- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

[Senate Hearing 108-440]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 2400

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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PART 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

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FEBRUARY 25; MARCH 24, 25; APRIL 7, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005--Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES

S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 2400

__________

PART 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

__________

FEBRUARY 25; MARCH 24, 25; APRIL 7, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93-577 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2005
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado, Chairman

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada JACK REED, Rhode Island
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

(ii)
?

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management, Office of
Future Liabilities, and Office of Legacy Management

february 25, 2004

Page
Roberson, Hon. Jessie Hill, Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management....................................... 4
Owen, Michael W., Director, Office of Legacy Management,
Department of Energy........................................... 17

Strategic Forces and Capabilities
march 24, 2004

Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 56
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 66

National Security Space Programs and Management
march 25, 2004

Teets, Hon. Peter B., Under Secretary of the Air Force and
Director, National Reconnaissance Office....................... 111
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 118
Lord, Gen. Lance W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command.... 129
Cebrowski, Vice Adm. Arthur K., USN [Ret.], Director, Office of
Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense....... 132

Defense Intelligence Programs and Lessons Learned in Recent Military
Operations
april 7, 2004

Cambone, Hon. Stephen A., Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence................................................... 191
Alexander, Lt. Gen. Keith B., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army......................................... 203
Porterfield, Rear Adm. Richard B., USN, Director of Naval
Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Navy.......................... 219
Sams, Maj. Gen. Ronald F., USAF, Director of Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Department of the Air Force.. 224
Decker, Michael H., Director for Intelligence, Headquarters,
United States Marine Corps..................................... 231
Wurster, Brig. Gen. Donald C., USAF, Director for Intelligence
and Information Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command.... 234

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF
FUTURE LIABILITIES, AND OFFICE OF LEGACY MANAGEMENT

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Allard, Graham, and
Nelson of Florida.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Alison E. Brill,
receptionist.
Majority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
counsel; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.
Minority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger and Sara R.
Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; and William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

Senator Allard. I call this meeting of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee to order. The ranking member is going to be a
little bit late, but he will show up. Some of the members will
come and go today. I want to go ahead and make my opening
statement and then go ahead and get testimony from our panel
this afternoon.
I would like to thank our panel. We have a couple of
witnesses that I am anxious to hear from. First, the Honorable
Jessie Hill Roberson, Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management (EM); and Michael W. Owen, who is
Director of the Office of Legacy Management (LM), Department of
Energy (DOE). I will have quite an extensive questioning
period, I think, for both of you. So in a way it is a blessing,
because I can go ahead and put all of this in the record
together.
Let me go ahead and get my opening statement out of the
way, and I want to thank both of you for being willing to join
us today and letting us hear from you.
I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee today and providing testimony
about the DOE's vision for cleanup and closing all of the
environmental sites and facilities. I also look forward to the
testimony on the subsequent challenges of handing over the
long-term stewardship and personnel responsibilities to the
newly created LM. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
I am especially pleased to have this hearing on the fiscal
year 2005 budget request for EM, which at most is the last full
fiscal year authorization and appropriation for cleanup at
Rocky Flats. I hope I am not being overly optimistic. I want to
express my compliments and sincere appreciation to assistant
Secretary Jessie Roberson for her unwavering dedication and
focus which led to this success.
In 1996, then as manager of the DOE's Rocky Flats field
office, Jessie Roberson was part of a small group of
visionaries who first conceived of the closure of Rocky Flats
by 2006, 60 years ahead of schedule. Madam Secretary, you have
shown enormous leadership and courage when there were more
voices saying it could not be done and it should not be done.
Despite those criticisms, you stayed the course.
I know there are still big challenges to face at Rocky
Flats these next 2 years and I have full confidence in your
abilities. Similar efforts and success are being realized at
the Fernald and Mound sites in Ohio.
The vision which you brought to these first three closure
sites along with Under Secretary Bob Card and many others was a
vision to challenge the status quo, a status quo which sought
to comply but not clean up, to measure success by how many
milestones were met without first considering where those
markers were placed. Your visionary plan sought to reduce the
risks to workers, the community and the environment, and
thereby accelerate cleanup and closure. Implementing a plan to
lower these risks seems like common sense today, but was seen
as risky and impossible just a few years ago.
Now this vision is being spread to the remaining EM sites,
including Hanford, Idaho, Oak Ridge, and the Savannah River
site. There have been some voices of doubt about whether
accelerating cleanup and reducing risks to the workers,
community, and the environment makes sense. I would encourage
those few voices to take a look at what can happen when the
community helps find a way to accelerate the cleanup.
Rocky Flats was originally scheduled to be closed in 2065,
with special nuclear materials remaining on the site for most
of that period. Today in 2004, there are no special nuclear
materials on Rocky Flats and we will have a national wildlife
refuge for the community within the next couple of fiscal
years. Fernald and Mound will return valuable land to their
communities which can be used to cultivate new opportunities.
I am pleased that the challenges of closing these EM sites
are being faced head on as you have mapped out closure of the
remaining EM sites by 2035 or sooner, which is 35 years sooner
than the original DOE baseline, with a savings of untold
billions of dollars in life cycle costs. However, new
challenges seem to be emerging, including capping the scope of
the EM program, addressing current and future waste streams
within the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), creating a new Office
of Future Liabilities to address disposition of facilities
which fall outside of the scope of the EM program, and making
sure there is a smooth transition for workers, environment, and
community as the first major EM sites are closed. I would say
that without the workers and their dedication none of this
would have been possible.
To help maintain the momentum to accelerate closure of the
EM sites, DOE has defined the entire scope of the EM program.
While this approach should give the EM program the focus it
needs to bring the remaining closure sites to a final
disposition, it also challenges the remaining programs within
the DOE to address their own environmental and waste management
issues. I am not certain the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) is fully engaged in dealing with their
own wastes, especially if this is to include all the cleanup
responsibilities currently being conducted by EM.
I am also not certain if DOE has anticipated this new
responsibility for NNSA in their budget. I am interested to
know how the budget expertise and infrastructure within the EM
program is being shared with the other DOE programs so they do
not have to reinvent the cleanup technologies and the
technologies which are now running so well within the EM
program.
I recognize that this is a discussion to be continued when
the Secretary of Energy appears before the full committee next
month, but I want to know how engaged EM is in this apparent
transfer of responsibilities.
I also have some questions about the new Office of Future
Liabilities which is proposed in the fiscal year 2005 budget.
It is my understanding that this program is supposed to take on
those environmental restoration and waste management issues
which fall outside the scope of the EM program, which has been
capped, but do not fall within the scope of the DOE programs to
deal with themselves. Also, Future Liabilities is only supposed
to take on environmental cleanup work until 2025, which is at
or before the completion of the EM sites.
I am interested to know more about how the Future
Liabilities program has been set up and how DOE will define the
Future Liabilities program's work scope as unique in comparison
to the environmental cleanup by NNSA or the other DOE programs.
While accelerated cleanup of our EM sites is proceeding well, I
have growing concerns about a smooth transition. If we want the
workers, communities, and stakeholders to embrace the
accelerated closure concept, then we need to ensure that there
is a smooth transition at the three major sites scheduled for
closure by 2006. That is Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound.
Once the cleanup is completed, the EM program will no
longer have a presence in the community. However, it is very
important that DOE have an active presence. This responsibility
will largely fall to LM.
Mr. Owen, as we discussed in the past, I think it is very
important that at the current closure sites in Colorado and
Ohio there is a storefront in each of these sites to help with
the smooth transition. I envision the storefronts as a central
clearinghouse for inquiries, a worker and community response
center. The people working at these worker and community
response centers need to be prepared to answer the questions
that the workers will have about their pension and health
benefits and to ensure that there is a continuity of services
to address their concerns. There also needs to be someone there
who is also accountable to the community about ongoing
environmental stewardship.
I do not envision a large enterprise, but it needs to be
robust enough to handle whatever the traffic may bear. I am not
saying this office will always have to be run by Federal
personnel. In fact, it is my understanding that you may be
trying to work out a plan that will eventually turn this
responsibility over to a contractor-supported enterprise. I do
not object to this as long as it meets the needs of the workers
and the communities.
We have an opportunity to smoothly move from an EM site
that is active with cleanup activities to a closed site which
still has responsibilities to the workers and the community. If
DOE does this right, the remaining closure sites will be ready
to move in that direction. If the word on the street is that
the workers and the communities were not treated well after the
closure, then I believe you are placing accelerated closure at
the other sites at risk.
That means that the workers feel that they were taken care
of by DOE. It also means that the workers are not penalized for
that acceleration by receiving a reduction in their pension
when one of the variables of their pension formula is length of
time. It means that the workers can go to a knowledgeable
individual and get answers to tough questions, someone who is
trained and can address the concerns of the workers as well as
community leaders and other stakeholders.
In each of your testimonies, I hope you will provide some
specific plans for how EM and LM plan to ensure the smooth
transition is met. Last year you spoke before this subcommittee
about a seamless transition. That will be a tall order, but I
believe that that is the target you should be aiming for.
Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, thank you for your service
to our Nation. We look forward to your opening statements and
then I will recognize the ranking member, Senator Bill Nelson,
for his statement whenever he wishes to make it. Secretary
Roberson, it is good to have you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSIE HILL ROBERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon and thank you,
Chairman Allard.
I would like to begin by conveying the Department's
appreciation to you for your investment in our accelerated
cleanup program. Your support is allowing us to witness the
dramatic results we forecast a short 2 years ago. I am here
today to discuss President Bush's fiscal 2005 budget request
for the EM program and its goals of sustaining the momentum
that our work force has worked so hard to achieve, a momentum
that benefits the vibrancy of our communities, our environment,
and our economy.
In these last 2 years, we have introduced dynamic reforms
delivering fundamental change and achieving significant
improvements in health, safety, and environmental protection.
With your support, these reforms are fully ingrained in our
operations and business processes. We are making a historic
contribution to reducing the financial liability associated
with the legacy of the Cold War.
Last year when I spoke to you, I stated that I was not
satisfied with our progress. We must continue to better our
performance and to look beyond the status quo, to achieve
results that are truly groundbreaking for the benefit of the
generations that follow us. I challenge our work force, our
partners, and myself and all those interested in joining us in
our vision of accelerated cleanup to put their most innovative
ideas and people forward.
I am proud to announce that, with our combined efforts, our
objective of accelerating environmental cleanup and risk
reduction by 35 years and saving the taxpayers in excess of $50
billion has become a reality. With your support and our
continued keen focus on cleanup and closure, the momentum can
continue.
I would like to take a moment to underscore the impacts of
refocusing the EM program. We have improved safety performance.
We are committed to instilling this philosophy into every
worker's day-to-day decisions from start to finish of every
project. To that end, with top-quality safety standards, we are
demonstrating that we can accelerate work and improve safety
performance at the same time. We have not, nor will we, stop
paying attention to safety. We will continue to ``raise the
bar'' and hold ourselves accountable to the highest standard.
Complacency is not acceptable in our advancing the safe
conclusion of our cleanup objectives.
We have demonstrated cleanup results and risk reduction.
Last year we set a new floor for performance not yet seen in
this program. I say ``floor'' because we see this as a level of
performance that we will continue to build on. Over the last 2
years, for example, six of nine nuclear fuel basins de-
inventoried, none of which were in our plan before. Four
thousand, one hundred of 5,900 containers of plutonium have
been packaged. We are almost complete. Over 1,300 of 2,400
metric tons of spent nuclear fuel repackaged--these are
activities that the work force have accelerated in the last 2
years.
I can go on with examples and would really love to, but I
know we have other things to get on with. Our corporate
performance measures, which I have included in my written
statement, further demonstrate our deeds and, in combination
with exceptional safety performance, we have accomplished
consequential outcomes important to the public, our
communities, and for the generations to follow us.
Two years ago the EM program was described as lacking a
risk-based cleanup approach and the hazards at DOE sites and
the liability associated with them did not appear to dictate
the need for urgency. Innovative actions in all elements of the
EM program were needed to transform EM's processes and
operations to reflect the new accelerated risk reduction
cleanup paradigm.
We are more than ever encouraging innovation in safety
performance, in accelerated risk reduction, and in business
management. We believe that providing an atmosphere that
encourages innovation can reduce risk to workers and the
environment faster, and save resources to be reinvested in
furthering the priorities of each of the sites.
Tying all these accomplishments together has been our
driving force to improve performance in our acquisition
strategy specifically.
Legal actions and court decisions may direct us to alter or
modify our activities from the accelerated cleanup and closure
path. We are committed to work diligently with all concerned
parties to avoid interruptions in reducing risk where we can.
This year has seen dramatic results demonstrating our steadfast
belief that continuing on the accelerated path will resolve the
problems that lie before us. We must not lose our momentum that
has so earnestly been established by the work force.
As with all new enterprises, impediments will be many, but
we are committed to employ our resources to continue to show
meaningful results, and we are taking a very staunch view of
results. The job isn't done yet. We can't be complacent. We
must continue to do better. It is not done when we develop a
plan. It is not done when we agree on a milestone. It is not
done when we ask for funding. It is not done when we sign a
contract. It is not done when we get money. It is not done
until it is done and there is positive and measurable risk
reduction for the investment made.
I ask for your support of our fiscal year 2005 budget
request of $7.43 billion to continue this momentum. We are
safer today than we were last year and we must stay the course
so that we are safer next year than today. We have accelerated
cleanup by at least 35 years, saving over $50 billion. The
potential is there to lose what we have gained should we fail
to stay focused on our commitment.
I look forward to working with Congress and others to
achieve this goal and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Roberson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Jessie H. Roberson

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am delighted to be
here today to convey the Department of Energy's (DOE) appreciation for
your support of the Environmental Management (EM) program, without
which the dramatic results in accelerating the cleanup of the legacy of
the Cold War would not be possible. I welcome this opportunity to sit
before you and report on our progress, the potential gains and risks
that lie before us, and the importance of sustaining the momentum that
our workforce has labored so hard to achieve--a momentum that benefits
the vibrancy of our communities and the environment.
Two eventful years have passed since the release of the Top-to-
Bottom Review of the EM program. In these last 2 years, we have taken
decisive steps to transform a program focused on managing risk to a
core mission-focused program that is accelerating risk reduction and
cleanup. We have introduced dynamic reforms, delivering fundamental
change and achieving significant improvements in health, safety, and
environmental protection. With your support and these reforms fully
ingrained in our operations and business processes, we are
demonstrating that this bold strategy to accelerate risk reduction and
cleanup has made a historic contribution to reducing the financial
liability associated with the legacy of the Cold War. As cited in the
U.S. Department of Treasury 2002 Financial Report to the United States
Government, ``the recognized cost of cleaning up environmental damage/
contamination across government programs was estimated to be $273.0
billion, as compared to $306.8 billion for September 30, 2001. A
significant component of this reduction relates to the DOE. It reduced
its environmental liability by $28.7 billion, mostly due to employing
an accelerated cleanup approach resulting from a top-to-bottom review
to find efficient and cost-effective ways to achieve greater real
cleanup and risk reduction to public health.'' But that is not the
whole story.
Last year when I spoke with you, I stated that I was not
``satisfied'' with our progress. We must continue to better our
performance and to look beyond the status quo to achieve results that
are truly groundbreaking for the benefit of the generations that follow
us. I challenged our workforce, our partners, and myself and all those
interested in joining us in our vision of accelerated cleanup to put
their most innovative ideas and people forward. I am proud to announce
that with our combined efforts, our objective of accelerating
environmental cleanup and risk reduction by 35 years and reducing
estimated program costs in excess of $50 billion has become a reality.
With your support and our continued keen focus on the cleanup and
closure, the momentum can continue.
For fiscal year 2005, the President's budget includes a record
$7.43 billion for the accelerated cleanup program, the peak year in our
funding profile. As we identified last year, the administration
believes that this investment is crucial to the success of accelerated
risk reduction and cleanup completion. We anticipate funding will then
decline significantly to about $5 billion in 2008.
The EM portion of the fiscal year 2005 congressional budget is
structured analogous to last year. The budget structure focuses on
completion, accountability, and visibility; institutionalizes our
values; and integrates performance and budget. Requested funding can
clearly be associated with direct cleanup activities versus other
indirect EM activities.
Within the Defense Site Acceleration Completion Appropriation, the
budget reserves $350 million for a High-Level Waste Proposal. With the
Idaho District Court decision on Waste Incidental to Reprocessing, the
Department's ability to proceed prudently with accelerated risk
reduction for some activities is drawn into question. The decision
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for us to undertake planned
actions at Idaho, Hanford, and the Savannah River Site to aggressively
reduce risks posed by wastes stored in tanks at those sites--actions we
had committed to take, in agreement with our host states, before the
court decision. The decision now means we are likely to leave tank
wastes in place longer while we try to resolve issues created by the
decision--a course that has significant societal and monetary costs.
This $350 million supports activities normally funded from the 2012
Accelerated Completions account and from the 2035 Accelerated
Completions. These funds will be requested only if the legal
uncertainties are satisfactorily resolved.
In alignment with ongoing departmental missions, this budget
reflects a transfer of multiple activities that are not core to the EM
mission to other departmental elements. These transfers provide the
responsible and accountable mission programs with the resources and
tools to achieve their objectives at the expected performance level.
This accountability model is the key to moving each of the enterprises
or missions of the DOE forward in attaining the desired outcomes and
results important to the administration and supporting our accelerated
risk reduction and closure initiative. Transfers include:

Transferring Federal staff at the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory to the Office of Science and Federal staff
at Headquarters to the Office of the Chief Information Office.
Transferring the EM portion of the Offsite Source
Recovery Program to the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
Transferring spent fuel storage responsibilities at
Idaho National Laboratory, the Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Fuel Program, management of Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)-licensed spent fuel, and the National Nuclear Spent Fuel
Program to the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Transferring Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action
Project records management, responsibility for cost liability
and recovery reviews, and Environmental Justice and the Massie
Chairs of Excellence Program to the Office of Legacy Management
(LM).

We will also be transferring sites, as they are completed, either
to the landlord or to LM. The latter will occur if the site has no
further DOE mission. EM is working with LM to ensure smooth site
closure and transition by:

Ensuring that site baselines identify functions and elements
beyond contract closure to meet all internal requirements;
Conducting assessments of site readiness for transfer and
closure in tandem with LM;
Having joint teams at each site (Rocky Flats has two LM
employees) and supported by LM headquarters personnel who were
once EM personnel and EM personnel at sites are transferring to
LM positions;
Holding quarterly meetings between EM and LM senior
management to address key issues and make decisions;
Developing a communication plan defining roles and
responsibilities between EM and LM staff.

The administration considers this budget request a critical step on
the accelerated risk reduction and cleanup path. Without these
resources, we could face higher risk to the environment and the public
and lose the momentum we have gained in changing the paradigm. With
your support, we have the opportunity to succeed in producing historic
results that will last for many years to come.

DEMONSTRATING RESULTS

With the October 2003 release of the Report to Congress on the
Status of Implementation of the Top-to-Bottom Review, we have
demonstrated that the direction we took 2 years ago is showing real
results. I wish to take a moment and expound the impacts of the far-
reaching accomplishments that are underpinning the developing momentum
of the program.

Improved Safety Performance
We believe in order to accomplish our accelerated risk reduction
and cleanup mission, we must continue to do work safely. We are
committed to instilling this philosophy in every worker's day-to-day
decisions from start to finish of every project. To that end, with top-
quality safety standards, we are demonstrating that we can accelerate
work and improve safety performance at the same time. For example in
August 2001, EM's Total Reportable Cases (TRC) and Lost Workday Cases
(LWC) were 1.9 and 0.8 respectively, per 100 workers (TRC and LWC are
standard tools used to measure safety performance.) In September 2003,
we had reduced our TRC to 1.2 and LWC to 0.5. These rates are
significantly better than private industry, which the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reported in 2002, had a TRC of
5.3 and LWC of 1.6. The construction industry alone had rates of 7.1
for TRC and 2.8 for LWC in 2002. We have not, nor will we, stop paying
attention to safety. We will continue to ``raise the bar'' and hold
ourselves accountable to the highest standards. Complacency is not
acceptable in our advance to the safe conclusion of our cleanup
objectives.

Cleanup Results and Risk Reduction
Prior to the Top-to-Bottom Review, EM had lost focus of the core
mission, the mission that the program was established to solve--address
the environmental legacy of the Nation's Cold War nuclear weapons
research and production. With a program responsible for the management
of millions of gallons of liquid radioactive waste and thousands of
tons of spent nuclear fuel, the unhurried pace of cleanup and risk
reduction was unacceptable. If immediate actions were not taken, the
risks associated with the EM program would continue to grow to
unpardonable levels.
Last year set a new floor of performance not seen before in the
history of the program. Our investment has born amazing results. For
example: three spent nuclear fuel basins were deinventoried at Idaho
National Laboratory, along with two at the Savannah River Site and one
at Hanford. In regard to Hanford, we have removed 70 percent of the
spent nuclear fuel from the K-Basins. These basins located less than a
quarter of a mile from the Columbia River have the potential to leak
and cause costly environmental harm both to the health of the river and
the public--this is a significant gain in risk reduction. Another
example is at Rocky Flats. This site, once responsible for nuclear
triggers, has shipped all plutonium off site and closed the last
remaining material access area. These visible, risk reducing results
that have demonstrated our ability to accelerate schedule and reduce
life cycle cost while showing to our public and surrounding communities
the DOE's commitment to improve worker safety, reduce health risks, and
eliminate environmental hazards.
So you may have a better comprehension of the magnitude of our
cleanup results, I would like to insert for the record a copy of our
recent corporate performance measures.

EM's Performance Measures is a compilation of the program's 16
complex-wide performance measures. As you can see, we can deliver
significant risk reduction and cleanup and, as I stated earlier, in
combination with improved safety performance. Accelerating risk
reduction and cleanup, in concert with exceptional safety performance,
accomplishes consequential outcomes important to the public, our
communities, and for the generations that follow us.

Innovations in Ideas, Processes, and Practices
Two years ago, the Top-to-Bottom Review described the EM program as
lacking a project completion mindset, internal processes were
inconsistent with a risk-based cleanup approach, and the hazards at the
DOE sites and the liability associated with them did not appear to
dictate the need for urgency in the cleanup decisions. The Top-to-
Bottom Review team emphasized that the EM mission cannot be
accomplished by continuing business as usual. Innovative actions in all
elements of the EM program would need to be taken to transform DOE's
processes and operations to reflect the new accelerated risk-based
cleanup paradigm.
To foster innovation, we identified ideas and processes from
successful projects that had delivered accelerated results and conveyed
the information across the EM program. For example, at Rocky Flats, we
drew from their experience in project planning and delivery along with
technology advancements. Sharing the innovative practices allowed for
similar outcomes at other sites. If I may take a moment to share a few
ideas and practices:

(a) Establish a clear end-state vision and risk-based cleanup levels
in conjunction with specific future land/site use and in
consultation with regulators, stakeholders, and affected and
interested governments.
(b) A ``best-in-class'' management team is recruited and sustained
with the result of team focus and retention of key staff.
(c) Senior management emphasis is placed on key safety issues of
keeping workers working, minimizing the risk of possible high-
impact events, quick recovery after accidents, safety
``pauses'' as appropriate, and improved safety training.
(d) Projects are managed in an environment that provides significant
incentives for real cost savings.
(e) New and innovative equipment and methods are being used for size
reduction (e.g. plasma cutting torch, engineered enclosures,
water-jet cutting of components), significantly improving
safety and effectiveness.
(f) Improved decontamination techniques coupled with new radiation
instrumentation.

We continue to encourage innovation in our processes and practices
to further enhance safety performance, accelerate risk reduction,
reduce health impacts, and save resources to be reinvested in
furthering the priorities of each of the sites.

Acquisitions Driving Performance
Tying all these accomplishments together has been our continued
drive to improve performance from our new acquisition strategy. These
accomplishments serve as indicators of the level of performance we are
expecting from our contractors now as well as into the future. When we
reviewed our contracts over the past year--as you may remember I said
we formed a Contract Management Advisory Board last year--we identified
a short list of significant findings that did not prove advantageous to
the overall success of the program. We concluded that DOE tends to
manage the contractor, not the contract, that project baselines needed
improvement along with project management and the associated reporting,
incentives for meaningful risk reduction were lacking, more emphasis
was needed on cost-efficient performance, and there seemed to be
insufficient competition and small business participation.
To address these weaknesses, we have instituted three business
models that we believe will vastly improve our acquisition process and
opportunities for success. Our reform strategy is to accelerate the
reduction of risk from the legacy of the Cold War safely and
efficiently and at a cost savings for the taxpayer. One model focuses
on improving incumbent contractor's performance, while another aims to
increase competition and small business participation. The third
concentrates on the establishment of national Indefinite Delivery/
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts for remediation and
decontamination and decommissioning. All three are on the fast track.
In fact, in September, as a first step we announced the selection of
five 8(a) businesses that will perform work at our small sites across
the country. In fiscal 2004, we have six new contracts--two at Paducah,
two at Portsmouth, one at the Fast Flux Test Facility at Hanford, and
one at the Idaho National Laboratory along with the IDIQ contracts that
will be completed. We expect these new contracts will challenge the
contractor community, a challenge that is healthy for all involved.

We Have Our Challenges Too
As we continue to challenge the status quo, we may be confronted
with legal actions and court decisions that will direct us to alter or
modify our activities from the accelerated cleanup and closure path. We
will continue to work diligently with all concerned parties to avoid
interruptions in reducing risk and advancing cleanup for the public.
We expect to be challenged on our delivery of Government Funded
Services and Items (GFSI). We are accountable on delivery of GFSI and
we expect to be held to our commitments.
Also, we have challenged our managers at all levels to stay true to
our commitment and employ our corporate performance measures as an
accountability and success gauge assessing our progress as well as a
tool that alerts us when management action or intervention is
warranted.

THE FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST

The fiscal year 2004 budget was the first budget that fully
reflected the initiatives undertaken by the administration to transform
and revitalize the cleanup of the former weapons complex. The EM
program has been refined and fortified with management reforms, which
have led to accelerated risk reduction and a decrease in lifecycle
costs surpassing previous expectations. The investment we have
requested in our fiscal year 2005 budget will contribute to EM's
continued success in achieving its mission of accelerated risk
reduction and site closure.
The EM fiscal year 2005 budget request represents the peak year of
our investment strategy to accelerate cleanup and reduce risk. This
budget fully reflects each site's accelerated risk reduction and
cleanup strategy. The fiscal year 2005 budget request is pivotal to
keep the momentum going and to achieve even greater risk reduction and
cost savings than ever before.
The 2005 budget request for EM activities totals $7.43 billion to
accelerate risk reduction and closure. The request includes five
appropriations, three of which fund on-the-ground, core mission work,
and two of which serve as support. The five appropriations and
associated requested funding are:

Defense Site Acceleration Completion ($5.97 billion)
Defense Environmental Services ($982 million)
Non-Defense Site Acceleration ($152 million)
Non-Defense Environmental Services ($291 million)
Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
Fund ($500 million)

Within the Defense Site Acceleration Completion Appropriation, $350
million is tied to the Idaho District Court decision on Waste
Incidental to Reprocessing. These funds will only be requested upon
satisfactory resolution of the recent court decision that affected the
Department's plans for some waste streams.
In building the request, the DOE applied the following principles
and priorities:

Protect workers, public, and the environment
The budget request continues to place the highest priority on
protecting workers, the public, and the environment. The implementation
of EM's cleanup strategies allows for an overall improvement in safety
and reduction in risk because cleanup will be completed sooner,
reducing the extent to which workers, the public, and the environment
have the potential to be exposed. Over the past 2 years, dramatic
improvements in safety performance have been demonstrated.
Ensure the appropriate levels of safeguards and security
Due to heightened security levels throughout the Nation, it is
crucial that we maintain vigilance in our domestic security to protect
our citizens. The EM program is responsible for many tons of surplus
nuclear material. This budget request reflects our increased safeguards
and security needs, including the new Design Basis Threat (DBT)
requirements. Overall, the budget has decreased from fiscal year 2004
because we have been able to consolidate materials into fewer, more
secure locations, and we have reduced the footprint of secure areas.
The sites with the largest remaining funding needs are the Savannah
River Site and Hanford. The Savannah River Site's funding supports the
security of nuclear materials, maintenance of uniformed protective
force personnel, information security, and operations security for the
protection of classified and sensitive information, cyber security for
the protection of classified and unclassified computer security, and
personnel security. Hanford's funding supports security for shipment of
special nuclear materials and elimination of one material access area
within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), enhancement of cyber
security, Hanford site security clearances and other security
activities.
Accelerate risk reduction
Accelerated risk reduction requires a pragmatic approach to
cleanup. Risk reduction occurs in various stages, which involve the
elimination, prevention, or mitigation of risk. Because safe disposal
of many materials will take a number of years to complete, our major
focus of risk reduction is stabilization of high-risk materials.

The following categories of materials are considered to pose the
highest risk:

High-curie, long-lived isotope liquid waste
Special nuclear materials
Liquid transuranic waste in tanks
Sodium bearing liquid waste in tanks
Deteriorating spent nuclear fuel in leaky or poor
integrity basins
Remote-handled transuranic waste and high transuranic
content waste
Transuranic waste stored on the surface
Decommissioning of highly-contaminated facilities

Although all of these items are to be considered when setting
priorities, their relative ranking may vary from site to site. Risk
reduction is a major consideration in the development of the site
baselines. Examples of planned activities/milestones for fiscal year
2005 that correspond to sitespecific risk categories are:

Hanford

Complete cleanout of K East and K West basins (fuel,
sludge, debris, and water).
The K basins are located less than 1,000 feet from the
Columbia River. This project involves packaging and removing
degrading spent nuclear fuel and radioactive sludge, debris,
and water from wet storage in the K Basins to safe, dry interim
storage away from the Columbia River. The K Basin facilities
are well past their design lives and are a major threat to the
environment due to the potential for basin leakage to the
surrounding soil and the Columbia River. Their cleanout will
prevent potential leakage of 55 million curies of radioactivity
to the soil and the river and will decrease the risks posed by
the basins to human health and the environment.

Complete transfer of nuclear material to the Savannah
River Site or DOE approved interim storage facility, and
complete legacy holdup removal and packaging/disposition of
material/waste.
The PFP consists of several buildings that were used for
defense production of plutonium nitrates, oxides, and metal
from 1950 through 1989. Completion of the transfer of the
stabilized materials and legacy holdup material from PFP allows
the cleanout and demolition of these facilities to slab on
grade. It results in a reduced national security threat by
consolidating nuclear materials into fewer locations.

Ship all above-ground transuranic waste to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant.
Hanford has several thousand containers of previously
generated transuranic waste in above-ground storage buildings.
Characterization and shipment of this waste to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Project for final disposal will reduce the
risks to facility workers as well as reduce the safeguard and
security vulnerability associated with this waste. This action
represents final disposal of this waste in an environmentally
protective repository.

Complete installation of In Situ Redox Manipulation
Barrier in the 100-D Area.
Chromium-contaminated groundwater is reaching the Columbia
River in the 100-D Area. The contamination levels are above 20
times the aquatic life water standard, and the area is adjacent
to potential salmon spawning locations. To address this, a
series of wells will be drilled and a chemical that detoxifies
chromium will be deposited into the matrix in which the
groundwater travels to the river. As a result, the groundwater
reaching the Columbia River will once again meet the aquatic
water standards, thereby protecting human health and the salmon
population in the river.

Initiate waste retrieval from 11 single-shelled tanks.
Radioactive liquid waste stored in older single-shelled tanks
has the potential of leaking and contaminating soil and
groundwater that flows to the Columbia River, presenting a risk
to human health and the environment. Waste will be retrieved
from the single-shelled tanks and moved to safer double-shelled
tanks.

Idaho

Disposition 34 containers of special nuclear material
containing uranium, completing 75 percent of shipments offsite;
initiate transfer of spent nuclear fuel from CPP-666 wet
storage to the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility; and maintain a
running average of 2,000 cubic meters per year of transuranic
(TRU) waste shipped out of Idaho.
Idaho sits over a major sole source aquifer, the Snake River
Plain Aquifer, which is used to supply water to the people of
southeastern Idaho as well as irrigation water for the
significant agricultural activities. These actions will reduce
the potential risk to human health by preventing the migration
of contamination into the aquifer. It also will reduce the
national security threat by consolidating materials into fewer
locations.

Paducah

Disposition 875 cubic meters of low-level/mixed low-
level legacy waste, allowing for a 37 percent completion of
work.
The packaging and disposal of low-level waste stored outdoors
will reduce the waste inventory and eliminate the potential
release into the environment that could result from
deterioration of the storage drums. Outside storage of this
material in some cases leads to additional surface water and
soil contamination. Removal of these materials further reduces
the continued exposure to workers performing surveillance and
maintenance.

Disposition 12,400 tons of scrap metal.
Scrap metal is a suspected source of continued surface water
and possible soil contamination. This action contributes to the
continued source term removal of contaminants leaching into the
environment. Reduction in the massive quantities of scrap metal
continues to improve the potential safety concern to our
workers.

Continue decontamination and decommissioning of C-410
complex.
The C-410 Complex is a large chemical complex in a shutdown
condition. Removal of contaminated materials and equipment
reduces potential risk to onsite workers and represents a key
step in stabilizing the facility such that contaminants are
prevented from release to the environment.

Portsmouth

Disposition 9,089 cubic meters of legacy waste.
The continued shipment and disposal of legacy waste will
proportionally reduce the risk such wastes present to the
health and safety of workers and reduce the ongoing potential
for release to the environment.

Process approximately 42 million gallons of water
through Groundwater Pump and Treat facilities.
Plume control keeps contaminants from reaching surface
streams and off-site drinking water supplies. Trichloroethylene
(TCE), which was an industrial solvent, is the main groundwater
contaminant at the site.

Pantex Plant

Complete Zone 11 soil vapor extraction for removal of
contamination from the vadose zone and protection of the
groundwater.
Removing the soil gas contamination will avoid potential
migration to a fresh water supply, thereby reducing the risk
posed to human health and the environment.

Complete Burning Grounds landfills interim corrective
measure (engineered covers) to secure wastes and protect
groundwater.
The covers will mitigate the vertical transport of
contaminants, which will reduce the potential impact to the
fresh water supply.

Complete demolition of Zone 10 Ruins.
The Zone 10 ruins have suspected high explosives contaminants
in the numerous disintegrating structures. Removal of high
explosive will avoid further contamination of soils, and
demolition of the ruins will reduce safety risks to persons in
the area.

Complete decontamination and decommissioning of
Building 12-24 Complex.
There is evidence that this complex contributed to the high
explosives plume that migrated to the southeast and off-site.
Decontamination of the 12-24 Complex will mitigate the
migration of this plume.

Oak Ridge

Complete East Chestnut Ridge Waste Pile Closure.
Risks associated with industrial safety will be reduced by
eliminating the need to excavate and transport the material to
treatment subsequent to disposal.

Complete disposition of legacy low-level waste.
Approximately 40 percent of the low-level waste was stored
outdoors in deteriorating containers. Disposition of this waste
will decrease the risks associated with their potential
environmental release.

Complete processing and stabilization of transuranic
waste tanks.
This action will eliminate the potential for the waste's
migration to groundwater.

Initiate contact-handled transuranic waste processing
at the Waste Processing Facility.
This waste is stored in above grade-storage trenches and in
earthen trenches. Processing the waste prevents the risk of
release to the environment and a continued cost of waste
storage and monitoring.

Complete treatment of liquid low-level waste supernate
at the Waste Processing Facility and disposal of the dried
supernate product at the Nevada Test Site.
Treatment and disposal of the supernate decreases the risks
posed by these highly radioactive fission products.

Complete Atomic City Auto Parts.
This action will reduce the risks posed to workers and the
surrounding community from uranium and polychlorinated
biphenyls contamination in the soil.

Savannah River Site

Begin processing neptunium solutions.
The site has approximately 6,000 liters of Neptunium-237
nitrate solution in H-Canyon. Through processing, the neptunium
solutions are converted into a more stable form, and the risks
they pose to human health and the environment are reduced.

Complete bulk waste removal in Tank 5.
Tank 5 is one of 49 underground tanks currently used to store
radioactive liquid waste at the Savannah River Site. This waste
represents one of the highest risk to human health and the
environment. Current plans call for the removal of the waste
from Tank 5 for treatment, stabilization and disposal. A new
approach, the Waste-On-Wheels (WOW) system, will be utilized to
remove the waste from Tank 5 and other tanks. The WOW is a
portable method of performing bulk sludge waste removal from
the tanks. The WOW system will reduce the project schedule for
waste removal and therefore reduce the risk to human health and
the environment imposed by the highly radioactive waste.

Complete decommissioning of seven industrial and
radioactive facilities.
Decommissioning excess radioactive facilities will reduce the
footprint of the site, and therefore collectively reduces risk
to the worker by eliminating the need to enter the facilities
to perform required, routine surveillance and maintenance
activities. Risk of worker exposures while performing these
activities is eliminated. Decommissioning excess radioactive
facilities also eliminates the potential environmental and
human health risk of accidental releases from these facilities.
Decommissioning industrial facilities eliminates the risk to
workers associated with having to maintain old facilities which
are no longer needed but which require regular inspections or
maintenance activities, such as roof work.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Livermore Site

Construct, install, and operate a portable treatment
unit at Treatment Facility D Hotspot, Treatment Facility E
Hotspot, the northern portion of the East Traffic Circle Source
Area, and the Treatment Facility 406 Hotspot area.
These actions will further prevent the release of TCE,
thereby reducing risks to the public from exposure to
contaminated groundwater.

Remove contaminated surface soil and contaminated
sandpile at Building 850.
These actions will mitigate risk to onsite workers, and will
prevent further impacts to groundwater above health-based
standards.

Construct, install, and operate groundwater extraction
and treatment facility.
Remediation of the high-explosive process area is a high
priority due to the offsite migration of contaminant plumes,
current impacts to onsite water-supply wells, and the
inhalation risk to onsite workers. These actions will impede
the migration of plumes, protecting offsite water-supply wells
from contamination.

Maintain closure schedules
Three major sites, Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound, have
accelerated closure schedules. In addition, two smaller sites,
Ashtabula and Battelle-Columbus are scheduled to close in 2006. Funding
in the fiscal year 2005 budget will allow these sites to remain on
track toward project completion and site closure.
At Rocky Flats, fiscal year 2005 funding provides for:

Completing site deinventory of legacy low-level/mixed
low-level and transuranic waste to off-site disposal;
completing remediation of 30 release sites.
During fiscal year 2005, Rocky Flats will be approaching
completion of their commitment to closure and conversion of the
Rocky Flats site for future beneficial use. The buildings where
plutonium and other hazardous materials were used in support of
the nuclear weapons deterrent will be under various stages of
demolition, the final quantities of radioactive wastes will be
removed from the site, and the grounds will be receiving the
necessary remediation action. These actions, when complete,
will allow the DOE to release the site to the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to become the Rocky Flats Wildlife Refuge with
little or no further risk to human health or the environment.

At Fernald, fiscal year 2005 funding provides for:

Completing decontamination and dismantlement of the
Waste Pits Complex and the East Warehouse Complex, and
completion of waste pits remedial action operations.
Completing the Waste Pit Remediation Project will result in
over one million tons of waste pit material having been
transported off-site via rail for safe, compliant disposal and
the decontamination and decommissioning of the treatment
facility and other waste pit infrastructures. Completing these
activities represents a substantial risk reduction to human
health and the environment for the entire Fernald Closure
Project site. This remediation activity is being conducted in
an extremely safe manner considering the industrial hazards
involved.

Completing Silos 1 and 2 operations, including removal
of waste material, and beginning disposition of the waste for
off-site disposal.
Silos 1 and 2 Extraction and Treatment Operations represent
the greatest risk to human health and the environment at the
Fernald Closure Project. Silos 1 and 2 contain the highest
levels of radiological activity residing in any waste stream at
the site. The Silos 1 and 2 project constitute the Site Closure
Critical Path. Their successful completion is a prerequisite
for a timely and safe closure.

Completing construction of the On-Site Disposal
Facility (OSDF) Cell 3 and Cell 4 caps.
Capping Cells of the OSDF will ensure the reduction in risk
to human health and the environment during post closure.
Overall, the OSDF will be composed of 8 cells, containing 2.5
million cubic yards of waste soil and debris. The OSDF has been
designed and engineered to possess a 5-foot thick liner and a
9-foot thick cap. The OSDF has a design life of 1,000 years.

At Mound, fiscal year 2005 funding provides for:

Completing remediation of 37 potential release sites
(65 percent of remaining), including the restoration of
potential release site (PRS) 66.
Completing the PRSs in fiscal year 2005 decreases risk by
preventing any further radioactive contamination from migrating
into clean soil areas and ground water, by reducing potential
exposure to site workers and other personnel located on site,
and by precluding any potential environmental impacts to off
site areas.

At Ashtabula, fiscal year 2005 funding provides for:

Completing remediation of the Waste Management Unit.
Remediating the Waste Management Unit significantly reduces
the remaining risks of organic and inorganic chemical exposure
to both soil and groundwater at the RMI company site.

At Battelle-Columbus, fiscal year 2005 funding provides for:

Completing decontamination/stabilization of the fuel
storage pool and transfer canal and the high-bay area surfaces
in JN-1.
Removing this source term will reduce the risk of
contamination, both internal and external, to the workers
during building de-construction. Removal of the source term
would also reduce risk to off-site areas and members of the
general public.

Integrate technology development and deployment
An integrated technology development and deployment program is an
essential element for successful completion of the EM cleanup effort
and for fulfilling post-closure requirements. The EM Technology
Development and Deployment (TDD) program provides technical solutions
and alternative technologies to assist with accelerated cleanup of the
DOE complex.
EM TDD investments are focused on high-payoff site closure and
remediation problems through a two pronged approach: Closure Projects
and Alternative Projects.
Closure Projects
Principal near term closure sites (such as Rocky Flats, Fernald,
and Mound) will be provided with technical support and quick response,
highly focused technology development and deployment projects. The goal
is to ensure that accelerated site closure schedules are achieved.

At the Rocky Flats closure site, technical assistance
teams will assess critical technical issues and provide
technology alternatives including the treatment and disposition
of orphaned waste streams and improved methods of beryllium
decontamination.
At Mound, innovative technologies will be developed to
determine and enable treatment of radioactive contaminated soil
beneath buildings.
At Fernald, the vacuum thermal desorption
demonstration will be completed to provide a technical solution
for an orphaned waste stream, and technical support to the
Silos # 1, 2, and 3 waste removal and disposition will be
successfully completed.
At Oak Ridge, delineation of contamination and
definition of treatment feasibility for subsurface
contamination will be completed.
Alternative Projects
Alternative approaches and step improvements to current high-risk/
high cost baseline remediation projects are our second focus. The goal
is to enable cleanup to be accomplished safely, at less cost, and on an
accelerated schedule. EM is focusing funds for fiscal year 2005 on:

Alternatives For Tank Waste Pretreatment and
Immobilization (Hanford Site, Office of River Protection);
Alternatives for Carbon Tetrachloride Source Term
Location (Hanford Site, Richland);
Alternatives for Disposition of High-Level Salt Waste
(Savannah River Site);
Alternatives for Remediation of Chlorinated Ethenes
using Monitored Natural Attenuation (Savannah River Site);
Alternatives for Deposit Characterization and Removal
at Gaseous Diffusion Plants (Portsmouth);
Alternatives for In situ Transuranic Waste Delineation
and Removal (Hanford Site, Richland)
Alternatives for Non-Destructive Assay and Examination
of Large Transuranic Waste Containers (Savannah River Site/
Carlsbad)

CONCLUSION

This year has seen dramatic results demonstrating our steadfast
belief that continuing on the accelerated path will provide the
direction and framework to resolve the problems that lie before us. As
with all new enterprises that seek to challenge the status quo,
impediments will be encountered. We must not lose our momentum that has
so earnestly been established through collaboration and a singular
focus of delivering meaningful results for the American public.
We are committed to employ our resources to show meaningful results
and we are taking a very staunch view of results. The job is not done
until it is done. We cannot be complacent, we must continue to do
better. It is not done when we develop a plan--it is not done when we
agree to a milestone--it is not done when we ask for funding--it is not
done when we sign a contract--it is not done when we get money. It is
not done until it is done and there is positive and measurable risk
reduction for the investment.
The only measure of success will be positive, measurable
accomplishments of public safety and environmental protection. The
longer we wait, the greater the potential risk. We must not lessen our
commitment to the American people to do the ``right thing.'' I ask for
your support to continue this important work. We must avoid losing the
opportunity to rid this legacy from our children's inheritance. We are
safer today than we were last year and we must stay the course so we
are safer next year than today. We have accelerated cleanup by at least
35 years reducing lifecycle cost over $50 billion. The potential is
there to lose what we have gained should we fail to stay true to our
commitments.
I look forward to working with Congress and others to achieve this
worthy goal. I will be happy to answer questions.

Senator Allard. Thank you for your testimony.
Now we would like to hear from you, Mr. Owen.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. OWEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LEGACY
MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. Owen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon.
My name is Michael Owen and I am the Director of LM at the
DOE. I would like to request permission to submit a written
statement for the record and I have a brief oral statement.
Senator Allard. Both of your full statements will be put in
the record.
Mr. Owen. Thank you.
At this time last year, I testified before this committee
on the Department's proposal to establish LM. This committee
expressed support for this proposal in the defense
authorization bill for fiscal year 2004 and included language
recommending merging the office, the old Office of Worker and
Community Transition (WT) with LM. The Department has merged
the two offices, and I can report to you that the establishment
of this new office will enable additional progress in our
efforts to address the consequences of our former nuclear
weapons production program.
LM's fiscal year 2005 budget request is just over $66
million. The environmental surveillance and maintenance efforts
require approximately $28 million of that. The pension and
benefit continuity program for former contractor personnel
requires approximately $22 million, of which $1.5 million will
be used to prepare for the administration of pension and
retiree benefits for the planned 2006 closure sites. The
remaining $16 million includes $2.5 million for the traditional
worker transition activities and roughly $13.5 million for
program direction.
Currently, LM is responsible for long-term surveillance and
maintenance activities at more than 50 sites where active
environmental remediation has been completed. As the EM office
continues to accelerate cleanup, sites will be ready for
closure earlier than previously predicted. However, the
acceleration will not eliminate the post-closure
responsibilities and environmental liabilities. LM has been
established and organized to support the EM office's
accelerated closures and ensure that all departmental post-
closure responsibilities and liabilities are effectively and
efficiently addressed.
LM and EM will work seamlessly to ensure a smooth handoff
of responsibilities at these sites. In the near term, these
sites include the Department's Rocky Flats facility outside of
Denver and the Mound and Fernald facilities in southwestern
Ohio. All three sites are scheduled to be remediated, closed,
and transitioned to LM for long-term surveillance and
maintenance by fiscal year 2007.
Over the next 5 years, the number of sites managed by LM is
projected to grow to approximately 105. Once sites have been
accepted and transitioned to LM, the office performs long-term
surveillance and maintenance to ensure the environmental
remedies remain protective of human health and the environment.
Working with the EM closure sites, the regulators and the
communities, LM also develops long-term surveillance and
maintenance plans, provides post-remediation expertise and
assistance to sites which are transitioned to LM.
LM is also charged with the transfer or reuse of sites that
no longer support an ongoing departmental mission and possible
disposal of properties in long-term surveillance and
maintenance. The function of the community transition program
from the old WT office falls under this office and includes
assisting DOE communities in acquiring excess departmental
personal and real property for economic redevelopment purposes.
The completion of missions at certain DOE sites also has an
impact on the former contractor personnel at those respective
sites. When the site contractor's cleanup functions are
complete, pensions and other long-term benefits due to former
contractor personnel still need to be administered. There will
no longer be, for the first time ever, a contractor on the site
to administer these benefits.
Therefore, LM implements departmental policy concerning
closure site contractor employees for continuity of their post-
closure and retiree benefits and will coordinate and
procurement concerning contractor benefits after closure.
Additionally, a significant increase in pension and long-
term benefit administration will occur in the near future. In
the past, administration of pensions and benefits at closed
sites was transferred to other DOE contracts. The Department's
objective is to avoid benefit interruption or inconveniences to
plan participants, to maintain and improve quality of service,
and to develop a flexible approach to accommodate future
closure sites. LM is currently establishing a program to
oversee the continuation of benefit payments that the
Department through its contractors is committed to provide for
former contractor employees at closed sites.
Integral to the cleanup and closure of sites is the
preservation and protection of records and information. LM will
develop a plan for accepting and maintaining all records
transferred to the office. These records include, but are not
limited to, historical site records, long-term surveillance and
maintenance records, former contractor personnel records, and
various classified records, as well as the record of the actual
environmental remediation at that site.
For example, Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald will have by
closure approximately 170,000 cubic feet of records that must
be managed by LM. As the sites continue to transition to LM, we
expect that volume of records, of hard copy records, to grow
additionally.
In closing, the Secretary is dedicated to ensuring the
Department's commitment to the environment, our stakeholders,
our workers past and present, and the nearby communities. We
recognize that the DOE has responsibilities to the former
contractor workers and communities following the completed
remediation and closure of sites.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Graham, that concludes my statement.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today and
will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]

Prepared Statement by Michael W. Owen

OPENING REMARKS

Good morning Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. My name is Michael Owen, and I am the Director of the
Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the Department of Energy (DOE).
This time last year, I testified before this committee on the
Department's proposal to establish LM. This committee expressed support
for this proposal in the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2004 and included language recommending merging the Office of Worker
and Community Transition (WT) with LM. The Department has merged the
two offices, and I can report to you that the establishment of this
office will enable additional progress in our efforts to address the
consequences of our former nuclear weapons production program. This is
an important time for the Department, and we are now positioned to
continue focusing DOE programs and personnel on achieving the diverse
missions of the Department, including assisting the Environmental
Management (EM) program with their focus on risk reduction and site
closure. LM is one element that will enable the Department to continue
this progress.

LEGACY MANAGEMENT MISSION AND VISION

I want to take this opportunity to describe the mission and vision
for LM.
LM's mission is to manage the effects of certain changes in the
Department's mission requirements and ensure the future protection of
human health and the environment. Our mission is to ensure departmental
legacy responsibilities are managed in a manner that best serves
Department workers, communities, and the environment. This vision
includes several elements:

Human health and the environment are protected at
closed sites, through effective environmental surveillance and
maintenance.
Key records and critical information are preserved and
made publicly accessible.
Public trust is sustained through cooperative
partnerships with stakeholders and State, tribal, and local
governments.
Effective oversight and management of health and
pension benefits of the Department's former contract work
force, who have been instrumental to the successful conduct of
our missions;
Federal land and other assets are returned to the most
beneficial use consistent with the Department's mission
requirements; and
Impacts of departmental work force restructuring have
been mitigated, working in partnerships with departmental
workers, labor unions, and communities to adapt to changes in
the Department's missions;

LEGACY MANAGEMENT FISCAL YEAR 2005 FUNDING REQUEST

LM's fiscal year 2005 budget request is just over $66 million. This
funding request will enable us to conduct our mission. The
environmental surveillance and maintenance efforts require
approximately $28 million. The pension and benefit continuity program
for former contractor personnel requires approximately $22 million.
This funding provides benefits at three sites: about $14 million for
former contractor personnel associated with the Paducah, Kentucky and
Portsmouth, Ohio sites; and, approximately $6.5 million for the former
contractor employees at the Pinellas Plant in Florida. For the planned
2006 closure sites, $1.5 million will be used to prepare for the
administration of pension and retiree benefits. The remaining $16
million includes $2.5 million for worker transition activities, and
roughly $13.5 million for program direction.
This request does not include funding to sustain the community
transition program. Over the past 10 years, the DOE has reduced its
contractor work force by 50,000 employees. At the same time, the
affected communities have received over $280 million in financial
assistance. This assistance has resulted in the creation or retention
of more than 32,000 jobs. At this point, the Department is projecting a
decreased need for additional community transition assistance. This is
largely attributed to stabilization of the Department's missions and
the effectiveness of the community reuse organizations across the
country in assisting displaced former DOE contractor employees.

THE OFFICE OF LEGACY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

Over the past year, the DOE has worked hard to create an office
that addresses the concerns of our work force, our communities, and the
environment. Since LM is a new organization I will take a brief moment
to describe the offices within LM. Also included, on the last page of
my statement, is a copy of the LM organization chart.
The Office of the Director oversees all functions of the office and
reports to the Under Secretary, Energy, Science and the Environment.
The Office of Strategic Materials is the former Asset Management
Program under the old WT, and manages the Department's strategic
material stockpile. The Office of Stakeholder Relations is our liaison
with State, local, and tribal governments, and coordinates our external
communication with many stakeholder groups. The Office of Budget
manages the office's finances, budget request and coordination. The
Office of Business and Resource Management provides human resources
support for LM, assists in long-term surveillance and maintenance, as
well as oversees and manages the large and complex issue of records
management, which I will touch on later.
The Office of Legacy Benefits, Work Force Restructuring, and Labor-
Management Relations oversees all work force restructuring efforts and
labor relations across the Department's complex, as well as the new
function of legacy benefits, or post-closure benefits which I will also
describe later in my testimony. The Office of Property Management and
Community Assistance manages disposition, leasing, and reuse of the
office's real property and works with other agencies and external
organizations to transfer real property from the DOE. The Office of
Policy and Site Transition develops policy and guidance in close
coordination with EM for accepting EM sites into LM. Finally, the
Office of Land and Site Management monitors and maintains environmental
remedies such as long-term surveillance and maintenance at LM sites.
We have built an integrated team of LM personnel to accomplish our
mission. Federal staff are located strategically in key locations to
minimize travel costs and maximize customer service. Our staff
locations include Washington, DC; Grand Junction, Colorado; Morgantown,
West Virginia; Pinellas, Florida; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF POST CLOSURE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES

The Department's environmental legacy responsibilities stem
primarily from the activities of the Department and predecessor
agencies, particularly during World War II and the Cold War. Currently,
LM is responsible for long-term surveillance and maintenance activities
at more than 50 sites where active environmental remediation has been
completed. The majority of these sites are either Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) sites or sites associated with the
Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). In addition
we have responsibility for three Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) sites: Weldon Spring Site in
St. Charles County, Missouri; the Monticello site in Utah, and the
Young-Rainey Science, Technology, and Research (STAR) Center in Largo,
Florida, at the former Pinellas Plant site.
As EM continues to accelerate, cleanup sites will be ready for
closure earlier than previously predicted. However, that acceleration
will not eliminate the post-closure responsibilities and environmental
liabilities. LM has been established and organized to support EM's
accelerated closures and ensure that all departmental post-closure
responsibilities and liabilities are effectively and efficiently
addressed. LM and EM will work seamlessly to ensure a smooth handoff of
responsibilities at these sites. In the near term these sites include
the Department's Rocky Flats facility in Colorado and the Mound and
Fernald facilities in Ohio. All three sites are scheduled to be
remediated, closed, and transitioned to LM for long-term surveillance
and maintenance by fiscal year 2007. Over the next 5 years, the number
of sites managed by LM is projected to grow to approximately 105. The
majority of the new sites transferred into LM will be those associated
with UMTRCA Title II and FUSRAP sites currently being remediated by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Once sites have been accepted and transitioned to LM, the office
performs long-term surveillance and maintenance to ensure the
environmental remedies remain protective of human health and the
environment. Working with EM closure sites, the regulators, and the
communities, LM also develops long-term surveillance and maintenance
plans, provides post-remediation expertise, and assistance to sites
with their transition to LM. Environmental surveillance and maintenance
requirements differ according to the nature of the individual site but
generally include: groundwater monitoring and treatment; maintaining of
adequate institutional controls; record keeping; radiological surveys;
repairs to waste disposal cell caps and covers; and erosion control and
periodic inspection and the preparation and submission of post-closure
regulatory documentation.

MANAGE LEGACY LAND AND ASSETS, EMPHASIZING SAFETY AND REUSE, AND
DISPOSITION

LM is also charged with the transfer or reuse of sites that no
longer support an ongoing departmental mission and possible disposal of
properties in long-term surveillance and maintenance. As such, LM works
with other agencies and organizations to transfer real property from
the DOE, and supports other departmental elements in reviewing
transition plans and closure plans to facilitate the transfer of real
and personal property assets to other agencies, private organizations,
or private interests. The function of the community transition program
from WT falls under this office, and includes assisting DOE communities
in acquiring excess departmental personal or real property for economic
development purposes.
At this time the Department's priority focus is to transfer or
lease portions of Federal properties associated with the following
sites: the Weldon Spring site in Missouri; the New Brunswick Laboratory
and the Wayne site in New Jersey; the Salmon site in Mississippi; the
Mound site in Ohio; the Eastern Tennessee Technology Park in Tennessee;
the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology site in Colorado; and the
Hanford site in Washington.

ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF POST-CLOSURE CONTRACTOR
RESPONSIBILITIES

The completion of missions at certain DOE sites also has an impact
on the former contractor personnel at the respective sites. When the
site contractor's cleanup functions are complete, pensions and other
long-term benefits due to former contractor personnel still need to be
administered; however, there will no longer be a contractor on site to
administer these benefits. Therefore, LM implements departmental policy
concerning closure site contractor employees for continuity of their
post-closure and retiree benefits, and will coordinate on procurement
concerning contractor benefits after closure. Additionally, a
significant increase in pension and long-term benefit administration
will occur in the near future. In the past, the administration of
pensions and benefits at closed sites was transferred to other DOE
contracts. For example, the administration of pensions and benefits at
Pinellas was transferred to an Albuquerque contractor. With the planned
closure of Rocky Flats, this practice would no longer be a viable
option given the magnitude of the Rocky Flats pension and benefit
plans. Rocky Flats is scheduled to close by the end of fiscal year
2006. The DOE's objective is to avoid benefit interruption or
inconvenience to plan participants, to maintain or improve quality of
service, and to develop a flexible approach to accommodate future
closure sites. LM is currently establishing a program to oversee the
continuation of benefit payments that the Department through its
contractors, is committed to provide for former contractor employees at
closed sites.

PRESERVE AND PROTECT LEGACY RECORDS AND INFORMATION

Integral to the cleanup and closure of sites is the preservation
and protection of records and information. LM will develop a plan for
accepting and maintaining all records transferred to the office. These
records include, but are not limited to, historical site records, long-
term surveillance and maintenance records, former contractor personnel
records, and classified records. The office will also manage records
including the collection, storage, maintenance, and retrieval of
electronic and physical records as well as database and systems needed
to support LM activities. For example, the three closure sites, Rocky
Flats, Mound, and Fernald will have, by closure, approximately 167,000
cubic feet of records that must be managed by LM. As sites continue to
transition to LM, we expect that volume of hard copy records may exceed
225,000 cubic feet. These volumes do not include records for which
special handling will be needed. These include X-rays, photographs and
negatives, video and audio-tapes, and architectural drawings.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the Secretary is dedicated to ensuring the DOE's
commitment to the environment, our stakeholders, and our workers--past
and present. We recognize that the Department has responsibilities to
the former contractor workers and communities following the completed
remediation and closure of sites. The continued involvement of
stakeholders including State, tribal, and local governments, is
critical to meeting these responsibilities. To this end, we will
vigorously promote an effective mechanism that provides for, and
encourages, active public participation.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, that concludes my
statement. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today,
and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator Allard. Thank you both for your testimony.
I want to give Senator Graham an opportunity to make any
statement if he would like. Before you proceed, Senator Graham,
I just kind of want to lay out to you what my plans are. I have
a lengthy question-response dialogue that I want to carry on
here with Secretary Roberson. I think it will be of interest to
you because it deals with the sites at Hanford and Idaho as
well as Savannah River, and I know that is very dear to your
heart and very important to you.
Then if you want to make a statement and ask some
questions, if your schedule demands that you cannot be here for
that, then I will let you go ahead. If not, maybe I will go
ahead and get these questions out. You can make your opening
statement, I will get this questioning out of the way, and then
call on you for additional questions.
Senator Graham. Okay, Mr. Chairman. I have to leave in
about 10 minutes.
Senator Allard. Senator Graham, make your opening
statement.
Senator Graham. It will take me a minute.
Senator Allard. Okay, very good.
Senator Graham. One, thank you for having the hearing. Two,
thank you both for coming.
The opening statement basically is that the administration
has been very creative, I think, in trying to come up with an
accelerated cleanup plan. I know the chairman here is sort of a
leading edge kind of guy to make sure that we are spending
taxpayer dollars wisely. I know you are negotiating with South
Carolina and other States to see if we cannot have a rational
way of classifying high-level wastes and having a rational way
of disposing of it.
There are literally hundreds of billions of dollars at
stake here, and I am not advocating or asking any State or any
site to accept a burden they cannot bear. I am not asking any
community to leave legacy materials behind that are going to be
hazardous to the health of the community in any fashion. But I
am asking everyone, including myself, who represents the
Savannah River Site, to be open-minded and try to break through
this mentality that there is no new way to do something with an
old problem.
So I will stand squarely behind the Department's efforts to
get every State with a waste legacy from the Cold War to be
more open-minded and more creative and more responsive to using
good science to save money and protect the environment.
Mr. Chairman, I know you have gone to all the sites and we
particularly appreciate your leadership of trying to make the
committee more responsive to the efforts of the Department to
do things in a more professional, common sense way. I want to
compliment you.
With that, I will listen to your questions.
Senator Allard. Well, thank you very much for your
participation. It is valuable to this committee.
I am going to be referring in my questioning to ``WIR,''
which stands for ``Waste Incidental Reprocessing.'' I think it
would behoove the committee to hear, Secretary Roberson, you
summarize what the WIR issue is.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, Chairman Allard. Thank you,
Senator, as well.
Cleanup of tank waste at Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah River
represents the greatest risk reduction effort in the
Department's entire cleanup program.
Senator Allard. This falls under WIR, is that correct?
Ms. Roberson. Absolutely.
Senator Allard. Okay.
Ms. Roberson. I will explain what portion of the program
that specifically applies to.
Senator Allard. Very good.
Ms. Roberson. We had plans at these three sites to clean up
tank wastes, plans agreed to with our host States and that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had also carefully
reviewed. At each site our plans acknowledged we would remove
as much tank waste as we could. We would separate the tank
waste into two fractions: first, a high-level, a high activity
fraction containing over 95 percent of the radioactivity, which
we would classify as high-level waste and treat and dispose of
in the repository for spent fuel and high-level waste called
for by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act; and a low activity
fraction which we would classify as low-level waste incidental
to reprocessing, depending on its characteristics, treat and
dispose of in an appropriate disposal facility for such
material.
We would then determine whether we could demonstrate that
disposing of a small amount of residues remaining in the tanks,
generally around 1 percent of the original volume, by
immobilizing it in place to ensure that it would be comparable
to the public health and safety requirements for disposal of
low-level waste in a near-surface disposal facility. If it
would, our plans were to classify the residues as low-level
waste incidental to reprocessing, to immobilize them in the
tanks, and close the tanks with these residues in place.
A key element of these plans is the classification of the
tank waste. The problem we have encountered is that in July
2003 an Idaho district court struck down the WIR portion of DOE
Order 435.1, the DOE order addressing how DOE and its
contractors classify waste under the Atomic Energy Act. As a
result, we now face uncertainty in implementing the very plans
our host States had agreed made technical sense.
The classification of this waste is key to determining how
to dispose of it. Therefore, if we are unable to resolve this
issue regarding WIR, we face leaving these tank wastes in place
far longer than we and our host States had anticipated and by
such delay would likely create more serious health and safety
risks to workers and members of the public by leaving the
wastes in the tanks longer and risking leaks to groundwater.
Senator Allard. Madam Secretary, why do you have to leave
any of the waste residues behind?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, let me briefly describe the
size of these tanks and the nature of the waste removal in
question. Each tank can hold as much as 1.3 million gallons of
liquid waste. At Hanford, for example, the tanks are 75 feet in
diameter and the tanks are of differing shapes. Some are
concave, which means they do not have a flat bottom.
Senator Allard. I guess that is about the size of this
room, would be a good estimate?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, standing on its head.
Senator Allard. Standing on its side, yes, that is right.
Ms. Roberson. That is right.
Under the triparty agreement at Hanford between DOE,
Washington State, and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), which governs the cleanup at that site, the goal is that
we retrieve 99 percent of the tank waste. If all of the
remaining waste were on the bottom of the tank, it would be
just under one inch thick. Because of radiological concerns
with exposure for workers, tank waste removal must be done
remotely. In addition, these tanks usually sit below ten feet
of soil cover. Our retrieval equipment must fit into openings
two inches to two feet wide, and tank structures are not
designed to support heavy loads from which equipment must be
deployed to do the tank cleaning.
It is not a simple task to scrape the last remaining tank
residues from a tank. Further, much of the waste residues are
expected to have a stiff consistency. Most removal techniques
require directing pressurized water streams at the remaining
wastes to immobilize it and to move it to a location which can
be pumped. We have spent over 10 years working on technologies
to improve removal opportunities for the waste from these
tanks.
Finally, many of the tanks are over 40 years old and have a
number of known leak sites, requiring us to exercise great care
to preclude water leaking from the tank.
As I said, DOE spent tens of millions of dollars exploring
how to get as much residual waste as possible out of the tanks.
Senator Allard. What is the material you plan to leave in
the tanks?
Ms. Roberson. We think the residues when stabilized are
appropriately considered low-level waste, suitable for shallow
land burial. Analysis will be performed to ensure that they
meet performance objectives established by DOE and the NRC for
low-level waste performance objectives. In fact, that is what
the order that was struck down by the judge's ruling required.
Senator Allard. Now, should not the waste's characteristics
and the risks it poses be what matters in terms of safe
disposal, rather than the process that created the waste?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we believe so, and we
believe that that is the philosophy behind the cleanup plans in
place for those sites.
Senator Allard. How much more than your current estimates
might this cost the American taxpayers?
Ms. Roberson. Our preliminary assessment was that it would
cost as much as $138 billion more over the life cycle of the
Department's cleanup program and extend that life cycle by
decades to have to process all of our tank waste as high-level
waste for disposal in a geologic repository, including exhuming
the tanks themselves, cutting them up, and packaging them for
disposal.
Senator Allard. So what is the risk if you have to do that?
Ms. Roberson. Clearly, the risk to workers and, frankly, to
the environment is much larger if we have to exhume tanks.
Given that we cannot proceed with our cleanup plans that were
based on our waste classification order, we risk leaving waste
in tanks much longer than we had planned right now. We also add
to environmental risk by the need to dispose of the large
amounts of metals resulting from the almost 250 large tanks and
the associated equipment.
Our analysis thus far indicates that we would increase
worker exposure tenfold, increase costs tenfold, and achieve no
meaningful improvement in environmental protection.
Senator Allard. So I do not see a rational benefit to the
American taxpayer from the DOE having to implement the Idaho
district court decision.
Ms. Roberson. Frankly, Senator, we do not see it either,
which is why we are pursuing this. Rather than accelerating
cleanup of tank waste in agreement with our host States, we
face stopping much of that work.
Senator Allard. What is your plan for resolving this WIR
issue?
Ms. Roberson. Accelerated cleanup of tank waste is a top
priority for the entire DOE and the States that host our
facilities. As pointed out in the General Accounting Office
(GAO) report completed last year, the WIR issue poses a
significant vulnerability for the Department. Consistent with
both the GAO recommendations to seek legislative clarification
regarding DOE's authority to classify tank waste, and with the
report by the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
last year, we proposed draft legislation to Congress that would
clarify our authority for managing such wastes.
We have since held discussions with affected States over
the impacts the Idaho district court decision had on our
activities at Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah River in order to
seek to address issues they have raised about our proposed
legislative approach. In addition, we have just filed our
opening brief in our appeal of the Idaho court decision to
continue our litigation efforts to resolve the WIR issue.
Without timely resolution of this issue, not only could we be
unable to implement our cleanup plans, but DOE could be forced
to realign its resources across the complex in a manner that
would significantly distort the Department's cleanup and other
priorities.
Senator Allard. What about the $350 million and what does
it take to get that money released?
Ms. Roberson. The Department's fiscal year 2005 budget
request includes $350 million in a high-level waste proposal
that reflects the need to satisfactorily resolve this issue to
support cleanup. These funds will be requested only to the
extent that legal uncertainties concerning disposition of these
wastes are resolved. Until we can resolve the legal
uncertainties related to WIR, it does not make sense for us to
proceed with projects that prepare tank wastes for disposition
as other than high-level wastes destined for a deep geologic
repository.
Senator Allard. I want to thank you for your responses, and
thank you, Senator Graham. Do you have any questions now that
you would like to ask?
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that was a
very comprehensive overview.
Senator Allard. Before I have you go ahead, there is a
closing comment I need to make here that I overlooked. I would
like to take a moment to comment on the WIR issue. The more I
learn about this issue, the more it reminds me of the type of
arguments that existed at Rocky Flats 7 or 8 years ago. Placing
workers, communities, and the environment at high risk simply
to meet an arbitrary cleanup requirement which does little or
nothing to lower the safety or health risks for the site is not
a good policy. Doing so at great expense makes even less sense.
It is my understanding that the DOE, working with the NRC,
has determined that if the very small amounts of liquid waste
residues left in the tanks are mixed with grout and stabilized
in place then they will meet the low-level waste performance
standards required for burial in a low-level waste repository.
The three States involved: Idaho, South Carolina, and
Washington, agreed to this cleanup plan and either issued
permits or indicated a willingness to do so. It was only after
a third party intervened on a technical legal issue that this
process come to a screeching halt. By narrowly reading the
language in the statute, this small amount of liquid waste
residue is being characterized at a higher level than I think
is necessary, potentially adding billions of dollars in extra
costs to DOE's EM program.
This interpretation is not backed by science as far as I
can tell and will only result in delays at these sites that
could extend for decades. This interpretation defies common
sense and may require legislative action on the part of this
committee. You can be assured, Madam Secretary, that resolving
this issue will be one of my highest priorities as this
committee considers the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005.
Now I will call on Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Well, number one, I would like to associate
myself totally with your statement. I think that is a very
appropriate way that we need to address this problem. If
legislative action is necessary, so be it. I just hate to see a
bunch of money wasted for no good, and that is not a technical
evaluation. That is just my view of things. I really believe
that the standards that we are trying to achieve can be met
without spending $50 billion unnecessarily.
However, I think it is the actinon and cesium separation
process at Savannah River that is sort of unconnected to the
lawsuit. Will the funds to allow that separation process be
released here, or why are they tied together?
Ms. Roberson. Senator, you are referring to what we call
the salt processing project. What that process does is take
waste, a fraction of the waste from the tank, and it stabilizes
it, the large majority of it, for disposal in a form other than
being disposed of at the geologic repository. So it is indeed
impacted. The risk of proceeding with that activity following
the Idaho district court is cause for concern for the
Department and is considered part of the $350 million account.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator.
I also have some questions here for both you, Madam
Secretary Roberson, and then Mike Owen. I will address them to
you, Mr. Owen, and then if you feel the need to chime in, why
do you not go ahead and do that, Madam Secretary.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Allard. I guess I do have separate questions for
both of you, but most of them are for you, Mr. Owen. My office
already received numerous phone calls from workers who are
concerned about their retirement and health benefits. I am
concerned that information regarding retirement and health
benefits may not be reaching the workers. Specifically, I am
interested in hearing from each of the witnesses on retirement
and health benefits for the workers before, at, and after
closure of Rocky Flats. Frankly, I would be interested in
knowing how these same types of issues are being addressed at
Fernald and Mound.
So my first question I guess is to you, Madam Secretary. As
an example, can you please help explain what DOE's and Kaiser-
Hill's responsibilities are to provide retirement and health
benefits leading up to the closure of Rocky Flats? Mr. Owen, do
you want to go ahead?
Ms. Roberson. We worked that together, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Owen. I may be a bit more schooled in that. We have
worked it very closely.
At Kaiser-Hill at this hour, there are terms in the
contract that they are currently operating under. Those terms
remain in effect and will until closure and thereafter if need
be. They would require Kaiser-Hill to continue to deliver the
pension and health services and benefits that they have been
doing to date.
When we, LM, working with EM, devise and develop the new
model for delivering those services, we will then turn to
Kaiser-Hill and say: Okay, under the terms of your contract we
are now saying this is the system we are going to use; fall in
on it. They will do that at that time.
We envision the establishment and the operation of
something that we commonly refer to somewhat generically as a
National Stewardship Entity as one central focal point that
would serve the former contractor workers at Rocky Flats,
Colorado; Fernald, Ohio; Mound, Ohio; and Pinellas, Florida;
where we have already closed, and any other sites that we may
come across as we go into the future. That one National
Stewardship Entity would then be responsible for delivering
those services, those pensions, those health benefits, doing
everything for those workers, such as the actuarial
calculations, processing benefit claims, and adjudicating
claims. Many of the functions that you would find in such a
human resources shop normally, would be done by that National
Stewardship Entity.
Until we relieve them and fall in on this new system,
Kaiser-Hill is contractually obligated to continue to do what
they are doing to this day. It is natural that as we get closer
to that closure date these benefits are very near and dear to
everybody's hearts, not just at Rocky Flats or Fernald, all
over the country. You read about it on the front page of the
paper every day. People become a little anxious, a little
concerned: Oh, well, I see the site is being demolished, there
is no longer a human resources office up there where I used to
go; what am I going to do?
We are receiving increased numbers of those types of
questions. I had envisioned originally when we went into a
contractual relationship with the National Stewardship Entity,
this central focal point to deliver these goods, that part of
the terms of that contract would require them to operate a
first-class, state of the art, high-quality customer service
operation with a national call center, and to include for some
period of time what I refer to as a storefront benefit
counselor's presence in those local communities to help answer
the questions.
In discussions on that, we have had some of the other
delegation members from Colorado and the other sites, and the
pace of inquiry has picked up probably a little earlier and
quicker than we thought. I think one of the ways--and I am
looking at that now--to help address that would be to identify
an appropriate, reasonably senior level Federal employee or two
or three, whatever it takes, to cover those communities here in
the interim, maybe about a year earlier than we thought,
because it looks as though the pace of inquiry has quickened,
quicker than we thought it would.
But until that stewardship entity is on board and under
contract, he is the guy that is going to actually manage the
nitty-gritty details of their benefits programs. But in the
interim, I am looking to find a way to put someone in there who
is comprehensively knowledgeable about these types of things
and can help answer their questions and explain how the system
is going to work.
So far we have explained it to the union heads, management,
and others. But now we have to get it down to the individual
workers.
Senator Allard. Does LM have the dollars in the budget in
fiscal year 2004 or fiscal year 2005 to meet these new
requirements?
Mr. Owen. I do not at this time. I had not planned for this
type of Federal presence as such. It would not be an
inordinately expensive operation, but there would be some cost
to it.
Senator Allard. Is there an office you could share with
somebody else?
Mr. Owen. I would have to look at the various options.
Maybe Ms. Roberson's facilities are still available, subletting
from her or sharing office space; looking at some of her
Federal employees that may be shortly being ramped out of her
organization. Maybe they can come to mine. I have to explore
all those possibilities. It is not something I set out to
budget for specifically, but I will look at what I have
internally and see how we can accommodate.
Senator Allard. Early on here I do not know whether you can
hold a full-time office or even a part-time office, but at
least some time when they could come in and look somebody in
the eye and say, this is my problem, this is what my concerns
are, and they could get a response.
Mr. Owen. Initially I would anticipate that the person or
persons would be shared among Rocky, Fernald, and Mound. They
would maybe spend half the time out in southwestern Ohio and
half of it back in Colorado. Announced hours, make an
appointment, this type of thing.
Senator Allard. That sounds like you are moving in the
right direction.
The other question I have here--and I do not know which one
of you wants to answer this, but this is the question. Does
Kaiser-Hill have adequate human resources professionals
available to answer questions about retirement and health
benefits?
Mr. Owen. I will start with that. I believe that they do at
this hour. I think we will continue to watch to make certain
that they do.
Senator Allard. Has there been some training or something--
--
Mr. Owen. Well, to be perfectly honest, I will say Kaiser-
Hill is first-rate at this. They have put together a very
progressive, modern, state of the art employee relations career
transitioning operation, and I have every confidence that they
can and will continue to do that. I think human nature, as
things start to go away, sometimes you lose some of your best
people. We will have to watch and see if that gets to be an
issue.
But I know Kaiser-Hill is tuned in to that and they are
doing a very good job so far, sir.
Senator Allard. Very good.
I would like to turn to the pension and health benefits
after closure. I understand that LM is working on a concept to
ensure the continuation of worker pension and medical benefits.
Can you please explain this concept in more detail?
Mr. Owen. I partially went into that in my earlier answer,
sir. I will try to explain, but it is a rather complicated
system. As we sit today, so to speak, the dollars that pay for
a former Rocky Flats or Fernald or Mound employee, for his
health benefits or his pension, are embedded down inside the
management and operating (M&O) contract that is being executed
by Kaiser-Hill at Rocky Flats at this hour. It is currently
embedded there now.
When that contract expires, when closure is accomplished
and the site is a wildlife preserve, we will not have that M&O
contractor there as such, so we have to find an alternative way
to deliver those goods. This is the National Stewardship Entity
concept. At the same time, we will have to examine our ledgers,
our budget-keeping procedures. We will have to identify those
dollars that are currently down inside Ms. Roberson's M&O
contract, pull out those sites that we have mentioned, and
bring them up into a consolidated request for dollars under the
line of LM. There will be one lump sum there that will cover
multiple sites in some respects and give us more visibility of
how much we are spending on that type of activity.
But we anticipate that in a fiscal year or two hence we
will be requesting what will look like a big bump in LM's
budget, but really it will be the funds that have been
scattered about in the M&O contracts.
Senator Allard. Well, you helped clarify this.
I am concerned that the workers at Rocky Flats, Fernald,
and Mound may be penalized in their pension due to the
accelerated closure schedule. I think this is a concern that
they have. So who is responsible for addressing the concerns of
workers who may be close to deadline for retirement points?
Ms. Roberson. The responsible entity would be EM. Although
we have no proposals before us, the contractor managing the
work force would make proposals to the DOE that will receive
consideration. We do not have any such proposals before us.
Senator Allard. Do you perceive having any, or are there
any additional closure benefits or bonuses for workers who stay
until closure?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, we have very progressive
programs at Rocky, and we actually used Rocky as the model for
Mound and Fernald. We are not forecasting any additional
benefits at those sites. We believe that we have very
progressive programs at this point. So there are none that are
at play that I am aware of.
Senator Allard. Mr. Owen.
Mr. Owen. If I could add to that, Mr. Chairman. We did one
enhancement at Rocky several years back. They went to, working
with the contractor, what is known in the trade as a rule of
70, which is in the pension business you have a rule of 85 or
70 or whatever combination of years of service and age. That
was a substantial sweetener or enhancement. That was done, and
I believe it took effect in 2001.
Senator Allard. You understand my concern is, and I think
you share it, as we move toward closure here you lose your good
people, those that you have trained, right at the time when you
may need them, because they get a job offer a year or 2 years
and they are going to take something that perhaps has some
longer tenure. So if there is some way we can keep hold of
those people on, on board until we close out, that would be
helpful.
Ms. Roberson. They have actually proven to be extremely
capable with that at Rocky, in holding onto their work force.
We continue to struggle with that, both on the Federal side and
the contractor side, at the closure sites, though, and we
continue to work at it to make sure that we can.
Senator Allard. Very good. Thank you.
During a recent meeting of the Rocky Flats Council of Local
Governments several local governments expressed concern about
the safety of the workers. Specifically, the local governments
are worried that the effort to accelerate closure may result in
safety violations. What steps are you taking to ensure worker
safety during this accelerated closure process? I know that we
have already gotten rid of a lot of the hazardous materials and
I think that is a big step towards closure. But what additional
steps might you be taking?
Ms. Roberson. We are covering all four corners of the
world, quite frankly. We have a team of people that we send
out, because we find that the most effective thing to do is to
apply new eyes to our activities on a basis that allows them to
be fresh and to see things that people do not see on an
everyday basis. That has actually proven to be the most
effective.
We are sitting down with our contract managers, going
through safety statistics. The safety performance at all of our
sites has been elevated to the Deputy Secretary for review. The
Deputy Secretary looks at our safety performance on a site-by-
site basis, occurrence-by-occurrence basis, every quarter. So
the level of attention has increased and the number of
resources that we are applying has increased, as well as the
impacts of poor performance in this arena from a consequence
perspective for our contractors.
Senator Allard. I would like to move on to another subject,
and this is for you, Madam Secretary. The DOE announced a new
Design Basis Threat (DBT) level to increase the amount of
security at DOE and NNSA facilities in response to the attacks
on September 11. At sites at which EM manages, but which still
have NNSA activities, how is each program making sure the
security requirements are being met across the entire site?
Ms. Roberson. The one key site that we have that fits that
category is Savannah River. At the site level, the NNSA
management staff and EM management staff work together to make
sure it is integrated, since it is provided by the same
contract, so it has to be integrated at some point because the
same contractor provides the service.
So for those activities that are specific, required
protection for them, they are funding those, but for the site-
wide activities EM is responsible for those.
Senator Allard. So they have worked out some cost-share
agreements and what-not?
Ms. Roberson. They have worked out the specifics of the
activities and who is responsible for what at the site level.
Senator Allard. Is there any confusion remaining about
their responsibilities between EM and NNSA?
Ms. Roberson. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. I have a question on the Price-Anderson
authority for indemnification for DOE contractors who work on
nuclear matters. Apparently that expires at the end of this
calendar year. Can you please describe what difficulties EM
will have if the Price-Anderson indemnification authority is
not extended beyond its expiration at the end of this calendar
year?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, it will likely be the same
reaction we saw when last we approached this point of not
knowing whether it was going to be extended or not. The
contractor has become very concerned about its liability in
these contracts and that coverage and are resistant to
progressive changes in the contracts or signing new contracts.
Senator Allard. Now, are there any contracts you anticipate
that will be signed in fiscal year 2005 which would be impacted
by the expiration of the Price-Anderson authority?
Ms. Roberson. Well, our Idaho contract would be a 2005 new
contract. I think most of those that are in the procurement
phase now other than Idaho are 2004. But we will have new
procurements that are out over this year, so we will clearly
have other procurements that could be impacted.
Senator Allard. Very good.
We are now being joined by Senator Nelson of Florida. Glad
to have you with us, and if you want to make an opening
statement we will give you some chance to make an opening
statement, and then if you have some questions you are welcome
to pose those.
Senator Bill Nelson. I take it you have to exit; is that
correct?
Senator Allard. Let me see. Let me look at my schedule
here. Yes. Obviously I am going to have to stay here for a
little while longer, but yes, at some point in time I would
like to exit.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

Senator Bill Nelson. I was racing here to get here, having
had the delightful duty this afternoon of joining with our
former colleague and a former member of this committee, Senator
Max Cleland, as he is being sworn in as a member of the Board
of Directors of the Exim Bank. I came because I understood you
had to leave, therefore so I could go on and conduct the
business. So at your pleasure, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. I think what I will do is go ahead and let
you run the meeting. Do not do anything with unanimous consent.
[Laughter.]
Then when you are finished, if you will go ahead and
adjourn the meeting I would appreciate it. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. I bring you greetings from
Senator Max Cleland.
Senator Allard. Give him my best.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. He looks better than I
have seen him look in a long time and is looking forward to
this new challenge that he is taking on.
This Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing is in the midst
of a busy and short year. I thank you all for coming today.
Among many of the legacies of the Cold War, we have as the
subject matter of today copious amounts of waste materials that
were stored or improperly disposed of, hundreds of highly
contaminated facilities, thousands of square miles of
contaminated soil, and millions of gallons of contaminated
ground and surface water.
All of this has to be cleaned up and decontaminated, torn
down or otherwise put in a safe, stable, long-term closure,
treated, and permanently and safely disposed of. The focused
effort to deal with the waste, the soil and water
contamination, and the excess facilities actually began back in
1989, and considerable progress has been made.
So I am going to dwell in three areas to discuss: one long-
term, one mid-term, one near-term. The DOE has a long-term
responsibility to ensure that the cleanup, including the
demolition of contaminated facilities, is fully completed. As
noted last year, just one DOE-owned site, the Pinellas plant in
Florida, has closed. Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound will
hopefully close in 2006. Others, such as Hanford, will have
another 30 years to go.
How DOE plans to maintain its commitment to cleanup in the
long term is one of the issues that I would like you to
continue to discuss. Last year, DOE created LM to address some
aspects of the future management issues. In the 2005 budget DOE
has proposed to create another new office, the Office of Future
Liabilities. How these two offices and the EM office all fit
together is something I want to find out about.
Ms. Roberson and Mr. Owen, I hope you can help unravel and
explain some of these roles for all three of the offices,
including why three offices are more efficient than one.
The DOE and the contractors continue to assure us that
Rocky Flats will be closed by 2006. If this closure schedule is
met, it will be a remarkable achievement and the result of a
concentrated effort of a number of parties such as DOE, the
contractor, Congress, community, the State, and the EPA; all
focused on accelerating the cleanup.
The Rocky Flats model could be used as a model for other
site and facility closures, Ms. Roberson. I know you are trying
to do this. A key aspect of that model, however, was the
decision to provide substantial additional amounts of money up
front to accelerate the cleanup. ``The DOE fiscal year budget
request for 2005 represents a peak year of our investment
strategy to accelerate cleanup and risk reduction.'' This
implies that in future years the budget will be reduced. I
think many sites were under the impression that the budget
would level off when Rocky Flats was closed and the funds freed
up as a result of the closure would be available for
accelerated cleanup at other sites. That is another issue I
want to discuss.
DOE has worked aggressively to develop accelerated cleanup
schedules at other sites. There are at last two key elements to
this accelerated pace. The first is fully funding the contracts
to support the commitments made by the contractors. That is the
money issue I just mentioned. The second is renegotiating the
various cleanup agreements with the States and the EPA in ways
that will reduce the scope and cost of the cleanup.
Ms. Roberson, while I would like to hear from you today
about the general success of this effort, I am interested in
one particular area of the work, which is dealing with the WIR
spent nuclear fuel. This effort is an area where DOE's plans
have been challenged in court, and I understand DOE is
considering a number of potential options to resolve the issue.
So we welcome you all today, and where some of this has
already been covered then let us not repeat. From those general
comments, if you could start from there, and then I will go on
in with some specific questions.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, Senator. We actually had a fairly
lengthy discussion on the WIR. So I would be glad to answer
specific questions, but I think we actually had a long response
on the record at this point, sir.
Two things, if I can. The issue of the budget leveling out,
I would like to address that; and then I would be glad to
explain the relationship between EM and the proposed Office of
Future Liabilities in conjunction with Mr. Owen on LM.
In 1997 the DOE developed what was called Path to Closure,
which was a complex-wide strategy for cleanup which included
holding all sites level in funding except the closure sites,
Rocky, Fernald, and Mound. The then-Assistant Secretary of EM,
Al Alm, went from State to State, talked with the regulators,
governor's office, and others to reach this agreement. It is
documented in a document that was provided to Congress. Those
States would agree to hold their budget level while they
supported additional investment at Fernald, Mound, and Rocky to
accelerate cleanup. Once those cleanups were completed, that
delta in budget would be reinvested in those States.
When we completed the Top-to-Bottom Review in February
2002, one of the recommendations was that, one, the States did
not seem to remain committed to that strategy; and two, that
the risk was growing at the other sites and we needed to make
the same commitment to those States. There was born the
Accelerated Cleanup Program for the complex, which resulted in
an increased budget for all sites, not just the closure sites.
So we have been very clear with our discussions and
negotiations with the States that the Path to Closure strategy
of holding everybody, holding the EM program at a $5 billion
budget annually, completing the cleanup of three closure sites,
and then reinvesting that budget in the others was not the
strategy we were moving forward; we were making an increased
investment in all of the sites. That discussion did occur with
the States as we reached agreement with them on the accelerated
cleanup program.
EM has a very extensive project baseline to complete. I
think the DOE has looked forward and said there are a host of
facilities yet to be cleaned up; we need to plan and we need an
office that can look objectively and work between the programs
to identify when facilities would become available or property
would become available for cleanup. That is the intended
purpose of the Office of Future Liabilities.
The actual management structure has not been decided. But
Senator, I know you can understand what we are trying to do is
make sure we do not find ourselves overwhelmed like we have
been before, where we have two or three programs negotiating
with one State, one set of State regulators, on different
elements of environmental compliance requirements or trying to
operate a facility turned over to EM that sits in the middle of
an operating complex.
I think forethought and planning are necessary and that is
what that office is intended to do.
I will let Mr. Owen talk about the rest.
Mr. Owen. If I could add, Senator, from the Office of
Future Liabilities, on those sites that Ms. Roberson's program
has identified for accelerated closure, remediation activities,
those sites where we know the course of action are coming to
the Office of Future Liabilities once she has completed her
job.
It was recognized by the Secretary a while back as he went
about organizing the Office of Future Liabilities that Ms.
Roberson's mission is to very specifically, with a large amount
of money, accomplish a tremendous amount of remediation work at
some very environmentally contaminated sites. She is going to
do it ahead of schedule, tremendously ahead of schedule, and
tremendously under budget. Let us let her focus on that. Why
would the official responsible for devising successful
accelerated remediation strategies at the same time be
responsible for devising a means of continuing to deliver
pension and health benefits to the affected retired contractor
workers? It seemed logical to put that into a different office
and let that office focus on that, the legacy of what is going
to be left over when she has cleaned it and turned Rocky Flats,
for example, into a wildlife preserve. Then my office would be
capable of, and we were responsible for, what we hope at that
stage of the game is a much more passive, low dollar effort--it
will only need small amounts of money--to surveil, to maintain,
to monitor the remediations that she has put into place and
make sure that they are successful and they are tended to and
maintained properly.
So it allows her to focus on her mission and we identified
new evolving missions for my office to focus on, the legacy
things, the pensions, the benefits, the surveillance and
monitoring, and keeping hundreds of thousands of cubic feet of
records from these sites.
Ms. Roberson. So if I may try to put the three pieces of
this together, you have front-end planning, and we are focused
very much on projectizing the cleanup program. You have front-
end planning of what is to come and how best to manage it so
that we keep control of our finances and our practices. That is
Office of Future Liabilities. You have environmental
remediation, responsible for the physical cleanup; and LM for
the after-cleanup activities long-term.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) suit challenging DOE's plans to deal with the
tanks, alledging that DOE does not have the option as a matter
of law to leave the tanks in place, even with some small
amounts of waste, the suit goes on to say that DOE does not
have the ability to treat and segregate the waste removed as
low-level and high-level waste. Up to this point, the NRDC has
been successful in its litigation and the matter is currently
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Is there any reason to believe that this case should be
settled?
Ms. Roberson. I am certainly not the legal representation
for the Department, but I certainly am not aware of an approach
for settlement or discussions to that vein.
Senator Bill Nelson. Could you get us an answer for the
record?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, absolutely, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

DOE is very interested in resolving the status of its cleanup plans
at these sites but firmly believes that this cannot be done through a
series of settlement agreements. The Department's cleanup plans for the
91 million gallons of tank wastes in Idaho, Hanford and Savannah River
depend on DOE being able to classify lower activity waste from
reprocessing as low-level or transuranic (TRU) waste. However, the
Idaho District Court decision struck down the portions of DOE's Order
435.1 that address when waste from reprocessing may be classified as
other than high-level waste. If DOE were to proceed with cleanup
activities that depend on DOE being able to classify some of the waste
in the tanks as low-level or TRU waste, it would be making hundred-
million-dollar-plus investments in technologies with no confidence that
it had the authority to classify the waste as it had done, and hence
with no assurance that the waste form it spent this money creating had
a disposal pathway.
The District Court decision said very little about what kind of
waste classification criteria it believed might be lawful. Thus, the
Department faces the prospect that any decisions it makes to classify
tank waste as other than high-level waste would readily be the subject
of legal challenge. Therefore, DOE has concluded that it should only
move forward with large investments to turn tank waste into material
slated to be disposed of as low-level or TRU waste if there is a
satisfactory resolution of the legal uncertainty either by the courts
or by new legislation.
Entering into settlement agreements with the various parties to the
lawsuit would not provide the Department the needed legal certainty.
Potential legal challenges are not limited just to the parties to the
current lawsuit. They could come from many other groups or individuals.
Also, settlement would not necessarily prevent the Idaho District Court
decision from being cited as precedent. Therefore, unless the district
court decision is either reversed on appeal or modified by new
legislation, it will continue to be a significant obstacle to DOE's
ability to proceed with its longstanding--and State approved--tank
closure plans.

Senator Bill Nelson. To complicate this matter further, DOE
has submitted a $350 million fiscal year budget request that is
contingent on either legislation that would allow DOE to carry
out its plans or the litigation being resolved in DOE's favor.
DOE therefore is using the $350 million as an incentive for the
involved States to pursue and obtain legislation or to withdraw
from the litigation.
If there is no legislation this year, what will you do?
Ms. Roberson. Well, Senator Nelson, we will likely not be
in a position to proceed with the work that $350 million was
intended to buy. Let me clarify one thing. The plans that we
propose to carry forward are plans that were negotiated with
the host States for those sites. We are not proposing to do
something inconsistent with the triparty agreement at Hanford.
In fact, it supports the triparty agreement. We are not trying
to do something inconsistent with our clean water permit at
Savannah River. It is consistent. We close two tanks using this
process at Savannah River. We are not proposing to do something
inconsistent at Idaho. We have approved closure plans at Idaho
that we cannot implement.
The issue for us with the $350 million is that it was
intended to pay for stabilizing our processing material into a
form that would be disposed of in a means other than going to a
geologic repository. Those activities, we believe, because of
the judge's ruling are indeed at risk of proceeding.
Senator Bill Nelson. So if there is no legislation this
year, what will you do?
Ms. Roberson. There are certain activities we planned in
our high-level waste program that we cannot proceed with until
there is resolution one way or the other.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about if the litigation is not
resolved this year? What will you do?
Ms. Roberson. We will not proceed with those activities
until there is some resolution in this matter one way or the
other. The judge cautioned us not to proceed with plans that
were in place, and these were clearly the plans that were in
place.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it the same answer if the
litigation is not resolved in DOE's favor?
Ms. Roberson. Or in favor of the processes that have been
developed and incorporated into our cleanup plans with our host
States.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what about the construction of
the Hanford waste plant? Will it be stopped under any of these
three scenarios: no legislation, no resolution of the
litigation, or resolution of the litigation adverse to DOE?
Ms. Roberson. At this point, the Department's belief is
that construction of a vitrification plant, because its primary
purpose is preparation of material to go to a geologic
repository, is not an issue. There is a small part of the
construction of that facility that is to prepare waste for
something other than a geologic repository, but we do not
believe we have encroached upon that yet.
So our plan at this point is to continue with construction
of a plant.
Senator Bill Nelson. When do you plan to submit
legislation?
Ms. Roberson. Can I get back to you really quick on that?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

DOE transmitted an initial legislative proposal to Congress last
summer (August 1, 2003) to remedy this waste incidental to reprocessing
problem. Since that time, we have been in discussions with affected
States over the impacts the Idaho District Court decision has had on
our activities at Hanford, the Idaho National Laboratory and the
Savannah River Site. We attempted to address issues the States raised
about our initial proposed legislative approach. We did reach agreement
with the State of South Carolina. The Senate included a provision based
on that agreement in section 3116 of the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense
Authorization Bill. The administration has indicated its strong support
for this provision.

Senator Bill Nelson. It is clear that the EM office would
like to go out of business, whether it is by 2025 or maybe 2012
or some other date. The crystal ball is murky. At any date,
there will still be cleanup to be done. If it closes in 2012,
there will be substantial cleanup work remaining. In
preparation for closing the EM office, you have stopped taking
new cleanup work and the office is in the process of shifting
responsibility for the newly generated waste as well as other
activities to other DOE program offices.
There is a goal to close EM. When will that happen?
Ms. Roberson. There is a goal to complete the scope of work
that the EM program is responsible for, and our current
baseline says that we can do that around the time frame of
2032. We are challenged to continue to accelerate that, but DOE
has proposed the Office of Future Liabilities begin the
planning and develop management options for carrying out the
future cleanup of those facilities that are currently active
today because of ongoing operations. The Department has not
precluded EM as one of those options, but it is keeping the
options open because we have learned valuable management
lessons as to how to do this.
So the DOE has not made a decision as to whether that would
be EM, an EM-2, or not. It simply has not made a management
decision. It is focused on how to manage and what the rate of
return would be for ongoing operations today as they complete
those missions.
Senator Bill Nelson. So there is a plan that lays out that
path to closure?
Ms. Roberson. For EM?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
Ms. Roberson. I would say the Top-to-Bottom Review is the
first strategic plan, and we have recently done an update to
that and provided it to Congress. There is a status of the Top-
to-Bottom Review that has been recently provided to Congress,
too.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, once you close it what work will
still need to be done and who will do it?
Ms. Roberson. When we say ``close,'' we are speaking of
completing the work the program is currently responsible for.
Once cleanup is completed at a particular site, if there is no
ongoing operation, LM would step in. If there are ongoing
operations, the Department is attempting to develop a plan as
to how that cleanup would occur and when it would become
necessary.
So I cannot tell you the answer because the Department is
venturing into the planning process for that work that is
currently not in EM.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you are going to move some of those
activities to LM and the Department has proposed in this budget
a new Office of Future Liabilities and it will apparently take
the new cleanup projects?
Ms. Roberson. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is not so?
Ms. Roberson. No. It will do the planning for sure and
provide management options for the DOE to make a decision. One
of those options will likely be EM. I do not know, but they are
going to look at the management structure and propose options
based upon when that work would become available for cleanup.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, would that new office take over
the old EM activities when EM goes out of business?
Ms. Roberson. When EM goes out of business for the scope of
work that it has, it should be complete. So there would not be
cleanup intended for that office to take over at all.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about the newly generated waste?
Ms. Roberson. The newly generated waste is proposed to stay
with the generating organizations. So when they cease to
operate, there is no more newly generated waste to be passed
on.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you are saying that when EM goes
out of business there is not going to be any remaining work
done by this LM, and if there is any future waste it is going
to be assigned to whoever the generating office is?
Ms. Roberson. When EM completes cleanup at a site and there
is no ongoing mission, there is not another landlord, the NNSA
does not have an ongoing mission, as in the case of Los Alamos.
NNSA is the landlord. They have an ongoing mission there. That
would not transfer to LM. Once we complete the cleanup scope
that we have, NNSA still remains the landlord and it is still
their site, so that it would not move.
Mr. Owen. Also, LM will take on some functions, but
ideally, as I believe I said earlier this afternoon, it would
be in comparison to the fevered pace that EM is conducting
today at, say, Rocky. It would be a fairly passive activity,
where we would be conducting long-term surveillance and
maintenance and stewardship activities. We would be monitoring
pump-and-treat ground wells, making certain that containment
cells are kept in good order, that the appropriate engineering
and institutional controls are kept up, and the records of
those activities are available to the public.
It would be a much lower level of activity conducted by LM,
because Ms. Roberson's organization actually ideally has been
successful in remediating the site, removing the vast majority
of what ever could possibly be threatening to human health and
the environment. It is our job then to monitor and make certain
that that is indeed the case.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell me, what is this new creature
called the Office of Future Liabilities?
Ms. Roberson. The Office of Future Liabilities is intended
to do planning to work with all the programs that have
operations and facilities that are not in the EM program now,
to ascertain when the missions will end, when facilities would
be available for cleanup, or when sites would be available for
cleanup, and to lay that out in a time line that allows the DOE
to make informed management decisions as to how to carry out
that work.
So it is initially a planning function only, planning for
the scope of work and proposing management options for how to
carry out that work.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk to you, Mr. Owen, about
LM.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. One of your primary responsibilities
will be to continue the health insurance and retirement
benefits for workers from the closed DOE sites and facilities.
Do you believe that any legislation is needed to carry out your
mission to protect the workers?
Mr. Owen. Several years ago when we looked at this pending
liability, this pending legacy that we needed to manage, we
very carefully looked at it and determined that we felt we
could devise a model to deliver those services successfully to
the rightful recipients without requesting legislation. As we
continue to work through the process, we have run across a
number of hurdles, but we have worked around them internally.
We are getting a tremendous amount of cooperation from the U.S.
Department of Labor on the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), as well as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
At this hour we do not believe that legislation is needed.
We appreciate the inquiry as to if legislation will be needed.
We may encounter problems that would cause us to conclude that
we need legislation, but right now we believe we are on a
course that will allow us to accomplish it.
On a side note, we are doing it successfully, even though
we are going to change the model a little bit, for the former
contractor workers at the Pinellas plant outside of Tampa. That
is a group of former contractor workers, where we are getting
the job done now and we are planning to continue to be able to
do that for those workers. It will be a different model than we
are following for those people now.
But my office budget request does actually include the
pension dollars for the former contractor employees at the
Pinellas site.
Senator Bill Nelson. Could any legislation help you to
simplify the whole thing?
Mr. Owen. I would not rule that out. I do not think I could
give you a comprehensive answer at this time, Senator, but I
will keep that in mind. But as we move forward, realize that
there is an interest here that, if something needs to be
statutorily put in place or legislatively clarified, that we
would welcome the opportunity to come and work with you and
your staff.
There are a lot of issues involved in doing this, sir. But
right now things are working and it is coming together.
Tomorrow morning it may be a different story. We will blow the
whistle if it is. We will let you know.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Roberson, does each facility have
the full amount of funds anticipated in each contract?
Ms. Roberson. I believe we have requested the full amount
of funds anticipated in each of our contracts.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you give us a funding plan by
the major prime contractor for the next 5 years?
Ms. Roberson. I can give you that if we have contracts that
go for 5 years. That would be a subset of those contracts we
have in place. For those we can.
Senator Bill Nelson. What would a contract typically go
for?
Ms. Roberson. Well, they start at different points. They
may be 5-year contracts, but if it started in 2000 then there
is 1 year. A number of our larger contracts do expire in the
next 2 years.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Well, give us what you have
in the remaining.
Ms. Roberson. Yes, we will do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Bill Nelson. Keeping Rocky Flats as well as the
other cleanups on the accelerated cleanup schedule, that is
important. Many of the other sites apparently do not have
enough money to keep their cleanup programs on schedule. Money,
that is one need. But there is also the need to ship nuclear
waste and other nuclear material to Savannah River. As a
receiving site for the plutonium wastes from Rocky Flats and
other materials from other sites, Savannah River is playing a
very important key role in supporting the cleanup.
The perceived delay in 2002 in the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Fabrication (MOFF) Facility that is going to be built at
Savannah River to process the plutonium has strained relations,
to say the least, with the governor of South Carolina and the
DOE. This year there is a new concern about a delay in
construction of the MOFF Facility. So what impact would a delay
in that plant construction have on the cleanup and can you give
us some notion of its impact by this time?
Ms. Roberson. Actually, Senator, since that is an NNSA
project, I would like to confer with them and respond for the
record if I might.
[The information referred to follows:]

I believe the Department is endeavoring to mitigate the impact of
any delay in the construction of the MOFF Facility. Consolidating all
of EM's surplus plutonium, approximately 13 metric tons, is a key
element of EM's cleanup plans and the Department's national security
goals. Although the Department is evaluating the consolidation of the
approximately 13 metric tons at the Savannah River Site, no decision
has been made. Any decision to consolidate surplus plutonium would be
subject to appropriate National Environmental Policy Act review.

Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what I am looking for is a 1-
year delay, 2-year delay, 5-year delay? What impact would it
have on your program?
Ms. Roberson. I would really need to confer with them. I do
not know what a 1-year delay would mean from an operating
capability without talking to them first. So if I could, we
will respond, but I can't speak for their plans right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do any of the staff have any further
questions that you want to ask?
Ms. Roberson. Oh, that is not fair. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Anybody in the audience want to ask
any questions? [No response.]
We are going to keep the record open for 3 days and also we
will keep the record open to receive the information that we
have requested. Instead of asking some additional questions, I
am going to submit some in writing to you for the committee.
Everybody have a good afternoon and the meeting is
adjourned.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

SECURE TRANSFORMATION ASSETS

1. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, are you satisfied that the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has enough secure
transportation assets to meet Environmental Management's (EM)
transportation needs during the next several years?
Ms. Roberson. In recognition of the multiple program demands for
secure transportation assets, the Secure Transportation Advisory Board
has been formed. This board, which includes a member from my staff, is
very effective in prioritizing needs and helping to ensure that
programs, such as EM, are able to meet its commitments successfully.
However, the Department is facing a challenge to ensure that there
are adequate Federal agents (couriers) hired and trained to meet the
increased demands. This challenge is further complicated by competition
by other agencies for these same resources. As the agent force
increases, it will enable the NNSA to ensure EM that our commitments in
the next few years can be met.

OFFICE OF LEGACY MANAGEMENT

2. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, what is the regulatory structure of
the Office of Legacy Management (LM)?
Mr. Owen. LM is responsible for long-term surveillance and
maintenance activities at more than 60 sites (with an additional 45
anticipated over the next 5 years) across the country where active
environmental remediation has been completed. LM is also responsible
for overseeing workforce restructuring of contractor employees
operating at the Department of Energy's (DOE) sites and for overseeing
benefit continuity for contractor employees after site closure.
LM's long-term surveillance and maintenance work is conducted under
a variety of legal and regulatory frameworks. Work at many of our
current sites is subject to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act. LM conducts activities at these sites under a license from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with NRC regulations.
Additionally, a number of our sites fall under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act and operate in
accordance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
requirements. OLM must also comply with a variety of applicable state
requirements.
Workforce restructuring of contractor employees at DOE sites is
conducted consistent with section 3161 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Distribution of funds for the
retired contractor workforce on sites where active environmental
remediation has been completed is conducted in accordance with the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), U.S. Department of
Labor rules and regulations, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
regulations, and applicable State laws and regulations.

3. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, there could be massive legal changes
in the DOE's fiduciary responsibilities as sites close and
relationships with the traditional contractors change. How does DOE see
its role post-closure?
Mr. Owen. The DOE will ensure that there are effective mechanisms
in place to assure continuity of benefits for contractor employees
after site closure. As in the case of ongoing sites, DOE's role will
include contracting with the plan sponsor(s), providing funding,
approving allowable costs, and providing appropriate contract
oversight. The Department is not now the plan fiduciary of any
contractor benefit plans and will not become the fiduciary after
closure.

4. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, what legal, accounting, benefit
specialist, and actuarial resources does DOE have to perform that role?
Mr. Owen. The Department has created LM to ensure that legacy
responsibilities are effectively and efficiently managed. LM will work
with the Office of General Counsel, the Office of the Chief Financial
Officer, the Contractor Human Resource Management Office, and other DOE
offices, as needed, to address post-closure requirements. Actuarial
consultants for additional legal, benefit, and actuarial expertise also
have been retained to assist the Department to ensure legacy
responsibilities are effectively and efficiently managed.

5. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, is there a need for more resources
here?
Mr. Owen. The Department has assembled an integrated team to
develop and implement the post closure benefit program that includes
key members of my staff as leaders and participants. At this time, the
Department believes these resources, together with actuarial
consultants who have been retained to provide additional legal,
benefit, and actuarial expertise, are sufficient to implement the
program and oversee contractor performance. We will routinely assess
staff skills and levels to ensure that the post-closure benefit program
is managed effectively and efficiently.

6. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, what framework, if any, does DOE have
in place to effectively review the contractors' obligations and costs
for pension and post-retirement benefits on an ongoing basis?
Mr. Owen. The Department reviews contractor obligations and costs
for pension and other post-retirement benefits under the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) cost principles and pursuant to DOE Order
350.1 or a special clause(s) pertaining to compensation and benefits.
LM will analyze and evaluate existing processes and determine if
additional mechanisms are needed for the administration of post-closure
retirement benefits.

CLARIFYING THE DEFINITION OF CLOSURE

7. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, how does the EM program plan
to close gap between physical closure and regulatory closure?
Ms. Roberson. The EM program will complete its cleanup mission and
attain physical closure (e.g., all waste removed or adequately
contained, all required engineering systems constructed and operating
properly) in accordance with regulatory agreements, permits, and
decision documents. Once EM has completed all necessary remedy
documentation (e.g., Records of Decision, remedial action workplans)
and transitions any remaining long-term response action management
responsibilities (e.g., surveillance and maintenance of containment
cells, operation and maintenance of ground water treatment systems) to
LM or to the Program Secretarial Office responsible for ongoing
missions at the site, the receiving organization will be responsible
for final regulatory closeout. In some cases, regulatory closeout may
occur years after EM completion. Accordingly, EM is responsible for
providing the receiving organizations with all essential information to
ensure they are fully equipped to conduct long-term stewardship,
confirm remedies are performing as intended and ultimately demonstrate
to our regulators that final objectives have been attained and
regulatory closeout can proceed. We are working closely with LM and
other Program Secretarial Offices in developing site-specific
transition plans that will outline regulatory requirements (e.g.,
surveillance and maintenance, institutional controls), personnel and
funding needs, and other activities (e.g., public outreach, records
management) needed to provide for a smooth transition from one program
element to another.

F-CANYON DISPOSITION

8. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, what is the current status
of the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the F-Canyon?
Ms. Roberson. Limited decommissioning of several of the support
facilities will begin later this year. We are in the planning stages to
determine final disposition of the facility.

9. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, is it your understanding
that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is satisfied
with your current plans and progress with the D&D of F-Canyon?
Ms. Roberson. DOE is not aware of any DNFSB issues or concerns
associated with the plans and progress of F-Canyon deactivation. We are
in the planning stages to determine final disposition of the facility.

ACCELERATED COMPLETION SCHEDULE

10. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, the fiscal year 2005 budget
request for the 2012 and 2035 accelerated closure accounts is less than
in fiscal year 2004. How will accelerated completion be accomplished
with less funding?
Ms. Roberson. The reduction between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal
year 2005 in the Defense Site Acceleration Completion, 2012 and 2035
Accelerated Completions accounts, is due to the decision to show
separately the funding associated with the Waste Incidental to
Reprocessing (WIR) court ruling. The $350 million in fiscal year 2005
is for activities that are planned to be performed in the 2012 and 2035
Accelerated Completions accounts, should the legal issue be
satisfactorily resolved. The following table displays the increases to
the Defense Site Acceleration Completion, 2012 and 2035 Accelerated
Completions accounts when the WIR-related funding is incorporated.

[In Thousands of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
-----------------------------------------------------------------
2005
Appropriation/Account 2003 2004 2005 2005 Adjusted vs.
Comparable Comparable Request Adjusted Fiscal Year
for WIR 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Site Acceleration Completion
2006 Accelerated Completions................ $1,234,037 $1,239,018 $1,251,799 $1,251,799 $12,781
2012 Accelerated Completions................ 2,102,613 2,199,338 2,150,641 2,247,941 48,603
2035 Accelerated Completions................ 1,811,563 1,918,375 1,893,339 2,146,039 227,664
Safeguards and Security..................... 254,747 291,124 265,059 265,059 (26,065)
Technology Development and Deployment....... 113,679 66,116 60,142 60,142 (5,974)
HLW Legislative Proposal.................... 0 0 350,000 0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... $5,516,639 $5,713,971 $5,970,980 $5,970,980 $257,009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

POST-CLOSURE LEGAL STATUS

11. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, will participants in
individual pension/benefit plans have standing to sue DOE, either
directly or as third-party beneficiaries, to enforce promises made in
employment contracts?
Ms. Roberson. The primary rights of participants in pension and
other benefit plans to enforce promises regarding the plans made in
their employment contracts are against their employers (the
contractors). They may also have rights against the plan fiduciaries.
DOE is not a party to either the plans or to the employment contracts
and is not a fiduciary of these plans. The participants have no third-
party beneficiary status to sue under DOE's contracts with the
contractors.

12. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, what is the impact of State
law on contractor obligations where the contractor, like the University
of California, is a State entity?
Ms. Roberson. Where a DOE contractor, like the University of
California, is a (pure) State entity (not operating through a venture
involving non-State entities), the formation of the plan documents and
any trust, as well as the legal status of the employing contractor and
its labor-management relations, are all primarily State law matters.
The contractor's plans would not be covered by ERISA and the
contractor's agreements concerning benefits would be a matter of State
law regarding employment matters. Federal laws such as the National
Labor Relations Act which may impact determination of benefits promised
in other contexts would not be applicable.

POST-CLOSURE ENTITY

13. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, DOE presently plans to
establish an entity to regulate long-term pension and benefit matters
after site closure. This will, it appears, be a very large entity with
a very large responsibility. Does DOE have the resources to effectively
monitor such an entity?
Ms. Roberson. The Department has in place an integrated team to
oversee the post-closure benefit program. LM staff is an integral part
of this team and will ensure that the appropriate resources are brought
to bear to oversee this responsibility. Staff needs assessments are
continuously being performed to ensure that adequate quantity and the
right skills are on board to perform management and monitoring
responsibilities.

14. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, how will DOE resist being
drawn into benefit determinations and caving in to political pressure
for benefit increases, when so many contractor employees are close to
retirement?
Ms. Roberson. DOE will retain its arms-length relationship with
contractor employees by contracting with the plan sponsor(s)
responsible for any plan amendments which would increase or decrease
benefits to retirees. DOE will retain the right to approve or
disapprove of all plan amendments. DOE currently reviews and approves
plan amendments against established benchmarks to prevent benefits from
being out of line with those in comparable industries.

15. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, will these changes
(especially in view of section 3161 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993) encourage employees and
retirees to look directly to DOE for these things, thus moving away
from the Manhattan Project paradigm of the government's working through
contractors in these matters?
Ms. Roberson. While Section 3161 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 directed DOE to mitigate the
impact on contractor employees and their communities of the
Department's changing mission, it did not alter the relationship
between DOE and its prime contractor employees. DOE is consulting with
the Department of Labor and the IRS regarding its approach to providing
continuity of post-closure benefits. They have been consistent in their
advice and counsel to have a DOE prime contractor(s) continue as a plan
sponsor(s) and fiduciaries.

POST-CLOSURE OBLIGATIONS

16. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, the General Accounting
Office is investigating the size and duration of DOE obligations for
contractor post-retirement benefits after site closure. Proposed Cost
Accounting Standard (CAS) 419, which would have regulated the
allocation of costs for health benefits for government contractors, was
recently withdrawn because of industry concerns about exposure to these
costs, and a desire that the government bear more of the risk of
rapidly increasing medical costs. What are your thoughts on this?
Ms. Roberson. Withdrawal of CAS 419 would not have a direct and/or
immediate impact on DOE contracts due to current DOE policy that
requires cash basis or pay-as-you-go accounting for post-retirement
benefits (PRB) (other than pension plans).
The proposed CAS 419, Accounting for the Costs of Post-Retirement
Benefit Plans Sponsored by Government Contractors, would have required
accrual accounting for PRB plans when benefits meet the following
criteria: (1) documented in writing, (2) communicated to employees, (3)
non-forfeitable once earned, and (4) legally enforceable. DOE
contractors' PRBs, like most commercially sponsored PRBs, meet some of
these criteria, but may not meet all of the proposed CAS 419 criteria.
While pre-funding of PRBs may be desirable, the DOE contractor
liability for post retirement benefits has been accruing for 50+ years.
Converting to accrual accounting (pre-funded) from pay-as-you-go
accounting would result in a significant transitional liability.
Additionally, unlike pension plans, PRBs cannot be funded through tax
favored funding vehicles.

17. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, when the main operational
mission of the sites is completed and the great bulk of costs remaining
are post-operational retiree benefits, what incentive is there for the
contractors (who are working under various kinds of contracts which
effectively provide for cost reimbursement) to control these costs?
Ms. Roberson. We believe the Department has tools available to it
that it can use in developing appropriate contractual arrangements that
will allow a significant measure of cost control. These include
contract incentives to implement efficiencies in plan administration
and reasonableness determinations with respect to the allowability of
costs that can take into account relevant industry comparators (e.g.,
industry competition and geographical location) consistent with other
applicable laws and rules.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATIONS

18. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, what is the EM program
doing to encourage new cleanup technologies and innovations to help
further accelerate cleanup at EM sites?
Ms. Roberson. Of fundamental importance are the cleanup contracts
that provide strong financial incentives for contractors to bring the
safest and most efficient technologies to bear on the site cleanup
contracts. The progress at Rocky Flats is a result of such a contract
change. The emerging success there isue not only to its project
management approach but also to a great number of new and improved
technologies. In addition, we fund selected activities to ensure the
sites have the best available scientific and technological background
and advice with which to proceed with the best, viable technical
solutions and technologies.

19. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, does the EM program
encourage new technologies to be introduced into the existing cleanup
framework?
Ms. Roberson. Absolutely. We are doing this in two ways. First, we
are creating strong incentives for contractors to bring the safest and
most efficient technologies to bear on the site cleanup contracts.
Second, we fund Technical Solutions, Closure Projects, and Alternatives
Projects within the Technology Development and Deployment program to
ensure the sites have the best available scientific and technological
background, advice, and confidence with which to proceed. These
programs directly stimulate the use of the best, viable technical
solutions and technologies.

20. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, how would a company or
other entity introduce their new technology into the existing EM
contractor framework?
Ms. Roberson. By far the greatest opportunity is through the sites
and their site cleanup contractors who are searching for the best
available solutions and who will be responsible for verifying that a
vendor's claims are supported. In addition, as we pursue alternatives
projects, procurements are advertised for commercial response.
Companies and teams of companies are encouraged to submit their
proposals.

21. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, how does the EM program
assess whether a new technology may be a viable cleanup option?
Ms. Roberson. In most cases, the vendors present testing and field
operational experience for DOE assessment and decisionmaking.
Treatability studies and other technology demonstrations may be
conducted to further support such assessments.

ACCELERATE RISK REDUCTION

22. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, in your written testimony
you focus on the benefits of accelerating risk reduction as the best
way to increase safety and reduce the cost of cleanup. Are there any
statutory or regulatory obstacles preventing the EM program from
accelerating risk reduction which should be changed to help increase
safety and reduce the cost of cleanup?
Ms. Roberson. We have identified one statutory change that would be
extremely important for proceeding with the accelerated cleanup
program. This legislation would clarify the Department's authority to
separate and dispose of tank waste according to the risk it presents.
The Department submitted a legislative proposal on this subject last
August and since then has been in discussion with the affected States
and Congressional delegations to craft a consensus on a legislative
solution. As you are aware, these efforts resulted in agreement with
the State of South Carolina. We appreciate the State's agreement on a
legislative approach, and we appreciate the committee's consideration
of this approach with respect to the Savannah River Site in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Clarification
of the Department's authority to classify waste remains critical to
implementation of accelerated cleanup plans at Idaho, Hanford, and the
Savannah River Site.
The Department has not identified any additional statutory changes
it would recommend to execute accelerated cleanup. Nonetheless, the
cleanup program continues to implement various initiatives (e.g.,
baseline validation reviews, acquisition strategies, and development of
site Risk-Based End State documents) that may, at some point in the
future, lead to identification of the need for additional statutory
changes. Should these initiatives lead to identification of additional
changes to support accelerated cleanup, the Department will make
appropriate recommendations to Congress.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY

23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, with a program as
complex as the EM program, it would seem that a reasonable investment
should be made in improving the technologies and methods that will be
utilized to accomplish this mission. Technology improvements can only
be achieved through a technology program that is able to look to the
future, rather than dealing with the day-to-day challenges of
implementation. The DOE EM program has spent the last year implementing
its accelerated cleanup program and is currently in the process of
another reorganization to streamline its processes to provide better
focus on its core mission and to reduce the risks imposed by the legacy
of our nuclear weapons programs. In testimony provided to the Energy
and Water Appropriations Subcommittee last year, you indicated that you
had instituted an integrated technology development and deployment
program to focus on ``high-payoff'' site closure and remediation
problems. How does this integrated technology development and
deployment program plan on focusing on the longer term research and
development necessary to ensure that continual improvement is achieved
as you embark on what you now assert is a 35-year mission to complete
the EM cleanup objectives?
Ms. Roberson. In 2003, EM consolidated its basic and applied
research activities with those in the Office of Science. Since 2003,
for longer-term research and development, DOE's Office of Science is
leading the way to yield the greatest benefit. To assist in clarifying
these research needs, EM (and more recently the Office of Science)
commissioned a series of reports conducted by the National Research
Council. To date, the Council recommended additional research in
subsurface contamination, high-level waste, facility deactivation and
decontamination, I transuranic and mixed wastes, and DOE's excess
nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel. The Office of Science is
using these recommendations as a basis for their research.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, Florida International
University (FIU) has been a fertile ground to seek solutions to long-
term challenges. Would you agree that the support the EM program has
received from academic institutions has significantly contributed to
the development of the solutions that have allowed you to have be
optimistic that EM will accelerate cleanup and closure of the many DOE
sites and facilities?
Ms. Roberson. We have worked cooperatively with FIU to identify
beneficial activities to support EM's technology needs. FIU technology
activities support several DOE sites including Savannah River, Mound,
Oak Ridge Rocky Flats, and Hanford as well as providing technical
support to help solve EM complex-wide issues.

SUPPORT OF INSTITUTIONS TRYING TO SOLVE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, will you continue to
support the ongoing role of these institutions in assisting the
Department solve the considerable technological challenges yet to be
identified?
Ms. Roberson. The EM Office of Cleanup Technologies and DOE site
offices will continue to work with these institutions to align their
expertise, as appropriate, to address site specific or complex-wide
technical issues that are challenging accelerated cleanup. Areas of
technical support provided by these institutions include waste
characterization and dissolution, instrumentation, decontamination and
decommissioning, robotics, and university curriculum development.

BUDGET DECISIONS

26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, the two largest
cleanup programs with a 2006 site closure date are Rocky Flats,
Colorado, and Fernald, Ohio. The DOE increased the Rocky Flats by $21.7
million for fiscal year 2005. Fernald, on the other hand, was reduced.
Why is the Fernald budget being cut this close to closure?
Ms. Roberson. The fiscal year 2004 budget for Fernald included
increased funding for significant scope associated with Silos 1, 2, and
3. In fiscal year 2004, the construction of the Silos 1 and 2 treatment
facility and the Silos 1, 2, and 3 retrieval facilities will be
completed. Remediation of the Waste Pits will be completed before the
end of fiscal year 2005. The funding requested for Fernald in fiscal
year 2005 reflects the completion of these major activities and
progress on the critical path. In addition, the request for safeguards
and security funding has been reduced in fiscal year 2005 due to the
progress in accelerated cleanup and reducing the site footprint.

27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, other major budget
losers include the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (INEEL), cut $94 million, or 18.5 percent; Paducah,
Kentucky, cut $32 million, or 17.1 percent; and Savannah River Site,
cut $76 million, or 5.7 percent. At a time when DOE is trying to
accelerate cleanup, why are funds being reduced for these sites?
Ms. Roberson. What appears to be decreases at the Savannah River
Site and the INEEL in fiscal year 2005, results from the decision not
to include funding associated with those activities impacted by the WIR
court ruling in the site budgets, but rather to show that funding in a
separate proposal. There is $350 million in fiscal year 2005 for the
planned activities to be perfomled should the legal issue be
satisfactorily resolved.
The Paducah decreases in fiscal year 2005 are due to work
completions in fiscal year 2004, i.e., the north/south diversion ditch
project; the dismantling and removal of all piping and equipment from
sectors 1 and 9 in building C-410; and preparation of sectors 2 and 3
for dismantling and piping equipment removal.

28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, although informal
estimates show that only a third of the DOE's EM budget goes for
environmental restoration (i.e., cleanup), the DOE budget continues to
lack a clear delineation between funds going to real cleanup and funds
going toward waste management. Why doesn't the DOE separate
environmental restoration and waste management in the budget?
Ms. Roberson. EM implemented a new budget structure in fiscal year
2004 to clearly distinguish the scope and resources that directly
support EM's core accelerated cleanup and risk reduction mission versus
those activities that indirectly relate to on-the-ground cleanup. It
also distinguishes waste management activities, which are an integral
part of EM's mission-related cleanup activities, from environmental
restoration activities.
EM's new budget structure consolidates direct cleanup activities
such as waste management and environmental restoration into
predominately two appropriations--the Defense and Non-Defense Site
Acceleration Completion. Over 80 percent of EM's fiscal year 2005
request (approximately $6.1 billion of $7.434 billion) is in these two
mission-related cleanup appropriations.
To support the new budget structure, for the Defense and Non-
Defense Site Acceleration Completion Appropriations, major mission-
related cleanup activities are categorized at the lower-level project
baseline summary (PBS) structure. Among the direct cleanup activities
categorized are waste management activities (operation of waste
disposal facilities, solid waste disposition, and radioactive liquid
tank waste stabilization and disposition) and environmental restoration
activities (soil and water remediation). With such a structure, the EM
program is capable of ``isolating'' the costs associated with each
major direct cleanup activity at each EM site.

29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, you have always
considered Rocky Flats to be the model for accelerated cleanup.
However, the estimated life-cycle costs for cleanup of Rocky Flats have
increased more than $210 million in the past year. In addition, the
fiscal year 2005 request indicates that accurate estimates of future
costs for some major activities at Rocky Flats cannot be determined
``until EM conducts the next life-cycle cost estimate.'' What will the
life-cycle costs be at Rocky Flats?
Ms. Roberson. The increase in the life-cycle cost estimate for the
Rocky Flats Site is due primarily to an increase in estimated post-
closure contract liabilities such as pension and health care benefits,
not an increase in cleanup costs. We are in the process of collecting
updated life-cycle costs from our sites. We will be able to provide the
updated life-cycle cost estimate for the Rocky Flats Site after
September 30, 2004.

HIGH-LEVEL WASTE

30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, the budget request
includes a ``high-level waste proposal'' that would create a $350
million contingency fund for high level waste tanks at Hanford, the
INEEL, and Savannah River Site. Does DOE intend to stop all above
ground waste treatment and handling work at these sites in the event
that the litigation is not resolved?
Ms. Roberson. DOE believes it can proceed with above-ground
treatment and stabilization of the waste from reprocessing that is
intended to be disposed of in the Federal geologic repository for spent
fuel under the District Court decision. However, it can be done only to
the extent those actions are independent of plans with respect to the
lower activity fraction of the waste slated for disposal elsewhere.
Therefore, at Savannah River, DOE continues to transfer high-activity
tank waste sludges to the Defense Waste Processing Facility, where
these wastes are treated into a vitrified glass waste form for disposal
as high-level waste. Similarly, at Hanford, DOE is constructing a Waste
Treatment Plant that will separate tank wastes into a high-activity
fraction (92.5 percent of the tank waste radioactivity) for
vitrification into a glass waste form for geologic disposal as high-
level waste.
DOE's plans for above-ground stabilization and treatment of lower-
activity portions of the waste from reprocessing planned to be disposed
as low-level or transuranic (TRU) waste have been jeopardized by a
district court decision that invalidated the DOE order under which
these decisions are made.

31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, specifically what
activities does the DOE believe it cannot do regarding cleanup and
closure of the high-level waste tanks at Hanford, INEEL, and Savannah
River Site, based on the recent court order?
Ms. Roberson. The activities are outlined on pages 291-292 of the
DOE budget request for EM. In general, the activities involve either
activities to complete operational closure of tanks at the three sites,
which are predicated on classification of the residues as low-level
waste, or activities involving removal, stabilization and disposal of
non-residue waste in the tanks that DOE anticipated classifying as low-
level or TRU waste.
If the Department were to proceed with these activities that depend
on DOE being able to classify some tank waste as low-level or TRU
waste, it would be making hundred-million-dollar-plus investments in
facilities and technologies--with no confidence that it has the
authority to classify the waste as it had planned to do, and hence no
assurance that the waste form has a disposal pathway. The Department
has concluded that it should only execute these cleanup actions if the
appeals court overturns the lower court decision, or legislation from
Congress affirms the Department's authority to classify these materials
as low-level or TRU waste that is incidental to reprocessing.

32. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, how will the $350
million high-level waste fund be divided among the sites presuming an
agreement is reached between DOE, the litigants, and the States and
regulators? Please provide a detailed breakdown by site by project.
Ms. Roberson. At this time, we anticipate the site-specific
activities will include the following. However, these allocations may
change depending on the exact nature of the resolution and the manner
in which delays have affected project baselines.

Hanford ($64.1 million, 2035 Accelerated Completions Account):

Begin to retrieve and package wastes from 8 to
20 tanks for disposal as TRU waste at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant.
Pursue supplemental low-activity waste
technologies to prepare that waste for disposal as low-
level waste.
Proceed with final stabilization of residues
for tank closures.

Idaho ($97.3 million, 2012 Accelerated Completions Account):

Begin design of a facility to treat and
stabilize the approximate 1 million gallons of liquid
sodium-bearing wastes remaining in the Idaho tanks in
order to dispose of it as TRU waste.
Proceed with final stabilization of residues
for tank closures.

Savannah River Site ($188.6 million, 2035 Accelerated
Completions Account):

Initiate detailed design and construction of
the Salt Waste Processing Facility (to separate certain
tank wastes into high-activity and low-activity
fractions for subsequent treatment and disposal).
Proceed with an in-tank process to remove low-
curie salt tank wastes for on-site disposal as low-
level waste.
Proceed with activities to separate actinides
(some TRU isotopes and some strontium) from tank
wastes, so that the actinides would be processed
through the Defense Waste Processing Facility and
disposed of as high-level waste and remaining as low-
level waste.
Grout residual tank waste for on-site disposal
in the Saltstone vaults as low-level waste.
Proceed with final stabilization of residues
for tank closure.

ACCELERATED CLEANUP

33. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, the DOE was supposed
to report to Congress within 60 days of enactment of the Fiscal Year
2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (i.e., by February
1, 2004) regarding proposed statutory changes for its ``Accelerated
Cleanup'' program. When can we expect this report and what changes will
DOE propose?
Ms. Roberson. I apologize for the tardiness of our response, but
thank you for the opportunity to identify statutory changes critical to
accelerated risk reduction, cleanup, and closure of Department sites.
You should receive our formal response shortly.
We have identified one statutory change for the accelerated cleanup
program that the Department formally recommended to Congress in August
2003. This legislation would clarify the Department's authority to
separate and dispose of tank waste according to the risk it presents.
The Department has been in discussion with the affected States and
congressional delegations in an attempt to agree on a legislative
solution. Clarification of the Department's authority to classify waste
remains critical to implementation of accelerated cleanup plans at
Idaho, Hanford, and the Savannah River Site. These discussions resulted
in agreement with the State of South Carolina on a legislative
approach, and we appreciate the committee's consideration of this
approach with respect to the Savannah River Site in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.
The Department has not identified any additional statutory changes
needed to execute accelerated cleanup. However, the cleanup program
continues to implement various initiatives (e.g., baseline validation
reviews, acquisition strategies, and development of site Risk-Based End
State documents) that may, at some point in the future, lead to
identification of additional desirable statutory changes. Should these
initiatives lead to identification of additional changes to support
accelerated cleanup, the Department will inform Congress.

34. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, the Risk-Based End
States (RBES) project is based on the premise that cleanup should focus
on the risks to human health and safety, and protection of the
environment consistent with the future use of the property. It appears
that in some instances the level of cleanup may be less than the level
previously agreed to under the various cleanup agreements with the
States. Even before the site RBES vision statements were finalized,
several State governments and EPA regional offices, including Ohio and
California, weighed in with strong objections. How is DOE addressing
the concerns of EPA and these States?
Ms. Roberson. Stakeholder involvement is an essential part of the
RBES process. The RBES documents will remain drafts for quite a while
until we believe that we have adequately and openly addressed any
issues or concerns with the public and with the regulators. This does
not overtake the regulatory process. It provides a visible basis for us
and for the public to understand what we may propose in the process.

35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roberson, DOE is attempting an
ambitious ``Accelerated Cleanup'' program while at the same time
attempting to negotiate a transition of cleanup responsibilities away
from EM to other offices, including a new LM, and while also
restructuring the budget to create new accounts for funding cleanup and
waste management. What comments and concerns has DOE received from
stakeholders about these initiatives and about how they will be
implemented?
Ms. Roberson. Stakeholder comments about these initiatives and how
they will be implemented are generally supportive. There have been,
however, some specific concerns expressed. The transition of certain
activities from the EM office to other offices has been praised for
bringing better organization and efficiency to the cleanup effort.
Concerns have centered on the necessity of working with a number of
different DOE offices rather than a single EM entity. Stakeholders,
regulators, and local government officials have also expressed concern
that after years of developing a close working relationship on numerous
levels with EM, they will have to begin the process allover with a
number of different offices. The ability of EM and other offices that
share responsibilities to act in a coordinated manner so as to avoid
confusion and having important actions ``fall through the cracks'' is
another issue of concern.
The restructuring of the budget to create new accounts has met
widespread support from interested parties. Stakeholders generally feel
that the changes have brought about greater transparency and
accountability and have resulted in a budget that is much easier for a
layperson to follow. The concerns expressed have centered on the usual
issues of funding sufficiency and certainty.

OFFICE OF LEGACY MANAGEMENT

36. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Owen, DOE's Weldon Springs site in
Missouri is one of the first sites to be transferred to LM. DOE and the
State of Missouri signed an agreement to provide funding for monitoring
agreements. DOE has since withdrawn support for the agreement. Many
more sites are planned to be transferred to LM. Will DOE reinstate
funds for monitoring agreements for States and communities?
Mr. Owen. LM is responsible for over 60 sites across the country;
one of these is the Weldon Spring Site in St. Charles County, Missouri.
Since 1993, DOE has provided over $5,000,000, through a grant, to the
State of Missouri for its participation in the remediation of the
Weldon Spring Site. DOE continues to provide funding to the State
through the existing grant but has reduced the level of funding from an
average of $450,000 per year to $65,000 in 2004. We believe this is an
appropriate amount for the State's workload in 2004. This reduction is
commensurate with the overall reduction in work at the site from over
$60,000,000 per year in active remediation to roughly $1,000,000 a year
focused on surveillance and maintenance. In addition, DOE continues to
fund the Weldon Spring Citizens Commission as an integral component of
our public participation efforts and St. Charles County to perform
independent monitoring of ground water.
LM expects to assume responsibility for an additional 45 sites over
the next 5 years. DOE intends to continue to compensate affected State
and local governments for work that is required to ensure the
protection of human health and the environment at our sites.

37. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Owen, what is the current status of
the claims under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act?
Mr. Owen. As of September 3, 2004, the DOE has effectively
completed its work on 8,197--data acquisition from DOE sites and case
processing. This number includes 3,755 completed/closed cases--
applicants have either received a determination or their cases were
closed for lack of eligibility or the applicant withdrew. In addition
another 14,971 cases are currently being developed. Lastly, 2,213 cases
are in th queue awaiting development.

38. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Owen, how do those numbers compare to
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2002?
Mr. Owen. The Department's Physician Panel rule governing the
programs procedures became effective on September 13, 2002. At this
point the Department began processing cases, but by the end of fiscal
year 2002, no cases had gone through the Physician Panel determination
process. At the end of fiscal year 2002, the Department had received
approximately 12,000 cases. While the Department began processing cases
immediately after the rule became effective, the first few months after
the rule became effective, the program office spent the majority of its
resources setting up the program (establishing procedures, developing
processes, hiring contractors and staff, etc.).

39. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Owen, what remedies is DOE looking at
to improve the situation for the ``Cold War'' veterans?
Mr. Owen. For the past 10 years, the Department has assisted and
continues to assist ``Cold War'' contractor employees by providing
benefits consistent with section 3161 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. The focus of the program when
it began about 10 years ago was to assist individuals whose careers
were dedicated to weapons production. The majority of those individuals
have now retired. LM is now also responsible for oversight of benefit
continuity for contractor employees at site closure. The Department
believes that there are progressive benefit programs in place to
address the needs of contractor employees at site closure, some of whom
are ``Cold War'' employees, and carefully reviews those programs.

40. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Owen, the risk based end states draft
headquarters documents reference a modification process for changing
the site end states in the future. The modification process is not
specified in those documents. Once the sites are transferred, are there
provisions for modifying the site end states within LM?
Mr. Owen. LM is working closely with the EM office in the
development and review of the RBES documents. LM conducts annual
inspections at sites where we are required to perform long-term
surveillance and maintenance. One component of that annual inspection
is to evaluate potential future changes in the use of the site and/or
the surrounding area. A decision to change a site's land use would be
dependent on the relevant land use controls and appropriate
consultation with the affected Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments and/or adjacent landowners.

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGIC FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Allard, Cornyn, and
Bill Nelson.
Majority staff member present: L. David Cherington,
counsel.
Minority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Bridget E.
Ward, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

Senator Allard. I am going to call the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee hearing to order here. I am going to go ahead and
make an opening statement. My hope is by the time I finish my
opening statement, we will have some minority members here,
then we can go ahead with testimony. We will maybe give Senator
Cornyn an opportunity to make an opening statement, if he would
like.
This hearing will come to order. I want to welcome all of
you here. I am pleased to welcome our witnesses today:
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) and Under Secretary of Energy Linton F. Brooks, and
Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
Gentlemen, I thank you both for your service to our Nation
and for taking the time and effort to join us here today.
We are here to receive testimony on U.S. strategic forces
and capabilities. I would venture an informed guess that no
command in the U.S. military has gone through more changes than
STRATCOM over the last couple of years. These changes reflect
the rapid evolution of the international security environment,
the merger of Space Command and Strategic Command, and
previously unassigned new missions now assigned to STRATCOM.
There is no more important task for this subcommittee than
to exercise its oversight functions with respect to U.S.
nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons remain the most awesome tool in
our arsenal. I cannot foresee any circumstances in which
nuclear weapons will cease to play a central role in our
deterrence posture. The safety, security, reliability, and
effectiveness of these weapons remains paramount.
The Department of Defense (DOD) concluded in its 2001
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that a new, more flexible,
adaptive strategic triad was needed to deal with new threats.
These threats are uncertain to their origins, but certainly
quite different than those posed in the Cold War. Rather than
rely exclusively on a nuclear triad of land, sea-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and long-range
bombers to deter a single adversary, the NPR outlined a new
triad consisting of offensive strike forces, both nuclear and
non-nuclear, defensive systems, both active and passive, and an
infrastructure capable of supporting these systems. These are
all supported by robust command, control, and intelligence
capabilities.
The purpose of these capabilities is not simply to deter,
but to assure our allies and to dissuade, deter and, if
necessary, defeat our adversaries. The new missions assigned to
STRATCOM reflect these new strategic realities with which we
must deal. Strategic does not equate to nuclear anymore.
Strategic could mean an information operation to disable an
adversary command and control network. Strategic could mean a
conventional munition delivered precisely on a weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) target, targets that once could easily be
defeated with nuclear weapons are now or will be held at risk
with non-nuclear systems.
I believe that these new options raise the nuclear
threshold higher than it has ever been. I am aware that much
work is already being done. Studies are proceeding on the new
shape of Global Strike. One purpose of this hearing is to more
fully explore the full range of strategic capabilities the
Nation needs to achieve prompt, decisive results, when
required, and to understand the scope of the programs that
support these capabilities.
None of this is to say that defenses and advanced non-
nuclear weapons and delivery systems can deter or defeat the
entire range of threats. Our legacy nuclear weapons and
delivery systems will remain important to hold certain targets
at risk and for no other reason than their enormous destructive
power remains a powerful deterrent.
There are no new nuclear weapons initiatives in the budget
request for fiscal year 2005. Over the last 2 years, we have
also debated whether advanced nuclear concepts may contribute
to our ability to hold at risk emerging threats. In both the
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 requests, the Department
of Energy (DOE) requested funding or legislation for several
nuclear weapons initiatives, including the feasibility study on
the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and Advanced
Concepts Initiative research.
As a result of these debates, I believe we were able to put
some safety checks in place which will allow research and
feasibility studies to continue while still allowing Congress
the final say on more advanced development. It is my view that
we found a good balance between nuclear weapons research and
studies versus engineering development in subsequent phases.
A series of recent reports, including the NPR, to Congress
by the panel to assess the reliability, safety, and security of
the United States nuclear stockpile, known as the Foster Panel
reports, and the report of the commission on maintaining the
United States nuclear weapons expertise, known as the Chiles
Report, pointed out the importance of sustaining key parts of
the third leg of the new triad, the nuclear weapons
infrastructure and expertise in the nuclear weapons program.
The advanced concepts initiative provides a new outlook to
ensure our weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians have
opportunities to conduct research and studies to ensure that
they are able to maintain their skills and the abilities to
respond to military requirements sent or to be sent from the
DOD.
The feasibility study on the RNEP is an example of an
advanced concept which seeks to meet a specific military
requirement of the DOD. There could be a variety of advanced
concepts which address reliability, safety, or security issues,
and ensure our weapons labs and plants are ready to deliver is
paramount to our Nation's nuclear weapons program.
The balance we achieve is in the requirement that should
the decision be taken to move beyond research for feasibility
studies for the RNEP or low-yield nuclear weapons, the
administration must first receive a specific authorization from
Congress. This will keep Congress informed of these latter
phases of nuclear weapons development and will provide ample
opportunity for a vigorous debate on these issues to occur at
that time.
We do not want our nuclear weapons scientists to be afraid
to think for fear of breaking the law. We should let our
scientists think about the science of nuclear weapons. We
should let the policy makers of both the administration and
Congress decide, based on accepted facts established by solid
research, whether we should proceed forward with new or
modified nuclear weapons.
There are several other issues that I believe we need to
explore in some depth in this hearing. Several projects key to
the success of the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program
are struggling for a variety of reasons. These include the
National Ignition Facility, the Modern Pit Facility, and the
Mixed Oxide (MOX) Facility.
Safeguards and security, especially the new design basis
threat requirements, remain a significant concern. I am still
not satisfied that NNSA has provided enough transparency in its
budget to request for Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities (RTBF). In my view, we cannot afford to defer
maintenance until we end up with a dilapidated and potentially
dangerous nuclear weapons complex.
I believe that the development and construction of modern
facilities, the research encouraged by the Advanced Concepts
Initiative, and maintaining the infrastructure across the NNSA
complex are seed corn for the future of our nuclear deterrent
forces.
Ambassador Brooks, I hope that during your testimony and
the question period we can get a better assessment of how NNSA
is addressing challenges in each of these areas.
Now I would like to recognize other members of the
committee that are here. I will start with my good friend from
Texas, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess that was
an easy choice, given the conflicts that I know members have
with other committee meetings. Indeed, I am going to have to
leave here momentarily, but I did want to say to the Ambassador
and Admiral, thank you for being here this morning to talk
about this very important subject. We certainly do not want the
occasion to pass without thanking you again for your service to
our country.
As we transform our country's defense and meet new and
emerging threats, you both play a critical role in redefining
and reshaping our nuclear security and strategic forces for the
21st century. I believe that I would adopt everything that
Chairman Allard has said about the importance of that issue,
particularly when it comes to developing responsive nuclear
weapons infrastructure.
That is, in many ways, as important as strike forces in
meeting our defense objectives. The capabilities of the
defense, technical, and manufacturing infrastructure provide
the ability to quickly respond to new or emerging threats. I
believe that, Ambassador Brooks, in your statement you pointed
out that physically restoring the capability to produce
plutonium pits in sufficient quantities will be essential to
responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Chairman Allard made
the same reference.
The Modern Pit Facility or Pit Rework Facility will support
the pit remanufacturing needs of the entire stockpile. This
capability is important, even if we never produce another
nuclear, another new weapon. I strongly support the building of
a Modern Pit Facility and encourage members to fully fund this
effort.
With that, I would say once again thank you very much for
being here and look forward to reading your testimony.
I will have to leave, Mr. Chairman, for another committee
meeting, but thank you for conducting this important hearing.
Senator Allard. Well, thank you, Senator Cornyn, for being
here. You are an active player on this committee, and it is a
delight to have you on this subcommittee. The ranking member,
Senator Nelson, will be here shortly, I am told. What I thought
we would do is we will proceed with the testimony from the
panel. Then when he arrives, we will give him an opportunity to
make his opening statement.
So which of you would like to go first? Ambassador Brooks.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Ambassador Brooks. Thanks, sir, and thank you for the
opportunity to talk about the administration's views on nuclear
policy. I am especially pleased to be joined by Admiral Ellis,
who is a friend and colleague of long standing. He will be
speaking from the military perspective.
I have submitted a written statement and would like, with
your permission, to summarize it at this time.
Senator Allard. Without objection, both of your full
statements will be made a part of the record.
Ambassador Brooks. In May 2001, President Bush spoke at the
National Defense University (NDU), and he articulated his
vision for nuclear weapons. ``Nuclear weapons still have a
vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. I am
committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest
possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with our
national security needs.''
The President in that statement and elsewhere recognized
that a full decade after the Cold War, it was time to do a
fundamental reexamination of the post-Cold War role of nuclear
weapons. The results of that examination were codified in the
December 2001 NPR, which is setting the direction for our
nuclear forces for the next decade and beyond.
That review reaffirmed that nuclear weapons remain crucial,
but consistent with the change in the international
environment, it also represented a radical departure from the
past. It was, in my view, the most fundamental rethinking of
the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in the quarter
century.
Among the many changes in the NPR, three seem to me to be
particularly important. Instead of focusing on deterring the
nuclear threat posed by a single specific enemy, as we did
during the Cold War, it established the need for a
capabilities-based force to accomplish four distinct policy
goals.
Second, instead of treating nuclear weapons in isolation,
it considered them as an integrated component of American
military power, allowing us to use other means to achieve
objectives that previously could only have been addressed with
nuclear weapons.
Third, and perhaps most important, instead of treating the
future as static and predictable, it recognized requirements
could change and U.S. nuclear forces must be prepared to
respond to those changes.
Under this new thinking, our nuclear forces serve four
goals. First, to assure allies of our commitment to them and
our ability to make good on that commitment. The implications
of this goal are that our forces have to be effective. They
have to be reliable and they have to be seen that way by our
allies. Assurance serves our nonproliferation objectives,
because those allies with the capability to develop nuclear
weapons for themselves do not need to because they have
confidence in the continued reliability of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella.
Second, our nuclear forces serve to dissuade potential
adversaries from trying to match our capabilities. That means
that we need a combination of forces and infrastructures so
that no potential power can have any hope of matching our
capability and thus will be dissuaded from trying.
Third, our nuclear forces have to fulfill their traditional
role of deterring threats. That implies an ability to hold at
risk those elements of power that a potential adversary values.
Finally, the NPR called for forces capable of defending and
defeating those threats that for whatever reason could not be
deterred.
Those first two policy goals help determine the size of our
force. The second two policy goals help determine the nature of
those forces.
As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, if
Admiral Ellis and I had appeared before you a few years ago, we
would have spoken of a triad. We would have spoken of ICBMs and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers and
how they work together. The NPR broadens that concept to a new
triad of strike capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear,
active and passive defenses, especially ballistic missile
defense (BMD), research and development (R&D), and an
industrial infrastructure.
Now, there have been some press reports that the new triad
in the NPR somehow increased reliance on nuclear forces. That
is not true. In fact, they continued the trend of the past
decade toward a reduced reliance. By having a new emphasis on
BMD, we are no longer as dependent on offensive strike to
enforce deterrence. By strengthening non-nuclear strike forces,
we are no longer as dependent on nuclear weapons for the
offensive component of deterrence.
Our new approach was coupled with a judgment that we no
longer need to plan as if Russia represented an immediate
threat. That was the basis for the dramatic reduction in
deployed forces codified in the Moscow Treaty. Over the next 8
years, the United States will reduce deployed warheads by about
two-thirds from today's level.
The experience of the last decade and a half and our
difficulty in predicting the future make it unwise for us to
base our security on false assumptions that we can predict the
future. Thus, while we reduce our deployed weapons, we have to
plan against an uncertain future. Specifically, we have to be
ready to respond to both unforeseen technical problems and
unanticipated geopolitical changes.
One part of that response is a non-deployed stockpile. As
part of its plan to implement the NPR, the administration is
assessing the long-term requirements for non-deployed weapons.
Congress has requested it be provided with the results of that
assessment in a revised stockpile plan. We are working to
complete that task as soon as possible. While we regret the
delay in submitting the plan, the importance of nuclear weapons
to our security makes it imperative to conduct a thorough
review.
Now, I am not able to provide specifics, and I could not do
so in an unclassified forum in any case, but let me give you
some of the considerations involved in such a review.
The 2012 nuclear stockpile will be substantially reduced
from current levels. The reductions will not lower the
stockpile to the 1,700 to 2,200 weapons called for in the
Moscow Treaty. We will always need additional weapons beyond
those that are deployed for logistics spares and to conduct
surveillance testing.
In addition, we will need warheads to meet our commitments
to our allies. We will maintain a small number of warheads for
U.S. nonstrategic nuclear forces. Finally, we will retain
warheads over and above those deployed as a hedge against
geopolitical and technical risk so that we can augment the
operationally-deployed force in the event that world events
require. We will also need to preserve diversity in our force
so that a problem in one system does to result in a major
degradation in our capability.
One of the many new concepts in the NPR, and the most
important for me personally, is the idea of a robust industrial
base--what we are coming to call a responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure--is as important as strike forces or defenses in
achieving our long-term defense goals.
Defense scientific, technical, and manufacturing
infrastructure must provide us the means to respond to new
challenges. If we can do this, if we can produce new or
replacement warheads on a short time scale, if we can respond
to technical surprise, then we can go much further in reducing
the stockpile we have to maintain on hand.
In my written testimony, I discuss in some detail the
characteristics of a responsive infrastructure. I would like to
highlight only one area right now, and that is underground
nuclear test readiness. I need to make it very clear, as the
President has made it very clear, that we have no plans to
resume testing. Our efforts to improve test readiness are a
hedge against the possibility of a problem arising that cannot
be confirmed or a fix certified without a test. Our goal is to
achieve the 18-month test readiness posture called for in the
Defense Authorization Act. That is an appropriate time, because
it represents a typical time to diagnose a problem, design a
test, confirm the problem, and certify a fix.
A responsive infrastructure has both an intellectual and a
physical dimension. Intellectually, our proposals to examine
advanced concepts will help train scientists and engineers who
have to provide the design underpinning for the infrastructure
of the future. Physically, as you mentioned in your opening
statement, one of the most important steps is restoring a
capability to produce plutonium pits.
The Modern Pit Facility (MPF), or what I am coming to call
more accurately the Pit Rework Facility, will support the
remanufacturing needs of the stockpile. As you said in your
statement and Senator Cornyn said, we need this facility even
if the United States never produces another new weapon. All
existing plutonium pits will ultimately need to be rebuilt due
to aging effects caused by radioactive decay.
Let me turn to two particularly contentious elements of the
administration's budget request and describe how they relate to
the principles we have been discussing. In 2005 we propose to
continue a modest research effort on the Advanced Concepts
Initiative and to continue the RNEP feasibility and cost study.
There has been a lot of discussion of these two programs. So I
want to review them in some detail.
We intend to use Advanced Concepts funds to investigate new
ideas, not necessarily new weapons. For example, we are
beginning a study examining the feasibility of adapting an
existing nuclear warhead to provide a cruise missile capability
that has enhanced safety and use control. We are looking at the
feasibility of improving warhead design margins so that we can
have continued high confidence as we get farther away from
nuclear testing. We are in discussion with the Air Force about
examining the utility of nuclear weapons to destroy chemical
and biological agents, although we have made no decisions on
that.
Perhaps the single most controversial request in our budget
is continued funding for the RNEP. This study is to determine
whether an existing nuclear warhead, either the B-61 bomb or
the B-83 bomb, could be adapted without nuclear testing to
improve our ability to hold at risk hard and deeply buried
targets.
I want to correct some misconceptions. There is a clear
military utility to this weapon. It has been recognized for
almost a decade. That is why the DOD asked for it to be
studied. The DOD submitted a classified report to this
committee last year, which remains valid and provides some
additional details inappropriate for this session.
Second, despite this utility, we are only going to move
beyond the study stage if the President approves it and if the
funds are authorized and appropriated by Congress. We included
funds in our out-year projections only to preserve the
President's option. There will be no decision until the study
is completed. The law is very clear, the beginning development
engineering will require specific congressional approval.
Finally, even if the study proves that the weapon is
feasible, the President decides to proceed with it, and
Congress agrees with that decision, this weapon would not
change the policy goal of deterrence. Deterrence requires that
we be able to hold at risk things that an adversary values. In
our effort to determine the effectiveness of this earth
penetrating weapon, it reflects not a change in deterrence, but
a continued emphasis on it. Once again, I refer you to the
classified reports submitted last year.
I would like to conclude by addressing three misconceptions
raised both by Members of Congress and by others about our
efforts. First, there is the suggestion that you referred to in
your opening statement that we sought repeal of the prohibition
on low-yield warhead development in order to develop and field
new, low-yield nuclear weapons.
Second, there is the perception that in doing so we are
going to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional
weapons and make nuclear use more likely.
Finally, there is a perception that nuclear weapons R&D
will undercut our nonproliferation efforts. All three of those
perceptions are wrong. Press accounts have spoken of
administration plans to develop new low-yield weapons, but
there are no such plans. Such warhead concepts could not in any
case proceed to full-scale development, much less production,
unless Congress authorizes and appropriates the funds.
The repeal of the prohibition on low-yield warhead
development simply removed the chilling effect on our ability
to think, because somehow those thoughts ``could lead to''
designs of less than five kilotons.
None of our efforts are blurring the distinction between
conventional and nuclear weapons or making nuclear use more
likely. The U.S. stockpile has had warheads capable of
producing very low-yields for decades. At the height of the
Cold War, thousands of these warheads were deployed. The simple
possession of these weapons never made nuclear use by the
United States more likely, even in regional confrontations
where their use might not have provoked a Soviet response. Only
the President can authorize use of nuclear weapons. No
President would employ any nuclear weapon of any yield except
in the gravest of circumstances. The nuclear threshold for the
United States has been, is, and always will be high.
Finally, our major nonproliferation objective is to prevent
rogue states and terrorists from acquiring WMD. Neither the
Advanced Concept Initiative efforts nor studies of earth-
penetrating weapons will increase incentives for terrorists to
acquire such weapons. Those incentives are already high. Our
efforts are not likely to have any impact on rogue states,
whose proliferation activities appear independent of U.S.
nuclear programs.
Over the past decade, we have seen significant cuts in the
number of U.S. weapons. We have taken weapons off alert. We
have ended nuclear testing. We have ended weapons production.
There is no evidence that that had any effect whatsoever on the
behavior of the North Koreas or the Irans of the world.
Further, for more responsible states, our efforts are also
not going to hurt nonproliferation. Once again, we have an
example. The same weapon that I am trying to see if I can get
to penetrate into rock we decided to have penetrate into frozen
soil in the mid-1990s. That decision was taken just before the
last review conferences of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and appears to have had no impact on the success of the world's
reaffirmation of nonproliferation norms.
Mr. Chairman, the United States is going to continue to
lead the way to a safer world through deep reductions in
nuclear forces, through Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) efforts. But we will have to continue to
maintain an effective, reliable, and capable nuclear force as a
hedge against an uncertain future.
Our efforts to reduce the stockpile to the minimum
consistent with national security, to address options for
stockpile transformation, and to restore a responsive nuclear
weapons infrastructure are key elements of the administration's
national security strategy. Carrying these out is in the
national interest and poses no risk to our nonproliferation
objectives.
This concludes my statement, sir. After you have heard from
Admiral Ellis, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]

Prepared Statement by Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the administration's views on nuclear policy, U.S.
nuclear forces, the nuclear weapons stockpile to support those forces,
and ongoing work on implementing the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
I also want to thank all of the members for their strong support for
our critical national security activities. Before I begin my remarks, I
would like to say how pleased I am to be on this panel today with my
friend and colleague, Admiral James Ellis, Commander of the United
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), who will present the military
perspective on the same issues.

OVERVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Since before he took office, President Bush has been committed to
achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest number of nuclear
weapons consistent with current and future national security
requirements. On May 1, 2001, at the National Defense University (NDU),
he articulated his vision:

Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security
and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the
composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that
reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I am committed
to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible
number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security
needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to
move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will
lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for
peace in the world.

The President recognized clearly that, almost a decade after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it was time to conduct a fundamental
examination of the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world.
The results of that reexamination were described in the December 2001
NPR. The purpose of that review was to set forth the direction for
American nuclear forces over the next decade and beyond. Let me
highlight some key points about the review.
The NPR reassessed the role of nuclear forces and their
contribution toward meeting defense policy goals. It reaffirmed that
nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a crucial
element of U.S. national security strategy. But, consistent with the
changed international environment, the NPR represented a radical
departure from the past and the most fundamental re-thinking of the
roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in almost a quarter-century.
Among the many changes, three are the most important:

Instead of focusing on deterring the nuclear threat
posed by a single, specific enemy, as in the Cold War, it
established the need for a capabilities-based force to
accomplish four distinct defense policy goals.
Instead of treating nuclear weapons in isolation, it
considered them as an integrated component of American military
power, thus allowing us to achieve national security objectives
through other means that previously could only have been
addressed with nuclear weapons.
Instead of treating the future as static and
predictable, it recognized that requirements could change and
that U.S. nuclear forces must be prepared to respond to those
changes, including by increasing the fraction of the force that
is deployed.

Let me discuss each of these in turn.

THE POLICY GOALS OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES

Under the new thinking of the NPR, our nuclear forces serve four
goals:

To assure allies of our commitment to them and our
ability to make good on that commitment. The implications of
this goal are that forces must be effective and reliable.
Assurance serves our non-proliferation objectives because those
allies with the capability to develop nuclear weapons can
continue to forego doing so, safe in the knowledge of the
reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
To dissuade potential adversaries from trying to match
our capabilities or from engaging in strategic competition.
This requires that we maintain a combination of forces and
infrastructure so that no potential power can have any hope of
matching our capability and will be dissuaded from attempting
to do so.
To deter any threats that do emerge. This implies an
ability to hold at risk those elements of power that a
potential adversary values. I will say more on this point in a
moment.
To defend against and defeat those threats that, for
whatever reason, we do not deter.

The first two policy goals help determine the size of our nuclear
forces, while the second two govern the nature of those forces. As the
committee will readily see, these goals are, in a sense, the goals of
our entire military. That is why Admiral Ellis often says that we
should, perhaps, refer to the NPR more generally as a Strategic Posture
Review.

THE NEW TRIAD

Had Admiral Ellis and I appeared before you a few years ago, we
would have spoken of a ``triad'' of strategic nuclear forces. This
triad included bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), each with unique
strengths that operated synergistically to ensure our ability to
retaliate under any condition of war initiation. The NPR broadens our
thinking to encompass a new triad of flexible response capabilities
consisting of:

Non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities including
systems for command and control,
Active and passive defenses including ballistic
missile defenses (BMD),
Research and development (R&D) and industrial
infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain nuclear
offensive forces and defensive systems.

To provide a practical means to implement this new, integrated
approach, the President established a new STRATCOM, with responsibility
for Global Strike--both nuclear and non-nuclear--and for integrating
missile defenses with offenses.
Contrary to some press reports, this new triad--and the NPR
generally--continued the trend of the past decade towards a reduced
reliance on nuclear forces in U.S. national security strategy. The new
emphasis on BMD means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily
dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was
during the Cold War. The strengthening of non-nuclear strike forces--
including precision conventional strike and information operations--
means that the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in the past
on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent capabilities.

PRESENT AND FUTURE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES

Our new approach, coupled with the judgment that we no longer need
to plan our forces as if Russia presented an immediate threat to the
United States, was the basis for dramatic reductions--codified in the
Moscow Treaty--in operationally-deployed strategic nuclear forces. Over
the next 8 years, the United States will cut the number of deployed
warheads by approximately two-thirds from today's level. But the
experience of the past decade and a half makes it clear that it is
unwise for us to base our security on the false belief that we can
predict the future. Thus, while dramatically reducing the number of
deployed weapons, we must plan against an uncertain future.
Specifically, the United States needs to be prepared to respond to
both unforeseen technical problems and unanticipated geopolitical
change. One element of such a response is a responsive infrastructure,
which I will discuss in a moment. But another component of such a
response is the non-deployed stockpile. As part of its plan to
implement the NPR, the administration is conducting an assessment that,
when completed, will clarify the long-term requirements for non-
deployed weapons. Congress requested such a revised stockpile plan as
well. The administration is working to complete this complex task as
soon as possible. While we regret the delay, the importance of nuclear
weapons to our security makes it imperative to conduct a thorough
review.
While I am not prepared to provide specifics--and could not do so
in an unclassified forum in any case--I can provide some of the
considerations factoring into the review. The 2012 nuclear stockpile
will be substantially reduced from current levels. But reductions will
not lower the stockpile to 1,700-2,200 total warheads. Additional
warheads over and above the operationally-deployed strategic warheads
will be needed for routine maintenance of the stockpile including as
logistics spares and to replace those warheads eliminated during
destructive surveillance testing.
In addition, a small number of warheads (reduced by 90 percent from
Cold War levels) for U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces will be
retained, among other things, to meet commitments to allies.
Finally, warheads over and above the operationally-deployed force
will be retained over the near term for prudent risk management in
connection with mitigating geopolitical and technical risks. In
particular, sufficient warheads will be retained to augment the
operationally-deployed force in the event that world events require a
more robust deterrence posture.
We also must preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall
stockpile in order to mitigate technical risks. Although we are making
progress in restoring a responsive nuclear weapons production
infrastructure, we are not yet able to produce replacement warheads in
sufficient quantity to respond if a technical problem called into
question the safety or reliability of one or more warheads critical to
our Nation's deterrent. Thus, for example, we are planning to deploy
two types of ICBM warheads--the W87 and W78--and will retain sufficient
numbers of these two types in reserve so that if a technical failure
occurred in one type, there would be sufficient warheads of the other
type to restore the operationally-deployed ICBM force. We seek to apply
this approach, where appropriate, to other nuclear delivery means.

RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFRASTRUCTURE

Of the many new concepts in the NPR, one of the most important is
formal recognition that a robust defense R&D and industrial base--a key
element of which is a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure--is as
important as strike forces or defenses in achieving our overall defense
goals. The demonstrated capabilities of the defense scientific,
technical, and manufacturing infrastructure, including its ability to
sustain and adapt, provides the U.S. with the means to respond to new,
unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner.
If we can employ this infrastructure to produce new or replacement
warheads on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or
in response to stockpile ``surprise'', then we can go much further in
reducing the standing stockpile and meet the President's vision of the
smallest stockpile consistent with our Nation's security.
By ``responsive'' we refer to the resilience of the nuclear weapons
enterprise to unanticipated events or emerging threats, and the ability
to anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them before
our deterrent is degraded--all the while continuing to carry out the
day-to-day activities in support of the stockpile. Unanticipated events
could include complete failure of a deployed warhead type. Emerging
threats could call for new or modified warhead development, or for
providing additional warheads for force augmentation.
A key measure of ``responsiveness'' is how long it would take to
carry out certain activities to address stockpile ``surprise'' or deal
with new or emerging threats. Specific goals have been established for
several activities; our progress towards meeting them is an important
measure of the success of our program:

Fix stockpile problems: The ability to assess a
stockpile problem, once one has been identified, and then
design, develop, implement, and certify a fix will depend on
the nature and scope of the problem. For a relatively minor
problem, our goal is to be able to deploy warheads modified to
overcome the problem within 1 year.
Adapt weapons: Our goal is to achieve a capability to
modify or repackage existing warheads within 18 months of a
decision to enter engineering development. I note that under
current law such a step would require congressional approval.
New warhead design, development, and initial
production: Our goal is to be able to design, develop, and
begin production of a new warhead within 3-4 years of a
decision to enter engineering development. Among other things
this capability is critical to reduce reliance on warheads that
are beyond their life expectancies. Once again, congressional
approval would be required. While there are no current plans to
develop new weapons, maintaining the capability is an important
pre-requisite to extensive reductions.
Quantity production of new warheads: Our goal is to
maintain sufficient production capacity to produce new warheads
in sufficient quantities to meet any defense needs that arise
without disrupting ongoing refurbishments. In the near term,
refurbishment demands, starting later this decade and
continuing until about 2014, will dominate production capacity.
Support for force augmentation: We must assure that
services such as warhead transportation, tritium support, etc.,
are not ``long poles in the tent'' for force augmentation--they
must be capable of being carried out on a time scale consistent
with the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to deploy
weapons.
Underground nuclear test readiness: We have no plan to
resume testing; our efforts to improve test readiness are a
prudent hedge against the possibility of a problem arising in
the stockpile that cannot be confirmed, or a fix certified,
without a nuclear test. Our goal is to achieve an 18-month test
readiness posture as directed by the Defense Authorization Act.
Eighteen months is appropriate because that is a typical time
to diagnose a problem and design a test to confirm the problem
or certify the fix.

A responsive infrastructure has both intellectual and physical
dimensions. Intellectually, the administration's proposals to examine
new advanced concepts will allow us to train the scientists and
engineers who must provide the design underpinning for a responsive
infrastructure. Physically restoring a capability to produce plutonium
pits in sufficient quantities will be essential. The Modern Pit
Facility (MPF)--or, more accurately, a pit rework facility--will
support the pit remanufacturing needs of the entire stockpile. It is
important to understand that we need this facility even if the United
States never produces another new weapon. All existing plutonium pits
will ultimately need to be rebuilt due to aging effects, for example,
caused by radioactive decay of plutonium.
We are just beginning the transformation to a responsive nuclear
weapons infrastructure. I call for your support in this important
endeavor.

NEAR TERM IMPLICATIONS

Let me now discuss two specific elements of the administration's
budget request and how they relate to the principles we have been
discussing. The NPR highlighted the importance of ensuring that the
weapons complex can adjust to the changing requirements of nuclear
deterrence in the coming decades. In fiscal year 2005, we propose
continuing a modest research effort on advanced concepts to meet
potential new or emerging requirements. We also propose continuing the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) feasibility and cost study now
underway.
Because there has been a great deal of discussion on the
implications of these two programs, I would like to review them in some
detail. We intend to use advanced concepts funds to investigate new
ideas, not necessarily new weapons. For example, we are beginning a
study examining the feasibility of adapting an existing nuclear warhead
to provide a cruise missile capability that incorporates enhanced
safety and user control. Some additional work is underway to examine
the feasibility of improving warhead design margins in order to ensure
continued high confidence in warhead reliability without nuclear
testing. We are also in discussion with the Air Force on examining the
utility of nuclear weapons to destroy chemical and biological agents,
although no decisions to study this area have yet been reached. The DOD
and Department of Energy (DOE) will jointly determine the specific uses
of the remaining fiscal year 2004 and the proposed fiscal year 2005
funds.
Perhaps the single most contentious issue in our budget request is
continued funding for the RNEP study. This study is to determine
whether existing warheads--the B61 and the B83--could be adapted
without nuclear testing to improve our ability to hold at risk
hardened, deeply buried facilities that may be important to a future
adversary. I want to correct several misconceptions about this effort:

There is a clear military utility to such a weapon,
which is why the DOD asked for it to be studied. A classified
report was submitted to this committee last year on this
subject and remains valid.
Despite this utility, we will move beyond the study
stage only if the President approves and funds are authorized
and appropriated by Congress. We included funds in our out-year
projections only to preserve the President's options. No
decision will be made until the study is completed. The law is
clear that beginning development engineering requires
congressional approval.
Even if deployed, this weapon does not represent a
change from our policy goal of deterrence. Deterrence requires
we be able to hold at risk that which an adversary values. Our
efforts to determine the potential effectiveness of an earth
penetrating weapon reflect a continued emphasis on enhancing
deterrence. Once again I refer you to the classified report
submitted last year.
Nuclear Misconceptions
Let me conclude my statement by addressing three misconceptions
that have been raised both by Members of Congress and by others:

That we sought repeal of the prohibition on low-yield
warhead development in order to develop and field new, low-
yield nuclear weapons;
That in doing so we will blur the distinction between
nuclear and conventional weapons, making nuclear use more
likely; and
That nuclear weapons R&D necessarily undercuts U.S.
nonproliferation efforts.

While press accounts have spoken of administration plans to develop
new, low-yield weapons, there are no such plans. Nor does repeal of the
prohibition on low-yield warhead development commit the United States
to developing, producing or deploying new, low-yield warheads. Such
warhead concepts could not in any case proceed to full-scale
development, much less production and deployment, unless Congress
authorizes and appropriates the funds required. Repeal of this vague
restriction simply removed the chilling effect on scientific inquiry
that has hampered our scientists' ability to explore technical options
of any yield because such options ``could lead to'' designs of less
than five kilotons. Our scientists need the freedom to explore new
concepts both to maintain and exercise their intellectual capabilities
and to respond to needs that one day might be articulated by this or a
future President.
Nor are U.S. R&D programs blurring the line between conventional
and nuclear weapons, making nuclear use more likely. This is not simply
an assertion, but is empirically based. Recall that from the 1950s and
continuing through today, the U.S. nuclear stockpile has contained
warheads capable of producing very low nuclear yields. At the height of
the Cold War many thousands of these warheads were deployed, but never
used--even in regional confrontations where their use would not
necessarily have provoked a Soviet response. There is no evidence that
the simple possession of these weapons made nuclear use by the United
States more likely. To be clear, only the President can authorize use
of U.S. nuclear weapons and no President would be inclined to employ
any nuclear weapon, irrespective of its explosive power, in anything
but the gravest of circumstances. Simply put, the nuclear threshold for
the United States has been, is, and always will be very high.
Along these lines, the NPR emphasized an increasing potential to
base deterrence more on non-nuclear and missile defense capabilities,
and called for development of high-precision, advanced conventional
weapons to replace nuclear systems, where possible, to further reduce
our reliance on nuclear forces to deter aggression.
Finally, the major U.S. nonproliferation objective is to prevent
rogue states and terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and systems for their delivery. Neither advanced
concepts efforts nor studies of an earth-penetrating weapon will
increase incentives for terrorists to acquire such weapons--those
incentives are already high and are unrelated to U.S. capabilities. Nor
are they likely to have any impact on rogue states, whose proliferation
activities march forward independently of the U.S. nuclear program.
Over the past decade we have seen very significant reductions in the
numbers of U.S. (and Russian) nuclear weapons, reductions in the alert
levels of nuclear forces, and the abandonment of U.S. nuclear testing.
No new warheads have been deployed and there has been little U.S.
nuclear modernization. There is absolutely no evidence that these
developments have caused North Korea or Iran to slow down covert
programs to acquire capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. On the
contrary, those programs have accelerated during this period.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the United States will continue to lead the way to a
safer world through the deep reductions in nuclear forces codified by
the Moscow Treaty, through Nunn-Lugar and other Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) efforts, and through other actions. At the same time,
although conventional forces will assume a larger share of the
deterrent role, we will maintain an effective, reliable, and capable--
though smaller--nuclear force as a hedge against a future that is
uncertain and in a world in which substantial nuclear arsenals remain.
Our ongoing efforts to reduce the current stockpile to the minimum
consistent with national security requirements, to address options for
transformation of this smaller stockpile, and to restore a responsive
nuclear weapons infrastructure are key elements of the administration's
national security strategy. Carrying out these efforts will pose no
risk to critical U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to your
questions.

Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, we are now ready to hear
your comments.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a delight to
be with you again today, a privilege as well to join with
Ambassador Brooks in this hearing. As you have already noted,
the NNSA is a strong and vital partner with STRATCOM and the
DOD. With their unparalleled expertise, we conduct vital life
extension and stockpile stewardship programs, as well as
research and test Advanced Concepts to assess how we can
further reshape and enhance our strategic capabilities.
My written statement defines and details the current
posture of STRATCOM's newly assigned mission areas. I
appreciate your inclusion of that in the record, as you
indicated, sir.
On March 11, I testified before the full Senate Armed
Services Committee, as you recall, at a hearing on our missile
defense mission. I have the opportunity to testify before this
subcommittee once again tomorrow afternoon to discuss the
important issues regarding one of our most important legacy
missions, that of space operations.
The focus today, as you have noted, is on the strategic
deterrent mission and strategic capabilities, nuclear,
conventional, kinetic, non-kinetic, Information Operations
(IO), and Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the
opportunities we now have to shape a dramatically different
strategic future for our command and for our Nation.
As you recall, on January 10, 2003, the President signed
Change Two to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and assigned
STRATCOM, as you noted, four previously unassigned
responsibilities. Those are Global Strike, Global Missile
Defense (GMD), DOD IO, and command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C\4\ISR).
With the assignment of this unique combination of global
roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities under a
single unified command, we have taken the opportunity to
recapture the classic definition of the term ``strategic'' that
is essential to the conduct and success of large-scale military
operations.
In January of this year, I reported to the President that
STRATCOM had achieved full operational capability (FOC) for
oversight and direction of all of these assigned missions. Each
mission area itself continues to develop. Three missions,
Global Strike, IO, and C\4\ISR are progressing towards full
operational capability in 2004. GMD, the fourth mission area,
will achieve Initial Defense Operations (IDO) in the months
ahead. It has been, as you noted, a tremendous year of change
and progress incorporating new missions and building a new
organization-all while focusing support to other regional
combatant commanders (RCCs) during Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) and the broader global war on terrorism.
Also during 2003, STRATCOM had many key accomplishments to
include: developed a Global Strike concept plan and validated
the plan through a series of regional exercises; established a
Global Operation Center (GOC) and Global Integration Center
(GIC) to command, control, and integrate support to the joint
warfighter wherever he or she might be on the face of the
Earth; and accepted transfer of responsibility for the
production of reconnaissance operations planning from the Joint
Staff, a first step in achieving global ISR integration.
We developed a Joint Forces Headquarters for IO (JFHQ-IO)
within the overall headquarters structure and established
functional relationships with the National Security Agency
(NSA), Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We
provided federated intelligence support to Central Command
(CENTCOM) and to Pacific Command (PACOM), producing over 3,000
products covering four geographic areas and over 12,000 points
of interest.
We recognize there are many opportunities and challenges
that still lie ahead, and I and all of my colleagues at
STRATCOM remain committed to working with our strong and
growing team of partners to address each one. Opportunities to
move our command forward include continuing the implementation
of the NPR while refining the way ahead through ongoing
strategic capabilities assessments. I might parenthetically add
that given its breadth and scope, as Ambassador Brooks so
eloquently described it, it might have been more appropriately
named the Strategic Posture Review for the implications that it
has to my command and to the Nation.
This effort will enable continued reduction in the Nation's
nuclear arsenal even as we examine future deterrent concepts,
sustain the safety and surety of the stockpile, and modernize,
for our partners in the NNSA, the Nation's technical
infrastructure.
We are also going to be exploring new concepts of ISR that
will permit collating and fusing data collected by the
Intelligence Community and DOD sources. Our goal is to aid the
Nation's military and civilian leaders. As they move rapidly up
the continuum, we all must travel from data to information to
knowledge and to wisdom. We are also embracing the concept that
ISR in a real sense has a deterrent character all its own.
We are going to be simultaneously employing a national
missile defense test bed to provide the Nation with a
rudimentary defensive capability even as we support the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) as it incrementally refines and evolves a
future multilayered GMD system. We will be delivering, I
believe, on the full potential of the DOD IO by supporting real
advances in the incorporation of computer network attack and
defense, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
strategic deception, and operational security, all elements of
DOD IO into our mission areas.
In conclusion, as STRATCOM continues to shape the heart of
the Nation's strategic capability, a fundamental principle
remains. Deterrence has credibility only to the extent that we
back it up with capability, determination, and resolve.
STRATCOM provides credibility through its cohesive package of
both new and legacy missions even as we explore new deterrent
concepts to serve the Nation in a very different future.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, Jr., USN

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Allard, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to once again appear before you,
representing the outstanding men and women of United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and to review the strategic and space capabilities
that remain vital contributors to our Nation's security. During my last
appearance before your subcommittee, I outlined how STRATCOM, our
components, and task forces were crafting a new command focused on
integrating space capabilities, deterring a wider array of potential
adversaries, and recasting the Nation's global military capabilities
for the demands of the 21st century.
Today, I can report that the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines--representing active duty, the National Guard, and the
Reserves--joined by a cadre of talented civilians, have made tremendous
progress in maturing the missions of the new STRATCOM.
As you recall, on January 10, 2003, the President signed Change Two
to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and tasked STRATCOM specifically with
four previously unassigned responsibilities. These are: Global Strike,
Global Missile Defense (GMD) Integration, Department of Defense (DOD)
Information Operations (IO), and command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR).
This unique combination of roles, responsibilities, authorities and
capabilities, under a single unified command brought with it new
opportunities to recapture the classic definition of the term
``strategic'': essential to the conduct of large scale military
operations. In this strategic context, we also have been given the
opportunity to support our Nation's security requirements around the
globe by directly supporting the regional combatant commanders (RCCs)
and their deployed forces.
On January 1, 2004, I was pleased to report to the President of the
United States that STRATCOM has completed reorganization and achieved
full operational capability (FOC) for oversight and direction of all
assigned missions. Each mission area continues to develop and, as we
apply resources to each, we are moving to reach and maintain FOC in
those four areas by the end of this year. Three of our missions, Global
Strike, Global Integrated IO, and Global C\4\ISR, are on track and
progressing toward FOC during 2004. GMD, the fourth newly assigned
mission, will achieve Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) in the months
ahead and will support concomitant achievement of STRATCOM oversight
FOC.
There is still much work to do and we have outlined five major,
near-term goals for STRATCOM, each of which has the potential to add
significantly to our national defense.
These opportunities include:

Proactively moving to enhance the security of our
critical space systems. This will enable us to maintain an
advantage in space while denying an asymmetric avenue of attack
for our adversaries. In concert with service and Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) partners, we are crafting a step-by-
step plan that approaches the problem in manageable increments.
Continuing the implementation of the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) while refining the way ahead through the ongoing
Strategic Capabilities Assessment. This effort will enable
continued reduction in the Nation's nuclear arsenal even as we
examine future deterrent concepts, sustain the safety and
surety of the stockpile, and modernize, through our partners at
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Nation's technical infrastructure.
Exploring new concepts of ISR that will permit
collating and fusing data collected by the Intelligence
Community and defense sources. Our goal is to aid the Nation's
military and civilian leaders to move rapidly up the continuum
from data to information to knowledge to wisdom.
Simultaneously employing a nascent missile defense
test bed to provide the Nation with a rudimentary defensive
capability even as we support the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
as it incrementally refines and evolves a future multi-layered
GMD system.
Delivering on the full potential of DOD IO by
supporting real advances in the incorporation of computer
network attack and defense, electronic warfare, psychological
operations, strategic deception, and operational security into
our mission areas.

II. PROGRESS OF THE ``NEW'' U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

It was a year of tremendous change and progress--incorporating new
missions and crafting a new organization--all while primarily focused
on supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the broader global war
on terrorism. During the past year, this command and our components
have:

Developed a Global Strike Strategic Concept, validated
it through a series of exercises and gained final approval of a
Global Strike plan.
Developed a Missile Defense Concept of Operations
(CONOP) with plans in place to support operator training,
evolutionary testing and system employment for GMD at IDO.
Developed a C\4\ CONOP and established a Global
Operation Center (GOC) and Global Integration Center (GIC) to
command, control, and integrate support to the joint
warfighter.
Transitioned the Space Operations Center in Colorado
Springs to the Space Operations Watch in the GOC in Omaha.
Hosted Senior Warfighter's Forum to identify combatant
commands' requirements for future satellite communications
capabilities.
Accepted transfer of responsibility for production of
the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations plan from the Joint
Staff, a first step in achieving global ISR integration.
Formed Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) IO within the
overall headquarters structure, commanded by the Deputy
Commander, STRATCOM.
Established strong, functional relationships with the
National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Information Systems
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Provided federated intelligence support to U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
producing over 3,000 products covering four geographic areas
covering over 12,000 points of interest.
Procured, prioritized, and allocated military and
commercial satellite bandwidth to support the critical
communication needs of the combatant commanders.
Forward deployed STRATCOM support teams with reach-
back capabilities for strike planning, intelligence, and space
and information operations.
Transmitted theater early warning data on missile
launches to RCCs.
Through the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command,
provided successful Space Based Blue Force Tracking
capabilities for Special Operations Forces (SOF).
Through the Joint Information Operations Center
(JIOC), fully integrated IO into OIF operational planning,
contributing directly to shaping of the operation and elements
of its combat success.

III. NEWLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS

Global Strike
The Global Strike mission embodies STRATCOM's ``capabilities-
based'' strategy and employs various assets to execute limited-
duration, extended-range, and precision kinetic and/or non-kinetic
strikes anywhere on the globe. Our adaptive planning process is being
upgraded with the goal of accelerating development of courses of action
for rapid presentation to our national leadership. When fully realized
we will be able to dramatically shrink response timelines.
This new construct also provides the Nation with a combatant
command that effectively works across traditional regional boundaries
and addresses potential threats with a global perspective. We are
strengthening formal relationships through extensive coordination with
RCCs, Services, the Joint Staff, and the OSD.

Information Operations
As with our other global responsibilities STRATCOM is tasked with
integrating and coordinating DOD IO across regional areas of
responsibility (AORs). Core pillars of IO include computer network
defense, computer network attack, military deception, operations
security, psychological operations, and electronic warfare. The
recently published DOD IO Roadmap also supports collaboration of broad
IO efforts across the DOD, the Intelligence Community, and other
national-level organizations in coordinated support of operations
directed by the RCCs.
The ability to quantify IO effects is another area of concerted
effort at STRATCOM. Initial conclusions from advanced concept
technology demonstrations and a number of experiments all recommend
establishing a national test range for IO. STRATCOM is working closely
with the OSD in establishing the requirements for just such a test
range. This range will help us define effects in understandable terms,
quantify systems' performance and provide assurance that the elements
of IO will achieve the desired effects while avoiding unintended
consequences.

Organizing for Success
In April 2003, we formed a JFHQ-IO within our overall headquarters
structure. This interim move enables STRATCOM to provide IO support
directly to warfighters while, at the same time, developing our
internal structure and nurturing these evolving capabilities.
In the past year, we have successfully integrated Computer Network
Exploitation and Attack mission areas. The Network Attack Support Staff
was established to function as the Computer Network Attack planning
interface between the combatant commanders and the Intelligence
Community. This component has significantly streamlined the planning
process and contributed directly to the maturation of our efforts.

Support to global war on terrorism
STRATCOM provides tailored, deployable Strategic Support Teams that
combine the capabilities of the JIOC, located in San Antonio, with
support elements from many other STRATCOM functional mission areas.
Additionally, as we prosecute the war on terrorism, effective IO is
becoming even more essential to our success. Supporting U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), PACOM,
U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and CENTCOM for global war on terrorism
and IO planning, JFHQ-IO works to provide an IO perspective, broader
and deeper than any one RCC staff can, thus allowing us to better
achieve required global effects in support of national strategic
objectives. Our GIC will interface with other organizations to provide
Time Sensitive Planning (TSP) as well as Crisis Action Planning. TSP
oversight expertise will reside in the GIC and will formalize and
codify STRATCOM's standard operating procedures, drawing on all
organizational elements so as to provide global effects in support of
all combatant commanders.

The Way Ahead
The future of global IO requires us to better define our
operational battlespace. STRATCOM is developing a common operational
picture based on inputs from all available DOD and intelligence
sources. We are also developing measures of effectiveness, with
corresponding metrics, allowing us to gauge the success or failure of a
specific IO course of action.
The challenge is melding the art and science of IO with emerging
technologies, training, and educating senior warfighters in these
concepts, and, most importantly, developing a cadre of military leaders
with sound IO skills.

Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD)
In my statement presented to the full Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 11, 2004, I discussed the status of STRATCOM's GBMD
mission. Missile defense concepts have evolved from separate efforts
focused on the terminal intercept of short and medium range ballistic
missiles. The single entity of GBMD now includes mid-course intercept
of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, in the years
ahead, development of a multi-layered missile defense system
contributing to the defense of the U.S., our allies, and our interests
abroad. STRATCOM is developing the GBMD CONOP and the battle management
architecture in order to provide full capabilities for RCCs defensive
employment.
The IDO is the first increment of a capabilities-based approach in
developing and providing GBMD. Initial capability will include the
ability to detect a launch, display the data for decision makers, relay
command and control execution decisions, and then to fire a ground-
based interceptor. Our plan calls for a continued assessment of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capabilities as they are
developed and fielded by the MDA. Fielding a layered and integrated
GBMD system is best accomplished in a spiral manner. An initial
capability, followed by evolutionary improvements, provides commanders
with both operational flexibility and an increased range of system
design options based on extensive testing and assessment

Global C4
Future ISR systems, along with new weapons platforms, are expected
to at least double the current demand on the global communications
infrastructure. (During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), General Tommy
Franks required 32 times more bandwidth than did General Norman
Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm (ODS).) Change Two of the UCP
directs STRATCOM to coordinate C\4\ capabilities in support of
strategic force employment.

Providing Robust Communications Architectures
The DOD is developing the Global Information Grid--Bandwidth
Expansion (GIG-BE) to address the growing bandwidth requirements. This
program is key to enabling the vision of universal situational
awareness for the warfighter. GIG-BE is scheduled to provide a fiber
connection to over 100 sites by the end of fiscal year 2005, providing
much needed, wideband terrestrial connectivity. Once completed, GIG-BE
will provide a robust, optical Internet Protocol Network that the
warfighter can post and access information at multiple levels of
classification.

Information Assurance (IA)
The DOD established the Information Assurance Vulnerability
Management (IAVM) program in 1998 to notify combatant commands,
Services, and DOD agencies about network vulnerability alerts and
countermeasures information. In our assigned role of directing DOD-wide
computer network defense, the IAVM program is one of the key means we
use to rapidly update the security of DOD computers.
We are working to improve our ability to automatically apply
software patches across large networks, correct vulnerabilities
identified through the IAVM process, and automatically verify patch
compliance. This is a formidable challenge; DOD networks are complex,
with over 3 million computers and a wide variety of operational
configurations. Our partnership with industry will help us develop the
best approach.
The warfighter of today accesses information by sifting through
networks stratified by classification and membership. The GIG-BE will
result in a more easily accessible network providing multi-level
security information to authorized users. Enforcing need-to-know while
enabling need-to-share presents DOD IA personnel the challenge of
moving from a defense-in-depth mindset to an IA-throughout approach.
As the DOD moves from the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)
to the GIG-BE, it also brings a new approach to network defense. With
the DII, our efforts were focused on defense in-depth, with layers of
defense to keep intruders from breaching our information fortress. In
contrast, the GIG focuses on defense throughout. This concept
incorporates a model that recognizes intrusions may occur, and allows
the network to remain functional even as the infection is being cured.

Transformational Communication System (TCS)
A second fundamental requirement for our information networks is to
achieve the ``Power to the Edge'' vision of John Stenbit, former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration. He said, ``We must replace top-down operations with
distributed operations--and use information technology to empower
whomever is in need of a solution, regardless of where that individual
is.''
Developing this type of network requires reshaping our security
philosophy and technology. Identity management must focus on end users,
applications, and services. This will enable distributed computing
between allied components using applications able to securely
communicate with other applications. STRATCOM is working closely with
the OSD staff and the Transformational Communications Office to develop
the policies and architectures needed to realize the vision of the TCS.

ISR
Change Two of the UCP tasks STRATCOM with planning, integrating,
and coordinating DOD ISR in support of strategic and global operations.
Day-to-day operational control of DOD ISR assets will typically remain
with the RCCs.
STRATCOM is applying its unique global focus to planning and
executing the DOD ISR mission. In effect, DOD ISR will be employed as a
weapon system against specific strategic objectives and priorities.
Each platform allocation will be planned to achieve specific effects
and will be evaluated against that objective. New relationships and
mechanisms are being developed to bring existing expertise and
capabilities together in new, more powerful ways.
To fulfill this mission, STRATCOM has organized intelligence and
operations into an ISR Division that is unique among combatant
commands. By integrating the operations and intelligence elements of
the DOD ISR mission, we provide a holistic view of DOD ISR to increase
the synergy between those who determine the requirements, those who
conduct the operations to satisfy those requirements, and the end-users
of collected and processed intelligence.
The initial focus of our ISR Division is completion of the recently
approved DOD ISR Implementation Plan. The timeline for transfer of the
DOD ISR processes identified in the ISR Implementation Plan began with
the sensitive reconnaissance operations approval process in December
2003 and will end with the ISR allocation process in October 2004. We
have just completed observing the latest bi-annual allocation process
and started identifying steps necessary to transfer the process to
STRATCOM by the fall of 2004.
In addition to fulfilling current ISR requirements, STRATCOM is
actively engaged in determining future airborne ISR needs. As the
combatant command lead for DOD Airborne ISR, we will have visibility
into the requirements from the theaters. Combining a composite list of
theater requirements with emerging technologies allows us to develop a
comprehensive list of capabilities to better support the RCCs. We will
work closely with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to fully integrate
DOD ISR into architecture and doctrine development. However, to be
truly effective, we must find a more efficient means to influence the
shape of DOD ISR procurement programs. The overarching goal is a more
efficient, effective, responsive, and coordinated DOD ISR capability
across the globe. With the responsibility for both DOD ISR allocation
and advocacy, STRATCOM is uniquely positioned to provide a global view
of both intelligence needs and required future capabilities.
All of this effort will also support the objectives for
intelligence sharing set by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. His office is crafting policies and supporting
architecture to horizontally integrate collected intelligence from the
theaters with the information acquired by the national agencies.
STRATCOM sees this as a significant step toward providing all users
with better insight into collected intelligence and enabling the
sharing of essential information among all legitimate users. We believe
this concept will significantly enhance intelligence available to all
users and showcase the operational potential of future persistent
intelligence collectors such as Space-Based Radar (SBR).

IV. FUTURE OF NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

Sustainment and Modernization
ICBMs
ICBMs have been a mainstay of strategic deterrence for decades,
providing prompt responsiveness, high reliability, accuracy, rapid and
flexible targeting, and a high state of alert readiness. With
Peacekeeper deactivation proceeding as planned, Minuteman III will soon
be our Nation's only remaining land-based strategic deterrent.
Recognizing the importance of the Minuteman III weapon system, the Air
Force has implemented an aggressive life extension program for the
Minuteman III ICBM force to ensure weapon system reliability through
2020.
We appreciate Congress' continued strong support for ICBM weapon
systems by funding reliability upgrades to critical components of the
Minuteman III. These include the Guidance Replacement Program,
Propulsion Replacement Program, Propulsion System Engine Life
Extension, Safety Enhanced Vehicle Program, and Command and Control,
Security and Cryptography Upgrades. Finally, we support an analysis of
alternatives (AOA) that will examine follow-on systems to the Minuteman
III.

Bomber Force
The long-range bomber fleet is the second essential element of the
Nation's strategic deterrent force as well as a primary element of our
conventional Global Strike capability. The B-52 Avionics Midlife
Improvement Program remains a high priority for STRATCOM and is
critical to sustaining the platform into the next decade. Of equal
concern is keeping the B-2 radar replacement program on track.
The viability of our bombers in a nuclear and conventional role
requires unimpeded access to increased bandwidth as well as secure,
survivable, and endurable global communication capabilities inherent in
the next generation satellite communication constellations. Robust
command and control, coupled with the recently demonstrated value of
real-time, in-flight bomber weapon re-targeting, require that we
continue to synchronize the fielding of bomber communication terminals
with the launches of advanced communications satellites.

Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)
The final leg of strategic deterrence is the D5 Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missile. Life extension (LE) and back-fit programs will
provide a standardized fleet of 14 Ohio class SSBNs capable of
employing D5 Trident II missiles for the full hull life of these
submarines (extended to 45 years). The last two submarines awaiting
upgrade will complete their D5 back-fit and refueling overhauls in
fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. D5 LE upgrades the guidance and
missile electronics on fielded D5 missiles and procures additional
missiles to meet system reliability and accuracy testing needs for the
life of the program, while also providing a sufficient quantity of
missiles to fully load out 12 SSBNs.
The conversion of the four Ohio class SSBNs to Guided Missile
Submarines (SSGNs) is an example of modifying existing platforms,
concepts and capabilities for a dramatically different military role.
SSGN conversions are on schedule and are being completed in conjunction
with scheduled Engineering Refueling Overhauls (EROs). The boats will
be equipped with conventional cruise missiles, extensive special
operations capability, and will be assigned evolving new missions. The
U.S.S. Ohio, U.S.S. Florida, and U.S.S. Michigan have entered ERO and
are proceeding on an aggressive conversion schedule with deliveries
scheduled for 2005 and 2006. The U.S.S. Georgia is scheduled for ERO in
2004 and conversion will be completed by 2007.

Stockpile Stewardship
In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs,
we are working closely with our partners in the Department of Energy
(DOE), DOD, and Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe,
reliable, and credible. As the Nation's nuclear stockpile continues to
age, we must carefully monitor its condition. Through the NNSA's
Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our
surveillance, modeling, and simulation tools and processes in order to
provide the critical data on aging effects, component reliability, and
physics phenomena we require in the absence of nuclear weapon testing.
Past reductions in nuclear weapon infrastructure capacity require that
the essential warhead life extension programs be carefully sequenced
with scheduled warhead dismantlement so as to provide just-in-time
delivery to meet operational deterrent force requirements. We are
working closely with the NNSA, the national laboratories, and plants to
shape their support to our future stockpile. With the production
complexes operating near peak capacity, we will need to optimize the
balance between essential life extension programs and dismantlement
work.
A 2003 congressionally-mandated panel, led by Dr. John Foster, Jr.,
reported that our nuclear weapons program must be balanced between
maintaining the existing warheads and the need to transform elements of
the existing stockpile for the future. As we reduce our nuclear forces
toward the goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed strategic nuclear
warheads by 2012, we must concurrently analyze and research advanced
concepts in order to realize the vision of the Foster Panel and the
NPR. The results of this research will, in turn, enable objective,
fact-based discussions on very important deterrence and policy issues.

Assessment and Testing
The United States' nuclear stockpile has a weighted average age of
over 20 years, and we are the only nuclear power without a current
capability to build a complete nuclear weapon. The Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship Program supports ongoing research and development
(R&D) of new advanced technologies and analytical tools to assess the
health of our aging stockpile without a current need for underground
testing.
Since 2000, the DOE has used the Advanced Computing Initiative as
an integral part of the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program to
analytically simulate nuclear explosions. These computational experts
and their physicist colleagues in our technical laboratories are a
national treasure, trained to make sense of torrents of information
obtained from those simulations to certify the safety and reliability
of the current stockpile.

V. SPACE OPERATIONS

Across DOD, space is both a major integrator of missions and a
global enabler for our forces. Our space assets gather and disseminate
real-time data on virtually any location on the globe, as well as
provide essential command and control capabilities to forces anywhere
on the planet. That is why STRATCOM elected to embed space operations
throughout our organization rather than treating it as a specific,
stove-piped mission area. U.S. dependence on space, and the potential
corresponding vulnerabilities, demand that our national security space
interests be addressed as top national security priorities. Our focus
includes:

Improving U.S. Launch Capabilities
New capabilities are required to enable rapid augmentation,
replacement, or repair of satellites lost due to component failure or
adversary action. STRATCOM looks to the Air Force, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and industry partners to
expedite delivery of a more effective, next-generation launch system.
Resolving Space System Vulnerabilities
Operations in Iraq demonstrated that adversaries can and will
challenge our ability to use space assets. The attempts to jam our
global positioning system (GPS) and degrade the accuracy of our
precision weapons, in Navy parlance, were a ``shot across the bow.''
DOD must be able to monitor the health of our essential systems,
advance our space situational awareness, and respond appropriately to
sustain our national on-orbit capabilities. In support of the
leadership of the DOD Executive Agent for Space, Peter Teets, STRATCOM
is fully engaged in assessing and strengthening all elements of our
space systems.

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
The potential provided by the developing SBIRS will be a key
contributor to greater capabilities in the mission areas of theater and
global missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and
battlespace characterization to support real-time warfighting
operations. As designed, SBIRS will expand our ability to detect
shorter-range missiles with systems designed for both tactical and
strategic requirements. Once operational, SBIRS will not only represent
our primary source of initial warning, but will also represent the
first link in the chain of a layered, integrated missile defense.
Deployment of a capability such as SBIRS is essential to replace legacy
systems, some elements of which are now operating well beyond their
intended life.

Satellite Communications
Military satellite communications will remain our primary means of
providing dedicated, secure, and/or hardened command and control
capabilities for worldwide military operations. During the past year,
we launched the final satellites to complete the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS), Milstar, and Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
follow-on constellations. These systems have served us well for decades
and many have lived far beyond their projected life expectancy. As a
result of this extended service life, deployment of more modern and
more capable replacements is needed immediately. The capabilities
represented by these programs will be sustained and improved with the
launch of the next generation of satellite systems beginning with the
Wideband Gapfiller Satellite in fiscal year 2005 and continuing through
the launches of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS).
The Wideband Gapfiller program consists of five high capacity
satellites launched from fiscal year 2005-2010 that will replace the
aging DSCS and Global Broadcast Service satellites, providing DOD with
high-capacity, wideband service for the Nation.
The AEHF program is the follow-on to Milstar. Currently scheduled
to launch three satellites during fiscal year 2007-2009, AEHF provides
up to 10 times the capacity of Milstar, a significant increase in
coverage, and the ability to support twice as many networks. It will
support national, strategic, and tactical users requiring protected,
anti-jam, survivable communications for national crises, Emergency
Action Message dissemination, Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack
Assessment, missile defense, presidential secure voice conferencing,
and interoperability with selected international partners.
The MUOS will field five UHF satellites to provide the warfighter
on-demand, high capacity communications to ISR, and weapons system
platforms on the move. This system is designed to alleviate the need to
purchase expensive, commercial satellite services. MUOS launches
currently are scheduled for fiscal year 2009-2011.
Investments in replacement technology and capacity will help
maintain the U.S. as the pre-eminent space faring nation well into the
future. STRATCOM will remain engaged as these programs are developed
and procured to monitor progress and ensure warfighter requirements are
clearly articulated.
STRATCOM is working with the Joint Staff, the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA), and, as appropriate, the commercial satellite
industry to develop a methodology whereby DOD can assure future
satellite communications systems are designed, funded, fielded, and
sustained as an end-to-end communication system. In the past, complex
communications systems routinely were procured in parallel, as separate
elements, and often by many organizations. Due to increased system
complexity and the number of segments involved, an end-to-end
synchronized acquisition process is essential. We must streamline the
process and develop a procedure to centrally fund and manage seamless,
integrated, on-demand capable satellite communication services to meet
national security needs.

VI. GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION

Integrating the GOC
On April 15, 2003, STRATCOM published an overarching operational
concept to incorporate changes driven by the assignment of our global
missions. Central to this document is the creation of the GOC. The GOC
and its supporting command elements will enable STRATCOM to provide
responsive support to the President, Secretary of Defense, combatant
commanders, and agencies. Additionally, the GOC, with support of our
components, will develop and leverage global battlefield situational
awareness and present decision makers with full spectrum courses of
action that integrate all STRATCOM's missions and capabilities.
Within the GOC, we will also perform space operations including
space control, space support, and force enhancement. The GOC will
enable STRATCOM to better execute our assigned missions by providing
improved responsiveness and better command and control of our missions
by placing the responsibility for mission support and execution under a
single integrated operations center.
The Combatant Commander's Integrated Command and Control System
(CCIC\2\S) is the integrated battle management command and control
engine for STRATCOM. CCIC\2\S integrates fixed and mobile command and
control systems to support our missions and RCCs. CCIC\2\S must be
responsive to the combatant commander's vision and ``evolve to a highly
responsive and cost-effective sensor-to-decisionmaker-to-shooter
capability.'' It supports spiral development and delivery of air
defense, missile warning, space surveillance and defense, and common
command and control service capabilities.

VII. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Strengthening Components and Agency Relationships
We continue to seek the proper composition and alignment of
components to accomplish our missions while allowing flexibility as our
missions evolve. In this area, we have accomplished the following:

On October 1, 2003, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
directed the activation of a Marine Corps service component
command called U.S. Marine Corps Forces, STRATCOM (MARFORSTRAT)
to support our mission areas.
We established command relationships to leverage
capabilities of the NSA, DISA, and JIOC to provide an armory of
IO capabilities.
The Cruise Missile Support Activities previously
assigned to PACOM and JFCOM were realigned under STRATCOM to
enhance Global Strike capabilities.

Strengthening Reach-back Capabilities, Joint Exercises, and Training
DOD is transitioning toward smaller, more agile forces, decreasing
the forward footprint of our personnel in theater. To enable mission
success for these agile forces, we must provide improved situational
awareness and command and control capabilities. This requires
unprecedented reach-back to planning capabilities, intelligence
products, and other specialized expertise.
A DOD oversight committee is crafting a roadmap for leveraging
technologies to provide seamless distributed operations, or reach-back
to supporting commands and elements. Developing GIG-BE will greatly
improve this reach-back capability. By moving digits, not people, we
reduce not only transportation and support costs, but the number of
personnel placed in harm's way. Reach-back capabilities proved highly
successful during OIF in supporting targeting, planning, and IO.
In parallel, a specialized team of 35 personnel was sent to support
CENTCOM by providing specialized space and information operations
planning and execution support. Referred to as a Space and Information
Operations Element, this team represents a first step in developing
connectivity back to our headquarters for broader access to specific
STRATCOM expertise, making our entire headquarters a trusted agent for
the RCC.
In the future, we anticipate opportunities for STRATCOM Support
Teams to train and/or exercise regularly with the RCCs, thereby
building relationships that are well understood before crisis or
conflict looms. If requested by the RCC, they will be forward deployed
in time of conflict. Alternatively, if that commander were comfortable
with reach-back support from this team, they would provide the regional
commander with the full spectrum of capabilities from our GIC at Offutt
Air Force Base.
As STRATCOM continues to mature our recently assigned global
missions, we must develop robust training and exercise programs to test
the tactics, techniques, and procedures envisioned in our integrated
concept of operations. Our annual major exercise, Global Guardian, has
traditionally been a nuclear operations-focused exercise. We are
dramatically reshaping that construct and creating a new exercise
series that better captures the broad range of new responsibilities
while still supporting the essential zero-defect focus on our legacy
mission. The Strike Directorate continues to coordinate with RCCs on
the command and control structure required to simulate integration of
full spectrum Global Strike missions into future regional exercises.
In December 2003, we successfully demonstrated support to a RCC
(PACOM) in Terminal Fury 04 in the areas of Global Strike, IO, Space
Operations, and ISR. Using extensive reach-back opportunities and
Strategic Support Teams, it afforded STRATCOM the opportunity to gain
hands-on experience in areas such as planning, executing, and
recovering Global Strike missions across regional boundaries. By
working closely with PACOM in this exercise, we further developed a
regional context and improved capabilities in our new mission areas to
extend to all RCCs. The coming year undoubtedly promises new challenges
and greater opportunities.

VIII. CONCLUSION

As STRATCOM reshapes the heart of the Nation's strategic
capability, we are required to study new deterrence concepts to provide
the President with a wider range of military options that bring to bear
every element of national power. The warrior Sun Tzu said, ``To win
without fighting is best.'' A fundamental principle remains that
deterrence has credibility only to the extent we back it up with
capability, determination, and resolve. STRATCOM provides credibility
through its cohesive package of both new and legacy missions, even as
we explore new deterrent concepts to serve the Nation in a very
different future.
STRATCOM is ready to meet the challenges of the future. We are
mindful of the magnitude of the task before us, and confident in the
talent of our staff, our components, and our mission partners. In the
words of Abraham Lincoln, ``The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate
to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and
we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think
anew, and act anew.''
I appreciate your continued support and look forward to reporting
our progress to you in the future as we continue to build the new
STRATCOM.

Senator Allard. I want to thank both of you for your
statements.
Admiral Ellis, a recent news article stated that U.S. war
planning ``is allowing strategic nuclear capabilities to become
but one component of a spectrum of potential strategic
responses to global terrorism and rogue nations rather than a
separate level of capability.'' As commander of STRATCOM, you
are responsible for much of this planning. Do you consider
nuclear capabilities to be just another component on a spectrum
of capabilities or do you consider them to be a separate level
of capability?
Admiral Ellis. I absolutely do not consider them to be just
another element of that continuum, sir. As Ambassador Brooks
noted in his statement, the decision that any President,
current or future, might have to make with regard to employment
of those forces would clearly be the most significant decision
he or she ever made in their lifetime. We very clearly
understand the difference. We very clearly understand the
difference in security and surety that comes with our oversight
and stewardship of the nuclear capabilities.
As you are well aware, and as we could address in a more
classified forum, there are very distinct and separate command
and control elements and processes and security elements in
place to ensure that the President, and only the President, in
the direst of circumstances can authorize the employment of
those systems. So I believe it is incorrect to characterize
them as just elements in a continuum of kinetic options. I can
assure you that in STRATCOM and the DOD that is not the way
they are viewed.
Senator Allard. Just for the record, maybe you would just
go through the steps that most commanders have to go through to
get authorization to use nuclear weapons. You mentioned the
President's authorization and I would just like to have you go
through those steps for us.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The details of that, of course,
are appropriately classified. As you alluded to, it is only
after presidential and senior civilian leadership consultation
with senior military leadership, including the Secretary of
Defense, me, my staff, and other involved combatant commanders,
that those decisions are weighed and assessed.
Then, should there be no other option--and I emphasize
that, as always, these weapons are weapons of last resort--
should there be no other option in this hypothetical scenario
that you described, then there are very rigorous coded
capabilities that ensure that we authenticate the identity of
the leaders in the chain of command. Those authorizations are
very carefully and rigorously conveyed exactly as spoken and
within the scope and context in which they were delivered to
the operating forces through robust, hardened global command
and control capabilities that we also oversee at STRATCOM.
So there are a number of checks and balances. There are
various layers of oversight that have to be employed
simultaneously to ensure that no one individual can take these
actions without the authorization of the Nation's senior
leadership. I can assure you that we continue to review,
exercise, and examine those processes and procedures regularly
at my staff level and above, and we are committed to sustaining
that level of certainty as we reshape the capabilities for the
future.
Senator Allard. So to your knowledge, the level of control
over nuclear weapons has not been diminished in any way. There
are not any initiatives which you are aware of that would
reduce positive control over nuclear forces.
Admiral Ellis. Absolutely not, sir. In fact, just the
contrary. We are exploring, as is appropriate, ways in which we
can bring into being new technology to further enhance the
already rigorous controls that are in place.
Ambassador Brooks. That is one of the potential uses for
the Advanced Concept Initiative, by the way.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Ambassador Brooks.
Admiral Ellis, I am worried that our adversaries are
adapting to our ability to hit targets with extraordinary
precision in part by hardening their assets or burying them
deep underground. I know the DOD has identified literally
thousands of these types of targets. What is the relationship
between these hard and deeply buried targets in your concept of
strategic targets?
Admiral Ellis. Sir, the hard and deeply buried targets that
you characterize represent a very important subset of a broader
set of targets that might be appropriate for the application of
strategic force. I emphasize that that includes strategic force
as we now define it, including both conventional, non-kinetic,
and SOF, as well as the classic legacy nuclear missions that
have historically resided at STRATCOM.
They are a unique target set. They are proliferating, as
you note, on a global scale. There are more of them than the
Intelligence Community is able to discern, or get hints about,
more appropriately, as the years go by. A large number of them
can be dealt with by conventional means. But there is a subset
on the hard and deeply buried side that are very demanding
targets for conventional forces and in some cases cannot be
dealt with by conventional forces as we know them, which brings
into context three important issues here.
The first is that we need to continue to advance our
development of conventional capabilities to further broaden our
ability to deal with these target sets. We also need to enhance
our ISR capabilities so that we can better identify and
characterize these targets. To no one's surprise, if it is
important enough to be hard and deeply buried on the part of an
adversary, it is also likely to be deceptively camouflaged, to
be protected by robust air defenses, and to have multiple
levels of command and control and support and communications
associated with it.
So, in any way that you would characterize it, it is a very
demanding target set. It is one that we are interested in,
because it is obviously a critical node in either the
communications for military forces or the leadership control of
potential adversaries. So they are appropriate military
targets. They have tremendous complexity associated with them.
We are in favor of exploring all concepts, the full spectrum of
concepts that might be brought to bear to deal with them, if it
is so deemed necessary by the Nation's leadership.
Senator Allard. Can you give us a sense of what proportion
of these targets you think can be defeated today with non-
nuclear means and whether that proportion will change over
time?
Admiral Ellis. Well, I would rather not get into exact
numbers, because that might be classified. A significant
percentage of them can be dealt with by conventional means.
That would be the way in which we would intend to employ them.
However, as you noted in your statement, adversaries have a way
of responding to our capability. As they see capabilities
coming on line, it is within their purview to dig deeper and to
make these systems harder.
So I would anticipate that unless we advance further down
this continuum of capabilities and systems that can deal with
this target set, that those that we cannot deal with might
continue to grow in the years ahead. How significant that
growth is, I defer to the Intelligence Community. Even in that
context, it is fair to say that they would not sit here and
tell you that they had located all of those that are known to
exist in the world today.
So even the numbers as we currently define them probably do
not include all those that are actually in use.
Senator Allard. How important are prompt, precise delivery
systems to the effort to defeat the hard and deeply buried
targets?
Admiral Ellis. We think that prompt and precise delivery
systems are key elements to the ability to counter those
capabilities, such as a storage area for something that the
adversary values very highly. Ambassador Brooks talks about
some elements that that might include. Whether it is a
leadership location or a command and control capability for
military forces that could be used against us or our allies,
there is a time criticality associated with that in some
context. That needs to be part of planning for any strike
mission.
There are little things that have to be dealt with. What is
the range of the systems that you have to employ? How fast do
they respond? In other words, how fast do they go, or are they
in the local area? Then the accuracy and precision element
ensures that it requires the minimum number of strike passages,
if you are using a manned system, for example, so you expose
fewer people to that risk, or it involves fewer numbers of
weapons that have to be employed to achieve the desired
results.
It also very importantly minimizes any associated
collateral damage, of which we are always concerned in the
military, as well as looking at targeting options. So for a
number of reasons, the things that you describe--range,
precision, and appropriate sizing--are important elements of
weapons systems of whatever character that we assess for use
against this target set in the future.
Senator Allard. I understand that acquisition efforts
related to the defeat of hard and deeply buried targets
leverage capabilities in many programs and are well coordinated
by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). I am a little
concerned, however, that this approach may leave the Services,
each of which has many competing priorities, in a position in
which they might not respond adequately to some of STRATCOM's
unique requirements.
Where do you believe these efforts fall short of providing
you the complete tool kit you need to strike at the full range
of strategic targets?
Admiral Ellis. Well, as Ambassador Brooks noted when he
described the NPR, and as I call it, the Strategic Posture
Review, the assumptions predicated that allowed us to draw down
the numbers that he described were based to some degree on the
creation of advanced conventional capabilities.
While many of these capabilities are still in the
developmental or requirements generation phases, it is fair to
say that they compete with other priorities that the Services
have. My role as a combatant commander is to make my input
appropriately heard in the venues that I have. As you are well
aware, there is a joint capabilities process that has been
defined in the DOD into which I will make inputs and continue
to make inputs that address the need for these issues. Then
those are reviewed and collated and, with the support of the
Secretary and the Chairman, apportioned through guidance to the
Services to be dealt with.
One of the challenges we face, of course, is that, just as
with nuclear weapons, many of these advanced conventional
capabilities are niche capabilities. In other words, they are
not intended to be procured in the thousands. They are not
intended to be carried on every strike platform in the
inventory. They are not intended necessarily to be used against
mobile, all-weather targets, and the like. In that context,
they sometimes do not compete as well in the analysis of
alternatives (AOA) with other systems that may have broader
application.
I think it is important for my voice to be heard in
articulating how essential these advanced conventional
capabilities, even though they may be viewed or defined as
niche capabilities, are to advancing our Global Strike
capability and our ability to deal with hard and deeply buried
targets.
Senator Allard. Well, in that regard, do you think the
acquisition approach is sound and your unique requirements will
be met in a timely way?
Admiral Ellis. I think the process is sound, sir. It is up
to me to continue to be a loud voice and an articulate voice to
the extent we can inject that on a regular basis into the
consideration of alternatives for the future. I can assure you
that within the OSD and his staff there is great support for
advancing these capabilities. We have now begun to see a
consideration of advanced concepts that might serve us well in
the future.
But it is important that we understand the difference
between paper programs and real capabilities. There are things
that could be addressed in the near term through the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other organizations that are
very able to quickly respond to this. There is also a set of
long-term issues that need to be considered as we look to the
future and contemplate what a Global Strike capability needs to
look like 10 or 20 years hence.
Senator Allard. We have talked about hard and deeply buried
targets. We use the terms kinetic and non-kinetic, and I wonder
if you would go into more detail on the value of both these
facets of the effort to defeat hard and deeply buried targets,
the other facet being flexible planning.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. Within the level of classification
of this hearing, it is fair to say that kinetic is well
understood. We have talked a little bit about that. Ambassador
Brooks alluded to it in discussions of concepts that NNSA is
beginning to examine. I have talked about it in terms of
conventional capabilities that I think are needed for the
future. Those are the kinetic things, the things that explode
and destroy.
The non-kinetic piece is an opportunity that is just
beginning to come into being and deals with issues of disabling
from long distances support elements that are necessary to
sustain targets or items of interest. Those can include power
grids. They can include other capabilities that might be
brought down electronically, if you will. There are jamming
capabilities, active electronic warfare. There are computer
network techniques that are beginning to be explored that
consider how we might be able to, at least for a specified
period of time, draw down the capabilities of an adversary
without the requirements to target them kinetically.
I emphasize that while these are tremendously exciting
concepts, they have not delivered yet on the level that would
allow me confidently to offer them as an alternative to kinetic
solutions at this time. However, I do believe that this is a
capability the Nation needs to pursue for the reasons that you
have described earlier. I think it certainly is something that,
under our IO responsibilities newly assigned to STRATCOM, we
are aggressively moving forward with the support of agencies
and Services in that effort.
Senator Allard. Well, and it raises the threshold, I think,
for whether we would have to use nuclear means or not.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The focus that Ambassador Brooks
noted with regard to the NPR is absolutely essential. What it
is tasked to do and what it tasked us to do is provide the
Nation's leaders with a much broader range of capabilities to
deal with threats to the Nation. All of those have a deterrent
character, and they also have a capabilities character. They
are not necessarily nuclear in character.
So the point that you raise is absolutely right. The more
options, opportunities, or choices that we can offer the
Nation's leadership before they have to regrettably consider
that last resort nuclear system, the higher we continue to
raise the threshold. It is fair to say that the threshold is
higher now than it once was. We are working every day to
implement the NPR, which in my view will continue to raise that
threshold in the years ahead.
Senator Allard. Now I would like to call on the ranking
member, Senator Nelson, for an opening statement and some
questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. To save time, Mr. Chairman, if you
will just submit my statement for the record.
Senator Allard. Very good. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

Thank you Senator Allard. I would like to join you in welcoming our
witnesses. We have many issues to discuss this morning. Senator Allard
highlighted some of them, and I would like to highlight a few as well.
I look forward to hearing from Admiral Ellis about his year of
change--integrating the former space and strategic commands into one
command and taking on a host of new responsibilities under the Unified
Command Plan Change Two. Ambassador Brooks, we look forward to hearing
from you about the activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, including the challenge of meeting the security
standards associated with the new design basis threat, the progress of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and the efforts to downsize and
modernize the nuclear weapons complex.
In addition, I would hope to be able discuss issues associated with
bombers, such as reversing portions of the B-1 retirement plan,
maintaining the bomber modernization programs for the B-2 and the B-52,
and the work that is beginning on the bombers of the future. What does
long-range Global Strike look like in the future?
I would also like to hear from each of our witness the progress
being made in implementing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the
Moscow Treaty. What is the progress in reducing the overall size of the
nuclear weapons stockpile, not just the number of operationally-
deployed nuclear warheads. One additional aspect of the Moscow Treaty
that I would like to discuss is how operationally-deployed warheads are
going to be counted to achieve the goal of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed
warheads by 2012.
Related to the issue of counting, is a recent press report
asserting the decision in the NPR to download all of the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to a single warhead
configuration is being reconsidered. Such a decision would have a
direct impact on the mix of warheads deployed and would most directly
impact the number of warheads on Trident submarines.
Last year there we had considerable debate and discussion in the
Senate on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), Advanced Concepts
Initiative, and the repeal of the ban on research and development (R&D)
of nuclear weapons with yields below 5 kilotons, and nuclear test
readiness. The RNEP and the Advanced Concept work was routinely
described as being studies only and that there were no plans to produce
or deploy new or modified nuclear weapons. Clearly this is no longer
the case with the RNEP. I would like to here from both of our witnesses
about the capabilities of the RNEP, and understand the military
requirements, value, and utility.
We have much more to discuss, so I will conclude by again welcoming
our witnesses. This hearing is always interesting.
Thank you Senator Allard.

Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, in September of this
year, the administration plans to deploy a long-range missile
defense system. Are you going to be the person responsible for
this defense and also responsible if the defense fails against
a real enemy missile?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Since you are responsible for the
development of the concept of operations (CONOPs) for this
missile defense system that will be fielded, what is the
process for developing this concept? What are your planning
assumptions?
Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir. That is a great question. As
we discussed in front of the full committee on March 11, the
role of STRATCOM, as you describe it, is to take the
capabilities that are being developed by General Kadish in the
MDA, which might as well be called the Missile Development and
Acquisition Agency, and move it into the operational realm as
we begin to put this test bed in place over the next--in the
months ahead.
The role that I have is to, as you described, define the
CONOPs, to begin the training and integration, to provide the
command and control capabilities, to ensure that the Services
provide well-trained and aware crews, and to ensure that the
assumptions with regard to its employment and weapons release
doctrine and those types of things are clearly understood and
reviewed prior to this capability beginning to be in place
conceptually by the end of this year.
The assumptions that we made are based on sharing the data
that has been currently provided through the tests that have
been conducted and the simulations that have also been
conducted in developing this system. You heard from Mr.
Christie and Ron Kadish about the way in which their teams or
elements have come together to share that database. Well,
STRATCOM also accesses that database to help us understand the
capabilities that we are likely to have as this, as the
Secretary calls it, rudimentary capability comes on line later
this year.
All of those issues help us ensure that we understand
realistically what this system is capable of doing in this test
mode. We have a process in place that allows us to bring online
a limited alert capability at the same time as we continue the
spiral development process. This has to occur simultaneously as
the MDA continues to move or evolve this system into the forms
that it will take in the years ahead.
So we draw on their data. We understand and draw from their
experience with legacy systems. We have significant expertise
from the Army involved in this, as you are well aware, and draw
air defense expertise to make sure, from a doctrinal
standpoint, we are asking the right questions. We are under no
illusions as to what we will or will not have when the IDO
capability comes on line. But we do believe that it will add
value to what we have. It will be a capability that is in the
field anyway for testing and development and we believe it is
appropriate to draw on it to the extent that it can provide
capabilities to the Nation to enhance our Nation's security and
defense.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, since you are the one
responsible for its success or failure, would you like to see
it operationally tested in a combat-like way as soon as
possible?
Admiral Ellis. The continuing testing that Mr. Christie and
Ron Kadish are pursuing is, in my view, going as aggressively
as is appropriate and prudent. In other words, as capabilities
deliver, they are tested and assessed. Changes are immediately
made to reflect the lessons that are learned. A system of this
scale and complexity is unique in the history of the Nation. It
requires a global range, if you will, in order to put all these
elements in place.
So in my view, there is a logic in putting it in place
where it was intended to operationally serve. So I think from
an operational standpoint, that is about as realistic an
operational environment as we could expect, the actual sites
from which it will be expected to be operated with all of its
elements, as you are so well aware, including Fort Greely and
Vandenberg and the Shemya Radar Facility and all of those
capabilities.
So I think we are putting it into an operational scenario,
operational environment, even as we continue to refine and
advance the testing. So I think that will enhance significantly
the operational character of the tests that will unfold in the
years ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, I know something about
rockets. If there is a rocket being developed where you have
one test and you have four tests canceled over the course of
the last year, I do not think I would want to ride that kind of
rocket. Is that not what has happened?
Admiral Ellis. Well, I cannot speak for Ron Kadish and
would not presume to, sir, but my understanding is that the
tests have not been canceled. They have been rescheduled, as
reflective of the incremental testing program that is underway.
In other words, Ron's team, MDA's team, has discerned that
there were technical issues, just as we described, that needed
to be addressed. They are addressing those. When those are
addressed, then the incremental testing program will continue,
as indeed elements of it are scheduled to continue this year.
Now clearly, and perhaps optimistically, when those
schedules were crafted last year, there was a sense that we
might be further along. But as you are well aware, there are
technical challenges that have arisen along the way, as there
are in any developmental program. Adjustment of the test
program to reflect the readiness to do those testings, I think,
is not inappropriate.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you, as the operational officer in
charge, are satisfied with the way that they are going to turn
over an operational system to you on a major weapons system
with the amount of testing and so-called independent testing
that has occurred thus far.
Admiral Ellis. Well, if they were sitting here with me, I
do not think either Mr. Christie or Ron Kadish or I would say
that any of us are ever satisfied, and I do not think that is
the right term. We understand where we are in terms of system
maturity. We understand the elements of the system that have
been tested, boosters and kill vehicles and radars along the
way. We understand how they are being brought together for this
IDO capability. That is where we will be when the first of
these elements are put into place, or the last of them are put
into place, to create this system sometime later this year in
all likelihood.
So that is the process we have. We are assessing, fairly
candidly with the help of MDA and Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E), what capabilities that really represents. In
that context, then, we will craft, as you noted, the CONOPs and
the procedures for its employment in support of the Nation's
security.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would not want to be in your shoes
to accept the operational responsibility for something that had
not been tested any more than this. In wartime, we have to do
whatever we have to do. I am not sitting here as an opponent of
national missile defense, but I am sitting here as someone who
has to ask the hard questions. How can you make something
operational that has not been properly researched, developed,
and tested? That is the question that I will continue to ask.
The Air Force has established two offices to study options
for long-range strike options. Is STRATCOM fully engaged with
the Air Force effort to study options and conduct an AOA?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, we are. Well, all of our unified
commands are joint commands. My deputy actually is an Air Force
three-star officer and has attended some of those sessions. We
are working with each of the Services as they examine concepts,
as I discussed in my dialogue with Senator Allard, that might
serve our long-range strike needs for the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think that manned long-range
bombers should be a part of the long-range strike capability?
Admiral Ellis. I do not think we know the answer to all of
that yet, sir. What I am supporting is broad consideration of
all concepts. Some of them can employ modifications to existing
systems, conventional in character. Some of them can employ
concepts that perhaps are long dwell unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) that can orbit in a target area with high-speed weapons.
Manned bombers are certainly something that needs to be brought
into the equation.
The issue we have to avoid, I think, is we do not want to
get locked into merely sequential procurement of what we
already have without an honest and dispassionate assessment of
what the future and what technology can bring us. While I am
not in any position to give you the answer, STRATCOM continues
to fully support the careful study of all options that might
contribute to this capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. One of the options being considered is
a bomber variant of the F-22. What do you think about that?
Admiral Ellis. Well, I would have to see the specifications
on it and what the tradeoffs are with regard to--as a pilot
myself, and I know you understand, there are elements that come
with manned platforms that are different than those that come
with unmanned. There are range issues and refueling and support
requirements and what kind of environment it will be considered
or designed to operate from, an air defense environment and the
like.
So again, I do not think it is possible right now, absent
completion of these studies, to pick an answer. But I think all
of them ought to be put on the table in a fair and objective
process and weighed against one another to satisfy the Nation's
security needs. This is again one of those things that is
inevitably going to have to compete with other requirements.
There is certainly the view that we are not going to be able to
buy newer versions of everything we have, nor should we. We
ought to consider how we can best meet this need in the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about other long-range strike
options, such as the Falcon?
Admiral Ellis. We believe that that, too, is one that
offers promise in terms of the criteria that I identified with
Senator Allard a short time ago. In other words, we are looking
for something that has long range. We are looking for something
that has speed of response. We are looking for something that
has precision and lethality, if we decide to use it.
Certainly, the Falcon has promise, although it is an
evolving concept potentially in each of those areas.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Secretary of Defense told the
House Armed Services Committee to develop and provide a CONOP
for a Common Arrow Vehicle (CAV), ``that precludes any
perception of CAV launch intent prior to conducting any
development launches of CAV.'' Then Peter Teets also submitted
a report. What do you think about that? Do you think it would
be subject to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)?
Admiral Ellis. Not as currently structured, sir. The START
has some exclusions on space launch facilities and areas of
interest. So their issues would have to be clearly reviewed to
make sure they are treaty compliant. There are now procedures
for information exchange amongst interested parties with regard
to schedule and intent.
So I would not say that those policy issues are
insurmountable obstacles to consideration of the value of a CAV
concept, as we examine future concepts.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you already talk with the chairman
about the process by which there would be a requirement for a
new nuclear weapon to be developed?
Admiral Ellis. No, sir. We did not address that
specifically.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, would this process be the same
for a modification of an existing nuclear weapon to meet a
military purpose?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The essential elements would be
the same up to and including congressional oversight in any
process that deals with modification to an existing nuclear
capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. For both of you, the NNSA plans $135
million to complete the studies on RNEP. This is substantially
more than the $45 million that was announced back in 2003. Why
has the cost grown so substantially?
Ambassador Brooks. I think the $135 million figure is based
on a misreading of what we put in our out-year project. Some of
that is completion of study. Some of that, as I alluded to in
my opening statement, is a place holder in case, at the
completion of the study, the President and Congress elect to go
forward.
I think that the total cost of the study is closer to $70
million, although I will correct that for the record if I am
wrong. The cost has gone up in part because we have discovered
the problem is more complex. We have involved more of the
weapons complex. In looking at it, we had not envisioned deeply
involving, for example, the Y12 Plant, but we have. I can give
you a more detailed answer for the record, if that is all
right, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, I would appreciate that. I
understand that in your planning you have to put in a certain
amount of padding, which is just good planning.
[The information referred to follows:]

We never expected the RNEP Phase 6.2/2A study to cost $135 million,
but we did not make it clear in our fiscal year 2005 submission. When
we formulated the fiscal year 2005 request, we anticipated the cost of
the study to be approximately $71 million. These costs can be
attributed to: congressionally imposed funding reductions and delays
(reporting requirements), addition of the production plants to help
assess design feasibility, and an independent review of competing
designs.
As a result of the 50-percent funding reduction in fiscal year 2004
for the RNEP, as well as a better understanding of the RNEP study and
the need to balance priorities across the nuclear complex, we are
studying the funding profile for RNEP in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.

Senator Allard. I think here on this issue, you are kind of
caught between a rock and a hard spot, Senator Nelson, on this.
If you do not put in the money, then somehow or other they
think you are hiding it. If you do put it in and you are
straightforward, then you can be accused of trying.
I looked at this figure, too, and that obviously sticks out
there. On the other hand, I think we need to have some estimate
in case they decide to move ahead with that, about where those
future costs would be. I think this had quite a bit of
discussion in the hearing yesterday. Is that right?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, it did. Our view
was twofold. First, that our interpretation of what Congress
expected and what we need internally when we went to
meaningfully estimate out-year budgets, was that we ought to do
the very best we can. Second, we thought that we are, after
all, preserving an option for the President. If the President
has no option within your budget, that seemed to us
inappropriate. So that is why we chose to display these figures
in the 5-year projection.
But, of course, a projection is a projection. We decide on
spending a year at a time. But in doing that, it is
appropriate, it seemed to us, for Congress to understand what
the future projections might be. But I stress again, we cannot
get to that future without an affirmative decision by Congress,
quite apart from the appropriations process.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, I would like to have this
hearing pretty well wrapped up by 11:30. I thought at this
point in time we would exchange at 10-minute intervals, if that
is okay with you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. I have a bunch of constituents
waiting on me.
Senator Allard. Okay.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think I could finish a few more
questions?
Senator Allard. Go ahead, and then I will wrap up behind
that. We will accommodate you on that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good.
You have in your 2005 budget request the plans to spend
$135 million to complete the phase 6.2/6.2A study on the RNEP.
This is substantially more than was announced in fiscal year
2003 for the RNEP. It is on your congressional budget. You
spell out with specificity in the years ahead the cumulative
percentage progress in completing the phase such-and-such
activities of the RNEP. So in 2004, complete 17 percent of
scheduled RNEP; 2005, complete 56 percent of RNEP; 2006,
complete 100 percent of scheduled RNEP.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. But, Senator, that is true.
Let me try again. The number you are looking at for 2006
includes some money to complete the study, the phase 6.2A
study, and some other money to move into phase 6.3. That
additional money could not be spent without a congressional
declaration.
So completing the phase 6.2A study will not cost $135
million. It will cost more than the $45 million we told you
last year. But it will not cost $135 million. If the budget
document leads you to a different impression, then we did a bad
job of drafting the budget document. I will correct it both for
the record and for other committees.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, is it your conclusion
that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and
reliable, and that there is no need to conduct an underground
nuclear weapons test?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, that is my conclusion.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
Ambassador, does the NNSA have adequate funding in its 2005
budget to allow it to meet the new security requirements
arising from the new Design Basis Threat (DBT) at the end of
2006?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir, it does. I believe that we may
need additional 2004 money. I anticipate there will be a
reprogramming request submitted to this and other committees in
the relatively near future.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you think it makes sense maybe to
have some of those improvements sooner.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. For some of them, it is not
just a question of making sense. You would like everything
soon. But we put in place mitigating measures. Some of those
mitigating measures are simply more expensive. Mitigation
usually is a euphemism for putting more guards in places by
increasing overtime.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you need any help from us with
regard to transportation?
Ambassador Brooks. I am in a slightly awkward position,
because the administration has not completely finished the
reprogramming request. If there were a reprogramming request
about to come up, I would expect that there is a good chance
that we would have a few million dollars for transportation in
order to support emptying Hanford of plutonium on the schedule
that the department would like to make.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, there is a fellow named Dr.
Younger that said we are taking a fundamentally new look, a
clean sheet of paper look, at what to do when we need to defend
the country from a strategic perspective. Do you agree with
that?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. As I alluded to earlier, the
concepts that now are part of the new STRATCOM broadened the
concept of what is strategic in character. I believe that we
need to understand and appreciate that much of what we do adds
to the deterrent value of our Nation's security efforts,
including ISR, the missile defense piece, and our advanced and
overwhelming conventional capabilities, as they evolve.
So there are many contributors to deterrence. I think that
is an appropriate way to view it. Indeed, the fundamental
purpose of the NPR was to broaden the number of options to
enhance our deterrence and to raise the nuclear threshold.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you support conventional weapons,
warheads, on deployed ICBMs?
Admiral Ellis. I support consideration of that as part of a
broader address, all of the advanced conventional capabilities,
as I said earlier, because I think there are elements dealing
with range and response times that are going to increasingly
challenge us into the future. That, coupled with accuracy and
effectiveness, some of those could be dealt with by a construct
that you described, just as they could be dealt with by other
concepts that are also under consideration.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, Dr. Younger was also saying he
was not talking about 10-year development cycles. He was
talking about 90 days. What do you think about his ideas of 90-
day development cycles? What would be the effect on the ground
in the United States if such 90-day time frame would be put on
conventional warhead on a Minuteman II ICBM?
Admiral Ellis. Well, not understanding the context in which
Steve Younger made those remarks, I cannot approach it
directly. If he was talking about the challenges we face with
long development times and how long it takes us to take a
concept from conception to delivery, then I certainly am
empathetic with shortening those time lines.
I do believe, as I addressed with the chairman, that there
are near-term issues that can be addressed very quickly by
employing modifications of existing systems and the like or
there are then also longer term efforts that will have to play
out as technologies and capabilities need to be reviewed and
assessed. I think Steve Younger's view, I infer from those
remarks, was that he could do it on the shorter end rather than
the longer end. Whether 90 days or not is the right value, I
could not say, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. There is some indication from Pratt
Whitney that the replacement program may be delayed. Tell us
about that.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. As they may have told you, they
have had two incidents at their Pratt Whitney facility in San
Jose with regard to propellant mixing in support of the
Minuteman program and others that have forced them, in concert
with the overarching corporate leadership, to consider other
alternatives. They have now done that. They have shifted the
location in which that propellant element for the first stage
of the Minuteman is mixed to a new facility run by ATK in Utah.
They have not recaptured schedule. They have lost time as a
result of that. However, I have spoken personally with the
corporate leadership, and they believe that by the end of the
year, they will be back in production for the Propulsion
Reliability Program (PRP), which is the final upgrade to the
Minuteman III process to deal with some long-identified
technical challenges.
Senator Bill Nelson. Replacing W62 with W87, I understand
that is being reconsidered.
Admiral Ellis. That is news to me, sir.
Ambassador Brooks. That is news to me, too, and it is very
hard for me to believe that it would be reconsidered without
one of us being involved in it.
Admiral Ellis. The rationale for that was because of the
modern capabilities that are associated with the W87. It made
sense to do that as the Peacekeeper force was retiring, and
that process is well underway. So it would seem to be a logical
thing to do to employ the newer capabilities over the longer
term by transferring it to the Minuteman system. But I will
have to take that one for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

During a Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on March 25, 2004,
Admiral Ellis provided Senator Nelson with more details. The exchange
follows:

Senator Bill Nelson. Yesterday, Admiral Ellis, we had talked
in the full committee about the Minuteman III. The Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and the Moscow Treaty achieved the bulk of
the reductions in the deployed nuclear warheads by retiring the
Peacekeeper and taking the Multiple Indepently-Targetable
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), de-MIRVing the Minuteman IIIs, so
that each Minuteman III has one instead of multiple warheads.
There was a recent press report that suggested that the
decision to have one warhead on each of the 500 Minuteman IIIs
was being reconsidered. Is there any truth to that press
report?
Admiral Ellis. I am aware of no reconsideration of that, sir,
and I believe that the modernization program of which we spoke
yesterday is still on track as you and I understand it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there any plan to retain MIRVed
Minuteman IIIs?
Admiral Ellis. I am not aware of any program at all, sir, in
that construct. Now, as with all posture and policy reviews,
someone may have hypothesized as we look at alternative
structures for the future and what combination of reduced
vehicle numbers could allow us to do that. I can assure you
that there is nothing in the program of record that alters the
information that either you or I have been given about the way
ahead for the program with regard to Minuteman III.

Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. But I am familiar with most
thinking on future nuclear weapons. There may be somebody
somewhere who is thinking it, because there are always people
somewhere who are thinking everything. That is not under active
consideration at any significant level in the DOD or DOE.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Ambassador, what is the impact on
the repeal of the ban on R&D of new yield nuclear weapons? How
does that impact on the U.S. nonproliferation goals?
Ambassador Brooks. I believe it does not impact at all,
sir. Congress asked us for a report which sets forth our
rationale in some detail. I expect that report to be here
within a few days. But let me walk through the basic
conclusions.
First of all, look at people who might wish to acquire
nuclear capabilities. Start with the most benign ones, our
friends and allies. Our friends and allies want to know that we
are acting to maintain the reliability and security of our
forces. So they are not threatened by this.
Terrorists do not care what we do, because they have
motivations of their own. There is no particular evidence that
the rogue states are influenced one way or the other by whether
we are thinking about any particular form of weapon. After all,
over the last 10 years, we have cut forces. We have taken
forces off alert. We have ended testing. It has not appeared to
affect the Irans and the North Koreas of the world.
So the remaining question is that large body of states that
helped form the nonproliferation norm that is codified in the
NPR. There, I believe, the repeal of the ban does not make any
difference. What we choose to do with it makes a difference.
If, as some in the press have claimed, we were seeking to
develop low-yield weapons and blur the distinction between
conventional and nuclear weapons, I think that would affect our
nonproliferation goals. Since we are not planning to do any of
those things, I do not think there is any impact on them, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple more
questions. I will submit them for the record, and we can get
answers.
I would just like the two of you all to give us some
assurance. Our committee staff has been trying with no success
for over a year to get a briefing on the end-to-end review,
which was a joint DOD/DOE review. It has been completed for 2
years. Will you all arrange a briefing for this subcommittee
and our staff?
Admiral Ellis. I will certainly convey that request to the
DOD, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. To whom?
Admiral Ellis. To the Secretary and the staff. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Will you report back
directly to me?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. On the answer?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Mr. Chairman, if we can
submit it for the record, this is the chart on the national
missile defense testing showing that, in 2003, the test planned
after the decision to deploy. In 2003, you had a failed test.
Then you had three tests that were canceled. In 2004, you had
one test and three additional tests canceled.
For the life of me, it is hard for me to understand, even
as someone who would like to see a national missile defense
system work, because that gives us certain strategic
advantages. I do not know if you have that kind of testing
schedule and then it is canceled, how you can say that it is
ready to go operationally and put it in the field.
You do not have to answer that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Ellis. No, sir. Well, I think I have given you the
only answer that I can, that while that snapshot is certainly,
I am sure, accurate for the 2-year slice, the broader continuum
of evolutionary testing started before that and will continue
beyond that at a pace that is as rapid as the technology and
system supports. I am committed to that and I know Ron Kadish
and the MDA are committed to that, and so are our other
contractors and folks who are proceeding with the system.
We do not want testing in advance of readiness for testing.
I think that is the element that is reflected there.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you were Ron Kadish and running
that program, you would be satisfied in doing exactly what he
is doing?
Admiral Ellis. I would be satisfied that he is pursuing
this as aggressively as it can possibly be done given the level
of technology and the time line that we are on. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, I have a couple questions I
would like to ask in response to that. Maybe you want to be
here while I ask those questions. But, we have no defense.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would accept your gracious
opportunity, but I have these people out there waiting on me.
Senator Allard. Very good. Well, we will go ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you so much.
Senator Allard. We have no defenses against long-range
ballistic missile development today. I have a series of short
questions in regard to that. We had a whole hearing in the full
committee on missile defense. I hate to tromp over the same
issues again. But just for this record and this subcommittee,
do you support the use of the missile defense test bed to
provide limited operational capability? Yes or no?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Does such a capability contribute to
deterrence? Yes or no?
Admiral Ellis. Absolutely.
Senator Allard. Does such a capability provide a useful
strategic option?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, it does.
Senator Allard. Does such a capability raise the nuclear
threshold?
Admiral Ellis. It certainly does.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
I want to clarify for the record the funding issue that we
talked about, Ambassador Brooks. I want this to be clear. Has
the NNSA decided to proceed to phase 6.3 engineering
development of the RNEP?
Ambassador Brooks. No, sir.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your question.
I want to go back to the nuclear weapons stockpile and just
ask a few questions in regard to that for both you, Admiral
Ellis and Ambassador Brooks. Following the NPR, which
envisioned reducing our nuclear weapons stockpile from around
6,000 nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200
operationally-deployed nuclear weapons, the Appropriations
Committee has included language in their bill requiring the
nuclear stockpile to be included with the fiscal year 2005
budget request.
To date, the plan has not been delivered. When do you
anticipate the plan will be delivered?
Ambassador Brooks. I think the Secretary of Defense
testified that it would be delivered ``in the spring.'' It is
being worked at the highest levels. On the other hand, there is
probably nothing more important than getting this right. It has
taken us longer to get it right than we anticipated, and we
regret the delay. I am very reluctant to give you a specific
date that I cannot deliver on.
Senator Allard. There are a number of people reviewing it,
a number of offices reviewing it, I understand.
Ambassador Brooks. Well, yes, sir. But more importantly,
the importance of this will require personal involvement by
both my cabinet officer and the Secretary of Defense, and
ultimately by the President.
Senator Allard. I understand it is over at the DOD now.
They are reviewing it.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. It is being worked actively.
Senator Allard. Okay. Funding for the nuclear weapons
initiatives were reduced by the House Energy and Water
Appropriations Subcommittee until the nuclear stockpile plan is
received. That subcommittee asserted that NNSA should not be
moving forward with initiatives when they do not know the size
and character of the stockpile. Is that a proper
characterization?
Ambassador Brooks. That is certainly a proper
characterization of what the committee did.
Senator Allard. Well, what about their allegation? Is that
a proper characterization?
Ambassador Brooks. What the committee did was two things.
They fenced off certain parts of the advanced concepts money
until we had presented this plan. They suggested it would be
inappropriate to make any further decisions on the MPF,
including a selection of the site for it, until the plan had
been submitted.
That is part of the normal process of congressional
oversight. With regard to the MPF, the committee also reduced
the funding. With that reduced funding, we are focusing on
design aspects that will be required wherever the site
selection leads us.
I do not believe that that step alone is hampering the
program. Naturally, I would prefer to have those restrictions
off. I would prefer to have the plan the committee wanted up
here, too.
Senator Allard. Let me ask this next question then. Can the
NNSA and DOD do research and conduct activities on the nuclear
weapons initiatives without a complete nuclear weapons
stockpile plan?
Ambassador Brooks. We are allowed to use $2 million of the
$6 million that was provided without the stockpile plan. The
remaining $4 million has to wait until 90 days after the
stockpile plan has been submitted.
Senator Allard. You are kind of focusing on the restriction
there.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The fact of the matter is we
certainly have a number of initiatives that can proceed
comfortably without a precise definition of stockpile character
at decades--so that is a fair statement. We do not need that in
that level of detail or specificity in order to continue to
advance the issues in which we have a shared interest.
Ambassador Brooks. I will follow up.
Senator Allard. Do you want to amend your statement here a
little bit?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Allard. We will strike that. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Brooks. The kind of thinking that we do under
the Advanced Concepts Initiative is not directly related to the
specific future size of the stockpile. So there is no direct
need in order to do that thinking for us to settle on a future
stockpile plan. There are simply different parts of the
intellectual spectrum.
Senator Allard. What activities are appropriate for NNSA to
proceed with, based on current assumptions of the nuclear
weapons stockpile plan?
Ambassador Brooks. I believe that it is appropriate for us
to continue Advanced Concepts Initiatives because we need to
both maintain a robust intellectual capability at our design
labs and also make sure that as we get to a smaller stockpile
we are not passing up any opportunities to improve safety and
security and reliability.
Senator Allard. Ambassador, I would think world events
would have some impact on your plan, as we see a change in the
global landscape and the defense capabilities improve.
Ambassador Brooks. That is certainly true. The most obvious
example is one we have already discussed, the RNEP. We see, as
we have submitted to Congress, a change in the global landscape
in that more and more countries, some of whom we may need to
deter, are using the option of hardening and deeply burying
targets. So that makes it appropriate for us to think about how
the Nation responds to it both in a non-nuclear sense, as
Admiral Ellis described, and in a nuclear sense.
We also believe it is important for us to continue with the
so-called responsive infrastructure. Because as the world
changes, it may be necessary to alter what we have deployed.
One way to do that is to be able to respond not from fully
operational weapons in warehouses, but from an infrastructure
capability.
We think it is important to continue all of the efforts at
life extension and stockpile stewardship, because, once again,
with a smaller force and no prospect of significant new
weapons, we have to extend the life of current weapons. We have
to make sure that they are effective and reliable. That is the
reason Congress has been, and we are grateful for it,
supportive of our stockpile stewardship efforts.
Senator Allard. By having an operating MPF, an active
Advanced Concept research program, and enhanced test readiness
and revitalized infrastructure, will not the United States be
able to reduce the quantities of nuclear weapons even further
in a future nuclear weapons stockpile plan?
Ambassador Brooks. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
The Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program was
designed to use scientific tools and technology to maintain a
reliable, safe, and secure nuclear weapons stockpile without
the need for underground nuclear tests. Can you please provide
an update on how the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship
Program is proceeding?
Ambassador Brooks. It is proceeding well. The program
includes a large number of components. We are working on each
of them.
Senator Allard. What is the biggest challenge?
Ambassador Brooks. I think the biggest challenge is to make
sure that we find ways to gather data about conditions that do
not exist in nature on Earth except in a nuclear explosion. So,
for example, we will start stockpile stewardship experiments at
the National Emission Facility later this year. We are moving
forward to use that facility more and more over the coming
decades to gather data that cannot be gathered any other way.
We are continuing a program of so-called subcritical
experiments. We are working to overcome some of the problems
with the dual axis radiography facility at Los Alamos so that
we can gather data on the phenomenon of implosions. It is
probably a mistake to look at a single silver bullet. The idea
is to have a robust array of tools, which in the aggregate will
provide a good scientific, theoretical scientific basis for
what has historically been something between an empirical
science and an art.
Senator Allard. To what extent can the Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship Program help to certify reliability,
safety, and security of our nuclear stockpile?
Ambassador Brooks. Well, we believe it is crucial to that
certification. We see no reason at the moment to foresee a time
when we would not be able to conduct that certification. But
the enhanced test readiness is necessary as a hedge if we ever
find that we cannot certify without an actual experiment
involving nuclear yield.
Senator Allard. For how long do you estimate we can
continue to certify the nuclear stockpile as reliable, safe,
and secure without the need to conduct a full-scale underground
nuclear test?
Ambassador Brooks. I do not think there is a responsible
answer to that. I cannot see a time when we will not be. But we
look at this in a very formal, very rigorous way. Each year,
the laboratory directors look at it. Admiral Ellis looks at it
separately. What we can tell you for sure is we do not need it
today. What we can tell you is we do not see any reason to
believe we will need it tomorrow. But this is something you
have to look at continuously because of the complexity of the
phenomenon involved.
Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, how important are the
nuclear weapons initiatives, including RNEP, the MPF, and
enhanced test readdress program to you?
Admiral Ellis. Well, as I addressed in my opening remarks,
Mr. Chairman, as you fully understand, we partner with NNSA
through each of these elements. While some of them are more
directly linked to satisfying our military needs--and RNEP's
consideration as one of several alternatives to deal with hard
and deeply buried targets is an example of that--it is also
fair to say that the ability to understand and to ensure the
safety and security of the stockpile in the future is
absolutely an essential element to deterrence in and of itself.
In other words, we have to have confidence in this
stockpile in order to assure that potential adversaries might
have the same kind of confidence and to enable the deterrent
character that is the primary focus of the stockpile. So
clearly, Ambassador Brooks' success and the success of the
great team that he leads is an essential part of our shared
collective national success in establishing a credible arsenal,
be it of smaller size and more modern focus to better meet the
national security challenges that confront us.
Senator Allard. Admiral, I would like to follow up on the
command and control. Strategic command and control in the not
so recent past was oriented toward the need to communicate in
very stressful conditions orders related to planned nuclear
strike options for nuclear weapons delivery platforms. The
broader range of missions and weapons and platforms for which
your command now has considerable responsibilities within the
new triad clearly requires more flexible command and control.
Would you assess the progress being made in achieving this
flexibility? What command and control capabilities will you
need in the future?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. I would be delighted. In fact, as
you are well aware, sir, some of this almost actually bleeds
over into tomorrow's hearing, because many of these are spaced-
based capabilities and the like, as we deal with specific
satellite communications capabilities and the like. But in a
broader sense, it is clear that effective command and control
will remain an essential element of not just oversight of the
nuclear capabilities, the deterrent capabilities that we have
had for years, but more and more the oversight and employment
of the global or the newer definition of strategic capabilities
that we face for the future.
Our challenge now is to make sure that we are in concert
with the guidance out of the OSD. John Stenbit articulated a
lot about the Global Information Grid (GIG) and the
standardization of the architecture and the formats that are
necessary for us to be a part of that.
We are working at our level to establish a national command
and control capability that better serves the needs of the
Nation's combatant commanders down to the theater commander
level. We are partnering with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), who
has the responsibility for effective command and control at the
theater level and below. The intent is to provide a seamless
GIG command and control capability for all of our forces.
The elements that are important to me are in our command
and control information system that we are modernizing. How do
we integrate that with the BMD capabilities and their command
and control battle management system and the like? So we bring
those together in an effective way, make them part of that
larger architecture that Mr. Stenbit used to describe. They
collectively serve the national command and control needs
rather than the classic version of nuclear command and control.
It is now in reality a national command and control system. We
are very much actively involved in supporting all of those
efforts.
Senator Allard. Now I understand that the Air Force has
stood up a long-range strike office to develop an AOA for the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and another office
to look at the future bombers. How are you in your command
involved in these efforts?
Admiral Ellis. Well, as I mentioned in the earlier
question, sir, we are very actively involved in that. The JROC
is using a new process to validate requirements. It is called
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS). It still smells like a rose, but it is the JCIDS.
Senator Allard. It is hard to keep up with all these new
acronyms.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, it is, even for those of us in
uniform. The process is designed to be more responsive. In some
cases, we are specifically tasked to identify those
requirements for capabilities that are ours, such as long-range
Global Strike, for example. My command is responsible for
delivering by the end of this year a statement of the
requirements for that.
At the action level, in reality, my Air Force staff is very
much involved with the Air Force as they begin to explore these
concepts. We participate in many of their armament summits and
things of this nature. We understand the value of that
expertise and access it wherever we find it. We do not believe
that perfect knowledge or insight resides solely in STRATCOM.
We need to go where others are aggressively trying to work
these problems in support of us. So we are very much involved,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. I just wanted to give Ambassador Brooks a
little bit of a break here, Admiral Ellis.
Admiral Ellis. That is fine.
Senator Allard. So I will give him a little bit of a break,
and then get back to him. Ambassador, we were talking about
this Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program. The National
Ignition Facility (NIF) is a key facility in the Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship Program. When fully constructed, it will
allow weapons scientists to aim 192 lasers at a BB-sized target
simulating the temperatures and conditions of a nuclear
explosion but at a much smaller scale.
Can you report to us on the progress of the NIF?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. We are generally pleased with
the progress. Several years ago, there were management issues
there. But in recent years, the NIF has been consistently
meeting milestones ahead of schedule. It is today the most
powerful laser in the world with only 4 of those 192 beams
operating. We will begin Stockpile Stewardship experiments on
it later this year.
We had thought that we might need to delay the actual
ignition in the NIF from 2010 to 2014. But a recent analysis
that Dr. Beckner has conducted has allowed to recover the 2010
date for ignition. While ignition is important, and it is
important to Stockpile Stewardship, the experiments we conduct
between now and 2010 will also be important.
So I believe this facility is a clear example of a success.
It is the largest single stockpile stewardship project we have,
though and so it requires fairly constant supervision. But
right now, they are doing a remarkable job. I mean, 3 million
workdays without a loss.
Senator Allard. Well, that is good news. You are under
budget and ahead of schedule. We always like to hear that on
this side of the table. You say that it is extremely important
to the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, correct?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. The MPF would provide the United States the
capability to manufacture plutonium pits for our nuclear
weapons stockpile. The United States is the only nuclear nation
without this capability. If the pit of a nuclear warhead-type
failed, either due to a design flaw or an aging defect, what
would happen to that class of weapons if we do not have an MPF?
Ambassador Brooks. Well, it depends very much on the nature
of the failure. It could be something that would not meet its
military characteristics. It could, I guess, conceptually be
something that would no longer have any utility. What we know--
and it is important to distinguish between what we know and
what we do not--is that plutonium is a very difficult metal to
fully understand with its multiple phases.
We know that it ages due to radioactive decay, which
changes the nature of the metallurgy. We know that when you
attempt to initiate a nuclear explosion, getting things exactly
right--I am being a little fuzzy because of classification--is
important.
What we do not know is how long plutonium can age before
the problems become significant enough so that it effects
military characteristics. Our analysis suggests a time before
45 and 60 years. So we need to be able to establish a
capability to remanufacture all the pits we are going to
exchange before they get to that time frame.
The only capability we have now is an interim capability
thus far focused only on a single warhead, the W88 at Los
Alamos. Los Alamos will manufacture the first actual Stockpile
War Reserve W88 in 2007. We have learned, I think the director
of Los Alamos started to say, about 43 separate technical
processes that had to be carefully qualified. Some of these are
a little bit of an art. Some of them are more of an engineering
science.
So we march forward with understanding how we will need to
design an MPF. We assume that there is some risk in any
significant delay to the current design of the MPF. Some would
argue, the Foster Panel you mentioned earlier, that we are
accepting unacceptable risk by not having it in operation until
the next of the next decade. We are comfortable with the
schedule that we have set forth. We would not be comfortable
with a significant delay.
Senator Allard. One of the issues that has always been
important to me is security.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. My colleague, Senator Nelson, had a
security question for Admiral Ellis. I now have a security
question for you, Ambassador. After the September 11 attacks,
the Secretary of Energy increased the security requirements for
facilities across the nuclear weapons complex. The security
requirements for the DOE are known as a DBT. Are you confident
the facilities across the nuclear weapons complex will be able
to meet the security requirements of the new DBT by the target
date of 2006?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, I am. Equally important, I am
confident that nuclear materials are not at risk right now.
Senator Allard. Very good. Thank you.
Admiral Ellis. If I might add to that, sir?
Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis.
Admiral Ellis. When I answered very quickly Senator
Nelson's question prior to his departure, I did not want to
infer that we, too, are not continuing to review and upgrade
the security associated with our end of the nuclear stockpile
storage. That is, of course, at the launch facilities, in terms
of the ICBM, the ports where the SSBNs deploy from, and our own
capabilities at the bomber bases and weapons storage sites.
So we, too, have adopted a new DBT. We are continuing to
upgrade what is reflective of the new security environment. It
is not fair to say that everything has been done that needs to
be done. But it is fair to say that we have had a very
aggressive scrub of this, a great deal additionally has been
done by the Services, and a clear roadmap and way ahead has
been identified. We will continue to enhance our capability to
deal with an increasingly robust postulated threat in the years
ahead.
So we, too, are focused on that. We are not sitting on our
laurels here. We understand there is work that needs to be
done, and we are pursuing that.
Senator Allard. Well, thank you. I have one question, and
then we will draw this hearing to a close.
Admiral Ellis, every year this committee asks the Services
for their unfunded priorities lists. As you review programs
that meet STRATCOM priorities, can you identify any particular
acquisition efforts that you believe have not been adequately
resources?
Admiral Ellis. We have to be very careful, understanding
the balance that inevitably is a part of the process, both here
with the committee and the Hill, but also within the DOD. I
highlighted some issues earlier about the advanced conventional
capabilities and the things that are an important part of
understanding this new triad, that sometimes I think we use
that phrase a bit too glibly. We do not fully articulate what
the elements of that are.
In addition to the classic nuclear piece were, of course,
the advanced conventional capabilities that need to mature and
fairly rapidly in order to supplement and complement and enable
that draw-down that you discussed. The infrastructure piece
that Ambassador Brooks is responsible for, the missile defense
capability, as the defensive element, for the first time the
Nation will now have a defensive element to its deterrent
posture that we have not had before. Then there is the very
insightful question that you asked me, about the command and
control capabilities to knit all that together as an effective
whole.
If I had some areas in which I would like to focus, it
would be on those elements of the new triad, to ensure that we
do not just focus on one corner of that, because it has to grow
as an entity, not as an individual element. So while there is
attention being paid to it, we need to continue to refine the
balance of those elements of that new triad in order to
continue to enhance the Nation's deterrent capabilities for, as
I said, a much different future.
Senator Allard. Okay. I want to thank you both for showing
up to testify before the subcommittee. We do have some other
questions we will submit to you that we did not have time to
cover this morning. But if you could respond to those promptly
and get those responses back to this committee within a short
period of time, we would certainly appreciate it.
Again, thank you for your dedication and for the great job
you are doing. With that, we will call the subcommittee to a
close.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

LEGACY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, what is the status of legacy
command and control (C\2\) systems? Will these systems be sustained and
serve as the technical basis for secure nuclear command in the future,
or will they be replaced as part of the more general effort to upgrade
C\2\ capabilities?
Admiral Ellis. I respectfully defer to Ambassador Brooks on
specifics related to the National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA)
fiscal year 2005 budget request.
Over the last few years, knowing that Net Centric operations were
on the horizon, we have and continue to move forward to modernize our
C\2\ systems to better support IT-based hardware and software. United
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) just completed one of the most
modern and secure facilities called the Situation Room, which takes
complete advantage of state-of-the-art technology and provides our
senior decision makers the capability to communicate and collaborate
with supporting forces, other combatant commanders and national
leadership while maintaining global situational awareness. We are now
in the process of doing a full upgrade and modernization of our fixed
command center to bring this facility on par with the Situation Room.

LONG-RANGE STRIKE SYSTEMS

2. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, when the Services talk about
long-range strike or Global Strike, they often tend to talk in terms of
theater systems such as tactical aircraft. What methodologies do you
use to compare requirements for long-range strike systems in
combination with requirements for theater systems?
Admiral Ellis. Two years ago, while we were first developing Global
Strike as it appears in Unified Command Plan (UCP) 02, Change 2, the
Air Force was also developing a concept for prompt Global Strike.
Admittedly, this coincidental use of similar terms has created some
confusion. STRATCOM's UCP-defined Global Strike mission is a joint,
integrated mission combining kinetic and nonkinetic means to achieve
rapidly planned/rapidly approved/rapidly executed, long-range,
strategic effects. STRATCOM's prompt Global Strike processes are built
around rapid collaborative planning and senior-level approval.
Therefore, the product of a prompt Global Strike planning effort could
be the approval of a theater-based strike package or a long-range
strike package, both of which could be called ``Global Strikes.'' The
Air Force's prompt Global Strike capabilities can provide an element of
the joint mission assigned to STRATCOM. The Air Force's prompt Global
Strike capabilities, however, also support geographic combatant
commander's requirements.
STRATCOM will consider all Service capabilities (Air Force and
others) that meet our basic requirements of: long-range, speed of
response, precision and lethality. STRATCOM is developing a Global
Operations Center that will look across all blue forces available
during crisis planning in order to develop the most effective Global
Strike courses of action (COAs). To the extent of their availability,
theater forces (such as tactical aircraft) will be considered during
COA development.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

3. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, STRATCOM has absorbed several new
missions in addition to its traditional mission of nuclear deterrence.
These include missile defense coordination; coordinating, planning, and
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
missions; information operation; and Global Strike. In addition,
STRATCOM and Space Command were merged into the new Strategic Command.
How is your command dealing with the huge workload of absorbing this
new mission and what challenges in this process have you found most
difficult to overcome?
Admiral Ellis. The President established STRATCOM to provide a
practical means to implement and integrate a new triad of global
response capabilities. We have the responsibility for Global Strike--
both kinetic and non-kinetic--and for integrating missile defenses with
a broad-spectrum of flexible offensive and support capabilities. There
is a synergy in integrating these facets into one command and we are
proceeding well down the road on gaining full operational capabilities
for each newly assigned mission. We are addressing opportunities to
gain capabilities in space system technology and advanced conventional
strike.

BOMBER FLEET

4. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, from your perspective as STRATCOM
commander, is the bomber fleet properly sized and would you recommend
any changes to the current structure of the bomber fleet?
Admiral Ellis. The adequacy of the overall bomber fleet size and
composition must be examined from the global perspective of the Air
Force; but from a STRATCOM perspective, the current bomber fleet size
is adequate to meet the needs of the operational plans they support.

5. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, what are the most important
upgrades to current generation bombers and are these initiatives
adequately supported?
Admiral Ellis. We are carefully monitoring the progress of two
critical bomber upgrade programs: Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) terminal integration for the B-2 is key to gaining the
capability of survivable, robust, and secure two-way satellite
communications in a stressed environment.
Additionally, the International Civil Aviation Organization will no
longer grant waivers to very high frequency (VHF)-equipped aircraft
that are unable to receive and transmit in 8.33 khz increments. B-52s
will gain that important capability from the Global Air Traffic
Management Program. Without it, they will not be able to operate out of
European airfields, if the need arises.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

6. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, during the
hearing, there may have been some confusion about a line of questions
on the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP). Please provide for the
record your view on why, even without a final NWSP, the NNSA should
proceed in fiscal year 2005 with the following four nuclear weapons
initiatives: the Advanced Concepts Initiative; the feasibility study on
the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP); the design and
environmental assessment work on the Modern Pit Facility (MPF); and
enhanced test readiness. How would you respond to critics who claim you
should not do any work on these four initiatives without a final NWSP?
Ambassador Brooks. These four initiatives, in large part, are
independent of the details of the revised 2012 NWSP. That plan will
determine the number of warheads and warhead types from the legacy,
Cold War stockpile that we will need to maintain between now and 2012.
The Advanced Concepts Initiative and the RNEP Phase 6.2 study address
options to transform that stockpile in the years beyond 2012; nothing
in the revised stockpile plan would obviate the need for these two
efforts. Moreover, so long as our Nation requires safe and reliable
nuclear forces for its security, a test readiness program is a prudent
hedge against a failure of a warhead critical to our deterrent that
cannot be resolved without nuclear testing--this need is independent of
the revised stockpile plan. Finally, irrespective of the size of the
nuclear stockpile, and even if we never deploy another new warhead, we
will still need an MPF to produce replacement pits for warheads whose
pits will have aged out. The size and capacity of that facility will,
of course, depend on the size and composition of the nuclear stockpile
as well as on pit lifetime. In view of these uncertainties, MPF
planning underway is exploring options at the low end of the range of
plausible plant production capacities--if are planning assumptions are
wrong there is plenty of time before construction begins to adjust
plant capacity accordingly.
Admiral Ellis. The four initiatives you cite are independent of
each other and the NWSP. The NWSP is focused on numbers and types of
weapons. Neither the RNEP study nor any Advanced Concepts would be
reflected in the plan until and unless approved for development and
production. The design and environmental assessment for the MPF do not
require the details of the NWSP during these initial stages, and
enhanced test readiness is an infrastructure issue and not sensitive to
the size of the stockpile.

7. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, would
active programs in these four initiatives help the Department of
Defense (DOD) to complete the NWSP and could active programs in these
four initiatives help to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the
operationally-deployed and response force?
Ambassador Brooks. Certain of these initiatives could indeed help
to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that are in the operationally-
deployed or responsive forces. For example, our current plan is to
maintain some additional warheads in the nuclear stockpile as
reliability replacements for warheads that experience age-related
problems that could call into question their safety or reliability.
Planning for an MPF is a critical step in restoring our production
infrastructure. An ability for timely production of replacement
warheads to address technical problems that arise would mean that we
would not need to maintain as many warheads in the overall stockpile.
Admiral Ellis. None of these initiatives have any bearing on
reducing the number of weapons in the stockpile in the near term.
However, in the long term, once a responsive infrastructure is
implemented (for example, the MPF), it could possibly support deeper
stockpile reductions.

8. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, considering
continuing advances in defense technologies and intelligence
capabilities, constantly changing geopolitical balances, and other
factors discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is the NWSP ever
truly completed?
Ambassador Brooks. No, it is not truly ever completed. We typically
update the NWSP annually.
Admiral Ellis. Through the annual review process mandated by the
President, the NWSP is designed to be a living document. It generally
articulates policy guidance, details a snapshot in time in the life of
the stockpile, and outlines the vision and goals for the foreseeable
future.

9. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, in general,
please indicate the level of complexities required to complete the
NWSP.
Ambassador Brooks. The stockpile plan is an interagency effort and
is prepared jointly by the DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE). Once
both Secretaries concur on the document it is sent to the White House
for approval by the President. Because these are typically complex
issues and critical to our Nation's security, understanding their full
implications and then reaching agreement on specific options is a
lengthy and time-consuming process.
Admiral Ellis. The DOD and NNSA analysts spend thousands of man-
hours examining stockpile alternatives. Analysts examine potential
changes in the strategic environment (a new threat or reliability
concern) and the ability to react to a changed environment via weapons
retained in the stockpile and a more responsive infrastructure.

10. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, does the
NNSA have enough information about what will be included in the NWSP to
prudently proceed with the four initiatives?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes. These four initiatives in large part are
independent of the details of the size and composition of the nuclear
weapons stockpile. Even if we never deploy another new warhead, we will
still need an MPF to produce replacement pits for warheads whose pits
have reached the end of their service lives. The size and capacity of
that facility will, of course, depend on the size and composition of
the nuclear stockpile as well as on pit lifetime. MPF planning underway
is exploring options at the low end of the range of plausible plant
production capacities. If we are wrong in our planning assumptions,
there is plenty of time before construction begins to adjust plant
capacity accordingly.
Admiral Ellis. Yes.

11. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, would
reasonably anticipated modifications to the NWSP cause any changes to
the research or other activities planned for the four initiatives in
fiscal year 2005?
Ambassador Brooks. No. There are no research or other activities
planned to be underway on these four initiatives in fiscal year 2005
that would need to be changed based on anticipated modifications to the
revised 2012 NWSP. These initiatives will ensure that we can sustain
and, in the case of planning for an MPF, restore our nuclear weapons
capabilities in the period well beyond 2012.
Admiral Ellis. No, none.

PRICE-ANDERSON AUTHORITY

12. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks, Price-Anderson authority is
the indemnification protection for DOE contractors who work on nuclear
matter and it expires at the end of this calendar year. What would the
impact be on the DOE if the Price-Anderson indemnification authority is
not extended beyond its expiration at the end of this calendar year?
Ambassador Brooks. NNSA utilizes the Price-Anderson authority to
indemnify its contractors against public liability arising from a
nuclear incident. If the authority to indemnify is not extended NNSA
will utilize the authority fund in Public Law 85-804 to provide its
contractors protection as nearly approximate to Price-Anderson as
possible. This was done in the late 1980s when Price-Anderson authority
had expired. Because Public Law 85-804 authority is not specifically
tailored to address the risks associated with Atomic Energy Act work,
its protections under the best of circumstances is not as good as
Price-Anderson and may leave the public with less protection in the
event of a nuclear incident.
NNSA will conduct at least two significant procurement actions,
beginning in 2004, with award expected in 2005: the management and
operating contracts for Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Nevada
Test Site. If the Price-Anderson indemnity is not available there may
be a chilling effect on competition. At least one firm has informed
NNSA that it would not propose in the absence of Price-Anderson
authority.

13. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks, are there any contracts
which you anticipate will be signed in fiscal year 2005 which would be
impacted by the expiration of Price-Anderson authority?
Ambassador Brooks. As noted in the response to Question 12, NNSA
expects to sign management and operating contracts for Los Alamos
National Laboratory and the Nevada Test Site in 2005. In addition, the
management and operating contracts for the Kansas City Plant, the Y-12
Plant and the Pantex Plant expire in 2005; each of these contracts has
an option to extend the period of performance for 5 years.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

B-1 BOMBERS

14. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, the Air Force has
apparently decided to return to service 7 of the 23 B-1 bombers that
were slated for retirement. General Moseley has indicated that an
additional 10 of the 23 may be available to bring back to service. Of
those 10, apparently 5 are in fairly good condition such that they
would be easier to recover. The remaining six are apparently too far in
the retirement process to be brought back. Recognizing that the B-1 is
no longer nuclear capable, but given your expanded responsibilities for
Global Strike, would you support bringing back more than seven bombers,
if it were feasible?
Admiral Ellis. As one of many users of the B-1, STRATCOM is not in
a position to evaluate the overall needs of the Air Force for this
important system. However, from a STRATCOM perspective, the current
fleet is adequate to meet our needs.

B-2 AND B-52 BOMBERS

15. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, during Operation Iraqi
Freedom the B-2s and B-52s flew 5 percent of the sorties but dropped 65
percent of the ordnance. Are you satisfied that the programs to
maintain and upgrade the capabilities of the B-2 and B-52 are
adequately funded and on track?
Admiral Ellis. We are carefully monitoring the progress of two
critical bomber upgrade programs:
AEHF terminal integration for the B-2 is key to gaining the
capability of survivable, robust, and secure two-way satellite
communications in a stressed environment.
Additionally, the International Civil Aviation Organization will no
longer grant waivers to VHF-equipped aircraft that are unable to
receive and transmit in 8.33 khz increments. B-52s will gain that
important capability from the Global Air Traffic Management Program.
Without it, they will not be able to operate out of European airfields,
if the need arises.

16. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, only 76 of the 93 aircraft
in the B-52 fleet are being upgraded and modernized. In your view
should the entire fleet, including the attrition reserve aircraft, be
upgraded and modernized?
Admiral Ellis. The Air Force has conducted studies over the past
several years to determine the right mix of bombers to fund, and I am
satisfied with their evaluation.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AND STOCKPILE RELIABILITY

17. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the DOE will, according
to its plan, complete the process to achieve a 24-month test readiness
by early fiscal year 2005 and then complete the process to achieve an
18-month test readiness by the end of fiscal year 2005. This is 1 year
earlier than the direction contained in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004. Why is DOE moving so
quickly to achieve the 18-month test readiness posture?
Ambassador Brooks. The Department's actions are consistent with
congressional direction. Section 3113 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004
requires that the Secretary of Energy, not later than October 1, 2006,
achieve a readiness to conduct an underground nuclear test within 18
months. Our fiscal year 2005 request was to enable us to meet this
congressional requirement. However, funding cuts and delays from
continuing resolutions have caused a slip in the timeframe somewhat, to
about the second quarter of fiscal year 2006.
As the President has made clear, we have no intention of resuming
testing; our plans to improve test readiness are a prudent hedge
against the possibility of a problem arising in the stockpile that
cannot be confirmed, or a fix certified, without a nuclear test.

18. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, does this rush to achieve
an 18-month test readiness test posture signify that the DOE wants to
resume nuclear weapons testing to support the development of a new
nuclear weapon or to test an advanced nuclear weapons concept?
Admiral Ellis. The DOD currently has no requirement to develop a
new nuclear weapon or to test an advanced nuclear weapon concept in an
underground testing environment.

ADVANCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONCEPTS

19. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, on
March 17, 2004, the DOE submitted a report on its plans for $2 million
of $6 million appropriated for fiscal year 2004 for advanced nuclear
weapons concepts. In discussing the reason that the administration
requested the repeal of the ban on low-yield weapons research and
development the report states: ``A revitalized nuclear weapons advanced
concepts effort is a core element of NNSA's ability to respond, in a
timely manner, to DOD's nuclear weapons needs.'' What are the needs of
the DOD to which the DOE is responding that could only be addressed
with repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons research?
Ambassador Brooks. Repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons
research was not undertaken in order to meet a specific DOD requirement
for a new, low-yield warhead. Rather, we sought repeal to ensure that
we had the freedom to explore the full range of advanced nuclear
warhead concepts without the chilling effect on scientific inquiry that
the law represented.
Admiral Ellis. There is great value in investigating a deterrent
strategy that is global in nature and includes the most effective mix
of capabilities available, including nuclear, advanced conventional,
nonkinetic, and Special Operation Forces. The DOD is interested in
conducting rigorous studies of all new technologies, and examining the
merits of precision, increased penetration, and reduced yields for our
nuclear weapons that will provide a broad-spectrum of capabilities that
may prove effective against new or emerging threats, such as select
hard and deeply buried targets.

REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

20. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, what is the process by
which a military requirement for a new nuclear weapon would be
developed and what is the process by which a military requirement would
be developed for a modification of an existing nuclear weapon to meet a
new military purpose? At what stage in the 6.X process would such a
requirement be developed?
Admiral Ellis. The process for developing and processing
requirements for a new nuclear weapon is administered by the Nuclear
Weapons Council and follows the life-cycle known as Phase 1 through
Phase 7. The key document that captures the DOD requirement for the
weapon is the Military Characteristics (MC) for the weapon. Each weapon
in the stockpile has an MC document.
When establishing a military requirement that could result in a
modification to an existing weapon to meet new military mission needs,
one would follow what is referred to as the 6.X process, overseen by
the Nuclear Weapons Council. The 6.X process consists of the following
phases: Concept Assessment, 6.1; Feasibility Study and Option Down
Select, 6.2; Design Definition and Cost Study, 6.2A; Development
Engineering, 6.3; Production Engineering, 6.4; First Production, 6.5;
and Full-Scale Production, 6.6.
Depending on whether the weapon is new or modified, the development
phase of the process would be Phase 3 or 6.3.

ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

21. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, the
NNSA, according to its fiscal year 2005 budget request, will spend $135
million to complete the phase 6.2/6.2A study on the RNEP. This is
substantially more than the $45 million that was announced in fiscal
year 2003 when the first funding for the RNEP was requested. Why has
the cost grown so substantially and what activities are covered in this
amount?
Ambassador Brooks. The cost to complete the RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A
study has not increased. Included in the ``out-years'' request in our
fiscal year 2005 Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) is the
funding that would be required in fiscal year 2006 and beyond should a
decision be made to advance RNEP into full-scale engineering
development. I must emphasize that no decision has been made to do
this, nor do we anticipate such a decision until after the RNEP study
is completed. Our inclusion of these funds in the FYNSP ``out-year''
budget request was a prudent ``placeholder'' in the event a decision is
made in fiscal year 2006 to develop the RNEP system.
Admiral Ellis. I respectfully defer to Ambassador Brooks on
specifics related to NNSA's fiscal year 2005 budget request.

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS AND MANAGEMENT

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Allard, Akaka, Bill
Nelson, and E. Benjamin Nelson.
Majority staff member present: Brian R. Green, professional
staff member.
Minority staff member present: Kenneth M. Crosswait,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Bridget E. Ward.
Committee members' assistants present: Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler,
assistants to Senator Akaka; and William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

Senator Allard. We call the subcommittee to order and, just
to let our witnesses know about what we are facing here, we
have a 2:45 vote. I am going to make an opening statement and
we will let Senator Nelson, the ranking member, make an opening
statement, and we will go as far as we can with the testimony
and then we will go vote and come back.
If I have other Republicans set up over here, or somebody
shows up on the other side, we may have an opportunity to let
them make their statement or you continue to make your
statements, and we will run down and vote and come back, so we
can keep it going so we can get out of here and keep you on
time as best we can.
We meet today to receive testimony on the space programs of
the Department of Defense (DOD). I want to first welcome
Senator Bill Nelson, my ranking member on the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee. I know you share my keen interest in space issues
and I look forward to working with you closely in this area.
I am also pleased to welcome the witnesses today: the
Honorable Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force;
Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM); General Lance Lord, Commander, Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC); and retired Vice Admiral Arthur
Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Admiral Ellis, it is good to see you again today. We had an
opportunity to hear from each other yesterday. I thank you all
for your service to the Nation and for taking time out from
your very busy schedules to join us here today.
Our space forces today are the most capable they have ever
been and they provide our military a decisive advantage over
our adversaries. The stories of how space contributed to our
rapid victory over Saddam's forces in Iraq last year are well
known and praise for how well our space forces performed is
well justified.
The space assets that provide these tremendous capabilities
were developed by extraordinarily talented individuals. There
is no denying their great success. At the same time, however,
many space acquisition programs have had long, difficult
development histories. Space-based Infrared Radar System
(SBIRS)-High, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), and
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) programs, and the
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) program, to name a few, have
experienced significant problems in the past few years.
I think many people are concerned, with considerable
justification, that space programs are so often fraught with
such great difficulties. Difficulties that manifest themselves
in increased costs, schedule delays, and technical
complications.
Secretary Teets, I commend you for your reforms of the
space acquisition process as you try to control risks and
minimize these problems. I also believe it is to your great
credit that you commissioned the Young Panel, a joint Air
Force-Defense Science Board (DSB) group of experts, to explore
some of the causes of these difficulties. The task force
identified five causes for the cost growth and schedule delays
in National Security Space (NSS) programs, including cost as
the primary management driver in, as opposed to mission
success; unrealistic cost estimates and unrealistic budgets;
inadequate requirements definition and requirements
instability; erosion in the government's ability to lead and
manage the space acquisition process; and industrial management
failures.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) also put out a recent
report on this subject that in some ways parallels the Young
Report, but GAO also identified the use of immature
technologies as a prominent cause of these difficulties.
We might add to this inventory of causes the fact that
space is a very challenging environment in which to operate. As
I have dealt with some of the programs in the authorization
process over the past few years, I have wondered if some of the
problems are simply inherent in the way we develop and operate
our space capabilities. The process it seems to me goes
something like this:
Space launch continues to be very expensive, so we do not
launch very often. With launch both infrequent and expensive,
we must build the most capable spacecraft we can and we build
them to last a long time. That means we use the most advanced
technology we can in constellations of just a few satellites.
So we use the most sophisticated technologies in just a few
platforms, with very limited opportunities to improve in an
evolutionary manner. We also try to make such a system work
perfectly the first time it is launched and the first time it
functions in its operational environment.
It seems to me that it is this set of challenges that makes
these programs so difficult. I am encouraged that the Air Force
budget includes funding for Operationally Responsive Launch
(ORL). The intent of that program, if I understand it
correctly, is to try to reduce launch costs and time lines, at
least for small payloads.
I also note that the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force have testified before the full committee on the
importance of responsive space capabilities, and I know Admiral
Cebrowski's office has sponsored some very interesting
initiatives in this area. Admiral Cebrowski, I read your
prepared statement for today's hearing with great interest. The
business model today, focused on large, complex satellites,
evolved for good reason and has provided us with remarkable
capabilities. It does seem to me that technology has advanced
to the point that an additional approach to space capabilities,
one that features much smaller satellites, more frequent
launches, and operational and technical agility, must be
examined more thoroughly and could provide great advantages.
I am very interested in exploring these ideas of how new
capabilities might fit into future architectures and how this
new approach could achieve significant capabilities for the
warfighter at lower risk. This needs to be a high priority. I
am concerned that the Department has not adequately resourced
this approach this year, particularly as it pertains to small
satellites.
I also intend to determine if additional funding or
legislation might be useful to accelerate the progress that has
already been made to date by the Air Force and the Office of
Force Transformation (OFT).
I commend the Air Force for its interest in ORL and OFT for
its transformational vision. I am convinced that this new
approach holds great promise that must be aggressively
explored. At the same time, I fully understand that we have
ongoing space programs that will continue to provide very
important capabilities and that business models and technical
approaches do not change overnight.
I look forward to exploring with our witnesses the status
of current programs, the challenges they face, and how we might
meet these challenges successfully.
Gentlemen, I know how busy you are and appreciate your
willingness to appear before our subcommittee and I look
forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will boil down my
opening statement to five words: access to space and technical
challenges. That will be the essence of my line of inquiry, and
I will submit a statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

Thank you Senator Allard. I would like to join you in welcoming our
witnesses this afternoon.
This is an important hearing and it is a pleasure to have each of
our witnesses here today. As the United States becomes increasingly
dependent on space for a wide variety of functions, from ATM machines
to operations in Iraq, to maintaining vigilance through our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, we must
ensure that we always maintain access to space and to our space assets.
Maintaining our access to space--ensuring that the ability to
launch satellites as and when needed--is critically important to
national security. Put simply, we would not be the same country if we
were not able to maintain assured access to space.
The program that will allow us to maintain this access in the near
term is the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. This
program has its share of issues at the moment, not the least of which
is cost. We will, I am sure, have an opportunity to have a full
discussion of the EELV program today.
A longstanding concern of mine, and one that I believe I share with
you, Senator Allard, is the fact that with most all of the National
Security Space (NSS) satellite programs are experiencing some sort of
technical difficulty. They are over budget and behind schedule--some by
significant amounts of time and money. Curiously, the reasons for these
problems vary with the program. It is not just the more mature programs
that are of concern. Some of the newer programs are so technically
aggressive that although they may not yet be over budget or behind
schedule, it is probably only a matter of time before they, too, will
be beset with problems.
Today, I would like to focus on a few of the satellite programs
that are of particular concern to me, the Transformational
Communications satellite, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellite, the Space-based Radar (SBR), and the Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS)-High.
Also of concern, from a policy perspective, are space programs in
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Today, I would like to discuss the
policy and programmatic issues associated with these MDA space
programs. It appears that these programs may be the beginning of a
change in U.S. policy with respect to space weapons.
The last area that I hope to discuss is where we go in the future.
I would very much like to hear from each of our witnesses their visions
for NSS in the future. Where will we be in 5, 10, or 20 years?
Secretary Teets, I want to note the attention you have given to
ensuring that we also have the people that we need to ensure our
ability to utilize space as a national asset. This is a real challenge
and I want to thank you for your efforts and your dedication to the
space professionals.
Thank you Senator Allard, and to our witnesses, it is a pleasure to
have you all with us. Collectively you bring many years of space
wisdom.

Senator Ben Nelson. The other Senator Nelson.
Senator Allard. Right.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome all of you today, but especially my good
friend Admiral Ellis, the Commander of STRATCOM. Although it is
newly expanded, STRATCOM already has a very proud legacy and an
opportunity for the future. So many of the missions that will
be talked about in the future and a lot of the planning will,
in the words of my colleague from Florida, involve space.
I know we are all interested in how this will affect
preparedness, how it will help the American people feel more
secure and have more security in the world.
I thank you very much for being here, thank you for taking
on this responsibility, and look forward to your comments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
We are just checking on the bell here to make sure we are
not having a vote that is getting started. I welcome the panel
here, and we thought we would start with Dr. Teets, Under
Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO). It is always good to hear from
you, Dr. Teets.
Then after each of you have had your testimony, we will
proceed with 10-minute rounds of questions and comments from
the members of the committee.
Dr. Teets.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER B. TEETS, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Dr. Teets. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I am very pleased to be here today
and to have an opportunity to make some remarks. I have
submitted a written statement for the record, and with your
permission would like to ask that it be entered into the
record, but I do have a few brief opening remarks I would like
to make today.
Senator Allard. All of your full statements will be entered
in the record and please proceed.
Dr. Teets. Thank you.
I am particularly honored to be here with Admiral Ellis,
General Lord, and Admiral Cebrowski. Over the course of my
tenure, I have had the good fortune of working closely with
these three gentlemen, and indeed I think that does emphasize
the importance that we place on jointness in our NSS endeavors.
We have worked hard together as a team to define a way ahead
that will provide a strong NSS program that meets the needs of
all the military services as well as the Intelligence
Community.
The President's budget request, along with our efforts to
develop and maintain our team of space professionals, will
enable us to sustain America's preeminence in space. In my
multiple roles as the DOD's Executive Agent for Space, Under
Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director of the NRO, I have
set five priorities for our NSS efforts in this year of 2004.
They are:

Number one, achieving mission success in operations
and in acquisition;
Number two, developing and maintaining a team of
space professionals;
Number three, integrating space capabilities for
national intelligence and warfighting;
Number four, producing innovative solutions for the
most challenging national security problems; and
Number five, ensuring freedom of action in space.

These priorities have shaped the fiscal year 2005 budget
for our DOD space programs and I see substantial improvement in
capabilities in every mission area as we recapitalize our space
assets in the years ahead.
The funding requested in the President's budget for fiscal
year 2005 allows us to evolve capabilities in current
constellations while planned investments in new space systems
will provide significant increases in performance, supporting
the full range of intelligence and military operations, to
include the global war on terrorism.
We are aggressively pursuing two major initiatives that
will deliver transformational capabilities to military and
intelligence operations. First, the Transformation
Communications Architecture (TCA) will provide vast
improvements in data rates, expanded accesses, communications
on the move, the Internet protocol-based connectivity. As a
part of that architecture, the Transformational Communications
Satellite (TSAT) will be a revolutionary change in satellite
communications for the warfighter and for national intelligence
users, and is an enabler of horizontal integration, allowing
our fighting forces to have near-real-time intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) at their fingertips.
TSAT will provide an unprecedented connectivity with
Internet-like capabilities that extends the global information
grid to deployed and mobile users worldwide and will deliver an
order of magnitude increase in capacity. The program entered
design phase this past January and as a result we recently
awarded two contracts, for technology risk reduction and design
development. We plan to launch the first TSAT in November 2011.
Second, we are moving to more persistent surveillance with
Space-Based Radar (SBR) and other innovative capabilities. SBR
will provide a start on persistent global situational awareness
and target tracking capability as part of a horizontally
integrated DOD-wide and national system of systems. Radar from
space will provide day-night, all-weather, worldwide, multi-
theater surveillance on demand.
In fiscal year 2005 we plan to focus on concept definition,
risk reduction, and systems engineering activities, all leading
to a system requirements review in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2005 and a system design review as early as fiscal year
2006. These activities are part of the study phase, which will
culminate in a downselect award and a decision to enter design
phase in mid-fiscal year 2006.
As I look over our NSS program, there are areas that
require our vigilant attention and we plan to work these areas
hard in the coming months, placing emphasis on each of these
areas in future budget deliberations.
For some of our constellations, our replenishment strategy
provides very little margin if there is a launch failure, a
premature on-orbit failure, or a significant program delay.
While I am confident in the systems we are developing, true
capability is the result of end-to-end performance in support
of the user. Greater emphasis is needed on synchronization of
fielding ground and air receivers and terminals to match on-
orbit capabilities.
The aggressive DOD to Intelligence Community horizontal
integration effort to better integrate and exploit ground, air,
and space remote sensing capabilities remains a priority for
us.
We have taken steps to strengthen the acquisition process
for NSS programs, but there is still much to do. We are
committed to building credible management reserves into our
acquisition program so that the program managers (PMs) will
have the resources available to solve problems in a timely way.
Mission success in all phases of space operations and
acquisition continues to be my highest priority. We made steady
progress on space programs during the past year and the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, along with efforts
to enhance the space profession, will enable us to continue
that progress.
I appreciate the continued support that Congress and this
committee have given to help deliver these vital capabilities
and I look forward to working with you as we continue to
develop, produce, launch, and operate critical space systems
that deliver vital capabilities to this great Nation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Teets follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter B. Teets

INTRODUCTION

It is my distinct honor to appear before the subcommittee today
representing the world's finest air and space force, and to be joined
by leaders of our National Security Space (NSS) activities: General
Lance Lord, Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC); Admiral James
Ellis, Jr., Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); Admiral
(Ret.) Arthur Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Our appearance here, together,
underscores the importance of jointness in our NSS endeavors.
Given the role of this committee, and my role in overseeing NSS
activities as Under Secretary of the Air Force, Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Department of Defense
(DOD) Executive Agent for Space, I will concentrate my remarks today on
the five priorities I have set for our NSS efforts for 2004. They are:
(1) achieving mission success in operations and acquisition; (2)
developing and maintaining a team of space professionals; (3)
integrating space capabilities for national intelligence and
warfighting; (4) producing innovative solutions for the most
challenging national security problems; and (5) ensuring freedom of
action in space. These priorities are my focus for this year and are
supported in the fiscal year 2005 budget for our DOD and NRO space
programs.

ACHIEVE MISSION SUCCESS IN OPERATIONS AND ACQUISITION

Our ongoing activities in support of the global war on terrorism
highlight the fact that our space capabilities have become increasingly
integrated in our national intelligence and warfighting operations.
Space systems are unique assets--they provide global persistence,
perspective, and access unhindered by geographic or political
boundaries. Our space systems, whether integrated with airborne and
surface sensors, or acting alone over areas of high risk or denied
access, provide critical surveillance and reconnaissance information to
national decisionmakers and combatant commanders. They are also the
primary sources for global environmental monitoring and weather
forecasting data, global communications, missile warning, precision
navigation and timing to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft
in flight, and weapons en route to targets. These space capabilities
enabled the tremendous success our joint warfighters achieved during
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and will continue to be a
cornerstone for success in future conflicts.
Our success in conflict relies on a mixture of technologies,
tactics, and people, including military members, government civilians,
and contractors. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Air Force Space
Command crews and their contractor mission partners developed new
tactics and procedures to achieve the highest global positioning system
(GPS) accuracy possible to support combat operations; as a result, we
were able to strike legitimate regime targets with pinpoint accuracy
while minimizing collateral damage, protecting civilian lives, and
reducing re-strike requirements. Also, in a prime example of the
benefits provided by integrating sources, coalition forces used a
mixture of space, airborne, and surface sensors to detect Iraqi theater
ballistic missile launches, protecting lives while allowing our troops
to sustain their operations tempo.
To maintain our asymmetric advantages in space, we must continue to
provide our warfighters with the most capable and reliable systems
possible. We have eight NSS launches planned for calendar year 2004,
which focus on sustaining and improving existing military and
intelligence satellite constellations. This year, we will launch three
GPS Imaging Infrared (IIR) satellites, and on February 14, 2004, I was
pleased to be present as our Air Force and industry team successfully
launched a Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite to augment our
strategic missile warning capabilities. This launch, and the launch of
an NRO payload in the last quarter of calendar year 2004--one of three
NRO launches this year--mark the last Titan launches from Cape
Canaveral after 45 years of test and operations. Now our focus is
shifting to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) system for our
future space launch missions. In support of this transition, we plan to
launch the first heavy lift Delta IV EELV this year, giving us the
capability to launch our heaviest communications and national security
payloads. Our budget this year supports an anticipated price increase
in future EELV buys, due largely to the downturn in the commercial
launch market.
Mission success in operations must be accompanied by mission
success in acquisitions. We have benefited greatly from the
recommendations of the joint Defense Science Board (DSB) and Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board task force on Acquisition of National
Security Space Programs, led by A. Thomas Young. One of their
recommendations, with which I strongly agree, is that mission success
should be the primary driver of a program, not cost and schedule.
As programs are established, strong systems engineering practices
need to be employed. Management of requirements, early risk reduction
activity, rigorous design discipline, periodic independent program
assessment, and thorough component subsystem and system level test
activities need to be built into the program at the onset. Program
Managers must have unencumbered schedule and financial reserves at
their disposal to solve problems that arise during program execution.
In an effort to institutionalize this thinking, and following an
extensive coordination process with OSD and the Joint Staff, I signed
the new NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 on October 6, 2003. Using this
process, we have conducted Defense Space Acquisition Boards that
approved Space-Based Radar's (SBR) entry into the Study Phase and
Transformational Satellite's (TSAT) entry into the design phase. In
each case, an Independent Program Assessment Team and an Independent
Cost Assessment Team identified key risk areas and made excellent
recommendations on how to best manage the risks inherent in these
complex and vital programs. In concert with the Joint Staff, the
Intelligence Community, and the OSD, we are implementing these
recommendations so that these critical programs have the necessary
foundation to assure their future mission success.
In addition to the institution of NSS 03-01, we have made great
strides in developing better cost estimates. In a joint effort with the
Director of the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), we now have
a strong space system cost estimating capability in place; and, with
the CAIG leading the Independent Cost Assessment Teams, have
incorporated the process on SBR and TSAT.
NSS 03-01 and its companion directive in the NRO, in their current
forms, have provided excellent insight into our programs. Yet, we are
learning with each program acquisition milestone decision, and will
update the policies later this year.

DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN A TEAM OF SPACE PROFESSIONALS

In order to preserve our advantage as the leading space faring
nation, we must ensure we have a strategy to guarantee availability of
the most crucial element of space power--our space professionals.
People remain central to our success in space, and meeting the serious
challenges of today, and the future, requires a total force approach.
We will continue to develop well-educated, motivated, and competent
people who are skilled in the demands of the space medium.
Operationally, they must understand the tactical environment they
support, as well as the space-unique tactics, techniques, and
procedures needed. Technically, they must be schooled in the
acquisition of space systems, the requirements of the vehicles that
operate in space, and the development of space-related research,
science, and technology. Our space professionals must be sensitive to
the needs of the many and varied end-users of space capabilities, and
be able to formulate and articulate new space doctrine to fully control
and exploit the medium of space in support of our Nation's security
objectives. They must be able to develop new technologies, systems,
training methods, concepts of operations (CONOPs) and organizations
that will continue to sustain the U.S. as a world leader in space. The
new systems they develop must be able to achieve desirable effects at
all levels of conflict. Furthermore, they must ensure these systems are
interoperable with and integrated into architectures that support the
creation of lethal and non-lethal effects. The backbone of our joint
and interagency space operations capabilities will continue to be
individuals of exceptional dedication and ability.
In order to develop and maintain our space professionals, we are
implementing the Secretary of the Air Force-approved Space Professional
Strategy, and the DOD Space Human Capital Resources Strategy. These
strategies describe a professional development construct that is
comprehensive and recognizes the unique roles that officers, enlisted
personnel, and government civilians play in NSS. As we implement these
strategies, our objective is to ensure the space cadres of all the
Services possess the necessary education, skills and experiences, at
all levels, to meet NSS needs.

INTEGRATE SPACE CAPABILITIES FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND WARFIGHTING

We continue to make dramatic improvements integrating our manned
and unmanned terrestrial, maritime, air, and space systems for joint
warfighting and intelligence collection, and have seen dramatic
results. In OIF, the difference was not so much the introduction of new
capabilities, but rather the integration of existing space capabilities
to produce desired effects. Using existing systems in new ways,
applying new ideas, and making new connections between information
providers and information users is truly at the heart of our
transformation and integration efforts. Our synchronization of end-user
and space segment capabilities, and the improvement of our enterprise-
wide vertical and horizontal integration efforts are prime examples of
our ability to transform our warfighting and intelligence gathering
capabilities through integration.
However, true transformational integration requires more than the
use of existing capabilities in new and innovative ways. We need to
make integration a priority throughout the enterprise. As we attempt to
increase our worldwide persistent situational awareness, we need to
bring a true system of systems approach to the fielding of new
capabilities. SBR, for example, is not being developed in a vacuum. As
we work through the early development of this system, which offers the
promise of a start on a persistent surveillance architecture, we are
ensuring that other systems in development, such as TSAT and the NRO's
Optical Relay Communications Architecture (ORCA), are not just
interoperable with SBR, but are truly integrated from operational
concept to employment.
We continue to integrate our warfighting needs and our intelligence
collection activities. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) will not
only replace the veteran DSP platform, but will also meet the demands
for much greater capability in the mission areas of missile defense,
battlespace characterization to support real-time warfighting
operations, and technical intelligence. However, technical challenges
associated with electromagnetic interference have continued to delay
the two highly-elliptical orbit payloads. These payloads, currently
scheduled for delivery in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, will perform at
the crossroads of defense and intelligence needs, and we're managing
them to ensure the missions of both communities.
Another aspect of integration is to ensure that the defense and
intelligence space organizations work together as a team. As the DOD
Executive Agent for Space, I strongly encourage unifying efforts across
all of the space stakeholders--ensuring integration remains a priority,
not an afterthought. In support of this unity of effort, we continue to
integrate our corporate processes. Our planning, programming,
budgeting, and acquisition efforts embrace an integrated capabilities-
based approach to develop the means necessary to secure our national
security objectives in the most effective and efficient manner
possible.
Yet, unity of effort alone is not enough. Our continuing commitment
to integration is also shown in the development of our space
professionals. The DOD has developed a Space Human Capital Resources
Strategy designed to integrate the space cadres of the military
services and the Intelligence Community to the maximum extent
practicable. Among other things, this means that we will be eliminating
unnecessary redundancies in our space education and training programs
as well as finding and eliminating gaps in our programs. More
importantly, it means that space professionals from the four Services
and the Intelligence Community will be working together more closely,
earlier in their careers. The best practices and ideas that they each
bring to the table can truly help push our space capabilities to the
next level.
Integration properly done has a synergistic effect. The value of
our NSS systems, developed with a system of systems approach, using
integrated corporate processes, and manned by space professionals who
have been developed in an environment that fosters innovative
employment, will greatly exceed the sum of the parts.

PRODUCE INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR THE MOST CHALLENGING NATIONAL SECURITY
PROBLEMS

Our goal is transparency--we want the ability to see everything and
know everything, while simultaneously denying our adversaries both the
ability to do the same, and the knowledge that such capabilities are
being used against them. We want to always be one step, or more, ahead
of our adversaries--to be first to see, first to understand, and first
to act. To do so requires the development of breakthrough technologies
that would produce new sources and methods for collecting intelligence.
Thus, our other activities this year support the transformation of
military satellite systems, with technology maturation and development
activities in TSAT and SBR; and the modernization of current systems,
including new jam-resistant capabilities for our GPS constellation.
We will launch the last of the present generation of GPS satellites
in fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2005, we will begin launching the
next generation of ``modernized'' GPS satellites, with military-code
and flexible power capabilities. The generation after next will be
composed of GPS III satellites, which will include all of the legacy
capabilities, plus the addition of high-powered, anti-jam military-
code, along with other accuracy, reliability, and data integrity
improvements.
As always, communications play a fundamental role in any military
action. We are modernizing our communications systems, as well as
preparing for the next leap forward in capability. Last October, the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved our
Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA). Part of the TCA is
the Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), which will augment the current
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) capability.
Another vital program, which will provide a smooth transition to
TSAT, is the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system that
replaces the MILSTAR communications constellation. The first AEHF
satellite will be launched in fiscal year 2007 and will provide
survivable, protected satellite communications for strategic and
tactical users. AEHF represents a significant step forward in
capability over current systems, providing up to 12 times greater
capacity than MILSTAR with up to 4,000 simultaneous networks while
hosting up to 6,000 users per satellite.
TSAT will be a revolutionary change in satellite communications for
the warfighter and national intelligence. Our goal is to create an
``internet in the sky''--making it possible for U.S. marines in a High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), in a faraway land, in
the middle of a rainstorm, to open up their laptops, request imagery,
and get it downloaded within seconds. TSAT is an enabler of horizontal
integration--allowing our fighting forces to have near-real-time
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) at their
fingertips. TSAT will provide an unprecedented connectivity with
Internet-like capability that extends the Global Information Grid to
deployed and mobile users worldwide, and will deliver an order of
magnitude increase in capacity. The program entered Design Phase this
past month; and as a result, we recently awarded two contracts for risk
reduction and design development. We plan to launch the first TSAT in
November 2011.
SBR is an important element in our efforts to achieve horizontal
integration. SBR will provide a start on persistent, global situational
awareness and target tracking capability as part of a horizontally
integrated DOD and national system of systems. Radar from space will
provide the critical element of global persistence, providing day/
night, all weather, worldwide, multi-theater surveillance on-demand. In
fiscal year 2005, we plan to focus on concept definition, risk
reduction, and systems engineering activities, all leading to a System
Requirements Review in third quarter of fiscal year 2005 and a System
Design Review as early as fiscal year 2006. These activities are part
of the study phase (concept definition), which will culminate in a
downselect award and a decision to enter design phase in mid-fiscal
year 2006.
Recent conflicts have proven, once again, how vital meteorological
forecasting is for military operations. Knowing what the weather is in
any given location allows us to choose the right weapon for the right
target, and is an invaluable asset for navigation. The National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) will
satisfy both civil and military national security requirements for
space-based, remotely sensed environmental data that will significantly
improve weather forecasting and climate prediction. NPOESS is a tri-
agency (DOD/Department of Commerce (DOC)/National Aeronautic and Space
Administration (NASA) satellite program consolidating the missions and
programs of DOD's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and
DOC's Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) systems
into a single integrated program. An integrated suite of 12 very
complex instruments will provide visible and infrared cloud-cover
imagery and other atmospheric, oceanographic, terrestrial, and space
environmental information. The system is currently in development, with
a planned first launch in fiscal year 2010.
We cannot stay on the cutting edge of development without investing
in science and technology (S&T) efforts. We are actively working with
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and organizations such
as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL), and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL),
along with civil agencies such as NASA on our space S&T effort. With
their participation, we are documenting our space S&T strategy, which
will be available this summer. We are also working with DARPA to
leverage common technologies and applications into the Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) program, including next generation propulsion,
advanced structure, and thermal protection schemes. While we do not
currently have an operational role in NASA's new space exploration
program, we will work closely with the agency through our Partnership
Council to find areas of possible collaboration. These activities build
on nearly five decades of collaboration with NASA on X-vehicles,
hypersonic propulsion, and space tests and technology demonstrations.

ENSURE FREEDOM OF ACTION IN SPACE

Americans have come to rely on the unhindered use of space and will
demand no less in the future. This includes robust capabilities for
assured launch and space control. While the United States supports the
peaceful use of space by all, prudence demands that we must be able to
ensure the United States, its allies, and coalition partners will be
able to make use of space, while denying that use of space to
adversaries.
To ensure freedom of action, we are maintaining assured access to
space in the near term as we simultaneously investigate entirely new,
operationally responsive space activities. Today's space surveillance
capability must evolve into integrated Space Situational Awareness
(SSA). Space control activities--while taking advantage of SSA--
emphasize first the protection of our national security interests
against known vulnerabilities and credible threats. We will also pursue
a mix of capabilities to limit any adversary's ability to deny us free
access to space and deny an adversary's use of space against us for
hostile purposes.
We are proud of the success of both families of EELVs. With six
successful launches in a row, three from each provider, these are the
best launch vehicles we've ever produced. However, we are not finished
yet. Long-term, we are pursuing vehicle concepts that can be launched
on demand--in hours and days, rather than weeks and months--with the
vision of fulfilling time-critical warfighter requirements. I've been
in the launch business for 45 years, and we still launch satellites
about the same way we did in the 60s. We can do better.
The intent of ORS is to create a more responsive, reliable, and
affordable lift family capable of fulfilling both current and future
launch requirements, and the corresponding responsive and affordable
satellites. Near term, we plan to demonstrate a more responsive and
less expensive launch system with capabilities of 1,000 pounds to low
Earth orbit. Concurrently, Air Force Space Command, AFRL, the NRO,
DARPA, OSD's Office of Force Transformation, and our national and
Service laboratories are sponsoring Tactical Satellite (TacSat)
initiatives focused on responsive satellites, and decreasing the size,
cost, and timelines of development. The combined efforts of these
initiatives--operationally responsive launch and satellite
development--will transform the delivery of space-based capabilities.
Similarly, our launch ranges must keep pace with modernized launch
vehicles and future launch manifests.
Even as we become more operationally responsive, future adversaries
will try to deny us the asymmetric advantage that space provides us--as
evidenced by the GPS jamming in Iraq. We must look now to overcome
future threats that may not be as straightforward. We recently finished
a broad reaching study to baseline vulnerabilities of our military
space systems. An action plan is being implemented that will help
mitigate vulnerabilities in a way that will help ensure the
availability of space capabilities to our warfighters and national
decisionmakers. Our efforts currently fall into three areas: SSA,
Defensive Counter Space (DCS), and Offensive Counter Space (OCS).
SSA forms the foundation for our counter space actions and includes
traditional space surveillance, detailed reconnaissance of specific
space assets, collection and processing of space intelligence data, and
analysis of the space environment. It also encompasses the use of
traditional intelligence sources to provide insights into adversary
space operations. We continue to invest in critical capabilities to
improve our ability to detect, track and characterize objects in space.
We are modernizing the current Space Surveillance Network with new
hardware for selected radar and optical sensors, and plan to integrate
and fuse this improved sensor data with space intelligence and
environment data through a command and control system. This will allow
us to produce a common space picture relevant to the warfighter for
decisionmaking. Finally, we will increase our surveillance and
characterization capabilities to new levels when we deploy our new
space-based sensors: Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) and Orbital
Deep Space Imager (ODSI).
SBSS will be a constellation of optical sensing satellites in low
Earth orbit designed to provide timely and accurate information on
satellite locations. The SBSS constellation is the follow-on to the
successful Mid-Course Space Experiment/Space Based Visible (MSX/SBV)
sensor on orbit today. The initial SBSS satellite will launch in fiscal
year 2007, and improve our ability to detect deep space objects by 80
percent over the MSX/SBV system. ODSI will be a constellation of
satellites in geo-synchronous orbit, and will provide significant
improvement in today's ability to not only track, but also characterize
objects in space.
In terms of protecting U.S. space assets, our Defensive Counter
Space program continues the development of the Rapid Attack
Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) to ensure
capability to identify and locate attacks on U.S. space systems. The
first spiral of RAIDRS will include radio frequency interference
detection, and geo-location for communication satellites, and laser
dazzling detection for DSP. RAIDRS is one key element of a larger
strategy to identify and reduce vulnerabilities across the NSS sector.
Over the past year, we have worked across the NRO, STRATCOM, and other
organizations to develop an integrated approach for investments in
protection. This crosscutting effort seeks to deter attacks on U.S.
space interests by making focused investments in specific programs, as
well as in generic capabilities like RAIDRS.
Our OCS program is intended to develop systems to deny adversary
use of space and assure U.S. space superiority. Earlier this fiscal
year, we successfully tested and delivered the first Counter
Communications Systems to the 76th Space Control Squadron at Peterson
Air Force Base, Colorado. We plan to deliver two more of the first
generation units in fiscal year 2005 to achieve a Full Operational
Capability, and will then begin work on the next generation capability.
We also intend to award a contract for the multi-service Army/Air Force
Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (CSRS) for final system
design and development. CSRS is a mobile, transportable system that
will use reversible effects to counter space-based surveillance and
reconnaissance satellites. Our goal is to achieve Initial Operational
Capability in fiscal year 2009.

CONCLUSION

This is an exciting time for the space programs in the DOD and
Intelligence Community. In spite of the challenges we face, we have the
most capable space force in the world as proven by recent actions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Our accomplishments in calendar year 2003 include
successful launches of 11 national security satellites and the
successful launches of both the Atlas V and Delta IV EELVs. In
addition, we have made great progress in modernizing our current family
of systems, working toward the next generation of intelligence,
communications, remote sensing, missile warning, and environmental
satellites.
We have identified and are addressing systemic issues in order to
improve our ability to deliver these vital capabilities. However, space
programs are challenging--by virtue of the complex technologies, small
quantities, and the inability to repair them on-orbit. This requires
up-front investment and attention to practices that are more demanding
than in most other acquisitions. As long as we continue to expect our
space systems to provide extremely asymmetric advantages, even after
years on-orbit, then we will be building systems that are on the
leading edge of technology. We are working to minimize the
difficulties; but as we continue to push the technological envelope,
challenging situations will always be part of the equation.
I appreciate the continued support Congress and this committee have
given to help deliver these vital capabilities, and I look forward to
working with you as we continue to develop, produce, launch, and
operate critical space systems that deliver vital capabilities to this
great Nation.

Senator Allard. Thank you for your testimony. Now we have
Admiral Ellis, Commander, STRATCOM. Admiral, it is always good
to have you before us.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Admiral Ellis. Likewise, Senator.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, distinguished members of the
subcommittee: As you noted, it is once again an honor to appear
before you today representing the outstanding members of
STRATCOM in Omaha, Nebraska, and that includes, of course, our
Service components, some of whom are represented here today,
including Army, Navy, United States Air Force, and now the
Marine Corps, which also provides an important Service element
in support of STRATCOM's mission.
It is my pleasure to testify before you today with Pete
Teets, Lance Lord, and Art Cebrowski. As the Secretary noted,
we have met regularly over the past year to address the many
challenges and opportunities afforded this Nation through our
preeminent space systems. I look forward to discussing the
operational and technical aspects of satellite and space launch
programs from the warfighter's perspective, because indeed that
is the charter of STRATCOM.
In previous hearings this year, before both the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
we have covered the status of one of our legacy missions,
strategic deterrence, and each of STRATCOM's newly assigned
global mission areas: missile defense, Global Strike,
information operations, and command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C\4\ISR). Today, of course, we appropriately focus on what
could be called one of our second legacy missions: space
operations.
As you are aware, STRATCOM was created first and foremost
to provide responsive, integrated, and synchronized combat
capability and support across all geographic boundaries. Our
very success in every area continues to be reliant upon our
ability to operate to, from, in, and through space. Across the
DOD, space is both a major integrator of missions and a global
enabler for our forces. Our space assets gather and disseminate
real-time data on virtually any location on the globe. They
enable terrestrial forces with precision navigation and timing
and provide essential command and control capabilities to
forces anywhere on the planet.
Eighteen months after the alignment of United States Space
Command and STRATCOM missions under a new command, I am
convinced that grouping our Nation's space capability under a
unified command with global responsibilities in the areas of
missile defense, Global Strike, information operations, and
C\4\ISR has accelerated the integration of space into all
phases of our military operations.
STRATCOM is tasked to be the space advocate and spokesman
for the combatant commanders. I work closely with the regional
combatant commanders (RCCs) to determine requirements and bring
the warfighter's perspective to the table. My staff is fast
becoming expert in the technical details so we can provide an
independent evaluation of the full range of system options. We
are not tied to single solutions, specific systems or programs,
but rather advocate broad capabilities.
Last year, 2003, was a year of tremendous change and
opportunity at STRATCOM. New missions and new organizations,
all in the midst of supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
and the larger global war on terrorism. During the past year
our success in the space operations realm included:
transitioning the Space Operations Center in Colorado Springs
to our Global Operations Center in Omaha; deploying STRATCOM
support teams with reach-back capabilities for strike planning,
intelligence, space, and information operations to every
theater of the globe; transmitting missile early warning data
to the RCCs; procuring and allocating essential satellite
communications bandwidth for RCCs; and providing successful
space-based blue force tracking capabilities for both regular
and Special Operations Forces (SOF) through our Army component,
Space and Missile Defense Command.
None of this could have been accomplished without the
leadership and efforts of this subcommittee and a host of
talented Americans such as the gentlemen seated to my right.
Right now we have an opportunity and the responsibility to
continue to fundamentally reshape the future of national
defense by advancing and defending the global integration of
space capabilities.
There are many opportunities ahead and I am committed to
working with our strong and growing team of partners, military,
agency, and industry, to address each one. We are engaged in
crafting not only a vision, but a clear and detailed course of
action in each area. These focus areas include: assured,
responsive, and affordable access to space; safe and effective
launch ranges; persistent space surveillance and appropriate
space control capabilities; reducing the vulnerability of space
systems and their accompanying global network of ground
stations and communications links and recapitalizing our space
assets for the development and fielding of essential
capabilities, such as those promised by the SBIRS, the Global
Positioning System (GPS) Constellation, AEHF, and the TSAT.
In short, STRATCOM and its components continue to partner
with all those playing an integral role in the defense of our
Nation to improve the combat effectiveness of our modern joint
warfighting forces. We are mindful of the magnitude of the task
before us and confident in the talent of our staff, our
components, and our mission partners.
I appreciate your continued support and look forward to
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, Jr., USN

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Allard, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to once again appear before you,
representing the outstanding men and women of United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and to review the strategic and space capabilities
that remain vital contributors to our Nation's security. During my last
appearance before your subcommittee, I outlined how STRATCOM, our
components, and task forces were crafting a new command focused on
integrating space capabilities, deterring a wider array of potential
adversaries, and recasting the Nation's global military capabilities
for the demands of the 21st century.
Today, I can report that the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines--representing active duty, National Guard, and Reserves--joined
by a cadre of talented civilians, have made tremendous progress in
maturing the missions of the new STRATCOM.
As you recall, on January 10, 2003, the President signed Change Two
to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and tasked STRATCOM specifically with
four previously unassigned responsibilities. These are: Global Strike,
Global Missile Defense (GMD) Integration, Department of Defense (DOD)
Information Operations (IO), and command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR).
This unique combination of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and
capabilities, under a single unified command brought with it new
opportunities to recapture the classic definition of the term
``strategic'': essential to the conduct of large scale military
operations. In this strategic context, we also have been given the
opportunity to support our Nation's security requirements around the
globe by directly supporting the regional combatant commanders (RCCs)
and their deployed forces.
On January 1, 2004, I was pleased to report to the President of the
United States that STRATCOM has completed reorganization and achieved
full operational capability (FOC) for oversight and direction of all
assigned missions. Each mission area continues to develop and, as we
apply resources to each, we are moving to reach and maintain FOC in
those four areas by the end of this year. Three of our missions, Global
Strike, Global Integrated IO, and Global C\4\ISR, are on track and
progressing toward FOC during 2004. GMD, the fourth newly assigned
mission, will achieve Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) in the months
ahead and will support concomitant achievement of STRATCOM oversight
FOC.
There is still much work to do and we have outlined five major,
near-term goals for STRATCOM, each of which has the potential to add
significantly to our national defense.
These opportunities include:

Proactively moving to enhance the security of our
critical space systems. This will enable us to maintain an
advantage in space while denying an asymmetric avenue of attack
for our adversaries. In concert with Service and Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) partners, we are crafting a step-by-
step plan that approaches the problem in manageable increments.
Continuing the implementation of the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) while refining the way ahead through the ongoing
Strategic Capabilities Assessment. This effort will enable
continued reduction in the Nation's nuclear arsenal even as we
examine future deterrent concepts, sustain the safety and
surety of the stockpile, and modernize, through our partners at
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Nation's technical infrastructure.
Exploring new concepts of ISR that will permit
collating and fusing data collected by the Intelligence
Community and defense sources. Our goal is to aid the Nation's
military and civilian leaders to move rapidly up the continuum
from data to information to knowledge to wisdom.
Simultaneously employing a nascent missile defense
test bed to provide the Nation with a rudimentary defensive
capability even as we support the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
as it incrementally refines and evolves a future multi-layered
GMD system.
Delivering on the full potential of DOD IO by
supporting real advances in the incorporation of computer
network attack and defense, electronic warfare, psychological
operations, strategic deception, and operational security into
our mission areas.

II. PROGRESS OF THE ``NEW'' U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

Developed a Global Strike Strategic Concept, validated
it through a series of exercises and gained final approval of a
Global Strike plan.
Developed a Missile Defense Concept of Operations
(CONOP) with plans in place to support operator training,
evolutionary testing and system employment for GMD at IDO.
Developed a C\4\ CONOP and established a Global
Operation Center (GOC) and Global Integration Center (GIC) to
command, control and integrate support to the joint warfighter.
Transitioned the Space Operations Center in Colorado
Springs to the Space Operations Watch in the GOC in Omaha.
Hosted Senior Warfighter's Forum to identify combatant
commands' requirements for future satellite communications
capabilities.
Accepted transfer of responsibility for production of
the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations plan from the Joint
Staff, a first step in achieving global ISR integration.
Formed Joint Force Headquarters--Information
Operations (JFHQ-IO) within the overall headquarters structure,
commanded by the Deputy Commander, STRATCOM.
Established strong, functional relationships with the
National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Information Systems
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
Provided federated intelligence support to Central
Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM), producing over
3,000 products covering 4 geographic areas covering over 12,000
points of interest.
Procured, prioritized, and allocated military and
commercial satellite bandwidth to support the critical
communication needs of the combatant commanders.
Forward deployed STRATCOM support teams with reach-
back capabilities for strike planning, intelligence, and space
and information operations.
Transmitted theater early warning data on missile
launches to RCCs.
Through the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command,
provided successful Space Based Blue Force Tracking
capabilities for Special Operations Forces (SOF).
Through the Joint Information Operations Center
(JIOC), fully integrated IO into OIF operational planning,
contributing directly to shaping of the operation and elements
of its combat success.

III. NEWLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS

Information Operations
As with our other global responsibilities STRATCOM is tasked with
integrating and coordinating DOD IO across regional areas of
responsibility (AORs). Core pillars of IO include computer network
defense, computer network attack, military deception, operations
security, psychological operations, and electronic warfare. The
recently published DOD IO Roadmap also supports collaboration of broad
IO efforts across the DOD, the Intelligence Community, and other
national-level organizations in coordinated support of operations
directed by the RCCs.
The ability to quantify IO effects is another area of concerted
effort at STRATCOM. Initial conclusions from advanced concept
technology demonstrations and a number of experiments all recommend
establishing a national test range for IO. STRATCOM is working closely
with OSD in establishing the requirements for just such a test range.
This range will help us define effects in understandable terms,
quantify systems' performance and provide assurance that the elements
of IO will achieve the desired effects while avoiding unintended
consequences.

Support to the global war on terrorism
STRATCOM provides tailored, deployable Strategic Support Teams that
combine the capabilities of the JIOC, located in San Antonio, with
support elements from many other STRATCOM functional mission areas.
Additionally, as we prosecute the war on terrorism, effective IO is
becoming even more essential to our success. Supporting Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), PACOM,
European Command (EUCOM), and CENTCOM for global war on terrorism and
IO planning, JFHQ-IO works to provide an IO perspective, broader and
deeper than any one RCC staff can, thus allowing us to better achieve
required global effects in support of national strategic objectives.
Our U.S. Strategic GIC will interface with other organizations to
provide Time Sensitive Planning (TSP) as well as Crisis Action
Planning. TSP oversight expertise will reside in the GIC and will
formalize and codify STRATCOM's standard operating procedures, drawing
on all organizational elements so as to provide global effects in
support of all combatant commanders.

The Way Ahead
The future of global IO requires us to better define our
operational battlespace. STRATCOM is developing a common operational
picture based on inputs from all available DOD and intelligence
sources. We are also developing measures of effectiveness, with
corresponding metrics, allowing us to gauge the success or failure of a
specific IO course of action.
The challenge is melding the art and science of IO with emerging
technologies, training and educated senior warfighters in these
concepts, and, most importantly, developing a cadre of military leaders
with sound IO skills.

Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD)
In my statement presented to the full Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 11, 2004, I discussed the status of STRATCOM's GBMD
mission. Missile defense concepts have evolved from separate efforts
focused on the terminal intercept of short and medium range ballistic
missiles. The single entity of GBMD now includes mid-course intercept
of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, in the years
ahead, development of a multi-layered missile defense system
contributing to the defense of the U.S., our allies, and our interests
abroad. STRATCOM is developing the GBMD concept of operations and the
battle management architecture in order to provide full capabilities
for RCCs' defensive employment.
The IDO is the first increment of a capabilities-based approach in
developing and providing GBMD. Initial capability will include the
ability to detect a launch, display the data for decisionmakers, relay
command and control execution decisions, and then to fire a ground-
based interceptor. Our plan calls for a continued assessment of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capabilities as they are
developed and fielded by the MDA. Fielding a layered and integrated
GBMD system is best accomplished in a spiral manner. An initial
capability, followed by evolutionary improvements, provides commanders
with both operational flexibility and an increased range of system
design options based on extensive testing and assessment

Global C\4\
Future ISR systems, along with new weapons platforms, are expected
to at least double the current demand on the global communications
infrastructure. (During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), General Tommy
Franks required 32 times more bandwidth than did General Norman
Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm (ODS).) Change Two of the UCP
directs STRATCOM to coordinate C\4\ capabilities in support of
strategic force employment.

Information Assurance (IA)
The DOD established the IA Vulnerability Management (IAVM) program
in 1998 to notify combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies about
network vulnerability alerts and countermeasures information. In our
assigned role of directing DOD-wide computer network defense, the IAVM
program is one of the key means we use to rapidly update the security
of DOD computers.
We are working to improve our ability to automatically apply
software patches across large networks, correct vulnerabilities
identified through the IAVM process, and automatically verify patch
compliance. This is a formidable challenge; DOD networks are complex,
with over 3 million computers and a wide variety of operational
configurations. Our partnership with industry will help us develop the
best approach.
The warfighter of today accesses information by sifting through
networks stratified by classification and membership. The GIG-BE will
result in a more easily accessible network providing multi-level
security information to authorized users. Enforcing need-to-know while
enabling need-to-share presents DOD IA personnel the challenge of
moving from a defense-in-depth mindset to an IA-throughout approach.
As the DOD moves from the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)
to the GIG-BE, it also brings a new approach to network defense. With
the DII, our efforts were focused on defense in-depth, with layers of
defense to keep intruders from breaching our information fortress. In
contrast, the GIG focuses on defense throughout. This concept
incorporates a model that recognizes intrusions may occur, and allows
the network to remain functional even as the infection is being cured.

IV. FUTURE OF NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

Sustainment and Modernization
ICBMs
ICBMs have been a mainstay of strategic deterrence for decades,
providing prompt responsiveness, high reliability, accuracy, rapid and
flexible targeting, and a high state of alert readiness. With
Peacekeeper deactivation proceeding as planned, Minuteman III will soon
be our Nation's only remaining land-based strategic deterrent.
Recognizing the importance of the Minuteman III weapon system, the Air
Force has implemented an aggressive life extension program for the
Minuteman III ICBM force to ensure weapon system reliability through
2020.
We appreciate Congress' continued strong support for ICBM weapon
systems by funding reliability upgrades to critical components of the
Minuteman III. These include the Guidance Replacement Program,
Propulsion Replacement Program, Propulsion System Engine Life
Extension, Safety Enhanced Vehicle Program, and Command and Control,
Security and Cryptography Upgrades. Finally, we support an Analysis of
Alternatives that will examine follow-on systems to the Minuteman III.

Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)
The final leg of strategic deterrence is the D5 Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missile. Life Extension (LE) and back-fit programs will
provide a standardized fleet of 14 Ohio Class SSBNs capable of
employing D5 Trident II missiles for the full hull life of these
submarines (extended to 45 years). The last two submarines awaiting
upgrade will complete their D5 back-fit and refueling overhauls in
fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. D5 LE upgrades the guidance and
missile electronics on fielded D5 missiles and procures additional
missiles to meet system reliability and accuracy testing needs for the
life of the program, while also providing a sufficient quantity of
missiles to fully load out 12 SSBNs.
The conversion of the four Ohio Class SSBNs to Guided Missile
Submarines (SSGNs) is an example of modifying existing platforms,
concepts and capabilities for a dramatically different military role.
SSGN conversions are on schedule and are being completed in conjunction
with scheduled Engineering Refueling Overhauls (EROs). The boats will
be equipped with conventional cruise missiles, extensive special
operations capability, and will be assigned evolving new missions. The
U.S.S. Ohio, U.S.S. Florida, and U.S.S. Michigan have entered ERO and
are proceeding on an aggressive conversion schedule with deliveries
scheduled for 2005 and 2006. The U.S.S. Georgia is scheduled for ERO in
2004 and conversion will be completed by 2007.

Stockpile Stewardship
In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs,
we are working closely with our partners in the DOD, DOE, and Congress
to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe, reliable, and credible.
As the Nation's nuclear stockpile continues to age, we must carefully
monitor its condition. Through the NNSA's Science-Based Stockpile
Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling,
simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on
aging effects, component reliability, and physics phenomena we require
in the absence of nuclear weapon testing. Past reductions in nuclear
weapon infrastructure capacity require that the essential warhead life
extension programs be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead
dismantlement so as to provide just-in-time delivery to meet
operational deterrent force requirements. We are working closely with
the NNSA, the national laboratories, and plants to shape their support
to our future stockpile. With the production complexes operating near
peak capacity, we will need to optimize the balance between essential
life extension programs and dismantlement work.
A 2003 congressionally mandated panel, led by Dr. John Foster, Jr.,
reported that our nuclear weapons program must be balanced between
maintaining the existing warheads and the need to transform elements of
the existing stockpile for the future. As we reduce our nuclear forces
toward the goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads by 2012, we must concurrently analyze and research advanced
concepts in order to realize the vision of the Foster Panel and the
NPR. The results of this research will, in turn, enable objective,
fact-based discussions on very important deterrence and policy issues.

V. SPACE OPERATIONS

Across DOD, space is both a major integrator of missions and a
global enabler for our forces. Our space assets gather and disseminate
real-time data on virtually any location on the globe, as well as
provide essential command and control capabilities to forces anywhere
on the planet. That is why STRATCOM elected to embed space operations
throughout our organization rather than treating it as a specific,
stove-piped mission area. U.S. dependence on space, and the potential
corresponding vulnerabilities, demand that our National Security Space
interests be addressed as top national security priorities. Our focus
includes:

Resolving Space System Vulnerabilities
Operations in Iraq demonstrated that adversaries can and will
challenge our ability to use space assets. The attempts to jam our
global positioning system (GPS) and degrade the accuracy of our
precision weapons, in Navy parlance, were a ``shot across the bow.''
DOD must be able to monitor the health of our essential systems,
advance our space situational awareness, and respond appropriately to
sustain our national on-orbit capabilities. In support of the
leadership of the DOD Executive Agent for Space, Peter Teets, STRATCOM
is fully engaged in assessing and strengthening all elements of our
space systems.

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
The potential provided by the developing SBIRS will be a key
contributor to greater capabilities in the mission areas of theater and
global missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence and
battlespace characterization to support real-time warfighting
operations. As designed, SBIRS will expand our ability to detect
shorter-range missiles with systems designed for both tactical and
strategic requirements. Once operational, SBIRS will not only represent
our primary source of initial warning, but will also represent the
first link in the chain of a layered, integrated missile defense.
Deployment of a capability such as SBIRS is essential to replace legacy
systems, some elements of which are now operating well beyond their
intended life.

Satellite Communications
Military satellite communications will remain our primary means of
providing dedicated, secure and/or hardened command and control
capabilities for worldwide military operations. During the past year,
we launched the final satellites to complete the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS), Milstar, and Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
follow-on constellations. These systems have served us well for decades
and many have lived far beyond their projected life expectancy. As a
result of this extended service life, deployment of more modern and
more capable replacements is needed immediately. The capabilities
represented by these programs will be sustained and improved with the
launch of the next generation of satellite systems beginning with the
Wideband Gapfiller Satellite in fiscal year 2005 and continuing through
the launches of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS).
The Wideband Gapfiller program consists of five high capacity
satellites launched from fiscal year 2005-2010 that will replace the
aging DSCS and Global Broadcast Service satellites, providing DOD with
high-capacity, wideband service for the Nation.
The AEHF program is the follow-on to Milstar. Currently scheduled
to launch three satellites during fiscal year 2007-2009, AEHF provides
up to 10 times the capacity of Milstar, a significant increase in
coverage, and the ability to support twice as many networks. It will
support national, strategic, and tactical users requiring protected,
anti-jam, survivable communications for national crises, Emergency
Action Message dissemination, Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack
Assessment, missile defense, presidential secure voice conferencing,
and interoperability with selected international partners.
The MUOS will field five UHF satellites to provide the warfighter
on-demand, high capacity communications to ISR, and weapons system
platforms on the move. This system is designed to alleviate the need to
purchase expensive, commercial satellite services. MUOS launches
currently are scheduled for fiscal year 2009-2011.
Investments in replacement technology and capacity will help
maintain the U.S. as the pre-eminent space faring nation well into the
future. STRATCOM will remain engaged as these programs are developed
and procured to monitor progress and ensure warfighter requirements are
clearly articulated.
STRATCOM is working with the Joint Staff, Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA), and, as appropriate, the commercial satellite
industry to develop a methodology whereby DOD can assure future
satellite communications systems are designed, funded, fielded, and
sustained as an end-to-end communication system. In the past, complex
communications systems routinely were procured in parallel, as separate
elements, and often by many organizations. Due to increased system
complexity and the number of segments involved, an end-to-end
synchronized acquisition process is essential. We must streamline the
process and develop a procedure to centrally fund and manage seamless,
integrated, on-demand capable satellite communication services to meet
national security needs.

VI. GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION

Integrating the GOC
On April 15, 2003, STRATCOM published an overarching operational
concept to incorporate changes driven by the assignment of our global
missions. Central to this document is the creation of the GOC. The GOC
and its supporting command elements will enable STRATCOM to provide
responsive support to the President, Secretary of Defense, combatant
commanders, and agencies. Additionally, the GOC, with support of our
components, will develop and leverage global battlefield situational
awareness and present decisionmakers with full spectrum courses of
action that integrate all STRATCOM's missions and capabilities.
Within the GOC, we will also perform space operations including
space control, space support, and force enhancement. The GOC will
enable STRATCOM to better execute our assigned missions by providing
improved responsiveness and better command and control of our missions
by placing the responsibility for mission support and execution under a
single integrated operations center.
The Combatant Commander's Integrated Command and Control System
(CCIC2S) is the integrated battle management command and control engine
for STRATCOM. CCIC2S integrates fixed and mobile command and control
(C2) systems to support our missions and RCCs. CCIC2S must be
responsive to the combatant commander's vision and ``evolve to a highly
responsive and cost-effective sensor-to-decision-maker-to-shooter
capability.'' It supports spiral development and delivery of air
defense, missile warning, space surveillance and defense, and common C2
service capabilities.

VII. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

On October 1, 2003, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
directed the activation of a Marine Corps service component
command called U.S. Marine Corps Forces, STRATCOM (MARFORSTRAT)
to support our mission areas.
We established command relationships to leverage
capabilities of the NSA, DISA, and JIOC to provide an armory of
IO capabilities.
The Cruise Missile Support Activities previously
assigned to the PACOM and JFCOM were realigned under STRATCOM
to enhance Global Strike capabilities.

We have become more efficient in organizing our components and are
still exploring several opportunities for further realignment of
component support in order to avoid unnecessary and duplicative
headquarters growth. In those instances, we are seeking mechanisms
allowing us to interface with appropriate senior leadership to access
the centers of excellence and proven capabilities resident within their
subordinate organizations. We call it ``capabilities-based
componency,'' and it is a construct defined by access to, versus
ownership of, resources essential to the accomplishment of our diverse
missions.
Partnerships with civilian agencies, private industry, and academia
are also vital to successful accomplishment of our missions. As we
continue to establish new relationships and enhance existing ones, we
remain focused on refining effective and efficient processes in the
common pursuit of enhanced national security.
Strengthening Reach-back Capabilities, Joint Exercises, and Training
DOD is transitioning toward smaller, more agile forces, decreasing
the forward footprint of our personnel in theater. To enable mission
success for these agile forces, we must provide improved situational
awareness and command and control capabilities. This requires
unprecedented reach-back to planning capabilities, intelligence
products, and other specialized expertise.
A DOD oversight committee is crafting a roadmap for leveraging
technologies to provide seamless distributed operations, or reach-back
to supporting commands and elements. Developing GIG-BE will greatly
improve this reach-back capability. By moving digits, not people, we
reduce not only transportation and support costs, but the number of
personnel placed in harm's way. Reach-back capabilities proved highly
successful during OIF in supporting targeting, planning and information
operations.
In parallel, a specialized team of 35 personnel was sent to support
CENTCOM by providing specialized space and information operations
planning and execution support. Referred to as a Space and Information
Operations Element, this team represents a first step in developing
connectivity back to our headquarters for broader access to specific
STRATCOM expertise, making our entire headquarters a trusted agent for
the RCC.
In the future, we anticipate opportunities for STRATCOM Support
Teams to train and/or exercise regularly with the RCCs, thereby
building relationships that are well understood before crisis or
conflict looms. If requested by the RCC, they will be forward deployed
in time of conflict. Alternatively, if that commander were comfortable
with reach-back support from this team, they would provide the regional
commander with the full spectrum of capabilities from our GIC at Offutt
Air Force Base.
As STRATCOM continues to mature our recently assigned global
missions, we must develop robust training and exercise programs to test
the tactics, techniques, and procedures envisioned in our integrated
concept of operations. Our annual major exercise, Global Guardian, has
traditionally been a nuclear operations-focused exercise. We are
dramatically reshaping that construct and creating a new exercise
series that better captures the broad range of new responsibilities
while still supporting the essential zero-defect focus on our legacy
mission. The Strike Directorate continues to coordinate with RCCs on
the command and control structure required to simulate integration of
full spectrum Global Strike missions into future regional exercises.
In December 2003, we successfully demonstrated support to a RCC
(PACOM) in Terminal Fury 04 in the areas of Global Strike, IO, Space
Operations, and ISR. Using extensive reach-back opportunities and
Strategic Support Teams, it afforded STRATCOM the opportunity to gain
hands-on experience in areas such as planning, executing, and
recovering Global Strike missions across regional boundaries. By
working closely with PACOM in this exercise, we further developed a
regional context and improved capabilities in our new mission areas to
extend to all RCCs. The coming year undoubtedly promises new challenges
and greater opportunities.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Admiral.
General Lord.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE W. LORD, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND

General Lord. Thank you, Senator Nelson and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. It is my honor today to appear
with Under Secretary Teets, as well as Admiral Ellis and
Admiral Cebrowski, to represent the 39,000 hard-working men and
women of AFSPC. On their behalf, I want to thank you for your
continued support of our people and our programs.
Along with our Army and Navy colleagues, as Admiral Ellis
pointed out, we really put the force behind the Under Secretary
and Admiral Ellis' priorities. In AFSPC we conduct space and
missile operations 24-7-365, around the clock every day of the
year, under the direction of our two Numbered Air Forces. Our
operations are sustained and supported by both our acquisition
arm under the command of Lieutenant General Brian Arnold, the
Space and Missile System Center in Los Angeles, and our
innovators in the Space Warfare Center.
We operate because our space capabilities provide what we
think is a very real transformational effect. It was seen in
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as well as OIF that space
capabilities were a helping hand to all joint and coalition
forces. We certainly demonstrated that in recent combat
operations. That helping hand we see is backed up by the
clenched fist of our ready and alert missile forces that are on
alert every day to continue to deter.
As we meet today to discuss and talk about the future, it
is important to remember the truly indispensable power
provided, as Admiral Ellis said, by these capabilities. We
think our advantages in space are certainly apparent to us and
are certainly apparent to our potential adversaries, and we
must take all appropriate steps to protect our capabilities.
With your continued support, we will increase our focus on
space force protection, to include space control and space
superiority and its critical enabler, space situation
awareness.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Lord follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Lance W. Lord, USAF

INTRODUCTION

It is my distinct honor to appear before the committee today on
behalf the 39,000 men and women of the world's finest space and missile
team--Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). I am honored to appear with
Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter Teets, the Department of Defense
(DOD) Executive Agent for Space, Admiral Jim Ellis, the Commander of
United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and retired Vice Admiral
Arthur Cebrowski, Director of DOD Force Transformation. These leaders
are a major reason why our space and missile capabilities continue to
play an ever-increasing transformational role in joint and coalition
operations. They continue to push advancement of our sentinels on the
high ground and our ready, safe, and reliable missiles below ground to
increase the range, speed, and precision of all our forces in conflict
and, moreover, to deter a conflict before it begins.

TRANSFORMATION

There is no better example of this transformation than we recently
displayed in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Simultaneously, our forces limited collateral damage,
delivered humanitarian aid and saved the lives of combatants and
civilians alike while conducting highly successful combat operations.
General Franks, former Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) told
Congress, ``The pieces of this operation which have been successful
would not have been so without space-based assets . . . it's just very
simply a fact.'' Spacepower continues to improve our battlefield speed,
precision, lethality, reach and flexibility. As President Bush said on
May 1, 2003, aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, ``Operation Iraqi
Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and
boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before.
From distant bases or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that
could destroy an enemy division, or strike a single bunker.'' In a
matter of minutes, not weeks, hours, or days as in past wars,
commanders identified and engaged targets and received timely battle
damage assessment. Our coalition, and our adversary, got the message:
spacepower is now in the fight like never before.
The organizational and structural changes implemented after the
Space Commission puts AFSPC on an even better footing for the future.
The synergy between the acquisition arm of the command--the Space and
Missile Systems Center, the innovators at the Space Warfare Center, the
Space Numbered Air Force--the 14th Air Force, our missileers in the
20th Air Force, and our headquarters team is beginning to be realized.
Our people are always in the fight--either through our ``deployed in
place mission'' from our sites around the world (some of our men and
women spent 180 plus days in the missile field last year, for example)
or the 1,200 people deployed to the theater last year (over 436 members
still deployed). Our airmen, from the most junior enlisted to the
senior officers, understand they are all part of the team that doesn't
just support the warfighter--they provide combat effects 24/7/365.

AFSPC VISION

As Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom continue to wind
down, I'd like to share a snapshot of our Command Way Ahead. Our
command vision is to be a full spectrum space combat command preeminent
in the application of space power for national security and joint
warfare.
We've been creating combat effects since well before we stood up as
a command--I pulled my first Combat Crew Missile Alert in 1969. Our new
vision is to provide full spectrum effects, from strategic (which has
always been our strength) to tactical effects using nonkinetic through
kinetic weapons in full combat synergy with all coalition forces.
Our framework to achieve that vision is what we call ``Commanding
the Future.'' This framework enables a complete understanding of our
progress in all aspects by ensuring: we have the right enterprise and
are focused both operationally and strategically; we have the right
partners; we are unleashing human talent to develop space professionals
with education and certification programs; we are developing new
wizards who understand all the aspects of the space medium and system
and creative ways of employment; we are warfighter centric and have the
proper concepts of operation (CONOPs); and that we can properly
transition advanced technology to warfighting and increase combat
effects. Through these ``thrusts,'' we ensure we cover all management
areas as we execute our command priorities for 2004.

AFSPC PRIORITIES

Our first priority is developing our people to lead us into the
future, and educating them through Space Professional Development--this
is significant, as we have formulated a plan that ensures the success
of our operators, developers, and maintainers as one warfighting space
cadre. When the Secretary of the Air Force approved the Space
Professional Development strategy, he took the additional step of
naming me, in my position as the AFSPC Commander, the Space
Professional Functional Authority--the only Functional Authority
residing outside of the Pentagon. We developed, tested and conducted
space professional education prototypes in 2003, and this year we'll
bring both the initial Space 100 and the advanced Space 200 courses on-
line for Space Cadre members at the 8-10 year point in their careers.
Finally, I approved identifying Space Cadre members and associated
Space Cadre positions using Space Experience Codes (SPECs). These SPECs
will become the common terminology linking the experiences that
identify the individual and the position, helping us to inventory
capabilities and requirements for all Space Professional Cadre members.
With the proper focus on people, we must improve our capabilities
and deliver on near term commitments. Improving missile warning systems
remains one of our top priorities. We need to upgrade our missile
warning that served us well throughout the Cold War, to be more
responsive and more capable to our forces in the field. We stretched
the Defense Support Program (DSP) system hard for tactical missile
warning, but our forces deserve increased capability to precisely
determine launch and impact point for both warning and engagement of
incoming enemy missiles. With just one DSP left to launch, we can't
wait for a degraded constellation. Degraded strategic and tactical
missile warning would present significant national security
challenges--it would severely handicap national missile defense and
strategic response through tactical warning to warriors in the field.
We will continue to push Space Based Infrared capabilities in the near
term.
We will also maintain our assured access to space with multiple new
launch vehicles and developing operationally responsive spacelift and
spacecraft. Our Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS) initiative is
progressing well. The Mission Needs Statement (MNS) was validated by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in April 2002 and we're
in the midst of an ORS analysis of alternatives (AOA) that should be
completed mid-2004. The fiscal year 2005 presidential budget also
includes funding for an Air Force/Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) demonstration called Force Application and Launch from
the continental United States (CONUS) (FALCON). However, we are
stressing our newest, state of the art rockets known as Atlas V and
Delta IV. These two contractor teams, plus our new group of launch
professionals--acquirers and space operators now on one team--are all
focused on mission success in each and every operation leading to
launch. Our focus is delivering on the promises of the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) fleet and getting toward more
responsive launch without sacrificing mission success.
A continuing priority is space superiority and understanding all
avenues that adversaries could take to counter our capabilities. Space
superiority is just as important as gaining and maintaining air
superiority in times of conflict. It is our fundamental duty to ensure
our advantages in space don't become vulnerabilities. Each time the
higher ground was sought throughout history, adversaries developed
capabilities to remove the advantage. We are very concerned about space
force protection to ensure all our space forces are survivable, and we
are exploring rapid reconstitution capabilities. However, fundamental
to space superiority is the capability to detect, categorize and
counter attacks on spacecraft, ground stations and the links between
them. Every new contract we let must take into account all appropriate
space situation awareness and protection measures.
In 2004, we'll continue modernizing our ICBMs while exploring other
alternatives for future force application. Our space capabilities were
the helping hand of our coalition force operations because they were
backed up by the clenched fist of our missile force--always alert and
providing ``top cover'' by deterring any adversary from using weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) against our Nation or our forces around the
world. In 2003, we strengthened that fist even more with over 200 new
guidance sets and 80 missiles with new propellant. We'll continue to
increase those numbers this year and conduct an AOA on the next
generation Land Based Strategic Deterrent.
Over the next year, we will also plan for future advancements in
force enhancement through GPS modernization, Space-Based Radar (SBR)
development, and advanced satellite communications. GPS has proven its
worth. It is the world's largest free public utility with numerous
applications that improve our daily lives. The military value of this
system is unquestionably the driving force behind our transformation.
We look forward to launching the next generation of GPS to keep our
forces on the leading edge. SBR will provide surveillance and target
tracking around the clock and in all weather. The situational awareness
provided by the SBR constellation promises to be just as revolutionary
as GPS has been. We must continue to ensure SBR is responsive to our
forces in the field and the power of this system is not only used for
intelligence preparation of the battlespace, but provides the much
needed capability to ID and track targets in theater, real time.
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications serve a fundamental
need of all our expeditionary forces--the expanding need for protected,
reliable, long haul communication. We are looking hard at the
interoperability between Intelligence Community and DOD requirements.
We are also weighing associated affordability/schedule risks and the
appropriate tradeoffs leading toward a fiscal year 2012 (November 2011)
TSAT first launch.
These priorities, executed through the Commanding the Future
framework, will solve our most pressing needs leading into both near
and mid term to achieve the needed effects on the battlefield by all
members of our joint and coalition team. AFSPC will be ready for
whatever the future brings by continuing to innovate, develop, design,
launch, and operate leading-edge space and missile systems.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
look forward to your questions.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, General.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI, USN [RET.],
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Admiral Cebrowski. Thank you, sir. It is a pleasure to be
here. I suppose what I should do is point out first of all
that, unlike my colleagues here to my right, I am really not in
the space business; I am in the transformation business. So I
am really not here to talk about programmatics for our larger
space programs or make declarations about what is or might not
be transformational. I have a fondness for microsatellites, but
I am really not here to talk about that either, although we are
moving into the age of the small, the fast, and the many, not
just in space potentially but in all aspects of military
operations.
Actually, I am here to discuss a new and broader and
complementary business model which could decidedly expand our
capabilities base, our technical base, and our competitive
base. I really only have three points about that.
First, the barriers to competition are falling in several
key elements of military competition. Space is one of those
areas, perhaps more than any other area, and consequently the
question before us is how do we respond to that.
Second, the old model has a lot of goodness in it, and it
pushes to the fore competition on the basis of technology and
technical complexity, where we have the ability to indeed do
quite well. We need to expand that to a new broader basis for
competition with new metrics, for example, and metrics which
are more output-oriented rather than the technical insertion
piece.
Lastly, there are a few small but very important steps that
need to be taken to indeed broaden our space capability and
bring the new model on line. We are in a position right now
where we judge the strategic context to demand that we be
swift, bold, and very specific about what we do. I believe that
as the major defense power in the world, we must dare to
compete with ourselves to ensure perfection, to set our own
standards.
With that, I am very pleased to be here again and eager for
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Cebrowski follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN

Chairman Allard, Senator Nelson, and members of the subcommittee,
I'm honored to have the opportunity to address the subcommittee, and to
join the leaders of our National Security Space (NSS) team to address
current space issues so vital to our Nation and our military forces.
During my April 2002 testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, I noted that the barriers to competitive entry are falling
as a result of new technologies made possible in the age of
information. Nowhere is this truer than in space.
Now it is 2 years later, and transformation across the force is
happening much faster than we expected when we announced the journey
just 28 months ago. Not just a concept and not just action in the
future, transformation is happening today. It is happening due in large
part to the information and power derived from our vital space
capabilities.
Our space capabilities are a prominent feature of the global
advantage we currently enjoy. However, the space technology context is
changing, making possible a movement to an additional business model
and an expanded business base for space. Cost per kilogram on orbit is
still a problem. But, capability per kilogram on orbit is soaring due
to advances in information technology. This makes the alternative model
feasible. The door for small, micro and nanosatellites is open,
allowing us to redefine cost and mission criticality curves, increase
transaction and learning rates and the ability to assume risk. As we
move towards the age of the small, the fast and the many, it is time to
start thinking about applying that movement to our model for space.
Adopting this complementary and broader business model will help us
ensure space superiority well into a future where space will be yet
more responsive to our joint military forces. In short, it is within
our capability to create options, a process which itself can be a
competitive advantage.
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is that new and complementary
business model. At its core are: (1) the defining of a joint military
demand function; and (2) the focus on providing joint military
capabilities for our operational and tactical level commanders.
Finally, the model incentivizes output rate and uses a co-evolutionary
strategy of concept-technology pairing, providing for iterative
advancement in operational capabilities.

PROGRESS OF SPACE TRANSFORMATION

Our NSS team has made great strides in its short 45-year history.
Rooted in the Cold War, the NSS program was viewed as a source of
national power. There was a clear connection between space and our
strategic deterrent forces. The Nation capitalized on converted weapon
systems to develop the ability to launch small payloads in low Earth
orbit. Then we graduated to larger payloads in higher orbits vital for
detecting the ballistic missile threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Thirty years later, the military value of space capabilities became
apparent during Operation Desert Storm (ODS), which many have deemed
the first space war. In reality, our space forces, like our traditional
military forces, used a robust Cold War force structure to defeat the
Iraqi Armed Forces and expel them from Kuwait. Nevertheless, ODS
highlighted the importance of being able to distribute or
operationalize these global space utilities to be operationally
relevant in theater.
One need only compare ODS with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to see how successful we have been at
operationalizing our global space forces. One of the key differences
between ODS and OIF is the distribution of satellite-based wideband
communications down to the tactical level. In ODS our military forces
numbered 542,000 and they had 99 megabits per second of bandwidth
available. In OEF/OIF bandwidth rose to 3,200 megabits per second while
our forces were reduced to 350,000. Satellite communications provided
the backbone for Blue Force Tracking, shared situational awareness down
to the individual level and allowed operational and tactical level
commanders to exploit an unprecedented speed of command. The Nation's
space capabilities directly impacted speed of maneuver, the tempo of
the fight, and the boldness and lethality of our forces.
Additionally, the advances made in missile warning were
significant. In ODS, using our Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites
designed to detect the Cold War ballistic missile threat, we were able
to give rudimentary theater missile warning. However, in the 10 years
since ODS, advances in ground processing, on-orbit software,
organizations, command and control and theater warning concept of
operations made our warning capability dramatically more robust
allowing for theater battlespace characterization.
Finally, it is obvious that, in the years leading up to OIF, great
advances were made in distributing the Global Positioning System (GPS)
signal to weapons. This has significantly increased our precision
strike capability.
These examples of increased bandwidth, theater missile warning
capability, and precision, show just how important space capabilities
are to transforming our force and how far we have come in
operationalizing these capabilities. But all along the way, the
operational and tactical benefits were what could be teased out of the
larger NSS systems.

THE LINK TO STRATEGY

One may ask why we need a new model; given the success of our
existing force. From all indications our space forces are providing us
with an asymmetric advantage that no adversary currently enjoys.
Although that is clearly true, evidence suggests that our space
supremacy is not guaranteed. An adversary might turn our asymmetric
advantage into an asymmetric vulnerability if we cannot maintain space
supremacy. The United States is the most heavily space dependent nation
in the world and that holds true for our joint military forces--this
will continue to hold true for the foreseeable future.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prominent naval historian and strategist,
described the oceans as a ``great common.'' Today, space and cyberspace
must be added to the list of commons that must be controlled. One of
the recognized barriers to becoming a hegemonic power is the ability to
operate in and control the commons. Therefore, we can expect nations
with hegemonic aspirations to try to erode our ability to operate
effectively in the commons and to achieve the ability to control the
commons for their own use.

The barriers to entry into space, which were so high during the
Cold War, have eroded. No longer is space reserved for great power
nations alone. Space has become much more common, and today a nation
needs not be a space power to employ space power. The commercial space
communication and remote sensing industries that emerged in the 1990s
provide power derived from space, once reserved for the most powerful
of nations, to weaker nations, organizations and even individuals.
Additionally, the increasing capabilities of small, micro, and nano
class satellites have moved them from a segment more suited for
university backed experiments to a niche with potentially significant
military utility. Today, nations can contract with universities to not
only build microsatellites, but also to transfer the knowledge required
to develop them. The United States, the leader in space, has taken a
back seat to other nations in exploiting these smaller segments of the
space industry. As we are at the threshold of transforming ourselves to
a network centric military, using the coherent effects of distributed
military forces and systems to achieve commander's intent, the newer
smaller elements of space capability emerge as a toolset providing
virtually unlimited potential.
In the past 2 years, other nations have launched 38 microsatellites
while our contribution in this segment of the market is very modest.
Furthermore, our Space Test Program as indicated by the number of
satellites launched for test is in decline.
The Cold War attributes of our existing space program limit our
ability to maintain space superiority required by today's rapidly
changing strategic environment. Specifically, the mission criticality
that grew out of the Cold War and the very high cost of our complex and
highly capable space systems lead to a high consequence of failure. The
required corresponding risk mitigation strategy incentivizes expensive,
long lasting, heavy, multi-mission payloads. These same attributes also
impact our ability to launch our satellites into orbit. They require
larger, higher cost launch vehicles, with low launch rates and
significant mission assurance oversight.

ATTRIBUTES OF OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

ORS is a new approach. Rather than trying to operationalize
national/global space utilities, this model designs military
capabilities directly for the operational commander. The key attribute
of the ORS business model is that the field commanders drive the
demand. That demand is the joint military capability required to meet
operational and tactical level needs. Rather than treating our
operational and tactical level commanders as lesser includeds, this
business model designs a capability to meet their specific warfighting
needs.

Demand Function
The operational level of war is a theater level of war, and the
operational commander is normally established only in a time of
conflict. This definition helps put the demand function into context.
The operational commander requires a theater capability to satisfy a
joint warfighting need (vice a national intelligence need) that is
available during joint warfighting planning timelines. This demand
function changes the space calculus and the cost, risk and mission
criticality variables that incentivize lower cost, smaller, satellites
and single mission, sub-optimized payloads with shorter life spans. The
time function for responsiveness is then driven by adaptive contingency
planning cycles rather than predictive futures or scripted acquisition
periods. The objective is agility and dynamic fitness, not
optimization.

Military Capability
Today's joint force commander requires capabilities that are
horizontally integrated transmission control protocol/Internet protocol
(TCP/IP) accessible, flexible, interoperable, joint down to the
tactical level and are risk tolerant. Increasing the speed of command,
which proved so vital in OIF and OEF, requires high transaction rates,
increased information rates and volume, and a tolerance of ambiguity
from unpredictable demand.

Autonomous
ORS capabilities necessitate the ability to launch and autonomously
reach the required orbit without months of state-of-health checks,
calibrations, and configurations by large squadrons of satellite
controllers.

Networked
When space is accessible to the tactical or operational users, it
changes the manner in which relationships occur and the way that
organizations behave. While micro or nano satellites may not offer
technologies that are groundbreaking, they can significantly alter the
capabilities of a wider user base. The collective produces an
understanding that is not replicated or deliverable by any single
analyst or structured hierarchy. Leveraging space access by the entire
defense establishment changes the methods and techniques that can be
adopted by future users.
In a network centric force each satellite becomes a node within a
tiered network of sensors such as larger space systems, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), air and surface assets. A network centric approach
uses the internet protocols throughout the entire lifecycle of the
satellite. That means integrating the payload remotely and using the
internet protocols for preflight testing, command and control, payload
tasking and data dissemination. This will allow for increased fusion of
data from multiple platforms while reducing lifecycle costs.

Broadened User Base
Parenthetically, there is no reason why this must be confined to
Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Rather, it could mean an organic
space capability for the larger national security community. One of the
objectives of ORS is to make space assets and their capabilities
available to operational and tactical users and an organic part of the
Joint Task Force (JTF). One specific means to do this is for space to
use the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to task,
receive and widely disseminate data. Because the SIPRNET has matured as
a core U.S. warfighting command and control venue and evolved to be the
de facto standard as a preferred data sharing service, the cost of
gathering information has plummeted and the value of shared information
content has soared. As a result both the richness of information
improves and the reach of its content expands exponentially.

COMPLEMENTING BIG SPACE

Note that this complementary business model does not replace the
larger space program. Today, small satellites cannot provide the
capabilities required to meet all national intelligence needs. However,
just as we have operationalized our larger space program to meet
theater needs, these operationally designed theater capabilities will
also enhance our national and strategic space capabilities.
Specifically, these satellites will help reduce the burden we are
currently placing on our national systems and the organizations that
operate them, enhance the persistence of the national capabilities,
assist in meeting the force structure requirements mandated by the
current force planning construct, and help ensure that U.S. forces are
adaptable to an uncertain future.
Another role that these systems could provide in the future is the
ability to reconstitute our larger space capabilities if adversaries
attempt to negate them. Although, it would not be replenishment in
kind, it could provide a subset of capabilities for our national and
military leaders.

TEST BED FOR BIG SPACE

As the pace of change in the information age is accelerating, so
must the institutional transactions that create capabilities from
``learning.'' Stagnation of institutional learning comes at the expense
of creating future advantage. Today our space forces are at risk of
becoming a strategically fixed target. The cost of sticking to slower
generational turnover--a cycle that currently runs 15 to 25 years for
U.S. forces--is likely to be technological surprise that works to our
disadvantage in future conflicts.
Besides providing operationally relevant capabilities for the joint
warfighter, this new business model would serve as a test bed for the
larger space program by providing a clear vector for science and
technology investments, enhancing the institutional and individual
learning curves, and providing increased access to space for critical
research and development (R&D) payloads. Today, less than 25 percent of
our space R&D payloads make it into orbit, and this is with a heavy
reliance on the space shuttle.
Sound space science and technology stewardship requires that the
sole superpower compete with itself to avoid stagnation. Getting new
technologies into space earlier to understand the ramifications and
inform our conceptual context builds a learning curve for big space and
provides a look at alternative futures.
By reducing cost, increasing transaction rates, and developing
standardized buses and interfaces we change our risk mitigation
strategy. This will allow the United States to lower the cost of
placing payloads into low Earth orbit and simultaneously increase our
ability to put R&D payloads into space. Additionally, these same
attributes will allow sub-optimized, simpler ``wooden round'' payloads
to be launched into orbit.
However, the most important aspect of the test bed is the
institutional and individual learning that will take place. As an
institution, we will learn there are alternative methods and processes
to conduct space operations that could not have been developed through
our larger space program. Additionally, the smaller satellite programs
will provide great venues to pair seasoned space expertise with new
prospects, allowing them to ``cut their teeth'' in an area where
failure is a data point.

GENERATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY--BRIDGING THE TECHNOLOGY/OPERATIONS
GAP

Finally, this business model uses a co-evolutionary process,
pairing concepts and technologies in an effort to start influencing
change immediately. The co-evolutionary techniques guide the ORS
approach to instantiating these capabilities. The techniques are used
to stimulate disruptive innovation through the continuous development
and refinement of operational concepts, processes, technologies and
organizations. This approach should influence technology, policy,
concepts of operations, acquisition processes and public/private
partnerships.
ORS provides the ability to conduct a strategy of generational
science and technology (S&T) and acquisition. This new business model
brings the United States ``back to the future.'' The ORS model is
similar to the space model of the 1960s and 1970s. All space systems
started small and in low Earth orbit and grew bigger and higher as
technology and operational requirements matured.
Analysis of the development of the GPS satellite constellation
provides some key attributes that are readopted in our model.
Creating leverage by targeting the investment of relatively small
research and development dollars and the role of research
laboratories.
The GPS grew out of work done by the Service laboratories. The
Naval Research Laboratory and Air Force Research Laboratory were both
targeting the investment of relatively small R&D dollars towards key
technologies required to develop the system. When it became apparent
that DOD could not continue to fund two unique systems, the two labs
were directed to get together over a Labor Day weekend and come up with
a single approach. The best attributes of both approaches were put
together in the final system. It was determined that the Navy had the
best clocks and orbits and the Air Force had the best signal structure.
The DOD directed the Air Force to take the lead in operationalizing the
system and the Naval Research Laboratory was funded for continued
research and development. In our ORS business model we view the
research labs as matched filters for technology concept pairing to
address operational needs.

Affordable access to space
The successful development of the GPS constellation relied on
testing clocks in space. The Naval Research Lab was able to get ``free
piggy back'' rides to space using excess capacity on the Agena rocket.
The cost, timelines, and risk associated with getting piggyback
research and development payloads to space today hinder our ability to
advance space technologies.

Generational Approach
The GPS actually grew out of a series of lab sponsored experimental
microsatellites. In all there were 15 navigational microsatellites and
8 R&D satellites. Combined, these satellites served as stepping-stones
to the operational GPS. They provided intermediate capabilities to
begin developing operational concepts directly impacting the final
orbital parameters adopted for the operational system.
Our business model seeks to embed experimental capabilities into
combatant commanders warfighting experiments. By doing so, we can
mature the operational concepts in parallel with the technology. By
increasing transaction rates, next generation technology and
operational concepts can be embedded into future payloads, leading to
increased capability for the warfighter.

Public/Private Partnerships
Another key attribute of the GPS acquisition program was the
public/private partnership between the Services and Rockwell, which won
the contract to build the first block of operational satellites. For
about a year, engineers from Rockwell worked with the Service
laboratories to learn all the lessons to be learned prior to developing
the operational system. This public/private team was crucial to the
success of the acquisition program. Currently, our S&T strategy falls
short on several fronts. First, access to space does not afford a
robust space S&T and R&D program. Second, there is a gap in translating
R&D into operational capabilities. The new business model and co-
evolutionary approach seek to bridge this gap.

THE WAY AHEAD

Over the past year, the DOD has taken great steps in embracing this
new business model. My office funded the TacSat-1 experiment with the
goal of providing an operationally relevant capability to the warfigher
in less than a year for $15 million. Although we expect to be right on
the margins of both metrics with a planned early summer launch, a lot
of progress has been made in our institutional processes.
The Air Force, under the leadership of Mr. Teets, General Jumper,
and General Lord, has provided outstanding support to our ORS
experiment. They have crafted a customized mission assurance approach
for the oversight of a new commercial launch vehicle consistent with
the nature of the TacSat-1 experiment. Additionally, they have worked
closely with the commercial launch provider to come up with innovative
safety processes that will ensure public safety. At the same time, they
have been willing to accept risk in operational suitability and
effectiveness. This process is ongoing, and real organizational
learning is happening in the Air Force and in the commercial launch
company.
Our TacSat-1 experiment has set the baseline for a co-evolutionary
concept/technology pairing process and has helped shape a stronger
relationship between Service laboratories. The Air Force is following
our TacSat-1 with a TacSat-2 that builds on the modest capabilities
provided by our first instantiation. This is a realistic first step of
generational science and technology efforts.
Critical to achieving the agility and flexibility demanded by an
ORS model we must develop standards for modular/scalable satellite
buses. This must be a part of our future plans and will allow us to
increase the utility margin of smaller satellites.
We have forged a healthy relationship with the Pacific Command
(PACOM) to imbed these capabilities into their annual combatant
commander exercises.
TacSat-1 has also served to strengthen interagency relationships.
The Office of Force Transformation has capitalized on the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's and the Air Force and Army Space
Battlelabs' work with the Virtual Mission Operations Center. This has
allowed Internet-based payload tasking and data dissemination.
Additionally, we have forged a partnership with the Federal Aviation
Administration, the commercial space regulators, to ensure proper
liability and indemnification levels.
Finally, taking a more macro view, DOD is stepping up to making
operationally responsive space a near-term capability. General Jumper,
the Air Force Chief of Staff, recently announced the Air Force's Joint
Warfighting Space concept. The Air Force is leading a joint team to
investigate operationally responsive space technology vectors and
Strategic Command is engaged to help define the corresponding vectors
for operational concepts.
The leaders I am privileged to testify with today are taking the
right steps to move this concept, currently in its infancy, into an
operational warfighting capability.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Let us start, Admiral Ellis and Dr. Teets, and talk about
assured access to space. You know the flap that is going on
between Boeing and Lockheed Martin. There are some in the DOD
that would like to have only one line and there are arguments
for that and there are arguments against it. Could both of you
address that issue of keeping open two lines for EELVs?
Dr. Teets. All right, sir, I would be pleased to start. I
have a very strong and firm conviction that we need to maintain
our two families of EELVs, the Atlas family and the Delta
family. I say that from the experience that we had when at one
point in time our Nation decided to put all our space delivery
capability on the space shuttle and it suffered an accident. As
a result our capabilities were put into question for a while.
Fortunately, Secretary Aldridge had the foresight to have pre-
ordered some 10 Titan IV EELVs to be used in an emergency
situation and we pushed our way through that.
I believe that our Nation's space capabilities are now so
important that we cannot get ourselves into a position where a
single launch incident--maybe it is close to a pad and you lose
the pad. You still have to be able to pull yourself together
and launch again in the relatively near future. So I feel it is
very important for us to have two families of launch vehicles
that can give us that delivery capability, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral.
Admiral Ellis. I would certainly echo Mr. Teets' comments,
Senator Nelson, from a number of perspectives. This is an
absolutely essential capability that the Nation must have.
Clearly there are some costs associated with that, but even
those are under debate. The real issue is the cost of not
having that.
I sometimes speak of Pascal's wager, which highlights the
difference between the probabilities of an outcome and the
consequences of an outcome. The consequences of being denied
access in any significant measure to space by the failures that
Mr. Teets hypothesized are grave and severe for this Nation and
for the warfighters that we support.
So I think it is prudent that, until we get more detail or
definition on the way ahead with some of the ORS initiatives,
that a prudent course of action, indeed in the larger scale, a
more affordable course of action, is to maintain both of those
avenues.
Senator Bill Nelson. I agree with both of you.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to run make the vote.
Senator Allard. We will give you the benefit of your time
when you return.
In the mean time, I want to follow up a little bit on his
line of questioning. I have supported the idea that we have two
space launch vendors and felt that we had some redundancy there
in the system. Recently we received a Nunn-McCurdy notice that
the program through which we buy launch services, the EELV
program, is more than 25 percent over cost. The way I
understand how that works, it triggers a review of the program
to determine if other approaches can meet the operational
requirements.
What is the status of that review and what alternatives are
being considered? Dr. Teets?
Dr. Teets. The review is in process now, Mr. Chairman, and
the alternative that is being looked at is to go to a single
family of launch vehicles and to compare that with the
presently planned course. The reason that the Nunn-McCurdy
breach occurred has to do with really the fallout from the
commercial marketplace and the fact that both of our providers
of launch services based their first round of EELV pricing on a
strong supplemental commercial market. That supplemental market
has not materialized and as a result we are essentially on
notice that the next time we go out to buy EELVs, we are likely
to see a significant increase in price.
Therefore, we have found it necessary to declare this Nunn-
McCurdy breach, and that triggered the analysis of alternatives
(AOA).
We expect to meet with Mike Wynn, the acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, in the latter part of April, and at that point in
time a review will be held of what those analysis of
alternatives tell us and we will determine a recommended course
forward.
Senator Allard. A follow-up on that. Now, of the budget
request for the EELV for the 2005 budget year, how much is
specifically for assured access and what would happen if that
funding were not approved?
Dr. Teets. Actually, as we formulated our 5-year plan we
anticipated additional pricing to accommodate this reduction in
commercial launch activity. So as a result, while the EELV
budget request is I believe $38 million, we really need that to
be able to sustain our current activity for assured access,
which includes maintaining these two families of launch
systems.
Senator Allard. Now, in the past the EELV contracts were
structured such that infrastructure costs were included in the
costs of the launch. What is your view on how infrastructure
costs should be handled in the future? Should the Air Force
fund them directly or do you believe that the contractor should
include them in their launch costs?
Dr. Teets. I would like to maintain some amount of
competition in the EELV activity going forward, but I do think
it is important for us to develop a strategy which does not
cause either supplier to go into a death spiral of trying to be
competitive or face extinction. Therefore, I think it important
for us to find the right acquisition strategy that will allow
us to fund infrastructure costs for both the Atlas family of
vehicles as well as the Delta family of vehicles, but then move
in a direction where we can incentivize the contractors to
invest in their particular product line, to keep their best
people assigned to those products, and to have some of the
benefits that competition can bring to us.
We are in the process right now of trying to formulate that
strategy, and I expect that by the early part of this summer we
will have our strategy in place, sir.
Senator Allard. I would be very interested to know what you
come up with there. If you would keep us informed we would
appreciate it.
Dr. Teets. We would be happy to do so, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. It seems to me that both EELV vendors have
performed well technically, but it is also obvious that there
are concerns about both. One vendor has been sanctioned and is
under continuing investigation for violations of fair
procurement practices during the original EELV competition. The
other relies on a Russian rocket engine at the urging of the
U.S. Government, but that fact potentially adds one element of
uncertainty in the program.
I understand we are buying all the data we need to co-
produce the Russian engines, but the cost of building a
production facility is quite steep. I am sure you are aware of
that.
What is your view of the advantages and disadvantages of
downselecting to one EELV vendor? Would such an approach
provide any cost savings?
Dr. Teets. As I mentioned to you earlier, there is an AOA
that is ongoing that will put some factual information behind
the very question that you are asking. My own view is that we
should proceed to the next step of determining whether or not
this rocket engine that you referred to, that has been
developed and designed in Russia--it is the RD-180 engine--
whether or not it can indeed be produced here in the U.S. and,
if it can, at what price would it be able to be produced?
That needs to be a part of this trade study that we are
looking at. I think it would be highly desirable for us to have
a production capability. I do not know that it is practical in
terms of being able to afford it. I do know that if you look at
an alternative of going to a single supplier it would be an
imperative to have the capability to produce here.
Senator Allard. What is the status of the investigation
into Boeing's violation of the Procurement Integrity Act and
have any other further violations been discovered?
Dr. Teets. The violations of the Procurement Integrity Act
have resulted in Boeing's suspension. There are two Boeing
companies that were suspended by the Air Force last summer.
Since that point in time, Boeing has responded in a strong way
to deal with the problems that were found in those two
companies' behavior, and I would say that they have
aggressively sought the root cause of the problem.
They have commissioned Senator Rudman to do an independent
study of their ethics and awareness program. He has reported
back out. They have embraced all of the recommendations in
Senator Rudman's report.
We in the Air Force legal shop have been dealing
extensively with Boeing to establish an administrative
agreement which would allow us to have full insight, awareness,
and knowledge of their ethics program and the way they are
conducting their business practices going forward. When that
administrative agreement is properly put into place, I do
believe that we will be able to lift the suspension with
confidence that Boeing has in place a system that will ensure
that they are a responsible contractor in those two companies
that we deal with for launch services.
Senator Allard. So your feeling is that they are well on a
process. The sanctions have had their effect; they are doing
what you anticipated they would accomplish, and that the
corrective actions by Boeing are adequate?
Dr. Teets. All indications are that that is the case, Mr.
Chairman. As I say, the Air Force legal department is in the
process right now of concluding an administrative agreement
which will allow us to lift the suspension. Now, it would be
hard for me to predict exactly how long it is going to be
before that administrative agreement is in place, but as soon
as it is we will be very confident that they are a responsible
contractor.
Senator Allard. How much time do I have left? Okay, I am
going to yield to Senator Nelson. I have just 1 minute left and
I want to approach this next line of questioning when I have
the full time period.
Senator Ben Nelson. If you would like to go ahead and
finish, that would be okay with me.
Senator Allard. No, I have about 5 minutes worth here on
the next round.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Ellis, yesterday I know you testified that DOD
needs to enhance its ISR capabilities to better locate hidden
targets which could be camouflaged or protected by robust air
defenses. I think ISR is important in every environment,
including space obviously, and ISR is obviously one of the new
missions STRATCOM has been given.
Our staff did a little checking with the folks at STRATCOM
and discovered a strong desire for better technology to improve
the collection capabilities of mission area experts which would
improve ISR. The difficulty seems to be taking information or
intelligence that currently fits on about 15 computer monitors
and trying to transform that into a single monitor for easy
application. That has not been achieved at this point in time.
I hope I am not tattling on some of the folks back home. I
think it is something we must absolutely have. Is there a way
that we could be helpful in achieving that kind of technology,
if you are interested in it as well, as I assume you are?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. Of course I am very interested in
it. What you have described, in a very real sense, is at the
tactical level. It is reflective of the challenges that Mr.
Teets and I, and General Lord and others, have been undertaking
under the broader rubric of horizontal integration. In our
headquarters, for example, we look at disparate feeds or
databases and how we blend those all together into a coherent,
integrated process. Of course, that is something that we are
pursuing with our own processes and upgrades within the
headquarters, and continued support for Air Force funding of
that, of course, would be greatly appreciated.
However, in a broader sense, it really mirrors the
challenges that we face between the operational world and the
various elements that contribute so effectively to intelligence
collection, and how do we bring those together in a
collaborative way. Particularly, as this next generation of ISR
platforms begin to be more rigorously defined technically, and
that would include SBIRS, SBR, and the like, there will be an
important element of bringing those capabilities together at
the source, if you will, and then providing them through the
appropriate processes to those that need them, wherever that
might be, in the operational world or in the Intelligence
Community.
So we are focused on that. We are aware that, while this
presents challenges, it also gives us an opportunity as these
systems evolve and mature to fundamentally address this with a
clean sheet of paper and a different approach. We are excited
about it, while we do not in any way minimize the challenges
that will be a part of its successful execution.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have any idea whether we are
talking 6 months or 6 years when it comes to developing the
technology, assuming that the Air Force budget is okay?
Admiral Ellis. On the technology side, we well understand
how to work protocols and those types of things. So as you
could infer from my first answer, there are various levels to
this challenge, and I am comfortable that we are on track to
integrate the current pieces from a technology standpoint, from
a shared format standpoint.
The broader ones will involve legitimately some significant
cultural issues and organizational requirements.
Senator Ben Nelson. It is not all technology?
Admiral Ellis. No, sir. There are huge issues, legitimate
issues, in terms of information sharing and sensitive sources
and those types of things that will need to be addressed as we
move through this, and obviously ways to protect that, to
protect sources, to have multi-level security, all of those
elements will have to come together to ensure our success in
this effort.
We are working collectively again with other elements
within the OSD to move that forward as quickly as possible. Mr.
Teets has been a big driver of that because he was the first to
recognize that as this technology advances the requirements for
this type of integration also advances and there is an
opportunity here.
I defer to him if there is anything you would like to add,
sir.
Dr. Teets. I would just add that it has been a real
pleasure to work with Admiral Ellis and General Lord and others
within the military community to try and tackle this problem of
horizontal integration, as we call it. I think we are making
headway and it is hard work, but one of the things we tried to
do when we put out the request for proposal for the SBR system
was to insist upon an agreement for a concept of operations for
how we would operate the SBR. That pulled together various
elements of the Intelligence Community and the DOD. I think we
are making headway.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Lord, out in western Nebraska, as I know you know,
it is home to some intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
launch control centers and silos that are currently managed by
or staffed by active duty U.S. Air Force personnel that are
assigned to Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. There are other
silos in Wyoming and Colorado as well. Is that a role that
perhaps the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserves could
play? Is there a role that could be played by Reserve and Guard
units in helping staff those facilities to release active duty
staff for other responsibilities?
General Lord. Yes, sir, that is a very good question. We
have looked at that a couple times, trying to make the ICBM
mission a total force mission with Guard and Reserve support.
One of the stumbling blocks we come into is a program called
the Personal Reliability Program (PRP) which each individual
has to be certified under. Historically it has been difficult
to have people that are not on continuous active duty to be
part of that program. But we have asked that same question and
we should have an answer fairly soon about is this a good way
to go and get some help and relief in that program. I would be
glad to report back to you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, it would be consistent with, I
think, where some of the transformation for the Air Force might
be heading, to where Northern Command (NORTHCOM) might be
heading in terms of having Reserve and Guard personnel do
things that are done here at home currently by active duty
personnel, which obviously then would obviate the need for
deployment and mobilization for other parts of the world, if
they can do more of the tasks here at home.
General Lord. Yes, sir. I might add that we have five
squadrons of one flight from the Guard in the space business,
not part of the ICBM side, and eight squadrons in one flight in
the Reserves that are part of what we do in space day-to-day.
So, we want to take as many steps forward as we can in the
total force and we will continue to look hard at the ICBM
mission.
Sir, if you do not mind I would like to follow up on
something Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis talked about.
Senator Ben Nelson. Oh, please.
General Lord. We experimented right before Christmas this
year with something to help Admiral Ellis and certainly Mr.
Teets and others in the space business to do just what you
asked us about, and that is the integration of these
capabilities. It is something we call the Single Integrated
Space Picture, with which we are able to draw on all these
sensors, show what is available when, and put this together in
a coherent kind of picture so that I can inform my combatant
commander what is available at any given time with respect to
space assets, what we are looking at, where those are.
It is a pretty comprehensive look. We are going to continue
to refine that over the next year, and hopefully by the end of
this fiscal year we will be able to have something that he is
really proud of. We are experimenting with it right now at the
14th Air Force, our Space Air Operations Center in California,
and we are starting to learn, and we will be able to, I think,
set the basis for some of this integration you talked about. So
we are on the way.
Senator Ben Nelson. I commend you as you try to work
through some cultural, security, and technical issues to bring
this all together, because clearly that will be beneficial for
the entire military. To have it currently unified and then
functioning for combatant commanders as well as for other staff
requirements is a definite advantage for national security.
I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
I am going to ask you about some of your testimony, Admiral
Cebrowski, and then I thought perhaps maybe I would ask General
Lord some questions. I have not adequately welcomed you to
Washington, General Lord; I am glad you are here.
Admiral Cebrowski, I know your office has been a leader in
looking at transformational space concepts. I understand your
office is interested in exploring the notion of a new business
model for space. In this new model, as I understand it, field
commanders would drive demand and more frequent launches of
small satellites, individually less capable but responsive and
potentially available in large numbers, would meet warfighter
needs.
Could you summarize what you think the critical advantages
of this approach are?
Admiral Cebrowski. Yes, sir. Thank you. The overall shift
is from a supplier-centered approach to a demand-centered
approach on this important capability. This is a common
business phenomenon and a common business approach to move one
towards excellence. So one adopts output models and looks and
adopts the perspective of the customer.
I might add that this is meant to augment the larger space
capability, because one of the objectives is to broaden the
larger capabilities that we have. This is not about deserting
one capability to pursue another because that would defeat the
purpose of the approach.
It is also clear that in the current state of development
one cannot really realistically be thinking about supplanting
the capabilities of the larger space program. On the other
hand, we could significantly reduce the burden that is being
placed on the larger space systems from both an organizational
point of view and a risk point of view. We could enhance
persistence. We could increase adaptability. We could provide
some measure of a reconstitution capability in this.
We could essentially, you might say, popularize the use of
space, broadening the user base across the military and indeed
in other agencies of government. Also, it would broaden the
industrial base, and one of the targets here would be to
achieve or focus on mass customization rather than the somewhat
elusive dream of mass production.
Of course, there is a significant research and development
(R&D) component in this that we should expect as well.
Senator Allard. What do you think are the keys to
establishing this new business model?
Admiral Cebrowski. I think that an entry fee item right off
the bat is to make our larger space business model healthy,
pursuing the management initiatives that were talked about in
the DSB study and that Secretary Teets is pursuing.
But next, getting to the model itself, there is a need to
develop and implement standards and protocols for modular and
scalable satellite capabilities specifically in the bus
structure itself. This then becomes a unifying principle which
both suppliers and users can point to, whether you are talking
about launch vehicle suppliers, payload manufacturers,
integrators, and indeed the users themselves. This is a vital
step, I believe, that we take in doing this.
Of course, we must also develop a process wherein
operational commanders can play a role very vigorously moving
forward. You must expand the team, with multiple laboratories,
multiple suppliers, and multiple combatant commanders playing
roles in here.
We must also avoid the tendency to let this model simply
graduate into the larger space model. I think, for example,
about IBM, which spun off the PC and then spun it back into its
larger institution, where it was essentially killed and the
process had to be begun afresh. So there are some cautions in
there.
I think that, working with STRATCOM and the Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM), we have to develop an aggressive
experimentation and prototyping plan for this. These items that
I have pointed out are also essentially coincident with the
plan by General Jumper for his warfighting space concept
development.
Senator Allard. How important is standardization and spiral
development in the development of these transformational
concepts?
Admiral Cebrowski. It is actually critically important. A
model for this is really the Internet itself. The Internet
itself has a consortium called the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), which is responsible for determining the standards and
protocols for the Internet. Once we achieved these standards
and protocols, the Internet was allowed to bloom, and the base
of suppliers and users also blossomed. So this is a very
critical step.
Senator Allard. Now, you in your testimony note that you do
not supplant big space, but you also state that new, smaller
elements of space capability emerge as a tool set providing
virtually unlimited potential. It seems to me that this new
model is very important, but not be able to meet all of the
military requirements. Do you agree, and what kind of missions
and payloads do you believe are most appropriate to smaller
satellites?
Admiral Cebrowski. If one looks at the history, and I think
I mentioned this in my testimony, the GPS is of course a
massive and vital capability for our society. Others really
grew out of an experimentation program which was based in small
satellites. So one can see that there is growth, and since it
has already been demonstrated in the area of navigation, it has
already been demonstrated in the area of sensing, and to a
somewhat lesser degree in communications. So it is not so much
a matter of which area one can apply it. It can be applied in a
great deal of areas, the ones I mentioned as well as
environmental measurements. There is not the capability there
to do some of the things that very large systems can do.
A small satellite now is thought of as for sensing purposes
a very small aperture, and consequently it is limited. But the
technology is at hand where you may be able to launch several
of them, network them, and develop the phenomenon of the
distributed aperture, which would significantly enhance the
capability.
Senator Allard. I want to give General Lord, Admiral Ellis,
and Secretary Teets an opportunity to talk a little bit about
their views on whether the small satellite can or should fulfil
any operational missions in the near term. Maybe, General Lord,
you would like to respond?
General Lord. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We agree
with Admiral Cebrowski in terms of what the small satellites
are capable of doing. We are engaged with him and his TacSat-1
demonstration program that will launch, hopefully here in the
next several months, with an initial kind of put on
communications capability.
I agree with what the Admiral said about it. In some things
you can not probably replace larger missions that are done
because the satellites are bigger with apertures, although we
have demonstrated some other techniques. Our chief, General
Jumper, and the Secretary, as well as Dr. Teets, have pushed us
to work hard in this area, and we have a plan to encourage the
small satellite business to continue to grow along with TacSat-
1 and TacSat-2 and then others after that. Along with our space
test program in an area the chief has asked us to work on,
joint warfighting space, which looks at just these kinds of
capabilities--tactically responsive, small payloads, available
to a theater commander in a certain circumstance given whatever
his or her needs are depending on the situation.
So we see this as a very fruitful effort for the future.
Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. We would certainly agree, as I
speak for the combatant commanders. Given the sophistication
and numbers of our ISR resources, we are forced to make
prioritization decisions in time of crisis or conflict. We
literally skew much of our orientation, our constellations, and
even our air-breather platforms to focus on the area of
conflict and provide legitimate and appropriate support of the
RCCs.
In other words, they are forced to make choices and stop
looking or monitoring or reduce our awareness in other parts of
the globe. This capability has the possibility of reversing
that paradigm, where you do not have to move all of the major
long-dwell on orbit sensors. You are able to more quickly
respond with an alert capability that you can launch into orbit
in support of the regional combatant commanders.
So it offers us a great deal more potential in that regard,
and we are excited about the concept and would like to see the
developmental effort that Admiral Cebrowski has under way.
Senator Allard. Secretary Teets.
Dr. Teets. Yes, I am very supportive of the entire ORL
initiative, including what Admiral Cebrowski is doing. You
recognize, too, that we have funded an ORL line and General
Arnold out at Space and Missile Center is in the process of a
competition right now. They have nine competitors involved in
proposing on ORL capabilities. The objective here is to be able
to launch 1,000 pounds into low Earth orbit for under $10
million recurring costs and do it in a matter of days and
hours, not months, weeks, or years.
At the same time, we have some people at the Air Force
Research Laboratory and also at the National Reconnaissance
Office that are looking at what kind of responsive 1,000-pound
satellite missions can do to augment a conflict in a particular
region. If we can get operationally responsive to the point
where we could on a matter of a day or 2 call-up and be able to
launch an ISR asset at a particular inclination to optimize on
a particular theater of operations, Admiral Ellis would be able
to provide ISR capability to that combatant commander in a
matter of hours. That would be extremely helpful.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Nelson, we will have you finish off your time on
the first round of questioning. I will then call on Senator
Akaka, and I will come back to you, get Senator Akaka, and then
we will have completed the second round.
Senator Bill Nelson. When I raced out to vote, I had talked
about dual access, dual lines. General Lord, I did not get a
chance to ask you to respond.
General Lord. Sir, I support that, having been down at the
Cape to see both teams in action. Both the Atlas and the Delta
teams, sitting on the launch console with the folks down there,
I must tell you that those teams are coming together very well
into a good operational team and a launch business. I agree
with my colleagues here on the panel that I think it is
important to have assured access with two providers, keep the
competition, and we have 39 successful launches in a row since
our broad area review and we want to continue that. Should we
have an incident where we would lose one, we want to continue
to have access with our vital payloads we need to get into
space. So I think that is the best way to go operationally, is
to have two opportunities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, you had said while I
was gone that your general counsel is having a session with
some of the Boeing executives about corporate ethics. Do you
want to expand on that?
Dr. Teets. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. Boeing has
responded quite strongly to the violation of the Procurement
Integrity Act that caused two of their companies to be
suspended. They have done a lot of work internally. They have
hired an outside consultant, Senator Rudman, as a matter of
fact, to give them recommendations. They have listened to those
recommendations and they have implemented corrective actions.
The comment I made was that we were in the process right
now in our Air Force legal department of trying to construct
with Boeing an administrative agreement that, once in place,
would allow us to proceed with confidence that they are now a
responsible contractor and that we can count on them as a
contractor that we are willing to deal with and therefore lift
the suspension. That is in work right at the present time.
Senator Bill Nelson. What corporate executive resignations
have occurred as a result of this scenario?
Dr. Teets. I would say that the widely publicized
resignations of Mike Sears and Darlene Druyen are the ones that
I am familiar with.
Senator Bill Nelson. They are who? What are their
positions?
Dr. Teets. Mike Sears is the former Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) for Boeing, and Darlene Druyen was a former acquisition
or contracting person for Boeing.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the highest corporate executive to
resign was the CFO?
Dr. Teets. Correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Chief Operating Officer (COO) and
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), has there been any
discussion there of acceptance of responsibility?
Dr. Teets. Forgive me here, but I should have mentioned the
CEO of Boeing over the course of some time last fall did in
fact resign and Boeing has a new CEO named Harry Stonecipher.
Phil Condit resigned. Now, I am not trying to say that Phil
Condit resigned as a result of this ethics violation that
occurred, but he chose to leave the company some time last
fall.
Senator Bill Nelson. When did the ethics violation come to
the light of day as an acknowledged fact?
Dr. Teets. It came to light about a year ago, and the Air
Force decided to suspend Boeing in July of last year.
Senator Bill Nelson. July?
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, permit me to interrupt you.
The names that you mentioned, did they resign as a result
of the tanker issue or bidding of the EELV issue? I was under
the assumption that they resigned because of the tanker issue.
Dr. Teets. It is a complex kind of a picture. I am not sure
I am qualified to tell you why they chose to resign. I know
that there has been a lot of activity over this ethics
violation that the Air Force suspended the two companies for.
There have been other items in the news media as well.
So I cannot tell you why people resigned. I can tell you
that the three that I mentioned, Phil Condit, Mike Sears, and
Darlene Druyen, I do know that they all did resign at some
point during the course of last year.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Sears and the lady that you mentioned,
did they resign or did they get fired?
Dr. Teets. I guess technically they were asked to leave.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the case of the CEO?
Dr. Teets. I believe Phil Condit resigned.
Senator Bill Nelson. So do I take it from our discussion
here that you will make the decision on the second line for the
EELV prior to Boeing coming off of suspension?
Dr. Teets. It is hard for me to predict the exact date when
Boeing would come off of suspension. I do think that those two
decisions can be uncoupled because I feel very confident that
Boeing now, under the leadership of Harry Stonecipher, is
taking this ethics violation very seriously. They recognize
that a vitally important part of their business depends on
their ability to properly deal with the United States
Government and they are putting into place strong corrective
actions. They are putting into place an ethics program which
has substance and teeth to it, and I am confident that they
will indeed emerge from this suspension as a healthy,
responsible contractor.
Senator Bill Nelson. How much more is this going to cost
the U.S. taxpayer as a result of the Boeing suspension?
Dr. Teets. It is not possible for me to be able to estimate
that, sir. I do not know the answer to that.
Senator Bill Nelson. There are going to be additional
costs, correct?
Dr. Teets. I think when the Boeing Company comes out from
under suspension in many ways they will be a stronger company
than they were before. Certainly the high ethical standards and
a program of instituting standards of business practices within
their organizations will serve them well. I think in an end
result in really reduced costs as opposed to increased costs.
So it is real hard to estimate something like that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what about just the contract
price? Boeing underbid the other company. So had that been on
the up and up, by going with those eight or nine flights that
you awarded to the other company how much is the differential
there?
Dr. Teets. The differential there I think is estimated
somewhere just under $200 million.
Senator Bill Nelson. Per flight?
Dr. Teets. No, no. Total, the total number of launches that
were re-awarded to Atlas family from the Delta family.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about the cost in lost time?
Dr. Teets. Again, there has been some time lost. It is
awfully hard to estimate those costs. I do not have a good
handle on that, to be candid.
Senator Bill Nelson. Has national security been compromised
as a result of this fiasco?
Dr. Teets. Not to my knowledge. I do not think that
national security has been compromised.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about in the sense of any delay of
the flights?
Dr. Teets. I think the flights are largely driven by the
readiness of the satellites to fly. I do not think that we are
seeing delays in launch due to the suspension of Boeing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you provide for the record an
overall analysis of what the additional cost to the U.S.
Government will be as a result of the Boeing suspension?
Dr. Teets. I will indeed.
[The information referred to follows:]

Currently the Government's total cost as a result of the Boeing
Procurement Integrity Act violation is estimated at $257 million
(fiscal year 2004-2009.)
Of the total reported increase in EELV program costs, $8,640
million (total year money) through 2020, or approximately 63 percent is
attributable to the downturn in the commercial market.

Senator Bill Nelson. So with the way we are rocking along
now with the contracts given to Lockheed, can you tell this
committee that we will have assured access to space?
Dr. Teets. I believe that the way we are proceeding
maximizes the probability of having assured access to space.
Now, it is hard to guarantee assured access to space with the
kind of fragile infrastructure that we have today. Two
incidents, one on an Atlas and one on a Delta, would leave us
hard-pressed to launch National Security Spacecraft any time
soon.
I will say that with two strong launch vehicle families, I
think we maximize the probability of being able to have access
to space when we need it.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have a number of other questions,
but I want to give our colleague from Hawaii a chance.
Senator Allard. I need to check with the time here because
my watch says he has used 10 minutes. He has used 10 minutes.
So now when we get around to the second round I intended for
Senator Nelson to be able to use that time which he did not
complete on the first round of questioning. How much time is
left from that?
Senator Bill Nelson. It is just going to be you and me, so
it does not make any difference.
Senator Allard. I want to be fair with everybody.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to give him a chance.
Senator Allard. He will get a chance.
So he has 6 minutes on the second round. Okay, very good.
Senator Akaka, you have 10 minutes.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for having this hearing on NSS programs, as well as
on the defense authorization request.
I would like to touch on the National Space Policy and
direct my question to Secretary Teets. I believe that we are
currently operating under the National Space Policy issued
under the Clinton administration in 1996. Space weaponization
is not mentioned anywhere in this document. Yet the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) has requested $75.5 million in fiscal year
2005 for space weapons-related programs.
If the current administration plans to develop space
weapons and take space policy in a drastically new direction,
as it appears to be doing with that request of $75.5 million,
why has a new National Space Policy not been issued on that?
Dr. Teets. Senator, I believe that we are proceeding in
full compliance with the National Space Policy. I think that
one of the dictums that we have is to be certain that we have
freedom to operate in space, and we have implemented an
aggressive space control activity which starts out with trying
to understand better what these 10,000 objects that are
orbiting our Earth really are made up of. We have a catalogue
of those objects today, but we cannot tell you much about those
objects. We want to learn more about space situational
awareness.
We also want to make certain that we are able to defend our
own space assets so that we can in fact be able to continue to
enjoy the asymmetric advantage that we currently have by
operating our space systems.
Then, third, we are in fact looking at some offensive
counter-space capability and we have emphasized in that
reversible effects. Those offensive space capabilities today
are ground-based. So I would just simply say that we are, I do
believe, operating in full compliance with the National Space
Policy.
Senator Akaka. My question was why a new policy has not
been issued.
I want to direct the next question to Admiral Ellis, and it
is something that is close to home. Starting in September, when
the Bush administration plans to deploy a national defense
against long-range missile attack, you will be the person
responsible for protecting all 50 States from such an attack. I
understand that because of the radar coverage limitations with
the current system, in order to protect the State of Hawaii
from an attack from North Korea, a Navy ship will be required
to be stationed off the North Korean coast. This ship will
provide radar coverage for the system.
The question then arises to whether the Navy is committed
to placing a ship on station off the coast of North Korea to
provide the necessary radar coverage. Secretary of the Navy
Gordon England reportedly stated this week that the Navy would
provide virtually continuous deployment of a ship off North
Korea. What does ``virtually continuous'' mean? Will a Navy
ship be on station 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to protect
Hawaii from a long-range missile attack starting in September?
Admiral Ellis. As we discussed, Senator Akaka, during our
hearing together on March 11, the Navy contribution to the
missile defense capability is just as you describe. It is a
radar tracking capability that will provide initial cuing in
addition to our overhead sensors and the like. They complement
the other ground-based radars, which are more optimally suited
to defend other elements of the entire defended area, which I
can assure you includes the great State of Hawaii.
The Navy has committed to identifying ships and to
upgrading their radar configuration so as to provide that on-
station capability of which the Secretary spoke, and that
commitment is real. There are milestones that are being met to
provide the capability that he described.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I have another question for
Secretary Teets. I have a statement that I would like to have
placed in the record.
Senator Allard. We would be glad to make that a part of the
record, Senator Akaka.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing.
Space-based technology has become integral to this country's
national security. The first Gulf War was nicknamed the ``Space War''
because of the important role that guidance, reconnaissance, and
communications satellites played in the U.S. victory. That war marked a
watershed moment in the military's perception of, and reliance on,
space. Today, we are able to call upon space assets to improve the
strength and accuracy of military campaigns. Because of this, American
soldiers are safer.
While space is commonly used to aid military operations, it has
been kept free of weapons and combat. It is not the practice of the
United States to attack other assets in space nor to attack land
targets from space.
However, the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) indicates that the administration wishes to change
this policy. MDA has requested $75.5 million for space weapons-related
programs.
Of that, $65 million is earmarked for the Near Field Infrared
Experiment (N-FIRE). While the main purpose of this program is
described as information gathering, there is concern that the N-FIRE
could pave the way to space weapons development.
N-FIRE involves a kill vehicle-like projectile that is fired out of
a satellite. The projectile is supposed to maneuver close to a missile
for inspection. This is a feat much more difficult than actually
hitting the missile. Essentially, if MDA successfully develops the N-
FIRE satellite, it would be much closer to developing a space-based
weapon.
I am troubled by this slippery path on which we are embarking.
Space weaponization should be subjected to a public debate, not slipped
in through the backdoor. This is a decision that should be made by the
country, not just the administration.
The United States has avoided space weaponization for national
security reasons. We have more assets at risk in space than any other
nation. Our defense would be crippled if our communications and
intelligence satellites were attacked. A decision to introduce weapons
to space would be precedent-setting and could trigger a space arms
race. In the long run, U.S. national security would be jeopardized, not
enhanced, by a move to weaponize space.
The administration's budget proposal this year cut funding to many
key homeland security and domestic programs. How can we afford to
invest over $75 million in space weaponization when the administration
proposes to cut programs that will produce clear, immediate benefits to
the United States?
Space-based technology plays a critical role in the U.S. military,
and I want to ensure that the space programs that aid U.S. national
security are well developed and fully funded.
I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to
hearing from you on this important subject.

Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Secretary Teets, the Near-Field Infrared Experiment (N-
FIRE), which is scheduled for launch in fiscal year 2006, will
develop a satellite that can deploy a kill vehicle towards a
missile. It is my understanding that this portion of the
program would enable MDA to develop technology that can be
applied to space-based weapons.
My question to you is: Is the N-FIRE program intended to
pursue space weapon capabilities? If not, what safeguards are
being placed on the N-FIRE program to stop it from turning into
such a program?
Dr. Teets. I think it is true that the kind of capability
that N-FIRE will have could with a different concept of
operations (CONOP) be used as a space-based weapon capability.
There is no such CONOP that I am aware of that is under
consideration at this point in time, and this N-FIRE sensor
will indeed be a sensor that looks at infrared plume real close
up and personal.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Teets, according to the MDA the N-
FIRE is needed because the data it gathers can be used to make
missile defense interceptors better at target discrimination.
Dr. Teets. Right.
Senator Akaka. However, it is my understanding that the
observation capabilities N-FIRE will offer can be achieved by a
number of other less costly and complex methods, such as air or
ground-based sensors. Can you explain what observation
capabilities N-FIRE will give us that cannot be achieved by
other means?
Dr. Teets. I sit on a board and meet quarterly with General
Kadish and I have a general feeling for what they are doing,
but I am not real close to this program.
But as I understand it, the objective of N-FIREs is to get
an infrared sensor very close to the plume of an accelerating
reentry vehicle, and understand then and characterize the
infrared characteristics of that target in the closing end
game. I do not know how else you can do that. If you are going
to get close to it you are not going to do it with an airplane,
I do not think. But again, it is not a subject that I really
have studied in depth, sir.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Ellis, I would like to ask you to
provide something for the record.
Admiral Ellis. Certainly, sir.
Senator Akaka. Could you provide the committee with a
description of the milestones you mentioned for a 24-7
deployment of a naval radar to protect Hawaii?
Admiral Ellis. I would be delighted to describe for you the
naval contribution to the missile defense system in its
entirety and I look forward to doing that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy is poised to contribute significantly in fielding initial
sea based missile defense capabilities to meet the near term ballistic
missile threat to our homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends
and allies. They are working closely under the authority of the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) to deliver this much-needed capability to the
Nation's combatant commanders.
As part of the President's Directive to accelerate the fielding of
a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Initial Defensive Operations (IDO)
capability in 2004, the Navy is providing a capability in select
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs) to conduct Long Range
Surveillance and Tracking (LRS&T) of ballistic missiles. These ships
will provide cueing and tracking data to support ground-based elements
of our layered defense system. As with other military missions, the
combatant commander will be responsible for assessing indications and
warning and other intelligence in his evaluation of risk, and his
subsequent deployment of assets to effect a readiness posture. National
policy and operational directives will determine whether coverage is
continuous or virtually continuous.
Presently, MDA plans to equip 15 DDGs and 3 cruisers (CGs) with BMD
capability, both for LRS&T and firing of the SM-3. SM-3 procurement
numbers will be based on input from the combatant commanders and
determined by the Program Objective Memorandum process.
Since November 2002, the Aegis BMD Program Office has successfully
completed two of three intercepts with the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3
Block 0) from the U.S.S. Lake Erie and is on track to support emergency
deployment of a sea-based mid-course engagement capability by spring
2005.
The Navy is also evaluating the benefits associated with developing
a Sea-based Terminal Missile Defense capability. A viable regional and
terminal sea based ballistic missile defense system is important to
ensure the safety of U.S. forces and the flow of U.S. forces through
foreign ports and airfields when required.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time
has expired. I will submit the other questions for the record.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Nelson for 6 minutes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yesterday, Admiral Ellis, we had
talked in the full committee about the Minuteman III. The
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Moscow Treaty achieved the
bulk of the reductions in the deployed nuclear warheads by
retiring the Peacekeeper and taking the Multiple Indepently-
Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), de-MIRVing the Minuteman
IIIs, so that each Minuteman III has one instead of multiple
warheads.
There was a recent press report that suggested that the
decision to have one warhead on each of the 500 Minuteman IIIs
was being reconsidered. Is there any truth to that press
report?
Admiral Ellis. I am aware of no reconsideration of that,
sir, and I believe that the modernization program of which we
spoke yesterday is still on track as you and I understand it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there any plan to retain MIRVed
Minuteman IIIs?
Admiral Ellis. I am not aware of any program at all, sir,
in that construct. Now, as with all posture and policy reviews,
someone may have hypothesized as we look at alternative
structures for the future and what combination of reduced
vehicle numbers could allow us to do that. I can assure you
that there is nothing in the program of record that alters the
information that either you or I have been given about the way
ahead for the program with regard to Minuteman III.
Senator Bill Nelson. Following up also our conversation of
yesterday on missile defense, you are the combatant commander
that has the responsibility for its success and you accept the
responsibility if it fails against a real enemy missile; is
that correct?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, I have the overarching role for
integrating and coordinating that and making those capabilities
available to the RCCs, who of course, if it were ever required,
would be the ones to employ it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you like to see the national
missile defense system operationally tested in a combat-like
way as soon as possible?
Admiral Ellis. My belief is that that effort is under way,
sir. Over an extended period of time, as we get through the
developmental test phase and we put these capabilities into the
operational environment where they would be called upon to
serve, and even as we continue to evolve follow-on phases of
that spiral development, we will take advantage of those
nascent capabilities that are immediately available as we work
towards, as Mr. Christie and General Kadish testified on March
11, an ultimate test program that more completely evaluates all
dimensions of that system.
Senator Bill Nelson. The key criteria for operational
testing are independence and combat realism. Do you think that
this system being deployed is combat-realistic?
Admiral Ellis. Well, there are obviously elements that
cannot, and hopefully never will be tested from a full
operational capability (FOC), the launch of threat missiles and
the like from potential adversaries. I do believe that the
elemental testing that is under way will characterize the
dynamics and the environment in which this system is intended
to operate. They will refine and identify the sensor
capabilities. We will assess the command and control linkage,
command, and control processes and procedures that are an
important part of all of that. That will then be brought
together in a comprehensive way, with Mr. Christie's
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) team, the Joint Theater
Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) team, the MDA,
and my own personnel. I believe that we will get to those
operational elements as we can define them over time as this
system evolves towards future capabilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Help me understand. Is your answer yes
or no that you would like to see this system operationally
tested in a combat-like way as soon as possible?
Admiral Ellis. Ultimately, I think that is where we are
going.
Senator Bill Nelson. When would that in your mind be
operationally tested?
Admiral Ellis. That is going to be contingent on the
assessments that we make in the early phases on what successes
we have and what technical challenges are delivered. As we
quantify the capabilities that will be brought on line through
2004, 2006, 2008, and beyond, we will be better able to
characterize the evolving configuration and then better assess
its operational capabilities. But clearly that is not going to
be achieved in the near term, nor was that the expectation.
Senator Bill Nelson. As the combatant commander, your
answer then is yes, you want to see it operationally tested;
you just think it is going to be down the line before it is?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, and I think that is the intent of
the team all along, to bring as much operational character to
this as can be brought, when it is appropriate, and when the
system maturity permits it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, current law provides for
independent testing to make sure they are suitable and
effective. Do you support the intent of this law as it applies
to this national missile defense system?
Admiral Ellis. My view, sir, having had a background in
testing many years ago, is that it is appropriate that we
examine the context and the scale and the dimensions of
programs rather than automatically applying a system definition
for OT&E that might more appropriately be applied to smaller-
scale, less complex environments. I think we need to have the
flexibility to do the spiral development that is under way, to
do developmental testing with operational inputs as this
process evolves, and we ought to be involved in assuring that
we deliver those capabilities and those honest assessments in
the most realistic and rigorous way possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you support the intent of this law
that provides for independent testing?
Admiral Ellis. I think we are getting to the intent of that
law by involving the OT&E people in the process. Indeed, that
is the intent of all of this. My point is that, with large-
scale systems, the complexity of the test, the expense of
testing and the like, no longer allow us perhaps the luxury
that we once had of sequential developmental and operational
testing. That technology and simulation now allow us, for the
first time, to bring these elements together in a concurrent
manner that more efficiently uses the resources and arguably
more quickly delivers that capability that we all seek.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Secretary Teets, in your view what should the government
approach to launches be and what should the launch industry
look like 10 years from now?
Dr. Teets. I think that in 10 years I would like to see us
at least well along the way toward a truly next generation
launch capability. Now, I recognize that we have two important
thrusts going right now. One is to maintain a healthy family of
EELVs. The other is to bring on line operationally responsive,
small-sized launch vehicles that can be launched very
economically and rapidly.
The third leg in this is for us to start the move toward a
next generation launch system. I must say that I have been
around the launch business now for over 40 years, and when I
first started in the launch business 40 years ago we were
fundamentally getting things into orbit about the same way we
are today. That is kind of a sad thing in a way. It is a
controlled explosion all the way up. It is certainly not a 99
percent kind of reliability system.
I have a strong belief that ultimately we need to find
essentially the jet engine of the rocket business. Aviation
celebrated its 100th anniversary of powered flight here last
year, and from the time the Wright Brothers flew until some
time in the 1940s aviation evolved along the way. Then all of a
sudden there was a breakthrough called the jet engine, and it
revolutionized the way airplanes could be used and air
transportation could be put into effect.
I think we need something like that in the rocket business.
We have evolved expendable launch vehicles to the point where
our EELVs today are the best expendable launch vehicles we have
ever had, but they are still not nearly good enough. We are not
going to have reliable, dependable, rapid access of significant
cargo to space until we get that next generation of technology
under our belt.
You may be familiar with the fact that when I was at
Lockheed Martin I was very much involved with the X-33 program,
which was a single stage to orbit vehicle. It was a partnership
between Lockheed Martin and NASA. We worked real hard at it. We
invested a lot of company money and NASA invested a significant
sum of their resources, too. When we finally gave up on X-33,
which was going to be a single stage to orbit kind of a
vehicle, I think we were probably two inventions away from
success.
Ten years from now, I would hope that we would be at a
point where we could see a future that has a truly, fully
reusable space launch capability. I think we need to get there
and we need important research and development funds to do it.
Senator Bill Nelson. As a technical follow-up, until we get
to that day of nirvana with that next generation, in the mean
time Lockheed is relying on the Russian rocket.
Dr. Teets. Engine.
Senator Bill Nelson. The engine. Now, is that in the
security interest of our country, relying on that being
manufactured over there? There was originally a plan to put a
manufacturing facility here.
Dr. Teets. Yes, sir, and there still is a plan to do that.
That technology is being imported even as we speak, and
Lockheed Martin is engaged with Pratt and Whitney in a look at
how could we co-produce that RD-180 engine here in the United
States. It is not clear that it is going to be economically
feasible to do so, although it may well be.
So far, the strategy that Lockheed Martin has employed in
order to give us assured access to space is to inventory
Russian-built rocket engines. That is not an enduring strategy,
and as a result they are continuing to press forward with their
plans to have a capability to co-produce here in the United
States.
Senator Allard. Now I would like to hear from Admiral
Ellis, General Lord, and Admiral Cebrowski on your thoughts
about the future of our launch industry.
Admiral Ellis. As with many around this table, I spent a
lifetime with complete fascination with everything that flies
and soars. Along with many of you, I grew up staring at grainy
black and white TV images of early launch successes and far too
many early launch failures. We all remember those days, and
they inspired us, in my case, to an aerospace engineering
background.
While I certainly do not share Senator Nelson's experience,
I do have some rocket science in my own background. I echo Mr.
Teets's views that that is the goal. We have spent a lot of
time over the last year in the Partnership Council, which
brings together NASA and me and General Lord and Ron Sega,
under the leadership of Secretary Teets, to assess what is in
the realm of the possible. We examine how do we get there and
how do we identify, not just the wholesale leaps, but the
little incremental technological improvements that Mr. Teets
spoke of that might enable that leap when the time is right.
Clearly, it is that kind of routine access that we must
strive for. But as you and Senator Nelson rightly pointed out,
we also have to have a plan in the meantime. We have to have a
near-term addressal of the national security challenges. While
I share the idealism of where we want to go, I also share the
realism and the challenges that we face today and tomorrow in
support of our operational forces. A lot of those options that
are being pursued, that you heard described by General Lord and
Admiral Cebrowski, are more realistic near-term alternatives,
but we cannot give up on that dream and we need to pursue the
technology appropriately that might enable us to get there
either in the mid- or far-term, as the case may be.
We certainly understand the need to continue appropriately
addressing the technological miracles or achievements, but we
also have to have near-term solutions as well.
Senator Allard. General Lord, do you have anything you want
to add?
General Lord. Yes, sir. If you look back 20, 25 years ago,
there were two major suppliers of the launch business, us and
the former Soviets. You look now, there are probably 7 or 8
countries that can do it with 9 or 10 different launch
vehicles. The business model just did not hold up, not only for
the United States but for others as well.
To take it to the future, I think it is in our national
security interest to push hard, to get to aircraft-like
operations in space, to do the kind of things we need to help
achieve, as Admiral Cebrowski says, the full advantage of a
different kind of business model in the future. I think we have
to push hard. I think it is something we need to invest in as a
nation, I think as a space-faring nation.
The 100th anniversary of powered flight was mentioned. The
Air Force celebrates 50 years in space in August this year. I
think it is important for us to continue to push the envelope
and be able to do that.
Senator Allard. Admiral Cebrowski.
Admiral Cebrowski. I think as we look at major advances in
one area of the technology, such as in propulsion, we should be
aware too that there are likely to be other major advances
going on simultaneously which impact us. So the questions of
what you lift and how you lift it seem to intersect. For
example, we need to get a handle on what happens when we are
able to reach for nanostructures for space vehicles, payloads,
and what that impact has on our capability, which could sharply
accelerate the utility of smaller vehicles.
I think we also have to look at frequency of launch and the
impact that has on the competitive environment. The more
frequently we launch, essentially the higher the transaction
rate is amongst all the various elements in the program, so the
learning rate is up then. With only a modest number of
launches, learning is stagnant. So we should not be surprised
that we have gone so long with only modest advances in lift.
Senator Allard. Let me wrap this up. I commend you,
Secretary Teets, for initiating the ORL effort. I believe that
at least two competitors in the analysis of alternatives for
responsive launch could have viable small, low-cost launch
vehicles within a couple years. Yet the ORL program appears to
be in a very much longer time line, potentially 7 or 8 years in
development.
What drives the schedule of the ORL program?
Dr. Teets. The schedule is fundamentally driven by resource
allocation, sir. I would just say that one of the things that
we have recently done is, when Space and Missile Center source
selected these nine contractors to be involved with ORL we have
asked them to propose to us how rapidly they could indeed put a
test vehicle into effect.
We are hoping to accelerate our current schedule. Our
current schedule is to have two of these concepts have a test
launch in 2007. We would like very much to accelerate that if
we possibly can. So to that end we are asking our contractors
to put some effort on how could you accelerate it and what
would it cost in terms of resources in order to accelerate a
capability from 2007 into the nearer term.
Senator Allard. Would this be characterized as a spiral
development effort?
Dr. Teets. Yes, it would.
Senator Allard. I believe my time has expired. Go ahead,
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary and General Lord, what is the current status
of SBIRS-High and how late is the Highly Elliptical Orbit
(HEO)-1?
Dr. Teets. I am pleased to give you a summary of where we
are with SBIRS-High. As you probably recall, 2 years ago we had
a Nunn-McCurdy breach on the SBIRS-High program and that breach
resulted in quite a significant restructuring of the program.
It was certified 2 years ago now by Secretary Aldridge and we
proceeded to put additional resources in it and restructure the
contract, change many of the terms and conditions of the
contract and content to the program. Over the course of the
last 2 years, we have made significant progress.
I will say recently--in the last year or thereabouts--we
have encountered some adversity in the area of electromagnetic
interference that is put out by the sensor that is destined for
the HEO ride. We have been working diligently to solve this
electromagnetic interference problem. I meet very regularly
with the presidents of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman and
we have put a lot of resources and a lot of technical talent
and we have made good headway.
At the present time, I would tell you that we are on course
to be able to deliver this HEO sensor to the host vehicle by
the end of July of this year. That is a year and a half late
and a year and a half late creates problems in the program. I
will say the fact that we have focused intensive efforts on
solving this electromagnetic interference problem has caused us
to move work out of the work that would normally have been
applied to the geostationary vehicle.
So let me tell you that this is a fluid situation right
now. We are in the process right now of reevaluating what our
launch date for the geostationary vehicle will be. I cannot
tell you the exact new launch date. I can tell you that I
anticipate having another cost problem on the SBIRS-High
program and I expect that we are going to have to take some
steps to see if we can apply additional fiscal year 2005
funding in order to handle the impact to this geostationary
vehicle.
Senator Bill Nelson. So there is a separate technical and
schedule problem with the geosatellites?
Dr. Teets. There is a schedule problem. We are not
suffering a separate technical problem on the geo birds. The
fact is that we focus so much attention on the HEO birds that
we have fallen behind in the development of the geo, the first
geosatellite, and it is a schedule problem. That schedule
problem comes with a cost problem, unfortunately, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you want to add anything, General
Lord?
General Lord. No, sir, other than to say that Dr. Teets,
myself, Admiral Ellis, General Arnold, and the company
presidents meet almost monthly on the program. Of all the
programs I have experienced in my history in this business,
this is the one that is getting the most scrutiny, I will
guarantee you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, how important is SBIRS-
High to your mission?
Admiral Ellis. It is absolutely essential. Senator, it is
not merely a follow-on to the DSP Constellation, although it
certainly will fill that and do a great deal else in addition.
It is a critical increase in our ISR capabilities, our
technical intelligence capabilities, and many of the other
things that you know well that lie in the classified realm. So
it is absolutely essential that the capabilities that are
promised by the SBIRS program continue to mature.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, in your written
statement you refer to space-based infrared capabilities, but
you do not mention SBIRS-High. Should we be reading something
into that?
General Lord. No, sir. As we talk about SBIRS-High,
remember, we have a space part and we also have a ground part,
and we have already done Increment One, which is the beginning
of the ground part. As a matter of fact, during the war and OIF
the missile warning processing was done by DSP through the
Missile Warning Center up at Buckley. Our Increment One
capability with what we have done in the SBIRS program with the
ground system really was very useful in providing that kind of
warning to the theater.
Essentially what we have done with the DSP is wrung just
about every bit of operational capability we can out of that
set of sensors, and we are looking forward to moving in a way
to get this advanced capability to provide Admiral Ellis and
the other combatant commanders with this improved capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, on the AEHF satellite,
the decision to buy the fourth is going to have to be made by
October; is that right?
Dr. Teets. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, as I understand the TSAT
program, it is going to have various technologies and they may
not be sufficiently mature to include in a TSAT in the third
quarter of 2006, such as Multi-Access Laser Com. It is not
going to be mature until 2008. Can you tell the committee how
you can forgo the fourth AEHF and rely on the first TSAT as a
substitute?
Dr. Teets. Yes, sir. We face that decision in the October
timeframe, as you mentioned. This is going to be a very
important and significant decision to make, whether or not to
buy a fourth AEHF satellite. What we are doing at the present
time is significant technology risk reduction activity on the
TSAT program, and we are pointing very much toward this October
decision that you mention and it will be a balancing of risk in
order to make that decision.
We have put into place this TSAT program in a way that we
had hoped would allow us to make a decision to not buy the
fourth AEHF vehicle, but that decision has not been made. The
decision will come in the October-November timeframe, and we
will evaluate very carefully the progress that we have made on
the TSAT program.
Now, when you talk about the Multi-Head Laser Head, that is
a capability that we do not require for the first spiral of
TSAT vehicles. That is a development that we see as being very
important to expand the capability for receiving information
from space-based radar or other ISR kinds of sensors. It is not
necessary on the first TSAT vehicle.
What we want on the first TSAT vehicle is a vehicle that
has significantly better capability than AEHF and have it be a
vehicle that we are highly confident we can deliver to a
schedule. That decision, as you mentioned, that takes place in
the October-November timeframe will weigh the risk of a late
delivery of TSAT against the advisability of acquiring the AEHF
as a safety stopgap.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk about timing. A fourth
AEHF would launch in 2010. The first TSAT is not going to be
ready until 2012, and that is assuming it is on time. So what
confidence do you have that secure communications will be
maintained?
Dr. Teets. Well, these AEHF satellites that you are
referring to have 10-year lifetimes.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you would not have a break there if
you cancelled a fourth AEHF?
Dr. Teets. Well, that is the exact trade that we want to
make in the October-November timeframe, because we will not
have a break in coverage if we can deliver the TSAT on the
schedule that we are currently on. On the other hand, what I am
trying to tell you is that we are taking this decision
seriously, because what we cannot do is leave our warfighting
community without the capability of secure communications.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is right. You know the history of
rushed satellite programs.
Dr. Teets. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. So that begs the question, why not buy
the fourth AEHF?
Admiral Ellis, can you live with this approach?
Admiral Ellis. Well, sir, I do not know. We have not made
the decision yet, as Mr. Teets noted, sir. So to define the
approach in the sense that you did, obviously we are not there
yet. But our role in STRATCOM is to represent the needs of the
warfighter in what Admiral Cebrowski had a big hand in, and
that is creation of these network-centric forces that are
increasingly reliant on these capabilities. A part of that is a
pretty clear-eyed view of, if plan A does not execute as
scheduled, what is plan B? Those are important considerations
as we chair the Senior Warfighters Forum and other venues that
address these very real and important concerns.
So I cannot live without the enhancements and improvements
in the bandwidth that are needed to support the systems that we
are increasingly putting in the field. The short answer to
that, of course, is no.
The issues that Mr. Teets addressed on the technical
maturity of TSAT vis-a-vis the AEHF have to be very carefully
played out in that fall timeframe, as he is committed to doing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you not love being head of Space
Command? [Laughter.]
Admiral Ellis. It is a dream job, sir, and I mean that. It
is a dream job.
Senator Allard. I want to follow up a little bit on the
GPS-3, Secretary Teets. This has been around for a long time.
It is a powerful satellite and the idea is to blast through.
There has been some suggestion that perhaps modifications could
be done in the ground stations, the user equipment, as well as
the networking. That may not be necessary.
Has the Air Force recently done any evaluation of or a
comprehensive look at the full range of technical alternatives
to defeat the GPS jamming threats?
Dr. Teets. Yes, sir, we have. I am pleased to say that I
think we now have a quite well-synchronized programmatic plan
that will take us from today's GPS-2R configuration, starting
next year with the launch of GPS-2R modified, that will put up
our first M code GPS satellites, which will have additional jam
resistance. When those play out, it will lead logically and
progressively into our GPS-2F configuration, which will add
even more jam resistance to it. Then ultimately it will
synchronize into our GPS-3, and GPS-3 will give us significant
anti-jam kind of capability.
Meanwhile, the ground equipment, the receivers, and the
necessary ground equipment will be synchronized with that
evolutionary flow. So I think we now have a GPS program that
makes excellent sense.
Admiral Ellis. There is also an element of tactics,
techniques, and procedures that play into this, as we were able
to discern in our assessments as we approached the conflict
last year. We have found that there are very successful
techniques with regard to antenna placement and tactical
employment of our existing systems that can further mitigate
this.
So we are working this in concert. It is not just the
technological answer that we are pursuing, though. As Mr. Teets
fairly describes, that will get better and better as we move
forward with the maturation of the GPS Constellation. We are
also working the real-time employment techniques that can
further ensure success for our warfighters.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Admiral Cebrowski, we have not forgotten you. I understand
that your office is sponsoring a number of TacSat payloads and
launches that are designed to demonstrate the viability of low-
cost operationally useful payloads and space launch. How would
you describe the value of the TacSats? What role will they play
in transformational space?
Admiral Cebrowski. The TacSat-1 is an experiment. It is a
very broad experiment in that it includes many elements, but it
is focused on what you might consider the key or what we
consider the key elements of the new business model. While it
is experimental, it is not a technical experiment. It is an
operational experiment that has some technical components to
it.
So we are working closely with the Pacific Command (PACOM)
to apply a particular capability against an operational problem
that the joint commander has in the Pacific. When we do this,
the methodology that we have selected is to try to move space
capabilities onto the time lines of contingency planning for a
major contingency, so that we could launch, create a payload,
integrate it into a rocket, and launch it within about a year
with a cost of about $15 million.
We are on the outside margins of those numbers, quite
honestly, but not so far that I feel as though the basic
concept is at risk. We want to be able to have the payload
tasked and respond via the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET), the Internet protocols which we use for the
general command and control system for the forces at large. We
also want to have a payload which is capable of talking to
aircraft, to UAVs, ships at sea, forces on the ground, and be
able to do so directly, so that we do not require very large
installations or incur significant infrastructure costs.
So we are using essentially existing network structures to
be able to do that. Now, I think one of the most exciting
things about this experiment has been the teamwork that has
been generated between the Naval Research Laboratory, the Air
Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Space in general, the NRO,
and a whole host of commercial partners, not the least of which
is Elon Musk's space effort, and he is our launch provider. We
are going on his maiden voyage and taking advantage of that.
We have all of these things in play simultaneously in this.
The objective is that we would catalyze activity, and I believe
we have been successful in doing that, and that would bring
operationally responsive space into the present so that it
would not be just something for the end of the decade. The
larger system has responded to that.
TacSat-2, which is a somewhat more involved payload, but
also performs in the sensor realm, will probably launch much
later in this year. We need to get on to increase the
frequency, the cycle rate, if you will. In order to do that, a
critically important step is to focus on standardized bus
interfaces that I had mentioned before. This will allow for
this very high cycle rate that we are looking for.
This also addresses to a certain extent the issue of access
that was talked about earlier, increasing the frequency of
launches, and moves us to the point where we can be talking
about essentially high-speed designer capabilities at low cost,
able to operate nearly autonomously, and responding to the
market demands.
Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, I note that TacSat-1 and -
2 are fully funded and that senior Air Force staff have shown
us a plan for a series of TacSats. The question is, are future
TacSats funded in the Air Force Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP)?
Dr. Teets. Senator Allard, I am going to need to take that
for the record. I do know that TacSat-2 is funded. I do not
know that TacSat-3, -4, and -5 are funded separately. I know
the Air Force Research Laboratory has a plan to continue the
TacSat series, but I cannot tell you if they are identified as
separate line items or not. I would be happy to take it for the
record, though.
[The information referred to follows:]

TacSat-1 and TacSat-2 are fully funded and, based on their
anticipated success, we are pursuing future TacSat opportunities. We
believe that this is a good strategy for future exploration of rapid
warfighter capabilities. Currently there is no funding in our budget
beyond TacSat-2. We are working to secure funding for these future
TacSats in our FYDP.

Senator Allard. Okay. Let me move on to the other question
I had for you. Do you believe that the model using lower cost,
smaller satellites to meet space requirements potentially may
have broader applications in supplementing and reconstituting
current capabilities?
Dr. Teets. I do, particularly when it comes to the
supplemental part. I think that there are multiple applications
for small satellites to be able to augment existing
capabilities to be able to operate in conjunction with existing
capabilities, and to increase capabilities for a certain
theater of operations that exists at a certain latitude on the
face of the Earth. With an operationally responsive launch
capability, you can optimize orbital characteristics for a
specific theater and that can give some very important
operational benefits.
Senator Allard. Does operationally responsive space (ORS)
imply a different approach to requirements definition for
space?
Dr. Teets. Well, it does in the context that we will impose
requirements that will dictate that both the ORL vehicle and
the satellites that they will launch will need to be able to be
checked out and processed and launched in a matter of hours and
days, not weeks, months, and longer.
Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, do you have any comments on
the requirements aspect of this question?
Admiral Ellis. I certainly do, sir. As Mr. Teets said,
obviously there is going to have to be an ability to bring
these satellites from wherever we store them and get them ready
to launch to match the aggressive time lines that we have been
discussing. But I do think it is fair to say that we are also
going to have to address the requirements piece more
realistically. In other words, one of the key advantages and
potential for this flexibility and this replenishment rate, as
Admiral Cebrowski describes it, is that we do not have to
design for all cases. We can focus on the near-term
requirement. We can, in modular fashion, put together a payload
that best serves the very specific needs of the commander.
We are going to need a process that very quickly identifies
the key requirements and makes the appropriate tradeoffs to get
the kind of responsiveness we need. Also, it should identify
those elements that can be drawn from commercial sources and
the like, as is an important part of the TacSat program, so
that we do not overstate requirements. We need to get to the
element that is really essential and of most benefit to the
warfighter, and we get there quickly and efficiently.
Senator Allard. My time has expired.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk about SBR. It should
deliver, according to Pentagon descriptions, persistent radar
coverage of most of the globe. What does ``persistent'' mean?
Does that mean continuous? If not, what is the difference?
Anybody?
Dr. Teets. I would be glad to take a stab at that. I think
one of the lessons that we have learned in recent years is that
we need in our intelligence collection systems to move toward
more persistence. I know this is an open hearing and so I am
getting a little bit careful here, but today typically a
commercial imaging satellite passes will have two passes over a
target on any given day. Widely open on the Internet are the
catalogue of warned satellite passes.
So one of the things that we would like to do is move
toward systems that can be more persistent than a couple of
times a day. The first logical move toward persistent
collection would be with a SBR system, in that you can get day-
night, all-weather coverage. You can take synthetic aperture
radar images. You can also get indications of ground mobile
targets.
So what we have determined to date is that with the SBR
program that we are proposing we want to move in that
direction. We have asked our contractors to provide a wide
range of concepts and potential implementation strategies while
we are maturing the technology. We have a very significant
technology maturation effort ongoing on both SBR and TSAT.
So what we are doing is waiting until we get the results of
these broad concept trades to pick any specific concept for SBR
implementation. It may involve low Earth orbiting satellites,
it may involve medium Earth orbit satellites, it may involve
some combination of both. The amount of persistence will be an
important factor in determination of the system we ultimately
want to acquire.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, last year we talked
about you fully funding all of these space programs to their
estimated cost over a 5-year period. You indicated otherwise,
and that is different from the typical policy of almost every
other major Pentagon program. The other programs are required
to be fully funded by Milestone B, to try to avoid the type of
cost growth problems that we see.
So I want to ask you, why have you implemented a specific
policy which does not require that the space programs be fully
funded?
Dr. Teets. Early on in the conceptual development of a
program, it is very difficult to get an accurate estimate of
the run-out costs of the program. In the case of something like
a SBR, we do not know yet which system we are going to buy. We
do not know if we are going to acquire a medium Earth orbit
satellite operating in conjunction with low Earth orbit
satellites. We do not know how many satellites we would have in
a low Earth orbit constellation.
All of that is in the trade space that we are currently
investigating with our industrial partners. So what we have
done for purposes of putting forth a FYDP plan is we have taken
a point design, which happens to be nine low Earth orbit radar
satellites, and we have done a reasonably good quality,
independent cost estimate for what that would cost, and that is
what we have put into the 5-year plan.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does that not really increase the
chance that there is going to be cost growth?
Dr. Teets. I think not. I think it is an intelligent
estimate of what the costs for the program could be. I do think
we are embarked in SBR on a program that will allow us to
gracefully expand the Constellation. That is to say, one of the
attributes that we are looking for from our contractors in
proposing concepts is how would we phase this thing in in a way
that you could kind of buy by how much you can afford?
If you want it truly persistent, if you want this thing to
be a true surveillance system as opposed to a reconnaissance
system, it will take years to populate and it will be an
expensive system. But we want to be able to gracefully move in
that direction.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am almost through, and I would like
to be able to submit additional questions for the record.
Let us talk about space-based interceptors. The American
Physical Society says it is going to take thousands. But even
if we concluded that hundreds of these interceptors would have
to be launched, are you aware of any Pentagon cost study which
estimates what would be the total cost to orbit and maintain
such a sizeable constellation of satellites?
Dr. Teets. I am not, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis.
Admiral Ellis. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you believe we could afford such
enormous numbers of satellites?
Admiral Ellis. Clearly there would be costs associated with
development and deployment of hundreds of satellites no matter
what their construct, sir, and that would be a significant
offset against existing programs and desired sensor
capabilities. So there is no doubt there would be significant
costs associated with something such as you describe.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, what is the role of NORTHCOM
and STRATCOM in missile defense? How are you coordinating?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, that is an excellent question. As
I mentioned in front of the committee 2 weeks ago, I have the
development, integration, and ultimate training
responsibilities for this system as we begin to operationalize
what is initially only a test bed. But it is a responsibility
of the RCCs to oversee the defense of their AOR. I make those
capabilities available to NORTHCOM for the continental United
States and Alaska and to PACOM with regards to Hawaii since
those are the apportionments.
They are the combatant commanders who would be responsible
for employment of this capability. I would be the one who makes
it available and, of its global character, it makes sense that
a single individual or organization be part of that, that
global organization. So that is the role we play and make that
available then to General Eberhart or to Admiral Fargo for the
employment by their commands.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, you talk about a national
test range for information operations. When might such a range
be stood up?
Admiral Ellis. We hope that consideration of that continues
here in the near term. I think a capability like that is going
to be an essential element of expanding and beginning to
deliver on the promise of elements of information operations.
While a great deal of that is classified, the fact of the
matter is one of the challenges we will face is, how do you
know that these capabilities indeed deliver on behalf of the
warfighters, and that indeed implies a test capability so that
we can certify those capabilities before we make them available
as a legitimate alternative to other, perhaps kinetic, options.
Senator Bill Nelson. What kind of testing would be done
there?
Admiral Ellis. The testing would be of the full range or
the full scope of non-kinetic options. It could be electronic
warfare, it could be computer network operations--those types
of elements that might allow us in the future to influence
outcomes without necessarily destroying targets. Those are the
types of things that need to be addressed and a facility that
addresses it in a realistic environment would be of assistance.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Director of OT&E be
involved?
Admiral Ellis. I do not see any reason why he would not be
involved, sir, in those types of efforts. We certainly intend
to fully wring out those capabilities. It is what is absolutely
essential if we are going to offer that as a legitimate
capability to the warfighters in lieu of a kinetic option.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you will keep the committee
apprised of the progress on this, I think we would appreciate
it.
Admiral Ellis. I certainly would, sir.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, I am ready to draw the
hearing to a close. Both of us have some questions that we
would like to submit and I would ask that you respond in a
timely way and get something back to us within 10 days so that
we can make it a matter of the record, if you would, please.
Then we will close the record after 10 days.
I appreciate you taking time from your jobs to be here and
to brief us about space and what is happening today and what we
can look forward to in the future as far as space is concerned.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am sorry we did not ask too many
questions of you, Admiral Cebrowski.
Senator Allard. He is the one that stimulated all this
conversation.
I want to again thank all of you and thank you, Senator
Nelson, and we will call the subcommittee adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

INTEGRATING THE SPACE CADRES

1. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Lord, please assess
the progress made in integrating the space cadres of the Air Force,
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.
Secretary Teets. I believe we have made significant progress in
integrating the space cadres of the military services. In February, we
completed the Space Human Capital Resources Strategy, the purpose of
which was to integrate to the maximum extent practicable the space
cadres of the military services. It provides the framework for
integrating the cadres primarily from a managerial and educational
perspective and it is now being implemented.
The Department of Defense (DOD) must ensure the services develop
space professionals to fulfill their unique mission needs. We recognize
there is a pressing need to synchronize space cadre activities of the
National Security Space (NSS) community to increase efficiency and
reduce unnecessary redundancies. We are accomplishing this by
establishing Department-level managerial functions and creating a focal
point within the DOD for space cadre activities. I am happy to report
that, although we are just beginning implementation, we are making
tremendous progress within the training and education arena.
Furthermore, we have been working hard to synchronize the space
programs of Air Force Institute of Technology and Naval Postgraduate
School through our Space Professional Joint Oversight Board, and are
also examining the possibility of creating a school that will be a
center of excellence in joint space education and training. These are
just two examples of initial success and there will be many more.
General Lord. First, the subcommittee must be aware the Space Cadre
of the Services are fundamentally different, both in size and scope.
(Air Force Space Cadre =10,000, Navy =700, Army =1,000, and Marine
Corps =60.) But these differences contribute unique aspects producing
a synergy of space expertise for the total DOD Space Cadre. Air Force
Space Command, like the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), is
responsible for ``cradle-to-grave'' space systems development.
Similarly, our people typically come into the space business very early
in their careers, often as second lieutenant or airman accessions, and
remain in space for the vast majority of their careers. The other
Services typically don't bring an individual into space until the 10-
year period. Air Force Space Cadre members do everything from design,
engineering, acquiring, testing, operating, sustaining, and integrating
space capabilities; while the majority of the other Services' Cadre
members focus mostly on the latter. As a result, all Services' Space
Cadre members bring diverse sets of perspective, experience, and
capabilities to the fight.
Though there are differences, we are working hard to make sure our
Cadres can be integrated easily where appropriate. The greatest
progress to date is in education initiatives. We built a continuum of
courses to satisfy the education requirements of the Air Force Space
Cadre and Reserved seats for all Services. One of the courses, Space
200, will be used by the Army as the front end to their initial course
for entry into their Space Cadre (FA-40 course) starting July 2004.
My staff ensures that everything we do for the Air Force Cadre is
applicable across the Services. We are implementing a certification
program for the Air Force Space Cadre that sets requirements for
education, experience, and training to achieve each level. We well also
attach a certification level to each Space Cadre position and ensure
Cadre member attains the required certification level in order to fill
that respective position. We believe this certification program's
construct is a good strawman for the NSS certification program and are
working to ensure the two are consistent and understanding of the
differences in the various Service Cadres.

SPACE HUMAN CAPITAL RESOURCES STRATEGY

2. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Lord, please provide
a description and schedule of actions needed to implement the Space
Human Capital Resources Strategy.
Secretary Teets. A complete description of the implementation
actions and schedule is contained in chapter two (pages 9-10) of the
Space Human Capital Resources Strategy, provided to the committee in
February 2004. To summarize, the Space Human Capital Resources Strategy
will be implemented in three phases. Phase I is underway and we hope to
complete it in the next few months. Phase I will create an
organizational framework and our basic processes. Among other things,
during Phase I we will charter a Space Human Capital Resource Senior
Forum, the Space Professional Joint Oversight Board, hold the first
Space Cadre data call, and develop policy concerning human capital
development and use. Phase II represents those activities to be
implemented through the summer. During that phase we will be holding an
education and training summit to determine a common baseline of space
professional competencies, implement appropriate best practices, and
commence any demonstration projects. Phase III extends through the end
of the calendar year. The specific activities of Phase III include
crafting and presenting the first ``Space Cadre Update Report'' to the
Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and to
update the NSS strategy and plan as required. The Space Human Capital
Resources Strategy, however, does not end after the initial three
phases. Following the initial implementation, there will be an ongoing
process to properly manage the space cadre. These are some of the
activities which will be accomplished on an annual basis: deliver an
annual ``Space Cadre Update Report'' to the Secretary of Defense and
DCI; update the NSS strategy and NSS plan to reflect the tasks and
activities associated with space cadre management; and implement best
practices.
General Lord. We worked very closely with all Services in the
National Security Space Human Capital Working Group to build the Space
Human Capital Resource Strategy and have been implementing many of the
actions for our Air Force Space Cadre since last summer. The Air Force
Space Professional Capital Development Strategy is consistent with and
supportive of the Space Human Capital Resource Strategy. As the Air
Force Space Professional Functional Authority, designated by the
Secretary of the Air Force, I am implementing the Air Force Space
Professional Development Strategy consisting of six overarching
segments.
First, our primary focus is developing the Space Professional
Education Continuum of classes. Space 200 is the cornerstone of the
effort and we have already graduated 135 of our Air Force Cadre
(active, Guard, and Reserves/office, civilian, and enlisted) members
from the class. (Seven students were from the Army Space Cadre, six
from the Navy, two Marines, two National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and one National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) participant. NRO participants are counted in the Air Force
members). When fully implemented, we'll host approximately 360 students
a year. Space 100, our space fundamentals course for entry-level space
professionals, is on track for an October 2004 start date with an
annual throughput of about 410 students. We are now determining the
requirements for our Space 300 course targeted for space professionals
at the 12-15 year point which will prepare our Cadre to fill senior
level space positions.
Second, we've identified a new way of tracking the experience of
every member of the Cadre. This Space Experience Code (SPEC) basically
identifies the weapons system and the function performed (operational,
acquisitions, or staff). We are using this code to identify the
experience of every member of the Cadre as well as the requirements for
every space billet in the Air Force. Our next step is to automate this
process so it is integrated into existing Air Force processes and
databases.
Third, a three level certification program was approved prescribing
the education, training, and experience requirements for each level of
certification. This program serves two primary purposes: it measures
the overall health and status of the Cadre and its sets consistent
standards for education, training, and experience at key points in each
member's career. Certification is the glue that holds the Space Cadre
construct together. Every member of the Cadre will be centrally tracked
and every space billet will have a certification level attached to it.
Fourth, we're identifying, by name and position, every member of
the Space Cadre. While doing so, we are identifying their experience
using the SPECs previously discussed and assigning a certification
level based on their experience and education level. We expect to
complete this process with the active duty personnel by June this year
and the civilians, Guard, and Reserves by end of the year. We are doing
the same for each space billet in the Air Force by identifying what
experience and certification level is required to enter the position.
We expect to complete this portion by March 2005.
Fifth, we are publishing career guidance to the Space Cadre on a
periodic basis through Vigilant Vectors and Spread-the Word briefings.
These communications are intended to help the Cadre with career
development issues until we've completed step 4. When step 4 is
complete, we will have the picture on all of our requirements and will
be better able to provide comprehensive guidance based on these
requirements and projected Air Force growth. The sixth and final step
involves establishing a permanent Space Professional Management Office.
Our current effort is through a task force to jump-start the effort.
Similar to the permanent Defense Acquisition Career Management Office
for Air Force acquisition personnel, we realize there are enduring
parts of this program requiring constant oversight and management. We
will be moving the office under our Director of Personnel and they'll
be responsible for day-to-day management of Space Professional
Development while at the same time integrating with the Air Force's
Force Development Program. Specific responsibilities of the office will
include managing the certification program, working with the assignment
teams to make sure we're putting the right person in the right job at
the right time with the right education and training, continuing their
excellent work with the Space Professional Education continuum and
maintaining relationships with other DOD Space Cadre offices.
As you can see there are many interrelated parts for implementing
this strategy. We have made great strides in the past year and are on
track with our current plan. We envision that the complete Space
Professional Strategy will be implemented, stabilized, and
``normalized'' for our Air Force Space Cadre by summer 2006.

OPERATIONAL RESPONSIVE LAUNCH PROGRAM

3. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, you stated in your testimony
that the operational responsive launch program is a spiral development
effort. Do you have plans or requirements for larger operationally
responsive launch vehicles?
Secretary Teets. Although DOD has not defined the specific path we
will take to an operationally responsive spacelift capability, we have
a number of ongoing activities that will help refine our approach. Air
Force Space Command is our lead organization for requirements
definition and has initiated development of an Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD) and an Operationally Responsive Spacelift Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA). The purpose of the ICD is to list capability gaps
and launch alternatives to meet the joint warfighters' requirements.
The AOA will help clarify the military utility of an operationally
responsive spacelift capability and help select the most cost effective
solution. Both activities should be completed by summer 2004.
Additionally, we have an ongoing technology demonstration called
Force Application and Launch from the continental U.S. (FALCON). This
joint Air Force-Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
effort includes a demonstration launch of a responsive small launch
vehicle in fiscal year 2007. This activity holds promise to deliver our
first limited operationally responsive launch (ORC) capability (1,000
lbs. to LEO). Follow-on activities to this demonstration are dependent
on the ICD and AOA activities, but include potential spiraling paths to
increased performance and larger vehicles.

RESPONSIVE SPACE CAPABILITIES

4. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, we are now pursuing next
generation satellites for virtually all the constellations we fly now--
space-based infrared radar system (SBIRS) for the Defense Support
Program (DSP), advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) for military
strategic and tactical relay military standard (Milstar), Mobile User
Objective System (MUOS) for UHF Follow-on (UFOs), National Polar-
Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) for the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), Global Positioning
System (GPS) III for GPS IIF, the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA) for
current intelligence satellites, and we are developing new satellite
technologies like Space-Based Radar (SBR) and transformational
communications. I think it is fair to say that these next generation
satellites look in many respects a lot like legacy systems--relatively
large, expensive, technically complex satellites built for long
satellite lifetimes. You have also described operationally responsive
space as an important transformational goal. Do these next-generation
efforts meet your transformational goal of achieving operationally
responsive space capabilities?
Secretary Teets. Operational responsive space (ORS) does not mean
that we can or will get rid of large satellites. ORS is an important
transformational goal but these capabilities will augment rather than
replace our next generation satellites. Our next generation systems
will provide critical capabilities that will meet our Nation's
warfighting needs. Concurrently, the Air Force Space and Missile
Center, Air Force Research Laboratory, NRO, DARPA, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation, and our
national laboratories are sponsoring initiatives to decrease the size,
cost, and timelines of satellite development. In addition to our next
generation satellites we are also looking at operational responsive
space launch. In the near term, we plan to demonstrate a more
responsive and less expensive launch system capability of placing
approximately 1,000-pound payloads into low Earth orbit.

STANDARDIZATION OF SPACECRAFT DESIGN AND OPERATIONS

5. Senator Allard. General Lord, your command's strategic master
plan identifies as a near-term goal the development of ``technologies
to increase standardization of spacecraft design and operations, [and]
to facilitate spiral development. . .'' What programs contribute to
these goals and how much progress has been made to date in achieving
these goals?
General Lord. The Tactical Satellite (TSAT) demonstration program
is underway to explore technologies and acquisition practices that will
improve space system responsiveness, spacecraft standardization, and
application of spiral development philosophy. The objectives of this
series of space demonstrations are to evaluate the military relevancy
of small satellites providing support directly to theater commanders,
augmentation of large satellite constellations, and emerging through-
space/in-space missions via warfighter experiments, exercises and
wargames. The intent is to reduce risks in future high-responsive space
system acquisition.
To date, there are two TSAT demonstrations underway; the first is
sponsored by the Navy and the second by the Air Force. These two
demonstrations are focusing on increasing the responsiveness of
providing fielded military capability by developing the spacecraft in
15 months, launching it in 7 days from call-up, and completing check
out and initial on-orbit operations in one day.
Four subsequent TSAT demonstrations are in the planning stages, and
building upon the success of the first two missions, we will pursue
technologies and design methods to further improve responsiveness. This
will enable standardized spacecraft bus design and manufacturing,
combined with the application of spiral development practices. These
demonstration flights will also provide a proving ground for advanced
technologies prior to incorporating them into operational system
development programs for both the satellites and launch systems. An
added benefit is the vitalization of a domestic small satellite
industrial capability.
The TSAT demonstration program fits well with a larger study
currently underway at the Air Force Research Laboratory called the
Responsive Space Advanced Technology Study (RSATS). Its charter is to
identify an overall investment plan for rapid fielding of space
capabilities. The overall scope of this larger plan includes investment
in technologies for standardization of satellite components and
interfaces, modularity of space systems, rapid assembly, integration
and test, as well as high responsive launch systems. A core element of
these thrusts is the notion of plug and play satellite interfaces,
which allows flexible standardization of capable digital, analog, and
electronic interfaces for satellite components. This concept parallels
the developments in the personal computer industry for peripherals,
expansion cards, and even new technologies. Plug and play satellite
architecture enables more rapid development of satellite components
because it avoids the time consuming process of developing and
validating interface requirements.

STANDARDIZATION AND SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT

6. Senator Allard. General Lord, the Air Force tends to build small
constellations of big satellites. How amenable is that ``business
model'' to standardization and spiral development?
General Lord. Our satellite system development concept uses
standardization and spiral development to the greatest extent possible.
Standardization is applied at the component, subsystem, and system
level. Additionally, we continually look for standardization
opportunities between the different families of satellite systems. As
standardization opportunities are identified, we perform technical and
cost trades to ensure they are beneficial from a development,
operations, and sustainment perspective.
We are implementing spiral development within our satellite
programs as it makes sense. Several future programs have planned spiral
developments in the baseline programs.
One example of the use of standardization and spiral development is
the SBIRS-High Component Single Acquisition Management Plan. This
document strives to standardize spacecraft design and operations
through a revised acquisition strategy, management philosophy, and
structure that promotes the employment of spiral development techniques
(e.g., risk identification and rigorous testing) for enhancing system
capabilities. Progress is measured incrementally with current emphasis
placed on standardizing hardware and software components of spacecraft
performing similar missions. The next step is to attempt to standardize
components of spacecraft performing different missions.

SPACE-BASED RADAR

7. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
is responsible for both intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) missions and space operations. What is your assessment of the
importance of the SBR system?
Admiral Ellis. The SBR program represents tremendous potential as
both an operational and Intelligence Community support platform. SBR
will provide persistent surface target tracking, imaging and mapping
capability in all weather. 24/7 capabilities provide worldwide
operational data for situational awareness, force protection and strike
support. These capabilities, horizontally integrated into the Nation's
ISR network of systems will provide commanders and decision makers with
a level of situational awareness, intelligence preparation of the
battlespace, and information assuredness never before achieved.

8. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, what essential role do you see
SBR filling that would not be filled by other systems in a larger ISR
architecture?
Admiral Ellis. SBR can potentially provide access to denied areas
under reduced (different) threat considerations. This unfettered access
to moving target indications and all-weather imagery is not limited by
geopolitical boundaries, deploys in a much smaller footprint, and
provides wide area coverage with more frequent revisit rates. This will
provide persistence that current collection methods do not provide,
i.e., Global Hawk, U-2, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS), and that is critical to support a common, worldwide
operational picture.

9. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, does a large SBR constellation
that fills both military and intelligence missions pose any unique
challenges for you as a space operator?
Admiral Ellis. The concept of supporting military and Intelligence
Community requirements is not unprecedented. We have several
constellations (GPS for one) that support the DOD, Intelligence
Community, and even civilian missions. The principle challenge SBR
presents is the level of interaction in meeting DOD and Intelligence
Community needs.
Future DOD and Intellgence Community intelligence activities will
interact within a horizontally integrated intelligence enterprise
architecture linking individual, single-discipline information need
requirements with multi-discipline requirements supporting operations
and policy decisions. This transformational architecture will provide
universal, dynamic, easy-to-use services readily available to all
levels of decision makers and users. This solution will require greater
automation of requirements and task development, and post-downlink
processing, posting, exploitation and analysis, storage, retrieval, and
data transfer.

10. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, I wanted to commend you for
implementing what I think is an effective SBR acquisition strategy. I
know the Air Force has adopted a notional SBR architecture for planning
purposes and I also know that the early estimates for this architecture
appear to be very costly--in the tens of billion of dollars. If that
cost estimate turns out to be accurate, do you believe that the
notional nine satellite architecture is affordable?
Secretary Teets. I will not allow the SBR to proceed beyond Key
Decision Point (KDP)-B unless it can be shown to be affordable.
Affordability is being aggressively addressed in Phase A, which will
refine the SBR concept, architecture, and cost drivers resulting in a
mature program cost baseline to support KDP-B. The Acquisition Strategy
currently supports two prime contractor teams each carrying two or more
concept sets, which gives us a broad trade space between cost and
performance. At my request, early cost estimates have been conservative
in considering technical and performance risks while supporting broad
warfighting and intelligence utility. This has allowed a robust risk
reduction program to be scoped for Phase A along with a focus on
performance/cost trades to be completed before KDP-B. Funding is
focused on design-specific risk reduction to drive down technology and
affordability risks.
The need for SBR by our warfighters is greater than ever. To
provide this capability we have an acquisition strategy that allows us
to fully explore and mature various concepts and technologies. As these
mature we will have much greater visibility into the cost of SBR.
Affordability is key to the program and I will ensure we can afford it
before proceeding into the next program phase.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

11. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, I would like to inquire as
to the health of today's launch providers. You have stated on several
occasions that ``assured access to space'' is one of your top
priorities. I think all of us on the committee appreciate the
importance of your position and the requirement to launch America's
satellites to support both warfighter and national needs. When you were
here last November, you stated that we could anticipate the price of
future launches increasing between 20 and 50 percent. Given that a
second West Coast pad is now being built to handle additional launches
from Vandenberg Air Force Base and given that both launch providers
have already spent hundreds of millions, maybe even billions of their
own money to make the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
a success up to this point, what do you anticipate the increases to
launch funding will be beginning in fiscal year 2006?
Secretary Teets. We are currently developing the EELV funding
requirements to support a potential new contract strategy, aimed at
ensuring our acquisition strategy of assured access to space via two
viable launch service providers is maintained. Until we have firmer
data from our next procurement, we will continue to estimate the
increase as being on the order of 50 percent. The specific funding
levels will be addressed in the fiscal year 2006 President's budget
request.

12. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, will the expected increases
be sufficient to cover the ongoing fixed infrastructure costs of each
launch provider as well as the variable cost of each launch?
Secretary Teets. The new contract strategy for the EELV, currently
under development, has at its core funding for the contractor's
infrastructure costs as well as the marginal prices for launch services
ordered in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. However, financial losses
resulting from launch services negotiated in previous years will not be
reimbursed. Therefore, the U.S. Government's funding will not cover the
entire cost of the launch provider's infrastructure because the
contractors will have a mix of old and new launch services underway
from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010.

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

13. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, it is my understanding that
the key to a successful GPS constellation is sustainment of the fleet
of satellites. Where are we now in sustaining an optimal fleet?
Secretary Teets. The Air Force is currently operating 28 satellites
to ensure a high probability of at least 24 satellites. The current GPS
Constellation is healthy, but aging--14 of 28 satellites are operating
beyond their design lives, therefore continuous replenishment is
necessary to ensure confidence in the constellation.
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) assesses constellation sustainment
on at least a quarterly basis, to determine the need, time, and optimal
location (plane/slot) of future launches in order to sustain an optimal
constellation within budget and schedule constraints. The Air Force is
committed to sustaining the constellation of at least 24 satellites to
support civil and military users worldwide.

14. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, how many GPS II Rs and GPS
II Fs will need to be procured to keep the constellation at peak
operating capability?
Secretary Teets. The contract with Lockheed Martin was for 21 total
GPS IIR satellites. All of these vehicles have been procured. The first
was destroyed during launch in January 1997, leaving 20 vehicles. Since
that time, the Air Force has successfully launched 10 IIRs with the
remaining IIRs planned for launch through fiscal year 2007. The
contract with Boeing for IIF satellites has finalized procurement of
three vehicles, with intent to buy nine more and a predicted need for
at least four additional IIF satellites to ensure the constellation is
sustained until deployment of GPS III. Basically, we expect to launch
3-4 Block IIF satellites per year--until the next-generation of GPS is
available--in order to sustain the constellation of 24 satellites with
high confidence.

WIDEBAND GAPFILLER SATELLITE PROGRAM

15. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, one of the bright hopes for
the warfighters' ability to communicate on the battlefields around the
world is the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (WGS) program. I understand
that one of these satellites will provides more broadband
communications capability than all the Defense Satellite Communications
System (DSCS) on orbit today. That's quite a capability. But because of
today's shortage of broadband capability, most of the satellite
communications our deployed soldiers use come through leased
satellites. I believe that some of these leased satellites are foreign
owned. I understand that we are spending nearly $300 million in lease
costs annually. The Air Force has procured three of these WGSs with the
first launch expected late in 2005. I am concerned, however, that there
is a 3-year gap in production before satellites 4 and 5 would be
funded. Would you explain the Air Force's rationale for this 3-year gap
and would you comment on the Air Force's commitment to purchase the
next two satellites, currently on option?
Secretary Teets. As part of the transformational communications
architecture, which ensures continuous availability of communications
for the warfighter, the Air Force will renegotiate, in fiscal year
2005, an option on the current contract to purchase WGS 4 and WGS 5. In
the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request, the Air Force has
included in fiscal year 2006-2008 an estimate of the funding required
for satellites 4 and 5. This estimate will require updating in the
fiscal year 2006 budget, following the renegotiation. Satellites 4 and
5 will be launched in fiscal year 2009 and 2010, respectively.
When first developed, warfighter requirements for wideband
satellite communications were satisfied with an initial contract for
three WGS satellites, with an option to purchase additional satellites
in the future. Based on the resources then available, the Air Force was
able to fund procurement of three WGS satellites, but due to budget
constraints was unable to begin funding additional satellites until
fiscal year 2006. While this acquisition strategy satisfies warfighter
needs, it unfortunately results in a production gap between satellites
3 and 4.
The Air Force would certainly like to reduce or eliminate the
production gap, thereby avoiding parts obsolescence and manpower
fluctuation issues; however, that would require an additional $400
million or more in the fiscal year 2004-2006 time frame.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

TRANSFORMATION FLIGHT PLAN

16. Senator Akaka. Secretary Teets, the United States Air Force
Transformation Flight Plan, released in November 2003, lists a number
of anti-satellite and space-based weapons programs by name that it
plans to deploy by 2015. These programs include: the Air-Launched Anti-
Satellite Missile, the Ground-Based Laser, the Space-Based Radio
Frequency Weapon, and Hypervelocity Rod Bundles. This seems to be a
bold step in the direction of a weaponized space. What funding is in
the current budget to develop the four new weapons systems I just
listed?
Secretary Teets. The Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile, the
Ground-Based Laser, the Space-Based Radio Frequency Weapon, and
Hypervelocity Rod Bundles are not funded programs, but are ``future
system concepts.'' These are marked in italics in the 2003 Air Force
Transformation Flight Plan (roadmap) to distinguish them from funded
programs. While some have science and technology and/or experimentation
funding tied to them, many, such as those identified in this question,
do not. Historically, most will never be developed. Their inclusion is
to address the Office of Force Transformation's request for ``out-of-
the-box'' thinking in the Service transformation roadmaps.
The upcoming 2004 edition of the Transformation Flight Plan has
already been edited to more clearly distinguish between funded programs
and future system concepts and to only include such future system
concepts that actually have Air Force science and technology or
experimentation funding tied to them.

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

17. Senator Akaka. Secretary Teets, by pursuing anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons, are we not signaling to potential enemies that they
should take the same course of action and spend more of their defense
budgets on space warfighting capabilities?
Secretary Teets. ASAT weapons are nothing new. The former Soviet
Union had an operational anti-satellite system in the 1980s and early
1990s. We have the responsibility to explore a wide range of possible
capabilities and systems that will enable us to deny our adversaries
the advantages gained from space that could be used in a manner hostile
to the United States or our national interests. The force structure of
the armed services and the weapon systems they utilize are and will
continue to be fully compliant with our international obligations,
treaties, and our right to self-defense as spelled out in the United
Nations (U.N.) Charter.

SPACE-BASED KINETIC ENERGY TEST BED

18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Teets, $10.5 million was included in
the fiscal year 2005 Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget request for
research on a space-based kinetic energy test bed. The research is
supposed to lead to on-orbit testing in the 2010-2011 timeframe, and
may result in a limited experimental constellation in 2012. Fort
Greely, which is where the MDA will be fielding its initial missile
defense deployment, also started as a test bed. Is it your intent to
use this test bed as a starting point for weaponizing space?
Secretary Teets. No, it is not our intent to use the test-bed as a
starting point for weaponizing space. The President has directed the
DOD to develop a national missile defense system to ensure the national
security of the United States. As the MDA pursues promising
technologies, it is incumbent upon them to explore all alternatives and
perform research and experimentation in the areas of these
alternatives.
The force structure the armed services studies, plans for, and
acquires to provide for national defense is now and will continue to be
fully compliant with our international obligations, treaties, national
policy, and our right to self-defense as spelled out in the U.N.
Charter.

19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Teets, what is the administration's
position on the pursuit of space weapons by the United States?
Secretary Teets. In May 2001, when Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld announced the implementation of the Space Commission he
emphasized two key points concerning our space policy: ``The United
States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all
nations for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all humanity. Peaceful
purposes allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit
of national security and other goals.'' The Secretary went on to say:
``Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop,
operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of
action in space, and if directed, deny such freedom of action to
adversaries.'' In the 3 years since this statement, this position has
not changed.

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

20. Senator Akaka. General Lord, the GPS III satellites, which will
provide the GPS with better protections against jamming, were
originally scheduled for launch in 2009. That date has since been
pushed back to 2012 because of cost considerations. Why is the Air
Force now focusing on the development of risky new technologies, such
as laser communications satellites and space-based radars, when near-
term needs to protect our space assets, such as the planned upgrade to
GPS, are being delayed?
General Lord. While the Air Force is proceeding to develop laser
communications and a SBR capability, this does not come at the expense
of GPS. The initial GPS III program called for an fiscal year 2009
first launch; however, in addition to being costly, the program was
assessed as being overly .aggressively and high risk. Modernization of
the GPS II space segment, coupled with user equipment improvements,
will provide an interim anti-jamming capability to support current
requirements to counter existing threats. The first launch of a
modernized higher-power GPS Block II satellite is projected for March
2005. This modernization campaign best meets the DOD's near-term
navigation warfare requirements, and supports an fiscal year 2012 first
launch of GPS III, still necessary to meet projected future threats.

KINETIC ENERGY ANTI-SATELLITE

21. Senator Akaka. General Lord, Air Force officials have opposed
the Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite system in the past because of
concerns about creating dangerous space debris, but the Transformation
Plan envisions a similar Air-Launched ASAT Missile. Is the Air Force no
longer concerned that use of a kinetic energy anti-satellite weapon
will create debris that could threaten our own and allied space assets?
General Lord. The Air Force continues to be concerned with the
problem of space debris. A kinetic energy anti-satellite weapon was
only one of a variety of solutions aimed at meeting the Quadrennial
Defense Review's operational goal of space superiority. There are,
however, other long-term concepts that can be pursued that do not have
the negative side effects of creating large amounts of space debris.
This is one of the reasons this concept has been removed in the most
recent draft of the Air Force Transformational Flight Plan (to be
released in July 2004).
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

MISSILE DEFENSE PROTECTION OF HAWAII

22. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, starting in September, when
the Bush administration plans to deploy a national defense against
long-range missile attack, you will be the person responsible for
protecting all 50 States from such an attack. I understand that because
of radar coverage limitations with the current system, in order to
protect Hawaii from an attack from North Korea, a Navy ship will be
required to be on station off the North Korean coast. This ship will
provide the radar coverage for the system. The question then arises as
to whether the Navy is committed to putting a ship on station off the
coast of North Korea to provide the necessary radar coverage. Secretary
of the Navy, Gordon England, reportedly stated recently that the Navy
would provide ``virtually continuous'' deployment of a ship off of
North Korea. What does ``virtually continuous'' mean--will a Navy ship
be on station, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to protect Hawaii from a
long-range missile attack, starting in September?
Admiral Ellis. The Navy contribution to the missile defense
capability is just as you describe. It is a radar tracking capability
that will provide initial cuing in addition to our overhead sensors and
complement other ground-based radars. The Navy has set milestones and
is committed to identifying ships and upgrading their radar
configuration to provide that on-station capability of which the
Secretary spoke.

SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTORS

23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, at a recent conference,
General Kadish, Director of the MDA, discussed his plans for space-
based interceptors (SBIs). He was quoted as saying, ``From the
standpoint of the threats we face at this particular time . . . we
don't need to put weapons in space. But that situation may or may not
last a long time.'' He also reportedly said that there is likely to be
a national debate on deploying weapons in space before the MDA begins
deploying SBIs. The MDA wants to spend close to $100 million on SBI
research next year. That is a significant amount of money--despite the
fact that even General Kadish says there is no threat that warrants it.
Yet there is no sign that the administration desires to have a national
debate or discussion on deploying weapons in space. Rather, the
administration appears to be creeping slowly towards weaponizing space,
hoping no one notices. Do you know what the goal is of the SBI research
and will any of this research require or include work that could lead
to space-based weapons?
Secretary Teets. One of the MDA's goals is to understand the
minimum constellation size and associated ballistic missile defense
system interfaces where a SBI capability begins to cost-effectively
contribute to a layered defense against all threat classes in all
phases of flight. MDA is not restricting their capability alternative
studies to only global boost phase intercept defense. In fiscal year
2005 MDA will initiate space based technology development. MDA's plan
is to mature the technology (light-weighting of interceptor components
including the kill vehicle and development of a liquid axial stage).
This would also allow MDA, by 2008 at the earliest, to have the ability
to determine whether it is technically and economically feasible to
pursue an SBI capability for ballistic missile defense (BMD).

24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, if there is a goal or
desire to weaponize space, when will the administration seek specific
authority to take this significant step and do you believe the U.S.
should place weapons in orbit?
Secretary Teets. There is no specific desire or goal to ``weaponize
space.'' As stated by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, during
testimony to the Full House on February 5, 2002: ``Our goal is not to
bring war into space, but rather to defend against those who would.
Protecting U.S. military assets in space from attack by foreign
aggressors must be a priority in the 21st century.'' (Secretary
Rumsfeld to the Full House, February 5, 2002.) The DOD is responsible
for ensuring our national security. It is, therefore, incumbent upon
the armed services to remain open to a wide range of possible
capabilities and systems that will enable us to deny our adversaries
the advantages gained from space that could be used in a manner hostile
to the United States, our citizens, or our national interests. The
force structure of the armed services is and will continue to be fully
compliant with our international obligations, treaties, and our right
to self-defense as spelled out in the U.N. Charter. If the research and
development (R&D) proves promising and an exhaustive analysis of
alternatives concludes that the best/only way to ensure our national
security is to base a defensive capability in space, than that option
will be provided to the President and Congress for subsequent approval
and funding.

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what is the policy
regarding space-based weaponry and would such a SBI system be
consistent with that policy?
Secretary Teets. The current DOD policy concerning space
capabilities is directly derived from the National Space Policy,
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49 dated September 14, 1996. The
actual language is classified. The force structure the armed services
studies, plans for, and acquires to provide for national defense is now
and will continue to be fully compliant with our international
obligations, treaties, national policy, and our right to self-defense
as spelled out in the U.N. Charter.

26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what risks to our own
military and commercial satellites would this pose, and what additional
risks to the U.S. would weapons in space pose?
Secretary Teets. As stated by Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, during testimony to the Full House on February 5, 2002: ``Our
goal is not to bring war into space, but rather to defend against those
who would. Protecting U.S. military assets in space from attack by
foreign aggressors must be a priority in the 21st century.'' The DOD is
responsible for ensuring national security. It is, therefore, incumbent
upon the armed services to remain open to a wide range of possible
capabilities and systems that will enable us to deny our adversaries
the advantages gained from space that could be used in a manner hostile
to the United States, our citizens, or our national interests.
Furthermore, the force structure of the armed services and the weapons
systems they utilize are and will continue to be fully compliant with
our international obligations, treaties, national policy, and our right
to self-defense as spelled out in the U.N. Charter.

27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what is the threat being
addressed, what weapons do we need, and when would we need these?
Secretary Teets. It is our goal to stay ahead of any potential
adversary; the development of new and emerging technologies ensures we
keep our edge. The asymmetric advantage the U.S. has gained from our
space capabilities has not gone unnoticed by our potential adversaries.
As such, we continuously review our space system vulnerabilities and
are looking at ways to make our space services and systems less
susceptible to enemy attack. In January 2004, we asked the National
Intelligence Council to update the threat assessment contained in the
1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Threats to U.S. Space
Systems and Operations. The actual assessments are classified, but the
threat posed by our potential adversaries continues to grow.

28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, are you
aware of the study by the American Physical Society that indicated you
would need a thousand or so space-based interceptors in orbit in order
to make an effective system, and the follow-on study by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)--which used much more optimistic
assumptions, but still concluded that hundreds of interceptors would
have to be launched?
Secretary Teets. The MDA is aware of the American Physical Society
study and that the CBO is conducting a follow-on study. I understand
the CBO report is nearing completion. In late fiscal year 2003 the MDA
developed a response to the American Physical Society which analyzed
space based interceptor constellation sizes and came to a conclusion
that constellations of 150 to 450 satellites would be required.
Admiral Ellis. No, I am not aware of this study.

29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, are you
aware of any Pentagon cost studies which estimate what the total cost
to orbit and maintain such enormous constellations of satellites would
be?
Secretary Teets. The MDA reports that as of this time they have not
conducted a cost study which estimates the total cost to orbit and
maintain a large constellation of satellites.
Admiral Ellis. No, I am not aware of such studies.

30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, do you
believe we could afford such enormous constellations of satellites,
when we are currently struggling to keep far smaller and less complex
satellite programs on schedule and on budget?
Secretary Teets. Building a responsible defense budget demands
constant balancing between warfighter requirements and available,
affordable technologies. It is premature to speculate on the ultimate
character of a SBI constellation. As the concept and technologies
mature, we anticipate that the MDA will address the cost, schedule, and
performance issues related to a constellation of SBIs.
Admiral Ellis. Clearly, there would be significant costs associated
with the development of hundreds of satellites no matter what their
construct. We must be able to balance our system development efforts
with the value of the same to our national security.

MISSILE DEFENSE TESTING

31. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, by law, operational testing
is defined as ``the field test, under realistic combat conditions, of
any item of (or key component of) weapons, equipment or munitions for
the purpose of determining the effectiveness and suitability . . . for
use in combat by typical military users.'' The law also states that the
Pentagon's chief test authority, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E), is ``the principal operational test and evaluation
official'' who shall ``approve (in writing) the adequacy of the plans
for operational test and evaluation.'' The law says that a major
weapons program ``may not proceed beyond low rate initial production
until initial operational test and evaluation of the program has been
completed.'' The intent of this law is to prevent the mass production
and deployment of a system prior to completion of independent, combat-
realistic operational testing. The key criteria for operational testing
are independence and combat-realism. None of the completed or planned
missile defense tests meet these important criteria. No other weapons
system has ever been deployed without any plans for operational
testing. In September of this year, the administration plans to deploy
a long-range missile defense for the United States. I understand you
will be the person responsible for this defense, and also responsible
if the defense fails against a real enemy missile. Would you like to
see the national missile defense system operationally tested in a
combat-like way as soon as possible--both to assess how it will work in
battle, and to fix any problems that almost surely will be revealed by
such testing?
Admiral Ellis. My belief is that this effort is currently underway.
Over an extended period of time, as we move through the developmental
test phase, we are placing the system and evolving its capabilities in
the operational environment where it would be employed. There are
obviously elements that cannot and, hopefully, will never be tested
from a full operational capability--such as the launch of threat
missiles from potential adversaries. I do believe that the elemental
testing that is underway will characterize the dynamics of and the
environment in which this system is intended to operate. We will define
and refine the sensor capabilities. We will assess the command and
control linkage and the command and control processes and all of those
elements will then be integrated in a comprehensive manner.

32. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, current law provides for
independent testing of major weapons systems to make sure they are
suitable and effective. Do you support the intent of this law, as it
applies to national missile defense?
Admiral Ellis. In my view, we are getting to the intent of that law
by involving the OT&E people in the process. With large-scale systems,
the complexity of the tests, the expense of testing, and modern
simulation capabilities allow us to integrate elements of both
developmental testing and operational testing as the system evolves.
Technology and simulation now allow us, for the first time, to bring
these elements together in a concurrent manner that more efficiently
uses national resources and, arguably, more quickly delivers the
capabilities that we need.

U.S. NORTHERN AND STRATEGIC COMMAND

33. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, what are the roles of U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and STRATCOM in missile defense, and how
are the efforts coordinated?
Admiral Ellis. Change Two of the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)
tasked STRATCOM to plan, integrate, and coordinate the global missile
defense capabilities of the Nation. STRATCOM is operationalizing the
capabilities being developed and deployed by the MDA.
We are leading the development of the necessary doctrine, concepts
of operations (CONOPs), and operational plans in coordination with our
subordinate Service component commands and the other combatant
commanders. This effort requires that we define the broad
interrelationships among the Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD)
mission and other mission areas, such as ISR, strike operations, and
information operations. Operationalizing GBMD capabilities also
requires detailed planning to address the policy, rules of engagement,
force employment, force readiness, and logistics support, and tying
together diverse system elements including sensors, interceptors, and
the command and control network.
NORTHCOM and Pacific Command (PACOM) are our principal warfighting
partners in preparation for activation of the initial defense
capability. With them, we are continuing to refine and validate our
plans in a series of exercises and readiness assessments designed to
prepare the responsible combatant commands for assuming operational
responsibility for the initial elements of this nascent defensive
system.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated an unprecedented level
of cross-theater missile defense cooperation and coordination.
Integrated early warning data from Army, Navy, Air Force, and other
intelligence sensors provided vital data supporting Patriot missile
engagements of all threatening theater ballistic missile launches.
Expanding upon OIF's example of an integrated and effective defense,
STRATCOM is developing the GBMD CONOP and the battle management
architecture to provide full capabilities for regional combatant
commanders to defend their areas of responsibility.

SPACED-BASED INFRARED RADAR SYSTEM-HIGH

34. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, the
SBIRS-High has experienced and is continuing to experience significant
problems. When complete, the system will consist of two high Earth
orbit (HEO) sensors and five geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO)
satellites. The current problem is with the HEO-1 sensor, but we are
also beginning to hear that there may be significant problems with the
GEO satellites as well. What is the current status of SBIRS-High--how
late is the HEO-1?
Secretary Teets. The first HEO payload delivery is scheduled for
July 2004 (classified launch date). Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
is within acceptable limits. The second HEO payload delivery is planned
for November 2004 (classified launch date). Testing so far supports EMI
performance within specification for the second HEO payload. The SBIRS-
High GEO program is currently being replanned due to recent technical
maturity challenges. Schedule impacts include a 12-month schedule delay
for GEO-launches. There is an approximate $1.5 billion program cost
growth from fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2013.
We are replanning the Signal Processing Assembly (SPA) flight
software for GEO satellites. The original design was assessed as
insufficient to meet mission requirements.
Other contributing factors have exacerbated the cost over-runs:

1. Extensive rework of the HEO sensors as a result of the EMI
problems
2. HEO and GEO Single Board Computer (SBC) anomaly resolution
3. Underestimation of space-to-ground interface complexities
4. Known technical issues did not close as planned
5. Extremely challenging contractor manpower roll-off plans

A SBIRS-High program replan is underway. Preliminary results were
presented to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) on April 20, 2004.
Full cost and schedule impacts are to be completed by July 2004 and a
new acquisition program baseline (APB) will be established thereafter.
The Air Force is committed to fully funding the cost of the replan in
the fiscal year 2006 President's budget.
General Lord. SBIRS-High program obtained Nunn-McCurdy
recertification in May 2002. At that time, we had expected to deliver
the first of two HEO payloads by February 2003. After working through
the electromagnetic interference problems, we are confident that we
will deliver HEO-1 by end of July 2004. Due to the significant time and
resources spent while focused on the highly elliptical Earth orbit
challenges, we are in the process of replanning the GEO development,
which will result in a 1-year slip to the GEO launch schedule.

35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, is there
a problem with the GEO satellites? We are aware that there may be some
spillover effect on the GEO satellites, as a result of the delays and
increased costs of the HEO-1 sensor, but is there a separate technical
or schedule problem with the GEO satellites?
Secretary Teets. The Air Force is addressing a GEO schedule issue
tied to development of flight software. This is the replan of the SPA
flight software for GEO satellites previously described. This schedule
problem, along with HEO delays, has resulted in cost growth to the
program approximately $1.5 billion from fiscal year 2004-2013 and a 1-
year delay in launch of the first SBIRS GEO satellite.
General Lord. SBIRS-High has experienced the normal challenges of
an acquisition program. GEO is experiencing schedule challenges as a
result of the delays in the HEO schedule. There are also technical
challenges with the data throughput capability of the SPA and with the
single-board computer onboard the GEO satellite. We are working through
these challenges with Lockheed Martin, our prime contractor, to ensure
a low-risk solution.

36. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, how important is the SBIRS-
High to your mission?
Admiral Ellis. The capabilities it promises are absolutely
essential to the mission of the STRATCOM.

37. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, what sort of impact would a
significant delay in either of the two parts of the SBIRS-High have on
your mission?
Admiral Ellis. Recent conflicts and world events have demonstrated
that the threats SBIRS is designed to target are here today.
Significant delays in meeting the current baseline for SBIRS-HEO or GEO
capabilities will negatively impact STRATCOM's missions of Information
Operations (IO), Space Operations, Global Strike, Integrated Missile
Defense (IMD), and ISR. Without the transformational capabilities SBIRS
would provide in missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence and battlespace characterization, STRATCOM would
experience gaps in the following capabilities: the ability to support
the space surveillance aspect of space control (IO); the ability to
provide theater support for battle damage assessment/situational
awareness (Space Operations); the ability to provide warning necessary
to protect U.S. interests around the world (Global Strike); the ability
to provide the accuracy needed to optimize weapon systems (IMD); and
the ability to provide data necessary to address future threats and
adequately conduct treaty monitoring (ISR).

38. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, in your prepared statement
for the record you refer to spaced-based infrared capabilities but do
not mention the SBIRS-High by name. Should we read something into this?
General Lord. No. I was referring to all overhead infrared sensors,
which includes the SBIRS-High.

TRANSFORMATIONAL SATELLITE

39. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, the TSAT communications
satellite is in the early phases of technology development and risk
reduction. When operational, TSAT is designed to have substantially
improved secure, protected, high data rate communications capability.
It will be a successor to the Milstar AEHF satellite family. The
current plan is to have the first TSAT take the place of the fourth
AEHF satellite. How important to you is the ability to have secure
communications at all time and why?
Admiral Ellis. It is vital to STRATCOM's mission as well as the
missions of the other combatant commanders to have secure
communications at all times. In the case of STRATCOM, our ability to
hold targets at risk anywhere and anytime depends on secure
communications for all phases of the mission, from planning to
execution and, if required, recall. This need has been validated by the
President, as recently as June 2003 with the release of National Space
Policy Directive 28.

40. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, the
decision to buy the fourth AEHF satellite must be made by October as I
understand it--is that correct?
Secretary Teets. No, the decision must be made in time to be
included in the fiscal year 2006 President's budget, and is scheduled
for November 2004. This decision would result in advance procurement
funding in fiscal year 2006, and full funding in fiscal year 2007, with
congressional approval. The launch of satellite four would be in fiscal
year 2010.
General Lord. This decision is a complex one. Yet, the optimal
decision point based on AEHF development schedules is in the fourth
quarter of calendar year 2004.
However, many factors play into this decision: predicted mean
mission duration of AEHF, MilStar, and DSCS satellites, AEHF
development progress, and the outcome of TSAT Phase B contracts.
As we approach the fourth quarter of 2004, we will look at all
these factors to determine the right way forward.

41. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, the TSAT
program, as I understand it, will not have its various technologies
sufficiently mature to confidently include in the TSAT until the third
quarter of 2006. One significant technology, multi-access lasercom,
will not be sufficiently mature until 2008. Could you explain how you
can confidently forego the fourth AEHF, and rely on the first TSAT as a
substitute if you won't know if your technologies are viable until 2006
and 2008?
Secretary Teets. We have not yet made the decision on whether to
purchase a fourth AEHF satellite. This decision is scheduled for the
fall of 2004. The decision will involve assessing a number of factors:
the risk associated with TSAT technology maturation, anticipated launch
schedules for AEHF and TSAT, and warfighter satellite communications
requirements. We will carefully evaluate all of these factors before
deciding on whether or not to go forward with AEHF number four.
General Lord. We have taken extensive measures to put into place
mitigation plans to reduce the risk of the program and still allow us
to meet the launch schedule. The current schedule matures all key
technologies to a level consistent with DOD and commercial best
practices for space systems. The goal of the TSAT program is to provide
critical communications on the move and ISR support to the warfighter
that will meet the growing needs of the user community. To do this,
will require a balance of the technology risk with program schedule. We
will continue to monitor and assess technology maturity throughout the
life of the TSAT program. Should the technology fail to mature to a
sufficient level in 2006 and/or 2008, we will use backup technology to
provide the warfighters a capability significantly greater than
currently available.

42. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, General Lord, and Admiral
Ellis, the fourth AEHF would launch in fiscal year 2010. The first TSAT
would not be ready until fiscal year 2012. This certainly seems to be a
large gap. This assumes that the TSAT will even be ready on time. As we
know every satellite program recently is late--some by years. What
confidence is there that the secure communications will be maintained?
Secretary Teets. I am very confident that secure communications
will be maintained. Although the first TSAT is intended to complete the
AEHF constellation, during the 2010-2012 timeframe secure
communications will be sustained by a combination of the first three
AEHF satellites and remaining Milstar satellites on orbit. Working
together, these satellites will provide worldwide coverage ensuring
uninterrupted, protected, secure communications support.
General Lord. I am very confident secure communications will be
maintained. Although the first TSAT is intended to complete the AEHF
constellation, during the fiscal year 2010-2012 time frame, secure
communications will be sustained by a combination of the first three
AEHF satellites and remaining Milstar satellites on orbit. Working
together, these satellites will provide worldwide coverage from 65+ N
to 65+ S, thus ensuring uninterrupted support.
Admiral Ellis. The 14-15 April 2004 SATCOM Senior Warfighter Forum
(SWarF) discussed the possibility of a gap in secure AEHF
communications. We are confident limited secure, survivable, protected
communications can be maintained with a mixed constellation of AEHF and
Milstar satellites until 2017. The SWarF voiced concern that higher
capacity, IP-based and communications-on-the move requirements cannot
be met until the TSAT system is implemented. The SWarF's greatest
concern--delaying TSAT and transformational communications--affects all
future missions and impedes the ability of the Services to transform
their operations. While the SWarF will again review the possible need
for AEHF 4/5 this summer, they are unanimous in recommending the TSAT
funding line remain stable to allow a fiscal year 2012 first launch.

43. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, why not
buy the fourth AEHF, and not be in a position to force the technology
and schedule of the TSAT? Our history of rushed satellite programs
isn't good either. Even comparatively simple satellites have turned out
to be difficult.
Secretary Teets. The DOD has identified the need for a near-term
decision to purchase a fourth AEHF satellite and plans to make the
decision this fall. The decision will be based on a comprehensive
evaluation of the TSAT program and associated risks. The program office
is not forcing the technology and appropriate steps are in place to
ensure the delivery of capability on schedule. The TSAT schedule is
commensurate with past and ongoing communications satellite programs
such as Milstar II and AEHF. Technology development is on schedule to
meet Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) prior to the Preliminary
Design Review (PDR), currently scheduled for 2007. This is consistent
with commercial and DOD best practices. Finally, to manage the
technology risk, the program office has identified mature technology
alternatives that can be used to maintain schedule.
General Lord. The Transformational Communications Architecture
(TCA), completed in 2003, established the basis for introducing clearly
defined, improved communications capabilities for the warfighter.
Technology development is on schedule to a level consistent with
commercial and DOD best practices. The schedule is also commensurate
with past and ongoing communications satellite programs such as Milstar
II and AEHF. Finally, to manage the technology risk, the program office
identified mature technology alternatives that can be used to maintain
schedule. TSAT offers an enormous increase in capabilities designed to
meet the growing needs of the warfighter in the 2012 time frame.
Without timely TSAT delivery, we won't be able to provide
``communications-on-the-move.''

EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

44. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, what is
the current status of the Boeing suspension, when will you make the buy
three decision for the EELV program, and will you wait until Boeing is
off suspension?
Secretary Teets. The suspension remains in effect. It will be
terminated as soon as Boeing has satisfied the Air Force that the
company has taken appropriate remedial actions.
We want to make a Buy III decision in 2004. We hope Boeing will be
off suspension by the time we release the Buy III procurement. While we
desire competition between both EELV contractors in Buy III, we do not
anticipate delaying the procurement of any individual launches due to
the Boeing suspension.
General Lord. As of April 28, 2004, Boeing is still suspended. The
Air Force Deputy General Counsel for Contractor Responsibility (SAF/
GCR) determines whether or not to continue the suspension. The Air
Force desires to retain competition as an element of the Buy III
strategy, but the Air Force will not delay launch awards because of the
Boeing suspension. We will continue to follow the provisions of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) concerning debarment and
suspension. FAR Subpart 9.4 prohibits the government from soliciting
offers of awarding contracts to suspended contractors, absent a
determining by the Air Force that there is a compelling reason to do
so. The strategy for Buy III is under development, a process that can
normally take 180 days before the request for proposal is released.
This schedule may be further extended to incorporate a reliability
study recently tasked by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as part of the EELV Nunn-McCurdy
certification.

45. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, how much
will the EELV costs be increased in fiscal year 2005 and beyond as a
result of the Boeing suspension and how much of the increased EELV
costs are as a result of the downturn in the commercial satellite
market?
Secretary Teets. Currently the U.S. Government's total cost as a
result of the Boeing Procurement Integrity Act violation is estimated
at $275 million (fiscal year 2004-2009).
Of the total reported increase in EELV program costs, $8,640
million through 2020, or approximately 63 percent is attributable to
the downturn in the commercial market.
General Lord. Currently the Federal Government's cost as a result
of the Boeing Procurement Integrity Act violation, leading to the
suspension, is estimated at $275 million (fiscal year 2004-2009). The
Air Force estimated the downturn in the commercial market to account
for 63 percent of the total increase in the EELV cost.

46. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Lord, what is
assured access to space and why do we need it?
Secretary Teets. Assured access to space is the ability to launch
critical space assets when required. Basically, it is the ability to
ensure support of our warfighter and national security requirements
with space-based assets when, where, and how they need it. It is a key
enabler to maintaining the asymmetric advantage the United States has
in space. Having two EELV providers is the foundation of assured
access. Without two providers, a catastrophic launch failure in a
single provider environment means we are out of the launch business for
an extended period of time. We would be unable to ensure the needs of
our warfighters are met. It's a position I never want to see this
country in. It's my job to see that doesn't happen.
General Lord. In the ``Report to Congress on Assured Access to
Space for the United States,'' delivered by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on March 18, 2003, we defined assured access to space ''as the
ability to launch critical space assets when required.'' The report
notes the EELV program's ``Atlas V and Delta IV launch systems are the
essential elements of assured access to space,'' and goes on to say,
``maintaining two providers is critical to mitigate the risk of
possible early design flaws, gain confidence that all government space
launch requirements can be met, and increase the probability of assured
access to space without protracted downtimes.'' In order to provide
timely support to our warfighters, including national intelligence, we
require the ability to place space assets on orbit whenever needed.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS TESTING

47. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, in your prepared testimony,
you discuss your plan to establish a national test range for IO. This
sounds very interesting and useful. When might such a range be stood up
and what sort of testing would be done there?
Admiral Ellis. STRATCOM is working closely with the OSD to
determine the requirements for just such a test range. This range will
help us define effects in understandable terms, quantify systems'
performance, and provide assurance that the elements of IO will achieve
the desired effects while avoiding unintended consequences. We intend
to develop a ``test range'' that can certify IO capabilities before we
make them available as a legitimate alternative to other capabilities
such as a kinetic option.

48. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, how would the larger test
community be involved, including for example the Pentagon's Director of
OT&E and could you please keep this subcommittee appraised of the
status of this?
Admiral Ellis. I anticipate that the Director, OT&E will be
involved in those types of efforts. It is absolutely essential to
validate and certify effects if we are going to offer them as a
legitimate capability to the warfighter.

DEFINITION OF ``PERSISTENT'' SPACE-BASED RADAR

49. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, Admiral Ellis, General
Lord, and Admiral Cebrowski, according to Pentagon descriptions, the
new SBR program will deliver ``persistent'' radar coverage of most of
the globe. I'd like all of you to comment on what you believe the word
``persistent'' means. Is it the same as ``continuous,'' and if not,
what is the difference--and what is the minimum requirement for
``persistence?''
Secretary Teets. We define persistence as the ability to maintain
long-term surveillance of items of interest in order to monitor,
characterize, and track activities and events occurring around the
globe. Our objective is to optimize the collection of information
through dynamic tasking across multiple air/space sensors--taking
advantage of the complimentary attributes of the systems--to have the
right resources focused on the problem or threat at the right time.
Our definition of persistence is not the same as ``continuous.''
The degree of persistence will vary depending on the situation, the
nature of the threat or information need, and the timeliness required
for action. In many instances, frequent revisits over denied or
difficult terrain areas with space-based systems will provide the
necessary degree of persistence. Tracking mobile theater ballistic
missile launchers during combat operations will require a more
continuous presence from a mixture of airborne, surface, and space-
based sensors to obtain the degree of actionable information necessary
to support decisionmakers.
SBR, as part of an integrated system of sensors, will be a major
contributor in achieving global persistent surveillance.
Admiral Ellis. Persistent is not synonymous with continuous. The
definition of persistence within the SBR concept will be entirely
dependent upon the complexity of the constellation. With each
additional vehicle the frequency of coverage will likely increase;
therefore, persistent will slide across the continuum toward
continuous. But given mission needs and budgetary constraints, an
effort to reach continuous will be cost prohibitive. That is why trade
studies have been, and will continue to be, conducted throughout
acquisition of the system.
General Lord. Persistent surveillance is the ability to monitor,
track, characterize, report, and update at frequent intervals on
specific activities at fixed locations, on moving objects, and changes
occurring to the surface of the Earth. This definition is not
synonymous with ``continuous.'' The activity cycle of the target, the
situation, and the action we want to take on the target determine the
amount of persistence needed. For example, the rate at which we need to
sample a missile test site preparing for a launch may be days; for a
ship traversing the Mediterranean, it may be hours; and for a mobile
theater ballistic missile carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
it may be 30 seconds. We look to achieve persistence through a mixture
of integrating our surveillance and reconnaissance system designs and
allowing these collection systems to trade off coverage of each other,
In some cases, a SBR capability will provide both the deep access and
the persistence to meet our goals, and sometimes our needs will require
a more rapid revisit rate that only airborne sensors can provide. The
surveillance provided by a SBR, in combination with other complementary
space and airborne systems, could bring us much closer to realizing
persistent surveillance.
Admiral Cebrowski. Persistent is not the same as continuous.
When dealing with elements of observation, persistence means having
the capability to know what you need to know, when you need to know it,
and with the fidelity necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions.
You must be able to sense the discriminant or the phenomenology while
it is there and while it is actionable. This requires matching the
observation revisit rate with the time constant of the object to be
observed.
Therefore, any measure of persistence is dependent on the activity
or behavior being observed. For example, if you require information on
a moving target, your ability to observe or sense that target (revisit
rate) must be consistent with changes to its actionable state.
With a networked force it is also important to note that
persistence needs to be measured in terms of a system of networked
space, air, and surface assets. This networked or layered persistence,
allows the advantages of each layer to be brought to bear ensuring a
higher fidelity of actionable observations, while reducing the
vulnerability to deception and denial.

FULL FUNDING FOR SPACE PROGRAMS

50. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, at last year's hearing, I
asked you why the new space policy you were implementing did not
require, as a matter of policy, that space programs be fully funded to
their estimated costs over the 5-year budget horizon used by the
Pentagon. I pointed out then that your policy is different than the
policy for almost every other major Pentagon program. Other major
programs are required to be fully funded by Milestone B, to try to
avoid the type of cost growth problems we keep seeing in space
programs. You didn't answer my question last year, yet I understand the
policy has remained the same. So I'd like to ask you again: Why have
you implemented a specific policy which does not require that space
programs be fully funded? Doesn't such a policy actually increase the
chances for space program cost growth?
Secretary Teets. The policy does require us to fully fund space
programs. The National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 states
that ``The DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority shall determine the
appropriate point at which to fully fund a DOD Space Major Defense
Acquisition Program--generally when a system concept and design have
been selected, a System Program Director/Program Manager has been
assigned, capability needs have been approved and system-level
development is ready to begin.'' This provides us some flexibility as
to when this is required but it typically occurs at the entry to Phase
B, risk reduction and design development.

MINUTEMAN III ICBMS

51. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, at the hearing there was
some confusion about a question I asked with respect to the Minuteman
III ICBMs. The Nuclear Posture Review and the Moscow Treaty achieve the
bulk of the reductions in deployed nuclear warheads by retiring the
Peacekeeper and de-MIRVing the Minuteman III ICBMs--having one warhead
on each Minuteman III rather than multiple warheads. There was a recent
press report that suggested that the decision to have one warhead on
each of the 500 Minuteman III ICBMs was being reconsidered. Is this
true? Is there a plan to retain MIRVed Minuteman IIIs?
Admiral Ellis. No, I am not aware of any such plan.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS AND LESSONS LEARNED IN RECENT MILITARY
OPERATIONS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Dayton.
Majority staff members present: Charles A. Alsup,
professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff
member; and Gregory R. Kiley, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswalt,
professional staff member; and Creighton Greene, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger and Bridget E.
Ward.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King and
Neil D. Campbell, assistants to Senator Reed; and Peter A.
Contostavlos and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

Senator Allard. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee will come to order. Today, this
is a hearing on defense intelligence programs and intelligence
lessons learned in recent military operations.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on
defense intelligence programs and tactical and operational
intelligence lessons learned in recent military operations.
Intelligence has always been an important part of military
operations, but the criticality of intelligence to precision
targeting and decisive military operations has clearly
increased. The Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for
transforming its warfighting capabilities are grounded in
information dominance--accurate, timely intelligence.
Understanding our complex defense intelligence system, its
capabilities, and future requirements is of great importance to
this subcommittee.
We welcome our witnesses. We have with us here this morning
Dr. Steve Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(USDI); Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, G-2 of the Army;
Rear Admiral Richard Porterfield, Director of Naval
Intelligence; Major General Ron Sams, Director for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Air
Force; Mike Decker, Director of Intelligence for the Marine
Corps; and Brigadier General Don Wurster, Director of
Intelligence and Information Operations for Special Operations
Command.
It would be impossible to assemble a more qualified group
to comment on our tactical and operational intelligence
capabilities, and we look forward to your testimony.
As an administrative note, we will have opening statements
and a round of questions in open session, and then move to a
closed session to address important classified items.
Clearly, intelligence has played a central role in recent
combat operations and stability operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as in the ongoing global war against
terrorism. It is an intelligence effort against new types of
efforts that differ greatly from the traditional threats of the
20th century. Our Intelligence Community has had to adjust to
these new threats, and they've done an admirable job.
We've all been thankful for the successes of our Armed
Forces in these recent military operations. While much will be
debated in the months and years ahead about tactics and weapons
systems, all of our forces are dependent on timely, accurate
information to succeed. Indeed, one of the central tenets of
our national military strategy is information dominance. The
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets
available to the theater and subordinate commanders appear to
have done a remarkable job in delivering that information.
While much recent attention has been focused on the pre-war
strategic intelligence available to national decisionmakers, I
feel it's important for the American people to know that the
military intelligence assets of the DOD have served the Armed
Forces and the Nation well.
Even when things go well, however, we must not be
complacent. I want our witnesses to address not only what is
done well, but also where we need to do better. Clearly, we
have a very capable system, but it is your job to make it
better, and the job of Congress to help you.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. It is clear that each of the military Services
and the defense intelligence agencies are very capable and
composed of dedicated professionals. It is equally clear that
this defense intelligence community is a complex enterprise
that requires dedication, consistent, high-level guidance, and
a unifying vision to ensure the best-possible support to the
soldier on the battlefield, the generals guiding operations,
and the strategic decisionmakers.
Secretary Cambone has had 13 months to study this
challenge, and we look forward to his views on the current
state of defense intelligence and the way ahead. One year ago,
this subcommittee held a related hearing to evaluate how well
the ISR assets of the military Services were combined and
integrated together to support joint warfighters.
Our purpose here today is to build on the insights gained
last year and on the insights gained through the experience of
a challenging year of military operations, to better understand
this complex enterprise and determine that the investments we
are making are adequate, and, if, in fact, we are investing in
the right capabilities. Furthermore, we want to understand if
the capabilities that are being developed in each of the
Services not only support the unique core requirements of that
Service, but can be fully integrated into a system that
effectively supports joint warfighters and our national defense
decisionmakers.
Current capabilities have proved quite adaptable over time.
Much of the credit for that goes to the amazing young service
men and women, who use American initiative and ingenuity to
figure out some very unique ways to maximize the capabilities
of these ISR systems. Such ingenuity is critical, but we must
also ensure that we're not asking too much, that we are
developing the capabilities that can focus on the really
challenging threats of the future, such as transnational
terrorists and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Experts suggest that a persistent, all-weather, 24-hour
capability, delivering high volumes of data and queued by a
variety of other integrated sensors, is essential. That seems
to make sense, but true persistence in analytical tools that
help analysts find the key pieces of information has been
elusive. I hope each of our witnesses will address the issue of
persistent surveillance, how we achieve it, and how we
recognize the important nuggets of information quickly when
that information is collected so that we can react quickly,
with confidence. Such an integrated system is clearly the first
line of defense, not only in winning future battles, but in
stopping threats to our homeland and our national security
interests before they fully materialize.
I will be brief, as it is more important that we proceed on
to the testimony of Secretary Cambone and our military
intelligence chiefs. I look forward to hearing your testimony
on the performance of our intelligence system in supporting our
warfighters. I also am anxious to hear how much each of you
anticipates working better together to ensure we have a well-
integrated, coordinated effort. I am also most interested in
your view of the future. What do we need to be prepared for?
What gaps or challenges may be anticipated? What can we,
Congress, do to help?
As we consider the fiscal year 2005 budget request, we must
be mindful of the critical role intelligence plays in our
current and future military operations, and how timely
connected our intelligence assets and weapons have become. This
is clearly the future of warfare, and we must ensure that our
defense intelligence capabilities and the larger Intelligence
Community continue to be the best in the world.
Again, I welcome our witnesses, and thank you for your
service.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you----
Senator Allard. Oh, wrong Nelson. Let me catch Senator Bill
Nelson, from Florida, and then, Senator Ben Nelson, we'll give
you an opportunity to make your comments.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you like me to defer?
Senator Ben Nelson. No, no, no, I defer to you. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. We could go back and talk about some
of our rivalries between the University of Nebraska and the
University of Florida if you'd like.
Senator Ben Nelson. That was before we gave up football for
a while.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's correct. [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

Senator Bill Nelson. Anyone who has worn the uniform of
this country knows the very difficult situation that we are
facing on this very day, especially where there is an
indigenous population that is starting to rise up. So, in the
course of this hearing, we want to find out more how we can
help those very brave men and women who are out there carrying
on the fight.
This hearing is going to give us an opportunity to focus on
how we collect data about the enemy and the environment, and
how we turn that data into information, and then how we get
that information to the right people at the right time.
In the past, some have talked about sensor-to-shooter
integration, or such concepts as ``dominant battlefield
awareness,'' while others have been espousing a concept called
``horizontal integration.'' Whatever the words are, it's clear
that we have to be able to fight smarter, not just on future
battlefields, but on this present battlefield, given our
reduced force structure and our desire to minimize casualties.
So the programs and systems that we will be discussing in this
subcommittee hearing are the foundation upon which any such
concept will have to be based. What we don't cover here in the
open session, I'm looking forward to getting into, and no
mumbo-jumbo, when we get into the closed session.
Thank you.
Senator Allard. Senator Ben Nelson, from Nebraska.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing today.
I don't think we could overstate the importance of how we wed
together the civilian and military leadership responsibility
for collecting and disseminating intelligence within the
operational and intelligence communities.
I want to thank each of you, gentlemen, for being here
today, both for your dedication and for your efforts to be able
to provide the kind of coordination that's going to be
essential in the days ahead.
Last week, Admiral Ellis, Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), testified that the DOD needs to enhance
its ISR capabilities to better locate hidden targets, which
could be camouflaged or protected by robust air defenses. He
went on to describe the challenges that they face between the
operational world and the various elements that contribute so
effectively to intelligence collection, and how they bring
those together in a collaborative way, particularly as the next
generation of ISR platforms begin to be more rigorously defined
technically to include space-based radars (SBRs) and the like.
A concern that we have all had relating to intelligence and
the lack of intelligence capabilities in the past is a matter
of public record, of politics, and, I think, of public policy,
as well. I am hopeful that today, as we look at what we can do
operationally, that our focus will be on the technical side,
that it will be on the side of enhancing our capabilities to
deal with information on the ground, information that can be
human intelligence (HUMINT), as well as technical in nature.
Clearly, with what's going on in Iraq today, there are
those who could suggest that perhaps our intelligence breakdown
did not prepare us for the potential violence that we're
dealing with today. Intelligence can help us only so far. But
we have to continue to increase it, because I do believe that
many of the challenges that we've encountered could have been
avoided. But, more importantly, there are challenges ahead that
I think we do need to avoid, and we're looking at you as to how
this could come about. Clearly, the ball is in your court to be
able to tell us what's going on, and to tell us what will be
going on, to enhance our collaboration and use of intelligence.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to your
testimony.
Senator Allard. I'll now call on the Honorable Steven A.
Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Dr. Cambone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. I do appreciate the opportunity to come here 13
months, almost to the day, since the Senate confirmed my
appointment, and to first give you an idea of what we have been
doing over those 13 months as they relate to some of the issues
raised in the opening statements, then take a minute to talk
about some work being done with the combatant commanders to
improve their capabilities, and then to give you a bit of
insight into some of our thinking about how defense
intelligence overall may evolve in the coming months and years
to meet the changing environment in which we live.
So, if I may, please. A year ago I told this committee and
others that there were three major issues that we needed to
address. One was to ``take stock,'' as we called it, of the
title 10 capabilities and responsibilities of our service
intelligence organizations. The gentlemen who are with me here
today worked very closely with my staff, and have put together
a fairly substantial brief, which, Mr. Chairman, I would offer
to you and your staff as a summary of the work that was done on
those responsibilities and capabilities. The bottom line of
that effort was to say that we needed, collectively, to pay
more attention to both our people and to the changing
operational environment in which the Intelligence Community is
going to have to work.
The second effort that we undertook was to review our
HUMINT capability within the DOD, and let me leave that as a
heading, for the moment, and return to it in a few minutes.
Likewise, I would like to return to the third heading,
which was the support that we could give to our combatant
commanders. By that, I mean we, early, concluded that the
relationship between intelligence and operations was growing
closer, so close, in fact, that it was beginning to become
increasingly difficult to separate the two; and, therefore,
we've had to change the way in which we thought about our
support to our combatant commanders. I'll say a few more words
about that in a few moments.
One of the first things we did, however, was sit down to
review the basis of the work that is done in the DOD on
intelligence. A first cut through the many directives and
instructions that exist within the DOD to guide our work turned
up 30 main directives that affect the work of the Intelligence
Community within the DOD. Some of them date back to the 1970s,
a good number of them are from the 1980s, and the balance from
the 1990s. We are in the process of trying to reconcile those
directives, and update them in light of the changing
environment.
The second thing I did was ask my people to collect a list
of the committees, boards, working groups, and other types of
organizations within the DOD that claim to have some
responsibility for intelligence or for the supporting
capabilities, like communications. At last count, that list is
14 pages long, which tells you something about the need to
clean up our internal processes to assure that we have more
people who are capable of saying yes to initiatives and being
able to move more quickly, and fewer people who can say no,
which is essentially what 14 pages of boards, committees, and
working groups amount to.
We have undertaken an effort to establish, finally, the
Defense Career Intelligence Personnel System program. That is a
defense intelligence personnel system that is designed to give
those people who are working in defense intelligence a proper
personnel system for their career development. We have, in the
past year, taken and made the implementation decision necessary
to bring that program forward.
Second, we are in the latest stages of transferring our
Defense Security Service (DSS) and background investigation
capabilities over to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
which should, we hope, speed up the process by which clearances
are granted and adjudications take place.
Third, we have undertaken a review of the Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) for the National Security Agency
(NSA). We hold our first meeting tomorrow to review the status
of the major programs within NSA, and our desire and hope is
that we will review those programs, take whatever corrective
actions are appropriate, along with the Director of NSA, and
then return here to Congress to see if we cannot persuade you
that the proper changes have taken place and that that MDA
should be returned to the Director of NSA.
Fourth, in the area of information sharing--this issue was
raised or touched on in the opening statements between and
among members of the Intelligence Community, between that
community and the operating forces of the United States Armed
Forces, and between and among those two entities and our
Coalition partners, is a subject of a great deal of work and
effort at the moment. There are a number of circumstances
which, if they did not occur in the context of ongoing military
operations, would be humorous in the way in which information
flows seem to be interrupted and not made as easy as they
should be. So we have taken on the task of making certain that
that information can flow much more smoothly and much more
rapidly in the community and between the community and the
operating forces.
Related to that--and, Senator Nelson, you touched on it--
horizontal integration has been a major effort of my office. We
have been teamed with the Director of Central Intelligence's
(DCI) staff and his Community Management Staff (CMS) in an
effort to bring the notion of being able to move information
easily between and among the users, and getting the information
to the user in a format that is best suited to their needs. We
have been working quite diligently, and I will tell you--and,
Senator, without any prevarication--we haven't gotten to the
bottom of it yet. It is a difficult subject. We know how to do
it technically. What we haven't figured out how to do yet is to
do it in a way that the information can be--we can have
assurance that the information will be protected both in its
transit across the networks, and that the user will have the
appropriate means for protecting the information they receive.
That is a very difficult problem. It crosses the ``boundary,''
if you will, between the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the
DCI and their relative responsibilities for that information.
We're working hard, and I am hopeful that we are going to come
to a conclusion with respect to that capability.
Sixth, mentioned in the opening statements, was persistent
surveillance. We have put an enormous amount of effort into
persistent surveillance. If I may just take a moment here, this
subject is most frequently associated with platforms in space,
and particularly with the space-based radar. I will be the
first to say that such a system would go a long way toward
helping us to provide the kind of persistence that I believe we
are going to need in the future. But space systems and the
space-based radar are not the definition of that capability. It
needs to be integrated with those assets that fly, those that
are on the ground, and, indeed, with our HUMINT capabilities.
Together, they form a complex of collection capability which
can yield the kind of persistence we will require across the
wide range of activity in which we are going to be engaged.
Indeed, the information collected is useless without having a
basis for moving that information--hence, the emphasis on
horizontal integration; and, second, having an analytic cadre
that is capable of analyzing that data and extracting knowledge
from it.
Therefore, if I may move on to the last point I wanted to
raise here, the SECDEF and the DCI have proposed to Congress a
substantial increase in the intelligence budgets for the next 5
or 6 years. We can discuss those in the closed session, if you
wish. But I want to underscore here that a great deal of that
increased funding is aimed at improving the analytic capability
of the community, both the defense side of the community as
well as the national side.
So where are we now? If those are some of the major
initiatives and some of the things we've touched on the last
year, where are we?
I mentioned a few moments ago that we had begun to look at
our intelligence support to the combatant commanders. We
undertook a major effort to support the transition from V Corps
to the III Corps in Iraq, and the stand-up of the Combined
Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). We continue to be actively engaged
with General Sanchez and General Fast, who is the J-2, in
assisting in the development of the intelligence architecture
there, in providing counterintelligence support, in assisting
the Army and others with the transition, particularly their
tactical HUMINT teams, and the like. General Alexander, who is
here with me today, can give you a great deal of information on
that effort.
But I would say that from General Abizaid's point of view,
he has told me that the effort to improve capabilities within
Iraq, at the operational and tactical level, has been so
successful that he has asked us to undertake a similar effort
with his architecture in Afghanistan, and we have people
engaged in that today.
In addition, with respect to support to the combatant
commanders, we have introduced a new concept, which we are
calling ``intelligence campaign planning.'' For those of you
who are familiar with the way in which the military plans,
there is a notion of starting in a pre-conflict environment,
moving into a crisis, into combat operations, and, from there,
into post-combat operations. You can look at any plan that's
been laid down, and you will see the threads that run through
those phases of operations that affect logistics, supply, and
the like. We have come to the conclusion that we have to have a
thread for intelligence support, and that we have to have a
notion of how intelligence is going to be applied, how it will
be effective in not just closing the ``kill chain,'' but in
actually helping the combatant commander to understand what
effects he is having on his adversary, on their attitudes prior
to a conflict, their attitudes during the crisis, how they are
reacting to the combat maneuvers of the combatant commander,
and, indeed, what is to be expected in a post-hostilities
environment.
This notion of intelligence campaign planning is getting
legs. General LaPorte, the commander in Korea, has a pilot
program underway to see how we can lay in an intelligence
campaign plan for his deliberate plan for the defense of South
Korea.
Special Operations Command, Commander General Brown, has
taken elements of the idea and has begun to think of ways that
he may apply it.
Admiral Giambastiani, who is the combatant commander for
Joint Forces Command, has undertaken, with my office, an effort
to develop, essentially, a joint-intelligence doctrine, a
doctrine for the use of intelligence in the coming environment.
We believe that that will be an enormously important
development in support not just of an intelligence campaign
plan, but campaign planning overall.
We have made significant strides in the area of ISR by
giving to the USSTRATCOM Commander, Admiral Ellis, who was
mentioned here this morning, the mission of supporting, on a
global basis, the management of our ISR assets and providing
the kind of combatant-commander advice that is essential to the
proper use of what is, in fact, a weapons system. ISR platforms
and the associated command-and-control and the individuals who
make it up are a weapons system, and we should not forget that.
We have, as I say, given to a combatant commander the
responsibility for managing that weapons system on a global
basis.
Lastly, Special Operations Command (SOF) has been
designated by the SECDEF as a supported commander for the
purposes of planning global operations in the war on terror,
and that implies a level of intelligence support, which, when
we go into closed session, I'm sure General Wurster would be
more than happy to outline for you.
I said that we had looked at HUMINT reform, and we are in
the process of bringing together our thoughts on that subject.
But as we looked at it, we concluded that the problems, such as
they are within our defense community, are but a part of a
larger mosaic of defense intelligence as a whole, and so we
have pulled together a number of proposals, which, I must tell
you, we have yet to brief to the Secretary or to the DCI. So we
are very much in the early stages.
But I would like to touch on two or three things which have
emerged from our work, and that is that, first, I mentioned the
spectrum of activity in which a combatant commander is
engaged--pre-crisis and conflict, into the operational phase,
and then into the post-operations environment. If one sat down
and said, ``In each of those phases of activity, what are the
kinds of intelligence support requirements that are needed,''
you would make a fairly long list, but it would be a fairly
orderly list. I think what you'd discover is that the elements
of defense intelligence are all necessary to be brought to bear
in order to provide the intelligence needed.
What are those elements? They include HUMINT, which we have
just talked about, measurements and signals intelligence
(MASINT), counterintelligence, a very healthy analytic
capability, as well as the integration of technical collection
data, and, often forgotten, the role for the defense attaches,
who play a very important role in their respective countries in
supporting the overt-collection of information which is useful
for intelligence purposes.
What we concluded is that we have to find a way to take
those various disciplines and roll them into an integrated
capability, such that they are a more operationally capable
element at the disposal both of the SECDEF and of the combatant
commanders. We think if we move in that direction, which is
toward a more operational focus, we're going to require, in the
end, different organizational structures within the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Proposals are being drawn up for
such changes.
We are going to have to sharpen the relationship with the
combat support agencies--NSA and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), in particular--and we are going to
have to give to them a much better definition of the needs of
our operating forces for intelligence, in terms of the quantity
and the quality, as well as the timeliness of that information.
We are clearly going to have to have an enhanced
relationship with the service providers, because let's not
forget that the majority of the defense intelligence capability
resides not in the DIA, but in the Services that you see
represented here. So we're going to have to be certain that we
establish the kind of relationships with the Services that will
permit them to provide the expertise that's going to be needed
in the defense intelligence community.
We're going to have to give a much more precise definition
of what our defense intelligence support requirements are going
to be relative to foreign intelligence. Here let me just make a
distinction for the moment. A dysfunction is often made between
national and military intelligence which I think is not quite
the right distinction. I think the distinction is between
military intelligence that is needed for the operating forces
that plan and execute, over against the foreign intelligence
which is the context in which those forces will operate.
Foreign intelligence is clearly the purview of the DCI, and we
have, I would argue, been remiss in the DOD in not providing to
him and to his staff a much better definition of what our
foreign intelligence requirements are and may be in the coming
years. If we make the reforms internal to the DOD, we should be
able to provide a much better definition of those support
requirements.
Finally, if we're going to make the defense intelligence
capabilities more robust and more operationally focused, we
need to continue the dialogue that has been ongoing between the
DCI and the SECDEF on the question of how best to array those
assets, both over time and within the battle space where our
forces may be engaged.
So let me conclude here, then, sir. What I've just sketched
for you, we are getting ready to bring forward in the next few
weeks to our respective leadership. Once we've done that, we
will be able to come back to this committee and others to
describe the types of changes we think we may need to make.
We'd like to, at that point, consult with you and your staff on
some of the particular issues that may be of concern to you.
But, in the end, we are on a schedule to have these kinds of
reforms reflected in the fiscal year 2006 budget bill, which
will take place toward the end of the year.
Let me close with one other item of interest. This
committee has expressed a concern with what is called the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Council. That
council has met for the first time 2 weeks ago. It has laid out
an agenda of work for the coming weeks and months. It will be a
vehicle by which we get to some of the issues that have been
raised in the opening statements here this morning;
specifically, how is it that we begin to lash together the
various service capabilities so that we do, in fact, have a
joint capability? How do we take that joint capability and
better associate it with the national capabilities, and assure
the flow of information from the one community to the other?
Then, third, how do we look to what we need for the future? We
do need to have a much better description of the range of
capability that we will require, and to provide to you a sense
of how, in the end, we think we can fund that capability in the
coming years.
Mr. Chairman, that's a precis of the statement that I have
prepared for your subcommittee and for the record. I would ask
that that prepared statement be submitted for the record, sir,
and that of my colleagues. With that, I'm happy to take any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Cambone follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Stephen A. Cambone

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee for
inviting me here today. I appreciate the interest the subcommittee has
in the stand up of the USD(I), which occurred a little over a year ago.
I will briefly review the roles and missions of my office as well as
the DOD's goals in guiding the Defense Intelligence Community. I would
also like to provide you an overview of the tactical and operational
intelligence capabilities and requirements of the DOD, as well as how
the military intelligence capabilities of the DOD can best be
transformed to support combatant commanders and subordinate warfighting
commands. I would also like to briefly review some steps we are taking
to help determine future DOD intelligence requirements as well as what
we are doing to acquire these capabilities--which will be critical to
success against current and future threats. I will also provide some
comments on the role of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Integration Council as well as my assessment of the
performance of the DOD ISR system, including the supporting
communications architecture during recent military operations, the
degree of integration that has been achieved, the ability of this
system to support the peacetime and contingency requirements of all
combatant commanders, lessons learned at the tactical, operational and
strategic levels of intelligence support, and any significant changes
or reforms to DOD intelligence that I am implementing or considering.
Finally, I will discuss my Horizontal Integration efforts and how we
are working with the Director of Central Intelligence to move forward
in an area that will play an important role in enhancing how analysts
can more effectively manage information and find the critical knowledge
decisionmakers need.

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

We are facing a turbulent and volatile world. It is populated by a
number of highly adaptive adversaries including terrorist networks that
operate both within the confines of civil society and in ungoverned
areas. It is a world in which international political-military affairs
continue to evolve. As a result of these and other ongoing
developments, it is impossible to predict with confidence what nation
or entity could pose threats in 5, 10, or 20 years to the United States
or to our friends and allies. This places a heavy burden on
intelligence. Deterring, and if necessary confronting and defeating
future adversaries, some of whom may emerge only in the fullness of
time, will require detailed understanding of their goals, motivations,
history, networks, and relationships that is developed over a long
period of time and to a level of detail that is far deeper than we can
reach today.

DOD'S SIX CRITICAL GOALS

If the DOD's intelligence components are to successfully fulfill
their roles in the coming decades both as part of the Intelligence
Community (IC) and in their roles in support of the operations of the
joint force, we must modernize and transform that capability.
The SECDEF identified six critical operational goals in the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that provide the focus for the DOD's
overarching transformation efforts. They are:

(1) Protection of critical bases and defeating chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons;
(2) Projecting and sustaining forces in anti-access environments;
(3) Denying enemy sanctuary;
(4) Leveraging information technology;
(5) Assuring information systems and conducting information
operations; and
(6) Enhancing space capabilities.

Intelligence has a major contribution to make in meeting these
goals. Our intelligence capability is essential to military success. It
is a key enabler of how and when our power is applied. Intelligence
capabilities allow military commanders to prepare appropriately, and
when ordered by the President, to close rapidly with the adversary, to
swiftly defeat the enemy, and to support follow-on security and
stability operations.
In support of the DOD's goals and to guide us in the transformation
effort we have established the following goals:
Defense Intelligence Goals To Achieve Intelligence Transformation
(1) Know something of intelligence value about everything of
interest to us, all the time: Current collection capabilities
predominantly reflect a Cold War-era reconnaissance paradigm--one of
periodic looks and sampling. Persistent surveillance (the ability to
monitor, track, characterize, report and update at short intervals on
specific activities at a fixed location, moving objects such as trains,
convoys or military movements, as well as changes occurring to the
surface of the earth) is essential for planners, operators, and policy
makers. We need to evaluate existing and proposed intelligence programs
e.g., technical collection, HUMINT, etc. in light of the goal of
persistent surveillance. We need to seek out and develop long-dwell
sensors and pursue other emerging technology breakthroughs in sensor or
platform capability. We must also develop technology to permit rapid
data exploitation by users who need it most urgently. The combination
of these improvements will enable us to achieve the goal of persistent
surveillance.
(2) Develop reliable strategic warning: Competence in strategic
warning across the full spectrum of potential threats is critical to
support the full range of political, economic, and military tools that
we have. For DOD in particular, strategic warning is essential to
provide the time needed to re-fashion our forces and adjust their
posture in a timely, efficient, and effective way to dissuade
adversaries, deter foes and, when necessary, defeat enemies. The effort
is complicated by the reality that the warning we seek in the future is
likely to be against threats that we may not be able to imagine today.
Averting crises is nearly always preferable to managing them.
(3) Pursue agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis
capability: Our intelligence capability needs to be less dependent on
Kepler's Laws, Bernoulli effects (that is, satellites and aircraft in
fixed orbits), and linear processes (like Tasking, Processing,
Exploitation and Dissemination) (TPED)), and more prepared to respond
to surprise. We need to expect the unexpected. The tremendous amount of
information available to collectors and analysts requires a
horizontally-integrated, network-centric environment less constrained
by bandwidth limitations. Today's transforming military and
intelligence environment demands rapid conversion of data to
information and information into actionable knowledge. Interoperability
at the data level, through the use of common standards and content
tagging, will further the horizontal integration of information from
all sources--not just intelligence--at all levels of classification.
The net result will be a more efficient use of our collection assets
and a more effective synergistic use of our intelligence analysts.
(4) Provide an intelligence capability that supports a national
strategy of forward deterrence and agility: Deterring future
adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals,
motivations, history, networks, relationships, and all the dimensions
of human political behavior, on a scale that is broader and deeper than
today's. This requires a regeneration of our HUMINT and close access
capabilities and an overhaul of our analytic processes and culture. An
``intelligence reachback'' capability is needed to permit deployment of
platforms/sensors/shooters to forward operational areas without the
need to deploy analytic cells and infrastructure into theater.
Reachback communications from our intelligence platforms can make this
collected intelligence data readily available to our military forces
and to the Intelligence Community through shared communications and
archives. It is now DOD policy that the national intelligence agencies
and service intelligence centers have broad access to collected theater
intelligence data along with the authority to store and distribute.
This will facilitate the horizontal integration of ISR information
making the analytical power available to assist where needed without
extended lead times and delays.
(5) Ensure military forces receive intelligence in a fashion and in
a format that enables them to swiftly defeat an adversary: We need
intelligence that enables us to act quickly, secretly, and
effectively--intelligence that enables us to anticipate our adversary's
actions and anticipate the needs of our commanders and warfighters. We
then need to provide predictive intelligence that stays ahead of the
battle. This implies continuous preparation of the battle space,
whether it is on the surface, under the seas, in the air, in space, or
in cyber-space. This includes having policies and procedures to deliver
nearly instantaneously critical data from sensitive sources directly to
the warfighter so that prompt action can be taken based on that data.
Intelligence support must extend to the post-conflict, security and
stabilization phase of a campaign as well.
(6) Ensure knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise our secrets:
This will require obtaining robust capabilities to acquire an
adversary's secrets in ways that cannot be comprehended, even as we
ensure that our own capabilities are not vulnerable. Traditionally,
this goal has been met through defensive measures. In the world of
today and tomorrow that will not be enough. An active offensive
counterintelligence effort is needed to complement defensive measures.
To protect our plans, critical infrastructure, and research technology
while at the same time countering espionage, we will need to learn of
an adversary's intent and capability in advance and take measures to
deny and disrupt those efforts. An offensive posture will require
investment in intelligence capabilities that allow us to gather
exquisite knowledge of the adversary, but without his knowledge, that
is integrated with and validated by sensitive HUMINT sources, and
explained by trained analysts.
In order to support the needs of both the policymakers and the
warfighters, the Office of USD(I) continues to evaluate Defense
intelligence plans and programs and to make resource decisions relative
to the six primary Defense Intelligence goals as well as lessons
learned from recent operations. The Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (OUSDI) coordinates with the DCI's Community Management Staff
(CMS) to ensure continuity and consistency across the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program
(JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
programs.

ISR Organizational Transformation
ISR organization and doctrine--whether in support of political or
military leaders--has not been systematically revised for two
generations. ISR activities are burdened by legacy policies and stove-
piped activities that are de-conflicted, but not integrated either
within DOD or between DOD and the IC. We are taking measures to create
a modern ISR capability.

Unified Command Plan Change--Global ISR
The organizational transformation of our ISR forces is already
underway. The means by which ISR information was produced and used in
Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is just the
beginning of what will eventually become a transformational
intelligence capability. Cooperation among defense and non-defense
agencies was outstanding during these conflicts and resulted in a
number of innovative applications of intelligence. Fused analysis of
data provided by differing disciplines produced new kinds of
information. Close integration of intelligence and operations was the
norm, to the point where the two were sometimes indistinguishable.
Speed with which critical information was supplied to both analysts and
warfighters made the difference in a number of critical situations. New
tactics, techniques, and procedures for collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating intelligence made contributions to the successful
completion of those campaigns. We must codify these lessons by updating
how our ISR forces are organized and fight.
USSTRATCOM, in addition to its Global Strike responsibilities, has
been assigned responsibility for global ISR. This is in keeping with
our continuing effort to make intelligence and operations integral to
each other and capable of performing within the timelines of the
commander's decisionmaking cycle. We know that if intelligence lags
behind operational and command decisionmaking windows it is not
actionable. Just as a maneuver formation on the ground, at sea or in
the air is a warfighting system, so is intelligence. By making ISR the
responsibility of a functional combatant commander we gain synergy and
perspective among warfighting systems.
In addition to the assignment of the global ISR the mission to
USSTRATCOM, I have issued guidance for all theater-collected airborne,
shipboard, and ground intelligence data to be posted for discovery and
access across the Global Information Grid in a timely manner. The
chairman's staff is converting this guidance to an instruction. I
believe this is the first time such direction has been given. Not only
does it permit access to the data at all levels within a command and
between commands, it also opens the way for sharing this data with the
larger IC, which I believe is a first as well.
We are also working closely with USSTRATCOM, the DCI's CMS, the
Combat Support Agencies (CSA) and the Joint Staff on proposals to
operationalize our coordination between and among organizations to
maximize the return on DOD and IC collection.

ISR Integration Council
The ISR Integration Council, under my direction, will be the
vehicle the Department uses to connect Defense ISR programs and the
Global ISR applications and capabilities being administered by
USSTRATCOM. The objective of the ISR Integration Council will be to
oversee DOD's fundamental goals in achieving an integrated ISR
capability. It will provide leadership for ISR capability
transformation, overseeing development of an investment strategy for
achieving integration of DOD's ISR capabilities that ensures effective
sustainment of needed tactical and operational efforts and efficient
acquisition of transformational ISR capabilities. The ISR Council's
strategy will allow rationalization of ISR investments focusing on
identification of critical ISR integration issues, materiel and non-
materiel. It will enable synchronization of Service and Agency
programs, resulting in better integration of investment across the full
spectrum of ISR systems--operated by the Services and the CSAs.
To guide the Council in its deliberations and to institutionalize
its products, we are developing an ISR Integration Roadmap. This
roadmap will be a broad document that provides guidelines for future
capabilities, articulates the DOD's fundamental ISR goals, establishes
the boundaries of the trade spaces within which the DOD's ISR
investment strategy will be built, and identifies the options for
funding. It will span the entire range of Defense ISR, including space,
air, maritime and ground systems, as well as HUMINT and emerging
disciplines. The roadmap will also address key external issues/systems
that impact Defense intelligence, such as the Transformational
Communications Architecture, to enable an understanding of how issues
in those foundational capabilities will affect the ability of Defense
ISR to transform.

ISR Investment Transformation
The DOD is strengthening our intelligence capabilities by
transforming our ISR processes, procedures, and systems. We must
transform if we are to succeed in protecting our homeland and in
achieving and ensuring peace abroad. The DOD is currently engaged in
transformational ISR investments to bolster integrated ISR
capabilities. Investments made in collection systems a generation ago
are being re-evaluated. Known adversaries, arrayed in large formations,
operating in known locations, have given way to a new combination of
potential threats who focus their efforts on denying us use of those
capabilities we rely upon most.

ISR Communications Network Investment
ISR collection must be coupled to a process that allows the data
collected to be accessed by the user--the analyst or the military
operator. Toward this end, beginning in fiscal year 2003 substantial
investment has been made in laser satellite communications, the
expansion of the Global Information Grid, the creation of a Distributed
Common Ground System (DCGS), and joint command and control systems.
These, in turn, are being fashioned into a networked operating
environment both the Defense and IC share. As this capability comes on
line, the need for ``direct downlinks'' (and the bandwidth that it
consumes in theater) will decline as ``reachback,'' both on and through
the intelligence network, takes hold.

ISR Interoperability Investment
The DOD continues to increase real-time networking of ISR systems,
improve access to ISR information by weapons platforms, and increase
interoperability among ISR systems, allowing seamless integration of
collected sensor data into the joint and national environment. The DCGS
is the DOD's overarching family of interconnected systems for posting,
processing, exploiting, and updating ISR information. Many ISR assets
are already an element of, or have a major interface with, the DCGS.
DCGS is also the DOD's ``hub'' to effectively implement the information
sharing relationships between the warfighters, the Service intelligence
analysts, and the various intelligence agencies.
A key feature of DCGS is that it's constructed in such a way that
the data is separated from the Service applications used to employ the
data. Each Service--or by extension agency or command--can at its
discretion or by direction of higher authority employ the same
applications. This is especially important in a joint operating
environment. But, for other Service, agency or command-specific
activity, the users are free to assemble and present the data in a
manner most appropriate to its need. In other words, we have avoided
``one size fits all'' in favor of the ability to create a user defined
operating picture on demand.
Another important feature of DCGS is the potential to support
integrated mission management by allowing all available data to be
accessed by any interested user. This could reduce the overall demand
for ISR collection assets by eliminating unnecessary duplication of
effort and maximizing the processing of the total collected data.

ISR Platform and Sensor Investment
The DOD's ISR ground, naval, and airborne platforms have been
heavily employed since the start of the global war on terrorism. These
systems provided a significant portion of the theater and tactical
intelligence information during OIF and continuing operations in
Afghanistan, enabling rapid precision strikes and an unprecedented
speed of advance by our ground forces. These ISR platforms remain the
primary ``eyes and ears'' of our deployed forces. This administration
has strongly supported programmed budgets and supplemental requests
that have funded numerous improvements to ISR systems to enhance our
existing capabilities.
Among the investments made in newer platforms or sensors, DOD is
fielding high endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) (e.g., Air
Force's Predator and Global Hawk) and smaller tactical UAVs (to include
Army's SHADOW 200), providing flexibility and adaptability to meet the
immediate needs of battlefield commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
DOD continues to invest in other UAV programs like the Navy's Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) tactical UAV (VTUAV). The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System
(JUCAS), conceived as a combat aircraft, may prove to have ISR
potential as well.
The Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) is a project now wholly within the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP) for fiscal year 2005,
realigned from TIARA and the JMIP's DCP and consolidated within DARP.
ACS is an Army-led, joint airborne ISR system that will meet both Army
and Navy requirements. ACS will provide commanders with tailored,
multi-sensor intelligence using four to six onboard operators. The
robust ACS Multi-sensor capabilities include communication intelligence
(COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT)
and MASINT sensors, incorporating electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR),
synthetic aperture radar (SAR), Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI),
and multi- and hyper-spectral imagery sensors. For the Army, ACS
replaces the aging RC-12 Guardrail Common Sensor and the RC-7 Airborne
Reconnaissance Low fleets beginning in fiscal year 2009, while the Navy
will replace their EP-3E Aries II aircraft with ACS beginning in fiscal
year 2012.
Prominent among new investments to realize the intelligence goal of
persistent surveillance is the SBR. The fiscal year 2004 SBR
appropriation was $198 million and the fiscal year 2005 request is $438
million, spread across three TIARA and JMIP budget lines. The fiscal
year 2005 request is critical for the concept development activities we
are pursuing under the SBR acquisition strategy. The surveillance
provided by a space-based radar, in combination with other
complementary space and airborne systems, could bring us much closer to
realizing persistent surveillance. SBR plays to an established area of
U.S. technological advantage with its all weather, day/night, and
worldwide multi-theater access. SBR capabilities will include:

Surface moving target indication
High Resolution SAR imagery
High Resolution Terrain information

Among the products envisioned from using these SBR capabilities
are:

Maneuver Doctrine
Relocatable Entity Tracking
Treaty Monitoring/Verification
Coherent change detection (CCD)
Dynamic Imaging

HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION

These new ISR capabilities will be enabled by an overarching
Horizontal Integration (HI) strategy that compels an integrated
approach to acquiring and applying collection assets--a planned
``system-of-systems'' that integrates surveillance capabilities across
the various human and technical intelligence disciplines and national,
theater, tactical, and commercial programs. This provides the mechanism
to share information across the enterprise--increasing the likelihood
that events can be correlated and fused to increase the accuracy,
timeliness and value of intelligence.
OUSD(I) is working closely with the IC to achieve the horizontal
integration of currently fielded and future DOD and IC intelligence
systems. The aim of HI is to take full advantage of future intelligence
systems that provide agile and persistent collectors, enable ease of
information sharing, and support predictive analysis to deal with a
strategic environment characterized by adaptable adversaries,
accelerated technology diffusion, and the increasing potential for
disruptive and destructive attacks.
Pursuit of HI was a key recommendation of the Kerr Panel report on
remote sensing in 2001 and it was the primary recommendation from the
July 2003 Transformational Space and Airborne Project (TSAP) report
sponsored by DOD and the IC. The TSAP study found that near term
improvements in intelligence capabilities could best be realized by
focusing on HI and recommended immediate implementation of initial
policy, management, and organizational improvements.
In August 2003, a Senior Steering Group for HI was formed to guide
the implementation of these key capabilities across DOD, the IC, and
law enforcement. This steering group is co-chaired by the Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence and myself.
Among the principles guiding our approach to HI:

It places emphasis on the tailored mission needs of
consumers;
It shifts the focus from data ownership to data
usability; and
Accordingly, it urges that all data must meet net-
centric standards at its earliest point of consumability and be
broadly available.

Quite honestly, we have not yet worked out between DOD and the IC
the many thorny issues that need to be resolved to realize the promise
of HI. However, I do believe that the vision of a seamless and
transparent capability to translate analysts' needs into the collection
of information, and the availability of that information in a timely
fashion to be structured in useful formats to those who need it, will
come in its own time. The advance of the Internet, with the adoption of
its features both within Defense and the IC, suggest to me that this
time is not far off.

Intelligence Campaign Plans
As we develop integrated approaches to acquiring and applying
collection assets, we must also develop integrated approaches for
planning and conducting intelligence operations. We have begun
exploring the concept of Intelligence Campaign Planning, which is
designed to synchronize and integrate intelligence into the commander's
adaptive planning process and, when fully developed, will bring
together DOD and IC capabilities in a more synergistic effort.
Intelligence Campaign Plans are designed to focus the IC's capabilities
on the commander's critical decision requirements. Under the old
paradigm, intelligence developed stove-piped plans that were poorly
coordinated. Recent lessons learned and new operational concepts
require intelligence plans that are fully integrated, multi-discipline,
holistic and support all phases of operations.
To that end we have asked the Commander, Joint Forces Command, to
begin the concept development process, focusing initially on three
elements of Intelligence Campaign Planning: defining and developing the
concept, creating a comprehensive methodology for use by the DOD IC,
and designing an exercise venue for validating the concept and
methodology.
To fully realize the promise of robust Intelligence Campaign
Planning, we have begun an intensive, long-term strategy for remodeling
defense intelligence in order to address several of our major
objectives. This remodeling effort focuses on ``operationalizing
intelligence,'' transforming the functions and capabilities of Defense
intelligence into more than simply a supporting arm of the DOD, but
rather into a true joint operational capability. We are examining
organizational approaches that could provide senior DOD leaders and
military commanders a wide array of intelligence options against mobile
and adaptive adversaries. Those organizational approaches are being
evaluated for their contributions.

Human Intelligence Revitalization
HUMINT is one of our top priorities in the defense intelligence
remodeling effort. HUMINT in the DOD context is much more than
clandestine recruitment of assets. It includes clandestine logistics,
overt debriefers, and interrogators, as well as the hundreds of
Tactical HUMINT Teams we have deployed in the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). We have taken steps to
provide better management and oversight of HUMINT resources by
establishing a new JMIP Program, the Defense Human Intelligence Program
to give us better management and oversight of HUMINT resources.
Finally, we are studying a number of inputs gathered from combatant
commands and the Services, including lessons learned from both
Afghanistan and Iraq, regarding their clandestine and overt HUMINT
needs.

REMODELING DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Proposed plans and initiatives for Defense intelligence
transformation are the culmination of almost 10 months of work. We
began with a multi-service, interagency study titled `Taking Stock of
Defense Intelligence,'' which we have offered to your staff. Our
efforts to remodel defense intelligence are a work in progress, but we
are moving toward implementation, while consulting across the defense
IC, the national IC, and supported warfighters as we move forward. In
the coming months, I look forward to sharing with you the progress we
are making and refinements in our plans as we pursue this goal.

CONCLUSION

Our Nation possesses a preeminent advantage: A global intelligence
capability composed of the very best people and the finest technology
anywhere. Military capability, guided and enabled by intelligence, is a
powerful instrument. The DOD--along with its IC colleagues--are
reshaping and revitalizing intelligence capabilities to meet the more
rigorous demands of today and tomorrow. I look forward to the
opportunity to work with you to improve the Nation's intelligence
capabilities in this time of war. Again, thank you for your support. I
look forward to your questions.

Senator Allard. We will put your full statement and each
one of your colleagues' in the record. I would ask that the
rest of the panelists, in their testimony, try and limit their
comments to around 3 minutes or so, so we have plenty of time
for questions from the members of the subcommittee. Just
remember that we're going to have your full statement in the
record, and will have an opportunity to go through it in
detail.
Also, Secretary Cambone, I'd just remind you that we'll be
going through with the defense authorization bill here
relatively quickly, and so if you have suggestions that you're
going to submit to this subcommittee and to the Armed Services
Committee, we need to be getting those quickly. Perhaps before
you even complete your process, give us some heads-up of what
you're thinking so that perhaps we can begin to get our staffs
working on some of those issues.
Let me next go ahead and call on General Alexander, Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of Army.
General Alexander.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General Alexander. Sir, thanks for the opportunity to
appear here, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor to be here and to tell you about
what's going on in Army intelligence.
As I walk the halls and go out to each of our units, I'll
tell you that the spirit that we have in Army intelligence is
as high as it has ever been. With the operational tempo that we
have going on, I know this might sound strange to you, but that
is, in fact, what I see when I talk to our soldiers. The reason
it's high is because we have an opportunity to make changes
that both of you have addressed earlier on, and we see those
changes as required to get us into the future. That's what we
see in transformation, Army transformation, that it's needed to
get the intelligence that you both spoke of to all the soldiers
and the operators that we have in the field.
Now, I think there's two key points to make on this. First
of all, the Army leadership has backed actionable intelligence
as part of Army transformation fully. General Schoomaker, the
Vice, and the acting Secretary have been superb. I think
equally important is Dr. Cambone in the OUSDI has been superb
in providing us support and mediating between the agencies that
which the Services need, and that support has also been superb
and something that's needed in Army intelligence for as long as
I can remember.
In Army intelligence transformation, there's a few things
that I'd like to note, with a few vignettes. First, in our
transformation, a key point that you brought out, sir, is
changing the culture and mindset. When we talk about culture
and mindset, first and foremost, when we put a unit on the
battlefield, we have, in every soldier, a sensor. Getting that
information that that soldier has to the other soldiers and to
the operators out there is key. The second one is fighting for
knowledge, creating your own luck. Those culture and mindset
changes that we're trying to instill in the Army are important,
and can only happen when we start to make some of the other
changes that we've put in the paper that I've provided;
specifically, tying those sensors and soldiers to a network,
enabling that network and the analytic centers to work
together, and providing them access to the databases.
Let me give you some examples of how this has worked and
where we see it going in the future. In Kuwait, in 2002, we had
soldiers from 3rd Infantry Division working with soldiers from
our theater and national brigades doing all sorts of collection
on Iraqi border guards, their outposts, their actions, where
they were located, and how they operated. That information
allowed the 3rd Infantry Division intel soldiers to tell their
chain-of-command where these outposts were, what they were
doing, and how to target them. The outcome was zero casualties
for our folks and the takedown of every one of those outposts.
The lesson learned is, how do we as an Army use our soldiers,
tactical soldiers in national-level/theater-level operations,
to get them the skills and the training that they need? We're
going to do that in Army transformation under a program called
Foundry.
The 3rd Infantry Division went from Kuwait to Baghdad. One
of the tactical HUMINT teams picked up an air force general. An
Iraqi air force general. I wanted to make that clear.
[Laughter.]
This Iraqi air force general had on him a series of names--
key names, places, and events that were used by our forces to
pick up key Iraqis necessary in our campaign. I can give you
more in closed session on that. But the part that I wanted to
bring out was the tactical HUMINT team. When I went over there
and talked to every division commander, they said, ``We need
more tactical HUMINT. We need more unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV).'' Sir, part of Army transformation gives them both UAVs
and tactical HUMINT.
Another tactical HUMINT team ran into a few guys coming
down the road, they stopped him, opened up his trunk, and he
had a bunch of money and some other paraphernalia in there. He
claimed he was just an ordinary citizen traveling through Iraq.
This is during a firefight, and they were in civilian clothes.
Kind of strange. But they policed these up. More importantly,
the names of this individual and some of the other
paraphernalia were sent back to the analytic centers here in
the States. I think this shows you how our agencies are
starting to work together, because all of our national agencies
and our tactical analytic centers worked together. This guy was
taken to Kuwait and by the time they got there, they knew he
was a key Iraqi intel service general. They knew who he had
operated with and where he had been, and that's how they could
start their tactical questioning and interrogation. It was
extremely important in breaking out a series of raids
throughout Iraq later on in the next week.
The reason I bring that out is because, one, it shows you
how important tactical questioning, analysis, and interrogation
are to our folks. Two, it's how we're training them today. We
call it our intel support to combating terrorism. It's done at
Fort Huachuca, and it uses the lessons learned from Guantanamo
to our folks in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Also, the benefits for
tactical questioning, for those soldiers on the ground to know
how to ask the right questions of these guys, is being taught
to every one of our centers--in every one of our schools and
centers throughout the United States before soldiers deploy.
Another vignette that I would use, and I can give you the
highlights of this, really shows how powerful it is to bring
our analytic centers together, because what we've found was, in
capturing one of the key Zarqawi lieutenants is, using the
power of those analytic centers and the information they had,
they were able to identify, locate, and give the information to
one of the SOF units to take down one of the key Zarqawi
lieutenants. I'll tell you that that shows that we are making
headway in how we get the analytic centers to work together
with the national agencies and the tactical forces, what you
call, sir, horizontal integration or whatever it may be. I'll
tell you, sir, that we have made some great changes. That's
what we're trying to do in transformation.
In order to get that to work, we have put together, in
Korea, an operation called Project Morning Calm. In fact, that
is sponsored by the USDI. That project brings together
everything that I just talked about back to our elements here
in the States, and is a great test bed for how we can kick-
start some key things for intelligence, get that going, take
those lessons learned, and apply them to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Those lessons learned that we have in Korea and Iraq and
Afghanistan, we're moving amongst all three of those, and we
have a team that is doing those in each. I know that the Chief
of Staff of the Army has brought that up to you previously.
Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and
look forward to answering any of your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, USA

OPENING COMMENTS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Lieutenant
General Keith Alexander. Thank you for this opportunity to testify in
support of the JMIP and Army TIARA. I would like to personally thank
each of you for your support, which is vital to our soldiers fighting
the global war on terrorism on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
throughout the world. Your support is sincerely appreciated and is
critical as we continue to fight the war, rapidly adapt and transform
our current force and design the future force.
Army Intelligence is fully embedded within the aggressive Army
transformation plan which is moving from the current to future force .
. . now. Focused on fixing the current force while building towards the
future force, we are synchronized within the overarching Army plan,
ensuring that the intelligence capabilities and processes are fully
capable of supporting a joint and expeditionary quality force that will
be relevant and ready to fight our Nation's wars and defend our
homeland. As we continue to fight this war, improve and reset our
current force and transform while in contact, we remain intrinsically
synchronized with the DOD intelligence objectives. We are also working
closely with the other Services, the combatant commands, the combat
support agencies, the joint community and the USD,I to ensure we
develop an integrated and relevant IC. Within this written testimony, I
would like to briefly discuss the following areas:

Intelligence lessons learned from the global war on
terrorism
Army Operational and Tactical Intelligence support to
the war
Army Intelligence JMIP and TIARA program highlights
Army Intelligence Transformation--Actionable
Intelligence

BACKGROUND

Our Army, our Army Intelligence team, and our soldiers are fighting
and are doing a superb job not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also
throughout the entire world. By the end of this year, 9 of our 10
active Army Divisions--all but the 2nd Infantry Division committed in
Korea--will have seen action in Afghanistan or Iraq. More than 325,000
soldiers remain forward-deployed and stationed in 120 countries around
the globe supported by over 164,000 mobilized Reserve and National
Guard soldiers while 23,000 soldiers are directly supporting global war
on terrorism operations within the United States. Decisively engaged in
defending our homeland and fighting the global war on terrorism,
Intelligence soldiers are serving with distinction at home and abroad.
As of 12 March 2004, there were approximately 2,700 active component
and more than 1,000 Reserve component Intelligence soldiers mobilized
for active Federal service in support of Operation Noble Eagle, OEF,
OIF, and Joint Task Force, Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
We are making significant improvements within our current force,
fixing problems, adapting processes and systems and are giving our
commanders and soldiers the best possible support and systems
available, but we are not done--we still have a lot to do. We are
working through the institutional procedures and policy barriers that
have been in place since the Cold War. We intend to rapidly adapt
structures and procedures to develop and field the equipment our
soldiers need and deserve today, vice waiting years as we now do under
an archaic and lengthy acquisition process.
The Army is fighting a war while simultaneously rotating,
resetting, rethinking, rebalancing, restructuring, and designing a
future force; incorporating lessons learned while also spiraling
technology insertions into the current force. As we design and
incorporate technological solutions for the future intelligence force,
we are also pulling relevant technology to the left (spiral insertions)
into the current force. The INSCOM Information Dominance Center (IDC)
and Project Morning Calm are exceptional examples of how we are
accelerating transformation by operationally applying new analytic
tools and capabilities in support of Army and Joint Warfighters for
insertion or inclusion into our new systems, most specifically,
Distributed Common Ground System-Army and Joint (DCGS-A and DCGS-J).
We are moving from the current force to the future force . . . now:

to reflect wartime realities
to incorporate ``next generational'' capabilities
to keep soldiers first
to develop a Joint and Expeditionary Army

INTELLIGENCE LESSONS FROM THE WAR

Traditional intelligence methods and products served U.S. forces
well during the combat phase of OIF, although there was a notable
degradation of situational awareness for forces on the move because of
the lack of an adequate network and the inability to fuse all source
intelligence while on the move. During Phase IV (Post Combat
Operations), intelligence sensing requirements shifted dramatically to
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as the principal of the intelligence
disciplines rather than more technical collection means.
Following an on-the-ground assessment of the intelligence resources
and processes in Iraq, the Army G2 Staff worked with CJTF-7,
identifying long and short term solutions to improve intelligence for
OIF and to improve the current force. Short-term solutions are well
underway. Of the 127 actions initially noted, the majority are in place
today and new actions are being addressed as they are identified not
only in support of OIF, but OEF as well. These lessons are proving
critical as we concurrently develop an intelligence transformation to
the future force.
The intelligence related lessons learned are categorized in four
major areas:

(1) Tactical collection: Overall, analysis and sensing capabilities
were inadequate at maneuver brigade and battalion echelons. Since the
ability to strike at the enemy exceeded our ability to target them, we
needed more UAVs and other targeting sensors. Every Division Commander
stated that they needed both more UAVs and more Human Collection Teams
(HCTs). Limited capabilities to conduct tactical surveillance of the
enemy revealed the need for more SIGINT assets and more HUMINT
capabilities. We are addressing these priorities through our close work
with Task Force Modularity in redesigning the Army's new Maneuver Units
of Action (Brigades of today). We are ensuring there are sufficient
organic collection and analysis capabilities to meet the identified
requirements. Some upgrades already implemented include augmenting
units monitoring borders with existing sensors and further providing
leading-edge capabilities as they become available. We have also
installed special-purpose document exploitation suites (Harmony) to
facilitate Document Exploitation (DOCEX).
(2) Reporting: The information obtained from combat patrols,
logistics activities, and other non-Military Intelligence (MI) missions
was not adequately integrated into the intelligence system for
analysis. Information that soldiers reported was not in digital form
and therefore did not enter the reporting system quickly enough to be
of operational use. The small percentage of reports that actually
entered the intelligence system were manually transcribed and entered
the analytic network after the completion of the operation. To resolve
this issue, we must digitize all reporting at the point of origin and
connect the soldier and tactical echelons to the network. In the near
term, we are rapidly fielding Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below (FBCB2) to provide a reporting and intelligence exchange
capability at the soldier level. To link the soldier and tactical
echelons to the network we are rapidly creating and fielding DCGS
capability down to battalion level. We also must re-emphasize the
doctrinal aspects of tactical reporting. The Intelligence Center and
School has sent out a Mobile Training Team to address both this and
tactical questioning issues.
(3) Access to National Intelligence: We have made great strides in
information access, but we still have a way to go. Intelligence access
was, and still is, constrained by policies that restricted
dissemination and use, especially at the tactical level (division and
below). These policies complicated basic access to many databases,
limiting our ability to conduct all-source analysis. We are working
with DOD to eliminate classification dissemination caveats and grant
universal data access. Initiatives such as the IDC and Project Morning
Calm are assisting in accessing and providing access to various
databases and agencies. We are building Trojan Spirit (a classified
communications capability) into every Maneuver Unit of Action.
(4) Networking Analytic Centers: During the war, especially as
troops deployed forward, we had large volumes of message traffic, with
incredible amounts of information, but did poorly in extracting and
synchronizing relevant knowledge with our tactical forces. The
increased volume of intelligence at higher echelons could not be
processed, refined or fused for tactical or operational use on a timely
basis. We had good situational awareness across the force until our
units crossed the line of departure (LD) into combat. After crossing
the LD, the pace of the attack limited shared situational awareness and
resulted in a constant movement-to-contact operational environment.
This lack of shared situational understanding revealed the need for a
digital intel-on-the-move network capability supported by
communications-on-the-move at the lowest echelons. We also need to
evolve our doctrine such that analytic centers provide ``overwatch'' of
tactical formations 24/7.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

The soldier is our focus--every soldier is a sensor. We have over
120,000 soldiers--sensors--located on the battlefield in Iraq. The
soldier on the ground, patrolling and interacting within their
environment or battlespace, has constant access to immeasurable amounts
of data. Information is reported verbally at the lowest levels and a
small portion is later digitized into a database. In the end, the
majority of observations--reports by soldiers on the ground typically
do not make it into the reporting network. Further, we must continue to
develop training our soldiers as sensors or collectors of battlefield
information. They do not fully understand how to observe or sense their
environment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, since the soldier is
not connected to the network, he is not receiving the most current data
or information relevant to his battlespace or environment. We would not
send our pilots up without ensuring that they were digitally linked
with the best, most relevant, actionable intelligence available, such
as early warning radar. But, today, we send our soldiers into battle,
unlinked and without dedicated intelligence support.
Fight for Knowledge. The successful units at the tactical echelons
(company through brigade) within Iraq and Afghanistan have developed a
tactic we refer to as ``Fight for Knowledge.'' They are not waiting for
intelligence from higher to tell them where the enemy is. They are
utilizing combat patrols, interaction with the local populace, and any
other legitimate means at their disposal to acquire intelligence and
knowledge to enable operations (combat intelligence, when merged with
intelligence from higher, is a powerful force enabler). They are, in
essence, ``creating their own luck,''--``fight(ing) for knowledge.''
They are reinvigorating the existing, but often neglected concept of
Combat Intelligence. Prior to revitalizing this concept, unit
commanders would wait for intelligence to come from higher before
acting. In the type of war we are fighting now--over mountains, through
caves, house to house--our technical collection will not always provide
all the information required to enable action. (``Fight for Knowledge''
will become further enhanced when we digitally connect the soldier and
lower tactical echelons to the network.)
Tactical Overwatch. Currently, tactical units receive their
intelligence through an echeloned structure: from national, to theatre,
to corps, to division, and so on. This lockstep methodology is a
remnant of industrial-age, Cold War structures and procedures. Before
OIF, this process was marginally adequate when units were static or
garrisoned; however, the dissemination and reporting channels collapsed
when the units moved into battle in Iraq. This legacy process causes
information or intelligence latency. Latency that is caused by the
existing echeloned structure that requires information and intelligence
be sent step by step, through the various levels of command, which can
often take hours, if not days. The lower tactical echelons rarely
receive the intelligence in a timely manner, nor do they have direct
access to experts located at agencies in the United States or
elsewhere. This also impacts the ability for lower tactical echelons to
provide critical reports that are relevant to the higher agencies or
headquarters that need them. Our vision is to implement a new approach
to this concept, creating a dedicated structure to provide intelligence
or tactical overwatch, focusing higher level intelligence capabilities
in direct support to the tactical echelons. We have already started
this effort through support provided by the IDC and through initiatives
such as Project Morning Calm and The Pantheon Project.

Three initiatives have significantly contributed to the overwatch
concept over the last year and continue to contribute to the
overall establishment of an overwatch capability in the future.
The IDC is an operational, state of the art, analytic Intelligence
center. The IDC has been and continues to support the tactical forces
engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan through direct support to the JTF
Headquarters or through the IDC extensions located in direct support to
CJTF-7 and JTF-GTMO. The IDC has pioneered and is using processes and
methodologies for timely situational awareness and analysis of complex
networks of individuals and organizations that can be shared to the
extent that the network and/or policies allow. The IDC uses advanced
software tools and special data access agreements to extract, correlate
and capture the essence of vast amounts of information across many
databases. The IDC is the premier Army Intelligence test bed for
advanced, new technologies and concepts which, when operationally
proven, are spiraled into the Intelligence Community and the tactical
force. The true power of the IDC will be realized when the tactial
overwatch initiative is fully established along with a global network.
Project Morning Calm: An outgrowth of the IDC is an initiative
referred to as Morning Calm and sponsored by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). This is a rapidly evolving intelligence
structure in support of a theater combatant commander; virtually a
testbed for concepts that may have application in global war on
terrorism and all theaters in both joint and combined environments.
Morning Calm creates an all-inclusive intelligence ``system'' capable
of rapidly sharing and visualizing intelligence and all disparate data,
from the numerous collection systems and agencies, tactical through
national and combined. Morning Calm demonstrates a revolutionary
capability to merge high volume, multi-lingual, live collection feeds
(streaming data) with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) IDC advanced technological processes for interacting with
large repositories of disparate data types in a much more rapid,
timely, and visually intuitive manner than currently available.
Numerous overwatch related tools and technologies have already been
developed within this project--benefiting from the development of
advanced tools and capabilities operationalized within Morning Calm.
The Pantheon Project: This initiative has contributed significantly
to advancing technological innovations within the IDC, Morning Calm,
and the entire IC. This project has brought together a grouping of
world-class individuals from business, academia, and government to
address and solve the hardest technical problems, creating
technological or procedural solutions for the enhancement of tactical
through national intelligence echelons. These solutions have been
rapidly spiraled forward primarily into the IDC and Morning Calm
Project. While previously done ad hoc, and through the generosity of
several ``patriots'' who have volunteered their time to enable this
rapid technology insertion program, our goal is to formalize this
initiative into a core group who will constantly be on call to assist
with issues and provide expert advice.
Systems. Supporting the tactical echelons were several TIARA
(funded) systems to include: Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs);
Prophet; All Source Analysis System (ASAS); Counterintelligence/Human
Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Information Management System (CHIMS);
Integrated Meteorological System--Light (IMETS-L); Remotely Monitored
Battlefield Surveillance System (REMBASS); GUARDRAIL Common Sensor
(GRCS) airborne ISR system; UAV, Shadow 200 and Hunter--and Tactical
Exploitation System (TES). We have also successfully deployed our JMIP
funded UAV, Shadow 200 and Hunter. All of these systems have and
continue to successfully support tactical echelons in OEF, OIF, or
both. A noteworthy achievement was the ability to rapidly insert
technology patches--upgrades into some of these systems to adapt them
and maximize capabilities--based upon the threat in both Afghanistan
and Iraq. A noted shortcoming was that these systems were neither
networked nor integrated. Even when data was collected, often it did
not make it to the required database or user; or, if it did, it was
extremely late. Our transformation plan includes the rapid convergence
of many of these systems into the Distributed Common Ground System--
Army (DCGS-A), which is addressed later in this paper.
Tactical HUMINT: Our tactical HUMINT HCTs continue to provide
critical intelligence, supporting both ongoing missions and Force
Protection to our units serving in both Afghanistan and Iraq. With the
Services short on linguists across the board, contract linguists have
successfully augmented the HCTs. HCTs integrated themselves into the
tactical echelons and provided superb support throughout the force.
These teams, especially in the follow-on phase of operations, were
lauded by commanders who have consistently requested additional teams--
a request that our existing inventory cannot sufficiently supply. One
notable shortcoming was the inability to network these teams while they
were on the move.
Today. Our soldiers are adapting, learning to observe and report.
Our tactical commanders have also learned to use patrols aggressively
to interact with the environment and collect combat intelligence. Our
systems have operated well overall and numerous adaptations or
improvements have been incorporated in order to maximize their
effectiveness. Our HCTs, although lacking in quantity, have established
themselves as the premier force enabler. Overall, each separate,
distinct area of the intelligence fight is working well with the
exception of an integrated network that binds these similar, but
disparate, entities together to create an integrated framework. We have
several initiatives geared to resolve this issue. The most critical one
is establishing the network:

Establishing the Network
The top priority for Army intelligence transformation is rapidly
converging our current ``diverse'' intelligence processors into the
DCGS-A. DCGS-A is a modular and scaleable family of multi-intelligence
systems for posting, processing, exploiting, and updating ISR
information. While it will eventually replace current and future Army
intelligence processing systems (TIARA and JMIP) for national, joint
and Army organic sensor data, the Army intent is to rapidly build and
field an integrated DCGS-A capability, establishing intelligence
interoperability vertically across all echelons down to the battalion
level. It is important to note, we are dependent on the Army network
for much of our collateral connectivity.
DCGS-A will be implemented using a spiral development acquisition
strategy through the evolutionary merging of existing and programmed
Army processing systems, including ASAS, GUARDRAIL Information Node
(GRIFN), future ACS ground processing segment, Army Space Program
Office (ASPO) Tactical Exploitation System (TES) Tactical Exploitation
of National Capabilities (TENCAP) processing systems, Joint STARS
Common Ground Station (CGS) SAR/MTI processing, TUAV Ground Control
Station (GCS), and Tactical Control System (TCS). All DCGS-A components
will comply with Service, Joint, and National interoperability
standards.
The current emphasis is to converge several different existing
systems (ASAS, TES, CGS, CHIMS, CHATS) into what are being referred to
as battalion and brigade DCGS-A thrusts. These initial systems will
consist of existing off-the-shelf-type equipment utilizing existing
hardware and software to establish a network-centric environment and
get the capability into the hands of our soldiers now, vice years down
the road. As future DCGS-A upgrades come to fruition, they will be
spirally inserted into the existing DCGS-A thrusts that we will have
already established within the various echelons. In the near future,
DCGS will be the ``hub'' for the DOD to effectively implement the
information sharing relationships between the warfighters, the service
intelligence analysts, and the IC. The end result will be, for the
first time, a common intelligence network with common analytical tool
sets truly enabling horizontal and vertical collaboration and
integration. DCGS-A will be implemented using a spiral development
acquisition strategy through the evolutionary merging of existing and
programmed Army processing systems, including ASAS, GUARDRAIL
Information Node (GRIFN), future ACS ground processing segment, ASPO
TES Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) processing
systems, Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS) SAR/MTI processing,
TUAV Ground Control Station (GCS), and Tactical Control System (TCS).
All DCGS-A components will comply with Service, Joint, and National
interoperability standards.
Unique to the DCGS-A initiative is our plan--already initiated--to
integrate ``legacy'' systems rapidly into DCGS, investing into the
future system vice continuing to spend money on a system or program
that will be terminated in the very near future. Also, in conjunction
with INSCOM, theater level DCGS-A will be integrated with the various
INSCOM IDC hubs located at the different theater intelligence groups
and brigades throughout the world. In essence, home station DCGS and
the IDC hubs will become merged. This will enable the merging of
technology and tool sets into one common system, and allow for proven
integration of IDC technologies already in use and supporting the war,
into the DCGS-A program.
The Army is also progressing with fixed-site DCGS-A assets at
various garrison locations. This will give the Army a home-station
ability to support the joint as well as organic forces from sanctuary
locations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Army will have access to
National and Air Force reconnaissance assets as well as Army organic
assets. The Army fixed-site DCGS capability is in its formative stage
with an initial capability at the 66th Military Intelligence Group in
Darmstadt, Germany, as well as at the 501st Military Intelligence
Brigade, located in South Korea.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE JMIP AND TIARA PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Tactical intelligence capabilities provided by TIARA and JMIP
programs continue to be extraordinarily critical to the ability of the
ground maneuver force's ability to prosecute the war. Our MI soldiers
are performing superbly as they collect, analyze and process data and
information into intelligence, so that the ground commander can rapidly
act against a very adaptive and mobile enemy. Our focus is to enable
them and the entire intelligence enterprise to be connected to the
intelligence framework.

1. Overview
Army TIARA comprise an array of 25 separate programs and systems,
training programs, and forces that are located throughout the Army. The
various TIARA programs are engaged in ongoing military operations,
whether conducting combat counterterrorism operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, supporting homeland defense, maintaining the armistice
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea, or enforcing the peace
between various factions in the Balkans. Last year, Army intelligence
supported the full spectrum of warfare ensuring that ISR capabilities
were pervasive throughout the current force, the Stryker brigades, and
are setting the stage for the future force. This year, as the Army
continues to support U.S. commitments, Army transformation remains on
track and, in many cases, is being accelerated by the Army's Focus Area
initiatives to address the urgent operational needs of our Nation's
global war on terrorism. Army intelligence transformation is embedded
within the Army Campaign plan and is allowing the Army IC to fast track
several initiatives that will improve intelligence support to the
tactical forces.
The Army JMIP consists primarily of research, development, and
acquisition programs for manned and unmanned airborne ISR systems,
advanced SIGINT, and intelligence tasking, posting, processing, and
using (TPPU) (also known as tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED)) systems. Army TIARA and JMIP are focused on
supporting the tactical echelons with Actionable Intelligence:
providing commanders and soldiers with a high level of situational
understanding, delivered with the speed, accuracy, and timeliness
necessary to operate at their highest potential enabling rapid and
successful execution of operations. Army intelligence transformation,
empowered by the TIARA and JMIP systems and programs, achieves its
intended purpose of empowering greater individual initiative and self-
synchronization among tactical units by integrating information across
organizations and echelons, accelerating the speed of decisionmaking
and the agility of operations.

2. Language Program
The Army is DOD's Executive Agent for the Defense Language
Institute and Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California.
DLIFLC annually trains 3,500 of the best-trained linguists in the world
and continues to be the pre-eminent language schoolhouse in the world,
providing 700,000 hours of instruction in 23 languages at Monterey and
85 languages through the Washington Office.
DLIFLC is also on the forefront of using distant learning tools
designed to maintain and improve language skills of service members.
The Satellite Communication for Learning (SCOLA) program, using live
television programs from over 25 countries beamed via satellite to
posts, ships, and armories around the world, continues to be a vital
tool to maintain easily perishable language skills. DLIFLC provided
support to field operations through over 9,200 hours of Video Tele-
Training (VTT) and 2,000 hours of mobile training team support using
DLIFLC instructors.
The global war on terrorism has strained the Army system that
provides trained linguists in support of DOD and national agencies, as
well as the warfighter. Thousands of additional requirements in Arabic,
Kurdish, Pashto, Urdu, Dari, and other languages have exhausted the
Army's organic linguist base in the active and Reserve components.
Consequently, the Army has outsourced more than 6,000 linguist
requirements in support of the global war on terrorism. The cost per
annum of a single contract linguist varies from $15,000 per year for a
locally hired linguist to approximately $200,000. Factors such as
clearance and duty location requirements contribute to the total cost.
Further, there are simply not enough U.S. citizens with the requisite
language skills and desire to deploy to harsh, frequently dangerous,
locations to support the cleared linguist requirements of the Army,
DOD, and the national community, thus increasing the demand from the
same linguist pool. The cost to the Army of supporting the global war
on terrorism with contract linguists this fiscal year exceeds $250
million. The annual cost of the language contract in Bosnia, employing
over 900 locally hired linguists is an additional $36 million. Given
the number of linguists required by commanders across the battlespace,
contracted linguists will remain a necessity for the foreseeable
future.
JTF-GTMO: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
established Joint Task Force--Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (JTF-GTMO), to
support detainee operations (including detention and interrogations)
for enemy combatants who come under U.S. control. We must continue to
operate and maintain support for the assigned intelligence missions and
personnel. Counterterrorism supplementals provided initial funding for
detainee operations and military construction at Guantanamo Bay in both
fiscal years 2002 and 2003. As an ongoing requirement, program funding
commenced in fiscal year 2004 as part of the JMIP. Supported missions
include: screening, interrogation, intelligence collection, and
interaction with other agencies involved in the detainee operations.
Questioning JTF-GTMO detainees improved the security of our Nation
and coalition partners by expanding our understanding of al Qaeda, its
affiliates and other extremely dangerous terrorist groups that threaten
our security. Detainees have revealed al Qaeda leadership structures,
operatives, funding mechanisms, communication methods, training and
selection programs, travel patterns, support infrastructures, and plans
for attacking the U.S. and other countries.

3. Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Army airborne ISR is currently operating at a high tempo in support
of ongoing military operations worldwide. Today, all five of our
Military Intelligence Aerial Exploitation Battalions (AEB) are forward
deployed, or recently returned to home station, again preparing to re-
deploy in support of worldwide operations.

Our Korea-based GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) and
Airborne Reconnaissance-Low (ARL) AEB continues to provide over
80 percent of the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) on
the Korean peninsula.
In November 1995, our Germany based GRCS AEB deployed
to Taszar, Hungary, in support of Task Force Eagle. This GRCS
unit provided critical indications and warning, and force
protection oversight during the implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords. After 3-plus years in Hungary, this unit further
forward deployed to Brindisi, Italy, in support of Task Force
Falcon operations in the Balkans. In late February 2003, this
unit redeployed to Germany for 5 short months to refit and
refurbish in preparation for its deployment in support of
USCENTCOM and OIF. At present, this unit is scheduled to
redeploy to Germany in September of this year.
The first of two U.S.-based GRCS AEBs deployed in
August 2001 to participate in Operation Phoenix Venture in the
USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). After 8 months
supporting the USCENTCOM AOR, this unit deployed to South
America to support the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
commander. Following a successful 2-month deployment, this unit
again forward deployed into the USCENTCOM AOR to support OEF
and OIF. This unit redeployed to homestation in October 2003,
and is preparing to again deploy in September of this year.
Our CONUS-based ARL AEB that supports Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) is currently deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
Based upon the USSOUTHCOM combatant commander's requirements,
portions of this unit are now deployed 365-days a year to
support the theater's coordinated ISR plan in Colombia.
In May 2002, our second CONUS-based GRCS AEB deployed
to provide additional support to USCENTCOM. This unit
redeployed to homestation after a successful 13-month
deployment. At present, the unit is conducting refit and
refurbish requirements in preparation for its redeployment in
August of this year to support continuing OIF intelligence
requirements.

The Army continues to work to ensure that our ISR aircraft deploy
with AOR specific hardware and software capabilities. We have also
continued to stress interoperability, and are achieving notable success
in Airborne Overhead Cooperative Operations (AOCO) in coordination with
the national systems. For the past 4 years we have fielded cooperative
capabilities to all four GRCS units. AOCO allows us to connect a single
GRCS aircraft to an National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) capability
facilitating precision location especially at increased depths.
Additionally, this capability yields other benefits such as improved
geometry to the target, increased range, and connectivity to the
National Intelligence infrastructure via the GRCS integrated processing
facility. This dramatic interoperability success and sharing of
functionality between systems is also a requirement for our future
force airborne ISR system, Aerial Common Sensor (ACS).
GRCS is the workhorse of Army airborne ISR at the corps and theater
level. There is no other ISR system in the world that equals the
ability of GRCS to provide responsive, precision SIGINT geo-location
data on threat communications and radar emitters. GRCS is presently
flying an average of 1,900 sorties per year in support of U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and USCENTCOM.
To meet the rapidly changing threat signals environment, we are
continuing selective upgrades to the SIGINT capabilities of our fielded
GRCS systems by integrating advanced technologies developed through the
Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP). We are also modernizing the outdated
GRCS Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) on the ground, replacing it
with the state-of-the-art GRIFN. GRIFN is an integral part of the DCGS-
A.
To ensure our GRCS units forward-deployed in support of OIF can
provide their critical information into the Global Intelligence
Architecture and to ensure the system's ability to effectively
prosecute terrorist targets, we are providing a near-term very small
aperture terminal (VSAT) connection for forward deployed GRCS units.
This connection will support GRCS's prosecution of CENTCOM targets.
ARL is our current manned, multi-intelligence airborne ISR system.
ARL flies an average of 444 sorties per year in support of early
warning/force protection for USFK, and over 288 sorties per year in the
USSOUTHCOM AOR. ARL also flies ISR missions in support of Joint Task
Force-6 (JTF-6) here in CONUS.
The Army's final ARL platform is currently in production and was
funded in the fiscal year 2000 supplemental appropriation as a
replacement for the system that crashed in Colombia in July 1999, while
conducting reconnaissance in support of counterdrug operations. This
system will be fielded in April, fiscal year 2004, and will be
available to support combatant commander requirements. In fiscal year
2004, we continue to upgrade IMINT and SIGINT sensors, while also
ensuring that the avionics on our oldest ARL systems meet international
Airspace 2000 flight requirements. We used the Defense Emergency Relief
Fund (DERF) to accelerate IMINT sensor upgrades and to develop, test
and integrate MASINT sensors.
The Army continues to strive to meet airborne ISR requirements
given our resource constrained environment. The fiscal year 2005 budget
request will provide us the ability to minimally sustain our existing
GRCS and ARL airborne fleets. We used DERF counterterrorism funding and
fiscal year 2004 supplementals to provide key sensor upgrades that were
required to maintain technical relevance in pursuing the global war on
terrorism, but the majority of our modernization effort is focused on
meeting the ISR requirements for the Army's future force.
The Army's next-generation manned, airborne, collection platform
will be ACS, which will replace both ARL and GRCS. ACS is a Joint Army
and Navy program and will be a multi-intelligence collection system,
with SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT sensors. ACS sensor data will be
processed and disseminated via the DCGS architecture. Building upon the
success of GRCS, ACS will provide responsive precision targeting data
to the full range of Army organic weapon systems in support of the
Joint Task Force or ground component commander. The Army ACS program
will meet all joint and national interoperability standards. The fiscal
year 2005 budget request supports the beginning of the ACS System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. The robust ACS sensor suite
includes precision location Communications and Electronics Intelligence
sensors with the ability to prosecute new and emerging threat signals;
highly accurate Imagery Intelligence sensors including: Electro-optic,
Infrared; Synthetic Aperture Radar and a Ground Moving Target
Indicator; and advanced Measurement and Signature Intelligence
including a Ultra/Hyper/Multi-Spectral Imagery, Foliage Penetration
Radar, Masked Target Sensor, Light Detection and Ranging Sensor; Non-
Imaging Synthetic Aperture Radar; Calibrated Non-Imaging Infrared
Sensor; and Unintentional Radiation Sensor. These sensor suites will
ensure ACS is able to successfully prosecute and precisely locate
threat targets regardless of their techniques to evade detection. ACS
will begin production in fiscal year 2007, with initial fielding in
fiscal year 2009. Meeting these timelines is essential in order to
ensure that the first ACS system is operational when the Army's initial
Future Force unit is fielded.
The Army leadership continues to strongly support the rapid
fielding of a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) in order to fill
a critical warfighting capability-- providing the tactical warfighting
commander with the ability to physically look over the next hill,
without putting a soldier in harm's way. Since the start of sustained
combat operations a year ago, the Army's UAV capabilities have expanded
significantly. Although limited at the outset of ground combat
operations, Army UAV capability has improved and will continue to do so
over this year. Our UAV lessons learned and demonstrated successful
support of OIF missions have fortified our commitment to providing this
capability as quickly as possible. This JMIP program accordingly
remains a high modernization priority for Army tactical intelligence in
fiscal year 2005. The Army has fielded 12 TUAV systems, 8 to
operational units, of which, 5 are directly supporting combat
operations today.
The Army's Shadow TUAV is the first UAV to be fielded through the
normal acquisition process and holds the distinction of being the only
DOD UAV system to achieve a full rate production decision, approved on
25 September 2002. Not only a true acquisition success story, going
from contract award in December 1999 to initial operational capability
in just 32 months, this system has also proved to be an invaluable
asset in the hands of our deployed commanders. Between intelligence
gathering and force protection, the TUAV has proven its usefulness time
and again by revealing detailed information about enemy positions. By
providing near-real-time combat information to commanders, the TUAV has
helped save soldiers by providing video footage of the areas soldiers
are moving into. The Shadow TUAV flew over 2,350 hours in fiscal year
2003 and has surpassed a total of 4,600 total hours in OIF to date. As
a result of increased demand for this capability from the field, the
Army is accelerating procurement of Shadow systems this year by three.
The Army will field a total of 41 TUAV systems; 35 to the active
component brigades, two to the National Guard, and four to the UAV
training base.
Our fiscal year 2004 budget provided funding for selecting an
Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) air vehicle to be integrated into
the Army's UAV architecture by fiscal year 2009. The selection process
will be completed in fiscal year 2005. This new UAV will be capable of
reaching out to 300 kilometers and carrying advanced data links and
payloads such as EO/IR imagery, all-weather synthetic aperture radar
and moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) sensors coupled with a
communications relay payload to assist the ground commander's command
and control infrastructure. These enhanced capabilities will be vital
to the ability of the tactical ground and Joint Task Force Commander to
achieve knowledge dominance across the full spectrum of military
operations in the future.
During the interim, while we are developing the ER/MP capability,
we will continue to use the Hunter UAV as an intervening capability.
The Army has stationed three companies of Hunter UAVs with operational
units, all of which have provided support to OIF. Most recently, the V
Corps Hunter company deployed to support OIF in January and continues
to provide vital day and night imagery intelligence to CJTF-7. In 2003,
the two Hunter units deployed in support of OIF flew over 4,067 hours
with the loss of seven Hunter air vehicles. The Army has since
contracted to maintain an operational readiness rate of 85 percent for
our Hunter units allowing continued support to the Joint Task Force
Commander in Iraq as well as maintaining training for units pending
redeployment. This contract supports air and ground components of the
Hunter system with refurbishment and replacement parts necessary to
maintain the operational readiness rate. Replacement parts for the air
component of the system will provide increased capability, reliability,
and precision with new heavy fuel engines, extended center wing
sections for additional fuel, and modern avionics.
More recently, the Army has developed plans to deploy the Improved-
GNAT (I-GNAT), a downsized Predator UAV, provided through a
congressional add in 2003. Manufactured by General Atomics, the I-GNAT
was originally planned to be flown in the U.S. as a means to gain an
understanding of this class of aircraft and its capability in relation
to the ER/MP mission. However, operations in Iraq pre-empted this plan
and the Army will now use this system to support the CJTF-7 commander
with an additional day and night full motion video capability. The Army
has borrowed Air Force Lynx radars to supplement the day and night
capability on I-GNAT with a near all-weather capability to provide a
more robust intelligence capability to the commander. The employment of
I-GNAT will be analyzed while deployed in order to develop doctrine and
TTP for the ER/MP UAV.

4. Ground Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The Army's tactical ground ISR modernization efforts are focused on
meeting current and future warfighting requirements. The fiscal year
2005 budget request adequately supports these efforts. Prophet is the
Army's next generation tactical ground COMINT system being developed.
Prophet replaces four less capable systems while significantly reducing
footprint. The system provides a near real time electronic picture of
the battlefield. The benefits to the commander include enhanced
battlefield awareness, force protection and target development. Unlike
previous systems, Prophet is able to perform collection and electronic
attack on the move enabling it to operate in close support to highly
mobile maneuver forces throughout the full spectrum of operations. The
system also operates in two configurations, mounted and dismounted.
The Prophet program uses a blocked acquisition strategy:

Block I provides a basic communications intelligence
and radio direction finding capability
Block II provides an electronic attack capability
Block III provides a capability to intercept and
locate modern emitters

Block I is in full-rate production and fielding will be complete to
the active Force in fiscal year 2005. Fielding will not be complete to
the Army National Guard unless additional funding is provided to
support Army National Guard requirements. The Block II/III SDD contract
was awarded in March 2003 to General Dynamics--Phoenix. The first unit
equipped with Block II/III is expected in 4Q fiscal year 2005. The
fiscal year 2005 budget request supports the completion of the Block I
buy and the continuation of the Block II/III SDD development phase, and
the initial procurement of Block II/III systems.
Prophet is an OEF and OIF combat tested system. It deployed with
the SOF in the early stages of OEF and crossed the line of departure
with the 3rd Infantry Division at the beginning of OIF. Prophet's on-
the-move collection capability proved its worth as it detected a
waiting ambush for the lead elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. It
also played a key role in the capture of the international airport as
it located targets for the artillery units. Prophet continues to play
an integral role in both theaters as it provides critical battlefield
awareness at the brigade level. As the Army looks to the Future Force,
Prophet plays a critical role. Based on warfighter requests, Prophet
Block I deployed with additional capabilities to meet theater specific
requirements. These capabilities include beyond line of sight
communications and significantly enhanced collection and processing
capabilities. This is the way of the future: keeping tactical SIGINT
capabilities relevant across the full spectrum of operations by
insertion of evolving technology. Prophet is key to the Army's
transformation effort. The system is an integral part of the Stryker
Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) providing critical battlespace awareness and
force protection capabilities. It has performed extremely well with the
first SBCT in OIF. The Future Combat System (FCS) materiel developer
considers Block III as the COMINT sensor payload baseline to meet the
FCS COMINT requirements. The specific unit of action (UA) applications
include the COMINT sensor payloads for the FCS Reconnaissance and
Surveillance Vehicle and the Armored Robotic Vehicles. One of the key
products these systems will provide to the UA commander is emitter
mapping. The requirements for the unit of employment (UE) are being
worked at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Early indications are that Prophet
will be the UE ground ISR system.
Recent contingency operations have highlighted the need for
electronic warfare (EW), a component of information operations (IO).
While Army intelligence is not the sole practitioner of EW, it has a
unique role in EW as it maintains the Army's electronic attack (EA) and
electronic support (ES) capabilities. An EA capability is included in
Prophet Block II/III. Additionally, the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose
UAV will have an EA payload that will enable our warfighters to conduct
effective non-lethal fires throughout the depth of the battlespace.
Military Intelligence systems such a GRCS, ARL and ACS work hand-in-
hand to provide the intelligence or electronic support to enable EA.

5. Intelligence Fusion
The ASAS is the current Army intelligence fusion program. ASAS and
current ground processor capabilities will rapidly migrate into the
DCGS-A architecture to provide: automated intelligence analysis;
management of intelligence and electronic warfare resources; and
production and dissemination of intelligence to warfighting commanders
and staff. Variants of ASAS are fielded at all echelons in the Army,
enabling the rapid dissemination of the all source fusion picture of
the current threat to forward combat maneuver battalions. ASAS is the
Army intelligence interface to the warfighter Army Battle Command
System (ABCS) and to the Joint Global Command and Control System
(GCCS), and provides the automated ground threat picture to the Joint
Command Operational Picture (JCOP). The system is interoperable with
national military intelligence integrated database (IDB) standards. The
next generation ASAS Analysis and Control Element (ACE) will be fully
integrated with the DCGS-A systems of systems, enabling true near-real-
time multi-source intelligence correlation and target development.
The ASAS reliance on commercial-based hardware and a true open
architecture allows continued interoperability with current force
intelligence systems, while ensuring a smooth evolution to the future.
We have used congressional supplemental funding to rapidly develop and
integrate new software for the analysis of non-traditional/
nonstructured threats and adjust to lessons learned from OIF. This
software is currently in use in Bosnia and has been delivered to all
units engaged in OIF. The Army firmly believes our substantial TIARA
investment in ASAS demonstrates our resolve in joint intelligence
information exchange and support to the joint and ground warfighter.

6. Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence
CI and HUMINT are critical enablers to successful combat operations
in environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Underscoring the
importance of human intelligence, we have used congressional
supplemental funding to accelerate procurement of the CI/HUMINT CHIMS
and the integration of biometric analytic tools into the software
baseline. Over 900 systems have been fielded to active component and
Army Reserve soldiers who have been deployed to OIF. Fielding of these
systems was a monumental task, which involved training 1,200 soldiers
on the care and operation of the CHIMS. Our fiscal year 2004 funding
continued spiral development and procurement of CHIMS devices and
acceleration of CHIMS enhancements to our soldiers serving in OIF.
CHIMS automation has proven to be invaluable in meeting the
challenge of screening, interrogating, and reporting intelligence from
the large numbers of prisoners from OIF. The experience we gained has
validated a requirement for state-of-the-art equipment to support the
exploitation of large volumes of documents and computer magnetic
storage media. In the near term, the Army has provided the CHIMS with
an initial DOCEX capability.

INTELLIGENCE TRANSFORMATION: THE SOLDIER--OUR FOCUS

The focus of intelligence transformation is the soldier. All of our
initiatives seek to leverage all collected data, utilizing smart tools
and trained analysts, to conduct fusion analysis to generate relevant
intelligence for decisionmakers, both commanders and soldiers. Today,
our soldiers in the fight have the greatest local knowledge but the
poorest situational knowledge outside their immediate area of
operations (only hundreds of meters). The opposite situation exists at
the Joint, Theater and national levels, where the greatest operational
and strategic knowledge resides, with little to no local knowledge
available.
In part, we are hindered by our own remarkable technological
advantages and capabilities. Information age technology has allowed us
to develop exceptional collection system capabilities. However,
realizing the full power of our entire intelligence system depends not
only on our ability to collect information efficiently, but also on our
ability to effectively process, analyze, and most importantly, make
intelligence actionable. While we made incredible improvements in our
collection systems, we neglected to technically and procedurally change
how we process and analyze all this information. Our collection systems
gather vast amounts of information, but the majority of that
information is dumped into single source databases available to only
those single source analysts in that particular collection
organization. This stovepipe process is a consequence of how our
Intelligence Community has evolved--or, more accurately, has failed to
evolve--and how we have implemented technological change while
continuing to use existing processes. Focus Area Actionable
intelligence--our road map for intelligence transformation--is working
to bridge that gap through a variety of changes in TTP and materiel
solutions.

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

Actionable Intelligence is one of the necessary components of
achieving shared situational understanding. It requires that we change
the way our Army culturally views and integrates intelligence.
Additionally, we must continually develop and integrate new technology
solutions systematically to maintain first advantage in terms of
capabilities, technologies, and knowledge sharing.
Actionable Intelligence provides commanders and soldiers a high
level of shared situational understanding, delivered with the speed,
accuracy, and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest
potential and conduct successful operations.
Task Force Actionable Intelligence (the Army G2's transformation
initiative team) has identified four critical components that we must
address within the Army in order to transform intelligence in line with
the overarching Army Transformation--while remaining integrated within
DOD ``Remodeling'' Initiatives. I will also briefly discuss six
critical initiatives which are nested within the four critical
components that we are initiating in tandem within Army Transformation
today.
1. Critical Component: changing the culture and mindset of how the
Army integrates intelligence--change the methods and means of how we
collect, move, process, analyze and use intelligence. Change how we
think of intelligence starting with the soldier, continuing through all
echelons or our Army.
To change our culture and mindset, we must first change our
behaviors through better training and career experiences. First and
foremost, we must institute the mindset that every soldier is a sensor.
There are three main premises to soldier is a sensor: (1) Soldiers on
the ground have always been the best information collectors, and they
must recognize themselves as such. OEF and OIF have Actionable
Intelligence provides commanders and soldiers a high level of shared
situational understanding, delivered with the speed, accuracy, and
timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential and conduct
successful operations. Actionable Intelligence provides commanders and
soldiers a high level of shared situational understanding, delivered
with the speed, accuracy, and timeliness necessary to operate at their
highest potential and conduct successful operations. Recent operations
have shown that there are no frontlines. All soldiers and facilities
are at risk of attack. Soldiers must become highly conscious, trained
observers and reporters, aware of the value of reporting their
experiences, perceptions and judgments so the right person, at the
right time, can make the right decision to accomplish the mission--we
must give them the means to do so. (2) We must move operational units
from a passive (waiting to receive intelligence with which to take
action) to an active role in pursuing intelligence. Commanders must
acknowledge that every operation is also an intelligence operation.
Some of the most valuable intelligence comes from soldiers on point or
on patrol. This ``Fight for Knowledge''--create your own luck--begins
prior to operations and extends through the post-operation phases
indefinitely as long as the Nation has a vested interest in the region.
(3) Lastly, we need to see ourselves as the enemy sees us.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Red Teaming Capability
Red Teaming has two significant components. First, we need a base
cadre trained to think like terrorists, insurgents and paramilitaries.
Soldiers who have been trained as Red Team cadre will represent the
full spectrum of today's potential opponents (state and non-state
actors), ensuring blue force planners truly reflect the asymmetric
threat, the contemporary operating environment and the second and third
order effects of blue and red force actions. Second, we need a baseline
of geographic expertise to provide regional subject matter experts. Our
initiative starts with organizing a core Red Team capability within
INSCOM and in each of the Theatre MI Brigades. This will expand to
include the establishment of a Red Team University for training within
the Army Education system.
2. Critical Component: Improved battlespace capabilities organic to
soldiers and units--the capability of the soldier to sense and
understand his environment--integrating the soldier into the network.
Situational awareness on the complex battlefield of the 21st
century demands greater access to information with increased fidelity
at every level, starting with the soldier. Battlespace capabilities
represent what is in the hands of our soldiers or organic to their
unit. Reporting by individual soldiers will be digitized at the point
of origin with FBCB2. Soldiers will be able to better share what they
observe, realizing the every soldier is a sensor concept. Connecting
the soldier to the network will revolutionize information flow in both
directions. For units, this means increasing our ability to rapidly
build and deploy modular intelligence packages that satisfy the unit's
needs, to include providing regional expertise to tactical forces in an
Army with a global and joint mission. We also need to connect the local
sensors to the national networks and both the sensors and the soldiers
to the analytic base, DCGS. We will ensure that service intelligence
interdependencies are identified and leveraged.
3. Critical Component: Overwatch support to engaged units--
assisting the soldier by sensing and analytically overwatching his
battlespace, providing awareness over the broader environment in which
he is or may operate.
The concept of overwatch encompasses those capabilities that enable
the soldier or unit to reach out beyond their immediate area of
operations via a collaborative network centric environment. Overwatch
is part of a larger transformation where we are changing from a
vertical, echeloned approach, to a collaborative enterprise approach.
Overwatch provides the soldier on the ground with situational awareness
of the environment that influences his mission. The soldier also senses
his local environment and shares that high fidelity data with the rest
of the force. The Intelligence Community then optimizes the
capabilities and talents of intelligence professionals from the
tactical through strategic level, active, Reserve, civilian, and
contractors, across every discipline, to provide the shared situational
understanding every soldier and leader requires to understand and
control their battlespace.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Analytical Overwatch
Our next initiative, analytic overwatch, is an improved way of
operating that commits theater resources to tactical support, providing
tailored products (vice megabytes of information) to decisionmakers at
the tactical echelon. Analytic overwatch enables direct support
intelligence capabilities, providing collaborative and tailored support
down to the maneuver brigade and battalion echelons.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Project Foundry
Complementing overwatch, Project Foundry is an initiative that will
assign a portion of the Army's intelligence soldiers in the tactical
force to duty locations with organizations where they will conduct live
environment intelligence operations. These soldiers will be assigned to
Maneuver UA and UE, but their duty location (including their families)
will be at geographically dispersed locations away from their parent
units.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Information Dominance Center
The INSCOM IDC is a state-of-the-art operational intelligence
organization. The IDC has pioneered processes and methodologies for
timely situational awareness and analysis of complex networks of
individuals and organizations that can be shared across the
intelligence enterprise from national to tactical. The IDC has
established extension nodes in each theater and continually provides
direct support to our deployed units around the globe. A direct
capability ``spin-off'' from the IDC is Project Morning Calm. This
project is an example of our rapidly evolving intelligence system in
support of a theater combatant commander--virtually a test bed for
concepts that may have application in all theaters. Morning Calm
creates an all-inclusive intelligence system capable of rapidly sharing
and visualizing intelligence and all disparate data, from the numerous
collection systems and agencies, tactical through national and
combined. The first iteration of Morning Calm was recently installed
and tested in Korea.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Pantheon Project
Today, any new technology that has intelligence applications, such
as demonstrated in Project Morning Calm, must be promptly incorporated
into the intelligence system. To that end, we are implementing a rapid
fielding capability through the creation of The Pantheon Project. The
project will bring together a team of 10-12 elite, world-class
individuals from business, academia, and government to address and
solve the hardest technical problems, creating technological or
procedural solutions for the enhancement of tactical through national
intelligence echelons.
4. Critical Component: A network centric environment that enables
and glues these concepts together--the tools, comms, collaboration,
access to data, integration and enhanced visualization capabilities
that make the framework; connecting the soldier (battlespace) to higher
echelons and analytic centers (overwatch).
The intelligence enterprise is a function of information
transparency made possible by a common network which integrates people
with shared databases, advanced analytical tools, knowledge centers,
and sensors/collectors that are accessible by all. An assured network
centric environment is the key enabler and the glue that binds all
these concepts. Actionable Intelligence is dependent on the network as
the communications backbone to set the conditions for a collaborative
environment.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Begin fielding of an interim
Distributed Common Ground System--Army capability this year
The objective DCGS-A will fuse and integrate data from all
collectors and sources. DCGS-A is the centerpiece of the future
intelligence framework and is the enabler for all operations at all
echelons from the UA to national. DCGS-A is already a future force
Program of Record (POR) originally designed to field a capability in
fiscal year 2008. Starting now, we have already begun accelerating
DCGS-A to the field in a spiral development approach. Interim DCGS-A
fixed site capabilities are being fielded to the theater intelligence
brigades and groups. We will expand this effort and provide the Army
with increasing capabilities that correspond to improvements in
automated fusion and information visualization technologies down to the
maneuver battalion level.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE TRANSFORMATION SUMMARY

Army Intelligence is changing in all aspects to adapt faster than
our adversaries. We are increasing our tactical collection in all
intelligence disciplines, with particular emphasis on HUMINT. We are
working with Task Force Network to form a network which creates the
framework connecting the soldier to the strategic level. We are
changing how intelligence information is reported and disseminated
throughout this operational and intelligence network. We are updating
our processes to provide all echelons, down to the individual soldier,
with access to shared situational awareness.
Focus Area Actionable Intelligence is the vehicle for Army
Intelligence transformation. Evolutions in sensing, fusion and analysis
will solidify the foundation of the Army's ability to conduct
knowledge-based operations. Our emphasis is on addressing current
operational mission requirements, while maintaining first advantage in
capabilities. Technology spiral insertions will continue to improve and
optimize our intelligence capabilities. At its very core, however, the
conduct of intelligence analysis remains a human endeavor. Technology
creates possibilities; humans turn possibilities into realities.
Creating Information Age processes will allow us to leverage the
essence of the vast amounts of information available today. This will
radically change the way we do business and dramatically improve the
commander's and soldier's understanding of the battlespace. The
soldier, whether intelligence analyst or operator, will interface
directly, and in near real-time, with the information required for
current operations. We will ingrain the concept that ``Every Soldier is
a Sensor'' (a contributor to and a consumer of the global intelligence
enterprise). Tactical commanders nearest to the fight will leverage
modular, tailored packages to develop intelligence, while being
supported by a network of analytic centers providing overwatch.

CHALLENGES

Our Greatest Challenges are:
(1) Changing the Culture and Mindset of the entire Army: We must
institutionally change the culture and mindset of the Army on how we
collect, report, disseminate and use intelligence. Our challenge is to
ingrain the changing concepts throughout not only the MI Branch, but
throughout the entire Army.
Training: Our soldiers must be trained on the perishable skill of
conducting combat surveillance and reporting the critical elements he
observes within his environment. Soldiers must become highly conscious,
trained observers and reporters, aware of the value of reporting their
experiences, perceptions, and judgments so the right person, at the
right time, can make the right decision to accomplish the mission. This
mindset starts with our institutional training and builds with unit
training and experience.
Structure: Army leadership at all echelons must institutionalize a
narrowing of the gap between intelligence and operations. Collecting
intelligence must become a natural occurrence of any operation that we
conduct, from logistics resupply to an actual combat patrol.
Doctrine: Furthermore, we must move operational units from a
passive (waiting to receive intelligence with which to take action) to
an active role in pursuing intelligence. Commanders must acknowledge
that every operation is also an intelligence operation. Some of the
most valuable intelligence comes from soldiers on point or on patrol.
This `Fight for Knowledge' begins prior to operations and extends
through the post-operation phases indefinitely as long as the Nation
has a vested interest in the region. Lastly, we need to see ourselves
as the enemy sees us: through Red Teaming. Our challenge is to build
these constructs into our structure.
(2) Breaking down the existing policies and procedures for data
access: Within the Army, as well as the Intelligence Community, we must
revamp the current processes and procedures that hinder our ability to
rapidly move data, information, and intelligence throughout all
echelons. Some policies limit our ability to access essential data
bases while some limit our ability to move classified information to
the tactical echelons and soldier. Others limit the sharing of certain
types of data or intelligence. Another challenge is our tactics,
techniques and procedures that we continue to use that were instituted
prior to the advent of computers and current technology enablers.
Existing TTP dictate an echeloned, stovepiped approach to requesting
and passing intelligence. This slows and seriously limits the sharing
or integration of data and knowledge, thereby impeding intelligence
integration within the Intelligence Community and slowing and negating
rapid intelligence sharing with the tactical echelons and soldier--
impacting the ability to rapidly execute operations.
(3) Funding our Intelligence Transformation initiatives: Over the
last several months, the Army has validated our Actionable Intelligence
initiatives as enablers of modularity and larger Army transformation.
This is a first and critical step toward achieving these goals. The
next and equally critical step is committing the funds to implement
these initiatives. To date, we have the funding required to begin
pursuing our initiatives for DCGS-A. At the same time, we are
reprioritizing within the Army budget to fund emerging requirements
within the Information Dominance Center such as Red Teaming, Project
Foundry, and The Pantheon Project. In the past, we have sustained
minimal IDC operations with the assistance of Congress and the OSD. We
are very appreciative of your support. We are convinced that the
advancements we have made over the last couple of years are a
tremendous return on that investment. However, the IDC's participation
in recent and ongoing operations and the lessons learned from Project
Morning Calm have expanded its mission focus and support concept. The
IDC has become integral to the battle rhythm of engaged forces and
should therefore be funded as a formal Army program vice dependence on
supplementals and congressional aids. We are also working with the USDI
and the agencies on support for those functions and capabilities that
support the joint fight.

OUR FOCUS, THE SOLDIER

Our focus is on the soldier of an Army that is fighting a war,
resetting our forces, and transforming to the future. Our dynamic
environment features new technologies, nontraditional missions and
unconventional, elusive adversaries requiring radically different
operating capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures. Focus Area
Actionable Intelligence is the vehicle for Army Intelligence
transformation. Evolutions in sensing, communications, fusion and
analysis will solidify the foundation of the Army's ability to conduct
integrated and shared knowledge-based operations. Our emphasis is on
addressing current operational mission requirements, while maintaining
first advantage in capabilities--constantly focused on connecting the
network--linking the soldier. At its very core, however, the conduct of
intelligence analysis remains a human endeavor. Technology creates
possibilities; humans turn possibilities into realities.

CONCLUSION

The Army is at an historic crossroad. Our dynamic environment
features new technologies, non-traditional missions and unconventional
adversaries requiring radically different operating capabilities,
tactics, techniques, and procedures. In response to this, the Army is
transforming from top to bottom, even while engaging in combat
operations, fighting an adversary unwilling and unable to challenge us
directly, yet able to adapt to take advantage of real or perceived
weaknesses. The funding provided is critical and essential in enabling
our soldiers to continue to take the fight to the enemy.
In closing, our common goal is to provide the best possible
capabilities for our soldiers. We all know that our soldiers--our young
men and women, America's finest--deserve nothing less than the best we
all can do and provide for them. On behalf of the entire Army
Intelligence Community, we appreciate your interest and support as we
fight the current war, adapt our current force to the fight, and
continuously transform--always building towards a future force. Thank
you for allowing me the opportunity to address you in this forum and we
sincerely appreciate your resolute support to our greatest assets, our
soldiers.

Senator Allard. We'll hear now from Admiral Porterfield,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. RICHARD B. PORTERFIELD, USN, DIRECTOR OF
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral Porterfield. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for the opportunity to appear here today.
I want to tell you that the Navy, like the Services of my
other colleagues, is in the midst of two really fundamental
changes. First, we're in the middle of transformation, and
we're also fighting a war, and that's simultaneously. I think
that what we, in the Navy, see there are great challenges to
this and we also see great opportunities to effect long overdue
changes.
In the recent active combat, the Navy found that we were
deficient in our HUMINT; and, in closed session, I want to go
over what we're intending to do about that.
We also found that we were deficient in our ability to
support naval special warfare, which we believe could well be,
in the future, one of the very first naval assets to be
employed in any conflict, because the nature of the war that
we're facing has greatly changed.
The third thing that we've found is that we've gotten very
good at what we'll call ``time-critical strike,'' the ability
to hit fixed or mobile targets on the land mass, but it's now
time for the Navy to focus on the maritime domain because of
some of the challenges that we see in the future in that arena.
Antisubmarine warfare is a key issue for us, and it's driving
some of the things that we're looking for.
I also want to point out that, to use a saying that the
highway administration uses, ``speed kills.'' The Navy's focus
is on getting our capability to the fight quickly, to
accomplish the movement of intelligence to warfare commanders
and our warfighters on the ground and at sea and in the air
very quickly. That's one of our fundamental tenets, and it is
something that we're working very hard on.
I also want to say that there's a great deal of
interdependencies among the service capabilities and the joint
capabilities which are currently under discussion, and I think
that's important for you to realize that they all have to work
together in order to be optimized. We're talking about
persistent surveillance often, but we also need to think about
persistent analysis and the ability to move the data to the
right place at the right time quickly.
I want to also mention to Senator Nelson that Scott
Speicher is a continuing high priority for the Department of
the Navy. We continue to examine every shred of evidence and
working with our DIA and Iraqi Survey Group colleagues, Major
General Dayton, that continues to be a very high focus for
Secretary England and Admiral Vern Clark.
Senator Bill Nelson. I just met with General Dayton.
Admiral Porterfield. Yes, sir.
With that, sir, I want to yield the remainder of my time,
and will be glad to take questions either here or in closed
session.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Porterfield follows:]

Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Richard B. Porterfield, USN

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify. I welcome the opportunity to once again appear
before you to discuss the state of Naval Intelligence. I want to
express my sincere gratitude for your support of the United States
Navy. At no time has that support been more vital than it is today, as
we continue to fight a global war on terrorism, projecting decisive
joint power across the globe. Naval Intelligence is engaged worldwide,
meeting the current intelligence demands of our joint forces while
transforming to meet future joint ISR requirements. The Naval
Intelligence program is consistent with Dr. Cambone's Defense
Intelligence Goals and we continue to work closely with the USDI and
the other Services to shape an effective and efficient Defense
intelligence program. Reflecting the priorities set forth in my annual
guidance as Director of Naval Intelligence, I will focus today's
remarks on three topics:

Naval Intelligence support to global operations;
Lessons learned and transformational initiatives;
Navy ISR Roadmap and program highlights.

II. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO GLOBAL OPERATIONS

I am proud to inform you of the outstanding work being performed by
the Navy's intelligence team around the world. A trademark of the Navy
is being forward deployed and fully engaged in providing for the
Nation's security. Today, there are two Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs)
and four Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) deployed globally. Each
deployed force possesses fully manned afloat intelligence centers and
ships signals exploitation spaces, which provide imagery and targeting
analysis, cryptanalysis, and ISR battle management support to U.S. and
Coalition Naval Forces. In addition to our CSG and ESGs Nuclear-Powered
Attack Submarines (SSN) are forward deployed, providing both strike and
ISR capability and Navy EP-3 and P-3 AIP aircraft are providing multi-
sensor intelligence collection in support of joint and coalition
forces. Forty percent of our manpower is invested in joint
intelligence, providing maritime intelligence expertise to each of our
combatant commanders.
Here at home, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is heavily
engaged on a daily basis providing critical maritime intelligence to
support the multi-agency homeland security effort, focusing its
maritime shipping, cargo and proliferation expertise on denying
terrorists the use of the seas. In the past year, ONI has partnered
with the U.S. Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center and
established a 24-hour a day, 7 day a week, National Maritime Watch in
direct support of Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) mission to ensure the
maritime homeland defense of the U.S. Each day, we report on vessels of
interest en route U.S. ports, identifying those that pose a potential
national security threat. At the same time, ONI continues to be
instrumental in taking the fight to the enemy by providing critical
intelligence support to global Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).

III. LESSONS LEARNED AND TRANSFORMATIONAL INITIATITIVES

Our experiences during recent combat operations have highlighted
the need for enhanced Naval Intelligence expertise in several areas,
particularly collection management, HUMINT, and support to Special
Warfare. In addition to revitalizing Navy HUMINT, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), in his Guidance for 2004, directed us to focus on
improving our global maritime awareness and merchant ship tracking
capabilities, and delivering advanced ISR capabilities within FORCEnet.
He also directed us to support these efforts through improvements to
the development and integration of our total force of civilian, active,
and Reserve intelligence personnel. In response, we have commenced a
number of transformational initiatives, while modifying our fleet
exercises to better stress and test our skills in joint operations.

A. HUMINT Transformation
There is a continuing need, consistent with the President's budget,
to grow and sustain the Navy HUMINT capability. ONI has strengthened
and will continue to expand its HUMINT capability with emphasis in
Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) and Civil Maritime Collection
Operations.
Demonstrating the total force concept, 69 naval reservists have
been mobilized since September 11 to support these HUMINT efforts. ONI
overt HUMINT collectors have accompanied the U.S. Coast Guard on more
than 3,250 boardings of foreign vessels since September 11. We are
transitioning this capability from a force consisting primarily of
mobilized reservists to a more permanent full-time capability.

B. Maritime Intelligence Transformation
The ONI continues its Maritime Intelligence transformation--both in
its support to the global war on terrorism and in its emerging role of
providing direct support to theater naval forces. ONI continues its
efforts to improve the detection, identification, and tracking of
merchant shipping activity worldwide. To support national and theater
maritime intelligence requirements, ONI has strengthened its strategic
relationships with numerous regional partners. These maritime
information exchanges provide valuable regional maritime information,
much of which is not available from other sources. ONI's Automated
Merchant Reporting System is a critical component of this effort.

C. Fleet Intelligence Transformation
ONI is also transforming its support to the fleet. As we learned
during OIF, combat operations often placed a high demand for imagery
exploitation capabilities in support of targeting and battle damage
assessment (BDA). Recognizing the need to improve imagery analysis
support to forward-deployed forces, the Navy and ONI established the
Fleet Imagery Support Team (FIST). FIST will provide direct support to
deploying battlegroups by increasing our imagery analysis capabilities
afloat, our reachback capabilities for analysis of tactical imagery
ashore, and the ability of forward-deployed forces to leverage ONI's
analytical and technical expertise. FIST will improve the near real-
time imagery support required to support Time Critical Strike missions.
Specifically, FIST will improve the CSG and ESG's ability to task,
process, exploit, and disseminate theater and tactical ISR sensor data
such as that obtained from Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAVs
and other developmental and existing systems.
Another priority mission for ONI is analysis of the worldwide
submarine threat. ONI has focused its efforts in two areas: assessing
submarine capabilities, and projecting future force levels to support
DOD and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) acquisition
community requirements. ONI also devoted considerable analytic effort
to develop projections of worldwide naval systems and weapons
capabilities over the next 20 years. These detailed projections are
used to support wargaming scenarios, which in turn, support the
acquisition decisionmaking process.

D. Total Force Transformation
As I mention earlier in my testimony, recent combat operations have
highlighted the need for enhanced Naval Intelligence expertise in
collection management, HUMINT, and support to Special Warfare. In
response, we have aligned our training and manpower management
processes to better support the development, tracking, and application
of these capabilities.
A key milestone of this effort is the development of the
Intelligence Officer Professional Qualification Program (PQP), which
responds to OIF lessons learned and a recently completed intelligence
officer job task analysis. We are expanding our Additional
Qualification Designator (AQD) program to track the core skill areas
mentioned above in addition to our existing Navy Targeting Officer and
Joint Targeting Officer AQDs. Similarly, we are refocusing Active and
Reserve Intelligence Specialists (IS) toward the core skill areas of
imagery analysis, strike warfare, and operational intelligence, and
coding all enlisted billets to accurately reflect current and future
skill requirements. This is part of our broader effort to evolve the IS
rating into an Advanced Technical Field.
The Navy continues to face major challenges in accessing and
retaining sailors with the right skills to meet emerging requirements--
both ashore and afloat. Ensuring the Fleet is manned with the right
people with the right skills is as important as equipping them with the
latest technology and tools. Naval Intelligence is leading the way in
the CNO's broader efforts to revolutionize training in the Navy and
achieve full integration of our active and Reserve components.
Last summer, we established the Center for Naval Intelligence in
Virginia Beach, Virginia as one of several learning centers supporting
the CNOs' Revolution in Training initiative. This center is responsible
for all Navy intelligence training, education, and professional
development, including oversight of the Navy and Marine Corps
Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) in Virginia Beach and the Fleet
Intelligence Training Center (FITCPAC) in San Diego. We are embracing
new technologies and applying human performance development concepts
from the science of learning. We are revising every aspect of our
current training processes and incorporating computer-based training
and realistic team trainers that form the centerpiece of training at
the Center for Naval Intelligence as well as the Center for Cryptology
at Corry Station in Pensacola.
This year, with the support of the Naval Reserve Intelligence
Program leadership, we developed a Naval Intelligence Community Roadmap
to guide our officer and enlisted professional development and advance
the full integration of our active and Reserve components. Based on
requirements validated by Fleet Forces Command, this roadmap helps us
define skill requirements to meet emergent missions, tailor skill
training to specific job tasks, and make sure Reserve component
capabilities augment or complement active component capabilities.
The most important personnel action concerns our initial accession
contracts for active-duty sailors. Beginning this fiscal year, we
shifted to a 6-year obligation, Advanced Technical Field enlistment
contract. These sailors will report aboard ship fully trained and
qualified to support fleet combat operations from day one. For example,
starting with the October 2003 class, sailors awarded the strike
warfare qualification code arrived in the fleet certified to develop
aimpoints for precision-guided munitions.

IV. ISR ROADMAP AND PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Navy ISR Transformation
FORCEnet is the centerpiece of the Navy's transformation to a
network centric environment. The vision of FORCEnet is a single,
enterprise-wide, open architecture. It will reach across all programs
to create a continuous information environment across the Navy and will
serve as the key enabler for Sea Power 21 capabilities. Naval
Intelligence intends to remain at the forefront of this initiative and
ensure our intelligence programs are fully integrated.
At the heart of Navy's plan to integrate a net-centric ISR
capability into FORCEnet is the DCGS. The DCGS family of systems will
not only support integration of tactical, theater and national ISR
capabilities into Naval warfare operations, but it will also ensure
that a distributed network of Navy ISR sensors can contribute directly
to a Joint common operational picture via the Global Information Grid
(GIG). The Navy recently created a single program office for the Joint
Services Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) and the TES to facilitate
incorporating these programs into our DCGS effort. Although primarily
focused on supporting strike warfare and time critical targeting, the
objective is for the Navy's DCGS to support all naval warfare domains.
This initial consolidation is the first step toward developing a Navy
DCGS capability that is compatible with the DCGS Integrated Backbone
(DIB) and the Joint DCGS architecture.
I am a co-lead in the FORCEnet project, primarily to ensure that
the Navy's ISR capabilities and investments remain a core component of
Navy Network Centric Operations (NCO). Furthermore, the Navy staff has
recently established an ISR branch within the warfare requirements
directorate, headed by a naval intelligence flag officer. This move is
an acknowledgement that ISR has become a critical warfighting
component.

B. Airborne ISR Programs
Last year at this time the Navy had not yet decided on the way
ahead to replace the aging EP-3 ARIES II system. I am pleased to report
this year that a Navy variant of the Army's ACS will meet the Navy's
requirements for a manned multi-INT airborne ISR capability. Navy ACS
will exceed current EP-3 capabilities, while promising improved
airframe reliability and reduced operating costs. Navy ACS will be
tailored to support the Navy's warfighting and ISR concept of
operations (CONOP).
Persistent surveillance over open-ocean and littoral areas remains
critical to establishing and maintaining comprehensive battlespace
awareness in a dynamic maritime environment. This is especially true
when potential adversaries are equipped with long-range anti-ship
cruise missiles. The high altitude endurance (HAE) BAMS UAV is designed
to provide the necessary persistent ISR capability required by CSG,
ESG, and the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) to
support Joint Operations. Navy will acquire two modified Global Hawk
UAVs as part of a Maritime Demonstration to rapidly inject a persistent
UAV into the Fleet. These systems will be used to develop the CONOPs
and procedures required for introduction of BAMS UAV. BAMS UAV will
complement other Navy maritime surveillance systems such as the P-3 and
Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).
For tactical reconnaissance, the Shared Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP)
represents a significant increase over the legacy TARPS system, adding
a robust night capability, high bandwidth data-link, increased
standoff, and an all-digital imagery system. SHARP is scheduled for
formal operational evaluation (OPEVAL) in late fiscal year 2004, but
experienced a very successful early operational capability (EOC)
deployment aboard U.S.S. Nimitz during OIF.
ACS, the BAMS UAV, and other Navy ISR systems, will be designed to
``plug in'' to Navy DCGS/FORCEnet, allowing rapid distribution of ISR
data to Navy and Joint users, and key Navy and Joint analysis nodes for
further processing. Naval forces will also be able to access ISR data,
from joint assets such as Global Hawk and Army ACS, via the DCGS
architecture.

C. Surface and Subsurface ISR Systems
The Maritime Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century (MCS-21) is
our vision for integrating existing cryptologic capabilities with
advanced technologies to create a single, scaleable, interoperable
SIGINT system. Spiral E of SSEE, the first step toward achieving the
MCS-21 vision, will provide improved front-end sensor capabilities by
incorporating easily reconfigurable software receivers. Also included
are radio direction finding and Information Warfare capabilities and an
embedded scenario-based training package. The result is significantly
enhanced threat detection and identification for warship commanders.
As the threat environment evolves, submarines remain a potential
high-interest threat. Accordingly, Navy continues to invest in ISR
capabilities that will monitor emerging undersea threats and provide
cueing to tactical ASW assets.
For our submarines, the latest Submarine Electronic Support
Measures (SSEM) equipment will provide an advanced capability for both
open-ocean and littoral environments. The system includes a sensor
suite, processing and analytical tools to provide self-protection,
situational awareness and, when augmented by special additional gear,
an undersea ISR capability.
Taken together, these airborne, surface and subsurface systems
provide the flexible, scaleable, comprehensive ISR capability required
to meet current and emerging threats and support naval, joint, and
coalition forces at the tip of the spear.

V. CHALLENGES

My greatest challenges fall into two basic categories:

(1) Determining the optimum skill mix and distribution of
personnel between the analytical capabilities needed afloat
with those that can be accomplished via reach-back;
(2) Identifying the emerging sensing and processing
capabilities that affect this mix.

Ultimately the success of our ISR vision, and its contribution to
naval warfare, depends on the individual sailor and whether we've given
him the skills and tools to do his job well. Innovations in digital
classrooms and team trainers are clearly a positive step but the trend
toward more technologically advanced ships manned by smaller crews
complicates the task ahead. To achieve our goals we will have to do
more things, and do them better, with fewer people or make huge strides
in our remoting capabilities to facilitate improved ashore/afloat
collaboration. Equally challenging is our ongoing effort to determine
the best mix of ISR sensors Naval Forces will need to fulfill
warfighting requirements, and then correlate this sensor mix with
appropriate air, surface, and subsurface manned and unmanned platforms.
Realistically, we will have to pursue our vision on both fronts.

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I want to thank this committee and Congress for the
consistent support you have provided Naval Intelligence. I've talked
today about our current support to global operations of all types, our
response to lessons learned from recent combat operations, and our
efforts to build the right naval ISR system of systems at the right
cost, while developing our human capital to effectively utilize those
capabilities in support of naval and joint forces going into harm's
way. Our priorities are reflected in our fiscal year 2005 budget
submission and form the foundation of our ISR roadmap and
transformational strategy. I hope I have conveyed the breadth and depth
of naval intelligence's contribution to ongoing operations. Our
transformation efforts will shape a future Navy intelligence capability
that is an even more powerful enabler to joint and naval forces,
providing the Nation with unmatched maritime intelligence capabilities.

Senator Allard. Thank you.
Now we'll call on Major General Sams, U.S. Air Force
Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
Welcome.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RONALD F. SAMS, USAF, DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE, DEPARTMENT OF
THE AIR FORCE

General Sams. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
it's my honor to talk to you about Air Force intelligence.
It was almost a year ago that an Air Force Global Hawk,
flying over a suspected Iraqi surface-to-air missile (SAM)
site, sent missile data information and the pictures it took to
a ground site at Beale Air Force Base, California. That ground
site took that information and pumped it immediately to an
imagery analyst in Nevada. Within 2 minutes after those images
were received, the analysts discovered the Iraqi SAM site. The
data was then sent, within 10 minutes, to the Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC); and 57 minutes after that Global Hawk
saw that Iraqi SAM site, a B-2 was reprogrammed with a
precision weapon and took out the site.
On that same day, a Predator was flying, looking for
missile transporters, and actually spotted some Iraqi tanks in
a tree-line. Predator video was also sent back via our
distributed systems to analysts back in the States, who sent
the information to the CAOC, who then sent it to the airborne
aircraft; and 17 minutes after the initial Predator video was
transmitted, those tanks were destroyed.
Now, these two examples illustrate what we talk about in
terms of the results of Air Force ISR, which is a crosshair and
a target. It also serves to illustrate where we're going in
ISR, because time-critical targets require rapid movement of
information and rapid targeting of weapons, and our first
priority to the combatant commander will always be to prosecute
those targets through global persistent surveillance, through a
combination of ground and airborne and space-based sensors and
systems.
To better make our ISR capabilities available to combatant
commanders, the Air Force has aligned ISR and command and
control (C-2) wings under a single-numbered air force, 8th Air
Force, which is responsible for their training and readiness.
At the headquarters level, we've established a Deputy Chief of
Staff for Warfighting Integration, who's responsible for Air
Force C-2 and ISR interoperability at the technical and
operational levels.
The examples I referred to earlier also illustrate the
success of networking our information. Through use of reachback
to distributed analytic centers, we have access, in a matter of
seconds, to analysts worldwide. During Operation Desert Storm,
the DCGS at Langley Air Force Base was deployed forward, and so
was the one at Beale. Today, if we deployed those two centers
forward, it would cost us about 17 C-5s, and would cost us
about a million--maybe up to $50 million to move all that
equipment, and not to mention the people. Today, through
reachback, the Air Force doesn't have to deploy all of those
people forward. The technology allows us to leverage our
expertise from a myriad of analysts around the world from our
Active and Reserve Forces. We also substantially reduce the
number of people that we have to move forward, or, as we like
to say, ``When possible, we'll move digits and not people.''
As demonstrated during OIF, our U-2 continues to be an
extremely capable multi-intelligence platform. It is a true
workhorse today. It is not the same U-2 that was flown by
Francis Gary Powers during the Cold War. In fact, airframe-
wise, it's one of our youngest, and we believe it'll remain
viable until at least the year 2025.
Now, a few years ago, it was my honor to be the commander
of the 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base. My RC-135 fleet was
extremely busy then; it is extremely busy now, and the Rivet
Joints continue to be our heavy-lift SIGINT platform with an
airframe that should last through at least 2023.
We are continuing our spiral development of our Global Hawk
to a multi-INT platform. Though the Global Hawk is still in
development, it provided over 28,000 images during OIF, and
over 3,000 of those helped prosecute time-critical targets.
Predator continues to be a success. All the Predators that
we purchase now will be capable of delivering weapons. We are
also developing our Predator B into a true hunter-killer
aircraft capable of automatic target queuing and prosecuting
time-critical targets.
Our investment in the DCGS, version 10.2, will provide the
communications backbone that will help all Services plug into
this, and use their own communication architectures so that we
can spread data when and where it's needed.
Our investment in SBR and Space-Based Infrared System is
significant, but it's critical to global persistent
surveillance. When these systems are operational, it will mean
that the enemy really has no place to hide, day or night or in
adverse weather. Our vision is to give the enemy no place to
hide, to know what the enemy is doing all the time, to be
inside the enemy's decision cycle so that we can engage
anytime, in any place at our choosing.
Thank you very much for my few minutes, and I look forward
to discussing this with you later.
[The prepared statement of General Sams follows:]

Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Ronald F. Sams, USAF

OPENING REMARKS

Mr Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor
to provide you my vision of Air Force ISR and also to discuss some
important lessons learned from recent, and ongoing, military
operations. As we work closely with the newly established USDI, we see
a future in which Air Force ISR will greatly contribute to our Nation's
ability to dominate the enemy's information space. Our first priority
is to provide the combatant commanders with the means to prosecute
global and persistent surveillance from a combination of airborne,
ground, and space-based capabilities. To that end, the Air Force
realigned its ISR and command and control (C2) wings under a single
numbered Air Force commander, responsible for all ISR training and
readiness. The realignment of Air Force ISR under 8th Air Force in 2002
was a total force initiative--providing the combatant commander with a
coherent, integrated force capable of meeting tomorrow's information
intense environments. Our outlook for the future also calls for
significant increases in operational integration across all domains--
joint, allied, and coalition partners. In 2002 we also established a
Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighter Integration to ensure a coherent
look at all Air Force ISR and C2 interoperability at the technical and
operational levels. In addition to improved methods for
interoperability and information sharing with our partners, we see
great opportunities for achieving information dominance through
increased networked centric intelligence operations and broadband
reachback to our distributed analytical centers. Based on lessons
learned from ongoing conflicts, our analytical centers are also
adapting to provide the warfighters with ``predictive'' intelligence
through multi-INT approaches to include extensive analysis of open
source information. For example, assessment of terrorist and
proliferator use of civil aviation, whether compiling basic
intelligence or identifying potentially hijacked aircraft threats, will
require an unprecedented degree of integration of open source and
classified data streams. We have explored the means to fully integrate
these data sources with promising results. Last, our vision for
information dominance is founded on a balanced investment and
modernization strategy that leverages off of industry's key
technological advances in unmanned aerial vehicles, radar and signals
intelligence processing, access to commercial imagery satellite
communications, and distributed networking capabilities.
On the eve of OIF, the Air Force was prepared to provide rapid,
comprehensive, and precise targeting to support the joint warfighter.
This capability was supported via a joint multi-intelligence framework
(SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT), which in turn provided an actionable
battlespace picture to the warfighter. The plan achieved regional ISR
persistence, with distributed operations, and incorporated reach-back
to provide more flexibility and analytical capability. One of the
extraordinary results achieved from this synergy was the ability of the
Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) to engage multiple targets
per sortie, vs. the WWII-era standard of hundreds of sorties per
target.
As I provide an operational overview of some of our major ISR
programs, I will also highlight some of the lessons learned during
recent and ongoing operations. Some of our most significant
accomplishments involve the integration of multiple ISR assets to
produce an effective ISR architecture. Recent operations have found us
integrating information from our mainstay ISR fleet, including the U-2
and the RC-135; and our UAV programs, Predator and Global Hawk with
space based ISR systems. Much of this integration has been made
possible by our continuing evolution of the DCGS. In addition to our
traditional ISR capabilities, we are continuing our efforts to improve
and integrate MASINT and Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (NTISR) into our ISR collection and processing
capabilities.
Beyond the hardware, no discussion of ISR capabilities would be
complete without addressing what the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
refers to as ``the heart of our combat capability'' . . . our airmen.
Air Force intelligence personnel continue to perform in a consistently
outstanding manner in a number of ongoing joint and coalition
operations. Before closing my overview of Air Force ISR, I will address
some of our ongoing force management efforts, which assist in defining,
renewing, developing, and sustaining our intelligence force structure.

ISR ARCHITECTURE

The integration of theater and national ISR assets during OIF
reflects the tremendous potential of truly integrated ISR to transform
combat operations. The Air Force pursued several programs to integrate
air and space ISR capabilities into the CAOC. A key integrating program
for theater ISR is the Air Force DCGS. The operational effectiveness of
network-centric operations was validated during Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The DCGS weapon system provided the
combatant commander a global, distributed architecture for theater ISR
via a combination of reachback and forward deployed systems and
personnel. This reachback effort included TPED for Predator, Global
Hawk, and U-2 missions. We teamed with the national agencies, and other
mission partners to provide unprecedented ISR coverage throughout OEF
and OIF. The success of both of these operations was enabled by
integrating ISR asset capabilities into the DCGS network, which allowed
us to cross-cue information among platforms and sensors, and pass on
fused actionable intelligence to commanders and strikers in real time
to execute coordinated, synergistic combat operations.
In fiscal year 2005 we begin fielding the Block 10.2 Multi-INT Core
baseline of DCGS. The centerpiece of this baseline is the DCGS DIB. The
DIB is the foundation of the DOD DCGS transformation to net-centric
operations. The Services cooperatively developed DIB technical
requirements to ensure joint interoperability and enable net-centric
operations. The Services have committed to being interoperable with the
DIB, and a DOD-level governance process has been established to ensure
compliance. The improvements to our space and terrestrial
infrastructure, modernization of our legacy baseline, and the
integration of the DIB, will provide the combatant commander
unprecedented access to decision quality information for operations
anywhere on the globe.
As warfighters, we focus engagement-based intelligence with the
concept General Jumper calls ``cursor on the target.'' Cursor on the
target does not imply that we will always use intelligence to destroy
enemy equipment or attack their forces. In some cases, we put the
cursor on the target to simply learn more by focusing collection with
ISR sensors.
At the heart of this approach is predictive analysis. Based on what
we know of terrain, weather, enemy training, capabilities and habits,
we focus our application of military intelligence on what is possible
and likely. We cannot chase an infinite set of possibilities, but
rather, must frame the problem for our decisionmakers. Leveraging this
predictive analysis tied to a network centric ISR architecture through
DCGS enables us to optimize limited ISR assets.
While we've spoken to the architecture, these successes aren't
possible without the specific programs and people making it happen.

U-2 DRAGON LADY

The U-2 continues to be the most capable multi-intelligence
platform in our inventory, as was demonstrated during OIF. We are in
the final stages of a decade long upgrade program to the aircraft,
sensors and data links and we are in the initial stages of fielding
this new capability. We will be fielding additional capability over the
course of the next couple of years as systems complete operational
testing and evaluation.
The U-2 continues to be at the forefront of Air Force
reconnaissance, enhancing our strategic competencies for warning,
providing data needed for time sensitive targeting and enhanced data
links speeding information to multiple users. The U-2 is a lynchpin in
Air Force efforts to network and integrate ISR into warfighter C2 and
will remain a viable and necessary ISR asset.

RC-135 RIVET JOINT/COBRA BALL/COMBAT SENT

The RC-135 fleet continues to be in high demand by the unified
combatant commanders in support of the global war on terrorism, because
of its state of the art airborne collection system, and adaptability.
Baseline modifications allow us to adapt quickly to time-critical
unified combatant commanders' requirements, and field capabilities as a
direct result of lessons learned from OIF and OEF into future
baselines.
We currently project the RC-135 fleet to remain viable well into
the 2020s and perform the role of heavy-lift SIGINT in the Air Force's
scaleable, networked ISR architecture. This long-term viability is, in
part, based on two major upgrades to the fleet that enhance the overall
reliability, maintainability, and sustainability of the platforms. The
re-engining effort to equip all RC-135s with CFM-56 engines has already
paid huge dividends with zero maintenance write-ups for the new engines
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Another vital modification, well
underway, is the modernization of our cockpit instrumentation and
systems. This major upgrade will provide the infrastructure to meet new
International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements for
global air traffic and navigation.
The global war on terrorism has dramatically expanded our target.
Mission ready enlisted aircrews remain a challenge with the expanding
operational tempo required to meet the worldwide support requirements.
We continue to address these issues in order to meet future combatant
commander requirements. We have maximized linguist-recruiting
accessions and filled our training pipeline. We are addressing
retention through offering higher re-enlistment bonuses, continually
working to alleviate operations and personnel tempo issues, and
refining airborne linguist career field management to maintain our
current pool of linguists.
Even as we work to increase the availability of the RC-135 fleet
and address our manning challenges, the fleet will remain a Low
Density/High Demand (LD/HD) asset. Combatant commanders across the
globe depend on the capability RC-135s bring to their theaters. To meet
this challenging LD/HD situation, we will continue our high priority
efforts to maximize the utility of all available assets, enhance
aircrew training across the board and continue to improve management of
our linguist career fields. Further, to counter rapidly emerging
threats, we will continue updating RC-135 collection systems to ensure
warfighters are armed with accurate, timely and actionable
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

MQ-1 AND MQ-9 PREDATOR

We continue to develop the Predator system into fiscal year 2005.
Most noteworthy is our development of the MQ-9 Predator B `Hunter-
Killer' aircraft capable of automatically cueing and prosecuting
critical emerging Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs) with a self-contained
hard-kill capability to include precision-guided munitions. This will
provide a persistent, armed reconnaissance multi-mission UAV operating
higher and faster than the MQ-1 and with a greatly increased payload
capacity.

RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK

As it did for OEF, the Global Hawk deployed in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom and was able to provide critical support for the
warfighter. The persistence, flexibility, and responsiveness of this
system were once again proven successful, where it demonstrated the
capability to image anywhere in the area of operations. Its ability to
deviate from pre-planned flight tracks combined with its simultaneous
carriage of EO, IR, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors offers
the flexibility to respond to dynamic environmental conditions to
achieve the best available collection.
The Global Hawk is a tremendous addition to our ISR fleet
capability. The persistence and long dwell capabilities preclude an
enemy's sanctuary from reconnaissance or surveillance. It also affords
theater commanders the ability to plan for and execute a standard, pre-
planned collection mission while also having plenty of time available
to execute ad-hoc retasking for emerging or time-critical targets. As
we field the Global Hawk fleet over the remainder of this decade we
will achieve significant improvement in our ISR capabilities.

REACHBACK

Reachback provided desired support without the costs and risks to
personnel and equipment associated with the deployment. Prior to the
war, Air Combat Command established the Expeditionary Intelligence
Group (EIG), a CONUS-based organization. The EIG enabled the CFACC to
call upon analytical and operational support from over 1,000
personnel--not all in one location--coordinated by one organization.
EIG assistance also reduced forward deployment requirements, and
eliminated the commensurate requirements for base operating support,
force protection and airlift.

Commercial Imagery
The Air Force has recognized the improvements in the quantity,
quality, and timeliness of Commercial Imagery, and has established a
robust Commercial Imagery capability to support the full spectrum of
warfighter requirements. The 480 Intelligence Wing serves as the Combat
Air Forces premier reach back intelligence production center for the
global war on terrorism, and is the Air Force's primary producer of
Commercial Imagery products.
The first Air Force Controlled Image Base (AF-CIB) production in
support of OEF was completed within 3 days of September 11. This made
possible production-enabled mission planning for current operations.
Non-Traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
NTISR was developed to address the need for additional ISR
collection by tasking aircraft to record weapons system video of
selected targets. Aircraft with targeting pods traditionally used for
targeting purposes, were tasked to locate, identify, and assess
potential/emerging targets and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).

FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT

During OIF, deployment of Air Force intelligence professionals
jumped to a level almost 10 times greater than the pre-September 11
numbers. In our new ``steady state'' operations, the number of
intelligence personnel deployed at any given time is still far in
excess of that experienced before September 11. This dramatic increase
in our expeditionary commitments has placed tremendous stress on our
ISR workforce. This is especially true with LD/HD skills such as
targeting, collection management, imagery intelligence, and
cryptologic-linguists in selected language groups. However, we are
making strides in addressing this issue: in fiscal year 2004, Air Force
Intelligence received additional authorizations to support stressed
career-fields, and for fiscal year 2005, AF Intelligence will receive
more authorizations. Additionally, our Air Reserve component continues
to make vital contributions to meeting Air Expeditionary Force
requirements.
We are diligently working to improve the skills of our enlisted,
officer, civilian, and Air Reserve component intelligence professionals
by developing career-long Force Development models based upon the Air
Force Chief of Staff's direction. This effort involves taking a hard
look at our initial skills, advanced skills, and follow-on unit mission
readiness training for the total force. In our initial skills courses,
we are reviewing combatant command requirements to ensure entry-level
airmen have the skills necessary to meet both steady-state and wartime
requirements. For advanced skills training, we have developed two new
courses, the ISR Operations Course and the Intelligence Master Skills
Course, which enhance the operational proficiency and leadership skills
of mid-career intelligence professionals. At the unit level,
Intelligence Formal Training Units provide airmen the right training at
the right time on specific weapon systems and mission areas. In
addition, we will continue to leverage educational opportunities such
as the Joint Military Intelligence College and the NSA internship
programs designed to enhance the technical and leadership skills of our
total force.
The Air Force's vision for improving intelligence analysis involves
a three-pronged approach of professional development, analytic tool
development and technology recapitalization. In the area of
professional development, the Air Force Intelligence division sponsors
the Quality of Analysis program, which is focused on providing analysts
with deeper analytical area and functional expertise. The individually
tailored training may involve travel to foreign countries for
geographic area familiarization; attendance at academic seminars,
scientific symposia and equipment exhibitions; and visits to Federal
and private research centers and laboratories. At the National Air and
Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), there is a professional development
program for the entire workforce, incorporating education and training,
mentoring, tradecraft, and a civilian career development program to
ensure that analysts have the skills they need to serve our country to
their highest potential. The second front on which the Air Force is
working to improve our intelligence analysis capabilities is analytic
tool development. We are working with the other Services to develop
products and models in common languages and databases that the entire
Intelligence Community can use. Examples include IDMATS, which
characterized foreign Camouflage Concealment and Deception; Joint
Dynamic Information Operations Decision Environment (DIODE), a links
and nodes analysis program; and the Threat Modeling and Analysis
Program (TMAP). The Air Force is also working to operationalize digital
production, following standards set by the Intelligence Community Chief
Information Officer. The Digital Production program at the NASIC, when
complete will allow smart data mining and instant access and search
capability on thousands of products. Finally, we are exploiting Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT). The events of September 11 and the A.Q.
Khan proliferation network have abolished all doubts that civil
aviation is a vital logistical node for terrorists and proliferators.
Air Force Intelligence has begun to focus on the full spectrum of this
problem in order to provide combatant commanders the requisite
intelligence to support military operations. This must include the
capability to provide a worldwide, 24/7, real-time air picture.
Assessment of terrorist and proliferator use of civil aviation, whether
compiling basic intelligence or identifying potentially hijacked
aircraft threats, will require an unprecedented degree of integration
of open source and classified data streams. We have explored the means
to do this and the results are promising indeed. I regard it as one of
the most vital services Air Force Intelligence can provide to the
Nation.
We are continuously reviewing our manpower utilization and the
operational requirements placed upon our intelligence force to ensure
they have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet our National
Security objectives.
The global war on terrorism continues to highlight the need for
skilled linguist to meet ongoing operational requirements. To amplify
this LD/HD capability within the Air Force we have increased the
crypto-linguist training pipeline and number of personnel trained in
less commonly taught languages critical to global war on terrorism
operations. Earlier this year we teamed with the Air Force Manpower
Agency to identify requirements using the Air Force's new Capabilities
Based Manpower Determinants process. This process takes a holistic end-
to-end look at weapon system and mission area operations to determine
force structure needed to provide required warfighting capabilities.
This process will ensure our combatant commanders have the full
complement of intelligence resources to meet their needs in peace,
crisis, and war.

SHORTFALLS

JFCOM noted, in their final OIF Lessons Learned document, that BDA
did not keep up with the speed of operations. The Air Force initiated
the Air Force Assessment Task Force (AFATF) to address a number of the
issues listed in this document as it pertains to BDA. The AFATF has
developed a flight plan towards Effects Based Assessment and is
addressing service and joint issues using the DOTMLPF (Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities)
construct, identifying a number of near-, mid- and long-term solutions.
JFCOM identified ISR as ``A capability that demonstrated
considerable effectiveness'' within their OIF Lessons Learned Report.
However, they also highlight the need for better enemy force locations
once hostilities began and to measure the effects in a manner that
supports operational objectives.
The Air Force's ability to determine enemy composition and
disposition in support of targeting is being addressed partially via
the Air Force's Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA) Implementation
Plan. The plan, which has captured some of the work of the PBA
Integrated Product Team (IPT), is looking at DOTMLPF solutions to
improve--and expedite--the continuous generation of tailored
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products. Some of
these solutions will be material in nature and will improve our
machine-to-machine interfaces, thereby expediting the IPB products used
by our targeteers and others within the Air and Space Operations Center
(AOC). In short, a true PBA capability, once fully implemented, will
enable U.S. Air Force intelligence personnel to determine enemy
composition and disposition in a more timely fashion, thereby
supporting our ability to strike, maneuver and generate desired effects
within the battlespace.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has stated ``the sum of all the
parts of our ISR capability ends with a cursor over the target. . .,''
and today's Air Force ISR programs are providing the warfighter with
the tools to achieve this. The Air Force is committed to bringing the
best ISR capabilities to the fight and providing the intelligence
capabilities that address both the national security demands of today
and of the future. The Air Force is proud of its contributions to the
defense of the Nation, and is especially proud of our people who are
working every day to support the global war on terrorism. We appreciate
this opportunity to provide you an overview of our programs--our
successes, our challenges, and our efforts to ensure that the Air Force
ISR programs continue to provide the capabilities needed for our
Nation's security.

Senator Allard. Next I'd like to call on Mr. Decker,
Director for Intelligence, United States Marine Corps.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. DECKER, DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE,
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Mr. Decker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. It's a pleasure to be here to talk about Marine
Corps intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance today.
Marine Corps ISR exists to support expeditionary maneuver
warfare, and specifically it exists to support the commanders'
planning, decisionmaking, and then execution of expeditionary
maneuver warfare. We believe that the program that we've
fielded in OIF, and what we continue to field in our fiscal
year 2005 program, allows the commander to build a
comprehensive ISR network that gives him the necessary degree
of tactical self-sufficiency, while allowing him to reach back
and network into theater and national sensors. We think that
we're also an enabler of joint operations because we've put
these capabilities forward, and that using the tenets of
horizontal integration, we're building our capabilities to be
networked into the larger ISR network of the DOD and national
intelligence agencies.
We build our systems specifically to support both maneuver
and targeting. I appreciate the chairman's comments at the
beginning that the goal here is to support both targeting and
decisive military operations, because I believe sometimes we
overemphasize sensor-to-shooter in targeting, and not spend
enough time on the difficulties involved in supporting maneuver
to get to the targets on the ground.
We believe that although these systems are networked to
support horizontal integration, they are networked as part of a
larger joint environment, that our systems are tactical by
nature and that they're funded in TIARA because they really are
the commanders' systems, and the commander has ownership of his
intelligence marines and his intelligence systems. The
information that they may be presenting to the commander may be
something they got through reachback or through networking in
that joint and national arena, but what they're doing is, the
commanders' intelligence marines are presenting to him
information to support maneuver and targeting, and they're part
of his warfighting team, and we think that's the best way to do
this.
We have some great examples from OIF. We provided, prior to
D-Day, a lot of reachback support to the marine division. The
Marine division's initial guidance was to attack due north
through Al Kut, through a Republican Guard division, and then
essentially hook left towards Baghdad. The Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity, under DOD federated intelligence
production, was asked to study the terrain in between Al Kut,
where the Baghdad division was, and the terrain between there
and the Army forces that were maneuvering further west up
towards Baghdad, to determine if a division could maneuver in
that area. We determined that that could be done, and that was
instrumental in the division commander crafting his plan to
move forward by swinging well to the west of that Baghdad
infantry division. So that ability to reach back to the
combination of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity and the
national agency's support allowed us to help them make that
decision. Part two of that decision, though, was based on the
ability to eliminate any threat from the Baghdad division to be
able to reach out and touch the right flank of the Marine
division as they bypassed Al Kut. That was truly a community
effort in targeting to support the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing.
Those precision-target coordinates, hundreds per day, came from
the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). There was
actually a click-on, on the home page down in Charlottesville,
where the Marine wing, over in Al Jabar in Kuwait, would click
on the NGIC home page in Charlottesville, and it said, ``Click
here for today's 3rd Marine Air Wing targets.'' Same thing for
NGA, in St. Louis; same thing for the Joint Intelligence Center
at CENTCOM, which many of those targets actually came, as
General Sams said, from the Air Force DCGS here in the CONUS.
But by the time they were done, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
had eliminated every tank, every vehicle, and every artillery
piece that could have impacted the right flank of the division,
and the division commander was fairly comfortable in his
ability to maneuver past Al Kut and head towards Baghdad in a
much more expeditious manner than he would have been able to
had he been forced to fight through that Baghdad infantry
division to get across the Tigris River. So we think that that
whole ability to provide the commander that capability to use
his own assets and to reach back to national worked for us
there.
We also, as Dr. Cambone mentioned, created persistence
surveillance for the commander by attaching to the commander a
large number of UAVs, tactical HUMINT teams, what we call CI/
HUMINT exploitation teams. We attached to the commander SIGINT
support teams, Trojan Spirit devices down to the regimental
level that allowed our SIGINT marines to reach back to NSA for
interactive SIGINT support, so that both the tactical SIGINT
collectors and what national was getting would support--and I'd
like, in closed session, to tell you more about how we bring
that capability together to do some rapid targeting, and
especially now, in OIF-2.
But I think the bottom line for us is that we were able to
put together in a rudimentary fashion where we're headed for
horizontal integration, because I take the comment of the
Members that persistent surveillance also brings an analytical
challenge, it brings an information-overload challenge. I think
we were able to pull that together to support the maneuver
units both in OIF-1 and now again in OIF-2, and I think we'll
be able to talk more in closed session, but I think we're on
our way there, sir.
I think the Intelligence Marines are doing a great job.
We're extremely proud of them; they're extremely pumped up when
you hear them--they talk to us on e-mail every day, and they're
just out there building targets and supporting maneuver on a
daily basis. I just couldn't be prouder of what they're doing
on a daily basis. If anything, they're probably providing more
targets on a daily basis than we can actually go after, just
because they're doing such a great, thorough job for us.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Decker follows:]

Prepared Statement by Michael H. Decker

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee for requesting
Marine Corps participation in this hearing on our intelligence programs
and lessons learned from recent military operations. It is an honor to
be here to discuss Marine Corps ISR programs funded by TIARA funding
and the JMIP.
During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve,
engaged in operations around the globe. Our successes in executing
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) depended on our Marine Air Ground
Task Forces (MAGTFs) having a reach-back capability to leverage and
populate theater, service and national intelligence repositories, while
maintaining a tactically self-sufficient ISR network to support forward
MAGTF fire and maneuver. We fund our ISR systems, generally referred to
as the Marine Air Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS), in TIARA because
although networked and joint enabling, they are integral to our
tactical combat command elements and maneuver units.
Marine Corps ISR exists to support EMW and, specifically, the
commander's planning, decisionmaking, and execution. Our previous
Marine ISR modernization efforts emphasized increased collection and
analytical capability at the maneuver level of command and reach-back
support from theater, service and national organizations. We have
sought, and we continue to seek, to transform how we fight by providing
unprecedented ISR capability and access to all of our combat echelons--
from our small units such as companies all the way to the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF), our largest MAGTF. These efforts led to a
number of successes during OIF-I that I would like to share with you.
Marine commanders task organized their organic intelligence support
to adapt to the speed and distance of their specific operations. We
augmented our Marine Divisions with support from Pioneer UAV squadrons,
topographic/IMINT specialists and Trojan Spirit-Lite intelligence
communications systems to provide responsive ISR support and secure
mobile connectivity. Likewise, we augmented the next lower maneuver
echelon, the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), with a wide array of ISR
enhancements such as Dragon Eye UAVs, CI/HETs, and SIGINT Support Teams
(SSTs) to improve their organic collection capability; Trojan Spirit
IIs to provide secure mobile connectivity; and data link receivers for
aerial sensors such as the Pioneer UAV, the Navy's P3 and the Litening
POD on the AV8-B Harrier to provide them with a ``bird's eye'' view of
the battlefield. These enhancements provided the capability to conduct
immediate and responsive ISR operations such as employing the Dragon
Eye UAV to safely scout the first crossing of the Tigris River; using
SSTs to identify and neutralize enemy call for fire nets during the
second crossing of the Tigris River; and capitalizing on CI/HET assets
embedded with Light Armored Reconnaissance units to facilitate a
prisoner of war rescue north of Baghdad.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), the Marine Corps'
Service intelligence center, provided Federated Production support
before D-Day including lines of communication (LOCs) and inundation
studies. This intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) support
was critical to 1st Marine Division receiving approval to bypass Al Kut
and strike toward Baghdad on secondary routes. MCIA serves as the
parent command for Intelligence Marines on joint duty and in combat
support agencies. Consequently, MCIA connects Marines assigned to
defense agencies, Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs), Joint
Intelligence Centers (JICs), and Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers
(JRICs) and enables them to work as a virtual team in support of
warfighting and combat development intelligence requirements.
The MEF's organic Intelligence Battalion coordinated reach-back
targeting support by leveraging the NGIC, the NGA St. Louis, and the
Joint Intelligence Center Central Command (JICCENT)/CFACC in order to
populate automated target folders for strikes conducted in theater.
These target folders enabled advancing Marine Forces to rapidly strike
and destroy artillery units of an Iraqi Division between Al Kut and
Baghdad, thereby denying the enemy the ability to use these assets to
hinder our advance.
As these stories illustrate, TIARA funded MAGTF ISR assets are
embedded in command elements and maneuver units. We have technical
specialists in all-source fusion, SIGINT, CI/HUMINT, reconnaissance and
UAV operations that can be task organized to support any given
commander's situation based upon his specific requirements. Enhanced
intelligence support to the Marine maneuver unit in combat enables more
efficient utilization of theater, service and national collection
assets while simultaneously enabling commanders to focus their organic
collection assets on their immediate areas of responsibility. We
believe these organic capabilities should remain in TIARA so the
commander will have an ownership stake in not only making them part of
his team in combat, but in preserving and enhancing these capabilities
during Service planning, programming, and budgeting.
Our EMW concept continues to be used with great success today in
Iraq and Afghanistan for force protection, security and stability
operations, and counterterrorist operations. Our commanders are using
actionable intelligence to conduct focused raids and attacks on a daily
basis in Iraq and Afghanistan. When only partial information exists,
commanders are conducting patrols and ``cordon and knock'' operations
to generate intelligence. Actionable intelligence requires not only
commanders who are empowered and willing to act, but also the
presentation of target development information by Marines who are
viewed as part of the team. Both focused raids and patrols are examples
of commanders viewing their ISR Marines as trusted members of the
command element's decisionmaking process. It is very rewarding to
routinely read in commanders' Situation Reports things like ``forces
throughout the AO positioned to conduct focused, intelligence driven
operations against the enemy;'' ``execution time based on actionable
intelligence;'' and ``continue to gather and refine targetable
intelligence.''
I would like to thank the subcommittee for your support of Marine
Corps intelligence. I have tremendous pride in the contributions made
and the hard work being done by our ISR marines. With your continued
support, intelligence will remain the indispensable precursor to and
enabler of MAGTF operations. The Marine Corps remains focused on
organizing, training, and equipping our forces to best support Marine
commanders, combatant commanders and national decisionmakers throughout
the spectrum of conflict. Incorporating recent experiences, increasing
our forces' integration with joint capabilities, exploiting the
flexibility and rapid response capabilities of our units, and
preserving the adaptability of our marines will collectively lead to
more options for the combatant commanders. I look forward to addressing
our successes in detail in closed session.

Senator Allard. Let me now call on General Wurster,
Director for Intelligence and Information Operations, the U.S.
Air Force.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DONALD C. WURSTER, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND

General Wurster. Thank you, sir. On behalf of General
Brown, thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
As you're aware, high-quality intelligence is essential for
us to be able to do the types of things that we do. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) depends on the architectures that
the other Services bring to the fight. We work on unique SOF
aspects of that sort of thing. But Global Hawks and the
national satellite architecture and the NSA and the Director of
the Central Intelligence (DCI) bring capabilities on which we
absolutely depend to get the right information down to our
shooters.
One of the key lessons that we have learned, and it's
something that we have long culturally believed in Southern
Command, is that persistent observation of a target is
essential. We virtually always have somebody watching a spot
before we go there. In the longer term, as we look at
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the intercept
of terrorists globally, we need to know, Where does that vessel
go when it leaves this place? We need to know, What time did
that vehicle move? We need to know, Tell me when that door
opens so that I can act. That requires a range of sensing and
information that runs the full spectrum from the national and
strategic to a person on the street that's accomplishing a
specific task for us.
We're working with the partners, our partners in the
Intelligence Community, to continue to evolve an excellent
system to orient it more towards the current needs. But in
today's world, we need to be able to locate and track a
specific person. We need to find a person, and then dwell on
that individual to gain information about who he interacts
with, where he goes, what he does, until we arrive at the point
where either we want to pick him off or take him out to achieve
our objectives. Tagging, tracking, and locating is important
not only for knowing where our own forces are, but where others
are.
SIGINT is essential to us, and I'll be happy to discuss
some anecdotes of that more in the closed session, one of which
includes the fact that the NSA saved my life, and I'll tell you
that story.
But we need to be able to detect, intercept, geo-locate,
monitor any device that these bad guys are using, and our
national experts are on the job at that. We're partnering with
the NSA to do the piece of that that is logical for SOCOM to
contribute to, and we are moving forward in that regard.
The other one is CI/HUMINT. You've heard it on several
occasions. In SOCOM, we believe that humans are more important
than hardware, and there are some things that just require us
to put a right person with the right skill in harm's way to
gain a piece of information that's essential for us to do that.
Anecdotally, our Defense HUMINT teams that, coupled with the
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces and other
national forces that were forward, were an ad hoc arrangement,
where we borrowed from DIA the right kind of people to do the
right types of work, and a small group of people was able to
pull information--cultural information, familial ties, and
things like that. That group of people assembled the
information that allowed our shooters to find the spider hole
that had Saddam Hussein in it. It can't be overstated the
importance of that.
Horizontal integration, the USDI already mentioned, but SOF
needs to be connected into that. We recognize that there's a
need for a unique piece of information that we have that may
have strategic importance to other organizations, need to get
back into that architecture. We do that fairly well now with
SIGINT, but as we look at increasing the number of UAVs we have
and--our human architecture needs to, likewise, support that
effort to arrive at a large--the large picture and perspective
that many can use. Data sharing is essential. We need to be
hooked into it.
I'd like to thank the agencies that we work with routinely,
the NSA, NRO, NGA, DIA, and CIA. General Brown has made the
comment that the relationships with those organizations have
never been better. They're embedded in our staff down at SOCOM,
and we have tremendously positive relationships at the working
level with them.
In summary, I have some other things that I would like to
share with you in closed session.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of General Wurster follows:]

Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Donald Wurster, USAF

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is
my privilege to report to you on the state of the United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) intelligence organization and capability.
Our men and women represent the finest quality of intelligence
professionals and they continue to make progress in the global war on
terrorism through their dedication, sense of urgency, and commitment.
We continue to work to ensure that our combat forces are provided
with the best intelligence available and have access to our most
advanced intelligence systems, as well as connectivity to the national
agencies, the Services, and other combatant commands. In addition we
strive for superior quality in our intelligence force as we train,
organize, and equip our people.
The USSOCOM commander's guidance is clear. We are to maintain a
steady focus on the global war on terrorism, ensure the readiness of
our forces, and continue transformation efforts to match our
capabilities with tomorrow's battlefield requirements. We are doing
this by teaming with conventional forces, coalition partners, and other
agencies, as well as by strengthening intra-departmental cooperation.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

High quality intelligence is a force multiplier which enables our
SOF warriors to achieve strategic success despite their limited numbers
in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accurate and timely intelligence
is a critical resource as we pursue counterterrorist efforts in the
Horn of Africa and the Pacific region as well. Intelligence preparation
of the battlespace assured SOF successes early in OIF and is
contributing to continued success in rebuilding the infrastructure of
Afghanistan while hunting down Taliban and al Qaeda leadership.

Iraq
A fused intelligence picture provided through the use of all
intelligence disciplines enabled SOF to establish early footholds and
successful operations in Northern Iraq. The intelligence gleaned
allowed SOF to play significant roles to prevent the Iraqi V Corps in
the north from reinforcing Baghdad. It helped us maintain a clear
picture of the threat poised by missiles in western Iraq, and assisted
in the seizure of key airfields, the capture of Iraqi senior
leadership, and the prevention of a potential ecological disaster
through the intentional destruction of oil wells and infrastructure.
Finally, it allowed SOF to secure potential chokepoints that could
impede our main axis of attack and control sensitive areas for
investigation and analysis. These are poignant examples of SOF leading
the fight with the speed and security afforded by responsive, timely
intelligence. The establishment of Task Force Viking to conduct
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North operations in
Northern Iraq assured early teaming with Kurdish military and political
leaders. Accurate intelligence assessment of the threat in the Bashur
region enabled SOF to help secure the airfield and allowed the 173rd
Airborne Brigade to conduct their night drop into Bashur to deliver
nearly 1,000 airborne troops in the largest airborne drop since WWII.
This set the stage for the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and eventually the
26th MEU, to link up and team with Kurdish Peshmerga enabling
coordinated offensive air operations against 700 entrenched Ansar Al
Islam fighters.
The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West denied
western Iraq as an area of operations from which Iraq could conduct
offensive missile strikes against neighboring countries, averting a
potentially wider regional conflict. Intelligence provided by SOF
teams, fused with that of national agencies and regional Joint
Intelligence Centers coupled with reach-back operations to
exploitation/analysis centers of excellence, enabled U.S forces to
rapidly secure and control this strategic ground in Iraq.
In the south, high quality intelligence provided an accurate
picture of the threat to aircrews as they inserted SOF teams deep into
Iraq. These teams provided precise and timely reconnaissance of key
locations and allowed conventional ground commanders a more accurate
picture of the battlefield contributing to the rapid speed of advance
in the ground campaign. National intelligence assets identified
strategic oil infrastructure targets in the littoral areas and enabled
Naval Special Warfare Task Group to secure these objectives and provide
the initial conduit for seaborne humanitarian aid to Iraq. This
successful operation which secured all targets within 40 minutes
secured critical nodes and averted the threat of an intentional
ecological disaster in the region.
SOF, supported by multi-source intelligence collection, continue to
aid the efforts to eliminate Fedayeen Baath party loyalists, former
Iraqi military and political leaders, foreign fighters, and other
terrorist cells who seek to attack U.S. forces as they attempt to
thwart stability within Iraq.
Afghanistan
Our SOF supporting the combined operations in Afghanistan continue
to rebuild the infrastructure, establish positive rapport with the
local populace, and eliminate Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorist
elements. Tip offs from various intelligence sources have led to
successes that eliminate weapons caches and explosives, as well as the
terrorists and their leaders.

LESSONS LEARNED

To provide a better and more predictive picture of the battlefield
against terrorists, our processes are being refined based on the
lessons we have learned. With the assistance of the USDI, national
agencies, geographic combatant commanders, and our components, we are
adjusting our intelligence sight picture to improve the way we conduct
intelligence activity. Some of the key lessons learned are described
below.
Persistent ISR. We need to provide our commanders with higher
fidelity information to allow them to detect, locate, and track small
groups or individuals. The USSOCOM global war on terrorism mission
requires the ability to conduct ISR on a focused and uninterrupted
basis in order to find, fix, and finish terrorist threats. We are
working with partners in the Intelligence Community to adjust
intelligence requirements and methods to the new paradigm.
Our highest priority requirement is to attain the capability to
find a specific person who presents a threat to our country, our
values, and our way of life. We must be able to locate and track this
High Value Target (HVT) in permissive and non-permissive environments,
then dwell on the HVT from the point of discovery through decisive
action to capture or kill the individual. We also seek the ability to
integrate deployable tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL) technology
to defeat the threat. Ultimately, we seek to expand the capabilities of
remote, unmanned devices that could be added to this network. The ISR
architecture must be flexible and adaptive to meet the challenges of
the future.
CI/HUMINT support to SOF. The global war on terrorism has produced
an increase in demand for professional HUMINT and CI resources.
Dedicated HUMINT and CI resources have proven to be one of the greatest
contributors to the successes enjoyed by SOF to date. While all
recognize the need for more and better HUMINT, SOF's relationship to
these intelligence providers is central to success in the hunt for
terrorists. USSOCOM is working closely with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and we support the HUMINT Reformation
Initiative. We look forward to the outcome of this effort which holds
positive indicators for the future.
Training and Manning. You have heard USSOCOM repeat the consistent
opinion that ``Humans are more important than Hardware.'' We must
produce high quality technical systems while remembering that success
or failure depends upon trained intelligence specialists. We place high
priority on our efforts to recruit, train, and retain talented
intelligence professionals. The capture of Saddam Hussein is directly
attributable to the dedicated work of a small group of analysts who put
together the pieces of a puzzle, coupled with the SOF warriors who were
able to find him in his spider-hole. Recruitment, training, and
retention are essential ingredients in our ability to perform similar
feats in the future.
Horizontal Integration. To achieve integrated persistent ISR that
provides actionable intelligence results from the development of an
overarching integrated intelligence architecture including a
collaborative environment with tools, databases and collection systems
that specifically support the global war on terrorism. The IC, under
the guidance of the DCIA and the USDI, is focusing on this issue. As a
result, the interagency and DOD interaction and cooperation continue to
improve. USSOCOM has been fully engaged in these planning efforts.
USSOCOM recognizes that the al Qaeda network is adaptive, flexible,
agile, and capable of inflicting harm on U.S. interests at anytime. Our
intelligence architecture must be equally adaptive and flexible, and
provide timely, relevant, and precise information to defeat this
threat. USSOCOM is actively participating in the IC efforts to improve
Horizontal Integration. USSOCOM seeks integration in any network or
execution architecture that enables key participants in the global war
on terrorism to collaborate effectively. As the IC, law enforcement
agencies, coalition partners, and other sources assemble information on
terrorists, we must be able to improve the security of our forces and
citizens.

INTERAGENCY SUPPORT

I would like to take this opportunity to make a statement about the
support USSOCOM has received from NSA, NRO, NGA, DIA, and Central
Intelligence Agency. Liaisons from each of these agencies are embedded
in the USSOCOM intelligence team. The close relationship established
and maintained by these committed patriots is crucial to our successes
to date. General Brown, Commander, USSOCOM stated that ``the current
relationship is the best it has ever been'' and USSOCOM would not have
enjoyed the success we have had without the support of these agencies.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES AND JOINT MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

USSOCOM's TIARA and JMIP budget request ensures that USSOCOM will
continue to provide the intelligence support required to conduct the
global war on terrorism and fulfill title 10 responsibilities for
ensuring component readiness. Our TIARA and JMIP investment strategy
provides the means to leverage national and theater intelligence
capability and acquire SOF peculiar systems required to meet the unique
mission needs of the SOF warfighter. As we continue to fight the global
war on terrorism, we must continue our modernization program in concert
with other Department of Defense and interagency organizations. I will
first address our TIARA programs followed by our JMIP needs.
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System--SOCOM Research,
Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (JDISS-SOCRATES)--JDISS-SOCRATES
is an umbrella program that acquires and supports garrison sensitive
compartmented information (SCI) automated intelligence system (AIS)
requirements for Headquarters USSOCOM, its components, subcomponents,
mission support units, supported geographic combatant commands, and
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) in conducting global war on
terrorism, OIF, OEF and peacetime missions. Capabilities include access
to national, theater, and SOF-specific databases; news service and
message traffic; softcopy imagery processing, imagery product archiving
and dissemination; analyst-to-analyst electronic mail and chat
communications; Intelink and Intelink-S web servers; and secure voice
and facsimile. In short, all those sources and possessors of
intelligence which enable operators to engage the enemy decisively are
delivered to SOF operators over JDISS-SOCRATES. The $30 million
requested in fiscal year 2005 will provide the architecture and
infrastructure required for the global war on terrorism and will assist
in our current efforts to incorporate national mandates and maintain
full interoperability with the DOD Intelligence Information Systems
standard architecture and with each theater Intelligence Data Handling
System.
Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN)--TACLAN provides a deployable
command and control system capable of sharing operations, intelligence,
and administrative information throughout USSOCOM, the Service
components, supported geographic combatant commands, TSOCs, and
deployed task forces in all security domains. The TACLAN is an
extension of JDISS-SOCRATES that provides a nearly seamless transition
of intelligence system connectivity from home station to combat
operations. TACLAN consolidates tactical command, control, computers,
communications and intelligence (C\4\I) requirements from previous
USSOCOM programs and centralizes management of USSOCOM's tactical C\4\I
requirements in order to integrate current and future tactical AIS
initiatives into a single efficient information management system/
architecture. Based on lessons learned from OEF and OIF, and other
operations, tactical intelligence communications and dissemination
capabilities are mission essential to special operations. The total
TACLAN fiscal year 2005 budget request is $20 million. The fiscal year
2005 TIARA portion of the TACLAN budget request, $2 million, provides
critical deployable, tactical SCI connectivity and functionality to
prosecute the global war on terrorism and future contingencies.
Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center
(SOJICC)--We have continued to improve our network-centric,
collaborative capability, the SOJICC. The SOJICC uses advanced
computing capabilities and nodal analysis to rapidly collate, process,
display, and disseminate relevant information for timely decision
support. The SOJICC information technology is scalable in design and
corresponds to current industry standards in data mining, data
retrieval, data warehousing, knowledge management, pattern recognition,
speech recognition, machine learning/neural networking, audio and video
capture, parallel/distributive computing, visualization and search
optimization. SOJICC's data mining and other capabilities complement
the efforts of DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating
Terrorism. Over the last year, SOJICC has been instrumental in
populating a standardized, collaborative terrorist database that is
replicated to the combatant commands. This effort is essential for
producing a common intelligence picture that allows combatant
commanders to link and track terrorist personalities and events
throughout the world. The total $9 million fiscal year 2005 budget
request for SOJICC will fund and maintain the current analytical
efforts in support of the global war on terrorism and allow the program
to identify and test new software technologies to improve future
support.
USSOCOM is now the Program Manager (PM) for the
Counterproliferation Analysis Planning System (CAPS). As one of the
prime users of CAPS, it was logical for us to assume the PM duties and
guide the fiscal year 2005 $16 million effort. This effort continues
development of the CAPS database, intelligence support procedures,
information technology systems planning, system integration and
interface control, software development, and development of analytical
tools and system interfaces. CAPS will continue to be an invaluable
tool in the future as the United States struggles to curtail the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Joint Threat Warning System (JTWS)--Uniquely provides credible
threat warning and intelligence information to special operations
forces. JTWS will provide this critical SIGINT capability tailored for
all components. The following SOF legacy SIGINT systems were
incorporated into the JTWS family of systems in fiscal year 2002:
Improved SOF SIGINT Manpack System (ISSMS), Privateer, and Silent
Shield. We are replacing these legacy systems with JTWS ground, air and
maritime variants which will provide an increased capability against
the sophisticated forms of communications that are present worldwide.
The legacy SOF SIGINT systems have demonstrated the high value of
tactical SIGINT during many recent missions involving SOF. The
acquisition and fielding of JTWS is key to providing enhanced
situational awareness, force protection and time sensitive intelligence
for targeting to supported SOF elements. SOF SIGINT capability has
routinely proven itself in ongoing combat operations throughout
Afghanistan and Iraq. Intelligence gained through the use of SOF SIGINT
capabilities is shared with other intelligence collectors and the
national community.
Direct Support Operations (DSO) on Air Force Special Operations
Command aircraft, using Silent Shield equipment, have proved
indispensable to the safety of SOF airborne attack and infiltration
operations.
The Privateer systems have provided key intelligence to SEALs
during numerous Maritime Interdiction Operations. During OIF, Navy
tactical cryptologic support operators were critical to supporting all
phases of Navy SOF operations, including the critical opening hours of
the war while supporting those forces tasked to secure Iraq's key
infrastructure.
The ISSMS continues to provide key force protection and situational
awareness to SOF teams in every area of operation. It is crucial that
we continue to modernize our SIGINT gear in order to keep pace with the
ever changing increasingly sophisticated technologies we are
encountering on today's battlefields.
The JTWS program will significantly improve our ability to provide
early warning, force protection, situational awareness, and tactical
targeting in support of full spectrum operations in general and the
global war on terrorism in particular. In short it assures our
operators define the conditions of the battlefield, keeps aircrews,
sailors and soldiers alive, and enables precise target engagement. The
fiscal year 2005 budget requests $13 million to sustain current
cryptologic systems, to procure Ground SIGINT Kits to replace the ISSMS
and to complete JTWS air variant development.
Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT)--MATT provides SOF
with a near-real-time capability to receive and process national and
theater intelligence broadcasts. It provides threat warning, force
protection, enhanced situational awareness, and target acquisition
information to SOF via receipt of Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS)
data. IBS data supports mission planning and execution by aiding the
warfighter with course of action analysis during infiltration and
exfiltration from operating areas. The currently fielded MATT systems
are rapidly approaching the end of their service life. USSOCOM is
currently pursuing the Embedded Integrated Broadcast System Receiver
(EIR) technology to replace MATT and Briefcase MATT systems. EIR
utilizes Embedded National Tactical Receiver (ENTR) technology, which
is significantly smaller and lighter and uses less power than the MATT.
ENTR is a receive-only system that will provide globally deployed SOF
with an enroute capability to receive near-real-time intelligence data
on the changing threat and target environment. USSOCOM's ENTR contract
will accommodate SOF's basis of issue plan requirements, as well as the
DOD and Second Party members' requirements. USSOCOM has been working
with the IBS Executive Agent, the United States Army's Joint Tactical
Terminal Program office, and the Services. The fiscal year 2005 TIARA
budget requests $1 million for MATT sustainment.
Special Operations Tactical Video System (SOTVS)--SOTVS provides
the capability to capture, store, and forward digital imagery in near-
real-time and in day or night. SOTVS provides a diverse array of
surveillance and reconnaissance mission capabilities and operates in
environments utilizing the global command, control, communications, and
computers communications infrastructure. This capability has proven
invaluable in OEF and OIF and will continue to be critical to success
in the global war on terrorism. The fiscal year 2005 SOTVS TIARA budget
request of $2 million will sustain digital imaging equipment, remote
controllers, and transmission devices.
National Systems Support to SOF (NSSS)--NSSS is a rapid technology
development program that is funded to leverage technologies and systems
from the national agencies, Services, and national laboratories, with
the goal of quickly improving the exploitation of existing and emerging
space technologies to satisfy SOF requirements. NSSS improves the
combat effectiveness of USSOCOM, its components, and the TSOCs through
the innovative use of national and commercial space intelligence, data
processing, and communications technologies and systems. This includes
Imagery Intelligence, SIGINT and Measurements and Signature
Intelligence, and associated tasking, processing, dissemination, and
tactical display technologies. Requested funds of $1 million in fiscal
year 2005 provide enhancements in SOF personnel tracking capabilities,
miniaturized antenna and receiver technology, surrogate satellite/high
altitude airship technology, and providing mission essential
intelligence to forward deployed forces.

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (JMIP)

At USSOCOM, JMIP funding allows USSOCOM to maximize the total force
construct by providing critical Reserve support each year. Reserve
Intelligence support provides almost half of USSOCOM's total
intelligence manpower requirements. These reservists are integrated
into every intelligence mission area within the command. USSOCOM is
requesting $3 million in fiscal year 2005 for military reserve support.
We have exceptional expertise and skill sets throughout for Reserve
Force and we must retain this support. This funding provides USSOCOM
with personnel who possess the highly valuable skill sets that are in
high demand throughout the SOF Intelligence Community.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, there is much work to be done to protect our Nation,
accomplish our missions, and take the fight to the enemy. We are taking
the right path to maximize ISR programs that enable precise engagement
of SOF in the global war on terrorism and maintain our readiness. Our
process assures improvement in effectiveness and efficiency of
operations as we adjust through lessons learned and changes to the
battlefield. Our requirements are documented in USSOCOM and component
Mission Needs Statements and Capability Documents. These requirements
serve as the basis for programming, doctrinal, procedural, and force
structure changes to correct ISR-specific operational deficiencies.
OIF, OEF, and the global war on terrorism will continue to challenge
our intelligence system and we must look ahead to make sure we optimize
our collection efforts, collaborative processes and architectures, and
cross-sharing of information to make sure the right people, know the
right things, at the right time.
Thank you for the opportunity to represent the Quiet Professionals
of USSOCOM to this committee and for your continued support to our
forces and, more specifically, to our intelligence needs in your role
of oversight and fiscal decisionmaking. We appreciate your efforts and
assistance.

Senator Allard. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
I just want the members to know what we're planning is,
from here, we'll give each member 5 minutes for questions, and
then that'll probably get us pretty close to 11:30, 25 minutes
to 12:00, or so, and then move to the other room that's secured
for secret discussions, and then I want to just start out, do
the questioning. I'll yield my time first to the Chairman from
the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, and then we'll
call on Senator Nelson, and then we'll proceed from there.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I say to you, and your distinguished colleague, you are a
great team because of all the subjects we have, I think there's
the greatest degree of bipartisanship on the importance of
intelligence and how it's a force multiplier and literally
saves lives. Lives are very much on our mind at this hour, when
our forces are fighting, and we have reports now of significant
casualties, both killed and wounded, and our hearts go out to
their families and to the bereaved.
Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of being in Iraq just
2\1/2\ weeks ago, and, General Alexander, I met with General
Fast, a very impressive major general, who's your chief of
intelligence. Matter of fact, I spent several hours with her
during the course of that day.
This leads me to the question. Right now, I'm working with
the leadership to have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
perhaps the Secretary of Defense come over this afternoon to
work with the Senate. One of the issues that we'll be
discussing, Secretary Cambone, is the issue of the June 30
deadline for turnover of the sovereignty. Speaking for myself,
I have done a lot of research and thoughtful discussion on
this. I feel very strongly we should hold the course and
maintain the schedule of turning over sovereignty on the 30th,
irrespective of the increased insurgency, because I feel that
it affects the credibility of the coalition forces, and
particularly the United States and Great Britain, in the eyes
of the Iraqi people, recognizing these insurgents represent a
small percentage of the Iraqi people, the majority of them
desirous of obtaining freedom and sovereignty. It also would
affect the credibility of our efforts in the eyes of the
bordering countries. I've visited with the heads of state and
government and military commanders of several of the bordering
countries. Throughout that region, I think, it would send an
unfortunate signal if we were to arbitrarily shift that date
and leave an uncertainty.
Does the intelligence show any meaningful indicators with
respect to holding fast, versus changing the date?
Dr. Cambone. No, sir, not that I have seen this morning or
over the last few weeks. You've heard the President's position,
you've heard the Secretary's position----
Senator Warner. Both the Secretary of Defense and, indeed,
the President have spoken out very firmly on this.
General Alexander, from your perspective?
General Alexander. No, sir, I haven't, either. I appreciate
your comments on General Fast. Thanks.
Senator Warner. Yes.
General Alexander. Thanks.
Senator Warner. Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank you, Members, for your indulgence. I yield back my time
to questions you may have.
Senator Allard. Thank you, and we appreciate your being
here. I also had a chance to go over to Iraq a couple of weeks
ago or so, and had an opportunity to see the Predator, and
actually see it land--very impressive. Part of your discussion
this morning and your testimony--as well as to see the Stryker
new Light Armor Division actually being at work here on TV and
seeing those--that new technology being put to work out there,
and so it's always heartening to see that that's out there
serving the men and women on the battlefield.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, Space-Based Radar,
persistent surveillance, how do you define ``persistence''?
Dr. Cambone. I appreciate that question, Senator, because I
think there is some misperception about it. I do not define
persistent as continuous in the sense of every minute of every
day, day in and day out. Where I think we need to go is to an
understanding of the amount of time that we need to have under
observation, as General Wurster said, the targets of interest.
That interval needs to be commensurate with the character of
the activity that we are trying to observe.
So a ship crossing the ocean moves at a given speed, and
within a fairly simple mathematical calculation, you know where
it could be over some given period of time, and you need to be
able to be within a time interval, all right, that is
consistent with your ability to reacquire that ship as it's
moving.
With respect to something that's moving on land, on the
other hand, which is moving in a more confined space and may be
moving more rapidly than a ship is, you would have to have
what's called a ``revisit rate'' that is more frequent than it
would be for a ship.
What we're in the process of doing with the Space-Based
Radar, working our way through, if you will, those algorithms.
How frequently do we have to revisit a target? Over what area
do we have to cover? Then--and here is the important part, and
why I said what I did in my opening statement--to integrate the
data that you would get from a Space-Based Radar with the
aircraft that provide radar coverage, with the aircraft or
satellites that might provide signals intelligence, and with
those human sensors or those remotely-placed sensors that one
may have, and integrate all that data to provide the level of
persistence that's required.
Senator Bill Nelson. Horizontal integration. I'd like each
of the witnesses to say what you're doing to increase the
number of analysts to support the increased volumes of data
that the new collection system is going to provide. Since we'll
probably never have enough imagery, analysts, or linguists to
support the data volume, what steps are you going to be taking
to reduce the workload and increase the efficiency?
Then before the 5 minutes gets out, General Sams, Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is
something that I've been involved in for over 15 years. It's
located in my home town of Melbourne, Florida. Last year,
Congress asked the Air Force for your views on proposed re-
engining. When is the Air Force going to produce the required
report? What's the Department's position? I'd like you to share
that with the committee.
General Sams. Sir, in terms of re-engining the JSTARS, I
know there's been a lot of discussion in the Air Staff, and I
know that the aircraft could use new engines. I would like to
take that for action and get back to you with a coordinated
response from the Air Force, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. If you will get in touch with
me, personally.
General Sams. I will do that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The draft JSTARS re-engining report is in Air Force top-line
coordination. The draft report covers the operational benefits and
lower overall life cycle cost of re-engining JSTARS through purchase or
lease, compared to maintenance of the current engines. While re-
engining makes a good business case, the Department will likely balance
the need for JSTARS re-engining with other Air Force priorities as it
builds the fiscal year 2006 budget submissions. OSD AT&L will sign out
the report to the Hill when it is approved.

Senator Bill Nelson. Good.
Gentlemen, horizontal integration, and what are you doing
to increase the number of analysts and so forth so we can
analyze the data?
General Alexander. Sir, in Army transformation, we have a
great increase in intelligence soldiers--our interrogators, our
counter-intelligence, and our off-source analysts--and we're
moving them down to brigade level under task force modularity,
and it's a superb effort. It takes the connection in the
system, the DCGS of the future, and gives that down to brigade
level and below. I think this is important.
We are coupling, to the DCGS, the tools that we are using
in the IDC and in Project Morning Calm that they need to work
through the mounds of data that we have available. This new
technology is key in getting at the problem that you're talking
about, sir, how do we rapidly sort through information,
hundreds of thousands of reports, that have been, over the last
several years, that might be applicable to an apprehension?
We've found that it has been superb. We are getting that out
now. I think that's going great, sir, and we have several
places that we could show you that in operation.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about the Navy?
Admiral Porterfield. Yes, sir. We have several initiatives
underway in this regard, and I consider horizontal integration,
the way to describe it is ``data ownership.'' We have to get
rid of that as a principle. It's shared. As General Wurster
said his SOF assets could have a bit of information that makes
a great deal of difference to the President, but we may not
know that. So horizontal integration is that concept.
We're doing two things that I think you'd like to hear
about. First, we're taking some people that are doing, and have
been doing in the past, largely administrative work, and we're
turning them into imagery analysts. We have in the program this
year requests for several transformational UAV platforms, which
will take analysis to make some use of them. We are doing that.
The second one is, we are actively integrating our Reserve
intelligence forces into active participation in our overall
effort, from training to the production to the way we recruit
and assign these people. So those two things--one, turning the
administrators into the analysts, and also making much greater
use of our very fine Reserve component.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about Special Operations?
General Wurster. Sir, one of the things that was General
Schoomaker's vision just came online in 2001 and 2002. It's
called the Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration
Center (SOJICC), and it's a collaboration center. What we have
done is coordinated to gain access to a large number of
classified databases that comes back through the intelligence
architecture. We have a fairly small group of people down
there, but they have built the equivalent of a Google search
engine, if you will, that looks at--where Google looks at 5
billion Web pages, this looks at 15 billion pages of
information. So if you type in ``al Zarqawi'' and
``chemicals,'' it will draw for you a visual presentation. If
you add, say, ``halalah activity'' for financial transactions,
it will give you another map, and we can use those maps. What
we're using is--we're finding ways to use the information to
learn information about the information, and to know where to
look to apply resources. So we've taken a technological jump in
the methodology by which we're going to approach that, much the
way you would search on eBay or something like that. But we
were able--for instance, as they were rolling guys up in Iraq,
we had the list of people we were trying to find, and so we ran
all of their information in the SOJICC, and printed out a
notebook that would fit in a soldier's thigh pocket, ``When you
get this guy, here's who his family is, here's where he's from,
here's who he's hooked up with. By the way, get us his phone
numbers,'' and things like that.
So that is probably the most significant piece of
horizontal integration we have. But that, primarily, again, is
as a consumer of other people's expertise. So, as we gain
access to more information of that type and infuse into that
structure, we anticipate that we will have continued success
with that. Right now, whenever we have people go out around the
world, they're bringing information back and plowing it into an
infrastructure that enables us to mine it later.
Mr. Decker. Sir, on the Marine Corps side, since Operation
Desert Storm the Marine Corps has gotten about 10 percent or
more smaller, but the number of intelligence analysts in the
Marine Corps has actually grown by 10 percent over that same
period. So we've made an investment in analysts to handle this
information flow. The target folders that were used to brief
the Fallujah operations to Joint Task Force-7 (JTF-7) and, in
turn, to get the SECDEF's and the CENTCOM's approval on the
mission were done by, first, intelligence battalion analysts
that are right there on the ground with 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force. So that system is working.
Part of that, sir, also is a great Reserve capability. The
commandant has approved a doubling, 100-percent increase in our
Reserve intelligence analysts, starting in fiscal year 2005, so
we'll be increasing that.
But I think it's important, also, when you look at
horizontal integration, to look at the data tagging and then
the tools for searching and looking at the data, and the
attempts to automate that. There's two attempts to tag data.
One is Extensible Markup Language data tagging that occurs with
finished products. Then the other is the role of the Air
Force's DCGS 10.2 integration backbone and setting a standard
for tagging the raw sensor data as it comes in, so that'll even
speed that up further, and then to provide the analysts tools
to search that raw data. So it's a synergy, sir, of analysts,
reservists, tools, and database tagging.
Dr. Cambone. Let me just close that off, Senator, to say
that there are probably two parts of this that are important,
in addition to the analysts. One is what Mike Decker just
talked about, and that is the enabling technologies from the
communications pipes to the machine-to-machine interfaces and
so forth. That's enormously important.
The other thing that's important is access, access, access,
because the more that the people who use the data have access
to the information as soon as it is in a consumable state,
ironically enough, the fewer analysts you are going to need.
What you want to do is get to an environment in which the user
is able to find what he needs, and make use of it, and then
leave, for the analysts, the harder work of putting together
larger mosaics, trend analysis, and things of that sort. We
have to learn how to get the access for the operating forces to
the information that they need.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
I'll now take my 5 minutes. I want to address this to
Secretary Cambone.
Where are you--I don't expect a real detailed answer in
this--in standing up your Department? Are you 80 percent there,
75 percent, 100 percent? Where are you? I was struck by some of
the challenges you have, 14 pages of committees and boards that
are all involved. You have to worry about consolidating, and
some directives go all the way back to 1970. So if you could
just give us very quickly some idea about where you are as a
percentage of getting the Department stood up.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. In terms of personnel--I was just
briefed this morning--I have 117 people, billets, Department of
Defense billets. There was some number of contractor support.
My staff thinks they need a lot more people. I'm not so
certain. But we probably need another handful of people, and
we'll work that over the next few months.
In terms of the directives--the 30 directives that sit out
there--that is just a matter of dogged determination in going
through them, so I feel pretty good about that. The 14 pages of
boards and committees, I'm less satisfied with. We have not yet
undertaken the effort to get all of that consolidated. So in
terms of people, we're probably at the 85 percent mark. In
terms of going through the paperwork, we're probably somewhere
at the 50 to 60 percent mark.
In terms of establishing the relationships that make the
organization work, I think we're well on our way to making
those connections.
Senator Allard. While you're in the process of standing up
your Department, some are even suggesting that we need to
establish a cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence.
I'd like to hear what your views might be about the
establishment of a Director of National Intelligence.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. You won't be surprised that I share
the views of the Secretary of Defense. [Laughter.]
That is that what you have heard here today is as
compelling a case for retaining the extant relationship between
the DCI and the SECDEF. The information on which the operations
of the forces depend are only in part generated by the DOD. The
remainder of it is generated through those systems which are
developed and operated in the context of a national foreign
intelligence program. Absent the deep and abiding relationship
between the DCI and the SECDEF, it is easy to see the ways in
which seams would begin to grow up between organizations and in
which the DOD would not benefit, and, in fact, the Intelligence
Community, as a whole, be hurt by that split.
So sustaining the existing relationship, we think, is
essential. Are there areas that one can look to see improvement
made? Certainly. We have reviewed some of those. Indeed, the
additional funds that have been requested by the President for
intelligence reflect an effort on the part of the DOD and the
Intelligence Community to identify our shortfalls and
shortcomings, to suggest our priority, in terms of fixing them,
and then coming to some conclusion about where the resources
should come from in order to be able to pay for those
shortcomings.
So I honestly do not see advantage to the creation of a
different structure for the governance of the Intelligence
Community than the one we have today.
Senator Allard. The other question I want to bring up is
open-source intelligence. We have a lot of reporters that are
covering a lot of the issues related to Iraq and a lot of our
foreign affairs, and they establish relationships, and then
they report their findings on TV, or they report their findings
in the newspaper, sometimes even on the Internet. Are we paying
attention to those open sources? Seems to me like perhaps they
could be helpful. I wondered if any of you want to respond to
that.
General Wurster. Sir, I'll respond to that. If you haven't
read Maria Ressa's book, called ``Seeds of Terror,'' about
Jemaah Islamiah in the Pacific, you should read it. She
interviewed me when I was the Joint Task Force Commander in the
Philippines, and she is incredibly articulate. As a matter of
fact, I distributed that book to all the flag officers at
USSOCOM. She knows what's going on in the Pacific; and when she
talks, we listen.
Senator Allard. Any other comments in that regard?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. We use open source in our
analytic centers. We use that information, and it does help us
to link different things together. So it is used widely.
Senator Allard. I see all of you shaking your head up and
down. I'm assuming that you do use those sources.
Just, finally, the UAVs are in use. I'm curious as to how
many different--I'm not asking about the number of UAVs, but
how many different UAVs are now in use in each Service, and
what unexpected difficulties have you encountered, and what are
you doing to address some of their problems? I address that to
all of you.
Mr. Decker. Sir, in the Marine Corps we have two different
types of UAVs. We have the Dragon Eye, which we call our
``backpack UAV.'' It's a small UAV that folds up about this
big, that's used at the battalion level. They used them at the
regimental level in OIF as well. Then we have the Pioneer UAV,
which is referred to as a ``tactical UAV,'' that has about a
100-mile range. The problem we had with the Pioneer UAVs--there
were two squadrons of them with the division--the problem was
the 100-mile range. The MEF commander attached those two
squadrons to the division because he knew the division would be
running fast. As Dr. Cambone said, you want him to be able to
tailor his persistent surveillance to where and when he needed
it, so he had his own UAVs to do that with, but he was just
maneuvering so fast and often covering more than 100 miles a
day, and he would have to seize an airfield that those UAVs
could operate from, or a piece of road. So our plan for the
Pioneer replacement, that's in the 2005 to 2009 program, is to
replace it with a vertical takeoff UAV with increased range and
speed that will then allow us to go further than 100 miles with
the air platform, and the ability to sprint back and forth
between maneuver units that are in trouble that need
persistence surveillance at any given time.
In the case of the backpack UAVs, our solution is just to
buy more of them, because there just weren't enough. We had
great success, though, with the backpack UAVs in the case of
the crossing of the Tigris River. The division commander told
the regiment, ``Don't show yourself unless you're sure the
bridge is still standing, because I don't think the enemy
realizes we bypassed Al Kut and we're already up here.'' He
said, ``Can you see the bridge? Or can you get somebody up to
the bridge?'' The regimental commander said, ``Well, we can't
get close enough to see the bridge with binoculars without the
enemy knowing that we're here, but we can let the lead
battalion throw their backpack UAV up over the hill and look,''
and that's what we called that. We called that the battalion
commander's with look-over-the-hill capability with the
backpack UAV, the Dragon Eye. So we've had good success with
them, sir, and we just want more of them and want them to be
better.
Senator Allard. Admiral.
Admiral Porterfield. Sir, in the Navy we don't have any
operational UAVs right now, but we have two programs that are
in development; one, a tactical platform for use on our
littoral combat ships, as well as a high-altitude UAV, we call
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) at the moment, for
maritime surveillance. We intend to stay the course and develop
the concept of ops as both of these platforms can be used to
provide the maritime ISR that we require.
Senator Allard. General Alexander.
General Alexander. Sir, we have right now three UAVs. Let
me go over those. We have what's called the short-range UAV,
which we've just begun to purchase those. I think we have 15
right now in Iraq and Afghanistan working, and those will
increase, thanks to your support in the supplemental for
purchasing more of those rapidly for our forces. Those give the
battalion level, company level, the ability to see over the
next hill. The tactical UAV, or Shadow, is the one that we're
buying for the brigade level. Under Army transformation, both
of those increase significantly and are needed for the
battalion and the brigade commanders to see out to their level.
At the division theater level, division corps theater level, we
have the extended range multi-purpose UAV coming online.
I would like to point out that we don't see the UAV mission
as something that the Army does alone. We depend heavily on the
Air Force for their support with Predator and Global Hawk,
also. So integrating across that is key to the way that we'll
operate in the future.
Senator Allard. General?
General Sams. Sir, we have three primary UAV systems. We
have a small one, called Desert Hawk, which our security forces
use. It's literally launched with a bungee-type rubberband, but
it has a 200- to 500-foot altitude capability. It flies around
the air bases. It allows the security forces to have eyes
outside the gate. It's been very successful, actually. Over in
OIF, we've found weapons caches, we've found some bad guys
running around. It's been very good for force protection.
Probably our best-known one is the Predator. We consider
that as a true growth industry. I think the limitations that we
have on Predator are primarily range. It has a whopping 65-knot
air speed, and so in a 70-knot wind, it takes a long time to
get anywhere. [Laughter.]
So that's one of the reasons that we're looking to the
Predator, the B version, which will be the turboprop version,
and it'll fly 30,000 feet, and we'll be able to get to the
target a lot faster with a heavier payload.
Global Hawk, our high-altitude system, is very popular. We
are working hard to make that operational. There is a pre-
production model right now that's working pretty well at
Edwards, and we have accepted two production models out there.
Our challenge, though, is to get the pilot training, get the
ground systems in place, get the maintenance, all the kinds of
things that it takes to build an operational squadron to make
it operational.
Senator Allard. I now call on Senator Ben Nelson from
Nebraska.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With all the discussion about UAVs and looking over the
hills, I suspect that Admiral Porterfield was thinking the Navy
probably got this right first with the periscope. [Laughter.]
But whether we look at horizontal or vertical integration
of intelligence, I think that it all boils down to something
that maybe Lieutenant General Ronald Keys, USAF's Deputy Chief
of Staff of Air and Space Operations, when he was quoted in
this month's issue of ISR Journal as saying, ``Many of the
things we're doing today involve a system-of-systems approach,
a network-enabled solution. It's the ability to take
information from different sensors and fuse it to get that
cursor over the target.''
Secretary Cambone, does STRATCOM have the ability to
address requirements such as integrating multiple ISR feeds
into a common global display for use in global command center,
an ISR feed? Then, second, would it be safe to say that
STRATCOM's global operations center requires a level of C-2
integration, which cuts across the national to the tactical
level of operations at a level not equal to--found in any other
command, fusing together operational and intelligence
information?
Dr. Cambone. I'll give you a qualified yes to the second
question, and the only reason I qualify it is that I would
argue that the extent, scope, depth of information that they
will need at Omaha on a tactical situation, I think, is a
matter of judgment for the commander about how much of that he
may need. I can tell you that that kind of data is readily
available. You can go into any of the ops centers, you can go
in the Pentagon and see at a very finite level of detail those
tactical feeds.
With respect to the question of whether they are yet
arranged, situated to do the task, again, I'll give you a
qualified no. The reason I say that is that they are equipped
for most of the connections that they will require. The
question of whether they have the stations and the internal
servers and support networks and so forth is not clear to me.
Admiral Ellis has put forward a proposal over the course of the
Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the next 5 years to build that
capability out there and to meld both his intelligence and his
targeting activities so that he will be able to do both in a
unified way.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will that be supported in the budget by
the Defense authorization?
Dr. Cambone. You bet. There is funding in 2005, on the
order of--I want to say $80 million. He did not receive in 2004
what he had requested, and I am aware of that, and I have asked
my people to see if, as we go through the midyear reviews, we
can find some additional funding for him to get started
earlier. The issue is, when can he let the contracts with some
confidence that there is going to be the funds there. He and I
have talked about this, and I have asked them to go see if they
can find some money for him.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Sams, I understand the Air
Force is standing up the Air Force Strategic Command (AFSTRAT)
and that will be the force provider for STRATCOM. Maybe you
could expand on how this command would be organized, and how
it'll integrate with current STRATCOM operations and activity.
General Sams. As I understand it, the AFSTRAT concept was
still in discussion with Admiral Ellis and Air Combat Command.
But in terms of the ISR forces, we do present them through 8th
Air Force, so we have the command-and-control wings underneath
Lieutenant General Carlson at 8th Air Force. Then those forces
are then tasked through our normal Air Expeditionary Force
(AEF) rotation cycles, and in terms of ISR forces, those are
proportioned in accordance with the demands of the AEF and also
the demands of what is the joint staff. Then as STRATCOM then
takes over the ISR responsibility, there'll be proportioned in
accordance with that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Would that include the joint command of
Space Command, as well as part of that action, or are they
separate?
General Sams. I believe it does, and let me get back to you
with a more definitive answer.
[The information referred to follows:]

Day-to-day Air Force administrative tasking for Air Force space
assets fall under Air Force Space (AFSPACE). For those apportioned to
STRATCOM their day-to-day tasking will be done by STRATCOM through
AFSPACE via STRATAF once it is stood up.
The draft fiscal year 2004 Forces for Unified Commands will assign
STRATAF (8AF) as an Air Force component to STRATCOM. STRATAF will
consist of a headquarters staff and air operations center to provide
planning support for Air Forces forces to either assigned to under
operation control for STRATCOM.
An AFSTRAT forward element is being established to Offutt AFB and
it will have the ability to communication with 8th, 14th, 18th, and
20th numbered Air Forces.

Senator Ben Nelson. With the Orwellian big-brother approach
that intelligence offers, I am concerned about how you move
from overload of information to analysis to use. Obviously,
inadequate information and inadequate intelligence is a problem
that I'm sure that you're very carefully using the information
you have to avoid overload problems so that the analytical side
and the utilization of it can be as effective as possible.
Would any of you like to comment on that? I assume, General
Alexander, you'd be interested in this finding.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I'll tell you that you bring
up a real key point about how we leverage information-age
technology for our Intelligence Community. What I mean by
that--when I grew up in intelligence, we used to take 100
messages and spread them out on a table in hard copy, and then
our analysts would go through----
Senator Ben Nelson. You probably still do some of that, I
take it?
General Alexander. No, sir, they bring them in to me now,
and they tell me, ``This is the one you should read.''
Senator Ben Nelson. Oh, okay.
General Alexander. You see, when they do that, the irony
is, they're filtering it for you. In our systems yet today,
when you're on the Internet, what you do when you do a Google
search, for example, is, you do a search, you get a query with
50,000 responses, and then you redefine your query to cut it
down to a hundred.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
General Alexander. But the intelligence that we need,
especially in the global war on terrorism, was in that other
49,900. So what we have to do is train the analysts to use that
information in realtime.
We sat down with one of our terrorism analysts who had,
similar to what General Wurster talked about, the ability to
take 200,000 messages and put them up into spheres and to make
and bring the information amongst those spheres together to
track for the Marine shootings in the Failaka Islands to a
shooter in Saudi to support a national agency on who this guy
was and what he had done, 210,000 messages that an analyst was
using. Now, we can't do that consistently across the force, but
that's what we have to do, is take those kind of tools and the
ability to use that in realtime and get that amongst our
analysts. I think that's what we're trying to do with the DCGS,
IDC, and Project Morning Calm.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is that technology better than
Google's?
General Alexander. Yes, sir, absolutely. [Laughter.]
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Senator Allard. The Senator's time is expired.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Did our intelligence--Mr. Secretary, I'll direct this to
you and then others that want to respond--in Iraq develop a
foreknowledge of the latest eruptions of the insurgents?
Dr. Cambone. I don't think, sir, that there was much
confusion about the situation in Fallujah, and I don't think
that there was a lack of understanding about the political
situation in the south, in the Shia area.
Senator Dayton. Can you give me just an applied lesson and
an applied intelligence--and what is the nature or the specific
kind of intelligence that you're able to obtain through your
various devices--and we can go into closed session if you want
to elaborate--but that provides forewarning to our forces there
that something is developing, or the nature of what's
developing, or the size of the force that's developing?
Dr. Cambone. I'd be happy to do that, sir, but if we could,
would you allow me to do that in a closed session?
Senator Dayton. Absolutely.
Dr. Cambone. Yes. I think the others can give you some
information as well.
Senator Dayton. Okay.
Is the intelligence that you gather in your respective
branches, is that shared with your counterparts in the other
branches at the level of intelligence, or is that the level of
operations? How is that transmitted to one another?
General Alexander. Sir, we share intelligence back and
forth, at least from my perspective, amongst the Services
extremely well.
Senator Dayton. Okay.
General Alexander. We argue over who should do what at
times. But I'll tell you, on the ground it works very well
together, passing the information, as General Sams said, from
the Predator and others. I think that's getting better and
better all the time.
Senator Dayton. That's shared at the level of the
intelligence operations, or is that at the level of the on-the-
ground----
General Alexander. On the ground.
Senator Dayton. On the ground, okay. When you talk about
the 49,900 units of information that you have that you need to
analyze, how do you distribute that information? Because
somebody else might have another 49,900 something that connects
up. How do you integrate that, or is it even desirable to
integrate it? Any of you?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. Let me jump in on this,
because you're hitting on a key point where the databases that
we have that would have all the information that goes back
years, as an example, would be maintained at a national and a
theater level; and then at a higher classification in the
operational intelligence that I'm talking about of sharing on
the ground--for example, tracking a target and destroying it.
So if the question was, what do we know about Abu-X, and who is
he related to, and how does that lead to a takedown that we
would work with the SOF or with the Air Force, that information
is information that is in those nationally-held databases, and
goes all the way down, today, to division level, that we will
move down to brigade level in the future, and that all of our
Services have at a certain level that is specially
compartmented.
The secret collateral-level information goes all the way
down to our battalion level and is something that we are now
taking down to the soldier level, sensitive but unclassified,
so that they have that information. So that if Predator sees
something over the next hill, they can get that information
through all that, all the way to that soldier over the next
hill. More importantly, that soldier can ask a question and
oftentimes the Air Force will re-tier that platform to help us
understand what's going on. So when I say it's working back and
forth, that's what I mean.
But we have to continue to push that Distributed Common
Ground Station, which we are in a joint effort. That's
something that I think you'll see all the Services benefit from
in the future.
General Sams. Sir, Mr. Decker mentioned earlier about data
tagging. I think that is one of the key things about making all
of that information available, because what I might be
interested in something different, as an Air Force person, than
the Army did, but we want to be able to click on something and
get it immediately. The other thing is, if that data is tagged,
if the machine can talk, it prevents me from having to manually
type certain bits of information--and then the way I type it, I
know it's going to come out wrong--so that we reduce our
opportunities for errors when we can do that, and those are the
kinds of things that we're working really hard on.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Decker. Sir, as General Sams and General Alexander
said, all of the data, all of the intelligence information
reports are being shared at the secret level, from the
battalion tactical unit teams all the way up to the JTF and
then into the national databases, and that's where the great
synergy occurs. Dr. Cambone mentioned the importance of robust
communications, and getting larger bandwidth in the future. But
when you uncover an individual at a battalion-level tactical
HUMINT team, and you flip open your CI/HUMINT laptop, and you
start trying to check that person's name in the database, you
can find out if anybody else has ever mentioned that name
before. You can find out if any--if he has phone numbers on a
piece of paper in his pocket, you can find out if those phone
numbers have ever been used before, and who he possibly has
been talking to, who he's associated with. That pattern-linked
trend analysis is key to unwrapping all of this. It's very
important that we share the raw information reports and the
finished products both online, and have the bandwidth to share
them across the force.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. The only question I would
have outstanding, and maybe it's better to get it in writing
from each of the branches, is if there's anything that they
need seriously that is not included in the 2005 authorization
budget.
Senator Allard. You can submit questions and we'll ask the
panel to respond back in 10 days.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. All right, thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Allard. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Cambone, you've been a promoter of the Space-
Based Radar system to develop global persistent surveillance.
We are having a difficult time funding space systems, in
general. Many of them are difficult in terms of cost overruns.
The modest version of the Space-Based Radar being proposed has
a substantial cost already, likely to grow. What are you doing
to ensure that we will have not only a feasible alternative,
but one that we can afford?
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. Three things, none of which may seem
to be critical, but, I think, in fact, is where we have to be
focused if we're going to get to affordable systems, no matter
whether they're in space or on the ground or at sea.
First, the contract proposal that has gone out is seeking
not a point solution by a single contractor, but is looking for
a first cut at the range of alternatives, trying to calculate
the needed capability over against a range of metrics and
measures about its application and use. So we'll have a better
sense of the applicability of the system, its mission
effectiveness, than we might otherwise have, and be able to
define and refine its performance. Because we have a habit of
saying to ourselves, ``Space systems are expensive, so let's
hang every Christmas-tree bulb we can think of onto that
platform,'' and that drives the cost up substantially. So the
first thing is to work closely with the contractor community to
make sure we understand the range of capability over the range
of applications.
Second, we are working with that same contractor community
to develop a new set of metrics to measure how the system
should be analyzed--evaluated. Let me give you an example.
Today, we essentially have a single-shot-camera approach to
taking imagery. It takes a picture, and it takes a picture, and
it takes a picture, and it takes a picture. So you can come up
with some metrics. How many pictures can you take in a day,
over what area, and so on and so forth?
That's not how the Space-Based Radar is going to work. The
Space-Based Radar will be about managing an output of energy,
and that energy output will be relatively continuous. So the
area to be covered is known. The question is, how much
information are you going to be generating as that beam sweeps
across the area of interest? How do you understand its value?
We've never done this before, and so we need to apply a new set
of metrics back against the performance and the applications
that I mentioned earlier.
Then, third, Mr. Teets has written into the specifications
for the contract that he wants the senior management for the
program to be of long-serving managers. We have a habit of
seeing people, both on the government side and the contractor
side, move through the management ranks of these major
programs. He is looking for longevity in those programs.
Hopefully he is going to see that the program manager has the
kind of authority he needs to make certain that those standard
elements of cost growth, primarily requirements creep, are
within his control--that is, the program manager's control--and
he's not forced to add things that he doesn't think are
essential to the mission.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, the directive establishing the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight provides that
that Secretary shall review all allegations that raise
questions of the legality or the propriety of intelligence
activities in the DOD. Also, he is supposed to report at least
quarterly to the SECDEF on any DOD intelligence activities of
questionable legality or propriety. Now, the question has been
raised publicly about the Office of Special Plans. What is your
relationship to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Oversight? Has he issued any reports with respect
to the Office of Special Plans?
Dr. Cambone. The assistant is just what his title implies,
which is that he is in a direct-report status relative to the
SECDEF. So he, that person, that office, does not report
through my office, nor do I have any authority over that
office. We decided to do that. That was a positive decision,
because, in fact, you do want to have an independent eye
looking at that kind of question.
Second, he would not normally be asked to do that, because
as Mr. Feith has, I think, testified before Congress on a
number of occasions, that office was not an intelligence
function under the oversight of that office.
Senator Reed. It was not an intelligence function, but I
think, colloquially, at least, it was conducting intelligence
activities. It was analyzing----
Dr. Cambone. I don't think so, sir. What they did--I mean,
every office within the Department receives, each day, some
package of intelligence materials, whether it's in the Services
or in the Office of the Secretary, down to the Joint Staff. In
the case of the policy community, each of the subordinate
offices receives that information. I think that you would agree
that they would be remiss if they did not read, absorb, and do
what they should with the intelligence that's provided to them,
and that is to formulate the policy positions of the Department
relative to the issues of the day. My understanding from Mr.
Feith is, that was the role that that office played in the
course of time that it was in being.
Senator Reed. I find the answer less than satisfying,
substantively and intellectually.
Thank you.
Senator Allard. We'll now move to closed session. We'll
have the closed session in room 232. Do I have that correct? So
if we can expeditiously move over there, we'll get proceeding
further on our testimony.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Question Submitted by Senator Mark Dayton

FUNDING SHORTAGES

1. Senator Dayton. Secretary Cambone, General Alexander, Admiral
Porterfield, General Sams, Mr. Decker, and General Wurster, during the
hearing we discussed lessons and potential areas for improvement during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Have any equipment or specific program funding
shortages developed that need to be addressed in fiscal year 2005
appropriations?
Dr. Cambone. This office has been working with the authorizing and
appropriations committees to identify all shortfalls in the fiscal year
2005 appropriations bill and looks forward to continuing to work with
the committee in the future.
General Alexander. There are many lessons learned from OIF and the
Army Intelligence community has organized a task force to document and
implement them during fiscal year 2004. As we resolve these problems,
we have been making adjustments within the Department of the Army to
address many of the intelligence-related equipment, personnel,
architectures, tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, there are
still unresolved issues.
We continue to rely heavily on contractor linguist support for
intelligence, force protection, and general support operations in Iraq
and in global war on terrorism. This requirement includes personnel for
security screening and investigations.
There is a critical need for an adequate intelligence architecture
to support information processing, fusion, and dissemination for
successful operations. In that regard, we endorse the acceleration of
DCGS-A identified in Army's Shortfall List to Representative Ike
Skelton. Additional capabilities required include the IDC and an IDC-
Baghdad Extension to support units in OIF 3. The House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) recognizes the value of FBCB2-CDA Hand Held reporting
devices providing digital reporting capability for dismounted soldiers.
The HASC authorized $6 million for this requirement and we solicit the
committee's support to ensure that combat intelligence information is
analyzed by intelligence centers. We are conducting operational testing
at this time on the prototypes. The Army is also exploring other
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to enhance
collection and situational awareness. CI/HUMINT have proven to be
intelligence disciplines of choice. Both mobile training teams and
institutional training are necessary to support increasing training
needs. To assist in determining the value of terrorist and intelligence
threats, additional contractor interrogators and polygraphers are
needed. Procurement of additional communication flyaway packages and
CHIMS/CHATS systems are required for deployed personnel. These packages
enable reporting of critical CI/HUMINT information to support force
protection and battlefield operations. The Army also needs to develop
doctrine that clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities between
Military Intelligence and Military Police in the handling of prisoners
and detainees. This task will require additional civilian or contractor
personnel.
There is also an urgent need to track individuals of intelligence
value through the use of Biometric FBI Compliant Fingerprint
Architecture. A compliant architecture supporting the transmission of
biometric data from tactical patrols/tactical HUMINT teams/Special
Operations Teams to higher echelons in the DOD will facilitate
information sharing with the FBI and support tactical and strategic
operations as well as homeland defense. Such biometric data must also
be integrated into an overarching architecture to ensure
interoperability among multiple Army, DOD, and national reporting and
analysis systems in battlefield, crisis, and peacetime environments.
Additional detailed information will be provided upon request.
Admiral Porterfield. On 1 March 2004, the CNO submitted to the
Senate Armed Services Committee an Unfunded Program List (UPL) wherein
number 22 addresses budget shortfalls for direct intelligence support
for the global war on terrorism. Recent operations in support of the
global war on terrorism have identified increased need for more robust
communications to support real time dissemination of intelligence, more
forward deployed contract linguists, forward surveillance equipment
supporting ship tracking/MIO, sensor and payload tactical remoting
initiatives, increased OCONUS HUMINT activities, databases
enhancements, and continued professional intelligence training.
Additionally, I would like to direct your attention to other ISR
related requirements on the CNO's UPL. These include requirements for
the ACS (#11), FIRESCOUT VTUAV (#12), Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Modules for VTUAV ISR capability (#13), SEA TRIAL-modular mission
payloads for Sea Predator UUV (#15), procurement of additional SHARP
pods (#39), and finally the procurement of a second UAV BAMS air
vehicle to mitigate program development risk (#43). Fully funding these
programs will allow us to better support Navy and Joint operational
needs.
General Sams. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget meets Air
Force requirements. However, the Air Force is continuing to work
through its lessons learned. For the first time in the history of the
Air Force, Air Force leadership is standing up a permanent office for
Air Force Lessons Learned (AF/XOL) whose partial mission is to collect
issues, vet them for actionable items, track progress, and decisions
related to any fixes and keep senior leadership informed.
To date, this fledgling organization has taken the voluminous
reports on Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom from Task
Force Enduring Look; distilled them into broad, but workable areas and
briefed each as part of the ongoing Capability Review and Risk
Assessment (CRRA) Process. These inputs are used to influence/inform
the capability shortfall assessment, which in turn will focus Air Force
development efforts in future years.
Additionally, XOL is working with AF/XP to matrix Lessons Learned
across each program, thereby informing the Air Force Corporate Process
in their budget deliberations and tradeoffs.
Finally, the Air Force is working with Joint Forces Command on
shaping the approaches to 42 Joint Lessons Learned from major combat
operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which will be worked through the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
Mr. Decker. We have identified four intelligence programs that
would benefit from increased funding. The programs listed below were
submitted within the U.S. Marine Corps Fiscal Year 2005 Unfunded
Programs List (UPL):
1. Communication Emitter Sensing and Attacking System (CESAS).
Additional funds procure, test, and evaluate equipment to provide
protection against Remotely Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices
(RCIEDs). The CESAS provides marines with the capability to detect,
disrupt, and deny the enemy use of RCIEDs.
2. Global Command and Control System--Integrated Imagery and
Intelligence (GCCS-I3). Funds procure additional computer servers and
associated licenses and software for GCCS-I3 to support the Distributed
Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) Integrated Backbone (DIB). The
global war on terrorism has identified the need for collaborative
effort to establish a multi-intelligence, interoperable, ISR
infrastructure across DOD.
3. Intelligence Analysis System Modification (IAS MOD). Additional
funds would purchase a replacement UNIX server for the IAS Family of
Systems required to support software migration to the Global Command
and Control System (GCCS) 4.X software baseline. The current server
configuration will not provide the performance and processing
capabilities needed to support Marine Corps Operating Force
intelligence staffs.
4. Manpackable Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (MSIDS) for
Small Unit Intelligence Toolkit (SUIT). Funding would provide one MSIDS
suite for each of the 24 Scout Sniper Platoons at the Infantry
Battalion level under the SUIT concept. MSIDS provides capability to
capture, transmit, receive, and forward ground reconnaissance imagery
products in near real time.
General Wurster. Currently, the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) is in the process of developing our submission to the
Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 2005 supplemental requirements. In
that submission, we are focusing on funding needs related to deployment
costs, stress on equipment and procurement, all related in USSOCOM's
execution of the global war on terrorism. In the global war on
terrorism, it is essential that we bring the right sensors to the
battlefield, get those sensors to the target, and communicate that
information to Special Operations Forces. These types of capabilities
are being forwarded to the Department for their consideration in their
fiscal year 2005 supplemental request.

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned and
reconvened into closed session.]