[Senate Hearing 108-837]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-837
NASA: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2003
__________
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
GORDON SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois RON WYDEN, Oregon
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
CONRAD BURNS, Montana JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia RON WYDEN, Oregon
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 2, 2003.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator Brownback................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 40
Witnesses
Chase, Brian E., Executive Director, National Space Society...... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Roland, Alex, Professor of History, Duke University.............. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Article from Discover, dated November 1985, entitled The
Shuttle, Triumph or Turkey?................................ 21
Smith, Marcia S., Resources, Science and Industry Division,
Congressional Research Service................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
NASA: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam
Brownback, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all for joining us today. I think we'll be joined
by some other members a little bit later on. There's a briefing
going on right now by Secretary Rumsfeld that a number of
people have gone over to, and I certainly don't blame them. I
was tempted, myself, to postpone the hearing for an hour's
period of time, but finding an hour during the day is just
tough to find. I decided to go ahead and go forward with the
hearing. I would anticipate we'll probably be joined by some
other members here a little bit later on.
America has consistently proven her leadership in space
science and technology. Predominance of America in space came
from the charge set forth by President Kennedy to land a man on
the moon and return him safely to earth. The technological
advances made during the Apollo era were a result of the U.S.
space program pushing forward in human space exploration.
Today, I hope to take a look back briefly at the recent history
of human space exploration, specifically the Space Shuttle, as
well as a look forward at what the vision of NASA should be.
This is going to be one of a number of hearings that I
anticipate we'll do in this Subcommittee looking at the future
of NASA. Moving towards a reauthorization bill for NASA hasn't
been done for now some 10 years. Through these hearings I hope
to mold together an effective effort to move forward a
reauthorization bill for NASA.
Recently, the Shuttle has been a topic of many discussions
and debates in the wake of the Columbia Shuttle disaster. As
these debates continue, I hope we'll be able to add to that
discussion today.
In the wake of the Columbia tragedy and the decision to not
replace Columbia, we must take a close look at our efforts in
developing the next launch vehicle for NASA. It is imperative
that we make our way to space and do so as quickly and as
safely as possible. As tempting as it is to accelerate the
process of developing our next launch vehicle, we must do so as
safely as we possibly can.
I cannot say right now whether more money is the answer to
the problems NASA has encountered in their quest for a new
launch vehicle. I fully intend to look at the budget of NASA
and determine where they are hurting, where they are operating
successfully, and where they are involved with projects that
could be better accomplished by another agency or by the
private sector. I certainly hope that today we can bring to
light some of the issues behind the future of human space
flight and help determine where NASA needs to go.
When President Kennedy challenged America to send a man to
the moon and return him safely to earth by the end of the
decade, NASA was sent on a mission in which the only option for
the outcome was success. It seems it is going to take that same
kind of dedication and determination to successfully accomplish
the next step in human space exploration.
The future of the space program is also contingent upon the
role that private businesses play in the process. As the
government looks at ways to save costs, NASA will have to rely
more heavily on private investment and commitments. Spurring
competition within the private sector could reduce the pressure
on NASA to accomplish everything in space. For example, Trans
Orbital, a California company, is working on the first
commercial project to the moon. They're calling it the
Trailblazer. It is exactly what this country needs right now,
someone or something to blaze the trails between the earth and
the stars in human exploration.
Currently, NASA and Russia are the only countries
successfully launching humans into space. We are continually
hearing comments by the Chinese and reports that, as early as
October, they, too, will be launching its first astronaut into
space. If China does become the third space-faring nation, we
are faced with a more complicated and urgent matter here in
America.
Today, I hope to learn more about how NASA came to the
decision of using the Shuttle and if the Shuttle is the best
means of space transportation for the future. Additionally, I'd
like our witnesses to comment on the role of human space
exploration and the overall goals of NASA. Just a few weeks
ago, members of NASA's Advisory Council announced their
concerns that NASA's decision to build an orbital space plane
lacks vision. I hope that today we can help determine what a
vision for human space flight in the U.S. should look like and
bring focus where we are currently lacking.
In the days immediately following the Columbia tragedy, I
stated that we needed to step back and take a close look at
where NASA has been, where they are currently, and where they
need to go in the future. That's exactly what we'll be
discussing today.
Marcia Smith, with the Congressional Research Service, will
talk with us about the fundamental question of, how did we get
here. That is, how did the U.S. get to the current point of
using the Space Shuttle as our means of transportation to and
from space. I welcome her to the Committee and her years of
expertise in studying this issue.
Mr. Brian Chase, with the National Space Society, will
discuss access to space and human space flight initiatives
related to new space transportation systems. Mr. Chase will lay
out access to space as the most critical part of any space
exploration effort. This is something that the founders of this
organization, Dr. Von Braun, would agree with.
And, finally, we'll hear from Dr. Alex Roland, a former
NASA historian and current professor at Duke University. Dr.
Roland will discuss the flaws of the current space program and
present his recommendations on how NASA should proceed with
space exploration.
We look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses in
this first hearing.
Before we go there, I'd like to turn to my colleague from
Louisiana, where I guess KU will be going, but Duke won't. I
don't mean to rub it in, Dr. Roland. But to New Orleans on
Saturday, we're excited about that. We normally lose to Duke,
but we finally got over it this time.
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. Sure. Well, we welcome you to New Orleans,
and the team, and wish you the very best. It's going to be a
great event.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. I thank you for having this hearing. I
think it's timely, and it's important. Hopefully, it will be
very informative. I think this country is, indeed, at the
crossroads of where we're going to be in the future with regard
to exploration of space.
There are many who look at the Space Shuttle's recent
disaster as a reason to call for the termination of space
exploration. I think that is not a correct conclusion, I think
that we obviously need to find out what went wrong. I think
NASA and the independent board are looking at that, will find
out what happened, and take the necessary steps to correct it.
We will explore space because it is there and because we
learn a lot and develop new technology from those efforts,
which benefit all of us in ways that we could only dream of a
couple of generations ago.
I do think that it's important to have this opportunity to
assess where we are, where we're going to be, and what needs to
be done. I have no doubt that all the workers and the thousands
of employees and contractors that are all part of what we call
space exploration will continue to do a remarkable job.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Breaux follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Breaux, U.S. Senator from Louisiana
Mr. Chairman, as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space, I look forward to working with you this
Congress, particularly as the Subcommittee examines issues related to
the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy, NASA, and the future of space
flight.
Today, we are at a critical juncture for manned space flight, and
perhaps a turning point in its history. I am a strong supporter of
human space flight and of the thousands of workers who enable it. Their
efforts have taken us to the very edge of what was dreamed possible
forty years ago, and to the doorstep of a new era of exploration and
development. I have no doubt that the United States will continue to
send people to space. However, we must do so with a full acknowledgment
of the risks, a commitment to continue to minimize those risks, and a
vision for what humans can and should aim to accomplish in space.
The discussion about the future of space which we are beginning
today will not come to focus solely on Columbia and its loss. The
future of the Space Shuttle has broad implications for the
International Space Station--a program in which the United States and
its International partners have already made a significant investment.
Without the Shuttle, it will be difficult to keep the Station fully
supplied and further construction will be halted.
We see and applaud NASA's actions to recover the space agenda. Even
as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board continues its work on the
causes of the accident, NASA has begun to plan for the Shuttle's return
to flight. And there are discussions underway among the international
partners, too, on the use and servicing of the Space Station for the
foreseeable future. We judge these to be prudent and necessary actions.
In addition, and now in parallel to the Columbia investigation, last
fall NASA instituted a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) plan to
assure the long term future of the Space Shuttle. This newly
implemented annual planning process culminated in a SLEP summit a few
weeks ago at which NASA and its human spaceflight stakeholders
identified a series of proposed initiatives that they deemed necessary
to ensure the Shuttle's ability to effectively support the
International Space Station. Finally, this team of senior NASA and
industry managers also defined the criteria to be used by the NASA
leadership to evaluate the proposed programs and make investment
decisions and recommendations necessary to assure the long term
viability of the Shuttle.
When the results of the investigation are known, NASA will make any
modifications needed to make the Shuttle safer and will consider how it
will proceed to complete the assembly and support the crew and
logistics needs of the International Space Station. In the mean time,
the Agency will need to retain the critical skills of the current
Shuttle and Space Station workforces, both inside and outside the
agency. For thirty years, these workers have been a critical part of
NASA's successes, and they will be needed for the continued success of
the human space flight program.
In addition, we must begin planning for a time beyond the current
era of the Space Shuttle and Space Station. Although the answer to the
question, ``Why fly humans in space?'' may have required no better
response than, ``Because it is there'', the loss of Columbia chastens
each of us to ask the harder questions before us: ``At what risk,
towards what ends, and in what time frame can we do it safely and
securely.'' Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this first of many
discussions this Committee will have on this subject over the coming
year, and I hope that today's discussion can begin to lay out the
agenda we need to pursue in examining these questions.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Breaux.
First will be Ms. Marcia Smith, specialist in aerospace
technology policy from the Congressional Research Service. The
floor is yours. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MARCIA S. SMITH, RESOURCES, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY
DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Smith. Mr. Chairman, Senator Breaux, thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss the history of the human
space flight program in the context of the Space Shuttle
Columbia accident. I ask that my written statement be made part
of the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
Ms. Smith. You asked that I address the fundamental
question of how did we get here. The answer has two components.
Why does the United States have a human space flight program?
And why did we decide to build the Space Shuttle?
Senator Brownback. Ms. Smith, pull that microphone up a
little closer to you, if you would. Thanks.
Ms. Smith. The dream of people journeying into space has
been the lore of science fiction for centuries. By the time
Sputnik 1 ushered in the space age in 1957, a cadre of
enthusiasts was ready to make such dreams a reality.
Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in
1958, creating NASA and establishing as one objective the
``preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in
. . . space science and technology.''
In 1959, NASA selected the first group of astronauts, the
Mercury 7. Two years later, the first human orbited the earth.
But it was not one of the Mercury 7; instead it was a
Soviet cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin. Gagarin's flight added new
impetus to the U.S. program. America's leadership in space
science and technology, its international prestige, and, many
believed, its national security, were at stake.
Three weeks later, Alan Shepard became the first American
in space, but it was a suborbital flight. The United States did
not match Gagarin's feat until 10 months later, when John Glenn
became the first American in orbit.
The risks were high in those early flights, yet the Nation
was willing to accept those risks, and pay the costs, to ensure
American preeminence. Indeed, only 3 weeks after Alan Shepard's
flight, President Kennedy called on the nation to commit itself
to the goal of landing a man on the moon by the end of the
decade, and the Nation said yes. Although the space program has
changed in many ways since then, human space flight as an
indicator of technological preeminence appears to remain a
strong factor in its support.
And there are other reasons. President George H. W. Bush,
the first President Bush, may have articulated them best in
July 1989, when, on the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo
lunar landing, he announced a commitment to returning humans to
the moon and going on to Mars. He said, ``Why the moon? Why
Mars? Because it is humanity's destiny to strive, to seek, to
find, and because it is America's destiny to lead.''
That is not to say that human space flight is without
controversy. The debate over the need to send humans into space
is as old as the space program itself. And over the past 42
years, little progress seems to have been made in bridging the
divide between those who believe human space flight is
essential, and those who believe it is a waste of money and an
unnecessary risk to human life. Since your other witnesses here
this afternoon are going debate that topic, I will not.
Suffice it to say that, to date, the United States and
other countries have decided that human space flight is worth
the costs and the risks. Representatives of 31 countries have
traveled into space over the past 42 years on American and
Russian spacecraft. And later this year, China is expected to
launch its own astronaut into space for the first time.
The next question is, why the Shuttle?
As 1969 dawned and the first Apollo lunar landing neared,
President Nixon took office and faced the question of what
goals should guide the space program in the post-Apollo years.
He established a Space Task Group chaired by Vice President
Agnew that developed a plan to build a space station, a
reusable space transportation system to service it, and to send
humans to Mars.
But after America won the moon race, support for expensive
human space missions waned. NASA found that it had to pick just
one of those new projects. It chose the reusable space
transportation system--the Space Shuttle. One goal of the
Shuttle program was to significantly reduce the cost of
launching people and cargo into space.
The reusable Space Shuttle was intended to replace all
other U.S. launch vehicles, so-called ``expendable launch
vehicles'' that can only be used once. By transferring all
space traffic to the Shuttle, NASA projected that the Shuttle's
development and operations costs would be amortized over a
large number of launches, 48 per year, with resulting cost
efficiencies.
Senator Brownback. How many per year?
Ms. Smith. Forty eight.
Senator Brownback. Per year?
Ms. Smith. Per year.
Dr. Roland. At one time, they said 60.
Ms. Smith. That premise has not held true, however. The
costs were higher, and the flight rate lower. Today, many point
to the Shuttle as a technical success but an economic failure.
NASA has initiated several attempts to develop successors
to the Shuttle, with the continued goal of reducing costs. Each
attempt has failed in turn, in large part because anticipated
technological advances did not materialize. Late last year,
NASA announced that it would continue operating the Shuttle
until at least 2015 and perhaps 2020 or longer. Despite the
Columbia tragedy, NASA officials have made clear that plan is
unchanged.
Congress is now again assessing the costs and benefits of
human space flight. Based on past experience, many expect that
the decision will be made to continue the human space flight
program essentially unchanged once the cause of the Columbia
accident is determined and fixed; but there are a number of
options to consider, from returning the Shuttle to flight as
soon as possible to terminating the human space flight program
entirely. I summarize those options in my written statement and
would be happy to discuss them with you if you wish.
Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any questions that
you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marcia S. Smith, Resources, Science and Industry
Division, Congressional Research Service
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting
me here today to discuss the history of the human space flight program
in the context of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. You asked that I
address the fundamental question of ``How did we get here?'' The answer
has two components: Why does the United States have a human space
flight program, and why did we decide to build the Space Shuttle? These
are complex issues and my brief statement cannot do them justice. But I
will try to provide an overview of some of the factors that shaped
those decisions in the past, and summarize options as you reassess
those decisions for the future.
Why Human Space Flight?
The dream of people journeying into space was the lore of science
fiction for centuries. By the time Sputnik 1 ushered in the Space Age
on October 4, 1957, a cadre of enthusiasts was ready to make such
dreams a reality.
Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in July
1958, creating NASA and establishing as one objective ``the
preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in
aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application
thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the
atmosphere.'' NASA opened its doors on October 1, 1958, and 6 months
later the first group of astronauts--the Mercury 7--was selected.
Two years later, on April 12, 1961, the first human orbited the
Earth. But it was not one of the Mercury 7. Instead, it was a Soviet
cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin.
Gagarin's flight added new impetus to the U.S. program. America's
leadership in space science and technology, its international prestige,
and, many believed, its national security, were at stake. Three weeks
later, Alan Shepherd became the first American in space, but it was a
suborbital flight. The United States did not match Gagarin's feat until
10 months later, when John Glenn became the first American in orbit.
The risks were high in those early flights. We had little
experience with launching rockets into space, and with the spacecraft
that protected the astronauts. Yet the nation was willing to accept
those risks, and pay the cost, to ensure American preeminence. Indeed,
only three weeks after Alan Shepard's flight, President Kennedy called
on the nation to commit to the goal of landing a man on the Moon by the
end of the decade, and the nation said yes. Although the space program
has changed in many ways over the past four decades, human space flight
as an indicator of technological preeminence appears to remain a strong
factor.
Human space flight is risky. It has claimed the lives of 17
American astronauts and four Russian cosmonauts in spaceflight-related
accidents so far. \1\ While this is a relatively small percentage of
the more than 400 people who have made space journeys, their loss is
felt deeply. Human space flight also is quite expensive. NASA will
spend about $6 billion on the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs
in this fiscal year. Yet we persevere. President George H.W. Bush
articulated what many consider a guiding impetus. In July 1989, on the
20th anniversary of the first Apollo lunar landing, he stood on the
steps of the National Air and Space Museum and announced a commitment
to returning humans to the Moon, and going on to Mars. He said:
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\1\ The 17 American astronaut spaceflight-related fatalities
counted here include the three Apollo 204 astronauts who were killed in
a pre-launch test in 1967. Some sources exclude these astronauts
because they were not killed in an actual spaceflight. The table at the
end of this statement provides more information on the space tragedies
that ended in death: the 1967 Apollo fire (3 deaths), the 1967 Soyuz 1
mission (one), the 1971 Soyuz 11 mission (three), the 1986 Space
Shuttle Challenger accident (seven), and the 2003 Space Shuttle
Columbia accident (seven). The Columbia accident is also discussed in
CRS Report RS21408 and CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Why the Moon? Why Mars? Because it is humanity's destiny to
strive, to seek, to find, and because it is America's destiny
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to lead.
That is not to say that human space flight is without controversy.
The debate over the need to send humans into space is as old as the
space program itself. Over the past 42 years, little progress seems to
have been made in bridging the divide between those who believe human
space flight is essential, and those who believe it is a waste of money
and an unnecessary risk to human life. The Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences--the predecessor to this Subcommittee--
held hearings on that debate forty years ago, and little has changed. I
know your other witnesses today will resume that dialogue, so I will
not devote much of my statement to it. Briefly, critics of human space
flight believe that robotic probes can gather the needed scientific
data at much less cost, and that humans contribute little to space-
based scientific research. They point out that no ground-breaking
scientific discoveries have emerged from 42 years of human space flight
that can be uniquely attributed to the presence of humans in space.
Proponents insist that human ingenuity and adaptability are essential
for some types of basic research in space, and can rescue an otherwise
doomed mission by recognizing and correcting problems before they lead
to failures. While proponents point to the value of ``spin-off''
technologies that were developed for human space flight but found
broader application in medicine or other fields, critics argue that
those technologies probably would have been developed in any case. Past
economic studies that attempted to quantify the value of spin-offs were
criticized because of their methodologies, and critics suggest that
investing federal monies in non-space areas might have yielded equally
valuable spin-offs or led directly to new scientific knowledge or
technologies. The two sides of this debate have been, and remain, quite
polarized. To date, the United States and other countries have decided
in favor of human space flight, despite its risks and costs.
While a desire for preeminence has been one motivation in pursuing
human spaceflight, it has not precluded cooperation. Even at the height
of U.S.-Soviet space competition in the early days of the Space Race,
the United States and Soviet Union also worked together--at the United
Nations through the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and
through bilateral cooperative agreements as early as 1962. In 1963,
President Kennedy proposed that the two countries cooperate in sending
astronauts to the Moon, but the Soviets did not accept the offer. Human
space flight cooperation between the two countries, and with other
countries, grew as the space programs matured. \2\ The United States
and Soviet Union agreed to a joint docking of a Russian Soyuz and an
American Apollo in 1975 to demonstrate ``detente in space.'' The United
States brought Canada and the European Space Agency (ESA) into the
Space Shuttle program, with Canada building a remote manipulator system
(``Canadarm'') and ESA building the Spacelab module for conducting
scientific experiments in the Shuttle's cargo bay. In 1977, the Soviet
Union began launching cosmonauts from allied countries to its space
stations, and the United States included representatives of many other
countries in Space Shuttle crews beginning in 1983. To date, astronauts
and cosmonauts from 29 other countries \3\ have journeyed into space on
American or Russian spacecraft. And today, of course, 15 nations--the
United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and 11 European countries--are
partners in building the International Space Station.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ There has been extensive cooperation in other space activities
as well since the beginning of the Space Age.
\3\ Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Saudi
Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, and Vietnam.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The international landscape has influenced the course of human
space flight over these decades. But fundamentally, the desire to
pursue such activities seems based on a quest for national
technological preeminence and a yearning to explore new frontiers.
Why the Shuttle?
The first decade of the U.S. human space flight program saw the
execution of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. As 1969 dawned
and the first Apollo lunar landing neared, President Nixon took office
and faced the question of what goals should guide the space program in
the post-Apollo years. He established a ``Space Task Group,'' chaired
by Vice President Agnew, to develop recommendations. The group's report
laid out a plan that called for developing a space station, a reusable
space transportation system to service it, and sending humans to Mars.
But after America won the Moon Race with the Apollo 11 landing in July
1969, it became apparent that support for expensive human space
missions was waning. Attention turned to other national priorities, and
NASA found that it had to pick just one of those new projects. It
decided that the first step should be development of the reusable space
transportation system--the Space Shuttle. One goal of the Shuttle
program was to significantly reduce the cost of launching people and
cargo into space. President Nixon announced the Shuttle program in
1972. It was quite controversial in Congress, but ultimately was
approved.
The reusable Space Shuttle was intended to replace all other U.S.
launch vehicles, so-called ``expendable launch vehicles'' (ELVs) that
can only be used once. By transferring all space traffic to the
Shuttle, NASA projected that the Shuttle's development and operations
costs would be amortized over a large number of annual launches--48
flights per year-- with resulting cost efficiencies.
That premise has not held true, however. The costs were higher than
expected, and the annual flight rate much lower. Since 1981 when the
Shuttle was first launched, the greatest number of launches in a single
year has been nine. One factor in the lower launch rate was policy
changes in the aftermath of the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger accident.
The Reagan White House reversed the decision to phase out ELVs and
announced that, with few exceptions, the Shuttle could be used only for
missions requiring the Shuttle's ``unique capabilities'' such as crew
interaction. Commercial communications satellites, expected to comprise
a large share of Shuttle launches, no longer could be launched on the
Shuttle. While that provided a market for the resurrected ELVs, the
effect on the Shuttle program was many fewer launches and a higher
cost-per-launch. Today, many point to the Shuttle as an outstanding
technical success, but an economic failure.
In the 22 years since the Shuttle's first flight, NASA (sometimes
working with DoD) has initiated several attempts to develop a successor
to the Shuttle--a ``second generation reusable launch vehicle''--with
the continued goal of reducing costs. Each attempt has failed in turn,
in large part because anticipated technological advances did not
materialize. Thus, the Shuttle continues to be the sole U.S. vehicle
for launching people into space, and the only launch vehicle capable of
meeting the International Space Station's requirements for taking cargo
up and back. Late last year, NASA again reformulated its plan to
develop a successor to the Shuttle, asserting that an economic case
could not be made at this time for investing as much as $30-35 billion
in such a vehicle. Instead, NASA plans to continue operating the
Shuttle until at least 2015 (instead of 2012), and perhaps 2020 or
longer.
That decision was made prior to the Columbia tragedy, but NASA
officials have subsequently made clear that no change is expected. NASA
plans to build an ``Orbital Space Plane'' that could supplement (but
not replace) the Shuttle early in the next decade, and there are
discussions about potentially flying the Shuttle with as few as two
crew members, or perhaps autonomously (without a crew), in the long
term future. For the present, however, NASA asserts that the Shuttle is
needed to support the International Space Station program, and to
service the Hubble Space Telescope.
Options for the Future
In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, Congress is again assessing
the costs and benefits of human space flight. Congress has faced these
questions before--in the early days of the Space Age, after the 1967
Apollo fire that took the lives of three astronauts, after the United
States won the ``Moon Race'', and after the 1986 Space Shuttle
Challenger tragedy that claimed seven lives. Based on past experience,
many expect that the decision will be made to continue the human space
flight program essentially unchanged once the cause of the Columbia
accident is determined and fixed. But there are a number of options to
consider, each with its own set of advantages and disadvantages. The
major options and some of the associated pros and cons are discussed
next.
1. Terminate the U.S. human space flight program, including the
Space Shuttle, U.S. participation in the International Space Station
(ISS) program, and plans to develop an Orbital Space Plane.
Pros: The annual budget for the Space Shuttle is approximately $4
billion, and for the Space Station is approximately $2 billion. That
amount of funding, plus whatever would be spent on the Orbital Space
Plane (which is still in the formulation phase) could be saved, or
redirected to other space or non-space priorities such as robotic space
flight, scientific research, homeland security, or the costs of the
Iraqi war. Human lives would not be at risk. Human spaceflight might
remain a long term vision.
Cons: To the extent that human space flight is still perceived as a
measure of a nation's technological preeminence, that advantage would
be lost. \4\ Although the United States is the leader of the
International Space Station (ISS) program, ISS could continue without
U.S. involvement, as long as the other partners had the requisite
funds. \5\ Thus, the more than $30 billion U.S. investment in the Space
Station could be lost for American taxpayers, while the other partners
could continue to use it for their own purposes. Without servicing
missions by the Space Shuttle, the Hubble Space Telescope might not
achieve its scientific potential, and non-Shuttle options for disposing
of it at the end of its life would have to be developed. \6\ There also
could be consequences for the U.S. aerospace industry, particularly
Boeing and Lockheed Martin. \7\
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\4\ Some would find this ironic at a time when China is about to
become only the third country capable of launching people into space.
It has launched four test spacecraft as part of that goal; the first
launch carrying a Chinese astronaut, or ``taikonaut,'' is expected late
this year.
\5\ The ISS program is an international partnership among the
United States, 11 European countries, Japan, Canada, and Russia. The
Russians have three decades of experience in operating space stations
without a Space Shuttle. Most of the remaining segments of the Space
Station are designed to be launched on the Shuttle, so construction
would remain stalled until and unless some other launch vehicle becomes
available to launch the remaining segments, but operation of the
existing space station could continue using Russian Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft if funds are available.
\6\ At least one more servicing mission is planned in 2004 to
enable the telescope to operate until 2010. At that time, NASA plans to
use the Shuttle to return the telescope to Earth because it does not
want it to make an uncontrolled reentry into the Earth's atmosphere.
Such a reentry could pose hazards from falling debris.
\7\ The two companies operate the Space Shuttle (under a joint
venture called United Space Alliance). Boeing is also the prime
contractor for the Space Station program.
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Terminate the Shuttle and Orbital Space Plane programs, but
continue participation in the ISS program, relying on Russian vehicles
for taking U.S. astronauts to and from space when possible.
Pros: The annual budget for the Space Shuttle is approximately $4
billion, so that amount of funding, plus whatever would be spent on
OSP, could be saved or redirected to other space or non-space
priorities (as above). The lives of fewer astronauts would be at risk.
Compared to Option 1, this would leave open the possibility of U.S. use
of the Space Station whenever NASA could obtain flight opportunities on
Russia's Soyuz spacecraft.
Cons: Similar to Option 1, but if the United States wanted to
continue using ISS, it would need to work with the other partners to
solve the problem of how to deliver cargo to and return it from ISS.
\8\ If only the Soyuz spacecraft is used to take crews to and from the
Space Station, agreements would have to be reached with Russia on how
often American astronauts would be included in the Space Station crews
and how much it would cost. \9\ The issues related to the Hubble Space
Telescope and the U.S. aerospace industry (discussed above) would
remain.
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\8\ Vehicles other than the Shuttle are available, or are expected
to become available in the next few years, to take cargo to the Space
Station, but none can bring cargo back to Earth. Russia's Progress
spacecraft is the only other cargo craft available today. Russia has
indicated that it cannot afford to build more than about three per
year, however, which is insufficient to resupply even a two-person crew
(this problem is being addressed currently). Under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, NASA is prohibited from making payments to Russia
in connection with the Space Station program unless the President
certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain technologies to
Iran. Without such a certification, NASA could not pay Russia for
Progress flights. Europe and Japan are both developing spacecraft that
will be able to take cargo to the Space Station, but they will not be
available for several years, and cannot return cargo to Earth. U.S.
expendable launch vehicles potentially could be used to take cargo to
the Space Station, although a cargo spacecraft equipped with autonomous
rendezvous and docking systems would have to be developed. These also
probably would not be able to return cargo to Earth.
\9\ The Iran Nonproliferation Act (discussed in the previous
footnote) would also prohibit U.S. payments to Russia for Soyuz flights
unless the President certifies that Russia is complying with the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Terminate the Shuttle program, but continue participation in the
ISS program and continue to develop the Orbital Space Plane or another
replacement for the Shuttle.
Pros: The annual budget for the Space Shuttle is approximately $4
billion, so that amount of funding could be saved, or redirected to
other space or non-space priorities (as above). Costs for developing
and operating an Orbital Space Plane or a successor to the Shuttle are
not yet known, however, so there might not be any net savings over the
long term. A new vehicle might be safer and more cost effective.
Cons: The disadvantages of this option would be similar to those
for Option 2, except that at some point in the future, a U.S. human
space flight vehicle would become operational, ameliorating questions
about access to the Space Station by American crews.
4. Continue the Shuttle program, but with fewer missions--perhaps
limiting it to space station visits--and as few crew as possible.
Pros: Would limit the risk to Shuttle crews. If the Space Station
was equipped with a system to inspect the Shuttle prior to undocking,
\10\ problems could be identified and possibly repaired. Continues U.S.
leadership in space and any resulting benefits therefrom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ This would be in addition to inspections that could be
accomplished using Department of Defense ground- and space-based
sensors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cons: There would be little, if any, financial savings from this
option. \11\ Astronaut lives would remain at risk. The question of what
to do with the Hubble Space Telescope (discussed above) would remain if
flights were limited only to space station visits.
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\11\ There are only two non-space station missions on the Shuttle's
schedule today, both to the Hubble Space Telescope. At NASA's current
estimate of the marginal cost of a Shuttle launch ($115 million), that
would save only $230 million. The costs for fixing the problems that
caused the Columbia accident are unknown, but seem likely to exceed
that amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Resume Shuttle flights as planned.
Pros: Allows construction and utilization of the Space Station to
continue as planned. Allows the Hubble Space Telescope to be serviced
and returned to Earth. Continues U.S. leadership in space and any
resulting benefits therefrom.
Cons: There would be no financial savings, and costs would be
incurred to fix the Shuttle. The risk to human life would remain.
Options 4 and 5 could be coupled with directives to NASA to:
equip the Space Station with a system that could inspect the
Shuttle while it is docked;
upgrade the Shuttle to make it safer, perhaps including
additional crew escape systems or making the crew cabin
survivable if the vehicle breaks apart;
develop systems to enable the Shuttles to fly autonomously
(without a crew); and/or
accelerate efforts to build a successor to the Shuttle with
the emphasis on improved safety, even if that meant not
reducing costs as much as desired.
Summary
Mr. Chairman, as I said, this brief statement provides only a
cursory review of these complex issues. As the world readies to
celebrate the 42nd anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's historic flight 10
days from now, the future of the U.S. human space flight program is in
question. Apart from the broad questions of whether the U.S. human
space flight program should continue, a more specific focus may be the
cost of returning the Shuttle to flight status and how long it will
take. Those answers will not be known until the cause of the Columbia
accident is determined, and remedies identified. If the costs are high,
difficult decisions may be needed on whether to use the funds for the
Shuttle, for other space initiatives, or for other national priorities
such as paying for the Iraqi war and homeland security. While many
expect that the United States will once again rally behind NASA, only
time will tell if the past is prologue.
BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT: 1961-2003
United States
Mercury (1961-1963)
Purpose: To demonstrate that humans can travel into space and
return safely.
Flights: Six flights (two suborbital, four orbital). Alan Shepard,
first American in space (on suborbital flight), May 5, 1961. John
Glenn, first American in orbit, Feb. 20, 1962.
Gemini (1965-1966)
Purpose: To prepare for lunar missions by extending the duration of
spaceflight (to 14 days), developing experience in rendezvous and
docking, and demonstrating ability to work outside the spacecraft
(extravehicular activity--EVA)
Flights: 10 flights. Ed White conducted first U.S. EVA (June 1965).
Apollo Lunar Program (1967-1972)
Purpose: To land men on the Moon and return them safely to Earth.
Flights: Eleven flights, nine to the Moon. Of the nine, two (Apollo
8 and 10) were test flights that did not attempt to land, one (Apollo
13) suffered an in-flight failure and the crew narrowly averted tragedy
and were able to return to Earth, and six (Apollo 11, 12, 14, 15, 16,
and 17) landed two-man teams on the lunar surface. Neil Armstrong and
Buzz Aldrin were the first humans to set foot on the Moon on July 20,
1969, while Mike Collins orbited overhead.
Space Tragedy The Apollo program saw the first spaceflight-related
tragedy when the three-man crew (Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger
Chaffee) of the first Apollo mission was killed on January 27, 1967,
when fire erupted in the Apollo command module during a pre-launch
test. The Apollo program resumed flights 21 months later.
Skylab (1973-1974)
Purpose: First U.S. Space Station
Flights: The Skylab Space Station was launched in May 1973. Three
three-person crews were launched to Skylab using Apollo capsules from
1973 to 1974, extending the duration of human space flight to a new
record of 84 days. A wide variety of scientific experiments were
conducted. Skylab was not intended to be permanently occupied. It
remained in orbit, unoccupied, until 1979 when it made an uncontrolled
reentry into the Earth's atmosphere, raining debris on western
Australia and the Indian Ocean.
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (1975)
Purpose: Cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Flight: A three-man Apollo crew docked with a two-man Soyuz crew
for two days of joint experiments to demonstrate ``detente in space.''
This was the last flight in the Apollo series. No Americans journeyed
into space for the next six years while waiting for the debut of the
Space Shuttle.
Space Shuttle (1981-present)
Purpose: Reusable launch vehicle for taking crews and cargo to and
from Earth orbit.
Flights: Pre-Challenger. Twenty four successful Shuttle missions
were launched from 1981-1986. The Shuttles were used to take satellites
into space; retrieve malfunctioning satellites (using ``Canadarm,'' a
remote manipulator system built by Canada); and conduct scientific
experiments (particularly using the Spacelab module built by the
European Space Agency). Sally Ride became the first American woman in
space in 1983, Guion Bluford became the first African American in space
in 1983, and Kathy Sullivan became the first American woman to perform
an EVA in 1984. Senator Jake Garn and then-Representative (now Senator)
Bill Nelson made Shuttle flights in 1985 and 1986 respectively.
Space Tragedy: On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger
exploded 73 seconds after launch when an ``O-ring'' in a Solid Rocket
Booster failed. All seven astronauts aboard were killed: Francis (Dick)
Scobee, Mike Smith, Judy Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ron McNair, Gregory
Jarvis, and Christa McAuliffe (a schoolteacher). The Space Shuttle
returned to flight 32 months later.
Post-Challenger. From September 1988-January 2003, the Shuttle made
87 successful flights. Nine of these docked with the Russian Space
Station Mir. Since 1998, most Shuttle flights have been devoted to
construction of the International Space Station.
Space Tragedy: On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia
broke apart as it returned to Earth from a 16-day scientific mission in
Earth orbit. All seven astronauts aboard were killed: Rick Husband,
William McCool, Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel
Clark, and Ilan Ramon, an Israeli. The cause of the accident is under
investigation.
International Space Station (1998-present)
Purpose: Space Station
Flights: The United States initiated the Space Station program in
1984. In 1988, nine European countries (now eleven), Canada, and Japan
formally became partners with the United States in building it. In
1993, the program was restructured due to cost growth, and Russia
joined the program as a partner. Construction began in 1998 and is
currently suspended pending the Space Shuttle's return to flight.
Successive three-person crews have permanently occupied ISS since
November 2000. The three-person crews are alternately composed of two
Russians and one American, or two Americans and one Russian. ISS is
routinely visited by other astronauts on Russian Soyuz spacecraft or
the Space Shuttle (prior to the Columbia accident) some of whom are
from other countries.
Soviet Union/Russia
Vostok (1961-1963)
Purpose: To demonstrate that humans can travel into space and
return safely.
Flights: Six flights (all orbital). Yuri Gagarin, first man in
space (made one orbit of the Earth), Apr. 12, 1961. Valentina
Tereshkova, first woman in space, June 16, 1963.
Voskhod (1964-1965)
Purpose: Modified Vostok spacecraft used to achieve two more space
``firsts'': first multi-person crew, and first EVA.
Flights: Two flights. Vokhod 1 carried three-person crew. On
Voskhod 2, Alexei Leonov performed the first EVA (March 1965).
Soyuz (1967-present)
Purpose: To develop a spacecraft for taking crews back and forth to
Earth orbit. Early flights extended the duration of human space flight
(to 18 days) and practiced rendezvous and docking. Flights since Soyuz
10 (1971) have been largely devoted to taking crews back and forth to
Soviet Space Stations (Salyut and Mir, see below), and to the
International Space Station.
Flights: The Soyuz is still in use today, although it has been
modified several times. The original Soyuz was replaced by Soyuz T in
1980, by Soyuz TM in 1987, and by Soyuz TMA in 2002. There were 40
flights of Soyuz, 15 of Soyuz T, 34 of Soyuz TM, and one flight of
Soyuz TMA to date. (A few of these missions did not carry crews.)
Space Tragedy: The Soyuz program saw the first Soviet space tragedy
when Vladimir Komarov was killed during the first Soyuz mission on
April 24, 1967. The craft's parachute lines tangled during descent and
he was killed upon impact with the Earth. The Soyuz program resumed
flights 18 months later.
Salyut 1 (1971)
Purpose: First Space Station
Flights: Salyut 1 was launched in April 1971. This was a ``first
generation'' Soviet Space Station with only one docking port. Two crews
were launched to the Space Station. The first docked, but was unable to
open the hatch to the Space Station, and returned home.
Space Tragedy: The second crew, Soyuz 11, docked and entered the
Space Station, and remained for three weeks. When they returned to
Earth on June 29, 1971, an improperly closed valve allowed the Soyuz's
atmosphere to vent into space. The three cosmonauts (Georgiy
Dobrovolskiy, Vladimir Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev) were not wearing
spacesuits and asphyxiated. The Soviets had eliminated the requirement
for spacesuits because they had confidence in their technology, and
three space-suited cosmonauts could not fit in the Soyuz as it was
designed at that time. The Soyuz returned to flight 27 months later.
The Soviets have required spacesuits since that time, and launched only
two-person crews for the next 10 years until the Soyuz T version was
introduced which could accommodate three cosmonauts in spacesuits.
Other ``First Generation'' Salyut Space Stations (1974-1977)
Unnamed launch (1972) did not reach orbit.
Salyut 2 (1973) broke apart in orbit.
Kosmos 557 (1973) broke apart in orbit.
Salyut 3 (1974) hosted one crew (another was unable to dock) and
was designated in the West as a military space station dedicated to
military tasks.
Salyut 4 (1974-1975) hosted two crews, and was designated in the
West as a civilian space station. A third crew was launched to the
Space Station, but the launch vehicle malfunctioned and the crew landed
in Siberia (the so-called ``April 5th anomaly'' or Soyuz 18A).
Salyut 5 (1976-1977) hosted two crews and was designated in the
West as a military space station. A third crew was unable to dock.
Soyuz-Apollo Test Project (1975)
Purpose: Cooperation with the United States
Flight: A three-man Apollo crew docked with a two-man Soyuz crew
for two days of joint experiments to demonstrate ``detente in space.''
This was the last flight in the Apollo series. No Americans journeyed
into space for the next six years while waiting for the debut of the
Space Shuttle.
``Second Generation'' Salyut Space Stations (1977-1986)
Purpose: Expand space station operations. The second generation
space stations had two docking ports, enabling resupply missions and
``visiting'' crews that would remain aboard the Space Station for about
one week visiting the long duration space station crews, who remained
for months. These space stations were occupied intermittently over
their lifetimes.
Salyut 6 (1977-1982) hosted 16 crews (two others were unable to
dock). The Soviets increased the duration of human space flight to 185
days. The visiting crews often brought cosmonauts from other countries.
The first non-U.S., non-Soviet in space was Vladimir Remek of
Czechoslovakia in 1978.
Salyut 7 (1982-1986) hosted 10 crews. A new duration record of 237
days was set. Among the visiting crews was the second woman to fly in
space, Svetlana Savitskaya. She visited Salyut twice (in 1982 and
1984), and on the second mission, become the first woman to perform an
EVA. One crew that was intended to be launched to Salyut 7 in 1983
suffered a near-tragedy when the launch vehicle caught fire on the
launch pad. The emergency abort tower on top of the launch vehicle
propelled the Soyuz capsule away from the launch pad to safety. Unlike
all the previous Soviet Space Stations, which were intentionally
deorbited into the Pacific Ocean, Salyut 7 made an uncontrolled reentry
in 1991, raining debris on Argentina. There was insufficient fuel for a
controlled reentry.
``Third Generation'' Mir Space Station (1986-2001)
The Mir Space Station was a modular space station with six docking
ports. The core of the Space Station was launched in 1986. Additional
modules were added through 1996. Mir hosted a large number of crews,
and inaugurated the era of ``permanently occupied'' space stations
where rotating crews were aboard continuously. Mir was permanently
occupied from 1989 to 1999. A new duration record of 438 days was set.
In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
and Soviet Union increased cooperative activity in human spaceflight,
including Russian cosmonauts flying on the U.S. Shuttle, and American
astronauts making multi-month stays on Mir. Nine U.S. Space Shuttles
docked with Mir from 1995-1998. In 1997, a fire erupted inside Mir when
a ``candle'' used to generate oxygen malfunctioned. That same year, a
Russian cargo spacecraft (Progress) collided with Mir during a failed
docking attempt. These events called into question the wisdom of
keeping crews on Mir, but both the Russians and the Americans continued
to send crews to the Space Station. Mir was intentionally deorbited
into the Pacific Ocean in 2001.
International Space Station (1998-present)
Purpose: Space Station
Flights: The United States initiated the Space Station program in
1984. In 1988, nine European countries (now eleven), Canada, and Japan
formally became partners with the United States in building it. In
1993, the program was restructured due to cost growth, and Russia
joined the program as a partner. Construction began in 1998 and is
currently suspended pending the Space Shuttle's return to flight.
Successive three-person crews have permanently occupied ISS since
November 2000. The three-person crews are alternately composed of two
Russians and one American, or two Americans and one Russian. ISS is
routinely visited by other astronauts on Russian Soyuz spacecraft or
the Space Shuttle (prior to the Columbia accident) some of whom are
from other countries.
Senator Brownback. Thanks, Ms. Smith. And I appreciate your
expertise that's been available for many years to Congress to
help us look at this overall issue. We will get into a lot of
this in the questions and answers.
Mr. Chase, executive director of The National Space
Society, welcome, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. CHASE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SPACE
SOCIETY
Mr. Chase. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Breaux.
Robust low-cost access to space is the key to expanding our
opportunities in space, whether in low-earth orbit or beyond,
and this issue is even more critical in the wake of the loss of
the Space Shuttle Columbia.
NASA's 2004 budget submission contains important elements
of an integrated space transportation plan to begin addressing
this important issue. The first element of the plan is the
Service Life Extension Program which addresses the need to
upgrade the Space Shuttle fleet and its supporting
infrastructure. The Space Shuttle is the only vehicle that can
complete the International Space Station, so we need to return
the fleet to service as quickly as is feasible to let it
complete that mission.
Although the original estimates for the Shuttle's costs
were very optimistic, as has already been said, the Space
Shuttle's capabilities remain unmatched today. But we cannot
escape the need for a backup to the Shuttle, so the second
element of the plan is to provide a complementary capability to
transfer crews to and from the Space Station.
The current proposal, called the orbital space plane, would
be launched aboard evolved expendable launch vehicles, EELVs,
developed jointly by the Department of Defense and industry and
now operated commercially by Boeing and Lockheed Martin as the
Delta 4 and Atlas 5. While the orbital space plane could serve
as a component for a next-generation launch vehicle, it serves
only as a complement to, not a replacement for, the Shuttle
during this phase. The additional benefit of the orbital space
plane would be its utility in future human missions, all of
which will require crew transfer capabilities.
The third element of NASA's plan is the development of a
next-generation launch system that would ultimately replace the
Space Shuttle. The next-generation launch technology program,
which is being conducted jointly with the Department of
Defense, focuses on new technologies that can lead to launch
systems with much greater reliability and much lower costs.
This NASA/DoD partnership is one that should be encouraged and
fostered.
These three elements are all important efforts to improve
our access to space, and I believe NASA's initial plan is a
prudent step in that direction. However, there are also several
critical factors that could be major stumbling blocks to its
success.
First, the loss of Columbia dramatically underscores the
urgency to develop a secondary capability to launch crews to
and from the Space Station. The orbital space plane can be
built using today's technology, and most of the designs under
consideration have been studied in several variations for the
last 20 to 30 years, so there needs to be a very serious effort
to accelerate this program while keeping it focused on its core
mission of launching and retrieving crews.
Second, NASA has to reexamine a backup capability to launch
unmanned cargo to the International Space Station. NASA's
Alternate Access to Station initiative was doing just that, but
that program is slated to be terminated this summer without
moving into the test or development phase. The Alternate Access
to Station program should get a fresh look from NASA.
Third, once the orbital space plane and some form of a
backup cargo capability are activated, we should not rush to an
artificial deadline to develop a new launch system. While it's
important for us to continue making investments in new launch
technology, it's equally important that we develop a strategic
plan for our space exploration efforts and not waste time and
money jumping from program to program.
Finally, I believe a key, yet overlooked, element in this
debate is the evolved expendable launch vehicle I mentioned
earlier. Although designed initially for unmanned missions, the
fleet of EELVs represent significant improvements in safety,
reliability, and efficiency over their predecessors. Once
modified for human launch requirements to handle orbital space
plane missions, the EELVs will represent a formidable and
versatile fleet of vehicles that can fulfill an even wider
range of missions than they perform today. Importantly, by
expanding the EELVs' market to include crew and cargo to ISS,
that improves our Nation's competitiveness in the commercial
space arena, as well.
In summary, I believe NASA's plan to be a reasonable
approach. We should begin making the investments now to ensure
we can complete the International Space Station and then build
a robust, yet simple, secondary capability to transfer crew and
cargo to and from orbit. Beyond that, though, we should
carefully consider our next steps as part of a long-term space
architecture that provides a bold vision for the future. We can
certainly begin building some of that infrastructure today, but
we need a roadmap to put that infrastructure to work.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chase follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian E. Chase, Executive Director, National
Space Society
Chairman Brownback, Senator Breaux and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me here today.
I am pleased to present testimony to the Subcommittee on behalf of
the National Space Society, a nonprofit organization dedicated to
promoting space exploration. NSS has approximately 22,000 members
around the world, including space professionals, astronauts, business
leaders, elected officials, and, most important, everyday citizens
without ties to the space industry who support the exploration,
development, and eventual settlement of space.
The Subcommittee has asked NSS to provide its perspective on NASA's
human space flight programs and how those initiatives relate to efforts
to develop new space transportation systems. In our view, access to
space is the most critical part of any future space exploration
efforts, so I appreciate the opportunity to share our thoughts today.
NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan
Robust, low cost access to space is the key to expanding
opportunities in space, whether in Low Earth Orbit or beyond. In light
of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, it is more important than
ever for our nation to address the issue of how we transport people and
cargo to and from space. Indeed, although the Columbia investigation
and now the war in Iraq occupies the nation's attention, NASA's
generally overlooked FY 2004 budget submission contains important
elements of an Integrated Space Transportation Plan to begin addressing
this critical issue.
The first element of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan is
the Service Life Extension Program, which addresses the need to upgrade
the Space Shuttle fleet and the infrastructure that supports it. The
Space Shuttle is the only vehicle that can complete the International
Space Station, so we need to return the fleet to service as quickly as
is feasible to let it complete that mission.
Although the original estimates for the Shuttle's cost and
performance were very optimistic--which means today we have a system
that is significantly more expensive and more challenging to operate
than was ever envisioned--the Space Shuttle remains a very unique and
important asset in our nation's launch inventory. It combines the
capabilities of a heavy lift launch vehicle, a small Space Station, an
on-orbit repair depot, and a system that can return cargo to Earth,
among other functions. Its capabilities, despite being conceived 30
years ago, remain unmatched today by any vehicle flying or by anything
even on the drawing board. So any mention of a ``replacement'' of the
Shuttle has to be viewed as only a partial replacement, since future
vehicles will likely not be as versatile as the Space Shuttle is today.
But we cannot escape the realities of the need for a backup to the
Shuttle, regardless of its impressive capabilities. The second element
of the plan is to provide a complementary capability to transfer crews
to and from the Space Station. The current proposal, called the Orbital
Space Plane (OSP), would be launched aboard Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicles developed jointly by the Department of Defense and industry,
and which are now operated commercially by Boeing and Lockheed Martin
as the Delta IV and the Atlas V, respectively. The requirements laid
out by NASA call for the OSP to be able to launch at least four crew
members to ISS, stay on orbit for long periods of time, and to serve as
a ``lifeboat'' to evacuate the ISS crew in the case of emergencies,
replacing the Russian Soyuz capsules that perform that function today.
While the OSP could serve as a component of a next generation
system, it serves only as a complement to--not a replacement for--the
Shuttle during this phase of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan.
The OSP would relieve much of the Shuttle's burden of launching crew to
and from ISS and allow the Shuttle fleet to focus on the launch of
heavy cargo and components, but both vehicles would be flown during
this time period. The additional benefit of the development of the OSP
or similar vehicle would be its utility in future human missions, all
of which will require crew transfer capabilities.
The third element of NASA's plan is the development of a next
generation launch system that would ultimately replace the Space
Shuttle, meaning it would launch both crew and cargo. The Next
Generation Launch Technology program, which is being conducted jointly
with the Department of Defense, is a restructured element of the Space
Launch Initiative (SLI), and focuses on new technologies and new
systems that can lead to launch systems with much greater reliability
and much lower costs than systems today.
The Challenges
These three elements--upgrading the Space Shuttle, developing a
backup system to launch crews to and from the Space Station, and
investing in next generation launch technologies--are all critical
components in a national plan to significantly improve our access to
space, and I believe NASA's initial outline is a prudent step in that
direction. However, there are also several critical factors that can be
major stumbling blocks to the success of this plan.
First, the loss of Columbia dramatically underscores the urgency to
develop a secondary capability to launch crews to and from ISS, and it
is not clear that this sense of urgency is shared by all of NASA's
managers at the program level. Additionally, the natural inclination
for NASA's talented engineers will be to develop the latest technology
for use in the Orbital Space Plane--but that urge must be strongly
resisted. The OSP can be built using today's technology, and most of
the designs under consideration have been studied in several variations
for the last 20-30 years. NASA's stated goal of a fully operational
system by 2012 must be accelerated, and it must also be done as simply
as possible by focusing on its core mission of launching and retrieving
crews.
Second, NASA has to reexamine a backup capability to launch cargo
to the International Space Station. A program to do just that--NASA's
Alternate Access to Station initiative--was examining several potential
options to launch unmanned cargo to ISS using expendable launch
vehicles, but that program is slated to be terminated this summer
without moving into the test or development phase. The AAS program
should get a fresh look from NASA so that, when combined with the
Orbital Space Plane program, we will have both assured crew and cargo
access to the International Space Station. The European Space Agency is
working on the Automated Transfer Vehicle, which is designed to be a
robotic cargo vessel for ISS. That system may offer the capabilities to
fulfill this need, but it is an option which may or may not be viable
depending on the state of international affairs. But both the crew and
cargo launch capabilities are needed regardless of what long-term
choices we make about human space exploration, so it is advisable to
fund and begin these programs as soon as possible.
Third, once the Orbital Space Plane and some form of backup cargo
capability are activated, the United States will possess a significant
launch capability that can meet multiple needs. With these
complementary capabilities available, we should not rush to an
artificial deadline to develop and field a new launch system. The
Shuttle and existing fleet of expendable launch vehicles, coupled with
the OSP and a cargo delivery system, can meet many of our nation's
needs for the near term, and the Shuttle still possesses capabilities
that should be carefully reviewed before we decide to retire the entire
fleet. While it is important for us to continue making investments in
new launch technology, it is equally important that we develop a
strategic plan for our space exploration efforts and not waste time
just jumping from program to program.
Fourth, the nascent partnership between NASA and the Department of
Defense in developing next generation launch technology should be
encouraged and fostered. For years, an adversarial relationship existed
between the two agencies, yet the skills and experience each brings to
the space arena have been recognized as critical to both civil and
national security needs.
Finally, I believe a key yet overlooked element in our nation's
space launch capabilities is the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
mentioned earlier. Although designed for unmanned missions, the two
vehicles represent significant improvements in safety, reliability, and
efficiency over their predecessors. Indeed, both the Delta IV and Atlas
V represent, in many ways, revolutionary improvements in access to
space. These systems are already in production and operation, and they
are capable today of meeting the launch requirements for unmanned
scientific, national security, and commercial missions. Once modified
for human launch requirements, the EELVs will represent a formidable
and versatile fleet of vehicles that can fulfill an even wider range of
missions. Importantly, by developing a crew and perhaps cargo
capability that can be launched aboard EELVs, that improves our
nation's competitiveness in the commercial space arena by strengthening
the market for those vehicles.
The reason it is important to highlight the potential role of EELVs
is because expendable launch systems are usually ignored in the
discussion of next generation launch systems--most people assume that
only reusable launch vehicles can fulfill that role. But the economics
of reusable versus expendable systems is not as simple as it first
appears. The key to low cost reusable vehicles is routine use that
allows expenses to be amortized over a large number of flights. For an
expendable vehicle, the key is low cost production, which can be
achieved in part through launch rates that are high enough to maximize
the efficiency of the production and assembly operation. Generally
speaking, the launch rate for a reusable system has to be very high
before it effectively competes with the cost of an expendable launcher.
The best option for a next generation system may indeed turn out to be
a reusable launch system, but it could also be a further evolution of
the EELV or a derivative of the Space Shuttle.
The Future of Human Space Exploration
The choices made today in space transportation investments will
obviously impact our capabilities for future space exploration
missions, but there are decisions that can and should be made even as
we work to develop a long term vision for our future in space. We know
that completing the International Space Station requires the Space
Shuttle, and that in order to successfully operate the Space Station we
need a robust yet simple backup capability for crew and cargo. So those
are two elements of space transportation planning that should proceed
as quickly as possible and accelerated where feasible.
Beyond those elements, we should carefully consider our next steps.
Focusing exclusively on reusable launch vehicles may be the right
choice if we seek routine access for crew and low-to-medium weight
cargo. But if we opt to launch heavy cargo (such as components for a
mission to Mars), then expendable launch vehicles may better fill that
role. So the nation needs to develop a long-term space exploration
architecture to provide a clear direction for the future to help direct
these efforts. NASA has begun an initiative to accomplish this
important task, but it needs public and political support to remain a
key part of the NASA agenda. Without that underlying vision for
tomorrow, it makes it more difficult to make the right decisions today.
So the choice before our nation is complex, but, importantly, it is
not an ``either-or'' proposition. In order to fund future launch
systems, we do not have to cannibalize the Shuttle program, and in
order to fund the Shuttle we do not have to forgo future investments in
next generation launch technology. I also know you have to wrestle with
difficult budget choices in a wide range of areas and, as stewards of
the public's money, I know you consider it important to make
investments that are worthwhile and have a benefit to the taxpayers.
Space exploration is worthwhile endeavor and a sound investment in
the future, and it is an investment that can be made even while meeting
other needs in our nation. It is important to invest in the future, and
it is important, as a society, to continue opening frontiers. History
teaches us that societies that have pushed their frontiers outward have
prospered; those that have not have withered and faded into the history
books. No society has ever gone wrong opening up the frontier, and we
shouldn't stop now.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chase, and I look forward
to discussion as well.
Dr. Alex Roland is professor of history at Department of
History, Duke University, and a former historian for NASA.
Thank you for joining us today. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ALEX ROLAND, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DUKE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Roland. Thank you.
Senator Brownback, Senator Breaux, thank you for the
opportunity to share with you my views on human space flight,
which will be considerably different than what you've heard so
far, though there are many points of convergence.
The Columbia accident confirmed what the Challenger
accident made clear; systemic flaws in the Space Shuttle render
it unsustainable as a safe, reliable, and economical launch
vehicle. The Rogers Commission issued two critical injunctions
to NASA--do not rely on the Space Shuttle as the mainstay of
your launch capability; begin at once to develop a next-
generation launch vehicle. Sixteen years later, NASA is
massively dependent upon the Shuttle; no replacement is in
sight.
I have appended to my written remarks an article explaining
how and why the Shuttle program became systemically flawed.
Briefly stated, NASA made two mistakes in Shuttle development
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, it traded development
costs for operational costs. Second, it convinced itself that a
recoverable launch vehicle would be inherently more economical
than an expendable. NASA promised savings of 90, even 95
percent in launch costs. In practice, it costs more to put a
pound of payload in orbit aboard the Shuttle than it did aboard
the Saturn launch vehicle that preceded it.
These mistakes produced a program that cannot work. NASA
could conceivably operate the Shuttle safely and reliably, but
it dares not admit what it would cost.
The evidence for this was abundant before the Challenger
accident. Instead of listening to that data, NASA consistently
allowed its judgment to be clouded by its hopes and predictions
for human activities in space. The agency cares about astronaut
safety, but it's trapped by its own claims about Shuttle costs.
And, unlike expendable launch vehicles, the Shuttle grows more
dangerous and more expensive to fly with each passing year.
In what it euphemistically called success-oriented
management--that is, hoping for the best--NASA assumed, in
1970, that each orbiter would fly 50 times. In those heady
days, NASA was expecting 60 Shuttle flights a year by 1985,
meaning that a fleet of five Shuttles would be completely
replaced every 5 years. No one imagined that a Shuttle would be
in service after 20 years, let alone 30 or 40 years.
Unfortunately, nothing practical can be done now to save
the Shuttle program. A crew escape system would help reduce the
risk to human life, but it cannot eliminate it. It is not clear
that crew escape could have saved the astronauts aboard either
Columbia or Challenger. Nor will an infusion of new money
suffice. The United States spends more on space then the rest
of the world combined. NASA has ample funding to support a
robust space program. It has simply wasted too much of that
money flying astronauts on unnecessary missions aboard a
ruinously expensive spacecraft.
We should drastically curtail human space flight until we
have a safe, reliable, and economical launch vehicle. In the
meantime, anything we want to do in space, except having humans
there as an end in itself, we can do more effectively and
efficiently with automated spacecraft controlled from earth.
Whenever we put people in a spacecraft, we change the primary
goal, be it reconnaissance or communication, science or
exploration, to bringing the astronauts back alive. Most of the
weight, and, hence, the cost, of manned missions comes from
safety and life-support systems. The astronauts contribute
little. Even had the astronauts aboard Columbia known of the
damage to their spacecraft, they could not have saved
themselves.
NASA should begin at once to carry out the recommendations
of the Rogers Commission. It should limit Shuttle flights to a
bare minimum. It should convert the Space Station into a space
platform to be visited, but not inhabited. And it should use
the savings from these actions to fund development of a new
launch vehicle.
I have enormous confidence in NASA's ability to achieve a
vital and productive space program, including both human and
automated missions. But to achieve that goal, it must do the
right thing. That means phasing out the Shuttle. It is a death
trap and a budgetary sinkhole. NASA must develop a stable of
launch vehicles that will open up the promise of space.
I believe that we should send people into space only when
they have something to do there commensurate with the risk and
cost of sending them. Given the liabilities of the Shuttle, I
do not know of any mission now that meets that criterion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alex Roland, Professor of History, Duke
University
Senators, thank you for the opportunity to share with you my views
on human spaceflight.
The Columbia accident confirmed what the Challenger accident made
clear. Systemic flaws in the Space Shuttle render it unsustainable as a
safe, reliable, and economical launch vehicle. The Rogers Commission
issued two critical injunctions to NASA. Do not rely on the Space
Shuttle as the mainstay of your launch capability. Begin at once to
develop a next-generation launch vehicle. Sixteen years later NASA is
massively dependent on the Shuttle; no replacement is in sight.
I have appended to my written remarks an article explaining how and
why the Shuttle program became systemically flawed. Briefly stated,
NASA made two mistakes in Shuttle development in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. First, it traded development costs for operational costs.
Second, it convinced itself that a recoverable launch vehicle would be
inherently more economical than an expendable. NASA promised savings of
90 percent, even 95 percent, in launch costs. In practice, it costs
more to put a pound of payload in orbit aboard the Shuttle than it did
aboard the Saturn launch vehicle that preceded it.
These mistakes produced a program that cannot work. NASA could
conceivably operate the Shuttle safely and reliably, but it dares not
admit what it would cost. The evidence for this was abundant before the
Challenger accident. Instead of listening to the data, NASA
consistently allowed its judgment to be clouded by its hopes and
predictions for human activities in space. The agency cares about
astronaut safety, but it is trapped by its own claims about Shuttle
costs. And, unlike expendable launch vehicles, the Shuttle grows more
dangerous and more expensive to fly with each passing year. In what it
euphemistically called ``success-oriented management,'' i.e., hoping
for the best, NASA assumed in 1970 that each orbiter would fly fifty
times. But in those heady days, NASA was expecting sixty Shuttle
flights a year by 1985, meaning that a fleet of five Shuttles would be
completely replaced every five years. No one imagined that a Shuttle
would be in service after twenty years.
Unfortunately, nothing practical can be done now to save the
Shuttle. A crew escape system would help reduce the risk to human life,
but it cannot eliminate it. It is not clear that crew escape could have
saved the astronauts aboard either Columbia or Challenger. Nor will an
infusion of new money suffice. The United States spends more on space
than the rest of the world combined. NASA has ample funding to support
a robust space program. It has simply wasted too much of that money
flying astronauts on unnecessary missions aboard a ruinously expensive
spacecraft.
We should drastically curtail human spaceflight until we have a
safe, reliable, and economical launch vehicle. In the meantime,
anything we want to do in space, except having humans there as an end
in itself, we can do more effectively and efficiently with automated
spacecraft controlled from earth. Whenever we put people in a
spacecraft we change the primary goal--be it reconnaissance or
communication, science or exploration--to bringing the astronauts back
alive. Most of the weight and hence the cost of manned missions comes
from safety and life support systems. The astronauts contribute little.
Even had the astronauts aboard Columbia known of the damage to their
spacecraft, they could not have saved themselves.
NASA should begin at once to carry out the recommendations of the
Rogers Commission. It should limit Shuttle flights to a bare minimum.
It should convert the Space Station into a space platform, to be
visited but not inhabited. And it should use the savings from these
actions to fund development of a new launch vehicle. I have enormous
confidence in NASA's ability to achieve a vital and productive space
program, including both human and automated missions. But to achieve
that goal, it must do the right thing. That means phasing out the
Shuttle. It is a death trap and a budgetary sink hole. NASA must
develop a stable of launch vehicles that will open up the promise of
space.
I believe that we should send people into space only when they have
something to do there commensurate with the risk and cost of sending
them. Given the liabilities of the Shuttle, I do not know of any
mission that now meets that criterion.
______
Discover, November 1985
THE SHUTTLE, TRIUMPH OR TURKEY?
BY ALEX ROLAND
The American taxpayer bet about $14 billion on the Shuttle. NASA
bet its reputation. The Air Force bet its reconnaissance capability.
The astronauts bet their lives. We all took a chance.
When John Young and Robert Crippen climbed aboard the orbiter
Columbia on April 12, 1981 for the first Shuttle launch, they took a
bigger chance than any U.S. astronauts before them. Never had Americans
been asked to go on a launch vehicle's maiden voyage. Never had
astronauts ridden solid-propellant rockets. Never had Americans
depended on an engine untested in flight.
Next to the orbiter was an external tank holding 1.3 million pounds
of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, flanked by booster rockets
containing two million pounds of solid propellant. Beneath Young and
Crippen were the three main engines, which had failed with alarming
regularity on the test stand. The escape system that would separate
them from this pyrotechnic nightmare should the engines fizzle again
had been scrapped--to save money.
The tiles that would protect the spacecraft from the consuming heat
of re-entry had fallen off by the dozens on Columbia's comparatively
gentle flight to Cape Canaveral atop a 747. None of them had been
subjected to the rigors of a launch, when six million pounds of thrust
would accelerate the Shuttle from zero to 4,000 feet per second in
about a minute and a half.
If the tiles stayed on, they would begin to do their work as the
Shuttle, traveling at 17,500 m.p.h., re-entered the atmosphere. At 50
miles up heat would begin to ionize the air molecules flowing around
the vehicle, blocking communications and engulfing the spacecraft in a
fireball that one astronaut has likened to the inside of a blast
furnace. The orbiter, again provided the tiles stayed on, would pass
out of this inferno at about 34 miles up, slowed now to 8,200 m.p.h.,
but still flying nose up, ``with the glide ratio of a pair of pliers,''
as a NASA engineer put it. Finally, it would nose over and pass through
20,000 feet on a 22-degree glide slope, about seven times steeper than
the normal angle for a commercial aircraft. If all went well, the
Shuttle would flare out at about 2,000 feet and touch down on the
runway moving at something like 200 m.p.h., five to ten percent faster
than the supersonic transport, the fastest-landing commercial airplane.
And the Shuttle would have to land on the first pass: the two jet
engines that were to give it a fly-around capability had been
jettisoned during development.
Tom Wolfe assures us that astronauts thrive on this sort of risk.
And, indeed, Young and Crippen came up winners in their gamble. But
what of the American people? Has their bet on the Shuttle paid off ?
And what of NASA and the Air Force? It's on these questions that any
assessment of the success of the American Shuttle program turns.
And any such assessment must begin with the four critical years
from 1969 through 1972. Both NASA and the country got new chief
executives in 1969. Richard Nixon, an old friend of the space program,
moved into the Oval Office determined to end the war in Vietnam, to
restore domestic tranquillity, and to bring the federal budget under
control. Thomas Paine became NASA administrator, determined to parlay
the first moon landing in July 1969 into a mandate for NASA to take
``the next logical step'' in space. Paine envisioned himself as a
latter-day Horatio Nelson, head of a ``band of brothers'' whom he
encouraged to ``swashbuckle'' and ``buccaneer'' with him on the high
seas of space. These true believers saw the Apollo landing as the
sparkling achievement of a decade gone sour. It required an encore of
even greater scope and daring. Nothing less than a manned mission to
Mars would do.
Nixon might publicly call the voyage of Apollo 11 ``the greatest
week in the history of the world since the Creation,'' but he wasn't
about to mortgage his administration and a distressed U.S. economy to a
commitment that would look like an imitation of John Kennedy's famous
man-on-the-moon proposal of 1961. Nixon appointed a Space Task Group,
chaired by Vice President Spiro Agnew, to lay out the options. Agnew
quickly signed on with the band of brothers: he came out for the Mars
mission, a manned space station in earth orbit, a Space Shuttle to
ferry men and materials to the station, and a ``tug'' to move things
around in space. His report presented choices of pace and sequence, but
they all ended up on Mars.
Congress went into orbit, and Nixon went underground. Some liberals
in both houses, claiming that the $25 billion spent on Apollo could
have been put to better use in social programs on earth, assailed the
Mars mission as the pipe dream of a bureaucracy gone mad. Many
officials in the administration agreed. Nixon himself withdrew from the
debate and let his subordinates fight it out.
Bereft of presidential support, NASA came down to earth--fast.
First it abandoned the Mars mission, except as a long-term goal. Then
it abandoned the Space Station. Finally, it settled on the Space
Shuttle, a re-usable spacecraft designed to reduce by two orders of
magnitude the cost of placing cargo in orbit.
The notion of re-usable spacecraft dates back to the 1920s in
Germany. The U.S. was, in fact, moving in that direction with the X-
series aircraft of the 1950s--until Sputnik set off the space race. The
Soviets had used a modified intercontinental ballistic missile to
launch Sputnik; the U.S. responded in kind, launching its first space
shots and even the early manned missions of Mercury and Gemini on
military rockets. Soon a stable of civilian launch vehicles was
developed, dominated by the mighty Saturn, which could put more than 50
tons of payload into low earth orbit.
But all these launch vehicles were throwaways. They boosted one
spacecraft into orbit and then fell back to earth to incinerate in the
atmosphere. They were also expensive; a Saturn cost $185 million
dollars. If Paine and his band of brothers were to swashbuckle in the
``new ocean'' of space, as Kennedy had called it, they had to find a
cheaper way of getting out to sea.
The most logical solution was a re-usable launch vehicle to Shuttle
men and cargo to and from orbit. There were several varieties of these.
Those that received serious consideration in the U.S. would lift off
vertically like rockets and fly back horizontally like airplanes. The
simplest was the single-stage-to-orbit vehicle, which would carry all
the fuel, engines, and aerodynamic features needed to power itself into
orbit and fly back to earth. The two-stage fully re-usable Shuttle
would consist of a spacecraft mounted atop a recoverable booster, both
of which would be piloted, winged vehicles; the booster would power its
cargo to near escape velocity and then glide back home. Finally, the
partly re-usable Shuttle would have a returnable orbiter on an
expendable rocket; you'd lose the rocket on each mission but you'd save
the spacecraft.
The relative appeal of these configurations depended on three
variables: payload, launch rate, and development costs. The bottom line
was cost per pound of payload in orbit. With expendable launch vehicles
NASA had achieved rates of $500 to $1,000 per pound. In 1969 George
Mueller, NASA associate administrator for manned space flight, set the
tone for the post-Apollo era when he called for a Shuttle that could
take off and land at major airports and place as many as 50,000 pounds
of payload in orbit at costs approaching $5 a pound.
Beyond those startling parameters, what kind of Shuttle would this
be? Opinion within NASA ranged from a Chevy to a Cadillac.
Swashbucklers at headquarters and elsewhere preferred a large Shuttle
that would enjoy economies of scale and be capable of carrying the
Space Station components of the future. They were seconded by officials
of the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, Ala., builder of the
Saturn rocket. Marshall wanted a mandate to produce a large new engine.
Flight specialists at the Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston knew
that a smaller craft had more manageable aerodynamic characteristics on
re-entry and landing. Each of these groups contributed to the designs
that NASA ordered from contractors.
The din of competing proposals drowned out voices of caution within
the agency. In a journal article now famous in NASA circles, A.O.
Tischler, head of the chemical propulsion division of NASA's office of
advanced research and technology, argued for an evolutionary approach
to the next generation of launch vehicles, as opposed to the quantum
leap favored by the band of brothers. The principal cost in space
transportation, he said, isn't hardware but people. The salaries of the
30,000 people NASA employed at the Kennedy Space Center were almost
half a billion dollars a year, imposing an overhead cost of about $500
per pound on all launches. Add to that the personnel costs at mission
control in the Johnson Space Center, at the tracking and telemetry
stations around the world, and at all the other NASA facilities, and
the cost of a manned mission in space was higher than the projected
costs of the Shuttle, regardless of which sort of hardware was
developed. What was needed, Tischler insisted, was a better
understanding of the cargo of the future, for the type of launch
vehicle would be determined primarily by the volume of traffic. Before
making ``a precipitous, total-immersion dive into the future . . . it
would be shrewd to make sure first that we know how to swim,'' he
argued. ``Once begun, there is no way back.''
The true believers would have none of this. They looked at the same
evidence and reached different conclusions. Tischler likened the
propulsion problems of the Shuttle to those of the SST, which was then
being hotly debated in the U.S.: ``If you fall short of design
requirements, you have the option of flying part of your passengers all
of the way or all of your passengers part of the way across the
ocean.''
Mueller looked at studies of the supersonic transport that
predicted a market for 900 American SSTs in 1985, and extrapolated a
market for 50 Space Shuttles. Obviously, something besides the data was
driving perceptions of what to do next in space.
The skeptics' views were driven by experience. As they had learned
in the Apollo program, development on the cutting edge of technology
always runs afoul of the unexpected. It would be better, they believed,
to move along incrementally and not let predictions outrun data.
Wernher von Braun likened this go-slow approach to life on a cruise
ship, prompting Paine's injunction to swashbuckle. ``Buccaneers,'' said
a NASA memorandum, ``stake out and create powerful outposts of
stability, sanity, and real future value for mankind in the new
uncharted seas of space and global technology.''
The swashbucklers won out. Before Paine left NASA in 1970, the
agency was leaning toward not just a Space Shuttle, but a Cadillac of
Space Shuttles. A fully re-usable orbiter, about the size of a DC-9
airliner, would be launched atop a first stage that could also be flown
back for re-use. A new engine producing 400,000 to 550,000 pounds of
thrust would be developed for use on both vehicles. The orbiter would
have a life of 100 missions with only minor refurbishment between
flights, comparable to normal operations for commercial jets. It would
carry a cargo weighing 65,000 pounds and measuring 15 feet in diameter
and 60 feet in length. It would be able to land on a conventional
runway and fly again in two weeks. The price tag was $10 billion to $14
billion for a vehicle to be ready in the mid-l970s.
The public attack on this plan sprang first from Capitol Hill.
Senators Walter Mondale, William Proxmire, Clifford Case, and Jacob
Javits warned their colleagues that the Shuttle was a cat's-paw for a
``manned space extravaganza'' that would cost between $20 billion and
$25 billion. They cited distinguished space scientists like James Van
Allen and Thomas Gold, who said the U.S. had no compelling need or use
for such a vehicle, which they believed would drain money from other,
worthier space activities.
Joseph Karth, chairman of the House subcommittee on space sciences
and applications and a NASA supporter, wondered if the proposed Shuttle
was technically feasible. ``This is going to be more difficult than
most people on the Hill suspect or NASA has led us to believe,'' he
said. ``And anyone who tells you this can be done for six or eight
billion dollars is out of his mind.''
These critics were drowned out by colleagues scrambling to get
Shuttle business for their districts or states. While few congressmen
grasped the technological complexity of the program, all of them
readily understood its pork barrel potential.
The critics never had a chance, but they did wring some important
commitments from NASA. Most had to do with cost, which soon became the
program's overriding concern. During 1970, the agency brought the
maximum price down from $14 billion to less than $10 billion, and
promised that even this sum would be amortized within a decade by
cheaper launches. In short, the Shuttle would pay for itself.
Still, it was left to the Office of Management and Budget to do
most of the moderating of NASA's lavish planning. Few OMB officials
believed the U.S. needed a Shuttle, and surely not the one NASA had in
mind. But the key man at OMB, deputy director Caspar Weinberger,
disagreed. He wanted to proceed with a Shuttle, but he let his staff
negotiate NASA down to a cheaper model. In mid-1971 OMB informed NASA
that its annual budgets during Shuttle development couldn't exceed the
1971 level of $3.2 billion. That allowed for a Chevy, and a stripped-
down one at that.
But the Air Force refused to ride in a Chevy, and Air Force
endorsement of the Shuttle carried great weight in Congress, in the
White House, and at OMB. To keep that endorsement, NASA had to retain
an expensive set of options, including the 65,000-pound payload
capacity, an inertial upper stage for placing satellites in high earth
orbit, and a cross-range capability of 1,100 miles. (This meant that
the craft had to be able to fly 1,100 miles right or left of its space
trajectory on re-entry, which would give it the ability to land from
almost any orbit. Only a delta-winged vehicle could practically provide
that flight characteristic. The simpler, straight-winged vehicle NASA
preferred could not.) But while the Air Force insisted on these
features, it refused to pay for them. NASA was caught in a cost squeeze
from which there seemed no escape.
At the insistence of OMB, NASA turned to a think tank for help with
its financial woes. It chose Mathematica, Inc., headed by Princeton
economist Oskar Morgenstern. Using data provided by prospective Shuttle
contractors, Mathematica concluded, just as NASA wanted, that the new
vehicle would pay for itself--if it had a launch rate of more than 30
flights a year, a very conservative estimate in those heady times.
The Mathematica report strengthened NASA's hand, but it didn't
carry the day. Critics at OMB and the White House still doubted that
the Shuttle was worthwhile. In the closing months of 1971, Shuttle
designs popped up and fell like ducks in a shooting gallery. This one
was too expensive. That one would take too long to develop. The next
one failed to meet the cross-range requirements of the Air Force. A
climactic meeting was arranged with Weinberger and OMB director George
Shultz. NASA Administrator James Fletcher came prepared to trade away
the payload capacity that NASA and the Air Force wanted. He was amazed
to learn that Nixon and his domestic policy adviser, John Ehrlichman,
cognizant of both the upcoming 1972 election and the boost the Shuttle
would give the slumping aerospace industry, had decided to approve the
Shuttle with whatever payload bay NASA felt necessary.
From this war of wills emerged a Shuttle that no one had willed--
except perhaps the Air Force. Congress, OMB, the Air Force, and NASA
had all pulled in different directions: Congress toward cost recovery,
OMB toward low development costs, the Air Force toward operational
capabilities, and NASA toward a future of manned space flight. Instead
of a horse, NASA got a camel--better than no transportation at all and
indeed well suited for certain jobs, but hardly the steed it would have
chosen.
Fletcher rushed off to San Clemente to join Nixon at a press
conference announcing the decision to go ahead with the Shuttle and
revealing its configuration. Nixon promised the American people that
the Shuttle would ``revolutionize space transportation'' and ``take the
astronomical cost out of astronautics.'' Fletcher promised that ``by
the end of this decade the nation will have the means of getting men
and equipment to and from space routinely, on a moment's notice, if
necessary, and at a small fraction of today's cost.'' The two men posed
for reporters with a model of the Shuttle. But it was the wrong
Shuttle. Fletcher had taken with hun an earlier version, not the one
that was eventually built. Plans called for a single-stage, only partly
re-usable Shuttle, fed by an expendable external tank.
In a curious piece of technical inconsistency, NASA promised two
different costs for orbiting payloads. Fletcher announced that the new
Shuttle would put payloads in orbit for $100 a pound, but he also
claimed a cost of less than $10 million dollars a flight, which yields
a cost of something more than $150 a pound. Both figures were dependent
on a launch rate of 60 flights a year by 1985 and a two-week turnaround
time for refurbishing the orbiter. The first orbital test flight was
projected for March 1, 1978. The total development cost was put at $5.5
billion, subsequently scaled down to $5.15 billion, with a 20 percent
ceiling on overruns. This was about half the development cost NASA had
estimated for its fully reusable Shuttle.
NASA had gotten out of its bind by trading operational costs for
development costs. Except for a new engine, the launch vehicle would
rely heavily on proved technologies. An expendable external tank and
recoverable solid boosters would help keep development costs below the
ceiling set by OMB, although they would raise the cost of each launch.
But Mathematica had told NASA it would break even at 30 or more
launches a year, and it was expecting 60 a year by 1985. There seemed
to be plenty of cushion. So NASA promised all things to all men.
Then it developed a management technique to match. ``Success-
oriented management'' is a euphemism for betting on the come. You
assume everything will work as designed, so you test only at the end,
when the entire machine is put together. This not only saves the time
that would otherwise be spent on intermediary tests; it also creates an
aura of confidence. No tests, no failures--and absence of failure is
success.
A version of this technique had been used in the Apollo program.
All-up testing, as it was called then, delayed the final check-out of
the three stages of the Apollo launch vehicle until they were mated on
the pad at Cape Canaveral. It succeeded largely because expensive
redundancies were built into Apollo and problems were drowned in money.
The Shuttle had no room for such luxuries.
For a while success-oriented management seemed to work. The first
Shuttle orbiter, named Enterprise in deference to Star Trek
enthusiasts, rolled out within a year of its scheduled completion date.
No major shortcomings had come into public view, and between 1974 and
1977 NASA had even absorbed more than $300 million in OMB cut-backs in
Shuttle funding.
Behind the scenes, however, normal development snags were taking
their toll, and NASA's reduced budget meant there was no money to
prevent these snags from becoming big problems. Inevitably, the weight
of the launch vehicle rose. Something had to go. Two escape rockets on
the orbiter were jettisoned, leaving the astronauts locked onto the
launch vehicle during lift-off. The auxiliary jet engines and their
fuel tank were scrapped, meaning that the Shuttle would have no fly-
around capability. A number of other features went by the boards, and
with each deletion NASA moved farther away from the spacecraft it had
envisioned.
The public and Congress knew little of this. About the only public
controversy was stirred by an April 1977 report by the House Committee
on Appropriations. Among other things, it criticized NASA and the
Rocketdyne Company for deciding to proceed with production of the Space
Shuttle main engine (SSME), a decision the committee felt might have
been influenced ``more on contract scheduling and costs than the
maturity of the design.'' Indeed, during 1977, the SSME began to
experience an ominous series of turbopump failures.
But in August of that year, the public watched Enterprises's first
test flight largely unaware of the problems mounting behind the scenes.
The orbiter lifted off its 747 carrier with grace and conviction at
20,000 feet and glided down to a flawless landing at Edwards Air Force
Base. It looked like another virtuoso performance by NASA, just what
the public had come to expect from the folks that had given it Apollo.
Then came 1978 and more engine failures. New rocket engines
routinely have taken more time and money to develop than expected and
have been full of bugs. But they usually end up delivering more power
than specified. The development of a new engine was a curious risk for
NASA, and it was probably taken mainly to give the Marshall Space
Flight Center something to do. NASA compounded the risk by betting that
its new engine would deliver 109 percent of its rated capacity. In a
bargain-basement development program this gamble never had a chance.
When the Shuttle engines first went on the test stand, they couldn't
deliver even 100 percent of their rated capacity, but weight growth in
the Shuttle demanded the full 109 percent if the craft was to perform
its mission.
The engine was simply too advanced to work to full capacity the
first time around. In 1978, NASA couldn't get one to survive so much as
a run-up on the test stand. In five tests, four different engines and
one turbopump were damaged, resulting in four months of down time and
$21 million in repairs and modifications. By the end of the year, the
illusion of NASA's infallibility was in tatters.
But its troubles were just beginning. Earlier manned spacecraft had
solved the problem of re-entry heating with ablative thermal surfaces,
materials that eroded during re-entry and carried the heat with them.
Obviously this wouldn't do for a craft that was to fly 100 missions.
NASA turned to re-usable ceramic tiles, for which it set breathtaking
performance standards. The insulation not only had to weigh just 1.7
pounds per square foot--the highly advanced Apollo shielding had been
3.9 pounds per square foot--but also had to fit the irregular contour
of the Shuttle body, withstand temperatures ranging up to 2,750
degrees, and be cheap.
Tiles made of rigidized silica fibers with borosilicate glass
coating met all these specifications. Some 31,000 of them, in black
high-temperature and white low-temperature versions, were ordered to
cover the Shuttle fuselage save the areas of highest and lowest re-
entry heat. The difficulties arose not with the insulating material but
with placing the tiles on the spacecraft. Each one had to be
individually designed, molded, machined, and applied to ensure that it
met the exacting tolerances set by NASA: for example, the gaps between
tiles had to range from 0.025 to 0.075 of an inch.
NASA and Rockwell International, the contractor tiling the Shuttle,
badly misjudged the task. Putting the tiles on Columbia, the first
orbiter scheduled to fly in space, ended up taking roughly 670,000
hours, or about 335 man-years. The craft still lacked 10,000 tiles when
Rockwell shipped it to Cape Canaveral in March 1979. The missing tiles
were air-shipped to Florida, where a motley team of Rockwell employees
installed them at the rate of less than two tiles per man per week. At
various times, college students, a few tomato pickers, hippies, and
assorted smokers of God-knows-what answered the Rockwell call for
labor. Despite NASA's disclaimers, it seems few had any incentive to
work well or quickly. Some wanted the job to go on indefinitely--and it
almost did.
Then NASA concluded that the glue holding the tiles in place
provided ``negative margins of safety.'' So 25,000 of them were
``densified''--that is, removed and reglued with a ``densified bonding
surface.'' What wasn't known was that the waterproofing material
applied overall was quietly dissolving the glue beneath the tiles that
weren't densified.
While public and congressional attention shifted between the comic
opera of tile installation and the Chinese fire drill of failing
engines, still another critical--although less noticed--shortcoming
precluded launch of the first Shuttle in 1979, or even 1980. Kenneth
Cox, who was in charge of navigation, guidance, and control for the
Shuttle, says he couldn't have approved the Shuttle for flight in those
years ``without significant risk.'' He simply didn't trust the data he
was getting from computerized flight simulations. This would be the
first spacecraft to carry a crew on its maiden voyage. The astronauts'
safety would depend heavily on the reliability of computer models and
wind tunnel experiments. But computers are only as good as the data and
assumptions that go into them, and no wind tunnel in the world was
capable of duplicating the flight regime of the Shuttle. This craft had
to go from re-entry at 25 times the speed of sound to landing, one hour
later, at about 200 m.p.h. Separate wind tunnels could re-create
segments of that descent, but the tunnels had different characteristics
and functioned at different Reynolds numbers. In other words, you could
find a slow wind tunnel to test a full-scale orbiter, and you could
find a fast tunnel to test a very small model of the Shuttle, but until
the Shuttle itself flew you could never be sure that the test results
were exactly comparable.
The Shuttle was known around NASA as the Flying Brickyard; it was
Cox's job to ensure that he had anticipated and built into the flight
control system all the characteristics of a brickyard traveling at Mach
25. And he had to program the five on-board computers to check each
other, identify mistakes, and overrule errant commands. ``If the
computer fails,'' said Cox, ``you've bought the farm.'' All this took
time. A lot of time.
Development dragged on past the original launch date of March 1,
1978 and into 1979. Congress began to ask embarrassing questions. Talk
was heard in Washington of abandoning the Shuttle altogether, although
most observers agreed that it had really proceeded too far for that.
Besides, whatever doubts there were about the floundering project were
obscured by a coating of SALT. The Air Force would soon be dependent on
the Shuttle to launch its space missions. The most important--and the
most secrecy-shrouded--of these involved the orbiting of reconnaissance
satellites. If Shuttle operations were delayed further, the Air Force
faced a hiatus between the use of its last expendable launch vehicles
and the availability of the Shuttle. The Air Force, and indeed the
entire intelligence community, dreaded this prospect. Perhaps more
important, so did Jimmy Carter, who in the spring of 1979 was
concluding the SALT II treaty. He would have to convince a skeptical
Congress that the U.S. had the reconnaissance capability to verify
Soviet compliance. There could be no gap in launch vehicle
availability.
The administration asked for more money for NASA in 1979, and
Carter made it clear that he wanted the Shuttle to get whatever funding
was necessary in the coming years to put it back on schedule. Congress
went along because it had already poured more than $10 billion into the
project and because the military implications were so serious. In 1979,
General Lew Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said, ``Whatever else
the Shuttle does and whatever other purposes it will have, the
priority, the emphasis, and the driving momentum now has to be those
satellite systems which are important to national security.'' For the
first time since 1971, cost was no longer the main determinant in
Shuttle development.
NASA paid a price for this reversal of fortunes: the myth that the
U.S. had an independent civilian space program was irretrievably
shattered. In Fiscal Year 1980 the military budget for space activities
exceeded NASA's for the first time since the beginning of the Apollo
program. With the Pentagon now piping the tune on Shuttle development,
some observers wondered aloud if an independent civilian space agency
could survive.
The infusion of money nevertheless had the desired effect. The
first Shuttle flew on April 12, 1981, somewhat reviving NASA's
reputation and quieting public criticism. Since that first launch, some
three years late, the operational record of the Shuttle has been
improving steadily, if slowly. After four successful test missions, the
first operational flight went up on Nov. 11, 1982, and was followed by
four missions in 1983 and four in 1984. Eight flights are scheduled for
this year--of which six had taken place when DISCOVER went to press--
and 14 next. On the basis of this record, NASA has sought and won
Ronald Reagan's approval to begin development of the Space Station, the
orbiting outpost the Shuttle was designed to serve.
The record of the Shuttle so far is decidedly mixed. The bad news
is that it's not up to specifications. The solid rocket boosters came
in over their design power, but the troublesome main engines have yet
to achieve the 109 percent of thrust NASA anticipated. This shortfall,
combined with weight growth on the launch vehicles, has restricted
payload capacity to 47,000 pounds instead of the specified 65,000. NASA
is developing a liquid boost module to add thrust on lift-off.
The turn-around time between the first and second Shuttle launches
was four months. The gap is now down to about two months, but the two
weeks originally projected seems impossible. Most Shuttle flights have
landed at Edwards Air Force Base, where the dry lake bed provides a
cushion against the erratic behavior of the landing gear. There are no
plans to land on commercial runways; they are simply too short. The
shock and vibration of launch are taking a far higher toll on the main
engines than anticipated; it seems unlikely that any of them will
survive NASA's goal of 50 launches.
The first flights of Columbia, Challenger, and Discovery were late;
Atlantis was to be launched in early October. Many follow-on missions
have been late as well; five have been scrubbed altogether. Some
satellites launched from the Shuttle have been either lost entirely or
placed in erroneous orbits, requiring depletion of their limited fuel
supplies to set them right. These mishaps weren't the fault of the
Shuttle, but the complete space transportation system has yet to
achieve the reliability of the expendable launch vehicles it replaced.
The good news is similarly compelling. Most of the shortcomings are
under control and getting better. The orbiter and the external tank are
getting lighter. Launches are more regular. Turn-around time is
decreasing. The bugs that always infest new technology are
disappearing.
Even with the bugs, the Shuttle is the most sophisticated
spacecraft ever flown, a generation ahead of the rest of the world and
the envy of all spacefaring nations. Its main engines have the highest
thrust-to-weight ratio of any ever developed; its thermal protection is
the lightest and most efficient ever flown. The Shuttle has retrieved
satellites. It has served as a platform for astronauts repairing
satellites in place. It has provided capacity for scientific
experiments on a scale that dwarfs the capabilities of Apollo and the
Soviet Soyuz. The Shuttle has more versatility and potential than any
other spacecraft ever flown, and it has also delivered on the promise
to routinize space flight.
Have the taxpayers, then, gotten their money's worth? Ah, that's
another question. One answer is undoubtedly no. Another is surely yes.
The choice between them is philosophical and political more than it is
technical.
Cost has driven the Shuttle from the outset. Cost dictated the
shape and pace of its development. Cost remains its only compelling
raison d'etre. And cost is the principal criterion by which it should
be judged.
Judged on cost, the Shuttle is a turkey. The problem isn't that it
cost too much to develop, as OMB had feared, but that it costs too much
to fly, which no one seems to have anticipated. The Shuttle cost
something like $14 billion (in 1985 dollars) to develop, well within
the budget and the 20 percent fudge factor predicted by NASA in 1972.
But NASA also promised then to amortize the Shuttle's development
costs, whatever the total. That notion was abandoned years ago, and
with it went the Shuttle's main initial selling point. By the time NASA
went back to Congress for more money in 1978, it had ceased to claim
that the investment in the Shuttle's development would ever pay off.
The Shuttle simply can't fly cheaply enough to turn a profit. No one
knows exactly how much a flight costs, but it's nothing like the $10
million that Fletcher predicted in 1972. Nor does payload fly at $100
per pound. In 1985 dollars, these predictions convert into $25.8
million per launch and $258 per pound. Earlier this year the
Congressional Budget Office suggested five ways to compute the costs of
a Shuttle flight, and they ranged from one and a half to six times
these predictions.
Accounting Meth. Cost per Launch Cost per Pound*
Short-run marginal cost $42 million $646/$893
Long-run marginal cost $76 million $1,169/$1,617
Average full operational $84 million $1,292/$1,787
cost
Average full cost less $108 million $1,662/$2,298
development
Average full cost $150 million $2,308/$3,191
*65,000 pound payload/47,000 pound payload
In 1972 Fletcher pegged the cost per pound of payload on a Saturn
rocket at $1,677 (in 1985 dollars). So if and when the Shuttle gets up
to its rated payload capacity of 65,000 pounds it will cost, under the
most reasonable accounting method (average full cost less development),
about the same per pound as an Apollo launch 13 years ago.
Bad as it is that the American taxpayer won't be reimbursed for
Shuttle development, it's worse still that more development money is
being poured into the Shuttle to bring it tip to specs. Worst of all,
even when these investments are written off, every Shuttle flight in
1986 will cost the American taxpayer a minimum of $50 million. NASA
Administrator James Beggs reported earlier this year that NASA was
budgeted on average $121 million for each of the 14 flights scheduled
in 1986, four and a half times the amount predicted by Fletcher in
1972. Since the commercial rate to hire a completely dedicated Shuttle
payload is $71 million, the American taxpayer would subsidize Shuttle
operations next year to the tune of $700 million if all 14 flights were
made and each earned its full commercial rate. In fact, fewer than half
the flights will earn the full commercial rate. Americans can look
forward to subsidizing all Shuttle missions--including foreign,
commercial, and Air Force flights--for the foreseeable future. Like old
John Henry, each Shuttle flight hauls as many as 24 tons and what does
it get? Another day older and deeper in debt.
Why not raise Shuttle fees? Simple. Ariane. While the U.S. was
abandoning expendable vehicles and developing the Shuttle, the European
Space Agency went about developing its own launch vehicle. Now Ariane
is operational and luring customers away from the U.S. The Shuttle and
Ariane are both heavily subsidized, launching spacecraft for all
corners at losses amounting, in the U.S. at least, to hundreds of
millions of dollars annually. (Ariane has no fixed pricing policy, so
outsiders can't be sure just what it charges for any given flight or
how much it loses.)
Ariane handcuffs the U.S. If America continues to subsidize
flights, it increases the loss to the taxpayer. If it raises prices, it
will lose business--even U.S. business--to Ariane, which already
includes among its customers GTE and Satellite Business Systems, which
is jointly owned by IBM and Aetna Life & Casualty. This would reduce
the number of Shuttle flights, which would increase the cost of each
flight, which would also increase the net loss to the taxpayer. In 1973
NASA envisioned 60 Shuttle flights a year by the sixth year of
operation. Mathematica pegged the break-even point at more than 30
flights a year. Now NASA hopes to have 24 flights a year by the end of
this decade--but don't bet on it.
In short, the Shuttle is an economic bust, with no prospect of
making money. It's the SST of space, a remarkable piece of technology
that costs more than it's worth in the marketplace.
But cost, say Shuttle supporters, isn't the best criterion for
judging the spacecraft. In fact, they contend, the cost constraints
that have crippled the program from the outset account in large measure
for the Shuttle's development problems and disappointing operations.
Retired NASA engineer James Nolan goes so far as to say that ``the
American people got the Shuttle they deserved.'' Others are more
circumspect. New technology, they argue, always entails the fits and
starts that the Shuttle has experienced, but the development must be
done. The Europeans, the Japanese, even the Chinese--not to mention the
Soviets--are moving aggressively into space, and if the U.S. wants to
remain competitive it must invest in the future.
Furthermore, supporters contend, new uses for the Shuttle are just
around the corner. It has unique capabilities that may be very
important in the commercialization of space. Orbital manufacturing of
crystals, pharmaceuticals, and space structures can take advantage of
near-zero gravity to achieve results impossible on earth. Even tourism
in space is now within reach; the Hyatt chain already has a commercial
featuring a future hotel in orbit. The prospects, say the Shuttle
faithful, are limited only by our imagination. Mueller claimed in 1969
that ``the Space Shuttle, by its very existence and economics, may
generate the traffic it requires to make it economical.''
That kind of logic tends to get circular and metaphysical. You
would only build a Shuttle if you had some reason for sending men into
space, but you can't know all the masons until they get there.
Christopher Columbus is the classic example of this phenomenon.
According to this line of thinking, you simply must bet on the unknown
occasionally, for even when predictions are wrong, the unexpected may
prove a greater blessing.
To date the Shuttle has found no gold in orbit. Nor is it likely
to. A second-generation Shuttle may be necessary for the space
transportation system to become truly economical, but that's not to be
the next step in space. When the Shuttle went operational in 1982, NASA
began to argue that the orbiter opened the way to development of the
Space Station. The purpose of the Shuttle in the first place had been
to reduce the prohibitive costs of resupplying the Space Station. Of
course, it hasn't done that, nor does it have any prospects of doing
that. The real cost of putting a pound of payload in orbit is at the
same prohibitive level as 16 years ago. But rather than make good on
its promise, rather than develop a second-generation Shuttle that might
prove profitable, NASA is pressing on with the Space Station.
Does Shuttle development, then, have anything to teach the U.S. as
it embarks on the development of a space station? It surely can't tell
Americans what will happen, but it can offer a handful of cautionary
thoughts. First, as Tischler warned in 1969, ``the desire of the
aerospace industry, which includes members of government agencies, to
build exquisite and innovative equipment does not of itself justify
spending the taxpayers' money.'' Second, beware of civil servants,
however well intentioned, who propose to swashbuckle with the public
purse. Third, high technology designed to cost will end up costing. And
finally, progress is in the eye of the beholder.
Senator Brownback. Good statements by all.
Let's run the clock at 7 minutes and then we can bounce
back and forth and probably go a couple of rounds here.
Ms. Smith, do we know what the cost per Shuttle flight is
now?
Ms. Smith. That's not an easy question to answer. It
depends on how you look at it. There are two ways that those
costs are usually described. One is called ``average costs,''
and the other is called ``marginal costs.'' The average costs
essentially take the annual Shuttle budget and divide it by
however many flights there were that year. So five flights or
six flights, whatever, you just do the math; it comes out to
$400 million, $500 million a year.
Senator Brownback. $400 to $500 million----
Ms. Smith. $400 to $500 million per flight, I'm sorry.
Senator Brownback.--per flight.
Ms. Smith. Yes.
The marginal costs are the additive costs of flying an
additional Shuttle mission in a given year, or the costs that
you would save if you did not fly a particular Shuttle mission.
So it doesn't account for the infrastructure cost, basically,
of the Shuttle program.
NASA currently calculates the marginal costs of a Shuttle
flight at $115 million a year. That's in full cost accounting.
Senator Brownback. Okay.
Mr. Chase, what should the vision be as to why we are going
to space? If you were to articulate that in a way that the
American people would identify with, what would that vision be
as to why we should be going to space?
Mr. Chase. I think the traditional reasons that have been
put forward--spin-offs and the valued education and the value
for international cooperation--those are all benefits, but
those aren't the overall rationale for going to space. I don't
think any one of those can justify the expenditures and the
programs.
I think there's something much bigger at stake here, and
that is, if you look historically, societies that have expanded
their frontiers are the ones that have prospered, the ones that
have the energy and the drive within that society to do other
things, whether it's economically or other areas of success
within that society. And I think that as soon as the society
begins to or stops exploring and stops opening that frontier,
they begin to risk some long-term detrimental effects. That's
not something you'll see in 5 or maybe even 10 years, but you
have a long-term detrimental effect that will impact society.
So I think that that's one of the motivating factors, that that
is a hallmark of societies that are successful and are leaders
in their world. So I think that's an important reason.
Clearly, there are a lot of outstanding benefits to the
motivation aspect in terms of motivating the next generation of
explorers, the next generation of scientists and engineers,
and, frankly, for that matter, the next generation of business
leaders and lawyers and anyone else who may be engaged in that
business or aspire to a higher calling.
So there's a lot of reasons to go. I don't think there's
any single reason that is a----
Senator Brownback. But how would you articulate it to the
American people? If we continue forward, this is billions of
dollars annually, how would you articulate it?
Mr. Chase. I think you would articulate it by saying that
this is important to the future of our--not just our society,
but even in some ways our civilization, to continue being a
leader in the world. And it's important for their kids to have
opportunities that they see a hope for the future.
You know, there's not a lot that we look at that says,
``Here's the vision for 10 years down the road. There's
something hopeful that you may be able to step foot on another
planet or another planetary body and have the chance to
experience something that no human has experienced before, to
have experiences that nobody's ever had before.'' I think that
can be a very motivating factor for a child or even for someone
today who is interested in that field.
Senator Brownback. So it's to open space for the vision of
humanity as always pressing forward?
Mr. Chase. It really is. There are economic reasons, there
are social reasons, but it's a continuous expansion of our
frontiers and of our understanding of society and then
obviously the benefits through technology that accrue to the
society that's used to do that.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Roland, how would you answer that
question? What's the vision for why we should be pursuing
space?
Dr. Roland. There are two things. I think it is important
to do exploration in space. But it's my very strong belief that
any exploration that you want to do in space with our current
technology, you will achieve far more with automated spacecraft
than you will with people. Any mission you do in space costs
ten times as much if you send people along. So if you want to
go to Mars and explore, you can send 10 unmanned missions for
the price of one manned mission. And the main purpose of the
manned mission becomes simply returning the humans.
I'm not saying that's an unimportant national goal. It is
inspirational and exciting, but it's kind of a feel-good space
program. And right now I don't feel very good about our space
program.
I think we get much more sustained payoff, and we have
consistently over the last 40 years, from our automated
spacecraft. We've spent two-thirds of our budget on manned
space flight, and we're doing basically what we were doing 40
years ago. We send astronauts up into low-earth orbit and they
float around and come back. And it's our unmanned spacecraft--
the communications satellites, the applications satellites, the
reconnaissance satellites, the deep-space probes--they're the
ones that have given us all the payoff.
So I think if we want to tell the American people that the
space program is good for them, that's where we should be
making our investment.
Senator Brownback. If you based it on scientific discovery
of what's taking place, you would stand by your previous
comment----
Dr. Roland. Absolutely.
Senator Brownback.--and can you quantify that?
Dr. Roland. Yes. I recommend to you an exercise. I tried a
short time ago to find any scientific results from Shuttle or
Space Station research that was written up in refereed
scientific journals. It doesn't appear there, because it isn't
important science. All the science that NASA gets published in
the best journals is coming from the automated spacecraft.
Now, the one exception to that is there are some human
physiology experiments that are written up, but that's--again,
it's sort of a circular argument. We're going to send people in
space so they can learn to survive in space in case we ever
find anything for them to do in space.
Senator Brownback. Ms. Smith, what would your comment be
about the scientific information that we're getting? Does it
come more from the manned or from the unmanned launches?
Ms. Smith. There is scientific information that comes from
both human and robotic spaceflight. I do have to agree with Dr.
Roland that it is difficult to point to some breakthrough
scientific discovery that can be directly traced to the
presence of humans in space. There have been many space
stations, both on the American side and on the Russian side,
and Shuttle flights and all sorts of other flights. They do
gather a great deal of data about biology, which is useful if
you are going to continue launching humans into space. They
also learn things that can be applied here on Earth. So there
are medical advances that other scientists say have developed
because of the space program.
But critics of the space program argue that those advances
would have been made anyway, even if you had not been launching
humans into space, and they might have been made sooner if you
had not devoted the sums of money to the space program and you
had devoted them to earth-based research instead.
But there is scientific data that comes back from the human
space flights, and there's a lot of data that comes back from
the robotic flights.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Chase, your response? And then I
want to go to Senator Breaux.
Mr. Chase. Well, I think the debate between humans versus
robots is actually a little bit of a false argument. I think
that any space program is a balanced approach. You have both
human exploration and you have robotic exploration. There's no
doubt that there are destinations in our solar system that a
human will probably never, ever be able to set foot, and robots
are going to be a critical role in that exploration.
But there's also things that robots will never be able to
do with current technology or even technology in the mid- to
long-term future that humans will have to fulfill. There's a
certain amount of interaction with the environment, the
mobility, the dexterity, the response time that a human
possesses. A robot can be sitting on the surface of a planet
and not know what's sitting behind it unless it's turned that
direction by an operator; and, even then, they may not know
exactly what it is. It takes a human to get down there and
interact with that object or that environment to understand
what's going on.
Now, the other thing that I think puts this in perspective
is, I would proffer an exercise as well. I would challenge any
earth-based scientist that does work in a laboratory and ask
them, ``Would you be willing to substitute a robot for the work
you're doing in your laboratory?'' And I dare say the answer is
no, they would not be willing to do that, because they know
they can achieve more with humans in that loop and in that
capacity.
Today we have the technology to replace humans to go to
Antarctica with probes and robotic measuring systems. We don't
do that. We could send probes to the bottom of the ocean, but
we don't do that. We send humans. So there's a reason that
scientists in the scientific arena have humans in the loop, per
se, in those discoveries.
Senator Brownback. Senator Breaux?
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel
for their testimony.
Dr. Roland, are you saying that this particular Space
Shuttle is defective, or do you think that any reusable Space
Shuttle that is manned is not the proper approach? I mean, is
this one uniquely defective in what you think, or do you think
that if we did a VentureStar or a type of program which was a
different type of reusable vehicle, that that could be okay, it
could be a better way of doing it? Or do you just fundamentally
think that the reusable manned space vehicle is not the right
way to go?
Dr. Roland. I think this one is uniquely defective, and I
think it's conceivable that the reusable idea could still work.
And I think NASA was fully justified in pursuing it. It seemed
like a good idea at the time. What we underestimated was the
wear and tear on the spacecraft that requires such an extensive
amount of maintenance and wears out the spacecraft faster than
we thought. That economic model doesn't work.
Also, at the time, NASA was basing all its projections on
an unrealistic economic model of how many flights there would
be. And those two things together make this particular reusable
not workable.
And I think we just don't know if we can design and operate
a robust reusable that will have a lifetime that will really
make it worthwhile. It might be that there's some combination
of the two where our orbiter is reusable but it launches on an
expendable, and that the cost balance might show up there.
I'm just encouraging them to take the experience we've
gained from the Shuttle, which is not trivial, and design a
better launch vehicle.
Senator Breaux. How much of your concerns with this
particular Shuttle are because of the way it is launched
through the rocket type of launch as opposed to like a regular
airplane, which would be a suborbital type of operation?
Dr. Roland. Right, I think if we could build a small
orbiter that could be launched from an airplane, at least
theoretically that sounds much more appealing. Of course the
whole problem is that when any launch vehicle lifts off the
ground, it has to carry all the fuel it needs to get into
orbit, so the enormous cost is in the first 100 feet and then
it starts going down rapidly after that. So if we can develop
another launch vehicle that'll get the orbiter up to a level
where it's only a hop into space, then we have an entirely
different technological model.
Senator Breaux. Is it your understanding that NASA, at this
point, really doesn't have any plans to look at an alternative
type of vehicle and they're now planning to use this one
through the year 2020?
Dr. Roland. That's what they told us in the fall. We were
waiting to see what they were going to do about the Shuttle
fleet. And their solution was to try and prolong its life and
defer, essentially, development of a replacement launch
vehicle. And I think that's the great problem. I'm not opposed
to the program they've designed in general or manned space
flight in general. It's just that this is not the vehicle
that's going to achieve our objectives for us.
Senator Breaux. From your knowledge, what type of vehicle--
would be an option, and what would that option look like?
Dr. Roland. I tend to think that we ought to separate cargo
and people, and that we need a small orbiter to take people
into and out of space. That's the vehicle in which we should
invest all the safety and life-support systems, and we just
make it as safe as we possibly can, but make it smaller, just
to carry the people. Then we have separate automated launch
vehicles; they can be either expendable or reusable launch
vehicles, the heavy-lift vehicles, the trucks that carry the
material up there. The astronauts meet them in orbit and do
their business and then the astronauts come back safely. And
then you have a vehicle that's not only a launch vehicle for
the astronauts and much safer, but it's an emergency crew
return vehicle, as well, and you solve two problems at once.
Senator Breaux. So you're not really saying that we just
shouldn't do manned space flights at all. You're just
separating the vehicle that takes humans up from a separate
vehicle that perhaps would be used for heavier payloads and
would not necessarily have to have the extreme human safety
precautions maintained.
Dr. Roland. Yes, this is what we do with our expendable
launch vehicles. This is what the Air Force does. You accept a
certain amount, a certain probability of failure. In other
words, if you get up to 95, 96, 97 percent success rate, it's
economically infeasible to try and get that any higher, and so
you accept an occasional loss of one of those launch vehicles.
But we can't do that with people. And so we ought to separate
those two functions have a much higher safety standard for the
smaller and lighter vehicle just to get the people and down.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Chase and Ms. Smith, can you comment on
that? Mr. Chase, you were talking about how you need humans in
space, but it seems like what Dr. Roland is really suggesting
is that you would still have humans in space; you would just
have a different vehicle for getting there and then you'd have
a different vehicle for the heavier payloads that would be
necessarily utilized in space. Do you have any comments on
that?
Mr. Chase. Yes, sir. Although I don't agree with Mr.
Roland's contention on some of the lack of the value of the
Shuttle at this present time, I think that we actually have a
lot of areas of agreement in terms of where this ought to go.
And some of the items that I outlined in my testimony are a
three-stage approach that NASA is planning for their future
space transportation needs. What NASA has finally realized, and
the space community has realized, is that we can't take this
jump in one bite, so to speak, in one step. We can't go just
straight from the old system to a brand new system that is a
single-stage to orbit that incorporates all the latest
technology.
What we've realized is that we have to do an evolutionary
approach. And the evolutionary approach is we continue to use
the Shuttle for the duration needed to finish the Space
Station. The next step is, you do exactly what Mr. Roland
mentioned, which is put a crew transfer system in place that
can take the burden off of the Shuttle to transfer a crew to
and from the Space Station and be used for future missions. And
then the next stage is that crew transfer system could become
part of a next-generation launch technology. So you have a
three-pronged approach to this problem. And I do----
Senator Breaux. Of course, the problem, at least in my
information from NASA, is they're not thinking in that terms
right now. We're talking about until year 2020 using the Space
Shuttle as both a human delivery system as well as a cargo
delivery system. And there's not a lot on the books right now,
from the standpoint of looking at the next generation. It's
just not even being started yet.
Mr. Chase. They did have a restructuring of their Space
Launch Initiative program, which was to address the next-
generation system. And out of that program is the orbital space
plane and what they're calling next-generation launch
technology, which is being done in conjunction with the
Department of Defense.
I think I mentioned in my oral testimony that that's an
important relationship to develop, and I think it's important
for this reason. The DoD has a very strong track record in
developing X vehicles and test vehicles for their eventual
systems. And I think that's important element that has been
missing in some of NASA's efforts. We try to go too quickly to
an operational system, or just do one X vehicle and all the
technology is thrown into that one system. And I think a
multiple approach, where we test technology on a variety of X
vehicles and have the experience from DoD in doing that, will
go a long way to solving that problem.
Senator Breaux. Okay, those are good suggestions.
Thank you very much, both of you.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask you--you've got some good
thoughts, but I want to hear--We hear a number of different
schools of thought. There's been, I think, a beautiful public
debate that's taken place since this last Shuttle disaster
about doing more space probes. Everybody agrees we should be in
space. Should we be doing more unmanned? More manned? Should we
be going back to the moon and colonizing the moon? Should we be
going to Mars and beyond? Great debate, and the sort of thing
we really ought to be talking about in broad scale, and I'm
delighted we're having that sort of discussion.
Ms. Smith what is the rationale? If we were to say to the
people that are most supportive of this, we need to go to the
moon and establish a long-term presence, an exploration
presence, on the moon, what's the major reason for us to do
that?
Ms. Smith. Well, there are advocates of returning humans to
the moon that would say that you could use the lunar surface as
a place for scientific observatories, you could put telescopes
on the far side of the moon, you could mine the moon for
helium-3 and bring it back to earth and use it for fusion
reactors.
Senator Brownback. I'm sorry, for what?
Ms. Smith. Helium-3 and use it for fusion reactors. There
are others who would like to put solar power systems on the
moon and beam the energy back to earth. So there are a number
of concepts out there for practical utilization of the lunar
surface. And if you also wanted to commit to sending humans to
Mars someday, then you might set up fuel production sites on
the moon using the lunar materials to produce the fuel that you
would need to go to Mars. So the visionaries in the space field
lay out a number of scenarios as to why it is that you might
want to go back to the moon.
There are others, however, who feel that we've been to the
moon--``Been there, done that,'' don't need to go back again.
That we really need is a commitment to going to Mars. In fact,
some of the Apollo astronauts who have been to the moon have
that point of view. They see going out to other places in the
solar system as part of this destiny to explore, and they feel
that we need to move on from what we did in the 1960s and start
a new quest to send humans to Mars.
Senator Brownback. What's the purpose of going to Mars?
Ms. Smith. Exploration. To set up settlements there. Again,
to do scientific research, to do a lot of geological research.
They make the argument that Mr. Chase was making earlier, that
if you have humans on site, that they're much better at doing
science than robots because they're adaptable. When you send a
robotic probe to some distant destination, if you haven't
programmed it with the information it needs, then it's not
going to be able to adapt to changing circumstances, whereas
people can.
So those who argue in favor of sending people to Mars want
the people there on site, because the feeling is that they can
do better scientific exploration there. They can look at the
geological sites and decide which rocks are the most important,
as former Senator Schmitt did when he was on the moon in Apollo
17, because he was a geologist and he was trained to do that.
So people see that as, sort of, the added value of having
people there, that you can get more bang for your buck even
though the bucks are so much greater when you're including
humans.
Senator Brownback. The cost of doing an unmanned mission to
Mars versus a manned mission to Mars, do we have any idea of
what factor we're looking at?
Ms. Smith. There are a number of ranges of cost estimates
for sending people to Mars. There's a gentleman who's very
enthusiastic about this, Bob Zubrin, who has very low cost
estimates. I believe it's in the $10 billion range. And when
NASA was last asked the question back when President Bush gave
his speech in 1989, they came up with a program that was about
$400 billion.
The robotic probes--how expensive they are depends on how
focused they are in their missions. But they're probably, you
know, $100 million, something like that. It's a vast
difference.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Roland, give me your perspective on
why we should or shouldn't go back to the moon or to Mars.
Dr. Roland. If the moon were paved in diamonds, it would
cost more to go get them than they're worth here on Earth. One
of the reasons we haven't gone back to the moon is that we
discovered nothing there worth going back for. It is true that
you could do some science there and you could do some
experiments, but nothing where the payoff is anywhere near the
cost. And I think the same thing is true in Mars.
This notion that humans, in situ, do better research than
machines, I think is simply not true. I don't know of any
particular activity that a human is going to do on Mars that a
machine can't do. Remember, our machines are controlled from
earth. We send them out, and we tell them what to do. We don't
have to pre-program. We direct them around. We have them get
samples.
Twenty-five years ago, NASA could have sent an automated
probe to Mars to take soil samples and bring them back. We
could have it down in the Air and Space Museum now. And we
haven't done those automated missions that we ought to be
doing.
I have no doubt that someday humans will go to Mars, and
we'll probably go back to the moon, and we'll probably colonize
the moon or Mars or some other place in space, but not with the
technology that we have now. What we have now is a technology
that allows us to do an enormous amount of scientific
exploration, and that's being cut off while we float astronauts
around in near-earth orbit. It's just an imbalance of our
priorities.
I agree that the space program has to have some balance of
priorities, but throughout NASA's history it's been spending
two-thirds of its money on manned space flight and we get very
little payoff from that.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Chase, I want to give you a chance
to respond to any of those comments, please.
Mr. Chase. I think that there's another avenue of this
discussion that's worth having, as well, because I think that
you can make the case that there are reasons to go back to the
moon and go to Mars, and I also believe that we will be doing
that at some point down the road. However, I think there's
another consideration, which is it may be better for NASA to
build capabilities that allow us to make decisions when we're
ready to make those choices.
For example, low-cost access to space is a critical part of
whatever sort of mission you're planning, whether it's to
launch a probe to do an environmental study of the earth,
whether it's a military satellite, whether it's a mission to
the Space Station, whether it's a mission to the moon or to
Mars. And so low-cost access to space is a major part of any
sort of an element of future space exploration.
Another good example is, NASA has begun a look at nuclear
propulsion and power, Project Prometheus, that is in the Fiscal
Year 2004 budget proposal. That is a capability that is
critical to both human and robotic probes. That is a capability
that will allow us to go places in the solar system we just
can't go with chemical rockets. And that's a capability that
can be built for a number of applications, and then when we
decide and make a decision about where to go, we can apply
those capabilities to those missions.
Now, there is somewhat of a danger in establishing a single
destination for the program. Obviously, that gives you the
ability to rally behind that destination, and there's a lot of
very attractive reasons to do that, and that's probably the
direction most people think of today is saying let's go back to
a single place. But if you apply all of your resources and all
of your technology behind a single destination and you either
never get that mission going or it has a failure en route,
you're left with nothing in the inventory for you to do next.
So that's why there's a rationale and a growing sense, even at
NASA by Administrator O'Keefe, that we need to build
capabilities to do a number of missions, and then as those
missions come about, assemble those capabilities into the
spacecraft that can achieve that mission.
Senator Brownback. In my discussions with the Administrator
and with other people that have thought about the space
program, a number of them will identify that we will need to
build the capacity to travel in space and that's what our
objective should be. We need to build the capacity that we
could get to and from Mars in a relative period of time so that
humans could take it, and have the capacity to do it. We don't
necessarily need to say right now that our objective is to go
back to the moon or to Mars, but we need to be able to build
the capacity. We'd probably test that technology and use it
through the unmanned to build up the capacity where we could do
it in a manned capacity. But our objective isn't to go to the
moon or to Mars. It's to open up space for human exploration
for humanity, how do you react to that?
Dr. Roland. It seems to me that there is a tendency to
associate our current space age with the age of Columbus, and I
think it's the wrong analogy. We're in the age of Leif
Ericsson. We have managed to get to the moon, but we don't have
a robust technology and a robust infrastructure which will
allow us to stay there and exploit and create a permanent
presence there. Our effort ought to be invested in developing
that capability and infrastructure, not in trying to
demonstrate that we can do a technological feat.
I think it was very important, in the context of the Cold
War, to send humans to the moon as a demonstration of our
technological prowess. But I don't think we have to prove
anything anymore. I think we have to have a rational space
program that builds up the infrastructure that will allow us to
do all of these things in space, and we're not doing it now.
We're spending our money flying astronauts around and not
developing the launch vehicles we need for the future.
Ms. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I can't resist bringing to your
attention a study that was done in 1985 to 1986, with which I
was associated, from the National Commission on Space, called
``Pioneering the Space Frontier.'' And the overarching theme of
that report was that we should open up the solar system for
science, exploration, and development. And the space
transportation system laid out in there, which was called the
Bridge Between Worlds, was, in fact, a series of spacecraft
that went on interlocking orbits so that you could access Mars
and the areas around Mars basically anytime you wanted to.
So there are folks who have thought about these things for
a lot of years. The problem has always been money. They're very
expensive to do, and the Nation has other priorities.
And what many people who are proponents of human space
flight have been searching for has been that catalyzing effect
that would make it imperative for America, or for planet Earth,
to go out there and do it again. We had that compelling reason
to go to the moon. And, as Dr. Roland said, it's hard to find
that compelling reason to send humans to Mars because of the
expense involved in it.
So I think on various bookshelves around town and around
the country you'd find a lot of studies that came out with
ideas of how you could accomplish this.
One of the concerns of the Commission on Space was that
they didn't want to do another Apollo program, which was a
dead-ended program. You went there, you picked up a rock, you
came home, and it was done with. They wanted to establish that
infrastructure so that you could go, not once, but repeatedly,
over and over again, that you had that infrastructure in place.
The problem has always been the funding for it.
Senator Brownback. You're talking about a catalyzing event.
Are we coming upon one if the Chinese launch into space? We've
had testimony in this Committee that they will shortly
thereafter announce that they are going to the moon and to
stay.
Dr. Roland. I can remember debating with former NASA
Administrator Dan Goldin, who was making the same argument ten
years ago, threatening that if we gave up our lead in human
exploitation of space, the Japanese were going to move ahead of
us and that they had a manned space program.
It is a bad way to make our national policy to think that
these symbolic programs are the best way to proceed into the
future. We have 40 years of experience in space now. We really
know what works and doesn't work, and we don't have to put on
demonstration programs to prove we're better than other people.
We just have to develop a rational program that will achieve
our goals.
My historical explanation for why we're in this dilemma now
is what I call ``the barnstorming era'' of space flight. We are
now in the era of space flight which is analogous to
barnstorming in the 1920s. We've learned how to fly, but we
didn't have any idea what to do with the capability. So we
would go out to the annual picnic and take Aunt Emma up for a
trip. Right now we are just showing off in space that we know
how to fly. It was in the 1930s, when the airplane turned into
a commercially useful tool and a militarily useful tool. Then
it started to develop its own technological trajectory. We
don't have such a trajectory now for manned spaceflight.
Senator Brownback. But would we, Dr. Roland--if we, though,
continued to go out for the Aunt Emma picnic----
Dr. Roland. Right, uh-huh.
Senator Brownback.--and watch the launch and come back----
Dr. Roland. Right.
Senator Brownback.--won't we learn as we go along? Then
we'll be able to get to a point that we find, a very good
logistical, military, commercial reasons for us to be up on the
moon on a permanent basis. If we're up there knocking around
and exploring, will we find things that we hadn't thought of
previously? Isn't that actually even the truth of most of human
discovery? Is you go not because you particularly know why
you're going, or what you're going to get, but once you get
there, you find out that what you come back with, the reasoning
is far different, but very important?
Dr. Roland. Senator, I agree completely, and we've been
doing this for 40 years, and we've found out what works:
unmanned communications satellites, unmanned reconnaissance
satellites, earth resources satellites, scientific probes. We
have a whole repertoire of space activity that works and is of
proven productivity and usefulness. It hasn't happened with
people yet.
Now, I'm not saying that we should stop sending people, but
we haven't had that catalytic event where people have
demonstrated that they're indispensable to some very useful
activity in space. I think one of the reasons is that we don't
have the right infrastructure.
If we could put people in space for free, there would be
lots of things for them to do up there which would be worth the
cost. If it costs a billion dollars to put them in space, there
aren't very many things up there that are worth the cost.
And, with all due respect to Marcia, I would maintain that
$1 billion is a much better estimate of what a Shuttle flight
really costs, including the total overhead. I can give you a
citation on that. And that's $1 billion a flight if you don't
include amortization of the development costs.
When NASA proposed the Shuttle, it said it was going to be
so cheap that it was going to amortize its development costs in
the first 12 years. Of course, it never did. So you should,
actually, be putting amortization of development costs into the
cost of a Shuttle flight. And if you do that, the number is
$1.7 billion a flight. But I think $1 billion is a good rough
figure for what it's really costing.
So it's a very expensive proposition to be putting people
up there. As a matter of fact, the space telescope is my
favorite example. It's used as an exemplar of how useful manned
space flight is. Well, we could have had two or three space
telescopes for the price of the program we have, because we're
spending all that money every time we go up to repair it. We'd
be much better off having several automated space telescopes.
They'd be in a more useful orbit, they'd be of a more practical
design, and we wouldn't be tied down to the Shuttle as we are
now.
Senator Brownback. Some observers have suggested that NASA
should explore developing a replacement for the Space Shuttle
instead of trying to extend the existing program and
complementing it with an orbital space plane. What are the
challenges to this approach? And do you support going that way?
Mr. Chase?
Mr. Chase. I believe that the Shuttle has inherent
capabilities that need to be maintained to complete the Space
Station, first and foremost. The remaining components of the
Space Station are in--most of them are at the Kennedy Space
Center in Florida waiting for launch, and those can only be
launched on the Space Shuttle. You can argue that that was a
design flaw, that we should have allowed those components to be
flown in other systems, but the bottom line is if we intend to
complete the Space Station, we have to have the Shuttle to do
that. And there are a lot of things that have been neglected in
the investments that need to be made in the Shuttle
infrastructure, both the vehicles themselves and the
infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center and other NASA
centers that support the Shuttle.
And that's been done to some degree, because there's been a
sense of an either/or proposition, that if you're going to fund
the Shuttle, you can't do next-generation launch investment; or
if you're going to do next-generation launch investment, you
have to starve the Shuttle. And that is not the case. You can
do both.
And, in fact, there are a lot of ways to integrate the
Shuttle program into next-generation systems and research. For
example, the Shuttle can be used as a test bed for some of the
new technologies that are being looked at for next-generation
systems.
So I think you have to have a period where you're flying
the Shuttle, you're also flying an orbital space plane, which
is kept as simple as possible, to do the crew transfer, and
then you're also doing investment in the next-generation
systems.
The key is I believe that NASA has matured its thinking of
the point to know that we do have to have that balanced
parallel approach, rather than simply embarking on a single
replacement system and then when that fails we not only have
not upgraded the Shuttle, but we don't have a replacement
system to replace it.
Going back, as well, to the exploration discussion, I think
that there has been a maturing of the thinking that we can't
have a mission simply to go there, that we have to have to
build the infrastructure and build the capability that lets us
do missions long-term, not just a flags and footprint type
program, which is what a lot of people describe Apollo as
being.
So I think we have a phased approach that involves multiple
systems being brought online.
Senator Brownback. We've been joined by a person with
personal experience, Mr. Nelson, Senator Nelson of Florida. The
floor is yours to ask questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Roland, I did not see you, because I was looking
straight at a TV camera. Were you the Dr. Roland that was on a
CBS program with me?
Dr. Roland. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. I guess I don't remember--2 months ago, or
so.
Dr. Roland. Yes, something like that. That's right.
Senator Nelson. You made a statement, and I heard it
through my earpiece, that the Rogers Commission had recommended
that the Space Shuttle be terminated.
Dr. Roland. I believe what I said--what I meant to say and
what I said in my prepared testimony here--was that the Rogers
Commission said, ``Do not make the Shuttle the mainstay of your
launch capability.'' In other words, they were encouraging
NASA, not to stop flying, but to get on with developing a
stable of launch vehicles where you could choose the vehicle
best adapted for any particular mission.
Senator Nelson. And that was clearly the conclusion as a
result of the Challenger tragedy----
Dr. Roland. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson.--17 years ago, was that instead of the
Space Shuttle being the space transportation system which it
was thought to be, that you would use the Space Shuttle
primarily where you needed the human in the loop, and you would
use expendable rockets to put up other payloads that you did
not need the human in the loop. That was the final result.
Dr. Roland. I went back and looked at the Rogers Commission
report, last night, in fact, and that isn't exactly what they
said. They took their charge very seriously, and it was only to
advise NASA on what to do about the Shuttle program. So they
were very cautious about what this other stable of launch
vehicles should be. I am quite sure that in their press
discussions surrounding the release of the report, they did say
that they thought there should be another stable of launch
vehicles. And I don't think they limited manned space flight to
the Shuttle. I think they were anticipating a follow-on manned
launch vehicle.
Senator Nelson. And 17 years later, here we are.
Dr. Roland. Here we are, that's right. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And we don't have one.
Dr. Roland. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. I would hope that we would accelerate those
technologies, and I've been kind of nipping at the heels of the
Administration to try to get them to do that and not to look to
NASA as the sole source of the funding for developing new
technologies since, in fact, other agencies clearly have an
interest in this, as well.
Dr. Roland. I agree completely.
Senator Nelson. Other agencies, I might say, that are a lot
more flush with cash than is NASA.
Dr. Roland. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Well, as you look from the experience of
what we learned 17 years ago and some of the mistakes--now, Mr.
Chairman, you might want to rein me in, because I might be
getting far afield. You're talking basically about the future
of manned space flight, so I will ask questions that are
directly related to that--NASA learned a number of lessons--and
I would address this to each of the three--17 years ago, NASA
learned a number of lessons, and it wasn't only about cold
weather stiffening rubberized gaskets, but it was also about
mistakes in human communication, where communication is like
water; it's really easy to flow from the top down, but it's not
necessarily as easy to flow from the bottom up. Do you think
that NASA learned those lessons and practiced those learned
lessons on into this experience?
Dr. Roland. I think they learned them and then forgot them
again. I think the Columbia accident was very similar to the
Challenger accident in the sense that it was a systemic flaw
within the system. It was a stressed system in which the
operators were proceeding with inadequate resources for what
they were trying to do. They performed heroically, but they had
more problems in the system than they had resources to fix, and
that meant looking the other way when a lot of problems arose.
And when problems arose, stick your head in the sand and hope
for the best. That's what happened on Challenger, and that's
what happened on Columbia.
Senator Nelson. What do you think, Ms. Smith?
Ms. Smith. Well, I don't mean to put you off, Senator, but
I think that until the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
determines exactly what went wrong, we aren't going to know the
answer to that question.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chase?
Mr. Chase. I have to agree with Marcia that we won't know
the answers until the investigation is finished. I can
certainly offer some preliminary assessments that I believe to
be the case.
I've had the privilege of working at the Johnson Space
Center, I've worked for a NASA contractor, I've lived in the
community around Kennedy Space Center, and so I've observed
NASA from a variety of angles, both from within the agency and
outside.
I think with Challenger, and certainly as your experience
with the agency would probably concur, there were a series of
severe endemic problems within the agency that resulted in the
Challenger disaster. There was a problem of suppression of
information from the top, an active suppression of information.
I think in Columbia, to date, we have not seen that there
has been an active suppression of the information. You can
debate whether or not certain pieces of information were
elevated properly from within management and engineering, it
seems, but I have not seen evidence, to date, that indicates
that there was an active effort to squelch that discussion.
The what-if-ing scenarios of what happens to a vehicle and
what happens to systems goes on on every single mission. I had
the opportunity to work console for three different Shuttle
missions while I worked for the Space Station Program, and
that's part of what you do, is you understand the details of
what happens to that vehicle and what happens to those systems,
and you go the absolute worst-case scenarios, and you talk
about those. It just happens that e-mail now puts that down on
paper, and some of that is now transmitted and can be taken out
context.
So I think that's a difference in those two areas. I'm sure
that we'll find areas that need to be improved, and those
improvements certainly need to be made. But I think that is a
very dramatic difference between the two incidents.
Senator Nelson. The question of photographs, Ms. Smith,
what do you think? Looks like NASA is going to be taking
photographs, if such an occurrence should occur in the future.
What do you think about whether or not they should have taken
photographs this time?
Ms. Smith. Well, again, Senator, not to put you off, but I
don't think CRS would take a position one way or the other. I
think NASA has explained itself. It said that it had gotten
photographs in the past and had not found them particularly
helpful in trying to determine whether or not there had been
missing tiles on previous flights, and so they felt that they
would not be particularly helpful in this case. So they've
explained why they chose not do that, and it would be up to
Admiral Gehman and his team to decide whether or not that was a
good management choice.
Senator Nelson. So you don't have a personal opinion about
that?
Ms. Smith. No, sir.
Senator Nelson. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. I've got several
other questions, but----
Senator Brownback. I've had my chance. I was just getting
ready to close the panel down when you came in.
Senator Nelson. Do you have another panel coming?
Senator Brownback. No, this is it. So if you have another
couple of questions, go ahead and ask them and then we'll
finish up.
Senator Nelson. May I have more than a couple?
[Laughter.]
Senator Brownback. All right. We may bounce back and forth
a little bit here. I may give you the gavel and go on. Go
ahead.
Senator Nelson. I'd love that, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. The last time I had the gavel in this
Subcommittee, we went for 5 hours.
[Laughter.]
Senator Brownback. Oh, well, I couldn't handle that.
Senator Nelson. As we look at some of the things that are
happening, do you have any technical suggestions for this
Committee about buying some more time if you've got a damaged
area of an orbiter and you want to buy some more time--I'm not
suggesting there was anything that could be done to save this
particular mission and crew--such as cold soaking or a higher
angle of attack or keeping the crew in space longer to rescue
them--if you're damaged area is your left wing, keeping your
left wing up instead of the roll reversal taking it back into a
left wing down? Any suggestions?
Dr. Roland. Senator, I don't have the technical competence
to answer that specifically, but I do have a suggestion that I
think's in the same realm. I think in the future, until we
either have a clearer idea and clearer prospects of a new and
safer Shuttle, that all Shuttle missions in the future should
go to the Space Station and should involve an inspection of the
Shuttle before it returns.
And, additionally, we might want to consider--we've been
speaking earlier about developing a small astronaut orbiter
which would be only to transport people to and from orbit--we
might want to consider using the Shuttle unmanned as a heavy-
lift vehicle. It can fly up and it can fly back without the
astronauts onboard. This would not hold down the costs, but it
surely holds down the risk to human life of a technology that I
think is becoming more fragile as time goes on.
Senator Nelson. Any other comments?
Mr. Chase. No, I don't have the technical background or the
currency with the programs to make the recommendations.
Senator Nelson. The future of human space flight. Where, in
your opinions, would you like to see us go as we get back into
flying with the Space Shuttle? What would you like to see the
program evolve into?
Mr. Chase. Senator, one of the discussions that we've been
having is this notion of a destination-driven program versus
building capabilities that let us go multiple destinations, and
I think that's a very good debate to have. I'm not sure that
that debate has been decided, but clearly NASA is moving
towards this notion of building capabilities to do a number of
things. Rather than simply building a vehicle that goes to Mars
or just goes to the moon, why not build capabilities that let
us do a number of things in space that can be applied to
robotic missions, to human missions, and anything else that we
may want to do.
One of the recommendations put forward in the Commission on
the Future of the Aerospace Industry, chaired by Congressman
Robert Walker, was just that notion, that you need to develop
the capabilities to do a number of missions. And, in a lot of
ways, that's more exciting, to understand that you have the
capability through developing nuclear propulsion and power
options for in-space transportation, but you can then take that
and apply it to a number of missions, to send a robotic probe
to Europa, to send a human mission to Mars. That, I think,
opens up your possibilities. You have some challenges in
perhaps how you motivate that team that develops the systems,
because they may not know exactly what they're driving towards.
But it does open up your possibilities, and that's where I
think we should go.
The most important element in all of that is the access to
space. Getting low-cost access to space is critical. The
capabilities of the Shuttle are critical for the short- and
near-term. Then as you develop and phase in the next-generation
systems, that's what enables you to drop the costs. And I was
encouraged by your comments earlier and your comments in the
past related to the role that the Department of Defense can
play in future space access, both in developing next-generation
RLVs and perhaps how the fleet of the evolved expendable launch
vehicles, EELVs, can play in our space transportation needs.
Those are very robust and very new systems that are much
simpler, much more efficient than their predecessors. I think
there's a major role for them to play in future access.
Ms. Smith. Well, Senator, I'm not allowed to take positions
or have opinions, so about all I can offer in this context is
that it----
Senator Nelson. But you're one of the great experts on
space.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Smith. But it may be useful to have the context set for
where it is that NASA and America expect to go in the long-term
in human exploration. Most of NASA's programs have this long-
term view. The planetary program does, the astronomy program
does. But when you get to human space flight, the Space Station
is basically it. Because it's taken so many more years than
people expected for it to become operational, and it's still
not there yet, people have sort of given up looking at what is
beyond space station. In fact, NASA, I don't think even has a
cutoff for when the Space Station is going to stop operations
or transition to something else.
And so in terms of trying to develop an architecture for
the future and decide what your options are and what kind of
launch vehicles you need and whether you want to have one
vehicle for human space flight and another vehicle for cargo,
you really need to know where it is down the road all of this
is going to be taking you.
And I know that there are a few people at NASA who have
been looking at this over these past few years, but because of
the funding situation at NASA, I think there aren't a lot of
people there who feel that they can stand up and say, ``Oh,
yeah, this is the way it's going to be.'' And so I think that,
you know, even after all these years and after all the studies
that have been done on future space goals, that here we are in
2003 and it's still not clear what direction this is all
leading in. And I think that's an important component of then
backtracking and saying, ``So what kind of launch vehicles do I
need?''
Dr. Roland. I don't think, with our current technology,
there are any missions for people in space that are worth the
cost and the risk, but that does not mean that there's not a
value for human missions in space--conceivably on a space
station, conceivably going to the moon, going to Mars. And the
question is, when will the cost come down enough that the value
of having people there, which is now so much more expensive,
intersects with that cost? I think the space program should be
focused on making that happen sooner rather than later, and
that means launch vehicle development. I think Mr. Chase and I
agree that access to space is the big issue, and that's where
we should be concentrating our research and development.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude my comments
just by responding to Dr. Roland.
In one sense, I agree with you, and that is that the risks
for human space flight are not accurately projected. Indeed, in
a flight that I participated in 17 years ago, at the time it
was generally thought to be catastrophic one in 100. It ended
up being one in 25. And now we know, it's two in 113. And
that's why I have been unrelenting in my advocacy for the
safety upgrades on the Space Shuttle and have been unforgiving,
Mr. Chairman, to a NASA that has not pressed with those safety
upgrades as a first priority of business; instead, stealing
money from the Space Shuttle, which would have gone into safety
upgrades and other things, and putting it in other things in
NASA. So in that regard, I think you're right.
Where I would disagree with you--and this is my concluding
comment, Mr. Chairman, because I know you want to shut down--
and that is that Americans are, by nature, explorers. We're
about to celebrate the 200th anniversary of Lewis and Clark.
And that was a big deal in the day. That was like an Apollo
project in their day. And that reaped enormous benefits for us.
And I think that we need, as a country, not only the
development of the technologies and all of those spinoffs to
the value of our society here on the planet, but fulfilling
that part of our nature as explorers.
For example, one of my crew mates, Dr. Franklin Chang Diaz,
has been developing over the last 30 years a plasma rocket that
he's just about ready to test if NASA will keep giving him the
money. He's got a 30-university consortium, he's got a test
model, and this thing would ultimately take us to Mars in 39
days instead of 10 months, which is conventional technology,
would solve the problem of gravity, because it would accelerate
half the way and decelerate the remaining half way, and would
create a magnetic field around the rocket, which would help us
repel the solar flares.
And so these are the kind of things that I think we've got
to be visionary in. And I'm so grateful to you, Mr. Chairman,
because you are a visionary, and I'm glad that you're the
Chairman of this Committee.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson,
Astronaut Nelson.
I want to thank the panelists, as well. This is the start
of a lengthy process. It's been going on for some period of
time. But we do want to fulfill the dreams of us as explorers,
and I don't think anybody on the panel disagrees with that.
It's just how we do that and how we proceed forward.
I want to thank all of you, individually, for your
expertise and your continued support and enthusiasm for how
America proceeds forward into space.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]