[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 109-54]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 9, 2006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
28-987 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan RICK LARSEN, Washington
CATHY McMORRIS, Washington JIM COOPER, Tennessee
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
Bill Ostendorff, Professional Staff Member
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Croft, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2006
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 9, 2006, Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for Missile Defense Agency
and Ballistic Missile Defense Programs......................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 9, 2006.......................................... 37
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 2006
FISCAL YEAR 2007 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee.................................. 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee.......................... 2
WITNESSES
Dodgen, Lt. Gen. Larry J., Commanding General, U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command, and U.S. Army Forces Strategic
Command, U.S. Army............................................. 9
Duma, David W., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 11
Flory, Hon. Peter C.W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 15
Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, U.S. Air Force......................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dodgen, Lt. Gen. Larry J..................................... 71
Duma, David W................................................ 90
Flory, Hon. Peter C.W........................................ 96
Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III.............................. 46
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Everett.................................................. 111
Mr. Reyes.................................................... 113
Mr. Rogers................................................... 113
FISCAL YEAR 2006, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2006.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m., in room
2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Terry Everett
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Everett. The meeting will come to order.
Thank you all for being here.
Somewhere I have an opening statement. I will get to it.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
Department of Defense fiscal year 2007 budget request for
missile defense programs. Again, I thank you all for coming.
I welcome Lieutenant General Obering, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA); Lieutenant General Dodgen,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Command; Mr.
Duma, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the
Department of Defense; and Mr. Flory, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy.
Thank you again for being here. We have a lot of ground to
cover today, so I would ask each of you to limit your opening
statement to about five minutes, and your entire statement will
be made a part of the permanent record.
I will briefly comment that world events continue to
highlight the security threats posed by the proliferation of
missile technology and nuclear materials. The news concerning
potential threats from Iran and North Korea is no better this
year than it was last year.
As a Member of both the House Armed Services Committee and
Intelligence Committee, along with my colleague Mr. Reyes, I
firmly believe that we have a responsibility to press forward
with fielding those missile defense elements for our nation's
defense.
General Obering, I would like to highlight a few specific
areas that I am interested in hearing about today: The impact
of funding reductions for the fiscal year 2007 through 2011
Missile Defense Agency programs that were made late last year.
I was very pleased with your response to the independent
review team's finding last year following several Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) past failures. I specifically commend
you for standing up a missions readiness task force, and I am
looking forward to hearing your assessment on how the MDA test
program is proceeding.
General Dodgen, I am specifically interested in hearing
about the following: your crucial role as joint functional
component commander for Strategic Command (STRATCOM), including
progress in developing contingency operations for GMD, and your
assessment of the operational readiness.
Mr. Duma, I know that your organization has been working
very closely with MDA in developing criteria for operational
realistic testing. I look forward to hearing more about your
assessment of MDA's test program.
Mr. Flory, I look forward to hearing about your perspective
on the ballistic missile threat to our country. I am interested
in your views on how we are doing and engaging our
international partners in cooperative missile defense.
Now, let me recognize my good friend and colleague Mr.
Reyes, the ranking member of the subcommittee.
And a while ago when I mentioned that both of us were on
the House Armed Services and the Intel Committees--comments
following that--I do not speak for Mr. Reyes. He speaks for
himself on those kind of things. But he has always been a
strong advocate for the defense of this country.
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to thank Lieutenant General Obering and
Lieutenant General Dodgen, Mr. Duma and Assistant Secretary
Flory for joining us here today.
Welcome, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, although we have several contentious issues
in our subcommittee's jurisdiction, our Members who follow your
example are able to express differences of opinion without
letting the debate turn ugly.
We may need to call upon your leadership again this
afternoon, Mr. Chairman, as we will be discussing some
contentious issues related to the development, the testing and
the deployment of ballistic missile defense.
Before we get into that discussion, however, I want to
explain, Mr. Chairman, how I frame this particular issue. This
context is not for the sake of the Members of this
subcommittee, because even when we may disagree about a defense
issue, we never question each other's commitment to defending
our nation.
Rather, I do this for the sake of the general public,
because too often we Democrats are painted as reflexively and
unalterably opposed to missile defense.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, after these many years that we
have known each other, I am a strong supporter of missile
defense, including the GMD system that already is being
deployed in Alaska and California. And I think we will
eventually prove that this system is an effective insurance
policy against a limited ICBM threat.
Moreover, ballistic missile defense systems that protect or
will protect our troops on the front lines such as Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THADD) and Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) enjoy
broad and strong bipartisan support.
In 1999 H.R. 4, a bill co-authored by two of our committee
colleagues, Congressman Curt Weldon and Congressman John
Spratt, came to the House floor for a vote. H.R. 4 simply
stated that, ``It is the policy of the United States to deploy
a national missile defense system.''
This was the simple language of H.R. 4, period, end of
story, no caveat. And I am proud to tell you that a majority of
House Democrats--again, a majority of House Democrats--voted
for that measure, supporting that policy.
I also know that on my side of the aisle we do not have as
much consensus on national missile defense and deployment of
that system as our colleagues on the other side. But somehow,
in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, there is
widespread perception that all Democrats oppose missile
defense, especially a national missile defense system. That is
flat wrong.
I provide this context because today many Members will ask
tough questions. And even though I strongly support missile
defense, and even though I believe it is important and
imperative for our nation to have a ballistic missile defense
system in place, I too want to ask some tough questions because
even though I support missile defense, I do not think we should
give it a blank check or allow it to avoid a thorough testing
process. I think that is part of our obligation as Members of
Congress.
On the contrary, the very fact that someday a missile
defense system might be the last line of defense to protect our
citizens against nuclear-tipped missiles, this is exactly why
it should undergo some strenuous testing before deployment.
Last year, when we held our subcommittee oversight hearing
after three missile defense test failures, I stated that we
should not be discouraged by those tests, and I compared our
task to that of a baseball player who, after striking out,
needs to go back to the dugout, regroup before his next turn at
bat.
Well, General Obering, MDA has regrouped. Your decisions to
charter an independent review team and then implement its
recommendations have helped to set the program back on the path
to success. Since resuming testing last summer, MDA has
achieved test objectives in all aspects of the program,
including interceptors, radar, battle management, and
targeting.
Just yesterday, MDA successfully completed a joint test
with the Japanese demonstrating the performance of SM-3 Aegis
missile that had been modified with a Japanese-designed
advanced nose cone, all very welcome news to all of us on the
committee.
Yet the most challenging tests, I think, are still to come.
This spring and summer MDA will attempt to verify the entire
field chain of the GMD system, including an actual intercept
using deployed hardware under what I think are going to be more
realistic conditions with our nation's warfighters at the
controls.
Today we will have an opportunity to ask both the developer
and the operational tester about the value of these upcoming
tests. Specifically, if these tests are successful, will we
have achieved Block 04 operational capability?
In the broader context, I also have questions about the
pace and the scope of the missile defense program. As an
example, the fiscal year 2007 budget includes long-lead funding
for GMD boosters numbers 41 through 50. This buy would complete
procurement of all GMD boosters prior to the conclusion of
operational testing.
In addition, funding for the two boost phase missile
defense options, Airborne Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI), is collectively slated to grow by over 50
percent between fiscal year 2006 and 2007. This growth is
proposed even after Congress requested a report comparing the
capabilities and the cost of these two systems.
My question is do we really need to accelerate the
development of both boost phase systems. As I see it, we are
not debating the question of are you for missile defense or
not. Instead, today we are discussing the relative value and
the priority of different missile defense systems given the
threats that we are facing worldwide.
We are also seeking assurance that deployed systems undergo
the rigorous testing required to assure warfighters of their
operational capability.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to state
the context as I personally see it and for calling this very
important hearing. I value your leadership, and I value your
friendship, and I know that you always have given us an
opportunity to fully look at all these different issues.
So today I look forward to the testimony of our
distinguished witnesses, and with that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Everett. I thank my colleague. And as my colleague
knows, I have no objection to anything that he says. I am in
full agreement.
I am supposed to have a--General Obering, I will tell you
what. We will just start with you while I find out where I am
at here.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Obering. Yes, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman Reyes and distinguished Members of the committee.
It is an honor to be here today. I ask that my prepared
statement be entered for the record.
Mr. Everett. Without objection. And by the way, we can make
that 10 minutes if you guys need it. I will take 5, but we can
make it 10 minutes each, and the rest of your statements will
be made a part of the record.
General Obering. Thank you. Since I last addressed this
committee, we have made good progress developing and fielding
an integrated layered system to defend the United States, our
deployed forces, allies and friends against ballistic missiles
of all ranges in all phases of flight.
We have implemented improved mission assurance processes,
established an increasingly robust and operationally focused
test program, and continued the fielding of system components
and integrated capabilities.
For the 2007 budget request, we plan to expand the
development, fielding and verification of this critically
needed defense. Proliferating and evolving ballistic missile
systems increasingly pose a danger to our national security.
There are hundreds of these missiles in more than 20
countries around the world, including those hostile to the
United States. Last year, there were nearly 80 foreign
ballistic missile launches.
Our program is structured to meet this evolving threat. We
balance the early fielding of system elements with steady
improvements for a spiral development and test approach. 2007
will be a very intense and demanding period for our development
and fielding efforts. As such, we are requesting $9.3 billion
to support our program of work.
About $2.4 billion covers the continued fielding and
sustainment of system components, including the long-range
ground-based midcourse defenses, short to intermediate range
defenses involving our sea-based interceptors, and all
supporting radars, command, control, battle management, and
communications (C2BMC) capabilities. About $6.9 billion will be
invested in development for evolution and testing of the
system.
As I detail our request for 2007, I think that it is
appropriate for me to review where we are with the budget that
you previously approved.
In our long-range midcourse defense element, I delayed the
interceptor deployment in 2005 to make the program changes
recommended by an independent team that reviewed our two flight
test reports last year.
I also established a mission readiness task force to follow
through on the corrections to ensure our return to a successful
program.
We are now undertaking the additional recommended
qualification tests and have implemented much stronger systems
engineering and quality control processes. These comprehensive
reviews and our recent successes indicate that we should
continue interceptor deployment. But I will pause again if
necessary.
We recently emplaced 3 more ground-based interceptors in
Alaska and plan to have a total of 16 deployed by December of
this year. This progress is critical, since we expect the
ground-based midcourse defense element to be the backbone of
our long-range defense capabilities for years to come.
Missile defense testing, based on event-driven results,
continues to evolve to where we test as we fight and we fight
as we test. We cooperate fully with the operational test
community and the combatant commanders and their efforts to
characterize system effectiveness and readiness.
Last year, I told you that we planned to conduct two long-
range interceptor tests in 2005. That did not happen, because
we wanted to ensure that we fully implemented the
recommendations of the mission readiness task force.
With the successful December flight of our operationally
configured long-range interceptor, we have resumed an
aggressive test program that includes three more flight tests
this year. These will include realistic targets, operational
sensors, operational crews and operational interceptors from
operational silos, with two of them as planned intercepts
beginning this summer.
Last year the committee voiced concern about the ability of
the Cobra Dane radar to support the fire control mission. This
past September, we flew a threat representative air launch
target, generating tracks that the operational fire control
system then used to produce an intercept solution. We are
confident in the capability of this radar.
We also reached another major milestone last month when we
successfully tested the upgraded Beale early warning radar in
California against a realistic ICBS target launched from
Alaska. Again, the operation configured fire control system
generated an intercept solution from the track data provided by
the Beale radar.
Later this year, we will deploy the first transportable
forward-based X-band radar to our very important ally, Japan,
where it will provide both support for regional and homeland
defense.
And in the United Kingdom, we expect the upgraded
Fylingdales radar to achieve initial capability later this
year.
In our sea-based sensor program, we added six more Aegis
long-range surveillance and track destroyers for a total of 11.
We successfully tested this capability against targets launched
from Hawaii and California.
Last year this committee expressed interest in our long-
range and our large sea-based X-band radar. I am pleased to
report that we completed its instruction and made good progress
in integrating that radar into the system.
This winter, after extensive sea trials and high-power
radiation testing, the radar completed its long journey from
Texas to Hawaii. Later this year, it will be placed on station
in Alaska where it will complete its integration and checkout.
Of our total 2007 budget request, $2.7 billion would go
toward the long-range midcourse defense. These funds would
allow us to continue to improve and build additional
interceptors, their silos, support equipment and facilities, as
well as order long-lead items for the next fielding increment.
We plan to field and support up to a total of 22
interceptors and conduct two more flight tests by the end of
2007. To continue to expand our sensor coverage in 2007, we
would deliver the second forward-based X-band radar and begin a
major portion of the upgrade to the Thule radar in Greenland.
We are requesting $475 million between these efforts.
As we prepare for an uncertain future, being able to meet
emerging threats worldwide becomes important. This means moving
to space with precision tracking sensors. Therefore, we have
budgeted $380 million to continue the development of our space
tracking and surveillance system. This includes the launch of
two demonstration satellites in 2007 to begin experimentation.
I would now like to turn to our most important area,
command, control, battle management and communications. This
infrastructure is the heart, soul and brain of our defensive
capabilities. Without it, we simply cannot execute the mission.
The global foundation that we have established for our
nation's leadership, Strategic Command, Northern Command and
Pacific Command, is unmatched in the world, but we have only
just begun. We need to expand this network to other combatant
commands and to develop the integrated fire control that will
allow us to mix and match sensors and weapons to expand our
detection and engagement capabilities.
We also continue to work closely with strategic command and
the combatant commanders to train and certify missile defense
crews by exercising the system with launch-ready
demonstrations. The $264 million we are requesting for these
efforts is essential to ensuring an effective missile defense
system.
Committee Members raised a concern last year that with our
focus on long-range defenses, we might not be adequately
funding defenses against the short to intermediate range
ballistic missiles. I can assure you that we are aggressively
addressing these threats from several angles. Nearly $2 billion
of our 2007 budget request is allocated evenly between our
Aegis ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area
defense, or THAAD, program to enable us to field capabilities
to counter these threats.
In addition to providing long-range surveillance and
tracking support, Aegis is providing a flexible sea-mobile
intercept capability against the shorter range ballistic
missile. This past year, we added a second Aegis engagement
cruiser trial involving architecture. In November, we
successfully used an Aegis cruiser to engage a separating
target carried on a medium-range ballistic missile. We plan to
conduct two more intercept tests this year and two more in 2007
using upgraded versions of this interceptor.
By the end of 2007, we expect to have three engagement
cruisers and seven engagement destroyers available with up to
33 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors delivered.
In our THAAD program, we are coming off a very encouraging
flight test last November when we put the redesigned
interceptor through its paces. We will continue to characterize
this performance and integrate this element into the overall
system.
We plan to conduct four more flight tests in 2006,
including the first high endo-atmospheric intercept. And in
2007, we plan to conduct four intercept tests in both the exo-
and endo-atmospheric regions. We will continue our development
efforts and plan to field a first unit in Block 2008 with a
second unit available in Block 2010.
To keep ahead of future threats, there are several other
important development efforts funded in this budget. We
continue to follow a strategy of retaining alternative paths
until the capability is proven, what we call a knowledge-based
approach.
The airborne laser reached all of its knowledge points for
last year when it reached and achieved a full duration lase at
operational power and completed initial beam control and fire
control flight tests.
Currently, we are installing the tracking and atmospheric
compensation lasers and preparing the aircraft to accept the
high-power laser modules in 2007. We have planned a campaign of
flight tests leading to a lethal shootdown of a ballistic
missile in 2008. Nearly $600 million of our budget request is
for this revolutionary work.
In our other boost phase development activity, the kinetic
energy interceptor (KEI), we focused our efforts on
demonstrating a mobile land-based very high acceleration
booster. Last year, we demonstrated the command, control,
battle management and communications functions required for the
boost intercept mission.
This past January, we completed the successful static
firing of a second-stage prototype and will continue static
firing tests of the booster's first and second stages in 2007
leading to the first flight in 2008. We have requested nearly
$400 million in our budget for this moderate-risk effort.
As threats grow in complexity, we will need a volume kill
capability. The multiple kill vehicle (MKV) program is a
generational upgrade to our long-range midcourse interceptor.
In 2005, we made progress in the development of the seeker
and made the decision to move to a lower-risk propulsion system
which we plan to hover test in 2009. We have allocated $162
million to continue this very important development effort.
Committee Members expressed strong interest last year in
our international efforts. We have been working closely with a
number of allies and friends and have concluded formal
agreements with four countries, with several more pending.
Japan continues to make significant investments in
multilayered missile defenses. We have worked closely with
Japan since 1999 to develop advanced Standard Missile-3
components, and I am proud to say that yesterday we
successfully flight tested a product of this cooperation, an
advanced nose-cone, off the coast of Hawaii.
This success is a good start for our most ambitious
international effort with our partner, Japan, the co-
development of a 21-inch Standard Missile-3 which will have
greatly expanded performance and dependent area capability.
In April we concluded an agreement with Australia to expand
our cooperative work on sensors. An agreement with Denmark
allows us to upgrade the Thule radar and integrate it into the
system by 2009.
In addition to the Fylingdales radar integration
activities, we are undertaking a series of technical
development efforts with the United Kingdom. In our ongoing
work with Israel on the Arrow Interceptor will continue to
enhance its missile defenses against emerging threats.
Mr. Chairman, last year I asked this committee to have
tactical patience as we worked through our quality control
issues. I explained that we certainly have our challenges, but
for the most part the program is on track.
The successes that we have had over the past year bear this
out. I greatly appreciate this committee's continued support
and patience, and I want to thank the thousands of Americans
and allies, both in government and industry, working hard to
make missile defense a success.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Obering can be found in
the Appendix on page 46.]
Mr. Everett. Thank you, General Obering.
General Dodgen.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY J. DODGEN, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S.
ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND, AND U.S. ARMY FORCES
STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
General Dodgen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Reyes and Members of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this distinguished panel and for your ongoing
support to our military.
This committee's support of the Army and the missile
defense community has been instrumental to our efforts in
fielding missile forces for our nation and our allies.
I appear before this panel in two roles. The first role is
as an Army commander for missile defense and proponent for the
ground-based midcourse defense, or GMD, system. My second
role----
Mr. Everett. General Dodgen, do you mind pulling that mike
a little bit closer?
General Dodgen. Not at all.
Mr. Everett. I am getting old and it is hard to hear. Let
me say older, not old.
General Dodgen. In my second role, I am a member of the
joint missile defense team as commander of the joint functional
component command for integrated missile defense, or JFCC-IMD,
as part of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and
the joint user representative working closely with MDA, other
services, combatant commanders to ensure that our national goal
of developing, testing and deploying an integrated missile
defense (IMD) system is met.
Before addressing the fiscal year 2007 President's budget
submission for the Army's missile defense systems, I would like
to provide a very brief update on the JFCC-IMD. The JFCC-IMD
was established in January 2005 as one of the JFCC supporting
U.S. STRATCOM's new triad concept. We reached full operational
capability on 28 February of this year.
The JFCC is truly joint, manned by Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marine Corps personnel. It is headquarters at the Joint
National Integration Center at Schriever Air Force Base in
Colorado. This arrangement allows us to leverage the existing
robust infrastructure and our strong partnership with our co-
located MDA team to execute the IMD mission.
In the past year, the JFCC-IMD has aggressively executed
STRATCOM's global mission to plan, coordinate and integrate
missile defense--in short, to operationalize capabilities. In
collaboration with geographical combatant commanders, we are
developing IMD plans that integrate theater and national assets
to provide the best protection.
Through our partnership with MDA, our sister services and
warfighters at the GCCs, U.S. STRATCOM is setting the stage to
evolve the BMDS beyond its current capability to a global
capability to provide more robust missile defense for the
homeland, deployed forces, friend and allies.
I would now like to highlight the Army's fiscal year 2007
budget submission for air and missile defense (AMD) systems.
The President's budget presented to Congress on February 6
includes approximately $1.57 billion with which the Army
proposes to perform current Army AMD responsibilities and focus
on future development and enhancement of both terminal phase
and short-range AMD systems.
Mr. Chairman, with the past support of this committee, the
Army continues to improve its ability to acquire, track,
intercept and destroy theater air and missile threats. The
Patriot system remains the Army's mainstay theater air and
missile defense system, and our nation's only deployed land-
based short to medium-range ballistic missile defense
capability.
Today's Patriot force is a mixture of configured units. To
maximize our capabilities and better support the force, the
Army is moving toward updating the entire Patriot force to PAC-
3 configuration. The current and updated Patriot force should
be maintained through sustainment and recapitalization efforts
until the medium extended air defense system, or MEADS, is
fielded, which is projected to begin in 2015.
As many of you are aware, the MEADS is a cooperative
development program with Germany and Italy to collectively
field an enhanced ground-based air and missile defense
capability. The MEADS program will enable the joint integrated
air and missile defense community to move beyond the critical
asset defense designs we see today.
MEADS will provide theater-level defense of critical assets
and continuous protection of a rapidly advancing maneuver force
as part of a joint integrated AMD architecture.
As I reported last year, the Patriot MEADS combined
aggregate program, or CAP, has been established. The objective
of CAP is to achieve the objective MEADS capability through
incremental fielding of MEADS' major in-items into Patriot.
Patriot MEADS CAP is an important capability that will
operate within MDA's BMDS. The Patriot and PAC-3 MEADS CAP
research, development and acquisition budget request for fiscal
year 2007 is approximately $916 million. This request procures
108 PAC-3 missiles and reflects the necessary Patriot
development to keep the system viable as we pursue development
of PAC-3 MEADS CAP capabilities.
The threat from land attack cruise missiles exists today
and will grow in the future. As you know, cruise missiles are
inherently very difficult targets to detect, engage and destroy
because of their small, low-detection signature and low-
altitude flight characteristics.
It is clear that the required systems and capabilities
necessary to counter this emerging threat need to be
accelerated to the field, to field a cruise missile defense
(CMD) capability as soon as possible.
Critical Army components of the joint CMD architecture are
provided by the joint land attack cruise missile defense
elevated netted sensor, or JLENS; the surface launched advance
medium-range air-to-air missile, or SLAMRAAM; and an integrated
fire control capability.
We are also working closely with the joint community to
assure development of doctrine that synchronizes our military's
full capabilities against the cruise missile threat.
The JLENS program is developing unique lightweight fire
control and surveillance radars to detect, track and identify
cruise missile threats. JLENS uses advanced sensors and
networking technologies to provide precision tracking and 360-
degree wide-area, over-the-horizon surveillance of land attack
cruise missiles.
The fiscal year 2007 JLENS funding request is $264 million,
supports development of full JLENS capability with first unit
equipped occurring by 2011.
SLAMRAAM will provide a CMD system to maneuver forces with
an extended battle space and a beyond line-of-sight engagement
capability critical to countering the cruise missile and
unmanned area vehicle threats. The fiscal year 2007 funding
request of $49 million supports the scheduled initial
operational capability target of 2011.
Sentinel radar is a critical component in the Army's
ability to conduct air surveillance for the maneuver force.
Sentinel is a small, mobile battlefield radar that supports the
joint air defense sensor network in detecting cruise missiles,
UAVs and helicopter threats.
The fiscal year 2007 request of $17.6 million provides for
continued development and integration of improvements to
support joint interoperability.
The forward deployment today of joint tactical ground
stations, or JTAGS, in EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, provides
assured missile warning to combatant commanders and assigned
forces through a direct downlink to space-based infrared assets
into the joint theater communications architecture.
Fiscal year 2007 funding request of $24.9 million sustains
the forward deployed JTAGS units supporting joint warfighters
and postures the Army to participate with the Air Force in
future ground mobile system compatible with the space-based
infrared system and follow-on sensors.
Mr. Chairman, the Army is a full contributing member of the
joint team to develop and field ballistic missile defense for
our nation, deployed forces, friends and allies. With the
continued support of this committee, the Army will continue the
transformation to support the Army's future force, the joint
integrated air and missile defense system and our global BMDS,
building on the ongoing success of our theater air and missile
defense forces.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these
important matters and look forward to addressing your questions
to you and other Members of this committee. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of General Dodgen can be found in
the Appendix on page 71.]
Mr. Everett. Thank you, General Dodgen.
Mr. Duma.
STATEMENT OF DAVID W. DUMA, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Duma. Chairman Everett, Ranking Member Reyes,
distinguished Members of the committee, I am pleased to have
this opportunity to speak to you about the ballistic missile
defense system test program. I will cover four areas.
First, I will recap the Missile Defense Agency, or MDA,
test accomplishments during the past year. Second, I will
discuss organization and philosophy changes within MDA. Third,
I will give you a status of compliance with the test
requirements prescribed in recent national defense
authorization acts. Fourth, I will highlight future challenges
facing the test program of the ballistic missile defense
system, or BMDS.
First, the results. The MDA testing program during 2005 was
adequate and appropriate to the developmental maturity of the
BMDS. The results of ground tests demonstrated that
integration, interoperability, tactics, doctrine and procedures
were adequate to increase confidence in these aspects of the
system.
For the first time, MDA flew a Raytheon exo-atmospheric
kill vehicle integrated onto an orbital sciences booster. While
the flight was successful, it did not evaluate the fixes to the
ground support system that caused the previous flight test
launch failures. Plans are to demonstrate the ground system
fixes in subsequent flight-testing.
The flight of threat representative targets across the
search and track volumes of the Cobra Dane and Beale early
warning radars demonstrated their capability to provide target
acquisition, tracking and queuing data.
MDA executed an operationally realistic test scenario that
provided significant information regarding the Cobra Dane
capabilities and limitations. MDA also demonstrated they could
successfully launch a long-range threat representative target
from an air platform.
The Aegis ballistic missile defense system completed two
intercept missions with the new SM-3 missile. One of these
flights included an intercept of a separating target. This was
a first for that missile.
The airborne laser completed the passive phase of flight
test of the beam control/fire control system, and completed the
integration and operational demonstration of six integrated
chemical oxygen iodine laser modules.
The terminal high-altitude area defense system, or THAAD,
executed its first flight test in five years. It flew its
redesigned missile on a non-intercept test to demonstrate
performance and measure interceptor kinematics.
Last year, two new sensors completed integration and some
combined developmental and operational testing. The forward-
based X-band radar-transportable, or FBX-T, demonstrated its
ability to track long-range ballistic missile launches.
The sea-based X-band radar completed integration testing in
the Gulf of Mexico and has arrived in Hawaii to begin its
checkout and integration into the BMDS test bed. The results of
the integrated ground tests, coupled with the success of other
element-level ground and flight test events, indicate the BMDS
is maturing.
Second, the approach. General Obering implemented several
changes in organization and test philosophy during the past
year. These changes more tightly integrate the developers,
warfighters and operational testers. They should also better
integrate the system engineering functions and the test and
evaluation functions within MDA.
These changes, coupled with improvements in test planning,
execution and analyses should result in better definition of
data requirements and better, more efficient test execution.
As part of his re-engineering his agency, General Obering
established the responsible test organization and combined test
force under the leadership and direction of his deputy for test
and assessment.
The combined test force will plan and execute tests and
collect and analyze data that will populate a database to
support the technical and operational evaluations of BMDS
performance. The combined test force will include test
personnel from each of the BMDS elements and the operational
test agencies.
With the support of General Obering, I have commissioned
the Institute of Defense Analyses to examine and recommend a
construct that integrates the operational testers into the
combined test force. The goal is to maintain the operational
testers' independence and credibility while economizing
resources, eliminating duplication of effort and supporting the
combined test force mission and objectives.
General Obering and I have also asked the institute to
investigate and recommend how to best integrate each
stakeholder's assessment needs into the test planning,
execution, data collection, analysis and evaluation processes.
This should further streamline the test and evaluation planning
and execution process, while ensuring all stakeholders
efficiently and effectively meet their objectives.
Along with these organizational changes, MDA and the
operational test community have agreed on an integrated test
planning approach for future BMDS blocks. Beginning with Block
2006, MDA, the joint operational test agency and my office will
develop an integrated, evaluation-driven test plan.
This test planning philosophy brings discipline and
structure to planning block testing based upon overall system
evaluation needs. It does this while concurrently addressing
individual element test requirements.
This approach should increase the quantity and the quality
of data while fostering the efficient use of test resources. It
will also enhance efforts to address priority issues, such as
verification, validation, and accreditation of models and
simulations.
Third, congressional interest. Over the last few years,
Congress has asked MDA and my office to accomplish several
specific initiatives with regard to operational testing of the
BMDS. Fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act
required operationally realistic testing of the BMDS.
This past year, MDA conducted numerous ground tests, war
games and capability demonstrations using trained warfighters
to operate the systems. These exercises included fully
integrated ground and simulated missions designed by the
operational testers and the warfighters.
This year's update to the integrated master test plan
incorporates greater operational realism in the areas of
increased warfighter involvement in flight tests; more end-to-
end system testing; use of operationally representative
missiles; employment of operational tactics, techniques and
procedures; and inclusion of more complex countermeasures.
Incorporating trained warfighters into the testing program
has added to the operational understanding of the capabilities,
limitations and maturity of the BMDS.
In fiscal year 2005, Congress required the MDA to conduct a
realistic operational test of the BMDS. Following two launch
failures in the ground-based midcourse defense system and
recommendations from two independent review teams, General
Obering restructured the flight test program.
Flight testing to date has not yet reduced the risk to the
point where General Obering is ready to execute an
operationally realistic flight test. Under the restructured
program, MDA plans three operationally realistic flight tests
later this year.
In fiscal year 2006, Congress required the operational test
community to plan and conduct an operational test of the
capability provided by each block of the BMDS beginning with
Block 2006. I have taken action to begin this effort involving
not only the operational test community but also the
warfighters and MDA.
When the evaluation plan is finished, MDA will include
these tests in the next revision to the integrated master test
plan.
Fourth, the challenges. The complexity of the BMDS is
increasing. Elements are maturing and being integrated into the
system. Consequently, testing of the BMDS is becoming more
challenging as the agency adds elements and capability.
Testers must assess performance and reliability during
concurrent test and operations of a layered BMDS system.
Integration of the BMDS elements and sensors that are still
maturing with operational legacy systems is a difficult task.
Fusing the data that each element provides into a single,
unambiguous operational picture is a significant software
development, integration, and testing challenge. Range safety
and environmental restrictions limit intercept geometries to
only a few scenarios.
Meeting each of these challenges is a big task, one that
requires a series of well-planned ground and flight tests.
Over the long term, MDA should incrementally develop a
capability to support concurrent testing and operations,
including simulation over live testing, to speed up the
process. This is similar to how DOD upgraded and tested
Cheyenne Mountain without interfering with operations.
When developed, this capability will provide an alternative
means for system test and evaluation to characterize
operational effectiveness and suitability using actual hardware
and warfighters in the loop.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the MDA experienced a
difficult year with its ground-based midcourse defense system
but ended the year on several high notes. Element successes
indicate they are progressing toward maturity.
Last year, warfighters demonstrated they could operate the
integrated ground system. The fact remains, however, that we
ground test for discovery, and we must flight test to verify
operational performance and validate the simulations.
Successful flight tests are the cornerstone for building
confidence in the BMDS. War fighters must have confidence that
the system will defend on demand.
This concludes my opening remarks. I ask that my statement
be entered into the record. And I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duma can be found in the
Appendix on page 90.]
Mr. Everett. Without objection, and thank you, Mr. Duma.
Mr. Flory.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Secretary Flory. Chairman Everett, Ranking Member Reyes and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you. It is a pleasure to be
here with you today to provide the subcommittee with a policy
perspective on our ballistic missile program. You just heard
laid out for you very capably and exhaustively the details of
that program and where we are going with it.
I would like to express our support for the subcommittee's
support and assistance over the years for our strategic
programs and for the Department of Defense.
Ballistic missile defense has been a top defense priority
of this Administration from day one, and it remains a priority
today. I take you back briefly to the beginning of the
Administration and look at the threat in the world we faced at
that point.
As members are aware, the security environment at 2001, at
the beginning of 2001, was very different from the one we faced
in the Cold War and it is about to change again significantly.
Former Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey has
pointed out that with the demise of the Soviet Union, we found
that while we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had been
replaced by many dangerous snakes. So the end of the Cold War
did not mean that the we no longer faced a threat, but it meant
that the United States would faced a different kind of threat
and a greater number of threats.
One such threat was the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivering them, particularly
ballistic missiles. Regimes in countries such as North Korea
and Iran and, at the time, Iraq understood that while they
could not hope to match the United States in conventional
forces, they could gain strategic leverage by investing in
ballistic missiles.
Without a defense against ballistic missiles, the American
people are vulnerable to the threat of missile attack. And
without defenses, an American President, faced with a threat to
vital U.S. interests from a rogue state armed with long-range
missiles, could find that our options are constrained by the
fact that these countries can now, for the first time, hold at
risk the U.S. population and the American homeland.
To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002,
took several bold steps. First, he announced that the United
States would exercise its right to withdraw from the
Antiballistic Missile, or ABM, Treaty.
Second, in 2002 he directed the Department of Defense to
end what had been for decades a research-and-development-only
approach to ballistic missile defense and to begin actually
fielding an initial set of capabilities for the United States
by the end of 2004.
I am pleased to say that today the United States has all of
the pieces in place that it needed to intercept an incoming
long-range ballistic missile. As you have heard described, we
have ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California; a
network of ground, sea and space-based sensors; a command and
control network; and, most importantly, trained servicemen and
women ready to operate the system.
Our system today is primarily oriented toward continued
development and testing, but we are confident that it could
intercept a long-range ballistic missile if called upon to do
so.
Because of the importance of this mission, one of the first
things I did on assuming my current position in the Department
of Defense was to take a trip up to Fort Greely. I want to tell
you how impressed I was, not just by the equipment and the
hardware and the facilities there, but the dedication and the
professionalism and the sense of mission of the men and women
who are there guarding our country day and night.
And I would encourage you all to visit Fort Greely. I know
it is a long way away. But I know the men and women who are
stationed there would appreciate the visit, and I am confident
you will be as impressed as I was by both the facilities and
the quality of the people we have there.
I would like to take a few minutes to put this program in
its strategic context, in terms of the evolving threat, and in
terms of our overall defense strategy. First and foremost, as I
mentioned briefly earlier, the threat posed by ballistic
missiles is growing. And the missiles we are talking about are
growing in range, complexity and in the threat they pose.
In 1990, around the end of the Cold War, there were 16
countries that possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges.
Today, about 25 countries have them.
The number of countries that possess medium, intermediate,
or intercontinental ballistic missiles--in other words,
missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers that may reach our
friends and allies and, in some cases, the U.S. homeland
itself--has increased from five to nine, so it has almost
doubled.
Not only is the number of nations possessing ballistic
missiles increasing, but the group includes some of the world's
most threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North
Korea and Iran.
General Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, testified recently in an unclassified session that
North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles, not only
for its own use but for foreign sales as well.
As General Maples--I should be clear, Lieutenant General
Maples, pointed out, Pyongyang is likely developing
intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile
capabilities.
As then--Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2001, North Korea
launched a multi-stage Taepo-Dong-1 missile in 1998, which the
intelligence community tells us demonstrated a North Korean
capability to deliver a small payload to the United States.
Now today, North Korea continues to work on the Taepo-Dong
II. In fact, it may be preparing to test the Taepo-Dong II,
which is a longer range missile capable of reaching more of the
United States with a nuclear weapon-size payload.
Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, U.S. service members have
stood on the border of North and South Korea. And we have
always known that these men and women were in harm's way. The
prospect of long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of the
North means that, for the first time, the American people, too,
are in harm's way.
Turning to Iran, Iran represents a dangerous nexus,
combining a vigorous ballistic missile program, a desire and a
program to develop nuclear weapons, and a history of support
for international terrorism.
Terrorism has been part of Tehran's strategy for decades.
And in fact, before the 9/11 attacks, more Americans had been
killed by Iranian-backed terrorists like Hezbollah and others
than by any other terrorist group.
Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of
its defense strategy. The intelligence community judges that
Iran now has the Shahab-3 missile operationally deployed and
could flight-test an IBM by the year 2015, so that is 9 years
away.
Now, the Director of National Intelligence, John
Negroponte, recently testified before Congress that Iran has
engaged in a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly
two decades and that, although it is the judgment of the
intelligence community that Iran does not yet possess a nuclear
weapon or have the necessary fissile material to do so, the
danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to
integrate such a weapon with ballistic missiles that Iran
already possesses is a reason for immediate concern.
In this environment, the recent statements by Iranian
president Ahmadinejad threatening the United States and its
friends are of even greater concern. In an October 2005 speech,
president Ahmadinejad declared that ``Israel must be wiped off
the map and, God willing, with the force of God behind it, we
shall soon experience a world without the United States and
Zionism.''
I note that in the papers today we see an Iranian spokesman
promising that harm and pain will come to the United States if
the U.N. sanctions Iran over its nuclear weapons program.
Iran's ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S.
friends and allies and over our deployed forces in the Middle
East. And as DNI Negroponte testified recently, this is part of
Iran's strategy to be able to threaten our allies, to be able
to threaten our forces in the region.
The addition of nuclear warheads and an ICBM that could
reach the United States would further extend Iran's ability to
coerce others and to threaten the United States.
As we face these threats, ballistic missile defenses are an
important part of our overall defense strategy. Last month, the
department released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, or
QDR. The QDR identifies a number of priorities to guide the
department as it makes choices about how to best defend the
Nation and how best to win the long war against terrorism and
extremism.
These priorities include defending the homeland in depth,
shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and
preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring
or using weapons of mass destruction.
Ballistic missile defenses make a contribution to each of
these important priorities. They can be used to defend the
homeland and to defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile
against the population and territory of the United States, or
its deployed forces or its friends and allies.
And by making an adversary uncertain that a ballistic
missile attack would succeed, missile defenses can dissuade
countries from investing in missiles or deter their use by
those who have already acquired them.
Some have questioned the amount of attention and the amount
of money that has been invested in ballistic missile defense in
the years following the September 11th attacks, on the theory
that the main threat to the United States is terrorism, and
that a ballistic missile attack against the United States is
unlikely.
I would turn that argument around. One of the lessons of
September 11th is that nothing is unthinkable, and that the
United States must and can prepare to defend itself against the
widest range of threats possible.
The U.S. Government was criticized in the wake of 9/11 for
not connecting the dots on the terrorist threat and for failing
to act to prevent the attacks. With respect to the ballistic
missile threat, the dots are out there for all to see.
And I certainly would not care to have to come before this
committee in the wake of a ballistic missile attack to explain
why, given all that we know of ballistic missiles in the hands
of dangerous regimes, we had not acted to defend the American
people.
A theme throughout the Quadrennial Defense Review is the
presence of uncertainty and surprise. And I mention this
because this has been particularly part of our history of
dealing with the ballistic missile threat.
Despite the best efforts of our intelligence community, the
fact is that countries that develop ballistic missiles for the
kind of purposes that they are developing them for, to threaten
the United States, to intimidate us and our allies--first, they
tend to do it in unorthodox ways that do not look like the way
that we and the Soviets prepared them.
They do not have long, extensive test programs. They are
not seeking high degrees of reliability or safety. But as a
result of that and the way that they proceed, they are able to
achieve what for them is a useful capability with relatively
little time and, because they are going to great lengths to
hide these, often with very little or no warning for the United
States.
We have been surprised many more times than we would like
to. One example is North Korea's deployment of the No Dong
missile after only one test, something that we, based on our
own practices, would have judged unlikely.
Another example was when North Korea launched the Taepo-
Dong-I missile in 1998 and when, to our surprise, it turned out
to have a third stage that we had had no idea that they were
working on.
I mention this to emphasize that the--while I have tried to
give you an idea of the threats that we know about, we always
need to be very modest and we need to be very cautious in our
confidence in the information that we have and the assumptions
that we are making based on that information, because as the
Rumsfeld Commission on Ballistic Missile Defense pointed out in
1998, we need to be very cautious, and we cannot be sure that
we know all the things that we need to know to make these
decisions, and that therefore decisions that require--that are
premised on having a certain level of certainty can be very
risky.
I spoke earlier about the ballistic missile defense goals
the President laid out in 2002. In addition to directing us to
field defenses for the United States, the President directed us
at that time to cooperate with friends and allies to extend the
benefits of missile defenses to them as well.
Since then, we have embarked upon a number of important
missile defense initiatives with our international friends and
partners. We have worked with the United Kingdom to upgrade the
early warning at Fylingdales so that it can perform a ballistic
missile defense mission.
We have worked with Denmark to achieve agreement to allow
us to upgrade the early warning radar at Thule, Greenland. We
continue to work with Israel on the Arrow program. Our own
Patriot system is widely deployed and is available for export
to a number of countries.
Germany and Italy are our partners in the medium extended
range air defense system, or MEADS. We signed a framework
memorandum of understanding on missile defense cooperation with
Australia in 2004.
And we are negotiating a defense technical cooperation
agreement with Russia to facilitate both government-to-
government as well as industry-to-industry missile defense
cooperation. At the same time, we continue to seek practical
areas of cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis as well
as in the NATO-Russia context.
One particularly good news story in our international
ballistic missile defense is our cooperation with Japan. The
successful test that we just had has already been noted. Japan
has committed to spending the equivalent of roughly $1 billion
on ballistic missile defense, making it our largest
international partner.
If you look at the map of Japan's neighborhood, and if you
consider that Japan was the country that North Korea launched a
ballistic missile over in 1998, you can understand the level
and the intensity of their interest in this program.
We have agreed with the Japanese to work together to
develop a more capable sea-based interceptor that will improve
the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. That is the larger
standard missile.
I am particularly pleased that the government of Japan has
agreed to evaluate the optimum deployment site for an X-band
radar on its territory that will help defend both the United
States and Japan. In addition, the U.S. and Japan are taking
the steps necessary to share ballistic missile defense
information with one another.
We also are considering fielding long-range missile defense
interceptors and radars in Europe. There is roughly $120
million in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request to
begin work on this project.
Such a site would house interceptors very similar to those
that we have currently have fielded at Fort Greely and at
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Fielding such a
capability would improve the defense of the United States
against long-range missiles, especially those launched from the
Middle East, and it would also begin to extend missile defense
to our European allies, protecting their populations from
attack and reducing the risk of coercion or blackmail.
The U.S. Government has held consultations with a number of
allies, beginning in 2002, about their willingness to host
missile defense interceptors. We intend to continue those
consultations in the near future with allies who have expressed
interest.
We are currently in the process of notifying those
countries, and I do not want to get ahead of that process
today. But that said, I would be happy to follow up with the
subcommittee in the near future with more details of what we
are doing in this regard.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Reyes, thank you very much for the time
and the committee's time today. I look forward to answering
your questions and those of other subcommittee Members. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Flory can be found in
the Appendix on page 96.]
Mr. Everett. Thank you, Mr. Flory.
Mr. Reyes.
By the way, we will limit our Members to 5 minutes. I will
ask them to be respectful of that time so that all Members can
have a shot at getting a question in. And then we will go as
many rounds as we have to.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to
cover this briefly.
General Dodgen, based on current tests and procurement
plans, when do you anticipate or expect that THAAD, the THAAD
system, will be ready to be transferred to the Army for
operational deployment?
And does the Army have a position on how many successful
flight tests need to be completed before they consider THAAD
ready for operational transition?
And then the last question is what will be the process to
determine when that transition to the Army by THAAD will be
accomplished?
General Dodgen. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. Let me start
from the back of the question and go forward. We are in the
middle of negotiations now with the Army and the Missile
Defense Agency on exactly what those procedures--and we have
come to a lot of agreement.
And I think the agreement we have right now and the
understanding we have right now--there is no doubt that on 9/11
when the THAAD batteries are ready for operation, there will be
United States Army soldiers that are manning those units
wherever they may be deployed around the world.
The Army test agency has been intimately involved in the
test program with MDA, as described by Mr. Duma in his
statement.
And while I am not sure exactly how many test we ultimately
see required, because we will continually test the program
throughout the life of a particular weapons system, I will tell
you that the Army's very comfortable with the test program and
that it is meeting what we think are appropriate testing to
operationalize the system.
I think the system is coming along very well. The
successful test was a step in the right direction. There are
four additional tests later this year. We look forward to doing
those tests.
And inherent in the mechanism that MDA does, soldiers and
operators are involved in every one of those tests, so there is
a growing exercise from test to test. But the Army is very much
looking forward to gaining that capability, putting it into our
inventory.
And at the same time this year we will be determining what
the ultimate number of batteries and missiles we will need for
the defense of our nation.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Everett. Oh, thank you.
Dr. Schwarz.
Dr. Schwarz. For anyone who cares to answer--and I am on
the learning curve on this topic, gentlemen, so--but can you
tell me what are the advantages or disadvantages in airborne
laser intercept as opposed to a kinetic energy interceptor, A?
And B, could a laser interceptor, which I believe has got
to be on an airborne platform--can that be scrambled quickly
enough to intercept a missile in the boost phase?
General Obering. Congressman, I will take that, if you do
not mind. First of all, the advantages and the disadvantages of
each. With a directed energy weapon like airborne laser, one of
the significant advantages, of course, is you cannot outrun
it--instantaneous speed of light transmission.
Also, a tremendous advantage in terms of its applicability
to all ranges of missiles, so it can attack the short-range as
well as all the way up to the intercontinental range missiles.
It can operate in a concept of operations not unlike what
we do today with our Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (STARS) aircraft, our Airborne Early Warning Control
System (AWACS) aircraft, in establishing orbits. And then they
are supported, obviously, by protective layers and tankers to
be able to do that. That work we have done. We have worked that
with the Air Force. And we thought through some of those
concepts of operation.
Some of the disadvantages, on the other hand--it is not 24-
hours, 7-day persistent like you could get with a terrestrial-
based capability. But that is why we instituted a KEI, or
kinetic energy interceptor, program, so that we would not only
have a risk reduction alternative to the airborne laser, but
also offers a complementary capability to that.
The disadvantage with a KEI is it cannot reach out and
touch the very short range in the short range ballistic
threats. It is more effective against the intermediate range
and the longer range threats. But it does give us an
alternative for that.
But again, it provides us persistence to the fight, and
when we can either land-base them or sea-base them, it also
gives you the flexibility to move as the emerging threats move.
Dr. Schwarz. In the end, we will have both.
General Obering. Our intention is that we will----
Dr. Schwarz. Best-case scenario, in the end, you will have
both.
General Obering. In the end, we will have both options to
choose from, if we have the resources, and the funding, and the
affordability of both of those systems, we will pursue both of
those.
Dr. Schwarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Everett. General, I applaud your optimism.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here. You know we appreciate
what you do to protect this country and to especially prepare
us for whatever kinds of challenges we may face in the future.
I know that each one of you are very affirmed by that beyond
any words of gratitude that I could have, but I certainly want
you to know that it exists.
And having said that, Mr. Flory, if you can express it in
an unclassified manner, what do you see as our greatest missile
vulnerability? I mean, would it come from North Korea or China
as far as our primary concerns?
And if not, let me know. If so, what would be our default
systems to try to interdict some type of either singular
missile or salvo? What would be the things that we would
default to?
And then last, what would be our chances of successfully
intercepting such an attack?
And perhaps, General Obering, you might want to follow up
as well.
Secretary Flory. Congressman Franks, thank you, first of
all, for your kind words.
The threats we are most focused on are the what is
sometimes called the rogue state threats. And Iran and North
Korea are the main competitors for that title right now.
I would say that the--and we would be happy to get you
greater detail in classified form. The tests I mentioned of the
Taepo-Dong (T.D.) I--what we know about the Taepo-Dong II and
the development of it suggests that North Korea may be closer
than Iran today to actually having an ICBM that could reach out
and hit the United States. The intelligence community assesses
that Iran could flight-test an ICBM in the year 2015.
As I mentioned earlier, there is a lot of uncertainty
involved, but given that the North Korean test of the T.D.-1
was in 1998, and they have been working on the T.D.-1 but also
the T.D.-2 for that whole time, I think we have to assume that
they are closer.
They also are more advanced in their nuclear weapons
capability. The U.S. intelligence community assumes that they
have nuclear weapons. They claim that they have nuclear weapons
and we believe them.
We have not actually put our hands on them, not
surprisingly. We do not have that level of certainty as to
their numbers. But it is something that we have to assume that
they have.
Now, Iran is right now the subject of a great deal of high-
level diplomacy. As you know, there was a meeting of the IAEA,
and the Iran dossier is going to the Security Council. And I
hope that some vigorous and tough diplomacy can maybe achieve
what we have not been able to achieve so far, which is to get
Iran to back off of its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
program.
On the other hand, we have to be prudent, and we have to
plan for the possibility that Iran may--either the diplomatic
efforts may fail or, for whatever reason, Iran may end up with
a nuclear weapons capability which, in time, when that ICBM--if
that ICBM is tested and becomes operational, that could be then
mated to that.
Now, in the meantime, there are a lot of other things that
Iran's current missiles, the Shahabs, which have a range of
about 1,300 kilometers, can already do to make our life more
difficult. With 1,300 kilometer missiles they threaten a lot of
our friends and allies in the Middle East.
By doing that, they also--not only is there the risk that
they could actually hit these countries, but they have the
ability to constrain our freedom of action, and we----
Dr. Schwarz. In the interest of time, Mr. Flory, may I----
Secretary Flory. Sure.
Dr. Schwarz [continuing]. Try to just pull that question
down to an attack on the continental United States? What would
be our greatest danger there and what would be our chances of
interdicting?
Secretary Flory. I will defer to General Obering on the
operational question, other than to say that we are confident
that we have pieces in place that could intercept a missile. I
would say that North Korea is probably going to be in a
position to do that sooner than Iran.
General Obering. Sir, with respect to North Korea, I cannot
get into specifics on the effectiveness, but I will let you
draw some of your own conclusions. We have actively flight-
tested, as I mentioned in my oral statement, against the Cobra
Dane sensor, against the Beale radar. We generated fire control
solutions based on that testing that in the analysis shows that
they would have been successful. Once we get this kill vehicle
into its end game, into the terminal basket--it has done a very
good job, and the testing we have shown to date shows that we
would have done that on that series of tests.
With respect to the Iranian threat, until we get sensor
coverage from that approach, we do not have protection against
the homeland. That is one of the reasons that we are upgrading
the Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom and continuing with
our work in Thule.
Dr. Schwarz. Thank you.
General Dodgen. Mr. Chairman, could I add on to that from
the operator standpoint?
Mr. Everett. Yes, and also let me make a brief remark that
General Obering or General Dodgen, either one of you, could
comment on.
The stage we are in now--doesn't that pretty much compare
to the way we were when the Israelis were when they deployed
the Arrow missile?
General Obering. Sir, we are following the very same
approach, which is we test to where we get a sufficient level
of confidence that we have a capability. We put it out there,
because we know we do not have protection, therefore we want to
get some modicum of protection. And we continue to improve it
over time. And so we are following very similar approaches.
General Dodgen. I would like to add to Congressman Franks'
questions and then answer a question you gave me in your
opening statement, which is--and I speak for the operators on
the system that have been manning the system 24/7 since October
of 2004.
They have been involved in all the testings. They have seen
the individual pieces of this system tested. The operational
capability demonstrations--they have gained a great deal of
confidence in this particular system for the threat that we
might be facing at this time in this--and they are very ready
and very able to put that system into effect if called.
They are looking forward to the testing which is coming on
this year because the end-to-end tests will allow us to
optimize the use of our inventory and maybe change our
techniques and procedures to get the most out of the missiles
we have.
But as far as operating the system they have right now, I
share their optimism. I share their confidence that they are
ready to do the job.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Obering, with regards to proposed budget and space-
based test bed, although this year's proposal does not include
any dollars, starting next year through 2011 there is $569.7
for a space-based test bed. Can you help us understand what you
mean by a space test bed, first off?
And then can you discuss whether or not this test bed will
include deploying some prototype space-based kinetic energy
interceptors?
General Obering. Yes, Congressman. First of all, there is a
lot that we would like to learn about space and space basing
when it comes to our sensors, to start with. So the first step
in that, as I mentioned in my oral testimony, is that we want
to launch two of our space tracking and surveillance system
satellites in 2007, and that program is on track to do that.
Those two satellites along with their cross links allow us
to begin experimentation to see can we solve the technical
challenges that are facing us there, what effectiveness is it,
and how reliable may this system be.
We intend to follow, as you said, in 2008 and beyond with
some experimentation that starts us down the path to understand
some of the technical challenges we face if we eventually
decide to pursue a space-based interceptor layer.
Now, we currently do not have any interceptors programmed
in our budget. All we have are experimentation to understand
some of the technical challenges, things like netted sensors
and how you would relate that to a fire control solution from
space.
We have the Near-Field Infrared Experiment (N-FIRE), of
course, which we are launching in 2007 that is part of this
overall concept as well, in which we can do some of the boost
phase measurements between what we call the plume-to-hardbody
handover--otherwise, can you track an object in that arena.
Mr. Larsen. So you will use N-FIRE for that?
General Obering. N-FIRE is part of our experimentation,
exactly. So we think it is prudent that while we encourage the
debate about whether or not we should have a space-based
interceptor layer that we base that on some concrete results.
And so we want to make sure we provide that debate with the
information that we think we will gain from our
experimentation.
Mr. Larsen. I would hope as well that we are part of that
debate----
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. And that information comes back to
us so we can participate in that. So with the $569 million you
are requesting, would that then pay for developmental
satellites--be deployed as part of this test bed with limited
defense capabilities? Are you going to be looking at that as
well? Should we expect to see that as well?
General Obering. That is something we will come back to you
and define in more detail what that looks like.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. With regards to ABL and KEI, last year the
NDAA included in section 231 a requirement for a comparative
assessment of capabilities and costs, a report for that. When
do you expect to complete this report? When do we expect to see
it?
General Obering. It should be forthcoming here in the next
couple of weeks. We have done the majority of that and we will
provide that to you.
Mr. Larsen. Can you give us an preliminary thoughts on that
assessment?
General Obering. Well, as I say, we are trying to set this
up to where we have the first flight in 2008 that we can
understand whether or not we have reached the knowledge point
for the KEI program as well as the airborne laser.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both, as I
briefly mentioned earlier.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
General Obering. And so a lot of that will basically say
that we are going to try to retain our options as long as we
can and understand more. Airborne laser has achieved some great
success last year.
However, we have a long way to go there. We have got to
integrate that laser on the aircraft. We still have to go
through the active flight tests and the high-power lasing. And
so we believe that we have a lot more to learn before we can
make a final decision.
Mr. Larsen. That sort of gets up to a follow-up point,
then, that I had about just kind of being aware of the
potential cost of these systems before we--well, we have to
make some decisions about the budget here this year for 2007,
including the $631 million for ABL and $405 million for KEI, so
that report--to the extent that we can certainly get that
before we delve into markup would be a great help.
I will end the questions right there. I have got another
set of questions on different topics for another witness, so I
will just end there.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks for your testimony, and I am sorry I was late. I
appreciate your forthcoming presentations. I want to see if we
can link together the testimony.
Mr. Duma, I understand you from past statements to say that
the ballistic missile defense testing regimen was not realistic
enough. You seem to testify today that we have made strides in
that direction over the last year.
But you also state in your testimony flight testing to date
has not yet reduced the risk to the point where General Obering
is ready to execute an operationally realistic flight test.
What is missing in the testing regimen now that needs to be
added to it to make it realistic?
Mr. Duma. Well, the fundamental technical unknown at this
point is to demonstrate the intercept capability on the ground-
based interceptor. We have modeled that. We have done a
tremendous amount of work down in Huntsville and actually
across the nation, linking models and simulations together for
integrated ground tests.
The big benefit of that has been the inclusion of the
warfighters, as General Dodgen has stated. That has gone a long
way to look at the tactics, techniques, procedures, the
integration problems that we are facing to get the
communications flow.
But the technical unknown right now--and while we have
demonstrated technology for hit-to-kill, we have not done it on
the operational booster and operational kill vehicle. We did
fly those for the first time successfully, but that was without
a target. The booster operated as expected. The kill vehicle
operated as expected and maneuvered as expected. But that was
not against a target.
So we need to get a target up there. And you may recall
from approximately a year ago we expended two targets but no
ground-based interceptors, because of other problems, so we
need to close that loop.
Mr. Spratt. Until that is done, that loop is closed, can we
state with confidence that a long-range missile can be
intercepted by our system if called upon to do so?
Mr. Duma. We have all the pieces in place to be able to try
that. I cannot tell you with certainty that we can do it yet.
We have not done that end-to-end demonstration.
Should a launch occur today, I would certainly hope the
operators would put it on alert and try the best they can with
what they have, but the testing to date has not confirmed that
you could count on that.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, sir.
General Obering, as I look at your budget, it is $10.4
billion all together, including PAC-3 and MEADS. In addition,
the Air Force is paying for SBIRS-high, but it is a component
of your system. That is about $670 billion. The two together
are $11 billion.
And we do not know where SBIRS-low is. I do not believe
there is a breakout for Space Tracking Surveillance System
(STSS), is there, or whatever that----
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt [continuing]. In the line?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. I beg your pardon. So that is included. If you
include SBIRS-high, then we are talking about $11 billion this
year, but almost all of that, as Mr. Larsen was saying, is
already T&E.
What is the procurement? What is the likely acquisition
cost of these systems if they are brought to fruition, proven
to work? What is the far end of the effort that we are doing
now when it comes to fielding all of this stuff that we are
developing and proving?
General Obering. Well, Congressman, I cannot give you a
single number. And the reason I cannot is because we are trying
to pace this program based on what we see as the threat
development and what we see as the technology development and
the maturation of the system.
So what we are doing is trying to manage the program within
the budget that we have been given and the top line authority
that we have been given. I have responsibility of that amount
that you mentioned. I have responsibility for $9.3 billion of
that.
And if you look across, it looks about that level, about
$1.5 billion to $2 billion of that per year goes to fielding,
and the rest of it goes to development of continuing
improvement of the system.
And what we will do is we will field as maturity and as the
knowledge-based testing presents itself to justify that and
continue that, and we will produce the rates that we think we
need to keep apace and ahead of what we see as the threat
inventories.
Mr. Spratt. You have got a full plate, I think you would
agree.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. Lots of things to bring together--GBI, KEI,
ABL. There might be a tradeoff between the two of those. You
are looking at an MKV to replace the EKV, and as you go along
with the spiral development the technology gets more and more
sophisticated.
I am a little dismayed at the notion that we would start by
fiscal year 2008 adding to this plate--multiple systems--
another system that could be hugely expensive, and that is a
space-based system.
General Abrahamson came to the conclusion years ago that to
field a space-based system you would have to have a dramatic
reduction in the cost of lift. Now, he was supportive of the
idea, but he also included in his SDI program a lift cost
production program seeking a reduction by a factor of three or
four in the cost of lifting a pound of payload into space.
Would you anticipate having to do the same thing to make 50
to 100 space-based interceptors a feasible undertaking?
General Obering. Well, yes, sir. That is part of what I
mentioned in the experimentation program that we would try to--
as part of that experimentation program is miniaturization and
how much weight can you get out of some of these payloads that
you would have to do.
But General Abrahamson, as you reflected--the
constellations that were envisioned at one time were much, much
larger than what we are talking about now, when you add a layer
to an already-existing terrestrial-based system. But we have a
lot of work to do there.
About the $10,000-per-pound-to-orbit cost--that has to be
driven down. A lot of those are the challenges that we would be
facing in any type of an approach or movement to space.
But if I can address your point about the affordability,
that is another advantage as to why we are proceeding the way
we are. We will not embark on a program if we do not think it
is affordable. We may have tremendous success with airborne
laser all the way through to lethal shoot down. But if we do
not think it is an affordable capability, we will not pursue
that.
That is part of the criteria that we apply to these
programs when they get to their knowledge points. It is not
just knowledge points about technical performance. It is also
about cost affordability. And we will reserve the right to make
those decisions.
As we get to that point, there will be ebbs and flows
throughout the program, so there will be programs that will be
coming off of their fielding requirements and others that will
be expanding.
That is why we think that this is a prudent investment,
because even with all of those programs thrown in that you just
mentioned, they are still less than 3 percent overall of our
defense budget.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for you, General Obering. Both the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency, in an unclassified assessment of the threat that we
face, have stated that it is their belief that North Korea is
capable of using rudimentary countermeasures in an ICBM attack
against the United States.
When will MDA test the GMD system against these kinds of
countermeasures?
General Obering. We already have, which is a little-known
fact. But we have demonstrated--the successful intercepts that
occurred in 1999 to 2002--there were countermeasures involved
in those intercept tests. Having said that, we plan three more
flight tests this year, as I said.
If we are successful in that test series, we will--we have
already actually given the direction to look at how we could
add countermeasures to part of that test regime.
Mr. Reyes. And in those tests, do we mimic or mirror the
basic or the rudimentary types of countermeasures that both
North Korea, Iran and possibly others might use?
General Obering. Well, Congressman, the intelligence
community may have much better insight into that than I do, but
I do not know of anybody that can say with any certainty what
kind of countermeasures those countries are capable of.
However, based on the physics, based on what you would try
to conjecture in terms of vulnerabilities, those are the kind
of things that we would use as part of our test program.
Mr. Reyes. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Everett. All right.
Dr. Schwarz.
Dr. Schwarz. Secretary Flory, I think this is probably best
directed at you. And the way to ask this so that, you know, my
question does not make you answer that that information is
classified--so let me give it a shot.
In unclassified terms, what is the near-term ballistic
missile threat to the United States? What additional
capabilities might we need to face that threat? And how likely
is it that a non-nation state will ultimately possess or could
conceivably possess ballistic missiles and the pertinent launch
capability?
Secretary Flory. I would say in terms of the near-term
threat, I would probably go back to some of my response to Mr.
Franks' question. In terms of a long-range missile, an ICBM
threat, we know what North Korea has done--its 1998 test of the
Taepo-Dong I. We know that it is working on the Taepo-Dong II.
As I mentioned, the intelligence community thinks that Iran
may have an ICBM, might be able to flight-test an ICBM by 2015.
So in this setting, and bearing in mind the classification
issue, that is about all I think I can say on that, although we
would be happy to get you a briefing on the details.
In terms of additional capabilities, I would ask my
colleagues to jump in on that, but I think--what we are working
on now is designed to deal with the kind of missile, the kind
of trajectory, the kind of threat we are talking about here, so
I think we are on a path to that.
Now, I would put one caveat. A couple of countries have
tested shorter-range missiles launched from ships, so that is
something--the shorter-range missiles exist. That is something
that hypothetically could happen in a much shorter time frame,
because all the elements of it exist. And that would be
something very challenging.
In terms of non-nation states getting a hold of ballistic
missiles--excuse me, I think non-state--maybe I garbled that--
non-state actors getting a hold of ballistic missiles, we have
to be concerned about that.
North Korea has shown a willingness to sell weapons to all
and sundry. Iran's ties with terrorism, which go back for a
long time, and represent a consistent element of Iran's
national strategy, are other concerns.
On the other hand, I think that with respect to non-nation
states, this would be challenging. I mean, they would have to
use a nation state somewhere to launch it from, so I think they
are--we know that there are terrorist groups, Al Qaida in
particular, that are working on trying to get together
materials for radiological and nuclear weapons. We know that
they have pursued chemical and biological.
But I would think, at least in the shorter term, those
would be more likely options for them to pursue.
Dr. Schwarz. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Obering, I would direct the question to you,
with the understanding if anyone else has a different
perspective or a better one--I am wondering, we were briefed by
the high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, the EMP, commission
here last year.
And that really reassessed in my own mind some of the
potential priorities that we may face, and with the potential
that even maybe a Scud missile or something of a more
rudimentary level might be used to elevate some type of
enhanced nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon.
Having said that, do we have any focus in the direction of
being able to interdict something that would come from our own
homeland, you know, to be elevated high enough to be detonated
over our homeland, or something that would, say, come off the
near term coastline that would probably be more, like you
mentioned, a rogue state attack?
So we have any sensing capability or any response
capability for something like that? Are we even thinking in
that direction?
General Obering. Mr. Franks, actually, the big problem
there is sensors and sensing. And we have taken steps to cover
that--what we call an asymmetric threat that would be off the
coast, and upgrading the sensors that we have existing today to
be able to meet that threat.
We could also choose to deploy assets that are available to
protect some of our higher population areas--that type of
thing--that is a decision that could be made in the future. But
in terms of the ability, the technical ability, we have that
inherent as part of our program.
I will not comment on internal launches. That is something
that we have nothing in our program today that would address
that.
Mr. Franks. Well, I guess, you know, it occurs to me that
maybe the greatest danger that we would face would be something
along those lines, because even in Iran, as insane as that
government is, it occurs to me that if they did have a missile
capable of reaching the United States, even though they have to
know what our response would be, they have to, it seems to me
like they would try to pass some type of technology off to
someone that could launch it closer, that they could ostensibly
have no fingerprints on it.
But you are saying to me that at least that equation is
being considered carefully, and I guess my add-on to that would
be how do you assess that threat in terms of potential--put it
in priority for me as far as, you know, some ICBM coming from
North Korea.
It occurs to me that we are almost more likely to face some
sort of close-in threat like that from some terrorist than we
are from some nation.
General Obering. Congressman, I would let the intel
community comment on the likelihood, but I will comment on the
technical feasibility. And I believe it is not that difficult
to do.
And in fact, in August of 2004 we actually launched that
type of a missile off the coast as part of a target series that
we are using in a test program with the Arrow missile. And so
we do not assess the difficulty technically of being that hard
to do.
But the likelihood, the motivations and that type of thing,
I would leave that to the intel community.
Mr. Franks. Sure. But you are saying to me that we have the
technical capability to sense and acquire and respond to
something like that if it were necessary.
General Obering. We have that as part of our program,
planned program.
Mr. Franks. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Spratt, we are going to reserve a place
for Mr. Larsen, if you are ready to go with a second round.
Mr. Spratt. You have all touched upon this in your
testimony, but it would be useful if particularly you, General
Obering, or General Dodgen, you could kind of lay out for us--
the Ground-based Initiative (GBI), for example. How many more
tests do you have to go before you think you will be able to
say with proven confidence that this is an operationally
effective system? And what are these tests?
General Obering. The tests that we have planned for the
remainder of the year, I will walk through those very quickly.
We have a target launched out of Kodiak, Alaska, that will fly
across the Beale radar, and we will launch an interceptor out
of the Vandenberg Air Force Base, and we will do what we call a
target characterization for this flight. That will occur in the
late May, early June time frame.
We will repeat that same type of profile in the latter part
of the summer and then again in the latter part of the fall.
And so those are what we would consider to be very
operationally realistic tests because they are threat
representative targets. That is an operational radar, the Beale
radar.
They are operational crews manning the consoles. There will
be an operational fire control system that will be used,
operational hardware and software. And of course, we have an
operational configured interceptor.
And so we believe that that begins to fit the bill of a--
the closest that we can come to an end-to-end test other than
trying to take a missile off the coast of North Korea and
launch it back this way, which is very improbable and not
practical.
General Dodgen. If I may deal with it from an operational
question, in a way the crews are dealing with it, the
uncertainty that we have in the performance of a system is
dealt with at an operational level right now by the potential
of doing multiple engagements on the same incoming missile.
As we see this test that is unfolding this year, we will
get a better understanding of just exactly the effectiveness of
the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) in the end game and the
interceptor, and we will go and modify our firing doctrine in
very short order so that we are gaining the effects we want.
At the same time, because this is the year when our
inventory is going to be going up significantly--so I think
they marry up pretty well that as our uncertainty goes down,
and our confidence goes up, we will be modifying our firing
doctrine to achieve the effect.
But we deal with the uncertainty with the ability to shoot
multiple times at the same target today.
Mr. Spratt. Going back to the electromagnetic question,
once again I think your predecessors determined some time ago
that if the attack were truly a massive attack in the days when
we were still conceiving the Soviet Union or the former Soviet
Union as our principal nuclear adversary, there was a general
rule of thought that if the attack was more than 100 RVs or
greater magnitude than that, that the electromagnetic effects
of intercepting a number of these RVs coming at us would be
such that the system soon would be--its operation would be
extremely problematic.
Do you still feel that way, that if we had a large attack
against the system, and if we were successful and particularly
if they were fused so that they would detonate upon collision,
salvage-fused, would that thwart the effectiveness of this
system if the--if so, what would be your estimate of the limit
at which this problem--this became a problem?
General Obering. Well, first of all, sir, the system that
we are fielding today clearly is not designed for massive
attack. It is not designed for that mission. It is designed to
handle the degrees of nuclear detonation that you talked about
with respect to the numbers that we would potentially be
facing, and the inventories that we have fielded, and the
capabilities that we have in the system, and we have further
steps that are identified to even make that more effective
against that type of a detonation that could occur.
But it is not designed for a massive attack, and it is
designed right now for the rogue nation threat, as we
mentioned.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you.
Mr. Everett. Well, let me give it a shot while--I know Mr.
Larsen wants to have some questions.
General Obering, as long as you are still up at bat, let me
ask you about a--last year, this committee and the House Armed
Services Committee, with the help of my colleagues here,
authorized an additional $100 million for further testing.
And I think the appropriators added another $50 million. I
think you ended up getting $150 million. Talk to me a little
bit, or talk to the committee a little bit, if you will, on how
that money was used and what good you think came from it.
General Obering. Sir, it was tremendously advantageous for
us to get that. What we used that money for specifically is
over $100 million went directly into our test program.
One of the things I did last year upon the recommendation
of the independent review team and the mission readiness task
force was to divert more of our interceptors into our test
program, so we actually diverted four interceptors from what
would have been silo emplacement into our test program.
And they also recommended that we do additional ground test
and additional qualification test with components. For example,
we stack fired an interceptor this last November as part of our
ongoing qualification and risk reduction testing. And so what
that money did was allow us to offset some of those impacts of
having to divert those boosters into the test program.
It also allowed us to integrate the sensors that are coming
online this year, the sea-based X-band, the forward-based X-
band that we are deploying, and that--especially the sea-based
X-band--greatly enhances our test bed as well, so we were able
to use that money for that, as well as provide $25 million for
mooring for that sea-based X-band off of Adak, Alaska.
So that money went directly into our testing and helped us
to offset some of the impacts from our diversion of
interceptors into that test program.
Mr. Everett. General Dodgen, can you update us, please, on
the Army's progress in directing the Patriot friendly fire that
we noted in Operation Iraqi Freedom? And also, do you have
adequate funding to complete upgrading all the batteries out
there?
General Dodgen. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. With
congressional help, we were able to reprogram $43.1 million to
take care of the immediate needs in the aftermath of Iraqi
Freedom. We did a very good scrub of what are the combat-
related improvements we needed to do. And they were in three
categories.
The first one was better connectivity on the battlefield.
The second one was retraining our crews in Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures (TTPs) and reinventing the way we did friendly
protect. And the third one was fixing the software
classification things in our software build and the Patriot
system, the latter being the thing that took the longest.
We used that money to accelerate the fielding of the
battery command posts that are out there now which gave every
one of the Patriot batteries Link 16 connectivity and datalink
connectivity assured.
We have retrained our crews over the last two years. We
have redesigned the next software build which is post-
deployment build six. It will be ready to put into the system
at the beginning of next year, and that will be the extent of
those improvements.
And we are very confident the TTPs will take care of us
until the software gets into the system, and when the software
gets into the system, we will be very robust and have those
things corrected.
Mr. Everett. Well, thank you. I will just simply say this
has been of long interest of this subcommittee. Some years
back, when we first noticed this, we put about $20 million in
there for you to take a look at it. And unfortunately, we lost
it in the appropriation process. But that is good news.
Mr. Larsen, we have been carrying the weight here until you
got back.
Mr. Larsen. I did not know I had that much pull on the----
Mr. Everett. Absolutely.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, sure. Yes.
A quick follow up for General Obering and the space-based
test bed. The GMD system evolved from experimental assets
deployed in Alaska into an operational system, and I think
perhaps the coda of my question in the last round might be
something like this.
As you move forward through 2011 with the $500 million or
so, are we kind of moving from experimental to something that
we assume will be operational, or can you commit to this
committee right now that if this is--you are just
experimenting, we are looking at this, and this is not the
beginning of something that gets so far down the road that we
cannot say hold on a second, what are the costs on this, why
isn't this working, how does it work?
General Obering. No, it is not. I would not characterize it
like that at all, Congressman Larsen. Again, it is a space test
bed for just experimentation purposes. We do not have any
configuration, anything like that, that is laid into our
program for that intercept.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Yes. Thanks.
Mr. Duma, the 2006 act included a section 234 requiring
appropriate joint service operational test and violation
components. As the director, you have to approve the block test
plan and submit a report when the test is complete.
And the operational test requirement begins with Block
2006. Can you describe to the committee your plans for
implementing that particular statutory requirement and discuss
your progress to date?
Mr. Duma. Yes, I can, Congressman. As I said in my opening
statement, we have worked with the Missile Defense Agency to
implement a bit of a new test philosophy, and that is any
valuation-based philosophy to drive, then, the test events
required to get the information to satisfy the knowledge points
for the development and the operational capabilities of the
systems.
We have begun that effort. And as I said, the approach
being taken will be incorporated into the next update to the
integrated master test plan. We did update the integrated
master test plan based upon the findings and recommendations of
the independent review team and the mission readiness task
force.
Both of those bodies took inputs from the operational test
community and incorporated them into their recommendations. We
updated the master test plan based on that. That plan is
virtually complete, and I believe it is in the final signature
chain right now.
And General Obering just told me he had signed it now, so
that will be out shortly. The next version of that will
incorporate the evaluation-based test planning.
Mr. Larsen. So this particular test plan design does not
reflect evaluation-based----
Mr. Duma. No, it does not. It reflects the recommendations
of the IRT and the mission readiness task force.
Now, that statute also requires reporting, as you know, and
I have three reports that I am read to provide to Congress. I
do an annual report which is through my Title X in which I
report an unclassified summary of the testing that has
occurred. I have an annual report that I have submitted so far
in a classified nature on the missile defense test program and
progress made. That is due February 15th of every year. And now
this section 234 requires another report on the completion of
each block. So it starts with Block 2006. That technically ends
on the 31st of December in 2007, so the report--or to satisfy
that Article 234 requirement will be in January of 2008.
Mr. Larsen. All right. I apologize for asking this, but you
said the classified report that you have is due February 15th.
Have we received----
Mr. Duma. You have. I sent that, I think, around the 13th
of February.
Mr. Larsen. Just under the wire. All right.
General Obering, the Navy and MDA is scheduled to select a
sea-based program for KEI in fiscal year 2007, and do you have
any concerns about moving forward with that, given that we have
not actually decided on the KEI or ABL?
General Obering. We have a study involved in terms of what
that recommended approach will be, looking at the various
configurations, ship configurations, and recommendations. That
is what that entails.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
General Obering. But we will base any type of--even a
development program on the testing that will occur between now
and the end of 2008. That is what we mean by a knowledge-based
approach.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
General Obering. We still do the systems engineering, and
if you go with a land-based and sea-based version, you have to
do that allocation of performance and allocation of
requirements. That is a prudent thing to go do. And in fact,
that is how you derive your knowledge points. But we fully
intend to achieve----
Mr. Larsen. But the dollars are not there to put something
on a ship----
General Obering. No.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. With the 2007----
General Obering. No. No.
Mr. Everett. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. I just have one last quick question.
Mr. Everett. Sure, absolutely.
Mr. Reyes. And this one is for you, General Dodgen. What is
the Army doing to develop or pursue technology to counter the
rocket, artillery and mortar attacks? And what is SMDC's role
in these efforts? And in your opinion, is there sufficient
research funding for these efforts in the 2007 budget?
General Dodgen. Well, as you know, we have deployed certain
guns with the help of this committee, certain guns into Iraq.
And as a part of that, there has been a joint sense-and-warn
ability which has been very effective also, which quickly
senses and warns soldiers so they can take cover. And that, in
and of itself, has saved a lot of lives.
So we have something that we have tested as an interim fix,
and we have deployed, and we are going to deploy more of those,
and we are going to continue to test those.
At this time, I think we recognize in the Army that this is
going to be a threat that is going to stay with us for some
time, and we are going to have to develop some capabilities for
the future force. And we are looking at alternatives now, and
the Army is actually looking at the requirements in building
something for the future.
SMDC has always been involved in what I am optimistic
about, and that is directed energy, a high-energy laser. We
have recently gone away from chemicals because of its ability
and its immobility on the battlefield, and now we are actively
pursuing solid-state lasers that could be packaged in a mobile
system to do that particular job.
And that is one alternative that is already funded. It is
not ready to be accelerated. We have awarded some contracts. We
want to get up to a certain level of power and make a
determination then. So we are looking at the future with that
alternative, directed energy, and we are looking at other
things.
So from solid-state standpoint, I think the 2007 is
properly funded for us to move forward.
Mr. Reyes. Very good. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Mr. Everett. Thank you.
And I thank the panel for being here today.
And I thank my Members for the questions. Obviously, there
were some in-depth questions that I thought were well put and
well answered.
I am personally pleased with the progress that we have
made, General Obering and General Dodgen, and from where we
were this time last year. I think that is a step forward. And I
look forward to the rest of this year.
I think I actually smell some success out there, big-time
success. So we are looking forward to that. There will probably
be some questions for the record, and I would ask you to
respond to those in real time rather than Washington time,
which is about 30 days, please. [Laughter.]
So thank you again. I thank the panel. I thank the Members
for participating.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 9, 2006
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 9, 2006
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8987.073
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 9, 2006
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT
Mr. Everett. I understand that the Missile Defense Agency has
invested over $250 million in the development of radiation hardened
electronics. Additionally, DTRA has invested approximately $150 million
and the Defense Production Act has invested over $100 million.
Recognizing the importance of this technology and the large amount of
funding that has been invested, how do you plan to utilize the results
of these efforts? Will there be a centralized data base to prevent the
unnecessary duplication of effort and the optimum utilization of the
results by the prime contractors?
General Obering. The Ballistic Missile Defense System began
improving its nuclear survivability this Fiscal Year. Two Ballistic
Missile Defense System elements, Ground-based Midcourse Defense and
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, received funds to address
electromagnetic pulse protection, radiation hardening against
persistent radiation from high altitude nuclear blast, and to conduct
the assessment study of nuclear survivability capability for the
potential upgrades using radiation hardened electronics to enhance BMDS
capability in accordance with our High Altitude Exo-atmospheric Nuclear
Survivability standard. Our Future Years Defense Plan requests nuclear
survivability funding to address High Altitude Exo-atmospheric Nuclear
Survivability requirements next Fiscal Year for the Multiple Kill
Vehicles, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and the Forward Based X-
band Transportable radar. I have a table to submit for the record that
identifies our current and future funding plan.
PB07 MDA Nuclear Survivability
[Dollars in Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMDS Element FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD 3 4 4 6 7 5 29
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMD 5 7 24 66 55 34 191
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MKV 12 26 50 72 91 251
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FBX-T 1 2 2 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THAAD 3 25 25 3 56
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 8 23 57 148 161 135 532
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Missile Defense Agency will include hardened electronics, co-
funded by the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, and the Defense Production Act, in future Ballistic Missile
Defense System equipment deployments.
The Missile Defense Agency has a Small Business Innovation Research
contract to build a radiation hardened catalog that will aid in access,
recognition, and utilization of DoD radiation hardened electronics
data. Next year, to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort,
Ballistic Missile Defense System contractors will be able to use this
catalog to search for hardened technology via a database warehouse
using a secure Internet-based protocol.
In addition to the Small Business Innovation Research contract I
just discussed, the Agency also participates in the Director of the
Defense Research and Engineering's Radiation Hardened Oversight Council
to mitigate unnecessary duplication of effort and optimize utilization
of radiation hard technology.
Mr. Everett. As the Army's Patriot System remains the cornerstone
for theater air and missile defense, I understand the Army Chief of
Staff recently decided the need to upgrade 12 Patriot batteries from
the older Configuration-2 to the upgraded Configuration-3 which permits
the battery to fire all missile versions to include the PAC-3. Given
that decision was only recently arrived at, would additional funding in
FY07 permit the Army to begin moving to that end-state more quickly and
get that enhanced capability to our troops sooner in the face of the
growing threats world-wide?
General Dodgen. Yes. The Army Chief of Staff directed the pure
fleeting of all Patriot battalions to configuration-3 to occur no later
than the end of FY09. Due to the long lead time necessary for industry
to produce, test, and install the upgrade kits, funding is required in
FY07 to meet the 2009 timeline. If funded in the FY07 appropriation, a
contract would be awarded upon receipt of funds. This requirement is
currently on the Army's unfunded 1-N list.
Mr. Everett. Would acceleration of moving the Patriot force to a
``pure fleet'' configuration-3, in other words PAC-3 capable force,
starting in FY07 improve the Army's operational flexibility to meet
global threats to our friends forward deployed troops?
General Dodgen. Yes.
A Patriot configuration-3 system provides substantially
increased capability against cruise and ballistic missiles in terms of
Probability of Kill (Pk), defended area footprint, lethality [``hit-to-
kill'' missile technology], Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and
saturation attack.
Additional funding in FY07 to pure-fleet the Patriot
force to configuration-3 improves the Army's missile defense
operational flexibility by:
Enabling the requisite number of ``like Patriot
battalions'' (config-3) to implement the Army's Force Generation model
(ARFORGEN) to ensure a continuous, rotational, and trained presence for
Combatant Commanders and Allies in forward deployed locations.
Negating capability deltas and interoperability
challenges between Patriot Configuration-2 and Configuration-3 systems
enables attainment of Army's goal of modularity, which provides
flexibility to deploy tailorable and modular Patriot task
organizations.
Streamlining the Army's institutional training and
logistics processes to maintain and sustain an operational Patriot
force structure.
Mr. Everett. The Army has taken steps to address the unfortunate
fratricide incidents experienced early in Operation Iraqi Freedom
involving Patriot. There have been improvements to communications
resources and software along with training and other measures. Along
with these and other improvements to the Patriot system, if an upgrade
to the radar were available to achieve a measure of organic combat
Identification not now present; would you support additional funding to
develop that onboard capability?
General Dodgen. Yes, upgrades to the radar are available which
would provide a significant organic combat identification capability.
This capability has been demonstrated in an engineering test
environment, and if implemented into the tactical system, would greatly
improve the protection of friendly aircraft. We fully support
additional funding to develop the onboard capability.
Mr. Everett. Are there efforts currently underway to improve
Patriot and other air defense systems with technologies and
improvements that will reduce or eliminate the likelihood of firing
upon friendly US or coalition aircraft?
General Dodgen. Yes, there are several efforts underway to
incorporate new technologies to greatly reduce the likelihood of firing
on a friendly aircraft.
- New Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 5/Mode S. These
capabilities are currently being developed for the Patriot system.
However, with the present radar/IFF interface, the utility of these new
capabilities is greatly limited. The full benefits of the new IFF modes
cannot be realized with the current interface. An upgrade to the radar
processor and IFF interface (unfunded) are required to realize the
benefits of the new IFF capabilities.
- New radar processing techniques. These techniques are currently
in use by other services, and have shown significant capability to
improve combat identification. The techniques have been demonstrated
with the Patriot radar in an engineering demonstration environment;
however no funding is available to incorporate them into the tactical
system.
Mr. Everett. The Army recently concluded a need to standup an
Integrated Air & Missile Defense program office for the purpose of
working to facilitate engineering and open architecture design
activities in support of the Army System of Systems initiative in both
the ongoing SLAMRAAM and Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Programs. The
FY07 President's Budget request arrived at the Hill before the results
of this decision could be taken into account. Would additional funding
in FY07 assist the Army in accelerating its efforts to field a System
of Systems Integrated Air & Missile Defense capability by 2011?
General Dodgen. While adequate funds exists to meet the fielding of
an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture by FY11, additional
funding, if available, could be used to develop those unique and common
components associated with attaining a more robust capability.
Additional funding could be used to upgrade software of Patriot
configuration-3 radars to ensure integration with a common Battle
Manager, accelerate the Launch Station component to achieve the
objective 2011 architecture and lastly, assist in the refinement and
development of the common Battle Management architecture.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
Mr. Reyes. In response to my question during the hearing concerning
your plans for testing the Ground Based Interceptor against
countermeasures that might accompany a threat-representative ICBM
warhead, you stated that MDA has already successfully tested the system
against a target accompanied by countermeasures. Please provide me with
information about each GBI test that has included countermeasures.
General Obering. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Reyes. Please describe the types of countermeasures that were
included in these tests.
General Obering. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Reyes. Were these test countermeasures developed based on
intelligence community estimates of the most challenging types of
countermeasures that could be developed to stress a missile defense
system by threat nations?
General Obering. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. The Army has taken steps to address the unfortunate
fratricide incidents experienced early in Operation Iraqi Freedom
involving Patriot. There have been improvements to communications
resources and software along with training and other measures. Along
with these and other improvements to the Patriot system, if an upgrade
to the radar were available to achieve a measure of organic combat
Identification not now present; would you support additional funding to
develop that onboard capability?
General Dodgen. Yes, upgrades to the radar are available which
would provide a significant organic combat identification capability.
This capability has been demonstrated in an engineering test
environment, and if implemented into the tactical system, would greatly
improve the protection of friendly aircraft. We fully support
additional funding to develop the onboard capability.
Mr. Rogers. Are there efforts currently underway to improve Patriot
and other air defense systems with technologies and improvements that
will reduce or eliminate the likelihood of firing upon friendly US or
coalition aircraft?
General Dodgen. Yes, there are several efforts underway to
incorporate new technologies to greatly reduce the likelihood of firing
on a friendly aircraft.
- New Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 5/Mode S. These
capabilities are currently being developed for the Patriot system.
However, with the present radar/IFF interface, the utility of these new
capabilities is greatly limited. The full benefits of the new IFF modes
cannot be realized with the current interface. An upgrade to the radar
processor and IFF interface (unfunded) are required to realize the
benefits of the new IFF capabilities.
- New radar processing techniques. These techniques are currently
in use by other services, and have shown significant capability to
improve combat identification. The techniques have been demonstrated
with the Patriot radar in an engineering demonstration environment;
however no funding is available to incorporate them into the tactical
system.
Mr. Rogers. The Army recently concluded a need to standup an
Integrated Air & Missile Defense program office for the purpose of
working to facilitate engineering and open architecture design
activities in support of the Army System of Systems initiative in both
the ongoing SLAMRAAM and Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Programs. The
FY07 President's Budget request arrived at the Hill before the results
of this decision could be taken into account. Would additional funding
in FY07 assist the Army in accelerating its efforts to field a System
of Systems Integrated Air & Missile Defense capability by 2011?
General Dodgen. While adequate funds exists to meet the fielding of
an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture by FY11, additional
funding, if available, could be used to develop those unique and common
components associated with attaining a more robust capability.
Additional funding could be used to upgrade software of Patriot
configuration-3 radars to ensure integration with a common Battle
Manager, accelerate the Launch Station component to achieve the
objective 2011 architecture and lastly, assist in the refinement and
development of the common Battle Management architecture.