuring public safety on parcels adjacent
to the leased central management operational area. Phase 2, planned for
fiscal year 2004, involves acquisition of the central maintenance
operational area, consisting of over 1,000 acres.
Training at Eglin Air Force Base. With cessation of training at
Vieques, Puerto Rico, the established training ranges, quality of
training support, and proximity to the ocean available at Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida, can provide Naval Expeditionary Forces with an
alternative training capability. Eglin's capabilities, location, and
tenant commands provide the opportunity to facilitate joint training
between Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Special Operations
Forces. Development of an expeditionary force training capability at
Eglin can support the Secretary of Defense's vision and direction for
training transformation and the development of a Joint National
Training Capability. This type of training will be critical to naval
expeditionary combat-readiness.
The Marine Corps proposes to execute two 10-day training exercises
with a Marine Expeditionary Unit at Eglin each year. These exercises
include a variety of scenarios such as amphibious landings, raids,
mechanized operations, helicopter operations, and live fire and
maneuver exercises. No final decision on training activities will be
made until an environmental assessment currently underway is completed.
The Navy and Marine Corps are actively working to develop and sustain
cooperative relationships with the local community and the State of
Florida.
Encroachment and Environmental Issues. Encroachment--defined as any
deliberative action that can cause the loss of, or restrict, the use of
land, airspace, frequency, or sea maneuver areas--is a serious threat
to the operational readiness of the Corps. Urban and residential areas
now surround many Marine installations that were originally remotely
situated. This growth is often accompanied by pressure for access to
Marine Corps resources, or demands to curtail Marine Corps operations
to make them more compatible with surrounding land uses. The Corps'
training lands often provide excellent habitat for threatened and
endangered species, serving as islands of biodiversity amid the crush
of densely populated urban areas that surround many of our
installations. The Marine Corps is proactively engaged with Federal,
State, and local agencies and governments, as well as nongovernmental
organizations, to provide win-win solutions to these encroachment
pressures, and ensure compatible land usage and environmental security
without degrading training and mission readiness. Unimpeded access to
our installations and ranges is critical to the Marine Corps remaining
America's ``Force in Readiness.''
Our Nation has crafted a strong environmental code of conduct
structured on a wide range of Federal, State, and local laws and
regulations. Vague or inflexible environmental requirements, however,
can present significant challenges for marines performing their primary
mission. We support ongoing efforts to seek clarity and limited
flexibility in certain environmental laws, so that we may more
effectively balance our training requirements with our long-term
environmental stewardship responsibilities. Our ultimate goal is to
``train the way we fight,'' while preserving the natural environment.
Today, marines at all levels perform their jobs with an increased
awareness of potential environmental impacts. All of our bases and
stations, for example, have implemented Integrated Natural Resource
Management Plans and aggressive pollution prevention programs. The hard
work does not end with these initiatives. The impact of encroachment on
the Corps' ability to fully utilize its installations are varied and
require constant vigilance and attention to ensure that operational
readiness is not diminished.
Command and Control
Interoperability is the key to improving naval expeditionary
command and control effectiveness, especially as we begin to integrate
battlespace sensors residing in our manned and unmanned aerial, space,
and ground vehicles. This is particularly true as the Marine Corps
continues to work routinely with a range of government, non-government,
and international agencies. The command, control, communication, and
computer (C\4\) end-to-end interoperability of the Global Information
Grid will serve to enhance our ability to conduct joint, multi-
department, and multi-agency operations through the use of technology,
standards, architectures, and tools.
The Marine Corps works closely with the Joint Staff, combatant
commanders, operating forces, and other Services to ensure that, where
possible, joint concepts of operations are developed for common
capabilities. An example of this process is occurring with the
development of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which combines numerous
single function programs of current inventories into a single,
interoperable, joint radio program that will provide secure digital
communications while enhancing wideband tactical networking.
Intelligence
Our fiscal year 1996-2003 enhancements to Marine Intelligence
Support are paying off during Operation Enduring Freedom and the global
war on terrorism. Intelligence Support organic to Marine Forces
combined with capabilities from our Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
in Quantico, Virginia, to provide federated production (reachback)
support has been validated through current operations. Marine
Expeditionary Unit's forward deployed with organic all-source
intelligence collection and production capabilities provide current
intelligence support to Marine and Special Operations units. Our
deployed signals intelligence, human intelligence, ground sensor, and
reconnaissance teams provide the commander current situational
awareness. All-source intelligence marines have the systems and
training to integrate organic collection, network with the Joint Force
on the ground, and effectively reach back to the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity and joint centers at secure locations.
Mobility
While the global war on terrorism has demonstrated the current
capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team, our continuous
transformation and modernization efforts hold even greater potential
for increasing naval power projection capabilities in the future. Many
of these efforts focus on increased speed, range, payload, and
flexibility of maneuver units--mobility. This concept includes a vision
of an all-vertical lift Air Combat Element, with the introduction of
tiltrotor and short-take-off/vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft. The
following initiatives are some of the keys to the achievement of Marine
Corps operational mobility objectives:
MV-22 Osprey. The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one
aviation acquisition priority. While fulfilling the critical Marine
Corps medium lift requirement, the MV-22's increased capabilities of
range, speed, payload, and survivability will generate truly
transformational tactical and operational opportunities. With the
Osprey, Marine forces operating from the sea base will be able to take
the best of long-range maneuver and strategic surprise, and join it
with the best of the sustainable forcible-entry capability. Ospreys
will replace our aging fleets of CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea
Stallion helicopters.
KC-130J. The KC-130J will bring increased capability and mission
flexibility to the planning table with its satellite communications
system, survivability, and enhancements in aircraft systems, night
systems, and rapid ground refueling. The KC-130J is procured as a
commercial off-the-shelf aircraft that is currently in production. We
are pursuing a multi-year program for purchase with the U.S. Air Force.
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is the Marine Corps' only Acquisition Category
1D program and will be one of the principal enablers of the
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare concept. AAAV will provide never before
realized high-speed land and water maneuver, a highly lethal day/night
fighting ability, and advanced armor and nuclear-biological-chemical
protection. This--coupled with a systematic integration into emerging
service and Joint Command and Control networked information,
communications, and intelligence architectures--will provide the Marine
Corps with increased operational tempo, survivability, and lethality
across the spectrum of operations.
Maritime Pre-positioning Force. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force
(Future) will be the true enabler of primarily sea-based operations.
When it becomes operational, the future Maritime Pre-positioning Force
role will expand beyond that of today, and will provide a true
seabasing capability. In this regard, it will serve four functions that
the current capability cannot: (1) Phased at-sea arrival and assembly
of units; (2) Selective offload of equipment and cargo; (3) Long-term,
sea-based sustainment of the landing force; and (4) At-sea
reconstitution and redeployment of the force. The naval services are
exploring several new technology areas during the development of
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future). Currently, the Maritime Pre-
positioning Force (Future) program is conducting an analysis of
alternatives to inform an acquisition decision by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
High-Speed Vessel (HSV). High-speed vessels will enhance the Marine
Corps' capability to perform a wide range of missions, from providing
support to a theater security cooperation plan to sustaining long-term
operations ashore. High-speed vessels can enhance our ability to
conduct sea-based operations and use the sea as maneuver space. HSVs do
not have the loitering and forcible entry capabilities of amphibious
ships or the pre-positioning capacity of our Maritime Prepositioned
Force Squadrons. However, their shallow draft, high speed,
maneuverability, and open architecture make them a valuable link in a
seamless logistics system that extends from source of supply to the sea
base and the Joint Force, enabling a faster, more responsive, and
capable deployment of a range of force modules from forward-based
``hubs'' such as Okinawa, or from the United States. The Marine Corps
is currently testing and validating these concepts by employing a high-
speed vessel in the Pacific theater as a form of strategic lift.
Power Projection Platforms. Combined with embarked marines, naval
expeditionary warships provide the Nation with forward-presence and
flexible crisis response forces. They also provide a truly unparalleled
expeditionary forcible-entry capability. As part of a joint effort, the
Marine Corps will remain capable of getting to the fight rapidly in
order to decisively deter or defeat adversaries who try to impose their
will on our country or its allies. A fiscally constrained programmatic
goal of 12 Amphibious Ready Groups--one that deliberately accepts
increased operational risk by attempting to balance force structure
with available resources--does not change the warfighting requirement
to lift the Assault Echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades via
future platforms for amphibious shipping. The Marine Corps supports the
LPD-17 and a modified LHD-8 (``Plug Plus'') ship design in fiscal year
2007 and will evaluate the adequacy of the R&D and SCN funding for the
development of future LHA(R) ships for the remainder of the class.
Mine Countermeasure Capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces
require an effective countermine warfare capability to open and
maintain sea lines of communication and to operate within the littoral
battle space. This is probably our greatest concern when it comes to
projecting power in an anti-access environment. With respect to mine
countermeasures, we require a family of capabilities that encompasses
mine detection, location, neutralization, marking, and data
dissemination. Designed to provide an organic mine countermeasures
capability within operationally acceptable timelines and with
acceptable levels of operational risk, this next generation of systems
includes the Advanced Mine Detector, the Assault Breacher Vehicle, the
Remote Minehunting System, and the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance
System. Our most critical mine countermeasures deficiencies exist in
the area near the shoreline through the high water mark and beyond,
where detection and neutralization capabilities are extremely limited.
Given the broad proliferation of known and unknown mined areas
throughout the world, we must improve our ability to operate in this
exceptionally lethal environment. Our intent is to leverage America's
strength in technology to dramatically improve our ability to locate
and avoid or neutralize mines and obstacles as necessary, and
eventually remove the man from the minefield.
Fires and Effects
With the increased range and speed of expeditionary mobility
assets, the landward area of influence of naval forces has increased by
an order of magnitude. Consequently, the Nation requires weapon systems
with correspondingly greater range, lethality, flexibility, and
tactical mobility. A range of lethal and non-lethal fire-support
programs is moving the Corps in that direction. The development and
acquisition of non-lethal weapons systems will expand the number of
options available to commanders confronted with situations in which the
use of deadly force is inappropriate. The Marine Corps is developing a
robust non-lethal capability that will address the non-lethal core
requirements of clearing facilities, crowd control, and area denial.
Additionally, we are enhancing the capabilities with which we can
affect our adversaries that defy the traditional concept of weapons and
fire-support means. Technical advances in directed-energy weapons hold
much promise for future capabilities in this area.
Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is the next-
generation strikefighter for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy and
will replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/Ds. The JSF family
of aircraft will include a STOVL variant, a conventional take-off and
landing (CTOL) variant, and an aircraft carrier-capable variant.
Commonality between the variants will reduce both development and life-
cycle costs and will result in significant savings when compared to the
development of three separate aircraft. The Marine Corps requires that
its STOVL variant be able to operate from large-deck amphibious ships,
austere sites, and forward operating bases. The STOVL Joint Strike
Fighter version can use from three to five times more airfields around
the world than our existing conventional take-off and landing aircraft.
Moreover, because the STOVL variant can operate from both conventional
carriers and amphibious assault ship decks, it thereby effectively
doubles the number of platforms available for seabased operations. The
advantages of a stealthy STOVL strike fighter--capable of taking off
from an expeditionary base on land or at sea, flying at supersonic
cruise, accomplishing its mission with advanced sensors and weapons,
and then returning to its expeditionary site--are dramatic. The STOVL
Joint Strike Fighter will provide the reliability, survivability, and
lethality that marines will need in the years ahead, and transform the
very foundations of naval tactical air power for the 21st century.
Naval Surface Fire Support. Our ability to provide fires in support
of expeditionary forces operations beyond the beach has not kept pace
with the dramatic increases in mobility. Critical deficiencies
currently exist in the capability of the Navy to provide all-weather,
accurate, lethal, and responsive fire support throughout the depth of
the littoral in support of expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps
supports the Navy's near-term efforts to develop an enhanced naval
surface fire support capability with the fielding of the 5-inch/62-
caliber naval gun and the development of extended-range munitions. In
the far-term, the Marine Corps supports the development and fielding of
the Advanced Destroyer [DD(X)], armed with 155 mm Advanced Gun Systems
and Land Attack Missiles, to fully meet our naval surface fire support
requirements. Our Nation's expeditionary forces ashore will remain at
considerable risk for want of suitable sea-based fire support until
DD(X) joins the fleet in significant numbers.
Indirect Fire-Support. A triad of indirect fire-support programs
will provide needed firepower enhancements for marines in the near- to
mid-term. The first element of the triad is the Lightweight-155 mm (LW-
155) towed howitzer needed to replace our current M-198 howitzer, which
is at the end of its service life. The LW-155 is a joint Marine Corps-
Army effort that will meet or exceed all the requirements of the
current system while significantly reducing its weight.
The second element, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS), will deliver very high volumes of rocket artillery in support
of the ground scheme of maneuver. The HIMARS will provide accurate,
responsive general support and general support reinforcing indirect
fires at long range, under all weather conditions, and throughout all
phases of combat operations ashore. It will fire both precision and
area munitions to a maximum range of 36 miles.
The Expeditionary Fire Support System, the third system of the
land-based fire support triad, will accompany marines in any
expeditionary mode of operation. It will be the primary indirect fire-
support system for the vertical assault element of the ship-to-
objective maneuver force. The Expeditionary Fire Support System, as a
system, will be internally transportable by helicopter or tiltrotor
aircraft to allow the greatest range and flexibility of employment for
our future operations.
Information Operations. Defense planners are engaged in studies
exploring Information Operations as a core military competency, fully
integrated into both deliberate and crisis action planning. The Marine
Corps intends to enhance our operational capability in both offensive
and defensive Information Operations. Marine Corps doctrine and
warfighting publications are being reviewed and revised to acknowledge
Information Operations as a core warfighting capability fundamental to
all operations spanning the spectrum of conflict with equal
significance during non-combatant and humanitarian operations. We
recognize a requirement to develop and train an Information Operations
career force of trained professionals from the ground up in support of
joint and interagency efforts.
New Weapons Technologies. The Corps is particularly interested in
adapting truly transformational weapon technologies. We have forged
partnerships throughout the Department of Defense, other agencies, and
with industry over the past several years in an effort to develop and
adapt the most hopeful areas of science and technology. Several notable
programs with promising technologies include: (1) advanced tactical
lasers, (2) high-power microwave, non-lethal active denial systems, (3)
free electron lasers, (4) electromagnetic guns (rail guns), and (5)
common modular missiles for aircraft.
Logistics and Combat Service Support
The Marine Corps logistics' vision is to significantly enhance the
expeditionary and joint warfighting capabilities of our operating
forces. Key warfighting capabilities encompassed in our future
concepts--Enhanced Networked Seabasing and Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver--
will be defined by our logistic capabilities and limitations. Hence, we
are committed to exploring and implementing actions to increase combat
power, operational versatility, and deployability. The concept of
focused logistics in Joint Vision 2020 is guiding the Marine Corps as
we strive to increase the sustained forward-deployed capability of our
forces. Future force combat service support--and the Marine Corps
logistics that enables it--will be changing as we shift more of our
operations to the sea base. At the forefront of this effort is the
Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan that outlines essential objectives
and tasks based upon overarching Marine Corps, naval, joint, and DOD
concepts and guidance. Our strategy encompasses four pillars:
Logistics Information Fusion and C2. A key to current and emerging
warfighting capabilities is a robust and responsive logistics
information technology capability--one that is integrated with our
command-and-control architecture and interoperable with naval and joint
systems. The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) and
shared data environment, along with the Common Logistics Command and
Control System, provide logisticians across the Marine Corps with a set
of common logistics assessment, planning, and execution tools that are
interoperable with the common operating picture.
Seamless Distribution. The single capability that defines Marine
forces in a joint environment is its ability to sustain itself over an
extended period of time. The principal goal is to move from defining
sustainment in terms of deployable ``days of supply'' to a continuous
uninterrupted sustainment capability for the force. A key element in
achieving this is integrating current distribution processes and
systems into broader naval and joint distribution processes. Achieving
this capability will not only greatly enhance naval operations, but
will be transferable to the task of sustaining Joint Forces and
operations.
Enhanced Equipment Readiness. The bulk of our logistics effort and
associated ``footprint'' is driven by its equipment-support activities.
The Marine Corps seeks to reduce the required level of support for
equipment by greatly improving the reliability, availability, and
maintainability of ground tactical equipment.
Enterprise Integration. Achieving the emerging warfighting
capabilities envisioned by future concepts require dynamic shifts in
our logistics processes and organizations. Leading this effort toward
logistics modernization is true enterprise integration consisting of
GCSS-MC, process reengineering, and organizational reform.

V. CONCLUSION

The major challenges confronting the Marine Corps today center on
organizing, training, and equipping our force to better support Joint
Force Commanders, now and in the future. The modernization programs and
the transformational systems that we are pursuing are key to our
ability to meet the Nation's wartime, crisis, and peacetime
requirements. We have put into place well-conceived programs addressing
the needs of our marines and their families, the requirement to enhance
the current readiness of legacy systems, the critical role
infrastructure plays in present and future readiness, and the balance
between modernization and transformation.
Our capabilities, combined with those of our sister Services and
Special Operations Forces, form the integrated array of military
capabilities America needs to confront an increasingly varied and
threatening national security landscape. You can remain justifiably
proud of what your Marine Corps contributes as America's forward
engagement and expeditionary combined-arms force. We are grateful for
the unwavering support you provide in this vitally important work.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Jumper.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE

General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you here today. I am proud to represent the
airmen of our United States Air Force who serve proudly beside
the soldiers, sailors, and marines represented at the table
here today.
I would like to echo my support and my thanks for what this
committee has done to improve the readiness of our forces
around the world. There is nothing that contributes more to
retention than to give that crew chief on the flight line the
part he needs to fix his airplane. I share Vern Clark's
sentiment; it has never been better in our United States Air
Force, but it is due to the support that is felt from this
committee, and we thank you for that.
This year we celebrate 100 years of powered flight. Many of
those celebrations will go on in Senator Dole's State and
around the United States. We have come a long way since those
days. We find ourselves in a much different world than we
expected as we face a variety of threats from the linear
battlefields of Iraq to the cave environments of Afghanistan.
But these challenges have been and will continue to be met
through a force of dedicated airmen from the active duty, the
Guard, and the Reserve. We have all had a busy year and our
tempo continues unchecked. Over the skies of our own United
States, we have flown more than 25,000 fighter sorties. Today,
the 390th Fighter Squadron from Mountain Home, Idaho, is
overhead the Capitol even as we sit here today. They have been
joined by tanker, airlift, and surveillance sorties 75 percent
of which have been flown by our National Guard and Reserve over
the United States.
We have 14,000 airmen in and around Afghanistan today and
have contributed to the joint effort nearly 70,000 sorties,
including 8,000 tanker sorties, which are the heart and soul of
our global strike effort.
All of these things are joined by efforts in Operations
Northern and Southern Watch, where we have had 9,000 airmen
deployed, have flown over 14,000 sorties in this past year, and
along with our Marine and Navy colleagues have gotten shot at
from the ground in Iraq virtually every day of the year.
We have also been engaged in significant humanitarian
efforts around the world. We are all familiar with the
disasters in Guam and, closer to home, the firefighting efforts
that we have all been a part of.
All this to say that our tempo is high and our people have
been sprinting for a long time, but they never fail to answer
the call, as you saw during your visit to overseas, Mr.
Chairman.
To deal with the tempo problems that have emerged since the
demise of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War, we
have organized ourselves into air expeditionary forces,
borrowing a chapter from the book of the Navy and the Marine
Corps, trying to get ourselves into a deployable rotational
scheme that puts predictability into the lives of our people.
Again, this is a total force effort and includes our National
Guard and Reserve.
This scheme has served to graphically point out many of our
shortages in our personnel, manning, and critical skills. We
are having to pull 23,000 of our airmen forward from future
rotation force packages to deal with the current situation as
we get ready for what the President might ask us to do in
Southwest Asia. These shortages in combat engineers, medical,
combat communications, and security forces are but a few
examples of what we are trying to deal with.
Another point of stress is our aging aircraft. Along with
our colleagues in the Navy, our average aircraft age is now
about 23 years of age. It is the oldest we have ever had to
deal with, and corrosion and fatigue problems that we have
never seen before are emerging. We are looking at costs of
repairing these aircraft rising at more than 10 percent a year.
Engines are another problem. We have had to add inspections
that have increased our manhours by about 200,000 manhours just
to inspect engines in the field to catch problems before they
happen.
Our space systems are little different. We have done a
great job, with the help of this committee, to replace our
aging launch fleet with the Atlas IV with the Atlas V and the
Delta IV rockets as well as the EELV launch systems that are
coming into service. It is hard to believe that our defense
satellite program is now 32 years old and our Minuteman III
systems are 30 years old, but it is true.
What are we doing to deal with these issues? You have seen
the people. We have all seen the people. They will not quit.
They will do whatever we ask them to do. Like Vern, our
recruiting and our retention is better than it has ever been.
One of the things that we have been asked to do by our
Secretary of Defense as a part of his personnel transformation
initiative is to make sure that we are making the best use of
our people. One of the initiatives we have had at Robins Air
Force Base in Georgia is to blend a wing of National Guard and
active and bring them together under the leadership of a
National Guard wing commander to make best use of the great
experience in that Guard unit and the ready response of our
active personnel.
This, along with other initiatives, has been approved by
our Secretary of Defense, and this includes educational
opportunities. Our Secretary of the Air Force has gone with the
Secretary of the Navy and blended the postgraduate education of
the Naval Postgraduate School with the Air Force Institute of
Technology so that we are not double-teaching and we share the
same professors and the same curricula. We have even opened
some postgraduate education opportunities to our enlisted
force. Today at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base at the Air
Force Institute of Technology, you will find seven Marine Corps
enlisted along with eight U.S. Air Force enlisted enrolled
getting master's degrees.
All these people, Mr. Chairman, are marvelous. I had the
opportunity this year to go give Air Force crosses to the
widows of two of our airmen who died in Afghanistan, Senior
Airman Jason Cunningham and Tech Sergeant John Chapman. We have
another of those heroes with us here today. I would like to
introduce Staff Sergeant Allen Yoshida, who is seated behind me
here tonight. Allen was badly wounded in Afghanistan and we
have asked him as he recovers to be a part of our effort,
another one of the Secretary of Defense's efforts, to
streamline our acquisition process.
It is Sergeant Yoshida, with his direct operational
experience, who is working directly with our acquisition
community to get the pieces of equipment rapidly fielded that
will make the job of the combat controller on the ground that
much easier. We salute his service, Mr. Chairman.
All of these acquisition initiatives are not just with what
we do on the ground, but we have seen similar acquisition
initiatives streamlines into our remotely piloted aircraft as
well. As Vern Clark pointed out, we have efforts with the
United States Navy to put ourselves together where we can in
the remotely piloted vehicle and the conventionally armed
unmanned vehicle programs as well.
We have continued our development of the F/A-22. This
airplane will give us 24-hour stealth capability for the first
time. It has already got the qualities of the best air-to-air
fighter in the world, but its main focus will be on what it can
do air-to-ground, and as it moves into the future, to add the
ability to hit moving targets in and under the weather with the
F-22.
Blending with the United States Army's concept of
operations, which calls for brigade combat teams behind enemy
lines, the F/A-22 will be able to reach the sergeants on the
ground and put ordnance on the ground in support of them in a
rapid way.
We are also working toward the notion of integrating, as
Vern Clark said, and networking along with the other Services,
and we have asked for the Multi-Sensor Command and Control
Aircraft to be a part of this transformation. It will
horizontally integrate at the machine level manned, unmanned,
and space platforms. It will allow us to coordinate our defense
to things like cruise missiles, to which we think we are very
vulnerable today, and it will be able to join in quickly with
naval and land forces to do rapid targeting.
Vern Clark likes to say that his favorite word for the
decade is ``persistence,'' and I could not agree with him more.
As we do remotely piloted aircraft into the future, such as
Predator and Global Hawk, and we bring the Predator B on line
with its six weapon stations and the ability to loiter for more
than 30 hours, we will see great leverage come to those on the
battlefield.
Sir, I can tell you that one of the great improvements we
have seen is in readiness and one of the great worries that I
have is to make sure that we keep our training ranges available
for all of our air, land, and sea forces. We have seen much
about encroachment issues. Another one of Secretary Rumsfeld's
initiatives is to maintain the edge we have in our training
with his range readiness and preservation initiatives, which we
ask for our support, Mr. Chairman.
Sir, there are many other initiatives under way, not only
in the Air Force but in the Department of Defense, that have to
do with streamlining processes and unloading administrative
burdens. I think we are going to see great improvements in all
these in the future.
Once again, let me thank all of the members of the
committee for their support. Sir, your Air Force has never been
more ready, and we are ready to do anything the President asks.
Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Jumper follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has an
unlimited horizon for air and space capabilities. Our Service was borne
of innovation, and we remain focused on identifying and developing the
concepts of operations, advanced technologies, and integrated
operations required to provide the Joint Force with unprecedented
capabilities and to remain the world's dominant air and space force.
The Wright brothers' historic flight in 1903 ushered in the dawn of
a dramatic era of scientific, cultural, and technological advances. As
the Air Force celebrates this centennial of powered flight, we do so
with the recognition that, despite the daunting challenges of a more
dynamic security environment, the next hundred years will witness
equally fantastic achievements. The 2003 Air Force Posture Statement
reflects this optimism. In this report, we relate some of our
accomplishments of 2002 as well as our vision of an innovative and
adaptive force capable of guaranteeing American air and space dominance
for the decades to come. Our successes are America's successes; they
are the direct result of the selfless and unconditional service by men
and women of the total Air Force and their families.
During the past year, and in the midst of combat and a variety of
contingency operations, we evaluated, implemented, and validated a host
of technological advances, organizational changes, and concepts of
operation. These enabled us to deliver desired effects faster and with
greater precision than at any time in the history of warfare. Such
adaptation is characteristic of our Service, as airmen continually
strive to push innovation ever forward en route to unprecedented air
and space capabilities for combatant commanders, the Joint Force, and
our Nation. In the year ahead, we will move our expeditionary Air Force
closer to realizing the transformational imperatives of this new era,
machine-to-machine digital integration of manned, unmanned and space
assets, and joint command and control. Our concepts of operations
leverage this integration, and expand our asymmetric advantages in air
and space--advantages that are fundamental to defending America's
interests, assuring our allies and coalition partners, and winning the
Nation's wars.
We recognize the responsibility for America's security is not one
we shoulder alone. We work tirelessly toward developing and training
professional airmen, transitioning new technologies into warfighting,
and integrating the capabilities of our sister Services, other
government agencies, and those of our friends abroad to act in the most
efficient and effective manner across all operations--from humanitarian
to combat missions. At the same time, we pay special attention to the
consolidating aerospace industry, our acquisition processes, and our
critical modernization challenges, to ensure we will be able to draw
upon our core competencies for decades to come.
Blessed with full endorsement from the American people, Congress,
and the President, we will remain the world's dominant Air Force. We
are honored to serve with America's airmen, and we sincerely appreciate
the confidence in our commitment and capability to provide our great
Nation with superiority in air and space.

INTRODUCTION

As America approaches the 100th anniversary of powered flight, the
Air Force realizes that the Nation is only in the adolescence of air
and space capabilities. Yet we envision a future that will manifest
dramatic advances in propulsion, operational employment, weapons
systems, information technology, education, and training for our air
and space forces. It is a future of unprecedented, seamless integration
of air and space capabilities with joint command and control at the
operational level of war, and machine-to-machine integration at the
tactical level. We are pursuing these changes--some elementary, others
revolutionary--which will dramatically escalate the capabilities
available to the Joint Forces of the United States, perpetuate American
air and space dominance, and redefine the nature of warfare.
If there was any ambiguity about the nature of the security
environment in this new century, the attacks of September 11, 2001
crystallized the setting. Just as the turmoil of the previous decade
eluded prediction, the dynamic setting of the decades ahead poses even
greater predictive challenges as centers of power and sources of
conflict migrate from traditional origins. No longer will it suffice to
prepare for real and perceived threats from nation-states. Instead,
America must apply the sum of our operational experiences and
experimentation to develop dynamic, flexible, and adaptable forces,
capable of dissuading, deterring, and defeating a much wider range of
potential adversaries, while still assuring our friends and allies.
This fluid setting underscores the need for doctrinal agility, and
expeditious and responsive acquisition, planning, and execution across
the spectrum of capabilities in support of homeland security--from the
most difficult anti-access scenario to humanitarian relief. As new
generations of technology proliferate among potential adversaries, we
also are reminded of the need to keep pushing technology forward. In
less than 100 years, we elevated from a Kitty Hawk biplane flying 100
feet on a 12-second flight, to a host of sophisticated, stealthy aerial
vehicles capable of reaching any place in the world, and an array of
satellites that circle the globe continuously. We do not rest on these
achievements, but instead engage a new generation of innovation.
Therefore, our mission is to make calculated research, development, and
procurement decisions with the resolve to integrate all of our combat,
information, and support systems into an enterprise architecture that
contributes joint air and space capabilities to help win the Nation's
wars.
Meeting these requirements also warrants our continued
transformation into an expeditionary force with the culture,
composition, and capabilities to fulfill our evolving operational
tasks. As the scope of global contingencies requiring American
involvement has multiplied, we have witnessed the substantial value of
agility, rapid response, and integration. Thus, we are becoming ever
more responsive in time, technology, and training, and in the process,
we are elevating Air Force contributions to joint capabilities, while
developing our airmen as joint warfighters.
A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld laid out a number of key priorities
for the Department of Defense (DOD). All of these--from pursuing the
global war on terrorism and strengthening joint warfighting
capabilities, to streamlining the DOD processes and improving
interagency integration--demand across-the-board changes in the way the
Defense Department operates. The Air Force has taken advantage of this
opportunity to evaluate and strengthen our capabilities, and to
fundamentally drive our investment strategy.
As we contemplate more than a decade of unprecedented success using
air and space power, we recognize that we never fight alone. The
emerging interdependence of joint, coalition, and alliance partnerships
throughout a decade of contingency warfare has been a profound lesson
learned. Through cooperative planning, we will realize the full
potential of our Service--bringing to bear fully integrated air and
space capabilities.
It is our imperative to approach this planning and integration with
innovation and vision, fundamentally focused on capabilities. All of
the Armed Forces are focusing on meeting the Quadrennial Defense
Review's ``1-4-2-1'' force-shaping construct, by defining the
fundamental capabilities required to meet the challenges of a changing
world. These are: to defend the United States through homeland
security; to deter aggression and coercion in the four critical regions
of Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Asian littorals; to
swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while being
capable of decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and to conduct a
number of smaller scale contingencies. A revitalized, capabilities-
focused approach to operational military requirements will allow us to
meet these missions.
Our focus on capabilities for an uncertain future has inspired us
to adapt anew the way we organize, train, and equip our forces. We have
begun by developing Task Force Concepts of Operations (TF CONOPs),
which will define how we will fight and integrate our air and space
capabilities with joint, coalition, and alliance forces. The
requirements that emerge from these operational concepts will guide a
reformed acquisition process that will include more active, continuous
partnerships among requirement, development, operational, test, and
industry communities working side-by-side at the program level.
This process can only be successful with the help of a vibrant
defense industry. Yet today the aerospace industry is consolidating to
a point that threatens to diminish the advantages of competition. This,
in turn, can lead to loss of innovation, diminished technical skill
base, lower cost efficiencies, and other challenges. We must foster
increased competition to ensure the long-term health of an industrial
sector critical to our national security. While the Air Force will
continue to advance the vision and associated capabilities for air and
space, we also must challenge industry in order for it to stay on the
cutting edge of technology and efficient management practices.
Finally, transforming our force will not be possible without a
process to educate, train, and offer experience to the right mix of
Active Duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and civilian airmen
who understand the nature of our changing security environment. To
achieve this, we will evolve what we have traditionally called the
``personnel'' function in new ways so as to blend Professional Military
Education, advanced academic degrees, and assignment policies under the
auspices of ``Force Development.''
This is the United States Air Force in 2003--inherently innovative,
tirelessly dedicated, and comprised of the very best airmen and
capabilities in the world to ensure American security and defend her
interests. This is what our Nation expects, and we will continually
meet that expectation.

WHAT WE DO

The United States Armed Forces exist to fight and win our Nation's
wars, which no service can accomplish alone. The Air Force's pivotal
role is to deliver fully capable and integrated air and space power to
the Joint Force Commander (JFC). By dominating the media of elevation,
the Air Force offers unique warfighting capabilities that leverage the
strengths of surface forces and expand the range of potential effects.
Air and space are realms with unlimited horizons for discovery and
development. While the Air Force has made tremendous strides in
realizing the visions of early airmen and exploiting the operational
potential in each medium, we know there is an array of capabilities as
yet undiscovered. As the Air Force strives to realize these
possibilities, we deliver a multitude of air and space achievements for
joint warfighting.
Although relatively short, Air Force history reveals fundamental
competencies that are core to developing and delivering air and space
power--those unique institutional qualities that set the Air Force
apart from the other Services and any other military force in the
world. By identifying and keeping these competencies foremost in our
vision, we are able to more effectively advance the unique
capabilities, as well as the ultimate effects, the Air Force provides
to the Joint Force and the Nation.
The Air Force continually develops areas of expertise that make us
the preeminent air and space force in the world. Previously, we
distilled these into six distinctive capabilities which we referred to
as our ``core competencies''--Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack,
Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority,
and Agile Combat Support. However, just as our concepts of operations
and capabilities continuously evolve, so also does the way in which we
articulate Air Force competencies. With deeper refinement, we learned
there are more fundamental elements to what we are as an Air Force and
how we develop our capabilities for joint warfighting. These are our
underlying institutional air and space core competencies, those that,
in fact, make the six distinctive capabilities possible: Developing
Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations. These
three air and space core competencies form the basis through which we
organize, train, and equip and from which we derive our strengths as a
service.

(1) Developing Airmen: The heart of combat capability

The ultimate source of air and space combat capability resides in
the men and women of the Air Force. The potential of technology,
organization, and strategy are diminished without professional airmen
to leverage their value. Our Total Force of active duty, Guard,
Reserve, and civilian personnel are our largest investment and most
critical asset. They are airmen, steeped in our expeditionary Service
ethos. Therefore, from the moment they step into the Air Force through
their last day of service, we are dedicated to ensuring they receive
the precise education, training, and professional development necessary
to provide a quality edge second to none. The full spectrum
capabilities of our Air Force stem from the collective abilities of our
personnel; and the abilities of our people stem from career-long
development of professional airmen.

(2) Technology-to-Warfighting: The tools of combat capability

The vision of airmen in employing air and space power fundamentally
altered how we address conflict. As the leader in military application
of air and space technology, the Air Force is committed to innovation
and possesses a vision to guide research, development, and fielding of
unsurpassed capabilities. Just as the advent of aircraft revolutionized
joint warfighting, recent advances in low observable technologies,
space-based systems, manipulation of information, precision, and small,
smart weapons offer no less dramatic advantages for combatant
commanders. The Air Force nurtures and promotes its ability to
translate vision into operational capability in order to produce
desired effects. Our innovative operational concepts illuminate the
capabilities we need, allowing us to develop unsurpassed capabilities
to prevail in conflict and avert technological surprise.
The F/A-22 is demonstrative of this ability to adapt technology to
warfighting capabilities. Originally envisioned as an air superiority
fighter, it has been transformed into a multi-role system. The F/A-22
not only brings to bear warfighting capabilities without equal for
decades to come, but also includes those we did not foresee at its
inception. Collectively, the platform's supercruise, stealth,
maneuverability, and novel avionics will deliver the ability to create
crucial battlefield effects to the hands of the warfighter, and allow
access to revolutionary concepts of operations.

(3) Integrating Operations: Maximizing combat capabilities

Effectively integrating the diverse capabilities found in all four
Services remains pivotal to successful joint warfighting. The Air Force
contributes to this enduring objective as each element of air and space
power brings unique and essential capabilities to the Joint Force. Our
inherent ability to envision, experiment, and ultimately execute the
union of a myriad of platforms and people into a greater synergistic
whole is the key to maximizing these capabilities. In so doing, we are
able to focus acquisition and force planning on systems that enable
specific, effects-based capabilities, rather than on individual
platforms.
Embedded in our exploration of innovative operational concepts is
the efficient integration of all military systems--air, land, maritime,
space, and information--to ensure maximum flexibility in the joint
delivery of desired effects across the spectrum of conflict, from war
to operations short of war. However, effective integration involves
more than smart technology investment--it also requires investigation
of efficient joint and service organization and innovative operational
thinking. Thus, investments in our people to foster intellectual
flexibility and critical analysis are equally as important as our
technology investments.
Collectively, our air and space core competencies reflect the
visions of the earliest airmen and serve to realize the potential of
air and space forces. We foster ingenuity and adventure in the
development of the world's most professional airmen. We seek to
translate new technologies into practical systems while we encourage
intellectual innovation at every level of war. We drive relentlessly
toward integration in order to realize the potential and maturation of
air and space capabilities.
Our proficiency in the three institutional air and space core
competencies underpins our ability to deliver the Air Force's six
distinctive capabilities in joint warfighting. In turn, our
capabilities enable desired effects across the spectrum of joint
operations through our task forces drawn from our air and space
expeditionary forces. The results of this relationship between core
competencies, distinctive capabilities, and operational effects are
manifest in the array of successful missions the Air Force accomplished
in the past year and those we continue to execute.
Expeditionary Construct
Our core competencies reflect a legacy of innovation and adaptation
to accomplish our mission. This point is underscored by the fact that,
in spite of over a 30-percent reduction in manpower in the past 12
years, we have faced an exponential increase in worldwide taskings.
Intensifying operations tempo (OPTEMPO) requires significant changes in
the way our force trains, organizes, and deploys to support JFC
requirements. We are a truly expeditionary force--the nature off our
``business'' is deployed operations.
The Air Force meets JFC requirements by presenting forces and
capabilities through our Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
construct. This divides our combat forces into 10 equivalent AEFs, each
possessing air and space warfighting and associated mobility and
support capabilities. A key element of our ability to deliver these
tailored and ready expeditionary forces is our development of Task
Force Concepts of Operations. Our TF CONOPs describe how we fight and
how we integrate with out sister services and outside agencies. They
are the fundamental blueprints for how we go to war. Combined with our
AEF construct--the principal tool we use to present expeditionary
wings, groups, and squadrons--TF CONOPs will guide our decisions in
operational planning, enable us to provide scalable, quick-reacting,
tasked-organized units from the 10 standing AEFs, and sustain our
ability to ensure trained and ready forces are available to satisfy
operational plans and contingency requirements.
The AEF construct incorporates a 15-month cycle during which two
AEFs are designated as lead for a 90-day ``eligibility'' period. During
this period, the two are either deployed or on alert for daily,
worldwide expeditionary taskings, for which they are tailored and
presented to the JFC as expeditionary squadrons, groups, and wings
(depending on the specific requirement). Meanwhile, the remaining eight
AEFs are in various stages of reconstituting, training, or preparatory
spin-up. It is during this preparatory time (approximately 2 months)
that we integrate the training-to-task of AEF squadrons immediately
prior to their on-call window.
Yet, it is important to note that while our combat forces cycle
through deployment vulnerability periods, they sustain wartime
readiness throughout the 15-month training and preparation cycle--a
critical drive of our 90-day eligibility window. Our AEF cycle thus
precludes the need for ``tiered'' readiness by allowing our combat
forces to remain current and capable for any contingency or operational
plan.
While ensuring necessary capabilities for the JFC, AEF cycles allow
us to provide our airmen with a more stable and predictable environment
in which to train, re-fit, and equip. In addition, AEF scheduling makes
it easier and more practicable for the Air Reserve Component (ARC)
forces--Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG)--
to bring their essential contributions to bear by allowing them to plan
definitive absences from their civilian employment. This is a critical
advantage of the AEF construct, as ARC forces comprise nearly half of
the forces assigned to AEFs and contribute the majority of forces for
some mission areas.
Operations in 2002
Confident in our air and space capabilities, and committed to
meeting any mission tasked, the Air Force completed an unprecedented
array of operations and exercises in 2002. From the mountain ranges in
Afghanistan and the jungles of the Philippines to the deserts of the
Middle East, and across every continent and body of water, the Air
Force joined with land and naval forces to secure America's national
objectives. With each mission, the Joint Force grows more capable as it
applies vision, experimentation, and integration to every undertaking.
We do not act as individual services, but in concert as joint
warfighters, as we prevail in the war on terrorism and in all
undertakings.
Assuring our Nation's citizens, the Air Force conducts a range of
alert postures involving more than 200 military aircraft at over 20
airbases for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). In conjunction with
unprecedented NATO airborne warning support and other U.S. assets, we
have provided continuous combat air patrols over sensitive/high risk
areas, and random patrols over other metropolitan areas and key
infrastructure. Last year, we flew over 25,000 ONE fighter, tanker,
airlift, and airborne warning sorties, made possible only through the
mobilization of over 30,000 Reserve component airmen. In fact, the ANG
and AFRC have effected over 75 percent of the total ONE missions. We
will continue this critical mission, as we execute our most fundamental
responsibility--homeland defense.
Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the USAF has
maintained a continuous, steady-force presence in Afghanistan and the
rest of the area of responsibility with more than 14,000 airmen. Air
Force assets provide crucial intelligence and situation awareness,
combat power, and support capabilities for the combatant commander. A
key reason for American military success in the region is the
performance of Air Force special operations airmen. Working in teams
with other special forces, ground units, and coalition elements, airmen
special operators heroically bring to bear the full weight of air and
space capabilities--from the ground. They introduce our adversaries to
the full lethality of our airmen, fully integrated on the ground, in
the air, and from space.
Fully engaged in all aspects of the war on terrorism, from mobility
to close air support, our aircraft and crews flew more than 40,000 OEF
sorties in 2002--over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. Over 8,000
refueling missions marked the linchpin capability for the joint fight--
the tanker force--while the magnificent achievements of airlift assets
rounded out overwhelming mobility efforts. Simply put, Air Force
mobility forces made operations in a distant, land-locked nation
possible.
Beyond air operations, we operated and maintained several
constellations of earth-orbiting satellites. In 2002, we launched 18
missions with a 100-percent success rate--including the first space
launches using Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. These activities
bolstered America's assured access to space and ensured vigorous,
global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile
warning, precision navigation and timing, communications, and weather
systems. In addition, manned, unmanned, and space ISR assets not only
delivered unprecedented battlefield awareness, but with the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), also introduced transformational combat
capabilities.
ONE and OEF levied particularly heavy demands on our security
forces. In CONUS and forward locations, increased alert postures
warranted significant increases in security personnel who constitute a
critical element of our force protection capabilities. These demands
have raised our force protection posture worldwide and have forced us
to adjust to a new ``steady state'' condition. Security forces bear the
brunt of the adjustment effort despite a resultant baseline shortfall
of approximately 8,000 personnel to meet the alert postures. In the
near term, we involuntarily extended for a second year nearly 9,500 ARC
security forces. However, in order to relieve these ARC forces, we
concluded a 2-year agreement with the Army for short-term support, and
initiated several ongoing efforts to combine technology, new processes,
and some manpower shifts to achieve a long-term adjustment to this new
era.
As we adjust, we continue to deliver force protection through the
integrated application of counter and antiterrorism operations, and
preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosive (CBRNE) incidents. We employ a tailored selection and
application of multi-layered active and passive, offensive and
defensive measures. Intelligence and counterintelligence programs
support this integrated effort and remain critical to our success. In
this regard, we continued to develop and employ all-source intelligence
systems, cross-functional intelligence analysis procedures, and an
operational planning process to implement force protection operations
that deter, detect, deny, and destroy threats. Our goal is to see
first, understand first, and act first.
Though engaged in these security enhancements and the global war on
terrorism, our combat operations were not limited to OEF in 2002. Iraqi
forces fired on coalition aircraft over 400 times during 14,000 sorties
supporting Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW).
The Air Force maintained a continuous, regional presence of more than
9,000 airmen, while air and space assets provided vital intelligence,
situation awareness, and indications and warning to monitor Iraq's
compliance with United Nations' directives.
Whether on the ground or in the skies, our airmen also conducted a
host of other missions above-and-beyond standing security requirements
around the globe. Even though the war on terrorism is our national
military focus, airmen joined soldiers, sailors, and marines in the
Balkans, South America, Europe, Asia, and around the world to assure
our friends and allies, while deterring and dissuading our adversaries.
Worldwide humanitarian and non-combat evacuation operations
missions remain other key tasks for Air Force personnel. In 2002, for
example, airlift crews exceeded 2.4 million airdropped daily ration
deliveries in Afghanistan, evacuated allied personnel at threatened
locations around the world, and flew typhoon relief missions to Guam,
while our explosive ordnance specialists removed unexploded munitions
in Africa. Yet, while conducting unprecedented food, medical, civil
engineering, and evacuation relief efforts in warring regions, we were
also on call to perform critical, quick-response missions during
natural or man-made crises at home. Through explosive ordnance
disposal, firefighting, law enforcement support, and rapid medical
response expertise, we conducted daily operations in support of local,
State, and Federal agencies. During the wildfire season, ANG and AFRC
C-130s equipped with modular airborne fire fighting systems flew nearly
200 sorties while assisting U.S. Forest Service firefighting efforts in
numerous States. In addition, when Hurricane Lili endangered Louisiana,
Air Force aeromedical and critical care forces rolled in with C-9
aircraft to transport and safeguard 40 patients from threatened
hospitals.
Training Transformation
Training is a unique American military strength. As potential
adversaries work to overcome our technological superiority, it is
imperative we enhance this strength through improved proficiency at the
tactical level and integration at the joint level. Training is integral
to our core competencies and the critical enabler for military
capabilities, so we are engaged with the other services, unified
commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in
developing and implementing a training transformation plan. Our
objective is to train as we will fight and increase the joint context
of our exercises through live, virtual, distributed, and constructive
environments. It is the realism of this training that gives us the edge
in combat. This involves not only modernizing the integration of space
and information operations on our ranges, but also planning for their
sustainment to meet future test and training missions while
implementing environmentally sound use and management to ensure long-
term availability. Additionally, to expand range support for current
and emerging missions, we are embarking on a new effort to identify and
procure environmental, airspace, and spectrum resources at home and
abroad. Balancing competing economic and environmental needs for these
resources is a growing challenge we face with our regulatory and
community partners. To support this effort, DOD developed the Range and
Readiness Preservation Initiative. This legislation recommends
clarification to environmental laws that, as currently written and
interpreted, can adversely affect resources available to support
training activities at ranges.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises, Interoperability Training, and
Experimentation
We advanced joint and combined interoperability skills with our
sister services and those of 104 nations throughout 111 JCS exercises
and Joint Task Force (JTF) experimentation, conducted in 40 foreign
countries. Exercises ranged from large field training such as Bright
Star, to command post exercises like Positive Response, to smaller, but
equally valuable, humanitarian exercises, as in the school
construction, well drilling, and medical clinic visits of New Horizons-
Jamaica. These activities provided realistic training and enhanced the
effectiveness of all participating nations' forces.
Task Force Enduring Look
Success in future operations hinges upon our ability to learn from
previous operations and exercises. To ensure we learn from ongoing
operations and adapt accordingly, we established Task Force Enduring
Look (TFEL). TFEL is responsible for Air Force-wide data collection,
exploitation, documentation, and reporting for our efforts in ONE/OEF.
The objective for TFEL is clear--provide superior support to the
warfighter and properly recognize and apply lessons learned during
rather than only at the conclusion of these operations.
Through extensive investigation and analysis, TFEL examines joint
warfighting effectiveness, determines implications, and shapes future
Air Force transformation of expeditionary air and space power. The task
force documents lessons learned in a variety of products that cover
every conceivable subject matter. As derivative campaigns unfold, TFEL
will broaden its assessments in follow-on reports. Applying the lessons
in these reports and adapting from our past experiences will help
ensure we prevail in future operations.
We are able to accomplish the full spectrum of air and space
missions and improve our capabilities through lessons learned, by
focusing on the best way to organize, train, and equip. Creativity,
ingenuity, and innovation are the hallmarks of all that we do, all of
which begins with our people.
who we are
``No arsenal and no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so
formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.
It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It
is a weapon that we as Americans do have.'' President Ronald
Reagan, 20 January 1981

America is blessed with vast resources, and chief among these is
her people. In the same way, the Air Force relies on the officers,
enlisted, civilians, and contractors that comprise our Total Force--
active duty, Guard, and Reserve--for cultural strength and unbridled
skill. Air Force strength will never reside in systems alone, but in
the airmen operating them. Nor will our capabilities improve solely
through technology, but instead through the adaptive insight of our
creative and selfless professionals.
Therefore, we recruit and retain a remarkably diverse group to
ensure we reach the fullest potential of air and space forces. Their
backgrounds reflect the cross-section of American culture--all races,
religions, economic and educational backgrounds, skill and management
levels, men and women--and make this Air Force the tremendous
organization it is today. Just as diverse individual citizens find
unity in the term American, our personnel embrace an identity and
fundamental perspective as airmen.
The underlying qualities found in all airmen emanate from our core
values--integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all
that we do. Embedded in these core values are the inherent
characteristics of our confident, capable airmen--courage, tenacity,
professionalism, vision, pride, and, when faced with seemingly
insurmountable obstacles, heroism. Indeed, today's airmen carry on the
traditions and visions of the earliest generation of airmen while
preparing for the challenges of the future.
The diversity of our airmen energizes the advancement of America's
air and space power. Airmen embrace transformational ideas and seek to
apply them to every aspect of the Air Force, from organizational
constructs to concepts of operations and employment. They are able
stewards of the Nation's space programs, advancing ideas and
technologies for national security, as well as for the environmental
and economic benefit of our Nation and the world. Yet, ultimately our
standout advantage is our warrior airmen themselves, who demonstrate
skills and dedication in combat unsurpassed by any in history. Whether
maintaining safe skies across the United Nations' sanctioned no-fly one
in Iraq, hunting down terrorists in the jungles of the Philippines, or
paying the ultimate price while rescuing fellow Americans in a battle
on an Afghan ridge, our airmen are proven combat veterans. Their
selflessness resonates the very best of our Service.
Airmen are expeditionary--our natural state of operations is not
``home station,'' but rather, deployed. After two successful cycles,
our AEF construct has been validated as an effective means of meeting
our Nation's expeditionary requirements. Yet we continue to enhance the
construct by initiating significant organizational change to ensure
nearly every airman belongs to 1 of the 10 AEFs. The effect has been a
change to our airmen's mindset and culture, where an individual's AEF
association cultivates an expeditionary perspective and a clearer
appreciation for joint warfighting requirements and capabilities.
Force Development--A New Leadership Development Paradigm
In the past, we addressed aspects of career development, education,
and assignments individually, but not necessarily in a coordinated,
connected approach. Recognizing this, and to prepare for the future
more ably, we introduced a systemic, deliberate force development
construct that evolves professional airmen into Joint Force warriors.
This construct coordinates doctrine and policies, concentrated to
provide the right level, timing, and focus of education, training, and
experience for all airmen, while encompassing personal, team, and
institutional leadership skills across tactical, operational, and
strategic levels.
In the 21st century, we need air and space warriors with mastery of
their primary skills and others who possess competency beyond their own
specialty. However, this diversity must be deliberate to ensure the
correct skills are paired according to institutional requirements.
Force development encourages many to obtain a deep perspective in their
functional area, but at the same time offers the broader perspective we
need to complement our leadership team. We begin this transformation
with the active duty officer corps and will eventually encompass the
civilian, enlisted, and Reserve component to better meet the expanding
challenges of tomorrow.
Education and Technical Training--Emphasis on Joint Leadership/Warfare
As opportunities resident in advancing technologies unfold, it is
imperative that the Air Force be able to draw upon a vibrant collection
of educated, technically skilled, and technologically savvy airmen--
both uniformed and civilian alike. We are answering this fundamental
need in fiscal year 2003 with aggressive and innovative initiatives to
enhance the abilities and breadth of our force. Agile, flexible
training is an essential investment in human capital, and our
initiatives will ensure our investment delivers the right training to
the right people at the right time.
In August 2002, we began our groundbreaking Enlisted-to-Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) program. An initial cadre of senior NCOs
began receiving world-class, graduate education to optimize them for
greater responsibilities and challenging follow-on assignments. We will
also provide a major influx of officers into AFIT, Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS), and civilian institutions. In addition, because more than
42 percent of our civilian force will be eligible for retirement in the
next 5 years, we are committing significant resources to pay for
advanced education as well as cross-functional career broadening.
Future military missions and contingencies will require greater
sophistication and understanding of the security environment, and our
expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign
language proficiency, and cultural understanding. We are working
diligently to expand the cadre of professionals with such skill sets
and experiences. Our education initiatives will contribute to a major
corporate culture shift that fosters appropriate development throughout
our airmen's careers to meet evolving force requirements.
Diversity
Foremost among our efforts to enhance the capabilities of our
airmen is a passionate drive for diversity. Diversity is a warfighting
issue; it is a readiness issue. We must attract people from all
segments of American society and tap into the limitless talents and
advantages resident in our diverse population if we hope to reach our
fullest potential as a fighting force. Nurturing rich representation
from all demographics opens the door to creativity and ingenuity,
offering an unparalleled competitive edge for air and space
development. Today's multi-threat world also mandates that we
invigorate in our airmen the ability to effectively think across
cultural boundaries and functional paradigms (or stovepipes). We will
thus recruit, train, and retain airmen without intellectual boundaries,
uniquely capable of integrating people, weapons, ideas, and systems to
achieve air and space dominance.
Recruiting
It takes tremendous effort to identify and develop such airmen, yet
the return for the Nation is immeasurable. Increased advertising, an
expanded recruiting force with broader access to secondary school
students, and competitive compensation prepare us to meet recruiting
goals. Despite the challenge of mustering such a diverse and skilled
collection of Americans, we exceeded our fiscal year 2002 enlisted
recruiting goals and expect to surpass fiscal year 2003 objectives. We
will adapt our goals to meet new force objectives; however, the
capacity limitations of Basic Military Training and Technical Training
School quotas will continue to challenge Total Force recruiting
efforts.
Officer recruitment presents similar challenges, yet we continue to
attract America's best and brightest. However, we are particularly
concerned with military and civilian scientists and engineers. We fell
short of our accession goal for this group and have begun all-out
recruitment and retention efforts for these critical specialties. For
example, in fiscal year 2003 we plan to begin a college sponsorship
program to attract scientists and engineers from universities lacking
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. In addition, we
continue to find recruiting health care professionals especially
difficult, so we are making adjustments to ensure improvement.
We will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the ANG
and AFRC access close to 25 percent of eligible, separating active duty
Air Force members (i.e. no break in service.) Continued high OPTEMPO
may negatively impact our efforts in attracting Air National guardsmen,
as well as drawing separating active duty airmen to the Air Force
Reserve. As a result, recruiting will have to ``make up'' a substantial
portion of accessions from that market by developing alternatives.
Retention
The Air Force is a retention-based force. The critical skill sets
we develop in our airmen are not easily replaced, so we expend every
effort to retain our people--the impetus for our ``re-recruiting''
efforts. Overall retention plans include robust compensation packages
that reward service, provide for a suitable standard of living, ensure
a high quality of life, and retain the caliber of professionals we need
to decisively win America's wars.
For fiscal year 2002, it was difficult to calculate accurate
retention results due to Air Force implementation of Stop Loss.
Nonetheless, we continue to reap the benefits of an aggressive
retention program, aided by bonuses, targeted pay raises, and quality
of life improvements. Introducing the Critical Skills Retention Bonus
for select office; specialties reinforces our commitment to target
specific skill suffering significant retention challenges. However,
many airmen retained under Stop Loss will separate throughout fiscal
year 2003--a fact of particular concern for our rated force.
Bonuses and special pay programs continue to be effective tools in
retaining our members. The ANG has placed particular emphasis on
aircraft maintenance fields, security forces, and communication and
intelligence specialists, among others, by offering enlistment and
reenlistment bonuses, Student Loan Repayment program, and the
Montgomery GI Bill Kicker program. Another example is the flexible
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program--an important part of our
multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. In conjunction with our rated
recall program, our fiscal year 2002 plan resulted in a substantial
increase in committed personnel. We have a similarly designed ACP
program in fiscal year 2003, and developed extensions to include
navigators and air battle managers.
Summary
Regardless of AEF deployment or home station missions, our airmen
accomplish their duties with firm commitment and resolute action. It's
what we do. It's who we are: a practical, technically sound, ingenious
force of uniformed and civilian airmen derived from this richly diverse
nation to create the world's premier air and space power.

WHERE WE'RE GOING

The first hundred years of powered flight witnessed tremendous and
enduring innovation. We commemorate this centennial during 2003 with
the theme, Born of Dreams, Inspired by Freedom, which recognizes the
remarkable accomplishments of generations of airmen. Today's airmen are
equally impassioned to bring dreams to reality as we pursue our vision
of tomorrow's Air Force, Unlimited Horizon. Through this vision, we
build a bridge from today's existing capabilities to those required to
win tomorrow's wars.
Ultimately, our success will be measured by our ability to provide
our forces with assured freedom to attack and freedom from attack.
Achieving such victory in tomorrow's battlespace will demand our full
integration with fellow services, allies, and coalition partners--an
essential part of the expeditionary construct. Through our security
cooperation efforts, we build these international defense relationships
and allied capabilities to ensure we have the access, interoperability,
and international support for our worldwide commitments. Toward this
requirement, we are working with our sister services to develop truly
joint concepts of operations that integrate the full spectrum of land,
sea, air, space, and information warfighting capabilities. When America
places its men and women in uniform into harm's way, we owe them
preeminent resources, planning, and organization to achieve victory
over any adversary.
Capabilities-Based CONOPs
While adapting to the new strategic environment, our principal
focus has been transitioning from a platform-based garrison force to a
capabilities-based expeditionary force. No longer platform-centric, we
are committed to making warfighting effects, and the capabilities we
need to achieve them, the driving force behind our ongoing
transformation. From this point forward, all of our operational,
programming, and budget decisions will be supported by a predefined
capability.
Our emerging TF CONOPs will help make this essential shift by
providing solutions to a variety of problems warfighters can expect to
encounter in the future. Whether detailing our plans for operating in
an anti-access environment or identifying how to deliver humanitarian
rations to refugees, TF CONOPs lend focus on the essential elements
required to accomplish the mission. They cover the complete spectrum of
warfighting capabilities (deep strike, information, urban,
psychological operations, etc.) and enable us to tailor forces
(expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) from existing AEFs to meet
JFC's requirements. Responsibility for CONOPs development falls to the
major commands, with a senior officer on the HQ USAF air staff assigned
to each CONOPs to serve as their ``Champion,'' facilitating the
process.
TF CONOPs directly support Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts to free
scarce resources trapped in bureaucracy and push them to the
warfighter. They will also be the focal point for a capabilities-based
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). In support of this effort, our
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment analyzes and assesses
shortfalls, health, risks, and opportunities, while prioritizing
required future capabilities. This helps CONOPs developers articulate
any disconnects between required capabilities and developing programs,
while providing senior Air Force leadership an operational,
capabilities-based focus for acquisition program decisionmaking. TF
CONOPs include:

Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) employs joint power-
projection capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value
targets, gain access to denied battlespace, and maintain
battlespace access for all required joint/coalition follow-on
operations.
Global Response Task Force (GRTF) combines
intelligence and strike systems to attack fleeting or emergent,
high-value, or high-risk targets by surgically applying air and
space power in a narrow window of opportunity, anywhere on the
globe, within hours.
Homeland Security Task Force (HLSTF) leverages Air
Force capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to
prevent, protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--
whether within or beyond U.S. territories.
Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Space & C\4\ISR)
Task Force harnesses horizontal integration of manned,
unmanned, and space systems to provide persistent situation
awareness and executable decision-quality information to the
JFC.
Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF) provides regional
combatant commanders with the planning, command and control
(C\2\), and operations capabilities to enable rapid, timely,
and effective projection, employment, and sustainment of U.S.
power in support of U.S. global interests--precision delivery
for operational effects.
Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF) provides the
deterrent ``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate,
and, if deterrence fails, avails a rapid scalable response.
Air and Space Expeditionary CONOPs is the overarching
context, which identifies and sequences distinctive
capabilities and broad-based functions that air and space power
provide the JFC to generate desired effects for national
military objectives.

The Air Force is transforming around these Task Force Concepts of
Operations. In addition to serving as a roadmap for operators, the TF
construct will form the basis for resource allocation, future system
acquisitions, and POM submissions in order to find capabilities-based
solutions to warfighter problems.
Science and Technology (S&T)--Wellspring of Air and Space Capabilities
Reaching these warfighter solutions rests in large measure with
research and development. Through robust investment and deliberate
focus in science and technology, the Air Force invigorates our core
competency of technology-to-warfighting. Combined with innovative
vision, S&T opens the direct route towards transforming air and space
capabilities. Therefore, we continue long-term, stable investment in
S&T to ensure we realize future capabilities, as well as those that may
immediately affect existing systems.
We are improving our S&T planning and collaboration with other
services and agencies to ensure; we: 1) encourage an operational pull
that conveys to the S&T community a clear vision of the capabilities we
need for the future; 2) address the full spectrum of future needs in a
balanced and well-thought out manner; and 3) enhance our ability to
demonstrate and integrate promising technologies. Some of these new
technologies--UAV systems, laser-based communications, space-based
radar, and others--show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting
applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to
imagine. We are exploring each of these technologies, and our
investment will deliver the required capabilities of our CONOPs.
Executive Agent for Space
Embedded in all of our TF ONOPs, and indeed within most military
operations, is an extensive reliance on systems resident in space. The
Air Force proudly fulfills the role of the Department of Defense
Executive Agent for Space with confidence and enthusiasm. Our ability
to execute this tremendous responsibility stems from a natural outflow
of our core competencies and distinctive capabilities. Accordingly, and
in conjunction with the other Services and agencies, we are shaping a
new and comprehensive approach to national security space management
and organization.
Our capstone objective is to realize the enormous potential in the
high ground of space, and to employ the full spectrum of space-based
capabilities to enable joint warfighting and to protect our national
security. The key to achieving this end is wholesale integration:
through air, land, space, and sea; across legacy and future systems;
among existing and evolving concepts of operations; and between
organizations across all sectors of government. We will continue to
deliver unity of vision, effort, and execution to fulfill our mission
of delivering the most advanced space capabilities for America.
Drawing Effects from Space
Our horizon is truly unlimited, extending beyond the atmospheric
environs of airpower to the reaches of outer space. Our proud Air Force
tradition of airpower is joined by an equally proud and continually
developing tradition of space power.
In the early days of the space age, only those at the strategic
level received and exploited the benefits of space capabilities. The
current state of affairs, however, is decidedly different. The former
distinctions between classified and unclassified programs among
military, civil, and commercial applications are growing increasingly
blurred--in some cases, they are virtually seamless. In short, space
capabilities now are woven deeply into the fabric of modern society,
and they have altered forever the way we fight wars, defend our
homeland, and live our lives.
It is in this context and this understanding of the widespread and
increasing importance of space systems that we strive to meet present
and future national security challenges by providing dominant space
capabilities that will:

Exploit Space for Joint Warfighting. Space
capabilities are integral to modern warfighting forces,
providing critical surveillance and reconnaissance information,
especially over areas of high risk or denied access for
airborne platforms. They provide weather and other earth-
observation data, global communications, precision navigation,
and guidance to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in
flight, and weapons en route to targets. All of these
capabilities, and more, make possible the tremendous success
our joint warfighters achieve during combat operations.
We will enhance these existing capabilities and, where it
makes sense, pursue new ones such as the Transformational
Communications System (TCS), which will strive to dramatically
increase bandwidth and access for warfighters, and Space Based
Radar, which will complement the airborne Joint Surveillance
Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) while migrating Ground
Moving Target Indicators (GMTI) into space. We will also
develop methods and technologies to enhance our Nation's
ability to conduct rapid and accurate global strike operations
anywhere in pursuit of U.S. interests.
Pursue Assured Access to Space. We cannot effectively
exploit space for joint warfighting if we do not have
responsive, reliable, and assured access to space. In August
2002, the new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle got off to a
strong start with the successful launch of Lockheed Martin's
Atlas V booster. Boeing's Delta IV program added to the
Nation's quiver of modern launch vehicles with liftoff in
November 2002. We will also pursue advanced and highly
versatile reusable launchers and small expendables with
extremely short response times to achieve long-term assured
access, while taking the necessary steps to maintain and
improve our space launch infrastructure.
Preserve our Freedom to Act in Space. We must be able
to act freely in space, or risk losing those capabilities
essential to joint warfighting. We initiated efforts to
increase our space situation awareness, beginning with the new
Space Situation Awareness Integration Office at Air Force Space
Command, and a similar program at the Space and Missile Systems
Center. Future efforts are planned to develop strategy,
doctrine, and programs to improve the protection of our own
space capabilities while denying the benefits of joint space
capabilities to our adversaries.

As it is with all Air Force capabilities, the most important
resource for national space capabilities is neither technological nor
fiscal--it is human. Our Space Professional Strategy fulfills a Space
Commission recommendation to develop space professionals and nurture a
cadre to lead our national security space endeavors at all levels in
the decades ahead. These space-expert airmen will be the core stewards
of space operations, and shoulder the responsibility for aggressively
advancing joint warfighting capabilities into the high ground frontier.
Horizontal Integration of Manned, Unmanned, and Space Assets
The essence of transformation is found in leveraging the Nation's
technological dominance to create maximum asymmetrical advantage.
Airmen seek unrestricted boundaries when looking at war planning from a
theater-wide perspective, or talking about national elements of power.
Simply stated, it is in the way we think--we must take advantage of it.
Our foremost objective is to develop the capability to conduct
rapid and precise operations to achieve desired effects and shape the
battlespace for the Joint Force. This requires interfacing numerous DOD
and national assets--the seamless, horizontal integration of manned,
unmanned, and space-based systems. An essential element is designing
systems that use digital-level, machine-to-machine conversations to
expedite data flow and ensure the JFC receives timely, decision-quality
information. Such integration will dramatically shorten the find, fix,
track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) cycle. In the end, we know
that neither JFC's guiding operations, nor special operators putting
iron on targets, care what source provides the target data. It is an
effect they seek, and what we will provide.
Key to the warfighter's success is Predictive Battlespace Awareness
(PBA). PBA requires in-depth study of an adversary well before
hostilities begin. Ultimately, we want to be able to anticipate his
actions to the maximum extent possible. PBA-derived insights allow us
to utilize critical ISR assets for confirmation rather than pure
discovery once hostilities begin. We are then able to analyze
information to assess current conditions, exploit emerging
opportunities, anticipate future actions, and act with a degree of
speed and certainty unmatched by our adversaries.
Along this path, we are transitioning from collecting data through
a myriad of independent systems (Rivet Joint, AWACS, JSTARS, space-
based assets, etc) to a Multi-sensor Command and Control Constellation
(MC2C) capable of providing the JFC with real-time, enhanced
battlespace awareness. Today, this transition is restricted by the
necessity to rely on low density/high demand (LD/HD) C\4\ISR assets.
The limitation inherent in LD/HD platforms forces us to shift their
exploitation capabilities between theaters to cover emerging global
threats and events. This suboptimizes overall battlespace awareness and
limits our efforts at predictive analysis. In the interim, responsive
space-based ISR assets will help mitigate our over-stressed LD/HD
systems. Yet ultimately, we need a synergistic combination of military
and commercial assets, advanced data processing capabilities, and
assured reachback to achieve true battlespace awareness.
In the future, a single widebody platform employing tunable
antennas and sensors--Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft
(MC2A)--will replace many of the C\4\ISR functions of today's
specialized, but independent assets. Air, ground, and space assets will
comprise the MC2C, which will elevate Joint Forces Air Component
Commanders' ability to command and control air assets. Additionally,
every platform will be a sensor on the integrated network. Regardless
of mission function (C2, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc), any data
collected by a sensor will be passed to all network recipients. This
requires networking all air, space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems,
command and control (C2) nodes, and strike platforms to achieve shared
battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize our ability to achieve
the JFC's desired effects.
Uniting joint and coalition information presents the most difficult
challenge in providing one common operational picture for key
decisionmakers. We are working closely with our sister services to
eliminate the seams between existing systems and taking the necessary
steps to ensure all future acquisitions are planned and funded to meet
the interoperability requirements of future joint CONOPs.
A critical element of successful information merging is
communications, as bandwidth is finite and requires careful management.
Long-range or penetrating systems must communicate beyond the horizon
despite adversaries' attempts to exploit or interrupt these links. To
counter disruption, all systems must be reliable, secure, and
bandwidth-efficient. The PBA construct facilitates this objective by
eliminating constrictive, stove-piped communications systems while
emphasizing networked operations.
We will realize the vision of horizontal integration in our TF
CONOPs. GSTF, for example, will deliver the right-sized mix of assets
with appropriate sensors capable of penetrating into enemy airspace.
Such sensors may be low observable and/or expendable, mounted on either
ISR platforms or imbedded into strike platforms. Sensors may consist of
Special Operations Forces, inserted before the commencement of
hostilities, who communicate with attack platforms during combat via
secure electronic writing tablets, annotating targets, and threats on
the imagery display with a stylus. As technology progresses, and where
it makes sense, a significant portion of ISR functionality will likely
migrate to space, affording 24/7 persistence and penetration. Likewise,
advanced defensive counterspace capabilities will afford these systems
protection from enemy actions.
Combining manned, unmanned, and space-based assets with dynamic C2
and PBA transforms disparate collection and analysis activities into a
coherent process, allowing the warfighter to make timely, confident,
and capable combat decisions. This is what the Air Force brings to the
joint fight. It is what air and space warriors are all about. We unlock
the intellectual potential of airmen who think across the dimensions of
mediums and systems capabilities for the joint warfighter.
Addressing the Recapitalization Challenges
Despite new CONOPs and visions for future capabilities, we cannot
rely on intellectual flexibility to eradicate the challenge of old
systems and technologies. Though creativity may temporarily reduce the
negative impacts of aging systems on our operational options,
ultimately there are impassable limits created by air and space system
hardware issues.
We have made tremendous strides in modernizing and improving
maintenance plans for our aircraft; however, the tyranny of age has
introduced new problems for old aircraft. Reality dictates that if we
completely enhance the avionics and add new engines to 40-year-old
tankers and bombers, they are still 40-year-old aircraft, and subject
to fleet-threatening problems such as corrosion and structural failure.
This is equally true for our tighter aircraft, where once cutting-
edge F-117s now average over 15 years of age, and mainstay air-
dominance F-15Cs are averaging nearly 20 years of service. With double-
digit surface-to-air missile systems, next-generation aircraft, and
advanced cruise missile threats proliferating, merely maintaining our
aging fighter and attack aircraft will be insufficient. In fact, the
dramatic advances offered in many of our TF CONOPs cannot be realized
without the addition of the unique capabilities incorporated in the F/
A-22. Simply stated, our legacy systems cannot ensure air dominance in
future engagements--the fundamental element for Joint Force access and
operations. We will thus continue executive oversight of F/A-22
acquisition in order to ensure program success. While keeping our
funding promises, we will procure the only system in this decide that
puts munitions on targets, and which is unequally capable of detecting
and intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles.
Although ultimately solving these recapitalization challenges
requires acquisition of new systems, we will continue to find
innovative means to keep current systems operationally effective in the
near term. We know that just as new problems develop with old systems,
so too do new opportunities for employment, such as our employment of
B-1s and B-52s in a close air support role during OEF. We will also
pursue new options for these long-range strike assets in a standoff
attack role for future operations.
Unlike with the aforementioned air-breathing assets, we cannot make
service life extensions or other modifications to our orbiting space
systems. Satellites must be replaced regularly to account for hardware
failures, upgrade their capabilities, and avoid significant coverage
gaps. Additionally, we must improve outmoded ground control stations,
enhance protective measures, continue to address new space launch
avenues, and address bandwidth limitations in order to continue
leveraging space capabilities for the joint warfighter. We are
exploring alternatives for assuring access to space, and a key aspect
of this effort will be invigorating the space industrial base.
Finally, it is imperative that we address the growing deficiencies
in our infrastructure. Any improvements we may secure for our air and
space systems will be limited without a commensurate address of
essential support systems. Deteriorated roofs, waterlines, electrical
networks, and airfields are just some of the infrastructure elements
warranting immediate attention. Our ability to generate air and space
capabilities preeminently rests with the ingenuity of visionary ideas,
yet intellectual versatility must be supported by viable systems and
structures to realize our Service potential.
Organizational Adaptations
Commensurate with our drive to enhance air and space capabilities
is our identification and development of organizational structures to
aid these advances. In 2002, we initiated numerous adaptations to more
efficiently and effectively exploit Air Force advantages for the joint
warfighter.
Warfighting Integration Deputate
Comprehensive integration of the Air Force's extensive C\4\ISR
systems is paramount for our future capabilities. This requires an
enterprise approach of total information-cycle activities including
people, processes, and technology. To achieve this, we created a new
Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration (AF/XI), which brings
together the operational experience and the technical expertise of
diverse elements (C\4\ISR, systems integration, modeling and
simulation, and enterprise architecture specialties.)
This new directorate will close the seams in the F2T2EA kill chain
by guiding the integration of manned, unmanned, and space C\4\ISR
systems. AF/XI's leadership, policy, and resource prioritization will
capitalize on the technologies, concepts of operations, and
organizational changes necessary to achieve horizontal integration and
interoperability.
Success has been immediate. AF/XI worked with the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Air and Space Operations to champion increased Air Operations
Center weapon system funding in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which
accelerated the stabilization and standardization of the weapon system.
Subsequently, the base-lined weapon system now has a modernization
plan, which is both viable and affordable. AF/XI also led analysis that
highlighted imbalances among collection and exploitation capabilities.
As a result, we plan to accelerate ground processing and exploitation
capabilities within the future years defense program to close the gap.
Major contributions in management of the complex information
environment will continue, as AF/XI makes better use of scarce
resources, allowing the Air Force to provide the joint warfighter the
capabilities to dominate the battlespace.
Chief Information Officer (AF/CIO)
Partnered with AF/XI, the AF/CIO shares responsibility to spearhead
the transformation to an information-driven, network-centric Air Force.
These two organizations orchestrate the integration within our
information enterprise, and establish processes and standards to
accelerate funding and ensure priorities match our integrated
information vision.
The AF/CIO's specific mission is to promote the most effective and
efficient application, acquisition, and management of information
technology resources under an enterprise architecture. The goal is to
provide the roadmap for innovation and to function as a blueprint for
the overall leverage of valuable information technology. Enterprise
architecture will use models and processes to capture the complex
interrelationships between the Air Force's systems and platforms. A
resultant example is basing Information Technology (IT) investment
decisions on sound business cases, approved Air Force standards, and,
ultimately, how a particular technology contributes to specific
capabilities. Additionally, we are institutionalizing enterprise
architecting as a key construct in defining mission information
requirements and promoting interoperability.
Currently, the wide variety of IT standards limits C2 processes and
information and decision support to our warfighters. The AF/CIO-AF/XI
team is tackling this and all other integration challenges as they
develop an enterprise architecture that spans the entire Air Force,
while also staying in harmony with other services' efforts.
Blended Wing
We do nothing in today's Air Force without Guard, Reserve, and
civilian personnel working alongside active duty airmen. A fundamental
initiative of Air Force transformation is formalizing this integration
under the Future Total Force (FTF). As part of the FTF, we are pursuing
innovative organizational constructs and personnel policies to meld the
components into a single, more homogenous force. FTF integration will
create efficiencies, cut costs, ensure stability, retain invaluable
human capital, and, above all, increase our combat capabilities.
A key effort is to ``blend,'' where sensible, units from two or
more components into a single wing with a single commander. This level
of integration is unprecedented in any of the Services, where active
duty, Guard, and Reserve personnel share the same facilities and
equipment, and together, execute the same mission. In essence, blending
provides two resource pools within a single wing--one, a highly
experienced, semi-permanent Reserve component workforce, offering
stability and continuity; the other, a force of primarily active duty
personnel able to rotate to other locations as needs dictate.
The first blended wing opportunity arose with the consolidation of
the B1-B fleet. The move left behind an experienced but underutilized
pool of Guard personnel at Robins AFB, GA. Meanwhile, the collocated
93rd Air Control Wing (ACW) (active duty E-8 Joint STARS), suffered
from high tempo and low retention. Hence, Secretary Roche directed that
the two units merge, and on 1 October 2002, the blended wing concept
became a reality with the activation of the 116th ACW.
The 116th ACW tackled many pioneering challenges: from legal
questions surrounding the command of combined active-Reserve component
units, to programmatic issues with funding the program from two
separate accounts, to integrating different personnel systems used by
each component. Airmen from both components are working through these
issues successfully, making the 116th an example for future FTF
blending. Yet, some additional Title 10 and Title 32 provisions still
need to be changed to make the FTF a reality. Meanwhile, parallel
efforts, such as placing Reserve pilots and maintenance personnel
directly into active duty flying organizations under the Fighter
Associate Program, add to this leveraging of highly experienced
reservists to promote a more stable, experienced workforce.
As organizational constructs, blending and associate programs lay
an important foundation for a capabilities-based, expeditionary air and
space force, which are inherently flexible and ideal to meet rotational
AEF requirements. In a resource-constrained environment, blending
promotes efficiencies and synergies by leveraging each component's
comparative strengths, freeing funds for modernization while sustaining
combat effectiveness, and effecting warfighting capabilities greater
than the sum of its parts.
Combat Wing
The comprehensive evaluations in our ongoing transformation include
examining our wing structure. Given all of the lessons gleaned from
expeditionary operations over the past decades, we asked, ``Could we
derive advantages in revised wing organization for both force
development and combat capability'' The answer was ``Yes,'' and we
enacted changes to create the Combat Wing Organization (CWO).
The central aspect of the CWO is the new Mission Support Group.
This will merge former support and logistics readiness groups, and
contracting and aerial port squadrons, as applicable. Within this
group, we will hone expeditionary skills from crisis action planning,
personnel readiness, and working with the joint system for load
planning and deployment, to communications, contingency bed down, and
force protection. Currently, all of these aspects exist in skill sets
that none of our officers have in total. But the new expeditionary
support discipline will address this and provide our officers the
expertise in all aspects of commanding expeditionary operations. With
this reorganization, each wing will now have one individual responsible
for the full range of deployment and employment tasks--the Mission
Support Group Commander.
The restructuring will retain the operations group; however, group
commanders will become more active in the operational level of war.
Squadron commanders will be role models for operators in the wings,
ready to lead the first exercise and combat missions. Similarly, we
will establish a maintenance group responsible for base-level weapons
system maintenance and sortie production rates. Like their operator
counterparts, maintenance squadron and group commanders will be role
models for all wing maintainers. Meanwhile, medical groups will retain
their current organization, although we are working changes to home and
deployed medical operations for future implementation.
Flying and fixing our weapons systems, as well as mission support,
are essential skill sets. Each requires the highest expertise,
proficiency, and leadership. The new wing organization allows
commanders to fully develop within specific functional areas to plan
and execute air and space power as part of expeditionary units, while
also giving maintenance and support personnel focused career
progression. This re-organization does not fix something that is
broken--it makes a great structure exceptional.
Acquisition and Business Transformation
To achieve our vision of an agile, flexible, responsive, and
capabilities-based air and space force, we must transform the processes
that provide combatant commanders with air and space capabilities. An
example of this in action is the Air Force's efforts to carry out the
responsibilities of DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). The
Secretary of the Air Force delegated those responsibilities to the
Under Secretary of the Air Force, under whose leadership immediate
benefit was realized. Adapting an effective process already in use at
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Under Secretary
instituted a new streamlined space acquisition program review and
milestone decisionmaking process. This new process was used for the
first time in August 2002 in developing a contract for the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. This effort
creates an opportunity for the Air Force to apply performance and cost
accountability to defense industrial firms through their chief
financial officers and board of directors by linking executive
compensation to contract performance.
In addition to the major process changes for DOD space, the Air
Force's Business Transformation Task Force directs and integrates
further process improvement and adaptation. Core business and
operations support processes--such as acquisition, logistics,
maintenance, training, medical and dental, among others--are crucial,
as they ultimately determine our overall enterprise effectiveness and
directly sustain combat capabilities. An additional category of
processes called ``enablers'' completes the Air Force enterprise.
Examples of ``enablers'' include management of human resources,
finances, contracts, property plant and equipment, and information. The
enablers are important as they facilitate our core capabilities and
determine the overall efficiency of our enterprise.
The Air Force will enact business transformation from an integrated
enterprise perspective, examining every process and associated link.
Accordingly, we will employ industry best practices and identify
management metrics to improve process efficiency without degrading our
enterprise effectiveness, expand our customer's self-service management
capability and free up needed resources for the operational
communities, and provide real-time, accurate financial data for better
decisionmaking. Already, acquisition reform has effected notable
improvements, including:

(1) Streamlined our acquisition and contracting regulations,
replacing lengthy prescriptive sets of rules with brief documents that
emphasize speed, innovation, sensible risk management, and elimination
of time-consuming process steps that have little value. As previously
mentioned, our new National Security Space acquisition process is an
example of progress in this area.
(2) Created a Program Executive Office for Services to bring new
efficiency to the growing area of services contracts. This key area,
which accounts for nearly half of our procurement budget, had no prior
centralized coordination and oversight.
(3) Developed and initiated System Metric and Reporting Tool
(SMART), putting real-time program status information on everyone's
desktop. This web-based application pulls data from dozens of legacy
reporting systems to give everyone from program managers up to senior
leadership direct visibility into the ``health'' of hundreds of
acquisition and modernization programs. When fully deployed in fiscal
year 2003, it will automate the tedious and laborious process of
creating Monthly Acquisition Reports and possibly Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary reporting to OSD.
(4) Empowered ``high powered teams'' of requirements and
acquisition professionals to create spiral development plans to deliver
initial capability to warfighters more quickly, and add capability
increments in future spirals.
(5) Designed a Reformed Supply Support Program to improve the
spares acquisition process by integrating the support contractor into
the government supply system. Contractors now have the same capability
as government inventory control points to manage parts, respond to base
level requisitions, track spares levels, and monitor asset movement.
(6) Continued, with OSD support, expansion of the Reduction in
Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) program, to identify critical cost
drivers, fund investments to address them, and generate cost savings
and cost avoidance. We also created standard processes and a business
case analysis model to use for initiatives within R-TOC. In fiscal year
2003, OSD allocated $24.9 million no-offset investments to R-TOC that
will return $53.2 million through fiscal year 2008. A planned $37.1
million investment across the FYDP will save a projected $331 million
in operations and maintenance through fiscal year 2009.

These initiatives are only the beginning of a comprehensive and
aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts today
will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space
capability acquisition, both immediately and in the future.
Ensuring Readiness
Integrating systems and expanding business practices will not only
have dramatic effects on air and space capabilities, but also reduce
readiness challenges. However, we still face daunting, but
surmountable, obstacles. We must overcome a multitude of installations
and logistical issues to secure flexible and timely execution of
expeditionary requirements for joint warfighting.
Reconstituting and reconfiguring our expeditionary basing systems
and wartime stocks is a critical element of our force projection
planning. While we made significant strides in funding, we require
additional investments in bare base systems, vehicles, spares,
munitions, and prepositioning assets. Our infrastructure investment
strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps. First, we must dispose of
excess facilities. Second, we must fully sustain our facilities and
systems so they remain combat effective throughout their expected life.
Third, we must establish a steady investment program to restore and
modernize our facilities and systems, while advancing our ability to
protect our people and resources from the growing threat of terrorism
at current, planned, and future operating locations--at home or abroad.
We are making progress. Improved vehicle fleet funding allowed us
to replace some aging vehicles with more reliable assets, including
alternative fuel versions to help meet Federal fuel reduction mandates.
Targeted efficiencies in spares management and new fuels mobility
support equipment will improve supply readiness. In addition, our
spares campaign restructured Readiness Spares Packages and repositioned
assets to contingency sites. Moreover, to increase munitions readiness,
we expanded our Afloat Prepositioning Fleet capabilities, and continue
acquiring a broad mix of effects-based munitions in line with the
requirements of all TF CONOPs.
Finally, our ``Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan'' calls
for major transformation in financial and infrastructure capitalization
to ensure Air Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the
threat spectrum. To support this plan, we increased funding in fiscal
year 2004 for depot facilities and equipment modernization. We also
began a significant push to require weapon systems managers to
establish their product support and depot maintenance programs early in
the acquisition cycle and to plan and program the necessary investment
dollars required for capacity and capability. Additionally, we are
partnering with private industry to adopt technologies to meet
capability requirements. The results from these efforts will be
enhanced, more agile warfighter support through the critical enabler of
infrastructure.
Expanding AEF Personnel
The attacks of September 11 significantly increased workload and
stress in a number of mission areas for our expeditionary forces.
Manning for these operations is drawn from our existing AEF packages.
In order to accommodate increased contingency requirements, we are
exploring options to augment the existing AF construct. Recent and
ongoing efforts to maximize the identification of deployable forces and
align them with AEF cycle, assisted in meeting immediate critical
warfighting requirements. However, some career fields remain seriously
stressed by the war on terrorism. Accordingly, our efforts focus on
changing processes that drive requirements not tuned to our AEF rhythm.
We developed formulas to measure, and gathered quantitative data to
evaluate, the relative stress amongst career fields to redirect
resources to the most critical areas. We also began a critical review
of blue-suit utilization, to ensure uniform airmen are used only where
absolutely necessary, and maximize the use of the civilian and contract
workforce for best service contribution and military essentiality.
We are refocusing uniformed manpower allocation on our distinctive
capabilities to reduce the stress on our active force. Additionally, we
are carefully considering technologies to relieve the increased
workload. These efforts exist within our longer-term work to
reengineer, transform, and streamline Air Force operations and
organizations, and have allowed us already to realign some new recruits
into our most stressed career fields.
Summary
As the two mediums with the most undeveloped potential, air and
space represent the largest growth areas for national security and the
greatest frontiers for joint warfighting. As such, air and space
operations will play an ever-increasing role in the security of America
and her allies. The Air Force will exploit technology, innovative
concepts of operations, organizational change, and our ability to
embrace creative ideas and new ways of thinking. We will bring to bear
the full suite of air and space capabilities for tomorrow's Joint Force
Commander--drawing from every resource, integrating closely with all
Services, and overcoming any obstacle to succeed.

NEXT HORIZON

The events of the last year have emphasized the dynamics of a new
international security era. The decade of new states following the Cold
War has been followed by the rise of non-state actors, many following a
path of aggression and destruction. Yet, just as America adapted to new
global dynamics in the past, we will again confront emerging challenges
with confidence and faith in our ability to meet the demands of
assuring freedom.
The Air Force remains dedicated to drawing on its innovation,
ingenuity, and resolve to develop far-reaching capabilities. The
ability to deliver effects across the spectrum of national security
requirements is the cornerstone of the vision and strategy of Air Force
planning and programming. In conjunction, and increasingly in
integration with ground, naval, marine, and other national agency
systems, the Air Force will play a central role in elevating joint
operations. We recognize the greatest potential for dominant American
military capabilities lies in the integration of our air and space
systems with those of other services and agencies, and our success in
this objective will be evident in every mission to deter, dissuade, or
decisively defeat any adversary.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
Those were excellent statements. Now we will proceed to
questions. Let us start off with the question of the readiness
of our troops. It seems to me there are two areas of readiness.
The overall readiness I think you have addressed, but three of
us on this committee who went overseas observed the readiness
of those forward-deployed troops in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
the Gulf region.
There were areas which concerned us, like the Joint Special
Operations Center (JSOC), Special Operations SEAL teams, and
things like that. Some of those individuals have been on a
rotation cycle to where they were back again many times. I
wonder if you all could just touch on that readiness situation.
Since you brought fortunately the sergeant, why do we not start
with the Air Force on that question.
Are you concerned about the ability to maintain that
OPTEMPO of those critical skills I mentioned as well as others?
General Jumper. Yes, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld and I are
concerned. Secretary Rumsfeld has rightfully asked us to go
forward and to make sure that everything that we are doing with
our people in uniform are things that need to be done by people
in uniform, and to take those things that do not need to be
done by people in uniform and shift those slots back over to
uniformed slots so that we can relieve the tension on our
deployed forces.
In the Air Force alone, we found 12,000 people doing what
we think does not have to be done by people in uniform. That
would go a long way to relieving some of the pressure that we
feel on those slots. So it is not just a matter of adding end
strength. It is a matter of making efficiencies out of what you
have and making sure you police up the battlefield, sir, and go
out and find where bodies have migrated off to and make sure
they get them back to military business. That is part of the
solution that we are working on.
Chairman Warner. My question was more narrowly directed to
those members of the Air Force who are participating on combat
teams in those regions right now.
General Jumper. Yes, sir. Especially in the Special
Operations Forces, they have not been sized for long-term
sustained operations.
Chairman Warner. Do you see a window which is a matter of
constraint?
General Jumper. Not a particular window, Mr. Chairman. I do
see a need to bolster up, especially in our combat search and
rescue forces, which is the Air Force portion of this, and our
combat controllers, of which Sergeant Yoshida is a part. We
need to take a look at bolstering up those career fields to be
able to sustain, especially in this war against terrorism, and
that kind of activity.
Chairman Warner. General Shinseki, we will shift to you
because you have the majority of those people.
General Shinseki. I do, Mr. Chairman. They are stressed and
we are using them on multiple missions that a few years ago
were not anticipated. The first step has been for Special
Operations Command, and then my Army commander who is part of
that, to look hard at the missions they are performing today.
The ones that can be returned to conventional forces, we are
taking that under our decisions now, so that we husband our
Special Operating Forces for the key missions that they need to
focus on.
Many more missions today than back in 1996, 1997, when we
saw these requirements expanding. Another thing, the Secretary
of Defense has asked the commander of Special Operations
Command to look at his capabilities and see what additional
requirements he might have. That analysis has been provided and
is being staffed.
In advance of that, the Army has in next year's budget
already added something of the order of 1,800 or 1,900
additional Special Operations authorizations and about a
billion dollars to give Special Operations Command added
capabilities.
Chairman Warner. Do you see any constraints on the time in
those regions that we visited, the ability to maintain that
high OPTEMPO of those particular skills, say in the next 60 to
90 days?
General Shinseki. There is stress today and, as I say, the
decision to pull some of our very best special operators off
missions that they can be relieved of will give us a bigger
inventory to deal with that rotation cycle.
Chairman Warner. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, it is well documented, and I
talked about the number of ships that I had deployed, 51
percent of my great Navy. I talked about 170 additional ships.
That is the Military Sealift Command. That is pressed forward.
A lot of those are civilian manned.
But I look back over the course of time since September 11
and the start of this process, we have had 9 of our 12 carrier
battle groups deployed. We are watching the tempo very
carefully. I feel good about our readiness. But that does not
mean that there are not areas where you have real challenges,
and the Special Forces teams are one of those areas that you
have identified.
So today I have six carriers over there. Am I concerned
over the next 60 to 90 days? No, I am very confident. But you
will recall that the previous two times I have come before you
I have said that at the top of my list was the current
readiness challenge, and we have invested significantly in
that. There are always areas where there will be pockets that
we have to manage and watch carefully, and we are doing it.
Chairman Warner. General Hagee.
General Hagee. Sir, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
we have 63 percent of the Marine Corps forward deployed. I
would associate myself with what the Chief of Naval Operations
said. For the near term, we can maintain that. We will continue
to watch that to see if we need to do any rotation.
We do not have any Special Operating Forces per se, but we
are working with Special Operations Command to see if there are
some of the capabilities that we have currently in theater that
can help relieve some of their pressure.
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, as we visited with the troops
there is no question about their having been well trained and
their commitment and their morale is high. But there is not a
one of us that did not look into their faces and share with
them the thoughts that they shared with us about, if force is
required to remove Saddam Hussein and to dismantle the weapons
of mass destruction, we could be confronted with in the early
stages of that combat weapons of mass destruction inflicted
upon our own forces.
I think each of you this morning should touch on the
training and your level of confidence in that training and our
ability of the troops to carry out their missions. General
Shinseki, we will start with you.
General Shinseki. This is the toughest part of our training
requirement. It is the part of the operation that has the
greatest risk and also the greatest constraints on physical
performance applied to it. Being inside of our overgarments,
masks, and gloves we restrict our senses, and it is the part
that deserves a considerable amount of training effort.
That training does go on, whether it is at home station in
the middle of winter at Fort Stewart, Georgia, or out at the
National Training Center in California in August. You can
expect in your training cycle to be put into full mission
oriented protective posture (MOPP-4) protective environment and
be required to operate.
So in terms of discipline, in terms of stamina, in terms of
the confidence that our equipment is functional at the
individual level, all of that is there. I think our commanders
have good visibility along with the responsibility to make sure
that that piece of their training is addressed in concert with
all the other training they have to go and get accomplished to
maintain the highest readiness standards.
But training in our nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC)
equipment is part of that, individually and as well as units.
Units that operate in that environment, if they're
contaminated, can be expected to operate for an extended period
in the environment. Units that have an opportunity to
decontaminate their own equipment and themselves individually
rehearse this as part of their responsibilities.
The training level is there. I say again, this is the
toughest part of our operation, but the requirement to meet the
training standard is there and commanders execute this.
Chairman Warner. But in your personal judgment, do you have
a high degree of confidence in their ability to endure and
carry out the mission?
General Shinseki. I do.
Chairman Warner. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. I second that completely. My conviction is
that we have made great investments in the current readiness
part of our budget. In previous testimony before this
committee, I have talked about that as a priority issue. I will
tell you that my manning is better in my battle group and
amphibious forces than it has ever been since I have been in
the Navy. It is that way because we have invested in it. We
have invested in the training cycle and are constantly
improving it so that we know we have it right.
Now, does that mean that there is no reason for concern? Of
course that would be a foolish thing to say when you talk about
potential conflict. But Mr. Chairman, I am very confident in
the readiness of our force.
Chairman Warner. The ability to cope with that contingency?
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General.
General Hagee. Senator, I am absolutely confident in our
ability to operate in that environment. As the chairman knows,
just a few months ago I was in command of the unit that is over
in Kuwait right now. In the 2 years I was in command, there was
nothing more important than the NBC readiness. To give you some
statistics, we have enough Saratoga suits to give three to each
individual. We have filters for the gas masks, enough for three
for each individual. We have 14 so-called Fox vehicles. These
are specially equipped vehicles to detect chemicals in the
atmosphere or in the ground. We have seven biological detection
units from the Army with the marines that are there,
specifically put together to detect biological agents.
Right now, 94 percent of our marines have had their
smallpox vaccination. If you include the ones that we exempted,
they are at 99 percent. We have 85 percent of the marines who
have had three or more anthrax vaccinations. If you look at the
ones that have had one or more, we are in the low 90 percent.
Sir, we are ready and we can operate in that environment.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
General Jumper.
General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, we train, as the other
Services do, every day in this environment. I have every
confidence that we can sustain operations in this environment.
We are under way fully with our anthrax and smallpox
vaccination program. We have the detectors around the
perimeters of our air bases and we practice in this environment
as part of our normal readiness training. Sir, we are ready.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 10:28 a.m., the hearing was recessed, the
committee proceeded to other business, and the hearing was
reconvened at 10:29 a.m.]
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much.
General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the
Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a
successful completion of the war?
General Shinseki. In specific numbers, I would have to rely
on combatant commanders' exact requirements.
Senator Levin. How about a range?
General Shinseki. I would say that what has been mobilized
to this point, something on the order of several hundred
thousand soldiers, is probably a figure that would be required.
We are talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of
geography that is fairly significant with the ethnic tensions
that could lead to other problems. It takes a significant
ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment
to make sure that people are fed, that water is distributed--
all the normal responsibilities that go along with
administering a situation like this.
Senator Levin. What effect would that type of an occupation
to that extent have on two things: one is our OPTEMPO, which
you have talked about, already stressed; two is the ability of
the Army to fulfill the other missions that we have?
General Shinseki. Well, if it were an extended requirement
for presence of U.S.-only Army forces, it would have
significant long-term effect and, therefore, the assistance
from friends and allies would be helpful.
Senator Levin. Some of the service personnel with whom we
chatted on our trip indicated a belief that there may be some
equipment that they needed but did not have, equipment which
might be, they thought was, in the hands of non-deployed units.
I'm just wondering whether any of you are aware of any such
equipment and whether you would just double-check it. We were
given one example particularly, something called a Laser Viper.
But are any of you aware of that situation, where we have the
most advanced equipment not in the hands of the deployed
forces, but in the hands of nondeployed forces?
General Shinseki. I am not aware of any specifics, but I
would not doubt that there is possibly an opportunity to
discover something.
Senator Levin. If you would just all check that issue out,
because that is obviously something relevant.
General Shinseki. I will find that information, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

I am not aware of any specific instance of the above situation in
today's deployed forces. Given the cycle in which Navy ships and
aircraft deploy (known as the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC)),
and the program manager methodology utilized by NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and
SPAWAR to introduce new technology into the operating fleet, the most
modern equipment approved for in-service use would have been installed
during the unit's last extended maintenance availability prior to the
commencement of training operations.
However, the situation of the ``most advanced equipment, not
(being) in the hands of the deployed forces'' is indeed possible, given
that, (a) many ships are currently deployed outside of their scheduled
deployment in support of overseas operations and hence may have missed
some equipment modernization opportunities and, (b) the ease of
installation and ready availability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
equipment allows for these systems to be directly procured and
installed by non-deployed ships crews, outside of the above IDTC and
program management scenarios (in the past, this has typically been in
the areas of shipboard navigation aids, computer peripherals, and
similar technology).

Senator Levin. On the end strength issue, last year our
Services indicated they needed additional end strength. Only
the Marines have received additional end strength in this
budget request. Admiral Clark, your number one unfunded
priority was for 4,400 additional active duty personnel. That
was unfunded last year. Your budget proposal for this year has
an end strength reduction of 1,900 active duty personnel, along
with a reduction of 2,000 Reserve component personnel. The Navy
is busier than it was last year. How do you square that?
Admiral Clark. Well, I square it like this. My proposal
also reduces the total number of ships that we will have in the
Navy as we seek to move toward a modernized and redesigned
Navy. My recommendation to the Secretary and him to the
President was that there were ships that we needed to
decommission and move on, and that is why the numbers are
smaller.
I will say this, Congress has given us authority to be in
an over-end strength posture. So in terms of the number of
people, I have shortfalls in the existing execution year in
people.
One of the reasons is that we have had the success that we
are realizing tremendous success in the battle for people.
Young people today want to serve, but I do have shortfalls
there that need to be addressed with supplemental
appropriations.
Senator Levin. General Jumper, your predecessor said the
Air Force needed an increase in end strength of 10,000 airmen.
The pace of operations has picked up considerably since then
and yet the Air Force did not get an increase in authorized end
strength last year and it did not, apparently, ask for an
increase this year.
Do you have the personnel you need and how do you square
those facts?
General Jumper. Sir, we are in fact stressed, as I stated
before. One of the things the Secretary of Defense has asked us
to do, and we are doing, is finding those airmen out there that
are not doing things that uniformed people need to be doing and
to police those up and move those slots into slots that do
require uniformed people.
We have another issue in that we have previous year
commitments of almost 4,500 slots that were taken as a result
of privatization actions that were actually not taken off the
books. We are having to reduce those as well as part of this
budget activity.
So we continue to look for these efficiencies. We will
continue to apply them where we can. If they do not do the job,
I will be the first to go back to the Secretary of Defense and
ask for the relief that we need to get that job done.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
I would ask all of you this. I have a copy of the draft
legislative proposal which has been circulating inside the
Department of Defense. Under that draft, the Joint Staff would
report to the Secretary instead of to the Chairman. The
Secretary would have to approve all appointments to the Joint
Staff. The draft amendment would strike the statutory
requirement that the Joint Staff be ``independently organized
and operated.'' We also have a copy of a memorandum signed by
David Chu requesting a legislative proposal that would reduce
the terms served by the service chiefs from 4 years to 2-year
renewable terms.
[The information referred to follows:]

I think these proposals, taken together or separately,
would undermine the ability of the uniformed military to
provide independent military advice to the civilian leadership,
to the executive branch, and to Congress. That is my view.
More importantly, would you tell us quickly whether you
support those proposals, General Shinseki?
General Shinseki. Senator Levin, I have not seen the exact
language here, but I have heard that there have been
discussions. This is a chief at the end of a 4-year service and
I think that the 4-year term, at least for me, has been helpful
in continuity. I am looking at the fact that, 4 years here, I
am about to field the first Stryker Brigade. At the end of 4
years here, the Army is about to have its first major
acquisition milestone decision in May of this year for the
Future Combat System. It has taken considerable effort, 4
years, to put these programs together.
I think it is helpful to have a long-term perspective. I
know there are others who have responsibility in this area,
whether it is here in Congress or over in Defense, combatant
commanders and service chiefs. All of us have responsibilities.
But for a service chief a longer term perspective is helpful.
I think that some of the early inertia that the Army had to
overcome in order to get its transformation legs moving and
develop some momentum would have been different had it been
just a 2-year term of service. I believe that the Joint Staff
as it exists today serves both the Chairman and the Joint
Chiefs. I look to them as part of keeping my role as a member
of the Joint Chiefs, keeping me abreast of those issues. I look
for them to continue to do that.
Senator Levin. To maintain that independence?
General Shinseki. That is correct, for the Joint Chiefs.
Senator Levin. Do you want to give us quick answers? My
time is up. Do you agree with these proposals?
Admiral Clark. First of all, I had not heard of the first
part of your proposal. This is the first I have heard of it.
Senator Levin. What was the first you heard of?
Admiral Clark. The proposal for the Joint Staff, the chain
of command and the way you lashed it up; I had not heard that.
Senator Levin. Okay. We will send you all a copy, by the
way. We would not want you to be in the dark about what is
floating around the Pentagon.
Admiral Clark. My sense is that I serve at the pleasure of
the President, and it seems to me that the experience you glean
in 2-year assignments is not the best way to go. Again, I am
not sure the status of that proposal and I have not been asked
to comment on it.
I know that there is a tenure issue here, and how long it
takes and the nature of your contribution. For me, it is a
pleasure to serve in a position like this, and if the President
makes a judgment that there are going to be 2-year tours
instead of 4-year tours, obviously that is the way we are going
to go.
The experience related to it is, I find myself now at a
point where there is a great learning curve in these
assignments. I would also say that 4 years that we currently
have is a considerable period to serve. What I believe is
required is that we need a construct that serves the President
and serves the Service and provides for independent assessment
by the Chiefs.
Senator Levin. General?
General Hagee. Sir, I had not seen the proposal either and,
in the interest of time, I would agree with Admiral Clark.
General Jumper. Sir, we have not been briefed on the
details of such a proposal nor have we had a chance to discuss
this with the Secretary of Defense. I will say that I would
think the Secretary would want his service chiefs in position
long enough to be able to make a difference and to establish a
rapport with one another, to be able to deal with the joint
issues that we deal with every day.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will address this first question to you, General
Shinseki, because Admiral Clark and General Jumper have already
responded to the end strength question that Senator Levin had
posed.
Since the early 1990s, the Army has been cut by more than
34 percent and undergoing a 300-percent increase in mission
rates. The average frequency of Army contingency deployments
has increased from 1 every 4 years to 1 every 14 weeks. During
the same period of time, the Army lost a third of its force
structure, 21 percent of its infrastructure and 37 percent of
its budget authority.
Now, all of this is before September 11 and then the
potential problems that we are gearing up for right now. To put
it in perspective, in fiscal year 1989, the Operation Desert
Storm-size deployment of 261,000 active troops would require 53
percent of the Army's deployable end strength and only a sixth
of its forward-staging troops. Today that same deployment would
require 86 percent of deployable end strength.
Now, that gets into the problem that we are having, of
course, with our Reserve component. They are doing a great job,
but we all know that we are having problems with certain
critical MOSs and there is not a person at this table up here
that does not have a lot of deployments in his or her State. I
know you all answer the question, yes, we are ready and all
that, but how long can you sustain this? Then specifically on
end strength, General Shinseki, where are you? What are your
feelings?
General Shinseki. Senator, I think the last 3 years that I
have appeared before this committee, I have indicated that the
mission profile that the Army has been asked to address is
bigger than the size of the active component formations that we
had and that end strength was an issue.
But if you recall 3 years ago, recruiting was a challenge
and we had to go take care of that. In the last 3 years,
recruiting and retention is no longer the issue. So we are able
to fill our ranks. Prior to this mobilization expansion for a
potential Southwest Asia scenario, I think you would have found
something on the order of 25,000 to 30,000 Reserve component
soldiers mobilized each and every day routinely for the Sinai,
Bosnia, and Kosovo. I think this is an indication that our
reliance on the Reserves. Their response has been fantastic,
but the fact that we are relying on them so heavily for those
routine day-to-day missions suggests that there is an end
strength issue here.
Those numbers are constantly reviewed. We have made the
case that end strength is an issue for the Army, and we will
continue to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Now, for all of you, I want to first thank you because you
have each had someone come into my office. We have had
briefings on this next issue that concern me. It concerns me,
not just because it has been of concern to this committee for a
long time, but I also chair the Environment and Public Works
Committee.
That is, environmental encroachment. We have had briefings
from each one of the four Services. General Hagee, we know what
is happening out at Camp Pendleton. We know that we will be
able to use about 30 percent of the land area there. General
Shinseki, we have the same problem at Fort Bragg and other
places. Of course, we know what has happened by losing the
Vieques Range. That puts more burdens on the ranges that we
have here in CONUS.
So I would like to have each one of you just very briefly
talk about how serious of a problem this is. Then for the
record, I would like to have you inform this committee as to
the monetary costs, as near as you can determine them, of
complying with these environmental regulations.
[The information referred to follows:]

ENVIRONMENTAL ENCROACHMENT

General Shinseki. Encroachment on training and testing ranges is a
significant issue for the Army. Our soldiers must train as they intend
to fight because they will surely fight as they have been trained.
Environmentally based restrictions on training add artificiality into
training. Compliance with environmental laws can also restrict access
to land needed for maneuver and live-fire and restrict the available
times and durations of training activities.
The Army has spent more than $74 million over the past 5 years for
compliance with the Endangered Species Act. Given the significantly
increasing requirements brought about by pending critical habitat
designations, we anticipate significant increases in cost both to
maintain compliance and find training alternatives.
In addition, there are indirect costs associated with deploying
units to alternative training sites when their home station does not
support all necessary training requirements. For example, the 25th
Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii cannot conduct all of the 18
required combined arms live-fire exercises at their home station range,
Makua Military Range, due to a NEPA-based lawsuit settlement. Rather,
they must conduct a number of these exercises while deployed to the
continental U.S. or overseas. In addition, other units in Hawaii
(National Guard and Marines) that would also train at Makua are unable
to do so and must deploy or develop alternatives (suboptimal training
methods) for their displaced live-fire training.
At Fort Richardson, Alaska, the Army is currently engaged in a
lawsuit where the plaintiffs allege that live-fire training violates
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). They
are seeking to shut down training at the Eagle River Flats (ERF) range.
The RCRA allegation argues that munitions fired into or onto ERF fall
within the definition of RCRA statutory solid waste. If munitions used
for their intended purpose are considered to be statutory solid waste,
the Army could be forced to perform corrective action or remediation of
ERF. Live-fire training during the remediation would be impossible and
the only mortar and artillery impact area at Fort Richardson would be
lost for training. The CERCLA allegations are that the act of firing
munitions onto an operational range constitutes a release of hazardous
substances requiring reporting, characterization, and remediation. If
the court agrees with the plaintiff, then live-fire training and
testing operation at every Army range could be subject to CERCLA
response requirements. These findings would not only dramatically
impact the readiness of the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska, the
largest infantry brigade in the Army, but the entire Department of
Defense (DOD).
Further lawsuits could compel the Environmental Protection Agency
and State regulators in all U.S. regions to enforce the same standards
on other military ranges. Live-fire training would be severely
constrained and military readiness would decrease dramatically. The
requirement to conduct RCRA corrective action or CERCLA response
actions on operational ranges would constitute a huge financial burden.
The Army estimates that the cost to conduct RCRA or CERCLA-type clean
up on Army operational ranges would range from $14 billion to $140
billion. This does not include money that would be required to move
displaced training to another location during the cleanup. Moreover, if
these standards are applied across the DOD, it is unlikely that
alternative live-fire training sites would even be available.
Admiral Clark. While the fiscal year 2003 Department of the Navy
(DON) environmental compliance budget is approximately $1 billion, no
specific lines are tied directly or exclusively to encroachment
mitigation. DON budgets the funding required to comply with existing
environmental laws applicable to installations, ships, and aircraft.
These laws and regulations in turn have encroachment impacts if they
alter training time or space available while we maintain the property
the taxpayers have entrusted in us.
The effects of encroachment go beyond the environmental programs
due to the fact that when encroachment occurs there are potential costs
associated with delays, cancellations, modifications, and movement of
training to different locations. Operational costs may increase in the
form of more steaming days and/or flying hours required to complete an
exercise, and personnel costs may rise from paying travel per diem over
a longer time period.
The final cost has no fiscal figure but carries the most weight and
burden of encroachment on our troops. Should an exercise move to an
alternate location because of encroachment concerns, it means the
sailor could incur a longer time away from home due to transit time to
the training site. During this higher state of operational tempo as we
prosecute the global war on terror, all possible options are used to
ensure the sailor maximum time with family while home. It is also why
Navy strives to accomplish most unit level training near the home base,
but unfortunately there are times when this goal cannot be achieved due
to encroachment.
General Hagee. For fiscal year 2004, the Marine Corps has budgeted
the following to meet environmental compliance, pollution prevention,
and conservation requirements:
[In thousands
of dollars]

Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps 121,975
Military Construction 31,200
Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve 9,245
Defense Working Capital Fund 2,966

General Jumper did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.

General Shinseki. I would tell you the Army must train.
Otherwise, our presence on a piece of ground is not useful to
us. So we have made the importance of meeting our training
requirements a high priority, and where we have forces located
we have had to work with folks responsible for the environment
and find ways to continue to train. I think we have done that
by demonstrating we are good stewards.
But this is an issue that we continue to work, whether it
is in the National Training Center where you have the Desert
Tortoise or Fort Bragg, Fort Polk, Fort Benning, where the Red-
Cockaded Woodpecker exists.
Senator Inhofe. General, I know you have been good
stewards, all of you have, and that is the problem. You are
such good stewards, you are getting more and more of the
critters coming in and more and more of the problems. For
example, look at Fort Bragg. Camp Lejeune is a good example,
General Hagee, where I have been down there at 2-year intervals
and I see more and more of these areas where they are not able
to train.
So I am concerned about this, and again for the sake of
time I will just go ahead and ask you for the record if you
would submit that.
General Shinseki, one other question for you is. First of
all, I thank you for all the effort that you made in coming up
with an NLOS cannon compromise that gets into our Future Combat
System. I think it is good. I would ask you, does the budget
adequately fund that program to meet the congressionally-
mandated time line, that is fielding this by 2008?
General Shinseki. It does, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, good.
General Jumper, I know one of the big controversial things
in the costs would be, what are you going to use for tankers?
There are several proposals out there. The KC-135 Es and Rs--I
think now four-fifths of them are converted to Romeos--but also
the proposal for the leasing of 100 767s, which I think people
have to understand is the first step. If that were to happen, I
would assume we would end up with 400 or 500 of these things.
My concern is this. You are going to have to come to this
committee for ratification of that lease agreement, is that
correct?
General Jumper. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. When you do come to this committee for
ratification, will you come in with an established training,
basing, and maintenance plan for that equipment?
General Jumper. Sir, the plan that we have for training is
not established yet. What the initial plan would be, to start
off, as we did with the C-17, and that would be that as a few
airplanes become available then that training would probably be
done on a contract.
As you reach a certain level of aircraft--in the C-17
example it was 20 aircraft--then you make a decision on
centralizing the training. So at that time, we would come
forward with a plan on how and when that would be done sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I remember the C-17. We went through
that for a number of years.
General Jumper. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. It is a successful program. However, it is
a little bit different than this because you are talking about
a leasing operation where you are going to have these
conversions and then a major training effort. I would just say
this: if you are not in a position to come before this
committee with the training and the basing and maintenance, I
am probably going to oppose the lease altogether, because there
are some alternatives out there and I think we really need to
see how this overall program is going to work before we get
into something as far-reaching as this program you are
contemplating right now.
General Jumper. I understand, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me begin by thanking and commending General
Shinseki for his great service to the Army and the Nation, and
also Patty Shinseki, who has served with equal distinction at
least. Thank you.
There is a recurrent theme in today's questioning about
manpower and end strength and I think that emanates from the
common sense view that it is very difficult to interject
military forces into a region and it is sometimes more
difficult to get them out. So I think we all are anticipating
not only successful military operations, but long-term
operations.
I know you have responded, but could you particularly
respond to the issue of Reserve and National Guard, because
what I have seen, as Senator Inhofe has suggested, in my home
State we have mobilized practically all the Guard and Reserve
Forces we have for 1 year. A more specific question is, what do
we have to do now to ensure that we do not run into a wall a
year from now and there are not any willing able National
Guard, Reserves, to fulfil critical missions, many of which
might be particularly germane to the Reserves and the Guards
since civil affairs, distribution of water, distribution of
food, as General Shinseki suggested there is a lot more of
those qualified individuals in the Reserves than the Active
Forces.
Could you comment, and I will ask all of you gentlemen to
do so.
General Shinseki. Certainly, Senator. I think this is part
of that larger discussion about right-sizing the force, the end
strength issue that I addressed earlier. Then once that issue
is addressed, then it is the appropriate mix between active and
Reserve components.
Day to day, we should be able to handle that out of the
available inventory of our active component formations, and
then have on those unusual circumstances when you have to surge
for a large operation a requirement to go to our Reserve
components. That is not what is happening right now. So it is a
right-sizing of the force and a decision on how to best achieve
the right mix and balance here.
Having said that, our Reserve component soldiers have been
absolutely fantastic in their response to these call-ups, many
of them, on very short notice. They have done what we have
asked them to do in days when we would have normally wanted to
give them weeks to respond.
Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, from your perspective?
Admiral Clark. I do not have the same circumstances the
General does, but I do have the issue for us and where we are
in the manning circumstances about force protection. We have
used a number of these individuals in the force protection
role. I have about 5,000 people called up today, so my numbers
are dramatically different than the other Services.
We will be able to sustain this where we are. The challenge
is: how do you get the right mix so that you are not constantly
calling on the Reserve structure to now handle what is in
effect from where I sit a new requirement for security? We are
moving and will in this budget this year bring more active duty
people into the structure to take care of basic force
protection challenges that we face.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Hagee.
General Hagee. Yes, sir. The Marine Reserve is pretty much
a mirror image of our Active-Duty Force, except for certain
functions like PSYOPS and civil affairs. We have approximately
14,000 Reserves on active duty right now and that is a result
of our prep for what action we might have to take in Southwest
Asia. We can maintain that in the near term.
Senator Reed. General Jumper.
General Jumper. Sir, I think one of the challenges we all
have is to try to determine the new background level baseline
activity that is going to be required of all of our Services as
we go through the dynamics that we are going through now.
Certainly with the addition of Afghanistan, the aftermath of
Kosovo, all of us have had to rise to a new, higher level of
basic activity in all of our Services.
This also dictates how the mix has to go between the active
and the Reserve. We have done some minor adjustments in the Air
Force with combat search and rescue forces, substituting one
capability in the Reserve Forces for active duty combat search
and rescue.
So I think this is going to be an iterative process. I do
not think we are going to be able to answer the question of the
right mix or even the right tempo of activity for some time
until we see how we baseline out again.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Clark, I noticed that the budget proposal cuts over
$400 million in submarine research and development, but my
hunch is that a lot of our research and development funds, not
just within the Navy but throughout the Services, are being
cut. What is the impact in terms of future technology from
these cuts in research and development?
Admiral Clark. I do not know exactly which budget line you
are referring to, but obviously research and development is the
lifeblood for future development. So we have a strong R&D
budget in this submit. But obviously, your question, what is
the role, is the lifeblood, so it has to be right.
I would be happy to address the specific if you have it. In
terms of the total macro numbers by community, I really do not
do it that way.
Senator Reed. We will specifically get you some
information, then.
My time has expired. Thank you.
Senator McCain [presiding]. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jumper, we have the Air Force Academy in the State
of Colorado. We have a number of allegations that are surfacing
now about women who have been raped at the Academy. There was a
problem in the early 1990s with some sexual harassment cases,
and I know that the Academy tried to deal with the problem by
putting in place some procedures to allow women to go ahead and
report a rape case or sexual harassment. Then, there was a GAO
report in 1994 that had some recommendations on what could be
done as far as the procedures concerned.
Since the investigative reporters have brought up this
situation and consequently we have had a number of women who
have contacted my office. I think we are up to about 16 now.
There is one common thread. I mean, there is a number of common
threads that run through with these cases, but there is one
common thread and that is that they are working under an honor
system in the Academy. They are encouraged to step forward and
they are given an amnesty opportunity. Then, they are brought
in and the case is investigated. They are put in a position
where if they want to stay in, continue to be in the Air Force
as a career, they have to lie.
So this really puts them in a box, and I hope you will take
a close look at what is happening at the Academy. I was hoping
maybe you might have a comment or two.
General Jumper. Senator, I could take up the rest of your
day with my comments on this subject. First of all, let me
assure you and other members of the committee that there is no
place in the United States Air Force for any potential officer
who would treat any other potential officer in the way that has
been alleged.
Secretary of the Air Force Jim Roche and I are the personal
action officers on this particular issue. Before this came to
light in the press, we had other indications that some of the
processes by which these infractions are reported were not as
they should be. There have also been suggestions that women who
surface these are encouraged not to press charges because the
circumstances they found themselves in leading up to the crime
may have compromised their situation.
Let there be no doubt that assault and rape are crimes of
violence, and crimes of violence will be treated separately
from the circumstances that one might find themselves in
leading up to that crime of violence.
We have a team out there right now looking at the very
processes you mentioned, Senator, to make sure that anyone at
the Academy has a clear channel to report these criminal
activities and that we have the means to deal with them
appropriately.
Senator Allard. I appreciate your comments, General Jumper.
I think there are two problems there. Number one, maybe some of
these cases in the past need to be reviewed a little closer.
Number two, I think most of the women that are contacting my
office are concerned about the future. I see that you are too
in the comments that you just made before this committee. It is
important to make sure this process is corrected so that we
have a team--we do not have a victim within the team that
somehow or other gets themselves in an untenable situation.
I appreciate your comment.
General Jumper. Senator, if I could just add one comment. I
have two daughters in the Air Force, and I have a third one who
will start ROTC next year. So you are looking at a dad who has
little tolerance for this stuff.
Senator Allard. General, I understand. Very good. Thank you
for your comments.
I would like to move on to another issue within my 6 minute
period here, and that is missile defense. I am very interested
developing and getting our missile defense system deployed out
there. I think it is a high priority for the President also.
The Missile Defense Agency is developing these systems, but
I think ultimately you are going to be the users of that
system. So my question is, are you all prepared to make the
ballistic missile system a core mission for each of your
branches of the Services? I am talking Navy, Air Force, and
Army. I am assuming it may already be becoming a part of your
core mission.
So I would like to have each one of you comment on that if
you would, please. We will start with General Shinseki and we
will just move on down the table, Admiral Clark and then
General Jumper if you would, please.
General Shinseki. Senator, the Army has had a long
tradition of association with missiles and, yes, we are part of
this National Missile Defense Program. Our contributions
currently have to do with, even as the National Missile Defense
Program is being stood up, our capabilities are in the terminal
attack business with our Patriots and our THAAD missiles. Right
now they represent about the only point to point attack,
missile to missile attack capability. Even as other
capabilities are being stood up, we are already part of this
effort.
Senator Allard. As a part of your core mission now; is that
where we are?
General Shinseki. We have been part of missile defense as
part of this.
Senator Allard. Core mission?
General Shinseki. Yes.
Senator Allard. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. We have had an incredibly successful testing
year the last 12 months, six for six and three direct hits.
Three were tracking exercises. We absolutely are prepared to
move into the future on this.
Now, as to whether it is core or not, missile defense has
been a core, but different kinds, near as opposed to ballistic
missile, long-range capabilities. The proposal put forward
would have us moving to an interim capability in 2004. We
anxiously are pursuing that. In fact, the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency was coming forward with a proposal to
build a test platform and I came forward with a counterproposal
that I commit a ship now to that program so we do not lose time
in that effort. We are on board and moving forward.
Senator Allard. I think a big part of that is this concept
of the spiral development.
Admiral Clark. Correct.
Senator Allard. I think you can play a key role in getting
it started there.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
General Jumper.
General Jumper. Sir, we will certainly consider it core to
the Air Force, whatever our role emerges in the future. We know
that we have a significant program with the Airborne Laser
already under way. It will blend in with this program, and we
will be working with STRATCOM and Northern Command as their
roles work out, and our components will then be a part of the
implementation, however it is designated.
Senator Allard. Thank you all.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCain. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shinseki, I want to thank you also for your
distinguished service and recall that when I attended this
hearing 2 years ago and each of you--and this was my first
time--expressed your own views directly to this committee,
regardless of other considerations and pressures as others did
as well. I certainly in subsequent years, especially last year,
had the chance to see how vital that is and how courageous at
times it requires someone to be. I want to thank you
specifically for that.
I want to follow up on Senator Inhofe's question a little
more regarding the NLOS cannon system. What specifically is in
the fiscal year 2004 request for that, what components of that
development? Are those locked into fiscal year 2004? Then are
we set up now step by step? You said fiscal year 2008 is the
expected deployment.
General Shinseki. Well Senator, we took the moneys that
were available coming out of the Crusader program, focused it
into the Non-Line of Sight Cannon. This Congress added
additional moneys to ensure that the development would be
visible and continue, and that is all on track.
This year in the fiscal year 2004 budget, we have taken
that Non-Line of Sight Cannon program element, which was a
separate element, put it together with Future Combat System
overall, those vehicles, because it is thought that this Non-
Line of Sight Cannon will provide us the common chassis on
which all the other systems would ride. We watch that very
closely, and that is addressed in the budget.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
One question I will ask each of you, and again I will start
with General Shinseki again. On the budget proposal for the 5
out years, it is basically in the DOD component for this coming
fiscal year $379.9 billion and then for the next 5 years it is
approximately $20 billion. Actually, it is a 5-percent increase
initially, but 4 percent at the end. So my thought was, if you
spend that increment of funding over the course of the plan you
have laid out here, what in fiscal year 2009 will be the major
developments or improvements or next steps forward,
irrespective of service areas? Does that progression reflect
your own priorities, your own view of what we most importantly
need to do to be ready to fight whatever we have to fight in
2009?
General Shinseki. If you look out, the Army is extending
from the fiscal year 2004 budget, but from fiscal year 2004 to
fiscal year 2009 you will see that on the moneys generated,
Future Combat System, that new capability that we are looking
at in 2010, that we will begin to field that in 2008 in small
increments, and the first brigade-sized element in 2010. So the
Future Combat System, precision munitions, sensors and
communications, what lashes this together is the C\4\ISR, if
you will, the ability to link all these capabilities.
Additionally, missile defense technology, a significant
investment of about a billion dollars; about a billion dollars
in science and technology as well. So these are the major
categories that we will see accomplished in 2010.
Senator Dayton. Admiral?
Admiral Clark. Senator, the major issues are the
recapitalization of the existing force and then moving forward
with transformation. I have testified before this committee in
previous years over the challenges that I face in that
recapitalization issue and that I need $12 billion a year in my
SCN account, for example, and have not had it.
As I move toward the out years and will we be doing
everything we need to do, the out years, we are doing
everything we can to turn dollars into investment in the future
for recapitalization, modernization, and transformation. I am
encouraged by the out years. It is easy to see the improvement
in the out years, but we have moved the budget in a way that
puts the resources in the ship construction account, that puts
the resources into the transformation we need in the aviation
side of the house.
For example, General Jumper and I are working--this will be
reflected in future budgets--on how we can team to make the
unmanned combat air vehicles and how we can get there quicker.
I absolutely see the kind of transformational things that we
need in the future as well as the number of ships that we need
to build so that we can recapitalize for the first half of the
20th century.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General?
General Hagee. Some of those transformation items that we
have talked about as far as the Marine Corps would be the
Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle. In fiscal year 2009 we are
going to start seeing, I believe, the Joint Strike Fighter
coming off; tiltrotor technology, which right now is doing very
well in the testing, will be available. We will be in the
middle of our upgrade of our Huey and Cobra to a four-rotor
blade on each one of those helicopters.
We will have a replacement for the LHA. We will also have a
way ahead for the replacement for our Maritime Prepositioned
Force.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Jumper. Sir, I think we will begin to see some of
Secretary Rumsfeld's initiatives in transformation starting to
come to fruition, where we streamline processes; we get the
operational community, and the acquisition community, the
scientific community together during the development of
programs, and we start to get things out much quicker to the
field.
As far as the Air Force is concerned, I think we are going
to see an increase in our ability to talk directly between
space, air, land, and sea platforms, so that we can get the
machine-to-machine interfaces that right now go through travel
communities and analog eyeballs in order to interpret results.
I think we will see a great uptick in our ability to
network. I call it the cursor over the target. The sum of the
wisdom of all of our systems talking to one another equals a
cursor over the target that we can act on immediately. I think
that we will see great improvements in our ability to deal with
future threats such as cruise missiles, which is a big worry of
mine, and mobile targets in and under the weather, in and under
the camouflage, being able to work with General Shinseki's
concept of operations to help our folks on the ground, all
these things.
The next generation of strike technology, whether it is a
bomber, whether it is in orbit, from orbit, or through orbit,
are going to be questions we are going to be asking in the
coming months to prepare for future threats.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Although my time has expired, you say you have the
resources you need, so I would say that anything that is not in
this, especially in these out years, that you think is either
not in that should be or that you think is underfunded, I would
appreciate having that in writing in the next month or so. But
I thank you all.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank each of you for the tremendous service you have
rendered. You have led in changing our military establishment
and transforming it to a more lethal and mobile force that we
respect, that leaves us with the capability of affecting world
events in a positive way. We really appreciate that, all of
you.
I know there are things that remain to be done. There will
be challenges you need to face, and whenever you make a change
someone is not going to be happy. But I think the change is
going in the right direction and I salute you for that.
I know that some may want to continue to discuss and debate
the niceties of the situation in Iraq, but I would just recall
that we have voted 77 Senators and overwhelmingly in the House
to authorize the President to take the action he believes is
necessary without a UN vote, without a NATO vote, and I expect
that the President will do that. It strikes me as really
ludicrous or really worse, pernicious that France and Germany
would suggest that we need to give at least 4 more months to
the inspectors when Saddam Hussein could, within a few hours,
disclose his weapons of mass destruction and the matter would
be settled and we would not have a problem.
So we need to give him more time to do something he could
do in one day is beyond me. So I hope the President will
continue to press on the United Nations the need for them to be
responsible, be relevant, and to honor the resolutions that
they have previously issued.
Gentlemen, on the Guard and Reserve, there is some concern
about whether we have them configured properly and whether or
not we are able to call them up in a timely fashion and we have
the right forces to call up. They are prepared to serve.
Alabama has the highest per capita National Guard service in
activation of any State in the country, and we are proud of
that and willing to serve on that.
I visited Opelika and Brundage and my old Army Reserve unit
that I spent 10 years in has been activated for the second
time. They are in Kuwait. They were there 11 years ago.
I would just ask, are you satisfied where we are with the
Reserves in terms of training? First, I would like to say the
training and their capability and their equipment are maybe not
perfect, but is so far superior to what it used to be. It is so
close to active duty in most instances.
But are you satisfied we are configured correctly and that
we are using them as wisely as we can? General Shinseki, I
guess you have the most. Maybe you can give your thoughts.
General Shinseki. Senator, as I said, we have used them a
lot more than I would have expected. I have watched this now
for a number of years and I have talked about the end strength
of the Army and the fact that we have gone to the Reserve
component for many of those routine missions. I mean, they are
in the Sinai today, they are in Bosnia, they are about to go to
Kosovo; this suggests that for these ongoing operations that we
are going to them far more frequently than I think any of us
expected.
I do know that there is stress on them. For these missions,
we have the time to bring them up to the mission standard and
they deploy and do a fantastic job. For a large-scale expansion
on short notice, which is really what the members of the Guard
and the Reserve have their focus on, this adds to the
challenge. When they are being used for those routine day-to-
day missions, it adds to the stress.
Are they able to do it? Yes. Are they better today than
they were 5 or 10 years ago today? Much, much better. A lot of
effort on their part and ours to get them resources and
training to the standard. But there is stress on their
formations and following this set of mobilizations we are going
to have to take a good hard look at right-sizing the force and
getting to the right mix. Those studies are under way.
Senator Sessions. So those studies are under way?
General Shinseki. Yes.
Senator Sessions. Any of you want to comment further on
that? [No response.]
One of the things that we need to continue to strive for in
our transformation are new methods of warfare: Special Forces,
which I hear you say are most stressed; precision-guided
munitions that we need enough of; and unmanned aerial vehicles
and maybe unmanned ground vehicles. Those are transformational
matters of great importance and it seems that we are somewhat
stressed in each one of those areas and we could perhaps be
further along in each one of those areas than we are today.
It strikes me that in any likely conflict in the next
decade these fores are going to be key to our success.
I will start with General Shinseki again. Do you have any
comments or are we where we need to be with regard to these
type forces and should we strive to do more?
General Shinseki. Special Operations Forces?
Senator Sessions. The Special Operations Forces, the
unmanned aerial vehicles, the precision-guided munitions, and
things of that nature that represent modern warfare.
General Shinseki. Special Operations Forces, you have
already begun to see some adjustments on the part of the Army.
Even before this latest expanded call-up or requirement for
Special Operations Forces, in this next budget we have added
something on the order of 1,800, perhaps 1,900, additional
people that come from the Army, and it takes us a certain
amount of time to grow that capability and then transition them
to the Special Operations Forces.
We are even recruiting directly off the street for
youngsters with particular skills and capabilities that may go
directly into that kind of unit. So we are looking at that. We
have added to their budget in fiscal year 2004. So those things
are under way.
As I indicated earlier, we are investing in precision
munitions. In some ways if you look at the efforts of the Army
to digitize in the 1990s, it was the term that was used to
describe what we were doing to create better situational
awareness for our units and our formations so we could more
precisely target those things we wanted to bring our fires
against. Much of that investment is being realized today.
For the ground combat formations, it is distinguishing
between ourselves, our friends, and those adversaries who we
want to target. Much of that is going on, a complement of now
precision fires being able to link into that. Those investments
are being made.
Senator Sessions. Admiral, a comment?
Admiral Clark. If I could. We have made a lot of progress
in the PGM world. I feel real good about where we are. We are
on a curve. We have not flattened out. This is a good news
story. General Jumper and I are working together to make sure
that we have the right mix of weapons and we have a great
partnering relationship going on with the Air Force.
I am really excited about what is happening in unmanned
vehicles. I absolutely believe this is one of the most
important technologies for us to pursue. We had a successful
flight of one of the unmanned prototypes this last week, a
combat vehicle, and this is all headed in the right direction.
Again, this is an area where the Air Force and the Navy are
working hand in glove, seeking to chart a path together so that
we can optimize and get the most bang for the buck for the
taxpayers' resources.
The area where I am a little more concerned is the SOF
question you raise. We have to look at this carefully. By the
way, with the command relationship that exists, some of these
forces work directly for Special Operations Command and not for
the Navy per se. But we know that they are turning this force
tightly.
The demand on this resource is significant and I would
expect that we are going to see a requirement to increase this
force structure.
Senator Sessions. General Hagee?
General Hagee. Sir, I would strongly agree about the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles.
Senator Sessions. Could I just interrupt. I notice that the
Navy sent out a memo, according to The Washington Times
article, that a capability gap exists and that a sense of
urgency needs to be placed on unmanned aerial vehicles. Would
you agree with that, Admiral Clark?
Admiral Clark. I do agree with it and that is why I am so
excited to report to you that we had a very successful flight
last week. We have unmanned vehicles. Now, I am talking about
the next generation. General Jumper and I are working on
unmanned combat vehicles that will be carrier-capable. If you
look at the nature of our operations cyclic off the carrier
or--we need more dwell time.
My favorite new word in the last year is ``persistence''--
persistent combat capability. We need that capability, and I
believe that the unmanned regime is going to give us great
capability. It is coming. There are investments for it in this
budget and there will be, and we are working on additional
things now for the future.
General Hagee. Sir, we are also working with the Navy and
the Air Force in the unmanned aerial vehicle area, both with
sensors and the combat unmanned aerial vehicles. We are also
working on the ground unmanned vehicles, too, mostly in the
sensor area.
As I mentioned before, we are working with Special
Operations Command. In fact this afternoon, I am meeting with
General Holland trying to identify those areas where Marine
forces that are already forward deployed might be able to
relieve some of the stress on his forces.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
General Jumper. Sir, I am very proud of how we are getting
this stuff out in the field in efforts like we described with
Sergeant Yoshida, who is working directly with commercial
industry, with our acquisition community, to take off-the-shelf
technology, get them into the hands of our combat controllers,
and do it now. I think that is a good model for the future.
On things like the unmanned air vehicle, we are making the
Predator UAV as quickly as we can. We are making two a month.
One of the problems that we have is we have to balance the
things we are trying to do with that vehicle with our ability
to have a stable production line, because since 1999, we have
added the laser designation capability to the Predator, we have
added the Hellfire missile to the Predator, and other special
capabilities that we keep going back then and trying to refit
into the ones that are being manufactured now.
We have a Predator B on the way that is going to have six
weapons stations on it and it will improve that capability
significantly.
Then with the precision-guided munitions, if you recall,
Senator, back as recent as the Kosovo war we did not have the
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM, which is GPS-
guided, is on everybody's tongue now. We did not even have it
in Kosovo. We were dropping prototypes out of the B-2.
Since then we have tens of thousands of these things that
Admiral Clark and I are out procuring at a rate of about 2,500
a month by July of this year, as quickly as we can make them.
So I think the emphasis is there. I could go on and on, but I
think the emphasis is there and we have a deep appreciation for
what you are talking about, sir.
Senator Sessions. Well, we do not want to run short.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join with all the members of the committee in commending
all of you for the job that you have done preparing our Armed
Forces to deal with the eventualities that we are going to be
facing, appear to be facing very soon in terms of Iraq. At the
time when these servicemen are called to perform, all of us are
going to be strongly behind them.
I am glad we talked earlier, in response to questions,
about the preparedness of the servicemen and women. I do not
believe that this conflict in Iraq is going to last a very long
time. I myself am most concerned about Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda, the security issues that are presented by them still,
and those issues that are presented by them in terms of terror
here at home and around the world.
I am very concerned about North Korea and the dangers that
they have in terms of production of nuclear weapons grade
plutonium.
I am glad that General Shinseki and others talked about the
training of our troops to deal with chemical and biological
weapons. I am sure that the real challenge that we are going to
face, I think, eventually is whether as a result of this
conflict, with the inspections if they fail and they are not
followed through or cannot be completed, is the danger of a
recruiting ground for al Qaeda in Iraq and among the Arab
world.
General Shinseki, we talked about feeding the people in
Iraq, 24 million Iraqis, 60 percent of them being fed and
probably food being stored in barns. It is not difficult to
assume that those barns are going to be burned down. So you end
up with individuals that after 3 days may not be looking at
American servicemen and women as liberators.
Setting up the local police, when you have these
bloodletting feuds that have lasted over a lifetime, a judicial
system in a country that has never known a judicial system. How
is that going to be developed? What is going to happen in terms
of American servicemen if the Kurds start going over and
reclaiming their old lands? Are we going to become involved and
embroiled in that? What are going to be the orders to our
servicemen?
We read in this morning's papers we are 2 to 3 weeks away
from moving, so there must be some instructions. What is going
to happen when the Shi'a move into the southern part of Iran to
reclaim their religious cities? Where are American servicemen
going to be over there?
So these are some of the concerns. At the same time, we are
seeing the North Koreans moving ahead in terms of their
production of weapons-grade plutonium. It appears to me that we
have developed and sustained a two-war military to only have it
run by an administration with a one-war attention span. Will we
resolve the crisis before or after in terms of, in Iraq, before
or after the North Koreans produce a few more bombs?
What is your thinking today in looking at the danger that
that poses to the security in the Pacific, the dangers of an
arms race there, of real conflict? What are your plans in terms
of telling this committee how we ought to be considering the
issues of using whatever is going to be necessary in terms of
force in order to protect our interests there?
What is the timing going to be? What should we know, given
those realities today and given the challenges that are
presented?
I do not think anyone is doubting that these men and women
are going to be able to get into Baghdad. That is, at least for
some of us, just going to be the beginning. I want to bring up
the whole questions about the Reserve and the Guard. In my
State, Massachusetts, we are proud of the ones that have served
well, the highest activation since World War II, with all the
implications that has in terms of primary responders that you
have talked about.
At a time that we see additional troops going to the
Philippines, additional troops going to Colombia. Primarily my
focus of the question is on North Korea, your statement of
whether we are going to have enough time in North Korea, and
then I am going to run out of time.
But I want to hear from General Shinseki about the
administration's cut on Impact Aid for schools, $130 million,
cutting back on school budgets in districts where servicemen
are going over to Iraq and these Impact Aid funds are 30, 40,
or 50 percent of school budgets. It is beyond belief to me on
this matter.
If someone could make a comment, just if they would on that
and the other issue about how they see this unfolding
responsibility on the military and how that fits into the
timing for our security interests in North Korea, with its
imminency of developing the weapons-grade plutonium.
General Shinseki. Senator, I think you have described quite
well this challenging and complex environment we find ourselves
in today. Had we sat back 3 years ago and described it, it
would not have been exactly as we see it. Maybe it is a good
caution to us that in this business of trying to anticipate it
is not precise and sometimes you have to have a little of added
capability to be able to adjust to these unanticipated
surprises.
I think in our discussions of two major combat operations,
one a decisive defeat and the other a significant, swiftly
defeat the efforts, you can add a third major contingency here
and that is the global war on terrorism. Several years ago that
was not seen as a requirement. So the stress on the
requirements has certainly spread, at least in the case of the
Army, our ground forces cover more missions than we would have
anticipated.
We are concerned about what appears to be happening in
North Korea, but we also know that there are actions under way
to deal with that. For the present, we look at our people on
the ground there and look at what requirements we may be asked
to provide to the combatant commander should tensions go any
higher. We are in the process of doing that and, as I indicated
earlier, to meet his requirements it would probably involve
additional mobilization of our Reserve components.
But I think your questions are appropriate. I would say
that in the aftermath of this series of crises, as we think
about where we position U.S. military presence for the future,
these are issues that ought to impact the strategy that
outlines where those capabilities ought to be positioned.
Senator Kennedy. If any of the others want to add to that?
General Jumper. Sir, could I comment on the Impact Aid?
Senator Kennedy. Sure.
General Jumper. I just learned about this yesterday, as a
matter of fact. I am not sure exactly what happened, but it is
certainly of concern to the Air Force and, as the father of a
child who goes to a school that benefits from this sort of aid,
it is something that we will go back and look into. It was not
something that was recommended by my service, I can tell you.
Senator Kennedy. It is a $115 million cutback. Thank you.
I know my time is up. The policy decisions are not made by
you. They are made by the administration and obviously to the
extent Congress does. So everyone has a high regard for all of
you, and I think it is almost because of the extraordinary high
regard that we have for all of you we want to make sure that
you have what you need to do the job and not being asked to do
things which put you at undue risk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shinseki, I want to join my colleagues in thanking
you for your extraordinary service.
I also want to pursue the issue of the readiness of our
troops to face a biological or chemical attack. Last July, the
Army Audit Agency submitted a report that was critical of the
Army's preparedness to deal with such an attack, and the
results of the audit were very troubling. Of 25 units reviewed
at Fort Hood and Fort Lewis, 18 of them were found not to be
proficient in operating chemical and biological defensive
equipment. Inspectors also found that many units were not
performing adequate maintenance on their chem-bio equipment.
There have been other reports, recently by ``60 Minutes''
and others, that have also raised very troubling questions
about whether our troops would be adequately prepared and
protected if they face chemical or biological weapons.
First, could you tell me how the Army has responded to
these audits and reports? Second, are you personally confident
that our troops are adequately trained, equipped, and prepared
to face a chemical or biological attack?
General Shinseki. Senator, just a point of clarification.
Was that report a year ago or 2 years ago that you are
referring to?
Senator Collins. I believe it was last July, just this past
year.
General Shinseki. Last July. Okay, there have been several
of these surveys. In some cases, we have asked these agencies
to go out and take a look because of things we have heard. The
one I am most familiar with was several years ago. I would have
to go back and take a look at this report.
I will tell you when we looked several years ago, when we
talk about a battalion sized unit, 2 years ago our problem
areas were with the two soldiers who were on the battalion
level staff that had responsibilities for certain select pieces
of equipment. So in a 500 to 800 person organization, the focus
of that investigation was we found some shortcomings in
training and maintenance at that level, and we have gone to
work and corrected those things.
I will have to look and see specifically what this last
July report was about. But whenever we discover there is some
concern, we go back out there and ensure that the commanders
are doing, and are resourced to do, what it is we expect of
them. The training that goes along with operating in this
environment is part of our mission set that we train to.
As I say, whether you are at garrison at Fort Stewart in
the wintertime or August in the National Training Center, you
can expect that these tasks are part of that set of skills that
individuals have to train to.
The answer to your question: I am confident we are training
and that standards are significant. This is the toughest part
of our training mission. For those units that are currently on
the ground in the forward areas, I can tell you they are
dealing with this requirement on a daily basis.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Admiral Clark, I am pleased that the budget this year turns
the corner on shipbuilding and provides for funding for 12
ships. But nevertheless, the Navy is still dealing with a
legacy of underfunding year after year and the result of that
with the planned retirement of the Spruance class destroyers is
that the fleet is projected to fall under 300 ships in coming
years, bottoming out at, I think, 291 ships in the year 2006.
You have testified in the past that ideally to meet mission
requirements you would need a fleet of approximately 375 ships.
Is that still your judgment, that a fleet ideally would be
about that size?
Admiral Clark. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Collins. I would like to talk to you about how we
can recapitalize our fleet, not only through new construction
but also modernization of the Arleigh Burke class of
destroyers. It seems to me that one way that we can reduce
total life-cycle costs is by reducing the crew size on our DDGs
using the technological breakthroughs and designs that we have
learned in designing the DD(X).
What are your thoughts on modernization of the DDGs to make
sure we are maximizing their useful life and also reducing
overall costs by reducing the size of the crew?
Admiral Clark. I think that is absolutely the right
direction to go. We have been doing some experimenting with
Smartship for the last several years. We see a lot of that
manifested in the design of DD(X). While we do not know exactly
how many people DD(X) is going to have on it, we know it is
going to be dramatically less than what we have on our main
line ships of the line today.
When DDG comes up for its midlife--and we must begin to
project toward that midlife upgrade--we are going to need to
apply the improvements that technology will allow us to bring
to bear.
Senator, when we talk about the total number of ships and
we talk about capability like DDG, the Burke class is a great
ship. It is a terrific ship. Still building them. But one of
the things that I do not believe that we have always done as
well as we should have done in our Navy is start thinking right
up front, where is the midlife improvement on this platform?
Because if we do not do that, looking back over time, you
lose the ship early. The taxpayer does not get the return on
investment that it laid out when it invested in the platform.
So we clearly, we are not there yet on DDG. We are still
building them. But we have to be moving toward that with the
things that we have discovered in some of our Smartship
experimentation.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Jumper, my time has expired, but I just want to
associate myself with the concerns expressed by Senator Allard
on the allegations involving rape and other sexual assault at
the Air Force Academy. One of my proudest responsibilities is
to recommend young men and women to attend our Service
academies, and the idea that I am recommending young women who
then may be at risk of sexual assault is just appalling to me.
I know that it is to you as well.
I just want to let you know that in my capacity as chairman
of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I, along with Senator
Lieberman, have asked the Inspector General of the Department
of Defense to investigate these allegations. I am pleased to
hear your comments as well this morning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins, I assure you that when I
first learned of this problem several weeks ago, in
consultation with our colleague the Senator from Colorado, we
have taken those steps to posture this committee so that we can
review the findings. We urged the appropriate Air Force
officials, including our witness today, to initiate these
steps.
I thank the Senator for her concern because I likewise,
along with every member of this committee, take such pride. As
a matter of fact, my Academy Day is coming up soon, when some
400 or 500 nominees or applicants and their families gather
here at the Senate to review those options.
I thank the Senator.
Senator Pryor, would you indulge me? I just wish to make an
announcement to the committee. Senator Levin and I have
arranged for tomorrow morning a classified briefing for the
entire committee on the efforts to date by the administration
with regard to the planning for the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
This is an interagency effort. We will have briefers from the
various departments and agencies of the Federal Government
initially tasked with this. I hope Senators can schedule their
time to be available for this briefing.
Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to concur with Senator Collins' statements a
few moments ago about the academies, and I know that you are
going to do everything in your power to do what we need to do
to make that situation right.
Also, I want to just thank you all for being here today,
thank you for your service to this great country. I think the
war on terrorism has touched every person in our Nation in
various ways and certainly everyone in this room is touched by
it in some way. I know that you cannot pick up the paper in
Little Rock without reading about the Little Rock Air Force
Base or the fact that many of our National Guard units have
been called up, including our Air National Guard unit there in
Fort Smith, and what is going on at the Army's Pine Bluff
Arsenal as part of the war on terrorism.
It has touched many lives, not just in my State, but all
over this great country.
Also, I must say on a personal note, Senator Warner, that
when I was the Attorney General of Arkansas, my director of
operations was a one-star general in the Arkansas National
Guard, and he has been called up now for I think over 6 months
now. Part of his responsibility is to assess readiness of
various National Guard units around the country and to call
them up as need be. He is now in Georgia doing that.
I know that preparedness is something that you are very
focused on. I appreciate your comments about preparedness today
and the lessons learned in this environment we find ourselves
in today. I can assure you, and I think I can speak for the
committee, that we are going to do everything in our power to
make sure that our men and women are the best-trained and best-
equipped in the world. We are just going to do our part on this
committee to continue to make sure that you can complete your
mission and the mission of the United States of America.
I really only have one question today, Mr. Chairman, and
that is about retention. Some of you mentioned that in your
opening statements. I know it is something in the last several
years that has received a lot of publicity and attention, as it
should. It is an important part of our military picture and an
important part of our preparedness. I would like to hear from
each one of you today, if possible, about how you feel we are
doing and your particular branch is doing on the issue of
retention and what we need to do to get you to the level where
you are very satisfied with retention.
General Shinseki. Senator, up until this point, retention
has not been an issue for us. In fact, if there was a challenge
it was recruiting 3 years ago. We fixed that. The last 3 years
we have met our recruiting targets. But at the same time, our
retention requirements we exceeded each year in each of our
components.
The stress on the force right now may affect decisions
after this mobilization period is over about primarily Reserve
component soldiers, whether they stay in their formations or
not, and I think that is something we have to pay attention to.
I think whatever we can do to work with employers of those
soldiers is also important, and we do. We go out and through
our contacts engage those employers, thank them for what they
do, and explain how important this is.
But there is stress out there. I think we are all aware of
it.
Admiral Clark. Senator, I always love this question because
we are doing better than we ever have in our history. We are
going through a period for the last 2 years we have had the
highest retention we have ever had in the history of the
institution. Part of this reason is because young men and women
want to be part of the solution. Young Americans want to be
there, and that is what we are seeing.
With regard to recruiting, last year we took 7,500 out of
the plan because we had more people than end strength would
allow us to have. So I would just sum it up like this: our
young people are responding to the challenge.
Now, make no mistake. They are responding to a whole series
of signals. One is the global war on terrorism. But they are
responding to signals that they have received from the American
people and from Congress as well. There have been major things
done to help us win this battle for people.
I would tell you that at this stage of the year I am
running about 20 points over my annual targets. But I will tell
you why this is; there are reenlistment incentives for people
to stay. When those reenlistment incentives run out, well, we
will see a change in the way that they respond.
So very much what has become evident to me in my 2\1/2\
years in this post is that they are looking for signals from
the American people and they like the signals that they are
getting from the American people and from Congress. Congress
has helped us put together financial incentive packages and the
things that they are responding to.
But more than anything else, my summation of what is going
on with our young people is they want to make a difference. I
would ask you to continue to support us on the issues that
allow us to create and shape the force the way we need to shape
it for the 21st century. There are financial tools that are
involved there and the help of Congress is critical.
Thank you.
General Hagee. Senator, I could not agree more with the
Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to thank this committee
and Congress for the support that you have given us and our
young men and women in uniform. Quality of life makes a
difference. Selective reenlistment bonus makes a difference.
Those are some of the things that the Admiral was talking
about. Obviously they want to serve.
As far as the Marine Corps specifically is concerned, we
have had the best year in retention in our officer corps this
year over the last 18 years. This year on our retention of our
first term enlistees, in January we had already retained 80
percent of what we wanted to retain for the entire year. So
like the Navy, we are doing very well in retention both on the
enlisted and the officer side.
General Jumper. Senator, in the Air Force we are
experiencing similar results. Our recruiting for last year was
finished by the end of April. Our retention numbers are higher
than they have been in years, and we set very high retention
standards because we spend so much money training many of our
technical people. We have experienced up to 20 points better
than the goals that we have set.
I think I agree completely with Admiral Clark. Once you
expose the youngsters out there today, who many think do not
have the capacity to be dedicated, patriotic, or committed,
once you expose them to success in military life, then they
cannot turn back. They are proud of what they do. They are
proud to serve.
The incentives that have been supported by this committee
have been a great help. As a result, we are experiencing the
highest pilot retention we have had in quite a few years.
So we thank the committee, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for
all you have done, and we need to continue to do this to keep
the quality of our force as high as it is.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
An important aspect of overall readiness is certainly
family readiness, and I would like to pursue a couple of
questions in this area. Having just been at Fort Bragg this
past week as well as Marine Air Station Cherry Point and
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, as I talked with commanders,
with enlisted personnel, with the spouses--many of the spouses,
their partners had been deployed; others were about to be
deployed. An issue that came up time and again was one that
Senator Kennedy brought up on Impact Aid and the fact that the
children of these men and women who are being repeatedly
deployed deserve to have a quality education in a well-funded
school.
General Jumper, I appreciate your responding to the
question, but I would like to ask the rest of the panel if you
would also speak to Impact Aid and how you see this in terms of
the importance to your people and your families. I am concerned
about this issue, and I would like to hear each of you respond
to that issue as well.
General Shinseki. Senator, the Army has been interested in
working a wide range of education issues because they have been
important to our service members, the education of their family
members. Impact Aid is a piece of that and it is important to
our service members, seeing the education of their children.
Admiral Clark. I align myself with the General's comments.
We have a saying, we recruit individuals, we retain families.
Senator Dole. Yes.
Admiral Clark. We believe that. Clearly one of the major
issues for a service member is making sure that their children,
that they have the kind of opportunity that they dream of for
them. So every one of these programs are critical.
I would say that one of the challenges for us--and this is
an issue for the committee and as we look at what it takes to
compete in the marketplace--is what kind of tools do the
Services need and what kind of issues are the service members
looking at when they make decisions about whether they are
going to serve or not.
We know that, first and foremost, it has to be an
attractive, appealing lifestyle. But I will tell you, Senator,
one of the things that has been real clear to me. The men and
women who are serving today, they are not missing the signal
that is coming from the citizens of the United States of
America, and that citizenry is saying to our people today: we
appreciate your service. Everything we can do to send that
signal will benefit our institutions greatly.
General Hagee. Senator, I would also like to associate
myself with General Shinseki and Admiral Clark's comments. When
the marine out in the field knows that his family is taken care
of, he can better focus on his or her job than if he is worried
about what is going on back on the home front. Our young men
and women today are highly educated and they want their
families to be educated.
Senator Dole. Let me raise another issue in this area. The
budget includes a $4 billion request for family housing for
fiscal year 2004 and about $346 million of that is for family
housing privatization. I am very interested in this. It is a
truly transformational program that seems to me to go directly
to the issue of morale of our troops and also to the fact that
if a young couple has attractive housing they are more likely
to make a decision to stay in the military, to make it a
career.
I would like to have each of you comment on this, whether
or not this privatization as a way to move in the future might
be the most cost-effective and the quickest way to eliminate
alot of this substandard housing which of course exists across
all branches of the Services.
I was particularly interested in the planned community
concept at Fort Bragg. But if you could talk with me a bit,
just respond briefly now and maybe more for the record, about
how you see privatization, for example the quality of
construction, how cost-efficient is it, and long-term plans for
maintenance. I think this could be a great asset and I would be
very interested in how each of you see privatization.
General Shinseki. Senator, it is an important initiative.
We started this about 2 years ago. Fort Bragg is in the second
tranche of posts. We started with Fort Sill, Fort Lewis, and a
number of others. For us, this was the only solution because to
generate the kinds of resources to do this on our own was not
possible. So this Residential Communities Initiative, in which
we get assistance from outside, has been a significant
momentum-builder in addressing our housing needs. It is
important. We think it works and we are expanding the
experiment to multiple locations.
Senator Dole. Are we devoting enough resources for this
family housing in this budget?
General Shinseki. In terms of privatization, we are.
Admiral Clark. We are moving forward and we got permission
from Congress last year to start a privatization public-private
venture in the area of bachelor quarters as opposed to the
house itself. Frankly, Senator, that is the area where we are
more behind.
But here is what I have to say. I do not really want to
build more military housing if I do not have to. When I talk to
our people, I ask them: How many of you have your own place? I
want them to have a stake in America. I want them to have their
own place, not a military place, especially when we get to
career people. That is what I tell them.
What has happened over the course of the last 4 years as we
have sought to buy down the out-of-pocket costs--we make
another big step in it in this budget--is that we are seeing
our service members get to a position that they can compete in
the market.
Now, in the area of bachelor quarters, that is a different
story. We are very much, again, experimenting with solutions
here and we want to move toward that as rapidly as possible. We
will have our substandard housing off the record by the end of
this FYDP. It will be gone. That has been the objective.
But the most exciting thing for me is to see a young
service member who owns their home for the first time. That is
what I want for them. What is being done for them now is making
that more of a possibility.
General Hagee. Senator, we strongly support the public-
private venture. We started several years ago in Hawaii. It has
been a great success. In fact, just last year the residents
threw a party for all the maintenance people. That is the
response that they had to public-private venture. We opened up
a series of houses in Camp Pendleton last year and without
public-private venture we would not be able to reduce the
number of inadequate houses that we have.
We are joining with the Navy on the experiment on PPV in
the BEQ area and I am quite excited about that.
Senator Dole. Great. Thank you.
General Jumper. Senator, we have quite a few bases that are
in fairly remote locations and we have about 38 projects
planned that will address about 40,000 family housing units. I
believe we are the only Service that does not get finished by
the Secretary of Defense's goal of 2007, but that mostly has to
do with northern tier bases where we would have to displace
people. We just cannot do the shell game fast enough to fulfill
the requirement. But we are pushing full speed ahead as quickly
as we can.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jumper, is the Air Force committed to extend both
contractors on the EELV over the next 5 years?
General Jumper. Sir, there is no reason that I know of to
deviate from that path. I know there are some studies underway
and we have not seen the results of those studies, but the
current program is to stick with both the Atlas and the Delta
programs.
Senator Bill Nelson. According to that answer then, is
there money in the fiscal year 2004 budget that will enable
that to occur?
General Jumper. As far as I know, we are adequately funded,
sir. I will get back if there is any doubt, but nothing has
been brought to my attention that would argue otherwise.
Senator Bill Nelson. If there is any doubt, please get
back.
General Jumper. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Needless to say, it is important that
we have assured access to space.
Now, I just found this out and this alarms me, because 20
years ago, as the Congressman representing Orlando, we started
the simulation center there, for the Navy, and pretty soon all
of the Services came together and that became a simulation
center. For obvious reasons, this was cost effective on our
training and so forth.
I have just been told that that is being zeroed out in the
fiscal year 2004 budget, which is hard for me to even imagine.
I would like each of your comments?
General Shinseki. Senator, I am not specifically sure what
is being zeroed out. But the Army's simulations efforts are in
Orlando, as you describe, and we continue to operate there.
What you would have known as Simulation, Training, and
Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) is there.
Admiral Clark. I am unaware of any move to zero out
Orlando. Orlando has been a key part in helping us put forth a
transformational approach to training. In fact, key members of
that organization have been on my task force who work toward
the revolution in training in the Navy.
I will look into it, Senator, and see if there is anything.
If there are any cuts there, I am unaware.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy contribution to the Joint Simulation Center in Orlando,
Florida is the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division
(NAWCTSD). There are no cuts of any kind scheduled for NAWCTSD in
fiscal year 2004 or the Future Years Defense Program.

Senator Bill Nelson. General Hagee.
General Hagee. Sir, I am also unaware of any cuts there.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper.
General Jumper. Sir, we have our modeling and simulation
center there and I am unaware of this. We do a lot of work down
there.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, if you would check,
because there is a DOD program decision memorandum, PDM,
directing the cancellation of the joint simulation system
program in the fiscal year 2004 budget, and that just seems to
me about as contrary as we can be as to what we need to be
doing.
General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. Senator, that is a project and an effort
all of us participated in. It is one that was not delivering
and I believe that is correct, that joint simulation system was
having difficulty meeting its contract. I believe that is the
reason it was scrutinized and decided to be lined through.
I will provide more information for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Termination
The JSIMS program was terminated in the Program Decision Memorandum
1 (PDM 1) decrement. While it did not cite a specific rationale for the
termination, the program has been under close scrutiny the past year
because of significant delays in achieving critical milestones,
increasing costs, and little to show for the large investment. However,
the PDM directed completion of JSIMS Block 1 by June 2003, which should
provide the Joint Warfighting Training Center a Joint Task Force
component-level training capability. The PDM also directed completion
of an analysis of alternatives to identify a cost-effective method of
meeting future Joint and Service training requirements. In subsequent
guidance to the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense also
recognized the Army's significant investment in the Warfighter
Simulation program and provided guidance to continue that effort. With
the requisite resources, we can meet our Title X training and have the
capability to link with any future joint training solution.

Senator Bill Nelson. I think we all ought to be aware,
because your colleagues do not seem to be aware of that. I
would like a justification as to how that is in the best
interests of the defense of the country as we train our troops
and try to be cost effective with simulators.
Let me ask you again, General. There are rumors that we are
going to have some amassing of opponents, the enemy, in the
area of northeast Afghanistan for some kind of spring
offensive. It could be in Afghanistan, it could be right across
the line in very forbidding territory where there is a bunch of
tribals.
I would like your comment on how we are going to meet that
kind of resistance, that kind of attempt to blunt some of the
success that we have had in Afghanistan from a military
standpoint.
General Shinseki. I am not specifically sure on exactly
this tip, but all along that border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, there are operations ongoing and we do from time to
time see a buildup of capabilities. The combatant commander
there, Lieutenant General Dan McNeil, working for General Tom
Franks, focuses on those day-to-day operations. We provide him
the capabilities to conduct those day-to-day operations.
This specific buildup for a springtime offensive, all of us
anticipate when the weather gets better activity goes up. But
the specific area you are referring to I probably want to take
a look at and give you a better answer.

[The information referred to follows:]

Operation Enduring Freedom

The Central Command Combatant Commander is better prepared to
answer operational questions such as this. As a force provider for this
operation, the Army's responsibility is to provide trained and ready
forces to the combatant commander. The Army has provided all forces
that the combatant commander has requested and is prepared to provide
additional forces if required.

Senator Bill Nelson. Does your commander have sufficient
forces to repel such an offensive?
General Shinseki. I believe he does. I will be certain to
ask that very question just because you have asked it.
Senator Bill Nelson. I ask it for obvious reasons, because
we are going to have our attention diverted to another part of
the world and we sure do not want to be losing ground. I mean,
it is irritating enough that there seems to be a lessening
cooperation from President Musharraf in Pakistan. But sooner or
later, if that is where the al Qaeda leadership is, we are
going to have to go in there and root them out, and not the
least of which we are going to have to be prepared in case
there is a counteroffensive from them on us.
So in whatever kind of setting you want to discuss this or
your designee, I would be most appreciative.
General Shinseki. Senator, I would be happy to do that.
There is coordination that goes on between our people and folks
on the other side to ensure coordinated activities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, as I conclude, I would like at an appropriate
setting, perhaps a closed setting, for us also to talk about
the new military role that is apparently occurring in the
Philippines, which I do not necessarily disagree with, but I
would like to know how we think that that is going to be able
to help us stamp out the terrorist activity in that part of the
world.
It is going to be there. It is going to be in other
countries, and as a member of your committee, I want to have
some assurance that we are doing what we should. Is the new
role symbolized by the more combat-capable, combat-ready,
combat-insertive position that we are talking about in the
Philippines?
Chairman Warner. Senator, the question of the Philippines
will be a part of our briefing tomorrow morning, and I wish to
say to the committee that we have a closed session scheduled
immediately at the conclusion of this round of questions, at
which time the Senator may pose that question. So there is the
first opportunity you would have to raise that question with
regard to the Philippines.
Like you, I would like to know exactly the circumstances
under which this decision was made and what the expectations
are with regard to those deployments.
I thank the Senator.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me just say that this Senator has a great
appreciation for the job each of you do, for your great
leadership you are providing, and for those men and women that
serve under you, and to each of you, I say thank you for that.
I also have a great appreciation for the job that the
administration is doing and the leadership that this
administration is providing with respect to winning the war on
terrorism, and thank goodness we have people who are willing to
make a tough and hard decision, knowing that they have under
them leadership like you and the men and women that serve under
you to carry out the jobs assigned to each of them that will
ensure that my children and my grandchildren are going to live
in the same safe, free, and open America that my generation has
enjoyed.
So for that I say thank you, and I hope you will express
that to each of the men and women that serve under you at every
opportunity.
General Jumper, you know my fondness for Robins Air Force
Base and the great job that the men and women, civilian and
military, do there, and I appreciate your comments regarding
the 116th. That decision was just a great vision on the part of
Secretary Roche, you, and the folks like Paul Weaver over on
the Guard side, any number of folks who participated in that.
It is going to be a model for where the future of the armed
services are going to go, irrespective of what branch we are
looking at.
I am very proud of those folks.
General Jumper. Thank you, sir.
Senator Chambliss. I have had the opportunity to visit
Robins Air Force Base many times, particularly recently.
General Shinseki, I will tell you that recently I was at Fort
McPherson, Fort Gillem, and Fort Stewart, and you all are
correct that the quality of the force out there today is second
to none. It is well-prepared, well-trained, and the men and
women that are being called on to defend freedom are in my
opinion the best-trained, best-service organization that the
world has ever seen. That is thanks in large part to your
leadership.
General Jumper, four weapons systems that I have a keen
interest in are C-17, C-130, F-22, and Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). From a budgetary
standpoint, I think the C-17 is moving forward in a very good
manner. The decision on the multi-year several years ago, I
think, was one of the best business decisions that any branch
has ever made, particularly the Air Force.
I would like for you to give us just a quick budget update
on the other three weapons systems, if you will, as it is
reflected in this current budget.
General Jumper. Yes, sir. Well, starting with the F/A-22,
we have the production cap of $43 billion. We are sticking
within that cap. We are on track to begin our operational tests
later in this year as we finish up our developmental testing.
The airplane is achieving astonishing results when you talk to
the people that fly it.
We continue to have some problems with software stability
that we are working very hard, and, of course, we are at the
critical part of the airplane's development now where it
continues to go from the development phase into the production
phase and the ensuing production problems that you get when you
start up production.
So we are working our way through those, but we have not
come back to ask for any more money, nor do we intend to. We
intend to live within that cap.
The JSTARS, of course, is a magnificent sensing device that
we join with the ground forces to give them targets, moving
target indications on the ground. The mission of the 116th is
to train their people up to speed and get the backenders up to
speed. We had a few slowdowns in the training for the
backenders that we are working our way through as we get that
first surge of people who have transitioned from other systems
in the National Guard through that training. We are working our
way through that now.
Then the C-130, I believe is the other one you mentioned.
All of the problems we had with the C-130J I think have been
reconciled and that is going forward now for OMB consideration.
So I think everything is on track, not without challenges, but
working our way through all of it.
Senator Chambliss. Are we going to be able to provide the
service to the customer out there with respect to JSTARS by
stopping at 17 instead of going to the full complement of 19
and moving on to the 767, where we are going to have that gap?
Are you comfortable with that?
General Jumper. Sir, we are working hard to make sure that
we do not have any more of a gap than we can stand. We are
proposing a transition into the Boeing 767 with the next
generation of JSTARS improvements and this will be the baseline
aircraft for our multi-sensor command and control aircraft that
will do the sort of integration with space, unmanned, and
manned platforms that we think will take us into the future--
talking directly to satellites, controlling UAVs, being able to
join with the other Services to provide command and control
depending on who is first on the scene, being able to
distribute signals around the battle space, and being able to
deal with things like cruise missiles.
We use the next generation of the JSTARS platform in a
Boeing 767 as our baseline for that activity. We took some
decreases in funding, but we think we can work our way through
that and we look forward to keeping this program vital and
pressing on with it. I think it is going to be very vital for
all the Services.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you. All of you, thanks again.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I listened
carefully to Senator Nelson's questions about the Philippines.
Will there also be additional information available about
current involvement in Colombia that the committee could be
advised of?
Chairman Warner. I will advise the Senator that there is no
reason why that question could not be asked if you are able
schedule-wise to join us at the closed session.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start by thanking General Shinseki for his
incredible work. General Shinseki has done a tremendous job on
behalf of the Army, and I am very grateful to his lifetime of
service and look forward to your continuing service in whatever
form that takes.
Admiral Clark, in late January, the Pentagon announced that
it was sending eight Coast Guard cutters and several port
security units to the Persian Gulf. As I understand it, this is
the first deployment of Coast Guard patrol boats overseas since
the Vietnam War. Is that correct as far as you know?
Admiral Clark. Actually, Senator, the cutters have been
deploying with us periodically and working up with us. Part of
our agreement is that in time of crisis they will come work for
us. The only way to make that work is to periodically do it. So
they periodically are deploying with our carrier battle groups.
Senator Clinton. What are the numbers that are currently
deployed? Do you have that?
Admiral Clark. I am sorry, I do not. We would be happy to
get that for you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The number of Coast Guard cutters deploying to the Persian Gulf
are:

378-foot high endurance cutters

USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)--homeport: Alameda, CA
USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716)--homeport: North Charleston, SC

225-foot seagoing buoy tender

USCGC Walnut (WLB 205)--homeport: Honolulu, HI

110-foot patrol boats

USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)--homeport: South Portland, ME
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)--homeport: Sandy Hook, NJ
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)--homeport: Atlantic Beach, NC
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)--homeport: Miami, FL
USCGC Grand Isle (WPB 1338)--homeport: Gloucester, MA
USCGC Bainbridge Island (WPB 1343)--homeport: Sandy Hook, NJ
USCGC Pea Island (WPB 1347)--homeport: St. Petersburg, FL
USCGC Knight Island (WPB 1348)--homeport: St. Petersburg, FL

Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Admiral. Because in
New York, as well as many other coastal States and cities, we
count on the Coast Guard to guard our ports against terrorist
threats and other emergencies like the one we just had the
other day with the explosion at Staten Island. The Coast Guard
was the first responder. We could not have responded without
their lead and assistance.
So I would like some additional information that I will
submit to you in writing, so that I have a better idea of the
criteria that are used to deploy the cutters, how long they are
expected to be deployed, what are the missions that they
perform, and how we anticipate replacing those functions that
are going to be left behind as they deploy with you.
I want to ask each of the chiefs a question that has been a
concern of mine for many years, ever since President Clinton
asked me to look into the Gulf War, the Gulf War Syndrome, and
I went out to Bethesda to Walter Reed and met with a number of
veterans who returned from the gulf suffering from unknown
symptoms.
I became convinced in my own mind and based on the research
that we were doing that this was real, this was something that
had to be addressed. The President appointed a commission to do
so.
Now, with U.S. troops being deployed again to the Persian
Gulf, I know that you are spending a lot of time and attention
trying to make sure that we do not send young men and women to
war where they are out of harm's way in a conventional and
traditional sense, but they return home debilitated and have to
be separated from the Service and have ongoing chronic health
conditions.
So I would appreciate each of the Services giving me a
brief overview and then I would like to arrange a briefing that
my staff is currently working on to get more indepth
information, because clearly the February 2002 GAO report
before the House Veterans Affairs Committee seemed to conclude
that, while military medical surveillance policies had been
established, still a lot needed to be done to implement the
system. I think we want to do everything possible to protect
our troops this time around.
If I could just have a brief overview comment from each of
the Service Chiefs about that and then, as I say, I look
forward to a more indepth briefing. General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. Senator, I would say, first of all, we
all share the concern coming out of the last gulf operation,
and the conclusions were less conclusive than we would like.
There was a variety of issues that continue today to be
studied.
I think since that last operation, however, we have
expanded our detection and sensing capabilities in some rather
significant ways, not just in chemical, but also biological
threats. I think we are concerned. We have gone back to look at
what the conditions might have been then. We pay attention to
it, better detection, better training. But still there are a
host of unknowns here, exactly what the causes were of that
gulf illness.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Admiral Clark?
Admiral Clark. My problem is a little different than
General Shinseki's. Our issue is providing fundamentally
protective gear for attack at sea, and we have some built-in
systems to protect our people inside the ships. I would just
tell you that we have made significant investments. In an open
forum I would put it this way: we have made significant
investments and we are ready.
Senator Clinton. General Hagee?
General Hagee. We share your concern, Senator. As General
Shinseki mentioned, we have vehicles, platforms out there that
did not exist 10 years ago during Operation Desert Storm,
platforms that can identify and detect chemical and biological
agents that are in the air and in the ground. We have also
collected information on every single one of our marines so
that we have good medical data baseline to try to, if anything
happens, to try to determine what change has occurred.
Senator Clinton. I really applaud you for that and I hope
that every Service can move toward that. We have found post-
September 11 in New York the fire department had baseline
screenings, the police department did not. It is much more
difficult to figure out what the exposures led to when you do
not know what the starting point was. So I very much appreciate
what the Marine Corps has done on that.
General Jumper. Senator, I agree with General Hagee. I
think the baselining activity plus the steps that have been set
up to gather data around the locations is much more
sophisticated than we saw last time, and hopefully the root
causes of these things can be determined in time to be of help.
Senator Clinton. I thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think this has not only implications for
our men and women in uniform, but rather significant civilian
ramifications as well. I greatly appreciate the chiefs taking
this on as an issue and I look forward to following with great
concern what we learn and how we respond.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I know firsthand of your deep
concern about the veterans who have returned from Afghanistan
and other far-flung parts of the globe as to their health, and
I commend you for those initiatives that you have undertaken.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and what has been
referred to doubtless all at the table as your favorite word,
for persevering in your command and, quite frankly, here at the
hearing.
General Shinseki, well done, sir.
General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. You have provided outstanding leadership
and I think your legacy is going to be better transformation of
the legacy weaponry, and so you have achieved a great deal and
we thank you for that.
General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. Thank you for working with our former
Commandant, General Jim Jones, who is the SACEUR. I think
before a hearing some time ago, I said we did not need two tips
and two spears; we needed one tip and one spear. We have done
that in regards to working with the Marine Corps and the Marine
Corps working with you, sir. So we thank you for your
innovative leadership.
General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. As a survivor along with Senator Levin of
Senator Warner's forced march, which was disguised as a CODEL,
to possible war zone countries where we are fighting and in my
opinion winning the war on terrorism, I want to say that we
have an obligation to meet with a number of men and women in
uniform on the front lines. As chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, I want to go out and check the intelligence to our
warfighters. We went to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Qatar as well
as other locations, and we survived. I think we did, Carl. I am
not quite sure.
But at any rate, I can report that the cooperation between
our intelligence and our military personnel is as close as it
has ever been. We now have in place information systems that
will allow rapid access to current intelligence from the
commander all the way down to the marine or soldier in the
field.
It is my judgment that we are really learning the lessons
of Operation Desert Storm and September 11.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we would not spend too much time
arguing about who constitutes the greatest threat to us right
this second. Is it Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader
Ali Khamani in Iran, or Osama bin Laden? They are all major
threats, all challenges to U.S. security here at home. They get
worse with time if not acted upon. They all represent very
unique geopolitical circumstances. They demand very tailored
situations or solutions, and they all demand action now, but
different kinds of action.
I have more or less a speech on this and I would ask
permission that my full statement be inserted in the record at
this point.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership. I
want to thank Admiral Clark and General Jumper for their perseverance
not only in service to our Nation but also in communicating with this
committee. General Shinseki, well done, sir. Thank you for your
leadership as Chief of Staff of the Army. Your legacy will be
transformation, the shift from the systems of the past to the platforms
and capabilities of the future.
Last week, along with Senator Levin, I survived Senator Warner's
forced march to possible war zone countries in which we are fighting
and, in my opinion, winning the war on terrorism. I had the pleasure of
visiting our men and women in uniform on the front lines.
As chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committee and
Armed Services Committee, we were able to talk directly to the folks
getting the job done for America's security from their stations in
Kuwait, Afghanistan, Qatar, and other locations.
I can report that the cooperation between our intelligence and
military personnel is as close as it has ever been. We now have in
place information systems that will allow rapid access to current
intelligence from the combatant commander all the way down to the
marine or soldier in the field.
I also observed a keen appreciation for the need to fully share
intelligence information. It is my judgment that we are learning the
lessons of Operation Desert Storm and September 11 well.

THREATS

I hope we do not spend too much time today arguing about who
constitutes the greatest threat to us right this second. Is it Saddam
Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, or Osama bin
Laden? They are all major threats, challenges to U.S. security here at
home that get worse with time if not acted upon.
They all represent unique geopolitical circumstances demanding
tailored solutions. Indeed, they all demand action now but different
kinds of action. Just because the military instrument of power is the
choice for responding to Osama bin Laden and may become the choice for
responding to Iraq, it by no means suggests force is appropriate right
now for North Korea or ever in the case of Iran.
It's not that simple and we ought not to mistake complexities in
the threat picture for contradictions in policy. For example, North
Korea, as dangerous and unstable as it is, has not invaded its neighbor
to the south since 1953.
We cannot say the same for Saddam Hussein who invaded Kuwait in
1990 with what looked at the time like intentions for Saudi Arabia as
well. Not to mention the fact that, to my knowledge, North Korea is not
currently harboring senior members of a terror network led by a close
associate of Osama bin Laden, Mr. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

IRAQ

But this is really beside the point. In passing H.J. Res 114,
Congress specifically authorized the President to ``use the Armed
Forces of the United States in order to: (1) defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Colleagues, that resolution passed the
Senate 77 to 23 on October 11, 2002.
This action was, of course, in addition to the Iraq Liberation Act,
which Congress passed and President Clinton signed in to law October
31, 1998. That act clearly states the U.S. should foster regime change
in Iraq.
Lastly, on November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 1441 which gave Iraq one last opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations.
Now, months later, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
told us unequivocally that ``Iraq has in place an active effort to
deceive the U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is
directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given
clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in
their possession.''
Further, the DCI stated ``Iraq's biological weapons program
includes mobile research and production facilities that will be
difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began
this program in the mid-1990s--during a time when inspectors were in
the country.''
Even the latest U.N. assessments directed by Dr. Blix indicate
Saddam Hussein is still not complying. Colleagues, let us be candid. No
amount of U-2 surveillance flights nor increase in the number of
inspectors will solve this problem, at the very least with respect to
biological weapons. Let's be honest. The U.S. Government has bent over
backwards to manage the threat from Saddam Hussein without further
military action.
I thank the chair.

Senator Roberts. I want to go first of all to the
commandant and ask him a question in regards to SOCOM, and I
know that they have a lot of operations. Everybody has
operation stress. But I understand we have 81 marines, 5
sailors organized, trained, and equipped for special
reconnaissance and direct action and other special operations
missions, who will be under the SOCOM operational control by
October of this year. I understand the answer is yes; is that
correct?
General Hagee. That is correct, sir.
Senator Roberts. All right. I hope we can continue that
partnership.
I am going to get down to your warfighting lab in Quantico,
VA, as soon as I can. I apologize for not coming sooner. One of
the questions I had as we were out to Camp Commando and Camp
Coyote out there in Kuwait; I was so proud of our marines, who
are operating basically in a sand trap and still performing and
training their mission, and I am not surprised. You already
answered this question in splendid fashion about our WMD
capability and I thank you for that answer.
I have a question for General Jumper. Do you remember the
old baseball combination--you and I are not too far off in age
difference--of Tinkers to Evers to Chance?
General Jumper. I am afraid not, sir.
Senator Roberts. You do not? Well, anybody else? Somebody
say they remember that. Will you, please?
Senator Clinton. Over here, Pat. I remember.
Senator Roberts. Admiral Clark?
Okay, thank you. I thank Senator Clinton.
Well, Senator Inhofe talked about Tinkers to Evers to
Chance when he mentioned the KC-135s and the lease agreement
that we are now working with under the national security
requirements. So General Jumper, I am not opposed to Tinker,
but I do not want to take a chance.
General Jumper. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. So consequently I would like to ask, if
the lease proposal under review is not approved, how will
procurement of replacement tankers be accelerated? I do not see
any plans down the road to do that other than to retire the 68,
who really should be retired. I do not think we have any other
alternative than to go to the lease agreement. Now, that is a
tough thing. I do not want to get you in between Jim and
myself, but that is where you are.
General Jumper. Sir, it is a tough decision we have to
make. As a matter of fact, the plan to accelerate the
procurement plan which we already had on the books was the
lease, and we put this lease agreement on the table for
everyone to take a look at. It has been thoroughly scrutinized
and the Secretary of Defense is looking at it now along with
his lease committee there in the building and we are awaiting
the decision.
Senator Roberts. I hope the decision comes soon, and I
would point out that the distinguished chairman and ranking
member are on record as supporting this. I do not have to say
that; they will, but I thought I would anyway.
General Shinseki, recent reports indicate the Secretary of
Defense is considering realignment of our force structure in
Europe. I know that our new SACEUR thinks the same way. As part
of this review, let me ask you, is the Army considering
bringing any force structure from Europe back to the United
States?
General Shinseki. Senator, we await the analysis that
General Jones is undertaking at this point. What we have always
said is a clear strategy is the best route to that long-term
stationing set of decisions, and we think General Jones's
insights will be helpful here. If the answer is to bring forces
home, we will do that. If it is to keep what we have there,
albeit in different configurations and locations, we are
prepared to support that as well.
Senator Roberts. I thank you very much.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, could I just have 10 seconds
for the record there. Just so that I do not mislead anybody, my
statement has been consistently that whether or not I would
support that lease will depend upon the numbers and the facts
as provided to us. I have been one that is more than willing to
look at that as an option, but I just do not want to mislead my
good friend from Kansas by my silence.
Senator Roberts. If the Senator would yield, I will be
happy to be a blocking back for him any time on this decision,
and we will just let you carry the ball, sir.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Members of the committee, it is now the
completion of the first round. We have had an excellent hearing
this morning and the attendance has been at an all-time high,
showing the concern of our members.
It is the intention of the chair, in consultation with my
ranking member, to go into a closed session now. But the
ranking member does have a prior commitment which requires his
asking one or two questions now before the closed session, and
I am happy to accommodate him.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to just ask General Shinseki about his reference to
the missile defense system. I believe Senator Allard raised
this issue. On January 2, Secretary Rumsfeld established some
new procedures for the development and oversight of missile
defense programs. This is what the memo said, ``The Secretary
of Defense will decide whether to use test assets for emergency
or contingency deployment based on an assessment of military
utility, progress in development, and recommendation by the
Director of MDA and military Services.''
The President has now decided to deploy a national missile
defense system in 2004 and the Department of Defense has asked
to waive the legal requirement for independent operational
testing of this system prior to deployment. I understand,
General Shinseki, that the Army is going to be asked to operate
this national missile defense system starting in 2004.
Here is my question: have you provided an assessment of the
military utility of the national missile defense system to be
deployed in 2004?
General Shinseki. I do not recall providing personally a
specific recommendation of that sort.
Senator Levin. All right. Will you check your records and
if there has been such an assessment, would you share that with
this committee?
General Shinseki. I will do that, Senator.
Senator Levin. Prior to the decision to deploy, did
Secretary Rumsfeld ask you for advice regarding the military
utility of the national missile defense system as it would
exist in 2004?
General Shinseki. I am not aware of that request.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. That concludes your questions?
Senator Levin. May I just have one question of General
Jumper? It has to get to this issue of the Predators. We were
out there. We have seen the value of the Predators just in so
many places now, most recently where we visited in the last
week. Is there any way of increasing the production from over
three a month?
The demand on these assets is huge. Their value is extreme.
They can make a huge difference. Everybody wants them, but we
need them in that theater I guess as much as anyplace. What
efforts have been made to increase, get a new production line
going somewhere else, get a license agreement going out?
General Jumper. Sir, there are several mitigating features
of the Predator. First, it was an advanced concept technology
demonstration (ACTD), that is, that was handed to the Service.
In that technology demonstration it took one ground station to
fly one Predator. One of the things we are trying to do in the
development is figure out how to fly several airplanes from one
ground station. Until we get that problem solved, there is
really no use in upping the numbers of productions because we
are ground station-limited in the number of airplanes that we
can put up at any one time.
We are working hard to solve this problem and once we do
and once we get the Predator B model under contract, then we
are going to have to decide if we want to shift all to B models
or have a mix of As and Bs. We have decided already we are
going to buy 128 of these things, if that is the force
structure that we need, and I think the program we are in right
now will answer a bunch of very important questions before we
make a decision about whether to open another production line
or not.
But we will keep you close to that, Senator, because it is
a concern of ours as well.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I join my colleague's view about that. We
went to certain sites on our trip. I think we are going to have
to revisit your current objectives and perhaps have Congress
inject itself in that decisionmaking, because the dependence on
this system, not only by the military--you know of other
segments of our Government that are drawing down those assets,
and the remarkable performance to date and the versatility of
this system, it just extrapolates into saving lives of the men
and women of the Armed Forces and others involved in this
system. So shall we conclude saying that the attention of
Congress is at full span on this.
General Jumper. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Warner. We are there to support you.
General Jumper. I understand and I appreciate that very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Yes, go ahead.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, you very kindly have requested
certain information from the CIA at our last meeting relative
to suspect site numbers. There was a very strong disagreement
here between myself and Mr. Tenet relative to what had been
supplied to the U.N. and the chairman was very much involved in
a number of conversations in this regard, as were Senator
Roberts and others.
The record is clear that this is a significant issue about
which some of the statements made by the CIA in letters to me
were in my judgment significantly different from some of the
statements that Director Tenet made before this committee and
the Intelligence Committee. In an effort to amplify or clarify
that issue, I believe that the chairman had indicated that he
had requested the CIA for a letter at our last meeting, which I
believe was the 13th of February.
But I just wanted for the record to determine whether or
not such a letter has been received?
Chairman Warner. I wish to advise my colleague and other
members of the committee that that letter has not been
received. But in the context of my requesting in an open
hearing of the Director of the CIA for such letter, I indicated
my own judgment, having reviewed I think almost all the facts
that you had before you with the exception of your important
visit to meet with Hans Blix. It was my judgment that the
administration had in good faith provided on a real-time basis
as much information as it possessed that was relevant to the
inspections.
But you are correct, the letter which I requested has not
yet been received.
Senator Levin. I had set forth on the record the
discrepancies, not in numbers but in terms of overall rank of
percentage that was very significantly different in terms of
what the classified information was supplied to me and the
representations of the Director at the Intelligence Committee
and before this committee.
It is a very important issue. I think it is very important
that the CIA carry out not just its commitment to the chairman
that they supply a letter in this regard, but, frankly, a
number of commitments that it has made to me that it has not
carried out in terms of written updates, and a letter to Mr.
Tenet will be going from me relative to those commitments this
afternoon.
But I want to thank the chair for this bringing us up-to-
date on that letter, which was not yet forthcoming from the CIA
to him. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. At this time the open portion of this
hearing is concluded. But again, I wish to commend our four
distinguished witnesses for an excellent hearing, and I thank
my colleagues who turned out in strong numbers to receive this
important testimony today and ask questions.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

SHIPBUILDING FUNDING ALTERNATIVES

1. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, in reviewing the budget request,
it appears that the first ship for two classes of ships, the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) and the DD(X) destroyer, will be funded with
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds. However the
first aircraft carrier of a new class, the CVN-21, is to be funded from
the shipbuilding account, split over fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Why is
it that the first ships of two classes were funded with RDT&E funds,
but the CVN-21 was not?
Admiral Clark. In the case of LCS and DD(X), both new hull designs
with multiple transformational technologies, the use of RDT&E for the
lead ships will aid in stabilizing these new construction programs
through better management of the inherently higher risks. Furthermore,
yearly review of RDT&E budgets will improve the fidelity in the
execution year budget requirement and allow flexibility to adjust out
year budgets if critical technologies are delayed or require additional
maturation. While CVN-21 will also incorporate transformational
technologies, the hull form will be similar to current proven carrier
designs, thus incurring less risk in ship construction than LCS and
DD(X). As such, funding CVN-21 in SCN is appropriate.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

2. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, last month the Naval Warfare
Development Command published the Concept of Operations for the LCS, in
which it stated: the LCS will contribute to Sea Shield through its
unique capability to respond quickly, to operate in the littoral
environment, and to conduct focused missions with a variety of
networked off board systems. The budget request calls for the first of
these ships to be purchased with RDT&E funds in fiscal year 2005, even
though it appears the requirement has not yet been finalized. What is
your vision for the LCS? How will it contribute to the overall
effectiveness of the fleet?
Admiral Clark. My vision for the LCS is a networked, fast,
stealthy, shallow draft vessel designed to gain and sustain our access
to the littoral to enable the flow of Joint Forces ashore. LCS will use
a system of systems approach, employing networked sensors, modular
mission payloads, and a variety of unmanned vehicles. It will have
robust self-defense capability at its core and an open computing
architecture that will enable the modularity we seek.
Key to LCS's capability will be the use of mission modules which
will allow LCS to perform a specific mission such as anti-submarine
warfare, mine warfare, or anti-surface warfare. Furthermore, these
modules will be forward staged and capable of being rapidly installed,
enabling LCS to be quickly modified to change missions as operational
priority dictates.
LCS will assure the Joint Forces access to contested littorals, and
will defeat the anti-access strategies any potential adversary may
employ. Equally important, the mission-tailored LCS permits our large,
multi-mission combatant ships to conduct those missions for which they
were optimally designed, such as ballistic missile defense, area air
defense, and naval surface fire support to our marines and other Joint
Forces ashore.

3. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, how much additional funding would
be required in fiscal year 2004 to accelerate the development of this
ship?
Admiral Clark. An additional $35 million in fiscal year 2004 would
reduce risk in development of anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine
hunting mission modules for Flight 0 of the LCS.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

RESERVE COMPONENT

4. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, I continue to be impressed with the greater role
that our Reserve component service members play in our National
Military Strategy. For example, General Shinseki's statement that
``today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve
component.'' General Jumper's statement that ``Air Reserve Component
Forces comprise nearly half of the forces assigned to the Air and Space
Expeditionary Force squadrons, groups, wings, and contribute the
majority of forces for some mission areas.'' Even the Navy, which
traditionally has a much smaller Reserve Force, is making history.
According to press accounts, ``A group of naval reservists from Texas
and Arizona are making history on the deck of the U.S.S. Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN-71). For the first time since the Korean War, an entire
Naval Air Reserve Squadron has been deployed aboard an aircraft
carrier, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 201 flying F/A-18s.'' Admiral
Clark, I am sure you are receiving the same reports I am. VFA-201 has
the best sortie completion rate--100 percent, best carrier landing
boarding rate, day/night landing grades and readiness, and during
COMPUTEX scored 100 percent on missile and bomb drops.
Please explain how the fiscal year 2004 Defense budget provides
adequate training and modernization funds for Reserves so you can
continue to rely on them over a sustained period of time, in modern
equipment like VFA-201 has?
General Shinseki. The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget provides
adequate training dollars; however, the Army lacks adequate
modernization/equipment funding for the Reserve components. With
support from Congress, we have made great strides in improving the
training dollars for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
Admiral Clark. Navy formally reviews Naval Reserve modernization
requirements as a part of its resource allocation process. As a result
of that assessment, the validity and priority of those requirements are
judged in the context of all other Navy and Naval Reserve modernization
requirements.
I am pleased to report that the fiscal year 2004 Defense budget
funded Naval Reserve modernization accounts at a higher level than
Defense budgets of the past 3 years (fiscal year 2004 is approximately
$32 million higher than fiscal year 2003). The fiscal year 2004 budget
continues modernization of the Naval Reserve Air Fleet by providing
funds to procure an additional C-40A ``Clipper'' aircraft. The C-40 is
a derivative of the Boeing 727 and is replacing the aging fleet of C-9
logistics aircraft. Additionally, the Flying Hour Program is funded to
meet 100 percent of the notional training requirement for Reserve
pilots. The increased operating and modernization funds have been
targeted to sustain a level of Reserve participation in Navy operations
that are essential for us to continue to project influence throughout
the globe.
As always, there have been some reductions and some increases in
the individual procurement accounts that reflect the changing
priorities of a transforming Navy undergoing recapitalization. A good
example of this is the integration of Navy and Marine Corps tactical
aviation forces that tailors future force structure in recognition of
increased capability of the airframes and munitions. One outgrowth of
this restructuring was the disestablishment of a Naval Reserve and a
Marine Corps Reserve Fighter/Attack squadron in the fiscal year 2004
Defense budget request.
The decisions reflected in the budget demonstrate Navy's intent to
invest in those priorities, to the extent it is affordable.
Unfortunately, there are also always high-priority requirements that
could not be funded. Within constrained top-lines, lower priority
requirements--both active and Reserve--will not be funded. Those that
cannot be funded are considered for inclusion in Navy's list of high-
priority unfunded programs, a copy of which is made available to
Congress. Historically, Congress has aided Reserve Modernization
through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA).
Dramatic decreases in NGREA have had an impact on Reserve
modernization.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has built an efficient and
effective Total Force. Maintaining our expeditionary readiness depends
upon high-quality Marine reservists as a key part of our Total Force.
Their training, leadership, quality of life, and equipment
modernization will continue to be of the utmost importance.
The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget request provides funding in the
Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve (O&MMCR) and Reserve
Personnel Marine Corps (RPMC) appropriations that will adequately
support the training requirements of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)
units and personnel. In fiscal year 2004, MARFORRES units are scheduled
to conduct live-fire exercises and participate in amphibious, desert,
jungle, mountain, and cold weather training. Fiscal year 2004 funding
will support individual and unit participation in Total Force exercises
such as: Combined Arms Exercise and Desert Scimitar in Twentynine
Palms, CA; Weapons and Tactics Instructor course in Yuma, AZ; Ulchi
Focus Lens in Korea; Cobra Gold in Thailand; Kernal Blitz in CA;
Rolling Thunder in Fort Bragg, NC; and UNITAS in South American
countries. These exercises provide operational tempo (OPTEMPO) relief
to the active component and provide increased opportunities for
reservists to support the Total Force effort throughout the world.
However, the execution of these exercises, rely heavily on robust OMMCR
appropriations and RPMC Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) budgets.
One of the Marine Corps pillars of readiness focuses on ongoing
modernization initiatives. The Marine Corps makes every effort to
resource the Reserve component at levels similar to the active
component. This effort gives the Reserve Forces the ability to fully
integrate into the Total Force, especially during periods of
mobilization when augmenting and reinforcing the active component in
sustained combat operations. The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget
provides funding for a series of incremental and affordable
modernization efforts for our legacy systems including: upgrades to
aviation systems (CH-46E, CH-53E, C-130T, and F/A-18A) and ground
systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Product. Improvement
Program; and new procurements of ground systems (Thermal Weapons Site,
the Lightweight 155 Towed Howitzer, and the High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System (HIMARS)).
General Jumper. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004
and the out years provide the resources for the Air Force Reserve
Command to undertake one of the biggest aircraft modernizations in the
past 2 decades, after the procurement hiatus in the 1990s. Force
structure associated with the C-141 will be realigned to support newly
built C-17 Globemaster IIIs, C-5As, and KC-135s. C-5 B-models will be
added to the AFRC fleet. The upgraded KC-135R air refueling tanker will
replace the last of AFRC's KC-135 E-models. The oldest C-130Es in the
fleet will be replaced by newer more capable H-model C-130s and newly
built C-130J aircraft. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget provides
a much needed jumpstart to the Air Force Reserve equipment
modernization program, ensuring that the Air Force Reserve remains a
robust and capable partner in the Total Force team.
Additionally, the budget covers the cost of training Air Force
Reserve personnel that have been called on in great numbers to
participate in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Noble Eagle, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Participation levels have risen sharply since
September 11, 2001, further increasing pressure on available training
dollars. The Air Force Reserve continues to make great strides in
efficient resource management by outsourcing support jobs and
partnering with the active component to maximize long-term combat
capability through the rebalancing of the Active/Reserve Force mix.

5. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what antiquated Reserve policies still exist in
statute that you would like us to change that negatively affect the way
you do business today? By incorporating Reserves in an even greater
effort into the Total Force?
General Shinseki. There are several ongoing studies by the General
Accounting Office, the Wexford Group, the Army Staff, and others that
are looking into issues like active component/Reserve component
program, compensation reform, duty statuses, etc. The Army and the
Department of Defense will be studying the recommendations with great
interest and will alert Congress to any recommended policy changes that
require legislative action.
Admiral Clark. It would be premature to request a statutory change
prior to completion of the Department's studies on Total Force
integration and the mobilization/force deployment process.
That said, we have made modifications to our internal policies and
coordinated changes to Department of Defense policies to improve
Reserve integration. These changes include the minimization of second-
year involuntary recalls, implementation of a narrowly focused active
and Reserve stop-loss policy (in effect for 5 weeks, affecting fewer
than 100 sailors), and implementation of the Navy-Marine Corps
Mobilization Processing System (NMCMPS), which provides web-based
requirements, sourcing, and processing.
General Hagee. First, the Marine Corps Reserve is an integral part
of the Marine Corps Total Force concept. Our Selective Marine Corps
Reserve Units are a mirror image of our active component units allowing
them to quickly integrate into our active component fulfilling their
traditional roles of augmenting and reinforcing Marine Expeditionary
Forces. Second, there are currently no statutory restrictions that
negatively impact the Marine Corps Reserve's ability to support the
total force. However, legislative assistance in the following areas
will allow the Marine Corps to provide a greater level of continuous
support to the Total Force.

Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB-SR)--Selected Reserve
Benefits Obligation Period Reduction. This would modify the
eligibility criteria to ``not less than 4 years'' in order to
allow the Services the option of offering MGIB-SR benefits to
recruits incurring a 4x4 contractual obligation in addition to
the obligation period of ``not less than 6 years'' required for
MGIB-SR benefits. This would increase the potential pool of
SMCR recruits.
Consistency in Reserve Strength Accounting and
Management. This proposal would revise Title 10, U.S.C. Section
115 exempting Reserve personnel serving on active duty for 180
days or more from counting against active duty end strength.
Approval of this change would ensure that a Reserve member who
is exempt from counting against active duty end strength would
also be exempt from counting against active duty grade strength
and would be exempt from inclusion on the active duty list.
This revision would likely remove barriers to Reserve component
participation and greatly enhance our flexibility in employing
reservists in support of operational requirements.
Limitation of Initial Payment of Enlistment and
Reenlistment Bonuses for the Selected Reserve. Currently, Title
37 limits the initial payment of these bonuses to one-half of
the total value. By increasing the initial payment amounts, the
recruiting and retention value of these bonuses would be
greatly enhanced and increase SMCR recruiting and retention
efforts.

General Jumper. A number of proposals have been included in the DOD
Omnibus submission to Congress, or are being submitted through the
fiscal year 2005 Unified Legislation and Budgeting cycle, to align
Reserve policies with the new steady state. We have always worked as a
team in the Air Force and will continue to set the standards for Total
Force commitment through discussion of these current initiatives and
those that may arise at a future date, to include the following:

Extending Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger Pay to
Reserve component Members on Inactive Duty
Position Vacancy (Below the Zone) Promotion
Consideration in Time of War or National Emergency
Military Leave for Mobilized Federal Civilian
Employees
Streamline the process to continue Officers on the
Reserve Active Status List

PAY

6. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, I am looking at the pay tables here. In 2000, the
law prescribed military pay raises to be ECI plus 0.5 percent.
According to the tables, E-1s to E-3s will receive a 2-percent pay
raise. Is that enough?
General Shinseki. Since fiscal year 2000, military pay has improved
substantially relative to the 70th percentile benchmarks recommended by
the 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation for junior officers
and junior enlisted personnel. Only the most junior enlisted personnel
and officers would receive less than 3.7 percent or Employment Cost
Index (ECI) plus 0.5 percent. E-1s would receive 2 percent while E-2s
would receive 3.2 percent. It should be noted, however, that these pay
grades are transitional-members are in them for a short time. Their pay
is now close to the 90th percentile while pay for mid-grade and senior
noncommissioned officers is still below our target. We continue to
support military pay raises of ECI +0.5 percent; however, we believe it
is appropriate to redistribute the pay raise--putting more pay where it
is needed while being assured that entry-level pay is very competitive.
Admiral Clark. I believe that it is enough for E-1s. We have
proposed a 3.2-percent raise for E-2s and E-3s. That said, when we
request targeted pay raises, we do so with one principal objective in
mind: provide incentive in a competitive work force. We expect our E-1
to E-3 personnel to move quickly through those pay grades and on to
positions of leadership at the petty officer level. I remain convinced
that targeted pay raises in these leadership pay grades are a valuable
motivator of performance in our most junior personnel.
General Hagee. The 2 percent pay raise is focused on E-1s only. E-
1s are automatically promoted to E-2 after 6 months of service, which
is normally about the time they complete their MOS training and go to
their first duty station. E-2s are scheduled for a 3.2-percent raise
and E-3s are scheduled for a 3.7-percent raise. Congress instituted the
ECI +0.5 percent to close the gap between military and comparable
private sector pay and currently E-1s are at or near the 90th
percentile.
General Jumper. The proposed pay raise, if approved, will increase
E-1 pay by 2 percent. This is approximate to the increase in inflation.
Personnel in grades of E-2 will receive a pay raise equal to the ECI
(3.2 percent) and E-3s will receive a 3.7-percent raise.
Our junior enlisted personnel entering the Service in the grades of
E-1/E-2 are in the transition phase of their career. An E-1 will
advance to the grade of E-2 once they reach 6 months time-in-grade
(TIG). An E-2 will advance to E-3 when reaching 10 months TIG. Upon
completion of basic training and tech school, most airmen will already
have advanced to the grade of E-3.
The proposed raise continues our efforts of previous years to
reduce the disparity between military pay and private sector, which
contributes to quality force retention. Additional targeting will also
result from a redistribution of the pay raises. Our most junior
members' compensation is now close to the 90th percentile of comparable
civilians while pay for Senior NCOs is still below the 70th percentile
target. We believe it is appropriate to redistribute the pay raise--
putting more pay where it is needed while ensuring the entry-level pay
remains very competitive.

7. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what is the projected pay raise for general and
flag officers?
General Shinseki. The projected pay raise for general officers for
2004 is 3.7 percent, ECI plus 0.5 percent; however, general officer pay
is capped at Executive Schedule Level III, which is currently $142,500.
Admiral Clark. The projected 2004 pay raise for flag officers in
the pay grades of O-7 through O-9 is 3.7 percent, which equates to the
by law increase of ECI plus 0.5 percent. The statutory requirement that
caps flag officer pay at the equivalent rate for level III of the
Executive Schedule is expected to result in no increase in basic pay
for officers in the pay grade of O-10.
General Hagee. The projected pay raise for O-7 through O-10 general
and flag officers is 3.7 percent (ECI0 +0.5 percent).
General Jumper. Their projected fiscal year 2004 pay raise is 3.7
percent. Unless overt action is taken, the four-star pay will remain
capped, which may create a situation in which there is virtually no
difference in three- and four-star pay.
Currently:
- 3-star base pay: $11,319.60
- 4-star base pay: $11,874.90 (capped)

Projected:
- 3-star base pay with 3.7 percent increase: $11,738.40
- 4-star base pay: $11,874.90 (capped)

8. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, if it is enough for E-1s, then is it enough for
generals and admirals?
General Shinseki. The projected pay raise for all our career
noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers is 3.7 percent, ECI
+0.5 percent, in recognition of their commitment to service and
associated responsibilities commensurate with their grade. E-1 pay is
now close to the 90th percentile relative to their civilian
counterparts based on experience and education. Additionally, E-1s are
only in this pay grade for a very short period of time.
Admiral Clark. We are trying to retain the best people in the Navy,
from E-1 to O-10. To do that, my folks need to have not only superior
job content and quality of service, but they need a pay system that
produces powerful incentives for promotion and retention.
Right now, Navy flag officers are paid at or near the 70th
percentile of comparably educated civilians, a level determined by the
9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) as necessary to
enable the military to recruit and retain the quantity and quality of
personnel it requires. By contrast, personnel in pay grade E-1 are
currently at the 90th percentile. Accordingly, I believe that the 3.7-
percent pay raise (Employment Cost Index +0.5 percent), provided for in
37 U.S.C. Sec. 1009, is appropriate to maintain flag and general
officer pay at a level consistent with their responsibilities, while a
2 percent raise for E-1s will help maintain their purchasing power,
similar to or above that of their civilian counterparts.
General Hagee. Congress instituted the ECI +0.5 pay raise to close
the gap between military pay and comparable private sector pay. After
considering the relative value of military compensation against the
private sector wages by age, education level, and experience, DOD
targeted the pay raise to more aggressively close the gap between NCOs/
SNCOs and their private sector counterparts. All enlisted personnel E-3
and above will receive a 3.7-percent pay raise or more, consistent with
properly targeting the pay raise to bring them closer to the
recommended 70th percentile of their civilian counterparts. Similarly,
all officers, except second and first lieutenants with no prior
enlisted service, to include general officers, will receive a 3.7-
percent pay raise consistent with the 9th QRMC review. These officers
will receive a 3.2-percent pay raise keeping them above the 70th
percentile.
General Jumper. In line with the 9th QRMC, DOD is targeting pay
increases for our mid-level to senior enlisted personnel ranging from
4.6 percent to 6.25 percent. Pay for E-1s will increase 2 percent,
approximately equal to the increase in inflation. A 2-percent pay raise
will maintain the purchasing power of E-1 pay and will maintain their
compensation close to the 90th percentile of comparable civilians
(recent high school/college graduates). E-2s and O-1/O-2s will receive
a 3.2-percent pay raise, which is equal to the ECI. All others will
receive 3.7 percent to include generals and admirals. A 3.7-percent
increase for general officers will slightly improve their purchasing
power and maintain their compensation close to that of CEOs leading
small companies (revenue under $2 million/year).*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Source: Executive Compensation, June 2001

9. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what effect will this have on those E-1s on the
lower end of the pay scale with respect to getting the last of our
military personnel off of food stamps, or will we backslide and be
putting personnel back on food stamps?
General Shinseki. There has been a steady and noteworthy decline in
the number of members on food stamps since the first survey of
participants in 1991. In 1991, there were 19,400 members on food stamps
among all Services. Today, the Department of Defense estimates that
there are 2,000 members on food stamps--we estimate that 1,155 are
soldiers. The decrease in food stamp participation is primarily due to
increases in military base pay, basic allowance for housing and
subsistence, and implementation of the Family Subsistence Supplemental
Allowance (FSSA). Eligibility for FSSA is based on USDA criteria for
food stamps, except income for FSSA purposes, includes the value of
government quarters. The USDA does not count the value of government
quarters in determining eligibility. We know the majority of soldiers
on food stamps live on-base, approximately 60 percent. However, since
the FSSA requires the soldiers to count their housing as income, these
soldiers are not eligible for FSSA and continue to receive food stamps.
The majority of FSSA participants for the Army range from E-3s to E-5s.
The proposed pay raise provides a raise equivalent to the employment
cost index to E-2s and the employment cost index plus 0.5 percent to E-
3s and E-4s. We do not believe the proposed 2 percent pay raise for E-
1s will impact food stamp usage.
Admiral Clark. As of the end of fiscal year 2002, there were 23
Navy E-1s on food stamps, or 0.03 percent of the Navy E-1 population.
While that is still 23 too many, we expect that the proposed 2 percent
basic pay raise for E-1s in 2004, as well as the increases in basic
allowance for housing (BAH) associated with the continued buy down of
out-of-pocket expenses, will continue to drive that number down.
General Hagee. The food stamp program is administered by the States
and, therefore, the USMC does not have access to this data. The NDAA 00
established a family subsistence allowance to help military families.
The maximum amount of FSSA is $500/month and is paid based on family
size and household income based guidelines as determined by the
Department of Agriculture. During 2002, we paid out $78,000 in FSSA to
48 marines. Only one was an E-1, with the majority of the recipients
being E-3 and above with large families. We believe that the continuing
raises in basic pay and reduction of BAH out-of-pocket expenses will
reduce the number of marines participating in FSSA.
General Jumper. Military pay for our airmen in the grades of E-1/E-
2 attending basic training and technical school is relatively high
compared to their private sector counterparts so we do not consider the
projected pay raise for E-1/E-2s to be a problem. In fact, airmen enter
the Air Force earning basic pay already close to 90 percent of their
civilian counterparts with the same education and experience
background. Additionally, airmen, depending on their specialty skill,
may be eligible for a variety of separate pays, allowances, and bonuses
in addition to the tax advantages they receive for nontaxable income.
Since the Services implemented the FSSA program in 2001, only 15 AF
active duty personnel are currently certified to receive FSSA. To
qualify for FSSA, an airmen's household income level must be less than
the USDA Food Stamp Program (130th of poverty level). FSSA is a
voluntary monthly tax-free cash allowance (up to $500/month) paid to a
member and must be reported as income to all federally-funded income
assistance programs (School Lunch Program; Women, Infant, and Children
(WIC); and Food Stamps: Earned Income Tax Credit). In February each
year, members must recertify for FSSA to show that their income is
below the USDA Food Stamp Program eligibility level. In 2002, 27
members qualified for FSSA. FSSA eligibility will fluctuate throughout
the year as a result of changes in the member's income level
(promotions, annual pay raises, special/incentive pays and bonuses, or
other household income). While it is difficult to determine exactly how
the number of personnel certified/qualified for FSSA will increase or
decrease, the pay raises proposed will certainly be a step in the right
direction toward reducing such numbers.
Of the 15 families currently receiving FSSA, there are 7 E-3s with
5-6 members in household, 2 E-4s with 6-7 members in household, and 6
in the grades of E-5 and E-6 with 8-11 members in household. Average
FSSA amount paid to eligible members is $308 per month. There are no
members below the grade of E-3 currently receiving FSSA.

END STRENGTH

10. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, last year, I supported a legislative proposal with
my friend Senator Max Cleland, which called for an increase in end
strength based on your personnel requirements. The Army reported to the
committee that they may need 42,000 to 43,000 additional soldiers, the
Air Force 22,000 to 30,000 additional airmen, the Navy 10,000
additional sailors, and the Marine Corps an additional 5,000 marines.
You and your personnel chiefs were quite clear that the requirement
was driven by the war on terrorism and operations after September 11.
The first 100,000 Reserve and national guardsmen that you called up for
Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom have just returned home. We
are engaged all over the world. Our men and women in uniform may be
asked to do more this year than last.
How do you propose to manage an even lower military end strength
with increased requirements for more personnel in even more places
(i.e., homeland security, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, etc.)?
General Shinseki. While the congressionally-mandated fiscal year
2002 active Army end strength was 480,000, the Army exceeded this end
strength target, as well as the budgeted average strength of 474,000
man-years. The Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of
486,543 (78,158 officers, 404,305 enlisted, and 4,080 cadets). The Army
was allowed to exceed the end strength targets only because of the 2-
percent flex authorized by Congress. The Army will continue to utilize
this flex and continue to use Reserve component (RC) forces to meet
current and emerging requirements for the global war on terrorism and
the new strategic environment.
This is a complex question that has no simple answer. Looking at
our history since September 11, we have had a 480,000 Active-Duty Force
and a sustained force of 30,000 mobilized RC soldiers on active duty
status. The Army views these requirements as a new operational plateau
and not as a spike. The recent increase in mobilization of the RC is a
spike for the potential war against Iraq and increased threat levels.
But even after the immediate spike subsides, we see the Army's
operational requirements maintaining a new plateau. This coming June,
both the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force
(KFOR) will become RC operations to mitigate active component (AC)
tempo. This will require the mobilization of portions of an RC division
for SFOR and portions of another RC division for KFOR to sustain the
operations. During this period of mobilization, RC soldiers will be in
an active duty status. These requirements are additive to the support
the RC is already providing to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Noble Eagle to support homeland defense and the global war on
terrorism. Any increase in end strength will be tied to how long we
expect the RC to maintain that operations tempo. The Army continues to
look at whether or not the 480,000 Active-Duty Force is right and
whether we have the right AC/RC mix in our combat, combat support, and
combat service support formations, as well as addressing our current
high demand/low density units.
Admiral Clark. Embedded in our military end strength projections
are various platform decommissionings offset by increases in
Antiterrorism/Force Protection manning. Accelerating the retirement of
our oldest, least capable, and most maintenance-intensive platforms was
one of the most difficult decisions the Navy made this year. While
aggregate warfighting capability is a better metric than the number of
ships and aircraft in our inventory, we recognize that below a certain
threshold numbers do matter. However, all of our analyses suggest that
the near-term inactivations we are proposing do not compromise our
ability to accomplish our mission, and that the fastest and most
efficient way to recapitalize and transform the fleet is to pursue
vertical cuts in our least capable type-model series, both in ships and
in aircraft, and apply those savings toward procuring new ships and
aircraft.
In summary, Navy end strength is based on requirements that are
largely force structure based. As older, more manpower intensive
platforms are taken off line and replaced by more efficient ships and
aircraft the requisite end strength decreases in concert.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps asked for and was granted an end
strength increase of 2,400 marines for fiscal year 2003. This increase
was greatly appreciated and came at the right time. The 2,400 marines
were used to replenish units depleted by standing up the 4th MEB (MEB
Hqtrs/ AT Battalion/Chemical Biological Incident Response Force/
Security Force Company). Coinciding with the end strength increase to
175,000, the USMC continues to look at ways to return marines to the
operating forces. Military-civilian conversions, A-76, and outsourcing
efforts have allowed us to return approximately 900 marines to the
operating forces. We believe that 175,000 active component end strength
is sufficient to meet our current mission requirements.
General Jumper. We are examining opportunities to optimize use of
the current end strength. We continue to look for those airmen doing
things that uniformed people should not be doing, or those who are
supporting agencies outside the Air Force that do not necessarily have
to be military or Air Force resources. I would characterize this
portion as a force and skills ``mix'' issue. Over the past year, we
have been reviewing our core competencies--those things that we as an
Air Force do better than anyone else, or things that we do that are
very difficult for others to duplicate, as part of an ongoing effort to
find areas where we can realign our military personnel from ``non-
military'' jobs into those that must be military. These core
competencies will be implemented in a program we call the Human Capital
Task Force, which will ensure our military force structure is placed in
those functional areas with the highest demand and appropriateness for
uniformed airmen. The remaining areas we've determined to not be core
competencies, although essential, but not necessarily required to be
performed by military members--will be studied as to whether this work
can best be accomplished by our outstanding Federal civilian workforce
or by outside contractors through competitive sourcing studies or an
alternative to competitive sourcing. In addition, part of our long-term
strategy is to overhaul our entire requirements determination process
to better focus on core competencies.
Though we cannot definitively tell you we will not need additional
end strength until we are confident we have our skills mix issue
resolved, there is no doubt ``solving'' this issue will be very
expensive. We are looking for creative ways to pay for the increase in
contractor costs or an increase in civilian pay dollars to pay for the
non-``blue-suit'' work that is currently being performed by the
military we will reassign.

NATIONAL CALL TO SERVICE PLAN

11. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, my staff was recently briefed on the implementation
of the Call to Service Plan, which Senator Bayh and I were successful
in including in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003. I thank the Marine Corps in particular for embracing the program
in the commandant's statement. While I am encouraged by the new
enthusiasm shown by the Department of Defense, compared to last year, I
would like you to discuss how you plan to maintain this new level of
effort to ensure this program is fully utilized. How do you intend to
implement the 18-18-18 enlistment option approved last year?
General Shinseki. We are not participating in the 18-18-18 since it
was replaced by the National Call to Service Enlistment Option.
Participants in the National Service enlistment option, upon completion
of initial entry training, will serve in the AC for a period of 15
months. They may then stay in the AC or choose to serve 24 months in
the Selected Reserve. Upon completion, they may continue in the
Selected Reserve, serve in the Individual Ready Reserve, or serve in a
National Service Program, or any combination of the above. The Army
will offer the incentives specified for the National Service option
which includes the choice of one of the following: (1) payment of a
bonus in the amount of $5,000; (2) up to $18,000 repayment on
qualifying student loans; (3) entitlement to an allowance for
educational assistance at the monthly rate payable for basic
educational assistance allowances for a total of 12 months (now at $900
per month); or (4) entitlement to an allowance for educational
assistance at 50 percent of the monthly rate payable for basic
educational assistance allowances for a total of 36 months (now at $366
per month). Twenty-four military occupation specialties have been
identified for participation in this program.
Admiral Clark. Navy, in coordination with DOD and the other
Services, is in the process of developing an implementation plan, which
will take effect 01 October 2003 (fiscal year 2004). The overarching
theme for Navy's implementation of the National Call to Service (NCS)
enlistment option is to utilize the program to bolster our Selected
Reserve (SELRES) force readiness. NCS candidates will be afforded the
full range of active duty training, given fleet experience and then, if
they choose not to reenlist in the Active Force, they will be
transferred to our Selective Reserve Force as a readiness multiplier.
Our plan for fiscal year 2004 will goal NCS accessions at 1 percent of
total non-prior service accessions ( cents450). Future annual accession
goals, as well as the accession skill mix, will be directly tied to
projected SELRES manning shortfalls.
General Hagee. Marine Corps, in coordination with DOD and the other
Services, is in the process of developing an implementation plan which
will take effect 01 Oct 03 (fiscal year 2004). The overarching theme
for USMC's implementation of the NCS enlistment option is to utilize
the program to ultimately bolster our SELRES force readiness. NCS
candidates will be afforded entry-level recruit and MOS training, given
operating force experience and then, if they choose not to reenlist in
the Active Force, they will be transferred to our Selective Reserve
Force as a readiness multiplier. Our plans for fiscal year 2004 will
set the goal for NCS accessions at approximately 0.5 percent of total
non-prior service accessions (175) ramping up to 1 percent by fiscal
year 2006.
General Jumper. Senator we also have embraced this program. Our
strategy is to use this program to reach out to the market that may
find this type of enlistment more attractive than traditional
enlistments. We plan to reach out to individuals currently in college
or those completing it in the near future. Additionally, efforts are
underway to ensure we maximize the output of this program to help
improve the staffing in our Air Reserve components. Currently, we have
identified at least 29 different skills across the Total Air Force that
will be staffed with people that enter through the NCS program. These
29 skills were selected in large part because they are also utilized in
the Reserve component and will allow members to transfer easily. These
include security force positions, flight line positions, medical
positions, and numerous others.

12. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what percentage of your total force will be made up
of personnel under this type of contract?
General Shinseki. We will begin with an initial cap of 2 percent of
the annual accession mission. The percentage of the total force will
initially be significantly less than 1 percent.
Admiral Clark. Due to the short-term nature of the NCS contract
(average length of time on active duty projected to be 20 months), and
the Navy's vision of setting accession goals based on SELRES manning
shortfall requirements, it is anticipated that the first cut will
produce a steady state average of NCS contracts in the total enlisted
force will be approximately 1 percent (3,000-3,500 NCS contracts on
active duty at any given time). We will evaluate progress in the
future.
General Hagee. Present plans call for USMC to access 0.5 percent
(175) in fiscal year 2004 and ramp up to 1 percent (350) of our annual
enlisted accessions by fiscal year 2006.
General Jumper. Senator our current plan is to enlist 1 percent
(approximately 370 people), of our total non-prior service accessions
in fiscal year 2004. We have identified at least 29 different skills
across the Total Air Force that will be staffed with people that enter
through the National Call to Service Program. The 1 percent will be
divided across the 29 skills.

13. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what role would the National Service Plan member
fill in your Service? I would like to encourage you to come back to the
committee and myself for further help in using this program to increase
end strength.
General Shinseki. Participants who enlist for the 15-month term of
service will attend the same training as those who enlist for a longer
term of service in the same specialty. Specialties with a total
training time of less than 16 weeks and facilitate Reserve duty or
National Service will be open to this option. This enlistment option
will be open to 24 military occupation specialties including combat,
combat support, and combat service support. After training,
participants in this option are subject to both overseas assignments,
except Germany and Hawaii, and stateside assignments.
Admiral Clark. While on active duty, NCS recruits will be utilized
in the Navy to fulfill the same functions as recruits coming in under
longer-term contracts. All NCS recruits will attend boot camp, a Navy
``A'' school, and will be worldwide assignable to sea and shore
billets. At the completion of their active duty contract, they will be
afforded the opportunity to either reenlist in the Active Force or
transfer to the SELRES. While attached to the SELRES, NCS members will
fill manning gaps in targeted ratings. The skill mix for NCS accessions
will be directly linked to projected SELRES manning shortfalls.
General Hagee. The ultimate goal for our NCS marines is to support
the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) in meeting manning shortfalls
and support their emerging homeland security missions. A majority of
the NCS marines would be tied to ATIFP missions and would be trained in
infantry, NBC, and MP MOSs. Active duty would be spent serving with the
4th MEB (AT), Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF),
Marine Security Forces, and Base/Station MPs. Assignments in the SMCR
would be tied to Security Battalions, CBIRF, and other units assigned
to homeland security missions. We are also planning on offering a
limited number of NCS marines extended training in critical skill areas
in short MOSs (i.e. intelligence, linguists, aerial navigators, etc.)
so that we can assign these NCS marines directly into these critically
short billets within the SMCR.
General Jumper. Senator, we have identified many different skills
in which these members will be utilized. These skills stretch across
the Air Force and can also be utilized in one of our Air Reserve
components. Members enlisted under the National Service Plan are not in
addition to, but will count against our current authorized end
strength.

14. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, if you were authorized the increase in end strength
required to meet your commitments, how quickly would you be able to
fill out the ranks of currently undermanned units?
General Shinseki. Any increase in end strength will be tied to how
long we expect the Reserve components to maintain their current
operations tempo. The Army continues to look at whether or not the
480,000 Active-Duty Force is right and whether we have the right active
component/Reserve component mix in our combat, combat support, and
combat service support formations, as well as addressing our current
high-demand/low-density units. Additionally, the Army derives end
strength requirements from the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, which
currently is ongoing. The TAA and other efforts to move soldiers from
supporting roles to units will affect the increase in end strength
requirements.
Given current recruiting and retention resources, and current
retention rates, the Army has the ability to increase end strength by
approximately 7,700 in fiscal year 2004. An increase in resources or
efficiencies will have a commensurate increase in the ability to
increase the Army's end strength.
Admiral Clark. As a result of congressional authority to operate
above strength controls, yet within the NDAA authorization of +2
percent, Navy active-duty end strength levels are already sufficient.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is very satisfied with the NDAA for
fiscal year 2003 increase of 2,400 marines. The Marine Corps believes
that 175,000 active marines are sufficient to meet our traditional
mission requirements. We are currently not experiencing any problems in
recruiting, training, and retaining marines to meet this increase.
General Jumper. It is difficult to provide a definitive answer, as
there are several issues involved including the recruiting and training
pipelines. In the ideal environment, it takes between 12 and 18 months
to recruit and train additional personnel.

15. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, would you need to reactivate units and squadrons
that were decommissioned during the down-sizing of the 1990s?
General Shinseki. No. Soldiers who enter the Army under this plan
would be integrated into existing units.
Admiral Clark. I foresee no need to re-commission units at this
time. We are using the National Call to Service Plan to complement our
Reserve Force and to meet Reserve requirements for trained junior
personnel.
General Hagee. A. Marine Corps force structure is based on the
minimum manpower and equipment needed to provide required combat
capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, our requirements have
increased while end strength has decreased. Specifically, since a
recent high of over 191,000 in 1991, we now stand at 175,000 active
duty marines. This is at a time when we find ourselves engaged in a
major theater war as well as numerous other vital missions.
B. In recent years, with the help of a modest end strength
increase, we have reactivated selective units in order to meet emergent
threats and provide our regional combatant commanders with the
capabilities they require. Our reactivation of the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) and our active component Air
Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) are examples.
C. Through a combination of specific force structure realignments
and institutional process improvements, the Corps has enjoyed
unprecedented efficiencies in manpower allocation. In spite of this, we
currently are able to man our Active-Duty Forces at only 94 percent of
their validated requirement. Given this shortage of manpower to meet
our current requirements, and without presupposing another end strength
increase, I do not believe it is prudent for us to seek reactivation of
previously decommissioned units.
General Jumper. At this time there are no plans to reactivate any
units or squadrons inactivated during the downsizing of the 1990s. New
squadrons would only be required if additional force structure or
mission changes were directed. Additionally, end strength increases do
not generate the need for additional squadrons. We are analyzing our
force requirements to determine if there are opportunities to realign
military manpower from non-military essential functions into high-
stress, high-PERSTEMPO career fields within existing units. We would
then backfill the losing functions with civilian manpower or contract
support, depending on the availability of resources.

16. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what increases in procurement would be required to
ensure that these service members are properly equipped?
General Shinseki. None. Soldiers who enter the Army under this plan
would be integrated into existing units, assigned to authorized unit
positions, and utilize equipment authorized by the units. However,
there may be some additional cost associated with the procurement of
personal items such as initial uniform issue items that would be based
upon the number of soldiers entering the Army under this program.
Admiral Clark. Thus far, we have identified no additional
procurement needs to facilitate implementation of Navy's NCS program,
largely because the program will be operated within our existing
strength authorization and NCS members will perform duties associated
with existing requirements.
If, however, at some point, Navy leadership deems it necessary to
activate previously decommissioned activities (ships, squadrons, bases,
etc.), part of the consideration of such a decision will involve a
detailed evaluation of the mission and structure of commands identified
for reactivation, in order to determine procurement needs associated
with their activation/reestablishment.
General Hagee. This question is a follow-on to QFR #15 which asked,
``Would you need to reactivate units and squadrons that were
decommissioned during the down-sizing of the 1990s?'' The Marine Corps'
response indicated that there was no need to reactivate any units or
squadrons.
In light of the Marine Corps' response to QFR #15, this question is
not applicable.
General Jumper. We plan to enlist 1 percent (approximately 370) of
our total non-prior service accessions in fiscal year 2004 through the
NCS plan. As there is currently no increase in end strength associated
with the NCS plan, the cost to equip these members is included in the
budget.

CONCURRENT RECEIPT

17. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, I am on record as a strong supporter of concurrent
receipt since 1991. I believe military retirement pay is pay for
services rendered to a serviceman or woman after 20 years of dedicated
military service. Disability pay is pay to a serviceman or woman
because of physical or mental pain or suffering caused by their years
of service in the military. The pays are different. The pays are
separate. Military retirement pay should not be offset by disability
pay. The Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act on
``Special Compensation for Combat-Related Disabled Uniformed Services
Retirees'' addressed only a small portion of retired service members
not being fairly compensated for their service to this country and
disabilities acquired during that service. Senator Harry Reid and I
have re-introduced legislation to ensure that all service members are
fairly compensated. What are your views on this legislation and this
issue?
General Shinseki. Of course, the Army is most grateful to our
veterans, especially those who have served long and faithful careers.
We realize that there is no payment that can ever fully repay these
brave soldiers for the sacrifices they have made. However, we must
temper this emotionally charged issue with the position of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, which the Army supports. We cannot pay
anyone twice--that is, both retired pay and disability pay--for the
same service. Further, we must keep in mind our obligation to those who
are serving now and may be putting their lives on the line in combat in
the weeks and months ahead. Would we be able to support these troops
after paying the $45 billion, 10-year cost for concurrent receipt that
DOD estimates?
The Army is grateful to the President for signing ``Combat Related
Special Compensation'' into law. This new law will compensate military
retirees who served 20 years and were wounded in combat or combat-
related training. The Army is part of a DOD committee working together
to develop guidelines for executing this compensation program by June.
Admiral Clark. Like all Americans, I believe we owe our veterans a
great debt of gratitude, particularly those serving long and faithful
careers. We must always remember that our Nation has remained strong
because of the brave men and women who were willing to fight and risk
their lives to protect their fellow citizens. However, we must also
recognize the significant obligation this bill will place on the
Military Retirement Fund without identifying appropriations.
I cannot support concurrent receipt of retired pay and disability
compensation that goes into effect prior to appropriation of funds to
cover the cost to the Military Retirement Fund and manpower and
personnel accounts. To do otherwise would put other critical programs
at risk.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has always supported fair and
equitable treatment of retired marines and acknowledges that the issue
of concurrent receipt needs to be fully addressed. The NDAA fiscal year
2003 provides special compensation for military retirees with combat-
related disabilities (CRSC). Though this is not concurrent receipt, we
believe that this is an important first step. The Marine Corps' major
concern lies with the appropriation of additional funding to support
any legislative change concerning concurrent receipt. Compelling the
Services to pay the bill out of existing funds would result in serious
cuts in modernization and readiness, as well as potential cuts in
current programs to our active and Reserve marines.
General Jumper. Senator McCain, the Department has traditionally
opposed legislative attempts to repeal the ban on concurrent receipt of
full retired pay and VA disability compensation. This opposition is
based on 100+ years of historical precedent, and a longstanding
administration belief against ``duplicate payments'' for same period of
service. However, we recognize the importance of properly compensating
veterans for service injuries, and that there are two competing
viewpoints on whether concurrent receipt is justified.
Proponents of retaining the ban argue that offsets are common to
other Federal payments (for example, Dependency and Indemnity
Compensation offsets the Survivor Benefit Plan annuity). Ending this
offset would set an expensive precedent for reduction/elimination of
similar offsets among Federal programs. OSD reports a rough cost
estimate of $41 billion in increased direct spending for the first 10-
year period if the ban on concurrent receipt were lifted ($3 billion in
the first year alone, and $14 billion in increased accrual payments by
DOD to the military retirement trust fund for the same 10-year period).
Also, retired or ``retainer pay'' implies possible future service, and
since a disabled retiree is not fit for recall, offset is appropriate.
Proponents of repealing the ban argue the offset is unfair. Civil
service retirees and prior service retirees typically are able to
receive disability compensation from VA with no corresponding offset
(though no other agency provides for disability and retirement pay from
that agency). Another argument is that VA disability recipients are
entitled to other Federal benefits, so why not military retired pay? As
an alternative to ``full'' concurrent receipt, OSD estimates the ban
could be lifted for 100 percent disabled retirees at a much-reduced
cost of $50 million/year. The Air Force has not budgeted for this item
in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget and cannot absorb or support
the significant costs without additional funding. If additional funding
were provided by Congress to cover the cost of lifting the ban, we
would support such legislation.

ENCROACHMENT

18. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, the loss of Vieques, and the increasing impact of
encroachment on operations and training at bases and ranges, concern me
greatly. We passed legislation last year that will help to reduce some
encroachment concerns at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) and to a smaller
degree at Luke AFB, but there is much more to be done. Please discuss
what actions your Services are taking to protect the viability of
military ranges and bases, especially against encroachment.
General Shinseki. The Army is working internally and with other
agencies to mitigate the effects that encroachment has on our training
and readiness. Our principal internal effort is the Sustainable Range
Program (SRP). The objective of SRP is to maximize the capability,
availability, and accessibility of ranges and training land to support
doctrinal training and testing requirements. SRP is based on three
tenets:

(1) Scientifically Defensible Information. The Army is developing
and maintaining complete data on all aspects of ranges--operational
characteristics of training facilities, physical characteristics of
real property, and data on the range as part of the natural and
cultural environment.
(2) Integrated Management. We are integrating the management of
ranges across the four disciplines that directly affect them: range
operations and modernization; facilities and installation management;
munitions management and safety; and environmental management.
(3) Outreach. The Army is working to inform political leadership,
regulators, and communities to improve understanding of the Army's need
for training and testing and the Army's more sophisticated range
management approach.

The Army is developing both an overarching Army regulation and
detailed implementing guidance to the field on the SRP. Specific
programs that will support sustainment of ranges and minimize the
impacts of encroachment include: implementation of the Army Range and
Training Land Strategy, quantification of encroachment impacts in the
Army Installation Status Report, implementation of Army Compatible Use
Buffers (utilizing authorities granted by Congress in Section 2811 in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003), and the
implementation of mission-focused environmental management systems on
all Army installations.
I would like to comment specifically on the Army's efforts to
implement the authority Congress granted the military departments
earlier this year to acquire buffer zones around our installations.
Fort Bragg pioneered this type of agreement, and now, Fort Carson,
Colorado, has moved out and implemented one of our first agreements
under the new legislation. Under a cooperative agreement between The
Nature Conservancy and Fort Carson, The Nature Conservancy has
negotiated a renewable lease with a private landowner that establishes
a conservation easement and precludes development on about 30,000 acres
and 14 linear miles of perimeter on the Fort Carson's southern
boundary. We are excited about the prospects this new authority
presents and will be working hard to identify suitable properties and
resources to implement the program fully.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services
to develop overarching Department policy for sustainment of ranges and
operating areas. This policy will support the long-term planning and
programming necessary to ensure our ranges and training areas meet
mission needs now and in the future.
Admiral Clark. Beginning on the east coast, Navy is implementing
the Training Resource Strategy (TRS), which ties together multiple
ranges for fleet training. This plan distributes our training across
all ranges instead of relying on a single site as we did at Vieques and
consequently lessens the impact of short-term or seasonal encroachment
at anyone range on our overall training program. TRS also supports a
more realistic training scenario for our forces by providing larger,
multi-dimensional training areas that were not available at Vieques.
Taking advantage of legislation passed last year, Navy is
developing an ``Encroachment Partnering'' (EP) program. This program
allows acquisition of real estate interests on lands in the vicinity of
military properties to reduce incompatible land uses that impact
mission capabilities. As described below, funded programs are in place
to conduct long-term sustainable planning for Navy ranges, to include
identifying locations where EP projects can reduce the impacts
associated with urban encroachment. For example, EP projects may
support preservation of off-base habitat for species as cities expand,
reducing species reliance on military lands. EP projects can also be
used to reduce commercial and residential development in areas subject
to noise or other indirect effects from training or testing. EP extends
the options available for installations to conduct compatible land use
planning with States and local governments, and can support positive
partnerships with conservation groups and local stakeholders.
In fiscal year 2004, the Navy has budgeted approximately $800
million for compliance, pollution prevention, and conservation to meet
our environmental obligations and manage natural resources.
Additionally, the President's budget for fiscal year 2004 provides
approximately $98 million across the FYDP to support a range
sustainment program that will include development of management plans
for each of our training range complexes, based upon current and
anticipated operational requirements, and including detailed
environmental and land-use planning.
An important component of the range sustainability program is
ensuring an ongoing dialogue occurs with all stakeholders, including
local citizens and community planning organizations, as well as
national and State resource agencies. Since encroachment impacts are
often manifested via inappropriate regulatory restrictions or citizen
lawsuits, this coordinated planning and outreach effort is critical to
controlling the adverse impacts of encroachment.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is engaged in many ways to protect
the viability of our military ranges and bases, especially against
encroachment. The Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (OMMC) budget
for environmental compliance and protection has held steady over the
last several years at approximately $120 million per year. Our budgets
are requirements based and our steady funding is attributable to the
fact that environmental legislation has remained consistent since 1996.
Previous investments to improve environmental compliance have also
resulted in associated cost decreases. Additionally, the conservation
portion of our budget has increased from about $1 million OMMC in
fiscal year 1992 to about $15 million in fiscal year 2003.
Every Marine Corps base, station, or range with natural resource
responsibilities has in place an Integrated Natural Resource Management
Plan (INRMP) which provides for the conservation and rehabilitation of
natural resources. These plans are prepared in cooperation with
regulatory agencies. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) policy
acknowledges that INRMPs can be acceptable substitutes for critical
habitat designation. It is this policy we seek to have Congress codify.
Critical habitat designation under the Endangered Species Act
presents the single greatest encroachment concern for the Marine Corps.
The standard under the Endangered Species Act is that critical habitat
cannot be adversely modified. Currently, we do not train on lands
subject to critical habitat designation to ensure no adverse
modification. The Marine Corps' ultimate concern is that once land is
designated as critical habitat, land management authority transfers
from the commanding general of the installation to the regulatory
agencies and, via the courts, special interest groups. The Marine Corps
has worked with FWS to develop a scientifically and legally based
policy that precludes the need to designate critical habitat. The
Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI) has within it a
provision that would codify current FWS practice. Absent legislation,
environmental litigation may still cause 57 percent of the 125,000 acre
Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, California and 65 percent of
the 23,000 acre Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, California to
be designated critical habitat.
The Marine Corps is pursuing Encroachment Partnering opportunities
per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (10 USC
2684A, Sec 2811a) as another tool for addressing encroachment. This
legislation allows entry into an agreement with an eligible entity such
as a private conservation organization or State, to address the use or
development of real property in the vicinity of a military
installation. The purpose of Encroachment Partnering agreements are
twofold: limit development or use of property that would be
incompatible with the mission of the installation and/or preserve
habitat on the property that would relieve current or anticipated
environmental restrictions for the installation.
MCB Camp Pendleton is participating in the South Coast Conservation
Forum, a group whose goal is to acquire lands that will be set aside to
protect as many of the 50 listed species in the local Southern
California area as possible. MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is a
member of the Onslow Bight Forum, a group dedicated to sharing
information and discussing potential buffer land partnering
opportunities in coastal North Carolina.
The Marine Corps recognized that evidence of negative encroachment
impacts, though persuasive, were largely anecdotal. Consequently, the
Marine Corps set out to establish quantitative data regarding this
issue. Selecting MCB Camp Pendleton as the subject of the study, we
examined encroachment impacts on the capability of the installation to
support unit operational readiness requirements for a Marine Air Ground
Task Force. Study results found that combat arms elements were able to
accomplish only 69 percent of established standards for non-firing
field training while conducting an amphibious operation at Camp
Pendleton. A second phase of this study is on the verge of completion.
A final report of some 760 tasks is due to the Commanding General, MCB
Camp Pendleton this month. Initial results from the final report's
findings are consistent with those of the preliminary assessment. On
average, the units evaluated were able to complete their required tasks
to just below 70 percent of the established standard, while conducting
an amphibious operation at Camp Pendleton. Endangered species were the
largest contributing encroachment factor in this study. These findings
reinforce that for the Marine Corps, endangered species issues are at
the forefront of the Service encroachment debate.
As a necessary follow-on effort to the Camp Pendleton study, a
Headquarters Marine Corps Range Management System (RMS) has been
funded, including monies programmed through fiscal year 2004, to build
a Corps-wide ability to relate training standards to ranges. Intent is
to have the RMS in place within the next 18 months. RMS will have broad
utilization from the unit through institutional level. This system is
envisioned to be able to plan and develop training, schedule ranges and
training areas, perform training cost/benefit analysis, and very
importantly, measure the effects of encroachment on our installations
ability to support unit operational readiness requirements.
To conclude, the Marine Corps needs solutions as outlined in the
RRPI, embedded in law, that requires consideration, accommodation, and
protection of lands used for military training and operations. RRPI
passage, including the provision that addresses critical habitat
designation, has direct national security implications, and is a Marine
Corps priority.
General Jumper. The Air Force is also greatly concerned with the
increasing impact encroachment is having on our operations and
training. The Air Force has made it a priority to define and quantify
the resources needed to support our mission requirements and to measure
and communicate the impacts of encroachment on mission readiness. The
Air Force has a four-prong strategy to address encroachment issues:

(1) Identify and quantify the resource base needed to perform the
AF mission, and quantify the readiness impairments resulting from
resource denial (encroachment). To accomplish this, the Air Force is
developing the Resource Capability Model (RCM) that will more precisely
identify natural, physical, and statutorily controlled resources needed
to conduct readiness activities to better inform decisionmakers both
within the Air Force and among our community and regulatory partners.
(2) Continue to institute dialogue with other Federal resource
management agencies (such as the Department of the Interior,
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Commerce) to develop
regulatory or administrative improvements that can relieve military
resource encroachment.
(3) Enhance outreach and communications with States, local
governments, and interested organizations regarding how unintended
consequences of resource management programs can impair military
readiness.
(4) Explore the possible need for statutory modifications to
prevent unintended impacts to military readiness from resource denial
or degradation. One such effort to obtain statutory modifications is to
support the RRPI. It is a legislative proposal that will provide the
needed clarification to specific environmental statutes in order to
protect access to our training resources while continuing to protect
the environment. Those specific statutes include the Endangered Species
Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, the Compensation and Liability
Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
More specifically, the Air Force is conducting mitigation measures
to address encroachment issues that impact our operations. For example,
at the Barry M. Goldwater Range, the Air Force routinely monitors
target areas for Sonoran Pronghorn movements and will divert or cancel
live missions projected near Pronghorn areas. At Eglin AFB, we
electronically tag and track endangered Gulf Sturgeon to ensure they
are not impacted by our operations. At Nellis AFB, the Air Force is
acquiring 417 acres on the north departure zone due to urban
encroachment off of the southern departure zone.
Through the application of mitigation measures, together with our
strategic four-prong approach which includes the provisions of the
RRPI, the Air Force will continue to fulfill its dual mission of
protecting the lives and well-being of our citizens and to protect the
environment.

TRANSFORMATION

19. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, when transformation was first discussed, we talked
about a revolution in military affairs, and ``skipping a generation of
technology.'' We talked about taking advantage of emerging technology
to decrease the size of our military forces while increasing their
mobility and lethality. Kenneth J. Krieg, Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, recently came over to brief
our staffs on the current status of transformation. His briefing had
little to do with warfighting. I would characterize his briefing as
more of a major reform of DOD bureaucracy. When Dov Zakheim, Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) came to the Hill and briefed this
year's budget, he talked at length about what a transformational budget
this is. Yet it is very telling that in your R&D budget, while there is
$870 million for the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
there is $5.5 billion for continued development for three short range
fighter programs, all three of which were considered to be candidates
for the chopping block 2 years ago to provide money for
transformational programs and technologies. What has happened to
transformation?
General Shinseki. The Army is firmly committed to its
transformation efforts. In this President's budget and its associated
Future Year Defense Plan, the Army has generated approximately $22
billion of savings by terminating 24 systems ($13.9 billion) and
reducing or restructuring an additional 24 ($8.6 billion) in order to
fund transformation and other higher priority programs. The Army
reinvested these savings into: Future Combat System ($13.5 billion),
Precision Munitions ($3.2 billion), Sensor and Communications ($2.3
billion), Science & Technology ($1.1 billion), Missile and Air Defense
($1.1 billion), and other smaller high priority systems.
Admiral Clark. Transformation remains embedded in everything we do,
and the Navy is committed to what we see as joint transformation at the
Service level. To this end, transformation is about more than investing
in new technologies, although that is certainly an important part of
it. It is also about developing new operational concepts such as the
Global Concepts of Operations; new processes such as Sea Warrior, Sea
Trial and Sea Enterprise; and new organizations such as Navy-Marine
Corp Tactical Aviation Integration, all of which I described in my
testimony. These initiatives are in important ways about maximizing the
effectiveness of the capital assets in which we have already invested.
Transformation is also about investing in programs that will result
in major increases in warfighting effectiveness, including the next-
generation aircraft carrier (CVN-21), the transformational destroyer
(DD(X)) and LCS, the SSGN, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Advanced
Hawkeye (E-2C RMP) Upgrade Program. At the same time, not all of our
investments are for new things. Service life extensions, product
improvements, and modifications to current equipment may offer
significant future returns on investment, such as the cruiser
conversion plan. Other modernization programs are not transformational
by themselves, but are necessary to provide the supporting structure to
deliver new transformational initiatives.
General Hagee. Transformation is not merely about ``skipping a
generation of technology'' or developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
other future technologies. Transformation is also about developing new
operational concepts, organizational constructs, and business reforms
that will enable us to realize our vision of future warfighting. While
future technologies play some part in achieving these transformational
capabilities, many of the currently existing or planned programs and
technologies also support the transformation of the Marine Corps.
Indeed, if we can achieve a transformational capability through changes
in our organizations or operating concepts, then we may be able to
reallocate some of those savings to develop capabilities that can only
be realized through future technologies. Many of the existing or
planned programs are not, of themselves, transformational. But,
enhancements in their reliability, availability, and maintainability
over previous systems will allow us to pursue that next generation of
technology without sacrificing the warfighting capabilities of today.
Regardless, transformation should only be judged by the improvements in
the overall capabilities of the Nation's warfighters.
General Jumper. Senator, transformation is alive and well in the
Air Force. We are investing more than $95 billion over the FYDP in
transformational capabilities. These capabilities are provided by a
variety of programs and initiatives, including the F/A-22 Raptor and F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter programs you referred to, but not limited to
them. Transformation as we see it is not just about new programs, but
about exploiting new approaches to the operational concepts and
organizational structures we develop for the employment of both new and
existing technologies. Further, the AF is not transforming in a
vacuum--the unique air and space capabilities we provide are just one
part of an integrated joint, interagency, and coalition team. Ensuring
that the entire team is equipped with complementary and synergistic
capabilities and platforms is important as we transform the Air Force.
It is easy to fall into the trap of focusing on a particular system
when discussing transformation. Truth is that the transformed Joint
Forces will be composed of a ``system of systems'' connected through
operating concepts and organizational constructs. Those forces will be
more network-centric, less platform-centric, and able to better conduct
effects-based operations by increasing information sharing.
They will have C\4\ISR capabilities that provide a joint common
relevant operational situational awareness of the battlespace, rapid
and robust sensor-to-shooter targeting, reachback and other necessary
prerequisites for network-centric warfare. They will do it with
integrated Air Force capabilities and systems we are developing and
investing in now--including the Space Based Radar, the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation, laser-based
communications, the Distributed Common Ground System, and Global
Positioning System Blocks IIF & III. They will do it by bringing
together these capabilities, along with the F/A-22 and F-35, to provide
an overwhelming ability to see, reach out, and touch any possible
adversary with the right tool to achieve the intended effect.
To more directly address your comments about the short-range
fighter programs we're pursuing, I'd like to expand on some of the
transformational capabilities the F/A-22 will bring to the United
States. The Raptor combines air dominance, SEAD/DEAD (suppression/
destruction of enemy air defenses), and precision attack capabilities
in one platform. Its stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, and
integrated avionics will allow us to overcome night-operating
limitations in heavily defended areas, and bring persistent stealth to
the battlespace. Our warfighting commanders will have a greatly
enhanced ability to overcome anti-access environments, to ``kick down
the door'' to clear the way for follow-on forces and missions.
Complementing the F/A-22's superior air dominance and ground attack
``kick down the door'' capability, the F-35 provides persistent,
follow-on ground attack. It will give our joint and allied air forces a
greatly improved stealth platform with enhanced strike capabilities at
a lower cost by capitalizing on joint investments by the Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps, and allies. In addition to reduced procurement
costs, the F-35 will also be cheaper to maintain and operate. The F-35
Joint Strike Fighter is the ideal weapons platform to replace our aging
strike fighters.
Finally, the Air Force is fully committed to capitalizing on the
warfighting capabilities inherent with UAVs. From a historical
perspective, we are in a ``Billy Mitchell era'' with regard to UAV
development. The recently completed Defense Science Board study of UAVs
noted that the loss rates of existing UAVs are over 50 times higher
than for existing manned platforms. They also reported that these UAVs
can cost over $40 million each. Our R&D investment of $870 million for
UAVs is thus sizeable given the maturity of their development. They,
therefore, require a more substantial investment to successfully
transition these programs to production and deployment. The differences
you see in our R&D investment is more a factor of the development
maturity of the programs than any lack of commitment for UAVs. As the
development of UAVs matures, our investment will increase accordingly.

20. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, why are we now allowing evolutionary, traditional
platforms to be labeled transformational?
General Shinseki. Army transformation consists of three primary
vectors--the current Legacy Force, the Stryker Brigades, and the
Objective Force. Over the last 3 years, the Army has undertaken
transforming itself into a force that is more strategically responsive
and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations.
While Army transformation encompasses these three vectors, the Army has
worked in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to
which systems are considered transformational. The Army has 19 systems
recognized by the Department as transformational, and they include the
Future Combat Systems, the Warfighter Information Network Tactical,
Comanche, and the Joint Tactical Radio System. Current Army platforms
such as the Apache, Abrams, and Bradley while crucial to the Army's
transformation efforts, have not been classified as transformational.
Admiral Clark. The President's stated goal is to `skip a
generation' of technology and accelerate transformational technologies.
For example, aircraft carriers are indeed a `traditional platform,'
however, in CVN-21 we have leapt from the CVN(X) development plan into
CVN-21 within about the same timeline. The transformational
technologies include a new electrical generation and distribution
system, improved flight deck design with Electromagnetic Aircraft
Launching System, Advanced Arresting Gear, improved sortie generation,
enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and incorporation of a
flexible infrastructure that will allow the insertion of new
capabilities as they evolve.
General Hagee. Platforms themselves should not be viewed as
traditional or transformational. Instead, the innovative and relevant
capabilities that these platforms help support better demonstrate the
transformation of our force. The new operational concepts we develop
first describe our vision of future warfighting, and indicate the
capabilities that will be required to achieve this vision. Some of
these capabilities can then be achieved only through the employment of
leap-ahead technologies and with the development of new platforms, such
as the V-22 Osprey. Often, however, these capabilities will rely
equally on platforms already on hand--for mobility, fire support,
combat service, or communications, for example. In fact, we
intentionally leverage these investments, in both dollars and training,
whenever possible to achieve new capabilities as efficiently as
possible. I think it is more useful to evaluate our transformation
based on the new or dramatically improved capabilities we provide to
joint warfighters, rather than upon an appraisal of any individual
platform.
General Jumper. We primarily judge the transformational qualities
of our platforms based on whether the platform provides a significant
improvement to our joint warfighting capabilities that enable new
concepts for military operations. For instances that allow the
measurement of warfighting capability, ``significant improvement'' is
usually interpreted to mean a near order of magnitude improvement in
our warfighting capability. Another factor that contributes to our
assessment is the contribution of our platforms to Secretary Rumsfeld's
``Critical Operational Goals of Transformation.'' If our platforms
provide a substantial contribution towards the satisfaction of these
goals, it may be labeled transformational.
Not all of our platforms contribute to our transformation through
the implementation of new technologies. Some platforms become
transformational through use of existing technologies in new innovative
ways to significantly improve our warfighting capabilities. There is no
time element associated with our criteria. We judge our platforms based
on their contribution to our warfighting capabilities. Consequently, it
is entirely consistent with our viewpoint to have platforms that
preceded ``transformation'' as a DOD initiative to be labeled
transformational.

21. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what time line are we looking at for OSD's desired
bureaucratic reforms to actually have an impact on the battlefield for
our warfighters?
General Shinseki. On the DOD level, it is my understanding that
many of the proposed bureaucratic reforms require congressional action
and assistance in order to begin implementation, and will be forwarded
to Congress as part of a comprehensive transformation package.
Speaking from the Army's perspective, we have ongoing and emerging
efforts to identify and institute changes to our internal business
processes. The primary focus of our business process reforms has been
two-fold: free up resources available for higher priority programs, and
streamline processes and procedures to use our soldiers' and civilians'
time more efficiently. A few of these reforms will have near-term
impacts (within 1 year) in terms of freeing up personnel resources for
other activities or streamlining processes, but the majority take a
longer time to implement.
The Army's current internal business reform process, known as the
Army Business Initiative Council (Army BIC), has focused the majority
of its efforts on identifying and implementing mid-level improvements
intended to produce near-term savings and efficiencies. To date,
Secretary White, as part of the Army BIC process, has approved 53
initiatives. Some of those initiatives can be implemented simply by
changing old and outdated regulations and policies. Others require the
assistance of Congress to change statutory law.
One example of an initiative that has been approved by the BIC for
action, and championed by the Army, was recently forwarded to this
committee as part of the proposed National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2004. The initiative will allow the Army and the other
Services to get out of the business of purchasing, administering, and
paying for government cellular phones and is intended to save funding
and free up manpower for other, more important tasks. Instead, for
those with a validated government need for cellular phone use, we would
instead use the authority being sought from your committee to provide
them with a flat-rate stipend to use their personal phone for
government business.
Another initiative approved for implementation within the Army is
to update the Common Tables of Allowance, which will help ensure
equipment authorizations for our combat units and more accurately
reflect their current requirements, and thus make them better prepared
to carry out their combat mission when called upon to do so.
The above initiative is more representative of the type of
initiatives approved by the Army BIC; less than 20 percent of all
approved Army BIC initiatives require congressional action for
implementation. However, we do look forward to working with your
committee on those Army BIC initiatives which require congressional
assistance in the near future.
Admiral Clark. Secretary Rumsfeld is pursuing a number of
initiatives. I believe some of them will have immediate impact and some
will take longer to mature, but in the end we will be a more
streamlined, agile Department.
General Hagee. The Secretary of Defense's Transformation Planning
Guidance provides a strategy and timeline for the development and
fielding of new capabilities for our joint warfighters. Within the next
2-3 years, we can expect to see transformational changes to the
interoperability of our forces, especially in terms of joint planning
and communications, by taking into account lessons learned from joint
training and ongoing operations, as well as the results from advanced
technology demonstrations and experimentation. During the next decade,
our ongoing efforts to develop new joint operational concepts will
begin to promote the true integration of the various capabilities the
Services provide as we work to meet the six operational goals
established in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, the
Chairman's Joint Vision articulates our far-term view of future
operations and describes the capabilities that will reach the field in
15 to 20 years. I believe that this consistent emphasis on developing
capabilities that are ``born-joint'' for the near-, mid-, and far-term
will fundamentally change our acquisition, training, and planning
processes, and truly transform the way the way we operate on tomorrow's
battlefield.
General Jumper. Our new mind set for capabilities development,
which we call ``Agile Acquisition,'' is beginning to take hold and pay
dividends. Over the past 18 months we have proven to ourselves that we
can, in fact, reform our processes and deliver new capabilities to the
warfighter faster. For wartime specific requirements we use the Rapid
Response Process (RRP). RRP delivers approval to proceed with material
solutions submitted by MAJCOM combatant commanders to CSAF within 19
days. Success to date--the acquisition and fielding of 33 urgent Combat
Mission Need Statements valued in excess of $308 million across 12
platforms. Outside of wartime specific requirements, we have also
accelerated some warfighter acquisition initiatives from 3 years to
less than 1 year for contract award. One such example is the Joint
Warning and Reporting Network for detecting, analyzing, and warning of
potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
hazards.
The challenge now is to take these successes and institutionalize
them so that they become the way we do business. The AF is working with
OSD to ensure that all policies (both OSD and AF) foster collaboration,
initiative, trust, and partnering. All of this is fixed on the twin
goals of Agile Acquisition: reduced cycle time and increased
credibility. Additionally, we are aggressively developing training
programs to not only teach people new processes, but also to change the
work culture to one that accepts the urgency of Agile Acquisition.

``GO PILLS''

22. Senator McCain. General Jumper, there have been reports in the
press regarding an Air Force policy which authorizes Air Force pilots
to take amphetamines called ``go pills'' as a ``fatigue-management
tool''. The reports I saw described that Air Force tactical aviation
pilots, not just bomber crews, use the ``go pills'' during combat air
patrol (CAP) missions.
Can you describe to me why does the Air Force finds it necessary to
use amphetamines as a fatigue-management tool and Navy and Marine Corps
pilots do not use it, but are subjected to similar combat air patrol
missions? I believe some of our citizens may find it disconcerting to
learn that Air Force combat air patrols over cities since September 11
were flown by Air Force pilots using amphetamines.
General Jumper. I can't speak for the Navy or Marine Corps, but
I'll be happy to answer your concerns about the Air Force's policy for
use of ``go pills'' as a fatigue-management tool. It is part of a
comprehensive program that includes strict usage control and prefers
fatigue management over pharmacological use. The policy grew out of a
need to be able to sustain operations on long-duration missions, often
at night. From 1972 to 1995 the Air Force sustained 96 serious mishaps
in which fatigue was cited as a factor; there were no mishaps in which
the use of stimulants was a factor.
The Air Force conducted a comprehensive 18-month review on the
effects of the medication and concluded that the pills provide an extra
margin of safety by helping aircrews counter fatigue. Use of the pills
is completely voluntary at the discretion of the aircrew, and use is
approved in each case in writing by commanders, normally for missions
over 8 hours for fighter aircraft or 12 hours for bombers. Individuals
are informed that ``go pills should only be used in conjunction with
fatigue-management tools or after all fatigue-management tools have
been exhausted.''

RESERVE COMPONENT

23. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, in your statement you talk
about the importance of the Reserve component in supporting defense
requirements. The significant number of Reserve personnel activated
since September 11 clearly validates your comments. As you stated,
today more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve component
(RC). The Secretary of Defense has commented that there are functions
and capabilities now residing only in the RC that need to exist in our
Active-Duty Forces. I see this as another indication of the need to
increase your end strength. Please explain how you intend to migrate
capabilities back in to the active component (AC) under current end
strength limitations.
General Shinseki. While the congressionally-mandated fiscal year
2002 active Army end strength was 480,000, the Army exceeded this end
strength target, as well as the budgeted average strength of 474,000
man-years. The Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of
486,543 (78,158 officers, 404,305 enlisted, and 4,080 cadets). The Army
was allowed to exceed the end strength targets only because of the 2
percent flex authorized by Congress. The Army will continue to utilize
this flex and continue to use RC forces to meet current and emerging
requirements for the global war on terrorism and the new strategic
environment.
The Army's AC and RC force mix is the result of deliberate actions
to balance risks and priorities in light of operational requirements as
well as resource constraints. The Army continues to adjust its force
structure based on the ``1-4-2-1'' force-sizing construct. The Army's
force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commander's
requirements and is determined using the Total Army Analysis (TAA)
process. To stay within constant end strength levels, adding
capabilities to the Active Force will require the transfer of some
mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve Force. A number of
options exist to reduce risk including the conversion of lower demand
structure inside the Active Force; converting key capabilities held in
the RC, but needed intermittently; and changes in Reserve personnel
management to increase access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing
involuntary mobilization.
Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over
19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and
Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated
or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68
active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these
high-demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological
operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities
address the most urgent needs.
Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction
with the Joint Staff has undertaken a study to improve operational
availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the AC/RC
mix is being studied in the context of short-notice, short-duration
major combat operations. This study is incomplete and will be continued
as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine any
recommended force structure changes.

24. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, I noted that the Army intends
to invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize key
training ranges, such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack
Center near Gila Bend. What improvements will these funds be directed
towards?
General Shinseki. The Combat Training Center (CTC) modernization
program modernizes the maneuver CTCs, the National Training Center
(NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Combat Maneuver
Training Center, and establishes the Deep Attack Center of Excellence.
This allows the CTC program to develop its leaders, keep pace with Army
transformation, provide high-quality, full-spectrum training
operations, and realistic joint and combined arms training. During the
next 6 years, the Army will invest nearly $700 million to modernize and
establish these training centers. The $700 million provides for
opposing forces surrogate vehicles, surrogate tank vehicles, common
training instrumentation architecture, objective instrumentation
systems, and NTC military operations on urbanized terrain.
The Deep Attack Center of Excellence is designed for corps level
attack aviation training with Air Force integration. It will provide a
rigorous, integrated, live CTC-type collective training experience for
corps and divisional attack battalions, other service attack systems,
and respective enabling command, control, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance elements along with other combined
arms systems in a joint environment.

SHIP RETIREMENTS

25. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, the President's budget includes
the retirement of the Spruance-class destroyers. I have two concerns
here. First, today's Navy routinely operates in littoral waters
increasingly populated by a very capable diesel submarine threat, yet
we are doing away with a class of ships designed to counter that
threat. Second, these destroyers have been equipped, at significant
cost, to be able to carry Tomahawk missiles. What is the Navy doing to
manage the loss of both a key antisubmarine warfare (ASW) asset and a
capable strike platform?
Admiral Clark. The Spruance-class was designed to counter the
Soviet Navy's blue water nuclear submarine threat, which we no longer
face. Current Navy warfighting analysis indicates decommissioning this
class of ship does not affect our ability to prosecute diesel
submarines in the littoral. Our development of LCS and its capabilities
inherent in the antisubmarine warfare mission module will provide us a
new and better capability to prosecute diesel submarines at a lower
cost.
A key issue for littoral ASW is the ability to operate a
helicopter. The number of available helo spots exceeds the inventory of
helicopters available in the fleet, even with the accelerated
decommissioning of the Spruance-class.
Available verticle launch system (VLS) cells lost by the
decommissioning of the Spruance-class are gained back by the
commissionings of DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyers. These ships will
provide substantially more combat capability in every warfare area and
96 VLS cells compared to the 61 on Spruance-class ships. The number of
VLS cells in the fleet by fiscal year 2004 is greater than in fiscal
year 2003 even with the decommissionings, and rises steadily
thereafter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Weapon Systems --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total VLS Cells................ 6,869 7,131 6,870 6,949 6,993 7,316 \1\ 7,8 8,316 8,508
16
Total Helo Spots \2\........... 164 166 152 153 152 158 166 170 174
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SSGN IOC
\2\ Helo Spots exceed LAMPS inventory

26. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, you state that we currently have
151 ships deployed. How can you maintain that OPTEMPO, and stay within
PERSTEMPO while retiring these ships? Would it not make more sense to
hold off retiring these ships until after world wide requirements have
dropped off? Perhaps sometime after the Iraq situation has been
resolved?
Admiral Clark. Our Navy is at the highest state of readiness that
I've ever witnessed in my career. This is duel in no small part, to the
tradeoffs we have made between quantity and capability--including the
accelerated retirement of some of our ships. Last year, I promised we
would sharpen our focus on our force structure in the years ahead--to
buy the ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's
Navy while at the same time, maintaining our ability to meet
operational requirements. As a result, we took a hard look at the ways
we could balance these priorities and our discretionary investments to
both satisfy the near-term operational risks and prepare for the long-
term risks of an uncertain future. We identified several aging, legacy
systems with limited growth potential and high operating and support
costs, and ultimately, accelerated the retirement of 11 ships and 70
aircraft, divested more than 50 systems and eliminated thousands of
legacy IT applications. These initiatives result in an acceptable
operational risk in the near term because of our emphasis on sustaining
our current readiness gains. Equally important these difficult
decisions yielded $1.9 billion for reinvestment and will do much to
help reduce our future risk.

ENVIRONMENT

27. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, I am aware of a number of
environmental issues that are in the works on the Commerce Committee
that have military implications. Would you elaborate on some of the
specific issues surrounding the Marine Mammal Protection Act and how
they are impacting naval readiness?
Admiral Clark. The definition of the term ``harassment'' of marine
mammals in the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) is a source of
confusion because the definition is tied to vague and ambiguous terms
such as ``annoyance'' and ``potential to disturb.'' These terms apply
to even the slightest changes in marine mammal behavior and are ripe
for litigation that leads to increased restrictions on training and
testing.
In November 2002, a Federal District Court judge in San Francisco
presiding over a case brought by special interest groups alleging
violation of the MMPA, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) issued a court order that strictly
limits employment of the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low
Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) sonar system. This advanced system is
designed to detect and track the growing number of quiet diesel
submarines possessed by nations which could threaten our vital national
security. After highlighting what the court viewed as flaws in
regulatory agency implementation of the MMPA and ESA, and despite the
Navy's unprecedented efforts to comply with NEPA, the court issued a
preliminary injunction restricting Navy's deployment of SURTASS LFA to
only a small area in the Western Pacific. As a result of the inherent
structural flaws in the laws themselves as applied to worldwide
military readiness activities, the Navy now finds the deployment and
operation of one of our most important national security assets
constrained by a Federal Court as a result of litigation brought by
special interest groups that is specifically designed to deny the Navy
use of the system. Future testing and employment of SURTASS LFA (and
potentially other Navy training and testing programs) are in jeopardy
because of flaws in the MMPA, which was originally enacted to protect
whales from commercial exploitation and to prevent dolphins and other
marine mammals from accidental death or injury during commercial
fishing operations.
The submarine threat today is real and in some ways has become more
challenging than during the Cold War. Many nations are capable of
employing quiet-diesel submarines to deny access or significantly delay
execution of joint and coalition operations in support of our vital
interests. Of the approximately 500 non-U.S. submarines in the world,
almost half that number are operated by non-allied nations. Of greatest
concern are the new ultra-quiet diesel-electric submarines armed with
deadly torpedoes and cruise missiles being produced or acquired by the
People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea. These diesel
submarines are very difficult to detect outside the range at which they
can launch attacks against U.S. and allied ships using passive sonar
systems. Active systems like SURTASS LFA, when used in conjunction with
other antisubmarine sensor and weapons systems, are necessary to
detect, locate, and destroy or avoid hostile submarines before they
close within range of our forces.
While recognizing the national security need for SURTASS LFA,
nevertheless, the Federal District Court judge deciding the LFA lawsuit
was constrained by the broad language of the MMPA, which was not
drafted with application to military readiness activities in mind.
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to produce scientific evidence
contradicting the independent scientific research sponsored by the Navy
in coordination with numerous outside experts that the system could be
operated with negligible harm to marine mammals, the court opined that
Navy training must be restricted. In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that under the definition of harassment, the phrase
``potential to disturb'' hinged on the word ``potential'' and extended
to individual animals. Quoting from the opinion, the judge said, ``In
fact, by focusing on potential harassment, the statute appears to
consider all the animals in a population to be harassed if there is the
potential for the act to disturb the behavior patterns of the most
sensitive individual in the group.'' (Emphasis added.) Interpreting the
law this broadly would require authorization (permits) for harassment
of potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of marine mammals based on
the benign behavioral responses of one or two of the most sensitive
animals.
Highlighting how difficult it would be to apply the MMPA to
worldwide military readiness activities under such a broad
interpretation of harassment, the court also pointed out that a
separate structural flaw in the MMPA limits permits for harassment to
no more than a ``small number'' of marine mammals. Overturning the
regulatory agency's decades-old interpretation of the MMPA, the court
also said that the ``small number'' of animals affected cannot be
defined in terms of whether there would be negligible impact on the
species, but rather is an absolute number that must be determined to be
``small.'' The court's far-reaching opinion underscores shortcomings in
the MMPA, which apply to any worldwide military readiness activity, or
any grouping of military training activities that might be submitted
for an overall review of impact on the environment.
Other examples of how the MMPA affects testing and training follow:

Navy Research: During the last 6 years of Navy research on how
to counter mines and detect submarines in shallow water, over
78 percent of the tests have been delayed, scaled back, or
cancelled due to the impact of environmental regulations.
Shallow Water Training Range: Lack of clarity in the definition
of ``harassment'' is delaying the establishment of shallow
water training ranges to prepare sailors for the Navy's most
difficult battlefield--shallow water antisubmarine warfare.

Navy's fleet exercises face severe limitations
to avoid potential ``harassment'' of marine mammals.
Exercises to protect ships from submarines and
mines in narrow, shallow straits, such as the Strait of
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, have been moved to less
realistic conditions in deep water.
Some exercises forced to adopt aerial and
other visual surveys for sea turtles and marine mammals
can only be done in daylight. The mitigation denies the
ability to train at night.

To address these issues, I ask for your consideration of the
narrowly focused amendments to the MMPA proposed by DOD in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, which has now been
transmitted by the President to Congress. Our proposal to clarify the
definition of ``harassment'' and allow authorization of activities
under the MMPA that would have a ``negligible'' impact on a stock or
species, and follow recommendations made in a report to Congress by the
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences in
2000. According to the NRC, if the current definition of Level B
harassment (detectable changes in behavior) were applied to commercial
shipping and recreational boating as strenuously as it is applied to
scientific and naval activities, the result would be crippling
regulation of nearly every motorized vessel operating in U.S. waters.
The DOD proposed amendment to the MMPA will ensure protection of
marine mammals while allowing sufficient flexibility to conduct
training and other operations essential to national security. Left
unchanged, the MMPA will continue to be the subject of litigation
brought by special interest groups and could lead to restrictions on
other sonar systems in use by the fleet for over 30 years.

AVIATION SAFETY

28. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, an article in the November 4,
2002 Defense News delineated a key and expanding roll for rotary wind
aircraft in battle group operations as you invest in MH-60R and MH-60S
helicopters. I was surprised to learn that the Navy has elected not to
include the Cockpit Air Bag System (CABS) crash-activated, inflatable
protection system in these new airframes. Analysis of crash date shows
that airbags will save one aviator of every three that is killed in
what are considered survivable crash sequences. The Army is currently
equipping its rotary fleet with CABS, why has the Navy elected to
forego this readily available means of protecting the aircraft's most
valuable asset?
Admiral Clark. The U.S. Navy, through Naval Air Systems Command
engineering processes, has a hazard analysis and risk management
program, which it applies to all type/model/series of Navy and Marine
Corps aircraft. The Navy recognizes the benefits of CABS and has
included it in both the MH-60S and MH-60R Operational Requirements
Documents (ORD) as elements of the block upgrade program. Through the
evolutionary acquisition process, these block upgrades will improve
aircrew survivability and protect our most valuable assets.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) PROCUREMENT

29. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark and General Jumper, last year the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was not in the fiscal year 2003 proposed
budget. I am impressed that you have been able to accelerate
development and construction of Littoral Combat Ships in this year's
budget, and your 6-year funding plan, including beginning construction
next year. How have you been able to do this without leasing? As I
understand it, the basis for why the Air Force needs to lease KC-767
tankers is because our acquisition process is too slow and laborious.
General Jumper, perhaps your acquisition people need to speak with
Admiral Clark's. Please comment.
Admiral Clark. LCS brings a new approach to ship development. The
LCS acquisition, a streamlined derivative of the traditional approach,
focuses principally on developing a ship to accommodate modular combat
systems. These combat systems modules will be developed separately from
ship construction. In line with recent DOD initiatives to streamline
and tailor the acquisition process, the Navy has planned for LCS to
begin construction no later than fiscal year 2005. LCS program
initiation in fiscal year 2003 affords an opportunity to employ
innovative spiral development and acquisition methods from the keel up.
Lessons learned from Navy experimentation with small high-speed ships
and innovative hull forms such as Hybrid Deep Vee Demonstrator (HDV(D)-
100), High Speed Vessel (HSV), Coastal Waters Interdiction Platform
(CWIP), TRITON, and SLICE has proven invaluable in reducing program
risk. Collaboration between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater
program and with allied nations facilitates cost effective development
and procurement of the LCS and its associated mission capability
modules.
Early LCS flights will heavily leverage existing technologies and
ship designs, thereby accelerating the timeline for requirements
development and acquisition, which will keep delivery times for LCS
significantly shorter than traditional ship programs.
General Jumper. Sir, the Littoral Combat Ship will be a great asset
to the Navy once it has been designed, built, tested, then inserted
into the fleet. With this year's proposed budget, the Navy has funded
their program earlier in the FYDP just as the USAF has accelerated our
KC-135 Replacement Tanker Program into the FYDP. Both programs should
deliver their first new systems to the warfighter toward the end of the
FYDP. Both programs rely upon industry to design and provide suitable
platforms for the missions. So, in essence, both the Air Force and the
Navy used similar methods to accelerate both programs a similar amount
of time.
However, while the Navy must wait on industry to design and develop
their new Littoral Combat Ship, the Air Force can immediately leverage
the commercial 767 Tanker Transport design and development work
performed by Boeing for the Italian and Japanese Air Forces. Just as
the Navy has leased ships in the past to deploy combat support quickly,
the USAF believes that leasing air-refueling tankers is a good approach
to quickly replace our 43-plus-year-old KC-135E aircraft.
The KC-767 leasing proposal, if approved by DOD and Congress, will
have lower upfront costs than a traditional procurement and will field
67 new KC-767 tankers within the FYDP, compared to one aircraft via
traditional procurement. In addition, the leased KC-767 program could
provide the taxpayers with the benefits of immediate high rate
production, at a lower cost than achievable through a traditional
approach. These innovations in the acquisition process support our
Nation's security needs significantly faster, while providing
responsible stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars.

BOEING AND DELTA IV ROCKETS

30. Senator McCain. General Jumper, an article in the Wall Street
Journal on February 12, 2003 reported the Air Force will pay the Boeing
Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation $538 million to keep both
companies in the rocket-launch business because of the continuing
downturn in the commercial-satellite market. Is this a Department of
Defense policy or is Secretary Roche proposing this policy on his own?
General Jumper. The Air Force and DOD together are committed to
providing the capability to launch our Nation's national security
payloads required by today's warfighters. The fiscal year 2004
President's budget provides funding for assured access initiatives to
provide that capability.

31. Senator McCain. General Jumper, attempts in the past to
artificially keep two defense companies in a particular sector of the
defense market for the sake of competition has not produced competition
at all. In fact, there have been many independent reports that no
efficiencies were ever realized. Does it make sense to try and keep two
defense companies in the rocket-launch business when there may only be
enough business for one corporation?
General Jumper. Although competition is one of the benefits of this
approach, the overarching need is to assure access to space for
national security, and to do that we need to have two launch providers
that can back each other up. When compared to heritage launch systems,
Air Force estimates show that the EELV program still meets and exceeds
the 25-percent cost saving goal even after the assured access
initiatives are considered.

32. Senator McCain. General Jumper, what other options are you
examining with regard to this rather questionable policy on the Air
Force's rocket-launch program?
General Jumper. We have examined several options for providing
assured access to space, such as foreign launch providers and greater
utilization of the space shuttle, and have determined that maintaining
two competing contractors to provide assured access is the best
approach to meet the growing warfighter demands of our space assets now
and in the future.

F-15 CLS CONTRACT

33. Senator McCain. General Jumper, it has recently been brought to
our attention that the contract for F-15 Contractor Logistic Support
was awarded to a company whose bid was nearly 50 percent higher than
the company that currently holds the contract. Rather than stay with
the L-3 Corporation that has been performing this task in a fully
satisfactory manner for $68.8 million, the Air Force chose to go with a
bid by Boeing of $100.2 million. In fact, a recent decision to move the
facility to St. Louis vice Seymour Johnson AFB will make the price
difference between the two contract bids greater than $32 million due
to much higher work rates. Are you aware of this issue? If not, will
you please look into it and get back to this committee.
General Jumper. This refers to a contract award that includes the
acquisition of new F-15 training devices as well as upgrades and
contractor logistics support for some older devices. The requirement
under the solicitation was not the same as the previous contract. The
request for proposal (RFP) was not asking for business as usual;
therefore, minimally addressing the requirements would likely increase
perceived risk for implementation of future aircraft modifications and
upgrades. The RFP clearly stated that award would be made on a best
value basis, with the combination of evaluation factors other than
price (technical/management and past performance) being significantly
more important than cost or price. Boeing's technical proposal received
high ratings, while the technical proposal of L-3 Communications was
marginal and had several significant weaknesses. It was the
determination of the Order Award Authority that the technical
advantages of Boeing's proposal outweighed the increased cost. This
decision is consistent with Section M, of the RFP which states that the
best value decision, ``. . . may result in an award to a higher-rated,
higher-priced offeror, where the decision is consistent with the
evaluation factors and the Order Award Authority reasonably determines
that the technical superiority and/or overall business approach of the
higher priced offeror outweighs the cost difference.''
Location of the training system support center (TSSC) at the Boeing
facility in St. Louis did not increase cost differences between the L-3
and Boeing offers. The Boeing order includes fixed prices for operation
of the TSSC.

BOEING KC-767 AERIAL TANKER

34. Senator McCain. General Jumper, I continue to be troubled by
your Service's push to lease 100 KC-767 tankers under terms that are
clearly a disservice to the taxpayers of this country. In the context
of your Service's desire for this lease at any cost, the retirement of
KC-135s with relatively few flight hours concerns me.
Just last April at a press briefing with Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers, stated the
following about the Air Force KC-135 aerial tanker fleet: ``the fleet
is relatively healthy. These are older aircraft, but have lots of
flying hours left on them. They've been re-engined. We are putting new
avionics in the cockpit. There's been a lot of work done on those
particular aircraft to keep them modern. . .''
Let me review some of the highlights of the information that has
been provided to Congress by independent export, the Office of
Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office, the Department of
Defense Inspector General, and the Congressional Budget Office. These
are not my facts, these are facts reported by these agencies.

GAO (2002):

``The current fleet of KC-135s have between 12,000 to
14,000 flying hours on them--only 33 percent of the lifetime
flying hour limit and no KC-135s will meet the limit until
2040.''
``While the KC-135 is an average of 41 years old, its
airframe hours and cycles are relatively low. With proper
maintenance and upgrades, we believe the aircraft may be
sustainable for another 41 years.''
``The Boeing Company, manufacturer of the KC-135,
projected that the aircraft could fly for many years beyond the
turn of the century, based on average hours flown, and a
projected utilization of about 300 hours a year per aircraft.''
``In fact, when I inquired about the average hours per
year for KC-135s, GAO said the Air Force reported, ``the KC-135
fleet is averaging about 300 hours per year,'' including
Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle data.
``The Air Force Mobility Command has higher priorities
like replacing the C-5A, there is no requirement to begin
replacing KC-135s before fiscal year 2013.''

OMB (2002):
Director Mitch Daniels: ``The current fleet of KC-135s
is in good condition; there are higher priorities in terms of
modernization for the Department of Defense''.

Air Force (2002):
In the February 2003 issue of Military Magazine, you
reported that the mission capable rate for KC-135 tankers
improved 3.7 percent, up to 79.5 percent last year the second
highest in the Air Force inventory. The B-2 bomber mission
capable rate by comparison is only 42.1 percent, and that is up
10.6 percent over the previous year.
According to the Air Force ``Tanker Requirement Study
05'', replacing the KC-135 fleet with leased Boeing 767 tankers
would not solve, and could exacerbate, the shortfalls
identified in the TRS-05.

I believe the above information clearly shows that we are
prematurely retiring flight hour young KC-135s. The fact is there are
aircraft in the DOD inventory as old as the KC-135s with as much as
five times the number of flight hours that are still in service and
will be for some time.
I would like you to explain why you believe that the KC-135s need
to be replaced 10 years earlier than the Air Force's most recent study,
in spite of several independent assessments that we do not need to
begin replacing the aircraft until 2013, and in fact, the airframes
will not reach their flight hour limits until after 2040.
General Jumper. The Air Force has an obligation to spend the
taxpayer's money wisely, while providing a robust, reliable, and
flexible air refueling force. Studies, such as the one referenced, are
intended to provide planning information to senior leaders to allow
them to make informed decisions rather than dictate a specific way
ahead. Competing priorities and limited budget demand our leaders make
choices based on risk. Today, our most pressing tanker risk is a delay
in the recapitalization process. With over 90 percent of our air
refueling capability resting on our venerable KC-135 fleet, replacement
needs to begin as soon as possible. The Air Force simply cannot accept
the risk of unknown systemic failures that could ground the fleet and
cripple the global reach of U.S. and coalition forces.
Every weapons system is unique and comparisons to the KC-135 should
be taken in proper context. The KC-135 is the oldest combat weapon
system in the Air Force inventory and particularly susceptible to
corrosion due to its design and basing history. An abundance of hidden
joints and layered body skins on the KC-135 provide ample opportunity
for moisture to accumulate, which has only been exacerbated by extended
operation in damp and coastal climates.
Subsequent to April 2002, more about the effects of corrosion were
learned. We have also gained an appreciation for how much the
projected operations and support (O&S) costs for the KC-135 fleet have
grown since the completion of the Economic Service Life Study (ESLS).
Originally, the ESLS estimated annual cost would escalate from $2.1
billion per year to $3.0 billion by 2040. However, 18 months after the
ESLS completion, we determined the average annual O&S cost estimate
increased by $250 million over study projections. This equates to an
11.9 percent annum increase in O&S, the equivalent of the operations
and maintenance requirements for 62 KC-135s. The updated ESLS data now
reflects that the annual cost would escalate from $2.2 billion to $3.4
billion by 2040. While it is true that KC-135s are young in hours
compared to structural design life, this fact does nothing to protect
the airframes from the corrosive effects of years of exposure to the
elements.
With an average of about 17,000 flight hours versus a design limit
of about 36,000 hours, you would not expect to see stress-induced metal
fatigue on KC-135s. In general, that is the case. Instead, we are
seeing age induced corrosion similar to rust, and cracked hoses and
wiring, just as you would on a low mileage, 43-year old automobile.
Repairing and preventing this type of corrosion is both difficult and
expensive. The Air Force is now in the process of incrementally
replacing the entire aircraft structure over the next 40 years.
The combined effects of aging, the surge in demand due to the
global war on terrorism, and the heightened steady-state stress of a
post-September 11 world have compelled the Air Force to accelerate
plans to replace the KC-135. Increasing costs and decreasing
reliability and maintainability, in light of our future expectations,
have reached the point where it no longer makes sense to continue
investing limited resources to keep our oldest and least capable
tankers flying.
In summary, the Air Force simply cannot accept the risk of unknown
systemic failures that could ground the fleet and cripple the global
reach of U.S. and coalition forces. Today, our most pressing tanker
risk is a delay in the recapitalization process.

35. Senator McCain. General Jumper, what programs do you intend to
shift funds from to enable you to pay for a lease of Boeing 767s in the
near-term and in the long-term?
General Jumper. The Air Force is working to identify sources to pay
for a potential lease. If DOD approves the lease, we will submit the
sources with reprogramming actions, budget submissions, and budget
amendments as required.

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

36. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the retirement of 19 Spruance-
class destroyers reduces the number of 5-inch guns available for fire
support missions by 38. This is an area where the Navy has had a
chronic shortfall in capability since the battleships were retired in
the early 1990s. What impact on the Marine Corps' ability to conduct
amphibious operations will this additional reduction in naval guns
have?
General Hagee. The Navy's current Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
capability lacks sufficient range and lethality to adequately support
the Marine Corps' concept of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). Also,
the fire support system on the Spruance-class destroyers is not capable
of receiving calls-for-fire via data transmission from the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). While the Marine Corps
is at significant risk today in terms of NSFS support for expeditionary
operations, the retirement of these ships, to be completed by fiscal
year 2006, will not significantly increase this risk.
The Navy has already started fielding the 5-inch/62-caliber naval
gun on newly built Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Navy is
scheduled to field the Naval Fires Control System (NFCS) in fiscal year
2004 to provide the capability to receive and process digital data
calls for fire, and the 5-inch Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM)
will be fielded in fiscal year 2006. The introduction of these systems
will provide an enhanced capability to provide NSFS support to
expeditionary forces that does not reside in the current fleet of
surface combatants.
The Navy plans to fully meet the Marine Corps' NSFS requirements in
the far term with the fielding of DD(X). The Marine Corps requires that
each DD(X) be fielded with two 155-mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) and a
total magazine capacity of at least 900 extended-range munitions. This
configuration for DD(X) will be sufficient to meet minimum Marine Corps
NSFS requirements for gun-launched munitions, assuming a total of 24
DD(X) will be built.

AIRCRAFT

37. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the V-22 is rapidly approaching
what is theoretically a final key decision point. The Marine Corps
demonstrated unprecedented flexibility last year in moving off of ships
in the Indian Ocean to a base of operations hundreds of miles inland in
Afghanistan. A force deployment of this type was thought to be beyond
your current air fleet. Does the success of your operations in
Afghanistan mitigate the requirement for the V-22?
General Hagee. The MV-22 remains our number one aviation
acquisition priority.
We remain proud of the Marine Corps' contributions in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and our current operations today. These
successes highlight the Marine Corps' role in national security as a
truly expeditionary force in readiness.
These successes were not without risk and limitations. Issues of
force protection, establishment, and maintaining intermediate support
bases, limitation in total number of personnel allowed in country,
fuel, and range limitations, long range MEDEV AC, and our ability to
conduct ``Be Prepared To'' (BPT) missions highlighted the need to field
improved systems like the MV-22 to our Fleet Marine Forces.
The V-22's speed, range, payload, survivability, and self-
deployability attributes have implications on the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. Its use in OEF would have given the
Joint Task Force commander an increased operational flexibility that
would have spanned across all warfighting functions. Specifically in
OEF the MV-22 would have:

- Minimized risk
- Increased operational flexibility
- Provided a responsive sustainment capability
- Decreased survivability concerns
- Increased mission success for BPT

38. Senator McCain. General Hagee, why does the Marine Corps
continue to invest in its aging Huey fleet instead of upgrading to an
H-60 variant that would align the Marine Corps with the future Navy
rotary wing force? This would dramatically streamline training and
logistical support, and provide commonality of parts support between
Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has chosen to remanufacture both
legacy H-1, the AH-1W, and UH-1N airframes with a focus on commonality
as a way of reducing the logistical and manpower demands. This decision
was controversial at Milestone II and remains a point of discussion
because some feel that a combination of AH-64D Apaches and a variant of
the H-60 Blackhawk (MH-60S Seahawk Combat Search and Rescue variant)
with over 1,500 operated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and
several other nations, would save money for the government through
economies of scale in procurement, and shared maintenance and support
burdens.
However, repeated independent analysis has revealed that intra-
service commonality between the Huey and Cobra would yield greater
benefits in areas of personnel manning requirements and logistics. Most
recently, an analysis of alternatives for the H-1 upgrades program was
reviewed and updated by OSD. The conclusion, once again, was that the
AH-1Z/UH-1Y combination is the most cost effective option that meets
the Marine Corps recapitalization and warfighting requirements. The
commonality of 84 percent between the AH-1Z and UH-1Y results in
significant cost savings, logistics and deployability advantages for
the Y/Z fleet over the life cycle. All other alternatives considered
for our attack and utility requirements would adversely impact our
current manpower force structure and would be cost prohibited in
procurement and life-cycle support. In order to meet USMC Utility
Helicopter ORD Thresholds, the MH-60S would require the many additions
and modifications to include: Digital moving map system, Helmet mounted
display system, Aircraft Survivability suite (radar and laser
detection, IR/RF countermeasures), crew served gun system, forward
firing ordnance (2.75,, rocket) system with pilot sight, UHF DAMA
SATCOM, FLIR with LDRS, Modifications for ballistic tolerances
(OBIGGS), cockpit software, and ergonomic fixes.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

B-1

39. Senator Cornyn. General Jumper, there is little doubt that the
B-1 has played an important role in Operation Enduring Freedom. I would
like to get your thoughts on how the B-1 has performed and how you
envision the B-1s role in the future?
General Jumper. The B-1 performed magnificently during Operation
Enduring Freedom, delivering 39 percent of all total tonnage and 67
percent of all JDAM dropped in Afghanistan while flying only 35 percent
of bomber strike sorties and 12 percent of all Air Force sorties.
Moreover, the B-1 maintained a 78-percent Mission Capable rate while
deployed. The B-1 will continue to function as the backbone of the
bomber fleet in direct attack operations conducted in permissive and
semi-permissive threat environments. A non-permissive threat
environment will necessitate the use of standoff munitions to ensure
survivability. Armed with a full complement of 24 long-range,
precision, stealthy JASSM-ERs, the B-1 provides critical capabilities
to the Global Strike (GS) CONOPs while providing enhanced key
capabilities to the Global Response (GR) CONOPs.

V-22

40. Senator Cornyn. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, I understand that Under Secretary of Defense Pete
Aldridge was ``encouraged'' after being briefed recently on the V-22
flight test program and that he believes he should have enough
information by May whether to continue the V-22's production schedule.
From an operational perspective, how would an aircraft with
capabilities such as the V-22s help you in the global war on terrorism?
General Shinseki. The Army does not have an operational requirement
for an aircraft with the capabilities such as the V-22.
Admiral Clark. The V-22 will save American lives in all military
operations, including the global war on terrorism. With twice the speed
of CH-46, the V-22 will deliver combat forces to the objective area
sooner, with less exposure time spent en route. The range of the V-22,
five times that of the CH-46, will increase our reach from forward
bases and amphibious shipping, allowing us to influence much more of
the battlespace simultaneously. The payload capacity of the V-22, three
times that of the CH-46, will enable the swift delivery and rapid re-
supply of combat forces deep within enemy territory, vastly
complicating the enemy's attempts to attack us. With aerial refueling
support, the V-22 is capable of self-deploying worldwide. The self-
deploying capability combined with the increased speed of the V-22 will
allow an initial response to threats much more rapidly than with our
current helicopters. The V-22 gives our Marines and Special Forces the
capability to strike the terrorists at any time, in any place, with
devastating effect and with reduced risk. The V-22 will be a force
multiplier that translates into shorter conflicts and reduced friendly
casualties.
General Hagee. The speed, range, payload, survivability, and self-
deployment attributes of the V-22 will provide the Joint Force
commander with unprecedented operational reach, expanded area of
influence, and the ability to leverage netted forces to deter or defeat
adversaries. The MV-22 will help meet the requirements for increased
flexibility and adaptiveness while overcoming the physical and
political challenges of access denial.

Global self-deployability will enable combatant
commanders to reduce their strategic airlift requirements while
expediting warfighting capabilities from inside or outside
their theater.
The unparallel survivability of the MV-22 is a salient
feature that ensures that the MV-22 not only gets to the fight
first but returns.
The increased operational reach, provided by the MV-
22, will allow the Joint Force Commander to conduct operations
from deep in the sea-based to deep in the landmass. The
combinations of a forward presence force with the capability to
be augmented by global self-deployable MV-22s will enhance at-
sea-arrival and assembly operations or expeditionary land-based
operations. Eliminating the breakdown and build up period
associated with rotorcraft, the MV-22 will be able to support
operations on arrival in theater. The increases in speed and
range will allow the Joint Force Commander to leverage off of
the MV-22's sortie cycle efficiency to increase the tempo of
operations. The increases in sortie cycle efficiency will
permit expeditious movement of troops and supplies while always
retaining the ability to mass forces from a distributed and
dispersed environment.
The combinations of the V-22's attributes
exponentially increase the Joint Force commander's possibility
of options in the planning and execution phases. The
sanctuaries of time, space, and the tyranny of distance that
protects terrorist operations and cells will be reduced. The
MV-22 will reduce the execution timelines and increase the
amount of intelligence that we can act on.
The introduction of the V-22 will help shape the
operational environment and underwrite general deterrence
thereby assuring allies and dissuading aggression among other
things. Fielding the MV-22 will contribute to general
deterrence by conveying the impression that U.S. forces are not
only the most powerful forces in the world today, but are
likely to stay that way.

General Jumper. The CV-22 would give the USAF a transformational
leap forward in our ability to infiltrate and resupply Special
Operations Forces. This platform will meet the long-standing
requirement for long-range, night/adverse weather clandestine
penetration of politically and/or militarily denied areas, in order to
support special operations missions, most within one period of
darkness. Additionally, the CV-22 has twice the combat radius of the
MH-53, can fly 1.9 times as fast, and can carry 10,000 lbs. more
payload.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING

41. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, for the second consecutive year,
the Navy is requesting a real decrease in its S&T budget. After
removing ``pass through'' and ``devolved'' programs that are managed by
Navy for Joint Forces Command and OSD, the Navy S&T fiscal year 2004
request is down 3.6 percent from fiscal year 2003 requested levels in
constant dollars.
How are declining S&T budgets that are projected out through the
years of the FYDP consistent with efforts of transformation? Is this a
reflection that the value of your S&T activities in the past have had
in supporting your warfighters?
Admiral Clark. The Navy's fiscal year 2004 President's budget
request for science and technology shows an increase from the fiscal
year 2003 budget request as shown in the table below.

NAVAL S&T BUDGET
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's Budget Request
Budget Activity -------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2003 Fiscal Year 2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic Research (6.1).............. 410 457
Applied Research (6.2)............ 580 536
Advanced Technology Development 617 721
(6.3)............................
-------------------------------------
Total Naval Science & Technology 1,607 1,714
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pass-through
The Department of Defense appointed U.S. Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) as the ``transformation laboratory'' of the United States
military. JFCOM develops future concepts for joint warfighting. All of
the Services help fund the unified commands. The U.S. Joint Forces
Command is one of the nine unified commands and is budgeted in the 6.3
portion of the naval science technology request.
Given the expanded mission of JFCOM, it may be more appropriate to
place JFCOM funding in a defense wide budget activity. Pending a
defense wide line, it may be appropriate to move the funding (which is
for prototypes, demonstrations, and concept development) up to the
higher Navy R&D budget activities (i.e. 6.4-6.7).
The JFCOM programs elements are listed below.

[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2004
PE Title PE Number President's
Budget Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Technical Information 0603727N 151
Presentation System.............
Joint Warfare Experiments........ 0603757N 13.7
------------------
JFCOM Total.................... 164.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Devolvement
Although several programs devolved from OSD to Navy, the largest
devolved program, the University Research Initiative (URI) program,
will now be managed by Navy in support of naval needs and technologies.
$71 million is being requested for URI in fiscal year 2004. Navy will
now be in charge of URI funding, topics, and the programs executed
therein. In the past, Navy competed through OSD for these funds
annually and could not incorporate these efforts into our long-term S&T
planning. This provides an opportunity to enhance Navy's world class
basic research program, which is the cornerstone for future
transformational opportunities. Factoring in the URI program, Navy
actually has real growth of 1.0 percent over the fiscal year 2003
President's budget request. Beyond fiscal year 2004, there is real
growth in fiscal year 2005 as well.
While Basic Research (6.1) has benefited from the devolvement of
the URI program to Navy, there remain difficult choices in 6.2 and 6.3
funding to maintain the best possible portfolio in the face of the
significantly constrained budgetary environment. This environment has
necessitated significant cuts in the Future Naval Capabilities--
designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to
focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3
portfolio.
Transformation
As for transformation, Navy S&T programs directly support and
enable transformation. The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains
several transformational initiatives, reflecting OSD and Navy
leadership priorities. Examples of new initiatives and ongoing programs
include the following:

- Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle-Navy (UCAV-N)
- Electric Power Technologies such as the Free Electron Laser
and High Temperature Superconducting Motor
- Advanced Multi-function RF System (AMRFS)
- Wideband Gap Power Devices
- Functional Materials-Hypersonic Weapons
- Virtual At-Sea Training (VAST)

Recent experience in Operation Enduring Freedom, where thermobaric
weapons and a knowledge web system were among several programs that
transitioned directly from S&T to the fleet, demonstrates the current
value Navy places in its S&T programs. The investment transformation
described above will provide continued support to the warfighter.

42. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, are we sacrificing the next wave
of transformation (15-20 years out) that will be driven by today's
scientific advances by underinvesting in S&T? What programs were cut in
order to achieve the 3.6 percent savings?
Admiral Clark. The next wave of naval transformation (15-20 years
out) requires a robust and strategically balanced investment in Navy's
basic research (6.1) account which funds the Department's science
requirements. The fiscal year 2004 6.1 budget request ($456.6 million)
shows significant growth compared to the fiscal year 2003 request
($409.9 million), due to the devolvement of the URI program. This is a
real increase to the Navy 6.1 program and increases the core funding
available for Navy discovery and invention, the bedrock of future naval
transformation.
While the overall portfolio for S&T increased, there have been both
increases and decreases to specific programs, mostly in response to
Navy and OSD leadership priorities focused on naval transformation. For
example, increases can be found in the UCAV-N program, the Supersonic
Cruise Missile program, and the High Altitude Auroral Research Program
(HAARP).
Though Core National Naval Responsibilities initiatives were
protected from reductions, there remain difficult choices in 6.2 and
6.3 funding to maintain the best possible portfolio in the face of a
significantly constrained budgetary environment. This environment has
necessitated significant cuts in the Future Naval Capabilities--
designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to
focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3
portfolio.

NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

43. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, a recent article in Defense
Horizons titled ``The Silence of the Labs'' described the ongoing
deterioration of the Navy's S&T capability, especially at the Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL). What role does NRL play in achieving the
vision of Sea Power 21? What steps are being taken to ensure that this
organization's important capabilities are not degraded as we seek to
transform the Navy?
Admiral Clark. The Naval Transformational Roadmap supports
transformation through the components which comprise Sea Power 21: Sea
Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet. Each of these components
is enabled by naval science. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has
aligned its science and technology (S&T) investment with Naval Strategy
with the strategic goal of naval science being to provide the
foundation for overwhelming and enduring technological superiority for
American naval forces. The NRL is the Navy's corporate laboratory. As
such, it is responsible for execution of much of ONR's S&T investment
in support of Sea Power 21.
The role of supporting transformation is not a new one for NRL.
Since 1923, the lab has been the source of numerous technological
innovations that have made significant contributions to transforming
the fleet and creating modern naval warfare. A few of these include:
developing the first U.S. radar; inventing the key concepts leading to
the Global Positioning System (GPS); and developing, in partnership
with industry, GPS's four prototypes and first operational satellite.
More recent achievements include an electronic warfare decoy, the ALE-
50, which protected combat aircraft over Kosovo, a decoy so effective
it earned the nickname ``Little Buddy'' from U.S. pilots. Another
innovation seeing action in Kosovo was Specific Emitter Identification
technology, which identifies any radar by its unique characteristics
with such accuracy as to ``fingerprint'' it. In fact, it can
distinguish between identical models produced off the same assembly
line. Selected by the National Security Agency as the national
standard, Coast Guard vessels, naval warships, and aircraft use it to
support drug interdiction, enforce treaties, and monitor the movement
of materials used in weapons of mass destruction.
NRL's capabilities are, therefore, very important to achieving the
vision of Sea Power 21, which seeks to leverage innovative
organizations, concepts, and technologies with the stated aim of
achieving order of magnitude increases in warfighting effectiveness.
For example, among other things, the vision calls for the use of
unmanned platforms and an improved intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capability. NRL has world-class expertise in both these
areas, and in numerous others of importance.
The problems discussed in ``The Silence of the Labs'' are not new
and, in fact, were validated in a recently-released tri-Service lab
study conducted under the auspices of the Naval Research Advisory
Committee (NRAC). The study, chartered by the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, produced a report called ``Science and
Technology Community in Crisis,'' which argued that the future
viability of the Defense Department's S&T capability is threatened by
increasing losses of key technical personnel, insufficient levels of
funding for facility and equipment modernization, and bureaucratic
impediments that often produce counter-productive results in the
research environment.
The NRAC panel emphasized, in particular, the serious demographic
challenge the labs face over the next several years, when retirements
are expected to claim much of their experienced scientific and
engineering talent. Because replacing that talent is a top priority, we
are already taking steps to improve the labs' ability to recruit, hire,
and retain the best technical personnel. For example, we are supporting
lab efforts to utilize, to the fullest extent, the personnel
demonstration pilots established at a number of labs including the NRL.
These pilots, which Congress authorized in Section 342 of the Fiscal
Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, encourage participating
labs to experiment with a variety of innovative personnel practices,
each adapted to the many unique lab environments found within and
across the Services. While they do not completely solve the personnel
problems, these demonstrations have improved our ability to recruit and
retain some of the best and brightest technical talent on the market.
Another example is an initiative by the Chief of Naval Research
specifically aimed at revitalizing the S&T workforce in our labs and
centers. This collaborative effort, which also includes academic
partners, has a number of components. For example, it provides
scholarships at participating universities in return for obligated
service in our labs. It also envisions retraining retired military
technology officers and bringing them back into the labs where their
valuable experience as warfighters can be infused into our research
efforts. We are also supporting other congressionally authorized lab
reform efforts including utilization of the experimental authority to
hire scientific and technical personnel which you authorized in
Section 1113 of the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization
Act.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNFUNDED PRIORITY LIST

44. Senator Reed. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, please provide a detailed list of high priority
science and technology (S&T) projects which are supportive of your
efforts to transform your Services that you were not able to adequately
invest in with the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
General Shinseki. The Army's unfunded priorities provided to
Congress included two S&T efforts that we were unable to fully fund in
the fiscal year 2004 budget: $28 million for Future Combat Systems
manufacturing technology (Man Tech) and $12 million for the Future
Tactical Truck System (FTTS). The Man Tech funding would provide
technology solutions to avoid costs in developing munitions and sensors
critical to FCS. These include micro electro-mechanical systems for
safe and arm functionality, reducing the size and increasing
performance of inertial measurement units in munitions, and uncooled
infrared sensors for target detection and identification. The FTTS S&T
program is a new effort pursuing technologies for next generation
medium and heavy tactical cargo vehicles. The primary goals of the FTTS
program are to determine the tactical efficiencies of a hybrid-electric
vehicle to reduce logistics demands and increase mobility and
survivability by adding technologies such as enhanced situational
awareness and add-on armors. The FTTS funding would provide embedded
prognostics and intelligent load handling, a vehicle/load alignment
system, and a smart load conforming tie-down system.
Admiral Clark.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Title Year Comments
2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Based Weapons............... 61.00 Accelerated research and
development of the
electrical components,
electrical control
systems, and material
technologies needed to
support electric
weapons deployment is a
very high risk,
extremely high payoff
investment area.
However, significant
investments in these
areas will provide a
revolution in Naval
Fires, Time Critical
Strike, and Platform
Self-Defense while
significantly reducing
the logistics'
footprint required to
support this mission
area. Products include
Electromagnetic Gun
Naval Fires, advanced
directed energy self-
defense weapons, and
Free Electron Laser
100KW demonstration.
CVN-21/Advanced Capability Ship...... 49.00 Accelerated research and
development of the
electrical components,
electrical control
systems, and material
technologies needed to
support significant
expansion of electric
power systems and
reduction of high
maintenance fluid
systems is a complex
high risk, high payoff
investment area.
However, significant
investments in these
areas will ``unlock''
the significant amount
of propulsion power for
enhanced warfighting
capability, such as
higher sortie rates,
increased striking
capability, and
improved self-defense
while significantly
reducing system
maintenance and
logistics footprint
required to support
these platforms.
FORCENET............................. 45.00 Develop and demonstrate
a shipboard ADM of an
Advanced Multifunction
RF System (AMRF-C) that
will encompass current,
planned, and future-
growth comms, EW, and
LPI radar functions in
C, X, and Ku Bands for
LCS, DD(X) subs, and
CVN-21. Demonstrate
wide- and narrow-band
anti-jam (AJ)
waveforms, a wideband
AJ high altitude UAV
comms and network
package, and a
narrowband AJ/LPI/LPD
comms and network
package (JTRS)
necessary for planned
and future FORCENET
use. Develop
technologies and
architectures to
support high data rate,
uninterruptible network
to deployed sea base
and forces projected
ashore.
Space S&T............................ 17.10 Provide the next
generation of
technologies to enhance
and transform both
naval and joint
warfighting
capabilities. The
enhancement of space-
based communications,
navigation, ISR, METOC,
and space control all
hinge on the
development of
spacecraft, payloads,
and components which
are more robust,
responsive, covert, and
economical. Examples of
target technologies are
micro-satellites, MEMS,
high bandwidth encoding
techniques, autonomous
operations, etc.
Precision Strike/Solutions to GPS 60.10 Provide jam-resistant
Jamming. missile guidance by
ultra-tightly-coupled
GPS/INS system when
stand alone GPS
receiver is jammed,
thereby, circumventing
jammer threats. The
ultra-tightly-coupled
GPS/INS will increase
precision flight time
of weapon to target and
hands off to inertial
navigation to guide the
weapon when jammed for
the last few minutes of
flight. Precision
navigation, guidance,
and control in a GPS
denied environment; Nav
by imagery, low cost
MEMS and laser IMUs and
weapon integrated
precision timekeeping.
Precision target
location sensors across
EM/optical spectrum and
signal/image track
processors both on and
off-board surface, air,
and gun launched
weapons. Network,
computational, and
mission planning
technology for
precision targeting.
Aircraft and weapon
airframe and propulsion
technologies to counter
emerging threat
spectrum.
Littoral ASW (LASW).................. 50.00 Significantly increase
ASW applied research to
provide technology to
meet the 2015 threat.
Develop components of
advanced off-board
distributed systems.
Develop technology for
cross platform sensor
level fusion and
estimating performance
of advanced sensors.
Demonstrate airborne
electromagnetic
detection system for
Multi-Mode Aircraft and
Unmanned Air Vehicles
(UAVs). Demonstrate
wide area cueing using
advanced electro-optic/
infrared systems and
high altitude long
endurance UAVs.
Demonstrate components
for transition to light
weight torpedo plan
product improvement
program.
MANTECH.............................. 5.50 Although Navy previously
committed to Congress
to funding the program
at $60 million per
year, PB04 (fiscal year
2004) request is only
$54.5 million.
Academic Research Fleet Renewal-- 80.00 There is a pressing need
UNOLS. to modernize the
country's aging
Academic Oceanographic
Research Fleet through
an orderly, phased
renewal plan with
construction of 4 new
Ocean Class ships and 3
new Regional Class
ships over the next 10
years.
Seabasing/STOM....................... 24.00 Logistics planning and
execution from CONUS to
Seabase and Objective.
Develop capabilities to
support command and
control on the move
from the Seabase to the
Objective. Naval
Surface Fire Support
improvements in range,
projectiles/fusing,
precision, and volume
of fire. Ammunition
resupply of surface
combatants.
Organic MCM.......................... 6.00 Protective Mining--
Protect sea basing.
Integrated joint
command and control for
multiple, cooperating
unmanned systems.
Mine Countermeasures Reconnaissance.. 30.00 Develop clandestine
approaches to
countermeasures
networked minehunting
using fully
reconnaissance
autonomous, cooperative
vehicles with
classification sensors
reporting tactical
control ID indicators.
Develop and demonstrate
mission capability
package for LCS using
coordinated swarms of
autonomous,
interactive, underwater
vehicles engaged in
networked minehunting.
Total.............................. 427.70
------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Hagee. The Marine Corps looks for innovation in four broad
areas to address future challenges, e.g., transformational
technologies. Our commitment to S&T, rooted in the axiom that forward
thinking now equates to tangible transformation today, manifests as
programmed growth in fiscal year 2004. Promising projects such as the
Expeditionary Tactical Communications System, the Joint High Speed
Vessel, and the Target Handoff System (experimental) support, on the
move command and control, Sea-Basing and Sea Strike respectively. We
are also transforming the way we do business through proactive joint
experimentation. To support this effort, three Joint Concept
Development and Experimentation (JCDE) divisions were established and
have already leveraged concepts amongst the Services. While JCDE is
adequately funded, have noted the benefits to be achieved by increasing
the funding for this effort and the Center for Emerging Threats and
Opportunities.
Attached you will find a detailed listing of unfunded fiscal year
2004 Department of the Navy S&T programs. (See Admiral Clark's response
to same question.) These programs support our transformational efforts.
General Jumper. One of the most important efforts currently ongoing
within our S&T program is the work we're doing to enhance the
Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit equipment carried by the Air Force
Special Tactics Controllers who perform operations deep in enemy
territory to help identify who the terrorists are, where their weapons
are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Using very rapid
spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing, production, and
fielding, the Air Force is working to realize significant enhancements
to these kits, while reducing weight and size. The following list is a
representative summary of high priority S&T efforts, including
enhancements to the BAO kit, for which the Air Force could use
additional funding in fiscal year 2004. A more detailed, comprehensive
list will be provided to the Senate Armed Services Professional Staff
as requested.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
[In
Effort millions of
dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAO Kit Enhancements....................................... 13.000
Basic Research for Nanosatellites, Space Control, Command 8.000
and Control, and Super Energetic Propellants..............
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (lSR) 11.800
Automation for Time-Critical Targeting....................
Joint Battlespace Infosphere............................... 13.900
Electronically Steerable Array and Space-Based Radar On- 10.000
Board Processing..........................................
Advanced Payload--Hard and Deeply Buried Targets........... 3.000
Commanders' Decision Aids for Predictive Battlespace 3.500
Awareness.................................................
Laser Infrared Flyout Experiment Advanced Technology 7.400
Demonstration.............................................
Denied Area Surveillance................................... 1.000
Airborne Active Denial System Integrated Concept........... 35.860
Force Protection........................................... 3.000
Human Systems Countermeasures to Future Laser Threats...... 3.100
Targets Under Trees........................................ 3.800
Effects-Based Operations................................... 4.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

OVERSEAS BASING

45. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what level of involvement have each of you had with
the series of Overseas Basing Studies currently being conducted
regarding our overseas presence?
General Shinseki. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Army
staff to conduct an extensive review of Army Strategic Posture looking
out over the next 10 years. The intent is to ensure that the Army is
able to meet all the requirements of the combatant commanders and is
well positioned to seamlessly transform to the Objective Force.
Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense has directed that his staff, the
Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders review future posture and
overseas basing. The Army is working in coordination with these efforts
to ensure the synchronization necessary to meet the Army's
responsibilities for flexible power projection and sustained land
dominance as part of the joint force. The Army will continue to work
closely with the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to ensure we have the appropriate posture
and force structure to meet both the current strategic requirements and
the many future challenges to our national security.
Admiral Clark. I have been briefed on these studies throughout
their development. In the specific instance of the SECDEF Overseas
Basing Requirements Study completed in December 2002, the Navy assisted
in shaping the effort through a Flag/General Officer Steering Committee
and through a staff-level working group.
I have also been briefed on the findings of the Integrated Global
Presence and Basing study initiated in March 2003 by the Secretary of
Defense. I expect the results of this study to be published in October
2003.
General Hagee. The Secretary of Defense has requested the
examination of global positioning of forces, capabilities, and
supporting infrastructure be accelerated. He has tasked the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the combatant commanders with developing, by July 1, 2003, a
comprehensive and integrated presence and basing strategy looking out
10 years.
The United States Marine corps is participating in this
examination, providing input at both the Service level to the Joint
staff and at the component level to the combatant commanders. This work
is being coordinated with other ongoing efforts within the Department
of defense including the directed study on Oversees Basing Requirements
(OBRS, 2002), the ongoing JROC directed Overseas Presence Study (OPS,)
the ongoing Joint Staff Operational Availability Study (OA), and the
ongoing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy) analysis of
overseas presence requirements.
General Jumper. We have been engaged with OSD, the Joint Staff, the
Combatant Commands, and other Services over the past 1\1/2\ years with
these basing studies. We will continue to stay engaged as basing
options are further developed and will work with the Combatant Commands
to implement the options the Secretary of Defense decides upon.

46. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, in evaluating our overseas force structure in both
Europe and Asia, what options are being considered if we should choose
to change our current structure? What would each of these options
require from a facilities and infrastructure standpoint?
General Shinseki. The Army and its regional Army Service Component
Commanders are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and each of the geographic combatant commanders and staffs
to determine the global posture of engagement which best supports our
national security strategy. The Army will work to determine the cost or
need for additional facilities in the continental United States once
these discussions yield greater fidelity for the potential courses of
action. We do know that the United States and the Republic of Korea
have agreed to a number of changes under the March 25, 2002, Land
Partnership Program (LPP). This plan reduces the number of major
installations from 41 to 23, but does not change the number of Army
forces based on the peninsula. However, this action could facilitate
the reduction of forces on the peninsula as the LPP takes effect
between now and 2011.
Admiral Clark. In August 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed
all combatant commanders to review overseas basing requirements and to
examine opportunities for joint use of facilities and land by the
Services, consolidate infrastructure, and enhance training. The
Department of Defense continues to examine these opportunities within
the context of a global strategy. This will include an assessment of
facilities and infrastructure needs, and should be completed by October
2003.
General Hagee. We are not planning any significant force structure
changes in Europe or Asia. Our intent is, and always has been, to
continue to support the regional combatant commanders in accordance
with our Title 10 responsibilities.
General Jumper. We have infrastructure--enduring in value and
strategically located--that we would like to maintain in both Europe
and Asia. We are pursuing a network of Main Operating Bases (MOB),
Forward Operating Bases (FOB), and Forward Operating Locations (FOL) to
support our expeditionary air force. This architecture will enhance our
access to areas adversaries seek to deny, distribute our forward
presence, and increase airbase availability by using bases in receptive
host nations.
In a few cases we may move some of our forces to new MOB; this will
likely require extensive infrastructure improvements. In contrast to
our MOBs, we plan to develop more FOBs, bases with a few, but adequate
number of permanently stationed personnel to keep them ``warm.''
Accordingly, we will improve or develop only a limited amount of
infrastructure at such bases. Using a rotational force, we would then
periodically deploy to these FOBs, using such opportunities to
familiarize our forces with the FOBs and exercise with our friends and
allies. Complementing our MOBs and FOBs, we will have designated FOLs
with minimal infrastructure and no permanently stationed active duty
personnel. These FOLs are designed for contingency use. As such,
incoming units will bring their own support equipment.

47. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, could each of you please discuss the increasing
strategic role that both Hawaii and Guam play in maintaining our
forward presence in the Pacific? What additional requirements might we
see for Hawaii and Guam in support of future operations?
General Shinseki. East Asia will continue to be a region of
strategic importance. Given the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and
the great distances between the continental United States (CONUS) and
East Asia, stationing Army forces forward is absolutely critical to
reducing response time for potential contingency operations in the
region and conducting operations in support of Pacific Command's
(PACOM) theater security cooperation plans. Hawaii remains critical to
supporting potential operations in Korea and Southeast Asia.
Maintaining combat ready forces in Hawaii, such as the 25th Infantry
Division, reduces the deployment time to each of these regions by more
than 20 percent compared to CONUS-based forces. Additionally, the
shorter deployment legs help us conduct sustained operations throughout
the Pacific.
There are approximately 28,000 soldiers stationed in Hawaii, about
one-third of whom are Reserve component personnel. Headquarters, U.S.
Army Pacific, co-located with Headquarters, PACOM, provides Title X
support to PACOM and manages Army operations throughout the Pacific
region outside of Korea. The 25th Infantry Division runs a Division
Ready Brigade cycle to provide PACOM with a ground force ready and
deployable for any contingency. The 25th Infantry Division participates
in numerous training activities throughout the region to enhance
military cooperation with important allies such as Japan, Australia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. The 45th Corps Support Group provides
continuous support for units and personnel performing critical
missions, whether they are major operations such as Operation Enduring
Freedom-Philippines, exercises such as Cobra Gold (Thailand), or small
unit deployments.
In the future, Hawaii will continue to play a critical role in
support of U.S. military objectives in the Pacific. As proposed for
congressional funding in the fiscal year 2004 Army budget submission,
we plan to transform one brigade of the 25th Infantry Division into a
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) beginning in fiscal year 2005. This
transformed SBCT will provide PACOM with a more lethal and survivable
force, deployable from a forward base.
Guam's location provides the Army with a key support base for
operations in the East Asian littoral. While there are no active Army
combat forces stationed on Guam, the Guam Army National Guard supports
PACOM's missions by providing critical enabler units for deployments
throughout his area of responsibility. Guam also provides important
logistical and maintenance support for the Army vessels that make up
the Army prepositioned stocks afloat fleet.
In the future, we anticipate that Guam will continue to play a key
role in support of Army forces deployed throughout the Western Pacific.
With its airfield, seaport, and strategic location, Guam can serve as
an intermediate staging base to support contingencies in the East Asian
littoral, as well as in Northeast Asia.
As a State and territory of the United States, Hawaii and Guam,
respectively, provide secure locations to support Army forces operating
in the Western Pacific. Together with the other armed services, the
Army continues to provide critical land component capabilities for use
in PACOM's Joint Mission Force concept.
Admiral Clark. The Navy has long recognized the strategic value
played by both Guam and Hawaii in support of the joint force. Both are
essential to maintaining the U.S. forward naval presence within the
Asia Pacific Rim and significantly improve the operational flexibility
and efficiency of naval forces.
Together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Marine
Corps, we are studying various options for both Guam and Hawaii as we
move forward with the Navy's new Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs).
Under the Global CONOPs, today's carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and
amphibious ready groups (ARGs) will be re-configured into carrier
strike groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs). In
addition, the CONOPs also envisions surface action groups (SAGs)
devoted to theater ballistic missile defense. I can assure you that
both Guam and Hawaii are being reviewed in various contexts to
ascertain the best way of maximizing the forward deterrent value of
these forces.
The Navy has already taken steps to improve its forward deployed
posture by implementing a plan to homeport three fast attack submarines
(SSNs) in Guam. Submarine Squadron 15 was established in Guam in fiscal
year 2002, the U.S.S. City of Corpus Christi arrived in October 2002,
the U.S.S. San Francisco arrived in December 2002, and the U.S.S.
Houston is to arrive in 2004. Forward basing SSNs in Guam reduces
transit time to/from station, equating to greater time ``in theater''
and additional mission days to fulfill national and fleet requirements.
Guam is 2,100 nautical miles (7 full steaming days) closer to the
Arabian Gulf than is Norfolk and Pearl Harbor, as such, it is uniquely
positioned to support continued naval forward presence in the Pacific
in the future. Additionally, its status as a U.S. territory allows
storage and loading of prepositioned war munitions without the consent
of a foreign government. Moreover, Guam can be used as an intermediate
staging base and safe haven for potential non-combatant evacuation
operations within the Pacific theater.
Finally, both Guam and Hawaii do not have any political-military or
diplomatic issues to address. Guam, as a U.S. territory, is the only
guaranteed failsafe against the loss of basing rights in East Asia.
Hawaii is home to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Submarine
Force, three submarine squadrons and their 25 submarines assigned to
Pearl Harbor. COMNAVMIDPAC headquarters and numerous surface warships
are homeported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Pacific Fleet's Maritime
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Commander's headquarters (with four VP
and VPU (P-3) squadrons) are located at MCB Kaneohe Bay. These forces
are approximately 1 week closer to the Asia Pacific region than are
West Coast forces, and thus, add flexibility/quicker response times to
mission essential tasking. Pearl Harbor is the largest U.S. naval base
outside of the continental United States. Consideration is being given
to a proposal to relocate additional warships from the West Coast to
Pearl Harbor to take advantage of Hawaii's proximity to the WESTPAC
theater of operations. However, considerable infrastructure would be
required to make such a move. Lastly, NCTAMS PAC is the main hub for
Pacific Command (Joint) communications and is slated to be a teleport.
General Hagee. The threat to peace and security within the Pacific
region has fundamentally changed. While we still must deal with the
traditional forces of potentially aggressive nations, we now must also
deal with terrorism, rogue states employing asymmetric tactics, and
weapons of mass destruction. We must be capable of dealing with all of
these dangers. We must be able to assure our allies and friends;
dissuade military competition; deter threats against U.S. interests and
the interests of our friends; and decisively defeat any adversary who
is not or cannot be deterred.
To be more adaptable and responsive to these emerging threats and
challenges, our Pacific Marine forces are now working with the
Commander of the Pacific Command in examining new ways of organizing,
employing, and supporting our forces. While this project is still in
its initial stages, there are several key emergent Marine Corps
concepts that highlight the importance of Hawaii and Guam within our
future Pacific security structure.
Our forward-deployed Marine forces will be truly expeditionary.
They will be potent, agile, and mobile forces that can gain and
maintain strategic access, rely on advanced sea basing, and conduct
effective Theater Security Cooperation. These forces will require a few
major bases, or hubs, to support their forward presence. Extending from
these hubs, we envision smaller forward operating bases to support our
amphibious forces with a rotational force presence. Ideally, extending
even further throughout the region would be minimally manned training
areas capable of providing up to battalion-sized combined training. To
support these forward-based and forward-deployed naval forces, we will
require in-theater logistics distribution centers. Lastly, we will
continue to require sites for the Pacific-based future Maritime Pre-
positioned Force (MPF(F)) squadron. It is also clearly evident that
this basing concept will require adequate strategic airlift and sealift
to deploy and sustain our forces, and adequate intratheater mobility
assets to move forces and supplies within theater.
Even in this early stage of concept development, it is clear that
both Hawaii and Guam, strategically positioned and having vital
infrastructure, will play key roles potentially augmenting our existing
facilities in Japan in supporting the basing, sustaining, and training
of our forces deployed across the Pacific.
General Jumper. We continue to value Hawaii's strategic roll in the
Pacific. There is approximately $60 million in the fiscal year 2004
President's budget for new military construction to support the eight
C-17s that we will station at Hickam AFB in fiscal year 2006.
Guam's strategic importance is becoming evident as we increase our
focus on the global war on terrorism and other instability in the East
Asian Littoral \1\ (EAL). We expect to develop it into the power
projection and logistics hub for the region with permanently based and
rotational forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ East Asian Littoral is defined as the region stretching from
south of Japan though Australia and into the Bay of Bengal.

48. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, could each of you please detail the support the
U.S. receives through the host nation funded construction programs such
as the Japanese Facilities Improvement Project program in Japan and the
Funded Construction Program and Land Partnership Plan in Korea? What is
the status of each of these programs and how do we currently benefit
from these partnerships?
General Shinseki. The Host Nation Funded Construction Program
(HNFCP) consists of the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) in Japan,
the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program in Germany, the Combined Defense
Improvement Program (CDIP) in Korea, and the Republic of Korea Funded
Construction (ROKFC) program in Korea.
The primary HNFCP is the FIP, which has provided about $700 million
of construction per year. The program was implemented in 1979 and over
the past 20 years, the Government of Japan has built $19 billion of new
quality of life and operational facilities for our U.S. service
members.
The PIK program awarded $202 million in construction projects from
fiscal year 1994 through 2001. There is an additional $33 million
planned for award in fiscal year 2003 and 2004.
In Korea, the CDIP was initiated in 1982 by the Republic of Korea
(ROK) to share the financial burden of maintaining U.S. forces in
Korea. The CDIP funds projects that support only warfighting and
operational facilities and total about $50+ million of construction per
year.
The ROKFC program was established in 1991 it provides well-being
facilities, infrastructure, as well as warfighting projects. The ROKFC
program funds about $135+ million of construction per year. In 2002,
the U.S. forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea Minister of
National Defense signed an agreement for a Land Partnership Plan (LPP).
The LPP is a comprehensive plan for more efficient and effective
stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. The LPP increases readiness and
force protection; gains efficiencies; improves quality of life for U.S.
forces in Korea; resolves civil petitions; facilitates regional
development; and strengthens the ROK-U.S. alliance. The LPP will cost
approximately $2.4 billion over the next 10 years. It allows USFK to
close and consolidate some major installations by the end of 2011. The
ROK will fund an estimated $1.3 billion to construct replacement
facilities; purchase more than 1,200 acres for new grants; expand ROK
military training area for U.S. use; and purchase safety easements with
USFK exclusive grants. The U.S. will return 33,000 acres of land to the
ROK government and is expected to fund about $1.1 billion to build
replacement facilities for the installations it plans to relocate or
close. The LPP allows the U.S. forces to train more efficiently
alongside ROK forces. It will optimize land use in one of the world's
most densely populated and congested countries and station U.S. forces
where they can best accomplish their assigned mission.
Admiral Clark. The Navy receives Host Nation Funded Construction
(Burden Sharing) support from both Japan and Korea. The Japanese
Facilities Improvement Program is funded by the Japanese Defense Agency
and currently supports four categories of projects: force structure or
mission increases, family housing and community support, Japanese
initiatives including environmental and safety issues, and service
initiatives. In Korea, two cost sharing programs are in use including
the Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) and the ROKCF. The CDIP
supports construction of facilities related to improved combat
operations, war reserves, and combined U.S./Korea operations. The ROKFC
supports quality of life and sole U.S. use projects.
All of these programs are active and help share the financial
burden of a forward deployed posture. In fiscal year 2002 we received
$199 million in support from the JFIP program to include $80 million
for improvements to the Yokosuka Carrier Pier, and $4.5 million from
ROKCF to include a $3.8 million medical clinic in Chinhae.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps portion of the 2003 Japanese FIP is
$142.1 million. Generally, the FIP provides housing, community support,
environmental and safety deficiency abatement, and other non-
warfighting (i.e., other than weapons, ammunition and fuel storage)
facilities. FIP has been very successful in supporting improved quality
of life/quality of workplace infrastructure since the program's
inception in 1979.
General Jumper. The Air Force receives support, in the form of
host-nation funded construction, from NATO, Japan, and Korea. In recent
years, that support has averaged roughly $300 million per year. The
funds provided by these countries are used to construct facilities that
directly support Air Force missions, as well as facilities that support
quality of life for Service members and their families stationed
overseas.
For example, the NATO contribution helps offset construction
supporting the Air Force's roles in the NATO mission. The Japan
Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) supports ``defensive''
warfighting capabilities, such as aircraft shelters, and may be used to
replace ``offensive'' capability facilities that predate 1979. The
Korean CDIP funds combined Republic of Korea-United States warfighting
requirements; while the ROKCF program funds mission support and
quality-of-life requirements.
In addition, under the Rhein Main transfer program, Germany is
helping to pay for facility construction at Ramstein and Spangdahlem
Air Bases necessary to relocate the missions currently at Rhein Main
Air Base. In total, Germany is investing nearly $400 million to help
pay for construction associated with this relocation. The majority of
this construction will occur in 2004 and 2005.
Korea's LPP is an initiative supporting the consolidation of U.S.
installations in the Republic of Korea. USFK will vacate land no longer
needed, due to force realignment on the Korean peninsula. At the same
time, the Korean government will give USFK additional land around
military installations receiving realigned forces. The U.S. Army is the
major player in LPP. However, the Air Force is benefiting from LPP at
Osan Air Base, where we are adding acreage to the installation to
support housing construction.

49. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, please provide cost estimates for the additional
resources that would be required, on a continuing basis, to construct
and maintain facilities in the continental United States that would be
lost if we eliminated a permanent force structure in Europe and Japan.
General Shinseki. The Army and its regional Army Service Component
Commanders are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and each of the geographic combatant commanders and staffs
to determine the global posture of engagement which best supports our
national security strategy. The Army will work to determine the cost or
need for additional facilities in the continental United States once
these discussions yield greater fidelity for the potential courses of
action.
Admiral Clark. The Department of Defense is developing a
comprehensive basing strategy, including an assessment of the
implications for facilities and infrastructure needs, that should be
completed by October 2003. Until the results of this study are known,
it would be premature to speculate on which commands or individual
units, if any, should be relocated to the continental United States,
where they might be based, or what the associated costs would be.
General Hagee. The plant replacement value of Marine Corps
facilities in Japan in fiscal year 2001 is $8.7 billion. In the absence
of a force reduction and since the Marine Corps has limited
underutilized space in the United States we expect an initial
investment of $8.7 billion would be required to replace the plant
provided by the Japanese in the United States. In addition, we would
also need to increase our sustainment by at least $40 million each year
to replace the labor provided by the Japanese government in order to
maintain the new facilities in the United States. The Marine Corps has
no permanent force structure in Europe.
General Jumper. We feel that maintaining our presence in Europe and
Japan is crucial to the United States' national security and stability
in both regions, therefore, we have not considered completely
withdrawing U.S. Air Forces from these regions nor studied how much it
would cost to do so.

BASE OPERATIONS FUNDING SHORTFALL

50. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, and General
Hagee, I am concerned about the reductions in base operations funds in
each of your Service's budgets. Can you please comment on what you feel
the impact of these reductions will be from a broader readiness and a
morale perspective?
General Shinseki. Base operations support funding for fiscal year
2004 is $5.8 billion and represents only 65 percent of our
requirements. The Army took some risk by funding higher priorities in
force protection and replenishing depleted peacetime spares inventories
to eliminate a significant readiness issue. We will continue to provide
quality services to our soldiers and their families but in some
instances the quantity of services will be reduced.
Admiral Clark. I expect no impact on shore installation readiness,
nor do I anticipate any impact on morale. The fiscal year 2004 budget
is aligned with previous years in terms of producing a constant level
of capability. In our effort to find efficiencies, we are making
organizational and process changes in the management and delivery of
installation support. Key to this effort is the establishment of a
single consolidated organization, Commander, Navy Installations (CNI),
whose core mission is management and operation of shore installations.
Our fiscal year 2004 budget reflects those anticipated efficiencies.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps strives to preserve program
stability while balancing competing requirements of modernization,
investment, and infrastructure. Given these competing requirements in a
fiscally constrained environment, our base operations account has been
funded to the optimum level without any near-term degradation to
readiness or morale.

STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

51. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, could you outline the current
plans for the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) planned for
Hawaii?
General Shinseki. The Army intends to field an SBCT in Hawaii. We
have resourced all six SBCTs to contribute to fulfilling the ``1-4-2-
1'' defense construct and national security requirements; however, at
this time, the Secretary of Defense has only authorized the procurement
of the first four brigades. As directed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with an
analysis of potential enhancements for Stryker Brigades five and six.
Pending Secretary of Defense approval, fielding for the 2nd
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in Hawaii begins in October 2005 with
the unit achieving initial operational capability in the summer of
2007.

52. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, what are the military
construction requirements needed to support the expected fiscal year
2005 implementation of the SBCT?
General Shinseki. Based on current planning, the Hawaii SBCT
reaches initial operational capability in fiscal year 2007. Currently
known fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 Army Military Construction
requirements that support the Hawaii transformation and combat systems
total about $517 million. Additionally, the Army's fiscal year 2004
budget includes $71 million for military construction in Hawaii that is
required to support both Legacy Force requirements that are currently
not being met and transformation.

NAVY INSTALLATION COMMAND

53. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, in your written testimony you
discuss the stand up of the Navy Installation Command planned for
October 2003 with an estimated cost savings to the Navy of $1.6 billion
over the next 6 years. Can you detail how these savings are expected to
be achieved?
Admiral Clark. We anticipate savings in personnel, facilities, and
base-operational costs due to:

Streamlining of shore installation management
procedures and policies.
Elimination of redundant HQ management functions and
cost.
Greater competition for contract work from aggregating
functions.
Simplification of the budgeting and funding process.
Increased consistency in standards and levels of
performance for base operations across Navy installations.
More focused support from contractors and support
organizations.
Expansion of regional management concept in providing
installation support.
Greater use of Information Technology tools to
increase efficiency.

54. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, as you are aware, the Army
undertook a similar initiative, the Installation Management Agency
(IMA), which stood up in October 2002. What lessons have you drawn from
and do you expect to draw from the Army's experiences with the IMA?
What similarities and differences are there across the two Services
that might point either to similar practices or the need for different
approaches?
Admiral Clark. We have been in regular dialogue with Army over the
past year including four face-to-face meetings with senior IMA
leadership, and have drawn the following lessons:
First, it is essential to separate installation funding from
mission funding. This eliminates the problem of installation funding
migrating to mission requirements for contingency or other emergent
actions, and thereby, adversely impacting installation support services
to the fleet.
Second, reducing the number of major commanders involved in running
shore installations can generate efficiencies.
Third, a single installation commander affords Navy the opportunity
to consolidate the best in installation management expertise.
Fourth, a single installation command allows major commanders to
focus on primary missions rather than the means.
We have several similarities between our Services in this area as
installations in both Services generally perform similar functions. In
the past, we both had multiple major commanders doing installation
management functions while mission and BOS funding were programmed,
budgeted, and allocated as a single operating budget.
Our differences will not affect our approach. Navy moved toward
claimant consolidation and regionalization in 1997/1998 by reducing the
number of installation claimants from 18 to 8. Army has an additional
layer (for policy and resourcing) between the IMA (for execution) and
Army Chief of Staff. Navy CNI combines policy, resourcing, and
execution and will report directly to the CNO. Navy has identified 28
installation management functions while the Army has 95.
Based upon these considerations, we have adopted a similar approach
to installation management by standing up CNI on 1 October 2003.

READINESS IMPACT OF ACCEPTING SHORT-TERM RISKS TO FUND MODERNIZATION

55. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, as both Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld and you have acknowledged, the fiscal year 2004 budget accepts
short-term risks in order to more fully fund modernization efforts. In
your view, what are the immediate readiness impacts of this strategy,
especially with the high tempo our military forces are currently
experiencing?
General Shinseki. The Army continues to make difficult choices and
implement changes in its investment plans and resourcing efforts.
During the fiscal year 2004-2009 program/budget process, the Army
modified its overall transformation plan by further reducing near-term
efforts to support achievement of longer-term goals. These reductions
are made in the context of a careful and prudent balance between
immediate operational needs, e.g., the demands of homeland security and
the global war on terrorism and the imperatives of Army transformation.
In general, funding is increased for programs that are ``clearly
transformational'' and support Defense transformation goals. The Army
has chosen to manage risk in the modernization of its current force and
the associated mid-term warfighting readiness. This risk takes the form
of more selective modernization and recapitalization efforts for the
current force, while still retaining sufficient efforts to ensure
essential readiness requirements.
The immediate readiness impacts of this strategy are minimal.
Another metric for current readiness is the amount of funding provided
to ground and air operational tempo (OPTEMPO). For fiscal year 2004,
ground and air OPTEMPO are funded to provide the resources to sustain
Army readiness for peacetime operations. The potential war in Iraq and
the ongoing global war on terrorism have created additional
requirements that will require passage of a 2004 supplemental to ensure
the continued readiness of our forces.

COMBAT AIR PATROLS

56. Senator Akaka. General Jumper, The Washington Post has been
reporting that the U.S. Customs Service has begun to assist the Air
Force in conducting combat air patrol, or CAP missions. I understand,
however, that this support is fairly limited. Can you give us a broad
sense of the percentage of forces engaged on an ongoing basis in
conducting CAP missions, and how much that might increase if we were to
go to war in Iraq?
General Jumper. The Air Force and the U.S. Customs Service have a
long history of working closely together, but there are important
distinctions between our respective missions and capabilities. We
expect Custom's role will evolve as part of their transition into the
Department of Homeland Security, but we expect their focus will remain
primarily law enforcement. They are well equipped to respond to general
aviation aircraft that violate temporary flight restrictions without
additional indications of hostile intentions. However, they have no
capability to defend against a commandeered airliner like we
experienced on September 11. Air defense forces, in contrast, are there
to provide a last-ditch defensive capability against any type of
airborne threat, but are neither equipped nor authorized to enforce
laws. Today, both Customs and the Air Force have personnel sitting
side-by-side 24 hours a day in the National Capitol Region Coordination
Center, sharing data and coordinating their combined response.
Prior to operations beginning in Iraq, approximately 0.7 percent of
our active duty USAF personnel (2,810) were required to support air
defense operations, including the CAP. Today that number has grown to
just over 0.8 percent (3,000) with the addition of four alert sites.
Should conditions indicate, the number could rapidly grow to over 1.5
percent (6,000) to support the maximum planned defensive posture.

57. Senator Akaka. General Jumper, is the Air Force exploring other
options, such as expanding our cooperation with Customs, to help reduce
the burden over the long term?
General Jumper. The Air Force is working directly with Customs, the
Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration, Federal
Agency Administration, and others in establishing the Interagency
Homeland Air Security Coordination Center. As better aviation security
procedures are implemented and intelligence information shared and
fused between agencies, we expect the requirements for CAP will be
reduced. However, we also believe it unlikely that the threat of an
asymmetric air attack will be eliminated in the immediate future. In
light of that, we are working to put the Noble Eagle Level 5 forces
into a sustainable posture that will eliminate the need for continued
mobilization of the Reserve component.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

END STRENGTH AND MOBILIZATION OF GUARD AND RESERVE

58. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, each of the armed services is feeling
significant pressure from the pace of current operations and the
ongoing requirements of forward presence, peace operations, and
training requirements. The Services do not have the numbers of
personnel they need in the skills required to sustain the force for
worldwide commitments--and I expect commitments to increase as the war
on terror expands. This is a high-risk strategy--pushing end strength
problems onto the back of the Guard and Reserve could unhinge the
entire ``reserve system.'' Does the Nation have the Active Forces
necessary for what we are doing now and what we are expected to do over
the next 10 to 20 years to secure the Nation?
General Shinseki. This question addresses a particularly vexing
challenge for the Army, requiring a multi-faceted analysis. As I have
previously testified, we have an Army that is too small for its mission
profile. Emerging requirements in support of the global war on
terrorism, uncertainties regarding long-term operational requirements,
and the requirement to sustain existing ongoing small-scale
contingencies while simultaneously transforming the Army certainly
warrant a review of our entire force structure. The Army is
particularly sensitive to the tremendous demands currently being placed
on our Reserve component soldiers in their selfless service to the
Nation.
The post-September 11 environment has seen a tremendous increase in
the number of Reserve component soldiers mobilized in support of
ongoing operations--current steady state is approximately 30,000. As
part of Total Army Analysis 2011 (TAA-11), the Army is reviewing its
existing force structure, specifically focused toward facilitating
transformation to an Objective Force capability. A critical charter of
TAA-11 is to review the existing force structure, both active and
Reserve, to determine the correct allocation of forces in support of
the National Security Strategy and Defense and Transformation guidance.
Paramount to this review will be studies focused on determining the
correct balance of Active and Reserve Forces to ensure the Army is
capable of meeting its responsibility to the Nation.
Admiral Clark. The Navy has sufficient Active-Duty Forces. In fact,
we are seeking to reduce the number of Active-Duty Forces in the coming
years. That said, we have always relied upon Reserves to complement the
Active Force in times of conflict, and the global war on terror is no
exception. Reserves have filled--and are continuing to fill--positions
requiring specific skill sets that may not reside in the Active Force.
We will continue to take the steps needed to ensure we have the right
balance of skill sets in both the active and Reserve components to
complete all missions.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps asked for and was granted an end
strength increase of 2,400 marines for fiscal year 2003. This increase
was greatly appreciated and came at the right time. The 2,400 marines
were used to replenish units depleted by standing up the 4th MEB (MEB
Hqtrs/ AT Battalion/Chemical Biological Incident Response Force/
Security Force Company). Coinciding with the end strength increase to
175,000, the USMC continues to look at ways to return marines to the
operating forces. Military-civilian conversions, A-76, and outsourcing
efforts have allowed us to return approximately 900 marines to the
operating forces. We believe that 175,000 active component end strength
is sufficient to meet our mission requirements.
General Jumper. This is specifically one of the questions we are
trying to answer with a study led by our Air Force Plans and Programs,
Directorate of Strategic Planning, Strategy and Defense Integration
Division (AF/XPXS) called Operational Assessment. It looks at the
suitability of the current active duty and Reserve component mix to
meet future operations. The results of the initial study will be
briefed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on 31 March 03.
The Air Force's active duty and Reserve component mix is
fundamentally sound, both for current and future operations. The Air
Force Reserve component (ARC) is different than the other services.
Several points illustrate this contention. On any given day, 35 percent
of our Reserve component, or over 66,000 airmen, are on active duty.
Our tanker and airlift professionals are now predominately from the
Reserve component with approximately 61 percent of our airlift crews
and 51 percent of our tanker personnel from the ARC. To meet Combatant
Command requirements, our Air Expeditionary Forces use significant ARC
forces -25 percent of our aircrews and about 14 percent of
expeditionary combat support are from the ARC. Volunteerism is
exceptionally high for the initial part of any contingency. For most
operations we can meet all requirements with volunteers given
sufficient mandays and a clear utilization plan. Additionally, our
Reserve component maintains high readiness and ramps up quickly,
normally within 72 hours and frequently sooner.
The Operational Availability study validates that the Air Force has
very few issues with ARC contribution, even when their capability is
required with minimal warning. We clearly have some areas that require
further examination to see if adjustments are required. However, the
current defense strategy does not invalidate our active duty and
Reserve mix. As long as the strategy does not change substantially, we
are confident the Air Force will meet its requirements. A fully
stressed defense strategy necessitates acceptance of risk in some areas
but the Air Force's active duty and Reserve mix is not a primary
factor.

59. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, current and future
operations in the global war on terrorism are increasingly requiring
mobilization of large numbers of Reserve component forces. Mobilization
of these patriotic citizen-soldiers is, of course, a burden on
thousands of families and communities nationwide. The Guard and Reserve
system is a volunteer system. Looking into the future, what do you
think the long-term impact of extended and frequent reserve
mobilizations will be on the strength and vitality of the Reserve
Forces?
General Shinseki. The Army Reserve has been in a continuous state
of mobilization since December 1995. Rotations in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Kuwait, and mobilizations and deployments are part of Operation Noble
Eagle and the war on terrorism have all become part of what it means to
serve in the Reserve components today. These recurring deployments have
given our units a great deal of experience in being able to mobilize
quickly and effectively.
We are sensitive to the stresses of frequent mobilizations and the
impacts on retention and recruiting of quality soldiers. Soldiers are
committed to their duty and we do not anticipate any long-term impacts
on the readiness of the force resultant from the ongoing mobilizations.
The concerns of most soldiers, families, and employers are that the
mobilizations are as predictable as possible and the duty is directly
related to the defense mission of the Nation.
Additionally, the Army Reserve is executing a Federal Reserve
Restructuring Initiative that will, among other things, mitigate
potential negative effects caused by increased small-scale contingency
mobilizations and establish a goal to limit the total time mobilized
for individual Army Reserve soldiers to 270 days over any 5-year
period.

60. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, what are the risks to
the Guard and Reserve ``system'' posed by the current pace and scope of
mobilizations--what happens if members vote with their feet and leave
the Reserves upon release from active duty?
General Shinseki. There is a risk of losing highly trained and
qualified Reserve component soldiers due to these numerous mobilization
requirements. Currently, there are over 65,000 Selected Reserve and
94,000 Army National Guard soldiers mobilized in support of Operation
Noble Eagle and the global war on terrorism. This represents close to
one-third of our current Selected Reserve strength and 27 percent of
Army National Guard strength. If upon demobilization, these individuals
decided to leave the Reserve components, it would take several years
for the Reserve components to reach its mandated end strength
objective, and duty military occupational specialty qualification
objectives. However, based on past studies, we are estimating that the
Reserve components will lose between 20 and 30 percent of these
soldiers. In recognition of this, the Army Reserve is executing a
Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative that will, among other things,
establish human resources life-cycle management practices aimed at
providing trained and ready units and individuals while mitigating the
affects of multiple mobilizations.

61. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, what about employer
backlash?
General Shinseki. To date, there is no data or trend to demonstrate
that employer backlash will come as a result of the present
mobilization. In many discussions with employers concerning employee
mobilizations, the employers generally agree that Guard and Reserve
employees are loyal to their companies and will be returned to their
previous positions without difficulty. Of note is that employers want
planning time both mobilize and demobilize. Also, there is no trend to
indicate that multiple mobilizations have a negative impact on
employment.

62. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki and General Jumper, the
National Guard opposes any relegation of its structure to less than
high-end combat capability consistent with Active Forces and essential
to a globally relevant strategic Reserve. How will the Army and Air
Force preserve and promote this capability within the National Guard?
General Shinseki. The Army's transformation process includes the
Army National Guard (ARNG). Changes to the ARNG began in 1996 with the
ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS), a four-phased plan that converts
up to 12 ARNG combat brigades-worth of structure into required combat
support and combat service support structure. Phase 1 and 2 (fiscal
year 1999 to 2007) conversions are ongoing or currently programmed to
convert. Phase 3 and 4 requirements will be determined at the
conclusion of Total Army Analysis 2011.
In January 2002, the Army began developing a new plan, the Army
National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI), in anticipation of
publication of the new Defense Strategy. In concert with ADRS, AGRI
continues to reshape the ARNG; however, the AGRI concept focuses on
converting heavy combat structure to lighter, mobile combat structure
that is more relevant to the new defense strategy. AGRI restructures
the Army National Guard to meet emerging requirements from homeland
security to small-scale contingencies and major combat operations.
AGRI reshapes selected ARNG divisions from a heavy configuration to
a more versatile design called the Multi-Functional Division (MFD).
Embedded within the MFD is the Mobile Light Brigade (MLB), an infantry-
centric organization enhanced with systems that provide commanders with
more versatile capabilities over present ARNG divisional brigades. We
envision using MLBs in a variety of mission sets to include homeland
security, small-scale contingencies, and generating force operations.
Additionally, we will begin funding AGRI in this Program Objective
Memorandum.
Through the MFD and MLB, AGRI is the Army National Guard's
organizational bridge to the Objective Force. With initiatives like
this, the ARNG will continue to improve its readiness and maintain a
relevant combat force to meet the Nation's requirements.
General Jumper. The National Guard's quest for continued relevance
in the Expeditionary Air Force and in the arena of homeland security is
well founded and supported by both the Secretary and myself. The Air
National Guard specifically, as a Total Force Partner, continues to
provide large portions of the Air Force's combat, combat support, and
humanitarian capacity. Their aircraft, aviators, and support teams are
second to none and we intend to continue to lean on them as we have in
the past. The Air National Guard will remain in the forefront as the
Department's capability-based planning construct evolves. Rest assured,
that as we organize, train, and equip the Total Air Force for the
future, the Air National Guard will be involved in every step of the
process.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

63. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, U.S. forces in
Afghanistan continue to conduct dangerous combat operations. In recent
weeks, U.S. forces completed the largest ground battle with al Qaeda
and Taliban elements since Operation Anaconda. Are U.S. operations
being hampered by the ``safe haven'' in the ungoverned areas of western
Pakistan that al Qaeda and Taliban forces are using?
General Shinseki. I believe an operational question such as this is
best answered by the Central Command Combatant Commander. As the Chief
of Staff of the Army, my responsibility is to provide trained and ready
forces to the combatant commander. Afghanistan is still a dangerous
place. The Army staff here in the Pentagon carefully monitor the
situation there, and maintain good communications with Central Command
so we remain ready to provide any support General Franks requests.

64. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, how do you see U.S.
combat operations in Afghanistan evolving over the next year and do you
feel the combatant commander has sufficient forces to accomplish the
missions laid out by the President?
General Shinseki. I believe operational questions such as these are
best answered by the Central Command Combatant Commander. The Army has
provided all forces that the combatant commander has requested and is
prepared to provide additional forces if required.
The Army currently has 11,600 soldiers conducting operations in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Over the next year the Army's
numbers are expected to increase as we send in a team of soldiers to
assist in training the Afghanistan National Army. Our goal is to have
an Afghanistan National Army capable of providing security and able to
defeat any threats to the legitimate government anywhere within the
borders of Afghanistan. We will also work with the Afghanistan Minister
of Defense and General Staff, which will control Afghanistan National
Army operations and activities according to the directives and policies
of the Central Government's civilian authorities. We anticipate this
training to last 36 months.

SPACE CAPABILITY

65. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper, space superiority ranks
with air superiority as a top priority. The ability to exploit and
assure U.S. access to space assets while denying the same to our
adversaries is of great importance. As the ultimate high ground, space
provides America with military advantages that cannot be duplicated.
With determined exploration and exploitation of space capabilities, we
will widen our advantages and set the bar beyond reach of any
adversary. How important is assured access to space to our current and
future military capability?
General Jumper. Assured access to space and the space control
mission are high priorities as they are critical to success in modern
warfare. We must maintain the capability to support the current needs
of our warfighters and be in a position to provide for future
requirements as our Nation's dependency on space-based assets continues
to increase. Not only do our forces need unhampered access to space-
based services, but they must be protected from the space-based
capabilities of future adversaries. Thus, we must be prepared to
deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities when
American interests and lives are at stake.

BOMBER FLYING HOURS

66. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper, the Air Force has been
putting many more flying hours on bombers particularly the B-2 and B-52
than had been contemplated in the bomber study, that study anticipated
the B-52 would be available through 2040. Do you see the bomber study
conclusions as still being valid?
General Jumper. The bomber study conclusion is still valid:
aggressive modernization of the existing bomber force will provide an
equivalent capability to that of a B-2C force at a significantly lower
cost.

67. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper, do you see a need to look
at the possibility of a replacement bomber program that would be in
place before 2040?
General Jumper. No, not at this time, the Air Force does not see
the need to accelerate the bomber replacement program. The Long Range
Strike Platform (LRSP) study is progressing well and will be completed
in early 2004. The objective of the study is to identify the most
promising concepts and the required technology investments needed to
support a 2012-2015 start of an acquisition program.

JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEM

68. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, I have been made aware of a Department of
Defense (DOD) Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directing the
cancellation of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) program in fiscal
year 2004 and through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The PDM
also directed the cancellation of your related Service simulations,
although I understand now that some funding may have been restored in
the actual fiscal year 2004 budget request that has arrived in
Congress.
I and other members on the Armed Services Committee who care deeply
about the pace and scope of efforts to increase joint experimentation,
joint training, creation of a standing joint operational headquarters,
and joint requirements and acquisition validation, are troubled by this
development. The program is intended to provide a joint simulation
capability to ``integrate'' Service simulations allowing for joint
training and experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. This kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the
Military Establishment to greater joint training, doctrine and
experimentation. What is your position on the cancellation of this
program and the impact on your related Service simulation programs?
General Shinseki. I do not believe the cancellation of the program
will have an impact on joint training. The fiscal year 2003 funding was
retained so the program manager could deliver the Block 1 software to
the Joint Warfighting Training Center (JWFC) for their use to conduct
Joint Task Force (JTF) component level training. This will enable the
JWFC to continue further development to support joint training,
doctrine, and experimentation. Moreover, the PDM directed an analysis
of alternatives (AoA) to identify a cost-effective method of meeting
future joint and service training requirements. The impact on the Army
simulation is greater, however, because the Block 1 software provides
little utility for service use. To this end, I believe it is better for
the Army to pursue its own Title X solution with a capability to link
with a joint simulation when it has matured.
Admiral Clark. Navy supports the decision to cancel the Joint
Simulation System (JSIMS) for Service use. JSIMS was over budget ($12
million in fiscal year 2003), behind schedule (over 1 year for Block 1
and estimates as much as 5 years for Block 2), and delivering a product
that does not meet all of the requirements in the Operational
Requirements Document. The impact to the Navy is that funding to
support wargaming development has been zeroed. However, unlike the
other Services, Navy training requirements for wargaming are directed
at a small audience (Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group Staff only)
and therefore do not require the extensive hardware and manpower to run
a JSIMS scenario. Navy will reprogram existing funds to upgrade the
Enhanced Naval Wargaming System (ENWGS) to meet emerging training
requirements. Because the reprogramming is minimal, Navy chose not to
reclama the JSIMS portion of the PDM to DOD.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps continues to support the
requirement for an effective joint simulation capability. We concur
with the PDM guidance to perform a near-term joint service validation
and test of the JSIMS system and support the decision to concurrently
perform a formal AOA to the current JSIMS program. However, we are
concerned with the adverse impact that the PDM guidance will have on
our ability to support, and ultimately replace, our service-specific
legacy simulation programs. The version of JSIMS that will be delivered
this summer will not meet the Marine Corps Title X training
requirements. The elimination of all subsequent JSIMS funding precludes
our ability to upgrade the JSIMS to meet these Title X mandated service
training requirements. Therefore, we will have to continue to rely upon
our aging legacy simulation systems. Since JSIMS was intended to
replace our legacy systems the USMC JSIMS funding line had displaced
the funding for those legacy systems. The elimination of the Marine
Corps JSIMS funding line by the PDM did not include a concomitant
provision to provide the funding required to effectively maintain and
upgrade our existing training simulation systems and associated
infrastructure.
General Jumper. The Air Force accepts the fiscal trade-offs that
led to the OSD PDM decision on the JSIMS program. Impacts to related
Air Force simulation programs will require funding adjustments to
maintain and improve legacy systems in current use for service and
joint training, doctrine and experimentation.

69. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, are you satisfied that DOD directed the
cancellation with a clear understanding of the risks and costs
associated with closing the existing program, delaying establishment of
a replacement program, and the potential loss of time and skilled
modeling and simulation development personnel?
General Shinseki. I can only assume that DOD had a clear
understanding of the risks and cost for terminating this program. The
Army worked very closely with them while they were drafting the PDM. We
recommended completing Block 1, assessing the software, and then
complete an AoA before deciding on termination. We also strongly
recommended the service program funding be retained regardless of the
JSIMS decision so that the Services could progress on their own toward
their own Title X capability with the intent to link to JSIMS at a
later date.
Admiral Clark. I am satisfied that DOD made a good faith decision
on the JSIMS based on management structure, overhead, and nature of the
separate development environments. JSIMS has not adhered to basic
acquisition principles and shows no potential to deliver a usable
product for service use within the Acquisition Program Baseline
timeframe. However, the PDM does allow for completion of Block I to
address near-term joint training requirements. The PDM-directed AOA
should recommend a follow-on program that has the ability to ``learn''
from JSIMS mistakes and possibly deliver a better product in less time
than JSIMS had projected for Block 2.
General Hagee. We are concerned with the unintended adverse impacts
of the guidance embodied by the PDM. As I mentioned earlier, the PDM
did not address the funding resources required to sustain our legacy
systems in the absence of a near-term replacement joint simulation
system that meets the Marine Corps Title X training requirements. The
PDM zeroed out the funding that was designated to support the
replacement of our legacy systems and the upgrade of the associated
infrastructure. We currently have no future year funding available to
support our legacy system sustainment and upgrade requirements.
We are also concerned with the adverse impact on the JSIMS
workforce as significant numbers of well-trained and experienced
personnel abruptly depart the program. The departure of these
critically skilled personnel is negatively impacting the Orlando-based
modeling and simulation industry and will delay our ability to
reestablish the cohesive joint program team required to assume
management of a follow-on joint simulation training system acquisition
effort.
General Jumper. We are satisfied that OSD principals understood the
risks and costs implied and that the final decision reflects the
difficult fiscal trade-off's often required among competing OSD
priorities and the mandate to remain within DOD total obligation
authority.

70. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, are you satisfied that cancellation of the
JSIMS program is necessary to accelerate establishment of a Joint
National Training Capability or does it complicate achieving such an
objective?
General Shinseki. Cancellation of the JSIMS program should not
complicate achieving a Joint National Training Center (JNTC)
capability. Constructive simulations are only a small piece to JNTC
effort and current simulations should support near term JNTC
requirements until JSIMS is built to meet that requirement.
Admiral Clark. The cancellation of JSIMS will help accelerate the
establishment of a viable joint simulation training capability in the
long-term. The program was over budget, overdue, and did not meet the
requirements as set forth in the Operational Requirements Document.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps continues to support the
requirement for an effective Joint Simulation Capability as well as the
requirement for a Joint National Training Capability. The respective
programmatic funding decisions should take into account the
complementary nature of these respective capabilities and should not be
viewed as an either/or resolution. These capabilities should be
developed concurrently while ensuring the maximum effective amount of
interoperability.
General Jumper. The OSD Program Decision Memorandum in question
covered a range of resource decisions, including the cancellation of
JSIMS and the establishment of JNTC. I would defer to OSD to comment on
whether the two decisions were related.
The JSIMS decisions does include provisions for an AOA to determine
a way ahead for joint simulation, so it is clear that joint simulation
remains a departmental goal.

71. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, what are your views on the importance of
quality modeling and simulation to joint experimentation, joint
training, joint doctrine, joint requirements development, and joint
acquisition?
General Shinseki. Modeling and simulations are absolutely essential
to support joint and service training, experimentation, doctrine,
requirements development, and acquisition. The Army transformation
effort depends on the use of models and simulations to develop emerging
systems, assess advance concepts and test doctrine, and provide a
greater capability to train commanders and staffs in their warfighting
task through constructive simulations.
Admiral Clark. We must be more efficient in the manner in which we
organize, train, and equip our forces. Modeling and simulation will
help us to do that by providing a virtual venue for the types of joint
training and experimentation required to develop joint requirements and
sound doctrine.
That said, JSIMS was not moving effectively toward a solution. It
was over budget ($12 million in fiscal year 2003), behind schedule
(more than 1 year for Block 1 and as much as 5 years for Block 2), and
it would have delivered a product that fails to meet the requirements
set forth in the Operational Requirements Document.
General Hagee. Quality modeling and simulation provide critical
enabling capabilities required to effectively achieve the desired goals
of joint experimentation, joint training, joint doctrine development,
joint requirements development, and joint acquisition. Modeling and
simulation tools have proven their efficacy across a variety of
applications and functions.
These powerful tools alleviate the limitations associated with
physical processes and entities. Simulation-based systems have been
proven to reduce costs, increase safety, improve the effectiveness, and
accelerate the timeframes required to perform joint training and
experimentation. These tools have been used to facilitate doctrine
development and identify weaknesses on which to focus the requirements
development process. Joint acquisition programs have repeatedly
leveraged the benefits of simulation to achieve reduced procurement
costs, reduced live testing requirements, and reduced design cycle
times.
Modeling and simulation are core capabilities that will increase in
scope and utility in support of our ongoing national training
transformation initiatives.
General Jumper. Quality modeling and simulation continues to be
critical to achieving the Revolution in Military Affairs currently in
progress and is therefore essential to joint experimentation, training,
doctrine development, requirements definition, and acquisition.

72. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, in your view, what DOD agency should be
responsible for the definition of requirements, research, development,
testing, evaluation, and procurement of a joint simulation system?
General Shinseki. The Joint Forces Command is responsible for the
definition of requirements for a joint simulation system. Those
requirements are then vetted through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee for validation.
Admiral Clark. In my view, operationally focused systems,
supporting training, and experimentation activities should be the
responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the
Commander, Joint Forces Command. They should meet the needs of the
Services and the functional and geographic combatant commanders to the
maximum extent possible. Systems supporting acquisition, test and
evaluation, and research and development should be the responsibility
of the applicable DOD office.
General Hagee. We have learned from our JSIMS experience that the
degree of success of a joint acquisition program is dependent upon the
authority provided to the central joint program management office over
the personnel, material, and funding resources designated in support of
that program.
The Joint Forces Command is well positioned to lead a coordinated
joint service effort to complete the definition of requirements,
research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement of a joint
simulation system. Their personnel resources could be augmented with
the requisite level of functional experts and acquisition professionals
from the respective services and agencies, to include technical support
from the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office.
General Jumper. Joint Forces Command should be, and is, responsible
for compiling and defining the operational requirements of all
Warfighting Commands and their Component/Supporting Commands that will
use any joint simulation system. The RDT&E and procurement of any
potential joint simulation system should be under the direction of
OSD(AT&L) and assigned service acquisition executives, or as assigned
by OSD to the authority of an established Joint Program Office.

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

SERVICE SECRETARIES

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole,
Levin, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and
Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Joseph T.
Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and Peter K.
Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew Kent,
and Sara R. Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Douglas Flanders and Jayson Roehl, assistants to Senator
Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James
P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier,
assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
Senator Talent; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham;
Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Barry Gene (B.G.)
Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey and Peter A. Contostavlos, assistants
to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton;
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning. The committee meets today to
receive testimony of the Secretaries on the respective posture
of the military Services and President Bush's budget request
for fiscal year 2004 and the future years defense program. I
was thinking of the gravity of the times that we face today and
how Senator Levin and I will have our 25th annual hearing with
Service Secretaries this morning. I cannot recall in years past
when there has been a more important time to have each of you
address the readiness of your forces as they are poised to
respond to such orders as the Commander in Chief may direct.
Secretary White, Secretary Roche, we welcome you back
before the committee. Secretary Johnson, congratulations on
your recognition to become the Acting Secretary of the Navy. We
have a great respect for Secretary England for his service to
the Department of Defense and, in particular, to the Department
of the Navy. We miss him, but he will do well in his
challenging assignment of homeland defense.
We look forward to this annual hearing, your personal and
professional views on how the budget sets forth the
requirements of your respective Services to accomplish their
current missions, as well as the requirements to modernize and
recapitalize for future missions of this committee's oversight
responsibilities and decision-making functions. Indeed, you all
deserve a tremendous amount of credit for the service you have
provided to our Nation, and most particularly to our men and
women in uniform and their families.
Two weeks ago, Senators Levin, Roberts, Rockefeller, and I
had the pleasure of visiting our U.S. military personnel in the
Persian Gulf region, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I
can assure you that we found our forces ready, focused, well-
equipped, and committed to respond to any orders that they may
receive. Our forces are poised in support of our diplomatic
efforts, and I wish to stress that over and over again, to the
extent diplomacy may work. I think all of us still have a
glimmer of hope that it could succeed, brought about simply by
the forces under your respective departments, together with
those of Great Britain and other nations of the coalition of
the willing.
That is the backbone of the diplomacy. As we prepare for a
possible confrontation with Iraq, if diplomacy fails, our
forces continue to fight the global war on terrorism elsewhere.
The capture in Pakistan this week of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the
mastermind of the September 11 attack, is another significant
blow to the al Qaeda leadership and a reminder that we have not
been distracted by events in Iraq and, indeed, our President
and the Department of Defense have kept up the high tempo
worldwide on terrorism.
North Korea poses a problem, and we note with interest the
response that our President has directed there in his efforts
again to have a multilateral resolution of that problem between
Russia, China, South Korea, and the United States. As we focus
on these important threats, we must not forget our deployed
forces in Europe or Asia, as well as those operations deployed
in the Balkans, Philippines, Colombia, and elsewhere, but that
our military personnel are able to successfully conduct such
wide-ranging missions is a tribute to their ability, their
training, their dedication, and the support they receive from
their families. They truly are the best, most capable military
force in modern history, so I urge you to sustain and approve
that action.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We join in
welcoming our Service Secretaries. Congratulations, Secretary
Johnson, on your appointment. You have been here before, but in
a different capacity. Secretary Roche, Secretary White, it is
always good to have you two in front of us.
At this momentous time, first and foremost on our mind is
whether our forces have everything they need to succeed in
their missions, should they be called upon to go to war. That
is obviously something which every member of this committee,
every Member of Congress, every American, wants to be assured
about. As the Chairman mentioned, Senator Rockefeller, Senator
Roberts, the Chairman, and I paid a visit to those troops and
found them to be of high morale, well-motivated, and well-
trained. They feel that they are ready.
We know that the debate about whether to go to war and if
so, whether we should go with or without authorization of the
United Nations, is part of a debate in a democratic society.
They are there to protect a democratic society. All of the
debate and discussions are part of that society, I have found
them not to be dismayed by the kind of discussion, debate, on
the demonstrations that have occurred. They are focused on
their duty and their mission, and that they are aware of the
fact that should they be called upon to go to war, that they
will have the 100 percent support of the American people.
Regardless of what the positions are that Americans take and
under what conditions we should initiate an attack, there is
going to be total unity in this country. Our troops feel it
relative to the support for them, should, in fact, they be
called upon.
We also meet at a time when we have a budget which we must
deal with. This year again, we have authorized significant
increases in our defense budget over the last 5 years, where
there have been sustained budget increases for the Department
of Defense. They have been appropriate. We have been able to
protect our readiness and our modernization at the same time we
have provided for significant pay increases and benefit
improvements for our forces. The men and women of the military
deserve no less.
What is left out of this budget, however, are the estimated
costs of going to war, war itself, the post-Saddam period, as
well as the additional costs of maintaining waging a war on
terrorism. The estimates, even with ranges, have not been
provided to us, despite many requests, and these costs are
real. They are going to be significant, but they are not
included in the budget request.
Some of us feel as a matter of fact that it is
irresponsible for us to adopt a budget resolution without
knowing what these ranges are. The best case and worst case
scenario estimates that will make such a big difference to the
budgets this year and in the future are not available to us. At
the same time, a budget request is before us which has
significant tax cuts, for instance, which will cause a
reduction in revenues to the Government at the same time we are
on the verge of going to war and having extensive costs in a
postwar period.
There will be more on that in the next few days as to
whether or not it is wise to proceed with adoption of a budget
resolution in the absence of those estimates. At least as
important is how much money we spend on national defense and
the question of how those dollars should be spent; and that, of
course, is the annual quest of this committee. We have to go
through the budget request to determine what is the best way to
spend the resources which are allocated and dedicated to the
defense of this Nation.
Each of our military departments has been undergoing a
change since the end of the Cold War. The efforts of the
Services to reshape themselves, to respond to the emerging
security environment, will succeed if we have strong
leadership, and the leadership of the witnesses that we have
before us today.
The task of charting a vision and getting the men and women
of the Services to accept that vision will strongly depend upon
the efforts of the three witnesses before us. I applaud them
for their efforts to date and encourage them, as all of us
would, to continue to exert that strong leadership to make
these reformation efforts a reality.
So, Mr. Chairman, we have some tough choices. There's an
increase to the size of the budget. We nonetheless have some
major decisions that we must make, and we look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today to help us with that process.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. The full
statement of each witness will be placed into the record. To
the extent you wish in your opening remarks, if you would
abbreviate, thank you very much. We will start with the senior
Service, the United States Army, and Secretary of the Army
White.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary White. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of the committee, I am grateful for this
opportunity to speak with you today about the Army. Our
priorities remain the same: win the global war on terrorism and
transformation.
First and foremost, I wish to thank this committee for your
continued support of the Army. The fiscal year 2003 budget has
allowed us to make significant improvements in many key areas.
We have structured our budget request for fiscal year 2004 in
the same fashion as fiscal year 2003 based on our top
priorities of people, readiness, and transformation.
Thanks to your support, we are making significant strides
in the personnel area: the fully funded pay raise for all
soldiers, targeted pay raises in selective grades,
significantly reducing soldier out-of-pocket expenses for
housing, and an accelerated Residential Communities Initiative
to improve on-post quarters for our families, to name just a
few initiatives to support our soldiers.
To shift away from our individual replacement system, we
are examining options for unit-manning initiatives that will
enhance the cohesion of combat readiness of our formations
while improving the predictability of assignment patterns for
Army families.
We have had since September 11 over 30,000 National Guard
and Reserve soldiers on active duty consistently for the past
18 months. As of today, we have activated over 128,000 of these
reservists for current potential future operations. These
Reserve component soldiers are performing magnificently, and we
appreciate the tremendous support that they have received from
their employers, as well as the American public. We recognize
the unique sacrifices made by these citizen soldiers as they
step up to do their duty as citizens and patriots.
From a readiness perspective, the Army is ready for any
additional operations we are ordered to perform in the future,
and our great soldiers are successfully meeting our many
current obligations around the world. With your help in fiscal
year 2003 and again in our fiscal year 2004 budget request, we
fully funded training requirements for the force, significantly
improved our spare parts availability, and accelerated fielding
of soldier support items and unit communications equipment to
make our unit as ready as possible.
Having said that, our operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has never
been higher in my nearly 40 years of experience with the Army.
While we have fully funded normal OPTEMPO and training,
including the full complement of pre-September 11 missions such
as Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and Korea, we have many other
obligations as we pursue the global war on terrorism as part of
the joint force. Post-September 11 missions of the past 18
months include Operation Noble Eagle, here at home, Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as well as operations in the
Philippines and elsewhere. Finally, we have a significant flow
of Army forces into the Persian Gulf in support of the
diplomatic efforts to ensure the disarmament of Iraq. Given
this level of activity, it should come as no surprise that
supplemental funding will be required in 2003.
We are working hard to balance our readiness imperative
with realistic training with our obligations as good stewards
of the environment with our range preservation initiative that
you are considering. It is essential for us to restore the
balance between the use of military lands for their uniquely
military purposes and the need for environmental protection and
species preservation. The readiness of our soldiers going into
harm's way depends upon that, so we ask for your help with this
important initiative.
From a transformation perspective, we are transforming our
Army even while we execute combat operations and prepare for
future contingencies, which is an absolute necessity. There
will be no operational problems. We are transforming the
business side of the Army as well as the operational forces,
and we are transforming within the joint context, not
necessarily in a service-centered manner. We have held steady
on the azimuth established by our Chief of Staff, General Eric
Shinseki, in 1999, almost 4 years ago. In fiscal year 2004 we
fund a fourth of our six Stryker brigades in the field at Fort
Polk, Louisiana, with the Second Armed Cavalry regiment.
We remain focused on the Objective Force for the
restructured Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter program.
We are postured to successfully meet acquisition Milestone B in
May for the Future Combat System (FCS). FCS includes the Non-
Line-of-Sight (NLOS) variant and the initial fielding
increment, which will meet the cannon requirement previously
addressed by the Crusader program. We remain on a glide path to
field the first Objective Force unit in 2008 with an initial
operational capability some 2 years later.
On the business side of the Army, we fully solicit your
support for the Department of Defense (DOD) transformation
package which will greatly streamline our operations and give
us flexibility to manage the Department in the most efficient
manner. In the same vein, our business transformation
initiatives are designed to achieve greater value for the
taxpayer dollar. Our Residential Communities Initiative (RCI)
to privatize family housing continues to be an enormous
success, and we deeply appreciate your support. Every set of
family quarters in the United States Army will be up to
standard by 2007, and I can't think of any better initiative to
support families in an Army that is a married Army than RCI.
Furthermore, we continue to privatize on-base utilities,
centralize Army-wide contracting, and consolidate installation
management activities into a new agency.
Finally, we are conducting what we call our ``Third Wave
Initiative,'' which seeks to eliminate all non-core functions
currently consuming Army people and dollars and find some other
way to accomplish those tasks. Rest assured, we will pursue
these business initiatives in full consultation with Congress.
From a risk perspective, balancing the risk associated with
near-term modernization and mid-term transformation has
required us to make some very tough choices. We have had to
terminate or restructure numerous modernization programs for
the current force to generate the capital to fund the
transformation. In a nutshell, our 2004 budget supplement funds
people, readiness, and transformation at the expense of some of
our infrastructure accounts and current force modernization. We
made these judgments only after a careful balancing of
operational risk, and the risk of not transforming, to provide
the capabilities the Army needs to meet the obligations of mid-
and long-term joint operational concepts.
In conclusion, I wish to return to those who I mentioned
first in my remarks and those that are most important in the
Army, our soldiers. Their performance in Afghanistan speaks
volumes. In the dead of winter in a landlocked country in the
toughest terrain imaginable, they collapsed the Taliban regime
and put al Qaeda on the run. It's been my privilege as it has
been your privilege to visit them in Afghanistan, Kuwait,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and all around this country.
You could not meet a finer group of young Americans. They
are, flat-out in my 40 years experience, the best soldiers I
have ever seen, and we all ought to be very proud of them. Let
me assure you they are ready for whatever contingencies and
operations the President sees fit to order. Thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the 2004 budget submission of the Army.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary White follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas E. White
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to report to you today on the posture of the
United States Army.
America's Armed Forces are the most powerful in the world.
America's Army remains the most respected landpower to our friends and
allies and the most feared ground force to those who would threaten the
interests of the United States.
Since before the birth of the Nation, American soldiers have
instilled hope in a noble dream of liberty. They have remained on point
for the Nation through nine wars, and the intervals of peace in the
years between--defending the Constitution and preserving freedom.
Magnificent in their selfless service, long in their sense of duty, and
deep in their commitment to honor, soldiers have kept the United States
the land of the free and the home of the brave. This is our legacy. Our
soldiers who serve today preserve it.
In October 1999, we unveiled our vision for the future--``Soldiers,
on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in
the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant
across the full spectrum of operations.'' The attacks against our
Nation on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism validate
the Army's vision--people, readiness, transformation--and our efforts
to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.
While helping to fight the global war on terrorism, the Army is in
the midst of a profound transformation. Readiness remains our constant
imperative--today, tomorrow, and the day after. Transformation,
therefore, advances on three broad axes: perpetuating the Army's legacy
by maintaining today's readiness and dominance; bridging the
operational gap with an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;
and fielding the Objective Force to fight and win conflicts in the
years beyond this decade.
As they have throughout the Army's 227-year history, soldiers
remain the centerpiece of our formations. Versatile and decisive across
the full spectrum of joint missions, land forces have demonstrated time
and again the quality of their precision in joint operations. Our
responsibility is to provide soldiers with the critical capabilities
needed for the tough missions we send them on.
After 3\1/2\ years of undiminished support from the administration
and Congress, and the incredible dedication of soldiers and Department
of the Army civilians, we have begun to deliver the Army Vision. With
continued strong support, we will win the war against global terrorism,
meet our obligations to our friends and allies, remain ready to prevail
over the unpredictable, and transform ourselves for decisive victories
on future battlefields.
We have achieved sustainable momentum in Army transformation; the
framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded this decade.

THE ARMY--AT WAR AND TRANSFORMING

The United States is at war, and the Army serves the Nation by
defending the Constitution and our way of life. It is our nonnegotiable
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
decisively.
In the weeks immediately following the attacks of September 11,
2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan,
penetrated al Qaeda and Taliban strongholds, and leveraged all
available long-range, joint fires, enabling the Northern Alliance to
begin dismantling the Taliban. By January 2002, U.S. and Allied
conventional force reinforcements began to set the stage for Operation
Anaconda, where soldiers, demonstrating courage and determination under
the most challenging conditions, defeated al Qaeda at altitude on the
escarpments overlooking the Shah-e-kot Valley.
Today, more than 198,000 soldiers remain deployed and forward
stationed in 120 countries around the globe, conducting operations and
training with our friends and allies. Decisively engaged in the joint
and combined fight against global terrorism, soldiers are serving with
distinction--at home and abroad. Soldiers from both the active and the
Reserve component have remained ``on point'' for the Nation in the
Balkans for 7 years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in the
Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years. At the
publication of the Army Posture Statement, there were more than 110,000
Reserve component soldiers mobilized for active Federal service in
support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. Even
as we transform, soldiers will remain ready to answer the calls of the
Nation to defeat well-trained, determined, and dangerous adversaries
who miscalculate in taking on the best led, the best-equipped, and the
best-trained army in the world.
At war and transforming, the Army is accelerating change to harness
the power of new technologies, different organizations, and revitalized
leader development initiatives to remain at the head of the line. To
accomplish this, Army transformation advances along three major axes
towards attainment of the Objective Force. We selectively recapitalize
and modernize today's capabilities to extend our overmatch in staying
ready to defend our homeland, keep the peace in areas important to the
Nation, and win the war against global terrorism. Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams--our Interim Force--will bridge the current operational
gap between our rapidly-deployable light forces and our later-arriving
heavy forces, paving the way for the arrival of the Objective Force. By
2010, the Army's Objective Force--organized, equipped, and trained for
ground dominance, cyber-warfare, and space exploitation--will provide
the Nation the capabilities it must have to remain the global leader,
the strongest economy in the world, and the most respected and feared
military force, by our friends and allies and our enemies,
respectively.
The surprise attacks against our Nation and Operation Enduring
Freedom, in response to those attacks, validated the Army Vision and
provided momentum to our efforts to transform ourselves into an
instrument of national power that provides full spectrum operational
capabilities that are strategically responsive and capable of decisive
victory. In a little over 3 years, we have begun to realize the Army
Vision--People, Readiness, and Transformation.
The transforming Army is enriching as a profession and nurturing to
families whose sacrifice has borne the readiness of the force for the
past 10 years. Our well-being initiatives are our commitment to reverse
this trend by giving our people the opportunity to become self-reliant,
setting them up for personal growth and success, aggressively investing
in family housing, and revitalizing single-soldier living space in our
barracks. Our manning initiatives have filled our line divisions and
other early deploying units to dampen the internal turbulence of
partially filled formations and help put a measure of predictability
back into the lives of our families.
The Army has carefully balanced the risk between remaining ready
for today's challenges and preparing for future crises. With unwavering
support from the administration, Congress, our soldiers, and Department
of the Army civilians, the Army has made unprecedented progress in its
efforts to transform.
We will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the first
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) this summer and demonstrate the
increased responsiveness, deployability, agility, verastility,
lethality, survivability, and sustainability that SBCTs provide to
combatant commanders. In a little over 3 years from initial concept to
fielded capability, the SBCTs will allow us to glimpse the potential
for acquisition reform in paving the way for delivery of the Objective
Force.
We have constructed the framework for achieving the Objective Force
this decade: a Transformation Campaign Plan with Roadmap, the Objective
Force White Paper, the Operational and Organizational plans for the
Objective Force Unit of Action, and the Operational Requirements
Document for the Future Combat System of Systems.
Additionally, the Army is poised to fill ground maneuver's most
critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with
Comanche, a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft that is a
cornerstone of the Objective Force.
All along the way, we have tested our concepts in wargames and
experiments, checked and rechecked our azimuth to the Objective Force
weekly and monthly, and look forward to a successful Future Combat
System Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision in May of this
year.
However, we cannot accelerate Army Transformation without
transforming the way the Army does business--from transformation of
logistics and acquisition to personnel and installation transformation.
Revolutionizing Army business management practices achieves the best
value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for
investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances
management of personnel systems, installations and contracting; and
augments our potential to accelerate arrival of the Objective Force.
Changing the Army is first about changing the way we think, and better
business practices represent practical application of common sense
initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation.
We are proud of our progress. We are grateful for the strong
congressional support that has helped put the Army on its approach
march to the Objective Force. The Army 2003 Posture Statement describes
our tremendous progress in transformation--an orchestrated campaign,
synchronized with OSD and joint transformation, to achieve the
Objective Force and keep America's Army the dominant landpower in the
world.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM

THE ARMY--SERVING TODAY, BALANCING RISK, MANAGING TRANSFORMATION

Soldiers are the most precise and responsive means to strike and
then control enemy centers of gravity on the ground--where people live,
work, and govern. American soldiers are disciplined, professional, and
trained for success in diverse missions; they are the foundation of a
flexible force that accomplishes its missions in the non-linear
battlespace by integrating new, innovative technologies and techniques
with current systems and doctrine. Our people adapt under the harshest
conditions, whether in the deserts of Kuwait and the Sinai, the
mountains and rice paddies of Korea, or the tropics of the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste.
These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between
current and near-term readiness and our transformation to meet future
challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the
mid-term in order to fund our transformation to the Objective Force. To
avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current
operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in the war
against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term
effort to defeat transnational threats. We have designed and
implemented the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) to provide a
precision, predictive tool with which to monitor the Army and make
appropriate adjustments to preserve current readiness. Our surge
capacity in the industrial base further reduces current risk by keeping
production lines warm and responsive. Our first Stryker Brigade Combat
Team will provide the combatant commanders with a new capability to
further mitigate operational risk--even as we transform to the
Objective Force.

REALIZING THE ARMY VISION--PEOPLE, READINESS, AND TRANSFORMATION

In 1999, the Army announced its vision to transform into a more
strategically responsive force, dominant across the full spectrum of
military operations. The Army vision addresses three essential
components: people, readiness, and transformation. Soldiers are the
heart of the Army, the centerpiece of our formations, and the
foundation of our combat power. Readiness remains our overarching
imperative; it is the means by which we execute our nonnegotiable
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
decisively. To preserve readiness while rapidly changing,
transformation advances on three major axes: preserving our Army legacy
by maintaining readiness and dominance today; bridging the operational
gap with Stryker Brigades--the Interim Force; and fielding the
Objective Force this decade to keep the Army dominant in the years
beyond this decade.
Realizing the Army vision requires the concerted effort of the
entire Army, across all components--from warfighting to institutional
support organizations. The Army published its Transformation Campaign
Plan in April 2001 to synchronize and guide this complex undertaking.
The November 2001 Objective Force White Paper describes the advanced
capabilities and core technologies needed to build the Objective Force.
The Army's June 2002 Army transformation Roadmap defines transformation
as a continuous process--with specific waypoints--that increases our
contributions to the joint force while achieving the six DOD critical
operational goals. The result will be a more strategically responsive
and full spectrum dominant force capable of prompt and sustained land
combat operations as a member of the joint force.
In support of the emerging joint operational concepts and
architectures, the Army--as the major landpower component--continues to
develop ground concepts for a full spectrum, and multidimensional
force. These concepts are producing a joint force that presents
potential enemies with multiple dilemmas across the operational
dimensions--complicating their plans, dividing their focus, and
increasing their chances of miscalculation.
In future joint operations, Objective Force units will be capable
of directing major operations and decisive land campaigns with Army
headquarters. Objective Force headquarters at all levels will provide
the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with seamless, joint battle command and
decision superiority. The modularity and scalability of our Objective
Force formations will provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility
and adaptability to the combatant commander--providing the right force
at the right time for decisive outcomes.

PEOPLE--OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE

The Army Vision begins and ends talking about people. People are
central to everything else we do in the Army. Platforms and
organizations do not defend this Nation; people do. Units do not train,
stay ready, grow and develop leadership--they do not sacrifice and take
risks on behalf of the Nation. People do. Institutions do not
transform; people do. People remain the engine behind all of our
magnificent moments as an Army, and the well-being of our people--the
human dimension of our transformation--is inextricably linked to Army
readiness.
In our vision, we recommitted ourselves to doing two things well
each and every day--training soldiers and civilians and growing them
into competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders who
succeed in situations of great uncertainty. We are dedicated to
preparing our soldiers to lead joint formations, to enabling our
headquarters to command and control joint forces, and to providing to
those joint formations the capabilities only the Army can bring to the
fight: the ability to control terrain and populations.

MANNING THE FORCE

The objective of our manning strategy is to ensure we have the
right people in the right places to fully capitalize on their
warfighting expertise--this is the Army's commitment to the Nation,
Army leaders, soldiers, and our families. Correctly manning our units
is vital to assuring that we fulfill our missions as a strategic
element of national policy; it enhances predictability for our people;
and it ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform their
assigned tasks. In fiscal year 2000, we implemented a strategy to man
our forces to 100 percent of authorized strength, starting with
divisional combat units. The program expanded in fiscal year 2001 and
fiscal year 2002 to include early deploying units. In fiscal year 2002,
we maintained our manning goals and continued to fill our Divisions,
Armored Cavalry Regiments, and selected Early Deploying Units to 100
percent in the aggregate, with a 93 to 95 percent skill and grade-band
match. We remain on target to accomplish our long-term goal of filling
all Army units to 100 percent of authorized strength.

RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE FORCE

In 1999, the Army missed its recruiting goals for the active
component (AC) by about 6,300 inductees, and for the Reserve component
by some 10,000. Our recruiting situation was simply unacceptable, and
we committed ourselves to decisive steps and reversed that trend.
In fiscal year 2002, the active component achieved 100 percent of
its goal in recruiting and retention--for the third consecutive year.
The Army exceeded its AC 79,500 enlisted accession target in fiscal
year 2002 and exceeded our aggregate fiscal year 2002 retention
objective of 56,800 soldiers in all three categories by 1,437. We are
poised to make the fiscal year 2003 accession target of 73,800, and we
expect to meet our active component fiscal year 2003 retention target
of 57,000. The fiscal year 2004 accession target is set at 71,500.
The Army Reserve has met mission for the last 2 years, and its
recruiting force is well structured to meet fiscal year 2004
challenges. The Army Reserve continues to maintain a strong Selected
Reserve strength posture at 205,484 as of January 17, 2003,--over 100.2
percent of the fiscal year 2003 end strength objective. Overcoming many
recruiting and retention challenges in fiscal year 2002, the Army
National Guard (ARNG) exceeded end strength mission, accessions were
104.5 percent of goal, and we exceeded reenlistment objectives.
To ensure that we continue to recruit and retain sufficient
numbers, we are monitoring the current environment--the global war on
terrorism (GWOT) and frequent deployments--to determine impact on
morale, unit cohesiveness, combat effectiveness, and support of well-
being programs that draw quality people to the Army. We continue to
examine innovative recruiting and retention initiatives. The challenges
we face in fiscal year 2003 and 2004 are two-fold: increase recruiter
productivity and recruiting resources necessary to maintain recruiting
momentum when the economy becomes more robust. Resourcing recruiting
pays dividends well beyond accessions in the year of execution. For
example, Army advertising in fiscal year 2002 influenced not only
fiscal year 2002 accessions, but also potential recruits who will be
faced with enlistment decisions in fiscal year 2003 and beyond.

RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS)

CIVILIAN COMPONENT

As a comprehensive effort to consolidate, streamline, and more
effectively manage the force, the Army has begun an initiative to
transform our civilian personnel system. High quality, well-trained
civilians are absolutely essential to the readiness of our force and
our ability to sustain operations today and in the future. Recruiting,
training, and retaining a highly skilled, dedicated civilian workforce
is critical in meeting our obligations to the combatant commanders and
the Nation. Aggressive transformation of our civilian force--in which
projections through fiscal year 2005 indicate a 16 percent annual
turnover due to retirements and other losses--will ensure we continue
to meet those obligations.
As of fiscal year 2002, the Army employed 277,786 civilian
personnel. To forecast future civilian workforce needs with precision,
we developed the Civilian Forecasting System, a sophisticated
projection model that predicts future civilian personnel requirements
under various scenarios. The Army is working closely with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other Federal agencies to
demonstrate the power of this system so they can fully leverage its
capabilities, as well.
The Civilian Personnel Management System XXI (CPMS XXI) has
identified the reforms necessary to hire, train, and grow a civilian
component that supports the transforming Army. To achieve this, we have
redefined the way civilians are hired, retained, and managed. Mandatory
experiential assignments will become the vehicle by which we develop
future leaders. CPMS XXI fully responds to current mandates in the
President's Management Agenda and incorporates the results of the Army
Training and Leader Development Panels. For example, two initiatives
for recruiting well-trained civilians are:

ARMY WELL-BEING

The readiness of the Army is inextricably linked to the well-being
of our people, and Army well-being is the human dimension of our
transformation. Well-being responds to the physical, material, mental,
and spiritual needs of all Army people--soldiers, civilians, retirees,
veterans, and their families. We recognize the fundamental relationship
between well-being programs and institutional outcomes such as
readiness, retention, and recruiting. To support mission preparedness
as well as individual aspirations, well-being integrates policies,
programs, and human resource issues into a holistic, systematic
framework that provides a path to personal growth and success and gives
our people the opportunity to become self-reliant. We recruit soldiers,
but we retain families--well-being programs help make the Army the
right place to raise a family. When our families are cared for,
soldiers can better focus on their mission--training, fighting, and
winning our Nation's wars, decisively.
Soldiers appreciate the Nation's devotion to them, and they are
grateful for the country's recognition of their service and sacrifices.
Recent improvements to the Montgomery GI Bill, Tricare for Life,
Tricare Reform, Retired Pay Reform, the 4.1 percent general pay
increase, and additional pay increases in 2003, are all important to
soldiers and their families. These initiatives have helped the Army
respond to the well-being needs of our people. Army voluntary education
programs improve our combat readiness by expanding soldier skills,
knowledge, and aptitudes to produce confident, competent leaders. Other
well-being initiatives include:

Spouse Employment Summit. The Army is developing
partnerships with the private sector to enhance employment
opportunities for Army spouses and provide improved job
portability for them.
Spouse Orientation and Leader Development (SOLD). SOLD
connects Army spouses and enhances their opportunity to serve
as valued leaders who contribute to the readiness and future of
the Army and our Nation.
Army University Access Online. eArmyU offers soldiers
access to a variety of online, post-secondary programs and
related educational services. www.eArmyU.com is a comprehensive
web-portal widely accessible to soldiers, including those in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kuwait.
In-State Tuition. To level the playing field for
access to education opportunities, the Army is working to
encourage States to grant in-State status for military
personnel and families at public colleges and universities in
their soldier's State of legal residence and State of
assignment.
High School Senior Stabilization. This policy enhances
predictability by allowing families to request stabilization at
their sponsor's current duty location if they have a child who
will graduate from high school during that year.
Secondary Education Transition Study (SETS) Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA). Facilitated by the Army, this agreement
among participating school superintendents is their commitment
to partner and improve high school transitions for DOD
children. Currently, over 110 school superintendents have
signed the SETS MOA.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT--TRAINING SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS, AND GROWING
LEADERS

The Army is a profession--the Profession of Arms. Conducting
decisive ground combat operations in defense of the United States and
its interests is a core competency of this profession. The development
of each member of the Army is the foundation of lifelong devotion to
duty--while in uniform and upon returning to the civilian sector.
By its nature, our profession is extraordinarily complex and
dangerous. The American people entrust the Army with the sacred
responsibility to apply lethal force in defense of U.S interests. As
such, the Profession of Arms must remain firmly grounded in
constitutional values and must constantly change and grow to preserve
its competitive advantage in an evolving strategic environment. At all
levels, our leaders--military and civilian--must apply their
professional knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations
that are characteristic of today's strategic environment. Ultimately,
we must grow professional Army leaders who provide wise and discerning
military judgments founded on long experience and proven professional
expertise. This capacity is developed only through a lifetime of
education and dedicated service--in peace and in war.
Soldiers serve the Nation with the full realization that their duty
may require them to make the supreme sacrifice for others among their
ranks. Soldiers fighting the war on terrorism today, those who will
fight our future wars, and those who have fought in our past wars are
professional warfighters and a precious national asset. To ensure we
remain the greatest landpower in the world defending the greatest
country in the world, the Army and the Nation rely upon their unique
and hard-earned experiences and skills. To develop the operational
skills required to defend the Nation, training must remain our number
one priority.
The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our
responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks the Army performs
require us to review and periodically update the way we educate, train,
and grow professional warfighters. The Army's strategic
responsibilities to the Nation and combatant commanders now embrace a
wider range of missions. Those missions present our leaders with even
greater challenges than previously experienced. Therefore, leader
development is the lifeblood of the profession. It is the deliberate,
progressive, and continuous process that trains and grows soldiers and
civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, and decisive leaders
prepared for the challenges of the 21st century in combined arms,
joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
In June 2000, we convened the Army Training and Leader Development
Panel (ATLDP). The ATLDP's purpose is to identify skill sets required
of Objective Force soldier and civilian leaders. Further, ATLDP
assesses the ability of current training and leader development systems
and policies to enhance these required skills. In May 2001, the Army
Training and Leader Development Panel Phase I (Officer Study)
identified 7 strategic imperatives and generated 89 recommendations.
With those, we validated the requirement to transform our Officer
Education System (OES)--from the Officer Basic Course through the
Command and General Staff Officer Course. Additionally, the panel
reconfirmed the value of Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME
II) in preparing our leaders for joint assignments. The most
significant product of the officer ATLDP is our OES transformation.
ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study) identified three high-payoff
institutional training and education initiatives for lieutenants,
captains, and majors. The first of these is the Basic Officer Leader
Course (BOLC). BOLC will provide a tough, standardized, graduate-level,
small-unit leadership experience for newly commissioned officers. The
second of these initiatives is the Combined Arms Staff Course for staff
officers, and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course for company
commanders. Both courses will capitalize on advanced distributed
learning and intensive resident training methods. The third initiative,
Intermediate Level Education (ILE), will provide all majors with the
same common core of operational instruction, and it will provide
additional educational opportunities that are tailored to the officer's
specific career field, branch, or functional area. Beyond ILE, Army
officers continue to attend Joint or Senior Service Colleges to develop
leader skills and knowledge appropriate to the operational and
strategic levels of the profession.
Completed in May 2002, the ATLDP Phase II (NCO Study) resulted in
78 findings and recommendations extending across 6 imperatives--Army
culture, NCO Education Systems (NCOES), training, systems approach to
training, training and leader development model, and lifelong learning.
Among others, the ATLDP Phase II recommended building new training and
leader development tools for NCOs to replace current methods, as
required. The ATLDP Phase III (Warrant Officer Study) culminated with
63 recommendations extending across 4 crucial imperatives.
Recommendations included clarifying the warrant officer's unique role
in the Army and improving the Warrant Officer Education System to
ensure timely training and promotion. The Civilian Training and Leader
Development Panel (Phase IV) study results are complete, and we are
forming the Implementation Process Action Team (I-PAT). I-PAT will
identify actions the Army must take to increase the professional
development of our civilian workforce. At the senior leader level, the
Army initiated the Army Strategic Leadership Course (ASLC). The program
is aimed at teaching principles of strategic leadership, with emphasis
on visioning, campaign planning, leading change, and transformation. To
date, we have completed 12 of the foundation courses and 3 alumni
courses, training the majority of the Army's general officers.

READINESS--WINNING OUR NATION'S WARS

Homeland Security (HLS)
Defending our Nation--abroad and at home--against foreign and
domestic threats is fundamental to the Army's legacy, and our
warfighting focus provides capabilities relevant to HLS requirements.
HLS missions range from traditional warfighting competencies that
defeat external threats to the non-combat tasks associated with
supporting civil authorities in domestic contingencies. Operation Noble
Eagle mobilized over 16,000 Army National Guard soldiers to protect
critical infrastructure. These soldiers assisted the Department of
Transportation in securing our Nation's airports while also playing a
vital role in securing our Nation's borders. The Army is moving forward
to provide one Civil Support Team to each State, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The Civil
Support Teams support incident commanders and identify chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents and
substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on
response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for additional
support. To date, OSD has certified 30 of 32 teams, and the Army is
working to establish additional teams. Collectively, the certified
teams have performed 890 operational missions since September 11, 2001.
The Army remains committed to HLS, dedicating AC and RC staffs to focus
on training, doctrine, planning, and execution of DOD missions in
support of civil authorities.
Missile Defense
Robust missile defense is a vital warfighting requirement that
protects both our homeland and our deployed forces. Missile defense
includes far more than a reactive capability to shoot down missiles in
their reentry phase. Missile defense requires a coherent system of
sensors; battle command; weapons systems; and active, passive,
proactive, and reactive operational concepts, all aimed at destroying
enemy missiles--not only during their reentry phases. Missile defense
must also be able to destroy enemy missiles on the ground, before they
launch or during their boost phase once launched. Missile defense is
inherently a joint capability to which the Army is a major contributor.
The Army is deploying and employing ground mobile defense assets to
contribute to this warfighting capability, accelerating the fielding of
the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC 3) system, and developing
directed energy weapons that will bring new defense measures to the
Army and the Nation. We are postured to assume control of the Medium
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program in fiscal year 2003 and
intend to begin fielding by fiscal year 2012.
MEADS is a transformational program of Objective Force quality and
a significant improvement on Patriot's capabilities. It will be more
mobile and more deployable (C-130 capable) than Patriot and cover a
360-degree radius to Patriot's 120 degrees. It will be effective
against low radar, cross section cruise missile targets, and require
only 30 percent of Patriot's manpower. MEADS will be more accurate and
more sustainable than Patriot.
Chemical Demilitarization
In Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145, Congress directed the DOD to
destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. In turn, the
Secretary of Defense delegated management of all chemical munitions
disposal to the Department of the Army. On November 29, 2000, the
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, using incineration-based
technology, completely destroyed the last stockpiles stored at the
Atoll, and closure operations began in January 2001. The Tooele
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has incinerated 44 percent of the
chemical agents and 81 percent of the munitions stored there. Disposal
operations at these two sites destroyed 30 percent of the total U.S.
chemical weapons stockpiles. Construction of incineration facilities at
Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is
complete. Systemization activities are on-going at Aberdeen, Anniston,
Umatilla, and Pine Bluff. The plan to accelerate the disposal of bulk
agents using a neutralization process at Aberdeen, Maryland, and
Newport, Indiana, has been approved. Anniston and Aberdeen are
scheduled to start destruction in second quarter fiscal year 2003, and
Newport is scheduled to begin in first quarter fiscal year 2004.
To comply with treaty agreements and the congressional mandate, we
must complete the destruction of these weapons by 2007. The treaty
allows for a one time, 5-year extension to this deadline. With
continued funding and minimal schedule changes, we will safely destroy
the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions at eight
existing CONUS sites.
Training the Force
In October 2002, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training
the Force. Synchronized with other field manuals and publications being
updated to respond to changes in Army, joint, multinational, and
interagency operations, FM 7-0 is the capstone doctrinal manual for
Army training and leader development. It provides the developmental
methodology for training and growing competent, confident soldiers, and
it addresses both current and future Objective Force training
requirements.
We are transforming the way we fight future wars, and the Army is
participating fully in a DOD-sponsored program to transform how forces
train to fight. This effort involves four major initiatives: building
upon existing service interoperability training; linking component and
joint command staff planning and execution; enhancing existing joint
training exercises to address joint interoperability; and studying the
requirement for dedicated joint training environments for functional
warfighting and complex joint tasks. The Army is scheduled to host the
first joint National Training Center (NTC) event at Fort Irwin,
California, in May 2003. During June 2003, the U.S. Army Forces Command
will execute the second joint NTC event--JCS exercise Roving Sands.
During the late 1990s, funding for the recapitalization and
modernization of the Army's Combat Training Centers was reduced,
eroding their capability to support their critical missions.
Additionally, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment
and current force instrumentation systems have become difficult to
maintain. The Army's Combat Training Center modernization program will
ensure that our premier training areas (NTC at Fort Irwin, Combat
Maneuver Training Center in Germany, the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack Center of Excellence
near Gila Bend, Arizona) are modernized to provide high quality,
realistic, full-spectrum joint training. To address these problems, the
Army will invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize
these training centers.
OPTEMPO
In accordance with congressional directives, the Army developed a
new methodology to prepare budget requests that accurately reflect
operations and maintenance requirements. In the report submitted in
July 2002, the Army outlined updated processes that ensure consistency
in reporting of tank miles and reflect requirements and execution with
more precision. Management controls initiated in fiscal year 2001 to
prevent migration of OPTEMPO funds to other areas were highly
successful and remain in effect.
The Army's combined arms training strategy determines the
resourcing requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our forces.
For the active component, the Army requires 800 ground OPTEMPO miles
per year for the M1 Abrams tank and corresponding training support; the
active component flying hour program requires an average of 14.5 live
flying hours per aircrew each month. Both Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve aircrew training strategies require 9.0 hours per crew
each month. The ARNG ground OPTEMPO requirement is a composite average
of 174 miles in fiscal year 2004, and the Army Reserve (USAR) ground
OPTEMPO requirement is 200 tank-equivalent miles in fiscal year 2004.
While this describes the Army's training strategy, actual execution
levels from unit to unit have varied depending upon factors such as on-
going operations, safety of flight messages, and adequate manning of
combat formations. To this end, the Army has fully funded its AC ground
OPTEMPO requirement, while its AC flying program is funded to its
historical execution level of 13.1 flying hours. The RC air and ground
OPTEMPO are similarly funded to their execution levels, rather than
their requirement. Although the Army has not always been able to
execute the training strategy, we have taken steps to have all units
execute the prescribed training strategy in fiscal year 2003, fiscal
year 2004, and beyond.
Force Protection and Antiterrorism
Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel and includes
family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. In the
war on terrorism, the area of operations extends from Afghanistan to
the East Coast and across the United States. Naturally, force
protection and antiterrorism measures have increased across Army
installations in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.
Findings from the Cole Commission, the Downing Report on the Khobar
Towers bombing, and Army directives to restrict access to installations
have all led to thorough assessments by the Department of the Army
Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and
commanders. Our efforts focus on improved force protection policy and
doctrine; more rigorous training and exercises; improved threat
reporting and coordination with national intelligence and law
enforcement agencies; enhanced detection and deterrence capabilities
for CBRNE threats; increased capabilities and protection for access
control; and expanded assessments of Major Commands (MACOM) and
installation force protection programs. Both operational and
installation environments rely upon secure, networked information
infrastructure to execute daily enterprise-wide processes and decision-
making, so the parameters of force protection include contemporary and
evolving cyber threats, as well.
The Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) secures the
Army's portion of the Global Information Grid, secures the digitized
force, and supports information superiority and network security
defense-in-depth initiatives. ISSP provides the capability to detect
system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare
attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. To the greatest extent
possible, it protects warfighters' secure communications--from the
sustaining base to the foxhole.
Soldiers, active and Reserve, are heavily engaged in force
protection and antiterrorism missions. Soldiers guard military
installations, nuclear power plants, dams and power generation
facilities; tunnels, bridges, and rail stations; and emergency
operations centers. During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City,
Utah, nearly 1,500 ARNG soldiers provided security, and soldiers
guarded key infrastructure sites during Super Bowl XXXVII in January
2003. Over 12,500 Reserve component soldiers are currently mobilized
for Operation Noble Eagle to fulfill force protection requirements, and
in February 2003, over 8,000 Army National Guard soldiers will support
Air Force security requirements--a requirement that could reach 9,500
soldiers. Security of detention facilities and detainees at Guantanamo
Bay Detention--a long-term detainee mission--requires approximately
1,500 Army personnel, 50 percent of whom are military police. Army
Reserve Internment and Resettlement battalions on 6-month rotations
impact military police availability to CONUS force protection
requirements.
Sustainment
The Army is revolutionizing its logistics process. One initiative,
the Single Stock Fund (SSF), redirected more than $540 million worth of
secondary items from stocks to satisfy customer demands between May
2000--SSF inception--and November 2002. During that same period, we
redistributed more than $218 million worth of secondary items from the
authorized stockage levels to meet higher priority readiness
requirements. By extending national visibility of stockage locations
and capitalizing inventories into the Army Working Capital Fund, we
reduced customer wait time by an average of 18.5 percent. The SSF will
continue to reduce inventory requirements and generate even more
savings for the Army by creating greater flexibility for the management
of inventories.
Another initiative, the National Maintenance Program (NMP),
enhances weapon system readiness, reliability, and availability rates
by bringing Army Class IX repair parts to a single national standard.
Ultimately, increased reliability will reduce overall weapon system
operating and support cost. Additionally, the NMP centralizes the
management and control of Army maintenance activities for components
and end items. NMP will produce appropriately sized Army maintenance
capacity that still meets total maintenance requirements.
Strategic Readiness Reporting
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive
readiness reporting system that objectively measures readiness to
support the NSS. The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS) responds
to and provides a baseline in achieving this critical initiative.
SRS is a precision readiness measurement tool that provides Army
leadership with accurate, objective, predictive, and actionable
readiness information to dramatically enhance resource management
toward one end--strategic readiness to defend the United States. The
Army Scorecard--a product of SRS--will integrate readiness data from
the business arena and the operating, generating, and sustaining forces
of both the active and Reserve component. Army Scorecard methodology
focuses on four critical areas: People--investing in soldiers and their
families; Readiness--maintaining the support capability to the
combatant commanders' operational requirements; transformation--
transforming the Army into the Objective Force; and application of
sound business practices.
SRS markedly improves how we measure readiness. It gathers timely
information with precision and expands the scope of the data
considered. We are further developing this system to leverage leading
indicators and predict trends--solving problems that affect readiness
before they become problems, from well-being to weapons platforms. SRS
will help enable the Army preserve readiness to support combatant
commanders, invest in soldiers and their families, identify and adopt
sound business practices, and transform the Army to the Objective
Force.
Installations
Army installations are our Nation's power projection platforms, and
they provide critical training support to the Army and other members of
the joint team. Additionally, soldiers, families, and civilians live
and work on Army installations. The quality of our infrastructure
directly affects the readiness of the Army and the well-being of our
soldiers, families, and civilians.
The Army has traditionally accepted substantial risk in
infrastructure to maintain its current warfighting readiness. However,
a decade of chronic under funding has led to a condition in which over
50 percent of our facilities and infrastructure are in such poor
condition that commanders rated them as ``adversely affecting mission
requirements.'' Our facilities maintenance must improve. Over the past
2 years, with the help of the administration and Congress, the Army has
begun to rectify this situation with significant increases in funding
and innovative business practices. These efforts have been dramatically
successful as we continue to correct a problem that was 10 years in the
making. Thus, in an effort to prevent future degradation of our
facilities, the Army has increased its funding for facilities
sustainment to 93 percent of requirement beginning in fiscal year 2004.

TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM)

Recognizing the requirement to enhance support to commanders, the
Secretary of the Army directed the reorganization of the Army's
management structure. On October 1, 2002, the Army placed the
management of Army installations under the Installation Management
Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). Its mission is to
provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army
installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of
soldiers, civilians, and family members; improve infrastructure; and
preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the
migration of base operations funds to other operational accounts below
the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional
installations to support evolving force structure and Army
transformation needs. The Army is poised to capitalize on opportunities
TIM gives us to provide excellence in installations.
Two programs that significantly increase the well-being of our
soldiers and their families are the Barracks and the Family Housing
programs. The Army established the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) in
the late 1990s to improve single soldiers' housing conditions. Through
2002, we have upgraded or funded-for-upgrade 70 percent of our
permanent party barracks to soldier suites that consist of two single
bedrooms with a shared bath and common area. The Army will continue the
BUP until all permanent party barracks achieve this standard.
With the strong support of Congress, the Army established the
Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) for our families. This program
capitalizes on commercial expertise and private capital to perform a
non-core function for the Army family housing management. The program
provides greater value to the Army by eliminating the housing deficit
at our first 11 sites, while leveraging a $209 million Army investment
into $4.1 billion of initial private development. The Army's
privatization program began with 4 pilot projects and will expand to 18
active projects by the end of fiscal year 2003. Pending OSD and
congressional approval, 28 projects are planned through 2006 that will
impact over 72,000 housing units or 80 percent of Army family housing
in the United States. By the end of 2007, we will have the programs and
projects in place to meet the OSD goal of eliminating inadequate family
housing. We will accomplish this goal through RCI and increased Army
investment in family housing military construction (MILCON) at non-
privatized installations. The Reserve component (RC) enhances RCI
through real property exchange authority that is only available to the
RC. This legislative authority allows the exchange of RC owned property
with public or private entities and has a tremendous potential to
improve future Reserve component infrastructure at no governmental
cost.
The Army has also aggressively reduced its financial burden and
physical footprint by disposing of 34 percent of its facilities from a
1990 high of 116 billion square feet. The Army anticipates that the
congressional fiscal year 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
authority will permit additional appropriate reductions. BRAC will
enable the Army to dispose of excess infrastructure and realign the
remaining facilities with the requirements of the transforming Army and
the Objective Force. BRAC will also allow the Army to re-allocate
resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority
requirements.
The Army continues to improve its utilities infrastructure by
divesting itself of non-core utility systems' operation and maintenance
through privatization. As of December 2002, we had privatized 64 of the
351 systems in the program, and we have an additional 104 presently
under negotiation.
As part of our Army Knowledge Management (AKM)--described later in
more detail--we are modernizing our Installation Information
Infrastructure--infostructure--to support a network-centric, knowledge-
based Army. The Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization
Program (I\3\MP) executes a multi-year, $3.2 billion program for
upgrades to optical fiber and copper cable, installation of advanced
digital equipment, and upgrades to Defense Global Information Grid
gateways. This program will ensure worldwide, high-speed data
connectivity at Army installations. To date, we have completed 22 of 95
CONUS installations and initiated upgrades at 4 installations outside
of the continental United States (OCONUS). We plan to complete I\3\MP
in 2009.

TRANSFORMATION--CHANGING THE WAY WE FIGHT

The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and creating a
force more responsive to the strategic requirements of the Nation. We
are building a joint precision maneuver capability that can enter a
theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at will to gain
positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if necessary,
close with and destroy the enemy.
The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a
single, networked, integrated C\4\ISR architecture that will link us to
joint, interagency, and multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly
deployable, mounted formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint
force and capable of delivering decisive victory across the spectrum of
military operations. Consolidated, streamlined branches and military
operational specialties comprised of professional warfighters will be
poised to transition rapidly from disaster relief to high-end
warfighting operations.
The Objective Force and its Future Combat System of Systems will
leverage and deliver with precision the combat power of joint and
strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based force that rapidly
responds to the requirements of the strategic environment in which our
soldiers will be the most strategically relevant and decisively capable
landpower--no matter the mission, no matter the threats, no matter the
risks.
In the final analysis, the Army's combat power does not wear tracks
or wheels--it wears boots. No platform or weapon system can match a
soldier's situational curiosity and awareness. It is the soldiers'
ability to discern and to think, their ingenuity and resourcefulness,
their endurance and perseverance, and their plain grit that make them
the most reliable precision weapon in our inventory. Soldiers remain
the centerpiece of our formations.
To help guide our transformation efforts, the Army leverages
lessons-learned from extensive experimentation and wargaming. We are
working to harness the power of knowledge, the benefits of science and
technology, and innovative business solutions to transform both the
operational and institutional Army into the Objective Force. The Army's
annual Title 10 Wargames provide critical insights for developing the
Objective Force. Likewise, results from joint experiments--Millennium
Challenge 2002 and other Service Title 10 Wargames like Global
Engagement, Navy Global, and Expeditionary Warrior, to name a few--also
inform these efforts.
The Army is fully committed to joint experimentation as a means to
examine and assess Objective Force contributions to the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of joint warfare. The Army has
established a joint/Army Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)
Task Force to ensure that Army CD&E efforts are synchronized with joint
CD&E. This task force makes certain that joint experiment lessons-
learned inform the design and development of the Objective Force. This
year, the Army's Title 10 Wargame--co-hosted by Commander, Joint Forces
Command--will focus on the joint force that will fight the next battle.
Linked to Joint Forces Command's Pinnacle Impact 03 experiment, it will
be conducted within the context of a future 1-4-2-1 global scenario and
the emerging Joint Operations Concept. The Army is committed to these
efforts, and in this budget we have nearly doubled last year's funding
of these exercises.
Joint, interagency, multinational, and Army warfighting experiments
provide invaluable opportunities for the Army to experiment with
innovative approaches to warfighting and to test new tactics,
techniques, procedures, organizations, processes, and technology. In
Millennium Challenge 2002, the largest joint experiment in U.S.
history, the Army demonstrated four vital capabilities it brings to the
joint fight:

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT) concepts for battalion and company operations in a joint force,
the Army employed a SBCT unit during Millennium Challenge. Less than 4
weeks after Stryker vehicles were delivered to the first unit at Fort
Lewis, the unit demonstrated rapid air and sealift deployability and
integrated into the exercise well. Additionally, when given a mission
on short notice to support a Marine Corps unit in ground operations,
the SBCT unit demonstrated its agility and versatility.
Balancing Risk as We Manage Change
Balancing risk is integral to Army transformation. To maintain
current readiness while we transform, we are managing operational risk:
risk in current readiness for near-term conflicts with future risk--the
ability to develop new capabilities and operational concepts that will
dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. The Army has
accepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization, and we
continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the
well-being of our people, transformation, the war on terrorism, and new
operational commitments. Since 1999, the Army has terminated 29
programs and restructured 20 others for a total savings of $12.8
billion. These funds were reallocated to resource the Stryker Brigades
and essential Objective Force research and development.
In Program Budget 2004 and its associated Five-Year Defense Plan
(FYDP), the Army has generated an additional $22 billion of savings by
terminating 24 additional systems and reducing or restructuring 24
other systems. To accelerate achieving the Objective Force capabilities
and mitigating operational risk, the Army reinvested these savings in
the development of transformational capabilities in these and other
programs:

Future Combat System--$13.5 billion
Precision Munitions--$3.2 billion
Sensors and Communications--$2.3 billion
Science and Technology--$1.1 billion
Missile and Air Defense--$1.1 billion

The operational risk associated with the decreased funding for
certain current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker
Brigades on schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force
for arrival this decade. We will continue to reassess the risk
associated with system reductions and related organizational changes
against operational requirements and the strategic environment.
An Information Enabled Army
Achieving the full spectrum dominance of the Objective Force
requires changing the way we fight. Changing the way we fight requires
a holistic transformation of logistics, personnel, installation
management, acquisition, aviation, business practices--every aspect of
the Army must transform. The Objective Force requires innovative
changes and out-of-the-box ingenuity in the way we take care of our
people and manage the information and material that enhances their
readiness and answers their needs--both personal and professional, at
home and in the short sword warfight at foxhole level. Simply put, we
cannot achieve the Objective Force capabilities without leveraging the
full potential of the technological advances that our Nation's
industrial base and science and technology (S&T) communities are
developing. The Army has consolidated management of information
technologies (IT) into a single effort--Army Knowledge Management
(AKM). AKM capitalizes on IT resources unique to our Nation and
harnesses them for transformation, for the Army, and for the combatant
commanders.
Information management is critical to achieving the Army Vision,
and Army Knowledge Management supports transformation through the
development and implementation of a network-centric, knowledge-based
Army architecture interoperable with the joint system. AKM will
accelerate the detect-decide-deliver planning processes and enable
warfighters to see the adversary first--before our forces are detected;
understand the common relevant operating picture first; act against
adversaries first; and finish the warfight with decisive victories--see
first, understand first, act first, finish decisively. AKM will provide
knowledge at the point of decision for all leaders--from the factory to
the foxhole.
Enabling collaborative mission planning and execution among widely
dispersed locations around the globe, AKM will provide a rapid and
seamless flow and exchange of actionable information and knowledge. The
network-centric operations that AKM enables will decrease our logistic
footprint and enhance sustainability of the Objective Force through
multi-nodal distribution networks--reaching forward to the theater and
back to installations. Advanced information technologies will
dramatically enhance battle command. Command, control, communications,
and computer (C\4\) decision tools seamlessly linked to intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets produce a radically
improved common relevant operating picture (CROP) and enable battle
command.
AKM will dramatically enhance the warfighter's ability to
distribute, process, fuse, and correlate unprecedented amounts of
actionable data into information--securely, reliably, and quickly
enough to enable leaders to synchronize and mass effects for decisive
results. Network-centric operations enable information awareness,
information access, and information delivery.
The Army Knowledge Enterprise (AKE) construct describes the Army's
process to enable improved strategic and tactical information
distribution and collaboration. In short, AKE leverages the ingenuity
and resourcefulness of our people in shaping the environment to achieve
dominance and helps leaders achieve decision superiority and mission
efficiencies.
Integration and refinement of existing Army networks is the first
step in achieving a network-centric, information-enabled force that
creates efficiencies and provides secure, reliable, actionable
information communications. To this end, the Army activated the Network
Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM is the Army's single
authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend the Army's
information infrastructure. NETCOM has assumed technical control of all
Army networks--active, Guard, and Reserve. This new policy allows
NETCOM to evaluate any system, application, or piece of equipment that
touches the Army networks. NETCOM will improve the capacity,
performance, and security of our networks at every level.
Among others, one tangible product of NETCOM is the consolidation
and removal of redundant servers across the Army. This example of
better business practice will harvest significant savings in
resources--both dollars and managers--while increasing the
effectiveness of the network. Since the first quarter fiscal year 2002,
we have reduced the number of servers Army-wide by 16 percent--311 in
the National Capital Region alone.
Army Knowledge Online (AKO) begins to allow the Army to
decentralize the management of information. AKO is the Army's secure,
web-based, internet service that leverages the Army's intellectual
capital to better organize, train, equip, and maintain our force. It
gives our people a means to collaborate, to improve their situational
awareness, and to access their personnel data. Already, hard-copy
processes that formerly took days and weeks can now be accomplished
almost instantly--from pay to personnel actions to assignments, to name
a few. AKO is just an early glimpse of the potential capabilities of a
network-centric, knowledge based organization that harnesses the
potential of the global infostructure.

OPERATIONAL ARMY

The Objective Force
The Army is actively engaged in global operations supporting
combatant commanders today, but it is our obligation to prepare for the
future, as well. The Objective Force is the Army's future full-spectrum
force that will be organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more
strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
survivable, and sustainable than we are today--across the full spectrum
of military operations as an integral member of a cohesive joint team.
The Nation will continue to face adaptive, asymmetric threats that
capitalize on the power of information. To dominate and maintain
superiority over these emerging challenges, the Army is changing the
way we fight--a paradigm shift more significant than the 20th century's
introduction of the tank and the helicopter. The Army is changing from
sequential and linear operations to distributed and simultaneous
operations. The Objective Force--characterized by networks of people
enabled with systems that provide actionable information and decision
superiority--will dissuade, deter, or decisively defeat our adversaries
anytime, anyplace, and anywhere.
The Objective Force will consist of command structures scaled to
meet Joint Force Commander requirements and modular combined-arms units
tailored according to each situation. Objective Force integrated,
mobile, air-ground teams will conduct mounted and dismounted operations
and employ both manned and unmanned platforms to achieve decisive
victories. Capable of forcible entry and operations in austere
environments to address the spectrum of military operations--from
humanitarian assistance to warfighting--the Objective Force will
conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations and master
transitions between phases of operations. It will be an offensively
oriented, multi-dimensional force enabled by advanced information
technologies that give soldiers real-time intelligence and actionable
information.
The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat-capable;
deployment will be synonymous with employment. The Objective Force will
be strategically responsive and rapidly deployable on the U.S Air Force
family of inter-theater and intra-theater aircraft. An Objective Force
Unit of Action (UA) will deploy on approximately one-third the number
of aircraft required to deploy a heavy brigade combat team today. It
will be operationally deployable and capable of operational maneuver
over strategic distances by air, land, or sea. Soldiers will overcome
anti-access and area denial strategies and environments through
precision maneuver and decision superiority.
Equipped with new systems designed to meet the needs of the Army's
future fighting formations, the Objective Force will be a networked
system-of-systems. This system-of-systems includes soldiers equipped
with the Land Warrior system; a family of 18 integrated, synchronized,
manned and unmanned FCS; and critical complementary systems such as the
Comanche and the Future Tactical Truck System. The components of the
FCS are being synchronously developed and fielded as a complete family
to achieve the warfighting capabilities the Nation requires to defeat
adaptive, asymmetric conventional and unconventional adversaries.
Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army's formation--not
equipment. Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant
knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will
seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities
of joint forces, Special Operations Forces, other Federal agencies, and
multinational forces. The Objective Force soldiers will enable the
United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis,
rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary. Employing
FCS capabilities in formations called Units of Action (UA) and Units of
Employment (UE), Objective Force soldiers will provide campaign quality
staying power--that means precision fire and maneuver to control
terrain, people, and resources, without having to resort to
indiscriminate collateral damage. The Land Warrior system will
integrate individual soldiers in the network while providing them
increased protection and lethality. FCS will give soldiers the
capability to destroy any adversary in any weather and environment with
smaller calibers, greater precision, more devastating target effects,
and at longer-ranges than available today.
Joint C\4\ISR--a network-centric information architecture nested
within the Global Information Grid--will connect the Objective Force's
system-of-systems. Capitalizing on the synergistic power of the
information network enterprise, every Objective Force soldier and
platform will be capable of sensing and engaging the enemy while
maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces. Advanced
information technologies and C\4\ISR decision tools and assets will
enhance the Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). The Objective
Force will identify, locate, and engage critical targets with lethal or
non-lethal affects and assess battle damage on those targets. The joint
C\4\ISR linkages will enable the attack of targets with whatever joint
or Army assets are available for immediate employment, whether the
force is in contact or out of contact. Similarly, enhanced situational
awareness will facilitate multi-layered active and passive defense
measures--including both offensive and defensive counter air against
air and non-air breathing, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The CROP and network-centric operations will enhance sustainability
of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks that
reach forward to the area of operations or reach back to the Home
Station Operations Center. Increased reliability through equipment
design and commonality among the FCS family of systems will enhance
sustainability while reducing logistics demands. Advanced technologies
will enable robust Objective Force operations while shrinking the
logistics footprint and lift requirements of deployed forces.
The FCS is a transformational approach to meeting this Nation's
requirements for the Objective Force. We designed and will field the
FCS family in a carefully balanced manner to avoid optimizing a
component at the expense of sub-optimizing the overarching capabilities
of Objective and Joint Forces. The acquisition and requirements
development processes are being updated to accommodate the DOD's
direction to field a networked system of systems rapidly through spiral
development and an open architecture that allows maturing technological
insertions as they occur.
The Army embraces the ongoing DOD and Joint Staff capabilities and
acquisition processes reform efforts to achieve revolutionary
capabilities in the fielding of a new generation of equipment. This
collaborative DOD and JCS effort enables the Army to design new
information-age capable organizations holistically, use evolutionary
acquisition strategies to equip those organizations, and see the
Objective Force fielded before the end of this decade.
Science and Technology (S&T)--Moving Toward the Transformed Army
Preempting our adversaries' technological surprises over the past 3
years, Army S&T investments are already providing America's Army with
sustained overmatch in all materiel systems. The Army has increased and
focused its S&T investments. We are demonstrating the enabling joint
interoperable technologies essential for Objective Force capabilities
and accelerating their arrival. Our S&T program is pursuing a wide
spectrum of technologies for unmanned air and ground systems that will
expand the range of joint warfighting capabilities, reduce risk to
soldiers, and reduce the logistics footprint of the force. Realizing
the full potential of unmanned systems requires technological
development in sensors that improve navigation and mission performance,
in intelligent systems for semi-autonomous or autonomous operation, in
networked communications for manned-unmanned teaming, and in human-
robotic interfaces, among many others.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army
partnership contracted for a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to
accelerate the transition of FCS to the System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) Phase, with a Milestone B decision in May 2003. The
Army is on track to achieve first unit equipped in 2008 and an initial
operating capability of one Objective Force Unit of Action (UA) in
2010. To accelerate development and in partnership DARPA, the focus on
key transformation technologies for the FCS has been narrowed to the
systems with the most promise. Our highest priority S&T efforts remain
technological advances for the FCS.
The Army will field FCS as a family of systems built on information
age technologies embedded in manned and unmanned air and ground
platforms. Integral to joint fires, the family of systems will
integrate long-range air- and ground-based sensors with long-range
cannon and missile precision munitions. The family of systems will also
provide increased joint capabilities to conduct battle command,
reconnaissance, mounted combat operations, dismounted combat
operations, medical treatment and evacuation, and maintenance and
recovery. To provide decisive lethality, FCS will employ networked,
precision and loitering attack munitions fired from modular, easily
transportable containers. Finally, FCS will leverage embedded, real-
time interactive, virtual, distributed, collaborative, joint
simulations for training and mission rehearsal.
Enabling the Objective Force Soldier
Eighteen systems, both manned and unmanned; the Objective Force
soldier; and C\4\ISR, together, comprise the Future Combat System.
Manned and unmanned reconnaissance capabilities are part of the FCS
Family of Systems' interdependent networked air- and ground-based
maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment systems.
There are 10 unmanned systems: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)--the
Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE), the Armed Robotic
Vehicle (ARV), and the Small (manpackable) Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(MUGV); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); and Unattended Munitions--the
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) and Intelligent Munitions
Systems (IMS).
There are eight manned systems: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV);
Command and Control Vehicle (C\2\V); Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Vehicle (RSV); Line-of-Sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mounted Combat
System (LOS/BLOS MCS); NLOS-Mortar; Medical Vehicle (MV); the FCS
Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV); and the Non-Line-of-Sight
(NLOS) Cannon.
Decisive warfighting is about fires and maneuver: fires enable
maneuver, and maneuver enables fires. Joint and organic close,
supporting, indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy's
capabilities, protect our forces and enable ground units to maneuver.
The ICV, the Unattended Munitions NLOS-LS, IMS, C\2\V, MCS, NLOS-
Mortar, and NLOS Cannon are important elements of the FCS that will
enable the Objective Force to conduct distributed and simultaneous
joint combat operations. With joint fires, the NLOS cannon is critical
to support and protect our land forces in hostile environments. NLOS-LS
NetFires is a platform-independent family of missiles with precision
attack and loitering capability. Both Precision-Guided Mortar Munitions
and Excalibur precision cannon munitions will enhance organic maneuver
fires. A new, joint fire support, battle command and fire support
architecture will allow rapid engagement of targets by any Army or
joint asset.
For over 227 years, soldiers have remained the centerpiece of our
formations. The Land Warrior program--another key S&T initiative--
responds to this legacy and enhances our soldiers combat power
generation capability. The Land Warrior program will develop a
lightweight, low observable, enhanced-armor protection, fighting
ensemble for the individual Objective Force soldier. Through networked
connectivity to the FCS-equipped, maneuver Unit of Action, Land Warrior
soldiers will enable revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability,
and sustainability for the individual warfighter while reducing
logistics demands.
Future Combat Systems are networked in the joint C\4\ISR
architecture--including networked communications, networked options,
sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These networked systems
will dramatically enhance situational awareness and understanding and
operational level synchronization well beyond today's standards.
Improved C\4\ISR capabilities will enable network-centric Objective
Force operations. The results of the investments will allow leaders to
capitalize on sensor and processing technology to see, understand, and
shape the battlespace before the enemy can react--increasing combat
force effectiveness and survivability. The S&T program will develop and
demonstrate real-time, continuous situational understanding by
integrating data from manned and unmanned air- and ground-based
sensors.
S&T investments in military logistics are an important enabler for
the Objective Force. We are placing our emphasis on sustainment's big
drivers--fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and water--to dramatically
reduce our logistics footprint and lift requirements in these areas.
Key technologies include on-board water generation, real-time logistics
command and control processes and distribution management, enhanced
multi-purpose munitions and packaging, efficient propulsion and power
technologies, real-time diagnostics and prognostics, and Micro-Electro
Mechanical Systems (MEMS).

TRANSFORMATIONAL SYSTEMS

Several transformational systems were under development prior to
announcement of the Army Vision in October 1999. The Army has completed
an extensive analysis to identify those systems that complement FCS and
the Objective Force system of systems.
The Comanche helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation
Modernization Plan (AMP) and represents the first new system to reach
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within the Army's Objective Force.
Comanche is our armed reconnaissance platform with attack capabilities.
It will leverage the situational awareness and situational curiosity of
a scout augmented with revolutionary, state-of-the-art intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies. Comanche supports
vertical and horizontal maneuver as an integral part of network-centric
operations and extends human eyes and decisionmaking beyond the ground
maneuver force. Utilizing stealth technologies, it will network with
all joint C\4\ISR and joint weapons systems. Comanche will leverage
maximum effect of future standoff precision weapon systems such as the
Common Missile and allow us to maneuver ground formations based upon
full knowledge of the situation. Augmented with armed or unarmed UAVs,
Comanche will fill ground maneuver's most critical battlefield
deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with a capable, survivable,
and sustainable aircraft. The Comanche program is already well on its
way to giving the Army a capability pivotal to transforming the way we
will fight.
Several other transformational systems will empower the Objective
Force with the knowledge dominance and battle command to provide
decision superiority across the spectrum of operations. The Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) System, Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and the
Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) will enable Objective
Force joint C\4\ISR capabilities. These programs will provide the
tactical enterprise-level networks that will ensure seamless, secure,
digital connectivity between the Objective, Interim, and today's
forces. The Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A)
architecture provides Army network-centric ISR connectivity from
national agencies to joint systems to Objective Force Units of Action
as part of the integrated Department of Defense DCGS architecture.
DCGS-A will enable interoperable tasking, processing, and exploitation
capabilities. The Aerial Common Sensor brings improved signal
intelligence collection and precision geolocation capabilities, as well
as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signals (MASINT)
sensor packages. Another system, Prophet, uses communications
intelligence to depict the battlespace and further enhance situational
awareness. These C\4\ISR systems greatly enhance the Objective Force's
ability to gain actionable information superiority and decision
dominance over all adversaries and expand the range of options for the
joint force combatant commanders.
Transformational systems will provide the Objective Force with
strategic and tactical maneuver capabilities. The Theater Support
Vessel will support rapid intra-theater lift requirements, provide the
capability to conduct operational maneuver and repositioning, and
enable units to conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal. The
Future Tactical Truck System will have commonality with FCS and will
support the Objective Force by enabling command, control, and
transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel. The Tactical
Electric Power (TEP) generators will provide power to Objective Force
units where fixed power grids are not available.
Transformational systems provide the Objective Force with other
important capabilities, as well. Chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) effects systems support the Objective
Force across the spectrum of military operations and improve
capabilities to conduct homeland security activities. Engineer, civil
affairs, and psychological operations vehicles will enable mobility and
enhance civil affairs and PSYOPs capabilities. The Up-Armored High
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) will improve Objective
Force soldier survivability and lethality. The Multi-Mission Radar will
provide the capability to detect and track aircraft, artillery, and
other projectiles, then queue appropriate weapons systems and airspace
synchronization systems. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) is a lighter weight, more deployable multiple rocket launcher
capability that will integrate into the joint fires network.
Bridging the Capabilities Gap--Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
Announcing our intent to field an Interim Force in October 1999,
the Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal,
survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable
light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility
that we seek. Just 2\1/2\ years later in 2002, the Army began fielding
the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to bridge that gap. In 2003--less
than 4 years after the announcement--we are on track to achieve IOC
with the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. Stryker Brigades will
provide the combatant commander vastly increased operational and
tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non-contiguous
operations.
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams respond to combatant commander
requirements across the spectrum of military operations. Optimized for
combat in complex and urban terrain, the Stryker Brigades will be
decisive in other major combat operations, as well. The SBCT
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron
provides both organic human intelligence capabilities and UAVs embedded
at the brigade level. Its military intelligence and signal companies--
working through a digitally enabled battle command bridge--leverage
theater and national assets to create an information-enabled force.
SBCTs will use this enhanced joint C\4\ISR capability to revolutionize
combat paradigms from ``make contact, develop the situation, maneuver
the forces'' to ``understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make
contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish
decisively.''
Moreover, leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics
practices and enablers, and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT
is vastly more deployable and sustainable than our heavy forces, while
significantly increasing combat power generating capabilities.
Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer
CSS personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. While capitalizing on
these advantages, developing and available technologies allow us to
mass effects--rather than massing formations--and create a robust,
reliable capability to conduct operational maneuver over strategic
distances.
Finally, SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading
transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned
officers--tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major--in the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the
Objective Force.
The Army has resourced six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to
contribute to fulfilling the 1-4-2-1 defense construct and national
security requirements; however, at this time, the Secretary of Defense
has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The
Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker
Brigades 5 and 6.
Fielding of the SBCTs affects the entire Army: active and Reserve
components; heavy and light forces; CONUS and OCONUS. Current fielding
timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to fight and win the GWOT
and conduct major combat operations. The transformation of four active
component brigades to SBCTs provides a rotational base with three of
the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two SBCTs fielded
at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007. The
Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps'
critical need for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a
Reserve component brigade to an SBCT will enhance our strategic Reserve
and support the GWOT, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense
missions. Additionally, SBCT stationing provides rapid, strategic
responsiveness through power projection platforms capable of supporting
four critical regions described in the 1-4-2-1 defense construct. The
first SBCT will attain Initial Operational Capability in the summer of
2003.
Preserving the Army's Legacy
Today's force guarantees the Army's near-term warfighting readiness
to fight and win our Nation's wars decisively. Because the Army
bypassed a procurement generation, the Army's Combat Support and Combat
Service Support systems now exceed their 20-year expected life cycle,
and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their expected
half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving
resources for transformation, the Army is recapitalizing and
selectively modernizing a portion of the current force. The
modernization program addresses the critical issue of AC and RC
interoperability and serves as a bridge to mesh these two components
seamlessly. In general, the Army increased funding for programs that
are clearly transformational and support the defense transformation
goals, sustained funding for high priority systems that will transition
to the Objective Force, and reduced funding for systems not essential
to Army transformation. The Army remains committed to its 17-system
recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized
recapitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two
divisions.
Army Special Operations Forces are an indispensable part of the
Army and will continue to provide unique capabilities to the Joint
Force and Land Component Commanders. In response to the increasing
requirement for Special Operations Forces in support of joint campaign
plans, the Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF
structure. The recent initiatives will transfer 1,788 manpower spaces
to Major Force Program-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003. Since the
commencement of Army Special Operations Forces operations in support of
the GWOT, the U.S. Army has provided over $1.4 billion in new equipment
to enhance Special Operations Forces firepower, communications, and
ground and air mobility.
The Army will remain the largest user of space-based capabilities
among the Services. Army space assets are providing tangible support to
the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom--they ensure Army
and Joint Force Commanders optimize communications, satellite
intelligence, global positioning system, imagery, weather, missile
warning, and other space-based capabilities in every aspect of planning
and operations. We are working diligently with the joint and
interagency space community to ensure that Army and joint space systems
continue to provide their essential capabilities now and for the
Objective Force.
Aviation Transformation and Restructuring
Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard
choices in balancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim
plan--now in progress--lowers operating and sustainment costs while
posturing aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache
modernization is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation
Plan. The AH-64D Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of
the maneuver battlespace and provide the ground commander with a
versatile, long-range weapon system against a range of fixed and moving
targets. The UH-60 Blackhawk continues to be the assault workhorse of
Army aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's annual flying
hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with
capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is
fully committed to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift
capability is invaluable to transforming the Army. As we restructure
and standardize attack and lift formations across the force, we will
also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve component aviation
units to mitigate the near-term risk.
Army National Guard Aviation comprises almost 50 percent of the
Army's aviation force and is one of the Nation's most valuable assets
both for wartime and for peacetime missions. Essential for successful
execution of the Nation's military strategy, the ARNG currently has
aviation units deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, Europe, and
Saudi Arabia, as well as Central and South America.
Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (ARNGRI)
ARNGRI seeks to transform a sizeable portion of ARNG combat
structure into more deployable, flexible fighting forces to support
Army requirements at home and abroad. ARNGRI will introduce two new
organizations into the force structure: Mobile Light Brigades and
Multi-Functional Divisions. These organizations will provide full
spectrum capabilities in support of combatant commanders. The Mobile
Light Brigades will operate as a subordinate unit to the Multi-
Functional Divisions, which will also contain two combat support/combat
service support brigades and be capable of supporting either major
combat or homeland security operations.
Army Reserve Transformation Initiatives
By providing responsive force generating capability and technically
trained individuals, the USAR facilitates our capability to conduct
extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint
operations. Army Reserve initiatives ensure the USAR is missioned,
organized, and equipped to provide interoperability across the full
spectrum of military operations. Transformational organizations include
experimentation forces and information operations, joint augmentation,
network security, and interagency units.
The Readiness Command Restructuring Initiative and Federal Reserve
Restructuring Initiative will help the USAR fulfill these new mission
requirements. These initiatives lend greater flexibility to efforts
that enhance responsiveness to America's foreign and domestic
protection needs. Regional Readiness Commands will focus on individual
and unit readiness, leader development, training and growth which will
demand a new personnel system that achieves holistic life-cycle
management for Army Reserve soldiers.

INSTITUTIONAL ARMY

Transforming the Way we do Business
We have made great strides in revolutionizing our business
management practices by starting at the very top. Last year, we
realigned our headquarters by reorganizing and realigning
responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Army Staff--streamlining
coordination, tasking, and decision-making--resulting in a more
responsive and efficient organization. This initiative allowed us to
eliminate unnecessary functions and redistribute 585 manpower spaces to
accomplish core competencies.
As previously discussed, the Army has addressed the management of
its installations, personnel systems, and contracting in its
Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). We are aggressively
pursuing efforts to outsource non-core functions. The Army will reap
substantial dividends in efficiency and effectiveness through these
strategic realignments of human and physical capital.

PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION

The Secretary of the Army's key management initiative is personnel
transformation. Its goal is to modernize and integrate human resource
programs, policies, processes, and systems into a multi-component force
that includes civilians and contractors. We will evaluate our processes
and implement the most efficient program, policies, and organizations
to support the Objective Force.
The centerpiece of personnel transformation is a comprehensive
effort focused on a potential Army-wide implementation of unit manning
and unit rotation. We are aggressively examining the feasibility of a
unit manning and rotation system that would better support the new
national defense strategy, improve cohesion and combat readiness within
the operational Army, provide highly cohesive well-trained units to
combatant commanders, and improve well-being for families by providing
greater stability and predictability in assignments. The Army currently
uses unit rotations in support of operational missions in the Balkans,
Sinai, and Afghanistan. The Army is studying the use of unit rotations
for other locations and in the war on terrorism. Units would know of
these rotations well in advance, providing families with greater
predictability and enabling focused preparation, both of which
contribute to increased combat readiness of the unit.
Unit manning seeks to synchronize the life cycle of a unit with the
life cycle of the soldier within that unit. All soldiers and leaders
would be stabilized, resulting in a significant increase in cohesion
and combat readiness over our present individual replacement system.
Such a system has significant second and third order effects across the
force--training and leader development, recruiting and retention, unit
readiness levels, and total Army end strength among others. All of
these are being studied intensively, and we anticipate senior Army
leadership decisions on unit manning and unit rotation in July 2003.
Third Wave
Because we operate in an environment in which there are increasing
demands for military capabilities--the Secretary of the Army's Third
Wave initiative seeks to ensure that we are achieving the best value
possible for our taxpayers' dollars.
There are three phases to the Third Wave process. First, we
determined what activities were core or non-core to the Army's mission.
In the second phase, we are validating the breakout between core and
non-core functions by determining if any non-core functions should be
exempted. This phase has an anticipated completion date of mid- to
late-February 2003. Upon completion, the Army leadership will notify
Congress of the results of this phase. In the third phase, key Army
leaders will assess appropriate plans to execute non-core functions,
select the best means to proceed, and develop implementation plans. At
this time, we do not know how many of the 214,000 jobs identified as
potentially non-core functions in Phase I will be included in
implementation plans. Although implementation plans will target
execution in fiscal years 2005-2009, some implementation plans may be
delayed beyond that period.
The implementation of competitive sourcing of non-core functions
will adhere to OMB Circular A-76 and related statutory provisions.
Exceptions to the requirement for public-private competition are
limited, such as where 10 or fewer civilian employees perform the
function or where legal restrictions against using the A-76 process
apply to the function. To lower costs for taxpayers and improve program
performance to citizens, OMB has undertaken major revisions to the
processes and practices in OMB Circular A-76 to improve the public-
private competition process.
Acquisition Transformation
The Army is leading the way in acquisition reform within DOD's
broad transformation of defense acquisition policies and procedures.
The Army's FCS program may prove to be the largest DOD acquisition
effort that fully embraces the concepts of evolutionary acquisition and
spiral development--leveraging the potential of rapid advancement
within individual technologies by allowing for changes within programs
as technologies mature.
The FCS program is evolutionary in its design and incorporates
periodic blocked improvements within its 19 systems--the Objective
Force soldier and 18 manned and unmanned systems. Within these 19
systems are 540 spirally developing technologies. The Army's use of a
Lead System Integrator (LSI) enables a ``best of the best'' approach to
selection from competing industry efforts. Our unprecedented
partnership with DARPA ensures the FCS effort leverages that agency's
DOD-wide perspective and resources to produce the best capability and
value for the joint force.
The Army continues to revise its acquisition policies and
applicable regulatory guidance. On October 3, 2001, the Army approved
an acquisition reorganization that transferred control of all
acquisition program management to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
and eliminated duplication of effort in two major Army commands.
Effective October 2002, 12 Program Executive Officers (PEO) report to
the AAE, and their subordinate PEOs assumed management of all Army
acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category. The plan
ensures that there is only one chain of authority for acquisition
programs within the Army. In addition, the plan clearly holds Program
Managers responsible and accountable for the life cycle management of
their assigned programs.
We have also transformed the way we conduct business through the
organization of the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) that realigns our
previously decentralized installation and information technology
contracting processes into one organization. Responsible for all
contracts over $500,000 and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts,
ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA
supports Army transformation efforts by aligning all base support
contracting into a single organization that best supports installation
management transformation. All of these initiatives use information
technology to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities.
Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form
the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational
support to the warfighting commands. The Army Contracting Agency and
other contracting activities will continue to support small business
awards in the outstanding manner it did in fiscal year 2002.
Logistics Transformation
We cannot transform the Army without a transformation in logistics.
We must incorporate the logistician's view into the design of our
systems even before we begin to build platforms. Collaboration between
the acquisition and logistics communities will give the Objective Force
the rapid deployability and sustainability we demand--by design--
without compromising warfighting capability.
Designing the right logistics architecture--systems, business
processes, enterprise, for example--is fundamental to success. The
Army's logistics transformation will focus on creating an overarching
corporate logistics enterprise that employs industries' best business
practices. Within this enterprise, the Army established three principal
goals for logistics transformation: enhance strategic mobility and
deployability, optimize the logistics footprint, and reduce the cost of
logistics support without reducing readiness or warfighting capability.
The Army's mobility and deployability goals for the Objective Force
are to deploy a combat brigade within 96 hours after lift off, a
division on the ground in 120 hours, and a five-division corps in
theater in 30 days. To achieve this strategic responsiveness, the Army
Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) serves as a catalyst to bring about
force projection changes both in the Army's and in our sister Services'
lift programs.
Platforms like the Intra-Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Inter-
Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) provide
transformational capabilities for operational and strategic maneuver
and sustainment of Army formations.
Because strategic air and sealift cannot meet deployment
requirements, Army prepositioned stocks (APS) ashore and afloat
continue to be a critical component of Army power projection. The Army
is currently participating in a joint-led worldwide prepositioning
study to determine if location, mix, and capabilities in existing
stocks of combat, combat support, and combat service support require
adjustments to meet the defense strategy more effectively.
The Objective Force requires the Army to optimize its logistics
footprint to produce a smaller, more agile, responsive, and flexible
sustainment organization. To achieve this goal, we will leverage
technology and innovative sustainment concepts. The Army is already
developing and integrating key enablers to provide a transformed,
corporate logistics enterprise. Some of these enablers include embedded
diagnostics and prognostics, tactical logistics data digitization
(TLDD), serial number tracking, and the Global Combat Service Support--
Army (GCSS-A) system that utilizes a commercial Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) solution. The ERP approach changes the Army's logistics
automation systems strategy from one of custom code development for
unique Army requirements to adoption of a commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) product.
The selective use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) to augment military logistics force structure provides
commanders with the flexibility to reallocate manpower, resources, and
materiel by adding contractors to the equation of logistics support. In
addition to providing services and some supply support, these
contractors can quickly deploy to establish base camps, receive and
process soldiers as they begin arriving in theater, and reverse the
process when soldiers go home.
Current initiatives that help reduce costs without reducing
readiness or warfighting capability include the National Maintenance
Program and the Single Stock Fund (SSF). As previously discussed,
programs provide two basic building blocks for a revolutionary change
in logistics business practices.
Advanced Medical Technology
Congress designated the Army as the lead agent for DOD vaccine,
drug, and development programs for medical countermeasures to
battlefield threats. This includes vaccines against naturally occurring
infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care,
military operational medicine, and telemedicine research. The program
also funds Food and Drug Administration requirements for technology
transition to advanced development.
The medical force provides the requisite medical intervention and
care for the joint force deployed around the globe. With its Medical
Reengineering Initiative (MRI), the Army Medical Department has
transformed 28 percent of its Corps, and echelon above Corps, force
structure to an organizational structure that promotes scalability
through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. These packages
result in improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased
modularity for flexible task organization. MRI supports both the
current forces and the Stryker Brigades, and is the bridge to the
Objective Medical Force. We have implemented innovative strategies that
make the most efficient use of our budget. Medical modernization, which
includes the acquisition of current medical equipment and technology,
is partially funded within MRI units.
Business Initiatives Council
In June 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the Department
of Defense Business Initiatives Council (DOD BIC). The DOD BIC's goal
is to improve business operations and processes by identifying and
implementing initiatives that expand capabilities, improve efficiency
and effectiveness, and create resource savings in time, money, or
manpower.
The Army has aggressively explored ways to improve its internal
business practices, and has established the Army BIC, under the
leadership of the Secretary and the G-8. Effective November 13, 2002,
the Secretary of the Army has approved a total of 35 initiatives under
the Army BIC. Subsequently, the Army submitted a number of the
initiatives through the formal DOD BIC process for implementation
across the Services and other DOD activities. The BIC process has
helped to create a culture of innovation and inter-Service cooperation.
The superb level of cooperation across the military departments, the
Joint Staff, and OSD has made this possible.

A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE

With the continued strong support of the administration, Congress,
our soldiers, our Department of the Army civilians, and the greatest
industrial base and S&T communities in the world, the Army will field
the Objective Force--this decade.
By 2010, we will have fielded the first operationally capable
Objective Force unit equipped with the Future Combat Systems. Our
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be providing to combatant commanders
capabilities not currently available--enhanced strategic responsiveness
and the ability to operate in a distributed, non-linear battlespace.
Through selective recapitalization and modernization of systems that
enable our soldiers to preserve our legacy today, we will have
sustained a decisive-win capability at a high state of readiness as an
integral part of the Joint Force. We will have significantly improved
the well-being of our people and sustainment of Army infrastructure.
We remain committed to our legacy--preserving America's freedoms.
In peace and in war, the Army's soldiers serve the Nation with
unmatched courage, indomitable will, pride, and plain grit--as they
have for over 227 years. Soldiers will continue to fight and win the
Nation's wars, decisively--it is our sacred duty and our non-negotiable
contract with the American people.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Secretary White. For
the Department of the Navy, Secretary Johnson.

STATEMENT OF HON. HANSFORD T. JOHNSON, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY

Secretary Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of this committee, it is an honor to
appear before you today and talk about the Department of the
Navy and also the fiscal year 2004 budget. Our Nation is served
by the most professional and capable naval force in the world.
The Navy-Marine Corps forces alongside the Army, Air Force, and
Coast Guard partners are on station in every part of the world
that you saw in your trip, taking the fight on global terrorism
to our enemies, deterring aggression against our Nation and our
allies, and as you so eloquently mentioned, representing U.S.
interests, diplomatic and military, around the world.
Today, more than 60 percent of our ships are underway,
including seven deployed carrier battle groups, and 63 percent
of our Marine operating forces are deployed. The Navy-Marine
Corps team successes are reflective of the strong and sustained
support of this committee and Congress and the Department of
Defense, as well as, as you mentioned, our dedicated civilian
and contractor employees and most importantly, the great
American moms, dads, wives, husbands, and children who support
these forward-deployed defenders of freedom.
Our people remain our most precious resource. The fiscal
year 2004 budget sustains the tremendous progress we made in
readiness accounts by requesting targeted pay raises and
further reduction of the out-of-pocket expenses for housing.
Our recruiting goals are being met. Our retention remains very
strong. With respect to personnel management transformation,
the 21st century security environment demands flexibility. We
are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
explore ways to provide greater flexibility and modernize our
personnel systems.
We must now turn to the challenges, as you mentioned, of
recapitalization and modernization. Two-thirds of our top-line
increases for fiscal year 2004 are dedicated to increased
procurement. $11.4 billion is dedicated to shipbuilding
providing for the construction of seven new ships, two SSBN
conversions to the SSGN, and the first ship in the cruiser
conversion program. This represents a significant increase, and
is a step in the right direction.
I am also pleased to report that the budget funds 100 new
aircraft, sustains the MV-22 Osprey program, continues
development of the Joint Strike Fighter, and continues the
procurement of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.
Moreover, we are pressing ahead with innovative ways to
ensure that we are not locked into purchasing platforms whose
electronics, sensors, and systems are obsolete upon delivery.
We are moving forward on procuring ships not as a total
package, but in a phased approach to acquire the systems in the
right way, insert them at the right time, in a structured
process.
As you are well aware, the acquisition process sometimes
forces us to act in ways that no business would ever consider.
Under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense, we are
exploring opportunities to transform the process, increase
flexibility and efficiency, foster creativity and innovation,
streamline processes, and create savings.
We look forward to working with you on these proposals as
they mature. The budget reflects a careful balancing of
competing demands and risks. Most evident is our decision to
accelerate the retirement of our older, most maintenance-
intensive ships. We are convinced that selected near-term
divestment of platforms that are least relevant to our future
is the best and the most efficient way to recapitalize,
modernize, and transform without compromising our ability to
accomplish our mission.
In total, the retirement of legacy systems and application
of transformational business practices will result in a savings
of $1.9 billion. More importantly, the budget builds on the
concept of transformation into our recapitalization and
modernization efforts. This commitment to transformational
platforms includes the next generation aircraft carrier, the
CVN-21, which makes tremendous steps in aircraft carrier
design, the DD(X), which is the centerpiece of the Navy's
future family of ships, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
which will be designed from the outset as a focused mission
ship that will use reconfigurable mission modules to counter
the most challenging threats in the littorals.
In aviation, we continue to move forward with the Joint
Strike Fighter, the advanced Hawkeye upgrade program, and this
year, we introduce EA-18G, which will replace the EA-6B
Prowler, our most maintenance-intensive aircraft in the
Department of Navy.
FORCEnet is the architecture that will enable network-
centric warfare to begin now. We made difficult choices in the
fiscal year 2004 budget request, but we have been careful to
craft it to sustain the advances made in personnel, quality of
service, and readiness to balance risk while divesting legacy
systems and concepts, and to invest in shipbuilding, aircraft
procurement, transformational technologies, all to achieve the
combined joint total force that the future demands.
I must also tell you, Secretary White mentioned that the
cost of operations in support of the global war on terrorism
and preparation for any contingencies in Iraq are not reflected
in the budget request. A supplemental request will be
necessary. I look forward to working with you and all the
members of the committee in your continued strong support for
our entire Armed Forces. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Johnson follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Hansford T. Johnson

NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM: NATIONAL SEAPOWER . . . AROUND THE WORLD,
AROUND THE CLOCK

I. INTRODUCTION

The Navy--Marine Corps Team continues to provide extraordinary
service and value to our Nation. Throughout the past year our Naval
Forces have distinguished themselves around the globe, and our sailors
and marines operating in the air, on and under the sea, and on the
ground--including our space cadre--remain at the leading edge of the
global war on terrorism. They have demonstrated the full effect of
their lethal power, from the blue water to the littorals and well
beyond, engaging and destroying the enemy in areas that previously
would have been considered sanctuaries from sea-based forces. At a time
of great consequence for our Nation, our Navy and Marine Corps not only
have ``answered the call,'' but have done so while improving our combat
readiness and retaining our sailors and marines at historic rates.
Our successes in the global war on terrorism, while significant,
have not been achieved in isolation. We have worked alongside, in
partnership, with our sister Services to realize the true potential of
joint, interoperable forces in the new environment of 21st century
warfare. The superior operational and personnel readiness levels we
have been able to sustain are directly reflective of the strong,
sustained support of Congress. In fiscal year 2004, we seek your
support for the President's budget request to sustain the gains made to
date, improve those areas where shortfalls remain, and continue
transforming the Navy and Marine Corps for the 21st century.
In the balance of this statement we will describe the significant
accomplishments the Navy and Marine Corps have realized during the past
year, the improvements in our warfighting readiness and capabilities
that are supported by the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request,
and some details of our plans to transform and prepare for the
challenges of the future. In assessing our request, it is important to
note that our focus is on improving our ability to operate as an agile,
lethal and effective member of a broader, networked joint warfighting
force. To that end, we have given priority to the following overarching
goals:

Successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism
while sustaining our current readiness;
Recapitalizing, modernizing, and transforming our Navy
and Marine Corps to meet the challenges of the future;
Fully networking our forces at sea and ashore to
operate seamlessly in a joint and coalition environment;
Continuing to invest in our sailors and marines; and
Sustaining the quality of our operational training.

In pursuing these principal objectives, we had to make some
difficult tradeoffs within our proposed program. However, our fiscal
year 2004 budget request is the best balance possible among important,
but often competing priorities.

II. CONTEXT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST: SUCCEEDING IN A
TIME OF GREAT CONSEQUENCE

Last year, our Navy and Marine Corps forces built on the historic
response of our sailors and marines following the September 11, 2001
attacks on our Nation. Today, our forces continue leading the way on
the front lines of the global war on terrorism. More than half of our
Navy operating forces and over 60 percent of the Marine Corps operating
forces are currently deployed around the globe. Since the beginning of
Operation Enduring Freedom more than 90,000 sailors and marines and 100
Navy ships have deployed in support of ongoing operations. Nine of our
12 aircraft carriers and half of our 12 Amphibious Ready Groups have
seen action in this worldwide conflict. Additionally, over 5,000
members of the Naval Reserve and 15,000 members of the Marine Corps
Reserve have been activated in support of these operations.
Even after the effective defeat of the Taliban and the liberation
of Afghanistan, our Naval Forces, whether sea-based or on the ground,
continue their missions. For example, marines from the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism) provide support and security for
the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, while others
serve in Tactical Air Operations Detachments in support of air and
Naval Special Warfare operations in Afghanistan.
While the global war on terrorism remains our principal focus, the
Navy-Marine Corps team still operates extensively, as in the past,
representing U.S. interests throughout the world. In Southwest Asia, we
maintained continuous carrier presence, conducting combat operations
over Iraq in support of Operation Southern Watch. At the same time,
naval task forces continued Maritime and Leadership Interdiction
Operations supporting United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq
for the eleventh straight year. In addition to these operational
commitments, over 2,000 marines participated in Eager Mace 2002, an
amphibious assault exercise in Kuwait in late September 2002.
During May through August 2002, over 1,400 sailors, marines, and
coast guardsmen participated in the eighth annual Cooperation Afloat
Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with countries including the
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.
Marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Force participated with all
CARAT nations in landing force operations as well as providing a Marine
Security Element to advise and assist the armed forces of the
Philippines in their efforts against global terrorism.
In the Mediterranean, Navy ships, including surface combatants,
submarines, and patrol craft, operated with friends and allies in over
60 exercises with NATO and Western European nations to enforce United
Nations sanctions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Marines from
the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
demonstrated their capability to offload and move inland to reinforce
Kosovo Forces' security requirements.
Our ability to sustain the preceding breadth of capabilities, from
combat operations to peacetime coalition-building exercises, came as a
result of difficult choices we made--choices that have proven wise by
the manner in which history unfolded last year. As you recall, in last
year's budget we placed great emphasis on fixing some of the chronic
problems that had been threatening our long-term ability to man,
operate, and sustain the fleet we have today. We made a conscious
decision to give the highest priority to our personnel and current
readiness accounts. Within our critical procurement accounts we
undertook a major effort to make the foundations for our shipbuilding
programs healthy, even at the expense of being able to procure only
five new ships in fiscal year 2003. While congressional support for
supplemental appropriations did much to decrease our maintenance
backlog and fill our spare parts bins, we fully recognize our fiscal
year 2003 plan devoted fewer resources toward recapitalization than
either the Department or Congress would have wished. Having made that
difficult prioritization we committed to translating a healthy
procurement base in fiscal year 2003 into earnest recapitalization in
fiscal year 2004. We have kept that promise.

III. THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET: BUILDING FROM A SOLID FOUNDATION

The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects an
increase of $3.5 billion above the amount provided in the Fiscal Year
2003 Defense Appropriations Act. It also reflects the Department's
commitment to get the most out of every dollar provided by the American
taxpayers. We do not come to Congress with ``hat in hand,'' but rather
with a responsible request, optimally balanced across an entire
department of competing priorities. In this budget request we have
proposed an additional $1.9 billion for our priority programs with
funds identified through our own rigorous cost savings and divestiture
initiatives.
Together, these sources of additional funds have enabled us to
``turn the corner'' in our most pressing recapitalization efforts. Two
thirds of our top line increase is dedicated toward increased
procurement. This budget request reflects two more new construction
ships and five more aircraft than appropriated by Congress last year.
It increases our funding for transformational research and development
(R&D) initiatives by a half billion dollars while consolidating the
critical gains in personnel and current readiness achieved in last
year's budget. The following represents the priority funding in fiscal
year 2004 for the Department of the Navy:

We propose 7 new construction ships and 100 new
aircraft;
We propose significant transformational capabilities,
including the next-generation aircraft carrier (CVN-21), the
next-generation destroyer (DD(X)), the LCS, two more SSBN-to-
SSGN conversions, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the V-22
Osprey, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), and the
Advanced Hawkeye (E-2C) Program;
The administration proposes a range of military pay
increases from 2.0 percent up to 6.25 percent, targeted by rank
and years of service, and additional reductions in out-of-
pocket housing costs from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent;
We propose sustained funding for our key operational
readiness accounts, including an increase by over $200 million
for aviation depot maintenance;
We implement Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Aviation
Integration, a process that will maximize our combat power,
optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces, and
introduce 200 modern aircraft across the fiscal year 2004-
fiscal year 2009 program; and
We improve the quality of our operational training
through our Training Resource Strategy, and provide $61 million
in fiscal year 2004 toward this end.

Highlights of our fiscal year 2004 budget request are provided in
the sections below.
A. Current Readiness
The fiscal year 2004 budget request builds upon the best successive
2 years in readiness budgets in more than a decade. It funds an OPTEMPO
of 54.0 days per quarter for our deployed forces. This level supports
the Global Naval Forces Presence Policy in terms of Carrier Battle
Group (CVBG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) availability as required
by national security policy. However, accelerated deployment timelines
and increased OPTEMPO will cause current year execution to run ahead of
the existing plan.
Funding for ship maintenance will achieve more than 96 percent of
the fiscal year 2004 notional goal. This reflects a virtually identical
posture as compared to last year, both in terms of percent
accomplishment and quantity of backlog remaining. The aggregate level
of funding for ship maintenance declines from fiscal year 2003 to
fiscal year 2004, due in part to the positive effects of the additional
maintenance funding provided in supplemental appropriations in the
previous year, and in part to the accelerated retirement of our oldest,
least capable, and most maintenance-intensive ships.
Accelerating the retirement of these ships was one of the most
difficult decisions we made in building this year's budget. While
aggregate warfighting capability is a better metric than the number of
ships in our inventory, we recognize that below a certain threshold
numbers do matter. However, our analyses indicate that the near-term
inactivations we are proposing provide an acceptable level of risk
without compromising our ability to accomplish our mission, and that
the fastest and most efficient way to recapitalize and transform the
Fleet is to pursue vertical cuts in our least capable type-model
series, both in ships and in aircraft, and apply those savings toward
procuring new ships and aircraft.
The growing sophistication of potential threats, increasing
complexity of modern warfare, advances in training technology, and the
development of new weapons and tactics require more capable training
facilities and methodologies. Under the leadership of Fleet Forces
Command, the Department has produced the Training Resource Strategy
(TRS), a multi-year plan to improve inter-deployment training for
CVBGs, ARGs, and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). The Department is
committed to implementing and fully funding these improvements.
The training technology, range, and facility improvements
programmed via the TRS will ensure the long-term combat readiness and
effectiveness of our deploying forces and produce a training capability
superior to that existing today. The fiscal year 2004 budget will
ensure deploying forces are fully prepared for the challenges of armed
conflict in the 21st century.
Military lands and training ranges--including land, sea, and air
training and operating areas (OPAREAs)--are necessary to ensure that
realistic training opportunities exist to prepare our sailors and
marines. Population growth, economic development, expansion of
conservation and recreational areas, and urban and suburban sprawl,
along with State and Federal environmental laws and regulations, have
significantly restricted the military's access to and use of military
lands, training ranges, and at-sea OPAREAs. This ``encroachment'' has
markedly restricted our ability to train realistically and, unless
checked, promises to produce further restrictions.
Our goal is not to roll back environmental protection, but to
ensure that our sailors and marines are properly trained. We owe these
young people realistic, quality training before we send them in harm's
way. We are not looking for an exemption for everything the military
does, but rather for a scientific approach that achieves an appropriate
balance between environmental concerns and unique military readiness
needs. We remain committed to our long tradition of excellent
environmental stewardship, and our fiscal year 2004 budget will ensure
our deploying forces are fully prepared for every challenge they may
encounter.
B. Personnel Readiness
Our ships, submarines, and aircraft have no ``asset value'' to the
Nation until manned by trained, educated, and motivated people. Sailors
and marines--along with our civilian workforce--remain the strong and
steady foundation of our naval capabilities. The families of our
service members also are vital to our readiness. It is a fact that we
recruit sailors and marines, but we retain families, and we recognize
that the effectiveness of our forces is dependent in large measure on
the support they receive from their loved ones.
Over the past 2 years we realized significant gains in the manpower
arena that translated directly into increased personnel readiness. In
the process of maintaining an increased readiness posture while
transforming antiterrorism/force protection positions, Navy operated
just below the congressionally-allowed maximum end strength flexibility
in fiscal year 2002. Doing so permitted us to sustain CVBG and ARG
manning readiness near 100 percent. Our ability to surge deploy forces
around the globe in response to recent events is testimony to the
success of our personnel readiness posture. Over the course of fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, we anticipate end strength will decrease slightly
to reflect force structure changes.
Active Duty
The Navy and Marine Corps met recruiting and accession goals in
2002, and continue to attract America's finest young men and women to
national service. The Marine Corps notched its seventh year of meeting
monthly and annual recruiting goals. Navy achieved its recruiting goals
for a fourth consecutive year. Both Services are well-positioned for
success in meeting 2003 officer accession requirements. The sailors and
marines entering active duty truly represent our country's best and
brightest. In 2002, 92 percent of Navy's enlisted accessions were high
school graduates (up from 90 percent in 2001), while the Marine Corps
accessions of high school graduates rose 1.3 percent to 97.5 percent.
Retention rates in 2002 remained at record levels, with 58 percent
of eligible first-term sailors deciding to ``stay Navy.'' The Marine
Corps met retention goals in 2002 in record time, achieving its highest
occupational specialty match to date while also experiencing its
highest officer retention rate in 18 years. Sailors and marines have a
sense of purpose and the desire to serve during this critical juncture
in our Nation's history. We provide them unique opportunities to grow
professionally and personally, to achieve and be recognized, and to
lead. They see improvements to their quality of service, and they
appreciate the outstanding compensation and benefits provided to them
and to their families. Our recruiting and retention success is
reflected in the fully manned and operationally capable CVBGs and ARGs
currently on station around the globe.
We are fully committed to providing the finest education and
training for these bright young minds, as befits their place as future
leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps. Graduation from ``Battle
Stations'' or the ``Crucible'' is but the first step toward achieving
the technologically advanced force required to conduct naval warfare in
the 21st century. Our ``Revolution in Training'' is establishing a
career-long learning continuum, ensuring the continuous personal and
professional development of every service member.
Successful as we are in attracting and retaining the best, we must
not lose focus on people programs. Our immediate goals include:

Increase Navy recruit high school graduation rates
from 92 percent to 94 percent. Marine Corps recruit high school
graduation rates are currently between 97 percent and 98
percent;
Increase the percentage of enlisted Navy recruits with
previous college experience or technical/vocational training;
Continue the Training Transformation started by Navy
Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through Commitment to Education
and Learning), and Marine Corps training continuum
synchronization, including partnering with industry and
academia to impart individual training and education;
Continue to develop a live, virtual, and constructive
training environment both within the Department and for use in
conjunction with the Joint National Training Capability; and
Explore innovative manning initiatives such as the
Optimum Manning program, which relies on new technologies and
creative leadership to reduce ship manning.

Congressional support for a targeted pay raise in fiscal year 2004,
which recognizes and reaffirms the value of our career force, is
critical to staying the course. So, too, is continuing the reduction of
out-of-pocket housing expenses and the extension and enhancement of
essential special pay and bonus authorities. The Selective Reenlistment
Bonus remains an important tool for retaining our critical skill
personnel.
Reserves
Our Reserve community remains an integral part of our Navy and
Marine Corps team, with 88,000 naval reservists and 40,000 Selected
Marine Corps reservists serving today. The seamless integration of the
Reserve and active components as a total force in the global war on
terrorism has been a resounding success. The dedicated service,
invaluable resources, and selfless sacrifices to duty each of these
``citizen sailors and marines'' provides on a daily basis are integral
to operational success. We have recalled over 15,000 Navy and Marine
Corps reservists as of mid-January 2003. These patriots have provided
force protection, staff augmentation, intelligence, and warfighting
skills to the Nation's war efforts.
The Naval Reserve constitutes 19 percent of the Navy's total force,
with an additional 69,000 sailors serving as Individual Ready
Reservists (IRRs). In 2002 the Naval Reserve met both its officer and
enlisted recruiting goals, the result of significant recruiting program
efforts. These Reserve Forces provide our inter-theater airlift, harbor
defense, naval embarked advisory teams, and Naval Coastal Warfare
capabilities. In addition, a large portion of the Navy's port cargo
handling support, Mobile Construction Battalions, intelligence, and
medical capabilities are resident in the Reserves.
The Selected Marine Corps Reserve comprises nearly 25 percent of
the Marine Corps' warfighting capability, with an additional 58,000
marines serving as Individual Ready Reservists (IRRs). The Marine Corps
Reserve's contribution to the global war on terrorism continues with
individuals and units mobilized to provide a wide variety of support.
The additional mobilization of hundreds of Individual Mobilizations
Augmentees and IRRs provided a critical surge of ready expertise and
staff augmentation to warfighting commands, both Joint and Marine.
Civilian Personnel
The civilian workforce, currently totaling approximately 186,000,
forms an essential role as part of our total force. Hard-working and
dedicated civilian employees can be found in every major command,
working alongside our sailors and marines, performing the vital work of
the Department. We continually refine and shape this vital work force
for current and future missions. Twenty-one civilian occupational
groups are targeted specifically for intensive active management. These
include science and engineering, logistics, contracting, human
resources, and financial management. Just as it is essential to recruit
and retain the very best sailors and marines, it also is essential to
recruit and retain the best and brightest civilians. We are in a
competition for talent, and your support for a flexible set of civilian
human resource management tools will enhance our efforts to hire,
develop, and retain this quality work force.
C. Shipbuilding
The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides funding for seven new
construction ships, the final two of four planned SSBN-to-SSGN
conversions, and the first ship in our Cruiser Conversion program. In
all, our shipbuilding program includes $11.4 billion, a significant
increase above last year. Additionally, we invest more than $1.5
billion for R&D in transformational shipbuilding programs such as CVN-
21, DD(X), LCS, and SSGN (discussed later in this statement). The seven
new ships include:

Three Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) destroyers. These
ships are being procured as part of a multi-year procurement
(MYP) of 10 DDG-51 ships over the period fiscal year 2002
through fiscal year 2005. In addition to the cost savings from
this MYP, the Navy and its two principal DDG builders
successfully negotiated a workload swap arrangement in June
2002 in which General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works will transfer
LPD-17 ship construction work to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
in exchange for additional DDG-51 work. This arrangement will
optimize production efficiencies and stabilize workload at all
shipyards building DDG-51 and LPD-17 class ships.
One Virginia class (SSN-774) fast attack submarine.
The fiscal year 2004 ship marks the initial year of a seven-
ship, 5-year MYP that will achieve significant savings while
increasing submarine procurement to two per year starting in
fiscal year 2007. The first Virginia class submarine (SSN-774)
will deliver in June 2004.
One San Antonio class (LPD-17) amphibious transport
dock. The fiscal year 2004 budget provides full funding to
procure the sixth ship of this class. The program is on track,
and represents an urgently needed contribution to the Marine
Corps' amphibious lift requirements.
Two Lewis and Clark class (T-AKE) auxiliary cargo and
ammunition ships. Fiscal year 2004 funding procures the fifth
and sixth ships of this class to continue recapitalization of
our support fleet. Delivery of the lead ship is expected in
fiscal year 2005.

Beginning in fiscal year 2004, the Cruiser Conversion Program will
provide selected Ticonderoga class Aegis-equipped cruisers with
essential land attack, force protection, and Area Air Defense Commander
capabilities, extending their mission-relevant service life to 35-plus
years.
Beyond the new construction ships and conversions, the fiscal year
2004 budget request provides additional incremental funding for LHD-8,
service life extension for three Landing Craft Air Cushioned, and
initial R&D efforts on the LHA Replacement (LHA(R)), scheduled for
procurement in fiscal year 2007. In LHA(R) the Department is pursuing a
far more capable replacement for aging amphibious ships such as the
LHA. While the initial stages of design move forward, LHA(R) will offer
many improvements over the LHA it will replace, and will set the stage
for further development toward a new design that could offer
capabilities such as concurrent flight operations of helicopters and
fixed wing aircraft.
D. Aircraft
The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget maximizes the return on
aviation investment, primarily through the use of MYP arrangements for
the F/A-18E/F (both airframe and engine), the E-2C, and the MH-60S. We
also have agreed to enter a joint MYP contract with the Air Force to
procure KC-130Js to replace the Marine Corps' fleet of KC-130F/Rs. In
all, the fiscal year 2004 budget procures 100 new aircraft, including:

53 tactical, fixed wing aircraft (42 F/A-18E/F, 2 E-2C
and 9 MV-22);
28 helicopters (13 MH-60S, 6 MH-60R and 9 UH-1Y/AH-
1Z);
16 trainer aircraft (15 T-45 and 1 T-39); and
3 support aircraft (2 UC-35 and 1 C-40A)

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the Navy's principal tactical
aviation recapitalization program until we get to the JSF. The fiscal
year 2004 budget includes $3.0 billion for 42 planes, which constitutes
the final installment of a fiscal year 2000--fiscal year 2004 MYP
contract. Deliveries remain ahead of schedule, and the first squadron
of F/A-18E/F recently conducted combat operations aboard U.S.S. Abraham
Lincoln (CVN-72). Of note, a variant of the F/A-18 airframe, the EA-18G
Growler, has been selected as the Navy platform to replace the aging
EA-6B Prowler. By using a common airframe, the EA-6B follow-on will
deliver at lower cost while providing growth potential for improved
future electronic warfare systems. The Marine Corps expects to fly the
EA-6B (ICAP III) until approximately 2014 to 2015 before transitioning
to a new Electronic Attack aircraft.
Based on successful flight testing results, the Department felt
confident to continue the minimum sustaining rate for the V-22 Osprey
program and has requested nine MV-22s along with two CV-22s requested
by the Air Force. Additionally, fiscal year 2004 funding supports key
elements of the Department's helicopter master plan. We have requested
procurement of 13 MH-60S platforms (organic mine countermeasures,
combat search and rescue, special operations and logistics missions)
and 6 MH-60R platforms (tactical support missions for surface
combatants and aircraft carriers). Together, these will continue
replacing the Department's aging fleet of H-46, SH-3, SH-60B, and SH-
60F helicopters. Fiscal year 2004 will mark the first year of
procurement in the AH-1Z/UH-1Y program. These aircraft improve many
capabilities for the Marine Corps, including increased payload, range
and time on station, improved sensors and lethality, and 85 percent
component commonality.
E. Weapons
The fiscal year 2004 budget request supports the Department's
objective to develop, upgrade, and replace weapons and weapon systems
to ensure we maintain our warfighting edge.
Our precision-guided munitions inventory will continue to improve
in fiscal year 2004 as the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) system ramps up
to full rate production. TACTOM will accelerate the transition of our
land attack missile inventory from the older Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile to the newer, more capable, less costly TACTOM. The budget
request sustains the maximum Department of the Navy production rate for
the Joint Direct Attack Munition of 1,000 units per month while
procuring over 5,000 Laser Guided Bomb kits. Production of the Joint
Standoff Weapon (JSOW) baseline variant (dispenser) increases in fiscal
year 2004, and the JSOW unitary variant (penetrator) enters full rate
production.
Several land attack R&D efforts central to future littoral warfare
continue in fiscal year 2004. Advanced naval gun technologies will
enhance fire support to marines operating ashore. Evolving toward a
fiscal year 2005 ``shoot-off,'' either the Extended Range Guided
Munition or the Autonomous Naval Support Round will enhance the range
and accuracy of Navy 5-inch guns. The Advanced Gun System will provide
the next generation of surface combatants with a modular, large caliber
gun system including an automated magazine handling system.
F. Key Warfighting ``Core Competencies''
While the fiscal year 2004 budget request devotes a significant
amount of resources toward recapitalizing and transforming to meet
future requirements, it also provides solid support for our
longstanding naval ``core competencies'' of Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW), Ship Self Defense (SSD), and Air Defense
(AD).
ASW
ASW remains a challenging mission area, particularly in the shallow
water littoral regions populated by modern, quiet submarines. The
fiscal year 2004 budget request supports numerous improvements in ASW.
The Improved Extended Echo-Ranging is incorporated into the USQ-78B
Acoustic Processor, which will improve large area acoustic search
capability on our Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Further enhancements to our
capability for large area search will be provided by acquiring the
Automatic Periscope Detection and Discrimination system. Additionally,
the capability for our surface combatants to survive attacks from
threat torpedoes will be enhanced through the Surface Ship Torpedo
Defense effort. The success of the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-
RCI) program in providing significant improvement in ASW sensor
processing for our submarine force has spawned similar efforts in
submarine combat control, communications, and upgrades to the surface
fleet's SQQ-89 combat suite. These programs validate the Navy's
decision to use commercially available technology to deliver superior
performance at less cost.
MIW
The Navy continues to make advances in MIW capabilities, and our
emphasis on organic capabilities to counter the growing mine threat is
enhancing our ability to ``get to the fight.'' The fiscal year 2004
budget continues the development and acquisition of the Long-Term Mine
Reconnaissance System (LMRS), which is on track for a fiscal year 2005
IOC on Los Angeles class submarines. LMRS will provide a clandestine
reconnaissance capability for mines and mine-like objects. The fiscal
year 2004 budget also includes funding for the development and
acquisition of the Remote Mine-hunting System (RMS), a surface ship--
launched and recovered semi-submersible vehicle. RMS has a fiscal year
2005 IOC with near-term fielding planned for DDGs 91-96. RMS also is a
strong candidate for future deployment on the LCS. To meet the
Department's goal of an organic mine warfare capability by fiscal year
2005, the fiscal year 2004 budget continues the development and
integration of five Organic Mine Subsystems into the MH-60S platform.
SSD
We continue to invest in upgrading our Ship Self Defense programs.
Fiscal year 2004 funding covers the spectrum from electronic
countermeasures to missiles to guns. The Surface Electronic Warfare
Improvement Program (SEWIP) is a spiral development effort initiated to
provide a robust, full spectrum electronic warfare system following
cancellation of the Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System in
fiscal year 2002. SEWIP will build on the legacy SLQ-32 system to field
capabilities against next-generation threats. The current budget
expands procurement of the Close-in Weapons System, Block 1B. The
internationally-procured Rolling Air Frame Missile will provide ship
self-defense against missiles as part of a layered defense.
Additionally, we are pursuing installation of minor caliber guns on our
deploying ships to improve our ability to counteract a small boat
threat in the 0 to 8,000 yards range. We soon will install stabilized
minor caliber guns on two DDGs.
AD
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests funds to develop the Extended
Range Active Missile (ERAM). ERAM will enable over-the-horizon
engagements against the most advanced anti-ship and land attack cruise
missiles, and represents an important step in projecting area defense
landward from the sea.
G. Maneuver Warfare
The fiscal year 2004 budget supports the continued development and
fielding of all equipment used by the Marine Corps' maneuver forces.
This year, we identify approximately $340 million for R&D and
procurement of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). Last
year we procured the first AAAV, which will serve as a full-up system,
live-fire test vehicle. We will procure 186 systems over the remainder
of the fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2009 program. Scheduled for IOC in
fiscal year 2008, the AAAV will provide a unique combination of
offensive firepower, nuclear-chemical-biological protection, and high
speed mobility on land and on sea.
The fiscal year 2004 budget will fund the next 60 Lightweight 155-
mm (LW155) Howitzers. These units will provide significant improvements
in Marine Corps fire support over the current M198 system. Compatible
with all U.S. and NATO 155mm rounds, the smaller footprint of the LW155
will reduce strategic sealift requirements while providing improved
accuracy and greater lethality.
H. C\4\I, Space and Network Initiatives
The Department's Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and
Intelligence (C\4\I) and Space programs are an integral part of
network-centric operations, enhancing the combat capability of our
Naval Forces and serving as critical enablers of a transforming Navy
and Marine Corps. Our concept of Information Technology for the 21st
century (IT-21) is providing a common backbone for C\4\I systems to be
linked afloat, ashore, and to the Internet. IT-21 combines satellite
and line-of-sight communication paths with commercial IT hardware and
software to establish secure and unclassified Internet Protocol network
connectivity for ashore and mobile Naval Forces. This is a critical
first step toward transformational network-centric operations.
Our next major objective is to integrate the successes of IT-21 and
incorporate them across the full spectrum of naval operations to
achieve significant improvement in knowledge management and operational
performance. This full dimensional approach, called FORCEnet, will
provide the operational construct and architectural framework for naval
warfare in the information age. We will address FORCEnet in greater
detail later in this statement.
Support from space is essential to many Navy and Marine Corps
operations today, and grows increasingly important as the force becomes
more network-centric. The fiscal year 2004 budget supports the
Department's expanding efforts in space, including assured, high data
rate satellite communications, precision navigation and targeting,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems and environmental
support.
The fiscal year 2004 budget continues critical enhancements that
will provide our forces with a common tactical picture. Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) will provide real time exchange of fire
control quality data between battle force units and will permit a
single, identical tactical picture. The Block 2 version will reduce
cost, size, and weight, with procurement beginning in fiscal year 2006.
The Naval Fires Control System and Joint Fires Network will use
existing fire control infrastructure to serve as the nerve center for
surface land attack by automating shipboard land attack battle
management duties, incorporating improved land attack weapons systems,
and utilizing battlefield digitization.
The Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) serves as the principal
element of the IT-21 effort ashore and is a key enabler of IT
transformation. Business Case Analyses conducted over the last 2 years
have demonstrated that the NMCI strategy, characterized by having a
single private sector entity provide IT services under a long-term
commercial seat management contract is, in fact, a sound business
decision compared to the way IT requirements previously were satisfied.
Last year, Congress approved a 2-year extension to the base performance
period of the original NMCI contract, extending coverage through fiscal
year 2007. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.6 billion continues user seat
roll-out and cutover to the NMCI architecture, progressing toward a
target end-state of 365,700 seats.
I. Missile Defense Initiatives
The Department of the Navy is poised to contribute significantly in
fielding initial sea-based missile defense capabilities to meet the
near-term ballistic missile threat to our homeland, our deployed
forces, and our friends and allies. We are working closely with the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to upgrade six DDGs in calendar year 2004
and another six in calendar year 2005 for ICBM surveillance and
tracking duties. We also are supporting MDA's procurement of up to 20
Standard Missile interceptors to provide a limited at-sea capability to
intercept ballistic missiles in the ascent and mid-course phases of
flight. Finally, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70) will be assigned to MDA to
facilitate a more robust testing program for missile defense. Our sea-
based missile defense programs experienced tremendous success on the
test range during 2002, and we look forward to building on these
successes to accelerate development of this vital capability for our
Nation.
J. Shore Infrastructure
The Department remains dedicated to maintaining and improving the
quality of our support to sailors and marines. Maintaining and
improving an aging infrastructure, while recapitalizing our operating
forces, requires disciplined choices and innovative approaches.
The fiscal year 2004 housing program continues the Department's
course toward the goal of eliminating inadequate family housing by
2007. The Navy's three-pronged strategy of improving allowances to
service members, privatizing, and continuing traditional military
construction is proving very successful. Increased Basic Allowance for
Housing (BAH) is spurring local communities to provide necessary
housing on the open market. Recent analysis shows we have reduced the
total requirement for Government-furnished housing by over 9,500 units.
Public/private housing ventures are allowing us to achieve more
with less commitment of resources. In fiscal year 2003, we will
privatize over 10,400 homes in five locations; in fiscal year 2004, we
are increasing this by another 7,000 units. Where BAH and privatizing
do not apply we are renovating or replacing our inventory.
We are building on our successes in family housing to help achieve
our Homeport Ashore Program. Three bachelor housing Public-Private
Venture (PPV) projects are being developed that could triple the number
of spaces we would have been able to provide in San Diego, Norfolk, and
Camp Pendleton under traditional military construction.
The fiscal year 2004 Military Construction and Sustainment program
reflects difficult but necessary trade-offs between shore
infrastructure and fleet recapitalization. The Department remains
committed to achieving a 67-year recapitalization rate by fiscal year
2008. In pursuing that goal, we will explore innovative solutions to
provide safe, efficient installations for our service members,
including design-build improvements, more efficient facilities, and
BRAC land sales via the GSA Internet.
K. Business Practices
We have embarked on a mission to improve the business practices of
the Department. Every dollar saved by working smarter or by ending
outdated methods of operations is another dollar that can be used for
our sailors and marines to equip, train, or fight.
Information is key to improving the way we do business. Better
information makes for better decisionmaking, both on the battlefield
and at the budget table. We have four pilot programs in place utilizing
enterprise resource planning (ERP), which aim to improve the quality of
information available to our decisionmakers. These pilot projects will
eliminate dozens of incompatible computer databases and the business
processes that once supported those databases. Even more importantly,
ERP should produce financial and managerial information that is more
complete, more accurate, and more timely. Our focus now is on
converging these pilots to achieve even greater synergy of management
information across a broader spectrum of the Department, and working
with the Department of Defense Comptroller to ensure these efforts are
advancing the uniform business management architecture under
development.
In addition to better information, we need flexible and innovative
tools to help manage the Department. Some of these tools, like
strategic sourcing, are being used already. Competition helps achieve
the best quality support to the sailor and marine at the lowest
possible cost by introducing the discipline of the marketplace. The
acquisition process still needs considerable reform. We owe it to every
sailor and marine to ensure that today's technology arrives in their
hands today, not tomorrow. It still takes too long from lab to live
fire. Finally, the Navy and Marine Corps need better tools to recruit
and manage the civilians who support our warfighter.
iv. naval power 21: a transformational vision for the 21st century
Fundamentally, our Navy and Marine Corps exist to control the seas,
assure access, and project power beyond the sea. Our vision, Naval
Power 21, is built upon three pillars:

We assure access. We assure sea-based access worldwide
for military operations, diplomatic interaction, and
humanitarian relief efforts.
We fight and win. We project power to influence events
at sea and ashore both at home and overseas.
We are transforming continually to improve. We are
transforming concepts, organizations, doctrine, technology,
networks, sensors, platforms, weapon systems, training,
education, and our approach to people.

Although the Navy and Marine Corps team remains the greatest
maritime force in the world, the emerging challenges of the 21st
century demand a joint, netted, power projection force that offers
modern and ever-evolving combat capability. Together, under the
supporting service visions of Seapower 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21,
we will provide funding for a full array of transformational
initiatives in our R&D, investment, and operational programs. Evidence
of the scope and magnitude of these changes is highlighted by our
transformation:

from a single new class of destroyer to a family of
surface combatants tailored for the full range of 21st century
missions;
from a Cold War force of 18 SSBNs to a 21st century
force of 14 SSBNs and 4 SSGNs;
from evolutionary aircraft carrier improvements to the
revolutionary promise of CVN-21;
from no ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to
limited sea-based BMD capability; and
from competing Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation
to an integrated naval tactical aviation.
A. Transformational Capabilities to Assure Access and Project Power
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to meet the imperative of
transformation. Our ``way ahead'' for the future capitalizes on
transformational ideas that facilitate our recapitalization goals. The
fiscal year 2004 budget request includes funding for initiatives in
shipbuilding, aviation, and C\4\I that promise dramatic improvements in
assuring access and projecting power.
In shipbuilding, we are fulfilling the President's stated goal to
``skip a generation'' of technology by restructuring our previous two-
step (CVNX-1 and CVNX-2) evolutionary acquisition approach into a
single transformational ship design that accommodates continuous
evolution through the life of the class. The new design, named CVN-21,
sustains the original development and construction schedule from CVNX-
1, but accelerates many critical technologies previously planned for
the second step ship, CVNX-2. CVN-21 will feature a new propulsion
plant, a greatly expanded electrical generation and distribution
system, a new/enlarged flight deck, an improved sortie rate generation
over CVNX-1, an electro-magnetic aircraft launching system (EMALS), a
new advanced arresting gear, improved weapons and material handling
systems, and improved survivability features--all with 800 fewer crew
members. In support of this technology acceleration we have added
significant funding across the fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009
program while providing $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2004 alone.
The centerpiece warship of our future surface combatant ``family of
ships,'' the DD(X), is on track to move to an initial construction
contract award in fiscal year 2005. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.05
billion will enable further development of key electric drive, power
grid, and combat system components. Through a spiral development
acquisition process, DD(X) will be the principal technology engine that
will feed the entire family of ships.
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests approximately $160 million in
R&D to begin moving out with the next member of our future surface
combatant ``family of ships,'' the LCS. A networked, lethal, small,
fast, stealthy, and highly maneuverable ship, LCS will be designed from
the keel up as a focused mission ship capable of employing manned and
unmanned mission modules to counter some of the most challenging anti-
access threats our Naval Forces may encounter close to shore--mines,
quiet diesel submarines, and swarming small boats. Last year, we
continued experimenting with a range of innovative hull forms, and
Congress supported us so we could get the program moving this year,
avoiding a critical 1-year delay. The fiscal year 2004 effort will be
aimed at defining requirements, improving our knowledge base for
selecting an LCS design, and beginning mission module development.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains nearly $1.2 billion
for SSBN-to-SSGN conversion. This effort will provide a near-term
transformational capability to the Nation by removing four Ohio class
submarines from their strategic mission, refueling their reactors to
permit an additional 20 years of operation, and converting them into
conventional strike platforms capable of carrying more than 150
Tomahawk missiles and deploying over 60 Special Operations Forces.
Funding to commence the first two conversions was provided in fiscal
year 2003; this year's request supports beginning the final two
conversions.
The fiscal year 2004 budget provides $2.2 billion to continue
development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a stealthy, multi-role
fighter aircraft designed to be an enabler for Naval Power 21. JSF
replaces the Navy's F-18A/C Hornet variants and the Marine Corps' AV-8B
Harrier and F/A-18C/D Hornet while complementing the Navy's F/A-18E/F
Super Hornet. JSF offers dramatic improvements in affordability and
supportability. It has completed all major milestones to date on time,
and remains on track to IOC for the Marine Corps in 2010 and for the
Navy in fiscal year 2012.
A critical enabler of transformational intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Program will provide a
robust overland capability against current and future cruise missile-
type targets. The fiscal year 2004 budget invests over $350 million for
continued development. IOC is planned for fiscal year 2008 with a total
procurement of 66 systems.
As the global war on terrorism has demonstrated, unmanned
technology will play an ever-increasing role in the battleground of the
21st century. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget invests more
than $300 million across a series of UAV programs, including Tactical
UAVs, Maritime Surveillance UAVs, and an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
(UCAV) initiative, developed in partnership with the U.S. Air Force.
Beneath the sea, we will invest more than $80 million in Unmanned
Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) that are being developed to enhance
capabilities in minefield reconnaissance and other submarine missions.
B. Transformational Organizations and Operational Concepts
Beyond pure technology, transformation also includes revolutionary
methods for achieving dramatically greater utility out of our existing
assets. The Department's initiative to integrate its tactical aviation
capabilities is one such transformational story. Navy and Marine Corps
tactical air integration will maximize forward deployed combat power
and optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces. Its positive
impact will be felt across the Department's entire tactical aviation
enterprise, from leaner, more capable fighting formations to
streamlined procurement requirements (tactical and training) to
manpower savings. In total, this innovative program promises to save
$975 million over the fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009 program and
provide approximately $19 billion in cost avoidance from fiscal year
2007 to fiscal year 2012.
To support the ability of forward-based Naval Forces to respond to
a host of scenarios, the Navy and Marine Corps are exploring more
robust strike capabilities for the ARG/MEU team. The Expeditionary
Strike Group pairs the traditional ARG with surface combatants and an
SSN so the force has greater capability to conduct independent
operations in the ``deter'' and ``swiftly defeat'' scenarios outlined
in our defense strategy.
FORCEnet is the Department of the Navy's catalyst for operational
transformation. In the realm of network-centric warfare and operations,
it will enable orders of magnitude increases in combat power to ensure
decisive influence and warfighting success across the full spectrum of
military operations in the information age. FORCEnet is not a system.
It is the architecture by which we will integrate our sensors,
networks, decision aids, weapons, and warfighters into a networked,
distributed combat system, scalable across the entire range of conflict
from seabed to space and sea to land. Leveraging powerful network
infrastructure ashore, including NMCI and the various constituents of
IT-21, with legacy and developing tactical networks at sea, including
those as diverse as CEC, Joint Fires Network and the E-2C Advanced
Hawkeye Program, FORCEnet will bring a dramatically expanded
``toolbox'' of capabilities to the joint warfare commander. Through
FORCEnet the Navy and Marine Corps will transform to a joint, netted,
distributed, and forward stationed force.
C. Transformational Initiatives for our People
Sea Warrior is the process of developing 21st century sailors.
Curriculum Mapping is the Marine Corps equivalent. These initiatives
identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for mission
accomplishment; apply a career-long training and education continuum;
and employ a responsive, interactive career management system to ensure
the right skills are in the right place at the right time.
Modern Naval Forces are manned by streamlined teams of sailors and
marines who fight and manage some of the most complex systems in the
world. We need sailors and marines who are highly educated and expertly
trained. They must be creative thinkers and life-long learners, and it
is for them that we undertook the Revolution in Training. They also
deserve a human resource management and detailing system that provides
information and choice, both to the sailor and gaining commands, so
that informed career decisions can be made. To this end, we are moving
toward an interactive and incentivized distribution system that
includes team detailing, web job listings, an information call center,
and comprehensive and extensive engagement of our detailers with
individual sailors to help shape their careers.
At sea, we are exploring two initiatives that promise a revolution
in the way we man our ships. First, we have begun an ``Optimal Manning
Experiment'' on board U.S.S. Milius (DDG-69) and U.S.S. Mobile Bay (CG-
53) to develop a more efficient model for the shipboard manning
requirements of the 21st century. Also, we have begun a crewing
experiment titled ``Sea Swap,'' in which we will deploy two destroyers
for 18 months consecutively, rotating the entire crews at 6-month
intervals. This initiative will realize significant operational savings
by avoiding multiple 6-week transits to and from the deployed operating
areas.
D. Transformational Initiatives for Doing Business
Our ability to recapitalize and transform stems in large measure
from a vigorous divestiture program that forced us to make hard choices
across every facet of the Department's operations. We looked hard at
older systems with their limited capabilities and high infrastructure
costs (maintenance, parts, training, etc.) and ultimately decided to
accelerate retirement of 11 ships and 70 aircraft. We reorganized and
then reduced the Secretary of the Navy Headquarters Staff by 25
percent. We divested ourselves from more than 50 systems and eliminated
70,000 legacy IT applications from an original baseline of 103,000. In
the aggregate, these difficult decisions yielded $1.9 billion for
reinvestment in higher priorities.
In addition to divestiture initiatives, we are transforming the way
we manage the entire Department's internal affairs. Perhaps nowhere is
this more evident than in our shipbuilding programs. Instead of locking
ourselves into ``pre-ordained obsolescence'' through rigid designs for
hull, combat, and information systems that take years to execute, we
are capitalizing on computer-aided, design-build strategies in which we
harvest commercial, ``state-of-the-art'' technologies and insert them
at the optimum time as the construction process moves from hull to
combat system suite to information systems. We have undertaken some
remarkable initiatives within our acquisition community that have
stabilized key industrial bases, expanded our ability to capitalize on
the best commercial practices, and laid a strong foundation for
controlling the costs of our major acquisition programs.
We are working with industry as partners across the full breadth of
our shipbuilding programs. The tri-partite agreement between Navy,
General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman stabilized both our DDG-51 and
LPD-17 programs, avoided a ``second lead ship'' challenge for the LPD
program, and produced savings sufficient to purchase a third DDG in
fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005. We are working with the software
industry to open all Navy architectures. These efforts are intended to
lead to the development of a truly open architecture that can be shared
between all of our current and future combatant ships. Finally, we have
imposed a discipline on ourselves that severely limits change during
the critical phases of our major shipbuilding programs. This discipline
also has been implemented in the JSF program through a configuration
steering board. By controlling the scope and timing of change, we hope
to implement necessary changes in our programs in a planned fashion
where we know what it will cost and how we will install it in the most
economical manner.
Through these transformational business initiatives and others, our
Department will emerge with an optimal force structure; a healthy
industrial base and an efficient and appropriately sized
infrastructure.

V. THE WAY AHEAD: POSITIONING TODAY'S NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FOR
TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES

Although the global war on terrorism is closer to the beginning
than the end, our Navy and Marine Corps, as members our Nation's joint
battle force, have disrupted terrorist networks and freed the people of
Afghanistan. Our Nation can take pride that, in 2002, the Navy-Marine
Corps Team continued its record of combat excellence, improved
operational readiness, and retained our magnificent people at historic
rates.
Much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. The
Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request positions today's Navy and
Marine Corps to support tomorrow's joint warfighting environment by
sustaining hard-fought advances in personnel and operational readiness,
investing in critical shipbuilding and aircraft programs, fueling
transformational capabilities, and building a global, agile, and fully
networked force. As our Navy and Marine Corps Team confronts a future
with challenges already visible on the horizon, we thank you for your
terrific support of our Naval Forces, and urge your continued support
for the course upon which we have embarked to fight and win our
Nation's wars while preparing to meet the demands of an uncertain
tomorrow.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. For the
Department of the Air Force, Secretary Roche.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Secretary Roche. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
members of the committee. It is my great honor to join my
fellow Service Secretaries today and to represent some hundred
thousand active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen who are
engaged in defending our Nation and serving our interests
around the globe. I am very proud of their achievements this
year, from combat operation to homeland defense, to their daily
efforts that guarantee the readiness, health, security, and
morale of our forces.
It has also been my distinct pleasure to serve for another
year with a wonderful general officer named John Jumper. I
enjoyed working with him; I enjoyed his background. We note in
our travels around the Air Force, we have been impressed and
humbled by the creativity, commitment, and professionalism of
our airmen.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, if the President decides that
we should go into conflict, I want you to know we are ready. We
have looked at all of the aspects. As some of you know, I carry
each day the current list of preferred precision munitions and
where we are in production. We review all that will be asked of
us. We are ready; we want you to know this.
As we prepare for the future, we fully support the
Department's continuing efforts to balance near-term readiness
and operational requirements with long-term transformation of
the Armed Forces. Our challenge is to fight the global war on
terrorism while simultaneously transforming. We must do both.
Although we face near-term budget pressures, we nevertheless
must invest in the future. Otherwise, we may be forced to pay
more later in dollars and perhaps even lives.
A year of challenging operations, readiness improvements,
and investments in our people provide us with many good news
stories. In defense of the homeland, we flew over 25,000
Operation Noble Eagle fighter, tanker, and airborne warning
sorties, made possible only through the mobilization of over
30,000 airmen from the Air Force Reserves and Air National
Guard. They have conducted over 75 percent of all Operation
Noble Eagle missions.
In Operation Enduring Freedom, we flew more than 40,000
sorties in 2002, over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. We
did over 8,000 refueling missions, 55 percent of which were for
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, which really made this a joint
operation in a distant landlocked nation that we never thought
possible that we would have to fight a long time ago.
In Afghanistan, our special operation teams developed new
ways to bring air and space power to bear in a variety of
engagements. Notably, our combat controllers integrated new
technologies and precision weapons into close air support from
39,000 feet using the B-2 bomber; and Curtis Lemay probably is
turning in his grave. We are now developing better processes to
target and engage time-critical and moving targets, and the
same combat controllers are working on the next generation of
systems.
We have sustained a forward presence around the globe
protecting our Nation's interests and assuring our allies. We
now have over 35,000 deployed airmen serving in some 50
expeditionary bases in over 35 countries plus over 50,000
airmen permanently assigned overseas, not including Hawaii and
Alaska.
In space, we continued the operation of a variety of
satellite constellations that provided essential capabilities
to warfighters and civil consumers. Last year, we launched 18
missions with a 100 percent success rate, including the first
space launch using an expendable launch vehicle. But we are now
facing some interesting challenges. For instance, we now note
with undeniable reality that other nations are investing in
American advanced military technologies, and fielding the best
our aerospace industry has to offer in their air forces. This
is unique in our history.
While investment of our good friends and allies is a great
value for our alliance's industrial base, superior capabilities
are now sure to be present in American-produced airplanes that
do not fly the American flag. While other nations are
modernizing, we continue to employ aging systems that are
becoming more difficult to operate and more expensive to
maintain. The average age of the operational Air Force fleet is
22 years old this day. Even with our planned aircraft
procurements, the total average age is expected to increase to
27 years by the year 2020.
While our 2004 budget addresses a number of these
challenges and supports the Department's priorities, it
accelerates our modernization of joint capabilities, and
maintains the gains of readiness and people programming
achieved last year. Most important it gets money into our
procurement programs and funds essential capabilities our
warfighters need. I strongly request that you support stability
in all of these programs.
Mr. Chairman, we are also working with Secretary Rumsfeld
and our colleagues to assess, advocate, and implement a range
of sensible management practices that we believe will help
minimize bureaucratic obstacles in the path that affect the
future administration of the Department. In particular, we are
looking at measures to transform our personnel, acquisition,
administrative, and range management practices and we have
asked for your help.
In order to be brief, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude there
and thank you and your colleagues for investments you have made
in our future and for the trust you have placed in our
concerted effort to provide America with air and space
dominance.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Roche follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. James G. Roche

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has an
unlimited horizon for air and space capabilities. Our Service was borne
of innovation, and we remain focused on identifying and developing the
concepts of operations, advanced technologies, and integrated
operations required to provide the joint force with unprecedented
capabilities and to remain the world's dominant air and space force.
The Wright brothers' historic flight in 1903 ushered in the dawn of
a dramatic era of scientific, cultural, and technological advances. As
the Air Force celebrates this centennial of powered flight, we do so
with the recognition that, despite the daunting challenges of a more
dynamic security environment, the next hundred years will witness
equally fantastic achievements. The 2003 Air Force Posture Statement
reflects this optimism. In this report, we relate some of our
accomplishments of 2002 as well as our vision of an innovative and
adaptive force capable of guaranteeing American air and space dominance
for the decades to come. Our successes are America's successes; they
are the direct result of the selfless and unconditional service by men
and women of the Total Air Force and their families.
During the past year, and in the midst of combat and a variety of
contingency operations, we evaluated, implemented, and validated a host
of technological advances, organizational changes, and concepts of
operation. These enabled us to deliver desired effects faster and with
greater precision than at any time in the history of warfare. Such
adaptation is characteristic of our Service, as airmen continually
strive to push innovation ever forward en route to unprecedented air
and space capabilities for combatant commanders, the joint force, and
our Nation. In the year ahead, we will move our expeditionary Air Force
closer to realizing the transformational imperatives of this new era,
machine-to-machine digital integration of manned, unmanned, and space
assets, and joint command and control. Our concepts of operation
leverage this integration, and expand our asymmetric advantages in air
and space--advantages that are fundamental to defending America's
interests, assuring our allies and coalition partners, and winning the
Nation's wars.
We recognize the responsibility for America's security is not one
we shoulder alone. We work tirelessly toward developing and training
professional airmen, transitioning new technologies into warfighting,
and integrating the capabilities of our sister Services, other
government agencies, and those of our friends abroad to act in the most
efficient and effective manner across all operations--from humanitarian
to combat missions. At the same time, we pay special attention to the
consolidating aerospace industry, our acquisition processes, and our
critical modernization challenges, to ensure we will be able to draw
upon our core competencies for decades to come.
Blessed with full endorsement from the American people, Congress,
and the President, we will remain the world's dominant Air Force. We
are honored to serve with America's airmen, and we sincerely appreciate
the confidence in our commitment and capability to provide our great
Nation with superiority in air and space.

INTRODUCTION

As America approaches the 100th anniversary of powered flight, the
Air Force realizes that the Nation is only in the adolescence of air
and space capabilities. Yet we envision a future that will manifest
dramatic advances in propulsion, operational employment, weapon
systems, information technology, education, and training for our air
and space forces. It is a future of unprecedented, seamless integration
of air and space capabilities with joint command and control at the
operational level of war, and machine-to-machine integration at the
tactical level. We are pursuing these changes--some elementary, others
revolutionary--which will dramatically escalate the capabilities
available to the joint forces of the United States; perpetuate American
air and space dominance; and redefine the nature of warfare.
If there was any ambiguity about the nature of the security
environment in this new century, the attacks of September 11, 2001,
crystallized the setting. Just as the turmoil of the previous decade
eluded prediction, the dynamic setting of the decades ahead poses even
greater predictive challenges as centers of power and sources of
conflict migrate from traditional origins. No longer will it suffice to
prepare for real and perceived threats from nation-states. Instead, we
must apply the sum of our operational experiences and experimentation
to develop dynamic, flexible, and adaptable forces, capable of
dissuading, deterring, and defeating a much wider range of potential
adversaries, while still assuring her friends and allies.
This fluid setting underscores the need for doctrinal agility, and
expeditious and responsive acquisition, planning, and execution across
the spectrum of capabilities in support of homeland security--from the
most difficult anti-access scenario to humanitarian relief. As new
generations of technology proliferate among potential adversaries, we
also are reminded of the need to keep pushing technology forward. In
less than 100 years, we elevated from a Kitty Hawk biplane flying 100
feet on a 12-second flight, to a host of sophisticated, stealthy aerial
vehicles capable of reaching any place in the world, and an array of
satellites that circle the globe continuously. We do not rest on these
achievements, but instead engage a new generation of innovation.
Therefore, our mission is to make calculated research, development, and
procurement decisions with the resolve to integrate all of our combat,
information, and support systems into an enterprise architecture that
contributes joint air and space capabilities to help win the Nation's
wars.
Meeting these requirements also warrants our continued
transformation into an expeditionary force with the culture,
composition, and capabilities to fulfill our evolving operational
tasks. As the scope of global contingencies requiring American
involvement has multiplied, we have witnessed the substantial value of
agility, rapid response, and integration. Thus, we are becoming ever
more responsive in time, technology, and training, and in the process,
we are elevating Air Force contributions to joint capabilities, while
developing our airmen as joint warfighters.
A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld laid out a number of key priorities
for the DOD. All of these--from pursuing the global war on terrorism
and strengthening joint warfighting capabilities, to streamlining the
DOD processes and improving interagency integration--demand across-the-
board changes in the way the Defense Department operates. The Air Force
has taken advantage of this opportunity to evaluate and strengthen our
capabilities, and to fundamentally drive our investment strategy.
As we contemplate more than a decade of unprecedented success using
air and space power, we recognize that we never fight alone. The
emerging interdependence of joint, coalition, and alliance partnerships
throughout a decade of contingency warfare has been a profound lesson
learned. Through cooperative planning, we will realize the full
potential of our Service--bringing to bear fully integrated air and
space capabilities.
It is our imperative to approach this planning and integration with
innovation and vision, fundamentally focused on capabilities. All of
the Armed Forces are focusing on meeting the Quadrennial Defense
Review's ``1-4-2-1'' force-shaping construct, by defining the
fundamental capabilities required to meet the challenges of a changing
world. These are: to defend the United States through homeland
security; to deter aggression and coercion in the four critical regions
of Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Asian littorals; to
swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while being
capable of decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and to conduct a
number of smaller scale contingencies. A revitalized, capabilities-
focused approach to operational military requirements will allow us to
meet these missions.
Our focus on capabilities for an uncertain future has inspired us
to adapt anew the way we organize, train, and equip our forces. We have
begun by developing Task Force Concepts of Operation (TF CONOPS), which
will define how we will fight and integrate our air and space
capabilities with joint, coalition, and alliance forces. The
requirements that emerge from these operational concepts will guide a
reformed acquisition process that will include more active, continuous
partnerships among requirement, development, operational, test, and
industry communities working side-by-side at the program level.
This process can only be successful with the help of a vibrant
defense industry. Yet today the aerospace industry is consolidating to
a point that threatens to diminish the advantages of competition. This,
in turn, can lead to loss of innovation, diminished technical skill
base, lower cost efficiencies, and other challenges. We must foster
increased competition to ensure the long-term health of an industrial
sector critical to our national security. While the Air Force will
continue to advance the vision and associated capabilities for air and
space, we also must challenge industry in order for it to stay on the
cutting edge of technology and efficient management practices.
Finally, transforming our force will not be possible without a
process to educate, train, and offer experience to the right mix of
active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and civilian airmen
who understand the nature of our changing security environment. To
achieve this, we will evolve what we have traditionally called the
``personnel'' function in new ways so as to blend professional military
education, advanced academic degrees, and assignment policies under the
auspices of ``Force Development.''
This is the United States Air Force in 2003--inherently innovative,
tirelessly dedicated, and comprised of the very best airmen and
capabilities in the world to ensure American security and defend her
interests. This is what our Nation expects, and we will continually
meet that expectation.

WHAT WE DO

The United States Armed Forces exist to fight and win our Nation's
wars, which no Service can accomplish alone. The Air Force's pivotal
role is to deliver fully capable and integrated air and space power to
the Joint Force Commander (JFC). By dominating the media of elevation,
the Air Force offers unique warfighting capabilities that leverage the
strengths of surface forces and expand the range of potential effects.
Air and space are realms with unlimited horizons for discovery and
development. While the Air Force has made tremendous strides in
realizing the visions of early airmen and exploiting the operational
potential in each medium, we know there is an array of capabilities as
yet undiscovered. As the Air Force strives to realize these
possibilities, we deliver a multitude of air and space achievements for
joint warfighting.
Although relatively short, Air Force history reveals fundamental
competencies that are core to developing and delivering air and space
power--those unique institutional qualities that set the Air Force
apart from the other Services and any other military force in the
world. By identifying and keeping these competencies foremost in our
vision, we are able to more effectively advance the unique
capabilities, as well as the ultimate effects, the Air Force provides
to the joint force and the Nation.
The Air Force continually develops areas of expertise that make us
the preeminent air and space force in the world. Previously, we
distilled these into six distinctive capabilities which we referred to
as our ``core competencies''--Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack,
Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority,
and Agile Combat Support. However, just as our concepts of operations
and capabilities continuously evolve, so also does the way in which we
articulate Air Force competencies. With deeper refinement, we learned
there are more fundamental elements to what we are as an Air Force and
how we develop our capabilities for joint warfighting. These are our
underlying institutional air and space core competencies--those that,
in fact, make the six distinctive capabilities possible: Developing
Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations. These
three air and space core competencies form the basis through which we
organize, train, and equip and from which we derive our strengths as a
Service.

(1) Developing Airmen: The heart of combat capability

The ultimate source of air and space combat capability resides in
the men and women of the Air Force. The value of technology,
organization, and strategy are diminished without professional airmen
to leverage their value. Our total force of active, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian personnel are our largest investment and most critical asset.
They are airmen: steeped in our expeditionary Service ethos. Therefore,
from the moment they step into the Air Force through to their last day
in service, we are dedicated to ensuring they receive the precise
education, training, and professional development necessary to provide
a quality edge second to none. The full spectrum capabilities of our
Air Force stem from the collective abilities of our personnel, and the
abilities of our people stem from career-long development of
professional airmen.

(2) Technology-to-warfighting: The tools of combat capability

(3) Integrating Operations: Maximizing combat capabilities

Effectively integrating the diverse capabilities found in all four
Services remains pivotal to successful joint warfighting. The Air Force
contributes to this enduring objective as each element of air and space
power brings unique and essential capabilities to the joint force. Our
inherent ability to envision, experiment, and ultimately execute the
union of a myriad of platforms and people into a greater, synergistic
whole is the key to maximizing these capabilities. In so doing, we are
able to focus acquisition and force planning on systems that enable
specific, effects-based capabilities, rather than on individual
platforms.
Embedded in our exploration of innovative operational concepts is
the efficient integration of all military systems--air, land, maritime,
space, and information--to ensure maximum flexibility in the joint
delivery of desired effects across the spectrum of conflict, from war
to operations short of war. However, effective integration involves
more than smart technology investment--it also requires investigation
of efficient joint and Service organization and innovative operational
thinking. Thus, investments in our people to foster intellectual
flexibility and critical analysis are equally as important as our
technology investments.
Collectively, our air and space core competencies reflect the
visions of the earliest airmen and serve to realize the potential of
air and space forces. We foster ingenuity and adventure in the
development of the world's most professional airmen. We seek to
translate new technologies into practical systems while we encourage
intellectual innovation at every level of war. We drive relentlessly
toward integration in order to realize the potential and maturation of
air and space capabilities.
Our proficiency in the three institutional air and space core
competencies underpins our ability to deliver the Air Force's six
distinctive capabilities in joint warfighting. In turn, our
capabilities enable desired effects across the spectrum of joint
operations through our task forces drawn from our air and space
expeditionary forces. The results of this relationship between core
competencies, distinctive capabilities, and operational effects are
manifest in the array of successful missions the Air Force accomplished
in the past year and those we continue to execute.
Expeditionary Construct
Our core competencies reflect a legacy of innovation and adaptation
to accomplish our mission. This point is underscored by the fact that,
in spite of over a 30-percent reduction in manpower in the past 12
years, we have faced an exponential increase in worldwide taskings.
Intensifying operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) requires significant changes
in the way our force trains, organizes, and deploys to support JFC
requirements. We are a truly expeditionary force--the nature of our
``business'' is deployed operations.
The Air Force meets JFC requirements by presenting forces and
capabilities through our Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
construct. This divides our combat forces into 10 equivalent AEFs, each
possessing air and space warfighting and associated mobility and
support capabilities. A key element of our ability to deliver these
tailored and ready expeditionary forces is our development of Task
Force Concepts of Operation. Our TF CONOPS describe how we fight and
how we integrate with our sister Services and outside agencies. They
are the fundamental blueprints for how we go to war. Combined with our
AEF construct--the principle tool we use to present expeditionary
wings, groups, and squadrons--TF CONOPS will guide our decisions in
operational planning, enable us to provide scaleable, quick-reacting,
tasked-organized units from the 10 standing AEFs, and sustain our
ability to ensure trained and ready forces are available to satisfy
operational plans and contingency requirements.
The AEF construct incorporates a 15-month cycle during which two
AEFs are designated as lead for a 90-day ``eligibility'' period. During
this period, the two are either deployed or on alert for daily,
worldwide expeditionary taskings, for which they are tailored and
presented to the JFC as expeditionary squadrons, groups, and wings
(depending on the specific requirement). Meanwhile, the remaining eight
AEFs are in various stages of reconstituting, training, or preparatory
spin-up for their lead period over the course of 12 months. It is
during this preparatory time (approximately 2 months) that we integrate
the training-to-task of AEF squadrons immediately prior to their on-
call window.
Yet, it is important to note that while our combat forces cycle
through deployment vulnerability periods, they sustain wartime
readiness throughout the 15-month training and preparation cycle--a
critical driver of our 90-day eligibility window. Our AEF cycle thus
precludes the need for ``tiered'' readiness by allowing our combat
forces to remain current and capable for any contingency or operational
plan.
While ensuring necessary capabilities for the JFC, AEF cycles allow
us to provide our airmen with a more stable and predictable environment
in which to train, re-fit, and equip. In addition, AEF scheduling makes
it easier and more practicable for the Air Reserve Component (ARC)
forces--Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG)--
to bring their essential contributions to bear by allowing them to plan
definitive absences from their civilian employment. This is a critical
advantage of the AEF construct, as ARC forces comprise nearly half of
the forces assigned to AEFs and contribute the majority of forces for
some mission areas.
Operations in 2002
Confident in our air and space capabilities, and committed to
meeting any mission tasked, the Air Force completed an unprecedented
array of operations and exercises in 2002. From the mountain ranges in
Afghanistan and the jungles of the Philippines to the deserts of the
Middle East, and across every continent and body of water, the Air
Force joined with land and Naval Forces to secure America's national
objectives. With each mission, the joint force grows more capable as it
applies vision, experimentation, and integration to every undertaking.
We do not act as individual Services, but in concert as joint
warfighters, as we prevail in the war on terrorism and in all
undertakings.
Assuring our Nation's citizens, the Air Force conducts a range of
alert postures involving more than 200 military aircraft at over 20
airbases for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). In conjunction with
unprecedented NATO airborne warning support and other U.S. Services'
assets, we have provided continuous combat air patrols over sensitive/
high risk areas, and random patrols over other metropolitan areas and
key infrastructure. Last year, we flew over 25,000 ONE fighter, tanker,
airlift, and airborne warning sorties, made possible only through the
mobilization of over 30,000 Reserve component airmen. In fact, the ANG
and AFRC have effected over 75 percent of the total ONE missions. We
will continue this critical mission, as we execute our most fundamental
responsibility--homeland defense.
Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the USAF has
maintained a continuous, steady-force presence in Afghanistan and the
rest of the area of responsibility of more than 14,000 airmen. Air
Force assets provide crucial intelligence and situation awareness,
combat power and support capabilities for the combatant commander. A
key reason for American military success in the region is the
performance of Air Force special operations airmen. Working in teams
with other special forces, ground units, and coalition elements, airmen
special operators heroically bring to bear the full weight of air and
space capabilities--from the ground. They introduce our adversaries to
the full lethality of our airmen, fully integrated on the ground, in
the air, and from space.
Fully engaged in all aspects of the war on terrorism, from mobility
to close air support, our aircraft and crews flew more than 40,000 OEF
sorties in 2002--over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. Over 8,000
refueling missions marked the linchpin capability for the joint fight--
the tanker force--while the magnificent achievements of airlift assets
rounded out overwhelming mobility efforts. Simply put, Air Force
mobility forces made operations in a distant, land-locked nation
possible.
Beyond air operations, we operated and maintained several
constellations of earth-orbiting satellites, and in 2002 we launched 18
missions with a 100-percent success rate--including the first space
launches using Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. These activities
bolstered America's assured access to space and ensured vigorous,
global ISR, missile warning, precision navigation and timing,
communications, and weather systems. In addition, manned, unmanned, and
space intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, not
only delivered unprecedented battlefield awareness, but with the
Predator UAV, also introduced transformational combat capabilities.
ONE and OEF levied particularly heavy demands on our security
forces. In CONUS and forward locations, increased alert postures
warranted significant increases in security personnel who constitute a
critical element of our force protection capabilities. These demands
have raised our force protection posture worldwide and have forced us
to adjust to a new ``steady state'' condition. Security forces bear the
brunt of the adjustment effort despite a resultant baseline shortfall
of approximately 8,000 personnel to meet the alert postures. In the
near term, we involuntarily extended for a second year nearly 9,500 ARC
security forces. However, in order to relieve these ARC forces, we
concluded a 2-year agreement with the Army for short-term support, and
initiated several ongoing efforts to combine technology, new processes,
and some manpower shifts to achieve a long-term adjustment to this new
era.
As we adjust, we continue to deliver force protection through the
integrated application of counter and antiterrorism operations, and
preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosive (CBRNE) incidents. We employ a tailored selection and
application of multi-layered active and passive, offensive and
defensive measures. Intelligence and counterintelligence programs
support this integrated effort and remain critical to our success. In
this regard, we continued to develop and employ all-source intelligence
systems; cross-functional intelligence analysis procedures; and an
operational planning process to implement force protection operations
that deter, detect, deny, and destroy threats. Our goal is to see
first, understand first, and act first.
Though engaged in these security enhancements and the GWOT, our
combat operations were not limited to OEF in 2002. Iraqi forces fired
on coalition aircraft over 400 times during 14,000 sorties supporting
Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW). The Air Force
maintained a continuous, regional presence of more than 9,000 airmen,
while air and space assets provided vital intelligence, situation
awareness, and indications and warning to monitor Iraq's compliance
with United Nations' directives.
Whether on the ground or in the skies, our airmen also conducted a
host of other missions above-and-beyond standing security requirements
around the globe. Even though the war on terrorism is our national
military focus, airmen joined soldiers, sailors, and marines in the
Balkans, South America, Europe, Asia, and around the world to assure
our friends and allies, while deterring and dissuading our adversaries.
Worldwide humanitarian and non-combat evacuation operations
missions remain other key tasks for Air Force personnel. In 2002, for
example, airlift crews exceeded 2.4 million airdropped daily ration
deliveries in Afghanistan, evacuated allied personnel at threatened
locations around the world, and flew typhoon relief missions to Guam,
while our explosive ordnance specialists removed unexploded munitions
in Africa. Yet, while conducting unprecedented food, medical, and civil
engineering and evacuation relief efforts in warring regions, we were
also on call to perform critical, quick-response missions during
natural or man-made crises at home. Through explosive ordnance
disposal, fire fighting, law enforcement support, and rapid medical
response expertise, we conducted daily operations in support of local,
State, and Federal agencies. During the wildfire season, ANG and AFRC
C-130s equipped with modular airborne fire fighting systems flew nearly
200 sorties while assisting U.S. Forest Service firefighting efforts in
numerous States. In addition, when Hurricane Lili endangered Louisiana,
Air Force aeromedical and critical care forces rolled in with C-9
aircraft to transport and safeguard 40 patients from threatened
hospitals.
Training Transformation
Training is a uniquely American military strength. As potential
adversaries work to overcome our technological superiority, it is
imperative we enhance this strength through improved proficiency at the
tactical level and integration at the joint level. Training is integral
to our core competencies and the critical enabler for military
capabilities, so we are engaged with the other Services, unified
commands, and OSD in developing and implementing a training
transformation plan. Our objective is to train as we will fight and
increase the joint context of our exercises through live, virtual,
distributed, and constructive environments. It is the realism of this
training that gives us the edge in combat. This involves not only
modernizing the integration of space and information operations on our
ranges, but also planning for their sustainment to meet future test and
training missions while implementing environmentally sound use and
management to ensure long-term availability. Additionally, to expand
range support for current and emerging missions, we are embarking on a
new effort to identify and procure environmental, airspace, and
spectrum resources at home and abroad.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises, Interoperability Training, and
Experimentation
We advanced joint and combined interoperability skills with our
sister Services and those of 104 nations throughout 111 JCS exercises
and Joint Task Force (JTF) experimentation, conducted in 40 foreign
countries. Exercises ranged from large field training such as Bright
Star, to command post exercises like Positive Response, to smaller, but
equally valuable humanitarian exercises, as in the school construction,
well drilling, and medical clinic visits of New Horizons-Jamaica. These
activities provided realistic training and enhanced the effectiveness
of all participating nations' forces.
Task Force Enduring Look
Success in future operations hinges upon our ability to learn from
previous operations and exercises. To ensure we learn from ongoing
operations and adapt accordingly, we established Task Force Enduring
Look (TFEL). TFEL is responsible for Air Force-wide data collection,
exploitation, documentation, and reporting for our efforts in ONE/OEF.
The objective for TFEL is clear--provide superior support to the
warfighter, and properly recognize and apply lessons learned during
rather than only at the conclusion of these operations.
Through extensive investigation and analysis, TFEL examines joint
warfighting effectiveness, determines implications, and shapes future
Air Force transformation of expeditionary air and space power. The task
force documents lessons learned in a variety of products that cover
every conceivable subject matter. As derivative campaigns unfold, TFEL
will broaden its assessments in follow-on reports. Applying the lessons
in these reports and adapting from our past experiences will help
ensure we prevail in future operations.
We are able to accomplish the full spectrum of air and space
missions, and improve our capabilities through lessons learned, by
focusing on the best way to organize, train, and equip. Creativity,
ingenuity, and innovation are the hallmarks of all that we do, all of
which begins with our people.

WHO WE ARE

``No arsenal and no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so
formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.
It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It
is a weapon that we as Americans do have. President Ronald
Reagan, 20 January 1981

America is blessed with vast resources, and chief among these is
her people. In the same way, the Air Force relies on the officers,
enlisted, civilians, and contractors that comprise our total force--
active, Guard, and Reserve--for cultural strength and unbridled skill.
Air Force strength will never reside in systems alone, but in the
airmen operating them. Nor will our capabilities improve solely through
technology, but instead through the adaptive insight of our creative
and selfless professionals.
Therefore, we recruit and retain a remarkably diverse group to
ensure we reach the fullest potential of air and space forces. Their
backgrounds reflect the cross-section of American culture--all races,
religions, economic and educational backgrounds, skill and management
levels, men and women--and make this Air Force the tremendous
organization it is today. Just as diverse individual citizens find
unity in the term American, our personnel embrace an identity and
fundamental perspective as Airmen.
The underlying qualities found in all airmen emanate from our core
values--integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all
that we do. Embedded in these core values are the inherent
characteristics of our confident, capable airmen--courage, tenacity,
professionalism, vision, pride, and, when faced with seemingly
insurmountable obstacles, heroism. Indeed, today's airmen carry on the
traditions and visions of the earliest generation of airmen while
preparing for the challenges of the future.
The diversity of our airmen energizes the advancement of America's
air and space power. Airmen embrace transformational ideas and seek to
apply them to every aspect of the Air Force, from organizational
constructs to concepts of operation and employment. They are able
stewards of the Nation's space programs, advancing ideas and
technologies for national security, as well as for the environmental
and economic benefit of our Nation and the world. Yet, ultimately our
standout advantage is our warrior airmen themselves, who demonstrate
skills and dedication in combat unsurpassed by any in history. Whether
maintaining safe skies across the United Nations' sanctioned no-fly
zone in Iraq, hunting down terrorists in the jungles of the
Philippines, or paying the ultimate price while rescuing fellow
Americans in a battle on an Afghan ridge, our airmen are proven combat
veterans. Their selflessness resonates the very best of our Service.
Airmen are expeditionary--our natural state of operations is not
``home station,'' but rather, deployed. After two successful cycles,
our AEF construct has been validated as an effective means of meeting
our Nation's expeditionary requirements. Yet we continue to enhance the
construct, by initiating significant organizational change to ensure
nearly every airman belongs to one of the 10 AEFs. The effect has been
a change to our airmen's mindset and culture, where an individual's AEF
association cultivates an expeditionary perspective and a clearer
appreciation for joint warfighting requirements and capabilities.
Force Development--A New Leadership Development Paradigm
In the past, we addressed aspects of career development, education,
and assignments individually, but not necessarily in a coordinated,
connected approach. Recognizing this, and to prepare for the future
more ably, we introduced a systemic, deliberate force development
construct that evolves professional airmen into joint force warriors.
This construct coordinates doctrine and policies, concentrated to
provide the right level, timing, and focus of education, training, and
experience for all airmen, while encompassing personal, team, and
institutional leadership skills across tactical, operational, and
strategic levels.
In the 21st century, we need air and space warriors with mastery of
their primary skills and others who possess competency beyond their own
specialty. However, this diversity must be deliberate to ensure the
correct skills are paired according to institutional requirements.
Force development encourages many to obtain a deep perspective in their
functional area, but at the same time offers the broader perspective we
need to complement our leadership team. We begin this transformation
with the active officer corps and will eventually encompass the
civilian, enlisted, and Reserve components to better meet the expanding
challenges of tomorrow.
Education and Technical Training--Emphasis on Joint Leadership/Warfare
As opportunities resident in advancing technologies unfold, it is
imperative that the Air Force be able to draw upon a vibrant collection
of educated, technically skilled, and technologically savvy airmen--
both uniformed and civilian alike. We are answering this fundamental
need in fiscal year 2003 with aggressive and innovative initiatives to
enhance the abilities and breadth of our force. Agile, flexible
training is an essential investment in human capital, and our
initiatives will ensure our investment delivers the right training to
the right people at the right time.
In August 2002, we began our groundbreaking Enlisted-to-Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) Program. An initial cadre of senior NCOs
began receiving world-class, graduate education to optimize them for
greater responsibilities and challenging follow-on assignments. We will
also provide a major influx of officers into AFIT, Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS), and civilian institutions. In addition, because more than
42 percent of our civilian force will be eligible for retirement in the
next 5 years, we are committing significant resources to pay for
advanced education as well as cross-functional career broadening.
Future military missions and contingencies will require greater
sophistication and understanding of the security environment, and our
expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign
language proficiency, and cultural understanding. We are working
diligently to expand the cadre of professionals with such skill sets
and experiences. Our education initiatives will contribute to a major
corporate culture shift that fosters appropriate development throughout
our airmen's careers to meet evolving force requirements.
Diversity
Foremost among our efforts to enhance the capabilities of our
airmen is a passionate drive for diversity. Diversity is a warfighting
issue; it is a readiness issue. We must attract people from all
segments of American society and tap into the limitless talents and
advantages resident in our diverse population if we hope to reach our
fullest potential as a fighting force. Nurturing rich representation
from all demographics opens the door to creativity and ingenuity,
offering an unparalleled competitive edge for air and space
development. Today's multi-threat world also mandates that we
invigorate in our airmen the ability to effectively think across
cultural boundaries and functional paradigms (or stovepipes). We will
thus recruit, train, and retain airmen without intellectual boundaries,
uniquely capable of integrating people, weapons, ideas, and systems to
achieve air and space dominance.
Recruiting
It takes tremendous effort to identify and develop such airmen, yet
the return for the Nation is immeasurable. Increased advertising, an
expanded recruiting force with broader access to secondary school
students, and competitive compensation prepare us to meet recruiting
goals. Despite the challenge of mustering such a diverse and skilled
collection of Americans, we exceeded our fiscal year 2002 enlisted
recruiting goals and expect to surpass fiscal year 2003 objectives. We
will adapt our goals to meet new force objectives, however the capacity
limitations of basic military training and technical training school
quotas will continue to challenge total force recruiting efforts.
Officer recruitment presents similar challenges, yet we continue to
attract America's best and brightest. However, we are particularly
concerned with military and civilian scientists and engineers. We fell
short of our accession goal for this group and have begun all-out
recruitment and retention efforts for these critical specialties. For
example, in fiscal year 2003 we plan to begin a college sponsorship
program to attract scientists and engineers from universities lacking
ROTC programs. In addition, we continue to find recruiting health care
professionals especially difficult, so we are making adjustments to
ensure improvement.
We will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the ANG
and AFRC access close to 25 percent of eligible, separating active Air
Force members (i.e. no break in service). Continued high OPTEMPO may
negatively impact our efforts in attracting Air National Guardsmen, as
well as drawing separating active airmen to the Air Force Reserve. As a
result, recruiting will have to ``make up'' a substantial portion of
accessions from that market by developing alternatives.
Retention
The Air Force is a retention-based force. The critical skill sets
we develop in our airmen are not easily replaced, so we expend every
effort to retain our people--the impetus for our ``re-recruiting''
efforts. Overall retention plans include robust compensation packages
that reward service, provide for a suitable standard of living, ensure
a high quality-of-life, and retain the caliber of professionals we need
to decisively win America's wars.
For fiscal year 2002, it was difficult to calculate accurate
retention results due to Air Force implementation of Stop Loss.
Nonetheless, we continue to reap the benefits of an aggressive
retention program, aided by bonuses, targeted pay raises, and quality-
of-life improvements. Introducing the Critical Skills Retention Bonus
for select officer specialties reinforces our commitment to target
specific skills suffering significant retention challenges. However,
many airmen retained under Stop Loss will separate throughout fiscal
year 2003--a fact of particular concern for our rated force.
Bonuses and special pay programs continue to be effective tools in
retaining our members. The ANG has placed particular emphasis on
aircraft maintenance fields, security forces, and communication and
intelligence specialists, among others, by offering enlistment and
reenlistment bonuses, Student Loan Repayment Program, and the
Montgomery GI Bill Kicker Program. Another example is the flexible
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program--an important part of our
multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. In conjunction with our rated
recall program, our fiscal year 2002 plan resulted in a substantial
increase in committed personnel. We have a similarly designed ACP
program in fiscal year 2003, and plan future extensions to include
navigators and air battle managers.
Summary
Regardless of AEF deployment or home station missions, our airmen
accomplish their duties with firm commitment and resolute action. It's
what we do. It's who we are: a practical, technically sound, ingenious
force of uniformed and civilian airmen derived from this richly diverse
Nation to create the world's premier air and space power.

WHERE WE'RE GOING

The first hundred years of powered flight witnessed tremendous and
enduring innovation. We commemorate this centennial during 2003 with
the theme, Born of Dreams, Inspired by Freedom, which recognizes the
remarkable accomplishments of generations of airmen. Today's airmen are
equally impassioned to bring dreams to reality as we pursue our vision
of tomorrow's Air Force, Unlimited Horizon. Through this vision, we
build a bridge from today's existing capabilities to those required to
win tomorrow's wars.
Ultimately our success will be measured by our ability to provide
our forces with assured freedom to attack and freedom from attack.
Achieving such victory in tomorrow's battlespace will demand our full
integration with fellow Services, allies, and coalition partners--an
essential part of the expeditionary construct. Through our security
cooperation efforts, we build these foreign defense relationships and
allied capabilities to ensure we have the access, interoperability, and
international support for our worldwide commitments. Toward this
requirement, we are working with our sister Services to develop truly
joint concepts of operation that integrate the full spectrum of land,
sea, air, space, and information warfighting capabilities. When America
places its men and women in uniform into harms way, we owe them
preeminent resources, planning, and organization to achieve victory
over any adversary.
Capabilities-Based CONOPS
While adapting to the new strategic environment, our principal
focus has been transitioning from a platform-based garrison force to a
capabilities-based expeditionary force. No longer platform-centric, we
are committed to making warfighting effects, and the capabilities we
need to achieve them, the driving force behind our ongoing
transformation. From this point forward, all of our operational,
programming, and budget decisions will be supported by a predefined
capability.
Our emerging TF CONOPS will help make this essential shift by
providing solutions to a variety of problems warfighters can expect to
encounter in the future. Whether detailing our plans for operating in
an anti-access environment or identifying how to deliver humanitarian
rations to refugees, TF CONOPS lend focus on the essential elements
required to accomplish the mission. They cover the complete spectrum of
warfighting capabilities (deep strike, information, urban, and
psychological operations, etc.) and enable us to tailor forces
(expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) from existing AEFs to meet
JFC's requirements. Responsibility for CONOPS development falls to the
Major Commands, with a senior officer on the HQ/USAF Air Staff assigned
to each CONOP to serve as their ``Champion,'' facilitating the process.
TF CONOPS directly support Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts to free
scarce resources trapped in bureaucracy and push them to the
warfighter. They will also be the focal point for a capabilities-based
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). In support of this effort, our
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment analyzes and assesses
shortfalls, health, risks, and opportunities, while prioritizing
required future capabilities. This helps CONOPS developers articulate
any disconnects between required capabilities and developing programs,
while providing senior Air Force leadership an operational,
capabilities-based focus for acquisition program decision-making. TF
CONOPS include the following:

Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) employs joint power-
projection capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value
targets, gain access to denied battlespace, and maintain
battlespace access for all required joint/coalition follow-on
operations.
Global Response Task Force (GRTF) combines
intelligence and strike systems to attack fleeting or emergent,
high-value or high-risk targets by surgically applying air and
space power in a narrow window of opportunity, anywhere on the
globe, within hours.
Homeland Security Task Force (HLSTF) leverages Air
Force capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to
prevent, protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--
whether within or beyond U.S. territories.
Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Space and
C\4\ISR) Task Force harnesses horizontal integration of manned,
unmanned, and space systems to provide persistent situation
awareness and executable decision-quality information to the
JFC.
Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF) provides regional
combatant commanders with the planning, C\2\, and operations
capabilities to enable rapid, timely, and effective projection,
employment, and sustainment of U.S. power in support of U.S.
global interests--precision delivery for operational effects.
Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF) provides the
deterrent ``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate,
and, if deterrence fails, it avails a rapid scalable response.

Air and Space Expeditionary CONOPS is the overarching context,
which identifies and sequences distinctive capabilities and broad-based
functions that air and space power provide the JFC to generate desired
effects for national military objectives.
The Air Force is transforming around these Task Force Concepts of
Operation. In addition to serving as a roadmap for operators, the TF
construct will form the basis for resource allocation, future system
acquisitions, and POM submissions in order to find capabilities-based
solutions to warfighter problems.
Science and Technology (S&T)--Wellspring of Air and Space Capabilities
Reaching these warfighter solutions rests in large measure with
R&D. Through robust investment and deliberate focus in S&T, the Air
Force invigorates our core competency of technology-to-warfighting.
Combined with innovative vision, S&T opens the direct route towards
transforming air and space capabilities. Therefore, we continue long-
term, stable investment in S&T to ensure we realize future
capabilities, as well as those that may immediately affect existing
systems.
We are improving our S&T planning and collaboration with other
Services and agencies to ensure we: (1) encourage an operational pull
that conveys to the S&T community a clear vision of the capabilities we
need for the future; (2) address the full spectrum of future needs in a
balanced and well-thought out manner; and (3) enhance our ability to
demonstrate and integrate promising technologies. Some of these new
technologies--UAV systems, laser-based communications, space-based
radar, and others--show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting
applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to
imagine. We are exploring each of these technologies, and our
investment will deliver the required capabilities of our CONOPS.
Executive Agent for Space
Embedded in all of our TF CONOPS, and indeed within most military
operations, is an extensive reliance on systems resident in space. The
Air Force proudly fulfills the role of Department of Defense Executive
Agent for Space with confidence and enthusiasm. Our ability to execute
this tremendous responsibility stems from a natural outflow of our core
competencies and distinctive capabilities. Accordingly, and in
conjunction with the other Services and agencies, we are shaping a new
and comprehensive approach to national security space management and
organization.
Our capstone objective is to realize the enormous potential in the
high ground of space, and to employ the full spectrum of space-based
capabilities to enable joint warfighting and to protect our national
security. The key to achieving this end is wholesale integration:
through air, land, space, and sea; across legacy and future systems;
among existing and evolving concepts of operation; and between
organizations across all sectors of government. We will continue to
deliver unity of vision, effort, and execution to fulfill our mission
of delivering the most advanced space capabilities for America.
Drawing Effects from Space
Our horizon is truly unlimited, extending beyond the atmospheric
environs of airpower to the reaches of outer space. Our proud Air Force
tradition of airpower is joined by an equally proud and continually
developing tradition of space power.
In the early days of the space age, only those at the strategic
level received and exploited the benefits of space capabilities. The
current state of affairs, however, is decidedly different. The former
distinctions between ``black'' programs, ``white'' space, military,
civil, and commercial applications are growing increasingly blurred--in
some cases, they are virtually seamless. In short, space capabilities
now are woven deeply into the fabric of modern society, and they have
altered forever the way we fight wars, defend our homeland, and live
our lives.
It is in this context, and this understanding of the widespread and
increasing importance of space systems, that we strive to meet present
and future national security challenges by providing dominant space
capabilities that will:

Exploit Space for Joint Warfighting: Space
capabilities are integral to modern warfighting forces,
providing critical surveillance and reconnaissance information,
especially over areas of high risk or denied access for
airborne platforms. They provide weather and other earth-
observation data, global communications, precision navigation
and guidance to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in
flight, and weapons enroute to targets. All of these
capabilities, and more, make possible the tremendous success
our joint warfighters achieve during combat operations.
We will enhance these existing capabilities and, where it
makes sense, pursue new ones such as the Transformational
Communications System (TCS), which will strive to dramatically
increase bandwidth and access for warfighters; and Space Based
Radar, which will complement the airborne Joint Surveillance
Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) while migrating Ground
Moving Target Indicators (GMTI) into space. We will also
develop methods and technologies to enhance our Nation's
ability to conduct rapid and accurate global strike operations
anywhere in pursuit of U.S. interests.
Pursue Assured Access to Space: We cannot effectively
exploit space for joint warfighting if we do not have
responsive, reliable, and assured access to space. In August
2002, the new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle got off to a
strong start with the successful launch of Lockheed Martin's
Atlas V booster. Boeing's Delta IV program added to the
Nation's quiver of modern launch vehicles with liftoff in
November. We will also pursue advanced and highly versatile
reusable launchers and small expendables with extremely short
response times to achieve long-term assured access, while
taking the necessary steps to maintain and improve our space
launch infrastructure.
Preserve our Freedom to Act in Space: We must be able
to act freely in space, or risk losing those capabilities
essential to joint warfighting. We initiated efforts to
increase our space situation awareness, beginning with the new
Space Situation Awareness Integration Office at Air Force Space
Command, and a similar program at the Space and Missile Systems
Center. Future efforts are planned to develop strategy,
doctrine, and programs to improve the protection of our own
space capabilities while denying the benefits of joint space
capabilities to our adversaries.

As it is with all Air Force capabilities, the most important
resource for national space capabilities is neither technological nor
fiscal--it is human. Our Space Professional Strategy fulfills a Space
Commission recommendation to develop space professionals and nurture a
cadre to lead our national security space endeavors at all levels in
the decades ahead. These space-expert airmen will be the core stewards
of space operations, and shoulder the responsibility for aggressively
advancing joint warfighting capabilities into the high ground frontier.
Horizontal Integration of Manned, Unmanned, and Space Assets
The essence of transformation is found in leveraging the Nation's
technological dominance to create maximum asymmetrical advantage.
Airmen seek unrestricted boundaries when looking at war planning from a
theater-wide perspective, or talking about national elements of power.
Simply stated, it is in the way we think--we must take advantage of it.
Our foremost objective is to develop the capability to conduct
rapid and precise operations to achieve desired effects and shape the
battlespace for the joint force. This requires interfacing numerous DOD
and national assets--the seamless, horizontal integration of manned,
unmanned, and space-based systems. An essential element is designing
systems that use digital-level, machine-to-machine conversations to
expedite data flow and ensure the JFC receives timely, decision-quality
information. Such integration will dramatically shorten the find, fix,
track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) cycle. In the end, we know
that neither JFCs guiding operations, nor special operators putting
lead on targets care what source provides data. It is an effect they
seek, and what we will provide.
Key to the warfighter's success is Predictive Battlespace Awareness
(PBA). PBA requires in-depth study of an adversary well before
hostilities begin. Ultimately, we want to be able to anticipate his
actions to the maximum extent possible. PBA-derived insights allow us
to utilize critical ISR assets for confirmation rather than pure
discovery once hostilities begin. We are then able to analyze
information to assess current conditions, exploit emerging
opportunities, anticipate future actions, and act with a degree of
speed and certainty unmatched by our adversaries.
Along this path, we are transitioning from collecting data through
a myriad of independent systems (Rivet Joint, AWACS, JSTARS, space-
based assets, etc.) to a Multi-sensor Command and Control Constellation
(MC\2\C) capable of providing the JFC with real-time, enhanced
battlespace awareness. Today, this transition is restricted by the
necessity to rely on Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) C\4\ISR assets.
The limitation inherent in LD/HD platforms, forces us to shift their
exploitation capabilities between theaters to cover emerging global
threats and events. This sub-optimizes overall battlespace awareness
and limits our efforts at predictive analysis. In the interim,
responsive space-based ISR assets will help mitigate our over-stressed
LD/HD systems. Yet ultimately, we need a synergistic combination of
military and commercial assets, advanced data processing capabilities,
and assured reachback to achieve true battlespace awareness.
In the future, a single wide-body platform employing tunable
antennas and sensors--Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft
(MC\2\A)--will replace many of the C\4\ISR functions of many of today's
specialized, but independent assets. Air, ground, and space assets will
comprise the MC\2\C, which will elevate Joint Forces Air Component
Commanders' ability to command and control air assets. Additionally,
every platform will be a sensor on the integrated network. Regardless
of mission function (C\2\, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc.), any data
collected by a sensor will be passed to all network recipients. This
requires networking all air, space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems,
command and control (C\2\) nodes, and strike platforms, to achieve
shared battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize our ability to
achieve the JFC's desired effects.
Uniting joint and coalition information presents the most difficult
challenge in providing one common operational picture for key
decisionmakers. We are working closely with our sister Services to
eliminate the seams between existing systems and taking the necessary
steps to ensure all future acquisitions are planned and funded to meet
the interoperability requirements of future joint CONOPS.
A critical element of successful information merging is
communications, as bandwidth is finite and requires careful management.
Long-range or penetrating systems must communicate beyond the horizon
despite adversaries' attempts to exploit or interrupt these links. To
counter disruption, all systems must be reliable, secure, and
bandwidth-efficient. The PBA construct facilitates this objective by
eliminating constrictive, stove-piped communications systems while
emphasizing networked operations.
We will realize the vision of horizontal integration in our TF
CONOPS. GSTF, for example, will deliver the right-sized mix of assets
with appropriate sensors capable of penetrating into enemy airspace.
Such sensors may be low observable and/or expendable, mounted on either
ISR platforms or imbedded into strike platforms. Sensors may consist of
Special Operations Forces, inserted before the commencement of
hostilities, who communicate with attack platforms during combat via
secure electronic writing tablets, annotating targets and threats on
the imagery display with a stylus. As technology progresses, and where
it makes sense, a significant portion of ISR functionality will likely
migrate to space, affording 24/7 persistence and penetration. Likewise,
advanced defensive counterspace capabilities will afford these systems
protection from enemy actions.
Combining manned, unmanned, and space-based assets with dynamic
C\2\ and PBA transforms disparate collection and analysis activities
into a coherent process, allowing the warfighter to make timely,
confident, and capable combat decisions. This is what the Air Force
brings to the joint fight. It is what air and space warriors are all
about. We unlock the intellectual potential of airmen who think across
the dimensions of mediums and systems capabilities, for the joint
warfighter.
Addressing the Recapitalization Challenges
Despite new CONOPS and visions for future capabilities, we cannot
rely on intellectual flexibility to eradicate the challenge of old
systems and technologies. Though creativity may temporarily reduce the
negative impacts of aging systems on our operational options,
ultimately there are impassable limits created by air and space system
hardware issues.
We have made tremendous strides in modernizing and improving
maintenance plans for our aircraft, however the tyranny of age has
introduced new problems for old aircraft. Reality dictates that if we
completely enhance the avionics and add new engines to 40-year-old
tankers and bombers, they are still 40-year-old aircraft, and subject
to fleet-threatening problems such as corrosion and structural failure.
This is equally true for our fighter aircraft, where once cutting-
edge F-117s average over 15 years old, and mainstay air dominance F-
15Cs are approaching 20 years old. With double-digit surface-to-air
missile system, next-generation aircraft, and advanced cruise missile
threats proliferating, merely maintaining our aging fighter and attack
aircraft will be insufficient. In fact, the dramatic advances offered
in many of our TF CONOPs cannot be realized without the addition of the
unique capabilities incorporated in the F/A-22. Simply stated, our
legacy systems cannot ensure air dominance in future engagements--the
fundamental element for joint force access and operations. We will thus
continue executive oversight of F/A-22 acquisition in order to ensure
program success. While keeping our funding promises, we will procure
the only system in this decade that puts munitions on targets, and
which is unequally capable of detecting and intercepting aircraft and
cruise missiles.
Although ultimately solving these recapitalization challenges
requires acquisition of new systems, we will continue to find
innovative means to keep current systems operationally effective in the
near term. We know that just as new problems develop with old systems,
so too do new opportunities for employment, such as our employment of
B-1s and B-52s in a close air support role during OEF. We will also
pursue new options for these long-range strike assets in a standoff
attack role for future operations.
Unlike with the aforementioned air-breathing assets, we cannot make
service life extensions or other modifications to our orbiting space
systems. Satellites must be replaced regularly to account for hardware
failures, upgrade their capabilities, and avoid significant coverage
gaps. Additionally, we must improve outmoded ground control stations,
enhance protective measures, continue to address new space launch
avenues, and address bandwidth limitations in order to continue
leveraging space capabilities for the joint warfighter. We are
exploring alternatives for assuring access to space, and a key aspect
of this effort will be invigorating the space industrial base.
Finally, it is imperative that we address the growing deficiencies
in our infrastructure. Any improvements we may secure for our air and
space systems will be limited without a commensurate address of
essential support systems. Deteriorated roofs, waterlines, electrical
networks, and airfields are just some of the infrastructure elements
warranting immediate attention. Our ability to generate air and space
capabilities preeminently rests with the ingenuity of visionary ideas,
yet intellectual versatility must be supported by viable systems and
structures to realize our Service potential.
Organizational Adaptations
Commensurate with our drive to enhance air and space capabilities
is our identification and development of organizational structures to
aid these advances. In 2002, we initiated numerous adaptations to more
efficiently and effectively exploit Air Force advantages for the joint
warfighter.
Warfighting Integration Deputy Chief of Staff
Comprehensive integration of the Air Force's extensive C\4\ISR
systems is paramount for our future capabilities. This requires an
enterprise approach of total information-cycle activities including
people, processes, and technology. To achieve this, we created a new
Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration (AF/XI), which brings
together the operational experience and the technical expertise of
diverse elements (C\4\ISR, systems integration, modeling and
simulation, and enterprise architecture specialties).
This new directorate will close the seams in the F2T2EA kill chain
by guiding the integration of manned, unmanned, and space C\4\ISR
systems. AF/XI's leadership, policy, and resource prioritization will
capitalize on the technologies, concepts of operations, and
organizational changes necessary to achieve horizontal integration and
interoperability.
Success has been immediate. AF/XI worked with the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations to champion increased Air Operations Center
funding in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which accelerated the
stabilization and standardization of the weapon system. Subsequently,
the base-lined weapon system now has a modernization plan, which is
both viable and affordable. AF/XI also led analysis that highlighted
imbalances among collection and exploitation capabilities. As a result,
we plan to accelerate ground processing and exploitation capabilities
within the Future Years Defense Program to close the gap. Major
contributions in management of the complex information environment will
continue, as AF/XI makes better use of scarce resources, allowing the
Air Force to provide the joint warfighter the capabilities to dominate
the battlespace.
Chief Information Officer (AF/CIO)
Partnered with AF/XI, the AF/CIO shares responsibility to spearhead
the transformation to an information-driven, network-centric Air Force.
These two organizations orchestrate the integration within our
information enterprise, and establish processes and standards to
accelerate funding and ensure priorities match our integrated
information vision.
The AF/CIO's specific mission is to promote the most effective and
efficient application, acquisition, and management of information
technology resources under an enterprise architecture. The goal is to
provide the roadmap for innovation and to function as a blueprint for
the overall leverage of valuable information technology. Enterprise
architecture will use models and processes to capture the complex
interrelationships between the Air Force's systems and platforms. A
resultant example is basing information technology (IT) investment
decisions on sound business cases, approved Air Force standards, and,
ultimately, how a particular technology contributes to specific
capabilities. Additionally, we are institutionalizing enterprise
architecting as a key construct in defining mission information
requirements and promoting interoperability.
Currently, the wide variety of IT standards limits C\2\ processes
and information and decision support to our warfighters. The AF/CIO-AF/
XI team is tackling this and all other integration challenges as they
develop an enterprise architecture that spans the entire Air Force,
while also staying in harmony with other Services' efforts.
Blended Wing
We do nothing in today's Air Force without Guard, Reserve, and
civilian personnel working alongside active airmen. A fundamental
initiative of Air Force transformation is formalizing this integration
under the Future Total Force (FTF). As part of FTF, we are pursuing
innovative organizational constructs and personnel policies to meld the
components into a single, more homogenous force. FTF integration will
create efficiencies, cut costs, ensure stability, retain invaluable
human capital, and, above all, increase our combat capabilities.
A key effort is to ``blend,'' where sensible, units from two or
more components into a single wing with a single commander. This level
of integration is unprecedented in any of the Services, where active,
Guard, and Reserve personnel share the same facilities and equipment,
and together, execute the same mission. In essence, blending provides
two resource pools within a single wing--one, a highly experienced,
semi-permanent Reserve component workforce, offering stability and
continuity; the other, a force of primarily active personnel able to
rotate to other locations as needs dictate.
The first blended wing opportunity arose with the consolidation of
the B1-B fleet. The move left behind an experienced but underutilized
pool of Guard personnel at Robins AFB, GA. Meanwhile, the collocated
93rd Air Control Wing (ACW) (active E-8 Joint STARS), suffered from
high tempo and low retention. Hence, Secretary Roche directed that the
two units merge, and on 1 October 2002, the blended wing concept became
a reality with the activation of the 116th ACW.
Over the course of calendar year 2002, the 116th ACW tackled many
pioneering challenges: from legal questions surrounding the command of
combined active-Reserve component units, to programmatic issues with
funding the program from two separate accounts, to integrating
different personnel systems used by each component. Airmen from both
components are working through these issues successfully, making the
116th an example for future FTF blending. Yet, some additional Title 10
and Title 32 provisions still need to be changed to make the FTF a
reality. Meanwhile, parallel efforts, such as placing Reserve pilots
and maintenance personnel directly into active duty flying
organizations under the Fighter Associate Program, add to this
leveraging of highly experienced reservists to promote a more stable,
experienced workforce.
As organizational constructs, blending and associate programs lay
an important foundation for a capabilities-based, expeditionary air and
space force, which are inherently flexible and ideal to meet rotational
AEF requirements. In a resource-constrained environment, blending
promotes efficiencies and synergies by leveraging each component's
comparative strengths, freeing funds for modernization while sustaining
combat effectiveness, and effecting warfighting capabilities greater
than the sum of its parts.
Combat Wing
The comprehensive evaluations in our ongoing transformation include
examining our wing structure. Given all of the lessons gleaned from
expeditionary operations over the past decades, we asked, ``Could we
derive advantages in revised wing organization for both force
development and combat capability?'' The answer was ``Yes,'' and we
enacted changes to create the Combat Wing Organization (CWO).
The central aspect of the CWO is the new Mission Support Group.
This will merge former support and logistics readiness groups,
contracting, and aerial port squadrons, as applicable. Within this
group, we will hone expeditionary skills from crisis action planning,
personnel readiness, and working with the joint system for load
planning and deployment, to communications, contingency bed down, and
force protection. Currently, all of these aspects exist in skill sets
that none of our officers have in total. But the new expeditionary
support discipline will address this, and provide our officers the
expertise in all aspects of commanding a forward base system. With this
reorganization, each wing will now have one individual responsible for
the full range of deployment and employment tasks--the Mission Support
Group Commander.
The restructuring will retain the Operations Group; however, group
commanders will become more active in the operational level of war.
Group and squadron commanders will be role models for operators in the
wings, ready to lead the first exercise and combat missions. Similarly,
we will establish a maintenance group responsible for base-level
weapons system maintenance and sortie production rates. Like their
operator counterparts, maintenance squadron and group commanders will
be role models for all wing maintainers. Meanwhile, medical groups will
retain their current organization, although we are working changes to
home and deployed medical operations for future implementation.
Flying and fixing our weapons systems, as well as mission support,
are essential skill sets. Each requires the highest expertise,
proficiency, and leadership. The new wing organization allows
commanders to fully develop within specific functional areas to plan
and execute air and space power as part of expeditionary units, while
also giving maintenance and support personnel focused career
progression. This reorganization does not fix something that is
broken--it makes a great structure exceptional.
Acquisition and Business Transformation
To achieve our vision of an agile, flexible, responsive, and
capabilities-based air and space force, we must transform the processes
that provide combatant commanders with air and space capabilities. An
example of this in action is the Air Force's effort to carry out the
responsibilities of DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). The
Secretary of the Air Force delegated those responsibilities to the
Under Secretary of the Air Force, under whose leadership immediate
benefit was realized. Adapting an effective process already in use at
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Under Secretary
instituted a new streamlined space acquisition program review and
milestone decision-making process. This new process was used for the
first time in August 2002 in developing a contract for the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. This effort
creates an opportunity for the Air Force to apply performance and cost
pressure on defense industrial firms through their chief financial
officers and board of directors by linking executive compensation to
contract performance.
In addition to the major process changes for DOD space, the Air
Force's Business Transformation Task Force directs and integrates
further process improvement and adaptation. Core business and
operations support processes--such as acquisition, logistics,
maintenance, training, medical, and dental, among others--are crucial,
as they ultimately determine our overall enterprise effectiveness and
directly sustain combat capabilities. An additional category of
processes called ``enablers'' completes the Air Force enterprise.
Examples of ``enablers'' include: management of human resources,
finances, contracts, property plant and equipment, and information. The
enablers are important as they facilitate our core capabilities and
determine the overall efficiency of our enterprise.
The Air Force will enact business transformation from an integrated
enterprise perspective, examining every process and process link.
Accordingly, we will employ industry best practices and identify
management metrics to improve process efficiency without degrading our
enterprise effectiveness; expand our customer's self-service management
capability and free up needed resources for the operational
communities; and provide real-time, accurate financial data for better
decisionmaking. Already, acquisition reform has effected notable
improvements, including:

(1) Streamlined our acquisition and contracting regulations,
replacing lengthy prescriptive sets of rules with brief documents that
emphasize speed, innovation, sensible risk management, and elimination
of time-consuming process steps that have little value. As previously
mentioned, our new National Security Space acquisition process is an
example of progress in this area.
(2) Created a Program Executive Office for services to bring new
efficiency to the growing area of services contracts. This key area,
which accounts for nearly half of our procurement budget, had no prior
centralized coordination and oversight.
(3) Developed and initiated System Metric and Reporting Tool
(SMART), putting real-time program status information on everyone's
desktop. This web-based application pulls data from dozens of legacy
reporting systems to give everyone from program managers up to senior
leadership direct visibility into the ``health'' of hundreds of
acquisition and modernization programs. When fully deployed in fiscal
year 2003, it will automate the tedious and laborious process of
creating Monthly Acquisition Reports and possibly Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary reporting to OSD.
(4) Empowered ``High Powered Teams'' of requirements and
acquisition professionals to create spiral development plans to deliver
initial capability to warfighters more quickly, and add capability
increments in future spirals.
(5) Designed a Reformed Supply Support Program to improve the
spares acquisition process by integrating the support contractor into
the government supply system. Contractors now have the same capability
as government inventory control points to manage parts, respond to base
level requisitions, track spares levels, and monitor asset movement.
(6) Continued, with OSD support, expansion of the Reduction in
Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) program, to identify critical cost
drivers, fund investments to address them, and generate cost saving and
cost avoidance. We also created standard processes and a business case
analysis model to use for initiatives within R-TOC. In fiscal year
2003, OSD allocated $24.9 million no-offset investments to R-TOC that
will return $53.2 million through fiscal year 2008. A planned $37.1
million investment across the FYDP will save a projected $331 million
in operations and maintenance through fiscal year 2009.

These initiatives are only the beginning of a comprehensive and
aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts today
will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space
capability acquisition both immediately and in the future.
Ensuring Readiness
Integrating systems and expanding business practices will not only
have dramatic effects on air and space capabilities, but also reduce
readiness challenges. However, we still face daunting, but
surmountable, obstacles. We must overcome a multitude of installations
and logistical issues to secure flexible and timely execution of
expeditionary requirements for joint warfighting.
Reconstituting and reconfiguring our expeditionary basing systems
and wartime stocks is a critical element of our force projection
planning. While we made significant strides in funding, we require
additional investments in bare base systems, vehicles, spares,
munitions, and pre-positioning assets. Our infrastructure investment
strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps. First, we must dispose of
excess facilities. Second, we must fully sustain our facilities and
systems so they remain combat effective throughout their expected life.
Third, we must establish a steady investment program to restore and
modernize our facilities and systems, while advancing our ability to
protect our people and resources from the growing threat of terrorism
at current, planned, and future operating locations--at home or abroad.
We are making progress. Improved vehicle fleet funding allowed us
to replace some aging vehicles with more reliable assets, including
alternative fuel versions to help meet Federal fuel reduction mandates.
Targeted efficiencies in spares management and new fuels mobility
support equipment will improve supply readiness. In addition, our
spares campaign restructured Readiness Spares Packages and repositioned
assets to contingency sites. Moreover, to increase munitions readiness,
we expanded our Afloat Prepositioning Fleet capabilities, and continue
acquiring a broad mix of effects-based munitions in line with the
requirements of all TF CONOPS.
Finally, our ``Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan'' calls
for major transformation in financial and infrastructure capitalization
to ensure Air Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the
threat spectrum. To support this plan, we increased funding in fiscal
year 2004 for depot facilities and equipment modernization. We also
began a significant push to require weapon systems managers to
establish their product support and depot maintenance programs early in
the acquisition cycle, and to plan and program the necessary investment
dollars required for capacity and capability. Additionally, we also are
partnering with private industry to adopt technologies to meet
capability requirements. The results from these efforts will be
enhanced, more agile warfighter support through the critical enabler of
infrastructure.
Expanding AEF Personnel
The attacks of September 11 significantly increased workload and
stress in a number of mission areas for our expeditionary forces. Since
our day-to-day operation is absolutely set to the rhythm of the
deploying AEF packages, we must make appropriate adjustments. Recent
and ongoing efforts to maximize the identification of deployable forces
and align them with AEF cycles, assisted in meeting immediate critical
warfighting requirements. However, some career fields remain seriously
stressed by the war on terrorism. Accordingly, our efforts focus on
changing processes that drive requirements not tuned to our AEF rhythm.
We developed formulas to measure, and gathered quantitative data to
evaluate, the relative stress amongst career fields to redirect
resources to the most critical areas. We also began a critical review
of blue-suit utilization to ensure airmen are used only where
absolutely necessary and maximize the use of the civilian and contract
workforce for best service contribution and military essentiality.
We are refocusing uniformed manpower allocation on our distinctive
capabilities to reduce stress on our active force. Additionally, we are
carefully considering technologies to relieve the increased workload.
These efforts exist within our longer-term work to reengineer,
transform, and streamline Air Force operations and organizations, and
have allowed us already to realign some new recruits into our most
stressed career fields.
Summary
As the two mediums with the most undeveloped potential, air and
space represent the largest growth areas for national security and the
greatest frontiers for joint warfighting. As such, air and space
operations will play an ever-increasing role in the security of America
and her allies. The Air Force will exploit technology, innovative
concepts of operations, organizational change, and our ability to
embrace creative ideas and new ways of thinking. We will bring to bear
the full suite of air and space capabilities for tomorrow's Joint Force
Commander--drawing from every resource, developing closely with all
Services, and overcoming any obstacle to succeed.

NEXT HORIZON

The events of the last year have emphasized the dynamics of a new
international security era. The decade of new states following the Cold
War has been followed by the rise of non-state actors, many following a
path of aggression and destruction. Yet, just as America adapted to new
global dynamics in the past, we will again confront emerging challenges
with confidence and faith in our ability to meet the demands of
assuring freedom.
The Air Force remains dedicated to drawing on its innovation,
ingenuity, and resolve to develop far-reaching capabilities. The
ability to deliver effects across the spectrum of national security
requirements is the cornerstone of the vision and strategy of Air Force
planning and programming. In conjunction, and increasingly in
integration with ground, naval, marine, and other national agency
systems, the Air Force will play a central role in elevating joint
operations. We recognize the greatest potential for dominant American
military capabilities lies in the integration of our air and space
systems with those of other Services and agencies, and our success in
this objective will be evident in every mission to deter, dissuade, or
decisively defeat any adversary.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will
now proceed to a round of questions with 6 minutes each.
First, an administrative announcement to the committee. The
committee has presently before it a number of military and
civilian nominations, including those for the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works, and Administrator of the National Security
Administration. These nominations have been before the
committee for the requisite 7 days. It is the hope of myself
and my colleague, Senator Levin, that we be able to convene our
committee at some point today, possibly following a vote on the
floor, for the purpose of voting on these nominations with the
exception of one, and that is we will defer to the request of
one of our members who desires to have a personal meeting with
that individual. He has not been able as yet to schedule, so we
will defer with regard to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works until our colleague on the committee has had a
chance to be here.
Now, the questions each of us have. These are very somber
moments, not just for those of us who have the responsibility
to the men and women of the military and their families, but
indeed for every American. We recognize that, as I said
earlier, it is the presence of our troops with other troops
throughout the world that is providing the measure of diplomacy
that grinds on day after day, hour after hour. I commend all of
those engaged in the diplomatic efforts, especially Secretary
Powell, who has been exemplary in his performance, as well as
the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and, indeed, our President
have shown a measure of courage and judgment without parallel
in contemporary history in trying to deal with this situation,
which I personally characterize as the most complicated thing I
have ever seen in my years of having the privilege of being
here.
But the question of the chem/bio is the great unknown.
There is the potential for the use of these weapons, that
category of weapons in this conflict should force be needed,
and it would be the first time in the annals of U.S. military
history since 1918. My father served as an Army doctor in the
trenches during that period and I have read through his
letters, a short biography he wrote of his experiences, and it
was the most difficult situation to deal with, not only from
the standpoint of his responsibilities of medical treatment,
but for command and control.
From my own assessment of the status of the military, I
think the departments have done the best they can with the
state-of-the-art technology. Also, this committee in the years
that I have been on it made the tough decision, along with the
whole Congress, that our military would not use these weapons.
Such remaining weapons as we have in the possession of the
United States are all carefully housed in places for
demilitarization, so there are none in our inventory.
For years, it was thought as a part of military doctrine
that the best way to preclude the use of these weapons was to
have an equal or greater capability to declare an end to them.
That proved to be the case successfully during World War II,
but I think it is important that each of you address the
efforts of your departments to train and equip our forces, and
then your own personal assessment of the level of that training
and equipment to meet any possible use of those weapons in such
force that may be ordered by the President and other heads of
state and governments for the coalition for weapons. Mr.
Secretary, what is your assessment of the caliber and quantity
of the chembio defense equipment currently deployed with the
Army forces in that region?
Secretary White. In my view, Senator, the soldiers we have
in CENTCOM area are well-equipped from a nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) perspective. The equipment that they have is
significantly better in many cases than what we had in the
Operation Desert Storm experience. NBC training is an integral
part of all Army training activities--the donning of chemical
suits, masks, and so forth.
We have checked masks and individual sets of equipment
before deployment to make sure they fit properly. We have
adequate stocks in the theater of chemical suits, gloves,
boots, and headgear for two complete sets for every soldier
that is in the Gulf and contingency stocks. Naturally, when you
talk to soldiers, there is an apprehension about the chemical
environment because we are talking obviously about live agents.
We practice against chemical agents, but I believe there is a
confidence because of the training and because of the equipment
that they will deal satisfactorily with the situation. I am
confident they will.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Johnson.
Secretary Johnson. I agree with Secretary White. We have
the very best equipment, and as Senator Levin, you, and I saw
the marines in the desert donning this gear, they are very
serious about it even when it is very hot and difficult to
wear, but they understand the threat. The thing that concerns
me most is the obvious anxiety that goes through their minds
about what they know about, and even worse, what they do not
know about, we are doing all we can, but this is of great
concern to us.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche.
Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, the airmen also wear these
suits. It is not fun to fly an F-16 in your chemical suit, but
the aircraft tends to go low. We train them to fly in them.
They are very uncomfortable, but they understand the reason and
we are properly equipped for all of our deployed forces.
Chairman Warner. The question of if force is utilized, and
following the judgment of our military command of this
situation at some point in time will be secure in terms of the
cessation of combat activities, what level of forces do you
anticipate each of your departments projecting that will have
to remain in that area of responsibility (AOR) and for what
period of time?
I raise that question because General Shinseki appeared
before this committee. He gave his views. Those views were
subsequently commented upon by the Secretary of Defense, and I
understand Secretary White this morning, you are prepared to
give the statement on behalf of the Department of the Army.
Secretary White. Senator, what General Shinseki said was in
response to that question was, first, that it is up to the
combatant commander to determine what the force level is and
the duration of it, and, second, the combatant commander hasn't
made that decision. General Shinseki has some experience in
this, having run the stabilization force in Bosnia, and he is a
very experienced officer and he expressed his own personal
opinion that it could be several hundred thousand I believe is
what he said.
At the same time with the vagaries of this and the
variables that are involved in it and the difficulty of
predicting an exact number, there are others that would suggest
maybe it is going to be significantly lower, and I think we
will just have to wait and see as, if the President so orders
the campaign, and if we become involved in the stability
operation after that, we will have to wait and see how those
variables work out, what the specifics are. You have two views
on this right now and many theories in support of each view.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Johnson.
Secretary Johnson. Sir, I agree, and the great unknown is
the participation of many people, other nations. I was in
Bahrain just about the time that you were there to visit with
the coalition representatives, and they had people from all
over the world. They want to help us in every way possible, and
I personally was impressed to see the Japanese, who had three
warships in the area. They have an oiler that refuels our
ships, 75,000 gallons of oil. But all of those people are eager
to participate in any activity after the conflict is over, and
I think you'll see a great coalition effort.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche.
Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, we could not have predicted
how many aircraft we needed to keep behind for Afghanistan. It
is a very uncertain thing as to how it would end. We had 7,500
airmen in the region. Operation Southern Watch is now up to
35,000, but a lot of what we do by air depends on what we are
doing by truck or by ship. Certainly bomber aircraft we only
use two of the three in Afghanistan, fighter bombers, we have
used 117s. It is a combination of how fast it goes, to what
degree can support come in by truck and ship, and to what
degree it has to be funneled.
Chairman Warner. I'd like to make a personal observation
here and defer this question to another colleague. When I was
privileged to be in the department many years ago during the
war in Vietnam, we had a most unexpected and tragic series of
scandals at the various academies. The Secretary of Defense
constituted the three Service Secretaries as a committee to
examine this and to determine how best we would address the
problem. We did that.
But I remember in the course of that responsibility of
assessing the problem, how we correct it, listening to many
very senior and retired officers and their reverence for the
academy system and how it is to always represent a model
institution of learning, discipline, and all the other
attributes that we try to create in our educational system.
Also, Members of Congress are intimately involved with
these because we are privileged under the law to make
nominations, and I don't think there is one of us in our
travels that are not deeply moved when a young person comes up
and says with great pride ``Senator, I attended the Academy
because of your nomination.'' It is a very special feeling.
So we were as a group on this committee very deeply moved
when the allegations arose with respect to the most serious
types of disciplinary breakdown and fracture in the Air Force
Academy. I commend you, Mr. Secretary, for the swiftness with
which you addressed this and I commend my colleague, the
Senator from Colorado, Mr. Allard, who promptly in consultation
with me and others proceeded to have this committee fully
involved. But I think it is important, and Senator Allard and I
incorporated this in our letter to the Department of Defense,
that each of you look at your own institutions to make certain
whether or not allegations are present of the kind involved in
the Department of the Air Force.
It has come to my attention that there are letters coming
in with regard to a second inclusion. I will wait for the
Department of Defense to address those. I brought those to the
attention of the Department. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
likewise has worked on this, so I will defer the question to my
colleague from Colorado when it comes his turn.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For reasons that
you have indicated the potential future costs of our actions in
southwest Asia are difficult to assess, but I do understand
that each of your departments has produced some cost estimates
for supplemental funds that we would be required to spend
through the end of the fiscal year under a number of different
assumptions. One, that the current presence in the CENTCOM area
is maintained without actually fighting a war; the other
assumption is that we do fight a war and then engage in post
conflict stability operations.
Have your departments, in fact, generated cost estimates,
Secretary White?
Secretary White. Yes, we have. We have had detailed
discussions with the Comptroller of the Department, Mr.
Zakheim, and no final decisions have been made about how much
of a supplemental fee will be requested or what the timing of
it will be.
Senator Levin. How many cost estimates have you submitted?
Secretary White. We have been through a number of
iterations to make sure that our cost estimates for the
operations and maintenance, the estimates, how much money it
will cost to reconstitute a force given that the President does
direct an operation, all these types of details we have
scrubbed through with the comptroller's office.
Senator Levin. This would be the supplemental funds for
this fiscal year?
Secretary White. 2003.
Senator Levin. What is the range, highest and lowest?
Secretary White. Currently if you break this up into the
piece that is required to support the non-Iraq buildup
activities, the Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble
Eagle part of this, where we were on the 1st of October steady
state since September 11, those cost about $6 billion
additional from, assuming that we stay in Afghanistan and other
places at about the same OPTEMPO that we have held there for
the past year or so.
Senator Levin. What about the post-conflict stability
operations in Iraq? What is the range for that?
Secretary White. We have not gotten into the details of
that, in as much detail as we have buildup and the
mobilization.
Senator Levin. To the extent you have gotten into it, what
is the range?
Secretary White. I think looking at it from the Army's
perspective, looking at the operation as it is currently set
up, the Army's bill could be roughly somewhere between $20
billion and $30 billion.
Senator Levin. That is for the range of the cost of the
post-conflict stability in 2003?
Secretary White. That is the cost to mobilize the force
above what we have for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring
Freedom to do the preparation tasks, to properly prepare that
force for a potential operation, to transport it and get it in
position, and then to bring it back at some point.
Senator Levin. Does that include the cost of maintaining
the force in Iraq after Saddam Hussein?
Secretary White. Through the end of the year.
Senator Levin. Through the end of the year. So that is the
extra cost of the war?
Secretary White. No. Because the details of how long the
war would last and how it would play out, there are so many
variables associated with that, I'd prefer not to get terribly
specific.
Senator Levin. That doesn't include the cost of the war?
Secretary White. The cost of the war would be in addition
to the base cost of $20 million.
Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, do you have that? The cost of
maintaining the force?
Secretary Johnson. I do not, sir. We are a fully deployed
Navy and Marine Corps. That is a blessing and a curse. We will
run out of the first area operations and maintenance funds by
midsummer. Depending on how Secretary White has talked, the
assumptions, the numbers vary widely. We are in discussions
with the Secretary of Defense's office continually, and the
assumptions in dollars change and I am not prepared to give a
number.
Senator Levin. You are not prepared to tell us what the
range is, the high and low, for post-conflict stability
operations?
Secretary Johnson. Our ranges are for just what we are
doing now in the $3 billion to $4 billion. If you go into
higher ones, we are near what Secretary White talked about, but
I do not have anything more specific.
Senator Levin. What about the Air Force?
Secretary Roche. The Air Force has a movable range
depending on what you are talking about. It depends on the
level of Operation Noble Eagle, which can go from $250 million
in a peaceful state up to a billion a year if we have to
maintain fighters over the U.S. We are able to do OEF because
we are in a specific state in Afghanistan.
We are more fungible in that we have done no work on the
post. We tend to fly stuff back, and we have the mobility
forces going, but we have a PACOM that is emerging. We have
been ordered to put that aircraft in Guam. Guam is just coming
through a typhoon, so there will be work done there in order to
base more in Guam. That is uncertain. Put it all together, the
part that is, has downward variance is OEF and Operation Noble
Eagle is $7.5 billion, Iraq could be as much as $7 billion, but
if it is earlier we will pull staff back and then PACOM is just
emerging. We are not sure what that is.
Senator Levin. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary White, I
have taken a lot of interest in the ultimate solution of what I
consider to be a real crisis in our capability. I don't think
there has ever been a time the Service has been more
cooperative in working together to a solution, the NLOS
solution that will be compatible with our Future Combat System.
But at the same time, I look at that as being one that would be
a part of the FCS. It is something that is needed in addition
to that, and that is to get us out of this old antiquated
equipment that we are using right now. You would probably be
surprised to find out there are four countries making an
artillery piece that is better in range, accuracy, and rapid
fire than ours, including South Africa.
Now, my concern has been to get that online as quickly as
possible. Our target date for rapid deployment would be 2008.
My question would be in the event something happens that would
delay the FCS, can we continue to keep that date an accurate
deployment date?
Secretary White. I think we can. The progress since we
talked about this last year has been excellent. The use of
funds to transfer the technology from the Crusader program, we
put those funds to good use. It will be the future milestone
coming up in May, and my view right now is not only will we
hold the schedule and NLOS cannon, but there will be an
implementation of FCS that will hit the 2008, 2010 time frame.
I think it is possible.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. Closely related, there
has been a lot of discussion about the fifth and the sixth
Stryker Brigades. I have had an experience when we were
mandating the competition and I conducted competition to M-113
and Stryker. I came back without any question in my mind that
it was necessary to do that. I see the Stryker Brigade as a
bridge to FCS. I'd like to have you tell us a little bit about
yours, an update as to the need for the fifth and the sixth
Stryker Brigades and where we are right now.
Secretary White. Certainly. The fifth brigade will go to
Hawaii with the 25th Division and it will be in the 2005
budget. The sixth brigade will go to the Pennsylvania Army
National Guard, and that is in the 2006 program. We have had
extensive discussions with the Secretary of Defense, with the
staff of the Secretary of Defense about the composition of
brigades 5 and 6. There are other things we can add to the
brigades to make them more robust, make them more of a stepping
stone to the Objective Force, as you said.
We owe the Secretary a study on precisely how we should
configure brigades 5 and 6. We will have that to him in the
near future, and the money remains in the program for the
fielding of those. From an Army's perspective, I think it is
critical that we field brigades 5 and 6 on schedule. Brigade 1,
by the way, that you saw at Fort Lewis will hit its initial
operational capability (IOC) on time this summer.
Senator Inhofe. How many are delivered right now?
Secretary White. We are producing about 45 a month and the
acquisition of it has been a very good story from an
efficiency-of-acquisition perspective.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Roche, let me tell you how much I
personally appreciate the time that you were confirmed. I think
you and I took a trip, your first trip after confirmation, but
we had a chance to talk about the dilemma we are facing right
now with our depots, and the fact that it has been a long
history in looking at this that it's answering actually a
national security problem that we would have should we become
dependent upon someone from the outside for core capability.
You made it very clear on that trip--I remember a statement--
that the Air Force is not going to get in the real estate
business, and everyone interpreting it is wrong. But right
after that, we passed the largest bond issue by a 72 percent
margin that's ever been passed in that part of my State of
Oklahoma. Your initiatives are working when for the first time
we are getting something in there where we can be competitive,
where we can deal with something, with equipment that's newer
than World War II technology. I appreciate that very much and
your workforce-shaping initiatives that are working, now that
we can turn out a KC-135 in 200 days.
I ask you, first of all, about that. Second, is there any
legislation that's needed to have you continue on this path
that is in my opinion very successful?
Secretary Roche. Thank you, Senator. One of the things that
I would like to mention that the metrics Tinker displayed were
for both Boeing and place in Alabama, the other ALCs, those
people said none of those people are better than we are, and
they got better. The place is dramatically cleaner. I think
that you have noticed that our ability to get airplanes through
the place is much faster. Our models are coming through faster.
The E models are old. The partnering initiative that Tinker was
one of the leaders on has really paid off, and we have now gone
to all the companies who are producing or will produce aircraft
for us in the future and said this model really works.
I was personally involved with one. It's beneficial to the
country and industry. Tinker has the lead on some of that, and
in fact, we are asking that some of the larger companies
producing aircraft start to work with the ALCs early on. So far
it's not so much legislation that we need as to continue to try
to get the change both in terms of the original manufacturers
and at the ALCs, but it's been a tremendous progress in
something like 20 months, tremendous progress.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, my time
has expired. Can I just ask a question of Secretary White?
Secretary White, when we had the chiefs, we had the same
question about the downsizing that has taken place. I'd like to
have you give us an analysis not here, but for the record,
where we are in end strength in the Army, including the Reserve
components.
Secretary White. I will do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The congressionally-mandated fiscal year 2003 active Army end
strength is 480,000; the Army National Guard is 350,000; and the Army
Reserve is 205,000. The Army expects to exceed this end strength
target, as well as the appropriated average strength of 480,000
manyears.
The active Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of
486,543; the Army National Guard finished fiscal year 2002 with an end
strength of 351,078; and the Army Reserve finished fiscal year 2002
with an end strength of 206,682.
The active Army's fiscal year 2002 average strength was 482,733,
which was approximately 8,700 more than the budgeted level. The current
projection for fiscal year 2003 active Army end strength is 490,300,
which includes an estimated military occupational specialty stop-loss
strength of 2,585. This estimate could increase by as much as 10,000 to
15,000 with the implementation of unit stop-loss for units involved in
operations in Iraq.
The Army National Guard average strength for fiscal year 2002 was
350,785. Current projection of National Guard end strength for fiscal
year 2003 is 350,000. The Army National Guard expects to meet or exceed
that goal.
The Army Reserve fiscal year 2002 average strength was 207,396,
which was approximately 4,731 more than the budgeted level. The current
projection for fiscal year 2003 Army Reserve end strength is 211,817,
which includes an estimated 70,000 mobilized Army Reserve soldiers.
These soldiers are expected to remain mobilized into fiscal year 2004
and are not subject to normal attrition. This will result in the Army
Reserve exceeding its fiscal year 2003 end strength by 6,000 to 8,000.

Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for your testimony and your service. There was an article in
the Kansas City Star, where the first line is troops heading to
the Iraqi theater are not getting health screening, especially
blood sampling mandated by a law enacted by Congress in 1987.
Is the Army not screening?
Secretary White. My information is that we are screening. I
think it's imperative that we screen. We have DNA samples,
blood samples from every soldier that deploys. I will check
that information.
Senator Reed. I understand that, and I am not the expert,
but that the DNA samples are different than the blood screening
mandated by this congressional act, but I am not certain of
that.
Secretary White. I will get you information for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

DOD Directive 5154.24, dated October 3, 2001, requires the Armed
Forces Institute of Pathology to maintain a repository of DNA samples
from members of the Armed Forces. The DNA sample is a specimen
collected by swabbing the inside of the service member's mouth, and is
not a blood sample. The Army is currently at nearly 100 percent
compliance for active component troops, and at nearly 90 percent
compliance for Reserve components, and is currently working to correct
the quality and technical errors in the collection process in order to
reach the goal of 100 percent.
Section 1074f of title 10, United States Code, enacted on November
18, 1997, directs that the pre- and post-deployment screening of all
service members include the drawing of blood samples. The Army is
currently in compliance with the guidelines. The blood sample is drawn
as an HIV test, with the remaining blood being stored. All soldiers
will have current HIV tests and associated blood samples before
deployment.

Senator Reed. Secretary Johnson, is the Navy following this
as well?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. We have had no challenges so
far.
Senator Reed. Secretary Roche?
Secretary Roche. I have gone through the line to make sure
we do it correctly. We do a baseline on someone, including
blood, DNA, etc. We monitor conditions in a particular area.
When they come back off the rotation, we do another medical
review to compare it to the baseline and anything we may have
learned overseas. I think we have this reasonably under
control, sir.
Senator Reed. Secretary White, many of the questions this
morning focused on the forces that will be needed to not only
decisively engage in defeat of Iraq if so ordered, but longer
term occupational forces. That puts a particular burden on the
Army, Navy, Air Force, expeditionary forces. Do they have the
flexibility of reconstituting and falling back very quickly? If
there is extended occupation, the Army will bear the brunt of
it. I wonder at this point what percentage of our Army has been
committed to the Iraqi theater operations roughly?
Secretary White. Active component (AC) plus Reserve
component (RC) probably a third. You are talking about Central
Command (CENTCOM) in general, but all the deployments around
CENTCOM, and it's working on AC and RC and those that have been
alerted to deploy, maybe 30 percent.
Senator Reed. What additional percentage has been allotted
for possible deployments?
Secretary White. That would be the top end figure.
Senator Reed. Of course with this deployment forward, you
have to have a rotational force upon it. Essentially, the
deployed force together with their rotational force could be 60
percent of the Army?
Secretary White. If you look at Afghanistan, we have
rotated three different divisions into Afghanistan to date--
82nd Airborne to 10th Mountain to 101st Airborne.
Senator Reed. One of the reasons I am concerned about it is
that, generally, these things usually take longer and more
people than you expect even in your most realistic estimate. I
recall last October when plans for the operation talked about a
force of 75,000 Army ground personnel with air power. There are
300,000 troops in the theater right now. I think we would be
wise to assume the worst case which would drive numbers up, I
know your discussion with Senator Levin suggested that you have
a range, but my guess would be it would be the top end, not the
bottom end?
Secretary White. Our experience, we are in our eighth year.
Kosovo, we are in our fifth year, I do believe although at much
lower levels than we initially would suggest it's a one-term
effort. The Secretary of Defense made the point that the hope
would be that very soon it would be an international effort,
and the others would contribute, which would lower the burden
on us, as has been the case to a certain extent in Afghanistan.
Senator Reed. Let me raise the pressure that we are seeing
back home with the National Guard and Reserve. This falls most
particularly in the Army National Guard and Reserve units, with
the Air Force also. My troops have basically all been mobilized
for a year. My suspicion, though, because of the expertise of
these soldiers, military police officers, civil affairs people,
information specialists, that those are precisely the people
that you need not this year, but the following year. Where are
you going to get them, because I can tell you the imposition,
the disruption, these are patriots but they have to come back.
You are going to have to replace them is my point.
Secretary White. I think the long-term concern is if we
stay at current levels of mobilization, eventually it's going
to impact on Reserve component retention and recruiting as
well. Now, in the first 18 months of the global war on
terrorism, we have been very fortunate we have not seen that.
But a year or 2 years from now, depending upon what level of
mobilization of that, we are certainly concerned about that.
Senator Reed. Again, this I think applies, but with most
impact on the Army, Air Force, illustrative of the Navy, I
would assume you are preparing plans right now to meet this
very likely contingency and the sooner these plans are
presented to us, the more opportunity we will have to look at
your proposals, which I think would involve increasing end
strength, incentivizing additional retention or Reserve or
National Guard or resizing the force between Reserve component
and active component, and all of these issues if they are
delayed further will slow down I think your ability to respond.
Secretary White. Senator, you know that's all under
consideration. I think the Secretary talked about that while he
was here. It is a matter of urgency for us.
Senator Reed. I did not mean to pick on you, Mr. Secretary.
But the Army is the lead, I think, in the forces that will
occupy the country. Mr. Secretary, thank you. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. Ladies and gentlemen of the committee,
there is now a vote. What I would suggest we do is that the
next allocation of time be equally divided between Senator
Dole, Senator Ensign, and we will take you and then we will
adjourn for the vote until Senator Allard returns. I will see
that the vote is held. Senator Dole?
Senator Dole. Upon recent visits to military bases in North
Carolina, they have given me initial insight into what our
military personnel and families are facing as they go through
repeated deployments. I would like to have each of you discuss
family readiness and family morale. First, as you have had an
opportunity to reflect on the tragedies that occurred at Fort
Bragg, are there lessons that all of the Services have learned,
and what are you doing to ensure that both military personnel
and their families have appropriate counselling both
predeployment and post deployment? This is of great interest
and concern to me.
As head of the Red Cross for many years, I put in place a
program on mental health counseling for victims of disasters
and for families. We streamlined our Armed Forces Emergency
Services, which includes counseling, but I wonder if it's not
the case that in some instances there is a reluctance to seek
counseling because it might be viewed as hurting one's career.
What do you do to anticipate problems where there may be
special family stress where supervisors have reported this sort
of situation? Also as I have toured our bases, I was very
impressed with the support network that is there. I visited, in
each instance with the military spouses, and they had an
excellent support network. Are we ensuring that this sort of
support network is available on all our bases and that it has
strong command support?
Secretary White. First of all, family issues are readiness
issues. We spend an enormous amount of time on that. You raised
a key point. We found when we examined the Fort Bragg situation
in great detail that the tragic situation that occurred last
summer, though not in all cases, we need to have ways for
people on a confidential basis to deal with these problems and
seek help and counseling and so forth without it becoming a
chain of command issue, which of course stifles that. We have
put in place changes to our family advocacy program to see to
it that those avenues are open. We spent a great deal of time
both pre- and post-deployment with spouses when they return and
we consider the matter of utmost importance.
Secretary Johnson. We have long had this challenge, of
course, and we have a program we call return and reunion and we
actually have an ops plan, if you will, to prepare the families
and also the members when they return for reunion. We work with
key volunteers--key spouses--and we have done well, but we
always are trying to improve and we learn a lot from the Army
difficulties. We are trying to move forward in a very positive
way. I also visit with the families, and families are very
important. I happen to have a son who is a reservist activated
in Kuwait. I know from a personal standpoint about the
importance of the families.
Secretary Roche. Senator, we have had an expeditionary Air
Force operation now for about 3 or 4 years, and in the process
of that, we have had to go through this in the past with people
deploying all of the time. Of our 360,000 active duty airmen,
we have over 100,000 in this rotation; now it's up to 260,000,
so from the very early days, we have had to worry about
particular bases supporting those who were deployed. Because we
flew people from so many bases, each base has a program to be
available to the families, worry about them, making sure they
don't have other issues, getting to the schools, make sure
schools know deployments are happening. So this is not
necessarily new.
Senator Dole. I see my time has expired, but I would like
to submit some questions for the record that you should answer
with regard to impact aid and a couple of other questions,
please.
Senator Ensign [presiding]. Let us assume the President
decided he was going to do as some had suggested and give the
inspectors whatever period of time, whatever period that time
was, you are building up in case we have to go to war. The
costs that he was talking about, would there be any difference
in those costs through 2003 if we just continued with the
weapons inspectors and we built up because we have to be
prepared for war? Is there any difference in the costs than
what he was talking about?
Secretary White. Senator, the costs I was talking about,
most of them are already sunk.
Senator Ensign. That was the point I was trying to make. If
we go with just weapons inspectors, the costs that you all are
talking about are pretty much there. The costs that you did not
include would be the costs of ammunition, of operations within
the war itself. Isn't that correct?
Secretary White. That's right. Because we have paid to
mobilize a force and a significant amount of Reserves. We paid
to transport it.
Senator Ensign. For the Army and Navy, that would be yes?
The Air Force would be different?
Secretary Roche. If we are at war, we will probably take
Operation Noble Eagle and go up to a large aircraft going
overhead which will have our costs go up somewhat
exponentially. In terms of having the costs of having people
deployed, we sacrificed some things like training, school
housing. Flight training is not being done the way they want it
to be. Those costs will start to accumulate. Our presumption is
that we will be there as long as we have to be, but there is a
price.
Senator Ensign. The point is if you would just have the
military there, those costs were being incurred?
Secretary Roche. The cost of having that many of our people
deployed, the incremental cost is high. So we pay a cost just
to be deployed, which is something over and above what we
normally would be paying.
Senator Ensign. Just briefly, I do not know if you want to
comment on this, that's the future we are looking at with bases
in Europe. We are looking at another round of Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) here, but there is also with General Jones
what he has talked about as far as shifting the bases. Did any
of you want to comment as far as what you see as the future of
those bases and your general impressions of that?
Secretary White. As the Secretary of Defense talked about
in the hearing, the combatant commanders are taking a look at
repositioning and the strategic requirements going forward. We
actively support those reviews. General Jones, for example,
combatant commander in Europe, is part and parcel with him and
working with how we should be stationed and positioned in
support of our naval applications. Korea was mentioned. We
actively support them because it's enormously important to us,
so we are studying where the force is going to be positioned
and whether we rotate units in or whether they be permanently
stationed there. There is a tremendous amount of work going on,
and we are right in the middle of it.
Senator Ensign. One other quick question, and then turn it
over to Senator Allard, since the other senators have left. You
can continue to chair and go on since the rest of the senators
will be coming back.
There was an article in yesterday's Early Bird that
discussed what is called the Pentagon's private Army. The Army
they described is comprised of individuals hired by private
military companies to handle mostly noncombat jobs so our
military forces can focus on their core mission. The article
stated during the Gulf War, there was one contractor for every
50 to 100 soldiers; that ratio is now one for every 10.
First of all, are those figures correct? Do you see us
continuing in that direction? What other types of functions
currently performed by the military are we looking to contract
out? Also in light of the recent incident in Colombia involving
contractor civilians, what are the rules that apply to these
individuals who happen to find themselves in harm's way? Can
they carry weapons, are they considered prisoners of war if
captured?
Secretary White. For the Army's part, we extensively employ
contractors for a wide variety of things. We are continuing to
do that with this Third Wave initiative, as I mentioned, at the
start and the numbers are bigger. I think the trend has been to
do more and more of this because you can get a better value
proposition than tying up uniformed people with these types of
activities. I think it's a positive thing that we ought to be
doing. I am not an expert on rules of engagement. I will
provide that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Employees of civilian contractors serving with U.S. Army units in
contingency operations are in noncombat positions. Normally, employees
of civilian contractors are not issued weapons, but instead rely upon
soldiers responsible for rear area security. If circumstances warrant,
a commander may issue a personal weapon, a pistol or rifle, to an
employee of a civilian contractor, provided the employee has received
firearms training and is determined to be competent in handling the
weapon safely. The employee may use the weapon for personal self
defense only.
An employee of a civilian contractor is an individual accompanying
the Armed Forces and, as such, is entitled to prisoner of war status if
captured by the enemy.

Senator Ensign. Any of you wish to comment on that?
Secretary Johnson. We use contract labor when our ships go
into port. When I was in Kuwait, I saw more and more contract
activity moving things. I remember in Operation Desert Storm
that most of the ground movement was done by contractors. We
use them when we need them. We do not have as quite a
regimented a program as the Air Force and Army do.
Secretary Roche. The nature of air power, we do have
contract labor. We probably have a ratio that's even higher.
They are further back. They are not in an area where they are
in combat. I know of no occasions where we actually have
aircraft in harm's way, but certainly it would be involved in
maintenance for software work, software support, and they
perform functions well done by them and allow us to take
uniform airmen and use uniform airmen.
Senator Ensign. Thank you. I will turn it over to Senator
Allard.
Senator Allard [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Ensign.
First of all, as Chairman, I am going to ask unanimous consent
that I make my opening statement part of the record. Also I
would like to enter into the record as well a letter to
Secretary Roche of the Air Force concerning rapes and sexual
assaults. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard and the
information referred to follow:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the willingness of the
Service Secretaries to appear before us today. Our forces continue to
fight in Afghanistan, assist forces in Yemen, Djibouti, and Georgia,
and defend our homeland. Now, they are poised to take on a new mission:
the invasion of Iraq. The mobilization of thousands of men and women in
the Reserves and National Guard are indicative of the size and scope of
our current military operations. Despite many hardships, our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardmen have stepped forward and
embraced their country's call to arms. We thank them for their service.
We thank each of you for providing them with the leadership they need
to defend our Nation.
I would like to take a few moments to address a very serious
concern of mine. Four months ago, a former cadet at the U.S. Air Force
Academy approached me about her recent experiences at the Academy. She
said that she was sexually assaulted, but was punished by the Academy
for drinking and having sex in the dormitories. Since then, more than
25 current and former cadets who were allegedly sexually assaulted or
raped have approached me and my staff.
Three weeks ago, I wrote a letter to Secretary of the Air Force
James Roche requesting a full and complete investigation into these
allegations. The Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John
Warner, and I sent a second letter last week requesting that the
Department of Defense Inspector General review the Air Force's
investigation. I also gave Secretary Roche a letter following my
meeting with him on February 25, which asked him to answer several
important questions. I have yet to receive a response from the Air
Force.
The Air Force did send an investigative team to Colorado Springs.
The team spent 10 days at the Academy and, from my understanding, was
able to get an understanding for the school's current system for
addressing sexual assault and rape cases. However, I also understand
the investigative team did not interview any current or former cadets
who have reported being sexually assaulted or raped.
The Air Force tells me that the investigation is not over and that
the investigative team may return to the Academy to meet with the
victims. My office has been attempting to facilitate this process. I
have also been told that the Air Force will be setting up a hot-line at
the Department of Defense that will be available for cadets to call. I
think these actions are a good start, but it is not enough.
I am concerned that the Air Force has not offered confidentiality
to the cadets. How can the Air Force expect cadets to come forward and
not be given confidentiality, particularly after watching the Academy
punish and ruin the careers of several of their classmates who made the
mistake of reporting a sexual assault or rape? I am also waiting to see
if the Air Force will work with the local rape counseling service in
Colorado Springs, which reportedly assisted 28 cadets who were raped.
Over the last couple of days, I have been asked several times if I
thought this current crisis at the Air Force Academy resembled the 1991
Navy Tailhook scandal. In many ways, I think this scandal is worse. It
seems clear to me that the problems at the Air Force Academy go much
deeper than those that became apparent during the Tailhook scandal. The
entire support and legal system at the Academy appears to have failed.
The Academy can't even tell us how many cadets reported a sexual
assault or rape.
These failures begin with leadership, but they do not end there.
The system is broken and must be fixed if we are to ensure the safety
of the cadets.
Many of my colleagues here today have urged and in fact nominated
high school students to attend the Air Force Academy. We stressed the
honor and integrity of the institution. I still believe in the Air
Force Academy, and I am interested in working with the Air Force to
correct many of the problems at the school. But first, we need to have
a full and complete investigation and that begins by working with the
victims. So, I urge you, Secretary Roche, to consider all options that
will encourage victims to come forward. I also encourage you to
cooperate with the Defense Department's Inspector General when he
begins his investigation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address this
important issue. I look forward to discussing it in more depth during
the question and answer period.

Senator Allard. I want to say a few things about the Air
Force situation and ask Secretary Roche a few questions.
Several reporters over the last week have asked if I consider
the current situation at the Academy to be worse than the
Navy's 1991 Tailhook scandal. I told them that I think it's
worse and here's why.
We have a system breakdown at the Academy. Over 25 current
and former cadets sexually assaulted or raped have contacted my
office. Each one of these cadets provided information on how
the Academy failed to adequately support them after the
reported sexual assault or rape. Perception by some of these
cadets was that they were actually punished for reporting.
Clearly, Academy support and the legal system failed to assist
these cadets.
This problem begins as leadership, but it doesn't end
there. I appreciate the comments by both Secretary Roche and
General Jumper that this cannot be tolerated. Secretary Roche,
I appreciate your personal involvement. I was pleased when you
ordered an investigation into this matter. However, I believe
more needs to be done. The victims need to feel good about the
process. They need genuine action that seeks to solve the
problem. Having just made this brief comment before the
question, let me proceed on to the questions.
The investigation, Secretary Roche, that you ordered has
been proceeding now for over 2 weeks. Can you give this
committee an update on the progress of the Air Force
investigation?
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. We want everyone to know the
degree to which you and I have worked closely on this matter
and make sure we have a baseline on the record for the United
States Air Force, and I speak for General Jumper as well as
myself. This is a problem and that cadets are having. In fact,
we have cadets who have misused power who have done things that
we cannot tolerate, and we will not tolerate any cadet who
sexually assaults another. We will not tolerate a cadet who
harbors one who had or cadet who was present and allowed
something like that to go on, and especially we will not
tolerate cadets who harass or who shun that cadet who has the
courage to come forward. That's a cadet problem.
It's a climate problem. You are absolutely right. We have
to deal with a climate that has allowed this to emerge 10 years
ago. This is the second time the therapy actions taken 10 years
ago were thought to be effective, but in fact we found that
they are not. We are on a two-track path here.
First track is to worry about the fact that come June,
Senators, as you well know, we will have 714 American women at
our Air Force Academy. 218 of those 714 will be brand-new
arrivals. We have to ensure that their parents believe that
those cadets are safe. We also have roughly 3,400 male cadets.
We have to make sure their parents understand that an
accusation is not a conviction.
We will always retain due process. First thing we are doing
is to get a larger sense of what is happening at the Academy.
To this degree, we have talked to counselors there, we talked
to professors, and we put out blanket calls for cadets to speak
with us as well as any victim past or current, or past and not
reported, to come. We have talked to victims.
We are obligated to adhere to privacy standards just as
your office is, so when you tell us about a cadet, you
recognize we have to ask you, could you ask that cadet if she
would speak to us, because we cannot violate the policy. We are
learning enough to realize that the change must occur, change
in the climate, how we manage the place, how we lead the place
has to change. That's the first rule of business.
The second is we have now reviewed on a cursory or in-depth
level 54 cases. Of those 54 cases, we are trying to identify
which of those that our inspector general will go into in-
depth, so some of the parties to a particular allegation will
be contacted. The IG will start shortly. We will give them the
initial list, give them the whole group, but say these 11 or 12
that you see right now, or maybe more, may emerge. We want to
make sure you go into it because they reflect situations where
the person who placed the accusation felt that the system let
her down.
We want to have specific review of due process in those
cases. There are other cases where the victim chooses not to
deal with this again. The part that is the saddest thing--and
this is comparable to what is occurring throughout universities
in the United States--is that while we have seen whatever we
see--whatever the number is, 25, 50--there are probably another
100 more that we do not see. That's a smaller number than the
national statistics say occur on universities. But this is not
a university.
Any woman going into the Air Force Academy should feel
better protected than going to any other university. Therefore,
what frightens me most is the climate is affecting so many
others who have not come forward. In fact, I was introduced to
one and all I could say was I am sorry. We have to get at that.
So we will both make changes which will come out by the end of
March.
You are the Senator from Colorado. You have long-term
interest as a member of the Academy advisory board and also
because there are particular cadets who have approached you.
I also would like you and everyone to know that the reason
that General Jumper and I are so adamant about this is we
cannot bear the thought of criminals being commissioned. We
cannot bear the thought of a criminal flying around with a
couple thousand pounds of bombs under his wings using his
judgment instead of rules of engagement or deciding when he can
do something, when he cannot do something, or possibly preying
on other of our airmen.
We cannot have that and, therefore, we need for the male
cadets to take initiative. We will do whatever we have to do
with regard to administration of the Academy. We also, and this
is tough, need to ask for courage, ask for a number of the
female cadets to come forward. We cannot have them know that
there is a criminal who is making it through that place,
because when she goes on we want her to worry about the Air
Force, not that fear. I'm proud to say with cooperation of
Secretary Johnson and Vernon Clark, I have just had an open
door at the Naval Academy. Spent last night there benchmarking
how we do things, how they do things--best practices.
It's my intent to share everything that we come upon with
both Secretary White and Secretary Johnson just in case there
is a chance to stop something. The Naval Academy was open with
all of the difficulties they are facing, with things that they
deal with. The fact that we have this ability to quickly speak
among ourselves I think is very important.
I would expect by the end of March that we will have a
number of initiatives that General Jumper and I will sign out,
and they will affect the climate of that school. Meanwhile, the
inspector general for the Department is participating more in
an over-our-shoulders watching how we are doing the business,
which is fine. As long as we are transparent, we should be
fine. We will make the first moves by the end of March.
Senator, we are between 60 and 90 days for 217 new recruits to
show up.
Senator Allard. I do appreciate your further elaborating on
the progress of the investigation. You and the investigating
team were there about 10 days?
Secretary Roche. They were there Friday, and I started a
week ago tomorrow. They begged to see their families and get
clean laundry. They have certain approaches working with the
downtown clinic, TESSA, where they have very strict privacy
rules as well. We are trying to ask them and we need time for
them to turn, with some of them go back 15 years, and ask those
patients if they would be willing to come forward. That would
be tough.
We have some telephone appointments with some parents. We
have male cadets who have come forward who want to contribute.
We have faculty members, female, and others. We have had some
of the victims come forward already. We keep trying to create
an environment that says it's okay, but we cannot force any of
them. Even in your case, you notice the same thing. Your office
has been supportive. Some of the women do not want to go
through it again, but they want someone to know that something
has happened.
When we get the inspector general tasks, they will go by
the cases case-by-case to see whether or not there were any
holes in due process, but we are discovering larger things,
Senator. We are discovering different definitions of sexual
assault used that the Academy has compared to at a typical Air
Force base.
Benchmark that with the Navy. Secretary of the Navy doesn't
have that problem. It's exactly the same definition one place
as the other. So uniform military justice can be applied
properly and systematically. Because of budget reasons in the
past and because of shortage of pilots, we have dropped the
preparation programs that we had for naval company officers we
called AOCs, commissioned officers who are with the squadrons,
but that's a terrible thing to have done but the pressures 5, 6
years ago caused that to happen.
The Navy did not succumb to that. They maintained standards
of training prior to becoming an officer. We failed. We failed
to empower our senior enlisted at the Academy. The kind of
resources that exist are not existent in the Air Force Academy,
but they will be.
Senator Allard. How many victims have you met with so far?
Secretary Roche. We have met with at least six and there
are two new cases that have come along.
Senator Allard. You have another team?
Secretary Roche. TESSA downtown. They have had a chance to
contact people. It's starting to converge, climate, power
imbalances, putting young women in difficult positions that we
ought not to be doing. Come back to the fact that these are
adults, they have to deal with these problems themselves. We
have to help them, but we cannot have them preying on high
school students that will be young officers come June. They
must be protected.
Senator Allard. We all struggle with this issue of
confidentiality. I cannot even give you the names unless they
agree to allow me to give them the names. The crisis center has
the same problem. We need to get the victim to understand that
we are going to treat their concerns seriously. As this
confidential issue comes up, and I think there needs to be a
frank discussion with the victim as to what is most important,
the confidentiality aspect or whether this goes to court, a
case, or somewhere or another that it may jeopardize that case
somehow or another and sometimes they have to make that
decision. But I guess the question I'm going to ask you is that
many of the victims that have approached my office have refused
to talk to your investigative team because they fear reprisals
and do not want to jeopardize their careers. There are those
that say that they would like to have their confidentiality
protected. Are you willing to grant confidentiality to victims
that might be willing to come forward?
Secretary Roche. It's a legal term. It depends what
confidentiality is. If a victim comes forward and says I would
like my name not to be used, that we can absolutely do. We can
be sure that publicly we can be led to that victim. If she
reports a crime, we are obligated to go after that criminal and
to that degree we have to tell her that if there is a crime
involved, if in fact there is an assault, we have to
investigate because there is a potential criminal who could be
flying one of our aircraft.
This is where confidentiality is the problem. First of all,
I'm not empowered to give confidentiality. If I ask a question,
the answer has to be something that can be used for official
purposes only so we can protect someone's privacy rights. But
if there is a crime, we are obligated to go after that
criminal.
Senator Allard. Many of the assailants have gotten off
lightly. How many cadets have been court martialed for sexual
assault or rape and can you share with this committee how many
cadets have been court martialed at the Air Force Academy for
sexual assault and rape for the last 10 years?
Secretary Roche. I'm going to give you a preliminary
number. It changed over the weekend. Recordkeeping is not all
we had wanted it to be. There has been one formal court martial
where the assailant was acquitted. However, there was another
court martial where alleged assailant pled guilty and went off
to jail for 7 months, so far I know of two. In many of the
other cases, there has not been sufficient evidence to fit the
element of the crime under the uniform code, but because we are
finding out enough administrative wrongdoing by the individual,
we have thrown the person out. That's different from being able
to take them to trial. One of the things we know is that in the
future if a young person has been assaulted, we can educate her
on what is the difference between harassment and assault so she
understands that. Then we want to put with her very quickly
someone who can explain the law, explain the process, so she
understands what is going to happen and that there are defense
counsel, understand that the process of the crime has elements
of the crime that must be approved.
However, there are administrative things. When we have not
been able to take someone to court martial, oftentimes we have
been able to throw them out. We get to a point of a ``He said,
She said'' situation which is difficult to take to court. The
other Academies have that same problem.
Senator Allard. I think we really need to instill
confidence in the system so victims, when they report a rape,
know that the rape itself won't put their military careers at
risk. This is the problem that we are willing to take on.
Secretary Roche. We are at a point now when we go to look
for senior officer, for instance, the superintendent will be
retiring this summer and we are looking for replacement, it's
sad we have to go back to make sure no one ever accused the
general officer of something even if it was unsubstantiated
because it's such a delicate matter. We cannot start a
discussion by saying, ``But in your past. . .'' So we are
taking this very seriously, and we do not want a situation
where a victim suffers through her career because of something
that was not her fault in any way, shape, or form. There is
nothing in the breaking of regs that justifies a sexual assault
against any of these women. Nothing.
Senator Allard. Just to wrap it up, Mr. Chairman, if I
might. On February 25, you and I met in my office to discuss
this issue. During that meeting, I gave you a detailed letter
asking a number of questions pertaining to the investigation. I
just ask that you put in the record your responses, what is the
status of your response to that particular letter.
Secretary Roche. We have a draft, but it's changing. I do
not want to give you the draft, rather at least wait until the
end of March and say, as of the end of March, here are the
answers based on what we have found, but I have been given one
draft already. Too much is changing. We want to go back and see
if the folks at TESSA have some insights that are different
than we obtained. We are going to fold those in. There is one
in the GAO report that I want to spend more time on. They are
all quite useful.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Allard. As was mentioned by the Chairman, who is
now with the committee, and you know we all have something at
stake here. Members of Congress do make nominations to the Air
Force Academy, and we frequently promote the Academies in
general as a good education and a wonderful opportunity for
young people who measure up. It's vitally important we have a
system in place where they are comfortable, and there will be
some justice if there is a situation where a victim experiences
rape or incest.
The integrity of the system is at stake and I think this is
a really important time in the life of the Academies,
particularly the Air Force Academy. Thank you for your
interest, and we will be continuing to be watching over these
as you move forward in your investigation.
Secretary Roche. Absolutely. We are totally transparent to
you. I think you know General Jumper is en route flying out
there now. He will be speaking to the cadets. He will also be
speaking to some of our enlisted there. We have had one polling
of the senior enlisted. We are trying to touch as many of those
bases as we possibly can. A thing that's scary is that we are
talking about young people who come 2 months from now, will
graduate and some of them may face war within 12 months. I
don't want them growing up in a war, Senator. I want them grown
up when they go out of the Academy and I don't want them to
think that they can get away with this, so there is something
else they can get away with later on.
These are aspiring officers in whom we all place special
trust and confidence. Once upon a time, their commissioning
certificates referred to them as officers and gentlemen. They
have special obligations. They cannot escape now and all of a
sudden become responsible in the future.
Senator Allard. There is this loyalty to the squadron. The
loyalty needs to start with the perpetrator of the act, and if
he is going to be a loyal member of that squadron, he should
not have done what he did and shouldn't come back later on in
the squadron where he says you are the one that is the problem.
Secretary Roche. These young people need to know their peer
group is the men and women of the Armed Services. Right now
some of them are shaming the Air Force, but they are also
shaming any member of the Armed Forces.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you for an excellent
line of questions, and again I commend you for your work on
this issue. Also, another member of our committee who has been
very active and that is our next questioner, Senator Nelson. I
wonder if you would indulge the chair for one question as I
have been involved in this. I think we better employ language
that is clearly understandable by a generation, an age younger
than we or maybe in my case a generation, but zero tolerance is
understood. I think that the importance of each of the Service
Secretaries indicate that in their analysis and factions that
they take with respect to their Academies the policy of zero
tolerance would be very much a part of the understanding. Is
that correct?
Secretary Roche. Senator, I dread ever to disagree with
you. Zero tolerance to me I don't think captures the specifics
that these young men especially need to know. Zero tolerance
says you cannot perform, and we will not condone, a sexual
assault on a victim, another cadet. We want to go further,
Senator, and I think you agree.
Not only is that not tolerated, if they know of one of
their own in their group, they have an obligation to go after
that person. They have an obligation to stop these things from
happening, and especially they have an obligation never to
harass or shun a cadet who had the courage to come forward.
Chairman Warner. It can be broadened to that. But I think
we have to employ standards that are understood by this
generation. I think the zero tolerance does send some message.
Secretary Johnson, your view?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. I certainly agree. The code
says we will not tolerate them among us. That's certainly what
we are talking about.
Secretary White. We agree as well. We start the education
process and understanding of that policy the day they come to
the Academy.
Chairman Warner. In the letter we specifically asked our
former colleague on the committee who is now in charge of
personnel in the Department of Defense that each of the
Academies should review this situation, and the Air Force can
ascertain to the extent that there is any presence of
allegation within those Academies. I will close out on that and
now turn to my colleague, who has raised that with the
committee of the other Academies.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's exactly right. I have had
complaints from the Air Force Academy. One woman, who was raped
at the Air Force Academy while she was a freshman, learned that
another woman had been raped by the same man, a fellow cadet 2
weeks earlier. They reported the crimes to the office of
special investigations, but the male cadet was never charged.
One woman left the Academy. The other is still a cadet.
In another complaint, a Floridian, a woman at West Point
assaulted in her dorm room by another cadet, was urged not to
make an issue out of the attack and eventually, separated from
the Academy. Now, given these complaints, and I certainly hope
Secretary Johnson that this doesn't get to your Academy, but
given these complaints and a number of others that have been
reported in the media, I want to know how many complaints of
sexual assault or rape have you received in the past 5 years
and how many times have you pursued criminal charges against
the alleged rapists?
Secretary Roche. We are assembling those data for the Air
Force at this time. We had a hotline that picked up 98 calls.
We have had 54 major investigations. We have only had one,
possibly two formal court martials. We have had a number of
dismissals because while you cannot prove the elements of their
defense, you have enough to say there is violation of the
Academy regulations, and therefore dismissing the individual. I
would encourage you Senator, if you could, if they would have
the courage to contact us or contact your office and allow your
office to tell us their names so we can contact them. The
privacy rights are such that we cannot ask any of them unless
they come forward to us.
Senator Bill Nelson. If after investigation of the facts if
you determine that a crime had been committed, would you turn
that over to the appropriate criminal authorities?
Secretary Roche. Absolutely. One of the things that the
inspector general's work will do that Senator Warner was
referring to is to look at these cases to see whether due
process was followed. If not, or if it warranted reopening,
then that was something we could do with uniform code. We
would, just as we are now having some young women come forward
who had previously not come forward. We will put that into the
chain of command into the office of special investigations and
follow through with it.
We have done things for instance that I know won't surprise
you. We have had an incident of a cadet in a community do
something rather heinous. The district attorney decided that it
wasn't a big enough deal to him, refused to prosecute it. We
prosecuted it and he is in the slammer now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White.
Secretary White. We have prosecuted and taken cases to
court martial in the past. We will provide details for the 5-
year period that you requested. It is a critical issue for us.
It has been for a long time. Women have been at West Point
since 1976. I think, as Secretary Roche has talked about here,
the point is to establish a climate that makes people safe
about reporting these things, and then take action appropriate
with the offense. We will provide you that detail. We consider
it very important. We are looking very closely at the situation
at the Air Force Academy.
[The information referred to follows:]

The United States Military Academy (USMA) has had five allegations
of rape: one in 1998; one in 1999; one in 2000; one in 2001; and one in
2002. Charges were preferred in two of these cases. In the 1998 case,
the investigation determined that the sex was consensual and both
cadets graduated. In both the 1999 and 2000 cases, the accused cadets
resigned in lieu of court-martial and received other than honorable
discharges. In both cases, the victims recommended acceptance of the
resignation in lieu of court-martial.
It is important to note that the Department of the Army provides
oversight for this. In the 2001 case, there was insufficient evidence
to support the allegation to go to court-martial. However, the cadet
was found to have violated other USMA regulations and resigned. In the
2002 case, DNA evidence did not substantiate the allegation and both
cadets graduated.

Senator Bill Nelson. Of the victims who left, will you
provide them with an opportunity to serve in the military?
Secretary Roche. Depends on the circumstances, sir. I would
not want to make a blanket statement there. I know that some of
them, for instance, loved the Air Force enough, and I'm
surprised at this level of courage that they left the Academy,
gone to university, and joined the ROTC program. We have known
that, and we have welcomed them.
Secretary White. I would, too, on a case-by-case basis,
certainly.
Senator Bill Nelson. You have spoken earlier of a cadet
problem. Is this an officer leadership problem?
Secretary Roche. As I noted, it's always both. These are
adults, and it is easy for those adults to try and put
responsibility for their actions someplace else. They are the
ones who committed it. There is a leadership problem. I believe
we the corporate Air Force have failed the Academy. This is not
an issue at the Academy. When we allowed budget reasons and
shortages of officer reasons to not, for instance, at the Air
Force Academy there are very few pilots for these squadron
officers, battle managers, because they are so desperately
needed in the field. We have to think was that really smart? We
gave up 1 year of advanced education for counseling. That
clearly was not smart.
We did not make good use of our superlative noncommissioned
officers and put them in the chain of command so that they
could have helped this problem. That was not smart. That's not
the fault of the people there. It's my predecessor and his
predecessor as well as General Jumper's predecessor and his
predecessor. It's a corporate responsibility for that.
Senator Bill Nelson. At the end of the day, we want to make
sure that both your investigations hold someone responsible and
accountable, which is the appropriate way in the military. I
have been burned a little bit recently on this. Senator Pat
Roberts and I have been involved in the Scott Speicher case and
we have seen how everything has been so mushy over the last 12
years with mistakes being made and no one being held
accountable. Now we have every reason. I personally think he is
likely to be alive, that we have left a downed pilot for 12
years, and that no one has had to step forward with
accountability. I do not want to see that in this case as well.
Secretary Roche. Senator, if I may, sir, where
accountability is warranted, it will be there. I have had no
problem removing general officers from jobs. I have had no
problem holding people accountable, but when you really get
into this particular case, the accountability goes broad. If it
has to be somewhere, it's with General Jumper and me.
Secretary White. The chain of command is responsible for
this, and I as the Secretary am responsible for the department.
West Point is a national treasure. We intend to keep it that
way.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your willingness to jump into this with all fours.
Chairman Warner. I also wish to commend you for your work
on Commander Speicher. I know that you had offered and wanted
to accompany Senator Levin and I on our recent trip. That was
not possible given the size of the aircraft. I know your desire
to pursue that case. I think Senator Roberts at each stop was
able to invoke not only your intense feelings on that case, but
his. I thank you for bringing it up. I hope you continue to
bring it up until we have some resolution of that tragic saga.
We had excellent patience exercised by Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator?
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the last
several weeks, there have been a number of news articles about
the hardships that military personnel both active and Reserve
are facing because of deployments to support several
contingency operations and some of these hardships include
possible bankruptcy, but also parenting issues when both
parents or single parents are deployed, effects in income for
reservists ordered to active duty where they are paid far less
than they are paid and compensated in their civilian jobs,
first responders ordered to active duty leaving their cities
and neighborhoods without their services in the event of a
terrorist attack on the homeland.
As I ask each of you, I would like to have each of you
respond. Does your Service have policies in place to prevent
wherever possible, for example, both parents from being sent to
a combat zone at the same time?
Secretary White. I don't think we have a specific policy
against that particular issue. We require single parents or
families where both parents are in the military to provide a
family care plan that's reviewed by the chain of command to
make sure when they deploy that the children are adequately
provided for. But I will have to get back to you for the record
about the specifics of dual soldier families, and if there are
any limitations on it or comments on it.
[The information referred to follows:]

There are no specific DOD policies that preclude the assignment or
deployment of multiple family members to designated hostile-fire/
imminent-danger areas or combat zones at the same time. This includes
both a single parent and members of a dual-military couple with family
members. However, DOD policy does exist which speaks to the concurrent
assignment of multiple family members to the same unit or ship. The
policy provides for reassignment of all but one member to a different
unit or ship. Approval of such requests will be based on military
requirements. The Army defines a unit for this purpose as a battalion,
squadron, or element with less than 500 authorized Army personnel. Army
implements DOD policy without change.
Understanding that plans must be made to ensure family members are
properly and adequately cared for when the soldier is deployed or
otherwise not available, current Army policy requires that dual-
military couples with family members have an approved Family Care Plan
(FCP) on file. Soldiers unable or unwilling to provide an adequate FCP
are ineligible for deployment. Soldiers without approved plans may be
considered for separation.
As a matter of policy, all similarly qualified service members must
share assignments or deployments in hostile-fire/imminent-danger or
combat zones equitably. However, provisions exist for consideration of
combat deferment or exemption for service members or families
experiencing severe humanitarian or compassionate problems. Our
soldiers voluntarily entered the profession of arms with the
understanding they would be subject to worldwide assignments to include
being placed in harms way. On balance, they accept these policies and
do not wish to be restricted from performing their duties along with
their fellow soldiers.

Secretary Johnson. We also have no policy that specifically
prohibits it, but we do require, as Secretary White talked
about, for them to have a plan.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the event that they are both
deployed?
Secretary Johnson. That they are both deployed.
Senator Ben Nelson. That works for deployment. But I think
we are worried about losing the same parents in the same combat
zone.
Secretary Johnson. We understand that. Most often their
larger family takes care of the children. On the other hand, it
would be incorrect to say that an officer couldn't serve. We
have to be careful to allow them to serve their country while
serving their family also.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand. We are trying to narrow
it down to a combat zone, as opposed to service.
Secretary Roche. Again, I would have to support the
Secretary of the Navy. We would not want to say that a
condition of officership or enlistmentship is affected by
result of your majority. Support groups are maintained. I do
not know of any cases where we would have a married couple
where we would have a same flight over a same combat zone at
the same time.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have any screening system that
would identify firefighters, police officers, medical
personnel, and other first responders to determine whether they
may be needed more in their local community because of the
interest in hometown security and the homeland security effort?
Secretary Roche. I love this one, sir. We, in fact, look
for those specific specialties because we are in such short
demand of them, and we are in such short demand because we are
protecting so many bases here plus new bases overseas that,
thanks to my colleague, Secretary White, we are renting close
to 8,000 Army guardsmen to protect Air Force bases because we
do not have the force. We have exhausted the Reserve Force to
be able to have the force protection at the bases here and
overseas at the same time.
The specialties you brought up we are very much in need of
and, yes, every now and then it's a shock to realize how many
members of police departments and fire departments of small
American towns are now on active duty, but they have been part
of our Reserve and we sure needed it.
Secretary White. I would agree and say the same thing. If
you look at Military Police (MP) units, most of them are in law
enforcement in their private communities and we have activated
just about every MP unit in the stretcher right now: both Guard
and Reserve. The Reserve side of this is that in States where
units have been activated that have specific capabilities that
the State would like to use under State control for emergency
purposes, the Adjutants General (AG) of the States have contact
with the surrounding States and they swap out capabilities to
cover when a unit is mobilized, but that doesn't get exactly
what you asked.
Senator Ben Nelson. Over the years, they have had
relationships with employment groups. They work closely with
employers and we have a good partnership. Local units look at
the things we are talking about, but yet as the other two
Secretaries have mentioned, we go after some of the people that
are also needed in our great Nation at home.
That's reminiscent changing the words to the song ``Over
There.'' So I would hope that you might take a look at that. I
understand the importance of having the reservists and the
Guard serve and be available and be deployed. Also, I think we
all are aware of the importance of what effect it has over here
when they go over there.
My final question is: what systems do you have in place to
make sure that your mobilization is fair? For example, that
some individuals are not ordered to active duty for a second
time unless absolutely necessary or kept on active duty longer
than they have been led to believe they would be on active
duty, while others are not activated? I understand that there
are different skills or different service requirements and
therefore that will mitigate, but is there a system in place to
apply fairness where possible?
Secretary White. We work this very carefully. In
conjunction, on the Guard side with the State adjutant general
obviously, there have been cases, and we have not had to
mobilize anyone for more than a 1-year period. That's one of
the reasons we are helping out the Air Force on-base security
is they would have had to go into a second year of
mobilization. But even having said that, 18 months into the
global war on terrorism, we are so short of MPs that we have
had to remobilize a small group of people who in fact were
mobilized September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2002. After the
current situation we have remobilized, but we worked very hard
in the Guard and Reserve oversight process to make sure it's
fair and the burden is kept as reasonable as we can.
Secretary Johnson. We work on the burden, but you would be
proud of the number of volunteers who come forward and want to
serve. I would be hard pressed to give a percent, but I suspect
it's a majority.
Senator Ben Nelson. I wouldn't in any way want to suggest
that you wouldn't have the loyalty of these men and women. It's
a matter of certain hardships and/or equity that plays a role
and you never want to under sell the importance of those who
volunteer because their particular circumstances may permit
them to do that.
Secretary Roche. Same thing. As of today, we have over
1,700 volunteers. Easier for us depending on how the airlines
are going. We mobilize by experiences, and I think quite
frankly we mobilize for our needs in combat and expect that the
Air National Guard and Reserves will try to handle this
particular need of the individual. The Air National Guard has
been in this business for a long time. They have been in
Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch, and
Operation Enduring Freedom. They have been part and parcel. You
cannot tell that this is a guard craft or active craft unless
you look at the tail number. They have a personnel system that
gets what we need on the spot. We do not try to figure it out.
It just works.
Senator Ben Nelson. My time is up. Thank you very much. I
appreciate it.
Senator Warner. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you and Senator Allard for raising the issues of discipline and
behavior at the Academies. I appreciate the addressing of this
very crucial issue that concerns many of us, not only those of
us here on the dais, but people around the country.
Chairman Warner. Senator, you have spoken to me on several
occasions about your concerns on this case.
Senator Clinton. I know in the great scheme of things where
we have 200,000 of our men and women on the knife's edge going
into harm's way, some may wonder why we are raising this, but
indeed I think it demonstrates the strength of our system and
the commitment to our overriding values. I am very proud that
it has been raised and followed through in such a professional
manner.
I also want to express my appreciation to the Secretaries
for their response to the question that the chairman asked
toward the beginning of the hearing concerning General
Shinseki's testimony before us a week or so ago. I understand
completely that we are talking unpredictable, in the words of
Secretary Rumsfeld, unknowable factors perhaps. But I think
that the manner in which you responded to that question and
referred to General Shinseki's personal service with a
comparable set of circumstances was very welcomed. I, for one,
appreciate it and I think that the range that we are attempting
to understand Senator Levin has consistently questioned every
witness about is an important one for us to continue to probe.
I thank you for the way you have responded to that inquiry.
I have a series of questions. I will submit them to the
record. With respect to a question, Secretary Johnson, about
Coast Guard deployments, I will be submitting to the record,
committing to the record a letter that I'm sending to you with
respect to more information about the call up of Coast Guard
ships.
[The information referred to follows:]

Last week, Admiral Clark informed me that the Coast Guard
cutters have been periodically deployed with Navy carrier
groups to ensure their readiness to work with Navy ships in
times of crisis. However, according to a Coast Guard spokesman,
this is the first time that Coast Guard combatant ships have
been deployed in support of a national contingency in 30 years.
Indeed, one news report indicates that the Coast Guard has
sent one fourth of its fleet to the Gulf. We, in New York and
other coastal states, particularly along the east coast, count
on the Coast Guard to be part of our homeland security to guard
our ports against potential terrorist threats, as well as to
provide assistance and leadership in responding to emergencies
such as the recent barge explosion on Staten Island, where the
Coast Guard was the first responder on the scene and helped to
contain that accident. So I will be asking for additional
information for how many additional Coast Guard cutters,
including patrol boats, are currently deployed, the criteria
that are used to determine deployment, how long we expect to
see them deployed overseas, the missions that they are
currently performing, and any provisions or planning with
respect to replacing their necessary functions into the future.
Obviously as we are looking at the multiple challenges that we
are confronting, it's imperative that we think ahead, and I do
not know that deploying Coast Guard cutters in times of
heightened alert will always be a very good idea. It may be
necessary now, but we may have to look for alternatives, so I
will look forward to receiving those answers to those
questions.
Secretary Roche, I'm deeply interested in the work that is
done at the Air Force research lab in Rome. Have you had a
chance to visit the lab? I would love to, however, be there
with you when and if you do?
Secretary Roche. I'd be delighted. That's the sort of stuff
if you know my past that turns me on. [Laughter.]
Senator Clinton. I wasn't inviting you to be turned on. I'm
only kidding. I couldn't resist. [Laughter.]
Secretary Roche. I'm an electronics and research man.
Senator Clinton. I know. Just kidding.
Secretary Roche. It's a very interesting place, and it does
great work.
Senator Clinton. It would be a great pleasure. Obviously,
the work being done to develop cyber security technologies are
one of the most important investments we need to be making with
respect to our cyber infrastructure and the protective
technology that is required, so I hope that we will have a
chance to do that sooner instead of later.
Finally, I would just echo the questions and concerns of my
colleague, Senator Ben Nelson, about first responders. This is
another one of those issues that has to be taken into account
as we plan for the future. I know Secretary Rumsfeld has
apparently expressed concern about having reliance that our
forces have on reservists and guardsmen for the kind of
deployment that we are now experiencing. Of course in many
communities in our country, we are deeply dependent upon them,
our firehouses, police stations, and emergency rooms. So I
think we are going to have to consider how to better deal with
demands on both ends of our security spectrum, both here at
home and overseas, when we look at the Reserve components.
Mr. Chairman, the Secretaries have been very helpful in
responding to concerns many of us have about the questions that
Senator Nelson raised, possibly married couples with children
both serving in the same combat area. If there is any kind of
formal statement or policy that has been adopted on this, we
might want to get that just so that we all know if there are
individual service policies, we need them; but if there is
something that is being developed across the board, it would be
very useful because many of us are receiving a lot of questions
from not only constituents but from mayors, county executives,
and others who have been facing these tremendous fiscal crises
that they are currently undergoing and have to pay their
reservists costs. We are trying to get our arms around this. I
would look forward to receiving that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary Johnson. Spouse collocation is a key distribution goal.
To the greatest extent possible, we assign one member to a shore
billet, or otherwise non-deployable activity, while the spouse is
fulfilling a sea-going or operational tour.
Navy makes every effort to avoid concurrent assignment of dual Navy
couples to deployable units. We also strive to avoid these operational
assignment concerns for personnel married to other Service personnel or
Reserve component members. However, given the expeditionary nature of
naval service, there remains the potential for both members of a dual
military couple to be simultaneously deployed.
Dual Navy couples, and Navy members married to members of the other
Services, are required to establish formal contingency arrangements to
provide for the needs of children (and other dependent family members)
in the event of conflicting operational demands. Commanding officers
are responsible for ensuring compliance with program requirements and
maintaining documentation of these plans at the local command.
Requests to be excused from deployment are submitted to a member's
immediate commander and forwarded for disposition through the
operational chain of command. If requests cannot be resolved at the
local level, the commander may, if deemed appropriate, refer the
request to headquarters level as part of an administrative separation
package.

Chairman Warner. Thank you Senator. That will be done.
Secretary Johnson. We will provide all the information you
asked for. The partnership between the Navy and the Coast Guard
has always been strong. It's even stronger now. There are some
things that military people cannot do where Coast Guard members
have that authority. We will provide information on the ships
that go forward, but that partnership is tremendous forward and
in the homeland. We are supporting the Coast Guard here very
much and we will provide the information to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The number of Coast Guard Cutters deploying to the Persian Gulf
are:

378-foot high endurance cutters

USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)--homeport: Alameda,
CA
USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716)--homeport: North
Charleston, SC

225-foot seagoing buoy tender

USCGC Walnut (WLB 205)--homeport: Honolulu, HI

110-foot patrol boats

USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)--home port: South
Portland, ME
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)--homeport: Sandy Hook,
NJ
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)--home port:
Atlantic Beach, NC
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)--homeport: Miami, FL
USCGC Grand Isle (WPB 1338)--homeport:
Gloucester, MA
USCGC Bainbridge Island (WPB 1343)--home port:
Sandy Hook, NJ
USCGC Pea Island (WPB1347)--home port: St.
Petersburg, FL
USCGC Knight Island (WPB 1348)--homeport: St.
Petersburg, FL

Chairman Warner. Secretary Johnson, you raised a very
important point about the statutory provisions in laws that
enable the Coast Guard to do certain actions in reference to
boarding that is not available to our forces. Maybe it ties
into the review the Secretary is undertaking. But I think in
these times when we are stretched so thinly and if it impacts
on the Coast Guard to cover so many areas, that you might
revisit that legislation to determine whether or not some
authority, albeit maybe temporary, would enable the forces to
maintain this task.
Secretary Johnson. In hostile situations, we do not have a
problem. But in nonhostile situations, we do. But we will look
at that.
Chairman Warner. I do not want to have the Coast Guard
impacted in the ability to carry out so many of its functions
because of the necessity to have Coast Guard personnel or a
ship, as the case may be, present. Thank you very much.
The chair is going to remain here for a number of wrap-up
questions, but Senator Levin has commitments. I will yield to
him and Senator Allard, then do the wrap-up.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, as always, for your
courtesy. First on the end strength issue. You commented on
this before, but when I asked the question in a little
different way. Given the fact that our forces are so widely-
deployed in such great numbers, given the fact that we have
such huge demand and stress on our Guard and Reserve Forces, do
you believe it is likely that you will be asking for an
increase in the end strength of your Army and your Navy? Is it
likely you'll be asking for an increase?
Secretary White. Senator, we have discussed this before.
The Army has had an active duty end strength Guard plus Reserve
of 510,000 for 18 months. While there are certainly
efficiencies that we can make within the 480,000 end strength
cap to get military people doing military jobs and freeing up
those spaces, if the operational tempo stays where it is in
Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom going forward, we
are over strength right now. We have Stop-Lossed 3,000 people.
Our retention numbers are better than we had expected so we are
at about 489,000 as it is. I think it's going to be a prime
topic of discussion.
Senator Levin. Is it likely you, Secretary Johnson, will be
asking for increase in end strength?
Secretary Johnson. Not likely. We are 2 percent over
strength now and Marine Corps has a Stop Loss which puts them
over also.
Secretary Roche. We are in a situation where we are over
the 2 percent right now. We have found 2,000 airmen not working
for the Air Force. We are trying to bring 6,000 of them back
in. I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld. 600 some communicators in
the Pentagon easily handled by a contract out, which we are
doing. When we finish with that, we will come back. It's
distorted now, Senator Levin, because pilot retention is way
up. Recruiting--we have recruited this year--finished early. We
see that happening and re-enlistments are happening as well.
It's what's distorted. As of right now, we do not see asking
for end strength increase.
Senator Levin. Secretary White, are you aware of proposals
to merge the staffs at the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the JCS?
Secretary White. It was brought up in this hearing when you
had the chiefs here. I had not seen the paper. I have heard
because it has been discussed here in committee and discussed a
little bit over in the department.
Senator Levin. Have you been briefed on any such proposal?
Secretary White. No.
Secretary Johnson. I have read about it. I have not been
briefed.
Secretary Roche. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator, such an important question. Do
you have any basis, in fact, to say there is any official
circulation of a document and it leads to the question whether
or not the Secretaries, who in my judgment are an integral part
of any formal policy should be involved? I do not know of an
official document and I do not know if the Secretary has
omitted the process.
Senator Levin. The question is whether there is a draft
floating around which our Secretaries have been briefed about,
or at least the idea has been briefed to them. The answer is
no.
Secretary Roche. I know of no draft and have not been
briefed.
Senator Levin. We have all kinds of reasons to believe
there are proposals floating around for both areas of the
length of service of the chiefs and in terms of merger of the
staffs. I believe those proposals are floating around the
building, but my question is whether they have been briefed on
it. Their answer was no.
Secretary Roche. Sir, you raised a new one, length of
service of the chief. We have had a dialogue with our boss and
he has listened to our views.
Senator Levin. There has been dialogue?
Secretary Roche. Length of service of chief, combatant
commanders, Chairman and Joint Chairman.
Secretary Johnson. Absolutely sir.
Secretary White. Yes.
Senator Levin. I did not mean to throw that curve ball. I
appreciate your catching that. Two different subjects we are
interested in. One of them you said there have been
discussions, one of them there have not been, and that's
acceptable to me.
Secretary Roche, on the tanker issue, has the decision been
made about tanker leasing?
Secretary Roche. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Is there anything in this budget, any item
that presumes the outcome of such a decision?
Secretary Roche. I'm keeping the word that I gave you last
year. In the budget is plan A, which is that the lease will not
occur and we have to continue to buy tankers later in the
decade. So therefore we could not ask Secretary Rumsfeld to
approve our budget if in fact that made conditions for him
approving the lease.
It assumes a negative outcome that says we will buy later
in the decade because we could not ask him to make a decision
on the budget without having made a decision on resources. The
office of the Secretary of Defense has been working on this for
some time. We are hoping it will happen shortly. I can't tell
you, Senator. I know Secretary Rumsfeld is getting frustrated
that gestation period for this is growing. We are about
elephant size now.
Senator Levin. He doesn't get easily frustrated so
something must be going on. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. The chair observes the Senator from
Georgia has arrived, if you would like to be recognized.
Senator Chambliss. Sorry I'm running behind, gentlemen.
It's one of those days full of hearings. I appreciate your
conversation yesterday, Secretary Roche. We look forward to
continuing to work on that issue and as Chairman of the
Personnel Subcommittee, I look forward to working closely with
you to make sure all of our men and women are well. I know
that's your intention.
Secretary Johnson, I have a question for you with respect
to the C-130J multiyear program. We worked awfully hard last
year to include the language in last year's Defense
Authorization bill for multiyear procurement of the C-130J,
both the Air Force and the Marine Corps. I know that work is
being done to get the planes on contract, and most of the
information is with the Comptroller's office. However, I
understand the Navy has not provided all the paperwork that is
needed and this is holding up the contract. Can you tell me
when the Navy will finish submitting the paperwork so we can
move that contract forward?
Secretary Johnson. We are participating with the Air Force
on the C-130J.
Senator Chambliss. It's my understanding that paperwork has
been there for sometime and hasn't come out of the Navy. It's
been sitting there for several weeks. If you can follow up on
that, I'd appreciate it.
Secretary Johnson. I will follow up.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy completed the required paperwork for the C-130J Multi-Year
Program and the contract was signed on March 14, 2003.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you. That's all I have, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased with
the way the missile defense program is moving along, and the
question I have of the Secretaries is this. What are you doing
to assure that missile defense is going to be a core competency
in your Service?
Secretary White. Senator, from the Army's perspective, it
always has been and we will get back from the Missile Defense
Agency control of the PAC-3 program which is critical to
terminal phase defense. Our component command of STRATCOM is
reestablishing Fort Greeley, where the test site will be, and
of course, we also run the test range so we are very heavily
involved in this. It's always been a core competency of the
Army and I think will be an integral part of the defense.
Secretary Johnson. We have given use of the U.S.S. Lake
Erie to the Missile Defense Agency to do their work on
experimentation and so forth. We have identified five other
ships and missile defense systems on board. We are working with
the Missile Defense Agency to develop better missiles. We have
the capability on the launch end, and we would like to have
longer capability to get in the mid range. We are leaning
toward a good partnership from our perspective.
Senator Allard. Secretary Johnson, I think in the test
phase we have allocated money to the land-based and then also
some to the Navy, too. I was thinking the number that we
allocated to the Navy was more than what you just mentioned.
Secretary Johnson. 20 missiles. But five ships we are
talking about here. One has a tracking capability. The others
have vertical launch system capability and we have the 20
missiles allocated. We plan to develop better missiles.
Secretary Roche. Senator, the United States Air Force is
heavily involved in this defense, but certainly from space and
things like high and low, those problems. We work closely with
the Missile Defense Agency on the airborne laser, very delicate
project at Edwards Air Force base. It would be infrastructure
for missile defense.
Senator Allard. Mr. Secretary, when I first came on to this
committee, I had the opportunity to serve as Chairman of the
Personnel Subcommittee. At that particular point in time, we
were struggling with how it is we were going to retain our
specialty areas. My question is right now how are we doing at
retaining individuals in these specialty areas? We put some
provisions in that legislation so that there could be salary
adjustments for people in the private sector. I'd like to hear
from all three of the Secretaries on how they view our ability
to retain and recruit individuals into various specialty areas
that we were having difficulty a number of years back.
Secretary White. As it stands right now, retention across
the board and paid incentives that support specialty areas are
in good shape. The question is will we be able to sustain that
going forward.
Secretary Johnson. We in the Navy and Marine Corps are in
outstanding shape. Marine Corps has always been able to retain
as many as they wanted to. Now I have to worry about if there
is a slot in the particular specialty the person wants to stay
in. But we are able to do 90 percent of the ones who want to
stay. We have to move a few to a different specialty.
In the Navy, we have been focusing on a more mature, older
force. We have some 71 percent that are past the initial part
in the Navy; we expect to drive that to 75. With that, of
course, comes a difference in cost because they are more
senior, but when you look at the requirement to train new
people and the cycle, the additional cost to keep the more
senior, more capable people is well worth it.
Secretary Roche. Senator, the help that Congress has given
us is really a godsend. It's helped us to deal with navigators,
battle managers, scientists, engineers that we are looking at
so it has been really a help to us to be able to focus. There
are still some specialties in demand. We are still behind in
the pilots, but at least we are filling up the school.
Some of our specialties are clearly things like security
forces, which there is an unexpected demand for. Some unique
ones, like specialties who know hot to handle fuels become very
critical folks. Rehooks, civil engineers are in great demand
elsewhere. Another thing we try is to make education part of
why you want to be in the Armed Forces, not just things like
the college.
For the first time, we have had enlisted members at the Air
Force Institute of Technology Air Force degrees, we have eight
airmen and six marines. We have tailored the officer program
much more with very good degrees that will help us and help
them in later life, which gives them a reason to be part of us
for a longer period of time.
Senator Allard. Secretary Roche, I have a question on our
access to space which is essential to our military operations.
The EELV program has been critical for assuring that we do have
that access. Is the Air Force willing to commit to in the long
term to having two service providers for EELV programs? There
are some programs where we did not have duplication of effort
and we have gotten into trouble. I'm concerned that if we end
up with sole source here that if we discover a problem with one
of these vehicles, we do not have back-up. This is survival.
I'd like to hear your comments on this.
Secretary Roche. Sir, I had the pleasure of being on the
staff of the Intelligence Committee. At the time, it was the
sense of Congress that we should make sure we had a back-up.
I'm very mindful of that. We are convinced we need two
different launch vehicles. Right now that's two launch
providers.
Every now and then we think is there a sensible way we
should reduce costs given that commercial demands do not
appear. If you maintain two design teams and combine overhead
functions, we are not there yet. It's clear we need two
separate designs in case there is a class problem so we do not
get caught.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.
This has to do with what is the Air Force doing to protect our
space assets? Perhaps this is a question that cannot be
answered. There may be some things that you can answer in this
setting and in relation to that I'm concerned about our
security as far as cyberspace is concerned as well. During
these times of conflicts, I know there is an unprecedented
amount of hits coming in to the Pentagon and various computer
systems. So I'm interested in how you are addressing this
issue. If you could deal with the space aspect and maybe all of
you would be willing to respond to the cyberspace issue, I
would appreciate it.
Secretary Roche. Senator, it would be very hard in open
session to talk to you about the subject. I can say the
following. I have been telling everyone that the space field is
going to be something exciting in the future. People are going
to start to play games. The game is going to be an interesting
game, and they are going to start developing doctrine not
unlike naval doctrine and air doctrine and the GPS jammer which
we developed on our own, to see the fact that the jammer is on
the market is really the first overt move for war and space.
It's intended to deny us of the use of space. This kind of
a game is going to go on. Understanding what we might be able
to do in other circumstances is clearly something I would be
delighted to talk to you about in an appropriate setting.
Cyber is in many cases the same. We have been hit. Our tri-
defense industry cycle company by company and tries to overload
that company and put it out. That continues. Making sure
firewalls work must go on, but it's something that's also been
looked at as it should.
Secretary Johnson. We are working the second problem, all
of us together.
Secretary White. I would agree with that.
Senator Allard. Not only the companies, but Congress here.
We had a day this month where we were completely overloaded,
and it was an intention to try and make it difficult for our
offices.
Secretary Roche. They smoked a server and put a server on
fire when I got hit.
Senator Allard. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, especially for your
help with the Armed Services and the Academies.
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, with regard to the proposals
forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to Congress earlier this
week, and the article in The Washington Post today, those
proposals in large measure track the ones that were brought up
to Congress late in the session last year. We simply were not
given time, I think, to adequately review them, and to secure
the measure of relief that is necessary. But this engagement
with the environmental community is something which frankly I
regret.
I think all of us, whether we are environmentalists or
otherwise, are concerned about the readiness of the men and
women of the Armed Forces and their ability to carry out their
assigned missions and that directly relates to the training
that they receive. So it seems to me it's an all America
question to strike a balance here.
I will read one quote of Michael Jansy, a senior policy
analyst for the National Defense Council, charged that ``this
bill is a rollback of almost every major environmental law on
the books.'' I have been around now a very long time, and I can
see what is going on here. But I'm going to continue to work on
this issue as I have in the years past to see whether we cannot
get a realistic balance between what is needed by the military
and no damage to the framework and environmental laws which
recognize a struggle in Congress over many years.
My dearly departed friend, John Chafee, who I served with
on the Environmental and Public Works Committee, who, as a
matter of fact, recruited me to serve on that committee, and
now I find myself as the senior Republican on that committee,
with Senator Inhofe the current chairman of that committee. He
is very active on that issue. Our distinguished colleague,
Senator McCain, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, will have
part of it, so the three committees that work together are
trying to achieve a careful balance.
It's very important, however, that this hearing today
reflect the positions of the three military departments on the
whole with reference to what hierarchy will you assign to this
issue, and the need for Congress to provide some remedies that
you are able to continue that level of training that you think
is essential. So we will start with you, Secretary White.
Secretary White. Mr. Chairman, I think it's imperative that
we have the ability to balance environmental protection of the
lands that we occupy and train on with the requirements to
train and sustain a ready force. We have traditionally been
very good stewards of the environment, and I think our track
record is excellent. It's not an issue as you would suggest as
the article suggested that we want to roll back this
legislation.
What we are seeking is the flexibility to be able to
balance these requirements on a single piece of ground, and
what we find is we are becoming more and more limited because
the way the laws are interpreted in being able to strike that
balance. So for us, it's tremendously important that this
legislation be fast and that we have the opportunity to make
that balance.
Chairman Warner. The anecdotal story in this area, I
remember 10 or 15 years ago that we had an issue before this
committee that the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker was a magnificent
bird and it was on an Army base. It was in the environmental
community being challenged, and when we got into it we found
that indeed the operation of the tanks and the artillery did
take its toll on some of the birds, churned up the ground but
finally, that case was resolved on the following: we found that
the number of woodpeckers had tripled because that operation
with the equipment and the training increased the food supply.
Just a little quick note. I have a constant battle within
my own family. I have three wonderful children who really spent
a lot of time in a serious way on this subject, so I have
accountability myself. I want to probe this fully and get some
relief. Secretary Johnson.
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. We work very hard in outreach.
Last year, we brought the proposals to Congress at the last
moment. This year, we have been able to continue the dialogue
with the various committees and people who have answers. We
have been able to work with the other agencies within
government to gain support for the things we want to do and in
some cases we want to do it for defense.
They would like to do it for the entire Nation, but there
are different issues with economic exploitation from the
defense. We feel very strongly about the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, and have agreement with NOAA on that and of
course the Endangered Species Act, we would like to do the
integrated natural resource management plans, and those are two
big ones.
Last year, you gave us the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that
wasn't quite what we asked for, but we are going to try to work
it in the context that you gave it to us working with the
Department of the Interior before we come back and ask for help
on that one.
Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, this is very important. If
you are an endangered species, come to one of our ranges and
bring all your critter relatives with you. We care about the
environment. They flourish very nicely. The major issue is as
Secretary White stated, Mr. Chairman; there are interpretations
going on that could be a problem. Much of this legislation
before you is to ask that Congress resolve these so we do not
wind up in court with every single one of our ranges tied up in
court cases.
We can get some resolution for those early. No one really
wants to have any of our airplanes have to get a license for
bird strikes, so many kills per day. That's sort of silly, but
yet some could think of interpreting things that way. We do not
mind when for instance one of our ranges has a certain type of
antelope that's grazing. We just do not fly that day. We can
live with the environment quite comfortably.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. There is a quotation in The
Washington Post article today attributed to the EPA, and it
states as follows: ``I do not believe that there is a training
mission anywhere in the country that is being held up or not
taking place because of environmental protection regulations.''
I would appreciate if each of you would provide for the record
such instances where it is the judgment of the military
departments that there have been clearly documented areas where
the training has been impaired as a consequence of these
interpretations that the Secretary alluded to and, in your own
professional judgment, how that degrades readiness.
Secretary White. Be happy to.
Secretary Roche. Delighted, sir.
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary White. I believe Governor Whitman's comments were
intended to address the Federal statutes under the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) purview, so I will focus my comments on those
laws. Nonetheless, I would like to point out that many of the
environmentally based constraints on Army training stem from
requirements of laws outside of EPA's purview, i.e., the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) and mitigation measures imposed as a result of the
National Environmental Policy Act process.
The Army's primary concern with statutes within the purview of the
EPA are those of the expanding application of pollution control laws to
live-fire training activities. The Army is currently litigating
allegations that firing activities at Fort Richardson, Alaska, violate
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); and
the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs are seeking to halt live-fire training
and require remediation of the Eagle River Flats impact area. This
would dramatically impact the training of the 172nd Infantry Brigade,
the largest infantry brigade in the Army. If the suit is successful, it
would set a precedent that could subject live-fire training and testing
at more than 400 Army operational ranges to permitting and remediation
actions under these laws.
It is interesting to note that the expanded application of
environmental laws to military ranges is not coming from regulatory
agencies, but from citizens' suits seeking novel interpretations of
these laws. The DOD has worked closely with the EPA to develop tailored
and narrowly drafted legislative proposals that will clarify the
applicability of both RCRA and CERCLA to our operational ranges. These
proposals seek to codify the long-standing EPA policy, established by
the Clinton administration, that firing ammunition on an operational
range is not a trigger for cleanup requirements.
The EPA issued a series of administrative orders under the Safe
Drinking Water Act that shut down artillery and mortar firing and
pyrotechnics use at the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR). These
actions significantly curtailed National Guard training at that
installation. As a result, the Army has had to permanently displace
this training to alternate locations. Units from the Massachusetts
National Guard must travel over 400 miles to train at Fort Drum, New
York. We continue to conduct some limited training at MMR under
restrictions designed to protect the aquifer that underlies the
installation. It is important to note that the legislative
clarifications DOD is seeking would not have affected the outcome of
this case or the authority of the EPA to take such an action under the
Safe Drinking Water Act.
Secretary Johnson. The following are examples of where
environmental protection regulations are impacting readiness:

Due to the complexity of applying environmental laws
to military activities, the Navy's premiere sonar system for
detecting diesel submarines, operated by countries like North
Korea, Iran, and China, currently operates under the
restrictions of a court order limiting where and when the
system can be used. This summer, the court will rule on future
use of the system.
During the last 6 years of Navy research on how to
counter mines and detect submarines in shallow water, over 78
percent of the tests have been delayed, scaled back, or
canceled due to the impact of environmental regulations.
Lack of clarity in the definition of ``harassment'' in
the Marine Mammal Protection Act is delaying the establishment
of shallow water training ranges to prepare sailors to fight
and win in the littorals, the Navy's most difficult
battlefield.
Navy's fleet exercises face severe limitations to
avoid potential ``harassment'' of marine mammals.

Exercises to protect ships from submarines and
mines in narrow, shallow straits, such as the Strait of
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, have been moved to less
realistic conditions in deep water.
Some exercises forced to adopt aerial and
other visual surveys for sea turtles and marine mammals
can only be done in daylight. The mitigation denies the
ability to train at night.
Environmental factors--including application
of the vague definition of harassment--often conflict
with the operational need for the training and increase
the time away from home for sailors.

There are 17 miles of beach at Camp Pendleton,
California, but due to environmental restrictions and urban
encroachment, only 1,500 meters is available to practice
amphibious landings and movement from the beach using all
Marine Corps combat vehicles. Even within this 1,500-meter
beach, all military vehicles must stay on designated roads.
Due to EPA-based restrictions in the Mariana Islands,
this year's multi-national exercise Tandem Thrust will not
include amphibious landings using air cushion landing craft--
the best heavy-lift capability we have.
Proposed critical habitat designation on military
lands in Guam--for species not currently present, but which the
Fish and Wildlife Service would like to introduce as a solution
to special interest lawsuits--threaten to shift the core
mission of these Government-owned lands from military readiness
to one of environmental protection.
Secretary Roche. In terms of the affects to our readiness,
realistic training is important to all Services and joint operations is
and will continue to be a decisive advantage in future conflicts.
Ensuring that the other Services have the resources necessary to train
realistically is just as important to the Air Force as our own
training.
The Air Force and John Peter Suarez, Assistant Administrator,
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, are in agreement that in its history, there is only
a single instance when the EPA took an enforcement action that halted
live-fire training at a range. The installation that was affected was
the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR) on Cape Cod,
Massachusetts. Live-fire training had to be shifted to another facility
but some training was able to be continued such as small arms training,
as well as other training without using explosives, propellants, and
pyrotechnics.
Environmental plaintiffs have filed suit at Fort Richardson,
Alaska, alleging violations of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Alaska antipollution law
applicable under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). If
successful, they could potentially force remediation of the Eagle River
Flats impact area and preclude live-fire training at the only mortar
and artillery impact area at Fort Richardson thereby dramatically
degrading readiness of the 172nd Infantry Brigade, the largest infantry
brigade in the Army. It could also set a precedent fundamentally
affecting military training and testing at virtually every test and
training range.
The proposed Range Readiness Program Initiative (RRPI) legislation
would codify and confirm the longstanding regulatory policy of EPA and
every State concerning regulation of munitions use on operational
ranges under RCRA and CERCLA. It would confirm that military munitions
are subject to EPA's 1997 Military Munitions Rule while on range, and
that cleanup of operational ranges is not required so long as material
stays on the range. If such material moves off-range, it still must be
addressed promptly under existing environmental laws. Moreover, if
munitions constituents cause an imminent and substantial endangerment
on range, EPA will retain its current authority to address it on-range
under CERCLA section 106 (our legislation explicitly reaffirms EPA's
section 106 authority).
The legislation similarly does not modify the overlapping
protections of the Safe Drinking Water Act, NEPA, and the ESA against
environmentally harmful activities at operational military bases. The
legislation has no effect whatsoever on DOD's cleanup obligations under
RCRA or CERCLA at Formerly Used Defense Sites, closed ranges, ranges
that close in the future, or waste management practices involving
munitions even on operational ranges (such as so-called Open Burning
and Open Detonation (OB/OD) activities).
The Endangered Species Act provision would confirm the prior
Administration's decision that an Integrated Natural Resources
Management Plan (INRMP) may in appropriate circumstances obviate the
need to designate critical habitat on military installations. The prior
administration's decision that INRMPs may adequately provide for
appropriate endangered species habitat management is being challenged
in court by environmental groups, who cite Ninth Circuit case law
suggesting that other habitat management programs provided an
insufficient basis for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to avoid
designating critical habitat. These groups claim that no INRMP,
regardless of how protective, can ever substitute for critical habitat
designation. This legislation would confirm and insulate the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's policy from such challenges.
The Defense Department's proposal has vital implications for
readiness. Absent this policy, courts, based on complaints filed by
environmental litigants, compelled the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
to re-evaluate ``not prudent'' findings for many critical habitat
determinations, and as a result U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposed
to designate over 50 percent of the 12,000-acre Marine Corps Air
Station (MCAS) Miramar and over 56 percent of the 125,000-acre Marine
Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton as critical habitat. Without the
legislation, the Air Force may face restrictions at Beale AFB, Travis
AFB, and Andersen AFB as a result of proposals to designate critical
habitat currently being evaluated. Unlike Sikes Act INRMPs, critical
habitat designation can impose rigid limitations on military use of
bases, denying commanders the flexibility to manage their lands for the
benefit of both readiness and endangered species.
The Clean Air Act's ``general conformity'' requirement, applicable
only to Federal agencies, has repeatedly threatened deployment of new
weapons systems and base closure/realignment despite the fact that
relatively minor levels of emissions were involved.

The planned realignment of F-14s from NAS Miramar to
NAS Lemoore in California would only have been possible because
of the fortuity that neighboring Castle Air Force Base in the
same airshed had closed, thereby creating offsets.
The same fortuity enabled the homebasing of new F/A-18
E/Fs at NAS Lemoore.
The realignment of F/A-18 C/Ds from Cecil Field,
Florida, to NAS Oceana in Virginia was made possible only by
the fortuity that Virginia was in the midst of revising its
Implementation Plan and was able to accommodate the new
emissions. The Hampton Roads area in which Oceana is located
will likely impose more stringent limits on ozone in the
future, thus reducing the State's flexibility.

As these near misses demonstrate, under the existing requirement,
there is limited flexibility to accommodate readiness needs, and DOD is
barred from even beginning to take readiness actions until the
requirement is satisfied.

Chairman Warner. Now, homeland defense. When I visited with
our troops in the Gulf region here recently with my
distinguished good friends and colleagues, Senators Levin,
Roberts, and Rockefeller, everywhere we went, we talked about
homeland defense and I explained to them that the military's
mission for homeland defense begins right where they are in the
far-flung outposts across the world where these individuals in
many cases are taking a lot of risks to perform their missions
because to the extent we can intercept, curtail, reduce,
capture, crush, or otherwise stop individuals and
organizations' participation in worldwide terrorism, this
lessening of the chance that it will be brought to the shores
of the United States.
So I look at defense of homeland of the military as not
just embracing our security here in the continental United
States, but in every outpost throughout the world. I think it's
important that this record reflect what each of your
departments is doing in this area and the coordination efforts
that are underway with the newly created Department of Homeland
Defense. Start with you.
Secretary White. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the homeland
defense mission is always foremost for us. A lot of changes in
the department, the standing up of a combatant commander,
General Eberhart with NORTHCOM, we have headquarters in the
Army that work directly with him as we do other combatant
commanders around the world to ensure that we have force,
responsive forces should the need arise to take care of that.
Second, we have invested a lot of money in antiterrorism
force protection initiatives to better protect our
installations to protect our people.
Third, we have done a lot of coordination with the National
Guard so that if we take units that would be used in a first
response and federalize them and deploy them someplace, the
States have compacts in place with the surrounding States that
can fill in those holes so that the local capability is not
lost. So there are a whole series of initiatives ongoing within
the overall envelope of homeland security. We are in much
stronger position now than we were 18 months ago.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Johnson.
Secretary Johnson. My predecessor, Gordon England, put it
very well when he talked about homeland defense. We want it to
be an away game, as you were explaining, to the troops
overseas. We want to take the actual battles to the source and
we support Northern Command as well as Secretary White has
described.
We have a Marine and Navy component. The Marines stood up
focused on these sort of activities, so we take it very
seriously, our strong partnership not only with Northern
Command, but homeland security and others associated.
Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, this is a big thing for us.
With NORTHCOM and NORAD associated, we have netted all the
radars inside the United States as compared to the case where
we only worried about the periphery, so if we have a track of
interest, we need to put fighters on it.
Depending on the threat level and where the President of
the United States is, you know we have special things in place.
We have AWACS, tankers, accounts for 20 bases, over 200
aircraft every day are tied up in this, and prepositioned C-
130s to be able to move Marine and Army units. This is big to
us. It's costly to us. It's wearing our planes out faster, but
we have a very close relationship with NORTHCOM, and General
Eberhard knows the demands he places on us.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche, I have a very detailed
and technical question regarding a program and I'm going to put
it in the record.
Secretary Roche. I'd be delighted to, sir.
Chairman Warner. We monitor that program with care. Do we
have concerns over these cost overruns and consequences of
financial diminution and size of the force?
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. The subject of the Montgomery GI Bill
benefits from taking these trips and getting down to these
troops in the field. They are concerned about their families
and different things but a number of them asked me and my
colleagues about this program.
Congress--I was very active in this--gave you authority
with regard to transferability of benefits. For those who may
be following and are not familiar with this, the service
person, male or female, whatever the case may be, earns the GI
Bill, and in some instances, they complete much of their
education or they feel as a parent that they should give that
very important asset that they earn through their service to
their spouse or their children. Each of the departments has
treated this in a different manner. Let us just start with the
Secretary of the Air Force first.
Secretary Roche. I'm not up on how we deal with it. I know
I have talked with some of our senior-enlisted. They agree this
is something that would be useful if it was given to the
senior-enlisted because they made decisions to stay in the
Service, as opposed to going outside. They are probably not
going to go to college, and, therefore, they feel they are
losing something. They would like to see a transfer, but with
regard to exactly how we are handling it, I will have to get
back to you.
Chairman Warner. This is on the minds of these young
people, I tell you, very much so. I'm hopeful that you will
avail yourself of the authority. I have very modest, relatively
insignificant, tours of duty in the Navy and Marines, but I'm
here as a United States Senator solely because of the GI Bill.
I received very generous treatment from two modest tours of
active service, and I just feel that I want to participate with
my colleagues on this committee and other members of the Senate
in providing for the current generation of people in the
service in a manner that's so generously given to me, to use
it. If not, we will make it mandatory.
Secretary Johnson. As I talk, as you do, to these people,
this subject comes up. Our approach is to try to use it as a
retention tool for senior NCOs. In particular, to have it more
focused as opposed to having a situation where a person can
come in to gain that benefit.
Secretary White. I would agree with both of my colleagues.
That would be the final approach. We need to get on with it and
make some decisions.
Chairman Warner. I thank you for that commitment because
there is one thing we all know from our service time in
uniform. Boy, the word goes through the ranks fast. The big
boys at the top are going to make it work. I understand your
retention is at an all-time high and that's magnificent.
Your recruiting is at an all-time high, but I have been
here long enough to see this drop off and have serious
problems. I hope we do not see those stressful periods again.
So let us strengthen everything we can for these people.
Unmanned systems has been a favorite subject of mine in
this committee for a long time. I'm very proud of the strides
that this committee made when I was privileged to be chairman
some years ago and Senator Levin has continued to join me in
periods of his chairmanship. In fiscal year 2001, this
committee set the ambiguous goal of getting the technologies
that would lead to the development of the fielding of unmanned
operational combat systems.
This budget continues to build on that goal by increasing
funding for unmanned systems by more than 25 percent over last
year's funding. I commend the administration's commitment to
this transformation. Could each of you tell us your view of the
role of unmanned systems in ongoing and future operations and
what technology in unmanned systems requires more
investigation? Start with Secretary Roche because he knows
about the Predator. I was astonished we could do two a month.
Secretary Roche. It's up to three now, sir.
Chairman Warner. It was magnificent, very small company
that has the patents, and it's not easy to go to a second
source. Also, the highly technical part of that, down in the
guts of it, hard to mass produce it.
Secretary Roche. It turns out we looked seriously at
whether we should have more. I took the planes one and a half a
month to three a month making each of them a common fire wing.
It's not the limiting feature of the sensor systems that you
could put on these. Three a month if everybody will steady out
in time will give us a very good output on a continuing basis.
One of the things that's been interesting since your
original legislation is we have had a lot of learning. We may
be able to use things in the Afghan war. General Franks was
really terrific to General Jumper and me and allowed us to take
systems that weren't ready for prime time and deploy them
knowing full well we are going to have failures and a bunch of
other things. We have learned so much of that that our views of
unmanned aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft, and unattended
aircraft have changed and we are getting quite excited, to the
point where we are attempting to replicate what occurred in the
Army Air Corps in the late 1930s where different types of
systems were developed, airmen got together and used them from
that developed doctrine.
There is a point where Congress passed a law on the limit
of the length that a bomber could fly, that we gave the planes
to the Navy. Series of things that we have done and that were
dramatic in World War II. Right now, we know certain systems
require pilot in the loop.
It's the instinct of that young officer who takes the plane
and turns it in such a way that for most radars--it's called a
zero doppler notch--there is not enough doppler. Therefore, the
fighter plane cannot see it. We have been shot down once, but
these tactics that they have learned as pilots become very
handy.
Also, since these things can be attack systems, we want the
same officer responsibility that we have in all of our other
systems. That can be done by keeping the pilot in the loop,
remotely pilot the aircraft. Then there is Global Hawk. Where
Global Hawk has long-term persistence, very high altitude and
Global Hawk can give you a U-2 complement.
We are thinking of taking things from space and linking
down. For instance, we could in fact have reinforced GPS
signals from Global Hawk orbits or provide a local area
communication system without having to use all the bandwidths
on a particular region. Working these through, we have tried to
provide self defense on some of our drones.
We have other families. Predator will go higher and faster.
We consider it a hunter killer. The electronics and avionics
are appropriate for a remotely unattended aircraft, just having
a pilot, it's going to dance on its hind legs. But now that
it's dancing, what do you do for it? If we can tailor it, they
can make a contribution to war. Hunter killer would be designed
to do automatic cueing.
We are borrowing things we have learned from the Navy. This
thing can hunt, hunt, hunt. Let us know when it all of a sudden
sees a match; then we can put the pilot back into the loop and
act like a typical attack officer who will take responsibility
for the attack he conducted. We find this to be a very exciting
thing. There are some that have been in the classified world.
We will have multiple families and figure out where the
comparative advantages are.
We know some place where there is no comparative advantage.
When it comes to judgment, you cannot beat the mind of a man or
woman flying the plane. We take areas where there is
comparative advantage and assign those increasingly to these
unattended or remotely piloted aircraft.
Chairman Warner. Do you feel that the program is at about
the right pace?
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. We have debates with some of our
colleagues as to design and comparative advantage. What we
really notice is persistence is terribly important. Long stay.
What we call digital acuity, which means that a digital system
does not tire the way an operator tires.
As any of the three of us know, if you put someone on a
radar scope, there is only so much time. You do that in digital
domain, that thing will be as good at 23 hours as it was at 2
hours. We find it to be a very exciting area, and no fighter
pilots are complaining because they understand this is a good
contribution to war, and they do not want to just bore holes in
the sky searching.
They have been able to work with these systems beautifully.
With Predators, pilots have done laser bombing from our own
drones, and when they talk to the little thing, it answers
right back.
Chairman Warner. Good. That's quite encouraging. Do you see
other nations moving along at any pace near what the United
States would achieve?
Secretary Roche. No. But we are starting to see other
interests. Some of the exports of the Israelis may come back
and haunt us some day. But other countries are starting to
recognize that there is something here. Even some country in
the Middle East that you would otherwise not expect recognize
the great advantage of using these vehicles.
Secretary Johnson. Admiral Clark is working very closely
with General Jumper on our joint unmanned vehicle development.
We in the Navy have additional activities in the Marine Corps.
One we would like to do more in the maritime arena.
Ultimately, we are interested in having unmanned vehicles
to do undersea activity to destroy mines and operate them from
on board ships. There is a lot of science that has to be done,
but we have great cooperation with all the Services, and we all
have the same interest in moving forward. The Marines would
like to have an expendable and see what is there.
Secretary Roche. Something that's very exciting we have
been doing is that there are some of these that are only this
big but if you are trying to do base security overseas whether
we are trying to do it for our bases or working with the Army,
the Army has the intellectual lead here, and they have
developed some of these that are just fabulous. John and I
united in the desert up in the mountains to watch how they
could effectively use these very small systems with very light
cameras and do a terrific job at surveillance. So the whole
field is exploding in some very interesting ways.
Secretary White. In the current time frame, as Secretary
Roche just said, we have been using the small robotic vehicles
in Afghanistan to clear caves and do things that would be
potentially hazardous. We are also fielding right now shorter
range UAVs that Jim is talking about for our brigade commanders
who are buying eight Shadows this year which the brigade level
went. We are buying 800 UAVs for corps commanders and fielding
those right now. In the Objective Force in the Future Combat
System, there is a family of unmanned ground vehicles and a new
family of unmanned aerial vehicles to support the force. So we
are investing heavily in this and we appreciate your support.
Chairman Warner. I have taken an interest, of course, in
the civilian applications, but I'm also finishing up here very
shortly communication to the administration urging that this be
studied very carefully because of the potential to invade
privacy. As the private sector takes much of the technology
which the military departments have done on this in R&D and
otherwise, and puts it into the private sector, that's
something our country has to monitor carefully.
Pay equity for soldiers stationed in Korea. Last month, I
met with the general commander of the U.S. Army forces in
Korea. We discussed hardship assignment to Korea with living
and working conditions, family separation, and pay disparity
comparative to those serving in Japan. I understand that
soldiers are continuing to turn in resignations for officers
rather than facing another tour.
This is a tough question, Mr. Secretary. I know you are
doing your very best. If you could just bring us up-to-date
because I'm going to continue to monitor this. I spent some
time over there, a short tour. The weather was challenging, to
say the least.
Secretary White. It's a difficult place to serve. We have
people in several locations. We are examining the whole posture
there as Secretary Rumsfeld talked about, but there are
financial disadvantages to serving in Korea as opposed to other
parts of the world. Consequently, we have a very high turn-down
rate of soldiers put on assignment there.
We have talked about it with the previous commander there,
General Schwartz brought this up. We have had extensive
discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense but we
have not resolved anything at this point, and I'm going to
continue to push.
Chairman Warner. I have to say, Mr. Secretary, that every
problem has a solution. In the course of this current bill that
is to be written by this committee, I want to include
provisions in it that will correct this. I have great respect
for Secretary Rumsfeld and his team, but I guess there are
times when Congress has to step out. No criticisms of the other
co-equal branch of the government, the administration, but we
are going to solve this. We are going to make some progress in
this legislation this year.
Secretary White. Good, sir. Soldiers will be better off for
it.
Chairman Warner. I have a personal interest, and now, of
course, the Korean peninsula poses a very serious threat
situation which I think is being commendably addressed by our
President and others in a diplomatic manner.
Gentlemen, I thank you for an excellent hearing today, very
thorough, and I wish you well. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

1. Senator Warner. Secretary Roche, the Predator Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle has proven to have tremendous operational capability. How many
of these vehicles are currently in service? What is the current
Predator production rate? What, if any, are the limiting factors to the
production rate?
Secretary Roche. The Air Force has 46 Predator Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles in service with an additional 42 that are funded through this
year. In October 2001, I directed acceleration in production to two
Predator aircraft per month. This acceleration will continue with
deliveries through 2004. The primary limiting factor to increasing
production is our current production facility capacity. Within our
current facilities, up to four Predator aircraft can be produced per
month. This will, however, require additional production line
employees, and an investment in additional production tooling.

F/A-22 RAPTOR AIRCRAFT

2. Senator Warner. Secretary Roche, this past year, the Air Force
changed the designation of the F-22 Raptor to the F/A-22. I want to
commend the Air Force for recognizing the importance of capitalizing on
this aircraft by expanding its mission to include a ground attack role.
I also understand, though, that delays in the development program have
caused cost growth in excess of $800 million, which has to be made up
out of available production funds for the aircraft. What is your
assessment of the causes for the delay and the cost growth in the F/A-
22 program?
Secretary Roche. As a result of resolving several development-
related issues--such as fin buffet, canopy howl, and avionics
stability--we extended the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) schedule to allow proper completion of envelope expansion flight
testing, and avionics development and avionics flight testing. This
extension reflects the fact that the program is event-driven, not
schedule driven. We will complete all EMD content required to deliver
an ORD-compliant aircraft to the warfighter. The resultant impact of
the schedule extension is an $876 million increase to the EMD estimate-
at-completion (EAC). Of note, this amount includes a risk factor to
increase confidence in the estimate. We sourced this EMD EAC increase
from within the F/A-22 program. It is important to also note that this
EMD schedule extension, and corresponding EAC increase, does not
indicate a concern regarding aircraft performance, nor does it
represent an increased risk of production retrofit.

PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPON INVENTORIES

3. Senator Warner. Secretary Johnson and Secretary Roche, while
only 10 percent of the air-launched weapons used in Operation Desert
Storm were precision-guided, a much higher percentage of precision
weapons have been used in more recent conflicts, such as Operations
Allied Force and Enduring Freedom. Do you believe that the current
inventories of these weapons are sufficient to carry out possible
conflict with Iraq?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, I believe that the current inventories of
precision-guided weapons are sufficient.
Secretary Roche. CENTCOM's munitions requirements for operations
are being met. As a result of supplemental funding, the Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) procurement program has been energized to reach
a production rate of 2,800 units per month by July 2003. We are
currently at a rate of over 2,400 units per month, and have in excess
of 18,000 JDAM in the Air Force inventory. Overall, procurement of JDAM
for the Air Force will exceed 150,000.
Supplemental funding and increased emphasis on collateral damage,
the Air Force has committed to procuring additional Laser Guided Bombs
(LGBs), specifically the GBU-12 which has a 500-pound blast/
fragmentation warhead. The Air Force qualified a second vendor,
Lockheed Martin, in the summer of 2002. As a result, the Air Force is
procuring over 40,000 GBU-12s through the Future years Defense Plan
(FYDP). Current production rate is 1,650 LGBs per month (accelerating
to 2,000 by summer 2003), and we have in excess of 11,000 GBU-12s in
the Air Force inventory.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

ARMY EDUCATION

4. Senator Sessions. Secretary White, the Army has enjoyed a great
reputation with their eArmyU program. You currently have roughly 35,000
soldiers enrolled with many more on waiting lists. What do you see as
the future for eArmyU and is the Army committed to funding this program
so our soldiers can continue to gain educational benefits?
Secretary White. The Army is committed to funding eArmyU as it
expands from its current 14 sites to Army-wide status in 2005, at which
time enrollment will reach 80,000. eArmyU is successfully reaching a
new generation of soldier-students and helping them to achieve their
academic goals. The program offers unprecedented academic access,
choice, and flexibility and continues to set the standard in today's
online learning environment.
Today, eArmyU enrolls over 33,400 students. This number is expected
to reach 40,500 by September 2003. eArmyU soldiers have access to 115
degree and certificate programs through 23 colleges and universities by
logging in to the eArmyU.com portal. We are currently in the process of
adding 12 new institutions this year, which will soon bring our total
to more than 30. What's even more exciting for us is the scope of our
program. eArmyU is fulfilling the promise of ``anytime-anywhere''
learning. Soldiers located in 50 countries, four U.S. territories, and
49 States are taking classes through the eArmyU portal. More than 135
soldier-students have graduated as of February 27, 2003.
The Army's purpose in creating eArmyU was to enhance traditional
learning programs and services by providing an anytime, anywhere
distance learning program that ensures eligible enlisted soldiers have
full access and scholastic support to achieve their educational goals.
We know that continued support to the program benefits not only the
soldier, but the Army as a whole.
As a testament that eArmyU is a long-term investment for the Army,
I am pleased to report that the program is being transitioned into
standard Army operations. Efforts are underway to incorporate eArmyU
into the Army Knowledge Management structure. Additionally, we are
developing concepts such as an education shared data warehouse, in
which eArmyU's data management capabilities will be the cornerstone
that allows us to leverage all current and legacy Army education data.
Online education continues to reach a new generation of learners.
e-Learning will become a dominant approach to educating a broad cross-
section of the American population in coming years. Finding ways to
build enhanced and specialized academic support for online learners
will continue to play an important role in this revolution. eArmyU will
lead the way in providing the most effective e-Learning tools in the
most cost-efficient e-Learning environment.

NATIONAL GUARD FAMILY ACTIVITY CENTER

5. Senator Sessions. Secretary White, during Operation Desert
Shield and Operation Desert Storm, once the number of mobilized
National Guard troops reached a certain level, the National Guard
received Temporary Tour on Active Duty (TTAD) funds to staff Family
Activities Centers (FAC) in each State with retired military personnel.
These centers supported the families of deployed National Guard
soldiers. I have been told that, to date, no funds have been received
to support any FACs. With the numbers of deployed guardsmen approaching
the number activated during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, there is a
pressing need to ensure that we are taking care of the families of our
guardsmen. Can you provide an update on the status of plans, to include
funds expended or planned for expenditure, that address the obligation
that we have to provide support for these family members?
Secretary White. We did not receive any funding for this critical
requirement. The National Guard Bureau provided a baseline requirement
of $60 million to support this mission. This unfunded requirement was
submitted to us for the global war on terrorism supplement. The Army
National Guard borrowed $13 million from other accounts to support
initial manpower requirements to ensure immediate family assistance and
services were accomplished.
During large activations and deployments, the Army National Guard
sets up and operates Family Assistance Centers throughout the Nation to
serve families. These centers are usually staffed with between one to
three paid personnel and are expected to provide 24/7 on-call contact
availability. Based on increased mobilizations, we estimate an eventual
requirement for approximately 400 FACs across America. Of these 400
centers, approximately 275 are currently operational. We have a
statutory and regulatory obligation, as well as a moral imperative, to
assist and support our military families. Full funding of this
requirement is critical to the success of the Reserve component's
mission accomplishment.

AIR FORCE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL SUPPORT

6. Senator Sessions. Secretary Roche, I understand that training
slots for many different technical specialty schools are in short
supply, and that the technical training schools are having difficulty
meeting the demands of the Reserve customer. In the past, most
reservists were prior active duty members, and joined the Reserve
component already trained. However, today the majority of the people
joining the Reserve are non-prior service. This change has led to an
increase in the Reserve's training needs. Further complicating the
issue of training and scheduling school dates is the reality that
reservists must attempt to schedule their training around the needs of
their civilian employers. Therefore, the reservist often cannot fill
training school vacancies on short notice.
Today, my Reserve unit reports that 57 Air Force technical training
schools are already closed for fiscal year 2003. As a result, a new
recruit joining the Air Force/Air Force Reserve today will have to wait
a significant amount of time before being inducted because of this
shortage of school slots.
Do you see a need for increased capacity in Air Force technical
training schools, and does the Service have any plans or initiatives
underway to increase the number of training slots to meet the increased
and changing nature of the demand?
Secretary Roche. The Air Force is in the process of reshaping the
force in response to the current security environment. Some Air Force
Specialty Code technical schools met past capacity requirements, but
are now feeling stressed because of meeting new or expanded mission
demands. As we work through this force reshaping, schoolhouse
requirements will be adjusted. Active and Reserve component
requirements will be re-evaluated and enough seats made available to
meet new steady state current and future requirements.
In the interim, the timing of course dates may not be as
convenient; however, sufficient seats will be available to accomplish
Total Force mission requirements. Our focus is on making force-shaping
adjustments while maintaining the most effective and efficient Total
Force training pipeline possible. We expect to sustain adequate
capacity given the size of the force we have today.

ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION CONCERNS

7. Senator Sessions. Secretary Johnson, in testimony before this
committee, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations
have said that environmental concerns are weighing heavily on your
ability to train. This negative impact, in turn, has negatively
affected readiness. So that the record on this subject is clear, could
you offer some examples, some evidence of this problem, and how you
believe legislative relief will re-strike the correct balance between
training and readiness and environmental stewardship.
Secretary Johnson. With regards to the Marine Mammal Protection Act
and the Endangered Species Act, the following examples and requested
relief are provided.
Examples of Impacts from the Marine Mammal Protection Act
1. Operational training and deployment of the Navy's Surface Towed
Array Sonar System Low Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) sonar system has
been delayed for 6 years, even after the Navy invested $10 million on
independent scientific research that showed the system could be used
with negligible impact on marine mammals.
2. During the last 6 years of research on how to counter mines and
detect submarines in shallow water, over 78 percent of the tests
planned by the Navy's Office of Naval Research (ONR) have been delayed,
scaled-back, or cancelled due to environmental regulations having to do
with marine mammals under the Marine Mammal Protection and Endangered
Species Acts.
3. Navy's efforts to establish permanent at-sea shallow-water
training ranges for both the East and West Coast are being delayed by
environmental regulations and the potential for litigation,
particularly over how to apply the definition of ``harassment'' in the
Marine Mammal Protection Act to Navy training.
How Congress Can Help By Passing DOD's Proposed Legislation for MMPA
Clarifying the definition of harassment could reduce special
interest group lawsuits that challenge regulatory agency
interpretations of ``harassment.'' Special interest groups can
overstate the impact of Navy activities with arguments based on vague
terms such as ``annoyance'' and ``potential to disturb.'' A clearer,
science-based definition based on biologically significant behavior
could show that Navy activities actually impact only a minimal number
of marine mammals. Clarifying the definition could also reduce
unnecessary modification (dumbing down), delays or cancellation of
valuable Navy training and testing.
Examples of Impacts from the Endangered Species Act and Critical
Habitat Designation
1. In 1996, when 40 percent of the Chocolate Mountain Aerial
Gunnery Range was designated as ``critical habitat'' pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act, Navy sea/air/land (SEAL) training was
negatively impacted. Before the designation, Navy SEALs conducted
realistic training with multiple avenues of approach. Navy SEALs using
this important range are now restricted to firing their weapons in a
narrow field of fire to avoid firing toward the critical habitat.
2. Environmental-based restrictions on training at Southern
California ranges normally used by SEALs, including Endangered Species
Act restrictions for birds at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, have
caused the SEALs to relocate much of their training. Utilization of
military lands to protect species without recognizing the comprehensive
impacts to the military is a constant concern.
3. Environmental restrictions for the protection of birds and
lizards at San Clemente Island, another important SEAL training range,
significantly impact the use of live ammunition. As a result, the SEALs
resorted to using blanks, paint balls, laser tag, and other simulated
ammunition.
4. Due to similar ESA-based restrictions in the Marianas Islands
intended to protect sea turtles, the Tinian Monarch (a bird), the
Micronesian Megapod (a ground bird), and the Marianas Fruit Bat, as
well as providing protection for near-shore coral reefs, the amphibious
landing portion of this year's exercise Tandem Thrust will not include
landings on the beach by air cushion landing craft. Tandem Thrust is a
multi-national exercise involving the U.S. and other allied nations
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and others) supporting Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command's warfighting readiness.
5. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recently proposed designating
critical habitat on two Navy installations on Guam and Hawaii where the
relevant endangered species are not currently present on Navy lands.
Both these installations have Integrated Natural Resource Management
Plans (INRMPs) for managing the natural resources that currently exist
within their boundaries. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's goal is
to introduce these species on Navy land now dedicated to training.
How Congress Can Help By Passing DOD's Proposed Legislation for ESA
Changing the ESA so that an approved INRMP removes the need for a
critical habitat designation will protect endangered species under the
overall management plan for all natural resources.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) AND DD(X)

8. Senator Collins. Secretary Johnson, in its fiscal year 2004
budget submission, the Navy includes $160 million for the LCS. Admiral
Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, has indicated that this is a top
priority of the Navy in this year's budget. Last week, the Navy issued
a request for proposals to build the first LCS. This vessel is aimed at
providing the Navy with better capability to operate closer to shore.
However, these kinds of ships cannot serve as a substitute for major
surface combatant vessels. The Navy's budget submission also includes
$1.1 billion for development of the DD(X) destroyer. I would like to
hear your insights into the different capabilities that the LCS and
DD(X) destroyer will provide. Is the development of DD(X), along with
the LCS, a top priority for the Navy?
Secretary Johnson. Development of both our next generation
destroyer, DD(X), and the LCS is critical to the future Navy. Future
surface combatants are optimized to perform key functions: LCS to
assure access to littoral regions in the face of asymmetric threats
such as mines and submarines; DD(X) for delivery of precision strike
and volume fires in support of forces ashore; and the next generation
cruiser, CG(X), to create and maintain air superiority over joint
forces at sea and on land, as well as defend the homeland against
ballistic missile threats. As such, DD(X) and LCS will provide
complementary capabilities, described below, to the Fleet.
Armed with an array of land-attack weapons, such as Tactical
Tomahawk and the Advanced Gun System (AGS), DD(X) will provide
persistent, distributed, long-range, precision attack needed in support
of our joint forces operating deep inland. It will combine this
firepower with 21st century technologies such as stealth, integrated
power systems, and electric drive propulsion. The added electrical
power will allow DD(X) to spiral develop to hyper-velocity and laser
weapons.
LCS will capitalize on emerging unmanned vehicle technologies and
perform the focused Sea Shield missions of MIW, Surface Warfare (SUW),
and ASW. It will provide the fast, affordable, focused-mission
capability that will sustain access and enhance the Navy's ability to
establish sea superiority not just for our Carrier Strike Groups and
Expeditionary Strike Groups, but for all the joint logistics, command
and control, and prepositioned ships that must transit the critical
littoral threat area to move and support forces ashore.

9. Senator Collins. Secretary Johnson, it is critical that the Navy
build on the momentum of the fiscal year 2004 budget submission in the
coming years. According to documentation submitted by the Department of
Defense, the Navy has budgeted $12 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal
year 2005, including an additional three DDG-51 destroyers. However, as
it currently stands, there is no funding for DDG-51s after fiscal year
2005. The DD(X) destroyer program is scheduled to begin production at
that time, but there only appears to be funding for one DD(X) in fiscal
year 2006, and one in fiscal year 2007. The possibility of only two
major surface combatant ship constructions in fiscal year 2006 and
fiscal year 2007 would substantially damage the industrial base. Is the
Navy committed to addressing this problem?
Secretary Johnson. In order to transform to meet future threats,
the Navy must move toward DD(X). The current plan is to complete
procurement of 62 ships in the DDG-51 class in fiscal year 2005. A
single DD(X) in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 creates pressure
on the surface combatant industrial base, but is mitigated by the 10
ship DDG multi-year procurement and the workload swap between Bath Iron
Works and Northrop Grumman that will optimize production efficiencies
and stabilize workload at both shipyards. The Navy is committed to
maintaining a robust and competitive shipbuilding industrial base.
Industrial base concerns will be taken into consideration in the
formulation of future budgets.

10. Senator Collins. Secretary Johnson, DD(X) will allow the Navy
to field a fleet of highly capable and affordable warships. It will
accomplish this by leveraging R&D costs, resultant technologies, and
efficient processes and benefits across multiple platforms. DD(X) is
also central to improving quality-of-life for our sailors--even more
important as we ask our Armed Forces to do more in the new security
environment. Would you discuss the value that you believe DD(X) and its
family of ships will provide the Navy team, and further could you speak
to the $1.1 billion investment proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget
for this family-of-ships?
Secretary Johnson. DD(X) will be armed with an array of land attack
weapons, such as Tactical Tomahawk and the AGS to provide persistent,
distributed, long-range, precision attack needed in support of our
joint forces operating deep inland. Tactical Tomahawk will reach up to
1,000 miles inland as a responsive call-for-fire weapon. AGS will
provide fires to 100 miles, a seven-fold improvement on current
capability.
DD(X) will take advantage of advanced stealth technologies to be
less detectable and more survivable to enemy attacks than the ships it
will replace. An open architecture, distributed combat system will
support a ``plug and play'' environment in which to operate AGS, an
advanced vertical launching system and a Multi-Function Radar/Volume
Search Radar suite. Other features on DD(X) will include an advanced
hull form, integrated electric drive propulsion, optimized manning, and
extensive automation.
The DD(X) research and development effort will enable the Navy to
keep pace with today's rapid technological advances, spiraling
promising technologies to both CG(X) and LCS. It will also enable the
Navy to upgrade in-service Aegis cruisers and destroyers with selected
leading edge technologies to maintain operational effectiveness of the
legacy, multi-mission fleet. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget
requests $1.058 billion for DD(X) to fund continuation of the DD(X)
design effort and continued design, development, and test of the 10
DD(X) Engineering Development Models (EDMs) listed below:

Advanced Gun System (AGS) and Munitions
Integrated Power System (IPS) *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* EDM will be tested at-sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume Search Radar (VSR)/Multi-Function Radar (MFR)
Radar Suite *
Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) *
Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS)
Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures
Autonomic Fire Suppression System (AFSS) *
Infrared Mock-ups
Hull Form Scale Model
Integrated Undersea Warfare System (IUSW)

The DD(X) lead ship contract award is scheduled for fiscal year
2005.
The LCS will use emerging unmanned vehicle technologies and deliver
the focused Sea Shield missions of MIW, SUW, and ASW. It will provide
the fast, affordable, focused-mission capability that will sustain
access and enhance the ability to establish sea superiority not just
for our Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups, but for
all the joint logistics, command and control, and prepositioned ships
that must transit the critical littoral threat area to move and support
forces ashore.
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $158 million for
LCS to support hull form development, mission module development and
integration, and requirements analysis. The LCS Integrated Requirements
Document has been completed and construction of the first LCS is
expected to commence in 2005.

AIR FORCE ACADEMY

11. Senator Collins. Secretary Roche, as I expressed last week to
General Jumper, I am appalled by the allegations of sexual assaults at
the Air Force Academy. Along with Senator Lieberman, I have asked the
Department of Defense Inspector General to investigate this very
disturbing situation. Your cooperation in looking into this matter has
been appreciated. The perpetrators of these crimes are a discredit to
the Academy, and a discredit to the Air Force. Since these crimes have
come to light, what actions have you taken to ensure that the young
women at the Academy receive the protection and attention that they
require?
Secretary Roche. We are conducting a comprehensive review of Air
Force Academy programs and practices to deter and respond to sexual
assaults. In connection with that review, we are looking closely at
factors affecting both reporting and handling of alleged incidents of
sexual assaults, including the cadet hierarchy and the relationships
between the upper and freshman classes. We are also evaluating how the
Academy administers cadet discipline in order to ensure there are no
obstacles to the reporting of crimes. We are evaluating how we select,
train, and organize the professional staff to ensure we provide the
best available supervision and mentoring. We are also reviewing the
process of investigating allegations of sexual assaults, as well as the
awareness training, medical care, counseling services, legal
consultation, victim advocacy, and spiritual support we provide to
victims to ensure they receive the support that they need, and fair
treatment throughout the investigative and judicial process. We are
also clarifying the definition of sexual assault used at the Academy to
include only conduct that constitutes a crime.
While our review is continuing, General Jumper and I have made
changes in Academy leadership in order to implement some significant
changes to reinforce our goals to train and equip tomorrow's leaders at
the Academy. We intend to ensure the safety and security of every cadet
and to enhance the trust and confidence of the American people in the
Air Force Academy. On March 26, 2003, we announced our Agenda for
Change, which directs a variety of changes including among others those
regarding cadet life, Academy leadership, officer and NCO selection and
training, security for cadets, and the social climate at the Academy.
The full Agenda for Change has been made available to the committee.
These changes, which are to be implemented in time for the arrival of
the entering Class of 2007 this fall, are intended to reinforce the
values of character, leadership, integrity, and honor that we must
instill in every cadet and future Air Force officer.
This job is not finished, but we think we've made a good start. Our
bottom line is this: sexual assaults will not be tolerated at the Air
Force Academy, and all who commit sexual assaults will be brought to
justice. In addition, those who knowingly protect perpetrators, and
those who would shun or harass anyone with the courage to come forward
and report these crimes, will be held accountable.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

12. Senator Collins. Secretary White, during last week's hearing
with the Service Chiefs, I asked General Shinseki about a July 2002
Army Audit Agency report dealing with the Army's preparedness to deal
with a chemical or biological attack. The results of this audit were
very troubling. Of the 25 units reviewed at Fort Hood and Fort Lewis,
18 of them were not judged to be proficient in operating chemical and
biological defensive equipment. Also, inspectors found that many units
were not performing adequate preventative maintenance on their chem-bio
defense equipment. Given the possibility of war against Iraq, I am very
concerned about these findings. ``60 Minutes'' recently did a story
based in part on this audit. Can you assure not only me, but also the
troops who are even as we speak being deployed to the Persian Gulf,
that they have adequate training and equipment to deal with a chemical
or biological attack?
Secretary White. U.S. forces serving in Iraq and throughout the
Gulf region are trained and prepared to operate in a contaminated
environment. The threats and challenges presented by operating in a
contaminated environment may increase the degree of difficulty, but are
not insurmountable. Our forces are trained, and they have the equipment
they need to survive and sustain operations in a nuclear, biological,
and chemical environment.
Army individual and collective training doctrine places great
emphasis on sustaining a ``band of excellence'' across a range of tasks
that specifically focus on the unit's mission essential tasks. In the
last several months, these training programs received significantly
greater attention and focus. Military commanders recognized the
immediacy of the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and
initiated training to improve their chemical-biological defense
equipment readiness. Each unit mobilizing or deploying in support of
current operations will conduct individual skill training validation
before and after deployment to ensure they are fully capable of
operating equipment in a chemical-biological environment.

MEDICAL CONDITIONS CAUSED BY WAR

13. Senator Collins. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, a sad part of modern warfare is the illnesses that
have cropped up after our Nation's last two major conventional
conflicts. Many of the men and women who served during the Vietnam War
were afflicted with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. As we saw over the
years, Agent Orange has had devastating long-term impacts on some
veterans of that conflict. Following our last war against Iraq, some
veterans suffered as a result of what we now call Gulf War Syndrome.
There is still debate about its causes. As we stand potentially on the
brink of another conflict in the Middle East, what steps are your
Services taking to adequately track the health of those serving in the
Persian Gulf? If there is a conflict, will we have an adequate
foundation of data to ensure that if another illness should appear,
like Gulf War Syndrome, that we will be able to adequately diagnose its
causes?
Secretary White. Numerous steps have been taken to track the health
of soldiers serving in the Persian Gulf. These steps include measures
that occur before, during, and after the deployment period. Before
departure, all soldiers complete a pre-deployment health assessment to
determine if individuals have pre-existing medical conditions that
might affect their health while deployed. Evaluations by medical
specialists are completed, when necessary, to assure that deploying
personnel are fit for service in a combat zone. Copies of data from the
health assessment are archived and reviewed periodically to assess the
health of deployed service members. During deployment, a standardized
health surveillance system is implemented to detect and mitigate any
outbreaks of illness. Data from this system is captured electronically
and can be monitored from any place in the world through secure
Internet access. In addition, all soldiers deploy with a recently
implemented deployment health record to assure that all medical
encounters are recorded and archived for future review.
In addition to these measures, an active environmental surveillance
program is conducted by the combatant command to proactively identify
and assess any potential threats that are recognized. A systematic
information system assures that evaluations are completed on a timely
basis, that results are communicated to appropriate authorities for
action, and that all evaluations are permanently archived for later
review.
At the time of redeployment, numerous processes are in place to
assess and assure the health of soldiers who are coming home. These
include a medical debrief on the threats encountered while deployed and
information on what to do if health problems occur at a later time.
During the redeployment process, soldiers undergo an expanded health
assessment to identify any physical or mental health issues that may
have developed during the deployment. Any health issues identified
during the post-deployment health assessment are referred to
specialists for further evaluation using the Deployment Health Clinical
Practice Guideline developed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. This
guideline requires that all deployment-related health visits be
recorded using a special diagnostic code, so that such visits can be
monitored electronically.
In summary, an intense effort has been made to safeguard and
monitor the health of soldiers deployed during Operation Enduring
Freedom and to Iraq. Numerous data systems are in place to track health
outcomes on an individual level, monitor environmental exposures in
theater, record clinic visits occurring during or after deployment, and
assure that appropriate health care is provided. These new efforts
enhance abilities to rapidly detect any emerging health problems that
occur as a result of the deployment, focus on groups of service members
that may be affected, and identify potential exposures that may have
been the cause of specific clusters of illness.
Secretary Johnson. The Department of Defense is enhancing the post-
deployment health assessment process. The improvements include a more
comprehensive health assessment and a blood sample taken within 30 days
of leaving the theater. The more comprehensive assessment will provide
individual information about events that occurred during a deployment
and enable the DOD health care providers to more effectively assess
health status as they interact with each service member. The blood
samples will be forwarded to the DOD Serum Repository for archival
purposes. These enhancements are just one piece of the total force
health protection program that also includes increased environmental
surveillance, electronic medical recordkeeping, and improved unit
location data. Commanders are responsible for complete redeployment
processing of their personnel and helping each individual to make a
smooth, post-deployment transition, according to DOD guidelines.
Because deployment health concerns often evolve over time, commanders
also encourage their returning service members to re-visit with health
care providers to address all deployment related health concerns. The
complete force health protection program, including regular blood
tests, regular physical examinations, annual dental examinations,
annual medical record reviews and pre- and post-deployment health
assessments, assists DOD in providing a world-class continuum of care
from accession to separation. The health and safety of our people is
our top concern. DOD will continue to improve the force health
protection program based on medical lessons learned from deployments.
DOD is committed to providing service members and the public access to
accurate, consistent, and comprehensive information about post-
deployment force health protection policies and to instilling and
maintaining public confidence in DOD's concern for the health of its
personnel, its health care system, and its ability to respond to any
health concern that may arise from a deployment.
Secretary Roche. The men and women of the United States Air Force
deserve our every effort to protect their health both at war and in
peace. The pillars of force health protection are recruiting and
maintaining a fit force, preventing disease and injury, and caring for
those who are injured or become ill. The Air Force is committed to
force health protection through the life cycle of their service. The
cornerstone of our effort is rooted in the Deployment Health
Surveillance program. Mandated by public law and implemented by
Department of Defense Instructions, this program combines elements of
preventive and supportive medicine to protect the health of our airmen.
The program includes pre-deployment health assessments. These
assessments provide baseline data--the ``foundation of data'' that you
speak of--that can be used to compare against post-deployment
assessments to determine the deployment's impact, if any, on the
member's health. Our Deployment Health Surveillance program also
includes immunizations, serum sampling, patient record maintenance, and
centralized data storage for ongoing and future analysis.
None of these individual tools will yield the total picture, but
taken together they ensure we will have the information we need to
monitor, investigate, improve, and protect our members' health.
Our primary goal is the prevention of the conditions you rightfully
address in your statement. Environmental surveillance at deployment
sites initially includes sampling air, water, and soil, and continues
with routine monitoring of food, water, and endemic disease vectors.
Since the Gulf War, we have established many programs for deployment
health surveillance. While these programs have greatly increased our
ability to detect health hazards, reduce risks, and survey for health
problems in personnel who have deployed, we are continuing to improve
in a number of areas. Here are some of the concrete efforts and
initiatives we are currently working:

Automation of the deployment health assessments, in
cooperation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs
Enhancement of the health assessments returning airmen
receive before leaving theater and within 30 days of returning
to home station
Automation of deployed health records and records of
medications taken while deployed
Electronic recording of environmental data
Mental health assessments and critical incident stress
support both in theater and at home
Agile medical support in theater to prevent casualties
and illness
Archiving of unit locations throughout a deployment
for possible future use

We are continuing to enhance the care we provide when service
members develop conditions possibly related to deployments. To this end
we have implemented a program to screen personnel for deployment
related health concerns and to use a clinical practice guideline,
developed in cooperation with the Veterans Administration, to address
those illnesses and conditions that could be associated with combat
service. We have linked such care to our automated record of clinic
visits to ensure we can track these patients and the care they receive.
We maintain deployment related medical and environmental data in a
variety of repositories. The main Department of Defense repository for
health assessments and serum samples is the Army Medical Surveillance
Activity. We have Air Force service specific repositories for
environmental health data, theater surveillance data, and patient
records. The Air Force has physicians and epidemiologists to monitor
deployment related illnesses and injuries, and to study the data for
potential causes to any conditions that may arise. The men and women of
the United States Air Force deserve nothing less.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

14. Senator Collins. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, waging the war against terrorism has required
significant resources. The recent build-up in the Persian Gulf has also
placed a strain on funding. It is my understanding that later this
year, the Department of Defense will be submitting a supplemental
appropriations request to cover some of these costs. However, I am
becoming increasingly concerned about the toll being taken on the men
and women serving today. Admiral Clark has indicated that half of our
fleet is currently deployed, a significant jump from normal operations.
I am sure that the other Services are in a similar situation. How long
can we operate at this high rate before we start seeing negative
impacts on our recruiting and retention? How are each of you managing
military personnel to deal with this issue?
Secretary White. Currently, the Army is having no problem meeting
its annual accessions requirements and quality goals and anticipates no
problems in the future, despite the current operational tempo and
deployments. If we see a drop in enlistment, we will reassess our
recruiting strategy and make appropriate adjustments.
It is difficult for us to determine retention trends at this time;
however, studies by RAND and the Army Research Institute show that
first deployments have a positive impact on the soldier's desire to
stay in the Army, but subsequent and repetitive deployments have a
negative impact on the soldier's desire to stay in the Army. A fall
2002 survey of military personnel shows that ``amount of time away from
my family'' was one of the leading reasons given by soldiers who leave
the Army.
We are managing critical military personnel skills through our
stop-loss and stop-move programs. We have implemented these programs
through precision management and executed them incrementally based on
the changing operational environment since September 11, 2001.
Secretary Johnson. Despite long deployments and the extremely
arduous duty required of sailors over this past year, we have not yet
observed a negative effect on retention, and the retention successes we
are enjoying have permitted us to continue reducing our accession
goals. Should it become necessary for us to continue extending
deployments, and should longer deployments become routine, we would
expect this to have a negative effect on recruiting and retention.
Studies following Operation Desert Storm suggested that deployments
exceeding eight months resulted in significantly lower reenlistment
rates, particularly for married sailors and those in relatively sea-
intensive occupations (2 percentage point drop for sailors overall, 7
percent for married sailors, and 3.4 percent for those in sea-intensive
occupations).
However, those studies also showed that if long deployments were
not routine, but were associated with ``morale boosting crises,'' such
as the present situation we are facing, ``these challenging and
exceptional deployments are likely to yield higher retention than
routine long deployments.'' Recent statistics support this finding.
However, it is difficult to predict for how much longer we can extend
deployments without the practice being perceived as ``routine,''
thereby adversely impacting retention.
Navy recognizes that to continue extending deployments for
sustained periods of time, will likely begin to adversely impact the
current recruiting and retention successes we are enjoying. While our
active strength level, with selective-augmentation by naval reservists,
is sufficient to support mission requirements and force structure, we
continue to monitor the situation closely to evaluate the recruiting
and retention impacts of the current operational tempo. As situations
evolve both in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, we
anticipate that extended deployments will remain the exception, vice
the rule; thereby limiting the potential adverse impacts on our
recruiting and retention efforts.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force shares your concern about the
current high tempo and the toll it is taking on our airmen. Our
involvement in the numerous hot spots around the world has truly
stretched our troops to the limit. We have tried to minimize that
impact by employing our people in the most efficient manner possible
for these contingencies. One of our greatest strengths continues to be
the quality and dedication of our Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserves troops. When combined with our active duty and civilian force,
these troops help spread our commitments throughout the ``Total''
force. Our Expeditionary Air Force concept has also served us well
during these times of high tempo. That is not to say that it has
resolved the problems associated with our high tempo, but it has
provided the foundation from which to build a model to minimize the
impacts.
Your question concerning how long will we be able to operate at
this rate before we begin to feel an impact on recruiting and retention
is a good one. While we cannot say definitively how long we can sustain
this rate without an impact, current data indicates positive trends in
both recruiting and retention. Exit surveys show that deployments alone
do not play a major role in a member's decision to separate when
compared to other factors such as compensation and the availability of
civilian jobs. We have worked very hard with your support to ensure our
airmen are duly compensated for the work they do for our great Nation.
Our hope is that these trends continue and that we will be able to keep
the best and brightest members of our Air Force in uniform. Recruiting
efforts have also responded well to your committee's continued support.
Our recent increases in recruiter strength and marketing efforts have
had a significant impact. We continue to attract the finest of
America's youth from all walks of life.
While we are currently doing well in these areas, we do not want to
build a false sense of security. Our assumption is that if these high
tempo rates were to continue for an extended period of time, it would
ultimately begin to have a negative impact on our troops and a
detrimental impact on our ability to recruit and retain the forces
needed to meet the many demands placed on our Air Force.

``GO-PILLS''

15. Senator Collins. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, I have some concerns about the usage of amphetamines
by our military. As part of the proceedings regarding last year's
friendly fire bombing of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, the use of
these so-called ``go-pills'' has been spotlighted. It is my
understanding that these drugs are administered directly by military
physicians, and that pilots are monitored very closely during their
use. Given the intense supervision given to pilots and their flying
hours, I can understand how the Air Force can manage the use of these
drugs. However, for military personnel operating on land or at sea,
supervision becomes more of an issue. Are these drugs distributed to
non-pilots? If so, what controls are in place to ensure that they are
not abused? Are there adequate studies regarding their effects on
performance?
Secretary White. Dexedrine, commonly referred to as ``go-pills,''
is not used by anyone in the Army other than aviators. It has been a
long-standing Army policy to maximize the use of non-pharmacological
countermeasures to fatigue such as sleep/wake cycles in operational
plans. A query of the Pharmacy Data Transaction Service database for
prescriptions to active duty Army soldiers revealed an average of two
Dexedrine prescriptions a month over the last 18-month period. Further
investigation revealed that personnel at Fort Rucker used these
prescriptions for flight training purposes.
Army aviators will use pharmacological countermeasures only in
extreme circumstances. The Army has long studied various stimulants and
is most comfortable with the benefits and side-effect profile of
Dexedrine for Army aviators. After other countermeasures have been
exhausted, and the commander has decided conditions warrant its use,
the flight surgeon may use 2.5, 5, or 10 milligrams of Dexedrine up to
a maximum of 30 milligrams in a 24-hour period.
The decision to use stimulants is the commander's, but is made in
concert with appropriate medical and safety counsel. For example,
within the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a policy letter
signed by the commander directs that ``the utilization of drugs such as
amphetamines, or the application of medical procedures, such as `blood
doping,' to enhance or extend performance is strictly forbidden without
the approval of the Commander, USSOCOM.'' To date only the 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment has applied and received approval
for a performance-enhancing drug protocol for pilots. In this protocol,
the use of Dexedrine requires approval from the first general officer
in the operational chain of command after a request from the battalion
or air mission commander and the flight surgeon.
Secretary Johnson. There is no authorized use of ``go pills'' for
any non-pilots.
Secretary Roche. While I cannot comment on Navy and Army policies,
Air Force policies currently only permit the use of ``go-pills'' by one
or two-seat fighter/bomber aircrew members and by U2 reconnaissance
pilots. The policies would include a small group of F-15E Weapons
Systems Officers, who are covered under the same controls as pilots.
There are no USAF policies that permit the distribution of ``go-pills''
in ground personnel. In fact, the Air Force Special Operations Command
restricts ``go-pill'' use outside of the policies I've previously
mentioned. With respect to the use of Dexedrine by Air Force pilots,
there is a considerable body of scientific literature over the last 60
years, dating back to World War II, which supports the safety,
efficacy, and performance benefits to be gained from the use of small
doses of dextroamphetamine in extended duration air operations. I am
confident that our fatigue management system, which includes such
pharmaceuticals, is scientifically sound, voluntary, and very well
controlled.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

CUTS IN IMPACT AID

16. Senator Dole. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and Secretary
Roche, during my visits recently to several North Carolina bases I
listened to commanders, enlisted personnel, and military spouses. In
addition to concerns about pay and quality housing, one of the themes I
heard repeated had to do with making sure that the children of the men
and women who are dealing with repeated deployments are getting a
quality education in adequately funded schools. That brought the
subject around to Impact Aid and the cuts that have been made in the
fiscal year 2004 budget. If we ask the men and women of our armed
services to go into harms way, they need to know that we are doing
everything to make sure that we are taking care of their families. How
can we possibly justify the cuts that have been made in Impact Aid
funding?
Secretary White. Impact Aid funds are an important source of
Federal income for school districts that educate federally-connected
children and help to ensure military children are provided quality
education. The Impact Aid program is a U.S. Department of Education
(DoED) function and responsibility. The Army supports the DOD position
that Impact Aid funding and management is correctly positioned within
DoED. The Army was not consulted by either DoED or the Office of
Management and Budget in the formulation of this portion of the
President's budget for fiscal year 2004. The Army strategy is to
continue to work closely with DoED and DOD to find solutions to Impact
Aid's persistent underfunding. Through our School Liaison Services
program, we are keeping commanders and parents informed about the
importance of completing the required Federal forms so school districts
receive the Impact Aid allocation for each military-affiliated student.
Secretary Johnson. Education issues for the children of our active
duty personnel are important to the Navy and I recognize the
significance of Impact Aid funds. They are an important source of
Federal income for school districts that educate federally connected
children and help to ensure military children are provided quality
education. The Impact Aid program, however, is a DoED function and
responsibility. The Navy plays no role in the development or
determination of Impact Aid and was not consulted by either DoED or the
Office of Management and Budget in the formulation of this portion of
the President's budget for fiscal year 2004.
Secretary Roche. We view adequate funding for schools as one of the
most important quality-of-life issues for our families with school age
children. We are very gratified that Congress has supported requested
funding levels for the operation of our DOD dependent schools overseas
and within the United States. Impact Aid is certainly an important
ingredient in guaranteeing education quality for our children who
attend schools within the United States. The Air Force has not
recommended any changes to the Impact Aid program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

SHIP RETIREMENTS

17. Senator Levin. Secretary Johnson, this budget includes cutting
the Navy fleet size below 300 ships in fiscal year 2004. At a time when
we are deploying the fleet more and asking our people to spend greater
periods of time away from home, this would appear to be moving in the
wrong direction. Will the Navy be able to sustain its normal peacetime
deployments at these lower fleet sizes without breaking the operating
tempo goals that establish how frequently, and for how long, sailors
will be expected to be absent from their families?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy will be able to sustain its normal
peacetime deployments without breaking operating tempo goals. The CNO
is committed to his personnel tempo guidelines, and the Navy has
sufficient ships to meet its commitments within these guidelines. The
Navy has commenced a comprehensive review of our forward deployment
responsibilities, and operational and personnel tempo guidelines are
major factors in this review. Additionally, Navy initiatives such as
Sea Swap and the Fleet Response Concept are projected to provide
forward, ready, and employable forces where and when needed--both
designed with personnel tempo goals in mind.

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

18. Senator Levin. Secretary White, a recent press article quoted
General Pace as saying that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is
reviewing a recommendation that would reshape the Army's force
structure from 10 more specialized divisions to 10 identical divisions
that could be deployed to contingencies on a rotating basis. What is
your view of that concept?
Secretary White. I do not think the Army will ever have 10
identical divisions. There will always be a need to maintain some level
of specialization that will not be required across the total force.
However, the Army intends to field interchangeable, general-purpose
forces with common core capabilities through the Objective Force,
beginning with initial operating capability of the first brigade-sized
unit of action by 2010. In the near- to mid-term, the Army will meet
overseas presence and rotation requirements through tailoring current
forces in accordance with combatant commander requirements.
Today's Army comprises a robust mix of specialized divisions:
airborne, air assault, light infantry, infantry, and armored/
mechanized. Each type of division is optimized to provide a unique
combination of capabilities, but is also specifically designed for
rapid reorganization to accomplish a specific task or mission referred
to as ``task organizing.'' Task organization ensures the force contains
the appropriate mix and quantity of combined arms to accomplish
assigned overseas presence and rotational missions in accordance with
the combatant commander's intent and concept of the operation.
Reducing or eliminating the distinctions between heavy and light
forces is a fundamental objective of Army transformation. Objective
Force units are being designed to be strategically responsive and
dominant at every point across the full spectrum of operations. In the
future, the Objective Force will possess an organic capability to
conduct vertical envelopment (airborne) and air assault in both
independent actions or as complementary maneuver in support of
committed forces. The Army continues to assess and adjust the
configuration of the unit of action and unit of employment to best
support the emerging needs of the combatant commanders. The first unit
of action begins fielding in 2008 and will achieve its initial
operating capability this decade.

19. Senator Levin. Secretary White, is there no longer a role for
specialized divisions such as the airborne and air assault divisions?
Secretary White. Airborne and air assault operations are a relevant
and necessary part of the mix of capabilities the Army provides to the
geographic combatant commanders. Operations in Afghanistan and
potential operations in Iraq require the unique skills and flexibility
inherent in the airborne and air assault divisions. The capabilities
necessary to conduct horizontal and vertical envelopment missions are
valid requirements that support the full spectrum of joint military
operations.
Executed rapidly, airborne and air assault operations provide
positional advantage, achieve surprise, overcome difficult terrain,
expose enemy capabilities to destruction throughout the joint
operational area, and block, isolate, or otherwise dislocate enemy
forces.

ACTIVE/RESERVE COMPONENT MIX

20. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, it is clear that many of our Reserve and National
Guard units and individuals are being taxed by the current level of
commitments. It may well be that the Department should adjust the roles
and functions assigned to each component appropriate for this new
strategic environment. Do you all believe that DOD should adjust the
roles and functions assigned to each of the active, Reserve, and
National Guard components? If so, what changes, if any, do you believe
are necessary? What are your plans for dealing with this issue?
Secretary White. The Army is aware that many of our soldiers, from
both the active and Reserve components, are being taxed by our current
level of commitments as we pursue our assigned missions in support of
the defense strategy, which includes the war on terrorism and homeland
defense. The current size, mix, and roles of the Army's components were
established under a different set of conditions than what the force is
now operating under and what we expected to operate under in the
future. Our participation this past year in defense planning on
operational availability has helped identify potential changes in the
mix and role of our Reserve components. Our participation in the
upcoming DOD study on active and Reserve component mix will assist the
Army in the implementation of the changes necessary to meet the Army's
requirements in the defense strategy while also reducing burden on all
of our soldiers.
Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over
19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and
Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated
or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68
active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these
high demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological
operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities
address the most urgent needs.
Secretary Johnson. While the current level of commitment is
certainly taxing both active and Reserve personnel of all Services, the
Naval Reserve has not been overused.
The roles and functions mismatches that burden some of the other
Service Reserve components are not as prevalent in the Navy/Naval
Reserve mix. The Navy has worked hard to integrate reservists into the
daily business routine of the overall Navy and we need not activate
large numbers of reservists to go to war.
Lessons learned post-September 11 have suggested a need to adjust
Navy force mix in the Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) mission area. NCW is
a mission that is currently resident only in the Naval Reserve. The
commencement of the GWOT led us to the conclusion that we need to
increase the size of our NCW forces. We have made a conscious effort to
buy active duty NCW capabilities to meet the increased operational
demand. These forces will not replace, but will reinforce the
capability we already have in the Naval Reserve.
In June 2002, ASN(M&RA) and VCNO chartered an effort to develop a
21st century vision for a fully integrated Active and Reserve Naval
Force. This effort is exploring Active/Reserve Force mix alternatives
and is ongoing under the tutelage of Navy's Total Force Flag Steering
Group. Active duty and Reserve officers are fully engaged in
appropriately shaping the Navy of tomorrow and will continue working to
bring this effort to completion.
Secretary Roche. The entire Department of Defense is currently
looking at all the emerging requirements of the new National Military
Strategy which have been given such great impetus by the events of
September 11. In the Air Force, we have made and will continue to make
changes to our force mix (the ratio of a mission in the active and
Reserve components) and force structure (how those forces are based and
organized) as new needs emerge to support that strategy. The Air
Reserve Component (ARC), both Reserve and Guard, have made huge
contributions to our successes in Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble
Eagle. They have stepped up to the challenges just as our active
component has. Though the active and Reserve components have both been
stressed in these endeavors, our risk management has spread that stress
fairly equitably.
We do have several mission areas in which we are making adjustments
to mitigate some of those stresses to the Reserve component. For
example, the Air Force Reserve is transferring 15 combat search and
rescue aircraft, a low-density/high-demand asset, to the active
component. In turn the Reserve unit will convert to KC-135 R-model
tankers, a mission that has proven very successful in the Reserve
component. The ARC will also be transferring 14 C-130 R-models to our
Air Force Special Operations Command to meet the post September 11
requirements. These adjustments will allow the active and Reserve
components to maintain the steady-state requirements without overusing
our invaluable Reserve component.

ARMY MODERNIZATION

21. Senator Levin. Secretary White, in this year's budget request
the Army has made a clear statement as to acquisition priorities,
shifting $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2004 and $22 billion across the
fiscal year 2004-2009 FYDP from the procurement of existing legacy
weapon systems to the R&D and procurement of Objective Force systems.
This was done by canceling 24 programs and restructuring another 24
more. This is on the heels of numerous such cancellations in prior
years. While moving forward with transformation, until this year the
Army had intended to balance the risks in the transformation plan by
recapitalizing and selectively modernizing the three heavy Army
divisions and the Armored Cavalry Regiment of the counter-attack
corps--forces which will continue to be needed for the next two
decades. Now only two divisions of that corps will be modernized. How
should we assess the risks in that strategy?
Secretary White. The Army has conducted continuous reassessment of
the risk associated with transforming the force in anticipation of its
Future Combat Systems. At this time, given current transformation
timelines, the Army believes that the risk it has taken is prudent. The
continuous assessment of risk includes all Quadrennial Defense Review-
defined risks, particularly the near-term operational, the future
challenges, and the force management effects of programmatic offsets.
We will continue to reevaluate these reductions each year and will
readdress our risk as the situation warrants.

22. Senator Levin. Secretary White, I note that news reports
indicate that the Army plans to deploy four heavy divisions and a
cavalry regiment for a possible war with Iraq. Does modernizing only
two of those over the next 20 years make sense?
Secretary White. The Army made a conscious decision to decrease the
modernization of the Counterattack Corps from 3\1/3\ divisions to 2
divisions. It was clearly the toughest decision in this budget. We were
forced to terminate and curtail some modernization programs including
the digitization of the Counterattack Corps in order to generate
capital for Army transformation. The Army has accepted prudent
operational risk in the mid-term to fund our transformation to the
Objective Force. The Army has several means to mitigate the risk
associated with this decision. We are on schedule to gain the initial
operational capability of the first Stryker Brigade this year. The six
Stryker Brigades, which we have planned, act as both a strategic hedge
to allow transformation of our current forces and as a learning
environment to train leaders and soldiers for our Objective Force
formations. We have also accelerated the fielding of transformational
technologies to enhance the warfighting capabilities of our deployed
forces. We will be transforming units from our divisions into Objective
Force formations by the end of this decade.
We made the judgment to curtail the modernization of the
Counterattack Corps at two divisions after a careful balancing of
operational risk, and the risk of not transforming, to provide the
capabilities that the Army needs to meet the obligations of mid-term
and long-term joint operations concepts. We are closely monitoring the
current operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in
the global war on terrorism, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute
the long-term effort to defeat transnational threats to ensure the risk
remains prudent. As current operations unfold, we will reexamine our
risk assessment each year.

23. Senator Levin. Secretary White, how confident are you of
meeting the 2010 initial operational capability date for the Future
Combat Systems? Do you believe that the technologies will be mature
enough to make a decision to go forward with system development and
demonstration this spring?
Secretary White. I am highly confident that we will meet the Future
Combat System's initial operational capability in 2010. In the context
of emerging changes to acquisition policy, we are working with DOD to
develop an acquisition approach that supports our intent to provide an
operationally effective initial capability to the Nation in 2010. To
meet our timelines, we are adopting an approach that will enable the
Army to adapt processes available in the commercial sector to
accelerate maturation of technology and integration of systems. The use
of the Lead Systems Integrator to assist the Army in the management and
execution of this program has allowed us to leverage commercial
practices to retain competition and integrate a broad range of
solutions for the system of systems concept.
The Army is finalizing its evaluation of the technology within FCS
as required by the Defense Acquisition Executive. The chief scientist
of the Army chartered reviews of the technology by both government and
independent experts. These assessments have been reconciled and Army
leadership is reviewing the consolidated product. Upon approval, the
technology maturity assessment will be forwarded to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for final endorsement. The Army foresees no issue
that would preclude an affirmative technology maturity assessment at
the systems development and demonstration decision point in May 2003.

24. Senator Levin. Secretary White, if you expect to begin fielding
the Future Combat Systems in 2008 as planned, why do you believe it is
so important to field the fifth and sixth interim Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams in 2006 and 2007? Would you consider spending the $3
billion intended for those brigades for modernizing the remainder of
the heavy counter-attack corps instead?
Secretary White. The Army has established the correct balance
through continuous reassessment of the approximate mix of Legacy,
Interim, and Objective Forces needed to accomplish various mission
sets. In order to sustain the ability to support forward deployed
rotations and meet multiple requirements of the defense strategy, the
Army has developed the appropriate number of highly mobile forces.
As the Army transitions to support the ``1-4-2-1'' defense
construct, the Stryker Brigade is a force that fills critical gaps that
enable combatant commanders to accomplish the defense strategy. Present
Stryker Brigade fielding timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to
fight and win the war on terrorism while deterring hostile nations with
weapons of mass destruction and transforming. The transformation of
four active component brigades to Stryker Brigades provides a
rotational base with three of the brigades focused on the Pacific
theater and one forward-based in Europe. The Stryker Cavalry Regiment
will support the XVIII Airborne Corps' critical need for robust armed
reconnaissance. The conversion of a Reserve component brigade to a
Stryker Brigade is critical because it enhances the capabilities of the
strategic Reserve, and homeland defense missions are better met. This
will allow the Army to embed digital technology into the Reserve
components that will facilitate future active and Reserve
interoperability as part of the joint force.
Additionally, the conversion to six brigades focuses on every part
of the Army: active and Reserve components, heavy and light forces, and
U.S. and overseas based. Then, the ability to rotate the Reserve
component Stryker Brigade into small-scale contingencies or enduring
support and stability operation deployments in support of the global
war on terrorism, Balkans, etc., allows a manageable operational tempo
and deployment tempo for these capable units.

25. Senator Levin. Secretary White, do you intend to include any of
the 48 canceled or restructured programs on any unfunded priorities
list the Army would submit for congressional consideration this year?
Secretary White. The fiscal year 2004 budget submission included 24
systems that were terminated. Based on lessons learned from the global
war on terrorism, the Army reviewed ongoing operations and revalidated
limited numbers for four systems that had been terminated during the
preparation of the budget submission: Tactical Exploitation System
(TES), M919 25 millimeter ammunition, Stinger Missile, and the Joint
Tactical Terminal. As part of the budget submission, the Army also
generated a list of critical unfunded priorities. Three of the
revalidated systems were placed on this list--TES, M919, and Stinger.
In all cases, the unfunded priorities procure systems to meet an
identified Army shortfall in the global war on terrorism.
The budget submission also included 24 programs that were
restructured. Of these 24 restructured programs, four programs include
elements that appear on the unfunded priorities list (Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Javelin missile, second generation forward-
looking infrared radar (FLIR), and Soldier Modernization Systems). The
FMTV request would procure light medium tactical vehicles and medium
tactical vehicles, the Javelin request would procure 720 command launch
units for the Army National Guard, the second generation FLIR request
would provide funds required to maintain the industrial base, while the
Soldier Modernization Systems request would provide various soldier
equipment to support the Army's Rapid Fielding Initiative for the
global war on terrorism.
The Army may propose further changes to fiscal year 2004
investments pending lessons learned from current operations.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING

26. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, the fiscal year 2004 budget request reduces
investments in critical S&T programs by more than $1 billion from
fiscal year 2003 appropriated levels. It falls well short of the goal
of investing 3 percent of the defense budget in S&T to support military
transformation, despite the fact that the goal has been endorsed by the
Defense Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, Quadrennial
Defense Review, Congress, and even yourselves. In fact, by fiscal year
2009 it is programmed to fall to 2.4 percent of DOD's topline, not even
including supplemental appropriations. How is this limited investment
supportive of your goal to transform our military capabilities?
Secretary White. To accelerate Army transformation, the Army has
grown the S&T budget request every year since the Army Vision was
announced in 1999. This represents a total of 38 percent growth in Army
S&T since the fiscal year 2001 budget request. We have done this
because we recognize the key role of Army S&T in accelerating Future
Combat Systems and other Objective Force capabilities. Over 98 percent
of fiscal year 2004 S&T investments are focused on maturing and
developing critical technologies to achieve Objective Force
capabilities. S&T investments through fiscal year 2009 continue to
increase, focused on transitioning technology to the warfighter faster.
Secretary Johnson. The overall Navy S&T portfolio is closely
monitored to ensure consistency with, and support for, the Navy's
Transformation Roadmap Sea Power 21 pillars, including Sea Strike, Sea
Shield, Sea Base, and FORCEnet. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget
request contains several transformational initiatives, reflecting OSD
and Navy leadership priorities. Examples of such transformational
programs which are included in the Navy S&T budget request include:

Joint Forces Command's experimentation program
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
Electric Power Technologies including 100 kilowatt
free electron laser, and 36 megawatt superconducting motor
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle S&T requirements
(Marine Corps)
Advanced Multi-function Radio Frequency System
Wide bandgap power devices
Functional materials
Hypersonic weapons
Virtual at-sea training
Project Morgan
DC homopolar motor
X-Craft
Lightweight electrical energy sources (Marine Corps)
Secure mobile wireless networking technology (Marine
Corps)
USMC Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
USMC Electric Technologies for Advanced Ground
Vehicles
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab experimentation

Navy understands the importance of identifying appropriate S&T
projects and quickly delivering those new technologies to the
warfighters. During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, several S&T projects (thermobaric weapons, affordable weapons,
and a knowledge web system) transitioned directly from S&T to the
Fleet/Force, thereby demonstrating the current value of S&T programs.
Secretary Roche. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requested
amount of $2.2 billion is actually higher than the fiscal year 2003
appropriated amount of $1.8 billion for the Air Force S&T program and
provides for the technology development essential for the Air Force
vision of an Expeditionary Air and Space Force. We have taken the
effects and capabilities required by the Air Force's Concepts of
Operations and mapped them to the long-term challenges and short-term
objectives identified in the congressionally-directed S&T Planning
Review completed in February 2002. Our goal is to make the warfighting
effects and the capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for
everything we do and this is especially true in our S&T program.

27. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what areas of research are you cutting back on?
Secretary White. The Army regularly reviews S&T investments to
ensure we maintain a balanced portfolio of basic and applied research
and advanced technology development programs. We are not cutting back
on research; we are increasing investments in those areas that will get
us to the Future Combat Systems and the Objective Force sooner.
Specifically, in basic research we have increased funding 18 percent
compared with the fiscal year 2001 budget request for paradigm-shifting
technologies such as nanoscience and biotechnology.
Secretary Johnson. While Basic Research (6.1) has benefited from
the devolvement of a portion of the University Research Initiative
program to Navy, there remain difficult choices in Applied Research
(6.2) and Advanced Technology Development (6.3) funding to maintain the
best possible portfolio.
In the face of the constrained budgetary environment, we made
difficult choices in Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced Technology
Development (6.3) funding to maintain a viable portfolio to fund
transformational S&T at a rate we can afford.
We reduced funding for the Future Naval Capabilities (FNC)--
designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to
focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3
portfolio.
The following shows some of the primary FNC products that were
reduced or not pursued in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget
request:

Low observable integrated deckhouse,
Advanced estimate of sensor performance,
Mission responsive ordnance,
Limits of passive sonar, and
Underwater surveillance data link network.

Secretary Roche. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requested
amount of $2.2 billion for the Air Force S&T program is actually higher
than the fiscal year 2003 appropriated amount of $1.8 billion. This
increase comes primarily as a result of In-House Laboratory Independent
Research, High Energy Laser, and High Performance Computing
Modernization programs that were devolved to the Air Force by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. We have worked hard to maintain a
balanced S&T portfolio and, if you discount these programs and compare
only traditional S&T funding, our fiscal year 2004 President's budget
request sustains a level S&T investment from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal
year 2004.

WORKFORCE

28. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, it is clear that government labs, especially defense
labs, are finding it difficult to attract and retain the finest
scientific and engineering technical talent. Congress has attempted to
provide the directors of your laboratories with the ability to
establish demonstration programs to address workforce issues, and to
``directly hire'' needed technical talent (avoiding standard civil
service red tape) to be more competitive with the private sector, but
these have not been aggressively utilized by the Services. How are you
planning to address your science and engineering workforce crisis?
Secretary White. The service laboratories are now facing other
challenges from within the Department. A Federal Register announcement
has been published which may have consequences for the laboratories,
possibly compromising progress on the previous lab demonstrations and
requiring the labs to adopt, with union concurrence, so-called ``best
practices.'' These ``best practices'' were personnel rules adopted from
all of the current personnel demonstrations, but which may not be
tailored to the specific needs of the various labs. In addition, the
Department is attempting to develop a ``one size fits all'' new
personnel system based on these ``best practices,'' which will apply to
all of its employees, but which may not address the specific needs of
the labs. Until these OSD initiatives sort themselves out, it remains
unclear how we will address the personnel requirements of the labs.
Secretary Johnson. Civilian workforce issues are of great concern
to the Department of the Navy, and have been the subject of several
recent studies:

the August 2000 Civilian Workforce 2020: Strategies
for Modernizing Human Resources Management in the Department of
the Navy;
the July 2001 Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO)
Task Force report on Civilian Manpower & Personnel Management;
and
the May 2002 tri-Service study carried out under the
auspices of the Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) study
called Science and Technology Community in Crisis.

All three of these produced recommendations for improving the
Department of the Navy's civilian workforce, some of which have already
been implemented.
Your concerns about the crisis in our science and engineering task
force were validated in the NRAC study which was chartered by the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Its report emphasized that
the viability of the Defense Department's S&T capability is threatened
by increasing losses of key technical personnel, insufficient levels of
funding for facility and equipment modernization, and bureaucratic
impediments that often produce counter-productive results in the
research environment.
The NRAC report emphasized, in particular, the serious demographic
challenge the labs face over the next several years, when retirements
are expected to claim much of their experienced science and engineering
talent. Replacing that talent is a top priority, we are already taking
steps to improve the labs' ability to recruit, hire, and retain the
best science and engineering personnel. The Navy has been working with
the DOD in analyzing all human resources practices in the laboratory
demonstration projects under DOD's Best Practices Initiative and we are
working together to provide the results of this analysis as best
practices across the entire laboratory community rather than just one
lab experiencing independent success.
Congressionally-authorized personnel demonstration projects have
improved our ability to recruit and retain some of the best and
brightest technical talent in the market, but they do not completely
solve our lab personnel problems. For example, the pilot projects do
not provide all the hiring flexibilities we need because we still
cannot get the most innovative programs through each local union which
we are required to do under the demonstration project authority.
Building on the success of these congressionally-authorized
personnel demonstration projects, the Administration recommended
legislation for a DOD National Security Personnel System (NSPS) this
year. We strongly support this legislation which the House-passed
version in H.R. 1588 largely reflects. This legislation takes the labs
out of a demonstration project status and allows permanent use of best
practices flexibilities in the labs as well as the rest of the
Department by providing among other things, the basis for a fair and
flexible system of civilian personnel management with critical
flexibilities in hiring, assignment, advancement, and reduction in
force. In addition, it provides the opportunity for a new labor-
management relationship that is critical to implementing NSPS in a
timely manner and a streamlined appellate system that is fundamental to
implementing a workable pay for performance system. The legislation
would also permit the temporary hiring of older Americans and remove
the pay penalty for hiring annuitants that would allow us to retain the
mentoring capability and institutional knowledge of our best talent.
Another example is an initiative by the Office of Naval Research
specifically aimed at revitalizing the S&T workforce in our labs and
centers. This collaborative effort, which also includes academic
partners, has a number of components. For example, it provides
scholarships at participating universities in return for obligated
service in our labs. It also envisions retraining retired military
technology officers and bringing them back into the labs where their
valuable experience as warfighters can be infused into our research
efforts.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has
implemented a successful personnel demonstration project, which is in
its sixth year. It addresses many workforce issues, such as pay
inequalities and workforce refreshment. As a direct result, we have
seen great improvement in the laboratory workforce morale and
retainment.
With respect to Section 342 of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1995 and Section 1114 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2001, additional initiatives have been implemented, while others,
such as direct hire authority for college graduates, are still being
evaluated by the Department of Defense. In the interim, AFRL and the
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel worked together to allow
AFRL to utilize the Federal Career Intern Program.
To fully address the S&E workforce crisis, the Air Force has
established the first-ever Scientist and Engineer Functional Manager
within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Science, Technology, and Engineering) to oversee the health and
development of the workforce. In addition, we have established several
military and civilian recruitment, retention, and bonus programs to
address critical career field needs. An example of one recent success
story is that a large percentage of military scientists and engineers
have accepted the Critical Skills Retention Bonus.
In March 2002, the transformation of the entire DOD civilian
personnel community was initiated as the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) directed the establishment of the DOD Human
Resources Best Practices Task Force. The Task Force, consisting of
representatives from both the human resources community and the
functional community, including Air Force and defense laboratory
representatives, reviewed initiatives that had been subject to testing
and evaluation in our personnel demonstration projects. After careful
consideration of the ``best practices,'' they developed a personnel
system to best meet the needs of the Department, the National Security
Personnel System.

29. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what new authorities, if any, do your lab directors
need to face this crisis?
Secretary White. The labs continue to require authorities to hire
top talent at market rates, in some cases well above current Senior
Executive Service pay scales. In addition, they also should have
authorities to more easily remove employees at the bottom of the
performance scale, allowing the labs to raise the ``quality bar.''
These two authorities are the most critical for improving the quality
of the workforce.
Secretary Johnson. Enactment of the House-passed version of the
National Security Personnel System in H.R. 1588 is critical to
obtaining the widest possible flexibilities to enable the labs and
centers to recruit and retain the best and brightest.
Secretary Roche. For the Air Force to move forward in the coming
century, we need the ability to use all the flexibilities proposed in
the Best Practices demonstration project, not only for the laboratory
workforce, but across all Air Force functions. In addition, The Air
Force Research Laboratory Commander needs the authority to implement
the flexibilities contained within Best Practices to meet mission and
workforce demands and to adequately address the Air Force scientist and
engineer workforce crisis.

STANDOFF CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE DETECTION

30. Senator Levin. Secretary Johnson, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole
demonstrated a significant force protection vulnerability. Since the
October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, what technological advances
have been made to help prevent a repeat of this tragic event?
Secretary Johnson. The Office of Naval Research has developed
several technologies to help provide force protection to U.S. ships
including:

Flare launcher on a .50 Caliber machine gun mount to
send warning shots at small boats;
Running Gear Entanglement System to provide a 100m
perimeter around a ship at anchor;
Rapidly developed empirically validated models
demonstrate new solutions for ship survivability. Model shows
that use of stainless steel for hull material helps to reduce
blast penetration;
360 degree periscope and related software;
Microwave powered warning system which deters
intruders by heating their skin; and
Nuclear Quadrapole Resonance System for the detection
of bulk explosives (RDX, PETN) in packages, mail pouches, or on
personnel (manual scanning).

31. Senator Levin. Secretary Johnson, specifically, what
investments has the Navy made to improve our ability to detect
conventional explosives (not WMD) from standoff ranges?
Secretary Johnson. This is a challenging problem for which no good
technical solution has yet been identified. ONR hosted a conference on
standoff detection of conventional explosives that concluded that no
stand-off (defined as >1Km) off-the-shelf detection technologies could
be exploited within the next 18 months.
Planning for technology investment in this area is underway. ONR is
collaborating with Air Force, Army, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal,
and NAVSEA Indian Head experts (both government and contractor) to
identify and exploit emerging technologies that may potentially be
stand-off quality detectors. Additional proposals are being continually
received and reviewed for merit. Much work is underway in detectors
suitable for shorter range, including joint Navy/DARPA work in the
nuclear quadruple resonance technology especially in combination with
other standard techniques.

army research, development, and engineering command
32. Senator Levin. Secretary White, the Army has begun to standup a
Research, Development, and Engineering Command that will absorb the
existing labs and research organizations (such as TARDEC) that
currently are aligned with Army Major Commands (such as TACOM). How
will this reorganization affect the reporting chains, mission, and
funding levels at these organizations?
Secretary White. Overall funding levels will not be affected by the
reorganization. The Research, Development, and Engineering Command
Center Directors will report to the Commander, Research, Development,
and Engineering Command. The commanders of the Tank and Automotive
Command, Communications and Electronics Command, and Aviation and
Missile Command continue to report to the Commander, Army Materiel
Command.

33. Senator Levin. Secretary White, will there be any net loss of
personnel from the affected organizations?
Secretary White. The realignments within the affected organizations
will be done without any net loss of personnel.

34. Senator Levin. Secretary White, why is this reorganization a
positive step, when it would seem to create a wider gulf between the
technology developers and the organizations that typically make use of
their innovations and products?
Secretary White. Research, Development, and Engineering Command
will establish synergy across the laboratories to speed technology
transition to the developing and buying organizations--program
executive offices. Each program executive office will have a senior
official responsible to ensure the technologies developed in the labs
are satisfying essential warfighting needs. The Research, Development,
and Engineering Command Agile Development Center's scientists and
engineers will work directly with the combatant commands to establish a
``reach-back link'' to Army Materiel Command laboratory capabilities.

HIGH ENERGY LASER PROGRAMS

35. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, the OSD has proposed devolving
all high energy laser S&T programs to the Air Force. This program was
established by statute as a joint program, with OSD management. There
is great concern that the joint program that has been established will
be subsumed by Air Force interests in high energy lasers. Will the Air
Force be requesting a change in statute to support and legalize the
devolvement?
Secretary Roche. The devolvement of programs to the Air Force was
initiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force has
no plans at this time to request a change in statute, but we are
working to ensure that the programs transferred to the Air Force
continue to advocate the broader multiple military objectives inherent
in these programs. We are currently developing a Memorandum of
Agreement between the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and
Technology) (DUSD (S&T)) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Science, Technology, and Engineering) on management of the High
Energy Laser Joint Technology Office. We plan to have DUSD (S&T)
continue to function as the Senior Civilian Official and as Chair of
the Technology Council in accordance with the current statute.

36. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, how will the Air Force retain
the joint nature of the program as intended by Congress?
Secretary Roche. The Air Force does not plan to make any changes to
the High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office (JTO) process beyond that
required by changes in the funding source. Representatives from the
other Services and defense agencies will still participate in the JTO.
Proposals will continue to be solicited from them, as well as from
industry and academia as before, and these proposals will continue to
be evaluated by the same joint structure. The Air Force will not
increase its participation in the JTO or in the various working groups
that support the JTO. The Technology Council, chaired by the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology) and comprised of
the Service and Defense Agency Science and Technology Executives, will
continue to be the principal oversight body. The JTO will not be a part
of the Directed Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research
Laboratory, but will continue as a separate organization. The JTO
Director will report to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Science, Technology, and Engineering).

37. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, how will the Air Force ensure
that the programs continue to be funded at a sufficient level in future
years given growing budget constraints?
Secretary Roche. The three High Energy Laser JTO program elements
were devolved to the Air Force along with out-year funding. These
programs will be protected as much as possible from future budget
reductions. It is our plan at this time to use the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology) Technology Council to
address appropriate funding levels for this program.

38. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, is there any OSD guidance on
the appropriate level of funding for these programs?
Secretary Roche. The Air Force has not received any guidance from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the appropriate
level of funding for these programs.

DEVOLVEMENT

39. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, a number of S&T programs have been devolved to the
Services from the OSD. There has been guidance from OSD regarding
funding levels for these programs (including the JTO High Energy
Lasers, High Performance Computing Modernization Program, and others)
during the FYDP. There is concern that, if the Services are faced with
resource shortfalls due to current operations or other expenses, these
programs may become targets for reprogramming and could be used as
sources of funding for other Service priorities. Is there any guidance
from OSD on protecting devolved programs from reprogramming actions?
Secretary White. The devolved OSD programs have been assigned new
program elements, which allow OSD and Congress to track the funding
levels of these efforts.
Secretary Johnson. There is no such guidance. For the devolved
programs, OSD guidance did note that consistent with oversight
responsibilities, appropriate OSD staff will review execution plans and
metrics prior to the start of each fiscal year, and at mid-year to
determine future allocations.
The following funded requirements were devolved from OSD to Navy
S&T during the fiscal year 2004 budget development cycle:

[In millions
of dollars]

University Research Initiatives 70.7
In-House Laboratory Independent Research 2.1

Although special protection has not been assigned to these
programs, Navy will execute these programs in accordance with R-2
budget justification exhibits which support the fiscal year 2004
President's budget request. These programs did receive proportionate
reductions (approximately -2.0 percent) without prejudice during the
Navy fiscal year 2004 budget development cycle; these cuts are
reflected in the President's budget request.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force has not received any guidance from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to protecting
devolved programs from reprogramming actions.

40. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, will you ensure that these programs are protected to
preserve OSD and congressional intent with regards to the investment
levels in these critical research and technology areas?
Secretary White. Yes. We have no plans to change either the intent
or investment levels in these programs.
Secretary Johnson. The following funded requirements were devolved
from OSD to Navy S&T during the fiscal year 2004 budget development
cycle:

[[In millions
of dollars]

University Research Initiatives 70.7
In-House Laboratory Independent Research 2.1

Although special protection has not been assigned to these
programs, Navy will execute these programs in accordance with R-2
budget justification exhibits, which support the fiscal year 2004
President's budget request. These programs did receive proportionate
reductions (approximately -2.0 percent) without prejudice during the
Navy fiscal year 2004 budget development cycle; these cuts are
reflected in the President's budget request.
It is noted that OSD continues to maintain joint oversight for
these programs, before and after the fiscal year 2004 devolvement.
Secretary Roche. The In-House Laboratory Independent Research, High
Energy Laser, and High Performance Computing Modernization programs
devolved to the Air Force by the OSD were devolved along with out-year
funding. These programs will be protected as much as possible from
future budget reductions. It is our plan at this time to work with OSD
to address appropriate funding levels for these programs.

COORDINATION WITH DARPA

41. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, the DARPA now executes over 25 percent of the total
DOD S&T budget. How do you work with DARPA to ensure that they support
your mission areas and complement your S&T programs?
Secretary White. The Army looks to DARPA to invest in high-risk,
high-payoff technologies that might give us significant increases in
future warfighting capabilities. Through the years, there have been
many instances of the Army transitioning technologies, components, and
systems from DARPA that support Army mission areas. Frequently,
however, these transitions were not smooth.
The FCS program was conceived with a number of important goals. One
was to use DARPA's innovative thinking and procurement strategies to
help the Army transform on a very rapid timeline. Another was to lay a
foundation for achieving smoother, faster transitions of technologies
from DARPA to the Army. We believe that the key to achieving both of
these goals was establishing a partnership early in the research and
development cycle.
The Army/DARPA FCS memorandum of agreement (MOA) established a
partnership that has served us well over the past 3 years. We have
achieved the key program objectives in support of the FCS Milestone B
decision and the products of this partnership will be seen in FCS
Increment I. We are now in the process of negotiating a new FCS MOA
with DARPA for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006, focusing on
selected enabling technologies that will continue to increase the
capabilities of FCS and the Objective Force through the spiral
development process.
The Army continues to cultivate its relationship with DARPA and
partner with them to achieve unprecedented leaps in areas beyond ground
combat. We are pursuing breakthroughs in unmanned aviation through an
established partnership on the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft program
and a proposed partnership on the A-160 Hummingbird. Based on our
successes with FCS, I am confident we will continue using this approach
for future programs that require risk-taking, innovative approaches.
Secretary Johnson. Our investment portfolios are not built in
isolation. The defense reliance process integrates the Services' S&T
programs while preserving the healthy diversity of vision and approach
that has given us the technical agility we enjoy today. Our relations
with DARPA are excellent and productive. Much of the Office of Naval
Research's basic and applied research investment is designed with a
view to handing scientific advances over to DARPA for further
development and exploitation. The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program
is an excellent example of this kind of collaboration. We are working
closely with DARPA on wide band gap semiconductors to support the
radar, communications, and electronic warfare systems of the future,
including the advanced multifunction radio frequency concept.
Secretary Roche. The relationship between the Air Force and DARPA
continues to be strong with the Air Force acting as agents for a number
of DARPA technology programs. This relationship helps focus both the
Air Force and DARPA on technologies that provide future capabilities
that are relevant to the warfighter. In addition to executing DARPA
technology programs, the Air Force participates in the defense reliance
process to coordinate those programs that are of mutual interest, but
not ones that we are executing for DARPA. DARPA technology investments
are important to the Air Force and we strive to maintain cognizance of
their research programs to harmonize efforts and eliminate duplication.

42. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, are there specific technology development goals
supporting mission areas in your Service in which DARPA could play a
larger role?
Secretary White. The new FCS MOA for future Army/DARPA
collaboration will be finalized after the FCS Milestone B decision in
May 2003. At that time, the Army and DARPA will assess capability gaps
between FCS Increment I and objective capabilities where new
technologies can offer a solution. From that set, we will determine the
best mix of technology investments in which the Army should lead and
those in which a partnership with DARPA makes the most business sense.
In laying the groundwork for the new MOA, we already have
identified three key areas where we believe DARPA can help the Army.
They are (1) find the enemy, (2) autonomy with intent, and (3)
affordable survivability.
``Find the Enemy'' seeks to provide technologies to defeat
camouflage, concealment, and deception and to exploit situational
awareness through improved sensors, assured communications, intelligent
decision aids, and data fusion.
``Autonomy with Intent'' focuses on improving the ability of
unmanned systems to function while minimizing soldier workload and
required attention/interaction.
``Affordable Combat Identification'' aims to increase force
survivability by improving identification of battlefield entities for
intermingled forces in high OPTEMPO operations in complex terrains
using cost-effective approaches.
Each of these areas presents real technical challenges that will
require extremely innovative thinking and the ability to invest
significant resources to demonstrate viable solutions. All are
important today and will be even more important in the future Objective
Force.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy has been working closely with DARPA to
coordinate S&T efforts. There are numerous areas where S&T Program
Officers wear both ONR and DARPA hats thus leading to highly leveraged
cooperative efforts. Wide band gap semiconductor developments that
enable the advanced multi-function radio frequency system for Navy
ships is a good example.
DARPA and ONR work together to identify DARPA programs and projects
that have high applicability to naval requirements and utilize ONR's
Future Naval Capabilities program to enable transition. Besides
identifying DARPA programs with Navy interest, ONR technologies
addressing DARPA development needs, such as small atomic clocks, make
DARPA's efforts more likely to succeed. Recently, DARPA has initiated a
Service Day activity, inviting S&T, requirements, and acquisition
members of the Services to briefings on their programs in order to get
better exposure of their efforts. The first Navy-DARPA Service Day will
be conducted in early May 2003 in the areas of electronic warfare,
communications, and information assurance.
Secretary Roche. The most important area in which DARPA could
increase their technology development efforts is in space access and
other space-related efforts. We have seen indications that they are
already planning for a larger space technology investment and we
certainly encourage this. Another area of particular interest to the
Air Force is information technology. DARPA already has a robust
investment in this area, which the Air Force would like to see
continued and, perhaps, even increased.

FOREIGN STUDENT INVOLVEMENT IN DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH

43. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what policies and directives currently control the
participation of foreign students in Service-funded research programs?
Secretary White. The Army requires contractors performing basic
research to abide by Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324a, which
makes it unlawful to employ unauthorized aliens and sets forth the
requirements for documenting and attesting that aliens are not
unauthorized, as well as 8 Code of Federal Regulations 274a(2), which
sets forth the process for the verification of employment eligibility
of aliens. As long as the contractor or university complies with the
United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations alien employment
requirements, and the foreign student is eligible for employment, there
are no restrictions on their working on unclassified basic research.
Additionally, we comply with the Department of Defense grants and
agreements regulations. All Army basic research is unclassified and is
generally published in peer reviewed, open literature.
Secretary Johnson. Generally, student participation in a Service-
funded research program occurs at an institution of higher education
(IHE); the IHE receives an award from the Service to conduct research
(typically a grant) and then chooses which students participate in the
research. Student participation is generally not limited by citizenship
unless a security clearance is required for the uncommon instance of a
classified research program at an IHE.
Some students participate in research at Service laboratories via
various intern/summer programs. Security clearance requirements
generally limit participation in these programs to citizens or, in some
cases, permanent residents.
Small Business Administration policy governs acceptance and
prohibition on issues such as these. If the individual has a ``green
card'' or is a legal resident, he/she is permitted to work on an Small
Business Innovation Research project.
Secretary Roche. The baseline document that the Air Force uses to
provide policy and direction for foreign students in funded research
programs is the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-189,
entitled ``National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and
Engineering Information.'' This directive establishes national policy
for controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering
information produced in conjunction with federally-funded fundamental
research at colleges, universities, and laboratories. Basically, the
NSDD-189 policy, to the maximum extent possible, is that the products
of fundamental research remain unrestricted. If it is determined prior
to conducting the research that there will likely be national security
issues involved, the mechanism to control information will be by
classification. Fundamentally, no restrictions may be placed upon the
conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has
not received national security classification, except as provided in
applicable U.S. statutes. It is important to point out that NSDD-189
applies to all students, including foreign students, involved in
federally-funded fundamental research.

44. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, how do you work to ensure that these programs are
consistently applied across your Service?
Secretary White. There are no restrictions on foreign students
working on unclassified basic research sponsored at universities.
Secretary Johnson. Each Institution of Higher Education (IHE) that
performs Service funded research is responsible for choosing the
students that participate in said research under the award (i.e.
grant), as long as the IHE meets all provisions of the award
requirements. In most cases, student participation is not limited by
citizenship, unless a security clearance is required; however, it is
uncommon for an IHE to perform on a classified research program.
Students also participate in research at Service laboratories via
various intern/summer programs; however, security clearance
requirements generally limit participation in these programs to
citizens or, in some cases, permanent residents.
In the case of work performed at IHEs, laboratories, etc., it is
generally considered to be the purview of the performing organization
to assure that its policies and practices comply with applicable laws
and regulations (including those regarding intellectual property and
export control).
Secretary Roche. To ensure our foreign student involvement programs
are consistent across our laboratory, the Air Force relies on our
Scientific and Technical Information Program and on our classification
program managers to determine if federally-funded work is sensitive and
should be appropriately controlled by national security guidelines. If
foreign students are involved in research programs, the baseline for
determining if fundamental research needs to be controlled for national
security reasons is the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-
189, entitled ``National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific,
Technical and Engineering Information.'' This directive establishes
national policy for controlling the flow of science, technology, and
engineering information produced in conjunction with federally-funded
fundamental research at colleges, universities, and laboratories.

PUBLICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH

45. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what policies and directives currently control the
classification, publication in literature, and presentation in
scientific conferences of Service-funded research programs?
Secretary White. National Security Decision Directive 189 defines
policy for publication of federally-funded research results. Under this
policy, no restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of
federally-funded fundamental research that has been determined to be
unclassified. The challenge is in maintaining a process that identifies
when and if unclassified information becomes classified.
National security statutes require periodic reviews throughout the
research process to reaffirm the classification of ongoing research.
The mechanism for safeguarding this information is through
classification. Army Regulation 380-5 (Information Security) provides
policies, procedures, and criteria for the security classification of
Army information. Additionally, Army Regulation 380-381 (Special Access
Programs) provides policies, procedures, and criteria for safeguarding
and protecting Army Special Access Programs. Army Regulation 360-1 (The
Army Public Affairs Program) provides similar policies, procedures, and
criteria for the release of unclassified Army information to the
public.
Secretary Johnson. Executive Order (EO) 12958, April 17, 1995,
Classified National Security, prescribes a uniform system for
classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security
information.

One of the classification categories is ``scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the national
security (SEC 1.5).
Basic scientific research information not clearly
related to the national security may not be classified (SEC
1.8b).

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, September 21,
1985, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and
Engineering Information with Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/
Research and Engineering (OUSD/R&E) Memo, October 1, 1984, Publication
of the Results of DOD Sponsored Fundamental Research.

This directive establishes national policy for
controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering
information produced in federally-funded fundamental research
at colleges, universities, and laboratories. Fundamental
research is defined as follows:

``Fundamental research'' means basic and applied research in
science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are
published and shared broadly within the scientific community,
as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial
development, design, production, and product utilization, the
results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or
national security reasons.

To the maximum extent possible, the products of
fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy
of this administration that, where the national security
requires control, the mechanism for control of information
generated during federally-funded fundamental research in
science, technology, and engineering at colleges, universities,
and laboratories is classification. Each Federal Government
agency is responsible for: (a) determining whether
classification is appropriate prior to the award of a research
grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if so,
controlling the research results through standard
classification procedures; and (b) periodically reviewing all
research grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements for
potential classification. No restriction may be placed upon the
conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundament research
that has not received national security classification, except
as provided in applicable U.S. statutes.

Other Directives
DOD 5200.1-R, Jan 1997, Information Security Program Regulation
SECNAVINST 5510.36, 17 Mar 1999, Department of the Navy (DON)
Information Security Program (ISP) Regulation
DOD Instruction 5230.29, 6 May 1996, Security and Policy Review of
DOD Information for Public Release
DOD Instruction 3200.14, 13 May 1997, Principles and Operational
Parameters of the DOD Scientific and Technical Information Program
DOD Directive 3200.12, 15 Feb 1983, DOD Scientific and Technical
Information Program
SECNAVINST 3900.43A, 20 Jul 1994, Navy Scientific and Technical
Information Program (STIP)
DOD Directive 5230.24, 18 Mar 1987, Distribution Statements on
Technical Documents
ONRINST 5570.1, 1 Dec 1986, Distribution Statements on Technical
Documents
DOD Directive 5230.25, 6 Nov 1984, Withholding of Unclassified
Technical Data From Public Disclosure [applies to all unclassified
technical data with military or space applications which may not be
exported limited to critical technology with military or space
applications]
OPNAVINST 5510.161, 29 Jul 1985, Withholding of Unclassified
Technical Data from Public Disclosure
ONRINST 5570.2, 1 Dec 1986, Processing of Unclassified Technical
Information
DOD Instruction 5230.27, 6 Oct 1987, Presentation of DOD-Related
Scientific and Technical Papers at Meetings
Militarily Critical Technologies List, June 1996, with updates
EO 12829, 6 Jan 1993, National Industrial Security Program (NISP)
Additional DOD/DON directives exist that contain restrictions on
release of information relating to specific programs, such as Sensitive
Compartmented Information and others, but these are usually classified
programs not considered fundamental research.
Other directives deal with specific procedures to accomplish
review, if needed.
Secretary Roche. I can only speak for Air Force research programs.
Fundamental Executive Branch policy is documented in National Security
Decision Directive 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific,
Technical, and Engineering Information, approved by President Reagan.
This Directive states that, ``to the maximum extent possible, the
products of fundamental research [are to] remain unrestricted.''
Classification of all Air Force information is governed by
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, as
amended. This order specifies that information may only be classified
if an original classification authority determines that its
unauthorized disclosure would cause damage to the national security
that the classification authority can identify or describe. Information
properly classified may only be presented in forums where personnel
present have a security clearance and a need-to-know. In addition, some
scientific and technical information may be unclassified, but
sensitive, and require controls under the Arms Export Control Act, the
Export Administration Act, or other statutes. This information could
not be presented in open forums, but could be presented in forums where
personnel present have a need-to-know, but not necessarily a security
clearance. Any scientific and technical information proposed for
presentation in any open forum is required to undergo a security review
in accordance with Air Force Instruction 35-101, Public Affairs
Policies and Procedures.

46. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, do these provide standard exceptions for fundamental
research?
Secretary White. Army activities, including the Army Research
Laboratory, have incorporated clauses in the terms and conditions of
research contracts when the area of research either may have potential
defense applications or contain sensitive material. In these cases, the
clause calls for review of the research results and papers prior to
publication in the open literature. However, some universities have
rejected contracts with prepublication review clauses.
Secretary Johnson. Yes. Executive Order (EO) 12958 states that
``Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the
national security may not be classified.''
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 establishes policy
that products of fundamental research remain unrestricted, except where
classification is warranted.
DOD Instruction 5230.27 reiterates the policy in EO 12958 and NSDD
189 and is carried down to various DON directives.
Secretary Roche. Yes, basic research is normally conducted,
presented, and published in the public domain. As research is focused
on military or scientific applications, it increases in sensitivity and
access becomes more restricted. The only situations where basic
research might be restricted or classified are if they involved a
scientific breakthrough that had national security implications.

47. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, how do you work to ensure that these programs are
consistently applied across your Service?
Secretary White. By following the adequate and comprehensive
National Security, DOD, and Army policies and procedures described
above.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy follows Department of Defense and
Department of the Navy directives. At the Office of Naval Research,
program officers and program managers are responsible for determining
that classified access is not required and that all information can be
released to the public before awarding a grant as fundamental research.
Secretary Roche. We have established formal review procedures
through our Office of Public Affairs to review any data for release
into the public domain. We also have formally designated those
individuals having Original Classification Authority within the Air
Force and require them to receive training prior to assuming those
duties. We have formal mechanisms such as mandatory declassification
reviews and annual security reviews to monitor our information security
program to ensure information is properly classified and adequately
protected. The Air Force Inspector General's office can review programs
as needed.
It is both prudent and cost effective to share data on basic
research with the scientific community to globally conserve resources
and cooperate in determining which approaches have promise and which
have already proved worthless. There is no logic to restrict basic
research. However, in transitioning from basic research to applied
research, we must determine which basic research efforts have promising
military applications that should be exploited. We rely on our
technical directors in our laboratories to monitor their research
programs and make informed judgments on when it is appropriate to begin
to restrict access to information for national security reasons.

PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING FOR TRANSITION

48. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, a major concern of DOD and Congress is the rapid and
efficient transition of technologies from the S&T community to the
warfighter. A common problem in this process is the reluctance of
acquisition programs to commit out-year funding to transition or accept
the anticipated products of current S&T programs, for fear of ``losing
the money'' if the relatively high-risk S&T programs fail for technical
reasons. This fear limits program managers' ability to take on risk in
their program. How are you working to encourage program managers to
take on more risk in their programs in order to accelerate Service
transformation?
Secretary White. The new DOD 5000 Defense Acquisition Framework
provides Army program managers with a flexible process that encourages
the insertion of new technologies at any point along the acquisition
process to maintain technological superiority to the warfighter, while
keeping program risk at an acceptable level. Key to this framework is
the concept of evolutionary acquisition where capabilities are improved
through time-phased requirements. The focus is on maturing and
demonstrating technologies in a relevant environment before inserting
the technology into actual systems to reduce life cycle cost and cycle
time, while keeping overall risk to programs at a manageable level.
The primary tool for communicating technology maturity to the
program managers is through Technology Readiness Assessments (TRAs).
TRAs are periodically conducted to measure the maturity of developing
technologies to ensure they are sufficiently mature before being
integrated into systems being developed by program managers. One of the
end results of a TRA is the assignment of a Technology Readiness Level
(TRL 1 through 9) for the technology being assessed. In general, the
Army's position is that technologies are mature enough to transition
once they have achieved TRL 6, or where systems have been demonstrated
in a relevant environment. If a technology is rated less than a TRL 6,
further development and risk reduction work is encouraged with a plan
to include the new capability during the next increment or block
upgrade of a weapons system.
This new framework encourages the program managers to accept a
manageable level of risk while attempting to transition ``high-risk''
S&T programs into weapon systems. The framework allows for technology
insertion by a program manager at any point along a program's life
cycle to take advantage of rapidly maturing technologies and ensures
technological superiority to the warfighter is maintained.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy research and development community is
working together to speed the transition of science and technology into
the acquisition community. There are two major initiatives underway to
reduce the risk of technology transition: the FNC process and the
Commercial Technology Transition Office (CTTO).
Future Naval Capabilities (FNC)
FNCs are programs to shape the next Navy and Marine Corps.
Developed and managed by integrated product teams with members of the
acquisition, requirements, S&T, resource, and warfighter requirements
communities, the FNC fill the gap that all too often opens between the
S&T community and the acquisition commands.
The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program
managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
process improvements. With a total investment of $578 million in fiscal
year 2002, over $640 million in fiscal year 2003 and $500 million
planned for fiscal year 2004, FNCs support the Secretary of the Navy's
goals to: (1) increase combat capability, (2) enhance personnel
performance, (3) introduce advanced technology, and (4) improve
business practices.
The FNC process is already delivering products to the acquisition
community. The Autonomous Operations FNC program is pursuing a dramatic
increase in the performance and affordability of naval air, surface,
ground, and underwater autonomous vehicles-unmanned systems able to
operate with a minimum of human intervention and oversight. The
Autonomous Operations FNC gives us a great potential to operate
effectively in what would otherwise be denied areas and supports Sea
Shield and Sea Strike.
In fiscal year 2004, for example, we will transition the Gladiator
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle to the Marine Corps. Gladiator is
intended to support dismounted infantry across the spectrum of conflict
and throughout the range of military operations. It will enhance the
tactical commanders' ability to detect, identify, locate, or neutralize
a broad range of threats.
A great deal of our transformational effort is lodged in the FNCs.
The key to successful transformation is the strong business partnership
among scientists, industry, requirements, acquisition, and warfighters.
Commercial Technology Transition Office (CTTO)
To help enable the transition of technology into naval acquisition
programs, the CTTO is staffed with personnel with business skills as
well as technical expertise, who are able to communicate effectively
with acquisition professionals and empowered to negotiate with them.
For the Department of the Navy, this role will be filled by the
Commercial Technology Transition Office at the Office of Naval
Research, which is explicitly dedicated to transitioning technologies
into acquisition programs, works under the aegis of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)
(ASN(RD&A)) and coordinates closely with the newly-created Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, Technology and
Engineering) (DASN(RDT&E)). By carefully matching mature technologies
to specific needs, the CTTO has already concluded 20 technology
insertion agreements with senior acquisition managers and has earned
their trust.
Beginning in fiscal year 2004, the new Rapid Technology Transition
Program Element, PE 0203761N, has been requested to fund the activities
of the CTTO. This program element will provide the seed funding needed
to get a fast start on technology insertion projects, including a
number of candidates already in the pipeline. The CTTO plans to follow
through on leads generated in the dialogue with venture capitalists to
add to the pipeline of candidate insertion agreements.
Secretary Roche. One way of rapidly transitioning technology to the
warfighter and accelerating transformation is through the Air Force
Applied Technology Councils (ATCs) and the Advanced Technology
Demonstrations (ATDs). The councils are composed of two- and three-star
generals from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), our logistic
centers, our acquisition product centers, and our major user commands
who formally prioritize ATD programs. We hold an ATC meeting with each
Major Command twice a year and have commissioned 34 ATDs that have
transition funding. The ATC process is extremely important in linking
the S&T program to the system developers, the logisticians, and the
operational users. This process facilitates technology transition to
operational use and secures user commitment for resources to do systems
design and development and fielding of the technology.

49. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, how can you protect the funding of programs that are
attempting to plan and program assuming the success of current S&T
programs in the event of technical delays?
Secretary White. Programs that are dependent on success of S&T
programs ``protect'' their funding by minimizing the risk of the S&T
program to their overall program. Risk is minimized a couple of
different ways. Program managers utilize evolutionary or spiral
development to allow open architecture within their hardware design so
that if the S&T program is not successful, they can replace that
component with proven technology. This still allows the program manager
to integrate the new technology when it becomes mature.
In addition, the TRAs are designed to minimize program risk of
incorporating new technology, and the evolutionary/spiral development
open architecture design process allows for programs to continue
forward using proven technology in lieu of new technology that may have
been delayed due to unsuccessful S&T efforts. Combined, these practices
are designed to help protect funding of programs planning on the
success of S&T programs.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy S&T community is actively and
cooperatively working with the acquisition community to speed and
ensure the efficient transition of S&T products into the fleet. In
order to reduce the inherent risks of any technology transition of S&T
products to the acquisition community, the ONR, in 1999, implemented a
new initiative called the FNC process.
The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program
managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
process improvements. With a total investment of $578 million in fiscal
year 2002, over $640 million in fiscal year 2003 and $500 million
planned for fiscal year 2004, FNCs support the Navy's goals to: (1)
increase combat capability, (2) enhance personnel performance, (3)
introduce advanced technology, and (4) improve business practices.
The 12 FNCs concentrate scientific, technologic, and funding
resources to deliver specific programs and products to the acquisition
commands on mutually agreed upon schedules. Developed and managed by
Integrated Product Teams (IPT), consisting of members of the
acquisition, requirements, S&T, resource, and above all, warfighter
communities, the FNCs bridge the technological gap that often develops
between the S&T community and the acquisition commands. Through a
consensus- based approach, the IPT provides critical transition-focused
management oversight of all S&T products. Each S&T product is required
to have a Technology Transition Agreement (TTA). The TTA serves as the
contract between the S&T and acquisition communities and provides all
product and transition-relevant information. This includes a
description of the product to be delivered, the identification of exit
criteria (key technical/performance parameters), target acquisition
platform/program, requirements, resource, and demonstration information
as well as an assessment of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the
product at the time of transition. The TTA are signed by the S&T,
acquisition and resource/requirements sponsors, thus eliminating any
potential ambiguity.
Additionally, S&T managers sponsor product-specific ``industry
days'' to solicit input from potential industrial performers regarding
technological development strategies and associated manufacturing
issues. This systematic approach of integrating key stakeholder
opinions and perspectives serves to reduce the overall risk associated
with the successful technological development and subsequent
integration of an S&T product into an acquisition program.
A key component of the IPT-led FNC process is the formal commitment
of the acquisition community to accept the technologically-ready FNC
products and commit funds to transition them. For example, the Organic
Mine Countermeasures (OMCM) FNC is working to provide our forces with
an organic--that is to say, an inherentability to detect, characterize,
and neutralize mines, wherever they may be encountered. Closely aligned
with the tenets of Sea Shield, the OMCM FNC has recently transitioned
several important products. One of them, the REMUS autonomous
underwater vehicle, is currently supporting our operating forces as
they search for mines in Operation Iraqi Freedom. REMUS was also used
in the weeks immediately following September 11 to help secure our
domestic ports. REMUS has emerged from a basic oceanographic research
program and successfully transitioned to our Special Operations Forces.
The overall FNC process is managed through ONR and the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RDT&E and is overseen by the
Department of the Navy S&T Corporate Board, a four-star level group
consisting of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research Development and Acquisition. As the FNC approval
authority, the Corporate Board serves to provide the macro-level
investment balance of the Navy's S&T portfolio.
Secretary Roche. Our ATC process facilitates technology transition
to operational use and secures user commitment for resources to do
systems design and development and fielding of the technology. In this
way, we ``protect'' funding for our ATDs. In addition, we review these
ATDs several times during their existence to ensure the technology is
maturing as expected. If delays are encountered, all appropriate
leadership is informed at that time during the ATC.

UNFUNDED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

50. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, please provide a prioritized list of unfunded S&T
projects that the committee can utilize in its consideration of the
fiscal year 2004 budget request.
Secretary White. The Army's unfunded priorities provided to
Congress included two S&T efforts that we were unable to fully fund in
the fiscal year 2004 budget: $28 million for FCS Manufacturing
Technology (ManTech) and $12 million for the Future Tactical Truck
System (FTTS). The ManTech funding would provide technology solutions
to avoid costs in developing munitions and sensors critical to FCS.
These include micro electro-mechanical systems for safe and arm
functionality, reducing the size and increasing performance of inertial
measurement units in munitions, and uncooled infrared sensors for
target detection and identification.
The FTTS S&T program is a new effort pursuing technologies for next
generation medium and heavy tactical cargo vehicles. The primary goals
of the FTTS program are to determine the tactical efficiencies of a
hybrid-electric vehicle to reduce logistics demands and increase
mobility and survivability by adding technologies such as enhanced
situational awareness and add-on armors. The FTTS funding would provide
embedded prognostics and intelligent load handling, a vehicle/load
alignment system, and a smart load conforming tie-down system.
Secretary Johnson. In building the fiscal year 2004 President's
budget request, the Department had many competing priorities. I feel
that the request reflects the best balance of resources to accomplish
the mission of the Department. While the list of efforts below would
expand the scope of our S&T request, they need to be considered in the
overall context of Navy and Marine Corps unfunded priorities. Unfunded
priorities have been provided to various committees by way of a joint
CNO/CMC letter.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Title Year Comments
2004 $
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Based Weapons............... 61.00 Accelerated research and
development of the
electrical components,
electrical control
systems and material
technologies needed to
support electric
weapons deployment is a
very high risk,
extremely high payoff
investment area.
However, significant
investments in these
areas will provide a
revolution in Naval
Fires, Time Critical
Strike, and Platform
Self-Defense while
significantly reducing
the logistics footprint
required to support
this mission area.
Products include
Electromagnetic Gun
Naval Fires, advanced
directed energy self-
defense weapons, and
Free Electron Laser
100KW demonstration.
CVN-21/Advanced 49.00 Accelerated research and
Capability Ship...................... development of the
electrical components,
electrical control
systems and material
technologies needed to
support significant
expansion of electric
power systems and
reduction of high
maintenance fluid
systems is a complex
high risk, high payoff
investment area.
However, significant
investments in these
areas will ``unlock''
the significant amount
of propulsion power for
enhanced warfighting
capability, such as
higher sortie rates,
increased striking
capability, and
improved self-defense
while significantly
reducing system
maintenance and
logistics footprint
required to support
these platforms.
FORCENET............................. 45.00 Develop and demonstrate
a shipboard ADM of an
Advanced Multifunction
RF System (AMRF-C) that
will encompass current,
planned, and future-
growth comms, EW, and
LPI radar functions in
C, X, and Ku Bands for
LCS, DDX subs, and
CVN21. Demonstrate wide-
and narrow-band anti-
jam (AJ) waveforms, a
wideband AJ high
altitude UAV comms and
network package, and a
narrowband AJ/LPI/LPD
comms and network
package (JTRS)
necessary for planned
and future FORCENET
use. Develop
technologies and
architectures to
support high data rate,
uninterruptible network
to deployed sea base
and forces projected
ashore.
Space S&T............................ 17.10 Provide the next
generation of
technologies to enhance
and transform both
naval and joint
warfighting
capabilities. The
enhancement of space-
based communications,
navigation, ISR, METOC,
and space control all
hinge on the
development of
spacecraft, payloads,
and components which
are more robust,
responsive, covert, and
economical. Examples of
target technologies are
micro-satellites, MEMS,
high bandwidth encoding
techniques, autonomous
operations, etc.
Precision Strike/Solutions 60.10 Provide jam-resistant
to GPS Jamming....................... missile guidance by
ultra-tightly-coupled
GPS/INS system when
stand-alone GPS
receiver is jammed,
thereby circumventing
jammer threats. The
ultra-tightly-coupled
GPS/INS will increase
precision flight time
of weapon to target and
hands off to inertial
navigation to guide the
weapon when jammed for
the last few minutes of
flight. Precision
navigation, guidance,
and control in a GPS
denied environment; Nav
by imagery, low cost
MEMS and laser IMUs and
weapon integrated
precision timekeeping.
Precision target
location sensors across
EM/optical spectrum and
signal/image track
processors both on and
off-board surface, air,
and gun launched
weapons. Network,
computational, and
mission planning
technology for
precision targeting.
Aircraft and weapon
airframe and propulsion
technologies to counter
emerging threat
spectrum.
Littoral ASW (LASW).................. 50.00 Significantly increase
ASW applied research to
provide technology to
meet the 2015 threat.
Develop components of
advanced off-board
distributed systems.
Develop technology for
cross platform sensor
level fusion and
estimating performance
of advanced sensors.
Demonstrate airborne
electromagnetic
detection system for
Multi-Mode Aircraft and
UAVs. Demonstrate wide
area cueing using
advanced electro-optic/
infra-red systems and
high altitude long
endurance UAVs.
Demonstrate components
for transition to light
weight torpedo plan
product improvement
program.
MANTECH.............................. 5.50 Although Navy previously
committed to Congress
to funding the program
at $60 million per
year, PB04 (fiscal year
2004) request is only
$54.5 million.
Academic Research Fleet 80.00 There is a pressing need
Renewal-UNOLS........................ to modernize the
country's aging
Academic Oceanographic
Research Fleet through
an orderly, phased
renewal plan with
construction of four
new Ocean Class ships
and three new Regional
Class ships over the
next 10 years.
Seabasing/STOM....................... 24.00 Logistics planning and
execution from CONUS to
Seabase and Objective.
Develop capabilities to
support Command and
Control on the move
from the Seabase to the
Objective. Naval
Surface Fire Support
improvements in range,
projectiles/fusing,
precision, and volume
of fire. Ammunition
resupply of surface
combatants.
Organic MCM.......................... 6.00 Protective Mining--
Protect sea basing.
Integrated joint
command and control for
multiple, cooperating
unmanned systems.
Provides residual for
LCS.
Mine Countermeasures 30.00 Develop clandestine
Reconnaissance....................... approaches to networked
minehunting using fully
autonomous, cooperative
vehicles with
classification sensors
reporting tactical
control ID indicators.
Develop and demonstrate
mission capability
package for LCS using
coordinated swarms of
autonomous,
interactive, underwater
vehicles engaged in
networked minehunting.
TOTAL 427.70
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secretary Roche. One of the most important efforts currently
ongoing within our S&T program is the work we're doing to enhance the
Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit equipment carried by the Air Force
Special Tactics Controllers who perform operations deep in enemy
territory to help identify who the terrorists are, where their weapons
are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Using very rapid
spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing, production, and
fielding, the Air Force is working to realize significant enhancements
to these kits, while reducing weight and size. The following list is a
representative summary of high priority S&T efforts, including
enhancements to the BAO kit, for which the Air Force could use
additional funding in fiscal year 2004. A more detailed, comprehensive
list has been provided to the Senate Armed Services Professional Staff
as requested.

[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effort Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAO Kit Enhancements........................................ 13.000
Basic Research for Nanosatellites, Space Control, Command 8.000
and Control, and Super Energetic Propellants...............
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 11.800
Automation for Time-Critical Targeting.....................
Joint Battlespace Infosphere................................ 13.900
Electronically Steerable Array and Space-Based Radar On- 10.000
Board Processing...........................................
Advanced Payload--Hard and Deeply Buried Targets............ 3.000
Commanders' Decision Aids for Predictive Battlespace 3.500
Awareness..................................................
Laser Infrared Flyout Experiment Advanced Technology 7.400
Demonstration..............................................
Denied Area Surveillance.................................... 1.000
Airborne Active Denial System Integrated Concept............ 35.860
Force Protection............................................ 3.000
Human Systems Countermeasures to Future Laser Threats....... 3.100
Targets Under Trees......................................... 3.800
Effects-Based Operation..................................... 4.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

51. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche, the Air Force's fiscal year
2004 budget request for depot maintenance is at its lowest level in a
decade. At the same time, the operational tempo of its aircraft is very
high and it appears that it is likely to remain at high levels, if not
grow higher, for the foreseeable future. Why did the Air Force choose
to reduce maintenance funding under the current circumstance?
Secretary Roche. We increased our funding by $226 million from
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004 in the fiscal year 2004
President's budget for depot maintenance. However, our requirements
grew by $486 million for that same period. The increase in funding
applied by the Air Force was quickly absorbed by aging aircraft issues
that are increasing both material consumption and direct labor hours.
For example, the depot work package for KC-135E aircraft has doubled in
the last 10 years, primarily due to aging aircraft issues. One factor
is the corrosion on the engine struts, the point at which the engines
attach to the wing. This corrosion must be repaired now or it will
continue to worsen, become more expensive to repair over time, and
could impact the safety of flight/airworthiness of our KC-135E fleet.
There are numerous examples like this across all our fleets. We faced
tremendous pressure in this budget and took some risk within depot
maintenance, knowing that we will have challenges to work in fiscal
year 2004. We are committed to working those challenges.

52. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche, do you believe these reductions
are consistent with maintaining ready forces in the near- and mid-term?
Secretary Roche. Right now, the Air Force is experiencing its best
readiness posture in years: Aircraft down for spare parts is less than
11 percent--the best it has been since fiscal year 1996.
Cannibalization rates have decreased 26 percent since fiscal year 1997.
Engine readiness is at its highest level since fiscal year 1998. We
have been able to do that with your help and with some help from the
OSD. We know we have challenges in fiscal year 2004 as we try to
maintain our forward progress in improving our readiness posture.
Obviously, we have to look at trade-offs and make tough decisions, but
the impact to readiness will be one of the first questions asked as we
work through those decision sets. We are committed to working through
those challenges and addressing any backlogs in fiscal year 2005.

BASE OPERATING SUPPORT

53. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, the fiscal year 2004 budget request for each of your
Services includes reductions in base operating support. These accounts
fund critical aspects of keeping our military installations running
safely and efficiently. In addition, they frequently serve as
``flexible'' accounts from which money is drawn in the short-term for
ongoing operational demands. Many times, these funds are not fully
replaced by future supplemental allocations. Are you comfortable with
these reductions?
Secretary White. The Army took some risk by funding higher
priorities in force protection and replenishing depleted peacetime
spares inventories to eliminate a significant readiness issue. We will
continue to provide quality services to our soldiers and their families
but in some instances, the quantity of services will be reduced.
Secretary Johnson. From a broad readiness perspective, I expect no
negative impact on shore installation readiness as a result of the
fiscal year 2004 budget request for base operating support. The fiscal
year 2004 budget is aligned with previous years in terms of producing a
constant level of capability. In our effort to reduce support costs, we
are making organizational and process changes in the management and
delivery of installation support. Key to this effort is the
establishment of a single consolidated organization, Commander, Navy
Installations (CNI), whose core mission is management and operation of
shore installations. The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects anticipated
efficiencies, which allow us to produce the same capability at a lower
cost.
Secretary Roche. The reduction in our fiscal year 2004 Base
Operating Support account results from three factors:
(1) A reduction in the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
annual payment. This reduction is based on historical levels paid to
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for financial services.
(2) Rate reductions from the Transportation Working Capital Fund.
Because the Transportation Working Capital Fund posted higher earnings
in fiscal year 2002 during Operation Enduring Freedom, the carryover
results in reduced rates in fiscal year 2004.
(3) Fiscal constraints and the realignment of funding to other Air
Force priorities. While not completely comfortable with these
reductions, the Air Force must balance funding across its full spectrum
of requirements. We have included a $160 million request for base
operating support on the fiscal year 2004 Unfunded Priority List.

54. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what are both the short- and long-term implications of
these decreases, both for morale and for future funding requirements?
Secretary White. The short-term implication will be reduced
services. In the long-term, the Army will need to increase base
operations support to ensure we meet soldiers' needs. Affordability
limits the amount of funding that can be devoted to base operations
support.
Secretary Johnson. I anticipate no long- or short-term implications
for these decreases. While projections of shore installation
requirements show the submitted budget less than 3\1/2\ percent short
of the requirement to sustain current levels of service through fiscal
year 2004, these calculations include assumed efficiency savings which
I believe to be conservative. However, as you know, one of my key
issues is concern for the quality of service for our service men and
women. Therefore, you will see included on CNO's Unfunded Programs
List, an item for an additional $98 million for base operations, to
reduce the risk of not maintaining a constant level of service in
fiscal year 2004, which in turn may affect the quality of service
experienced by our sailors.
Secretary Roche. In the short-term, the fiscal year 2004 base
operating support program decrease will lower the level of services
provided at our installations. Commanders are aware of base operating
support service level reductions and typically take measures to
mitigate morale impacts by allocating available end-of-year funding for
quality-of-life items.
In the long-term, the Air Force will continue to strive to balance
adequate base operating support funding with the need to fund other Air
Force requirements.

EXECUTIVE AGENCY

55. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) recently
stated that his office is conducting a review of whether the Services
should continue to have ``executive agent'' responsibilities for
various DOD functions. What are your views on this subject? What
alternatives to executive agency should be considered?
Secretary White. While I have not seen the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) review you mention, I believe the Services should
continue to have executive agent responsibilities because this
minimizes duplication of Service efforts and resources. I do, however,
have several concerns about executive agent responsibilities. These
responsibilities must be reviewed frequently by the OSD to ensure they
are still appropriately assigned and the Services should be resourced
to accomplish their assigned responsibilities.
DOD is addressing these issues with DOD Directive 5100.88 (DOD
Executive Agent) published on September 3, 2002. While this directive
is still in the process of being fully implemented, it establishes
procedures to address the Army's concern that Services are assigned
executive agent responsibilities, yet not provided the resources to
meet those responsibilities. DOD Directive 5100.88 specifies procedures
to identify funding methods and resource requirements and include them
in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. In the
future, Services will not have to take funds from Service specific
programs to fund their executive agent responsibilities. DOD Directive
5100.88 also instructs the OSD Director of Administration and
Management to maintain, monitor, and revise the list of DOD Executive
Agent designations and make it available to all DOD components.
The Army is not aware of any better alternatives to executive agent
responsibilities and believe that our efforts should focus on fully
implementing Directive 5100.88 to identify executive agent
responsibilities and ensure they are properly resourced.
Secretary Johnson. Navy has Executive Agency of Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM). In light of the ongoing
study underway by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and Joint Staff, the Navy is in a position to evaluate
the alternatives as they are finalized. The current system affords the
opportunity for the Navy and the Combatant Commands to actively engage
in discussion and evaluation of issues in order to gain a general
understanding of the requirements.
Secretary Roche. A fiscal year 2004 Program Decision Memorandum
gave the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in concert with the
Under Secretary of Defense (Programs, Analysis, and Evaluations), and
the Joint Staff, the responsibility for identifying alternatives to
Executive Agency to the Senior Level Review Group (SLRG). The Air Force
has been told the alternatives will range from keeping the current
system to totally replacing it. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
and Joint Staff internal review process is ongoing; the task force is
preparing a briefing for the SLRG but the meeting has not yet been
scheduled.

TRANSITION FUNDING

56. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, as DOD places increasing emphasis on joint
experimentation, some have suggested that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
should be provided with its own funding in order to purchase promising
items quickly and get them directly into the hands of the regional
combatant commanders. In your view, does JFCOM need such an account?
Secretary White. In meeting its responsibilities as the lead Joint
Force Integrator and DOD's executive agent for Joint Warfighting
Experimentation, JFCOM already performs a significant and valuable
function. In this capacity, JFCOM develops future joint warfighting
concepts and validates those with the most promise through joint
experimentation. If the analysis indicates changes in doctrine,
organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities are warranted to enhance joint, multi-national, or
interagency interoperability, JFCOM forwards these through the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Services for implementation.
We have received and acted upon a number of recommendations since
this process began last year, but JFCOM does not have the procurement
processes or the expertise necessary to implement a rapid acquisition
program that would flow from funding as you describe. The Army believes
the Joint community is best served by JFCOM continuing to serve as the
focal point for concept development and experimentation and providing
specific change recommendations to the CJCS and Services through the
JROC. The military departments and Defense agencies already have the
acquisition mechanisms and expertise, with oversight provided by the
JROC and OSD, to rapidly procure and distribute items to the regional
forces assigned to combatant commanders. In addition to the normal
acquisition process, which is currently undergoing significant
improvements and streamlining, we have dramatically improved our rapid
acquisition programs to quickly provide promising and ``off-the-shelf''
products and capabilities to Army forces and combatant commanders.
Secretary Johnson. Draft Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year
2005 proposes the establishment of a Joint Rapid Acquisition Program
(RAP) by USD(AT&L) in coordination with JFCOM to rapidly acquire joint
capabilities for fielding. It further states that Joint RAP ``will
accelerate acquisition by starting development in the fiscal year with
bridge funds that tie the joint acquisition initiatives to the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process.'' The
program is intended to allow the rapid testing and evaluation of
emerging technologies to facilitate transformational initiatives. Since
the existing PPBS processes do not support rapid test, evaluation, and
acquisition, some mechanism will need to be established, and Navy
supports the development of Joint RAP.
Secretary Roche. Joint Forces Command funding authority for rapid
acquisitions carries risk. Experimentation results alone do not provide
the total evaluation required to ensure future interoperability and
sustainability. Title X provides the Secretary of the Air Force with
the responsibility for equipping Air Forces for the combatant
commanders. In close partnership with JFCOM, we can apply Service
acquisition processes to rapidly deliver those capabilities to the
regional combatant commanders and ensure corresponding programming
strategies for sustainment and upgrades.

57. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what would the impact be on your Service and its
support to the regional commanders?
Secretary White. The most significant impact would be on the
oversight provided by the JROC. This body oversees the development and
implementation of warfighting solutions to ensure joint coherency.
Elimination of JROC oversight will increase the challenges associated
with program integration and synchronization of the capabilities
provided to regional combatant commanders. As mission executers,
combatant commanders rely on the military departments and Defense
agencies to provide effective and interoperable forces and capabilities
through their respective Service component commands, particularly
important as forces are shifted between theaters for operational
missions. Mature processes and procedures to accomplish this are in
place and working. Providing JFCOM funding and acquisition authority
would unnecessarily complicate the challenge of providing synchronized
and integrated capabilities to combatant commanders.
Secretary Johnson. Draft Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year
2005 states that start-up funding for the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Program will be provided in fiscal year 2005 and out. The source of
these resources has not been identified. Assuming that these resources
are provided to the Navy, any long-term financial impact will be
related to the technologies tested. Assuming positive testing and
evaluation, the bridge funding proposed in the language will allow some
transition period for the Services to identify appropriate funding
alternatives.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force believes we are currently on the
right approach in teaming with JFCOM to identify transformation needs
and capabilities and then applying Service acquisition processes to
deliver these capabilities to the regional commanders. The addition of
acquisition authority to JFCOM would only serve to complicate a teaming
arrangement that we believe is working. There is no process to
synchronize the timing between JFCOM rapidly purchasing a capability
and the ability of the Service to program for training, fielding, and
sustainment. Ultimately, the lack of a coherent implementation plan
will impact support to the regional commander.

HOUSING INITIATIVES

58. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, in your written testimony you
state that the Navy relies first on the local community to provide
housing for our sailors, marines, and their families. Given today's
threat environment how does the Navy propose to address force
protection concerns for those sailors and marines living off base on
the local economy?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy's force protection plans for families
living in the private sector are much the same as for civilians.
Currently, about three out of every four Navy families live in the
private sector, side by side with their civilian counterparts. Security
and protection for these families are provided through the existing
network of Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities
currently protecting all of our citizens. The dispersal of military
personnel into the private sector reduces the exposure of military
personnel to force protection threats. Additionally, the regular
training and awareness provided to active duty members on the issue of
antiterrorism and force protection contribute to the safety of military
families regardless of where they live.

ANTI-TERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) FUNDING

59. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, according to the administration, homeland defense
funding drops in the fiscal year 2004 request due to one-time force
protection investments in 2003. Out of the approximate $2 billion
decrease for the Department, homeland defense funding for MILCON, which
represents AT/FP funding, drops from $733 million to $82 million. What
progress have you made in the buy-out of AT/FP requirements for our
installations? Are we almost finished fulfilling the requirements, or
should we expect additional requirements in fiscal year 2005, fiscal
year 2006, fiscal year 2007, and the future?
Secretary White. The Army has significant requirements in MILCON,
operations and maintenance, and procurement in fiscal year 2005 to
fiscal year 2009.
The Army has made significant progress in buying AT/FP requirements
for our installations. In fiscal year 2003, approximately $211 million
will be spent on AT/FP MILCON projects related to installation access
control. Additionally, approximately $302.4 million of Other
Procurement, Army will be spent on physical security equipment
controlling access on installations.
Secretary Johnson. Through Joint Service and Navy Integrated
Vulnerability Assessments, critical facilities at each installation are
regularly assessed. These assessments compare existing critical
facilities against prevailing construction criteria. The Vulnerability
Assessments are performed on a 3-year cycle for CONUS installations,
and every 2 years for OCONUS installations. In addition, installations
are required to perform self-vulnerability assessments annually. Based
on the results of these assessments, the Navy continually looks at its
Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) requirements for our
installations, and programs the most needed projects. As such, there
could be additional requirements for AT/FP projects for fiscal year
2005 and beyond as these assessments are completed. The fiscal year
2004 President's budget future years defense program indicates that the
total resource requirement to address the Navy's force protection needs
with military construction is $542.3 million. It should be noted that
each military construction project is designed to incorporate
antiterrorism/force protection construction standards.
Secretary Roche. With the fiscal year 2003 enacted budget, the Air
Force is investing more than $450 million in antiterrorism/force
protection facility requirements. Of this amount, more than $200
million is being invested through our military construction program.
For fiscal year 2004, we have requested nearly $20 million for
antiterrorism/force protection-specific projects (e.g., perimeter
fencing, entry access gates) and antiterrorism/force protection design
requirements embedded into other construction projects. In addition to
this investment, we still have antiterrorism/force protection
requirements programmed in our future years defense plan. Specifically,
the Air Force has identified approximately $100 million in requirements
for fiscal years 2004-2009. These projects either enhance existing
antiterrorism and force protection measures or eliminate inefficiencies
caused by existing workarounds. They include, for example, fencing,
entrance gates, and vehicle inspection stations.

OVERSEAS BASING

60. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, could each of you please discuss the support you
currently receive through host nation construction programs such as the
Japanese Facilities Improvement Project in Japan and the Funded
Construction Program in Korea as well as support in Europe?
Secretary White. The host nation funded construction programs
consist of the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) in Japan, the
Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP), and the Republic of Korea
Funded Construction (RoKFC) program in Korea. In Europe, we also have a
Payment-In-Kind (PIK) program in Germany under which we use residual
value to build facilities.
The primary host nation funded construction program is the FIP,
which has provided about $700 million of construction per year. The
program was implemented in 1979 and over the past 20 years, the
Government of Japan has built $19 billion of new quality of life and
operational facilities for our U.S. service members.
In Korea, the CDIP was initiated in 1982 by the Republic of Korea
to share the financial burden of maintaining U.S. Forces in Korea. The
CDIP funds projects that support only warfighting and operational
facilities, and total about $50+ million of construction per year.
Residual value is a method for Germany to provide compensation for the
Army's improvements to facilities on installations we return to
Germany. PIK is residual value that comes in the form of construction
credits. The PIK program awarded $244 million in construction projects
through fiscal year 2002.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy receives host nation funded
construction (burden sharing) support from both Japan and Korea. The
Japanese Facilities Improvement Program is funded by the Japanese
Defense Agency and currently supports four categories of projects:
force structure or mission increases, family housing (provision of
housing only) and community support, Japanese initiatives including
environmental and safety issues, and service initiatives. In Korea, two
cost sharing programs are in use including the Combined Defense
Improvement Fund (CDIP) and the Republic of Korea Construction Fund
(ROKCF). The CDIP supports construction of facilities related to
improved combat operations, war reserves, and combined U.S./Korea
operations. The ROKFC supports quality-of-life and sole U.S. use
projects. In Europe, we use every available funding source, including
the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) for those eligible
projects, residual value, and payment-in-kind in partnership with the
host nations.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force receives support, in the form of
host-nation funded construction, from NATO, Japan, and Korea. In recent
years, that support has averaged roughly $300 million per year. The
funds provided by these countries are used to construct facilities that
directly support Air Force missions, as well as facilities that support
quality of life for service members and their families stationed
overseas. For example, the NATO contribution helps offset construction
supporting the Air Force's roles in the NATO mission. The Japan
Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) supports ``defensive''
warfighting capabilities, such as aircraft shelters, and may be used to
replace ``offensive'' capability facilities that predate 1979. The
Korean Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDlP) funds combined
Republic of Korea-United States warfighting requirements; while the
Republic of Korea Funded Construction (ROKFC) Program funds mission
support and quality-of-life requirements.
In addition, under the Rhein Main transfer program, Germany is
helping to pay for facility construction at Ramstein and Spangdahlem
Air Bases necessary to relocate the missions currently at Rhein Main
Air Base. In total, Germany is investing nearly $400 million to help
pay for construction associated with this relocation. The majority of
this construction will occur in 2004 and 2005.

61. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, what is the status of each of these programs and how
do we currently benefit from these partnerships?
Secretary White. The various host nation funded construction
programs continue to be an active and important program for our forces
overseas by providing quality-of-life and operational facilities at
little or no cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
Secretary Johnson. All of these programs are active and help share
the financial burden of a forward deployed posture. In fiscal year
2002, we received $199 million in support from the Japanese Facilities
Improvement Program (JFIP) to include $80 million for improvements to
the Yokosuka carrier pier, and $4.5 million from the Republic of Korea
Construction Fund (ROKCF) to include a $3.8 million medical clinic in
Chinhae. In Europe, we use every available funding source, including
the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) for those eligible
projects, residual value and payment-in-kind in partnership with the
host nations.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force receives support, in the form of
host-nation funded construction, from NATO, Japan, and Korea. In recent
years, that support has averaged roughly $300 million per year. The
funds provided by these countries are used to construct facilities that
directly support Air Force missions, as well as facilities that support
quality-of-life for service members and their families stationed
overseas.
For example, the NATO contribution helps offset construction
supporting the Air Force's roles in the NATO mission. The Japan
Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) supports ``defensive''
warfighting capabilities, such as aircraft shelters, and may be used to
replace ``offensive'' capability facilities that predate 1979. The
Korean Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) funds combined
Republic of Korea-United States warfighting requirements, while the
Republic of Korea Funded Construction (ROKFC) Program funds mission
support and quality-of-life requirements.
In addition, under the Rhein Main transfer program, Germany is
helping to pay for facility construction at Ramstein and Spangdahlem
Air Bases necessary to relocate the missions currently at Rhein Main
Air Base. In total, Germany is investing nearly $400 million to help
pay for construction associated with this relocation. The majority of
this construction will occur in 2004 and 2005.

62. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, could each of you please describe your Services'
efforts to consolidate forces overseas with programs such as the Land
Partnership Plan in Korea and Efficient Basing East in Germany?
Secretary White. Efficient Basing-East will consolidate the
activities of 13 installations in Germany onto one, allowing the
majority of those installations to be closed. Efficient Basing-East
will enhance unit readiness and effectiveness by improving command and
control, enhancing force protection, and improving training. Soldier
quality-of-life will also be improved because new housing and renovated
or new mission facilities will be provided.
Land Partnership Plan in Korea will consolidate 41 U.S. Forces,
Korea (USFK) installations onto 23 enduring installations. Of these 41
installations, 32 are Army installations which will be consolidated
onto 14 enduring installations. The plan returns approximately 32,000
acres to the Republic of Korea (RoK). USFK will receive new facilities
to replace currently occupied poor facilities with more joint use of
RoK ranges and training areas to improve training and combat readiness.
Command and control, force protection, and soldier quality-of-life will
also improve.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy has successfully consolidated our
presence overseas in a number of core locations. In Naples, Italy,
where we operate multiple sites, we are nearly complete with a major
effort to consolidate facilities at two sites. A major recapitalization
at Sigonella, Sicily is underway and a consolidation of facilities at
La Maddalena will soon begin.
Secretary Roche. Air Force overseas force structure is inherently
consolidated since our operations primarily revolve around an airfield.
For this reason, the Land Partnership Plan and Efficient Basing East
models are difficult to apply directly to Air Force overseas basing,
basing that has changed significantly since 1990.
For example, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) had 805
aircraft and 72,000 personnel at 51 locations in 1990. Today USAFE has
220 aircraft and 32,000 personnel at 28 locations--a 45-percent
reduction in operating locations. This consolidation of locations
overseas was based in part in the transformation of the Air Force from
an overseas garrison force to a predominately stateside expeditionary
force.

QUALITY-OF-LIFE

63. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, funding for a number of budget areas that directly
affect quality-of-life for our service men and women has seriously
decreased in this year's request. Some examples include a $1.5 billion
drop in overall MILCON funding, a $200 million cut to family housing,
and a reduction that brings Army restoration and modernization, or R&M,
down to a level that is 10 percent of the fiscal year 2002 level. What
impact will these types of reductions have on the quality-of-life of
our service men and women and their families?
Secretary White. Quality-of-life continues to be an Army priority,
and available funding is focused on restoring or building new
facilities that improve the living and working conditions for soldiers
and their families. For example, our budget request supports the
elimination of inadequate family housing by 2007, compared with 2010 2
years ago. For single soldiers, we have budgeted over $700 million for
new and renovated barracks in this year's budget request. While budgets
fluctuate from year to year, the Army's commitment to barracks and
family housing improvements has not wavered.
Secretary Johnson. The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2004
budget request represents a balance between funds needed to operate,
recapitalize and transform our fleet assets with funds needed to do the
same for our shore installations. We believe our quality-of-life
programs will continue to provide the kinds and levels of support
needed by Navy and Marine Corps families.
We do not anticipate an adverse impact on quality-of-life as a
result of reductions to MILCON funds for housing. The Department of the
Navy will eliminate its inadequate military family housing by fiscal
year 2007. This is possible through increased reliance on the use of
military housing privatization authorities. These authorities allow us
to leverage Government resources with private sector capital to
renovate or replace our inadequate housing and construct additional
housing as needed. More importantly, the continuing commitment to buy-
down out-of-pocket housing expenses, through increases to the Basic
Allowance for Housing, will allow our sailors and marines to be better
able to find suitable, affordable housing in the private sector.
Secretary Roche. With the fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Air
Force is continuing to focus on quality-of-life for our people. The
quality of our facilities, infrastructure, and communities sends a
direct signal to our men and women regarding the value we place on
their service.
Our military construction request is up $150 million from last
year's request--a 20 percent increase. Included in that request is more
than $250 million to construct new dormitories, fitness centers, and
family support/child development facilities.
Our housing request is up slightly from last year's request and up
nearly 30 percent from the fiscal year 2002 request. This year we will
construct or renovate more than 3,600 houses, and with the exception of
4 northern-tier locations, we will eliminate our inadequate housing
units in the United States by 2007.
Finally, our facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization
(O&M) request is as high as it has been in a decade--nearly $2 billion.
This level of funding allows us to properly invest in facility
sustainment (to keep our good facilities good) and invest some O&M
funding in much-needed restoration and modernization.
Recent surveys indicate that members perceive no significant
problems with Air Force quality-of-life. In our newest survey, 90
percent of respondents agreed that the Air Force is a good place to
work. Housing ranked fifth and sixth in order of importance of quality-
of-life issues while pay and compensation ranked as the top two. As you
can see from the preceding paragraphs, we have a get-well plan for
MILCON. With the help of Congress in these few appropriation cycles, we
have made significant progress in the area of pay and compensation. We
have seen dramatic changes in the number of individuals who feel that
total compensation is fair. We thank you for that much needed support
and appreciate your question concerning the overall quality-of-life for
our members and their families.

ORDNANCE CLEANUP

64. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, you indicated that the Navy
was planning on treating the island of Kaho'olawe as a formally used
defense site (FUDS). Given the fact that the FUDS program is severely
underfunded and that priority is given to unexploded ordnance (UXO)
clearance in areas with civilian populations, I am concerned about this
revelation. Please provide me with more detail about the Navy's
intentions regarding this issue including, but not limited to, how this
would affect the Navy's responsibilities regarding the clearance of
newly discovered previously undetected ordnance on Kaho'olawe after
November 11, 2003.
Secretary Johnson. The Navy does not plan on treating Kaho'olawe as
a FUDS after control of the island is returned to Hawaii in November
2003. The Navy executed a quitclaim deed in 1994 that transferred title
to Kaho'olawe to the State. DOD policy makes cleanup/clearance of any
property transferred from DOD control after October 17, 1986 ineligible
for FUDS funding.
With respect to the discovery of previously undetected ordnance on
Kaho'olawe Island after November 11, 2003, the Navy and the State of
Hawaii have been working on a Memorandum of Agreement concerning the
means for regular interval clean-ups and removal of newly discovered
previously undetected ordnance by the Navy, as required by Section
1002(a)(2) of PL 103139. Representatives from the Navy and the State
continue to discuss the framework for the agreement. The Navy is
planning on reserving funds in the Kaho'olawe Island Trust Fund for
clearance associated with the above discoveries.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

MANPOWER

65. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, last week all four
Service Chiefs testified that their forces were under significant
``strain'' due to the high operational tempo required by the global war
on terrorism, peace support operations (Bosnia/Kosovo), and forward
presence missions (South Korea). In particular, the Army is feeling
significant strains to its 480,000-soldier force, which is the same
size as was authorized in the late 1990s despite a substantial increase
in deployments and combat operations since September 11. A potential
peace support operation in Iraq requiring thousands of Army troops will
add to this burden. The Bush administration continues to insist that
more troops are not required. Instead, they claim that the existing
force must be used more efficiently. Is the active duty Army big enough
to accomplish the tasks it has been given?
Secretary White. Nothing has changed since my last testimony--the
Army is too small for its mission profile. The reality is that our
operations tempo (OPTEMPO), already challenging before September 11,
has increased dramatically in the post September 11 environment. Over
the past 18 months, mobilizations have maintained a steady state of
approximately 30,000 Reserve component soldiers, effectively increasing
our active duty strength to approximately 510,000. We recognize the
necessity to ensure we look internally to obtain all possible
efficiencies before making any determinations on potential end strength
increases.
A study is currently underway to review Army non-core
competencies--the Third Wave--with the expectation that some personnel
savings will be generated for use in mitigating ``force stress.''
Additionally, we are fully cognizant of the stress that this steady
state mobilization is placing on our Reserve components. Studies are
underway to determine the correct balance of Active and Reserve Forces,
including an analysis exploring options for mitigating the current
stress to the Reserve components by ensuring that the correct type
units are resourced within the active component. The results of these
studies, coupled with corresponding supportability analyses, are
expected to provide valuable insight into the end strength question.

66. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, is it possible to realign
the existing active force of 480,000 troops to relieve this pressure
without ``breaking'' the force in terms of training and logistics
support needs?
Secretary White. Efforts are currently underway to examine the
existing active and Reserve component mix. This analysis will include a
review of those high-demand/low-density organizations, primarily
located in the Reserve component, that are experiencing extended or
repeat mobilizations in support of operations worldwide. Any attempt to
assess impacts to training and logistics support needs would be
premature until all analysis is complete.

SHIPBUILDING

67. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Johnson, the size of the Navy's
fleet is expected to decline to as few as 292 ships in the coming
years, yet Admiral Clark has repeatedly testified that he needs a
minimum of 375 ships to accomplish all the missions he has at a
reasonable operational pace. Why is there such a large difference
between what the Navy says it needs and the fleet supported by the
President's budget?
Secretary Johnson. To build a force of about 375 ships needed to
meet the requirements of the new defense strategy will require a major
commitment of resources over an extended period of time. The fiscal
year 2004 President's budget includes a significant funding increase
from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004 for Navy shipbuilding
programs. Funding for Navy shipbuilding programs is projected to
increase across the Future Years Defense Program. In the near term,
some older, less capable ships will be decommissioned. The operational
cost savings from retiring these higher manning, maintenance intensive
ships will be used to help finance the transition to a larger, more
capable force. This will result in a smaller force in the near term,
but savings generated by those retirements will facilitate the
transition to the numbers, type, and mix of ships required to execute
the range of missions anticipated in the 21st century.

68. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Johnson, can you estimate the
additional cost involved to bring the size of the fleet anywhere near
the Chief of Naval Operation's target size?
Secretary Johnson. To achieve approximately 375 ships in the first
quarter of this century requires an average of $14 billion per year in
new construction (TY03 dollars) and procurement of an average of .12
ships per year. This requires a long-term commitment to fund
construction at significantly higher levels than recent years.
Additionally, to sustain this force will require an average of $2
billion per year (TY03 dollars) for nuclear refueling overhauls,
conversions, landing craft, and service craft replacement.

MANPOWER REDUCTION

69. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Johnson, how do you justify the
10,000-sailor reduction in the President's budget when the future shape
and size of the Navy has yet to be determined?
Secretary Johnson. In conjunction with the execution of our overall
investment strategy, we continue to conduct extensive reviews focused
on balancing current and future force operational requirements and
capabilities, while operating within established fiscal constraints. In
proposing the budget submission for fiscal year 2004, we determined
that reducing the number of less capable, manpower intensive platforms
would free valuable resources essential to future plans for enhancing
transformational capabilities. The manpower associated with these force
structure changes results in a smaller requirement.
Additionally, Navy has various efforts underway that are helping
improve manpower efficiency and reduce future manpower requirements:

Task Force Excel is exploring innovative techniques to
improve how we train sailors.
Sea Swap and Optimal Manning are finding ways to keep
battle forces at sea longer while exploring potential areas to
restructure crew manning.
FORCENET is aimed at improving manpower efficiency by
integrating warriors, sensors, networks, command and control,
platforms, and weapons into a networked distributed combat
system.
Sea Enterprise maintains core capabilities, optimizes
investments, and applies selected business reforms to our
organizations and processes.
Sea Warrior is the enhanced assessment, assignment,
training, and education of personnel.

We believe these initiatives, when completed, will yield increased
capabilities, while permitting us to man our forces in the most
efficient and economical manner possible.

RESERVE MOVEMENT

70. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, current and future operations in the global war on
terrorism are increasingly requiring mobilization of large numbers of
Reserve component forces. Mobilization of these patriotic citizen-
soldiers is, of course, a burden on thousands of families and
communities nationwide. Looking into the future, what do you think the
long-term impact of extended and frequent Reserve mobilizations will be
on the strength and vitality of the Reserve Forces?
Secretary White. Soldiers from the Army National Guard and Reserve
have been in a continuous state of mobilization since December 1995.
Rotations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, and mobilizations and deployments
as part of Operation Noble Eagle and the global war on terrorism have
all become part of what it means to serve in the Army National Guard
and Reserve today. These recurring deployments have given our units a
great deal of experience in being able to mobilize quickly and
effectively.
We are sensitive to the stresses of frequent mobilizations and the
impacts on retention and recruiting of quality soldiers. Soldiers are
committed to their duty, and we do not anticipate any long-term impacts
on the readiness of the force resulting from the ongoing mobilizations.
The concerns of most soldiers, families, and employers are that the
mobilizations are as predictable as possible and the duty is directly
related to the defense mission of the Nation. We anticipate a higher
attrition rate after the stop-loss policy is lifted. However, a part of
this attrition will be a result of impeding normal loss over time.
Additionally, we are looking at building a rotational base in the force
that is applicable to the Reserve component (RC). This concept is based
on a plan for a 180-day unit rotation, which falls within the 270-day
Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority, no more than once
every 5 years. Among other things, it will provide these units with
operational experience, provide OPTEMPO relief for the active Army,
impart a sense of predictability for the RC soldiers, and distribute
the workload across the force. Consequently, we expect that this
concept will mitigate any potential negative effects caused by
increased small-scale contingency mobilizations.
Secretary Johnson. It is difficult to accurately predict the long-
term impact of extended and frequent Reserve mobilizations on the
Reserve Forces. While there has been considerable discussion about
mobilizing large numbers of reservists and involuntarily extending some
for 2 years, the Naval Reserve has called up approximately 25 percent
of its force since September 11. Preliminary trends do not show an
increased attrition rate from the Naval Reserve as a response to a
concern about being mobilized. In fact, since June of last year we have
seen the Naval Reserve's focused enlisted attrition rate rise only
slightly greater than 2 percent to a rate of 19.1 percent. Our Naval
Reserve Career Decision Survey results show that financial and medical
compensation are the key reasons for mobilized reservists to stay in
the Naval Reserve. On the other hand, the effects of mobilization on
our reservists' spouses and children are the main reasons some of them
choose to leave.
One often-overlooked impact that mobilization has on the Naval
Reserve is within recruiting. In the last few years the Naval Reserve
has seen a downward trend in the number of NAVETS entering the Naval
Reserve. Although this may be a factor of higher retention rates in the
active component, it may also reflect a propensity of NAVETS not to
join the Naval Reserve upon release from active duty for fear that they
may be mobilized after joining the Naval Reserve.
The net impact the global war on terrorism will have on the Naval
Reserve is still uncertain. However, the key to maintaining a strong
Naval Reserve Force during periods of mobilization is to maintain
training opportunities, mobilize SELRES to fill meaningful requirements
(i.e., those for which they were trained), and ensure personnel
policies (such as duration of mobilization and healthcare for the
member's family) are consistent, fair, and seamlessly accessible.
Secretary Roche. The long-term effect of extended deployments for
our reservists is in the data-gathering process. Presently, there is no
correlation, but this number and length of deployments is
unprecedented. Reserve components continue to face many challenges, to
include recruiting and retention. Since 1992 when the number of active
duty separations was 50,000, to the current 13,000, they have relied
more and more upon Non-Prior Service (NPS) accessions and accessions
from other Services to fill that recruiting pool gap. Recruiting more
NPS also means more time and money, and a higher attrition rate than
with prior service recruits.
In addition to considerations of a smaller pool of potential prior
service personnel, recruiting from active duty becomes more difficult
during high operations tempo periods because those leaving active duty,
when faced with transitioning to a civilian job, will choose not to
participate in the Reserve or National Guard. This is particularly
prevalent in the high-stress, high-demand, low-density career fields.
Likewise, this becomes true for those who participate and are faced
with whether to continue to do so at the risk of their civilian job or
their families.
Anticipating these difficult decisions, and evaluating what effect
the high operations tempo has had and will have on members of the
Reserve components, we have worked hard through the recent past to
provide adequate pay and benefits and increase bonuses for these high
stress career fields.
Our citizen airmen are highly trained and motivated and will
continue to be a vital force if we manage several factors: continue to
provide adequate pay and benefits, communicate openly and often with
their families, civilian employers, and civic leaders, assign PERSTEMPO
across the force as evenly as possible, and provide predictability to
the extent possible in the number and length of mobilizations and
deployments.

71. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, in addition, is the current mobilization causing you
to rethink both the size and structure of the Reserve Forces?
Secretary White. Much of the force found in the RC today is a
result of decisions made to support the Total Force Policy and previous
defense strategy. With the draw-down during the 1990s, the Army could
not maintain all of its warfighting capability in the Active Force and
decided to place many highly specialized capabilities in the RC. The
Reserve components were configured and resourced to provide many
specialized capabilities anticipated to be needed only in a protracted
major theater war. Given the requirements of the new defense strategy
and the high level of RC use, these force structure decisions are under
review to determine the proper Active and Reserve Force mix.
We are also aware that the mobilization process is in need of
overhaul to get ready units to the fight, with less notice, in less
time, with reduced sacrifice and stress on the part of the mobilizing
soldiers and their families. We are analyzing this process in order to
institute these improvements. Additionally, we are further exploring
the impact of active component (AC) and Reserve component
transformation initiatives on mobilization and readiness before we make
a final determination as to the proper AC/RC force mix.
Among the RC transformation initiatives is an endeavor to eliminate
unready units by bringing structure levels down to better match end
strength. This will dramatically increase readiness by focusing
resources on high-demand, high-OPTEMPO forces and creating rotational
depth in capabilities such as civil affairs, psychological operations,
biological detection, military intelligence, and military police units.
Secretary Johnson. With the exception of NCW mentioned previously,
I think in fiscal year 2004, the size and structure of the Naval
Reserve Forces is just about right. In the case of NCW, we are working
to provide an active duty capability that will compliment the
capabilities we already have in the Naval Reserve.
Secretary Roche. The Air Reserve component (ARC), both Reserve and
Guard, have performed magnificently in our ongoing successes in
Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle. It is no secret that we
rely heavily on the capabilities that reside in the ARC. They have
stepped up to the challenges just as our active component has. Though
the Active and Reserve components have both been stressed in these
endeavors, our risk management has spread those stresses fairly
equitably. However, the entire Department of Defense is currently
looking at all the emerging requirements of the new National Military
Strategy which have been given such great impetus by the events of
September 11. In the Air Force, we have made and will continue to make
changes to our force mix (the ratio of a mission in the active and
Reserve components) and force structure (how those forces are based and
organized) as new needs are emerging to support that strategy.
We do have some mission areas in which we are making adjustments to
mitigate some of those stresses and meet those emerging requirements.
For example, the Air Force Reserve is transferring 15 combat search and
rescue aircraft, a low-density-high-demand asset, to the active
component. In turn, the Reserve unit will convert to KC-135 R-model
tankers, a mission that has proven very successful in the Reserve
component. The ARC will also be transferring 14 C-130 H2-models to our
Air Force Special Operations Command to meet the post September 11
requirements. These adjustments will allow the active and Reserve
components to maintain the new steady-state requirements without
overusing our invaluable Reserve component. In short, we will
continually rethink the entire air and space force as we lead our
Defense's transformation efforts to meet the challenges of the 21st
century.

72. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, are the kinds of units that are in the various Reserve
components the right ones? (For example, the USAF has ``borrowed''
thousands of Reserve Army troops to provide protection for air bases
and other Air Force facilities due to the insufficient size of USAF
security personnel units.)
Secretary White. The Army's active and Reserve component force mix
is the result of deliberate actions to balance risks and priorities in
light of operational requirements as well as resource constraints. The
Army continues to adjust its force structure based on the ``1-4-2-1''
force-sizing construct. The Army's force mix is designed to support the
geographic combatant commander's requirements and is determined using
the Total Army Analysis process. To stay within constant end strength
levels, adding capabilities to the active force will require the
transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve
Force. A number of options exist to reduce risk including the
conversion of lower demand structure inside the active force;
converting key capabilities held in the Reserve components, but needed
intermittently; and changes in Reserve personnel management to increase
access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing involuntary
mobilization.
Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over
19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and
Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated
or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68
active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these
high-demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological
operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities
address the most urgent needs.
Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense in conjunction
with the Joint Staff have undertaken a study to improve operational
availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the AC/RC
mix is being studied in the context of short-notice, short-duration
major combat operations. This study is incomplete, but will be
continued as part of defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine
any recommended force structure changes.
Secretary Johnson. Neither the Navy nor the Naval Reserve have been
required to borrow units from the other Services to complete Navy
missions. Therefore, the Naval Reserve does not require force structure
adjustments in fiscal year 2004.
Secretary Roche. The events of September 11 and the subsequent
global war on terrorism have changed the scope of many requirements.
One of the most dramatic changes is the requirement for force
protection particularly within the borders of the United States. The
use of the Army National Guard to provide installation force protection
is a short term fix while the Air Force pursues a number of initiatives
to both increase the number of security forces personnel as well as
invest in transformational technologies to meet the new increased
requirements. We must remember that U.S. soil has now become a new area
of responsibility for the new combatant commander of NORTHCOM and the
permanent adjustments to support homeland defense including our active,
Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard facilities are in the works.
In more general terms of the mission mix of active and Reserve
components in the Air Force, we have made and will continue to make
changes to our force mix (the ratio of a mission in the active and
Reserve components) and force structure (how those forces are based and
organized) as the new needs emerge to support the National Military
Strategy that puts homeland security at the pinnacle of
responsibilities. The Air Reserve component, both Reserve and Guard,
have made huge contributions to our successes in Operations Enduring
Freedom and Noble Eagle. They have stepped up to the challenges just as
has our active component. Though the active and Reserve components have
both been stressed in these endeavors, our risk management has spread
that stress fairly equitably. We think we have the mix just about right
although, in a few areas like force protection, we are currently making
significant changes to the entire force--active, Reserve, and Guard.

AIR FORCE ACADEMY

73. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, one woman who was raped
at the Air Force Academy while she was a freshman there has contacted
me. She learned the same man--a fellow cadet--had raped another woman 2
weeks earlier. They reported the crimes to the Office of Special
Investigations, but he was never charged. One of the women left the
Academy--the other still is a cadet. I also received a complaint from a
woman at West Point who was assaulted in her dorm room by another
cadet. She was urged not to make an issue of the attack, and eventually
she was separated from the Academy. If, after a thorough investigation
of the facts and you determine that crimes were committed, will you now
pursue criminal charges against the perpetrators?
Secretary Roche. I have from the beginning made it clear that
sexual assault is a crime and that those who commit sexual assaults are
criminals who will be punished to the fullest extent of the law and for
whom there is no place at the Academy or in the Air Force. It would be
improper, though, for me to prejudge the disposition of any specific
case. In general, our comprehensive review of sexual assault issues at
the Air Force Academy includes examination of the investigation and
disposition of sexual assault allegations. While our review is not
complete, the information available so far indicates that with very few
exceptions--perhaps no more than one--allegations reported to the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations were properly investigated.
However, if facts are developed in any case that were not appropriately
considered in the original disposition decision, and if the Air Force
still has jurisdiction over the alleged offender, prosecution under the
UCMJ would be one of the options available to the cognizant chain of
command.

74. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, will you also provide the
victims who left school before graduation an opportunity to again serve
in the military?
Secretary Roche. Cadets who reported sexual assaults have
subsequently left the Academy for a wide variety of reasons; in some
cases those reasons were not related to the alleged sexual assault. I
therefore cannot provide a ``one size fits all'' answer to this
question. The Academy, and other Air Force accession sources, will
consider requests for reentry on a case-by-case basis.

75. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, who is responsible for
allowing the allegations of rape to go unanswered and for failing to
provide the women cadets the care and attention they needed after such
a traumatic event?
Secretary Roche. With several reviews and investigations of the
Academy situation incomplete, we cannot yet be sure we know all the
facts, and we must not rush to judgment as to the personal
responsibility of any individual. I intend to take another look at this
issue when all the relevant information is in. As you are aware, I have
replaced the leadership team at the Academy. I did so because I believe
new leadership can most effectively implement the changes General
Jumper and I have directed at the Academy in our Agenda for Change,
announced on March 26, 2003, and any future changes we may find
appropriate after receiving the reports of the Working Group, the Air
Force and DOD Inspectors General, and the review group recently
mandated by Congress. My focus has been, and remains, on fixing the
problem.

CANCELLATION OF JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEM

76. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, I have been made aware of a DOD Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) directing the cancellation of the Joint Simulation
System (JSIMS) program in fiscal year 2004 and through the FYDP. I and
other members on the Armed Services Committee who care deeply about the
pace and scope of efforts to increase joint experimentation, joint
training, creation of a standing joint operational headquarters, and
joint requirements and acquisition validation, are troubled by this
development. The program is intended to provide a joint simulation
capability to ``integrate'' Service simulations allowing for joint
training and experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. This kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the
military establishment to greater joint training, doctrine, and
experimentation. What is your position on the cancellation of this
program and your related Service simulation programs?
Secretary White. I do not believe the cancellation of the program
will have an impact on joint training. The fiscal year 2003 funding was
retained so that the program manager could deliver the Block I software
to the Joint Warfighting Training Center (JWFC) for their use to
conduct Joint Task Force component level training. The Army also
reprogrammed $9.9 million this year to support the Block I effort. The
Block I software should enable the JWFC to maintain the software to
support joint training, doctrine, and experimentation. Moreover, the
PDM directed an analysis of alternatives to identify a cost-effective
method of meeting future joint and service training requirements. That
will either be JSIMS Block II and III, or a different model. The impact
on the Army simulation is greater, however, because the Block I
software provides little utility for service use. To this end, we
believe it is better for the Army to pursue its own Title X solution
with the clear intent of linking to the future joint simulation once
that simulation has been determined and matured.
Secretary Johnson. Navy supports the decision to cancel the JSIMS
for service use. While an excellent concept, JSIMS experienced cost
overruns and delays, it would not meet all of the requirements in the
Operational Requirements Document, nor would it provide for joint
experimentation.
In order to continue support of wargaming requirements at the
Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group staff level, Navy will
reprogram existing funds to upgrade the existing Enhanced Naval
Wargaming System (ENWGS), which creates a track database in Global
Command and Control System-Navy.
Navy has also demonstrated the ability to link Joint Semi-Automated
Forces (JSAF) to the Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT) system and
stimulate ship's combat systems in a Battle Group sized modeling and
simulation (M&S) training event. Navy will build on this positive
experience in an effort to standardize and improve in-port and underway
virtual exercises as JSAF allows federation with M&S training and
experimentation systems of the other Services.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force accepts the fiscal trade-offs that
led to the Office of the Secretary of Defense PDM decision on the JSIMS
program. Impacts to related Air Force simulation programs will require
funding adjustments to maintain and improve legacy systems in current
use for service and joint training, doctrine, and experimentation.

77. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, are you satisfied that cancellation of the JSIMS
program is necessary to accelerate establishment of a Joint National
Training Capability or does it complicate achieving such an objective?
Secretary White. Cancellation of the JSIMS program should not
complicate achieving a Joint National Training Center capability.
Constructive simulations are only one piece of the Joint National
Training Center (JNTC) effort and current simulations will support
near-term JNTC requirements until a joint solution is built to meet
that requirement.
Secretary Johnson. No. A JNTC does not require the JSIMS.
Alternatively funded programs exist, and they have the capability JSIMS
intended to provide a JNTC. Also, the maritime capability of the
initial version of JSIMS does not equal the capability of the program
it is intended to replace, thus forcing the continued funding of the
legacy program.
Secretary Roche. The OSD Program Decision Memorandum in question
covered a range of resource decisions, including the cancellation of
JSIMS and the establishment of JNTC. I would defer to OSD to comment on
whether the two decisions were related.
The JSIMS decisions does include provisions for an Analysis of
Alternatives to determine a way ahead for joint simulation, so it is
clear that joint simulation remains a departmental goal.

78. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Roche, from your perspective, what are the priority
requirements for a true joint national training capability and the
simulation systems necessary to make it possible?
Secretary White. Joint training must be capabilities-based and
responsive to the mission requirements of the combatant commanders. It
must be adaptable to meet both joint and service mission planning and
rehearsals requirements across the full spectrum of military,
multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental operations. To this
end, it should have live, virtual, and constructive components that can
be integrated to optimize the training for all audiences.
Secretary Johnson. The following elements are required to provide
true joint training:

Access to joint command and control training
environments for commanders and their staffs at all levels;
The ability to train joint tactical interoperability
during the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) accomplished
via participation by other Service personnel and units in
exercises;
Modeling and simulation assets operated in accordance
with Service specific or joint tactics, techniques, and
procedures; and
Investment in connectivity infrastructure and software
interfaces between service systems in order to replicate the
joint environment in live, modeling, and simulation
environments. Services must agree on architectures and
databases.
Secretary Roche. We envision Joint National Training Capability
(JNTC) requirements to focus on the three following areas: First,
development of a network of high-fidelity simulators and training
devices connected across a long-haul network, that enable warfighters
to train together as they would fight even though separated
geographically by great distances. Second, JNTC must enhance existing
service interoperability training by synchronizing events at major
training centers (e.g. Red Flag, Virtual Flag, Air Warrior, Blue Flag),
with an end-state of fully integrated and standardized joint
interoperability training. Third, JNTC must develop mechanisms to
measure joint training effectiveness. These mechanisms include range
instrumentation, certifiable joint standards, ``ground truth'' through
data availability, and after action review incorporated into air Force
and joint lessons learned. Ultimately, the intent is to train ``the way
we intend to fight'' with JNTC enhancing execution of air power in
support of the Joint Force Commander.
Live, virtual, and constructive simulations, at the tactical and
operational levels of war integrated within distributed systems
architecture, will be the integral elements of the JNTC. The Air Force
continues to work closely with the other Services, unified commands,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to identify requirements and
cost-effective solutions to implement this initiative.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

EXPLOSIVE SAFETY ARCS

79. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, many of our military
installations' missions are being encumbered by community encroachment.
This has been highlighted by flight restrictions at certain military
installations and, in the extreme, by the controversy of the Navy
training at Vieques. Encroachment at ordnance facilities can take a
less visible, but extremely dangerous form. Those installations that
store large quantities of ordnance items may have explosive safety arcs
that extend past their boundaries into the surrounding community. In
this era of heightened security, total containment of explosive arcs
within military installation boundaries is even more critical.
When all of the explosive storage magazines are fully loaded at our
ordnance facilities, do the explosive safety arcs extend beyond the
installation's boundaries?
Secretary Johnson. The encumbrance of off-installation properties
by naval ordnance storage facilities is not permitted, except under
strictly controlled circumstances in support of operational missions,
and only in accordance with the explosives safety criteria detailed in
Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (DOD
6055.9-STD) and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) OP 5, ``Ammunition
and Explosives Safety Ashore Regulations for Handling, Storing,
Production, Renovation, and Shipping''. An example of those
circumstances is unsuitable terrain for development (i.e., wetlands,
topography, etc.) or restricted access such as Government-owned land
that is not open to the public.

80. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, as communities have built up
closer to our ordnance activities, have they entered the explosive
safety arc areas?
Secretary Johnson. As a general rule, off-installation areas are
not permitted to be encumbered by Explosive Safety Quantity Distance
(ESQD) arcs from naval ordnance storage facilities. Under the
Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (DOD
6055.9-STD) the Navy can present a case for a waiver wherein explosive
arcs can extend beyond station boundaries if a risk analysis
demonstrates low risk to those exposed. If a waiver is granted there is
a requirement that the risk be closely monitored and explosive arcs
reduced if the risk increases. Occasionally, temporary event waivers
are granted for specific evolutions, but these are closely monitored
and duration is limited to the absolute minimum.

81. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, have the ordnance activities
had to download from full capacity to bring in the explosive safety
arcs?
Secretary Johnson. There have been cases in the past where changes
external to the naval ordnance storage facility have caused an
encumbrance of off-installation areas. Examples include off-
installation zoning changes or where updates to explosives safety
criteria (outlined in Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives
Safety Standards (DOD 6055.9-STD) and Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) OP 5, ``Ammunition and Explosives Safety Ashore Regulations
for Handling, Storing, Production, Renovation, and Shipping'') caused
an encumbrance of off-installation areas. In these cases MILCON
projects have reapportioned the explosives storage capability on
station or explosives limits for ordnance facilities were reduced so
that Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) arcs would no longer
encumber off-installation areas.

82. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, is this ``ordnance
encroachment'' going to be a factor in the BRAC criteria?
Secretary Johnson. The BRAC 2005 selection criteria are currently
in development. The BRAC 2005 law requires that the Secretary of
Defense must publish for comment, and transmit to Congress, the
proposed criteria no later than December 31, 2003. The final criteria
must be published and transmitted to Congress no later than February
16, 2004.

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Collins, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, Dayton, Bayh,
and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff
member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary
Alice Hayward, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas,
professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; and Christina D. Still, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W.
Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; James Beauchamp, assistant to
Senator Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Mieke Y.
Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King and Neil D. Campbell,
assistants to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to
Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey and Douglas Bush, assistants to
Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton;
Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton; and Andy York, assistant to
Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning. The committee will come to
order. We tender our apologies to our distinguished panel of
witnesses and others who have gathered here this morning for
this very important hearing. It was a historic moment in the
Senate chamber this morning when our very much beloved and
distinguished chaplain since 1995 retired such that he could go
back to his home and care for his family, and that was followed
by two votes. Of course we get paid by the vote, and therefore
we have a way of being there for those votes.
The committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral
Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; General Leon
LaPorte, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and General James Hill,
Commander, U.S. Southern Command, with regard to their area of
responsibilities (AOR) and particularly their military strategy
and operational requirements. Also, whether Congress, in their
judgment, has fulfilled our obligation to give them the support
that they require. This is the first in a series of hearings
that this committee conducts annually to receive the testimony
from our Nation's combatant commanders.
Gentlemen, you are our warfighters. With great distinction
and humility, you have carried out your missions thus far and
will continue to do so. We welcome your insight on developments
in your areas of responsibility as well as your assessment of
the fiscal year 2004 defense budget requests.
Each of our witnesses has assumed his current assignment
within the past year. We welcome you on your first posture
hearing before this committee. Each of you has a long and
distinguished record of service to our country and I thank you
and I thank your families on behalf of Congress. We ask you to
convey to the fine men and women under your commands the
gratitude of the committee and indeed the entire Nation for
their professionalism and dedication to service.
Gentlemen, the committee values your unique contributions
and perspectives on the important issues we are addressing this
morning. Your insight provides us with the important
information we need to make the decisions regarding policies
and programs that affect each of your areas of responsibility.
This is of particular significance this year due to the ongoing
global war on terrorism, a potential all-out war with Iraq, and
this Nation's other global responsibilities, of course the
Korean Peninsula being foremost, General LaPorte, among the
priorities.
I will put the balance of my statement in the record to
achieve some efficiency of time. I thank you.
Senator Levin.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

The committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral Thomas
Fargo, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command; General Leon LaPorte,
Commander of U.S. Forces Korea; and General James Hill, Commander of
U.S. Southern Command, on their military strategy and operational
requirements.
This is the first in a series of hearings this committee will
conduct over the next few weeks to receive testimony from our Nation's
combatant commanders. Gentlemen, you are our warfighters. We welcome
your insight on developments in your areas of responsibility (AOR), as
well as your assessment of the fiscal year 2004 defense budget request.
Each of our witnesses has assumed his current assignment within the
past year. We welcome you on your first posture hearing before this
committee. Each of you has a long and distinguished record of service
to our country. I want to thank you on behalf of the committee and the
Nation for your leadership, dedication, and service.
We ask you to convey to the fine men and women under your commands
the gratitude of the committee and our entire Nation for their
professionalism, their dedication, their service and the sacrifices
that they and their families are making on behalf of the American
people.
Gentlemen, the committee values your unique contributions and
perspectives on the important issues we are addressing this morning.
Your insight provides us with important information we need to make
decisions regarding policies and programs that affect each of your
areas of responsibility. This is of particular significance this year
due to the ongoing global war on terrorism, a potential all-out war
with Iraq, and this Nation's other global responsibilities in which
each of you play a critical role.
In a development of utmost concern to all of us, tensions have
risen on the Korean peninsula over the past few months, following the
admission by North Korea in October 2002 that it is operating a secret
nuclear program based on uranium enrichment, and its subsequent
decision to withdraw from the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
North Korea has now restarted its reactor at Yongbyon and could
soon begin reprocessing operations to extract weapons-grade plutonium.
Resumption of North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses a grave
threat to regional and international stability. Some have accused the
administration of being ``resigned'' to a nuclear North Korea. I
respectfully disagree. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated just last
week: ``The position of the United States is we don't want to see
nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. It is also the position of
China. It is also the position of Japan and South Korea.'' The United
States, in conjunction with its friends and allies in the region, is
working responsibly to resolve this situation through diplomatic means.
I look forward to hearing Admiral Fargo's and General LaPorte's
assessment of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. I am particularly
interested in any changes in North Korea's military posture, as well as
your assessment of North Korea's nuclear program, ballistic missile and
proliferation activities, and the readiness of our forces to respond to
any possible developments on the peninsula both now or in the future.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the global war on terrorism is being
waged in the Philippines, with U.S. troops deployed to that nation to
help the Philippine Government in its fight against terrorist groups.
Recently, our two governments have been discussing a new mission in the
Philippines that would increase the role of U.S. forces, to include a
possible combat role. I look forward to hearing an update on the status
of discussions with the Philippine Government regarding this potential
new mission.
Last, but certainly not least, we look forward to General Hill's
assessment of the state of affairs in Latin America. Of particular
concern is the situation in Colombia, where the U.S. is providing
substantial amounts of aid to helping that nation eradicate illicit
drug cultivation. Our military is involved in this effort. We look
forward to General Hill's assessment of the mission.
We welcome our witnesses this morning and look forward to their
testimony.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I will do the same thing. I
will just join you in welcoming our witnesses and, thank them
for their tremendous service to our Nation. The
responsibilities are awesome and growing in each of their
areas. We have new challenges and I think growing challenges.
I would just ask that my statement be made part of the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

We meet today to discuss military strategy and operational
requirements in two critical parts of the world--Asia and Latin
America. In Asia, we are faced with a full-blown political-military
crisis on the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans admitted that they
have a secret uranium-based nuclear program, in contravention of four
existing agreements to keep a nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula. In
an attempt to force the United States to meet with them, the North
Koreans have taken a series of escalatory steps, bringing us to a
stalemate fraught with the danger of miscalculation.
The North Koreans expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors who were monitoring the plutonium-based program that
had been successfully frozen by the Agreed Framework. They removed the
seals and monitoring cameras from the plutonium facilities, announced
their withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty, and a few weeks ago
they restarted the nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon complex. We remain
highly concerned that their next step might be starting up their
plutonium reprocessing facilities, which could yield five to six
nuclear weapons in a matter of months.
The administration continues to refuse to speak directly with the
North Koreans, thereby denying us the benefit of communicating to the
North Korean government what actions are unacceptable, and of
obtaining, at least, some more information about their objectives. I
believe that we ought to talk to them. Talking is not appeasement. It
is the only feasible avenue right now for preventing them from
developing more nuclear weapons and possibly exporting them to the
highest bidder. If we are serious about working with our allies on this
matter, we would do so, because our allies are urging us to talk to
North Korea.
Also related to Korea, the Washington Post carried a story on page
1 of its March 4th edition concerning the incident in which four North
Korean jets intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in international
airspace over the Sea of Japan on Sunday, March 2. According to the
story, defense officials stated that ``At least one of the North Korean
planes directed its radar to identify the U.S. aircraft as a target and
may have `locked on,' a step short of shooting a missile.''
Additionally, on March 8, the New York Times carried a page 1 story
that said the North Korean jets ``were trying to force the (U.S.)
aircraft to land in North Korea and seize its crew'' according to a
senior defense official. I hope that our witnesses can clarify the
following: 1) Did the North Korean aircraft ``lock on'' to the U.S.
planes; 2) Did the North Koreans attempt to force down the U.S.
aircraft; and 3) Did the North Koreans take any action that could be
construed as preparatory to shooting down the U.S. aircraft?
At the same time that we are faced with the threat from North
Korea, the administration's response to it has greatly stressed our
already evolving relationship with South Korea. So, I look forward to
hearing from General LaPorte about our latest efforts with the South
Koreans to examine the military alliance and to address the respective
roles and missions of our militaries, as well as U.S. force structure
and basing in South Korea.
I am also interested in hearing about our work to help train the
Philippine army to more effectively fight terrorists and insurgents.
How successful have we been in achieving a key objective--helping them
develop an ability to eliminate the kidnap-for-ransom Abu Sayyaf Group?
Were we were planning to change our role in the Philippines--as has
been reported--in a manner that would have contravened the Philippine
constitution? If so, Congress should have been consulted, as Secretary
Wolfowitz said we would, in advance of any change in our mission. I
certainly expect that we will be consulted if there are any changes in
the future.
Last month fighting broke out again between the Philippine
government and one of the other groups operating in the southern
Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In the past this
25,000-strong group has indicated that they would take military action
if U.S. troops encroached on their territory. I am concerned about the
possibility that our activities in the Philippines might put our troops
at risk from other groups like the MILF.
So, I look forward to hearing about our future training plans from
Admiral Fargo.
In Latin America, one of the greatest political-military challenges
we face is the effort to fight drug production and trafficking.
Colombian President Uribe says he is committed to confronting the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--the FARC--as well as the
National Liberation Army--the ELN--and the paramilitaries, head-on. He
has taken some important steps toward developing the strategy and
resources to wage an enduring campaign against the FARC, ELN, and
paramilitaries. I look forward to hearing from General Hill how our
training efforts are complementing and leveraging his strategy, and if
the existing personnel and other limitations on U.S. participation
should be maintained. I am also interested to hear about what we are
doing throughout the Andean region to address the potential of
spillover of coca and heroin production and trafficking to neighboring
countries.
I look forward to testimony from our witnesses on these issues and
other topics of concern to them.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Both
of our statements in their entirety will go in the record, and
each of the written statements submitted to the committee by
the witnesses in their entirety will go into the record. We
will just proceed to Admiral Fargo. Why don't you lead off.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS B. FARGO, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Fargo. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
and members of the committee. It is great to be with you again.
The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are
providing superior service to the Nation in the Asian Pacific
region and around the world, and the high readiness of our
forces today can be directly attributed to the generous support
of this esteemed body and of the American people as a whole.
Dramatic events of the past year have brought into focus
new national security demands for the 21st century, and we have
outlined five near-term priorities for the Pacific Command to
meet those demands. I would like to briefly highlight these
priorities for you.
The first is the global war on terrorism and we are
building momentum in the war on terrorism in the Pacific
theater. In addition to providing forces to the Central Command
for Operation Enduring Freedom, we are focused on two primary
terror threats related to al Qaeda, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
in the Philippines, and the Jemaah Islamiyah, an al Qaeda
surrogate spread throughout Southeast Asia.
Last year we responded to the request of the Philippines to
provide training, advice, and assistance to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in southern Mindanao, including Basilan Island,
then an Abu Sayyaf stronghold. This 6-month effort provided a
template to help the Republic of the Philippines develop a
lasting counterterrorist capability. As a result, we have seen
the beginning of stability on Basilan, the terrorists have been
separated from the people, and normal activity, like children
going back to school, has returned.
There is clearly more to be done. The ASG is
reconstituting, have been active in bombing campaigns, and are
looking for outside support, and we have an active exercise and
a security assistance program in place to contribute to build
the counterterrorist capability that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines needs.
The Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI, has had cells in Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, has attacked American and other
interests throughout the region. This group was also
responsible for the tragic Bali bombing which killed some 200
people, many of them Australian. We are focused on the JI and
are pleased with the cooperation of our friends in the region,
including the investigations by the Government of Indonesia to
apprehend and bring these terrorists to justice. Over 130 JI
members have been arrested or detained to date.
Our Service components are enjoying the highest readiness
that I can recall in my 32 years of service. For example, in
January, all six Pacific Command aircraft carriers were
underway simultaneously, five with full air wings embarked. I
can provide similar examples for all the Services in the
Pacific componency.
Our warfighting readiness will benefit from future
developments of missile defenses, increased stocks of
precision-guided munitions, improved anti-submarine warfare
capabilities, increased intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, and improved air and sealift to speed
our forces to future conflicts.
Our quality-of-service concept in the Pacific includes the
traditional quality-of-life initiatives plus the facilities,
the spare parts, and the information technology necessary for
satisfaction and efficiency on the job. You should know that I
am a big fan of this new and present generation. They are
smart, engaging, and unafraid of hard work, and they well
represent our Nation and its values around the globe.
Morale and retention are high and we appreciate your
support of the defense budget, including the improved readiness
funding and the pay raises that demonstrate part of your
continuing commitment to our people.
Our longstanding bilateral alliances in the Pacific, our
solid friendships, and the presence of our forward-deployed
combat forces are the constants that ensure the region's peace
and stability. Northeast Asia is a center of gravity for our
Asian Pacific security and our alliance with Japan is
fundamental to that security. Japan has been aggressive and a
strong partner in the global war on terrorism. In my judgment
our relationship with Japan has never been stronger.
Our alliance with South Korea is also solid. It has been
the basis for peace and prosperity in South Korea for 50 years
and will continue to serve our mutual security interests even
after the lessening of tensions on the Peninsula. North Korea's
provocative actions over the past 6 months have not changed
that fundamental truth.
Australia is our special partner and friend in the Pacific.
The Australians have demonstrated courage and leadership in
regional efforts from Afghanistan to Bali to East Timor and we
continue to work to eliminate barriers to interoperability
between our forces.
Our relationships with Thailand and the Philippines, as I
have already described, also demonstrate cooperation and
partnership in regional and global security initiatives. The
contributions by good friends in the region are really
numerous. Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and more recently
India have all participated in the global war on terrorism,
with contributions ranging from intelligence sharing to over-
flight access to combat forces.
Our final priority is to promote change and improve our
Asian-Pacific defense posture for the future. Pacific Command
is synchronizing transformational efforts to produce rule
improvements in six key areas, which include: first, updating
our plans to meet current and emerging threats within our new
force planning construct.
Second is strengthening command and control relationships,
including maturing the standing joint force headquarters
concept.
Third is improving our force posture and our footprint in
ways that improve our ability to respond to threats more
rapidly while minimizing adverse impact on our allies and
friends.
Fourth, we need to increase capabilities for immediate
employment, and here I am talking about once again missile
defense, global strike capabilities, the nuclear-powered cruise
missile attack submarine (SSGN), and improvements in
intelligence assets to increase our warning of potential
threats.
Fifth, we need to harness those capabilities in new
operating patterns and concepts, such as the Navy's
expeditionary strike group, the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat
Team, and high-speed vessels.
Finally, increasing opportunities for diversified access
and in or out logistics to reassure allies, build reliable
options for contingency planning, and improve training
alternatives to relieve the pressure on overstressed locations.
These six areas encompass the primary focus of our
transformational efforts in the Pacific. On behalf of the men
and women of the Pacific Command, let me offer my sincere
appreciation for your support and for the opportunity to report
on the posture of the United States Pacific Command. I
certainly look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Fargo follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, USN

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and
women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you for this
opportunity to testify on security in the Asia-Pacific region.
Having served as Commander, United States Pacific Command
(CDRUSPACOM) over the past year, and previously serving as Commander,
United States Pacific Fleet for 30 months, has fortified my belief that
a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region is of paramount
importance to our country and the world. In contrast, an Asia that is
uncertain presents grave dangers to our Nation and the security of our
friends and allies in the region.
We have a number of security concerns, and they are addressed
clearly in our National military strategy and supporting guidance:

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
Miscalculation over the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir
Transnational threats like terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and illegal
drug trade
Instability associated with a failing nation-state or
humanitarian crisis, and
Ensuring the readiness of our forward deployed forces
in the region.

We are not facing these concerns alone. Since the terrorist attacks
of 11 September and over the past year, we have had unprecedented
cooperation in combating and supporting the global war on terrorism and
backing from concerned neighbors to stop the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. We have continued to build on the longstanding
bilateral alliances and friendships necessary to deter regional
aggression and coercion, dissuade military competition, and assure our
allies and friends of our commitment to them and the region. We've
accomplished this by our forward presence in the theater and by the
actions of our forces as they execute tasks and operations in support
of our Nation's security. In short, we have begun a journey to
``operationalize'' the strategic guidance we have received. Our
destination is a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.
Last year during my confirmation hearing, I provided five broad
priorities for Pacific Command. Since then, I've used the priorities as
a roadmap for focusing the command, directing operational initiatives
and assessing progress. Today, my intent is to provide you an update on
these priorities as they pertain to the defense posture of the U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM).
Sustaining and Supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
Our highest USPACOM priority is sustaining and supporting the GWOT.
This includes not only operations in the Pacific, but also as a force
provider to Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), or wherever
international terrorism might threaten our interests worldwide.
Although we don't have any Government-supported sanctuaries for
terrorists in the Pacific, terrorist cells and organizations that
operate in the region provide unique challenges to USPACOM and to the
countries in which they proliferate.
GWOT Update. Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al
Qaeda pose the most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly
interests in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Bolstered by
financial and technical support from al Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI) network and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines
have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S. and Western
interests. Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure
these terrorists do not destabilize established governments in the
region or threaten Americans or our friends. Regional alliances and
partnerships are critical to achieving both our short-term goal of
eradicating regional terrorist groups and our long-term goal of
establishing a security environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region
that rejects terrorism and addresses the factors that breed terrorists.
Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002,
including the bombings of tourist nightclubs on the Indonesian island
of Bali on 12 October that killed nearly 200 civilians, including seven
Americans, and a series of bombings across the Philippines also in
October. We believe the ASG was responsible for the attacks in the
Philippines that killed at least 22 people--including a U.S.
serviceman--and wounded over 200 others. Coincident investigations and
arrests in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
and Australia have revealed an extensive, sophisticated network,
centered on the Jemaah Islamiyah, that continues to plan attacks
against U.S. and Western diplomatic interests and less defensible
commercial or tourist venues across the region. We have credible
information that al Qaeda has long sought to expand its movement in
Southeast Asia. By leveraging its connections with sympathetic groups
and individuals, some previously trained in Afghanistan, al Qaeda seeks
to expand its network and obtain the support of local proponents in
establishing a regional pan-Islamic state supportive of radical Islamic
ideology.
To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have
strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year. Regional
governments have made progress achieving counterterrorism goals through
legislation that combats terrorism and its resource methods, by
capturing and detaining terrorists, and through interagency
coordination and intelligence sharing. To date, over 100 terrorist
suspects have been arrested or detained, primarily in Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia. The U.S. Government has
designated JI, the ASG, and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This action enables
us to identify and freeze the financial assets of these groups and sets
the conditions for their isolation. Governments in the region are also
increasing their cooperation with regional counterparts--forming
bilateral and multilateral alliances to combat terrorist activity.
ASEAN's plan to establish a regional Counterterrorism Center in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia is a noteworthy example. USPACOM continues to support
the efforts of these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve the
effectiveness of regional armed forces, and promote democratic ideals
of pluralism and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is to use
international, regional, and local relationships to defeat terrorism
through coordinated diplomacy, education, information operations, and
the use of force when necessary. This is our challenge--and we will
meet it.
We've learned a great deal about terrorism in Southeast Asia over
the past year: how these entities organize, how they operate, and what
they seek to achieve. We realize we have much more to learn and to
accomplish. I am convinced that our best approach is to disrupt
terrorist activities where we can while helping build our regional
partners' capabilities to do the same. It is a team effort.
To better synchronize our efforts in combating terrorism in the
Pacific, we have assumed the offensive while putting in place an
``active defense.'' Offensively, we established a full time Joint
Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG-CT) at
USPACOM Headquarters. Defensively, we designated our Army component,
U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), as our Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC)
for Hawaii; Commander, Pacific Representative--Guam (COMPAC- REPGUAM)
as our JRAC for Guam; and Commander, Alaska Command (ALCOM) as Joint
Task Force--Alaska. These command and control constructs are
successfully prosecuting the war on terror while protecting our forces
and critical infrastructure.
JIACG-CT. We have established a Joint Interagency Coordination
Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG/CT) to coordinate DOD and other
Government agency (OGA) activities in USPACOM AOR, develop targets for
future military or OGA operations, plan USPACOM regional and country
counterterrorism (CT) campaigns, and enhance U.S. and partner nation CT
capabilities in support of national objectives in the GWOT. It is an
all-encompassing and focused effort, where we are now integrating our
Theater Country Teams to assess host-nation concerns and necessary
conditions to proceed with our CT campaign. This team endeavor has been
extremely successful as demonstrated by the actions of regional
countries that are supporting U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan and
regional operations, like those in the Philippines, while conducting CT
operations in their own countries--all in the past year.
Forward and Deployed Forces. Within the last year, the U.S.S. Kitty
Hawk, John C. Stennis, Carl Vinson, Constellation, and Abraham Lincoln
battlegroups; maritime patrol aircraft; U.S.S. Peleliu, Bonhomme-
Richard, Belleau Wood, and Tarawa Amphibious Ready Groups with the
11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units; 5th, 11th, and 13th Air
Forces; and the 509th Bomber and 40th Air Expeditionary Wings have
deployed in support of major roles in OEF-A and operations in the
Persian Gulf. Further, many USPACOM countries continue to provide
tangible support to OEF-A within their means. Australia, India, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have
all contributed support ranging from overflight, access and basing to
escort, logistics, and troops on the ground. We appreciate their many
contributions and valuable cooperation.
Regional Counterterrorism. Information sharing between countries in
the Pacific has provided unprecedented insights into the Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda networks in the Asia-Pacific region. As a
result, Singapore and Malaysia have arrested dozens of members of JI,
the primary transnational terrorist organization in the Pacific with
links to al Qaeda. Indonesia has arrested suspected terrorist leaders
and bombing suspects since the October bombings in Bali. However,
Indonesia has a difficult problem and has factions that do not want to
aggressively investigate groups within Indonesia sympathetic to al
Qaeda. We need to cooperate more effectively at all levels with
Indonesia on terrorism. An International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program for Indonesia is key to our engagement effort.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) continues
to attack terrorist infrastructure and capabilities in the Philippines
and throughout the region. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is firmly
on our side in the GWOT--strongly supporting the effort. Our advice and
assistance, including our maintenance and training packages provided
under security assistance authorities, are improving the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) CT capabilities. Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for U.S. forces to
advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills necessary to
fight terrorists. Additionally, the infrastructure improvements to
roads, hospitals, and schools and the construction of water wells on
Basilan Island under DOD's humanitarian and civic assistance program
provide positive impacts on local communities--highlighting America's
positive role while assisting the Philippines in dealing with the
socio-economic causes that entice disenfranchised Filipinos to support
terrorist activities. As a result of this well integrated operation,
the ASG is on the run on Basilan and its influence with the local
populace there has been dampened.
USPACOM's Antiterrorism Program is proactive and dynamic in its
approach to protect our people and resources throughout the Pacific. It
is an ``active defense'' because it has offensive qualities. Since 11
September, we have come a long way in better protecting DOD personnel
and critical infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.
Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii,
Japan, and Korea are the focal points for force protection,
coordinating security measures and intelligence fusion among the
different services in their AORs. JRACs provide the command and control
construct to synchronize our DOD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/
FP) efforts for military installations and property with Federal,
State, and local agencies and with the host nations in the cases of
Japan and Korea. USPACOM's JRACs are models for interagency
coordination, combined scenario-based training events, and
unprecedented cooperation and information sharing. We are working
continuously with U.S. Northern Command to standardize and synchronize
our efforts and procedures.
USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program that
covers DOD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas in the AOR that
are not under U.S. control. We use assessment teams from the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to
ensure our facilities have current assessments and proactive
antiterrorism plans. USPACOM personnel work closely with their
Department of State counterparts to ensure host-nation support is
adequate to protect our deployed forces and that all are employing the
latest AT/FP procedures.
Force protection is ``operationalized'' in USPACOM. Our staff
continually monitors threat information and the environment in which
our forces are based. Theater and country specific Force Protection
Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and upgraded as necessary.
Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate terrorist
planning. USPACOM also has a travel restriction program, providing a
tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof ``off-limits'' to
DOD members, thus keeping them out of harm's way. In addition, Force
protection plans are required for all travel in our AOR, from major
unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource drain from
increased FPCONs is a formidable challenge to both manpower limitations
and Force Protection Technology initiatives. Your continued support is
necessary to sustain the progress we are making in this area.
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program and Homeland
Security. Currently, we support Homeland Security and Forward Base
security efforts primarily through Information Analysis,
Infrastructure/Personnel Protection, and Quick Reaction Forces. The
Critical Infrastructure Program is our operational initiative to
improve security in the AOR. The program is on track in developing
processes and methodologies. The first CIP Appendix to one of our
theater Operational Plans (OPLAN) will go to the Joint Staff on 30
April 2003. Additionally, a comprehensive USPACOM CIP Operation Order
(OPORD), our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, is in final
staffing. Notably, the program has resulted in a partnership with the
Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures to develop
and field a prototype Combatant Command CIP Database in May 2003.
Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS). With the recent
direction to consolidate the security, defense, and support for the
homeland, we are working to integrate existing functions as well as
expanded mission requirements to enhance our protection of the USPACOM
Homeland AOR that includes the State of Hawaii, the Territories of Guam
and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands. Programs such as the JRAC, CIP, Homeland Air Security (HAS),
Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,
and high yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations are
but a few of those being combined into one plan to maximize our
capabilities and still refine the use of our resources. USPACOM's HAS
mission deters, prevents or interdicts aerial threats and aggression
directed toward Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and U.S. territories within
USPACOM's AOR. The HAS air threat spectrum ranges from ballistic
missiles and aircraft to future low-altitude cruise missiles and radio
controlled sub-scale aircraft. The potential for a terrorist to gain
this capability is rising. USPACOM has addressed this challenge with
close integration, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among
international, Federal, State, local agencies, and governments. This
fusion of individual agency capabilities, including our military, into
an integrated, multi-layered response is key to our collective success.
USPACOM also supports other non-Homeland Security functions. Civil
Support operations will be an enhancement of our existing Domestic
Support Operations to the Homeland. Although not directly related to
securing the homeland against terrorism, this support affects the
impact of terrorist action. With Secretary of Defense direction, we
quickly support the Department of Homeland in mitigation and recovery
efforts relating to natural disasters. Typhoon Pongsona in Guam is a
good example. The USPACOM HLD/CS program has taken on a renewed effort
with great scope and responsibilities. Our Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
will build on our processes for intelligence sharing, AT/FP, CIP,
CBRNE, and natural disasters as well as other requested support to the
civilian sector, providing a comprehensive program for Hawaii, Guam,
and all our territories in the AOR.
Information fusion. USPACOM's Counterintelligence Program remains
the key link between DOD and Law Enforcement Agency efforts in the
Pacific Theater. We are committed to furthering the integration efforts
of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group--Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-
CT) and counterintelligence missions with the FBI's Joint Terrorism
Task Forces and with allied international agencies. Along these lines,
we are pioneering efforts to promulgate all-source intelligence fusion
to connect local, state, national, and DOD intelligence,
counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. These efforts,
coupled with a joint international training regimen encompassing
asymmetric warfare and analysis from multiple perspectives, hold great
promise in developing an ``actionable intelligence'' capability.
Manpower Requirements. Legislation mandates reductions in Higher
Headquarters (HHQ) staffs by 15 percent. USPACOM and our sub-unified
commands are executing these reductions in ways that will minimize the
impact on our missions. The need for intelligence gathering, analysis,
production, coordination, dissemination, campaign planning, and
capabilities testing in exercises and coalition building is greater
than ever. Adequate manpower resources are essential to mission
planning to counter emerging asymmetric threats. Achieving synergy of
forces launched from around the globe during conflicts while providing
effective reach-back for those forces creates high mission demand on
our combatant headquarters (HQ) staff.
The GWOT has created additional manpower requirements. Increased
security patrols, both shore-based and waterside, in response to
enhanced FPCONs; non-U.S. controlled port and airfield assessment
teams; 24/7 coverage for JRACs and Crisis Action Teams; and the already
expanding Homeland Defense, Civil Support and CT missions are a few
examples of manpower generating tasks. Additional AT/FP billets are
needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism,
and CT missions throughout USPACOM. As we continue to develop the
Homeland Defense and Civil Support plan, we already see the need for
enhanced information analysis capabilities and consequence management
resources for CBRNE events.
Integrating reservists. Throughout the 1990s, we increasingly
relied on our Reserve and Guard members to help accomplish our mission.
These outstanding service members/citizens contributed not only hard
work, but also unique talents and perspectives. It is not an
understatement to say that they have helped in every facet of the
USPACOM mission. After 11 September, with the sharply increasing
demands of the GWOT, we needed their support. Throughout USPACOM, we
only mobilized about 5,000 reservists--about 10 percent of the
immediate 11 September mobilized force capability. They helped with
force protection, logistics flow, and increased shifts in a myriad of
areas. As we continue to tap into our reservists and National Guardsmen
to support operations, we need to ensure they receive benefits
comparable to our active duty service members. America can be proud of
how our Reserve and Guard Forces have responded.
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF). USPACOM
received $3.98 million in CbT RIF funding in fiscal year 2002. The
fiscal year 2003 worldwide allocation stands at $47 million. This
initiative provides the Geographic and Functional Commanders additional
avenues for resourcing against emergent and emergency terrorist
threats. USPACOM received $4.14 million (10 projects) of the $32.4
million available in the first allocation of fiscal year 2003 funding,
not including $2.56 million (14 projects) for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
USPACOM funded CbT RIF projects include emergency Explosive Ordnance
Disposal responder gear for USARPAC; a perimeter wall for the new
USPACOM Headquarters; vehicle gates and barriers for Tripler Army
Hospital; mass notification system for Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan;
closed circuit television for Fort Buckner; gates for Yokota AB, Japan
flight line; barrier gates for Fort Shafter; crash barriers for Camp
Zama, Japan; and a standoff initiative with HQs security upgrades for
Yokota AB.
Special Operation Forces (SOF). USPACOM, through Special Operations
Command, Pacific and JTF-510, maintains the ability to deploy SOF under
the command of a general officer to any location to combat terrorism.
We have used this capability in Operation Enduring Freedom--Philippines
and continue to refine it to support the GWOT. This capability,
however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting
allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relationships
through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater
Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. We look forward to working with
the Congress to ensure these activities continue to receive future
resource consideration.
Improving Readiness and Joint Warfighting Capability
Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of USPACOM
Forces is critical to assuring our friends and allies, dissuading
future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against
U.S. interests, and defeating an adversary if deterrence fails. It
includes the force levels, spares, operating dollars, and training
needed to maintain ready forces. It also means innovating,
transforming, and improving our capabilities and developing operating
concepts and technologies needed to keep our forces ready for a wide
range of alternative futures.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The GWOT and
traditional regional military threats demand ever-increasing agility
and innovation in military intelligence. In the Asia-Pacific region,
Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) remains our best means to provide timely
information on threat developments and intentions. It is key to
tracking terrorist activities in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well
as maintaining warning indicators and situational awareness on areas
such as Korea, tensions between India and Pakistan, and China's
continuing military modernization and relations with Taiwan.
The ability to integrate National Security Agency (NSA) and service
SIGINT is vital in peacetime and in crisis. Rapid advances in
telecommunications technologies, and their use by adversaries, present
a daunting SIGINT challenge. I strongly support NSA's transformation
efforts to defeat any perspective gains the digital technology
revolution may present to our enemies.
I strongly advocate the accelerated development and fielding of
joint, interoperable, modular, rapidly reconfigurable tactical SIGINT
equipment for land, sea, and air platforms. These improvements should
be balanced by collaborative intelligence processing systems at
national, theater, and tactical levels to make the best use of the
increased data obtained.
Without concurrent improvements in NSA's capabilities and in
service cryptologic systems it will be increasingly difficult to
predict, find, and target the most serious threats in our region.
Substantial improvements are needed to enhance Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) collection capability against key USPACOM Indications and
Warning requirements, to include hard and deeply buried underground
facilities supporting the adversary's command, control, and
communications and WMD infrastructure. Focused and coordinated source
development is critical. Sustained resources for both CIA and DOD
(Defense HUMINT Services) will yield the progress we need. Our military
commands must have insight into enemy plans and intentions that only
good HUMINT can provide.
Cryptolinguists remain a long-standing shortfall with Operation
Enduring Freedom proving the value of personnel fluent in languages and
dialects. We are partially meeting the current challenges by training
cryptolinguists to become familiar with low-density dialects and using
speakers fluent in these dialects to augment our force. Ensuring the
Defense Manpower Data Center's Automated Language Finder database
tracks all USPACOM languages and dialects would significantly improve
our ability to find speakers of languages/dialects required for future
operations. Additionally, it is essential the Defense Language
Institute develop tests for languages/dialects that accurately assess
language skills of service personnel.
To support future contingencies, crises or OPLANs, we require a
full-up and exercised joint ISR architecture with adequate ISR assets.
One positive development sponsored by the U.S. Air Force is the multi-
intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
(TPED) environment with the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) at
Hickam Air Force Base (AFB). This system will distribute data from
theater, commercial, and tactical ISR sensors to multiple users--
national, joint, and combined--involved in a crisis. To fully benefit
from the DCGS, additional funding is needed to ensure USPACOM service
components have a sustained airborne ISR infrastructure, to include
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and extended tether U-2 high-altitude
surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\). Over the
past 3 years, improving the C\4\ posture in the Pacific has been a top
USPACOM priority and still is one of the most critical challenges we
face today. The C\4\ infrastructure must be continually sustained and
protected. We've invested heavily in command and control systems and
equipment, communication devices, and computers across the command. We
do this because our current and future requirements demand that we do.
For example, the Air Force recently declared initial operating
capability for a new Air Operations Center at Hickam AFB in Hawaii.
This function can deploy in part or as a whole to operate through the
full spectrum of contingency operations, reaching back for support from
the rest of the Air Operations Center at Hickam. Every planning action,
training event, operation, and weapon system in existence today relies
heavily on the ability to communicate. Providing our fighting men and
women with the weapons they need comes with a large price tag, but it's
worth it. To do otherwise would be tantamount to denying them
ammunition in the heat of battle.
C-4 Challenges. The GWOT demands effective communication systems
and equipment to link national authorities and local first responders
with real-time information. We have made great strides in improving C4
capabilities in the Pacific Theater, but we must continue improvements
at a rapid pace to keep up with expanding requirements for
connectivity, capacity and security. C4 ties all technology together
and is the underpinning for Transformation, both directly and
indirectly. We must enhance our information infrastructure to be more
robust, able to rapidly capitalize on improving technology, and more
cost efficient.
To achieve information superiority we need to move large volumes of
information to and from the warfighter to maintain vivid and complete
situational awareness and achieve understanding at a glance. Many folks
envision large volumes of information as pages and pages of text
messages, which can overwhelm users and result in ``information
overload.'' Instead, we are talking about maximum use of multi-media
such as video, shared applications through collaboration software, and
high-resolution imagery. Through these types of tools, our operators
can digest more information and we can collectively move towards a more
knowledge-based environment.
This type of capability requires large network capacity. Our
warfighting requirements for remote and austere locations require that
this network capacity be robust and resilient. Enhanced satellite
capability is one of USPACOM's most critical needs. Today we do not
have enough bandwidth in any of the military satellite bands, Ultra,
Super, or Extra High Frequency, to fully support our operational plans.
Commercial SATCOM capacity can support much of this shortfall, however,
commercial SATCOM availability is subject to market pressures and is
not fully dependable. For example, an important commercial SATCOM
service to the Navy was preempted by media coverage of the 2000
Olympics in Sydney, Australia.
Additionally, USPACOM principally relies on geo-stationary weather
satellites to track destructive typhoons over the vast expanse of
USPACOM's ocean areas. Our current geo-stationary satellite weather
information comes from foreign-owned and operated satellites that are
reaching their designed service lives.
Consequently, it is absolutely crucial to fully fund and keep on
track satellite upgrades, launches of new communications and weather
satellites, and new satellite programs. The Transformational
Communication System (TCS) system being proposed by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for C3I looks promising for meeting our SATCOM
needs.
Our terrestrial communication infrastructure also needs attention.
Most of our bases, posts, camps and stations are supported by mid 20th
century cable and wire technology. The Global Information Grid (GIG)
Bandwidth Expansion Project promises to replace this legacy
infrastructure with the fiber optic connectivity needed for our in-
garrison forces, command centers and training facilities.
Radio communications that connect us with Federal, state and local
government agencies are also important for force protection, homeland
security and disaster response. We appreciate the congressional support
for the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System (PACMERS), which will
help us meet National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) mandate for frequency consolidation and allow for excellent
interoperability with non-military partners.
Information Assurance and Information Sharing. Communication
connectivity and capacity are only part of the solution for network
centric warfare. Communication and information security must be
maintained while simultaneously sharing information and collaborating
with bilateral and multilateral coalitions. Our ability to share
information with coalition partners is inhibited by our need to
restrict information within enclaves that are not accessible to
coalition partners. To be network centric, we need the network to be
agile and allow for the dynamic interconnection of nodes that support
several communities of interest. Typically, we can have several
simultaneous operations involving different coalition partners
occurring in the Pacific at any given time. Being able to support these
concurrently, with sufficient network capacity, is an information
technology challenge.
Our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN) initiative is
helping us achieve this goal by developing an information system that
is interoperable with U.S. and coalition forces and is agile enough to
allow us to selectively collaborate in multiple joint/multi-national
environments simultaneously. We have formed a strong partnership with
CENTCOM to roll our COWAN solution into the Combined Enterprise
Information Exchange System, CENTRIXS, which may become the single
network environment for all joint forces to support coalition
operations and intelligence networking requirements. This single,
highly meshed environment would be much more responsive and financially
efficient than the multiple networks required today to support each
individual coalition community.
Communication and information security measures are both part of
our comprehensive Information Assurance strategy. As the Internet
expands and becomes more pervasive, our adversaries are continuously
finding ways of using computer vulnerabilities and network weaknesses
to deny access to our information resources or exploit our information
content. There are many programs focused on information assurance
involving encryption, intrusion detection and network emergency
response. Coordination of these programs and computer network defense
activities requires a highly trained team of network professionals
working around the clock with and a strong relationship with the Joint
Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF CNO). I cannot cite any
single program that is more important than any other in the Information
Assurance area; however, emphasis in this area is a must if we expect
to rely on network centric operations.
With regard to information sharing, we have made great strides in
gathering and taking advantage of ``open source'' information and
providing it to our coalition and inter-agency partners to build trust
and improve understanding. The vast amount of this information
necessitates focused collection and analytical efforts to identify
accurate and relevant information to enhance security cooperation. Open
source products provided by the Virtual Information Center (VIC) and
the regional information exchanges conducted via the Asia-Pacific Area
Network (APAN) have increased our situational awareness of events and
developments in the Asia-Pacific region that affect all of our
operations. More importantly, these web-based activities have enabled
us to expand our information base and share the results instantly with
our foreign counterparts and potential coalition partners.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The Pacific undersea warfare
challenge is growing at a significant rate. In recent years, the
USPACOM AOR has seen the greatest increase in submarine order of battle
in the world. A robust and integrated ASW architecture and more capable
force structure are essential to counter the growing submarine threat.
The premier ASW asset remains submarines. To ensure sufficient
submarines are available to track and kill enemy forces, we must
continue to support the refueling of 688-class submarines and follow
through in reaching a Virginia-class submarine build rate at two per
year in fiscal year 2007. I also strongly support the rapid transition
to acquiring Automatic Periscope Detection technology for surface ships
and Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft employed in littoral regions.
Congressional efforts last year resulted in funding for a welcomed and
much needed 688-class submarine refueling overhaul program and funding
that enabled the transition from a science and technology program to an
acquisition program for airborne Automatic Periscope Detection
technology. I appreciate your support as we make necessary improvements
in our ASW war fighting capabilities.
Missile Defense (MD). Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
pose the most pervasive and challenging missile threat for USPACOM MD.
Effectively defending against this threat requires a layered,
complementary mix of sea and ground based lower tier and upper tier
terminal phase defense systems. Until a robust upper tier system is
fielded, lower tier systems remain paramount to successful execution of
theater OPLANs. A mix of forward deployed ground systems and sea-based
lower tier systems offers the lowest risk and earliest deployment
options. Accordingly, I support delivery of a sea-based terminal system
as soon as technologically feasible and a moderate increase in Patriot
PAC-3/GEM+ missile production/conversion to meet current OPLAN and
contingency plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements. From a homeland
defense perspective, continued development and fielding of a Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of intercepting missiles in all
phases of flight (i.e. boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all
known threats remains a top priority. Key capabilities that support
these requirements, now and in the future (Missile Defense Agency's
Block 2004-2006 BMDS capabilities), for USPACOM include PATRIOT PAC-3,
Sea Based Midcourse Defense Segment, Theater High Altitude Air Defense,
and Airborne Laser \1/2\ power. Congressional support of the BMDS
programs remains vigilant, and I applaud your continued support of
Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives.
Mobility and Operations. During 2002, we made great strides
partnering with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to modernize
our strategic air and sealift infrastructure to meet potential
operational needs ranging from disaster relief to the GWOT and all the
way to a major war. The USPACOM En Route Infrastructure Steering
Committee has identified, validated, and championed over $500 million
in hydrant, ramp, and runway projects throughout the AOR to support the
National Military Strategy as mandated by the Defense Planning Guidance
and by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005. Our current en route
airlift system includes Elmendorf AFB Alaska, Hickam AFB Hawaii,
Andersen AFB Guam, and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Kadena AB,
Misawa AB, and Yokota AB Japan. Additionally, we have developed an AOR-
wide prioritized list of air and seaports to visit and assess their
capability as potential en route locations.
The heavy use of Naval Supply Facility in Diego Garcia, a British
Island in the Indian Ocean, in support of OEF, has led to its near-term
consideration as an en route port supporting both USPACOM and USCENTCOM
operations. We have identified over $38.7 million in infrastructure
improvement projects to expand the facility's current operational
throughput capability. Projects nearing completion include improvements
in temporary containerized munitions handling pads and storage areas,
wharf lightning protection, and transient berthing projects. Similarly
at Wake Island, we have identified significant infrastructure
improvement projects to ensure continued access to this critical
location supporting our Pacific Tanker Air Bridge. The fiscal year 2002
MILCON $9.7 million Repair Island Access Facilities is currently
restoring the wharf and marine bulkhead in preparation for major
airfield pavement replacement starting with the fiscal year 2003 MILCON
$24.9 million, which replaces the entire deteriorated runway pavement.
Following that, four more phases in fiscal year 2004 and beyond will
complete replacement of the airfield taxiways and aprons and upgrade of
the water supply, electrical power and sanitary sewage systems, for an
additional $74 million. These investments and others like them
throughout the Pacific will ensure we have the necessary infrastructure
readiness when we need them.
As early deployers, air-refueling tankers are critical to executing
theater war plans for establishing the Pacific Tanker Air Bridge.
Ongoing OEF and Noble Eagle have demonstrated the operational impact
that air-refueling capability has in support of the GWOT. The KC-135
aircraft comprises 90 percent of the tanker fleet and their usage
increased 45 percent over what was programmed following 11 September
2001.
The High Speed Vessel (HSV) provides a flexible alternative for
intra-theater movement in USPACOM, including its use to augment
airlift. Since October 2001, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has
been testing and evaluating deployments using a leased HSV with great
success and cost savings for exercise deployments and redeployments, as
well as operational employment. Joint Venture HSV X1, the Joint Army/
Navy HSV that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 and other
exercises, was scheduled to support U.S. Army training in the USPACOM
Theater from March to April 2003, but was diverted to support U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM). USPACOM fully supports the pursuit of high
speed sealift technology as an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) and a future force projection transportation
platform.
USPACOM supports USAF and USTRANSCOM efforts to procure C-17
aircraft to meet strategic airlift needs in our AOR. Our number one
strategic lift shortfall is airlift due largely to the retirement of
aging C-141 and C-130 airframes and substandard C-5 aircraft
performance. Additionally, to better meet operational response in the
AOR, we fully support the initiative to forward base eight C-17s each
at Hickam AFB, and Elmendorf AFB starting in fiscal year 2006 and
fiscal year 2007 respectively. To have facilities available on arrival
of these aircraft, Hickam's C-17 beddown military construction (MILCON)
will start in fiscal year 2004 with six projects totaling $64 million.
Elmendorf's C-17 beddown MILCON will start in fiscal year 2005 and the
MILCON funding stream for these facilities will total about $105
million each over the fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009 MILCON FYDP
to provide the needed facilities for these assets to have full mission
capability. These strategic mobility aircraft will bring a much-needed
aerial delivery capacity to the Pacific Theater and prevent any lapse
in capability during the reduction of C-130s in the AOR. We also
support USAF efforts to procure F/A-22 Raptors. The F/A-22 will provide
a unique, rapid response to swiftly defeat enemy threats in the USPACOM
AOR.
A V-22 Osprey tiltrotor capability is truly transformational--
exhibiting leap-ahead technology. If the current test program proves
successful, this capability will extend our operational reach and
access in the AOR. The Osprey's projected design, performance, and
reduced vulnerability and susceptibility will provide USPACOM with a
highly survivable and flexible capability. The aircraft's enhanced lift
abilities provide significant migration for the medium-lift
requirement.
The Pacific region needs three of the six planned Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams (SBCTs) to fully support theater warfighting capabilities
and region transformation efforts. The primary military force of our
friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region is their Army. SBCT
participation in regional events reinforces our commitment to support
allied transformation efforts and coalition building by continuing
Army-to-Army high technology training and exercise events.
Additionally, the SBCTs show great promise in providing joint
commanders the means to better integrate Army force capabilities as
part of a joint or coalition task force.
Training Areas. We are tasked to perform an increasing number of
missions, from peace operations to strikes and raids to noncombatant
evacuation to humanitarian assistance. Each mission requires
preparation. The only way to prepare and ensure readiness is through
tough, oriented, and realistic training. Dropping dummy bombs and
firing inert ordnance cannot replace ``live-fire'' practice. The first
exposure to ``live fire'' our forces face must be in a controlled
training environment where they learn from their experience at less
risk than in hostile combat.
However, we routinely receive encroachment pressure on our training
ranges throughout the AOR. Restrictions on space, hours, ordnance, and
radio frequencies impact our ability to exercise our equipment and
train to standard. Last spring, a suit pertaining to the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA) temporarily closed our primary aircraft live-fire
range, Farrallon de Medinilla, near Guam, until the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals granted an emergency stay. Fortunately, timely congressional
action amended the MBTA to exempt DOD military readiness activities,
and a subsequent appellate court order dismissed the case as moot.
Likewise, Makua Range on Oahu is in use but severe limits in the number
and type of ground force training cycles have forced us to accomplish
most small unit training in Hawaii through expensive deployments to the
Pohakuloa range on the Big Island. Range and training limitations in
Japan and Korea cause units to deploy away from their home station for
routine training. Moreover, although aircraft, artillery, and pistols
are noisy instruments of war, they are basic parts of our business.
Developments now demand noise restrictions that force important low-
altitude maneuvers to unrealistically high altitudes and limit the use
of ranges.
We are good stewards of our environment. Success stories are
numerous, but often the stories aren't well known. We have set aside
space for protected species, altered or deferred some units' training
to avoid interference in nesting areas, and developed specific programs
to increase the populations of protected or endangered species.
The military's answer to encroachment challenges has been to work
around the problems while seeking to minimize the impact on the quality
and quantity of training. But, maneuver space is less, training lanes
have become narrow and artificially tunneled, and our individual
maneuvers have become too predictable or repetitive. The work-arounds
may still accomplish the training, but usually require additional
costs--in terms of money, time, and impact to the well-being of our
service members. Readiness and training experiences decline; we cannot
let this continue.
Many of our environmental laws, while well intentioned, are vague.
For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits
harassment of protected species without prior authorization from the
respective regulatory agency. The current definition of ``harassment''
of marine mammals can be mere ``annoyance'' or ``potential to disturb''
without biologically significant effects. Any Navy test or training
activity that harasses a protected species must be approved by the
applicable regulatory agencies--often after delays, or subject to
restrictions, that degrade the quality of the training. Sometimes
inflexibilities in the statue preclude our regulators from approving
even activities that many believe have insignificant impacts.
Additionally, litigants using the Endangered Species Act are seeking to
force the Fish and Wildlife Service to lock up thousands of acres of
military ranges as ``critical habitat'', even though our own
congressionally-mandated Installation Natural Resource Management Plans
afford habitat protection. In fact, litigants are seeking to force the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate such critical habitat on
significant areas of DOD training ranges for endangered species that
are not even present on such lands. As these examples show, such loose
language and broad definitions can and do impede essential air, land,
and sea activities near marine mammals or endangered species locations.
Clear definitions and consideration of national security requirements
should be important points in all environmental legislation.
In April 2002, the administration sent a legislative package to
Congress recommending clarifications to certain environmental statutes
as part of the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI). The
proposed package was prepared to help DOD maintain its ability to train
forces and continue to protect the environment in which we train. Last
year, Congress enacted three elements of our proposal but did not act
on the remaining five. This year, the President has resubmitted the
remaining RRPI proposals, with some modifications based on both
discussion with Congress and other environmental stakeholders and a
significant decision last year concerning the MMPA in the SurTASS
lawsuit. We thank Congress for support of the RRPI and ask for your
support on future encroachment issues that impact our readiness.
Logistics. An aging aircraft inventory and some parts shortages
continue to drive reduced Mission Capable and reduced fill rates for
our ``go to war'' Readiness Spares Packages and high cannibalization
rates. The result is lower than expected readiness at increased costs.
Although funding for spare parts has improved over the last 2 years,
some shortages continue. For example, only three of eight Pacific Air
Force (PACAF) A-10, F-15, and F-16 wings maintained minimum Mission
Capable standards during fourth quarter fiscal year 2002. PACAF
requires excess cannibalization to meet wartime mission planning sortie
generation rates. PACAF cannibalization rates are higher than 8 percent
for the F-16, F-15C/D, F-15E, and A-10. Likewise, the U.S, Army uses
controlled substitution to achieve peacetime mission-capable Aviation
Fleet goals. Delays in stock availability due to 12-18 month spares
delivery lead-times are a root cause of controlled substitution and
create difficulty in matching funding lines with projected
capabilities. Increased spares at the Army wholesale level are required
to meet the increased flying hours necessary to surge to wartime
Operational Tempo.
We have made progress but need your continued support in fully
funding materiel and personnel requirements for organizational,
intermediate, and depot maintenance levels. Additionally, we need
support for each Service's Life Cycle Support program to extend the
life of our aging aircraft fleets.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield
Explosive (CBRNE) defense is a significant concern in the Pacific
theater, and a potential showstopper for U.S. military operations,
causing significant operational risk to Major War OPLAN execution.
CBRNE is a critical operating condition and potentially the greatest
theater threat I face, affecting everyone, everywhere, including our
allies and the homeland. Aircraft exposure on the Korean Peninsula or
an attack on a few strategic choke points, including Guam and key
Japanese air and seaports, could stop U.S. force flows and other
critical support operations. Significant differences exist between what
we would like to achieve against CBRNE threats and our actual
capabilities. Specific shortages include Individual Protective
Equipment, Chemical/Biological Point and Standoff detection, inadequate
decontamination standards, and significant shortcomings in detailed and
actionable intelligence on adversary WMD processes and facilities.
We are active in the Joint Service Installation Protection Program
and with other ongoing studies and demonstrations. For example, we are
sponsoring a Restoration Operations (RESTOPS) Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to examine the actions necessary to
protect against and immediately react to the consequences of a chemical
or biological attack at a fixed site. Through this venue, we are
investigating new tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as
exploring new detection, decontamination, early warning networks, and
medical technologies. The RESTOPS ACTD will have its final
demonstration at Osan Air Base, Korea, in February 2003. Another effort
we are sponsoring is a DOD-wide biological warfare (BW) seminar. The
DOD WMD community collectively assessed the shortfalls within DOD for
responding to enemy BW and gave us a way-ahead to resolve these issues.
We are working to integrate procedures and technologies that allow us
to mitigate the impact of such an attack. We cannot do this alone.
USPACOM needs support from the entire joint community to improve our
abilities to protect our forces and to operate in this difficult
environment should the need arise. Your continued support is critical
to CBRNE defense readiness.
Quality of Service for our Men and Women
While winning the war on terrorism and transforming our forces to
ensure a qualitative military edge, we must improve on the Quality of
Service (QOS) for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. QOS means
providing the high quality operating facilities, the tools, and the
information technology necessary for our service men and women to
achieve their goals and execute their missions with efficiency and a
minimum of frustration. My travels throughout the Asia-Pacific region--
first as Commander, Pacific Fleet, and now as Commander, Pacific
Command--confirm my belief you have done a great service to our
military members and their families in the area of personnel
entitlements.
The QOS initiatives included in the Fiscal Year 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act show service members that military and
congressional leaders are taking actions to meet the needs of our
service men and women and their families. Thank you for your support on
recent initiatives, including the 4.1 percent pay raise, assignment
incentive pay, and the ability to grant emergency leave of absence.
These QOS initiatives will assist in retaining highly skilled troops
and their families. Many USPACOM personnel will benefit from the
ability to defer their Consecutive Overseas Tours travel entitlement,
from recent increases in Basic Housing Allowance, and from the
additional Basic Allowance for Subsistence provisions in areas with
inadequate messing facilities. Deployed personnel will be more at ease
knowing that additional family assistance has been provided in the form
of childcare, education, and youth services for our men and women who
are in harm's way, supporting contingency operations and the GWOT.
Military Family Housing remains a top priority. All services have
devised plans to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007 with a
combination of traditional military construction (MILCON) and
privatization (Public Private Venture or Residential Communities
Initiative). Congressional support has provided immediate benefits to
our men and women who serve. Continued funding is essential, however,
to enable further progress in reducing the number of inadequate
quarters and in limiting out of pocket expenses to our service members
and their families while maintaining a high standard of construction
and quality. While we have made progress, we still have considerable
work remaining. We appreciate your continued attention on this
important issue.
Dorms and Barracks for our single service members is another area
where we have seen significant improvement. Our service components are
now pursuing well thought out plans to meet the fiscal year 2008 goal
of eliminating open bay berthing and central latrine-style barracks. We
must retain our current operational funding stream, however, to
maintain existing facilities as renovation proceeds. Again,
congressional support has had a direct and beneficial impact on our
young service members.
Our base infrastructure is still below standards. Sustainment,
Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) of facilities and infrastructure
throughout the USPACOM AOR continues to be an important concern. Fiscal
Year 2001 Installations Readiness Report rated about 80 percent of
USPACOM facilities at C-3 (having serious deficiencies) or C-4 (not
supporting mission requirements). In many areas, USPACOM facilities are
1940s vintage and not mission conducive. For example, modern weapons no
longer fit into WWII vintage magazines and require improved piers for
safe, proper handling. The DOD goal directs components to achieve a 67-
year recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2007 and restore readiness of
existing facilities to C-2 (minimum acceptable performance) status on
average, by the end of fiscal year 2010. Current funding puts achieving
this directive at risk. In addition to maintaining our facilities, we
have equally important infrastructure requirements above SRM needs that
require attention. These include new mission bed-downs and essential
environmental requirements. Our facilities and infrastructure provide a
foundation for optimum readiness and quality of service critical to
mission success. We appreciate Congress' past funding efforts and call
upon your continued assistance to ensure adequate facilities and proper
maintenance for the long term.
By far the most important weapons systems in our inventory are our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. These individuals require life-
cycle support and maintenance just like other systems. Force Health
Protection is that maintenance program. Ensuring the health of our
forces directly relates to our ability to implement effective disease
countermeasures that include vaccines, antibiotic stockpiles, and
automated disease surveillance systems. I ask you to continue your
support for ongoing research and development efforts that will improve
our disease detection capabilities.
The upkeep and replacement of military medical facilities remains
one of our top QOS priorities. We are working to replace or renovate
our substandard facilities, particularly for Naval Hospital, Guam,
further degraded by Typhoon Pongsona in December. We must continue to
ensure our military medical infrastructure is safe, modern, and secure.
We appreciate the MILCON appropriations to the USPACOM AOR. These
funds are vital to maintain our ability to work and fight together with
our allies and to help transform and modernize our forces. In fiscal
year 2003, $1.1 billion was allotted toward mission and mission support
requirements and $300 million toward family housing needs. In fiscal
year 2004, we need continued MILCON support for vital readiness and QOS
issues. For example, we require MILCON for new mission bed-downs, such
as the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and the C-17 aircraft. Our backlog
of major infrastructure repairs is reflected in the need for complete
or major repair of airfield pavements at all U.S. Pacific Air Force
bases, as well as the major repairs needed on critical infrastructure
at bases and long-range radar detection in defense of the homeland. In
the wake of destruction from Typhoon Pongsona in November 2002, it is
clear we require supplemental MILCON support for a ``typhoon-proof''
concrete aircraft hangar as well as several other projects at Andersen
Air Force Base, Guam. The hangar will provide reliable support for
critically important current and future Air Expeditionary Force and
OPLAN requirements. Also, we require MILCON for consistent
environmental stewardship and essential dorm and family housing
deficits and renovations. I thank Congress for using MILCON where
enhanced force protection is necessary.
The New USPACOM Headquarters is under construction and designed to
provide advanced information management, decision support and
visualization technologies for our people to efficiently accomplish
their mission.
Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) MILCON for two
schools on Guam is my top family QOS priority. One is an elementary
school that is currently not in the DODEA MILCON program due to lack of
funds. The second is a replacement high school programmed in the
DODEA's fiscal year 2006 MILCON program. Current facilities are 1997
building conversions in poor, substandard condition that received
significant damage from two typhoons in 2002. Further, numerous seismic
events over the past few years have significantly weakened the
elementary/middle school. Our military family dependents need safe,
soundly built schools conducive to a good learning environment. We need
your near-term support for these two DODEA school MILCON projects in
Guam especially in light of our increased force posture on the island.
Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC). Increasing operational and
exercise activity, training complexities, and C\4\I modernization have
rendered obsolete USPACOM's exercise simulation infrastructure and
support capabilities. This deficiency significantly reduces the ability
to train USPACOM and Joint Task Force commanders in crisis action
readiness procedures; limits their ability to rehearse key operational
orders; degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with
friends in the region; and contributes to increased OPTEMPO, training
time, and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to
contingencies. The current facility does not support future
technologies or meet force protection requirements. The planned, state-
of-the-art operations and simulation center will improve total force
readiness and achieve OSD's goal for transforming training by
exploiting emerging technologies to create a robust, networked, live,
virtual, and constructive training and mission rehearsal environment
for joint and combined force commanders and their staffs.
PWC will be a key node on the Joint National Training Center's
global grid of operational warfighting centers. Specifically, it will
fully integrate with, and extend the capability of, the Joint Forces
Command's Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center and U.S.
European Command's Warrior Preparation Center. Accordingly, the PWC
will provide an effective venue for decision support, OPLAN mission
rehearsal, and combat analysis for headquarters and deploying forces.
The planned simulation center will transform USPACOM through the use of
emerging information technologies to support advanced warfighting
concepts and joint experimentation. The PWC promises to save exercise
funds and enhance regional security cooperation using Internet-based
information exchange opportunities via the Asia-Pacific Area Network.
This MILCON project will provide a secure facility in Hawaii for
assembling military, civil-military and interagency representatives
from throughout the Asia-Pacific region for interoperability exercises,
collaborative research, and seminars. The facility will also support
component conference requirements in a secure and protected setting.
Again, much has been accomplished in QOS improvements, but we still
have more to do. Thank you again for the support you have provided and
I thank you in advance for your continued future support.
Reinforcing the ``Constants'' in the Pacific Region
Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region,
our friendships and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces
continue to be the foundation of the region's peace and stability. One
of my goals is to build on these relationships while nurturing
multinational efforts that support the region's mutual interests. Our
forward posture is fundamental and our combat capability essential to
deter regional threats. We look for initiatives that help shape our
overseas posture.
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Dramatic events of the past 2
years have brought into focus new and challenging national security
demands for the 21st century. A mix of traditional and non-traditional
threats jeopardizes the unprecedented levels of Asia-Pacific security
and prosperity of the last 50 years. These threats are reminders that
evolving challenges require more prompt and effective responses to
ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At USPACOM, we
``operationalize,'' national and defense security strategy with
regional emphasis. Attaining national security and defense objectives
in the Asia-Pacific region requires a broad understanding of threat
capabilities, a frank assessment of political-military realities, and a
well-charted course supported by meaningful and mutually beneficial
security cooperation.
Our acute theater security concerns include conflict on the Korean
Peninsula (where the stakes are high); miscalculation between regional
strategic rivals (such as China-Taiwan or India-Pakistan); and
transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation, drug-associated
violence, and instability from failed nation-states. Although we
anticipate peaceful resolution of longstanding security concerns in
places like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir, the
strategic situation in these potential flashpoints and elsewhere
mandates vigilance and preparedness. We are strengthening our current
security relationships and military capabilities while developing new
relationships and capabilities to deter conflict and dissuade would-be
regional competitors.
The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan supports the
overall mission by enhancing U.S. influence, expanding U.S. operational
access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and forward-based combat
forces, and increasing interoperability with our coalition partners to
support potential efforts across the spectrum of military operations.
Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined
capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or
dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is
an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and
Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link
between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.
The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSC plan are clear--our
treaty allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF and
the GWOT. Every day, our TSC planners, exercise planners, security
assistance personnel, and forward-deployed forces coordinate, plan, and
execute meaningful security cooperation activities that strengthen
military-to-military cooperation and prepare U.S. forces and their
prospective Coalition partners for the next challenge.
Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. From the
outstanding rapport at the highest levels of our governments to the
action officers, our two countries are moving forward in strengthening
ties and resolving problems. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel
are stationed in Japan, which also serves as a forward-deployed site
for about 14,000 U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4.5 billion
in host-nation support, the most generous of any U.S. ally. Without
these forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, it would be much
more difficult for the U.S. to meet commitments and defend American
interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance
is fundamental to security and peaceful development in the region.
Since becoming Prime Minister (PM) nearly 2 years ago, PM Koizumi
has stressed the importance of the alliance and has sought to move
Japan's security policies forward. He exerted exceptional leadership in
response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, pushing support for the
GWOT. After 11 September, the Government of Japan (GOJ) rapidly passed
legislation and obtained Cabinet approval of a Basic Plan that provides
the framework for significant Japan Self-Defense Force contributions to
the war on terrorism. The speed with which Japan reacted is
unprecedented in the 50-year history of the Japan-U.S. security
relationship. GOJ contributions to the GWOT include the provision of
over 70 million gallons of fuel oil to coalition ships by the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force has
provided over 1,700 flight hours moving tons of important cargo and
passengers throughout the theater. We take every opportunity to express
our appreciation to the GOJ for its support following 11 September.
The significant progress in building national support against
terrorism does not eliminate concerns, however, about U.S. military
activities in Japan. Although Japanese public support for the alliance
remains high, about 70 percent, a majority of Japanese citizens would
like to see a reduction in the burden of our presence. The normal range
of base-related issues, including constraints on training and concerns
about crime and the environment require continued careful management.
Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been
completed, 12 (2 of 5 noise reduction and 10 of 11 land release
initiatives) are still in progress. The cornerstone of the Japan-U.S.
SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ
approval of a Basic Plan for the off-shore portion of the FRF
highlights the progress in the SACO process. However, we continue to
emphasize to the GOJ that our requirements have not changed, and a
complete replacement facility is required before returning Futenma.
The U.S.-Japan alliance requires our proper attention. At the same
time, significant growth opportunities exist for advancing U.S.
interests. U.S. forces' presence here, from the country team
perspective, is secure, and careful management of the issues will
ensure it remains so. My hope for the coming year is that our security
dialogue with Japan will advance beyond the discussion of current
issues related to bases and training to address our longer-term
interests in sustaining our vital alliance. We also look to expand and
improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries within the region
to address regional security issues.
Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK remains one of our strongest
allies. The new Korean Government is committed to the alliance.
Unfortunate incidents marred the relationship this past year--the most
tragic was the death of two young Korean girls in an accident involving
a U.S. Forces Korea vehicle. In this regard, the U.S. has at every
level offered our profound sympathy and apologies.
The late fall protests indicate the depth of emotion the Korean
people feel on issues related to perceived inequalities in the ROK-U.S.
relationship. However, they are not indicative of the solution sought
by most Koreans or the Korean Government. The Korean people in general
recognize the great contributions made by the United States to their
nation's security and believe the relationship is in their interest, as
it is in ours. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and United States Forces Korea, we continue to review our force
presence in the ROK and North East Asia.
As a partner, the ROK has been steadily increasing its regional
security role. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure
our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one
another and integrated where appropriate. In particular, the ROK
supports USPACOM exercises and seminars aimed at increasing regional
cooperation and interoperability among U.S. friends and allies. Korea's
contributions to regional peace and stability were clearly demonstrated
this past year in Timor-Leste, where ROK Army troops participated in UN
peacekeeping efforts to support the region's newest nation. This
growing regional role for Korea contributes to the security of the
region while not detracting from its peninsular defense
responsibilities.
The ROK continues steadfast support to anti-terrorism efforts. The
Korean Armed Forces are with us in the GWOT, from Guam to Central Asia
and on the ground in Afghanistan, supporting our efforts with
transportation and medical support. In the USPACOM area, the ROK Air
Force has flown over 2,000 hours moving tons of important cargo and
passengers throughout the AOR. Similarly, the ROK Navy has provided
important sealift to bolster our efforts in South Asia, moving 3,500
tons of material. In the aftermath of Typhoon Cha'taan, the ROK landing
ship tanks (LSTs) provided emergency sealift of over 350 tons of
bottled water and other disaster relief supplies and materials to Guam.
The ROK Army deployed a Mobile Surgical Hospital initially to Manas,
Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently to Bagram, Afghanistan. A civil
engineering battalion will soon join these forces to assist in
rebuilding the infrastructure of that emerging nation. These
contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to the
success of OEF, and we thank the Korean people for their support.
The events of 2002 remind us of the dangers posed by the Kim Jong
Il regime and the threat our ROK-U.S. combined team faces on the
peninsula. The conventional threat from the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains unabated, illustrated by the
unprovoked naval attack in July on an ROK Navy vessel that resulted in
the loss of four young ROK sailors. The DPRK maintains more than 60
percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its ``military first'' policy,
providing sufficient resources to keep its large force fed, equipped,
and exercised, while its citizens face deprivation and starvation.
While the DPRK has so far not broken its promise to suspend ballistic
missile test flights, it continues development efforts including static
engine tests. Additionally, the DPRK exports missiles and missile
technology, posing a grave counter-proliferation concern. Finally, the
Kim regime continues to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, with the
disclosure of its Highly Enriched Uranium program and progressive steps
to restart its plutonium production and reprocessing program. These
actions are in violation of the Agreed Framework, DPRK pledges to the
IAEA, and the 1992 North-South Basic Agreement calling for
denuclearization of the Peninsula. The DPRK is not above precipitating
a crisis to strengthen its bargaining position. Now more than ever it
is critical our ROK-U.S. partnership stand firm.
The ROK is a strong ally that is increasingly contributing to
regional peace and stability. Together we face a common threat on the
Peninsula. However, the Korean people are looking for ways to foster
reconciliation with the DPRK. We recognize the importance of these
efforts to the Korean people and their government. Moreover, we agree
on the crucial role of the Armistice Agreement in maintaining peace on
the Korean Peninsula, and we are committed to ensuring that efforts at
reconciliation do not increase risk for the security of the ROK or the
United States.
In sum, through continuing support to the coalition to combat
global terrorism and efforts to participate fully in regional security,
the ROK plays a very positive role in the region. U.S. and ROK forces
remain prepared, and we are looking for ways to strengthen the alliance
to deal with current and future challenges.
Australia. Our strong ally and partner, Australia has demonstrated
steadfast commitment and bold leadership in the GWOT and in essentially
every other security endeavor in the region. Its military contributions
to the coalition against terror are substantial and include Combat Air
Patrols (CAP), tankers, Special Air Service (SAS) troops, guided
missile frigates and, most recently, support for Sea Swap, our USN
initiative to exchange crews of select vessels forward in theater.
Additionally, Australia has become a regional leader in pursuing
multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia by signing
counter-terrorism MOUs with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand while
pursuing others. USPACOM remains focused on maintaining strong levels
of interoperability with the Australian Defence Forces across the full
spectrum of contingency operations including counter-terrorism.
Australia continues to lead international support for the struggling
nations of the Oceania region, providing humanitarian assistance and
training. Australia is the southern anchor of our security architecture
in the region, and we will maintain the vibrancy of this strategic
relationship.
Republic of the Philippines. Our relationship with the Government
and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) developed and matured
throughout 2002. Through comprehensive security assistance packages and
focused security cooperation, the AFP has improved its ability to fight
terrorism on its homeland as demonstrated by the AFP Southern Command's
effective neutralizing of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Basilan Island
and the continuing fight in Jolo. This has not come without cost. Both
American citizens and service members have been wounded, or lost their
lives to the terrorists in the Southern Philippines.
Despite these losses, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-
P) has produced tremendous successes. The Joint Task Force advised and
assisted AFP forces in their mission to rid ASG terrorists from Basilan
Island. As a result, the ASG threat declined significantly on Basilan
Island. Although the road that circled Basilan was repaired to support
AFP/U.S. tactical mobility, it will also help the people of Basilan in
their economic livelihood as will the new water wells, repairs to
school buildings, critical hospitals, and other medical treatment areas
throughout the island. These humanitarian and civic assistance program
successes acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations
because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting
the terrorist threat. To ensure the AFP can successfully respond to the
terrorist threat, the U.S developed a Security Assistance (SA) Program
that will provide the AFP with additional counter-terrorism training
and equipment. This program is just starting and will consist of light
infantry battalion, light reaction company, night-vision, intelligence
fusion, Non-commissioned Officer, and Civil Military Operations
training. The SA modules will occur at various locations in the
Philippines to benefit the AFP beyond its Southern Command units.
Additionally, USPACOM is implementing a Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan that will sustain AFP critical
tactical mobility platforms, including UH-1H helicopters, C-130
transport aircraft, two-half ton trucks, and 78-foot patrol craft. We
seek your assistance in ensuring funding for this program through the
next 3 years. This will give the AFP an opportunity to address current
equipment maintenance shortfalls.
Action has not been limited to the southern Philippines. We have
completed various large-scale exercises in Luzon and continue to plan
for security cooperation events in 2003. On 21 November 2002, the AFP
signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with USPACOM--a positive
sign of reciprocity and an improving relationship. We have already used
the agreement by leasing body armor to the AFP. This small gesture will
improve the AFP force protection posture and support Philippine efforts
to combat terrorism.
The Philippines plays a strategic role in the USPACOM AOR. As
training areas for U.S. forces dwindle, excellent training facilities
in the Philippines remain available, though repairs are required. Last
year, the U.S. provided $25 million in fiscal year 2002 supplemental
funding for the SA modules currently underway in the Philippines.
We have accomplished a lot in the GWOT and in securing our
strategic objectives with the unwavering support of the Philippine
Government. The security situation in the Philippines needs continued
improvement to attract investments and promote economic stability.
Continued U.S. support through comprehensive, focused and timely SA
funding is one way we can influence the situation in the Philippines.
Supporting the GRP in their fight against the ASG is another way. A
sustained GRP counterterrorism capability is the goal.
Thailand. The Kingdom of Thailand is a treaty ally that continues
to have an outstanding military-to-military relationship with the U.S.
Exercise Cobra Gold (CG) is a centerpiece of this relationship. CG-2003
will be our 22nd joint/combined bilateral exercise with Thailand, and
the 4th of the expanded observer program--making it USPACOM's premier
multilateral event. By adding this multinational exercise dimension in
an environment that trains for transnational issues, Thailand is
assuming an active role in promoting South East Asia security.
Military-to-military policy with Thailand is managed through annual
Thai-American Consultations. Benefits to Thailand include U.S.
counterdrug/border security support, demining training, peace
operations training and support, and an extensive security assistance
program with a robust International Military Education and Training
(IMET) component. Thailand's contributions as a regional leader include
a peacekeeping troop presence in Timor-Leste, a commitment to providing
engineering support in Afghanistan to support the GWOT, and an intent
to contribute to the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia.
As a result of our strong relationship with Thailand, we have
received access to facilities, ports, and airfields, and the granting
of overflight clearances in support of operational emergencies. Our
ongoing security cooperation program, including exercises such as Cobra
Gold, helps to address the security interests of both our countries and
serves as a catalyst for enhancing our regional security posture.
Singapore. Our relationship with Singapore is one of the strongest
in the region. Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, Singapore
provided access to airfields and naval facilities to U.S. forces,
detained 31 suspected terrorists, froze terrorist financial assets,
increased protection to shipping in the Strait of Malacca, and
implemented the U.S. Container Security Initiative. Singapore's
recently published White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists and
announcement to launch a terrorist research center in 2003/2004
testifies to its comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism in
Southeast Asia. Our efforts with Singapore focus on reinforcing our
already strong foundation through improved interoperability and
cooperation.
Malaysia. Some of the most aggressive action against terrorism in
Southeast Asia has occurred in Malaysia. To date, Malaysian security
forces have arrested more than 70 suspected terrorists and have taken
the lead in several initiatives aimed at increasing cooperation in
combating terrorism and other areas of mutual interest. The proposed
Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur is one such
initiative and represents an important opportunity to enhance regional
efforts at combating terrorism. By providing expertise, information,
and funding when appropriate, we can assist Malaysia and other nations
of Southeast Asia in developing the skills necessary to defeat
terrorism. As a moderate Muslim nation with a secular democratic
government, Malaysia's influence extends beyond the region. Its January
announcement to discontinue funding for private religious schools is an
example of a government taking action against the root causes of
terrorism by not supporting deviant extremist teachings that breed
hatred. Currently, Malaysia holds the chairmanship of the Organization
of Islamic Conference and remains influential in the Non-Aligned
Movement. Together, we remain committed to cooperating in areas of
mutual interest and improving our ability to operate in combined
regional efforts.
India. Based on the policy direction provided by the Indo-U.S.
Defense Policy Group, USPACOM embarked on an aggressive security
cooperation program with India over the past year. To date, our forces
have conducted a number of successful exercises--ranging from airborne
operations to surface warfare naval exercises--that have improved the
combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. Over the past 10 months, USPACOM
and its components have met with their Indian counterparts and
established a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial activities.
These programs will increase our interoperability with, and access to,
Indian forces. Our growing military cooperation supports the
transformation of our relationship with India and serves to further
this strategic partnership. This partnership was evident in India's
strong support for the GWOT, most notably its naval escorts of U.S.
ships transiting the Strait of Malacca last summer. As my recent trip
to the troubled state of Kashmir confirmed, terrorists also menace
India. Our improved relationships with India and Pakistan were
invaluable as we helped these rivals step back last year from the brink
of war.
Indonesia. The government of Indonesia responded admirably to the
terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, arresting many key
operatives and developing information on the domestic and regional
terrorist threat. Globally, radical Islam continues to destabilize
Muslim countries and threaten the interests of tolerant, democratic
nations. Indonesia is a key battleground in the struggle against
terrorism and radicalism. In the face of economic turmoil, separatist
and communal violence, and political transition, the world's most
populous Muslim nation is struggling to maintain its secular,
democratic character, and to cooperate with the international community
in eliminating transnational security threats. The Indonesian military
(TNI) is also going through a difficult transition from protector of an
autocratic regime to defender of a popularly elected government. This
is a significant cultural and institutional transition that will not
happen by itself.
Accountability, essential to democratic civil-military relations,
must improve. Critical to the success of this effort is Professional
Military Education that exposes TNI officers to democratic norms and
modern defense management techniques while building personal bonds of
trust and goodwill. Particularly important is influencing the younger
generation of officers to support the struggle against terrorism.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) is another
important tool as is FMF support for equipment, such as patrol boats
for monitoring Indonesia's porous borders, to improve TNI's ability to
counter transnational threats.
East Timor. This past May, Timor-Leste became the world's newest
democracy following 20 plus years of occupation and over 200,000
deaths. Though the greatest credit for this achievement goes to the
Timorese people, the U.S. military provided significant assistance in
Timor-Leste's transition to a democratic state. Our U.S. Support Group
East Timor (USGET) played a vital role in providing a stabilizing
military presence during Timor-Leste's transition to independence. We
conducted monthly ship visits, built schools and roads, repaired water
and electrical systems, and provided medical and dental treatment for
thousands of Timorese. We are proud of USGET and our military forces
that contributed to Timor-Leste independence.
Although USGET deactivated on 17 December 2002, USPACOM continues
to play a positive role in Timor-Leste's development as a democratic
state. Through IMET and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) we are funding
English language training, helping develop the Timor-Leste Defense
Force (ETDF) logistics system, purchasing basic equipment, and
designing training programs to help develop Timor's Defense Secretariat
and the ETDF. My key goals are to support the development of a civil/
military defense establishment subordinate to civilian authority and
the rule of law and help develop the ETDF as a credible self-defense
force.
China. We have a modest but constructive military-to-military
relationship with China. Our relationship is guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA
2000), which limits us to the areas of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HA/DR) and other non-warfighting venues. Our activities are
part of ongoing DOD efforts to place such contacts with China on a new
footing since the April 2001 aircraft collision incident. The U.S.S.
Paul Foster port visit to Qingdao in November 2002 and my visit to
China from 13-17 December 2002 were the first USPACOM bilateral
military-to-military contacts with China since March 2001. One
objective of these exchanges is to demonstrate the quality of our
forces and our values by developing personnel exchanges between the
younger generation of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and U.S.
military personnel.
Taiwan. For Taiwan, our actions are guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act. We have worked this past year to support self defense improvements
that can best meet Taiwan's identified defense needs. We want Taiwan to
remain stable, democratic, and economically prosperous while it
develops a professional, civilian-controlled defense establishment with
a modernized, joint operations-oriented military.
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) brings together
current and future military and civilian leaders to discuss regional
security concerns. The Center provides a unique platform to discuss
security issues while promoting USPACOM and OSD regional cooperation
policies. Now more than ever, we realize each country must contribute
to regional security to assure its continued political, economic, and
social stability. Through executive courses and conferences, the APCSS
gives Asia-Pacific leaders a regional forum to recognize security
challenges, not only from a U.S. viewpoint but also from the
perspective 45 participating nations, including Russia, Chile, Canada,
and Pakistan.
Center of Excellence (COE). COE's peace operations seminars have
improved peace support capabilities in countries such as Thailand,
Malaysia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. This improvement is
evident in Thai and Filipino participation in peace stability
operations in Aceh, Indonesia. These and other COE activities
demonstrate our long-term commitment to relationships across the civil-
military spectrum in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center's
contributions complement other efforts to eliminate immediate terrorist
threats. COE continues to prepare our forces to perform effectively in
more complex environments with new actors and less predictable
behaviors toward civilian victims of conflict. The Center's unique
position as a civil-military humanitarian organization allows it to
engage authorities from diverse countries in non-intrusive ways that
help USPACOM reach out to new and otherwise reluctant partners. Your
support for the COE in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
provides valuable assistance in executing USPACOM priorities.
Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference. One of our premier theater
security activities, USPACOM annually hosts this regional conference,
bringing together Asia-Pacific CHODs (CJCS equivalents) for a series of
discussions on regional defense issues. The November 2002 conference,
which was held in Singapore and was co-hosted by the Singapore Armed
Forces and Chief of Defense Lieutenant General Lim Chuan Poh, gathered
senior military leaders from 21 nations, including the Vice Chairman of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace. The conference's theme,
``Meeting Security Challenges in the 21st Century,'' provided a forum
for candid dialogue among senior leaders. The October 2002 Bali
bombings heavily influenced discussions and underscored the ability of
terrorists to cut across borders and present a common regional and
global threat. The CHOD's conference continues to provide an excellent
opportunity to foster understanding, build confidence among
participants, strengthen relationships, and promote stability.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides vital support to
developing countries involved in the GWOT. Funds provided in the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act,
2002 and the emergency FMF Supplemental directly supported Security
Cooperation priorities in the East Asian Littoral and other regions in
USPACOM. FMF delivers the military articles, services, and training
required to support the efforts of our friends and allies that promote
U.S. security interests. We appreciate your support of SA programs and
our efforts to improve their effectiveness and responsiveness.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) is an
effective, low-cost component of the SA effort. The program provides
U.S. access to foreign governments and influences those governments far
out of proportion to its modest cost. Furthermore, it exposes future
leaders to U.S. values and commitment to the rule of law and the role
of a professional military in a democratic society, and it promotes
military professionalism. Recent restoration of full IMET to Indonesia
is a welcome development. Having a core group of well-trained,
professional leaders with first hand knowledge of our values and
democratic institutions will make a difference in achieving our
strategic security goals in Indonesia and throughout the theater.
Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic
Support Agreements (MLSA) have enhanced interoperability and readiness
and provided a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support
for U.S. and Allied Forces. USPACOM forces that participated in the
fiscal year 2002 multinational exercise Cobra Gold greatly reduced
their logistics footprint by using an ACSA. Three countries within
USPACOM's AOR have deployed forces outside our AOR under ACSA
provisions in support of the GWOT--Australia, New Zealand, and the
Republic of Korea. Thus far, these countries have benefited from
approximately $350,000 worth of logistics support, supplies, and
services via reimbursable ACSA transactions. Primary logistics support
provided includes food, medical services, dental support, force
protection, transportation/material handling equipment, billeting,
vehicle/equipment maintenance, and fuel. Thailand is preparing to
deploy forces to the USCENTCOM AOR soon in support of the GWOT, and the
ACSA has been instrumental in providing Thai forces with cold weather
and NBC gear on a reimbursable basis. USPACOM has 10 ACSAs in place
(Philippines, Australia, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
New Zealand, Fiji, and Tonga) with eight other countries within our AOR
in DOD's ACSA--Eligible status (India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Brunei, Maldives, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka). We will continue to
negotiate with ACSA-Eligible countries to expand the options we have to
integrate coalition capabilities.
Forward stationed or deployed military presence provides the
leading edge of U.S. combat power and forms the cornerstone of
deterrence. Within the Asia-Pacific region this equates to roughly
100,000 forward-deployed personnel located primarily in the Republic of
Korea and Japan. These forces deter conflict, dissuade competition,
respond to crisis, man the infrastructure to receive follow-on forces,
and fight if necessary. USPACOM is committed to developing the most
effective regional command and control constructs to maximize the
employment of our forward-deployed forces. In conjunction with ongoing
DOD restructuring initiatives, we are reviewing these command and
control structures and our force posture to ensure they are consistent
with today's operational requirements and geo-political realities. The
goal is to consolidate and transform our headquarters in Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and throughout the region to provide an immediately
employable force capable of decisive operational effects. Of course,
these improvements will be undertaken in close consultation with our
allies. Prototype command and control constructs such as the Joint
Mission Force or Standing Joint Force Headquarters leverage both
enhanced joint warfighting equities and transformation dividends. Along
with our efforts to improve our command structure, we will continue to
develop diversified access throughout the region. We foresee ongoing
requirements to consolidate and improve our facilities in Korea, Japan,
and other locations in the region. We also expect to enhance our access
to facilities in Southeast Asia (SEA) and the South Asia Indian Ocean
(SAIO) area to meet regional and global requirements and support the
GWOT and other operational or contingency demands.
Promoting ``Change'' and Improving the Asia-Pacific Defense Posture
Our country is undergoing the most fundamental transformation of
its defense strategy and Armed Forces since the Second World War.
Guidance for this transformation is clear and starts with the National
Security Strategy. At USPACOM, we are putting that guidance into
action, operationalizing it with Asia-Pacific emphasis. Our efforts
include strengthening command and control constructs, updating plans,
improving force posture, diversifying access and enroute logistics,
improving capabilities for immediate employment, and developing new
operating patterns and concepts.
Our progress toward successful transformation of our force is the
result of a deliberate, iterative process of innovation and
experimentation. This process necessitates that we collaborate and stay
in close touch with service initiatives--ensuring they are synchronized
into the joint team. Likewise, we continue to build a collaborative
bridge between our experimental efforts and the experimentation
underway in USJFCOM, the lead command for joint experimentation.
Consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld's Transformation Planning
Guidance, USPACOM has a multifaceted program covering a broad range of
technological, organizational, and conceptual initiatives. It is a
focused effort to explore and integrate innovative concepts and mature
technologies to address our toughest challenges to effective joint
operations.
Our transformation and experimentation efforts are necessary steps
in advancing improvements to the speed of action and effectiveness of
joint operations across strategic, operational, and tactical force
levels. To date, our new standing operating procedures and enhancements
to collaboration have yielded as much as 2 weeks' reduction in time to
stand up and deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) in response to a
contingency. By experimenting with and fielding mature technologies and
prototype decision tools--placing them in the hands of operators well
within the traditional acquisition cycle time--we have established
information superiority and enhanced efficiency for theater command and
control. With continued support, we can zero-in on even greater
improvements to JTF effectiveness, such as integration and
synchronization of operational fire and maneuver, surpassing
information superiority with decision superiority, and expediting the
fielding of mature technologies and concept prototypes to forward-
deployed JTF Commanders.
Within USPACOM, our Joint Mission Force (JMF) initiative provides
the coherent framework for experimentation and transformation to
enhance JTF operations across the spectrum of missions from forcible
entry through humanitarian assistance. This mature initiative has
allowed us to focus our transformational efforts toward a specific end-
objective: seamless joint operations. The JMF concept will serve as
USPACOM's segue to implementing the Standing Joint Force Headquarters
as directed in the Defense Planning Guidance.
Each year during exercises such as Cobra Gold, our multilateral
exercise co-hosted with Thailand, and Tandem Thrust, our theater-wide
biennial joint exercise with Australia, we experiment with JMF
initiatives that address our ``Top Ten Challenges'' to enhancing JTF
speed of action and effectiveness. By experimenting while we exercise,
we can accurately assess the military utility of new technologies and
procedures. As a direct result of success during exercises, JMF has
fielded several key technologies within USPACOM's designated JTFs. Over
the past year, Bandwidth Monitoring and Control devices have given our
JTFs dynamic control of limited bandwidth for critical communications.
The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) now provides
USPACOM Headquarters Joint Operations Center and our JTFs an
interoperable tool for sharing a common operational picture for dynamic
tracking and targeting and for conducting personnel recovery
operations. JMF has provided our designated JTFs with a suite of
collaborative tools and the training required for planning, executing,
and assessing joint operations. Our design and implementation of a
standard JMF web tool provides an internet ``one-stop shop'' for JTF
real-time information sharing, planning, and execution.
Additionally, JMF has operationalized other important command-wide
capabilities such as our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN)
for secure operations with our coalition partners, the Asia-Pacific
Area Network (APAN) for civil-military and non-government organization
operations with coalition forces, telemedicine for joint medical
operations (JMO-T), and language translation capability such as DARPA's
``Phraselators.''
To bridge the gap between our major joint exercises, hone
readiness, and provide periodic spiral development opportunities,
USPACOM conducts routine command and control exercises (C2X). These
short duration, vignette-driven exercises not only test our JTF command
and control procedures, they also provide an important venue for spiral
technology and procedural development and fielding. This JMF initiative
has proven effective in USPACOM as a readiness-enhancer.
Over the next 2 years, with your support, USPACOM's Joint Mission
Force will integrate emerging technologies into information operations
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management. Our
transformation and experimentation initiatives include our coalition
partners.
In Korea, we have worked Integrated Total Asset Visibility and
language translators during exercise Ulchi Focus Lens. USFK has the
lead for the Theater Precision Strike Operations ACTD and this year is
sponsoring the Theater Effects-Based Operations ACTD.
We have installed our JMF Web tool on the Japan Self-Defense Force
bilateral secure wide-area network. We also have an information sharing
agreement with Japan, and Japan has used Coalition Rear Area Security
Command and Control in exercises such as Keen Edge and Yama Sakura.
As Cobra Gold 2002 participants, Singapore Armed Forces and Royal
Supreme Thai Command members were directly involved with our
initiatives for collaboration tools, virtual Civil Military Operations
Center, and Cowan. Additionally, Singapore is participating in the
Spartan ACTD and is pursuing involvement in other ACTDs, such as
RESTOPS and JTF WARNET (Wide Area Relay Network).
The JTF WARNET initiative approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) on 25 April 2002 provides organic, wireless
secure Internet Protocol-based connectivity among tactical components
of a JTF. WARNET applications, interfaces, and procedures enhance JTF
command and control by sharing tactical situational awareness data
among service command and control systems, enabling joint fires and
collaborative planning and execution. JTF WARNET provided tactical-
level force integration during Millennium Challenge 2002. We will
conduct WARNET regional tests and a pre-deployment exercise in Hawaii
and Japan in fiscal year 2003 before WARNET becomes a JTF operational
capability in fiscal year 2004, culminating in Cobra Gold 2004.
USPACOM served as the host Combatant Command for the Joint Warrior
Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 2002 and will host JWID 2003. For
the first time, Japan, Korea, and Singapore have been invited to sit on
the Coalition Task Force (CTF) staff. Their inclusion in the
traditional mix of U.S., NATO, U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
participants is pushing the envelope on coalition interoperability as
it demonstrates the true nature of our interoperability challenges.
The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program
complements the IMET program. DOD funding has sent foreign military
officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers
for non-lethal education. This program has provided regional combatant
commands with additional flexibility in executing our security
cooperation strategies and has had an immediate and positive impact in
encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in
addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.
The fellowship focus for USPACOM has been toward educational
programs that encourage these advancements among Asia-Pacific nations
addressing transnational threats with a focus on counter-terrorism.
Specific courses have assisted in minimizing terrorist threats in the
Asia-Pacific region, severing links between indigenous terrorist groups
and global terrorist networks, allowing the establishment of a more
professional military, developing stronger mutual security
partnerships, and enhancing theater security cooperation. We are using
the program to provide non-lethal training to Indonesian, Malaysian,
and Philippine military officers at U.S. military educational
institutions. U.S. military courses provide the basics for success in
any military operation. A secondary benefit is the exposure students
receive to the higher standards of ethics and behavior associated with
a professional military that is under competent civilian control. Your
continued support in providing this flexible funding alternative is
appreciated.
C2 for Coalitions. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
(MPAT) Program involves a group of military planners from the U.S. and
many nations in USPACOM's Area of Interest. The purpose of MPAT is to
increase operational interoperability among participating countries'
interoperable planners who can rapidly augment a multinational force
headquarters in response to a regional crisis. Using multinational, but
standardized skills and procedures, MPAT planners would plan and
execute coalition operations to support a multinational and interagency
response to a small-scale contingency. Through a series of workshops
and information exchange events, including four major crisis action
planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge base of the
various national crisis action planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific
region. They have also developed a strong working relationship with
each other. Military planners from over 25 countries and
representatives from the UN and various non-governmental and
international organizations have attended these workshops.
As part of the MPAT initiative, we and other nations in the region
are developing a multinational force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF
SOP) that any nation leading a coalition crisis response relief effort
can use. This MNF SOP has coalition/combined task force activation,
forming, and planning procedures focused on military operations other
than war (MOOTW), from humanitarian assistance through peace
operations, and includes counter-terrorism aspects. Planners from 30
nations practice and validate the MNF SOP during MPAT and other
multinational exercises each year.
Since the Asia-Pacific region does not have a regional NATO-like
organization, the MPAT and MNF SOP efforts represent the major regional
program aimed at developing multinational procedures and maintaining a
cadre of multinational military planners using common planning and
operating procedures for coalition operations. USPACOM's Internet-based
Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) enables the working-level
communications required to develop these procedures. APAN's easily
accessible collaborative capability enables us to extend regional
dialogues begun in functional forums such as CHOD conferences into
exercises and operations that improve our regional response to the
growing range of military missions we face today. The ability to place
instructional material on APAN for mutual benefit of the U.S. and Asia-
Pacific partners would enhance the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation
program and U.S. national security interests. The provision of
internet-based training and education should include such programs as
Advanced Distributed Learning and similar internet tools. USPACOM could
thereby more effectively use focused military education programs to
develop regional skills required to accomplish cooperative security
missions, improve civil-military relations, increase respect for human
rights, and strengthen democratic principles.
I would like to express our appreciation for past congressional
support of the Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) appropriations--
support that has ensured a robust beginning for these programs. As we
continue with the MPAT and MNF SOP development, we will improve the
capabilities and interoperability of countries in the region to support
operations that we may lead while enhancing the ability of other
countries to lead coalition operations as well.
Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA). Achieving the fullest
possible accounting of Americans is a high USPACOM priority, and we
will continue to devote the necessary personnel and resources to obtain
the answers the POW/MIA families so richly deserve. During fiscal year
2002, JTF-FA conducted 10 joint field activities (JFAs)--4 in Vietnam,
5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. The JTF-FA field teams investigated 211
cases and excavated 50 sites. In total, they recovered and repatriated
remains believed to be those of Americans unaccounted-for from the war
in Southeast Asia from 27 sites (9 in Vietnam, 12 in Laos, and 6 in
Cambodia). Furthermore, 31 individuals from recovery operations were
identified and returned to their loved ones during this period. JTF-FA
will maintain its pace of operations in fiscal year 2003, with 10 JFAs
scheduled--4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. JTF-FA will also
conduct an underwater survey in China.
Following Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's direction to determine the
feasibility of merging JTF-FA and the Army's Central Identification
Laboratories, Hawaii, we have put in place a comprehensive plan of
action and milestones to ensure a smooth merger and standup date of 1
October 2003. Merging of the two units under a single command is
operationally sound and will clearly demonstrate our government's
commitment to our unaccounted for citizens. Three critical items
remain. First, realignment of the Department of the Army's Central
Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI) funding to the Department of
the Navy as Executive Agent for USPACOM and the merged organization.
Second, transfer of Department of the Army civilian positions and
functions to the Department of the Navy. Third, determining the
permanent location of this new organization with the attended
adjustment and advancement to the CILHI approved FY-08 MILCON
headquarters building project.
Land Partnership Plan (LPP). The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK) has reached agreement with the ROK Government on an LPP that
will consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number
of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 23 while significantly
enhancing training and combined warfighting capability--better
supporting our long-term regional strategy. The LPP will also have a
significant positive affect on the quality of life of our servicemen
and women and their families assigned to our forces on the peninsula.
Our partner is committed--the LPP has received the full backing of the
Korean Government and its National Assembly, and will be a model for
future discussions.
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). USPACOM
continues to lead in innovating tactics, techniques, procedures, and
concepts of operations that make the Nation's investment in science and
technology productive for our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in
the field. We do so through a continual cycle of experimentation,
demonstration, and special projects aimed at our early understanding of
emerging technologies and their impact on military operations in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Transformation depends heavily on ACTDs. Today we are involved in
19 ACTD projects, more than any other regional command. We have
distributed the Transformation workload across the whole theater--
almost all service component and Sub-Unified Commanders and most of my
Staff Directors have responsibility for executing one or more ACTD.
Our new fiscal year 2003 ACTD will provide us with new tactical
capabilities. The Overwatch ACTD will give us a capability to detect
and pinpoint sniper fire in an urban environment, enhancing security
and situational awareness for our troops in the field. In addition to
our new ACTDs, we have pioneered co-development of technology with
Singapore with the SPARTAN Unmanned Surface Vessel ACTD. This ACTD
provides technological developments to improve capabilities for multi-
mission packages in Mine Warfare, force protection, precision strike,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Additionally, it
will enhance battlespace awareness and increase force protection for
surface and subsurface operations through the unmanned surface vessel
with modular sensor packages.
The ACTD program is clear proof that when system developers and
operators come together we can get useful military products into the
hands of the user faster than with standard acquisition. However, this
is only true if the technology successfully transitions into a program
of record. I am proud to report that we will successfully transition
all five of our ACTDs completed this year. Soon all combatant
commanders will reap benefits in the areas of Joint Fire Control,
personnel recovery, small unit logistics, telemedicine, and decision-
support tools from our completed projects.
Our Joint Experimentation program focuses on Joint Task Force (JTF)
operations. It is fully coordinated with the U.S. Joint Forces
Command's Joint Experimentation Program and includes technology
insertion experiments during our regular exercises to advance our state
of practice of JTF operations, both in the U.S. only venue and in
coalition venues. This year, we executed the first two major
experiments. The first occurred as part of our C2X exercise series
where we train to establish command and control of a deployed JTF. The
experiment augmented our normal C\4\I surveillance and reconnaissance
equipment suites with new capabilities to manage and control
information flow on the JTF networks and provide enhanced fires
management capabilities across the joint force. Our second experiment
occurred in a coalition environment during the Cobra Gold exercise with
Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. We also added new
technology from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to
improve network security and the commander's understanding of the war
plan. We are finding that by experimenting as we exercise, we can
provide a continuous series of warfighting improvements that are field
tested in joint and combined operations before we make key procurement
decisions.
I've highlighted just a few of the experimentation and
modernization initiatives in USPACOM. Our initiatives, like those of
other Regional Combatant Commanders and the Services, in concert with
USJFCOM, promise to modernize the force and enhance mission capability.
We are working hard with USJFCOM to synchronize and bring coherence,
prioritization, and continuity to the transformation of our forces.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

America's Armed Forces in the Pacific continue to promote security,
peace, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Through the
professional efforts of our dedicated men and women, we continue to
assure our allies, dissuade our adversaries and deter aggression. We
are relentlessly pursuing terrorists, improving our force protection
posture and maintaining our readiness so that if called upon, we will
decisively defeat any adversary. U.S. Pacific Command's priorities for
the near term remain unchanged: sustaining and supporting the global
war on terrorism; improving our Readiness and Joint Warfighting
Capability; improving the Quality of Service for our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines; reinforcing the Constants in the Pacific Region;
and promoting change and improving our Asia-Pacific Defense Posture for
the Future.
The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command welcome this
opportunity to tell their story. The support of Congress and the
American people is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LEON J. LaPORTE, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, U.S. FORCES KOREA, COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND KOREA

General LaPorte. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and
distinguished committee members, I am honored to appear before
the committee to update you on the current situation in the
Republic of Korea (ROK). First, I want to extend the thanks of
all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the
Department of Defense civilians that serve in Korea. Your
consistent support enables us to maintain readiness and for us
to be able to accomplish our mission on the Korean Peninsula.
The past year was extraordinary for those who served in
Korea. We have deterred North Korean aggression while
maintaining a high state of readiness. In May when I took
command, I established five priorities: first was to ensure
peace and stability on the Peninsula and in the northeast
region. Second was to ensure that our forces were trained and
ready for their deterrence mission and, if needed, to conduct
combat. Third was to strengthen the very strong Republic of
Korea-United States Alliance. Fourth was to transform the
command into a 21st century capability. Finally, it was to make
Korea an assignment of choice for all U.S. service members.
2002 marked the fourth democratic transfer of power in the
Republic of Korea, renewed South Korean efforts toward inter-
Korean reconciliation and the first World Cup hosted in Asia.
In contrast, there were some discouraging incidents as well:
North Korea's unprovoked attack, which resulted in the sinking
of a Republic of Korea naval patrol boat in the West Sea and
increased regional tensions; and the revelation, too, of the
North Korean nuclear weapons development program; and also a
cyclic rise in anti-United States Forces Korea sentiment.
The Republic of Korea-United States Alliance weathered the
challenges of 2002 and continues to be the foundation of peace
and security throughout Northeast Asia. In 2002, the United
Nations Command has made significant contributions to inter-
Korean initiatives by the South Korean Government while
maintaining the effectiveness of the armistice agreement, most
notably to reduce tensions following the 20 June North Korean
attack on the Republic of Korea naval ship, and also in the
development and operation of the transportation corridors.
Combined Forces Command, the backbone of the ROK-U.S.
Alliance, continued to modernize capabilities and work together
to deter the North Korean threat. United States Forces Korea
established the groundwork for its transformation to a
capabilities-based force for the 21st century. This
transformation, as determined by the ROK-U.S. Future of the
Alliance policy initiative, will ultimately result in a better
and more capable disposition of forces throughout the region.
Our alliance, forged in blood of 415,000 South Koreans and
33,000 Americans who gave their lives during the Korean War,
remains strong and committed to the tenets of the mutual
defense treaty. The challenges of 2002 have firmly reinforced
three points.
First, the events in Korea affect the entire world, North
Korea remains a serious threat to regional and global
stability; continued United States presence in northeast Asia
is critical to regional stability; and the Republic of Korea-
United States Alliance is essential to continue regional
security.
2003 will be a pivotal year for the Republic of Korea. As
the international community works to resolve the North Korean
nuclear weapons issue, security and stability will remain a
common denominator of our alliance. As the first 50 years of
our mutual defense and security relationship comes to a close,
we will achieve closely to the principles of the 1953 mutual
defense treaty as we prepare for the next 50 years.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General LaPorte follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, USA

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to appear before you as Commander, United Nations Command;
Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; and
Commander, United States Forces Korea. On behalf of the more than
37,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 5,700 civilians serving
in Korea, I thank you for your unwavering support which enables us to
maintain readiness and accomplish our deterrence mission on the Korean
peninsula. I appreciate this opportunity to present an assessment of
the command's status.
This has been an extraordinary year in Korea. 2002 marked the 4th
democratic transfer of power in the Republic of Korea, renewed South
Korean efforts toward inter-Korean reconciliation, and the first World
Cup hosted in Asia. In contrast, there were some discouraging incidents
as well: North Korea's calculated armistice violation in the West Sea,
exposure of the North Korean nuclear weapons programs, a tragic
training accident in June, and cyclic rise of anti-United States Forces
Korea sentiment. With consistency and determination, North Korea
attempts to split the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance by
exploiting these events. Our Alliance weathered these incidents and
continues to be the foundation of peace and security throughout the
Northeast Asia region. These incidents have firmly reinforced three
points: the consequences of events in Korea affect the entire world;
continued United States presence in Northeast Asia is critical to
regional stability; and the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance is
essential to regional security.
Today, I will address current and future requirements by looking
at: the Northeast Asia security environment; the North Korean challenge
to regional and global security; the Republic of Korea-United States
Alliance; and my command priorities--Ensure peace and stability on the
Korean peninsula, Readiness and Training, Strengthen the Republic of
Korea-United States Alliance, Transform the Command, and Make Korea an
Assignment of Choice.

THE NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Northeast Asia is a nexus of economic might, competing interests,
converging threats, cultures, and historical animosities. Over 17
percent of the world's trade value is with countries in Northeast Asia,
and United States trade with the region is second only to our trade
with the North American Free Trade Association.\1\ Many of the nations
in the region--China, Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea--are
contending for economic and political influence. Enduring cultural and
historical animosities remain a dynamic political force. This region
marks the convergence of five of the world's six largest militaries,
and three of the five declared nuclear powers. Today, the current
military demarcation line between North and South Korea is the most
heavily armed in the world and remains an arena for confrontation.
North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of missile
technology threatens regional and global stability. United States
presence in Korea demonstrates our firm commitment to defend democratic
values and prevent our enemies from threatening us--and our partners--
including with weapons of mass destruction. Our forces in Korea send
the clear message that we will stand with our allies and friends to
provide the stability that promotes prosperity and democratic values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Derived from U.S. Census data. For the first 11 months of 2002,
total trade with Northeast Asia ($U.S. billion) are: Japan $172.92,
China $148.13, Republic of Korea $58.13, Taiwan $50.60. Trade with
NAFTA during the same period was $557.39 (Canada $342.55 and Mexico
$214.73), (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2002/11/
balance.html) accessed 19 February 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Republic of Korea Today
The Republic of Korea is fast becoming a global economic
competitor. In 2002 the Republic of Korea's economy grew 6 percent
while boasting the world's 11th largest Gross Domestic Product and
third largest cash reserves.\2\ The South Korean people are justifiably
proud of these achievements and the Republic of Korea's increasing
international prominence. The Republic of Korea's vision of the future
is to diversify its economy by becoming the ``transportation,
financial, and information technology hub of Northeast Asia.'' \3\ This
vision seeks to route Northeast Asia, Europe, and the Americas trade
through the Republic of Korea using an inter-Korean transportation
system. To achieve this goal the Republic of Korea must significantly
increase cooperation with North Korea. Inter-Korean initiatives begun
by former President Kim Dae-Jung and continued by President Roh Moo-
Hyun pursue reconciliation for cultural, economic, and humanitarian
reasons. The Republic of Korea's engagement policies toward North Korea
profoundly affect how South Koreans view their relations with the
United States and North Korea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guide
Korea, Fiscal Year 2003.
\3\ President Roh, Moo-hyun announced his intent to position the
Republic of Korea as the ``economic powerhouse of Northeast Asia''. In
public appearances, he amplified this vision stating that he sought to
make South Korea the transportation, financial, and information
technology hub of Northeast Asia. For President Roh's national
priorities, see Korea Herald articles at http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/
SITE/data/html--dir/2003/01/11/200301110003.asp, http://kn.korea-
herald.co.kr/SITE/data/html--dir/2002/12/28/200212280010.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many South Koreans under age 45, a generation that has lived in an
era of peace and prosperity, have little or no understanding of the
North Korean threat. These South Koreans perceive North Korea not as a
threat but rather as a Korean neighbor, potential trading partner and a
country that provides access to expanded Eurasian markets. This
perception of North Korea contrasts with America's view that North
Korea is a threat to regional and global stability. This divergent view
of North Korea, coupled with strong national pride, has been a cause of
periodic tension in the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance.
There have always been groups in the Republic of Korea that are
critical of United States policy and claim that the United States
hinders inter-Korean reconciliation. Demonstrations against American
policy and military presence increased sharply during this year's
Republic of Korea presidential election. Political interest groups made
claims of inequity in the Republic of Korea-United States alliance a
central issue during the presidential campaign. Opposition groups
exploited a United States military court's acquittal of two American
soldiers charged with negligent homicide in the tragic training
accident that claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls last
June. Non-governmental organizations asserted that the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) was unjust and that the acquitted soldiers should have
been tried in a Republic of Korea court rather than by a United States
military court. During the presidential election campaign, these groups
used biased and inaccurate media reporting to inflame anti-United
States Forces Korea sentiments and mobilize demonstrations, a
traditional tool of political protest in the Republic of Korea.
Regrettably, several of these protests turned violent.
Since the December 2002 Republic of Korea presidential election,
anti-United States Forces Korea demonstrations have virtually
disappeared, due in large part to positive steps taken by United States
Forces Korea, the United States Embassy, and the Republic of Korea
government. Through our Republic of Korea-United States Status of
Forces Joint Committee process, we identified ways to improve
implementation of the 2001 Status of Forces Agreement. Convening a
Republic of Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement Special
Joint Task Force, we incorporated recommendations in vehicular safety,
convoy operations, and joint investigation procedures. This Special
Joint Task Force assisted United States Forces Korea and the Republic
of Korea's government in explaining the provisions of the Status of
Forces Agreement to the Korean people.
The prompt and comprehensive actions of the Status of Forces
Agreement Joint Committee addressed the concerns of many South Koreans.
Shortly after his election, President Roh, Moo Hyun voiced support for
a strong Republic of Korea-United States alliance and continued United
States military presence in Korea even after reconciliation.
Acknowledging the rationale for the Alliance, he expressed a desire to
re-examine the relationship based on the principles of equal
partnership and greater emphasis on shared interests. Since the
presidential election, pro-American groups, some as large as 100,000
people, in the Republic of Korea have conducted demonstrations
supporting the continued stationing of United States Forces in the
Republic of Korea. In this the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, we
have an opportunity to revitalize the Alliance in constructive ways
that enhance this mutually beneficial partnership while ensuring
peninsula and regional security.
We can improve the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance by
closely examining the roles, missions, capabilities, force structure,
and stationing of our respective forces. This includes the Republic of
Korea assuming the predominant role in its defense and increasing both
Republic of Korea and United States involvement in regional security
cooperation. These efforts will enhance our partnership while fully
acknowledging the Republic of Korea's contributions to burdensharing,
support to the war on terror, and their modernization program for
defense of the Republic of Korea.
Republic of Korea Defense Burdensharing
Defense burdensharing is an important part of maintaining the
readiness of United States Forces Korea. The Republic of Korea
burdensharing contribution in 2002 was $490 million, 41 percent of
total United States Forces Korea non-personnel stationing costs, behind
Japan and Germany in Allied burdensharing. In 2003, the Republic of
Korea's contributions will increase to $539.5 million. The Republic of
Korea's annual burdensharing contributions have increased significantly
since the Asian financial crisis, rising over $206 million (62 percent)
since 1997.
The Republic of Korea's support for the war on terror
The Republic of Korea has continued its steadfast support to the
global war on terror. The Republic of Korea's National Assembly
extended its mandate through 2003 and increased its commitment of
support forces to Operation Enduring Freedom. Today Republic of Korea
liaison officers are planning and coordinating with their United States
counterparts at both Central Command and Pacific Command headquarters.
The Republic of Korea's military is supporting the war on terror from
Tampa, Florida, throughout the Pacific, and in Kyrgyztan and
Afghanistan. The Republic of Korea has provided several contingents of
support troops to include a navy transport ship moving essential
airfield material to Diego Garcia, four C-130 cargo aircraft to support
the United States Pacific Command's operations, and a hospital unit in
Bagram. In February 2003, a Republic of Korea engineering unit began
deployment to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. In addition, the government
of the Republic of Korea has provided $12 million of their $45 million
pledge to fund humanitarian and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan.
Republic of Korea's military modernization
The Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense has made a
long-term commitment to acquire the necessary capabilities to secure
the Republic of Korea against current and emerging threats. The
Republic of Korea's military modernization program involves significant
purchases of United States equipment to improve interoperability. Over
the last decade, 82 percent of the Republic of Korea's equipment
purchases have been United States equipment. Last year direct Foreign
Military Sales of United States military equipment to the Republic of
Korea exceeded $1.8 billion and commercial agreements were reached to
deliver over $4 billion of additional military equipment over the next
few years. Boeing was awarded the contract to deliver 40 F-15K aircraft
between 2005 and 2008. This year, the Republic of Korea is taking
delivery of 20 additional KF-16 aircraft, procuring its second
battalion of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and extended range
munitions. The Republic of Korea's Navy is building three new
destroyers, equipped with the AEGIS system.
The Republic of Korea's military has made strides in improving its
capabilities; however, its small budget, as a fraction of Gross
Domestic Product, restrains modernization efforts. In 2003, the
Republic of Korea's defense budget increased 6.5 percent to $14.2
billion but fell from 2.8 percent to 2.7 percent of Gross Domestic
Product. This has left some key programs unfunded or delayed,
continuing a 10 year trend. The Republic of Korea has delayed purchase
of critical equipment in the required quantities--theater air and
missile defense systems, early warning and control aircraft, and
upgraded equipment for their Special Operations units. Acquiring these
systems provides critical capabilities to ensure the Republic of
Korea's security against threats posed by North Korea.
north korean challenges to regional and global security
North Korea is a dangerous dictatorship that continues to threaten
peace, security, and stability in Northeast Asia. The Kim Jong Il
Regime uses illicit activities to fund the extravagant lifestyles of
the inner circle and is using its military capabilities to extort
resources from the international community. North Korea poses several
threats to global stability: an economy on the brink of collapse; an
active nuclear weapons development program; growing proliferation of
missiles, chemical, and biological weapons technologies; and large
conventional forces and special operations forces that directly
threaten our allies. North Korean brinksmanship ensures that the Korean
Peninsula remains a place of palpable danger, illustrated by North
Korea's unprovoked attack on a Republic of Korea patrol boat in the
West Sea on 29 June 2002 and North Korean efforts to develop highly
enriched uranium nuclear weapons. North Korea continues to flagrantly
violate its international agreements resulting in increased regional
tensions. The Republic of Korea and United States Forces continue to
face the possibility of a high intensity war involving large
conventional forces and significant weapons of mass destruction.
North Korean Political Environment
Kim Jong Il is firmly in control. He is the ultimate decision maker
who controls the state security apparatus and occupies all key party,
military, and government leadership positions. Kim relies on a core
group of elites to maintain power. This inner circle, not the formal
hierarchy of the party and government, run all the major North Korean
institutions. Kim provides the ruling elite with a relatively luxurious
lifestyle, while the masses live in poverty. Kim's overriding goal is
regime survival. His intent remains to dominate the Republic of Korea
and to reunify the peninsula under North Korean leadership.
North Korean Economic Environment
The most pressing problem facing North Korea is its failing
economy. Economic output has shrunk by nearly one-half since 1993. The
country suffers from obsolete production facilities and severe
shortages of capital, energy and raw materials. Industrial facilities,
other than those devoted to defense industries, are nearly beyond
repair as a result of more than a decade of under-investment and
critical spare parts shortages. Most factories operate at less than 25
percent capacity.
Despite severe economic problems and acute deprivation among the
general populace, the Kim Regime chooses to maintain a large, capable,
and forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea's
``Military First'' policy ensures the military receives top priority in
all resources, at the expense of the North Korean people. The military
consumes about one third of the North Korean budget. The military
operates a parallel economy producing conventional weapons, missiles,
and illegal drugs for sale on the open market as well as large-scale
smuggling and currency counterfeiting. Most of the profits from these
activities accrue directly to the military, with the remainder going to
Kim and the elite. Kim Jong Il continues to buy the loyalty of his
elite by providing luxury cars, housing, food, and special medical
care.
To prop up the progressively deteriorating North Korean economy,
Kim Jong Il has implemented a number of initiatives. He has invigorated
ideological campaigns that demand loyalty and perseverance--encouraging
the North Korean people to endure hardships for the good of the nation.
To complement the ideological campaign, the Kim Regime has tightened
security and increasingly militarized North Korean society to preclude
broad internal dissent. North Korea has turned to foreign aid,
primarily from the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and
China to meet its food and fuel needs. The Kim Regime has implemented
limited economic reforms, including unprecedented wage and price
increases, designed to jump-start the economy; however these efforts
have not revitalized the North Korean economy. Unless North Korea
embraces a more open market economy--a prospect that Kim Jong Il fears
will threaten his control--we expect no significant economic
improvement in the foreseeable future.
North Korean Nuclear Issues
North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses a very serious threat
to the United States and our allies, risks regional stability, and
challenges the international non-proliferation regime. During a meeting
with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in early October 2002,
North Korea acknowledged its pursuit of a covert program to enrich
uranium for nuclear weapons. In a 16 October statement, North Korea
admitted a series of actions that violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement,
the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the 1994 Agreed Framework. We assess that the Kim
Regime believes possession of nuclear weapons will guarantee survival.
The North Koreans have again resorted to brinksmanship using the
nuclear issue in an effort to gain economic and political concessions
through negotiations. On 10 January 2003, they expressed their
intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Restarting the Yongbyon nuclear reactor near Pyongyang has prompted
fears that it intends to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. If
North Korea begins reprocessing existing fuel rods at the Yongbyon
facility, it could produce enough material for five to eight nuclear
weapons within a year. North Korea's history of selling missiles and
missile-related technologies to any state or group with hard currency
raises serious concerns about the potential for nuclear weapons
technology or scientific know-how to find their way from North Korea to
the hands of terrorists.
North Korean Ballistic Missile Sales
North Korea's ballistic missiles, capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction, are a threat to the region and a destabilizing
influence in the world. North Korea remains one of the few countries
willing to sell to anyone with cash complete missile systems,
production facilities, and technological assistance. These sales in
turn contribute to instability in regions such as the Middle East and
South Asia. Although Kim Jong Il told President Putin and Prime
Minister Koizumi last year that the current ballistic missile flight-
testing moratorium will remain in place beyond 2003, North Korea has
repeatedly threatened to restart missile test launches.
Role of the North Korean Military
The Korean People's Army ensures regime survival by controlling the
internal situation and deterring external threats. It is the one
instrument of national power that enables North Korea to extract aid
from its neighbors in the region. The military also plays a major role
in the economy. Although a decade of resource shortages has left the
North Korean military ill-prepared to fight and win a war to reunify
the Peninsula, there are no indications that the Kim Regime has
abandoned the forced reunification option.
Conventional Forces: With 1.17 million personnel, the Korean
People's Army is the fifth largest active duty military force in the
world. The North Korean air force has over 1,700 aircraft and the navy
has more than 800 ships, including a large submarine fleet. The ground
force is the world's third largest, with almost one million soldiers,
and an estimated 6 million Reserves. About 70 percent of the North
Korean Army is deployed south of Pyongyang, where they are capable of
attacking with very little tactical warning. The preponderance of the
North Korean long-range artillery force can strike Seoul from its
current locations.
Asymmetric Threat: The North's asymmetric forces are dangerous,
well trained, and well funded by the North Korean military budget. They
continue to make methodical improvements in weapons of mass
destruction, ballistic missiles, and special operations forces.
North Korea is openly pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Their
program to develop both plutonium and uranium based nuclear weapons has
been well documented. North Korea maintains a substantial chemical
weapons stockpile and production capability that threatens both our
military forces and the civilian population centers in the Republic of
Korea and Japan. Additionally, North Korea has the capability to
develop, produce, and potentially weaponize biological warfare agents.
The principal risk attendant to the North Korean weapons of mass
destruction is proliferation--the sale of fissile materials, completed
nuclear weapons, and the technology to produce chemical or biological
agents to other nations or terrorist organizations.
Their ballistic missile inventory includes over 500 SCUD missile
variants that can threaten the entire peninsula. They continue to
produce and deploy medium-range No Dong missiles capable of striking
cities and United States bases in Japan. According to estimates by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, North
Korea has an untested ballistic missile capable of delivering a payload
the size of a nuclear weapon to parts of the continental United States.
Continued research on a three-stage variant of these missiles will
provide North Korea the capability to target all of North America. As
with weapons of mass destruction, North Korean missile proliferation
poses a threat far beyond the Korean peninsula.
North Korea's 122,000-man special operations forces are the world's
largest and pose a significant asymmetric threat. We consider them a
tough, dedicated, and profoundly loyal force. They undergo year-round
training to develop and maintain their skills. During wartime, these
forces would attack to disrupt command facilities of the Republic of
Korea-United States Combined Forces Command and seek to destroy our
force generation capability. The North will concentrate their special
operations forces against our critical war fighting nodes while seeking
to deny reinforcement from the continental United States.
Force Improvements: The North Korean military is adaptive. They
have studied our military actions, most recently in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, and adapted their tactics to offset our technological
advantages. They concentrate their efforts against the combined
surveillance, precision attack, and force generation capability of the
Republic of Korea and the United States. North Korea continues to
improve their command, control, communications, and intelligence
systems, harden and bury their facilities, improve lines of
communication, disperse forces, and improve camouflage, concealment,
and deception measures. These efforts increase the survivability of
North Korean combat power, and complicate our attack warning
capability.
Assessment: North Korea poses a dangerous and complex threat to
peace and security on the peninsula and throughout the region. Their
growing missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, including a
re-vitalized nuclear weapons program, constitute a substantial threat
to the world. Moreover, they have shown willingness to sell anything to
anybody for hard currency. They will continue to support the military
at the expense of the general population and extort aid to prop up
their failing economy. We see no indications that the Kim Regime will
change the policies of military first, brinkmanship, and missile
proliferation throughout the world.

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND UNITED STATES
FORCES KOREA

Since I took command in May 2002, I have had several opportunities
to assess the capabilities and readiness of United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. Key events
included response to the West Sea Armistice Violation by North Korea,
security for development of the inter-Korean transportation corridors
through the Demilitarized Zone, and security support for the 2002 World
Cup and Asian Games.
United Nations Command
Under the mandate of Security Council Resolutions 82, 83, and 84,
the United Nations Command in Seoul provides a standing coalition with
15 member nations to address trans-national interests in regional
stability. United Nations Command led the international response to the
29 June 2002 West Sea Armistice violation by the North Koreans. This
egregious, unprovoked North Korean attack in the West Sea sank the
Republic of Korea patrol boat SOSAN; killing 6 and wounding 19 Republic
of Korea sailors. The United Nations Command member nations promptly
issued strong statements denouncing the North Korean aggression. Facing
this international censure, North Korea reluctantly expressed regret
over the incident and agreed to the first United Nations Command--
Korean Peoples Army General Officer talks in almost 2 years. At the
General Officer talks, North Korea guaranteed not to interfere with a
United Nations Command-led salvage operation. Under the United Nations
flag, the Republic of Korea's navy successfully salvaged the sunken
boat. United Nations Command observers ensured neutrality and
transparency of the salvage operation. The strength of the Republic of
Korea-United States Alliance, backed by the United Nations Command
member nations, led to a successful West Sea recovery operation and
reinforced the legitimate authority of United Nations Command to
enforce the Armistice. United Nations Command again provided a
stabilizing force and prevented a dangerous situation from escalating
into open hostilities.
Following the West Sea salvage operation, the Republic of Korea and
North Korea held the Seventh Inter-Korean Ministerial talks, during
which they re-invigorated efforts to establish inter-Korean
transportation corridors. These corridors allow reconnection of rail
lines and roadways through two designated points in the Demilitarized
Zone to facilitate inter-Korean humanitarian visits and commerce. To
support this Republic of Korea reconciliation initiative, United
Nations Command worked closely with the Republic of Korea's Ministry of
National Defense to establish special coordination measures between the
Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense and the North Korean
People's Army to speed construction and operation of the transportation
corridors while ensuring compliance with the Armistice Agreement and
security of the Demilitarized Zone. The first group of passengers
crossed the Military Demarcation Line through the eastern corridor on
14 February 2003. This was the first time in 50 years that citizens of
the Republic of Korea crossed directly into North Korea and is a clear
demonstration of successful cooperation between the Republic of Korea
and United Nations Command. The figure below illustrates the location
of the east and west inter-Korean transportation corridors through the
Demilitarized Zone.

Combined Forces Command
Combined Forces Command ensures the security of the people of the
Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command provides the military force
that deters external aggression and stands ready to defeat any external
provocation against the Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command,
composed of air, ground, naval, marine, and special operations
components, conducts combined training exercises and readiness
inspections to maintain the warfighting readiness that is essential to
deterrence. Combined Forces Command headquarters is a fully integrated
staff, manned by Republic of Korea and United States military officers.
This thoroughly integrated headquarters coordinates the operations that
deter external aggression. In 2002, Combined Forces Command assisted
with the successful United Nations Command salvage operation in the
West Sea and with military security support to the World Cup and Asian
Games.
Leveraging Combined Forces Command wartime operational procedures,
United States Forces Korea and Republic of Korea forces shared
information and conducted combined exercises to deter terrorist
infiltrators seeking to disrupt the games. Combined Forces Command
operated a Crisis Action Response Team to quickly respond to any type
of incident. United States Forces Korea provided unique biological and
radiological defense assets to augment the Republic of Korea's military
capabilities. Our close cooperation ensured a secure 2002 World Cup and
demonstrated the agility of Combined Forces Command to conduct a wide
range of operations.
United States Forces Korea
United States Forces in Korea are the tangible demonstration of
United States commitment to peace and stability in Korea and throughout
Northeast Asia. United States Forces Korea brings the robust
technological superiority, information dominance, and warfighting
prowess that complement and buttress the Republic of Korea's military
capabilities. Our forward presence deters North Korean aggression and
convinces North Korea not to start a devastating war that would only
have tragic consequences throughout the region. To maintain the
dominance that ensures deterrence, we must maintain state-of-the-art
capabilities in Korea. My top priorities for force modernization are:
increasing C\4\ISR functionality and interoperability, increasing the
pre-positioned stocks of preferred munitions, improving counter fire
capabilities, missile defense, force protection, and logistics. These
capabilities support peninsular defense and regional security
operations.
C\4\ISR functionality and interoperability
United States Forces Korea continues to work hard to achieve the
decision superiority needed to execute effects-based operations. We
have made significant improvements in the combined Command, Control,
Computers, Communications, and Intelligence architecture in Korea. Over
the last year we have created a combined Common Operational Picture
that integrates Republic of Korea Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Tactical
Data Links from both Republic of Korea and United States air and naval
vessels and live video feeds from throughout the theater. We seek to
expand these capabilities by adding logistics and engineering Common
Operational Picture currently under development at Joint Forces
Command. We thank you for your support, which has allowed us to
progress this far. However, this common operational picture is built on
an aging communications infrastructure that is increasingly expensive
to maintain. We need to continue improving Command, Control, Computers,
Communications, and Intelligence functionality and interoperability.
The strategy for improving our Command, Control, Computers,
Communications, and Intelligence requires improved secure digital
networks, collaborative planning tools, and enhanced interoperability.
Our secure digital networks need significant technology upgrades to
improve the efficiency of information exchange. High-speed internet
encryption will enable us to prioritize and rapidly transmit secure
data throughout the theater. We also need to increase our secure long-
haul communications networks to effectively collaborate with United
States Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Improving these
networks provides the infrastructure required to upgrade our
collaborative planning tools and interactive displays to provide real-
time decision support.
Improving interoperability of Republic of Korea and United States
Forces Korea communications systems is paramount. The Program Budget
Decision 725 has helped us to address our Command, Control, Computers,
Communications, and Intelligence shortfalls. Some examples of key
interoperability programs that need your continued support are
integration of Republic of Korea Command Post Automation System and
United States Global Command and Control System-Korea; integrating
tactical Mobile Subscriber Equipment; and expanding Automated Deep
Operations Coordination System. I urge your continued endorsement of
Program Budget Decision 725 to maintain this funding across the Future
Years Defense Plan.
Preferred Munitions
The complexity of Korean terrain and weather require the all
weather capability provided by precision munitions. Our operational
planning leverages ``preferred munitions'' to conduct precision strike
against essential military targets. While we can conduct a successful
campaign without precision munitions, it would be longer and more
costly in terms of infrastructure damage and human suffering. Korea's
weather often impacts our munitions choices, but Global Positioning
Satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition and inertial-guided Wind
Corrected Munitions Dispenser give us the capability to sustain our
operations when the weather precludes the use of other munitions. Some
key requirements for this theater are: Joint Direct Attack Munition,
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, Conventional Air Launched Cruise
Missile upgrades, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, Javelin
and Hellfire anti-tank weapons. We must maintain adequate stocks of
these munitions on the peninsula. Critically important are early
development and fielding of munitions to defeat the hard and deeply
buried targets prevalent throughout North Korea. Toward that end,
United States Forces Korea is sponsoring two promising Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations--thermobaric weapons and tactical missile
system penetrator munitions, which will carry the fight to the enemy
wherever they seek to hide. I ask that you continue to support
development and production of the advanced precision munitions required
to support all contingency plans.
Counter-fire Capabilities
In the event of a conflict, the ability to rapidly destroy North
Korean long-range artillery is essential to deterrence. An aggressive
counter-fire battle achieves early destruction of one of North Korea's
essential military capabilities, while minimizing casualties and
protecting Seoul--the Republic of Korea's seat of government and hub of
economic power. My vision for the counter-fire fight is two-fold: a
proactive capability to destroy North Korean artillery systems before
they fire; and an overwhelming response to any North Korean fires into
the Republic of Korea. A fully resourced and integrated ground, sea,
and air counter-fire capability is essential to achieving this decisive
overmatch. Key components of the theater counter-fire system are:
state-of-the-art counter-battery radars, precision munitions,
operational-level and strategic-level Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and
state-of-the-art Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
capabilities. Your support of these programs provides the capabilities
needed to destroy the North Korean artillery at the time and place of
our choosing while simultaneously protecting Seoul.
Missile Defense
North Korea's theater ballistic missiles can range deeply into the
Republic of Korea, and deliver both conventional and chemical weapons
on the civilian population and military targets. To defeat the North
Korean missile threat, I need to increase the number of advanced
PATRIOT missiles in the Republic of Korea. Increasing the density of
these advanced air defense weapons on the peninsula ensures the needed
protection for critical nodes.
Force Protection
Protecting the force remains essential to operational readiness--I
will not compromise the safety of our service members and their
families. We remain vigilant and have taken critical steps to improve
our security posture--most notably increasing perimeter security
forces, installation of closed circuit television monitors at key
access points, fielding Portal Shield chemical and biological detection
systems, and conducting intensive anti-terrorism and force protection
training exercises.
Although we continue to assess the terrorist threat as low, we have
implemented additional force protection measures and increased our
physical security presence to ensure the safety of our people. In
addition to our normal security forces, the Korean National Police are
integrated into our installation security plans. Their sustained
presence adds depth and effectiveness to the security of our key
facilities. We have worked closely with the Republic of Korea Ministry
of National Defense to increase military security cooperation during
times of heightened force protection posture. These prudent measures
ensure the Republic of Korea--United States Alliance is prepared to
meet any terrorist threat to our installations.
Over the past year, we completed a detailed vulnerability
assessment of our installations. This assessment identified over 130
major tasks required to comply with anti-terrorism and force protection
requirements, many of which require changes to our infrastructure. Key
requirements to improve force protection focus on establishing adequate
standoff protection around our key facilities and installations and
upgrading structural integrity on mission essential and vulnerable
buildings. We have taken prudent measures to mitigate these shortfalls
with the available resources. I encourage you to support all force
protection related projects.
Logistics and Sustainment
Adequate logistical sustainment is essential to our campaign plans.
In Korea, our operations are sustained by a combination of pre-
positioned equipment stocks and replenishment from the continental
United States. In addition to the precision munitions requirements I've
presented, I need your support to correct shortfalls in Army Pre-
positioned Set-4 equipment, supplies, and maintenance facilities. These
war reserve sustainment stocks are essential to execute operational
plans. To ensure timely arrival of additional forces and sustainment
supplies, I fully support initiatives to field robust strategic
transportation systems like the High Speed Vessel and C-17. Equally
important to the Korean Theater is the continued improvement of Joint
Logistics Over The Shore equipment, which provides the flexibility to
sustain the force against an enemy's anti-access strategies. Improved
strategic mobility and robust pre-positioned equipment and supplies
ensure sustainment of forward deployed forces and rapid reinforcement
from the continental United States.

COMMAND PRIORITIES

As the commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces
Command, and United States Forces Korea, my command priorities are:
Ensure Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula, Readiness and
Training, Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance,
Transformation of the Command, and Make Korea an Assignment of Choice.
I want to elaborate on each of these, identify the key programs and the
resources needed to make them a reality.
Ensure Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula
Maintaining the Armistice and deterring aggression are the most
important missions I have as Commander, United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. Readiness to
fight and win decisively is critical to these missions. We must also
foster broader regional security cooperation to enhance solidarity
among our allies and friends. It is essential that the two key elements
that deter conflict on the peninsula, the United Nations Command member
nations and the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance, continue
cooperation to actively promote peace and stability. Our common
purpose, steadfast resolve and advanced capabilities are essential to
continued stability in Korea.
Readiness and Training
Readiness is my number one priority. Readiness is our ability to
deter, and if required, defeat aggression on the Korean peninsula. The
proximity of the threat, the complexity of combat in this theater, and
high personnel turnover demand intensive, combined training at all
levels. Our year-round combined exercise program, which leverages the
results of Joint Forces Command experimentation, provides a great venue
to maintain our warfighting proficiency and implement new operational
concepts that support transformation.
Combined Forces Command uses the combined exercise program to
maintain readiness that is essential to defeat a limited warning attack
by North Korea. Our robust annual training program consists of three
major exercises: Ulchi-Focus Lens; Reception, Staging, Onward Movement
and Integration; and Foal Eagle. Collectively, these exercises train
over 400,000 personnel and ensure that the Combined Forces Command Team
of active and Reserve component units remains proficient in all
warfighting tasks. In Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002, our capstone training
exercise, we improved our Common Operational Picture with interactive
command and control displays. We used the Common Operational Picture at
all command levels to achieve common situational awareness. We also
implemented a new collaborative planning and execution system to
coordinate theater-level operations. Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002 provided an
opportunity to test Integrated Total Asset Visibility and automated
language translators.
Our 2003 exercise program focuses on implementing effects based
operations. To enhance the exercise program, we are continuing the
development of the emerging Northeast Asia Regional Simulation Center
to provide simulation support to joint, combined, and bi-lateral
exercises. This effort is becoming the preferred venue to resolve
difficult coalition integration and doctrinal issues. As this center
moves toward its objective state in 2008, it has the potential to
support multilateral exercises and simulation with other regional
partners and allies. Our 2003 exercise program is essential to
maintaining warfighting proficiency and implementing new doctrinal
concepts that improve operational effectiveness.
Training Area Encroachment
In addition to simulation training, we must conduct regular live
force-on-force training to practice combat tasks and maintain maneuver
proficiency. Korea's increasing urbanization encroaches on training
areas, restricting our ability to train in Korea. For example, armored
and mechanized units cannot maneuver outside of small and discrete
pockets of land located in a corridor North of Seoul. Artillery live
fire training is limited to two small training areas, which prohibit
effective integration of fire and maneuver techniques. We have the same
problem with our Air-to-Ground ranges and must continually work to
ensure we have the proper separation for adequate aircrew training
while maintaining safety for the people who live near the ranges. The
Land Partnership Plan provides the mechanism for us to improve our
training areas and reduce the effects of encroachment. By 2008 we
expect to have the land necessary to create a consolidated Korean
Maneuver Training Center. I ask you to fully support this initiative.
Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance
For 50 years the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance has been
a standard by which all others are judged. To strengthen the Alliance,
we need to improve public understanding of United States contributions.
It is also essential that we review and re-affirm the military
relationship of the Republic of Korea and United States Forces Korea.
These complementary efforts will ensure that the Alliance endures well
into the future.
To improve the public understanding and appreciation of United
Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces
Korea, I have implemented a ``Good Neighbor'' program that encourages
closer interaction between our units and the people of the Republic of
Korea. This program uses local unit outreach programs such as tutoring
English language students in area schools, Arbor Day activities, and
sponsoring charitable contributions for orphanages. One of our largest
volunteer efforts occurred in the aftermath of Typhoon Rusa in
September 2002. United States Forces Korea volunteers assisted with
clean-up operations and delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies.
These efforts reduced suffering and sped recovery in the affected
communities. Community outreach programs develop personal relationships
that increase understanding and appreciation for United States Forces
Korea.
In addition to these one-on-one programs, I've established new
channels of communication with South Korean community leaders,
nongovernmental organizations, media representatives and concerned
citizens. The Commander's Korea Advisory Council provides a venue for
military and community leaders to help with our efforts to positively
influence the Alliance. Unit commanders have established hot lines to
receive and address issues of concern to the South Korean people. We
are also educating local civic leaders about provisions of Status of
Forces Agreement, improved safety programs, and Land Partnership Plan
implementation. We are now developing a Korean language web site to
provide command information to the South Korean public.
Because of our high annual personnel turnover, Eighth United States
Army has instituted a cultural awareness program called ``New Horizons
Day.'' New Horizons Day teaches our service members and civilian
employees about Korean culture, safety, risk mitigation, and command
policies on appropriate off-duty behavior. New Horizons Day reinforces
our efforts to improve understanding of the close ties that are the
foundation of the Alliance.
We have begun the process of re-defining the Republic of Korea-
United States Alliance. In December 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and Minister of Defense Lee, Joon agreed to conduct a Future of the
Alliance Policy Initiative to guide Alliance transformation. The Future
of the Alliance Policy Initiative--jointly led by the United States
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Republic of Korea's Ministry of
National Defense--will focus on future roles, missions, functions,
structure, and stationing in the Alliance; combined transformation and
modernization; and the role for the Alliance after reconciliation.
These policy discussions will ensure the Alliance has the right balance
for the future.
The defense ministers also directed the Republic of Korea-United
States Military Committee develop new operational concepts for combined
operations. These operational concepts take advantage of new military
technologies and lessons from other theaters to implement an effects-
based warfighting structure. Using the lessons of Millennium Challenge
02 we will implement the systems needed to make these concepts a
reality. We are rapidly revising our contingency plans to achieve rapid
decisive maneuver and simultaneous engagement throughout the
battlespace. These initiatives increase our ability to defeat the North
Korean threat and to transform the command.
Transformation of the Command
We must prepare today to shape the uncertain future in Northeast
Asia. My transformation vision is the core of an enhanced Alliance and
ensures our ability to provide security throughout the region. As we
conduct the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative with the United
States Office of the Secretary of Defense and Republic of Korea's
Ministry of National Defense, we will closely examine how to make the
command structure more efficient, modernize our capabilities, and
develop a future regionally capable combined force that can protect
Korea and conduct regional security missions. This vision is achievable
in the near to mid-term and we're on the right path to making it
reality.
The Land Partnership Program, ratified by the Republic of Korea's
National Assembly in November 2002, is a great foundation for
transformation. LPP is a plan that returns 50 percent of United States
Forces Korea installations to the Republic of Korea government and
consolidates United States Forces Korea into 23 centralized
installations. What's most important about Land Partnership Plan is its
flexibility to accommodate future changes in force structure, command
arrangements, and basing. In addition to the Land Partnership Program,
we are conducting a combined Republic of Korea-United States Initial
Master Plan to reduce United States presence in Seoul. This study will
identify the needed facilities and a less intrusive location for our
units currently stationed in Seoul.
Make Korea ``The Assignment of Choice''
Today, Korea remains the least desirable assignment for all
services, largely because of family separation, poor living and working
conditions, and financial hardship. Improving housing conditions, re-
capitalizing the infrastructure, and correcting the pay disparity will
create an ``irreversible momentum'' in making Korea an assignment of
choice.
To reduce family separation in Korea, I want to provide command-
sponsored housing for at least 25 percent of our married military
members and their families by 2010. We currently provide government
owned and leased housing for less than 10 percent of our married
service members, far less than the 70 percent in Europe and Japan. I
plan to station the vast majority of our families south of the greater
Seoul metropolitan area. To accomplish these goals, we must increase
our housing and support leasing authorities to 15 years. This will make
the programs attractive to South Korean construction companies and
create a ``build-to-lease'' market in the Republic of Korea. With
stable Military Construction funding levels, increased leasing
authority, and Host Nation Funded Construction under the Land
Partnership Program, we can afford this initiative to improve living
and working conditions in the Republic of Korea.
With your support, we are continuing to improve accompanied housing
with phased renovation of family housing units. In fiscal year 2004, we
will start the second phase of a three-phased housing project that will
add housing for 111 more families at Osan air base. We began these
efforts 2 years ago and we continue to make progress on this important
initiative.
Even with your great support to housing last year ($185.3 million),
over 40 percent of our unaccompanied service members live in inadequate
quarters; many in buildings erected shortly after the end of the Korean
War. Because of overcrowding and sub-standard facilities, many
unaccompanied personnel must live in dense urban areas outside our
installations, creating force protection concerns and requiring our
service men and women to pay high out-of-pocket living expenses. We
have a plan to provide unaccompanied enlisted service members with
quality housing by 2008, as mandated by the Department of Defense. The
Air Force Dormitory Master Plan and Army Barracks Upgrade and Buyout
Plan allow us to use funds where they are most needed for renovation
and new construction. The Fiscal Year 2004 Military Construction
program requests three Army dormitory complexes and another Air Force
dormitory that will significantly reduce housing deficiencies. Your
continued commitment to stable Military Construction will have a major
impact on correcting the housing shortage our service men and women
endure in Korea.
Deteriorating work facilities impair readiness, reduce the
efficiency of uniformed and civilian workers, and lower retention rates
of highly qualified and otherwise motivated people. Our facilities and
infrastructure are old--over one third of all buildings in the command
are between 25 and 50 years old, and one third are classified as
temporary buildings. We are working hard to maintain existing permanent
facilities through an aggressive Sustainment, Restoration, and
Maintenance program funded with Operations and Maintenance accounts.
Environmental stewardship is important to me personally and to the
command. Our most immediate environmental concern is the command's
aging fuel tanks. We are continuing to work through challenges with
environmental protection and mitigation programs. Although there have
been improvements in the last 2 years, more needs to be done with
environmental project funding in 2004. Environmental requirements have
been integrated into military construction and Sustainment,
Restoration, and Maintenance funding. These resources will be wisely
invested in our enduring installations under the Land Partnership Plan.
The final element of making Korea an assignment of choice lies in
correcting the pay disparity between serving in Korea and equally harsh
shorter tours in southwest Asia and the Balkans. Our service members
are motivated by more than money; however, financial hardship and low
morale are clearly linked. An Army Sergeant serving a 6-month tour in
Bosnia receives $500 more per month than one of his or her peers
serving a 12-month unaccompanied tour in Korea. Additionally, our men
and women pay significant out of pocket costs to maintain a second
household in Korea, where cost of living expenses exceed those in San
Francisco and Frankfurt, without the benefit of a cost of living
allowance. We are participating in a Department of Defense study to
explore possible solutions such as separate rations, additional
hardship duty pay, a cost of living allowance, and distributed
incentive pay. We are also exploring other initiatives to reduce
financial inequities, such as expanding the Overseas Tour Extension
Incentive Plan, implementing Assignment Pay Initiative, and
implementing partial Basic Allowance for Housing to compensate for sub
standard housing, but we need your support to make these initiatives a
reality for our service men and women.
In conclusion, I'd like to leave you with these thoughts:
Northeast Asia is a key region for the United States and our
partners. We must maintain our presence in the region to demonstrate
our commitment to ensure peace and security in the region.
Congressional support is vital to our future in Korea and Northeast
Asia. We thank you for all that you've done.
Events in Korea affect the entire world. North Korea's aggressive
posture and continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction pose
serious danger to the peace, security, and prosperity of the peninsula
and the region. It has substantial military capability and is selling
high technology missiles to the highest bidder. North Korea continues
to violate its agreements and extort aid from the international
community. North Korea's renewed efforts to develop nuclear weapons
pose a formidable threat to the world. North Korea is a threat to
Northeast Asia and all peace-loving nations. It is a threat that
requires a strong Republic of Korea Alliance, a robust forward United
States military presence, and an active international domestic effort.
The Republic of Korea-United States Alliance has weathered
challenges for over 50 years, and this partnership will continue to
endure. Now is the time to transform this alliance to meet the changing
conditions in the region. We need your support to implement our
transformation vision.
You can be justifiably proud of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and civilians in Korea that serve the American people. Their
daily dedication and performance reflect the trust and support that
you've placed in them.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
General Hill.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. HILL, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

General Hill. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
members of the committee: I am honored for this opportunity to
appear before you today. I greatly appreciate the support of
the committee for the United States Southern Command and the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
civilian personnel who I am so privileged to command.
These men and women are performing in an absolutely
outstanding manner. I have seen Special Forces trainers in the
remote regions of Colombia, Reserve medics exercising their
skills by bringing medical attention for the first time to
villages in Belize, airmen conducting detection and monitoring
missions over the source zone in the Andean region, and sailors
and coast guardsmen conducting interdiction operations in the
Caribbean.
I am grateful and continually inspired by their selfless
dedication and unwavering pride in serving our great country. I
have also been inspired by the dedication of Colombian soldiers
in their daily fight to defend Colombian democracy against
vicious narcoterrorists and in their efforts to rescue three
American citizens. The Colombian military has sustained deaths
in their continued attempt to rescue these Americans.
Since taking command 7 months ago, I have traveled
extensively throughout the region, to include nine visits to
Colombia. These visits have provided me important insights to
the region, its leaders, the challenges, and, equally
important, opportunities that lie before us in Latin America
and the Caribbean.
The expectations derived from democratic and free market
reforms, seemingly so available at the close of the last
century, are not being realized at the dawn of this one. This,
along with economic stagnation and endemic corruption, are
significantly challenging many of the hemisphere's fledgling
democracies.
Latin America and the Caribbean is an increasingly
important region to the United States. We have strong and
growing economic, strategic, security, and cultural ties to the
region. On the negative side, nearly all of the cocaine and
much of the heroin consumed in our country comes from this
region, significantly contributing to the 19,000 deaths caused
by drugs last year.
The threats to security and to stability in the region do
not come from warring or antagonistic countries or neighbors.
Overall, the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
generally have friendly relations. In fact, it is the least
militarized region of the world. The threats instead come from
destabilizing and corrupting influences of international
terrorism, narcoterrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, and
rampant crime.
Although nowhere are these transnational threats more
graphically and brutally active than in Colombia, they have
pervasively and corrosively spread throughout all regions of
Latin America and the Caribbean. We therefore cannot focus our
efforts exclusively on Colombia, and we in Southern Command are
not. Fortunately, there is a growing recognition among the
region's leaders that the problems emanating from, but not
restricted to, Colombia are regional and require a regional
solution.
In fact, just yesterday the Andean Ridge countries' foreign
ministers and ministers of defense, meeting in Colombia, signed
an understanding to increase regional cooperation and
information-sharing to coordinate their efforts along their
borders to combat narcoterrorists and the flow of drugs. This
move toward regional cooperation is a very important one and
one that we have been pursuing vigorously.
As I mentioned in my written statement for the record, I am
proud to say that the men and women of the United States
Southern Command do a great deal to further our Nation's
interests in this hemisphere with very few resources and a
modest presence. We are, however, at a critical point where the
progress in eliminating conflict, reducing tension, and
establishing democracy throughout the region could be at risk
if we are not steadfast in our efforts. The continued progress
as a region of democracy and prosperity is of paramount
importance, I believe, to our national security.
I thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hill follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Hill, USA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is a
pleasure to appear before you today to present the United States
Southern Command's current posture statement. I am honored to have the
opportunity to highlight the important contributions the men and women
of our command are making to the war on terrorism. These soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, members of the Coast Guard, and our civilians
are working in virtually every nation in the region to promote U.S.
national security interests. Their work has done much to preserve
stability and strengthen relationships with our allies.
Since taking command 7 months ago, I have traveled extensively
throughout the region and have witnessed the mounting challenges facing
regional leaders and their people. The expectations derived from
popular elections and free market reforms, seemingly so achievable at
the close of the last century, are not being realized at the dawn of
this one. Economic stagnation, endemic corruption, and unprecedented
challenges to sovereignty by international terrorists, narcoterrorists,
and drugs, arms, and human trafficking organizations threaten many of
the hemisphere's fledgling democracies. Without sustained international
support, some of these democracies could collapse, signaling the return
of authoritarian regimes that respect neither human rights nor
democratic principles. Today, I will outline the United States Southern
Command's priorities in the hemisphere and the impact of what we do, or
fail to do, on our own national security. The strategic importance of
the hemisphere, the war on terrorism, and our interests in Colombia
remain central.

IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION

The nations of our hemisphere are largely at peace with each other
and have foresworn the development of weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed, the regional nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of Tlatlelolco,
is one of the most successful in history. Military spending on a per
capita basis is lower in Latin America than anywhere else in the world.
There are many cultural, economic, and political reasons to suggest
that U.S.-Latin relationships should be increasingly important, yet
world events keep U.S. security policy focused appropriately in other
directions.
The region is the number one source of new Americans as more than
34 million residents in the U.S. are of Latin origin. Latin Americans
are the largest and fastest growing minority group in the country and
by 2050 are projected to comprise one quarter of the U.S. population.
Their growing numbers are having a profound influence on our society
and culture.
Our economic and strategic ties to Latin America and the Caribbean
have never been stronger. The region provides over 31 percent of our
imported oil, more than all Middle Eastern countries combined. The
volatility of the Middle East makes the availability of oil supplies
from Latin America and the Caribbean all the more critical. The U.S.
conducts more than $360 billion of annual trade with Latin America and
the Caribbean, nearly as much as with the entire European Community. By
the year 2010, trade with Latin America is expected to exceed that with
the European Economic Community and Japan combined. This exchange
translates into millions of American jobs and businesses linked to this
region. As our recently negotiated Free Trade Agreement with Chile
shows, these links will only grow as we progress toward the president's
vision of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. Latin America is also
critical to the global environment as the Amazon Basin produces 20
percent of the world's freshwater runoff and 25 percent of the world's
oxygen. Also, 25 percent of United States pharmaceuticals are derived
from sources in this same area.
During the past 25 years, Latin American and Caribbean nations have
emerged from limited democracies and dictatorial regimes to democracies
governed by elected civilian leaders that have increased respect human
rights and control their military forces. This transformation is in no
small measure a result of Southern Command's ongoing engagement and
security cooperation activities. Such activities now include military
operations in support of the war on terrorism; counterdrug operations;
military training and exercises; and professionalization of the
region's militaries emphasizing the role of the military in a
democratic society, respect for human rights, and the protection of
civil liberties.
The true test of a nation's democracy and military professionalism,
however, is how well that nation endures crisis. Many Latin American
and Caribbean nations are currently experiencing political, economic,
and social crises, and never before have their militaries demonstrated
such restraint and support for their elected civilian leadership.
While much is going right in the region, there still is much that
is discouraging. Millions of Latin Americans remain mired in poverty,
living in urban slums or neglected rural areas with crumbling
infrastructure, inadequate sanitation, little access to proper health
care, and perhaps most tragically, minimal educational opportunities
for their children. Some telling statistics illustrate the magnitude of
the economic crisis now facing the region. According to the United
Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC), 214
million people in the region, 44 percent of the population, live below
the poverty level. Seven million people were added to the ranks of the
poor in 2002, and 20 percent of the region's population is unable to
provide for even their most basic food needs. Developmental assistance
and international investment are inhibited by the lack of security in
the region. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous
challenges faced by our democratic allies in the region.
In recent years, economic desperation and volatile social
environments in the hemisphere have set the conditions for the
proliferation of international terrorism, narcoterrorism, illegal
drugs, and arms trafficking. This is the crux of my concern and my
responsibility. Unless and until Latin American and Caribbean
governments can provide both security and stability and a reasonable
opportunity for positive change in the lives of their citizens, these
activities will continue to fester and grow and the foundations of
democracy could crumble under the weight of these transnational
threats.

THREATS

Terrorism in the Region
The war on terrorism is our number one priority. The events of
September 11, 2001, provided a cruel and graphic illustration of the
evils of terrorists and their ability to attack at a time and place of
their choosing. The recent El Nogal nightclub bombing in Bogota,
Colombia, in which at least 35 people were killed and 173 wounded is
just one example of the incessant terrorist attacks in that country.
Last year's bombing outside the U.S. Embassy in Peru by the Shining
Path is an indication that terrorist groups in the region are
deliberately targeting U.S. citizens and interests. Economic
deprivation, political instability, rampant corruption, drug
trafficking, and paralyzed judicial systems are breeding grounds for
terrorists and coupled with Latin America's proximity to the U.S.,
increase our vulnerability to attack from the southern approaches to
our homeland.
To complement Homeland Security efforts and seal the seams through
which terrorists infiltrate, we must take comprehensive measures in our
region to combat international terrorism. To effectively prosecute the
war on terrorism, we must have the authority to use our assets and
subordinate commands to assist partner nations interdict those illicit
activities that support terrorists throughout our area of
responsibility. To strengthen capabilities, build coalitions, and
ensure our allies can effectively defeat terrorist activities within
their borders, we must continue to provide partner nation security
forces with equipment and continue to train with them in bilateral and
multilateral exercises. Promoting security and effective border defense
in every nation of our area of responsibility denies terrorists
operating locations, support structures, freedom of movement, and the
financial underpinnings from drug trafficking for their destructive
activities.
International terrorists and narcoterrorists, fueled by drug and
arms traffickers, menace our region. While the primary front in the war
on terrorism currently lies elsewhere, Southern Command plays an
important supporting role. Radical Islamic groups operating out of the
region use the profits from drug, human, and arms trafficking, false
documentation, and other illicit activities in our hemisphere to fund
their worldwide operations. The narcoterrorist organizations operating
primarily out of Colombia are spreading their reach throughout the
region, wreaking havoc, and destabilizing legitimate governments. It is
these organizational networks that remain our focus.
Middle Eastern based terrorist groups to include Hamas, Hizballah
and Islamiyya al Gammat have networks and support structures throughout
the region. These cells, extending from South America through Central
America and the Caribbean, consist not only of logistics and support
personnel, but also of terrorists who have participated in attacks in
the Middle East. Radical Islamic supporters have long gathered in areas
such as the Tri-border region between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina,
known for its deep links to a full range of transnational criminal
activities. Similarly, we continue to be concerned by possible
activities of radical Islamic groups on Margarita Island in Venezuela
and Maicao, Colombia. Precise estimates of the amount of money diverted
from the region to radical Islamic groups are difficult to determine
due to the illicit nature of the activity, however, the figures are
likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
In the Tri-border area, a raid in the fall of 2001, on the business
of a local Hizballah leader revealed terrorist training videos and
audiotapes extolling the virtues of Jihad. He admitted having ties to
businesses in Miami, New York, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay--leaving
open the question of his involvement in terrorist efforts to penetrate
the United States or pass money to terrorist groups.
Last year, Paraguay arrested and tried several important Islamic
radicals. Hizballah financial chief, Sohbi Fayad, was convicted on
charges of tax evasion and local extremist, Ali Dahrough, is awaiting
trial. Paraguay awaits the extradition of Hizballah Tri-border chief,
Assad Barakat, from Brazil to face similar charges. These actions
against convicted and alleged terrorists, and those who support them,
produce important disruptions of terrorists' networks.
Similar efforts are needed throughout the region to neutralize the
Islamic radical structure while upholding the rights of law-abiding
Muslims. Building coalitions, training, equipping forces, and improving
capabilities will enable allies to significantly reduce their
ungoverned spaces and gain greater control of their borders. These
efforts produce skills, which are tested in U.S. sponsored multilateral
exercises that promote security, improve effective border control, deny
terrorists safe havens, and restrict their ability to operate.
Narcoterrorism is most pervasive in Colombia where citizens suffer
daily from murder, bombings, kidnappings, and lawlessness. However,
narcoterrorism is spreading increasingly throughout the region.
Narcoterrorist groups are involved in kidnappings in Panama, Venezuela,
Ecuador and Paraguay. They smuggle weapons and drugs in Brazil,
Suriname, Guyana, Mexico, and Peru, are making inroads in Bolivia, and
use the same routes and infrastructure for drugs, arms, illegal aliens
and other illicit activities. The narcoterrorists are very well
financed by their involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation and
production, kidnapping, and extortion. These drug-fueled terrorist
groups with their ideologically appealing names--the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, the National Liberation Army or ELN,
and the United Defense Forces or AUC--directly attack the legitimate
authority of the Colombian government. Ideology is no longer the moving
force it once was for these organizations. Today, they are motivated by
money, and power, and protecting, and sustaining themselves through
drug trafficking and terror. The arrest last year in Houston, Texas of
an AUC operative arranging an exchange of $25 million worth of drugs
for arms is a clear indication of the symbiotic relationship among
terrorists, drugs, and arms traffickers. The re-emergence of the
Shining Path in Peru is being fueled by their involvement in the drug
trade.
Narcoterrorism also negatively impacts the environment. Over 4
million hectares of rain forest have been destroyed in order to plant
coca. Forty eight thousand metric tons of precursor chemicals used in
coca production per year, are dumped into the environment. Terrorist
pipeline attacks have spilled 3 million gallons of oil, the equivalent
of 12 Exxon Valdez's.
Drug Trafficking
Underlying all of this is the illegal drug industry--a scourge that
constantly threatens the sovereignty, stability, and rule of law in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Drug traffickers generate violence,
foster crime, fuel gangs, and corrupt public institutions. The Drug
Enforcement Administration believes that a substantial number of
foreign terrorist organizations are trafficking in large amounts of
narcotics--six of these organizations are operating in this hemisphere.
In addition to all three of the Colombian terrorist groups, the Shining
Path, Jama'at Al Musilmeen, and Hizballah generate revenues through the
drug trafficking business.
According to the Office of the National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP), over 19,000 Americans die annually from drug-induced causes.
This constitutes, in my mind, a weapon of mass destruction. If we
define national security as the safety and well being of our citizenry,
illegal drugs must be considered a major national security concern.
Narcotrafficking not only threatens the security of the United
States, but also the survival of democratic allies in the region
through unabated violence, terror, and corruption, while forcing these
countries to devote precious resources to address these problems.
Additionally, as traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in
the transit countries, transit nations become drug consumers as well.
Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can occur; it
is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world behind the
United States. While partner nations are willing to work with us to
develop regional approaches to counter the production and trafficking
of illegal drugs, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations
severely test the capabilities of their thinly stretched security
forces.
Arms Trafficking
A nearly unchecked flow of illegal arms throughout the region poses
another serious threat to the security of several nations and
exacerbates terrorist violence throughout the region. Many of these
arms are leftover from the region's civil wars, while others are from
former Soviet bloc countries or even purchased legally in the United
States. They are then shipped through the region's porous borders
destined to the terrorist organizations in Colombia or gangs elsewhere,
often in exchange for drugs. Arms traffickers use a variety of land,
maritime, and air routes that often mirror drug and human trafficking
routes.

REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS

Andean Region
Colombians suffer daily from a level of violence and terror
practically unimaginable to us. In this war-torn country, a decades-old
conflict waged by narcoterrorists and fueled by illicit drug money
continues unabated, claiming thousands of lives. More than 1.5 million
Colombians have been displaced from their homes by war, terror, and
violence. Last year there were more terrorist attacks in Colombia--an
average of four per day--than in all other nations of the world
combined. Colombia has the highest homicide rate in the world. Last
year more than 28,000 Colombians were murdered--13 times the U.S.
rate--making homicide the most likely cause of death. More than 2,900
Colombians were kidnapped, also the highest rate in the world. Violence
has become so endemic that a Colombian company now specializes in
bulletproof vests for children.
Many familiar with Colombia's conflict romantically describe the
illegal groups as ``revolutionaries,'' ``guerrillas,'' or ``rebels.''
These terms are inaccurate and out of date. The FARC, ELN, and AUC,
directly challenge the legitimate authority of the Colombian
Government, yet offer no alternative form of government. Simply put,
these are narcoterrorists who profit at the expense of Colombia and its
people.
All three of these groups target elected government officials and
the civilian population with their brutal attacks. International human
rights groups have publicly denounced the massacres, assassinations,
political kidnappings, forced displacements, and forced recruitment of
minors by all three groups. Human rights groups have also denounced the
FARC's use of illegal weapons to attack protected sites and civilian
institutions such as the May 2002 battle between the FARC and AUC, in
which a FARC mortar fell attack on a church in Bojaya, killing more
than 100 people, many of them children. The FARC's latest innovation of
forcing kidnapped individuals to drive bomb-laden cars on suicide
missions represents yet another step in the downward spiral toward the
terrorists' total disregard for the sanctity of human life. Attempting
to protect Colombians from this lawlessness is a paralyzed judicial
system in which 97 percent of crimes go unpunished and three million
cases remain backlogged.
In the face of these enormous challenges, President Alvaro Uribe is
vigorously proceeding with changes to reform the nation's political and
legal systems, promote socio-economic development, protect human
rights, provide help to displaced persons, enlarge and professionalize
the security forces, and combat narcoterrorism. I have traveled to
Colombia nine times and am impressed by President Uribe and his strong
and principled team's determination to defeat the forces that are
ripping his country apart.
President Uribe's initiatives are solidly supported by internal
control and legislative measures designed to hold military members
responsible for their own actions. Education and training initiatives,
including human rights training implemented by the Colombian Ministry
of Defense, have produced some of the best-trained and most
professional military personnel in Colombia's history. Allegations of
human rights violations by the military have dropped to less than 2
percent of all allegations, and today the Colombian military is one of
the most respected organizations in the nation.
Colombia remains the world's leading producer of cocaine and
accounts for 90 percent of the U.S. supply. Furthermore, we are seeing
a surge in poppy cultivation and heroin production in Colombia. While
Colombia's heroin production is a modest eight metric tons per year,
virtually all of it is smuggled into the U.S.
Although it has the political will to fight drug traffickers,
Ecuador remains a significant transshipment country for illicit drugs
and is the country most vulnerable to spillover from Colombia. Economic
limitations and security concerns hamper Ecuador's ability to
strengthen border control operations. Ecuador is host to one of the
Southern Command's Forward Operating Locations (FOL) in Manta. The FOL
has proven to be an effective launch site and critical element in our
source zone counterdrug operations. This FOL provides coverage in the
eastern Pacific where we have seen the greatest increase in drug
smuggling activity. Runway improvement, construction of living
quarters, and maintenance facility projects were completed in 2002.
Continued infrastructure improvement will ensure the airfield meets
U.S. operations and safety standards. Manta's substantial contributions
to counterdrug efforts will become even more valuable with the
resumption of the Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia. The
effectiveness of the Air Bridge Denial Program is unquestionable. The
incorporation of additional safety measures will facilitate the
resumption of this program, which will improve our ability to assist
Colombia in its efforts to interdict the flow of illegal drugs.
Venezuela continues to deteriorate with its declining per capita
income, financial crisis, increased instability, violence, and crime.
Despite this political and societal crisis, the U.S.-Venezuelan
military contacts continue with Venezuelan military students attending
U.S. schools. We have a longstanding institutional relationship with
the Venezuelan military and will continue to pursue common security
concerns, as long as the military remains within its constitutional
authority.
Caribbean
In the Caribbean the primary challenge comes from narcotrafficking
and the corruption that accompanies it. With the exception of Haiti,
democratic institutions remain relatively stable but the police and
security forces are often overwhelmed or outgunned by the resources of
drug traffickers and others engaging in illicit activity. The
significant economic slowdown in the Caribbean provides a fertile
environment for the corruption of government and security personnel as
well as the proliferation of drug trafficking and other illicit
activities. To meet these challenges regional governments are
attempting to focus on cooperative efforts such as the Regional
Security System (RSS) and CARICOM. There is a growing understanding
among Caribbean leaders that leveraging each other's limited resources
is the only way to deal with the threats they face. Our efforts are
focused on supporting these cooperative approaches.
Haiti stands out in the area of responsibility for its total
political and economic paralysis. The government has refused to
implement both the economic and political reforms essential for
garnering vital support from the international community. Without
fundamental changes in both the political and economic sphere, Haiti
will continue to stagnate.
A key element of our efforts in the Caribbean is the uniquely
focused Tradewinds exercise. Conducted annually, Tradewinds exercise
objectives focus on combating transnational threats, counter drug
operations, and disaster preparedness. This year's exercise will
consist of two phases hosted respectively by Jamaica and Barbados.
Central America
We are at a unique point in time in Central America, with most of
the region's political and military leaders dedicated to overcoming
historical border differences and tensions in order to pursue regional
economic and military integration. Southern Command has a long history
of providing security cooperation to Central American nations with a
regional focus on disaster response, humanitarian and civic assistance,
demining, peacekeeping, and counterdrug operations. Arms trafficking,
originating with arms left over from the civil wars of the 1980s not
only threaten this region but flow southward to Colombia. This region
is also a primary avenue for illegal migrants and drugs entering the
United States. Especially troublesome is the situation in Guatemala.
The administration has proven to be an unreliable partner in countering
drug trafficking and according to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, there were more than 100 attacks against human rights
workers in Guatemala last year.
Central America is therefore key to our counterdrug and counter
terrorist efforts, which include regional operations to strengthen
capabilities and foster cooperation within nations of the region. We
are working more closely with the Organization of Central American
Armed Forces (CFAC) to promote military integration and cooperation in
maintaining regional security. El Salvador provides Southern Command
the use of Comalapa Airport as a Forward Operating Location for
counterdrug coverage throughout Central America, the eastern Pacific,
and the western Caribbean. Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras continues
to provide a logistical support base to the critical humanitarian
missions of the region, as well as counterdrug operations through
support of Central Skies exercises.
Southern Cone
Military-to-military engagement in the Southern Cone remains
strong. Argentina remains in the grip of economic crisis. Recent
estimates indicate that 19 million, or 53 percent of Argentines are
living below the poverty line. In the midst of this crisis, the
Argentine military remains a strong partner for the U.S. in the region
and has carved out a useful role in U.N. peacekeeping operations and
support for the war on terrorism. Argentine military leaders strongly
support democracy and the constitution and serve as a voice of
restraint and respect for the democratic process. Southern Command
continues its military-to-military contact program with the Argentinean
Armed Forces and expects this sustained cooperation will continue in
the future.
Crime in Brazil, especially urban gang violence, remains a serious
problem, and President ``Lula'' da Silva faces challenges from illicit
drug and arms traffickers. Thus far, cooperation with the new Brazilian
administration and the Brazilian military continues seamlessly.
Despite regional economic difficulties, Chile's economy remains on
firm footing and offers appreciated stability in the Southern Cone.
Transparency International rates Chile as one of the least corrupt
nations in the world. The United States has recognized this by
concluding a Free Trade Agreement with Chile, the first nation in the
region after Mexico. We look forward to a growing and cooperative
relationship with Chile and its armed forces.

WAR ON TERRORISM

As mentioned earlier, terrorists throughout the region bomb,
murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, and smuggle arms among other illicit
activities. Southern Command trains, equips and builds allied nation
capabilities to confront terrorists, control borders, deny safe havens,
and prevent terrorists from operating with impunity. Interagency
cooperation, improving Colombian military capabilities, conducting
detention operations, the use of expanded authority, and security
cooperation are among the tools we employ. With the inextricable link
between terrorists, drugs, and arms trafficking, counterdrug and arms
interdiction operations are critical to our efforts. Joint Interagency
Task Force-East (JIATF-E) is integral to our operations.
Inter Agency Cooperation
JIATF-East began as an interagency coordinator of maritime
counterdrug operations in the transit zone. Today, after merging with
JIATF-S, collocating in Key West, Florida, assuming responsibility for
the source zone, and adding international members to their staff,
JIATF-East provides planning assistance for counterdrug operations in
response to U.S. country teams throughout the region. Transit zone
operations may or may not involve U.S. forces, but our forces do
participate in planning operations supported by the U.S.
Responding to Secretary Rumsfeld's guidance to participate in a
Joint Interagency Coordination Group, Southern Command meets monthly to
focus on the war on terrorism with representatives from the Department
of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of State, Department
of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense. The Joint Interagency
Coordination Group is also a venue for sharing intelligence and
effectively coordinating our regional counterterrorism efforts.
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative, a complement to Plan Colombia,
concentrates on the region rather than on Colombia alone. Success in
Colombia could produce a spillover into neighboring countries that may
not be prepared to deal with the consequences. These countries remain
transshipment points for arms, drugs, and precursor chemicals entering
and exiting Colombia. While success in Colombia is essential, we cannot
risk winning the battle in Colombia and losing the war in the region.
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative is intended to contain the effects of
spillover and, to a lesser degree, sustain the success of Plan
Colombia.
Improving Colombia's Military Capabilities
Southern Command assistance programs are intended to help Colombia
develop the capabilities to solve their security problems and diminish
the U.S. in-theatre role. Military training of Colombian units that are
vetted for human rights abuses is key to realizing success on the
battlefield. The training of the Counter Narcotics Brigade and the
establishment and training of a Commando Battalion to pursue enemy
leadership have already produced results.
U.S. Special Forces have also been training Colombian Armed Forces
in Arauca as part of an infrastructure security strategy to protect a
portion of the 772-kilometer pipeline and other critical infrastructure
points, that have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks. This
training will enable Colombia to protect remote narcoterrorist
influenced areas of the countryside where the pipeline is located. The
oil carried by the pipeline represents annual revenues of about $500
million for the Colombian Government. The loss of this revenue
seriously undermines Colombia's fiscal health and the attacks create
considerable environmental and ecological damage.
Detention Operations
In addition to its work in Central and South America, Southern
Command has directly and actively supported the war on terrorism by
establishing a terrorist detention and intelligence operations facility
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in January 2002. Intelligence operations at
Guantanamo have provided critical information regarding terrorist
organizations' leadership, planned attacks, potential attacks, and
other specific information that has already thwarted terrorist
activities. As Guantanamo operations continue, we will improve
intelligence exploitation, collection and dissemination, and establish
more permanent facilities to provide servicemembers a better quality of
life.
We combined Joint Task Force 160 and 170 to form Joint Task Force
Guantanamo, achieving unity of command and ensuring improved
coordination between the intelligence collection mission and camp
operations. Detainees continue to receive medical care, three meals
daily that meet Muslim dietary laws, clothing, permanent shelter,
showers, and humane treatment consistent with the provisions of the
Geneva Convention.
Expanded Authority
The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 and the Fiscal Year
2003 Defense Appropriations Act included provisions to use counterdrug
assets for non-counterdrug missions within these respective years. The
granting of expanded authority for operations was an important
recognition that it is impossible to separate the drug threat from the
threat to security and stability raised by terrorist organizations such
as the FARC, ELN, and AUC. Operations are more efficient and effective
because the same assets are used to confront terrorists as well as drug
traffickers. We can now share more intelligence with Colombia, and they
can use counterdrug-funded assets in the combined campaign against
terrorists and drug production and trafficking. A great example of
success as a result of expanded authority is the killing of the FARC's
15th Front Commander by the Colombian military utilizing U.S. provided
UH-1 helicopters flown by Colombian pilots.
Security Cooperation
Southern Command's security cooperation activities expand United
States influence, assure friends, and dissuade potential adversaries.
The overarching goals are to promote regional security and stability
through training, equipping, and developing allied security force
capabilities that improve competence and professionalism while
underscoring respect for human rights.
Command programs are also intended to strengthen respect for the
rule of law, civilian control of the military, and support for
democratic ideals. We do this not only because it is in tune with the
highest values of the American people, but also because it is a
strategic, operational, and tactical necessity. Security forces must
enjoy the trust and confidence of their people before they can be
effective. Only by respecting the law and the dignity of all the
citizens they are sworn to defend, can security forces hope to gain the
respect of those they protect.
We annually coordinate and direct more than 30 legal engagement
activities among military counterparts, regional governments, and non-
government organizations. Specific accomplishments include the creation
of a legal corps, reform of military justice codes and procedures,
human rights and law of war education, and the inclusion of military
lawyers in the planning and execution of military operations. Nowhere
are the positive results of these efforts more apparent than in
Colombia where the people now hold their military in high esteem.
Complementing this training are disaster relief programs that teach
militaries how to respond to their civilian authorities when disasters
occur. Fuerzas Aliadas is the cornerstone of this program and will be
hosted by Nicaragua this year. More than 20 nations will participate,
including our regional partners, Canada, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and France.
Beyond disaster relief, New Horizons exercises provide unique and
rigorous training opportunities to engineer, medical, and civil affairs
units. These activities hone U.S. forces' engineering and medical
skills in a challenging environment, under conditions nearly impossible
to replicate in the U.S.
Last year the New Horizon exercises completed 33 engineer projects
consisting of schools, medical clinics, wells, and rudimentary road
construction and repair. The 59 humanitarian medical deployments
treated more than 680,000 patients. During these deployments, our
veterinary teams treated approximately 67,000 animals in varying
livestock categories, which contributed significantly to sustaining
local economic health. Bolivia, Panama, Belize, Dominican Republic,
Grenada, and St. Kitts will host New Horizons exercises this year.
The annual naval exercise, UNITAS, is conducted throughout the
region with significant participation by several countries. This year,
Ecuador will host the UNITAS Pacific Phase. Argentina is scheduled to
host UNITAS Cruise 2004 Atlantic Phase in October. An amphibious
bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Argentina is scheduled for
September. Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru will each conduct a bi-lateral
amphibious exercise with participating U.S. forces.
This year the Central American nations will host several exercises
to include Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) North that will focus on
enhancing the peacekeeping skills and capabilities of the 22
participating nations. All the Central American countries and the
majority of Caribbean nations will participate. We will also conduct
PKO SOUTH and Cabanas to strengthen the peacekeeping skills,
cooperation, and capabilities of the rest of the region's military
forces.

REQUIREMENTS

As the war on terrorism progresses we will increasingly pursue
operations of mutual interest with goals that increase interoperability
with our allies. We will pool our resources to the extent possible, but
we foresee additional threats to U.S. security interests that may
require additional resources or the reprioritization of programmed
funds, if circumstances warrant. We anticipate Guantanamo's operating
tempo to increase, additional stress on our theater communications
architecture, an escalation of detection and monitoring activities, and
a greater need for interoperability of allied nations that will require
Foreign Military Financing programs and a renewal of the expanded
authorities.
Joint Task Force--Guantanamo
Long-term operational requirements for JTF-Guantanamo detainee
operations are necessary to enhance our effectiveness in the war on
terrorism, but as we continue to improve our mission capabilities there
will be a cost associated with the progress. Since January 2002,
Guantanamo has provided, and continues to provide, critical
intelligence information on worldwide terrorist organizations'
leadership, planned attacks, potential targets, and other critical
information that can thwart subversive activities. We anticipate the
arrival of additional detainees to be secured, screened, held, managed,
and interrogated for both counterterrorist planning and law enforcement
purposes. Manpower requirements will also increase to ensure a safe and
secure facility.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\)
My next priority deals with enhancing our C\4\ architecture for
fixed and mobile operations throughout the region as outlined in
previous testimonies. The current C\4\ infrastructure lacks the
flexibility to execute the assigned mission due to over reliance on
inadequate commercial communications systems, limited communications
bandwidth, and fragmented operations and maintenance support.
Consequently, Southern Command is unable to effectively and efficiently
support a counterdrug mission simultaneously with another contingency
operation such as anti-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation, migrant
operations, disaster relief, or defense of the Panama Canal.
Since existing military systems alone are insufficient, it is my
intention to transform, expand, and maintain a cost-effective,
efficient, centrally managed, and robust infrastructure that supports
the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy. This strategy includes
counter-terrorism operations, regional engagement, crisis response, and
counterdrug missions. We are partnering with the Defense Information
Systems Agency and the Department of State's Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office to explore commercial
alternatives such as fiber optic communication links. This effort shows
promise for improving C\4\ effectiveness throughout the region.
Detection and Monitoring
We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring (D&M)
operations that require a high state of readiness and a joint effort to
link multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic,
operational, and tactical requirements. This melding of organic and
national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill the
Quarterly Defense Review Transformation requirement for continuous and
persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
Southern Command's role in Operation Enduring Freedom includes the
employment of national, airborne, ground, and maritime ISR assets that
are targeted against regional terrorist groups and transnational
support cells. Their combined products create a common operating
picture of regional activity that can be shared with our allies as
appropriate. Successful D&M operations contribute to allied nations'
defenses against terrorism and promote regional security cooperation.
Detection and monitoring has eight major programs that are vital to
our counterdrug campaign plan. These programs include Relocatable Over
the Horizon Radar (ROTHR), Fleet Support Operations, Maritime Patrol
Aircraft (MPA), FOLs, JIATF-East, Joint Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Operations Center (JSSROC), Hemispheric Radar System (HRS), and South
Air Force Support. These programs, when sufficiently funded, will
provide a formidable capability to detect and monitor illicit
trafficking of arms, drugs and other illegal activities that fuel
terrorist groups. Overall, this capability further provides critical
information used by the U.S. and host nations to effectively counter
the expansion of narcoterrorism.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Foreign Military Financing fosters cooperative security
arrangements, and regional initiatives rely on partner nation
participation. Many nations rely, in turn, on FMF to sustain the kind
of readiness that effective partnering requires. Latin American and
Caribbean militaries still have legitimate defense sustainment and
modernization requirements. As we request more partner nation
assistance in fighting terrorism and transnational threats, FMF will be
an important source of their equipping and training efforts. Regional
militaries require force modernization to be interoperable. Without FMF
support and adequate national funding, training, and maintenance,
equipment in Latin American forces continues to deteriorate, which
degrades allied military readiness, increases the cost of U.S.
participation, reduces the capability of our hemispheric partners in
the war on terrorism, and makes military responses to natural disasters
and humanitarian relief more difficult.
Expanded Authority
As previously mentioned, operations today are more efficient and
effective because the same assets are used to confront both drug
traffickers and terrorists, thanks to the expanded authority. The
authority also permits greater intelligence sharing and allows allied
nations to use U.S. counterdrug funded equipment for non-counterdrug
missions. Expanded authority is essential to the command's ability to
deal with both narcotraffickers and terrorists. The authorities granted
in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 were 1-year programs confined
to Colombia. Because of the successes we have experienced in both
intelligence sharing and improving operations, we are requesting
expanded authority for the entire area of responsibility in fiscal year
2004.

CONCLUSION

Without question, democracy has gained a foothold in Latin America.
The question is how long will it prevail? Until ordinary citizens
benefit from free market reforms and reduced corruption and until
terrorists can no longer operate with relative impunity, that question
will linger. For most nations in our area of responsibility, the
threats come from within. It will be up to those nations to demonstrate
their ability to govern; to provide law and order, implement judicial
reform, and develop a profound respect for human rights. These
fundamentals provide the stable and secure environment necessary for
economic growth--growth that will improve the quality of life for
ordinary citizens. Southern Command will play a crucial role in
developing the kinds of security forces that help provide the ability
to govern throughout the region, and particularly in Colombia.
We are at a critical time in Colombia's history. The elected
government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval ratings of
about 70 percent. Under his leadership, the Army is helping to regain
control of urban neighborhoods long since held by narcoterrorists.
Colombia's citizens are taking a more active role in their nation's
defense, providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed
Forces. President Uribe has raised taxes to provide greater resources
to his nation's security forces. There is a renewed sense of momentum,
commitment, and hope as the Colombian people struggle to save their
country, but there is also a small window of opportunity beyond which
public opinion and support will wane without significant progress.
I would like to close by leaving the committee with this thought. I
am proud to say we do a great deal to further our Nation's interests in
this hemisphere with very few resources and a modest presence. Beyond
Colombia, we are at a critical point where the progress in eliminating
conflict, reducing tension, and establishing democracy throughout the
region could be at risk if we are not steadfast in our efforts. While
our attention is drawn to another region of the world, we must keep in
mind that we live in this hemisphere, and its continued progress as a
region of democracy and prosperity is of paramount importance to our
national security.
I would like to thank the Chairman and the members of the committee
for this great opportunity and for the tremendous support you have
provided this command. I can assure you that the men and women of the
United States Southern Command appreciate all that you do for them as
they perform their noble work for our great country.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
The committee will proceed with a 6-minute round of
questions. I will lead off, followed by Senator Levin.
The press reports this morning that the United States has
announced spy flights over North Korea will resume amid
warnings that Pyongyang's nuclear program is much more advanced
than previously thought. Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly said North Korea could have enough weapons-grade material
within months, not years, to produce nuclear weapons.
Let us talk about that, and I think that responsibility is
shared by two of our distinguished witnesses this morning. Let
us first address the resumption of the flights, and also it is
my understanding they will not be accompanied by such
protective aircraft initially as could be available. Admiral
Fargo, that would be in your jurisdiction, shared with General
LaPorte. Why don't you lead off, Admiral.
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that is in my
jurisdiction and those press accounts this morning were
accurate. I cannot go into the exact form and substance of
those flights, but of course we retain our right to fly these
unarmed surveillance and reconnaissance flights in
international air space, as we do throughout the world.
So those flights have recommenced. I do not think I can add
much more to that without getting into classified material on
the tactics of that.
Chairman Warner. We can understand that. But I presume the
most prudent and reasonable precautions are on hand to protect
that plane if necessary; is that correct?
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, obviously we took a very close
look at this and did a full assessment and a complete analysis,
and we have put in place what I consider to be the prudent
measures to ensure that these planes are properly----
Chairman Warner. That is all we need to know for the
moment.
Now, your own professional assessment with regard to the
nuclear program that has been initiated once again by North
Korea and the dangers it poses to this country?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir. I think this nuclear program has
dangers on any number of levels. Obviously we are very
concerned and all of our regional allies are very concerned
about nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Certainly there are a
couple ways they can do that, through the highly enriched
uranium program or through reprocessing spent fuel rods. The
concerns are both in the neighborhood of the ability of North
Korea to have an arsenal of nuclear weapons and an equal, maybe
even a greater, concern is that they could take this weapons-
grade material and proliferate it and proliferate it to----
Chairman Warner. Ship it to other areas of the world.
Admiral Fargo. Ship it to other areas of the world and to
terrorist organizations, and of course that is a very serious
situation that is international in its context.
Chairman Warner. Well, given the seriousness of that, I am
going to pick up on your phrase, of concern to the regional
allies. That would be Russia, China, Japan, South Korea. Thus
far, our efforts diplomatically--and I commend the President
and others for conducting this diplomacy--to try and bring
about a resolution of this problem. But thus far our allies
have not expressed the willingness that I feel measures up to
your observation that they are concerned, to participate in
multilateral talks prior to any bilaterals that may eventually
be decided upon between the United States and North Korea. Your
views on that?
Admiral Fargo. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, on a military-
to-military level, which is really my lane here, we are
conducting very close cooperation with the Japanese and the
Republic of Korea on this issue. I have had exchanges, very
candid discussions with Admiral Ishikawa in Japan. I am sure
General LaPorte has had similar discussions with his
counterpart, and we are working very closely on this issue
together.
Chairman Warner. Well, let us hope it works out
diplomatically, and I think the President is quite right to try
and approach this from a multilateral standpoint, because
Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea all have very severe
interests in this thing being resolved so that that is not a
nuclear peninsula.
General LaPorte, your professional views on this?
General LaPorte. In terms of the reconnaissance flights, I
support Admiral Fargo in providing him some assets to enable
him to accomplish that mission. So we are fully in agreement on
the execution of these missions and the manner in which he has
designed them.
In terms of the nuclear issue, Mr. Chairman, I want to
underscore the significant threat North Korea presents in terms
of proliferation. North Korea's economy is a failed economy and
they gain hard currency in order to keep their regime in power
by engaging in activities such as proliferation of military
hardware, and missiles that we all know about.
They are also very much involved in the narcotics business,
methamphetamines especially. In Japan alone, it is estimated
that it is a $9 billion-a-year business. They are also involved
in counterfeiting and also dealing in endangered species. So
that should underscore the fact that if they had weapons-grade
plutonium they would be willing to sell that also for the right
price. That is very important.
In terms of my contact in Korea, I will tell you that the
military is very concerned about the nuclear issue. I meet
periodically with the Republic of Korea Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Lee, and he joins us in our concern
and our desires.
Chairman Warner. Let me ask specifically, are each of our
commanders before us this morning satisfied that you have the
forces you need to support the range of contingencies that
could arise in connection with this developing situation?
Primarily those forces are there for deterrence, but should
some measure of engagement be required, Admiral, do you have
sufficient forces?
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I am better postured today in
the western Pacific than I was a year ago. We are fortunate at
this point in time that we have an annual exercise that takes
place on the Korean Peninsula, Foal Eagle, or Reception,
Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I), that brings
additional troops and aircraft to the Peninsula. This has been
on the books for a year. We do it every year, so it is not
provocative.
Chairman Warner. Your answer is yes and, even though our
country is heavily engaged, as it should be, in supporting
diplomacy in the Iraq situation and that diplomacy is supported
directly as a consequence of the forces that we forward-deploy
in that region, you are confident that there has been no
deterioration in your deterrent capability and reaction
capability?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir, I am confident.
Chairman Warner. General?
General LaPorte. Senator, I am also confident that I have
the ability to deter and have contingencies if required. We
have increased our intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities so that we have good indications of
warning of any North Korean activity.
Chairman Warner. That capability extends to chemical and
biological protection for our troops? I ask both commanders,
you have adequate protection should that weapon be utilized?
General LaPorte. Yes, sir, we do.
Chairman Warner. Admiral?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you.
My time is up. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, back to this
reconnaissance plane incident. The Washington Post carried a
story on it in its March 4 edition, which said that ``Defense
officials stated that `at least one of the North Korean planes
directed its radars to identify the U.S. aircraft as a target
and may have locked on, a step short of shooting a missile.' ''
That is the quote that I want to ask you about from the
Post. There is a quote from the New York Times on March 8 that
said that North Korean jets `` `were trying to force the U.S.
aircraft to land in North Korea and seize its crew,' according
to a senior Defense official.''
Admiral, would you first comment on those two quotes?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir. Senator, as you would imagine, we
have gone back and done a pretty thorough analysis of the
intercept, including the tapes and debriefing the pilots. It is
clear that the North Korean acquisition radar has a couple of
different modes. I would not characterize this as lock-on. The
radar was in its acquisition mode, but had not shifted to its
fire control mode. So I think that is the answer to the first
question.
The second question: We do not know exactly what the North
Koreans were trying to do. I have looked at the videotapes
myself. They may very well have been signaling for the plane to
go down.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me. Those were hand signals vice
electronic?
Admiral Fargo. Those were hand signals, and there were no
voice coms with the plane.
Chairman Warner. I think that should be made clear.
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. In your judgment did the North Korean jet or
jets try to force the aircraft to land in North Korea?
Admiral Fargo. In my judgment, this was a provocation on
their part. I cannot come to a conclusion that they were trying
to force the aircraft down. They may have been trying to
indicate to them to leave their air space or they could have
been trying to signal the aircraft to follow and go down. But I
do not think you can make a judgment based on what I have seen.
Senator Levin. Now, the word that was used apparently
yesterday in terms of resumption of our flights, which I very
much support, is that they would be ``resumed with
circumspection.'' Can you give us a little more detail about
that? Or would you want to just leave it where you have
testified this morning?
Admiral Fargo. I think the comments that I made to the
chairman's question about taking prudent measures here is
consistent with the term ``circumspection.''
Senator Levin. ``Prudent measures,'' does that imply to
protect our plane if necessary?
Admiral Fargo. That implies the full range of things that
we can do in terms of making sure we have the right
intelligence, situational awareness, warning, and procedures in
place to ensure that the plane can fly this mission safely.
Senator Levin. There has been some discussion about how we
proceed with North Korea in terms of whether there should be
direct discussions at a high level between us and the North
Koreans. What has been stated frequently is that we prefer to
proceed multilaterally with the other nations in the region,
which obviously makes sense. We want to consult with them and
to work with them in terms of how to respond to what is
obviously a crisis. Now, some people do not want to describe
this as a crisis, but, listening to your testimony and an awful
lot of testimony and reports prior to your testimony, it is
obvious we have a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
But putting that aside just for a minute, this is my
question. What the regional nations are telling us, every one,
after we consult with them multilaterally, is that we ought to
have direct talks with North Korea. That is one of the things
that they are advising us to do, talk to North Korea directly.
Is there any military reason that we should not have direct
talks with North Korea? First, Admiral?
Admiral Fargo. Well, I think that the clear views that I
get from talking to our regional partners here is they want to
be part of any process with respect to North Korea. Certainly
that is true of the Japanese and the Republic of Korea, and
they want to be consulted and involved and their voice needs to
be heard in this because they have huge equity here.
So I think that is the way that we have to proceed.
Senator Levin. Is there any military reason from our
perspective, if our friends and other nations in the area are
urging us to have these direct talks, is there any military
reason from our perspective that we should not do so?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, I do not know how to answer that
question.
Senator Levin. Have you been consulted on this question?
Admiral Fargo. I have been. What I am trying to do, with
respect to my responsibilities, is to do the kinds of things
with the Japanese and Koreans that build their confidence in a
solution to the problem, to make sure that we have the right
deterrent posture in place and the right warning for any future
event. That is fundamentally my responsibility here in this
issue.
Senator Levin. Do you want to add anything, General?
General LaPorte. Senator, I would just reinforce what
Admiral Fargo said. This is an issue that has international
implications, international concerns, violations of an
international treaty. I could not best advise on the best way
of going about these negotiations. I think I would have to
leave it to the experts, leave it to the Secretary of State to
make those determinations.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. If the committee would indulge the chair,
this incident brings us to the question of the historic
problems that we as a Nation have encountered, 25, 30 years ago
with the Soviet Union. We had very close calls in the air and
on the sea, and we entered into the Incidents at Sea Executive
Agreement.
Senator Levin. Which, if I can interrupt our chairman, our
chairman was the person who represented our Nation at the
signing of that treaty.
Chairman Warner. I thank my colleague, yes. It has worked,
if I may say with a sense of humility. It has worked very well.
So it comes to mind that, while we may not want to try a
framework with North Korea at this time, at least we ought to
try and take the precaution to establish, either directly or
through intermediaries, a system of communication between
aircraft such as to avoid an unintended consequence. So I leave
it at that.
My understanding, there is a channel that that North Korean
plane could have come up on to communicate with our aircraft;
is that correct?
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I will have to take that for
the record and get back to you, because I do not have it. I do
not know the answer to that question.
[The information referred to follows:]

There is no installed capability that enables direct communication
with the DPRK aircraft other than UHF/UHF Guard. Electronic voice
communications were not established between aircraft.

Chairman Warner. Well, I would suggest that we look into
that, because relations between these two nations are very
strained at the moment and a precipitate act by a military
officer, intentionally or unintended, could exacerbate these
situations. Thank you for the indulgence.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The plane that made the intercept was a MiG-29, is that
correct?
Admiral Fargo. That is correct, sir.
Senator Inhofe. The MiG-29 is a very advanced aircraft, in
some ways better than our aging F-15s and F-16s. I know that
you folks are not Air Force, but I also know that is in your
command.
I was very proud, about 5 years ago in the previous
administration, when General Jumper in a different position
made the statement of his concern over such aircraft as the
MiG-29, the Su-27, the Su-30, some of the Russian vehicles,
that are better than our aircraft in some ways. There is no
sense in getting into which ways they are, but they are.
We all know that our pilots are better, our troops are
better, but we do have these deficiencies. As far as that is
concerned, I would just like to hear a comment on the
capabilities of the North Korean Air Force and our assets, how
they compare with each other, not the pilots but the equipment.
General LaPorte. Senator, I could give you a very detailed
answer in a closed session.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Chairman Warner. It is the intention of the chair to
provide a closed session following this open session.
Senator Inhofe. Well, that is fine. Something that does not
require a closed session is a recognition of some of those
problems. The Army, as you well know, also has some
deficiencies. One of the problems we had in Operation Anaconda
is we did not have the capability of really having a
sophisticated artillery response. Close air support is good for
the ground troops when it is working and when you do not have
weather problems or you are able to get up there.
I have been concerned for quite some time that in the case
of artillery there are some four countries, including South
Africa, that make a better artillery unit than we have.
Admiral Fargo, I have not heard of anything that would be
comparable to that in the Navy. Is there a deficiency in the
Navy where our modernization programs have not really kept up
with some of the potential adversaries that we have?
Admiral Fargo. Well, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, I think the thing I am most concerned about in my
area of responsibility is missile defense. I am concerned about
the proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles and medium-
range ballistic missiles and our ability to deal with that
right now. We have programs that are coming along, but we have
not fielded those yet and they are certainly key in my judgment
to being able to protect our military forces both ashore and at
sea.
Senator Inhofe. I only bring this up because I just think
in all these hearings we need to recognize that we do have
deficiencies. We need to get on with the F-22, we need to get
on with a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) cannon that can be fielded
and can be competitive with potential adversaries.
General LaPorte, today in the New York Times you said that
there are no signs that North Korea was preparing for war, but
you also said, ``They have studied our military actions most
recently in the Balkans and Afghanistan and have adapted their
tactics to offset our technological advances.''
Could you elaborate a little bit on that comment?
General LaPorte. I am not certain I made that quote, but I
will answer your question.
Senator Inhofe. Oh, then you were misquoted. I am not
saying this critically, by the way. I was very much concerned
when I saw that.
General LaPorte. North Korea has for the past 10-12 years
adapted based on what they perceive as the strengths of the
United States military. They have adapted in several ways.
First, in terms of communications, they have developed an
indigenous frequency-hopping radio that allows them to
communicate in a secure mode. They have gone to a great deal of
fiber optics in terms of their communications between fixed
facilities.
In an attempt to protect their forces from our surveillance
and air capabilities, they have gone to a tremendous number of
underground facilities throughout North Korea to protect
leadership and critical forces. Those are examples of the way
North Korea is adapting to what they perceive as the
capabilities of the United States.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Finally, let me ask Admiral Fargo this question. There was
a severe case of righteous indignation that set into the North
Korean press when the U.S.S. Carl Vinson was holding its
exercise. They were talking about, that the exercise at its
height made the situation so tense that a nuclear war may break
out at any moment.
Isn't this exercise that they refer to by the U.S.S. Carl
Vinson the same exercise that we do on a regular basis
virtually every year?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, Senator, that is exactly right. We do
an annual exercise on the Peninsula and in the surrounding
waters and we try to commit a carrier battle group to that
exercise every year.
General LaPorte. I would add to that, Senator Warner, this
exercise had been planned for over 5 years. We plan them 5
years in advance. It was planned for this time. It is a
nonprovocative exercise. It is focused on the reception of
forces into the Peninsula and integrating them in. So I think
their claims are really not accurate.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. My time has expired, but
I think we needed to say that, because a lot of people read
that and think that this is a provocative act, which it is not.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome our panel this morning and commend you
and all of our troops. I want to tell you that we are very
proud of what you are doing.
General LaPorte, your statement discusses periodic tension
in the Republic of Korea and the United States alliance. You
refer to the generation of South Koreans who have lived in an
era of peace and prosperity, who have little or no
understanding of the North Korean threat. From your vantage
point, do you believe there has been a diminishment of support
for American troops in the South?
General LaPorte. Senator, I have been asked quite often
recently, do we have a crisis in South Korea? My response has
been adamantly no, we do not. We would have a crisis if South
Korea was unable to hold democratic elections like they just
did. We would have a crisis if the civilian authorities did not
control the military. We would have a crisis if people were not
allowed to gather and to speak their mind. We would have a
crisis if people were unable to worship freely.
That is not the case in South Korea. We have a maturing
democracy and what we have is a democracy that is dealing with
the challenges of a democratic society.
I will tell you that most of the Korean people truly
support the United States Forces Korea. Last weekend there was
a rally. Over 70,000 Koreans came out waving American flags.
They unfurled a massive flag, a massive Korean flag, a massive
United Nations flag.
Senator Inhofe. Where was that, General?
General LaPorte. In South Korea, in the capital, in Seoul.
They were demonstrating their support.
But the fact still remains, due to the combined efforts of
the Republic of Korea military and the United States military,
we have been very successful in our deterrent mission for 50
years and we have provided a peaceful environment that has
allowed great prosperity. So many of the younger generation, 45
years and younger, have lived in that prosperity in the era of
peace. So they do not have a true, full appreciation of the
threat that the North Korean military presents. We need to work
on that and we will.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for that response.
General, Senator Warner mentioned Assistant Secretary of
State James Kelly's testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee yesterday that North Korea could produce
significant plutonium within 6 months, but that the HEU, highly
enriched uranium, alternate capability is not so far behind.
Mr. Kelly also followed up saying that the HEU program,
``contrary to conventional wisdom, is not a problem for down
the road, but a real threat in a matter of months.''
I would like to have a clarifying assessment of this.
General LaPorte. Well, I agree with Secretary Kelly in
terms of the plutonium. If the North Koreans were to open the
reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and start reprocessing the spent
fuel rods, it would be a short period of time in which they
would be able to leach out the weapons-grade plutonium and have
enough to produce nuclear weapons.
In terms of the highly enriched uranium source, I would
like to address that in a closed session for you.
Senator Akaka. General, according to an unclassified
summary released in November 2002 by the CIA, the CIA said,
``We recently learned that the North is constructing a plant
that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more
nuclear weapons per year when fully operational, which could be
as soon as mid-decade.''
Do you see the HEU program becoming in a matter of months a
serious threat?
General LaPorte. I think the HEU program is a serious
threat. In terms of the timing and when they would be to a
point where they could process the uranium, it is still in
question. We know for certain that they have been involved in
gathering the technologies and the equipment necessary to use
this method of producing highly enriched uranium, and we can
talk in a closed session in terms of the timing of it.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Fargo, I have been very concerned,
and we have spoken about this, about the homeland security of
the State of Hawaii and the territories of the Pacific. I have
continuously asked about the coordination not only between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security,
but also between Northern Command and Pacific Command. What
kind of coordination is occurring to ensure that Hawaii's
homeland security needs are not forgotten as Federal policies
develop involving the other 49 States?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, I think the coordination between
Northern Command and Pacific Command is excellent. In fact,
General Eberhart was at my headquarters within the last 7 days.
We have talked through these issues with his command. We are
also proceeding on planning that is very closely aligned. In
Hawaii and the other areas within the Pacific we built the
Joint Rear Area Coordination Group that was designed
specifically to provide the kind of intelligence and crisis
response and help to first responders that was necessary to
ensure that we had a strong partnership with the State and the
local government.
We are going to transition that to what I will call Joint
Task Force (JTF) Pacific, which will provide once again a
capability to ensure that the coordination is absolutely
strong. This is essentially the same procedure that is being
done in NORTHCOM. But our relationships with organizations like
the Joint Terrorist Task Force in Hawaii are very strong. Our
relationships with the Governor and the Mayor's offices to make
sure that they have this information readily are also solid.
So I am very comfortable that we have the procedures in
place now and have a good plan for the future to support our
homeland defense responsibilities and our homeland security
responsibilities.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared
statement I would like to insert in the record at this point.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have Pacific Command, Southern
Command, and U.S. Forces Korea represented here today. Gentlemen, I
commend you and the men and women who serve under your command.
Undoubtably, this hearing will touch on various aspects of the
current worldwide threat situation and the appropriate U.S. response.
Along those lines, I want to express for the record what I see as
President Bush's national security strategy and where the current
government of Saddam Hussein fits in.
I realize Central Command is not appearing today but we keep going
around and around on this subject here in Congress, sometimes losing
sight of what we do here in Washington is all about.
President's Strategy
The President's national security strategy is simple: prevent a
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon from ever being detonated in
the United States. That's it. It's not about oil, old scores, or even
fostering political revolution as certain "intellectuals" believe. It's
about preventing hundreds of thousands of Americans from dying in an
instant.
Toward that end, this administration has, quite logically, sought
to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capability--be it large scale passenger-carrying aircraft, nerve
agents, anthrax, highly enriched uranium, etc.--by the new apocalyptic
terror groups we all saw in action on the morning of September 11,
2001.
We know in such groups ``the will'' is there so it's largely a
question, at least in the short term, of preventing the means, ``the
way,'' for suicide terrorists to destroy our cities and kill our
people. A good start, naturally, is to take a hard look at regimes
that, for whatever reason, support terrorism in general, hate the
United States, and possess--or seek to possess--WMD.
That's what the axis of evil is all about: Iran, Iraq, and, yes,
North Korea. In particular, we have no choice but to deal right now
with those axis of evil regimes with links to the new apocalyptic
terror groups.
Which government fits the bill at this moment? The government of
Saddam Hussein. With which terror groups is he associated? Those lead
by Mr. Poison Center himself, Abu Masab al-Zarqawi.
This is not debatable. Understanding this situation is not a matter
of political persuasion. It's established fact and since no member of
the United Nations, except perhaps Great Britain, faces the specific
threat the U.S. faces, we should not be surprised the Security Council
does not support the destruction of Saddam's regime. Why should they?
None of their cities and landmarks are on the top of al Qaeda's hit
list. They didn't lose 3,100 people and their two tallest buildings in
90 minutes. They do not face the same threat. They do not experience
the same fear. Of course, invite them along, but, if they refuse to
join the effort, then move on for goodness sake. In this day and age,
on these issues, with the emerging nexus between suicide terror groups
and weapons of mass destruction, it is the height of irresponsibility
to make fundamental policy decisions based on what Paris, Bonn, Moscow,
or Brussels thinks.
That is taking multilateralism to an absurd extreme. It is leaving
the safety of our people to governments who have no responsibility nor
incentive for protecting them.
Prioritizing Threats
I hope we do not spend too much time today arguing again about who
constitutes the greatest threat to us right this second. Is it Saddam
Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, or Osama bin
Laden? They are all major threats, challenges to U.S. security here at
home that get worse with time if not acted upon.
They all represent unique geopolitical circumstances demanding
tailored solutions. Indeed, they all demand action now but different
kinds of action. Just because the military instrument of power is the
choice for responding to bin Laden and may become the choice for
responding to Iraq, it by no means suggests force is appropriate right
now for North Korea or ever in the case of Iran.
It's not that simple and we ought not to mistake complexities in
the threat picture for contradictions in policy. For example, North
Korea, as dangerous and unstable as it is, has not invaded its neighbor
to the south since 1953.
We cannot say the same for Saddam who invaded Kuwait in 1990 with
what looked at the time like intentions for Saudi Arabia as well. Not
to mention the fact that, as I noted earlier, to my knowledge North
Korea is not currently harboring senior members of a terror network
lead by a close associate of Osama bin Laden.
Iraq's Last Chance
But this is really beside the point. In passing H.J. Res. 114,
Congress specifically authorized the President to ``use the Armed
Forces of the United States in order to--(1) defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Colleagues, that resolution passed the
Senate 77 to 23 on October 11, 2002.
This action was, of course, in addition to the Iraq Liberation Act,
which Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law October 31,
1998. That Act clearly states the U.S. should foster regime change in
Iraq.
Lastly, on November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 1441 which gave Iraq one last opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations.
Now, months later, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
told us unequivocally that ``Iraq has in place an active effort to
deceive the U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is
directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given
clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in
their possession.''
Further, the DCI stated ``Iraq's biological weapons program
includes mobile research and production facilities that will be
difficult, it not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began
this program in the mid-1990s--during a time when inspectors were in
the country.''
Even the latest U.N. assessments directed by Dr. Blix indicate
Saddam Hussein is still not complying. Colleagues, let us be candid. No
amount of U-2 surveillance flights nor increase in the number of
inspectors will solve this problem, at the very least with respect to
biological weapons. Let's be honest. The U.S. Government has bent over
backwards to manage the threat from Saddam Hussein without further
military action.

Senator Roberts. I want to go back to the suggestion that
some have made in regards to direct negotiations with North
Korea and Kim Jong Il. It is my understanding--in the
Intelligence Committee we have had numerous briefings.
Basically, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
indicated that Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year, ``to
parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into a political
leverage suggests he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally
different relationship with Washington, one that implicitly
tolerates the nuclear weapons program.''
I guess my question is, why take the bait? It seems to me
that they have stated their basic purpose of any direct
negotiations would be a nonaggression pact. To enter into those
negotiations at this point without our neighbors in that same
neighborhood seems to me to be pointless. They continue to
provoke and proliferate. I think the estimate in 5 years is
that they could have numbers in double digits in regards to
missiles and warheads that they would sell, maybe worth a
billion and a half or 2 billion dollars, they would have to
proliferate to receive any income; and that country is a basket
case.
Their behavior in regards to what General LaPorte has
already indicated in regards to crime, drugs, and kidnappings,
etc., is deplorable. They are a theocracy. I have been to
Pyongyang. I was part of the first official delegation allowed
in, not really to negotiate, but at least to have some
dialogue. That was 4 years ago. So we tried some direct
dialogue, not negotiations, and we were trying to arrange a
third-party grain sale to address the famine, which was even
more severe say 4 or 5 years ago. What we got back was rhetoric
and a very surreal experience.
Let me give you a plausible intelligence scenario, both for
Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, in regards to Kim Jong Il
and what he has in his mind in terms of the future. I think my
suggestion would be or my surmising of the intelligence that is
provided is that he views the countries of the world in two
categories, (1) those that have capability in regards to
nuclear weaponry, and (2) those that do not; and then he
separates again where the United States and the international
community will permit that, i.e., India, Pakistan, and other
countries, and he wants to be the Musharraf, if I could use
that as a very poor I guess analogy, and to basically have the
U.S. accept his position in regards to being a producer of
nuclear weaponry. That basically is his goal and he is going to
continue the production and he is going to continue testing and
he is going to continue launching until he gets into that
category. It seems to me that is what his goal is.
If that is the case, why on earth would we want to take the
bait and go into direct negotiations when in fact this is a big
international challenge? Would you have any comment other than
to say yes, you agree with me?
General LaPorte. Senator, there is no question in my mind
that Kim Jong Il is in charge and he is making the decisions,
and his main goal is regime survival. His most pressing concern
is his failed economy. North Korean provocations and nuclear
brinkmanship are aimed at gaining security guarantees and
economic assistance to ensure that that regime remains in
place.
Senator Roberts. Admiral Fargo?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, the only thing I would add to that
is it is pretty clear that he is not complying with his current
agreements.
Senator Roberts. Let me ask something that occurred to me
when I was there again on a second Congressional Delegation
(CODEL). 116,000 Americans in regards to South Korea, 37,000
members of the Warrior Division, 20 minutes from what I would
describe as possible Armageddon with the capability that North
Korea has. Why keep our families there with the current
situation? I have never understood why that has to be? I know
the quality of life means a great deal, but 37,000 of the
Warrior Division have certain circumstances, others who are
stationed there, and a great many more Americans. I do not
think we want to signal that we want to withdraw by any means
in terms of weakness or send any signals like that down the
road in regard to our resolve. But it has always bothered me
from that standpoint.
Would you address that, General LaPorte?
General LaPorte. Yes, Senator, I will. We have
approximately 5,000 family members on the Peninsula. We have
37,000 service members on the Peninsula. Let me address it from
the standpoint of desires to serve in Korea from a service
member's perspective. There are three aspects of service in
Korea that we work very hard. First is and foremost is the
family separation. 67 percent of U.S. service members are
married, and they are put under a lot of stress and strain in
terms of family separation. Right now if you serve in overseas
positions you are not guaranteed you are going to remain there.
You may be deployed so you are away from home many times.
Only 7 percent of my 37,000 have family members
accompanying them. It is an important aspect of having an
accompanied tour in Korea. Up north where the Second Infantry
Division is, there are almost no family members. There are
some, but very few.
We need to look at a balanced approach in terms of our
positioning of the U.S. forces in Korea and having a reasonable
rate of accompanied families associated with it. We have
procedures in terms of notification of what we call
noncombatants and we have procedures if the need arises to move
them and evacuate them. But that is a big issue for service
members in terms of being with their families, something that
is a very difficult challenge where there is a real threat.
We had a similar threat in Europe for a period of time, and
I think we have to put some thoughtful work into it.
Senator Roberts. If he pulls the trigger you have about 20
minutes. I do not know what evacuation plan is going to be
successful under those circumstances. I am not trying to pick
an argument with you. It is just something that I have been
concerned about for several years and I know you are as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
I think at this point in the record you ought to expand on
this important inquiry by our colleague, because in the private
consultations that you and I have had you alluded to your
thinking something should be done, but you are doing it right
now, together with the Secretary of Defense, looking at the
entire force structure, the disposition of that force structure
on the Peninsula, and the numbers involved. Am I correct in
that?
General LaPorte. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. In December
we had a security consultative meeting in Washington. The
Minister of National Defense from Korea and the Secretary of
Defense agreed to conducting a Future of the Alliance study
initiative with the new South Korean administration once it
came into office.
On the 26th of February, Department of Defense policy
personnel came and we initiated discussions with the South
Korean Government associated with roles, missions, force
structure, and basing of forces. We think this is a very
healthy process to do. October is the 50th anniversary, so why
not reexamine and reaffirm our commitment to the alliance, but
it may not have to look exactly as it has looked like for 50
years.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. Thank you, Senator
Roberts, for raising it.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking you for your service to
our country. We are all very grateful to you. I hope you will
express that gratitude to the men and women who serve under
your commands.
General Hill, I am going to try to get to you eventually,
but I do have a couple of questions about Korea first. I do not
want you to be insulted feeling like you have been left out of
everything today.
General Hill. That is all right, sir.
Senator Bayh. I am interested in a couple of the issues
that you deal with.
But first a couple of things about Korea. To Admiral Fargo
and General LaPorte. This situation, the nuclear tensions in
the Korean Peninsula, may not be resolvable through a dialogue,
but they are certainly not resolvable peacefully if we do not
try under some set of circumstances. Having said that, I think
we need to keep all the options on the table in case whatever
dialogue develops fails, either because the North Koreans have
made a strategic decision they are just going to go down the
road of increasing their nuclear capabilities or because there
is nothing that we can offer them that will convince them to
desist in that path or, even if there is something we can offer
them, perhaps we conclude that we cannot verify that they will
abide by any agreement we might reach.
For whatever set of circumstances might exist, the
President needs to have all the options available to him, as do
we. If we chose to try and remove the reprocessing facility and
the small reactor that they have, the launch sites for the
longer missiles that they have developed, do we have the
capability of doing that?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, we have a wide range of
capabilities and great capability in terms of precision-guided
munitions. I am not going to go into the specifics of any
particular potential targets or the hypothetical. I am
obviously very confident with the capability that we have at
hand today.
Senator Bayh. I appreciate the need for some vagueness in
your answer, Admiral. I will not press you further on that.
The reason I ask the question is if you do not have that
capability then obviously that takes one option off the table
and forces you in a different direction, even if you do not
have great confidence at the end of the day it is going to
achieve the security of the country that you are trying to
achieve.
If we were to pursue such an option, what do you
anticipate? Obviously, we have to try and game these things
out. What is the likely response that the North Koreans would
present us with?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, these are things that we have given
a lot of thought to and I would really like to deal with these
in a classified session if we could, please.
Senator Bayh. I will respect that, Admiral. Perhaps you
will feel the same way about my next question. It is along the
same lines. The North Koreans obviously have missiles that are
capable of hitting Japan. We suspect that they may have one or
two nuclear warheads. Do we know that they can fit those
warheads to those missiles? Would Japan be at risk of a nuclear
strike if hostilities were to break out?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, I am not trying to duck these, but
these all have great intelligence-related components to the
answers. So if I could, we could deal with it in another
session.
Senator Bayh. My curiosity unfortunately leads me into
areas that we cannot discuss in this forum.
Maybe a couple of things we can discuss. I would like to
follow up on Senator Roberts' questions and the chairman's
questions. I do hope that we are giving serious thought to
repositioning our forces on the demilitarized zone (DMZ). It
seems to me one of their likely responses--if they are
interested in continuing to drive a wedge between us and our
South Korean allies, they would launch a large barrage on
Seoul. That would perhaps backfire in terms of public
relations. They are more likely to try and attack our troops
along the DMZ. It seems to me that the troops are really
sitting ducks there. I hope we give some serious consideration
to at least repositioning them somewhere out of artillery
range. I will just make that comment. I think the General
already indicated that we are giving serious thought to that.
Maybe you can answer this on the record. If the North
Koreans were to declare themselves a nuclear power or at some
point in the next year or so were actually to test a nuclear
device, what do you think the reaction of the South Korean
military authorities would be to that? You have discussed, both
of you, the change in public opinion in the South. What effect
would that have on public opinion in the South, if any? Or if
you cannot discuss public opinion, at least the South Korean
military authorities?
General LaPorte. I am confident, working with the South
Korean military on a day-to-day basis, that the South Korean
military would follow explicitly the guidance given to them by
the civilian leaders.
Senator Bayh. They seem to be--I do not want to say denial,
but they are certainly downplaying the potential threat from
the North. I was wondering if this might convince them to take
the threat a little more seriously at this point.
General, let me ask about Colombia, hopefully with a little
more luck here.
General Hill. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. The violence seems to be escalating. The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has obviously
gotten some assistance from others in urban warfare techniques
and so forth. I am told by at least some informed individuals
that there really are not demands that the FARC has put on the
table today that might give one much hope in terms of a
negotiated settlement of this conflict any time soon.
In your opinion is there a military solution to this
problem?
General Hill. Senator, I believe that I look at Colombia
pre- and post-7 August, which is when the Uribe Government took
over. They have energized both militarily and in all the other
facets of governance--judicial, economic, and political
reform--they have energized the Colombians to levels they have
never reached before. I believe that they have in fact on the
military side gained the momentum on the FARC and the National
Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC). I believe that they can maintain that momentum
if they continue to see it through and I believe they will, and
that we continue to support them in that effort.
They will never in my opinion totally eradicate those
organizations. They will not eradicate them because they have
morphed from purely ideological entities into narcoterrorists
and they are now in the business of making drugs and in the
drug trade. They will not want to give up their businesses.
In my opinion, as they continue movement in all areas, not
only military but the other areas of governance, the Government
of Colombia can reclaim portions of Colombia that they have not
been in in years, and they are in the process of doing that.
They can stop the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC from operating
with impunity throughout the countryside, and then they can
maintain and restore the greater part of their democracy.
Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, could I make two brief
comments? My time has expired. They are very brief.
Chairman Warner. I tell you what. We are going to have
another round in which you can participate.
Senator Bayh. General, I appreciate it. I take your answer
to be that they are making progress, therefore making our
support worthwhile, even though there is no final resolution to
this process through military means only.
General Hill. There will never be a pure military solution
to the problem that is Colombia. They recognize that and we
recognize that. But I remain cautiously optimistic.
Chairman Warner. That is an important line of questions
that you have proposed and I intend to do a follow-up.
Now we have Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question relates to Korea. As I understand it, we
have somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 troops stationed there
right now. The South Korean military is maybe around a million
or so. Those are round figures, I know. This is more of a
philosophical question, and that is, in your estimation, what
is the deterrence consideration that we provide in South Korea?
It seems to me that we would be quite a deterrent to any
aggression by North Korea and that it is important that we
maintain a presence there, if nothing else, just for the
deterrence factor there. Could I hear a response on that?
General LaPorte. Senator, I think you are exactly right. We
have been a tremendous deterrent for the past 50 years, but it
has been a result of a combined forces deterrence, not a U.S.
unilateral deterrence.
I would just like to highlight, the South Korean military
is a very capable military, over 640,000 strong on active duty.
They are well-equipped, they are well-trained, and they are
extremely well-led. They are motivated. They are good
warfighters. We train with them on a daily basis. They have a
very good army that has modern equipment. They have an air
force with very talented and very well-trained pilots and good
equipment. They are purchasing the F-15. Their navy is a very
good navy and getting stronger every day. They have one of the
finest marine corps in the world.
So I have great confidence in the South Korean military and
they play a predominant role and it will be an increasing,
significantly more viable role in their national security
posture.
Senator Pryor. This is a follow-up to Senator Roberts'
question a moment ago. I know that he was not implying this or
would not even ever say this because he does not believe this,
but I have heard some say that we should just withdraw from the
South Korean Peninsula altogether and always be ready to
respond, but not have any presence there. I personally think
that is a mistake, and I would like to hear your thoughts on
that.
General LaPorte. I began in my conversation saying that
what happens in Korea has an impact throughout the world and I
truly believe that. Thirty percent of the gross domestic
product of the world is produced in the Northeast Asia region.
You have four of the largest six militaries in the world there.
For the reasons of stability and peace, I think it is very
important that the United States has presence on the Peninsula
and that that presence is linked with forces in other regional
neighbors and allies throughout the Pacific.
Senator Pryor. If I can change gears and go to Colombia
here for just a few moments. I will be glad to sit down and
meet with you in private about this. I do not want to say I
have a concern, but I want to make sure that you and your
forces are receiving the right kind of training, right kind of
equipment, and the right kind of people there to fulfill your
mission.
I know it is very difficult, under very difficult
circumstances. It is a different kind of mission. It is a very
unique mission in a lot of ways. I just want you to know that I
would be glad to sit down any time and talk about what you
think your special needs may be to accomplish the goal there.
General Hill. I appreciate that, Senator, and I will set up
a time to come in and do that.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
General Hill. Thank you, sir.
Senator Pryor. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Hill, I would like to follow on that line of
questions by our colleague. We now have caps on the number of
persons and so forth. I presume you are in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense and others on that issue. Do you have
a view, your professional view, that you would like to share
with the committee regarding those caps and your ability to
carry out the mission to which you have been assigned?
General Hill. Yes, sir. I believe at the present time,
given the mission that we are doing, we can operate within that
cap. I would not say that down the road you might want to
relook that issue, but at the present time I stay within the
cap and we can accomplish our mission within the cap.
As you are aware, we have gone slightly over the 400 number
in personnel during the last 30 days in our search for the
Americans. But the law allowed for that and we made the proper
notifications.
Chairman Warner. I would hope that the adversaries would
not misinterpret the intention of this country to be supportive
to stamp that out by virtue of this cap situation. Do you find
that they can utilize that cap to their advantage by telling
those who support them, you see that the United States is not
serious about this?
General Hill. No, sir. I think that they understand that
the United States is serious about this.
Chairman Warner. All right, you have answered the question.
General Hill. May I add one other point to that?
Chairman Warner. Sure.
General Hill. Going back to Senator Bayh's earlier
question, as you look at the escalating violence--his term--I
believe that what is going on in the last couple of months in
Colombia is an indicator that the Colombian efforts supported
by the United States is working, is a successful program, and
that is why you are seeing this change in the way that
especially the FARC are operating.
Chairman Warner. Well, let us just go right from that
observation, which is a very important one you have made. Do
those perpetrators of harm and deceit and production of drugs
and dissemination of same now figure that the intensity of our
effort in Colombia requires them to go to other countries and
begin to establish a stronger base of operation there? What
should we do to address that?
General Hill. Yes, sir. The FARC and the ELN, all three of
the narcoterrorist groups that operate in Colombia, operate in
varying degrees on the other side of the borders of the
neighboring countries, in all of them. As I have traveled
through the region and from the very beginning of my first
trip, I have talked to both the political and the military
leadership and said: ``As we continue to win the battle in
Colombia, you are going to have to work your side of the
border, and you need to, with greater coordination with the
Colombians, do that.'' I have offered up SOUTHCOM facilitating
apparatuses to assist them.
I believe that this is coming to fruition. Just yesterday
the Colombians held a meeting in Bogota with government
representatives from Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Peru. They met for a day and all agreed that they needed to
establish greater cooperation along those borders. This is an
important step and one we should not overlook.
Chairman Warner. I think it is important that our record
reflect that the committee is concerned about Venezuela and
also your status report on Panama and particularly the
functioning of the canal to serve the interests of the world.
General Hill. Yes, sir. First on Panama, I was in Panama 2
weeks ago. I toured the canal and I met with President Moscoso,
the chief of the Panamanian police, the commissioner of the
canal, and other important people inside Panama. We have worked
with them and are continuing to work with them over the
security of the canal. I believe the Panamanians are capable of
defending the canal and supporting their role in it, and that
the canal is operating very efficiently. I have heard of this
both professionally and anecdotally from many people.
Chairman Warner. Let us shift to Venezuela.
General Hill. Yes, sir. Venezuela--during the first part of
the major strike, I believe that what you saw in Venezuela was,
for lack of a better term, democracy in action: people in the
street with opposing views to the elected president. Following
the strike, it seems to me that his actions might portend a
move toward greater authoritarianism. In my mind that bears
watching very carefully. I have directed my people to do that.
I have not been in Venezuela. I have not been in contact with
any senior level military of Venezuela, although we continue to
have military-to-military relationships with Venezuela.
I think it is also important to note that the work we have
done, not only in Venezuela but throughout the region, has paid
off in the professionalization of the militaries. The
Venezuelan military did not go out into the street and kill its
citizens, nor did they conduct a coup. I think that is an
important aspect of what is going on there. But we are watching
Venezuela carefully, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Admiral Fargo, I think it is very important that you bring
the committee up to date with respect to China and particularly
our military-to-military relationships. They appear to be
strengthening. Am I correct in that?
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I would agree. I just visited
China in December, visited five cities in 5 days in three of
the military regions, and had a very, I would term it,
constructive and useful dialogue with primarily the military
leadership, but to some degree some of the political leadership
also.
We have also started an exchange of port calls. Admiral
Gaffney, who heads our National Defense University, is
conducting educational exchanges with China. Of course they are
a regular participant at the Asian Pacific Center for Security
Studies.
Chairman Warner. This is on a positive trend?
Admiral Fargo. I think it is a positive vector, is the way
I like to put it.
Chairman Warner. I would like to shift to Taiwan, a very
valuable relationship between our nations, that is the United
States and the current government there. Bring us up to date on
that. The tensions appear to be somewhat lessened at the
moment.
Admiral Fargo. I think that is a fair characterization.
Certainly our relationship with Taiwan is governed very clearly
by the Taiwan Relations Act. There is a great deal of economic
connectivity right now between Taiwan and the People's Republic
of China (PRC), and certainly I would term the level of tension
right now in the Strait is relatively low.
Chairman Warner. We have a government-to-government
relationship and I think it is important. Thank you very much.
Let us conclude my questions on India. India is in our AOR,
but of course we would have to address the relationships with
Pakistan, which is in CENTCOM. But you can address that status
there.
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I certainly can. I used to
command our naval forces in the Central Command and so I am
very familiar with Pakistan. I have been there a number of
times.
Right now we are building a relationship with both India
and Pakistan. We recognize this is not a zero sum game. We
ought to be able to have a productive and constructive
relationship with both countries. India, specifically, is
helping in the global war on terrorism. They contributed a ship
to conduct the Straits of Malacca patrol as part of the global
war on terrorism. I have also been there recently and talked to
their leadership. We think India is a natural partner, the
largest democratic country in the world, and we are improving
our relationship and expanding our military-to-military
cooperation with India.
Chairman Warner. I thank you.
Senator Levin, I see two colleagues have joined us. Senator
Ben Nelson, to then be followed by Senator Reed.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being in and out. It is difficult to do several things at
once around here, but sometimes you are required to do that.
First of all, I want to thank all of you for being here.
General Hill, it is good to have you back and this time
testifying for Southern Command. I appreciate that very much.
My first trip as a Senator was with two of my colleagues here
to visit Colombia. I have followed as closely as possible what
has been going on in the Andean region. I hope you will forgive
me if I focus most of my time on Admiral Fargo and General
LaPorte.
Both of you lead commands that the entire world is watching
right now and, although Iraq tends to garner greater attention
at the moment, I truly believe that in many respects North
Korea presents the more immediate and maybe in some respects
the greater threat at the moment. Our military buildup in Iraq
is required to keep that nation from becoming the next North
Korea.
But in our effort to deal with that one threat, it seems to
me that we are missing an opportunity to address the other. I
am speaking, of course, of the decision to engage North Korea
only in multilateral talks. Unfortunately, our allies in the
region do not seem to share that same enthusiasm for
multilateral talks. China and Russia have also suggested that
this is an issue for the United States. North Korea states that
they will only meet us on a one-on-one basis.
I would prefer multilateral talks, but I do not think we
can wait for partners who do not seem to be coming to join us
at the moment and who do not seem to be welcome at the table
with respect to the North Korean position. I understand the
argument that the administration has made that they do not want
to reward bad behavior. Neither do I. But waiting to talk until
North Korea has a larger nuclear--or has a nuclear arsenal and
continues to be the greatest proliferator and the one-stop shop
for rogue nations as well as potentially for every possible
terrorist is not a very attractive alternative.
I think we can act as though we have options, but I think
our options are really basically two: We negotiate or we wait
until there is a nuclear arsenal and then we are worried more
about what is the military reaction to this if we are even able
to have a diplomacy opportunity.
I believe the best course of action--and I have offered
this as a construct for negotiation--is to use what I have
referred to as the simultaneous model of engagement, in which
North Korea would agree to freeze its nuclear program in both
cases and allow inspectors to confirm those actions, while the
United States agrees to hold off any military action, not
necessarily a nonaggression pact, but an agreement to withhold
any military actions before and during negotiations, talks, and
not to impose any kind of economic sanctions in that process as
well.
I appreciate so much a little over 2 weeks ago the fact
that General LaPorte and other colleagues there, including the
ambassador, gave us a fairly substantial briefing on the nature
of the challenges that are there on the Peninsula. I do believe
that a simultaneous model of negotiation can work, but it
requires that we will agree to do it on a bilateral basis.
I have followed the first steps toward bilateral
discussions or at least that suggestion. Secretary Powell then
said that his statement about that was the equivalent of
leaning too far forward on his skis; apparently he was perhaps
just a little bit ahead of himself. Secretary Armitage also had
some reference to bilateral talks. I can understand that there
can be differences of opinion in the administration.
But my concern is, if we do not address the threat soon I
fear we are going to come to regret it. In 50 years it will not
be about whether we had bilateral or multilateral talks, but
about whether we were able to work together to stop the nuclear
threat at this point in our history.
Admiral Fargo, the administration has really made it clear
that they want multilateral talks. Obviously, North Korea said,
no, they want it one-on-one. Fifty years from now, what do you
believe will matter most, whether we have bilateral talks or
that we were able to work together, hopefully, to resolve the
nuclear issue?
Admiral Fargo. Well, Senator, fundamentally I believe this
is a multilateral issue. It is certainly a regional issue and
all of our partners in the region have said that a nuclear-
capable North Korea is unacceptable to them. It is not only a
regional issue; it is an international issue, and that is
certainly why the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
taken this to the UN and the Security Council. That is my
belief and I think that is the proper way to approach it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I understand. Now, the President
in his news conference said it was regional. He did not say it
was global. I am not going to suggest to you, in baseball
parlance, that saying it is regional and global is trying to
steal second and keep your foot on first. I am not going to
suggest that.
It is difficult to distinguish or to draw a line on what
the distinction is. To go ahead and say it is regional, I do
understand that. But it does have these global implications and
I can understand the interest that some have in saying, let us
get together with the North Koreans and let us start the talks.
If we can expand them into multilateral discussions and
multilateral solutions, we will deal with the regional issue
very effectively. But we also will begin to deal with the
global aspect of it because of the missile capacity of North
Korea to potentially reach the west coast of the United States
and other locations of a considerable distance.
Maybe it sets you up for a question that is very difficult
to answer, but it does seem to me that we have to pursue this
aggressively now.
My time is expired. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I understand we are prepared to
go into closed session now?
Chairman Warner. My colleague has his second round
opportunity. If you would like to take a brief one, we have
time for yours and Senator Levin, then go to closed.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts also.
Senator Roberts. I wanted to ask General Hill some
questions.
Chairman Warner. I think we will proceed then to complete
our second round.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, at this time let me just say
publicly how much respect and esteem I have for the gentlemen
here and the job they are doing for the country, and then
reserve my questions for the closed round.
Chairman Warner. Well, you are a running mate of most of
these generals, are you not, out of West Point?
Senator Reed. Well, General LaPorte is from Rhode Island
and I do not want to suggest that everyone from Rhode Island is
5\1/2\ feet tall, but we are very proud of his contribution to
the national defense.
General LaPorte. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo apparently made a critical
mistake in his youth and went to Annapolis, and General Hill is
just a general. You have been a great general. So I have a
great deal of respect and affection for----
Chairman Warner. Your time has expired. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In view of the Senator from Arkansas' remarks in regards to
my position on a possible withdrawal from Korea, nothing could
be farther from the truth. I would point out that in terms of
war planning, on the first day of war we have one division, the
Warrior Division, the South Koreans would have 28. The fourth
day of war their Reserves would come on and they would have 44
divisions, as I understand it.
We also provide 50 percent of the air force capability, 80
percent of the naval capability, and 100 percent of the command
and control, and it is an integrated force. So there is no way
that we should be even thinking about any kind of withdrawal
for these combatants.
Ten thousand members of the 37,000 who are combatants, of
the Second Infantry Division, 10,000 in regards to the Air
Force personnel, 15,000 in terms of headquarters and support,
mostly in Seoul. But it is the 116,000 noncombatants that I am
concerned about. I am concerned about combatants as well. Five
thousand military dependents, and that was the key that I was
really referring to; 5,000 to 10,000 other U.S. Government
agencies and dependents; 100,000 businessmen, contractors,
etc., mostly non-defense-related.
Obviously, there is a long-range studying effort that you
are going to do on this particular problem, but I wanted to
make it very clear that I am not suggesting in any way any kind
of withdrawal.
General Hill, I was a fan of General Wilhelm when he was
the Southern Command CINC and he pointed out to me at that
particular time we had 31 nations involved with your command,
30 of them were democracies. We have made so much progress
since 1980, 360 million people, average age 14. In terms of the
following issues: one, immigration, big-time issue for the
United States; two, drugs; three, energy, more especially with
Venezuela and the strike--we get 17 percent of our energy
supply from Venezuela; where my wife is complaining that we are
paying $2 a gallon in regards to gasoline--terrorism and
trade--these issues affect our daily lives and pocketbooks.
Yet, during the Balkans crisis we took away a lot of
infrastructure from you, not from you personally but from the
command, and have not put it back. Now we have the surge in
regards to Iraq. My question to you is: Do you have the
necessary funding and the infrastructure to do the job, with
the thousands and thousands and thousands of miles in an area
which we tend to ignore--not ignore; maybe benign, maybe not so
benign, neglect. I am concerned about this because of the
issues that I raise that directly affect the daily lives and
pocketbooks of the American people.
General Hill. Your points are well taken in terms of the
importance of the region to the United States and I completely
concur with that. If I needed one thing, I need greater
intelligence support. But if I go back to the Joint Staff, all
of us need greater intelligence support. That comes forward in
my integrated priority list to the Department, and I understand
priorities. They are sitting to my right at this point.
Senator Roberts. Well, General, let me interrupt you, and I
apologize for doing that. But I can introduce you to the
chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I can promise you that
you can get a full hearing from him, and if you want to come
and visit the chairman of the Intelligence Committee we will be
happy to take a hard look at that in your behalf, in
conjunction, of course, with the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, who also serves on the Intelligence Committee.
General Hill. Sir, it really comes down to a matter of
prioritization. I have enough assets within my theater to do
the missions that I have been allocated to do. I could always
use more, as General LaPorte could use more and Admiral Fargo.
Senator Roberts. I understand. I understand that.
General Hill. That is the point I was making.
Senator Roberts. Let me ask you a question in regards to
Comandante Castro. Senator Akaka is no longer here, but he was
with me in a trip to Cuba about, oh, a year and a half ago. The
Comandante is 77 years old. I am concerned about post-Castro
Cuba and I am concerned about trying to establish some tie of
entrepreneurship, some tie so that democracy--I am not trying
to get into the Cuban-American situation at all.
It worries me that, with tourism down there and the growing
drug problem there, that we could possibly make some progress
if we entered into some kind of a joint understanding on
narcotics control. That has been proposed before. It gets into
the State Department and some ideological questions. I know it
is controversial. Do you have any feeling about this?
General Hill. Sir, Cuba along with many other countries in
this region play in the drug trade. There is no doubt about
that. If we could work out something where we could begin to
get a handle on their part of the drug trade, it would be very
useful.
Senator Roberts. Let me point out, not that I do not have
any illusions about Castro, but what his number one concern
was, as I determined it to be during those meetings, those
infamous 12- to 14-hour meetings where you do a lot more
listening than talking, that he really was very much interested
in that, because he is worried about his country and a drug
cartel having undue influence in a post-Castro period.
I would like to visit with you about that and perhaps we
can bring that up in the closed session.
General Hill. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, General LaPorte, there have been a lot of press
reports that North Korea has restarted its Yongbyon reactor. I
do not know that anybody has officially told us that. Is that
in fact correct?
General LaPorte. The reactor to the best of my knowledge
has been restarted. As far as the reprocessing plant, we do not
have any indication that that has been restarted.
Senator Levin. As far as moving the fuel rods from the
storage facility to the reprocessing facility, has that been
confirmed?
General LaPorte. Could I address that in a closed session
with you?
Senator Levin. Sure.
But you just indicated that as far as we know they have not
yet resumed operation of the reprocessing facility?
General LaPorte. Correct.
Senator Levin. You've been asked about the testimony of the
Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, yesterday about the
enriched uranium program of North Korea not being far behind
the plutonium program. I think both Admiral Fargo and General
LaPorte were asked about this. General LaPorte, you indicated
you preferred to comment on that in closed session. The problem
with that is that Assistant Secretary Kelly talked in open
session. It is difficult, it seems to me, to argue that that is
still a classified issue when the Assistant Secretary of State
has made a statement on the record publicly about that issue.
I do not know quite how to go about that, Mr. Chairman.
This would be your call on this. It is troubling to me that we
do not get your testimony on that subject at a public hearing.
Maybe you are being more circumspect, which is totally
appropriate if he talked about classified information. But how
is it still classified if the Assistant Secretary of State has
commented publicly on the issue?
Chairman Warner. Would you not think, Senator, that he
could share his views in closed session and then you and I
jointly could undertake to get such declassification as we felt
appropriate?
Senator Levin. All right. If that is more comfortable for
you, that is fine with me. But I do think we have to resolve
that disconnect there. That would be fine, Mr. Chairman.
Now, Admiral Fargo, have we proposed allowing U.S. troops
in the Philippines to participate in patrols?
Admiral Fargo. In patrols?
Senator Levin. Have we proposed to the Philippines that we
participate in patrols with their army?
Admiral Fargo. We are talking to the Government of the
Philippines right now about what kind of additional help we can
provide. Last year we conducted Balikatan 02-1, which was an
exercise that allowed us to train, advise, and assist.
Certainly any exercise that we conduct would have to be in a
non-hostile environment. So to answer your question
specifically, we have not worked out an arrangement past the
current effort that is underway, which is the security
assistance we are providing to train these five modules, the
light reaction companies, the battalions, provide night vision
capability, and infuse intelligence and planning into their
system, plus the other exercises, the large array of exercises
that we have.
Senator Levin. So are you saying that if we make a proposal
along this line it would be for patrols in a non-hostile
environment? Is that what you are saying?
Admiral Fargo. If it is an exercise, and that is what we
agree with the Government of the Philippines that we would like
to go forward with, then an exercise would have to be in a non-
hostile environment.
Chairman Warner. That is a training exercise.
Admiral Fargo. A training exercise.
Chairman Warner. For training.
Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony you
indicated that al Qaeda has given financial aid to a number of
terrorist groups in the southern Philippines. Could you
elaborate on any recent financial or technical support from al
Qaeda to the Abu Sayyaf Group or to any other terrorist group
in the Philippines?
Admiral Fargo. We believe that al Qaeda has had both a
training and a financial relationship with the Abu Sayyaf
Group.
Senator Levin. Would that be within the last few years?
Admiral Fargo. Within the last few years, yes, sir. I can
give you more specifics in closed session.
Senator Levin. That would be fine.
Are we getting cooperation, Admiral, from Indonesia in
terms of the war on terrorism and in terms of the investigation
of the killing of two Americans last August?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, we are certainly getting
cooperation on the war on terrorism. The cooperation with the
Bali investigation has been excellent. It has led to the arrest
of a number of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, including the number
three leader Samudra, and has certainly painted a much clearer
picture for us of the operations of this group in Southeast
Asia.
We are not happy with the cooperation we have received on
the Papua investigation, the Freeport Mining investigation, and
we are continuing to talk to the Indonesian Government about
how they can improve that investigation.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Hill, just one question for you--my time, should I
just finish with one question?
Chairman Warner. Sure, go right ahead.
Senator Levin. At the time Hutchison Whampoa was the low
bidder on a contract on port operation at the Panama Canal,
there was a lot of concerns raised here by some members of the
Senate about their connection with the Chinese Government. Has
there been any threat to our security, any problem with
Hutchison Whampoa operating those facilities?
General Hill. No, sir, there has not.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed, any follow-up that you might have?
Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you. The committee will now
commence its work in closed session in Hart 219. Thank you very
much.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

INDONESIAN MILITARY INVESTIGATION

1. Senator Allard. Admiral Fargo, on August 31, 2001, a number of
American teachers in Papua, Indonesia, were attacked as they were
returning from a picnic outing. Two Americans died, and several others
were wounded. The attack occurred during the middle of the day, less
than a half mile away from an Indonesian military position, and lasted
for approximately 45 minutes. The Indonesian police immediately
launched an investigation into the attack and later issued a report
concluding that there was a strong possibility that the attack had been
carried out by members of the Indonesian military (TNI).
After substantial U.S. diplomatic pressure, Indonesia's government
ordered a new joint police/military investigation and agreed to allow
the participation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI
investigators recently returned to the United States from Indonesia and
reported that they had received marginal cooperation from the
Indonesian government. For example, the team was only allowed to
interview military personnel from the region in the presence of a
senior Indonesian military officer and was not given complete access to
the evidence from the attack.
I remain concerned about the lack of progress in the Indonesian
investigation into this attack. The Government of Indonesia proved in
the Bali investigation that it is capable of developing information on
suspects and conducting a thorough investigation. However, in the
August 31 attack on innocent Americans, it seems that the Indonesian
government is not doing what it can to bring those responsible to
justice. What is your assessment of the Indonesian government's
determination to investigate this case and bring those responsible to
justice?
Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to comment
on this extremely important matter.
In short, I feel that the Government of Indonesia simply has not
yet done enough to develop the evidence in this case, and to follow it
wherever it leads.
In my meeting with Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States,
Ambassador Soemadi, on 26 November 2002, I made clear the seriousness
with which the United States Government regards this case. I informed
him that it could affect our entire relationship. The initial evidence
suggesting possible TNI involvement was especially disturbing. Since
then I have continued to be fully supportive of the embassy's efforts
with the Government of Indonesia to pursue justice in this case.
Unfortunately, Indonesia's government is still undergoing a very
challenging transition to democracy after 32 years of authoritarian
rule under former President Suharto. This transition has been made even
more difficult by the lingering economic crisis, various incidents of
regional violence, and more recently, challenges to the nascent
democratic government from terrorism and extremist Islamic groups. I am
hopeful from the recent prosecution and conviction of the TNI members
who murdered Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay (even though the
severity of the sentences was disappointing) that the government will
continue to investigate this case and punish those found guilty.
I can assure you that we will not abandon our efforts to pursue
accountability for this tragedy; we feel that the further development
of democratic government and the safety of United States and other
foreign citizens in Indonesia are inextricably tied to bringing this
incident to a satisfactory resolution.

2. Senator Allard. Admiral Fargo, are you satisfied with the
Indonesian military's cooperation with and participation in this
investigation?
Admiral Fargo. No, Senator, I am not. Our constant position has
been that the Indonesian military must fully support the government's
efforts to investigate this case, and to follow the evidence wherever
it leads. This includes sharing of evidence with investigators and
providing uninhibited access to witnesses. We will continue to insist
upon these and any other necessary conditions until the case is
satisfactorily resolved.

3. Senator Allard. Admiral Fargo, in your prepared testimony, you
expressed support for the International Military Education Training
(IMET) funding provided by Congress last year for Indonesia. I agree
that the IMET program is an important tool exposing Tentara Nasional
Indonesia (TNI--Indonesia National Military) officers to democratic
values and civilian leadership. Yet, I am troubled by allegations that
personnel from the TNI were involved in the August 31 attack. Wouldn't
you agree that the United States should withhold IMET funding until the
Indonesian investigation has been completed and the TNI has been
exonerated?
Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for your positive opinion of the
ability of the IMET program to favorably influence the development of
democratic values within TNI. Respectfully, however, I feel that
withholding IMET is not only unlikely to result in a satisfactory
conclusion to this investigation, but that it will also hinder
Indonesia's democratic development as well.
Although TNI has already instituted significant reforms since the
end of the New Order in May 1998 (reduction in the number of seats in
the Legislature, divestment of the National Police, successive civilian
Defense Ministers, a non-Army Supreme Commander, repudiation of their
socio-political doctrine of ``Dwifungsi'' and the practice of inserting
active duty officers in civilian government positions, and consistent
support of the civilian government during three transitions of
Presidential power), it still retains enough influence and access to
resources to maintain its institutional integrity indefinitely,
regardless of whether IMET is offered or withheld.
I believe that IMET should be considered an enabler, rather than a
reward, that will give TNI the tools and relationships to develop their
organization into a modern, professionally managed force that is
capable of working with their civilian leaders and other nations in
addressing some of the serious problems that confront our community of
democracies today, such as terrorism, sectarian violence, international
peacekeeping requirements, piracy and other transnational issues. It is
important that Indonesia develop the capacity to play this role because
of the potential influence it can wield as the largest country in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the most populous
Muslim-majority (and democratic) nation in the world. Because of this
potential benefit, I believe it is as much in our interest to provide
IMET as it is in Indonesia's to benefit from it. My experience has been
that withholding educational opportunities from developing countries
tends to perpetuate many of the dysfunctional, debilitating patterns of
behavior that prevent them from advancing.
I agree that it is important to send a clear message that in spite
of significant reform, there is still a need for improvements in TNI's
accountability and contribution to Indonesia's developing democracy.
Besides personally discussing key issues with senior TNI officers at
bilateral and regional meetings, and offering capacity-building
activities through Pacific Command's Theater Security Cooperation
Program (TSCP), we also endorse such restrictive measures as: 1)
vetting candidates for U.S. education and training for a history of
human rights violations or other illegal activities, 2) forgoing
combat-related training activities, and instead focusing on reform,
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping, and 3)
withholding full FMS (with exceptions only for areas supporting U.S.
interests, such as counter-terrorism).
In summary, I feel that the best approach to achieving
accountability, furthering democratic reform, and supporting U.S.
interests with TNI is a ``Balanced Approach'' that both enables
advancement and discourages recidivism.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

NORTH KOREA--URANIUM-BASED NUCLEAR PROGRAM

4. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, on March 12,
2003, Assistant Secretary James Kelly testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that, ``the enriched uranium issue, which
some have assumed is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future, is
not.'' He added, ``It is only probably a matter of months, not years
behind the plutonium program.'' Do you agree with this assessment?
Admiral Fargo. [Deleted.]
General LaPorte. [Deleted.]

PHILIPPINES--AL QAIDA-ABU SAYYAF GROUP LINK

5. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony you
state, ``bolstered by financial and technical support from al Qaeda,
the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the
southern Philippines have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S.
and Western interests.'' Can you elaborate on recent financial and
technical support from al Qaeda to the ASG?
Admiral Fargo. [Deleted.]

6. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, do we have fresh intelligence
linking the ASG to al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah?
Admiral Fargo. [Deleted.]

COLOMBIA--WORLDWIDE TERRORIST GROUPS

7. Senator Levin. General Hill, the Department has requested
authority to support use of counterdrug funding in Colombia and
throughout the region to support a unified campaign against illicit
narcotics-trafficking, to support a unified campaign against activities
by organizations in the Americas hemisphere actively engaged in, or
designated as, terrorist organizations.
In your written statement you assert, to complement homeland
security efforts and seal the seams through which terrorists
infiltrate, we must take comprehensive measures in our region to combat
international terrorism. You also state that Middle Eastern terrorist
groups to include Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamiyya al Gammat have
networks and support structures throughout the region. If you were
granted this authority, would you use the counterdrug funding to fight
the Middle Eastern groups you listed?
General Hill. Terrorist organizations and drug trafficking
organizations are frequently one and the same. Because it is difficult
to meaningfully separate their activities it makes sense to deal with
them holistically, using all available resources without the necessity
for case-by-case analysis of a group's specific activities. National
Security Policy Directive-18 and the statutory authorities in the
Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Appropriations Bill allow us, in Colombia, to
use counterdrug funds to support the Colombian Government's efforts
against U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. These same authorities
outside of Colombia against the activities of other U.S.-designated
terrorist organizations would be beneficial.

8. Senator Levin. General Hill, what other international terrorist
groups fall under the definition of ``actively engaged in . . .
terrorist organizations''--the Irish Republican Army, the Basque
separatists?
General Hill. [Deleted.]

9. Senator Levin. General Hill, do you believe that the priority
for using counterdrug assets should be fighting the narcoterrorists
indigenous to Colombia and the other countries we are assisting?
General Hill. I believe the priority of use for counterdrug
resources should be counterdrug missions. However, we recognize that
the activities of terrorist organizations cannot be meaningfully
separated from the activities of narco-trafficking organizations.
Therefore, if the organizations are one and the same, there are
efficiencies to be gained by conducting both counterdrug and
counterterrorism missions with the same resources.

10. Senator Levin. General Hill, if so, how would you ensure that
counterdrug funding was used primarily to fight drugs, and the
insurgents who have the greatest role in producing and exporting those
drugs?
General Hill. Counterdrug authorities 1004 and 1033 mandate end-use
monitoring and reporting. Under these counterdrug authorities, we track
the DOD funding and the intended use of equipment, training, and other
USG activities that support Colombian and other participating nation
counternarcotics units responsible for fighting narco-terrorism.
USSOUTHCOM employs rigid monitoring and reporting to ensure counterdrug
funding is applied properly and against those insurgents who produce,
export, and traffic drugs.

COLOMBIA--ERADICATION

11. Senator Levin. General Hill, the White House reported 2 weeks
ago that coca cultivation in Colombia has decreased by 15 percent, the
first time since we began the current eradication program 3 years ago.
A February 28 Washington Post account states that the drop in
cultivation occurred in southern Colombia where most of the herbicide
spraying is focused and that cultivation has increased in the east. In
addition, cultivation has increased slightly in Peru and Bolivia. In
Bolivia, President Sanchez de Lozada is under pressure to allow an
increase in legal coca cultivation. Do you agree with the White House
and Washington Post assessments?
General Hill. Yes. According to the Interagency Assessment of
Cocaine Movement eradication in four of Colombia's key coca growing
areas reduced the coca crop 15 percent at the end of 2002, the first
decline observed in Colombia's crop in a decade. The Government of
Colombia with support from the Department of State's Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS) reportedly sprayed over 38 percent more area in 2002 than
in 2001, resulting in reductions in coca production in the Putumayo,
Narino, Norte de Santander, and Caqueta growing areas. The crops
shifted back toward Guaviare to include Meta and Vichada with
substantial new cultivation. Reportedly, 54 percent of the Colombian
coca crop is being cultivated in this region; up from 33 percent in
2001. In 2002, Peru had its first increase since 1995 with 4,100
hectares of new cultivation. Bolivia's eradication teams were also
unable to keep pace with new plantings in the Chapare resulting in a
cultivation rise of 23 percent in 2002. The pressure on Bolivian
President Sanchez de Lozada to increase the legal coca cultivation
limit is coming from the Leftist Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party
being led by Evo Morales, who is supported by the cocaleros. An
agreement to increase legal cultivation (presently restricted to the
Central Chapare region) for each small farmer is under debate.

12. Senator Levin. General Hill, what are we doing to prevent
cultivation from popping up in places where we are not eradicating?
General Hill. From a military perspective, we have encouraged the
Colombian military to mass their military operations, sequentially and
within their capability, to secure ungoverned areas. This will allow
the Colombian government to establish governance, enforce the rule of
law, foster alternative development and bring other institutions and
services to those areas. We are also training the Colombian military to
create civil affairs and information operations capabilities that can
persuade and assist the applicable Colombian population not to
participate in coca cultivation, processing, and trafficking
activities.

13. Senator Levin. General Hill, will we be able to maintain
success in southern Colombia over the long term?
General Hill. Long-term success will require an improved,
coordinated, and enduring interagency and regional effort sufficient to
overcome 40 years of violence, criminal activities, and social
inequities. Additionally, increased personal security for inhabitants,
a functioning judiciary, visible government presence, and viable legal
economic opportunities will help to ensure success in southern
Colombia.

14. Senator Levin. General Hill, how are we addressing possible
displacement to Bolivia and other neighboring countries?
General Hill. To support the reduction of illicit activities,
SOUTHCOM has a permanent Military Information Support Team (MIST)
assigned to Bolivia. The MIST team supports the objectives of the
Bolivian U.S. country team and SOUTHCOM to prevent illicit trafficking.
To improve Bolivia's capabilities to counter illicit trafficking, there
have been six Special Operation Force deployments in the past 12 months
and five Security Assistance Teams in the past 7 months to Bolivia.
USSOUTHCOM works closely with the Andean Ridge countries to support
their drug reduction efforts to contain the problem. To assist in
containment, USSOUTHCOM supports the regional alternative development
efforts of the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs and the U.S. Agency for International
Development.

COUNTERNARCOTICS BRIGADE

15. Senator Levin. General Hill, in your written testimony you
state that the training of the Counter-Narcotics Brigade and the
establishment and training of a Commando Battalion to pursue enemy
leadership have already produced results. You are also conducting
training in the Arauca Province to help the Colombian military protect
valuable infrastructure, including the Cano Limon oil pipeline. What
concrete results have the Colombians achieved to date as a result of
this training, and what are the measures of effectiveness that you are
using to determine military success?
General Hill. The immediate results of the mission may be observed
in recent operations conducted by the Colombian military. Since the
initiation of expanded authorities for Colombia in October 2002, the
Colombian military has completed the following significant military
operations:
[Deleted.]
All of these actions reflect progress in several of the training
objectives for USSOUTHCOM's mission in Colombia. In addition, training
of the Commando Battalion continues on track, with an expected
operational capability in April 2003.
As for the overall measurements of effectiveness, in the initial
phases of the expanded mission in Colombia (commenced in January 2003),
measuring success will be based on the completion of USSOUTHCOM-
sponsored training, equipping, and support of specified Colombian
military units, combined with measuring the demonstrated capabilities
of these supported units.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING

16. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony you
state that through the Special Operations Command Pacific and Joint
Task Force-510, your command has the ability to deploy special
operators anywhere to combat terrorism. You add that ``This capability,
however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting
allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relations
through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater
Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP).'' How important are the SOF
training missions in the various countries within your area of
operations in terms of: 1) maintaining readiness; 2) deploying troops
into familiar and unhostile environments; and 3) gaining participation
of other countries in operations or exercises that are important to
you?
Admiral Fargo. SOF training deployments foster combat-ready forces,
regional knowledge, cross-cultural understanding, and national
alliances.
To support theater contingency and operation plans, U.S. SOF must
be capable of conducting sustained combat operations in rugged
environments, diverse terrain, and dense urban areas. Maintaining
requisite skills is a never-ending challenge, requiring U.S. SOF to
refine theater-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures during in-
theater deployments.
Unlike training in the Continental United States, in-theater
deployments offer first-hand knowledge of theater-specific operational
conditions. During these deployments, SOF work hand-in-hand with
foreign nation counterparts, building interoperability, sharpening
language skills, and exchanging solutions to operational challenges.
They accomplish these mission-essential activities ``in-country,''
demonstrating America's moral character, military power, democratic
principles, and economic might.
In addition to enhancing combat skills, in-theater deployments hone
SOF command and control functions, support relationships, and
collateral mission activities. SOF planners, logisticians, intelligence
analysts, civil affairs and psychological operations specialists,
communicators, and medical personnel routinely participate in SOF
deployments. While doing so, SOF subject matter experts work with host
nation counterparts and civilians, enhancing regional expertise. Such
interaction is invaluable when coordinating forward staging bases or
executing short-notice deployments.
Regional access and alliances are two additional SOF deployment by-
products. SOF events have created inroads with previous belligerents,
strengthened relationships with burgeoning friends, and nurtured
historic partners. SOF deploy to Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, training
local agencies to disarm land mines and interdict drug smugglers. SOF
are training in India, generating relationships with future allies.
Pending appropriate authorization, U.S. SOF are poised to re-initiate
training with select Indonesian and Burmese military units. Given
rising international terrorism and pressing requirements to obtain
counter-terrorism intelligence, SOF training deployments and related
host nation interactions will soon become even more valuable.

LANGUAGE TRAINING

17. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony on
intelligence assets you state, ``it is essential that the Defense
Language Institute develop tests for languages/dialects that accurately
assess language skills of service personnel.'' Have you encountered
problems with assessing language skills, identifying who has them, and
retaining personnel and proficiencies?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, we continue to have problems assessing language
skills and also have problems identifying speakers of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) languages and dialects. The Defense Manpower
Data Center's (DMDC) Automated Language Finder (ALF) database currently
does not track speakers of six languages and dialects required for OEF
namely: Cebuano, Chavacanno, Maranoan, Maguindanoan, Tausug and Yakan.
Further, no language proficiency tests currently exist for 18 PACOM OEF
languages/dialects: Achenese, Balinese, Bengali, Cebuano, Chavacanno,
Ilocano, Javanese, Malay, Maranoan, Maguindanoan, Pushtu, Punjabi,
Singhala, Sudanese, Tamil, Tausug, Urdu and Yakan. It is not cost-
effective to maintain cryptolinguist communities for all languages and
dialects required for OEF. However, it is essential that speakers of
OEF languages and dialects be identified and tested so that short
notice requirements can be filled by speakers with known proficiencies.
Retention of linguists is directly related to use of their language
skills. Retention of linguists who use their language skills in support
of operations and planning equals or exceeds the retention of non-
linguists. Turnover and loss of linguists who do not use their language
skills is significant.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS

18. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
the Department of Defense has established a set of programs called ACTD
which are designed to help accelerate the adoption of new technologies
by operators. This largely successful program brings together
developers and warfighters and has successfully transitioned some
systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), into current
operations. How are you working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program to test and
evaluate new technologies and the new operational concepts that they
enable?
Admiral Fargo. The United States Pacific Command continues to lead
the way among regional combatant commanders using Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations to operationalize science and technology for
the warfighter. Today we are involved in 18 active ACTD projects, more
than any other theater command. We have distributed the transformation
workload across the whole theater--almost every Service Component,
Joint Task Force and Sub-Unified Commander, as well as each of my Staff
Directors, is responsible for executing one or more ACTD.
Investing our time in ACTDs provides an ideal way for my forward-
deployed forces to confront emerging technologies early and influence
the way they will be introduced into the joint force. ACTDs are
organized as projects, and so benefit from having crisp objectives,
schedules, budgets and deliverables. They demand partnerships between
technical project managers, transition managers, and my operational
project managers, each with a clear role in the project's ultimate
successful demonstration and transition. These projects encourage my
joint force to create new tactics, techniques, procedures and concepts
of operations, a useful military product with value often exceeding
that of the new technology. By applying project management discipline
to ACTDs my forces are able to assess the military utility of these
technologies and concepts within a fixed time.
In addition, U.S. Pacific Command integrates its Joint
Experimentation and Transformation initiatives with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
program. Adhering to the philosophy of ``experiment while we
exercise'', Pacific Command actively engages in experimentation during
all its joint training exercises, such as Cobra Gold and Tandem Thrust
with our coalition partners, and Terminal Fury with our own joint
forces. In conjunction with our special focus Command and Control
Exercises (C2Xs) Pacific Command's joint exercise program provides the
operational venue for hosting and applying advanced concept technology
demonstrations, other technology initiatives, and advanced procedures
to quickly add new capabilities to our joint forces. Pacific Command
also hosts the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration for its
second year, providing another international opportunity to apply
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations to an operational scenario
for experimentation and test. Timing of all our exercises allows
experimentation and spiral development, characterized by hands-on
feedback from the operators and valuable leave-behinds for the joint
warfighters after assessment. This rapid spiral transformation over the
past 3 years, currently, and in the coming years, puts capability in
user's hands years ahead of traditional acquisition timelines.
Through funding support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations, Pacific Command has
integrated a joint fires capability into the headquarters and each of
its primary Joint Task Forces for addressing time-sensitive and time-
critical targets with an initiative called the Automated Deep
Operations Coordination System. We've extended hospital diagnosis,
treatment, and surgery to the front lines with an initiative called
Joint Medical Operations-Telemedicine. We're simplifying logistics
tracking and host nation support with a multinational equipment and
supplies tracker called Coalition Theater Logistics.
Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network (JTF WARNET) is a
Transformation Initiative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Advanced Systems and Concepts (AS&C) and Commander U.S. Pacific
Command (USPACOM) resulting from the Extending the Littoral Battlespace
(ELB) ACTD. The ELB ACTD demonstration phase completed in fiscal year
2001 with its major system demonstration exercise Kernel Blitz
(Experimentation) (KBX). As a result of the advanced warfighting
concepts and capabilities demonstrated, PACOM and OSD AS&C restructured
the ELB ACTD fiscal year 2002 and 2003 transition phase as the JTF
WARNET initiative to enable joint tactical level digital connectivity
and command and control interoperability. In April 2002 the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council approved JTF WARNET to build, test, and
develop Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) and Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs) to deploy the first prototype to PACOM operational
forces. All services, Special Operational Command, OSD, PACOM and Joint
Forces Command are partnered in the JTF WARNET initiative.
In fiscal year 2002 and 2003, PACOM Component forces have assisted
in setting requirements and developing CONOPs and TTPs for employing
the JTF WARNET prototype. In June through September of 2003 PACOM
Component forces will assist in testing and evaluating JTF WARNET in a
series of field exercises. In fiscal year 2004 JTF WARNET capabilities
will be deployed in Western Pacific and will participate in exercise
Cobra Gold 04.
The Joint Tactical Radio System Joint Program Office has been named
as the JTF WARNET Transition Manager for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
PACOM has been instrumental in developing the JTF WARNET Transition
Plan that is completing final staffing for approval. JTF WARNET
products will transition into 23 programs of record. The JTF WARNET
fielding and transition efforts are fully funded.
Additionally, we're taking control of the limited frequency
bandwidth available for joint operations and dynamically controlling
which applications and operational priorities are allocated that
bandwidth. This initiative is expected to become the Information Flow
Analysis and Control Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
beginning in fiscal year 2004, as a result of its experimental
application and force enhancement throughout Pacific Command units. To
help Pacific Command achieve more accurate planning with specific
desired results, we're working closely to bring Theater Effects Based
Operations and Joint Networked Fires and Effects to the range of
Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations that have modernized our
force capabilities so rapidly within the past 3 years.
The U.S. Pacific Command continues to work closely with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Advanced Concepts Technology
Demonstrations to provide a true operational environment--not a battle
lab--for mature and promising technologies and procedures. That
office's support of Pacific Command initiatives is a sound investment
in rapid spiral transformation of our joint and combined operational
forces.
General LaPorte. Since the inception of the ACTD and to this day
USFK works directly with the Principal Assistant to the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD-AS&C), Dr.
Charles Perkins. Dr. Perkins and USFK communicate directly and
regularly via email and telephone. These communications are
supplemented with frequent face-to-face meetings in Korea.
General Hill. We are working very closely with the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts in the planning
and execution of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration programs. At
this time, we are the operational sponsor for three major technology
demonstrations in our geographical area of responsibility. One program
is developing the capability to find targets of interest such as narco-
terrorist camps, supporting infrastructure, and associated lines of
communications hidden under the dense foliage of the Andean Ridge. This
technology will enable key operational capability in the Command's most
critical region and other similar operational environments in the
world. Another technology demonstration is designed to rapidly collect
high-resolution terrain mapping from unmanned aerial vehicles. This
program will allow us to explore high-definition elevation data to
improve the effectiveness and survivability of forces entering
unfamiliar or hostile environments. Also, we are teaming with the U.S.
European Command to undertake a technological demonstration that will
provide protection of key infrastructure and personnel against human-
carried bombs. This teaming arrangement will ensure a broad set of
fixed and mobile requirements applicable to military and civilian
agencies. In the future, we expect to continue our support of these
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. The Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts provides tremendous
support through technology demonstrations to meet my near, mid and long
term operational needs. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations are
absolutely necessary to develop operational capability in a methodical,
cost-effective and expeditious manner.

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS

19. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
you are constantly being faced with new technological threats (such as
cyberattack, adaptation of cheap commercial technologies for military
purpose, chemical and biological attack, etc.) as well as opportunities
to apply new revolutionary technologies to address operational
requirements. How are you provided with scientific and technical advice
to support your missions and operations?
Admiral Fargo. We receive advice about both threats and
opportunities arising from emerging science and technology from many
sources. At the first level, I have my staff of senior professional
military officers who represent all the services, and branches of the
services. These men and women are subject matter experts in the various
areas of modern warfare, and as professionals they maintain their
connections and currency in the fields where they are subject matter
experts. Embedded in my staff at PACOM I have representatives from the
Office of Naval Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense
Information Systems Agency, and others. I also have a Chief Information
Officer to keep me apprised of the latest threats and opportunities in
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C\4\I).
I have an office of Defense Cooperation in Armaments to monitor science
and technology in the Asian-Pacific region. Finally, I have a Science
and Technology Advisor (STA) whose purpose is to exchange information,
and to coordinate projects and policy with the national, international,
and Department of Defense science and technology community.
The STA maintains close working contact with each of the offices
listed above, and with the science advisors for each of my service
components and sub-unified commands within the region. This close
relationship encourages a free flow of scientific and technical
information between and among the commands, and in particular
encourages the development of limited objective experiments and
demonstration projects that can quickly assess the military utility of
emerging technologies. By confronting new technologies early in a
forward military setting, we are able to take the lessons away rapidly
in terms we can use, namely improved concepts of operations, tactics,
techniques, and procedures. When these lessons help influence
acquisition, so much the better.
My STA stays current in many of the issues concerning Department of
Defense science and technology issues, coordinating with the OSD, and
the Service science and technology organizations and laboratories. He
also acts as conduit for international cooperation for various ongoing
and planned projects. For instance, the STA brokered the first
international agreement for cooperative development of an ACTD with
Singapore on the SPARTAN unmanned surface vehicle. This improves our
theater security by providing unmanned vessels interoperable by either
navy to support escort of our vessels in the straits of Malacca. The
Science and Technology Advisor, along with my Logistics Directorate,
also developed an international cooperative development arrangement
with Australia for the Coalition Theater Logistics ACTD. Since then we
have begun to explore developing similar cooperative projects with
Japan, Korea, India, and Malaysia.
PACOM is also taking the initiative to develop responses to
chemical and biological attacks. In addition to the ongoing Restoration
of Operations ACTD, my Plans Directorate has developed a roadmap and is
pursuing technology and projects that can reduce the effects of
chemical/biological warfare attacks.
PACOM's focus on operationalizing science and technology has given
me the ability to build an incomparable team of advisors from all the
services to address science and technology challenges in the region.
General LaPorte. USFK receives scientific and technical advice
through a number of sources: The Army Materiel Command provides a
Science Advisor through Army Materiel Command-Field Assistance in
Science and Technology (AMC-FAST); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) has an Liaison Officer (LNO) within the command; the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) has an office in theater; and the
Program Executive Office for Command Control and Computers Tactical
(PEOC3T) also maintains a presence in Korea. USFK also receives
assistance from the USPACOM Science and Technology Advisor (STA). In
the area of modeling and simulations, USFK receives effective technical
support from throughout the DOD. The Defense Modeling and Simulation
Office (DMSO) maintains a full time liaison officer at the Korea Battle
Simulation Center (KBSC). Additionally USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, and the
modeling and simulation agencies of all four services provide the
latest in simulations and associated links to joint and service C\4\ISR
systems.
General Hill. I receive scientific and technical advice to meet my
missions and operations through the Office of the Command's Science and
Technology Advisor. My pool of science and technology personnel
provides me with extensive Air Force, Army, Navy, and industrial
experience. In fact, the U.S. Army Materiel Command--Field Assistance
in Science and Technology, the U.S. Navy Office of Naval Research, and
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts
assist with scientific and developmental engineering manpower to the
Command. The advisors identify, analyze, consolidate and coordinate
technical solutions to operational requirements. In addition, they
actively seek new technologies to improve our operational capability.
Their goal is to achieve a balance between the aggressive pull of
operational requirements and the push of technical innovations to
include transformational activities. My advisors maintain close
liaisons with the scientific and technical community at large from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, national agencies, Services,
industry, academia and our participating nations. Examples of support
include the application of an innovative foliage penetrating radar to
current operations; initiatives to improve wide area maritime
surveillance, detection and monitoring for tactical riverine
operations, and bio-terrorism; and, the development of a red team
program in U.S. Southern Command.

20. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
how are you connected to the various Service technology development
organizations in order to address quick response technology needs and
questions?
Admiral Fargo. Pacific Command is connected with the various
Service technology development organizations, and other organizations
that collectively make up the national research enterprise, through
many layers of staff interaction. My staff, which is organized by
operational discipline, is made up of professional military officers
who have deep experience within both their Services and their military
specialties. They often maintain contact with Service science and
technology organizations and laboratories to develop quick-response
solutions to current needs. My staff is augmented with liaison officers
from many Service and Department of Defense agencies who assure that
their products and expertise is known to Pacific Command, and that
Pacific Command's emerging challenges are known to their home
laboratories. My staff includes a Chief Information Officer (CIO) who
is a national leader in the current discussions about the future
architecture of world-wide command information infrastructure. Finally,
my staff also includes an office of the Science and Technology Advisor
who coordinates a broad program of technology projects, and maintains a
network of connections to address quick response technology needs and
questions.
Each of my theater Service components has a Science and Technology
Advisor (STA) who maintains close ties with their Service technology
development centers. The STA's and CIO's offices maintain close working
relationships with the theater Service component STAs as well as
maintaining their own ties within the Navy and Air Force technology
communities. This group collaborates on theater projects employing new
technology from various Service laboratories or technology centers.
Three such recent projects have explored the use of written and spoken
language machine translators for operational use, developing and
testing a system that manages the limited bandwidth available to our
Joint Task Forces at sea, and developing a counter-sniper weapons
system. It is important to emphasize that technology employed without a
developed concept of operations (CONOPs) or tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) provide nothing the operator in the field can use.
These Limited Objective Experiments provide the operators the
opportunity to develop the CONOPs and TTPs while determining the
military utility of the technology. They then can provide improvement
feedback for the project. In the case of the language translation
devices, and the bandwidth management, the real world operations
resulted in significant upgrades to improve the system. If the project
is successful then these experiments will lead to the formulation of an
ACTD.
In addition to the ties to the Service technology developers, the
STA staffs are tied into the national technology agencies, such as the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Information Systems
Agency, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as well as
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and
Technology and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence.
General LaPorte. Army Materiel Command-Field Assistance in Science
and Technology (AMC-FAST) has a formal staff of ``Quick Reaction
Specialists'' that receive requests from the field and respond back
with solutions. United States Forces Korea (USFK) is intimately tied in
with this staff and is currently receiving support through two separate
programs within AMC-FAST. USFK also maintains close liaison with Air
Force Operational Test and Experimentation Command, the Air Armaments
Center, and the National Assessment Group. USFK and USJFCOM have also
established a strong program of interaction on developing projects.
General Hill. I am connected to the various Service technology
development organizations through the working interfaces between my
science advisors and agencies within the U.S. Army Research Laboratory
and U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Command. My advisors also
interact with the U.S. Navy technology development offices such as the
Office of Naval Research and Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition,
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts
provides U.S. Southern Command with links to other technology
organizations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. This connectivity provides forums
to address my operational shortfalls through special joint initiatives,
Service programs, and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.

21. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
how can that connectivity be improved?
Admiral Fargo. The Nation's research enterprise is a vast and
dynamic endeavor that involves universities, industry, national and
service laboratories, and Department of Defense funding and policy
agencies. This enterprise represents a tremendous reservoir of talent
that can reasonably be applied to the issues we face in U.S. Pacific
Command, when we are effective at attracting and focusing their
attention. We do a good job of this by using multiple channels to
communicate with OSD. We make our needs known through my Integrated
Priority List and through persistent contact with the national research
enterprise at all levels.
Overall, I am satisfied and our process is working well. Improved
connectivity with the Nation's research enterprise would mean more
effective joint technologies for U.S. Pacific Command. This effort
would aid in bridging the technological gap between the Services and
between us and our coalition partners. We continually strive to broaden
our scope of involvement with the national research enterprise. This
year alone we have hosted the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Science and Technology, and leadership from the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. U.S.
Pacific Command maintains a partnership with both of these agencies
including experimentation in unmanned vehicles, and a new U.S. Pacific
Command focal role addressing chemical and biological weapon
mitigation.
General LaPorte. The Army Materiel Command-Field Assistance in
Science and Technology (AMC-FAST) Science Advisor position in Korea has
been vacant since October 2002. Filling this position would be a
significant improvement. Also, AMC-FAST is an Army organization;
providing USFK a Navy and Air Force equivalent would be of significant
value to take advantage of synergistic efforts within all of Department
of Defense.
General Hill. I am satisfied we are on-track in the way we work
with developmental commands within the Department of Defense, with
Services and, with the other Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) to
address operational and technology challenges. I have directed my
science and technology staff to routinely coordinate with, and leverage
the technical accomplishments of other commands and agencies. In order
to improve connectivity, we are increasing information exchanges and
interaction at every level of DOD, Service, RCC and non-defense
agencies to ensure USSOUTHCOM's unique mission needs are considered
during planning, resource allocation and execution phases. I have also
directed that the staff be more proactive in identifying both potential
and mature technical solutions to solving the command's requirements.
Through active interface, in an increasingly collaborative environment,
we are seeking to leverage the success other RCCs are having in any
given area. Finally, I have recently been able to increase my science
and technology staff, having them report directly to a general officer
whose responsibilities include seeking new and transformational methods
wherever they exist for routine and operational missions.

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard,
Sessions, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; and
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional
staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Jennifer Key.
Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator
Allard; Arch Galloway, II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James
P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard
Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and
Terri Glaze and Andy York, assistants to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Given the historic moment, I think that
each Senator should consider using a minute or two for an
opening statement, if he or she so desires, before we get to
the particulars of this very important hearing.
I would like to say I was very privileged last night to be
in attendance with my colleague, Senator Levin, and other
leadership from the Senate and House as the President spoke
with us in the Oval Office--that is, the Cabinet room, prior to
his addressing the Nation at 8 o'clock. I have unhesitatingly
given my support to this courageous President throughout this
controversy for many months.
His address to the Nation last night was very clear, to the
point, and entirely consistent with his views as Commander in
Chief and the responsibility he has under our Constitution. It
is my judgment that he is acting consistent with a series of
U.N. resolutions, most particularly 1441. He has put together a
coalition of nations. While not as large as that in 1991, in my
judgment, it is equally significant.
There were statements to the effect that we are going
without the support of Muslim nations. That is incorrect. A
number of those nations are providing us with port facilities,
air bases, overflight rights. It is clear that the
preponderance of the nations in that region of the world are in
support of the actions that we, Great Britain, and Australia,
with our troops, are undertaking to eliminate the weapons of
mass destruction.
I find certainly in my State and across the Nation a
growing support among our people for the actions taken by the
President. That is as it should be. It is my hope and
expectation that those of us here on Capitol Hill, who have
expressed a diversity of opinions, will now close ranks behind
the men and women of the Armed Forces, and indeed the Commander
in Chief, as he undertakes to carry forward this mission in the
cause of freedom.
Senator Levin, do you care to say a few words?
Senator Levin. I was not planning on doing so, Mr.
Chairman, but since you have invited us to do so, let me just
add a word perhaps similar to what I expressed yesterday on the
floor of the Senate at great length.
The President has now decided to end the diplomatic effort.
Those of us who have questioned the administration's approach,
including this Senator, will now be rallying behind the men and
women of our Armed Forces to give them the full support that
they deserve, because it seems certain that we will soon be at
war.
The question of the approach was based on a number of
factors, including the fact that we have invoked the
resolutions of the Security Council, including 1441, as the
basis for proceeding, and yet now ignore the apparent
unwillingness of the Security Council to support military
action at this time. It is obvious that nine members of the
Security Council were not able to be aligned by the
administration to support a second resolution, even though the
President said there would be a vote just a few days ago.
But that is water over the dam. Last October, a majority of
both houses of Congress voted to authorize the President to use
military force with or without the express authority of the
United Nations. I disagreed with that decision. I offered an
alternative. But the overriding fact is that this democracy
functions through debate and through decision. The decision to
give the President wide authority was democratically arrived
at.
So now we have courageous men and women in harm's way, who
are not just carrying out an order of the Commander in Chief
with bravery and the highest form of professionalism, they are
also implementing the outcome of that democratic debate in
Congress. This Nation honors and protects democratic debate and
the resolution of that debate.
So I am sure that all of us feel, regardless of what
position we took on whether or not to go with or without the
express authority of the United Nations, as the President said
he would request, those men and women should and, I believe, do
know--that they have the full support and the fervent prayers
of all the American people as they carry out their missions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
We will just go back and forth.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. First of all, I
would join you in your comments. I do appreciate Senator
Levin's comments that now we join together after we have had a
fervent debate on the need to and how we deal with the Iraqis
and Saddam Hussein. We have historically, in this country, had
our debate and then joined together to support the men and
women overseas who are putting their lives on the line for
freedom and the security of America.
Many of us in policy decisionmaking really do appreciate
their commitment. I have a lot of confidence in their
leadership and a lot of confidence in their equipment and
getting them supplied and prepared over there to meet the
coming challenges, I think, in the next few days.
As chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Mr.
Chairman, I plan to closely follow the development of our vital
defenses. I think they are important to the future mission of
all branches of the military. I have been saying for years that
the missile threat to this Nation is here and we must be
prepared. I think this was confirmed by the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, during our hearing on September 12.
He was asked if North Korea had a missile capable of hitting
the West Coast of the United States. Director Tenet stated,
very unambiguously at the time, that the declassified answer is
yes, they can do that.
North Korea is not the only country of concern that is
developing long-range ballistic missiles. This threat is
growing and we remain extremely vulnerable to the missile
attack. That is why the December announcement by the President
to deploy a missile defense system is so important. The
national security of this Nation is at risk and we must be
ready.
I also want to thank all the witnesses for being here. I
know you have a lot on your plate at this time and I thank you
for taking the time to share with us your thoughts on this
important issue.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I thank you for suggesting, as
did Senator Levin, that we have a full committee hearing. In
due course, I will turn the chair over to you as the
subcommittee chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Are there other colleagues who would like
to make a brief opening statement relative to the matter other
than what is before the committee?
Yes. Go ahead, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.
Like of all of us, we are expecting the commitment of
military forces. I have every confidence that they will
prevail. That confidence is borne out by having associated with
many of the commanders as classmates and friends for 30 years.
They are extraordinary Americans and they will do a great job
for our country.
Their job is to carry out the orders of the Commander in
Chief. Our job is to continue to probe and ask questions, so
that the policy is the right policy for the country. That is
the process of debate and deliberation in our system of
government, a system that we would like to see in Iraq.
When it comes to the issues before this committee, we
continue to raise serious questions, because these are
complicated and serious issues. That is why I think this
hearing is very important.
Over the last few years, particularly the last two, as I
chaired the Strategic Subcommittee, we have tried to focus on
deploying equipment after it has been thoroughly tested, not
without testing. We wanted to fund activities that could be
executed, not simply to provide funds that would not lead to
executable programs. Third, to avoid excessive funding for just
nonspecific activities. Those questions still remain and we
will keep raising those questions, because that is our
responsibility and our job. We are committed to do it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. We all recognize your
deep interest in the command structure for this particular
conflict since a number of them were class mates,
contemporaneous at West Point with you and in your own
distinguished military career.
If you wish to have a leave of absence to join them, the
Chair so grants it. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. I do not know what I could add, other than
enthusiasm.
Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, the die has been cast. I want
our troops to know that we are proud of them. The reports we
have of them is that their training is at the optimum, and they
are ready for anything. I want our troops to know that we are
proud they are out there, and we want them to know that we are
here in Congress to support them in every way. I want to be one
of those here as a Senator to do that. Of course, we want to
wish them well in everything that they do.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. You were a trooper
yourself at one time in an early period of our history.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I enjoyed watching you
and Senator Levin last night.
Chairman Warner. I enjoyed watching you earlier this
morning. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. I enjoyed watching Senator Warner last
night. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. That is part of our responsibilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have the privilege of being the
ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I am
looking forward to getting into the specifics. I have a lot of
questions. I do not know all of you personally, but I do know
Secretary Aldridge personally, and he is one of the best
appointments in this administration. I have lots of questions
for you, Pete. So I am looking forward to it.
Chairman Warner. Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We live and
work in an environment where debate and differences of opinion
are crucial to the democracy and the freedoms that we enjoy and
we protect. But there are times when we need to recognize the
debate may be over, decisions have been made, and it is time to
put the differences behind us, to join together. This is one of
those times where we need now to support the men and women in
uniform and support their efforts throughout the world.
We hope and pray for their safety and their speedy return.
We hope that things will turn out as they are planned.
It is important that we join together as a Nation today and
in the days ahead, because there will be differences of
opinion. But it is important that we put those aside for the
common good of our men and women in uniform and come together
and support their efforts.
I thank you very much for the opportunity.
Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just
reiterate the feelings of my colleagues in terms of rallying
around the troops at this time, regardless of the differences
of opinion that may have existed previously. We all keep them
in our thoughts and our prayers at this important hour.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator, the record reflects that you are
one of the original drafters of the resolution that passed the
Senate by 77 votes. I was privileged to be associated with you
as one of the four drafters myself.
Senator Bayh. The privilege is mine, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have
anything to add other than it is a very serious moment in
American history and for all Americans, and really for all the
world. It is just a time, I think, that calls for prayer. We
need to pray for the leadership of this country, including the
President and our military leaders and planners, and certainly
the troops out there on the ground. I just appreciate the
opportunity you have given us this morning.
Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator.
Senator Levin and I now will give our opening statements
relative to the matter at hand.
The definition of homeland defense is ever-expanding. But
before us today is a panel of individuals who are entrusted
with one of the most critical chapters of homeland defense, a
chapter that many of us, including this Senator, have advocated
for years and years, since I have been in this United States
Senate.
You, as the Four Horsemen, are bringing into fruition the
hopes and dreams that so many of us have had, beginning with
our former president, Ronald Reagan, when he initiated the
boldest steps in this direction, followed then by George
Herbert Walker Bush.
I thank Senator Levin and Senator Allard for suggesting we
have this at a full committee hearing this morning.
I welcome the witnesses. We have the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Mr. Aldridge; the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, Mr. Christie; the Director of
the Missile Defense Agency, General Kadish; and Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security, Dr. J.D.
Crouch.
Thank you all, gentlemen.
Events in the world today underscore the importance of this
hearing. As our troops prepare for possible conflict with Iraq,
U.S. missile defense assets are now at this moment being
deployed throughout the Middle East in the Persian Gulf region.
Turkey, Israel, and a number of nations in the Gulf are, today,
defended by U.S. Patriot batteries against the missile threats
posed by Iraq.
In addition, with U.S. assistance, Israel has developed and
deployed its own national defense system centered around the
important Arrow Program. Our Nation was a major contributor in
many ways to the development of that program. These deployments
are a key component of President Bush's vision of a layered
missile defense system capable of defending the United States,
its allies, friends, and deployed military forces against the
increasing threat posed by ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction.
This is not a future hypothetical threat we are discussing.
It is here and now, as Senator Allard pointed out. According to
the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in his
testimony before this committee, and I quote him, ``The United
States faces a near-term ICBM threat from North Korea. Over the
next several years, we could face a similar threat from Iran
and possibly Iraq.''
September 11 was a vivid reminder that the United States is
vulnerable to attack in ways we never imagined. It is our duty
to protect the American people against the full range of
threats as we can best envision them. President Bush has given
that leadership from the moment he took office. He has been
committed to developing and fielding missile defenses to
protect the United States, our troops deployed overseas, our
allies, and friends from a limited missile attack.
The President has substantially increased funding for
missile defense and has focused our efforts on deploying an
effective missile defense system. For fiscal year 2004, the
President has requested $9.1 billion for missile defense, an
18-percent real increase over the 2003 level. He has removed
the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. With this budget
before us, he has taken an important first step in actually
fielding a missile defense capability.
On December 17, 2002, President Bush announced his decision
to field an initial missile defense capability, consisting
primarily of ground- and sea-based interceptors to protect the
United States, our friends, and our allies: ``These initial
capabilities emerge from our research and development program
and build on the test bed that we have been constructing. While
modest, these capabilities will add to America's security and
serve as a starting point for improved and expanded
capabilities later, as further progress is made in researching
and developing missile technologies.''
A clear statement by the President and recognition of the
fact that the program under optimum circumstances would have
remained intact. But I think the President is exactly right in
using the limited capabilities that we have thus far put in
place. I strongly support this President's decision. It is a
prudent, responsible step. It will ensure the United States
has, at least, a modest capability.
Today we will receive your individual assessments as to the
degree it helps. But he points out, it is a modest capability
for the near future to protect our people against a limited--
not a massive--but a limited attack.
It is important to point out the use of a development
system by our military forces for operational purposes is not
unique. There are many examples from the recent past, driven by
an urgent need and the fact that the developmental system could
provide at least limited operational capability of such systems
for our military forces.
Some of these examples are well known. Two Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System aircraft, or
JSTARS, flew hundreds of hours of combat missions during the
1991 Persian Gulf War and provided warning to our forces on the
ground when the Iraqi army was on the move. What was the status
of the JSTARS aircraft at that time? A question. They were pre-
production aircraft that had not even started operational test
and evaluation.
Indeed, in the wake of the outstanding performance of
JSTARS during the 1991 conflict, our committee increased the
administration's request for JSTARS aircraft long prior to
completion of operational test and evaluation. More recently,
the Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles have
proven to be valuable assets to our forces during the global
war on terrorism. Our military put these assets in the field in
Afghanistan, even though the Predator failed its operational
evaluation, and Global Hawk has yet to start its operational
evaluation.
The witnesses today will testify as to how successful these
systems have been in contributing to our military effort. The
record is clear, when faced with an imminent threat and an
urgent need for a military capability, we have often fielded
systems that have not fully completed their operational
testing. This does not mean that we are fielding systems with
no military value.
To the contrary, this practice has enabled us to provide
our military with critical capabilities during times of crisis
and conflict. Clearly the testing of the BMD system is not
complete. The Secretary of Defense has already testified, and I
expect our witnesses today will confirm, that testing on the
BMD system will continue unabated, will be vigorous, will grow
more complex and difficult, and that the system capabilities
will hopefully improve over time.
The capability that this initial fielding will provide is,
by the Department of Defense's own assessment, limited. The
alternative is to leave the Nation with no defenses at all
against long-range missile attack. I repeat, we have absolutely
nothing in place in this Nation to interdict the rogue state
from firing at us, terrorists firing at us, or other means of a
limited attack. That is unacceptable. I think the steps taken
by our President, and supported by the witnesses before us, are
very prudent and the correct steps.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
calling this very important hearing today.
This committee has historically been committed to ensure
that the men and women of our military service receive the best
equipment, the best training, and the best support that we can
provide. That is why 20 years ago, this Congress passed one of
the most important laws to ensure the quality of the military's
equipment.
The law established the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E). It was passed in 1983. It states that no
weapons system may be deployed without undergoing rigorous
realistic operational testing, or a plan for that testing at a
minimum, and approved by the director.
To keep the director as independent as possible, he is
appointed by the President, not by the Secretary of Defense. He
is confirmed by the Senate. We are pleased to have the current
director, Tom Christie, with us today. Mr. Christie and his
predecessors have been able to maintain an independent,
unbiased watch over the development of the Pentagon's weapon
systems.
Unlike the military services that developed the systems,
the director has no stake in the systems that he tests, except
to see that they perform as they should under realistic combat-
like conditions. If they do not, his job is to inform the
Secretary of Defense and Congress. This powerful system of
checks and balances has served the military well. It has been a
long time since we deployed a system that does not work, or at
least that we deployed a system that does not have a plan for
operational testing to make sure that it does work.
Prior to the existence of the 1983 law that established the
Operational Test and Evaluation Director, such multi-billion
dollar mistakes were all too common. The Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, the B-1 bomber, and the Sergeant York gun, were all
part of a major defense build-up of the early 1980s. There were
examples of systems that were rushed to deployment without
realistic testing or a plan for realistic testing. The first
two systems had such serious problems that they would have
posed life-threatening dangers to their own crews, had they
ever been used in combat. The taxpayer was forced to pay tens
of billions of dollars in extra costs to retrofit fixes for the
most egregious problems. The Sergeant York gun was actually
canceled outright after taxpayers spent $2 billion to develop
and purchase more than 100 of the faulty guns.
So we enacted a law in 1983 to establish the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, require that all major weapon
systems have independent operational testing either before they
are deployed or to have a plan for such operational testing in
the field, and that they not be exempt from operational
testing. The Patriot PAC-3 missile system is one of such
systems and is being deployed now, following a rigorous set of
operational tests.
The decision to develop and deploy a national missile
defense against strategic missiles has been made. That is not
the issue anymore. There was debate over that decision, as to
whether it was wise to do that, and what it would precipitate
in terms of other countries' responses, but that debate is
over. The decision to deploy a national missile defense is
over.
The question now is whether or not we are going to deploy a
system, which we take steps to assure will work. That is the
issue, and that is where operational testing comes in. I want
to first off agree with my chairman relative to the history of
JSTARS and Predator.
JSTARS and Predator were fielded before operational testing
was completed and should have been. They were tested in the
field. We learned a lot about JSTARS and Predator in the field.
What we did not do relative to JSTARS and Predator, and what we
should not do here, is exempt them from operational testing at
some point.
There was no language relative to JSTARS and to the
Predator such as is in this year's budget request, which
provides that a system which is being fielded is going to be
considered a system which is in development and demonstration.
Because the effect of saying, as this budget request does, that
the 2004 system, which is going to be deployed or fielded in
Alaska, is going to be considered, in the words of the budget
request, a system development and demonstration for purposes of
any law governing the development and production of a major
defense acquisition program. That language effectively exempts
this system from operational development. That is the problem
that I see.
I have problems with fielding a system before it is
operationally tested, because part of the system can never be
operationally tested. The radar that is going to be deployed
cannot be operationally tested for 2 years. I have problems
with that. That is one problem. We can agree or we can disagree
over that one.
But it seems to me, doubling the problem is this exemption
from operational testing for the parts of the system that can
be tested after they are fielded. Parts of the system can be
tested. I would hope we could unite on that issue. We never
adopted language such has been requested here for JSTARS and
for Predator. There is no reason to adopt that language. It
sets a horrible precedent for us to exempt a system from
operational testing at some point, even after it is fielded.
Predator and JSTARS prove my point, that you do not need
language like is being proposed in order to field a system. So
we can debate whether or not this system should be fielded at
this point. We can debate that issue; it is a debate and people
will differ on that one. But it is obviously going to be
fielded. I do not think we should have any debate over whether
or not we ought to include language which exempts a system that
has been fielded without operational testing from being
operationally tested, to the extent it can be, after it is
fielded. That is what seems to me to be an issue where we ought
to be able to rally around. We are rallying our troops, and
rightly so, even though there was difference over the issue as
to whether or not the decision to move to war without the full
support of the United Nations with a resolution, which the
President said he would seek a vote on. We debated that and
that debate is over. Now we are rallying around our troops.
We debated the deployment of a system, a national missile
defense system. That debate is over. The decision to develop
and deploy it has been made. But now, it seems to me that we
ought to rally around operationally testing that system to the
extent we can. That is a safety mechanism for our troops and
for our people. That 1983 law should not be waived. We should
not exempt systems from being operationally tested at some
point, either before they are fielded, hopefully.
In most cases, they can be. But in exceptional cases, and
the chairman has mentioned those cases, Predator, JSTARS, they
had a useful purpose to be served after they were fielded. By
fielding them, there was a useful purpose. They gave us some
capability we otherwise did not have. It was not the full
capability. But we sure learned a lot after they were fielded
by testing them in the field.
Again, I emphasize we did not adopt this kind of language
that is being proposed here by the administration; that no one
seems to know how it got in the budget, by the way. We did not
adopt this kind of language for JSTARS and Predator, as far as
I know, at least.
So that is my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. Again, I
thank you for calling the hearing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I guess we agree,
then, on the question of fielding it. It is the old doctrine,
use it or we could lose it. We could suffer an attack, which
would substantially damage life and limb and property here in
this country. To think that we would not put everything
possible against that potential attack is not a wise decision.
Now as to the laws, that specific question that you framed
is before the secretary and this panel this morning. So, Mr.
Secretary, we will admit all statements in their entirety for
the record. You gentleman may proceed, as you wish.
Secretary Aldridge.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD C. ``PETE'' ALDRIDGE, JR., UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

Secretary Aldridge. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin,
and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the fiscal year 2004
Department of Defense missile defense program and budget
submission. I am pleased to provide you this update on the
progress of the missile defense development program.
In the year that has transpired since I last addressed the
committee, we have made some good progress in missile defense.
The new management structure, established by Secretary Rumsfeld
in his memorandum of January 2, has been stood up. An effective
and vigorous oversight structure, aided by the Missile Defense
Support Group, is in place and providing valuable advice to me
and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the conduct
of the program. Processes within the Department have been
modified to support the accelerated development and fielding of
these new revolutionary capabilities.
A national team of the best and brightest of government and
industry has been formed and is tackling the complex technical
challenges of ballistic missile defense. We have achieved a
number of successes in the missile defense test program, which
have added momentum to the development effort and bolstered our
confidence that we will be able to meet the challenges that lie
ahead.
In addition, our overtures to allies and friends have
generated an expanded desire for international participation in
the ballistic missile defense program. The focus of my
testimony in March of last year was the management and
oversight of the missile defense program. The committee was
rightly concerned that the new management structure should
provide for the proper oversight of the program by the
Department and that Congress would have full insight into
program activities.
I informed you of the formation of a Missile Defense
Support Group, consisting of key officials plus two advisors
from 13 selected offices within the Department, including the
military services, for a total of 39 individuals who support
the decisionmaking by the Senior Executive Council and to
advise me and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency on the
full range of issues associated with the missile defense
program, including policy, operations, acquisition, and
resources.
In the span of one year, we have had 25 meetings of the
Missile Defense Support Group, an average of two meetings each
month of a group of some of the most knowledgeable and
experienced individuals in the Department. No program in the
Department receives more scrutiny, either in level of rigor or
frequency of study, than the missile defense program.
The Missile Defense Support Group has provided me and
General Kadish strong support in numerous key areas of the
missile defense program. The Missile Defense Support Group has
helped develop the strategies for the deployment of an initial
capability, and the follow-on deployment of expanded
capabilities, in block configurations. It has also been
valuable for the transition of developed capabilities to the
Services for fielding and operation.
In October of last year, I decided that the time was right
to transfer the Patriot PAC-3 system to the Army. The advice of
the Missile Defense Support Group for making the hand-over to
the Army supported the Defense Acquisition Board process and
aided my decision to make the transfer.
The Missile Defense Support Group has also helped the
missile defense development program by speeding a number of
routine Department processes, including review of the annual
budget and continuing evaluation of each part of the missile
defense program against its cost and schedule goals. I can
confidently assure Congress that oversight has actually
improved under the new management structure with the continual
engagement of this support group.
As you are aware, in December 2002, President Bush made a
decision to deploy limited missile defense capability beginning
in 2004. The nature of the expanding ballistic missile defense
threat, and the declared hostile intent of our adversaries,
compels us to put capabilities in the hands of our fighting men
and women as soon as they become available, even if the state
of development is less than we would ultimately hope to
deliver.
Putting an effective capability into the hands of our
fighting force is a dramatically safer move for our troops, our
Nation, our lives, and our friends, than delaying their
fielding for 5 years or more as we strive for the final
objective level of performance. This is the strategy directed
by Secretary Rumsfeld in his January 2, 2002, memorandum on the
missile defense program and the philosophy by which our efforts
are being guided.
Concerns have been raised by some that this might result in
the fielding of systems that are unproven and unsuitable for
battlefield conditions, or that the Department is seeking a
waiver of statutory requirements governing operational testing.
No such waiver of testing requirements has been requested; and
I will repeat that. No such waiver of testing requirements has
been requested.
Quite the contrary, the revolutionary nature of missile
defense and the threat posed by ballistic missiles have
prompted us to take steps to ensure that deployed systems meet
effectiveness and suitable goals through rigorous testing
throughout the development. The Department involves the
operational test community well in advance of a deployment
decision, so that we can gain a better understanding of these
issues as capabilities are being developed. The Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation is directly involved in the
review and assessment of all missile defense testing
activities. He will provide his operational assessment report
to Congress each year and provide the Department an operational
assessment of the suitability and effectiveness of the
ballistic missile defense system at each block decision point.
DOT&E also participates as a member of the Missile Defense
Support Group, which has examined the development test program
on several occasions during its first year of work. The
Department is committed to ensuring that fielded missile
defense capabilities are sufficient for defending against the
threat. I am confident that the level of oversight being
provided to test activities will accomplish this goal.
An important element of our missile defense program is the
planned ability to extend ballistic missile defenses to include
our friends and allies. Recent revelations about North Korea's
ability to reach the United States, compounded by that nation's
recent behavior, have validated the concerns of Japan and other
Western Pacific nations regarding the threat of ballistic
missile attack.
These concerns are rightly shared by Europe, as well. The
ongoing proliferation of weapons and missile technology to
nations such as Iran pose an immediate threat to the European
continent and to North America. This has sparked a growing
desire among several of our allies to participate in the
missile defense program. We have recently conducted discussions
with the United Kingdom, Japan, and Denmark toward expanded
missile defense participation, with some positive outcomes
already agreed to.
We are also continuing dialogue with other allies. The
effectiveness of any global ballistic missile defense system
will be enhanced by international participation.
Since this is my first opportunity to testify before the
Senate Armed Services Committee since the passage of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, I
would like to take this opportunity to thank its members for
their invaluable contribution to such elements of this
legislation as Buy-to-Budget. This provision will help us
optimize the use of taxpayer funds as we seek to provide the
best possible equipment and weaponry to the warfighter. We are
also grateful for the removal of certain superfluous and
resource-consuming reporting requirements.
The continued cooperation between the Department of Defense
and Congress will only grow in importance as we execute our
mission to provide for the national security of the United
States. I look forward to continuing that cooperation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Secretary Aldridge.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aldridge follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Edward C. ``Pete'' Aldridge, Jr.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the fiscal year 2004 Department of Defense missile defense
program and budget submission. I am pleased to provide you this update
on the progress of the missile defense development program.
In the year that has transpired since I last addressed the
committee, we have made good progress in missile defense. The new
management structure established by Secretary Rumsfeld in his
memorandum of January 2, 2002, has been stood up. An effective and
rigorous oversight structure, aided by the Missile Defense Support
Group, is in place and providing valuable advice to me and to the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the conduct of the program.
Processes within the Department have been modified to support the
accelerated development and fielding of these new revolutionary
capabilities. A national team of the best and brightest of the
government and industry has been formed and is tackling the complex
technical challenges of ballistic missile defense. We have achieved a
number of successes in the missile defense test program, which have
added momentum to the development effort and bolstered our confidence
that we will be able to meet the challenges that lie ahead. In
addition, our overtures to allies and friends have generated an
expanded desire for international participation in the Ballistic
Missile Defense Program.
The focus of my testimony in March of last year was the management
and oversight of the missile defense program. The committee was rightly
concerned that the new management structure should provide for the
proper oversight of the program by the Department and that Congress
should have full insight into program activities. I informed you of the
formation of a Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG) consisting of key
officials plus 2 advisors from 13 selected offices within the
Department (including the military services) for a total of 39
individuals who support decisionmaking by the Senior Executive Council
(SEC) and to advise me and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency
on the full range of issues associated with the missile defense program
including policy, operations, acquisition, and resources. In the span
of 1 year we have had 25 meetings of the MDSG, an average of 2 meetings
each month of a group of some of the most knowledgeable and experienced
individuals in the Department. No program in the Department receives
more scrutiny--either in level of rigor or frequency of study--than the
missile defense program. The MDSG has provided me and General Kadish
strong support in numerous key areas of the missile defense program.
The MDSG has helped develop the strategies for the deployment of an
initial emergency capability and the follow-on deployment of expanded
capabilities in block configurations. It has also been valuable for the
transition of developed capabilities to the Services for fielding and
operation. In October of last year I decided that the time was right to
transfer the Patriot (PAC-3) system to the Army. The advice of the MDSG
for making the handover to the Army supported the Defense Acquisition
Board process and aided my decision to make the transfer. The MDSG has
also helped the missile defense development program by speeding a
number of routine Department processes including review of the annual
budget and the continuing evaluation of each part of the missile
defense program against its cost and schedule goals. I can confidently
assure Congress that oversight has actually improved under the new
management structure with the continual engagement by the MDSG.
As you are aware, on December 19, 2002, President Bush made the
decision to deploy a limited missile defense capability beginning in
2004. The nature of the expanding ballistic missile threat and the
declared hostile intent of our adversaries compel us to put
capabilities in the hands of our fighting men and women as soon as they
become available, even if the state of development is less than what we
ultimately hope to deliver. Putting an effective capability into the
hands of our fighting force is a dramatically safer move for our
troops, our Nation, our allies, and our friends than delaying their
fielding for 5 years or more as we strive for a final, objective level
of performance. This is the strategy directed by Secretary Rumsfeld in
his January 2, 2002 memorandum on the missile defense program and the
philosophy by which our efforts are being guided. Concerns have been
raised by some that this might result in the fielding of systems that
are unproven and unsuitable for battlefield conditions or that the
Department is seeking a waiver of statutory requirements governing
operational testing. No such waiver of testing requirements has been
requested. Quite the contrary, the revolutionary nature of missile
defense and the threat posed by ballistic missiles have prompted us to
take steps to ensure that deployed systems meet effectiveness and
suitability goals through rigorous testing throughout development. The
Department involves the operational test community well in advance of a
deployment decision so that we can gain a better understanding of these
issues as capabilities are being developed. The Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is directly involved in the review and
assessment of all missile defense testing activities. He will provide
his operational assessment report to Congress each year and provide the
Department an operational assessment of the suitability and
effectiveness of the ballistic missile defense system at each block
decision point. DOT&E also participates as a member of the Missile
Defense Support Group, which has examined the developmental test
program on several occasions during its first year of work. The
Department is committed to ensuring that fielded missile defense
capabilities are sufficient for defending against the threat. I am
confident that the level of oversight being provided to test activities
will accomplish this goal.
An important element of our missile defense program is the planned
ability to extend ballistic missile defenses to include our friends and
allies. Recent revelations about North Korea's ability to reach the
United States, compounded by that nation's recent behavior, have
validated the concerns of Japan and other Western Pacific nations
regarding the threat of ballistic missile attack. These concerns are
rightly shared by Europe, as well. The ongoing proliferation of weapons
and missile technology to nations such as Iran poses a more immediate
threat to the European continent than to North America. This has
sparked a growing desire among several of our allies to participate in
the missile defense program. We have recently conducted discussions
with the United Kingdom, Japan, and Denmark toward expanded missile
defense participation, with some positive outcomes already agreed to.
We are also in continuing dialogue with other allies. The effectiveness
of any global ballistic missile defense system will be enhanced by
international participation.
Since this is my first opportunity to testify before the Senate
Armed Services Committee since the passage of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, I would like to take this
opportunity to thank its members for their invaluable contributions to
such elements of this legislation as ``Buy-to-Budget.'' This provision
will help us optimize the use of taxpayer funds as we seek to provide
the best possible equipment and weaponry to the warfighter. We are also
grateful for the removal of certain superfluous and resource-consuming
reporting requirements. The continued cooperation between the
Department of Defense and Congress will only grow in importance as we
execute our mission to provide for the national security of the United
States. I look forward to continuing that cooperation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the
committee. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Chairman Warner. Mr. Christie, in your opening statement
here, I hope you would address Senator Levin's important
observation and express your concurrence, I presume, with the
very clear statement about waiver given by Secretary Aldridge.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. CHRISTIE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Christie. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
distinguished members of the committee, I also appreciate this
opportunity to appear and discuss operational test issues
involved with building this missile defense test bed that may
also have some inherent defense capability. Let me emphasize up
front that I strongly support building this test bed as a means
of conducting more realistic ballistic missile defense testing.
It will provide us with an excellent capability to test the
integrated ballistic missile defense system against more
challenging targets and under more realistic flight conditions.
Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this test bed may
have some capability to defend against an actual threat and a
real attack. It depends, of course, on certain assumptions
about intelligence of an imminent attack and the positioning of
sensors to acquire, track, and target the threat.
Regardless of what this initial collection of equipment,
communications, and personnel is called, the fact remains that
we must build this test capability and put it in the field
before we can test the system. It is also prudent to develop
operational concepts and to train personnel in concert with
test bed development, so that whatever inherent capability
exists in this testing infrastructure could be employed to
defend the United States in an event of a ballistic missile
attack.
I understand and share the concerns raised by some members
of Congress, with the precedent of fielding operational systems
without adequate operational testing. Some had suggested that
the Department is requesting a waiver from operational testing
for the ballistic missile defense system. Mr. Aldridge has said
that the Department has not requested such a waiver.
Now, let me take just a moment here to discuss my overall
assessment of the situation. The Missile Defense Agency is
proceeding with the design and development strategy that is
very proactive when it comes to testing. General Kadish has
adopted a mission assurance philosophy that treats test
instrumentation as mission-critical equipment. My staff and I
are involved on a daily basis with the Missile Defense Agency
and the program managers for the ballistic missile defense
elements. We review test plans, participate in planning
meetings, witness tests, and provide coordinated advice to the
director and respond in written reports to Congress on the
adequacy of the testing programs.
I have access to all the information I need to fulfill
these responsibilities. I have completed my assessment of the
PAC-3 initial operational test and evaluation, which is
documented in a classified beyond low-rate initial production
report that was provided to Congress last November.
I have also completed, and submitted to the appropriate
committees of Congress, my annual assessment of the MDA testing
programs, as required by House Report 107-333. In that report I
conclude that the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element
of the BMDS, in essence, has not yet demonstrated operational
capability.
This conclusion, which I believe General Kadish agrees
with, is based on the fact that many essential components of
GMD have yet to be built. We can't test the system without
these critical components. We cannot test the GMD system
realistically without this test bed.
This was illustrated recently when the exo-atmospheric kill
vehicle failed to separate from the booster in integrated
flight test ten. MDA subsequently restructured the flight test
program, eliminating further testing with this old booster
system. This decision considered the poor performance of the
surrogate booster system and the risks of diverting booster
developers from the objective booster design effort, compared
with the advantages of gathering additional data from those
flight tests.
Beginning later this fiscal year and continuing to the 2004
decision, testing will resume with a test flight for each of
the candidate booster motors and a risk-reduction flight for a
target launch from Kodiak. Intercept testing will continue in
IFTs-14 and -15, flown with the new boosters. This is followed
by integrated ground testing of the test bed and a system test
readiness review just prior to the 2004 deployment decision.
Current plans also call for three more intercept flights
for the Aegis ballistic missile defense prior to the end of
fiscal year 2004. Additional flight testing beyond this point
is still being planned. The purpose of the test bed is to
establish a baseline capability, to realistically integrate and
test the components of the BMDS, and to enhance capability
incrementally through block development.
The real challenge here is to develop an operational
concept for using the test bed that will integrate components
of the BMDS as they become available, in order to evaluate the
operational capability of the system and defend against a
ballistic missile attack, if so needed. If we do not develop an
operational concept and an attack does come, then we will have
failed in a most serious way.
On the other hand, if an effort to refine an operational
concept for an interim system significantly distracts us from
building the objective system in expeditious fashion, then we
risk similar failure. Defense from the test bed is a serious
matter that will demand the focus and attention of the
developers, the testers, and the users. We will need to work
together with a common understanding of what we are building to
achieve this goal.
While the test bed is a research and development system,
this does preclude us from addressing operational test and
evaluation issues with it. In fact, it is common for systems in
development to combine developmental and operational test
objectives. The test bed, including missiles, will provide an
early opportunity to acquire valuable ground test data on
intra- and inter-operability between the command and control
center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile
health, or built-in testing capability; and on system safety,
reliability, maintainability, and logistics.
It will also permit us to get an early start on collecting
data on the aging effects on the missile. Availability of this
data will permit lessons learned from the test bed to be
considered in improving the objective ground-based mid-course
defense system.
Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and
after the 2004 test bed is available, formally addresses both
development testing and operational testing, objectives
consistent with the maturity level of the system. The Service
operational test agencies have approximately 35 personnel at
this point, dedicated to planning the details of the
operational test portions of the ground and flight tests and
for analyzing and reporting relevant operational test data.
My staff is working with the operational test agencies to
define independent evaluation plans for those operational test
activities. I will review and approve these operational test
and evaluation plans and their associated data requirements. I
will review and comment on plans for development tests,
exercises, simulations, and experiments that will produce the
data to feed the evaluation process. I will use both
developmental and operational test data as the basis for my
operational assessments, for advising General Kadish and the
Secretary, and as the basis for my annual assessment, which
will be provided to Congress.
Let me wrap up my remarks by briefly covering the Patriot
PAC-3 system, which was talked about earlier. This is the first
BMDS element to go through a procurement milestone under the
new capability-based acquisition philosophy. I concluded in my
beyond-low-rate production report, submitted last November to
Congress, that the PAC-3 missile shows significantly improved
performance against some tactical ballistic missile threats.
The Defense Acquisition Board approved a limited purchase
of PAC-3 missiles consistent with programmatic objectives, such
as developing production capacity, unit cost considerations,
and urgent military needs. This puts an improved, proven
capability in the field, well ahead of when a completely
demonstrated objective capability will be available.
The Missile Defense Agency originally planned for future
blocks of the PAC-3 system to stay in research and development,
transitioning to the Army only after each block went through
further developmental and operational testing. However, MDA
took advice from me and other Missile Defense Support Group
members, as Mr. Aldridge has discussed earlier, to keep the
development and testing activities in a combined DT/OT mode.
The entire PAC-3 program is being transitioned to the Army.
This decision avoids conflicting development objectives between
missile defense and air defense mission needs. The program
office has developed a robust follow-on test program to address
other ballistic missile targets, counter-measures, and other
air defense targets.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my staff has worked and
will continue to work diligently with General Kadish's staff to
build what I feel is a very effective relationship. I will
continue to work closely with General Kadish to ensure that the
mission of the test bed, as a test bed, is kept in perspective.
He and I have discussed taking advantage of the data gathering
opportunities that this test bed will provide.
I am working with the Service operational test agencies to
identify data requirements for an operational test evaluation
plan that I will review and approve. I will continue to monitor
planning and testing activities to ensure that we test as
realistically and as thoroughly as we can, advise the Director
of MDA of operational testing concerns, and report my
assessments of progress to both the Secretary and to you.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Christie.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christie follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. Christie

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the operational
testing issues involved with building a missile defense test bed that
may also have some inherent defensive capability. I strongly support
building this test bed as a means of conducting more realistic
ballistic missile defense testing. It will provide us with an excellent
capability to test the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System
against more challenging targets under more realistic flight
conditions. Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this test bed
may have some capability to defend against an actual threat in a real
attack, depending, of course on certain assumptions about intelligence
of an imminent attack and the positioning of sensors to acquire, track
and target the threat. Regardless of what this initial collection of
equipment, communications, and personnel is called, the fact remains
that we must build the test capability and put it in the field before
we can test the system. It is also prudent to develop operational
concepts, and train personnel in concert with the test bed's
development, so that whatever inherent capability exists in the testing
infrastructure could be employed to defend the United States in the
event of a ballistic missile attack.
I understand and share the concerns raised by Members of Congress
with the precedent of fielding operational systems without adequate
operational testing. Some have suggested that the department is
requesting a waiver from operational testing for the BMDS system. Let
me take a moment here to discuss my assessment of this situation.
The Missile Defense Agency is proceeding with a design and
development strategy that is very proactive when it comes to testing.
General Kadish has adopted a mission assurance philosophy that treats
test instrumentation as mission critical equipment. My staff and I are
involved on a daily basis with the Missile Defense Agency and the
program managers for the Ballistic Missile Defense System elements,
reviewing test plans, participating in planning meetings, witnessing
tests, providing coordinated advice to the director, and responding in
written reports to Congress on the adequacy of the testing programs. I
have access to all the information I need to fulfill these
responsibilities.
I have completed my assessment of the PAC-3 Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation test results, which is documented in a classified
Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report, provided last November to
Congress. I have also completed and submitted to the appropriate
committees of Congress, my annual assessment of the MDA testing
programs, required by House report 107-333. In that report, I conclude
that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the BMDS has
essentially not yet demonstrated operational capability. This
conclusion, which I believe MDA agrees with, is based on the fact that
many essential components of GMD have not yet been built. We cannot
test the system without these critical components, and we cannot test
it realistically without the test bed.
This was illustrated recently, when the exoatmospheric kill vehicle
failed to separate from the booster in IFT-10. MDA subsequently
restructured the flight test program, eliminating further testing with
the old booster system. This decision considered the poor performance
of the legacy booster system and the risks of diverting booster
developers from the objective booster design effort, compared with the
advantages of gathering additional data from those flight tests.
Beginning later this fiscal year and prior to the 2004 decision,
testing will resume with a test flight for each of the candidate
boosters and a risk reduction flight for a target launched from Kodiak.
Intercept testing will continue in IFTs-14 and 15, flown with the new
boosters. MDA is currently considering plans to optimize the sequence
of these tests, and to include additional risk reduction flights. This
is followed by integration ground testing of the test bed and a system
test readiness review. Current plans also call for three more intercept
flights for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense prior to the end of
fiscal year 2004, with the last flight conducted against a separating
threat. Additional flight testing beyond this point is still being
planned. The purpose of the test bed is to establish a baseline
capability, to realistically integrate and test the components of the
BMDS, and to enhance capability incrementally, through block
development.
The real challenge is to develop an operational concept for using
the test bed that integrates components of the BMDS as they become
available, in order to evaluate the operational capability of the
system and defend against a ballistic missile attack in an emergency.
If we don't develop an operational concept and an attack does come,
then we will have failed in a most serious way. On the other hand, if
an effort to refine an operational concept for an interim system
significantly distracts us from building the objective system in an
expeditious fashion, then we risk similar failure against more
sophisticated threats down the road. Defense from the test bed is a
serious matter that will demand the focused attention of the
developers, the testers and the users. We will need to work together
with a common understanding of what we are building to achieve this
goal.
While the test bed is a research and development system, this does
not preclude us from addressing operational test and evaluation issues.
In fact, it is common for systems in development to combine
developmental and operational test objectives. The test bed, including
missiles, will provide an early opportunity to acquire valuable ground
test data on intra- and interoperability between the command and
control center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile
health and status or built in testing capability; and on system safety,
reliability, maintainability and logistics supportability. It will also
permit us to get an early start on collecting data on aging effects on
the missile. Availability of this data will permit lessons learned from
the test bed to be considered in improving the objective Ground-based
Mid-course Defense system.
Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and after the
2004 test bed availability, formally addresses both DT and OT
objectives consistent with the maturity level of the system. This
includes testing planned both prior to 2004 test bed capability and
after. The Service Operational Test Agencies have approximately 35
personnel dedicated to planning the details of the operational test
portion of the ground and flight tests, and for analyzing and reporting
relevant operational test data. My staff is working with the
Operational Test Agencies to define independent evaluation plans for
the operational test activities. I will review and approve these
Operational Test and Evaluation plans and their associated data
requirements. I will review and comment on plans for developmental
tests, exercises, simulations, and experiments that will produce the
data to feed the evaluation process. I will use both developmental and
operational test data as the basis for my operational assessment, for
advising General Kadish, and as the basis for my annual assessment.
Let me wrap up my remarks with an update on the PAC-3 program. This
is the first BMDS element to go through a procurement milestone under
the new capability based acquisition philosophy. I concluded in my
Beyond Low Rate Production report submitted last October that the
missile shows significantly improved performance against some tactical
ballistic missile threats. The Defense Acquisition Board approved a
limited purchase of PAC-3 missiles, consistent with programmatic
objectives, such as developing production capacity and unit cost
considerations, and urgent military needs. This puts an improved,
proven capability in the field well ahead of when a completely
demonstrated objective capability will be available. MDA originally
planned for future blocks of the PAC-3 system to stay in research and
development, transitioning to the Army only after each block went
through further developmental and operational testing. However, MDA
took the advice of myself and other missile defense support group
members, to keep the development and testing activities in a combined
DT/OT mode. The entire PAC-3 program is being transitioned to the Army.
This decision avoids conflicting development objectives between missile
defense and air defense mission needs. The program office has developed
a comprehensive follow-on test program to address maneuvering ballistic
missile targets, countermeasures, and air defense targets.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my staff has worked diligently
with General Kadish's staff to build what I feel is a very effective
relationship. I will continue to work closely with General Kadish to
make sure that the mission of the test bed, as a test bed, is kept in
perspective. General Kadish and I have discussed taking advantage of
the data gathering opportunities that the test bed will provide. I am
working with the Service operational test agencies to identify data
requirements for an operational evaluation plan that I will review and
approve. I will continue to monitor planning and testing activities to
ensure that we test as realistically and thoroughly as we can, advise
the Director, MDA of operational testing concerns, and report my
assessments of progress to the Secretary and to you.
This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.

Chairman Warner. Secretary Crouch.

STATEMENT OF J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Secretary Crouch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
members of the committee. It is an honor to come before your
committee today to provide details about the missile defense
policy and direction of our missile defense program in light of
the President's recent decision to begin initial fielding of
missile defense capabilities in 2004. This committee has played
a crucial role in bringing our missile defense program to this
point.
Mr. Chairman, we and our allies face serious and
unpredictable threats to our homeland and military forces from
the proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of
mass destruction. Ballistic missiles have proliferated on a
global basis and are in the hands of over two dozen states,
many of which have either chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons programs under way.
North Korea, for example, has had an active ballistic
missile program for years and has developed a wide range of
offensive missiles. It has deployed and exported missiles that
can threaten our allies, friends, and forces abroad. North
Korea also has the Taepo Dong II long-range missile, which is
capable of reaching parts of the United States and could be
flight tested at any time.
Iran and other countries are also working on space launch
vehicles and intercontinental range ballistic missiles that
could be ready for testing in the next few years.
We are moving forward with missile defense to help protect
American territory and forces abroad, our allies, and friends
against the use of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by
unpredictable and, in some cases, irresponsible states.
In addition, some countries seek missiles and weapons of
mass destruction to coerce us simply by threatening their use.
Missile defenses can help to reduce our potential vulnerability
to such coercive threats.
Finally, missile defense can help to reduce the
proliferation of offensive missiles by reducing their value,
thereby reducing the demand for them. In this way, we see
defenses as a way to provide a useful complement to our non-
proliferation efforts. In light of this new security
environment and the considerable progress made to date in
missile defense technology, the President directed the
Department of Defense to proceed with initial fielding of
modest missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005.
As the President has noted, because ballistic missile
threats also endanger our friends and allies around the world,
it is essential that we work together cooperatively to defend
against them. To do so, the Department of Defense is developing
and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only
the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends
and allies. We have structured our missile defense program in a
manner that encourages participation by other nations.
The Department has been pursuing a broad-based research
development and testing program to examine the full range of
capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges and
in all phases of flight. As we field the missile defenses
called for by the President, our development and testing
program will continue to improve our defensive systems over
time.
Under this evolutionary approach, we do not envision a
final or fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, the
composition of missile defenses, including the type, number,
and location of components, will change over time to meet the
changing threat and take advantage of technological
developments. This approach facilitates the timely delivery of
an initially modest, but still useful, defensive capability
that can then be improved with the benefit of technical
advancement and operational experience.
The capabilities called for by the President for 2004/2005
include 20 ground-based interceptors against an
intercontinental range ballistic missile threat, 16 located at
Fort Greeley, Alaska, and four located at Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California. The GBIs, or ground-based interceptors,
will be available on a continuous basis to intercept long-range
missiles during their mid-course phase of flight.
The ballistic missile defense system supporting the GBIs
will include an initial set of integrated sensors, based on
land and at sea, and cued by early warning sensors in space. We
have also made requests to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom
of Denmark to upgrade early warning radars on their territory
to track ballistic missile threats that might emanate from the
Middle East. The United Kingdom has already granted the United
States permission. We look forward to hearing from Denmark
sometime later this year.
To address the medium-range threat, we plan to equip three
existing Aegis-class naval ships with up to 20 standard missile
SM-3 interceptors. This will provide a highly mobile missile
defense capability to help protect U.S. forces and allies and
provide, again, some modest limited protection for the U.S.
homeland against shorter range missiles that might be launched
from ships off of our coast.
Finally, with respect to the short-range threat, we will
continue to field additional air transportable and mobile
Patriot PAC-3 units with up to 346 PAC-3 missiles and 42 PAC-3
radars. These initial capabilities may be improved later in the
decade through additional measures that will ultimately lead,
we hope, to a multilayered missile defense capability.
Fielding a layered missile defense system poses new
operational command and control challenges. A key presidential
document used to organize U.S. forces, the Unified Command Plan
UCP 2002, assigns the U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for
planning, integrating, coordinating, and developing the desired
characteristics for sea-, land-, air-, and space-based missile
defense operations.
UCP 2002 addresses the missile defense command and control
issue through the use of centralized planning with
decentralized execution. Therefore, while STRATCOM will be
given responsibility for planning, integrating, and
coordinating global missile defense operations, NORTHCOM and
other regional combatant commands retain responsibility for
defending their geographic areas of responsibility. It also
includes command and control over systems providing defense
against ballistic missile attacks.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has stated, it is essential
that we work together with allies and friends to defend against
ballistic missile threats. Accordingly, the Department of
Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of
protecting our friends and allies, as well. There are a number
of examples of U.S. missile defense in cooperation with allies
around the world. The United States, as this committee well
knows, has been working with Israel since the late 1980s to
develop the Arrow Missile Defense System.
We are also working cooperatively with the United Kingdom,
Japan, Italy, and Germany, and have an ongoing dialogue with
India on missile defense issues. The United States continues
actively to engage the Russian Federation in the area of
missile defense cooperation. The joint declaration, signed by
Presidents Bush and Putin last May, called for missile defense
cooperation and reflects the new relationship between our
countries.
To fulfill our commitment to strengthen confidence,
increase transparency, and study areas for missile defense
cooperation, a U.S./Russian missile defense working group has
been established under the auspices of a ministerial-level
group on strategic security. In this venue, the United States
has proposed to begin voluntary and reciprocal information
exchanges and visits, has made proposals for potential areas of
new cooperation, and has also encouraged the Russian
interaction with U.S. companies working on missile defense.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, missile defenses are an
essential element of our overall national security policy to
transfer U.S. defense capabilities to meet the requirements of
a dynamic international security environment. As we move
forward to field the missile defenses called for by the
President, we will do so in cooperation with our friends and
allies.
Our initial missile capabilities will be modest but the
evolutionary approach we are pursuing will support continued
research, development, and testing to improve our capabilities,
as budgets and technologies allow and as developments of the
threat necessitate.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Secretary Crouch.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Crouch follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. J.D. Crouch II

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to come before your committee to
provide details about our missile defense policy and the direction of
our missile defense program, especially in light of the President's
recent decision to begin initial fielding missile defense capabilities
in 2004.
I would like first to identify the basic reasons for moving forward
with the fielding of missile defense. We and our allies face serious
and unpredictable threats to our homelands, populations, and interests,
particularly including the proliferation of ballistic missiles armed
with weapons of mass destruction. One of the reasons potential
adversaries seek ballistic missiles is because we have no defenses
against long-range missiles, and limited defenses against shorter-range
missiles. Potential adversaries see these weapons as a means for
exploiting an obvious U.S. and allied vulnerability.
Ballistic missiles have proliferated on a global basis and are in
the hands of over two dozen states, many of which have chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons programs underway.
North Korea, for example, has had an active ballistic missile
program for years, and has developed a wide-range of offensive
missiles. It has deployed and exported missiles that can threaten our
allies, friends, and forces abroad.
North Korea caught us by surprise when it launched its three-stage
Taepo-Dong I space-launch vehicle/ballistic missile in August 1998. We
knew North Korea was developing longer-range missiles, but we were
surprised at the presence of a third stage on the missile. We have been
surprised many times in the past by foreign ballistic missile
developments. We likely will be surprised again in the future. The
existing and emerging missile threats of which we are aware are
significant; those we can see now only in part almost certainly will be
more severe.
For example, North Korea has the Taepo Dong II long-range missile
capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-
sized payload, and it could be flight-tested at any time. According to
the National Air Intelligence Center, the Taepo Dong II missile may be
exported to other countries in the future. Iran and other countries
also are working on space-launch vehicles and intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles that could be ready for testing in the next few
years.
We are moving forward with missile defense to help protect American
territory and forces abroad, and our allies and friends against the use
of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by unpredictable, and in
some cases, irresponsible states.
In addition, some countries seek missiles and weapons of mass
destruction to coerce us simply by threatening their use. Missile
defenses will help to reduce our potential vulnerability to such
coercive threats.
Finally, by reducing the value of ballistic missiles for coercion
or use, our missile defense capability will help to dissuade countries
from investing in ballistic missiles at the outset. Missile defense can
help to reduce the proliferation of offensive missiles by reducing
their value, and thereby reducing the demand for them. In this way
defenses will provide a useful complement to our other non-
proliferation efforts.
In light of this new security environment and the considerable
progress made to date in missile defense technology, the President
directed the Department of Defense to proceed with fielding initial
missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005. We will build on the
missile defense test range (known as the ``test bed'') that we have
been constructing. As a result of our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
the fielding of these initial capabilities no longer is prohibited. The
initial missile defenses called for by the President will serve as a
starting point for improving our defensive capabilities as budgets and
technological progress allow, and as developments in the threat
necessitate.
Finally, as the President has noted, because ballistic missile
threats also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is
essential that we work together cooperatively to defend against them.
To do so, the Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile
defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our
deployed forces, but also our friends and allies; and we have
structured our missile defense program in a manner that encourages
participation by other nations.
With these general points in mind, allow me to elaborate on our
approach to missile defense development and deployment, and how we are
pursuing cooperative efforts with allies and friends.

U.S. DEFENSE GOALS AND CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING

From the start of this administration, our approach to developing
and fielding missile defenses has been consistent with the Department's
goal of transforming U.S. military forces and adopting a capabilities-
based approach to planning. We begin with the recognition that we face
a security environment where threats and potential adversaries are less
predictable and more diverse than during the Cold War. Therefore,
rather than organizing our defense planning around a fixed and largely
static set of enemies, we now focus on how potential adversaries might
fight and with what means.
The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that a mix of capabilities--
offensive and defensive--is required to address the emerging missile
threat, and to help meet the four broad defense goals outlined in the
Nuclear Posture Review: to assure, dissuade, deter, and if necessary,
defend and defeat. Missile defenses will help to:
Assure allies and friends that ballistic missiles threats will not
coerce the U.S. from fulfilling its security commitments, or allow
aggressors the means to undermine the cohesiveness and political
stability of a coalition or alliance;
Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in or developing
ballistic missiles and their associated nuclear, chemical, and
biological warheads by reducing the value of such weapons;
Deter ballistic missile attacks and threats by reducing an
adversary's confidence in the possible success of its missile attack,
and by denying the political-coercive or military benefits associated
with threatening an attack;
Defeat missile attacks and defend the population of the United
States, its forces, allies, and friends should deterrence fail.

THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO FIELDING MISSILE DEFENSES

In applying capabilities-based planning to missile defense, we
concluded that an evolutionary approach to acquiring and fielding
missile defense was the best way to address ballistic missile threats
in a dynamic and unpredictable security environment.
The Department has been pursuing a broad-based research,
development, and testing program to examine the full range of
capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all
phases of flight. On December 17, 2002, the President announced his
decision to field in 2004 and 2005 initial defensive capabilities
against long-range missiles, and additional capabilities against
shorter-range missiles. As we field these capabilities, our development
and testing program will continue to improve our defensive systems over
time.
Under this evolutionary approach, we do not envisage a final or
fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, the composition of missile
defenses, including the number, type, and location of components, will
change over time to meet the changing threat and take advantage of
technological developments. The evolutionary approach to the
acquisition and fielding of missile defenses is the best means for
providing advanced capabilities to the warfighter, while continuously
pursuing follow-on improvements in capability. This approach
facilitates the timely delivery of a modest, but still useful defensive
capability that can then be improved with the benefit of technical
advancements and operational experience.
The severity of existing and emerging missile threats, and the
potential for surprises, call for this approach to acquisition that
permits the fielding of appropriate defensive capabilities as soon as
technically practicable.
Fielding modest capabilities in the near-term will provide not only
timely defensive coverage, it also will allow operational input from
combatant commanders. This is especially important for the missile
defense mission wherein there is little previous operational experience
to serve as a guide.
Two good examples where we have taken a similar approach to the
timely fielding of limited capabilities still in development are the
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack System (JSTARS). Predator was begun as an Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration project in 1994, conducted its first
flight test in 1995 and was first deployed in Bosnia in 1996. Since
then, commanders in the field have provided valuable inputs on ways to
improve the system and have continued to request this capability in
other operational scenarios, including Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
JSTARS aircraft were deployed in 1991 to participate in Operation
Desert Storm even though they were still in development. The
developmental aircraft flew on 49 combat sorties and accurately tracked
mobile Iraqi forces. JSTARS developmental aircraft also flew 95
operational sorties in support of NATO peacekeeping mission Operation
Joint Endeavor in December 1995, monitoring ground movements to confirm
compliance with the Dayton Agreements.
In each case, the timely and limited deployment of a system still
in development provided useful capabilities, and facilitated subsequent
improvements in the systems.
Our evolutionary approach to missile defense similarly points to
the initial fielding, in limited numbers, of those missile defense
capabilities that have been demonstrated to work, and the subsequent
improvement of these capabilities through incremental improvements, for
example, by inserting new technologies when available.
We are moving forward with missile defense on the basis of a highly
successful test program over the past 2 years. For example, since the
beginning of 2001, we have had four successful tests out of five for
the long-range, ground-based interceptor, three successful tests out of
three for the short- to medium-range sea-based interceptor, and five
successful tests out of seven for the short-range, ground-based
interceptor. Where tests have failed, we understand what went wrong and
have taken measures to correct the problem. In the next 2 years, we
plan to conduct over 120 flight and ground tests.
Some test failures are to be expected with advanced technology
development programs. Indeed many of our most successful programs have
had significant test failures. For example, the Corona satellite
program, which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites,
suffered 11 straight test failures. The Vanguard program failed 11 of
its first 14 tries. The Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile failed
in 66 out of 123 flights.
Nevertheless, in each case, these programs continued in
development, were successfully deployed, and made significant
contributions to our national security. We have learned from our
missile defense test successes and failures, and look forward to
additional successful tests as we deploy the initial missile defense
capabilities and work continuously to improve those capabilities.

INITIAL CAPABILITIES (2004-2005)

In December 2002 the President directed the Department of Defense
to build on the missile defense test bed and begin deployment of
missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005. These capabilities will
serve as the starting point for the evolutionary improvement of our
missile defense capabilities.
The capabilities planned for 2004-2005 include 20 ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) against the intercontinental-range ballistic
missile threat; 16 located at Fort Greely, Alaska and 4 GBIs at
Vandenberg Air Force Base. The GBIs will be available on a continuous
basis to intercept long-range missiles during their midcourse phase of
flight, while the incoming enemy warheads are outside the atmosphere.
The Ballistic Missile Defense System supporting the GBIs will
include an initial set of integrated sensors based on land and at sea,
and cued by early warning sensors in space. We also have made requests
to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Denmark to upgrade early
warning radars on their territory to track ballistic missile threats
from the Middle East. The UK has granted permission and we look forward
to hearing from Denmark by this summer.
To address the medium-range threat, we plan to equip 3 existing
Aegis-class ships with up to 20 Standard-Missile (SM-3) interceptors.
This will provide a highly mobile missile defense capability to help
protect U.S. forces and allies and provide some limited protection for
the U.S. homeland against shorter-range missiles launched from ships
off our coasts. We also plan to modify other sensors on 15 existing
Aegis ships to support the overall ballistic missile defense system.
Finally, with respect to the short-range threat, we will continue
to field additional air-transportable and mobile Patriot PAC-3 units
with up to 346 PAC-3 missiles and 42 PAC-3 radars. The PAC-3 missile is
the first upgrade of the Patriot system to feature a hit-to-kill
missile that can help defeat chemical and biological threats, and is
designed to protect U.S. and coalition forces in the field as well as
limited geographic areas.
These initial capabilities may be improved later in the decade
through additional measures that will lead, ultimately, to a multi-
layered missile defense system. These include additional ground- and
sea-based interceptors and PAC-3 units; introduction of the Theater
High Altitude Area Defense system to intercept medium-range missiles at
high altitude and the Airborne Laser that will use directed energy to
destroy a ballistic missile in the boost phase; enhanced radars and
other sensor capabilities; development of a common booster for boost
and midcourse defense; and initial development and testing of space-
based hit-to-kill interceptors.
The budget request for the Missile Defense Agency for fiscal year
2004 and fiscal year 2005 is $7.7 billion and $8.7 billion
respectively. Included in this funding request is an additional $1.5
billion total for fiscal year 2004 and 2005 to provide those initial
capabilities directed by the President for 2004 and 2005. Funding
requests for our missile defense programs will remain relatively
constant at roughly $8+ billion per year from fiscal year 2004 to
fiscal year 2009. This represents less than 3 percent of the total
defense budget over these years.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Fielding a layered missile defense system poses new operational
command and control challenges. A key Presidential document used to
organize U.S. forces, Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002, assigns the U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) responsibility for planning, integrating,
coordinating, and developing the desired characteristics for sea, land,
air, and space-based global missile defense operations. UCP 2002
addresses the missile defense command and control issue through the use
of centralized planning with decentralized execution. Therefore, while
STRATCOM will be given responsibility for planning, integrating, and
coordinating global missile defense operations, NORTHCOM and other
regional combatant commands will retain responsibility for defending
their geographic areas of responsibility--including command and control
over systems providing defense against ballistic missile attacks.

COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS

As the President stated, it is essential that we work together with
allies and friends to defend against ballistic missile threats.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense is developing and deploying
missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and
our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies. For example, two
of the capabilities we plan to operate in 2004 and 2005--sea-based
missile defense and Patriot PAC-3--could provide some protection for
allies against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, depending on
where they are located.
The United States also will structure its missile defense program
in a manner that encourages industrial participation by other nations,
consistent with U.S. national security. Countries will be encouraged to
participate at whatever level they deem appropriate up to and including
co-development and production of various systems. They might also
provide in-kind contributions such as territory and facilities upon
which to build components of our missile defense system.
There are a number of examples of U.S. missile defense cooperation
with allies and friends around the world. For example, the U.S. has
been working with Israel since the late 1980s to design and develop
missile defense systems. U.S. and Israeli cooperative programs, such as
the Arrow defense system, along with the sharing of U.S. missile launch
warning information, will continue to assist Israel in the development
of a ballistic missile defense capability to deter and, if necessary,
defend against current and emerging ballistic threats. We are also
helping Israel to address the threat via a co-production arrangement of
Arrow components in the U.S.
Turning to Asia, the U.S. and Japan have engaged in missile defense
research cooperation since the 1990s. These efforts have focused on
sea-based missile defense efforts (Japan has acquired several AEGIS
ship platforms), including components developed by Japan that could
become part of an evolutionary development upgrade to the U.S. Navy's
Standard Missile III (SM-3). The U.S. and Japan are scheduled to
conduct joint flight tests of the SM-3 in fiscal year 2005/2006. We are
exploring additional avenues to enhance missile defense cooperation
with Japan.
Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific area, we are working closely with
South Korea as they proceed with their new air defense frigate
development with the aim of including missile defense capabilities. We
have an ongoing dialogue with India on missile defense issues and
recently this dialogue expanded to include discussion of India's
efforts to determine its own specific missile defense requirements.
Likewise, we have met with officials from Taiwan in an effort to answer
their questions regarding missile defense.
Turning to Europe, there is consensus in NATO on the need to
develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting deployed
forces against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The Alliance
is undertaking a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility study to
examine options for protecting allied forces from ballistic missile
threats of up to 3,000-km.
Because Europe increasingly is threatened by missiles of all
ranges, we have encouraged the Alliance to expand its consensus on
missile defense to include missile defenses capable of protecting all
Alliance territory against the full range of missile threats. As a
first step, the Alliance agreed at the November 2002 Prague Summit to
initiate a new missile defense feasibility study to examine options for
protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centers against
the full range of missile threats.
The United States has had a long relationship with the United
Kingdom in the area of missile defense research. Recently, British
Secretary of State for Defense Geoffrey Hoon stated that ``developing
the capacity to defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack
is in the interest of the UK and its people.'' We are in the process of
deepening this relationship between our two nations to facilitate
greater missile defense cooperation. The United States has requested
and received permission by the United Kingdom to upgrade the early
warning radar located at Fylingdales.
The governments of Germany, Italy, and the United States have been
pursuing a multilateral research and development program to field a new
mobile air and missile defense system capable of providing protection
for forces on the move, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).
MEADS is expected to replace the U.S. Army's Patriot system in the next
decade and has the potential to become the core short-range missile
defense capability for the Alliance. Both Germany and Italy support
MEADS and have programmed funding for the next phase of activities.
The United States continues to engage the Russian Federation
actively in the area of missile defense cooperation. The Joint
Declaration signed by Presidents Bush and Putin last May called for
missile defense cooperation and reflects the new relationship between
our countries. Our relationship no longer is focused on managing
hostility, but instead, on building cooperation.
To fulfill our commitment to strengthen confidence, increase
transparency and study areas for missile defense cooperation, a U.S.-
Russian Missile Defense Working Group has been established under the
auspices of the Ministerial-level Consultative Group on Strategic
Security. In this venue the U.S. has proposed to begin voluntary and
reciprocal information exchanges and visits, made proposals for
potential new cooperation and also encouraged Russian interaction with
U.S. corporations working on missile defense.
We already have some ongoing programs of missile defense
cooperation. For example, we have conducted three successful Theater
Missile Defense Exercises with the Russian Federation. A fourth
exercise is planned in Moscow in the spring of 2005. These
unclassified, computer-based exercises are designed to establish
procedures for independent but coordinated operations in the event that
our forces are deployed together against a common adversary.
We also are seeking to resolve issues that impede implementation of
agreed cooperation programs. Negotiations continue on the Russian-
American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program. We also continue to
discuss the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is held up by a
disagreement over tax and liability provisions.

CONCLUSION

Missile defenses are an essential element of our overall national
security policy to transform U.S. defense capabilities to meet the
requirements of a dynamic international security environment. As we
move forward in 2004 and 2005 to field the missile defenses called for
by the President, we will do so in cooperation with our allies and
friends. Our initial missile defense capabilities will be modest; but
the evolutionary approach we are pursuing will support continued
research, development, and testing to improve our capabilities as
budgets and technology allow, and as developments in the threat
necessitate.

Chairman Warner. General Kadish.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY

General Kadish. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. I would like to take just a few minutes to
highlight for you some key points about the missile defense
program and underscore the progress we have made.
In early 2001, we started structuring the missile defense
program to develop capabilities to defend the United States,
our allies, our friends, and deployed forces against all ranges
of missiles in all phases of flight. With the support of
Congress, and in particular this committee, we have made
considerable progress in demonstrating key missile defense
technologies and system integration.
Our testing and analysis gives us confidence that the
``hit-to-kill'' technology works and that we can take the
initial steps we are proposing to provide modest initial
defensive capability where none exists today. Altogether we
have made great progress in our missile defense program. Our
testing has been aggressive and productive.
Over the past 2 years, we have achieved four for five
successful ground-based intercepts against long-range targets.
We are three-for-three in our sea-based intercepts against
medium-range targets. We were five-for-seven with the Patriot
Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3, against short-range targets.
We are making steady progress with the airborne laser to
develop the revolutionary speed-of-light technologies involved.
We have had failures and in all probability we will
continue to have some failures. But this score card has
increased our confidence in our basic technical approach. Last
December, the President directed the Department of Defense to
field an initial set of missile defense capabilities because of
our technical progress and our total lack of missile defenses
against intermediate and long-range missiles. Given our
fielding approach, using the test bed we have been working on,
and given our testing successes to date, and our analysis of
them, I believe we are ready for this.
With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-
term architecture for a limited system to address a range of
missile threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed long-
term architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of
the Block 2004 system over time, so that when we propose to
field initially in 2004 and 2005, it may evolve to look very
different a decade later.
The number and type of missile defense assets and their
locations and basing arrangements may be expected to change to
make the system more integrated and even more capable. This is
consistent with the approach I have described in previous
hearings. We are building and fielding limited militarily
useful capabilities as soon as they can be made available. We
have said all along that when we do field, we will not field a
system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will
have limitations and gaps. Let there be no illusions there.
The system we will be fielding initially will be limited
operationally. But we went down this road knowing that there
would be limitations. We have a process that specifically is
designed to make up for those limitations as soon as
practicable. With an evolutionary capability acquisition
approach, we put capability in the field, we test it, we use
it, we get comfortable with it, we learn what works well and
what does not work well, and we improve it as soon as we can.
Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004
President's budget would have reflected the development of a
set of test bed capabilities that could have been made
operational. Today we are asking Congress to authorize funds
that would allow us to add to this test bed capability and make
it operational in the 2004 and 2005 time frame. In other words,
instead of building a test bed that might be used
operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive capability
we will continue to test.
Because of this relationship between initial defense
capability and testing, we are asking that all funding
associated with both efforts be under the defense-wide
appropriation RDT&E.
Now with respect to the issue of operational testing before
deployment, I would argue that what we are faced with today is
a timing issue. This is a unique, unprecedented technology in
its early stages of maturity. We have to strike a balance
between our desire for perfection in missile defense as we
deploy and our desire to have, as soon as possible, a defensive
capability where none exists today; or can we do both? Can we
continue to test the elements of the components of the system
we might also use to defend ourselves? I believe we can.
Now, why do I believe that? Because we have shown the nuts
and bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning
to field and Block 2004 can work. Over the past 2 years, we
have conducted a total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests;
17 of these tests were intercept tests. Each test builds our
confidence. Now we know ``hit-to-kill'' works. We have had a
significant degree of repeatability represented in the tests
conducted to date. We are well along in our goal of
demonstrating reliability.
Mr. Christie has clearly stated the relationship we are
building and our objectives concerning operational tests. We
will continue to work with Mr. Christie and his people to make
the best decisions we can about missile defense.
Regardless of the names we apply to our testing, we must
have assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going to
begin to test the system under operationally realistic
conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded
at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good
job of hooking it all up to make sure it works. This program
and this budget proposes to do just that.
Our intentions are to test the complete system as soon as
possible. Over the next 2 years, we are planning another 68
flight tests, 58 ground tests, and about the same number of
intercept tests as before. We have done the testing to have
confidence to proceed. We want to continue to strike the right
balance. The elements of the test bed will also have some
inherent defense capability. We can do operational testing
while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of
that.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take the next
step in missile defense for another reason. Our test bed
evolutionary approach to initial defensive capability is
rational from a cost standpoint as well. We do not now have an
adequate understanding to submit a budget for many tens of
billions of dollars for a huge, fixed, long-term architecture.
We do not need to.
We are able, however, to purchase some field capabilities
in small numbers. This approach will allow us to control costs.
With an increase of $1.5 billion over 2 years, we could provide
this country with a modest missile defense capability where
none exists today.
Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on
track. The Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told
Congress it would do. Your support has been important to the
progress we have made. We have listened to your concerns and
have sought to address them in a responsible manner. Our tests
and our analysis gives us confidence that we can take the first
step toward initial defensive operations, while we continue to
prove our new technologies and demonstrate missile defense
combat utility through realistic testing.
I believe there is a tremendous benefit in putting this
unprecedented technology into the field in manageable
increments to provide some defense, to learn more about it,
gain experience with it, and improve it over time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is an
honor to appear before you to present the Department of Defense's
Fiscal Year 2004 missile defense program and budget.
In early 2001 we restructured the missile defense program to
develop the capability to defend the United States, our allies and
friends, and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all
phases of flight. With the support of Congress, we have made
considerable progress in demonstrating key ballistic missile defense
(BMD) technologies and system integration. Our testing and analysis
give us confidence that hit-to-kill technology works and that we can
take the initial steps we are proposing to bolster defenses against
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and introduce a modest
defensive capability to defeat a limited long-range threat. Today I
will review our progress, discuss why we are confident in our approach,
and outline our plans and challenges ahead.
Over the past 2 years we have conducted several successful
intercept tests. We achieved four for five successful long-range,
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) intercept flight tests,
demonstrating the hit-to-kill technologies of the Exo-atmospheric Kill
Vehicle, critical sensor technologies, and the integration of many
geographically dispersed missile defense assets. The failure of the
most recent such test (Integrated Flight Test-10) last December
resulted from the non-separation of the interceptor and the surrogate
booster rocket. This was not a failure of new missile defense
technology, but a failure of our quality control processes. We are
increasing our already focused quality control efforts. We are taking
steps to ensure this separation problem is not repeated. Furthermore,
future GMD tests will no longer use the surrogate booster and instead
will use one or both of the boosters currently under development.
We are three for three in our ship-based exo-atmospheric intercept
tests. Last year Aegis BMD successfully completed its Aegis Lightweight
Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Intercept (ALI) project. Based on
these results we accelerated the insertion of the follow-on Aegis BMD
capability into the test bed. Our third intercept in November 2002 was
the first ever intercept of a ballistic missile in the ascent phase of
flight.
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) has made significant strides.
Since January 2001, we have had five for seven successful intercepts of
ballistic missile targets and have begun fielding the first PAC-3
missiles. We also executed more than a dozen successful test flights of
the Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft, completed significant aircraft
modifications, and accomplished successful subsystem testing and full-
up ground-tests of the first laser module. While we are in the
difficult phase of integrating the components into the ABL, our
progress to date has increased our confidence that ABL can eventually
be integrated into the BMD system (BMDS).
Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on track. The
Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told Congress it would do. We
listened to your concerns and have sought to address them in a
responsible manner. We have faced significant technical and management
challenges, but through aggressive testing we have proven that hit-to-
kill technology works. We have demonstrated system integration through
complex system testing. These tests, combined with analysis of
simulations and exercises, give us confidence that the system can take
the first steps toward initial defensive operations while performing as
a test bed for further realistic testing and continued spiral
development.
The President's fiscal year 2004 budget will allow us to continue
this significant progress and is structured to incorporate the
recommendations of the Defense Science Board summer study of 2002.

EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

The BMD system involves many sensors and interceptors that are
integrated and layered to enable engagements against hostile missiles
in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Layered
defenses can allow multiple shot opportunities across all of the
engagement segments and potentially within each one of those segments,
greatly enhancing our ability to handle countermeasures and destroy in-
flight missiles and their payloads.
As I have explained in past hearings, we are building the missile
defense system using an evolutionary acquisition approach, so that the
system's capability can be enhanced over time. Our plan continues to be
one of incrementally providing the decision makers the ability to field
militarily useful capabilities based on their technological readiness,
suitability for operational use and threat developments.
Last December the President directed the Department to field an
initial set of missile defense capabilities in order to reduce the
vulnerabilities of the United States, our troops, and our allies and
friends. Given our fielding approach, and given the successful testing
we have accomplished to date, I believe we are ready for this. The
proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 and across the 2004-2009 Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) activities to accomplish that goal. We plan to begin
operating modest land and sea defense capabilities in 2004 to provide
limited protection of our country as well as our troops and critical
assets overseas.
In missile defense, we deal routinely with revolutionary
technologies and unprecedented engineering requirements. The program we
are currently executing recognizes the unique challenges we face and
sets out a disciplined course to develop the BMD system in an
evolutionary way. Having spent the last couple of years looking at
different missile defense options, we are now narrowing our program
activities and focusing on development and fielding of the most
promising elements.
Consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings,
we are building and fielding limited, militarily useful capabilities as
soon as they can be made available. This approach takes into account
known and projected threats and the present state of technology. With a
capability-based acquisition approach we put capability into the field,
test it, use it, get comfortable with it, and learn what works well and
what does not. We have structured test bed fielding opportunities to
occur in ``blocks'' every 2 years to improve what we have fielded as
needed. Block 2004 (initial defense capabilities) represents 2004-2005,
Block 2006 represents 2006-2007, and so on. These blocks will deliver
elements and components that are ready for continued rigorous testing
and full integration into the system.
With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term
architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile
threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed, long-term
architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of the Block
2004 system over time, so that what we propose to field initially in
2004 and 2005 may evolve to look very different a decade later. The
number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and
basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more
integrated and capable.
We have adopted this evolutionary approach because a single
acquisition cycle is not responsive to rapid changes in threat and
technology and is not structured to deal with surprise. We want to
avoid prematurely constraining system design by using the traditional
requirements process and waiting up to 20 years or more for a defensive
capability that would result from using traditional acquisition rules.
In a world marked by increasing ballistic missile activity, our Nation,
forces, and allies cannot afford to wait that long.
In using this evolutionary approach, we still have the ability to
incorporate the discipline and intent of the traditional acquisition
process. For example, the warfighting community has been heavily
involved from the beginning in the development of system elements and
components. We are successfully using a spiral development process to
put new technologies into play more quickly than if we were to use the
traditional approach. Spiral development requires regular dialogue and
active participation between user and developer for delivering a
militarily useful set of capabilities. Once we field the initial
capability, uniformed personnel will operate the system.
Despite the many uncertainties we face, this approach allows us to
be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. The President's recent
announcement stands as a good example of this. We are not making an
early commitment to large-volume serial production and very large-scale
investments. Our fielding commitment will be scaled over time and rise
with our confidence that we are on the right development path for this
complex, multifaceted system.

AGGRESSIVE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TEST ACTIVITIES

As we prepare to implement the President's directive, we plan to
continue the program's intensive testing activities up to and beyond
the 2004-2005 timeframe. We have a single, robust RDT&E program
dedicated to the development and demonstration of missile defense
technologies and integration concepts. In fact, consistent with our
investments over the past 2 years, the lion's share of the fiscal year
2004 budget request of $7.7 billion for the Missile Defense Agency,
roughly $6 billion, will support RDT&E activities that are not directly
tied to system fielding. Significant development efforts in fiscal year
2004 include continued work on Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD), ABL, and kinetic energy boost-phase interceptors in the post-
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty environment.
These aggressive RDT&E activities are the basis for proceeding as
the President has directed and for continuing development work to build
a multi-layered BMD system. We will continue our practice of assessing
these activities on a regular basis to see if they can be accelerated
or whether they must be truncated or modified in some manner. RDT&E
activities occurring in fiscal year 2004 will contribute to Blocks
2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010.
We are still evaluating the impact of our withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty. The treaty successfully did what it was intended to do. It
severely restricted missile defense development and fielding options.
The President's action has made it possible to begin to develop and
test aggressively the full range of missile defense technologies and
pursue capabilities that make the most sense from the standpoints of
technology, operations, and cost.
For example, as a result of the treaty withdrawal, Aegis BMD, the
sea-based defense element, began its successful participation in GMD
integrated flight tests conducted last October and December. While
initially only collecting boost and ascent phase radar data, Aegis BMD
has begun engineering efforts to become a full participant in future
tests and will eventually provide fire control data to the BMD system.
Our intercept tests against long-range ballistic missiles are very
complex, yet since October 1999 we were forced to restrict ourselves to
the same intercept flight geometries because of artificial constraints
in our current test bed and our obligation to remain compliant with the
ABM Treaty. Today, in order to test our GMD interceptors, we must
launch targets from Vandenberg, AFB in California and interceptors from
Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. We are changing that. The test
bed we are building will introduce flexibility into our test approach
and help overcome some basic geographic and geometric limitations by
allowing us to test weapons and sensors against ballistic missiles of
all ranges along different azimuths and using different trajectories.
For test purposes we will introduce variable target launch and impact
points and engagement areas.
Robust, realistic testing is absolutely critical to developing an
effective missile defense system. Over the past 2 years we conducted a
total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these tests
were flight-intercept tests. Each test builds our confidence in the BMD
system. From our flight-testing, we know that the hit-to-kill approach
works. We know our sensors can successfully detect and track the target
and that our software algorithms can discriminate between reentry
vehicles and basic decoys and debris. We know our battle management
system can generate orders that put a kill vehicle in a position to
achieve intercept. We will continue to refine and improve the system's
performance in all areas. Our test program continues to add to our
confidence that the basic technologies are sound and that they will
work together to provide the Nation an effective BMD system.
Our program and budget will continue to maintain a high tempo of
increasingly complex ground- and flight-testing. Over the next 2 years
we are planning another 68 flight tests, 58 ground tests, and
maintaining the same pace of intercept tests as before. We do system
testing to give us confidence that we have the ability to integrate
geographically dispersed missile defense elements and components into
an effective system. This does not include the many experiments we
conduct routinely, the modeling and simulation activity, and the
wargame exercises. Our computer predictions are very valuable in this
process and give us a great deal of confidence that we are on the right
paths.
We remain committed to our aggressive testing approach, where we
mature midcourse, boost, and terminal missile defense components and
elements through rigorous testing under increasingly realistic and
challenging conditions. When we have adequately demonstrated
technologies, decisions can then be made concerning their integration
into blocks for fielding. Testing activities remain central to what we
do and are well supported within our funding request.

INITIAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Congress has already funded plans to put five midcourse
interceptors into the test bed in silos at Fort Greely in Alaska,
develop Aegis BMD, and test the SM-3 interceptor at the Pacific Missile
Range Facility in Hawaii. Other activities are currently underway to
improve the missile defense test bed by upgrading or developing launch
sites (including Vandenberg, AFB), radar sensors, battle management and
command and control components, communications terminals and networks,
and associated test infrastructure in the United States and the
Marshall Islands (including airborne, sea-based, and ground-based data
collection assets).
Today we are asking Congress to authorize funds that will allow us
to add to this test bed and make it operational by 2004. These initial
defense capabilities, fielded over a 2-year period, will include
ground-based interceptors to counter long-range threats, sea-based
interceptors to defeat short- and medium-range threats, additional PAC-
3 units, and early warning and tracking sensors based on land, at sea,
in the air, and in space.
Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's
budget would have reflected the development of a set of test bed
capabilities that could have been made operational. Instead of building
a test bed that might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial
defensive capability that we will continue to test. All RDT&E
activities will support the initial defense capability, and the system
elements and components we field will continue to support RDT&E.
Because of the relationship between initial defense capabilities and
testing, we are asking that all funding associated with both efforts be
under Defense-wide appropriations RDT&E. With the December announcement
we have quickened the pace at which we are moving forward, but we have
not changed the direction in which we are moving.
We are proposing to do in fiscal year 2004 what we said we were
going to do in previous hearings, that is, field tested missile
defenses a little at a time using a step approach. The missile defense
operations we are proposing are unprecedented, and there still is much
to learn. I believe there is tremendous benefit in putting this
unprecedented technology into the field, in manageable increments, to
provide some defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it,
and improve it over time.
The Israeli Arrow program stands out as an example of how fielding
militarily useful capability in block increments and in a timely manner
can work and how successful it can be. With only four successful
intercept flight tests, Israeli officials declared their first Arrow
battery operational on October 17, 2000 and fielded that country's
first capability to defeat incoming ballistic missiles launched from
nearby states. The Israeli system has been operational for more than 2
years now, and during that time it has conducted additional intercept
and flight tests to enhance the system's performance. Plans are moving
forward to augment it even further. Surrounded by states having an
active interest in ballistic missiles, Israel found a way to field a
limited defensive capability on an accelerated timeline and at a time
when it could not afford to wait for system testing to be completed.
We in the United States, of course, are not strangers to fielding
an unprecedented military capability on an accelerated schedule. Our
leadership struggled in the early stages of deploying the first
reconnaissance satellites and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Urgent national security requirements pressed us to deploy capability
soon, and through trial and error we did. Despite test failures, the
country persevered and made militarily useful capabilities operational.
Since that time, we have dramatically improved the capabilities of
those first-generation systems. The parallels between these pioneering
programs and the missile defense program are clear.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take this next step
in missile defense. Our fielding approach will not only help
rationalize the force structure we deploy from the technological and
threat standpoints, but also from the standpoint of cost. We do not now
have adequate understanding to submit a bill of many tens of billions
of dollars for a huge, long-term fixed architecture. We are able,
however, to purchase, produce, and field capabilities in small numbers.
This approach will allow us to control costs. With a modest investment
and increase by the Department of a total of $1.5 billion spread over
the fiscal year 2004 and 2005 budgets, we will provide this country
with militarily useful capabilities where none exists today.
In short, this $1.5 billion primarily will add a small number of
ground-based interceptors as well as more SM-3 interceptors to the test
bed capability we are already building. Future fielding decisions, as
we have said all along, will be made in the outlying years based on the
progress of technology and the evolution of the threat, subject to the
annual congressional appropriations process.

CONFIDENCE IN INITIAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In assessing our level of confidence with the planned initial
missile defense capabilities, we have to strike a balance between our
desire for perfection in the missile defenses we deploy and our desire
to have as soon as possible a defensive capability where none exists
today.
Adequate testing is the key to achieving that balance. While this
testing may not fit the mold of classical operational testing that
would traditionally take place prior to full-rate production, we do
follow a testing discipline that I believe can give us the confidence
to say that what we deploy will work as we have said it would under
threat circumstances that we believe we might have to face.
I believe that to strike the right balance we must go through an
intense period of testing to demonstrate that the technologies on which
we are relying can work consistently under conditions that are
increasingly stressful and realistic. We have spent the past 2 years
demonstrating the technologies we propose to employ in the Block 2004
Test Bed. We have said all along that when we do field we will not
field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will
face limitations and have gaps, let there be no illusions there. The
system we are initially fielding will be limited operationally. But we
went down this road knowing that there would be gaps and with a process
that is specifically designed to fill those gaps and make up for
performance limitations as soon as practicable.
Among the limitations that should be included here is that of
operational experience. We need to build operational experience over
time with the system that will be guarding our Nation and our troops.
There is no better way to do that than to put basic elements out into
the field and to begin working with those assets to develop the
doctrine and concepts of operation we will need and to train the
military personnel who will operate it.
We have spent significant amounts of money on testing the GMD and
Aegis BMD elements of system. All of the tests to date have been what
we have called ``developmental tests.'' Regardless of the names we
apply to our testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the
field if we are going to begin to test that system under operationally
realistic conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded
at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good job of
hooking it all up to make sure it works.
The President's decision allows us to put this materiel out in the
field for testing, in locations that make sense from an operational
point of view. Given the recent events in the international security
environment, the President's decision reflects an urgent need to make
that test bed as operational as we possibly can. That decision also
recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect system at the
outset.
What we are faced with today is a timing issue. Must we do what has
been traditionally called ``operational testing'' before we can say
that we have a capability we can use in an extreme security situation,
or can we do both? Can we continue to test the elements and components
of a system we also could use to defend ourselves if needed? I believe
we can.
Why do I believe that? Because we have shown that the nuts and
bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning to field in
Block 2004 can work. We have had a significant degree of repeatability
represented in the tests we have conducted to date, and we are well
along in our goal of conducting these tests reliably. We are now to the
point where we need to assemble selected missile defense elements into
a test bed that will permit operationally realistic testing using
different azimuths and trajectories, different launch and target
points, and different arrangements in our sensors and weapons. That
test bed will allow us to test in different ways so that we can refine
our all-too-important battle management and command and control
infrastructure. The elements of the test bed also will have some
inherent defense capability. We can do operational development testing
while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.
Our intentions are to test the complete system and to be ready to
respond to ballistic missile threats against the United States, our
deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We have conducted the
rigorous testing needed to give us the confidence that we are far
enough along to do operationally realistic testing in an integrated
way. Testing will always be an important part of this system--always.
We will always be improving what we have in the field. The budget we
have submitted will support the testing required to ensure that the
elements of the Block 2004 system we would like to field will
adequately serve the defense needs of this Nation.
Our RDT&E activities are extensive and are important part of our
acquisition approach. Below are three areas of special interest.
BMD System Radar Activity
The MDA's Family of Radar concept is continuous and flexible global
detection, tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment. Ideally, we
want to be able to watch missile payloads deploy and accomplish prompt
and early battle assessment. We are currently pursuing multiple sensor
technologies and identifying and developing sensors to give the BMD
system the ``eyes'' it will need. In order to identify the most
promising technologies and reduce risk, we are investigating, in
parallel, sensor alternatives on land-, sea-, air- and space-based
platforms to add robustness to the BMD system and improve opportunities
to collect multiple phenomenology on the threat missile or target
complex. Evaluations of different sensor and weapon combinations and
alternatives will help us assess their overall benefit to an
integrated, layered BMD system. An important element in this effort is
the mobile Sea-Based X-Band radar (SBX), which we plan to build by
September 2005 to greatly improve both testing and our initial defense
capability.
The BMDS Radar project, a new activity, is funded in the fiscal
year 2004 budget to expand the engagement battle space and assess
missile defense concepts of operation that we were not allowed to
consider under the ABM Treaty. We will validate the concept of forward-
basing and sensor layering and evaluate advanced algorithms using both
MDA- and non-MDA-owned sensors. Current plans call for the BMDS radar
to be available for integration into the test bed in late 2006. We will
support continuous sensor research to improve capabilities and develop
advanced algorithms for Block 2008 and beyond.
BMD System Infrared Sensor Activities
The Department restructured the Space Based Infrared System-Low
(SBIRS-Low) element in fiscal year 2002, renaming it the Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS). We will explore new technologies to
enhance missile detection, improve reporting on ballistic missile
launches regardless of range, azimuth, or launch point, and provide
critical midcourse tracking and discrimination data.
The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) project is a
cooperative effort between the United States and the Russian Federation
to improve early warning technologies. RAMOS represents an innovative
space-based sensor R&D initiative. We are proceeding towards a joint
Preliminary Design Review this summer and expect to conclude the design
and development phase in early fiscal year 2005. The United States is
actively striving to reach a bi-lateral agreement to conduct activities
beyond the design and development phase. If we are able to move forward
with this project, we would launch two satellites in late fiscal year
2008.
BMD System Interceptor Activity
Our longer-term goal is to develop low-cost enhanced interceptors
for integration with different platforms to defend against missiles in
the boost, midcourse, and exo-atmospheric terminal phases of flight. We
are consolidating all next-generation kinetic energy interceptor
(booster and kill vehicle) development efforts and placing them under
our BMDS Interceptor activity. Relying heavily on existing hardware and
proven technology, we will develop a hit-to-kill boost phase capability
by Block 2008 and deliver capability enhancements for Block 2010 and
beyond.
In fiscal year 2004 we will begin developing a space-based kinetic
energy interceptor test bed to explore the technological feasibility
and operational advantages of engagements from space. This plan is
consistent with the Defense Science Board's recommendation, released
last August, to establish a comprehensive development program for a
space-based kinetic system. Following up on last year's successful
experiments to understand key sensor technologies, we will conduct in
2004 a Near Field Infra-Red Experiment to observe from space a boosting
rocket. This data will assist in the selection of seeker and sensor
technologies for a ground-based boost interceptor and development of
interceptor guidance and homing algorithms.

BLOCK ACTIVITIES AND BUDGET

We are working within the MDA and with the Department's operational
community to meet the President's objective to establish an initial
defense capability in 2004, which begins with Block 2004. The following
describes by block our planned fielding opportunities across the FYDP.
Block 2004
This block continues development and integration of elements,
components, and facilities in the test bed. Block 2004 RDT&E funding
will deliver capabilities directed by the President for operational use
in fiscal year 2004-2005. We plan to add different capabilities to
point-defense capabilities already provided by PAC-3 units. This
initial fielding will grow the RDT&E program and expand the physical
infrastructure of the test bed.
Funds in this block will enable us to conduct major target and
countermeasure development and capability demonstrations, integration
tests, and experiments. We are investing in a substantive system test
program to test system command, control, and battle management (C\2\BM)
and communications across the elements. The Block 2004 Master Test Plan
lays out the strategy for conducting a comprehensive set of integrated
and distributed ground- and flight-tests to verify performance and
characterize the capability of the system. This test program will form
the basis of operational and military utility assessments of the Block
2004 initial defense capability.
We will have three major system integration flight tests, the first
of which is a large-scale integration event that tests C\2\BM and
communications during multiple element intercept tests. We plan to
demonstrate C\2\ capabilities and communications among C\2\ and battle
management nodes, weapons, and sensors and to continue work with the
Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to ensure BMD system interoperability with legacy and planned
Department systems and standards.
We are requesting $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for fielding Block 2004. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2004
activities across the FYDP is $6.2 billion (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: BLOCK 2004 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
($M Then-Year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year FYDP Totals
---------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal Fiscal
Project Year 2004- Year 2002-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C\2\BMC Block 2004................................................ 21 80 114 79 0 0 0 0 194 295
Hercules Block 2004............................................... 0 0 18 27 0 0 0 0 46 46
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2004............................... 0 0 24 13 0 0 0 0 37 37
Test & Evaluation Block 2004...................................... 47 57 37 33 0 0 0 0 70 174
Targets & CM Block 2004........................................... 75 104 197 170 0 0 0 0 367 547
THAAD Block 2004.................................................. 808 888 622 635 65 0 0 0 1,322 3,018
GMD Test Bed Block 2004........................................... 636 452 1,205 868 0 0 0 0 2,073 3,161
Aegis BMD Test Bed Block 2004..................................... 413 440 648 894 98 0 0 0 1,640 2,492
ABL Block 2004.................................................... 454 348 345 150 0 0 0 0 494 1,296
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals.......................................................... 2,454 2,369 3,212 2,868 163 0 0 0 6,242 11,065
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

Boost Elements. We are developing directed energy and kinetic
energy boost phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer
near the hostile missile's launch point. We require quick reaction
times, high confidence decision-making, and redundant engagement
capabilities to counter ballistic missiles in this phase.
ABL is currently under development to acquire, track, and kill
ballistic missiles in boost phase using speed-of-light technology. ABL
integrates three major subsystems (Laser; Beam Control; and Battle
Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (BM/C\4\I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F
aircraft. We will continue major subsystem integration and testing
activities. Block 2004 activities involve completion of ground-testing,
to include first light on the test bed aircraft, first flight of the
complete weapons system, and the successful track and high-energy laser
engagement of a missile-shaped target board dropped from high-altitude.
In fiscal year 2005, we will deliver one aircraft for BMD system
integration and testing and demonstrate a missile shoot-down against a
boosting threat-representative target.
Midcourse Elements. Midcourse defense elements engage ballistic
missiles in space after booster burnout and before the warhead re-
enters the atmosphere. The GMD element defends against long-range
ballistic missile attacks, and Aegis BMD will counter from the sea
medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
The Department's plans are to add by the end of fiscal year 2004 1
more Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) at Fort Greely in Alaska for a
total of 6 GBIs at that site, and 4 interceptors at Vandenberg, Air
Force Base, for a total of up to 10 interceptors at both sites. The
decision to develop two interceptor sites is consistent with our
layered approach and operational concept and will allow us to work
through critical integration, battle management, and command and
control issues early on.
There are a number of other activities we need to undertake in
fiscal year 2005. We are asking for appropriations to produce up to 10
additional GBIs for fielding at the Fort Greely site, for a total of 16
interceptors in Alaska and 4 in California. We also plan to produce by
the end of 2005 between 10 and 20 SM-3 missiles for deployment on 3
Aegis ships converted to the missile defense mission. Because we are
starting from a base of zero, each interceptor we field between now and
2005, up to the full complement of 20 ground-based and 20 sea-based
interceptors, will increase significantly our overall capability to
defend this country, our troops, and friendly countries against long-
and medium-range threats.
Included in the test bed and as part of the initial missile defense
architecture are plans for integrating Early Warning Radars (EWR) at
Eareckson AS (the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska) and Beale AFB
(Upgraded EWR). We will add to this infrastructure multiple fire
control nodes and improved lines of communications connecting sites in
Alaska and the continental United States using fiber optics and
satellites. The administration is working to secure allied approval to
upgrade and integrate into the BMD system early warning radars
currently located in the United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland to view
threat missiles launched out of the Middle East. The United Kingdom
already has approved the use of the Fylingdales radar. We also plan to
build by September 30, 2005 a Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) to improve
the testing regime and enhance initial missile defense system
performance.
We have made dramatic progress in recent months with the GMD
element, including in the areas of silo construction, development of a
nationwide communications network, and integrated flight-testing. We
have excavated six silos at Fort Greely, 7 weeks ahead of schedule, and
we are in the process of constructing and establishing appropriate
security for multiple test bed facilities at Fort Greely and Eareckson.
By the end of 2005, we will upgrade SPY-1 radars on 15 Aegis
warships for enhanced surveillance and track capability. Three
prototype surveillance and track Aegis destroyers will be available
starting in 2003; we will modernize additional destroyers for
surveillance and track and BMD engagement capability. Two Aegis
cruisers in addition to the U.S.S. Lake Erie, our test cruiser, will
receive BMD engagement modifications.
The next SM-3 flight test, scheduled for later this year, will use
a reengineered Monolithic Divert and Attitude Control System (MDACS)
for the first time in the interceptor's kinetic warhead. MDACS has
proved to be more reliable than the previous model, faster to build,
and less expensive. Five at-sea flight tests and numerous tracking
exercises, including participation in GMD integrated flight-tests, are
planned through 2005. Our cooperative research with Japan will continue
to enhance the capabilities of the SM-3 interceptor. The focus of that
research is on four components: sensor, advanced kinetic warhead,
second stage propulsion, and lightweight nosecone.
Terminal Elements. THAAD is designed to be rapidly deployable and
protect forward-deployed U.S. and friendly troops, broadly dispersed
assets, population centers, and sites in the United States by engaging
short- to medium-range ballistic missiles or their payloads at endo-
and exo-atmospheric altitudes. THAAD could have more than one intercept
opportunity against a target, a layering potential that makes it more
difficult for an adversary to employ countermeasures effectively. This
terminal defense capability will help mitigate the effects of a WMD
payload.
This year we will complete missile and launcher designs, initiate
manufacturing of missile and launcher ground test units, and begin
testing the first completed radar antenna. We will continue fabrication
of the second radar and building the battle manager and launcher test
beds. A total of four exo-atmospheric flight tests at the White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico are planned for fiscal year 2004-2005.
PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability against short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and
aircraft with a low radar cross-section employing advanced
countermeasures. PAC-3 successfully completed initial operational
testing last year, intercepting ballistic missiles, aircraft, and
cruise missiles. The tests uncovered problems that we have since
corrected in collaboration with the Army. We have completed development
of the PAC-3 missile and made C\2\BM modifications to enable PAC-3's
integration into the BMD system. We will continue to conduct PAC-3
tests this year. Later in Block 2004 we will demonstrate PAC-3's
integration with other BMD system elements.
With the support of Congress, the Department already has
accelerated PAC-3 missile production and currently has a plan to
increase that production rate to 20 missiles per month in 2005. Given
current production plans, by the end of 2005 the PAC-3 inventory will
stand at 332 missiles.
The Department is transferring this month PAC-3 procurement and
RDT&E funding to the Army, which is reflected in the Army's fiscal year
2004 budget request. The MDA will retain responsibility for defining
and testing BMD system interoperability and continue to work with the
Army on PAC-3 engineering, development, and testing. The Department is
currently preparing to transfer later this year RDT&E funding for the
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) from the MDA to the Army.
The Arrow Weapon System, developed jointly by the United States and
Israel to counter short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, is
operational at two sites in Israel and interoperable with U.S. missile
defense elements. We worked with Israel to deploy its first two Arrow
batteries, and are currently assisting that country to procure a third
battery.
The Arrow System Improvement Program, a spiral development upgrade
of the current operational system, includes technical cooperation to
improve the performance of the Arrow system and test it at a U.S. test
range. The first flight test was conducted successfully on January 5,
2003. We continue to support additional Arrow flight-testing to assess
technology developments and overall system performance and to collect
data and conduct annual hardware-in-the-loop exercises with Israel to
enhance interoperability.
Block 2006
Block 2006 work continues to improve existing capabilities and
provide new sensors and interceptors for integration with fielded
elements. Our focus will be on evolving and integrating the capability
to achieve a more synergistic and layered BMD system. We will continue
rigorous system and element flight-test demonstration and validation
efforts and use wargames to help develop concepts of operation and
operational procedures.
We are requesting $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for Block 2006. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2006 activities
across the FYDP is $11.3 billion (see Table 2).

TABLE 2: BLOCK 2006 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
($M Then-Year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year FYDP Totals
---------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal Fiscal
Project Year 2004- Year 2002-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C\2\BMC Block 2006................................................ 4 27 53 104 116 0 0 0 273 304
Hercules Block 2006............................................... 0 0 19 18 45 45 0 0 127 127
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2006............................... 0 0 0 12 24 12 0 0 48 48
Test & Evaluation Block 2006...................................... 1 1 2 9 41 39 0 0 92 93
Targets & CM Block 2006........................................... 1 4 32 110 213 172 0 0 526 530
THAAD Block 2006.................................................. 0 0 109 208 598 498 113 0 1,525 1,525
GMD Block 2006.................................................... 2,460 2,109 1,605 1,774 1,354 1,235 0 0 5,969 10,538
Aegis BMD Block 2006.............................................. 0 0 24 73 377 299 0 0 773 773
ABL Block 2006.................................................... 0 0 10 86 150 79 81 55 461 461
BMDS Radars Block 2006............................................ 0 0 101 145 134 0 0 0 380 380
STSS Block 2006................................................... 55 232 276 285 285 204 75 35 1,160 1,447
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................................... 2,520 2,372 2,232 2,823 3,335 2,583 270 90 11,333 16,225
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

Boost Elements. We will enhance and test the integration of the ABL
aircraft into the BMD system. Candidate enhancements include
improvements in BMC\4\I, interoperability, pointing and tracking, and
target engagement. We will continue evaluation of the ABL test aircraft
capability against a range of threats. This aircraft will be available
to provide an emergency operational capability except for a maximum of
6 months during fiscal year 2007 when it may undergo modifications and
enhancements.
Midcourse Elements. We plan to enhance defensive capability and
further develop the test bed by maturing hardware and software of all
GMD interceptor, sensor, and C\2\BM components. We will continue our
ground- and flight-testing to demonstrate improved weapon and
discrimination performance and critical interfaces with external
sensors. We also plan to complete the upgrade of the Thule EWR should
we get approval from Denmark.
Aegis BMD flight missions will incorporate remote engagements of
targets as well as demonstrations against intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) targets. We will continue development of Aegis BMD
sensor discrimination capability. Prototype BMD signal processors will
be tested aboard Aegis ships with SPY-1 radar modifications. SM-3
missile deliveries will begin in 2004. Our plans are to build an
inventory of up to 35 SM-3 interceptors by the end of 2006. Also, if
directed, we would prepare to field up to 20 additional SM-3
interceptors in 2007. We will proceed with our cooperative BMD research
with Japan to enhance the SM-3. We have two joint flight tests of the
advanced nosecone planned in the fiscal year 2005-2006 timeframe, and
we will continue to look at possibilities for co-development.
Terminal Elements. The THAAD interceptor begins in the third
quarter fiscal year 2006 a series of five flight tests that are
scheduled to conclude in first quarter fiscal year 2008. We will
improve THAAD's exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric endgame
discrimination capability against increasingly complex targets.
Sensors. Current plans call for a new forward-based radar in late
2006 for positioning close to the threat at sea or on land. Enhanced
forward-based sensor capabilities and improved sensor netting will
enable the BMD system to handle threats posing a more difficult
discrimination challenge and provide a launch-on-remote capability. A
midcourse radar will be added as part of our layered approach.
Additional radar configurations will be procured as necessary to
satisfy Block 2006 objectives.
Current plans are to launch two low-earth orbit satellites in
fiscal year 2007 to validate space-based sensor concepts for target
acquisition, tracking, and discrimination and to provide a space node
for the test bed. STSS will improve in subsequent blocks to provide
data fusion, radar/sensor cueing over-the-horizon, and interceptor
handover and fire control. Production alternatives will be evaluated at
least annually based upon element performance and integrated BMD system
performance.
Block 2008
Block 2008 represents a major step in BMD system evolution. We plan
to complete multiple layers of weapons and sensors, based on fixed and
mobile platforms, to counter a range of ballistic missiles. This block
will include C\2\BM components that enable integrated control of all
system assets throughout the battlespace. Primary development projects
include adding boost phase weapons to the test bed, integrating space
sensor platforms, and fusing multi-sensor discrimination products. We
will integrate capability-based targets and payload suites (to include
new and more complex countermeasures) into our system testing to
demonstrate effectiveness against evolving threats.
We are requesting $572 million in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for Block 2008. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2008 activities
across the FYDP is $16.3 billion (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: BLOCK 2008 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
($M Then-Year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year FYDP Totals
---------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal Fiscal
Project Year 2004- Year 2002-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C\2\BMC Block 2008................................................ 0 0 1 12 27 144 145 147 476 476
Hercules Block 2008............................................... 0 0 19 17 17 17 62 60 192 192
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2008............................... 0 0 0 0 0 12 29 31 71 71
Test & Evaluation Block 2008...................................... 0 0 1 1 4 13 85 87 190 190
Targets & CM Block 2008........................................... 0 0 0 57 77 68 239 253 694 694
THAAD Block 2008.................................................. 0 0 0 0 237 227 369 300 1,134 1,134
GMD Block 2008.................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 878 877 1,756 1,756
AEGIS BMD Block 2008.............................................. 0 0 0 116 186 322 470 386 1,481 1,481
ABL Block 2008.................................................... 11 237 256 402 582 561 366 267 2,435 2,683
BMDS Radars Block 2008............................................ 0 0 0 0 0 136 102 22 261 261
STSS Block 2008................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 82 177 89 348 348
BMDS Interceptor Block 2008....................................... 54 100 296 529 1,013 1,562 1,939 1,890 7,229 7,383
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................................... 65 337 572 1,134 2,145 3,146 4,862 4,409 16,268 16,669
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

Boost Elements. ABL will integrate new technologies to improve
performance and lethality and enhance operational suitability. We will
continue development of promising technologies for insertion into Block
2008 and beyond and design and develop a system-level ground-test
facility for ABL. We plan to test a second ABL aircraft in the test bed
during Block 2008.
Plans also are to develop and integrate a mobile ground-based boost
phase hit-to-kill capability into the test bed for flight-test
demonstration. We will initiate a space-based test bed development to
determine the feasibility of intercepting missiles from space. Initial
on-orbit testing would commence with three to five satellites in Block
2008.
Midcourse Elements. We will conduct up to three GMD flight-tests
annually to demonstrate advanced engineering and pre-planned equipment
improvements for the boosters, interceptors, early warning and fire
control radars, and C\2\BM and communications software builds. We plan
to enhance the Aegis Weapons System AN/SPY-1 radar to improve
discrimination for engaging both unitary and separating targets. We
will assess GMD integration with the BMDS Interceptor and also test the
interceptor on board an Aegis warship.
Terminal Elements. We will complete the development and testing of
the THAAD weapon system. We are planning up to eight developmental and
operational-type flight tests to stress interceptor, radar, and C\2\BM
performance in realistic scenarios that include advanced
countermeasures.
Sensors. Our work will build on the initial BMDS Radar
configuration and conduct sensor research to improve capabilities and
develop advanced algorithms. We will improve Family of Radar coverage,
performance, and flexibility and address vulnerability within the
context of the overall BMD system global sensor network. STSS
operations will continue to be integrated with other BMD elements in
the test bed and support enhanced C\2\BM development initiatives. STSS
will demonstrate the ability to acquire, track, and discriminate
midcourse objects with space-based infrared sensors.
Block 2010
Work in this block will continue spiral development projects for
weapon and sensor improvements and platform integration. C\2\BM and
communications improvements will enable highly resolved sensor data to
be exchanged with all BMD system elements.
We are requesting $24 million in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for Block 2010. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2010 activities
across the FYDP is $4.7 billion (see Table 4).

TABLE 4: BLOCK 2010 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
($M Then-Year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year FYDP Totals
---------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal Fiscal
Project Year 2004- Year 2002-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AEGIS BMD Block 2010.............................................. 0 0 0 0 0 8 104 145 257 257
STSS Block 2010/2012.............................................. 179 55 24 44 232 565 750 1,065 2,680 2,914
BMDS Interceptor Block 2010....................................... 0 0 0 0 97 146 585 974 1,803 1,803
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................................... 179 55 24 44 329 719 1,439 2,184 4,740 4,974
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

Boost Elements. Block 2010 activities will improve exo-atmospheric
BMDS Interceptor performance and enable greater basing mode
flexibility, to include possible adaptation to sea-based platforms. We
will develop and test an advanced space-based test bed to augment or
replace the Block 2008 space-based test bed.
Midcourse Elements. We will continue flight-testing improved weapon
and sensor components and work toward the integration of an advanced
BMDS Interceptor. Aegis BMD will incorporate prior block developments
into the Navy-developed next-generation, open architecture Combat
System.
Terminal Elements. THAAD will integrate proven technologies to
enhance its capability against longer range and faster ballistic
missiles without sacrificing existing mobility and performance.
Fielding and survivability upgrades also are planned to demonstrate a
capability against both IRBM and ICBM threats.
Sensors. New technologies will be inserted into subsequent STSS
blocks to provide precise threat tracking and improved discrimination.
We will develop and launch a satellite with improved sensors integrated
into the first common satellite bus, and develop and integrate advanced
ground station equipment and software. The Block 2010 STSS will deliver
a space-based capability to acquire, track and discriminate ballistic
missiles based on larger aperture track sensors, increased vehicle
lifetime, and increased, near-real-time on-board data processing. The
funding also includes launch services for Block 2010 satellites. C\2\BM
funding focuses on integrating STSS data into the sensor net.

MISSION AREA INVESTMENTS

Our Mission Area Investments are investments common to the entire
BMD system that enable us to implement over time our block fielding
approach. Mission Area Investments maintain core development and
testing infrastructure and facilitate the integration of future block
capabilities. The President's budget requests $1.69 billion in fiscal
year 2004 for these investments. This program activity accounts for
about $11.3 billion, or just over 20 percent of the total funding
estimate across the FYDP. Table 5 provides a detailed breakdown of
funding for each investment activity.

TABLE 5: MISSION AREA INVESTMENTS FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
($M Then-year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year FYDP Totals
---------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal Fiscal
Investment Activity Year 2004- Year 2002-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Engineering................................................ 236 397 436 474 501 510 580 578 3,079 3,713
C\2\, BM & Communications......................................... 16 16 119 125 178 201 204 218 1,045 1,076
Test & Targets.................................................... 359 332 338 332 328 352 316 333 1,998 2,688
International Programs............................................ 211 205 148 215 129 100 89 89 769 1,185
Advanced Concepts................................................. 347 176 388 418 363 437 524 534 2,664 3,187
Program Operations................................................ 232 170 264 252 283 306 317 333 1,754 2,156
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................................... 1,400 1,296 1,692 1,817 1,783 1,904 2,029 2,083 11,309 14,005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

The significant Mission Area Investments are as follows:
System Engineering
The System Engineering activity defines, manages, and integrates
the layered BMD system. Capability-based acquisition requires continual
assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the component,
element, and system levels. Our system engineering process assesses and
determines system design and element contributions and the impact of
introducing new technologies and operational concepts to ensure
properly synthesized system blocks. These activities provide the
technical expertise, tools, and facilities to develop the BMD system
and maintain an intelligence and research capability to ensure that the
system evolves in a way that is responsive to known and anticipated
threats.
We are increasing our focus on risks related to producibility,
manufacturing, quality, cost, and schedule of the BMD system elements.
We dedicate resources to examine the applicability of technology to
system needs and transition readiness. Industrial and manufacturing
investment strategies for achieving system affordability and
facilitating insertion of successive new capabilities are increasingly
vital to the program.
Command and Control, Battle Management & Communications (C\2\BMC)
Our activities related to C\2\BMC create interoperability among a
wide variety of legacy systems and emerging elements over joint and
coalition networks. The C\2\BMC activity will continue development and
integration of the C\2\BM and communications functions for the BMD
system. By fielding software development spirals that improve system
synergism, integration capability, and interoperability with external
systems, this activity expands the inherent C\2\BM capabilities of
fielded terminal, midcourse, and boost defenses. Communications funding
will develop and improve BMD system-wide communication links and sensor
netting functions to enable enhanced early warning and quicker
interceptor response times. The Joint National Integration Center
(JNIC) provides a common environment for the BMD elements to conduct
experiments, demonstrations, and exercises and is a key-operating
C\2\BM component of the test bed.
BMD Tests & Targets
The missile defense program includes significant test and
evaluation infrastructure, test execution capabilities, and analytical
tools for program-wide use. The Agency conducts risk reduction,
developmental, and operational element and component testing as well as
tests to collect critical measurements, such as plume signatures. We
also have a rigorous measurements test program to collect data in
support of design, development, and engineering activities.
Measurements from dedicated test events and targets of opportunity
enable us to design components, characterize potential countermeasures,
test algorithms, undertake lethality and kill assessment, and validate
our critical models and simulations.
Investments providing ballistic missile targets, countermeasures,
and other payloads support our test objectives. Presentation of the
targets and payloads for flight test events involves designing,
prototyping, developing, procuring, certifying, and qualifying for
testing. In fiscal year 2003 we will establish a single prime
contractor to further enhance system level management of targets and
countermeasures activities.
In fiscal year 2004 we will continue to resource critical test
facilities, launch capabilities, instrumentation, telemetry,
communications, and safety systems underpinning our testing regime.
With the enhanced realism of the test bed, the increasing complexity of
our tests, and the escalating tempo of test activity, our investments
in this area will emphasize flexibility, standardization, and mobility.
International Programs
The President has underscored the importance of working with other
countries to develop missile defenses and provide protection against
ballistic missile threats. We are building defensive layers that could
potentially involve a variety of locations around the globe and
probably involve many other countries. Last summer interagency teams
briefed key allies on the international participation framework. Today
we are well along in our discussions with several governments regarding
their possible participation in the missile defense program and
improvements in our industrial relationships.
Advanced Concepts
We have several science and technology (S&T) initiatives to
increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the
engagement battle space of terminal elements. In fiscal year 2004, we
will continue to focus on the miniature kill vehicle project, which
could lead to a flight-test in fiscal year 2005. Fiscal year 2004
funding will support investigating early detection and tracking
technology, Laser/LADAR technologies for improved tracking, weapon
guidance, and imaging, and technologies for a space-based, high-power
laser. While our S&T activities are not on a critical path for
insertion into the BMD system, each one of them is being considered for
their block enhancement value.
Program Operations
Our Program Operations expenses are primarily for government
personnel performing management support activities, contractors that
assist in performing these activities, and O&M-like costs associated
with operations and maintenance at numerous facilities around the
country, supplies and equipment, communications and printing, travel
and training, and information technology management.

MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

The missile defense program uses an acquisition approach tailored
to the unprecedented nature of the technology involved in missile
defense. We will continue to work very hard to ensure that the program
has adequate management and congressional oversight. There is an
improved process in place within the Department that preserves
management, technical, and financial oversight by cognizant authorities
on the Senior Executive Council and the Missile Defense Support Group.
Senior warfighters, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
have reviewed missile defense objectives and will continue to do so
several times a year. Internally we have in place configuration
management procedures, and we produce on a regular basis the necessary
threat, system, and configuration control documentation to ensure that
our activities continue to support our development and fielding
objectives. As directed in the 2002 and 2003 Defense Authorization
Acts, we have identified cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals
and developmental baselines in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget
justification materials and shown clear linkages between the Agency's
budget and key performance measures.

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman, we are on track with our missile defense program. We
know that the technology fundamental to the current generation of
missile defenses works. We have demonstrated many times over the past 2
years that we can collide with a warhead and destroy it. We have the
confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense capability. A
few years ago, I could not have said this to the American people. Today
I can. We will build confidence in the system over time as we invest in
the program.
We also recognize that we have much more work to do to improve the
BMD system. The architecture we have in 2004 and 2005 will probably be
very different a decade later, depending on how our RDT&E efforts
proceed. Our objective continues to be one of improving missile defense
capability over time. We have made considerable progress in missile
defense over the past 3 years. With the President's direction, and with
your approval of our budget request, we will take another important
step on that long road before us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Before we proceed to a 6-minute round of
questions, the distinguished Senator from New York has joined
us now. Each of us have had an opportunity, given the unusual
events of the day and particularly the last 24 hours, to
address the committee and others.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just
add my words to those of my colleagues, that certainly last
evening was a solemn occasion for every American, when the
President addressed our Nation about the possibility of
military action, giving Saddam Hussein one last chance to avoid
war. Obviously we all hope, although it is a hope against
evidence, that Saddam Hussein will finally hear this ultimatum
and understand the severity of those words and the
consequences.
While I, along with many others, wish there were more
international support for this effort to disarm Saddam Hussein,
at this critical juncture it is important for all of us to come
together in support of our troops and pray that, if war does
occur, this mission is accomplished swiftly and decisively with
minimum loss of life and civilian casualties.
On Friday, Mr. Chairman, I was at Fort Drum, where we held
a memorial service for 11 young soldiers who died in a training
accident on a Black Hawk mission. I met with the wives of those
young men, two of whom were pregnant, their mothers, their
fathers, their grandparents, their sisters, their brothers,
their cousins. I looked into the eyes of each person and told
them how sorry I was and how I hoped that they shared our pride
in the extraordinary courage of these young men, as they were
training to defend us.
Clearly, all of us hope that this mission will be
accomplished with minimum loss of life. We know that our
military, thanks in large measure to the people who serve on
this committee, are the best trained, equipped, and motivated
in the world. We support them fully and we are very grateful
for their service in these difficult times. I know that all of
us will be praying for them and sending our strongest, most
heartfelt best wishes; not only to the men and women who are
poised on the edge of combat, but to their families, who in a
very real sense in today's world are also serving our country.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. Throughout your
service on this committee, you have emphasized your personal
concern for the family structure that is such a vital part of
the overall infrastructure to support our men and women in the
Armed Forces. I thank you.
I will open with questions. Then I will pass the gavel to
the subcommittee chairman, Senator Allard, to conclude the
question period in the hearing.
Secretary Aldridge, let us go back to the very important
issue raised by my colleague, Senator Levin, and fully explore
the issues that he raises. It would be helpful. Let us cut
through some of the legal situation here and just get down to
it. What was the intent of the administration asking for this
provision? What is it that you feel the provision, if adopted
by Congress, enabled you to do that you can't do now?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I wish I had a
record of how the language got added to this bill. We do not
know exactly other than perhaps protecting some interests of
the Department. I think the bottom line, however, is that it
was never our intent to try to get a waiver for operational
testing. As a matter of fact, the reason we have the test bed
and we are developing the test bed is to enable operational
testing.
I think we can work with the committee and the staff to
find language that clearly, unambiguously states where the
Department is. That is, we do not request a waiver. I think we
can find language that will ensure that Senator Levin's
concerns are being addressed. I believe we can do that.
Chairman Warner. That is helpful but I think it is a frank
admission that, at this juncture, you are not certain as to how
it originated. To the extent you can determine that, well and
good. Because I judge from your remarks now that this committee
and Congress can anticipate a revision forthcoming in the
course of our deliberations before any bill is drawn up. Am I
correct in that?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. That will be very helpful.
Now, General Kadish, I listened very carefully to your
excellent statement. You used the word ``limited'' in several
different contexts. I want to clarify for the record the
obvious, but some people following this hearing, I think, might
not fully appreciate that the ultimate objective is for us to
devise a system to protect us against a limited number of
missiles, were they to be directed at the continental limits of
the United States and/or our allies and so forth.
Am I not correct in that?
General Kadish. Yes, Senator. Eventually, evolutionary
improvements to the system may go beyond that. Certainly in the
2004 time.
Chairman Warner. Do not say beyond that. It enables the
system, then, to interdict a greater number.
General Kadish. Greater number, correct.
Chairman Warner. All right. That is the use of the word
``limited'' which I think you want to go back and look at your
testimony. Then you referred to ``limited'' in the context that
if we proceed as now anticipated, we will get a limited benefit
from the system.
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. In other words, limited in its capability
just to knock down one missile, much less a dozen or so.
General Kadish. Right.
Chairman Warner. Do you follow me on the use of the word
``limited''?
General Kadish. I think so.
Chairman Warner. If you go back and look over your
statement, you might wish to clarify that.
General Kadish. I will look at it again.
Chairman Warner. But let me go directly to a broader issue
here. Some are concerned that the President's decision to field
missile defense capabilities during 2004 and 2005 means that we
are deploying a capability that has not been tested. In
addition, there is some concern that making the missile defense
test bed an operational asset will somehow reduce or truncate
tests or will disrupt the testing you already have planned.
Let us clarify those. Give us your assessment, based on
test results of the maturity of the ground-based mid-course
system and the Navy missile defense system, which the President
opted to field.
General Kadish. Senator, our tests to date, I guess I would
characterize as that we have proven the basic functionality of
each of the elements and to some degree their ability to
integrate to perform their mission. That certainly has given us
a lot of confidence in proceeding.
Now what we have to do, specifically in the ground-based
missile defense case, is to actually put them in the locations
that they could be realistically tested. Let me just give you
an example. Right now today, as complex as our testing is from
Vandenberg to Kwajalein, we have a radar that is out of place
in terms of its operationally realistic configuration. The X-
Band radar is at Kwajalein itself. It should be farther
forward. The early warning radar is in California, and it
should also be farther forward in looking at the trajectory.
When we build a test bed, we hope to fix that and to
provide us with more capability to operationally, realistically
look at different azimuths of intercept, different
trajectories, and provide a much more robust look at the data
gathering that supports our models and simulations. That, in
turn, would give us greater confidence that we could handle
unusual situations.
In regard to the concern of whether or not we would reduce
our testing because we have the test bed in an operational
configuration, I think there is a risk that we may not be able
to time it exactly right. Basically we are working very hard
today and, in fact, have started a battery of meetings with the
using community starting with Strategic Command and NORTHCOM,
to look at different approaches to how we would actually keep
operationally alert status on the system or part of the system
while we are doing other types of tests. That is going to
require us a little bit more time to define in detail the
meaning of every test we want to do.
But what I see today is basically the capability of doing
both tasks in concert with the using community to make sure we
can accomplish both our objectives. I am confident we will be
able to work that out.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Secretary Crouch, the President made his decision last
December to proceed with the limited fielding of ground-based
mid-course capabilities and the Navy mid-course system. Can you
elaborate on the background which prompted this very important
decision? Was the decision promulgated by any specific threat
development? Or was it more directed at the general trend
toward widespread deployment and the need to do so for missile
defense?
Secretary Crouch. Senator, you know that we have taken, in
the Department as a whole, a capabilities-based approach to
dealing with emerging and extant threats. We see missile
defense capabilities as being one of the essential tools in the
tool kit that the Department will need in the future to defend
the United States, to defend our allies, and to defend deployed
forces abroad.
Clearly, we think from just looking at existing threats and
the development of things, for example, in North Korea our
concerns about long-range systems coming out of the Middle East
and the like, we think that threat was an important part of
this decision. But I would also underscore the fact that we
have been surprised in the past by things. We have been
surprised by new systems, by new capabilities. So I would not
want to say that it was keyed specifically to an individual
threat, but more broadly to the need for a capability for the
United States that we do not have.
Against that back drop is also the point that we do not
have any capability today in this area. It is not as though we
are building on an existing system, like aircraft carriers,
where we have a particular system deployed, and we are now
arguing about the next version or the next modification to that
system.
We thought it was important to get some capability out
there. We think that that will not only give us that limited,
very modest capability, but also will improve our operational
testing and give the warfighter some experience in using these
systems. We also think it has an impact in the way it might be
able to dissuade others from investing in long-range ballistic
missile capabilities.
So, it was really for all those reasons that I think the
President made the decision he did.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Christie, the planned 2004 national missile defense
deployment is going to use an old 1970s vintage long-range
radar that was never designed for missile defense. This radar
is called the Cobra Dane radar, as I understand it. First, in
your recent report on missile defense, which was released in
February, you said that ``the absence of a long-range target
that will be able to exercise the Cobra Dane radar will
preclude a system-level flight test of the 2004 national
missile defense system.''
Is that correct?
Mr. Christie. Yes, the Cobra Dane radar will not be able to
track a test target because of the way it is pointed, except in
a simulated operational exercise. We will not be able to use it
in testing.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, could the witness speak up?
We cannot hear.
Mr. Christie. Okay. I am sorry.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Mr. Christie. We will not be able to use the Cobra Dane
radar in testing because we would have to launch the target
from west of the radar into its envelope.
Senator Levin. So, there is not a long-range target
suitable to be used for that test; is that correct?
Mr. Christie. Yes. We would have to use an air launch
target which we do not have at the present time for testing.
Senator Levin. Right. So there is no plan to test that
radar against a long-range target?
Mr. Christie. That radar will be tested and exercised at
some length with the command and control system that will be
set up at Fort Greeley. But it will not be tested against an
actual target.
Senator Levin. All right. So therefore, the 2004 system
can't be tested as a complete system with a realistic long-
range target. Is that correct?
Mr. Christie. We will test the entire system in simulated
operational exercises.
Senator Levin. Do we have a long-range target, a realistic
one, to test it against?
Mr. Christie. We will not be able to launch a target from
Japan so it would fly into that radar's field of view.
Senator Levin. Right. That is all I am saying.
Mr. Christie. Okay.
Senator Levin. All right. So in that sense, we are not
going to be able to test the 2004 system that is being fielded
as a complete system with a realistic, actual long-range
target. Is that correct? I am just trying to summarize.
Mr. Christie. No. We are not going to be able to test with
a realistic launch from that direction.
Senator Levin. Okay. That is fine.
Mr. Christie. From that specific direction, no.
Senator Levin. We are not going to be able to do that.
Would you like to be able to do that?
Mr. Christie. If we had an air launch target that we could
launch to test that particular radar, we would be able to do
that.
Senator Levin. Let me get to this language that apparently
Secretary Aldridge does not know how it got into the
legislative proposal. I am glad to hear that it did not come
from you, Secretary Aldridge. Do you know how this language got
here that effectively waives operational testing by designating
the 2004 system as a development system? That is, what is the
effect of designating, as a development system does, to
effectively exempt it from operational testing, since it is a
development system under this language.
Mr. Christie, do you know how that language got into this
legislative proposal that came from the administration?
Mr. Christie. No, I do not. But I would also add that just
because it is a development system does not mean that some
operational testing cannot take place.
Senator Levin. Of course. That is our point. We did that
with other systems.
Mr. Christie. Operational testing will take place.
Senator Levin. It will take place and should take place.
Mr. Christie. It will.
Senator Levin. So then, you do not know what the point,
then, is of designating----
Mr. Christie. No, I cannot speak to that.
Senator Levin. You were not consulted?
Mr. Christie. No, I was not.
Senator Levin. Were you consulted, Secretary Aldridge,
before this language was put into this proposal of the
administration?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, I was not. But I am not
consulted on thousands of other pages of language. I think, in
reading the language, if the intent was never to ask for the
waiver, you read the language in a very innocent way; because
that was not our intent to interpret that language in a way
that would request a waiver.
Senator Levin. But you did not have an intent. As I
understand.
Secretary Aldridge. Oh, it is not an intent.
Senator Levin. You do not know where this language came
from?
Secretary Aldridge. I was not participating in adding the
language to the bill.
Senator Levin. Do you know what its intent is? Have you
asked the people who put the language in here what its intent
is?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Crouch, were you involved in getting this
language here?
Secretary Crouch. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Do you know what its intent is?
Secretary Crouch. No, sir.
Senator Levin. General Kadish were you involved in getting
this language in here?
General Kadish. Senator, I was involved in trying to get
the intent of the language into the budget documentation. The
basic intent of that paragraph in the budget documentation is a
very detailed description, was to get the authority that was
granted this year and previous years to use the RDT&E money
exclusively for all our efforts, as opposed to dividing up the
restrictions between military construction-type money and
procurement money. That was the intent at the budget-
documentation level.
Senator Levin. That is the intent of this language?
General Kadish. As I understand it, yes.
Senator Levin. Were you consulted or did you draft this
language?
General Kadish. I did not draft the language but I saw the
language, as we were putting our budget language together.
Senator Levin. All right. Do any of you have any objection
to this language being revised so that it makes it clear that
this system is subject to operational testing? Do you have any
problem with that?
General Kadish. There was never an intent to exempt us in
that language. It could be read that way; obviously, you have.
So I have no problem changing it. But the intent was a funding
issue, not a testing issue.
Senator Levin. All right. I am glad to hear that.
Will you all answer my question this way: Do you have any
problem with that language being changed?
Secretary Aldridge. We have no problem with changing that
language.
Senator Levin. So that it is not limited to development
testing, so that operational testing will take place on this
2004 system? Do you have any problem with that, Secretary
Aldridge?
Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, I do not. I just want to
hesitate and say one thing: But so long as we get the other
reason for the language, to include the RDT&E funding to permit
the deployment.
Senator Levin. Do you have any problem, Mr. Christie?
Mr. Christie. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Do you have any problem, Secretary Crouch?
Secretary Crouch. Absolutely not.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you.
Senator Allard. It is my time to ask some questions.
General Kadish, you were trying to respond to some questioning
to Mr. Christie or Senator Levin. Do you have a comment that
you want to elaborate on, on that question?
General Kadish. I would just point out, in regard to the
Cobra Dane radar, that this is another example of how difficult
it is to put a system together that depends on geography for
its function. The Cobra Dane radar is in a very good position
to do a lot of what we need to do for an early warning radar.
In regard to testing it operationally, there are two
methods that we will probably offer. They are not worked out in
detail yet. One is we have a long-range target air launched
under development that we will put into the program when we can
get it ready. It will not be ready in the 2004 time frame or
possibly in the early 2005 timeframe. But the schedules are
such that as soon as we can, we will be testing it
operationally using that type of a target, if it works out.
Senator Allard. So, your goal is to get a complete analysis
of the system?
General Kadish. Right. Now, there are other data elements
tracking different types of items that look like ballistic
missiles that would also help us in our evaluation of that
system.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
General Kadish. I would point out that the Cobra Dane radar
is certainly 1970s-type of technology. But what we intend to do
is upgrade it with the very latest computer processing
capabilities, as well as software, to make sure it can do its
intended function.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Mr. Christie, in your most recent report to Congress, you
stated that the BMDS elements have made progress this year in
one or more of four areas: flight test, system ground test,
component ground test, and system definition. Again to quote,
``MDA's program represents a sound engineering approach for
maturing both the system design and test infrastructure.''
Would you tell us what factors provide you with confidence
that progress is being made and that the MDA's approach is a
sound one?
Mr. Christie. The R&D program that is laid out for the
various elements is done in a very systematic way, with robust
testing for each of the elements. We have, I think, as General
Kadish earlier discussed, demonstrated the hit-to-kill
capability, which was a big question mark. We are now ready to
move on to ``missionizing'' that capability. We are now ready
to move on to a ground-based interceptor that will be using the
new booster motors, because the old booster motors have been a
problem.
For the test bed that is being planned, it will eventually
remove the dependence on the radar in Hawaii that provides mid-
course tracking when the sea-based X-band radar is operational.
So when I look at the total program, I think it is moving in
the right direction. The right tests are planned, both in terms
of individual elements, as well as the total system.
Does that answer your question, Senator?
Senator Allard. I think that is what we are wanting. Thank
you. But let me follow up with it just a little bit. Your
report also notes that the recent successful Aegis test flights
took place from functional, fully-manned, operational ships.
Consequently, the system could be employed in an emergency with
limited expectation of success.
Now, the Aegis tests were clearly not operational tests.
But an operational asset conducted them and led to a decision
to field that initial capability. Would you assess, in a
general way, the utility of conducting tests with system under
development with operational assets?
Mr. Christie. In the Aegis case, we actually fired off
operational ships using operational crews. We had three
intercepts that proved the capability of the missile system
that is in development. That testing supports buying a limited
number of missiles, up to 20, that will give us some limited
capability against medium-range threats.
I support the concept of doing operational testing or
getting an operational evaluation out of a development program,
and particularly when we are using operational troops or
operators on an actual operational ship, which is what the case
was here.
Senator Allard. A follow-up question I have in response to
your answer, since it was positive in nature: would your
confidence in the operational utility of the ground-based, mid-
course system be enhanced if one or more of these flight tests
took place using an operational asset and the soldiers who man
it on a regular basis?
Mr. Christie. Obviously it would be. But I do not think, at
this point in time in the development program, that we are
going to be able to turn over the ground-based system to
operators. We will be training operators once we get the test
bed fielded, but I am not sure that the testing will use
military operators. I would have to refer to General Kadish. I
do not remember.
Senator Allard. Do you want to elaborate on that?
Mr. Christie. It would give me more confidence if we were
using actual soldiers in an operational system. But I do not
think we are planning to use soldier operators for some time.
Senator Allard. General Kadish.
General Kadish. Senator, if I could answer that question a
little bit more in detail. The current testing, certainly on
the ground-based side, is not done with soldiers at the
consoles, although we simulate the types of decisions they
would make. Our intent, although the plans are not finalized
right now and they are just beginning to become part of our
discussions with the using community, is to--as we approach the
2004 fielding, is to actually put the user/soldiers at the
consoles for flight test, if at all possible, to replicate what
we have done with Aegis.
Now, we are not there yet. These are plans that need to be
put together and make sure we have all the safety and the
training up and operating. But that would be clearly our
intent, because as Mr. Christie pointed out, the best test we
could get is when real soldiers, sailors, and airmen operate
the equipment. That is the best test that we could use.
However, they would not be given the design of the GMD
system, the quantity of people involved is not very large at
all, because of the nature of that system.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Reed, my time has expired. You are next.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Christie, I think one of the critical points in your
testimony, which was very good testimony, is this phrase with
respect to the mid-course, ground-based program. This
conclusion, which I believe MDA agrees with, is based on the
fact that many essential components of GMD have not yet been
built. We cannot test the system without these critical
components. We cannot test it realistically without the test
bed.
Will all of these critical systems be built prior to 2004?
Mr. Christie. They will be built as part of the Block 2004
test bed. I do not think they will all be in place by September
2004. The sea-based X-band radar is a necessary component. We
will have new boosters. We will be testing the new boosters
with a ground-based interceptor.
Those are two components that are not there now.
Senator Reed. So based on your testimony and your response,
this is a question of not just deploying a system without
testing, this is deploying a system that has not yet been fully
built; is that accurate?
Mr. Christie. No, we have not built the sea-based X-band
radar yet that is needed for mid-course guidance.
Senator Reed. But we are deploying a system that has not
yet been built, the whole system?
Mr. Christie. We have to build it to put it in the field to
support testing.
Senator Reed. My point is, I understand we have to build
it. But maybe I am missing something, but usually we deploy
systems that are at least built, not fully tested, but at least
built. This seems to be a departure from the--my assumption
that we will build a system and then we will test it. Again, I
think your comments suggest that we are doing something that is
somewhat unusual in deploying a system that has not yet been
fully been built.
Mr. Christie. We will not deploy it until we have built it.
Senator Reed. We are deploying it in 2004; is that correct?
Am I wrong?
Mr. Christie. Yes.
Senator Reed. You have just indicated that we will not have
a significant part of the system even built by 2004?
Mr. Christie. We may not have it deployed in 2004. It may
not be built and in place in 2004.
It will be built as part of the 2004 test bed.
Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, I assume that the
President of the United States has declared that this system
will be deployed in September 2004; is that correct?
Secretary Aldridge. He set a goal to have it deployed and
we have used the term 2004 to 2005. We are constructing the
components that will make that happen, some of which already
exist, some of which do not.
Senator Reed. So there is a possibility that in September
2004, this system will not be deployed?
Secretary Aldridge. I do not--the terminology ``deployed''
bothers me. That is the reason I am hesitating.
Senator Reed. It bothers me, too. That is why I am trying
to figure out what you intend to do.
Secretary Aldridge. We are talking about the construction
of a test bed, the construction of a test bed, which will be
augmented with some limited operational capability. The word
``deployed'' has a connotation that goes far beyond the
construction of a test bed.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I could not agree with you
more. But that is the choice, the term, the President of the
United States used. He did not get up and make a speech about a
test bed and limited capabilities, which I think is very
accurate, which suggests to me that, from the test planning
standpoint, what you are saying makes a great deal of sense.
But there is a political connotation to ``deployment,'' which I
think has gotten in, perhaps.
Let me turn to General Kadish. First, let me say that you
have a very difficult job, technically demanding and also
rhetorically demanding at times.
General Kadish. I will not disagree with that, Senator.
Senator Reed. I know. We agree. So far, all of the tests
that you have conducted, and some have been successes and some
recognizably have not succeeded, require that you input into
your kill vehicle your booster target data; is that correct?
General Kadish. That is correct.
Senator Reed. At what point will you not be putting target
data into your test shots? At what time frame?
General Kadish. Let me try to be a little bit more precise,
because the implication of the question is that there is target
data that should not be there.
Senator Reed. No, no, no. At what point will you fire a
missile without target data?
General Kadish. We do not ever expect to fire a missile
without target data. The way the missile defense systems
operate, by their very nature, is that you have to have a
sensor in the right place at the right time to detect the
missile launch. Once that missile launch is detected, the whole
system starts tracking it, deciding when to shoot at it, how
many times to shoot at it, whether we kill it or not, whether
we want to shoot at it again. In a layered missile defense
system, we will always be injecting target data into the
system.
Senator Reed. At this point, you inject the days before the
event the pre-loaded data.
General Kadish. These tests are very scripted today.
Senator Reed. When will you stop doing very scripted tests?
What year?
General Kadish. We will get less and less scripted the more
we get the test bed into the operational mode.
Senator Reed. By September 2004, will you be firing
missiles that have limited or no data pre-loaded?
General Kadish. No. But the operational system will also
have pre-loaded data.
Senator Reed. That is true. But by 2004, essentially you
will be firing a missile, the kill vehicle and its booster,
which has significantly been loaded days before with target
data?
General Kadish. But that is the way the operational system
will work. What we will not do is predict the time of launch of
a threatening missile. The system, if we do it right, and this
is part of the testing that we have to do, is to make sure that
it is always up and operating; so when those sensors detect a
launch, we can shoot at it.
It will have intelligence data loaded up. It will have the
time of day loaded up, because that is the way the system
operates. So it will have that type of data. But the
operational system will use data of that nature.
Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you, General.
Senator Allard. Before I call on Senator Sessions, I have
just a comment. Obviously, the Aegis or the X-band radar has
been already tested and deployed. With this system, you have
confidence in it?
General Kadish. The sea-based X-band radar?
Senator Allard. Have we built, tested, and operated X-band
radars in the past?
General Kadish. I think so, Senator, yes. Oh, yes.
Senator Allard. All right. It seems like we are getting
into sort of a terminology issue here about ``operational'' and
``fielded.'' I wonder if perhaps maybe a ``fielded''
terminology would not be a little more accurate and actually
what is going on, because I think ``operational'' tends to
signify that certain events are going to occur. When we have
spiral development, it seems to me like we have a little
different terminology that has to be developed, as far as
missile defense systems are concerned.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to express my appreciation to the entire Department
of Defense for the superb way you have responded to the threat
of Iraq. You are placed in a position to be successful; Lord
willing, we will be successful, if that war does occur.
I think what you have done in transforming the military, in
applying the highest and best science, the best technology, and
then training our troops to utilize that technology, breaking
down old barriers so that Air Force and sergeants and airplanes
can communicate in a way that places incredible stress on the
enemy in the event of a conflict, is just an extraordinary
achievement. I am just exceedingly proud of that.
It allows our President, and the United States of America,
and the people of this country to stand strong for our values,
to be courageous, and know that if we do not knuckle under to
evil forces around the world, we can in fact make this a better
world and improve our own personal security. We can do it with,
hopefully, a minimal loss of life, even to our enemies. So it
is an extraordinary time. I really want to salute you for that.
There has been some debate and concern since I have been in
the Senate about national missile defense. There are those who
said the window that the commission found, setting forth the
date that we needed to be able to deploy, was not accurate,
that we did not need a missile defense program, that we ought
not to develop one, and we ought to slow down the development
programs that we had.
We have had a considerable number of debates since 1997,
when I came here, on that issue. Each time that we have debated
it, those who have felt that we need to move forward with a
missile defense have prevailed in the debate. We still have a
good, tough questioning, which I think can only be constructive
to our program. Some, I know, have not supported the program to
begin with. But there is nothing wrong in this democracy. We
are having to be challenged and be able to face those
challenges.
But with the emergence of evidence that Saddam Hussein has
missiles that could extend their range, that Iran is desiring
to enhance its missile capability, and with the testimony we
have had from CIA Director Tenet that North Korea may even able
to reach the United States with a missile today, I believe that
this has validated the commitment this country has made toward
that.
General Kadish, I know you have handled that for so many
years. You have testified many times. The program has had some
progress. I am sure there is a lot of difficulties and
challenges that you have faced. But we have continued to move
along. If I am not asking you to repeat it too much, would you
tell us where you think we are in terms of your personal view
of how much progress we have made and how close we are to our
goal of making this country safe against a missile attack?
General Kadish. Senator, as you will find in my formal
testimony, I believe we are ready to take the next steps. Two
years ago or more, I could not have told you with confidence
that the hit-to-kill technology would be workable enough to put
into an operational system. We believed it to be so, but we had
a lot of testing to prove it. We have accomplished that
testing. We are confident now that the basic technologies and
the approach we are using is a sound one.
We have many other efforts to improve on that in our RDT&E
program. Based on the fact that our current analysis and
testing provides us confidence in the hit-to-kill technology, I
think we are ready to take the next step, in actually making it
operational, use it, get comfortable with it, improve it as
best we can, and then make the decisions in the future of what
best to add to that system to make it even better than it is at
any given time.
So right now, I believe we have made a lot of progress. We
have a lot of work to do. We have a lot of challenges to face,
some of which are more management than technical. But I think
we are up to it. We are going to work hard to make it work.
Senator Sessions. I do not have any doubt that Kim Jong Il
would like to have the American leadership and the American
people think that he has the capability of hitting this country
with a missile. Once he has that capability, he may think that
he can blackmail, or push the United States around. He thinks
he can deter us from doing things that are in our national
interest and the interest of the world.
So, I think having that capability as soon as we can is
important. I believe events have validated the steady program
of progress toward this goal that we have invested in.
General Kadish and Secretary Aldridge, this year MDA will
transfer to the Army the PAC-3 and MEADS program. Procurement
and transition criteria seem to be in place. Please tell me
what R&D support the Missile Defense Agency will provide to
these programs in the out-years. Also, is there any sort of
strategy in place or being discussed which combines the various
programs into a seamless strategy? What is that strategy?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. Let me start off. We did take
a look at the PAC-3 program and MEADS. I had three criteria
that I established for myself to determine when such a program
should transition. That has been part of the missile defense
plan altogether. When we make a decision to take a system that
we believe is now ready for operational deployment, we would
remove it out of the Missile Defense Agency, focus the Missile
Defense Agency exclusively on the research and development, and
then give the operational system to the appropriate Service.
That is what we did with PAC-3.
We had technical maturity, we had--with the availability of
production facilities. We had the full support of the Secretary
of the Army to do so. Those were the basic criteria that I used
to make that decision to transfer.
The Army will have the exclusive responsibility for the
development and the operational deployment of PAC-3. However,
the integration of the PAC-3 into the ballistic missile defense
activities will continue to reside within the Missile Defense
Agency, because those activities have to be integrated. But
essentially the full deployment and the future development,
which would be primarily air defense capabilities, will exist
within the Army to do that.
Senator Sessions. General Kadish, do you want to further
comment?
General Kadish. I fully support that approach. Its linkage
with missile defense, as well as air defense, is properly
placed in the Army at this point in its cycle; and we will
continue involvement.
Senator Sessions. It is important that we make sure that
funding is maintained adequately. The Army is picking up now
something they had not had before. We need to make sure that
the funding follows it, else they will not be able to deploy.
Comment on that, Secretary Aldridge.
Secretary Aldridge. Absolutely. That was the third
criteria, that the Secretary of the Army fully supports this
and will properly fund it. He assured me that was going to
happen.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Aldridge, the President has
once again presented a robust missile defense budget. In the
aftermath of this treaty, are you satisfied that we have
sufficient funding to look at all phases of the architecture,
boost, mid-course, and terminal? Are you satisfied generally
with the budget?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I have gone through the
program in detail. We have activities dealing with boost phase,
mid-course, and terminal phase. We have capabilities dealing
with short-range, medium-range, and long-range rockets. We have
a robust technology program in place, some of which may work
and some of which may not. So we have a program that, I
believe, will get us where we want to go in this evolutionary
spiral development approach. We will make decisions as we go.
As some things turn out to prove themselves to be effective and
some things prove themselves not to be effective, we will stop
some things, which we have already done in one case.
The Navy Area Program was getting in deep financial trouble
and we decided to terminate that program and use our funds for
other things. Yes, I am very confident that we have a well
laid-out program that will get us where we need to go.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I do believe that is the
correct approach. I believe you should be free to make changes.
We should not straight-jacket you now with a program that we
are not absolutely certain is going to be the way it will end
up. I do salute the President for understanding early on that
the ABM treaty was not a basis of a relationship between us and
Russia, that it was complicating our ability to rationally
develop a missile defense system. You are now free of that. We
are able to develop a system that makes sense.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Sessions. The Senator's
time has expired.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have heard a lot of discussion today about the PAC-3
missile. I wonder if you could just tell me in general terms--
and this is really for anybody who is best qualified to
answer--what the PAC-3's capabilities are?
Secretary Aldridge. I think General Kadish can probably do
it better than any of us.
General Kadish. The Patriot-3, I can describe the
capabilities with a few characteristics. It is what we call a
point-defense system, where it protects a certain radius area
rather than a large region. It has a characteristic of being a
terminal system. So it intercepts after the warhead reenters
the atmosphere. It protects against short-range missiles and
medium-range missiles. So it has those kinds of characteristics
in terms of capability.
So when you look at it, it protects a point defense in the
terminal phase against short- and medium-range missiles.
Senator Pryor. How mobile is it?
General Kadish. It is what I would call transportable in
that it could be placed in a place where it needs to defend and
then can be moved. But it does not--if the term ``mobile''
includes, ``Can it shoot while it is moving?'' The answer is
no. It is transportable. In fact, the latest deployments prove
that out. We are able to move it, transport it, set it up. Then
if we need to move it again, move it again.
Senator Pryor. I understand if you cannot answer this next
question, but do we have PAC-3s in the Iraqi theater right now?
Again, we are not in a closed session. So if you cannot answer,
I understand.
General Kadish. We have every missile defense capability
that will contribute to this problem in play.
Senator Pryor. How many PAC-3s do we currently have in our
arsenal, if you can answer that?
General Kadish. I think it changes from day to day. Because
every time we get a delivery off the production line, we send
it into its intended use. I think the number is somewhere in
the mid-50s.
Senator Pryor. Okay. You have more requested in the
upcoming fiscal years that is included in the budget?
General Kadish. Yes. If I recall exactly, and I would have
checked these numbers, is that this program requests, and we
would have up to 332 by the end of 2005.
Senator Pryor. That was a question, too, I had. Are we
trying to get to a level and stay there, that we should always
have a set amount in our arsenal?
General Kadish. The inventory, what we call the inventory
objective, for Patriot-3 right now is not necessarily a
relevant factor, because we have so few of them. We are trying
to build as many as we can, as quick as we can.
Senator Pryor. Right.
General Kadish. The ultimate number will be subject to the
best judgment of the Army, and the Department, and the money
available.
Secretary Aldridge. The fiscal year 2003 omnibus bill just
provided $104 million for us to accelerate the production rate
to get up to a level rate, which I would prefer not to answer
in an open hearing.
Senator Pryor. I understand.
I do not want to put words in your mouth, but it sounds as
if you all are pretty satisfied with the PAC-3. Is that fair?
General Kadish. From my perspective, I am never satisfied
with where we are with these systems. I would like to do more
with every dollar we can afford to spend.
Senator Pryor. Right.
General Kadish. But it has a very good capability for what
it is used for.
Senator Pryor. I understand there are more upgrades and
additional capabilities that are being worked on right now?
General Kadish. That is correct. In fact, if you look back
in history, Patriot-2, which we have also in the inventory, was
an upgrade to Patriot basic, and now this is Patriot-3.
Senator Pryor. Right.
Secretary Aldridge. The follow-on program is a program
called MEADS, Medium Extended Air Defense System, which is an
international program with the U.S., Italy, and Germany. That
is a program that is being developed now that would make it far
more mobile in the sense of being air transportable on a C-141,
as opposed to C-17s, and would give it a much improved
capability for cruise missile, as well as tactical missile
defense.
Senator Pryor. Okay. If possible, and I know you do not
have these facts and figures before you, but I would like you
to get me what you anticipate may be required in funding the
upgrades and extending the capability of the PAC-3 system, if
that is possible.
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

I have directed the Army to combine management, development, and
fielding of the Patriot and MEADS programs. The Army plans to spend
$1.051 billion in fiscal year 2005, $986 million in fiscal year 2006,
$994 million in fiscal year 2007, $1.197 billion in fiscal year 2008,
and $1.209 billion in fiscal year 2009 on the Patriot/MEADS program. Of
these, $360.4 million are RDT&E in fiscal year 2005, $306.7 in fiscal
year 2006, $315.7 in fiscal year 2007, $345 million in fiscal year
2008, and $312.3 million in fiscal year 2009. The total budget will
fund the continued development of Patriot/MEADS, the procurement of
PAC-3 missiles and related ground support equipment, the upgrade of
additional Patriot units to PAC-3 capability and the continued support
of Patriot units deployed worldwide. Specifically, the Army will do an
incremental insertion of MEADS capability into the existing Patriot
forces starting in fiscal year 2009-2010, develop and field the MEADS
objective missile (PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhanced) by fiscal year 2011,
and develop and field Operation Iraqi Freedom fixes to the PAC-3 system
starting in fiscal year 2004.

Senator Pryor. The last question I have, and I just want to
make sure I am very clear on this, this is really a follow-up
to Senator Levin's earlier questions, is, as I understand it,
the PAC-3 system did go through operational testing before
being deployed. Am I correct in that?
Mr. Christie. That is correct.
Senator Pryor. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Allard. Next we have Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
General Kadish, I understand you plan to use radars of
Aegis ships floating off the coast of North Korea to augment
the 2004 national missile defense deployment. I also understand
those ships are required to defend Hawaii from a North Korean
missile attack. A senior Missile Defense Agency official was
recently quoted as saying, and I quote, ``These ships will
carry two computer programs, both of which will use Aegis radar
data. The programs will not run concurrently. Operators will
have to choose to operate the standard air defense program or
the ballistic missile defense program. While the ballistic
missile defense program is installed, it will not also, at the
same time, have a program that can do the other full air
defense missions.''
Does this mean that a crew of a ship off the coast of North
Korea will have the choice between defending themselves for the
type of anti-ship cruise missile launched by the North Koreans
last month or defending Hawaii from a missile attack? If so, is
this not a terrible choice they have to make?
General Kadish. Let me take that. The answer is no. Now let
me explain why I said no, that they would not have to make a
choice. It gets a little bit complicated. We still have some
things to work out with what the United States Navy will
actually have, as a concept of ops, for those ships and what
they are going to do. Let me start by saying that the Aegis
ships in this configuration have two functions.
One is to act as a surveillance platform for protecting
Hawaii, as well as giving cues for the whole United States. The
second function they would have would be to actually defend
against shorter range missiles. To the best of my knowledge,
the surveillance function can occur while the ship is actually
engaged in the full operation of its defensive capability.
When we move to the missile defense against shorter range
missiles, because those ships may have dual tasks defending
against shorter range missiles, as well as surveillance for
Hawaii and other purposes, they would have the choice between
the full fleet defense missile air defense capability and
operating the only missile defense, standard missile three
capability.
That is the choice they would have to make. They have full
self-defense capability on the ship for their own purposes. But
they would not have the fleet-air-and-missile defense that is
inherent in the Aegis platform. We are working through some of
the operational concepts that make sure that our sailors are
protected to the maximum extent possible during this mission.
That is underway by the Navy senior leadership right now.
So the choices are very compatible and commensurate with
the risks that we are running, is the best way I could put it.
If it is there to help us protect Hawaii and give cues to other
radar systems, then that is what it will do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
The national missile defense architecture envisioned by
President Clinton included a large permanent X-band radar,
located on the Island Shemya at the end of the Aleutian chain.
As I understand it, this radar was required to enable the
discrimination of the target warhead from a variety of other
potential objects and was located to be able to defend all 50
States from a missile attack from North Korea.
General Kadish, you have previously testified that this
radar was, and I quote, ``the long pole in the tent for a
national missile defense.'' The current plans for the 2004
missile defense deployment do not include any permanent X-band
radar for operational use. Although a floating sea-based X-band
radar is eventually planned for testing purposes, it will not
always be in a position to defend against a real threat
missile.
Furthermore, a recent report from the Missile Defense
Agency stresses that the sea-based radar is not a substitute
for the Shemya X-band radar. Rather, it is a test asset. The
sea-based radar may be operable in port, where it would
probably spend much of its time, because of interference issues
with aircraft, cars, and other devices.
General Kadish, why do you not plan to build a permanent
operational X-band radar to support the deployment of a
national missile defense against a North Korean threat?
General Kadish. I would not say we do not plan to build
those types of sensors. I think we have more evaluation to do.
As we evolve the program, I would expect those decisions to be
up for consideration.
If I might, let me take you back to the X-band radar at
Shemya and give you a chronology of why the decisions have been
made the way they have been made in regard to the X-band.
When the national missile defense program that required the
X-band at Shemya was put together, that radar was put there for
basically a couple of reasons. One is that we had no sensor
that we could really, at the time, do everything that we wanted
to do, and it was not in the Shemya arrangement. Cobra Dane was
evaluated. But we would like to have had more capability than
that, under the requirements-based approach that we were under
at the time, because it had a very high-performance standard.
So we decided that we needed a radar there. An X-band was a
good one. We wanted to put it at Shemya because it met a lot of
the criteria for that system. Once we looked at not having a
treaty in effect and looked at the basic capability of the
system we had, we could delay that radar and look at other
opportunities. That is where we came up with this sea-based
platform, to serve two purposes.
One is to move this very large radar around the Pacific so
it could have different viewing angles and not be tied to one
ground-based location. The second thing is that we could move
it into an operational capability to add to our overall
defensive posture when it became available and was not needed
for testing. That is on track to be done.
I guess the final reason, and the reason why it was a long
pole in the tent at the time we were talking about the Shemya
radar, was that it takes a long time to build anything in
Shemya in Alaska. It is at the end of the Aleutian chain, and
construction seasons are very short, and the weather to get the
material there is generally very bad.
So that is why we had to start so early. It became the
focal point of that debate. Now we are freer to look at other
locations. We will do that.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General, for your
response.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentleman, for your testimony today.
Secretary Crouch, I would like to start with you, if I
might. Then, Secretary Aldridge, I would like to turn to you.
I would like to focus first on the North Korea threat,
specifically how imminent and how serious it is. You have
testified, I believe, Secretary Crouch, that the North Koreans
have a missile capable of hitting the United States but it has
not been tested yet; is that correct?
Secretary Crouch. That is correct.
Senator Bayh. So they have deployed a system without
testing. I think it is interesting we are proposing to follow
the North Korean model, perhaps the only area in which we would
mimic the North Koreans. Can a warhead be fitted to that
missile? Do we know that they have the capability of doing that
and still hitting the continental United States? We know they
have a missile that we believe is capable of hitting the
continental United States, although not tested.
Secretary Crouch. I would say that we have seen two things.
One, we have seen an earlier test, a flight test, of a missile
that had three stages, that we think was attempting to put a
payload in orbit, which would have demonstrated some inherent
intercontinental capability. So we did see a flight test of
that.
The specific missile I was referring to that we have not
yet seen a flight test of, but which I believe we assess they
could flight test at any time, is something we call the Taepo
Dong II.
Senator Bayh. Right.
Secretary Crouch. We believe that that missile is capable
of carrying a reentry vehicle-sized payload to intercontinental
range.
Senator Bayh. I am going to digress for one second. You
mentioned Iran testing missiles. The missiles that they
currently are developing, they are not capable of hitting the
continental United States; is that correct?
Secretary Crouch. We see a flight test program going on
there. They have moved from short-range to now looking at
medium-range type systems.
Senator Bayh. Can those systems hit the United States?
Secretary Crouch. No. Those particular systems could not
hit the United States. They would be capable of threatening a
number of our allies and potentially deployed U.S. forces
overseas.
Senator Bayh. Correct.
Secretary Crouch. But our assessment is that by mid-decade
or around mid-decade they could flight-test a capability, based
upon the advancements of their program, that could strike the
United States.
Senator Bayh. They could.
Mr. Aldridge, I would like to turn to you.
The point I wanted to make, Secretary Crouch, at least for
the next few years, it seems to be largely a North Korea-
related problem. Is that a fair analysis?
Secretary Aldridge. That is to you.
Secretary Crouch. Oh, I am sorry. I thought----
Senator Bayh. Largely a North Korea-related problem.
Secretary Crouch. I thought he was directing Mr. Aldridge.
Secretary Aldridge. No.
Secretary Crouch. I would say----
Senator Bayh. Let me withdraw the question and move on. I
think you see where I was heading.
Let me ask you, Secretary Aldridge, about the effectiveness
of the system that is to be deployed in 2004 and 2005 in
protecting against this developing North Korean threat. The 10
land-based missiles proposed for the end of fiscal year 2004,
how effective would they be against the North Korean missile,
if it were in fact launched against our country?
Secretary Aldridge. We think it would be effective. We
probably should not go into a lot of details.
Senator Bayh. How do you define effective? 90 percent
success rate? 75? 50?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. The way you could achieve
these rates is you do not have to fire just one interceptor per
target. You could fire two, as we do in PAC-3.
Senator Bayh. Of course.
Secretary Aldridge. The effectiveness is in the 90-percent
range. Of course, we want the effectiveness to be high enough
that we never have to use these things. I mean, that is the
ultimate effectiveness, that they never be used.
Senator Bayh. There are 10 going on line in 2004, 10 in
2005?
Secretary Aldridge. Right.
Senator Bayh. The radar is not going to be available. When
will that go into place, 2006?
Secretary Aldridge. Let me see. General Kadish probably has
the specific dates for all of those.
General Kadish. We will have radars on line to handle the
early warning and usefulness of the system in 2004, when we put
the missiles on alert, if everything works out all right. We
will add the sea-based X-band, if it proves out, the following
year. It is currently scheduled by September 2005.
Senator Bayh. So, Secretary Aldridge, your testimony is
that with the 10 interceptors going in at the end of fiscal
year 2004 and the radar that will be on line at that time, we
would have a 90 percent effectiveness in shooting down the
Taepo Dong II?
Secretary Aldridge. A lot depends on the continuation of
the test and the effectiveness, its precise effectiveness,
numbers. But I would put, as of today, the projected
effectiveness in the 90-percent range.
Senator Bayh. The reason I ask this is, there is a great
deal of tension between our country and North Korea today. The
effectiveness of this system is going to affect our diplomacy,
other possible military actions, and so forth. If you are
advising Congress or the President of the United States about
possible North Korean reactions to our different actions, it is
going to have a pretty profound impact.
You perhaps take one course of action, if you think there
is a minimal chance of them hitting one of our cities with a
missile, and you take a different course of action if you think
it is somewhat more significant.
Secretary Aldridge. Exactly. Of course, that is the
rationale that went into the decision by the President to
proceed. I think he clearly has many more options available, if
he has a limited operational defense, is the way he described
it. The activities that exist, the thought processes that
exist, in North Korea or anywhere else, goes through a
different----
Senator Bayh. Just so I understand, and this will end my
questioning here, I would be interested in Senator Levin's
reaction to this, if he has a moment to think about it. If you
are advising the President of the United States that there is
the possibility of the North Koreans hitting Los Angeles or San
Francisco with a nuclear warhead, you are advising him that we
would have a 90-percent chance of taking that down before it
could get there as early as the end of the fiscal year of 2004.
I mean, if millions of lives depend on it, that is your answer?
Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Could I intervene here?
Senator Allard. I assume Senator Bayh is yielding his time.
Senator Bayh. I would gladly yield my time. My time has
expired. But my reaction to this is I am pleased to hear, I
will say I am pleased but more than a little surprised to hear
your answer. I would be interested in the Senator's thoughts on
that.
Senator Allard. We are getting close to wrapping up. I
think you only have 3 minutes anyhow. But let us go ahead and
we will proceed here.
Senator Levin. Number one, I am surprised that you even
answered this in an unclassified setting. But number two, I am
surprised at your answer, because I know the classified number.
I will leave it at that.
Secretary Aldridge. Well, I am projecting----
Senator Levin. I just think you had better go back and
check the classified numbers to the probability of success of
this 2004 system. I think you will want to correct the record
after you read the classified numbers. But I think I had better
leave it at that, because it is a classified number. But I was
surprised, number one, that you did answer it.
Secretary Aldridge. I am surprised there is a classified
number existing, because we do not know yet until we get into
the testing process.
Senator Levin. There is a range.
Secretary Aldridge. The range probably depends on whether
it is one missile or two missiles or a lot of other
assumptions.
Senator Levin. I am just going to leave it at that. I think
I have to leave it at that. I have no choice.
Senator Allard. Okay. We will move on ahead then.
Thank you, Senator Bayh.
I just have been conferring here with my colleague, Senator
Levin. He says that he has about 3 minutes that he wants to use
on follow-up questions. I have one question I would like to
follow up on. Unless Senator Bayh has any other questions or
anything, we will probably draw the hearing to a close at that
particular point.
My question is this: Secretary Aldridge, capabilities-based
spiral development means to me that we will put something in
the field when we believe it has military utility. Then we will
improve upon it over time. That, in turn, means to me that the
system meets a recognized threat and that it has sufficient
maturity that we think it has a good chance of working. Even
after it is in the field, we will continue to work on it and
improve it.
What concerns me is that some of my colleagues and some
people in the Pentagon continue to focus on deployment as a key
event in spiral programs. No doubt that it will be true for
some of the programs. But it seems to me that we almost need a
new vocabulary to help us better describe how we test and how
we put these capabilities-based spiral-development programs in
the field.
Would you care to comment on that, please?
Secretary Aldridge. I agree with you. The terminology is
very ambiguous. I think the whole concept of spiral development
has to go along with the spiral requirements process, as well
as the spiral testing process. I think the terminology is,
again, somewhat ambiguous. It could probably use some more
rigor in exactly how we define it.
But the concept itself is very strong. I think it clearly
gives the direction of putting systems into the field as
quickly as possible so the cycle times of this acquisition
process could be shortened. The risk can be reduced because we
are going with more mature technology earlier. We can get rid
of older equipment sooner, because it goes to the field. But
the spiral development capability must also have a technology
program that clearly can enter new technologies as it matures
into the program to create the blocks of improvement. So that
is a very key part of it.
Let me just make one other point of all this. Spiral
development also goes with a thing which I call properly
pricing the programs. Because even though you have a spiral
development, if the program manager runs out of resources at
the end of the year, the first thing he does, he slips the
program, and you have just defeated the purpose of spiral
development.
So you will hear a lot of talk within the Department about
spiral development and properly pricing the programs up front.
Those are two key elements that must go hand in hand.
Senator Allard. Then Senator Kadish.
Senator Levin. You just demoted him. [Laughter.]
Senator Allard. I am sorry. General Kadish.
General Kadish. That is an honor, Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Allard. General Kadish, would you just review for
some of us the management tools you have in place now, such as
your integrated master plan, integrated master schedule, and
earned value management system, and the progress you have made
in implementing these tools. Then maybe elaborate a little bit
on have they been effective in providing you with the
information you need to manage your programs in a disciplined
way?
General Kadish. We have been working very hard to put
management discipline in all phases of our activities. This has
been a goal of mine for several years, to be as efficient at
this as we possibly can. We have come up with the concepts. We
looked at GAO recommendations, internal recommendations,
consulted recommendations. We have come up with a system of
management tools that we are, in fact, working on, as we speak,
to manage this very complex program. It includes integrated
master schedules and plans. It includes earned value
management. It even includes weekly, and even daily,
interaction with our executing program managers.
I guess if I were to give us a report card right now on how
well we are implementing that, we have the right vision. I
would give us an A-plus on that.
The implementation has been difficult, as you would expect,
for something like this. I expect by the end of the year this
will be full up and operating to my full expectations. But
right now, we are probably halfway there on implementing some
of these things.
We get pretty good cost visibility out of the earned value
system. That is one of my major concerns, to make sure we know
where we are from a cost and schedule standpoint.
So the tools we are putting in place, I think, are going to
be effective. They already have been, to a large degree. They
are absolutely necessary for a complex program like this.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kadish, do you happen to have Section 8061, which
is the section that was written by somebody, relative to
exempting this test bed from operational testing?
General Kadish. No, I do not.
Senator Levin. Let me get you a copy of it here. I want to
go through this with you. ``Section 8061, the funds available
to the Department of Defense under the heading Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation Defense-wide may be used to
develop and field an initial set of missile defense
capabilities.'' That is defined in the next sentence.
So far, if you stop right there, that accomplishes what you
were interested in accomplishing in terms of the budget. Would
you say that is correct?
General Kadish. After the word ``capabilities''?
Senator Levin. Yes.
General Kadish. I believe so, yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. If it stopped right there, that would
achieve what you were trying to achieve when you said that you
would like the R&D funds to be used for this 2003 and 2004 test
bed?
General Kadish. I am not a lawyer, Senator. So I would
have----
Senator Levin. Well, but is that----
General Kadish. That is the intent. I mean, that is clearly
the intent.
Senator Levin. That is the intent of that language. I
understand. That is the intent of that language?
General Kadish. Right.
Senator Levin. If you had put a period right there, that is
what you intended to accomplish; is that correct?
General Kadish. Right.
Senator Levin. Now, it is the second half of that sentence
which is the mystery that nobody seems to know how it got into
the application here or in the proposal that came from the
administration. It is this language that I want to read to you:
``Such fielding shall be considered to be system development
and demonstration for purposes of any law governing the
development and production of a major defense acquisition
program.''
That is the language which I am talking about here this
morning. You did not suggest that part of that sentence; did
you?
General Kadish. I do not recall doing that. But in the
development of these types of paragraphs, I think you can
appreciate the fact that when the staff agencies and the legal
community look at this, they may not have every law covered
that may affect the funding issues. So my opinion would be that
these types of clauses are in general used to make sure that we
did not miss something in the process.
Senator Levin. These types of clauses, as far as we know,
have never been used for any fielded system in history. Do any
of you know of any fielded system that has been designated by
law as a developmental system? Do you know of any, anybody here
at this panel? [No response.]
We have searched. We can't find--you say this is the sort
of language which is used. General, do you know of any fielded
system that has been designated by law as a developmental
system?
General Kadish. I do not. I have not thought about it,
Senator, but I do not think so.
Senator Levin. Okay. Does anybody on the panel know of any?
Mr. Christie, do you know of any?
Mr. Christie. No, I do not.
Senator Levin. Secretary Aldridge? Secretary Crouch?
Secretary Crouch. Outside my----
Senator Levin. Okay. Well, we do not either. So since your
goal would have been accomplished, as you just testified, by
putting a period after the word ``defense capability,'' since
that is what you wanted to do, use R&D money to develop and
field this initial set of missile defense capabilities, and you
do not know, no one knows, where this second half of the
sentence came from, we are going to find out.
Secretary Aldridge. I am going to go search. But I think
the point is, I think we agree that it is not our intent to
waive operational testing.
Senator Levin. Yes. Well, I am glad----
Secretary Aldridge. We can come to agreement on what the
words say to make that happen.
Senator Levin. That is good. That is very reassuring, and I
hope our chairman and our full committee chairman will help us
to accomplish that, strip out that language. We have to find
out where that language came from, because the effect of that
language. It keeps something in development which is now
fielded, the effect of it is to exempt that system from
operational testing of a development system.
Secretary Aldridge. That was not the intent. I think the
intent was, as General Kadish has said, a system that is in
SDD, system development and demonstration phase, is an R&D
program and uses R&D research. Maybe it was just an expansion
of the first phrase for clarification. But whatever it is, I
think we are in full agreement as to how to proceed. We can
find acceptable language to make it work.
Senator Levin. Now, if you would help us find out how it
happened, because it is troubling to me. It is obvious that the
administration is trying to put a label of a deployed national
missile defense system on what is really a test bed. That is
troubling to many of us. That is exaggerating what is being
fielded here for many of us. I think Senator Reed went through
that with you.
But if at the same time there is an effort somewhere,
somehow, by somebody unknown to the four of you who run these
programs, language gets into a request to us that would exempt,
effectively, this system from operational testing, should
somebody try to exempt it, that is doubly troubling. I am glad
to hear that none of you are trying to exempt it from
operational testing.
Somebody here put that language in there for some purpose.
It is troubling enough and a puzzlement enough to many of us
but I am not speaking here for more than myself. I think some
others who have expressed themselves on this are troubled by
the exaggerated description of this as a deployed national
missile defense system with your exaggerated capability as to
the likelihood of success, Mr. Secretary, when it is really a
test bed. If in fact, the motivation of this language is to
immunize this from operational testing at the same time, it is
doubly troublesome.
I will leave the ifs there, because you are going to clear
up the mystery, Secretary.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, you are up, if you have
questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have plenty of
questions. But I just looked at the clock. Is that a vote in
progress?
Senator Allard. I think we are scheduled for a vote right
at 12:00. Senator Levin had 3 minutes. He has wrapped up. I am
wrapped up. If you would like to run a question or two then you
can submit the rest in writing, if you would like.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am going to try to ask them all.
Have they called the vote yet?
Senator Allard. No, not that I am aware of.
Senator Levin. If that is one light, they have called the
vote.
Could someone check, please, as to whether a vote is on?
Mr. Chairman, we received a letter from Phil Coyle, who is
the former occupant of the office that Mr. Christie now holds.
I would ask that this letter on operational testing history be
made part of the record.
Senator Allard. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Allard. I will find out how much time is left.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Christie, in your February assessment of the ground-
based national missile defense program, you stated that ``only
a very limited range of engagement parameters have been
explored so far,'' that ``overall only limited potential
functionality has been demonstrated in testing.''
Can you explain?
Mr. Christie. Up to the point that we wrote that report
last fall, the hit-to-kill capability had been demonstrated. We
had discovered problems with the booster. The last flight test
was a problem because of a failure of the kill vehicle to
separate from the booster. We had non-operationally realistic
geometries out of necessity, launching the targets from
Vandenberg to Kwajalein. We had a simulated mid-course tracking
system located on Hawaii that would not be applicable in an
operational sense.
So we had demonstrated quite a bit. But we had also found
that there are things that we should be doing in the very near
future to make testing more operationally realistic. That is
exactly what the test bed is designed to do, to correct many of
those shortfalls in realistic operational testing capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, since your statement in February,
there has been such sufficient confidence in the system and the
testing that you feel like that it is not going to affect the
effectiveness in order to deploy this in 2004?
Mr. Christie. I was reporting at that point in time on the
testing that had been done up to that point and my assessment
of the plans that are on the table. I do not believe I made
those kind of statements about the test plans that are
presently on the table, and particularly with respect to the
test bed that we have been discussing.
Senator Allard. Senator, just for your information, we have
about 10 minutes left.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
You stated, in your recent operational assessment, that the
current national missile defense system had no current
operational capability?
Mr. Christie. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yet you have had some interceptor
successes?
Mr. Christie. That is right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Why, then, is there no current
capability against a real threat?
Mr. Christie. A real threat, as we have talked about
earlier today, comes from North Korea. We have not tested that
geometry. We do not have a capability at this time to defend
against that kind of a threat. So at this time, we do not have
an operational capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
General Kadish, your budget documents show that you are
going down parallel paths to acquire the ground-based boost
phase and a space-based phase. Now, it is my understanding that
the space-based test bed that you plan will not actually be
used to shoot down a test missile, whereas the ground-based
will be used.
So is it true, the assumption that I am making, that you do
not plan to actually shoot down a test missile with a space-
based? If not, why not?
General Kadish. We do have the parallel paths, as you point
out. The nearer path is the terrestrial-based, whether it is
ground or sea eventually, we intend to move out very
aggressively on, and hopefully reduce the risk, to space-basing
those types of interceptors.
At the same time, we have a path that we are pursuing a
little bit later in time to put the space test bed up, as you
suggest. It is our intent, as far as at least my internal
discussions, that test bed that we would space-base would serve
two functions. One is to demonstrate intercepts from
interceptors that would be on orbit, so to actually do an
intercept, and to work out all the difficulties involved with
having a constellation of that size potentially on orbit.
But it would be a test bed. It would actually try to do
those types of things that I described, but only in a test
mode.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, what is our pleasure? I
came here at 9:30. I have a bunch of questions. We are going to
have to go vote. I would like to go vote and come back and
continue my questions.
Senator Allard. Everybody here on the committee has had one
round of questions. Then we had a shortened second round,
Senator Levin and myself. We are in the second round with you.
If you have some questions, you may want to submit those in
written form. If the member wants to come back and ask some
more questions, I will be glad to come back and chair the
committee for you.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think you need my vote on this
particular vote.
Senator Allard. We are voting on Estrada. So that is the
vote up on the floor.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is why you need my vote.
Senator Allard. Okay. Then let us go ahead and I will
recess the committee, and we will go ahead and vote, and we
will be back. If my information is correct, we have about 6
minutes or so, the vote will end. So that will give us time to
get down there. We will get back probably about 25 after, I
would guess, and we will give you an opportunity to ask some
more questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. If we are going to completely throw
off the schedule of these folks, I do not want to do that.
Senator Allard. That is a good point. What are your
schedules? Do your schedules permit you to be here for a while
longer? Does anybody have a problem? [No response.]
Okay. Let us go ahead, and we will come back.
[Recess.]
Senator Allard. We will go ahead and call the committee
back to order. We will go ahead and ask Senator Nelson to
resume his questioning.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All right. General, we were right in the middle of a
questioning about the parallel tracks on the space-based and
the ground-based. You had just started your answer.
General Kadish. Let me repeat and then try to answer the
question completely. We do have parallel paths for boost phase.
The reason why we do have them is because it is a very risky
proposition with the time lines and the phenomenology involved.
So we set up this parallel path approach that has terrestrial,
which includes sea-based and land-based approach, as well as a
space-test-bed approach that comes later in time.
Our primary path is the terrestrial approach, in order to
prove out the concepts, get the phenomenology and to provide
potentially as early a capability as we can, given the
constraints of geography surrounding the boost phase. We intend
to pursue a space interceptor test bed, as is described in our
budget documents. That test bed will have two fundamental
purposes being space-based. One is to see and test intercepts
from space in very limited test bed context, as well as to
prove out the difficulties and work out the difficulties of
having a constellation of that nature on orbit, very limited
number of potential satellites.
That is the concept. We have a lot of work to do on both
those efforts. But we have a primary path and a later path,
using the space-based test bed.
Senator Bill Nelson. When would you estimate that you would
do a test of the space-based?
General Kadish. We have--of the space-based test bed, it
could be--we are working out some of the details of that
strategy right now. My best guess, at this point in time, would
be sometime in the--well, I will give you a wide range--Block
2008 to 2012.
Senator Bill Nelson. You would consider that you would have
to have a test of that to determine if it was going to be
effective; would you not?
General Kadish. Yes, sir. I mean, that is the fundamental
pillar of all our activities under missile defenses, to test
them as best we know how, given their complex nature, to see
that they work properly.
Senator Bill Nelson. 2008 to 2012, is that right?
General Kadish. Right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are you still going to be around?
General Kadish. Senator, I hope not. [Laughter.]
I intend to be around, but maybe not in this position.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask a policy question to the
secretary over there. That would be the first time that we
would be weaponizing space. There has been a policy up to this
point that we are not going to weaponize space. Tell me about
your thinking with regard to the change of that policy.
Secretary Aldridge. I should quickly kick this ball to J.D.
Crouch, who is the policy guy. But let me just respond in the
sense that we are heading down the path for missile defense
that is looking at all elements: boost phase, mid-course, and
terminal. It is a logical step for an effective missile defense
system to have a very effective boost phase intercept system,
because you avoid a lot of problems. You basically can cover
the world. You can avoid any issue of discrimination.
Now once you have accomplished that, then you look at
various ways to do boost phase. We are looking at airborne
lasers. We are looking at ground-based interceptors. We are
looking at space-based. Any one of those might work and many of
them may not work.
So from the point of view of laying out a program plan of
development, we are looking at all those parallel phases. Now,
whether or not we actually go and do one of these to build a
test and do an intercept will depend on obviously getting the
money in the budget and getting congressional approval to spend
the money in that direction. So I think the policy issue will
have to be addressed. But right now, we are laying a plan that
has that as one of the options in it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you not have a lot of promise on
your boost phase right now with the Aegis system?
Secretary Aldridge. That is correct. I would say probably
the most effective boost phase would be the airborne laser. It
is the one that probably has more effectiveness because of its
essentially worldwide coverage and zero time of flight system.
Senator Bill Nelson. How far along are we in the testing of
the airborne laser?
Secretary Aldridge. General Kadish can probably address
that specifically.
General Kadish. Yes, sir. If I may, Senator. We are at what
I call the hardware phase of the airborne laser. We are
probably within 18 months to 2 years of demonstrating that this
laser system could actually shoot down a missile. That is quite
remarkable.
Senator Bill Nelson. Within how long?
General Kadish. Eighteen months to 2 years, depending on
how successful we are building it all on the airplane over the
next couple years. It is very risky, I would assess. But the
technology appears to be there.
So where we stand today is we have an airplane, a 747, that
is configured to accept the laser as its cargo to carry around.
We got that integrated. It is flown. We have gotten the test
program under way of that part of the program. We are
assembling, as we speak, at Edwards Air Force Base, the laser
component on the ground in a 747 carcass to make sure it fits.
This summer we plan to have first light out of that laser setup
in the carcass of the 747. If all goes well over the next 18
months to 2 years, we will integrate that in the airplane and
fly it to attempt to shoot down a boosting missile.
So we have made remarkable progress; not without its
problems and difficulties, but that is heading in the right
direction at this point in time.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is pretty dramatic.
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you can shoot down a rocket in its
boost phase with a laser from a big airplane, you can shoot
down anything.
General Kadish. I would not go that far, Senator, but we
can do a lot of damage.
Senator Allard. Senator, I have always advocated and I have
always liked the concept of going after the boost phase,
because you drop the warhead or weapon of mass destruction
right back into the lap of those who started it. I think that
works better than any peace treaty out there, frankly.
Senator Bill Nelson. Although presumably the warhead would
not be armed. Unless they do not have the arming techniques.
Senator Allard. You would hope not anyway.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is something. So, you are that
optimistic on the testing on the laser?
General Kadish. I am cautiously optimistic. In fact, I
would invite members of the committee to go out there and see
the hardware, if you have a chance, at Edwards Air Force Base.
But when you go out there and you see the hardware, talk to the
people working on this. They are worried about their next
crisis in front of them to meet schedule and cost effort. But I
think there is a very quiet confidence they will be able to do
this. It is a matter of when and what problems will come up.
There are a lot of skeptics on this. I think that is a
healthy attitude to take right now. But as Secretary Aldridge
points out, some things will work, some things will not. But
this is on track right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you perfect the technology on laser
from a platform of a sub-sonic airplane, can you use that
technology? There is no reason why you could not use that on a
space-based platform, is there?
General Kadish. There are different challenges in space.
The size of the mirrors require the optics, which in and of
itself is a major accomplishment of ABL, to be put on orbit and
then having, basically, a chemical plant that you have in the
back of that airplane on orbit, are significant challenges. The
fundamentals are the same. It would give us a lot better
confidence, I think, of going to space. Of course, space solves
your geography problem, in a sense, because you can use those
weapons more effectively from the high ground of space.
But there will be very difficult challenges to move that to
space. I would not characterize it as a trivial matter at all.
Secretary Aldridge. Plus the fact that we do not have a
launch vehicle to do it, because it takes several hundreds of
thousands of pounds for a space-based laser. There is just no
way to get it there at this point.
Senator Bill Nelson. With some of the rockets that we are
going to go to Mars with, we can do it with that. [Laughter.]
Secretary Aldridge. We hope.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let us talk about decoys.
Let me ask you, Mr. Christie, do you have a high confidence
that we will have the capability to discriminate from the
decoys when we deploy this thing in 2004?
Mr. Christie. High confidence with certain decoys, yes. We
have tested with some decoys already and demonstrated a
discrimination capability. We will be carrying out even more
difficult tests of counter-measures. But without getting into
classified information, I cannot speak to what we will
demonstrate with specific decoys between now and then. We can
provide that answer to you for the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. I would like to follow up on
that.
Senator Allard. Go ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. No, no. I mean in an appropriate
setting, in a classified setting at some point.
Senator Allard. Like many of the gentlemen on the
committee, for example, if you want a classified briefing on
either subject, usually just contact them. They can set aside a
room there. It is in S-407, I believe it is. That classified
briefing can be provided for you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Aldridge, what are we doing
to ensure that, as we try to orbit a constellation of space-
based radar satellites, and they are not being designed for
missile defense, but might be able to provide a global missile
defense tracking capability as a side benefit. What do you
think about the potential side benefit of this kind of system?
Secretary Aldridge. That is very difficult. The space-based
radar that is being considered by the Department is a radar
that looks to the ground. It is a radar that is trying to
detect targets moving and to provide some imaging capability.
So it is not designed to be tracking missiles in space. It is
really looking downward. The concept is in a fairly low earth
orbit. Yet we are looking at other concepts that could be--
maybe you would put it at a higher orbit.
I believe, really, the direction that we would like to move
was what used to be called the SBIRS-Low program, now called
Space Tracking and Surveillance System. It is a space-based
system designed exactly to do what you would like to do. Only
now it looks up into the orbits that would be for missiles,
rather than looking down on the ground. That program has been
restructured. As you may recall, there were some difficulties
with that, that we had last year. We restructured the program.
We are going to launch two satellites in the 2006/2007 period
that will be prototypes that would lead on to other systems
later on.
That is carried as part of the missile defense program. It
is carried under General Kadish's activity. It is fully
integrated with the work we have underway for missile defense.
That is perhaps the right way to go, as opposed to trying to
make a third mission of a space-based radar.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, with regard to the boost
phase systems, the boost phase interceptor has to be very fast
or it has to get very close in order to be effective. So what
are the general design goals of the boost phase system? What
are the regions that you might want to have covered by such a
system? Where would that system have to be placed, other than
what you have already told us about in Alaska and down at
Vandenberg?
General Kadish. The general characteristic of a boost phase
defensive system is such that you have to be closer to your
intended target than you would in the mid-course phase or in
the terminal phase, obviously. It is rather up close and
personal for terrestrial-type of activities. But if you look at
the geometries, if you have a boosting missile and you have the
kinetic fly out of another missile to catch up to it, you want
to be in the general vicinity of that boosting missile,
measured in hundreds of kilometers.
Space-basing gives you a bigger advantage because you could
be closer to any point on the ground from space than you could
be if you were deployed specifically on the ground. So one of
the major constraints to a boost-phase activity is that you
have to be close to the borders of the offending country that
you are trying to defend against.
There are a lot of advantages if you could make that work.
That is why we have the parallel paths of having boosters with
the proper velocities. When you have boosters doing kinetic
energy, you have time-line problems because the time lines are
very short. When you have the speed of light of a laser, you
have the speed of light, so you do not have the fly-out times
of a kinetic booster. That is why we are proceeding on all
those parallel paths.
So I guess the primary constraint, if you want to call it a
constraint, or characteristic of boost-phase defensive systems
is that they have to be close to the boosting missile to defend
against it, relatively speaking, in regard to the mid-course or
terminal phases.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you went to a space-based system,
how many satellites would you have to have giving you tracking
coverage in order to get 24-hour coverage of your potential
enemy launch regions?
General Kadish. That is a difficult question to answer. But
let me give you some ranges. It is difficult because you have
to decide what type of capability you want. In a layered,
multifaceted system that we are building, a space-based
interceptor boost phase system would not be the only system we
would depend on. So you would have a different constellation,
if it was the only system, than you would if you have other
layers in the process.
On the most likely side, we have done calculations, and I
have seen analyses that say we can do it with as little as
potentially 60 or 70 interceptors to as many as 300 or more. It
goes geometrical from there, depending on how robust we wanted
to be in the things we are talking about.
So I think affordability here, if we ever go down that
route, is a major issue. The complexity of those constellations
is one of the major technical risks associated with it. But it
is very attractive, as I pointed out, from a geography
standpoint.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you get to the time period of 2008
to 2012 that you talked about and start to deploy space-based
assets, if we were to ever have a policy decision that you
wanted to have them removed from space so that space would not
be weaponized, is that being put into your thought process?
General Kadish. Senator, I am not the right person to
address the policy issues of this. We will certainly comply
with the policy of the Department and Congress through the
appropriate process. I think that is better left to Secretary
Crouch.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Aldridge, Mr. Christie,
Secretary Crouch?
Secretary Crouch. Sure. I think your question was, ``Would
the system be capable of being extracted?'' Again, I think we
are in the very early stages here. So, whether or not it would
have that kind of a capability obviously for something on
orbit, you would have the options of trying to physically take
it out of space, which I think would probably be very difficult
and very expensive. You might also have the options of de-
orbiting the system.
But I think that those would be technical capabilities that
you would have to build in to the system, if you wanted to have
the option of being able to do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is correct. But the technical
capability has to follow a policy decision. That is why I
raised the issue for you to start thinking about.
Secretary Aldridge. I think it is probably a chicken-or-egg
issue, because if it does not make any technical sense, then
why do we ask for the policy change? We do have to understand
what is the technical difficulty of making this happen and the
cost. It may be just prohibitive. But I think in terms of what
we are doing now is we are just studying this issue and trying
to get some technical assessment of does this make any sense
long before we ask for--even address the policy.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Back on January 31, a senior
defense official was quoted as saying, ``It is not clear how
the national missile defense system to be deployed by 2004 will
be manned 24 hours a day.'' That was the quote. Then a
spokesperson for the Missile Defense Agency was quoted as
saying, ``The Missile Defense Agency is an R&D agency that has
no operational control over the system it develops.'' The quote
continued, ``The systems are turned over to the military
services for operational use.'' That is the end of the quote.
So, how can your agency continue to improve and test if the
system is going to be turned over to something like the Army
for operational use?
General Kadish. Senator, I think I alluded to this earlier
in our discussions with the members. But let me put it in this
context: We have a unified command plan change now that puts
STRATCOM as a primary interface with missile defense. Then we
have to deal with NORTHCOM as well. In the process of putting
this system together and putting it, what I would call, on
alert, we are actively discussing now just that very question
of how do you do both at the same time.
I am very confident that we will be able to work out an
arrangement that does such a thing. It would be a very
practical approach to the problem. We have some experience with
that, even today in our strategic systems of how you test and
operate at the same time.
Those details, however, have not been worked out. We are
working on those issues as we speak. I would expect that over
the coming months, and over the next year especially, those
issues will be addressed. In fact, I think without having the
test bed and the imperative to make it operational, we would
have a very hard time of getting any operational concepts put
together to operate such a system in the short run.
So I think that is a major benefit. As difficult as that
will be to work out, it will be a major benefit of us going
down this path, to get the warfighting using communities on all
our systems more familiar with how we ought to operate them,
and then we can respond to what they think ought to be done in
the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you are going to have 16 more
tests, and this thing is operational in 2004, you are really
going to have a challenge of how do you pull it off of
operational to get all those tests done.
General Kadish. I think it will be a challenge but a
welcome one.
Senator Bill Nelson. Since the President's decision to
deploy the ground-based mid-course missile defense by 2004, the
flight test schedule does not seem to have kept up. Three
intercept flight tests have been canceled. Now, why did you not
request enough funding to complete the flight test program with
the current interceptor design on schedule, while also
developing the new boosters? When will the objectives of the
three canceled flight tests be completed?
General Kadish. I think that, after the last flight test,
the best way I can answer that is we took a look at what we had
to do and what we have already done and tried to be good
stewards of the taxpayers' money and said: If we did the flight
test program that we had planned to do, using surrogate
booster, while at the same time putting new boosters into play,
two things would happen.
One, is we would repeat basically what we already knew in
the flight tests that we would do using the surrogate booster.
We would not be able to change the configuration. So we would
be doing tests confirming what we already knew about the
system. But we would probably have increased our confidence on
the reliability.
Traded with that would be the second thing, and that is
that there is only a finite amount of people involved in this
program at this point. We wanted to focus their attention on
what really needed to be done.
So the conclusion we collectively came to, and I think is
validated by Mr. Christie, is that it was prudent to focus our
attention on booster flight tests. We want to start up the
intercept tests in the proper configuration that we really want
to test, and suspend the other types of tests. The marginal
confidence and increase in knowledge would not necessarily be
worth the expense of those tests.
So we balanced the program. That is the effort we are
trying to execute right now. I think it is a prudent and wise
decision at this point.
Senator Bill Nelson. You want that system in Alaska by the
end of 2004. You have that X-band radar. It is not going to be
ready by then. So Mr. Secretary Crouch, will the President's
planned deployment of the national missile defense system in
Alaska still go ahead by the end of 2004, regardless of the
readiness of the radar?
Secretary Crouch. Yes, sir. My understanding is that the
modest capabilities that are planned for that system do not
require the sea-based X-band radar that you are speaking of.
But obviously, that sea-based X-band radar will, when it does
come on line beyond 2004, will provide some additional
capability to that system. But its primary purpose will be to
engage in testing for the system.
Senator Bill Nelson. Where is Shemya?
Secretary Crouch. Shemya is at the end of the Aleutian
chain in Alaska.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, that is a little island, you
have it there or the floating platform. Your answer would be
applicable to both?
Secretary Crouch. At this point, there is nothing in the
budget that would put the X-band radar in Shemya. That was part
of the old national missile defense system.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, you have had five successes
in 4 years. You have had, tell me if this is right, eight
flight interceptor tests and three of those have failed. Do you
have the confidence now that you are getting your hands around
the problems as you have developed, so that we are not going to
have that kind of success rate in the future, on your future
tests?
General Kadish. I am very confident in the approach we are
taking to the testing program. It is not only flight tests; it
is ground tests, it is simulations, it is a whole series of
different things that build our confidence.
In regard to the intercept tests, you are correct. There
were five successes in 4 years. But four of those successes
occurred in, I think, about a 13-month or 14-month time period;
and three out of the eight failed. Of the three failures that
we have had, one of my main frustrations is that they occurred
because we made a mistake in building the system, effectively a
quality control mistake. When you are dealing with prototype
hardware of this nature, unfortunately this occurs all too
frequently.
So one of the main focuses that I had in the program for
almost a couple years now, and it is coming to fruition with a
vengeance right now, is something called mission assurance. I
think you might be familiar with it. That has become the number
one criteria, even in our source selections, to make sure that
even our prototype hardware, our first hardware that we built,
now that we know the fundamental technology works, needs to be
built properly. These are very complex systems. We are going to
pay a lot of attention to that effort.
So my confidence stems from the fact that we have a basic
knowledge of the technology now. We know how to integrate it.
We will get experienced with it, with this test bed that we
will make operational. With the proper focus on mission
assurance and quality control, we could build it the way we
need to build it.
Senator Allard. Senator, we need to wrap it up. This panel
has been here for 3\1/2\ to 4 hours.
Senator Bill Nelson. So have I, Mr. Chairman; and I have
just completed my questions.
Senator Allard. Okay. Thank you.
Again, I would like to thank the panel for their time and
willingness to answer the questions from the members of this
panel. I want to thank you very much for your dedication and
your good work. Thank you. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Aldridge, many of the ballistic missile
defense programs currently being funded have no established performance
goals, architectures, or cost estimates. When will such goals be
established, how much money do you plan to spend on these programs
prior to establishing such goals, and which other major defense
programs do you plan to develop with no concrete performance and cost
goals or overall architectures?
Secretary Aldridge. The Secretary of Defense was definite about
goals and priorities for missile defense in his memorandum of January
2, 2002, which established ballistic missile defense as a single
program of work. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) immediately
established technical objectives and goals for a single program to
develop layered, integrated, ballistic missile defenses in depth for
our homeland, deployed forces, and friends and allies. The current
Statement of Goals provides even more detailed goals as they relate to
development for Block 04 of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS). In keeping with these goals, MDA developed cost estimates and
technical proposals to provide missile defenses as soon as practical.
This work created the budgets for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year
2004. As development and fielding progresses, MDA will adjust goals and
plan for technical development to keep pace with the ballistic missile
threat while providing affordable missile defenses. Consequently, while
there is a Block 04 architecture and cost estimate for limited fielded
defense, new technical capabilities responsive to emerging threats
drive an evolving architecture that may change significantly as the
BMDS becomes more effective in future blocks.

TESTING PAC-3 AGAINST SCUD TARGETS

2. Senator Levin. General Kadish, when do you plan to test the PAC-
3 system against actual SCUD targets and what is preventing you from
doing so now?
General Kadish. Testing of the PAC-3 missile became an Army
responsibility upon transfer of the program to the Army on March 31,
2003. MDA is still responsible as a ballistic missile target provider,
however, and stands ready to support the future PAC-3 test program. As
a part of the development and initial operational testing of the PAC-3,
we did not have actual SCUD targets available in appropriate quantities
and sufficient lead time to incorporate them into our test program.
There are a number of risks associated with the SCUD missile, such as
its accuracy, that make it impractical at many test ranges. The
resulting restrictions, including reliability, safety, environmental
and repeatability concerns, made SCUD-representative targets more
appropriate for early testing. Additionally, our testing philosophy is
to test against targets that represent a variety of threat solutions so
that we have a robust system capable of defending against a wide,
variable range of threats. This approach has reaped benefits in the
current conflict in Iraq.

DEPLOYING NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

3. Senator Levin. Mr. Christie, did you advise the President or
anyone else to deploy a national missile defense system in 2004?
Mr. Christie. I did not. However, I fully support building the test
bed to support more realistic testing and developing a concept of
operation. Also, the test bed may have some inherent capability that
could be employed in the event of a ballistic missile attack on the
United States.

APPROVING BLOCK 04 MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

4. Senator Levin. Mr. Christie, are you going to approve and
implement operational test plans for the Block 04 missile defense
systems prior to September 2004, so that we will know what the
demonstrated capabilities of the fielded systems are by the time they
are fielded?
Mr. Christie. I will review and approve the operational test plans
for the Block 2004 test bed. Each ground and flight test event will
address both developmental and operational test objectives. I will
review and comment on the developmental plans and approve the
operational plans. This process applies both prior to and after the
2004 deployment.

OPERATIONAL TESTING FOR MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

5. Senator Levin. General Kadish, when will operational testing in
accordance with current law for the ground-based national missile
defense and the sea-based missile defense systems be conducted?
General Kadish. Current testing of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) element developmental prototype is structured as combined
Developmental Testing/Operational Testing (DT/OT), occurring in a
Consolidated Test Force (CTF) environment. A CTF environment brings
together developmental and operational testers from both the prime
contractor team and the government in a common forum to plan and
execute all testing in accordance with combined DT and OT objectives to
the maximum extent practicable. Because GMD is an evolutionary
development, at designated intervals this process culminates in BMD
elements characterization, performed by the Operational Test Agencies
(OTAs), i.e., Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), and Joint Test
Interoperability Command (JTIC). At the time of each ``production off-
ramp,'' i.e., the transition of the developmental configuration into
production at some plateau in its evolution, an assessment of the OT
shortfall for that specific system configuration will be made. Based
upon this assessment, OT of the specific configuration will be
conducted, as required, to eliminate the shortfall.
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program has a Memorandum of
Agreement with the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
(COMOPTEVFOR), the Navy's OTA, to participate in the planning and
observe all Aegis BMD Block 2004 testing. Within 60 days following the
conclusion of each test, COMOPTEVFOR provides a ``Letter of
Observation'' which provides formal OTA feedback regarding system
performance to the Program Director, Aegis BMD. COMOPTEVFOR's
recommendations are then considered and, if possible, implemented in
subsequent testing. Flight Mission 9, which is currently the last test
of the Aegis BMD Block 2004 activity, is currently being planned as a
combined DT/OT. COMOPTEVFOR will conduct a formal Operational
Assessment of this system element.

AEGIS SHIPS

6. Senator Levin. General Kadish, the 2004 national missile defense
system to be deployed in 2004 relies on Aegis ships off the coast of
North Korea to protect Hawaii from missile attack. How many ships are
required to provide protection for Hawaii on a 24-hour, 7-day a week
basis (as well as to provide adequate self-protection for the ships)
and does the Navy have ``extra'' ships that it has agreed to provide
for this role? Has the Navy agreed to provide these ships on a 24/7
basis?
General Kadish. This issue is being actively worked directly with
the Chief of Naval Operations and his staff. This joint effort includes
a coordinated analysis of operational task force, and is considering
stationing one or two ships in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan to
provide Surveillance and Track Data to the BMD system. The Navy will
then determine how best to protect the ship(s).

7. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do the Aegis ships to be deployed
off the coast of North Korea as part of the Block 2004 system have the
demonstrated capability to track an ICBM targeting Hawaii from North
Korea with enough accuracy to prosecute an intercept using a ground-
based missile defense (GMD) interceptor? If so, how was this capability
demonstrated? Please provide a detailed answer at the classified level,
including the expected and demonstrated Aegis track accuracies as a
function of time compared to the handover requirements of the GMD
interceptor.
General Kadish. In the brief time since the withdrawal from the
Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, we have demonstrated the
capability of Aegis ships to track ICBMs with its Spy-1 radar in
Integrated Flight Tests 9 and 10. We cannot as yet say we can provide
data accurate enough to prosecute an intercept using a GMD interceptor.
However, our results are encouraging and support further analysis,
system modification, and testing of the extent of the capability to
provide not only cueing, but also, on certain trajectories, direct
support to the interceptor.

8. Senator Levin. General Kadish, can the Aegis ships planned to be
deployed off the coast of North Korea as part of the Block 2004 GMD
system defend themselves from anti-ship cruise missiles while
simultaneously tracking an ICBM which has targeted Hawaii, and will the
ICBM track from the ship have sufficient accuracy to prosecute an
intercept using a GMD interceptor?
General Kadish. Although the Aegis ship will not be able to conduct
other missions using the SPY-1 radar while conducting the BMD mission,
the ship still retains some self-defense capability through use of its
Close-In-Weapons-Systems (CIWS). Defense may also be provided by
another ship. The Navy is addressing how it will defend the
Surveillance and Track BMD ships. Continued improvements through Block
2004 will restore much of the self-defense capability of the Aegis BMD
ships. With regard to track inaccuracy, we cannot as yet say we can
provide data accurate enough to prosecute an intercept using a GMD
interceptor. However, our results are encouraging and support further
analysis, system modification, and testing of the capability to
determine whether it can provide cueing and, on certain trajectories,
direct support to the interceptor.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCK 04 GMD SYSTEM

9. Senator Levin. Secretary Aldridge, you stated at the hearing
that the Block 04 GMD system would have effectiveness ``in the 90
percent range.'' What is the basis for this estimate, and why does it
differ substantially from the classified probability of engagement
success values provided to the General Accounting Office by the Missile
Defense Agency earlier this year in the document titled, ``BMDS
Statement of Goals; Block 04 System Architecture''?
Secretary Aldridge. The BMDS Statement of Goals for the Block 04
System Architecture established system effectiveness values against a
range of targets and multiple trajectories. Higher effectiveness values
can be expected when multiple defense resources engage a single
adversary reentry. Actual effectiveness probabilities of engagement
success depend on various environmental factors, the number and types
of incoming missiles, defense capabilities available and deployable,
and ballistic missile command and control capabilities.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

ANOMALY PROBLEM WITH EKV

10. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you discovered the track gate
anomaly problem with the EKV during IFT-6 in July 2001. Why is it not
yet fixed, and when do you plan to fix it?
General Kadish. We first saw the track gate anomaly during IFT-6
and it recurred in all subsequent flight tests. We were able to
duplicate the anomaly during ground testing and found that it is likely
caused by introduction of electromagnetic interference (EMI) into the
EKV through some flight test-unique cabling. These cables are not part
of the EKV's operational hardware. Once we determined the probable
cause, the offending cables were eliminated and additional shielding
added to mitigate the EMI. We were unable to validate the fix on IFT-10
however, because of an unrelated hardware failure involving separation
of the EKV from the booster. Our next opportunity will be during IFT-14
in 1Q fiscal year 2004.
We have designed and built a very robust and capable system. It is
important to note that we had four consecutive successful intercepts in
which the EKV struck and killed the target vehicle despite experiencing
track gate anomalies. We have a high confidence that we solved the
track gate anomaly problem and look forward to demonstrating the fix on
IFT-14.

BUILDING A PERMANENT X-BAND RADAR

11. Senator Reed. General Kadish, when do you plan to build a
permanent, operational X-band radar to support the deployment of a
national missile defense against a North Korean threat?
General Kadish. Because the overall ballistic missile threat is
greater than North Korea alone, the BMDS is better served by the
positional flexibility afforded by a Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX).
Additionally, the SBX can support both operational needs and integrated
flight tests. For example, while both radars can provide operational
coverage of a specific region, the SBX also will support nearly all of
the remaining planned flight tests, while a fixed radar could support
only one. For these reasons, there currently are no plans to construct
a permanent operational XBR.

ICBM ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

12. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, in your February assessment of
missile defense programs, you stated that the 2004 national missile
defense deployment ``may have some intrinsic capability to acquire,
track, and intercept an inbound ICBM, under the right circumstances.''
Could you tell me whether you believe an actual ICBM attack against the
United States is likely to conform to the ``right circumstances'' you
allude to, and provide a general description of what the ``right
circumstances'' are?
Mr. Christie. The test bed elements are being built using
technology specifically designed to conduct ballistic missile defense
missions. It is being integrated by government organizations and
industry teams familiar with the mission and the technical challenges.
However, it will not be possible to demonstrate defensive capability
through testing that fully replicates the threat by the time the
fielding decision is made. The test bed will have some intrinsic, yet
unknown capabilities to defend against a limited attack. The right
circumstances that I refer to in my report are those situations where
we would expect the test bed capabilities to be most effective. While
the specific circumstances are classified, they generally relate to
timing, intelligence data, direction of attack, and the threat missile
and associated countermeasures.

FIXING THE GMD

13. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, your most recent report to Congress
stated that ``the GMD [national missile defense] element has yet to
demonstrate significant operational capability'' because ``the GMD test
program in fiscal year 2002 has suffered from . . . test infrastructure
limitations'' such as ``lack of a realistically placed mid-course
sensor'' and a ``fixed intercept point.'' Which of these problems will
be fixed by September 2004, which is the deployment date the
administration has set for national missile defense? Is it safe to say
that until those problems are fixed, it will be impossible to
demonstrate ``significant operational capability?''
Mr. Christie. If the test bed construction proceeds as scheduled,
the constraint of a fixed intercept point will be corrected by
September 2004. A realistically placed mid-course sensor for testing
will require the completion of the sea-based X-band radar, currently
scheduled for the end of calendar year 2005. It should be noted that
the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya is a realistically placed mid-course
sensor for a defensive mission, but is not easily included in testing
due to its fixed orientation. We will not have performed sophisticated
discrimination testing, so EKV and radar discrimination capability will
be unknown. The only way to test the full system in a variety of
operationally realistic configurations is to build the test bed. Until
the test bed is complete, operational capability will have to be
assessed based on the performance of the system and its elements in
more constrained encounters.

COST ESTIMATE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

14. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, the Fiscal Year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act required any missile defense program in the
``engineering and manufacturing development'' phase to provide the
estimated costs for the life of the program. This law defined
``engineering and manufacturing development'' as that phase which:

1. Translates the most promising design approach into a producible
design;
2. Validates the manufacturing process; and
3. Demonstrates system capabilities through testing.

The administration has decided to deploy ground-based national
missile defense and sea-based theater missile defense systems just 18
months from now. This surely places these systems well beyond the
``engineering and manufacturing development'' phase right now. When do
you intend to provide Congress with life cycle cost estimates for these
programs?
Secretary Aldridge. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is not
a program in engineering and manufacturing development. The President's
decision to field an initial capability in 2004 has not changed the
status of BMDS. The BMDS capabilities planned for Block 04 will use
developmental test articles designed to work together for an initial
layered missile defense capability.

EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

15. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, do you believe the missile defense
systems the administration has decided to field in 2004 have been
proven to be operationally suitable, effective, reliable, and
supportable in the field?
Mr. Christie. The two systems that may be fielded in 2004 are the
Aegis BMD system and the Block 2004 test bed, which consists of
elements of the GMD system. Both the Aegis and GMD program have
demonstrated some limited capability consistent with the mission of
defending against a limited ballistic missile attack. Operational
suitability and effectiveness are typically assessed based on a systems
performance in operational testing. Prior to September 2004 neither
system will have undergone sufficient testing to determine their
suitability and effectiveness. As I testified, the test bed will
provide the opportunity to acquire significant information on battle
management, command, control, communications, safety, reliability,
maintainability, and logistics supportability of the missile/silo/
command center complex. It can also be used for operator training and
for developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing the
test bed. Once the test bed is deployed, it will be used to execute the
flight tests.

GMD TESTING

16. Senator Reed. General Kadish, when do you plan to test the GMD
system against simple, realistic decoys that mimic the RV? When will
the system be tested against tumbling RVs together with simple,
tumbling RV-shaped balloons (please provide a classified answer, if
required)?
General Kadish. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

OPERATIONAL SYSTEM

17. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, the Missile Defense Agency
plans some 16 more major flight tests of the GMD system, and many more
major ground tests. Once the system is fielded in 2004, do you plan to
take the operational system off-line for this testing?
General Kadish. It will be possible to test the system while it is
on alert providing an initial defensive operations capability. It will
be critical to correctly time the testing, and MDA has already begun
discussions with STRATCOM and NORTHCOM in order to address this issue.

MID-COURSE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

18. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, since the President's
decision to deploy the ground-based mid-course missile defense system
in Alaska by the end of fiscal year 2004, three intercept flight tests
have been canceled. During the hearing, you stated that one reason why
they were canceled is that the tests would ``repeat basically what we
already knew.'' Does this mean that the three flight tests would have
been no more complex than the previous four flight tests, all of which
have been very similar?
General Kadish. MDA will continuously re-evaluate its test program
and adjust to meet evolving verifications needs. The decision to remove
1FT-11, -12, and -16 from the flight test plan was made prior to the
President's announcement to proceed with fielding initial defensive
operations (IDO) capabilities. Its important to note that since that
time, MDA renamed Radar Characterization Flight (RCF)-2 to IFT-16A.
MDA has long said that it will adjust its programs and schedules
based on successes and failures. It would be fiscally irresponsible--
while adding little to the current pool of data--to conduct another
flight test with similar testing configuration and component versions
that have been utilized and tested in five consecutive GMD flight tests
(during which we conducted four successful targets engagements).
Therefore, MDA decided to reprioritize the tests and concentrate on the
most immature component of the GMD element--the booster--and conduct
five critical booster test flights in fiscal year 2003, while
continuing to develop and construct the initial GMD parts of the BMDS
test bed and achieve initial operations capability by 2004.
With regard to IFT-16A: RCF-2 has been redesignated as IFT-16A and
rescoped as a system-level test involving a simulated intercept. IFT-
16A will specifically exercise the GMD element, especially the newly
upgraded Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR). IFT-16A, currently
scheduled for 4Q fiscal year 2004, is accelerated to support GMD system
assessment prior to fielding initial defensive capabilities.

19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, when do you plan to
increase test complexity to include targets with signatures,
countermeasures, and flight dynamics more closely matching the threat?
General Kadish. GMD flight test complexity continuously increases
as additional functionalities are added. Target signatures,
countermeasures, and flight dynamics are in concert with the current
threat estimates and the Adversary Capability Document.

IFT-10

20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, under the previous
administration's plan for NMD, IFT-10 would have included a relatively
realistic target suite. Could you please compare the original plan for
flight tests with the current plan, and explain the reason for any
differences?
General Kadish. IFT-10 was originally planned under a different set
of assumptions than the current BMDS program. The original purpose of
IFT-10 was to assess the capability of the NMD system against a
relatively realistic re-entry vehicle (RV) and target suite. There are
two primary differences between the planned and the completed IFT-10
mission: (1) Two additional objects were added to the target suite, and
(2) the mission was conducted at night. The two additional objects were
added to the target suite to increase the complexity of the intercept.
The mission was conducted at night to assess the systems performance in
a new flight test environment.

GMD INTERCEPTOR TESTING

21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, the GMD interceptor is
supposed to get in-flight targeting update messages to steer it towards
the target. I understand that you have not yet conducted a test where
in-flight target updates were actually used to change the course of the
interceptor. When is this type of test planned?
General Kadish. In IFT-15 we plan to commit the interceptor using
sensor track data external to GMD. This will require an In-Flight
Target Update (IFTU) based on GMD sensor data to further refine the
intercept point.

22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, should we proceed with
deployment of the GMD system if we have not yet completed a successful
test that includes aiming the interceptor with in-flight target
updates?
General Kadish. We have exercised the IFTU process during previous
successful IFTs, and plan to stress this process even more so during
IFT-15.

BLOCK 04 SYSTEM

23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, during the hearing, you
stated that the operational, fielded GMD system would require targeting
data to be loaded into the interceptor in advance of the intercept,
just as in the previously completed flight tests. For the Block 04
operational system, how long before launch does such target data need
to be loaded and what information needs to be included in the data load
(please provide technical details). Can we expect we will have that
information in real time in the event of a hostile missile launch
against the United States?
General Kadish. Targeting data can be loaded into the interceptor
immediately prior to launching the interceptor.
The interceptor requires the following targeting data to be loaded:

The predicted time and location in space where the
intercept will occur.
The range at which the interceptor can expect to `see'
the target.
Infrared and visual characteristics of the target that
will enable the interceptor to discriminate the target from
other nearby objects, e.g., decoys.

In addition to the above targeting data, the interceptor also loads
before launch:

Celestial coordinates of the stars that the
interceptor will use for navigation.
The times that communications events are scheduled to
occur to/from the ground.

The Block 2004 operational system will have hostile missile launch
early warning and cueing from space-based infrared satellites. The
predicted time and location in space where the intercept will occur is
calculated in real-time from data provided by tracking radars (i.e.,
Cobra Dane, Upgraded Early Warning Radars, the Navy's Aegis cruisers
and destroyers, and the Sea-Based X-band radar). Based on this real-
time information, targeting data is selected from a database and
uploaded to the interceptor prior to launch.

deployment of national missile defense system in alaska
24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Crouch, will the President's
planned deployment of the national missile defense system in Alaska go
ahead by the end of fiscal year 2004 regardless of the actual readiness
of the system or could that time line be adjusted to accommodate
additional necessary tests and preparations to achieve a working
system?
Secretary Crouch. In December 2002 the President directed the
Department of Defense to build on the missile defense test bed and
begin deployment of an initial set of missile defense capabilities in
2004 and 2005. These capabilities will serve as the starting point for
the evolutionary improvement of our missile defense capabilities, which
will evolve as technology and the threat develop. Additionally, over
the last 2 years we have conducted a successful flight testing program
which has given DOD the confidence to proceed with the deployment of
this initial set of capabilities. These capabilities will of course
continue to evolve and improve over time based on technical progress
and our continued testing program.

SPACE-BASED WEAPONS

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Crouch, if the administration
launches space-based weapons such as the space-based boost phase
interceptor test satellites, is it administration policy that such
satellites should be capable of being removed from space after they are
launched?
Secretary Crouch. The U.S. has made no decision to deploy space-
based weapons. Therefore, statements on operational issues associated
with deployment of such weapons would be premature at this time.

RADARS IN THE U.K.

26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Crouch, when does the U.S. plan
to upgrade the radars in the U.K. and Greenland for missile defense,
and how much funding will be required to protect the upgraded radars
and the local inhabitants from potential terrorist strikes on those
radars?
Secretary Crouch. The United Kingdom gave the U.S. permission to
proceed with the upgrade of the Fylingdales radar in February 2003. The
upgrade is currently scheduled to be completed by late-2005. Denmark is
willing to provide us permission to upgrade the Thule radar but also
wants to update the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement at the same
time. If we are eventually allowed to upgrade the radar, the plan is to
have the upgrade completed by mid-2006. We don't anticipate any
additional funding will be required to augment force protection
capabilities to protect these radars.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

LAYERED DEFENSE

27. Senator Clinton. General Kadish, as I understand it, the
missile defense program is designed to develop a ``layered defense''
capable of engaging all classes and ranges of ballistic missile
threats. It is designed to attack missiles in all phases of flight
including the boost phase (the part of the missile's flight from launch
until it stops accelerating under its own power), the mid-course phase
(where the missile has stopped thrusting but is gliding under its own
power), and the terminal phase (where the missile falls back into the
atmosphere). As you have noted, the initial deployment of a ballistic
defense system is slated to take place in 2004 in Fort Greeley, Alaska.
In your prepared testimony, you state that the President's decision to
deploy the system ``recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect
system at the outset.'' Will the system put in place by 2004 be able to
target missiles in each phase of launch?
General Kadish. The system in place by 2004 will be able to target
missiles in certain midcourse and terminal phases. Capabilities to
target missiles in the boost phase will be developed in Block 2006 with
kinetic intercept of boost phase included in the 2008 development
block. Boost phase fielding decisions have not yet been made.

MISSILE TESTING AGAINST COUNTERMEASURES

28. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Mr. Christie, Missile
Defense Agency documents acknowledge that during the mid-course phase,
there is a greater opportunity to deploy countermeasures against a
defensive system. These countermeasures include readily available
technology such as separating reentry vehicles, radar absorbing
material, booster fragmentation, low power jammers, chaff, and even
simple balloon decoys. Has there been any testing of the ability of the
missile defense system to respond to these countermeasures? What has
been the result?
General Kadish. Countermeasures exercised to date in the GMD
program have consisted of balloon decoys. Incremental changes in
complexity have been achieved by varying the type and number. In all
tests to date, the system has been able to identify and intercept the
reentry vehicle (RV) in the presence of countermeasures. In the near
term, future tests will be characterized by a transition to more
complex penetration aids (penaids) later in the test program. The
details of these future penaids and tests are classified.
Aegis BMD program has collected data while participating in flight
tests where countermeasures were present.
Mr. Christie. Yes, there has been both ground and flight testing
against countermeasures. MDA has a classified program that is
investigating the feasibility and effectiveness of various types of
countermeasures in laboratory environments and using modeling and
simulation. The data from these activities are used to predict expected
GMD system performance. System performance against some of the
postulated countermeasures can be adequately evaluated using hardware-
in-the-loop simulation; others will require flight-testing. To date,
flight-testing has included balloon decoys. As the test bed matures,
flight tests plans are to include more sophisticated countermeasures.

MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND NORTH KOREA'S CAPABILITIES

29. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Mr. Christie, ostensibly,
the decision to deploy a missile defense system by 2004 is to defend
the U.S. against a possible missile attack by North Korea. Will the
system in place by 2004 be able to defend against North Korean missiles
if they are equipped with countermeasures?
General Kadish. [Deleted.]
Mr. Christie. The test bed may have some inherent capability
against ballistic missiles, even with simple countermeasures, but it
will not be demonstrated in 2004. The test bed elements are being built
using technology specifically designed to conduct ballistic missile
defense missions. It is being integrated by government organizations
and industry teams familiar with the mission and the technical
challenges. However, it will not be possible to demonstrate defensive
capability through testing that fully replicates the threat by the time
the fielding decision is made.

30. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Mr. Christie, do we know if
the North Koreans are researching countermeasures technology for their
missile program?
General Kadish. As an acquisition agency, MDA depends upon DOD
intelligence agencies to assess specific adversary current and future
capabilities and research efforts. However, MDA's research and
capability based development approach allows for exploration of the
full range of known countermeasures and counter-countermeasures without
requiring precise intelligence information related to each adversary.
Mr. Christie. I think it is safe to assume that North Korea does
have some type of a countermeasures research program. We do not know
what North Korea is doing with countermeasures, but it is possible that
the Missile Defense Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency could
provide some insight into North Korea's countermeasure research
activities.

BOOST PHASE MISSILE

31. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Secretary Crouch, the boost
phase missile defense approach is the one that seems the least affected
by possible countermeasures. Given that the location of North Korea and
Iran--the most likely threats of a ballistic missile threat--are such
that a boost-phase intercept system is technically feasible, how are
boost phase interceptors incorporated into your missile defense plan?
General Kadish. The boost-phase interceptors are incorporated into
the layered BMDS by first providing a terrestrial kinetic energy
interceptor capability against boost/ascent targets with a ground
mobile launcher in Block 2008. In Block 2010 plans are to sea-base this
capability to provide additional geographic flexibility. We plan
further evolution of this capability in Block 2012 by expanding the
interceptor capability to counter targets in mid-course. MDA also plans
to initiate a parallel space-based boost interceptor development
activity starting in fiscal year 2004.
Secretary Crouch. Development and testing of boost-phase
interceptors is an important element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System. We are developing directed energy and kinetic energy boost
phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer near the hostile
missile's launch point. We require quick reaction times, high
confidence decisionmaking, and redundant engagement capabilities to
counter ballistic missiles in this phase. The most mature of the boost
phase systems is the Airborne Laser (ABL). The ABL is currently under
development and is being designed to acquire, track, and kill ballistic
missiles in the boost phase using speed-of-light technology. The first
shoot down test of ABL is scheduled for fiscal year 2005. We are also
developing a terrestrial kinetic energy boost interceptor, and have
requested from Congress funds for a test program to determine the
feasibility of intercepting missiles during the boost and ascent phase
from space.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Akaka, and
Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Mary Alice
A. Hayward, professional staff member; and Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Jennifer Key,
and Sara R. Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to
Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; D'Arcy
Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to
Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani
Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka;
William K. Sutey and Peter A. Contostavlos, assistants to
Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
receive testimony from Secretary of Energy Abraham, a very dear
and valued colleague of this institution. He will present the
posture of the defense-related activities of the Department of
Energy, as well as the President's defense budget request for
fiscal year 2004 and the future years defense program. We
welcome our witness this morning.
This is an important annual posture hearing for this
committee. This committee has jurisdiction over approximately
two-thirds of the Department of Energy's budget, the parts of
the budget related to defense or former defense missions.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the defense related
missions of the Department of Energy (DOE) is $16.6 billion, a
4-percent real increase over the 2003 appropriated level.
The budget request also contains a number of initiatives
which focus on the future of our nuclear deterrent, including
the repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons research, a
transition to an 18-month underground nuclear test readiness
posture, and a new initiative to reconstitute an advanced
concept program which would promote concept and feasibility
studies at the national nuclear weapons laboratories.
I will waive further reading so we can proceed with this.
All of us have a full agenda, as does the Secretary.
I would like to submit the rest of my statement for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from
Secretary of Energy Abraham, on the posture of the defense-related
activities of the Department of Energy, as well as on the President's
defense budget request for fiscal year 2004 and the future years
defense program. I welcome our distinguished witness and former
colleague back before the committee.
This is an important, annual posture hearing for this committee.
This committee has jurisdiction over approximately two-thirds of the
Department of Energy's budget--the parts of the budget related to
defense or former defense missions.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the defense-related
missions of DOE is $16.6 billion, a 4-percent real increase over the
fiscal year 2003 appropriated level. The budget request also contains a
number of initiatives which focus on the future of our nuclear
deterrent, including a repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons
research, a transition to an 18-month underground nuclear test
readiness posture, and a new initiative to reconstitute an ``advance
concepts'' program, which would promote concept and feasibility studies
at the national nuclear weapons laboratories where upon scientific
discovery can thrive.
The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile was designed and manufactured to
deter and defeat targets in the former Soviet Union. As such, it worked
very effectively as a deterrent for over 50 years. While the United
States needs to continue to maintain its deterrent capability, we must
also address the new threats posed by rogue nations and transnational
groups intent on acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in December 2001,
established a new defense strategy--a strategy which included a plan to
reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. The NPR provided the vision for
realigning our Nation's strategic defenses within a new triad, which
includes offensive strike systems, both nuclear and non-nuclear;
defenses, both active and passive; and a revitalized defense
infrastructure to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet
emerging threats. The ``advanced concepts'' initiative is part of this
triad.
Ensuring that our scientists and engineers are challenged and are
free to think, research, discover, innovate, and create is imperative.
That was the type of environment in which the nuclear weapons program
was born with the Manhattan Project. We must make sure such freedom to
research and develop is present in our national weapons laboratories if
we are to deter and, if necessary, counter 21st century threats.
I have long been concerned about the congressionally-mandated
prohibition on research on precision low-yield nuclear weapons. The
budget request specifically requests a repeal of this ban on low-yield
nuclear weapons research. In their budget request, the administration
found the ``legislation has negatively affected U.S. Government efforts
to support the national strategy to counter WMD and undercuts efforts
that could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to, new or
emerging threats.''
While there may not be a current military requirement for a low-
yield nuclear weapon, that does not mean the research is not important
or valid, or that there will not be a future military requirement for
such a weapon. In fact, the research could greatly benefit our
scientists and their understanding of nuclear weapons, to include a
better understanding of what our potential adversaries may be able to
produce. Additionally, such research would provide valuable experience
for new scientists and engineers, especially as test-experienced
scientists continue to reach retirement age.
I have also been concerned in recent years with our test readiness
posture. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is focused on
maintaining the existing nuclear weapons stockpile in such a manner
that it can be certified as safe, secure, and reliable, without the
need for underground nuclear testing. This is quite a challenge,
particularly as the average age of weapons in the stockpile has grown
beyond 20 years.
While the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program seems to have
been successful thus far in enabling DOE to annually certify the
safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile, if the Stockpile
Stewardship Program reveals a problem across a weapon-type in the
stockpile, actual underground nuclear testing may be the only way to
resolve the problem. Today, if such a problem were discovered, it would
take 3 years for DOE to be ready to conduct an actual test to help
resolve the problem. This timeline must be changed. Ensuring that we
have an enhanced test readiness posture is vital. The 18-month
readiness posture proposed by the administration does not mean that we
will conduct a test, but instead that we will be ready to do so should
circumstances arise which require testing.
The President of the United States should have the broadest range
of capabilities available to respond to adversaries who threaten the
safety and security of the United States. We should not place
artificial limits on the intellectual capabilities of our gifted
scientists. As threats emerge which cannot be deterred or destroyed
with conventional weapons, our President must have other options
available to protect the citizens of the United States, our interests
and our allies. This has been the policy of the United States for
almost 60 years. The President should not be limited by our 20th
century nuclear weapons which were designed to deter or defeat 20th
century threats. The President should have a wide array of conventional
and nuclear weapons to deter or, if necessary, defeat 21st century
targets which continue to emerge.
Secretary Abraham, thank you for your service to our Nation. We
look forward to your testimony.

Senator Levin?
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will also
follow that course of action, given the events that take up so
much of everybody's time here and simply put my statement in
the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I join Senator Warner in welcoming you
to the committee this morning to discuss the Department of Energy's
budget request for fiscal year 2004.
The Department of Energy's total budget request for fiscal year
2004 is $23.4 billion, of which $16.6 billion, or about two-thirds of
the overall DOE budget, is for defense-funded activities and, thus,
under the jurisdiction of this committee. These defense-funded
activities include the environmental cleanup program, the nuclear
nonproliferation programs, the nuclear weapons activities, and the
naval reactors development program. The National Nuclear Security
Administration is responsible for the nonproliferation programs, the
nuclear weapons program, and the naval reactors program.

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Earlier this month, the Department of Energy, Russia, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) co-sponsored an international
conference on the protection of radiological devices and other nuclear
and radiological materials that could possibly be used in a
radiological dispersal device--a so-called ``dirty bomb.'' I understand
that this conference was well attended and successfully highlighted the
need to provide greater security for much of this material. Secretary
Abraham, I am interested in your views on this subject and what
additional actions the DOE and other U.S. Government agencies are
taking to provide the necessary additional security for these and other
materials.
After several years of delays the DOE nonproliferation programs
appear to be back on track. While DOE, the Department of Defense, and
the State Department have improved the security of significant
quantities of weapons grade fissile materials and nuclear weapons, in
the 10 years of the Nunn-Lugar program, much remains to be done. About
37 percent of the short-term upgrades are in place, but only about 17
percent of the comprehensive security-measures are in place.
Earlier this month, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the John F.
Kennedy School of Government released a new report, ``Controlling
Nuclear Warheads and Materials, A Report Card and Action Plan.'' In a
forward to this report, Senator Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn
wrote: ``Preventing terrorism with weapons of mass destruction must
become the central organizing security principle of the 21st century.
It is the only threat whose danger is dire and diffuse enough to unify
all nations, and it will take the unity of all nations to meet that
threat.'' They remain concerned that one of ``the biggest obstacles to
action is overcoming the denial that such an attack could occur and the
paralysis that comes from believing the job is too massive and too
overwhelming to be done. . . We must finally face the truth about the
scale of the threat and build a partnership of nations with the methods
and means to respond.''
The report itself makes several key findings with respect to the
threat and the actions that need to be taken to address the threat.
Significant emphasis is placed on the importance of securing materials
at the source. ``The most effective approach to reducing the risk is a
multi-layered defense to block each step on the terrorist pathway to
the bomb. But securing nuclear weapons and materials at their source is
the single most critical layer of this defense, where actions that can
be taken now will do the most to reduce the risk of terrorists
acquiring nuclear weapons and material, at the least cost.'' While we
have put in place short-term upgrades for 37 percent of the material,
that means that 63 percent of the material has had no security
upgrades. Secretary Abraham, I know that you share the concerns about
the security of the materials, and I look forward to working with you
to address promptly this threat.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Protecting and securing nuclear weapons and materials is just one
aspect of a successful nonproliferation program. Coordinating nuclear
weapons policy and nonproliferation policy is also essential.
Over the course of the past 2 years, the administration has taken
several actions that would indicate more emphasis and importance is
being placed on nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation and the nuclear
weapons policies and actions of the United States are inextricably
connected, and we must be conscious of that interaction. I look forward
to discussing this issue with you as well.

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP

The Department has been making good progress on the cleanup of the
nuclear weapons complex. As I understand it, you are moving to
accelerate the cleanup effort even more. Further acceleration will
require close cooperation with the communities, the States and the
Environmental Protection Agency, as well as some additional funding.
This is certainly a significant challenge. I look forward to hearing
your plans for accelerated cleanup and how Congress could be of help.
It is a pleasure to have you back before the committee.
Thank you, Senator Warner.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator McCain, do you have any opening comment?
Senator McCain. No, thank you.
Chairman Warner. Fine. I would also like to submit for the
record the statement of Senator Roberts.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to offer my welcome to our
distinguished witness today.
First, I want to commend you, Secretary Abraham, and the
administration, for presenting Congress with a fiscal year 2004 budget
request for the DOE nonproliferation programs that is the highest ever
in the history of these programs. This shows the importance the
President has placed on these nonproliferation programs. Moreover, this
budget is 30 percent more than what was requested last year. This
increase alone is unprecedented.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities with oversight responsibilities for both the DOE and DOD
nonproliferation programs, I am pleased that these programs are
receiving Presidential level support and cooperation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is getting worse,
not better. Despite years of nonproliferation treaties and regimes
designed to curb and control such proliferation, today's reality is
that more nations and non-state actors have these capabilities, despite
these multilateral efforts. We must recognize this fact and protect
against it to the best of our abilities. The emerging threats that this
committee identified in past years are the threats of today.
For this reason, it is incumbent upon Congress to ensure that these
nonproliferation programs succeed. We must be certain that these
programs' goals are being met by ensuring that Congress has a way of
measuring program progress and achievements. By providing the resources
and the necessary oversight, Congress must remain vigilant and deliver
what is promised to the American people.
I applaud your diligent efforts in moving these nonproliferation
programs forward to meet the threats posed by proliferating weapons of
mass destruction around the world. Thank you for your remarks today and
for your contributions to U.S. national security.

Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Secretary Abraham. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I thank the
ranking member and my former colleague from Michigan, Senator
McCain, and others on the committee. Obviously, we meet as many
international events are taking place in the world today that
bring us here under unique circumstances, ones I know we all
join in our support of the combat teams in the field.
Our Department obviously plays a part in the support of our
national security. Literally all of the Department's
activities, from our defense programs to the many programs we
have to promote energy security and scientific leadership,
address national security concerns, but today I just will make
a brief opening statement and submit for the record a longer
statement that outlines our Department's budget.
Just a few top-line points. Of our $23.4 billion request
for the fiscal year 2004 budget, 70 percent, or $16.6 billion,
is for national security programs. Of that amount, $8.8 billion
will support the activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), and $7.2 billion will fund our
environmental cleanup programs, with the remaining $600 million
devoted to other defense activities.
NNSA has a huge responsibility for maintaining our Nation's
nuclear stockpile, rebuilding the capabilities of our defense
complex, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and
materials, and continuing our strong naval reactors program.
Because of our successful efforts in these areas over the
past 2 years, the Department has been entrusted with added
responsibilities and the means to execute them more
effectively. Our 2004 budget submission of $8.8 billion for
defense programs and NNSA includes a $925 million increase over
last year to carry out the defense program responsibilities and
our nonproliferation programs.
Our nuclear capability continues to be a key strategic
component of our Nation's security posture, and certifying to
the President the safety and the reliability of our stockpile
is among the highest, if not the highest, responsibilities I
have as the Secretary of Energy.
Our challenge today is large. It is complex. We must
maintain the safety, security, and reliability, as well as the
effectiveness of our aging nuclear weapons stockpile without
resort to underground testing. Our budget proposes $6.4 billion
in spending for stockpile stewardship and the rebuilding of our
defense complex, a $532 million increase over the fiscal year
2003 budget proposal.
We will use our increased funding to continue advancing the
scientific and the manufacturing capabilities we need over the
long term. Last fall we awarded a contract to build the two
largest supercomputers in the world to help us ensure our long-
term ability to certify the safety, reliability, and the
effectiveness of the weapons in our stockpile.
The Department will also continue to refurbish aging
weapons under our stockpile life extension program to ensure
that they remain safe and effective. We will continue to
dismantle warheads and bombs which are retired from the
stockpile, and we will continue to make progress toward
restoring the capability to manufacture and certify war-reserve
plutonium pits for the stockpile.
Finally, in order to carry out all these activities, the
budget funds programs that will allow our Department to
continue to restore, rebuild, and revitalize the physical
infrastructure of the weapons complex. While we work to keep
our stockpile ready, safe, and secure, we must at the same time
expand our already productive efforts to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and materials. During the past 2 years, our
Department has significantly improved control of Russian
nuclear materials. We put the plutonium disposition program on
a sound footing, revitalized the program to shut down Russian
plutonium-producing reactors, and accelerated the program to
protect Russian nuclear materials and Russian Navy nuclear
weapons. We have enhanced our ability to detect weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological
systems and other terrorist threats, and we have reduced the
risks of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide.
As a result of the unprecedented levels of cooperation
reached by President Bush and President Putin to control the
proliferation of nuclear materials, Russia and the United
States have agreed to complete the work of protecting some 600
tons of Russian fissile material by 2008, a full 2 years
earlier than expected.
In addition, the United States, Russia, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this year will
intensify international cooperation to keep radioactive
materials, the kind that could be used in the construction of
so-called dirty bombs, out of the hands of terrorists. That
work took a large step forward in Vienna last week when we co-
chaired an international conference on ways nations can work
individually and collectively to account for and secure
radioactive sources. Representatives from over 120 countries
attended the conference, which we co-chaired with Russia and
the IAEA.
To carry out our complex nonproliferation work, we have
increased our total nonproliferation budget to more than $1.3
billion, a 30-percent increase over last year. That budget will
make it possible for the Department to increase our
international monitoring visits to sensitive nuclear sites by
one-third, to boost our contributions to international
safeguards work carried out through the IAEA and other
cooperative programs by 17 percent over 2003 funding.
We will also continue to move ahead with work related to
plutonium disposition facilities in both the United States and
Russia to eliminate excess weapons plutonium and accelerate our
program for the elimination of Russian highly enriched uranium.
Our longstanding naval reactors program is responsible for
the safe operation of the reactor plants that power 40 percent
of our Navy's combatant ships, as well as for new nuclear
propulsion plants. Our budget request of $768 million for naval
reactors, an increase over the fiscal year 2003 appropriation,
will allow for the development and deployment later in this
decade of a new design reactor core to meet the requirements of
longer, harder ship deployments.
As we carry out our national defense duties, our
responsibilities also extend to cleaning up the legacy of a
half of a century of nuclear defense work here at home. Our
budget submission of $7.2 billion for environmental management
is the highest amount ever requested for these programs. These
funds will allow us to continue with our reformed accelerated
cleanup effort which will increase or accelerate completion of
environmental cleanup programs by 35 years, reduce risk to the
public and the environment, and save taxpayers more than $50
billion in program costs.
Mr. Chairman, I could obviously go on at great length, but
in the interest of the events of today and the committee's
desire, I know, to complete its work swiftly today, I will
submit the rest of my statement for the record and obviously
look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you
for having me.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Abraham follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Spencer Abraham

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is a
pleasure to be here today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2004
budget request for the Department of Energy (DOE). In doing so, I want
to stress the ways this budget is going to help us accomplish our
various missions related to defense and the environment.
The President's fiscal year 2004 budget of $23.4 billion for the
DOE continues the administration's commitment to ensure national
defense and safeguard the Nation's energy security through advances in
science and technology, as well as fulfill our obligation as
environmental stewards to surrounding communities. While DOE's national
policy objectives have not changed, this budget reflects a new approach
toward conducting business at the Department of Energy. Reengineering
efforts that we began in fiscal year 2002 have taken shape:
programmatic activities are better focused to achieve primary mission
objectives; budget priorities are set with improved measurable
performance criteria; and corporate management initiatives reflect
aggressive implementation of the President's Management Agenda.
Of the total fiscal year 2004 budget request of $23.4 billion,
approximately 71 percent of the total Department of Energy budget, or
$16.6 billion, is for the Department's defense programs within the
jurisdiction of this committee. Within the $16.6 billion budget, $8.8
billion is to support activities in the National Nuclear Security
Administration, $6.8 billion to fund the environmental cleanup
activities, $430 million to fund the Defense Nuclear Waste Fund, and
$522.7 million to fund Other Defense Activities.
This budget request reflects and addresses the critical challenges
we face today and will continue to face in the coming decades. I have
charted a course for the Department that emphasizes DOE's critical
contributions to our Nation's national security and provides forward-
reaching solutions to America's energy problems. These priorities as
they relate to this committee's jurisdiction are to:

meet our responsibilities to maintain the nuclear
stockpile;
expand and make more comprehensive our non-
proliferation activities;
accelerate the environmental cleanup program; and
build and maintain a stable and effective national
defense program to respond to the guidance in the Nuclear
Posture Review with special emphasis on revitalizing laboratory
and production plant infrastructure.

The fiscal year 2004 budget is focused to deliver on these
priorities.
As part of the Department's Strategic Planning process these
priorities translate into six overlapping departmental goals that form
our core mission of national security. All of the Department's planning
and budgeting for fiscal year 2004 drives toward these six goals:

maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear
deterrent;
control nuclear proliferation;
reduce dependence on energy imports;
achieve a cleaner, healthier environment;
improve our energy infrastructure to ensure the
reliable delivery of energy; and
maintain a world class scientific research capability.

Formulation of this year's budget reflects significant management
changes occurring within the Department. Guided by the President's
Management Agenda and the management reforms I started in fiscal year
2001, and incorporated more fully into the budgeting process in 2002,
this budget implements integrated, long-term program planning and
performance accountability. The Department is implementing a 5-year
programmatic and planning framework to provide an unprecedented
opportunity to consider future impacts in determining current year
funding priorities. This budget was formulated to deliver measurable
results to reach the Department's strategic goals. This achievement is
a significant step toward reaching our key goal to focus DOE activities
to adhere to the primary mission of national security. By streamlining
program activities and management structures, the Department of Energy
will more effectively and efficiently manage and produce the results
expected by American taxpayers.

PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA

Rising to the challenge of the President's Management Agenda, the
Department is beginning to improve how it manages, budgets, and plans
for all programs, projects and activities. By improving management,
performance, and accountability, the Department is striving for a level
of performance that keeps DOE programs safe, on track, and on budget. A
system of scorecards is being used to evaluate the effectiveness of
various programs and allocate resources to achieve this end.
Performance measures are improving to ensure that they are specific,
quantifiable, concise, comprehensive, and relevant to the American
taxpayer. Also, in accordance with the President's commitment to an
expanded and effective electronic government, DOE is centrally managing
information technology investments and other capital assets to reduce
waste, increase productivity and provide increased services at lower
cost.
Research and Development Investment Criteria
The President's Management Agenda calls for consistent and
sufficient evaluation of future research and development (R&D)
investments and past performance. In response, the Department developed
internal guidance for programs to score their R&D activities against
the administration's applied R&D investment criteria. This approach
focuses R&D dollars on long-term, potentially high-payoff activities
that require Federal involvement to be both successful and achieve
public benefit. The Department will continue to work to develop
consistent scoring and benefits estimation methods, to permit
comparison of applied R&D programs across the Department. The applied
R&D scorecard process is an important way the Department is integrating
performance into the budget. The scorecard process is in its second
year of development. The goal is to develop high analytical
justifications for applied research portfolios in future budgets. This
will require the development and application of a uniform cost and
benefit evaluation methodology across programs to allow meaningful
program comparisons.
Program Assessment Rating Tool
In addition to the use of R&D investment criteria, the Department
implemented a new tool to evaluate the management effectiveness of
selected programs. The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was
developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide a
standardized way to assess the effectiveness of the Federal
Government's portfolio of programs. While OMB's objective for fiscal
year 2004 was to evaluate 20 percent of each government agency, the
Department of Energy reviewed nearly 60 percent of its activities
through the PART process. The departmental elements that participated
were: Environmental Management; Science; Fossil Energy; Nuclear Energy;
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy; the Power Marketing
Administrations; and the National Nuclear Security Administration.The
structured framework of the PART provides a means through which
programs can assess their activities differently than through
traditional reviews. While some of the programs received less than
favorable scores, the information exchange between the Department and
OMB proved quite valuable. The current focus is to establish outcome-
and output-oriented goals, the successful completion of which will lead
to benefits to the public, such as increased national security and
energy security, and improved environmental conditions. The Department
will incorporate feedback from OMB into the fiscal year 2005 budget and
planning process, and will take the necessary steps to continue to
improve performance. The results of the reviews are reflected in the
Department's fiscal year 2004 budget.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

The Department of Energy, through the National Nuclear Security
Administration, preserves U.S. national security by ensuring the
safety, security, and reliability of our Nation's nuclear deterrent,
working to reduce the global danger from the proliferation of nuclear
materials and other weapons of mass destruction, and providing
technical expertise in advancing Homeland Security. The fiscal year
2004 budget request for NNSA is $8.8 billion, a $925 million increase
above the fiscal year 2003 budget request, and includes:

Weapons Activities ($6.4 billion)
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation ($1.3 billion)
Naval Reactors ($768 million)
Office of the NNSA Administrator ($348 million)

The administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) set the current
national nuclear weapons policy reflected in the Department's fiscal
year 2004 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). The NPR calls for the NNSA to maintain the
viability of the Nation's nuclear weapons capability without the use of
underground testing; develop a stockpile surveillance and engineering
base; refurbish and extend the lives of selected warheads; and maintain
a science and technology base, including responsive facilities and
infrastructure, needed to ensure the safety and reliability of the
Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile.
The Department's NNSA has recently implemented a major
reorganization that follows the principles of the President's
Management Agenda, to improve government through performance and
results. The new organizational structure eliminates a layer of
management, consolidates offices and administrative functions, and sets
NNSA on a course to achieve an almost 20-percent reduction in Federal
personnel by the end of fiscal year 2004.
Weapons Activities
One of my most important responsibility as Secretary of Energy is
to certify to the President the safety and reliability of our nuclear
stockpile. Our nuclear weapons capability protected the Nation and
helped us to win the 50-year Cold War. Today it continues to be a key
strategic component of our Nation's security posture. Our challenge
today is large and complex: we must maintain the safety; security;
reliability; and effectiveness of our aging nuclear weapons stockpile
without resort to underground testing. We must also provide a
manufacturing base for the production of a replacement weapon if the
need should arise.
Our fiscal year 2004 budget proposes $6.4 billion for the Weapons
Activities program, which also includes funding for safeguards and
security for NNSA sites and for rebuilding our national security
infrastructure. For the last 7 years, the Stockpile Stewardship Program
has allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify to the
President that (1) the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is safe,
secure and reliable and (2) that there is no need to resume underground
testing.
To ensure that the existing stockpile continues to meet its
military requirements, the NNSA also has a comprehensive refurbishment
program known as stockpile life extension. It is presently working on
four warhead types in the enduring stockpile--the W87, W76, B61, and
the W80. This program designs, builds, tests, and installs new
subsystems and components thereby extending the operational service
life for these warheads for some 30 years.
NNSA is also restoring the full suite of manufacturing capabilities
needed to respond to any stockpile contingency.
NNSA is installing an interim pit production capability at Los
Alamos. Later this year Los Alamos will deliver a W88 pit that will
meet all quality manufacturing requirements for use in the stockpile.
This will be the first pit made by the United States since the shutdown
of Rocky Flats in 1989. NNSA has begun work on design and siting for a
modern pit facility that will be capable of manufacturing all pit types
for the current stockpile and any new requirements, should they arise.
To complete the materials supply story, NNSA will begin producing new
tritium for the stockpile by irradiation of tritium producing rods in a
TVA reactor this fall.
We are also investing in the leading edge scientific and
engineering tools required to support the stockpile now and into the
future. Three areas deserve special mention. First, with the advanced
scientific computing initiative (ASCI), NNSA is working with U.S
computer manufacturers to acquire the world's fastest and most capable
computers to address nuclear weapons performance issues that several
years ago were impossible to solve. Second, the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrotest Facility at Los Alamos is providing ``cat-scan-like'' images
of weapons implosion processes. This test bed provides critical data to
validate the ASCI codes. Third, later this year, the world's most
powerful laser, the National Ignition Facility, will begin to carry out
experiments at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in support of
the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As the Nuclear Posture Review highlighted, the threats we face
today are dramatically different from those we faced a few years ago.
To ensure that future American Presidents have deterrence options to
deal with these threats, we have a modest Advanced Concepts program
($21 million) underway. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) will
be allocated $15 million. This program will examine whether or not two
existing warheads in the stockpile--the B61 and the B83--can be
sufficiently hardened through case modifications and other work to
allow the weapons to survive penetration into various geologies, with
high reliability, before detonating. The remaining funds will be
divided between the weapons laboratories for studies of other advanced
concepts work.
DOE supports about $1 billion annually for ongoing operation of
NNSA facilities at the government-owned, contractor-operated, national
laboratories, production plants, and test site. In addition, $273
million is requested in fiscal year 2004 for 8 new construction starts
and 12 ongoing construction projects. The Facilities and Infrastructure
Recapitalization Program ($265 million) is responsive to the Nuclear
Posture Review infrastructure guidance, and is in its third year to
restore, rebuild and revitalize the physical infrastructure of the
nuclear weapons complex that has deteriorated and is in immediate need
of attention. This program is tightly structured to address highest
priority needs, to eliminate deferred maintenance requirements, and
eliminate excess space in all nuclear weapons complex facilities. Our
responsibilities also encompass security for the nuclear weapons
complex. In the past year, we have placed the highest priority on
addressing urgent, emergent concerns about the safeguards and security
posture of our Nation-wide complex of facilities and transportation
systems following the events of September 11, 2001. In addition to
increasing our protective forces, enhancing training, and upgrading
equipment, we will begin a modest R&D effort to try to improve the
effectiveness of technologies for physical and cyber security. We also
upgraded our emergency response assets, which are available to be
deployed in emergencies around the world.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
America's safety must be our paramount concern. Presidents Bush and
Putin have agreed to an unprecedented level of bilateral cooperation to
control the proliferation of nuclear materials. The President's fiscal
year 2004 budget request of $1.3 billion for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation reflects the administration's full commitment to
reducing the global nuclear danger and participating in the Global
Partnership to sustain nuclear nonproliferation initiatives in the
former Soviet Union. This request supports departmental programs to:
(1) enhance U.S. capability to detect nuclear weapons proliferation,
(2) prevent and reverse proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), (3) protect or eliminate weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
material and/or infrastructure, and redirect excess foreign weapons
expertise to civilian enterprises, and (4) reduce the risk of accidents
in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide.
The fiscal year 2004 funding level for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation reflects a 30-percent increase over the fiscal year
2003 request of $1 billion. The increase provides for the start of
construction of a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility in the
U.S. and U.S. efforts to assist Russia with the start of construction
of an industrial scale MOX fuel fabrication facility. In addition to
MOX construction activities, the request of $657 million for Fissile
Material Disposition supports completion of design activities for the
pit disassembly and conversion facility and continuation of the U.S.
``off-spec'' HEU blend-down project.
Additionally, the request includes $30 million to implement a new
program to accelerate nuclear materials disposition efforts in support
of the 2002 G8 Summit initiatives to purchase Russian highly enriched
uranium (HEU) above the amounts in the 1993 U.S./Russia HEU Purchase
Agreement. The United States is currently in the process of drafting
agreements with Russia for the purchase of highly enriched uranium from
Russia to supply selected U.S. research and test reactors and for the
purchase of downblended Russian HEU for a low-enriched uranium (LEU)
stockpile in Russia.
The fiscal year 2004 request also provides $40 million for the
Russian Transition Initiative (RTI) to reduce the migration risk of
nuclear and WMD expertise in the former Soviet Union. The RTI partners
former Soviet weapons scientists with U.S. industry partners on
projects selected for their commercial potential, while also assisting
the Russians in downsizing their nuclear weapons complex and opening
the closed nuclear cities to commercial ventures. RTI has garnered over
$125 million in matching resources from U.S. industry partners, which
amounts to $3 in private sector funds for every $2 in U.S. Government
funding. In addition, private investment funding has contributed over
$90 million to further augment its technology commercialization
efforts.
The fiscal year 2004 request also includes $50 million to assist
the Russian Federation to cease its production of weapons-grade
plutonium by providing replacement power production capacity. In fiscal
year 2003, responsibility for the program was transferred from the
Department of Defense to the Department of Energy. Agreements were
recently signed with the Russian Federation, allowing work to be
initialized on this program.
The request includes $204 million to support the research,
development, testing, and evaluation of nuclear proliferation detection
technologies for agencies responsible for monitoring proliferation and
combating terrorism.
A request of $226 million for the International Nuclear Materials
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program will continue to
improve the security of weapons-usable nuclear material and weapons in
Russia, and secure materials that could be used in radiological
dispersion devices (dirty bombs). Specifically, the Department is
working to secure approximately 600 metric tons of fissile materials
and thousands of warheads. The program provides for security of trucks
and railcars transporting nuclear weapons-usable materials and
consolidates nuclear material at fewer locations in order to reduce
vulnerability from theft and sabotage. In fiscal year 2004, cooperation
will expand to include Russian strategic rocket forces.
Additionally, the MPC&A request supports efforts to install
radiation detection equipment at borders of Russia and the former
Soviet Union in order to prevent nuclear smuggling and illicit
trafficking.
The Nonproliferation and International Security request of $102
million supports U.S. efforts to control exports of items and
technology that aid in the development of WMD, implement international
safeguards in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and explore and implement innovative approaches to improve regional
security.
In addition, the fiscal year 2004 request includes an increase for
development and delivery of tools to meet requirements to detect,
understand, and verify dismantlement of clandestine nuclear programs.
Naval Reactors
The Naval Reactors program is responsible for the safe operation of
reactor plants in operating nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
carriers constituting 40 percent of the Navy's combatants. It also
fulfills the Navy's requirements for new nuclear propulsion plants that
meet current and future national defense requirements. The program is
beginning development and will deploy, later this decade, a new design
reactor core to meet the demands of longer, harder ship deployments.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request totals $768 million, an increase of
$612 million over the fiscal year 2003 appropriations, and allows Naval
Reactors to fund this transitional technology.

ACHIEVE A CLEANER, HEALTHIER ENVIRONMENT

Protecting the environment is compatible with increasing the supply
of dependable, domestically produced energy. As President Bush has
said, ``Sustained economic growth is the solution, not the problem,
because a nation that grows its economy is a nation that can afford
investments and new technologies.'' By harnessing the power of American
science and technology, we can achieve both energy independence and a
cleaner, healthier environment. The fiscal year 2004 budget embodies a
commitment to current and future generations of Americans to accelerate
risk reduction and cleanup of environmental damage resulting from Cold
War nuclear programs, reduce the polluting effects of energy sources,
and develop secure energy technology options for the future.
Environmental Management
The total fiscal year 2004 budget request for Environmental
Management (EM) activities totals $7.2 billion, approximately 5 percent
above the comparable fiscal year 2003 request, to accelerate risk
reduction and closure. This is the highest amount ever requested for
the EM program. Within this committee's oversight, the Department is
requesting $6.8 billion for the EM program, of which $5.8 million is
for Defense Site Acceleration Completion and $995 million is for
Defense Environmental Services.
The Environmental Management program was created in 1989 to safely
manage the cleanup of the environmental legacy from 50 years of nuclear
weapons production and nuclear energy research at 114 sites around the
country. The scope of the program includes stabilization and
disposition of some of the most hazardous materials known. In February
2002, the EM program released a Top-to-Bottom Review, which revealed
that process rather than cleanup results had been the basis for
performance and cleanup approaches.
Following this review, the EM program committed to devote the next
18 months to developing and implementing several key management reforms
that would drive accelerated risk reduction and project completion. We
are ahead of schedule. In one year, we have begun developing and
implementing four management reforms, which serve as the basis for the
EM program's accelerated risk reduction cleanup initiatives. These
reforms are:
Acquisition Strategy. We are implementing a strategy that will both
increase competition by enlarging the pool of potential contractors
competing for our work and increasing the accountability of our
contractors to deliver real, meaningful cleanup.
Configuration Control. EM has begun implementing a strict
configuration management system that baselines a number of key,
critical program elements, such as Performance Management Plans, EM
corporate performance measures, and life-cycle costs. Strict
configuration control and monitoring of these key elements will
facilitate a high confidence level that the goals and direction of the
accelerated cleanup initiatives are being met.
Human Capital. This reform strongly supports the President's
Management Agenda. EM is building a more robust organizational and
performance accountability system that holds each manager and employee
accountable for actions and results. Individual performance management
is being fully integrated into EM organizational goals. We have
completed two phases of senior executive reassignments between both the
Field and Headquarters.
New Budget Structure. We have developed and begun implementing a
new budget structure, which complements other management reform
initiatives by focusing on completion and endpoints, and communicating
EM's goals and objectives. The new budget structure clearly identifies
scope and resources that directly support the accelerated cleanup and
risk reduction mission.
Since the release of the Top-to-Bottom Review, significant progress
has been made with respect to these management reforms. In addition, EM
has made efforts to identify and implement changes in 10 areas
emphasized in the Top-to-Bottom Review that are critical to the success
of the program. EM has focused these activities into special projects,
each with a complex-wide perspective. Successful execution of these
projects is crucial to improving the performance of the program and
eliminating many of the barriers that have hindered previous
initiatives to accelerate cleanup and reduce life-cycle cost.
In fiscal year 2004, the EM program will continue making progress
in implementing management reforms and making changes in the areas
emphasized in the Top-to-Bottom Review. The EM fiscal year 2004 budget
request has been tailored to meet our mission of accelerated risk
reduction and completion. The most impressive aspect of this budget is
that it fully reflects each site's new accelerated risk reduction and
cleanup strategies. The strategic groundwork has been laid and the EM
program is moving forward. Through the implementation of accelerated
cleanup strategies, the EM program anticipates that cleanup will be
completed no later than 2035, at least 35 years earlier than originally
anticipated and life-cycle savings of greater than $50 billion will be
achieved.
Fiscal year 2004 will be a banner year, where significant risk
reduction will be achieved. During fiscal year 2004, the EM program
will:

Eliminate 1.3 million gallons of radioactive waste
from underground tanks, and permanently close nine underground
radioactive waste tanks (two at Savannah River, one at INEEL,
and six at Richland).
Complete stabilization of all remaining plutonium
metals, oxides, and residues in EM inventory (at Richland and
Savannah River).
Package 633 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel for safe
storage and disposal (cumulative 88 percent of EM's inventory
packaged).
Accelerate transuranic waste shipments to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant. EM will ship more than 12,000 m\3\ of
transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
Complete remediation of 180 formerly contaminated
sites (surpassing 50 percent of these sites in the EM
inventory).

The fiscal year 2004 budget will allow the EM program to remain
focused on the core mission of accelerated risk reduction and project
completion.
Legacy Management
The fiscal year 2004 budget realigns program activities that will
better support the Department's long-term mission by creating the
Office of Legacy Management to manage post-cleanup activities. The
Department is requesting $47.5 million in fiscal year 2004 for the
Office of Legacy Management to monitor and maintain the integrity of
cleanup remedies and administer the Department's post-closure
obligations at closed sites. Legacy Management will be the steward of
sites cleaned up and closed by DOE and the Army Corps of Engineers,
administer activities for post-retirement benefits for former
contractor employees and manage long-term contractor liabilities. This
restructuring supports the Department's efforts to focus the
Environmental Management program, which used to carry these
responsibilities, to achieve more cleanup and risk reduction for the
American taxpayer. I cannot stress strongly enough that even with the
completed remediation and closure of EM sites, the Department will
never abandon its responsibilities to the communities. Establishing an
Office of Legacy Management will ensure that those concerns and
responsibilities are represented by a dedicated office, measured only
by their success in meeting the defined needs of those communities and
their constituents.
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
The President's February 2002 recommendation and Congress' July
2002 approval of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the Nation's high level
nuclear waste repository was a seminal step in advancing the
Department's goal to ensure the safe and secure disposition of
dangerous nuclear materials away from the hands of terrorists. The
budget requests $591 million for the Department's repository program.
This request coupled with the fiscal year 2003 requested amount would
support the completion of work needed for the submission of a license
application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2004 and the
development of transportation capabilities needed to initiate
repository operations by 2010. However, the $131 million reduction from
the President's fiscal year 2003 budget request together with the 4
month-long continuing resolution, has introduced a high risk in our
ability to meet a December 2004 license application date, but we are
making every effort to meet this objective.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Safeguards and Security
Safeguarding and securing DOE's nuclear facilities, materials and
information, and protection of our employees remains one of the
administration's top priorities. As such, the Department's total
safeguards and security funding in the fiscal year 2004 request is $1.2
billion, an increase of $179 million over the fiscal year 2003 request.
Within the amount requested, $586 million will support activities to
safeguard DOE's NNSA nuclear weapon facilities, $357 million will
support activities that protect the Cold War nuclear waste material
being cleaned up at our environmental cleanup sites, $238 million will
fund the security of the Department complex-wide, and $48.1 million
will support the continued safeguards and security activities at our
scientific laboratories and facilities. A portion of these expenses
will be recovered through charges to non-DOE customers performing work
at DOE laboratories. I will continue to work closely with the President
to ensure our homeland security and fulfill our obligation to protect
the American people. With the administration's strong will and
commitment to national security, the funding request for safeguards and
security will translate into measurable results.
Counterintelligence
The Department's world leadership position in nuclear weapons
knowledge as well as its extraordinary research and development of many
leading edge technologies makes it a priority target of foreign
intelligence collection. To offset this threat, the Department is
requesting $46 million to support counterintelligence activities across
the entire complex. These activities are focused on protecting our
nuclear weapons secrets, but also emphasize a high priority on
protecting our other sensitive scientific endeavors, and on combining
with other departmental elements in our efforts to defeat terrorism.
Independent Oversight
I rely upon my independent oversight organization to provide me
with a current and accurate assessment of the Department, including the
NNSA, in the areas of safeguards and security, cyber security,
emergency management, and environment, safety and health. This office
conducts comprehensive evaluations to verify that the Department's
critical assets are protected, that the Department can effectively
respond to any emergency, and that site workers, the public, and the
environment are protected from hazardous operations and materials.
Independent oversight activities are conducted with a focus on
independence and objectivity, using a systematic oversight process,
with an extensive emphasis on performance and performance testing. For
fiscal year 2004, our budget proposes $22.6 million for an independent
oversight program that promotes excellence and continuous improvement
for the protection of departmental critical assets.
Energy Assurance
Failure to meet increasing energy demand with increased energy
supplies and vulnerability to disruptions from natural or malevolent
causes could threaten our Nation's economic prosperity, alter the way
we live our lives, and threaten our national security.
DOE will continue to assist in meeting this homeland security
challenge. To that end, the fiscal year 2004 budget proposal maintains
an analytical capability to support the Department's energy security
responsibilities. Included in the budget is $4.3 million for Energy
Assurance activities to continue to conduct energy security activities
in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. This is a key
concern underlying the President's NEP recommendations.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee that concludes my
prepared statement. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have
at this time.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We are both
quite familiar with the subjects at hand, and we commend you
for your stewardship to date. You have some challenges for the
future.
I will defer to Senator McCain. He has another engagement,
and then I will resume after Senator Levin.
Senator McCain. Secretary Abraham, thank you for being here
and thank you for your excellent stewardship of this very
important branch of Government.
Mr. Secretary, I would just like to ask you about a very
important issue that has arisen this morning. It is very
important in the State of Arizona and the country, and I do not
know if you had a chance to see the piece that was carried in
The Washington Times article by Bill Gertz and Jerry Seper. It
is titled ``Nation's Biggest Nuclear Power Plant a Terrorist
Target.'' ``Terrorists have targeted the United States' largest
nuclear power plant near Phoenix, and security officials are
looking for Iraqi government `sleeper cells' that might carry
out the attack, The Washington Times has learned.
``The threat to the Palo Verde nuclear plant, located in
the Sonora desert 50 miles west of Phoenix, prompted the
deployment of National Guard troops to the facility. . . .
`` `We understand the sensitivity.' ''
Then it goes on to say, ``One official said the report on
the Palo Verde threat was contained in classified intelligence
reports distributed to law-enforcement and security officials.
``A second U.S. official confirmed the report and said it
was `uncorroborated threat information' that was sent to
appropriate U.S. security authorities.''
[The information referred to follows:]
NATION'S BIGGEST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT A TERRORIST TARGET

[By Bill Gertz and Jerry Seper--The Washington Times]

March 20, 2003
Terrorists have targeted the United States' largest nuclear power
plant near Phoenix, and security officials are looking for Iraqi
government ``sleeper cells'' that might carry out the attack, The
Washington Times has learned.
The threat to the Palo Verde nuclear plant, located in the Sonora
desert 50 miles west of Phoenix, prompted the deployment of National
Guard troops to the facility, according to U.S. officials.
``We understand the sensitivity of this time, and we are very, very
committed to protecting the safe operation of Palo Verde,'' Jim
McDonald, a spokesman for the Arizona Public Service Co., which owns
the reactor complex, said in an interview.
Mr. McDonald declined to comment on specific intelligence
indicating a threat to Palo Verde but noted that the troops were added
Tuesday by order of Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano.
One official said the report on the Palo Verde threat was contained
in classified intelligence reports distributed to law-enforcement and
security officials.
A second U.S. official confirmed the report and said it was
``uncorroborated threat information'' that was sent to appropriate U.S.
security authorities.
Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power facility in the United
States with three reactors that produced 30 billion kilowatt hours of
electricity last year, Mr. McDonald said.
The threat to attack the facility came from sensitive information
indicating that the plant was targeted by Middle Eastern terrorists who
were not further identified.
The threat to Palo Verde comes as other intelligence reports
indicate that Iraq has set up clandestine cells of operatives inside
the United States or abroad that could be called on to conduct attacks
or sabotage on behalf of Baghdad.
For example, recent intelligence reports indicated that Iraqi
diplomats in Cairo had conducted surveillance of the U.S. Embassy
there, U.S. officials said.
Officials did not say how many Iraqi cells are in the country.
Baghdad has nearly 250 officials posted to the United States, most of
them at its U.N. mission in New York.
A Bush administration official said the State Department has
decided to expel the three Iraqi diplomats posted to Baghdad's interest
section in Washington. The expulsion order is expected as early as
today.
Only Iraqi officials engaged in improper intelligence or terrorism-
related activity can be expelled from the U.N. mission.
Meanwhile, the FBI warned law-enforcement officials yesterday to
watch for suspicious activity by people driving Iraqi diplomatic
license plates.
``Suspicious activity involving vehicles bearing Iraqi diplomatic
license plates should be reported immediately to the nearest Joint
Terrorism Task Force,'' the FBI stated in a weekly intelligence
bulletin.
Codes used by cars driven by Iraqi diplomats in Washington bear the
``TF,'' and Iraqi U.N. diplomatic vehicles in New York have the ``TS''
code.
Intelligence officials said the administration has urged
governments around the world to expel Iraqi diplomats, and several have
complied.
Iraqi diplomats have been expelled in recent days from Czech
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Thailand, and
Australia.
Two Iraqis also were expelled from the United States on March 5
after they were identified as intelligence officers, U.S. officials
said.
Justice Department officials yesterday confirmed that the FBI is
looking to interview as many as 50,000 Iraqis now in the United States
for information that could help U.S. forces. They said a war with Iraq
is expected to dramatically increase the chances of terrorist attacks
against U.S. targets in this country and abroad.
One senior department official said that while most Iraqis in this
country are not believed to be terrorists or associated with terrorist
organizations, Muslim extremists within the Iraqi community who are
affiliated with al Qaeda could use a war as the reason for an attack.
Among the Iraqis being sought for questioning are 3,000 illegal
immigrants said to be missing, amid U.S. concerns that some could be
connected with groups or agents of the Iraqi regime.
Earlier this week, Mexican authorities detained six Iraqi citizens
as they sought to cross into the United States from Tijuana. The six,
including one woman, claimed to be German citizens on their arrival at
the Tijuana airport Tuesday night on a flight from Mexico City. They
have been returned to Mexico City for questioning.
It could not be learned if the detained Iraqis were connected to
the plot to attack Palo Verde.
Border Patrol authorities also confirmed that a diary written in
Arabic was found last week in a backpack discovered on a southern
Arizona trail frequently used by illegal aliens. The diary, according
to the sources, contained names and telephone numbers of at least two
persons in Canada and Iran.
The FBI has since taken custody of the diary, but refused comment
on it yesterday.

Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power facility in
America, and I wonder if you could shed any more light on these
reports. As you can imagine, it has caused significant concern
back in the State of Arizona, as well as around the country.
Secretary Abraham. Senator, obviously, I will not comment
on the specific intelligence reports that are referenced in the
article. I would just say that I am aware of the issue and I
know that actions are being taken on a broad basis to both
explore any of the intelligence information that has come to
light, as well as to take adequate security procedures to make
certain that any threat that might be posed can be effectively
dealt with. I think that all actions that can be taken are and
will be taken by the appropriate authorities to try to minimize
any possible risks involved.
Senator McCain. You are working with other agencies to make
sure that the threat of this attack or a possible attack is
minimized?
Secretary Abraham. Well, we are playing the role that our
Department has. Obviously, nuclear reactors, private
facilities, are under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission who has the lead responsibility here. We
provide support services, as do other Federal agencies to that
oversight. I am informed that actions are being taken by all
the appropriate agencies, at the direction of NRC and others,
to address the concerns that have been raised.
Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One element of the Department of Energy's nonproliferation
program is the effort to ensure that Russian nuclear scientists
are not tempted to work for proliferants. The Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention, or IPP, program provides work for
scientists in conjunction with U.S. business interests, as you
well know, and it seems to be working well.
Another program, however, is not working so well, and that
is the effort to redevelop some of the Russian nuclear cities
and facilities. Apparently the Russians are trying to address
that issue. I am wondering whether or not the DOE is rethinking
the approach to the whole Russian nuclear cities issue.
Secretary Abraham. I would not say that we are rethinking
the whole approach. I think we are trying to find ways to make
all of these programs as effective as possible. I think there
has been definitely some progress forward in terms of engaging
more U.S. businesses to partner and engage in activities that
will employ technicians and scientists. I know that our
Ambassador to Russia, Ambassador Vershbow, recently visited one
of these cities with my counterpart, the head of the Ministry
of Atomic Energy, to explore other new promising opportunities.
But there has been, I think, some particularly positive
progress in terms of the engagement of, at least initially,
American companies, and now I understand also Russian companies
in not only engaging in more activities both in the nuclear
cities themselves, but also employing Russian scientists and
technicians.
We are pleased about that progress. We hope we can see it
continue to expand. But in terms of changing the program, that
is not under contemplation at this point.
Senator Levin. Would you take a look at the Senate bill 6,
which was introduced by Senator Daschle and others at the
beginning of Congress? There are some ideas in that bill on how
to revitalize this Russian nuclear cities program. If you and
your staff could take a look at it and get back to us with your
comments on the nuclear cities provisions in that bill, it
would be appreciated.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Energy has been quite successful in its efforts
to reduce the threat of WMD without the significant changes proposed in
S.6. The National Security Council has reviewed our programs, and we
are meeting and adhering to their guidelines. We closely coordinate
with the Department of State and the rest of the interagency on our
nonproliferation programs through the National Security Council's
Policy Coordination Committees (PCC).
First, S.6 would introduce what we feel are unnecessary
coordination processes and procedures that would divert key resources
from the implementation of on-the-ground activities. For example, we
believe that there is little need to create a joint U.S.-Russian
commission to advise on the shutdown of Russian nuclear weapons
assembly and disassembly facilities (Section 9006(c)). We already
cooperate closely with the Russians in this area to determine relevant
areas of work. We believe that such an effort would generate more
reporting and other requirements. Furthermore, we have multiple
checkpoints within the U.S. interagency for approval of projects.
Creating a commission would lead to duplication of activities and
efforts.
Section 9006(e) calls for Russia to bear only 15 percent of the
cost of downsizing, and this could be construed as committing the U.S.
to pay the remaining 85 percent. Russia should continue to bear the
largest financial burden of downsizing its own nuclear weapons complex.
Therefore, we recommend that the lowest fixed participation, at 15
percent in this bill, be stricken.
In Section 9008 (a) and (b), the proposed $25 million authorization
for IPP is problematic whether it is mandatory or additional
(discretionary) funds. If the funds are discretionary, they should be
appropriated to the integrated Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI)
program [which includes both IPP and the Nuclear Cities Initiative
(NCI)], and not specifically to IPP, since downsizing is not IPP's
mission. If the funds are mandatory, it will force IPP to spend more
than its entire budget to work at a few facilities designated for
shutdown in a limited number of closed cities in Russia. In fact, IPP
is presently working at dozens of locations in Russia and other former
Soviet states where nuclear, biological and chemical weapons scientists
are being engaged on non-weapons enterprises. This work would be
eliminated and many targeted scientists with very sensitive expertise
would be vulnerable for recruitment by government and terrorist groups.
If the efforts at downsizing are a priority for acceleration, then it
is advisable to increase funding to RTI, which is already working on
downsizing efforts.
We appreciate the continued congressional attention to threats
posed by weapons, materials, and expertise. We in the administration
are always willing to work with Congress to address and overcome
threats to U.S. national security.

Senator Levin. The DOE budget request for fiscal year 2003
included $15.5 million for a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $15 million for
that penetrator, $6 million for advanced nuclear weapons
concepts, and $17 million for enhanced test readiness to reduce
the time needed to conduct a nuclear test.
In addition, the Defense Department has sought a repeal of
the 1993 prohibition on research and development that could
lead to the production of a low-yield nuclear weapon. Is the
Department of Energy working on new nuclear weapons designs?
Secretary Abraham. Not on a new weapon design, no. I think
that at this point, as I understand the provisions of the
legislation, the work which relates to the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator only can take place after the Department of Defense
submits a report to Congress, and then 30 days after that. I do
not believe that report has been submitted as of yet, and so
the funds, the $15 million for that effort, are not yet
available to us to work on. But once they are, then we would
initiate conceptual work. But that is not directed toward a new
weapon.
I think what we have been given as an assignment, as part
of a broader study of the need for this capability, is the
responsibility to look at whether or not that capability can be
in some way provided by a modification of an existing weapon.
Senator Levin. The Defense Department, as I indicated,
sought the repeal of the 1993 prohibition on that research and
development effort that could lead to the production of a low-
yield nuclear weapon. Were you involved in the decision to seek
the repeal of that language? Or did you--and I am referring
either to you or the DOE as an agency--request the Department
of Defense to seek the repeal of the 1993 language?
Secretary Abraham. I would have to check to determine the
exact role that people from our agency played in the
development of the policy, and I would be glad to submit that
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Both the Departments of Energy and Defense support a repeal of
section 3136 of the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization
Act. We must recognize that the national security challenges that
confront the Nation today are dramatically different than when the law
was passed almost a decade ago. We believe it is only prudent to allow
the laboratories to undertake research into technical options that
could strengthen our ability to deter, dissuade, and respond to the
national security challenges of the 21st century.
Its also important to understand that the Department of Energy has
no requirements from the Department of Defense for any new nuclear
weapons nor does repeal of section 3136 usurp Congress' right to
authorize and appropriate the considerable sums that would be required
to build or deploy new or modified nuclear weapons consistent with
section 3143 of the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization
Act.

But I would just say to the committee, as you indicated,
when you read the definition, the restriction does not simply
prohibit research on new low-yield warheads but also prohibits
any activities which could potentially lead to the production
by the United States of such a warhead.
What we believe is that such a broad restriction has a real
impact, a chilling effect of sorts, on the work scientists and
engineers are doing and it really impedes efforts to explore
technical options to respond to threats. So we support the
position because we think that it has had a chilling impact on
the work that can be done because it is such a broad
definition. Any activities which could potentially lead to
production encompasses a lot of the work that could conceivably
be done in our weapons labs.
Senator Levin. The number one threat that we all face is
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. We are trying to persuade other countries to not
put greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, not to test. We are
highly critical of India and Pakistan for testing. We are
highly critical, appropriately so, of North Korea when they
pull out of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
If you want to talk about chilling effect on our
scientists, the chilling effect on our whole position and point
of view in the world is that we have to reduce the number of
nuclear weapons in this world and the reliance on nuclear
weapons in this world. If we start to move down the road of we
want modifications to improve capabilities, we want an earth
penetrator, we want millions of dollars to get readier to
resume testing, that sends the opposite message to the world
that we are saying, on the one hand, do not pull out of the
Nonproliferation Treaty, do not test weapons, do not rely on
nukes. Then when these budget requests come out to us showing
greater reliance, greater capability, greater willingness to
consider resumption of testing, it undermines or chills the
argument that we are making to the rest of the world. So I hope
when you look at the chilling reference and the chilling
language, that you also look at what the chilling effect is in
terms of our argument on the other side of this equation, which
is the nonproliferation side of the equation.
Secretary Abraham. Obviously, because our Department has
the responsibilities both, on one hand, for the work we do in
our complex and for much of the nonproliferation work we do,
that is something that we are always mindful of. I would say
that at a time when we have not been testing, when we have
terminated the plutonium pit production capabilities of the
country, when we have not been developing new weapons, when we
have passed the plywood restrictions, and so on, we have,
nonetheless, seen the message. That message has not, it seems
to me, resulted in others refraining from the development of or
the seeking of these weapons.
What we are trying to do here is maintain capabilities that
allow us to respond to threats of the new century, as outlined
in the Nuclear Posture Review or as might come forward in the
future. We will try to always take both of those considerations
into account.
But our work at least in the Department is not at this
stage that of developing new weapons but maintaining the
capacity, the capability, and the skills even of some of the
people so that we are at least able, when called upon, to
perform the job we are asked to do, which is the sort of
engineering work, as well as the responsibility to be able to
certify to you and the country and the President, obviously,
the capability of our stockpile, its readiness, as well as its
reliability.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, I would say in rebuttal to
my distinguished colleague's observation that there are some
very important collateral advantages to repeal of the ban on
low-yield nuclear weapons research. You pointed out the
importance of the maintaining of a cadre of individuals trained
should this administration or a future administration feel that
it is essential for our own security interests and primarily
for deterrent interests to move in the direction of a low-yield
nuclear weapon.
But are there not many collateral benefits derivative from
lifting the ban to the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
Program if the scientists are allowed to conduct some low-yield
weapon research?
Secretary Abraham. As I indicated, I think we view this
whole area as one in terms of maintaining capabilities. We are
concerned about the fact that an effective Stockpile
Stewardship Program requires not only tremendous investment,
which this committee has supported in new technologies from the
National Ignition Facility to the computer programs, but also
the human skills and technical expertise that has to be
maintained not only in retaining talent but also in recruiting
talent and keeping skills well developed. We see it in the area
of test readiness, for instance, where we find ourselves with a
work force not necessarily prepared to, if called upon, conduct
tests.
We think that both in the area of advance concept research
and in terms of just the general sort of technical research
that might be conducted in the labs, that if every time
scientists seek to engage in some type of research, they feel
they have to go to the general counsel to determine whether or
not the standard, which is a pretty broad definition standard,
is in jeopardy of being violated, we feel that that has had an
impact on the work force and on the kind of work that they can
do. So, yes, it does have collateral impact on the
effectiveness of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Chairman Warner. That is the key acknowledgement that I was
hoping to elicit from you. This Senator has followed this
Stockpile Stewardship Program since its inception. I think it
is important that you give us a little update on this program
because originally, in 1993 and 1995, it was thought that we
would take about 10 years to set up a comprehensive science-
based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which would begin to
validate the safety, security, and reliability of the aging
nuclear weapons stockpile. We are now reaching the end of that
decade, and I would like to have your views as to what is the
progress we are making.
For those following this hearing who might not recall this
history, when the decision made was to stop actual testing, we
then determined the reliability and safety. I underline safety
because many of our American citizens have volunteered to care
for this inventory and, indeed, the areas in which they live.
It is important that that safety be without any doubt or
question.
Now, what is the status of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program in view of the original estimates of a decade from the
1993-1995 time frame to have it full up operational?
Secretary Abraham. Many of the programs, many of the tools
are in the process of either being developed or will be
developed in the next few years. I am certainly not capable of
telling the committee today that all of them will be on line
and fully operational in the time frame of 2003 to 2005. They
simply will not be. We are still in the process of building the
National Ignition Facility. It is now largely completed, but
there is obviously considerable more work to do there.
I mentioned already that our new advanced supercomputing
initiative is launching the effort to build the two literally
largest computers in the world, but that is going to take
several years to complete. When they are finished, they will
form part of the capability.
The DARHT program is on track.
We are not, however, in a position where, within the next
year or 2, we will have a fully operational alternative and
effective alternative to use as an alternative for testing the
reliability of the stockpile. We believe these tools ultimately
will be able to help us make those determinations, but we are
not in the position of saying----
Chairman Warner. So let us face facts. You inherited a
program, and I am not suggesting your predecessors in any way
were other than doing their very best to put it together within
the original time frame of, as you said, 2003-2005. You
acknowledge it is not going to make it. What is your best
estimate of when this system will be full up?
Secretary Abraham. I do not feel today that I can give you
that estimate, Senator, because I think that each of these
tools interacts with one another in the process of trying to
replicate or trying to assess the capability of a weapon. At
least in my appearances here, I do not think I have ever
indicated that we know with absolute certainty. We believe that
the combination of these tools will serve to allow us to
determine the reliability of the stockpile, but they are not
operational yet. At that point, we will hopefully be successful
as we intend to be.
Chairman Warner. Now, the program, though, does in its
current status yield a considerable amount of data that
contributes to your annual certification. Am I not correct?
Secretary Abraham. Yes, that is right.
Chairman Warner. Even though it is not full up. I do not
know if you can say where on the curve between zero and full up
it is at the moment, but it is providing very valuable
information which contributes to your annual certification. Am
I correct on that?
Secretary Abraham. That is right.
Chairman Warner. Fine. My time has expired.
I see Senator Akaka has joined us.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to Secretary Abraham. It is always
good to see you on the Hill.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my statement be included in
the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I welcome the
opportunity to have Secretary Abraham testify before us today. The
issue I want to focus on is the administration's approach to nuclear
non-proliferation.
Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons has been an American
national security goal since the end of World War II. In 1946, at the
inaugural session of the newly created U.N. Atomic Energy Commission,
the U.S. Representative Bernard Baruch declared, ``We are here to make
a choice between the quick and the dead.'' He underscored the necessity
of limiting nuclear weapons to avoid a nuclear disaster and to meet the
world's demands for peace and security.
Out of these early efforts grew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which was completed in 1968 with over 180 countries as
signatories today. It is the cornerstone of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime. The treaty contains a special bargain: the
so-called non-nuclear states would forswear acquiring nuclear weapons,
and, in exchange, the nuclear states--the United States, Russia,
France, England and China--have committed to achieving their own
nuclear disarmament. This commitment is contained in Article 6 of the
treaty.
The U.S. remains committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Secretary of State Powell said so in his testimony in support
of the recently approved Moscow strategic nuclear arms treaty. Yet, the
administration's current policies make me wonder if this is truly the
case.
Rather than fulfilling our commitments to reduce the number and
limit the role of our nuclear weapons, we seem to be holding their
numbers steady and expanding their missions.
For example, the Moscow Treaty has a worthwhile goal, the further
reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. Yet, in practice, the U.S.
nuclear stockpile may not be much smaller in 2012, when the treaty is
over, than it is today. As many have noted, the Moscow Treaty does not
call for the dismantlement of any nuclear warheads or launchers under
any timetable whatsoever. The majority of U.S. or Russian nuclear
weapons could be removed from launchers and placed into storage. From
storage, they could easily be returned to active duty.
I hope Secretary Abraham today can provide more details about the
administration's announced plans to dismantle some of the weapons
removed from launchers. I would like to know how many are involved, or,
at least, what percentage will be dismantled. But more importantly, I
would like to know why all of the warheads removed cannot be
dismantled. Russia would eliminate more nuclear weapons if the U.S. did
the same. What is the justification for keeping such a large number of
warheads?
The administration also wants to embark on at least two new nuclear
weapons programs. The administration said that a robust earth
penetrating nuclear weapon (RNEP), or bunker buster, is needed to
destroy a growing number of hard and deeply buried targets. It may have
a yield in the range of 100s of kilotons. In contrast, the bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of less than 20 kilotons.
In addition, the administration is seeking to repeal the
congressional prohibition on so-called low-yield nuclear weapons, those
with less than five kilotons of explosive power. Low-yield, or mini-
nukes, are often described by the administration as potentially useful
in destroying buried weapon caches or weapons of mass destruction
facilities in urban areas because of the view--I call it a myth--that
these weapons would minimize civilian losses.
I do not think these new nuclear weapons are necessary. In the
1990s, we deployed the B6-11 bomb that has a large yield and is for
attacking buried targets. We also have several nuclear warheads types
that have small yields. Finally, we have an array of conventional
weapons that can accomplish difficult missions.
Moreover, seeking to develop new nuclear weapons and expand their
role to attacking other than the nuclear forces of other nations is a
dangerous development. It sends the wrong signal to the rest of the
world about the U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. We should be thinking how we, along with the rest of the
countries possessing nuclear arsenals, can reduce our reliance on
nuclear weapons and reduce our nuclear stockpiles.
Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other concerns about the
administration's nuclear policies. The administration's effort to
increase the readiness of our nuclear weapons test site is quite
worrisome. Again it sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world
about our commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. We must
keep the weapons we have safe and secure, but we can accomplish this
without a new round of nuclear tests.
I hope the administration will clarify these questions in today's
hearing. Our limited defense dollars will be constrained by the growing
Federal deficit and a war on Iraq. The burden of proof is on the
administration to show why we need to maintain such a large nuclear
arsenal and continue to develop unneeded costly new nuclear weapons
systems, when we have many other pressing defense and domestic
priorities.

Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, many are concerned about the
Moscow Treaty. The treaty does not have a timetable for
reductions or an agreement for the dismantlement of any nuclear
warheads. Could you please provide us with more details now or
for the record about the administration's plans to dismantle
warheads and also, in round numbers, how many or what
percentage of the warheads removed will be dismantled?
Secretary Abraham. Let me provide, if I could, a more
detailed response to that for the record. Let me, though, just
put a little bit of context in your evaluation.
When we talk about the capabilities for dismantlement, it
is important to always remember that the same facilities and,
to some extent, the same personnel who would work on
dismantlement are also responsible for weapons refurbishment
and our life extension program for weapons. We really have, in
terms of the process, to balance the need to keep the existing
stockpile in a state of effective readiness, and the life
extension programs are very extensive. We do dismantlement even
on an ongoing basis. Part of it would be included in the budget
we have requested. But we fit that work in as we also conduct
other work in our Pantex facility as opportunity provides
itself.
If we wish to do more dismantlement in relationship to the
Moscow Treaty or any other decisions that were made, it either
means we have to expand the complex to be able to do that or,
literally, reduce work that is done on the maintaining of the
reliability of existing weapons or the life extension program.
Those are the factors, and I would be happy to provide for
the record a more specific answer as to the sort of timetable
envisioned.
[The information referred to follows:]

The following is the current plan for warhead dismantlements:

While the Moscow Treaty does not specifically call for
dismantlement of warheads, the Department of Energy is working with the
Department of Defense to identify warheads that are excess to
requirements and plan for their dismantlement. With implementation of
the Nuclear Posture Review, DOE is expecting additional retirements and
is currently examining the possibility of new dismantlements in the
fiscal year 2004-2007 timeframe. [Deleted.] A moderate amount of
increased dismantlements could be accommodated within the current and
planned nuclear weapons complex capacity before the three Life
Extension Programs get fully underway and utilize most of the available
capacity later this decade.

Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
Mr. Secretary, Senator Levin raised the issue of the
administration's plans to develop a robust earth penetrating
nuclear weapon. He also mentioned the administration's desire
to repeal the congressional prohibition on low-yield nuclear
weapons, those with less than 5 kilotons of explosive power.
Low-yield and many nukes are often described by the
administration as potentially useful in destroying buried
weapons of mass destruction facilities in urban areas.
Theoretically these weapons would minimize civilian losses.
Yet, in the 1990s we deployed the B6-11 bomb that has a
large yield and is for attacking buried targets. We also have
several nuclear warhead types that have small yields. Finally,
we have an array of conventional weapons that can accomplish
difficult missions.
My question to you is, do you think it will be possible to
use an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon in an urban area
without causing collateral damage?
Secretary Abraham. I think that one of the reasons the
project which we are being asked to study is going on is
because of the concern, among other things, that, first of all,
hardened and deeply buried targets provide a serious challenge
as a matter of current and projected future military and
national security challenges, that we needed a capability to
deal with that, that existing capabilities for a variety of
reasons, part of which I think included the belief that they
might be more destructive than necessary. I am not sure if that
would be only in an urban setting, but just in a broader sense.
I think the conclusion that was reached, as a result of the
Nuclear Posture Review, was that we needed to explore a wide
array of possible responses to deal with that threat.
Only one of those is in our area. That is the idea of the
so-called RNEP, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, research--
to determine whether or not we might be able to modify an
existing nuclear capability to be able to address this. But it
is also my understanding that non-nuclear studies are also
being conducted by the Defense Department to see if there are
other ways that might be more effective. I think part of that
decision making would, obviously, deal with the question of
collateral damage and what is the most efficient and effective
way of addressing this threat.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Senator Allard [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Without objection, I would like to make my opening
statement a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, thank you very much for holding
this very important hearing on the Department of Energy's national
security programs. As always, it is good to see Secretary Abraham.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I have the privilege of
being the Chairman, is responsible for authorizing over two-thirds of
the Department of Energy's budget. A large share of the programs we
oversee are in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
These programs are vital to our Nation and our allies.
The ability to ensure that our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure,
and reliable, is the most important job at DOE and is THE mission of
NNSA. However, I believe DOE can enhance this mission. For the last 10
years, this mission has been focused on the past--meaning life
extensions on our aging, Cold War nuclear stockpile. However, while
this is their most critical mission, I believe that we have to begin to
look to the future and at what our next threat or threats will look
like. This means that DOE and NNSA scientists must be given the freedom
to think and explore. They must be allowed to be scientists. I realize
this is controversial, but unless we recognize that the world is
different and that we must adept to this changing threat structure, we
could find ourselves with the wrong deterrent for the future threats.
A matter of tremendous importance and a priority for me with
defense nuclear sites is our Environmental Management program. The
problems of the last half century will take a coherent policy of
innovation, integration, and funding to overcome. Luckily for you and
the Nation there are good and dedicated people in these programs. The
scientists at our national labs are the best in the world and the
engineers and craftsmen at our cleanup and Naval Reactors sites
continue to meet the ever-increasing demands we place on them.
I would like to end with a statement that I have said many times:
No site is an island. That is why is it so important for all States
with DOE sites, whether they have an ongoing mission or are slated for
closure, must keep the national objectives and needs at the forefront.
We all care deeply about our individual sites and situations, but we
must work together to make the DOE complex work for all of us.
Again, thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to
hearing Secretary Abraham's testimony.

Senator Allard. Senator Abraham, I would like to welcome
you personally.
I feel that we should not put science at a standstill. I do
hope and would encourage you to move forward with this idea of
nuclear concepts. I think that there is some advantage to
continuing to think from even a scientific basis all the
parameters of nuclear.
Before we get into a lot of that discussion any further, I
would just like to thank you and compliment you on your
commitment to cleaning up nuclear sites here in this country.
You have worked hard at it. You have visited a number of those
sites, I know.
In 1996, when I was first elected to the United States
Senate, the project I first got involved in was out at Rocky
Flats. At that point in time, about 1997, they were talking
about a cleanup date of 2060 to 2065. It was determined at that
time that if we put more money into the program, we could
advance cleanup and meet a deadline of 2006. It appears as
though we are going to meet that 2006. If you have any doubts
in that regard, I might ask you to mention that because that is
very important. I think, if nothing else, we have set a
standard for other cleanup of other sites. I am real proud from
that perspective.
Other sites were cooperative. There were three of them
originally. We talked about Rocky Flats, Mound, and then
Fernald. It seems as though some of the other sites that were
agreeing to this advance appropriations to clean up Rocky Flats
and the other two agreed with the understanding that there
would be money available once Rocky Flats got cleared up to
help advance their cleanup.
My question to you is, once the first three closure sites
are cleaned up and closed, does DOE plan to use the annual
savings realized from the completion of the 2006 closure sites
to accelerate the cleanup and closure of the remaining
environmental management sites?
Secretary Abraham. I think there has been somewhat of an
adjustment across the entire complex in the way we look at
cleanup, and I think, frankly, the Rocky Flats experience was
the model that has helped us to move to a new approach. Our
Under Secretary of the Department for Energy, Science, and
Environment, Secretary Card, was the CEO of the operation at
Rocky Flats, and our Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Jessie Roberson, was the Department site official
that helped bring about the expedited cleanup.
When they came into their jobs, I asked them to conduct a
Top-to-Bottom Review of the entire complex to see what we could
do to accelerate cleanup complex-wide. That is what we have
done. We thought that the approach taken at Rocky, at Fernald,
and at Mound was not appropriate for everybody. We thought that
you should not have to just live at one of those sites to be
able to see your site cleaned up in a short time frame. What we
were confronted with in the other sites, much as was the case
at Rocky Flats, was a 70-year game plan for cleanup.
At each site in the last year-and-a-half, we have developed
an accelerated program. In virtually every case, the site
letters of intent with the State and, slowly but surely, with
the regulators, whether that is the local regulators or the
EPA, are being developed to expedite all the sites.
Consequently, instead of having a budget in which scarce
resources are going to be fought for by all the sites with
inadequate amounts of money available to expedite all the
cleanup, the budget we are submitting this year is consistent
with moving all the sites ahead at an accelerated rate.
Obviously, when we passed the point where Rocky Flats is
finished in 2007, we would have a very substantial fall-off in
terms of expenses for that site. Whether we will need all of
that money to keep the other sites on their fast cleanup
remains to be seen.
But our goal is to front-end funding for cleanup across the
spectrum of the complex. That is why we are asking for the
largest Environmental Management budget the Department has ever
requested. The budget we have asked for is consistent with this
very accelerated program. We believe we can clean up the entire
set of facilities that were in the Environmental Management
mission not in 2070, but at least as early as 2035 and perhaps
sooner. We do not even want to wait, I guess I am saying, until
Rocky Flats is finished to start injecting more funds into the
other sites.
Senator Allard. I appreciate your commitment to
environmental cleanup.
What is the Department of Energy's policy with regards to
facilities which are managed by Environmental Management but
still have a long-term national security or science mission?
Secretary Abraham. We recognize that we have sites where
there are ongoing activities but where there is also a
substantial cleanup responsibility. One of the challenges that
we have is determining whether the ongoing missions are ones
that should place the site really under the leadership of the
part of our Department that will be taking the responsibility
for that future mission.
That is one of the things we have done up at the site in
Idaho where we have concluded that the long-term mission of
Idaho is a mission it has had for some time, but now is a
mission with, I think, a more focused effort, which is in the
area of nuclear energy research. Our Nuclear Energy Division
now has principal oversight for the site. That does not mean
the Environmental Management programs will be slowed down. In
fact, they will be sped up. That is now being looked at not as
primarily an EM program, but rather as a nuclear energy
program.
Senator Allard. You are saying that the landlord then would
assume that main responsibility at that site.
Secretary Abraham. Right. We are moving, in that case, to a
different division. Essentially our two under secretaries,
Under Secretary Card and the Acting Administrator for our NNSA
division, Ambassador Brooks, are right now in the process of
looking down the road to figuring out where responsibilities in
the future ought to be allocated. Part of that discussion also
goes to where legacy responsibilities down the road should be
allocated as to whether they will remain simply in an
Environmental Management division or whether the new landlord,
as you put it, the new lead agency or lead part of our
Department, should now take on that responsibility. We are
still working on what makes the most sense for the future.
Senator Allard. Again, thank you for your effort on
environmental management and cleanup.
I still have some time left, so I want to follow up on
NNSA. If they receive a new military requirement for a low-
yield weapon, what steps need to take place to allow the
national weapons labs and plants to begin production of a new
weapon?
Secretary Abraham. That is a fairly complicated series of
steps. I think I may have somewhere in my materials here the
multiple step process of weapons production, but I guess I
cannot find it right now, Senator. Maybe I could provide that
process, that legal process, to you.
At this stage, though, I just would reiterate. We are not
proceeding ahead even with the research on the RNEP because we
still await the Defense Department's submission of its report
to Congress.
Senator Allard. Just one brief question. This is probably
the most important question in this regard. Can NNSA begin
manufacturing new low-yield nuclear weapons without getting a
new approval from Congress?
Secretary Abraham. If the question you are asking is
whether or not we can proceed on the study that we are engaging
in to modify an existing warhead, that would be a different
status than the development of a new weapon because that
distinction is fairly significant. But I am not sure on the
precise legal status.
Senator Allard. If you could get a response back to us, I
think the committee would appreciate that.
Secretary Abraham. Yes. We would be happy to do that.
Senator Allard. If we get a written response back, it would
be fine.
[The information referred to follows:]

No, the Department of Energy cannot begin the research and
development, let alone the manufacture of new, low yield nuclear
weapons without obtaining relief from Section 3136 of P.L. 103-160, the
Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. This provision
prohibits the department ``. . . from conducting the research and
development that could lead to the production by the United States of a
low yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of enactment of this
Act, has not entered production.'' The law also defines low yield as a
``nuclear weapon that has a yield of less than 5 kilotons.''
Section 3143 of Public Law 107-314, the Fiscal Year 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act, requires the Department of Energy to request
funds in the President's budget for the development or production
of a new nuclear weapon. The budget entry is specified as a single
dedicated line item for each such activity that is in phase 3 or higher
for new nuclear weapons, or phase 6.3 or higher for weapons
refurbishment. The Department currently has no requirement from the
Department of Defense for the development or production of any new
nuclear weapons.

My time is expired.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. Senator Pryor, would you yield for 30
seconds?
Senator Pryor. Absolutely.
Senator Levin. I would appreciate it. I must leave.
Secretary Abraham, you have now sent us a letter, relative
to the documents that we have asked for relative to the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, stating that you are not going to
be furnishing us certain documents. You are asserting a
deliberative process privilege, which means then we would have
to seek a subpoena in order to determine if there is going to
be an executive privilege asserted over those documents.
I am not going to ask a question. I do not want to do that.
But would you take a look at the other part of our request,
which is that you tell us how many documents are you asserting
a privilege over and just the subject of the documents, but at
a minimum, how many documents are you asserting a privilege
over. If you could let us know in a supplementary letter to
that so that we can decide with, obviously, Senator Coleman,
who is the chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, whether or not a subpoena would then be issued
for those documents, which then sets up the executive
privilege.
Secretary Abraham. I would be happy to do that. I do not
know the answer, so I will be glad to.
[The information referred to follows:]

By letter dated December 9, 2002, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations requested that DOE supply certain documents related
to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. On January 10, 2003, by letter from
Mike Smith, DOE's Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, we provided to
the subcommittee a number of documents in response to its request. On
March 19, 2003, and again by letter from Assistant Secretary Smith, we
provided additional documents that were still under review when the
January 10 letter was sent. In both of the letters, DOE noted that many
of the documents being provided to the subcommittee were subject to the
deliberative process privilege or contained information that may be
protected from public disclosure by the Trade Secrets Act.
The March 19 letter stated that certain documents were not being
provided to the subcommittee because they constitute or reflect
confidential White House communications, and that for the same reason,
the documents would not be provided in response to your own March 4,
2003, letter. After receiving that response, your staff reiterated the
request in your March 4 letter that DOE provide a list of documents not
being provided to the subcommittee, the subject of each, and the
reasons for withholding it. In response, on March 25 our Office of
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs explained that the March 19
letter already had set forth why DOE has withheld certain documents--
they constitute or reflect confidential White House communications. We
also explained that the request for a list of those documents
originated with the March 4 letter, and, therefore, is a request by you
in your capacity as an individual Senator, rather than one from the
subcommittee. DOE does not have a list of the type you requested, and
creation of logs of withheld documents is not required in
administration by agencies of the Freedom of Information Act.
Therefore, and again as DOE already has explained to your staff, DOE is
not in a position to prepare and submit to you a list of the sort
requested in your March 4 letter. For all of these same reasons, we are
not in a position to supply to you the information you requested at the
March 20, 2003, hearing.

Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor.
Senator Allard. Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Abraham, I am looking at a press release from the
NNSA from late last year that talks about the reorganization
that is going on there. As I understand it, you are in the
process of, mostly through attrition, reducing the staff there
by about 20 percent. Is that right?
Secretary Abraham. Yes.
Senator Pryor. About 20 percent according to the press
release.
I have a general concern about that. By the way, I am not
opposed to that concept of streamlining and becoming more
efficient. I am always for that. But I have a general question
in the context of the heightened security we live in right now
considering this war on terrorism and all of the possible,
potential threats against which you all manage and maintain.
How is that going right now, and are you seeing any adverse
effects in terms of morale or any gaps or transitional issues
that are causing you problems?
Secretary Abraham. Senator, not at this point. I am not
saying there are not people who will always be unhappy with
changes in the status quo. What we have tried to do in this
proposal, I know, is to be very careful about how we would make
this transition occur. I can assure you and the committee that
no actions will be taken in a hasty fashion or in a fashion
inconsistent with the actual security of either the complex or
the capabilities of the complex.
One of the challenges which basically confronted me when I
became Secretary was the fact that shortly before my arrival,
in fact, based on actions I had voted for when I was in the
Senate, we had developed the NNSA as a quasi-independent part
of the Department. One of its first responsibilities--and that
is primarily one for the administrator and now the acting
administrator--to develop was a game plan for trying to set
this new agency, if you would, or quasi-independent agency, up
in a way that minimized the duplication of functions.
One of the frustrations Congress had that led in part to
the development of NNSA I think was that there was a sense
there were too many layers of decision making, too many
management layers. What Ambassador Brooks and before him
General Gordon have tried to do is to wrestle with that issue.
I can tell you that most of the hearings I had initially were
hearings in which people were arguing or asking really for us
to do this work quickly because it has been expected by the
appropriators as one of the first responsibilities in this
area.
We have tried in this reorganization to address it. We have
certainly heard from many Members who have had one particular
concern or another because of some of the rearrangements. I
know there are certainly going to be people in the system who
may prefer the old approaches that we had. But we think this
represents what Congress asked us to do, which was to do a good
faith evaluation of the bureaucracy and try to recommend ways
to make it more efficient and streamlined.
Senator Pryor. Again, I agree completely with those goals.
I am 100 percent on board with that. The committee, I think,
would like to hear just an assurance that while we are doing
this and going through this transition, we are taking care of
our business, we are taking care of our mission, and there are
no gaps or missed steps that could cause a security problem.
Secretary Abraham. I think we will be able to do the
mission better. Our goal really was to try to eliminate some of
the bureaucracy that was, in fact, perceived by upper
management of NNSA to be hard to work through, too many layers
in the chain of command. One of the frustrations that I have
and anybody who has served, I think, because I know most of the
previous Energy Secretaries, is that there sometimes are
problems within the complex, and people say why did that
happen. Part of it is because it took such a long time for
decisions to move up and down the chain.
But I can assure you, and look forward to working with the
committee as we effectuate these changes, that we are not going
to do anything that undermines the quality or the timeliness of
the work of the Defense Programs or Nonproliferation. I think
we are pleased with the progress, in almost every respect, that
we have been making on some of the priority items, but it will
not be lost on us that, as we make these changes, there is
always a threat that we could lose effectiveness. We will do
our best and keep you well informed of how we are addressing
those.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Secretary Abraham, good to see you this
morning. I want to thank you for appearing before the committee
today and tell you that I look forward to working with you to
ensure that our nuclear weapons facilities receive the proper
funding and resources they need in order to carry out their
important mission.
I am especially glad to see that we are moving forward with
the modern pit facility. I think most Americans would be
surprised, as I was when I learned, that we currently do not
have a certified capability to produce such an important part
of our nuclear arsenal. Indeed, it is supremely ironic that at
a time when we are justifiably concerned about the ability of
North Korea to produce nuclear weapons, that America cannot.
On that point, the point of the modern pit facility, I want
to ask you about the length of time it takes to complete that
facility. I am informed that the best estimate is 15 to 17
years. I wanted to ask you why does it take so long and is
there anything that we in Congress can do to speed up the
process.
Secretary Abraham. Senator, you raise an important point.
The duration of time between this point and when we feel we can
have a fully operational modern pit facility is a long one
because obviously there are inordinate numbers of both safety
standards, environmental standards, and others that have to be
met along that pathway.
I should, however, note that we believe that this year we
will be actually able to produce a pit which can be certified
at the work that is being done at Los Alamos. It is a small
operation by comparison to what we would envision a modern pit
facility to be. We are not going to be without any capability
because we will have that, but that is obviously a very small
production capability.
As to the specific impediments, I would have to, if I
could, respond for the record on that.
Senator Cornyn. That would be very helpful.
Secretary Abraham. I will give you maybe some of the
technical explanations that I do not have with me here today.
[The information referred to follows:]

Based on current planning, construction of a Modern Pit
Facility (MPF) will start in 2011 and be completed in 2017.
Initial production in 2018 will enable the manufacture of
plutonium pits for the nuclear weapon stockpile by 2020. This
schedule will ensure that the NNSA is able to develop essential
pit manufacturing capabilities that are both technologically
``modern'' and capable of meeting long-term needs of the
Nation's nuclear stockpile.
It is also essential that the MPF comply with all
environmental standards and evolving security requirements.
With an expected cost of some $2 billion to design and
construct a MPF, the DOE must provide high confidence that a
MPF can meet production goals and also meet all safety,
security, and environmental compliance requirements.
The current MPF schedule exercises prudent risk management
based on current understanding of pit lifetimes, future
stockpile requirements, and other priorities within NNSA. The
current schedule for design and construction could be shortened
by several years if the MPF project were provided additional
resources; however, NNSA will live within its FYNSP and feels
that the current schedule is reasonable.
While many regulatory and administrative actions will be
required to develop and operate a MPF, there are no specific
issues that Congress must address at present to speed up the
process.

The other issue here is that there has been some concern
about whether or not we should move ahead on some of these
projects. The time frame that you have just outlined is a good
example of some of the challenges we have in terms of
maintaining capability, which has been our priority of trying
to establish the capability to do the work that we may or may
not in the future be called on to undertake.
Senator Cornyn. Certainly I think we all understand if
there are safety or scientific reasons for such a huge length
of time. If there are, however, bureaucratic rules or other
things that do not make sense that we can address here in
Congress, I hope you will let me and the committee know.
Will the modern pit facility that we are talking about have
the flexibility such that it will be able to produce a range of
pits, possibly even for weapons that currently are not in
America's nuclear inventory?
Secretary Abraham. Yes. It is, I think, the objective to
have a facility that will have flexibility. We are always in
the process of not only thinking about being capable of doing
things today but being able to address challenges of the
future. I think the concept behind the facility is to have a
design that allows for that flexibility.
Senator Cornyn. Let me jump to another subject in my
remaining time--maintenance backlogs at our Nuclear Weapons
Complex. Of course, I guess we would all agree that it is
critical that we maintain upkeep of our facilities. The
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP)
appears to have been successful in halting the growth of the
approximately $1 billion maintenance backlog at our nuclear
weapons facilities. Unfortunately, the backlog will remain the
same or grow if the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
(RTBF) program, which continues current and future maintenance,
continues to decline. In fact, the nuclear weapons may be in
the same poor shape in the future when the FIRP ends.
Do you believe maintenance activities are adequately funded
at the plants and laboratories in order to eliminate
maintenance backlogs in the next 8 years when FIRP ends?
Secretary Abraham. We definitely place a high priority on
eliminating that backlog. Two of the challenges which we have
tried to address in the more robust budgets, which this
administration has been submitting, are the deterioration in
the infrastructure generally and the maintenance backlogs that
Congress has also identified as a problem. We believe that the
funding that we are providing puts us right on the course
towards addressing that backlog. It is going to take some time.
We recognize that.
It may be at the end of that, as we move down that road,
that we conclude that not only do we have to have an ongoing
maintenance program that is effective, but that we also find
additional challenges that fall into a category of perhaps
being defined as backlog by that point.
I would just say that the FIRP does enjoy very substantial
amount of support in this budget, and we certainly intend to
apply that effectively to the infrastructure problems we have
encountered.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Secretary Abraham, delighted to have you back in the
Senate, if not as a Member, at least as a witness. We
appreciate your leadership at the Department of Energy.
To follow up on Senator Cornyn's good line of questioning,
let me just drive home that point. Since we closed Rocky Flats
in 1989, the United States has not had production capability
for the primaries or the pits that are essential for making
weapons. I know we will be doing something in Los Alamos for
the W88 warhead, but that will only be dealing with a small
number of the warhead types.
Let me ask you a few brief questions. Does Russia have the
capability to produce these right now? Do they have a
production capability in Russia?
Secretary Abraham. Yes. The answer is that they do.
Senator Sessions. What about China?
Secretary Abraham. I believe they do, yes.
Senator Sessions. North Korea?
Secretary Abraham. We believe that they may have that
capability.
Senator Sessions. As I understand it, we are the only
nuclear power in the world at this point that does not have
production capability.
Secretary Abraham. Senator, that is the reason why we
strongly support the investments in the development of this
facility. We do not do it, however, because of a desire to
restart an arms race. I think your point is an important one.
Also, however, we just view our current capabilities as being
inadequate to meet any future national security challenges we
might have, and we feel that restoring capability is the first
challenge that we have to undertake. That is why we have worked
on the infrastructure programs that were mentioned, and that is
why we support the development of pit manufacturing capability.
Senator Sessions. It would be hard to say, would it not,
Mr. Secretary, that we are somehow destabilizing the world if
we are moving up, simply reestablishing the level that every
other nuclear power in the world has?
Secretary Abraham. The point I made earlier, which I would
just repeat, is that even as we have placed a moratorium on
testing, even as we closed Rocky Flats and have not had the
capability of developing a pit, and even as we have placed
restrictions on the sort of research that can be conducted, it
has not dissuaded others from acting.
Obviously, we always take into account the implications of
investments we make or the development of capabilities that we
might undertake. We take into account its impact on others, but
it seems that others are acting in their own best interests and
we feel that there is at least a need for us to now really
focus on the restoration of our capabilities here.
Senator Sessions. What you are then basically saying is we
have not been doing that. We have not had that capability, but
it has not deterred others from achieving that capability and
going forward. In fact, it has no impact whatsoever, if you
really think about it. I do not know why it would.
As a matter of fact, it might be an encouragement. It
strikes me that if we develop a nuclear policy that freezes our
capabilities against any future change or improvement, we have
simply set a floor, a goal that any nation that wants to be a
peer competitor to the United States should seek and try to
achieve, and, at that point, they would have parity with the
United States. Psychologically, I do not think we need to do
that.
Would you comment on that?
Secretary Abraham. I would just say this: With the end of
the Cold War, decisions about reducing the investments in these
kinds of capabilities were made and carried forward. I think
there is no tangible evidence that those decisions have led
others to necessarily follow that model, which I think is your
point. But notwithstanding that, what others might do is a
consideration.
But I think the first consideration we have is what is in
the interest of our national security. That is the first
consideration, and the first answer is we believe it is in our
interest, as a matter of national security, to restore these
capabilities. We see no behavior that suggests that doing that
would have an impact on the rest of the world that was so
undesirable as to offset whatever national security advantages
are gained from us moving ahead here.
But in the first instance, all of these decisions begin
with the question of what does the United States need in the
future to be able to maintain its capability, and we think that
has to be addressed in the fashion we are talking about.
Senator Sessions. I agree. We want to reduce nuclear
weapons. That should be our goal. But I do not think in the
long run the world will be safer and other nations will reduce
their power if we reduce our power substantially and freeze
ourselves at that level. I think it is a dangerous policy, and
I support your view.
Secretary Abraham. The Treaty of Moscow attempts to reduce
the number of nuclear weapons. What we recognize is that the
challenges of the Cold War of the latter half of the 20th
century may not be the challenges of the 21st century. We have
already seen evidence of that, and our belief is that there is
a pathway forward here that is important to proceed on. It is
not a pathway of immediately developing new weapons or
enhancing every weapon, nor is it the pathway of essentially a
nuclear freeze. It is a pathway of developing capability to
address challenges as they might emerge, and having no
capability, at least in our judgment, is not the proper
approach. Obviously, the pit facility is an important part of
that capability being reestablished.
Senator Sessions. I notice my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Will we have a chance to have a short second round?
Senator Allard. Yes, I believe so. We have to be sure to
get the Secretary out of here by 11:30, but I believe we will
have an opportunity to allow you to ask a question or two more.
Senator Graham, you are next. I just want to welcome you
here personally to the committee. I know our States have worked
closely on issues of environmental management and other issues,
and I look forward to continuing to work with you.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I will continue some of the things
that Senator Sessions was talking about.
First, though, I want to congratulate you and thank you for
appointing Jeff Allison as the site manager at Savannah River.
I think we are all going to be very pleased with that, and I
appreciate that. Jeff has done a good job and will continue to.
I will change the subject just a little bit. We will get
back to pits in a moment. The MOX program is a big deal to the
country and certainly to the Savannah River Site, and I
appreciate the budget allocation this year.
One of the concerns that I have is the Russian program. Can
you give us a little update about exactly where the Russians
are with their MOX facility and what is the outlook there?
Secretary Abraham. We feel very positive about recent
developments on the Russian side of the plutonium disposition
agreement. We have reached an agreement. The Russians have
reached a positive decision with respect to the design of their
facility. That had been one of the impediments, if you would,
or one of the project lines that had not been moving quickly.
That has now been achieved.
The success the President had last year with the
development of the Global Partnership initiative to recruit and
encourage other members of the G8 to join a partnership to
provide $20 billion over the next decade for nonproliferation
programs in Russia has changed some of the funding dynamics in
a favorable way so that the funding for the Russian program, I
think, is on the right track, and we are confident it will be
achieved.
Senator Graham. So you feel confident.
Secretary Abraham. Yes. Obviously, a reflection of our
confidence is in the budget submission we have made where we
have now made a major commitment in this proposal for the
beginning of construction in Savannah River.
Senator Graham. You think the Russians are going to keep
pace with us, generally speaking.
Secretary Abraham. I believe the Russian program is on its
track now in a much more confident direction. It will not be
exactly parallel to ours, but now it is moving ahead in a way
that is, I think, much improved over where we were a year ago.
Senator Graham. Along the lines of the questions by Senator
Sessions, what I am trying to say and I think what we are all
trying to say here is that a new pit production facility makes
sense to us. I applaud you for going down this road. The
sooner, the better for, I think, most of us.
Even though we are trying to appropriately reduce the
amount of nuclear weapons available to the former Soviet Union
and ourselves in a responsible way, lessening the dangers, I
think there is a feeling here among most of us--and I believe
the administration too--that you always have to maintain
currency and viability. So a pit production facility that can
make sure that we have the state-of-the-art, new generation
technology to marry up with delivery systems would be something
most of us would be supportive of.
I do not think they are contrary goals at all. Trying to
modernize your ability to produce and maintain a viable nuclear
deterrent force in the future is not contrary to trying to
lessen the danger. I applaud you for what you have done and
encourage you to continue and hope you bring it to the Savannah
River Site. [Laughter.]
Now, Senator Chambliss, my colleague from Georgia, has been
very supportive of the site. One thing I think we have had
going for us at the Savannah River Site is South Carolina and
North Carolina delegations and, recently, good leadership of
the Governor's office. I think that now you will have somebody
you can work with in Governor Sanford.
I know he is very concerned about hydrogen research and
Savannah River has a very rich tradition of hydrogen research.
We developed a hydrogen bus several years ago in the Savannah
River Technology Center.
Do you have any plans for that center in terms of hydrogen
research, and could you give us a little overview of where we
are going with hydrogen from the Department's point of view?
Secretary Abraham. Yes. Let me say that we are definitely,
as you well know, expanding our hydrogen fuel cell programs. We
have not made decisions as to where and when research will be
conducted, but the President has committed a $1.7 billion
program over the next 5 years. The design of that program will
be focusing on research on hydrogen production, hydrogen
storage, and on our capability of effectively reducing the cost
of hydrogen fuel cell generation. A variety of programs will
now be launched.
The goal is to really, in these next 5 years, jump start
the high risk research that needs to be conducted in order for
us to really make this transition that we envision to a
hydrogen economy, one that would see motor vehicles powered by
the fuel cells. We have not made decisions yet as to where all
that research will be conducted, but it will obviously be a
very robust program.
Senator Graham. I think Savannah River could help you
there, and we are definitely interested.
The last thing is the Savannah River Technology Center. We
would like to see that expanded. There is a real user-friendly
environment in South Carolina and Georgia for such projects,
and we are definitely working on a next generation nuclear
reactor. That is one area of our energy economy that I think
has been neglected. I applaud you for having a friendlier
attitude toward nuclear power. It is a non-emitting, safe form
of energy, and I think our country has been neglectful in the
past to let the technology become stagnant. I would certainly
encourage you to look at a research site, Savannah River being
one of them, obviously, for the next generation nuclear
reactors.
With that, I will appreciate what you are doing for our
country.
Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Allard. Senator Chambliss. I would also like to
welcome you to the committee and look forward to working with
you too.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and likewise.
Mr. Secretary, I want to associate myself with the remarks
of my colleague from South Carolina, Mr. Graham. We have worked
very closely together on any number of issues at the Savannah
River Site, a keen interest. I have expressed it to members of
your staff over the last couple of years.
The primary concern that I have about SRS is from a
security standpoint. I know we read the threats that exist out
there with respect to potential attacks of terrorism occurring
at our nuclear power plants. We have two in our State, Plant
Vogel and Plant Hatch. Plant Hatch is in my old congressional
district, and I have spent an awful lot of time there. I have
also spent time at Plant Vogel.
Very honestly, while we are always vulnerable at any site
in America, I think that Southern Company and the other owners
of those two nuclear power plants have done a good job with
respect to securing the facility. With the guidelines coming
from Washington regarding construction of those plants, I feel
very good about the security of the plant in the event the
perimeter lines were breached.
But, from a nuclear waste storage standpoint, I am
concerned about security at facilities such as the Savannah
River Site. I would like for you to comment to us about what
you have done there, what is in this budget, and what do we
expect to need to do at sites like the Savannah River Site
regarding nuclear storage.
Secretary Abraham. Our cross-cutting, if you would,
security proposal in the budget calls for about a $1.2 billion
complex-wide security allocation. To use Savannah River as an
example, among the sorts of things which we have done to try to
enhance security, particularly in the wake of September 11, is
to increase access controls, to create an inner-site perimeter,
to add armed guards, to extend the buffer zone at the site, and
to initiate patrols along the river and guards at the tank
farm. Similar kinds of things are going on at other parts of
the complex.
As I always tried to make clear when we have these
hearings, we have tried to also increase our monitoring and our
flexibility to make changes where they are called for. We
really believe that the security posture has to be reviewed on
a very frequent basis. Our security teams are doing that. We
are in the process of basically reexamining our design basis
threat on an ongoing basis to make adjustments where called
for. If we feel that there is a change that is needed,
obviously, we will place that kind of funding priority at the
top of any requests we make to Congress, or, if we have to,
within the site itself, we will make those adjustments to
reprogram money to make sure that any newly emerging concerns
can be quickly dealt with.
Senator Chambliss. I appreciate that very much, and folks
in our area will be glad to hear that too.
I want to echo also what Lindsey said with respect to Jeff
Allison. Bringing him on as site manager has been a good fit,
and we look forward to continuing to work with you to bring all
the assets we can to the Savannah River Site. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Allard. Let us see. Now I am trying to figure out
just where we stand as far as committee questions are
concerned. I have one question I want to cover. Senator Pryor,
do you have any questions?
Senator Pryor. No.
Senator Allard. I know that Senator Sessions has a couple
of questions, and then we will wrap it up.
I got cut short on time here, Mr. Secretary, and I want to
clarify my question to you.
Secretary Abraham. Please.
Senator Allard. I want to give you an opportunity to
respond to this question, and then I will explain why I think
this is an important question.
Just to clarify the record, does NNSA need an authorization
from Congress to proceed with the production of a new nuclear
weapon?
Secretary Abraham. A new weapon. I believe I answered in
the context of the research on the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator, but if it were a new weapon, yes, congressional
approval to proceed with production or design of a new nuclear
weapon would be required.
Senator Allard. I am glad you clarified that because I
think that is important for those who have concerns about
whether we are moving ahead with concepts on what we do with
nuclear weapons. It is an idea of looking at the scientific
aspects of a nuclear weapon. When you get right down to it,
Congress is going to have to approve production of a new
weapon. I think that is an important thing for people who may
have concerns about just the idea of concept, further
scientific investigation of a nuclear weapon, to keep that in
mind.
Let me go ahead and move to Senator Sessions. Did you have
any more, Senator Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. No.
Senator Allard. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Abraham, since I have been in
the Senate, through various different events, I have had
insights into the Department of Energy laboratories--Los
Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia. I have been shocked and
disturbed by the security breaches, by the mismanagement, and
by the problems that have existed there. Some of them have been
made quite public. There has been a pattern of misconduct that
I think is quite significant over a very long period of time.
I know you have taken it as your responsibility to clean
that up, and there are some good steps that have been taken.
Frankly, I have serious doubts about whether we ought to
maintain these contracts, whether other universities or other
entities ought to be given a chance to participate in this $2
billion a year that we routinely give out to Los Alamos
Laboratory, for example.
This is a published report. I have this Associated Press
article from CNN.com. The headline says this, ``Former Los
Alamos Official Says Lab Does Not Have `Criminal Culture'.''
Well, that is good to have the person say that.
[The information referred to follows:]

He said that the investigators, Glenn Walp and Steve Doran,
were fired because they had provided incomplete and inaccurate
information. These two investigators had pressed investigations
into suspected mismanagement of lab money, prompting the House
Energy Committee to hold hearings on it.
Salgado, who has now been removed or quit, acknowledged a
lab culture where money was at times treated as ``monopoly
money.'' This is a head man, the deputy director or principal
deputy director of the lab, who said they were treating money
as monopoly money. He said, ``It is not a criminal culture, but
it is a culture that has to be addressed.'' I would agree.
Seventeen employees have now been fired or removed from
management positions by the University of California which
manages this. Salgado himself, who was making those statements,
was fired in January. Top officials that hindered several
investigations into the misuse of hundreds of thousands of
dollars in lab funds were identified.
The investigator Walp said lab managers knew fraud at the
lab had been ``greening the valley'' around Los Alamos for
years but looked the other way.
They just listed a lot of different problems of individual
fraud by employees, and financial mismanagement and problems
involving espionage have been known for some time there.
Frankly, it strikes me that the University of California
cannot get it through its head that it is not some sort of
ordained entity here. Their security situation is difficult for
any university, but it particularly appears to me that the
University of California has difficulty understanding the
security requirements.
Are you looking at that? Will the Department of Energy
consider giving the opportunity to other universities who will
commit to run the program with integrity and with proper
security procedures? Why should some other university not be
given the chance?
Secretary Abraham. First of all, when some of the
revelations of late were brought to my attention, frankly in
the period right before or approximately the same time they
became part of the media, we began a very intense series of
discussions and meetings with the leadership, the president of
the university and others in his leadership team, to try to
convey, once and for all, our belief that when we hire somebody
as a contractor to run these labs, that they actually have all
of the responsibility that goes with that title. We made it
very clear to the university that they had to take action
quickly to address not just the specific issues that had
emerged, but the broader issues, the broader undercurrent, that
made it possible for these advantages to be taken and for this
conduct to occur.
They have done a number of things beginning, as I think we
made it clear to them, with some changes in personnel. You
alluded to that. That had not taken place when, just 2 years
before, another set of events took place at Los Alamos. There
had not been a change or changes in the security division and
other key leadership positions, even though there had been
quite obviously problems.
We also have tried, in studying the Los Alamos issues, to
share what we are learning about the problems there with all of
our labs because a lessons-learned approach, in my judgment,
has to be taken from this so that we do not have repetition of
these problems in the future elsewhere.
We have also made it clear to the university that unless
they meet what I consider to be the responsibilities that they
have been paid for, then we will find someone else to do it. To
that end, I have asked the Deputy Secretary of our Department,
Kyle McSlarrow, and the acting head of the NNSA, Linton Brooks,
to complete and provide for me by April 30 an evaluation of the
University of California's performance in the wake of our
directives, as well as any further recommendations as to the
ongoing or future role that the university should have, and I
look forward to getting the report.
I think also one of the issues you have touched on is an
important one, and that is the question of the nature by which
these sorts of contracts are provided. Ours is the only
Department, I think, which has Federal research facility
contracts that are ever made available for competition. I do
not think that happens with other Departments. We do have the
flexibility for that competition. Even as we are examining the
specific case of Los Alamos, I have appointed a blue ribbon
team of outside experts to provide us with a better
understanding of and some criteria for future competition,
which I think will inevitably be beneficial to the complex.
Senator Sessions. I would thank you for that. I would say
that from my experience, both at secure briefings and public
briefings, that serious security breaches have occurred that
have adversely impacted the United States. It is quite clear
that we should not be paying to green the valley with Federal
taxpayers' dollars, and frankly I see no reason whatsoever that
you ought not to give other universities who may be prepared to
carry on this program effectively with security and efficiency
a chance to bid on this. They do not have a right to have this
program forever. I think their behavior has been very poor, and
I hope that you will not just talk about it. I hope you will
take bids from other universities and see what kinds of
proposals they would make before you decide to continue this
one.
Secretary Abraham. The other point I would also make is
this, that as we examine the situation, we do not intend to
have the taxpayers responsible for mismanagement problems. We
believe that if there has been mismanagement, that the cost of
that has to be borne where appropriate by the contractor as
well.
Senator Sessions. It is just part of the university
culture, Mr. Chairman. They do not like restrictions. They do
not like security. These universities just do not think that
way, and if there is not very strong leadership, it tends to be
operated like a college campus rather than a highly secure and
important defense laboratory.
Senator Allard. I think you made some very good comments.
Senator Sessions, thank you for your questions.
We have run out of members and questions, Mr. Secretary. I
just want to say that I considered it an honor and pleasure to
serve with you in the Senate, and I feel like you do a good job
here with the Department of Energy. You have had a lot of huge
challenges. You have done a great job with them, and I wish you
well.
After we adjourn here, I would just like to speak with you
a moment, if we might.
Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. I declare the committee adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION
ASSISTANCE

1. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, with certain countries
moving towards indigenous nuclear programs and possessing weapons of
mass destruction expertise and technologies, do you believe the
Department of Energy (DOE) may require additional authority to permit
DOE nonproliferation programs and assistance to be spent in countries
beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU)?
Secretary Abraham. NNSA's nonproliferation activities are central
to the Bush administration's December 2002 National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, which lists ``Strengthened
Nonproliferation'' as a pillar of its approach to reducing
proliferation threats. The Department is fully committed to this
critical mission; this is reflected in the diversity of our programs to
address nonproliferation concerns in Russia, other states of the FSU,
and, increasingly, throughout the world.
NNSA's nonproliferation mission and responsibilities set forth in
the National Nuclear Security Administration Act are broad enough to
encompass our conduct of nuclear nonproliferation activities outside of
Russia and the FSU. However, we are seeking in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 to clarify that NNSA has the
requisite authority to conduct its international Materials Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program not only in the FSU but in
other countries where the risks of nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, materials and technology also threaten the security of the
United States.

2. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, specifically, what other
countries do you believe would be interested in DOE cooperative
nonproliferation programs, and, in particular, which programs do you
see participating and why?
Secretary Abraham.

We are currently pursuing a dialogue on MPC&A
cooperation with countries we believe are of particular
concern, but we feel it is premature to discuss specifics in
detail.
Many countries outside the FSU are interested in our
border detection and Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
programs--and we hope to expand these programs to those
countries where significant proliferation risks exist. Eastern
and Central Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa are regions
where we may initiate work. We will target resources to
countries where nuclear and radiological material security is
most vulnerable, including areas associated with terrorist
organizations or activities.
In addition, DOE/NNSA's export control assistance
program has grown from 3 partner countries--Russia, Ukraine,
and Kazakhstan--to nearly 20--including the Baltics, the
Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Cyprus, India,
Pakistan, Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt,
Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. Cooperation is
in its infancy in many of these countries. DOE/NNSA's broader
geographical focus is consistent with the U.S. Government's
interest in strengthening international export controls and
securing key transshipment routes that proliferators are known
to take advantage of in acquiring the items and technologies
needed for their WMD programs.

FISCAL YEAR 2004 NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM BUDGET REQUEST

3. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, the budget request for the
DOE nonproliferation programs represents a 30-percent increase above
last year's request. This is the first time in the history of these
programs that the increase has been so substantial. This increase will
primarily be spent on constructing a mixed-oxide facility (MOX) in
South Carolina to dispose of U.S. plutonium under the U.S.-Russia
Disposition Agreement and the President's new initiative to accelerate
nuclear materials disposition in Russia. Would you please tell me why
the DOE decided to focus the increase on these two programs this year
and what impact these programs will have on U.S. national security?
Secretary Abraham. The MOX facility is an important element of a
long-term agreement with Russia under which each country will dispose
of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium by 2025. The increase in
funding in fiscal year 2004 is needed to complete the detailed design
and begin construction of the MOX facility, contingent on parallel
progress in the Russian program. In addition, the President's new
initiative to accelerate nuclear materials disposition in Russia will
permanently eliminate 1.5 MT per year of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Both of these programs help to prevent the threat of theft or diversion
by terrorists or rogue nations of surplus plutonium/HEU in Russia and
strongly support the administration's nonproliferation objectives.

We did not increase our budget request for the
International MPC&A Program (which protects materials) because
we took that step 2 years ago. The pace of the program is now
governed by Russia's ability to absorb assistance, not by U.S.
funding. Within the $226 million for MPC&A we have new
initiatives to secure radiological materials and to provide
security of Russian Strategic Rocket Force warhead sites.
The Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
Program, recently transferred from the Department of Defense,
needs no increase now because $74 million in prior year funds
are being transferred to us.
The Russian Transition Initiatives Program has
sufficient funds at the $40 million level to work to redirect
Russian nuclear weapons expertise to peaceful civilian
activities. Increases are not required because we have a number
of pending projects.
Our bottom line: We are proud of what we have done.
Our budget request makes clear the administration's strong
support for nonproliferation.

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES AND THE TERRORIST THREAT

4. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, there has been a great deal
of discussion about the threats posed by a ``dirty bomb'' or RDD and
the need to secure and account for radiological sources both at home
and worldwide. Would you tell me what the DOE position is regarding the
threat posed by an RDD versus a device using weapons-grade nuclear
materials, e.g. highly-enriched uranium or plutonium?
Secretary Abraham. DOE's priority, in program focus and budget, is
on securing weapons grade nuclear materials, which could be used in a
nuclear explosion. These materials pose the highest risk to U.S.
national security. Still, the threat posed by an RDD is a major concern
and increasing resources have been dedicated to reducing this threat as
well.
An RDD is often termed a weapon of mass ``disruption'' rather than
a weapon of mass destruction. An RDD attack can produce general panic,
health consequences including immediate fatalities, and long-term
increases in cancer incidence, long-term denial of property use, and
massive economic impact arising from property and facility
decontamination needs, disruption of services, and other associated
factors. Recent reports have estimated that it would cost almost $20
billion, not including decontamination and other cleanup costs, to
recover from an RDD attack in a densely populated urban setting with a
strontium-90 source commonly used in Soviet-fabricated radioisotope
thermoelectric generators--Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
(RTGs). In comparison, the economic costs of natural disasters such as
the 1993 floods and Hurricane Andrew range from $5.5 billion to $20.5
billion, respectively.
In contrast, an attack using fissile material in an actual nuclear
device could result in damage that is many orders of magnitude greater
than that posed by an RDD attack, both in terms of loss of life,
infrastructure devastation, and recovery costs.
DOE/NNSA programs aim to address the broad spectrum of threats to
United States national security. This includes the priority mission of
securing fissile material and reducing the threat from high-risk
radioactive sources that could be used in an RDD.

5. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, since there are so many
radiological sources being used by industry, the medical community, and
others, how is DOE prioritizing the threat posed by these sources from
an RDD perspective?
Secretary Abraham. Many different organizations are involved in
determining what high-risk sources are. DOE and the U.S. national labs,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others have all contributed to
the body of work on this topic. We are working with our national
laboratories and the NRC to categorize priority sources and to evaluate
actions to protect sources of greatest concern. There are many
variables to consider, but there is general convergence on which
sources present the greatest potential threat, should they be used for
malicious purposes.

6. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, what sources do you believe
should be secured and accounted first and what is DOE doing to address
this threat?
Secretary Abraham. DOE will focus efforts on areas where the
greatest risk reduction can be achieved at the least cost.

This past March, at the International Conference on
the Security of Radioactive Sources, I announced a $3 million
contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to assist developing countries in securing their radioactive
sources. DOE can provide critical support in the form of
technical and financial assistance to enable countries of
interest to properly account for radiological material.
Our initial focus is on seven major isotopes of
concern: cobalt-60, cesium-137, radium-226, americium-241,
plutonium-238, iridium-192, and strontium-90. Although we are
initially focusing our efforts on these seven isotopes, we will
retain flexibility to include other isotopes on a case-by-case
basis.
Another aspect of the DOE's approach will focus
efforts on countries that are most at risk of having their
radiological materials stolen due to social/economic
conditions, lax regulatory infrastructure, and/or lack of
technical and financial means to correct problems on their own.
Working with the Department of State, DOE will continue to
analyze risks within the radioisotope lifecycle (production,
distribution, use, and disposition), risks within countries,
and potential smuggling/transit routes.

RUSSIAN TRANSITION INITIATIVE PROGRAM

7. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, the Russian Transition
Initiative (RTI) program is designed to address the ``brain drain''
concern in the FSU by providing commercial partnerships between FSU
scientists and U.S. industry and by assisting Russia with the
downsizing of its nuclear weapons complex.
I was pleased to learn in your testimony that RTI has obtained over
$125 million in matching resources from U.S. industry for
commercialization endeavors, or $3 in private sector funds for every $2
in U.S. Government seed funding. Can you explain how and why RTI has
been able to attract this kind of private sector investment and how RTI
could attract even more private sector dollars?
Secretary Abraham. First, credit for progress in this area should
go to the new leadership of the Russian Transition Initiative as well
as to the leadership of the U.S. Industry Coalition (USIC).

Specifically, under this leadership RTI has been able
to attract significant resources through its requirement that
USG funding be matched at least dollar-for-dollar with cash or
in-kind contributions by companies.
Once invested, many partners are anxious to see their
initial effort succeed, so they actually invest more than
required in time, capital or equipment. This translates into
greater leveraging.
Recently RTI attracted $96 million in outside funds
through five industry partners.
The support of RTI's investment in upgrades to
business and physical infrastructure encourages private
commercial support in the form of contracting, distributorships
and joint ventures between U.S. and Russian firms, especially
in the Russian closed cities. These successes encourage other
industry partners to invest. Recently, Russian companies have
begun to invest in businesses in the closed cities.
RTI plans to continue to expand its outreach to U.S.
industry partners and is already cooperating with other USG
organizations such as the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) to help attract private investment.
Recently a Russian counterpart to the private USIC,
the National Industry Coalition, has been formed and will work
to expand Russian investment in these cooperative commercial
efforts.

8. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, how many FSU scientists are
involved full time with RTI commercial projects?
Secretary Abraham. Currently, 7,200 scientists, engineers, and
technicians in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are at work.
Background: Russian Transition Initiatives includes Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP), which draws its numbers from work in
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) only
works in Russia. IPP employs about 6,700 scientists and NCI employs 500
scientists and technicians in commercial work, which totals 7,200.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION/DOE SUPPORT IN IRAQ

9. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, in December 2002, the NNSA
redirected $6 million of fiscal year 2003 DOE funds to provide
technical support to the IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) for weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) inspections in Iraq. To date how much of the $6
million has been spent and what kind of assistance have these funds
provided?
Secretary Abraham. In December 2002, $6 million was redirected by
NNSA to support WMD inspections being conducted by the IAEA's Iraq
Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) and the UNMOVIC, as mandated under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.
As of March 1, 2003, approximately $780,000 had been expended to
support inspections. These funds have been used to cover costs for
technical, proliferation assessments by our national laboratories and
for specialized equipment, software, and related technology for use by
INVO and UNMOVIC. At this time, it is undetermined what the funding
requirements will be in a post-war Iraq.

10. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, with the war in Iraq
underway and the inspections suspended, what role do you anticipate
NNSA will play now or in post-conflict Iraq?
Secretary Abraham. It is well known that the Department of Energy
is resident to hundreds of nuclear and other WMD specialists. We fully
anticipate that the Department of Defense will call on our experts to
assist with the identification and elimination of Iraq's WMD
capabilities. Looking further down the road, we anticipate supporting
any U.S. Government activities to provide long-term monitoring of Iraqi
dual-use facilities and imports and exports. At this time, it is
undetermined what the actual role will be in a post-war Iraq.

IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

11. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, there has been a lot of
attention recently on the status of the Iranian nuclear program, which
appears to be permitted under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In
your opinion, based on what you know of the Iranian program, how much
of a threat does this program pose compared to other nuclear programs
in ``axis of evil'' countries?
Secretary Abraham. Iran is actively developing a nuclear program
and related facilities for, we believe, nuclear weapons purposes. These
facilities were undeclared until recently and were declared only under
intense international pressure. This program raises very serious
questions about Iran's compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty obligations. It poses serious dangers, and we will work with our
partners in the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran
remains free of nuclear weapons.
By comparison, it is a long-standing intelligence community
assessment that North Korea has already produced one, possibly two,
nuclear weapons. If it were to reprocess the currently stored spent
fuel, North Korea could have enough plutonium for several more nuclear
weapons. A North Korea with nuclear weapons is equally alarming
especially since North Korea's program is further along in its
development. North Korea has acknowledged having nuclear weapons and
has threatened their export. The intent of the U.S. Government is to
pursue a multilateral process that leads to the complete, verifiable
and irreversible elimination of North Korean nuclear weapons
capabilities.
With regard to Iraq, we do not believe that Saddam Hussein ever
abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions. On the contrary, we believe
that there are strong indications that right up to the end of the
regime, Saddam remained determined to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact,
DOE joined most agencies of the Intelligence Community in the 2002
National Intelligence Estimate in the assessment that Iraq had
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.

DOE NONPROLIFERATION BUDGET AND NON-MONETARY OBSTACLES

12. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, during my time on the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, I have noted that
U.S. nonproliferation programs require greater cooperation from Russia
and other FSU partners to accelerate program goals. With this fiscal
year 2004 budget, I believe the real challenge ahead will be non-
monetary obstacles, such as access and greater cooperation.
This perspective is echoed in the March 2003 report, Controlling
Nuclear Warheads and Materials, A Report Card and Action Plan, just
completed by Harvard and the Nuclear Threat Initiative:

the available budgets are now large enough, and the non-
monetary obstacles substantial enough, that simply adding money
to existing programs, while making no other changes, would in
most cases do little to strengthen or accelerate these efforts.

What is your view of this assessment, and how is the DOE addressing
the challenges posed by ``non-monetary obstacles'' for the
nonproliferation programs within DOE?
Secretary Abraham. I agree with the assessment that non-monetary
obstacles such as access and cooperation now limit our nonproliferation
activities. Still, despite these obstacles, we continue to make solid
progress in a number of areas.
DOE's senior management meets frequently with Russian counterparts
in the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to review progress
in overcoming obstacles. We have developed a ``scorecard'' for
maintaining the visibility of all NNSA/MinAtom cooperation to ensure
that it stays on track. The senior management of both agencies reviews
it periodically. Also, as Secretary of Energy, I periodically have
direct discussions with Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev to
resolve issues such as access that thwart progress of nonproliferation
programs.
For example, in the area of MPC&A, we have made significant
progress with MinAtom on access issues, especially at ``civilian''
facilities with less stringent access restrictions imposed by MinAtom.
In fact, we are finishing work at the first large MinAtom fuel
processing facility, the Luch facility, this spring. Luch was the site
of the attempted theft of highly enriched uranium by a facility insider
several years ago. We expect to complete at least two additional large
MinAtom facilities next year (Novisibirsk and IPPE in Obninsk).
Consequently, this part of our program is in the process of
transitioning to the sustainability phase as upgrades are completed.
Another area in our work that periodically confronts access
difficulties is the Russian Transition Initiatives program. Since
September 2002, the Nuclear Cities Initiative has enjoyed access to all
three of the closed cities with which it works, without any problems.
Under the Implementing Arrangements on Access, negotiated in 2002, work
continues to proceed and access is being granted. One trip to Sarov
took place recently, and trips appear to be approved as requested. That
said, access is not unlimited. NCI and MinAtom do negotiate specific
numbers of visits to the cities per year, and NCI agrees to operate
under that ceiling. Requests for amending the number of visits to a
city can be made by an exchange of letters every 6 months.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

13. Senator Allard. Secretary Abraham, to help clarify the record,
is further congressional authorization required before the DOE-NNSA can
begin design or production of a new nuclear weapon?
Secretary Abraham. Neither full scale development nor production of
new nuclear weapons could proceed unless Congress authorizes and
appropriates the necessary funds. Further, section 3143 of Public Law
107-314, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Act, requires the
Department of Energy to request funds in the President's budget for the
development or production of a new nuclear weapon. The budget entry is
specified as a single dedicated line item for each such activity that
is in phase 3 or higher for new nuclear weapons, or phase 6.3 or higher
for weapons refurbishment. These phases correspond to final design work
phases and onward.

14. Senator Allard. Secretary Abraham, is further congressional
authorization required before DOE-NNSA can begin design or production
of a precision low yield nuclear weapon?
Secretary Abraham. Yes. Congress would have to repeal the
prohibition against research and development of new low yield weapons,
Section 3136 of Public Law 103-160, as the administration has
requested. Additionally, design or production of a precision low yield
nuclear weapon would be subject to the requirements of Section 3143 of
Public Law 107-314, that apply to development and production of new
nuclear weapons and to weapon modifications, if such modifications are
in order to meet new military requirements.

15. Senator Allard. Secretary Abraham, is further congressional
authorization required before DOE-NNSA can begin production of the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator?
Secretary Abraham. Neither full scale development nor production of
the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator could begin unless Congress
authorizes and appropriates the necessary funding.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FILL SCHEDULE

16. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in the spring of 2002, the
DOE determined to no longer permit deferrals of scheduled deliveries of
oil to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This decision, which was
publicly announced by the Secretary of Energy on April 9, 2002, was a
reversal of the practice employed during 2000 and 2001, which allowed
deferrals of SPR deliveries when oil prices were rising or oil supplies
were tightening, in exchange for deliveries of additional amounts of
oil at a later time.
On March 5, 2003, I released a report prepared by my staff on the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, showing how this new policy to fill
the SPR, regardless of the price of oil, helped to increase oil prices
without increasing overall U.S. oil supplies.
Documents provided by DOE indicate that, during the spring and
summer of 2002, DOE's SPR office repeatedly urged the Department to
return to the previous fill policy. For example, in a document dated
June 11, 2002, the SPR office advocated restoring the previous policy
of allowing deferrals of SPR deliveries as follows:

Since the prior business model for oil acquisition is
financially superior to the current model, works counter to
economic cycles, is familiar to contractors, is favored for
logistics reasons, is in tune with legislative mandates, and
allows the government to take positive action when consumers
are distressed by oil prices, the SPR office recommends
reconsideration of the decision not to renegotiate delivery
dates of SPR oil.

The document also states: ``Champions of the current policy are
unknown and there is no known record laying out arguments in support of
a rigid fill schedule.''
Please identify the ``champions'' who advocated adoption of the new
SPR fill policy.
Secretary Abraham. It is my responsibility to determine SPR oil
acquisition policy and approve implementation strategies. I seek the
advice of DOE staff and other members of the administration as
circumstances dictate.

17. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, please provide the arguments
made in the spring of 2002 in support of a ``rigid fill schedule.''
Secretary Abraham. In the spring of 2002, I determined to take
deliveries as contractually scheduled in order to fill the SPR at a
reasonable rate for the purpose of increasing our energy security. Our
policy towards SPR fill is not rigid. Had circumstances been different,
we had and have the flexibility to defer or otherwise modify fill
schedules.

18. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, please explain why the
identity of the proponents of the new SPR fill policy and the arguments
they used to advocate this new policy were not disclosed to the career
staff of DOE's SPR office.
Secretary Abraham. In large organizations, decisionmakers are
supported by numerous experts and advisors. Ideally, information flows
in both directions during the course of resolving issues. As a
practical matter, given time pressures and other factors, this does not
always occur.

19. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, please confirm whether you
were the individual who made the final decision, publicly announced on
April 9, 2002, not to permit any more deferrals of deliveries of oil
into the SPR.
Secretary Abraham. I did make the decision to take deliveries as
contractually scheduled, as I announced on April 9, 2002.

SPR OIL DEPOSITS/OIL PRICES

20. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in response to the PSI
minority staff report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued a
statement noting that the average daily deposit of oil into the SPR in
2002 represented only 0.14 percent global daily supply, and a DOE
spokesman was quoted as saying the amount of oil put into the SPR is
``a drop in the bucket.''
In contrast, however, career staff in DOE's SPR office have written
that the SPR daily fill rate can have a significant impact upon the
price of oil. One memorandum prepared by the SPR office in the spring
of 2002, for example, explicitly refutes claims that SPR deposits
involve ``inconsequential volumes'' of oil:

[I]f the SPR inventory grows and OPEC does not accommodate that
growth by exporting more oil, the increase comes at the expense
of commercial inventories. Most analysts agree that oil prices
are directly correlated with inventories, and a drop of 20
million barrels over a 6-month period can substantially
increase prices. (Memorandum titled, ``Options for Filling the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve,'' reprinted in PSI minority staff
report, Appendix 3, page 246.)

What are your views regarding whether the SPR oil deposits in 2002
and 2003 affected U.S. oil prices?
Secretary Abraham. It is administration policy to use the SPR only
in emergency supply situations or for national security reasons, not to
influence market prices. However, price is determined by the interplay
of supply and demand. On the demand side, the acquisition of oil for
the SPR is one of many demand variables. The SPR acquisition rates
during all of 2002 were modest, especially when compared to marginal
demand associated with weather extremes or the decline of demand from
the airline industry in the wake of the September 11, 2001, disaster.
Demand fluctuations overall during 2002, however, were small
compared with volatility of supply. Delays in renewing the Iraqi oil-
for-food program would periodically reduce supply by 2 million barrels
per day. Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico caused production platforms
to be evacuated in the fall of 2002, and a strike in Venezuela starting
on December 1, 2002, stopped over 3 million barrels per day of
production. Most importantly, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) maintained excess production capacity of 4-5 million
barrels per day through most of 2002. To the extent prices were
volatile during 2002, that characteristic of the market was driven by
fluctuations in supply and adherence to production quotas by member
countries of OPEC, not by SPR oil acquisition.
High prices during the first quarter of 2003 were associated with
the Venezuelan strike and concern for war in Iraq. However, the
decision by OPEC to increase its quota in 2002 and the fulfilled
promise of extra production by Saudi Arabia in 2003 reduced prices
substantially. SPR oil acquisition in 2002 has been minimal and has had
no influence on prices.

21. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, if SPR oil deposits are too
inconsequential to affect oil prices, please explain why DOE decided to
defer scheduled deliveries of oil to the SPR for the past several
months.
Secretary Abraham. Starting on December 1, 2003, Venezuelan oil
production was curtailed due to a general strike. Venezuela is one of
the largest sources of U.S. petroleum imports, and due to its location
the shipping time for Venezuelan oil to reach the United States is only
a few days. Virtually all of the world's excess production capacity is
in the Persian Gulf, replacement oil for the lost Venezuelan oil was 40
days away from the United States. Once it became apparent that the
Venezuelan strike would be prolonged, more oil was produced and shipped
from the Persian Gulf region for the U.S. Gulf Coast. Nevertheless, due
to the lengthy transit time, it was prudent to temporarily reduce SPR
demand for oil in the Gulf Coast in order not to aggravate what was a
transient regional problem.

SPR FILL RATE AND THE U.S. OIL SUPPLY

22. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, the attached chart shows,
using DOE/Electronics Industry Association (EIA) data, that U.S. crude
oil supply and demand are closely balanced. It shows that, since 1986,
the average daily change in U.S. commercial inventories has been only
about 50,000 barrels per day, and the largest daily change occurred in
1999, when U.S. commercial inventories lost an average of 110,000
barrels per day over the course of the year.

In light of these 17 years of data, what are your views regarding
the extent to which an SPR daily fill rate, which, over the course of
2002, took an average of 135,000 barrels per day of crude oil out of
the U.S. commercial marketplace, affected available commercial oil
supplies and U.S. commercial oil inventory levels?
Secretary Abraham. In general, it is in the interest of the world's
exporting countries with excess production capacity to match production
to demand in a price range that allows sustained economic growth.
Exporting countries are indifferent to the sources of demand, whether
for industry, transportation or strategic stockpiling. Consequently, as
long as SPR fill is moderate and consistent it probably has no more
than transient impacts on commercial inventories.

23. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, would you agree that an SPR
fill rate that may be insignificant if it lasts for a short period of
time, such as a few days, may become significant if continued over a
longer period of time, such as an entire year, if overall oil supplies
do not increase during that period?
Secretary Abraham. If supply were inflexible and other sources of
demand for oil were inflexible, then by definition any marginal demand
increase must come out of inventory. Whether a change in commercial
inventory is significant or not will depend upon whether industry can
meet commercial demand. During 2002-2003, despite SPR fill, the
Venezuelan strike, an extremely long winter, the disruption of Nigerian
exports, and the war in Iraq, industry has been able to satisfy all
demand for refined products.

IMPACT OF AN OIL RELEASE FROM THE SPR

24. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in an interview broadcast on
National Public Radio on March 7, 2003, Dr. Philip Verleger, a leading
oil economist, was asked why U.S. oil supplies were so low. Dr.
Verleger replied:

Venezuela is one reason, but as a U.S. Senate Committee pointed
out Wednesday, the U.S. Government was filling the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve last year as prices were rising. By my
estimate, had the U.S. Government not filled the U.S. Strategic
Petroleum Reserve or returned the 20 million barrels they'd put
in back to the market, prices right now would be around $28 a
barrel instead of $38 a barrel and gasoline prices might be 25
to 35 cents lower.

Dr. Verleger has just released an analysis with similar findings.
This analysis, which is attached, finds that modest releases of oil
from the SPR last December and January to compensate for the loss of
oil from Venezuela would have increased U.S. commercial inventories
enough to have kept crude oil prices as much as $9 per barrel lower,
and gasoline and heating oil prices almost 30 cents lower. What is
DOE's reaction to Dr. Verleger's analysis?

Secretary Abraham. There is no question that there is enough
inventory in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that the Government could
influence short-term oil prices dramatically if it chose to do so.
However, in the long run, allowing regular Government market
interventions would have a detrimental impact on market discipline;
marginal production would fail to materialize; consumers would not
constrain their energy use; and Government competition would discourage
private sector inventory accumulation. It is the policy of this
administration that a free market best allocates resources, and that
the SPR will only be used in the event of a severe energy supply
interruption of an emergency nature.

SPR DEFERRAL POLICY

25. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in light of its decisions
over the past few months to defer scheduled deliveries of oil to the
SPR, please describe DOE's current SPR deferral policy, including
whether it has abandoned the no-deferral policy announced in the spring
of 2002; whether it has restored the prior policy of allowing SPR
deferrals when oil prices are rising or oil supplies are tightening, in
exchange for deliveries of additional oil at a later time; or whether
it has developed new criteria to determine when to grant a request to
defer a scheduled SPR delivery.
Secretary Abraham. The policy of the administration is to fill the
SPR deliberately and cost-effectively, principally through royalty-in-
kind transfers, to its capacity of 700 million barrels by the end of
2005. The Department of Energy will consider all of the objectives
contained in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act for consideration
during the acquisition process. Specifically, the Department will seek
to minimize cost, minimize the Nation's vulnerability to a severe
energy supply interruption, minimize impacts on supply levels and
market forces, and encourage competition in the petroleum industry. It
will be our policy to transfer approximately 130,000 barrels of crude
oil per day from the Department of the Interior to the Department of
Energy until Reserve capacity is filled. If continuing SPR fill
impinges on these statutory objectives, we will consider deferring
deliveries.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

BERYLLIUM-EXPOSED WORKERS EMPLOYED BY DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY VENDORS

26. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Abraham, the Fiscal Year 2003
Consolidated Appropriations Act required the Department of Energy to
start an outreach and medical screening program for beryllium-exposed
workers employed by Department of Energy vendors in the Worcester,
Massachusetts, area through an existing medical screening program. When
do you plan to commence this screening and outreach program?
Secretary Abraham. Planning has started for the new beryllium
screening and outreach project for beryllium vendor employees in the
Worchester, Massachusetts, area. The project will be implemented
through one of DOE's existing Former Worker Program project teams
located in Boston. Existing facility records at DOE Headquarters have
been located and provided to the project team to assist it in preparing
a proposed plan and budget. It is anticipated that outreach will
commence this summer and medical screening for beryllium exposures will
be initiated before the end of the fiscal year.

27. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Abraham, will you use an existing
former worker medical screening program in order to expedite the
implementation of this program?
Secretary Abraham. Yes, an existing Former Worker Program project
team led by Boston University will implement the new beryllium outreach
and medical screening program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW, U.S. STOCKPILE, AND WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT

28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you indicated during your
testimony that you would provide additional information regarding the
administration's plans to dismantle warheads. Please also provide, in
round numbers, what percentage or how many of the warheads will be
dismantled that will be removed from strategic launchers by virtue of
the Moscow Treaty or the decision of the administration to have only
3,800 ``operationally deployed'' strategic warheads by 2008.
Secretary Abraham. Some warheads are likely to be retired and
dismantled as a result of the administration's plans to reduce the
number of operationally deployed strategic warheads to no more that
3,800 by the end of 2007 and between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of
2012, but that determination has not yet been made beyond reaffirming
the earlier decision to retire the W62 warhead by 2009. [Deleted]. The
Department of Energy will work with the Department of Defense to set
appropriate dismantlement rates once warheads excess to national
security requirements are identified.

29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you indicated during your
testimony that there is a trade-off between the work involved for
dismantling weapons and the work involved in maintaining or
refurbishing weapons. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget includes
a $12.9 million increase over the fiscal year 2003 budget for
dismantlement work. Could you please list the nuclear weapons
disassembly history from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2002 at the
Pantex Plant. Please include for each fiscal year: a) the total number
of weapons disassembled for disposal; b) total weapons disassembled for
evaluation and then disposed of; c) the total number of weapons
disassembled and then reassembled; and d) the total number
disassembled.
Secretary Abraham.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disassembled for disposal..................... 992 445 1,003 165 Deleted Deleted Deleted
Disassembled for evaluation and then disposed 72 53 59 42 Deleted Deleted Deleted
of...........................................
Disassembled and then reassembled \1\......... 86 114 84 23 Deleted Deleted Deleted
Total disassembled............................ 1,150 612 1,146 230 Deleted Deleted Deleted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Some warheads are disassembled in 1 year and then reassembled in a future year. ``Disassembled and then
reassembled'' numbers are those reported as ``rebuild'' for the appropriate year.

30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, please list all projected
disposal efforts by weapons program and projected start and end dates.
Secretary Abraham.

W-79 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile)
Disassembly began in fiscal year 1998 and was completed in
January 2003.
W56 (Minuteman II warhead)
Disassembly began in fiscal year 2000 and will be complete in
fiscal year 2005.
B61-3/4 (Non-strategic bomb)
Disassembly of a small number of excess units planned for
fiscal year 2004-2005.
B53 (Strategic bomb)
Disassembly planned for fiscal year 2006-2007.

Additional warheads are likely to be retired and dismantled as a
result of the Nuclear Posture Review, but that determination has not
yet been made beyond reaffirming the earlier decision to retire the W62
warhead by 2009. The Department of Energy will work with the Department
of Defense to set appropriate dismantlement rates once warheads excess
to national security requirements are identified.

31. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, please list projected
refurbishments by warhead type and projected start and end dates.
Secretary Abraham. The DOE is presently working on four major Life
Extension Programs (LEPs)--the B61, W76, W80, and W87. This will
design, build, test, and install new subsystems and components, thereby
extending the operational service for these warheads for some 30 years.

W87 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Warhead: The LEP is
enhancing structural integrity of the warhead. To date more
than 3/4 of the warheads have gone through the process.
Start: First Production Unit in second quarter fiscal year 1999
End: fourth quarter fiscal year 2004

B61-7/11 Strategic Bomb: The LEP is refurbishing the canned
subassembly.
Start: Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) authorized first
quarter fiscal year 2003
End: First Production Unit in third quarter fiscal year 2006 (4
year production program that is currently scheduled to end
fourth quarter fiscal year 2010)

W76 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead: The LEP is a
comprehensive overhaul of the warhead.
Start: Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) authorized second
quarter fiscal year 2000
End: First Production Unit in fourth quarter fiscal year 2007
(production of a Block 1 quantity to be completed by fourth
quarter fiscal year 2012)

W80 Air Launched Cruise Missile and Advanced Cruise Missile
Warhead: The LEP will replace various warhead components and
incorporate surety upgrades.
Start: Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) in first quarter
fiscal year 2001
End: Program being rebaselined from a second quarter fiscal
year 2006 First Production Unit to a new start date that could
occur as early as third quarter fiscal year 2007 for the W80-3
warhead (the production of a Block 1 quantity of warheads would
continue for 5 years)

In addition to these major efforts, DOE is carrying out a number of
smaller-scale alterations to the B61, B83, W78, and W87 warheads.

32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, in 1991 Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev announced they would take unilateral but reciprocal steps to
consolidate and eliminate, in some cases, their tactical nuclear
weapons. In the administration briefings on President Bush's decisions,
officials stated that 850 Lance missile and 1,300 nuclear artillery
warheads would be eliminated. In addition, 900 B-57 depth bombs would
be eliminated. Please provide an unclassified list of the warhead types
covered by President Bush's 1991 pledge, the date dismantlement began
for each warhead type, the date dismantlement was or will be completed,
and the number of warheads dismantled.
Secretary Abraham. President George H.W. Bush, in his September 27,
1991, Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet
Nuclear Weapons, stated: ``I am therefore directing that the United
States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched
short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and
destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic
missile warheads.''
Warhead types covered by President Bush's pledge:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dismantlement
Warhead Type Dates (FY) Quantity
1992
------------------------------------------------------------------------
W33 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile)..... 1992 554
W48 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile)..... 1992-1996 737
W70 (Lance Missile Warhead)................. 1992-1997 1,138
W79 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile)..... 1998-2003 \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dismantlements in fiscal year 2000 and beyond are classified
Confidential Formerly Restricted Data. The W79 data will be provided
separately.

While not explicitly pledged to be destroyed as part of President
Bush's 1991 announcement, the Department of Energy dismantled in excess
of 900 B57 bombs (all were able to be configured as depth bombs) in
fiscal year 1992-1996.

33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, please provide a list of
warhead concepts currently being worked on at DOE and the national
labs.
Secretary Abraham. RNEP is the only warhead concept currently
planned for work at the national labs in fiscal year 2003-2004.

ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR AND LOW-YIELD WEAPONS

34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, what kinds of assurance can
you provide that either a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or
low-yield weapon could be used in an urban area to attack a buried
hardened target without causing substantial collateral damage?
Secretary Abraham. The use of nuclear weapons is a Department of
Defense matter. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on this
issue.

35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, low-yield nuclear warheads
are commonly defined as those warheads with an explosive power of less
than five kilotons. Does the U.S. currently have operational nuclear
weapons that can have yields of five kilotons or less?
Secretary Abraham. The U.S. has two existing nuclear weapons that
have certified yields of less than five kilotons.

36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, will either a RNEP weapon,
new low-yield weapon, or a modified low-yield nuclear weapon require
nuclear testing?
Secretary Abraham. As currently conceived, RNEP will not require
any nuclear testing. We are confident that with simulation and use of
our past test data, we could design and certify a variety of new or
modified low yield weapons without requiring nuclear testing.

37. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, Dr. Everet Beckner of the
NNSA testified last year that the RNEP concept resulted from a Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated requirement. Please
list all JROC validated requirements post 1996 for advanced concepts
involving nuclear weapons by date with a brief description.
Secretary Abraham. The JROC is a Department of Defense
organization. We receive such requirements through the Nuclear Weapons
Council. The only such requirement since 1996 has been RNEP.

38. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, on a related note, are there
any validated requirements from the Nuclear Weapons Council for a new
or modified weapon that would produce a yield of five kilotons or less?
Secretary Abraham. There are currently no validated requirements
for a new or modified nuclear warhead with a yield of five kilotons or
less, and the 1994 prohibition on research and development of low yield
warheads prevents DOD from developing requirements for low yield
nuclear warheads.

U.S. AND FOREIGN PRODUCTION CAPACITY

39. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, can the Los Alamos facility
be adapted to fabricate all the pit types for the current stockpile?
Secretary Abraham. An upgraded facility could be adapted to
manufacture most, but not all, pit types in the current stockpile.
However, an upgraded LANL facility would not have the production
capacity required or agility to simultaneously manufacture multiple pit
types. Both capacity and agility in pit manufacturing are required to
meet long-term national security needs.

40. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, what is the validated
military requirement for annual pit production?
Secretary Abraham. The DOD does not establish a validated military
requirement for annual pit production, but does determine the number/
types of stockpiled nuclear weapons required. Based on these DOD
requirements, the DOE then determines the annual pit production
necessary to ensure that stockpiled nuclear weapons meet national
security needs. Today, there is a need for additional pits for W88 to
replace those used for destructive surveillance.

41. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you testified today that
several countries have the ability to produce plutonium pits for a
nuclear warhead, a capability the U.S. has lacked since 1989. Which
other countries have this capability, and, if so, are they utilizing
it?
Secretary Abraham. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea
have the capability to produce plutonium [deleted] nuclear warheads.
All are assessed to be utilizing or [deleted] their plutonium pit
production capabilities.

Russia is likely remanufacturing pits today for its
existing nuclear weapons stockpile using previously produced
plutonium.
Likewise, China is likely producing pits from
previously produced plutonium in its development of next-
generation nuclear weapons.
Although [deleted] compared with Russia's and China's,
India and Pakistan [deleted] plutonium for their nuclear
weapons and [deleted].
[Deleted], North Korea is likely preparing to recover
existing plutonium [deleted] and, once in hand, [deleted]
manufacture pits for [deleted] nuclear weapons.

42. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you answered in the
affirmative today to a question about whether North Korea has an
ability to produce plutonium primaries. Is it the position of the DOE
that North Korea has a facility for the serial production of plutonium
primaries? Does the CIA agree with the DOE position?
Secretary Abraham. Since this question pertains to intelligence
sources and methods, I am unable to answer it in an unclassified
context.

43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, is it the position of the DOE
that North Korea has produced one or more plutonium primaries? Does the
CIA agree with the DOE position?
Secretary Abraham. Since this question pertains to intelligence
sources and methods, I am unable to answer it in an unclassified
context.

RUSSIA

44. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, some people have proposed
importing spent nuclear fuel from around the world into Russia. They
have argued that the proceeds from this would allow Russia to pay for
needed security and environmental improvements. Before this project can
be implemented, however, the U.S. needs to sign an agreement on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy with Russia. Please tell us about the
status of negotiations with Russia on signing such an agreement.
Secretary Abraham. According to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the
United States must enter into an agreement for cooperation before it
may engage in significant nuclear cooperation with another nation. The
transfer of U.S. obligated spent fuel to Russia constitutes significant
nuclear cooperation and would thus require an agreement for cooperation
between the United States and Russian Federation. The Department of
State negotiates such agreements with the technical assistance and
concurrence of the Department of Energy. However, there are no ongoing
negotiations between the United States and Russian Federation to
conclude an agreement for cooperation. The administration has made
clear that we will not negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with
Russia under the Atomic Energy Act until our concerns about Russian WMD
and missile proliferation are resolved.

45. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, at the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Preparatory Committee (NPT PrepCom) in 2002, Russian officials
said the implementation of the Russian commitments under the 1991 Bush-
Gorbachev Presidential Nuclear Initiatives could be completed soon if
there were adequate funding. If so, this would be significant as it
would mean that Russia would dismantle all of its ground forces
weapons--smaller nuclear artillery shells, nuclear mines, and short-
range missile warheads--which are the types of nuclear weapons of the
highest concern from a security standpoint. Since the NPT PrepCom, has
the administration had formal or informal discussions with Russian
officials about how much funding would be needed to assist Russia with
finishing the implementation of its 1991 pledges? If so, what level of
funding would be needed?
Secretary Abraham. I share your concern about fully implementing
the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Using Nunn-Lugar
funding and other funding, the National Nuclear Security Administration
is extensively involved in cooperation with Russia to enhance the
security of Russian nuclear warheads, however the funding is not used
to enhance the operational capabilities of Russian nuclear forces.
At the May 2002 Moscow Summit, Presidents Bush and Putin
established the Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) in
addition to signing the Moscow Treaty. The CGSS is chaired by the
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the United States and Russia, as the
principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual
confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans and
discuss a broad range of strategic issues of mutual interest. The
initial meeting of the CGSS took place in September 2002, and resulted
in the creation of three working groups: Working Group One on Offensive
Nuclear Transparency, Working Group Two on Missile Defense Cooperation,
and Working Group Three on Nonproliferation.
Working Group One has met twice this year in Geneva. The U.S. focus
has been to build confidence in a spirit of cooperation by presenting a
positive long-term vision and emphasizing near-term transparency. As
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld mentioned during their testimony on the
Moscow Treaty and to their Russian counterparts in the CGSS, the United
States has a strong interest in transparency related to tactical
nuclear weapons, and in reducing uncertainties about their safety and
security and implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
The issue of transparency of tactical nuclear weapons has been under
discussion during the Working Group One meetings this year.

46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, a significant non-
proliferation problem is to guarantee Russian nuclear scientists remain
safely employed in Russia. One avenue to do this is to involve them in
commercial projects. Do you believe, however, there is non-commercial
work these scientists could be involved in, such as energy and
environmental research?
Secretary Abraham. We believe that finding employment for Russian
weapons scientists in Russia benefits from multiple approaches.
Although supporting commercial projects is an important component of
our effort, there are non-commercial opportunities as well. For
example, DOE's Russian Transition Initiatives is participating in a
multilateral effort coordinated by the International Science and
Technology Center in Moscow to engage Russian nuclear scientists in
fuel cell research, an important component of the administration's
energy agenda. In addition to energy and environmental projects, there
are non-commercial opportunities in nonproliferation research and in
securing and eliminating weapons grade materials.

47. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, do you believe the Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI) component of the Russian Transition Initiatives
(RTI) program should move beyond the three Russian nuclear cities where
it is currently focused?
Secretary Abraham. Yes. The Nuclear Cities Initiative should build
on its success in closing the weapons assembly facility at Avangard and
begin assisting the Russian Government in shutting down a second
weapons assembly facility in Zarechny (Penza-19). NCI should also
expand its efforts to Seversk (Tomsk-7) to complement the efforts of
the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production project. Finding
alternative civilian employment for the downsized workforce has been
identified as a critical factor in that project's ultimate success. I
believe that with additional funding, NCI can achieve accelerated
results in both these cities because it can readily adapt the
successful models developed in Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk.

48. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, do you think NCI and the
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) should devote more
attention and resources to downsizing and scientist/worker re-direction
at the closed cities of Zarechny (Penza-19; especially the warhead
assembly/disassembly plant) and Ozersk (Mayak)?
Secretary Abraham. Zarechnyy is the second weapons assembly
facility the Russians have indicated a desire to close, although we
have not yet reached agreement with them on NCI work in that city. I
believe that it is important for NCI, which is the downsizing component
of our Russian Transition Initiative, to devote attention and resources
to Zarechnyy, now that Avangard is no longer doing nuclear weapons
work. With the closure of Zarechnyy, the Russians will have only two
weapons assembly plants, a more appropriate level for the post-Cold War
environment and one which reduces the surge capacity of the Russian
nuclear complex. Because considerable U.S. funding is being provided to
Ozersk by other nonproliferation programs, that city is not a priority
for either NCI or IPP.

49. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, do you support a global
``clean-out'' of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) stocks at facilities
that pose security risks--in particular, do you support creating a
single, focused program at the Department of Energy consolidating the
U.S. Government's resources, authority, and expertise to remove HEU
from the world's most vulnerable sites as rapidly as possible?
Secretary Abraham. The Harvard-NTI Report recommended a new
initiative along these lines to secure HEU worldwide as rapidly as
possible. We have carefully considered this recommendation and
concluded such an initiative is not necessary.
Under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement with Russia, we have already
eliminated over 170 metric tons (MT) of the 500 MT expected to be
eliminated under this program. Other programs, such as the Accelerated
Materials Disposition (AMD) and the Reduced Enrichment Research Test
Reactor and Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program, will secure
more HEU in the years ahead. We are working with the IAEA and Russia to
secure HEU supplied to Russian and Soviet-supplied reactors. We have
made special efforts, such as that directed at the Vinca reactor in
Yugoslavia, to remove the HEU of greatest concern.
In our view, the administration's current plans to prioritize
reducing and eliminating stockpiles based on where they pose the
greatest threat is the most cost-effective and efficient approach to
lowering the threat of weapons of mass destruction to the United
States.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

PROTECTION OF SEALED SOURCES

50. Senator Clinton. Secretary Abraham, unfortunately, radioactive
materials that can be used to make a ``dirty bomb''--known as ``sealed
sources''--are currently also used in a wide array of beneficial
applications in the U.S., including in hospitals, research
laboratories, food irradiation plants, oil drilling facilities, and
airport runway lighting.
In the heightened state of alert that we now find ourselves, we
need to ensure that these sealed sources are adequately protected
against theft and nefarious activity. Senator Gregg and I have
introduced the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act, legislation that would help
provide such protections and do more to track sealed sources, recover
any sources that are lost, and ensure that sealed sources are handled
in a safe and secure manner so that they do not fall into the wrong
hands--either at home or overseas.
I know the U.S. recently co-sponsored and you participated in an
IAEA Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources. At the
conference, you stated, ``It is our critically important job to deny
terrorists the radioactive sources they need to construct such weapons.
. . . Radioactive sources can be found all over the world, and
terrorists are seeking to acquire them. The threat they represent to
people of every nation is very real.'' Do you agree that the Federal
Government should be doing more domestically to ensure that these types
of radioactive material--these sealed sources--are adequately protected
against theft and possible nefarious activity?
Secretary Abraham. While terrorist use of radioactive materials or
sealed sources does not threaten the massive destruction of a nuclear
explosion, it does pose a potentially serious threat to public health
and safety. I believe that the U.S. should pursue a vigorous effort to
protect radioactive materials and sealed sources against theft or
misuse. In fact, both the Department and the NRC have been using our
existing authority to pursue such an effort.
Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, the Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and I formed an interagency working group
to address this issue. The Department and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission released a comprehensive report on Radiological Dispersal
Devices on May 14, 2003. That report identified several areas where we
can accelerate our efforts, including:

Identification of the radiological sources of greatest
concern and the development of a national threat policy to
guide government actions to prevent terrorist use of
radioactive materials.
Consideration of a national tracking system for sealed
sources, with more extensive use of existing databases as an
interim measure.
An integrated approach to the recovery and disposition
of unneeded sealed sources.

The NRC oversees the disposal of the majority of sealed sources
used domestically, most of which can be safely disposed at commercial
sites. The Department of Energy is responsible for the disposal of a
relatively small amount of radioactive material, which exceeds the
upper limit for commercial disposal. The Department is working closely
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to aggressively recover and
store unneeded sources from licensees where commercial disposal is not
available.

51. Senator Clinton. Secretary Abraham, there are institutions in
New York State--and throughout the country--that are waiting for the
DOE to accept these used, sealed sources for appropriate storage under
the Department's Off-Site Source Recovery Program. In response to an
inquiry, your Department sent me a letter in August 2001 stating,
``Limited safeguards and security issues continue to impact our ability
to accept Plutonium 239 sources. There are several hundred such sources
around the county that could be stored under the Off-Site Source
Recovery Program. We expect to be able to resolve these remaining
issues and accept the sources . . . prior to September 2002.'' Yet as
of February of this year, facilities in New York are still waiting for
a ship date for these sources. Can you please tell me when DOE will be
able to accept these Plutonium 239 sources for storage under the
Department's Off-Site Source Recovery Program?
Secretary Abraham. The Off-Site Source Recovery Program has
recovered approximately 7,000 sealed sources since 1997. The program
was provided $10 million in fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental
appropriations with a goal of recovering 5,000 sources in 18 months.
The program has recovered over 2,500 sources under this appropriation
so far, and DOE expects to exceed the goal of 5,000 sources by April
2004, which is the end of the 18-month period.
The Department also has been working to initiate the recovery of
plutonium-239 sources. Due to the enhanced safeguards and security
requirements which are required when working with large numbers of
these sources, this process has been more difficult than with other
types of sources. The Department has identified a storage location and
is finalizing the safety and operating procedures at this time. The
Off-Site Source Recovery Program expects to begin receiving plutonium-
239 sources before the end of fiscal year 2003. Currently, source
program staff are visiting a limited number of high priority sites that
have plutonium-239 sources and packaging those sources for shipment.
When the storage facility is ready to begin receiving shipments, there
will be a number of sites already packaged and ready to ship. The Off-
Site Source Recovery Program is contacting licensees who have excess
plutonium-239 sources and making plans and arrangements to recover all
of these sources in an efficient, cost effective manner. It will take
approximately 1 year to recover all of the known, excess plutonium-239
sources.

WEST VALLEY

52. Senator Clinton. Secretary Abraham, I am concerned that
negotiations between New York State and the Department of Energy
regarding the West Valley demonstration project in Western New York are
at an impasse. West Valley has been engaged in the cleanup of nuclear
waste, but New York State and DOE are at an impasse over who should
have stewardship of the site. As the cleanup of West Valley proceeds
each day, it is imperative that we reach an agreement on the long-term
stewardship of the site. Do you have an update on the status of the
negotiations? If not, can you have a member of your staff follow up
with my staff?
Secretary Abraham. On January 29, 2003, the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority issued a press release announcing
that the negotiations are at an impasse. No formal negotiations have
taken place since that time.
We would be pleased, as well, to follow up with your staff.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m. in
room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed,
E. Benjamin Nelson, and Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Ann M.
Mittermeyer, counsel; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
member; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to
Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard;
James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy
Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to
Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze and Andy York, assistants to
Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive
testimony on the Department of Defense's role in the defense of
our homeland. I am pleased to welcome today's witnesses: the
Honorable Paul McHale, the first Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense; General Ralph Eberhart, the first
Commander of the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM); and
Admiral James Ellis, the first Commander of the restructured
United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Thank you all and
your assistants for traveling long distances in some instances
to get here.
I emphasize the fact that you gentlemen are the first for
an important reason. You are part of a transformation of our
military that is broader and deeper than just an examination of
weapons systems or military hardware. This transformation, a
refocusing of organizations and missions, was accelerated by
the tragic events of September 11.
As we begin our hearing this morning, our thoughts and
prayers are with our brave men and women in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as other parts of the world. We must be
ever mindful of the fact that they and their families, their
efforts are our first line of defense in the overall security
of our homeland. Homeland defense begins on these outposts of
the world. For every terrorist stopped on a distant
battlefield, that is one less who will bring danger to our
shores.
As we saw on September 11 and also in recent natural
disasters, the Department of Defense (DOD) has unique
capabilities to contribute to the overall security of our
homeland. You gentlemen represent the leadership that will
bring these capabilities to bear. Through your testimony, we
hope to more clearly learn the Department's role in homeland
security and how each of you envision the interaction between
your respective organizations to achieve an integrated
Department of Defense effort and, in tradition with this
committee, your personal views on what additions should be
made.
With the establishment of the new Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), we are reminded that homeland security is an
enormously complex task that must be carefully coordinated
throughout the government. It is essential that we understand
how you will coordinate your efforts with this new department
and what additional capabilities, resources, and authorities
you will require to ensure the success of this challenging
effort that is so vital to our national security.
The Armed Forces of the United States must in every way
legally possible support our Nation's homeland security effort.
This fundamental imperative is one that President Bush
identified to the American people while he was still Candidate
Bush. In a speech at The Citadel in September 1999, then-
Governor Bush stated that, ``The protection of America itself
will assume a high priority in a new century. Once a strategic
afterthought, homeland defense has now become an urgent duty.''
We are indeed fortunate that our President had the foresight to
begin to prepare our Nation for the challenges we are
confronting today.
Gentlemen, you truly are a part of transformational change
occurring within our Armed Forces. As a part of that, let me
once again raise a controversial issue, the issue of posse
comitatus. I have recommended to the administration ever since
September 11 the reevaluation of the contribution that DOD can
make to homeland defense and do it within the parameters of
that tried and effective statute, put on the books for good
intentions way back when, but I think it needs to be re-
examined today and I believe the Department is undertaking to
do that.
Simply put, this law prohibits members of the Armed Forces
from engaging in law enforcement activities, a very sensible
and rational and time-tested, proven doctrine. But things have
changed and emergencies occur, and in that instance we should
re-examine whether or not the current law and its regulations
and interpretations need to be changed in any way and what role
Congress might have or not have.
This law was adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War, and
the rest of the history you know.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to have all three
of you here today, as a matter of fact.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join
you in welcoming our three witnesses this morning to discuss
the very important subject of homeland defense.
As the chairman said, you are part of a first and making
history. It is appropriate that this hearing this morning is
taking place in the Senate Caucus Room, which has been a part
of so much history.
Admiral Ellis, I guess you made a little history this
morning, or at least your daughter-in-law did. I understand you
are a new grandfather. I do not know if that is for the first
time, but I know you have a new grandson this morning.
Congratulations on behalf of all of us. I know your son, who is
the father of your new grandson, is in Afghanistan. We wish the
new baby, his mother, and his father the best of all wishes
possible.
Admiral Ellis. Thank you very much, Senator. We are very
proud.
Senator Levin. It is typical of your family that the father
is in Afghanistan. You will be seeing the new boy before the
father will. But that is the way he chose to dedicate his life,
and we are very proud of him and you.
Admiral Ellis. Thank you for your kind words.
Senator Levin. I do not know if either of the other
witnesses has family either in Iraq or in the area or in
Afghanistan. If you do, I do not mean to leave you out in any
way.
Each of you has a new role to fulfill in meeting the
challenge of defending the United States, and in General
Eberhart's case North America. As part of the Unified Command
Plan Change 2, which was effective last October, the Strategic
Command and the Northern Command have new missions. The
Northern Command mission is to provide command and control of
Defense Department homeland defense efforts and to coordinate
support to civil authorities. Strategic Command assumes the
missions of U.S. Space Command as well as four new missions,
including oversight of command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in
support of global and strategic operations and global missile
defense integration.
The North American Air Defense Command retains its previous
mission, but now aligns with Northern Command rather than Space
Command. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Security, also recently established, will provide the
policy guidance to support the homeland defense mission, as
well as coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and
other Federal agencies involved in homeland defense.
In the short time that each of you has been in your new
position, you have made considerable progress, including
establishing a binational U.S.-Canadian commission, working
with the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Pacific Command
(PACOM) to develop recommendations regarding future roles and
organization of the joint inter-agency task forces, drafting a
plan for establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Team (WMD-CST) in every American State and territory,
and working to develop the right mix of forces that would be
assigned to the Northern Command under the Joint Task Force-
Civil Support (JTF-CS) to help civilian authorities when
directed by the Secretary of Defense.
Much remains to be done, including the establishment of
operational requirements for missile defense and implementing
the computer network defense and attack missions. In addition,
there remain many challenges, including coordinating between
Northern Command and Pacific Command to work out the modalities
of protecting Alaska and Hawaii, coordinating intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions for the DOD, and,
perhaps most importantly, for ensuring usable intelligence is
provided to all commands in a timely fashion.
So we thank each of you for your work and your service and
for launching this new effort. We look forward to hearing from
each of our witnesses.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and I
apologize for not being able to remain during the entire
hearing. However, I do want to raise one subject with the
Secretary, General Eberhart, and Admiral Ellis. There is a
dirty little secret about homeland security that I believe
needs to be examined and remedied as soon as possible, and that
is the fact that our borders are not secure.
We have an increasing flow of illegal immigrants, drugs,
and possibly--I emphasize, possibly--terrorists through our
southern border and perhaps our northern border. I am not as
familiar with the northern border as I am with the southern
border. We have had park rangers killed. We have had gunfights.
We have had organizations paint vehicles exactly like Border
Patrol vehicles and come across our border. We have intercepted
individuals from Middle Eastern countries. We have found a
backpack with documents printed in Arabic.
We have no control over our southern border. 30,000 illegal
immigrants are coming across the Arizona border every month. I
think it argues for a high priority. It argues for complying
with a fundamental of the United States of America's security,
and that is if our borders are porous and people can move back
and forth across our borders at will and with impunity, it
poses a threat. I do not know how we can assure the security of
our homeland when we have insecure borders.
In my home State of Arizona, we now have vigilante groups
who are forming and because of their frustration with the lack
of enforcement of our border, are now taking the law into their
own hands. That has some very dangerous consequences, but their
frustration is somewhat understandable. When you meet ranchers
who have had 11 times in one week sport utility vehicles
bursting through the seven-strand barbed wire fence that is the
barrier between our two countries, invading their land, it is
serious. When you have the National Park Service personnel who
are in charge of the wildlife refuges on the border saying the
wildlife refuges are being destroyed, we have a very serious
problem.
It is going to take, among other things, the use of some
high technology. I do not see how you can put individuals all
the way across our border between the United States and Mexico.
I would urge you to look at the use of the Predator, and other
high tech equipment which we have developed and could easily
use along our border.
This issue is serious. It has human consequences. Last
year, 134 people died in the desert trying to cross over from
Mexico into the United States of America. It has security
consequences and it has economic consequences for our health
care organizations and other providers of assistance to our
citizens and now are providing it to illegal immigrants.
So I hope that in your testimony or in the question and
answer session you will discuss this issue, because again I do
not see how you can possibly tell Americans that their homeland
is secure if their border is not secure, and the degree of
insecurity of those borders I think is not appreciated by most
Americans today.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being
here and I thank them for the outstanding work that they are
doing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain. That is a very
important dimension to our oversight responsibilities. It is
probably shared by other committees, but we have jurisdiction
over a portion of that.
Senator Levin. Before Senator McCain leaves, if I could
just ask Senator Kennedy to yield for a minute. I want to
concur in what he said about our borders. The northern border
which he made reference to is indeed a huge risk for us in
terms of our security. We have gone into this at great length,
but the point that he made about our southern border is indeed
too true for our northern border as well. I want to thank him
for raising the issue this morning.
Senator McCain. Could I mention--Mr. Chairman, I do not
want to take the time of the committee.
Chairman Warner. Go right ahead.
Senator McCain. We do not want the military on the border.
That is not appropriate. It is not constitutional. They are not
trained for it. There are too many strings on it. I believe
that a lot of the equipment that the military has can have
great application to border security, and that is where I hope
that the members of this panel can be involved and helpful to
us.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you again.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Just very briefly, welcome, gentlemen. I
had an opportunity over the weekend to go down to Otis Air
Force Base, home of the 102nd National Guard Fighter Wing. You
have elements of it over in Iraq. The 101st, which is one of
the wings, has been awarded as the top Air National Guard Wing,
and it obviously has--they take great sense of pride in meeting
their responsibilities in terms of air security over the
Northeast. They are very, as you well know, highly skilled,
highly dedicated and committed, and it is always reassuring.
Second, on the issues of immigration as well, we passed a
Border Security Act a little over a year ago and it is
gradually being implemented. That has implications on both the
southern border as well as the issues on all the borders
surrounding us.
One of the important things that had not been happening is
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had not been cooperating
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
therefore the INS had one hand behind its back. For instance,
two of the hijackers that came from Saudi Arabia were on the
watch list and the CIA had not notified them, and they were
able to get visas to come on in here. So this cooperation is
something that is beginning to take place, but it is something
that is going to be enormously important in terms of helping.
Just a final point. I want to commend the Defense
Department for its immunization of smallpox. They have done a
very effective job, immunizing I think 230,000 troops; I do not
know for sure. They have done it extremely effectively. They
have had small numbers of adverse reactions. They have taken
good care of the people with those and I believe, at least what
I had heard previously, virtually all of them had returned to
duty.
But it has been a very good screening program with follow-
up programs, and it really is the way to do it. As we are
moving on into these issues on smallpox, the DOD has really
given a wonderful example of how to do it. Constantly we have
these other issues and there was a hearing on Severe Accute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) yesterday. There is no reason to
believe that it is a bioterrorist weapon, but it could have
been. The way the World Health Organization (WHO) responded on
that along with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) is enormously reassuring in
terms of almost a test case on this.
I bring that to your attention as one of the things that
appears to be working. Several things that I have mentioned
here are working very well.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Inhofe, any other members wish to make an opening
statement, please signify.
Senator Inhofe. I will just make it very brief, Mr.
Chairman. My concern is with operation tempo (OPTEMPO) right
now. I know that, Secretary McHale, you are very interested in
this and we talked about this before. In fact, all of us have.
I do not think there has been a time in our history that we
have had to call up so much of the Reserve component, and it is
becoming a real hardship and we are losing some critical
Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). The fact is
exacerbated by the fact that you also have a lot of your first
responders in the Guard and in the Reserves. You are going to
have to be handling that.
So my major concern is the capacity. What are we going to
be able to do? How much can you spare from the military side
for homeland security, because from where I sit in Oklahoma and
I watch those that are being called up, I do not see that we
have the capacity to give anything there. So it is a critical
thing that I know you are having a difficult time dealing with,
but we certainly have to be answering this in our own minds as
we develop future budgets because, as the chairman said in his
opening remarks, things have changed in our relationship with
the use of the Guard and Reserves.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Are there others? Senator Reed, do you
wish to make a statement?
Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Fine, thank you.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I would briefly welcome the
panel. I think this is the first time we have had a hearing
since about this time last year when we discussed the
reorganization, and I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman,
on a timely hearing. I think it is important. They have been
stood up since around early this fall--I think it was the 1st
of October--and then it has been a year now and I am looking
forward to hearing their comments.
We did some unique things. We set up Northern Command. We
also combined U.S. Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command. I
want to know how that is progressing along.
On immigration, when I listen to the comments here of my
colleagues and on the floor, I agree, here on the table, that
we do have a problem with the borders, but we cannot do it
alone. It seems to me we have to solicit help from our
neighbors, Canada and Mexico. We have to get them, and I hope
that some effort is being done diplomaticly to bring them in.
They need to be partners in dealing with this. I do not know
exactly how we do it, but I think that is vital to our success
on the borders.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a full statement I would
like to make a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, at this time, the Department of
Defense announced several changes in the unified command plan. This is
really the first time that this committee has had the opportunity to
examine these changes. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing. It is important that we remain engaged on these issues.
Never before has homeland defense and homeland security received so
much attention. The administration responded to September 11 with a
number of proposals, including the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security and the development of a homeland security strategy.
To better respond to threats to the homeland, the Department of Defense
recommended several changes to its command structure, which the
President approved, that greatly improved the Department's ability to
defend the homeland and support lead civilian crisis and consequence
management agencies.
The creation of U.S. Northern Command was one of these changes.
This new organization will be responsible for protecting our homeland
from external threats and for supporting Federal, State, and local
agencies inside the homeland. I look forward to hearing from General
Eberhart about the progress his command has made over the last year.
The changes in the unified command plan also included the folding
of U.S. Space Command into U.S. Strategic Command. I understand that
Admiral Ellis and U.S. Strategic Command has done a great job in
supporting our troops in Iraq and in the global war against terrorism.
But, while I recognize the importance of this effort, I want to make
sure that other areas, such as Space, also remain a top priority for
Strategic Command.
I thank the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense for
being here today. I understand this is his first appearance before this
committee since his nomination hearing. I look forward to your
testimony about the Department's efforts to better protect our
homeland.
Our country remains vulnerable to attack; but the administration
and the Department of Defense recognize these vulnerabilities and are
taking measures to secure our homeland. This is a long-term process and
we should not expect quick results. We must be deliberate and certain
that the measures we take better secure our homeland and protect us
from potential attacks.
I appreciate the willingness of our witnesses to testify before
this committee during this difficult time and look forward to their
testimony.
This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Without objection, it is so admitted.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to welcome you all. There are so many
concerns today about homeland security, but I have boiled it
down to hometown security. If you do not feel secure in your
hometown, it is pretty hard to feel secure in your homeland.
In the process of calling up reservists and guardsmen, as
we always have, we are today faced with trading off what we
have to support us on the front lines versus what we have on
the home front. So many of our reservists and guardsmen are
also first responders, firefighters, police officers, and
emergency workers, that it makes it very difficult. I hope that
we are able to find a way to protect ourselves and secure the
people here at home as well as to try to take care of our
interests abroad.
So I thank you very much and look forward to your comments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Collins, as Chairman of the Governmental Affairs
Committee, you have jurisdiction over some of the aspects of
homeland defense.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As
Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, which has
jurisdiction over the new Department of Homeland Security, I am
particularly interested in hearing from our witnesses today
about the extent of cooperation between DOD and the new
Department of Homeland Security. This is an issue that I
discussed with Secretary McHale when we met and I look forward
to hearing the comments of our witnesses in this regard.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Does anyone else have
an opening statement?
Senator Cornyn. I will withhold any comments until
questions.
Chairman Warner. We will hear from our first witness,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul
McHale, a former member of the United States House of
Representatives and a marine with considerable experience and
some personal knowledge on what it is like to be called up from
the Reserves. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL McHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

Secretary McHale. Good morning, sir. Senator Warner,
Senator Levin, members of the committee: Good morning.
I will be submitting a formal statement for the record. It
is currently under review by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). But, Mr. Chairman, with your consent I would like
to provide a few brief remarks at the opening of the hearing.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
Secretary McHale. Mr. Chairman, President Bush has said
that, ``The world changed on September 11, 2001. We learned
that a threat that gathers on the other side of the Earth can
strike our own cities and kill our own citizens. It is an
important lesson, one we must never forget. Oceans no longer
protect America from the dangers of this world. We are
protected by daily vigilance at home and we will be protected
by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad.''
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, we should recognize that
America's first line of domestic defense really begins overseas
and results from the capabilities of our forward deployed
forces, many of whom are engaged in combat as we meet this
morning. In that sense, Secretary Rumsfeld has correctly noted
that the annual homeland defense budget of the Department of
Defense is $380 billion.
Recognizing, however, in the wake of the attacks on
September 11, that it was now essential to establish a new
combatant command with specific geographic responsibility for
the United States, NORTHCOM was created. On 1 October, NORTHCOM
assumed initial operational capability (IOC). The mission of
NORTHCOM, as paraphrased by Senator Levin a few minutes ago, is
as follows: ``United States Northern Command conducts
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression
aimed at the United States, its territories and interests,
within assigned areas of responsibility, as directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense provides military
assistance to civil authorities, including consequence
management operations.''
NORTHCOM's responsibilities fall essentially into two
categories: the warfighting defense of the area of
responsibility (AOR) and civil support to civil authorities
under circumstances where we in the Department may have a
unique capability not possessed by the civilian community or,
as was the case after September 11, under those circumstances
where it is determined that civilian authorities are
overwhelmed by the immediate challenge at hand.
NORTHCOM's force structure is unusual when compared to
other geographic combatant commands. There are very few forces
which are permanently assigned, although appropriate units have
been identified for possible assignment as needed. NORTHCOM's
commander is my friend Ed Eberhart, a superb general who joins
me this morning. His headquarters is located at Peterson Air
Force Base and, as I noted a few moments ago, his command
assumed initial operational capability just a few months ago.
I was nominated by the President to become the first
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in January.
That was to fill a new position created by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2003. You were kind enough to confirm me
to that position approximately 2 months ago.
During the past 2 months since I appeared before you during
my confirmation hearing, we have been busy. I have visited
virtually every major homeland defense command in the United
States. In the case of Hawaii--a distant responsibility--
pursuant to the commitment that I gave to Senator Akaka,
although I could not physically visit Hawaii during that period
of time, I had a secure videoteleconference with the operations
officer for PACOM and discussed with him the same kinds of
issues that I had covered in person with all of the other
commands.
Chairman Warner. There are a number of those commands and
would you provide for the record a listing.
Secretary McHale. The ones that I visited, sir?
Chairman Warner. I want to know all of them. Whether you
visited them or not, we would like to have the entire structure
as a part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, we will happily submit that.
Just to give you a brief summary, NORTHCOM and North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), are collocated out
of Peterson Air Force Base. Beneath NORTHCOM in terms of
command and control we have Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
which is located in Norfolk; Joint Forces Headquarters,
Homeland Security, also in Norfolk. We have a series of six
Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), rapid reaction forces at the
battalion level, that are geographically dispersed throughout
the United States. We have JTF-6, which is located in El Paso.
I have visited nearly all of those. There are two QRFs that
I have not yet been able to visit, one at Fort Drum and one in
Alaska, but hopefully those visits will be scheduled in the
very near term.
That gives you essentially an overview of the wire diagram
that falls under the command of General Eberhart. If I have
missed any major components, he can certainly add to the list
that I presented to you during his testimony. We will give you
a formal list of all of those units for the record, sir.
Chairman Warner. If you have a wiring diagram, that would
be helpful also.
Secretary McHale. We do, sir. As you look at that----
Chairman Warner. Does anyone have a copy of it with him?
Secretary McHale. Pardon me, sir?
Chairman Warner. Does any witness have a copy of that
wiring----
General Eberhart. Let me check, sir. I may.
Chairman Warner. If so, I would like to have the diagram
duplicated and distributed to the members in attendance.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Collins a couple of moments ago emphasized her
interest in the relationship between the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the new
Cabinet agency for which her committee has primary oversight
responsibility, the Department of Homeland Security. Senator,
let me assure you that in the interim since we last spoke we in
the Department of Defense have worked very hard to establish a
close working partnership with the Department of Homeland
Security.
We have a full-time Department of Defense representative in
their operation center. We are in daily communication with the
Department of Homeland Security. We have complete sharing of
intelligence information between the two departments. Routinely
each day we provide to them intelligence that we in the
Department of Defense believe may be helpful to them in the
execution of their mission, and they similarly do not hesitate
to contact us on matters that are of mutual concern.
In addition, Pete Verga, who has now been appointed my
principal deputy and is seated behind me, has as one of his
major responsibilities the day-to-day management of that
relationship between the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, I had a number of other comments, but in the
interest of time I will bring my opening statement to a close.
I certainly would welcome any questions that you might have and
I will do my very best to answer them. I would simply say in
conclusion that I can assure you today, as always, America's
men and women in uniform stand ready to defend our Nation
against any threat at home or abroad. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary McHale follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul McHale

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee: I
appreciate the opportunity to meet with you on the critical subject of
our Nation's security.
As stated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the highest
priority for the U.S. military is the defense of the U.S. homeland. At
home and abroad, the Department of Defense is a significant contributor
in this national effort to secure our Nation and its people.
The President understands that terrorists can attack at any time,
in any location, using every conceivable technique. He also understands
that it is physically not possible to defend against every conceivable
threat, in every place, at every time. To successfully defend against
terrorism, and other 21st century threats, requires that we take the
war to the enemy. Our task is to put pressure on the terrorists
wherever they are, in Afghanistan and across the globe, to ensure that
they have no safe haven, no sanctuary, anywhere in the world.
That is why the President has marshalled all of the Nation's
capabilities--political, economic, financial, law enforcement, military
and intelligence--to deter, attack, and destroy terrorist
organizations, and those who harbor them. These organizations typically
threaten the United States, our interests, or our allies from terrorist
locations overseas.
That is why defense of the homeland actually starts abroad, where
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are putting their lives on
the line every day to make it more difficult for terrorists to plan or
execute their attacks before they ever near our borders.

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY

As described by the President in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, homeland security is defined as a concerted national effort
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.
In addition, the Defense Department defines homeland defense as the
military protection of United States territory, domestic population,
and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed
to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if
deterrence fails.
With respect to homeland security, the Defense Department will
usually operate in support of a lead Federal agency. While in homeland
defense activities, the Defense Department will take the lead and be
supported by other Federal agencies. In fact, Section 876 of Public Law
107-296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, recognizes the Department
of Defense's lead role in the conduct of traditional military missions
by providing that ``[n]othing in this act shall confer upon the
Secretary [of Homeland Security] any authority to engage in
warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other
military activities, nor shall anything in this act limit the existing
authority of the Department of Defense or the Armed Forces to engage in
warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other
military activities.'' This section clearly delineates the difference
between homeland defense activities and homeland security activities.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE NATION

In his testimony before Congress in May of last year, the Secretary
of Defense described three distinct circumstances in which the
Department of Defense would be involved in activities within the United
States:
The first case was extraordinary circumstances, which require the
Department to execute its traditional military missions. For example,
combat air patrols and maritime defense operations. In these cases the
Department plays the lead role and is supported by other Federal
agencies. For instance, combat air patrols where the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) provides data to assist the efforts of Air Force
fighter pilots in identifying and, if necessary, intercepting
suspicious or hostile aircraft. Also included in the category of
extraordinary circumstances are cases in which the President,
exercising his Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief,
authorizes military action.
The second case was emergency circumstances of a catastrophic
nature--for example: responding to an attack or assisting in response
to forest fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and so forth, during
which the Department may be asked to act quickly to provide
capabilities that other civilian agencies do not have.
Finally, the Secretary noted temporary circumstances, where the
Department is given missions or assignments that are limited in
duration or scope and other agencies have the lead from the outset. An
example of this would be security at a special event like the Olympics.
Another example is assisting other Federal agencies in developing
capabilities to detect chemical/biological threats.
Subsequent to the Secretary's testimony, three significant changes
to the Department of Defense have fostered an evolving perspective of
our role at home in the security of our Nation.
First, the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the
President, changed the Unified Command Plan and stood up, on October 1,
2002, the U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command's mission is to:

Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its
territories, and interests within the assigned area of
responsibility; and
As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
provide military assistance to civil authorities including
incident management operations.

General Ed Eberhart, Commander of U.S. Northern Command, also
commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is
collocated with U.S. Northern Command at Peterson Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs, Colorado. U.S. Northern Command is a U.S. only
command and NORAD is a U.S.-Canada bilateral command. NORAD is
responsible for the aerospace defense of North America. U.S. Northern
Command is responsible for the land, maritime and U.S.-only air
capabilities of homeland defense. The two commands work closely
together on a daily basis to provide aerospace defense to the Nation.
The U.S. Northern Command and NORAD staffs are integrated with the
dual-hatting of many staff officers.
U.S. Northern Command's area of responsibility includes air, land
and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States,
Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately
500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and our territories
and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S.
Pacific Command. U.S. Northern Command will additionally be responsible
for security cooperation and coordination with Canada and Mexico.
In addition to defending the Nation, U.S. Northern Command will
provide military assistance to civil authorities in accordance with
U.S. laws and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
Military assistance is almost always in support of a lead Federal
agency, such as the Department of Homeland Security.
Military civil support includes domestic disaster relief operations
that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Support
also includes counter-drug operations and consequence management
assistance, such as would occur after a terrorist event employing a
weapon of mass destruction.
Second, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act
directed the establishment of an ``Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense.'' I am honored to serve as the first Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
In accordance with Section 902 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, my principal duty is ``the
overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the
Department of Defense'' to be exercised subject to the Secretary's
authority, direction and control (10 U.S.C. 113(b)) and without
interfering with the chain of command over the Armed Forces (10 U.S.C.
162(b)). My charge, as given to me by law, by the Secretary of Defense,
and by the President is to lead and focus the Department's activities
in homeland defense and homeland security, ensure internal coordination
of DOD policy direction, provide guidance consistent with the law to
Northern Command for its homeland defense mission and its military
activities in support of homeland security, to include support to civil
authorities, and to coordinate with the Homeland Security Council
(HSC), the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and other government agencies. In other words, I am
responsible for recommending to the Secretary the roadmap for the
Defense Department's role in securing our Nation at home.
Third, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act also
directed the establishment of an ``Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence.''
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will have the
primary responsibilities to assure that the senior leadership of the
Department and Combatant Commanders receive the warning, actionable
intelligence and counter-intelligence support needed to pursue the
objectives of our new defense strategy.
The Under Secretary will also enhance Defense Department
intelligence-related activities, provide a single point of contact for
coordination of national and military intelligence activities with the
Community Management Staff and strengthen the relationship between the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. So, in
terms of this forum, the new Under Secretary will define and provide
oversight for the Defense Department's participation in national
Indications and Warning.

DOD ACTIONS TO DEFEND THE NATION

As the President said, on the eve of the standup of the new
Department of Homeland Security, ``We're tracking down terrorists who
hate America, one by one. We're on the hunt. We [have] them on the run.
It's a matter of time before they learn the meaning of American
justice. We're opposing terror regimes that are arming with weapons of
mass destruction to threaten the peace and freedom of this world. We're
taking unprecedented measures to defend the homeland with the largest
reorganization of our government in more than a half a century.''
On October 7, 2001, we took the fight to the enemy when we, along
with our allies, launched attacks against al Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. This operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, successfully
liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban, destroyed al Qaeda training
bases, disrupted al Qaeda communications and impaired al Qaeda
organizational efforts.
The Department continues to prosecute the war on terrorism abroad.
Today, the brave men and women waging the war against terrorism around
the world are America's first and most important line of defense
against homeland attack. By going directly to the source and rooting
out terrorists and their networks, they deter and defeat terrorist
attacks before they occur.
Protecting our Nation requires an unprecedented level of
cooperation throughout all levels of government, with private industry
and institutions, and with the American people. The Federal Government
has the crucial task of fostering a collaborative environment, and
enabling all of these entities to work together to provide the security
our Nation requires. The new Department of Homeland Security is tasked
with the responsibility of leading this national effort to protect our
Nation against terrorist attacks. The Secretary of Defense has made a
public commitment to work closely with the new Department of Homeland
Security in order to coordinate our respective responsibilities.
The U.S. military actually took its first step in response to
September 11, 2001 when two F-15 Eagle jets arrived at the World Trade
Center, just minutes after United Airlines Flight 175 sliced into the
second tower. While they were unable to alter the course of history on
that morning, they stood guard with renewed vigilance. They were the
first, but they were not the last.
The direct defense of the American homeland, Operation Noble Eagle,
commenced immediately after the September 11 attacks and includes
combat air patrols over key domestic locations, expanded air
operations, and command and control of active component forces,
including U.S. Navy ships with anti-aircraft systems to enhance the
security of U.S. domestic airspace. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has
been flying daily combat air patrols over U.S. cities. Since that date,
DOD has flown over 28,000 sorties and responded to more than 1,000
requests from the FAA to intercept potential air threats. Operation
Noble Eagle also entails Coast Guard inspections of cargo vessels and
patrols--supported by Navy Patrol Coastals--in defense of major
seaports.
The Department of Defense is supporting the Department of Homeland
Security as the lead Federal agency for homeland security. Military
planners assisted the Department of Homeland Security in the
development of the Liberty Shield plan. DOD's continuing homeland
security commitments as part of Operation Noble Eagle complement
Liberty Shield's national effort to protect our citizens and
infrastructure.

THE NATIONAL GUARD'S ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE NATION

One of the critical elements in DOD's contribution to the security
of our Nation is the National Guard. Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, the Defense Department has depended daily upon the
personnel and resources of the National Guard. In fact, the two F-15
Eagle jets that responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, were from the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air
National Guard at Otis Air National Guard Base (ANGB).
When we were attacked on September 11, more than 100,000 reservists
and National Guard members sprang into action--Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines, Coast Guard. Since then, they have helped defend our homeland,
drive the Taliban from power, shut down the terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan, and liberate the Afghan people.
These contributions have been vital to our success thus far in the
global war on terrorism.
The National Guard is particularly well-suited to perform selected
homeland defense missions, such as the Air National Guard's important
role in continental air defense. However, the National Guard is combat
ready to conduct overseas military operations and is relied upon by
combatant commanders as part of our Nation's strategic Reserve.
In the past, the National Guard was dual-tasked. In wartime, the
Nation has expected the Guard to fulfill its mission overseas; in
peacetime, the Nation has expected the Guard to be available for
domestic emergencies. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have now
taught us that the National Guard may be called upon to do both at the
same time, not by accident but because our Nation's enemies may attack
us in both places at once.
Consequently, as DOD reviews how best to deal with the challenge of
the new security environment, it is mindful of the need to properly
balance the application of the total force to: defend the homeland,
contribute to the global war on terrorism, meet military commitments
abroad, and, if necessary, participate in a major theater war.
The National Guard can support homeland security in several ways.
First, the Guard can operate in State service under the direction of
the governors. For example, on September 11, the National Guard of New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut responded to the attacks on the World
Trade Center.
Second, in State service but performing duties of Federal interest,
in Title 32 status. This status involves State command and control, but
Federal payment of costs.
Third, in Federal Title 10 status, when the National Guard is
mobilized to serve under the direction of the President or the
Secretary of Defense. Significantly, the Commander of Northern Command
will have command authority over the Guard only when it is serving in
Title 10 status. In all other cases, command authority over the Guard's
activities remains with State governors.
These arrangements have worked well in the past. The challenge
today is to translate them into our new security environment. There are
many proposals for doing so, and we'll work with the NSC, HSC, DHS,
Congress, and the governors to make certain that we have an approach
that meets the Nation's needs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

March the 1st marked an historic day for the Federal Government.
Over 170,000 employees from more than 20 different agencies officially
became part of the Department of Homeland Security, creating a more
effective, organized and united defense of our homeland. The Department
of Homeland Security is a vital and important step in reorganizing our
government to meet the threats of a new era as we continue the work of
securing our Nation.
As noted earlier, the Secretary of Defense has made a public
commitment to work closely with the new Department of Homeland Security
in order to coordinate the respective responsibilities. DOD and DHS
have complementary missions and capabilities. In general, the
Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense missions--to
defend the land, maritime, and aerospace approaches from external
threats--while the Department of Homeland Security will be responsible
for major elements of domestic security and civil preparedness. DOD
will also provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities in
accordance with U.S. law, as directed by the President and the
Secretary of Defense. For example, such assistance could include
support for incidence management operations led by the Department of
Homeland Security when authorized by the President or the Secretary of
Defense. There will be an ongoing requirement for U.S. Northern Command
to coordinate plans, exercises, and training with the operating
components of DHS.
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, I will
supervise all DOD homeland defense activities, including combatant
command capabilities, consistent with the Secretary's direction and
without interfering with the chain of command, and will coordinate all
requests for assistance and cooperative ventures between the Department
of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FIRST RESPONDERS

DOD is eager to continue a long tradition of providing specialized
capabilities, technology, and training to first responders. In
addition, in situations where civilian authority capabilities to deal
with emergencies is overwhelmed, DOD can provide unique assistance
support of first responders. Some of these capabilities include those
provided by the U.S. Northern Command's Joint Task Force Civil Support,
the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams
(WMD-CST), the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the
Chemical/Biological-Rapid Response Team (CBRRT), explosives detection,
technical escort, and medical services.
DOD participates in many interagency efforts to transfer applicable
technologies to first responders. For example, DOD invests around $100
million annually in the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). The
TSWG is a broad, interagency group that brings together nearly 20
Federal agencies to develop, test, and field technology that would
protect U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. These technologies also
typically are applicable to first responders and other homeland
security missions.
DOD, through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical
and Biological Defense, funds and participates in the InterAgency Board
for Equipment Interoperability and Standardization (IAB). The IAB is a
user-working group supported by voluntary participation from various
local, State emergency responders, Federal Government, and private
organizations. It is designed to help achieve standardization,
interoperability, and responder safety and to better prepare emergency
responders to respond to, mitigate, and recover from any incident by
identifying and advocating requirements for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear or Explosives (CBRNE) incident response
equipment. The IAB publishes annually the Standardized Equipment List
(SEL) that is utilized by National Institute of Justice in their grant
process to guide State and locals on procurement of equipment for WMD
preparedness.
Section 1401 of the Fiscal Year 2003 Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to appoint a senior
individual to ensure transfer of technology and equipment to emergency
responders and the civilian sector.
DOD also provides first responder training at a variety of
installations around the country. These programs--at facilities like
the Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Chemical Defense
Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Defense
Nuclear Weapons School operated by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico--train DOD, State, and local
responders to recognize and react to weapons of mass destruction and
disaster situations.
From local to national level, the Defense Department is an active
participant in military/civilian training exercises. In fact, this
year, elements of the Defense Department are scheduled to participate
in exercises with Federal entities such as the Department of Homeland
Security, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, States such as Iowa, Utah, and Texas, and in
cities such as Colorado Springs, Colorado, Seattle, Washington, and
Winterburg, Arizona. Whether we are talking about a TOPOFF tabletop
exercise in Washington, D.C. to examine the national response to a
weapon of mass destruction attack or a Regional Readiness Workshop in
Anchorage, Alaska to examine how the Federal, State, and local
authorities cooperate to deal with the aftermath of an earthquake, such
exercises forge realistic expectations, foster a firm understanding of
roles and responsibilities, identify best practices, and highlight
shortfalls that must be overcome.
Some in Congress have expressed concerns that many first responders
are also members of the military's Reserve component and that they may
be called from their important local roles to fulfill their military
missions. The Defense Department shares this concern. This is why,
since 1979, the Defense Department has managed a screening program to
ensure that civilian employers can identify critical positions that
cannot be filled with personnel who are subject to mobilization. This
program is intended to minimize conflicts between employees' military
service obligations and their civilian employment requirements during
times of war or national emergency.
Due to the unique nature of the current emergency, which requires
not only mobilization of the Ready Reserve but also the careful
protection of public health and safety, the Defense Department has
established a special process to accommodate individual requests from
Federal and non-Federal agencies to submit mobilization exemption or
delay for their employees who are Ready reservists, based on the
critical nature of their civilian employment. DOD considers these
requests on a case-by-case basis. Ready reservists who are granted
exemption from mobilization are transferred to the Standby Ready
Reserve or the Retired Reserve, or discharged, as appropriate.
DOD is also in the process of establishing a mandatory Civilian
Employment Information program. This new program will require the
collection of both employee and employer related information. The
Department's intent is to permit the military to fulfill mobilization
requirements, while avoiding the dilemma outlined by some Members of
Congress.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the department and agencies--Federal, State, and
local--charged with protecting American people and property share a
common goal: to assure the security of American citizens, territory,
and sovereignty. The Defense Department plays a proud role in the
security of our Nation and will continue to work closely with others
that share this responsibility. America's men and women in uniform
stand ready to defend the Nation both at home and abroad.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General Eberhart.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

General Eberhart. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of the committee: I thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you once again. I also thank you
for your continued support of and commitment to a strong
national defense, and especially the way you support those men
and women who serve this great Nation and their families,
especially those in harm's way.
Chairman Warner. Would you bring the microphone up closer.
General Eberhart. I am sorry, sir.
Chairman Warner. You are not carrying your voice well.
General Eberhart. Is this better?
Chairman Warner. It is better.
General Eberhart. Excuse me.
It is also a pleasure to serve with the two gentlemen with
me today. As Secretary McHale has said, we are not only
professional colleagues, but we are also close personal
friends. I can tell you in the 2 months that he has been on
board he has certainly made a difference in focusing the
Department on homeland defense and homeland security.
To my left, Admiral Jim Ellis. As has been said, we have
worked hard over the last year to establish our two new unified
commands. There is a very special relationship between
Strategic Command and NORAD and Northern Command when you look
at aerospace warning, aerospace control, and in the future as
you look toward missile defense.
Although I have been asked this morning to appear as
Commander of Northern Command, I would like to speak briefly
about NORAD, a very special binational relationship that has
served Canada and the United States exceedingly well since
1958. The professional actions of those men and women in the
aftermath of September 11 mentioned by Senator Kennedy, those
at Otis among them, I am convinced have served to protect our
population centers and our key infrastructure from air attack
to this day. They have flown over 29,000 sorties collectively
without an incident or an accident, which attests to their
skill and expertise.
Now let us turn to Northern Command. Northern Command is
first and foremost a U.S. unified command, a construct that we
adopted with the National Security Act of 1947. In fact,
December of that year European Command, Pacific Command, and
Southern Command were established. We decided at that time,
because we were protected by two wide oceans and two friendly
nations, that we did not need that command structure in North
America.
Then in 1958, because of the threat of Soviet long-range
aviation and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), we
established NORAD, but their responsibility was for air and
space, not for land and sea.
In the aftermath of September 11, it became apparent to the
Secretary of Defense and the President that we were violating a
principle of military command and control, that we did not have
centralized command and control, decentralized execution. The
President and the Secretary had to go to several different
commanders that day to craft our reaction to those tragic
events of September 11.
So they decided and, with your support, they established
Northern Command in October of this last year. Again, this is
first and foremost a U.S. unified command; job number one,
national security, homeland defense, defense against foreign
aggression. However, this command is in fact different, as
Secretary McHale has alluded to, in that our homeland is in our
area of responsibility. So we have the secondary mission, which
will be our prominent mission in the near future in my view,
and that is providing support to civil authority, one-stop
shopping, if you will, for Federal forces to be used however
the President and the Secretary of Defense decide is the right
way to use it to protect the men and women of this great
Nation.
I believe that, as you look at where we were a year ago or
6 months ago or 3 months ago, we have come a long way. Mr.
Chairman, you and I discussed during the confirmation hearing
initial operational capability and full operational capability
(FOC), and you cautioned me not to wait, to press ahead as fast
as we possibly can, and we have done just that. In fact, I
believe that we are farther along than I would have dreamed
possible last year at this time or even 1 October, right around
the time that we discussed it.
But we still have a long way to go. In fact, I would offer
to you that we should never be satisfied with our status in
terms of homeland defense and homeland security. We need to
continue to advance the ball. We need to continue to get
better, because I guarantee you the bad guy out there, those
who wish us harm, are figuring out ways as we speak today to
attack us and what is near and dear to us.
As the Secretary of Defense has said, this is important
business. This is mission number one, to protect the men and
women of this great Nation where they live and work.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Eberhart follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee:
It is an honor to appear before this committee again, and to
represent the outstanding men and women of North American Aerospace
Defense Command and United States Northern Command. The soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, national guardsmen,
reservists, and civilians serving in our Commands are truly the ``best
of the best,'' and give our two great nations--the United States and
Canada--every reason to be proud.
norad
Our number one priority is to strengthen aerospace warning and
control of United States and Canadian airspace. Prior to 11 September
2001, we focused on threats originating from outside North America. As
a result of these terrorist attacks, we now also look for threats from
within our borders.
Thanks in large part to the timely passage of the Fiscal Year 2002
Defense Emergency Response Fund, today we have connectivity with 70 FAA
long-range interior en route radars, better ground-to-air
communications, and a robust coordination capability to provide
comprehensive coverage of our airspace.
Throughout this integration effort, the FAA has been very
responsive to our requests for technical assistance. This strong
partnership of dedicated people is committed to further improving our
ability to protect the Nation's airspace.
Operation Noble Eagle. NORAD defends North America from domestic
air threats through Operation Noble Eagle. Across the United States and
Canada, armed fighters are on alert and flying irregular combat air
patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft. Since 11 September
2001, we have flown over 28,000 sorties to deter, prevent and defend
against potential terrorist attacks, without a single mishap. This
tremendous accomplishment is a tribute to the professionalism and
perseverance of the men and women executing these missions.
In addition, we are supporting homeland defense operations with a
layered air defense of the National Capital Region. We have developed
new relationships across the DOD and with interagency partners to
establish a comprehensive shield to guard our Nation's capital.
To maintain our warfighting edge, we routinely exercise and
evaluate our ability to defend against the full spectrum of air
threats. United States' and Canadian civil agencies continue to make
air travel safer through increased airport and aircraft security
measures. However, if called, we stand ready as the last line of
defense against threats within our airspace.
North American Air Surveillance Plan. In our efforts to provide the
best possible coverage of North America, we have teamed with the FAA
and North American Air Surveillance Council to further enhance our
wide-area surveillance capabilities. There has been an outstanding
level of interagency cooperation to develop a comprehensive North
American Air Surveillance Plan that addresses our requirements to
detect, identify and classify all aircraft within North American
airspace. We look forward to fielding expanded capabilities that track
even smaller, low-altitude threats.

NORAD'S RELATIONSHIPS

USNORTHCOM. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands. Neither
command is subordinate to the other or a part of the other, but we work
very closely together. Members of the two commands work side-by-side
within the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center and, in many cases,
United States military members are dual-hatted in positions on both
staffs.
Bi-National Planning Group. The Departments of Defense and State
have been working with their counterparts in Canada to develop
additional areas of cooperation to better protect our citizens. One
promising outcome of this collaboration is an agreement to establish a
Bi-National Planning Group for a 2-year term.
This group will identify additional ways to protect our citizens
and strengthen air, land and maritime defense of North America, while
respecting the national interests and sovereignty of each nation.
Members have already begun arriving and will be appended to NORAD.

USNORTHCOM

On 1 October 2002, the President established USNORTHCOM as a
regional combatant command to provide ``unity of command'' for United
States military actions that counter threats to our homeland from the
air, land, or sea domain. We are just like the other regional combatant
commands, with one important difference--the United States homeland is
in our area of responsibility.
We conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests.
We also provide military assistance to civil authorities, when directed
by the President or the Secretary of Defense. When we work with civil
authorities, we will most likely be in a support role to a lead Federal
agency, providing ``one-stop shopping'' for Federal military
assistance. The President's decision to establish USNORTHCOM has
enhanced the DOD's ability to provide quick, responsive support, when
and where needed.
Organization. USNORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces.
Whenever mission requirements dictate, we will request additional
forces from the Secretary of Defense, and if approved, receive them
from our force provider, United States Joint Forces Command. Our day-
to-day operations are conducted by three subordinate commands:

The Joint Force Headquarters--Homeland Security
supports land and maritime defense planning for the continental
United States, and provides military assistance to civil
authorities.
The Joint Task Force--Civil Support provides command
and control of consequence management forces that respond to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive events.
The Joint Task Force--6 provides support to Federal,
State, and local counterdrug law enforcement agencies.

Exercises. Over the past several months, we have trained and
exercised with 55 Federal, State, and local agencies across a broad
spectrum of scenarios. During Unified Defense 02-2 in September 2002,
we validated our initial capability to command and control forces in
response to future attacks. Most recently, in February 2003, we
completed a second major exercise, Unified Defense 03-01, to strengthen
the trusted relationships we need with interagency partners to defend
our Nation's homeland.
Current Operations. We have demonstrated our ability to conduct
operations in a number of emergency situations. During the Washington,
DC, sniper attacks, we coordinated aerial surveillance for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) efforts. Most recently, we supported
military operations in the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia
tragedy. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, we established a
response task force to provide command and control for DOD resources
and units, in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
We have also been called upon to conduct operations in support of
pre-planned events. In October 2002, using forces provided by United
States Pacific Command, we supported the President's attendance at the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Los Cabos, Mexico. In
January 2003, we provided command and control of all military support
to the State of the Union Address, to include security, emergency
medical, and chemical and biological response forces.
Emergency Preparedness and Response. We have the capability to
assist local responders and lead Federal agencies in their response to
a bioterrorism incident. Although biohazard investigative expertise
exists in most local and State health departments and in the Federal
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, these resources may become
overwhelmed in emergency circumstances. When directed by the President
or Secretary of Defense, we will provide bioterrorism experts to a lead
Federal agency to help prevent or contain a situation. Likewise, we are
ready to provide field medical units, as well as logistics,
transportation and security capabilities to assist Federal, State, and
local agencies, as required.

USNORTHCOM'S CHALLENGES

Intelligence. Homeland defense relies on the sharing of actionable
intelligence among the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies.
Our Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center collates and analyzes data
from the United States Intelligence Community and nearly 50 different
government agencies. One of our greatest challenges lies in sifting
through the volumes of intelligence and operational data from these
sources. Our goal is to help connect the dots to create a clear threat
picture, playing our appropriate military role as part of the
interagency team. Another shared challenge is to overcome cultural and
procedural differences among the DOD and other departments for
information that is collected, categorized, classified, analyzed and
disseminated.
Homeland Command, Control, and Communications. We need to be able
to command and control forces and to coordinate planning and operations
with agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels. Interoperable
communication architectures and trusted information exchange
environments provide the framework for coordinated operations. We have
ongoing efforts with our homeland defense and civil support partners to
upgrade existing architectures and to better integrate our information
collection and exchange capabilities.
Ballistic Missile Defense. We are working with the Missile Defense
Agency, United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands to
develop the Concept of Operations that will ensure the United States
has an effective missile defense capability by the fall of 2004.
Posse Comitatus. We will remain vigilant in ensuring that
USNORTHCOM is used in accordance with the laws of our great Nation--
respecting the rights and liberties of every American. We understand
the Posse Comitatus Act and related laws and the clear limits placed on
military support to civil law enforcement. We believe the act, as
amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no
modification is needed at this time.

USNORTHCOM'S RELATIONSHIPS

Our command is built upon a total force and total national team
concept that includes members from all five Services, the National
Guard, the Reserves, DOD civilians and numerous Federal, State, and
local agencies. We believe we are redefining ``jointness'' by forming
new partnerships within the DOD and with numerous civilian agencies, as
well as strengthening existing ones. Developing these strong
relationships is key to our success.
Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Defense will
coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security on policy and
resource issues. In accordance with decisions by the Secretary of
Defense, we will work with various sectors of the Department of
Homeland Security on operational planning, training and execution.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)). We
have frequent interaction with Paul McHale on a broad range of issues.
As ASD(HD), his principal duty is the overall supervision of the
homeland defense activities of the DOD.
Other Combatant Commands. We have established a conceptual
framework with Admiral Jim Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic
Command; Admiral Ed Giambastiani, Commander, United States Joint Forces
Command; and General Charlie Holland, Commander, United States Special
Operations Command to secure the homeland. We are also working closely
with the regional combatant commanders to eliminate threats to our
homeland from afar. Our focus is to address gaps in coverage and any
overlapping responsibilities to ensure that we provide an integrated
defense for our citizens at home and abroad.
National Guard. We have a close relationship with the National
Guard Bureau, which is enhanced even more by having Major General Steve
Blum, an Army National Guardsman, as our Chief of Staff. We believe
that no force is better suited to help deter, prevent, and defeat many
of the threats we face than today's National Guard. Through the
National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM coordinates with State headquarters
for planning purposes and maintains situational awareness of National
Guard actions and commitments.
To support our missions of homeland defense and military assistance
to civil authorities, we are looking at the feasibility of evolving the
current mobilization process into something closer to the current air
defense model used by the Air National Guard in support of NORAD's
mission. Specifically, Air National Guard fighter units of 1st Air
Force have been successfully employing instantaneous Title 10 USC
orders for several years. These orders allow an individual to
volunteer, with consent of the Governor, to be federalized for specific
missions prior to execution. We believe we can achieve a higher level
of readiness if we apply the air defense mobilization model to the
existing National Guard response forces, when needed in a Federal
capacity.
Coast Guard Maritime defense missions involve traditional military
activities such as combat air patrols and naval operations within our
area of responsibility. In these cases, we would take the lead and the
Coast Guard would likely be called upon for support. It is important to
note that the Coast Guard does not report to USNORTHCOM, although we do
have several Coast Guardsmen on our staff, including Rear Admiral Jim
Van Sice, who serves as our Deputy Director of Operations. The Coast
Guard is in the Department of Homeland Security, and any requests for
Coast Guard assistance to DOD would come from the Secretary of Defense
to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
By contrast, the Coast Guard would be the lead Federal agency for
maritime homeland security. When directed, we would support Coast Guard
homeland security missions through our naval component commander. This
support might include maritime air surveillance, the use of naval
surface combatants with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments
onboard, or the use of specialized DOD capabilities.
Interagency. We are leveraging the unique capabilities and
expertise of Federal, State, and local agencies to protect our
homeland. Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group is working to help
synchronize interagency plans, exercises and operations. In addition,
we have a growing number of liaison officers in our headquarters staff
at Peterson Air Force Base, to include the FBI, Central Intelligence
Agency, FEMA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Administration.
potential future capabilities and missions for norad and usnorthcom
We continue to address critical command and control challenges
highlighted by the terrorist attacks on our homeland. We are committed
to improving our situational awareness by developing a common operating
picture for the air, land and maritime domains.
Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System. We are
pursuing ways to leverage the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command
and Control System to modernize our aging 60's era air and missile
warning systems and infrastructure. This will allow us to migrate to
our next-generation Battle Control System and provide the foundation
for a fully integrated NORAD-USNORTHCOM command and control capability.
Battle Control System. The upgraded Battle Control System will
provide connectivity with a wide array of radars and sensors across
North America, thereby giving our homeland a more integrated air
defense capability. As future increments are fielded, we will be able
to process air defense data faster, as well as improve our battlespace
awareness.
High Altitude Airship (HAA) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile
Defense Agency, the United States Army and NORAD are spearheading the
effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility of an unmanned,
untethered, long-duration HAA. The prototype airship will stay airborne
for 1 month and carry a 4,000-pound payload. We expect the objective
HAA to have the capability to stay airborne for up to a year and carry
a payload greater than 4,000 pounds. A robust HAA capability would give
warfighters persistent wide-area surveillance of the battlespace
against a full spectrum of air, land and sea threats.
Homeland Security Command and Control Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration. USNORTHCOM is sponsoring this Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration to provide the DOD homeland security community
with operationally relevant command and control capabilities. This
initiative will help us rapidly insert mission-enhancing technologies
and promote information sharing, collaboration and decision-making in a
trusted information exchange environment.

CONCLUSION

We are grateful for everything the members of this committee have
done to ensure our ability to defend our homeland. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 reflects your commitment to our
mission, as well as to our servicemen and women, and we appreciate your
continued support. With your help, our Nation will be safer tomorrow
than it is today. I am honored to appear before you, and look forward
to your questions.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral Ellis.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of the committee. I, too, have a prepared
statement that I would like to submit for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, all statements in their
entirety will be made a part of the record.
Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir.
It is an honor to appear before you all once again
representing, as always, the outstanding members of the United
States STRATCOM, men, women, military, civilian, Active and
Reserve alike. I am pleased again to share the panel with
Secretary McHale and General Ed Eberhart. As Ed noted, during
the last several months he and I have worked closely together
through the creation of our two new unified commands, and the
United States Strategic Command looks forward to developing a
similarly productive relationship with Secretary McHale and his
staff in the months ahead.
As you have already noted, Mr. Chairman, ours is a new
United States Strategic Command. It is a reflection of the new
international security environment we must all work to
effectively address together. It is a reflection of the
recommendations of the Space Commission, the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Finally, it is a reflection of the clear guidance the President
gave to the Department to challenge the status quo and envision
a new architecture of American defense.
The new United States Strategic Command was created first
and foremost to provide responsive, integrated, and
synchronized combat capability and support across geographic
boundaries. As has already been noted, in a global sense, every
combatant command is employed in defending our homeland and
this Nation's interests. The United States Strategic Command is
responsible for the integration of intelligence, information
operations, and the national strategic arsenal in their
support.
I am convinced that the alignment of responsibility for our
Nation's on-orbit capabilities under the same unified command
that now has global responsibilities in four previously
unassigned mission areas has created new opportunities to shape
our future. I am committed to working with our strong and
growing team of partners to address each one of these new
capabilities. We are crafting not just a vision, but a clear
and detailed course of action in every mission area.
Since the United States Strategic Command was established
last fall on the 1st of October, we have provided significant
support to the Nation and the regional combatant commanders.
Examples include: deploying intelligence, planning, space, and
information operations experts to theaters of interest around
the globe, including United States Central Command (CENTCOM);
optimizing communications, bandwidth, and global positioning
system performance for ongoing combat operations; and providing
24 hours a day, 7 days a week missile warning to our forces in
the field and to General Ed Eberhart for his AOR, our homeland.
We have led the intelligence community effort to find and
characterize underground facilities in Afghanistan and other
countries. We have used our on-orbit systems for battle damage
assessments, targeting, as well as for providing data to the
ongoing analysis being conducted by Admiral Gehman and the
Space Shuttle Columbia mishap investigation team.
We remain committed to the Nation's deterrent capability
resident in our stockpile and the delivery systems and to
retaining and advancing the United States' position as the
preeminent space-faring nation.
One of our new missions, integrating missile defense across
all areas of responsibilities, will be very important to
enhanced homeland security. Strategic Command's role in missile
defense is to develop a global concept of operations for a
multi-capability system with an integrated command and control
architecture to work seamlessly across all of the regional
combatant commands, a demanding task.
Response time to defend against an enemy missile attack
will be short. Therefore, streamlined organizational structures
and precise guidance must be drafted and wargamed in advance of
the initial defensive operations goal of fiscal year 2004.
This is a very exciting time for the professionals at
United States Strategic Command. We have tremendous
opportunities ahead of us and are engaged in charting the
course for meeting our future warfighting needs. To pursue
these needs, we will advocate for advanced conventional
capabilities, support the sustainment and modernization of our
nuclear deterrent force, sustain and further operationalize the
tremendous capability our on-orbit assets bring to the Nation,
and develop and maintain a cadre of highly trained strategic,
space, and information operations professionals.
Never before has such a broad array of missions been
combined under one combatant command. We are aggressively
building the right teams, the right structure, and the right
plans to move confidently from concept of operation to tangible
combat capability. We are leveraging our historic strategic
planning expertise and our space and information operations and
regional support heritage to become a more globally focused
operational headquarters, one that is better equipped to
provide the combat capabilities required by our national
leaders and support the warfighters in the defense of this
great Nation.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN

Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to again appear before you, representing the
outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command, to
address the strategic issues that remain so vital to the Nation. As you
recall, during our last hearing we discussed space operations, allowing
us to focus today on strategic deterrence and the actions underway to
shape a dramatically different strategic future.
U.S. Strategic Command, our components, and our task forces are
crafting an entirely new command, instrumental in fighting the war on
terrorism, deterring a wider array of potential adversaries, and
focused on recasting the Nation's global military capabilities for the
demands of the 21st century.
We are drawing on the best elements of both U.S. Space Command and
U.S. Strategic Command in order to eliminate seams, broaden oversight
and streamline responsibilities. Significant reductions in the level of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons have begun in
compliance with Presidential direction, the NPR and the Moscow Treaty
while continuing to meet our obligations under the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START). Associated deactivation or modification of
strategic delivery platforms is also well underway.
STRATCOM continues to deploy or provide intelligence, planning,
targeting, space, and information operations expertise to operations in
U.S. Central Command and around the world. We have reshaped and
streamlined the command's component and organizational structure to
enable an integrated and trans-regional approach to matching global
capabilities to global challenges. Importantly, we also completed a
comprehensive update to our deterrent force plans to reflect the needs
of the new international security environment.
While these efforts are critical, they represent only the first
steps toward a much broader vision of our strategic future. On January
10, 2003, the President signed Change Two to the Unified Command Plan
(UCP) and tasked us specifically with four previously unassigned
responsibilities. These are: global strike, missile defense
integration, Department of Defense information operations, and command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C\4\ISR). This unique combination of roles,
capabilities, and authorities under a single unified command will bring
new opportunities in the strategic arena, in addition to further
refining the global opportunities to support the regional combatant
commanders.
We are quickly integrating the efforts of our strong and growing
team of service, agency, national laboratory, and intelligence
community partners to define specific goals, identify milestones and
quantify the progress of our collective efforts. Today, the new U.S.
Strategic Command is improving our Nation's joint combat effectiveness
by modernizing systems, streamlining processes, and providing a broader
range of fully integrated mission capabilities to the warfighter and to
our Nation's leaders.

THE FUTURE OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

I am proud to again report that our Nation's nuclear deterrent
forces remain fully ready. They are manned by a cadre of true
professionals who, around the world and around the clock, effectively
support the nuclear pillar of our national security strategy. For more
than 56 years, Strategic Air Command and the former U.S. Strategic
Command stood at the ready, supporting deterrence through rigorous and
disciplined planning, effective training, and robust command and
control of our Nation's strategic nuclear forces. The professionals of
the new U.S. Strategic Command still willingly shoulder that enormous
responsibility. We remain fully confident that STRATCOM's readiness,
and that of our service components, is the most effective guarantee
that the use of these weapons will never be required. As we reshape our
organization and assume broader responsibilities, we remain committed
to rigorously ensuring the continued safety and surety of our nuclear
arsenal and delivery systems. Zero defects remain our standard.
We are making prudent and measurable progress in achieving the
President's goal, codified in the Moscow Treaty, of between 1,700 to
2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the year
2012. Air Force Space Command, our Air Force component, began
deactivation of Peacekeeper ICBMs on 1 October 2002. This effort
remains on schedule and will be complete by 2005. The Navy removed two
Trident submarines, U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, from strategic
service in fiscal year 2003, to be followed in fiscal year 2004 by
U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia. All four of these capable vessels
will be modified into Tomahawk cruise missile carriers, designated
SSGN, by the end of 2007. They will also provide a tremendous increase
in the size and sustainability of support to our special operations
forces. With the 1996 re-role of the B-1 to a non-nuclear role, we are
moving to retire several hundred gravity weapons in fiscal year 2003,
and are finalizing plans to remove many of the oldest ICBM warheads
from the Nation's active nuclear stockpile.

SUSTAINMENT AND MODERNIZATION

With no new nuclear systems under development, the important task
of sustaining and modernizing our Nation's aging weapons and delivery
platforms must be carefully managed and appropriately resourced. These
forces must remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our
Nation's security posture. Other than the Navy's submarine launched D-5
missile, still in low-rate production, we are no longer building any of
the weapons or platforms that comprise our strategic forces. We
appreciate your continued strong support, through service and agency
programs, of our key weapon, delivery platform, and communications life
extension and upgrade programs. These include:

Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP),
replaces aging electronic components and updates software to
preserve reliability, maintain accuracy, and ensure
supportability through 2020. The GRP is the foundation of MMIII
modernization and is being completed at the rate of 80 per
year, with 140 deployed to date.
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP),
corrects age-related degrades by repouring the propellant in
stages I and II, and remanufactures stage III. PRP requires GRP
software for fielding, and must be sequenced appropriately. It
is programmed at the rate of 96 per year, with 49 boosters
deployed to date.
B-52 Avionics Mid-life Improvement, one of STRATCOM's
highest priorities, and AEHF upgrade, to ensure mission
capability and assured connectivity as this aircraft continues
to establish new benchmarks in service longevity.
D5 SLBM Life Extension and Backfit Programs, will
provide a standardized fleet of 14 SSBNs for the full hull life
of the Trident II. Two of four SSBNs have completed backfit
with the remaining two scheduled for completion in fiscal year
2006 and fiscal year 2007. D5 life extension requires
replacement of guidance and missile electronics on fielded D5
missiles, and procurement of 115 additional missiles to meet
reliability testing needs over the 14-year life extension of
the hull. The D5 Life Extension Program is adequately funded
and on schedule for initial operational capability in fiscal
year 2013.
B-2 communications upgrade, which may require
acceleration in future years to ensure secure and survivable
connectivity as AEHF replaces MILSTAR.
Strategic War Planning System (SWPS), which recently
completed an initial upgrade and is now entering a new phase.
This new modernization effort will incorporate the flexibility
and responsiveness envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review and
broadened to support our newly assigned non-nuclear strategic
and regional support missions.
Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control
System (C2IC2S), which will replace aging and unsustainable
NORAD/U.S. Strategic Command mission-unique battle management
systems with a single, open architecture. C2IC2S is on track to
incrementally deliver warfighting C2 capability for NORAD in
late fiscal year 2004, strategic missile warning in early
fiscal year 2006, with space surveillance and control
capabilities being delivered from fiscal year 2003 through
fiscal year 2008.

In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs,
we are working closely with our partners in the Departments of Defense
and Energy, and Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe,
reliable, and credible. As the Nation's nuclear stockpile continues to
age, we must carefully monitor its condition. Through the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling,
simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on
aging effects, component reliability and physics phenomena we require
in the absence of nuclear weapon testing. Past drawdowns in nuclear
weapon infrastructure require that the essential warhead life extension
programs be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead dismantlement so
as to provide just-in-time delivery to meet operational deterrent force
requirements. We are working closely with the NNSA, the national labs
and plants to shape their support to our future stockpile. With the
production complex operating near its peak capacity, we will need to
optimize the balance between essential life extension programs and
dismantlement work.
Annually, at the direction of the President, I provide a nuclear
weapon stockpile assessment to the Secretary of Defense. In my last
assessment, based on the information provided by my staff and
independent advice from our expert Strategic Advisory Group, I outlined
my confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This is
the first time since the program began in 1996 that a STRATCOM
assessment did not indicate a decline in confidence in the reliability
of the stockpile. I attribute this directly to the continued
improvements in and funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, to
the steps taken by NNSA and the Services to diligently address
previously reported technical issues, and to the progress of the
ongoing life extension programs. I agree with the rigorous technical
analysis conducted, and confirmed to the Secretary there is currently
no need to consider resumption of nuclear testing. I appreciate your
strong support for funding of the NNSA, enabling continuation of their
important work.
As we continue to sustain and modernize our forces, we are also
working closely with the Services and the Department of Energy to
address the critical anti-terrorism and force protection requirements
associated with safeguarding the Nation's nuclear systems. The ongoing
Mighty Guardian exercise series and the Nuclear Command and Control
System Federal Advisory Committee End-to-End Review have helped the
Services and the Department of Energy better focus their security
efforts. While the changing character of the postulated threats
requires continuous evaluation, I believe the Services are making
concrete improvements in physical security, though much remains to be
done. We will continue to encourage this effort through the STRATCOM
Integrated Priority List and will remain an active participant in the
creation of implementation guidance that will flow from completed
Office of the Secretary of Defense policy studies such as the NPR and
the End-to-End Review.

FUTURE ENHANCED CAPABILITIES

It is well known that much of our current military capability was
designed or procured for a dramatically different international
security environment. This is especially true of our Nation's deterrent
forces. Though sustainment and modernization of these systems remains
essential, equally important is the examination of future concepts and
the contribution they could make to our deterrent posture. A
fundamental assumption of the Nuclear Posture Review is that a mix of
advanced capabilities, some yet to be designed, that include
conventional, non-kinetic, special operations and nuclear, is needed in
order to offer the broadest range of options to our Nation's leaders.
Such a spectrum of capabilities will both enable the planned NPR draw
down in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and form part
of a New Triad of deterrence in support of the President's goal of
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. While there are certainly
significant policy issues associated with this transformational effort,
it is also true that much laboratory research and development, detailed
analytical study and advanced simulation efforts are an essential
underpinning to such a fact-based dialogue. A number of organizations,
including the Department of Defense and the Defense Science Board have
nascent reviews underway. As the Secretary of Defense has noted, these
studies are intended to consider and weigh alternatives and in no way
pre-suppose decisions as to detailed design, production or deployment.
Advanced Conventional Capabilities and Global Strike
U.S. Strategic Command's newly assigned global strike mission
extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities
to the broader spectrum of conflict. We will incorporate conventional,
non-kinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum
contingency arsenal and into the Nation's strategic war plan to further
reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. This innovative approach will
enable the command to deliberately and adaptively plan and rapidly
deliver limited-duration, non-nuclear combat power anywhere in the
world. Our intent is to provide a wide range of advanced options to the
President in responding to time-critical, high-threat, global
challenges and, thereby, raise even higher the nuclear threshold.
As envisioned, global strike could be decisively conducted at the
direction of our most senior civilian leaders. It also represents a
powerful tool in support of the regional combatant commander,
essentially increasing the forces and options he has available to deter
and engage an adversary. In either case, global strike will provide the
Nation the ability to engage priority targets by moving rapidly from
actionable intelligence, through adaptive planning, to senior-level
decision-making and the delivery of kinetic or non-kinetic effects
across thousands of miles. It can provide what may be the most critical
element early in the fight--time. As a regional combatant commander
assembles and moves forces into position or needs to strike into
temporarily denied areas, U.S. Strategic Command can provide early
planning and tangible, long-range combat capability. We are initially
building this capability around the bomber force, and are bringing the
B-1 back into our force structure in its purely conventional role. This
committee's continued support of advanced conventional weapons
initiatives such as the SSGN will assist in our immediate efforts to
improve joint warfighting effectiveness. We continue to study concepts
such as conventional ballistic missiles, Common Aerospace Vehicles,
hypersonic aircraft, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could
play a significant role in improving our global strike capabilities in
the mid- to long-term.
Information Operations (IO)
Delivering on the promise of information operations is one of U.S.
Strategic Command's top priorities. Incorporating computer network
attack and defense, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
strategic deception and operational security, this nascent mission area
promises to dramatically improve our offensive and defensive
capabilities, and may play a large role in shaping the size and
character of future force structures. Quite simply, I believe that
integrated IO comprise the next revolution in warfighting, and our new
role as the integrator of DOD information operations will bring a joint
perspective to improvements in capabilities, ensure ready access to IO
planning, reduce stovepipes, test and validate new capabilities, and
provide a responsive command and control system to the Nation's
civilian leaders and combatant commanders.
Our current vision has U.S. Strategic Command serving as the
central IO armory. While we need not own service and agency IO
programs, or execute all IO missions, we must have full insight and
access to all DOD IO capabilities as well as execution capability for
strategic efforts. We will capitalize on our proven expertise in
detailed intelligence collection, rigorous nuclear planning and
consequence analysis to bring a fully integrated, deliberate planning
process to the IO realm. We envision providing weapons or capabilities
with documented system reliability and analytically based estimates of
consequences and effectiveness, just as we have done for decades with
the Nation's nuclear forces. We will support an expeditious national-
level approval process for conducting IO, and we will work to ensure
national leaders and warfighters have what they need at their disposal,
not only during crisis but also during the critical planning, training,
exercise, and deployment phases. In this vein, we have conducted a
number of advanced information operations exercises, spanning the
entire planning, approval, execution, and battle damage assessment
phases, and have identified valuable lessons for inclusion in our
future planning and development processes.
Missile Defense
The danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems is clearly one of our Nation's top concerns. As we discussed
during my last appearance, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is actively
developing an array of land, air, and sea-based missile defense systems
to provide an additional level of protection for our homeland, our
allies, and our forces in the field. Although still in the early stages
of development, global missile defense will become an important third
leg of the Nation's New Triad beginning next year.
While the MDA develops and acquires our missile defense systems,
U.S. Strategic Command is charged with efficiently integrating and
operationalizing global missile defense, enabling an initial defensive
operations capability in less than 18 months from today. As General
Myers noted recently before this committee, missile defense is
inherently a multi-command and multi-regional task, and we are
developing the global concept of operations and command and control
architecture to provide the full support needed by the regional
combatant commanders to defend their theaters, including the ballistic
missile defense of the continental United States by U.S. Northern
Command. With the unique combination of missions now assigned to our
command, we are also working to integrate the emerging defensive
capabilities with our full-spectrum of offensive capabilities, to
support rapid and fully informed decision-making at the appropriate
tactical level. This effort will be aided by the long-existing
relationships we have crafted as the historic provider of ballistic
missile integrated threat warning.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\)
In the fast-paced and complex national security environment of the
21st century, U.S. decision-makers and warfighters must have seamless
access to superior information to conduct decisive operations. Under
the Unified Command Plan, STRATCOM now is assigned the role of tasking
and coordinating C\4\ in support of strategic force employment. Our
objective is to provide a more capable and flexible means to integrate,
synchronize, coordinate, and convey information at any level from the
President to the front-line combatant. We will partner closely with
U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency in
this critical effort.
The events of September 11, 2001, illustrate the need to improve
our national command and control architecture, and we are working with
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and
Communications (ASD/C\3\) and a host of others to craft a new national-
level C\4\ system. This system must allow increased access to a broader
array of Federal agencies, provide improved information flow, enable
rapid decision-making, and support the requirements of our network-
centric forces in the Information Age. While this is important for the
Nation and all of the Department's missions, it is imperative for the
strategic deterrent, integrated missile defense, and global strike
missions, where data collection, analysis, decision-making, and
execution must occur within dramatically compressed timelines. We will
leverage our experience with nuclear command and control to create a
robust, hardened component to the national C\4\ system to preserve and
strengthen the deterrent effect that assured communications, rapid
decision-making and certain action provide. We appreciate your
continuing support of the innovative communications initiatives such as
the Transformational Communications Architecture and the important
delivery platform connectivity upgrades vital to robust command and
control.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
U.S. Strategic Command is also tasked under the Unified Command
Plan to plan, coordinate, and integrate ISR for the Department of
Defense in support of global and strategic operations. While ISR has
always provided intelligence insight and targeting data, recent world
events have demonstrated the critical role comprehensive ISR operations
can play in senior-level decision-making, tactical planning and even
deterrence.
We will work closely with Department of Defense and Intelligence
Community partners to develop and institutionalize the processes and
systems necessary to maximize the capabilities of existing systems and
assess intelligence collection priorities. New concepts such as
intrusive ISR, incorporating space-based, air-breathing, terrestrial
and maritime elements, could take us beyond passive collection
benefits, especially when integrated with critical human intelligence
and technical data. Our objective is to not only better provide
persistent, actionable, predictive intelligence, but also to deter the
threatening actions that a robust, global, persistent ISR capability
could bring into full view. Systems such as the Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS), Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Space Based Radar
(SBR) represent the high end of a spectrum that must also bring
advanced air-breathing, terrestrial and maritime elements into a global
architecture. Our ISR needs and regional focus in time of crisis are
well known. In the future, global challenges will require an ISR
capability that is broad and deep enough to simultaneously meet all
national and regional needs across the continuum of peace, crisis, and
conflict.

OPTIMIZING THE ORGANIZATION

As you recall from my previous statements, U.S. Strategic Command
is realigning our overall headquarters organizational structure in
order to effectively and efficiently address a wider range of
responsibilities. We will organize along functional and operational
lines, rather than administrative in an effort to focus on our primary
mission areas. As we move to our new organizational alignment this
month, we will expand the use of enhanced planning and analysis tools
into our newly assigned mission areas. While we will draw heavily on
their tools and skills, we will retain the core nuclear planning staff
as a distinct element in our headquarters, organizationally aligned and
consolidated to ensure focused and dedicated nuclear planning and
expertise continues in the future as it has for more than half a
century.
As we design concepts of operations for the new command, we are
pursuing innovative new service relationships that will enable the
command to efficiently tap into the unique skills and expertise
resident in an array of other organizations, without requiring full-
time STRATCOM ownership of their forces. We are strengthening our
partnerships with the national agencies in order to collaboratively
approach our new mission areas, particularly in the highly technical
and focused realm of intelligence, information operations, and
communications. We have forged new relationships with the National
Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense
Information Systems Agency. Each has incredibly talented professionals
and dedicated systems, processes, and procedures that are important to
our shared success but which need not be duplicated in our
headquarters. We are also excited about the opportunity to leverage our
strong relationships with the national laboratories as we expand and
develop new capabilities applicable to our recently assigned missions.
As we discussed previously, success in any of our missions depends
on our number one asset--our people. Creating a culture of excellence
in a broader and deeper range of missions while sustaining the
standards still reflected in our nuclear and space communities will
depend on recruiting, training, and retaining the best and the
brightest, in our military, in public service, in industry, and at the
national labs. We will fully support and participate in efforts to
create and sustain cadres of space, nuclear, and information operations
professionals in both the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy. They are absolutely essential to our future.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

As we work to achieve the goals, carry out the responsibilities and
deliver the capabilities needed for the global challenges of the 21st
century, we will encounter many difficulties and find many more
opportunities. It will not be quick or easy; few truly important
efforts are. We will need to keep in mind our broader objectives, even
as we wrestle with the daily technical, operational or policy details.
Though the list will doubtless change over time, our specific strategic
goals are:

Fully implement the guidance of the Nuclear Posture
Review, to include advocating the development of advanced
offensive and integration of defensive capabilities in order to
meet the President's goal of reducing our reliance on
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
Delivering on the promise of information operations to
the warfighter.
Integrating global missile defenses across regional
boundaries, combining land, air, and sea-based systems with
capable offensive forces to better protect the Nation and our
forces in the field.
Providing adequate bandwidth and a robust
communications architecture for rapid decision-making and
global combat operations at the strategic and operational
level.
Supporting technical and process enhancements in
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance so as to provide
comprehensive, persistent, predictive, and actionable strategic
capabilities.
Redefining the STRATCOM organizational structure and
crafting new relationships with the Services and national
agencies to effectively and efficiently support our broadened
responsibilities.
Supporting the Services' and the Department of
Energy's efforts to enhance anti-terrorism and force protection
measures for our critical space and nuclear facilities.
Addressing concepts of deterrence and the associated
force structure appropriate for the new international security
environment of this decade and beyond.

Each of these challenges will require a team effort, inside and
outside the command. As we move forward, we look forward to working
with you and the many others who are privileged to share the humbling
responsibilities for our Nation's defense.

CONCLUSION

It is a time of great enthusiasm, excitement, and opportunity at
U.S. Strategic Command. While 2002 was a year of new concepts, 2003 and
2004 must clearly be years of execution. Driven by new tasking and new
responsibilities, in a real sense we at STRATCOM have reclaimed the
classic definition of strategic, as articulated by Sun Tzu, Clauswitz,
Washington, or Webster. We no longer live in a world where strategic is
synonymous with nuclear, and we are integrating and interlinking the
command's broad portfolio of missions to better and more flexibly meet
the deterrent needs of the Nation. We have taken the first important
steps in the evolution of our full-spectrum ``new'' strategic
capabilities, even as we have taken the historic first steps in drawing
down our Nation's deployed nuclear arsenal.
I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of
STRATCOM and the unique and essential contributions they continue to
make to our Nation's security. I look forward to reporting our
continuing progress to you in the future, as we take the next important
steps in building the new United States Strategic Command.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Admiral.
We will have our usual 6-minute round. Our colleagues,
Senators McCain and Levin, have very carefully laid out
important questions with regard to the borders. I would like to
raise a similar question related to the coastlines bordered by
our oceans. How serious is the threat there? What role do each
of you play in protecting any possible incursions across our
coastline, the most probable being a terrorist missile attack
of some type from some type of vessel? Who budgets for
technologies and programs that might address this threat?
Yesterday, General Eberhart, you and I had an opportunity
to visit privately and you said that your area of
responsibility as designated extends 500 miles to sea. I was
quite reassured by the command and control you have over
vessels coming in and surveillance. Then, Secretary McHale, I
expect you are more or less coordinating all the efforts on
this. Admiral, I am not sure what portion you have.
But let us start with General Eberhart.
General Eberhart. Sir, as we look at maritime threats we
focus initially on what we would consider threats that the
Department of Defense would have the lead on. The example that
you used, a cruise missile, whether it was from a foreign
nation's navy or a terrorist cruise missile, we would certainly
have the lead for that type of activity.
Ideally, as we talked earlier and you alluded to during
your statement, we want to stop that missile, that crew, before
it reaches the 500-mile limit of our area of responsibility.
Chairman Warner. Board the vessel if necessary?
General Eberhart. Board the vessel, and if that does not
work then do whatever is appropriate in terms of international
law and law of the sea to make sure that that does not pose a
threat to this Nation. Ideally, we like to work with the flag
carrier, whatever nation whose flag that ship is flying, and we
have found that they are very cooperative. If they believe that
they have a flagged vessel that in fact is carrying contraband
or doing something that poses a threat to us, we would like for
one of our allies to take care of this problem before it poses
a threat to us.
You could argue that we are the supported command for this
exercise, kind of a moot point. But in fact, if European
Command (EUCOM) or Pacific Command can take down that threat,
that is great. Let us defend as far forward as possible.
Then if it is necessary and we do not detect it, we are not
aware of it until it is inside our area of responsibility.
Every day we look at where all of the ships are in the Atlantic
and in the Pacific. We work with both the Navy and the Coast
Guard to ensure we know what ships are closest to this threat,
what ships would have the capability to deal with the threat,
whatever the threat might be, and then we respond.
Now, what we do not have right now and what we need in the
future is wide area surveillance.
Chairman Warner. What is the last word?
General Eberhart. Wide area surveillance, sir. We get some
surveillance, obviously, from our overhead, but that is
cyclical, if you will. It is not 100 percent of the time. If we
know the general area to look in we can send out aircraft for
surveillance. Sometimes we can do it with other ships' radar,
et cetera. But over time we are going to have to harness the
technology so that we have a picture on the sea much like we
have a picture in the air today, so that we can sort the good
guys from the bad.
Chairman Warner. How soon do you anticipate that that will
be a part of your----
General Eberhart. Sir, right now we are doing what we call
an advanced concept technology demonstration, which is
supported by the Department of Defense. It is supported by
Congress and is funded. This is essentially a high altitude
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that will be up 60,000 to 70,000
feet. We think one day it will have the capability to be up for
a year or more and provide us this wide area surveillance.
Chairman Warner. What about the UAVs we currently have in
inventory and coming on line with further production?
General Eberhart. We can use those, too, sir. But obviously
they are somewhat limited in terms of duration time and in
terms of legs and in terms of their capacity to carry sensors.
But all of those things we have to harness.
Chairman Warner. Please include in the record such
additional information you may have.
[The information referred to follows:]

Lessons learned from employment of UAV systems such as the Predator
and Global Hawk have provided valuable insight into the potential for
unmanned systems to support homeland defense. Prospective UAV
applications include emergency response communications capability,
long-endurance surveillance and detection for border and maritime
security, and sensors to support law enforcement and civil response
agencies. In addition, ground and maritime unmanned vehicles are
promising technologies that could provide homeland defense
capabilities.

Chairman Warner. Now I want to get in a question for
Secretary McHale related to port security. It is one thing to
interdict the vessel beyond our shores, but there are instances
where that vessel will be portside, and also the ports
facilities could well be a target of those that have not come
by sea but come by land, that is the terrorists.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, one of the things
that I have tried to do during the brief period of time that I
have been in office has been a conscious focus on pushing
outward the boundaries of our defense. A great deal of emphasis
has been appropriately applied to port security and I certainly
do not denigrate that. But I come out of a Marine Corps
background and I believe in locating and defeating the enemy as
far from my position as possible.
So I want to reach out well into the blue water to defeat
the enemy threat, particularly if it is a weapon of mass
destruction. I also want to locate that threat if it comes into
port, but that is frankly when the enemy has made it into the
wire and that is a late stage in the process.
It was noted earlier that the NORTHCOM area of
responsibility includes approximately 500 nautical miles of
blue water. While that is true, it is somewhat of a
generalization. It is basically 500 nautical miles on the west
coast, but if you look at the Unified Command Plan and see how
the lines are actually drawn it is probably three times that
distance, approximately 1,500 nautical miles, along the east
coast because of the way the line is drawn in a straight line
and our coast is curved.
We have a substantial amount of blue water on either side
of the Nation in which to detect, interdict, and destroy an
enemy attack.
Chairman Warner. That includes the States of Alaska and
Hawaii, I presume?
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, it does. We have the
responsibility for all of the homeland defense activities,
whether they are in General Eberhart's AOR or, as is the case
for instance of Hawaii, within the PACOM AOR. So our charter is
a little bit broader, significantly broader in the sense of
protecting American citizens and property and freedoms beyond
the AOR that have been assigned to General Eberhart.
We have a very large amount of blue water. We need to take
advantage of that entire space for an integrated maritime
defense of our coastline. That begins with better intelligence,
intelligence that in terms of area of interest is worldwide for
General Eberhart. We need to bring to that intelligence a
homeland defense perspective that has not always been the case
in the past.
Chairman Warner. How long is it going to take you to
achieve that? You are saying that in the future we are going to
do this. I want to know what that time line is, and are there
sufficient assets in the pipeline, perhaps in this most recent
supplemental, perhaps in the President's budget, to implement
what you foresee now as being the needed requirements for
equipment, training, personnel to carry out that mission.
Secretary McHale. Mr. Chairman, we have gotten a lot better
in the last few months in terms of bringing a homeland defense
perspective to raw intelligence. That intelligence has
historically been oriented toward the forward edge of the
overseas battlefield and relatively few analysts have looked at
that information in order to make a connection to a domestic
threat.
We have gotten better. My hope and expectation is that the
President's proposal for the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC) that he announced in his State of the Union
address will allow us to fuse overseas intelligence collection
capabilities for analysis and review by those who in the United
States look at that information, to determine its relevance to
a threat that might materialize here, so that we connect the
dots before an event occurs.
Mr. Chairman, I also think that we can in the future take
advantage of our GPS tracking system in order to have real-time
location information with regard to a naval platform that may
ultimately pose a threat to the United States, and that that
tracking can go on for an extended period of time so long as we
believe that that ship is still on the seas and that it might
at some point be a threat to our Nation.
Chairman Warner. My time is expiring. Admiral Ellis, do you
have a contribution to this question?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, our
job is to provide to General Eberhart and all the regional
combatant commanders everything we have and to act as the
spokesman on behalf of the combatant commanders for the very
real capabilities that we need to develop. That includes robust
communications architecture, the persistent intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance that Ed was speaking to, the
fused multi-system ballistic missile defense capability, and a
viable information operations capability.
So we are being asked to centralize that, to assess what we
have, and to look, more importantly, at what the architecture
and requirements need to be for the future across the full
spectrum of the threats that confront the Nation.
Chairman Warner. I thank the witnesses.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to pick up with Secretary McHale and with
General Eberhart, particularly on the intelligence questions
which you just discussed. Secretary McHale, what is your
connection and what is the new command's connection to the
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at the CIA? How are you linked to
that center, which analyzes the information relative to foreign
terrorists which threaten our interests here in the United
States?
Secretary McHale. Senator, I think Ed will probably want to
comment on this as well. But there are a number of ways in
which we are linked. I have daily communication with the CIA in
order to have access to the information generated by the CIA
related to domestic threats. I begin each day with a DIA brief
and then follow that by attending the briefing that is received
by the Secretary of Defense on these very issues.
Senator Levin. Let me interrupt you there. Are you
represented at the CTC the way the FBI is and the way the
Department of Homeland Security is?
Secretary McHale. Our office is not, but I do believe that
the DIA is represented, and we have daily contact with the DIA.
In addition, we have recently created, pursuant to the
statutory authority provided by Congress, the Under Secretary's
position for Intelligence, and I know he intends to work very
closely with both that agency and the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center.
Senator Levin. So that your connection to that place which
produces the analyses which you need, presumably, and General
Eberhart needs, is through the DIA?
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir. In addition, General Eberhart
has on his staff full-time a representative of the CIA. That
person is located with General Eberhart out in Colorado
Springs. That person serves along with a DIA representative as
a conduit back to the CIA in terms of their counterterrorism
analysis and information.
Senator Levin. General, that person, however, does not sit
at the CTC and is not part of the analysis process; is that
correct?
General Eberhart. That is correct, sir. That person is not.
Senator Levin. So it is a one-way conduit from you to the
CTC, but not from the CTC to you; is that fair or is that too
simplistic?
General Eberhart. Sir, I really think that does not
appropriately capture it, because there are about five
different conduits from the CTC to me. There are regular
reports that they send out that we get copies of, and we get
those directly. In some cases we get them from other
organizations, but in some cases we get them directly.
Senator Levin. You get all the analyses of the CTC that
affect homeland security?
General Eberhart. Sir, I am convinced that we do. Again, we
have some checks and balances here. We have the head of the
DIA, and if he sees a report he picks up the phone and calls
our J-2, our intelligence, and says: ``Have you seen this
report?'' I am happy to report to this day we have.
We have this DIA liaison officer right there in the CTC who
is checking and doublechecking to make sure we get the
information we need. Then we have this flag level CIA
representative, so that if we have a question about a report we
can go back verbally and get an answer very quickly, as opposed
to going back through a bureaucracy, if you will.
Senator Levin. The lack of coordination of intelligence
information between the various agencies was a huge failure
prior to September 11. There are a number of efforts being made
by this committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee, by a
lot of committees, to make sure that that does not happen
again. You state in your testimony, General Eberhart, that one
of the greatest challenges lies in sifting through the volumes
of intelligence and operational data, and that another shared
challenge is to overcome cultural and procedural differences
among the DOD and other departments for information that is
collected, categorized, classified, analyzed, and disseminated.
I happen to agree, by the way, that those challenges exist.
But would you expand on that? If those challenges exist, it
suggests that they have not yet been overcome. Give us a little
more detail about those challenges.
General Eberhart. Sir, my view is that the challenges
exist. Sadly, they will probably always exist to some degree.
However, we have come a long way since September 11 in being
able to overcome those challenges and to make them manageable,
if you will. There is, to a large degree, an approach now that
we have termed ``need to share'' as opposed to ``need to
know.'' I think we are seeing that type of attitude out there,
whether it is a law enforcement organization, whether it is the
intelligence community, or if it is information from open
sources that we think we need to put together to integrate, to
ideally fuse, as the Secretary has said, so we can connect the
dots and have something that is actionable.
As we do these scenarios--as we do this real-time sharing
of information day in and day out--those cultural barriers come
down. I am seeing better cooperation than I have ever seen
before, much like during the 1990s when we brought down a lot
of those cultural barriers in the intelligence community to
share information, and Jim Ellis and others were part of that
effort.
We have done things like what we call a tear line, where we
might have very sensitive information that talks about the
source and a lot of other things, but the source and those
kinds of things are not important out at the tactical level. So
we take that, we sanitize it to the point where the tactical
user gets the information he or she needs and it is not as
highly classified as it was before, where we said we cannot
share this information.
So we have taken, I believe, some significant steps. That
does not mean we have this right yet. We have to continue to
work it.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
One of the issues that I have been very concerned about is
the ability to detect explosives from a distance. Ever since
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, that has been very high up on
our radar as a technological challenge. Are we making any
progress, Secretary McHale, on the ability to develop standoff
detection capability for explosives, as well as for chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons material?
Secretary McHale. Senator, I think we are. I was encouraged
by the briefings that I received when I came on board to find
out that our remote sensing capabilities are more advanced than
I would have anticipated. That for me was very encouraging
information.
A couple weeks ago I was with Senator Reed at a homeland
defense symposium in Newport, Rhode Island. Congressman Kennedy
attended that as well, and I had an opportunity to speak to a
number of significant contractors in the private sector who are
bringing advanced and robust technology to this area.
With regard to explosives, the challenge is significant.
With regard to weapons of mass destruction, it is even greater.
Just to give you a quick example, a few years ago Tom Clancy
wrote a novel that focused on the transport of an improvised
nuclear device across the Atlantic Ocean into one of our
unprotected ports. That novel's plot went on to describe the
consequences following the detonation of that improvised
nuclear device.
It is my belief that if an enemy is to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, that will likely take place overseas, and it
is likely that the material for that weapon would be brought
into our country by a maritime platform. There are sensors now
in use. They are in the early stages of development, but there
are sensors that I think hold out great promise for creating
what I have called WMD choke points, engagement areas, where we
would have the opportunity to screen passing vessels, to
determine whether or not a weapon of mass destruction was
aboard the ship. The science to support that effort is not too
far down the road in terms of its understanding and operational
employment.
So one of the most encouraging areas of information that I
have had brought to my attention since taking this office is
the very real prospect that in the not too distant future we
will be able to operationally employ in an effective way remote
sensing capabilities for explosives and particularly for high-
end weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. General Eberhart, we have talked a lot in
general terms about local, State, and Federal cooperation. I am
curious to know what kind of mechanisms perhaps you are putting
in place now to encourage that cooperation to occur. I think in
my own mind of things like war games, for example. I mean,
there might be an opportunity there to create some kind of
scenario where you could have local--or what are you doing, for
example, to maybe have an input on training programs for law
enforcement? I wondered if you would share with us some of your
thoughts.
General Eberhart. Senator Allard, I think the best way to
answer this is to say there are both formal programs and
informal programs. First to the formal programs. I think the
best example of that is the civil support teams that Congress
has authorized. These soon will be in all 54 States and
territories. My view is that these teams are a wonderful bridge
from those first responders to the State militia and then to
Federal forces if and when those Federal forces are required.
Because those teams are federally-funded and equipped, we
have been able to ensure standardization among those teams.
They have the same equipage, they have the same training, they
use the same terminology. They are certified by the United
States Army to conduct this mission, and then the Secretary of
Defense is the final certification official.
So therefore we have this standardization and soon we will
have this standardization in all of our States and territories
that I think will help us standardize all the way from the
first responders of the fire departments and the police
departments again to State agencies to Federal agencies. That
is a formal program, if you will, and I think those types of
programs pay big dividends.
The informal programs are what you alluded to. Those are
voluntary in nature, but we certainly do not have trouble
getting people to volunteer. These are where we do war games
scenarios. In most cases they are in Colorado Springs when we
do these, or when we participate in other places, there will be
upward of 50 different government agencies, to include State
and local responders and State agencies, sitting at the table
working our way through a scenario, whether that is a weapon of
mass destruction, whether that is some sort of epidemic, or
whatever the case may be, crisis management or consequence
management.
I think these interactions are very important in terms of
standardization, in terms of interoperability, in terms of
building friendship and confidence that will really be the key
to our success.
Then finally, back to the formal programs, we have formal
exercises. This summer, TOPOFF 2 has been chartered by Congress
for us to conduct. TOPOFF 2 will include three or four
different States in this exercise program where we will reach
down all the way to the first responders and we will exercise
the entire system from first responders to Federal forces when
and where needed.
So I think we are making good progress there. It takes
time. Sometimes it is slower than we would like. We cannot
mandate this, but I think everybody realizes this is the right
way to go.
Senator Allard. Thank you, General.
Admiral Ellis, I am curious to know what you are doing in
your newly created command to make sure that space remains a
core mission.
Admiral Ellis. Senator, as you and I have discussed many
times, space is the fundamental underpinning of everything we
do in today's military, not just with the new missions that
have been assigned to us at the United States Strategic
Command. Clearly that takes on a number of levels. First off,
we need to assess candidly the requirements and the programs
that are being put in place by each of the Services. From a
joint warfighter perspective that is our role, to assess the
level of funding, the priorities, and the like from each of the
Services--Army, Navy, and Air Force--that contribute to that
through robust componency relationships with me.
I have also taken it upon myself to make sure that I visit
all of the facilities that are so important to our space
effort. That is, the launch complexes on both coasts,
obviously, and the major industry contributors to the assured
access and the tremendous on-orbit capabilities that we have
enjoyed and absolutely must preserve and enhance in the years
ahead.
Finally, we are very much a part of the gaming and the
simulation capabilities that are an important part of
reemphasizing for each of our warfighters the importance of the
role that space plays in their ability to execute their
missions. We just completed, as you are undoubtedly aware,
Schriever II, which was the second of our national war games,
if you will, in space. That involved representatives from all
agencies, all Services, as well as the private sector, so that
we take the lessons that we learn from a vision of what
challenges will confront us in the future as a Nation to better
optimize the progress that we want to continue towards
enhancing our use of space.
Senator Allard. Secretary McHale, the National Guard
continues to be a critical part of our military mission. At the
same time, it is essential for homeland defense. Has the
Department of Defense determined how to best utilize the Guard
in your view?
Secretary McHale. I think we have a direction, but not an
end state that has been defined. While maintaining the Guard as
a balanced force that will continue to serve as an important
part of our Nation's Strategic Reserve, with overseas
warfighting requirements and training, we anticipate that the
National Guard will play a more active and focused role, a more
robust role, in homeland defense.
We have eight National Guard divisions that are oriented
now primarily toward the overseas war fight, at least in terms
of their Title 10 mission requirement. I anticipate, as General
Eberhart described a bit earlier, that the Guard will play an
even more significant role in terms of future CSTs. The
National Defense Authorization Act has now required that we
establish 55 such teams. We currently have 32 that are
certified. So clearly the National Guard is going to play a
bigger role in that area.
The National Guard plays an important role in terms of
individuals and units that have been assigned to JTF-Civil
Support for consequence management, including consequence
management following a successful enemy attack involving a
weapon of mass destruction. So in the future what I anticipate
is that, while the Guard will remain committed to the training
and equipment for an overseas war fight, substantial portions
of the National Guard will, in addition to overseas warfighting
missions, be assigned new homeland defense requirements.
Senator Allard. A lot of these individuals are part-time.
They have jobs other than the Guard. If we put on too much
responsibility, then it no longer becomes a part-time position.
Are we able to maintain our personnel in the National Guard?
Are they pretty happy with the current situation?
Secretary McHale. I think they are.
Senator Allard. Even with the increased demands?
Secretary McHale. Even with the increased demand. The Guard
is now playing an important role with regard to our overseas
war fight, particularly in combat support and combat service
support capabilities that the Guard brings to our overall
military capability. To the best of my knowledge, there are no
ground combat units, no maneuver elements from the Guard that
are currently engaged in Iraq.
We have a significant number of Guard personnel who can,
either in Federal status, Title 10 status, or more likely in
State status, play a significant role in terms of the
protection of domestic critical infrastructure. We have Guard
personnel deployed right now at various locations around the
country protecting in State status critical facilities that the
governor of the individual State believes needs to be protected
under circumstances where civilian law enforcement may not be
prepared to take on that challenge.
So in the years ahead--and I would emphasize this--I think
there will be a much more important role for the Guard, but not
just in Title 10 Federal status. I think, as was the case with
Operation Liberty Shield when Secretary Ridge announced that we
were going to a heightened state of alert during the period of
conflict in Iraq, at his suggestion a number of governors in
State status took their Guard forces, put them on alert,
brought them to active duty and, again in State status,
deployed them to protect critical sites.
That mission of critical infrastructure protection I think
is one that with increasing likelihood will be assigned to the
Guard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Eberhart, I have a few questions for you. During
the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy, how did NORTHCOM, NORAD,
and STRATCOM respond and how did they work together?
General Eberhart. Sir, as soon as we knew that in fact it
looked as if we had lost the Space Shuttle Columbia, there was
a problem with Space Shuttle Columbia, we initiated with the
National Military Command Center what we call a domestic event
conference. That domestic event conference is something that
grew out of the tragedy of September 11, where we get all the
players, if you will, on a teleconference so that we know what
the problem is and what type of solution sets might be
available and to try to sort out those very important questions
such as who will be in the lead, who will have the lead for
this effort. It has proved to be a wonderful vehicle that has
served us well as we have worked our way through many different
problem sets.
On that day, representatives from STRATCOM, NORAD, and
NORTHCOM were all up. I was personally up, and through that
conference and through then subsequent conversations offline it
was established that initially the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) was the lead Federal agency.
Then we switched the lead Federal agency from NASA to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) because it was
obvious that it was now a consequence management problem, but
that NASA would still be supported, because we had to in fact
secure this wreckage and make sure it did not constitute a
threat to the citizens of this great Nation, and also so we
could try to put together the accident investigation.
So, in fact, what you had was Strategic Command in the lead
for the accident investigation, supporting the accident
investigation, and Northern Command in the lead in supporting
FEMA in terms of recovering the debris and safeguarding our
citizens. That is the way it has progressed to this day,
obviously with policy guidance from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, specifically the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense. We had teleconferences every
day for about a week there as we sorted our way through these
problems.
So I think that the mechanism of the domestic event
conference, the close friendship and working relationship
between commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
served us well in the aftermath of that tragedy.
Senator Pryor. It sounds like you work pretty well
together. Are there lessons learned? In other words, can we do
it better next time? Did we learn some lessons this time?
General Eberhart. Sir, I am a believer that if you win 70
to nothing tomorrow, you can still do something better the next
time you get on the field, because whoever you are playing is
going to be better. So there is no doubt in my mind that there
are things that we can do better, and we in fact have an after-
action report that we are working our way through now. It is
the initial after-action report. It is very detailed.
But I think in terms of how we provide capabilities to
these agencies there is a long list of things that we in fact
can do better and we are working to do those better in the
future.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask a follow-up to Senator Allard's
questions a minute ago about the National Guard, and maybe you
answered this. But what role do you see the National Guard
having in homeland security and, more specifically, in
NORTHCOM?
General Eberhart. Sir, I would like to say that there are
two great teachers, if you will, in terms of homeland defense
and homeland security. One goes back to the 1630s and that is
our militia, that is our National Guard. The second is our
Coast Guard, dating back to 1790. They have been doing this
since their inception and we have a lot to learn from both of
these great institutions.
So when I think of homeland defense and homeland security,
first and foremost I default to those organizations because I
know they know how to do it. Of course, the dilemma is, as the
Secretary has said, do you take the National Guard and relegate
it--probably not the right verb--to only homeland defense and
homeland security missions or do you keep a broader view, but
look for ways to focus them better. I do not mean better in
terms of they are not doing it well enough, but so that we can
in fact leverage them better for homeland security and homeland
defense. I think the latter is what we should do, as the
Assistant Secretary has mentioned.
I believe that we have a construct right now in that our
air defense missions, as you well know, are predominantly,
almost exclusively conducted by our National Guard. I think
that construct can serve us well for sure on the land, too, as
we look at our quick reaction forces and our rapid reaction
forces in the future. Obviously, if we do that we have to have
them so that they are able to react quickly and promptly. 96
hours or a week does not get it. They have to be ready to go in
12 or 24 hours.
I think we can make those kinds of things work, but I am
open to any and all ideas here. I am convinced we can do it
better.
Senator Pryor. I would love to visit with you some time
about what resources you think the National Guard needs to
augment and to assist in the mission and be able to achieve the
mission that it is intended to do.
Secretary McHale, we talked a little bit here about
NORTHCOM and working very closely with Canada. What about
Mexico? Is there a reason why Mexico is not in this? Does that
mean that we do not perceive any threats coming from the south?
Secretary McHale. Senator, if I may, could I comment
briefly on the previous question and move to Mexico very
expeditiously?
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Secretary McHale. Among the lessons learned with regard to
the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy was initially some
uncertainty as to the lead Federal agency. Immediately
following the tragedy there was an expectation that the
Department of Defense might be the lead Federal agency. Quickly
there was a recognition that that is not the way to approach
these issues. Under the Federal response plan, FEMA assumed
very effectively its lead. We provided support to FEMA. But
there was uncertainty in the first few hours.
The military response during Space Shuttle Columbia
reflected the fact that Title 10 involvement is likely to be
modest in terms of domestic engagement. Most of the military
support for the recovery effort was led by the National Guard
in State status. About 1,000 guardsmen were deployed from the
various States that were affected and they did a superb job,
but they were under State command and control, at State
expense. We in fact used about a half dozen CSTs in Title 32
status as part of the cleanup.
Now, forgive me, I will move very quickly to your question.
Senator Pryor. That is okay.
Secretary McHale. We are pursuing a close cooperative
relationship with the Mexican military where that effort is
governed by profound respect for Mexican sensitivities with
regard to their national sovereignty. NORAD has provided a
bilateral relationship with Canada that goes back many decades.
It is a mature military relationship and the comfort level of
that relationship reflects the friendship and professional
military cooperation that has existed throughout NORAD's
existence.
We hope to achieve an even closer relationship than the one
we have had with Mexico in the past, but the pace of pursuing
that relationship must be dependent upon the sensitivities on
both sides of the relationship. There are appropriate
sensitivities in Mexico with regard to the protection of
Mexican sovereignty. We are pursuing cooperative military
efforts with Mexico, but only at a pace that meets the
requirements Mexico brings to the table.
So it is our hope that, with regard to the NORTHCOM AOR, in
the years ahead we will have a close cooperation between
neighbors both on our northern and southern borders, and we are
in fact pursuing that, but with a sensitivity toward the
historic concerns that are manifested by the Mexican government
and the Mexican people.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard [presiding]. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHale, let me begin by commending you for the
work that you have already undertaken to ensure a strong
relationship between your office and the new Department of
Homeland Security. I was very pleased to hear the update that
you provided in your opening statement. I want to follow up on
concerns that have been raised by my colleagues about the
National Guard.
As of April 2, I believe that there are nearly 220,000
members of the National Guard and Reserves now on active duty.
In Maine many of the members of the National Guard's regular
jobs are in our police and fire departments. They tend to be
the backbone of the first responders in many Maine communities.
Similarly, we had a situation in Maine where a Coast Guard
cutter which was working hard on port security in southern
Maine has now been deployed to the Gulf.
Is there a concern that as we rely more on the Guard in a
conflict such as the one in Iraq and as we deploy and redeploy
Coast Guard assets, there is a danger that we could end up
actually weakening our homeland security? When you look at the
members of the Guard who are first responders in communities
all across this Nation, and the first responders are the
backbone of homeland security in many ways, and if you look at
the Coast Guard, which has been so involved in port security,
if we are starting to redeploy those assets are we risking our
homeland security in times of war?
Secretary McHale. Senator, we obviously have to approach
those kinds of issues very carefully. The first thing we need
to do is get the facts. When I had my confirmation hearing,
Senator Clinton asked me about this issue and I indicated to
her that we would provide information related to the number of
first responders who were also reservists in various
capacities.
I discovered when I got back to the Pentagon--we have since
communicated this to Senator Clinton--that we do not know that
information, because when I gave the answer it was my belief
that we could locate those individuals within the Reserve and
the Guard who are also first responders. I discovered that,
since the majority of our first responders in the United States
are in fact volunteers, although we have data at the Department
of Defense with regard to employment of our reservists, we do
not have data with regard to their volunteer activities that
might relate to first responder requirements.
In fact, I think there are something like a million,
perhaps slightly more than that firefighters in the United
States. Three-quarters of them are volunteers.
So as a direct result of the question before this
committee, the Department of Defense has now undertaken a
comprehensive survey in order to determine not only the
occupations of those who serve in the Reserves, but also their
volunteer activities insofar as they relate to first responder
status.
In addition, the Department of Defense does have a program
for delaying the activation of individuals if in fact an
exemption is appropriate based on the public safety
requirements of an individual community. That request can be
made. Some requests have been made in the past, and we have
attempted to the very best of our ability within a reasonably
brief time frame to accommodate mobilization issues so that
communities are not left without their first responder support.
Lastly, with regard to the Coast Guard, that involves
coordination between an entity that in peacetime is under the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
that may require Coast Guard capabilities in an overseas
warfighting role. I can assure you that very careful attention
is paid to a balancing of overseas requirements and domestic
needs whenever those kinds of capabilities are deployed to an
overseas war fight.
That is not a decision that is lightly made, and included
in the analysis is a careful focus on what the domestic
implications are arising out of an overseas deployment of a
Coast Guard unit. We in the Department of Defense do not seek
that support from the Coast Guard unless it can be determined
that the risk is reasonable and prudent in terms of the
deployment, and frequently what it means is an identification
of other Coast Guard units that are capable of taking on that
mission should the first unit be deployed.
Senator Collins. Thank you for that response and I look
forward to seeing the results of the surveys that you are
undertaking. I am also pleased to know about the exemption
process, because in some small towns in Maine when the Guard
member is called up and he or she is the only support for the
police chief it has been an issue.
I want to turn to the issue of port security and learn more
about the Department's role in that regard, and I would like
all three of you to comment. I held a hearing recently in the
Governmental Affairs Committee to evaluate the security of our
ports, looking particularly at containers. We have literally
millions of individual containers coming into the United States
each and every year. We used to look at container ships as
marvels of international trade. Now we look at them and we
worry that they may harbor terrorists or the makings of a dirty
bomb or biological or chemical weapon.
Indeed, the testimony at the hearing was chilling in that
regard. The experts who testified before us felt that our ports
were our single greatest vulnerability. They also told us that
for years containers have been used to smuggle in illegal
aliens, drugs, other contraband. So there already is an
infrastructure, if you will, that could be used by a terrorist
group.
There is also an al Qaeda manual that advises the
recruitment of smuggling rings as possible members of terrorist
units. So the combination of an infrastructure that has been
used illegally for many years and the relative ease with which
it could be penetrated by a terrorist group was cause for great
concern among the committee members.
The Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
are obviously the lead on this. They are doing a lot of
screening and working with ports in other nations to station
customs officials. They have developed new technology that is
going to be of use. But it seems to me that the Department of
Defense has an intelligence role to play in perhaps identifying
cargo ships at particular risk, because the whole idea is we
have to stop them before they get to our shores.
So starting with Admiral Ellis, I would like each of you to
comment on the Department's role in port security.
Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Senator Collins. That is a great
question. Clearly it highlights the long-acknowledged
relationship between criminal smuggling elements and
terrorists, both in terms of the processes you describe, as
well as the funding streams that support terrorism in many
ways.
My role in the United States Strategic Command is to
oversee, as I mentioned, one of the elements of our DOD
capabilities, and that is C\4\ISR, a very awkward acronym, but
it really does talk to some of the issues you are addressing,
specifically in the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance piece.
As we look to requirements to better optimize the use of
current systems and to design capabilities for the future,
clearly the technology transfer opportunities that you address
into other agencies that are charged with the surveillance that
is essential in preventing that flow of terrorist capabilities
to our Nation has to be a strong piece of that, and it will be.
We have had some success in the past. As you know well, the
United States Customs and Border Protection, for example, flies
P-3 aircraft with Navy E-2 surveillance radars on them. So
there is some history of finding systems that have great
military applications and transferring them to areas that have
application more broadly in ensuring the Nation's security. The
same thing is also true of the technology that the Secretary
was alluding to earlier in the ability to detect chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction,
if you will.
So from our standpoint as we articulate the requirements
for the military, I think it is also important that we
understand the applicability that these capabilities may have
in other areas, and we are committed to that.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General?
General Eberhart. First of all, I would like to applaud
some of the procedures that have been initiated by Customs and
Border Protection and the Coast Guard to work this problem. The
96-hour notice, the manifest, working with customs agents there
at the ports of departure, I think are starting to really pay
dividends. They have put teeth in this and it is not unusual
for the captain of the port, if someone tries to approach the
port and has not given this 96-hour notice, to make them mark
time out there before they will let them into the port to make
sure that we follow these procedures.
Second, this relationship between the United States Navy in
particular and the Coast Guard goes way back, and it is a
relationship that has matured over time, that there is no doubt
when you talk to our leadership off of all of our coasts how
they work together. In fact, we put what we call law
enforcement detachments, which are Coast Guard men and women,
on Navy ships to work this problem. So at the tactical level
they are working this day in and day out.
But the final resolution in my view will be through
technology. We cannot inspect every container. If we can
require people to file these manifests 96 hours ahead of time,
we can have limited surveillance. But until we have wide area
surveillance and until we have the remote sensing capability to
know that there is something on that ship that could pose a
hazard to our citizens, we are never really going to be able to
solve this problem like we would like to solve it.
So we have to harness technology for both surveillance and
sensing and then, as we come back to the front end of the
problem, share intelligence. So if we think there is something
suspicious happening, that we share that with all the people
who need to know this so that we can protect this Nation.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired.
Could Secretary McHale just respond very quickly?
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary McHale. Senator, in my judgment, we need to
develop a maritime defensive strategy in depth for the 21st
century. The purpose of that strategy should be the decisive
defeat of terrorists in possession of weapons of mass
destruction. The Navy needs to maintain its blue water
capability to protect our country against hostile nation
states, but we need to take the current capabilities of the
Navy, supplement them with evolving technological capabilities,
and find an equally effective defense against terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction.
We need to bring a homeland defense perspective to
worldwide intelligence so that we understand how that
intelligence affects a potential domestic threat. We need to
track hostile vessels real-time so that we know where they are
all the time in terms of the implications for domestic
security. We need to advance remote sensing capabilities for
weapons of mass destruction, so that when a hostile vessel
approaches our shores we know it and we can screen it to
guarantee that a weapon of mass destruction will not be brought
into an American port.
Then lastly, we in the Department of Defense need to
strongly support the efforts of the lead Federal agencies in
this regard, the Coast Guard and law enforcement agencies,
including Customs and Border Protection and the FBI. We will
support them with emerging technologies that are being
developed within the Department of Defense and we will support
them, when appropriate, with unique capabilities, for instance
when the Navy may have a capability that is not possessed by
the Coast Guard but which would be of advantage to the Coast
Guard in carrying out its mission of port security.
We receive those kinds of requests from the Coast Guard and
we routinely cooperate with the Coast Guard in providing that
support.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. General Eberhart, you have stated that over
29,000 sorties have been flown since September 11, and in
addition to that NORAD has supported a continuous layered air
defense of the National Capital Region. The professionalism of
all of the men and women who have accomplished these missions
without a single mishap is truly exceptional.
Now, in carrying out your responsibilities for contingency
planning, how are you addressing the various readiness issues
that surface for some of the high density, low demand forces
that have been through repeated deployments? Do you foresee any
future morale issues, morale problems with regard to these
forces and their families?
General Eberhart. Senator, as you well know, we are
concerned about operations tempo and personnel tempo. We are
concerned about the wear and tear on our equipment, but more so
on our people, whether they are guardsmen or reservists or
active duty.
Right now, as we work our way around the low density, high
demand capabilities for NORAD and NORTHCOM, we are careful to
ask for capabilities and not platforms. For example, if we need
air surveillance, we do not specifically ask for an Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplane. What we will ask
for is the capability. In some cases, as Admiral Ellis has
said, we will get that capability from Customs or the Coast
Guard or from the United States Navy, as opposed to the E-3s
that are stationed at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.
But that really does not work the problem in the longer
term. The Secretary of Defense has alluded that low density,
high demand is a nomenclature we put on things that we have not
bought enough of. Over time, we need to buy more of those kinds
of things so that they are no longer low density, high demand
and we have the force structure we need in those areas to work
our problem.
Second, as the Secretary of Defense has said, in the longer
term we have to look at how we use Guard and Reserve and
Active-Duty Forces. Do we have the right mix of those forces?
If we are continually having to use the Guard and Reserve,
maybe we have the wrong force structure in terms of our Guard
and Reserve Force structure and our Active-Duty Force
structure.
So that is how we work the problem in the longer term. In
the near-term, we look for work-arounds in terms of these low
density, high demand forces.
Senator Dole. Secretary McHale, you supervise all homeland
defense activities, including combatant command capabilities.
How do you envision that the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
and its component units might be used in a homeland defense
role?
Secretary McHale. There are a number of ways in which they
could be utilized. The most likely employment of Special
Operations Forces would be upon assignment to a combatant
commander who requested those forces in order to execute a
homeland defense mission where that combatant commander thought
that the use of those forces would enable him to achieve the
mission.
That is another way of saying that homeland defense
missions would be treated the same as all other missions with
regard to the transfer of forces to the combatant commander for
the execution of the mission. Now, in a purely domestic setting
the distinction between the responsibilities of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) in the Department of Defense and
the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense would be a boundary drawn generally at the
U.S. border. Counterterrorism activities, including Special
Operations Forces, external to the United States would remain a
SOCOM-SOLIC function. The use of Special Operations Forces
within the United States would be the responsibility of the
combatant commander in whose AOR they would be operating. That
would be General Eberhart and the command would be Northern
Command.
Once counterterrorism activity begins to take place
internal to the United States, that counterterrorism activity
would be conducted in support of a lead Federal law enforcement
agency. At the low end of that DOD support, we would typically
be talking about the use of DOD equipment by civilian law
enforcement agencies. We would temporarily loan to a law
enforcement agency equipment that we possessed that they might
want to use.
As you move up the scale of response, it is conceivable
that at the high end of WMD capabilities and our ability to
defeat an enemy threat that under appropriate circumstances,
particularly in the chem-bio arena, that Special Operations
Forces could, based on the mission, be employed by General
Eberhart as the supported commander.
At the very high end, we get into a classified area of
response capability that we would have to discuss in a closed
session, where Special Operations Forces have had traditional,
but again, highly classified missions.
Senator Dole. The Special Operations community has been
able to transition technology into capability at a much faster
rate than other DOD agencies, primarily due to their unique
acquisitions process. General Eberhart, you mentioned the high
altitude airship advance concept technology demonstration
(ACTD). Beyond the ACTD, what else is being done to accelerate
the transition of a promising technology into a homeland
defense capability?
General Eberhart. There are several other projects we have.
We have one in terms of information-sharing and command and
control. It is another advanced concept technology
demonstration for homeland defense. We also have been supported
by the Department of Defense from several others that, as
Secretary McHale has said, may not be uniquely demonstrated for
homeland defense and homeland security, but have applications
in terms of our security and our defense of the homeland.
So therefore, we believe right now that we are making good
progress in terms of harnessing technology. I say that a little
bit tongue in cheek because we are never satisfied with how
fast we are going, because again this is an important mission,
this is important business. I would like to put the throttle
all the way to the stops here.
I think we are making good progress. There are promising
technologies out there. There are technologies that will be
appropriate for homeland defense that will also have
application in terms of homeland security. In fact, we have
entered into a strategic relationship with the Sandia
Laboratory and also with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) in terms of sorting our way through technologies that
exist today and how those can be applied to homeland defense
and homeland security.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. In your direct testimony you talk about
this system. For those following this hearing, I think that
this system is envisioned to be not unlike the old blimp, which
is a part of my generation. But this one presumably will be
unmanned, is that correct?
General Eberhart. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Warner. It would have the duration of perhaps up
to a year without servicing and the like?
General Eberhart. It would be theoretically above the
weather, Senator, 60,000 to 70,000 feet. So we do not have to
deal with thunderstorms and those types of phenomena.
Chairman Warner. What is that altitude again?
General Eberhart. 60,000 to 70,000 feet, sir.
Chairman Warner. That is up there.
I am glad you asked that question, Senator Dole, and we are
looking into it. It is in our markup right now and perhaps the
Senator would want to follow it in the markup, because it may
well be that we have to augment your funding profile to make
certain that the estimated dates can be met. So thank you,
Senator, very much.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That blimp
generation was a pretty good generation. You all did all right.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. There are a few of us still surviving. I
remember, if I can say as an aside, when I was Secretary of the
Navy there was a move afoot out in California to tear down the
old blimp--what did we call them, Admiral? They were hangars.
Admiral Ellis. Hangars, blimp hangars.
General Eberhart. Dirigibles, too. We called them
dirigibles.
Chairman Warner. Dirigibles. But they were magnificently
constructed, wooden. I said, no way we are going to tear them
down; there might be a future use for them. So there they are.
They are still there, are they not, Admiral?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir, at Navy Moffett.
Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, all three of you have a great
challenge in your respective newly created positions and I
commend you on getting off the ground and getting going like
each of you have.
General Eberhart, you and I, because of my close ties to
the Air Force, have had many opportunities to work together
over the last 8\1/2\ years. I have always been impressed with
your dedication, your hard work, and your capability. I could
not have been more pleased when I saw who the President's
choice for the newly created NORTHCOM commander was. So I again
congratulate you and commend you for the good job you are
doing.
Mr. Secretary, again you and I go back to our days on the
House Armed Services Committee and we have both come a long way
since then. Our mutual friends say you have taken a step up and
I have taken a step down. I do not know what my House buddies
mean by that. [Laughter.]
An issue that has been very important to me over the last
couple of years, particularly since September 11, has been the
issue of information-sharing between all of our intelligence-
gathering agencies, as well as all of our law enforcement
agencies at the Federal level all the way down to the State and
local level. Each of you have your own respective intelligence
piece, but I think most significantly information coming to you
from our intelligence gatherers is critically important to
winning this battle of protecting our homeland and winning the
war on terrorism.
I would just like to hear from each of you as to how that
integration and cooperation and dialogue between our
intelligence gatherers is working as far as coming to you and
as far as information that you gather going back to them with
respect to not just the war on terrorism, but any other issues
that may be important to us.
Admiral Ellis, if you would start off, please.
Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
opportunity. You rightly point out the critical element that
intelligence provides to whatever we do, whatever our shared
responsibilities are in defense of the Nation. It is not enough
just to talk sensors. It is not enough to talk about the
technology we have and what we need to collect. But it is very
important how we process it, how we evaluate it, and how we
distribute and disseminate it to the people that need to have
it.
So those processes are under stringent review. We have
identified new organizational elements that can fuse
intelligence more quickly. Some of those have already been
mentioned in the course of this hearing. We are exploring other
concepts to bring agency representatives more into active
participation rather than just liaison officer roles within our
organizations. For the first time, I think, we are beginning to
look at the entire intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance issue as a process, not just as a sensor or, as
Ed noted, a platform issue.
So I am pleased that we have made great progress. We are
going to try it out. We are making quick changes if we see
better ways to do it, and I promise you that it is getting
better everyday. It is not yet as good as the Nation must have
for the future, but we are working at it.
General Eberhart. Sir, from our perspective we work this
problem in several different ways. First of all, hopefully when
you visit our command you will see that when we have an
intelligence briefing or when we have a staff meeting we are
redefining ``joint,'' we are redefining the intelligence
community, if you will, because not only will there be military
intelligence experts there, but there are experts there
representing the entire intelligence community: NSA, CIA,
obviously representatives from DIA.
Also, there is an FBI representative there. There are Coast
Guard representatives. There are other representatives there,
so that we can, in fact, ensure that we are receiving the
intelligence and information those agencies have and then, it
is a two-way street, make sure that we get back to them any
information we have that might be of interest to them.
A perfect example is when we thought we perceived a threat
in the State of Arizona recently, our FBI representative was
the one who brought that to the intelligence community, and
then we immediately, through that FBI representative, ensured
that that information was getting played back into the State of
Arizona, that their FBI representative there knew, that the
local authorities, the State authorities who needed to know,
had that information.
So in many cases we find ourselves as the facilitator to
make sure that this information is in fact flowing to the right
people, knowing that we do not have the lead at this time.
Someone else by our Constitution has the lead, but that does
not mean that we do not work hard to make sure they have the
information that they in fact need.
As we talk about the word ``transformation,'' we also try
to think of those types of things we have that we normally
think of in terms of a homeland defense, fighting our Nation's
war type of perspective, and how we could possibly harness the
types of capabilities that Jim Ellis has in terms of
reconnaissance, imagery, communications, et cetera, for the
homeland security mission, obviously in accordance with the
laws of the land. There are ways to use those capabilities
whether we are fighting fires, whether we are in the aftermath
of the tragic Space Shuttle Columbia accident, or whatever it
might be. There are ways to harness those capabilities that we
normally think of in other terms to work homeland security
problems.
Secretary McHale. Senator, I think it was clear in the
immediate aftermath of September 11 that there was an immediate
need for the sharing of information across parochial boundaries
among those that had a genuine need to know. I can tell you
from first-hand observation that the sharing of that
information today does indeed take place. It took a very
painful experience to teach us that lesson, but the information
is now being passed without resistance across boundaries that
in the past were major impediments to the passing of
information.
As a result of that, what I have observed is that the need
now is to bring a sense of analysis and prioritization to huge
volumes of information in order to identify within that mass of
information what is truly relevant and important with regard to
homeland defense. Most of the information in the intelligence
world that I see relates to the historic commitment to be
prepared to prosecute, if necessary, an overseas war fight.
That information is not routinely analyzed in order to bring a
homeland defense perspective to the work product.
Now, in order to achieve that result Congress created the
new position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Secretary Cambone was recently confirmed for that position. We
do have robust ties through DIA and through the Joint
Intelligence Task Force--Combatting Terrorism (JITF-CT) with
other agencies, such as the CIA and the FBI. In fact, I can
tell you the sharing of information between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security is robust and
conducted on a daily basis. We in fact send to their operations
center those daily updates that are relevant to the mission
they have to accomplish.
Now what we have to do is change not only the process of
sharing information, but modify the culture related to its
analysis. We need to create an unprecedented capability to
analyze and understand the homeland defense implications that
arise out of huge quantities of data and information that have
been compiled for purposes other than homeland defense. We are
bringing a sense of urgency to that new homeland defense
prioritization.
Senator Chambliss. I agree with you, the analytical part of
it is just as critical.
Now, you say that you are sharing with them. Are you
getting that same information they gather back?
Secretary McHale. Yes. We tap into many of the same sources
in terms of collection capabilities, but we have a very robust
daily flow of information back and forth. As I mentioned
earlier, we have a permanent representative in the operations
center. I have been on the phone in the last couple of weeks
with Secretary Ridge on a number of occasions where he had a
matter that he wanted to bring to our attention in the
Department of Defense.
I, Pete Verga, who is seated behind me, and others have
routinely--and by that I mean daily--communicated with folks
within the Department of Homeland Security with regard to those
matters that we need to bring to their attention.
The real challenge now is bringing comprehension and
meaningful analysis to enormous quantities of threat-based
information where separating the wheat from the chaff is really
the difficulty. We have an enormous amount of information.
Determining what is significant is much more difficult.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. That is an important question you raise,
Senator. I would just probe it a little bit.
We have this new concept that the President has established
to synthesize in some person. Could not that be the area in
which you can get some distillation? I am concerned that if
every government agency has this enormous overhead and
infrastructure necessary to do their own evaluation, synthesis,
distillation, whatever it is--we all recognize the ever-
increasing massive amounts of this information--that we have a
wide range of redundancy across the government.
Are you familiar with this new setup?
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, I am. I am not directly
involved in it, but I certainly have a strong interest as a
potential customer in terms of the work product that they will
generate. It is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Secretary McHale. The President proposed it in his State of
the Union Address. Secretary Cambone, who was, as I said, just
recently confirmed by the Senate, will take over, has taken
over, as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He
and I have spoken at some length on this issue and he will be
the representative of the Department of Defense with regard to
our integration, our participation in the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, and he understands in some detail the
interest that I have in obtaining through him----
Chairman Warner. I have pointed this out.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I have urged that you all take a look at
it.
Secretary McHale. The potential benefit is enormous in
terms of bringing together into a single stream diverse sources
of information.
Chairman Warner. Now, this committee will be addressing its
annual authorization bill. We are midway at doing that now. I
recognize that, with the best of intentions, the administration
put in place legislation under which you are now operating. But
I urge you to bring to the attention of the next level echelon
the need you feel for any additional legislation, because now
is the time to incorporate it in our bill, assuming it is in
the oversight range of this committee.
So that is an open invitation to discuss that with your
Secretary of Defense. It would cover all three of you. So take
a look at that.
Next is the assets that you have within your respective
responsibilities: Are those assets sufficient? As you well
know, this committee looks at the President's budget, does its
own work, and then we take into consideration late entries by
the administration. It is referred to in some vernacular as a
wish list.
But that often is the case because the President's budget
is formulated almost a year ahead of time and here we are about
a year later. We try and do as much real-time adjustment as
necessary. So in terms of assets, if there is something that
would meet, in the vernacular, the wish list, I would hope you
would bring it to the attention of the committee.
Now, the question of posse comitatus has been of great
interest to a number of us here on the committee. I know my
colleagues, Senator Levin, and I have discussed this. Is there
some ongoing examination, Secretary McHale, of that statute
framework to determine whether or not any amendment is
necessary?
Secretary McHale. Senator, I think the analysis, at least
from the Department of Defense's perspective, has been largely
completed. I am hesitant to say that it is entirely complete,
because I cannot be sure that there is not a lawyer somewhere
taking a look at it. But let me tell you where we stand.
First of all, the Department is aware of your concern with
regard to the issue and we obviously are aware that you have
considered in the past and may still be considering hearings
into a possible revision of the posse comitatus statute. Should
you choose to move forward with those hearings, you will have
the complete cooperation of the Department of Defense in that
effort.
Chairman Warner. It is not necessary to have hearings if
the Secretary of Defense has made a decision that he does not
think any changes are necessary.
Secretary McHale. Sir, I think he has made that decision.
Chairman Warner. If that is the case, for the record I wish
you would give me a supplemental communication on the status of
that so that we can take it into consideration of the hearing.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Secretary of Defense stated last year that the current act
strikes a proper balance regarding use of the military for law
enforcement purposes within the United States. However, he also
indicated that he remained open to further review of the issue. Late in
2002, he directed a departmental working group to look into this issue.
That working group included representation from U.S. Northern Command.
The working group concluded that the President has sufficient authority
to order the military to provide military support to civilian law
enforcement authorities, when necessary, including in the aftermath of
a catastrophic weapons of mass destruction incident, and that no change
to the act is required.
A number of significant exceptions to the act have been enacted
over the years to allow for the appropriate use of U.S. military forces
to assist in enforcing the laws of the U.S. at the request of civil
authorities. These exceptions are reflected in current DOD policy.
Examples include:

Insurrection/rebellion (chapter 15 of title 10, United
States Code)
Chemical/biological weapon of mass destruction
incident (section 382 of title 10, United States Code)
Nuclear material incident (section 831 of title 18,
United States Code)
Terrorist incident (Public Law 107-40)

Regarding the potential need for rapid DOD response in domestic
emergencies, the Department recognizes that imminently serious
conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require
immediate action by military commanders, or by other responsible
officials of DOD agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or
mitigate great property damage. Under such exigencies, when time does
not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military
commanders and other responsible DOD officials are authorized to take
necessary action to respond to the immediate requests of civil
authorities. Should a larger response be required, U.S. Northern
Command would be prepared to react, as directed by the President and
the Secretary of Defense.
DOD is prepared to respond to catastrophic events, as directed. We
do not believe that the act would in any way impede the nature or
timeliness of that response.

Chairman Warner. My concern is that if another catastrophe
of the magnitude we experienced on September 11 took place, say
in another part of the United States which is somewhat remote
from the assets that were available to the New York scene, we
would have to call upon everybody to pitch in and help, and it
could well be that, from the standpoint of local security and
the like, the military could step up.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now, we just do not want, if that
misfortune struck the United States, everybody running around
on the telephone with the military commander saying, ``I would
like to help, but I have posse comitatus.''
Secretary McHale. Sir, let me give you a reassurance on
that. We do plan in some detail for those kinds of
contingencies and we do have forces prepared to respond in the
event that we were to experience that kind of attack and the
Department of Defense would be directed by the President or the
Secretary of Defense to respond.
However, with regard to posse comitatus, we do not believe
that the statute in its current form would in any way impede
that response. There are a number of significant exceptions to
posse comitatus that have been adopted statutorily over the
years, and in terms of our ability to respond, for instance, to
a weapon of mass destruction attack, there is an entire command
subordinate to General Eberhart that is prepared to launch such
a response and we do not believe in the Department that an
emergency response involving military capabilities would be
impeded in any way by posse comitatus.
Chairman Warner. Fine. That is your understanding, General
Eberhart?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir, it is.
Chairman Warner. You are satisfied with this. General
Ellis, you are satisfied to the extent that somehow you might
be affected?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Well then, it may well be that this issue
is cared for, but I would appreciate a letter which should
contain just the testimony that you have just given as a
conclusion on it.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Warner. Now, on the unmanned systems, as I think I
shared with you yesterday, General, not to get too personal
about this, but when I was a young man in the late 1930s and
1940s all of my generation was consumed in making model
airplanes. I am sure that there is a successive generation just
as active as my generation was many years ago, a half century
ago.
But that presents a platform that can deliver some
meaningful harm to communities if it fell into the wrong hands.
Now, as long as people are aware of that potential--I hope it
is being addressed and steps being taken to monitor certain
aspects of it to try and follow what is taking place in the
open marketplace and by telephone order or catalogue order or
whatever the case may be.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I assume that issue has been addressed and
people are looking into it. Is that correct, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary McHale. People are looking at it, sir, that is
correct.
Chairman Warner. General?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. That is all we need for the record, that
it is being examined.
Secretary McHale. Sir, I would point out, because of your
comment I can guarantee you as soon as we get back I will make
sure that even more attention is paid to that issue.
Chairman Warner. That is just good common sense.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Computer network defense. Admiral Ellis,
could you give us an assessment of the threats to our defense
information infrastructure and measures you are implementing to
protect it?
Admiral Ellis. I would be delighted, Senator. I have an
element under my command, initially established by General Ed
Eberhart when it was under the United States Space Command,
called the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations
(JTF-CNO). My responsibility is specific to the task of
ensuring Department of Defense network security and it is in
that context that I would like to couch my comments.
The JTF-CNO is headquartered here in Washington. It is
embedded with the Defense Information Systems Agency because of
their role in overseeing the Department's entire communications
networks. It has a phenomenal record of success in tracking
network intrusions and responding appropriately. They are
empowered to establish protective policies, to actually unplug
elements of the network should they be placed at risk by
attacks, and their entire focus is to ensure the rigor and the
integrity of the networks on which the Department is
increasingly reliant.
It is also fair to say that we are a part of the growing
concern on the Federal Government and national side with regard
to the vulnerabilities that are potentially resident in massive
computer network attacks, and indeed as a Nation we have become
much more reliant on them. A number of initiatives that have
begun under this administration, under the former leadership of
Richard Clark, specifically, have brought together inter-agency
and interdepartmental efforts to oversee this, including the
cyber warning information network and agencies and mechanisms
to rapidly disseminate the awareness and understanding and
sensitivity of what is going on with regard to the health of
the network are well under way, and the JTF-CNO commander, a
two-star general, is our representative to those agencies.
So we do believe and continue to assess the importance of
networks to our future. We are committed to establishing
firewalls that prevent intrusion. We also acknowledge that
intrusion, even on a small scale, can be particularly
devastating and we are pursuing aggressively capabilities to
deliver to respond appropriately to intrusions when they occur.
So it is not enough to have a perfect defense. One would argue,
and I think persuasively, that it is never going to be perfect.
The issue is how do you deal with it when it occurs, and we are
pursuing those options aggressively, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
The role of unmanned missions. We have a number of off-the-
shelf, it could well be in due course. What policy and
operational concerns do you have about the use of unmanned
systems in homeland security? General?
General Eberhart. Sir, as we discussed yesterday, I am
concerned about those technologies should they in fact be used
against us by terrorists. That is one issue you have already
addressed that concerns me greatly.
Second, I believe that those UAVs can be used very
effectively for surveillance, whether it is maritime
surveillance, whether it is border surveillance, just as we
have used them in downtown Baghdad and other places in
surveillance to ensure that in fact we can defeat the bad guy,
those who wish us ill.
Obviously, the concerns always are in terms of the safety
of those vehicles, in terms of deconflicting those vehicles
with other traffic, to make sure that they are properly
certified, properly operated, that they do not in fact--that
the unintended consequences are not that they present more of a
risk than they do an advantage to us as we work our way through
those, the use of that technology.
I believe all those things can in fact be overcome and that
we will see that these UAVs will become more and more prevalent
in the future. But we have to do this correctly and I know that
is your concern.
Chairman Warner. Yesterday I wrote a letter on this subject
to the President, since I and other members of this committee
are quite interested in it, pointing out the rights of privacy
of individuals. We have to be cautious about that issue. I will
make that letter a part of the record here. It is a public
document.
[The information referred to follows:]

President George W. Bush,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I have long supported the expanded use of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the United States military, and have
been heartened by reports from soldiers in the field of the usefulness
of UAVs as ``eyes in the skies'' in the global war on terrorism,
particularly in Afghanistan. As you may recall, under my leadership,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 contained
legislation (Section 217) and additional funding ($200 million) to
accelerate the use of UAVs by our military. I believe that the
potential applications for this technology in the area of homeland
defense are quite compelling.
I am writing to request that you explore the option of using UAVs
for the critical homeland defense mission.
First, I believe that UAVs could prove most valuable in helping to
monitor remote stretches of our northern and southern borders. These
areas are historically difficult to police, given the great distances
involved, and frequently are patrolled just once in a 24-hour period.
Given the fact that al Qaeda operatives, among others, have made it
clear that they will seek to gain entry to our country by any means, we
cannot afford to leave any route unmanned.
Second, long-endurance, land-based UAVs could support Coast Guard
vessels, enabling one ship to monitor longer distances. This could be
of great advantage to the Coast Guard, as it seeks to provide homeland
security coverage for our 95,000 miles of waterways while not
neglecting its traditional maritime responsibilities. In addition, it
would be another weapon in their arsenal as they seek to interdict drug
smugglers.
Third, UAVs could be used to monitor the safety and integrity of
our Nation's major oil and gas pipelines, and critical infrastructures
such as dams, hydroelectric power plants, drinking water conduits and
long-distance power transmission lines. They could also be used to
monitor the transportation of hazardous cargo, especially industrial
chemicals that could be used as a weapon against us.
As with the introduction of any new technology, UAVs have not been
problem free. I am aware that, to date, military UAVs have suffered
higher than desirable accident rates that will require that their
systems be engineered with greater redundancy for use by civilian
agencies. In addition, they do not have the ability to detect, and
automatically avoid, nearby aircraft. These are important safety issues
that would have to be addressed before employing UAVs over populated
areas, and in flight paths utilized by both commercial and private
aircraft, including helicopters.
Additionally, it is essential that any examination of this concept
address the real concerns we all share about the possible loss of
privacy. I know that you are as committed as I to ensuring that we meet
our national security needs without unduly sacrificing the privacy
rights of our citizens. There may be many detractors to the idea of
using UAVs for other than military purposes based solely on the
concerns regarding privacy.
Lastly, I confess that, as a young man in the late 1930s and early
1940s--before I began my military service in the Navy--I was fascinated
with aviation, and built many a model airplane. I draw your attention
to all the work being done within your administration to recognize that
someone desiring to bring harm to our Nation could utilize this
wonderful hobby by utilizing model airplanes to spread chemical and
biological agents. The administration might find it necessary to have
some congressional recognition of this important and rapidly expanding
technology to further insulate and protect our people from possible
harm.
There is broad agreement in this country that we must be proactive
in ensuring that terrorists never again strike our shores. You have
championed the idea of transforming our military services from being a
force designed to fight the former Soviet Union to one tailored to 21st
century adversaries, especially those utilizing terrorism as a weapon.
I believe that considering the use of UAV technology in homeland
defense echoes that spirit of transformation.
Mr. President, I hope that you will receive this idea in the
constructive spirit in which it is offered.
With kind regards, I am
John W. Warner.

Chairman Warner. Do you have anything further to add about
the UAVs, Secretary McHale?
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, I do. My personal experience
with them goes back to the Gulf War. We used them in the Gulf
when I was there the last time around as a marine, so I am
familiar not only with the policy issues, but the actual
operational employment of UAVs.
The use falls into two categories. I think there is a
tremendous potential benefit from the effective offshore use of
UAVs as part of an integrated surveillance plan that in turn
might be coordinated with a sea-based array of WMD sensors. We
establish various platforms in the air to observe threats as
they approach our shores and then array a maritime sensor
system that might well detect a weapon of mass destruction
while still out in the blue water. So I think whether you are
talking about an airship or a UAV, we have to push out as far
as we can the surveillance and other capabilities of a maritime
defense in depth.
Second, coming ashore, we can make certain capabilities
available to lead Federal law enforcement agencies for their
primary use with regard to domestic activity. We would make
equipment available at the direction of the President and the
Secretary of Defense and subject to whatever privacy
constraints Congress might want to impose upon that lead
Federal law enforcement agency.
So I think UAVs play a significant potential role both in
traditional defensive missions, where we would take the lead,
and in law enforcement missions, where we would simply provide
support to a properly constrained domestic law enforcement
agency.
Chairman Warner. If these vehicles become somewhat more
prolific in the private sector--I mean, some of these companies
might well offer them to the private sector--then you have an
air space situation that has to be hopefully monitored within
the structure that you are in.
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Admiral Ellis, any point you would like to
make on UAVs?
Admiral Ellis. Sir, I think you have teed it up very well.
This is yet another issue that builds on several others that,
as we look at the tremendously changed national security
environment, we have to balance appropriately between the need
for that intelligence essential to our defense and the rights
to privacy and personal security that are an important part of
being an American.
This is the same challenge we face in the computer network
operations area, in the intelligence issues that you are well
familiar with, sir, as we look to better fuse that together.
This adds to that and just highlights the direction in which we
are going as we, as a Nation, address those trades between
needing more actionable information, and the rights of the
individual citizens that have to be held in appropriate regard.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Admiral, you made reference to the computer
network defense mission in response to the chairman's question
and then made an allusion as to the offensive possibilities of
computer network operations. In that regard, have you had a
chance to study the various legal implications of an offensive
mission?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The issues that you describe
within computer network operations writ large, including both
defense and attack, are an important part of any policy
consideration as we look to the future. The Department of
Justice and others have undertaken reviews and it is an
important part of what we do as we look for policy guidance on
the way ahead, even as we examine technological alternatives.
The computer network operations piece is particularly
challenging because it is possible to employ the global
information grid in manners that disguise, if not hide, the
origin of certain elements. So there is an increasing challenge
in knowing where the potential threats to our own systems
originate. They can be laundered, if you will, through various
routes and mechanisms, and so there are legalities associated
with that as we address the issues that I was discussing with
the chairman: how do we deal with the rights of American
citizens and still deal with the security element.
The obverse of that, of course, is on the computer network
attack side as we examine potential capabilities for the
future.
Senator Levin. What are some of the legal issues that you
are grappling with in that area in terms of attack?
Admiral Ellis. I would be happy to provide a more detailed
discussion for the record.
Senator Levin. Would you do that, thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The legal issues related to computer network attack are generally
the same as employment of any class of weapon in time of conflict.
First, a test-bed needs to be developed so we can accurately predict
the effects of network attack. The results of the tests will allow a
fact-based evaluation of the discrimination and proportionality
judgments that form the basis of all Law of Armed Conflict. In other
words, we must strive to accomplish military objectives without causing
unnecessary damage to civilian infrastructure, and determine the best
methods to achieve dominance over an adversary using the least amount
of force.
Additionally, in all military actions we seek to limit the negative
effects of operations on those who are not combatants. On the attack
side of network operations, we must consider the effects a potential
course of action will have, not only on the physical well-being of non-
combatants, but also their personal privacy along with other human
rights concerns. We are committed to decreasing the humanitarian cost
of conflict wherever possible.

Senator Levin. Secretary McHale, I want to go back to the
intelligence coordination issue, which is something that I have
been deeply concerned about for a long time. We went through a
number of hearings on this subject and the conclusion of the
new Department of Homeland Security, and I think everybody
else, was that the CTC is the primary location to analyze
foreign intelligence. The new TTIC would then take those
analyses, supplement it in any way they wanted, refer it back
to the CIA and CTC for additional analyses, and then integrate
those analyses on foreign intelligence, intelligence about
foreign terrorist threats, integrate that with any domestic
threats----
Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--and then link all of that to infrastructure
vulnerabilities. But that is all done between the CTC and the
Department of Homeland Security.
How does the Department of Defense link up to the TTIC?
Could you go through that again with us?
Secretary McHale. It will be on two levels. On the tactical
level, DIA has a JITF-CT and the JITF-CT is the principal
portal between tactical intelligence external to the Department
of Defense and the internal needs of the Department of Defense
to be aware of that information.
On a policy level, the new Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence will take the lead in terms of coordination with
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. So as a practical
matter, on a daily basis I would anticipate that the JITF-CT
would remain the principal day-to-day contact with the
international and domestic intelligence community, subject to
the supervision of the newly created position of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
As a practical matter, what that means is every day I start
with a DIA briefing. Most of the information they bring to my
attention has been given to them from their JITF-CT and so I
have daily and I think open access to that information which is
deemed to be of domestic significance, whether it is gathered
internationally or domestically.
Senator, it is also significant that, as I said, I start
the day with that DIA briefing, but minutes later, at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, I attend with him each
day his briefing on these issues, at least during a wartime
environment. So I first get the briefing from the DIA and then
I am able to attend and hear the same information covering
those and perhaps some additional topics that might be
presented to the Secretary of Defense.
I think that really highlights the importance the Secretary
has placed, not on me, but on the office that I am privileged
to hold.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Eberhart, your prepared statement mentions that the
JTF-CS provides command and control of consequence management
forces that would be responding to a chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive event. How would
that JTF-CS and these forces be coordinated with efforts of the
Department of Homeland Security, as well as with State and
local emergency response forces?
General Eberhart. Sir, there is a variety of ways that this
would happen. First of all, an incident occurs and a
determination is made at that time that in fact the local
responders or the State agencies or other Federal agencies do
not have the wherewithal to deal with this problem. At that
time a lead Federal agency would in fact be established and
they would request what they thought was appropriate military
support.
If in fact we thought the military support was best
provided by the JTF-CS, that is where we would go for those
capabilities.
I do not want to lead you to believe that we are just
sitting there waiting, doing nothing, in case somebody might
call. Hopefully, we would have some intelligence up front that
this might happen. Second, as soon as it occurs we will know
that it has occurred. So that, in football terminology, we are
dressing out for the game. We are getting ready, so if they
call us we can shorten the amount of time it takes us to
respond with qualified people to help alleviate the situation.
Then we will in fact respond to this area, initially with a
planning force, then with follow-on forces to help. We have
everything from transportation to ambulance capabilities to
medical capabilities to abilities to help establish a cordon or
whatever we think is appropriate.
In almost every case, Senator, we would be in support of
another lead Federal agency, probably FEMA. It could be someone
else if they had established that another agency is best suited
to be the lead Federal agency. We take our instructions from
that agency, but we would in fact command and control those
forces.
Most likely that commander would report directly to me.
Depending on the situation, we may have him report to another
one of our subordinate commanders if we thought that was
appropriate. But those people work daily and they study
response plans from various counties, our large cities. The
counterterrorist organization from the city of New York will
soon visit down there.
So we are trying to in fact oil this mechanism so that
people know each other, we share plans, and we are prepared to
respond if and when needed.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, we have had an excellent
hearing, well-attended by a large number of this committee. It
is going to be extremely helpful to us as a committee and
indeed the Senate as a whole to recognize with the detail you
have given us the very significant participation by the
Department of Defense in the overall responsibility for
homeland defense.
We shall continue to follow this as one of the highest
priorities of this committee. We thank you and I once again
encourage you to access this committee for such assistance as
you need with regard to legislation and to such priority of
asset flow as authorized and eventually appropriated here in
Congress. So we are off to a good start.
Thank you for traveling long distances, Admiral Ellis and
General Eberhart, and it is always a pleasure to have a former
member of the United States Congress facing us. We know full
well that you are prepared for all of our questions.
Secretary McHale. Thank you, sir.
Senator Levin. Particularly one who wears glasses just as
wonderful as your's. [Laughter.]
Secretary McHale. I think we bought them at the same
drugstore. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening the
hearing. Thanks to our witnesses for very useful testimony.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
transfer of intelligence information to state and local authorities
1. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHale, it is important that State and
local law enforcement officials have the most accurate information as
possible about any potential threats to our communities. At the same
time, we need to safeguard sources and methods when it comes to
intelligence reporting. However, we must strike the appropriate balance
between protecting sources and methods and getting this information to
the people who need it. Could you explain how you will work within the
Department of Defense (DOD) and with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to ensure that the appropriate intelligence information
gets to the right people at the State and local level so we can better
protect our communities?
Secretary McHale. Within the DOD, as the principal staff assistant
and advisor on all homeland defense matters, I will work closely with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Stephen Cambone,
who serves as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Staff Assistant and
advisor on all intelligence, counterintelligence and security, and
intelligence-related matters, to ensure that DOD provides appropriate
intelligence information to the DHS. The DHS then, in accordance with
Public Law 107-296 (the Homeland Security Act of 2002) Sections 102 and
201, is responsible for ``distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating
the distribution of, warnings and information to State and local
government personnel, agencies, and authorities and to the public.''

FORCE PROTECTION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

2. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHale, I am privileged to have 17
major military installations in my State. As such, I am particularly
concerned that DOD has adequate and standardized force protection
measures in place at our military bases not only in Texas but across
the country. Last year, Congress directed DOD to develop a
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
installations for preventing and responding to a terrorist attack.
Could you provide me an update on the plan's progress and discuss your
role in ensuring that we have the proper force protection measures in
place at our Nation's bases?
Secretary McHale. Section 1402 of the Fiscal Year 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act directs DOD to develop a comprehensive plan
for improving the preparedness of military installations for preventing
and responding to terrorist attacks, including attacks involving the
use or threat of weapons of mass destruction. DOD is presently staffing
the plan and will submit it to Congress later this year. The report
defines elements of installation preparedness to include prevention,
detection, protection, and emergency response functions. The plan also
addresses a variety of initiatives the DOD is presently undertaking to
determine those ``best practices'' needed to enhance installation
preparedness through an integration of technology and human capital. In
my role as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, my
office is responsible for a variety of issues, including force
protection concerns as related to installation preparedness. As base
force protection conditions change due to the evolving threat,
corresponding flexible protective measures are activated. Flexible
employment of such measures allows a timely, focused response.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING BETWEEN NORTHCOM AND THE TERRORIST THREAT
INTEGRATION CENTER

3. Senator Cornyn. General Eberhart, in your opening statement you
note that ``homeland defense relies on the sharing of actionable
intelligence among the appropriate Federal, State, and local
agencies,'' and that NORTHCOM's ``Combined Intelligence and Fusion
Center collates and analyzes data from the United States Intelligence
Community and nearly 50 different government agencies.'' Could you
elaborate on the relationship between NORTHCOM's Combined Intelligence
and Fusion Center (CIFC) and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC)?
General Eberhart. We are laying the groundwork for partnerships
with the TTIC and other key intelligence organizations. We plan to
embed command intelligence officers in the TTIC to ensure continual
collaboration and information exchange.

TRANSFER OF DOD TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES

4. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHale, last year's Defense
Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to designate a
senior official to facilitate the transfer of DOD technology to State
and local first responders and other Federal entities. Could you tell
me your views on what DOD technologies you believe have the greatest
potential homeland security application, particularly in the area of
border surveillance, and how you plan to facilitate the transfer of
such technologies to other government entities?
Secretary McHale. DOD participates in many interagency efforts to
transfer applicable technologies to first responders. For example, DOD
invests around $100 million annually in the Technical Support Working
Group (TSWG), the U.S. national forum that brings together over 85
Federal agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate interagency
and international research and development (R&D) requirements for
combating terrorism. The TSWG rapidly develops technologies and
equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism
community, and addresses joint international operational requirements
through cooperative R&D with major allies.
Most, if not all, of the technologies considered by TSWG have
homeland security applications--especially in the areas of prevention
and response. Examples of technologies that may be of interest in the
area of border surveillance include: technologies to detect explosives,
weapons, chemical and radiological material, and other contraband on or
in personnel, vehicles, vessels, cargo, and mail; advanced technologies
for invisibly marking moving or stationary targets that may be imaged
remotely, day or night; improved body armor and standards to provide
greater effectiveness against current and emerging threats; and
advanced optical systems to provide improved imaging in night and
obscured viewing environments.
Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, directed that ``the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on the actions taken to carry out this section,'' to include ``[a]
summary of the actions taken or planned to be taken to implement'' the
responsibilities of the designated senior official and ``an initial
list of technology items and equipment identified'' pursuant to the
execution of these responsibilities. In coordination with the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, my office is developing the report that will outline the
process we will utilize to match DOD technology and equipment with
first responder requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

SYSTEMS FOR FORCE PROTECTION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, I would like to ask you a few
questions about the protection of U.S. forces and installations, and
how well the Department of Defense utilizes commercially available
technology to achieve these missions. As homeland defense encompasses
the protection of critical defense infrastructure against external
threats, this issue appears to fall squarely within your purview.
It is my understanding that whereas every U.S. embassy and every
airport is protected with explosive trace detection systems, metal
detectors, and x-ray scanners, there are very few of these systems
deployed at military installations around the Nation and abroad. I
played a role after the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in supporting the
Navy in its effort to outfit all ships in the fleet with explosive
trace detectors, to help prevent a recurrence of such a horrible event.
But I fear that the Defense Department has not adopted widespread use
of these systems and is failing to provide adequate force protection as
a result.
What is the current level of use of these types of detection
systems at Defense Department facilities?
Secretary McHale. Explosive trace detection systems, metal
detectors, and x-ray scanners are presently employed at numerous DOD
facilities worldwide. However, these capabilities are not universal.
Concerted efforts are underway in each of the Services to increase the
availability of equipment and systems to protect our installations and
facilities. For example, the Army is executing a program to provide
equipment packages to security forces at Army installations worldwide.
The package includes large mobile vehicle inspection systems, explosive
trace detection systems, x-ray inspection systems for cargo containers,
portable and fixed barriers, closed circuit television cameras,
portable light sets, and under-vehicle inspection capability. The Air
Force, Navy, and Army have employed large vehicle imaging systems at
some locations. The Navy is working to procure metal detectors and
baggage scanning equipment (x-ray imaging) for larger ships. The Air
Force has purchased baggage-scanning equipment (x-ray imaging) for
their passenger terminals and mailrooms. Additionally, the Marine Corps
has plans to purchase trace detectors in support of their Explosive
Ordnance Detection (EOD) mission and the Navy has employed these
systems in their shipboard operations. Furthermore, DOD is investing in
a research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) effort to field a
neutron electric generator-based scanning system to automate threat
recognition for large vehicles/containers.

6. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, who in the Department sets
requirements for the acquisition and deployment of such systems?
Secretary McHale. The individual Services set requirements for
acquisition and deployment.

7. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, which office sets standards
for the testing and evaluation of these systems?
Secretary McHale. Within the Physical Security Equipment Advisory
Group (PSEAG) and in accordance with DOD Directive 3224.3, the Navy
oversees the RDT&E of explosive detection equipment (EDE). A CAPSTONE
Requirements Document for EDE has been drafted and forwarded to the
Joint Requirements Working Group of the PSEAG. Specific key performance
parameters were included in this overarching document. The Naval
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Indian Head, MD has
been assigned as the Navy's Technical Development Agent (TDA) for EDE.

8. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, my understanding is that
other agencies in the Federal Government have conducted extensive tests
on these types of detection systems, such as the DHS--including the
Transportation Security Administration, the Customs and Border
Protection, and the Coast Guard--the Department of State, and the
Department of Transportation. Does the Department of Defense plan to
reinvent the wheel in evaluating these systems for its own use, or will
it cooperate with these other agencies and take advantage of the
analyses already conducted?
Secretary McHale. To ensure the timely acquisition of the most
effective force protection capability available, the Department
continually evaluates test data from all sources of force protection
technology. As an example, the test and evaluation efforts of the FAA
in the area of trace detection have been leveraged extensively. DOD
also uses State Department and U.S. Customs test data when deciding
which commercial barrier systems and x-ray systems best meet the needs
of the Services. Additional test and evaluation may be conducted when
the efforts of other agencies do not fully address our requirements. As
an example, additional evaluations may be conducted when the leveraged
results have not considered unique safety or climatic conditions. The
explosive detection equipment RDT&E program conducted on behalf of the
DOD PSEAG has coordinated much of their work with other government
agencies, academia, and the private sector. Over the past 3 years, the
Navy has conducted comparative studies of trace explosive detectors,
mailroom screening systems, and large vehicle imaging systems. Test
results are shared with these agencies and all branches of the
military.

9. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, I understand that this may be
out of your direct purview, but it certainly relates to your
responsibilities for protecting facilities and people. Do you know
whether these types of systems are being planned for deployment in Iraq
to protect our troops and the personnel helping to rebuild Iraq from
terrorist bombs?
Secretary McHale. This is not a matter in my direct purview;
however, I am given to understand that forward operating bases in Iraq
are protected by guarded perimeters with controlled access points
patrolled by personnel with specialized equipment capable of detecting
explosives and weapons.

FIRST RESPONDERS

10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, I understand that part of
the mission for your office is to assist the State and local public
safety agencies to utilize DOD dual-use technology to enhance their
response to acts of terrorism and other critical incidents. What
process do you anticipate using to match the needs and requirements of
first responders?
Secretary McHale. Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, directed that
``[t]he Secretary of Defense shall designate a senior official of the
Department of Defense to coordinate all Department of Defense efforts
to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to Federal, State, and
local first responders technology items and equipment in support of
homeland security.'' I anticipate that I will be designated this senior
official.
Section 1401 also directed that ``the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the actions
taken to carry out this section,'' to include ``[a] summary of the
actions taken or planned to be taken to implement'' the
responsibilities of the designated senior official and ``an initial
list of technology items and equipment identified'' pursuant to the
execution of these responsibilities. In coordination with the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, my office is developing the report that will outline the
process we will utilize to match DOD technology and equipment with
first responder requirements.

11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, how can DOD create a
permanent interface with this community?
Secretary McHale. While the report on technology and equipment
transfer to civil responders required by Section 1401 of Public Law
107-314 (the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal
Year 2003) and, therefore, a more complete answer to your question,
remains in development, two stratagems for maintaining a permanent
interface are:
First, we can continue to leverage existing forums that have
successfully engaged with first responder needs, such as the TSWG and
the InterAgency Board on Standardization and Equipment. These two
groups have had considerable success in properly interfacing with the
first responder community.
Second, we can work with the DHS; and more specifically, the Office
of State and Local Coordination. Working cooperatively with DHS allows
both DOD and the first responder community to have a single Federal
clearinghouse rather than multiple, potentially confusing and competing
Federal clearinghouses.

12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, what benefits do you
anticipate from this connection for both DOD and the first responder
communities?
Secretary McHale. I anticipate mutual benefits for DOD and the
first responder community. As demonstrated by DOD's successful
participation in such interagency efforts as the InterAgency Board on
Standardization and Equipment and the TSWG, DOD can be a valuable
source of useful technologies to first responders.
DOD benefits materially and procedurally. For example, when the
first responder community purchases a technology also used by DOD, the
cost-per-unit may decrease as the number of units purchased increases.
Additionally, the first responder community can be a rich source of
lessons learned on the use of these technologies in urban and
humanitarian operations.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

13. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, the military's ability to
act on U.S. soil is limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and other
legislative provisions, which prevent the military from traditional law
enforcement activities, such as engaging in search and seizures. How do
we balance these limitations against the increased role of the military
in homeland security?
Secretary McHale. Under the Constitution, the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, may order the military to perform specific domestic
missions under extraordinary circumstances. In addition to the
President's constitutional authority, Congress has specifically vested
the President with certain statutory authority to employ members of the
Armed Forces. The insurrection statutes at 10 U.S.C. Sec. 331, et.
seq., and Public Law 107-40, which grants the President authority to
respond to terrorist incidents, are two examples of this type of legal
authority. Other statutes authorize use of the Armed Forces and its
unique capabilities in providing support to other agencies during
domestic missions, operations, and activities. These include the
Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and Chapter 18 of Title 10, United
States Code, regarding military support to civilian law enforcement
agencies.
Immediate emergency response authority permits commanders to take
prompt action to respond to requests from civil authorities to save
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great damage to property as
a result of civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously
endangering life and property. Immediate emergency response is
authorized only when time does not permit local commanders to seek and
receive appropriate approval from the chain of command.
The potential applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act is evaluated
and resolved before military personnel undertake any mission,
operation, or activity on U.S. territory, especially when providing
support to civil law enforcement authorities. Since the President has
constitutional and statutory authority to use the military to provide
support to civil authorities, the Department does not believe that the
act would impede the nature or timeliness of DOD support when directed
to provide support by the President.

14. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, given the increased role of
the National Guard in homeland security, those individuals are blurring
the line between law enforcement and military operations. The Fourth
Amendment is a very complex body of law. Are National Guardsmen
receiving training in Fourth Amendment search and seizure law?
Secretary McHale. While in State Active Duty (State-controlled/
State-funded) or Title 32 status (State-controlled/Federally-funded),
National Guard Forces are not under the command and control authority
of the Secretary of Defense or the President. Also, while in State
Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard Forces are not subject
to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
The only training of a Fourth Amendment nature is MACDIS (Military
Assistance for Civil Disturbances) training. National Guard units of
select States are required to conduct annual sustainment training in
this area. This training covers apprehension and detention operations,
which includes searches of an individual in order to protect the safety
of an apprehending soldier. In practice, apprehensions in a MACDIS
situation are generally done by civil law enforcement officers or by
guardsmen under their supervision. Further, National Guard Forces in
State Active Duty or Title 32 status normally operate under State laws
and each State grants their National Guard Forces different levels of
law enforcement powers.

15. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, are they aware of the
applicable doctrines and exceptions?
Secretary McHale. While in State Active Duty or Title 32 status,
National Guard Forces are not under the command and control authority
of the Secretary of Defense or the President. Also, while in State
Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard Forces are not subject
to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
While in State Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard
Forces operate under State laws and each State grants their National
Guard Forces different law enforcement powers. Some of the States'
Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), employed by National Guard Forces
when operating in their State, include minimal authority for searches
and seizures, primarily used to apprehend and to protect the National
Guard member from individuals being apprehended. In other States, RUF
status allows somewhat broader search and seizure authority, such as
searches of private vehicles for weapons. Examples of these States are
Vermont, Texas, Illinois, and Nevada.
Federalizing National Guard Forces to perform domestic law
enforcement functions is the least effective and efficient method of
employing our National Guard and the DOD method of last resort. The
most appropriate status for them to perform such functions is in State
Active Duty status. In the extremely rare occasion that National Guard
Forces are federalized to perform law enforcement functions, members
will receive appropriate training in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure law.

16. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, have they received training
in ethnic and racial profiling?
Secretary McHale. While in State Active Duty or Title 32 status,
National Guard Forces are not under the command and control authority
of the Secretary of Defense or the President.
Each State's judicial authorities establish the applicable legal
authorities under which their respective National Guard members will
operate when under State control. Since National Guard members are not
granted full State law enforcement powers, ethnic and racial profiling
is not seen as applicable to the National Guard.
Federalizing National Guard Forces to perform domestic law
enforcement functions is the least effective and efficient method of
employing our National Guard and the DOD method of last resort. The
most appropriate status for them to perform such functions is in State
Active Duty status.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee adjourned.]