[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S SCREENING OF AIRLINE
PILOTS: SOUND SECURITY PRACTICE OR
WASTE OF SCARCE RESOURCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 13, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-13
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-034 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Chairman Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
Peter T. King, New York Peter A. Defazio, Oregon
John Linder, Georgia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Tom Davis, Virginia Columbia
Daniel E. Lungren, California Zoe Lofgren, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Islands
Katherine Harris, Florida Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Michael McCaul, Texas
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
______
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
John Linder, Georgia Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Christopher Cox, California (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman Subcommittee on
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, A Representativ in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 3
The Honorable Norm Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the
States of Washington
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
WITNESS
Ms Debra Burlingame, Member, 9/11 Families for a Secure America
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Captain Duane Woerth, President, Airline Pilots Association
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Ms. Candace Kolander, Flight Attendant, Alaska Air, Association
of Flight Attendants--Communication Workers of America (AFA-
CWA)
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
APPENDIX
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Questions Concerning the Screening of Pilots..................... 43
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S SCREENING OF AIRLINE
PILOTS: SOUND SECURITY PRACTICE OR
WASTE OF SCARCE RESOURCES?
----------
Friday, May 13, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Cox, Linder, DeFazio, and
Dicks.
Mr. Lungren of California. The Committee on Homeland
Security's Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
TSA's screening of commercial airline pilots. The purpose of
this hearing is to examine whether the screening of airline
pilots at airport security checkpoints is an appropriate use of
scarce Transportation Security Administration resources.
At the outset, let me apologize for being somewhat tardy. I
had to give a welcoming talk to, or make welcoming remarks to,
the NCAA National Championship Women's Soccer Team; which was
not from USC, by the way, but from the University of Notre
Dame, my alma mater, and I wanted to make sure I was there.
Unfortunately, they were a little late. So I beg your
indulgence. They were probably going through security; that is
correct.
There is no doubt that airline passenger screening
continues to be the most visible and most problematic activity
of TSA. I am informed that since September 11, the Federal
Government has spent over $13 billion on this function, with
the President calling for another $3.9 billion in the fiscal
year 2006 budget. Unfortunately, according to the Department of
Homeland Security Inspector General, in the 2-1/2 years since
the Federal Government took over passenger screening, screening
performance has not necessarily improved.
I believe that Americans are willing to shoulder necessary
burdens to ensure the security of the flying public; however,
we should make sure that TSA is not using precious taxpayer
resources in an unwise fashion.
TSA continues to focus its efforts on preventing dangerous
objects from getting onto aircraft; and the question is, what
about dangerous people? All of us have gone through the
screening process, all of us are willing to undergo the
inconvenience and sometimes the indignity of this, so long as
it seems to make sense. But just common observation would ask
the question: Does a wheelchair-bound grandmother pose the same
risk to aviation security as perhaps a group of agitated young
men? And what threat is TSA addressing when it separates a
small child from its parents for a pat-down, as recently
happened with one of my staff people when she was attempting to
fly from Sacramento down to San Diego, and she and her three
children were all taken out for a secondary search, and she was
told, rather aggressively, to just stand there while she was
separated from her children. And when one of her children, a
young girl, got frightened and she went for her, she was
forcefully told by the TSA individual that she was supposed to
stay where she was and not move until she had been wanded. I am
aware of 2-year-olds being patted down in certain secondary
searches.
And so we have to ask, does this make sense? And we are
going to ask a question today: Does it make sense to physically
screen airline pilots when we are talking about specific
groups? Now, maybe it does, and I am certainly willing to
listen, but I am informed that airline pilots are subjected to
psychological exams every 6 to 12 months; that they hold a
security identification area badge; and, in order to do that,
they have to have their fingerprints run against the FBI's
criminal records database. It would suggest that we know a
little bit more about them than we know about other people, and
yet there doesn't seem to be any distinction made. By some
estimates, our country's over 100,000 airline pilots are
subjected to checkpoint screening over 20 million times a year.
One has to ask: Is that a useful use of our resources?
I would hope that TSA would accelerate commonsense
programs, such as the transportation worker identification card
and the registered traveler program used by metric identifiers
to prove these people are who they say they are. So my intent
is, over time, to look at this comprehensively, to make sure
that if we are going to inconvenience the American public--and
they are willing to do that so long as they are assured that
what is being done is worthwhile.
And so today I thank our witnesses for taking the time to
join us, and I look forward to hearing each of your
perspectives on this issue. It is now my privilege to recognize
the Chairman of the full committee for any comments that he
might make.
Well, I will recognize our friend from Oregon first, as a
matter of protocol.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity
[Call hearing to order]
I would like to welcome everyone today to a hearing of the
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. This morning, we will
focus on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) policy
towards the screening of airline pilots.
Airline passenger screening continues to be the most visible and
most problematic activity of TSA.
Since 9-11, the Federal government has spent over $13 billion on
this function.
The President is calling for another $3.9 billion in the FY 2006
budget.
Unfortunately, according to the Department of Homeland Security
Inspector General, in the two-and-a-half years since the Federal
government took over passenger screening, screener performance has not
improved.
Americans are willing to shoulder the necessary burdens to ensure
the security of the flying public; however, I remain concerned that TSA
is not using precious taxpayer resources wisely.
TSA continues to focus its efforts on preventing dangerous objects
from getting onto aircraft, not on dangerous people.
One of the hallmarks of Federal airline passenger screening is that
it treats everyone the same.
While this policy may be comforting to some, I do not believe it
makes good security sense.
Does a wheelchair-bound grandmother pose the same risk to aviation
security as a group of agitated young men? What threat is TSA
addressing when it separates a small child from its parents for a pat-
down?
TSA should be paying more attention to those passengers most likely
to pose a terrorist risk.
Which begs the question: ``Why does TSA physically screen airline
pilots?''
Airline pilots hold a special place of trust in our society. We
trust them with our lives and our family's lives every time we step
aboard an airplane.
Pilots go through great lengths to prove that they are worthy of
that trust.
To maintain their airman's certificate, their names are routinely
run against the terrorist watch-list and the no-fly list.
When they are first hired by an airline, they undergo a rigorous
psychological exam.
They can be subjected to another psychological exam every 6 to 12
months as part of their required medical exams.
To hold a Security Identification Area (SIDA) Badge, pilots must
have their fingerprints runs against the FBI criminal records database.
Yet when it comes to screening, we treat them as if they were some
unknown quantity walking of the street.
By some estimates, our country's 100,000 airline pilots are
subjected to checkpoint screening over 20 million times a year.
TSA must accelerate common sense programs such as the
Transportation Worker Identification Card and the Registered Travel
Program that use biometric identifiers to prove these people are who
they say they are.
This will allow fully-vetted individuals to bypass the general
screening queue, which, in turn, will shorten lines and reduce TSA
costs.
I would like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to join us
today. I look forward to hearing each of your perspectives on this
issue.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always am happy to
go after the Chairman, but I will respond in part to your
remarks.
I have spent--this is my 19th year on the Aviation
Committee, and obviously we have spent a tremendous amount of
time on this issue. In fact, I introduced my first legislation
to enhance passenger screening in 1987 because of briefings I
received at that time and the extraordinary shortcomings that I
found with the system and the technology used in the system.
Unfortunately, we are using the same technology for the
most part today that they were using in 1987, which is
machinery that was thrown out at the Capitol more than 15 years
ago--and at the White House--as inadequate to the task, but
somehow we think it is adequate for airports.
So in part, the problems you pointed to between the IG and
the GAO relating to screeners go to the fact that they are
working wih two-dimensional, antiquated x-ray equipment, which
cannot readily detect what we are using now as simulated
threats, 21st-century threats, and are totally inadequate to
detect plastic explosives. So we do need to focus on that and
move ahead with improvements in the technology or add-ons to
technology.
The ``trusted traveler'' has been a point of frustration
since the formation of the TSA. The first head of the TSA Mr.
Magaw, just never quite understood it, although he himself
never stood in a line anywhere for one second. He was very
resistant, slowed it down, and the administration does not seem
to have fully embraced it. I stand at the long lines at
National looking at the unutilized trusted traveler machine,
because I can't get a trusted traveler card because I don't fly
American out of National; I fly United, and you have to be an
American passenger to get one of those cards at National. And I
am sure there are a lot of other frequent fliers standing in
the same line.
Again, we could--and my opinion is CAPPS and other things
focusing on the people are going to be a problem with those
technologies, but if we could remove the people who we know are
not threats and subject them to minimal screening, or perhaps
no screening in the case of pilots, we could expedite and allow
the TSA employees to focus on the unknown people and the
unknown bags that are being carried.
Again, unfortunately, they are moving at a very, very, very
slow pace with the trusted traveler program, which I believe
could pay for itself. I would be happy to pay, as would most
other frequent travelers, the full amount of the cost of my
background check, and even chip in a little extra to help them
buy the technology if we could expedite things in that manner.
So I think this is a timely hearing and a good beginning,
sort of a small baby step in approaching the greater problems
with passenger screening and aviation security. I thank the
Chairman for calling us together here today, and look forward
to the testimony.
Mr. Lungren of California. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman from the full
committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. I thank the Chairman. Let me begin by welcoming
and thanking our witnesses for appearing before the committee
today.
I would like to welcome first Ms. Debra Burlingame, who is
here representing 9/11 Families For a Secure America. She has
won the admiration of our entire Nation for the way that her
work on protecting Americans against future acts of terrorism
is honoring the life of her late brother, Captain Charles
Burlingame. He was the pilot of American flight 77, which
crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. His sister has
transformed her grief into an opportunity to help make our
Nation and airline travel safer.
Captain Duane Woerth, we appreciate the expertise that the
Airline Pilots Association brings to this hearing. ALPA has a
long and distinguished record of service to our country on
airline safety and security issues. We look forward to your
comments on the issues before the committee this morning.
I would also like to welcome to the hearing Ms. Candace
Kolander, representing the Association of Flight Attendants. As
the men and women responsible for passenger safety in the event
of a terrorist attack in flight, you have much wisdom to offer
us as we tackle these problems of security screening.
Each of you was affected in some unique fashion by the
terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and we appreciate your
coming before the committee.
I am very pleased that this subcommittee is focusing on the
need for a more rational approach, a more effective approach to
security screening in passenger air transportation. This
committee and the subcommittee today are committed to ensuring
security at every one of our Nation's 486 commercial airports.
We want to ensure the security against future acts of
terrorists for every aircraft and all the passengers that
utilize airport services, and we want to do this while
improving the flow of trade and legitimate travel.
In its efforts to tackle threats to aviation security
following September 11, 2001, we in Congress enacted
legislation which charged the Transportation Security
Administration with security screening for passengers in air
transportation. And in furtherance of this congressional
mandate, TSA has developed and applied a system for screening
not only airline passengers but also the pilots and the flight
crews, and we want to examine that today. We are focusing on,
in particular, TSA's protocols for screening airline pilots.
Just as with many other aviation security functions adopted
since TSA was established, TSA has not applied a risk-based
assessment to the screening of airline pilots. There are about
100,000 commercial airline pilots who undergo not only the
extensive background checks that my colleagues have described,
but also the same ordeal of standing in line on their way to
the plane once they get to the airport. They are treated, the
pilots, exactly the same as the general public. As a result,
TSA conducts 2 million security screenings for airline pilots
every month, and that adds to the long lines and wait times at
airport checkpoints for all the rest of the passengers. And yet
we know a lot about these pilots; it is not as if they are
strangers showing up in line. We are simply failing to use the
information we have about them, including biometric
information.
In contrast, TSA permits some categories of airline
workers, not the pilots, such as baggage handlers and people
responsible for aircraft equipment on the airplane itself to
bypass this same screening. There is not much logic in treating
pilots who take control of the plane differently from the
mechanics and the baggage handlers who service the airplane. I
don't think there is any question that airline pilots, among
all of the airline employees, are the most vetted category. Not
only do pilots have their names checked against terrorist watch
lists, like the passengers, but they have already undergone
extensive background checks, including criminal background
checks, psychological tests, physical examinations and so on,
all of these things related not just to counterterrorism but,
of course, to airline safety, because we want to be sure about
these men and women who are flying the airplanes, for very good
reason: We want to be able to trust our airline pilots.
Now, if we trust airline pilots with flying the plane, with
ensuring the safety of all of the passengers and the crew and
people on earth below, what is the rationale for treating them
as complete strangers when they show up at the airplane and
making them stand in line with all of the other passengers,
many of whom we have never seen before?
Airline pilots, unlike the other passengers, don't need
guns and knives in order to take control of the aircraft. They
have the keys, they are in command of the aircraft. And those
aircraft, as we learned in such grisly fashion on September 11,
2001, are themselves potential dangerous weapons. They carry
thousands of pounds of fuel.
Just taking a limited case, a 747, fully loaded with fuel;
that craft, as a missile, as a weapon, weighs almost a million
pounds, and it could be used to inflict devastating damage to
almost any given terrorist target.
Now there is no question that comprehensive screening of
flight personnel is important. The question is: Is the system
that we are using designed to do that for us? Are we learning
anything as these pilots go through the security screening?
One--and perhaps the only one example of why it is important to
have additional on-site screening at the airport--is that the
person showing up saying they are the pilot, this person that
has been fully vetted, might not be that person; it might be an
imposter wearing a stolen uniform with a stolen ID, maybe with
a stolen gun. And then we have to ask ourselves: Is the system
that we have in place at the airport designed to catch that
person, or are they just flashing an ID and wearing their
uniform and their gun and getting directed right up through the
airplane anyway? If that is what is going on, then all of these
pilots standing in line are buying us no security and only
cost. That is one of the questions we want to explore today.
We also want to compare this current system for pilots with
another complete solution that is already on the books, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, that goes by
the acronym of TWIC. TWIC uses biometric features. TSA can
improve the processes by which security screenings are
determined for airline, airport, and other transportation
workers and better manage access to secure areas of airports
and other transportation facilities, in my view, by expediting
TWIC.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 mandated
that TSA develop TWIC for workers requiring unescorted access
to secure areas of transportation facilities. By establishing
this common credential with biometric features of the user, TSA
could improve security across all transportation modes and
better manage access to secure areas of our national
transportation systems.
And if we applied it in this fashion, then airline pilots
would be able to bypass airport checkpoint screenings, making
sure they get to their planes on time, and making sure that the
rest of us who are waiting to get on the plane get there a
little bit more quickly. The result would be shorter wait times
for air travelers and increased efficiencies in airline and TSA
operations.
Yet, 3 years after Congress directed TSA to develop this
means of positively identifying transportation workers, TSA has
not yet completed development and distribution of the TWIC.
Mr. Chairman, I have as many questions as I do thoughts on
this subject, and I am very much looking forward to hearing
what our expert witnesses have to say on this subject. I really
want to commend you for focusing Congress' attention on this
issue this morning.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Christopher Cox, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California, and Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Let me first welcome and thank the
witnesses for appearing before the Committee today.
I welcome you to this morning's hearing, Ms. Burlingame, and the
valuable perspective you bring to this hearing. Those of us that have
helped wage the war on terror since the terrorist attacks on the United
States almost four years ago, know how the grief you suffered from the
loss of your brother, Captain Charles Burlingame, who piloted American
Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, has been transformed into an opportunity to help make our nation
and airline travel safer and another terrorist attack.
Captain Woerth, we appreciate the expertise that the Air Line
Pilots Association brings to this hearing. ALPA has a long and
distinguished record on airline safety and security issues, and we look
forward to your comments on the issue before the Committee this
morning.
I would also like to welcome you to the hearing, Ms. Kolander.
Flight attendants make important contributions in improving security in
airline travel and I look forward to your testimony.
Each of you was affected in some unique fashion by the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and we appreciate your coming before the
Committee to offer your perspective on whether TSA's comprehensive
screening of airline pilots is an appropriate use of its limited
resources.
I am very pleased that the Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity is focusing on the need for
a more rational approach to security screening in passenger air
transportation at today's hearing. This Committee is committed to
ensuring security at our nation's 486 commercial airports, and the
aircraft and passengers that utilize airport services, while ensuring
that flow of trade and legitimate travel are not unduly impeded by
burdensome and unnecessary screening requirements at our airports.
In its effort to tackle threats to aviation security following the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, which among other
requirements, charged the Transportation Security Administration with
ensuring civil aviation security, including security screening for
passengers in air transportation. To meet this aviation security
mandate, TSA has developed and applied a set of screening protocols for
airline passengers and flight crews.
Today, we are focusing on TSA's comprehensive screening of airline
pilots because just as with many other aviation security functions
adopted since it was established, TSA has not applied any risk-based
assessments to the screening of airline pilots. Consequently, most of
the 100,000 commercial airline pilots must undergo security screening
similar to that done for the general public. TSA conducts two million
security screenings for airline pilots per month, adding to long lines
and wait times at airport checkpoints.
In contrast, TSA permits some categories of airline workers, such
as those who handle baggage and aircraft equipment, to bypass physical
screening at airport checkpoints. There is no logic in exempting from
screening workers who handle baggage and aircraft equipment, while
requiring comprehensive security screening for airline pilots.
Without question, airline pilots are the most vetted category of
individuals in the industry. Not only do pilots have their names
checked against terrorist watch lists, they also undergo criminal
history background checks and psychological tests before they are
employed, and semiannual physical examinations.
If we trust airline pilots with ensuring the safety of passengers,
the aircraft and crew, what is the rationale for subjecting them to the
same level of security screening as the general public? Airline pilots
do not need guns or knives to do harm to aircraft, passengers, or
targets on the ground. In the course of their duties, they are in
command of aircraft, which are, themselves, potential terrorist
weapons, carrying thousands of pounds of fuel. A fully-loaded 747, for
example, weighs approximately 917,000 pounds and could be used to
inflict devastating damage to almost any given terrorist target.
There is, of course, one scenario in which comprehensive screening
of flight personnel could be valuable--the case of imposture, where
someone with a stolen uniform and forged identification sought to board
the aircraft. But has TSA actually done the kind of analysis of
terrorist capabilities and intentions that could balance the likelihood
of this threat against the burden of comprehensive screening of airline
personnel?
More to the point, there is a complete solution to this problem
already on the books--the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential, or TWIC, using biometric features.
TSA can improve the processes by which security screening is
determined for airline, airport, and other transportation workers and
better manage access to secure areas of airports and other
transportation facilities by expediting the TWIC. The Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 mandated that TSA develop the TWIC
for workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of
transportation facilities. By establishing this common credential with
biometric features of the user, TSA could improve security across all
transportation modes and better manage access to secure areas of our
national transportation systems. If applied in this fashion, airline
pilots would be able to bypass airport checkpoint screening, since they
would have already had threat assessment and criminal history
background checks. The result would be shorter wait times for air
travelers and increased efficiencies in TSA's operations.
Yet three years after Congress directed TSA to develop this means
of positively identifying transportation workers, TSA has still not
completed development and distribution of the TWIC.
More broadly, TWIC is a step towards the kind of policy that TSA
should be adopting--one that moves more and more blocks of travelers
out of the screening system through the use of reliable, and preferably
biometric, identification. By clearing this chaff from our radar
screens, such policies will enable TSA to focus on the fraction of
travelers who are genuinely of interest, and to do so without recourse
to the kinds of profiling that should arouse our concerns.
The Transportation Security Administration's paramount
responsibility is securing transportation. While I recognize the
importance of security screening within the airport environment, we
need to ensure that security practices do not needlessly harm the
nation's economy and diminish the freedoms that have defined our way of
life. While the TSA strives to protect the nation's transportation
modes, TSA must also pursue sound policies that will ensure the
efficient movement of people and goods.
The challenge before us, then, is helping TSA to find the right
balance between security and common sense protocols in its screening
processes. TSA's comprehensive screening of airline pilots seems to me
to be a questionable use of its limited resources in this time of
fiscal constraints. I look forward to hearing from you how we can work
together to effect improvements in these areas.
Mr. Lungren of California. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
We are pleased to have an expert panel of witnesses before
us today on this important subject. And just let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statement will be entered
into the record, so we ask that you strive to limit the oral
testimony to the 5-minute period allotted.
Mr. Lungren of California. The Chairman will now recognize
Ms. Debra Burlingame, who is speaking today as a member of the
9/11 Families For a Secure America.
STATEMENT OF DEBRA BURLINGAME, MEMBER OF 911 FAMILIES FOR A
SECURE AMERICA
Ms. Burlingame. Thank you, Chairman Lungren. And also thank
you to the distinguished members who are here, even though it
is a Friday, but we are very happy you are here to hear what we
have to say. And I am honored to be here before you and this
committee to discuss the TSA's proposed screening of airline
pilots. I think it is a very important issue for the country,
for the flying public, and the American people.
I am a member of 9/11 Families For a Secure America, but as
I say in my written statement, I feel my most important
qualification is being Chic Burlingame's sister. I learned a
lot about aviation from him. I was a flight attendant myself
for 7 years, but it was through Chic's eyes that I saw 9/11,
and it is through Chic's eyes that I see the safety of our
country going forward in what we are doing and evaluate it.
Sometimes I feel him--I hear him whispering in my ear, and I am
going to share a little bit of that with you this morning.
Chic was a pilot for American Airlines for 22 years. He was
qualified on Boeing 57s, 67s. In his 22 years, he flew at
various times domestic and international routes. Before that,
he was an elite Navy pilot, a carry base pilot, flying in the
Mediterranean. And he was with the Navy for a combined service
of 25 years, Active and Reserve duty. He died the day before
his 52nd birthday.
While the attack on this country 3 years and 8 months ago
was a horror for all of us, for all Americans, the commercial
aviation industry endured a particularly brutal experience.
While most people watched the planes hit the buildings and the
towers fall, with shock and disbelief, for flight crews
witnessing the summary executions of their fellow crew members
and those helpless passengers was a deeply personal experience.
These are people who love airplanes, who spent their entire
lives associated with aviation, many starting from the time
they were children, like my brother, dreaming of the joy of
flight. To them, seeing an aircraft used as an instrument of
mass destruction is a perversion which contradicts everything
they know and all they have trained to do.
And I am grateful to be before this committee today so that
I can commend them publicly for the incredible courage they
displayed in the days and weeks after they lost so many of
their colleagues. They understood that these attacks were not
simply an effort to bring down airplanes and buildings, they
knew that this was a full-out assault on the United States
economy. And no one knows better than these aviation
professionals how vital this industry is to our national and
global economy. And so with heavy hearts, they put on their
uniforms, they got back on the planes, and by their example
they restored confidence in the flying public in our commercial
aviation system.
And as a former flight attendant, and, above all, as Chic's
sister, I cannot tell you how grateful our family was to see
the jets up in the air again.
As you gentlemen have said already, no group of individuals
understands what is at stake here in making our aviation system
work better than the people who get on those planes every day.
And I urge you, Members of Congress and this committee, to play
close attention to what they have to say. They are uniquely
qualified, just as you have said, they are highly educated,
they are extremely intelligent, they know the aircraft, they
know the environment on the ground and in the air, and their
experiences have given them an ability to cut through the heart
of any issue that affects their world.
The story I want to tell you about my brother: He, as I
said, flew a lot of routes, including from Dulles to Los
Angeles. And on one particular trip he was flying back from
L.A. Another one of my brothers took him to the airport. And,
before 9/11, flight crews bypassed security by going straight
to the ramp or to operations through the ramp, or various other
means, but they didn't, obviously, go through screening.
On this particular day, Chic decided to submit to security
screening, because he wanted to simply be with my brother and
chat with him as they walked down the terminal. So he put his
bags on the ramp--or through x-ray, his crew kit through x-ray,
he went through the magnetometer, and my brother Brad followed
him. And when they were finished, Chic sort of shook his head
and muttered under his breath, and Brad said, ``You object to
that? Why shouldn't air crews be screened? You could be
secreting a knife, you could have a gun in your crew kit. Why
not?'' And Chic's response was, ``I am a pilot. I am a pilot. I
don't need a gun or a knife, I have an airplane filled with
60,000 guns of jet fuel; in essence, I am flying a missile.'' I
think that goes to the heart of what we are discussing today.
That conversation that he had with my brother Brad was in
1999, 2 years before Chic's Boeing 757 was commandeered and
used as a weapon of mass destruction in exactly the manner he
imagined. And it clearly illustrates what flight crews
understood then and continue to believe now: that it is
counterintuitive and counterproductive to subject, as you say,
the most highly referenced, heavily backgrounded, and
operationally visible employee group in the private sector to
airport security screenings. They are fingerprinted, they are
photographed, they are routinely monitored, as you said,
Chairman Cox. And some even continue to serve as military
Reserve pilots, as my brother did. They have long, long
records.
And pilots know one another. I think after 9/11 I don't
think an imposter could pull it off, frankly, even if he had a
TWIC ID. I think pilots are scrutinizing everything in their
world in a much sharper way post-9/11.
But my question is: What does it say to the flying public,
beyond the issue of resources, just in terms of sheer common
sense? What does it say to the flying public for TSA to be
subjecting flight crews to x-ray screening and wanding them
within minutes of handing over the controls to a lethal weapon?
And I agree with you all that seeing blue-haired ladies
being, you know, wanded--I have seen arthritic passengers have
to be helped in and out of their shoes. And I think it is sad
to me to see a captain in a spread-eagle position, frankly,
preparing for a pat-down.
I don't think, ultimately, that this instills confidence in
the flying public. I don't really even understand what the
purpose of it is, because the identity thing, it simply doesn't
make sense.
Meanwhile--and this is my great concern and the concern of
9/11 Families for a Secure America--the TSA continues to allow
hourly wage employees who are not subjected to background
checks to bypass security screenings altogether. Nonsecure,
unskilled workers who are employed on airport perimeters and
security areas on the ramp, and even on the airplanes
themselves, carry unsearched, unscreened personal belongings
such as backpacks with them. And I know, because the pilots are
telling me this; they are seeing them.
Over the last 3 years, ICE agents and Operation Tarmac have
discovered nearly 6,000 unauthorized workers at airports and
maintenance facilities around the country, and they have
arrested over 1,000 illegal aliens, including 5--a fugitive
alien, I believe it was at Boston Logan, with an outstanding
deportation order. They have issued 775 criminal indictments.
These facts suggest that the TSA lacks a fundamental
understanding of the threat we continue to face, because even
as we struggle to collate the databases which make up the no-
fly list consisting of the names of the FBI, State Department
and the Intelligence Community, the TSA continues to allow
passengers to board airplanes with Mexican Matricula Consular
ID cards. These. I have a handful of them here.
As a member of the FBI's Office of Intelligence testified
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee nearly 2 years ago,
these are aggressively marketed by the Mexican Government. They
take them out in mobile consulates. They go to street fairs and
high school parking lots. They have marketed them in now 360
American cities. The FBI calls this a laminated piece of paper;
that is all it is. It doesn't have a database connected to it.
The Mexican Government now says there are security features
embedded in these cards, but in fact there is no machine that
can read these alleged security features. And it doesn't matter
anyway because they are accepted at airports all across the
land.
And I have one here that I had made for me--by the way,
this is accepted at National Airport. This counterfeit card
would be accepted at National Airport. They don't have the
means to read security features, so they don't look for them.
I have one for you, Chairman Lungren. Here it is, with your
actual name, your actual address, and your actual birthday--
which we don't say.
I have one for you, Chairman Cox. I have one for the
Ranking Member of your committee, Mr. Bennie Thompson, which I
will give to his aide. And I also have one for the Ranking
Member of this subcommittee, Congressman Sanchez, with her
birth date too.
The interesting thing about these cards is--and I have got
six of them here, you can make hundreds of them. I had these
overnighted to me for this hearing, and if I had had more time,
I would have included your Mexican birth certificates, with all
your names and where you were born in Mexico. That is how it is
marketed on the street. That is where these people get them.
And it is, frankly, shocking to me that the TSA would allow
these to be used at airports as identification, not knowing who
these individuals are, and yet they are going to put Duane
Woerth's membership through screening when they know more about
these men than they can possibly know--men and women.
It seems to me that as we harden passports, as we
scrutinize visas and make them much harder to get, we are
taking these tools away from terrorists to get on airplanes,
but now we are giving them another one.
What good is it to discuss airplane screening of these
highly vetted pilots when we are letting these folks on and we
don't know who they are, we have no idea who they are?
I appreciate the difficult challenges that the
Transportation Security Administration faces as we forge ahead.
But you know, after the trauma of 9/11, 3 years and 8 months
ago, this country's heart was broken. It was. It wasn't just
the families; the country's heart was broken. And it is
absolutely unacceptable for the TSA and Members of Congress to
put the economics and the politics of illegal immigration above
the safety and security of its citizens.
Americans have been very, very patient. I think they are
willing to put up with a lot at the airport, and I think they
do. But they will not be fooled. They are not being fooled, and
they are losing patience, and they are getting angry.
And I would just like to leave you with the words--to me
the most important words of the 9/11 Commission report, and
that is that what failed us on 9/11 was a failure of
imagination. I would ask you to remember my brother's words,
and I would ask you to listen to the flight crews. They
understand this better than anyone.
Mr. Lungren of California. Thank you, Ms. Burlingame.
[The statement of Ms. Burlingame follows:]
Prepared Statement of Debra Burlingame
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of
the Homeland Security subcommittee:
I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's proposed screening of
commercial airline pilots. Thank you for requesting my views on this
subject which is of great importance to the aviation community, the
flying public and the American people. I am listed here on the panel as
a member of 911 Families for a Secure America, but in truth, the
qualification that has given me the greatest insight to the subject of
today's hearing--and the one I prize the most--is that of sister. My
brother was Captain Charles F. ``Chic'' Burlingame, III, pilot of
American Airlines flight 77, which was crashed at the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001. Chic was a pilot with American for 22 years. During
his commercial career Chic was qualified on Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft
and flew domestic and international routes. Prior to his career with
American, he was an elite carrier-based fighter pilot for the United
States Navy, serving a total of 25 years, combined active and reserve
duty. Chic died the day before his 52nd birthday.
While the devastating attack on our country three years and eight
months ago was a horror for all Americans, those who work in the
commercial aviation industry endured a particularly brutal experience.
While most people watched the planes hit the buildings on September
11th in a state of shock and disbelief, for flight crews, witnessing
the summary executions of their fellow crew members and their helpless
passengers was a deeply personal experience. These are people who love
airplanes, who have spent their entire lives associated with aviation,
many starting from they time they were children, dreaming of the joy of
flight. To them, seeing an aircraft used as an instrument of mass
destruction is a perversion which contradicts everything they know and
all they have trained to do.
I am grateful for the opportunity to commend them before members of
Congress, for the incredible courage they exhibited in the days and
weeks after they lost so many of their colleagues. They understood that
the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the thwarted
attack that ended in Shanksville, PA were attempts not simply to bring
down airplanes and buildings. They knew that this was an full-out
assault aimed at bringing down the United States economy. No one knows
better than these aviation professionals how vital the airline industry
is to our national and global economy. And so, with heavy hearts, they
put on their uniforms, got back on their planes and, by their example,
helped restore the confidence of the flying public in our commercial
aviation system. As a former flight attendant, and above all, as Chic's
sister, I cannot tell you how much it meant to his family to see those
jets back in the air.
I think all would agree that September 11th changed the world
forever, but again, no group of individuals feels those changes more
acutely than those who work in commercial aviation, and no single
group, in my opinion, has a bigger stake in bringing about successful
aviation security policies than the men and women who fly those planes
every day. For this reason, I urge members of Congress and this
committee to pay close attention to what they have to say. They are
uniquely qualified to assist you in addressing aviation security
issues; they are highly motivated, they are highly educated and they
are extremely intelligent; they know the aircraft, they know the
environment on the ground and in the air and their experience has given
them an ability to cut through to the heart of any issue associated
with their world.
A short but to-the-point anecdote illustrates my point and will go
right to the issue of whether the Transportation Security
Administration should subject pilots to security screening.
Prior to 9/11 it was routine for flight crews to by-pass security
by displaying their airline-issued photo Ids and going directly to
Operations. On this particular day, my brother was flying the tail end
of a trip home to Dulles Airport from Los Angeles. He was accompanied
by our brother, Brad, who obviously could not by-pass security, so
Chic, in uniform and with his airline ID clipped to his lapel, stood in
line and submitted to the same security procedures as everyone else,
including putting his bag and crew kit through x-ray screening and
walking through the magnetometer. After they were through, Chic shook
his head and muttered under his breath. Brad picked up on it and asked,
shouldn't Security screen air crews, too? It would be easy for them to
secrete a weapon in their carry-on bags. Chic's reply was a tragic
foreshadowing of the last flight he would ever know: ``I'm a pilot. I
don't need a gun or a knife. I've got an airplane filled with 60,000
pounds of jet fuel. Essentially, I'm flying a missile.''
That was in 1999, two years before Chic's Boeing 757 was
commandeered and used as a weapon of mass destruction in exactly the
manner he presaged. It clearly illustrates what flight crews understood
then and continue to believe now, that it is counter-intuitive and
counter-productive to subject the most highly referenced, heavily back-
grounded and operationally visible employee group in the private
sector, to airport security screenings. Pilots are photographed,
finger-printed, and routinely monitored for competence. A large number
are former military pilots with long records; some even continue to
serve, as my brother did, in the military reserves. What does it say to
the flying public, that the TSA is subjecting flight crews to x-ray
screening, wanding them within minutes of handing them the controls of
a potential lethal weapon?
Meanwhile, the TSA continues to allow hourly-wage employees who are
not subjected to background checks to by-pass security screening
altogether. Non-secure, unskilled workers who are employed on airport
perimeters, in secure areas of the ramp, or even on the airplanes
themselves, carry unsearched, unscreened personal belongings such as
backpacks with them to these secure areas.
Over the last three years, ICE agents in Operation Tarmac have
discovered nearly 6,000 unauthorized workers at airports and
maintenance facilities around the country. They have arrested over
1,000 undocumented workers, including a fugitive alien with an
outstanding deportation order, and issued 775 criminal indictments.
These facts suggest that the TSA lacks a fundamental understanding
of the threat we continue to face. Even as we struggle to collate the
databases which make up the so-called ``No fly'' lists consisting of
the names of individuals identified by the FBI, State Department and
the Intelligence community, the TSA continues to allow passengers to
board airplanes by using Mexican Matricula Consular ID cards.
As an member of the FBI's Office of Intelligence testified before
the House Judiciary subcommittee nearly two years ago, these cards are
aggressively marketed by the Mexican government for the sole purpose of
providing undocumented foreign nationals with identity documents that
can later serve as breeder documents for US-issued ID. They are not
linked to any central database and therefore offer no means verifying
the true identity of the holder. According the FBI, they are ``little
more than simple, laminated cards without any security features.'' And
they are widely available. Nevertheless the TSA continues to allow
passengers to use them to board airplanes.
No one appreciates the difficult challenges which the
Transportation Security Administration faces as we forge ahead. But if
I could leave this committee with one message, and one message only, it
would be this: remember the words of Chic Burlingame. Listen to the
flight crews. They want commercial aviation to thrive economically and
they want it to be safe & secure. Their own lives and livelihoods
depends on it.
Mr. Lungren of California. The Chair now recognizes Captain
Duane Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, to
testify. And I guess, in accordance with TSA proceedings, a
member of a suspect class.
You have 5 minutes, Captain.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH, PRESIDENT, AIRLINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Woerth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank all the
members for being here on a Friday and taking an interest in
this.
We represent 64,000 pilots of those 100,000 commercial
airmen out there, and there is probably no subject that has
gotten under their skin and angered them and frustrated them
more than the subject matter of this hearing. So if I can get
to the bottom line, it is patently ridiculous to run air crew--
including flight attendants, but especially airline pilots--
through the screening process we currently do. And the example,
I think, was left at this table and mentioned earlier: This
includes not just the fact that they can get behind the door
and will fly the plane, but we even have armed pilots. And an
armed pilot, an FFDO, the same person, the same day, maybe he
is commuting home, he is strip-searched and they are looking
for the same person's fingernail clippers. I mean, this is how
absurd this has actually gotten. And I appreciate this
committee's--I hope to get up and get some action changed.
People understood right after the hysteria of 9/11 that
some extraordinary measures were probably going to be taken,
but they assumed 3-1/2 years later some common sense would have
prevailed. And I am confident that Congress will insist that
the TSA and the agency of the Department of Homeland Security
will insert some common sense into our security.
As Congressman DeFazio talked about--and I was with you, as
were some of my predecessors--we were looking for electronic
identification cards in the 1980s; in the 1980s we were
pressing for electronic identification cards. In 1989, the FAA
issued a final rule on airport security, starting the process
for electronic and computerized identification cards. It just
kind of petered out into nothing.
In 1993 Congress appropriated millions of dollars to the
development of what was called the universal access cards,
computerized electronic identification for crew members, that
we needed at every airport, not just the one we were working,
because we worked everywhere. That just fizzled into nothing.
There is a long stack of letters I could produce and
congressional action, all predating 2001 and that tragedy by a
long measure. It is time we start doing what we know we have
needed to do for a very long time.
I don't have as many ID cards as Ms. Burlingame has
brought, but the card I have for Northwest Airlines today isn't
a lot different than the one I got 30 years ago; with a little
less hair, but other than that it is pretty much the same. It
does the same function, hangs around my neck. Nobody can tell
if it is me or not; it means nothing. We need electronic
identification cards.
As you know, the Transportation Worker Identification Card
has been developed, it has been processed, it has been tested,
it already works. Just like the Registered Traveler card that
was referred to here, I got in that program, too. And it is
amazing that I don't have one as an airline pilot, but as a
Registered Traveler. I can give my electronic fingerprint, I
can give a retinal scan. I have one as a passenger; I don't
have one has a pilot.
And everything that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, all the
other tests we have gone through for 30 years in my background,
they know more about me than my mother knew. But I go through
it, all my colleagues go through this every day.
I think we can also learn from the past practices of other
nations, as you are familiar with, particularly Europe, who has
been dealing with terrorism for 20 and 30 years. I travel
extensively out of the country. Airline pilots and flight
attendants don't go through any of this kind of hassle factor
and treatment any other place. The crew members go to the
airplane. If they go through security at all, it is a special
line, and it goes very quickly and off they go. I think we can
adopt some commonsense strategies.
And what I really believe is that it is going to require--
we are on our fourth director of the Transportation Security
Administration, fourth time. And I think until the Congress
asserts itself and demands action with timetables, we are going
to continue to test and test, and try and experiment, and
nothing is going be to implemented. So I am urging you to take
control of this process. We have a TWIC card that has already
been tested, it just needs somebody to have the courage to
implement it and force its implementation.
If I could get to a basic requirement, it goes to the
fundamentals of approaching security differently. We need to
focus on finding and removing bad people, not looking for every
bad thing imaginable. Right now our security forces us to look
for bad things. I don't care how many thousands of guns and
knives and fingernail clippers--there is always a big story,
all these things got through security. Who cares? They are in
the possession of good people with no bad intent. So until we
can focus on a system that looks for bad people and removes bad
people in the system instead of treating every single passenger
and pilot and flight attendant like a potential bin Laden, we
are going to hopelessly bog down in frightfully billions of
dollars in expenses, a frustrated Nation, a harmed economy. If
we can get to a new philosophy of security screening that is
common sense-based--I think the Congress, the people on this
committee, and the other committees in the House and the Senate
I have dealt with want to do that.
And I thank you for your attention. You said my written
statement can be entered. And I will conclude with that and
take your questions when you are ready, sir.
Mr. Lungren of California. Thank you very much, Captain.
[The statement of Mr. Woerth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Duane Woerth
Good morning. I am Duane Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots
Association, International. ALPA is the world's largest pilot union,
representing more than 64,000 pilots who fly for 41 airlines in the
U.S. and Canada.
We applaud the Committee for holding this hearing and we especially
appreciate Chairman Cox's interest in the subject of flight crew
screening. I dare say that there is no other issue on which pilots are
more unified than that of the need to replace physical screening with
electronic identity verification and controlled access to airport
secured areas for pilots, whose background and criminal history records
have been checked. So, it will come as no surprise that our answer to
the question of this hearing is an emphatic ``yes--the screening of
airline pilots, as practiced by the TSA, and FAA before it, is a waste
of scarce resources!'' But it's worse than that--the current security
screening system virtually ignores the trustworthiness of airline
pilots and instead focuses almost exclusively on a search for inanimate
objects. Unless and until the system becomes human-centered, rather
than weapon-centered, we will be more vulnerable to potential
hijackings and other aircraft attacks than we have to be. Trained
terrorists do not need weapons to perpetrate crimes aboard aircraft.
My remarks, therefore, are intended to put the question of this
Committee's hearing within the context of an analysis of the entire
security screening system and demonstrate that we can achieve a much
higher level of security at a lower cost by changing our fundamental
assumptions and screening procedures.
Pre-September 11, 2001
With the establishment of checkpoint screening in the 1970's, which
came about as a direct result of ALPA lobbying efforts, the FAA
required air carriers to provide passenger screening at our nation's
airports. Since its inception, the focus of checkpoint screening in the
U.S. has been to find objects which might threaten the security of an
aircraft, its passengers and crew. Given the type of threat posed by
``homesick Cubans'' in the 1960's and 1970's who had no desire to
commit suicide and mass murder, this was a rational approach.
Regrettably, in spite of numerous attacks on American interests in
the 1980's and 1990's by anti-American fanatics, which included suicide
attacks (e.g., the USS Cole), the federal regulators did not alter
their passenger screening methodology. One exception to this was the
Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (i.e., CAPPS I), which
was developed by the FAA and used by the airlines to look for travel
and threat pattern abnormalities.
Post-September 11, 2001
Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, the anti-hijack
training procedures used by airline crews were drastically altered to
counter our enemies' tactics. Now, pilots are trained to view any type
of hijacking attempt as a potential suicide/mass murder scenario and to
react decisively to confront and eliminate such a threat. However,
although some progress has been made toward deploying a
methodology(ies) for determining whether a passenger has hostile
intent, the federal government has still not altered its security
screening checkpoint system to reflect today's reality. As a result,
security screeners are focused almost exclusively on a search for items
which could be used as weapons and bombs, with insufficient
consideration being given to the threat that an unarmed terrorist may
pose. It should be noted that the government does operate a watch list,
and while somewhat useful, it has several inherent weaknesses that make
it incapable of keeping all terrorists off of commercial airplanes.
Accordingly, there is now an even greater focus on finding
inanimate objects than before 9/11. Small tools, fingernail files,
scissors, pocket knives, knitting needles, matches and lighters--all
have found their way onto government-mandated, prohibited-items lists.
Ironically, the very same Federal Flight Deck Officer who is allowed on
a Monday to carry a firearm through the screening checkpoint while in
uniform, is not allowed to carry a fingernail file through on Tuesday,
while deadheading out of uniform. It was reported recently that an
armed FBI agent was required to surrender a nail file at the
checkpoint--numerous other examples of such time-consuming
inconsistency abound.
The scrutiny of passengers that is required to identify such items
results in long passenger lines, delays, partial disrobings, and
harried passengers who prefer not to fly. Government reports are issued
periodically on the vast numbers of items that are found and
confiscated at screening checkpoints. Unfortunately, there is no
logical connection that can be made between the number of items found
and the number of attempted hijackings that were thwarted because, with
very few exceptions, the individuals carrying such items had no hostile
intent.
The current fixation on finding weapons, to the virtual exclusion
of determining a passenger's trustworthiness, is harming the industry's
economic viability. Flying is no longer considered a positive
experience by many, but rather, an ordeal that must be endured. The
hassle factor has caused some passengers to find other means of
transportation or to not travel at all. Because of these circumstances,
airline travel is also devalued by the public, which is partly
reflected in the carriers' inability to raise ticket prices to a
profitable level.
Political Correctness and Unintended Consequences
Americans pride themselves in their ability to look beyond
individual or group differences and treat everyone equally. Although
this philosophy is desirable in most situations, when it comes to
trust, equality is not possible, not because of a person's skin color
or ethnicity, but because of a person's demonstrated behaviors or
government authorities' lack of knowledge of same. Airline pilots earn,
and can document, a very high level of personal trustworthiness and
integrity because the government and their airline carefully scrutinize
them before being hired. Their integrity is under continual observation
on an ongoing basis by their fellow crewmembers, medical practitioners,
FAA inspectors, company personnel, and others. Unfortunately, that
trust has not been acknowledged at the security-screening checkpoint
for many years.
The politically correct notion of treating everyone in the same way
at the screening checkpoint is an ill-advised obstacle to
implementation of a human-centered security system. Political
correctness at the screening checkpoint has many unintended, and
ultimately very expensive, consequences. Following are a few noteworthy
examples:
It is driving away the airlines' best customers,
first- and business-class passengers, who are choosing to avoid
airline travel by increasingly flying on corporate and charter
aircraft. Airline travel makes no economic sense for highly
compensated individuals unless it actually saves them time; the
current paradigm makes it increasingly difficult for companies
to obtain such a benefit.
An environment has been created in which all
passengers are subjected to physical indignities and privacy
intrusions. Reducing the population of persons requiring such
treatment is clearly more needful from a security perspective,
and would actually realize the stated goals of privacy
advocates.
Long screening queues create large groups of
individuals outside of the ``sterile'' concourse, which fosters
a target-rich environment for those who would attack an
airport.
The screening system is less capable of keeping
terrorists off of airplanes than it could be if passenger
trustworthiness were determined.
Passenger confidence in the government screening
system is undermined when stories abound of demonstrably
harmless individuals who are given a great deal of unwarranted
physical scrutiny. Our members inform us regularly of privacy
invading screening experiences that are not in keeping with the
trust that they have earned.
It places a huge tax burden on an industry that is
struggling to survive. TSA spent $3.7 billion on aviation
security in FY 2004, which was more than necessary because no
accommodation is made at the screening checkpoint for those who
can be trusted. Those funds are extracted from airlines via
security taxes on each passenger ticket. Federal taxes and fees
constitute as much as 40 percent of a domestic roundtrip
ticket, more than consumers pay in federal consumption taxes on
alcohol, tobacco or gasoline. Our members have invested
billions in concessions so that their managements can restore a
healthy bottom line to our industry. But these efforts are
imperiled by ever increasing calls for additional security-
related tax hikes on an industry that is teetering on the brink
of insolvency.
There are approximately 100,000 airline pilots in the
U.S. Assuming that each one flies 20 days per month, on
average, and they are screened only once per day, there will be
24 million pilot screenings annually. In 2004, one passenger
screening cost approximately $4.70, which means that the total
cost of screening pilots was about $112 million. These are
merely rough-order-of-magnitude numbers because there is no way
to determine the exact number of pilot screenings in a given
year. But they illustrate the fact that money is being wasted
on screening of pilots that could be used on genuinely needed
security enhancements, such as improvements to the Federal
Flight Deck Officer program, implementation of the
Transportation Worker Identification Card system, secondary
barriers, better cargo security measures, and fortified flight
deck doors for cargo airplanes.
It reduces available safety margins by disallowing
pilots to carry certain tools of the trade with them through
security checkpoints. These tools are needed in the event of an
inflight emergency, but have been restricted since shortly
after September 11.
Screening methodologies designed to positively identify the
trustworthy members of the traveling public greatly increase security
and as added value, offer potential for reducing the frequency of
physical privacy intrusions.
Affirmation of this model exists in the U.S. as is demonstrated by
the processing of armed law enforcement officers at screening
checkpoints. Once their identities are verified and the legitimacy of
their travel needs confirmed, they are subjected to no physical
screening prior to boarding the aircraft. Its application should be
adapted to include aviation workers, and modified to provide for more
effective and efficient screening of a significant portion of the
traveling public who have demonstrated a satisfactory level of trust.
An Effective Security Screening System
The Israeli aviation security-screening model, widely regarded as
the world's best, is human-centered and trust-based. Information is
collected on passengers before they arrive at the airport and they are
physically screened and queried in concert with that knowledge. Trained
personnel assess individual characteristics that are indicative of
deception and engage passengers in conversation and questioning to
establish the purpose and authenticity of an individual's travel plans.
Considerably less time and resources are spent on physically screening
those who are deemed to be non-threat persons and traveling for
legitimate purposes. The effectiveness of the Israeli model is touted
around the world.
By contrast, recent reports by government oversight organizations
rate the effectiveness of U.S. aviation screening methods as deficient
in a number of respects. According to congressional testimony by the
GAO, ``TSA has not consistently implemented a risk management approach
or conducted the systematic analysis needed to inform its decision-
making processes and to prioritize security improvements . . . A threat
assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis of
factors such as capabilities, intentions and past activities (emphasis
added).'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO Report 05-357T, February 15, 2005
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current U.S. aviation screening system is built upon several
flawed assumptions--one is that everyone poses a potential threat to
aviation security. The truth is that the vast majority of individuals,
including airline pilots, do not pose any kind of threat to aviation.
Airline pilots, who are the most thoroughly scrutinized employees in
the workforce, are highly trusted individuals, which fact is recognized
everywhere, it seems, but at security screening checkpoints. A very
small fraction of all passengers actually pose some degree of threat,
but our screening resources are greatly diluted by giving the same
degree of physical scrutiny to an Air Force Reserve general and airline
pilot as is given to a federal prison parolee.
Another erroneous assumption is that an individual does not pose a
threat once they have been successfully screened for objects that could
be used as weapons. Such a conclusion for much of the general
population may be warranted, but it does not apply to a fanatically
dedicated and highly trained, murderous terrorist. Physical screening,
by itself, is incapable of keeping terrorists off of airplanes, because
it is not designed to identify them.
We conclude that a layered approach to aviation security screening
is essential. For the same reason that airline safety is enhanced by
having two or more professional pilots, two or more engines, and other
redundancies, aviation security can be improved by examining each
individual for hostile intent while keeping dangerous objects,
especially improvised explosive devices, off of airplanes.
A critical component to the success of a human-centered screening
system is identifying trustworthy individuals and then removing, or
lessening, the amount of scrutiny that they receive, so that unknown or
suspicious individuals can receive much greater scrutiny. There are
several initiatives in various stages of completion that could greatly
assist the government in accomplishing this task. Transportation
Workers Identification Card (TWIC)--The TWIC program is intended to
positively identify trusted workers in all transportation modes. The
program has been in development for nearly four years and is currently
undergoing operational tests. Ironically, and in opposition to our
expressed recommendations, there are no plans to test the program in a
meaningful way in the commercial aviation environment. TSA has
emphasized repeatedly that TWIC will be a voluntary program for the
airlines and airports, so whether the program will actually be
implemented remains a question, unless policy is created that will
require its usage. If used for nothing else, TWIC card readers placed
at screening checkpoints would remove trusted pilots and other aviation
employees from screening queues and help passengers be processed more
quickly.
The TWIC program has been a major disappointment to ALPA because of
false expectations that were created by government years ago about its
pending usefulness in helping pilots get to their jobs in an expedited
and secure fashion. It is our understanding that the program is being
moved from TSA to a new DHS screening coordination and operations
office later this year; we will continue to press for a TWIC program
that meets our members' needs and we urge congressional support for
this initiative.
Registered Traveler (RT) Program--The Registered Traveler
program is in prototype and has been successfully tested at a handful
of airports. RT is designed to collect information from passengers who
voluntarily sign up to be included in the program --I am one of those
who signed up and I have used the program at National Airport. To date,
the TSA has not indicated that any substantive advantage will be
realized by passengers who choose to join RT, such as a less intrusive
and trust-based screening process. ALPA is a strong proponent of RT as
a means of allowing passengers to voluntarily divulge information about
themselves so that their trustworthiness can be determined and used to
maximum advantage.
We cannot comprehend why this important and needed program has been
allowed to languish, while our members and passengers continue to waste
their valuable time in long lines at security checkpoints. We urge
Congress to fully exercise its oversight role in this matter and cause
RT to become a reality across the nation.
Law Enforcement Officer Verification Card System (LEOVCS)--The
law enforcement community, with TSA's assistance, has developed and is
testing an electronic method of positively identifying authorized law
enforcement officers at screening checkpoints. ALPA fully endorses
LEOVCS and urges its rapid deployment at the conclusion of successful
testing.
Secure Flight--The CAPPS II system was attacked by privacy
advocates, who expressed fears that the next generation of computerized
pre-screening would be too invasive and held the potential for theft or
misuse of personal information. TSA has revised its pre-screening model
in an effort to address those concerns and created Secure Flight, which
is to be introduced later this year. Secure Flight will be an
improvement over CAPPS I, but it will not have the same positive effect
on security that CAPPS II would have had by accessing information on a
number of public and restricted databases. CAPPS II would have served
as a form of pre-screening intended to separate known, trusted
individuals from those not meeting that threshold. The unknowns would
then have been subjected to closer scrutiny than those cleared by the
system.
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)--The
SPOT system is currently employed at Boston's Logan International
Airport and was developed by the Massachusetts State Police to identify
and question those passengers traveling for illicit purposes. Trained
observers look for signs of suspicious behavior and resolve issues with
those who merit closer scrutiny. Observation, evaluation and response
to human behavioral factors are keys to this system, which is intended
to efficiently allocate additional screening resources to a small
portion of the traveling public. ALPA endorses the concept of
behavioral recognition as a means of determining the trustworthiness of
certain passengers. Privacy advocates are suing the sponsors of this
successful program.
All government and industry employees who work in the aviation
industry should be trained on how to act as the ``eyes and ears'' of
security. Several years ago, ALPA participated in an Aviation Security
Advisory Committee that developed a protocol for an employee security
training program. The Security Team concept, as it was called, would
enhance other security efforts at no, or very minimal, cost.
The potential role of the public in protecting aviation should
be recognized. New York City's Port Authority has implemented an
effective campaign aimed at its citizenry, which uses the phrase, ``If
you see something, say something.'' In a similar effort, Canadians have
instituted an Airport Watch program, intended to utilize the eyes and
ears of individuals who frequent the nation's air terminals and
surrounding areas. This same philosophy should be employed in
protecting the U.S. aviation domain.
Recommendations
1. Law enforcement officers, airline pilots and others within the
aviation industry whose trustworthiness has been firmly established by
criminal history records checks, background investigations and other
measures should be screened electronically at security checkpoints.
2. The government should move quickly, with industry, to prototype,
fine-tune, and deploy a human-centered security screening system that
establishes a basis of trust as its principal component. Passengers
meeting an established trust threshold should be expeditiously screened
and allowed to proceed quickly to their gate.
3. In order to help facilitate items one (1) and two (2), the
government should expeditiously develop and deploy the TWIC, RT,
LEOVCS, and Secure Flight programs.
4. Airport law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to adopt a
program for identifying suspicious passenger behaviors, as Massports'
police have done via the SPOT program.
5. All government and industry employees who work in aviation
should be trained on how to act as the ``eyes and ears'' of security.
6. Public education programs should be expanded to create an
awareness that the general populace has a role in protecting aviation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Mr. Lungren of California. The Chair now recognizes Ms.
Candace Kolander, a flight attendant with Alaska Air, to
testify.
STATEMENT OF CANDACE KOLANDER, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS--CWA
Ms. Kolander. Thank you, Congressman. My name is Candace
Kolander, and I am the coordinator for the Air Safety, Health
and Security Department at the Association of Flight
Attendants, CWA. And I am a FAA-certified flight attendant with
19 years' experience at Aloha Airlines.
AFA is the world's largest flight attendant union; we
represent more than 46,000 flight attendants at 21 airlines.
And just so you know, there are a lot more than the flight
attendants, the 46,000 flight attendants that we represent at
AFA.
I want to thank the subcommittee for holding this meeting
which focuses on TSA's screening of airline pilots.
I do understand that some members of the committee staff
objected to having flight attendants having the opportunity to
testify on this matter today, and that is a bit frustrating to
us. It is imperative that flight attendants have a say on the
subject of screening. Flight attendants are subjected to the
security screening on a daily basis, and can therefore also
attest to whether security screening is a sound practice or a
waste of resources.
With the exception of those pilots participating in the
FFDO program, flight attendants are subject to the same level
of screening and background checks as pilots; so in that
respect, we are all the same here. Flight attendants are an
integral part of the crew in terms of safety and security and
an important component of the overall screening picture.
Now, while there always will be a need for ongoing
improvements regarding airport security screening
effectiveness, I would actually like to begin by taking note of
the progress that has been made in the aviation security
screening in the nearly 4 years since the terrorist attacks of
September 2001.
Explosive detection systems have been installed at most
U.S. commercial airports to provide capability to screen all
checked baggage for explosives. TSA has also expanded screener
training and developed performance measures and indicators for
these screening systems. There has also been an improvement in
the actual hands-on screening process itself.
I would like to share with you now the perspective on
flight attendants on the screening of airline crew.
Following 9/11, we received numerous complaints from our
flight attendant members regarding the new security screening
procedures, improper touching, or long lines to get through
screening. Now, although we have not been receiving as many
complaints now as we did before, more still needs to be done.
In a recent informal spot check that AFA did with flight
attendants around the country, part of the frustration that
came through loud and clear from our member flight attendants
was that their treatment varies greatly from station to
station. As one flight attendant reported, ``Most of the time I
passed through without difficulty, but sometimes it seems as
though certain individuals and/or stations have an agenda for
harassing crew members.'' I might add that this particular
flight attendant cited screening at Washington National as a
particular problem.
On a recent flight, he watched for 20 minutes as a screener
leered at him while he took every piece of clothing out of his
suitcase and spread it out on the search table, then removed
every item from his flight bag in a similar fashion. He went on
to say about once or twice a month he goes through some version
of this treatment somewhere in the country.
Now, while a large number of airports do have designated
crew lines or procedures to help expedite movement of crew
members to get to their flights, there are still a few airports
that do not, which makes them particularly problematic. One
flight attendant related her experience regarding the McCarran
Airport in Las Vegas, which does not have a designated
screening line for crew members at the D gate. United flight
attendants based in Las Vegas must arrive at the airport 1 to 2
hours ahead of their check-in time in order to stand in line
for security screenings to enter their usual gates. Meanwhile,
flight attendants at a checkpoint at another gate go through
screening at an expedited lane, and TSA employees who arrive
late are allowed to go to the head of the line while these
flight attendants are left cooling their heels.
We also hear from time to time about more egregious
problems. For example, 6 months ago one of our flight
attendants was subjected to a troubling groping examination by
a female TSA screener in Lexington. The screener used the cup
of her hand to cup the flight attendant's breasts and trace
around their perimeter. This particular flight attendant had
not caused the portal alarm to go off prior to being chosen for
the hand search, and she felt very violated by this employee.
These groping complaints used to be much more frequent though.
In the post-9/11 environment, flight attendants are under
increased scrutiny by airport security, and in some cases they
found this screening to be excessive and unnecessary. As
reported in a recent study, some feel it is unfair that they
should receive more attention, given the fact that flight
attendants have aviation security clearance, and because as one
flight attendant pointed out, there has never been a flight
attendant in the history of plane incidents who was involved in
a problem that brought a plane down. One participant said that
flight attendants are treated like criminals because we are the
most public, while others walk through or never get checked.
Now, I want to stress that these problems matter from a
policy standpoint far beyond the obvious significant stressors
these hassle and intimidation events cause for flight
attendants simply trying to get to work on time. If screeners
are devoting undue amounts of time examining flight attendants,
that is time that could be better spent screening out true
security threats. And if flight attendants aren't able to reach
their workplaces--the airplane--on time, then their ability to
perform their safety and security duties are compromised as
well. Remember, flight attendants are responsible for
performing preflight safety and security duties on the
aircraft.
So yes, while there are still some problems with the
current screening procedures and practices, and it is terrible
that flight attendants sometimes are harassed and singled out
for extra screening, but at the same time, we understand and
completely support the need for careful screening of every
person entering the aircraft, including myself as a crew
member. We are confident that there is a way to accommodate
both the needs of the flight attendants to reach the planes in
a timely manner, without excessive or intrusive screening
experiences, and the need to ensure that every person entering
every aircraft has been thoroughly screened. We will leave it
up to the experts to come up with the exact solution, be that
separate lanes to expedite screening of crew members, or some
other fix.
While the screening security practices are not perfect,
they are certainly not a complete waste of resources. Let me
just say that there is a need for TSA to devote serious
resources to the development of a transportation workers
identification credential that will promote expedited screening
of those who most frequently must pass through airport
security. This credential, as we have all noted, could include
biometrics, such as fingerprints, to get flight attendants and
others through quickly.
We are not suggesting that physical screening be abandoned
once such credential is developed; rather, that both credential
and screening have a part to play in developing a layered
security system that can protect against catastrophic attack.
Such a layered security system has been recommended by the 9/11
Commission staff as key to ensuring that the single point
failure in the system is not catastrophic. Thank you, again.
[The statement of Ms. Kolander follows:]
Prepared Statement of Candace Kolander
I am Candace Kolander, Coordinator of the Air Safety, Health and
Security Department at the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA and a
FAA-certified flight attendant. AFA is the world's largest flight
attendant union. We represent more than 40,000 flight attendants at 26
airlines.
I want to thank the Subcommittee for holding this hearing, and I'd
like to begin by taking note of the progress that has been made in
aviation security screening in the nearly four years since the
terrorist attacks of September 2001. While there is an ongoing need to
improve airport security screening effectiveness, there has been
overall improvement since 9/11. Explosives detection systems have been
installed at most U.S. commercial airports to provide the capability to
screen all checked baggage for explosives. TSA also has expanded
screener training and developed performance measures and indicators for
the screening systems.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Transportation Security, Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources, GAO-905-357T, Feb.15,2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certainly, however, more needs to be done. Today's hearing focuses
on TSA's screening of airline crew, an important component of the
overall screening picture. We understand that some members of the
Committee staff objected to us having the opportunity to testify on
this matter today. And that's a bit frustrating to us. We think it is
only natural for flight attendants to have a say on this subject.
Because, believe it or not, flight attendants are subject to the same
level of screening and background checks as pilots, with the exception
of those pilots participating in the FFDO program. So in that respect,
we're all the same here. And I think it's important for everyone to
remember that flight attendants are an integral part of the crew in
terms of safety and security.
Today, I'd like to share with you the perspective of flight
attendants on the screening of airline crew, which turns out to be
quite a significant stressor in their work environment. In the post-9-
11 environment, flight attendants are under increased scrutiny by
airport security and in some cases they find this screening to be
excessive and unnecessary. As reported in a recent study,\2\ some feel
it is unfair that they should receive more attention, given the fact
that flight attendants have aviation security clearance and because, as
one flight attendant pointed out, ``there has never been a flight
attendant in the history of plane incidents who was involved in a
problem that brought a plane down.'' One participant said that flight
attendants are ``treated like criminals because we are the most public,
while others walk right through or never get checked.'' This increased
attention has made it that much more difficult to get to work. Although
there is a ``new empathy'' for the passenger caught up in lengthy
airport security lines, allowances aren't made for this by some
supervisors, and so they have feel under increased scrutiny by their
company as well as airport security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Impact of the 9/11 Attack on Flight Attendants: A study of an
Essential First Responder Group; U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services funded study, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a recent informal spot check that AFA did with flight attendants
around the country, part of the frustration that came through loud and
clear from our member flight attendants was that their treatment varies
greatly from station to station. As one flight attendant reported,
``most of the time I pass through without difficulty--but sometimes it
seems as though certain individuals and/or stations have an agenda for
harassing crewmembers.'' I might add that this particular flight
attendant cited screening at Washington National as a particular
problem. On one recent flight, he watched for 20 minutes as the
screener leered at him while taking every piece of clothing from his
suitcase and spreading it out on the search table, then removing every
item from his flight bag in a similar fashion. He went on to say that
about once or twice a month he goes through some version of this
treatment somewhere in the country.
Another flight attendant related her experience at McCarran Airport
in Las Vegas as particularly problematic. United flight attendants who
are based in Las Vegas must arrive at the airport 1 to 2 hours or more
ahead of their check-in time in order to stand in line for security
screening to enter the gates. They have no designated screening line
for crew there. TSA employees who arrive late are allowed to go to the
head of the line for screening yet flight attendants who need to get to
work are left cooling their heels.
We also hear from time to time of more egregious problems. For
example, about six months ago one of our flight attendants was
subjected to a troubling groping examination by a female TSA screener
in Lexington. The screener used the palms of her hands to cup the
flight attendant's breasts and trace around their perimeter. This
particular flight attendant had not caused the portal alarm to go off
prior to being chosen for the hand search, and she felt very violated
by this employee.
Now, I want to stress that these problems matter from a policy
standpoint far beyond the obvious hassle and intimidation factor for
flight attendants simply trying to get to work on time. If screeners
are devoting undue amounts of time to examining flight attendants, that
is time that could be better spent screening out true security threats.
And if flight attendants aren't able to reach their workplaces--the
airplane--on time, then their ability to perform their safety and
security duties is compromised as well. Remember, flight attendants are
responsible for performing pre-flight safety and security duties on the
plane.
So, yes, there are problems with the current screening practices.
It's terrible that flight attendants sometimes are harassed or singled
out for extra screening. But at the same time, we understand and
completely support the need for careful screening of every person
entering the aircraft. And we are confident that there is a way to
accommodate both the needs of flight attendants to reach planes in a
timely manner and without excessive or intrusive screening experiences
and the need to ensure that every person entering every aircraft has
been thoroughly screened. We will leave it up to the experts to come up
with the exact solution, be that separate lanes to expedite screening
of flight crew or some other fix.
But let me just suggest that there is a crying need for TSA to
devote serious resources to the development of a transportation workers
identification credential that will promote expedited screening of
those who most frequently must pass through airport security. This
credential could employ biometrics, such as fingerprints, to get flight
attendants and others through quickly. We aren't suggesting that
physical screening of flight attendants be abandoned once such a
credential is developed, but rather that both have a part to play in
developing a layered security system that can protect against
catastrophic attack. Such a layered security system has been
recommended by the 9-11 Commission Staff as key to ensuring that a
single-point failure in the system is not catastrophic.
I'd like also to take the opportunity to make mention of two other
flight attendant priorities that we'd like to see receive much-needed
attention from policymakers: the need for effective security training
for flight attendants and the need for better avenues for communication
aboard the aircraft among crew members.
Although federal guidance on response to security threats aboard
aircraft calls upon the cabin crew to protect the flight deck, stop any
attempted hijack and protect lives in the passenger cabin, the current
requirements for security training and equipment fail to provide the
tools and training necessary for the flight attendant crew to carry out
this mission.
Flight Attendant crewmembers must have standardized security and
self-defense training in order to prepare them for potential threat
conditions. The training must be appropriate and effective, so that the
flight attendants will be prepared to properly respond to any level of
verbal or physical aggression encountered.
Flight attendants are capable of learning and applying appropriate
basic self-defense strategies and techniques if the program is science-
based and mandatory. They must all receive the same training, and work
together as a team to immediately counter any apparent or potential
threat. Civilians have been shown to be capable of learning basic self-
defense techniques in order to effectively respond to the types of
threats faced by flight attendants.
In order for this training to be appropriate and effective, it must
include three major learning components.
First, trainees must have classroom training for cognitive
learning.
Second, they must experience effective hands-on training for
learning of the basic physical skills and integration of the cognitive
material.
Third, they must participate in live situational training exercises
regarding the various threat levels to integrate the cognitive,
physical, and emotional skills under a safe but appropriately stressful
training environment.
The above training must include:
(a). behavioral profiling to assist in identifying and coping
with potential aggression and
(b). crew communication and coordination which is critical as
it relates to the survival of all crewmembers and passengers
and the overall control of the aircraft. Even with hardened
flightdeck doors, the Federal Flight Deck Officers program, and
the Federal Air Marshal program, all crewmembers must be
prepared to immediately respond during a terrorist attack. In
these situations a lag in response time due to poor
communications and coordination can prove just as fatal as it
did on September 11, 2001. Even with the heroic efforts of
those involved with Flight 93, this lag time proved fatal to
all persons on-board the aircraft.
Flight attendants are the only true professional first responders
in the cabin of every commercial airline flight (with over 19 seats).
The self-defense training should include the appropriate manner in
which to interact with both the Federal Air Marshals and Flight Deck
Officers who are present on some flights.
The training program should be developed, overseen and audited by a
federal law enforcement agency which would determine appropriate
curriculum and certification criteria for trainers as well as public or
private regional and local training facilities across the country which
would allow for decentralized training and collaterally benefit state
and local economies. Training close to the homes and bases of the
flight attendants and instructors will allow for the type of 1 to 2
hour repeat training sessions necessary for it to be truly effective
and would all but eliminate travel and lodging costs.
Scientific testing should be conducted to determine and establish
the minimum requirements for the basic course and recurrent training.
These minimum requirements should include the qualifications for the
primary and assistant instructors, the minimum teacher-student ratio,
and the minimum requirements for the regional and local training
facilities.
To enable effective communication and coordination when suspicious
activities or terrorist threats are in progress, discrete hands-free
wireless communication devices to permit immediate communication
between all crewmembers and Federal air marshals (FAMs), must be
provided. Such a device would also facilitate discrete and timely
communications from pilots to flight attendants regarding safety
issues, such as more detailed turbulence warnings to help prevent
injuries and reduce associated costs to industry.
In order for flight attendants to learn and apply appropriately
basic self-defense strategies, tactics, and techniques, they must all
receive the same training and work together as a team to immediately
counter any apparent or potential threat. In this way we can ensure
that the next flight attendants and pilots that come face to face with
committed terrorists have the ability to save themselves, their
passengers, and the aircraft.
Mr. Lungren of California. Thank you very much for your
testimony. And I want to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony.
Before I proceed to questions, I would like to enter into
the record a statement submitted by Mr. Marcus Flagg, aviation
security expert, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, and
surviving son of Rear Admiral Wilson Flagg and Darlene Flagg,
who were killed aboard American flight 77. And if there is no
objection, it shall be entered into the record.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement for the Record from Mr. Marcus W. Flagg Aviation
Security Expert and surviving son of Rear Admiral Wilson Flagg and
Darlene Flagg killed aboard American Flight 77. September 11. 2001.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
My name is Marcus Flagg. I am a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy
and Naval Post-Graduate School for Aviation Safety. I have over 10
years experience as a Navy fighter pilot and 9 years as a pilot for
UPS, flying domestically and internationally.
My parents, Rear Admiral Wilson F. Flagg and Darlene E. Flagg died
aboard American Airlines flight #77 on September 11, 2001, when it was
crashed into the Pentagon. My father was a Navy fighter pilot with over
38 years active and reserve service and also an American Airlines
Captain for 31 years. That tragic day irrevocably changed aviation, the
world, my family and myself.
I firmly believe there is the possibility of another terrorist
hijacking aboard a commercial aircraft unless we are proactive in
improving aviation security. Recent threat warnings and current
terrorist probes indicate aviation is a near term probable target.
Our nation, now more than ever, needs a robust multi-layered
security system to combat the terrorist threat. The Arming Pilots
Against Terrorism Act was passed almost unanimously by Congress and
intended to be a deterrent to aviation terrorism by arming qualified
pilots immediately.Nevertheless, the Transportation Security
Administration has succeeded in arming only the smallest fraction of
our pilots and has rejected and discouraged volunteers by the
thousands. Professional airline pilots as a whole are highly educated
and motivated individuals. The present program to arm our airline
pilots being administered by the TSA is hampered by restrictions put in
place at the behest of the airline lobby. Currently, Federal Flight
Deck Officer's operate twice the flight coverage at 1/25 the cost of
the Federal Air Marshal program. This program is the most cost
effective security initiative to date and creates no additional cost to
the private sector.
The current restructuring of the TS provides the opportunity to
move the FFDO and FAM programs to the FBI. The FBI's previous
successful operation and management of an armed pilot program set the
precedent with operation Switch. In September 2001, the FBI produced a
cockpit protection plan, which would arm all commercial pilots
immediately. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of crimes aboard aircraft
and counter-terrorism also come under the FBI. This would allow for
seamless integration of the programs, improved communication, and the
most cost effective means to combat terrorism.
Security screening of pilots and their luggage fails the common
sense test as well as being a waste of assets and manpower.
Professional passenger and all-cargo pilots have the responsibility and
accountability to have their hands on the controls of a potential
weapon of mass destruction; therefore, we do not need any weapons or
explosives to takeover and crash a commercial aircraft. We are the most
vetted professionals in any industry, yet we are treated as potential
terrorists. We have been finger printed and had background checks prior
to being hired, in addition to annual medical exams and flight
standards checks. The majority of airline pilots have extensive
military and/or law enforcement backgrounds. The original intent of the
2002 FFDO law was to allow FFDO's to bypass security. In addition,
passenger and all-cargo pilots would also bypass security so that
potential terrorists would not be able to tell who was armed thereby
enhancing deterrence of illegal actions. During the past year, the TSA
and the FAA have approved Cockpit Access Security System (CASS)
developed by the airlines for offline passenger and all-cargo pilots to
occupy cockpit jumpseats. The Department of Justice developed a
biometric PORTPASS for immigration several years ago. We continue to
wait for TSA programs such as the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) and Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS II).
It has been well documented that prior to 9/11, the passenger and
all-cargo carriers would rather pay the fines imposed by the FAA for
security violations than to implement aviation security changes. The
passenger and all-cargo carriers have done cost analysis assessments;
they state it is less costly to lose an aircraft with crew, passengers
and/or cargo than to implement new aviation security measures. As an
all-cargo pilot, I emphatically endorse cargo inspection measures
aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft. Every individual, aircrew
included, who travels aboard a commercial aircraft is screened along
with their luggage, yet cargo remains unscreened for explosive,
biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological hazards. The 9/11
Commission called for cargo inspection for this very reason.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I urge you to act immediately on these issues
and the 9/11 Commission's Report concerning aviation security.
Mr. Lungren of California. I recognize myself for 5 minutes
of questions.
And Captain Woerth, you have indicated that you have
traveled extensively overseas. In your written testimony you
make specific reference to the Israelis' aviation security
screening model. Could you tell me how they deal with pilots
and how they deal with crews?
Mr. Woerth. Yes, sir. In Israel, they go straight to the
airplane; they don't go through any lines, they go straight to
the airplane. Everybody knows who the crew is, they check in,
they are identified as the crew, and they proceed directly to
the airplane.
I have also traveled to Israel as a passenger, and, there
again, they have people who interview and look at the different
passengers. When I last went to Israel, I was subjected to
quite a few questions, as I should have been, based on my
passport and my extensive travel, including Egypt and back to
Germany a number of times. So it made sense. But they work--in
a matter of a minute they will determine all my travel made
sense, and I wasn't a threat, and I went on my way.
But their system is what I described. They are looking not
for things, they are not worried about your fingernail
clippers, they are not worried about your tweezers, they don't
make people unpack their clothes; they identify a threat in
terms of a person, and that is the key difference there, sir.
Mr. Lungren of California. I want to specifically go back
to the question on how they deal with pilots and the rest of
the crew. The pilots they allow just to go through, once you
are identified; once they are able to identify you through
whatever means you have, then you go directly to--.
Mr. Woerth. Well, once the crew is identified as an LL
pilot and LL flight attendant, they go straight to the
airplane.
Mr. Lungren of California. You also mention in your
testimony some concern about the flying public, some concern
about the economic repercussions of the screening that takes
place, long passenger lines, delays, and I think you even said
partial disrobing and so forth.
Recognizing that we have to have some security, recognizing
there is going to be some inconvenience involved, are you
suggesting that that is a necessary result of that; or are you
suggesting that the manner in which it is done now
unnecessarily inconveniences members of the flying public such
that in your opinion, either from observation or conversations
you have had, we are dissuading some people from continuing to
fly?
Mr. Woerth. To answer, sir, the last part of your question,
first, I am absolutely convinced we have dissuaded a lot of
people from flying; in particular, business travelers. Business
travelers have decided--the richer customers use their own
corporate jets and/or find other means of transportation.
And the short-haul flying, the communities with small
cities and small distances, is not funny to me; but the saying,
``If you have got time to spare, go by air,'' that has had a
real impact in the world, because if it is faster to drive to
Richmond or anyplace else than to fly--and you can take any
part of the country--that is what they will do. And they don't
want to have to go through the hassle, they want to take their
things with them.
And it is so irregular from airplane to airplane. One day
you will show up and the line, you got through there pretty
fast and you think you are good to go; and then you show up and
it goes outside the building again, and nobody can explain why
it is different. So I think we have had a very significant
impact on the hassle factor.
I do think--and as my other witnesses, I do not think we
are going to eliminate a screening system, I don't think--
nobody is suggesting that. But right now it is unreasonable,
and they treat every single person the same. People aren't
taking their shoes off in Europe; they can look at your shoes.
But every single person, every person take off your shoes is
ridiculous.
Mr. Lungren of California. Well, the position of TSA is
that is not a requirement.
Mr. Woerth. Right. It is not a requirement until you don't,
and then you get wanded instead. And every passenger knows what
the results of not complying with the request from every TSA
person is. That means you are going to be subjected to taking
all your clothes out of your suitcase. So everybody takes off
their shoes.
Mr. Lungren of California. Let me ask all three of you,
there are various programs, the TWIC program, the Registered
Traveler program, the Secured Flight program, et cetera, based
on the knowledge that you have of those various programs, if we
were to establish a priority for TSA, what would your priority
be? That is, which of the programs do you think we ought to
move the most quickly on, Ms. Kolander?
Ms. Kolander. AFA believes that we should move forward with
the TWIC program as a priority.
Mr. Lungren of California. Captain.
Mr. Woerth. I would absolutely agree with that. With all
the criminal background checks and everything, we have already
mentioned that the crews are ready to go, and I think we ought
to move forward with the TWIC program first.
Mr. Lungren of California. Ms. Burlingame.
Ms. Burlingame. I completely agree.
Mr. Lungren of California. The Chairman recognizes the
gentleman from Oregon.
Mr. DeFazio. I wish that we had representatives of the TSA
here today to explain the ongoing delay in the TWIC program and
the ongoing reluctance to expand the trusted traveler program.
Captain Woerth, since you have familiarity with the trusted
traveler program, that as I guess a patron of American Airlines
out of National, you are allowed to purchase--get one of those
cards, do you think that that technology could be utilized for
the TWIC program?
Mr. Woerth. Absolutely, sir. As soon as you touch the
screen, your face pops up instantaneously, or the retinal scan.
In fact, if it is located by the gate, the trouble is--I don't
use it either. It is not anywhere near the gate. It is
inconvenient to go get it and get verified. If these things are
going to work, it needs to be by as you go through security,
touch the screen, your face pops up. You can walk through as
fast as you can go through a turnstile.
So I think--and I think we should use the same technology.
I am concerned they are going to have a different thing for
registered travelers as for crew members. We will have an empty
line for crew members or an empty line for passengers, and we
will have wasted resources. I don't know why we can't just use
the same technology, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. I share your bemusement on that issue
and have no idea why they are spending years sorting through,
trying to recreate or otherwise decide on what parameters they
want to use or what kind of technology and biometrics. I mean,
this is being used in the nuclear industry, it is being used at
other secure installations in the United States, even in the
private sector.
Just a little bit on your observation about--I mean, a
major concern on aviation, although a tangential concern to
this committee since our principal focus is security, is the
impact of security on the economics of the industry and the
potential that we are going to lose one or another of our major
network or legacy carriers, as we call them today. Again, would
you just expand a little bit? Because I have observed the same
thing. It seems that the airlines, particularly as you
mentioned, short-haul flights, people figure, hey, if I am
going to be standing in that line I might as well just drive.
And I have also observed, you know, I have talked to people at
my home airport and they say, yeah, we don't know what happened
to all those United 1-K passengers, they kind of just
disappeared. Can you just comment on the impact on the industry
of the fact that we don't have Registered Traveler available to
expedite their movement?
Mr. Woerth. Yes, sir. I think that is probably the biggest
change in the demographic of the traveling public, is the more
leisure travelers, because the air fares have gotten so cheap
to attract the travel back since 2001. It is now more people
flying than before then but at cheaper fares than before then.
The revenue is like 15 billion a year less with more people
flying than 3 or 4 years ago. And a lot of that revenue less is
again a higher percentage of leisure travelers. The business
person has decided, for the best use of their time, they can't
get the chance of getting stuck in security lines or having all
that time wasted in having to get to the airplane an hour and a
half early, they have made their other arrangements. And
because of that, it has directly affected the economic health,
particularly of the legacy carriers, if you will, the large
passenger network carriers who have a wide amount of different
kind of airplanes who serve the small community. It is not just
the 60 largest communities that a Southwest or JetBlue might
serve, it is the 429 other airports that I think are being
impacted the most. I think small communities have been affected
to a much larger degree than certainly Chicago or Los Angeles.
Mr. DeFazio. It is my understanding that somewhere around 8
percent of the people who fly constitute 24 percent or 25
percent of the passenger load. That is, frequent business
travelers constitute essentially a quarter of the passenger
load; yet they are less than 10 percent of the actual, of the
individuals who fly. And it has always seemed to me that if we
could put those people through a system such as you have
subscribed to, that that would allow the TSA to focus on the
other unknown 75 percent of the people with whatever technology
they are applying.
Ms. Kolander, you did mention in your written testimony
about flight attendant training. You know, we have had on the
Aviation Committee, and I think it would probably be new to
this committee, an ongoing concern about the lack of rigorous
and uniform training for flight attendants. Could you give us
and give the committee sort of an introduction and update on
that?
Ms. Kolander. Certainly. Thank you. The Association of
Flight Attendants still believes that one of the major concerns
out there is that we still do not have effective training to
prepare our flight attendant members to respond effectively and
proficiently to an aircraft security incident. We do believe
that the training that we are currently receiving regarding
security training is inadequate to help us address these
situations. We still see varying from carrier to carrier, and
one of our other biggest concerns is that we are not being
trained necessarily as a coordinated team. We do believe that,
in order to respond effectively and efficiently to a security
incident, you have to train as a team. We need to know exactly
what is going to happen in the flight deck, what is going to
happen when we have Federal air marshals on board. Part of that
is a crew resource management approach, but overall we still
believe that there needs to be standardized security training
to help members respond to threat conditions, and right now we
still believe that that is not being effectively done at most
of the carriers.
Mr. DeFazio. Do we still have some carriers still showing
the 2-hour video and that is it?
Ms. Kolander. We do have some carriers that are still
showing the video, and we have tried to work with carriers to
ensure that the minimal amount of time is actually being
applied. We actually had a situation just recently where the
flight attendant said that the allotted time for the security
training was actually shortened because the instructor wanted
to make sure that they got to lunch on time. So they cut the
security training in half and sent them out to lunch. So those
are still some of the concerns we are seeing out there.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. It doesn't sound like our scrutiny
and continued efforts in those areas have had the impact that
we wanted. And I will--and I expect this committee will now
pick up that banner, and we will try and get the airlines to do
what is right by the flight attendants.
Ms. Kolander. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren of California. The Chair recognizes Chairman
Cox for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cox. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks again to
our witnesses.
Captain Woerth, I think one of the things that you said has
got us focused exactly where we need to be, and that is we need
to be looking for terrorists. We need to be remembering what
this is all about. It is not an exercise, it is not an end in
itself. There is a purpose to all of this, and so we have to
constantly question whether what we are doing is leading us to
that objective. And between the two of you, Captain Woerth and
Ms. Burlingame, I think you have drawn our attention to an
aspect of this problem that is truly scandalous. That is that
not only are these IDs that you showed us, Ms. Burlingame,
which you obtained overnight off the street--I have to say they
look quite nice. They are very fancy and official looking. Not
only are these things in use at our airports, but also, Captain
Woerth, the pilot's ID that you have you basically described as
worthless. It is 30-year-old technology, which is to say there
is nothing biometric in it. It is hanging around your neck so
people aren't really closely looking to see whether that is
you. And so the one instance that we are trying to guard
against that we know of--maybe there is another and you can
tell me, and that is that it is not that we don't trust the
pilots, but that this person might be pretending to be a pilot
could occur at an airplane. Nothing that we do in the screening
process protects us against that anyway. So it isn't a question
of having too much security; it is a question of having too
much wasted effort. We have got all these people standing in
line at enormous cost to the taxpayer, to travelers, to the
industry, and so on, and it is a great distraction. It is not
related to the object at hand.
I want to ask you, Ms. Burlingame, whether you know of
anyone who has actually traveled on one of these cards.
Ms. Burlingame. Yes, I do. In fact, I--.
Mr. Cox. What happens when you show this at the airplane?
Ms. Burlingame. Well, actually, I drove down. For some of
the reasons that Captain Woerth was just describing, I drove
here instead of flew. But if I had flown, I was going to give
it a go. And not because I wasn't afraid that they would be
taken, but because it is against the law to use a counterfeit
ID.
Mr. Cox. Well, we are glad that you didn't have to break
the law.
Ms. Burlingame. But you know what? I was tempted to
basically just to--because it would have been I guess a bit of
publicity to the cause. And I understand that the Mexican
government has threatened legal action against Peter Gadiel,
who is the president of our group. Peter lost his son at Ground
Zero on September 11th. And the interesting thing is that the
Mexican government would have a hard time proving that in fact
I wasn't born in Mexico, because they have no database to prove
that I wasn't born in Chihuahua, Mexico, which it says on that
card. And they would have a very, very difficult time. They
can't prove the actual identity of anybody who had these cards,
including the ones that they issue, because it is known that
the birth certificates that are used as the source document are
also counterfeited. And when the consulates, the mobile
consulates show up, they show up with a pack of blank birth
certificates that they fill in. I mean, it is that sketchy.
And so, in answer to your question, yes, I called a
gentleman who is involved in this movement. He has one of these
cards. His card is, by the way, identical to the ones that I
have shown you in terms of technology, and he only uses that to
fly in every airplane that he goes into.
Mr. Cox. And does he ever get set aside for secondary
screening because he is using that?
Ms. Burlingame. No. And in fact, I said, are they aware
that you are using the matricula consular card? He said: I make
sure they know. I point it out to them: I have here a Mexican
matricula consular card. Do you accept this as ID? Yes, we do.
Mr. Cox. Obviously, Captain Woerth, what we need to do--and
Ms. Kolander, what we need to do is get you real IDs. Now, the
Real ID Act was signed into law yesterday, I note, by President
Bush. But that is going to be quite some time in the making,
and those are ultimately going to be optional programs with
every State. And we need to fix this problem right away. The
TWIC program, which we have mentioned, is designed to give you
a biometric identifier that you as pilot and crew can use to
get to that airplane.
We are going to have the TSA up of course, and this is
preparatory for more hearings on this topic, but you can tell
us usefully today what you understand from the Federal
Government and specifically from TSA is the schedule for your
being able to use TWIC ID. Do either of you have any idea?
Mr. Woerth. It seems to be this slipping deadline. And when
it first started out, the development would be 6 months; after
6 months of testing we would go to implementation. And I am
still seeing information that now they need more time. I have
heard it has been tested and ready to go. I have heard
different things: One, we just need authorization, or they need
an allocation of funds, or they need somebody to make the
decision for them that is it all going to be voluntary at the
airports and airline, or is it going to be mandated? And so I
can't say with any certainty whatever that there is--I have any
idea when this actually might be.
Mr. Cox. So it sounds as if somebody needs to make some
decisions here.
Mr. Woerth. I think somebody has got to make the decision
for them to give them a schedule and a time line and pull the
trigger.
Mr. Cox. Now, can you help us imagine--and, Mr. Chairman, I
am happy to ask my questions on a second round and yield now.
Mr. DeFazio. No. I just wanted to ask the Chair if he would
yield on that point for a second.
Mr. Cox. Of course.
Mr. DeFazio. I would hope that either this subcommittee or
the full committee would bring in responsible Federal officials
from TSA or other agencies to both examine the ongoing delay,
which we have had them in probably 6 months ago into aviation,
on the TWIC card; the resistance to expanding Registered
Traveler; and third, to give us a full understanding of what
range of identification they are accepting. Because this is
news to me that one of these cards is allowed to board an
airplane. You know, it was driver's licenses. I thought foreign
nationals who didn't have U.S. driver's licenses or other
official ID were having to use passports.
So I would like to actually have the committee fully grasp
what is allowable out there, because, just like Ms. Burlingame,
Mr. Mica famously before one of our hearings had his staff go
on line and obtain a bunch of phony identification that was
driver's license based that could have been used at airports,
let alone something that isn't even based in our U.S. driver's
license system.
Ms. Burlingame. If I may respond.
Mr. Lungren of California. If the Chairman would yield for
just a moment.
Mr. Cox. I would be pleased to yield.
Mr. Lungren of California. In response to the gentleman's
inquiry, we do intend to have TSA here. We think it important,
though, that the people who are in the public and those who are
representing those who have special positions here, the airline
pilots, the attendants, I think it is important for us to find
out what their understanding is, because government has an
obligation, it seems to me, to be as clear as possible and to
give as best guidance as possible. And here we have two people
representing two of the major actors in this whole arena, and
it obviously reveals itself to be befuddlement, to say the
least. And so I think it is helpful for us to get the
impressions that they have, and then we will have TSA here to
give us their understanding. And I know Ms. Burlingame wanted
to say something.
Ms. Burlingame. I just want you to know that we tried to
actually get the answer to that question on these consular
cards from the TSA itself, and they made it very, very
difficult for us. In other words, we couldn't get a yes or no.
We simply wanted to know: Are these cards acceptable or not?
And I guess the answer was kind of a run around. I could send
you the e-mails that we got back and forth. And ultimately it
was almost like, yes, they were admitting that we accept them.
And then, you know, I did more research, and I found out that,
yes, they are accepted everywhere. And people are using them
everywhere, and they are using the counterfeit ones. And so
that is very disconcerting. The counterfeit ones are pretty
good. So I think a determined terrorist could probably get an
authentic one. And, again, when I say authentic, I use that
term loosely because they have really no security features that
can be sourced in any way at the airports.
Mr. Cox. Well, Mr. Chairman, at this juncture we have
before us a half dozen of these forged matricula consular IDs
with the photographs of members of this committee and others on
them. I would ask unanimous consent that digital copies of
these be entered into the record.
Mr. Lungren of California. Without objection, they shall be
entered in the record.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3034.001
Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Chairman, could I make a request at this
point, too, regarding that?
Mr. Lungren of California. Sure.
Mr. DeFazio. I would request that, given the frustration
that Ms. Burlingame encountered, that prior to scheduling a
hearing with TSA, that the committee ask of the TSA to give us
a full list of what forms of identification they are officially
recognizing and accepting. That would certainly include the
questions here, and there may be others that we are not aware
of.
Mr. Cox. I suppose I still have the time.
Mr. Lungren of California. Yes.
Mr. Cox. I think that is an outstanding suggestion, and it
is something that every member of this committee is interested
in having the answer to. So that would be wonderful preparatory
information for our next hearing.
But back to this line of questioning about biometric
identification, TWIC card in specific, perhaps Registered
Traveler and TWIC converging. Can you imagine with the airports
that you are familiar with, and your normal course through the
airplane to the aircraft, how it might work if we had a sturdy
biometric form of identification that you might go to the
airplane separate from standing in these lines, Captain Woerth?
Mr. Woerth. Yes, sir. I can envision a system where with a
machine no different than the one I use for the Registered
Traveler, where you can either do it a number of ways: You can
swipe your card, I can touch my fingerprint, or they look at my
retinal scan. A lot of these vendors today, sir, on one card
can print five different ways to do the same thing. So if an
airplane wanted to do a retinal scan, fine. If they wanted to
do a fingerprint, fine. If they want to have magnetic tape
information in a chip in the back. There is five or six things
they can do on one card.
Mr. Cox. Could you envision letting yourself in,
essentially, through a separate locked door that you open with
your fingerprint?
Mr. Woerth. No, I don't envision that. I think somebody--
because what I think the key factor is, I think, when all those
chips, when you slide your card or you touch your
fingerprint--.
Mr. Cox. Well, sliding your card obviously wouldn't make
any sense at all. It has got to be you. It has got to take your
biometrics if it is going to work.
Mr. Woerth. Right. And make that work. But what comes up
like on a Registered Traveler system right now is a life-sized
head shot right beside your head. So on the computer screen,
and so when I touch my fingerprint or my scan, what come up on
the screen that somebody else--a security person could verify
this. But we could go through so fast. As soon as they see us
go through the line, you know, and not taking off our shoes,
not emptying our bags, they would know electronically,
biometrically it was me. It is not at all a tiny picture me; it
is a life-sized picture like me on a computer screen. And I
think we could go through that screen as fast as we can walk
through there, almost like a turnstile. It wouldn't take any
time at all.
Mr. Cox. Now, the trouble with converging then TWIC and
Registered Traveler is that after you give your biometric in
the Registered Traveler program, which I am sure you have used,
you still have to go through the magnetometer. You know, you
get in the front of the line, but you still go through all of
that. And I take it what you have in mind a la Israel is that
once we have identified that you are you, you get to go to your
airplane.
Mr. Woerth. My belief is that crew members could do that.
But if it's--for everybody's comfort, if they are going to
throw more roadblocks in front of us to at least throw our bags
through the line, I am fine with that. I just don't want to
have to take off my shoes, take off my hat, take off my belt
and dump everything out. I am not troubled by running my flight
bag and my suitcase through a machine. I am troubled about even
after they know who I am taking all of my equipment out and
taking my shoes off.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, I would yield at this point. I know
we have additional members here.
Mr. Lungren of California. I know the gentleman from
Washington has just arrived.
Mr. Dicks. I am not ready yet to ask any questions, Mr.
Chairman. I am glad you had the hearing, and it is an important
subject. I would like to put my statement in the record.
Mr. Lungren of California. Your statement will be entered
in the record.
[The statement of Mr. Dicks follows:]
Prepared Remarks for the Record by the Honorable Norm Dicks, a
Representative in Congress From the States of Washington
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join with you to welcome our panel this morning.
Captain Woerth and Ms. Kolander, we appreciate your testimony and the
insights you are able to provide after years of experience keeping us
safe in the skies. Ms. Burlingame, we deeply sympathize with the loss
of your brother on September 11th, and I want to commend you for your
courage in responding to that tragedy by working hard to try and fix
some of the problems that allowed that terrorist attack to happen.
Chairman Lungren and I represent districts on the west coast, and
we log tens of thousands of miles in the air every year. So we are both
about as familiar with the airport screening process as anyone outside
of the airline industry could be.
Almost four years after September 11th, serious gaps remain in the
system that TSA has implemented. To date, the focus has been in the
physical screening of people and baggage for weapons and seemingly
benign items that could be dangerous in the enclosed environment of a
commercial aircraft. But reports by GAO, the DHS Inspector General, and
others show that the effectiveness of these efforts is limited.
This can be fixed by better training and oversight. And the
implementation of new technology will play a critical role. That is why
I strongly support the deployment of in-line explosive detection
equipment to our domestic airports. And we need to aggressively pursue
better technology to screen passengers for explosives.
But even with improvements in technology and methods, the
mechanical screening of passengers and baggage will continue to be a
comparatively slow and cumbersome process.
Under the direction of Congress, I understand that TSA is working
on some programs that will help to expedite the process of passenger
screening. Secure Flight, the Registered Traveler program, and the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential--when implemented--
should help to address some of the weaknesses.
But on each of these programs, TSA is running well behind schedule
and has been very slow in reporting back to Congress. In the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations bill we will consider next week on
the House floor, serious cuts and severe restrictions are imposed on
these programs because of TSA's failure to get the job done. These are
very serious issues of themselves, and I hope the Subcommittee will dig
more deeply into this issue at a later date.
Having reviewed your testimony, I understand that these lagging
programs are having a very serious effect on the two groups of people
that we most trust to keep us safe during every flight--pilots and
flight attendants. I look forward to hearing from you in more detail as
to how we can address this problem from your perspective.
I would like to pause one moment to note that I am concerned a bit
with the title of today's hearing, ``The Transportation Security
Administration's Screening of Airline Pilots: Sound Security Practice
or Waste of Scarce Resources?''
I am perplexed as to why we would limit the scope of this inquiry
to just pilots. It is my understanding that, with the exception of
Federal Flight Deck Officers, pilots and flight attendants undergo the
same extensive background checks and screening. If the purpose of this
hearing is to find ways to save resources without reducing security,
shouldn't we look at both groups?
Mr. Chairman, I am glad you have called this hearing, and I am
eager to hear the testimony of our panel.
Mr. Lungren of California. It seems to me, Captain, that
the major impact of your testimony is that we need to do more
in identifying the person rather than fingernail clippers, for
instance, that somehow would make more sense than what we are
doing now. Let me ask you a generic question, which is, can you
tell me whether or not the members of your organization feel
that we have had some success with the additional screening,
the additional security measures that we have taken post-9/11?
That is, does your membership, members of your organization,
feel safer today in terms of the people that are on the
airplane than they did before 9/11?
Mr. Woerth. I think the fair answer to that is they think
there has been an improvement in the system that was in place
prior to 2001, which was at wide variance from airplane to
airplane. The quality of the screening, as you remember, before
that, we had 400 percent turnover in some of the personnel in
those days. And I think they recognize it was a pretty
haphazard process. So they think it is a more thorough
screening. But I think that the risk reward, without focusing
on the right risks, the expense, and the hassle factor of it to
the economy, to the crew members, to the airlines, and to the
public, is far in excess of the incremental benefit that they
got. The cost of it has just been extraordinary for a very
little gain.
Mr. Lungren of California. Let me ask one more question on
that. And that is, some Members of Congress have voiced the
opinion that if we had another attempt to hijack an aircraft,
that the flying public wouldn't respond the same way. That is,
we had been trained before that if you had a hijacked aircraft,
be calm, don't do anything; they would make certain demands,
fly you someplace you may not want to fly, you would be captive
for a certain period of time but you would get out; as opposed
to you would be part of a flying missile. And the opinion has
been expressed that the American public now is not going to sit
down this time around, and that plane may go down but they will
fight to make sure it doesn't become a missile.
Number one, do you share that opinion? And, if so, what
does that say to you about the manner in which we should be
dealing with security then? In other words, it strikes me that
it would not be as important if someone has got a fingernail
file as to spending more time trying to identify who the people
are, as you subscribe.
Mr. Woerth. First of all, sir, I do agree that the public
themselves, the passengers, by United Flight 93, by the
Pennsylvania flight, the learning curve had already gone up of
the traveling public to do something. And so I am absolutely
convinced--and there is all sorts of anecdotal evidence--that
just on the flights of--to Washington National, if somebody
accidentally forgets about the 30-minute rule and stands up,
four people are grabbing their shirttails and pulling them back
in their seat right away.
So I think the traveling public will not sit idly by if
they think there is anything going on on this airplane that
would attempt a takeover. They would react very quickly.
Which goes to the point that I think has been made at other
tables. We have a tendency always to fight the last war, and
because a sharp object was used that is what we are--now we are
focusing on taking away things from people. The truth is a
trained terrorist needs nothing. His bare hands and bad intent
will be enough if he is trying to do something bad. So we
should focus on the next threat or new threats that we haven't
really covered, which includes some of the members of this
committee, of looking for explosive devices that are not
detected because they are not metal, and rather than looking
for all these tiny sharp objects. We should worry about the
next threat, not the last one.
Mr. Lungren of California. Ms. Kolander, you had mentioned
earlier that you felt there was insufficient training now from
a security standpoint with respect to how crews should respond.
And I guess I would ask, in the context of what was just
suggested; that is, that individual members of the flying
public would react differently than they would have prior to 9/
11. That would suggest that the attendants would probably do
something or give different sorts of commands than they would
have before 9/11. Has that been incorporated into the kind of
training programs that you have?
Ms. Kolander. Chairman, you would think, as you said, that
would suggest that has been incorporated into the training.
But, again, going along the same lines as having a standardized
security training does involve how to react to situations where
your passengers may respond in this new method. In other words,
that they take control. And from our AFA representatives we
have heard that this training is not being included in the
current security training. We have asked that helping flight
attendants to learn how to respond to more aggressive
passengers in the sense of either verbal or physical aggression
when it is encountered is trained to them, and we are not
seeing that.
In the same lines, flight attendants do need to be trained
in how to effectively manage a passenger load that may now be
trying to take control over something to thwart an incident. It
does go back to there has to be an effective communication
method. And part of that effective communication method is that
flight attendants need to be able to notify the flight deck
immediately when something is happening, they need to be able
to notify the Federal air marshals on board if they are on
board. And all of that so that we can communicate as a team
with the pilots, the Federal air marshals, and everyone else on
effectively responding to this emergency system or this
security event.
So I don't think that currently we are seeing an effective
training on how to manage the passengers when they start
responding on their own to security incidents.
Mr. Lungren of California. Thank you. The gentleman from
the State of Washington.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I regret that I
could not be here to hear your testimony. We have base closure
today, and in the State of Washington that is a big issue. And
California, of course.
I want to welcome all the witnesses here, and I hope that
maybe you can just fill me in a little bit. Ms. Kolander, I am
just--you agree with me, don't you, that flight attendants
should be part of this discussion along with the airline
pilots?
Ms. Kolander. I certainly agree that flight attendants
should be part of this discussion.
Mr. Dicks. Because they are a part of the security effort
on the airplane.
Ms. Kolander. Flight attendants have an integral role in
security on board the aircraft, in dealing with passengers,
through screening, and everything else. We are vetted the same
as pilots are. So to have this hearing without discussing
flight attendants to go through security screening may not be
in the best interest, I think, of this subcommittee, because
our members--AFA only represents 46,000, but there is a lot
more flight attendants that are flying around in commercial
aircraft out there.
Mr. Dicks. And you said they go through a vetting process.
They go through a process of being checked and everything. And
then is it your opinion that they, you know, there is a check
every time you go through the TSA clearance. Right? Just, I see
the flight attendants and pilots going through. They may go
ahead of the passengers, but they go through the same screening
system?
Ms. Kolander. Yes. Flight attendants are subject to the
same background check as pilots, and we are also subject to the
same security screening as pilots and other passengers. We do
go through the security lines.
Mr. Dicks. Do you think that is necessary?
Ms. Kolander. AFA believes that it is necessary. We don't
necessarily agree that we stand in the same lines as other
passengers. There has to be a compromise, and we think that the
ID along with a layer of screening creates a more effective
security system. This is security--effective security screening
is a layered approach. Part of that approach is the ID and part
of that is security screening.
Mr. Dicks. Do you also--I mean, the one thing I think you
would worry about, you know, if a flight attendant or a pilot
is getting on the airplane and somebody might have put
something into their baggage. I know you always have it with
you and all that, but you know how life is. Sometimes people do
get separated for a few moments. I mean, to have it--it seems
to me that it is an added layer of security to have--you know,
to continue to have the things that are going to go on the
airplane go through the same thing that passengers. Do you
disagree with that?
Ms. Kolander. No, I do not disagree. AFA believes that part
of the layered security approach is that you do have the
credential, which we have asked for, such as the TWIC program.
But we also believe that you should have some screening.
Because in the case that the credentialing, this new ID, does
become compromised or the individual unwittingly becomes a
mule, that is part of the layered approach. You can't just do
only the security card, the TWIC card, or only screening. It is
a combination, a layered approach.
So, yes, our members are willing to go through the security
screening process.
Mr. Dicks. Captain, what is your view on that?
Mr. Woerth. I share that view.
Mr. Dicks. You agree with that?
Mr. Woerth. Yeah.
Mr. Dicks. What I have heard--fly a lot on United, okay,
and I have asked the flight attendants, you know, how do they
think this whole effort is going. And one of the things they
mentioned--it is in your statement, too--is they don't think
the flight attendants get enough training on this particular
issue. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Woerth. AFA does agree that our flight attendants are
not receiving effective training at this point to properly
respond to a security incident. We do believe that the training
is inadequate, and it varies from carrier to carrier, and we
would like to see that fixed. As an example, I don't think you
were here, we gave an example where one carrier actually short-
changed the hours required for training just so that they could
take the extra hour for lunch, so that the flight attendants
wouldn't miss their lunch break. So that to me says how
important security training is for our members. That is saying
it isn't very important even after 9/11.
Mr. Dicks. Captain Woerth, how do you feel about this?
Mr. Dicks. As to flight attendant training?
Mr. Dicks. Do you think the pilots get enough training on
this subject?
Mr. Woerth. I think all the training could be enhanced. It
is still too much left over from pre-9/11, show the same
videos. It is different from airline to airline. I must say
there is not a standard. I represent 43 airlines; it is not the
same at each one. But some have done just modest changes since
9/11. Some of the same videos that I saw as a new hire at
Braniff in the mid-1970s, they are just slightly updated in the
1980s, are still shown, and a little discussion by an
instructor and off you go.
Mr. Dicks. So, again, you think more work can be done in
this area?
Mr. Woerth. Yes. I think the only pilots who have got
really new training were our Federal flight deck officers. I
mean, they have got extensive training, but the regular line
pilot doesn't have a lot different than he had prior to 9/11.
Mr. Dicks. Is there any guidance from TSA on training?
Mr. Woerth. Not that I can see that is of any use to
anyone.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren of California. Before I recognize the chairman
of the full committee, I was just going to say, Ms. Kolander, I
was going to ask you if you could tell me the difference
between the training of Aloha and Alaska Airlines, but I guess
I won't.
The Chairman.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to finish up our discussion about the human centered
focus of our counterterrorism efforts here and the fact that we
are supposed to be going after terrorists, the threat--and I
get, as the chairman of this full committee, briefings along
with Mr. Thompson of Mississippi on a routine basis from the
National Counterterrorism Center about the terrorist threat to
the United States. It is a global threat, and our chief sources
of concern, it will not surprise you, are overseas. So the
people that we are looking for include a pretty healthy dose of
folks who are, whatever their identification says, coming at us
from other countries. We need, therefore, if we are using
biometric forms of identification, for not just the pilots to
identify that you are the pilot but also the passengers, to
connect that to some reliable database. It strikes me that, to
the extent that we get lucky and some of these terrorists
overlap with the criminal class and we might have criminal
records on them, that the biometric identifier most commonly in
use around the rest of the world with Interpol and national and
provincial police departments everywhere is the fingerprint,
either multiple prints or single index finger. And a biometric
system that is focused on the rest of the world and our ability
to interchange data with them would be superior to one that
just tells us a lot about ourselves.
So I am wondering whether or not you would find it
satisfactory if the Registered Traveler program and the TWIC
program focused on that form of identification? Or do we need a
TWIC program--because it is the pilot and we want additional
security to make sure that whoever takes control of that
aircraft is really the pilot, do we want a TWIC program that is
based on additional biometrics such as a retinal scan?
And I would be happy to hear from any of our three
witnesses on that point. And, I mean, and I start from the
premise that right now we have got nothing. We have absolutely
nothing. We have what you have hanging around your neck, which
you described as useless. So going to a biometric would be a
sea change. Picking the biometric is a refinement, but that is
at least my premise going in and I want your views.
Mr. Woerth. I concur with certainly the last part of your
statement, that any new change to any biometric as soon as
possible would be light years ahead of what we have now,
because we have really nothing that we didn't have 40 years ago
today with our current ID cards. So whatever the TSA and the
Congress can work out to get the first thing implemented with
TWIC, whatever that happens to be, whether that be with
fingerprints or something else, I am fine. Firstest with the
mostest gets my vote. Just, let us get it started, and we can
improve it later.
But I also--I think you raised the other point that is very
valid. At some point we want not just interoperability, we want
the connectivity with all those other things we are doing.
Mr. Cox. Including the terrorist watch list.
Mr. Woerth. Including those. And I see either we are going
to leave out the things and have multiple systems trying to do
the same thing, and there is a good chance for everything to
fall through the cracks. Simplicity, overlapping, and
interoperability are the keys we ought to look for. And so I
concur with what was really your statement there.
Mr. Cox. Ms. Kolander or Ms. Burlingame?
Ms. Kolander. I think that while the Registered Traveler
program and all of those other programs could be effective in
the long run, I think what we need to concentrate on doing is
working on the programs, the credentialing cards for crew
members. If that is the TWIC program, then we need to work on
that first and foremost so that, as Captain Woerth has said,
you actually start to reducing the amount of possibly excessive
screening. And one of the biggest members of that group are the
crew members, and so a high priority has got to be placed on
getting that card out first.
Mr. Cox. Ms. Burlingame, the last word.
Ms. Burlingame. Well, my opinion on this is that--I mean, I
don't know how these things work at these various bureaucracies
on the Hill. And so I would echo what Mr. Woerth said, is you
get the program up and running that you can get up and running
first, because the terrorists aren't waiting around for us to
figure it out. And although I have to say I disagree, with all
due respect, a little bit to Ms. Kolander, I think the threat
risk from the cockpit and the cabin crew is significantly
lowered in the next 3 years before we get Real ID in effect;
that we really have to--we really have to focus on where the
danger is coming from, as Mr. Woerth said, from people, and
those people are going to be the ones boarding the planes. The
terrorists are very--they are very, very smart. We continually
underestimate them. And this idea that passengers are going to
rise up and prevent things from happening, I am not so
confident about that. We had the example of Northwest 327 where
the passengers essentially sat there. Now, I realize--I don't
know if you are aware of this incident, where we had a lot of
very, very unusual behavior from 14 Syrians who were traveling
from, I believe it was Detroit to Los Angeles. Now, I believe
there was a Federal air marshal on board, it turned out, but
the passengers were paralyzed with fear. And part of it was
because they were not doing the things that we know at least
now, to the extent we can, that the 19 hijackers were doing on
9/11. Their behavior was unusual and odd, and they couldn't--so
the passengers didn't know how to respond to this.
Also, remember that on 9/11 these hijackers selected very
light loads. They were smart about it. They cased these
flights. They flew 77, my brother's plane, before 9/11. They
knew that there would be very few people that they would have
to contend with. And if you listen to Betty Ong's tape recorded
phone call, which lasted almost 30 minutes, there was a great
deal she didn't know. Again, one of the other flight attendants
on Flight 175, there was a great deal they didn't know because
the hijackers pushed the passengers, the few that were there,
to the backs of the planes so they wouldn't see.
So I think that it is very important that we have this
multi-layered approach. But I think the danger is not going to
be coming from passengers or pilots, counterfeit pilots, the
danger is going to come from abroad. And they are going to be
sneaking through our borders, they are going to be embedding in
our communities, and they are going to be figuring out ways,
fashioning new ways, as Mr. Woerth said again, the next battle,
not the one behind us.
So I would urge, whatever the apparatus is, to get
biometrics for the flying public. That is the one I would go
with.
Mr. Cox. This has been extraordinarily useful testimony. I
think--I am sorry, Ms. Kolander, do you want to?
Ms. Kolander. Yes, Mr. Chairman. May I just end with one
comment?
Mr. Cox. Yes.
Ms. Kolander. Actually, I do believe that--Ms. Burlingame
had actually said a comment earlier. She said: It is a failure
of imagination that we don't look for any type of security
threat. And I think that it is a failure of imagination if we
think that a threat cannot come internally.
Mr. Cox. By internally, you mean someone--.
Ms. Kolander. From crew members.
Mr. Cox. Someone that infiltrates the crew?
Ms. Kolander. That is why we believe that you have to have
the layered approach, the ID card, with the security screening.
Mr. Cox. Ms. Burlingame, do you want to--.
Ms. Burlingame. I agree. But I think that we don't have
to--it is again the risk assessment that you mentioned earlier
when you are trying to decide which technology to use. And I
think there has to be a certain amount of--I think a concerted
campaign to educate the public about biometrics. They have to--
I think they would be willing to embrace this, and I think
their concerns about national ID and all these things I think
are completely overblown. I think the American people and in
general the flying public would be very amenable to this if it
is explained to them. I think it is the job of you folks here
on the Hill to make it clear to them what this is and why it is
being done. But I think, obviously, again, the layered
approach. But I think in terms of which technology to use, I
would go with the one that is going to get up fast.
Mr. Cox. So it is your judgment that, while there is in
fact a risk that terrorists could masquerade as pilots or crew,
that there is an even risk that they would come on board as
passengers.
Ms. Burlingame. I think it is a minimal risk that they
would succeed as masquerading as a pilot. I mean, remember,
Hani Hanjour, the fellow who took controls of my brother's
plane, had about 200 hours in an aircraft. He was--I actually
went and interviewed the flight instructors that took--
instructors that took him up in Bowie, Maryland. He was
terrified of when he had the controls of a Cessna trying to
land that plane, trying to--he was not a happy flier. And for
him to masquerade as a pilot with 2, 3,000 hours in a cockpit
instrument-rated pilot, I think--I just don't see how he could
do it.
But, again, then we have the example of Egypt Air. I think
we do have to use our imaginations. We must not underestimate
these people. We really must not. But I think the risk
assessment, you know, do you spend all this money on a very,
very far-fetched scenario, or do you put most of the money that
you have and the resources you have in one that is very common
and very practical and much more likely.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren of California. Thank you. I thank the witnesses
for your valuable testimony and the members for their
questions. The members of the committee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses, and I will ask you to
respond to those in writing if you receive them. The hearing
record will be open for 10 days. And, once again, I thank you
all for being here.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
---------- --
--------
Additional Questions Submitted For the Record
Questions Concerning the Screening of Pilots
Questions for Ms. Debra Burlingame
Thank you for your moving testimony. You mentioned that many
airline pilots are former military pilots. In addition to airline
pilots, who do you believe should also bypass regular checkpoint
screening? For example, I was thinking, perhaps, the men and women who
serve in the U.S. Armed Forces?
There has not been a response recieved.
In your testimony, you mentioned Operation Tarmac and the large
number of undocumented aliens and other unauthorized workers who work
at airports across the country. In your opinion, how might TSA work
more closely with the airports around the country to develop sound
hiring practices to prevent this from happening again?
There has not been a response recieved.
Questions for Captain Duane Woerth
Captain Woerth, in your testimony you mentioned the ``inherent
weaknesses'' in operating a watch list. Could you please describe some
of these weaknesses in more detail?
There has not been a response recieved.
Captain Woerth, in your testimony you mentioned various screening
initiatives, from TWIC to Registered Traveler to Secure Flight to SPOT.
To prioritize scare DHS resources, in your opinion, how would you rank
order these programs and why?
There has not been a response recieved.
Throughout your testimony, you refer to the Israeli aviation
security screening model that is ``human centered.'' Because great
difference in Israel's geographic size vis-a-vis the United States's,
do you really believe TSA could create a screener force as proficient
and effective as in Israel, why or why not?
There has not been a response recieved.
In your testimony, you recommended educating employees as well as
the general public to act as the ``eyes and ears'' of security. Please
expand on your recommendation and discuss how a program might be
developed that would include safeguards against terrorist
countermeasures? In other words, how might such a program be developed
without letting terrorists know what we're looking and listening for?
There has not been a response recieved.
Questions From the Honorable Christopher Cox
Are methods currently in place to expedite the screening of airline
pilots, especially in cases where they are under time pressure to
report for duty, conduct pre-flight inspections, and so on to meet
airline schedules? If not, what steps can be taken at airports to
ensure that pilots are not unduly burdened by long lines at screening
checkpoints and time consuming screening procedures?
There has not been a response recieved.
Can pilots currently use express lanes for screening at airports so
equipped? How many airports have these express lanes? Who is eligible
to use these express lanes (Registered Traveler Participants?)? At how
many airports is the screening of pilots and crew carried out at
locations separate from passenger screening?
There has not been a response recieved.
Are TSA screeners given any specific instructions or training
regarding the screening of pilots or airline crew?
There has not been a response recieved.
Are their bona-fide concerns that terrorists could infiltrate
secured areas of airports by posing as airline pilots? Can these
concerns be mitigated through means other than exhaustive screening of
pilots? Would background checks and tamper resistant identification
cards suffice or would this simply leave the system exposed to more
risk that the TSA is willing to accept?
There has not been a response recieved.
Can you provide for us your perspective of the status of the TWIC
Program?
There has not been a response recieved.
Is it envisioned that pilots and flight attendants will eventually
participate in the TWIC program?
There has not been a response recieved.
How will the vetting process in the TWIC program differ from that
of the Registered Traveler program?
There has not been a response recieved.
Could pilots who have already been vetted through extensive
criminal history records checks and checks against government terrorist
watchlists be expedited through security screening in the same manner
as participants in the Registered Traveler program?
There has not been a response recieved.
Is either the TWIC program or the Registered Traveler program
better suited for including airline pilots?
There has not been a response recieved.
Has the TSA taken any action to remedy screening procedures
complaints from pilots?
There has not been a response recieved.
The TWIC pilot program is currently scheduled to conclude on June
30.
What can you tell us about TSA's plans to continue to support those
locations, including issuance of new cards as well card replacement and
equipment maintenance, who have volunteered their time and resources
over the last 2-1/2 years to participate in this program?
There has not been a response recieved.
Has TSA shared any plans to expand the program beyond Delaware
River, LA/Long Beach and Florida between the end of the pilot program
and publication of the Final Rule? Is it TSA's intention to cease work
during that interim?
There has not been a response recieved.
TWIC stakeholders have indicated on numerous occasions in the past
that the TWIC program office has not effectively communicated system
progress, potential roadblocks and/or changes in project design or
scope. In some instances, there have been no communications, while in
others, the messages that are communicated are inconsistent.
Similarly, the Committee has heard that TSA has not recently
involved stakeholders, beyond perhaps those in Florida, in the program
design and development stages. This was most recently illustrated in
Philadelphia when TSA demonstrated the web portal for pre-enrollment,
and there were several basic functionality suggestions made by
potential system users.
When these issues have been brought to TSA's attention in the past,
TWIC program personnel have acknowledged some of the shortcomings and
indicated they would work to improve these processes. However, it
appears that few if any changes have been implemented over the last 12-
18 months.
Has TSA discussed with you any plans to address these issues?
There has not been a response recieved.
Questions From the Honorable Daniel E. Lungren
1. What is the status of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) and when will the card be deployed to transportation
workers?
There has not been a response recieved.
2. What forms of identification does TSA permit for identification
of passengers at airport checkpoints? Please submit a list.
There has not been a response recieved.
3. Does TSA accept the Matricula Consular card that is issued by
Mexican authorities for verifying the identity of Mexican citizens
traveling by air?
There has not been a response recieved.