[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DIGGING UP THE FACTS: INSPECTING THE BIG DIG AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT IN PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 22, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-29
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 22, 2005................................... 1
Statement of:
Amorello, Matthew J., chairman, Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority; John MacDonald, chairman, board of control,
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, accompanied by Morris Levy,
senior vice president, Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc., and
Keith S. Sibley, P.E., program manager, Central Artery/
Tunnel Project, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff; and George J.
Tamaro, partner, Mueser Rutledge Consulting Engineers...... 70
Amorello, Matthew J...................................... 70
MacDonald, John.......................................... 80
Tamaro, George J......................................... 94
Gribbin, D.J., Chief Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,
accompanied by Stanley Gee, Administrator, Massachusetts
Division, Federal Highway Administration; Kenneth Mead,
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation; and
Tom Reilly, attorney general, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 14
Gribbin, D.J............................................. 14
Mead, Kenneth............................................ 22
Reilly, Tom.............................................. 44
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Amorello, Matthew J., chairman, Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, prepared statement of........................... 75
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 4
Gribbin, D.J., Chief Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,
prepared statement of...................................... 16
Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of.............. 9
MacDonald, John, chairman, board of control, Bechtel/Parsons
Brinckerhoff, prepared statement of........................ 82
Mead, Kenneth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation, prepared statement of...................... 26
Reilly, Tom, attorney general, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
prepared statement of...................................... 46
Tamaro, George J., partner, Mueser Rutledge Consulting
Engineers, prepared statement of........................... 96
DIGGING UP THE FACTS: INSPECTING THE BIG DIG AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT IN PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDS
----------
FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in the En
Banc Courtroom, Moakley Courthouse, Boston, MA, Hon. Tom Davis
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, and Lynch.
Also present: Representative Capuano.
Staff present: Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie,
deputy clerk; Brian Stout, professional staff member; John
Hunter, counsel; Drew Crockett, deputy director of
communications; and Krista Boyd, minority counsel.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good afternoon. A quorum being present,
the committee will come to order. We are conducting this field
hearing in Boston today to assess the status of the Central
Tunnel/Artery Project, or the Big Dig, one of the largest and
most expensive Federal highway projects in the history of the
United States.
My colleague and good friend and member of this committee,
Congressman Stephen Lynch, requested that this congressional
committee convene a hearing here in Boston to witness firsthand
the steps being taken to address the outstanding concerns and
issues in terms of safety and cost associated with the Big Dig.
As this project nears completion, it is vital that we
assess the lessons learned here in Boston and determine how to
prevent such cost growth and improve oversight and coordination
in the future. These are significant areas of concern to the
Committee on Government Reform, and indeed to the entire
Nation, as we seek solutions to increased urban congestion
throughout the country.
It is imperative for the Federal Government, which often
pays 80 percent of the major highway projects, to play a role
to ensure that taxpayer dollars, whether Federal or State, are
being used effectively. In addition, the increase in the number
of projects and the rapidly growing competition for both
Federal and State funding demand that major transportation and
infrastructure projects be managed efficiently and cost
effectively, so we are able to fund the many needs we have
across the Nation.
It is for these important reasons that we decided to come
to Boston today and hold this important hearing. I am pleased
that Congressman Lynch is with us this morning, and I also want
to welcome Congressman Capuano to this field hearing as well.
And I would ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to sit
here as a member of the committee and ask questions. And, Mike,
we appreciate you being here as well.
I don't need to remind anyone here about the traffic and
related highway safety problems of the Central Artery in the
1980's that led to the planning for this massive project.
Preliminary designs began in the 1980's, and construction
commenced in 1991.
As with all State highway projects such as this, the
Federal Highway Administration is responsible for protecting
the Federal funding of this project. As part of the
Metropolitan Highway System, the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority has given construction and operational authority for
this project.
The figures associated with the Big Dig are staggering. The
nature and scope of the project, the time involved in planning
and construction, and the cost overruns and safety concerns are
unparalleled. What began in 1980 as a $2 billion project grew
to $8 billion in 1995, and the Authority currently estimates
the project cost to be $14.625 billion.
Upon completion, scheduled for later this year, the project
will encompass 7.8 miles of highway, with 161 lane miles of
pavement, 3 interstate tunnels, over 200 bridge structures, and
6 major interchanges. So it comes close to $2 billion a mile.
While it is hard to imagine another federally funded
project--public works project of this magnitude, there is a
growing need nationwide to plan, build, and support major
highway and infrastructure improvements. It is, therefore,
vital for us to learn what happened here in Boston and
implement procedures that will ensure against cost overruns of
highway projects and assure the safety and confidence of the
traveling public that utilizes those highways.
Certain steps have already been undertaken as a result of
the problems associated with the Big Dig. Congress now requires
initial financial plans and annual updates to be submitted and
approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation for all
projects costing over $1 billion.
These financial plans for the mega projects must identify
project costs and financial resources to implement and complete
the planned project. Annual updates must report actual cost and
revenue performance in comparison to original estimates and
revision of estimates.
This process has been implemented. The Woodrow Wilson
Bridge Project, which is the Potomac River crossing northern
Virginia, which I represent, and Maryland. Right now that is on
schedule and under budget.
I hope that this hearing will give us an accurate picture
of the current status of the Big Dig and the efforts to remedy
the tunnel leaks, which has been learned from this mega
highway--what else has been learned, and implementation of
safeguards for other federally funded projects.
Now, we have assembled an impressive group of witnesses
today. We will hear from the Federal Highway Administration,
the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the attorney general of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, the overall management consultant for the project
hired by the Massachusetts Highway Department, and a safety
engineer who evaluated the project.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
committee, and I look forward to their testimony.
I now yield to Mr. Lynch.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to
begin by thanking you for convening this hearing, and also it
was necessary for me to get the agreement of our ranking
member, Henry Waxman, and I appreciate you coming here to
Boston.
This committee is the Committee on Government Reform. And
as the name suggests, it is the continuing problems that we
have encountered on the Central Artery/Tunnel Project that
brings us here today. Very simply, this committee is charged
with asking the tough questions, and using the powers that are
afforded to this committee, and to the Congress, to determine
where the shared responsibilities lie in completing and
maintaining this project in a manner that meets the high
standards that taxpayers and toll payers expect.
In a national regulatory context, we also seek to ensure
that the systemic problems that resulted in cost overruns are
not allowed to happen again. There is frequent criticism of
partisan bickering in Congress that sometimes hampers our work.
And, in fairness, I must confess that sometimes that criticism
is warranted and well deserved.
However, I must say that my experience on this committee,
under the leadership of Chairman Tom Davis, the gentleman from
Virginia, has been a shining exception to that rule. In my
brief tenure on the committee, we have conducted investigations
of the Boston Office of the FBI and their involvement with
organized crime, we continue to investigate the U.N.'s
complicity in the Iraqi Oil for Food scandal, we are
investigating contract irregularities with Halliburton in the
Middle East, and most recently steroid abuse in Major League
Baseball and professional sports.
And through it all, I have seen Chairman Davis has
personally gone to great lengths to maintain a level of
fairness and to encourage the work of all members together,
regardless of their political affiliation. So, again, my
thanks.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. If you want to take more
than your 5 minutes, you are doing real well. [Laughter.]
Mr. Lynch. Well, he wrote this, so--[laughter]--not at all.
Turning to the difficulties of the Central Artery Project, as
somebody who literally grew up in the construction industry, I
have taken a natural interest in this project. Let me state at
the outset that I do not for a moment discount the colossal
scale of this undertaking, which is, again, as the chairman has
said, the largest and most complex construction project in the
history of the United States.
And also, I fully and personally appreciate the pride and
skill of the men and women of the building trades who built it.
I have enormous pride in them, and I am not questioning their
work.
And I am mindful, most of all, of the memories of workers
who actually gave their lives on this project, men like John
Hegarty, an old friend from Savin Hill, in the neighborhood, in
the Savin Hill section of Dorchester, a proud member of Pile
Drivers Local 56, who left a wife and young children; men like
Fook Choi Kan, who was a union carpenter from Springfield, who
also died on this project; and Lonnie Avant, a member of Local
4 Operating Engineers from Roxbury, who on all accounts was
considered a true gentleman and someone who took great pride in
his work.
And men like my young friend, Frank Shea, of south Boston,
who was an accomplished boxer and a Golden Glove champ, who
lived by the simple truth that there was honor in hard work.
Those gentlemen were reflections of what was and is best about
America.
There were common threads that ran through each of their
lives. They, like their parents, Irish, Asian, African-
American, by their labor they found dignity in their work, and
that has been an enduring truth in this country.
It is also directly related to America's sense of shared
sacrifice and our willingness, as citizens, to support projects
like this, that probably benefit future generations more than
they benefit us today, not simply to reduce the length of a
traffic jam or cut our morning commute time, but because we
hope that our work can become our legacy, to improve the lives
of future generations. And as noble as that may sound, it takes
more than good intentions to build that legacy, as this project
has shown.
I think the best example of how quickly good intentions can
succumb to failure is the story of greed following national
need during World War II. The people of this Nation were bound
to a unified cause because of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and
they rallied to superhuman acts during World War II.
And yet as the country grappled with logistics of the war
effort, terrible examples of waste and mismanagement and abuse
in our defense contractor practices threatened that effort
until Senator Harry Truman and the members of the Truman
Commission investigated the causes of those deficiencies and
that waste and got the war production effort back on track.
The risk then was not just in wasted tax dollars but in
lost lives, shoddy materials, and missed deadlines in delivery.
Then, Senator Truman got in his car and went around the country
visiting installations and talking with the people working for
defense contractors. He knew that the key to reform--true
reform--would be found where the work was actually occurring.
And so now we are here today in the spirit of that earlier
effort, and it is my hope, with at least a small fraction of
the clarity and the sense of mission that Senator Harry Truman
brought to his work.
Why is this as important as the earlier investigations? Our
transportation system is the key to our economic stability, and
we have just approved in the House a brand-new $285 billion
transportation bill. This Nation will continue to undertake
huge public works projects, but, whether large or small, the
taxpayer deserves value for each dollar spent.
This project was and is a courageous endeavor of
breathtaking ambition--make no question about it--an effort
that was equal to the people who have built it. And we are
trying to--what we are trying to do here is preserve the legacy
of this monumental effort and bring it back into
respectability, and that can only happen when all the parties
are held accountable and share in that responsibility.
I have followed the chronology of this project from its
inception to today, and I must say through all of its twists
and turns and conflicts and mediations I have yet to find a
single example when the interests of the taxpayers and of
ordinary citizens have prevailed. Well, we are hoping in this
hearing that will change.
If we reexamine how we got to this place, and take note, as
the chairman has said, of lessons learned from our experience,
if we work together thoughtfully and in good faith to find a
way to ensure that the public is a partner in this effort, we
can restore dignity to this project, and we can protect the
people's interests from this day forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank
you for allowing me to sit with you and to share some time with
you. Welcome to Boston. Actually, welcome back to Boston.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Capuano. And, again, I would echo everything Mr. Lynch
said about your tenure, both in this chairmanship and as a
human being. I find you to be one of the most fair and
honorable people in Congress, and I am pleased and honored to
sit here for a few minutes with you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Capuano. As far as today's hearings go, there are only
a couple of things that I am deeply interested in. I am the
least interested person here in the headlines that are going to
be in tomorrow's papers or in tonight's news, because I think
that's part of the problem with this particular project is too
many people interested in too many headlines and not enough
people interested in the facts and the realities of the
project.
First of all, as everything I understand, and I am going to
ask every single witness today to answer the question, as I
understand it today, the project is safe. And everything I have
read, everything I have heard from everybody involved has
indicated that it is safe, but I want to hear it from every
person who testifies here today.
No. 2, the project is working. I took it to get here today.
My expectation is that many of you took it to get here today
and will take it as you leave. And if you didn't take it, I
would suggest that you do. The project, though not complete, is
working.
It is doing what it was promised to do, which is to ease
traffic flow, improve our environment, and improve the quality
of life in greater Boston, and hopefully to set an example of
the kinds of construction projects that are wanted across this
country to improve the quality of life in other especially
older cities.
As far as what we learned from this project, my hope is
that we learn a couple of things. No. 1 is that we know that
this project will continue to be safe. That is the top
priority, that it continues to be safe tomorrow, next week,
next month, and in the next generation.
I would hope that over time, maybe not today but over time
we learn on issues of accountability--who is responsible for
what, how much, and hopefully none of that will go to the
taxpayers. But I think that will be part--it will clearly be
part of the discussion today, and it will take a while to work
all those things out.
I also want to hear some of the lessons that we have
learned from this project, both on a State level and on a
Federal level. I have been involved in major construction
projects in the past, and every time you do one you learn
something.
This project, as you have heard, is the biggest project in
the history of the country. There are lots of lessons that have
been learned, and hopefully they will allow us to improve our
process in the future, again, both on a State and on a Federal
level.
And, finally, I want to make sure that the costs relative
to this project don't have a negative impact on, No. 1,
taxpayers; and, No. 2, on future projects.
I was a former mayor of a city close to Boston,
Summerville, and during that time when I was mayor I personally
experienced projects in Summerville that were stopped or
delayed because the financing on this project sucked up every
single dollar the State had.
That was unacceptable, and the solution was a few years ago
the Congress passed basically a rule or a regulation, a law,
that said the State must have minimum spending on projects in
Massachusetts other than the Big Dig. To my knowledge, that is
still working. That is still in place and still being adhered
to.
I want to make sure that the future costs of this project
don't lead to the same results, both on maintenance and in
completion. Everything I have heard thus far on completion I
think we are in good shape. Obviously, maybe we will hear
different today, but that also goes for maintenance. It doesn't
do us any good if the maintenance costs of this project are
100-fold what we expect, so that they suck up future dollars.
I know that the House just passed a bill, as Mr. Lynch
mentioned, that for Massachusetts will mean $5.1 billion. It
means 7,500 new jobs--40,000 jobs but 7,500 new jobs per year
every year for the next 5 years.
Now, I happen to think that is the way government should
work, both for the jobs and economic aspects of it, even for
the transportation aspect of it. And I don't want those jobs
jeopardized by the concerns of this project.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be with you
today. Thank you for the opportunity to sit here with you. And,
again, I hope you enjoy your brief time here in Boston.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you very much.
Members will have 7 days to submit opening statements for
the record, and we are going to recognize our first panel. We
have Mr. D.J. Gribbin, who is the Chief Counsel for the Federal
Highway Administration. Mr. Gribbin is accompanied by Mr.
Stanley Gee, the Administrator of the Massachusetts Division of
the Federal Highway Administration.
Joining Mr. Gribbin and Mr. Gee is the Inspector General of
the Department of Transportation, the Honorable Kenneth Mead,
whose office plays a vital role in promoting the effectiveness
of and preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in departmental
programs and initiatives.
And we are also pleased to have the Honorable Tom Reilly,
the attorney general for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who
has been tasked with leading the current cost recovery efforts.
We appreciate your being here, too, Mr. Attorney General.
It is the policy of this committee we swear everyone before
you testify. So if you could just rise with me and raise your
right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Your entire statements are in the record.
Mr. Gribbin, we will start with you and move straight on
down. And thank you, once again, for being with us up here.
STATEMENTS OF D.J. GRIBBIN, CHIEF COUNSEL, FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY GEE, ADMINISTRATOR,
MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION; KENNETH
MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; AND
TOM REILLY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
STATEMENT OF D.J. GRIBBIN
Mr. Gribbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members
of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to
testify today on issues concerning the Boston Central Artery/
Tunnel Project.
I have asked, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Stan Gee, who
is Federal Highways' Massachusetts Division Administrator, to
join me today. Stan is our point person on this project, and he
has been overseeing it since the year 2000.
The Central Artery/Tunnel Project is 96 percent complete,
and substantial completion is scheduled by October of this
year. This $14.6 billion project has been the largest, most
expensive, and most complex highway project in U.S. history.
This ambitious project will provide countless benefits to the
city of Boston in the way of enhancing safety, easing traffic
congestion, providing acres of open park land to city
residents, and reconnecting communities severed by the old
elevated highway.
In my time here today, I will touch on three issues--the
safety of the tunnel, the recent problems with leaks, and the
cost of the project. First, I wish to take this opportunity to
restate Federal Highways' conclusion that the Central Artery,
including the tunnels that are part of this project, is safe
for public travel. We will not compromise on safety. Safety is
the Department of Transportation's top priority, and I agree
with Mr. Capuano that we need to ensure that this project will
continue to be safe into the future.
Second, one of the most recent areas of concern with the
project involves water intruding into the tunnels. This water
is causing two types of leaks. The most serious of these leaks
occurred on September 15, 2004, when a slurry wall panel was
breached, allowing a substantial amount of water to enter into
the northbound tunnel of I-93 for a few hours.
In response to this incident, Federal Highway Administrator
Mary Peters requested an independent Federal highway
engineering assessment of all tunnel leaks. The Federal
Highways' tunnel leak assessment team issued its interim report
on March 23rd of this year.
The team reports that the project is appropriately
addressing the tunnel leaks. The September 15 breach appears to
be isolated to a discrete section of the tunnel and is
primarily the result of poor quality control during
construction. It is not a result of a defective design.
The contractor responsible for this section of the tunnel
has successfully installed an interim repair, has submitted a
design for a permanent fix, and has agreed that repairs will be
made at their expense, not at the public's.
The MTA is reviewing plans for the permanent repair, and
Federal Highways will approve plans for the repair once we are
satisfied that it provides for a structure that is sound,
durable, watertight, and relatively maintenance free. We will
also assess the degree to which the repair disrupts nearby
structures and the traveling public.
As a result of the September 15 breach, emphasis has been
placed on the second kind of leak in the tunnels. Federal
Highways' leak report noted that the project continues to
manage the tunnel leak sealing efforts in a very methodical
way. As of April 13 of this year, almost 1,100 leak sealings
have been performed, and it is estimated that the project is on
track to have all of the low-level leaks sealed by October.
Once again, the cost of this work is the responsibility of
the mainline tunnel contractors, not the taxpayers. Federal
Highways will continue to monitor these efforts, and will issue
a report upon completion of all repairs.
Finally, perhaps the most publicly criticized aspect of the
Central Artery/Tunnel Project has been its dramatic cost
escalation. Federal Highways has worked closely with Inspector
General Mead and his office to ensure Federal Highways'
oversight practices and procedures to avoid similar
occurrences. Together we have been able to create a framework
for major project oversight that will serve us well for the
remainder of this project and for future major projects.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify. I will be pleased to answer any
questions you may have at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gribbin follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mead.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH MEAD
Mr. Mead. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
this hearing today, and Congressmen Lynch and Capuano. This is
the most expensive public highway project in U.S. history,
actually. But it is extremely important to the Commonwealth, to
the entire northeast, indeed to U.S. interstate commerce.
I should say, as the chairman alluded to in his opening
remarks, that the lessons learned on this project have just had
a huge impact on the oversight approach of the Federal
Government, as well as on the highway bill that is now pending
before the Congress. And the lessons learned have already had a
very positive impact on major construction and other multi-
million dollar projects.
The chairman mentioned the Wilson Bridge, which crosses the
Potomac--Virginia, Maryland, and D.C. That project is
actually--I think it is a little bit under budget, it is
certainly on target, and that project--we are really all I
think very proud of the progress that project is making.
It has also been applied to--the lessons learned on the
Central Artery have also been applied to other projects like
the Sound Transit/Light Rail Project in Washington State. It is
the largest transit project in the country at this time.
Trentabono in Puerto Rico, and it will have impact on the other
major projects, such as the Bay Bridge Project in California,
which is experiencing some problems.
And I dare say it will probably have an impact on the
Chicago O'Hare Airport runway expansion program. So I think
this one will go down in history.
Our office has been reviewing this project since about
1991, well before my time. And we are now finding ourselves
reviewing the 2004 finance plan. We can't approve this plan,
though, until, among other things, they have in place a
credible time table to fix the leaks, know approximately how
much they will cost to fix, and who will pay.
The project's troubled history of delays and cost increases
is well known. The Central Artery was to be finished initially
in December 1998; the new completion date is September/October
2005. It is almost 7 years later. Their price tag moved from
$2.6 billion in the beginning to today's $14.6 billion, and
that estimate of $14.6 has been holding now for 2 or 3 years.
And I certainly hope it doesn't change.
Congress has, with respect to the Central Artery Project,
taken the unprecedented step of actually capping the amount of
money that the Federal Government would have going to it, and
it is for the reasons that Congressman Capuano alluded to.
Four months ago, our testimony to a State legislative
committee here in Boston detailed two kinds of leaks on the I-
93 tunnels. The taxpayers ought not to have to pay for the
repairs to these leaks, regardless of whether the project
manages to come in at $14.6 billion on the button or even under
$14.6 billion. The taxpayers should not have to pick up the tab
here.
Mr. Gribbin outlined the two types of leaks. One is the
slurry wall leak. This became a public concern last September
15 when a panel breached, and I think you had 300 gallons per
minute coming out of that, so that was a pretty big leak. That
breach was, as he pointed out, caused by a series of
construction errors.
Actually, those construction errors were documented when
the wall was built, but they were not corrected. Since then,
inspections have found a total of 102 defective or leaking
slurry wall tunnels. The numbers change daily, but this is--so
this is as of about April 1.
There is about 1,900 wall panels, to give you a frame of
reference, so 102 of them they found a problem with. Here is
the breakdown on the types of problems. Two of them need major
repairs, 33 of them need what I would call moderate repairs,
and 67 of them need only patching; 10 of them have been
repaired, but the Authority has not approved the repair yet.
So we have 400 of about 1,900 odd wall panels that still
need to be inspected. That is about 20 percent. So I would like
to see that get done.
Now, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority is going to have
to decide soon on how to repair the wall panels with the worst
defects. There are three suggested methods. One is to install a
steel plate over the hole, a second does the same thing, but
adds a reinforced concrete, and a third requires rebuilding the
wall.
The Authority faces the challenge of selecting one without
being perceived by the public as picking just the most
expedient method. I think that is very important, given this
entire affair. A permanent, lasting fix to the walls ought to
be the paramount concern, and obtaining the most cost-effective
one at this point I think is probably secondary.
The second type of leak is found up at the roof wall
joints, and these are worrisome because they have long-term
maintenance implications. The number changes constantly as the
leaks--as you seal one leak with the grout--I guess they are
called grout injections, you seal one and the water goes down
all over and you get two more leaks. And that is why you see
these numbers keep fluctuating so dramatically.
Last summer, for example, there were more than 700 roof
wall joint leaks. As of April 1, there were 662. More than
4,500 of the 9,000 odd roof wall joints still have to be
reinspected for leaks. All of the roof wall joints have been
inspected once, so now they are on the second round of
inspections, and we still have 4,500 to check out.
We don't know yet the full cost of repairing all of the
leaks. A consultant assessment of the cost is due next month, I
think in the middle of the month. And, again, the Authority has
said that its contractor is going to pay to fix the leaks. We
are not entirely confident of this.
According to the Authority, contractors have already been
paid $7 million for leak repairs, and they estimate they will
have to be paid--have to pay another $10 million. We are
concerned that the costs and payments related to leak and water
problems may significantly exceed the $17 million.
And these payments may actually go back further in time
than we thought. Certainly, they go back through all of 2004.
They may go back for several years prior to that as well.
Taxpayers may have already paid for some of them. Now these
costs, if already paid, will have to be recovered.
I would like to turn now to the cost recovery program. The
cost recovery program that we now have in place for the Artery
will be helpful in returning some leak-related payments to the
project. Maybe all of them. The previous efforts on cost
recovery here, though, have been anemic.
In December, we recommended that the State form a
bipartisan commission that was independent of the Authority to
investigate the leaks and that this Commission would work with
the attorney general. Well, the Commission wasn't recreated,
but the Authority recently transferred its cost recovery
program to the attorney general's office.
We see this as an improvement, as a positive step, because
it served to remove the program from their project management
structure, where it was hampered by all kinds of role
conflicts, especially with Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, who
was a partner of the Artery, who is responsible for quality
assurance and portions of the project design, and who has been
paid nearly $1.9 billion for its work.
So we know the attorney general, Mr. Reilly. We have talked
several times on the phone. I know he has his work cut out for
him, and we wish him the very best. But he has to not only look
at the cost recovery issue for the leaks; he has to look for
cost recovery for the entire project, for things that have
nothing to do with the leaks, but have to do with change orders
that have already been paid.
In fact, the cost of the leaks are only a modest portion of
the cost recovery effort. Let me give you a frame of reference.
Over the life of this project, there have been over $2 billion
in contract change orders. A significant portion of these are
claims by contractors for work they claim is beyond the scope
of the original contract, or for work that they did because
they felt they encountered significant problems that they had
not expected.
As of February 28 of this year, there were over 3,600
unresolved contractor's claims for over $400 million. That is a
large piece of change.
We are currently reviewing the 2004 finance plan, as I said
before. By law, we must determine whether that plan contains
reasonable estimates for cost schedules and funding sources,
before the Department decides whether to release I think it is
about $81 million remaining in Federal funds.
And we won't be in a position to do that until more
information is known about the extent of the leaks, which means
all of the inspections have to be done, and a cost has to be
attached to them. And we would like a reasonable estimate as to
what it is going to take to dispose of them.
And I think I would just like to close by starting out
where I began, to say that there have been some important
lessons learned in this project. The last project finance plan
we reviewed from the Central Artery, it is--I tell people as I
go around the country and speak that it was probably among the
best in the country.
I know the Wilson Bridge project used the improvements that
the Central Artery had made in its finance plan, and there has
been a lot of other lessons learned. And hopefully we can get
this project done, no more cost overruns, we can get the leaks
resolved, and move on.
And, again, thank you for holding the hearing, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from the Commonwealth's attorney general.
Mr. Reilly, thank you for being with us.
STATEMENT OF TOM REILLY
Mr. Reilly. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And Congressman Lynch
and Congressman Capuano, thank you for being here as well.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for your courtesy in
scheduling my testimony this afternoon. I have submitted
written testimony, so I will not repeat that at this point.
There are a couple of points I do want to pick up on.
Ken Mead is right; we do have our work cut out for us in
this endeavor in taking over cost recovery. Let me tell you why
we agreed or actually volunteered for this task. This
represents--and the importance all of you have noted--it is a
very important project. It represents an enormous investment on
the part of the Federal and State governments and to
transportation improvements, not just for the city of Boston
but also for this entire region.
But it is more than transportation. Any one of you that has
been over the Zakim-Bunker Hill Bridge realize it is a
magnificent structure, a wonderful introduction into a great
city. And it is my hope that we will get to a point where we
will all be proud of this project and appreciate what has been
done here.
But we are not there yet; there are serious problems. And
getting from the problems to the promise of a future of this
project is why we stepped in. There were suggestions at the
time of a commission; I did not agree with that approach. Cost
recovery is going to go one of two ways. It is either going to
be a negotiated settlement, or it is going to end up in
litigation. Commissions don't litigate; commissions really
don't negotiate. So we decided that we would step in.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I take this responsibility, and to
Congressmen and the Federal Government, I take this
responsibility very seriously. We want to demonstrate to you
that we can do the job that you expect of us, and we will try
and are committed to doing that.
Let me just bring you up to date very quickly as to where
we are. Currently, we are reviewing 134 issues for cost
recovery. The major ones--and Ken Mead spoke on the leak issues
in the I-93, and clearly there has been poor construction. But
our focus is not just on the construction companies; our focus
is on Bechtel. They were hired to do a particular job, in terms
of oversight, in terms of design. And our focus is on them.
There is a lot of focus and a lot of attention paid to the
slurry walls. We are equally concerned with the wall and the
roof joint with the continuing leaks. We are not confident with
the approach that has been taken in terms of grouting, filling
those leaks and those holes with--by grouting. You cannot--in
our estimation, you cannot grout your way out of this problem.
We are concerned that this may not be solvable in the--for
a permanent solution, and we may have on our hands a very long-
range maintenance problem for the project. And certainly we
will have to take some time to find out, if that is true, what
is the cost and who is going to pay.
Again, we believe that the responsibility, the ultimate
responsibility, is not with the taxpayer--the ultimate--the
Federal Government or the State government. The ultimate
responsibility lies Bechtel. Waterproofing is a major issue
throughout the project.
Again, Bechtel was responsible for the concept for the
entire project, and concerns have been raised about the choice
of materials and design of certain of the waterproofing
details. Again, we see that as the responsibility of Bechtel.
There is a serious matter involving the so-called Honeywell
contract, which is a communications system throughout the
project for alert to any problems in the systems. Again,
Bechtel has a role in this.
There are roadway problems with pavement, causing not only
regrinding but also repavement. That has been so-called--people
went through it in the early stages of so-called rollercoaster
effect. Again, we see that as the responsibility ultimately of
Bechtel.
Last, there are problems with the water treatment system on
Spectacle Island for the treatment of environmental waste. It
is not functioning properly. Again, we see ultimately the
responsibility--there is a lot of focus and a lot of
fingerpointing back and forth, but ultimately we see the
responsibility being with Bechtel.
In the end, our goal is to recover as much money as we can
for taxpayers, both Federal and State, and to make sure that
when all is said and done we got what we paid for.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here in
Boston.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reilly follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank all of you for being here,
and for the testimony, some of which is in the record and
wasn't discussed here.
Mr. Mead, let me start with you. You said we have 3,600
claims for change orders that came through, basically?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Now, when these change orders came
through, were they agreed to by whoever was administering the
project, or did they just decide to make the change and resolve
later who was going to pay for it and how it was going to--and
who was to blame?
Mr. Mead. All of the above. One of the problems with this
project is that things that are now in dispute as to whether or
not the Commonwealth ought to get money back that they already
paid many years ago. I think there was a haste to pay some of
these things, and now we still have a very large number
outstanding.
I would just--some of these things just went unattended for
many, many years, and now Attorney General Reilly has a task of
trying to recover the cost of these things.
Chairman Tom Davis. He has to pick up the pieces.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, you--Mr. Mead, you said it was
about $400 million in these change orders roughly.
Mr. Mead. There's $400 million, sir, just pending now that
still have to be resolved.
Chairman Tom Davis. Payment doesn't resolve it? The fact
that these people were paid doesn't resolve it, in other words.
There is----
Mr. Mead. Well, it----
Chairman Tom Davis. Was it paid under protest, or how did
that work?
Mr. Mead. Well, they would just pay it, and there would be
no protest. And now people are raising a protest, and saying,
``We never should have paid this. This was somebody else's
fault.''
Chairman Tom Davis. Can you elaborate on that, Mr.----
Mr. Reilly. Yes, this is a big----
Chairman Tom Davis. I have never heard of that before.
Mr. Reilly. Well, there is a lot of things we haven't heard
of before, and there is a lot of lessons to be learned.
Chairman Tom Davis. I was a government contracts attorney
for 20 years. I was a general counsel for a $1 billion company,
and we worked with the government a lot. And it was resolved or
you didn't get paid. That is the way it used to work with us.
Sometimes you would do the work, but they would hold the money
until--you are telling me they paid this up front and then are
trying to resolve it later?
Mr. Reilly. One of the big----
Chairman Tom Davis. Either one of you.
Mr. Reilly. One of the major problems here is that there
was no cost recovery for a period of 10 years. This should have
been done in a timely fashion.
Chairman Tom Davis. I understand.
Mr. Reilly. An ongoing fashion. Deal with the problem when
it comes up, and decide who is going to be paid and for what,
and some of the quality assurances. That wasn't done and----
Chairman Tom Davis. Who would make the decision to pay?
Would it have been Federal Highways? Would it have been the
State? Was it a low-level person? I mean, obviously you are
trying to get the mission accomplished. You have the bulldozers
out there, or the drillers, or whatever.
They say they need to get paid, but who would make the
decision to pay versus saying, ``Let us see if we should make
this change?'' I mean, at what level was that done? Was that
done Federal or State or--can you explain that to me?
Mr. Mead. I would say that first inside the Artery there is
a great deal of closeness between the Artery and its project
consultant, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff. It was almost a
partnership, and I think there was some failures there.
At the Federal level, I have to candidly say that I think
the Feds dropped the ball as well. There was very little
oversight. I think the Feds were thinking that there was a
great deal of oversight going on inside the project, and the
project was thinking everything is going fine. But the Federal
Government learned a lot of hard lessons from this, Mr. Davis.
Chairman Tom Davis. If the money is recovered at this
point, the money that is recovered, who does it go to? Does it
go to Federal Highways? Does it go to the State? Can somebody--
--
Mr. Reilly. Most of it--at least 60 cents on the dollar--
goes to the Federal Government. It is Federal money.
Chairman Tom Davis. It will be shared basically in
proportion----
Mr. Mead. It will be a shared project.
Mr. Reilly. In proportion with the investment that was made
in the project. Most of that money is Federal money, at least
60 cents on the dollar, maybe a bit more.
Mr. Mead. I think, though, that a lot of that money might
find its way back to the Commonwealth, because a lot of that
money came to the Commonwealth as part of its annual
apportionment.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. So it is Federal money. And
depending how it was apportioned, it could be returned to the
State.
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. Or to the Federal Government, or
whatever. But there is a lot on the table.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. General Reilly, do you have any idea
how much money is on the table at this point?
Mr. Reilly. At this point, there has been a lot of
speculation, a lot of numbers thrown out there. I am
uncomfortable with doing that. We have----
Chairman Tom Davis. You set an expectation level when you--
--
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. And we have given assurances, and
we will give assurances to you. This will be fact driven. We
will make decisions based upon facts. When we have numbers that
we believe we can prove in court, then we will inform--if you
want to be notified, and the Congressman wants to be notified--
and I know the Federal authorities, they will be----
Chairman Tom Davis. That is fine.
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. They will be notified when we have
hard numbers that we can back up.
Chairman Tom Davis. I guess the last question before my
time runs out--we may do a second round, because I think we all
have a lot of questions as we go through this. Is there a
statute of limitations problem with any of this, that money
might have been paid off in the past, it probably shouldn't
have been paid off, but the statute has run on our ability to
get it back?
Mr. Reilly. In some cases----
Chairman Tom Davis. That is a possibility.
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. There are problems. There are
problems with people being gone. It is with memories, it is
with documents, it is with statute of limitations.
Chairman Tom Davis. The usual.
Mr. Reilly. On the other end of it, we have just got to
work our way through those problems and get the best possible
result that we can. But if there is a lesson to be learned
here, cost recovery should have been taken on an on-time basis.
Chairman Tom Davis. Right. And I think you have heard the
Woodrow Wilson Bridge project is going along, because of some
of the mistakes made here. We are not replicating those
mistakes in other parts of the country. I think from the
committee's perspective, we would be interested as you move
through to see if there are statute issues, things that might
have fallen through because of timeliness and stuff, not to
basically point a finger at anybody, but just to understand
this. Historically, I think that is important for us moving
ahead.
But we appreciate your cooperation in this. I am going to
recognize Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman, if I might just, given your
background, I think you can relate to this point really
quickly. You asked Attorney General Reilly for, you know, does
he have a sense of what the magnitude of cost recovery would
be, and he I think quite properly----
Chairman Tom Davis. He said what I would have said.
Mr. Mead. Yes. And when I was a lawyer would say, too. But
you should know that up until a couple years ago, this is a
$14.6 billion project. The total amount of cost recovery up
until 2 years ago was roughly $30,000.
Chairman Tom Davis. There is a lot of money on the table. I
got you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mead. I hope so.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gribbin, I just wanted to followup very quickly with
you. You answered rather forthrightly that you thought the
tunnels were safe. When we heard from the two construction
experts--Mr. Lemley and Mr. Tamaro--at the State hearing, they
answered in a similar fashion, but they conditioned that
response by saying, ``The tunnels were safe for now.''
They also said that if proper maintenance were not--was not
conducted, and proper repairs not done in a timely fashion,
then an unfair--or an unsafe condition could arise. Do you--is
that condition unstated in your answer?
Mr. Gribbin. I mean, our answer would be, first, as part of
the September 15 incident, we created a leak assessment task
force that did the interim report that I mentioned in my
statement. At that point in time, our experts went through the
tunnel and found it to be safe. We will continue, however, to
monitor the leaks, to monitor the injections on the leaks, and
we will be doing a final report once the project is complete.
And this project is still under construction from our
standpoint. And so we will--this project is perfectly safe to
be used. I don't think we are going to project forward into the
future too far until we finish our report, which will be done
after the project is completed.
Mr. Lynch. Right. All I am saying is you have at least--
right now you have 102 flaws that they have noted, a couple of
them serious, 33 of them No. 2's as they say, moderate
deficiencies, and then 67 light ones. I am just concerned
about----
Mr. Gribbin. That is correct.
Mr. Lynch. And not only that, but the patch that is on E-
045, which is the burst panel, that is a temporary patch, so--I
am just concerned about the completeness of your answer,
whether or not you think that, if we don't have proper
maintenance and repairs in a timely fashion, that there could
be an unsafe condition that arises.
Mr. Gribbin. The assessment that we made was that the patch
was appropriate. It is a temporary patch, but clearly
appropriate to protect the integrity of that wall in the tunnel
until a permanent patch can be made. But why don't I let Stan,
since he is the engineer here, add to that answer.
Mr. Gee. Sure. To answer your question, Congressman, there
have not been any discoveries of additional breaches of the
type of September 15. So we are confident now that the tunnel
is safe. The temporary repair is holding. We have recommended
they go to a permanent repair as soon as they can.
For the long-term safety, we are recommending they do a
tunnel--they create a tunnel inspection program similar to what
we do for bridges. I think you are all familiar with the
National Bridge Inspection Program that requires a periodic
review of bridges. Well, we are going to institute--we have
recommended, and will follow through, that the tunnel create an
inspection program for the long-term safety.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Inspector General Mead, I want to say
how pleased I am with the work you have done on this, and you
have been very helpful. I do note in your report this--for the
record, ``The Impact of Water Leaks on the Central Artery/
Tunnel Project and Remaining Risks,'' by the Honorable Kenneth
Mead, Friday, April 22.
You note that in your inspection you originally testified
back in December that it was an open question whether the
September breach was a one-of-a-kind event or a harbinger of
systemic problems in the tunnel walls. And, however, based on
the results of the Authority's inspections to date, it is clear
in our opinion that the wall panels leaks are systemic and are
not centered in just one contractor's section, as was
originally suggested.
That failure occurred 5 years ago. I am sorry. The wall was
constructed 5 years ago. The defects sat latent 5 years ago.
For that 5 years, Bechtel had a responsibility to inspect. For
that whole 5 years, we never were informed of, even though they
had the information in their possession, they never informed
the public, and we never found out about this latent defect.
The fact that there is another 101 defective slurry wall
panels that have been found, and the problems are more
systemic, as you say, are there suggestions that you would make
in terms of the approach that should be taken in order to
guarantee the structural integrity of the tunnel? Not only in
the short term, but in the long term as well?
Mr. Mead. Well, I, too, have never had any question that
the tunnel is safe, and it has integrity, and it will be safe
for travel, and so forth. But I do think this leak situation,
and the magnitude of it, does need to be resolved. And, yes, I
do have a suggestion.
The first thing we need to do is we need to complete all
these inspections, both the slurry walls and the roof wall
joints. Then, we need to have a credible process for deciding
how to fix them. You can already hear in this hearing that
there is going to be some controversy about the fix. I think it
is incredibly important that the public perceive that the fix
is the right one.
Mr. Lynch. I just want to--just for the sake of this--
follow up on this question, sometimes a picture is worth 1,000
words. Leah, I don't know how you turn the lights down a little
bit. I just want to show you, a lot of people have seen the
flooding, the water on the street. But I want to go to Slide B2
if we could. These are pictures of the breach that occurred
back on September 15.
I don't know if you can see that very well. There is sort
of a waterfall thing going on there. That is the breach. And,
notably, I wanted to bring your attention to the clock on this.
This is midnight, basically, on September 16. This wall
breached between 2 and maybe 3 and 5 o'clock I think on the
15th.
So this has been running. This actually burst, let us see,
a number of hours, at least--let us see, I am not sure of my
timing on the original breach. I think it was 8 or 9 hours
previous to this picture being taken. So this is after the wall
panel was taken apart.
Based on what you see here, and I can only imagine what the
actual force of this spout of water out onto the interstate
highway, by the way, which was being used by traffic traveling
at, let us just say, 55 miles an hour. Do you have any sense on
the safety aspect of this, you know, given the fact that now
you have had an opportunity to see what the breach actually
involved?
Mr. Mead. Well, obviously, if you had a lot of breaches
like that, you would have a safety problem. I mean, you would
need a boat. But I think there is two walls--there is two
panels where we have defects that are classified as serious,
and there is 30 others, 30 odd others where I think the problem
is moderate. It needs to be fixed, so it doesn't become
serious.
Maybe you would like to speak to that.
Mr. Gee. Yes. You know, on that particular situation, the
State Police shut down the lane, so it wasn't a danger in terms
of traffic flooding. In that particular situation, they had it
sectioned off. There was one lane of traffic that was allowed
to pass through. When the water was emptied, it was restored to
full operation.
The other leak that goes all the way through the wall is
the size of a tennis ball. OK? It is no longer leaking. It has
actually been temporarily fixed. All of the other leaks that we
have do not--are indentations or gouges in the wall, and this
is a----
Mr. Lynch. Are inclusions--is that included as well?
Mr. Gee. Excuse me?
Mr. Lynch. Are there inclusions?
Mr. Gee. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Gee. Yes. The foreign material, like dirt or whatever,
that was mixed in----
Mr. Lynch. That fell into the slurry during construction.
Mr. Gee. Right. And when we poured the concrete, they
filled up the hole. My point is that those other ones don't go
all the way through. This wall is almost 4 feet thick. So the
other moderate defects--also, most of the--if many of the--let
us see, I think very few of these defects, the numbers you--are
wet, are actually leaking. These are defects that have foreign
material in there, but they are not leaking water.
The last point I wanted to make is that these--the moderate
ones, as the Inspector General has mentioned, these are defects
that have inclusions that may be more than a foot deep. OK? But
the wall is almost 4 feet. That is why I can say that there is
not a structural integrity problem; it is a quality control
issue as was pointed out.
Mr. Mead. Now, you know, we have 400 of these panels of
these--that still have to be inspected. And what is very
troubling about this whole matter is that they knew that there
was a problem, and it wasn't fixed. And that this happened so
many years ago, and now there is a second one. Plus, they found
these problems with almost 100 panels.
I would hope that this teaches us a lesson that there is
something broken in the quality assurance process. And I hope
that the remaining 400, when they get done with those
inspections, they don't--that it doesn't turn up other
problems.
Mr. Lynch. I am going to--I know I have taken more than my
time. My concern is this, Mr. Gee, and maybe you can address it
at a later time. These defects are latent, just like the--this
was a latent defect until it burst. These walls are 3\1/2\ feet
thick. We shouldn't have water spouting through a wall 3\1/2\
feet thick. We shouldn't have a hole the size of a tennis ball
through a wall 3\1/2\ feet thick.
And in my estimation, we shouldn't have traces of water
filtering through a concrete wall 3\1/2\ feet thick. And the
reason it was designed to be 3\1/2\ feet thick is we need that.
We need that thickness to retain the soil and the water
pressure behind it.
And all I am saying is that these inclusions that are
treated so lightly by many are actually, over the long term,
threatening the structural integrity of those panels, not of
the tunnel itself but of those lateral panels that are holding
back the soil.
OK. The last question I have--I know I am over----
Chairman Tom Davis. Can I just follow on to that? I will
give you your last question. You said they knew about this. I
mean, the contractor knew about this. Did State or Federal
inspectors know about this, too?
Mr. Mead. Well, it is not clear--it is----
Chairman Tom Davis. Or should they have known about it?
Mr. Mead. Oh, yes, they should have known about it. We also
know, though, sir, that Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, whose job
it was to do quality assurance, knew about it. But they did not
require its correction. And the paper trail that we traced
down, it ends at problem identification. And there is no
followup documentation that we were able to find.
Chairman Tom Davis. Why do you think that is?
Mr. Mead. I don't----
Chairman Tom Davis. Is there any possibility of collusion
here, that everybody is just so close here they are losing
things?
Mr. Mead. I think, at best, sloppiness.
Chairman Tom Davis. At best.
Mr. Mead. At best, it is sloppiness.
Chairman Tom Davis. It could be collusion.
Mr. Mead. Yes. And, you know, what the taxpayers want here
is they want a wall panel that meets the specifications that
were originally designed.
Chairman Tom Davis. So do the drivers.
Mr. Mead. And that is going to be tough to do now.
[Laughter.]
That is right. The drivers that have to go through there.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Lynch, one more question.
Mr. Lynch. Just one last piece, and we are going to let Mr.
Capuano finally say something. The inspections that we are
talking about here--and I know we have a technical panel coming
up behind us--but is this with non-destructive testing? Are we
doing pulse echo? What are we--is this just visual detection of
defects, or are we actually scanning these walls with, you
know, pulse echo or ultrasound or--how are we detecting these
panel defects so far?
Mr. Gribbin. I am going to volunteer Mr. Gee for that
question. [Laughter.]
Mr. Lynch. OK. That is a question for--that is called a
question for the next panel.
Mr. Gee. We are doing--all of those are being done now. The
initial screening is visual, OK, but when there is a question
of a defect, all of the methods that you describe, non-
destructive as well as actual picking away, is the inclusion of
the material, the foreign material is being done, too.
Mr. Lynch. But it requires some other indication before you
do that, right?
Mr. Gee. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. So you are not doing that with every single
panel in the tunnel. You are not going through with non-
destructive testing, making sure there is no flaw, no defect or
deficiency within the panel.
Mr. Gee. Yes. At this point in time, the inclusions are
obvious in terms of visually seeing those. OK? And if there is
a leak, obviously you will see a wet wall.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I am going to ask you precisely the question I
said I was going to. I know that some of you addressed it, but
I want to make sure I hear it again. Based on what you know
today, understanding that things can change tomorrow, but based
on what you know today, is the tunnel safe today?
And on the presumption, I would imagine, Mr. Gribbin, I had
heard before that you had suggested a national bridge-like
inspection for this tunnel, which will be the first tunnel in
America, if I understand, that would be on such an inspection.
And I hope and presume and will do everything I can to assist
you to make sure that gets enacted.
But on the presumption that ordinary maintenance and
everything gets done, which to me that is a presumption, that
every bridge I drive over has ordinary maintenance--on the
presumption that ordinary maintenance gets done, is there any
reason to suspect today that these tunnels will be unsafe in
the near or distant future? Mr. Gribbin.
Mr. Gribbin. There is no reason to believe that these
tunnels will be unsafe in the near or distant future. We have
had a good number of experts looking at this, and all of them
have concluded the same thing.
Mr. Capuano. And that today they are safe to your
knowledge?
Mr. Gribbin. That is correct.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. Gee.
Mr. Gee. Yes. I have nothing to add to that. That is true.
That is my opinion also.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. Mead.
Mr. Mead. Yes. As I said before, the structural integrity
of the tunnel I have no problems with. I think it is safe for
the traveling public. I do think, though, that a very
compelling case could be made that when you consider all the
circumstances here that every one of these wall panels ought to
be scanned.
It is going to cost some more money. But given what has
happened here, given that picture, given the fact that this was
a latent defect that nobody saw until, I mean, once the thing
was built, they identified the problem, did nothing, I want to
make sure that there is no others out there like that.
So I would go to the expense of scanning every one of the
panels in this tunnel before we put this to bed.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. Reilly. Congressman, my understanding is that the
tunnel is safe. But there is a bottom line here, and the bottom
line is that there is too much water coming into this tunnel,
far more water than anyone anticipated. We also know that in
the winter months there is more leakage than at other times of
the year. And, you know, the last time I checked, winter comes
every year here, and it comes harsher in some years than
others.
Now, with that water in the tunnel, at places it shouldn't
be and in amounts it shouldn't be, we have--there is a
maintenance problem, and in terms of driving conditions, yes,
it is not a good situation until we get to the bottom of this,
find out what is causing the leakage, what is causing the
water, and correct it.
So is it safe? Yes. But let us get to the bottom of it.
Mr. Capuano. But to your knowledge at the moment, the
tunnel is safe, and there is no reason to suspect----
Mr. Reilly. Oh, yes.
Mr. Capuano [continuing]. That it won't be safe for the
near future.
Mr. Reilly. What you have heard--and, again, I am not an
engineer, but all of the information I have had, it is
structurally sound, it is safe, but there is too much water
coming into that tunnel.
Mr. Capuano. Thank you. Mr. Inspector General, first of
all, I want to thank you for coming today. I also want to thank
you for the assistance you have given both in this project and
other projects with my office and me personally. And for those
of you who don't know, the Inspector General is a son of
Massachusetts. He is a proud product of us, and I am very
pleased that he is back home today for a little while.
Mr. Inspector General, in your written report, and I think
you also said in your comments, you had suggested an
independent commission for this, and I had agreed with you. And
I just want to know, in your perfect world, if you were the
emperor of the universe tomorrow, right this minute, would you
still stand by an independent commission?
Mr. Mead. I am very encouraged by the fact that Attorney
General Reilly has stepped up the Commonwealth to a place to
control. I ought to say, to begin with, why--we came up with
this idea of the independent commission. Why did we come up
with it? Well, I am not a real good student maybe of
Massachusetts politics.
But I did--I could see that the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, which is--has this huge project and isn't part of
your State Department of Transportation. First of all, that was
kind of unusual. And the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority had a
cost recovery effort set up inside itself, and I thought that
was kind of strange because the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority itself may have been some--may bear some of the
responsibility for the problems here.
In addition, their consultant, their partner, was the one
that the cost recovery effort, or a large part of it, was
directed against. We came up with the idea of the commission,
sir, because it seemed to us that it needed to be defanged of
politics. And it was our idea that, if you had a commission
that was bipartisan, they could work with the attorney general,
who is endowed with these enforcement powers, and proceed.
The decision was made that the attorney general, who has
the legal authority, who has the skill set in his office--and
we wish him well. I support the effort. We will continue to
coordinate. And we were just trying to break a log jam by
pushing the independent commission.
That is a long-winded way of saying I am not wedded to the
idea of an independent commission.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. Inspector General, I am a student of
Massachusetts politics. [Laughter.]
And I supported, and I still support, the concept of an
independent commission. But I want to make it clear, it is not
because of a lack of confidence in the attorney general or his
office. I think they do a great job of everything that I am
aware that they do. I think they will do a good job on this.
My concern is the future. Everybody in this room knows the
attorney general is more than likely to run for Governor, and I
wish him well. And everybody in this room knows that I thought
about running for Governor and decided that Washington needs me
more. [Laughter.]
So I don't--I am not trying to hide anything here, and I am
not trying to play footsies about it. My concern is in a couple
of months, or a year, or 2 years, whenever the attorney
general's office comes up with whatever findings they have on
any of these issues, it is going to be the middle of a
gubernatorial campaign.
At this very moment, I myself am personally aware of only--
I haven't done a whole full-blown research--two news articles
already where the Governor himself or his people have already
attacked the attorney general and his process when the attorney
general hasn't done anything yet except begin the process. He
has already been attacked on political--my opinion, politically
motivated purposes.
And my concern is exactly what you repeat throughout your
entire testimony, your written testimony, is the main aspect
here is to restore public confidence. And as a student of
Massachusetts, and probably international politics, when
politics is involved--and I am a politician, there is a place
and time for it--public confidence goes out the door.
And when the time comes, if the attorney general does
everything perfectly correctly, and comes up with the perfect
answer, no matter what he comes up with, it is going to be
subject to political second-guessing and headline-grabbing. So,
for me, I still support the independent commission, because I
want politics out of this once and for all.
Mr. Mead. Yes. I did think also--and I didn't say this in
my response--another thought that went through our minds on the
independent commission is what happens if it turns out that
cost recovery is not possible, given some of the factors that
Chairman Davis alluded to.
An independent commission, in our heads at the time, the--
that would have taken--it would have made it so that the
expectations of success wouldn't have carried a political
implication if it was bipartisan. And I still think it is a
very hard road on cost recovery. And you've waited many, many
years on some of the claims that are--Mr. Reilly is going to be
pursuing here.
And that is going to be a very hard road to tow. That is
why I say, Mr. Reilly, I wish him well. [Laughter.]
Mr. Capuano. Thank you. I see that my time is up. Thank you
very much.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Well, I am not a student of
Massachusetts politics, but I won my first election here to the
Freshman Council at Amherst College. I was elected that, and
then I was elected president of the Young Republicans and that
ended my career in politics in Massachusetts. [Laughter.]
Mr. Capuano. You should have stayed. You could have been
Governor. [Laughter.]
Chairman Tom Davis. I hope everybody works together on
this, regardless. Mr. Reilly, I am sure you will work with the
Governor's office. I mean, this is--this really rises above
politics at this point. There has been--so many bad things have
happened to this, whatever our views, we just need to pull
together.
But let me ask you this. Your MOU with the Turnpike
Authority ends in 2006, is that right?
Mr. Reilly. Yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. And this is all not likely to be
finished by that time. Obviously, you want to tie up as many
loose ends as you can. What is the strategy to tying up the
loose ends after that? Just to renew it?
Mr. Reilly. That is the end of my term, and I did not feel
that it was appropriate to bind anyone else. I have accepted
this responsibility. Someone else would decline it, and I
understand that.
Chairman Tom Davis. And obviously you would love to wrap it
up, but I doubt it. You know, if it happens, then--you don't
think there will be a problem in renewing, though, do you, with
whoever your successor is?
Mr. Reilly. No, I don't. But I should tell you what our
strategy is, and we have shared it with everyone. The
termination of the leaks and how we go about this and who pays
for it and who has responsibility in finding a solution is
going to go a long way.
We have indicated that if we get by that point, we are
willing to enter into negotiation for a global settlement for
all of the cost recovery efforts, if we get beyond that. If we
do not, the likelihood would be litigation, which would be
costly and very time-consuming. So, you know, I am not ruling
out that these matters can be resolved.
The reason we stepped up here is I think you need, I think
the American people need, the taxpayers need Massachusetts'
decisions. A decision in an office and someone that is willing
to accept responsibility for those decisions, and then what
will come will come, and we will accept that. But that is what
we are trying to be about.
We are trying to get into a point where we can make
decisions, good decisions, fact-based decisions. And I agree
with you that this is beyond politics. This is far beyond and
far too important for politics. It involves the future of this
State in terms of not just the immediate project but other
projects that are coming down the road. I take that
responsibility very seriously.
We will work in a bipartisan fashion, both the Federal and
State officials, and with the Governor's office. You want
results, and we are going to try to give you those results. And
then people can measure them at the end.
Chairman Tom Davis. Sure. Let me ask another question. The
individuals who approved the payments--I think, Mr. Mead, we
talked about how close everybody was up here. The contractors
were close to the people that were overseeing it, and how
really outside the box--how unusual it is for people to just
approve these change orders and not really get resolved who was
to blame and what was within the scope of work, and that kind
of thing.
We don't know yet if there is evidence of collusion. But is
it possible, as we look back at these payments that were
approved, is--if we find evidence of collusion or somebody
acting in an ultravirus way of approving things they shouldn't
have and money went out the door, that individuals could be
held responsible who were in basically the State or Federal
lines of authority?
Mr. Mead. Yes. This project has been remarkably scandal-
free from the standpoint of hard evidence of criminal activity
at least to date. I think that this project, when it started, a
lot of hard questions that should not--should have been asked
were not asked. A lot of change orders were approved, that had
the project been properly scoped to begin with, I don't think
they would have--I don't think they would have occurred.
I don't think the jury is in yet on whether--the extent
of--that we might find malfeasance on this project. You know,
the tail on this project of claims was--I mentioned the $400
million. That is going to take some time to resolve, long after
the project is complete.
Chairman Tom Davis. I understand. General Reilly, would you
agree? As you look at some of these--some of the approvals that
were given early on for these change orders, you are going to
be looking behind it. Are you going to be looking for evidence
that maybe people were--I don't want to say on the take, but
the closeness of the people involved in this, is that going to
be a factor as you look at this?
Mr. Reilly. Obviously, it will be a factor. But you have to
bear in mind the very structure of this project, the way it was
organized, integrated project management encouraged that type
of----
Chairman Tom Davis. Collegial.
Mr. Reilly. Now, people did not think this thing through
when they set up this structure, because now we are at the
point where we are allocating and determining accountability
and responsibility, and that is very difficult under the
organizational setup. And if there are lessons to be learned,
that is one of them. I am not sure you want to do this again on
a project of----
Chairman Tom Davis. Right.
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. Of this magnitude. But, again,
this is one of the things that we will have to deal with, but
that is a lesson that should be learned.
And the last thing, in terms of some of the liability
limitations, in terms of capping that, the insurance situation
in terms of the amount of insurance for a project of this
magnitude, it is totally unacceptable. And we will be speaking
to that down the road, and I am sure you are aware of it and
you will want further briefings. But there are a lot of lessons
to be learned.
Chairman Tom Davis. Was that partly Federal responsibility,
the fact that the insurance levels, the bonding was so low?
Mr. Reilly. Well, I think on both--you know, it is a shared
responsibility.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Reilly. But there are insurance problems in terms of
the amount; $50 million obviously is not sufficient. There is a
gap in that because of the failure of Reliant. That is a
problem. There are a lot of problems, but they need to be dealt
with.
Chairman Tom Davis. I understand.
Mr. Reilly. And we are going to try to do it.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Mead. And, you know, you asked about--this is not--this
is not something I would characterize as collusion. I know you
would be interested in this point. This project had an
insurance program where they would bill the Federal Government
for premiums, and it is an allowable expense under the Federal
law to pay the premiums, a certain percentage of them.
It turned out that after we were billed that the insurance
company would notify the project that the premium for the
period that we had paid for was not as high as had been billed.
That they had--and that was an annual review they would do of
the claims experience and they said, ``So the premium isn't as
high.''
And an arrangement was in place on this project where those
premiums were retained and put in a trust account where they
accrued interest. And the Federal Government was not aware of
this particular arrangement.
In effect, I think they had an insurance program in place
here where we were paying premiums for insurance billings, and
we should have been refunded a great deal of the money that was
kept in a trust account. That wasn't evidence of collusion, but
I think it was evidence of an impropriety.
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes. I am sure the attorney general
will look at that, among other things. Is that----
Mr. Reilly. We will take whatever information that is----
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. That we have, and then call it as
we see it at the end.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. My last question--Mr. Gee, with the
number of leaks and the type of leaks in a tunnel, with the
engineering issues of this complexity, is it about normal? Is
it more leaks than normal? Is it fewer leaks? I mean, how would
you take a look at how it is complied from an engineering
perspective and the construction basis, with what would be
expected? I am not talking about the cost overruns. I am just
talking about the performance.
Mr. Gee. Well, I guess that answered two parts. As we
talked about--the picture you saw here, we would not expect
that to happen. That is clearly a problem, and that was a--I
would characterize that as a construction defect.
Chairman Tom Davis. That is a good answer, yes.
Mr. Gee. A latent defect. [Laughter.]
But we do expect some type of water to get in. When you
build tunnels underwater, that is expected. The concern we
would have in the long term is that water doesn't lie there and
corrode the steel. That is when it becomes a problem.
Through our research, we have indicated--and we use as a
gauge about 1 gallon per minute per thousand feet of tunnel as
a rough estimate of the amount of water that we would expect
that wouldn't be a problem. But even that amount could be a
problem if it is left to corrode the steel. OK? So it is not
actually the number of leaks, but the amount of water that
could penetrate the tunnel and sit and allow it to corrode the
steel. That would be a concern.
Chairman Tom Davis. And what you are saying is today--you
think after you are through with everything you are going to
probably render a decision that the tunnel is safe. But we
don't want to be back here in 10 years looking at a $5 billion
repair bill because of things that have corroded and----
Mr. Gee. No. We would expect through a maintenance and
inspection program that any water that does come through would
be a minimal amount and would not cause any problems,
corrosion-wise or safety-wise.
Chairman Tom Davis. What are the maintenance costs for the
tunnel? Do you have any idea?
Mr. Gee. No. I really do not. That would be something that
I think the next panel, the Turnpike Authority----
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Gee [continuing]. Would be able to answer.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Just a followup, Mr. Gee. You said that you
thought that this tunnel was placed under the National Bridge
Inspection Program. Is it, or isn't it? I was told that it was
earlier, but----
Mr. Gee. No. What I--excuse me if I state something
incorrectly, or misstate. We are proposing to institute a
tunnel inspection program similar to our National Bridge
Inspection Program.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Gee. The bridges on this project are subject to the
bridge inspection program.
Mr. Lynch. Right. Right. But you were going to include the
tunnel----
Mr. Gee. Right.
Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Which is not necessarily required,
but under the circumstances is a good idea?
Mr. Gee. Right. Actually, the Turnpike Authority has been
proactive in helping us design such a program, because of the
complexity of this project and the scale of the project.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Thank you. Attorney General Reilly, can you
give us a snapshot on--I understand this is ongoing litigation,
so you can't really--I wouldn't want you to disclose anything
that might undermine your negotiating position with respect to
cost recovery cases that you took over from Judge Ginsburg.
And I understand that for the first 8 years of this
project--there was a cost recovery program instituted in 1994.
And up until 2002, it had recovered a total of $35,000, is that
what we are saying? $35,000?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. And we are at about--it was about----
Mr. Mead. I was $5,000 off before. Let me correct the
record. It was $35,000 not $30,000.
Mr. Lynch. All right. And we are up to--on a project at
that point that was $10.8 billion. So we had recovered $35,000.
And then, Judge Ginsburg came in under the directorship of
Mr. Amorello. Now you are taking the cases that were begun by
the Judge, and also you are handling any other aspect of
recovery that we might hope to succeed in.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Can you give us a--without, again,
divulging any sensitive information regarding the liability of
certain lawsuits, could you give us a snapshot of where we are
today?
Mr. Reilly. Yes. One lawsuit has been stayed that had to do
with financial management. That lawsuit has been stayed.
Mr. Lynch. Stayed on your part.
Mr. Reilly. Stayed on our part.
Mr. Lynch. In other words, you made a determination that it
was not viable and you pulled back.
Mr. Reilly. No. We made a determination to hold on that
case to see where the overall effort goes.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Reilly. There are other--some eight section design
lawsuits that are in effect. Those are going forward. I think
the first one is scheduled for trial later this year, but they
will proceed on a regular basis.
The strategy here is that we will either come to some
resolution on the leak situation, both short term and long
term, and allocate a dollar figure to that we believe is fair
to both the Federal Government and the State government and the
taxpayers, or this is headed for litigation, all of it,
including the potential for additional lawsuits.
But we are--we believe it is in everyone's interest to
resolve this matter if we can, but with no expense to any
taxpayers and to recover as much money as we can. What that
time table will be, I can't promise you that, but----
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. We would set a date on that,
except that we are--we are proceeding with the leaks as No. 1.
No. 2, we are setting up a structure for a global negotiation,
if we get beyond this point. If it goes that way, it will go
that way. If it doesn't, it is headed for litigation that will
be very costly, and it will be long term.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Well, that is in your hands, and it
would be overreaching on my part to suggest how you might do
it. But as an editorial comment, I would just like to say that
settlement, if it were to occur, or the litigation were to
occur, would depend greatly on the assessment of real damages
within the tunnel and how much water we have in there and the
prospective maintenance costs that we--the delta between what
we should have had with the tunnel as it was advertised and
what we end up with at the end of the day. That should be a
factor in those settlements.
And all I am saying is that there is a pretty good audit
going on right now, and I would just--my own--and, again, I
don't want to influence you, but I would not enter into any
negotiations with these folks until we get all of that
information.
And, you know, based on what I have seen so far and the
lack of willingness to negotiate in good faith, I would just
say, you hang tough, and we are with you. And we realize that
you didn't have to take on this case, and that you did it out
of a spirit of good government and protecting the taxpayer.
I have a bad feeling about this. I think that the numbers
that we are seeing here for--you know, just counting heads down
in that tunnel, the number of people that are fixing those--
that are plugging those holes, and the number of leaks we have,
and it didn't get any better this summer than it did last
winter, I just think we have a whale of a problem down there.
And I would just not want to settle short and then end up
with a huge bill later on behalf of the--you know, the
taxpayers of the Commonwealth.
Mr. Reilly. I am in total agreement with you, Congressman.
There will be no settlement, and there will be no detailed
negotiations until we get the information that we need to make
an assessment whether the problem has been fixed, to what
extent it has been fixed, whether there are long-term
maintenance, and what is that going to cost. And until we get
to that point, we are not going far.
We expect them to do the job that they were paid to do. And
until they do that--there is an old saying, if you broke it,
fix it.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Reilly. Fix it, and step up and take responsibility for
it, and pay for what you broke. And then we will move on. If we
don't get to that point, then there will be no negotiations.
Mr. Mead. Congressman Lynch, I would just like to
supplement----
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Mr. Mead [continuing]. Or amplify on something you said. In
my statement, you will notice that we stress some cautionary
notes about running to the bank with a $17 million estimate. I
think that when we first started hearing about----
Mr. Lynch. Now, let us--just for clarity, the $17 million
is regarding leak----
Mr. Mead. There was an earlier----
Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Patching or waterproofing, right?
Mr. Mead. Yes. And patching and--the early estimates were
that, well, $7 million had been paid to fix leaks, and
another--there might be another $10 million out there. And our
testimony deliberately expresses some cautionary notes on
taking that figure and running with it, and that is because, as
you know, we have been working with the Artery and the
Governor's office and the Federal Highway Administration to
have Deloitte & Touche do an audit of the costs. They are
reporting in mid-May.
Now, I think a lot of people with these leaks--their frame
of reference is somehow the month of September in 2004. But if
we all remember, in 1997, the Artery set up a task force called
the Waterproofing Task Force. There was a reason they did that
in 1997. By the year 2000, that task force was called--there
was a new task force, and this one was called the Leak Task
Force.
So we started out with a waterproofing one in 1997; in
2000/2001, we had a leak task force. So the costs associated
with this--the cautionary note I am raising here go back longer
in time than we had initially thought.
Mr. Lynch. Right. And, you know, I noted that in my notes,
that in the reports we are reading at some point in time--and I
am not sure what precipitated that--but the Waterproofing Task
Force became the Leak Task Force. And, you know, it begs the
question.
One thing I wanted to ask both of you, it seems that in
this long-term construction schedule--and this goes back--this
is about 16 years that it spanned where we have had people
actually on the site on this project. It was always my
understanding that, well, on the average project, usually the
completion of the job triggered the statute of limitations.
But I understand, now that you are explaining it to me,
that phases of this contract were completed years ago, and that
the statute of limitations was too old on some of these--some
of the aspects of this.
It would make sense, don't you think, for Congress to have
a special statute of limitations for work performed on long-
term construction projects like this? Say, that they would go
on beyond 8 years or 7 years, or some longer period of time
that would not be properly addressed by the normal statute of
limitations under contract law.
Mr. Reilly. A couple of things on the State side, and it
certainly is worth looking at on the Federal side. The State
statute of limitations has been extended for this project. We
expect that to be contested, and that is--that will be an
issue. But, you know, this business should have been taken care
of, and we are all dealing with something very late in the
game.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Reilly. And we shouldn't have to deal with the
situation we are dealing with. But the State--on the State
level, there is a State law that extended the statute of
limitations to allow us to proceed.
Mr. Lynch. All right.
Mr. Mead. I would have to get back to you on the statute of
limitations. But what was fundamentally wrong here is their
closeness. Any project of this size--in fact, even smaller
projects--there ought to be an independent part of the project
that is watching.
What you had here is you had a partnership between Bechtel/
Parsons Brinckerhoff and the Artery management. And now the
Commonwealth is trying to get recovery against Bechtel/Parsons
Brinckerhoff, who has been partners all these years with the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
So I think that you needed to have more checkers in place
from the beginning on all these change orders that we are now
going back and saying, ``Well, should we have paid these or
not?'' You should have had an apparatus in place then.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Mead. That is a lesson learned. I don't want to keep
coming back to the Wilson Bridge, but that is one of the things
that the Wilson Bridge started doing right from day one. Well,
not exactly from day one, but shortly after it got underway.
And I know it costs the taxpayers a little bit of money to have
some auditors around, but I think at the end of the day we will
be very happy that we did so.
Mr. Lynch. I agree. This integrated project organization,
the IPO, that is sort of the source of a lot of problems that
we are looking at today, under that--based on previous
testimony in some of the pre-conference--prehearing
conferences, it was Bechtel's responsibility to report to the
Turnpike Authority.
But since they were so close that in many ways that
reporting was internal, because their organizations were
blended. And there was no reporting to an independent--as you
describe, an independent agent on behalf of the taxpayer. And I
was mystified that there is no requirement that there be an
independent agent there that gets reports on a monthly or
biweekly basis, so that they can track the project on behalf of
the taxpayer, because that is who is ultimately paying the bill
here.
And I am just wondering if there is any office or any
structure that you are aware of that would allow us to provide
that parallel reporting requirement, so that it is not all in-
house. Either of you gentlemen.
Mr. Mead. Well, no, I am not aware of an explicit such
arrangement. I think perhaps there ought to be one. You do have
the Federal Highway Administration.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Mead. These people are getting taxpayer dollars. I
mean, they are getting a lot of money from the Federal
Government, and I don't think it is inappropriate to establish
some reporting line. And you can go back in history on this
project, and Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff knew and did go and
brief the head of the Central Artery about where the costs were
headed on this project.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Mead. And it sure would have been nice in--with the 20/
20 hindsight we have today, if Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff had
come to my office at that time, or come to the Federal Highway
Administration and said, ``This project is headed north to the
neighborhood of $13 or $14 billion.''
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Mead. But that did not happen.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, that is maybe something we can address
in the regs with the Federal Highway Administration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I would like to just pursue--I mean, one of
the--I am not an engineer, and I know that the next panel is
supposed to be a little bit more technically oriented, except
for Mr. Gee. But nonetheless, the engineering parts are one
thing, and that is what the attorney general is going to do
over the next several months or years, try and determine who is
responsible for what engineering issues.
In the final analysis, though, let us assume that you find
somebody is responsible for something. There has to be money on
the table, and there has to be money to get. And in my limited
experience, there is two places to go. No. 1 is holdbacks,
money that was not paid to the contractors pending whatever
negotiations you have. And No. 2 is to the surety bonds, which
every major contract is supposed to have. I don't know if it is
a regulation, but it certainly should have, never mind whether
it is required or not.
And I guess I have a couple of questions, and my guess is
that they would be addressed both to Mr. Mead and Mr. Reilly,
most importantly. Are you satisfied now that either there are
enough holdbacks on this general project to address, if not
every dollar, you know, the bulk of the--well, and I know that
some of these--much of these costs haven't been estimated. But
are you comfortable with the percentages?
As I understand it right now, the Federal Government is
just holding I think it is $81 million. That is 1 percent of
the Federal dollars. So, in my mind, I mean, my uneducated
mind, that is not enough. But it is what we have.
And as I understand it--and, again, I would like to be
corrected, I am not the insurance expert. But as I understand
it--and I think, Mr. Attorney General, you just mentioned it,
that Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff only has $50 million, with
$10 million not even necessarily there, probably more like $40
million worth of insurance on this issue.
And Modern Continental, which, first of all, doesn't exist
anymore, but the company that has taken them over, I guess as I
understand it, picked up their insurance, which is $252
million, but that $252 million, as I understand it, may be
subject to claims on Route 3, may be subject to claims in a
Long Island project that may take up the whole thing, and
probably other projects that Modern Continental is involved in.
And I guess, No. 1, are you satisfied that the numbers of
dollars that are available to settle these issues are there?
And, No. 2, are you looking at both the surety bonds, the other
contractors, not just Modern--that is the big one at the
moment--the subcontractors, the manufacturers--I mean, we have
items that were manufactured, both roofing materials that may
or may not come under scrutiny, some of the computer and some
of the software issues and some of the intelligent
transportation issues, etc.
And I guess for me, are you satisfied at the moment that
the money is there on the table? Subject to debate and
liability and lawsuits and negotiations, is it there for us to
get?
Mr. Reilly. I can't say that at this point. I can tell you
right now there are serious questions on the insurance, on the
amount of insurance, and there is a gap in that insurance
because of the failure of Reliant. And that is a problem.
In terms of what money will be available from what source,
we are currently exploring that. But I can't represent to you
right now that there is enough money that we are going--there
is money that is being withheld by the project. Whether or not
that will be--that will be enough in total to resolve these
claims, I can't tell you that right now. I can tell you that we
are looking at every source and every potential source.
And as I said, and as--there are bottom lines in all of
this, and, yes, there are problems with the setup and the IPO
and all of that. But we feel, and we feel very strongly, that
the ultimate responsibility here lies with Bechtel. And we
intend to hold Bechtel accountable, and they have represented
to the public that they are willing to accept responsibility
for what they did, and let us see.
Chairman Tom Davis. Will the gentleman yield? And I guess
the question is that if the bond money isn't there, or if the
money hasn't been held back, you can sue them directly,
correct?
Mr. Reilly. Pardon?
Chairman Tom Davis. You could sue them directly and ask for
the money back.
Mr. Reilly. Yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. You always have that option.
Mr. Reilly. Yes. Yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. And, of course, GSA or Federal Highways
or anybody else always has the threat of debarment. There are a
lot of--depending what you find, there are a lot of ways to get
the money. It is not as easy as if we had the bond, as I think
Mr. Capuano indicated. If you had the bond, or you were holding
money back, it is a lot easier. But----
Mr. Reilly. It is a lot easier.
Mr. Davis [continuing]. We are not without having some
remedies here.
Mr. Reilly. We have some remedies, and I believe very
strongly that it is----
Chairman Tom Davis. Good question, though.
Mr. Reilly [continuing]. In everyone's best interest to
step up here and accept responsibility for what they did and
pay for what needs to take place in terms of fixing this
problem. I believe that, and we will see. They made those
representations; we will see.
Mr. Mead. I concur with the attorney general. There is a
thing called a retainage, that the Artery does have some
retainage accounts for some of these contractors. Like Modern
Continental, there is a retainage account. My recollection is
that there is $15 or $20 million in it. But that probably--I
don't know how sufficient that is going to be.
I do not believe in the case of Bechtel/Parsons
Brinckerhoff that there is a retainage account. But the
chairman is right; I mean, there is any number of different
avenues for getting the money. The $81 million is what the feds
owe the Commonwealth. You know, it is just money that is owed
the Commonwealth. And by law, it will go to the Commonwealth
when they get their finance plan in order, which I hope is
soon.
Mr. Capuano. I hope so as well. I understand that there are
other routes to take, but we all know that those routes get
more difficult, particularly when you are dealing with the
largest general contractor, the one with the most questions, at
the moment is bankrupt.
And you are going to have to get in line, unless--I can't
imagine we have a priority here somewhere that I am--and,
again, I am not an expert in any of these things, but I am not
aware that we would have any priority ahead of any other debtor
or claimant against Modern Continental.
And if they are gone, that is my biggest concern. I mean,
that is why I asked about subcontractors and other contractors,
especially, as I understand it, this particular--the major
breach that we are talking about, the one that everybody likes
to show on TV, that was Modern Continental.
I understand they were the largest contractor on the
project, and that is why--that is the main reason I asked the
question is because, with them bankrupt, that adds a whole
other layer of serious questions as to whether we will ever get
the money, never mind the judgments.
Yes, Mr. Gee.
Mr. Gee. The only thing I would add is that on each
contract they have a surety bond. So if they default on one, it
might not affect the Route 3, because they have a separate bond
on Route 3.
Mr. Capuano. I understand. I guess maybe I wasn't clear,
but one of my concerns is, for the sake of discussion--again, I
am no expert, but it just strikes me that a $50 million--well,
it is not a surety bond, but a de facto surety bond, on
Bechtel/Parsons is pretty small for a company that made--
correct me if I am wrong--in the $2 billion range, which, fine,
if the project works, maybe they are entitled to $2 billion.
But if you have $2 billion--I know that if a guy were
building me a $2 billion house, I would want a little bit
higher insurance rate than $50 million. And if that is all that
is there, to me it is not whether they have it or not, it is
how much.
And I understand that the attorney general would be the one
hopefully that will pursue our interest to determine how much
is ours. But if he gets a settlement for--pick a number, $100
million--if it is there in the surety, we don't have to go
through the next rigmarole of trying to sue the individual
company that may or may not have bank accounts. Who knows
whether they are in Switzerland. I don't know any of those
things.
But we all know that if it is in a surety, it is a lot
easier. And I know I, for one, am tired of this whole dance,
and we all want it over. And when it gets time to get it over,
I don't want to have to go through another 10 years of chasing
the money. But I guess we are where we are, and that is why I
wanted to ask those questions.
Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Very good questions. Thank you all very
much. I think this has been very illuminating for us.
Mr. Lynch. May I ask one last question?
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Lynch wants the final question.
Mr. Lynch. You know, it just kind of stuck in my head, you
were describing--Inspector General Mead, you were describing
this transaction where the Authority was overcharged for
insurance, and they got a rebate back. They got the money from
the Federal Government, right?
Mr. Mead. I was----
Mr. Lynch. Paid their insurance.
Mr. Mead. Yes. The government----
Mr. Lynch. Then, the insurance company says to them, ``You
overpaid. Here is a chunk of money back.'' I don't know how
much money that was. They put it in a trust account, and then
you never said what they did with the money in the trust
account.
Mr. Mead. Right. In fact, they had this accounting
technique--I think it is an accounting gimmick--where the
actual cost of the Artery, say just hypothetically, was known
to be $10 billion. But if there was $800,000 of interest in
this account, they would deduct the $800,000 and say, ``Well,
the project is only really costing $9.2 million instead of $10
million.''
Mr. Lynch. So it was a setoff. They are using it that way
anyway.
Mr. Mead. Yes. I mean, and later on, as I think Bechtel/
Parsons Brinckerhoff notes in its testimony, they had to make
an accounting adjustment where they had to reflect the fact
that all of this money had accrued in this insurance trust.
Mr. Lynch. Any idea how much money we are talking here?
Mr. Mead. It might have been in the neighborhood of close
to $800,000 or $900,000--$800 or $900 million.
Mr. Lynch. $800 or $900 million?
Mr. Mead. It might have been in that neighborhood.
Mr. Lynch. You guys want to confer on that?
Mr. Mead. It is not there now.
Mr. Lynch. Right. No, no.
Mr. Mead. I mean, they fixed it.
Mr. Lynch. But----
Mr. Mead. But I do think that it resulted in a fairly large
accounting adjustment to reflect the change in the cost of the
Artery--it might have been in the neighborhood--my recollection
is it was around $1 billion.
Mr. Lynch. Around $1 billion.
OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, this panel, very much. It
has been very illuminating for the committee, and I appreciate
your time. We will take a 2-minute recess as we move to our
next panel.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. We have Chairman Matthew Amorello, who
is the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the entity charged
with overseeing the Big Dig. Thank you very much for being with
us. We have John MacDonald, chairman of the Board of Control
for Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the management consultant for
the project.
Mr. MacDonald, you are accompanied, I understand here, by
Mr. Morris Levy, the senior vice president at Parsons
Brinckerhoff, and Keith Sibley, the program manager for the
project. Thank you all for being with us.
And we also have Mr. George Tamaro, who is a partner at
Mueser Rutledge Consulting Engineers, and a former engineering
consultant for the Big Dig. Mr. Tamaro's extensive experience
in slurry wall technology and major infrastructure projects
provides valuable insight to this committee's oversight
efforts.
It is our policy we swear everybody in before you testify.
If you would rise with me, raise your right hands.
Let me just identify the people in the back row who may be
called on, so we can get your names on the record.
Mr. Swanson. Mike Swanson, chief of operations and chief
engineer for the Turnpike Authority.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Lewis. Michael Lewis, project director for the CA/T
project.
Ms. Breen. Marie Breen, CA/T chief counsel.
Mr. Wiley. Matt Wiley, former program manager.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Lancellotti. Tony Lancellotti, former engineering
manager.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you all for being with us.
Now I am going to swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Amorello, we will start with you. You have a key role
in this. If you need to take more than 5 minutes, we certainly
understand. But your entire testimony is in the record.
STATEMENTS OF MATTHEW J. AMORELLO, CHAIRMAN, MASSACHUSETTS
TURNPIKE AUTHORITY; JOHN MacDONALD, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF CONTROL,
BECHTEL/PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF, ACCOMPANIED BY MORRIS LEVY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF, INC., AND KEITH S.
SIBLEY, P.E., PROGRAM MANAGER, CENTRAL ARTERY/TUNNEL PROJECT,
BECHTEL/PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF; AND GEORGE J. TAMARO, PARTNER,
MUESER RUTLEDGE CONSULTING ENGINEERS
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW J. AMORELLO
Mr. Amorello. That is great, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have a brief opening statement. I would
like to read it into the record.
Chairman Tom Davis. That would be great. Thanks for being
with us.
Mr. Amorello. Mr. Chairman, welcome to Massachusetts.
Welcome home to Congressman Lynch and Congressman Capuano.
My name is Matthew Amorello, and I am the chairman of the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. I welcome this opportunity to
appear before you to discuss the current management of the
Central Artery/Tunnel Project and the steps we are taking to
ensure that this project fulfills its promise to the citizens,
taxpayers, and tollpayers of this region and the Nation.
My mission upon taking office a little over 3 years ago was
challenging, and I come here before you today to say that I
believe we have met those challenges and continue to meet them
on a daily basis. My first mission was to bring order and
stability to a demoralized and chaotic Turnpike Authority.
We have done that, and today's Turnpike Authority is a
well-organized, efficient, and highly motivated public
authority focused on delivering quality service to the people
of Massachusetts in a cost-effective manner. In fact, Moody's
Investor Service has said that the turnpike ``Board has shown
strong commitment to rebuilding the Authority's financial
position.''
My second mission was to maintain the costs of this project
and restore credibility to our financial management of the Big
Dig. Again, I am pleased to report that we have accomplished
these goals. This project, like all public projects, must be
conducted in a transparent and forthcoming manner. I have made
every effort since becoming chairman to ensure that our Federal
and State partners and overseers have received all of the
information they need, when they need it, in order to do their
jobs effectively.
The project's budget today is exactly the same as it was
when I took office--$14.625 billion. I think it might be useful
to briefly review where and how these funds were spent.
Approximately $6 billion was for the extension of the I-90
interstate, including the Ted Williams Tunnel and Four-Point
Channel Tunnel, which now connect the Massachusetts Turnpike
directly to Logan Airport and points north, diverting traffic
away from downtown Boston. This part of the project has
dramatically cut drive times to Logan and decreased traffic in
the central corridor.
Approximately $8 billion has been spent building the new
tunnel and ramps from Charlestown and Interstate 93 to the
Tobin Bridge and Route 1, the Zacamb Bridge, and the ramps
connecting Sturrow Drive and Interstate 93, and, of course, the
construction of the I-93 tunnels, which are still being
completed beneath the city.
This project has expanded capacity and eliminated a
dangerous choke point for the motorists traveling through the
city. It is expected to reduce carbon monoxide levels in the
metropolitan Boston area by 12 percent, and has removed the
elevated highway which for 50 years separated the city's
financial and historic centers from its waterfront and several
of its neighborhoods.
In addition to holding the budget, we have taken several
initiatives to protect this public investment, including the
first meaningful effort in the history of the project to
recover costs for design errors and omissions.
My third mission was to ensure that the project did not
lose sight of its primary objective--to replace the old,
ineffective highway network, which threatened to destroy
mobility and economic growth in the city and region, with a
modern, safe, and efficient interstate highway system for those
who live, work, or visit New England.
I am pleased to report that we have opened almost every
major component of this project to the public, who are now
enjoying the benefits of this important investment. In 2003, we
met three major milestones that marked the turning point toward
completion of this project--the opening of the extension of
Interstate 90, the opening of the Interstate 93 northbound and
southbound tunnels. The entire project will reach substantial
completion this fall.
I note these achievements, because I understand this
project is often in the news, and the news, as reported, is not
very encouraging. It is sometimes easy to forget all of the
positive steps we have taken over the past 3 years.
The significant strides that have been made to set this
project back on track, to keep faith with our Federal and State
stakeholders, and to deliver on the promise of an urban
interstate highway system, that when completed will be one of
the marvels of this Nation's long and sustained effort that
began with President Eisenhower over half a century ago,
creating a national highway network second to none in the
world.
As you came to this chamber today, you no doubt noticed
that the old elevated highway is gone. It is being replaced by
the Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway--a magnificent public
amenity above ground and a modern, efficient interstate highway
underground.
Let me now address two specific areas that are in the
forefront of our current project oversight efforts. The first
area concerns the issue related to leaks in the tunnels. The
second concerns our efforts to establish a meaningful program
for cost recovery.
With respect to the issue of tunnel leaks, the first thing
I need to emphasize is that the tunnels are operating well,
and, Congressman Capuano, they are safe. Earlier this month we
received a report from the Federal Highway Administration as
part of that agency's independent and ongoing oversight of the
project. Federal Highway affirmed what I have been consistently
saying; the tunnels are safe and structurally sound.
Slurry wall breach that occurred last September was an
unacceptable result of poor workmanship and failed project
oversight. The responsible parties are being held accountable
by the Turnpike Authority, and they are undertaking to repair
the slurry wall in an appropriate manner. After the September
breach, I ordered an inspection of each of the 2,000 slurry
wall panels in the I-93 tunnels, and I initiated a weekly
update on the inspections and the identified defects in order
to keep the public and our overseers informed.
This thorough investigation of the entire slurry wall
system was undertaken to ensure that any additional defects are
identified and corrected. At our insistence, each contractor to
date has taken responsibility for identified defects, and is
correcting those defects at their own expense.
The FHWA report notes the differences between slurry wall
defects and the various low-level leaks that are largely
attributable to the fact that this project is not yet complete.
Federal Highways' report states, ``The project is adequately
addressing the tunnel leaks. We have confidence in the plan
that is being followed by the Turnpike Authority and project
staff, and we can expect that the work will be completed as
offered by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.''
Based on some media reports, public perception has been
that the low-level leaks at the roof wall joints were
``discovered'' after the September 15 breach. This is false and
has unfortunately confused two very different issues. On the
evening news in the Boston area, we routinely see video of the
September 15 slurry wall breach and hear talk of hundreds of
leaks, leaving the impression that there were hundreds of
issues like the breach, which is not true.
As I have said, the two breaches and more minor slurry wall
defects are absolutely unacceptable, and the contractors must
fix them at their own expense. With respect to low-level leaks,
they are part of an ongoing construction, and contractors have
been sealing them, doing injection grouting for some 4 years.
The FHWA report's first finding states that chronic low-
level leaks were noted and expected to some degree due to the
depth of the tunnel, and the sealing of all leaks is expected
to be completed later this year.
I want each of you to be assured that I have insisted that
project staff and consultants spare no effort to ensure that
all water infiltration issues are identified and resolved to my
satisfaction and the satisfaction of the Federal Highway
Administration as promptly as possible. We are insisting upon a
high level of attention to detail and quality control, as
expected by FHWA, in the resolution of these issues. And we
will continue to be completely transparent with the public and
our Federal and State partners and overseers as we undertake
this work.
We are currently inspecting the entire tunnel system for
possible points of water infiltration, something that is part
of our historic ongoing inspection protocol. I have with me
today the project director, Michael Lewis; the turnpike's chief
engineer/chief operating officer, Michael Swanson; his deputy
chief engineer, Helmet Ernst; and John Christian, the technical
advisor to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority Board of
Directors, along with the project chief counsel, Marie Breen
and other turnpike senior staff, in order to respond to more
detailed questions that you may have on this subject.
There are many misunderstandings and false assumptions
associated with the number and nature of the leaks that we will
be happy to address in more detail.
The second area I would like to discuss today is our effort
to take meaningful steps toward cost recovery. When I became
chairman, the project had a weak record in recovering costs. I
moved quickly to correct that. First, I hired the National
Academy of Engineering from Washington to provide me with an
objective study and report on the overall status of the
project.
Next, I established an independent cost recovery team to
begin an unprecedented effort to identify areas ripe for cost
recovery and to take action. Led by a retired Massachusetts
Judge, this cost recovery team built a strong foundation for
this ongoing effort.
The team's work was fully supported by the Turnpike
Authority, and if I may quote from the team's final report to
the Federal Highway Administration, ``Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority Chairman Amorello created the independent team to
hold the design professionals and construction managers of the
Big Dig accountable for costs caused by their errors or
omissions. He backed us up with a substantial budget, which
gave us the ability to hire world-renowned engineers to assess
the work and uncover deficiencies, and to hire the legal
firepower to aggressively prosecute lawsuits.''
Today, those cost recovery efforts are being ably led by
our State's chief law enforcement officer, Attorney General Tom
Reilly. The transition from our cost recovery team to the
attorney general this February was the right thing to do, once
a proper foundation was laid.
I have come to recognize that with a project of this size
and notoriety, many will second-guess these efforts. But this
project needs cost recovery oversight by an individual and an
office of irrefutable independence with the clout to back up
their work. That is why it was so important to transfer the
responsibility for cost recovery to the attorney general.
I believe that Attorney General Reilly's leadership and
commitment will bear substantial fruit for the taxpayers and
restore public confidence and our efforts to ensure that we are
getting what we paid for. He has, and will continue to have,
our full cooperation with his ongoing efforts.
Like each of you, I am a public servant, and I take my
responsibilities very seriously. The work we do will be judged
in the short term by the motoring public, but it will also be
judged by the history and by our children and grandchildren.
I am keenly aware of the obligation to close out this
project in a way that ensures the delivery of a high-quality
product that captures full value for our public funding
agencies, and I am also aware of the generational
responsibility we have to ensure that this project is completed
to a standard that will stand the test of time.
I can assure you that we are working and will continue to
work day and night to fulfill our responsibilities in this
regard. We are here today to respond to any questions you may
have, and I thank you for the courtesy and allowing me this
opportunity to make an opening remark.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Amorello follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. MacDonald.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MacDONALD
Mr. MacDonald. Good afternoon. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the committee. I am John
MacDonald. And since mid-2001, I have been chairman of the
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff Joint Venture. With me, Morris
Levy, my fellow board member from Parsons Brinckerhoff, has
been with the board since its inception. And on my left, Keith
Sibley, who has been with the project since 1988, and has been
our project program manager since mid-2004.
In my written statement, I have addressed broad topics of
interest to this committee, including B/PB's responsibilities
as management consultant on the Big Dig, the history of project
costs, and our work with the State to accurately estimate and
control costs. For the next few minutes, I will focus on
leakage in the I-93 tunnels and the implications for project
quality, cost, and schedule.
As much as half of the water intrusion in the tunnels is
simply precipitation that enters through openings that remain
while construction continues. Part of the genius behind the
original concept of the Big Dig was allowing construction to
progress while keeping the Central Artery open to the huge
daily traffic flows.
And until construction ends and the tunnels are fully
sealed later this year, water will continue to enter down
uncovered traffic ramps and through manholes and utility
conduits. Even so, these tunnels already conform to industry
norms for water intrusion in completed tunnels. And when
construction is finished, the I-93 tunnels will surpass these
norms.
Only a small percentage of roof wall joints in the I-93
tunnel shows signs of low-level leaks. We and the MTA
understood that sealing such seeps would be a normal part of
the construction process, and that grouting is the industry
standard practice for sealing these leaks.
Today, 13 crews are injecting wet locations with high-tech
grout. The Federal Highway Administration reported this month
that the process for sealing seeps is effective and should be
continued through completion of construction in late September.
Construction contractors who built the tunnel sections
undertook the responsibility, as part of finishing their job.
They, and not the taxpayers, will pay for the cost of the
grouting program.
Last September an 8-inch hole opened in the I-93 northbound
tunnel, temporarily flooding two lanes of traffic and closing
one lane during rushhour before being plugged that evening.
This wall breach reached--resulted from a series of
construction contractor errors compounded by inadequate
oversight.
We inadvertently missed an opportunity to direct the
contractor to correct the specific wall problem earlier. We
have publicly acknowledged our responsibilities, and we will
pay our fair share of the costs of the permanent repair. We
have worked closely with the MTA and the contractor to identify
and analyze permanent repair options. A decision is pending by
the MTA.
We are also working vigorously to avert similar problems
through extensive physical inspection of the tunnel walls and
thorough review of our records. In fact, we have added
personnel at our own expense to expedite this process. The
inspection should be finished early next month, and repairs are
now underway.
As we knew from the start, and as Federal Highways recently
confirmed, all tunnels built below the water table experience
some seepage throughout their life, including other slurry
walls in Boston. After the I-93 tunnels are completed to
standards, future leakage will be controlled by the owner as
part of a normal maintenance program.
This program should cost well within industry norms, given
the tunnel's length and their extensive traffic management and
safety systems. We are confident that with normal care and
proper maintenance these tunnels will provide excellent service
to Boston into the next century.
In conclusion, our goal is to complete this project as
quickly and as efficiently as possible. Already this project
has delivered enormous benefits to the Boston area motorists
and reshaped the urban landscape of the city.
We and our dedicated employees are extremely proud to be
associated with this project, and having brought through
innovative engineering and management the most complex urban
project ever undertaken in the United States.
So, again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today,
and we look forward to responding to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. MacDonald follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. MacDonald, thank you very much.
Mr. Tamaro, thanks for being with us.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE J. TAMARO
Mr. Tamaro. Yes, thank you. I would reduce my presentation
a little bit in the interest of brevity for the committee.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Tamaro. Slurry wall construction is a particularly
useful technology for installation of underground walls for
both permanent and temporary construction. It is particularly
useful in urban environments and difficult ground conditions.
It, in my opinion, was particularly appropriate for the
construction of I-93 Central Artery and Tunnel, and perhaps was
the only technology available. Slurry wall construction--its
end product, by its very nature, is very rough textured, it is
an unfinished concrete wall, and the end product is even more
regular and could be more problematic if attempted by unskilled
contractors.
The slurry wall work is started from ground level. It is
carried down to predetermined depths. The work is done in the
blind from ground level, and it requires intuition and a good
deal of monitoring and testing of the process as it proceeds.
Slurry wall construction can be expected to have some flaws as
a result of this in the blind process.
These flaws are usually observed during the general
excavation when the walls provide temporary support for the
construction. Defects are usually repaired as the excavation is
carried downward, and should be completed prior to the
incorporation of the slurry wall and to the permanent
construction. This is the procedure that should have been
followed for the I-93 tunnel.
Of immediate concern with the I-93 tunnel are the problems
associated with a number of slurry wall panels. The area of
concern is the portion of the slurry wall exposed from the top
of the walkway to the underside of the roof, where a defect in
the slurry wall would permit flow of water and/or soil into the
tunnel.
The defects are primarily in the slurry wall concrete. The
steel beams that are the vertical spanning members are not
affected by the defects in the concrete that spans horizontally
from beam to beam. These structural concrete defects cannot
remain and must be repaired as uncovered. The portions of the
slurry wall above the roof and below the roadway are of no
concern and have essentially been abandoned.
Field inspection records for one slurry wall panel, E-045,
indicate that the panel was not constructed in accordance with
specifications, and, furthermore, the wall was not adequately
repaired during general excavation. This defective panel
remained stable until September 15, 2004, when the defect could
no longer resist the external water pressure.
The defect in the wall gave way and permitted the flow of
water and soil into the I-93 tunnel. The defect in the panel is
currently temporarily protected by wooden wedges, grout, and a
steel plate. Alternative permanent repair schemes are currently
under review.
As a result of the incident of September 15, the project
engineering team has inspected slurry walls, as we have heard.
Several major problems have been discovered, and a large number
of minor leaks have been identified. In addition, due to
defects in the slurry wall concrete there is a problem of
leakage at the contact between the roof--concrete roof and the
slurry wall. At several locations, water has flowed down--
flowed down the face of the wall and onto the roadway, where in
the winter there is an icing problem.
There is also potential for corrosion at the roof girder
connections. This is a long-term problem that has to be
attended, and we have heard discussions about the inspection
program that has to be undertaken. These connections are the
main support of the roof system and will require regular
inspection and maintenance throughout the life of the tunnel.
There is currently disagreement on the extent of the leaks
and whether the leaks will be permanently sealed at the
conclusion of construction. It is uncertain that a permanent
sealing of the tunnel roof joint will be fully achievable.
There has been a lot of discussion about quality, and I
would like to just make a comment--that there is an old adage
that states that quality will be long remembered after schedule
and the costs is forgotten. As a casual observer, I am forced
to conclude that there has been a tremendous amount of
potential cost overruns and schedule, and I am concerned that
it may have had its effect upon attention to quality.
It is now necessary that the project assure the public that
quality control issues have been addressed, and that they can
use the tunnel without concern for their safety. This is going
to take a bit of time to do. It will not happen overnight,
because there has been this constant droning of difficulties
associated with the tunnel.
Thank you very much for permitting me to testify. If you
have any questions, I am available to answer them.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tamaro follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. So, Mr. Tamaro, how safe is it going to
be?
Mr. Tamaro. That is a question I always hesitate to answer,
because----
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, you are the independent guy here.
I mean, you are the----
Mr. Tamaro. I am not really, because I am not working. I
have not been working on the project for about 2 months now. I
can only----
Chairman Tom Davis. How safe was it 2 months ago?
Mr. Tamaro. Two months ago, I saw nothing that was of
concern to me.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Tamaro. The safety question has--it is a difficult one
to answer, because there are other things that occur within the
tunnel that could cause concern to the public--the falling of
debris into the tunnel for an example, which is totally
unrelated to the question of the structure. The structure is
safe, in my opinion.
There may be some leaks occasionally. There are problems
that have to be addressed. I think that the structural safety
question is not there. But there can be other problems.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, from your work on other large-
scale projects, like the World Trade Center recovery efforts,
what are the major mistakes that we made here, and do you think
they are at least technically corrected?
Mr. Tamaro. I think one of the biggest problems is when you
have an integrated team, and you do not have someone who is
very aggressive for that issue that he is responsible for. For
example, quality control--the quality control issues begin to
take a second step or begin to take a second role.
My experience at the World Trade Center was that I was
responsible for schedule and costs for the construction of the
slurry wall and the quality of the work. The Engineering
Department felt that the schedule and costs may begin to take a
more important element in my thought process, and assigned an
independent engineering staff to oversee the quality control
that I was responsible for.
So I had a totally independent quality assurance group
overseeing what I was doing, and they had the authority to stop
the work at any time, if quality was being violated in any way.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. MacDonald, Federal Highways
rewarded your company with the Excellence in Highway Design
Award for the Ted Williams Tunnel portion of the project back
in 1996. And to my knowledge, there have not been leak issues
in that part of the project that we have seen in the I-93
tunnel.
In your opinion, what is the difference between those two?
Were the specifications and requirements for the I-93 tunnels
more difficult to complete? Or did we just have some oversight
issues?
Mr. MacDonald. I think there are two different types of
tunnel construction. I think the tunnels leak. The Ted Williams
Tunnel leaks, but it is within normal industry practice. And I
think we have with the--you know, with the high profile issue
that we had on I-93, there has obviously been a lot of
attention, a lot of media focus, a lot of other focus on the
slurry wall construction and the I-93 tunnels.
So I think that is the primary difference--a very high
profile, a very high----
Chairman Tom Davis. But the Williams Tunnel didn't have the
kind of leak that Mr. Lynch put up there in construction, to my
knowledge. I think that was----
Mr. MacDonald. I am going to refer that one to my
colleagues who were here at the time. Keith.
Mr. Sibley. Thanks very much, John.
As John said, the tunnels are two different types of
structures. The I-90 tunnel is what we call a cut and cover box
tunnel. That is, we excavated a deep trench in the ground, and
we cast a floor, walls, and roof, all of reinforced concrete.
As John described, we did have some leakage. There were cracks.
Certain joints----
Chairman Tom Davis. You always get leakages below water,
right? Don't you?
Mr. Sibley. That is correct. And the leak injection
program, very similar, slightly different materials that we are
using on I-93 was used there. I-93 is so different because it
has the slurry walls. The slurry walls are cast, as my
colleague Mr. Tamaro identified, in the blind, and you see what
you get as you then excavate out.
So it is a different character of a wall to start with, and
then the floor is joined to those, the roof is joined to those,
and it is a different detail.
Chairman Tom Davis. Nevertheless, the kind of leak we saw
here probably shouldn't have occurred, all things considered,
should it in a case like that?
Mr. Sibley. Oh, absolutely correct. I think that has been
clear, that the breach should not have happened.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. And the I-93 tunnel just--it is
more complex, because of the nature of the slurry. Is that fair
to say?
Mr. Sibley. Yes, correct.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Amorello, you state in your
testimony that the Authority has opened nearly every component
of the project to the public, who are enjoying the benefits of
the investment. At this point, the press has not been that good
on this issue. A lot of this predates your being there, in
terms of the cost overruns and everything else.
What are we doing at this point to keep this process open,
to keep the public informed, to try to restore that confidence,
you know, in the project in the future? And, you know, I am not
up here. I just catch this occasionally, but that one picture
is worth 1,000 words. And that hole in the I-93 tunnel
literally blew a hole in the reputation of the integrity of the
tunnel.
And I think we have had explanations today for what
happened, but what are we doing to make sure that doesn't
happen again, and to make sure that when this tunnel opens it--
when it is completely opened to the public, they are going to
be satisfied that it is safe?
Mr. Amorello. Mr. Chairman, I am as upset as every resident
of Massachusetts that event occurred on September 15. And it is
repeated almost nightly on the evening news, as I mentioned in
my testimony. The event was unique, as was mentioned in the
Federal Highway report. It was an isolated incident. It should
not have occurred.
The tunnel system that the public is driving on today is
safe for them to use. I wouldn't have authorized it, the chief
engineer or the Turnpike Authority wouldn't have signed off on
it, nor would Federal highway officials have signed off on
opening these roadways for the public to use.
We have taken every step to be transparent in the process
that we have started. Every last Thursday of the month we give
a project monthly update on the costs of the project, our
safety record, our employment record, the status of uses of
contingency, to keep the public fully informed in terms of some
of the discussions that were held by the earlier panel.
Lessons learned--I think clearly that was one of the most
important lessons that this project implemented after the 2000
price escalation was in the financial report submitted to
Washington every year to reassure our partners that this
price--this budget was real and the budget was holding. And for
the 3-years I have been chairman, that has been the case.
And at every--as I said, every last Thursday of the month,
we have a public meeting, open to the public, where project
officials come out and discuss the issue of the inspections.
Every Thursday of the week we provide an update on the status
of the inspections that we are carrying on.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask you this. I mean, I hear
everybody saying, you know, mistakes were made. OK? When did
the Authority become aware of the construction problems that
led to that breach?
Mr. Amorello. The Authority, in a 1999 memo to project
officials, was circulated with a cc to the public employee in
charge of that particular construction contract. It is my
understanding the field records indicated that these steps were
going back and forth between Bechtel/Parsons and the contractor
to repair the E-045 breach, and the understanding was that wall
was repaired.
The breach that occurred on the 15th, there was no
awareness on I think anyone's part immediately that breach
would--or should have occurred given that there was repair work
done at that site I believe in the year 2000. I could be--stand
to be corrected on the particular--that particular aspect, but
there was repair work that was conducted, obviously inadequate
repair work.
The breach blew out on the 15th, and turnpike officials,
Bechtel, and our contractors immediately stepped in to repair
it. And we are now in the process of evaluating the correct
method for repair. I brought on board John Christian, an MIT
engineer, geotechnical engineer, and a member of the National
Academy of Engineering, a Massachusetts resident, to advise and
consult me on the repair method.
We have also recently retained STS out of Chicago, Clyde
Baker who is also here today, to evaluate the repair method
that we put in place. Inspector General Mead was very clear
when he and I have had several meetings in the last many months
talking about the repair method that we put in place, and to
make sure the public is assured that we have done everything
possible to make this wall safe and secure for the longevity of
the tunnel system.
These engineering experts that we have brought on, along
with turnpike staff--Mike Lewis, Mike Swanson, and Helmet Ernst
from the public side--to review the final proposal for the
repair method.
Chairman Tom Davis. Right. And it is going to be a whole
series of inspections, obviously, before it is finally opened
to the public at that point.
Mr. Amorello. Correct.
Chairman Tom Davis. You never know what you will find, but
at this point there is--things seem to be on track.
Mr. Amorello. Correct.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. MacDonald, what do you think--can
we talk more specifically about what happened on that major
leak in September?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir, we can.
Chairman Tom Davis. What happened?
Mr. MacDonald. What happened? You go back to the
construction reports at the time that panel was poured. There
were several things identified on those construction reports
that should have signaled--well, they shouldn't have happened.
They should have stopped the work. That is No. 1. No. 2----
Chairman Tom Davis. Who was asleep at the switch? Was it
both--was it the State? Was it you all? Was it a subcontractor?
Was it a little bit everybody? Federal Highways?
Mr. MacDonald. It was the contractor and Bechtel/Parsons
Brinckerhoff. So that was mistake one, allowing the panel to be
poured with the deviations that were identified during the
construction process.
The report, then having identified those things, went up
the chain through the resident engineering process, and that
was the second opportunity to catch those things, that
something here was amiss. And a flag should have gone up, and
that should have resulted in a very focused, very specific
inspection of that panel as the Artery was excavated. That
didn't happen.
The contractor, then, self-reported the issue when it
discovered a leak, as when the wall was uncovered and water
intrusion came in, and brought it to our attention.
Chairman Tom Davis. Now, was this the evening of the big
leak?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, no.
Chairman Tom Davis. This was before this.
Mr. MacDonald. This was 3 years perhaps in advance of that.
Chairman Tom Davis. Oh, OK.
Mr. MacDonald. Construction was still underway. The
engineer responded, per procedure, to produce some non-
destructive examination of the defect, to get the full scope of
the defect, and then to submit a repair procedure based on
those findings. That never happened.
What appears to have happened is the contractor went away
and repaired it in an ad hoc manner. That should not have
happened. That whole series of things that led to that breach
should not have happened.
Chairman Tom Davis. Now, is that contractor still with the
project?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. Yes, he is. He is still working on the
project.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Has he been appropriately
reprimanded?
Mr. MacDonald. He has been that. He has also stepped up to
his responsibility for making the fix.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. All right. Those are my--I think
those are my questions.
I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Lynch--I have to
catch a plane back to Washington--to chair the meeting.
I want to thank all of you for being with us. I just want
to say this. You obviously have a serious responsibility, and
the media are all over this issue, and the public, and
everything else. You know, all of us I think have a joint
responsibility to make this thing work from here on out.
We will sort out the money downstream. The attorney general
is going to be looking into that, the IG, and who owes what.
But the safety of this project has to be a priority over the
next few months, and the--we can't compromise with that at all.
I think if you have any other episodes like you had on
September 15th, I think it is going to seriously jeopardize the
contractors in terms of future government contracts and the
like. So everybody understands what is at stake.
Parsons Brinckerhoff has--and Bechtel have great
reputations with the government traditionally. We have had a
couple of things go wrong here, but I just want to tell you how
serious this is. That this has reverberated not just throughout
Boston and Massachusetts, but throughout the Federal Government
as well.
So let us all work together and just make it work. And I
appreciate your attentiveness to this.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you for your
leadership on this, and I do want to say just one thing before
you leave--is that what I am looking for here among the
responsible parties, not necessarily to lay the blame at one
person's door, but to admit that there was a shared
responsibility here.
And how to make this right is to make sure that the people
who are obviously blameless here, the taxpayer and the people
who pay the tolls, are held harmless. That is the goal that I
have, and that is going to require the cooperation of you all
and all of the contractors and insurers and designers and
everybody else to step up and do the right thing here.
So that is--I just didn't want you to think that was
something I said after the chairman left. But that is my stated
objection--my stated objective here, and that is what I am
going to pursue. That is what I am going to pursue, and I know
the chairman is of like mind. So I just wanted to get that out
there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Lynch [presiding]. OK. Why don't I pick up right where
the Chairman left off. Mr. MacDonald, on most job sites that I
was on over 20 years--and I know it was different on this one--
concrete inspection was usually handled by--a firm would come
in independently and check the contractor's work, check the
quality of the concrete, and, you know, the performance
according to the specs.
In this case, from reading the documents, apparently you
had your own field engineers. Is that right? Bechtel had field
engineers go down and do their own inspection?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, we had field engineers do our own
inspection. I also think, on the concrete testing, we would
have had a subcontractor perform the inspection.
Mr. Lynch. Maybe you could explain that division of labor.
Mr. Sibley. Certainly. As John said, we have a field
engineer that is assigned to do the quality monitoring of that
work. First and foremost, the contractor has a quality control
program. Their engineer would identify the mixed designs that
they are using, would all be approved submittals before they
start. They would do a checklist that everything is ready, and
they would submit that to us for verification as part of the
assurance step.
Our field engineer would perform those assurances, also
sign off on the checklist during the concrete placement. The
project has a certified laboratory. The laboratory has been
certified in accordance with ACI and the governing standards.
We would have a person come onsite, do in-place testing such as
air content slump, that sort of thing, do some monitoring of
the actual placement, and then we would break the cylinders,
and so forth, to verify strength later.
So it was a double effort of assurance, with our field
engineer at the point of placement and with the laboratory
checking the materials. The contractor is quality controlled,
and they are actually performing the placement and verifying
they are doing it correctly.
Mr. Lynch. OK. At some point--so that is--the concrete
coming out of the truck, if you are pouring it out of a truck,
is inspected by the contractor. You have somebody there that is
going to the lab and all of that.
But after the pour, maybe we could go to--just to kind of
make sure everybody is following along here--I think it is A1
or--I think it is the first slide. This is the excavating
machine for the slurry wall, is that correct?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Lynch. OK. And that clamshell bucket is digging that
trench in between the soldier piles, is that correct? Is that--
--
Mr. MacDonald. The soldier piles are not installed at
this--well, I can't tell if they are installed at this----
Mr. Lynch. Yes, I can't either, to tell you the truth.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. In any event, after the pour, after the pour is
complete, and you wait a certain amount of time for the
concrete to set up, and then you begin excavation. Whose
responsibility--was it the contractor or was it Bechtel's
engineer--to go down and just inspect the face of the wall for
any voids or inclusions or any defects that were visible to the
naked eye?
Obviously, somebody had to have the responsibility for
going down and checking the work after the excavation.
Mr. MacDonald. First of all, the excavation takes place
some time later.
Mr. Lynch. Right. Much later.
Mr. MacDonald. So it is much later when that opportunity is
available to it. It is the contractor's responsibility to check
his own work under the quality control process that is set up
for the project. It was our responsibility to assure that work
by a layer of auditing of the contractor's process to make sure
that he had accomplished that.
Mr. Lynch. OK. So it was theirs initially, and then, if I
am understanding correctly, you followup.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. You assure that they have done that. OK. And my
concern is that, 5 years after they poured the section that we
had the breach in, for 5 years that wasn't the--I mean, what is
the date on which that section of wall was excavated? That had
to be 1999 or----
Mr. MacDonald. If I may, I would like to turn that over to
Keith to answer. He is more fluent with the facts on the panel.
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Mr. Sibley. You are right with the date of the placement.
The excavation would have been in mid-2000. I don't have those
precise dates. I would be happy to get a specific answer and
provide that for the record at a later time, but I don't have
the exact date when that was excavated.
Mr. Lynch. Yes, OK.
Mr. Sibley. It would have been done in stages. This is
among the very deepest part of the job. The particular
excavation that Modern conducted here was working north to
south, and they worked toward a bulkhead from the adjacent
contractor to the south. This would have been toward the end of
their excavation.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Sibley. But I can get you that date.
Mr. Lynch. I do have some notes here about--that the
engineer's report indicated on April 2 that the slurry was
deficient. Now, that is not the concrete, but that the slurry
was deficient and did not meet standards, did not meet specs.
But I assume that it was some time after that you actually did
excavation, so it was after April 2, 1999. Would that be----
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, that is correct. The slurry report
refers to the--I believe it is the----
Mr. Lynch. The pour date?
Mr. MacDonald. It is before the pour date actually.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. MacDonald. Shortly before?
Mr. Sibley. Yes.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. OK. That is fair enough. I just want to--you
know, what mystifies me is that it was somebody's job to go
down there and inspect the face of that slurry wall, not just
to walk by it but to actually go down and inspect that, the
entire length of that wall.
And, you know, we have a list now of 102 spots, 102 problem
areas on the slurry walls, and there are still 400 panels that
have yet to be inspected. And a considerable amount of time
here--5 years went by--and if this hadn't burst, this would all
be buried, if this panel hadn't been burst. It just--it
troubles me greatly, the lack of quality assurance and quality
control on this project with respect to these panels, I have to
tell you.
And I am hearing that there are wet patches and there are
inclusions, and, you know, why don't we--Leah, if you have a
second, I just want to run through--maybe we can dim the lights
again. These are some--well, actually, why don't we go to--why
don't we run through all of them.
There aren't a whole lot of them, but I am just going to
note some of--now, the reason I included this is I understand
this process--this is--they are removing the panel so they can
get at the wall behind it, right? And this is--this is part of
the repair project. It looks like September 15, so this would
have been the major breach.
The cost must be prohibitive to keep removing those panels
and going back behind there. I don't know if something can be
done to reduce the cost of these continual repairs that we are
doing in these areas, but it is something you ought to think
about.
All right. Next slide. Again, that is the waterfall. That
is--we have seen that already.
Go ahead. Next, please. This is another shot of the same
breach that occurred on September 15.
We can go to the next one, please. I was a little surprised
at this. This is apparently the method, the temporary patch
that was used. I understand it is just temporary, so I guess I
am not as concerned. But driving oak wedges in there to try to
stop this.
Go to the next--there is another shot of the oak wedges
they are using to stop the flow of water. You know, it just
appears to be a Mickey Mouse situation. I don't know, guys.
But go ahead. Go with the next one. This is, again, I guess
there is some grouting going along in the area as well as the
oak patch, the oak plug, rather.
Please, again, Leah. And I understand that this is, again,
a temporary patch. That shows the metal plate going on over the
wooden form there, which I guess is bolted to the soldier pile.
But, again, I guess I am not as concerned now that I know it is
just a temporary patch, and something more permanent is going
to be put in place.
The next one, please, Leah. And this just shows that--let
us see, this is September 21, so this is a week later. This is
the patch that they just put on, and there is a stream of
water, and it looks like maybe some of the--some of the
grouting is actually coming back out.
Next one, please. This is a void at the base of a soldier
pile. It, you know, could create tremendous problems.
Next one, please. These are all different areas here. As I
am told, that is actually a hammer that--in the middle of the
picture there, there is a hammer that fell down into the pour.
And there is a huge void at the bottom, and they explained to
me that the void is filled with paste and soil that was still
soft when probed to 16 inches. So these are--these are deep and
significant inclusions and voids within the slurry wall.
Next one, please, Leah. This is a--there is not--that is
actually just to demonstrate. That is a trowel that was placed
in the wall just to show how soft the material was. This is a
clay inclusion in the--clay and soil inclusion of unsound
material, and it states that a 6-inch tool can be inserted to
its full depth. So that concerns me greatly.
Next one, please. This is all exposed rebar along the
slurry wall. No coverage there. This must be the area around
the Federal Reserve Bank. As I understand, that is the only
area that has rebar in it. But, again, there is no coverage. It
is exposed to water, and it concerns me as well.
Next one, please, Leah. Now, this is the roof joint. This
is one of the roof joints. Mike Capuano and I actually last
February did the walkthrough there, and we saw the work going
on. But I have to tell you, and I know you are going to say
that, you know, we haven't buttoned it all up yet, but in the
meantime, you know, we already have the oxidization of a lot of
these structure members, and I am just very concerned about it.
Next one, please, Leah. That is the last one.
I just want to read to you. This is contract language for
the I-93 mainline tunnel. And it states that--this is a
technical spec relating to water tightness of slurry walls. It
states that, ``Slurry walls shall be watertight, defined as
free of all seeping water leaks. Moist patches shall be
considered acceptable for slurry wall construction.''
``B) Repair of leaks shall be in accordance with Section
727.915, which says that simple surface patching, or shallow
injection, shall not be allowed.'' And the contractor--this is
what gets me. It says, ``The contractor shall inspect for water
tightness of all slurry walls on a monthly basis, starting
within 2 weeks after the first exposure of the wall panels
during excavation.''
This is what brings me back to April 2 or some time in
1999, some time thereafter. And starting within 2 weeks--so it
will be on a monthly basis, starting within 2 weeks and
continuing until final acceptance. The inspection reports shall
be submitted to the engineer--I assume that is Bechtel--within
1 week following inspection.
So it is not that we missed a couple of opportunities to
pick this up. It is--you know, if you--if it should be monthly
for 5 years, we missed 60 opportunities--60 opportunities to
pick this up under quality control and quality assurance. And
that troubles me greatly. Somebody just mailed it in on this.
No one was out there protecting the taxpayers' interest.
Mr. Tamaro.
Mr. Tamaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Could you tell me, now, I was an iron worker for
about 20 years, did some heavy highway work and bridges, and
all of that. But you are a lot smarter than I am; I promise
you.
The level of water tightness--now, first of all, this
tunnel, what did we buy here in terms of the U.S. taxpayer and
the Massachusetts taxpayer? How long is this tunnel supposed to
be in service? What is a reasonable expectation?
Mr. Tamaro. It should last 70 to 100 years. It shouldn't be
a problem.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Tamaro. With regard to the water tightness, I would
like to just kind of bifurcate the question.
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Mr. Tamaro. There are two elements in the water tightness.
One is the wall itself, and it has been my experience that you
can get these slurry walls very watertight except for
occasional flaws. And then, during construction, once they are
exposed, you go back and you fix the flaws. Once they are
fixed, they should not have running water down the face of the
wall. That has been my experience on most of the walls I have
worked on.
Mr. Lynch. And if I could ask you, the fact that these are
42 inches thick, that is a fairly thick slurry wall in my
estimation. I don't know, maybe that is--maybe you are used to
that, but 42 inches of concrete would seem to be fairly
impervious to water seepage.
Mr. Tamaro. It is more a matter of the installation
procedure rather than the thickness. A very thin, properly
executed wall can be more watertight than a thicker wall that
has not been done with the same level of care. So the thickness
is kind of irrelevant. The concrete is usually, if it is put in
correctly, it is water tight. And it is only the jointing and
the construction aspects of it that can really create the leak.
Mr. Lynch. Well, based on the spec I just read, do you
believe that these specs have been met on this project based on
what you have seen down there?
Mr. Tamaro. The panel E-045 is a clear example that it did
not meet that specification.
Mr. Lynch. And what about all of the others where there is
water coming through and voids and----
Mr. Tamaro. Panels that contain inclusions of material,
soil-like material or defective concrete, are just not
acceptable. They do not meet the specification.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Let me ask you about--now, if you say the
reasonable expectations of a life span for this tunnel is 75 to
100 years. What effect does continual play of water on the
structural members, whether it be seeping through the slurry
walls and, acting on soldier piles or inducing some type of
breach because of the inclusion in the wall, or the roof joint
that you mentioned could be a lifelong problem in this tunnel,
what does that have--what effect does that water play on these
structural members have on the overall life of the tunnel that
we bought?
Mr. Tamaro. That was kind of why I bifurcated the question.
The slurry wall concrete itself should not be significantly
affected by seepage. The loss of soil from behind the wall can
be a problem, but the concrete itself should not be
deteriorated if it is there and it is sound.
The steel beams should not be affected by corrosion. The
slurry wall soldier beam should not be affected by corrosion as
long as--the majority of them is buried in the concrete or
outside, so, therefore, it is not exposed to oxygen. The inside
face could corrode, and I have seen most of these eventually
stabilize themselves with a little bit of build up of rust, and
you don't have a major corrosion problem with the soldier
beams.
The real concern is the roof connection where your whole
street structure is resting on that connection, and that
connection is exposed to water that is seeping in through the
roof wall joint. And that is the critical element. It is not an
immediate problem; it requires resolution.
Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. Thank you. I want to turn it over
to Congressman Capuano for a while.
Mr. Capuano. Thanks, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. MacDonald, you had both written and oral testimony. In
the written testimony--if I remember correctly, it was on page
11--there was something along the lines of--you are talking
about the wall panel repairs, and there is a written statement
here that they will all be repaired at no cost to the public or
to the project. Do you stand by that written comment?
Mr. MacDonald. I stand by that statement. Yes, I do.
Mr. Capuano. OK. And during your oral testimony, if I heard
you right, and I would like to clarify it, I believe I heard
you say, in talking about the--because, again, we have two
different types of leaks. In your written testimony, I don't
recall that you addressed the roof and wall joints, but I
believe I--and, again, correct me if I am wrong--I thought I
heard you in your oral testimony say that when it came to the
grouting program there will be no cost to the taxpayers. Did I
hear you correctly?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. Yes. I think the grouting--the grouting
of the roof is--we are still in construction. We are not done.
And when we are done, we firmly believe that we are going to
meet the specifications for this--for the roof wall joint. We
believe it is the responsibility of the contractors to achieve
that under the specifications that are in there.
And if I may just comment on the picture that you showed of
that joint--and I fully agree with Mr. Tamaro that it is
critical that we don't get corrosion in there, and we are not
seeing signs of any significant corrosion in these girder beams
that you see in the roof base. What you saw in that photo was
algae. It wasn't rust. So I just want to be clear about that.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. MacDonald, your company--both the
companies have been involved with the construction, I am sure,
of many tunnels of different types and different locations and
different depths, and all around the world is my estimation.
Have you ever been involved with a tunnnel that didn't have
leaks?
Mr. MacDonald. No, sir. All tunnels leak.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. Tamaro, have you ever been involved with a
tunnel or any other similar aspect that doesn't have leaks?
Mr. Tamaro. I have been involved with tunnels that do have
leaks, and they are processed for collecting water.
Mr. Capuano. But have you ever had any one that doesn't
have a leak?
Mr. Tamaro. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Capuano. One that is below the water table?
Mr. Tamaro. Yes.
Mr. Capuano. Where was that?
Mr. Tamaro. Puerto Rico, the Minnia Tunnel.
Mr. Capuano. And there is no leaks in that tunnel today?
Mr. Tamaro. There are no leaks in the tunnel.
Mr. Capuano. Good.
Mr. Tamaro. To my knowledge.
Mr. Capuano. To my knowledge?
Mr. Tamaro. To the last of my knowledge.
Mr. Capuano. All right. Fair answer, because I was under
the impression that there were no tunnels anywhere that don't
have leaks. But that is a very interesting comment, because I
will go check that now, just because you have piqued my
interest. That is good to me. I mean, that changes some of my
opinions of tunnel construction.
I guess I am going to ask all of you the same question I
have asked before, and I think most of you have addressed it,
but I am going to ask it again, nonetheless, to be clear. To
the best of your knowledge as of today, is the tunnel, all of
the tunnels, are they safe? And to the best of your knowledge
today, is there any reason not to believe that they will not
continue to be safe in the future on the presumption that they
get ordinary and adequate maintenance programs. Mr. Amorello.
Mr. Amorello. Yes, and no to the second question.
Mr. Capuano. Mr. MacDonald.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, the tunnels are safe. The tunnels will
continue to be safe long into the next century.
Mr. Capuano. OK. Mr. Tamaro, I know that you have said
earlier that you haven't been involved with the tunnel directly
for the last several months. But as of the last time you knew
it, was there any reason to think that the tunnel wasn't safe
then?
Mr. Tamaro. I found nothing that would make me say that it
was unsafe.
Mr. Capuano. Fine. Thank you.
Mr. Amorello, Mr. Mead, who was up earlier--I know that you
are working with Mr. Gee and others relative to putting the
tunnels under a new comparable program to the bridge inspection
program.
Mr. Gee was very clear, which I knew before, but he said
it--publicly stated it here that your agency has been very
cooperative in trying to come up--since you will be the first
tunnel in the history of the country, if I understand it
correctly, to subject itself to this kind of inspection
process, you are breaking new ground, and he suggests that you
are being very cooperative in that. And I congratulate you for
that, and I hope you have great success and lead the way for
the rest of the country to follow.
But Mr. Mead here also suggested, with some of the
questions that are involved relative to the inspections of
these panels, he clearly suggested that each and every one of
these panels be subjected to a full inspection. I think Mr.
Lynch asked earlier--and I am no--I have no clue what is
involved with inspecting these, but Mr. Lynch suggested--and I
am sure he is right--that there is visual inspection, there is
hand inspection, there is sonar inspection, there is--I am sure
there is all kinds of methods that I have no clue what they are
all about.
But Mr. Mead was very clear in stating that he believes
that each and every one of these sections should be inspected
to the best of our technical ability. First of all, do you
agree with him? And, second of all, if you do, is that our plan
to get this done?
Mr. Amorello. I think the inspection process that had been
put in place after the September 15 breach is addressing each
and every panel and identifying it to date. To correct the
record, there were seven found yesterday, so it is 109 panels
that are defective in some fashion. Again, only two with a
major defect is similar to the September 15, including the
September 15 breach.
If I may, I would like to defer that both to Mr. Sibley
from Bechtel and to Mr. Lewis from the project, in terms of how
these inspections take place. And then, if I might, Mike
Swanson who is here is the chief engineer for the department--
for the Authority working on the protocol for the future
inspections. I think it goes to----
Mr. Capuano. Fair enough. But I want to make it clear--I am
not an engineer, I don't want to be an engineer, so speak
English.
Mr. Amorello. Let me--if it is--Mr. Sibley and then Mr.
Lewis, but the inspections that are ongoing now and how it--how
that is occurring, and then Mr. Swanson, who is looking at the
protocol--and I think Congressman Lynch, anticipating his
questions on warranties and how we go out into the future--some
of the costs that we have budgeted, one of the questions by--
that was asked of the earlier panel, the budget for the
operation of a metropolitan highway system--that is everything
inside of 128, the I-93 tunnel system, the Logan connection,
some--the Viaduct south of the city, the Zacamb Bridge, the
Kana tunnels, is $76 million; $25 million of that is O&M costs
associated with just the Interstate 93 tunnels.
And at some point, when the questions get to that stage, if
Mr. Swanson could talk about how we anticipate the inspections,
the cost of the inspections that we built into our budget
anyway, the logic in the 1997 legislation turning the project
from the State Highway Department--I wish Chairman Davis was
here. Taking the project from the State Highway Department,
transferring it to the Turnpike Authority, was because of our
expertise in tunnel management and the fact that we have
resources to maintain these tunnels. Having that, that is why
we are the authority charged with----
Mr. Capuano. Fair enough. But I want to make it clear, I
just asked basically what time it is. I really am not
interested, because I am not qualified to know how the watch is
made. You know, I mean, so I just really want to make it as
simple as you can. All the technical stuff, talk to Mr. Mead.
But the simple stuff, I am happy to listen to, but I want to
make that clear.
Mr. Sibley. Simply, the investigations we are conducting
since the September breach are twofold. One is we have been
going through the documentation. When we went back and looked
at the history of the panel in question, as John identified
earlier, there are irregularities in the documentation of that
panel.
So we did a search through all of our field records for all
of the panels to see if there were other strings of
documentation that would indicate troubles, and we put those on
a specific list of panels to take a close look at.
Second, then, we have identified--or we have been initiated
a 100 percent inspection of all panels. There is a section
where the wall is readily accessible above the tile panels that
were in some of the photographs. The stainless steel grills are
up there. We can look through those grills and remove some of
those grills, and do a 100 percent inspection of all panels.
We are looking for any indications that may need further
followup. The team identifies those indications, and then we
take a senior engineer out, we remove more of the steel in the
area, make a thorough investigation. If it appears to be
something worthy of followup, we actually take the tile panel
off and do a complete review of that panel.
The photographs that Congressman Lynch went through come
right out of our reports. Those are panels that the
investigation has located. Most of these more serious issues
are in areas that are fairly deep in the project. Both of those
areas, incidentally, are in areas where there was dewatering
surrounding it during construction. We are now getting full
water tables back, so now we have a better chance to see some
of these issues where water is coming through.
So it is a two step--documentation, check those
specifically, visual everything, followup indications, go
progressively forward. It is a conservative review.
Mr. Capuano. Since Mr. Mead is still here--Mr. Mead, I
wouldn't want to call you back, because I know you have had a
long day already. At some point, I would hope that we could get
some answers, so maybe at a later point, to tell me whether
what you just heard and what you may find out in the future
satisfies the suggestion you made, because, for me, though I
love you guys dearly, the only guy I really care about is Mr.
Mead, because he has no vested interest whatsoever in the
answer, and he is the guy, as far as I am concerned, that has
to be satisfied.
And, again, what you just said sounds fine to me. But I
haven't got a clue. And so I appreciate the answer, and I
appreciate the brevity, the clarity, the simplicity, but I
would still hope that at some point you have a lengthy
discussion with Mr. Mead and his office, so that he can be
satisfied. Or, if not, to notify us that you are not satisfied.
I guess for me--you know, I have heard a lot about slurry
walls. I am not a contractor. I am not a construction guy. I
haven't had the experience of Mr. Lynch. They get a little
complicated to me. And, you know, I mean, I think I understand
it. I am not sure. It sounds--you guys have made it relatively
simple, I think, but I always try to bring things back to what
I understand.
One of the things I understand is basic construction, not a
lot, but a little bit. And, you know, we have two kinds of
leaks. You know, you have a hole in the wall, that is a
problem, you have accepted it, you are fixing it. Whether it is
temporary--I will be honest, I was a little concerned myself
when I saw that the way to fix a temporary leak is exactly what
I would have done, is basically you stuck a cork in it.
[Laughter.]
But I guess I will trust you, because I drive through the
tunnel and I go by that cork, so I hope it holds. And I also
understand that there is some discussion now as to how to make
that permanent, and I respect that and I will leave that alone.
But there is also leaks at the top, and I have been
educated as to how all of this has happened and how you
couldn't do it--a different kind of roof because of the width
limitations on the buildings, and the like, and that you had to
do a roof basically that, in my mind, is almost inevitable to
have leaks.
My house has an overhang. Every house in New England that
is wisely built has an angled, steeped roof. Nobody in their
right mind in New England has a flat roof. There are some, but
those are the people that I think less of than others.
[Laughter.]
There is a reason for that. We want rain, we want snow to
get off and go away, and I understand that. I also understand
that you couldn't do some of these things, and so within the
limits you had to come up with a system.
But I have asked, and the Authority has granted me--I have
it here, and I have the prop, and all of that--but basically
asked, well, what is on the top of this roof? Where is this
water coming from? Not so much the slurry walls. I am talking
about the so-called low-level leaks, because those are the ones
that strike me as a bigger concern.
I mean, you are going to have holes in the walls, you are
going to fix them, and that is not--everybody--I have heard
everybody say that is not acceptable, and it is going to get
fixed. But there is going to be a question on the roof. And the
reason I say this is because, when I was mayor, we built
several schools. Every one we built we had to fight with the
contractors about what was on the roof--how thick the rubber
was, whether the rocks were this, whether this was this, how
the drain--every single roof there was an argument.
So I asked about roofs, and I got a nice little thin piece
of basic rubber here that is this thick that I am told is
sitting on top of the cement roof. OK. That sounds neat,
except, I have to tell you, this thing is pretty flimsy. It
doesn't strike me that this is even comparable to the roof that
is sitting on my house.
So I have to ask: is this sufficient? Is this normal? Is
this what you have used in other tunnels? And if not, why do we
get this?
Mr. Amorello, I guess I will start with you.
Mr. Amorello. Let me--again, these were decisions made in
the waterproofing, if I can defer to Bechtel, we will respond
to that question.
Mr. MacDonald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask Keith
to comment on the detail of it, the roof system was the subject
of a thorough review back in 1990. The systems were evaluated
with a lot of input from ourselves, section design consultants,
the suppliers of materials that went into the specifications.
There was a thorough review of these processes initiated in
1997 when there were some challenges in getting the
construction satisfactory during the installation of the roof
membranes.
So with that said, Keith, maybe you could fill us in on
more details.
Mr. Sibley. I am very tempted to talk about the thing you
had in your hand or the polyuria sprays or the preapproved
300's, but I recognize your watch analogy, so we will start
with----
Mr. Capuano. Thank you.
Mr. Sibley [continuing]. With waterproofing functions
essentially as a liner. The concrete roof is placed on the
steel roof girders that have been talked about. The roof,
before we backfill with the material, then it goes up to the
surface, sometimes 4 feet thick, sometimes 40 feet thick. We
put down this liner. It is loosely called waterproofing.
We did have a wide variety of waterproofing materials in
our early specification. It is a performance specification. The
supplier is chosen by the contractor. They are to make sure the
supplier reviews the geometry of the tunnel, how deep it is,
what kind of water is in the area, the water chemistry, the
details of the construction, and come up with a material that
they will certify will perform in a waterproofing function at
that location at that depth.
In the 1997 task force, we were recognizing that some of
these materials apparently weren't robust enough, or had
sufficient installation problems that we were having to review
a lot of leaks and waterproofing issues. We were concerned
about the continued use of those materials.
Initially, to restrict the marketplace, was not well
received, but this combined task force involving State
authorities, Federal Highway, some experts, and ourselves, we
wound up eliminating a few materials.
Mr. Capuano. Is this the Waterproofing Task Force or the
Leak Task Force?
Mr. Sibley. This is Waterproofing. We are selecting
waterproofing----
Mr. Capuano. So before leaks.
Mr. Sibley [continuing]. Materials. Correct. And we limited
the number, then, of materials that were allowed to be
considered under this performance specification. The details
and requirements of the spec remain the same. The contractor
chooses the material.
The manufacturer is required to have a rep onsite while it
started to train the people, test certified installers, and
basically to assure that the materials such as the one you had
in your hand will function at the depth and locations called
for in the tunnel.
Mr. Capuano. OK. Am I right to understand that this has a
5-year warranty? Do you know?
Mr. Sibley. I don't know, but----
Mr. Capuano. OK. Let us----
Mr. Sibley [continuing]. I can check that for you.
Mr. Capuano. I am pretty sure I am right. It is a 5-year
warranty. My roof has a 20-year warranty. Why does this only
have a 5-year warranty? And let us assume everything is done
perfectly. I have to replace my roof every 20 years, because it
leaks. Material gets old.
Let us presume everything is done well. Six years from now
the warranty is gone. I won't even ask the question what
happens within the warranty; I don't know how you replace it.
Six years from now, this is done, the warranty is done, and you
have another 71 to 94 years left. How do you fix it?
Mr. Sibley. Morris, do you want to take a stab at that one?
Mr. Levy. Well, I think there is a slight difference
between the house and the underground tunnel.
Mr. Capuano. I hope so.
Mr. Levy. Yes. I mean, the material in a house is subject
to a lot of the variations in the temperatures, the variations
in rainfall, ice, and so forth. The material that you have
underground, it would not be subject to this. It is just
staying there, and there is no change to it.
Mr. Capuano. So, then, theoretically they should be able to
warrant it for 100 years.
Mr. Levy. Well, as we said, it should stay for that long,
but I am not sure about the warranty----
Mr. Capuano. Do you mean even the material?
Mr. Levy. I am not sure about the warranty of this
particular material, and Keith would be----
Mr. Capuano. Well, I am pretty sure it is 5 years. I mean,
that is fair enough. Again, I guess I will leave it to people
who understand construction better than I. I have kind of gone
to the limits of my understanding.
But I will tell you that it raises concerns for me, not
because--I understand the engineering problems about you
couldn't get wider things, you couldn't extend the roof in a
different way. I know--I understand that, it makes sense, that
is life. But I have to tell you, forgetting everything else,
whoever picked this--and, again, not being a contractor it
raises questions to me.
I guess relative to the--who is going to be responsible for
what--and, again, I am just continuing on the roofing analogy.
Let us presume everything seems to be done well. To get to
this--just this, and get it on the roof, somebody has to design
the tunnel. Somebody has to draft the specs for the material
that goes in the tunnel.
Somebody has to select the contractors, choose the process,
choose the material, choose the supplier, prepare the surface
because, as I understand it you, can't just throw this on a
piece of cement, you have to prep it and all that kind of
stuff, select the adhesive, and then apply the material.
If I have those right, and if I haven't missed anything,
you have an architect who designs it, a general contractor, at
least one subcontractor, maybe several subcontractors, the
material supplier himself, the manufacturer of the material,
the manufacturer of the adhesive. Then, you have quality
control, quality assurance, and then you have the Turnpike
Authority themselves.
Maybe I am counting it wrong. Maybe I am missing something.
But just to get this on, you have eight potential parties who
have responsibility to get that done. Sometimes I am sure some
of those would be the same people, so maybe it is a little bit
less than eight, how are we going to determine who is
responsible? And the reason I ask this is because, very
carefully worded, wisely carefully worded, that Bechtel/Parsons
Brinckerhoff will accept your fair share of responsibility, and
because--and, again, correct me if I am wrong--all I am aware
of is a $50 million performance bond, or whatever the term
might be--insurance.
Are we going to have to hold everybody liable, all down the
line? Or is that your job?
Mr. MacDonald. The liability flows primarily two places. It
flows to the contractor, and many of those parties that you
described are subcontractors to that contractor. And some of it
would potentially flow to us. Correct me if I am wrong on this,
Morris, but I don't think the section design consultants, for
the most part, are involved in this.
Mr. Levy. Not in the choice of the roofing material. But,
Congressman, I think until today--I am not sure that the water
is coming from the roof. In other words, there is water at the
joints, and it could well be that the roofing--that the
waterproofing is still intact, and that the water is coming
through the concrete, because the concrete goes up the sides.
Mr. Capuano. But as I understood the way this was supposed
to be applied, it is supposed to be applied, what, up a foot--
--
Mr. Levy. That is correct.
Mr. Capuano [continuing]. On the soldiers. And, therefore,
there shouldn't be any water.
Mr. Levy. The outside wall of concrete is exposed to the
water. The top of the wall is exposed to the water. And the
water is coming through the concrete from the top or from the
side, instead of--that is why we are grouting. We are not
grouting the waterproofing. We are grouting the----
Mr. Capuano. Well, one of the reasons I picked this,
because, again, it is simple for me--and, you know, you get
into slurry walls, but the same issue applies to slurry walls.
I mean, you don't just have one guy come in and drop a slurry
wall in. Somebody has to design it, somebody has go to do this,
somebody has to pick the slurry.
I mean, I understand there are different kinds of slurries.
You have to pick which one you have to do, you have to have it
inspected, you have 8, 10, 9, 12 people or entities that are
responsible for any aspect, not just this. Same thing with the
intelligent transportation system, same thing with the concrete
selection, same thing with every aspect of it. This was just a
simple one to me, because it makes sense, something I
understand.
And I guess for me, I go through all of this to make sure
that I am not on the wrong track, that the liability for all of
these issues, regardless of how they are repaired in the
future, the liability is going to be a long-term discussion,
unless what you have said, Mr. MacDonald, is--turns out to be
accurate, that you will stand up and accept your
responsibility, whatever that may be.
And I take you at your word, but I also understand that
when the time comes this is still going to happen. And when it
happens, my hope is that each and every one of these people who
is on this list is going to be held responsible for their
aspect of it, and that includes you.
Mr. MacDonald. Congressman, let me respond by again saying,
yes, we will step up to our obligations under our contract.
Absolutely. The situation that you described is normal. A
contractor, section design consultants, a management
consultant, those are the three principal parties involved in
this conversation, so it is sort of a normal circumstance.
The disputes are, unfortunately, a normal circumstance in
this environment. I, frankly, believe that the issues that you
are concerned about will show themselves in the near future. I
don't think it is going to take years to discover potential
issues that are subject to cost recovery or subject to back
charges against contractors. For the most part, we are going to
know that in the near future.
I think there is a robust process in place now under the
attorney general's purview. We are committed to work through
that process. It is a process that has the attributes that we
have long sought. It is one voice on behalf of the
Commonwealth, the legislature, the administration, MHD, MTA, a
fact-based process. So we will fully engage in that process.
Mr. Capuano. Well, I am going to end with one last thing.
As I understand it--and correct me if I am wrong--there is
currently a lawsuit pending relative to notification from 1994
on some issues relative to the tunnel that--it is kind of
interesting.
Even in your written testimony, you suggest that, in 1994,
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff was under a contractual constraint
basically to lie relative to the cost of the tunnel. That is
what your written testimony says, that you couldn't have public
commentary--well, I can read it to you.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, our testimony said that we had an
obligation to tell our customer what we knew.
Mr. Capuano. Right.
Mr. MacDonald. And we did that.
Mr. Capuano. Maybe you shouldn't lie. You are right. I
should correct myself that you were constrained to not correct
a lie publicly given, repeatedly given, by your employer--
namely, the Turnpike Authority, not Mr. Amorello, but one of
his predecessors.
The contract prohibited Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff from
making any unauthorized statements, and that is relating to an
earlier statement--in 1994, you provided the Governor and State
officials with total cost estimates of almost $14 billion. I
have to tell you, if I were a prosecutor, I would not let you
off the hook because you had a contract that basically said you
had to let a lie happen. Different issue; others will decide
that.
But as I understand it--am I wrong to think that there is a
lawsuit pending relative to whether you did or did not inform
State officials on these issues?
Mr. MacDonald. There is a lawsuit pending on that matter.
Again, I don't think your characterization of this thing is
accurate. I don't think that is what the contract says or that
is what we did. We went through that process in 1994. We
continued to give our best advice to the Turnpike Authority
throughout that period of time.
Mr. Amorello. Could I just interject that in 1994 the State
Highway Department, then the Department of Public Works, was in
charge of the project, not the Turnpike Authority.
Mr. Capuano. Either way, it wasn't you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Amorello. No. Just in terms of clarification.
Mr. Capuano. Well, I respect that, Mr. MacDonald, but I
would suggest--I will tell you that as--well, as a non-
practicing attorney now, that if I were advising you, and I--
you had a client who was telling you, ``Look, we know we are 40
percent--minimum 40 percent over budget,'' and you know it, and
your client--in this case the State Highway Department--is
telling you to shut up, my advice to you would have been to
walk, because you can see--you can feel the anchor coming
around your neck.
Guess what? Here it is. Your client, based on your--again,
I am not going to--I don't know what the truth is, but based on
your written testimony, you knew then that your client, the
Highway Department, was perpetrating a public lie and, one,
they violated FCC regulations, never mind anything else, that
you knew was wrong.
And I think by doing that, even presuming that what you say
is true, you told the Governor and you told the State
officials, I still think you have some liability issues on
that, because you should have walked. You should have walked,
knowing that your client then was engaged in something immoral
at the very least, unethical, clearly, and probably illegal.
Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Tamaro, I want to go back to you for a second. How do I
determine what--the normal amount of water that we should
expect in this tunnel upon completion?
Mr. Tamaro. As far as the slurry walls themselves are
concerned, you should have no water. You should not have
running water. There will be an occasional seep that requires
repair.
Mr. Lynch. All right.
Mr. Tamaro. The roof joint appears to me beyond what you
would normally expect. I am going to go a little beyond perhaps
where I should with a comment with regard to the membrane. From
what I have seen of the roof, up between the girders, I think
the membrane is performing on the flat, and the problem is
exclusive to the turn of the wall and the wall contact.
I would suspect that the membrane will last the life of the
structure because of its being protected. I assume, and I don't
know if you have the proper protection boards and the like, as
long as it didn't get punctured by whomever was walking around
on top, the membrane on the horizontal should be satisfactory.
It is that joint detail and turning up the wall that is really
the culprit in this problem. And the question is: how does that
get resolved at this point?
Mr. Lynch. OK. Let us see. Why don't we talk for a moment
about what you described, Mr. MacDonald, as being fairly
normal. In Attorney General Reilly's testimony, he indicated
there were 134 issues outstanding for claims against the
project and a total of $400 million in claims.
Now, I understand that there is always that back and forth,
and there are claims. But at this late stage of the process and
the project, is that something that is normal, where a lot of
contractors have completed their responsibilities and are no
longer on the project and have been paid and now are going--we
are trying to resolve these things and doing cost recovery on
top of that?
Mr. MacDonald. I would like to separate it a little bit. If
I understood the attorney general correctly, he indicated there
was 134 items for cost recovery. To me, that would translate
into issues that are potentially at our doorstep or at the
doorstep of the section design consultants.
With respect to the $400 million in claims from
construction contractors, this is the pending amount of claims
from the contractors for their construction work, some that
have finished and some that are still ongoing, that is going
through a claims resolution process, a process which is
directly managed by the MTA.
I am not aware that--of anyone who has been paid in advance
of getting an agreement. So I think there is a little
miscommunication there about paying contractors for claims.
So this is a significant amount of money. The fact that we
have some disputes and this project has had a long--a fairly
long history of disputes with the construction contractors, I
think is--you know, is kind of within the normal expectation,
maybe a little more than we would like to see. We would like to
get it--we would like to get it resolved as quickly as
possible, so it is not around for a long time to come.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Tamaro, now I remember what the question
was I wanted to ask you. The idea that we have this slurry wall
that is 42 inches thick, and normally--well, let me put it this
way. Along the stretch of the--of the Artery Tunnel in front of
the Federal Reserve Bank, apparently the engineer that was--or
the engineer representative for the Federal Reserve Bank
required that reinforcing steel be put--maintained in the
slurry wall along that stretch in front of the Federal Reserve
Bank. Am I correct on that?
Keith Sibley, how about you?
Mr. Sibley. Originally, several of the slurry walls were
preliminary designed with reinforcing steel in them. As the
final dimensions--a real driving dimensional item here is the
soldier pile. It is 3 feet. When you add the cover, you get a
3\1/2\ foot wall. That wall thickness is not really required
for the soil and water to be held back, but that is what is
required to swallow the pile that is inserted in the trench as
we build these walls and then carry the roof loads.
Once we had that much design in place, we realized that we
did not need to reinforce the walls in many locations. Two
locations we do have the walls reinforced. It is along the side
of one financial, and it is along the side of the Federal
Reserve Bank.
Those are adjacent to critical buildings. We did review
this information with their consultants, and they preferred we
remain with a conservative design to keep that reinforcing
steel. We had it there. They preferred we not take it out when
we realized we didn't need it in many other areas. They didn't
require that we put it there, but they preferred we not take it
out.
Mr. Lynch. How much of the rest of the--apart from those
two spots--one financial and the Federal Reserve Bank--how much
of the remainder of the Artery Project had preliminary rebar
design?
Mr. Sibley. Actually, I do not know the answer to that----
Mr. Lynch. Take a stab.
Mr. Sibley [continuing]. From the study----
Mr. Lancellotti. We pretty much wanted the original
standard to have the walls reinforced as----
Mr. Lynch. OK. So it was the norm.
Mr. Lancellotti. The norm.
Mr. Lynch. The norm in the preliminary design was to have
rebar in the slurry walls.
Mr. Lancellotti. I can't say whether it was the preliminary
design or the conceptual design. But in the early stages of the
project, that is the standard we were discussing. As Keith
pointed out, later on we backed off of that, and only required
that----
Mr. Lynch. Can you move up to that mic, sir. All right. Let
us take that from the top again, please.
Mr. Lancellotti. During the early stages of the project, we
did have, as our concept, reinforced slurry walls. Later on, as
Keith pointed out, as we went into more of the analysis and the
design, we determined that it was not needed in all locations.
We kept it in certain locations.
I think there are a couple of isolated cases beyond Federal
Reserve Bank where either we had an air rights issue or a heavy
load issue where we kept the reinforcing in. But generally, we
took it out because the analysis and design showed it was not
necessary.
Mr. Lynch. Now, let me see if I understand you correctly.
Because the walls were so thick, you didn't think you needed
reinforcing steel?
Mr. Lancellotti. Correct. Based on the loads that they
would absorb or would be imposed on the wall, it was not
necessary. That is correct.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Now, as I understand it, concrete is great
under a compressive load, but the steel is added because of,
you know, a moment or a lateral load. In this case, it would be
from the soil and the water on the side of the panel. Is that
correct?
Mr. Lancellotti. That is very--you are a good engineer.
That is absolutely correct. It is usually from tension, either
from moment--primarily from moment. It is primarily from moment
or bending.
Mr. Lynch. So it wouldn't be the case where if we had left
the steel in, if we had left the steel in--in the slurry
walls--and I am not sure if there was a whole lot of steel in
here in terms of, you know, the size of these panels. But if
you had left the reinforcing rods in the thing as originally
designed, we might not be--we might not have had that blowout
problem for one.
Mr. Lancellotti. Actually, that panel has reinforcing steel
in it.
Mr. Lynch. Well, it was placed properly, is what I am
saying.
Mr. Lancellotti. And it still blew out, so I would not say
it is related to the reinforcing steel.
Mr. Lynch. Yes. Now, was this a cost-saving measure, to
pull the steel out?
Mr. Lancellotti. That is correct. It was part of a cost
containment initiative; that is correct.
Mr. Lynch. OK. But you left it in for the Federal Reserve
and----
Mr. Lancellotti. And some other isolated areas where the
stresses warranted.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Let us just go--I want to compare these two
pieces, because I think it is important. Mr. Tamaro, given the
dynamic here with this 3\1/2\ foot wall, what is the impact on
a lateral load like we were just talking about, with no rebar
in there and--but say there is a substantial inclusion of soil
or clay or a hammer or brick or just a complete void within
that panel, what does that do to the structural integrity of
that panel?
Mr. Tamaro. It diminishes the integrity. What happens is
that the reinforcing goes in sort of as a grid.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Tamaro. And if there is a void, a hole, a defect, there
are alternative paths around the defect. And in the case of
this particular panel, there is concrete missing for a
significant height of the element. So that you have a piece of
reinforced concrete to the north of the defect, you have a
piece of overpour concrete to the south, and you have a defect
between the two.
Had there been reinforcing and concrete, you would have an
element expand from beam to beam. What you have in the case of
E-045 is you have an element sitting out in space with no
support at the Perini end of the panel.
Mr. Lynch. I see. OK.
Mr. Tamaro. So having reinforcing or not having reinforcing
would be immaterial. If the panel had been constructed to the
flanges, behind the flanges of both of the soldier beams, and
there had been reinforcing and there was a hole, there would be
an alternative path around it, and we wouldn't have the same
structural concerns that we have for E-045.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Tamaro. It would have just been a sealing of the leak,
and that would have made life a little easier.
Mr. Lynch. Right. Now, let us go to the general situation.
Mr. Amorello tells me that we have 109 panels now that have
inclusions, defects, of--you know what? Can we get a definition
on--I know the No. 1s classified in the report are the severe
situations like the breach, and there are only two of those.
What constitutes a moderate or a No. 2 type defect that we
have in these walls? I guess there are 33 of them? Or actually
maybe more now.
Mr. Amorello. They changed with--34 panels with modest
repair and 73 require patching or a type of repair. I could
have Mike Lewis, project director, speak to that, or Keith
Sibley, if it is easier on the mic.
Mr. Lynch. Yes, either one. Either Mike or Keith, go ahead
and tell me what a No. 2 involves, and then I have some
questions for Mr. Tamaro.
Mr. Sibley. The No. 1 defect, we had two of those, those
are the breaches. The No. 2 type of defect is something that
there are indications in some cases of a piece of an end stop
left, which would indicate that there is not full engagement of
a pile for a short section.
There is an inclusion of material between a primary and
secondary placement; that is, a vein of material. I think Mr.
Tamaro described just recently how that is important to the
performance of the panel.
Mr. Lynch. Could that be clay or sediment or something
that?
Mr. Sibley. That is correct.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Sibley. Some foreign material. Clay is the most
frequent, where a joint was not fully cleaned off before the
next one. Sometimes it goes well into the panel; sometimes it
is toward the surface. Basically, it requires thorough
investigation. We have been doing this.
The contractors are starting to hydroblast the material out
to confirm precisely the dimensions of what we have, and then
recommend methods of doing proper repairs. In some cases, this
will be primarily filling with concrete materials. In other
cases, it may involve structural consideration for the reasons
that Mr. Tamaro outlined a moment ago.
The other 73 minor ones are--we think of as patching. These
go no less--no more than, say, half the depth of the wall and
involve some reinforcing steel and concrete repair patching,
typical of concrete structures.
Mr. Lynch. Didn't that spec say that simple surface
patching or shallow injection shall not be allowed? Does that
fly in the face of what you are telling me now, that you are
going to do minimal patching here?
Mr. Sibley. Simple surface patching would be like a
cosmetic repair. What I just described is a structural repair.
I mentioned similar that you would do in reinforced concrete
structures--for example, if you were repairing bridge abutment,
if you were repairing a retaining wall, something of that
nature, you clean out the surface, you prepare it to receive
new concrete, bonding agents, etc., or saturation, you dowel in
appropriate reinforcing steel, and then you cast additional
concrete on it.
If it is relatively shallow, it can be done by----
Mr. Lynch. Is this shot crete? Is that what you are talking
about now?
Mr. Sibley. That would be only in relatively shallow
situations. In deeper situations, the contractor puts up a
form--there are some of these in progress right now--and casts
the appropriate material. If it is large, it can use a large
aggregate. If it is small, you might use, say, a peastone
concrete, that type of thing.
Mr. Lynch. Yes. Who is paying for this?
Mr. Sibley. I think, as John said earlier, the contractors
are doing these repairs.
Mr. Lynch. And they are paying for it on their own dime.
They are not going to come back to the taxpayer to be paid for
this, right?
Mr. MacDonald. That is my understanding, sir, and we are
paying for our inspection services.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Tamaro, based on what you have heard,
that there are voids next to the soldier pile, and there are
examples that were shown earlier where it looks like sidewalk
bricks actually. Let me ask you about that.
They are doing slurry wall construction. They are pumping
slurry into this open trench that is the form basically for the
eventual slurry wall. And it appears that in many, many places
along this slurry wall, for the length of the Artery, that
there are things dropping in--you know, a hammer, some sidewalk
bricks, clumps of soil. It appears that there is clay sediment,
and it is creating these voids or inclusions that have been
described here.
Within that panel--within that panel, what does that do to
the--again, I know you said it diminishes it, but is this a
serious concern?
Mr. Tamaro. Can I just go back and tell you how it happens?
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Mr. Tamaro. So that we can develop it from there?
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Mr. Tamaro. These foreign debris come from either an
inadequate cleaning of a panel initially--at the conclusion,
when you are all done excavating, you should clean out the
panel, make certain there is no debris sitting on the bottom,
or due to the collapse of some material in the fills after the
concrete process has begun.
In the event it is a non-cleaning of the bottom, when you
put the tremmie pipe down to the bottom of the panel, the
debris is usually lighter than the concrete, and it is expected
to rise through the panel and be expelled. When you begin to
see pockets of material, it is indicative that there is a
potential sidewall collapse during the placement of concrete.
The material has fallen down.
When you see the condition of E-045, that is specifically
attributable to the fact that they had two elements that they
were trying to concrete, separated by a steel beam, and they
tried to do it with one tremmie pipe, and what it did was it
pushed all the trash into that slot.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Tamaro. And it collected as a vertical defect.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Tamaro. That is very serious.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Tamaro. A pocket of material the size of a bag of
potatoes is not a problem, if you don't have running water
coming in. You go back, you dig it out, and you fix it.
Mr. Lynch. Well, we do have water.
Mr. Tamaro. But E-045 is an extraordinary----
Mr. Lynch. No, no, no. But, I mean, I have a list here, and
they haven't done non-destructive testing on this stuff. This
is just the stuff that is coming up visually. We have
inclusions, and we know we have water behind the wall here. We
have wet spots. You know, in my mind, we have all of the
ingredients for a failure further down the line.
Mr. Tamaro. If there is sufficient waterflow to erode the
contaminated material, you have a potential E-045 problem.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Tamaro. If the leak is observed early on, and it is
addressed quickly, you can stop the leak from becoming a major
problem.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Mead was in here earlier. Actually, he
might be still here. He recommended that we do a scan of every
single panel, in light of the pervasiveness of this problem,
these inclusions, stuff dropping into the slurry wall. Is that
something that you would agree with?
Mr. Tamaro. I don't think it would hurt. It is one more
piece of information. I think the visual check is the most
important thing that one can do. The visual check and sounding
of the surface, banging on it, and the like----
Mr. Lynch. Really? Even though none of that picked up the
problem in E-045?
Mr. Tamaro. I think the problem in E-045 was picked up
somewhere along the way. There was shot crete applied. There
was grouting of the leak.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Tamaro. I think it was picked up.
Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. Chairman Amorello, I just want to
ask you--at the beginning of this hearing, we started talking
about this IPO situation, this integrated project organization
that so many people have now criticized, but at one point
apparently it was a popular idea because we--we adopted it. You
came in 2002, is that right?
Mr. Amorello. That is correct.
Mr. Lynch. Now, I know the Leak Task Force or the
Waterproofing Task Force was 1997.
Mr. Amorello. Waterproofing.
Mr. Lynch. OK. And then the Leak Task Force was 1999.
Mr. Amorello. 2000.
Mr. Lynch. 2000? And you came in in 2002?
Mr. Amorello. Correct.
Mr. Lynch. OK. So you have had a chance, based on the date
that you brought in in 2002, it is still pretty much--well,
there are some safeguards, I understand. Why don't I let you
answer the question.
What was your experience with this IPO situation? What did
you do? If you did anything differently, or if you are still
using the same system, I would like to hear about your opinion.
Mr. Amorello. When I first came in, being new to it, I
hired the National Academy of Engineers to come in and make
recommendations. And a panel came up and had several meetings
in Massachusetts and in Washington.
And John Christian, a Massachusetts resident who is now an
advisor to the Authority chaired that panel of national experts
from the Academy how to finish the project--their
recommendation came back. The management team and structure you
have in place is sufficient to carry you to the end of this
project, to 2005 being the substantial completion date.
But I wasn't a fan of the IPO, and I think lessons learned
from this--the IPO was not the manner to oversee this project.
The instances that the attorney general will speak of in cost
recovery, trying to recoup costs back where there is so much
agreement, the Inspector General has made it clear in many of
his--in his testimony today and in remarks in the past that we
somewhat dismantled that organizational structure. The public
employees report to me and to the chain of command here at the
Authority, and the Bechtel personnel answer to those overseeing
them from the public sector.
I would point out that at any given time in the past on
this project, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff I believe had at
times approximately 1,000 employees of their firms working or
subcontractors for them.
Mr. Lynch. Not counting attorneys, right?
Mr. Amorello. I don't want to characterize--it is the
number of FTEs at any given time under their work program and
the subcontractors they had within their work programs. And on
the State side, I believe at some given point we had
approximately 50 employees.
But the IPO, a decision made back in the late 1990's, I am
not a fan of it, wasn't when I came in, took the National
Academy's recommendation to finish the project with the
timeline we had left, manage that, opened roadways, kept the
schedule, kept to budget, at the same time moving public
responsibilities on the public side and treating it more like a
standard relationship between a consultant and the public side.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Let me ask you, who signs off on--do you
need to sign off on any payments to Bechtel and other
contractors?
Mr. Amorello. Contract modifications come in before--at a
certain level come into the Turnpike Board for approval. The
State Highway Department also approves them, because these are
State highway construction contracts. So there are basically
two layers of public approval on these contracts. The State
Highway Department is more of a procedural matter, because the
project is administered and controlled by the Authority given
the 1997 legislation.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, to the degree that you have any
authority to sign off on this, you know, I assume you were here
for my conversation with Attorney General Reilly.
Mr. Amorello. Absolutely. And the clarification, in terms
of holding the contractors responsible for their contracts, and
to provide a piece of information in regards to cost recovery
and those efforts seeking recovery to section design
consultants or Bechtel/Parsons as the joint venture.
And then, the claims and change progress, which, I think
Congressman Capuano and yourself have talked about, and the
chairman was talking about construction claims or changes that
we have instituted as part of the construction process, those
are settled with the Authority, and they are not settled as a
matter of an easy decision that we have our own attorneys and
our own outside consultant exponent to review the claims filed
by the contractors, and negotiated settlements where possible.
If we identify in a claim that we are going to pay, because
it is a legitimate, fair claim by the contractor to make it,
but we find that claim was as a result of a design error or
omission, then we submit that over to cost recovery. And those
are the items that the attorney general's office will be
looking at. Those were the items that the Ginsburg team was
dealing with in their cost recovery program.
Mr. Lynch. OK. While we are on that subject, on cost
recovery, I have to ask you--you came into this situation in
2002, and you know you are stepping into a problem because the
project is already, I don't know, it is out of sight. It is
over $10.8 billion--or, no, it has to be close to $14 at that
point, right?
Mr. Amorello. When I came in, it was $14.625. And today it
is----
Mr. Lynch. That is where it is, OK. So you know we have
problems, and there are enormous concerns about cost recovery,
getting some of that money back. And with all due respect to
the gentlemen at this table, we, as a Commonwealth, and you on
the Authority, we are in a pitch battle, a legal one, with
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, one of the biggest construction
firms in the world.
And in casting about for someone to handle our case and
recovering moneys for the taxpayer from this huge construction
company, apparently someone--perhaps yourself included--they
did a search to come up with someone to quarterback our team
for cost recovery. And I understand you found a fine gentleman
to do that.
However, from my research, it appears he was a probate
judge, someone dealing with divorce and custody and wills and
estates, to quarterback our team. And I have no--nothing but
fine things to say about that gentleman and--but
professionally, as someone who is responsible for watching out
for the Commonwealth, for the taxpayer, I have to ask you: how
did you, in a thorough search, come up with someone who, from
my own review and research, I can find no clear reason why one
would--if casting about the best person to represent us in that
conflict? And it was a conflict, a legal conflict--I just
cannot understand for the life of me why we made that
selection. And I just want to--I have to ask you that, because
it is vexing.
Mr. Amorello. I certainly appreciate and respect the
question. Judge Ginsburg is a highly regarded Judge of the
Commonwealth----
Mr. Lynch. Absolutely.
Mr. Amorello [continuing]. Regardless of the----
Mr. Lynch. An expert in probate law, I might add, and a
respected one.
Mr. Amorello. And removing the subject matter of his
jurisdiction in the courtroom, the credentials of him as an
intelligent legal mind, an individual of the highest
integrity----
Mr. Lynch. Unquestioned.
Mr. Amorello [continuing]. That heading up a team of
attorneys--and we are talking about a team of attorneys and
outside engineering consultants, able to administer the
program, and as Attorney General Reilly pointed out, you have
two avenues in cost recovery. You either settle the matters or
you go to court and litigate them.
I guess there would be a third one. You could just drop it
and not pursue it at all. But looking at the reality of the two
matters, the cost recovery team put into place by me was
looking to move a process that had, as has been mentioned by
Ken Mead and others, $35,000 and I believe $770, $35,770 for
the cost recovery in the prior 10 years of this project.
Judge Ginsburg and his team secured back $3.8 million in
settlement moneys, and filed 10 lawsuits, and an 11th lawsuit
that Congressman Capuano referenced against Bechtel/Parsons
Brinckerhoff on the grounds of fiduciary responsibilities and
others.
The attorney general in his remarks said that those 10
suits were for--or 8 of those 10 suits, and if--were moving
forward in the process, and that the 11th suit against Bechtel/
Parsons was--he had stated but did not--dropped it. I think
that speaks that the cost recovery team instituted by the
Authority was doing its job, pursuing it.
When it became a matter of lawsuits only, it was
appropriate that the chief legal enforcement officer for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the attorney general, take these
matters over, and use all of the tools and abilities at his
disposal that we currently didn't have--don't have as an
authority, other than through the discovery process in the
legal cases.
Mr. Lynch. In fairness, though, the assessment of the
previous cost recovery team--and I may be wrong, and you are
completely free to correct me if I am wrong--if I count up what
we have spent in cost recovery, I come up with approximately
expenses of approximately $8 billion.
Mr. Amorello. $8 million.
Mr. Lynch. I am sorry, $8 million, right. $8 million to
recover $4 million. So we spent $8 to recover about $4. You
know, if I am wrong, straighten me out.
Mr. Amorello. Well, just in terms of when you talk about
the individual matter of the settlements that were reached with
Jacobs Engineering and some other firms, the dollars invested
for those settlements were, I believe--and I stand to be
corrected on the exact dollar amount, but I believe it was
about $700,000 to secure back $3.8 million, $4 million in
settlement.
The additional moneys expended by the cost recovery team is
into the establishment of those 10 lawsuits, and I think all of
us know that the foundation now that the attorney general is
moving on are those 10 lawsuits and the amount of work put into
putting a suit before the Supreme Court--the Superior Court of
Massachusetts is where these dollars that were expended for
lawyers, for outside engineering consultants, and for the staff
attorneys that were working on cost recovery.
Mr. Lynch. I understand. But we are looking at an October
or November trial date here, and there is still an enormous
amount of work that needs to be done on these cases based on
the attorney general's assessment at this point.
Mr. Amorello. Well, if I may----
Mr. Lynch. You may.
Mr. Amorello [continuing]. Congressman, just to point out
that in the course of this project, in the 10 years of active
construction, there had been no effort--no meaningful effort in
terms of cost recovery. Ideally--and I say this with the
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff folks, you would like to reach
settlement and resolve matters in that fashion and not need to
pursue them in court.
I respect the fact that the professional relationship
between the Turnpike Authority and Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff
has not materially changed in their effort to continue to
complete this project, while at the same time we filed a
lawsuit against them and 10 of the section design consultants
in this course.
The process was not there prior to that, to the cost
recovery team that the Authority established. If you can reach
a settlement--and, again, ideally you want to reach that as the
attorney general, and hopefully the attorney general will be
successful in reaching a settlement, but if not, you only have
the course to go to litigation, and those are the steps that we
took.
And at the stage where we were finishing up, the court
cases had been filed, natural progression to turn it over to
the attorney general, and his willingness to accept it.
Mr. Lynch. It is a point well taken. But just two points.
No. 1, it is usually the quality and the strength of the
litigation that drives the settlement. It is not the settlement
that is the driving force, and then it falls to litigation as a
default measure.
So it leads me back to my original question, which was--I
mean, forgive me, but we are in a construction litigation case
against one of the largest construction companies in the world.
And we hire a probate judge to handle our case. That is my
point. I understand the intelligence of the gentleman, his
intellect unquestioned, a fine human being. It is just I
question the judgment of that----
Mr. Amorello. But take the fact--and, again, the two law
firms that are representing us, and were representing us--
Looney & Grossman is headed by a former----
Mr. Lynch. Fine law firms, but who is our quarterback on
this?
Mr. Amorello. The quarterback was Judge Ginsburg and the
team, and these two outside law firms, the other one having one
of the best legal counsels in terms of construction law--Bill
Zucker--in the country. So we had the right personnel in place,
and now it is rightly turned over to the attorney general. We
fully support him in his efforts in the cases that were given
over to him to manage and administer and move to either
successful conclusion with settlements or he moves to
continuing the litigation.
Mr. Lynch. Well, I wish I shared your faith. It is just a
troubling development.
Mr. Amorello. I hear you.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I will leave it at that. Maybe I should give
this back to Congressman Capuano, but I have to ask--it sounds,
you know, across the table here that there is a shared
assessment that things are going not perfectly, but things are
moving along in the right direction and that you are--you feel
that you are on the right path, and that, as Mr. MacDonald
says, this bridge--this tunnel will serve the citizens of the
Commonwealth well into the next century.
If that is really the case--and I am going to ask each of
you--Mr. Tamaro, you don't have a stake in this question. But
are you willing to support efforts to hold the taxpayer
harmless going forward here? That is my principal concern
here--that long after all of us are gone, and we already see,
you know, Modern Continental is gone, God bless them--bless
Marino, but the company is going under, and Mr. Cashman is
taking over his responsibilities.
Reliant Insurance, gone. Other entities that might be
looked to for recourse are also on the ropes, as they say.
There are some others that are in shaky condition.
My concern is that in the long term--and I am not saying 5
years or 10 years, I am saying this is a 75-year or a 100-year
tunnel, we have a responsibility to the next generation that we
give them something that it is not a continual drain on their
resources.
So I am looking to set up a structure; some have called it
a warranty. I am not sure that is the correct word for it, but
close enough--a way of protecting the citizens of the
Commonwealth going forward, collectively, meaning the Authority
and whatever resources it can garner and retain for that
purpose, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff in the same fashion, the
subcontractors, the general contractors, the designers, the
insurance companies, the reinsurance companies, the bond
companies, everyone.
But to hold the citizens harmless from--they are blameless
in this. They are blameless in this, and in fairness they paid
for a first-rate tunnel, and based on what I see--and there are
a lot of reasons for it--I don't see a first-rate tunnel. We
hired a world-class team here, and I don't see a world-class
product, quite frankly, not yet. We can get there; they are
salvageable. But we need the commitment of everyone involved.
And I know there is a lot of personal pride out there as
managers and as construction professionals. Right across the
board, right through Bechtel and each of the firms involved
here, and it goes right down to the workers on the site. Mike
and I walked there. You know, there is a considerable amount of
angst among the workers that they are being associated with a
project that is being criticized roundly.
And they would like to do everything that they can to work
themselves out of it. And I would just like to see the same
commitment from the firms involved here from the top to the
bottom, because I think it is solvable. But it requires a firm
and honest and genuine commitment to getting to that end.
And, you know, I haven't seen it yet. It looks like this
thing is barreling toward litigation, and I don't think that is
the best for anyone. And by God, if we get into that, then we
will all be involved. We will all be involved, and there will
be no easy way out. It will be take no prisoners from our
standpoint in the Congress. And there will be ramifications, as
Chairman Davis said, for those who seek to acquire other
Federal contracts.
We are not playing Tiddly Winks here. This is serious
business. Our obligation is to protect the people that we
represent, and your obligation is to fulfill your part of the
bargain. And we can get there if everyone is fully committed.
I will turn it over to Congressman Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I guess I only have one
or two more questions and then just a closing statement from
me.
Mr. MacDonald, I apologize for not asking this before, but
I want to make sure I get the question asked to you. In your
written testimony, you say that the contract prohibited the
agency from making any unauthorized statements to the public.
Are you still under the same contract to not make any
unauthorized statements to the public?
Mr. MacDonald. We are, sir, yes.
Mr. Capuano. But I presume that since you are under oath
today, the oath that you took at the beginning of this hearing
supersedes any contractual agreement.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, it most certainly does.
Mr. Capuano. OK.
Mr. MacDonald. I would also comment that the chairman has
authorized----
Mr. Capuano. Fair enough.
Mr. MacDonald [continuing]. Us to make statements.
Mr. Capuano. The reason I ask is because I want to make
sure I ask the question. Though I am hoping--I think I know the
answer, I want to hear it. Based on your knowledge today, is
there anything that the general public or that myself or Mr.
Lynch doesn't know relative to cost, safety, or security, of
major impact--major import, that we should know?
Is Mr. Amorello telling us the truth, unlike some of his--
not his predecessors but the predecessors of the other agency,
predecessors who ran the Big Dig? Are we being told the truth
today relative to cost, relative to safety and security of the
tunnel? Again, subject to all of the litigation. I am not
asking you to point fingers. That will be all worked out. But
to the best of your knowledge, are we currently being told the
truth about this project?
Mr. MacDonald. To the best of my knowledge, I think your
statements are absolutely right. I think you are being told
everything there is to know about the project. Mr. Amorello
is--Chairman Amorello is running one of the most transparent
agencies in the country right now. You know, everything is on a
real-time basis. From the time we find a defect in the tunnel
to when it is disclosed to the public is within days. So I
think it is an extraordinarily open administration.
Mr. Capuano. Thank you. That is the answer I was hoping to
hear, and I am glad I got it.
I just want to close by thanking you all for coming. We
have been here close to, give or take, 4 hours now. First of
all, thank you for staying, and thank you for being open and
honest. And, you know, thank you for sticking with it.
Mr. Amorello, I know you have had some good days and some
bad days on this project. And my hope is that we have more good
days coming than we have had in the past.
And, gentlemen, thank you all. Mr. Lynch, thank you for
inviting me, and I appreciate the opportunity.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Congressman. Just in closing, in a
similar note, Mr. Amorello, I reviewed the chronology of this,
and I know you came here in 2002 and that a lot of these
problems were in full bloom before that point. So I suspect
that they have laid more blame at your doorstep than you truly
deserve, and I want to make that--as someone who has looked at
this from day one to the present day, I just want to make that
perfectly clear.
I just want to go back to my friends at Bechtel. Again, you
understand the mission here and the desire here to find some
solution, not to lay the blame and the costs at your doorstep,
but to somehow get your involvement and your commitment to
indemnifying the taxpayers, so that the costs are borne by the
responsible parties. And I have no knowledge of the
proportionate responsibility among the parties. I suspect it is
widely spread.
Mr. MacDonald, are you committed to that process that would
seek to make sure that the construction is completed according
to the specifications and to the highest expectations of the
people of the Commonwealth? And also, the Federal taxpayers
that have contributed here. And are you willing to work with us
on indemnifying the taxpayer from any unreasonable costs above
what they should have expected?
Mr. MacDonald. Congressman, we are committed to giving you
the quality product that you deserve, and we will continue to
strive toward that end. With respect to the commercial matters,
at the closeout of this job, and some of the things that you
have talked about are similar to some things that were asked by
the Joint Transportation Committee of the legislature here back
in December.
And we are committed on taking those ideas on board. We
followed up with the co-chair, Chairman Wagner LeDoure. Their
view at the time, having the AG--State attorney general in
charge of the program, that was the appropriate process to
sustain that dialog through. And so we are committed to
sustaining that dialog through that process.
Mr. Lynch. But I am looking to find something long term,
some solution to put in place as this project winds down. You
may be right, and the project may perform as advertised.
However, there have been enough events during the course of
this project, and enough problems that have come to light, that
lead a prudent person to require some type of assurance.
Whether you call that a warranty or a--whether a policy can
be put together, it is an insurable risk, in my estimation,
given the timeframe for this project and what we know now and
what we will know especially after May 15 and DeLoitte & Touche
comes in with their report, which may prompt another hearing,
by the way.
But are you willing to look at that type of solution
collectively with all of the other partes?
Mr. MacDonald. Again, Mr. Congressman, the answer is we
will look at that in the context of the overall resolution of
these issues, and we think that the right place to do that is
through the process with the State attorney general.
Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. If that is your answer.
Do any of you have anything you would like to say in
closing? I should probably offer you that opportunity.
Mr. Amorello. Congressman, the commitment on the Turnpike
Authority to finish this project to the level that the public
expects us to, it is delivering on the commitments that were
made when it was initiated back in the mid-1980's in terms of
improving traffic flow.
We have done the groundbreaking on the north end parks. We
are seeing the greening of downtown Boston and improving
transportation. So the project is living up to the
expectations. These construction issues that we need to
resolve, while we have the contractors in place, while Bechtel/
Parsons are here, we will hold them accountable.
Your suggestion in terms of a warranty, I can assure you
that the Turnpike Authority will work cooperatively with the
attorney general, and items that perhaps we project out as
additional costs that the Authority should not have expected to
bear on itself as the owner and operator of this tunnel network
perhaps could be added into discussions in terms of
settlements, if it is possible with the responsible parties
from the SDCs and from the joint venture.
This is an incredible achievement. This highway network,
despite all of the negative press that has occurred here, it is
an incredible achievement. The tunnel system under the city of
Boston is a marvel that we will all take great pride in that we
are a part of and helped to make it a reality.
These issues, these hurdles that we need to overcome, we
will overcome them. I have the confidence in the gentleman to
my left. I have the conference in the folks sitting behind me
from the Turnpike Authority, particularly those of us in the
public sector that want to do the right thing, assure the
taxpayers and tollpayers that their money was wisely spent and
that they weren't spent on any additional costs that--for leak
repairs, or what have you.
But we will hold all our contractors accountable on our end
in terms of claims and changes, and we will work cooperatively
with the attorney general in its efforts at cost recovery, or
continuing the efforts of cost recovery. But this is--it should
never be forgotten by any of us in this Commonwealth--an
incredible project that is going to make a world of difference
for the future of Boston and New England.
It has had a great impact for the men and women in the
building trades for 10 years while construction was going on, a
rare opportunity of keeping a lot of people that were in a
business, as you know, that was cyclical and depending on
cycles. For much of the 1990's, this project kept the city of
Boston and the region healthy economically, because of the
spending that went into it.
And at the end of the day, we will have a first-rate tunnel
network, a first-rate transportation system, first-rate parks
on the top, all because of the investment that has been made by
the national government, by the State government by the
Turnpike Authority.
But we have an obligation to you, the Members of Congress,
to Inspector Mead--I agreed with you earlier when Congressman
Capuano said the one person he cares about is--if he is still
behind me somewhere--the Inspector General for the Department
of Transportation, but also our partners in Federal Highway.
Administrator Peters has been very supportive of this
project and efforts, but she is also holding our feet to the
fire to make sure that the panel replacement that comes in
meets your expectation and their expectation for longevity,
durability, constructability, and we will come up with a
solution with, again, the folks behind me--John Christian,
Clyde Baker from SDS--to assure the public that no cost was
incurred.
And no cost is being--the cost of repair of this panel is
not a factor for us. The Bechtel folks and the people from
Modern Continental have stepped up to take responsibility, so
we are not calculating in any dollar value to say, ``This is
the fix.'' It will be the best fix that works, with the least
amount of risk, least amount of impact to our abutters, and
something that is constructable and durable and will last as
long as we expect these tunnels to last, and that is 75 years
or greater.
Mr. Lynch. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
Gentleman.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, Mr. Congressman. This has been an
extraordinarily long game for us, as your management
consultant. We have been at this for 20 years. The
controversies that we face today aren't the first controversies
that we have responded to on this job. These aren't the first
challenges that we have overcome on this job.
So we will continue to go forward. We will continue to do
our best to complete this project as cost effectively and to a
high standard to deliver the world-class project that you are
entitled to. We will do that. The challenges today will be
overcome.
We have also done that--and, again, as you get to the tail
of these things, the cost recovery issues tend to take on a
rather large dimension, and that is what has happened here, and
it has happened over the past 3 years. It just didn't happen
this year. It has been an ongoing stress for us, really, since
the middle of 2001.
And I am so proud of our people that they have been able to
stay focused on their job and working with the MTA and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to get this job done. And we will
continue to do that while we continue to constructively work
through this dispute.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, thank you. And I trust that you will
work with Attorney General Reilly, then, maybe to pursue that
indemnification of the taxpayers in some shape or form that is
agreeable to you all?
Thank you, gentlemen. The hearing is adjourned.
[Note.--The slide presentation by Hon. Stephen Lynch
entitled, ``Digging up the Facts: Inspecting the Big Dig and
the Performance of Federal and State Government in Providing
Oversight of Federal Funds,'' may be found in committee files.]
[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]