[Senate Hearing 108-654]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-654
``LESSONS LEARNED'' DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN
AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, AND ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND REGION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
``Lessons Learned'' During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Ongoing Operations in the United
States Central Command Region
july 9, 2003
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 10
Franks, Gen. Tommy R., USA, Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 18
(iii)
``LESSONS LEARNED'' DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN
AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, AND ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND REGION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole,
Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
manager; Kenneth Barbee, security clerk; and Pendred K. Wilson,
receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Brian
R. Green, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jeremy L.
Hekhuis, professional staff member; and Maren R. Leed,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W.
Florell, Andrew Kent, and Sara R. Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator
McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; James
Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; James W.
Irwin and Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to Senator Chambliss;
Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman, Mieke
Y. Eoyang, and Jarret A. Wright, assistants to Senator Kennedy;
Christina Evans and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd;
Aaron Scholer, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to
Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William
Todd Houchins and Mark Phillip Jones, assistants to Senator
Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
receive testimony from the Secretary of Defense and General
Tommy Franks, who has just stepped down as the Commander of
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We also step aside from a very
sobering and important hearing to congratulate the Secretary on
reaching his 71st year. Today is his birthday.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You didn't need to do that.
Chairman Warner. I know that. You're joined, I understand,
by members of your family this morning, which is wonderful.
General Franks, we hope the opportunity comes for us to meet
your wonderful wife.
General Franks. Sir, thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. The American public, indeed the world, are
awaiting this testimony this morning, and, consequently, I'm
going to put my full statement into the record and make brief
opening remarks out of deference to my colleagues, who are
anxiously awaiting to hear the testimony and participate in the
questions and indeed the public that are following the hearing.
First, we open being mindful of the loss of life, loss of
limb, and the families who have suffered the consequences as
they have throughout the history of this Nation and other
nations in times of war. They've paid a great price, and those
risks continue, as we well know, each day. They showed courage,
the men and women of the coalition forces, they showed
commitment. Our delegation of nine Senators witnessed that just
days ago when we spent time in Basra, Baghdad, and Kirkuk. We
thank you, Mr. Secretary, and your staff, Tommy Korologos,
Secretary Cambone, and others who made this trip very
successful.
We salute all the men and women of the coalition forces and
their families. The leadership that has been shown is
remarkable--our President, Secretaries of State and Defense,
our military, General Franks, all those in your command. Our
hearing this morning covers not only Iraq, but also
Afghanistan, and indeed the possible military commitment in
Liberia. So I hope each of you, that is you, Mr. Secretary,
touch on that issue of Liberia.
Civilian control of the military has been a part of our
history, but I look upon the relationship that you, Mr.
Secretary, had with General Franks as really one of
partnership. I guess that's the way it should be. The buck
finally stopped on your desks, but having watched the two of
you as partners, conducting the operations in Iraq and in
Afghanistan, is truly remarkable.
When Senator Levin and I, on two occasions, visited
Afghanistan, and I think to an extent in the Iraqi campaign, we
were impressed by the leadership of the noncommissioned
officers, and indeed the junior officers, but the
noncommissioned officers, how groups of 15, 20, 25, would go in
on a mission at night with one officer, and that officer
knowing full well that each man or woman, as the case may be,
knew exactly what their missions were. A remarkable chapter in
history, and also of jointness, joint operations between the
Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force.
While the major field maneuvers of our troops, division
level, regimental level, have stopped, nevertheless the
fighting continues at the company level. When we visited the
4th ID, the commander went into great detail--three operations,
General Franks. I think one is still continuing--taking the
battle to the remaining enemy, not waiting for the enemy to
come, but taking it to them. To meet that challenge, we would
like to have your views this morning on the force levels, the
adequacy, the rotation policy, and how other coalition nations
are joining. Mr. Secretary, I personally felt that tremendous
efforts have been made from Washington and the other capitals
of the world to bring in other troops, not only to augment our
existing force structure, but hopefully to provide and
facilitate for the rotation of our forces and those of Great
Britain back home.
Intelligence is a matter of great interest. Your views on
the adequacy of that intelligence from a military standpoint--
troop commanders told us when we asked the question that they
had a high degree of confidence in the intelligence that they
received. Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary, the issue of
intelligence is of importance, as you well know, and how the
intelligence was utilized in the policy-making levels, at your
level, and with your subordinates as you address the American
public in open forums, and as you address Congress, how you
utilize that intelligence in such a manner to--I certainly
feel--remain accurate at all times.
The Task Force 20, which is performing, General Franks, the
specialized mission of searching out Saddam Hussein, a bounty
quite properly now having put on his head, and how they are
operating to not only find him and his two sons, but indeed the
others that had significant roles in perpetrating the horror
throughout Iraq and the threat to the world with their weapons
of mass destruction. On weapons on mass destruction, Mr.
Secretary, you've brought in David Kay, a man with impeccable
credentials and a long background and history in this subject,
working with General Dayton. You've given them a charter to go
out and use every asset that they need to uncover the mystery
of these weapons of mass destruction.
Lastly, I want to credit Ambassador Bremer. I've known him
through the years, but I think he's doing an extraordinary job,
and he laid down the three objectives that he has at this time
to try and lessen the risk to our troops and at the same time
bring about the fulfillment of our mission to provide freedom
for the Iraqi people. The first is to take the battle to the
enemy, and that's being done, to root out the last pockets of
resistance.
The second is to utilize every effort to find Saddam
Hussein and the other principals, and the third is to form an
interim government, composed initially of two parts: one, a
governing council of Iraqis who will elect their own chairman
of that council to supervise the several ministries, whether
it's the creation of a policy force, whether it's education,
whether it's the preservation of artifacts, whether it's
sewers, whether it's electricity; and two, to formulate a group
of individuals that will sit down, Iraqis, and write a
constitution, because without a constitution, we cannot expect
elections to be held nationally. There's just no infrastructure
on which an election can be established until that constitution
is put in place and candidates can address their views with
respect to the fulfillment of the provisions of that
constitution.
Now, while our delegation was there we met in Kirkuk with
Iraqis who are assuming local office as mayors, assistant
mayors, and so forth--and Bremer is to be congratulated--in
pockets here and there where possible putting together groups
of Iraqis who sort of elect themselves and take over the
responsibilities of community matters. But the national
elections have to await the constitution.
On the whole, speaking for myself, I feel very positive on
my return from this inspection trip, and I once again salute
those in uniform, the coalition forces, who night and day are
taking the risks, and their families at home who are sharing in
those risks.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets this morning to begin a series of hearings on
``lessons learned'' during the major combat phases of Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as
to receive testimony on ongoing military operations in the area of
responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We welcome
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, former
Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, back before the committee. On Monday, General
Franks turned over command of CENTCOM to General John Abizaid. We are
thankful for the opportunity to receive testimony from General Franks
before he departs for a well-earned retirement and to thank him for an
enormously successful command tour in the most volatile region of the
world. We in Congress applaud the leadership you have provided, General
Franks, in the successful military operations to remove the Taliban
from power in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. You,
together with Secretary Rumsfeld, and President Bush, have rallied an
international coalition to fight terrorism, tyranny, and proliferation
in that important part of the world. Congratulations on a job, very
well done. The world is a safer place as a result of your efforts.
As I said, this hearing is the first in what will be a series of
hearings on lessons learned in recent military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these campaigns were decisive military
operations and a tribute to the professionalism of the men and women of
the U.S. Armed Forces and their leaders. Both operations quickly
achieved their primary military objectives--removing regimes from power
that were a threat to the security of the United States and, indeed,
the world community. Both have also required extensive ``post-
conflict'' stability operations that are ongoing and will require
significant manpower, resources, time, and commitment in the future to
fully secure the peace. We are mindful of the fact that coalition
forces continue to be exposed to significant personal risks through
this ongoing phase of operations.
Senator Levin and I, along with six other committee colleagues and
Senator Rockefeller, Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, have just returned from a most informative trip to the
CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR)--a trip which included 3 days in
Iraq. We received extensive briefings from General John Abizaid, the
new CENTCOM Commander; Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the senior
U.S. military commander in Iraq; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, head of the
Coalition Provisional Authority and his staff; David Kay and Major
General Keith Dayton of the Iraq Survey Group concerning the WMD search
effort; and several other coalition military and civilian leaders. I
want to thank Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks for their help in
providing our delegation with the access and information we needed. It
was a very productive trip that will prove invaluable to our
understanding of the ongoing challenges and opportunities in this very
important region.
I want to share a few of my strongest impressions about our visit.
First and foremost, as Americans, we can all take pride in our
magnificent troops. As we traveled across Iraq, we met soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines doing their job and doing it well in the
harshest of conditions--120 degree temperatures, many without minimal
shelter or relief from the unrelenting heat, day or night. As we talked
with these great Americans, it was very clear that they understood the
importance and necessity of performing their duty and the enormity of
the task, and they appreciated the support of the American people.
Their morale is strong, as to be expected, and they are fully committed
to getting the job done.
Were there complaints? Some, but mostly in the nature of
constructive ideas. The biggest concern, almost universally, was simply
the uncertainty about when they, as individuals, would be returning
home. I know you are diligently working that problem, Mr. Secretary,
and the Department needs to develop a rotation plan as soon as
possible.
Second, I was encouraged by the level of involvement of other
nations. Eight countries currently have forces on the ground, and over
30 more are committing to provide forces to the coalition effort in the
near future. By the fall, British and Polish Divisions, composed of
troops from many nations, will be operating in Iraq. Dutch and Italian
forces are scheduled to begin operating in sectors being vacated by
U.S. marines this month.
Likewise, Ambassador Bremer's efforts are truly international. He
has eight nations currently involved, with more expected to contribute.
Ambassador Bremer is doing an admirable job, as he and his team attempt
to rebuild the economic, social, and political infrastructure of Iraq.
His main goal is to put an Iraqi face on this effort and to put Iraqis
in charge of the daily lives of the citizens of this nation. I commend
his efforts.
Connected to this is the issue of troop levels in Iraq. Military
commanders we met with on the ground in Iraq were quite clear in
telling our delegation that they have adequate troops to successfully
accomplish the mission. That being said, I think Secretary Rumsfeld has
taken the proper course by asking General Abizaid to review the
situation. It is always prudent to reevaluate during the course of a
military operation in light of developments on the ground. We look
forward to hearing the results of General Abizaid's assessment.
Third, I was left with the impression that the search for weapons
of mass destruction and related programs is making strong progress. Dr.
David Kay and General Dayton are leading a careful, deliberate process
that I am confident will ultimately yield the evidence that Saddam
Hussein had a complex, very capable WMD program that was a threat to
the Iraqi people, to Iraq's neighbors, and to the world. Saddam Hussein
spent the last decade building a WMD program that was deceptive and
well-concealed from the world's eyes--including efforts by U.N.
inspection teams. It will take time to uncover these years of
successful planning and deception. I am confident we have the right
team in place to do the job. The key will be information from Iraqi
citizens, from scientists to those who wielded the shovels to build a
concealed WMD infrastructure.
Because of questions raised about intelligence related to WMD, I
asked our military commanders in Iraq how they felt about the quantity
and quality of intelligence and analysis they received on all relevant
subjects, including WMD. They all expressed full satisfaction and
confidence in the intelligence they received, and all remarked how well
the entire intelligence systems worked together, across agency
boundaries. Mr. Secretary, I expect you will address the issue of how
policy officials in the Department used available intelligence in
briefings to Congress and to the American public.
My next impression is related. I did not fully appreciate before
visiting Iraq and talking with Iraqi citizens and officials, the
absolute fear Saddam Hussein inflicted on this nation. There is a
palpable fear that Saddam Hussein may somehow return to power, and
anyone who has cooperated with the coalition will be executed. This is
impeding the WMD search effort, as knowledgeable Iraqis are still
reluctant to cooperate, and encourages those who are perpetrating the
violence in central Iraq. It is essential that Saddam Hussein be
found--dead or alive, and that the nightmare he still represents for
Iraqis be brought to an end.
I was also left with the impression that Americans at home are not
getting the full story on what their Armed Forces are accomplishing.
Coalition forces are taking the fight to the enemy, aggressively
pursuing them and eliminating their funding and safe havens.
Of equal importance, coalition forces are decisively involved in
rebuilding Iraq--not from war damage, but from years of neglect under
Saddam Hussein. Our forces are rebuilding hundreds of schools,
hospitals, bridges, and other important infrastructure throughout Iraq,
and facilitating the development of local governments. The American
people were understandably proud of our rapid military victory, but
they also need to know that the good work these young people are doing
now is equally, if not more, important. Our troops deserve the full,
informed support of the American people.
One final thought I must share is that the enormity of the task of
rebuilding Iraq after 30 years of neglect and abuse by Saddam Hussein
is daunting. But, it is crucial that we succeed. This is clearly a
moment of enormous consequence for Iraq, for the region, and for the
world. We must seize the moment, demonstrate our commitment, and bring
a sense of optimism and reform to this troubled region.
It is a responsibility of this Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government and on behalf of the American people, to fully review and
understand all aspects of the significant military operations which
this Nation undertakes. This is in keeping with the precedent of this
committee and is a constructive undertaking to evaluate the performance
of our weapons systems, our infrastructure, our organizational
structures, and our people. Only through this process can we make
informed decisions about future investments in defense.
Again, I welcome our witnesses and applaud your successful efforts
to date. We look forward to your assessment of the current situation,
the way ahead, and the things we, in Congress, can do to best support
our Armed Forces as they prepare for current and future threats.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also shorten
my statement and ask that the entire statement be made part of
the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
Senator Levin. First, General Franks, let me thank you for
your life of commitment to this Nation. In your public service
as a solider, you've proven yourself time and time again during
a unique period in our history. Historians will someday judge
the military campaigns that you led in Afghanistan and Iraq
that swiftly defeated the Taliban and the forces of Saddam
Hussein as brilliantly planned and executed examples of the
military art, and as foreshadows of future military tactics.
While you would be the first to acknowledge that most of the
credit and thanks must go to all who assisted you in that
effort, and especially to the fighting men and women of the
U.S. Armed Forces who executed those campaigns, your role as
their commander was indispensable.
Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to
emphasize areas of concern, and will tend to spend less time on
the innumerable things that were done well. It is essential
that that be done, but it must not detract in any way from our
appreciation for the superb performance of duty by the men and
women of our Armed Forces as they continue to conduct stability
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and prepare to execute other
missions in support of our national military strategy.
We must succeed in this endeavor, and we need to understand
the strategy for ensuring that success. Part of that strategy
hopefully will be an attempt to internationalize the security
and nation-building efforts. To achieve that end, I hope that
we will seek NATO and United Nations support and endorsement.
That will facilitate the recruitment of their member nations to
our effort in terms of providing troops, resources, expertise,
and international legitimacy. The whole world has a stake in
the stability of Iraq.
It is a mystery to me why apparently we have not reached
out to NATO and to the United Nations as institutions. Their
support could bring significant additional forces, such as
German and French forces through NATO and Indian and Egyptian
forces through a U.N. endorsement.
We're going to be in Iraq a long time. A large number of
troops are going to be needed, as the President acknowledged
last week. There are a number of advantages to having a
significant number of additional forces from other countries
join us in the stability operations in Iraq. First, some U.S.
forces, including Reserves, have seen extended combat and other
exhausting duty. With U.S. forces stretched thin around the
world, increasing the number of non-U.S. forces who can
substitute for us in Iraq would reduce the numbers of, and the
burden on, U.S. forces. As of now, the number of troops of
other countries present on the ground will increase from the
present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end
of the summer--an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about
165,000. That is difficult to sustain.
Second, I would hope that internationalization would serve
to reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than reducing
the quantity of our forces on the ground. Up until now, we have
been the main target of those Baathists who stand to lose most
when democracy is established in Iraq because we were the ones
who brought down Saddam's regime, which provided privileged
status to the Baathist minority. It would be harder for those
Saddam loyalists to sustain attacks on forces wearing NATO or
U.N. patches on their shoulders, because it would be dramatized
to the people in Iraq that this is not a U.S./British
occupation, but is an international effort to bring stability
to the nation and to the region.
Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is
reaching in to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed. As
our chairman has indicated, that means turning over the
civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of
Iraq so that they understand that they are deciding their own
future. It also means making better use of our TV capability in
Iraq, so that Iraqis can be interviewed about, and talk to
their fellow countrymen about the thousands of projects that we
are engaged in to help rebuild their nation. We are rebuilding
schools, we are bringing back water, we are fixing up
neighborhoods, we are supplying food, we are moving garbage,
and doing many other tasks needed to reconstruct Iraq. But we
have done an inadequate job of getting that information to
Iraqis.
False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must be countered
by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in their
communities, and assuring Iraqis that we are not there for
domination, but to help them rebuild. Mr. Secretary, during our
trip, we talked to Principal Deputy Under Secretary Cambone
about speeding up that television presence and projection to
Iraq. I know that he has probably by now already discussed that
with you. The chairman and I and all the members of the
delegation had some strong feelings about the importance of
speeding up that effort.
The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task
of nation building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The
administration and Congress must work together to ensure
success in those endeavors. It's essential in that regard for
our Nation to understand the strategy and the milestones for
achieving our objectives. Surely, we need to know how we will
continue over the foreseeable future to maintain a large
American military presence in your former region of command,
General. It's been now, what, 2 days or 1 day?
General Franks. Two days.
Senator Levin. I know that the relaxation in your face is
palpable. Just kidding. You did that with great glory. You
handled it absolutely brilliantly, and never even showed the
stress. But we have to let the American people know how we're
going to be able to execute other missions of our national
military strategy as well as maintaining the large presence in
the CENTCOM region.
Mr. Secretary, we very much look forward to your testimony
as well as that of General Franks. We thank you for your
service, your commitment, and I know you're grateful for the
presence of your family today.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
General Franks, I want to add my congratulations and thanks for
your life of public service as a soldier, culminating as combatant
commander of the U.S. Central Command. You have proven yourself time
and again during a unique period in our history. Historians will
someday judge the military campaigns you led in Afghanistan and Iraq
that swiftly defeated the Taliban and the forces of Saddam Hussein as
brilliantly planned and executed examples of the military art and as
foreshadows of future military tactics. While you would be the first to
acknowledge that most of the credit and thanks must go to all who
assisted you in that effort, and especially to the fighting men and
women of the U.S. Armed Forces who executed those campaigns, your role
as their commander was indispensable.
Today we delve into the lessons learned and still are learning from
the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns and the ongoing stability
operations. Of course, we can only scratch the surface of those issues
here today. Some of the lessons learned will require time to develop,
as the records of the wars are examined and input is received from all
the levels for all of the Services that participated in those
campaigns.
Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to emphasize
areas of concern and will tend to spend less time on the innumerable
things that were done well. It is essential we do this but that must
not detract in any way from our appreciation for the superb performance
of duty by the men and women of our Armed Forces, as they continue to
conduct stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and prepare to
execute other missions in support of our national military strategy.
As thoroughly planned and brilliantly executed as the initial
military phase of Operation Iraq Freedom appears to have been, the
transition to post-conflict stability operations and the conduct of
those operations appear to be far less so. We must succeed in this
endeavor, and we need to understand the strategy for ensuring that
success. Part of that strategy, hopefully, is the attempt to
internationalize the security and nation-building efforts. To achieve
that end, I believe it is critically important to seek NATO and United
Nations support and endorsement. This will facilitate the recruitment
of their member nations to our effort--in terms of providing troops,
resources, expertise, and international legitimacy.
The whole world has a stake in the stability of Iraq. It is a
mystery to me why the administration has not reached out to NATO and to
the U.N. Their support could bring significant additional forces, such
as German and French forces through NATO, and Indian and Egyptian
forces through a U.N. endorsement.
We should end the feud with Germany and France. Those countries are
major participants with us in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Kosovo. They
should be asked to join with us in Iraq. We are going to be in Iraq a
long time and a large number of troops are going to be needed as the
President finally acknowledged last week.
There are a number of advantages to having a significant number of
additional forces from other countries join in the stability operations
in Iraq. First, some U.S. forces, including Reserves, have seen
extended combat and other exhausting duty in Iraq and, with U.S. forces
stretched thin around the world, increasing the number of non-U.S.
forces who can substitute for us, will reduce the numbers of and the
burden on the U.S. forces. As of now, the number of troops of other
countries that will be present on the ground will increase from the
present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end of the
summer--an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about 165,000. That
is difficult to sustain.
Second, I would hope that internationalization would serve to
reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than reducing the
quantity of our forces on the ground. Up until now, we have been the
main target of those Baathists who stand to lose most when democracy is
established in Iraq, because we are the ones who brought down Saddam's
regime which provided privileged status to the Baathist minority. It
would be harder for those Saddam loyalists to sustain attacks on forces
wearing NATO or U.N. patches on their shoulders, because it would be
dramatized to the people of Iraq that this is not a U.S. occupation,
but an international effort to bring stability to the nation and the
region.
Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is reaching in
to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed. That means turning
over the civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of
Iraq, so they understand they are deciding their own future. It also
means making better use of our TV capability in Iraq, so Iraqis can be
interviewed about and talk to their fellow countrymen about the
thousands of projects that we are engaged in to help rebuild their
nation. We are rebuilding schools, bringing back water, fixing up
neighborhoods, supplying food, removing garbage, and many other tasks
needed to reconstruct Iraq. But we have done a poor job of getting that
information to Iraqis. False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must
be countered by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in their
communities and assuring Iraqis we are not there for domination but to
help them rebuild.
The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task of nation
building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The administration and Congress
must work together to ensure success in those endeavors.
It is essential in that regard for our Nation to understand the
strategy and milestones for achieving our objectives. Surely we need to
know how we will continue over the foreseeable future to maintain a
large American military presence in the CENTCOM region and still be
able to execute other missions of the national military strategy.
I look forward to the testimony and discussions to follow.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. I will now
submit for the record Senator Allard's statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Secretary Rumsfeld and General
Franks. I am pleased that you could join us today to share the lessons
that we have learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite our
victory, much is still going on--our forces are still trying to provide
security and fend off attacks in Iraq; we are fighting a low-level
insurgency in Afghanistan; and we are now considering sending troops to
Liberia.
I want to let you know that we appreciate your service and
dedication to our country. Your leadership during this difficult time
has been outstanding.
I also want to take this moment to say a few words about the men
and women in our military. Over the last 6 months, thousands of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardmen have been
mobilized and sent overseas to several remote and distant places. Over
5,000 soldiers from Fort Carson, Colorado, have been deployed overseas.
These soldiers have embraced their duty and have frequently expressed
their determination to serve their country with pride and devotion.
Also, we cannot overlook the service of our reservists and
guardsmen. Many have had to leave their careers in order to answer the
call of duty. They have responded with enthusiasm and commitment. I am
thankful that we live in a nation where our military is widely
respected and where so many are willing to step forward in defense of
their country.
Again, I thank you for appearing before us. I look forward to
working with both of you to confront many of the national security
challenges facing our country today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I would ask that my complete statement be put in the
record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection. The statements of both
witnesses will be included in the record.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd like to make a brief statement.
I'll begin by saying a few words about the remarkable man
seated next to me, General Tom Franks. On Monday, I was in
Tampa to attend the change of command ceremony there. It was an
occasion to reflect on General Tom Franks and what the CENTCOM
leadership that he put together has accomplished during his
tenure as combatant commander.
Think back to September 11. It was a dark day for our
country, to be sure, but how fortunate our country was to have
General Franks and his team in command at CENTCOM. In the
period since September 11, consider what has been accomplished.
In just weeks, they developed and were executing a war plan for
Afghanistan. They had employed a range of capabilities from the
most advanced, such as laser-guided weapons, to antique 40-
year-old B-52s that had been updated with modern electronics,
to rudimentary cavalry charges, driving the Taliban and al
Qaeda from power in a matter of months.
The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was
even more innovative and transformational, employing an
unprecedented combination of speed, precision, surprise, and
flexibility. One of the most interesting aspects of the
campaign was mentioned in the opening statements about the
lessons learned process. It began before the war ever began.
There were something in excess of 50 to 70 people that General
Franks installed as a team from Joint Forces Command in his
command from the very start. They did a lot more than take
notes to improve our performance for the next war. They
actually provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM
leadership to apply lessons in real time and improve coalition
performance in this war. General Franks has said to me that
there wasn't a day that went by that there wasn't value added.
I'll leave it to General Franks to describe the lessons he
believes are most important. I've listed some in my testimony.
We're still in the early stages of studying these lessons,
and the conclusions that are drawn will most certainly affect
how the Armed Forces of the United States and the Services
organize, train, and equip for many years to come. This will be
one of General Franks' truly enduring legacies. He led the
coalition forces that liberated two nations, but how he
liberated those two people--the tactics, the strategies that he
developed and employed--will contribute to the freedom of our
country and our people for years to come.
So while General Franks may be leaving the Army, his
service to our country will live on in the impact of Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom that it will have
on our budgets, our procedures, our training, our doctrine, and
our joint warfighting. The people he led, those who served with
him in Iraq and Afghanistan, will now take those
transformational experiences to their next important commands
and teach them to the next generation of leaders. So General
Franks, I salute you and thank you for your truly remarkable
service to our country.
Today Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding
from decades of tyranny. Coalition forces are helping the Iraqi
people get on the path to stability and democratic self-
government by helping Iraqis reestablish security and commerce,
restore power and basic services, reopen schools and hospitals,
and establish the rule of law. With each passing week, more
services come online. Power and water are restored in more of
the country, gas lines disappear, and more Iraqi police are on
the streets.
But we must not underestimate how difficult the task is
before us. Yet despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis
are far better off today than they were 4 months ago. Let there
be no doubt about that. The residents of Baghdad may not have
power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up each morning
in fear wondering whether this will be the day that a death
squad would come to cut out their tongues, chop off their ears,
or take their children away for ``questioning,'' never to be
seen again.
It's true there are some Iraqis who are not better off
today. For the most part, they comprise a small, elite segment
of Iraqi society that benefitted from the Saddam Hussein
dictatorship, and they are understandably unhappy now that the
regime that favored them, at the expense of the population, has
been removed from power. Today some of them are in hiding,
others are engaging in acts of sabotage and violence.
Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq.
There seems to be a widely held impression that the regime
loyalists are operating freely throughout the country,
attacking coalition forces at will. That's clearly not the
case. Large portions of Iraq are stable. If one looks at this
map beside me, while there have been isolated incidents in
other parts of the country, most of the recent attacks have
been concentrated in Baghdad and in the three corridors that
reach to the west, the north, and the east out of the Iraqi
capital.
[The information referred to follows:]
At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in operations
to deal with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a number of
recent incidents in those regions are the result of offensive
operations by the coalition, cases where the coalition forces
have been seeking out and engaging pockets of enemy fighters.
Mr. Chairman, the problem is real, but it's being dealt with in
an orderly and forceful fashion by coalition forces.
In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country's leaders from
power, but unlike traditional adversaries in wars passed that
sign a surrender document and hand over their weapons, the
remnants of the Baath regime, Fedayeen death squads, and the
Special Republican forces did not surrender. Some were killed
or captured, but many others, particularly in Baghdad and to
the north, faded into the population and are now forming
pockets of resistance against coalition forces. We're now
dealing with those remnants of the regime just as we are
dealing with the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban that are
hiding in the border areas of Afghanistan.
In addition to the remnants of the former regime, coalition
forces in Iraq are also dealing with tens of thousands of
criminals, some estimate up to 100,000 that were let out of the
prisons into the streets prior to the beginning of the war.
They're dealing with foreign terrorists who have crossed into
Iraq, in many cases from Syria, looking for an opportunity to
harm the coalition and to try to shake our resolve in the war
on terror. Well, they'll not succeed.
So there are a number of sources of instability, but this
much is certain: Iraq has been liberated. The Baathist regime
has been removed from power and will not be permitted to
return. But our war with terrorists, the remnants in Iraq, the
remnants in Afghanistan, and terrorist networks across the
globe continues. It will take time, but we will prevail. As
President Bush made clear last week, there will be no return to
tyranny in Iraq. Those who threaten the order and stability of
that country will face ruin just as surely as the regime they
once served.
One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as the chairman mentioned.
We're still early in that process, so the task before is
sizable and complex. Major combat operations ended less than 10
weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years to conceal its
programs, to move materials, hide documents, disperse
equipment, develop mobile production facilities, and sanitize
known WMD sites, including 4 years with no U.N. weapons
inspectors on the ground. Needless to say, uncovering those
programs will take time.
The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered
dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass
murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new
light through the prism of our experience on September 11. On
that day, we saw thousands of innocent men, women, and children
killed by terrorists, and that experience changed our
appreciation of our vulnerability and the risks the U.S. faces
from terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with
powerful weapons.
The United States did not choose war, Saddam Hussein did.
For 12 years, he violated 17 U.N. resolutions without cost or
consequence. His regime had an international obligation to
destroy its weapons of mass destruction and to prove to the
world that they had done so. He refused to do so. If he had, in
fact, disarmed, why didn't he take that final opportunity to
prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were
destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of
dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions when he could have
had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had
disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was a fraudulent
declaration of his weapons with the United Nations? Why didn't
he cooperate with the international community as Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, and South Africa did?
Had he done so, war would have been avoided. If he had, in
fact, disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose
by cooperating with the United Nations, yet he did not
cooperate. He continued to lie and obstruct U.N. inspectors.
The logical conclusion is that he did so because he wanted to
keep his weapons, and he believed that he could continue to
outwit the international community for another 12 years, just
as he had for the past 12.
The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent
another attack like September 11 or a biological, nuclear, or
chemical attack that would be worse before it happens. We can
say with confidence that the world is a better place today
because the United States led a coalition of forces into action
in Iraq and because of General Tom Franks' skilled execution of
the President's orders.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to meet with the
committee. Let me begin by saying a few words about the remarkable man
seated next to me--General Tommy Franks.
On Monday, I was in Tampa to attend the change of command ceremony
where General Franks handed the reins of U.S. Central Command to his
able deputy, General John Abizaid.
It was an occasion to reflect on General Franks and what the
CENTCOM leadership team has accomplished during his tenure as the
combatant commander. It is an extraordinary record of achievement.
Think back to September 11--a dark day for our country. But how
fortunate our Nation was to have General Franks and his team in command
at CENTCOM.
Consider what they have accomplished:
In less than a month, they had developed and were executing a war
plan for Afghanistan employing a range of capabilities--from the most
advanced (such as laser-guided weapons), to the antique (40-year-old B-
52s updated with modern electronics) to the rudimentary (a cavalry
charge)--they and our Afghan and coalition allies drove the Taliban and
al Qaeda from power in a matter of months.
The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was even more
innovative and transformational--employing an unprecedented combination
of speed, precision, surprise, and flexibility.
The Iraqi regime very likely expected the war to begin, as did the
1991 Gulf War, with a sustained bombing campaign. Instead, General
Franks started the ground attack before the air campaign--sending a
large force of Special Operators into Western Iraq, followed by
thousands of coalition forces streaming across the Kuwaiti border.
Instead of a long march through the south, with pitch battles for each
city along the way, they drove through to reach the gates of Baghdad in
a matter of weeks--liberating the Iraqi capital and toppling the regime
in less than a month.
The plan was adaptable and flexible, allowing General Franks and
his team to turn difficulties into opportunities. For example, the
inability of coalition forces to enter Iraq from the north was
disappointing. But instead of bringing the 4th Infantry Division out of
the Mediterranean to the Gulf, General Franks kept them in the
Mediterranean--creating the impression in Baghdad that the attack would
not start until the coalition could open the northern front. This very
likely contributed to the surprise of the Iraqi regime when the war
began without those forces in the fight.
One of the most interesting aspects of the campaign was the fact
that the ``lessons learned'' process began before the war began.
General Franks installed a ``lessons learned'' team from Joint Forces
Command with his command from the start. They did more than take notes
to improve our performance for the next war--they provided immediate
feedback, allowing CENTCOM leadership to apply ``lessons learned'' in
real time and improve coalition performance in this war.
I'll leave it to General Franks to describe in detail the lessons
he believes are most important. For my part, I'd say some key lessons
so far include:
The importance of speed, and the ability to get inside
the enemy's decision cycle and strike before he is able to
mount a coherent defense;
The importance of jointness, and the ability of U.S.
forces to fight, not as individual de-conflicted Services, but
as a truly joint force--maximizing the power and lethality they
bring to bear;
The importance of intelligence--and the ability to act
on intelligence rapidly, in minutes, instead of days and even
hours; and
The importance of precision, and the ability to
deliver devastating damage to enemy positions, while sparing
civilian lives and the civilian infrastructure.
Another lesson is that in the 21st century ``overmatching power''
is more important than ``overwhelming force.'' In the past, under the
doctrine of overwhelming force, force tended to be measured in terms of
mass--the number of troops that were committed to a particular
conflict. In the 21st century, mass may no longer be the best measure
of power in a conflict. After all, when Baghdad fell, there were just
over 100,000 American forces on the ground. General Franks overwhelmed
the enemy not with the typical three to one advantage in mass, but by
overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, and using those
capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.
There are many more lessons we will learn from the experience in
Iraq, and we are still in the early stages of studying them. Admiral
Giambastiani and his team at Joint Forces Command are leading this
effort, and the conclusions that are drawn will most certainly affect
how the U.S. Armed Forces and the Services organize, train and equip
for many years to come.
This will be one of General Franks' truly enduring legacies. He led
the coalition forces that liberated two nations. But how he liberated
those countries--the tactics and strategies he developed and employed--
will contribute to the freedom of our country and our people for years
to come.
So, while General Franks may be leaving the Service, his service to
our country will live on--in the impact Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom will have on budgets and procedures, training
and doctrine. The people he led, those who served with him in Iraq and
Afghanistan, will now take those transformational experiences to their
next important commands, and teach them to the next generation.
So, Tom, we salute you, and we thank you for your remarkable
service to our country.
* * *
Mr. Chairman, Operation Iraqi Freedom will go down in history, not
just for what was accomplished, but also for what did not happen as a
result of the speed and flexibility of the war plan General Franks and
his team employed. Consider just some of the things that did not occur:
Neighboring countries were not hit with Scud missiles.
The vast majority of Iraq's oil fields were not
burned.
There were no massive civilian casualties, or large
masses of refugees fleeing across borders into the neighboring
countries.
There was no large-scale collateral damage. The
infrastructure of the country is largely intact.
Bridges were not blown, and rail lines were protected.
The dams were not broken, and villages were not
flooded.
So for all the difficulties in Iraq today--and there are tough
challenges to be sure--it is important to keep in mind all of the
problems that Iraqis do not have to overcome because of the way the war
was fought. Today, Iraqis do not have to rebuild oil wells, bridges,
roads and dams that were not destroyed in the war. They do not have to
bury large numbers of innocent civilians, or rebuild residential
neighborhoods, because of the compassion and precision with which
coalition forces fought.
Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding from three
decades of tyranny. We must not underestimate how difficult that task
will be. But we can take comfort knowing that, as we freed them from
tyranny, we did not add to their burden by destroying Iraq's
infrastructure. To the contrary, we saved it.
Today, coalition forces are helping the Iraqi people rebuild and
get on the path to stability and democratic self-government. We are
making progress in helping Iraqis reestablish security and commerce;
restore power and basic services; reopen schools and hospitals; and
establish rule of law. With each passing week, more services come
online; power and water are restored in more of the country; gas lines
disappear; and more Iraqi police are on the streets.
Indeed, civil society is beginning to form. There are now dozens of
independent newspapers sprouting up, in Baghdad and throughout the
country. Town councils and associations are forming, and people are
expressing opinions openly for the first time in decades.
Vendors in Baghdad are selling videotapes detailing the atrocities
that took place in Saddam's prisons. As the President put it last week,
these are ``the true monuments of Saddam Hussein's rule--the mass
graves, the torture chambers, the jail cells for children.''
Despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis are far better off
today than they were 4 months ago. The residents of Baghdad may not
have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up each morning in
fear, wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads come
to cut out their tongues, chop off their ears, or take their children
away for ``questioning''--never to be seen again.
It is true there are some Iraqis who are not better off today--
those who comprised the small, elite segment of Iraqi society that
benefited from the dictatorship. Such people exist in any dictatorship.
They are understandably unhappy now that the regime that favored them
has been removed from power. Today some of them are in hiding. Others
are engaging in acts of sabotage and violence.
Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq today. There
seems to be a widely held impression that regime loyalists are
operating freely throughout the country, attacking coalition forces at
will. That is not the case.
Large portions of Iraq are stable. Most of the recent attacks have
been concentrated in Baghdad and three corridors reaching west, north,
and east out of the Iraqi capital.
At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in operations to deal
with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a number of the recent
incidents in those regions are the result of offensive operations by
the coalition--cases where coalition forces have sought out and engaged
enemy fighters.
Mr. Chairman, the problem is real--but it is being dealt with in an
orderly and forceful fashion by coalition forces.
Some may ask: Why is the Coalition still engaging hostile forces
nearly 10 weeks after major combat operations ended? The answer has to
do with the nature of the enemy.
In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country's leaders from power.
But unlike traditional adversaries of wars past that sign a surrender
document and hand over their weapons, the remnants of the Baath regime
and Fedayeen death squads in Iraq did not surrender. Some were killed
or captured, but many others faded into the population and are forming
pockets of resistance against coalition forces.
We now have to deal with those remnants of the regime--just as we
are dealing with the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban hiding in
border areas of Afghanistan. Those battles will likely go on for some
time.
In Iraq, we face added challenges. In addition to remnants of the
former regime, coalition forces are also dealing with tens of thousands
of criminals the regime released into the streets before the war began.
They are now at large and are doing what criminals do--looting,
robbing, and killing people.
In addition, our forces must also deal with foreign terrorists who
crossed into Iraq for an opportunity to harm the coalition and to try
to shake our resolve in the war on terror. They will not succeed.
So there are a number of sources of instability. But this much is
certain: Iraq has been liberated. The Baathist regime has been removed
from power and will not be permitted to return. But our war with
terrorists--the remnants in Iraq and Afghanistan and terrorist networks
across the globe--continues. It will take time.
Just as we are dealing with terrorist networks in Afghanistan--
breaking them up as they attempt to reconstitute--we will deal with
them in Iraq. It will take time, but we will prevail.
As President Bush made clear last week:
``There will be no return to tyranny in Iraq. Those who
threaten the order and stability of that country will face
ruin, just as surely as the regime they once served.''
To help ensure long-term security, the coalition is forming a new
Iraqi army. Walt Slocombe, the Director of Security Affairs for the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, announced last month the start
of recruitment for the new army, with an initial goal of having a
division of 12,000 men ready within a year, and 40,000 less than 3
years. As with the training of the Afghan National Army, the objective
is to create a situation where, over time, Iraqis can take
responsibility for their own stability and security and not need to
depend on foreign forces.
One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs. We are still early in the
process, and the task before us is sizable and complex. Major combat
operations ended less than 10 weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years
to conceal its programs--to move materials, hide documents, disperse
equipment, develop mobile production facilities, and sanitize known WMD
sites--including 4 years with no U.N. weapons inspectors on the ground.
Uncovering those programs will take time.
The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered
dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of WMD; we acted because we saw
the existing evidence in a new light--through the prism of our
experience on September 11. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent
men, women, and children killed by terrorists. That experience changed
our appreciation of our vulnerability--and the risks the U.S. faces
from terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with weapons of mass
murder.
The United States did not choose war--Saddam Hussein did. For 12
years, he violated 17 United Nations resolutions without cost or
consequence. His regime had an international obligation:
To destroy its weapons of mass destruction; and
To prove to the world that they had done so.
He refused to do so.
It was the U.N. Security Council which passed the 17th resolution,
declaring Saddam Hussein was in ``material breach'' of his disarmament
obligations and giving him one ``final opportunity'' to disarm. If he
had in fact disarmed, why didn't he take that final opportunity to
prove that his programs were ended and his weapons destroyed? Why did
he continue to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under
U.N. sanctions when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by
demonstrating that he had disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was
a false declaration with the U.N.? Why didn't he cooperate with the
international community--as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa did?
Had he done so, war could have been avoided. If he had in fact
disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperating
with the U.N. Yet he did not cooperate. He continued to lie and
obstruct the U.N. inspectors. The logical conclusion is that he did so
because he wanted to keep his weapons--and believed that he could
continue to outwit the international community for another 12 years--
just as he had for the past 12 years--and survive.
Mr. Chairman, terrorist regimes have been removed in Iraq and
Afghanistan--but the global war on terror continues. The President
declared last week:
``As long as terrorists and their allies plot to harm America,
America is at war. . . . From the beginning, we have known the
effort would be long and difficult, and that our resolve would
be tested. We know that sacrifice is unavoidable. . . . We did
not choose this war. Yet, with the safety of the American
people at stake, we will continue to wage this war with all our
might.''
The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent another
attack like September 11--or a biological, nuclear, or chemical attack
that could be far worse--before it happens.
One wonders, looking back on history, what might have happened if
the world heeded Winston Churchill's warnings in the 1930s; if, instead
of ignoring the growing evidence, free nations had united, and formed a
coalition to intervene and stop Hitler before he completely rearmed--
before he invaded Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and set Europe aflame.
Consider the lives that would have been saved if the world had faced up
to the mounting evidence and the compelling logic of the case Churchill
presented, instead of waiting for perfect evidence of his capabilities
and intentions in the form of 25 million dead human beings.
The historical record of appeasement is a sorry one. In an age when
terrorists and dictators are seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons of mass murder, we need to consider the lessons of history.
We can look to our experience on September 11. We can look to
Saddam Hussein's brutal record of using chemical weapons on foreign
forces and on his own people, his history of aggression against his
neighbors, his rewards to families of suicide terrorist bombers, and
his stated hostility against the United States. We can look to his 12
years of defiance of the international community's demand that he
disarm--and the near unanimous assessment of successive Democratic and
Republican administrations, the Intelligence Community (both ours and
those of foreign countries), Congress, and the U.N. that he had weapons
of mass destruction. We can look at all this and imagine a world in
which such a dictator was permitted to develop nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons, while the world's free nations stood by.
We can say, with confidence, that the world is a better place today
because the United States led a coalition of forces into action in
Iraq--and because of General Tom Franks' skilled execution of the
President's orders.
So, yes, we are paying a price in Iraq and elsewhere around the
world today--a price in lives and treasure. But it must be compared to
the price we paid on September 11 and the price we would have paid for
doing nothing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, before we hear from the
General, I think it's important that you interpret in some
detail this important map. While we hear daily the stories of
attacks, my understanding of that map, based also on my trip,
is the green indicates those sections of Iraq which are
relatively secure. The dark center brown is where the most
intense number of attacks are coming, and the lighter shade of
green are between the two in terms of level of threat. Is that
correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is correct and if you'll recall,
when the U.S. and coalition forces moved up from the south,
most of the fighting occurred south of Baghdad and in Baghdad,
and, to a considerable extent, the forces in Baghdad and north,
in the Saddam Hussein strongholds, in many cases disappeared
into the countryside and still are there. So they still need to
be dealt with.
Chairman Warner. Those forces did not witness the maneuver
of our heavy forces which at one time were anticipated. Had our
relations with Turkey been such, we could have inserted heavy
forces in the north. Is that not correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's true. We did end up, General
Franks did, of course, with forces in the north and there was
fighting up in that area, but it was not as extensive as it was
in the areas to the south.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Franks.
STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator
Levin, it's an honor to appear again before the committee. I'd
ask that my full statement be entered into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
General Franks. Since we last sat in this room, much has
taken place in the Central Command area of responsibility. A
brutal regime has been removed in Iraq to be sure, and efforts
are ongoing to help Iraqis build a new future. Coalition forces
have continued to help Afghanistan and those people make
strides toward independence and have continued to seek out and
destroy terrorists and their networks in that country as well
as across the central region as part of the global war on
terrorism. I look forward to discussing these important
subjects today with the committee.
Let me begin by bringing a message to this committee from
some 280,000-plus members of our coalition, those that I have
been privileged to command. That message for the committee is
very simple. It's thank you. These men and women in uniform
very much appreciate the support of this body and the support
of this committee and all that you have done on their behalf,
Mr. Chairman.
Earlier in this week, General John Abizaid took the reins
of Central Command, and, in fact, he is a principled leader, as
this committee knows, and a soldier who brings a great deal to
United States Central Command. I am proud to relinquish command
to him and to consider him a friend.
I'd like to begin today by recognizing coalition nations
whose contributions of forces, equipment, and economic support
have signaled worldwide commitment to the eradication of
terrorism.
Over the past year, the coalition has been steadfast, and
today there are 63 nations represented in Tampa at our
headquarters, perhaps the largest coalition we have ever seen.
A force has been built in the Central Command area of
responsibility to continue to move forward to the complete
achievement of all of our objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom
as well as in Operation Enduring Freedom, as the Secretary
said, to prevent recurrence of the events we saw on September
11, 2001, to deny terrorists opportunities to use weapons of
mass destruction on our people, to bring terrorists to justice,
and to dismantle their networks.
We've also established a visible and viable presence in the
Horn of Africa, Mr. Chairman, since we last met in order to
continue that work. Work in the central region is underway, but
as I'll discuss in a moment, the environment within Central
Command's region remains challenging and volatile, as the
Secretary said. Securing U.S. interests in the future and
ensuring regional stability will continue to involve risks in
this region and will continue to require the commitment of our
resources.
This area encompasses 6.4 million square miles and about a
half a billion people, as the committee knows, and it runs from
the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan and South
Asia up to Central Asia, as far north as Kazakhstan, including
the waters of the Red Sea, the northern Indian Ocean, the
Persian Gulf, key maritime chokepoints of Suez, the Bab el-
Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz. This is an area that
represents all of the world's major religions and at least 18
major ethnic groups. National economies in this region produce
annual per capita incomes which vary from very little, perhaps
a few hundred dollars a year, to tens of thousands of dollars.
The area includes dictatorships, absolute monarchies, failed
states, democracies, and governments in transition toward
democracy.
Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse,
religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges, and
military power imbalances create social, economic, and military
volatility. These factors are particularly significant given
the geographical and economic importance of the region where
natural resources provide extraordinary opportunities, but they
also give rise to a range of socioeconomic problems.
In the past 2 years, Central Command has been at the
leading edge of the global war on terrorism, and the context I
just provided makes it perhaps understandable why the initial
focus on the war on terrorism would be in this region. The
command is engaged with U.S. and coalition forces today in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the commitment, as the Secretary
said, remains strong as our leaders and our troopers continue
to work to bring security across the region.
On the ground today in Iraq, our troops are conducting
ongoing operations. We're combining civil military work with
direct offensive military action which will continue to seek
out and bring justice to leaders of the fallen regime and
others, as mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by yourself as well as
Secretary Rumsfeld.
Priorities will continue to include forming and training
police and security forces as well as the creation of a new
Iraqi army. We'll continue to work to improve the
infrastructure, working with Iraqis to support the
establishment of local governance, providing emergency medical
care and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work
remains to be done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today
which 4 months ago were only a dream.
Our troops continue to work closely with Ambassador Jerry
Bremer and the entirety of his civilian team to provide the
tools he needs to be successful. Progress is being made and our
country is justifiably proud of what has been accomplished. I
think about lessons learned, as the Secretary mentioned, I'll
talk to just a few. The combat work inside Iraq saw a maturing
of joint force operations in a number of ways. Some
capabilities we saw reached new levels of performance. From a
joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations
Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan contributed to the jointness and the culture within
the headquarters of our area.
These operations helped to improve our interoperability,
they also helped to improve our command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence networking. Our
forces were able to achieve operational objectives by the
integration of maneuver forces, special operations forces,
other government agency assets, precision lethal fires, and
nonlethal fires. We saw for the first time integration of
forces rather than deconfliction of forces. I believe perhaps
most transformational is that particular notion, the business
of the integration of forces rather than, as we have seen in
the past, simple deconfliction of forces.
It seems to me that this integration of the conventional,
as you said, Mr. Chairman, air, ground, sea forces to leverage
special operations capabilities dealt effectively with
asymmetric terrorist-like threats and enabled precision
targeting simultaneously in the same battle, in the same battle
space. Similarly we have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq the
ability of special operators to use conventional forces in
order to set conditions for the success of those forces.
Operational fires have been used to spearhead ground maneuver,
and our forces have been able to sustain the momentum of the
offensive while defeating enemy formations in all kinds of
terrain, open desert terrain, complex terrain, and urban
terrain.
We saw jointness, precision munitions, command and control,
the readiness of our equipment, the state of training of our
troops, and coalition support as very clear winners during
Operation Enduring Freedom. The Secretary said that I would
also mention some of the lessons in my remarks, and I'll do
that briefly now. We also identified a number of areas where we
believe we require additional work.
Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of standardized
combat identification, so fratricide prevention remains work
that we're going to have to focus on in the future. Deployment
planning and execution were cumbersome and were much more
closely akin to those required during the Cold War than to
those required for force projection by our country in the 21st
century. Coalition information sharing needs to be improved at
all levels. When we operate a coalition, we need the ability to
reach back and forth, to and with coalition members. Human
intelligence and communications bandwidth also represent areas
where we're going to be required, Mr. Chairman, to focus effort
in the future.
A few comments on Iraq and where we stand today. As the
Secretary says, security continues to improve. Portions of Iraq
are now and will remain for some time, however, very dangerous.
The term stability operations does not infer that combat
operations have ended; indeed, they have not. Our forces are
engaged in offensive work as members of this committee saw
during a recent trip all over Iraq.
As we move forward, the composition and size of the forces
that we have in that country will change to match the
conditions, and it will ever change to match the requirements
recognizing that the enemy we see there also has a vote. So we
will size ourselves, as we have in the past, in order to meet
the conditions that we see developed in the future.
Factors that will influence our force mix inside Iraq will
have to do, as Senator Levin said, with coalition
contributions. They will have to do with what we see in the way
of the enemy threat. They will have to do with what we see in
the success of the Iraqi people themselves as they field their
security forces, police forces, infrastructure security forces,
single site protection capabilities, and as we assist them in
fielding a new Iraqi army.
Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term
effort. The United Kingdom and Poland are committed at this
point to leading divisions in southern Iraq and many partner
nations have offered forces to fill those units. Deployment of
those forces has already begun, Mr. Chairman. We continue
discussions today with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19
coalition partners are on the ground in support of operations
in Iraq with deployment of an additional 19 countries pending.
An additional 11 nations are conducting military-to-military
discussions with the Secretary's staff, the Joint Staff, and my
staff in Tampa today.
At this point, we see some 35,000 policemen as having been
hired, Iraqi policemen. This represents 55, perhaps 60 percent
of a total requirement, around 60,000 policemen in that
country. Until we see the complete standing up of that number
of security forces and policemen, we will continue joint
patrolling, we'll continue to train with and work with these
Iraqi forces as we bring them on.
Creation of a new Iraqi army is also moving forward. The
plan envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad, and
Basra. They will provide for territorial defense and they will
conduct stability operations. Over the next year, our goal is
to field approximately nine battalions in order to do that
work, and initially those forces will focus on performing
security at fixed sites, assisting in the movement of convoys,
and providing border control. As it develops, this force will
work with coalition forces to contribute to stability and
security throughout Iraq.
Underlying all security functions is the need to continue
humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil military
operations to improve the quality of life for Iraqi people. It
is obvious to all that in order to see Iraq move forward into
the future, security must in fact come along at a pace that
sees the betterment of the conditions of life for the Iraqi
people and the establishment of Iraqi governance, the placing
of an Iraqi face on the government there. It is in our interest
to move these items forward as quickly and thoughtfully as we
can, and we'll continue to do that.
I can't overstate the value of coalition contribution to
success we have seen up to this point. Hospitals, medical
supplies, water, food, transportation, expertise in rebuilding
is being provided by coalition members. The fact that there has
been no humanitarian disaster in Iraq, no widespread outbreak
of disease, no hunger, no refugees, or massive problems with
displaced persons, or any other predicted consequence of war,
is due in large part to the contribution of our allies.
The Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Jerry
Bremer, and our forces will continue to work in concert with
international and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the
result of more than three decades of a brutal regime.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying the global war on
terrorism is ongoing. The precision, determination, and
expertise of our military forces and our coalition partners
have brought about the liberation of both Afghanistan and Iraq
in lightning speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two
nations have only taken the first steps toward freedom. The
United States and our coalition partners must be there to
support the whole journey.
While we have accomplished a lot, the potential for
terrorist acts and other setbacks remains very real.
Afghanistan has a new fragile government, a new army, and with
coalition support the nation is making strides toward long-term
stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was destroyed and
regime supporters are being rooted out. Our focus has changed
from military destruction of a regime to providing security and
humanitarian assistance assisting the Iraqi people to grow a
representative form of government.
Decisive combat operations have been completed, but much
work remains to be done. I, as every member of this committee,
Mr. Chairman, am very proud of each and every one of the men
and women who have continued to serve selflessly and tirelessly
in the execution of our mission from Egypt to Kazakhstan, from
Suez to Pakistan, regardless of the uniform of service they
wear or the nation from which they come.
I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous
support you have shown and what you have done for me, Mr.
Chairman. I'd be pleased to join the Secretary in answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear
before you today. Since we last met here together, much has taken place
in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). We have
removed a brutal regime in Iraq and have begun to help Iraq build its
new future. Our forces have continued to help Afghanistan make strides
towards independence, and have continued to help the Afghan people
develop their nation while continuing to seek and destroy terrorists
and their networks all across the central region. I look forward to
discussing these important subjects with you and to your questions.
Let me begin by bringing you a message from the more than 281,000
U.S. and coalition troops that I have been privileged to command. That
message is thank you. Throughout both Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom, our forces in the field have been blessed
to serve civilian leaders who set clear military objectives and then
provide our men and women in uniform the tools they need to win. On
their behalf, let me thank you for all that you continue to do for the
troops.
Earlier this week General John Abizaid took the reins of command at
CENTCOM. He is a principled leader and soldier who has been tested
under fire, and I am confident about the future of CENTCOM under his
leadership.
I would like to begin today by recognizing the coalition nations
whose contributions of forces, equipment, and economic support have
signaled a worldwide commitment to eradicate terrorism. Over the past
12 months, the coalition has been steadfast. Today there are 63 nations
represented at Central Command's Tampa headquarters.
We have built a force in the CENTCOM AOR to help achieve our
objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom--
to deny terrorists the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to
bring terrorists to justice and dismantle their terrorist networks. We
have also established a more visible and viable presence in the Horn of
Africa (HOA) in order to combat terrorism and promote stability. Work
in the Central Region is underway, but, as I will discuss in the
sections ahead, the environment within the region remains challenging.
Securing U.S. interests and ensuring regional stability will involve
risks and will require continuing commitment of resources.
CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
Our AOR encompasses 6.4 million square miles, from Egypt and Jordan
to the HOA, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and the
Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It includes the waters
of the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the
key maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the
Strait of Hormuz. The area is home to more than 500 million people,
representatives of all the world's major religions and at least 18
major ethnic groups. National economies produce annual per capita
incomes varying from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of
dollars. CENTCOM's AOR includes dictatorships, absolute monarchies,
failed states, democracies and governments in transition toward
democracy. Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse,
religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges and military
power imbalances that generate social, economic, and military
volatility characterize this area. These factors are particularly
significant given the geographical and economic importance of the
region where natural resources provide extraordinary economic
opportunities. However, they also give rise to a range of socioeconomic
problems and rivalries. Some states have compensated for their lack of
mineral wealth through the industry of their people. However, other
nations have not generated the will, resources or organization to move
ahead. These factors will not be easily or quickly overcome and signal
additional challenges in the future.
In the past 2 years, CENTCOM has been at the leading edge of the
global war on terrorism (GWOT). The Command is engaged with U.S. and
coalition forces both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our commitment remains
strong as our leaders and troopers work to bring security throughout
the region.
On the ground in Iraq today, our troops are conducting ongoing
operations, combining Civil Military Operations with direct military
action to seek out and bring to justice leaders of the fallen regime.
Our priorities include forming and training police, security forces,
and the new Iraqi army; improving the infrastructure; supporting the
establishment of local government; and providing emergency medical care
and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work remains to be
done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today which 4 months ago
were only a dream.
Our troops are working closely with Ambassador Jerry Bremer and his
civilian team to provide the tools he needs to be successful. Progress
is being made, and our country is justifiably proud of all that has
been accomplished.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM--LESSONS LEARNED
Decisive combat in Iraq saw a maturing of joint force operations in
many ways. Some capabilities reached new performance levels. From a
joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations Southern
and Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom helped to develop a joint
culture in our headquarters and in our components. These operations
helped to improve joint interoperability and improve our joint C\4\I
networks as joint force synergy was taken to new levels of
sophistication. Our forces were able to achieve their operational
objectives by integrating ground maneuver, special operations,
precision lethal fires and nonlethal effects. We saw for the first time
integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces. This
integration enabled conventional (air, ground, and sea) forces to
leverage SOF capabilities to deal effectively with asymmetric threats
and enable precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle space.
Likewise, Special Operators were able to use conventional forces to
enhance and enable special missions. Operational fires spearheaded our
ground maneuver, as our forces sustained the momentum of the offense
while defeating enemy formations in open, complex, and urban terrain.
We saw jointness, precision munitions, C2, equipment readiness,
state of training of the troops, and coalition support as clear
``winners'' during OIF.
That said, we also identified a number of areas which require
additional work. Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of
standardized combat identification. Units in theater arrived with seven
different combat ID systems, and our commanders were forced to overcome
these shortcomings ``on the fly''. Deployment planning and execution
were cumbersome and need to be improved to meet the operational demands
of the 21st century. Coalition information sharing must be improved at
all levels. Finally, human intelligence and communications bandwidth
are also areas which will require continuing focus.
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM--LESSONS LEARNED
In Afghanistan, coalition forces continue to deny anti-coalition
elements sanctuary while disrupting their ability to plan, target,
rehearse, and execute operations. This is accomplished through active
combat patrolling from secure fire bases and forward operating bases
(FOB) in order to promote stability, enhance the legitimacy of the
Interim Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), and prevent the
re-emergence of terrorism.
During OEF, we saw a number of functional areas and capabilities
that reached new levels of performance. In some areas, improvements
were made prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, the DOD/CIA
synergy, which worked well during OEF, was built upon the integration
of liaison officers in each of our headquarters which facilitated
teamwork and paid great dividends in Iraq.
Also, we continued to leverage coalition strengths as new coalition
members were added. ``The mission determines the coalition; the
coalition does not determine the mission.''
Advanced technologies employed during OEF were also critical. The
command and control of air, ground, naval, and SOF from 7,000 miles
away was a unique experience in warfare as our forces achieved
unprecedented real time situational awareness and C2 connectivity. We
learned that precision-guided munitions represent a force multiplier.
Low collateral damage during both OEF and OIF was a fundamental factor
in achieving our objectives. Early in OEF we saw the need for an
unmanned sensor-to-shooter capability to support time-sensitive
targeting (TST). The armed Predator demonstrates great potential and
will be a high payoff system in the future. Blue Force Tracking and
enhanced C\4\I systems increase lethality and decrease response time,
and also represent transformational technologies. We will continue with
development of Global Hawk as an unmanned, high-altitude, long loiter
time, beyond line-of-sight multi-sensor UAV, and will work to
incorporate laser designation and delivery of precision weaponry from
that platform.
The integrated common operating picture (COP) was a very powerful
tool. Tracking systems were previously Service unique. Workarounds were
developed for OIF, but there is a need to develop one integrated, user-
friendly, C\4\I architecture that captures blue and red air, ground and
maritime forces.
Strategic lift and tanker aircraft availability were stretched
during OEF and OIF. These forces are critical to rapid future force
projection, and we must enhance this vital capability in the years
ahead.
Combined and joint training of our forces was also a key factor
during OEF and was carried over into OIF. Our military forces are the
best-prepared forces in the world, and I thank the Members of Congress
for providing assets and funding to train these wonderful fighting men
and women to give them every possible advantage.
Finally, our ability to take action in OEF was predicated on
``Strategic Anchors,'' one of which was ``Cooperative Security''
relationships, which paid high dividends in basing, staging, and over
flight rights during recent crisis.
REGIONAL CONCERNS--IRAQ
Although security continues to improve, portions of Iraq are now,
and will remain for some time, dangerous. The term ``stability
operations'' does not infer that combat actions have ended. Military
forces are still required to set conditions that enable progress. As we
move forward, the composition and size of our forces will change to
match emerging requirements. Factors that influence our force mix will
include coalition force contributions, threat, and success in fielding
Iraqi police forces, security, and the new Iraqi army.
Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term effort. The
United Kingdom and Poland are committed to leading divisions in
Southern Iraq, and many partner nations have offered forces to fill
those units. Deployment of those forces has already begun. We continue
discussions with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19 coalition
partners are on the ground in support of military operations in Iraq,
with deployment pending for 19 additional countries. An additional 11
nations are conducting military to military discussions with respect to
possibly deploying forces to Iraq in support of stability and security
operations.
At this point some 35,000 police have been hired. This fills about
half of the requirement nationwide. Throughout the country, many of
these law enforcement officers are conducting joint patrols with U.S.
military forces, and we will ultimately transition responsibility for
security and stability to the Iraqis. In the near term, we must build
upon the momentum we have generated in this area.
Creation of the new Iraqi army is moving forward. The plan
envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra to
provide territorial defense and conduct stability operations. In the
first year, the goal is to field approximately nine battalions.
Initially, Iraqi forces will focus on performing security functions at
fixed sites, convoy security, and border control. As it develops, this
force will work with coalition forces to contribute to stability and
security throughout Iraq.
Underlying all security functions is the need to continue
humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil-military operations to
improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people. In this regard, our
regional allies have been invaluable. Neighboring nations have provided
hospitals, medical supplies, water, food, and expertise in beginning
the rebuilding process. The fact that there has been no humanitarian
disaster in Iraq; no widespread outbreak of disease, hunger, refugees
or displaced persons; or any of the other predicted consequences of war
is due, in large part, to the generosity of our allies. The CPA and
coalition forces will continue to work in concert with international
and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the result of years of neglect
by a brutal regime.
AFGHANISTAN
Our efforts in Afghanistan have given the Afghan people a chance to
break the chain of violence, civil war, and poverty that many have
endured their entire lives. Our coalition has made considerable
progress over the last 18 months, but much remains to be done. The
average Afghan now enjoys basic freedoms, a higher quality of life, and
prospects for a better future. A Loya Jirga to ratify a new
Constitution will be held this fall and national elections are
scheduled for next summer. President Karzai's transitional government
continues to develop as he works to expand its authority beyond Kabul.
Security and stability are the keys to President Karzai's success.
Since 1 May, our primary focus has shifted to stability operations. A
stable and secure environment enables reconstruction. U.S. Civil-
Military Operations forces have completed more than 150 projects and
nearly 300 more are underway. To date, these projects have improved
drinking water, medical care, transportation, communications,
irrigation, and agriculture throughout the country. To further our
reconstruction efforts and to help foster stability, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are working in Bamian, Konduz, and Gardez. A
fourth U.K.-led team will soon deploy to Mazar-e-Sharif, and other PRTs
are being planned for future deployments to additional provinces.
A critical step toward stability in Afghanistan is building the
Afghanistan National Army (ANA). The U.S. is leading this effort,
supported by five coalition partners. To date, three brigades of
professional Afghan soldiers have been fielded; we project ANA strength
of approximately 8,500 soldiers by December 2003.
HORN OF AFRICA
Several countries in the HOA responded positively to President
Bush's call for support against worldwide terrorism. However, these
states are challenged to conduct successful anti-terrorism campaigns.
Over 21 million people remain at risk of starvation in the region.
Long-term conflicts have intensified the debilitating effects of
natural disasters, especially drought. This forces the dislocation of
affected populations seeking food, medical care, and safety. Existing
governments find difficulty meeting the needs of their populations,
creating an environment hospitable to terrorist cells and transnational
threats.
CENTCOM has addressed these issues by standing up a Combined Joint
Task Force in Djibouti. This Task Force provides a forward presence;
trains counterterrorism forces; and supervises a number of humanitarian
assistance efforts to enhance security, improve public health, and
combat famine. These initiatives are key elements of our security
cooperation strategy. Close cooperation with interagency and
international aid organizations facilitates a regional approach to the
humanitarian effort and maximizes the effects of our efforts.
The HOA will require a long-term commitment of resources to achieve
stability, thereby setting conditions that will make it less hospitable
to terrorists.
IRAN
Iran has long pursued a goal of regional hegemony through
modernization of a regionally capable military force, the development
of WMD, and the use and promotion of terrorism as an instrument of
foreign policy.
Tehran perceives itself encircled by the U.S. The enmity and
abiding mistrust of the U.S. Government is implacable among Iran's
ruling hard-liners furthering security concerns. Iran's principal
security objectives remain unaltered with the fall of Baghdad, namely
the survival of the Islamic state and the preservation of Iranian
independence, with the secondary goal of expanding Iranian influence in
the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the broader Islamic world. Iran's
national security policies appear focused on maintaining political
stability and internal security, expanding diplomatic and economic
relations, establishing WMD and long-range missile forces backed up by
unconventional warfare capabilities and maintaining a robust terrorism
apparatus.
Shifts in regional security relationships are expected as a result
of the formation of a stable and productive post-war Iraq. Of course,
those realignments and perturbations extend beyond Iraq's borders and
will be of concern to Iran. Following the ouster of the Saddam regime
in Iraq, Iran has mounted an increasingly sophisticated and
multifaceted influence campaign that will prove persistent in its focus
to create an anti-coalition, predominantly anti-U.S., sentiment among
Iraqis.
Just as complex is deciphering Iran's dual-track foreign policy and
often contradictory public statements. Iran's efforts to promote itself
as a responsible member nation of the international community are in
direct contrast with its long-standing covert and public support to
radical resistance groups and terrorists as well as its failure to meet
its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations.
The Iranian regime's proclivity for violence through terrorism, in
concert with its past support of terrorism and an established pattern
of developing nuclear and other WMD and missile programs, will continue
to be of concern.
GULF STATES
Transnational terrorists remain throughout the Gulf region.
Violent, anti-Western ideology appeals to some segments of the
populace, due in part to the increasing failure of regional governments
to meet the basic needs of the people. As populations increase,
regional governments struggle to provide adequate education, housing,
infrastructure, and jobs. Closed political systems are only just
beginning to reform. Regional politics and long-standing, hard-line
stances concerning the Palestinian-Israeli situation exacerbate
regional instability.
However, there are also hopeful signs. Many of the Gulf countries
are moving toward a more representational government. Bahrain and Qatar
have begun municipal elections; Oman continues working toward opening
its economy and political system; and Saudi Arabia has begun efforts to
change the educational system, privatize state industries, and open a
domestic dialogue on other needed social reforms. Substantive
improvements will require a long-term, determined effort.
The Gulf States have stepped up their antiterrorism efforts in
response to September 11 and the May attacks in Saudi Arabia. Ongoing
efforts include increasing law enforcement, stemming the flow of
illegal financial support, tracking personnel movements, and monitoring
terrorist activities. While their cooperation is extensive, these
governments continue to prefer working behind the scenes.
Militarily, the Gulf States continue to perceive a long-term threat
from Iran. In a show of support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the
Gulf States, for the first time, deployed the Peninsula Shield force in
defense of Kuwait. Outstanding OIF basing and access support from the
Gulf States demonstrates tangible results of our active security
cooperation programs. They understand that our "footprint" in the
region is likely to change, and each state continues to advocate
security cooperation with the U.S.
While most citizens are relieved that the Iraqi regime has been
removed, opinions differ on coalition activities and what type of Iraqi
society will eventually emerge. Regional governments are looking to the
CPA to ensure Iraq does not become segmented. Gulf leaders look forward
to lucrative trade and economic relations with a rebuilt Iraq.
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
Pakistan's support has been fundamental to our success in Operation
Enduring Freedom. President Musharraf has committed substantial
national resources against terrorism to include arresting a number of
al Qaeda leaders, freezing the financial accounts of known terrorists,
and banning fundraising to support Kashmiri militancy. He has pursued
these actions despite ongoing tensions with India and significant
domestic pressure, and he continues on a path toward democracy and
sustained economic development. The U.S. has expressed gratitude and
solidified his political position by lifting sanctions and granting
economic assistance. CENTCOM will continue to support our mil-to-mil
relationship and build closer security cooperation with Pakistan.
The Central Asian States remain dedicated partners in the global
war on terrorism. Each country declared its support for the U.S.
immediately after the attacks of September 11. All offered to host U.S.
personnel and equipment. Bases established in the Central Asian States
have been critical to the success of our operations in Afghanistan. The
defeat of the Taliban and the removal of al Qaeda from Afghanistan have
enabled the Central Asian States to refocus their attention on internal
development. We will continue working with our Central Asian partners
to prevent the resurgence of terrorism, and the Department of State and
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection will continue to improve
their capacity to secure their borders against the flow of illegal
narcotics.
WMD PROLIFERATION
The proliferation of technologies related to WMD and long-range
delivery systems continues to be a significant concern in the Central
Region. As some nations and international extremist groups pursue
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, some
regional allies will seek to offset such threats by pursuing strategic
weapons of their own, thus perpetuating the proliferation cycle.
Security cooperation is our best hedge against this possibility.
Iran continues to pursue WMD. Its nuclear programs are under the
continuing scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its
chemical weapons stockpile and probable biological weapons program are
of concern.
In South Asia, the missile and nuclear race between Pakistan and
India is also troubling. Both states continue to develop advanced
missiles and the risk of miscalculation leading to escalation remains
of concern.
We face a severe threat in the potential for chemical, biological,
radiological, or less likely, nuclear attacks by terrorists. Documents
found (during the exploitation of suspect WMD sites in Afghanistan)
indicated the al Qaeda terrorist network had explored methods for
producing toxins and was seeking to establish a biological warfare
capability. Terrorists will continue to seek WMD capabilities as their
need for more sensational attacks intensifies. The extensive press
coverage of the October 2001 anthrax mail attacks highlighted U.S.
vulnerabilities and exacerbated an already dangerous situation in the
Central Region, where many extremists are based and exploring such
capabilities.
TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Over the past year, the global war on terrorism has been marked by
major achievements. Multiple terrorist operations sponsored by al Qaeda
and affiliated extremists have been disrupted; and many terrorists,
including high-ranking operational planners, have been captured. Al
Qaeda has proven unable to reestablish the extensive training
infrastructure it had earlier instituted in Afghanistan. The dispersal
of its leaders and cadre from Afghanistan continues to impede al
Qaeda's ability to accomplish timely and secure communications
exchanges.
Nevertheless, al Qaeda has responded to our counterterrorism
initiatives; in this context, several lesser-known personalities have
emerged and this has translated into strikes such as the May 2003
bombings of multiple housing complexes in Riyadh. So far, these attacks
have focused on ``soft'' targets; however, al Qaeda retains an interest
in striking larger, more spectacular targets.
Counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, U.S. victories in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the persistent conflict between Israel and
the Palestinians have generated pressure throughout the CENTCOM AOR.
Jihadist groups and disgruntled individuals constitute another
important source of potential terrorist threats. Given this setting, we
are constantly working to identify vulnerabilities and refine our force
protection measures.
SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW
Our success in gaining basing, staging, and overflight rights for
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and our influence in the
region are directly related to an active security cooperation program.
CENTCOM's program builds relationships that promote U.S. interests,
build allied and friendly nations' military capabilities, and provide
U.S. forces with access and en route infrastructure. Prosecution of the
GWOT requires continued fiscal and political investment in these vital
programs. I would like to highlight a few dividends of our approach.
The fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriation of $908 million in
FMF is currently enabling the training of a professional Afghan
National Army and allowing Pakistan to restore its military forces.
Additionally, long-standing partners such as Jordan are increasing
their interoperability through FMF-funded purchases. Continued
investment in security assistance allows CENTCOM to improve the
capabilities of friendly nations by enabling them to provide for their
own security.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) remains a low-
cost, high-payoff investment that helps shape the security environment.
Courses offered under IMET provide military members of regional states
an opportunity to attend courses in U.S. military institutions such as
Command and Staff Colleges and Senior Service Schools. IMET
participation by students from the Central Region supports
congressionally-mandated initiatives: providing exposure to the U.S.
concepts of military professionalism, respect for human rights, and
subordination to civilian authority. The Counter Terrorism Fellowship,
a new DOD appropriation, enables us to provide flexible course
offerings to several nations who are key partners in the GWOT.
CONCLUSION
The global war on terrorism is underway. The precision,
determination, and expertise of our military forces and our coalition
partners brought about the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq in
lightning speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two nations have
only taken the first steps toward freedom, and United States and our
coalition partners must be there to support the whole journey.
While we have accomplished much, the potential for terrorist acts
and other setbacks remains very real. Afghanistan has a new government,
a new army, and with coalition support the nation is making great
strides towards long-term stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime
was destroyed and regime supporters are being rooted out. Our focus has
changed from military destruction of a regime to providing security and
humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, while helping to establish
a representative form of government. Decisive combat operations have
been completed, but much work remains.
I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who
continue to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our
mission from Egypt to Kazakhstan, from the Suez to Pakistan, regardless
of the uniform of service they wear or the nation from which they come.
I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous support you
have given them.
I would be pleased to take your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. All of us join the
Secretary in his commendation of your distinguished career, 36
years I believe, am I not correct, and the contribution of your
family.
Those were excellent statements by both witnesses, very
balanced, what went right and what we have to learn to do
better in the future, and we'll probe that in these questions.
We'll have a 6-minute round, colleagues. We have almost full
attendance of the committee, and I'll move on quickly.
Mr. Secretary, as I departed the one thing that was
foremost in my mind was, how can we proceed and what steps are
being taken to reduce the risk to the individual and groups of
our soldiers and civilians, coalition civilians who are in
support of this in the face of these repeated daily attacks and
losses? The most encouraging information that I received was
from Ambassador Bremer, that he hopes by this July, within
weeks, to have concluded putting in place the initial steps of
the interim authority with Iraqis, as I mentioned a council and
a constitutional group. Is that on schedule, and do you concur
in my view that that's perhaps the strongest tool that we have
to reduce these attacks, put an Iraqi face, a degree of Iraqi
responsibility on this situation as we move towards securing
their freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I do. I think it's a
combination of political progress and, as you suggested,
Ambassador Bremer is hopeful that sometime next week or the
week thereafter there will be the governing council set up with
some 25- to 30-plus members. There are a number of city
councils that have been stood up in Baghdad and other portions
of the country.
I think it is, however, a mixture of the political
progress, where Iraqis begin to assume responsibility for some
of the ministries and some of their activities; economic
progress, as General Franks said, so people see their lives
improving; and military security. I don't think any one can be
separated. I think all three are critical, and they all have to
move forward.
Chairman Warner. I agree with that. But as soon as we can
begin to hold some Iraqis responsible for these killings and
constant attacks, all the better, in my judgment. They can
publicly address the need to have them stopped.
Mr. Secretary, with respect to questions of augmenting the
coalition forces, and specifically as my colleague, Mr. Levin,
said and as I raised with Ambassador Bremer, the inclusion of
elements of NATO--can you address that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd be happy to. I keep hearing people
say things and people write things to the effect that this is
the U.S. and the U.K., and it's not. As General Franks said, we
have 19 countries on the ground. We have commitments from
another 19 countries. We are in discussions with another 11
countries. That would bring the total up to 49 nations. My
understanding is that we currently have on the ground some
19,000 coalition forces with commitments for another 11,000,
which would bring the total to 30,000. In addition, the work is
going forward to develop an Iraqi army, former Under Secretary
of Defense Walt Slocombe is working hard to achieve that goal,
and we expect to have thousands of Iraqis back in uniform,
functioning in a responsible way as well as the police
evolution that you've discussed.
Now, what about the U.N. and NATO? The United Nations
passed a resolution. They've assigned an individual, Mr. Sangio
de Mello, who works closely with Ambassador Bremer. I believe,
Senator Levin, you indicated that it was a mystery why we
hadn't reached out to NATO. We have reached out to NATO. NATO
is assisting Poland, which has agreed to take a sector in force
generation. In addition, there are discussions that have been
taking place in NATO about the possibility of taking on an
additional role. At the current time, they're planning to take
over responsibility in Afghanistan this August.
They have a lot on their platter. But we have reached out
to just about everybody I can think of asking for assistance of
various types, and it is coming in. Is it as much as we'd like,
as fast as we'd like? No, it isn't. But are we hopeful it will
continue to increase? Yes.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, all of us are very mindful
of the need to maintain a rotation base of our forces back. We
recognize that probably the OPTEMPO of our military forces of
all branches are at a very high point at this time, and yet our
Nation and other nations are faced with a contingency operation
in Africa, most notably Liberia. I think the President quite
properly is facing this issue, has sent teams out to make an
assessment of what needs to be done, will evaluate it, and then
make a Presidential decision.
Could you share with us this morning some of the options
that are being considered and how those options in terms of our
forestructure might impact our troop redeployments out of Iraq
or troop redeployments in other areas? In other words, can our
military accept in your professional judgment--I know they
will, but what are the consequences of--a Presidential
decision, should it be made, of a deployment force? We bear in
mind that if you deploy, say 1,000 individuals, you have to
have 1,000 in transit, 1,000 in training, so it's a multiple of
the force that actually goes in the country.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You're quite right, of course, Mr.
Chairman, that when you have 1,000 troops deployed overseas you
do need a rotational base, and it ends up like a multiple of 3
rather than just the 1,000. First let me say that it is
critically important that the Department manage the forces in a
way that we can continue to attract and retain the people we
need, that the Reserve who have just done a superb job are not
stressed or called up so frequently or kept there so long that
it affects their commitment to serve in the Reserves. We need
them badly, and we have to be attentive to that, and we intend
to be.
The rotation out of Iraq is already starting. I don't know
what the number is, but I think it's something like 142,000
have already been redeployed. For the most part, there were
large numbers of Air Force and Navy. There also have been some
Army and Marine Corps.
Chairman Warner. Redeployed back home, put in home?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Redeployed back home, back to their
bases, wherever they were, mostly in the U.S. The 3rd Brigade
of the 3rd Infantry Division is now in Kuwait, it's been taken
out of Iraq and it should be back home in July. The plan for
the 2nd Brigade is that they would return in August, having
been there something like 10 months, and the 1st Brigade of the
3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to return in September and
they've been in there since about January, so that would be a
total of about 9 months.
The Services and the Joint Staff have been working with
Central Command to develop a rotation plan so that we can in
fact see that we treat these terrific young men and young women
in a way that's respectful of their lives and their
circumstances and the wonderful job they did.
With respect to Liberia, the President is considering the
appropriate U.S. role. He has indicated to world leaders that
he intends that the United States assist in some way with
respect to Liberia. He has asked the Department of Defense to
dispatch assessment teams in two locations, one in Liberia and
it's currently there, several dozen people, and in addition he
is sending assessment teams to the so-called ECOWAS nations to
determine the readiness of the ECOWAS forces and the extent to
which they may or may not be ready to deploy and over what
period of time, with what type of equipment, having had what
type of training.
The United States, Great Britain, and several other
countries have been in the process for many months now training
ECOWAS forces, and some have been used in Sierra Leone, some
are currently committed. So until the assessment teams come
back, it seems to me that we will not have a good grip on what
we would propose to the President.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Your staff briefed this
committee yesterday and you yourself will be briefing the
Senate tomorrow, so I commend you on keeping us informed on it.
General Franks, lastly, in your planning did you anticipate
this level of conflict that continues? You've been very candid
with us this morning. Had you put in place the preparations to
deal with it, and have you considered perhaps while we're
standing up an Iraqi army, between now and the stand-up of that
army, utilizing some Iraqi soldiers that can be trusted to go
along on the patrols with our own, so that we have not only the
coalition helmet, but something that the citizens can clearly
perceive as one of their own helmets?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, the latter point first. Yes,
as we begin to work to build the Iraqi army with Walt Slocombe,
whom the Secretary mentioned a minute ago, we will, as those
forces are brought on, position them, work with them in a very
operational way because, as you said, that serves to put an
Iraqi face on the security assets that are being used
throughout the country. So, yes, sir, that is part of the plan.
With respect to the level of violence, Mr. Chairman, I will
tell you, I think in a war and in post-conflict, one never
knows how to gauge what may be expected in the aftermath of
major combat.
Was it anticipated, Mr. Chairman? I would say yes, sir, it
was. Perhaps the way I'll justify that statement is to say that
the footprint that we see in Iraq today is not the same
footprint that was in Iraq on the day the President announced
the cessation of major combat operations. In fact, the
deployment orders, which had been approved by the Secretary
prior to the time--I believe it was the 1st of May when our
President said that the major combat operations had ended--the
deployment orders which had already been signed, in fact,
adjusted the footprint for Iraq in terms of military police, in
terms of civil affairs people, in terms of humanitarian
assistance type forces, in terms of engineers.
The plan called for the removal of forces that are much
more inclined to be used during major combat operations than
during stability operations, for example, armor formations. So
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we did anticipate a level of
violence, and I can't tell you whether we anticipated that it
would be at the level that we see right now. Mr. Chairman, I
think that when a war begins one can always hope for a very
quick transition to peace, to see a nation begin to rebuild
itself without a great deal of friction and without a great
deal of messiness. But on the operational side, on the military
side we must always be prepared to handle whatever level of
violence may come along, and, Mr. Chairman, I believe our
forces have been and will continue to be able to handle the
levels of violence that we see as this nation tries to bring
itself together.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld,
going back to the NATO issue just for a minute, on April 13 you
were asked about a possible formal role for NATO in the post-
war effort in Iraq and this is what you said, ``NATO--I've
suggested to the Secretary General that I thought that would be
a good thing. If NATO wanted to do that obviously France would
be opposed I'm told. They are opposed to a lot of things so
that shouldn't be a problem, because you can do it at 18
instead of at 19 countries, since they're not a member of the
Defense Planning Committee.''
Now, we have apparently not asked NATO to formally decide
to raise a force for deployment in Iraq similar to what they've
done in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Why have we not made that request
of NATO, asked NATO not just to support Poland, for instance,
as they've done as an individual country, but why have we not
asked NATO to formally decide as NATO to raise that force and
to give its endorsement to our action? Is it because we're
afraid France might not go along, or what? We don't want to ask
France?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, first of all, it's not clear to me
we haven't. I was told this morning that the discussions taking
place in NATO include a discussion about a possible NATO role
in Iraq. Now to what extent the Department of State or the
United States has or has not issued a formal request, I don't
know, but I know the discussions are going forward and I know
that the assistance that NATO is providing, not individual
countries in NATO, but NATO as an institution is providing to
Poland, is a NATO institutional action. It is something that
has been discussed, approved, and under way.
I also know as I said that NATO is preparing to take over
responsibilities in Afghanistan so how many things like that
they're going to be able to do at one time remains to be open.
But I have no problem, as I indicated then and I indicate now
some months later, in having NATO involved. Indeed, I think it
would be a good thing.
Senator Levin. NATO involved as NATO, formally being asked
and deciding as an organization to raise and to deploy forces
in Iraq? You have no problem with that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have no problem with that. Indeed,
I'm very pleased that NATO has been assisting and is currently
discussing assisting in additional ways.
Senator Levin. But if that request to NATO had been made,
wouldn't you know about it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know technically what you're
getting at, but whether the Department of State has instructed
the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, or Permanent Representative as
he's called, to issue some sort of a formal request, I don't
know. I know NATO has seized the issue, is discussing it. I was
told that this morning after General Pace had a phone call with
the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Jones.
Senator Levin. Would you support asking Germany and France
to provide forces in Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our goal is to get large numbers of
international forces in from lots of countries, including those
two, but we have requests out to a large number of countries.
Senator Levin. But you would specifically support
requesting Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have made requests to, I don't know
what it is, something like the Department of State has issued
requests to something like 70 or 80, 90 countries.
Senator Levin. Is Germany and France on the list?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll have to ask. I would suspect they
are.
[The information referred to follows:]
There have been no formal requests made to, or offers of support
from, Germany or France to provide forces in Iraq since the start of
the war. As I stated during the hearing we would welcome their support.
However, I do note that government officials from both nations have
stated publicly that participation requires further endorsement by the
U.N.
Senator Levin. But would you support it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Why certainly.
Senator Levin. Good. The troop level, General Franks,
you've indicated that that is going to depend upon conditions
that exist in the future. General Abizaid, at his confirmation
hearing recently, said that he believes that we would have
large number of troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Do
you agree?
General Franks. I do, sir.
Senator Levin. Could you give us just a range of troops? I
mean, would it be from 100-150,000 for many years? I'm not
asking for any kind of precise figure, but what's your current
best estimate?
General Franks. Senator Levin, that actually is not as hard
to answer as it might seem. We have about 145,000 troops in
there right now. As I have talked to commanders at every level
inside Iraq, one finds that that footprint appears to us on the
operational side to be about what that footprint needs to look
like. There has been suggestion that perhaps there should be
more troops, and, in fact, I can tell you in the presence of
this Secretary that if more troops are necessary, this
Secretary is going to say yes. We have talked about this on a
number of occasions, and when the tactical commanders on the
ground determine that they need to raise force levels, then
those forces in fact will be provided. The Secretary may want
to comment on that.
Senator Levin. That's reassuring though. In other words,
the current footprint is your best estimate. That would be for
the foreseeable future?
General Franks. Sir, it is for the foreseeable future.
Senator Levin. Now, on the weapons of mass destruction
issue, which is back in many ways in the media this week.
Secretary Rumsfeld, earlier this week the White House
acknowledged that ``the reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire
uranium from Africa should not have been included in the
President's State of the Union speech on January 28.'' On the
29th, you said on CNN something very similar to what the
President had said the night before when you said that the
Iraqi regime ``recently was discovered seeking significant
quantities of uranium from Africa.''
Now, just a few weeks ago Condi Rice said the following:
``that we did not know at the time, no one knew at the time in
our circle, maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the
agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts
and suspicions that this might be a forgery.'' I'm just curious
as to whether or not you've determined as a policymaker how the
facts, the falsity of that claim of uranium sale to Iraq from
Africa, remained in the bowels of the agency for 9 months after
you made your statement on the 29th.
Did somebody come to you, did the Intelligence Community
come to you and say, ``My gosh, we have facts that show that
that just simply is inaccurate?'' Have you determined how those
accurate facts, in other words, the knowledge in the bowels of
the Intelligence Community that it was wrong that Africa was
solicited by Iraq for uranium and that those documents were
forged? Have you determined how it happened that that
information about the forgery stayed for so long in, to quote
Condi Rice, ``the bowels of the agency''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, I can't give you a good answer. I
can try to get an answer for the record if you'd like. I must
say that as someone who reads intelligence every day as you do,
I find that corrections are being made fairly continuously. You
review a week's worth of intel, and 2 months later they come
back and say, ``Well, we said this on this date, but we have
new information that suggests this or that.''
The fact that the facts change from time to time with
respect to specifics does not surprise me or shock me at all.
It's to be expected. It's part of the intelligence world that
we live with, this uncertainty and less than perfect knowledge.
I must say, however, that as we've gone through this period I
think the intelligence has been quite good, and I don't think
the fact that there is an instance where something was
inaccurate ought to in any way paint a broad brush on the
intelligence that we get and suggest that that's a pattern or
something. It's just not.
Senator Levin. Could you find out for this committee for
the record? This is a significant piece of intelligence. It was
relied on at the highest level, very publicly, very visibly by
the President and by you within 2 days of each, right before
the war. It was a very significant statement about seeking
uranium in Africa. It was based on intelligence, at the same
time the Intelligence Community knew in the depths of their
agency that this was not true. It seems to me it is absolutely
startling. I think we would all want to know how it could
possibly have stayed there in the basement of the agency while
policymakers on the upper floors were making these statements.
If you could do that for this committee, I think we'd all
appreciate it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll try to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
In response to the question on Niger-related intelligence, this
question is best answered by the Intelligence Community. I assume this
information is being provided to you as a member of the Senate's Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm interested, in
light of recent attacks and everything, in your assessment as
to what's happening--are they more organized than say they were
3 or 4 weeks ago, and, if they are becoming more organized, is
there any evidence of how central this organization is? Is it
regional or is it countrywide? I'd like to hear your assessment
on that, General Franks.
General Franks. Senator, because we see more of the
activity, I ask myself are we seeing more of this violent
activity in the areas that are shaded on the map that the
Secretary turned around a minute ago? Are we seeing more of
this violent activity because some of these Jihadist
extremists, Baathists, Saddam Fedayeen forces are coming
together, or are we seeing more violence there because we are
more offensive and because we are placing more patrols in
there?
So the answer that I give you I will caveat with that
because I suspect that we're seeing increased violence in some
of these areas because we are more present. We are out looking
for it because that's our charter, that's what our force is
going to do. Now in terms of networking among these groups or
between these groups, Senator, I'm not comfortable right now
saying that I believe that there is operational control between
factions operating in Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, Mosul, and Bayji. I'm
not sure. I recognize the same thing you recognize which is
that we see increased violence, sir, but I'm not ready yet to
tell you that I see evidence that these violent acts are being
coordinated. I might tell you that next week, Senator, but I do
not yet see evidence of it.
Senator Allard. Do you see any outside influences coming
into the country, for example, Iran? Are there any coalition
forces from any of the neighboring countries that you can pick
up or any suggestion that there may be?
General Franks. Sir, since the war started we have seen
infiltration of elements through Syria, and we have encountered
those on a number of occasions. I believe that there continue
to be efforts by Iran, by Teheran, to influence activities
inside Iraq. We see evidence in there of the intelligence
services, Iranian intelligence services. We see evidence in
there of political forces. So, yes, I do see attempts by
nations in the region--I named those two--to influence
activities that are going on inside Iraq.
Senator Allard. Mr. Secretary, I'm aware that Ambassador
Bremer is trying to get some members on their Iraqi Governing
Council and get this put together rather quickly, at least in
the near future. Do you have any idea what we're thinking about
in terms of makeup of the council? Are we going to include
Islamic clerics, are we going to have former exiles and Kurdish
leaders, and when do you anticipate national elections?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I saw the pool of names, and it's large
and diverse, in answer to your question. It includes folks from
all across the spectrum, the Iraqis. Elections are something
that it seems to me will have to be determined as we go down
the road. The goal in life is not to have one election one time
as happened when Adolf Hitler was elected, for example. The
goal is to have a process and to have true representation and
true respect for the various elements, diverse elements in that
country.
The steps would be something like this, although I can't
even be certain of that: that there will be a governing
council, there will be some sort of an interim authority, there
will be a constitutional convention to develop a constitution.
The constitution and the Iraqis who develop the constitution
will make a judgment as to when and at what pace they think
their country is ready to have elections in a way that would be
reasonable and create a representative system for them.
That's out some way. If you think back to Afghanistan, we
still have a provisional government in that country and their
elections are expected next year sometime, so it takes some
time. It's not an easy transition.
Senator Allard. The Kurdish problem in the north, I think,
continues to be a problem and the question I have is, from your
assessment, Mr. Secretary, do you think the Kurds in the north
are more interested in rebuilding Iraq or are they more
interested in forming a separate country at this particular
point in time?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, I think the former. Everything I've
heard is that the individuals from the Kurdish section of Iraq
are, in fact, participating in this process, that they've
behaved in a reasonably constructive way, that they're relieved
that the regime of Saddam Hussein is gone, and that they intend
to play a political role in the evolution of a new Iraq.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired.
Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, could I make a response
to Senator Levin on this subject that General Franks answered
on footprint? He responded for the foreseeable future about
such as it is, as I recall. I would just amend that slightly by
saying exactly. We see no reason to think that that footprint
isn't the right one for the moment. But the composition of U.S.
forces could change and we could end up with different types,
as he suggested. Second, the numbers of U.S. forces could
change while the footprint stayed the same, in the event that
we have greater success in bringing in additional coalition
forces, in the event we are able to accelerate the Iraqi army.
The exact number, therefore, of U.S. forces might change as
well as the composition even though the footprint, as General
Franks said, would be roughly the same until we see evolution
in the political and economic spheres. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Two administrative announcements,
colleagues. We have two votes coming circa 11:30. It is the
intention of the chair to catch the end of the first vote and
remain and do the second, and then return and resume the
hearing.
Following the open hearing, we will have a closed hearing
in the Intelligence Committee next door. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary,
General, we're all tremendously proud of the troops'
effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It's a great credit
to you, Mr. Secretary, and to General Franks. I'm now concerned
that we have the world's best trained soldiers serving as
policemen in what seems to be a shooting gallery.
The President declared an end to major combat operation,
but the war's not over for the men and women who are on the
ground in Iraq or their families here at home. The lack of a
coherent plan is hindering our efforts at internationalization
and aggravating the strain on our troops. Our troops are tired
and want to return to their families who are at home coping
with the absence and the loss of income. They've been gone
close to a year, and this truly is a hardship. They and the
American people want to know what the strategy is to stabilize
Iraq, bring the promise of democracy to the Iraqi people, and
alleviate the strain on our troops.
Now I've heard in response to Senator Levin's questions
about the NATO forces that there are 2 million troops in NATO.
Clearly not all of them are qualified to go here, but you have
the Italian carabiniere and the French gendarmes and the
Spanish guardia civil that are superbly trained troops in riot
control and dealing with barriers and fire and explosives. Have
we made a specific request to try and get some of the best
trained police that exist in the NATO countries to come over
and provide some relief to these American troops that are in
the process of being attacked almost daily?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, in fact, Italy and Spain have both
made commitments.
Senator Kennedy. When will they come, can you tell us what
the expectation is and how many are going to be there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can't tell you precisely. I've always
believed that it's up to those countries to make their own
announcements.
Senator Kennedy. I'm asking about what's been requested.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have requested of them exactly the
kinds of forces you've described and they have made commitments
to do so. The dates generally for these forces are going to be
in the latter portion of this summer and into September and
certainly by October. I'm guessing that some will be coming in
next month, and then it will be August, September, and October
that they will be flowing in, but I don't want to refer
specifically to those countries because I'm speaking to the 19
countries that have made commitments.
Senator Kennedy. That's true. But these three certainly,
among others, have some of the best trained in terms of the
police function.
I was troubled just by your earlier response about the
knowledge of the request of troops from NATO. It would seem
that you would be the person that would be on the phone to NATO
to ask these troops to be available, and we just want to know,
are you on the phone talking to NATO, to General Robertson, to
request troops? Have you done that? You indicated in an earlier
response, we want to reach out to everyone. Is it as much as we
would like? No, in terms of response to NATO. It's not clear
that we have announced to other countries. I have no problem if
they want to provide more help and assistance. I think families
want to know what are we doing. If they have 2 million troops
over there, what are we doing to bring a major chunk of those
troops through NATO into Iraq? Is that part of our plan now in
internationalizing the military phase of it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have made requests of NATO. I don't
know quite what you're asking----
Senator Kennedy. I'm asking when have you talked----
Secretary Rumsfeld. The 2 million troops, Senator----
Senator Kennedy.--have you picked up the phone?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The 2 million troops, I believe,
include the United States of America.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Europeans, minus France as a non-integrated military member,
currently have roughly 2.5 million people in uniform, as you suggested.
However, I am advised by our senior military leadership the reality is
that only a modest fraction of that number is actually available to
deploy to meet the Alliance's challenges. The reasons they are not
available are varied. Some NATO nations have legal limitations on the
number of troops they can deploy. Others mandate that only volunteer or
contract soldiers may deploy. Tens of the current 17 nations, excluding
France and the United States for this purpose, have such constraints.
As we know, of the fraction of the troops that could be available to
deploy, some 70,000, are already deployed by our allies to Bosnia,
Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and elsewhere. The result is that it
is estimated that only a very small number of all non-U.S. NATO forces
are actually available in the sense of our discussion.
There are, however some optimistic changes occurring in NATO that
center around NATO transformation. These include divesting obsolete
equipment, and closing unneeded installations. It also includes a new
and more modern NATO Response Force. Also we have recently seen NATO
demonstrate its will to have a global capability by its decision to
deploy, as a NATO command to Afghanistan.
Senator Kennedy. Then you have, what, 1,700,000 over there,
out of the 1,700,000 over there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I believe, months ago, the United
States through the Department of State made a request to
something like 70 or 80 countries for assistance. There have
been force generation meetings that have been taking place, one
that took place very recently, there's another taking place I
believe in New York----
Senator Kennedy. But your answer, I gather, Mr. Secretary,
is you're doing everything that you possibly can as a Secretary
of Defense----
Secretary Rumsfeld. We believe we are.
Senator Kennedy. --to make every request of NATO for combat
troops as well as for the kind of guard functions, and that
you're satisfied you're doing everything you can within NATO
and you have made that request yourself, or you're conscious of
the administration, or if you don't know that, you're going to
find out whether they have made that request?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We certainly want assistance from NATO
and from NATO countries. We have commitments from a good number
of NATO countries already, and NATO is already assisting.
Senator Kennedy. In the other area of the development of
Iraq, I understand the U.S. Government has talked about the
future of Iraq working groups. But I'm told by the people on
the ground that there's no formal plan for reconstruction. Can
you provide us with the operational plans for reconstruction?
Who are the people, the level of resources that are committed,
how many Iraqis will be involved in the plan to build, police,
justice system, the media, the schools, the other institutions?
Are there plans on paper, and where are those plans? Or are we
shooting from the hip and taking a piecemeal approach when
American lives are at stake in terms of the broader security
issues?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There certainly are plans for the
reconstruction of Iraq. I would, however, say that the plans
are not for the United States or the coalition to reconstruct
Iraq. Iraq's circumstance today is the result of 30 years of
repression by the Saddam Hussein regime, a Stalinist type
economy, and a denial of the people of that country and the
infrastructure of that country, the kinds of opportunities and
investments that a wealthy country like Iraq is perfectly
capable of doing.
Today if one goes from the Gulf States, from Kuwait or
Qatar or any of those nations into Iraq, it's like going in the
old days from Romania into West Germany. It's just stark how
damaging that regime has been to that country to say nothing of
the mass graves of people that were killed by that regime.
The plans do exist, but it will be the Iraqi people that
will have to build back their country and reconstruct their
country. A reference was made earlier to nation-building. I
suppose it's mostly semantics, but I think it's a little heady
and arrogant to think that you can build another people's
nation. I think the Iraqi people are going to build their own
nation back, and they're going to build it in a distinctly
unique Iraqi way.
Our task is to try to create an environment to get rid of
that repressive regime and to try to create an environment
within which the Iraqi people can put themselves on a political
and economic path towards a future and not to think that we're
going to go in there and spend the American taxpayers' dollars,
and billions of them, trying to rebuild a country in a way that
fits our image because that's just not going to happen.
Senator Kennedy. You're not suggesting we're not going to
be spending billions of dollars of American taxpayers.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course we are. Of course we will.
Chairman Warner. Senator, the light is on. Thank you very
much. I didn't mean to interrupt you, Senator, but we have to
move on.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks,
I want to express my congratulations along with the others for
your leadership, appreciation for your career, and for the
great troops that you led, how they performed under
extraordinarily difficult circumstances. They performed so
well.
When we think about what has occurred, a lot has occurred.
We could have as a Nation stayed right here and tried to build
up defenses at home, or we could have gone after the bases of
terrorism that were plainly out there in the world. The
President made a decision--this Congress supported him
overwhelmingly--to eliminate those bases. We saw those in
Afghanistan. You've liberated that country, and we've removed
al Qaeda and the Taliban from authority there. We've now
liberated the people of Iraq, and our prayer is and our hope is
that we can help them establish their own nation. It certainly
will be, as the Secretary said, ultimately their challenge to
do that.
I wanted to ask you a couple of things. One of the concerns
I have is how quickly we can bring on the Iraqi indigenous army
that will be a servant of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi nation.
How difficult is that? Do we need more resources? What can we
do to speed along the creation of a healthy, well-trained army
that serves the people of Iraq?
General Franks. Sir, first thank you for your kind remarks.
We do want to bring the Iraqi national army online as quickly
as we can. I think the vision is for an order of magnitude of
12,000 or so within the initial 12 months, if my memory serves.
We want to have as much Iraqi army as we can, but we want a
professional Iraqi army when we build it. What I mean by that
is we want the training of the troopers from the bottom up to
be done in a very competent way, and we have reinforced for
ourselves in Afghanistan that we know how to do that, that we
can do it.
But what we also learned in Afghanistan is that we do not
want to create an army that has no place to go. We want to be
sure that the Iraqis themselves bring along the infrastructure
for the positioning of those forces as we bring them online,
and at the same time we want to be sure that we work from the
top down to create a Ministry of Defense and the operational
level for an army that can manage them. I would like, Senator
Sessions, to see this thing, the Iraqi army, come along as fast
as we can actually control it and put it to work. I am
satisfied with the pace that Walt Slocombe intends to work on
that project right now, sir.
[Supplemental information follows:]
One of the CPA's major initiatives is to establish a new Iraqi army
that will help provide for the military defense of the country and, as
units become operational, will assume military security duties now
being performed by coalition forces. The old Iraqi military forces
disintegrated with the collapse of organized military resistance;
virtually all installations and equipment that were not destroyed in
the fighting were looted or stolen.
The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi military and security
services and is currently working on the creation of a new Iraqi army.
The current plan is to build a force of about 40,000 members (roughly 3
divisions) over 2 years as the nucleus of the national armed forces of
the new Iraq. The first battalion begins training this month. The
Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman, was awarded the
contract to conduct the day-to-day training under the supervision of a
coalition military assistance training team, which will be commanded by
a U.S. major general and will include officers from the United Kingdom,
Spain, and other coalition countries. This team is leading the effort,
including finalizing recruiting, vetting, and training activities.
It is our intention to build an Iraqi army that has officers who
possess true leadership skills, takes on traditional army roles such as
border defense, and is truly a national force that represents the
demographics of the country. It is our goal to have the first battalion
in October, 9 battalions by August 2004 and an additional 27 battalions
by mid-2005 for a total force of 40,000 troops.
Senator Sessions. General Franks, if you would just briefly
share with us the status of our commitment to containing Saddam
Hussein before this war started, those resources that we've
been committing for over a decade to keeping it in a box,
including patrolling the Persian Gulf, air flights, and
Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. We think about
the cost of the operation and the effort to help Iraq rebuild,
but tell us about the costs we were incurring annually?
General Franks. Sir, if you think about Operation Northern
Watch, Operation Southern Watch, and the maritime intercept
operations that were ongoing between 1992 and 2002, I can't
give you with precision the math associated with that. The
number that I would give you would probably be--Operations
Northern Watch, Southern Watch, $1 to $2 billion a year,
depending on the year. That does not factor what it costs
coalition members like the State of Kuwait, for example, who
paid in assistance in-kind perhaps another $200 to $250 million
a year during the course of containment.
Sir, I attempt to justify nothing with respect to
containment, and I make no comment about whether that was good
or bad. From an operational perspective, our job was to control
the skies over Iraq and to ensure as best we could in doing
that the sanctity, if you will, of 786, 787, and Security
Council resolutions, some 17 of them that the Secretary
mentioned earlier. That was the policy. That's what our forces
worked to do for that period of time. I will offer the
operational fact, sir, that, at this time, those operations are
no longer necessary. In fact, there are no longer jets and air
defense systems shooting at American men and women and then
returning to the sanctity of bases belonging to the regime.
Senator Sessions. I think that's an important thing for us
to consider. I always felt that in fact the Gulf War never
ended, that there was an agreed-upon peace that was not
holding. To me something had to be done, and I think those
actions have been taken.
General Franks. Sir, if I could insert one thing in
response to a comment Senator Kennedy made a minute ago about
troops having been committed a year and in many cases being
very tired. I believe, having been there, sir, that troops are
tired at two levels. One is a tactical level where one becomes
tired, and the other is a level where people do not believe in
what they're doing. I believe members of this committee who
recently visited our troops on the ground in Iraq found none of
the latter, and it's my job and our job to be sure that we
provide the tactical relief, rest, and quality of life for our
troops as best we can. But my comment is that I believe that
our young men and women who are deployed in Iraq, working in a
very dangerous circumstance, believe in their responsibilities
and are doing them remarkably well. I'm sorry, sir, please.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,
General Franks, let me add my commendation for an extraordinary
career in the Army and service to the Nation. I think you know
that we're all sincerely appreciative, but I think you also
know that the appreciation of the soldiers that you've served
with, their respect is much more, I think, gratifying to you,
and it should be. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege to go with Chairman
Warner and Senator Levin to Iraq, and I had a chance to meet
lots of soldiers. I would agree with General Franks. They are
proud of what they're doing, they will do it as long as we ask
them to do it, but they had one question of me I couldn't
answer, particularly the troops in my home State, the 115th
Military Police Company, the 119th Military Police Company, the
118th Military Policy Battalion--when are we coming home?
The answer to that question relies upon having troops
available to replace these troops because, as you've both
indicated, our footprint in Iraq will be significant. This
burden falls particularly with impact upon the Army. Today the
Army has 370,000 troops in 120 countries. In Iraq, the
footprint has the 3rd ID, the 4th ID, the 1st Armored Division,
101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 2nd Brigade of the
82nd, the 2nd Light Cavalry Squadron, and the 3rd Army Cavalry
Squadron, in addition five National Guard enhanced battalions
in Iraq and two in Kuwait. That's a significant footprint.
In Afghanistan, shortly we'll have almost two full brigades
with the 10th Mountain Division to take the mission. In the
Balkans, we have the 34th National Guard Division from Kansas.
In Kosovo, we have the 1st Infantry Division, which will be
replaced by the 28th National Pennsylvania National Guard
Division. We have forces in Korea, the 2nd ID, we have
contingency forces in the United States, and there are other
areas in the world that are dangerous.
In addition to that, the normal doctrine years ago when I
was serving was for every deployed unit you had to have a 3-to-
1 ratio. That I think has changed to 5-to-1 now because we also
have preparation, exercise phases, training center missions,
reintegration, and then the actual mission. We are dangerously
stretched thin in the Army and other Services also.
I know the answer to this will be multinational forces will
take the place of these troops in Iraq, but so far we've been
unsuccessful in arranging those forces. It seems to me that we
have to be prepared to increase our Army, number of brigades in
our Army, or to activate National Guard Divisions, and we have
to make that decision soon because of the training these troops
will need before they're deployed.
Mr. Secretary, are you planning or prepared to increase the
size of the Army to meet these commitments?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, I would say that I talked to
General Abizaid this morning, and he is sensitive to the
importance of troops knowing what the rotation plan will be so
they have some degree of certainty in their lives. He's
sensitive to the importance of the quality of their lives,
whether they get mail and those types of things, and is
determined to continue the fine work that General Franks has
done and, now that we've completed major combat operation in
Iraq, begin to get greater clarity as to exactly how that
rotation will take place.
It would be incorrect to say that we expect that
international forces will replace all of U.S. forces. We don't
anticipate that. We're going to have to replace U.S. forces
with U.S. forces in large measure, and we understand that. The
Joint Staff and the Services have been asked to make a
presentation to me; the request went back many weeks. They have
been working in the tank with the Services, and they expect to
bring that forward sometime this month, in which case they'll
get clarity as to what people can expect in terms of their
circumstances.
Then the question comes, do you need to increase force
levels, particularly in the Army or Marine Corps, the ground
forces, I would add? The answer to that question is if we
believe that's the case, obviously we would come to Congress
and make that request. At the moment we are attempting to bring
down our force commitments in a number of countries in the
world. We have proposals with respect to what's taking place in
Bosnia and Kosovo, which are through NATO, in together and out
together, as you're familiar. We have been working to try to
reduce our force in the Sinai. We have discussions going on
with Korea as to how we can have our footprint there arranged.
We have discussions taking place in Europe.
We also have, I'm told by Dr. Chu--and I don't know if
we've ever gotten the exact list--but something in the
neighborhood of 300,000 men and women in uniform doing jobs
that aren't for men and women in uniform. They're doing
civilian functions, and they shouldn't be doing civilian
functions. So we have to continue to try to manage the
Department in a way that we make the best use of people who
serve in the armed services.
If, at some point, it looks as though what you suggest
might be the case turns out to be the case, clearly we will
come to Congress and ask for an increase, but at the moment we
do not see that that's the case.
Senator Reed. Let me address the question a different way.
Since September 11, 42,000 National Guard troops have been on
active duty. That's before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Doesn't
that suggest to you that there is a need for a increase in
Active Forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, I don't have the number at my
fingertips, and I regret that, but there are a very large
number of Guard and Reserve that have been on duty that are
volunteers. They are individuals who were not called up.
They're not required, but a non-trivial fraction of the total
have been individuals who were asked, ``Would you like to come
on and serve on an active service for a period?'' and they have
said, ``Yes.''
So it is. You're right, except that within that mix of
numbers of Reserve and Guard, a lot of them are there because
they want to be, not because they're being forced to be.
Senator Reed. You need them, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet we need them.
Senator Reed. Then the question goes, if you need that many
National Guardsman over an extended period of time, stretching
back over a year, doesn't that suggest that the Active Forces
have to be increased?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course, we have increased the Active
Forces. We have a provision Congress passed and the President
has taken advantage of the 2 percent plus, and under an
emergency even the 2 percent ceiling is not a requirement for
us, and we are in some cases above the 2 percent. The force
levels have increased during this period, you're quite right.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired, but I
think this issue of the size of our forces is rapidly
approaching a decision point. From what I've seen from the
extended deployment of our Army particularly, and I agree the
Marine Corps also, and I would suspect the Navy and the Air
Force could make similar cases, is that we're reaching the
point where we have to go ahead and bite the bullet and put
more forces in our force structure so we can rotate those
troops who are doing so well and serving so proudly out of
Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks,
let me begin my remarks by joining my colleagues in thanking
you for a truly outstanding career. Our country owes you an
enormous debt of gratitude, and I join my colleagues in
saluting you.
Mr. Secretary, I was honored to be part of the Armed
Services Committee trip to Iraq recently, and, like my
colleagues, I had the opportunity to talk with many of our
troops. I want to echo the impressions that Senator Reed
received in his conversations. To a person I found that our
troops' morale was very high despite the harsh conditions under
which they're serving and despite the dangers to which they are
exposed.
But I also found a weariness among our troops, and over and
over I heard, ``I'm proud of our mission, I helped free the
Iraqi people, but when do I get to go home?'' I think it is
important that we communicate to the men and women who are
serving so that they will have some expectations. One soldier
from Maine told me, ``I can deal with another 3 months, I can
deal with another 6 months, but I just need to know.'' I would
encourage you--and I know that General Abizaid is working on
this--to share that information with our men and women in
uniform as quickly as it is available so there can be some
certainty.
I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, to project for us what
you see as the percentage mix of American troops versus troops
from other countries as part of the coalition forces by the end
of the year. Obviously, we can rotate troops home more quickly
if we can replace them not just with American troops, but with
troops from other countries. Could you give us some rough
estimate of what you see as the percentages of American troops
versus troops from other countries as part of the coalition
forces by the end of the year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As General Franks and I have indicated,
we now have about 148,000 troops there. We're hoping to have
the non-coalition forces up to something like, at the moment
we're looking at, 30,000 sometime late summer, early fall. We
intend to have the Iraqi army grow as rapidly as we can do so.
There's actually a fourth source of forces, and that's contract
forces for site protection to the extent that that might make
sense. That's roughly what it looks like to me going out toward
the end of the year.
Senator Collins. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, in your
statement that Iraqis no longer wake up every morning and fear
wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads
come. Indeed, all of us feel a great pride in freeing the Iraqi
people from the breathtaking brutality of Saddam Hussein and
his regime. Nevertheless, what I found during the trip is that
there still is very much a climate of fear in Iraq. There's the
fear that the Americans and the coalition forces will go home
too soon and that Saddam Hussein will return to power.
I was struck by a conversation that we had with an Iraqi
who was running an oil refinery in Basra whom, whenever we
asked any question that involved Saddam Hussein, would not
respond. How important is it that we capture or kill Saddam
Hussein, and how high a priority is it for the coalition
forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The President has said, and we all
agree, that the United States and the coalition forces are
committed to stay as long as is necessary and not a day longer.
So the idea that we would leave too soon and Saddam Hussein
would come back is not a realistic concern that anyone ought to
have. Saddam Hussein is not coming back.
How important is it that he be caught or killed and that
closure come to that? It would be helpful. There's no question
that this individual has created such fear on the part of the
Iraqi people because of his brutality and the numbers of tens
of thousands of people he's killed, and the willingness to use
chemical weapons on his own people and on his neighbors, that
there is a fear not just in Iraq but in the region that we have
to be certain that he is not going to be around.
I think that that will take some time. People don't get
over that fear immediately. But he's not coming back. He's
through. That regime is over.
Senator Collins. You and I know that. You and I know for
certain that Saddam Hussein is not coming back, but I am
convinced that the fear that Saddam will come back is impeding
our progress in reconstructing Iraq. Prior to this trip, I
would have said that as long as he's out of power, that's
sufficient. I came back with a very different feeling, a
determination that unless we capture or kill Saddam that our
progress is going to be far slower.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with that, and I will say,
however, that in answer to your question of what's the
priority, the priority is very high, as I'm sure you were
briefed.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
add to the record here my pride of the troops as well as the
leadership of General Franks. What you've done out there with
our troops is extraordinary, and I want to say thank you, and I
want to praise you for all of that. I also want to commend
Secretary Rumsfeld for all he has done with us as well as with
you and the troops during this period.
I want to continue to pursue the question of when are we
coming home because, although I didn't make the trip to Iraq,
I've heard it at home as well. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in
response to Senator Warner's questions that CENTCOM is
developing a rotational plan for forces in Iraq, and it appears
at this point that we don't have detailed answers about that.
My question to you is, when do you expect that plan to be
completed and will it include troop rotations in Afghanistan as
well? I would appreciate it if you could brief me on that plan
when completed as well. As ranking member of the Readiness and
Management Support Subcommittee, I am deeply interested in this
issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army will be contacting your office soon to provide that
briefing.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, CENTCOM's responsibility is to
communicate the force requirements that they believe they need
to do the job that they've been asked to do. The Joint Staff
and the Services then work with them to determine what kinds of
forces and what kinds of rotation schedules make the most
sense. That work is currently being done, it's going to be
presented to me this week, and I expect to be able to make some
decisions.
The certainty question is clear to the extent we can get
that work done, tell them as we've now told the 3rd Infantry
Division what their certainty is, to the extent we can do that
with the other forces there. I should add, however, we have
redeployed over 140,000 troops already including some Army,
including some Marines, some ground forces, as well as Navy and
Air Force.
Senator Akaka. In regard to this deployment, Mr. Secretary,
I recently visited some of our fine marines at Camp Lejeune and
our great soldiers at Fort Bragg. Many of them had just
returned from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we spent
a lot of time just talking about what they will need to
reconstitute their forces after returning home. In past
operations it has sometimes taken units up to a year or more to
fully regain high levels of readiness. Do you expect these
timelines to be about the same after Operation Iraqi Freedom?
If not, how do you expect to accelerate them, and how much
additional funding will this require?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We've asked for some funds already for
reconstitution, and I don't doubt for a minute that we'll have
to ask for additional funds for reconstitution. It's important
that that be done. It varies from unit to unit how much time it
takes and how much the cost is, but that work is all being done
by the Joint Staff. The other thing that happens, however, is
that the combatant commanders around the world look at what
took place in CENTCOM, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they begin
to change their judgments about the numbers of precision
weapons they would use, for example, relative to dumb bombs,
and how they might conduct their campaigns. As they involve
their contingency plans, they then alter their needs, and those
kinds of things will be coming in the budget that's being
prepared at the present time for presentation next year.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, I'm quite concerned about the
problem, and I'm shifting to dirty bombs. The General
Accounting Office recently completed a report for me on the
availability worldwide of radioactive material that can be used
to construct such a weapon. Because of this, the looting of the
Iraqi nuclear sites has been a matter of great concern. I thank
you for letting an International Atomic Energy Agency survey
team into Iraq. I would appreciate it if you could provide me
an update, either now or for the record, as to whether all the
missing radioactive sealed sources at the sites have been
accounted for.
General Franks. Sir, would you repeat the last part of the
question, just the last phrase, sir. I missed the last part.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's the percentage of materials.
Senator Akaka. I would appreciate it if you could update
either now or for the record as to whether or not all the
missing radioactive sealed sources at the sites have been
accounted for.
General Franks. We actually are very pleased with the
results of that and having brought the IAEA in to check the
work of our troops and some people who had been working that
very hard. Senator, I will provide for the record the exact
math, but the amount of yellowcake specifically is what we're
talking about from two different sites that was unaccounted for
at the end of bringing all this together actually is
infinitesimal. Virtually all of the drums and the substances,
the substance yellowcake, were recovered, and I will give you
with precision the math on it.
[The information referred to follows:]
In the International Atomic Energy Agency report summarizing the
results of its recent survey inside Iraq, the agency estimates that
fewer than 10 kilograms of yellowcake material remains unaccounted for,
and believes this small amount is not a proliferation concern.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again
let me, General Franks, echo what Senator Akaka and Senator
Collins and all the rest of us have said about the great
contribution you've made.
In the very beginning of this hearing, Senator Levin
mentioned that weapons of mass destruction are now back in the
press. I feel compelled to share at least my feelings--and I
think of some others up here--that they've never been out of
the press. It's so obvious that this whole notion that weapons
of mass destruction they claim that are not found, therefore we
should not have gone in and done what we have done is nothing
but an absurd media-driven diversionary tactic. I've never seen
the likes of it before. What these people are saying is that if
we didn't find these, therefore we should not have gone in.
First of all, if it hadn't been for the media, I think that
would have been put to bed way back in the beginning when they
found 11 chemical rockets with the capability--and I'm
recalling this from memory now--of 140 liters of some type of
chemical. As Richard Butler said, 140 liters of VX could kill a
million people. Now to me, we know there are 15,000 more like
that out there but we found those. That should have put it to
sleep.
General Franks, when you said three decades of bloody
regime, that's an understatement, and we all know that, and I
know that Secretary Rumsfeld has tried to articulate how bad
that really has been. But what you folks have done is end this
monstrous bloody regime. When you stop and think and envision
if we hadn't gone in, thinking about how in 1 day, 3,000 women
and children tortured to death using nerve gas--and I
understand that's one of the most painful ways of dying--to
envision 317 kids under 12 years old lined up and executed. I
recall right after 1991 when the war was supposed to have been
over, I think 2 days before that we had the first freedom
flight into Kuwait. Alexander Haig was on it. There were about
six of us on this flight. I recall going to the headquarters
that Saddam Hussein had used and walking through the torture
chambers and seeing the body parts and running into a little
boy that had his ear cut off because he had a picture of an
American flag that was in his pocket.
This fear, and now when I think about how gratifying it
must be to the two of you to know, the two of you more than
anyone else and the team that you put together, that you have
brought this bloodiest regime since Adolf Hitler to a close. It
has to be gratifying that people can now have weddings, women
can now walk the streets without worrying about being summarily
dragged out and raped and tortured to death, parents can send
their kids out without fearing that they'll have their tongues
cut out. So I just would say that, General Franks, as you cap
off a career, I don't think you ever in your wildest
imagination would have thought that you'd be doing such a
liberation the way that you have done.
There are a lot of things that we'd like to talk about and
you've covered quite a few, but I would say this. Before I came
in 1994, I was on the House Armed Services Committee and all I
heard all those years was jointness, jointness, jointness.
We're going to have to get to jointness and get rid of this
mentality of each one out there doing his own thing. We've come
so far. I think that the effort in Iraq and I might also say
the effort in Afghanistan is the greatest achievement in
jointness. I'd like to have your response, either one of you,
to your impression as to where we can go, how much further of
this effort of jointness we can go and with the successes that
we enjoyed.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll start. You're right. The pattern
in the past has been for the Services to try to do their own
thing and deconflict as best as possible. What took place in
Iraq was the most joint warfighting operation I believe in the
history of the world. I think the team, Lieutenant General
McKiernan, Lieutenant General Moseley, Vice Admiral Keating,
Major General Dale Dailey, General Franks and his deputies,
Lieutenant General Mike DeLong, and General Abizaid, have set a
pattern for the future that will dramatically leverage our
capabilities for the future.
General Franks. Sir, the only thing that I would add to
that is I think Afghanistan initially and Iraq later gave us
some insight into what joint can be. I think that expansion of
that across all our Services, all our combatant commands, is
the future. I think that that would fall under probably what
the Secretary would call transformation. I actually believe
that the notion of this level of jointness is tranformational.
I think Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, my buddy
down at Norfolk, will be and has the support of the Secretary
to bring this level of jointness all across our uniformed
Services in the years ahead.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much. Let me get on
record as saying I agree with much of what Senator Reed said
concerning a concern on end strength and--you've heard me say
this before--it's something that I hope you'll keep your minds
open. I know your close communications with the Reserve
component will convince you as it's convinced me and many of
the members of this panel that there has to be relief. I hope
that will continue to stay open.
I had occasion to be in Vicenza the other day and talk to
some of those in the 173rd, about half of those who were
deployed up to northern Iraq. That was a contingency that we
didn't know that would be there. We thought we'd be able to
come down through Turkey and it wouldn't be necessary, but they
are there. This is one of the minor things that we have learned
and this hearing is supposed to be about lessons we have
learned. Since my time is expired I'm going to ask you to give
this response in the record.
I know that in Vicenza when the 173rd was to deploy they
went to Aviano. Fortunately, we had good weather so that the
staging area, which is out in the open, could accommodate them,
which it would not have if it had been rainy weather. They're
now looking at some military construction projects that are
going to ensure that. That's just one of many, many lessons I'm
sure we've learned. I'd like to get as many of these examples
so that we and this committee, as we look at military
construction in the future and at our activities in the future,
will be able to isolate these and get your impression on all of
these things that now we realize maybe should have been done
before but we should address as a result of our experiences.
[The information referred to follows:]
Military construction (MILCON) projects support the Commander's
strategic vision of how we will operate in our AOR and from our HQ in
Tampa. MILCON projects are continuously evaluated and assessed to
ensure they continue to meet the requirements and intent of the mission
as set by the Commander. Presently, we are reviewing and updating the
Commander's strategy and long-term vision for the current AOR. MILCON
projects are but one example of the support needed to ensure that our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are able to carry out their
missions. Currently we have 13 MILCON projects in our AOR: 5 in
Bahrain, 2 in Oman, 3 in Qatar, 1 in UAE, and 2 in Uzbekistan for a
total dollar figure of $333 million. The following list includes 10
planned/future MILCON projects. Funding targets listed are estimates in
some cases, and only reflect MILCON appropriations. In most cases,
additional funds from outside MILCON appropriations are required to
complete the projects.
[In millions of dollars]
Location Title/Description Cost
1. Afghanistan Coalition Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF 180) Joint Operations 5.2
Center (JOC) at Bagram Air Base
Purpose of the CJTF 180 JOC project at Bagram is to replace the
existing JOC facility that is approaching the end of its life cycle due
to fair wear and tear and exposure to extreme conditions. The current
JOC for CJTF 180, a Corps level command, is comprised of tents of
various quality and dimensions. Due to the harsh environmental
conditions at Bagram (cold winters with snow, hot summers, intense UV
radiation affects due to the altitude, frequent and sustained winds in
excess of 40 knots, excessive noise caused by high winds, and excessive
dust) the tents need to be replaced.
2. Bahrain Headquarters 25.7
Expansion
(Operations Center
Phase III) at Naval
Support Activity
(NSA) Bahrain
Purpose of the Headquarter Expansion project at NSA Bahrain is to
expand the NSA operations center and incorporate a Naval Computer and
Telecommunications Station (NCTS) satellite communications (SATCOM)
expansion.
3. Djibouti Airfield Supplement 3.0
2 at Camp LeMonier
(Widen Taxiway and
Add Ramp Space)
Purpose of the Airfield Supplement 2 project at Camp LeMonier is to
allow the Camp LeMonier taxiway to accommodate C-5 and C-17 aircraft
and allow ramp space necessary to park aircraft. The current taxiway
will not accommodate aircraft larger than a C-130.
4. Jordan Airlift Apron at 17.5
``classified Air
Base''
Purpose of the Airlift Apron project is to provide aircraft parking
apron space for tactical and strategic airlift.
5. Oman Tanker Truck 10.5
Offloading Facility
at ``classified Air
Base''
Purpose of the Tanker Truck Offloading Facility project at
``classified Air Base'' is to provide fuel off-load facilities away
from main operations and cantonment areas.
6. Qatar Construct 51.6
Contingency Ramp at
``classified Air
Base''
Purpose of the Construct Contingency Ramp project at ``classified
Air Base'' is to provide additional contingency aircraft parking
capability.
7. Qatar War Readiness 50.0
Material (WRM)
Storage at
``classified Air
Base''
Purpose of the WRM Storage project at ``classified Air Base'' is to
provide additional storage capability of WRM assets.
8. UAE Flight Line 30.0
Facilities at
``classified Air
Base''
Purpose of the Flight Line Facilities project at ``classified Air
Base'' is to accommodate aircraft operations support.
9. UAE Refueling Ramp and 47.0
Hydrant System at
``classified Air
Base''
Purpose of the Refueling Ramp and Hydrant System project at
``classified Air Base'' is to support aircraft operations.
10. Tampa, FL Add to and Upgrade 102.3
CENTCOM HQ
Purpose is to consolidate CENTCOM staff and coalition personnel
into an adequately sized, efficiently configured, modern headquarters
facility. Project includes increased space for additional personnel,
renovation of the current building, a consolidated coalition facility,
and upgraded antiterrorism/force protection systems. Project is spread
over 3 fiscal years.
Chairman Warner. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. What is our situation, Mr. Chairman, with
respect to the votes on the floor?
Chairman Warner. Yes, the vote has commenced, and at the
conclusion of your questioning, we will adjourn.
Senator Byrd. Would you prefer to go now?
Chairman Warner. I think we would like to have you complete
your questions.
Senator Byrd. All right. Mr. Secretary, what is the current
monthly spend rate to support our ongoing military operations
in Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's a combination of appropriated
funds as you, sir, know better than any plus the expenditures
of funds that are taking place from Iraqi frozen assets, from
Iraqi seized assets, and from U.N./Iraqi assets under the Oil
for Food program. I can certainly have Dr. Zakheim come up and
provide a very precise answer as to what's currently being
spent.
[The information referred to follows:]
The projected monthly average obligation rate for the remainder of
the fiscal year for military operations in Iraq is about $3.9 billion
and about $900 million for the global war on terrorism to include
Afghanistan. These costs are financed with DOD appropriated funding.
The following are the type of funds available to finance relief and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Resources as of June 30, 2003:
[In millions of dollars] \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Available Allocated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated Funds:
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund \2\....... 2,475.0 954.1
Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (DOD). 502.5 252.0
Support to the Coalition Provisional Authority 599.0 206.4
(DOD)........................................
Non-DOD Resources (State, USAID, Treasury).... 529.2 529.2
Other Assets:
Iraq State Owned--Vested Assets............... 1,749.1 564.0
Iraq State Owned--Seized Assets............... 799.7 184.5
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) \3\........... 1,071.0 ..........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data as of June 30, 2003; source is the Section 1506 report
submitted to Congress on July 14. 2003.
\2\ Held by the Office of Management and Budget.
\3\ Established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1483 (2003). Revenue generated from the sale of oil and other
Iraqi commodities will be deposited in the DFI along with any frozen
Iraqi assets provided by other countries.
Senator Byrd. Do you recall a figure? Can you give us an
estimate? I've heard a figure of $1.5 billion a month.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would not want to venture a guess and
be wrong, sir.
Senator Byrd. Somebody ought to know.
Secretary Rumsfeld. They do know, and we'd be happy to
brief you on it.
Senator Byrd. I'd like to know now. [Laughter.]
Secretary Rumsfeld. We'd have to adjourn, and I'd have to
get on the phone with Dov Zakheim.
Senator Byrd. We'll be back won't we, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Warner. Yes, we will, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Along with that, how much are we spending a
month to support U.S. military forces in Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The expenditures for Iraq are in a
variety of categories. You might include the salaries of the
people that are serving there. Those salaries would be paid
whether they're serving there or they're back in Germany or
back in the United States. It might include funds as I
indicated that are coming from other sources. It might include
funds for reconstitution that are currently being spent but for
spending on restocks of bombs, for example, and weapons that
were used during the conflict.
It is not a question that can be posed and then answered
with a single number. I wish I were able to do that, but it
falls into a variety of different baskets under our
appropriated funds.
Senator Byrd. I understand that, Mr. Chairman, but I've
been around here going on 51 years. I'm on the Appropriations
Committee and we want to fund our military certainly and meet
the needs, but there must be some figure, some amount, that we
can cite as an amount that we're spending monthly in
Afghanistan and the same with respect to Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm sure there is, and we'll get it for
you.
Senator Byrd. That'll be another figure we'll hope to have
after when we return, Mr. Chairman, I would hope.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not likely--that fast?
Senator Byrd. You like to have figures fast when it comes
to appropriating money.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's for sure.
Senator Byrd. I would like to know on behalf of the
Appropriations Committee and Congress how much we're spending.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We'll try and get it for you.
Senator Byrd. I hear and I read that it's something like $3
to $3.5 billion a month to support U.S. military forces in
Iraq. Now where are these figures coming from that we read
about and that we in the Appropriations Committee are told from
time to time?
Chairman Warner. Mr. Byrd, the warning for 7 minutes has
stopped. We'll recess now and when we come back, you'll be
immediately recognized to finish those questions.
Senator Byrd. Very well. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. We're recessed.
[Recess.]
Chairman Warner. We will continue the hearing. Senator Byrd
will be recognized following Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks,
from a Kansas Aggie to an Oklahoma Aggie, you've done pretty
darn well.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. We truly appreciate your service and I
echo all the comments of my colleagues in that regard.
Mr. Secretary and General Franks, I want to tell you two
accounts from the chairman's CODEL over to Iraq of which I was
privileged to be a member, and in which I was trying to
determine the intelligence capabilities since I am the chairman
of the Intelligence Committee.
One is in regards to a massive grave site near Hillah where
there is a site about the size of a football field. It's my
understanding there are about a hundred of these grave sites
around the country and that we have, I think, been involved
with this task force justice on the accountability and the
forensic job that remains on about 14 and that will go up to
about 32, so it's a massive job. It was with anguish and
despair that our delegation stood on a mound of sand and
overlooked this pit, half of which has been smoothed over, that
contained 15,000 Iraqis. They brought them in by truck, three a
day, and in this pit would disgorge these people and they would
rape them, they would torture them, they would shoot them. If
somebody from the neighboring villages would try to rescue the
kids, why they were simply buried alive. Three thousand were
excavated when Saddam fell. One thousand were identified, and
then finally one of the clerics simply declared the whole
ground holy ground.
I stood there, and I wondered about man's inhumanity
against man. Saddam Hussein is a Hitler, a Pol Pot, a Stalin,
and it gets back to Senator Collins' comment in regards to the
palpable fear on the part of Iraqis. I underestimated that. I
know that you have made the statement that he is not coming
back, we have made the statement he's not coming back, and by
damn he's not coming back. But I don't think the Iraqis fully
comprehend that or fully grasp it or fully believe it.
That is why I think having been through that and having
learned that he basically executed at least 300,000, probably
closer to 1,200,000, of his own people and things as graphic as
I have described that we must capture or kill him--must capture
or kill him. I know Task Force 20, which you can't really talk
about much, if at all, has that duty, has that mission. You say
it is a priority. I would urge you, sir, to say that it is the
highest level priority because I don't think that we're going
to get the cooperation that we need and the full partnership
and have Iraqis enjoy liberty and democracy until we kill or
capture Saddam Hussein and his two sons.
I'm not asking you to comment on that. You've already
responded to it, but I feel very strongly about that. The next
account that I'd like to bring to your attention is that there
is a Colonel A.J. Kessel who is operating out of the Saddam
palace or headquarters there. He is working with the Minister
of Culture who is an Italian. Colonel Kessel got the bright
idea that there might be an opportunity to reconstitute the
Iraqi symphony of all things--after 30 years there had been no
symphony--and was able to do so by relocating and locating
people who played in the symphony and obviously some
replacements because it has been 30 years. They were in evening
dress that was provided. Some of the members of the symphony
found their instruments that had been hidden for 30 years, and
those that did not have them were provided, and they had a
symphony. It was a packed house. Tom Korologos was at that
performance and Tom did a magnificent job over there in Iraq.
The last piece they played, Mr. Secretary, was the Iraqi
national anthem, prior to Saddam Hussein. When they did that,
the crowd stood, applauded, and cried tears of joy. There is
Iraqi nationalism right below the surface that can flourish,
and there is hope for Iraq. Now I've not asked you a question.
Those are just two observations that I would make: one, anguish
and despair on what that man did to brutalize his country and
the need to bring him, either killed or captured, and his two
sons to justice, so that we can cooperate with Iraqis because
they have great fear. You've heard the tapes. You've heard the
pamphlets. Anybody that is cooperating lives in fear that he
could come back.
Then on the other hand, here we have a symphony of all
things that is going to be a regular performance, by the way,
from now on. God bless Colonel Kessel, who, by the way, goes by
the name of Buttons. So Buttons did his job, and that is one of
the projects, over 1,500 projects, that we are conducting in
that country that is the untold story because the media doesn't
cover it. I wish that symphony had been on CNN or, for that
matter, any other network. It was very impressive. If you have
any comment, I'd be happy to have you comment.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Roberts, I agree with you fully
on the importance of capturing and bringing to justice Saddam
Hussein, his sons, and the senior Iraqi leadership--just as
we've been working to try to bring the senior al Qaeda and
Taliban leadership. We will continue to do it. We recognize the
problem it poses. The story you've just recounted on the
symphony is an important one, and I thank you for doing it.
Senator Roberts. One hour and 28 minutes ago, it was
announced over Associated Press we have now captured number 23
on the U.S. most wanted list and number 29. A high-ranking
member of the Baath party regional command and the former
Interior Minister were taken into custody. The noose draws
tighter, and that's good news.
My time is expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Yes, Mr. Secretary, you wish to respond?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I was asked repeatedly by
Senator Levin and others, including members of the press, about
whether or not the United States has made an explicit, specific
detailed request to NATO for NATO's participation. I did not
know the answer as to what precisely had been done. It turns
out that my deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, did travel to Brussels in
December 2002, and, at least in that one instance, he made a
specific request to the North Atlantic Council to consider
contributions that the Alliance could make to post-war
stability in Iraq, and that's the answer to the questions.
There may have been other requests, which I suspect there have
been through the Department of State.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a bit to
what the Secretary said also. I know the committee is aware
and, Mr. Chairman, I know you're aware certainly that since the
beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan we have
had a French delegation with us in our coalition which, as I
mentioned earlier, now stands at 63 nations, and that
delegation has been with us throughout the entirety of both
operations in Afghanistan as well as the operation in Iraq.
Chairman Warner. General, when Senators Levin and I,
Rockefeller and Roberts were in-country there, we met with the
French officers who were actively participating in the training
command there in Afghanistan. As a follow up, Senator Levin,
the Secretary addressed your NATO question. I would simply add,
Mr. Secretary, that I feel that such additional information--
you said, ``There could well have been other contacts''--I
would hope you'd provide for the record. But, Senator, you
might wish to initiate and then we go to Senator Byrd.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just repeat it so that Senator
Levin is aware of it. The answer to the question of whether or
not we've made a specific request to NATO to assist in Iraq is
we did. Secretary Wolfowitz was sent over there in December of
last year. He did make a specific request. I'm sure there were
other specific requests that I'm not aware of either.
Senator Levin. None since the war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have no idea. I'll be happy to run
around and try to find out the answer to that but I do know
there was this one specific one. There may have been some
before, there may have been some since.
Senator Levin. If we could get a complete list, if there's
more than one, it would be helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
On December 4, 2002, in Brussels, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
outlined potential Alliance roles in support of coalition operations in
Iraq to the North Atlantic Council. These included:
Force protection for U.S. forces in light of the
increased terrorist threat;
Backfill for forces deployed in NATO operations;
Security measures against the increased terrorist
threat to shipping in the easter Mediterranean;
Support for the defense of Turkey; and
Support for the post-conflict stabilization,
humanitarian relief, and reconstruction.
During a visit to the North Atlantic Council on February 27, 2003,
Under Secretary of State Grossman reminded the Members of Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz's presentation, noting that NATO had to decide how
it would participate in Iraq. On April 3, 2003, Secretary Powell again
reiterated to the Members the U.S. desire for a NATO role in post-
conflict stabilization, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction. On at
least six occasions between February through May 2003 the U.S.
Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Burns, reminded the North
Atlantic Council in permanent session of the U.S. requests for support.
Based on these requests, NATO supported the coalition in the lead-
up to and during the Iraq conflict by helping protect U.S. forces on
their soil; ensuring the safety of shipping in international waters by
carrying out surface, submarine, and maritime air patrols and
surveillance activities, including intelligence collection, in the
Eastern Mediterranean and escorting civilian ships through the Straits
of Gibraltar; and supporting the defense of Turkey through deployment
of chemical-biological defense units, AWACs planes, and Patriot
batteries.
Following consultations with the U.S., Poland on May 14, 2003,
formally requested that the Alliance provide support to the Polish-led
multinational division in the stabilization force for Iraq. Ambassador
Burns actively supported this request and worked to achieve consensus
in the North Atlantic Council for this proposal on May 21, 2003. The
agreed support will include:
Intelligence;
Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation System (BICES)
Topographical and satellite imagery products
NATO country handbooks and intelligence
databases
Logistics expertise and assistance with logistical
planning;
Movement coordination;
Communications support;
CIS Satellite Communications and crypto
support (mobile communication module, transportable
satellite ground terminal and LAN connectivity
equipment)
BICES equipment (secure phone lines and
terminals)
Force generation.
Chairman Warner. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now if we may
continue with my questions concerning the amounts of spend out
monies that we're expending in Afghanistan and in Iraq monthly,
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Byrd, I've been given a number
by Dov Zakheim that says that in the fiscal year 2003
supplemental there are funds for the United States Government
appropriated to spend in connection with Iraq--that between
January 2003 and projected through September 2003 will average
something in the neighborhood of $3.9 billion spend rate per
month.
Senator Byrd. In Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In Iraq.
Senator Byrd. $3.9 billion.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
Senator Byrd. Okay. Now what has the spend out rate been
for Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The estimate that I was given is that
it's something in the neighborhood of $700 million per month.
Senator Byrd. $700 million. That doesn't square with the
press reports that I read which, as I indicated earlier,
amounted to about $1.5 billion.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The 1.5 number that I've seen is a
number that people used 4 or 5 months ago as the projected
figure for Operation Enduring Freedom, the non-Iraq portion of
the global war on terror. I don't know what you saw in the
press, but I have seen that same number in that connection.
Senator Byrd. But you say that the amount that you're
stating before this committee today is around $700 million?
Secretary Rumsfeld. For Afghanistan.
Senator Byrd. For Afghanistan, per month.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The numbers that I've been
given by Dr. Zakheim of other funds is they anticipate $1.7
billion from frozen assets to be expended by the end of this
fiscal year and $800 million in seized assets to be expended by
the end of this fiscal year. Then there are some additional
contributions from various other countries that are going on
and the last time I saw that, it was a number of something like
$2.3 billion committed by other nations to assist with the work
that's going on in Iraq.
Senator Byrd. Now it would seem then that we're spending
about five times as much per month, a little over five times as
much per month in Iraq as we're spending in Afghanistan, $700
million as against $3.9 billion, I'd say 5\1/2\ times. Yet the
numbers there are we have 10,000 men, I believe, in
Afghanistan, do we not, and something like 150,000 in Iraq, 15
times as many men in Iraq but we're only spending 5 times as
much money.
Anyhow, do you believe that the spending rate for Iraq and
Afghanistan will continue to remain at the current rate for the
next year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know what the administration
intends to propose to Congress by way of funding for that, and
that's something that is funded out of a whole host of
different portions of your Appropriations Committee, AID,
Department of State, Department of Defense, and others. What
OMB and the President will recommend at some point in the
future I just don't know, sir.
Senator Byrd. All right. I see my time is up but let me ask
this follow-up question which my line of questions leads me to.
When do you expect to see another supplemental submitted to
Congress and how large a supplemental should we expect it to
be?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am under the impression that the
Office of Management and Budget is looking at a supplemental,
but I do not know when they would decide to submit it or what
the amounts would be either from my department or from other
departments because they've not made any recommendations to the
President on that to my knowledge.
Senator Byrd. But you have some recommendations to make to
OMB?
Secretary Rumsfeld. At some point we will, yes sir.
Senator Byrd. Do you have any idea how much that's going to
be?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't. I'm sure that Dr. Zakheim has
some preliminary work that he's done with the Services in terms
of reconstitution, and we can try to provide some of that to
you personally if you wish, but I don't have anything at my
fingertips.
Senator Byrd. I'll be pursuing this as a member of the
Appropriations Committee. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I might say,
Mr. Secretary, if you need reinforcements, having been on this
trip with the chairman and the ranking member, their ages are
classified but they are in extraordinary shape and energy and
enthusiasm. It was a privilege to be on the trip with you, both
of you.
Chairman Warner. Glad to have you with us, Senator. Thank
you.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, General Franks, I salute
both of you for your extraordinary success and military victory
in Iraq. Mr. Secretary, you were very complimentary of the
General and those who worked with him, but from the published
reports I've read you were integrally involved as well, and I
think you should share in that. The strategy that you developed
and the success--I remember saying beforehand the optimistic
but realistic scenario would be to be 3 weeks, but that was
very optimistic and I believe it was 3 weeks exactly from the
day that you crossed the border to the day that you occupied
Baghdad. I think that's an extraordinary success, and I salute
both of you for it.
I'm not qualified to draw lessons. I'm not experienced in
military affairs, but it would seem to me that at least a
similarity in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the dispersal of
opposing forces rather than a surrender. I don't believe in
either case there was a formal surrender. As General Sanchez
told us in our meeting in Iraq, the Iraqi forces dissolved near
the end of the advance because of the extraordinary lethality
and precision of our firepower and the overwhelming force. This
suggests to me that with the follow-through and the
continuation of that after, there was a risk of prematurely
declaring the victory has been won and the hostilities are over
when in fact this continuation of the need to track down
people, the principals as well as those who have not really in
their own minds surrendered but are just running away to fight
another day. That, in fact, leaves our troops even more exposed
often than perhaps in the initial stage of combat. That's what
seems is occurring now, which is coming as a surprise to the
American public who thought that this matter had been declared
over and, in fact, was.
That leads me again, Mr. Secretary, to my concern about the
follow-through in terms of winning the country after winning
the war. As to the progress that you cite, we witnessed some of
that with the economic development of the country. The social
rehabilitation, which I totally agree with you, sir, is not
ultimately the responsibility of the American taxpayer or
anyone else in the world but the Iraqi citizens themselves. At
this point in time it seems that there's a direct correlation
between the progress that's being made in the non-military
areas of let's call it social and economic rehabilitation and
the feelings of the populus toward the American forces and even
the number of attacks on them.
I guess in my view, and I don't think this is necessarily
the Department of Defense--and we were not briefed and
obviously we didn't see everything--but I'm not aware of the
same magnitude of non-military projects and initiatives being
undertaken that are going to make any kind of difference in the
standard of living in that society. I fear without that kind of
parallel effort to the military that our forces are going to be
in a holding pattern trying to preserve this military victory
but not able to be extricated because this unrest is going to
continue.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree completely that it
takes progress on all three fronts: the political, the
security, and the economic, and no one is likely to get very
far out in front of the other. In the last analysis, either
people will be willing to vote with their dollars, and I don't
mean U.S. dollars but dinars or whatever, and invest in that
country, and people will come back to that country because they
have confidence in it and because it has a well-educated
population. It has a population that has energy, it has
resources in oil, and it's not a poor country like Afghanistan.
It has wealth, and there isn't any reason it can't be as
prosperous and as successful as its neighbors in the Gulf
States.
I think it's going to take some time, it's going to take
some effort, and that in the end it will happen, it will
improve, and we'll see progress.
Senator Dayton. I would assert that that question is about
when are our troops going to be able to come home, that the
speed with which we show some visible signs of improvement
across the country, socially and economically, and obviously
we're not going to see those through to completion, those will
take decades. To get things started, however, is going to be a
major determinant in how quickly our troops are going to be
able to come home. I don't see, and we were not informed, in my
recollection, of a magnitude of effort and initiative, which I
think is going to have to be U.S.-started anyway, or it's not
going to happen in the near term, to get people to start to
have faith in the future and also to look at us more favorably.
I would commend the report in The New York Times this
morning which talks about a city, Abu Ghraib, and it talks
about the absence of power there. The head of the council there
that's been elected said, ``Conditions have never been worse.
We've never been through such a long bad period.'' I'm sure
from our experience too there are parts of the country where
there is more progress being made, there are parts where
progress is not being made, but I would just again say that I
don't see, didn't see an organized and well-financed non-
military initiatives to parallel and build upon the success
that was accomplished militarily.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I believe you said that the
war was declared over. No one I know in any position of
responsibility declared the war over. What the President said
was that major combat operations are completed and now we have
to go after the remnants of the regime, and that it will take a
good deal of time.
Senator Dayton. I stand corrected. That's a better
description of what was said.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Second, the war started on March 19,
major combat was announced as having ended on May 1, and today
is July 9. That's less than 4 months. Think what took place in
Germany after World War II in 4 years. Think what took place in
Japan in years. I think we have to get some perspective on this
and put this in context and think back in history. This is
tough stuff. This is hard work. This takes time. As Senator
Roberts said, fear is a powerful thing, and those people were
repressed and fearful. Thirty years of a Stalinist type regime
suffocating the creativity and energy and brilliance of so many
of those Iraqi people has been a devastating thing on that
country. We need to have some patience.
Senator Dayton. All right. I would agree with you. How much
patience do the American people whose sons and daughters are
over there now need to have? Do they need to realistically
expect that those forces are going to need to be there for 2
years, 3 years?
Chairman Warner. Senator, we have to move on to other
Senators. A number are waiting. If you want to make a quick
response----
Senator Dayton. My time is up, could I have an answer to
that question?
Chairman Warner. Yes. I was just about to say if you wish
to----
Secretary Rumsfeld. We responded to that question earlier.
The answer is that the people who are over there now will be
coming home. They will be rotated home. The ones that are there
are not going to stay there for 4 or 5 years.
Senator Dayton. The question, sir, was whether American
forces have to be there for 2 years or 3 years.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The answer to that question is we don't
know. Nobody knows the answer to that question, how long it
will take. It will take some time, and I think we all believe
that it's important that it be done, that's it important we get
other countries to participate in it. We intend to see it
through, and it's going to take some patience. When it's done,
it's going to be darn well worth having done.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. General Franks, I want to add my
appreciation for your dedicated service and sacrifice for this
Nation and your outstanding leadership. I'll reserve any praise
for Secretary Rumsfeld until he retires. [Laughter.]
Please accept the thanks of all America on behalf of your
outstanding leadership. Mr. Secretary, here's what you're
hearing today from the committee. A survey by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press shows that 23 percent of
respondents think the U.S. military effort in Iraq is going
``very well,'' far fewer than the 61 to 66 percent that
expressed that view during the conflict. Yet at the same time a
large percentage of Americans, in my view very appropriately,
think that the decision to go to war was the right thing as you
state.
The problem here is that Americans are unsure about the
future of our involvement in Iraq. What you need to do, in my
view, is give not just this committee but the American people,
who hold you in the highest regard and esteem and have the
greatest confidence in the President of the United States and
his leadership in this conflict, the concrete plan as much as
you can. In other words, how much is it going to cost roughly
and how long we expect to be there, even if it's a pessimistic
scenario? Also, how many troops are probably going to be
required given that there are certain variables? In other
words, this whole issue of how long are they going to be there
and the uncertainty of seeing the pictures of the wounded or
dead American soldiers are leading to this unease, and I
emphasize that's the word, ``unease,'' not disaffection, not
anger, but unease on the part of the American people.
I am convinced without a doubt that when Americans are told
what the plan is for post-war Iraq, then I think you will
receive overwhelming support on the part of the American
people. I say in all respect and appreciation for your
leadership, everywhere I go Americans want to know that. I
suggest that you have probably been doing that, but probably
not in a fashion that the American people either are hearing or
understanding what our future is. But again I want to emphasize
an overwhelming majority of American people think we did the
right thing. Whether weapons of mass destruction are found or
not, the overwhelming majority of Americans support this
President and your leadership and that of General Franks.
But they need to be told. That's all they need, and I think
by the tenor of the questions that you've gotten today, the
other Senators are reflecting what they're hearing from their
constituents. I hope you take that as a constructive comment,
which it is intended to be.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do. Thank you.
Senator McCain. Now I'd just like to move quickly to Iran.
There's reports today that there's a newly found nuclear site.
There's accumulating evidence about Iran. I'd like to know your
assessment of the threat, the situation, whether there's any
North Korean involvement--I guess I'd like to hear a little
more information about how you view this situation in this very
bad neighborhood.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, as the President has
indicated, the situation in Iran is roughly as follows: the
U.S. Intelligence Community has assessed that they do have a
nuclear weapon program. The IAEA has had uneven success in
dealing with them. The United States, over successive
administrations, has had discussions with Russia encouraging
them to not participate in a cooperative program with them with
respect to anything involving a nuclear power plant. It's
estimated that the nuclear facility that they're saying they
need for energy would produce less energy than the amount of
gas that they burn off on an annual basis.
Senator McCain. Have you seen this report this morning?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know what report you're
referring to.
Senator McCain. ``Iranian Exiles Describe Newly Found
Nuclear Site.'' It was carried in a number of newspapers.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn't. I have not seen anything in
the press this morning. I apologize.
Senator McCain. Do you see any other North Korean
connection?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There has been interaction between
North Korea and Iran over a sustained period of time.
I would say one other thing. There are recent reports of
Iranians moving some of their border posts along about a 25-
kilometer stretch several kilometers inside of Iraq, obviously
not being respectful of Iraq's sovereignty. Certainly that is
behavior that is not acceptable, and they should be staying on
their own side of the border.
Senator McCain. What action do you think we should be
taking, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that the President and the
Department of State have been engaged in a variety of
diplomatic efforts to try to persuade countries to not
participate with Iran in developing their nuclear capabilities.
It takes time to understand the success or lack of success of
those efforts.
Senator McCain. It seems to me we may have to contemplate
significantly more. I hope not, but it's certainly disturbing
news. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you again, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
we're looking forward to having you as a part of our Tampa
civilian community and thank you added to all of the accolades
here.
I would like very briefly to report to both of you what I
observed since I just returned from Iraq last night. First of
all, I think you have a good appointment in General Sanchez and
the Secretary's and your appointment of General Dayton
specifically to go after the weapons of mass destruction and
trying to find out the fate of Captain Scott Speicher, which
was one of the main reasons for my trip there. I am convinced
that, in fact, he does have him as a priority along with the
WMD.
I went to the Hakmiyah prison. I can only describe it as a
hellhole. I wanted to go there because of the cell that has the
initials carved into the wall, MSS, which is the same as
Michael Scott Speicher. We have no proof that that was the
case. I observed the torture chamber and the refrigerated
containers outside where they would put the corpses, and it all
the more underscored the brutality of this regime.
Happily I noted on the way in this highly protected convoy
that went to the prison that economic life was returning on the
streets. There were crates of refrigerators and boxes of ovens
that you could see along with the fruits and vegetables, the
return on the street of economic activity. I was also very
heartened to find that new evidence has been produced, which I
have just shared at length with Senator Roberts--the two of us
have been joined at the hip on this matter of Captain
Speicher--that is classified but that gives me reason to be
optimistic for the first time in several weeks that I have been
pessimistic.
That doesn't say that he's alive, but that says that we're
beginning to get evidence that, in fact, we might be able to
find out. I wanted to give you that report. At the same time,
some of the frustration that you have heard here, I don't think
that there's any reason for us to shrink from the fact that
most of the leadership that briefed me while I was there thinks
that we're going to be there for a long time. Clearly, I hope
we're going to be there for a long time, because we have to be
successful. It is very important in this Senator's opinion that
we have economic and political stability, and I think that's
going to require us being there with a lot of effort for a lot
of time.
In addition to Senator Byrd, I had just mentioned to you,
maybe we can confirm that in addition to the 150,000 that are
there that in the region there are another 80,000 that are
basically supporting the 150,000, and I think that we ought to
realize that when leadership was telling me that we were likely
to be there 5 years, I think it may be longer. Indeed, I can't
imagine us being out of Afghanistan just in 5 years, and the
experience that we had in Bosnia, now we're in the 8th year.
I don't necessarily see that as a negative, but it's, I
think, what we ought to get on the table and understand that
over the long haul we're committed for that being a successful
liberation of those people. Now it gets a lot easier if we find
Saddam Hussein, dead or alive, because then a lot of this
assassination that's going on right now--and that's what it is,
it's premeditated, it was probably planned before the war.
Unfortunately one of the victims was a member of the Florida
National Guard, Sunday night, doing guard duty at the
university at which someone slipped up behind him, shot him in
the head, and then slipped off into the crowd. That has
happened five or six times along with what you see, the tactic
finding where our convoys are going, putting a mine, having a
remote device, detonating it on a Humvee, and that happened and
is chronicled in this morning's newspaper again.
I think we just have to screw up our courage, our
determination. Finally, I might say that, Mr. Secretary, you
and I have talked about the question of the morale of the
troops, the question of the replacement of the troops. I have
specifically raised the issue of the National Guard and the
reservists and whether or not a policy change ought to be made
upping the active duty roster because indeed most every soldier
I talk to, and I talk to a lot of them from Florida, both at
the noon hour and then later in the evening, they are pretty
well under the impression that they have to stay there for a
year. That's not only the full time Army but that's also the
activated National Guard and the reservists. Of course, that
brings enormous disruption in their lives, in their employers'
lives, in their families' lives that they did not necessarily
think of that.
I bring this issue up merely as a policy issue that will
have to be considered here as well as by you on the question
of, should we be doing this with these wonderfully trained and
specially skilled reservists and National Guard men and women,
or should we not be doing those kinds of tasks that are going
to have to be done for the long haul in Iraq as well as
Afghanistan with the active duty roster?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, very briefly, as I indicated
earlier, we absolutely have to manage the force in a way that's
respectful of what the obligations are and what the
expectations are. One of the things that the Department has
been working on since the beginning of this conflict is how we
can rebalance what we have in the Reserve and the Guard
relative to what we have on active duty. We ought to have on
active duty the kinds of people that are going to be needed for
longer term chores or tasks which are going to frequently come
up. We can't keep calling the same people up four, five, six
times. It's just not right, and the way the force was organized
over the past two decades has been the way it is today, and the
way it is today is that we don't have the right people in the
Active Force, enough of the right people in the Active Force to
do those kinds of things.
We will be coming forward with proposals in a relatively
short period of time to see if we can't get the people
proportion of this right.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
again, General Franks, not only do I want to congratulate you
on your long and distinguished career but I believe that your
leadership in both Afghanistan and Iraq will likely be studied
by military historians for years to come. I thank you for your
service to our Nation.
This is a session on lessons learned, and I have two areas
in particular that I am interested in. The first goes back to
Senator Levin's early questions, Mr. Secretary, about the
intelligence, and he focused in particular on the forged
documents out of Niger that served as the unfortunate reference
in both comments by you and the President as well as the Prime
Minister in England and other officials. Senator Levin's
question basically came down to how could it not have been
known. In response, and I appreciate your willingness to
provide specific details to respond to Senator Levin, you made
a statement that the intelligence has been quite good.
I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that, as part of the lessons
learned and the after-action review that I'm sure both the
civilian and the military leadership are conducting, you will
certainly go deeply into the question of intelligence, because
it's not just with the incident concerning the alleged efforts
by Iraq to obtain enriched uranium from sources in Africa.
During his confirmation hearing, General Abizaid said, ``[W]e
had indications from intelligence that they were getting ready
to distribute chemical weapons to forward Republican Guard
artillery units. That's what we thought, and so we really
targeted those artillery units, in particular, very, very
hard.''
Then he goes on to say, ``So the answer to the question is,
I am perplexed as to what happened, and I can't offer a
reasonable explanation with regard to what has happened.'' Now
obviously we're all grateful it didn't happen. I know the
chairman and I on several occasions shared our concerns about
what would happen if they were deployed, but the fact is that
in this new threat environment in which we find ourselves, we
are increasingly reliant on intelligence. We just heard Senator
McCain refer to a report from Iranian exiles concerning some
potential new nuclear site in Iran. Therefore, I think that of
the lessons to be learned, that I hope we have learned, the
thorough scrubbing and very careful analysis of intelligence
has to be at the top of the list.
It may very well be that the American people and certainly
the majority in this Congress believe we did the right thing
given what we found there and given the end of the Saddam
Hussein regime. But I don't think that's the answer to the
question about the quality, the accuracy, and the use of
intelligence. I would join in the concerns that Senator Levin
and others have expressed, not only in closed meetings, but
also in public venues insofar as possible, that particularly
the Department of Defense but also other agencies within our
Government really make it clear what our standards for
intelligence are and how we can best understand them because in
a democracy that's critical, this flow of information.
Now turning to another area of lessons, General Franks, in
both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom the
military we used was fundamentally different than the military
that fought and won the first Gulf War. Indeed, we saw the
fruits of a decade's worth of investment in our military. The
increased use of special forces, precision-guided munitions,
unmanned reconnaissance, and combat air vehicles benefited from
the decade's investment.
As we look ahead to transforming our military, it seems
clear that UAVs, special forces, precision-guided munitions
that we invested in during the 1990s will continue to play an
expanded role; yet, I think it's also important to look at the
legacy systems like the M1 Abrams tank, the A-10 Warthog ground
support plane that also played a critical role in this
campaign. Now in this committee we've debated which weapons
systems are necessary in the 21st century. As a man with
enormous expertise and experience in this area, what lessons
have you drawn from both the Afghanistan and Iraqi campaigns
about the role of legacy weapons like the M1 tank, the A-10
Warthog, and others in the transformed military that we are
going to be building?
General Franks. Yes, ma'am. I think that about any point in
the history of our country when we take a look we're going to
find the need for legacy systems. In this case, ma'am, you
mentioned two of them, the A-10 Warthog and the M1A2 Abrams
tank, and there are a number of others. We will find ourselves
being trained and ready at any point in our history to use
those legacy systems, and whatever we do tomorrow, we have to
be prepared with good legacy systems.
I think the thing that we're seeing now, the expectation
that I have for the next 2 years, the next 4 years, the next 6
years is a tremendous effort in the area of transformation that
will seek to maybe skip some steps in there. I think our young
people, men and women in uniform, have done, Senator, a
remarkable job of using very good systems, and, in Afghanistan
and Iraq, we also used some systems that came about, as you
said, over the past 10 years, unmanned aerial systems, to be
sure, precision munitions--very powerful.
I think the transformation that our armed services are
looking at now--this is out of my lane but it's my view, it's
my opinion--seeks to figure out what we are losing by not
putting more money into technologies. What are we losing by
perhaps overcapitalizing legacy systems at the expense of what
we may want in the future? I think I'm glad that bright people
like some subordinates of Secretary Rumsfeld work such things,
but I think it'll be a little bit different in the next 3 to 10
years than it perhaps has been for us in the past 10 years, if
that makes sense to you. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, could I make a brief comment?
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Two things. First I want to give a
different number than I gave earlier. I'm told now that the
$700 million-a-month burn rate on Afghanistan is low, that it's
actually probably $900 to $950. I suppose if we wait another
hour we might get a still different number, but that's the
trouble with trying to do things in real time.
Senator Clinton, I agree completely on the importance of
intelligence. I was asked at my confirmation hearing what was
the thing that worried me most, and I said intelligence
information. It's such a big complicated world, and there are
so many areas that need to be looked at today unlike the Cold
War period where you could focus on the Soviet Union and
develop a good deal of conviction about it. We're dealing with
closed societies. We're dealing with countries that very
skillfully used our advanced technologies, where they're
trading those technologies. They're indeed trading denial and
deception techniques among so-called rogue states.
It is something that we're focused on. We think it is
enormously important, and I share your concern about it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld,
I only have 6 minutes here, so I'm going to try to keep my
questions very short and I'd appreciate it if you could try to
keep your answers fairly concise.
Let me first start with one of Senator Levin's questions
earlier in the day where he talked about the breakdown in
communications here, maybe between the Intelligence Community
and the Oval Office and exactly how President Bush was allowed
to talk about the uranium statement in the State of the Union.
I'd love to get an answer from you on that, and I hope you will
follow up with Senator Levin with the committee. But my
question is slightly different from that, and that is, when did
you know, Secretary Rumsfeld, that the reports about uranium
coming out of Africa were bogus?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Within recent days, since the
information started becoming available.
Senator Pryor. In other words, right after the speech you
didn't know that or even before the speech, you had no
knowledge of that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I've just answered the question.
Senator Pryor. Are you trying to say that in no briefing,
in no documents that you had or that you were exposed to, that
was never communicated to you in any way?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn't say that. I see hundreds and
hundreds of pieces of paper a day and is it conceivable that
something was in a document? It's conceivable. Do I recall
hearing anything or reading anything like that?
[The information referred to follows:]
Shortly after Mr. El Baradei of the IAEA raised questions publicly
in a report to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, I asked
my CIA briefer what the facts were. After checking, he tells me that I
was advised on March 11 that the CIA believed El Baradei could be
correct in his suspicions regarding the validity of the documents in
question. A question similar to the one you asked me came up on ``Meet
the Press'' on July 13, and I clarified the situation.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The answer is, as I've given it, no.
Senator Pryor. The next question is on the lessons learned
front. We find ourselves in Iraq right now, post-war Iraq, if
we can call it that. Based on your experience there and your
wide-ranging experience during your career, is there something
that we need to do starting now and into the future to provide
our troops with more training or different kinds of equipment
for circumstances like Iraq, where they come in there and
they're an occupying force, hopefully for not very long, but
still at this point an occupying force? Do we need to do things
differently? Do we need to do things better?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We think of ourselves as a liberating
force, not an occupying force. We think of the role there as
not permanent, and, General Franks, maybe you'd be the best one
to respond to the question.
General Franks. Sir, I think about the national training
center at Ft. Irwin, California. I think about Twentynine
Palms, the Marine Corps training center. I think about Red Flag
and Green Flag Air Force training centers. I think about what
has been done during the period of time Senator Clinton
mentioned a minute ago, perhaps over the last 10 years, in fact
in this case perhaps over the last 15 years, the evolution of
things rather than sudden discovery.
Senator, I'll give you an answer that is precisely to that
same point. For the last 10 to 15 years because of our
experiences in other places where we were conducting security
and stability operations, tremendous energy has gone into the
preparation of the United States Marines, the United States
Army troopers, airmen and sailors, especially SEALs, for
example, to be able to work in an environment of security and
stability operations.
But, Senator, the point that I would make is no amount of
training and no amount of preparation is going to make it very
likely that within a period of 2 months or 4 months or 8 months
we're going to move our troops into a population of 25 million
people who have been abused to the extent that the Iraqis have
been abused over more than 3 decades and cause there to be no
fractious behavior and cause these groups that we're having all
the difficulties with to go away.
So, sir, if I could, I would say again I believe our troops
are both trained and ready and very capable and doing, by the
way, an excellent job in this very tough environment. Sorry for
the long answer.
Senator Pryor. I don't disagree with anything you're
saying. In fact, I agree with everything. I just hope that as
we look at Iraq and understand it and understand our mission
there that we continue to improve down the road and that's
really my main point.
One thing on intelligence, and I don't want to dwell on
weapons of mass destruction, but there was a number, if I
recall, of news reports and statements made by the
administration and others that Iraq was in possession of
several dozen--if I remember the numbers right--Scud missiles
before we went into Iraq. The last I've heard, and you correct
me if I'm wrong, Secretary Rumsfeld, to date there have been
zero found.
Secretary Rumsfeld. My recollection that I'm sure is
imperfect but I recall hearing that there were 10 or 12 Scud
missiles that were unaccounted for, up to two dozen.
Senator Pryor. Two dozen accounted for, and they've not
been found yet then, is that what you mean by that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, there have been none found.
Senator Pryor. Another thing, Secretary Rumsfeld, if I may,
in March on ABC News you indicated that you felt like you knew
where Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were and you gave a
specific general area, if that's a correct phrase, that they're
generally around Tikrit and Baghdad and some to the east,
south, west, and north. Knowing what you know now, do you think
that was an accurate statement at the time?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course it was an accurate statement
at the time. It's what I believed.
Senator Pryor. I understand you believed it at the time,
but knowing what you know now, do you think your belief was
accurate?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have no reason to believe it's
inaccurate. I was asked at a time when our forces were south of
Baghdad in the war, in conflict. I was asked why we hadn't
found any weapons of mass destruction yet while the war was
still going on. I allowed as how that the area from Baghdad to
the north and the west----
Senator Pryor. Probably that orange or brown area on that
map over there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Probably. Was an area that probably was
more likely to have the locations of these so-called suspect
WMD sites. How many hundreds were there?
General Franks. I think just short of 1,000, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. They were all suspect, and there was
plenty of time for people to know that they were suspect. As I
recall, a large majority of them are in the area that I've just
described. Is that right, General?
General Franks. Sir, that's right, and there's one
additional piece to it and that is confirming the negative,
whether we're talking about up to two dozen Scuds that the
Secretary mentioned a minute ago. If we know that coming out of
the 1991 Gulf War there are up to two dozen of these systems
that have not been found and we know that the United Nations'
team has spent 11, 12 years looking for them and have not been
able to confirm that the Iraqis don't have them, then we go
look for them just as America would expect us to do. We go look
for them. Sir, that is the case with these nearly 1,000 sites
that the Secretary mentioned. We must believe that the problems
are there until we confirm the negative that they're not there,
and so that's the process that has been ongoing.
Senator Pryor. I understand the difficulty in that, and I'm
out of time, but I would like to ask this one last question.
There's been some confusion in the press reports, et cetera,
about who actually is in charge of searching for the weapons of
mass destruction. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'd like to hear who is
in charge of searching for those weapons.
Secretary Rumsfeld. There is no confusion about it that I
know of. The facts are these. The capabilities on the ground in
Iraq essentially are in the Department of Defense--large
numbers, helicopters, the ability to move people around and do
things. So the Department of Defense was asked to form the
Iraqi Survey Group, which we did. General Dayton is in charge
of it.
It was pretty clear to me that the Department of Defense
did not have the same level of skill that the Intelligence
Community did and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), so I
sat down with George Tenet, the Director of CIA, and we
discussed the importance, not of running around using
helicopters and people on the ground to look for weapons of
mass destruction, but the importance of gathering intelligence
through interrogations, figuring out who might know what, who
could we offer amnesty to, who could we offer a reward to, and
go through that process that is quite a different thing than
looking under every tree for WMD.
He assigned a man named David Kay to work with General
Dayton, and the judgment portion of it is being made by David
Kay and his cell back in the United States that is a multi-
agency cell. The actual physically doing of things, looking for
people, looking for sites is being done under the authority of
General Dayton. General Dayton reports to me. George Tenet and
I are as close as you can be on this subject. The people on the
ground are as close as you can be on this subject, and my
impression is that the people that have been put in charge are
doing a good job and handling it well.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm sure my
colleague, Senator Levin, would join me--we met with Dr. Kay.
He was part of the team Ambassador Bremer assembled to brief
us. Seated right there was General Dayton, and we got clearly
the understanding that the chain of command was as you
described. Therefore, there is clarity, in my judgment, as to
that reporting chain through Bremer and Kay up to you with
parallel to the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you for
that.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I know,
General, you're never going to get tired of the accolades even
though they keep getting heaped on. I want to certainly add
mine to those of my colleagues and to extend my appreciation to
the Secretary as well for not only taking our questions today
but for sticking with this very important task that's before
us, and that is, of course, working with the issue about end
strength, with rotation, with deployment, and the obvious
questions that we're going to be facing in the future dealing
with retention as well as recruitment because that's going to
be extremely important to the future of our military.
I think you need to do as you are in the whole area of
transformation because obviously the force of tomorrow will
only maybe slightly resemble the force of today. This is all
before you, and I commend you in advance for your work on this.
Regarding the post-war planning, earlier this year I
discussed with former Army Secretary White the concerns that I
had regarding the number of military police and the number of
reservists who had been called up to active duty as a result.
While I recognize that this is a liberating force, there's no
question but for a period of time that we'll be looked at and
probably serve as an occupying force until stability is
established.
In Iraq I was told by a group of elected officials in
Kirkuk, just recently elected group, that they thought that the
looting had really undercut the effort toward democracy in
certain parts of Iraq and that while folks who had not had any
experience with democracy were wondering if this was what
democracy was going to be about. They don't have outside
experiences, no other experience to call upon and so their
first taste of democracy may not have been as sweet as we had
hoped, ultimately as sweet as we hope that it will be.
What I'm leading up to is, as we look toward other efforts
in the world today that we may be called upon to restore peace,
to establish democracy, are we thinking about the force that
will obviously involve immediately upon the end of combat
operations the installation of peacekeeping that consists of
law and order military police far more than our own military
forces? Are we thinking about that in terms of transformation
because it appears that with the lack of staffing that we may
have had in that area that it may have gotten away from us in
Iraq, but we may be faced with that in the next effort that may
be just down the road? Are we building toward that, and will
that be part of transformation?
I guess it's unfair to ask you, General Franks, on the way
out, but do you have any thoughts of it, and then, of course,
Secretary Rumsfeld, I'd love to have your thoughts too.
General Franks. Sir, your comment about looting, I think,
is right. Unfortunately, looting actually was a tool used by
the regime before we ever undertook this so some of these
criminal elements--and I'm not sure what the number is, I think
the Secretary mentioned a number earlier in the testimony.
Senator Ben Nelson. It's 100,000 I've heard.
General Franks. Perhaps 100,000 let out of jail, and so the
looting by those people as well as other disgruntled people,
for sure affects the taste that the Iraqis have in their
mouths.
In terms of expectation, sir, I'm not at all sure that I
believe that the planning or execution of the post of the
initial 60 days or so--and that's how long we've been looking
at this, the initial 60 days or so of post-major combat
operations--can be characterized as, ``Well, you weren't quite
with it.'' Actually, what we'll do, I suspect, and the
Secretary will comment on this, is as the Services think
through what the structure needs to be for our Armed Forces
over the next 10, 20 years, as part of transformation, I
believe that sort of study will be undertaken to decide do we
have the balance about right. Are we about right in Active
component, Reserve component? Are we about right in the numbers
of armor troopers, in the numbers of military policemen?
Sir, that's the best that I can do.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. There's nothing I can add. It clearly
is important that as soon as possible at the end of a conflict
that you have the ability to assert control over an area. It is
also impossible to do. You cannot go from a warfighting
circumstance in 1 minute and have a whole lot of forces decide
not to fight you, as they did from Baghdad north, and blend
into the countryside and think that you have the ability in 1
hour from a powerful warfighting force into a stabilization
force capable of guarding every hospital, every school, every
museum, every suspect weapons site in a country the size of
California. You can't do it.
Senator Ben Nelson. But is there a period of time that in
the planning process you could isolate it down to say that it's
something that you should be aiming for within 2 weeks, 7 days,
or is there a time frame that you can narrow it down to?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely and they did that.
General Franks. Sir, the comment that I would make is that
when you plan a war or an operation with a mission that says
remove a regime, you recognize that--and, in fact, the
Secretary includes in his statement--some half-dozen or so
things that can go wrong. As a planner, what one does is take a
look at the things that can go wrong and try to put some scope
around how long this operation will take because if we can
figure out about how long it's going to take and about what
size force in terms of the numbers of tanks and aircraft and so
forth we need, then we can figure out how long we have in order
to get the sort of force, Senator, that you're mentioning
loaded and get it on the ground so that it's Johnny-on-the-spot
and ready to do some work.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's exactly why I was asking
Secretary White if he thought we had the skill sets--sufficient
staffing and support--necessary to be able to move and be able
to do that in advance of the occurrence.
General Franks. Sir, actually in this case we couldn't do
that. I make no defensive comment about this. We'll let history
reflect whatever it chooses to reflect. But I can tell you that
there is a direct trade-off between the size force built and
the amount of deception and surprise one achieves. One more
day, 1 more week, 1 more hour, 1 more month to build additional
forces which we would all applaud now would have resulted in a
totally different war than the one we saw.
Senator Ben Nelson. The problem with trying to deal with
lessons learned is that there's always an element of criticism
that's a part of it. When it's not intentional to be critical,
if you're not critical, you don't learn the lesson.
General Franks. Sir, I agree with that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I indicated to the General that
as this committee continues to complete its reports on the
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and by no means in my
judgment are either operation at that point where we do an
after-action report because action is taking place, the General
has offered to return in his civilian capacity to take further
questions.
Yes, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm going to have to excuse myself.
This has gone considerably longer than I had expected.
Chairman Warner. I recognize that, and I would like to ask
of you if you can provide just a brief few minutes in closed
session in SH-219 next door. We want to have one or two
questions on the WMD program, and then you'll be free to go. We
thank you. This has almost been a 4-hour public open discussion
of all issues relating to these important deployments of our
troops.
Thank you very much. I'd like to put in today's record a
Washington Post article, April 2, 2003, by a former Marine
Corps Colonel, Gary Anderson. I was hoping to address it. Time
doesn't permit. We are adjourned.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey O. Graham
UTILIZATION OF GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS
1. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have received several
complaints regarding Guard and Reserve personnel stationed in Iraq
lacking missions; being under utilized; and, when used, assigned to
duties for which they have not been trained. Some of this has been
because of delays in getting their equipment over to them in a timely
manner. Can you discuss this in more detail and specifically speak to
the 151st Signal Battalion, 122nd Engineer Battalion, and the 3rd
Infantry Division?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The general practice for unit deployments is
for passengers to arrive by airlift 7 to 10 days prior to unit cargo
arrival by sealift. This permits the passengers to arrive, perform
necessary inprocessing, acclimatize personnel to the environment, and
take necessary logistical actions to receive the cargo at the seaport
of debarkation.
In order to move a unit's equipment by the most efficient and cost
effective means--sealift, the movement requirements must be submitted
for contract actions well in advance of projected arrival into the area
of operations (AOR). Transit times from continental United States to
the CENTCOM AOR average about 30 days. These long lead times present
unique deployment challenges, especially to Reserve and National Guard
Forces, which must undergo mobilization and training activities
stateside in preparation for deployment. Synchronizing completion of
these activities as far in advance as the sealift requirements' arrival
is not an exact science and occasionally the goal of passenger arrival
7 to 10 days before sealift cargo cannot be achieved. Occasionally,
these units will complete mobilization activities earlier than
projected. Rather than keep the forces stateside, with no real mission,
the operational commander requests the forces to deploy when complete
mobilization. At that point though, the cargo is already underway via
sealift and cannot be accelerated. This is what happened to the first
two units in question (151st Signal Battalion, 122nd Engineer
Battalion). Some 3rd Infantry Division troops were also affected by
this difficult synchronization of airlift and sealift arrivals.
While these units may not be capable of performing their assigned
tasks immediately without their cargo, they are capable of performing
important base support and security missions until their cargo arrives.
CENTCOM and the force providers realize this is not the ideal situation
and make every attempt to synchronize passengers arriving via airlift
with their unit equipment arriving by sealift.
LIVING CONDITIONS FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ
2. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have also heard from
concerned family members regarding the shortage of drinking water and
slow mail delivery for our troops in Iraq. Please discuss any problems
that have occurred and what has been done or will be done to help in
these areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld. With regard to drinking water, theater
requirements are four bottles per soldier per day. Water is procured in
Kuwait and Turkey and moved by a combination of military and contractor
trucks to bases throughout Iraq. Convoy security and force protection
requirements can upset or delay deliveries. Dedicated escorts for
convoy operations have improved pushes to northern Iraq by 100
percent--only 2 days from Kuwait to 4th ID. Staffs at all levels manage
the program. Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) reports on
hand balance of theater bottled water in Kuwait as 12 days of supply
(at 4 bottles per soldier per day). Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-
7) reports 2 to 5 days of supply at the forward units in Iraq. Units
report no shortages and the situation continues to stabilize.
Concerning slow mail delivery, current average transit time for
letters and parcels is 12-15 days, down from 13-18 days. Current trend
is decreasing as transportation routes are optimized.
GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS ROTATION AND DEPARTURE DATES
3. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, in accordance to military
guidelines and protocols, please provide me with an update on expected
rotation and departure dates for South Carolina Guard and Reserve
units.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The policy for Army units currently in-theater
is that they will remain there for one year, unless conditions change
to allow their earlier release. This policy was established to ensure
our ability to successfully prosecute the military mission, while
providing our members as much security as possible, which is enhanced
by the proficiency and confidence generated through stability and
continuity of units. We will continue to promote judicious and prudent
use of our National Guard and Reserve Forces. Attached is a roster of
South Carolina Guard and Reserve units that are mobilized indicating
mobilization date and tentative demobilization date.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICES
4. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the military
components I don't want us to forget are our military families. They
too are a key to readiness, and I am very encouraged by the reports and
briefings I have received about the Marine Corps' OneSource family
assistance pilot program. For about the price of a fast food lunch this
program delivers an integrated and comprehensive family support program
that both maximizes military services and integrates community-based
programs to a Marine Corps family for 1 year.
The beneficiary satisfaction is really encouraging, and this
program is working especially well for our Marine Corps active duty
families as well as Marine Corps reservists who don't necessarily live
near bases or other service members for support when deployed. The
Marines are rightfully excited about OneSource, and I think once the
word gets out on this program, you're going to be getting a lot of
calls from other Members of Congress wanting the Department of Defense
to get this program out to everyone.
I want to know if based on the encouraging success of OneSource
during one of the most stressful periods for our military families, is
the Department considering expanding the pilot program so more of our
service members and their families can take advantage of this good news
program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We, too, have been extremely pleased with the
success of the OneSource program. This program offers service members
and their families, from any location in the world, 24 hours, 7 days a
week access to a professional counselor via a toll-free telephone line,
the Internet, and e-mail. The program offers the service in more than
130 languages. The Department has already expanded this program to all
Special Operations Forces and to several installations in the European
Command. The Army implements this program for active duty and Reserve
members this summer, and in the fall of this year the program will be
expanded further to include all Navy active duty and Reserve members.
This program will be a boon for reservists and their families who are
often far removed from military installation support services.
5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, what can we do to help make
this program available to more of our military families?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate your support for the quality of
life of our military members and their families. The military family
lives with a high level of stress not only because of frequent
deployments that place the service member/parent/spouse in harm's way,
but also because of frequent moves, disruptions in the military
spouse's employment, and the challenges created by children changing
schools. The OneSource program is a primary means of support to
families dealing with these challenges, especially the two-thirds who
live off-base and the 60 percent with family responsibilities. Our
service members have strong family values and high aspirations and
expectations for their quality of life. To that end, the Department, in
its new social compact, has entered into a written commitment to
improve life in the military, underwrite family support programs, and
work in partnership with families to accomplish the military mission.
The OneSource program leverages the power of public-private
partnerships and technology to deliver services. The Department
appreciates your continued support to deliver support services to
military members and their families, wherever they are in the world.
AIR WAR
6. Senator Kennedy. General Franks, I was tremendously impressed
with the complexity of the air war--1,800 aircraft, over 40,000
sorties, and only 7 aircraft lost due to enemy fire. This kind of
success does not come without incredible coordination. What command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) lessons can we take from Operation Iraqi
Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we
planned, deployed, and integrated the most complex theater air control
system in history. This complex C\4\ISR architecture provided our
Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) with a redundant and
sustainable command and control system and the ability to effectively
meet all objectives within a Joint, Combined, and Coalition Force
environment. We successfully integrated intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support of our Suppression of Enemy Air
Defense (SEAD) campaign, streamlined and decentralized the command and
control (C\2\) in support of our Counter-Theater Ballistic Missile
campaign, successfully integrated the Special Operations Forces, and
were able to provide persistent ISR over the entire battlespace
enabling real-time surveillance, targeting, and cross-cueing in support
of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander.
The many valuable lessons learned from OIF are being formally
documented and coordinated between the components and Services at this
time. This in itself is a complex undertaking. However, we are gaining
valuable insights into systems interoperability requirements, the
balance required between network centric systems, strategic and
tactical communications requirements, and those areas requiring
improvement in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
We have also seen the value of expanding command and control roles
of assets such as the E-3 AWACS into non-standard C\2\ roles supporting
time sensitive targeting (TST) and support to our Special Operations
Forces, as well as the value of forward stationing C\2\ and ISR assets
to enhance the support to ground forces in a dynamic battlefield
environment. The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles and their
video feeds into our C\4\ISR architecture and the use of new C\2\
applications in the decisionmaking process were key elements in our
ability to prosecute emerging TSTs. Additionally, we are validating the
existing requirements for advanced datalink capabilities to connect
sensor and shooter platforms and the requirement for the development of
courses to better train and integrate the ISR planning through tasking
and execution cycle. Our ability to fully integrate our coalition
partners including systems, networks, training, and exercises is also
being highlighted.
The design and implementation of the complex C\4\ISR architecture
developed and executed during OIF is best described as an overwhelming
success story. While we will certainly identify areas needing
improvement, it is believed that these improvements or changes required
in systems, doctrine, and TTP are on the margins of our current C\4\ISR
capabilities and not at the core.
PATRIOT MISSILE EVALUATION
7. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that you have
conducted an evaluation of the performance of the Patriot missile's
performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We are very interested in
the findings of this evaluation. The Patriot missile system is very
important to our military as well as our allies. There is concern over
the incident involving the Royal Air Force's Tornado jet and what role
the Patriot missile played as opposed to human error in that
regrettable accident. Can you share with us the Department's findings
on Patriot's performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. On 18 June, the Department briefed the Senate
Armed Services Committee professional staff members on Patriot tactical
ballistic missile performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Copies of
the briefing were provided to the staffers. Unfortunately, at this
time, neither the combatant commander nor the United Kingdom Ministry
of Defense has completed their investigations. Anticipate these
investigations being completed in the near future.
Any information dealing with fratricide must first be released by
the combatant commander involved and briefed to Congress. Until that
time, it is premature to release any further information on this issue.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT
8. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, the mobilization of National
Guard and Reserve units has hit the States very hard. When floods hit
West Virginia last month, the West Virginia National Guard was unable
to send out its engineers to respond to the crisis. Every one of those
engineering units has been deployed for Federal duty. If summer rains
cause more floods and mudslides, my State will have to wait for
engineers from other States to arrive, or rely on expensive contractors
to do the work that would have been done by the men and women of units
like the 459th Engineer Company, the 119th Engineer Company, and the
1092nd Engineer Battalion. Is anything being done to relieve the strain
on the State missions of the National Guard because of these
deployments to Iraq and elsewhere?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I signed out a letter July the 9th to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense directing them to
rebalance the forces. In that letter I enumerated three principal
objectives that I wanted to achieve:
Structure Active and Reserve Forces to reduce the need
for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve, and
structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization to not more
than 1 year every 6 years.
Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint
requirements; ensuring force structure is appropriately
designed.
Make the mobilization and demobilization process more
efficient.
I levied actions that I expect to be completed, and an aggressive
set of milestones for the responses. I believe this action will indeed
relieve the strain on our National Guard and Reserve units. I assure
you that I am as concerned as you are and will strive to ensure the
continued judicious and prudent use of our valuable Guard and Reserve
Forces.
9. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, will National Guard units
under high demand for State duty be deployed back to the United States
on a priority basis?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Units that have deployed for operations
overseas have initially been mobilized for up to 1 year, contingent
upon the needs of the combatant commander. The policy for Army units
currently in-theater is that they will remain there for 1 year, unless
conditions change to allow their earlier release. This policy was
established to ensure our ability to successfully prosecute the
military mission, while providing our members as much security as
possible, which is enhanced by the proficiency and confidence generated
through stability and continuity of units. We will continue to promote
judicious and prudent use of our National Guard and Reserve Forces.
COSTS FOR VARIOUS MILITARY OPERATIONS
10. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the total amount of
funds spent in fiscal year 2002 for the global war on terrorism,
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld.
11. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the total amount of
funds spent to date in fiscal year 2003 for the global war on
terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer to question 10.
12. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the estimated total
amount of funds that will be spent in fiscal year 2003 for the global
war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom,
and Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer to question 10.
13. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the monthly spending
rate, as of January 2003, for the global war on terrorism, Operation
Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer to question 10.
14. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the monthly spending
rate, as of April 2003, for the global war on terrorism, Operation
Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer to question 10.
15. Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the monthly spending
rate, as of May 2003, for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble
Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer to question 10.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
LIVING CONDITIONS FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE
16. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, it appears that the U.S.
military is now engaged in a classic battle for the hearts and minds of
the Iraqi citizenry, and it also appears that we may be losing this
battle. Can you tell us what positive steps are being taken to improve
the basic living conditions of the majority of the populace?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not agree that we are losing the battle
for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizenry. Twenty-three million
Iraqis have been liberated.
Despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis are far better off
today than they were 4 months ago. Iraqis do face the enormous
challenge of rebuilding from 3 decades of tyranny. We must not
underestimate how difficult that task will be. But we can take comfort
knowing that, as we freed them from tyranny, we did not add to their
burden by destroying Iraq's infrastructure. To the contrary, we saved
it.
Today, coalition forces are helping the Iraqi people rebuild and
get on the path to stability and democratic self-government. We are
making progress in helping Iraqis reestablish security and commerce;
restore power and basic services; reopen schools and hospitals; and
establish rule of law. With each passing week, more services come
online; power and water are restored in more of the country; gas lines
disappear; and more Iraqi police are on the streets.
Indeed, civil society is beginning to form. There are now dozens of
independent newspapers sprouting up, in Baghdad and throughout the
country. Town councils and associations are forming, and people are
expressing opinions openly for the first time in decades.
Vendors in Baghdad are selling videotapes detailing the atrocities
that took place in Saddam's prisons. As the President put it last week,
these are ``the true monuments of Saddam Hussein's rule--the mass
graves, the torture chambers, the jail cells for children.''
17. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, can you provide any kind
of estimate as to when the majority of Iraq's urban populace will enjoy
better basic services than they did in prewar Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In some parts of Iraq, particularly the
southern area including Basra, and the north, they are already enjoying
better services, especially when you remember that Saddam used basic
services as rewards or punishments.
It is true there are some Iraqis who are not better off today--
those who comprised the small, elite segment of Iraqi society that
benefited from the dictatorship. Such people exist in any dictatorship.
They are understandably unhappy now that the regime that favored them
has been removed from power.
The Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Ambassador Bremer, and
coalition forces are working alongside the Iraqi people to restore
basic services to levels that either match or exceed prewar
capabilities as rapidly as possible. For all the difficulties in Iraq
today--and there are tough challenges to be sure--it is important to
keep in mind all of the problems that Iraqis do not have to overcome
because of the way the war was fought. Today, Iraqis do not have to
rebuild oil wells, bridges, roads, and dams that were not destroyed in
the war. They do not have to bury large numbers of innocent civilians,
or rebuild residential neighborhoods, because of the compassion and
precision with which coalition forces fought.
18. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, is there an orchestrated
plan weaving the restoration of basic services into a larger campaign
to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizenry?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. policy goals for the recovery of Iraq
remain to establish a secure environment for the Iraqi people and the
conduct of relief and recovery activities; achieve measurable
improvement in the lives of the Iraqi people; maximize contributions
from other countries and organizations; and prepare the Iraqis for
self-government.
Security continues to be the top coalition priority. Security is
the foundation for success of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and a
fundamental task in our administration of Iraq. We have made
significant progress since the collapse of the Iraqi regime, but
substantial challenges remain.
At the same time, the Coalition Provisional Authority is working
with Iraqis to get government functions operating. In Iraq, basis
services have been provided by the government. The various ministries
are already working to develop operating budgets, and to support
activities for the remainder of this calendar year and for 2004.
Restoring dependable electrical service throughout Iraq is job
number one now because, without it, nothing else works in the country.
The good news is that combat damage to Iraq's electrical, water, and
other key infrastructure was comparatively light at the conclusion of
the war, because coalition military planners made a conscious effort to
spare these structures.
19. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, who is the ultimate
authority in Iraq in charge of the above?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Ambassador Bremer is the President's special
envoy to Iraq and the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. This authority includes the responsibility to oversee the
use of U.S. government appropriations in Iraq, as well as Iraqi state
or regime-owned property that is properly under U.S. possession and
made available for use in Iraq to assist the Iraqi people and support
the recovery of Iraq.
Since the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
the Administrator of the CPA has had the primary responsibility for
identifying requirements for relief and reconstruction in Iraq, and for
overseeing, directing, and coordinating all U.S. Government programs
and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the
Commander, U.S. Central Command.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
20. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, who is in charge, in
theater, of the search for weapons of mass destruction?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) is in charge of the
search for weapons of mass destruction in theater. Major General Dayton
commands this group and reports to the Commander, U.S. Central Command
while informing the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7)
of ISG activities. The Director of Central Intelligence, through his
special advisor to the ISG, Dr. Kay, provides strategic guidance and
focus for the ISG and the search for weapons of mass destruction.
SEARCH FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN
21. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, how important is
ascertaining the location and/or fate of Saddam Hussein and his sons?
Who is in charge of this effort?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not believe that killing or capturing
Saddam Hussein is necessary to win the war. Either event would
certainly dishearten many of the Baathist ``bitter-enders'' attacking
our forces, and would further damage the ability of these insurgents to
intimidate the local population. But everyone should be clear that
Saddam's reign of terror is over, and regardless of his personal fate,
his regime will never return to power in Iraq.
The center of gravity in this conflict is the trust and confidence
of the Iraqi people. As long as we are seen to be working to
rehabilitate the dilapidated Iraqi infrastructure, create a free market
economy that offers hope to all Iraqis, and help the Iraqis to
establish a genuinely representative government, Iraqis will continue
to support us in our fight against the Baathists and the foreign
jihadists. Eventually, as we realize these goals, the Iraqi people
themselves will be able to defeat the insurgents in their midst who
seek to return the nation to a brutal dictatorship or turn it into an
extreme fundamentalist state.
ATTACKS ON U.S. PERSONNEL IN IRAQ
22. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, as attacks continue
against U.S. personnel in Iraq, will forces be drawn off of the
reconstruction effort and reassigned to force protection? Won't this
result in precisely what our foes in the region want: namely a failure
on our part to provide for the Iraqi citizenry, and an effective
recruiting tool for all those who oppose the U.S. presence in that
country?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. forces have not been drawn off of the
reconstruction effort and reassigned to force protection. The vast
majority of U.S. forces are engaged in security tasks, not
reconstruction. Most of the reconstruction effort is being handled by
the Coalition Provisional Authority and their contractors. While there
are some U.S. forces performing reconstruction tasks, notably the civil
affairs personnel and engineers, in the aggregate U.S. forces are
performing these reconstruction functions while simultaneously
conducting operations against former regime loyalists and terrorists.
These missions are not mutually exclusive.
23, 24. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you have
indications or information that entities may be organizing the
opposition to the U.S. and orchestrating recent attacks on U.S.
personnel? Would you characterize these as random killings, or is the
resistance being directed? By whom? Saddam Hussein? Baath party
elements? If these attacks are not centrally orchestrated, are they
symptomatic of the beginning of a popular uprising?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The anti-coalition attacks are being carried
out by loyalists of the former Iraqi regime who are fighting to regain
the status they enjoyed as beneficiaries of Saddam, and to a lesser
extent, foreign and indigenous Sunni radical Islamists who naturally
resist any form of what they perceive as Western occupation of their
lands. Presently, intelligence indicates that anti-coalition attacks
neither result from nor are symptomatic of a popular uprising.
The dissolution of the Iraqi regime led to the dispersal of many
former regime elites, including government officials, security service
members, and military officers. This group of former regime loyalists
is predominantly ethnic Sunni, and had long profited, if not subsisted,
as a result of its loyalty to Saddam's autocratic regime. We assess
former regime elites fund and direct localized political and violent
resistance to the coalition. Intelligence community assessments
conclude that the opposition has not yet matured into a nationally
organized movement.
Intelligence indicates that former regime loyalists and radical
Sunni Islamists may have begun to work together. This may indicate
coalescence among resistance groups, but does not yet portend their
central direction or widespread public support.
COORDINATION OF U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY NEEDS
25. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, how do U.S. civilian and
U.S. military authorities in Iraq coordinate their needs, and what
steps have been taken to improve that coordination? Are those civilian
authorities satisfied with the level of coordination and responsiveness
that they receive from the military; are they sufficient to protect
them while allowing them to accomplish their task and facilitating
their efforts to accomplish that task?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Coalition Provisional Authority coordinates
the efforts of all U.S. and coalition government agencies conducting
activities in Iraq. The CPA coordinates regularly with the Coalition
Joint Task Force and CENTCOM for security requirements and other
military support.
The security situation in Iraq is complex. In some areas, the
security environment is generally permissive--there is reasonable
freedom of movement, recovery activities proceed without significant
hindrance, and coalition forces are engaged in stability operations. In
other areas, the environment is less permissive and coalition forces
are engaged in combat operations against remnants of the Baathist
regime. There will be times when security requirements will be seen as
an impediment to other important tasks, but I have every confidence in
the skill and abilities of those servicemen and women who are charged
with ensuring the safety of the many non-combatants working in Iraq.
U.S. TROOPS AND PEACEKEEPING
26. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, given the doctrine of
preemption and regime change adopted by this administration, it would
seem to even the casual observer that the indoctrination of our troops
with peacekeeping and follow-on stability skills would be extremely
important. Do you believe that U.S. troops receive enough training to
handle these types of missions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. To date, the performance of U.S. forces during
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations clearly shows that they
have had adequate training beforehand to accomplish assigned missions
to the high standards expected of them by their Nation. I would even
say that mission performance shows that training has been adequate to
ensure risk to U.S. forces is acceptable. Considering the complex
environment typically presented by such operations, the overall
performance of U.S. forces has been remarkable.
In accordance with our joint training doctrine, training of U.S.
forces before being assigned a specific operational mission is focused
on mission essential tasks required in operational plans or in
warfighting doctrine. These tasks are centered on performance in a
major theater war. Such performance represents the `worst case'--the
most difficult-to-master performance required of U.S. forces, and
provides a disciplined foundation from which U.S. forces are best
postured to execute any mission they may be assigned and adequately
prepared should an assigned peacekeeping mission escalate.
Once a specific mission assignment is received, unit leaders make
maximum use of available training time, both prior to deployment and in
the theater of operations, by narrowing their training focus on exact
mission requirements. If time allows, mission execution is rehearsed
before execution to help ensure success. Units rotating into a theater
to replace an already employed unit frequently have adequate time
during training to undergo more rigorous mission rehearsal exercises
that replicate the operational environment as closely as possible and
provide an opportunity for all members of the operational team to
practice performance required by the mission. For such training, U.S.
forces have benefited immeasurably from Department of Defense ongoing
efforts to update training venues to reflect the current operational
environment (e.g., to incorporate operations on urban terrain and with
civilians on the battlefield).
Finally, training support agencies throughout the Department of
Defense assist deployed forces by providing training support packages
the ability of in-theater forces to `reach back' into centers of
excellence, and helping commanders gather and disseminate operational
lessons learned.
As anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of preparatory training
for deploying forces, I offer the following extract from an after
action report of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which is being
redeployed from Iraq.
Topic A--Training for Combat
The roots of the division's successful attack to Baghdad are found
on the training fields of Fort Stewart, Fort Irwin, and Kuwait. The
division crossed the line of departure with a mature and trained group
of staff officers, commanders, and soldiers. The ability of the
division to stabilize company commanders and field grade officers after
conducting multiple CONUS contingency response force (CCRF) and
National Training Center (NTC) rotations produced a seasoned fighting
force that was trained and ready to fight and win on any battlefield.
A direct correlation can be drawn between the division's training
cycle prior to crossing the line of departure and the division's
successful attack into Iraq. The division conducted multiple integrated
live fire maneuver operations on urban terrain and detailed command and
control exercises at the task force through the division level to
prepare for combat.
All maneuver battalions conducted externally evaluated force-on-
force and live fire training events focused on offensive operations at
the company team level through the battalion task force level. Every
rifle squad conducted combined arms training focused on entering and
clearing a complex trench system and a multiple room structure. These
training events focused every maneuver unit in the division on the
exact missions soldiers would execute weeks later against the Iraqi
Regular Army and Fedayeen death squads.
The division artillery conducted live fire training events prior to
crossing the line of departure that massed every firing system in the
division at a single point and ensured every firing battery was trained
and ready to mass fires anywhere on the modern day battlefield.
The 4th Brigade (BDE) trained both close combat attacks in support
of the ground maneuver commander and shaping operations under the
brigade commander's control while in Kuwait. This served to not only
synchronize the brigade's internal aviation assets, but to also
synchronize the division's aviation assets with the ground maneuver
forces. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) established
between 4th BDE and the maneuver brigades facilitated the rapid and
safe employment of attack aviation in combat.
The division fought to train under realistic conditions in
preparation for combat. The priorities were clear and subordinate
leaders executed training that produced a disciplined, lethal, and
flexible force capable of accomplishing any tactical task.
The requirement for tough realistic training has not changed in the
past 227 years. The division lived under the ``train as you fight''
motto for the 12 months preceding the war. The training proficiency,
lethality, and maturity of the division serve as an example for the
Army to follow.
The American people can take pride in the courage and determination
of our Nation as evidenced in the 3ID's conduct during the war. The
skill demonstrated by 3ID in combat operations was a product of their
training. That same training produced a well-disciplined force capable
of rapidly transitioning to peacekeeping and stability operations.
Training to the high end of the spectrum of war produced a well-
trained, disciplined force capable of executing peacekeeping and
stability operations.
27. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, what kind of specialized
civil affairs, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement training do U.S.
forces receive as part of their traditional military education?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Civil affairs, peacekeeping, and peace-
enforcement factors are incorporated throughout professional military
education curricula. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School provides specialized civil affairs training for those
officers and NCOs assigned to civil affairs billets. Furthermore,
instructions are provided in the law of war, law affecting peacemaking
and peacekeeping operations and rules of engagement to commissioned,
warrant, and noncommissioned officers through traditional military
education courses such as Officer Advance, Warrant Officer Advanced,
Advance Noncommissioned Officer and the Command and General Staff
Officers Course. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is
divesting itself of Cold War oriented instruction in professional
military education courses. This includes updating doctrine, scenarios,
threat, opposing force, and the operational environment. A wide range
of opposing forces scenarios integrated with the variables in the
operating environment continue to be integrated in the programs of
instruction of professional military education courses, as illustrated
by the following three examples. First, students must be able to
demonstrate a sound knowledge of the complexities and related issues
necessary to plan, prepare, execute, and assess missions (offense,
defense, stability operations, and support operations) in a full-
spectrum operational environment. Second, operational scenarios in
courses include joint, multinational, interagency, and
intergovernmental operations, and integrated conventional Special
Operations Forces operations. Third, courses have also been revised to
incorporate the following macro-variables in the operating environment
into meaningful elements considered by students as they participate in
the various training scenarios.
Physical environment
Nature and stability of the state
Military capabilities
Technology
Information
Economics
External organizations
Social demographics
Regional relationships
National will
Time
28. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, what was the
philosophical underpinning of the decision to close the Peacekeeping
Institute (PKI), given that this was the only DOD facility that focused
on exactly what we've engaged in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
and that peacekeeping seems to now be a primary mission of the U.S.
military?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision to close the U.S. Army PKI at the
Army War College was based on the recommendations of the recently
conducted Realignment Task Force. As a result of subsequent world
events, closing the PKI has been put on hold. We are in the process of
reviewing the PKI's mission with a probable outcome that it will be
retained at the Army War College, with an updated charter and structure
in keeping with our current policies and focus.
29. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, are the reports that the
PKI is being reopened true? Will there be a real plan to provide the
PKI with focused resources and dedicated funding?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Based on world events, the U.S. Army has put a
hold on closing PKI. We are in the process of reviewing the PKI's
mission with a probable outcome that it will be retained at the Army
War College, with an updated charter and structure in keeping with Army
and DOD current policies and focus.
The PKI's mission will be similar to the previous PKI mission but
will be more focused on the complex stability operations in which the
Army is engaged. Its mission will be to study the strategic
implications for the Army of stability operations; support senior Army
leaders in understanding and dealing with the implications of stability
operations on the Army, and the impact of international organizations
and nongovernmental organizations on the Army's conduct of peacekeeping
and stability operations; understand current and future allied and
other nations' militaries' objectives and doctrine on the strategic
aspects of stability operations; contribute to evolving stability
operations doctrine; and help educate the next generation of Army
strategic leaders on stability operations.
PKI's operating budget request for fiscal year 2004 is $250,000.
Costs do not include civilian and military manpower that are currently
funded within the respective programs. This funding is included in the
Operations and Maintenance, Army request.
30. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, in his 2000 Presidential
campaign, the then-Governor G.W. Bush stated that he opposed U.S.
participation in peacekeeping operations because it reduced military
readiness and morale. Did this position inform the decision to close
the PKI? Is this also the view of the Department of Defense today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD could not find such a reference in
President Bush's campaign speeches.
The commitment of U.S. military forces is a serious issue that the
President examines on a case-by-case basis. The U.S. military is
capable of performing duties across the spectrum of military
activities, from high-end warfighting to peace operations, and has
world-wide commitments. As can be seen in numerous places around the
world, the U.S. is working with its friends and allies to ensure that
peace and stability reign. The conduct of stability operations--
including peacekeeping and peace enforcement--is an important activity
for the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, we are naturally
concerned about the stresses that long-term deployments place on
military personnel and their families, and we will continue to examine
our commitments globally to ensure that we maintain the best fighting
force possible.
The Army's decision to close the Peacekeeping Institute was taken
as a result of the recommendations of its Realignment Task Force.
Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee has amended that decision by
directing the commandant of the Army War College to reestablish the
functions of the Institute as part of the Center for Strategic
Leadership.
U.S. MILITARY RECRUITMENT
31. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, what impact on
recruitment for the regular forces has the war on Iraq and its
aftermath had?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision on whether or not to enlist is
highly individual in nature and generally reflects a complex
interaction of economic risk/benefit assessments and effective factors.
As a result, some individuals are deterred in times when the
operational tempo is high while others are attracted. As military
activity continues in association with Operation Iraqi Freedom and the
global war on terrorism, it is still too early to tell whether these
operations will have a measurable long-term impact on recruiting.
However, all Services are currently at or above their fiscal year-to-
date recruiting goals for the active components. Recruit quality also
continues to hold steady above the DOD quality benchmarks of 90 percent
high school graduates and 60 percent scoring in the top 50th percentile
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
32. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, what impact on
recruitment for the Reserve Forces and National Guard has the war on
Iraq and its aftermath had?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As military activity in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism continues, it is still
too early to tell whether these operations will have a measurable long-
term impact on Reserve recruiting. Currently, the Reserve components as
a whole are achieving 96 percent of their recruiting objectives year-
to-date in 2003, and they are exceeding their authorized strength.
Recruit quality is very comparable with past years. Individually, all
Reserve components except the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve
are exceeding recruiting objectives. The Army Reserve has shown
significant improvement in recruitment in the second quarter and is
currently achieving 98 percent of its objectives. While the Army
National Guard is finding it challenging to meet its large recruiting
objective, it remains within acceptable limits of its required end
strength. We are closely monitoring the recruiting efforts of the Army
National Guard and are working with them to overcome the challenges
they are currently facing.
TROOP MORALE AND ROTATION
33. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, some units stationed in
Iraq have been in theater for close to a year now and there have been
reports that the conditions in which they are operating combined with
these extended tours are contributing to low morale. Can you comment on
the morale of the deployed troops, and whether or not some of the most
heavily relied upon units can expect to be rotated out of theater
shortly?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Troop morale in the entire CENTCOM AOR and
specifically in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom is of the utmost
concern of the President of the United States, Department of Defense,
and the Commander of U.S. Central Command. With some units currently
stationed in Iraq that have been in theater for close to a year, their
living conditions have improved remarkably over the last several
months. Upgrades in their quality of life include: increase in Army Air
Force Exchange Service (AAFES) operations (exchanges, and food and
beverage operations), installation of phone banks and satellite phones
for morale calls, increase of additional fitness and recreational kits
to the forward areas, and rest and recuperation (R&R) trips to give
respite for the troops in the most austere environments. In addition to
these improvements, Armed Forces Entertainment (AFE) and USO are
sending entertainment groups into the forward deployed areas on a
continuous basis to include Project Salute, the largest AFE/USO show
ever seen in CENTCOM's AOR. Morale among the troops is tremendous
considering the energy and effort spent over the last several months
ridding Iraq of a terrible regime. Efforts to continually improve
quality of life for our troops remain a very high priority. These
troops are serving their country well, far from home, and making
tremendous strides in making the world a safer and better place for the
Iraqi people and the people around the globe.
MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN IRAQ
34. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, some nations have balked
at the prospect of placing their troops earmarked for follow-on
stabilization operations in Iraq under a unilateral U.S. command. Yet
it grows increasingly apparent that we must not, cannot, go it alone in
that theater. How will you, or do you even plan to, include other
nations in peacekeeping efforts while respecting their desire for
multinational leadership of these contributed troops?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thus far, as of 17 October, 33 nations have
contributed troops to the stabilization mission in Iraq, and 57 nations
have contributed either aid or humanitarian supplies. Coalition forces
in the south sector are under U.K. leadership, and in the center-south
sector are under Polish leadership. The deputies and staffs of these
command elements include officers from all countries contributing to
the stabilization mission in the applicable sector.
In fact, the Turkish and Japanese governments have recently
indicated a willingness to send combat troops. The Republic of Korea is
sending noncombat troops and is considering a combat contribution after
a very positive report from their survey team. Based upon bilateral
discussions we have had with other nations, we are optimistic that we
will see further troop contributions in Iraq. Thus, the United States
is not ``going it alone'' in Iraq.
Passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 on 16 October also
shows international support for our mission.
SEARCH FOR WMD AND LESSONS LEARNED
35. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, as the administration
has shifted from nonproliferation measures to counter-proliferation, it
will be increasingly important for the U.S. military to find, seize,
and assess weapons of mass destruction and associated sites. Yet in
Iraq, the effort to do just these things began haphazardly and has not
improved to any great degree since. What are the lessons learned that
the DOD has `taken away' from the ongoing search for Iraqi WMDs?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. prewar planning focused on finding,
seizing, assessing, and dismantling or destroying Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction and the programs that developed and maintained them.
During combat operations, the immediate focus was to protect the
forces from the effects of the use or discovery of weapons of mass
destruction. The unit deployed with V Corps, the 513th Brigade, was
manned, trained, and equipped for this purpose. In addition to the
force protection task, it also was capable of identifying sites,
materials, documents, and individuals who, in the aftermath of the
combat operations, were assessed to have been of intelligence value in
subsequent exploitation efforts.
Prior to the outbreak of combat operations, plans were developed to
deploy the Iraq Survey Group to take on the longer-term mission of
exploitation, assessment, dismantlement, and destruction.
In the June time frame, the units associated with the 513th rotated
out of Iraq as the ISG deployed, and the ISG is now systematically
going about the process of uncovering Iraq's WMD program.
In his February 2003 speech to the United Nations, the Secretary of
State outlined the extensive effort by Iraq to hide its WMD program
from U.N. inspectors and, by extension, to deny and deceive the United
States about its WMD capabilities and intentions.
Our experience thus far underscores the need for a robust human
intelligence capability, particularly with respect to entities to which
our access is actively denied.
SERVICE TRANSFORMATION VISION
36. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, much of the DOD's
transformative vision is characterized by quick deployments, quick
victories, and quick disengagement from conflicts. Yet with the
administration's declared doctrine of preemption and preventive war, it
seems likely that future conflicts will continue a decade-old trend:
that of peacekeeping and stability operations. How does the DOD's
vision of service transformation take this into account?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our vision of transformation encompasses
developing new concepts for the employment of military force across the
spectrum of conflict, from major force-on-force combat to stability
operations. These are reinforcing mechanisms in that transformation at
one end will have benefits across the spectrum of our core
competencies. The Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and the military
Services are developing future joint concepts that will support our
operational goals as laid out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The Transformation Planning Guidance includes guidance on developing a
joint operating concept in stability operations, with particular
emphasis on peace enforcement.
MILITARY STRATEGY
37. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the lessons of
the war against Iraq is one of access and its importance to U.S. battle
plans. When Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused to allow U.S. forces to
stage from their territory, they prevented the northern front against
the Hussein regime from being opened, and, in doing so, they prevented
the U.S. Army's most digitized division, the 4th ID, from entering the
battle. How have these events affected DOD planning for future
conflicts? How will the U.S. assure access to future theaters of
conflict, and/or how will the U.S. `work around' such denials of access
in the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Military planners realize that the issues of
access, in the form of basing and overflight permission, are
politically sensitive issues. For this reason, our planners develop
contingencies that account for events like access denial. A good
example of this contingency planning was the immediate insertion of the
173d Infantry Brigade in Northern Iraq despite denial of access by
Turkey. Branch plans are developed to account for denial of access when
it affects the base plan. From this standpoint, there will be no long-
term affect on DOD future planning efforts. We are confident that by
combining this approach with continued close coordination between DOD
and political agencies within the U.S. Government, we can minimize the
impact of any such eventualities.
38. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, most of the U.S. follow-
on stabilization plan was highly dependent on an assumption that the
Iraqi citizenry would overwhelmingly welcome the U.S. troops as
liberators and that they would happily work alongside U.S. during
reconstruction efforts. What was this assessment based on?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This assessment was based on the Iraqi peoples'
experiences under 30 years of Saddam Hussein's tyranny. These
experiences include genocide, mass graves, torture chambers, children's
prisons, starvation and deprivation as Saddam, his family, and his
cronies acquired more palaces and luxury cars, and a repressive police
state unlike any since the darkest days of Stalin's Soviet Union.
These assessments have been supported by the public opinion polling
that has been conducted in Iraq since the end of the war. According to
Zogby International, 7 out of 10 Iraqis say they expect their country
and their personal lives will be better 5 years from now. The National
Democratic Institute Focus Reports find that Iraqis are grateful for
the ouster of Saddam, and are excited about their newfound freedoms.
According to Gallup International, 71 percent of Baghdad's residents
indicated that they do not want U.S. troops to leave in the next few
months.
SERVICE EVALUATIONS
39. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am troubled that the
U.S. has engaged in three wars since 1999 and has failed to embark on
an objective, independent assessment of any of them. Indeed, the DOD
seems content to allow the individual Services to undertake their own
evaluations. Why, in an age of `jointness,' isn't the DOD aggressively
pursuing after-action lessons-learned reports, as opposed to rolling
evaluations by individual services?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense understands the
importance of capturing lessons learned from military operations. In
fact, the Department has been very aggressively pursuing and publishing
detailed lessons learned reports for quite some time such as the
Department's ``Kosovo After Action Report.'' Since then, we have
collected joint lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom and are in the process of assessing these lessons at
Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff.
All combatant commanders, to include the United States Joint Forces
Command, collect and assess operational joint lessons from actual
operations in the form of Joint After Action Reports. Additionally, the
Joint Staff captures and assesses joint lessons at the strategic level.
In each case the Department of Defense records both the success areas
and areas which need improvement. The Joint Forces Command after action
report for Operation Iraqi Freedom is due late this year.
BOMBER FORCE
40. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, the bomber force has
performed brilliantly over Iraq, as it did in Afghanistan. Indeed, this
force dropped nearly 70 percent of all air-deployed ordnance against
Iraq. Yet while the Air Force plans to buy over 2,000 tactical aircraft
over the next 20 years, there are no plans for fielding a new bomber
until the 2030s. Why?
Secretary Rumsfeld. While all of our bombers and their aircrews
performed magnificently during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom, our long-term plans call for developing promising technologies
in the near term so we can enhance our long-range strike capability
beginning in the 2012-2015 time frame. The fiscal year 2002 President's
budget provided $30 million for independent studies and technology
development by the Air Force Research Lab and the Institute for Defense
Analysis to assess future bomber concepts and technological investments
required for pursuing a future long-range strike platform. These
studies, along with others, indicate that aggressive modernization of
existing platforms is not a substitute for developing and fielding new
technologies. In order to capitalize on technological advancements and
yield the greatest possible return on investment from constrained S&T
resources, we will continue to mature the necessary technologies in
order to begin a long-range strike acquisition program in 2012-2015
time frame.
INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY COMBATANT COMMANDERS
41. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, according to a recent
report, although intelligence on Iraqi forces and capabilities was
strong, intelligence on enemy combatant commanders was shaky, at best.
What steps is the DOD, along with the Intelligence Community,
undertaking to rectify this shortfall?
Secretary Rumsfeld. DOD and the Intelligence Community have already
begun adjusting intelligence collection and analysis based on
appropriate lessons learned from OIF. We are making significant
improvements in both areas. For instance, we are developing and
fielding better collection systems and techniques across all
intelligence disciplines and providing state-of-the-art analyst support
tools. HUMINT reform will soon be initiated, a key element in
addressing new world threats, as well as positive actions to improve
the analytical skill sets required to increase our knowledge base on
future enemy key personalities. We recognize that the enemy combatant
commander's perspective may be a key factor in our own decisionmaking
process. To that end, we are taking a multifaceted, multidisciplined
approach to focus on those individuals, to include training our
analysts to better understand the societies and cultures that produce
those commanders. These initiatives will ensure we go into the next
conflict with better information on our future adversaries' commanders.
[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]