[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC EVENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL GUARD IN DISASTER RESPONSE
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
[Serial No. 109-56]
with the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
[Serial No. 109-83]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 9, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael T. McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Islands
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
?
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Duncan Hunter, California, Chairman
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Ike Skelton, Missouri
Joel Hefley, Colorado John Spratt, South Carolina
Jim Saxton, New Jersey Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
John M. McHugh, New York Lane Evans, Illinois
Terry Everett, Alabama Gene Taylor, Mississippi
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Maryland Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon, Marty Meehan, Massachusetts
California Silvestre Reyes, Texas
Mac Thornberry, Texas Vic Snyder, Arkansas
John N. Hostettler, Indiana Adam Smith, Washington
Walter B. Jones, North Carolina Loretta Sanchez, California
Jim Ryun, Kansas Mike McIntyre, North Carolina
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Ellen O. Tauscher, California
Robin Hayes, North Carolina Robert A. Brady, Pennsylvania
Ken Calvert, California Robert Andrews, New Jersey
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Susan A. Davis, California
Jo Ann Davis, Virginia James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
W. Todd Akin, Missouri Steve Israel, New York
J. Randy Forbes, Virginia Rick Larsen, Washington
Jeff Miller, Florida Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Joe Wilson, South Carolina Jim Marshall, Georgia
Frank A. LoBiondo, New Jersey Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Jeb Bradley, New Hampshire Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam
Michael Turner, Ohio Tim Ryan, Ohio
John Kline, Minnesota Mark Udall, Colorado
Candice S. Miller, Michigan G.K. Butterfield, North Carolina
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cynthia McKinney, Georgia
Trent Franks, Arizona Dan Boren, Oklahoma
Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania
Thelma Drake, Virginia
Joe Schwarz, Michigan
Cathy McMorris, Washington
Michael Conaway, Texas
Geoff Davis, Kentucky
Robert L. Simmons, Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Jim Saxton, New Jersey, Chairman
Robin Hayes, North Carolina Marty Meehan, Massachusetts
W. Todd Akin, Missouri Adam Smith, Washington
Joe Wilson, South Carolina Mike McIntyre, North Carolina
John Kline, Minnesota Ellen O. Tauscher, California
Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania Robert Andrews, New Jersey
Geoff Davis, Kentucky James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Joel Hefley, Colorado Rick Larsen, Washington
Mac Thornberry, Texas Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jim Marshall, Georgia
Jeff Miller, Florida Cynthia McKinney, Georgia
Frank A. LoBiondo, New Jersey
Thomas E. Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Jean D. Reed, Professional Staff Member
Uyen T. Dinh, Counsel
William H. Natter, Professional Staff Member
Brian R. Anderson, Staff Assistant
(III)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security 8
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology 3
The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed
Services:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 6
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 41
The Honorable Geoff Davis, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Kentucky.............................................. 48
The Honorable Susan A. Davis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 52
The Honorable John Kline, a Representative in Congress From the
State if Minnesota............................................. 43
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode of Rhode Island........................ 33
The Honorable Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Washington............................................ 45
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 50
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut........................................... 40
Witnesses
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau,
U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
The Honorable Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Major General Richard J. Rowe, Jr., Director of Operations, U.S.
Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
FOR THE RECORD
Questions from the Honorable Mike Rogers for Major General
Richard J. Rowe................................................ 53
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson for Major General
Richard J. Rowe................................................ 54
RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC EVENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL
GUARD IN DISASTER RESPONSE
----------
Wednesday, November 9, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology,
with the
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Reichert
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Reichert, Saxton, Simmons, Rogers,
Kline, Davis of Kentucky, Dent, LoBiondo, Pascrell, Thompson,
Davis of California, Tauscher, Lowey, Langevin, Christensen,
Etheridge, Marshall, McKinney, and Larsen.
Mr. Reichert. [Presiding.] Good morning. The joint hearing
of the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, and the
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, will come to order.
The subcommittees are meeting today in joint session to
hear testimony on the role of the military and the National
Guard in responding to catastrophic events.
Let me first welcome our distinguished witnesses from the
Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. We greatly
appreciate your appearance before us today for this important
joint hearing.
Before we start, I would like to commend Chairman Jim
Saxton and Ranking Member Marty Meehan of the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities for their
leadership on homeland defense issues.
And I especially appreciate their willingness to hold this
joint hearing with the House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology,
which I chair with the able assistance of Ranking Member Bill
Pascrell.
This joint hearing is a timely one. The deployment of
thousands of federal troops to New Orleans in response to
Hurricane Katrina has spurred fresh debate about whether the
Department of Defense and not the Department of Homeland
Security should be the lead federal agency in responding to
disasters of great magnitude.
In a nationally televised address from New Orleans on
September 15, 2005, President Bush contended, ``It is now clear
that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal
authority and a broader role for the Armed Forces, the
institution of our government most capable of massive
logistical operations on a moment's notice.''
To an American public understandably upset by the slow
response to Hurricane Katrina and frightened by possible avian
flu outbreak, the president's suggestion merits serious
discussion. There are, however, constitutional, legal and
practical constraints on the military's ability to assume the
primary role in responding to catastrophic emergencies.
First, under our nation's constitutional framework, state
and local governments take the lead role in responding to
disasters and emergencies while the federal government and the
military take a supporting role.
As the former sheriff of King County in Washington state, I
fear than an enhanced role for the military in responding to
disasters and emergencies may undermine federalism and may even
encourage some already financially strapped state and local
governments from using their own scarce resources for something
that they might expect the federal government and the military
to handle.
Second, as the lead agency for responding to catastrophic
events, the Pentagon may be required to perform certain law
enforcement functions. Such a result may upset the delicate
balance of civilian-military relations that is well-established
principle of our democratic form of government that the
Pentagon should not conduct domestic law enforcement
activities, such as investigating, arresting and incarcerating
individuals.
Nevertheless, when local and state governments are
completely overwhelmed, federal troops may be needed to
maintain law and order. Such situations may test the limits of
Posse Comitatus Act.
Finally, as a practical matter, an enhanced role for the
military and the National Guard in responding to domestic
catastrophes could undermine our nation's defense capabilities.
The military's principal responsibility is to protect the
United States from direct attack, not to respond to disasters
and emergencies.
If the military assumes primary responsibility for both
national defense and emergency response, then its dual missions
may drain valuable resources and personnel. This result may
inadvertently harm military readiness to defend the United
States.
I want to again thank the witnesses for their testimonies
today and our colleagues in the Armed Services for holding this
joint hearing with us. And I look forward to discussing these
and other issues with all of you this morning.
Again, thank you all for being here.
The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology,
the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, for any statement
that he may have.
Prepared Opening Statement of Hon. Dave G. Reichert
Good morning. Let me first welcome our distinguished witnesses from
the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. We greatly appreciate
your appearance before us today for this important joint hearing.
Before we start, I'd like to commend Chairman Jim Saxton and
Ranking Member Marty Meehan of HASC's Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities for their leadership on
homeland defense issues.
And I especially appreciate their willingness to hold this joint
hearing with the House Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology--which I chair with the
able assistance of Ranking Member Bill Pascrell.
This joint hearing is a timely one. The deployment of thousands of
Federal troops to New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina has
spurred fresh debate about whether the Department of Defense, not the
Department of Homeland Security, should be the lead Federal agency in
responding to disasters of great magnitude.
In a nationally televised address from New Orleans on September 15,
2005, President Bush contended that ``it is now clear that a challenge
on this scale requires greater Federal authority and a broader role for
the armed forces--the institution of our government most capable of
massive logistical operations on a moment's notice.''
To an American public understandably upset by the slow response to
Hurricane Katrina and frightened by a possible avian-flu outbreak, the
President's suggestion sounds sensible. There are, however,
constitutional, legal, and practical constraints on the military's
ability to assume the primary role in responding to catastrophic
emergencies.
First, under our Nation's constitutional framework, State and local
governments take the lead role in responding to disasters and
emergencies, while the Federal government and the military take a
supporting role. As the former Sheriff of King County, Washington, I
fear that an enhanced role for the military in responding to disasters
and emergencies may undermine Federalism and deter already financially
strapped State and local governments from using their scare resources
for something that the Federal government and the military will handle.
Second, as the lead agency for responding to catastrophic events,
the Pentagon may be required to perform certain law enforcement
functions. Such a result may upset the delicate balance of civilian-
military relations. It is a well-established principle of our
democratic form of government that the Pentagon should not conduct
domestic law enforcement activities, such as investigating, arresting,
and incarcerating individuals. Nevertheless, when local and State
governments are completely overwhelmed, Federal troops may be needed to
maintain law and order. Such situations may test the limits of the
Posse Comitatus Act.
Finally, as a practical matter, an enhanced role for the military
and the National Guard in responding to domestic catastrophes could
undermine our Nation's defense capabilities. The military's principal
responsibility is to protect the United States from direct attack, not
to respond to disasters and emergencies. If the military assumes
primary responsibility for both national defense and emergency
response, then its dual missions may drain valuable resources and
personnel. This result may inadvertently harm military readiness to
defend the United States.
I want to again thank the witnesses for their testimony today, and
our colleagues on Armed Services for holding this joint hearing with
us. I look forward to discussing these and other issues with all of you
this morning.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Saxton,
Chairman King, Chairman Thomas. I am pleased to be here today
with my colleagues from both the Committees on Homeland
Security and Armed Forces to explore and examine the role of
the military and the National Guard in disaster response.
Clearly, the recent bombardment of hurricanes throughout
the Gulf Coast has focused the nation's attention on the use of
the military in domestic emergencies, and rightfully so. We are
all thankful for our men and women in the military, where in
active-duty, Reserves, the National Guard, who responded boldly
and honorably to the catastrophes that nature wrought on our
citizens.
The ability of people who comprise our Armed Forces is
never in question. The response to these events should be
commended and are being commended.
I believe that recent calls to require a broader role and
greater authority for the Armed Forces during such challenges
are misplaced and ill-advised. The worst lesson we could take
away from the hurricanes would be to irrevocably alter our
emergency management system in a way that would take all
control out of the hands of local and state first responders
who have a deep familiarity with their communities.
Placing the military in control would obviously create
conflict in long-existing statutes and conventions that prevent
the military from becoming inappropriately involved in civilian
affairs. The military can and, at times, must supplement the
relief efforts the locals undertake.
But, in general, having the officers of our Armed Forces go
into unfamiliar communities and explicitly control the
decision-making process by which state and local officials and
first responders must adhere is not an appropriate solution.
The fact is that these hurricanes, and Hurricane Katrina in
particular, showed America that there is a massive failure in
the very basic coordination of efforts among federal, state and
local agencies. This is what must be remedied.
For example, the Department of Homeland Security must start
doing its job and coordinate the Federal Government's response
efforts. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that, while plans
exist, there is a need for a much greater understanding on the
parts of federal, state and local governments about their
respective roles in regards to disaster response.
The National Response Plan is only valuable if these
officials use it and use it correctly. To that end, Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD) need
to clarify their respective roles and missions during a natural
disaster and how they operate and coordinate within the
National Response Plan.
And when doing this, we need to be flexible enough to
accommodate the possibility that certain DOD and National Guard
assets may not be available if the United States is in a
conflict when a disaster occurs.
In addition, many National Guard troops are also members of
the local law enforcement community. Any federal plans must
consider the impact on the local law enforcement community if
these individuals are called up to perform National Guard
duties.
That being said, I am interested in learning what the
Department of Homeland Security is doing to improve state and
local governments' ability to respond quickly, thus minimizing
the need for any supplemental military response in the first
place.
As we move forward, we must proceed deliberately and with
great care. I look forward to engaging our witnesses today
about how best to coordinate the capabilities of DHS and DOD
and to help ensure that another disastrous response to a
national catastrophe does not happen again.
And I thank our distinguished witnesses for being here
today and salute your service to this country.
I yield back.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The chair now recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Saxton, for any statement he may
have.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
In the interest of time, let me ask unanimous consent that
my statement be included in the record.
And let me just say this. First, I want to thank the
dedicated gentlemen who are here today to serve as our
witnesses to discuss what I think is the most important
subject, perhaps in a long time, perhaps in decades, maybe in
the history of our country.
Today we face a threat from overseas, which is unlike any
threat that we have ever faced before. It is a threat that is
misunderstood by many people around the world, in particular in
this country.
And it is through the efforts of the people that our
witnesses, who are here today, lead, that we have been able to
work to prevent additional attacks, like the attack on 9/11 and
other attacks that we see perpetrated in other parts of the
world.
And let me just finally say this. When I was a freshman in
Congress in 1994, Ronald Reagan said something to me that I
will always remember. He said, ``Of all the subjects you deal
with in the Congress of the United States, all of which are
important, none of them are as important as providing national
security for our country.''
I have always remembered that statement and have tried to
remember it each day when I come to work here to represent the
people of the third district of New Jersey and the other people
from around the country.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this meeting today.
I appreciate it very much. And I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Saxton
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities meets this morning in join session with our colleagues
from the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science and Technology to discuss and understand the role
of the Military and National Guard in responding to catastrophic
events. It is no surprise that the Department of Defense and Homeland
Security share similar joint interests across a range of areas, and we
hope to foster and encourage greater cooperation than already exists
between these two vitally imporant executive branch departments.
Nothing we do in Congress is more important than national security.
DOD and DHS are the lead federal agencies in assuring the safety and
security of the American public and must work together in a seamless
fashion as they work to deter and defeat terrorism.
The importance of military preparedness to deal with a catastrophic
event cannot be overstated. While Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the
great challenges our leaders face when implementing an emergency
response plan, we have to remember that in the case of Katrina we had
three days warning. In the case of a terrorist attack we will not have
the luxury of a warning.
As Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism
and Unconventional Threats, I am constantly reminded that Global
Jihadists actively seek to carry out a catastrophic event on our soil.
This threat, therefore, makes the military's response capability a
matter of great importance.
It is precisely because of the threat posed by the nexus of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that the Terrorism
Subcommittee began working on this hearing with the Homeland Security
Committee prior to Hurricane Katrina striking the Gulf States.
While it is not within the purview of this hearing to address the
Federal response to hurrican Katrina, today's hearing will focus on
some of the issues raised subsequent to Katrina. Much of this interest
surrounds statements made by the President on September 15 in Louisiana
where he called for an increased role for the military in responding to
catastrophic events. I am curious to hear if our witnesses have
anything more to say on this proposal.
Fortunately, since September 11 our country have worked to prevent
al-Qa'ida, and similar Jihadist groups, from perpetrating another
attacvkon U.S. soil. Our success in prevention, however, should not
make us lax in our preparedness to deal with an attack in the event it
occurs. We must be ready.
With that I'd like to thank Chairman Reichert for hosting today's
joint session, and thank our witnesses for joining us today.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Saxton.
The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Tauscher.
Mrs. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
the opportunity to meet this morning in joint session with our
two subcommittees.
The security of our nation is the top priority for both of
our committees. And while I know we each spend a great deal of
time exploring these issues, I am glad to see part of that
effort will occur today in a collaborative setting.
Mr. Chairman, the chain of events that has occurred over
the past couple of months has shown that our military possesses
an extraordinary capability to respond to natural disasters.
While the overall response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and
Wilma may not have always been seamless, the active-duty and
National Guard forces have proven time and again that they have
the ability to handle events of such magnitude and
significance.
Today's hearing is not intended to examine the specific
response efforts in these instances but rather to explore the
overall efforts to respond to either natural or manmade
disasters, as they are coordinated between the Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and the National
Guard.
It is my hope that we might delve a bit deeper into the
issue of interagency coordination and the possibility for
increased use of military in responding to catastrophic events.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, their
thoughts on the unity of effort in these situations, and pre-
event planning that occurs between various agencies.
I thank you for your service to your country and to this
committee.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
It is also our pleasure to have with us this morning on our
panel the chairman of the full Committee on Homeland Security
and also the ranking member of the full committee.
And, first, the chair will now recognize the chairman of
the Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from New York,
Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Reichert and Chairman Saxton,
Ranking Member Tauscher, Bill Pascrell, Bennie Thompson.
I will keep my remarks very brief. But as the previous
speakers have all said, if there was one shining light from the
Katrina crisis, it was the outstanding performance of our
military.
And I want to thank all of you at the table here today, all
the witnesses, for the job that you have done and the job you
continue to do for our country.
Today's hearing, obviously, raises questions about the
usurping of the traditional power of local and state
governments, whether or not regular use of the military would
stretch you too thin at this time in our nation's history,
whether or not Posse Comitatus or the Insurrection Act would
have to be amended or adjusted.
But I think it is important we have this hearing, to see if
there are any key places where the military can be used more
than it has been used in the past, if they should be pre-
positioned more than they have been used in the past, whether
or not there can be greater coordination between the Department
of Homeland Security--I know Secretary Jackson is here--between
Homeland Security and with the Pentagon, whether or not Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should coordinate itself
better with the military.
All of these issues, I think, are important to be
discussed. I have no preconceptions of what the answers should
be. I know they are serious questions. I know there could be
doubts raised.
But at the same time, since we do face, as Chairman Saxton
said, these are very turbulent, uncertain times. We are going
places we have never gone before. And I do not think we should
preclude or rule anything out and we should see exactly how we
could maximize to the greatest use all of our resources.
And certainly, there is no resource greater than the
military. And I know the Homeland Security wants to work as
closely with you as possible, if we decide to go that route.
So with that, regrettably, I will not be able to stay for
much of the hearing. And I have two other meetings I have to go
to, but I commend Chairman Reichert and Chairman Saxton for
having this joint hearing.
I think it also shows the awareness we have is that
terrorism does not stop at the nation's borders. This is both
an overseas and a domestic issue. I think it is very important
that our two committees do work together in such a
collaborative fashion, as Congresswoman Tauscher indicated.
So thank you for your testimony today.
And I thank the two chairmen and the two subcommittees for
bringing together this hearing.
I yield back.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter King
Thank you, Chairman Saxton and Chairman King for holding this
important hearing. I also would like to welcome and thank our witnesses
for appearing before us this morning. I look forward to hearing each of
your unique perspectives on the proper role of the military and the
National Guard in responding to catastrophic disasters.
The recent, dramatic deployment of thousands of Federal troops to
New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina has spurred fresh debate
about whether the Administration should designate the Department of
Defense as the lead Federal agency in responding to disasters of
extraordinary magnitude, whether natural or manmade.
Although the military's response to Hurricane Katrina has not been
without its problems, it is widely agreed that active duty forces and
the National Guard performed admirably. The call to ``give the military
the disaster response function'' sounds sensible to many Americans. But
doing so is not so simple.
Before taking such a drastic step, however, there are many
questions that need to be addressed:
Would an enlarged role for the military and the
National Guard undermine Federalism and usurp the
responsibility of State and local authorities?
Is an enlarged role for the military even necessary?
Isn?t the National Response Plan sufficient to facilitate
military support to civilian authorities? If not, what changes
need to be made to it?
Would a greater role for military and the National
Guard undermine its traditional war fighting role?
Would a greater response role for the military and the
National Guard require Congress to amend the Posse Comitatus
Act?
I look forward to your answers to these and other questions. Again,
I want to thank the witnesses for testifying today and our colleagues
on Armed Services for holding this joint hearing with us. I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Chairman King.
The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the
Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and ranking
members. I, too, have looked forward to the opportunity to hear
the testimony of our witnesses.
Admiral Collins, Assistant Secretary McHale, Major General
Rowe, General Blum, I must commend all of you for your efforts
with the response to Hurricane Katrina. My district was one of
those districts that was also impacted. We still suffer.
The military's role was absolutely invaluable in that
process. And for that, I thank you.
But we are here today to examine the role of the military
and the National Guard in disaster response. President Bush has
suggested the Congress re-examine the role of the military and
the National Guard in responding to catastrophic events.
Some people have even recommended that the military should
have control over federal, state and local authorities during
disasters. I disagree. The Department of Homeland Security
should remain in charge of this mission; the real issue is
whether or not the Department of Homeland Security is doing its
job.
It is time for the department to demonstrate leadership and
properly coordinate the Federal Government's response efforts.
Deputy Secretary Jackson, you told the Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee last month that Hurricane Katrina
was a once-in-a-century event. I disagree with that.
September 11th happened 4 years ago. Experts agree that it
is not a matter of when but if the next event occurs.
I recommend that the Department of Homeland Security and
Defense more clearly define their respective roles and
responsibilities in this. The department should review the
military's role within the National Response Plan.
It is also time for the department to release the
supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex.
In addition, I am interested and learning more about the
department, of the two departments within local and state
officials, your relationship.
To what degree are state and local officials participating
in joint exercises within the military and the Department of
Homeland Security? In my state, during Hurricane Katrina, many
officials involved in a response, this was their first time
ever meeting each other.
And you should not meet each other at the hurricane. You
should have some plans put together.
The other thing is, I would like to recognize the efforts
of a Sergeant Russell, an Air Force reservist who died while on
duty during Hurricane Katrina. Sergeant Russell was a former
Marine who had recently returned from Iraq. He died while
trying to assist others.
General Blum and Admiral Collins, Representative Taylor
recently contacted both of you to seek your assistance in
formally recognizing Sergeant Russell. I implore both of you to
act quickly and expeditiously in recognizing Sergeant Russell
and his contribution during Hurricane Katrina.
I yield back.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
with us today. And they are: first, the honorable Michael P.
Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; the Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense in U.S. Department of Defense;
Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Major General Richard Rowe,
Jr., Director of Operations, U.S. Northern Command, U.S.
Department of Defense; and Lieutenant General Steven Blum,
Chief, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense.
Let me gently remind the witnesses that their entire
written statement will appear in the record. And we ask that,
due to the number of witnesses on our panel today, that you
strive to limit your testimony to no more than 5 minutes.
The chair recognizes the Honorable Michael P. Jackson,
Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
to testify.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. JACKSON
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking members,
members of the committee.
I appreciate very much this opportunity to visit with you
today and to discuss the role of the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense, our active-duty military
forces and National Guard on these vital issues. So thank you
for convening this important hearing today. And thank you for
having us.
I am convinced that the scope and the devastation of
Hurricane Katrina is understood, but I am constantly focused
and reminded that this misery that was visited upon our
friends, our neighbors in these states, is an opportunity for
us to do better.
And as our recovery continues, we have continued to focus
on these victims and the lessons that we have learned here.
But first, I want to do, as you have done, and salute the
members of the military and the other first responders who
leapt into this incident with such effectiveness. There are
many, many good stories here, in my own department, at FEMA, in
the Coast Guard, Air Marshals, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
The full range, really, of our department threw assets into
this battle. My colleagues, who representing here today, the
military and the National Guard assets that were thrown into
this fray did superb work and tremendous work for which we are
deeply grateful and proud. And, really, all across the Federal
Government, others just picked up their kit and went into
action.
Without question, however, Hurricane Katrina posed an
extraordinary challenge for our collective response
capabilities, at all levels of government, across all levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations and the private
sector, as well.
It stressed some systems and it broke others. As President
Bush said, the overall results are not acceptable. He also said
that it was important that both the Administration and Congress
work together, take a good look at what went on, and to make
sure that our country is knitted up well as it can be in order
to deal with significant problems and disasters.
``I am interested,'' the president further said, ``in
solving problems.'' The president is exactly right. There are
obviously processes that need fixing. There are tools,
managerial and otherwise, that are missing. We continue to
identify lessons learned that will provide a foundation for
improvement.
And in all of this, we have to ask a simple question: What
works? What works? And we focus on that.
Regarding military operations, we had close cooperation and
many success in Katrina. I think that we learned very quickly.
And, by the time we got to Hurricane Rita, we had already
implemented some very meaningful lessons learned.
Let me just say an introductory word about how DHS works
with the Defense Department. And I will not try to cover the
details of this, which are in not only my prepared remarks, but
in Secretary McHale's remarks, as well as others.
But we obviously work with DOD through the mechanism of the
National Response Plan, published in December 2004. It provides
the framework in the overall federal incident management
structure for these efforts.
DOD is a signatory to the NRP. And until Title 10
authority, it plays an absolutely vital role in providing
federal emergency management assets, closely coordinated with
state and local authorities.
The Department of Defense's assets are tapped through its
civil support functions and support roles. We mission assign
them. We give them requests for assistance, which they fulfill.
It is not our job to ask for this helicopter, or this ship, or
this unit. We give them taskings, and orders, and requirements.
And they, in turn, assess their capabilities for doing this.
We ask them for over 90 specific request for assistance
(RFAs) to do work for us. They took up the assignment with
every single one. And we have relied on them very
significantly.
FEMA's role is not to request, then, these assets, but to
work closely together. The National Guard plays a tremendously
important role and has, unless the secretary calls them into
serve--the President calls them into service, it operates under
the command of their respective state commanders.
And, of course, in Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard
did operate under the command of the states.
Mr. Chairman, I share your deference to local authorities,
and that which was stated by many members of the committee
already here today.
As this hearing begins to explore the roles of active-duty
military, Reserves and National Guard, we should use as our
guide history and our constitutional relationships with the
states. The first lesson of history is that all disasters are
local and that it is the first responders on scene locally and
at the state that we are there to support and to assist.
In the weeks ahead, the administration will continue
systematically to collect lessons learned. There are many
lessons learned. With DOD, we have our own team working. And
DOD has a team working. We are sharing those messages together
closely.
We have learned many things with the experience of our
Principle Federal Officer (PFO), Thad Allen, who has served
ably. And I am sure that we can unpack some more of the details
of that here today.
We were, as I said, able after Katrina to prepackage, pre-
position, and deploy certain asset clusters in a more rapid
fashion. And we will also have a chance to discuss those
lessons learned and exactly how we have surged, in both Katrina
and in subsequent incidents, Rita, and in Florida.
So, in summary, I would like to thank the members of this
committee. This is a terribly important topic. We are eager to
talk with you. We are eager to learn with you. We are eager to
support this inquiry.
[The statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael P. Jackson
Introduction. Chairmen Saxton and Reichert, Ranking Members Meehan
and Pascrell, and members of the Committees: I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss with your committees important components of the
nation's overall preparedness. In particular, I will talk about the
roles of Homeland Security, the military and the National Guard in
responding to disasters, especially catastrophic incidents.
The scope of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina--and the misery
inflicted--was cruel and unprecedented. As our recovery efforts
continue, DHS's commitment remains focused on Katrina's victims.
First, I want to salute the literally tens of thousands of men and
women who surged around this catastrophic disaster, working tirelessly
and compassionately. At DHS, our FEMA professionals, Coast Guard
search-and-rescue teams, Air Marshals, TSA screeners and management,
ICE, Secret Service and CBP agents, headquarters staff and others from
virtually every part of the Department--all went to help. And help they
did, tremendously. The same is true for virtually every other federal
agency.
Today I am joined by colleagues who will detail in particular the
extraordinary work of our military forces. We at DHS are grateful for
the leadership of Lieutenant General Russell Honore and his troops,
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) under the leadership of Admiral Tim
Keating, and Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Commander of the
National Guard.
The broader federal team has also been in the Gulf states in
support of our state and local colleagues following Katrina and Rita.
We were joined by emergency management colleagues who came to help from
every corner of the Union. Relief and shelter workers, those who opened
arms to evacuees across the nation and so many more provided so much
for which we can be proud.
Without question, however, Hurricane Katrina posed an extraordinary
challenge to our collective response capabilities across all levels of
government, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. It
stressed some systems and broke others.
As President Bush said, overall ``the results are not acceptable.''
He also said that it was important that both the Administration and
Congress take a good look at what went on to ``make sure that this
country is knitted up as well as it can be, in order to deal with
significant problems and disasters. . . . I am interested,'' the
President further said, ``in solving problems.''
The President is absolutely right, and the scrutiny of DHS's
efforts is healthy. There are obviously processes that need fixing.
There are tools--managerial and otherwise--that are missing. We are
continuing to identify lessons-learned that will provide a foundation
for improvement. In all of this, we must ask a simple question: what
works? Nothing else matters. There is, moreover, no time to delay. DHS
is an all-hazards agency, and we must be more nimble. A sense of
urgency and innovation must pervade our work.
The sheer scope of this incident means we are facing policy and
operational issues not before confronted. We will continue to work many
issues for the path forward with Congress in the weeks and months
ahead. Regarding military operations, I can say that we had successes
in Katrina. By the time Rita made landfall, we had already absorbed and
implemented numerous valuable lessons learned from Katrina.
Department of Defense Responsibilities Under the National Response
Plan. The National Response Plan (NRP), published in December 2004,
provides the framework for the overall federal incident management and
response efforts. The Defense Department, as a signatory to the NRP and
under Title 10 authorities, plays an important part in providing
federal emergency management assets, closely coordinated with state and
local authorities.
The Department of Defense's main contribution to the NRP is through
``civil support'' for civilian agencies. The NRP states that when
requested, support for civil authorities during domestic incidents is
provided by Defense Department forces upon approval of the Secretary of
Defense. The Defense Department's role is triggered through Requests
for Assistance (RFAs)--formal requests from another federal agency
requesting specific capabilities in support of the federal response
mission. FEMA initiated those requests for the Hurricane Katrina effort
and the Defense Department responded to more than 90 RFAs.
FEMA's role is not to request particular assets, rather to identify
core needs or performance requirements, which Defense then meets with
assets it judges most effective. We greatly appreciate all Defense did
in responding to the FEMA RFAs in support of the Katrina response.
The National Guard also has an important role to play in disaster
response. Unless called into federal service by the President, the
National Guard operates under the command of its respective state
commanders. In Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard operated under the
command of the States.
The President has the authority to call the National Guard into
federal service when he concludes that he cannot with the regular armed
forces execute the laws of the United States. In the event that the
President federalizes the National Guard, it operates under the command
of the President as part of the regular forces.
Deference to State and Local Authority. As this hearing begins to
explore the role of active duty military, Reserves and the National
Guard in disasters, we should use as a guide our history and our
constitutional relationships with the states. The first lesson of
history is that all disasters are local in nature and must be handled
to the extent possible by local and state actors, with support from the
federal government as needed.
As Publius wrote in Federalist No. 45: ``the powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.'' This foundational principal--that state and local actors
possess the powers within their jurisdictions--guides our emergency
response planning and work.
Over the course of the last thirteen years, America has experienced
numerous significant natural disasters, including Hurricane Andrew in
1992 and the 1994 Northridge earthquake. In such cases, the federal
government provided crisis response assets to state and local
authorities, often including Department of Defense assets.
Catastrophic Events. While America has met the challenges posed by
natural disasters, it is important that we think deeply and plan
rigorously for the full range of catastrophic events before they occur.
It is important that we have detailed plans for deploying military
assets, and that these plans respect the chain of command of the
Secretary of Defense. It is reasonable to examine fully how and when we
use active duty military and federalize the National Guard--and all
other federal, state and local assets--in catastrophic incidents.
Presidents have historically exercised caution when deciding
whether to use the military domestically, and have given great
deference to state constitutional authorities in weighing such
decisions. This deference is especially important when management of a
disaster moves from a response phase to a recovery phase.
Without much difficulty, one can certainly imagine a terrorist
attack or series of coordinated attacks that could have such a
catastrophic and ongoing effect that Title 10 action would be
necessary. In cases that might involve extensive damage to state and
federal institutions and leadership, the case for such action is
stronger. In most cases of natural catastrophe, deployment of the
National Guard under the control of the Governor would be the first and
strongly preferred option.
Enhancing Homeland Security and Defense Exercise Activity. In the
years following the September 11th attacks and the creation of Homeland
Security, we have constituted a National Exercise Program lead by
Homeland Security that involves widespread federal, state, local,
tribal and international participation, certainly including Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense acting in close coordination.
Most recently, in TOPOFF 3--in the course of a scenario involving a
biological attack, a chemical attack and a vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device--Defense activated its Quick Reaction Force. We have
worked closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with U.S. Northern
Command in planning past such exercises and will continue to work
closely with them in planning future exercises.
The potential arrival of the H5N1 influenza strain has placed
additional requirements on our exercise capabilities.
We will do more to explore ways in which Homeland Security can
exercise its capabilities and the capabilities of other federal
departments and agencies using the realistic scenarios portrayed in the
National Planning Scenarios, while also adding elements involving
domestic events that warrant activating more extensive Defense
Department capabilities. The key is to enhance our joint exercises so
that we learn more about how our collective capabilities can support
our state, local and tribal partners as well as private sector
operators of critical infrastructure.
The Lessons of Hurricane Katrina. In the weeks ahead, the
Administration will continue systematically to collect and process
lessons learned from Katrina. From DHS's perspective, a key lesson
learned is that a robust Principal Federal Official (PFO) command and
control structure provided under the NRP permits a more disciplined
engagement with the National Guard and NORTHCOM, especially in truly
catastrophic events. Homeland Security has pre-designated and trained a
stable of high-level leaders as PFOs that can be rapidly deployed in a
matter of hours, if an Incident of National Significance is declared or
when a PFO is required.
Another lesson learned is the importance of re-tooling FEMA with
modern-day logistics, customer service and financial management
operations. We have much to borrow from the private sector and from
Defense's Transportation Command on how to manage better the supply
chain of emergency relief material. Some of the early points of focus
are in-transit visibility tools, automated inventory replenishment
systems, fast pull-down capabilities for emergency supplies that are
managed as close as possible to the delivery point, and pre-negotiated
contracts for supply chain surge capacity. We need to deploy new
technology for data management to allow our responders--whether they
are FEMA employees, military or National Guard members--to have the
information they need to serve the people who need help.
Both Defense and DHS have teams looking at interagency coordination
issues. Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Rita, we had already applied
valuable Katrina lessons about how to structure, aggregate and manage
the RFAs presented to Defense. We were able to pre-package, pre-
position, and deploy certain asset clusters more rapidly in advance of
the second hurricane based on our experience in Katrina. We will
continue collecting and analyzing the lessons of this hurricane. As
evaluations are completed and decisions made, we will engage in the
remedial action necessary to fix what is broken and shore-up what is
sagging. In all of that, we will focus on how to work better, faster,
and more effectively with our Defense and National Guard colleagues.
Conclusion. I want to thank the Chairmen and the members of these
Committees for exploring this critical issue. Given our country's deep
history of civilian control at the state and local level for disasters,
we must proceed carefully and deliberately in determining how best to
synchronize DHS and Defense capabilities. But as the President said,
Hurricane Katrina compels us to explore these issues with serious,
sustained focus and a mind open to change. I look forward to beginning
that dialogue with you today. Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Jackson.
The chair now recognizes the honorable Paul McHale,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL McHALE
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in
order to maximize time for questions, my opening remarks will
be brief and to the point.
As we examine the military role in disaster response, it is
appropriate, even essential, that we review the military
missions executed most recently in response to Hurricane
Katrina.
In that context, it must be noted that the Department of
Defense response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest
deployment of military forces for a civil support mission in
our nation's history.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast of the
United States during the early morning hours of August 29th. By
landfall plus five, more than 34,000 military forces had been
deployed into the affected area, more than five times the
number of military personnel deployed within the same time
frame in response to 1992's Hurricane Andrew.
By landfall plus seven, more than 53,000 military personnel
had been deployed in response to Katrina. That is three times
the comparable number for Hurricane Andrew.
And by September the 10th, military forces reached their
peak at 72,000, 50,000 National Guardsmen, 22,000 active-duty
personnel, a total deployment for Katrina that was more than
twice the size of the military response to Hurricane Andrew.
In scope and speed, no civil support mission in the history
of the United States remotely approaches the DOD response to
Hurricane Katrina.
In addition to 72,000 men and women in uniform, the
Department of Defense coordinated the deployment of 293 medium-
and heavy-lift helicopters, 68 airplanes, 23 U.S. Navy ships,
two standing joint headquarters to support FEMA's planning
efforts.
The overall impact of the department's efforts was
significant. DOD military personnel evacuated more than 80,000
Gulf Coast residents and rescued another 15,000. Two thousand
military health care professionals provided significant medical
assistance, including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and
air, delivery of medical treatment to more than 5,000 sick and
injured persons, as well as support for disease prevention and
control.
DOD approved the use of nine bases as FEMA logistics
staging areas for collection and distribution of ice, food,
water, temporary roofing materials, and medical supplies. DOD
also delivered critical emergency supplies, more than 30
million meals, including 24.5 million MREs and some 10,000
truckloads of ice and water.
In short, DOD acted with a sense of urgency and met its
civil support mission requirements. We did so because our men
and women in uniform acted to minimize paperwork, cut through
bureaucracy, and provide life-saving assistance.
That is not to say that our performance cannot be improved.
DOD communication with first responders was not interoperable.
Early situational awareness was poor, a problem that should
have been corrected following identical damage assessment
challenges during Hurricane Andrew.
Military command and control was workable but not unified.
National Guard planning, though superbly executed--I have said
to my good friend, General Blum, that this may have been the
finest hour in the history of the National Guard, in terms of a
domestic civil support mission. The National Guard's
performance was just superb.
However, the planning conducted by the National Guard,
though superbly executed, was not well-integrated with the
Joint Staff and Northcom. In other words, our task-organized
deployment reflected DOD's total force, but our operational
planning did not.
As President Bush noted on September 25th, it is now clear
that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal
authority and a broader role for the Armed Forces, the
institution of our government most capable of massive
logistical operations on a moment's notice.
Clearly, the president has challenged us to examine anew
the roles, missions and authorities of the Department of
Defense in responding to catastrophic events.
In its devastating impact, Hurricane Katrina resembled in
many ways the foreseeable effects of a terrorist attack
involving a weapon of mass destruction. Traditional disaster
response models simply did not apply, in that essential first
responders had evacuated or lacked equipment, supplies and
situational awareness.
Communication channels were non-existent or significantly
degraded. Thousands of citizens required medical care and basic
logistical support. The comparison with potential effects from
a catastrophic terrorist event, nuclear or otherwise, is
readily apparent. The lessons learned from Katrina go far
beyond the consequences of a natural disaster.
Mr. Chairman, the issues that we will examine today are
fundamental, in terms of federalism, in terms of a prompt
response, not merely to a major disaster, but to a catastrophic
event.
These are issues that are deserving of careful and balanced
consideration so that we preserve the historic federal
relationship between the various levels of government, while at
the same time recognizing the unique capabilities of the
Department of Defense to deploy organic logistical support in
an immediate response to American citizens who are desperately
in need.
I would welcome your questions.
[The statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul McHale
Introduction
Chairman Saxton, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Meehan, Ranking
Member Pascrell, distinguished members of the Committees: thank you for
the opportunity to address you today to discuss responding to
catastrophic events--the role of the military and National Guard in
disaster response.
The Department of Defense is one element of the overall response
effort to a complete spectrum of incident management activities,
including the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and
recovery from threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other
emergencies. DoD's response is part of a coordinated effort among
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as non-
governmental organizations.
Where applicable, I will use examples of our recent response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to illustrate DoD's role in responding to
catastrophic incidents. In terms of persons displaced, businesses
disrupted, commerce affected, and projected aggregate economic losses,
Hurricane Katrina was one of the most catastrophic hurricanes in U.S.
history. Appropriately, the Department's deployment of military
resources in support of civil authorities exceeded, in speed and size,
any other domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United
States. The ability of military forces--active duty, Reserves, and the
National Guard--to respond quickly and effectively to an event of this
magnitude is a testament to their readiness, agility, and
professionalism. It is also a reflection of the resources that enable
them to organize, train, and equip to meet the full range of DoD's
missions. I commend the members of your committees for your continuing
support of the Department. Without your support, U.S. military forces
would not have been poised to respond as effectively to the devastating
effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
As President Bush described in his September 15 address to the
nation:
The [Katrina] storm involved a massive flood, a major supply
and security operation, and an evacuation order affecting more
than a million people. It was not a normal hurricane--and the
normal disaster relief system was not equal to it. Many of the
men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the United States military, the
National Guard, and state and local governments performed
skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every
level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was
overwhelmed in the first few days.
There is no doubt that improvements can and should be made at all
levels of government. As a Department, we continue to capture
observations from our response to Hurricane Katrina in order to develop
lessons learned and improve our response the next time we are called,
whether for a natural disaster of like magnitude or catastrophic
terrorist attack.
DoD Responsibilities under the National Response Plan
DoD is an important partner in the overall national effort for
incident management and response activities. DoD resources are employed
as part of a coordinated incident management approach among Federal,
State, and local governments, as well as non-governmental
organizations. Title 10, United States Code, and the National Response
Plan (NRP), published in December 2004, define the authorities and
responsibilities of the Department. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-5 (February 2003) directed the development of an NRP to
replace the Federal Response Plan. The NRP aligned Federal coordination
structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline
and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. The NRP
incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident management
sources and disciplines, including fire, rescue, emergency management,
law enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services.
The Department's main contribution to the NRP is through Defense
Support of Civil Authorities--also known as ``civil support.'' The NRP
provides, ``When requested, and upon approval of the Secretary of
Defense, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides Defense Support of
Civil Authorities (DSCA) during domestic incidents.'' DoD's role in the
NRP is contingent upon a request for assistance (RFA) from another
Federal agency, and upon approval by the Secretary of Defense. In
responding to requests from FEMA for Hurricane Katrina operations, for
example, DoD acted quickly within the NRP framework. FEMA and the
Department of Defense worked closely together to identify and refine
requirements, allowing DoD to provide needed capabilities. In all, the
Department acted on more than 90 Hurricane Katrina-related RFAs from
civil authorities requiring a broad range of military capabilities.
Some of these requests were approved verbally by Secretary Rumsfeld or
Acting Deputy Secretary England, and were in execution when the
approval paperwork caught up days later. The Department felt a sense of
urgency and acted upon it, as provided for within the NRP.
DoD is the only Federal department with supporting responsibilities
for each of the NRP's fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).
Additionally, DoD's U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is designated as the
primary agency for Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and
Engineering, operating under separate statutory and funding authority.
While the considerable resources of the Department make it feasible
that DoD might be asked to contribute resources, personnel, equipment,
or expertise in a variety of circumstances, such support is directly
contingent on Secretary of Defense approval with the following
exceptions:
As the primary agency for ESF #3, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers performs emergency support activities under
separate statutory and funding authority, including Public Law
84-99.
Military forces responding to an incident under a
commander's Immediate Response Authority as outlined in DoD
Directives.
National Guard forces in State Activity Duty or Title
32 status commanded by the Governor of a State or territory.
When Federal military forces are employed in support of domestic
civil authorities, they are under the command and control of Commander,
U.S. Northern Command, for responses in the Continental United States,
Alaska, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the
District of Columbia; or Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, for Hawaii
and U.S. territories, possessions, and protectorates in the Pacific
region. It is important to note that the military chain of command
always runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
relevant Combatant Commander. The Department fully supports the
Incident Command System of the NRP's National Incident Management
System; however, at no time does a supported Federal agency exercise
any command and control over DoD forces.
DoD Responsibilities Under the National Response Plan's Catastrophic
Incident Annex
The Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the NRP provides for a
proactive Federal response in anticipation of, or following, a
catastrophic incident to provide critical resources on an expedited
basis to assist State and local response efforts. The NRP defines a
catastrophic incident as one ``that results in extraordinary levels of
mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/
or government functions.'' A catastrophic incident would almost
immediately overwhelm local or State response capacity and could
potentially threaten national security through interruption in
governmental operations or emergency services.
Implementation of the NRP's CIA is the responsibility of the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. When notified by the
Homeland Security Operations Center of such an implementation, Federal
departments and agencies activate and deploy capabilities in accordance
with the Catastrophic Incident Annex and commence relevant Emergency
Support Function responsibilities. In response to a catastrophic event,
DoD shares primary responsibility, along with the Department of Health
and Human Services, for the patient movement functional response area.
The National Guard's Role in Catastrophic Events
DoD uses the Total Force concept--the right forces for the right
jobs--to execute its missions. The National Guard provides unique
capabilities in every U.S. State, territory, and the District of
Columbia. The National Guard is a critical component of the military's
role in responding to catastrophic events. Today's National Guard
serves effectively in two distinct roles. First, it is an operational
force for military missions; and second, it stands ready to answer no-
notice calls by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the
Governors to respond to natural or man-made catastrophic incidents. The
National Guard provides significant capabilities to U.S. Northern
Command and U.S. Pacific Command, including situational awareness
capabilities, intelligence and information feeds, chemical-biological
weapons of mass destruction response force packages, and forward-
deployed command and control apparatuses and joint logistics bases, as
needed.
National Guard forces provide combatant commanders flexibility to
tailor their response based on specific scenarios encountered in
managing a contingency.
Title 10 (United States Code) Status. When National
Guard forces are ordered or called to active duty in a Federal
or Title 10 status (Federal control, Federal funding), the
President or the Secretary of Defense may authorize employment
of activated National Guard forces along with other active duty
forces. In this instance, the Commanders of U.S. Northern
Command or U.S. Pacific Command would have direct command and
control authority over those forces assigned for employment in
the Commander's area of responsibility.
State Active Duty Status and Title 32 (United States
Code) Status. National Guard forces can serve in State Active
Duty (State control, State funding) or in Title 32 status
(State control, Federal funding) under the command of a State
Governor. In either status, National Guard members are not
subject to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act and may
engage in activities related to law enforcement if authorized
to do so under applicable State law.
In the event of a catastrophic incident, forces under State command
and control, and Federal forces under U.S. Northern Command or U.S.
Pacific Command's command and control could find themselves operating
within a common operating area. Although they are not part of the same
command structure, unity of effort requires coordination and
cooperation among all of these forces toward a commonly recognized
objective. Unity of effort is critical to a successful response to
catastrophic events.
DoD Coordination with Interagency Partners
The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) work in close coordination to ensure the safety and security of
the U.S. homeland. Coordination and cooperation take place continuously
at all levels of both organizations. As the Secretary of Defense's
principal liaison with DHS, my office has worked diligently to foster
excellent working relationships and provide relevant expertise. In that
regard, the two Departments signed a memorandum of agreement in 2003
that authorized the assignment of 64 DoD personnel to DHS on a detail
basis to fill critical specialties, principally in the areas of
communications and intelligence. Further, we established a Homeland
Defense Coordination Office at DHS headquarters to provide for
continuous liaison and advisory support, and we maintain a 24 hours-a-
day/7 days-a-week presence in the DHS Homeland Security Operations
Center. As needed, DoD also provides senior military and civilian
personnel for the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group--a
group of senior Federal department and agency officials focused on
incident response. Beyond these formalized arrangements, daily contacts
between DoD and DHS are the norm in the course of interagency working
group meetings and our collaboration on a range of projects and
initiatives.
Role of DoD and Other Agency Exercises
DoD is committed to maintaining the readiness of military forces to
execute the full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support
operations, including catastrophic incident response. To this end, DoD
has hosted or participated in exercises sponsored by other government
entities as well as our own. Homeland security and homeland defense
exercises are important in ensuring readiness and identifying gaps and
potential weaknesses within each agency, and across agencies, in
responding to terrorist attacks, including potentially catastrophic
multiple, simultaneous challenges. These exercises support the DHS
National Homeland Security Exercise Program established by Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), (``National Preparedness,''
December 17, 2003).
DoD either sponsors or is a participant in no less than two major
interagency field exercises per year, involving deployment of command
elements as well as response units. In addition, DoD participates in
several command and control exercises, ranging from the combatant
command level to the national level. In the past, these have included
U.S. Northern Command exercises UNIFIED DEFENSE (2003, 2004), ARDENT
SENTRY (2005), DETERMINED PROMISE (2003, 2004), and VIGILANT SHIELD
(2005). Additional exercises have included DILIGENT ENDEAVOR (2003),
DILIGENT WARRIOR (2004), NORTHERN EDGE (2003), Scarlet Shield (2004),
Dark Portal (2004), and the National Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercises
(2003, 2005). Many of these exercise scenarios are designed to
overwhelm local and State assets to the extent required to evoke a
response under the National Response Plan, including the employment of
DoD and other Federal assets.
DoD Contribution to Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts
The Department of Defense's response to the catastrophic effects of
Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United
States since the Civil War. Federal military and National Guard forces
have been employed directly in saving lives through extensive search
and rescue, evacuation, and medical assistance.
By any measure, the flow of military forces and relief supplies
into the Katrina-affected areas was a massive operation. At the height
of the DoD response, some 72,000 men and women in uniform assisted
Federal, State, and local authorities in recovery efforts. Other
military capabilities employed during the response included 23 ships,
68 fixed-wing aircraft, 293 helicopters, amphibious landing craft,
space-based imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway
surveillance, mortuary teams, and large-scale construction support
provided through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Navy
Seabees. Additionally, nine DoD installations served as logistical
staging areas for the delivery of supplies and as sites for Federal
Medical Shelters. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was designated
as the central collection point for foreign relief donations.
Federal military and National Guard forces have been instrumental
in saving lives, restoring order, and beginning the long, challenging
process of recovery. Approximately 15,000 residents of the Gulf coast
were rescued and 80,000 others evacuated. DoD delivered critical
emergency supplies--more than 30 million meals and some 10,000
truckloads of ice and water. Military forces also provided significant
medical assistance, including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and
air, medical treatment of more than 5,000 patients, as well as support
for disease prevention and control. Further, DoD made available more
than 3,000 beds in field hospitals, installations, and aboard U.S. Navy
ships. At the request of FEMA, DoD also supplied 13 mortuary teams to
support local authorities in the systematic search, recovery, and
disposition of the deceased. Additionally, to assist in disease
prevention, DoD aircraft have flown mosquito abatement aerial spraying
missions covering more than two million acres.
The Department of Defense planned for and employed a balance of
Active, Reserve, and National Guard capabilities in responding to
Hurricane Katrina. In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992), in which
National Guard forces constituted 24% of the military response,
National Guard forces represented more than 70% of the military force
for Hurricane Katrina. Even while 75,000 National Guard members are
deployed overseas, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blum, the
National Guard amassed over 30,000 troops in 96 hours in response to
Hurricane Katrina. At the height of Katrina relief efforts, the
National Guard deployed a total of 50,000 military personnel. National
Guardsmen from every State, territory, and the District of Columbia
have been involved in Hurricane Katrina response operations. Further,
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction--Civil Support Teams (WMD-
CSTs) from 14 states deployed to provide state-of-the-art
communications capabilities to local authorities and assistance and
advice on identifying and handling hazardous materials from damaged
infrastructure.
Participating National Guardsmen served and continue to serve in
Title 32 status. As described earlier, while in Title 32 status, their
respective Governors maintain command and control of their forces and
the Department of Defense provides funding. National Guardsmen in Title
32 status are also able to undertake law enforcement activities in
accordance with State laws as directed by their Governor. One such
example is the deployment of National Guard military police into New
Orleans. When it became clear that civil order was breaking down, the
National Guard deployed 1,400 National Guard military police into New
Orleans each day, every day, for three days in a row, dramatically
increasing the security presence on the streets of New Orleans. Many of
these trained military police officers also serve as professional law
enforcement officers in civilian life. These National Guard forces were
able to not only backfill, but substantially expand, the total number
of law enforcement personnel available in New Orleans and the
surrounding parishes.
Observations on the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina
Typically, in responding to a major disaster, local first
responders are the first on the scene. Immediately following local
first responders, State emergency management officials, at the
direction of the Governor, would normally be available to provide
prompt augmentation capability. Disaster planning has traditionally
assumed that the majority of personnel immediately responding to the
scene are likely to be drawn from local and State communities, with the
bulk of Federal follow-on capabilities arriving in force a few days
later.
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, this model of response simply did
not apply. In fact, the combination of the initial hurricane strike and
several levee breaches in New Orleans transformed local first
responders and their families into some of the first victims. In many
cases, police, firefighters, emergency medical service providers, and
other essential responders were no longer mission capable.
As with all Department of Defense operations, we have made it a
priority to capture lessons learned from our response to Hurricane
Katrina. We have been doing so ever since the hurricane made landfall.
The Department has organized a comprehensive review group to support
the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force and to oversee
implementation of lessons learned within DoD. Although review and
analysis are still ongoing, let me highlight some preliminary areas,
already identified, to improve both the overall Federal government and
specific DoD response:
improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate
assessments of damaged areas immediately after an event;
examining the best way to achieve effective
coordination and unity of effort when multiple Federal agencies
converge on an affected area;
enhancing our ability to communicate with first
responders on the ground, focusing specifically on voice
communications;
integrating fully both Active Duty and Reserve
Components into pre-event and on-scene operational planning for
catastrophic events; and
re-examining the role of DoD in responding to a
catastrophic event.
These preliminary observations, and others under review, form the
framework for an in-depth analysis of our response to Hurricane Katrina
and will enable DoD to better plan for the next catastrophic event.
Conclusion
In terms of its magnitude, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the
most destructive natural disasters in the history of the United States.
Accordingly, U.S. military forces executed the largest, most
comprehensive, and most responsive civil support mission in our
nation's history. During a domestic disaster relief operation
unprecedented in scale, over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard
forces flowed into the Gulf Coast region over a twelve-day period to
assist fellow Americans in distress. The military response to Hurricane
Katrina validated DoD's Total Force concept, which effectively
integrates Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces to meet the
full range of military missions, including homeland defense and support
to domestic civil authorities. Hurricane Katrina also provided a real-
world opportunity to refine further the approaches outlined in the
National Response Plan and its Catastrophic Incident Annex--a task that
DoD and all NRP signatories are undertaking on a priority basis.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of these Committees for
your leadership, interest in, and support of, the Department's homeland
defense and civil support missions, with a particular focus today on
the role of Federal military forces and the National Guard in disaster
response. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. McHale.
The chair now recognizes Admiral Thomas H. Collins,
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS
Admiral Collins. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members. It is
a pleasure to be with you to, again, as what my other
colleagues have mentioned, focus on an incredibly important
topic.
As the Federal Government's maritime first responder, the
Coast Guard's primary disaster response missions are saving
lives in distress, ensuring survivability of our own forces for
post-disaster response, providing security of and
reconstituting the affected areas, ports, waterways, and
infrastructure, responding to oil, chemical, and hazardous
material spills, and, finally, providing support to other
agencies.
Coast Guard efforts before, during and after Hurricane
Katrina were sharply focused on each one of these missions. Our
operational results speak for themselves.
Coast Guard men and women saved or evacuated over 32,500
lives. We restored and maintained the safety and security of
the maritime transportation system by addressing more than
1,300 discrepancies to Aids to Navigation, and coordinated the
salvage of over 3,000 damaged or sunken vessels.
Within one week, we restored 50 percent of the affected
Aids to Navigation and temporarily established vessel traffic
services to affected ports and waterways.
Most waterways critical to our nation's commerce were
reopened in a matter of days. And with partnering agencies, we
responded to over 1,100 releases of oil, six of those
categorized as major spills, over 8 million gallons of crude
oil spills.
Importantly, even as we rush to respond to Katrina, we
maintained the security watch around our nation's maritime
borders.
Notwithstanding our many significant contributions to our
nation's hurricane emergencies, we recognize that the Coast
Guard is just one of many agencies needed to respond in a
coordinated way to wide-ranging and catastrophic effects of a
large-scale natural disaster.
As noted, the events here with Katrina give us all in the
emergency response business, at every level of government, an
opportunity to build on what went right and correct that which
went wrong.
In the spirit of moving ahead sharply on these issues,
Secretary Chertoff, from our perspective, is right on target
with his priorities to enhance the Department of Homeland
Security's role as the nation's all-hazardous response agency,
including organizational restructuring to integrate and improve
the department's preparedness efforts, emphasis on improved
emergency response logistics and business processes, and,
three, enhancements to communication, information sharing,
between first and second responders.
From the Coast Guard's view, improved communication and
information sharing to support the coordinated operation must
be at the top of our collective lists.
There are great opportunities in this areas and others for
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Defense to work together to enhance our national capabilities.
As a first responder, the Coast Guard is incredibly eager
to partner, to ensure the right capabilities, competencies and
capabilities, are brought to bear in times of crisis.
We in the Coast Guard look forward to working with our
colleagues within the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense to enhance our collective preparedness
for these incidents of national significance. America's
citizens expect us to do this, and American citizens deserve
nothing less.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would be happy to
take questions, if you have them.
[The statement of Admiral Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thomas Collins
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to address you today as we discuss the role of the military
and National Guard in disaster response.
As one of the nation's five military services, the Coast Guard has
the unique capability, capacity and authority that allows it to play a
critical role in disaster response. The Coast Guard is a first
responder, one of very few federal first responders and the only
national maritime first responder. Today I would like to discuss the
Coast Guard's primary missions in disaster response, our strengths,
limitations, and some issues that we must focus on as the nation moves
forward in this area.
PRIMARY MISSIONS IN DISASTER RESPONSE
The Coast Guard's primary missions in disaster response are:
1) Saving lives in distress and survivability of our own forces for
post-disaster response;
2) Security and reconstitution of ports, waterways and
infrastructure;
3) Oil, chemical and hazardous material response, and
4) Support to other agencies.
As always, saving lives in distress remains our first priority.
During Hurricane KATRINA, the first rescues were made at Port Sulphur,
Louisiana when a HH-65 Dolphin helicopter rescued two adults and an
infant from a roof top at 2:51 p.m. on August 29 as winds still howled
at 60 knots. The first Coast Guard cutter was on scene early that same
afternoon. This is noteworthy since KATRINA made landfall shortly after
9:00 a.m. that morning.
I should also note that in an average year, the Coast Guard saves
5,500 lives. Within 48 hours the Coast Guard achieved half of that
total in Louisiana and Mississippi alone. By September 14, Coast Guard
forces had rescued 24,135 people by boat and helicopter and evacuated
9,409 more from 11 hospitals for a total of 33,544 rescues. .
.statistically, seven years worth of search and rescue compressed into
a two-week period.
In addition to search and rescue operations, the Coast Guard
continued to flow forces into the impacted regions to restore ports and
waterways, respond to pollution, and provide security and additional
law enforcement throughout the region, including protection of offshore
petrochemical platforms. KATRINA impacted 6,400 miles of shoreline. The
Coast Guard responded to 1,380 Aids to Navigation discrepancies,
handled 1,129 pollution cases, including seven major pollution
incidents, and catalogued 1,000 salvage cases with more than 200
grounded vessels and numerous offshore structures that were adrift,
damaged, or sunk.
Those of you who have had the opportunity to walk the ground in
coastal Mississippi, or literally navigate the streets of New Orleans,
know the magnitude of the challenge our men and women have faced and
the reconstruction issues our nation will be dealing with for quite a
while.
OUR STRENGTHS
Coast Guard forces have several key strengths that allow a quick
and effective response to natural disasters. That strength begins with
our people whose dedication to response and adaptability to changing
circumstances never ceases to fill me with pride and admiration.
Coast Guard ships and aircraft are built to respond to a variety of
missions without the need for extensive reconfiguration or the addition
of special equipment. A Coast Guard cutter that was conducting
fisheries enforcement operations in the Gulf of Mexico could quickly be
diverted to the New Orleans area to provide aircraft command and
control, refueling, and forward staging facilities within only a few
hours. Coast Guard aircraft that normally perform law enforcement
surveillance in the Pacific Ocean were immediately available to fly
disaster relief supplies to the Gulf Coast.
Additionally, Coast Guard forces are on station at key locations
around the nation, many of them on short-notice recall, so they can
respond quickly to emergent events. When a major catastrophe occurs, or
is anticipated, we can reposition forces quickly to that area to
optimize the response.
It is also important to note that the Coast Guard enjoys an agile
command and control structure, which provides operational commanders
the authority to move forces quickly to respond to emergencies. The
Area and District Commanders can shift and reallocate forces from one
region to another based on levels of risk and anticipated demand. The
Coast Guard has also developed and regularly exercises continuity of
operations plans for relocating command and control functions out of
harms way.
In addition to fielding flexible, multi-mission forces and command
and control systems, the Coast Guard also benefits from its unique mix
of authorities, as well as extensive experience in both military and
other interagency response organizations.
As a military service, the Coast Guard can be a supported or
supporting commander and our forces are frequently integrated with
Department of Defense (DoD) services in Joint Task Force organizations.
We regularly provide forces in support of DoD exercises, Combatant
Commanders contingency plans, and theater security cooperation
activities. This close cooperation at the service level allows the
Coast Guard to integrate seamlessly with DoD forces during disaster
response operations.
In addition to its military role, the Coast Guard also works every
day with other federal agencies, state and local governments, non-
governmental agencies and international organizations under its U. S.
Code, Title 14 law enforcement and regulatory responsibilities.
The Coast Guard is the nation' ``maritime first responder'' and has
a leading role in executing the National Response Plan (NRP) for
disaster situations. Our personnel are well trained and experienced in
response operations, which makes them a sound choice to be designated
as the Principal Federal Official and other key leadership positions in
the NRP structure. This ability to operate concurrently in both
military Joint Task Force and civilian NRP structures enhances unity of
effort across response organizations and dramatically improves the
effectiveness of disaster response and makes the Coast Guard a truly
unique Federal agency.
OUR LIMITATIONS
Despite the many strengths the Coast Guard brings to disaster
response, the Service also has some limitations that must be
considered.
The Coast Guard is a small service. With only 39,000 personnel on
active duty, a major natural disaster severely strains our capabilities
and requires a delicate balancing of risk in other geographic and
mission areas. At the peak of KATRINA operations, over 1/3 of all Coast
Guard aviation assets were deployed to the Gulf Coast. We managed the
impact on our nation-wide readiness posture by incurring additional
risk throughout all 50 states. Canadian forces covered the Northwest
Atlantic search and rescue mission in order to divert forces to the
Gulf Coast. All aviation training was deferred until after the KATRINA
response, and we decreased forces normally performing counter-drug,
fisheries enforcement, and migrant interdiction operations in the
Caribbean and Florida Straits.
Closely related to the overall size of the Service, we have a
limited capacity to respond to long duration events. While the Coast
Guard is well positioned for immediate and effective first response,
our limited ``bench strength'' makes it impossible to sustain these
operations for an extended period of time. Plans to sustain operations
and hand off responsibilities once a crisis has been stabilized are a
primary consideration for Coast Guard commanders responding to natural
disasters.
The age and condition of the Coast Guard's assets is another
concern, and is one that the Administration, with the support of
Congress, is working hard to improve. Started in 2002, the Deepwater
Acquisition program is delivering new assets that offer increased
multi-mission capability and capacity to the Coast Guard. The
government has also invested extensively in new forces for the Coast
Guard since 2001, such as 13 new Maritime Safety and Security Teams,
170 new small boats, 15 87-foor Coastal Patrol Boats, and four 179-foot
coastal patrol craft to increase operational presence in the Nation's
Ports.
ISSUES TO FOCUS ON GOING FORWARD
Lastly, I would like to echo many of the recommendations Secretary
Chertoff has highlighted in recent weeks. There are several areas that
will require continued energy and focus in the months and years ahead
in order to enhance our national disaster response capacity and
capability. Katrina was certainly not our last national challenge, but
it is incumbent on leaders throughout every level of government to
build on what went right and correct that which went wrong.
First, the Secretary outlined a significant re-organization within
DHS earlier this summer, called the Second Stage Review 2SR). Even
before Katrina. I strongly believed that 2SR moved the Department in a
very positive direction; I believe such a reorganization is made even
more compelling in the shadow of Katrina. The Coast Guard will be an
active contributor to the new Preparedness Directorate that the
Secretary has recommended, as well as the new Policy and Planning
development entities. The Department of Homeland Security does have
significant operational capacity at its disposal, and we must
collectively continue to improve our arrangement and management of that
capacity to ensure it can respond to the full spectrum of homeland
security mission requirements. At the same time, we will do everything
possible to continue supporting FEMA in its critical coordination and
response role. By virtue of our mission requirements, the Coast Guard
necessarily has extensive experience and expertise in logistics and
communications, as well as supporting business processes.
Second, I couldn't agree more with the Secretary that we must
continue to focus on improving communications between first and second
level responders in the disaster area and ensuring adequate situational
awareness. Federal, state and local first responders could benefit from
a common framework designed to establish minimum requirements for
communications interoperability. Concurrently, one of the most visible
outputs of effective communications is a common operating picture.
There is opportunity for DHS and DoD to work together to enhance our
national capabilities in this area. For example, the Coast Guard has
been working hard with DHS and DoD partners to enhance maritime domain
awareness by the development and deployment of a maritime common
operating picture. We must continue our deliberate work to break down
barriers and develop improved information sharing arrangements and
hence improved situational awareness to support timely operational
decisions.
Third, preparedness is essential. No amount of response capacity
and capability will be effective without a foundation of preparedness.
Relationships between all levels of government disaster responders must
be created and maintained before an actual event. It is too late to
start building key relationships when a hurricane is on your doorstep.
Advance planning and exercises, involving all potential responders, are
a must for effective disaster response. Command and control
arrangements must be clarified, both in theory and in practice.
Interoperability between the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and DoD
Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders is critical. We must keep working to
find the appropriate mechanisms that will guarantee unity of effort.
Some cases may require unified commands, but in all cases it will
require a common framework among Federal, state and local partners. The
National Incident Management System (NIMS) goes far to provide that
framework and the additional preparedness efforts set forth by the
President and Secretary will help us test this framework against on-
the-ground realities.
CONCLUSION
The Coast Guard is well-positioned to respond to natural disasters
due to its unique blend of authorities, capabilities and capacity.
Flexible, multi-mission forces and agile command and control systems
provide the solid foundation from which we can respond to major
catastrophes. When combined with broad authorities and experience
operating with diverse partners, particularly the DoD, the Coast Guard
provides a vital service to the nation. We in the Coast Guard look
forward to working with our colleagues in DHS and DoD to enhance our
preparedness for incidents of national significance.
Thank you for your consideration.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Admiral Collins.
The chair recognizes Lieutenant General Blum, chief of the
National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEVEN H. BLUM
Lieutenant General Blum. Chairman Reichert, Chairman
Saxton, and members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to talk with you this morning about the National
Guard's role in disaster response.
As you well know, your National Guard is no longer a
strategic reserve. It is an operational force. We are, in fact,
your 21st century minutemen and women, always ready, always
there. We are the Department of Defense's first military
responders for homeland defense and military support to
homeland security operations in the United States of America.
The National Guard's soldiers and airmen continue to answer
this nation's call to duty. There are 80,000 brave citizen
soldiers and airmen deployed in 40 nations around the world
this morning as I address you.
At the same time, in recent weeks, we deployed as many as
50,000 citizen soldiers from every state and every territory
and the District of Columbia. When you called out the Guard for
Katrina, you called out all of America in reality.
There is not a single National Guard entity that did not
make a contribution of Air or Army National Guardsmen in the
response to that disaster on the call.
As provided by the National Response Plan, the National
Guard provided an immediate response, which is exactly what the
response plan intended. And as Secretary McHale said, this
response was unprecedented in the size, and scope, and
swiftness in military history, not only of our nation, but of
any nation in the world.
In resulted in over 15,000 U.S. citizens being saved by the
National Guard response and over 78,000 U.S. citizens being
moved from an area where they had no hope, no shelter, to an
area where they could begin building their lives anew.
While we have been successful in meeting the needs of the
nation, we all recognize there is significant room for
improvement. Bottom line: The National Guard, as the Government
Accounting Office has testified to this Congress, before
September 11, 2001, the National Guard had 75 percent of its
equipment necessary in the Continental United States (CONUS) to
these homeland defense, support the homeland security mission.
Four years later, because of cross-leveling, which is
correct and right, we put the best equipment in the hands of
our soldiers that are overseas. As a result, in this
unclassified setting, we are now below 34 percent of the
equipment that I must have to be able to respond to future
Katrinas, Wilmas, Ritas, or al-Qa'ida attacks on this nation.
The National Guard's equipment shortages fall for domestic
requirements in the following areas: satellite communications,
tactical radios, medical equipment, military trucks, utility
helicopters. Medical equipment and engineering equipment are
absolutely essential needs.
To improve our ability to respond to homeland defense and
ensure we are able to support civil authorities for homeland
security operations, it will take an emergency $1.3 billion to
immediately address our equipment shortages.
Interagency, intergovernmental relationships are absolutely
fundamental and essential to the success of any response to a
disaster. The National Guard, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Homeland Security, and our partners in Northern
Command, and our essential local, state and federal partners,
with which we are there to support, must exercise and train
together regularly and often, if we are going to do better in
the future.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Lieutenant General Blum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum
Chairman Saxton and Chairman Reichert, members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the role of the National Guard
in disaster response.
Today, the National Guard finds itself more than ever linked to the
vital interests of our nation, both here at home and around the world.
Over 80,000 National Guard soldiers are currently deployed in support
of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dozens of other nations. At the
same time, the men and women of the National Guard have responded
magnificently to the catastrophic events of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita
and Wilma here at home. Over 50,000 National Guard personnel hailing
from every state and territory--responded to calls for support during
this difficult period. That is more than the United States employed
during Grenada or Panama operations.
As the government begins the necessary process of assessing the
effects of the hurricanes and the response to those events, the picture
is one of laudable successes as well as areas requiring improvement.
I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the
National Guard's efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and our
response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces were in the
water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people within four
hours of Katrina's passing. More than 9,700 National Guard Soldiers and
Airmen were in New Orleans by the thirtieth of August. The National
Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the
passing of the storm.
More than 11,000 National Guard personnel remain on active duty
today in Louisiana alone, with over 12,500 total personnel in the five
affected states. In short, the National Guard response to the
catastrophic events of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma has been and
continues to be both timely and extensive.
While we have been successful in meeting the needs of the warfight
overseas, there exists room for improvement in our capability to
respond effectively to domestic mission requirements. Resourcing
National Guard units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
and Operation Enduring Freedom has reduced the equipment inventory of
the National Guard's non-deploying units. Every effort has been made to
ensure that our deploying units are fully equipped and ready to support
operations anywhere in the world. So far, we have transferred over
101,000 items of equipment in support of these missions. But these
efforts have resulted in reduced inventories of many critical equipment
items here at home, including trucks, radios and heavy engineering
equipment.
Resources earmarked in current legislation will help the National
Guard a great deal in addressing these challenges. By working with the
Army, the Air Force and the Congress to continue to prioritize National
Guard equipment needs, we will be well on the path to ensuring that the
Guard is fully prepared to fulfill its missions both at home and
abroad.Interagency relationships are fundamental to the success of the
federal response to any disaster, and we must continue to foster strong
relationships with the Department of Homeland Security and U.S.
Northern Command. Indeed, coordination efforts to date point to the
need for better planning, procurement of more equipment and
interoperable communications, and joint training of the National Guard,
active duty forces, and our federal partners.
As a full member of the national security team, the National Guard
had met its mission requirements at home and abroad. But additional
resourcing and better inter-governmental coordination is needed in
order for the National Guard to be effectively postured to meet the
needs of the future. By working closely with the Department of Defense,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Congress, the National
Guard will continue to be Always Ready, Always There.
Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Lieutenant General Blum.
And I now recognize Major General Richard Rowe.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD ROWE, JR., DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Major General Rowe. Good morning, sir. Good morning,
Chairman and members.
On behalf of Admiral Keating, it is an honor to be here
today to represent U.S. Northern Command.
The Department of Defense has a long history of defense
support to civilian authorities. In this operation, extending
from the end of August, still ongoing, we are proud of the
performance of Naval, Army, Marine, and Air Force, members from
the active force, that operated in concert with our serving
National Guard members, the Air and the Army National Guard,
and the Coast Guard teammates of the uniformed force, local and
state authorities, civilian authorities, in accordance with the
National Response Plan.
As a director of operations, I can tell you that our United
States Transportation Command, Special Operations Command,
Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command all played valuable
roles in supporting the active force effort.
Northcom was fully engaged to stabilize, to reduce
suffering, in a system recovery. We were engaged early. We met
the storm, as it was Tropical Depression 12, well before it
struck Florida, on 23 August, and reporting situational
awareness updates.
And teleconferences within the Department of Defense, with
the National Guard, with state and local authorities, through
the FEMA national teleconference, all started as early as the
24th and 25th of August.
We have been authorized by the secretary, and we were acted
on it to deploy defense coordinating officers to each of the
potentially impacted states ahead of storm strike.
Defense coordinating officers are serving brigade
commanders, colonels with a staff, and they went to locate at
the state coordinating emergency management facilities side by
side with the designated federal coordinating officer of FEMA.
We were asked, and had authority very early on, to provide
access to Department of Defense bases for operational staging
areas. And we did so. And this provided an ability to surround
the line of attack with logistics and supply.
And we had been authorized by the secretary to work with
the services and the other joint command to identify potential
required capabilities ahead of the storm. And we did that, with
the message on 28 August, to the joint staff and to our fellow
joint commands, that identified potential active capabilities
that would be needed to fill the niches in support of a
hurricane of this extent.
We anticipated requests at all levels, within our command.
We co-located at the state, at the FEMA regional level, and at
national FEMA level to support planning and thinking ahead of
the future operations required.
We were challenged to see the disaster area, the ability to
assess the strike zone through Mississippi, and later, when the
levees broke, inside the city of New Orleans, to understand the
extent of the damage effect and exactly where specific
capabilities might be needed, that assist us in deploying and
employing those capabilities.
During the period of the next 3 weeks after Katrina's
strike, we also continued to engage with all the same players
for anticipating Ophelia, which never did strike land on the
East Coast, and Rita, which struck with devastating effect
toward the end of September.
We saw some key lessons, which we will continue to work.
Many of those have been cited by my fellow panel members in the
areas of communications and collaboration. I would also
highlight reconnaissance capabilities that can be specifically
provided from mud to space, in order to help see the strike
zone and communicate very quickly assessment materials and to
assist.
We need to look at joint command and control enablers to be
in place pre-strike. Post-strike, improve collaboration, in
order to work in the focus efforts, and response capabilities.
We continue at Northcom to monitor the recovery very, very
closely. This morning, 7,000 guardsmen remain on duty in
Louisiana, several hundred in Mississippi, continuing to work
the aftermath of this strike. Less than 250 active forces
remain on active duty, most of them in a combat support
hospital inside New Orleans.
The mission does continue, and it will continue until the
last uniformed servicemember has done. We will continue to
coordinate and work.
Throughout the entire operation, we kept our eye on the
other part of our significant mission, which is homeland
defense. And we kept a balanced approach to make sure we had a
daily estimate for Admiral Keating of the posture of our
active-duty forces that could be called upon for homeland
defense. And we were ready to provide those capabilities
rapidly.
Sir, I am prepared to take questions.
[The statement of Major General Rowe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Richard J. Rowe, Jr.
Chairmen Saxton and Reichert, Congressmen Meehan and Pascrell and
Members of the Subcommittees:
On behalf of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern
Command, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role of our
active duty forces in disaster response. My comments today will first
focus on the actions U.S. Northern Command took to prepare for and
respond to Hurricane Katrina. I will also discuss proposals for
improving the Command's disaster response capabilities.
USNORTHCOM Operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long
history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic
events with specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize
and improve the situation. All DoD support is provided at the direction
of the President or Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the
National Response Plan.
As directed by the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command
supported the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) disaster relief efforts. Hurricane relief was
conducted as a team effort among Federal, state and local governments,
as well as non-governmental organizations. USNORTHCOM was fully engaged
in supporting the massive operation to save lives, reduce suffering and
protect the infrastructure of our homeland.
USNORTHCOM began tracking the tropical depression that became
Hurricane Katrina on 23 August. Before Hurricane Katrina's landfall in
Louisiana and Mississippi, USNORTHCOM established staging bases and
deployed Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Element
teams to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to manage DoD
response efforts in coordination with State and Federal officials.
These teams are normally not activated until a Presidential Disaster
Declaration is made; however, as authorized by the Secretary of
Defense, we deployed them early due to the magnitude of Katrina.
In addition, we alerted forces to be prepared to move as soon as
the situation on the ground stabilized and the Department of Homeland
Security, through FEMA, determined what assets were needed. We
coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide
heavy lift aircraft. We also worked with Joint Forces Command to
identify available Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units to
perform missions such as imagery support and damage assessment, inter-
coastal waterway search and rescue, aviation medical evacuation, and
construction/bridge/utility engineering to restore key infrastructure.
This enabled us to identify appropriate units to perform requested
assistance quickly and provide transportation to the scene as soon as
possible.
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, we were given
authority by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to deploy the forces we
deemed necessary to preserve life and reduce suffering. We had not yet
been asked by Federal agencies for these capabilities, but we wanted to
ensure we could respond when needed. As the levees in New Orleans gave
way and the magnitude of the disaster grew, we continued to lean
forward by preparing and moving additional capabilities, including
emergency medical teams and communications experts.
In anticipation of the significant role the Department of Defense
could play in the rescue and recovery efforts, USNORTHCOM established
Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina). Led by Lieutenant General Russ
Honore (Commander, First Army), JTF-Katrina provided command and
control of Title 10 assets deployed to save lives, mitigate suffering,
and restore critical services. JTF-Katrina grew to include 24,500
active duty forces, over 200 fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and 20
ships at its peak. General Honore and his staff provided pivotal
leadership on the ground and did a superb job providing Department of
Defense assistance in coordination with state National Guard Forces and
other Federal, State, local, and non-governmental partners.
USNORTHCOM met every request for support received from FEMA. In
support of the relief effort, Department of Defense forces conducted
search and rescue operations, assisted with evacuations, organized a
complex logistical system to deliver food, water, and other essential
supplies, provided medical care, provided imagery support, conducted
fire fighting and mosquito abatement missions, cleared debris, safely
managed crowded airspace and assisted with mortuary affairs.
Throughout the operation, we worked with our interagency partners
through on-site liaison officers who provided a daily assessment of
anticipated requests for military support. In addition, we shared
information through teleconferences with Joint Task Forces Katrina,
Defense Coordinating Officers, FEMA and other interagency
organizations, and the Secretary of Defense.
Relationships and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina relief
operations were extremely valuable in facilitating our response to
Hurricane Rita. USNORTHCOM worked with FEMA to define requirements
early and responded by ensuring Title 10 forces, imagery support, and
search and rescue assets were in place ahead of the storm, helping to
mitigate additional suffering.
Lessons Learned. We are actively involved in efforts to compile
lessons learned and incorporate them into future operations. One very
important lesson we learned pertains to unity of effort.
We all witnessed the employment of 50,000 National Guardsmen in
Title 32 status along with 22,500 active duty (Title 10) troops. But
due to various factors, we enjoyed less than comprehensive command and
control throughout disaster relief operations.
Commanding, directing and coordinating the efforts of over 70,000
troops present many challenges under any circumstances. While we
embrace the fact that the National Guard will play a pivotal role in
all disasters, the nation should have the capability to properly
leverage [HSC] active duty forces that have the inherent structure and
capacity to achieve unity of effort when assembling and directing a
large-scale, multi-state response to a catastrophic event.
If a tragedy occurs on a local level, it makes sense that the local
and/or state leadership retain command and control. They know the
terrain, they have the personal relationships with responders, and they
are familiar with the most likely challenges. However, DoD capabilities
can prove extremely helpful in mitigating a disaster when local and
state responders are overwhelmed, consequences are grave, and the scope
of the suffering and the casualties is extensive. We are prepared to
respond as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
[HSC] Another lesson learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina
relates to communications. We need immediate, reliable communications
that are survivable and flexible. These communications must be mobile,
secure and both voice and data capable.
The National Response Plan remains a solid framework for responses
to crises on a certain scale, but there is room for improvement. [HSC]
Conclusion. Our experience demonstrated we have adequate capability
to meet emerging homeland defense and civil support crises. Even as we
act to support civil authorities in responding to natural disasters, we
never lose focus on our primary mission of homeland defense. One fact
remains constant--our enemies should make no mistake about our resolve
or our capabilities.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Major General Rowe.
At this time, the chair will have the opportunity to ask a
few questions. But first, I have a comment or two I would like
to make.
I often have flashbacks, as the sheriff in Seattle, sitting
in your chair, in front of a group called the King County
Council. And shortly after, World Trade Organization (WTO),
similar questions were asked of us. Where did you fail? And
what lessons did you learn during that event?
So I think a lot of us understand your time and appreciate
your presence here today, in making yourselves available to
answer questions. Many of us on the committees represented
today have had the opportunity to visit New Orleans, Biloxi,
Waveland, Mississippi, about 12 miles inland, and have seen for
ourselves the destruction that has taken place there as a
result of Katrina.
We have also, some of us, have had the opportunity to visit
Houston and visit with the leaders there, in Beaumont, Texas,
and the surrounding areas. So we have seen first-hand the
results of Katrina's effects and how the local government, I
think, too, the federal agencies, learned from Katrina.
I am going to assume that, before Katrina, the Department
of Defense has been involved in assisting in serious
catastrophes that have arrived at our shores in the past.
And there has been efforts to integrate your resources and
work together, so when Katrina hit this was not an unexpected
partnership that needed to take place. So there were some
things in place that you have already been used to using, and
plans, and some training together.
One of the questions that weighs heavily on the minds of
the people of America and on the people of this committee, I
think, is why, then, if there were these previous opportunities
to partnership, and these previous plans, and previous
trainings that have occurred, why was our response so slow to
Katrina?
Anyone on the panel wish to--
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, I can only address the military
portion of the response. And as I indicated in my opening
statement, the military response was very fast.
It was unprecedented by comparison to any other remotely
comparable event in American history. As a rough gauge, it was
twice as fast and twice as large as our response to the 1992
Hurricane Andrew. We delivered forces in greater number, with
greater capabilities, beyond anything we had ever done before,
and faster than we had ever done before.
And we did that because it was obvious that there was an
urgent need to save lives and protect property, and that DOD
would be expected to exceed any past level of performance.
And so, at least in terms of the military piece, I guess
the summary I would give to you is we moved very quickly, and
we now recognize the obligation in a future event to move even
more quickly with even greater resources.
Mr. Reichert. I think there is at least a perception that
there was a slow response. And was there communication that was
occurring between the Department of Defense, National Guard,
Coast Guard, FEMA, the Red Cross, and all those others?
We have heard testimony from all of those agencies in
previous hearings. Were you in communication with FEMA before?
Mr. Jackson. I will let DOD address this, as well. But we
absolutely were, as General Rowe stated. From the very first
days when this became a tropical depression and was on our
radar screen, we began the coordination with the Defense
Department.
They participated in the command center at FEMA and had a
senior representative to manage liaison activities. And they
participated in the secure videos and the other video
conferences that we use to manage these events and to plan for
these events.
So there was significant cooperation and sharing of plans
on the types of assets that would be pre-staged into the area
for use after landfall.
Mr. Reichert. Just one more follow-up comment and question.
Some of the testimony that I heard this morning, that we have
heard this morning, were comments made about the response was
not well-integrated, that there was not communication that was
needed to really coordinate an integrated response.
So, if there was communication beforehand, as you just
responded, what needs to be improved, then, to make the
communication clearer, quicker, faster, so that there is an
integrated response to an event like Katrina or Rita in the
future?
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Jackson indicated,
there was close, continuous communication between the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
well before Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29th.
Ten days earlier, on August the 19th, before anyone
anticipated Hurricane Katrina, but at a time when we did
anticipate the hurricane season, the Secretary of Defense
signed a standing execute order for severe weather.
That execute order gave certain authorities to the
combatant commander, Admiral Keating, to coordinate with FEMA,
in order to identify DOD bases that might be used as staging
areas for FEMA and other assistance that we might provide,
including defense coordinating officers, to ensure that the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security
would be working collaboratively.
Now, we did not expect when the secretary signed that on
August the 19th that, a little over a week later, that execute
order would be implemented as it was in advance of landfall of
Hurricane Katrina.
On August 23rd, when Katrina was still a tropical
depression, tropical storm off the coast of Florida, I directed
members of my staff to do a complete inventory of the resources
that we had within the Department of Defense that we could make
available to FEMA, in the event that tropical storm became more
severe, as it did.
We conducted that inventory. We reviewed the Meal, Ready to
Eat (MREs) that we had available, the surge medical capability,
other logistic support, the bases that we might provide.
We did all that within the template of the four hurricanes
that we had supported within Florida last year during
approximately a five-to six-week period of time. And then we
passed all that information to the Department of Homeland
Security.
The challenge in communication was not the staff
communication of the type that I described. We were in close
daily communication.
The communication challenge that I described, the lack of
interoperability, has to do with the tactical communication on
the ground between first responders, the National Guard, and
active-duty military personnel, largely because we have very
different equipment.
A police officer is likely to be carrying a handheld
Motorola. An active-duty military officer is very likely to be
communicating on a secure single channel ground and airborne
radio system (SINCGARS) radio. Those two radios cannot easily
talk to one another.
And so, when I described in my opening statement a change
of interoperability, we need to develop the technology--and we
do have it--and deploy the technology much more effectively, so
that a police officer can talk to a National Guardsman, who, in
turn, can speak to an active-duty military officer, with
interoperability of communications at the tactical level. That
is where the challenge was.
Mr. Reichert. I thank you.
And, sir, did you have--
Lieutenant General Blum. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to add some further clarification, if I might.
If I could direct everybody's attention to the chart to
your right front. You can see a time line across the bottom.
And then you can see a build-up of the forces.
And you can notice that the Governors of the states of
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida already had 2,000
citizen soldiers harbored in place, getting ready to respond to
the hurricane, 4 days before it made landfall in Louisiana.
And as the hurricane was building strength out over the
Gulf, we were building strength of the forces and had 8,000
National Guardsmen in place, sheltered in place along the
Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana coast, because we were not
exactly sure where it would hit, and you do not want to be
exactly where it hits, either.
So you need to be close enough to respond, but not exactly
on ground zero when it happens. And that model, with 8,000
soldiers, was built on Camille, 1969, the largest hurricane
ever to hit the Gulf Coast. And our response then, at its peak,
required 8,000.
So we felt that was a prudent preset. And certainly, they
were not late, because they were there pre-event.
And then, as the event happened, and the situational
awareness became clear, in other words, the devastation, that
the amount--it is 80,000 square miles that we are talking
about. We are talking about the size of the United Kingdom.
People lose sight of that, that having gone down there and
seen how much devastation it really is.
And so when we looked at that, and the two Adjutants
General of the most affected states, which was Louisiana and
Mississippi, called me on the morning at 7:21 and said, ``This
is what we are facing; we need even more,'' we already had
10,000 more soldiers coming through a previously existing--you
asked about previously existing agreements--this is a
previously existing agreement at the state level.
Amongst the Governors of our great nation, since September
11, 2001, every Governor in this country, and even our states
and territories, has signed an emergency management assistance
compact that allows them to flow their National Guard forces
from state to state, equipment from state to state, and to put
those troops that have from the donor states to the receiving
state, under the command and control of the Governor of the
state that is affected.
And we moved in--as you can see, we have pressed it 11,000.
And we grew to ultimately 50,000, in the period of 4 1/2 days.
There is not a force on Earth that can move people any faster
or more efficiently than that.
And you could not put more in there, or you could not have
pushed them full the funnel of the restricted lines of
communication. Bridges were out, roads were out, airfields were
out. They had to be cleared. The bridges had to be cleared.
The highways had to be clear of debris, so you could even
bring in--you had to literally fight your win to the recovery
effort, for those that were not already there in place. And
within 36 hours, you had 133 National Guard helicopters on
site.
That is as fast as it can be done. Now, the Coast Guard was
even faster, because they flew in conditions, frankly, that our
helicopters are not authorized to fly safely in. It has to get
less than 30 knots for us to load up 20, and 30, and often 40
people in an aircraft that is designed to hold 14 in an
emergency condition.
That is what we did. We had one wheel on the top of a
building, and took the seats out of the aircraft, and loaded 35
and 40 people in there. And we evacuated, we saved 15,000
people through that and, later, subsequently, moved 78,000
more.
So the issue is not really the National Guard response or
the military response, because we are part of the military. We
just happen to be part of the Department of Defense that
responds first, because we are forward deployed all across the
landscape of this nation.
We have situation awareness. We had the relationships that
you talked about that have to be there. We know who the sheriff
is, and we know what they have and what they do not have. And
they know what we have and do not have; it is very useful.
And then, when the President came down there and surveyed
the scene on the 2nd of September, he thought it would be
useful to bring in additional ground forces, federal ground
forces.
So there was not a problem there. It was a parallel effort;
there was still unity of effort. And, frankly, we were good,
but I cannot walk on water.
So we had to leverage the Coast Guard and the Navy. And we
only can get through Northern Command. And Northern Command was
in continuous communication with the National Guard Bureau.
They were not surprised by what we were doing. They had
full disclosure on what we were doing. They would like to
probably have had more disclosure and detail on what we were
doing, but they were not surprised that we had 50,000 people
responding to the area.
And they brought in ships. And they brought in amphibious
vehicles that only the Marines had in the area. And, frankly,
some of my soldiers were able to go around through Saint
Bernard's Parish and do the good work that they did, through
the good graces of the United States Marine Corps.
So it was a joint effort. It was a collaborative effort. It
was a magnificent effort. And what we were there to do was
support the civil authorities, the Governors of Louisiana, and
the Governors of Mississippi, and all of the state, local and
federal agencies that the President, the federal agencies, that
the president sent in there to help their Governors.
So there was, in fact, unity of command. The commander was
the Governor--
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, General.
Lieutenant General Blum. --in Louisiana and Mississippi.
Mr. Reichert. I am trying to be as polite as I can, and I
can feel my members in the committee getting a little bit
anxious. I appreciate your energy, and your emotion, and your
thorough answer.
But let's give the other members a chance to ask questions.
So I recognize Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Blum, it is really an honor to have you here,
to cut through the red tape and get to what the answers are.
And I do not expect anything less from the National Guard.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and with the permission
of Chairman Saxton, I just want to yield very briefly, because
of schedule problems, to Congressman Langevin in Rhode Island.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I thank my colleague for yielding. I have to
leave for an 11 a.m. meeting. I hope to be back before the end
of this hearing for additional questions.
But let me begin by asking this. First of all, I have the
privilege on serving on both the House Armed Services
Committee, as well as the Homeland Security Committee.
So much of the work that I deal with in the Capitol here
deals with national security issues, and I have great respect
for both our homeland security officials, whether it is state,
or local, or federal officials, as well as the professionalism
of our military.
And on both sides, they want to make sure that all have the
resources to do their jobs in order to keep the American people
safe.
I am concerned, though, when we are talking about mixing
the two and expanding the role of the military, especially with
respect to engaging in civil or law enforcement activities, on
a routine basis. That concerns me.
And we have a Posse Comitatus statute, which clearly
strikes a balance and is cautious about allowing expanded use
of the military domestically.
I note that the Posse Comitatus statute does not apply when
the President is using his inherent emergency powers, or when
the Insurrection Act applies, or the use of the Coast Guard for
enforcing federal maritime laws, or when it is the assertion of
the immediate response authority by the President.
That being said, and in addition to talking about expanding
the role of the military for catastrophic events--and this
question I will pose to Secretary McHale--some are suggesting
that, in addition to using the military to respond to
catastrophic events, they should also be used to supplement law
enforcement agents along the U.S. border, working in the rural
areas to militarize the border.
And so, Secretary McHale, and I think also General Rowe, it
would be perfect for you to comment. What is the military's
position on this idea?
Mr. McHale. Congressman, if I can touch on a couple of the
issues that you raised, as discrete parts of your question,
there are more than 50 major disasters declared under the
Stafford Act each year. Those are the kinds of recurring
hurricanes and tornadoes that result in a presidential
declaration that provides assistance, usually to a part of a
state, several counties or multiple counties within a state.
The discussion that we are having today does not really
focus upon DOD's role with regard to major disasters. That role
is defined by the National Response Plan, and I think
historically has worked pretty well.
The challenge is when you have got something bigger, when
you have got a catastrophic event of the type that Hurricane
Katrina was or, perhaps, an attack by terrorists, involving a
weapon of mass destruction, where the local or even regional
community is devastated, where the first responder community no
longer exists as a functional entity.
Under that circumstance, where an entire region may have
experienced a devastating event, what should be the role of the
Department of Defense in providing the most effective relief
that we can marshal as a nation?
And the issues then relate to logistics, leadership under
the National Response Plan, and questions of Posse Comitatus,
as noted by Congressman Langevin.
The Department of Defense has taken the position that we
are not advocating changes in the Posse Comitatus statute,
although Senator Warner and others have indicated an interest
in reviewing that statue. And we have pledged our cooperation.
Perhaps the terminology of the statute needs to be updated.
But most, if not all, DOD missions that we envision can be
executed in conformity with the existing language of the Posse
Comitatus statute.
Lastly, with regard to border security, I was a member of
the House Armed Services Committee back in the mid-1990s when
we did militarize our border, specifically the border between
Texas and Mexico. And we had active-duty United States Marines
deployed along that border.
An incident occurred in which a young, armed Mexican man
was shot and killed by active-duty United States Marines. And
after that event, I think by consensus, or near consensus, a
decision was made not to militarize the border, but to
recognize instead that border security is primarily a civilian
law enforcement mission.
Consistent with that, there are statutes, particularly in
the area of counter-narcotics activity, and more recently in
the area of counterterrorism activity, that authorize the
Department of Defense to provide support to civilian law
enforcement in securing our land borders.
We support those statutes. And, in fact, we routinely
deploy forces, particularly along the southwest border, but
last winter along the Canadian border, in order to ensure that
we make available to civilian law enforcement, in their lead,
the resources that are available from the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Langevin. So you are suggesting you are not in favor of
turning the security of the borders over to the military, but
the military would continue to play a supporting role to the
civilian authority?
Mr. McHale. That is the role that we have played for 10
years, and I have heard no advocacy anywhere within the
Department of Defense that would change that responsibility,
other than the scope of support that we would provide to
civilian law enforcement.
Congress passed a statute last year that recognized that
Joint Task Force North, JTF-North, which used to be the old
JTF-6, down in El Paso, Texas, would have a counterterrorism,
as well as a counter-narcotics mission.
And that change in the law, which allows JTF-North to
support civilian law enforcement, has resulted in substantial
and unprecedented deployment of DOD forces for counterterrorism
missions, in support of civilian law enforcement.
But other than that change, we have not advocated--nor did
we even advocate that change--in terms of existing law. We are
in a supporting role.
Mr. Langevin. General Rowe, do you care to comment?
Major General Rowe. Sir, I merely indicate, we at Northcom,
we do not have any difficulty with the Posse Comitatus rule
set.
And for the deployment of our servicemembers, we are able
to take appropriate force protection actions and provide them
rules that allow them to be safe and effective.
I think it is significant when the concern becomes the
deployment of an active-duty capability, such as the division-
ready brigade of the 82nd Second Brigade, 1st Combat Avaition
Brigade (CAB) division, and the Marines that deployed from both
our east and west coast, at the President's request.
What did that mean? It is instrumental to realize that,
when the first C-17s arrived at the New Orleans International
Airport, the sergeant major who had traveled with them had the
airborne paratroopers get out their trash bags and walk among
the people that were at the New Orleans International Airport,
pick up trash, and, all of a sudden, it brought a great deal of
order and discipline to that airport.
They then deployed in on the 4th of September, in
increasing numbers, into the city of New Orleans, where they
worked shoulder-to-shoulder with our National Guard.
Major General Bill Caldwell, who is the commander of the
82nd Airborne, he showed you his diagram of the outline of the
city. You will see in that 45th Brigade of Oklahoma.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. I yield back to the gentleman.
I thank the gentlemen at the table for their comments.
And I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for yielding.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Pascrell?
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Major General Rowe, thank you for your service to your
country. We are proud of you.
I have a few questions. You say on page two of your
testimony that the U.S. Northcom began tracking the tropical
depression that became Hurricane Katrina on August the 23rd.
Before the landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi, Northcom
established staging bases and deployed defense coordinating
officers and defense coordinating element, et cetera.
Then you said that these teams are normally not activated
until a presidential disaster declaration is made. However, as
authorized by the Secretary of Defense, we deployed them
earlier due to the magnitude of Katrina.
Now, if that is the case, on page three of your testimony
you say, ``Shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, we
were given authority by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to
deploy the forces we deemed necessary to preserve life and
reduce suffering. We had not yet been asked by federal agencies
for these capabilities, but we wanted to ensure we could
respond when needed.''
I am trying to understand this to the best of my ability,
because I know that the services have been used as a political
football. Not your fault. It is either our fault or folks down
the street.
And I want you to explain what that means. Where does the
authority rest? Because you said very specifically you acted
without the authority. So clear up my confusion.
Major General Rowe. Sir, we had the ability to work within
our existing authorities to bring forces to a readiness to
deploy. So, for example, at Norfolk, an amphibious readiness
group and a carrier prepared to get underway. In Baltimore, the
T3United States Naval Ship Comfort T1 prepared to get underway.
We engaged with Transportation Command, Special Operations
Command, and Strategic Command to get strategic lift
capabilities, special operations, riverine capabilities, and
appropriate space communications capabilities ready to go.
At the point each of those deployed, the Department of
Defense and the joint staff had worked in the inner-agency to
ensure that we had the appropriate authority to act.
Mr. Pascrell. I mean, you do understand why we could be
confused about looking, and reading, or listening to your
testimony on this, and listening to the administration explain
where the authority rests?
So, in other words, when we see an emergency, if we are
able to prepare for an emergency, we realize that, if
terrorists attack, we are not going to have any preparation,
for the most part.
But if we are waiting for an emergency, and we had 7 or 8
days to prepare for this emergency, there is no necessary need
for a declaration by the President for you to move, be
mobilized, and be ready, correct?
Mr. Reichert. General, before you answer, could you speak
closer to the mike please? We are having trouble hearing. Thank
you.
Major General Rowe. Sir, as I understand the question, I
would have to take that for the record, to work the lines of
exactly when we have what authority.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
Major General Rowe. We leaned as far forward as we could.
Mr. McHale. Mr. Pascrell, I am prepared to address that, if
you would like me to?
Mr. Pascrell. Sure, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. McHale. The fundamental document that guides all of our
federal agencies in responding to major disasters or
catastrophic events is the National Response Plan.
The NRP was published last year. And it defines the roles
for the Department of Defense in our relationship with all
other federal agencies, but most especially the lead federal
agency, the Department of Homeland Security.
And the way the National Response Plan is written, based
upon the preexisting document, the Federal Response Plan, that
goes back over many decades, the concept is that, when
something really bad happens, if we have a major disaster, the
president will make a declaration of a major disaster, upon
request by the Governor, and then the system is designed to be
based upon a poll of DOD resources, upon request by the lead
federal agency, which is typically FEMA.
In this case, we knew that this was going to be a
catastrophic event. And we leaned into the mission. We had a
sense of urgency. We took risk.
We began deploying resources before anybody asked for those
resources. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Acting Deputy
Secretary of Defense, who was also the Secretary of the Navy,
for instance, began moving ships with their resources, to
include medical and helicopter resources, before we received
any request under the National Response Plan.
So what the General is saying is that the Department of
Defense, with a sense of urgency, anticipated the request that
would ultimately come from FEMA.
And in anticipation of those requests, in a manner,
frankly, that I think this committee would have wanted us to
do, we started pushing those resources forward. And then, when
the request came in, those resources were already in place.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your
response.
Thank you, General, for your response.
But I must say this: Then there was no need for anyone in
the administration to say, ``We were waiting to be asked by the
mayor or the Governor.'' This needs clarification.
This is not time for blame. I am not talking about blame. I
am going to the very center of the issue.
Based upon what you have testified to, General Rowe
testified to, there is absolutely nothing preventing the
Federal Government and its forces to be on hand before and
acting before, as you have just stated you were.
You were not asked by the Governor to do that. You were not
asked by the mayor to do that. You were not asked by the
chairman to do that. You did it because you are smart and you
know how to deal with things beforehand.
This is the point of clarity. That is why I have asked
those questions. I got many more questions to ask you, but we
will move on.
Thank you very much for both of your answers.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The chairman will recognize other members for questions
that they may wish to ask. So there is no confusion, I plan to
recognize members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority. Those coming in later will be recognized in the
order of their arrival.
We are going to stick now strictly to the 5-minute rule,
for those members that have not asked questions yet. I am told
we have votes, possibly at noon, so I will now recognize
Chairman Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Secretary McHale, I would just like to offer
you the opportunity to elaborate on, perhaps, the subject that
you had just begun to discuss.
We have heard the term catastrophic event. We have seen
several catastrophic events in the last several years.
When a catastrophic event occurs, can you just elaborate
for us on how the National Response Plan and the DOD joint
strategy for homeland security treat a catastrophic event? And
how does the local and federal response dovetail together?
Just talk us through this process, if you would.
Mr. McHale. As I indicated to Congressman Pascrell, the
fundamental document that organizes and integrates the federal
response is the National Response Plan.
Under the National Response Plan, new authority has been
granted--and I would invite Secretary Jackson to comment upon
this--new authority has been granted to the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to identify and declare an
incident of national significance.
That category did not exist under the old federal response
plan. And in my judgment, it provides an opportunity, and was
intended to provide an opportunity, for an earlier engagement
of DOD resources in support of the Department of Homeland
Security.
We, frankly, anticipate that, when a catastrophic event is
approaching, the secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security will look at the facts and declare an incident of
national significance.
And so, at an earlier point in time than historically has
been the case, we would expect to begin receiving what the
Department of Homeland Security calls mission assignments. We
call them requests for assistance.
They would start coming to us earlier on for assistance.
And that support would begin to flow in advance of the event.
We would not be delayed by the occurrence of the event or a
subsequent presidential declaration.
When something bad does happen, we anticipate that the
National Response Plan will cause the Governor to request a
major disaster declaration from the president. And then, at
that point, FEMA, almost assuredly, will begin sending to the
Department of Defense request for assistance. That is the way
it has worked historically.
And so the model is the National Response Plan. It is
normally based on DHS request DOD assets. But in this case, to
come back to Mr. Pascrell's question, we anticipated that a
Category 5 hurricane, which came ashore as a Category 4
hurricane, was going to produce a devastating effect.
And so, in anticipation of the kinds of formal requests
that would later come in under the National Response Plan, we
began moving. No one waited in the Department of Defense.
The guidance given to me by my superiors, the guidance that
was communicated by me to others was, ``Let's get moving.''
We faced an immediate challenge. We knew that DOD resources
would have to be engaged. And wanted to move those resources
forward with offensive urgency so that, when DHS came to us for
assistance, we would be prepared to move.
And we believe that the statistics are undeniable that the
forward movement of DOD resources was unprecedented in its
speed and scope.
Mr. Saxton. Secretary Jackson, Secretary McHale just
indicated that his role, DOD's role, is to respond to your
requests. Walk us through your process.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, happy to.
The weekend before this hurricane made landfall, the
Governors requested the emergency declaration that Secretary
McHale spoke of. And, in fact, the President did that weekend
prior to landfall put in place those emergency declarations.
So they were on the table, providing the authority and
creating an explicit recognition of national significance. So
we were able, actually, to begin to make mission assignments
prior to landfall in sync with what DOD had done to surge
assets in preparedness for this event.
We take those mission requests from the state and local
officials. We then assess who the right entity would be to
implement those. And mission assignments went all across the
federal government, and also into the private sector.
And, therefore, we pushed out to Defense Department those
mission assignments. Requests for assistance is the formal
legal mechanism that we use.
It is not very bureaucratic. It happens very quick. We have
our teams co-located. And I will tell you that DOD has learned
very well to help coach us to write together those mission
assignments so that we can make sure that the assets are
positioned as quickly as possible.
Mr. Saxton. My time has expired. I hope that one of the
questioners that follow me will get into what happens if you do
not have the appropriate knowledge than an event is going to
occur.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reichert. The chair now recognizes Mr. Simmons, who was
next to arrive at the hearing.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank all of our witnesses for their excellent
testimony. I am particularly gratified that we have two fine
Army officers at the table. And as a retired Army officer, it
gives me great faith and comfort to hear their testimony.
Of course, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral
Collins, the Coast Guard Academy is in my district. And they
are always prepared, semper paratus.
They did a fabulous job. And if you look at the numbers, I
mean, logistically, with my background and interest in military
affairs, whether it is Roman legions or whatever, getting their
firstest with the mostest is critically important. And the
logistics of this operation is just extraordinary.
That being said, I am a believer in Posse Comitatus. I do
not want the military doing domestically within the United
States things that they are not supposed to be doing and that
the civilian authority does not want them to do. So I think
that it is a difficult but a fine line that we have to follow.
My interest is in the comments made about situational
awareness. And I believe, General Rowe, you made reference to
teleconferences. You made reference to reconnaissance, a
satellite and other types of reconnaissance. And in your
written testimony, you talked about imagery support.
My sense was that one of the biggest problems was
information operations and sharing with the American people
just what you were doing. That, in actual fact, the media was
running around with a cameraman and a microphone talking to
people, and some of what they were collecting and distributing
was very distressing to me and to other Americans watching
this.
But, except for General Honore, and except for a few other
cases, we did not have a clear sense of the situation from your
perspective. We were not controlling our information
operations.
And let me bring up two images here that were not collected
through national technical means, that were available within
hours of the incident, that showed, in this particular
instance, the Astrodome, I believe, before and after, the race
track, before and after. The other one shows the levees that
were broken.
All of this is from Digital Globe, which is an open-source
of overhead imagery, which is virtually real-time, which could
be shared with the American people to give them an hour-by-hour
assessment of what the problem is, where the people are going,
what the military is doing, what the Coast Guard is doing.
Certainly, your cameras on your helicopters were terrific.
But, you know, this would provide you the opportunity to manage
the information so that we were not dependent on some cases on
erroneous information collected by the media, perhaps with good
intent, but nonetheless distorting the overall picture.
And so my question goes to, how do we manage information
operations, when it comes to these sorts of things? Even if you
are working with classified information, you have access to
open source of this nature and other types.
How can we better manage our presentation of what we are
doing in a crisis like this?
Anybody who wants to answer, feel free.
Mr. McHale. Congressman, in 1992, after Hurricane Andrew,
Government Accountability Office (GAO) did a pretty thorough
report on the response to Hurricane Andrew. And in that report,
it was noted that the initial damage assessment immediately
following Hurricane Andrew were almost universally inaccurate.
In the first 24 to 48 hours after Hurricane Andrew, the
full extent of the damage was not well-known. We did not learn
from that experience. In Hurricane Katrina, a similar
occurrence took place in the first 24 to 48 hours after Katrina
made landfall.
You noted certain aerial images of the New Orleans area. In
fact, imagery of that type would have been very helpful in
order to more rapidly and accurately assess the devastation
along the Mississippi Gulf Coast.
The media coverage early on tended to focus on New Orleans.
Much less coverage was provided with regard to the Mississippi
Gulf Coast, where utter devastation had taken place.
We learned from that experience. And so, about a month
after Hurricane Katrina, when we were preparing for Hurricane
Rita, a very detailed ISR plan, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance plan, was developed, so that, using DOD assets,
we would be able to get imagery equal to or even better than
the type you have just provided.
That plan--General Rowe may want to comment--included P-3s,
C-130 aircraft, Predators, high-altitude and space-based
imagery, so that, in preparation for Rita, we were not
dependent upon open-source media.
We had our own collection capabilities for wide-area
surveillance so that we would be able to more quickly and
accurately assess the damage.
And, finally, when disasters occurred not long after that,
in Pakistan and Guatemala, at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, we conveyed to Pakistan and Guatemala our lesson
learned, indicated to them that an immediate ISR would be
essential, and, in fact, consistent with operational security,
provided images to those countries so that they would be able
to conduct more rapid and accurate damage assessments.
We have learned that lesson.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands, Ms. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Chairman.
And good morning and welcome to the joint committee
hearing. And although the response was slow and heartbreaking,
I think we are getting a better understanding this morning of
why that happened. But we do applaud DOD and the Coast Guard
for the work that they did when they were on the ground.
I am going to try to get through as many questions as
possible. I will start with Assistant Secretary McHale.
In your response just a few moments ago, you said that you
were able, based on your experience, to deploy the kinds of
assets you thought were needed in advance, just based on your
own assessment.
I am used to preparing for hurricanes with FEMA. And I am
wondering, was there that coordination with Department of
Homeland Security in assessing what assets you had to have in
place in advance of the storm, or did you make those decisions
on your own?
Mr. McHale. We coordinated closely and daily, almost
continuously, with the Department of Homeland Security. On
August 23rd, as I mentioned earlier, when Katrina was still a
tropical storm, we had concerns that a tropical storm passing
over Florida entering the Gulf would pick up speed and become a
more severe event, as happened.
And so what we did was, we went back to the four hurricanes
that we had addressed in about a six-week period of time last
year in Florida. And we looked at all the capabilities that we
had employed in response to those four hurricanes.
And, typically, that involves massive quantities of meals,
MREs, surge medical capability, other logistical support, and
the designation of DOD bases to assist FEMA. We conducted that
inventory on August 23rd and subsequently shared that
information with the Department of Homeland Security.
And finally, what I would point out is that, not only do we
coordinate with DHS in a crisis environment, there are
approximately 65 employees who work in my office who work full-
time at DHS. If we were to leave this hearing room right now
and go over to the Nebraska Avenue complex of DHS, you would
find DOD employees from my shop co-located, working side-by-
side with their DHS counterparts.
So the communication is robust and continuous at the staff
level. The challenge is to make sure that we have the
operational capabilities that are well-coordinated in a crisis.
Mrs. Christensen. Major General Rowe, you, in your
testimony, said that you had been--Northcom had been fully
engaged in the preparation leading up to Hurricane Katrina. I
think you said maybe from the 23rd or the 24th.
And I am glad to hear that, because one of our very first
trips when this committee was formed was to go to Northcom. And
it seems as though you have come a long way.
But my understanding is that there had recently been an
exercise that included the topping or the breaching of the
levees. And my question to you is, wasn't that possibility
considered in your preparation? And, if so, what preparation
was done to deal with that?
Major General Rowe. Ma'am, thank you for that question.
Your references to the exercise about a year ago, by the
records we have at Northern Command, we did not participate.
I have some situational awareness personally of New
Orleans, because my number two daughter is a graduate of Loyola
of New Orleans and a couple of visits there and aware of the
situation and the potential.
We identified when the hurricane was a Category 5--it came
on land as a 4. We were aware of the potential threat, in the
past reports and situational awareness materials we have of the
potential of devastation in New Orleans.
And we, with great relief, greeted the end of the day on
the 29th, when the hurricane strike and went into that night,
with we had dodged a direct hit on New Orleans, because,
unfortunately, the main brunt of the storm was felt in
Mississippi.
Mrs. Christensen. Deputy Secretary Jackson, given all that
we know now, and the slowness that a lot of us saw and were so
upset about, there seemed to be difficulty getting to the sites
of the disaster.
And we have been focusing on criticizing the slowness of
the response. But knowing what we know, it sounds as though the
appropriate response would have been to evacuate everyone.
So, given that there was an emergency declaration, and we
knew that the possibility existed for the levees to be breached
and flooding to occur, given the emergency declaration, wasn't
it the responsibility--didn't the federal government have a
greater responsibility to see that that evacuation took place?
Mr. Jackson. The decision to execute an evacuation order is
a state and local decision, not a federal decision. We are
there to support that decision.
Mike Brown has testified that he strongly encouraged that
decision. And, in fact, as you know, the local authorities in
Louisiana did make that decision. And so we were very strongly
in support of that decision.
Mrs. Christensen. It just seems to me that, at the point at
which you are coordinating, there is a point at which you
realize that the capacity for the state and local to handle
that has been exceeded, and the Federal Government should have
automatically stepped in.
Mr. Reichert. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr.
Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and testifying.
It seems to me that what we are trying to get at is
unraveling some confusion in deciding who should be in charge
when. And, frankly, some of the confusion exists and is
represented right here.
We have three men in uniform, the commandant of the Coast
Guard, part of the Department of Homeland Security, and we have
a General from Northcom, representing the active-duty Army, and
then we have the head of the National Guard.
And General Blum said that the National Guard is DOD's
first responders. But that is part of the question we are
getting at, whether it is DOD's first responders or the
Governor's first responders.
Is the Department of Homeland Security in charge, as
represented by, in this case, Admiral Allen down in New
Orleans? Or, if you are going to bring disparate
representatives of men and women in uniform, should DOD be in
charge? Should Northcom be in charge?
And I think it is the question that we are trying to get
at. I share the concerns expressed by some of my colleagues
here in using active-duty forces, not just in reference to
Posse Comitatus and law enforcement, but do we want the active-
duty military to step in and taking over the responsibilities
of Governors?
These are important questions that we are trying to get at.
And I think there is just confusion about who is who.
You have an admiral in uniform down in New Orleans, who, by
the way, is doing a fabulous job. I was down there a week ago
with a Congressional Delagation (CODEL) from the Armed Services
Committee and looking at the devastation in New Orleans and
going all the way up the coast to the Mississippi Gulf Coast is
just--it is staggering.
Ms. Davis was with us. And I know that we were both stunned
by the extent of the devastation, both in its totality and
its--so we had a gigantic catastrophe here. And that is what we
are grappling with.
Is the National Response Plan, is it adequate? Does it
encompass this sort of catastrophe that crosses over state
lines?
We have the question of when we use active-duty forces.
Assistant Secretary McHale talked about leaning forward. And it
seems to me that what DOD did, with its active forces, was
start to deploy them, but I do not think they were employed, in
the sense that we would think of in the military.
And so I am sure where I am going with this, because,
again, it is part of the confusion. I am not sure who I should
be turning to.
But let me just continue to pick on you, Assistant
Secretary McHale, to talk about that issue of what the
Department of Defense's position might be on, if and when
Northcom, in this case, or DOD might be asked to take over.
What is the thinking that is going on now? And help us
understand that, really a strange blend here, with the citizen
soldiers that General Blum is talking about, the Coast Guard,
and active forces, and how we pull that together.
Mr. McHale. Congressman, when there is a major disaster or,
under current authorities, even a catastrophic event, the law
is pretty clear the DHS has the lead.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and various presidential
directives that have been published since that time make it
clear that, under the National Response Plan, when a federal
response is required to a major disaster or a catastrophic
event, DHS moves into the lead, in terms of coordinating the
entire federal response.
And the Department of Defense is in a supporting role. And
the military chain of command, as you know, from your own
experience, remains exclusively in military hands.
The actual command authority of the military forces is
exercised by the secretary and subordinate officers. But those
military forces are then used to assist FEMA and DHS.
Now, here is--
Mr. Kline. Excuse me. Could I just interrupt for just a
second?
Mr. McHale. Sure.
Mr. Kline. Because, again, we are talking about military
forces. But are we talking Title 10 or 32? Is the Coast Guard
being included in military forces? Or are you just talking
about active-duty forces and who they work for?
I mean, I think that is part of our confusion here, is who
is working for whom, even if you are in uniform.
I am sorry. I did not mean to interrupt.
Mr. McHale. We are talking about Title 10 forces. They may
be active-duty forces or they may be Reserve component Title 10
forces, but we are talking about the military forces that are
under the command and control of the President of the United
States, pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.
That authority is delegated to the Secretary of Defense,
who in turn delegates that responsibility to command down to
Admiral Keating, who is the commandant commander at Northcom.
Initially, the responsibility of the National Guard is a
state responsibility, a gubernatorial responsibility, where the
National Guard is under the command and control of the
Governor.
In this case, because of the magnitude of the event, and
the fact that, through an Emergency Management Assistant
Compact (EMAC) agreement, 50,000 National Guardsmen ultimately
were moving into the Area of Responsibility (AOR), a decision
was made to move those Guard forces from state status into
Title 32 status.
In Title 32, those 50,000 National Guard remained under the
command and control of the affected Governor, but they were
paid for by the Department of Defense. So it is kind of a
hybrid category.
The real challenge that we face is this: When a
catastrophic event occurs that essentially decimates an entire
region and degrades or destroys the first responder community
within that region, what should the role of the Department of
Defense be to, a, provide resources promptly to begin the
response? And, b, what leadership role, if any, should be
assigned to the Department of Defense?
Those are two related but separate questions. In this case,
we moved very fast.
But the lesson learned is, in a catastrophic event that
might be a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass
destruction, in the future, we will have to move even faster,
with more people, more resources.
The follow-on question is, when we do that, should we be in
support of FEMA or should we have an assigned leadership
responsibility? Those questions are related, but they have to
be answered separately.
Mr. Reichert. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr.
Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHale, you mentioned in your testimony--very
effusive in your praise, essentially, about operations, about
the ability to move things where they needed to get moved to,
and so on.
But you did mention where, if there was a problem, it was
in the planning. And you did not get into too many details in
your testimony. So could you give us some details about that,
what that means?
And in answering that question, could you talk about some
of the concerns that we have heard about the--not in terms of
the unity of effort issue, but the unity of command issue?
We have heard there was obvious confusion between, ``Who do
I report to? I am National Guard, I am active-duty, I am
Reserve, who am I--I am out here on the ground. Who am I
supposed to be reporting to?'' And if that is what you mean a
little bit by planning ahead for that.
And if you can answer those, and leave me some time to ask
a few more questions, I would appreciate it. Go ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McHale. I will see what I can do.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Mr. McHale. These are tough questions.
As I indicated in my earlier testimony, by September 10th,
there were 72,000 military forces that had been deployed into
the area of responsibility, into the AOR.
Of the 72,000, 50,000 were National Guard under command and
control of the affected Governor, 22,000 were active-duty
military personnel under the command authority of the secretary
of defense and, ultimately, the President of the United States.
So you had 72,000 total, 50,000 in the Guard, 22,000 active
duty.
General Honore commanded the 22,000 active-duty military
forces. He coordinated primarily with Major General Landreneau,
who was the Adjutant General of Louisiana, to ensure that, by
agreement, by coordination, the activities of the 50,000
guardsmen would be compatible with the activities, the
operational activities, of the 22,000 active-duty military
personnel.
But technically, the Guard was under the command and
control of the Governor. The active-duty military personnel
were under the command of Admiral Keating, the Secretary of
Defense and the President of the United States.
However, if that coordination had broken down at any point,
the President of the United States had the ability to bring the
Guard into federal service, at which point unity of command
would have been established and all 72,000 of those forces
would have been under the command and control of Admiral
Keating.
But on a daily basis, General Honore felt confident that
coordination with Major General Landreneau was working well and
that it would not be necessary to bring the Guard into federal
service, though that option always remained as a choice that
could have been made under appropriate circumstances by the
President. It proved to be unnecessary.
With regard to planning, the planning for the deployment
and operational activities of those 50,000 guardsmen took place
independently of the planning was conducted at Northcom.
But I want to emphasize Lieutenant General Blum was pushing
forward that information so that Northcom would have full
situational awareness of what the Guard was doing in their
operational planning.
Despite the fact that General Blum was pushing that
information forward, I am not confident that our deliberate
staff planning and our crisis ever really got fully integrated,
so that we would not, for instance, deploy multiple helicopters
from the Guard, from Northcom, maybe from the Coast Guard, to
pick up the same family from the same roof in a flooded area of
New Orleans.
So there was excellent crisis planning, but that planning
needs to be better integrated in the future.
Mr. Larsen. So does that need to be pre-event planning, or
can you even plan for that? Does it have to take place during
the crisis?
Mr. McHale. It is both. I think Secretary Jackson can
better address the catastrophic scenarios that have been
developed by DHS.
In my view, based on the scenarios that have been developed
by DHS, we need better deliberate staff planning in advance of
the event and then a better mechanism for crisis planning
during an event to make sure that what the Guard is doing is
fully known to and compatible with what the active-duty forces
are doing in the same AOR.
Mr. Larsen. I am running out of time, and hopefully
Secretary Jackson can address that, but I have another question
about, Secretary McHale, your comments.
You seem to say in your testimony that, as a major disaster
or as a catastrophic event that was a hurricane, as opposed to
some other catastrophic event, we learned a lot and we did
okay, but we maybe are not as prepared as we should be after
the last four years of trying to be prepared for another
catastrophic event that could be a terrorist attack or
something like that.
Is that what I gathered from your written testimony and
your oral testimony?
Mr. McHale. Not quite.
Mr. Larsen. That is why I wanted to give you that
opportunity there.
Mr. McHale. The federal response plan, over many decades,
and the National Response Plan, during the past year or so,
have worked pretty well in dealing with recurring major
disasters, the kinds of hurricanes that statistically occur
with regularity each year, the kinds of tornadoes that sweep
across the Midwest every year.
Those events are terribly tragic for the affected
communities, but they tend to hit fairly localized areas. And
the damage has been such that traditional mechanisms of
response have worked reasonably well.
Katrina brought forcefully to our consciousness a higher
level of event, a catastrophic event where an entire region is
just devastated, where the first responder community is taken
out by the magnitude of the event, where DOD forces, no matter
how quickly they arrive, cannot, under the current construct,
adequately backfill the loss or the near-complete loss of the
first responder community.
What do you do in the first day or two after a terrorist
attack involving a weapon of mass destruction where the damage
is equal to or greater than that of Hurricane Katrina?
Hurricane Katrina has forced us, as it should, to look with
an unflinching eye at what the requirements may be, not in
response to a major disaster--we were pretty well-prepared in
that case--but a catastrophic event where tens of thousands of
Americans may lose their lives, where the first responder
community is maybe taken out by the event and where a prompt
response requires something bigger and faster than anything we
have done before.
Mr. Reichert. The gentleman's time--
Mr. Larsen. Just quickly, out of respect for other members,
I will not push Secretary Jackson right now to respond, but out
of respect for Secretary Jackson, if you wanted to respond in
writing to the first question to Secretary McHale, for the
record, I just wanted to give you that opportunity.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.
Davis.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate you coming in to discuss this issue today. I
have told many groups, and certainly my constituents, that I
think the real silver lining from Katrina is going to be our
response to a WMD type of threat, as opposed to looking simply
at a natural disaster, because of the scope and scale. And in
that case, we will not have 6 days of advance notice.
I also share, because of it being the largest disaster that
hit, from a natural disaster standpoint, on American soil that
the Constitution works. And I think it is very important that
we understand that.
It is interesting, on this panel, that the former
professional officers have very strong feelings about DOD not
being in that response capability. That is not our job. I think
it creates very ominous constitutional questions that later
generations might inherit. And those of who have worn the
uniform are sensitive to that fact.
Nonetheless, I have to say that, with some of these
questions, the equivalent of the mobilization that began 5 days
before was the equivalent of moving my home county, 72,000
people, across the country in the space of a week and being
open for business. That was much more rapid than any wartime
deployment we have ever had.
And I also think it is apparent that much of the alleged
blame that is being pointed upward in this, and some of the
implications--I am not speaking here in our discussion today,
but certainly out in the media, I find it interesting, where--
Robert E. Lee said it was unfortunate that the best generals in
the Confederacy were all reporters.
But my point here is the one thing that has been
remarkable, in the discussion that you all have faced, is that
we are ignoring the gross and unacknowledged local leadership
failure that took place in New Orleans, where as many other
communities did not suffer the same, let's say, complete social
dislocation.
I know that is a sensitive discussion. And, you know, we
saw different responses in different areas. But I think it
points, you know, as we look in hindsight, there were some
things that we can do better.
You, as, let's says, response professionals, who are
looking at the magnitude of the institution, wrestle with this
on a daily basis. General Rowe made the comment about starting
to pick the trash up and just bringing order and discipline.
And what I would like for you to comment on--I would like
to address this to those wearing the uniforms today--first, as
military professionals, would you comment on the impact of
local leadership in the imminent and the immediate time before
and the immediate aftermath of an event similar to Katrina?
And then, second, you know, from an organizational,
operational or leadership standpoint, would you comment on what
you think that should be done differently or better, focusing
on that aspect of leadership, which is the one we have not
really talked about a lot.
Lieutenant General Blum. Leadership in any event, whether
it is the normal management of the course of events or in a
crisis situation, is paramount. And the better leadership you
have, usually the better response you have.
I mean, we have seen that time and time again in history.
Leadership does make a difference. And leadership comes from
many different places.
The question that has come up over and over this morning,
and I feel compelled to address this, there is no confusion.
You mentioned a document that trumps all of the plans, all of
the proposals, and has endured since the initiation of our
nation.
It is called the Constitution. It is what us in uniform
have sworn to defend. And that Constitution was played out in
the response to Katrina. It was a shared responsibility, which
is exactly what our founding fathers had in mind.
The Governors are always in charge, always--underline
always--in their state. They are in charge until they are no
longer the Governor.
The President has a shared responsibility to assist the
Governors when it becomes beyond their capability or their
resources. Our President did exactly that.
There were five states involved in Katrina. They did not
all need the same level of support and resources, because they
were not all equally affected by the storm. That was measured
out.
All of the response, whether it is coming from the
Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Defense,
federal assistance, monies, capabilities, people, equipment, is
there to support the Governor.
There is always one person in charge in Louisiana. It is
the elected Governor. The same goes for Texas, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida.
And the National Guard is a part of the Department of
Defense. And the President and the Secretary of Defense have a
clear decision, any time they want, to make sure that the
National Guard is either responding as a federal force, in
federal status, in Title 10, or to loan that force to be
available to be under the command and control of the Governor,
either in state active-duty, as a pure state militia, or to be
in Title 32 status, where the check is written by the Federal
Government, but the forces and direction are given by the
Governor.
I do not understand why there is confusion in here. That is
what our founding fathers intended. That is exactly the way we
responded to Katrina. That is exactly the way this General,
officer, and soldier, and citizen, and taxpayer thinks we
should respond in the future.
Mr. Reichert. General, thank you so much. It was awkward to
interrupt the General the first time, but to interrupt the
General a second time is even more awkward.
So I apologize, but we do have votes. And we have one more
member who wants to ask a question.
And the chair would recognize the gentlelady from New York,
Ms. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
expertise of the panel.
And after sitting here for a couple of hours, and hearing
all of my colleagues pretty much ask the same question, who is
in charge, I still want to pursue that.
And I particularly thank Secretary McHale, because you
mentioned very clearly that we were very good at moving forces
in, but the problem was the integration of them.
And I just hope, because we will not have time to really
explore this in depth, Secretary Jackson, that a couple of
months have passed, and I would hope this Administration will
finally bring to closure who is in charge.
I would like to refresh many of my colleagues'--some
comments that took place at a future hearing, when we had
Admiral Stiroy and Admiral Gilmour report to us. And it was
clear that they did yeoman work, rescuing thousands and
thousands of people.
But when I asked, ``What happened at the nursing home? What
happened with those who were left behind and died?'' We cannot
bring those people back today. But the issue was, ``Who did you
report to? Who gave you direction? Did the helicopters just
take off and make their own decisions as to who they would pick
up?''
And I thought another particular comment--because this
hearing is quickly coming to a close--was interesting.
A Maryland state police officer reported a story to NBC
News about rescuing stranded residents following Hurricane
Katrina. When a military helicopter swooped down over him,
someone in the helicopter dropped a bottle to the ground that
contained a note warning of a dangerous gas leak ahead.
Now, I am happy that the message was conveyed. It almost
sounds like we are back in the Paul Revere era. And we should
not be distributing messages by bottles coming out of
helicopters.
So it was clear for me from that hearing and this hearing
that it is still not clear as to whether the forces are all
integrated and if, God forbid, we have a major WMD or any other
kind of attack, who is in charge.
I would like to pursue in the couple of minutes I have
left, or maybe 2 minutes, the issue of communications and
interoperability.
General Blum, I believe you recently told the House
Government Reform Committee that Guard units have on average
only 34 percent of their authorized equipment, including radios
and other communications equipment.
You told Congressman Murtha, who served in the Marine Corps
in Korea and Vietnam, that he probably used the same radios
that you are using today.
What are we going to do about this? I mean, again, we
cannot bring those lives back, but in an emergency, if these
agencies cannot communicate with each other, we are in trouble.
Is it possible? And it seems to me that the military has
the most advanced, well-funded research and development in the
country. Where are we going with this? Why can't we develop
interoperability?
Is there anything that DOD can do to help solve the
problems of communications interoperability for first
responders? And what kind of technology is in the DOD pipeline?
So, in conclusion, I would hope--Secretary Jackson, you can
get back to me in the committee--as to looking forward, if
something happened now, are we better integrated, Secretary
Jackson and Secretary McHale?
And in terms of interoperability, are we still in such
desperate shape that people cannot talk to each other and they
are going to have to throw bottles out of helicopters, so you
can get those messages?
I still it--oh, it is still a green light. If someone could
answer those questions.
Lieutenant General Blum. I will start. The reason we had
the throw the bottle out--
Mrs. Lowey. Maybe you could give me a quick response, and
then give us some details.
Lieutenant General Blum. It will be quick. I need $1.3
billion to buy the radios I need so I do not have to throw
bottles with notes. That is to begin with.
I back that comment up with a congressional audit that this
body commissioned through the GAO to look at the equipment
problems in the Guard. These are not my figures; this is the
result of a year-long, in-depth look by them. You can see the
results.
That line is going the wrong way, and we can no longer
accept risk by under-equipping the National Guard, which is an
operational force that will respond in moments.
And it cannot wait for the equipment. It has to have it in
the hands of the aviators, the citizen soldiers and airmen now,
before the event, so that we can be ready when we are called.
Mrs. Lowey. I would address a follow-up to that to both
Secretary McHale and Secretary Jackson. It is not just the
National Guard. It is the police. It is the firefighters. It is
the Emergency Mdeical Services (EMS) workers. The
interoperability situation in this country is still a disaster.
Lieutenant General Blum. The National Guard, because of the
wisdom of the Congress, has civil support teams with a
communications band that does exactly that, Congresswoman.
They can, if somebody is talking on an apple and General
Rowe is talking on an orange, a different type of system
altogether, it can net the two of them. I flew seven of those
into the area to make that integration happen. We brought them
in from West Virginia and neighboring states, as far away as
West Virginia.
Mr. Reichert. General--
Mrs. Lowey. Well, we have to close--
Mr. Reichert. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Lowey. --but I hope we can continue.
Mr. Reichert. And, General, that is three times. So please
forgive me one more time.
I would like to recognize--we have a visitor this morning
who is not a member of either committee, but I would like to
give her an opportunity to ask a question, if she chooses, the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I appreciate that.
And I am here really as a member of one of the gap panels,
and we have been looking at this issue in Homeland Security and
also, certainly, the military response.
And I had an opportunity to travel, as Mr. Kline did, to
the region recently. And, you know, to a great extent, I think
you have really answered some of those questions. We met with
General Blum yesterday.
But I wanted to focus quickly on that triggering event, at
the time at which we know that local responses have been
incapacitated. The Admiral spoke on the--when we were in New
Orleans there about the fact that we were really dealing with a
hybrid incident here.
It went from a disaster to a major national incident. And,
in fact, you know, we understand that there could be more.
Are we in a position that we can gain that successfully so
that local responders and communities can begin to think the
process--
Mr. Jackson. We really are--
Mrs. Davis of California. --about which point we know that
we have this issue on our hands? How do we do that? Do you have
the resource to do that? What can the Congress provide to you
so that we do that better?
Mr. Jackson. We really are focused on that.
And that is a question the President addressed when he
asked the Department of Homeland Security to review with state
and local officials the evacuation planning, the incident
management plans of the major metropolitan areas in this
country. So we have lost that, that enterprise, that
investigation, that review, collectively.
And an important part of what we are all talking about here
is a more vigorous exercise program, together with the federal
family and our state and local partners. Without that, we will
not have the preplanning and the knowledge in advance of these
events to be able to manage them effectively.
So we need to put more focus there. We need to complete and
then put a continuous focus on those evacuation plans, those
emergency response management plans for the state and local
colleagues.
Mr. Reichert. And I do apologize to the gentlelady from
California, but we are out of time.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. We must run over and do our voting duties.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions. The members of the committee may
have some additional questions for the witnesses. And we ask
you to respond to these in writing.
The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
Questions from the Hon. Mike Rogers
AVIAN FLU
Mr. Rogers: Avian flu, technically known as the H5N1 virus, is
spreading overseas, with outbreaks in Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe and
England. On November 1st, the Associated Press reported that over 30
wild ducks tested positive for the less serious H5 bird flu virus in
Canada. If the virus mutates and begins to spread from person to
person, a pandemic could occur.
According to the L.A. Times of October 13, 2005 (news clip
attached) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul
McHale, indicated that DoD was preparing plans to respond to an
outbreak of avian flu. Assistant Secretary McHale reportedly stated
that an outbreak of avian flu could be so serious that active duty
forces may be required to support the National Guard in enforcing
quarantines.
What is your view of the role of DoD in responding to an avian flu
outbreak? Who will be in charge?
Major General Rowe: DoD will support the Primary and Coordinating
Federal Agencies appointed by the President to lead the nation's
response to a flu outbreak. This support can be requested by the
Primary Federal Agency or through individual states. The President or
the Secretary of Defense would direct DoD to provide this support.
Commander, USNORTHCOM would be the supported Commander for the
coordination of the DoD response within the continental United States.
For a widespread outbreak across the United States, Commander,
USNORTHCOM may elect to designate a Joint Force Land Component
Commander, who would orchestrate nation-wide efforts in support of the
Primary Federal Agency. USNORTHCOM, in conjunction with the Services,
would be responsible for ensuring Force Health Protection of DoD
personnel within its area of responsibility.
Mr. Rogers: How will DoD coordinate with the Department of Homeland
Security, CDC, and USDA in the event of an avian flu outbreak? With
state and local governments?
Major General Rowe: At the national level, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense coordinates with other federal agencies through
the Homeland Security Council Interagency Incident Management Group.
At the state and local level, as directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense, the USNORTHCOM-appointed Defense Coordinating
Officer(s) would coordinate with FEMA Region representatives, who work
with state emergency management officials.
Mr. Rogers: Which agency will ultimately determine whether
quarantines are necessary, and how will quarantines be enforced?
Major General Rowe: The Department of Health and Human Services
will determine the quarantine policy for the United States. As for
quarantine enforcement, this issue is best addressed by the senior
civilian leadership of the Department of Defense.
Mr. Rogers: If the military becomes involved, who will be the
Federal Government's lead spokesman?
Major General Rowe: The federal government's lead spokesperson
would be appointed by the President.
Mr. Rogers: What types of medical supplies and other assets will
DoD be able to provide to state and local public health providers to
help respond to a national medical emergency, such as a pandemic flu?
Major General Rowe: As directed by the President or the Secretary
of Defense, DoD could assist local, state and federal agencies with a
wide variety of assets and capabilities to respond to a national
medical emergency. DoD could provide assistance with local and general
planning prior to and during catastrophic events. At the local and
regional level, this would be accomplished with DoD's Joint Regional
Medical Planners and at the strategic level with other health services
operations officers.
If directed, DoD could provide the following assistance:
Logistics management to help move supplies in a timely
and efficient manner utilizing the Single Item Medical
Logistics Management capability
Patient movement and evacuation
Pharmaceutical distribution from the Strategic
National Stockpile
Expeditious field medical facilities and staffing
Routine trauma and surgical supplies, ventilator
support, and pharmaceuticals
Preventive medicine support
Mortuary affairs support
Lab support
Mr. Rogers: Alabama has one of the largest poultry operations in
the country. There is growing concern in Alabama and elsewhere about
news reports on the spread of avian flu overseas. If a virus kills
thousands of birds or animals, what role will the military play, if
any, in destroying carcasses and monitoring medical hazards tied to the
dead animals?
Major General Rowe: As directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, DoD will provide assistance within its capabilities and
consistent with applicable laws.
Mr. Rogers: If USDA does not have sufficient resources to deal with
a widespread emergency, will DoD provide support to USDA? If so, what
type and to what extent?
Major General Rowe: The military has been identified as a
supporting agency in the National Response Plan for all 15 Emergency
Support Functions (ESF), including providing assistance to USDA in the
execution of its firefighting (ESF#4) and agriculture and natural
resources (ESF#11) missions. As directed by the President or Secretary
of Defense, DoD would provide assistance within its capabilities and
consistent with applicable laws in response to a request from the USDA.
Mr. Rogers: On Oct 27, 2005, the Subcommittee on Management,
Integration and Oversight held a hearing on the new role of the Chief
Medical Officer in the Department of Homeland Security. At that
hearing, we heard testimony that the Chief Medical Officer does not
have sufficient authority to prepare for a coordinated Federal response
to a national medical emergency.
In the event of a major medical emergency, how should the Homeland
Security CMO work with the National Guard and the DoD in coordinating
the government's response?
Major General Rowe: In the event of a major medical emergency, the
Homeland Security Chief Medical Officer would work within the National
Response Plan. Before any event, the Chief Medical Officer should work
through the Homeland Security Council Interagency Incident Management
Group to coordinate DoD and National Guard responses.
Mr. Rogers: Is there one point of contact in the military chain of
command with whom the Homeland Security Chief Medical Officer should
begin working now to coordinate a possible military response in a major
medical emergency?
Major General Rowe: The Chief Medical Officer should work through
the Homeland Security Council Interagency Incident Management Group to
coordinate DoD and National Guard responses.
Questions from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL MARITIME STRAGEGIES AND THE NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN
Mr. Thompson: What is the relationship between the National
Maritime Strategies and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan?
Major General Rowe: As described below, the Interim National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and National Strategy for
Maritime Security (NSMS) (and its supporting plans) are complementary.
The NSMS, signed by the President in September 2005, established
national policies for ensuring the safety and economic security of the
United States and directed the development of eight supporting national
plans to address different aspects of maritime security. One of the
strategic objectives contained in the NSMS is the objective to
``Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and Critical
Infrastructure.'' To fulfill this objective, the President directed
several strategic actions to be addressed in the subordinate plans;
protecting maritime infrastructure is addressed within the NSMS by:
(a) embedding security into commercial practices;
(b) deploying layered security; and
(c) assuring the continuity of the marine transportation
system.
Four of the eight subordinate plans address aspects of maritime
infrastructure protection. These plans are the Maritime
Operational Threat Response Plan, the Maritime Infrastructure
Recovery Plan, the Maritime Transportation System Security
Recommendations and the Maritime Commerce Security Plan. The
Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan was approved by the
President in October 2005. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan
was issued on 28 Jun 05. The remaining plans are in
coordination within Departments at the federal level.
The NSMS and supporting plans specifically address the coordinated
federal, state, local and tribal strategic priorities and actions for
infrastructure protection in the maritime domain.
The Interim NIPP, dated February 2005, is a Department of Homeland
Security document which broadly addresses infrastructure protection at
the national level. From the USNORTHCOM perspective, this interim plan
addresses infrastructure protection generally and, when finalized, will
provide a means of broadly integrating critical infrastructure
protection efforts at the national level.
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
Mr. Thompson: Let's say, hypothetically that an Influenza Pandemic,
which experts fear could develop from the highly contagious avian flu
circulating in Asia, hits the United States. Should Posse Comitatus be
reconsidered?
Should the military be in charge?
Should DHS be in charge?
Should DHHS be in charge?
Do you believe that DoD or another department has
current authority to quarantine the sick?
What role does the state have in responding to the
pandemic?
What is the role of the National Guard?
Major General Rowe: The Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the
military from rendering support to Primary Federal Agencies in the case
of health emergencies that do not involve law enforcement tasks. In the
case of widespread civil disorder, the President could potentially
invoke the Insurrection Act (10 USC S331-335). Existing authorities are
sufficient for the use of DoD assets in the roles envisioned.
The decision to place any single agency in charge is up to the
President.
DoD's principal authorities for isolation/quarantine are focused on
Federal Health Protection for DoD personnel. If authorized by the
President, the Secretary of Defense may task DoD to aid in enforcement
of isolation/quarantine under existing authorities and statutes.
All states have the responsibility to safeguard the health and
welfare of their citizens and are responsible for intrastate isolation/
quarantine. If quarantine volume extends beyond the capabilities of
these officials, state Governors may direct the National Guard to aid
state and local governments. Title 42 USC S264-272 currently provides
the U.S. Surgeon General, and officials at ports of entry, the
authorities necessary to impose quarantine.
Federal, state and local health authorities may have concurrent
authority to impose quarantine in the case of a quarantine imposed on
an arriving international flight.
POSSE COMITATUS ACT
Mr. Thompson: In your opinion, do you think the Posse Comitatus Act
must be amended in order for the military and the National Guard to
provide support during a disaster?
Major General Rowe: No, the Posse Comitatus Act has in no way
hampered U.S. Northern Command's ability to accomplish its homeland
defense and civil support missions.
THE STAFFORD ACT
Mr. Thompson: Should the President have the ability to declare a
disaster under the provisions of the Stafford Act and direct Federal
aid without a State request? In what situations do you think this
should be permissible?
Major General Rowe: The Stafford Act currently allows the President
to make a declaration of an emergency when the affected area is one in
which ?the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent
responsibility and authority? under the U.S. Constitution or laws of
the United States. In this circumstance, the President may make this
declaration on his own, without a request from the Governor. The
President at his discretion will determine when such a declaration is
necessary and in the interest of the United States.
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Mr. Thompson: Should the president have the ability to order
Federal troops into a state when the state Governor has specifically
stated that he/she does not want nor needs these troops?
Major General Rowe: This is an issue that is best addressed by the
DoD civilian leadership.
FEMA's CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thompson: Do you believe that FEMA under the new leadership is
currently able to respond to a catastrophic event? If so, why?
Major General Rowe: We believe it is inappropriate for DoD to
comment on the capabilities of another federal agency.
FEMA's CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thompson: What should FEMA do to improve communications during
a catastrophic event?
Major General Rowe: The ability to communicate is vital in
responding to a catastrophic event. Our nation's communications
architecture has several areas in which we can make improvements. Some
of the areas we are looking into with our interagency partners include:
Creating a comprehensive national strategy to address
interoperable emergency communications and the publication of
an associated implementation plan.
Standardizing and acquiring rapidly deployable
redundant communications capabilities for major metropolitan
areas. Emergency response planning must account for the
probability that first responders and local governments will be
forced to initially operate without the benefit of existing
commercial and government communication systems and commercial
power.
Developing a mechanism similar to the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet for the communications industry.
Harmonizing existing spectrum allocations at the
national level to allow DoD, federal, state and local
responders to operate in the same bands allowing
interoperability and complimentary system roll outs.
PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE
Mr. Thompson: Briefly discuss the plans you have in place currently
to prepare for how you will interact with the local and state
governments when they need assistance. How often do you conduct drills
on these plans?
Major General Rowe: USNORTHCOM Functional Plan 2501, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, describes DoD support to civil
authorities during natural disasters and civil emergencies.
USNORTHCOM Pandemic Influenza Concept Plan (DRAFT), synchronizes
the DoD response in support of the Primary Federal Agency.
USNORTHCOM's primary interaction is at the federal level. We have
limited participation in local and state planning exercises. When in
attendance, we act as observers, not planners. We participate in
several Regional Response Team tabletop exercises and planning efforts
each year, which includes federal, state and local participants. In
addition, USNORTHCOM maintains an electronic library of all available
state pandemic influenza response plans.
NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN
Mr. Thompson: The National Response Plan (NRP) lays out the
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) assigned to Federal, state and local
agencies. What is your understanding of the state's role under this
plan? Do you think it needs to be revised?
Major General Rowe: In accordance with the NRP for catastrophic
disasters, federal assistance will be requested by the states when
their ability to respond is overwhelmed. Therefore, each State Office
of Emergency Preparedness (or equivalent department) should stay fully
engaged in federal planning efforts to increase visibility of their
capabilities and interests.
The effectiveness of the National Response Plan is an issue that is
best addressed by DoD's senior civilian leadership.
MILITARY RESOURCES
Mr. Thompson: Does the military currently have the resources to
take the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents? If not, what
will you need to perform this mission?
Major General Rowe: The Secretary of Defense is in the best
position to address the DoD's capacity to assume a lead role in
catastrophic incidents within the United States.
Mr. Thompson: How will this new mission impact your warfighting
capabilities?
Major General Rowe: As stated above, the Secretary of Defense is in
the best position to address the DoD's capacity to assume a lead role
in catastrophic incidents within the United States.
COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING
Mr. Thompson: Assistant Secretary McHale told the Subcommittee that
there was a disconnect in the communications and planning between
USNORTHCOM and the National Guard. Why was there a disconnect and what
is USNORTHCOM doing to ensure that in the future, plans will be
coordinated and there will be better communication?
Major General Rowe: Assistant Secretary McHale stated that "the
planning conducted by the National Guard, though superbly executed, was
not well-integrated with the Joint Staff and NORTHCOM." The National
Guard (when not federalized under Title 10) and USNORTHCOM provide
support through two distinct chains of command. National Guard units in
state status are under the command and control of the Governor.
USNORTHCOM, as the designated Department of Defense supported commander
for the response, provides command and control of force capabilities
from the active component, as approved by the Secretary of Defense. In
any circumstance when there are separate chains of command, it is
difficult to achieve a 100% integrated effort.
USNORTHCOM and the National Guard work together to improve
situational awareness and gain greater unity of effort. The key to
achieving improved integration and making planning more effective is to
conduct realistic exercises, allowing the opportunity to train and
build staff relationships between the organizations. In an additional
step to build staff relationships and mutual understanding, the
National Guard has placed a full-time representative in the USNORTHCOM
Joint Operations Center. USNORTHCOM is also working in cooperation with
the National Guard Bureau on initiatives such as the Joint CONUS
Communication Support Environment and the Joint Force Headquarters-
State to improve future coordination, communications and collaboration,
as well as a state engagement plan.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Mr. Thompson: What is the command and control relationship between
NORTHCOM and the National Guard during a catastrophe?
Major General Rowe: USNORTHCOM does not exercise command authority
over the forces assigned to the National Guards of the States,
Territories, or the District of Columbia, unless those forces are
federalized under Title 10 and assigned to USNORTHCOM. In most cases,
such as the response to Hurricane Katrina, National Guard troops
operate under the control of the state Governor in a State Active Duty
and/or Title 32 status. The relationship between USNORTHCOM and
National Guard units is one of coordination only, unless the National
Guard troops have been federalized.
CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
Mr. Thompson: Please advise if any contractors assisted in the
preparation of the answers to these Questions for the Record; the names
of such contractors and the companies with which they are associated;
the precise role of any such contractors in preparing the answers; the
percentage of the work in preparing these answers the contractors
performed; and how much the contractors were paid for their assistance
in preparing the answers.
Major General Rowe: Two contractors (Mr. Ronnie Graham and Mr. Jeff
Hill) assisted in the preparation of three responses. Consistent with
their contract, these individuals support USNORTHCOM under a services
contract awarded to SY Coleman. They collected information and
formulated response, which were provided to and accepted by the
USNORTHCOM leadership. They contributed a total of four hours to this
task. Based upon the total cost of the service contract to the federal
government, we estimate the cost of this work at $320.