[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRAVEL VS. TERRORISM: FEDERAL WORKFORCE ISSUES IN MANAGING AIRPORT
SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE
AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 4, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-176
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
29-848 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization
JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
TOM DAVIS, Virginia MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DARRELL E. ISSA, California ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
Ex Officio
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Ron Martinson, Staff Director
Tania Shand, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 4, 2006.................................... 1
Statement of:
Berrick, Cathleen, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Robert
Jamison, Deputy Secretary for Security Operations,
Transportation Security Administration; Kathy Dillaman,
Deputy Associate Director for the Center for Federal
Investigative Services, Office of Personnel Management; and
Dawn E. Lucini, airport security administrator, McCarran
International Airport, Las Vegas, NV, on behalf of the
Clark County Department of Aviation, owner and operator of
McCarran International Airport............................. 13
Berrick, Cathleen........................................ 13
Dillaman, Kathy.......................................... 63
Jamison, Robert.......................................... 56
Lucini, Dawn E........................................... 68
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Berrick, Cathleen, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 16
Davis, Hon. Danny K., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois, prepared statement of................... 9
Dillaman, Kathy, Deputy Associate Director for the Center for
Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel
Management, prepared statement of.......................... 65
Jamison, Robert, Deputy Secretary for Security Operations,
Transportation Security Administration, prepared statement
of......................................................... 58
Lucini, Dawn E., airport security administrator, McCarran
International Airport, Las Vegas, NV, on behalf of the
Clark County Department of Aviation, owner and operator of
McCarran International Airport, prepared statement of...... 70
Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada, prepared statement of..................... 5
TRAVEL VS. TERRORISM: FEDERAL WORKFORCE ISSUES IN MANAGING AIRPORT
SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency
Organization,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter,
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Porter, Schmidt, Davis of Illinois
and Van Hollen.
Staff present: Ronald Martinson, staff director; Patrick
Jennings, OPM detailee/senior counsel; Alex Cooper, legislative
assistant; Tania Shand, minority professional staff member; and
Teresa Coufal, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Porter. I would like to bring the meeting to order, a
quorum being present. Thank you all for being here this
afternoon. I know that we have just filled the room, so that is
good. If we need some more chairs, we will be happy to bring
some in a little bit later. Again, I do appreciate those that
have come across the country and for those that are here today.
Although for the most part, airport security is moving in
the right direction, it is an area that deserves close
congressional scrutiny from all relevant congressional
committees to ensure that our airports continue to be safe and
secure. The American public deserves nothing less. Federal
employees play an integral role in airport security in a
variety of ways. The hearing today will examine that role and
address ways to improve upon staffing and human capital
programs within DHS. In addition, I am also interested in
learning more today about the foreign management of some of our
airports.
Recently, the Dubai ports deal was reported by the press,
and people were understandably concerned that the deal would
have allowed a foreign company to operate some of the country's
largest seaports. Not many people know, however, that
operations at some our largest international airports are also
operated by foreign firms. For example, Indianapolis
International Airport is managed by the British Airlines, a
subsidiary of British Airports Authority, BAA USA, to be
specific. BAA also manages the concessions in the passenger
terminal at Pittsburgh International Airport. Terminal 4 at JFK
International Airport is operated by a consortium led by a
subsidiary of a company based in the Netherlands. The terminals
at Orlando Sanford International Airport are operated by a
Spanish company.
I believe that the issue of who manages and who works at
our airports deserves our attention and certainly out scrutiny.
We need to know who checks the backgrounds of these companies
and their employees. We need to know how these companies and
their employees are cleared to operate at our airports across
the country.
I has been almost 5 years since the attacks on September
11, 2001. After the attacks, we made many positive steps
forward in Government organization and airport security
procedures. In 2001, Congress established the Transportation
Security Administration. In January 2003, 22 Homeland Security
agencies were brought together when the Department of Homeland
Security came into existence. In terms of security operations,
the baggage screening process at airports has been placed under
Federal control. The number of air marshals has been increased,
and TSA Federal Security Directors have been assigned to the
Nation's more than 440 commercial airports to lead and
coordinate the TSA security activities.
Unfortunately, we still have a long way to go in terms of
airport security. A quick scan of news reports from 2006 alone
provides some examples that illustrate problems within DHS's
control.
On February 27, 2006, a Will Rogers World Airport in
Oklahoma City, authorities found threatening graffiti in the
cargo hold of an airliner. An airport spokeswoman noted that
the markings were found in a place that should only have been
accessible by authorized personnel.
On March 6, 2006, at John F. Kennedy International Airport
in New York, an elderly man drove his car through two guard
gates onto the tarmac in the early hours of the morning. The
driver entered an area managed by a private contractor.
Eventually he crossed at least one active runway, where an Air
France jet was about to land. About 23 minutes after the
incident started, the Port Authority Police intercepted the
man.
That same day at Midway International Airport in Chicago, a
man ran through a gate into a secure area while the gate was
opened for a vehicle. As a result, runway 4 was closed briefly.
Out of the three perimeter gates at Midway, the man apparently
got through the only one without a security camera. In response
to this event, airport authorities said they would retrain 222
aviation security officers and redesign the perimeter gates.
On March 11, 2006, news reports indicated that Federal
officials removed the head of security at Newark Liberty
International Airport following 4 years of security breaches
and staffing problems.
On March 31, 2006, two baggage screeners at the Honolulu
International Airport pleaded guilty to stealing thousands of
dollars in yen from the luggage of Japanese tourists. According
to prosecutors, the two screeners admitted to being among a
group of security screeners who stole money from the baggage of
outbound international travelers and divided the cash.
Despite these reports, I believe that Federal and private
security employees at airports are doing the best they can
under some difficult circumstances. However, we need to examine
this situation from a work force standpoint to ensure that we
are doing all we can to help the people protecting our
airports.
The subcommittee will examine the hiring, background
screening, training and deployment of Federal and private
sector employees working at airports. Airport security is the
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security. Two
components of DHS have key missions at airports--the
Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border
Protection. DHS deploys and trains an airport security work
force that includes TSA Federal Security Directors,
Transportation Security Officers, known as ``screeners,'' and
CBP inspectors. In addition to security operations, DHS sets
the rules for airport and air carrier security. Specifically,
DHS sets standards for airport perimeter security, access
controls and airport and air carrier security activities, and
due to recent legislation, the TSA is working to implement an
identification system for worker access at seaports and at
airports.
The Office of Personnel Management also plays a major role
in airport security. OPM's Federal Investigative Services
Division conducts background checks of Federal employee and
contractors working at our airports. OPM is responsible for
ensuring Federal and contract airport employees are
investigated thoroughly before they are hired. OPM accomplishes
this by checking job applicants against fingerprint records,
national criminal data bases at the FBI, and other sources, to
ensure that the applicants have no disqualifying factors in
their background.
Airport security is of critical importance to the Nation.
According to the Air Transport Association of America, in 2004
the total impact of commercial aviation on the U.S. economy was
approximately $1.2 trillion in growth output, $380 million in
personal earnings, and 11.4 million jobs. Approximately 8.8
percent of U.S. employment is directly or indirectly
attributable to the commercial aviation sector. In my district,
where McCarran Airport is located, which I think is one of the
best in country, if not in the world--I will put in a plug for
Las Vegas--we have 44.3 million air travelers that are passing
through McCarran each year. Most of these travelers are
tourists. Tourism is by far the most important part of the Las
Vegas economy. Las Vegas and the rest of the country can't
afford another disruption of air travel like we experienced
after September 11th. We need to find a balance between
security and the need to move air travelers efficiently through
our airports. Our country depends upon air transportation, and
air transportation in turn on the airport security personnel.
Proper management and security at airports is a matter of
national security. Thats I why the issues we will examine today
are vital issues to be addressed by this subcommittee.
As I mentioned, being from the communities of Nevada and
Las Vegas, I remember quite well, personally, September 11th,
because I had at that time a view of the landing pattern of
McCarran International, and I remember that day when there
wasn't a bird in the sky or a plane in the sky. And it is one
of those moments I think in time, as we look back, whether it
be the Kennedy assassination or whatever, I think we each have
these moments of time that we remember like a photograph. I
remember that day when the planes were not flying and cars were
not driving. From that moment on, I knew we had to change the
way we do business in this country, and I applaud those folks
that have been working very hard to ensure traveler safety, but
I still think we have a long way to go.
So today, I have invited witnesses from the GAO, TSA, OPM
and McCarran International Airport to discuss airport work
force issues. As I said, I hope this discussion will reveal
areas that need attention, help clarify some roles of all the
employees involved in airport security, and I look forward to a
discussion with all the witnesses that are here this afternoon.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]
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Mr. Porter. I would like to now again say welcome to all of
you who are here today, and introduce our ranking minority
member, Mr. Danny Davis, for any opening comments.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
When this subcommittee was considering the legislation that
created the Transportation Security Administration [TSA], the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act [ATSA], there was much
debate about whether airport screeners at the new agency would
be Federal employees or private contractors. It was a very
vigorous debate, and a compromise of sorts was reached. Within
1 year of being created, TSA was mandated to hire Federal
employees to take over airport screening services at all but
five U.S. commercial airports. Those five airports were
permitted to hire private screening companies as part of a
pilot program. All other airports were allowed by the ATSA,
after November 19, 2004, the choice of maintaining Federal
screeners or opting out and using private contractors.
Both Federal and private airport screeners have been
providing their services long enough for us to know how the two
groups performed. Reports by the Government Accountability
Office [GAO], and TSA's Office of Inspector General have shown
little difference between Federal screeners and private
screeners. They both perform in an equally poor manner.
The question that needs to be answered here is why. Do we
have enough Federal screeners? What are the staffing levels?
Why is there a hiring cap of 45,000 screeners? Are Federal
screeners adequately trained? Do airports have high-speed
Internet access so that screeners can take advantage of online
training? Is TSA taking advantage of aviation security
technologies for checkpoint screenings? All of these questions
must be answered and addressed before any judgment can be made
about the effectiveness of Federal screeners. Today's
witnesses, of course, are in a position to help us address and
understand these issues, and I look forward to their testimony.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Danny K. Davis follows:]
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Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Again, we appreciate you
being here today.
I would like to do some procedural matters. I would like to
ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days
to submit written statements and questions for the hearing
record, and the answers to written questions provided by the
witnesses also be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and
other materials referred to by Members and their witnesses may
be included in the hearing record, that all Members will be
permitted to revise and extend their remarks.
Without objection, so ordered.
It is also the practice of this committee to administer the
oath to all witnesses, so if you all would stand for a moment,
please, and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Porter. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative. Please be seated.
As with most congressional hearings, we will have Members
that will be coming and going throughout the afternoon, but
know that everything that is said today will be included in the
record and be used for our decision process later on. So,
again, we appreciate you being here.
I would like to begin by combining the panels, which we
have done, and let you know that each will have approximately 5
minutes and then we will be asking questions. Some of the
questions will be asked in writing, so you will have some time
to submit the answers.
First I would like to welcome today our Director of
Homeland Security at the Government Accountability Office. That
is Ms. Cathleen Berrick, and we appreciate you being here. So,
please, open your testimony.
STATEMENTS OF CATHLEEN BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ROBERT
JAMISON, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; KATHY DILLAMAN, DEPUTY
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR THE CENTER FOR FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE
SERVICES, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; AND DAWN E. LUCINI,
AIRPORT SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR, MCCARRAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT,
LAS VEGAS, NV, ON BEHALF OF THE CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
AVIATION, OWNER AND OPERATOR OF MCCARRAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN BERRICK
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Davis, for
inviting me to discuss the progress TSA has made and the
challenges it faces in managing a Federal work force to support
aviation security. My testimony today focuses on the
management, deployment and training of a Federalized security
work force with operational responsibility for passenger and
checked baggage screening, any actions TSA has taken, and the
challenges it faces to provide regulatory oversight of other
airport security activities.
Regarding TSA's efforts to manage, deploy and train a
Federal security work force, TSA has made significant progress
in these areas but continues to face staffing and training
challenges.
Regarding security leadership, the TSA Federal Security
Director is the ranking Federal authority responsible for
security at commercial airports. We found that despite initial
difficulties, Federal Security Directors have since formed
effective partnerships with key airport stakeholders, and have
improved coordination efforts to address airport security
needs. However, we found that TSA had not clearly delineated
the Security Director's authority related to other airport
stakeholders, which sometimes resulted in confusion when a
security incident arose.
Federal Security Directors are also responsible for
overseeing airport, passenger and checked baggage screening
operations performed by about 40,000 Transportation Security
Officers [TSOs]. We found that TSA has taken a number of steps
to improve the training and performance of the TSO work force,
although areas for improvement exist.
For example, TSA has significantly increased the amount of
training available to TSOs and have made changes to training
programs based on identified vulnerabilities. However,
insufficient staffing has made it difficult for all TSOs to
have the time needed to take required training. We found that
Federal Security Directors at about half of the 263 airports we
surveyed reported there was not sufficient time for TSOs to
receive required training within regular work hours.
In addition, a lack of high-speed Internet capability at
about half of the Nation's airports have prevented many TSOs at
these airports from fully utilizing TSA's online learning
center.
TSA has also developed a staffing allocation model to
identify needed TSO staff allocations at airports. However, TSA
has had difficulty attracting and retaining a part-time TSO
work force needed to address staffing needs. Some screeners are
used to performing administrative duties at airports due to a
lack of administrative staff.
In addition to having operational responsibility for
passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA also has oversight
responsibility for air cargo security and the security of
airport perimeters and restricted areas. We reported in October
2005 that TSA had significantly increased the number of
domestic air cargo inspections it conducted of air carriers and
freight forwarders or entities that consolidate cargo for
transportation to the airport. However, we found that TSA did
not determine to what extent air carriers and freight
forwarders were complying with existing security requirements,
and had not analyzed the results of its inspections to target
future areas of highest risk.
TSA also established a requirement for the random
inspection of air cargo, a reflection of the agency's position
that inspecting 100 percent of air cargo is not feasible. We
found that TSA established exemptions that allow certain cargo
to go uninspected, which if become known to shippers and could
potentially cause security weaknesses.
Related to airport perimeter security and access controls,
we found that TSA had begun conducting compliance inspections
of airport operators, and had conducted covert testing of
selected security procedures. We also found that TSA required
background checks for most airport workers, required by
legislation.
Regarding measuring the effectiveness of its screening
systems, TSA has made significant progress in testing the
screening components, including establishing an annual
recertification program for TSOs. However, despite these
efforts, testing has shown that weaknesses and vulnerabilities
continue to exist in the screening system.
In conclusion, TSA has made significant progress in
managing and deploying a Federal work force to conduct and
oversee security activities at the Nation's airports, including
hiring, deploying and training a work force of over 40,000
Transportation Security Officers. However, as TSA moves
forward, opportunities for further strengthening Federal
security efforts exist.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
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Mr. Porter. Thank you very much.
Next we have Mr. Robert Jamison, the Deputy Secretary of
Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration.
Before you begin, I would like to comment from a Las Vegas
perspective that although we still have our challenges, TSA has
worked very closely with McCarran International in being a
destination airport, unlike the Atlantas of the world, or my
colleague from Chicago, O'Hare, with folks that are passing
through. But work very closely, especially in the early days we
had some challenges, right, Jim? We had a few challenges
because of our visitor volume, and with the times or whatever,
the electronic convention, or what type of show was in town, we
learned together. And I would like to compliment TSA again. I
have my areas where I can be critical, and will at some point,
but I think there has been a lot of cooperation, and appreciate
what you have done.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JAMISON
Mr. Jamison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know Jim thanks
you, as well as Jose in Las Vegas.
Good afternoon, Chairman Porter, Ranking Member Davis and
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to
discuss TSA's role in enhancing aviation security. I will focus
my remarks today on TSA's role in vetting workers at our
Nation's airports and controlling access to secured areas of
the airport.
As you know, there are numerous independent layers of
security aimed at protecting America's transportation systems,
and in particular our aviation system. These include
intelligence gathering and analysis, checking passenger
manifests against watch lists, physical screening of passenger
and carry-on bags and checked baggage, the presence of Federal
air marshals, TSA-authorized Federal flight deck officers,
reinforced cockpit doors, and systems for vetting TSA
employees, airline employees, and airport workers who have
access to the secure areas of our airports.
All TSA Transportation Security Officers undergo a
comprehensive two-part background investigation process. The
first is the pre-employment background investigation that is
conducted by OPM, and includes a fingerprint-based criminal
history records check processed through the FBI, as well as a
name-based check by TSA against approximately 10 different
terrorism wants and warrants and immigration data bases. If
pre-employment screening is favorable, further background
checks are conducted through OPM's Access National Agency Check
with Inquiries. The TSO is permitted to begin employment while
the second interview is under way. This vetting of TSOs is the
equivalent of the secret level clearance check.
Non-Federal employees and contractors who seek employment
at our Nation's airports are also subject to vetting. They too
are the subject of an FBI fingerprint-based criminal history
records check prior to employment. Simultaneous with the FBI's
check, TSA conducts the first of what will be a perpetual name-
based security threat assessment of the name against its
terrorist and other data bases. Any name that is a possible
match to a data base is referred to appropriate law enforcement
or intelligence agencies to determine whether the individual's
identity can be verified and whether the individual poses a
threat to aviation. TSA informs airlines or airports if an
individual's access to secure areas must be denied or
rescinded.
Generally, in order to access sterile secured areas, anyone
who has not been issued a SIDA badge for a particular airport,
including airport and airline personnel, vendors and
contractors, and even other TSA employees, must pass through a
TSA security screening checkpoint and submit to the same
physical screening process that passengers must pass through
before boarding an aircraft.
Airport operators are responsible for developing and
implementing TSA-approved airport security programs and
procedures and processes to control the sterile, secure and
SIDA access areas. These programs include badging, a challenge
program, and a compliance regimen. All entrances must be
secured, which is generally accomplished by guards by
electronically controlled locks. Nearly 1,000 TSA aviation
security inspectors ensure that airports and air carriers
comply with the regulatory requirements.
Mr. Chairman, each of the many aviation security layers we
have in place is by itself capable of stopping a terrorist
attack. We recognize that despite our efforts to make each one
as strong as we can, it is still possible to devise ways to
beat any one of the individual layers. But there is a
tremendous power in layers. Truly, the whole is greater than
the sum of the parts, and together they are formidable.
Today we are in a transition point at TSA. We are moving
from a startup mode. Large-scale acquisitions and centralized
hiring and rigid standardized operating procedures were
required to quickly stand up the agency to becoming a more
dynamic, flexible agency that can respond to changing
conditions and threats. By building unpredictability into our
screening and oversight operations, deploying new technology as
it becomes available, and utilizing all of our resources more
flexibly, we can continue to improve the formidable system of
layered security that now exists.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I would
be happy to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]
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Mr. Porter. Thank you very much. I would like to also
recognize that the Customs and Border Protection were not able
to be with us today, but they are submitting information and a
statement for the record.
I would next like to introduce Kathy Dillaman, Deputy
Associate Director, Center for Federal Investigative Services,
Office of Personnel Management. Welcome, Kathy.
STATEMENT OF KATHY DILLAMAN
Mr. Dillaman. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Davis, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today on the process
used by the Office of Personnel Management to conduct
background investigations for personnel at the Transportation
Security Administration. OPM's mission is to ensure the Federal
Government has an effective civilian work force. Having an
effective work force means having a work force made up of
people with varying degrees of responsibility, therefore
requiring varying degrees of background investigations to
ensure they meet the Government's suitability requirements.
At OPM we are responsible for investigating every type of
position in the Government, from low-risk public trust
positions like mail clerks and customer service reps, to high-
risk public trust or national security positions like auditors,
nuclear material handlers, and baggage screeners.
At OPM, the division responsible for handling these cases
is our Federal Investigative Services Division, headquartered
in Boyers, PA. This division supports hundred of Federal agency
security offices worldwide. Its automated processing systems
and vast network of field investigators handle a high-volume of
investigations. In fact, we processed 1.4 million
investigations last year.
In the last few years, as investigations have become an
even more significant aspect of our mission, the number of OPM
employees and contractors working on them has risen
dramatically. In 2005, the Department of Defense transferred
responsibility for its personnel security investigations
program, including 1,800 investigative staff, from DOD to OPM.
This move consolidated the vast majority of background
investigations for the Federal Government with OPM. OPM
conducts investigations for TSA on Federal and contract airport
screeners. In conducting background investigations on these
positions, we work closely with TSA personnel.
On the other hand, TSA conducts background checks for
specific categories of workers, including those needing
unescorted access to what is referred to as the Security
Identification Display Area of an airport. Currently, TSA
submits fingerprints to OPM for airport screener applicants, as
an initial screening tool prior to the initiation of the full
background investigation. TSA then request that OPM conduct the
Access National Agency Check and Inquiries investigation on the
airport screeners. This type of investigation includes a search
of national record repositories, such as the FBI fingerprint
and investigative records, and DOD's investigative index, a
credit check, a search of military records, birth verification,
and a check of Immigration and Naturalization records when
appropriate.
Additionally, OPM sends letters of inquiries to employers,
local police departments, schools and personal references to
confirm the subject's background claims, and to obtain
information about their basic suitability for employment. Field
investigators are sent to conduct local criminal history
inspections of the subject if no response is received to the
written inquiries from police departments where the subject
lived, worked or went to school.
Between 2003 and 2006, OPM scheduled over 76,000 ANACI
investigations on airport screeners, of which over 1,700 were
closed with major issues, and were referred to TSA for
adjudication.
As part of the Government's effort to secure our Nation,
the Office of Personnel Management's role is critical. We take
this responsibility seriously, and are committed to ensuring
the Federal Government has an effective work force.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I am happy to
answer any questions you or other members of the committee may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dillaman follows:]
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Mr. Porter. Thank you very much.
Next, I would like to introduce Dawn Lucini, who is from
McCarran International, actually from southern Maryland
originally, now with McCarran International in Las Vegas.
Again, Dawn, I appreciate you being here, and to Jose and the
staff of McCarran. We appreciate what you are doing, so
welcome.
STATEMENT OF DAWN E. LUCINI
Ms. Lucini. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
opportunity to share with the subcommittee the views of the
Clark County Department of Aviation, owner and operator of the
Las Vegas McCarran International Airport, on how we are
managing security while ensuring travel and tourism. Today, I
will focus on procedures in place for employee background
checks, including TSA requirements and how the Department
interacts with Federal agencies charged with airport security
oversight.
Please accept our appreciation to you, Chairman Porter, and
to the subcommittee for the continued attention Congress is
devoting to aviation security.
The role of the airport operator is critical to ensuring
the safety and security of the national civil aviation system,
while also ensuring that tourism and commerce is not impeded.
In 2005, as the chairman mentioned, McCarran International
Airport was the gateway to Las Vegas for over 44 million
passengers, and we are on track to exceed that number in 2006.
Currently, we are the fifth busiest U.S. airport by passenger
volume. Las Vegas processes more passengers through security
checkpoints than any other airport in the Nation except for Los
Angeles.
As the Airport Security Administrator, I am responsible for
ensuring the security and safety of the passengers, employees
and the physical structure which is McCarran. As such, the
Department must conduct criminal history records checks for all
individuals prior to their commencing work at McCarran. As of
today, we have over 18,000 individuals who have successfully
passed these background checks. The individuals are employees
of the Department of Aviation, airlines, ground handlers,
concessionaires, food purveyors and many Federal agencies,
including the TSA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Federal Aviation Administration, the FBI, the U.S. Secret
Service and the U.S. Postal Service.
The TSA is responsible for ensuring that all U.S.
commercial airports are in compliance with security
regulations. These regulations clearly outline airport and
airport user requirements for conducting criminal history
record checks for all individuals seeking unescorted access
within Security Identification Display Areas, commonly referred
to as the SIDA at all airports. All individuals must undergo
fingerprint base checks to identify whether or not they have
committed one or more of the 37 disqualifying crimes listed
within the regulation. Airport employees collect the
fingerprints while the FBI compares the prints to its extensive
data base, and OPM then transmits the results back to the
airport.
If an individual is found to have been convicted of a
disqualifying crime, the individual must provide the airport
with proof of adjudication. If the individual cannot comply,
she will not be granted unescorted access authority. In
addition, airport employees, like passengers, are regularly
vetted against the TSA watch list. If an employee name is
matched, the Department of Aviation works in coordination with
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, METRO, the TSA and
the FBI to remove the individual from the facility and allow
the Federal agencies to take appropriate actions.
The subcommittee should appreciate that the procedures
outlined above are the minimum TSA requirements. Beyond the
Federal regulation, airports may have additional local and
State regulations to which they must adhere, or may voluntarily
establish additional employee vetting processes. The Department
of Aviation first requires individuals to submit to a local
traffic wants and warrants check and a check for the National
NCIC data base. As employee badges expire and must be renewed,
we again require individuals to submit to these checks. These
processes promote the Department's philosophy, which is a
layered approach to ensuring the integrity of our security
program. Further, even if an individual is not seeking
employment within McCarran's SIDA or sterile areas, rather only
public areas, the Department still requires them to undergo the
same fingerprint based criminal history records check.
At McCarran, we understand that we are an entry point into
the national civil aviation system, while also a first line of
defense. Accordingly, TSA readily approves our security
policies and procedures, as they are developed in concert with
our acting TSA Federal Security Director, Mr. Jose Ralls, and
his staff.
The Department of Aviation does not act alone in promoting
aviation security at McCarran. We do so in the spirit of
communication, coordination and cooperation with the TSA and
METRO. The key is, when it comes to security, none of the local
parties acts alone. All decisions are made collectively and no
protocols are implemented prior to all parties being consulted,
thereby leading to consensus.
While the Department knows what options and plans are most
effective for McCarran's users and facilities, enough attention
cannot be paid to how critical the local security and law
enforcement relationship is between the parties.
Mr. Chairman, in the almost 5 years after September 11,
2001, we have seen significant improvements to aviation
security. We should not forget that aviation security is a
matter of national security, and that individuals, businesses,
local and State governments, and the Federal Government, must
all continue to work in partnership to protect our citizens and
visitors from acts of terrorism.
Again, we appreciate the leadership of this subcommittee
and the opportunity to testify today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lucini follows:]
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Mr. Porter. Thank you, Dawn, but you forgot something. What
happens in Vegas stays in Vegas. [Laughter.]
You just shared a lot of successes that we weren't supposed
to tell anybody about, right?
Ms. Lucini. We like to brag about those types of things,
sir.
Mr. Porter. As you should. Thank you very much.
Ms. Lucini. Thank you.
Mr. Porter. I would like to spend a little bit of time,
Cathleen, with you for a moment. First, in reading the report,
page 28, referring to background checks, I thought I heard most
everyone say this afternoon that we are checking everyone. But
according to your report, we are really not. Can you talk about
that a little bit?
Ms. Berrick. Right. The Aviation and Transportation
Security Act requires all airport workers to undergo a
background investigation. When we did our work--and it was done
at the end of 2004--we found that workers that had escorted
access into the restricted or the SIDA airport areas, the
secure airport areas, were not undergoing a background
investigation. Now, mind you, they were being escorted by
persons that had those badges and had the background
investigations conducted, but that was a requirement of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act that wasn't being
implemented. I am not certain whether or not that is still the
case today. Maybe we could get an update, but that is what we
identified in our work.
Mr. Porter. So the individuals that have access without a
background check are having someone with them. Can you give me
an example of what that would be?
Ms. Berrick. Right. It would be, for example, a
construction worker that's doing some construction in the
secure airport areas that would have an airport employee that
had undergone the background investigation, would escort them
back to that area, and would be with them while they performed
their construction work, would be an example.
Mr. Porter. You also mentioned some perimeter problems. Can
you talk about that a little bit more specifically?
Ms. Berrick. When we had done the work, and still today,
TSA had paid a lot of attention to passenger and checked
baggage screening, and to a lesser degree they were focused on
airport perimeter security and access controls. And since then
they have taken a lot of action. They had done some
vulnerability assessments of airport perimeters and access
controls. They hadn't completed all of them when we had done
our work. They also had started doing inspections of airport
security programs to make sure airports were complying with
security requirements since TSA oversees that process.
We also found that TSA was doing covert testing of airport
perimeter security in restricted areas. For example, they would
go through a door into a secure airport area and see if they
were challenged if they didn't have a badge.
So essentially, our message was that they were starting to
take actions in all these areas, but had previously been
focused on passenger and baggage screening due to many
congressional mandates related to hiring a Federal work force
and deploying explosive detection equipment, but they had taken
action, and since then have taken more action to secure those
areas.
Mr. Porter. You had also pointed out some areas with
inspecting cargo.
Ms. Berrick. Right. We had issued a report in October 2005
on TSA's role in overseeing our cargo security, and again, the
air carriers and the freight forwarders, the organizations that
transport cargo to the airport to load onto the aircraft have
direct operational responsibility for securing cargo. TSA
oversees that process.
Essentially what we found was that TSA was doing
inspections of these air carriers and freight forwarders, but
they weren't really using the results of those inspections to
identify where the weaknesses were in order to target future
inspections. They had difficulty identifying to us all the
different air carriers and freight forwarders that they had
inspected, and mind you, there's thousands of freight
forwarders.
We also found that TSA had established exemptions. First of
all, they established a random inspection program for air cargo
because they have the position that it is not feasible to
inspect 100 percent of air cargo because it would impede the
flow of commerce, and also the technology wasn't where it needs
to be. So they established a random inspection program. They
did identify some exemptions of cargo that could go
uninspected. The problem that we identified with that was that
a lot of shippers knew what those exemptions were, so they
would package their cargo in a manner that would bypass
inspection.
So one of the related recommendations we made in the report
were that TSA reevaluate these exemptions that they created to
see to what extent they created security weaknesses, and TSA
agreed with that recommendation.
We had also recommended, related to TSA's inspection
program, that they use the results of their inspections to
target areas that should require greater scrutiny, and TSA also
agreed with that.
Mr. Porter. And back again to screening of employees. I
think you noted in the report that some vendors are not being
checked. TSA has not addressed the provision that calls for the
agency to require the airport vendors with direct access to the
airfield--so a vendor, to me, would be a McDonald's or some
business or other folks other than just construction workers.
So what the report is saying is not just construction workers,
there are vendors that are not being checked that are there on
a daily basis?
Ms. Berrick. Right. There's really two restricted areas of
the airports that we're talking about. One is the sterile area
which is behind the checkpoint inside the airport, and the
other is the secure area which is out by the aircraft. There
are about 900,000 workers that have access to the secure area,
and about 100,000 that have access to the sterile area within
the airport.
TSA physically screens those vendors and other employees
that are going into the sterile area of the airport. They would
go through the checkpoint just as passengers would do. They are
not physically screening those workers that go into the secure
airport area, those 900,000 workers. TSA's rationale is that
they are conducting background investigations on these
employees that have unescorted access. If someone is going back
there that has escorted access, they're being escorted by
someone who has undergone a background check.
An impediment that TSA has identified related to physically
screening all those workers is the time and resources that
would be required to do that. And then also some of these
workers are carrying tools and instruments that would set off
an alarm and make it difficult to physically screen them. So
those people aren't physically screened, but again, they're
getting background investigations----
Mr. Porter. Excuse me a second. So if you work at a food
vendor through the security gate, is there a background check
done on a food vendor or a bookstore employee?
Ms. Berrick. Yes, they do.
Mr. Porter. And if they are outside of that area?
Ms. Berrick. The employees and the vendors that work in the
sterile airport area, which is inside the airport past the
checkpoint, undergo a background investigation. They are also
physically screened through the checkpoint.
Mr. Porter. So it is two fold. Every day they are screened,
but also the background check is done.
Ms. Berrick. That's correct.
Mr. Porter. I have some more questions.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Berrick, does TSA have sufficient resources to staff
all of the checkpoints in our airports?
Ms. Berrick. As you know, there's a congressionally
mandated cap of 45,000 screeners, and I believe TSA has about
42,000 right now. TSA has had some challenges with hiring and
retaining screeners, and especially a part-time screener or
Transportation Security Officer work force. Their attrition
rate right now overall is about 23 percent for Transportation
Security Officers. It's about 50 percent for part-time
Transportation Security Officers, so it's been difficult. Part
of that has to do with circumstance. It's difficult to attract
a part-time work force because of the pay and the benefits and
the hours.
TSA is doing things to improve that. For example, when TSA
first hired over 50,000 Transportation Security Officers, they
had a very centralized hiring process that wasn't real
responsive, to bring people on quickly when they were needed,
and that was done because they had to hire a lot of workers in
a short amount of time.
Since that time, TSA has given a lot of more flexibility to
the airports related to hiring. They've created regional hiring
centers, so in the past where Federal Security Directors have
complained a lot about not being able to bring people on
quickly, TSA is making some changes to address those issues,
but TSA is still having the challenge of retaining people.
I'll also say that TSA recently--well, about a year ago,
developed a model to try to determine the appropriate
allocations among the airports, to make sure that they're
staffing appropriately. We have an ongoing review right now
that's looking at the assumptions that are used in that model.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Do you think that training is
associated with some of the attrition problems that TSA is
experiencing?
Ms. Berrick. TSA has significantly increased the amount of
training that it gives screeners. The problem that we have
identified--and it is almost a cause from some of the attrition
problems, is with screeners. Federal security directors are
identifying that screeners or transportation security officers
don't have the time available to take the screening that is
required, because they are busy manning the checkpoints. We
surveyed about 263 airports, and about half of the Federal
Security Directors at those airports were saying basically that
their Transportation Security Officers didn't have enough time
within a regular work day to take training. So it's really
another cause when you don't have adequate numbers, potentially
don't have adequate numbers at the checkpoints, training could
suffer as a result of that.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So the training is being improved.
Would you say that they are being trained and certified in the
latest technologies?
Ms. Berrick. I think--and I'm sure TSA can speak to this as
well. I think their training program is very robust. They just
completed a really intensive explosive training where they went
out and trained over 20,000 Transportation Security Officers on
different components of explosives to learn to detect those.
And I do think it is robust to have a basic screener training
program of 40 hours classroom, 60 hours on-the-job training.
They have a recurrent training requirement of 3 hours a week
averaged over a quarter. They also have a remedial training
program. If a screener fails a covert test, they are required
to go through remedial training, and they have so many attempts
to pass that. So I would say the training is pretty rigorous.
TSA also has an online learning center where they offer
online courses for Transportation Security Officers to take.
There is a problem with that in that not all airports have
high-speed Internet connectivity, but that is a resource that
TSA provides the work force.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. How do the performance of Federal
screeners compare with those of private screeners?
Ms. Berrick. We did an analysis of TSA's covert testing
data. TSA has an office that does inspections of checkpoints to
see to what extent they can get prohibited items through. And
we looked at the period from June 2002 to June 2004, and what I
can say in a public forum is that they identified witnesses at
airports of all sizes and all locations and airports with
Federal and private sector screeners.
I will say that we found a slight difference. Airports that
had private sector screeners performed slightly better on these
covert testing results, but I would caution that is really just
an indicator of performance, and it really can't be used to
draw overall conclusions about which work force is performing
better, but the test results were slightly better.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Were the sizes of the airports
compared essentially the same?
Ms. Berrick. There are five airports that have private
sector screeners, and they're at the different category level,
so it's a much smaller universe that have private sector
screeners and that's one of the weakness of the comparison. But
there is, for example, San Francisco is a Category X large
airport that has private sector screeners, so there's one large
Category X airport that's included there.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. I would like to talk about the foreign
management, whether by private companies or by government owned
companies. Mr. Jamison, do you know how many of our airports
are managed either by private investment or a foreign
government?
Mr. Jamison. It's well less than 1 percent. We have seven
airports that have some form of foreign ownership overseeing
some of the operations, but there's only one large airport, one
Cat 1 airport that has that, the overall operations managed by
a foreign entity.
Mr. Porter. I know the Clark County aviation system, and it
is operated by the county and a board of directors. These other
airports, the seven or more that you are talking about, are
their contracts then with local government or with the Federal
Government? Who do they contract with?
Mr. Jamison. They are contracted with the airport owner.
Mr. Porter. The airport owner.
Mr. Jamison. The airport owner in most cases, or they
subcontract to another company that's managing the airport.
Mr. Porter. What about the background checks of these
individuals that are foreign owned; how are they handled?
Mr. Jamison. They're actually regulated and treated the
same way as all other airport operators, so all of their
employees that have access to the secured area or have any
control in issuing that access have to go through the same
vetting process from a background check standpoint as well as a
criminal history records check and being bounced up against
terrorist data base.
Mr. Porter. If they are an employee, then they follow the
same steps is what you are saying.
Mr. Jamison. Exactly.
Mr. Porter. So of the seven, are any owned by the
governments themselves or are they all private?
Mr. Jamison. I believe they're all private. I believe
they're all large European companies for the most part.
Mr. Porter. When it comes to airports--I know there are
thousands of them around the country and many are not under the
control of TSA or the Federal Government--is it based upon
receiving Federal funds whether there is TSA or DHS oversight,
or how does that work?
Mr. Jamison. Actually, it's not based off the TSA fund. We
have the ability to so-called Federalize an airport and
determine whether or not there will be Federal screening
regulations put in place, and whether or not it will have a
Federal screening work force or under TSA purview. And that's
largely decided based off risk and the size of the airport. So
some smaller airports that have very, very few flights may not
have Federal screeners or be under TSA controls.
Mr. Porter. So if you had an airport in the middle of Iowa
or middle of Nevada that may not have been inventoried by the
Federal Government and may be operating without any type of
controls, correct?
Mr. Jamison. Well, they have the controls of the general
aviation controls and the recommendations of the guidelines and
the rules that are in place for general aviation, but we
constantly do a risk assessment, evaluate which airport that we
bring into that process, and before they can enter into the
other aviation system, they have to undergo certain
requirements. So if they're flying to another airport that
enters into the Federal system, they would have to go through
screening and have all the passengers rescreened prior to
entering that airport instead of making their connection to
another flight.
Mr. Porter. I guess this is more a question for Dawn.
Again, McCarran is an airport that I know well. I spend every
weekend at McCarran, and I think that as a rule that it
basically knows its customer base very well, and that's, I
think, been part of the success for McCarran working with TSA.
We know when people are going to arrive, and we know who they
are, because we do a lot of those market surveys. But also
having traveled, again, through airports every weekend, every
airport does things a little bit differently. Is there some
advice that you would give these other airports to help
streamline their process?
Ms. Lucini. I would, again, advocate what I provided in my
testimony earlier. It's really about local cooperation. The
success we've enjoyed has been done with the TSA and the METRO.
Again, we are completely dependent on the tourism industry in
Las vegas, so we have made every effort to assist the TSA in
the security process. We are one of nine letter-of-intent
airports in the country to provide our airport with an in-line
EDS screening solution, which will create greater efficiencies
for the TSA in baggage screening. In addition, at the screening
checkpoint we have hired contractors--they're called
divestors--that help the passengers at the front of the
checkpoint prior to going through the screening process, to
speed up, expedite that process and keep the queues moving
through when we have those large shows that you mentioned
earlier.
It's really local partnership. Every airport is unique, and
you probably heard that many times. It's incumbent upon the
local entities to work together to decide what will work best
for that airport.
Mr. Porter. You know, there are those that say the economy
is not thriving, but airports would be an example that the
economy is coming back stronger than ever. Every airport that I
have been through is at capacity. What is it that Las Vegas--
you mentioned the partnership--what are some of the specific
things that they have done in guiding the movement of tourists
through the airport?
Ms. Lucini. Well, again, we have put together a pre-
screening series we call TIPS, which are video montages, if you
will, that help passengers get ready for the screening process
prior to entering the checkpoint. The foundation of that was
laid before I arrived. I believe Mr. Blair, who's with us
today, was key to that as well, in partnership with our
director and deputy director of the airport, and we worked with
the local convention authority to produce those videos to help
passengers prepare.
Mr. Porter. If I may interrupt, for the audience, share
what some of those are.
Ms. Lucini. Well, for example, we'll have Carrot Top, the
comedian, go through with the oversize bag through the
magnetometer, and he falls backward, too heavy of a bag and
it's oversize, can't get through. We have a lot of travelers
that don't fly but once a year, and that's to Las Vegas and out
of Las Vegas, and they like to go shopping. So that's one
example, and we also have some other local celebrities that
give key travel tips, you know, don't wrap your gifts at the
holiday season and bring them through the checkpoints, just to
make it a smoother process for everybody.
Another thing that also helps is, as you know, today before
our system goes in-line for our EDS baggage screening system,
the EDS machines are currently in front of the ticketing
counters. Something that we've worked to expand in recent years
are the use of self-serve kiosks. It's a common use platform so
you can go to one of these kiosks, and all of our airlines are
currently on that kiosk, and if you're not checking baggage you
can use that kiosk. And it's not in the ticketing counter, it's
up at the checkpoint level throughout the facility, so it
reduces those queues so we don't have long lines out to the
departures curb, the arrivals curb, and we really help with
crowd control and keep the flow through the airport so we
protect everybody, because there are security concerns in front
of the checkpoint as well as beyond.
Mr. Porter. What would the average wait time be at McCarran
to get through security?
Ms. Lucini. The average wait time, well, we can go from,
you know, 5 minutes depending if you're at one checkpoint, and
we like to at our busiest times to say you're going to get
through in around 15 minutes. We always hope for 10 minutes,
but we work very well with the TSA--we know that there's a long
line at ticketing, and we call the TSA and they make best
efforts to open additional lanes to get through. So we know
when those big shows and conventions are coming, and the
Department of Aviation actually brings on staff to help with
crowd control and line monitoring, plus our divestors, and the
TSA will reallocate their shifts and the staffing per shift to
accommodate those crowds when we know they're coming.
And we provide monthly the list of conventions and shows
coming so we're all planned and staffed accordingly in advance.
Mr. Porter. I recall one time that McCarran was considering
designing your own baskets for travelers to put items in a
basket. Are you still working on that?
Ms. Lucini. That may have been the case, sir, that was
before I came to McCarran, which was in June of last year. I
think right now we are pleased overall with the current system,
but we refine it as necessary and from time to time.
Mr. Porter. Thank you for letting me put you on the spot.
Ms. Lucini. That's OK.
Mr. Porter. Congresswoman, comments?
Ms. Schmidt. I have first a question regarding going
through security. In the case of women sometimes, we are
wearing apparel that doesn't allow us to take off our jackets,
and yet sometimes they are very insistent that we do take off
our jackets, and put us into a holding place for a more
intensive search. What is the importance of having to take--I
mean, for instance, I could not take off this jacket to go
through a metal detector. What is the importance of that?
Shouldn't the metal detector pick up anything that would be
suspicious on us?
Ms. Lucini. I've enjoyed that same experience myself, and
I'll ask Mr. Jamison to answer that question.
Mr. Jamison. Sure, I'll be happy to reply. It is an SOP put
in place strictly for detection of explosives, so it's another
layer of security to make sure you're not concealing something
on your body that is not detectible through the metal detector
that might be an explosive.
Ms. Schmidt. May I have a followup? The problem is that I
could have something under my blouse as well. I think that--I
am not talking a coat. I am talking the outfit that I am
wearing now, and if I were to have flown in today I would not
have worn this outfit because I couldn't have taken the jacket
off. All I am saying is I think you need to look at your
guidelines a little bit more as to appropriate apparel and the
robing and disrobing for individuals.
Mr. Jamison. I absolutely agree with you, and, actually, we
are undergoing currently an SOP review, that whereas we can
give better direction to our TSOs to--given a situation just as
you described, where it's not one-size-fits-all that you have
to take off every outer garment, and that really, the intent is
to try to get the detection of explosives. In those cases where
you don't need to remove the garment to do that, we may be able
to implement different standard operating practices. So we're
looking at that very carefully, and hope to roll something out
very quickly.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you.
Mr. Porter. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jamison, once a screener has been hired, how long does
the training process take?
Mr. Jamison. Depending on where they're going to work, it
varies in length of time. They have about 50 hours of training,
general training. Then they get specific training in either the
checkpoint or the baggage area or both, and the training varies
depending on where you're at between, I think, a total of 120
hours to 200 hours.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. The cost for the training would be
about what?
Mr. Jamison. I don't have that figure. I'd be happy to get
it back to you per employee for the record. I don't have the
exact figure for that.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. There has been concerns over the
sufficiency of our airport security systems, and some people
think that they would lead to the Federalization of airport
screeners. What assurances do we have that a return to private
screeners will provide any increase safety or better security?
Mr. Jamison. I agree with Ms. Berrick's testimony earlier
about it's sort of hard to draw conclusions between those two.
However, I think it's very important from us as the TSA
management standpoint to look at both the privatized screening
work force, as well as the Federalized screening work force and
look at best practices to pull out to improve the overall level
of screening. The mission is the same whether or not it's
public or private, is to provide world class security to the
aviation system, and that's what we're about.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Ms. Dillaman, when we do background
checks, what are we looking for?
Ms. Dillaman. You're looking for record information about
the individual's conduct or other elements that might make the
individual susceptible to blackmail, coercion.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Of course, criminal background would
be a part of that. What other kinds of things besides----
Ms. Dillaman. Criminal background? Violent disruptive
behavior, issues of extended debt that might make the
individual susceptible to coercion, fraud in the qualifications
process.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Do we have information or data
relative to what percentage of the people who apply get
screened out or who don't pass the background check?
Ms. Dillaman. OPM has information in terms of how many of
the investigations develop issue information for consideration.
But the actual screening out of the applicant is done by TSA,
and so they would be in a better position to report on how many
individuals fail because of the background check. But I can
tell you that, for example, approximately 11 percent of those
we screened have criminal history records at the FBI.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Mr. Jamison, do you have any
further----
Mr. Jamison. No, that's why I want to put the focus on what
we've done to improve that, that process. So over the last
year, in addition to the process that we go through for FBI
checks and the OPM checks for employment, we have put in place
the ability to perpetuate that data base against terrorist
watch lists and other types of data bases, so we are getting a
consistent perpetual vetting process of all our employees plus
employees that have access to the SIDA.
We also put in place improved processes where we're
periodically going back and doing a fingerprint-based criminal
history records check on our TSO employees.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Ms. Lucini, would you say that the
best practices that you all have been able to develop could
just about fit any normalized airport?
Ms. Lucini. I hate to say the cliche, sir, that every
airport is unique, but as a baseline the partnership and that
relationship you develop will allow improvements in your
procedures and processes at the airport. So there's a lot of
best practices we've established that we gladly share with our
fellow airports across the country. And some of them have
adopted it with great success, others have tweaked it a bit and
it's worked better for them that way.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. I have a question about the high speed Internet
connectivity at some airports. What is the problem? That seems
like something we could resolve fairly easily. Is it a cost
factor, or what is the problem?
Mr. Jamison. There's been numerous problems. I think budget
is just one of them, the capability of the contractors and
others. But I agree with you, it's been a long time coming, but
I can tell you we're on course to have every airport with Hi-
SOC capability and high-speed Internet capability by the end of
the year.
We're also making sure that we strive to give the
capability for extending the online training center
opportunities. It's web-based and you can get to that online
training center. It's very important for us to get the Hi-SOC
to all of the airports, because it not only gives us capability
for training, but also gives us ability to pull information
back into our national data bases.
Mr. Porter. I would just think that airports would have
some of the latest technology available if they are of the size
that you are referring to that would need TSA. I am amazed that
it is not available. It sounds to me like it hasn't been a
priority but it needs to be. So you think by the end of the
year?
Mr. Jamison. By the end of the year----
Mr. Porter. Of this year?
Mr. Jamison. By the end of this year, quite hopefully by
the end of this fiscal year, we're going to have--I know we're
going to have the majority of airports, if not all of them,
done. It is a priority. There's a lot of issues of making sure
that system is secure and they have enough protocols that you
need to put it in place, were some of the challenges, but we're
addressing those, and I agree with you it's a top priority.
Mr. Porter. Because I understand that even checking
passports and visa can be a problem because of the lack of
technology and transmitting information back and forth, so I
will look forward to that being corrected.
With workers compensation, and I don't remember the
numbers, but we were having a number of employees that were
turning in workers compensation claims. What's happening there
and what is the status?
Mr. Jamison. We still have a very high claims rate. It has
come down. We have put a lot of focus on this, establishing a
war room effort in national headquarters to really address the
injury issue. I feel like it's a combination of a lot of
issues. It's a combination of work setup in some airports, it's
a combination of training and accountability, but we've got
focused programs everywhere from nurse care management to
address people that are on workers compensation to get them
back to work, to analyzing the worker setup, to looking at the
training that we're doing and really trying to track the data
and try to get that issue under control.
It's a big issue for us, as Ms. Berrick pointed out, work
force management, hiring, retention, huge issue. We know we got
to get our work force stable. Injuries are a huge piece of
that, and we've got a lot of focus on it.
Mr. Porter. What percentage of your work force is out at
one time on their workers compensation claim?
Mr. Jamison. The number is highly variable depending on
airport, and it's something that allows us to focus on that. I
don't have the exact number. We would be happy to get it back
for you for the record.
Mr. Porter. Thank you. And then regarding the explosive
detection systems and the explosive trace detection, baggage
screening systems, which of course, improve safety, but also
achieve some cost savings, and there are a lot of large
airports that don't have plans. Is it because of the lack of
space, lack of facilities? Why isn't it that a lot of airports
are moving forward with that?
Mr. Jamison. It's a combination of several things actually,
and as my boss testified earlier today, it's like a complicated
math problem, depending on the funding issues, but also the
layout of the airports, whether or not they've got the space,
the throughput of the machines that are available and the
requirements. So there's a lot of things that go into that
equation.
We're scheduled this year in 2006 to deploy 116 EDSs, and
we're scheduled to do 90 for 2007.
Mr. Porter. OK, thank you.
Mr. Van Hollen, do you have any questions or comments
today?
Mr. Van Hollen. Just a few questions, if I could, Mr.
Chairman. And we have two hearings going on at the same time,
so I apologize for being late.
But I did have a question regarding the watch list process,
and what mechanism someone can go through if their name is
inadvertently put on the watch list. We heard a number of
stories sometime ago about various individuals, and Senator
Kennedy, I think, was detained, as was Congressman John Lewis.
There have been a number of others, and the two I mentioned are
people in positions of influence, and even they seemed to have
some difficulty just going through the process of getting this
name off this list for a period of time.
We get people, who obviously, are not in that kind of
position, and you can imagine what they feel they have to go
through if they are wrongfully put on a list. What do you do if
you are put on the list and there has been a mistake? What
process do you go through? And has it been effective because my
impression is, anyway, that we are still not at a place where
there is a very clear mechanism for removing someone's name.
Mr. Jamison. We do have a formal redress process, and you
can access our redress office by an 800 number and/or the Web
site, TSA Web site. The data will show you that we have made a
lot of progress. While the size of the terrorist watch list is
ramped up, the issues and redress issues are starting to come
down, but it's a big focus of ours to make sure we clean up the
list, and that we actively manage the list.
TSA is in charge of managing the list. We're not really in
charge of nominating the people that are on the list. It's a
big focus for us, and secure flight implementation of
automating that at a Federal level which we're moving forward
rapidly with, will help alleviate a lot of the administration
problems with it.
Mr. Van Hollen. You, as you said, you sort of are
responsible for keeping the list, but you don't put the people
on the watch list, is that right?
Mr. Jamison. That's correct.
Mr. Van Hollen. So to get somebody off the watch list if
they have been wrongfully put there, do you have to go back to
the agency that put them on, is that right?
Mr. Jamison. We request that the Terrorist Screening Center
or the nominating agency that has put that on the list. And
when we have issues or incidents where we think that there may
be a problem with that, we frequently ask them whether or not
the derogatory information that goes into that process is still
valid and whether or not they should remain on the list.
Mr. Van Hollen. Have the agencies been cooperating with you
in that process?
Mr. Jamison. They have, absolutely, absolutely, and the
process gets better every day.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Congresswoman, additional questions?
Ms. Schmidt. I believe this is to Mr. Jamison, and I
apologize if I missed anything, but I had another meeting. In
2004 TSA began to work on the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential [TWIC], an identification card
embedded with fingerprints or other biometric information to
prevent unauthorized access to secured airport areas. The idea
is that workers in airports, seaports, and other transportation
sectors could use a single identification card to access secure
areas. TWIC was originally conceived as a TSA-run program.
However, reports I have received indicate that the TWIC program
has encountered delays, and contract cost increases.
My question is this: what are the next steps for the
program? And I understand that TWIC is an entirely fee-funded
enterprise this year and next. If this is correct, will this
funding approach delay implementation? And finally, how soon
can we expect it to be implemented? So a three-part question.
Mr. Jamison. First of all, I agree TWIC has been too long
in coming. We've got a committed focused effort for
accelerating deployment of the Transportation Worker ID Card.
We're currently approaching an accelerated parallel rulemaking
program, a rulemaking with the Coast Guard and with TSA, which
a primary component of it addresses your question and gives us
the ability the charge fees in order to fund the program. We
reached a milestone last week that shows you the commitment to
accelerating this program. We put out a request for
qualifications for contractors to help us deploy the long-term
implementation for TWIC, and we anticipate there will be a lot
more announcements, but we're committed to accelerating the
deployment and getting out there as quickly as possible.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Just one additional question, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Jamison, does TSA have any notion or idea or feel for
how many airports might want to go private with screeners?
Mr. Jamison. To answer your question, no, I don't have a
formal survey, and I don't have an indication of that. There
have been a few rumblings from the field that there's an
interest in more airports moving to that model, but we have
nothing formal in place, and that's really all we have.
Mr. Berrick. If I could add, Mr. Davis, GAO has done work
looking at a TSA screening partnership program where you have
private sector screeners at airports. And we surveyed about 25
airports and generally the interest doesn't seem to be out
there at this point in time, based on the airports we spoke
with, and they cited a couple of issues.
One was they wanted to wait and see how this worked out for
the airports that were using private screeners, kind of a wait
and see attitude. Also, some of them identify concerns with
liability, if there was a terrorist incident, how would that
affect them.
Now, the Department of Homeland Security is granting Safety
Act coverage to immune contractors from liability and the
appropriations law last year protects airports from liability,
so I think airports are hoping that problem has been solved,
but based on what we've heard it's basically they want to wait
and see how it works out for the next year.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Mr. Van Hollen, any additional questions?
Mr. Van Hollen. I didn't know if anyone else had a comment
on the watch list issue. I don't know if the GAO--I know it is
not part of the scope of this report, but I know you have
looked into it in the past.
Mr. Berrick. Right. We have. We actually have an ongoing
review looking at the quality--actually, a process for names
getting on and off the watch list. As you know, the Department
of Justice Inspector General had done a pretty comprehensive
review of the Terrorist Screening Center and their watch list.
We're going to be focusing more on the process for getting on
and off. Also the redress process you were talking about, that
work is going to be completed in August of this year. So we
would be happy to brief you on that when that's completed.
Mr. Van Hollen. Good, thank you.
Mr. Porter. I am actually going to conclude with a couple
of questions but first I have a little levity. When my
colleague, Mr. Davis, mentioned going private, I have never
seen so many heads turn and look at each partner sitting next
to each other at one time. [Laughter.]
It was kind of interesting. If you could see it from this
angle, it was one of those moments that I talked about earlier,
where there is a picture in time. Well, everyone kind of went--
[laughter]--you certainly asked a very good question and I
appreciate you asking it.
One of two final questions. Are you all satisfied with the
inspection of our foreign partners that are managing our
airports? Is there something else we should be doing? Do you
feel confident that we are checking as much as we should in
light of the current situation in the world? Is there something
else we should be doing?
Mr. Berrick. In terms of GAO, we haven't specifically
looked at that issue, so I don't have anything to add to that.
Mr. Jamison. I think from TSA's perspective, it's like all
of the other issues that we need to constantly look at, we need
to constantly evaluate the risk, and it's more of evaluating
the risk across the different levels of security in the
aviation system or at an airport, so evaluating SIDA access,
evaluating perimeter security, continuing to look at the risk,
continuing to provide unpredictability, and looking at the
ownership and the operation and compliance of that is just one
element of that we need to continue to look at.
Mr. Porter. Is there anything else that we can do to
empower you to do additional background if necessary; anything
we can do to help you?
Mr. Jamison. I think we have the authority that we need.
Mr. Porter. OK. What do you think from McCarran's
perspective?
Ms. Lucini. Well, I had a list here of--I do have a list of
entities on airport that are U.S. corporations, majority
foreign owned, which I believe you have been provided with a
copy of that list prior, Mr. Chairman.
But they are, again, subject to the same employee
background checks that I mentioned in my testimony, and again,
there's been some references to perimeter security at McCarran.
We are working locally with the TSA on regular assessments of
our perimeter and our security program there. Locally we have
decided the Department of Aviation specifically has decided to
make some further enhancements to our infrastructure on our
perimeter. So taking additional steps in advance of any
mandates or requirements.
And our current access control system, which is, you know,
the badges are issued to the people that have successfully
passed these background checks. We are going to be introducing
biometrics into our access control system. It's probably going
to be about 3 to 5 years from now, but the tentative foundation
is now being laid for us to go forward with that program.
Mr. Porter. Thank you. I firmly believe that we are safer
today than we were yesterday, and that we are going to be safer
tomorrow than we are today. I think we still have a long ways
to go.
But I would like to give you one last opportunity, I guess,
as a subcommittee. Normally we ask you a lot of questions, but
I would like to know if there are any other things that we
should be doing as a Congress to help make our travelers safer.
This is an opportunity if you have any thoughts for us, we will
pass onto our colleagues. Anything you think in your
investigation, Cathleen?
Mr. Berrick. I think based on the work that GAO has done, I
would just stress the importance of using risk-based
decisionmaking, knowing that it's impossible to secure
everything in commercial aviation, really stressing that TSA
needs to consider threat vulnerability and consequence in
making decisions, not just within aviation but across all modes
of transportation for which they're responsible, and we've
reported that TSA has done this to a great extent. We think
there is room for further improvement in that area.
Mr. Porter. Thank you.
Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Dillaman. No, sir. I think OPM and TSA have an
excellent relationship, and we've worked hard to develop a
system that cross-checks and makes sure that people don't fall
through the cracks.
Mr. Porter. Mr. Jamison.
Mr. Jamison. Actually, again, I would concur with Ms.
Berrick, that I believe that--the focus on being risk-based.
It's something that we're really trying to do, make all of our
decisions based off of risk, and our prohibited items decisions
have been driven by that.
So continued recognition of that and focus on that is a
huge issue for us at TSA, so we appreciate the committee's
interest in that and cooperation.
Mr. Porter. Anything else?
Ms. Lucini. I echo Ms. Berrick's comments and add that TSA,
from the headquarters level, I would promote that they continue
even more local autonomy be given to the Federal Security
Directors to work with the airport operator and other agencies
locally to develop the best solution for that airport.
Mr. Porter. Based upon the current structure of management,
let's just say there was a crisis today at one of our airports
or somewhere in the country. Is there a clear, defined
management role of different agencies, who is in charge of
what? We are comfortable with that?
Ms. Lucini. Yes, sir. We have an airport security program,
which is a requirement as we operate under a TSA regulation
that clearly identifies procedures we take for our security
program, as well as an airport emergency program, which is in
compliance with the Federal Aviation Administration regulation,
which also outlines a chain of command, if you will, incident
command, and the other agencies we work with in the event of an
emergency of security event.
Mr. Porter. Mr. Jamison, you feel the same, that there is a
clear and defined role for all of these agencies?
Mr. Jamison. Well, I mean, there is, and I think that
Federal Security Directors play a key role in the monitoring of
compliance with that airport security plan, as you pointed out,
and also plays a key role as a principal Federal official for
transportation security at the local level, so coordination and
making sure that everybody's involved and knows their roles and
response is a key role that we probably take on.
Mr. Porter. Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Dillaman. I believe our roles and responsibilities are
clear. At the same time, I think we're flexible enough that
should a new need arise, we can respond to it.
Mr. Porter. Thank you. Ms. Berrick.
Mr. Berrick. GAO actually did a study of this as well,
Federal Security Directors' roles and authorities at airports.
And we found that the partnerships were generally working very
well despite some additional difficulties, and FSDs were doing
a very good job establishing partnerships with key airport
stakeholders including local law enforcement and the airport
authority.
We did identify one area for improvement, that TSA could
help the process by clarifying the FSD's authority related to
other stakeholders. We did hear from some airports that in the
event of a security incident, sometimes there was confusion
regarding the FSD's authority, and TSA agree with that
recommendation and was making some changes to try to
communicate that to stakeholders. But overall it was very
positive in terms of the Federal Security Director's
relationship with other airport stakeholders.
Mr. Porter. Thank you.
Any additional questions from the panel?
[No response.]
Mr. Porter. Appreciate you all being here today, and know
that Members have additional questions possibly. They will
submit them and will be entered for the record. I just want to
make sure that when we wake up tomorrow that there is not a
crisis someplace and it is something we have missed. So keep
that in mind, and I know you do. But also I have learned that
many of the best ideas come outside of the box, so don't
hesitate to give us some ideas.
Thank you all for being here, and we will adjourn the
meeting.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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