[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF RADICALIZATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-104
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-626 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Rob Simmons, Connecticut, Chairman
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Zoe Lofgren, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Loretta Sanchez, California
Daniel E. Lungren, California Jane Harman, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Nita M. Lowey, New York
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 60
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress Frome
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committe on Homeland
Security....................................................... 6
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 6
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 5
WITNESSES
Mr. Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Officer, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Randall Blake, Al-Qa'ida Group Chief, National
Counterterrorism Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Don Van Duyn, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigations:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Panel II
Mr. Frank Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute,
The George Washington University:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director, The Investigative Project
on Terrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Dr. Walid Phares, Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Mr. John D. Woodward, Associate Director, RAND Policy Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
For the Record
Dr. M. Saud Anwar, Chairman, American Muslim Peace Initiative:
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
THE HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF RADICALIZATION
----------
Wednesday, September 20, 2006
U.S.House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Simmons, King, Dent, Lofgren,
Lowey, and Langevin.
Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] A quorum being present, the
Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to
order.
Today the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on the
homeland security implications of radicalization.
For some time, members of this subcommittee have been
interested in this issue, but this hearing began to take shape
last July when members of the subcommittee travelled with me to
Toronto, Canada, to learn more about the alleged plot involving
a group of individuals in the Toronto area who were arrested
for conspiring to attack their own homeland using approximately
three tons of ammonium nitrates.
We visited the neighborhoods, we saw the schools, and these
were not disadvantaged individuals. In fact, as we observed the
neighborhood, we were told that the homes were $300,000 homes.
It was an integrated neighborhood. The schools looked like the
same sorts of schools that I have back in my hometown in
Stonington, Connecticut.
And so, the question that I had in my mind and that we had
in our minds was, what exactly caused these young, second-
generation Muslims, many of whom were of Pakistani background,
to become radicalized? What were the conditions that were at
work here? And how can we better understand this issue?
This is not an issue just for Canada or just for Great
Britain. This is an issue for us as Americans, here within the
continental United States. This is an issue for us as people
concerned about the homeland security. This is an issue for us
who have Muslims in our districts and in our communities, who
want to better understand what the forces might be at play that
could cause this radicalization to take place.
Not testifying today but submitting testimony is a friend
and a colleague of mine from Connecticut, Dr. Saud Anwar, who
has written a paper on the subject and who has shared with me
his thoughts on the subject. And I just want to mention a few
of the conclusions and recommendations, and then I will ask
that his whole paper be put in the record for future reference.
But one of the things he says is that the American Muslims
are more integrated and assimilated into U.S. society than
perhaps their European or Canadian counterparts. They are
working to counter current challenges by being more socially
and politically active. They are looking for better integration
within our political community and increasing communication and
coordination. And so on and so on and so forth.
And I can tell you that, from my own experience in dealing
with Dr. Anwar, his family and his community, we have had many
long and very constructive discussions about the issues that
might give rise to radicalization.
And I would hope that this hearing, in a way, would become
the beginning of a conversation--a conversation that we might
initiate here in this subcommittee but that we can then extend
out into our districts and into our states, to talk with our
friends and neighbors in the Muslim community, to meet in their
meeting places, to gather to exchange views, so that we can
attempt to better understand what their issues might be and
then attempt to better understand what the issues of other
Muslims elsewhere in the world might be.
And so, it is with that in mind that I have called for this
hearing.
[The statement of Dr. Anwar follows:]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of M. Saud Anwar MD, MPH, Chairman, American Muslim
Peace Initiative
Immigrant American Muslims and European Muslims: Similarities and
Differences & Homeland Security Implications:
OPENING:
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, and Members of the
Subcommittee, My name is M. Saud Anwar; I am the Chairperson of the
American Muslim Peace Initiative. American Muslim Peace Initiative is a
network of organizations and leaders of various organizations uniting
our voices to articulate the challenges and opportunities for promoting
peace in our neighborhoods, our nation and our world.
I would like to thank you for holding this very important hearing
today and also allowing me an opportunity to underscore the American
Muslim Peace Initiatives' strong commitment to help understand and
share the American Muslim community's perspectives and help identify
ways of making our homeland safe and secure.
I have been the Founder and Past President of the Pakistani
American Association of Connecticut, a grass root organization of
Pakistani Americans in Connecticut. Subsequently, I have served as a
Secretary of the Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee, a
nationwide organization of Pakistani Americans. I am the President
Elect of this organization. I am also the founder of a community out
reach program for Pakistani Americans and American Muslim partnership
with our law enforcement agencies to help build bridges between the
American Muslims and our law enforcement agencies. With these
initiatives I have had the chance to interact with a large community of
American Muslims and Pakistani Americans to share perspectives
informally and formally. In order to get a quantitative and qualitative
perspective of the community members, a study was performed to look at
the acculturation status and views of the American Muslims of Pakistani
heritage and multiple group discussion with the people from different
segments were held to help learn the perspectives of people from a wide
array of backgrounds.
INTRODUCTION
The American-Muslims are believed to be a community of about seven
million people. This group is highly educated: 67% of American Muslims
have a Bachelor's degree or higher as opposed to 44% of Americans have
a Bachelor's degree or higher. 33% of American Muslims hold an Advanced
degree (above bachelor) and 8.6% of Americans hold an Advanced degree.
(Bridges TV Data) This group is affluent with U.S. Average income is
$42,158 per year (U.S. Census 2000) 66% of American Muslim households
earn over $50,000 / year 26% of American Muslim households earn over
$100,000 / year.
Since September 11th, after the United State's coordinated response
at multiple levels in the war on terror, there have been some
statements and activities, which have led to concerns for an average
Muslim in different parts of the world, as well as, in the United
States. It is critical that the American-Muslim community, as well as,
the United State's administration and Congress to have serious
discussions to help understand each other's perspective and identify
common grounds.
The American-Muslims have an important role to play in helping us
understand perspectives, policies, reactions and responses in the war
or terror. We the American Muslims enjoy religious freedoms in United
States and do feel that we have a role in helping educate Muslims
around the world on the true American values, and also to help educate
the US Administration to be very conscious of some of the steps and
wordings and activities, which have led the American-Muslim to question
and be concerned about some of the US policies. There is an acute need
for a combined analysis of the situation and this is the time to unite
and work together to help build the bridges and reevaluate the
positions which are in our best interest.
As a result of the above, some of the members of the American-
Muslim community were reached out to identify some qualitative analysis
of common grounds and perceptions as well as quantitative assessment of
the perception and views of a segment of American Muslims that need to
be shared.
Moreover, a number of that the questionnaires were sent out to the
some of the American-Muslim community to help identify the makeup and
the cross-cultural makeup of the some of the American-Muslim community.
I will outline some of the following different components:
QUANTITATIVE DATA AND ANALYSIS:
To understand the views of American-Muslim community, the help was
sought from the Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee to try and
identify the views of the Pakistani American community and American
community with regards to information on integration of this community
and the current views in the post-9/11 era.
A questionnaire was sent to 2000 individuals by electronic means.
There was a 10% response to it. The questions are placed in APPENDIX
ONE. [All responses are maintained in the committee file.]
When asked the question if American Muslims were more assimilated
and integrated than the European Muslims, of the responders to the
questions, 69% of the people agreed that the American Muslims were more
integrated than the European Muslims. 21% were not sure and the 10%
felt otherwise.
When asked the questions whether the American-Muslims valued
interacting with other Americans, 99.5% of the people valued
interacting with their fellow Americans. These numbers are much higher
than the British counterparts.
When asked whether the American Muslims would like to maintain the
identity and values of their religious and ethnic origin, 84% of the
people agreed and 7% were not sure and 9% said no. This suggests that
the American Muslims are more inclined towards integration rather than
assimilation.
When asked if the American Muslims had become more religious after
9/11 or the War on Terror, 76% of the responders said no, and 19% said
yes and approximately 5% were not sure.
When asked if the American Muslims disagreed with the US foreign
policies, 80% agreed with that and 4% were in disagreement and 16% were
not sure.
When the community was asked if the Pakistani-Americans and
American Muslims have had a wrongful negative perception in the United
States, 73% were in agreement as opposed to 16% who felt otherwise. 11
% were not sure.
When asked if the American Muslims were politically and socially
active, would that help change or improve the perception, 88% of the
people felt yes and 12% were not sure.
When asked if the people had a feeling of hopelessness with the
current situation, 22% of the people said yes as opposed to 58% of the
people who did not feel hopeless and 20% were not sure.
When asked if the people were comfortable talking to a law
enforcement officer, 75% of the people said that they were comfortable,
as opposed to 13% who were uncomfortable and 12% were not sure.
This data does give us a glimpse into some important issues which
are very relevant. This suggests that the American Muslims feel more
integrated and assimilated within the American society. They also feel
that they are much more integrated then their European counterparts.
The percentages of people who feel marginalized or separated are
minimal at this time.
With respect to the concern about people becoming more religious, a
small percentage do feel that they are becoming more religious, but
majority felt that that had not make them change their religious
perspective and religiosity. It was also clear that the majority of the
responders were in disagreement with the US policies and majority of
them did feel that because of media portrayal or otherwise there was a
negative perception about them. More importantly, the people do feel
that to overcome this negative perception, they would have to be more
politically and socially active. This to me is a good sign. In one of
the questions, it was concerning to see that at least 22% some of the
people have started to feel hopeless about the current situation, but
majority approximately 78% of the people do not feel hopeless about the
situation. The majority of the people are comfortable talking to the
law enforcement agent. However, this number should increase and again
appropriate actions need to be taken on the part of the American Muslim
community, as well as, the law enforcement agency to try and build
alliances and understanding so people feel more comfortable talking to
a law enforcement officer.
QUALITATIVE DATA:
In order to develop a better understanding of some of the key
issues at this time besides the quantitative data, some work was
initiated on get some qualitative insight. In order to get quantitative
information, some questions were sent as the qualitative questions to
general community members, who were not necessarily in leadership
position in organizations. These questions can be seen in APPENDIX TWO.
Moreover, there were some discussions held with four groups of students
and different American Muslims to get an idea about the concerns in
people's minds with the current challenges.
The following are some of the patterns of issues that were raised
in the discussion. Interestingly, many of the youth did not focus as
much on being either of an immigrant heritage or American Muslims, but
more as Americans and they felt that the life was going on a day-to-day
basis. They did not feel that there was any profiling or felt prejudice
from their peers.
Some in the discussions did mention about how receiving information
that is out there through alternate media sources was making people
upset and angry, which included the situation with the war on Iraq, Abu
Ghraib, and the fact that a large number of civilians had died, and
subsequently the war in Lebanon, and how that had impacted the lives of
people. How the alternate media was helping people get information even
simple information through BBC was a useful resource to get information
on the misery of the people in the world.
A common issue that was raised was that the media and the policy
makers in their commentaries or speeches should not to attack the
religion of anyone which is the core of the people. Anybody who feels
threatened starts to go towards the core as was seen in the post-9/11,
then the churches were full because the people felt that there were
under an attack and they obviously go towards the core. Whenever any
community is attacked they seek refuge in religion. When a religion is
attacked, people move to the core as well and when that leads to people
beginning to harbor anger. This is an issue, which has been raised on
multiple occasions where it appears that our account of terrorism
efforts have become counter productive because of the inappropriate use
of terminology. When the religion is suggested to be the source of the
problem, the terrorists are given more legitimacy.
Again when asked what would be the way to help keep the people and
the youth integrated in the community, appropriate use of terminology,
wordings, fair implementation of policies, protection of rights, and
again there also understanding of their responsibility has increased
where they would be involved with more other communities to try and
inform people about their true values and their ability to bridge
building activity with the world.
Qualitative responses also included people's perspective of
importance of stop negative portrayal of Islam and all Muslims. An
acute need for empowering the moderate majority and legitimizing the
efforts of the moderate Muslims was palpably felt. The psychological
and emotional difficulties people feel with the bias languages used for
them. People feel that Policy makers need to be educated about Islam by
Muslims rather than the other sources. The introduction and information
about Islam should be set up by Muslims in a way where people can
understand their perspectives and times like this, this is an acute and
important responsibility of the policymakers and law enforcement agents
to learn about this from appropriate sources rather than through
sources, which is going to further enhance the negative stereotypes
that have been created.
Profiling was again mentioned in multiple meetings and all actions
should be kept to try and prevent marginalization to not to occur. This
activity can help prevent the ghettoization of the American Muslims
that some feel may have happened into the European Muslims. Issues
about social injustice and foreign policies were mentioned by people
multiple times. The written components of the qualitative questions are
mentioned in APPENDIX THREE.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) There are clear differences between the American and
European Muslims. The American Muslims are much more integrated
and assimilated into the US society then their European
counterparts. The European Muslims are more likely to be
separated and marginalized than what we are seeing here in the
United States.
(B) The American Muslims are trying to counter the current
challenges by being more socially and politically active.
Majority are hopeful that their abilities to help educate and
inform fellow Americans would help bear fruits by increasing
understanding and harmony
(C) Wrongful use of terminologies and implicating Islam as the
cause of the current situation helps legitimizes the activities
of the terrorists and leads to weakening of the moderate voices
amongst the Muslims and thus these careless remarks are
counter-productive efforts in counter terrorism.
(D) Policies, positions and communications should be planned
which would help further integration of the American Muslims
within the larger society and reduce the probability of
physical or psychological ghettoization that can occur.
(E) Increase communication and coordination of American Muslims
and our law enforcement agencies needs to occur to help build
better understanding and comfort for long term coordination and
synchronization for a safe America.
(F) American Muslims do have an important role at this time to
help United States make better policies with the Muslim
Majority countries and help build bridges and share the true
American Values with the rest of the world. Our domestic
polices should help Muslims feel partners and owners in these
responsibilities.
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I thank you for your consideration of my testimony and
inviting me to share these perspectives.
Mr. Simmons. My ranking member, Zoe Lofgren from
California, is tied up in the Judiciary Committee. I was told
that she is on the way, and I am sure that she is on the way.
I know other members are extremely busy this week, but I
would be happy at this moment to suspend the rules and to see
if either of my colleagues here present would like to say a
word or two on the subject. If so, I would be happy to yield to
them.
The gentlelady from New York?
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank you for calling this hearing.
And I think I will express my appreciation to you for
giving me the opportunity to say a few words, but I am really
anxious to get to the witnesses, because this is such a
critical issue. And I don't, as the chairman says, expect to
find a lot of answers in your testimony, but I do hope that we
can really have serious discussions.
Not too long ago, I was in Jordan, and King Abdullah was
talking about the Amman message, encouraging imams, encouraging
those of the religious faith, encouraging leaders in the
community to talk out publicly against equating Islam with
murder, terrorism, and encouraging leaders in the community to
truly be leaders and talk about reconciliation, talk about the
issues that may breed radicalism.
So I look forward to the testimony. And, again, I would
hope that there are more leaders, not just in the Middle East
but in our country itself, who will speak out forcefully
against equating Islam with terrorism and perhaps have an
impact on those who might feel this is their only avenue to
express their grievances.
So thank you so very much. As a citizen of the United
States with three children and seven grandchildren, we realize
that this is a worldwide challenge, and it is not just over in
the Middle East, it is not just in London, it is not just in
Europe, it is right here in the United States of America. And
we have to approach it thoughtfully, intelligently and,
hopefully, finding some answers that work.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentlelady from New York for her
comments.
We have just been joined by the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King. And I would
recognize him for any remarks he might wish to make.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Simmons.
I want to, first of all, thank you very much for convening
this hearing. I believe it is a matter of great importance, the
issue of radicalization of Muslims in prisons--or, Muslim
radicalization of prisons is an issue which affects us right
here in the United States, as well as, you know, overseas,
London and Madrid.
And many of those attacks have been linked to prison
radicalization. I know, for instance, I have met with various
state officials from around the country, describing what a
serious issue it is, whether it is California or New York. I
know Senator Schumer has been very outspoken on this issue in
New York.
I also know, from meeting with the police, about a number
of mosques in New York which are under surveillance which do
hire Muslim converts when they come out of prison. They use
them as security officials at these mosques, which, to me,
raises a number of serious issues.
We have to address this issue. We have to not be overly
concerned about political correctness. We have to do what is
right. We have to look into it. And we have to hope that more
Muslim leaders will speak out and denounce terrorism which is
carried out in their name.
And also we should be looking at who selects the imams to
be in the prisons; what they are actually doing; what the
rights are of people, as far as having religious freedom in
prisons, when the imam is preaching a very radical form of
Islam.
So I think this is a very, very significant and very timely
hearing. And I commend the chairman for doing it. It may not be
politically correct, but I think it is the courageous thing to
do and the right thing to do. And I thank you very much.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman.
I have, again, suspended the rules. I would be happy to
recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania for any comments
while we wait for the ranking member.
Mr. Dent. Well, I just wanted to commend you, Mr. Chairman,
for having this hearing on radicalization.
I think the events of the U.K. recently demonstrate why
this issue should be high on the agenda. Many of us had always
thought that those who became radical Muslims often maybe were
brought up in squalid refugee camps, perhaps, in the West Bank.
But what we saw in the U.K. were young men who seemed to be
raised in a Western environment, British citizens in many
cases, who were not from a traditionally very poor or
underprivileged background, and have taken on this radical
ideology and attempted to do horrible things.
And for that, I commend you. And I really look forward to
receiving the testimony of those who are presenting today.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman.
I see we have also been joined by the gentleman from Rhode
Island, Mr. Langevin.
I have taken the liberty of suspending the rules. If you
have a comment that you would like to make at this point, we
would be happy to hear it.
Mr. Langevin. If it is okay, Mr. Chairman, I will ask to
submit my statement for the record.
But, gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
Mr. Simmons. Very good.
Well, why don't we begin? We have two panels today.
The first panel consists of Mr. Randall Blake, the al-
Qa'ida Group chief at the National Counterterrorism Center; Mr.
Don Van Duyn, assistant director of the Counterterrorism
Division at FBI; and Mr. Javed Ali, senior intelligence officer
in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of
Homeland Security.
The witnesses know that we have their full written
statements for the record. And we would ask that you limit your
oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes, thereabout.
Again, welcome, and thank you for being here.
And who wishes to start? Mr. Blake?
STATEMENT OF RANDALL BLAKE, CHIEF, AL-QA'IDA GROUP, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Blake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, for the opportunity to come down today and speak
to you about the problem of radicalization and its implications
for the homeland.
I plan to be brief this afternoon and let my colleagues
from FBI and DHS tell you about some of the significant efforts
under way to not only understand the scope of the problem in
this country but also to counter it.
First, however, let me give you a strategic picture of the
radicalization problem, as the National Counterterrorism Center
sees it. I will speak to you first about two paths to
radicalization, one in which young American Muslims, generally
male, become radicalized overseas, and the other in which the
radicalization process is predominantly homegrown.
Then I would like to conclude with a brief overview of what
we sometimes call the gateways to extremism, in other words,
those environments where the atmosphere is ripe for
radicalization to occur.
Radicalization is not a new problem, nor is violent
extremism, as you know and by your opening comments. What is
disturbing, however, is the extent to which the message of
violent extremism is reaching and resonating with some young
Muslims around the world, including Europe, Canada and here.
The examples this year from Europe, the U.K. in particular, and
Canada have been well-publicized and already commented on.
One of the key lessons for us is that we cannot assume that
young people who grow up surrounded by Western values, ideals
and culture are immune from the messages of violent extremism.
Al Qaida is well aware of this point, and there is little
subtlety in their approach to radicalization and recruitment of
others here in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West. It is not an
accident that many of the videotapes that we receive from Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his number-two, are produced
with English subtitles.
The video that was released the week before the 9/11
anniversary on the 2nd of September featured California native
Adam Gadahn, who is, himself, a radicalized American operating
in Al Qaida's senior circles. And the suicide videos from two
of the July 2005 London bombers speaking in perfect West
Yorkshire accents are powerful examples of the direct
recruitment and radicalization efforts of Western Muslims.
On this point, let me mention two examples of
radicalization from this country since and around the time of
9/11 that are particularly striking.
Two young men, John Walker Lindh and Majid Khan, one born
in this country and one born in Pakistan who spent his teenage
years here, both became radicalized during extended time
abroad.
For Lindh, a series of travels in the Middle East and South
Asia before 9/11 put him on a path to extremism that terminated
at Al Qaida's al-Faruq camp on the front lines, fighting for
the Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom.
In Khan's case, his parents have said that after 9/11 a
relative in Pakistan led him to al-Qaida and to the 9/11
mastermind, Khalid Sheik Mohammad, where we know he
brainstormed possible attacks against gas stations in his
adopted country.
The examples of Lindh and Khan illustrate the first kind of
radicalization I mentioned, radicalization that occurs
overseas. Clearly the danger here is that young men who have
attended extremist madrassas or terrorist training camps or
studied with imams who condone violence, a violent form of
extremism, could return to the homeland and act as agents of
radicalization.
Today the overseas radicalization process appears to be the
more common, at least when we talk about violent extremists who
turn to terrorism.
The other form of radicalization is predominantly
homegrown. In the cases we have seen of this since 9/11, young
men, often converts to Islam, adopt extremist views and even
engage in some nascent plotting efforts. Many of the homegrown
extremists we have identified have criminal backgrounds, as
Chairman King mentioned.
I will highlight two examples here, as well. In 2005, we
saw in Torrance, California, a group that originated within the
prison system that was engaged in armed robberies to bankroll
planned attacks. And earlier this year, a group with criminal
ties that claimed some inspiration from a black separatist
movement called the Moorish Science Temple was formulating a
plot against the Sears Tower in Chicago and federal buildings
in the Miami area.
These homegrown extremists have never been to Afghanistan
or Pakistan or the Middle East or attended an organized
training camp there. They have, as far as we know, never met a
member of Al Qaida or other foreign terrorist organizations.
But they have absorbed the message of violent extremism, and
they have incorporated it into their group's culture and are
using it to justify crime and terrorism.
Regardless of whether the radicalization occurs overseas or
at home, the stark lessons of Madrid and London, the
transportation attacks there, the arrests in Toronto that the
chairman mentioned, and most of the examples here at home that
I have cited, is that the next homeland attack may not come
from individuals who penetrate our barriers but rather from
long-term residents and citizens already in our midst who view
their own country as the enemy.
While there is no one-size-fits-all answer to
radicalization and why some turn to terrorism and others do
not, let me conclude by mentioning a few of those gateways to
extremism that the intelligence community has identified as
areas ripe for exploitation by extremists.
The prison system, as Chairman King mentioned, is a fertile
ground for radicalization, with its gang culture and population
of Muslim extremists. The cell I mentioned in Torrance,
California, was actually formed in Folsom Prison, and members
were recruited both inside and outside the prison.
University campuses offer an atmosphere where extremists,
either radical imams or students themselves, can spot and
assess young men and women who could be susceptible to the
message of violent extremism. We need look no further than the
radicalized Hamburg cell of students who piloted three of the
four hijacked planes on 9/11.
Some mosques and community centers offer a similar
environment, where extremist religious leaders encourage
Muslims to travel overseas and fight, ostensibly for Muslim
causes. We have seen that threat played out with deadly
consequences from foreign fighters who fought against us in
Iraq.
Finally, the Internet. The Internet continues to worry us
as a virtual recruiting station, open to anyone with access to
a computer and an Internet connection. It is the convergence of
globalization and technology all happening in real-time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to review this
critical topic, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Blake follows:]
Prepared Statement for the Record of Randall A. Blake
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Lofgren, and
members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to come today and speak
to you about the problem of radicalization and its implications for the
Homeland. I plan to be brief this afternoon, so my colleagues from the
FBI and DHS can describe the significant efforts their Agencies have
undertaken to understand the scope of the problem in this country and
to counter it.
First, however, let me give you a strategic picture of the
radicalization problem as NCTC sees it. I will speak to you first about
two paths to radicalization--one in which young American Muslims,
generally male, become radicalized overseas, and the other in which the
radicalization process is predominantly homegrown. Then I will give you
a brief overview of what we sometimes call ``gateways to extremism''--
in other words, those environments where the atmosphere is ripe for
radicalization to occur.
Radicalization is not a new problem, nor is violent extremism--as
you know. What is disturbing, however, is the extent to which the
message of violent extremism is reaching and resonating with some young
Muslims around the world, including Europe, Canada, and the United
States. The examples this past year from Europe, the UK in particular,
and Canada have been well publicized. One of the key lessons for us is
that we cannot assume that young people who grow up surrounded by
Western values, ideals, and culture are immune from messages that
translate into violent extremism.
Al-Qa'ida is well aware of that point and there is little subtlety
in their approach to trying to radicalize and recruit others here and
elsewhere in the West. It is no accident that many of the videos from
Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri are produced with English
subtitles. The video released the week before the five-year anniversary
of 9/11 featuring California native Adam Gadahn--a radicalized American
operating in al-Qa'ida senior circles--and the martyrdom videos of two
of the July 2005 London bombers--spewing extremism in perfect West
Yorkshire accents--are powerful examples of direct recruitment and
radicalization efforts of Western Muslims.
On this point, let me mention two examples of radicalization from
this country since 9/11 that are particularly striking. Two young men,
John Walker Lindh and Majid Khan, one born in this country and one born
in Pakistan but spent his teen years here, became radicalized during
extended time abroad.
For Lindh, a series of travels in the Middle East and South Asia
before 9/11 put him on a path to extremism that terminated at al-
Qa'ida's al-Faruq camp and on the front lines fighting for the Taliban
during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In Khan's case, his parents have
said that after 9/11 a relative in Pakistan led him to al-Qa'ida and to
9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, where--we now know--he
brainstormed possible attacks against gas stations in his adopted
country.
The examples of Lindh and Khan illustrate the first kind of
radicalization I mentioned--radicalization that occurs overseas.
Clearly the danger there is that young men who have attended extremist
madrassas or terrorist training camps, or who have studied with imams
who condone a violent form of Islamic extremism, could return to the
Homeland and act as agents of radicalization. Today, the overseas
radicalization process appears to be more common--at least when we talk
about violent extremists who turn to terrorism.
The other form of radicalization is predominantly homegrown. In the
cases we have seen of this since 9/11, young men--often converts to
Islam--adopt extremist views and even engage in some nascent plotting
efforts. Many of the homegrown extremists we have identified also have
a criminal background. I'll highlight two examples here as well: in
2005, we saw a Torrance, California group that originated in the prison
system, Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, engage in armed robberies to
bankroll planned attacks. And earlier this year, a group with criminal
ties that claimed affiliation with a black separatist movement called
the Moorish Science Temple, was formulating a plot against the Sears
Tower in Chicago and Federal buildings in the Miami area.
These homegrown extremists have never been to Afghanistan,
Pakistan, or the Middle East or attended an organized terrorist
training camp. They have, as far as we know, never met a member of al-
Qa'ida or any other foreign terrorist organization. But they have
absorbed the message of violent extremism. And they have incorporated
it into their groups' culture, and are using it to justify crime and
terrorism.
Regardless of whether the radicalization occurs overseas or at
home, the stark lesson of the Madrid and London transportation attacks,
the arrests in Toronto, and most of the examples here at home that I
have cited is that the next Homeland attack may come not from
individuals who penetrate our borders, but from long term residents and
citizens already in our midst who view their own country as the enemy.
While there is no ``one size fits all'' answer to radicalization
and why some turn to terrorism and others do not, let me conclude by
mentioning a few of those ``gateways to extremism'' that the
Intelligence Community has identified as areas ripe for exploitation by
extremists. The prison system is a fertile ground for radicalization,
with its gang culture and population of Muslim converts. The cell I
mentioned in Torrance was actually formed in Folsom prison and members
were recruited from both inside and outside the prison.
University campuses offer an atmosphere where extremists--either
radical imams or students themselves--could spot and assess young men
and women who could be susceptible to a message of violent extremism.
We need look no further than the radicalized Hamburg cell of students
who piloted three of the four hijacked planes on 9/11.
Some mosques and community centers offer a similar environment
where extremist religious leaders encourage Muslims to travel overseas
and fight, ostensibly for Muslim causes. We have seen that threat play
out with deadly consequences from foreign fighters who have fought
against us in Iraq.
Finally, the Internet continues to worry us as a virtual recruiting
station open to anyone with access to a computer and an Internet
connection. It is the convergence of globalization and technology--all
happening in real-time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to review this
critical topic with this subcommittee. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Blake.
The next witness is Mr. Van Duyn.
STATEMENT OF DON VAN DUYN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM
DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Van Duyn. Chairman Simmons, Chairman King, members of
the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to
speak to you on the topic of Islamic radicalization in the
United States.
I would like to emphasize, before I begin, that the issue
is not Islam itself but how the religious ideology is used by
violent extremists to inspire and justify their actions. The
FBI does not investigate members of any religion for their
religious beliefs, but rather focuses on investigating
activities that may harm the United States.
Successes in the war on terrorism and the arrests of many
key Al Qaida leaders have diminished the ability of the group
to attack the United States homeland. At the same time, a
broader Sunni extremist movement has evolved from being run
entirely by Al Qaida central to a broader movement. This is
demonstrated by the 2004 Madrid bombings, the July 2005
bombings and attempted bombings in London, and recent
disruptions in the U.S., United Kingdom, Canada, Bosnia,
Denmark and elsewhere.
That said, core Al Qaida remains committed to attacking the
United States and continues to demonstrate its ability to adapt
its tactics to circumvent security measures and to reconstitute
its ranks.
Al Qaida is also attempting to broaden its appeal to
English-speaking Western Muslims by disseminating violent
Islamic extremist propaganda via media outlets and the
Internet.
Although the most dangerous instances of radicalization
have so far been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of U.S.
persons, whether foreign-born or native, is of increasing
concern.
Key to the success of stopping the spread of radicalization
is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages. The FBI
defines homegrown Islamic extremists as U.S. persons who appear
to have assimilated but reject the cultural values, beliefs and
environment of the United States. They identify themselves as
Muslims and, on some level, become radicalized in the United
States. They intend to provide support for or directly commit a
terrorist attack inside the United States.
The threat from homegrown Islamic extremists is likely
smaller in scale than that posed by overseas terrorist groups,
such as Al Qaida, but is potentially larger in psychological
impact.
The FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons and
the Internet, that present opportunities for the proselytizing
of radical extremist Islam. Particularly for Muslim converts,
but also for those born into Islam, an extremist imam can
strongly influence individual belief systems by speaking from a
position of authority on religious issues.
Extremist imams have a potential to influence vulnerable
followers at various locations of opportunity, can spot and
assess individuals who respond to their messages, and could
potentially guide them into increasingly extremist circles.
Although the activities of radical imams are typically
associated with Salafist-Wahhabi lectures given in the mosque,
they are not limited to the mosque itself. Imams are often
active and influential in other venues, such as prisons,
publishing, online forums, audio lectures, and at Islamic
conferences and institutes.
The propagation of radical ideas is not confined to Sunni
Islam. The government of Iran is also committed to promoting
Shia Islamic activism.
The European and American experience shows that prisons are
venues where extremists can radicalize and recruit among the
inmate population. Mr. Blake has already addressed some of
these issues.
Most of the cases of prison radicalization appear to be
carried out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no
direct foreign connections, like the Torrance group cited by
Mr. Blake.
I would like to emphasize that not all prison
radicalization is Islamic in nature. Domestic groups, such as
white supremacists, also recruit in prison.
In response to this possible threat, the FBI and the Bureau
of Prisons have been actively engaged to detect, deter and
interdict efforts by terrorists and extremist groups to
radicalize or recruit in federal, state and local prisons since
February of 2003. As part of these efforts, we have identified
best practices for correctional institutions to combat the
spread of radicalization.
As Mr. Blake noted, the Internet is also a venue for
radicalization of young, computer-savvy Westerners, both male
and female, who identify with Islamic extremist ideology. An
older generation of supporters and sympathizers of violent
Islamic extremism, in the post-9/11 environment of increased
law enforcement security, have migrated their radicalization,
recruitment material, and support activities online.
Overseas experience can also be a significant element in
facilitating the transition from one who has the proclivity to
be radicalized and who may espouse radicalized rhetoric to one
who is willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs.
Although radicalization can occur without overseas travel,
the foreign experience appears to provide the networking that
makes it possible for interested individuals to train and
participate in operational activity.
We assess that the overseas experiences of John Walker
Lindh played a pivotal role in his involvement with the
Taliban. Once overseas, he was directed by radicalized
individuals to attend extremist universities and ultimately
training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The FBI approaches the radicalization issue on two levels.
We are attempting to understand and describe the dynamics of
individual and organizational radicalization to identify early
indicators as to whether individuals or groups are
demonstrating the potential for violence. We are also engaged
in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel the
misconceptions that may foster extremism.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this important
issue. I am happy to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Van Duyn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald Van Duyn
Mr. Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren and members of the
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you
on the topic of Islamic radicalization in the United States. I would
like to emphasize before I begin that the issue is not Islam itself but
how the religious ideology is used by violent extremists to inspire and
justify their actions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does
not investigate members of any religion for their religious beliefs,
but rather focuses on investigating activities that may harm the United
States.
Successes in the war on terrorism and the arrests of many key al-
Qa'ida leaders have diminished the ability of the group to attack the
United States (US) Homeland. At the same time, a broader Sunni
extremist movement has evolved from being run entirely by al-Qa'ida
central to a broader movement. This is demonstrated by the 2004 Madrid
bombings, the July 2005 bombings and attempted bombings in London, and
recent disruptions in the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Bosnia, Denmark
and elsewhere.
That said, core al-Qa'ida remains committed to attacking the United
States and continues to demonstrate its ability to adapt its tactics to
circumvent security measures and reconstitute its ranks. Al-Qa'ida is
also attempting to broaden its appeal to English-speaking Western
Muslims by disseminating violent Islamic extremist propaganda via media
outlets and the Internet.
Although the most dangerous instances of radicalization have so far
been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of US persons, whether
foreign-born or native, is of increasing concern. Islamic
radicalization in the United States does not appear to be endemic, but
it does exists nationwide. Key to the success of stopping the spread of
radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages.
The FBI defines homegrown Islamic extremists as US persons who
appeared to have assimilated, but reject the cultural values, beliefs,
and environment of the United States. They identify themselves as
Muslims and on some level become radicalized in the United States. They
intend to provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist attack
inside the United States. The threat from homegrown Islamic extremists
is likely smaller in scale than that posed by overseas terrorist groups
such as al-Qa'ida but is potentially larger in psychological impact.
Several recent cases illustrate the nature of the issue.
Since August 2005 the FBI, other federal agencies, and
our foreign partners have dismantled a global network of
extremists who are operating independently of any known
terrorist organization. Several individuals affiliated with
this network were arrested for providing material support in
connection with the plotting of a terrorist attack in the
United States.
The apparent increase of cases involving homegrown
Islamic extremists may represent an increased sensitivity of
law enforcement to activities not previously regarded as
terrorism, but we cannot rule out the possibility that the
homegrown phenomenon is growing.
The FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons and the
internet, that present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical
Islam.
Particularly for Muslim converts, but also for those born into
Islam, an extremist imam can strongly influence individual belief
systems by speaking from a position of authority on religious issues.
Extremist imams have the potential to influence vulnerable followers at
various locations of opportunity; can spot and assess individuals who
respond to their messages; and can potentially guide them into
increasingly extremist circles.
Although the activities of radical imams are typically associated
with Salafist-Wahhabi lectures given in the mosque, they are not
limited to the mosque itself. Imams are often active and influential in
other venues such as prisons, publishing, online forums, audio
lectures, and at Islamic conferences and institutes. These various
forums allow imams to reach new audiences and potentially susceptible
followers outside of the mosque itself.
The propagation of radical ideas is not confined to Sunni Islam.
Iran is committed to promoting Shia Islam activism.
The European and American experience shows that prisons are venues
where extremists have radicalized and recruited among the inmate
population. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-US
sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized
inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media. Ideologies
that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace include the
Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly
known as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar
to that of the Government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
Most cases of prison radicalization appear to be carried out by
domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign
connections, like the Sunni Islamic extremist group in California, the
Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), identified in July 2005. I would
like to emphasize that not all prison radicalization is Islamic in
nature. Domestic groups such as white supremacists also recruit in
prisons.
In response to this possible threat, the FBI and the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) have been actively engaged in efforts to detect, deter,
and interdict efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize
or recruit in US prisons since February 2003. As part of these efforts,
we have identified ``best practices'' for correctional institutions to
combat the spread of radicalization.
The Internet is also a venue for the radicalization of young,
computer-savvy Westerners--both male and female-who identify with an
Islamic extremist ideology. An older generation of supporters and
sympathizers of violent Islamic extremism, in the post-9/11 environment
of increased law enforcement scrutiny, have migrated their
radicalization, recruitment, and material support activities online.
Radicalization via the Internet is participatory, and individuals
are actively engaged in exchanging extremist propaganda and rhetoric
online which may facilitate the violent Islamic extremist cause. These
online activities further their indoctrination, create links between
extremists located around the world, and may serve as a springboard for
future terrorist activities.
Overseas experience can also be a significant element in
facilitating the transition from one who has a proclivity to be
radicalized, and who may espouse radicalized rhetoric, to one who is
willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs. Although
radicalization can occur without overseas travel, the foreign
experience appears to provide the networking that makes it possible for
interested individuals to train for and participate in operational
activity. The experience may vary from religious or language
instruction to basic paramilitary training.
We assess that the overseas experiences of John Walker
Lindh \1\ played a pivotal role in his involvement with the
Taliban. Once overseas, he was directed by radicalized
individuals to attend extremist universities, and ultimately
training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ John Walker Lindh, after pleading guilty in the Eastern
District of Virginia to supporting the Taliban, in violation of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C.
Sec. 1705(b)), and carrying an explosive during the commission of a
felony (18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2)), was given a 20-year prison sentence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI approaches the radicalization issue on two levels:
We are attempting to understand the dynamics of
individual and organizational radicalization to identify early
indicators as to whether individuals or groups are
demonstrating the potential for violence.
We are engaged in extensive outreach to Muslim
communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this important issue. I am
happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Van Duyn.
Mr. Ali?
STATEMENT OF JAVED ALI, SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ali. Chairman Simmons, other members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to share
perspectives from the Department of Homeland Security on
radicalization in the United States.
As described by my colleagues and by the various members
here, since 2004 a variety of actions overseas and here in the
U.S. has really spurred attention on the issue of
radicalization inside the United States, to include the cell
that was disrupted, the JIS, in the California prison system,
and the arrest of the individuals in Toronto.
As a result of these episodes, or activities, the
department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis has convened a
study which seeks to develop a broader understanding of how and
why radicalizing influences take root and spread in the United
States. This project is part of a broader DHS approach in
addressing the issue of radicalization and will inform the
department-wide effort to understand and mitigate the
phenomenon.
During the course of our study, we have found that no
universal definition of radicalization exists in the
intelligence or the academic and social science communities. As
a result, our study has developed a working definition whereby
radicalization entails ``the process of adopting an extremist
belief system, including the willingness to use, support or
facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change.''
This definition separates radicalization from terrorism. It
focuses more on an understanding of behavior and how and why
that behavior develops over time.
A major focus centers on our attempts to examine
radicalization nodes, which we define as the conduits that
facilitate or support a person or group through the
radicalization process. The nodes may be physical institutions,
virtual communities, charismatic individuals, written or
reported material, or even shared experiences.
We are conducting our study in a phased approach, focusing
on examining radicalization dynamics in key geographic regions
throughout the country. Our first phase focused on assessments
in California and the New York-New Jersey area, while our
second phase focuses on the Midwest and the national capital
region.
We hope to conduct other regional or state assessments in
future phases, with the goal that these will provide the
building blocks for a broader national assessment.
Each regional assessment has begun with our attempts to
frame an intelligence picture particular to that state or
region by examining national-level intelligence reporting and
open-source information. We then take those findings and share
them during face-to-face meetings with federal, state, and
local law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security
professionals.
As of September 2006, we have held meetings with
representatives from New York City; Los Angeles; San Diego; San
Francisco; Sacramento; Chicago; Columbus, Ohio; and
Springfield, Illinois. And we will soon meet with officials
from Virginia; Maryland; Washington, D.C.; and Texas.
We have also found a number of foreign governments keenly
interested in the radicalization issue, and our meetings with
them have helped strengthen our perspective.
Thus far, we have found that relationships between
radicalization nodes and radical actors or groups inside this
country vary across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums,
different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions.
Further, we have found many diverse pathways to
radicalization inside the United States based on an examination
of the nodes I described earlier.
Further, we are finding that radicalization is not a one-
way street and that individuals or groups can radicalize or de-
radicalize based on a variety of factors.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, our work on radicalization is
preliminary and by no means complete. Continued dialogue and
relationship-building with federal, state, local and even
foreign partners is a critical aspect of this work, in order to
gain the most accurate and nuanced intelligence perspectives on
radicalization activities both in the United States and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to
speak with you and members of the subcommittee. I welcome your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Ali follows:]
Prepared Statement for the Record of Javed Ali
INTRODUCTION
Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Thompson, and members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to share perspectives on an
important national security topic--radicalization in the United States.
Since 2004, a spate of terrorist activities in Western Europe carried
out or supported by radicalized ``homegrown'' Sunni extremists,
including the Madrid and London attacks, focused national attention on
the overseas phenomenon. More recent developments in the United States
and Canada, including the disrupted California prison-based Jam-iyyat
ul-Islam As-Saheeh (JIS) cell and the ``Toronto 17''--have focused
attention on the phenomenon in North America.
While traditional counterterrorism analysis emphasizes the who,
what, where, and when of potential terrorist threats, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OI&A) has
convened a radicalization study which seeks to develop a broader
understanding of why and how radicalizing influences take root and
spread in the United States. By identifying critical factors at the
``front end'' of the radicalization process, we hope to assist
policymakers, intelligence officers, and law enforcement officials in
their efforts to develop tools, practices, and methods which may
prevent radical beliefs from ``crossing the line'' towards actual
violence. This OI&A project is part of a broader DHS approach in
addressing the issue of radicalization, and will inform the Department-
wide effort to understand and mitigate the phenomenon.
CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES
During the course of our study, we have found that no universal
definition of radicalization exists in the intelligence or the
academic/social science communities. As a result, our study has
developed a ``working'' definition whereby radicalization entails ``the
process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to
effect societal change.'' This definition separates radicalization from
terrorism, and focuses more on an understanding of behavior and how,
why, and where that behavior develops over time. We are attempting to
identify and examine radicalization ``nodes''--which we define as
conduits that facilitate or support a person or group through the
radicalization process. Nodes may be physical institutions, virtual
communities, charismatic individuals, written or recorded material, or
even shared experiences.
METHODOLOGY
We are conducting our study in a phased approach, focusing on
examining radicalization dynamics in key geographic regions throughout
the country. Our first phase focused on assessments in California and
the New York/New Jersey area, while our second phase focuses on the
Midwest and National Capital Region. We hope to conduct other regional
or state assessments in future phases, with the goal that these will
provide the building blocks for a broader national assessment.
Each regional assessment begins with our attempts to frame an
intelligence picture particular to that State or region by first
examining national-level intelligence reporting and open-source
information. After this research is conducted, we then take those
findings and share them during face-to-face meetings with Federal,
State, and local law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security
professionals. As of September 2006, we have held meetings with
representatives from New York City, Los Angeles, San Diego, San
Francisco, Sacramento, Chicago, Columbus, Ohio, and Springfield,
Illinois, and will soon meet with officials in Virginia, Maryland,
Washington DC, and Texas. We have also found a number of foreign
governments keenly interested in the radicalization issue, and our
meetings with them have helped strengthen perspectives on
radicalization.
KEY FINDINGS
Thus far we have found that relationships between radicalization
nodes and radical actor/groups vary across ideological and ethno-
religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic
conditions. Further, we have found many diverse ``pathways'' to
radicalization in the United States based on an examination of the
nodes I described earlier. We have found that nodes may be physical
institutions, virtual communities, charismatic individuals, written or
recorded material, or even shared experiences. Further, we are finding
that radicalization is not a ``one--way street,'' and that individuals
and groups can radicalize or ``de-radicalize'' based on a variety of
factors.
CONCLUSION
Our work on radicalization is preliminary and by no means complete.
Continued dialogue and relationship-building with Federal, State,
local, and even foreign, partners is a critical aspect of this work, in
order to gain the most accurate and nuanced intelligence perspectives
on radicalization activities both in the United States and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for giving me the opportunity to
speak with you and the members of the Committee. I welcome your
questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much.
And I will start with some questions myself, and I know my
colleagues have some questions to ask, as well.
You made some comments, Mr. Ali, that I think are very
appropriate, that, ``Our work on radicalization is preliminary
and by no means complete.''
It was mentioned by witnesses at the panel that
radicalization does not necessarily deal just with the Islamic
religion. It can deal with white supremacist groups. It can
deal with homegrown Americans, such as those who blew up the
Murrah Building in Oklahoma, for example. And so, I don't think
there is any effort right off the bat to characterize one group
or another or another.
But what we read about today is what is going on in Great
Britain; what we read about is going on in Toronto. And of
course our concern is that this could go on in this country, as
well. I believe that in the Toronto case and in the Great
Britain case, there were perhaps some connections to
individuals or groups here in the United States.
So, again, even though we are at a preliminary stage in
looking at this issue, what characteristics or motivating
features have come out of the London case or the Toronto case
that would apply to us here in the United States?
What motivating factors--was it the introduction of a
charismatic leader, for example, into a group of young people
who responded to it? Was it conditions of discrimination or
alienation? Was it a sense that young Muslims could not
participate fully in the Western society in which they found
themselves--alienation, if you will?
What is your thinking along the lines of these issues?
Mr. Ali. Sir, I will take that first part of the question.
Part of the issue we are having here with the depth of the
assessment or the judgments we are able to make is we just
don't have a lot of data in order to, sort of, do the
comparative analysis. And that is the reason we are trying to
look at this issue from a regional approach and see what we can
cull from that--
Mr. Simmons. And if I could just interrupt on that point, I
think we all understand that, but intelligence officers
sometimes have hunches or intuitions or feelings. And I realize
we are in an open session and on the record, but if there is
some commonality among those hunches and feelings, feel free to
share that.
Mr. Ali. Sure, sure, Chairman.
One issue I was going to raise was, the things that we have
seen as important nodes or these conduits or catalysts for
radicalization here in the United States seem to have some
resonance or applicability with what we have seen in the U.K.
context, other parts of Western Europe, or even the Canada
experience.
What we have found so far at a macro level in the U.S., not
to say this holds true in every region or every state, is that
the nodes that appear to be of importance to us are the
Internet, which was described before, the power of the Internet
as a radicalizing node; certainly the use or the involvement of
a charismatic leader to drive those beliefs; and then
propaganda.
That is not to say that you necessarily need to have all
three of those in order to develop a radicalized group or cell,
but if you look at what occurred in the London context, and the
U.K. context to a degree, and then look at the smaller set of
data we have here in the U.S., there do appear to be
commonalities with those as drivers. But then there are also
examples, like the prison example, where some of those factors
aren't as significant.
So it is a bit of a difficult question, but at an abstract
level those are the nodes that seem to be important, to us.
Mr. Simmons. Gentlemen?
Mr. Blake. Let me add a couple comments about the London
bombing and particularly the 7/7 bombers.
In that case, you do have a couple of dynamics going on.
One is the issue of age. You did have, in Mohammad Sidique
Khan, a charismatic leader of the group there, the cell there,
of the 7/7 bombing. He was in his mid-30s. The other bombers
were much younger--early 20s, one I think still in his teens.
The other dynamic in this radicalization issue is, the
London case appears to be a case in which you have two aspects:
One is those who grew up in that West Yorkshire atmosphere and
had their life experience there. But, in the case of a couple
of them, you had those who had gone to Pakistan for a period of
time in the months leading up to the attack. Al-Qa'ida has been
quite willing--Ayman al-Zawahiri, in particular, in some of his
videotapes--to take credit for that, their level of
involvement.
But you have the issue of travel, to where you have some
exchange with terrorist leaders who either encourage, support,
sanction, direct some activities. And then you have those who
are willing to be radicalized and participate, don't have that
involvement but are swayed by some of the others.
Mr. Van Duyn. I think we see, in addition to the apparent
role of mentors, which seems to be key, and some sort of
influence in, I think also the effectiveness of propaganda,
whether it is over the Internet or otherwise, that has
portrayed Muslims as being oppressed and under attack. There
are clearly some--there is some great anger that has developed,
obviously, among the two cells that you are speaking of. So the
effectiveness of the propaganda out has been very effective.
The other thing I think that many people have noted, too,
is just what may be the speed of radicalization now that is
occurring.
Mr. Simmons. If I could just make a comment on that, in
going to Toronto, Canada, it was our understanding that the
period of time between the introduction of a charismatic leader
and the time of the arrests, which seemed to be at the cusp of
action, was around 3 months, maybe a little more.
That is pretty rapid. And I guess what that suggests to me
is that the circumstances of that radicalization were resident
within those individuals and within that community. So they
needed a spark.
And so, I guess the overreaching question and concern that
we have is, do those circumstances exist elsewhere in this
country and around the world? So that the spark results in that
very quick radicalization. Is that your perception?
Mr. Van Duyn. I think, in the United States, we see, I
think as you cited from your colleague's testimony, that we
don't see, in many respects, the same sorts of conditions, that
the populations are better assimilated.
That said, it is clear that, from our own experience, there
are people with that same sort of anger and who take on that
same sort of ideology. So it certainly cannot be dismissed. Nor
can something happening quickly or one individual taking it
into his own head to do something--nor can that be dismissed,
as I think perhaps may be indicated by the student down at
North Carolina.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the distinguished chairman of the full
committee, Mr. King of New York.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Simmons.
I will, as I did in my opening statement, focus on the
issue of prison radicalization.
And also, on a personal note and somewhat humorous note,
thank you, Mr. Ali, for not bringing up the Michigan-Notre Dame
score.
[Laughter.]
It was very thoughtful and generous of you.
Mr. Ali. Go blue, sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. Getting back to a serious note, just from my own
analysis and study, it does appear that the issue of prison
radicalization is increasing. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has
attempted to address it. Several states have attempted to
address it.
I would ask, really, if each of the three of you would try
to comment on, one, to the extent you do believe it is a
problem; secondly, what remedies there are, again, under our
Constitution; are there any constitutional prohibitions about
actually vetting chaplains that come in; how we find
organizations that are positioned to vet them, to perhaps work
through them.
I know, for instance, several years ago, in fact last year,
of all institutions, the fire department of New York--this
isn't even a prison situation--they hired a Muslim chaplain who
was then seen putting out statements basically denying the
reality of September 11th.
Also, as a Catholic, I know Catholics have faced
persecution in this country, as have all religions--Jews,
certain sects of Protestantism. You have to be careful as to
exactly how to vet or select. But on the other hand, there is
also a political dynamic we can't deny, and that is the
terrible impact I think many of these imams and self-appointed
imams in prisons have, as far as radicalizing prisoners.
So anyway, I would just appreciate any of the comments or
any of the suggestions that each of the three of you could make
on this.
Mr. Van Duyn. Again, as I indicated, we have been working
with the Bureau of Prisons since February of 2003. And there
are a number of measures. And I don't want to speak for the
Bureau of Prisons, but they are very cognizant both of the
constitutional rights of prisoners and also the generally
beneficial impact of religion. Conversion is generally
considered to be a good thing, because it gives direction to
lives that might otherwise be directionless.
The Bureau of Prisons does have programs to monitor the
spread of ideologies that could lead to violence within their
systems. And they certainly have, I think, the authorities to
do that. And they are paying attention both to who comes into
the prisons to preach.
And, in many cases, this is being done by contract imams.
There is a limited staff within the Bureau of Prisons for the
federal system, and then they contract out to others to come in
and to serve those prison populations. And that is a very
important part of what they do.
In addition, they do monitor the materials also. And there
were a couple items cited in a hearing yesterday that dealt
with the Noble Koran and also the guidelines of Islam. The
Noble Koran, which has a very extremist interpretation of
Islam, has been banned from the chapel libraries and the
libraries of the federal system.
And they are also disseminating this information, and have
been, out to the state and local systems. But, as you know,
there are well over 2,000 state, local, federal, tribal
institutions in this country. We have surveyed somewhere over
2,000 of them at this point and are trying to get those
messages out.
Mr. King. Do you think we are making progress?
Mr. Van Duyn. I believe so, because I think the
dissemination of education and awareness is really what is
going to make the difference here.
Mr. King. Mr. Blake? Mr. Ali?
Mr. Ali. Yes, sir. From our perspective at DHS, in terms of
just looking at it as a macro issue, it is certainly an issue
of concern, prison radicalization, of deep interest.
What I think we don't know or we have less of an
understanding of: What is the level of operational threat that
potentially could be within some of these prison systems or
some of the small groups or clusters within them who are really
promoting these radical beliefs? And that is just an unknown,
how many other potential JIS-like entities are there. Hopefully
there aren't many, but there may be some we just have not come
across yet.
And I think there are also two ways to think about the
issue, as well. There appears to be, sort of, the bottom-up
type of activity, which you could potentially say that is a
better characterization of the JIS. You have someone who truly
almost developed his belief system and then promoted that, and
at the output came a small group of people who bought in to
that belief system and were willing, potentially, to take
action on it.
So you have the, sort of, bottom-up phenomenon. But there
may also be a top-down phenomenon, as well, from transnational
organizations that, as Mr. Van Duyn mentioned, potentially the
government of Iran, that are also trying to spread a certain
ideology within the prison system. And I think we also don't
have a clear understanding of what that level of top-down
influence looks like.
So with that said, in terms of just potential ways to get a
better insight as to what is actually happening, I agree that
more potentially needs to be done in terms of how we vet
certain individuals who are coming into the prison system;
dialogue with Muslim communities as well, to get potentially
more involved into the, sort of, either the chaplaincy corps or
other types of volunteer services that are provided to
prisoners in the systems.
And from our perspective at DHS, getting a better
understanding as to what is really happening at the state and
local level, so building and expanding on those partnerships.
Just as an example, when we conducted our California study,
until we went out to California and had discussions with
representatives, both in Los Angeles and in northern
California--Sacramento, San Francisco--we just did not have the
picture that they had at the ground level, as to the prison
radicalization phenomenon, because there is very little
national intelligence reporting that captures that.
So from our perspective, building those relationships and
then furthering them is an important part of this equation.
Mr. Blake. I would just say, on a bit of a strategic point,
that one of the things we look at as we look at the, kind of,
Sunni extremist movement, the way that it has evolved, it has
changed, it has decentralized over time, one of the concerns is
the development of leaders and leadership and leadership
abilities. And if you look at some of the prison experiences of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Jordan, of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Egypt,
you recognize that their time in prison was an important part
of their formative experience.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For the second round, you have mentioned nodes, and I think
we have identified four basic nodes where this radicalization
appears to take place. One is university campuses; another is
in mosques and community centers; a third is the Internet; and
the fourth is the prison system.
And I guess, as somebody who has taught on a college
campus, worked for a newspaper, we are concerned about freedom
of speech, academic freedom, religious freedom. These are
fundamental freedoms that those of who have served in uniform
felt we were fighting for and want to protect.
When it comes to the prisons, it is a somewhat different
node. It would seem to me that it is much more under control.
And I think the chairman has asked those very appropriate
questions. So I would like to focus a little more on the
university campuses, the mosques, and the Internet.
There is a balancing act, always, between freedom and
security, between civil liberties and the right to be safe or
to expect to be safe. We know there are limits on free speech,
that fighting words, for example, are not protected, libel is
not protected, hate speech is not, or words that could lead to
harm, to damage.
Years ago, Zechariah Chafee at Harvard Law School wrote a
book called ``Free Speech,'' and I recall vaguely that he made
the statement that your to swing your arm ends where my nose
begins. And it kind of captures how we have to address the
issue of freedom of speech, civil liberties and the right to be
secure and be safe.
Have either of your three agencies encountered legal
difficulties in trying to examine more closely these nodes?
Have you been either restricted by the staff attorneys or been
given advice and guidance? And how does that issue, the issue
of individual liberties and freedom, interfere, let's say, as
you try to address radicalization in these different nodes?
Don't look at each other.
[Laughter.]
I know it is a hard question, and maybe it is a question
for the record. But if you could provide some kind of answer, I
think it could be useful.
I mean, we value the academic freedom of our college
campuses, but we don't want to see people teaching or preaching
hate. And that is the same, I guess, when we go to our mosques,
our cathedrals, our Protestant churches, this sort of thing.
And the Internet--we value the Internet as a communications
tool, but I don't want to see sexual predators using it, for
example. I don't want to see drug lords using the Internet for
their nefarious business. And quite frankly, I don't want to
see terrorists using the Internet.
Mr. Van Duyn. The FBI is very aware of the rights of
freedom of religion and also freedom of speech. And that is why
we focus our efforts on actual connections to terrorist
activities and predication that there is activity and intent to
harm the United States. But we are not looking at any
particular node or venue in particular. We are looking at the
activities that occur there that would be reflective of some
type of harm that is to be a plan for the United States.
Mr. Ali. Chairman Simmons, just to add to that, we have the
same concerns with the tension between civil liberties and the
ability to further investigate potential activities that could
cause harm in the U.S. And from our perspective, we also are
not focusing specifically on these entities in and of
themselves.
We are only examining them in the course of, if the
disseminated intelligence suggests that there is activity of
concern or interest there, then that is where our analysis
takes us. But we are, at least the Office of Intelligence in
DHS, we are not a collection agency, so we are not actively
collecting the information on any of these institutions.
Mr. Blake. Our answer would be somewhat similar, in that
the National Counterterrorism Center does not have a tactical
and collection mission, investigative or operational mission.
So we are recipients of the information. It is quite different.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Simmons.
First of all, I regret that I had to leave the room several
times during your testimony. I had different messages coming
in. So you may have covered this in your opening statements.
But what level of cooperation do you believe you are
getting from the Muslim community, especially imams, in trying
to screen out those who would be more radical or recommending
those who would be more mainstream and would not create
problems? Again, I am focusing on the issue of prisons.
Mr. Van Duyn. We do--and, again, I think it may be better
for you to speak to the Bureau of Prisons about their efforts,
because I know they reach out to the Muslim communities in the
various areas where they are looking for assistance in
identifying imams.
As I indicated, there is a very small staff--I believe it
is only 11 staff imams in the Bureau of Prisons. So they go out
extensively to local institutions to find people to serve the
prisoners' religious needs. So they are out in the communities.
Speaking for the FBI, we have, as I said, an extensive
Muslim outreach program, both in our headquarters, where we
bring people in to discuss various issues, and then also with
our Special agents in Charge in their various field offices.
Mr. Ali. And, Mr. Chairman, for the department, our office,
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, we don't have that
function, in terms of outreach with anyone. But there is an
element within the department, the Office of Civil Liberties
and Civil Rights, that this is part of their mission, to have
that kind of dialogue with various groups around the country.
I do not know whether that dialogue consists of the prison
issue, but we can certainly research that and get a better
answer back for you.
Mr. King. Good. I would appreciate it, even if it is just
anecdotal, as to what you believe the level of cooperation is.
Thank you.
Mr. Simmons. I know that they are going to be calling for
votes, I believe in 20 minutes to half an hour or so. I
reluctantly dismiss this panel. I have more questions.
And all members, of course, can submit questions for the
record.
But I want to thank you gentlemen for coming forward and
testifying on this issue. I think this is probably one of the
first hearings we have had on the subject in either the House
or Senate, even though there has been a lot of discussion of
it.
I realize that the work that we are doing on this subject
is preliminary in nature. But I also feel that it is an
extraordinarily important issue for us to understand better and
to work with.
So, again, I thank you for your testimony. And this will
not be the last time that we talk about this subject. Thank you
very much.
Mr. King. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Simmons. The second panel consists of four individuals.
Our first witness is Dr. Walid Phares--and if I have
mispronounced your name, I apologize--senior fellow at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on
Middle East history, politics, global terrorist movements,
democratization and human rights.
Dr. Phares also leads the foundation's Future of Terrorism
Project, which considers how the militant Islamist threat will
mutate over time and what can be done to defend against new,
more deadly strains of terrorism.
He holds degrees in law and political science from St.
Joseph and the Lebanese University of Beirut, a master's in
international law from the Universite de Lyon in France, and a
Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from the
University of Miami in the United States.
Our second witness, Dr. Frank Cilluffo, is associate vice
president for homeland security at The George Washington
University and leads the university's homeland security efforts
on education, research, training and policy.
He also directs the multidisciplinary Homeland Security
Policy Institute and teaches a graduate-level course on
counterterrorism and homeland security at the Elliott School of
International Affairs.
He joined G.W. from the White House, where he served as
special assistant to the president for homeland security.
Our third witness is Mr. John Woodward, associate director
of the RAND Intelligence Policy Center. From October 2003 to
2005, John served as director of the U.S. Department of Defense
Biometrics Management Office. Prior to joining RAND, Mr.
Woodward served as an operations officer for the Central
Intelligence Agency for 12 years, with assignments in East Asia
and East Africa.
Our final witness is Mr. Steve Emerson, executive director
of The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Mr. Emerson is the
author of five books on terrorism and national security, most
recently the national best-seller, ``American Jihad: The
Terrorists Living Among Us.''
Mr. Emerson started the investigative project in late 1995,
following the broadcast of his documentary film, ``Jihad in
America,'' on public television. The film exposed video of
clandestine operations of militant Islamic terrorist groups on
American soil.
For the film, Mr. Emerson received numerous awards,
including the George Polk award for the best T.V. commentary,
one of the most prestigious awards in journalism. He also
received the top prize from the Investigative Reporters and
Editors Organization for best investigative report in both
print and television for the documentary.
I want to thank all of you gentlemen for being here today.
I will also say that we have your written testimony in the
notebook, which we have reviewed, so we hope that you can
summarize in about 5 minutes.
Dr. Phares?
STATEMENT WALID PHARES, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR THE
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Phares. Thank you very much.
Mr. Simmons. Did I pronounce your name correct?
Mr. Phares. Close enough. It is Phares.
Mr. Simmons. Close enough for government work. Phares,
okay. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Phares. Ferris wheel.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Simmons. There we go. Simmons like the mattress. No
relation.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Phares. Thank you, Chairman. I would like to thank you
very much. It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you
today to discuss the theme of the homeland security
implications of radicalization. My contribution is titled,
``Intercepting Radicalization at the Indoctrination Stage.''
Your concerns about radicalization as a threat to U.S.
homeland security are warranted. For after 25 years of studying
the ideology and the evolution of the doctrines that produced
the self-declared jihadist movement--''al haraka al Jihadiya''
in Arabic--I conclude, along with a number of my colleagues in
the United States and across the Atlantic that the terrorism
America and its allies are facing in the war on terror is
direct product of this radical ideology.
The 19 men who massacred 3,000 United States and other
citizens belong to al-Qa'ida, and the latter is a self-declared
Salafist Jihadist organization. Every single case of terrorism
uncovered on U.S. territory since 9/11 was motivated by this
ideology.
To name a few: Virginia Paintball gang, the dirty bomb
case, the shoe-bomber case, Al Qaida's John Walker, Azzam al
Amriki Adam Gadahn, the Oregon case, the Virginia multiple
cases, Jihadi charities, so on and so forth. Even the case of
Abdelrahman in 1993, Sheik Abdelrahman, and the first bombing
of the New York towers is also grounded in its literature of
jihadism.
Statements made by Zarqawi networks, Osama bin Laden, Ayman
al-Zawahiri since 1998, the jihadist ideology, which also has
been expressed by the Ayatollah Khomeini teaching and Hezbollah
and Lebanon--all of the above comes to one source: the jihadist
ideology.
We know that there are two trees of this ideology: the one
born under Jihadi Salafists, their thinking, and the one born
under Jihadi Khomeinist thinking.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, jihadism is the ideological common
identity of terror groups such as al-Qa'ida, Salafi Combat
Group, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Jemaa Islamiya, Taliban, Laskar
Taiba, and dozens and dozens of others around the world,
including other chapters within the United States.
These organizations and individuals are responsible and
were responsible for attacks against the United States and its
allies in the 1990s, 9/11, Madrid, London, Beslan, Mumbai,
Riyadh, Casablanca, Sunni Triangle in Iraq, and other violence
associated with terrorism.
First conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is, at this stage of the
war on terror, the ideology behind the threat has been already
identified. he jihadists themselves identified it. And that
should be addressed as such: as an ideology.
Second remark is about the development of the threat
itself, the making of jihadism.
Prior to 9/11, the spread of this ideology was operated by
a variety of Salafi, Wahhabi, Ikhwan--or Muslim Brotherhood--
Tablighi, Deobandi, and Takfiri schools of thought around the
world, mostly by means of religious schools known as madrassa.
And then moving into the United States gradually out of the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, jihadi cadres took the control of
existing religious schools funded by foreign support but also
formed their own indoctrination networks, often in and around
mosques and other social and cultural centers.
In about 20 years of militant activities, this ideology
produced three generations of radicals, a pool which basically
allows the terrorists to recruit from.
Certainly the perpetrators of 9/11 could be defined as
foreign jihadists, but the worry, the concern for the homeland
security are the American jihadists, those who have been
recruited by the original first generation of jihadists, and
therefore constitute today a direct threat against homeland
security.
Third point, component of that threat, what are we talking
about. This is not a vague radicalization of one or other
community. This is a very specific, systematic, ideological
network that penetrates, has strategies, has visions, and
therefore is and constitutes a direct threat against homeland
security in the United States and our allies around the world.
The components are as follows. It rejects the legitimacy of
our national liberties: pluralism, role of secular law. The
jihadi ideology--and that is important--is not another social
or political way of thinking within democracy, nor is it a
political alternative to one particular party or a specific
policy in domestic or foreign affairs.
Jihadism rejects the American Constitution, the Bill of
Rights, the international declaration on human rights, the
United Nations and international law. Jihadism aims at
destroying democracies and installing a totalitarian regime
named, for some, caliphate, for others, imamate.
And to do so, jihadism creates the conviction--and that is
the important point--in the minds of adherents that war against
the government, people, and Constitution of the United States
is the path toward achieving the universal goal. And here, Mr.
Chairman, is the beginning of the threat, when the ``click''
that transforms a citizen into a jihadist. That is the
beginning of the process, not at the end of it.
Strategic penetration operated by the jihadist movement
before and since 9/11 is based on various models. First model
are those who originates overseas, move to the United States--I
am talking about cadre--legally or an illegal way, and starts
operating inside of the country, using its laws and facilities.
The estimate of jihadists who have infiltrated the country over
the past two decades is certainly in the hundreds, possible
close to a thousand people.
This first-generation jihadist has organized itself to
perform two activities: One is to grow its own strength for
future jihads. Two, very relevant to us now, is to produce the
second generation of American-born jihadists. If you analyze
the average age of U.S.-born jihadists, you would conclude that
the production of the second generation has begun in the late
1980s and mostly since the early 1990s.
The first generation of jihadists does two things. It
indoctrinates, then recruits within the Muslim community, using
various methods and influence already-penetrated institutions.
Second, and more important, is for them to take the control of
religious conversions of non-Muslims. The issue is not
conversion at all. The issue--this is a free and pluralist
society, of course--the issue is basically who does the
conversion and who shepherds the converts into being recruited
into the jihadist ideology.
Once the pool of indoctrinated individuals is formed,
mostly of younger persons, then the terror organizations can
recruit from. It is a fact that the most dangerous jihadists,
both on the individual level or as self-formed cells, are those
who have been able or are in the process of penetrating the
defense-security system of the United States.
The threat shield. There are several shields that
``protect'' the U.S.-based jihadists from containment. Among
these shields are: A, the little ability of the public, that is
the American public, to identify them, since their ideology
hasn't officially been identified by the government.
How can we ask ordinary citizens or people in the agencies
to find out who is the jihadists if the government has not
identified it to start with, from the top level all the way to
agencies and, of course, at the front of this, Congress?
B, without the public, law enforcement and homeland
security cannot mobilize on a large scale to identify and
isolate the jihadist activities.
C, the ideology of jihadi terrorism enjoys, obviously, if
not identified and banned, enjoys the political freedoms of the
country. It is protected, naturally, by advocacy groups, legal
defense, and is funded both domestically and by foreign regimes
and organizations.
Mr. Chairman, I do, in a very summarized way, suggest a
resistance to radicalization. What could be done? Six points.
And I would be more than happy to answer questions about the
details of these points later.
One, first of all, identification of the ideology of
jihadism by government, media and experts. It is unescapable,
every single plan we have in every single department in the
United States--and I have been visiting and in touch with other
experts around the world, in Canada and Europe and the Middle
East--without this identification, I don't think that the fight
against jihadism will be successful.
Two, once this is done, then mobilization against the
ideology of jihadism by the public and educational
institutions. If our students--and I have been a professor for
14 years--over the years are taught the wrong interpretation of
what this ideology is in the classroom, those who are going to
be recruited to agencies, government, media and the rest of the
public space are not going to be able to be very helpful in the
future in that war of ideas.
Three, the most sensitive, the most difficult aspect,
although had to be raised, is, after we identify this ideology
and we are sure that under the Constitution this ideology is
harming society, is calling for violence, is making a
distinction in society between one slice of it and the other
slice, encouraging one against the other, therefore under the
Constitution of the United States and the charter of the United
Nations, it has to be banned by the U.S. Congress.
Four, mass education of the public about it. That involves
public libraries. That involves a good use of the public
services funded by taxpayers, including C-SPAN, PBS, NPR. All
these publicly supported organizations should be very helpful
in encouraging the mass education of the public about where is
the danger.
Five, it is imperative to work with domestic NGOs, with the
general public in general, and specifically with the Muslim
community. But working with the Muslim community should
basically begin with working with those organizations that not
just are moderate but willing to inform the public within the
Muslim community and at large of the danger, of the threats.
Six, working with international non-government
organizations and particularly with liberal, democratic and
humanist Muslims.
In conclusion, terrorism is threatening homeland security,
and jihadism is a main root of terrorism. Therefore, the
capacity of the United States protecting homeland security and
defending national security will depend largely on developing
policies and laws that would identify, ban, isolate and shrink
jihadism, with the help of the American public in general and
the Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in particular.
Such a shift in homeland security must be based on a
comprehensive strategy of containment of the terror ideology
within the framework of civil and democratic rights of society.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Phares follows:]
Prepared Statement of Walid Phares
Chairman Simmons and Members of the Committee,
It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss
the theme ``The Homeland Security implications of radicalization.'' My
contribution is titled: ``Intercepting radicalization at the
indoctrination stage.''
Identification of the Threat
Your concerns about ``radicalization'' as a threat to U.S. Homeland
Security are warranted. For after twenty five years of studying the
ideology and the evolution of the doctrines that produced the self-
declared Jihadist movement (al haraka al Jihadiya) which has declared,
waged and continues to conduct war against the United States and other
democracies, I conclude along with a number of colleagues in this field
of expertise that the Terrorism America and its allies are facing in
the War on Terror, is a direct product of this radical ideology. The 19
men, who massacred 3,000 US and other citizens on September 11, belong
to al Qaeda and the latter, is a self declared Salafist-Jihadist
organization. Every single case of Terrorism uncovered on U.S.
territory, since 9/11, was motivated by this ideology. To name a few:
The Virginia Paintball gang, the dirty bomb case, the shoe bomber case,
al Qaeda's John Walker, Azzam al Amriki AKA Adam Gadahn, the Oregon
case, the Virginia multiple cases, the Jihadi charities, etc. This
ideology was omnipresent in the cases than ended with court sentences
and those which didn't; in the Sheikh Abdel Rahman case of 1993; in the
statements made by the Zarqawi networks wile assassinating innocent
civilians; in all speeches by Usama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri from
1998 till now; and all jihadi web sites in all languages: one global
common thread is always omnipresent: The Jihadi ideology. And in
parallel to al Qaeda's radical doctrine another ideology of Jihadism
follows the teachings of Ayatalollah Khomeini and is embodied by the
public speeches of Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad and Hezbollah.
Hence, the ideologies that produces ``Radicalization,'' are the
Jihadist ones. They are of two main ``trees,'' the Jihadi Salafist and
the Jihadi Khomeinist. These doctrines, taught and disseminated
worldwide and in America, are the producers of the ``Jihadists'' (al
Jihadiyun) who have declared war and waged it against the United States
both overseas and in the homeland. Jihadism is the ideological common
identity of terror groups al Qaeda, Salafi Combat Group of the Maghreb,
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya of south Asia, the Taliban of
Afghanistan, Laskar Taiba of Pakistan, the Mahakem Islamiya of Somalia,
and other Salafi-Wahabi groups internationally, in addition to
Hezbollah. Jihadism was the inspiration for the 1990s attacks, 9/11,
Madrid, London, Beslan, Mumbai, Riyadh, Casablanca, the Sunni Triangle
in Iraq and other violence associated with Terrorism. Hence at this
stage of the War on Terror, the ideology behind the threat has been
identified and thus should be addressed.
Development of the Threat
Prior to 9/11, the spread of Jihadis was operated by Salafi,
Wahabi, Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), Tablighi, Deobandi and Takfiri
schools of thought around the world, mostly by the means of religious
schools known as Madrassa. Moving into the United States gradually as
of the 1970s, and increasingly in the 1990s, Jihadi cadres took the
control of existing religious schools funded by foreign support but
also formed their own indoctrination networks, often in and around
Mosques and other social and cultural centers. In about twenty years of
militant activities, the Jihadist ideology produced three generations
of radicals, a pool which Terrorists have and continue to recruit from.
The perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks are foreign
Jihadists. But most of the other arrested Terrorists (or alleged
Terrorists) claiming the same ideology and who identify with al Qaeda
or its allies, are ``American Jihadists,'' citizens or permanent
residents, U.S.-born or naturalized. Hence the most dangerous dimension
of the ideology of Jihadism is the fact that it has already recruited
and inspired Americans to wage war against their own nation. Therefore
Jihadism is a direct threat against Homeland Security
Components of the threat
This threat against national security and against the foundations
of civil society and democracy is embodied by a set of ideas and
concepts that reject the legitimacy of citizens' free choice, their
natural liberties, pluralism, and the rule of secular law. The Jihadi
ideology is not another social or political way of thinking within
Democracy, nor is it a political alternative to one particular party or
a specific policy in domestic or foreign affairs. Jihadism rejects the
American constitution, the bill of rights, the international
declaration on human rights, the United Nations and international law.
Jihadism aim at destroying democracies and installing a totalitarian
regime named Caliphate. And to do so, Jihadism creates the conviction
in the minds of its adherents that war against the Government, people
and constitution of the United States is the path towards achieving the
universal goal. The beginning of the threat starts with the ``click''
that transforms a citizen into a Jihadist. From there one, the constant
objective of the Jihadi recruit is to strike against the national
security of the United States. The Terrorist can be a member of al
Qaeda if he/she are successful in establishing the contact, as for
example with the case of Adam Gadahn and Jose Padilla, or they could
operate under an al Qaeda like Jihadism, without having established a
link with the mother ship.
Strategic penetration
The strategic penetration operated by the Jihadists before and
since 9/11 is based on three models: One are the Jihadists who
originates overseas and move to the United States, either legally
(visa, lawful immigration, marriage, political asylum) or illegally. In
either of these cases the Jihadis ends up operating on the inside of
the country, using its laws and facilities. The estimate of Jihadists
who have infiltrated the country over the past two decades is certainly
in the hundreds, possibly close to a thousand. This ``first
generation'' Jihadists has organized itself to perform two activities:
One is to grow its own strength for ``future Jihads.'' Two is to
produce the second generation of American-born Jihadists. If you
analyze the average age of U.S. born Jihadists, you would conclude that
the production of the second ``generation'' has begun in the late 1980s
and mostly since the early 1990s. The formation of this ``second
generation'' can only happen through two methods. First is to
indoctrinate then recruit within the Muslim community using a variety
of methods and already penetrated institutions. Second, is for them to
take the control of the religious conversion of non-Muslims and
indoctrinate the converts during the process or after the process:
Hence a first generation of radical Salafists-Wahabis has already
processed a radicalization and the recruitment of American-born Muslims
or converts. The issue is not conversion: This is a free and pluralist
society. Certainly there is and would be a problem with the
radicalization taking place within a particular community. But the real
issue affecting Homeland Security is the systematic penetration of a
religious community and the recruitment of Jihadists to perform acts of
Terrorism and aggression against national security.
And once the ``Pool'' of indoctrinated individuals is formed,
mostly of younger persons then the Terror organizations can recruit
from. However, Jihadists in the West in general and in the U.S. in
particular, are of two types once they are formed: Either they join an
organization and moves into a cell, or they form their own cell,
without connecting with a larger organization or al Qaeda. The most
dangerous Jihadists, both on the individual level or as self-formed
cells are those who have been able or are in the process of penetrating
the defense-security system of the United States. In this realm, the
Jihadists can harm the most the national security of the Homeland, and
analytical indications project that one of their ultimate goals is to
penetrate and weaken U.S. Homeland Security.
Threat shield
There are several shields that ``protect'' the U.S.-based Jihadists
from containment. Among these shields are:
a. The little ability of the public to identify them since
their ideology wasn't officially>en identified by the
Government.
b. Without the public, Law Enforcement and Homeland Security
cannot mobilize on a large scale to identify and isolate the
Jihadists activities. Furthermore, by not identifying the
ideology and its strategies, the U.S. Government cannot direct
its agencies and resources against the threat.
c. The ideology of Jihadi-Terrorism unfortunately, enjoys the
political freedoms of the country. It is ``protected'' by advocacy
groups, legal defense and is funded both domestically and by foreign
regimes and organizations.
Resistance to ``radicalization''
To establish a national resistance to ``radicalization'' following
are 6 suggestions:
1. Identification of the ideology of Jihadism by Government,
media and experts.
2. Mobilization against the ideology of Jihadism by the public
and educational institutions
3. Ban of the ideology by the U.S. Congress
4. Mass education of the public about it
5. Working with domestic NGOs, with the general public and
specifically with the Muslim communities
6. Working with international INGOs and particularly with
liberal, democratic and humanist Muslims
Looking at the future
In summary, Terrorism is threatening Homeland Security and Jihadism
is a main root cause of Terrorism. The U.S. capacity of protecting
Homeland security and defending national security will depend largely
on developing policies and laws that would identify, ban, isolate and
shrink Jihadism, with the help of the American public in general and
the Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in particular. Such a shift
in Homeland security must be based on a comprehensive strategy of
containment of the Terror ideology within the framework of civil and
democratic rights of society.
In closing, I would like to thank you and the committee members and
staff for the opportunity to present this testimony today. I look
forward to responding to any question that you might have.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much for that very interesting
testimony. It went over the 5 minutes, but I felt that it was
very much worth it. So thank you very much.
Mr. Cilluffo?
STATEMENT OF FRANK CILLUFFO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY
INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cilluffo. Chairman Simmons, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I echo others in
congratulating you for your foresight and leadership to address
these issues. We don't want to be having this hearing after an
incident occurs.
I will try to adhere to Shakespeare's rule on public
speaking: Stand up to be seen, speak loudly to be heard, and
sit down to be appreciated.
[Laughter.]
So I will try to be brief, and I am already seated.
As discussed, radicalization has manifested itself in a
series of terrorist attacks and activities, such as those in
Madrid, London and the operations thwarted in Canada. Though Al
Qaida in its classic form is now a degraded entity, it has
franchised itself across the globe. These groups are prepared
to act locally and largely independently.
And we are now seeing the emergence of a leaderless
movement, marked significantly by self-enlistment and taking
its inspiration from ``Al Qaida classic'' to join the global
Salafi jihad.
The Internet has fueled this development, wherein chat
rooms have sort of replaced the smoke-filled bars, in essence
building a virtual umma.
Ironically, it is when homegrown groups attempt to reach
out to Al Qaida that they have been caught in key instances.
And fortunately, these groups have not yet attained a higher
level of competence.
It is essential to better understand the life cycle of the
terrorists, specifically the process by which an individual
becomes motivated to listen to radical ideas, read about them,
enlist oneself or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, and
ultimately act upon those ideas, from sympathizer to activist
to indiscriminate violence.
Together with my colleagues at the University of Virginia,
particularly Dr. Greg Saathoff, we have just co-chaired a task
force on prison radicalization, which we released yesterday on
the other side of the U.S. Capitol. My remarks today will focus
on the findings of that group.
But I should say that it was a request to brief the
chairman and ranking members of this committee that actually
led us, in a closed-door session, and reinforced our belief
that a task-force study was sorely needed.
Our dedicated volunteer group did a deep dive into the
issue and brought to bear a range of perspectives on the issue.
We looked at the challenge through the distinct lenses of imams
and chaplains, officials at all levels of government, scholars
of religion, and behavioral science experts, and of course the
more traditional law enforcement and intelligence perspective,
and integrated these views into a prism, so as to come up with
effective, multidimensional recommendations for action.
To put things in context, prisons have always been an
incubator for radical ideas, in part because they are the
captive audience. Examples run the gamut over time and
geographic space, from Hitler, to Stalin, to Bosnia's Arkan, to
the spiritual philosopher of Al Qaida, Sayyid Qutb, on to al-
Zarqawi.
Of course religious radicalization is not unique to Islam
and remains the exception, rather than the rule, irrespective
of the faith at issue.
To date, select cases, from the well-known, such as Richard
Reid, the new Folsom Prison case, and Sheik Rahman, to the
lesser-known, such as El Rukn or the extremist Christian group
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord, have revealed connections
between former prisoners and terrorism. Each held the potential
to be a high-consequence event, and authorities have attested
that these cases appear to be just the tip of the iceberg,
though they cannot discuss ongoing investigations in great
detail.
The potential scope of our challenge is considerable.
America's prison population is the world's largest, at over 2
million. Our incarceration rate is the world's highest. Ninety-
three percent of U.S. inmates are in state and local prisons
and jails, not at the federal level.
The figures in California alone are staggering. Facilities
are hugely overcrowded, operating at 200 percent capacity.
Wardens, understandably, have their hands full dealing with
day-to-day operations and safety issues alone. And prisoners
with radical Islamic religious views often conduct themselves
as model prisoners, so wardens and other prison staff, who are
already overburdened, may have little incentive to focus on
these inmates.
Despite such overstretch, California officials have
demonstrated an impressive level of resolve and commitment to
countering prisoner radicalization. Arizona and New York have
also been particularly forward-leaning in this approach.
However, even those that are proactive, most of the
successes, one would argue, are due to luck, such as the new
Folsom Prison case where it was one of the perpetrators
dropping a cell phone that unraveled a much larger plot.
In short, strides have been made, but disconnects remain.
Crucially local information is yet to fully find its way into
regional and national intelligence processes and networks, and
strategic analysis is not yet fused with the investigatory
efforts.
Complicating this matter, this is currently no database to
track inmates after release or to identify inmates associated
with radical groups, and no comprehensive database exists to
track religious service providers who are known to expose
inmates to radical religious rhetoric.
Compounding the threat posed by Islamic radicalization is
the established presence of violent gangs and extremist groups
in prisons. Some of these groups have found common cause with
extremist Muslim groups, who share their hostility toward the
U.S. government and Israel--the ``enemy of my enemy is my
friend'' effect.
It should go without saying that religion may have a
tremendously constructive impact upon inmates, imbuing them
with a sense of discipline and purpose, among other things.
Prisoners obviously also have a legal right to practice.
Unfortunately, a shortage of suitably qualified Muslim
religious services providers has opened the door to
underqualified and radical chaplains to enter prisons. In fact,
prisoners have often taken on this role themselves altogether.
Their captive audience may, in large part, have had no
prior exposure to Islam and no way to put the radical message
into context. The only version some may ever learn is the cut-
and-paste version of the Koran that incorporates violate prison
gang culture known as Jailhouse Islam, or Prislam, from gang
leaders or other influential inmates.
Moreover, there is no consistently applied standard or
procedure to determine what reading material is appropriate at
the state level, at the local level. Radical literature and
extremist translations and interpretations of the Koran--we
talked about the Noble Koran--has been distributed to prisoners
by groups suspected or known to support terrorism.
Nor is this unique to the United States. In fact, I think
we have an opportunity to get in front of the problem, not
behind it.
Let me, just in closing, I would be delighted to get into
greater detail on why we think we need a commission. But we
need broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim community.
They need to be identified and pursued to foster mutual
respect, trust and understanding. To confine the discussion of
these issues to terrorism alone is bound to encourage a
defensive posture and impede a constructive dialogue.
Prison radicalization is but one subset of the battle of
ideas, and it is only by challenging ideas with ideas, both
within and beyond prison walls, that we can succeed and
moderate some of these views.
[The statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Chairman Simmons, Representative Lofgren, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee, it is a privilege to be afforded the opportunity
to testify before you today. Your foresight and leadership in examining
the homeland security implications of radicalization is to be
commended.
Some months ago, I was asked to brief the Chairmen and Ranking
Members of the House Homeland Security Subcommittees on the more
specific issue of prisoner radicalization in the United States. That
briefing, provided jointly with Dr. Gregory Saathoff, a leading
behavioral science expert, was well attended by both sides of the aisle
and the discussion, which took place in a closed door session, was a
spirited one. Congressional leadership and political will in connection
with this particular challenge has been manifestly evident, and you
should all be recognized for your efforts in this regard. Proactive
consideration of this challenge and a carefully calibrated response,
implemented in timely fashion, will bolster national security. Getting
ahead of the curve requires the courage to assume risk, and those who
embrace risk in the interest of furthering public safety should be
supported in their efforts to serve the public interest. Let us not
wait until we are faced with the need to manage a crisis.
That briefing, taken together with other conversations I have had
with a bipartisan group of Representatives, served to reinforce my
belief, as well as Dr. Saathoff's, that there was a real need to
explore the question of prisoner radicalization in order to sharpen our
sense of the nature and scale of the problem, and thereby serve as a
spur to action. Against this background, The George Washington
University's Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the
University of Virginia School of Medicine's Critical Incident Analysis
Group (CIAG) blended their expertise and networks, and jointly convened
a dedicated volunteer task force of subject matter experts to examine
radicalization in prisons from a multidisciplinary perspective. Rather
than studying the issue through a single lens or solely from a
traditional law enforcement and/or intelligence perspective, the task
force interviewed and received briefings from imams and chaplains, and
brought together officials at all levels of government with scholars of
religion and behavioral science experts. The aim was to integrate
insights from each of these professions (received under ``Chatham House
rules'' and in the experts' individual rather than institutional
capacity), and recast their distinct lenses on this issue as a prism.
Each community represented is a critical part of the solution and no
analysis would be complete without the benefit of their insights and
input. The task force report is a product of its members' collective
talents and I would be remiss if I did not express my gratitude for
their willingness to join in this endeavor and share their valuable
insights.
What follows is, in large part, a distillation of the most salient
findings generated by this unique partnership, between HSPI and CIAG,
on the subject of religious radicalization of inmates in US prisons. To
set these remarks in broader context, however, I turn first to the
matter of radicalization writ large. Prison radicalization is, of
course, a subset of the more general phenomenon of radicalization that
has manifested itself in a series of terrorist attacks and activities
including the bombings in Madrid (3/11) and London (7/7), and
operations recently uncovered in Canada. The larger terrorist threat is
the tapestry against which prisoner radicalization must be studied, but
that fabric is ever changing. Al Qaeda in its classic form is now a
degraded entity, with many of its remaining key figures on the run.
However, it has franchised itself across the globe, with its
franchisees prepared to act locally, and largely independently--in
effect a network of networks. Having transitioned from Chief Financial
Officer to Chief Spiritual Officer, Bin Laden has spawned and
successfully marketed the Al Qaeda ``brand.'' Recently, we have seen
the emergence of a leaderless movement, marked significantly by self-
enlistment, and taking its inspiration from ``Al Qaeda classic'' to
join the global Salafi jihad. The internet has fuelled this development
by encouraging and accelerating the formation of stronger initial bonds
inside chat rooms than would occur through face-to-face interaction,
and facilitating the re-affirmation of aberrant attitudes--building in
essence a virtual umma. Ironically, it is when homegrown groups attempt
to reach out to Al Qaeda that they have been caught in key instances;
fortunately, these groups have not yet attained a higher level of
competence. The internet has also provided an avenue for participation
in jihad for women who could not otherwise become involved.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Interview with Scott Atran, Professor of Psychology and Public
Policy, University of Michigan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether beyond prison walls or inside them, it is essential to
better understand the life cycle of a terrorist--specifically, the
process by which an individual becomes motivated to listen to radical
ideas, read about them, enlist oneself or respond to terrorist
recruiting efforts, and ultimately, undertake terrorist activity.
In the prison context, the process of radicalization plays out in a
particular way. For present purposes, the term ``radicalization''
should be taken to mean ``the process by which inmates. . .adopt
extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken
for political or religious purposes.''\2\ Inmates in general are
particularly vulnerable to radical religious ideology due to their
anti-social attitudes and the need to identify with other inmates
sharing the same background, beliefs or ethnicity. Radical rhetoric may
exploit the inmate's vulnerabilities and lack of grounded religious
knowledge by providing validation to the inmate's disillusionment with
society and creating an outlet for their violent impulses. Possible
psychological factors increasing vulnerability include a high level of
distress, cultural disillusionment, lack of intrinsic religious beliefs
or values, dysfunctional family system or dependent personality
tendencies.\3\ These factors are prevalent among prison populations.
From an ideological standpoint, radical religious groups allow the
inmates to demonize their perceived enemies and view themselves as
righteous. Prisons are inherently violent environments and therefore
fertile ground for radicalization. Inmates are drawn to radical groups
out of the need for protection or to gain status amongst other
prisoners.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim
Religious Services Providers, Department of Justice, Office of The
Inspector General, April 2004.
\3\ S. Gerwehr and S. Daly, Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and
Recruitment, (McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, 2006), p. 84.
\4\ HSPI-CIAG Task Force Report, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead
of Prisoner Radicalization (Washington, DC, September 2006), p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Studies have suggested that terrorist recruitment methods are not
always expected to yield a high number of recruits.\5\ Radical messages
may be delivered to many prisoners with the understanding that most
will resist radicalization. Even if the radical message resonates with
only a few inmates, they could then be targeted for more intense one-
on-one instruction. How an inspired sympathizer turns into an activist
who then goes on to kill innocents is the crucial question. Only a few
who become radicalized go on to actively pursue terrorism, and an
important resource for combating terrorism would be to determine which
factor or factors that exist in prison influence some radicalized
prisoners to make the specific leap from radical beliefs to violence in
the name of those beliefs. Bear in mind, however, that a single
radicalized inmate can be a significant threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Gerwehr and Daly, supra, note 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prison radicalization is not a new threat. Prisons have always been
an incubator for radical ideas, in part because there is a captive
audience. Recall that Hitler wrote Mein Kampf while in prison; and
Stalin, while himself incarcerated, recruited inmates to power the
Bolshevik Revolution. Zeljko Raznatovic, the founder of Arkan's Tigers,
took part in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia in the 1990s, was just a
petty criminal until he spent time in Western Europe's prisons. The
spiritual philosopher of Al Qaeda, Sayyid Qutb, wrote the radical
Islamist manifesto Ma'alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones Along the Road)
while in an Egyptian prison; and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, initially merely
a petty criminal, recruited followers while imprisoned. Of course,
religious radicalization is not unique to Islam--and remains the
exception rather than the rule, irrespective of the faith at issue.
To date, select cases that have revealed connections between
former/current prisoners and terrorism have each held the potential to
be a high-consequence event:
In 1985, a group called El Rukn brokered a deal with
the Libyan government to carry out attacks on US police
stations, government facilities, military bases, and passenger
airplanes in exchange for $2.5 million and asylum in Tripoli.
El Rukn was founded by a Chicago gang leader who converted to
Islam while imprisoned in 1965.
When the compound of the extremist Christian group
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA) was raided,
authorities discovered landmines, US Army anti-tank rockets,
and a large amount of cyanide apparently intended to poison a
city's water supply. CSA's founder had earlier received
spiritual tutelage in prison from a fellow inmate--a leader in
the radical ``Christian Identity'' movement.
John King and Russell Brewer were convicted of
murdering African-American James Byrd Jr. in 1998. The two had
entered prison as petty criminals, but left startlingly
transformed, having joined a white supremacist group and
covered their bodies with racist tattoos. King's own attorney
``. . .admitted the significance of the prison experience.
`What I do know is [King] wasn't a racist when he went in. He
was when he came out'.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Anti-Defamation League, Dangerous Convictions: An Introduction
to Extremist Activities in Prisons (2002), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Reid, apprehended while attempting to detonate
a bomb on a US-bound commercial flight in December 2001, is
believed to have been radicalized by an imam while incarcerated
in Britain.
A recently foiled plot to attack numerous government
and Jewish targets in California was devised inside New Folsom
State Prison. Two men implicated in the scheme were recruited
from a local mosque by a former prisoner.
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the emir of Egypt's Gama'at
al Islamia (the Islamic Group), is the radical cleric who
plotted to bomb New York City landmarks in 1993. Upon being
sentenced to a life term, he issued a decree from federal
prison, declaring of Americans that ``Muslims everywhere
[should] dismember their nation, tear them apart, ruin their
economy, provoke their corporations, destroy their embassies,
attack their interests, sink their ships,. . .shoot down their
planes, [and] kill them on land, at sea, and in the air. Kill
them wherever you find them.'' Osama bin Laden later claimed
that this fatwa provided religious authority for the 9/11
attacks. Abdel Rahman has continued trying to run his
organization while incarcerated--and three defendants were
convicted of terrorism charges in 2005 for helping him do so.
These cases would appear to be just the tip of the iceberg,
however. According to authorities who briefed the task force, numerous
other examples exist, but due to the sensitive nature of ongoing
investigations, cannot be discussed publicly in detail. In short, we
have snippets of data but do not currently have a sense of how these
various ``pixels'' fit together as a mosaic--the big picture as it now
stands is fuzzy, and needs to be brought into focus in order for
effective response measures to be formulated and implemented.
That said, officials in California confirm that ``for every rock
they turn over'' in this context, they ``find something there.'' While
resource and personnel constraints have inhibited further investigation
of many of those leads, at least the bounds of what we do not know may
be apparent to those authorities. Potentially even more disturbing is
the further scenario in which we do not know what we do not know. In
short, there is a dearth of data in this area which inhibits a fulsome
assessment of the threat posed by religious radicalization of inmates
in the US correctional system. Further, social scientists and other
academicians interested in examining the issue have been largely
unsuccessful to date in gaining access to prison facilities to conduct
research, and prisoner radicalization therefore remains a poorly
understood phenomenon.
The task force set out to determine what is currently known about
radicalization and recruitment in the US prison system at the federal,
state and local levels. From the outset, however, I should emphasize
that the problem is by no means unique to the US. In Europe, for
instance, the number of Muslim inmates has been growing for decades,
and their numbers incarcerated are not in proportion to their
representation in the general population.\7\ By comparison to American
Muslims, Muslims living in Europe are more socio-economically
marginalized, and therefore more vulnerable to radical messages,
religious and otherwise. Indeed, the Washington Post recently reported
that whereas Muslims living in the United States ``tend to be more
educated'' and ``have higher incomes than the average American,'' the
reverse is true for Muslims in Britain.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ N.H. Ammar et al., ``Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio
State Prisons,'' International Journal of Offender Therapy and
Comparative Criminology, Volume 48, Number 4 (2004), pp. 416-17.
\8\ 59% of US Muslims hold a Bachelor's degree or more, versus 27%
in the US overall; and 52% of US Muslims earn $50,000 or more, versus
45% in the US overall. Geneive Abdo, ``America's Muslims Aren't as
Assimilated as You Think,'' Washington Post (August 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The European experience is relevant to our own in at least two
ways, though: as a containment challenge and a learning opportunity,
respectively. First, inmates radicalized in Europe may travel to the US
or participate in networks with individuals inside the US; and indirect
internet access, which may be accorded to some prisoners in the US,
facilitates such cross-border networking. Second, and more
encouragingly, the European experience offers us a chance to learn and
adapt lessons, and craft effective tailored strategies to the US
context before the problem manifests itself here to the extent that it
has overseas. In point of fact, the problem is a global one and, moving
forward, information-sharing between and among the US and other
countries will be crucial.
Within the US, the potential scope of the challenge is
considerable: America's prison population is the world's largest at
over two million, and our incarceration rate is the world's highest at
701 out of every 100,000.\9\ The overwhelming majority of these
inmates, that is ninety-three percent, are in state and local prisons
and jails.\10\ As a result, the threat of prisoner radicalization gains
even greater salience here than at the federal level. The figures for
California alone are staggering. There, thirty-three adult prisons
contain an inmate population in excess of 170,000. With facilities
hugely overcrowded--operating at 200% capacity--staffing, management,
funding, and logistics pose a tremendous challenge, and wardens there
understandably have their hands full dealing with day-to-day operations
alone. All of these inmates must be fed, clothed, housed and, most
importantly, supervised and secured. Concerned with dangerous inmates
and hardened criminals, prison officials simply do not have the
manpower to oversee every prayer service or investigate every lead.
Further, prisoners with extremist religious views often conduct
themselves as model prisoners, hence, wardens (and other prison staff)
who are already overburdened may have little incentive to focus on
these inmates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population (5th Ed.) (Home Office
Publication 234, 2003).
\10\ Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics, August 15, 2006; http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (September 13, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding such overstretch, officials at the state level have
demonstrated an impressive level of resolve and commitment to
countering prisoner radicalization. The issue has been identified as a
priority, and a concerted investigative effort is underway in
California (within the bounds of prevailing resources). A deliberate
effort to identify and remedy key gaps in the state's prevention and
response posture has given rise to a number of noteworthy initiatives
including pilot programs intended to draw on the expertise developed
over time by institutional gang investigators, and model terrorism and
training awareness courses under development for correctional officers.
State liaison officers posted at each prison meet monthly to share
information across facilities. Beyond the prison-to-prison network, the
long term and crucial process of building relationships and trust
between and among officials at different levels of government is
furthered by monthly meetings of a collective including prison staff,
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), the Los Angeles
Police Department, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
Assistant US Attorney for the area. Notably, California is not alone in
doing good work--Arizona and New York have also been forward-leaning in
their approach to this problem, and they too should be commended for
their proactive efforts.
Even in California, however, publicized successes may be due in no
small part to luck. For instance, while the LASD in conjunction with
the area's Joint Terrorism Task Force managed to foil the New Folsom
plot referenced above, it was the fact that one of the plotters
carelessly left a cell phone behind during a robbery that provided the
key break in the case. While strides have been made in the wake of this
episode, disconnects remain--crucially, local information has yet to
fully find its way into regional and national intelligence processes
and networks, and strategic analysis is not yet fused with
investigatory efforts so that synergies emerge. Significant cultural
obstacles also hinder the information-sharing process, highlighting
further the complexities of working across jurisdictions. Bureaucratic
infighting continues to hamper information sharing even between and
among federal agencies, in part because of differing views on
tradecraft--while some agencies are inclined to string people up at a
relatively early stage, others are predisposed to stringing them along
in order to tease out additional valuable information.
The implications are deeply disturbing. Radical preachers might be
caught in one prison, fired, and simply move on to work at another
prison. Radicalized prisoners might be transferred between prisons,
giving them an opportunity to spread their message to new audiences,
without prison officials on the receiving end knowing the threat posed
by their new charges. Radical groups might be communicating between
different prisons, coordinating their efforts, without prison officials
being aware of links between them. The importance of information and
intelligence sharing cannot be overstated, in part because it is
essential that operations be intelligence-driven. Complicating the
matter, there is currently no database to track inmates after they have
served their sentence or to identify prisoners associated with radical
groups. Further, there is no comprehensive database that tracks
religious service providers that have exposed inmates to radical
religious rhetoric. The sort of database that is truly needed is one
that encompasses both the prison context and beyond, and covers who
joins jihad, when, and how.\11\ In any case, it is critical that
information regarding the radicalization of prisoners in state, local,
and federal correctional facilities be included as part of the body of
information shared through the Information Sharing Environment called
for by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Scott Atran and Marc Sageman, ``Connecting the Dots,''
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compounding the threat posed by Islamic radicalization is the
established presence of violent gangs and extremist Christian groups in
prisons. Gangs have a long history of organizing, recruiting, and
violence within prisons, giving Muslim extremist groups an opportunity
to learn lesson organizational lessons. Many terrorist groups use
crime, including extortion, kidnapping, robbery, document fraud, drug
smuggling and arms trafficking to fund their enterprises,\12\ offering
an opportunity for the groups to cooperate to their mutual benefit.
More ominous is the potential for cooperation with right-wing Christian
extremist groups, which not only have a history of terrorist attacks on
US soil, but also a longstanding relationship with prisoners. These
groups, which ascribe to ``Christian Identity'' ideology, include Posse
Comitatus, The Order, and Aryan Nations. Some of these groups have
found common cause with extremist Muslim groups, who share their
hostility towards the US government and Israel--the ``enemy of my enemy
is my friend'' effect. Most recently, a number of white supremacist
groups vocalized their support for Hezbollah. Furthermore, radical
Islamic groups have already begun adapting practices of gangs and
extremist Christian groups. Where White Supremacist gangs use ancient
runes or Masonic symbols as secret codes, radical Muslim groups
increasingly use Arabic language and script to communicate in secret
while imprisoned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director, Office for Intelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, ``Narco-Terrorism: International Drug
Trafficking and Terrorism--A Dangerous Mix,'' Testimony before the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, delivered on May 20, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key factor in the growth of prisoner radicalization is the
shortage of suitably qualified Muslim religious service providers
available for work in prisons. Prisoners have a legal right to practice
their religion, and prisons are legally bound to provide for inmate
worship. This has opened the door to under-qualified and, dangerously,
radical preachers to enter prisons. Strikingly, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (FBOP) currently employs only ten Muslim chaplains for the
entire federal prison system, while the California state prison system
employs twenty Muslim chaplains for its 300,000 prisoners and parolees.
This handful of chaplains cannot possibly tend to the religious needs
of every Muslim prisoner or oversee every religious service. As a
result, prisoners often take on the role of religious service providers
and prayer leaders. A 2004 survey of 193 wardens of state correctional
facilities showed that half the institutions allowed inmates themselves
to act as spiritual leaders.\13\ Radical prisoners who volunteer for
religious functions and assume religious authority benefit from a
captive audience which may, in large part, have had no prior exposure
to Islam, and no way to put the radical message into context. Hence,
the only version of their religion that they have ever known is a
``cut-and-paste'' version of the Qur'an that incorporates violent
prison gang culture, known as ``Jailhouse Islam'' or ``Prislam''. (It
should go without saying, however, that in general terms religion may
have a tremendously constructive impact upon inmates, imbuing them with
a sense of discipline and purpose, among other things). Radical
prisoners who want the role of religious leader for themselves have
also been known to intimidate suitably qualified religious service
providers into ceding their role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ George W. Knox, ``The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat
Groups in American Prisons Today: Recent Research, Findings From the
2004 Prison Gang Survey,'' (National Gang Crime Research Center, 2005)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBOP has attempted to deal with this problem by instituting new
standards for prison religious service providers, and identifying a
national organization that could vet religious service providers,
ensuring a certain level of education and experience, as well as
weeding out potential radicals who would incite violence. However,
there has been no such national organization identified by the FBOP. As
a result, prayer leaders and religious service providers only require
endorsement by local organizations, making it more difficult to
identify and track radical preachers, who often move between prisons
freely. The situation at the state level is by no means more
comforting. By way of illustration, there is no standard policy for
vetting religious service providers in California prisons, leading
potentially to thirty-three different policies in thirty-three
different prisons. Without standard policies, it is possible for a
chaplain to be removed from one prison for spreading radical ideas and
inciting violence, only to find work at another prison, with officials
none the wiser.
Due to the lack of proper religious authorities and academically
credentialed experts available to review all materials entering the
prison system, no consistently applied standard or procedure exists to
determine what reading material is appropriate. In the absence of
monitoring by authoritative Islamic chaplains, materials that advocate
violence have infiltrated the prison system undetected. The lack of
individuals with a thorough knowledge of Islam, the Qur'an and other
religious materials entering prisons offers an opportunity for
recruiters outside of prisons to paint a violent picture of Islam.
Radical literature and extremist translations and interpretations of
the Qur'an have been distributed to prisoners by groups suspected or
known to support terrorism. The use of Arabic language materials
obscures the content to untrained prison officials. Radicals often do
not even need to rely on secret codes or foreign languages to smuggle
in radical tracts. The Noble Qur'an, a Wahhabi/Salafi version written
in English, is widely available in prisons. A recent review in The
Middle East Quarterly characterized this version as reading more ``. .
.like a supremacist Muslim, anti-Semite, anti-Christian polemic than a
rendition of the Islamic scripture.\14\ Of particular concern is its
appendix, entitled ``The Call to Jihad (Holy Fighting in Allah's
Cause).'' Another text of concern is Saeed Ismaeel's The Differences
Between the Shee'ah and Muslims Who Follow the Sunnah, written in plain
English. Extremist interpretations of the Qur'an use footnotes and
supplements to lead the reader to a radical interpretation of the
scripture. The FBOP is now requiring that Islamic teaching materials
and study guides be prepared by Islamic chaplains who are full-time
FBOP staff,\15\ but FBOP represents only a small fraction of the US
prison system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Khaleel Mohammed, ``Assessing English Translations of the
Qur'an,'' Middle East Quarterly, Volume 12, Number 2 (Spring 2005).
\15\ Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Efforts Since Sept. 11,
2001. Department of Justice Fact Sheet, 5 September 2006 .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The threat posed by prisoner radicalization does not end when
inmates are paroled or released. Former inmates are vulnerable to
radicalization and recruitment because many leave prison with very
little financial or social support. To the extent that radical groups
may draw upon funding from well-financed, extremist backers, they can
offer much more support to released prisoners than other more
legitimate community programs that would facilitate genuine
reintegration into society. By providing for prisoners in their time of
greatest need, radical organizations can build upon the loyalty
developed during the individual's time in prison. If connections are
made with a radicalized community group, the recently released inmate
may remain at risk for recruitment or continued involvement in
terrorist networks.
Moving forward, a fundamental imperative, in my view as well as
that of the task force, is for Congress to establish a Commission to
investigate this issue in depth. An objective risk assessment is
urgently needed in order to better understand the nature of the threat,
and to formulate and calibrate proactive prevention and response
efforts accordingly.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ It should be noted that the FBI and the Department of Homeland
Security are also conducting their own strategic assessments regarding
the scope of radicalization and recruitment in US prisons from a law
enforcement-centric point of view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For a proper appreciation of the proposed Commission and its course
of work, two additional caveats are essential. First, all relevant
perspectives must feed into the process--as emphasized above, solutions
in this context must be reflective of the complexity of the problem
and, therefore, no one profession alone is equipped to analyze and
recommend change. Law enforcement must come together with a range of
non-traditional partners in order to get us to where we need to be on
this issue. Second, it is crucial that balance be injected into this
exercise, specifically, that the practice of religious freedom be given
fulsome consideration and weight while means of preventing the spread
of radical ideology in a religious context are studied.
While the task force would not presume to instruct the Commission
on how to go about doing its work, we would urge that the following
core issues be accorded priority status:
As a corollary to assessing the risk posed by the influence of
radical groups within the prison system, there should be a companion
assessment of current levels of information sharing between and among
agencies at all levels of government involved in managing inmates and
monitoring radical groups.
Equally crucial is the identification of steps to ensure the
legitimacy of Islamic endorsing agencies so as to ensure a reliable and
effective process of providing religious services to Muslim inmates.
Steps to effectively reintegrate former inmates into the larger
society should also be identified, with an eye to diminishing the
likelihood that former prisoners will be recruited by radical groups
posing as social service providers, or act upon radical tendencies
learned behind bars.
Fortunately, we are not building entirely from scratch: lessons can
and should be learned and adapted from present and past efforts to
combat gangs and right-wing extremists in prisons. Existing prison
programs designed to prevent radicalization and recruitment or to
disrupt radical groups--whether at the local, state, federal, or
international level--should be evaluated to determine a set of best
practices that can be used to develop a comprehensive strategy to
counter radicalization. Knowledge must be translated into action across
the board. Awareness, education, and training programs must be
developed for personnel who work in prison, probation, and parole
settings.
Finally, broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim community
should be identified and pursued to foster mutual respect and
understanding, and ultimately trust. To confine the discussion to
issues of terrorism alone is bound to encourage a defensive posture and
impede constructive dialogue. Prison radicalization is but one subset
of the battle of ideas, and it is only by challenging ideas with
ideas--both within and beyond prison walls--that hearts and minds may
ultimately be changed, and radical ideas moderated. Just as we cannot
win the global war on terrorism abroad by military means alone, we will
not win the battle against extremism domestically through law
enforcement alone.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I would
also like to recognize the Subcommittee and their staff for their
professionalism. Please note that I am submitting for the record our
HSPI-CIAG Prisoner Radicalization Task Force Report entitled Out of the
Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization. I would be pleased
to try to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you very much. And I particularly
appreciate that conclusion. I think it is excellent. And I am
glad that the scheduling of this hearing stimulated work on the
other side of the Hill. Glad to hear that.
Mr. Woodward?
STATEMENT OF JOHN WOODWARD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RAND
INTELLIGENCE POLICY CENTER
Mr. Woodward. Good afternoon. I thank the distinguished
chairman, ranking member, and members of this subcommittee for
inviting me to testify about homeland security challenges, with
reference to a different aspect of this problem: how the U.S.
government can make better use of biometric technologies to
protect the nation in a matter consistent with American civil
liberties.
I base my testimony on my RAND research, as well as my
experience from 2003 to 2005 as director of the Department of
Defense Biometrics Management Office, the organization
responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing the
department's biometric activities.
Today I want to make two basic points with respect to
biometrics: First, the U.S. government is currently using
biometric technologies in various ways to make the nation
safer. Second, we can and should make better use of these
technologies for homeland security purposes.
With respect to current U.S. government use, it is well
established that biometric technologies are a significant tool
contributing to homeland and national security. They are a
significant tool because, among other things, they help
authorities answer the critical question, ``Who is this
person?''
For instance, by comparing biometric data collected from a
person to other biometric records in a database, we can conduct
what is called a one-to-many search, thus matching and linking
that person to, for example, previously used identities or
activities.
Of particular importance for this hearing, these biometric
processes work in a way that is race-neutral, ethnicity-neutral
and religion-neutral. In this context, three U.S. government
databases, all based on the biometric modality of fingerprint,
help make these matches and links possible.
These databases are: the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System,
operational since 1999, which contains the 10-rolled
fingerprints and facial photographs of approximately 52 million
people arrested in the United States, as well as the
fingerprints of approximately 20,000 known or suspected
terrorists.
The second database is the Department of Homeland
Security's Automated Biometric Identity System, which contains
approximately 50 million fingerprints, most in a two-digit,
flat, fingerscan format, and facial photographs from various
foreigners, to include visitors to the United States under the
U.S.-VISIT program, recidivists, watchlisted persons, and
asylum seekers.
The third database, the Department of Defense Automated
Biometric Identification System, operational since 2004, which,
in close cooperation with the FBI, enables automated searching
of 10-rolled fingerprint data and includes facial photographs
taken from detainees and other persons of interest in places
like Iraq.
The U.S. government's use of biometric technologies has
identified individuals who pose a threat to the nation's
security. Let me share some examples with you.
A fingerprint match which identified Mohammed al-Khatani,
the person whom the 9/11 Commission described as the 20th
hijacker. Fingerprint matches which have identified persons in
U.S. military custody in Iraq as: persons who, because of their
prior activities, pose significant threats to the well-being of
U.S. forces; people with prior U.S. criminal records; criminals
wanted in the United States; recidivists, many of whom were
previously taken into military custody using alias; as well as
persons of interest for other reasons. Fingerprint and face
matches have also identified person attempting to enter the
United States as a security concern.
All of these biometric matches provided helpful information
and, in some cases, valuable intelligence to U.S. authorities.
Many of these matches, including al-Khatani's, occurred because
of extensive DOD, FBI and DHS cooperation. A small but
significant number of these matches no doubt saved American
lives.
With respect to privacy and civil liberties, I have to say,
Mr. Chairman, your timing for the hearing is impeccable,
because the U.S. government, just yesterday, released several
white papers, including one on biometrics and privacy in which
the government discusses its approach to the use of biometric
technologies.
And I have my visual aid for you. I recommend it to the
subcommittee and staff.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection, we will insert it into the
record of the hearing.
Mr. Woodward. The U.S. government has made commendable
progress with respect to effective use of biometrics. However,
more can and should be done. Specifically, I call the
subcommittee's attention to two key areas where the U.S.
government must improve: identity management practice and
information sharing environment, ISE.
Identity management practice applies to any number of
homeland security applications, for example: the foreigner
seeking a U.S. visa; the registered traveler seeking to confirm
her bona fides for travel; or the U.S. government employee,
contractor or military member needing a common identity
credential.
In general, identity management practice should focus on
helping a person establish her identity through a process that
would include robust biometric vetting--that is, the one-to-
many search of biometric data against relevant databases--and
then helping the person to verify that identity through what
would be biometric verification, a one-to-one comparison, to
facilitate the various daily transactions that require identity
management.
For example, in the case of a foreigner seeking a U.S.
visa, the visa seeker's biometric data can be searched against
the FBI, DHS, DOD databases for any matches, as well as the
database of visa applicants to ensure that that individual has
not previously applied under a different identity.
By complementing the identity management process with a
biometric, we make it easier for the person, particularly when
names get confused, misspelled or misreported on watchlists of
various sorts.
The impartiality of biometric technologies also offers a
significant benefit for society. While humans, for example, are
very adept at recognizing facial features, we also have
prejudices and preconceptions. And the controversy surrounding
racial profiling is a case in point. Biometric systems do not
focus on a person's skin color, hairstyle or manner of dress.
And they do not rely on racial, ethnic or religious
stereotypes. By using biometrics, human recognition can be free
from any human flaws.
With respect to the information sharing environment, this
is an environment that still remains polluted with stovepipes,
cultural resistance, bureaucratic inertia, absence of
comprehensive policy, and other impediments.
Three specific examples requiring immediate attention
include: One, establishing a U.S. government biometrics-based
watchlist of homeland security threats; second, sharing
relevant biometric data with our international partners,
particularly in light of global terrorism; and third, creating
a net-centric approach to the biometric-based information
sharing environment.
A word of explanation: Too much biometric information
sharing is currently conducted by making copies of data,
providing those copies, sometimes on a physical medium such as
a compact disc, to another agency. This approach, while a
temporary expedient, leads to problems in the long run, such as
synchronization, correction, updating, data protection, et
cetera. We should strive for a federated, synchronized database
system based on a pooled information sharing environment.
Much of my testimony today has discussed fingerprints
because that has been the biometric mainstay for our homeland
security. However, this subcommittee should note that the
future will be increasingly multimodal, featuring and fusing
multiple biometric types such as fingerprint, iris, face
recognition, voice and others. The U.S. government's identity
management practices and information sharing environment must
be able to respond nimbly to these technological opportunities.
In closing, the U.S. government us of biometric
technologies is a success story, as measured by threats
identified, intelligence gained, and lives saved. Hopefully I
have provided the subcommittee with suggestions you may find
worth pursuing.
I believe we are still in the very early stages of using
biometric technologies for homeland security, with much more to
do. As experience shows, the U.S. government can use this
significant tool for protecting the nation while preserving
civil liberties.
Thank you for having me testify today, and I welcome your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Woodward follows:]
Prepared Statement of John D. Woodward, Jr.\1\
Introduction
Good afternoon. I thank the distinguished Chairman, Ranking Member,
and Members of this Subcommittee for inviting me to testify about
homeland security challenges, with particular reference to how the U.S.
Government can make better use of biometric technologies to protect the
nation, in a manner consistent with American civil liberties. I base my
testimony on my RAND research as well as my experience from 2003 to
2005 as Director of the Department of Defense Biometrics Management
Office, the organization responsible for planning, coordinating, and
implementing the Department's biometric activities.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ I also thank Nicholas M. Orlans, a biometric subject matter
expert, and my RAND colleagues, John V. Parachini and Michael A.
Wermuth, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, I want to make two basic points with respect to biometrics,
which are automated methods of recognizing a person based on a
physiological or behavioral characteristic:
1. The U.S. Government is currently using biometric
technologies in various ways to make the nation safer.
2. We can and should make better use of these technologies for
homeland security purposes.
Current Use
With respect to current U.S. Government use, it is well established
that biometric technologies are a significant tool contributing to
homeland and national security. They are a significant tool because,
among other things, they help authorities answer the critical question,
``Who is this person'' For instance, by comparing biometric data
collected from a person to other biometric records in a database, we
can conduct what is called a ``one-to-many'' search, thus matching and
linking that person to, for example, previously used identities or
activities. In this context, three U.S. Government databases, all based
on the biometric modality of fingerprint for automated searching, help
make these matches and links possible. These are:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (FBI IAFIS),
operational since 1999, which contains the ten-rolled
fingerprints (i.e., each digit taken ``nail-to-nail'') and
facial photographs of approximately 52 million persons arrested
in the U.S., as well as the fingerprints of approximately
20,000 known or suspected terrorists (KSTs);
The Department of Homeland Security's Automated
Biometric Identity System (DHS IDENT), which contains
approximately 50 million fingerprints (most in a two-digit
``flat'' finger scan format which will transition to ten
flats)3 and facial photographs from various foreigners to
include visitors to the U.S. under the US-VISIT program,
recidivists, watchlisted persons, and asylum seekers; and
The Department of Defense's Automated Biometric
Identification System (DoD ABIS), operational since 2004,
which, in close cooperation with the FBI, enables automated
searching of ten-rolled fingerprint data and includes facial
photographs taken from detainees and other persons of interest
in places like Iraq.
The U.S. Government's use of biometric technologies has identified
individuals who pose a threat to the nation's security. Examples
include:
A fingerprint match which identified Mohamed Al
Kahtani, the person whom the 9/11 Commission described as the
20th hijacker.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The 9/11 Commission Report, The Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 11, on-line at http://
www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, accessed Sept. 16, 2006.
For an in-depth description of the Al Kahtani match, see John D.
Woodward, Jr., ``Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the
Global War on Terrorism,'' Military Review, Sept./Oct. 2005: 30--34,
on-line as part of the RAND Reprint series at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
reprints/RP1194/, accessed Sept. 16, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fingerprint matches which have identified persons in
U.S. military custody in Iraq as:
Persons who, because of their prior
activities, pose significant threats to the wellbeing
of U.S. forces;
Persons with prior U.S. criminal records;
Criminals wanted in the U.S.;
Recidivists (who had previously been in U.S.
military custody, often using a different name); and
Persons of interest for other reasons.
Fingerprint and face matches which have identified
persons attempting to enter the U.S. as a security concern.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ [F]rom its inception [January 5, 2004] through January 5, 2006.
. . the use of biometrics alone has allowed DHS to intercept more than
1,011 known criminals and immigration law violators--including
individuals wanted for murder, rape, drug trafficking, and
pedophilia.'' See Testimony of Jim Williams, Director, US-VISIT
Program, Department of Homeland Security, before the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Jan. 25, 2006, 2, on-
line at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/
JWTestimonyFINAL.pdf#search=%22jim
%20williams%20usvisit%20senate%20appropriations%22, accessed
Sept. 16, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of these biometric matches provided helpful information, and in
some cases, valuable intelligence to U.S. authorities. Many of these
matches, including Al Kahtani's, occurred because of extensive DoD,
FBI, and DHS cooperation. A small but significant number of these
matches no doubt saved American lives.
Better Use
The U.S. Government has made progress with respect to effective use
of biometrics; however, more can and should be done. Specifically, I
call the Subcommittee's attention to two key areas where the U.S.
Government must improve: identity management practice and the
information sharing environment (ISE).
Identity management practice applies to any number of homeland
security applications; for example, the foreigner seeking a U.S. visa,
the registered traveler seeking to confirm her bona fides for travel,
or the U.S. government employee, contractor, or military member needing
a common identity credential. In general, identity management practice
should focus on helping a person establish her identity, through a
process that would include robust biometric vetting (i.e., the one-to-
many search against relevant databases), and then helping her to verify
that identity, through what would include biometric verification (i.e.,
the one-to-one comparison) to facilitate the various daily transactions
that require identity management.
We should achieve this focus, in part, by fully leveraging existing
biometric databases. We should also use biometrics to ``fix'' or
``freeze'' a person's identity to defeat the use of alias identities.
For example, in the case of a foreigner seeking a U.S. visa, the visa
seeker's biometric data can be searched against the FBI IAFIS, DHS
IDENT and DoD ABIS databases for any matches, as well as a database of
all visa applicants to ensure that that individual has not previously
applied under a different identity.
By complementing the identity process with a biometric, we make it
easier, or more identity user-friendly, for the person--particularly
when names get confused, mis-spelled, or mis-reported on watchlists of
various sorts. The impartiality of biometric technologies also offers a
significant benefit for society. While humans, for example, are very
adept at recognizing facial features, we also have prejudices and
preconceptions. The controversy surrounding racial profiling is a
leading example.
Biometric systems do not focus on a person's skin color, hairstyle,
or manner of dress, and they do not rely on racial, ethnic, or
religious stereotypes. On the contrary, a typical system uses objective
measures to recognize a specific individual. By using biometrics, human
recognition can be freed from many human flaws. In essence we are
enabling a person to use another convenient, impartial, reliable way to
establish and verify who she is, and to make it more difficult for
someone else to use her identity.
The information sharing environment (ISE) still remains polluted
with stovepipes, cultural resistance, bureaucratic inertia, absence of
comprehensive policy, and other impediments. Specific examples
requiring immediate U.S. Government attention include:
Establishing a U.S. Government biometrics-based watchlist of
homeland security threats.
Sharing relevant biometric data with our international
partners, particularly in light of global terrorism. The U.S.
Government should ask certain foreign governments to search,
for example, biometric data taken from individuals in places
like Iraq.
Creating a ``net-centric'' approach to the biometric-based ISE.
Too much biometric information sharing is conducted by making
copies of the data and providing those copies on a physical
medium, such as a compact disk, to another agency. This
approach, while a temporary expedient, leads to problems with
synchronization, correction, updating, and data protection. We
should strive for a federated, synchronized database system
based on a pooled information sharing environment managed by a
community of interest.
Much of my testimony today has discussed fingerprints because that
has been the biometric mainstay for our homeland security. However, the
Subcommittee should note that the future will be increasingly multi-
modal, featuring and fusing multiple biometric types such as
fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, voice, and others. The U.S.
Government's identity management practices and the ISE must be able to
respond nimbly to these technological opportunities.
Summary
U.S. Government use of biometric technologies is a success story,
as measured by threats identified, intelligence gained, and lives
saved. Hopefully, I have provided the Subcommittee with suggestions you
may find worth pursuing. I believe we are still in the very early
stages of using biometric technologies for homeland security, with much
more to do. As experience shows, the U.S. Government can use this
significant tool for protecting the nation while preserving civil
liberties. Thank you for having me testify today. I am happy to answer
any questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that testimony.
Mr. Emerson, you have been very patient. We appreciate it.
Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM
Mr. Emerson. Thank you.
I commend you for holding this hearing today, because in
the last 2 years we have witnessed plots, some successful,
others not, in Australia, Canada, the United States and Europe.
In studying the background of the homegrown plots in the United
States, Canada, Britain and Australia over the past 3 years,
there are certain commonalities that we can observe.
The participants in these plots are largely first-or
second-generation Americans or other loyal citizens in other
countries but they come from a Middle Eastern or Southeast
Asian ethnic origin. Suddenly, however, they become
radicalized. And that convergence of ideology with some type of
charismatic leader appears to be the instigator of many of the
plots that we have witnessed.
In the United States, the commonalities have included a
spiritual leader, mosque attendance, an Internet connection,
and overseas travel. The majority of these radicalized
individuals who have become involved in plots are below the age
of 30, and are oftentimes radicalized in private study circles
or by individuals they meet at the mosque.
In several instances, an older and charismatic imam or
spiritual leader is involved, such as Ali al-Tamimi or Juma al-
Dosari in the United States.
Certain radical Islamic groups and Islamic leaders engender
radicalization through engendering a false sense of persecution
and alienation in the Muslim community in the West, labeling
the war on terror as a war on Islam.
These conspiratorial allegations facilitate and maintain
indigenous Islamic alienation from host governments, reinforce
loyalty to the larger Muslim umma, and in some cases
rationalize acts of terrorism. In fact, in nearly all of the
post-9/11 terrorist plots, unsuccessful and successful, the
perpetrators have claimed that they are only avenging crimes
committed by the West against Muslims.
One of the common denominators in the creation of homegrown
terrorism are agents of radicalization. Primarily these have
included radical imams in mosques or at prisons.
Another factor and venue by which youngsters have become
radicalized has been the Internet. Indeed, the Internet has
become an indispensable, multifaceted operational tool for
terrorists, in terms of psychological warfare, publicity,
propaganda, data mining, fund-raising, recruitment and
mobilization, bomb instruction, networking, sharing
information, planning and coordination.
We recently tracked a posting on a militant Islamic forum
connected to Al Qaida about the bacterial botulinum toxin which
causes the deadly disease known as botulism. The author of the
post stated, ``We are lurking in wait for you. Allah will
torment you himself or use us to do it. You can plot, but we
are plotting as well.'' Then the author provided specific
instructions, very clear, how to produce toxins, lethal doses,
experiments and observations and methods of dispersion for the
toxin.
We have also seen that wannabe jihadists have been using
MySpace.com. Instead of commenting on a party, telling a joke,
or making social plans, increasing numbers, we have witnessed,
increasingly condemn America, swear support for bin Laden or
express graphic desires to inflict violence upon innocents in
the United States or abroad. Some even have identified
themselves as active terrorists and claim to have participated
in attacks against American soldiers in Iraq, and they post
pictures of themselves next to burn-out cars, armed with
semiautomatic weapons.
The common ideological denominator for jihadists is their
susceptibility to a narrative that the U.S. government or the
West is engaged in a war on Islam as opposed to a war against
terrorism.
This characterization serves to demonize the efforts of the
United States government, or British or Australian government,
and by extension the West, in order to demonstrate to the
Muslim community that it is the target of an official
discrimination campaign which ultimately serves to radicalize
and alienate Muslims in the United States or other countries,
creating fertile ground for extremists to operate and recruit
followers.
This self-victimization gives the illusion of credence to
the allegation that the war on terrorism is simply a war
against Islam. Therefore it is not surprising to see this
common claim in most of the terrorist networks that we have
witnessed since 9/11, from the Virginia jihad network to
Operation Pendennis in Australia, that acts of violence were
justified because of the need to avenge the atrocities
committed against Muslims.
We need to be sure that we are engaged in a dialogue with
Islamic organizations, but we need to be sure that these
organizations are not turning around and blaming the source of
violence on the United States. We have to make sure we are not
dealing with fake moderate groups, but genuine moderate groups.
It was noted briefly, recently, by Prime Minister John
Howard and Tony Blair, at their own political expense, about
the dangers that empowering various groups that focus only on
self-victimization, reinforcing a hatred of the West.
The British prime minister recently stated, ``Look, we have
got a problem even in our own Muslim communities in Europe who
will half buy in to some of the propaganda that is pushed at it
such as the purpose of America to suppress Islam, Britain has
joined with America in the suppression of Islam. And one of the
things we have got to do is stop apologizing for our own
positions. Muslims in America, as far as I am aware, are free
to worship. Muslims in Britain are free to worship. We are
plural societies. It is nonsense. That propaganda is
nonsense.''
U.S. government programs and official engagement can
provide only a limited amount of success. A greater effort on
the part of the Muslim community must be undertaken to counter
a growing trend that sees jihad as the new counterculture for a
generation caught between two cultures that are often at odds.
[The statement of Mr. Emerson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Emerson
Executive Summary
The radicalization of Muslim populations in Western societies has
leapt to the forefront of homeland security concerns due to the rise in
homegrown terrorist plots in the United States, Europe, Canada, and
Australia. Every episode of radicalization is a unique process due,
nonetheless these episodes often, but not always, share several
commonalities, including, but not limited to, a charismatic spiritual
leader, mosque attendance, an Internet connection, and overseas travel.
Homegrown terrorism poses a challenge to law enforcement because,
as demonstrated in the aforementioned cases, the individuals in the
plots, prior to their radicalization, have not necessarily shown any
evidence of extremist views, much less any connection to terrorist
activity. They appear to lead normal lives, at times even after
indoctrination into an extremist ideology. The examples presented
demonstrate that there are several underlying similarities
characterizing homegrown terrorism.
Those involved come from an array of backgrounds, but are largely
first or second-generation Americans with a Middle Eastern or South
Asian ethnic origin. The significant role played by Islamic converts is
apparent in the cases of the ``Virginia jihad network,'' the recent
Canadian plot, the Folsom prison case, the Portland Seven and the
London bombing cell.
The majority of these radicalized individuals who become involved
in such plots are below the age of 30 and are often times radicalized
in private study circles or by individuals they meet at their place of
worship. In several instances, an older and charismatic imam or
spiritual leader is involved such as Ali Al-Timimi or Juma al-Dosari in
the U.S., and in the case of the Toronto plot, by Qayyum Abdul Jamal, a
43-year-old mosque volunteer from suburban Toronto. These homegrown
jihadists are often well-integrated into Western society and many were
students at American universities.
Certain domestic radical Islamic civil society groups engender
radicalization through spreading a false sense of persecution and
alienation in the Muslim community in the West, labeling the war on
terrorism as a war on Islam. These conspiratorial allegations
facilitate and maintain indigenous Islamic alienation from host
governments, reinforce loyalty to the larger Muslim ummah, and in some
cases rationalize acts of terrorism. In nearly all of the post-9/11
terrorist plots, unsuccessful and successful, the perpetrators have
claimed that they are only avenging crimes committed by the West
against Muslims.
The effect the Internet has on radicalization and the formation of
homegrown cells has increased exponentially. Signs of the influence and
use of jihadist websites and forums are conspicuous in many homegrown
plots around the world, including some in the United States. Experts
around the world agree that access to the Internet is having a
radicalizing effect on Western second-generation Muslim youths who find
themselves divided between two cultures with contrasting value systems.
The Internet can facilitate the entire process of the development of a
plot from initial radicalization to the formulation of a complex and
potentially deadly terrorist attack.
Introduction
Terrorism is no longer only an external threat posed by foreign
entities. Since 9/11, there is an increasing trend towards homegrown
terrorism plotted and, in some cases, executed locally. This
realization struck with painful clarity following the terrorist attacks
in London in July 2005 and the foiled terrorist attack in Canada in
June 2006. Within the United States, this trend has been characterized
by the involvement of individuals who were integrated into American
society and have had little or no affiliation with formal terrorist
organizations prior to, and often after, their radicalization.
This testimony will attempt to elucidate the growing threat of
domestic radicalization by analyzing some of the many plots that have
already been hatched in the United States in addition to the agents of
radicalization, including radical spiritual leaders and the Internet,
that have been infusing the Muslim-American community with jihadist
thought and knowledge for years. Unfortunately, describing these
domestic plots as ``homegrown'' has only recently come into vogue in
our national discourse. This belated awakening to the root causes of
homegrown terrorism--including elements on the Internet, certain imams,
and others in positions of leadership or counsel who advocate
divisiveness and violence--has hindered our ability to understand the
threat posed by militant Islamism from within our borders. However,
with more events such as this hearing, designed to share a greater
understanding of the processes, risks, and vulnerabilities regarding
radicalization, there is improved potential to successfully address
this trend.
Homegrown Terrorism Plots
An overview of certain homegrown terrorists who have grown up in
America and the plots they have nurtured and developed, often within
our borders, provides a useful perspective on the causes and methods by
which radicalization occurs and the dangerous ways in which such a
process can manifest itself.
There is a misleading notion that those who fall prey to
radicalization--and from within that pool, the minority who take the
next step by committing or abetting acts of terrorism--are individuals
who feel marginalized. Whether this marginalization is brought about
via poor socioeconomic circumstances or simple unpopularity, there is
tendency to assume that these are the individuals who are fodder for
radicalization. While this is sometimes the case, relying on this
template ignores other, more prevalent factors at play in the process
of radicalization that direct a young man with friends in an
environment healthy in terms of family and economic condition towards
an extremist ideology.
John Walker Lindh
John Walker Lindh, known as the ``American Taliban,'' was raised in
well-to-do Marin County in California.\1\ As a teenager, he was quiet
and limited his interests to basketball and hip-hop music. Later in his
adolescence, he became interested in Islam and converted at a local
mosque. People who knew him described him as a devoted Muslim.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ David E. Kaplan and others., ``Hundreds of Americans have
Followed the Path to Jihad. Here's How and Why,'' US News and World
Report, June 10, 2002.
\2\ Philip Sherwell, ``The new Malcolm X?'' Sunday Telegraph, April
9, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2001, Lindh traveled to Pakistan and spent time at a
recruiting center in Peshawar for Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), a
Pakistan-based terrorist group with links to Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda.\3\ After leaving the recruiting center, he spent twenty days at
a training camp run by HuM.\4\ After his training, he returned to the
Peshawar recruiting office and expressed a wish ``to fight with the
Taliban on the front line in Afghanistan.'' \5\ Carrying a letter of
introduction from HuM officials, Lindh traveled to Afghanistan and
presented himself to Taliban recruiters in Kabul who sent him to al
Qaeda's infamous Al Faruq training camp after again expressing a desire
to fight on the front lines for the Taliban against the Northern
Alliance.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Kaplan, ``Hundreds Of Americans Have Followed The Path To
Jihad.''
\4\ USA v. John Phillip Walker Lindh, 02-37-A, ``Sentencing
Memorandum,'' pp. 2-3 (ED VA October 4, 2002).
\5\ Ibid., 3.
\6\ USA v. John Phillip Walker Lindh, 02-CR-37A, ``Indictment,''
(ED VA February 5, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his two months at Al Faruq, Lindh learned to use rocket-
propelled grenades and other weapons. Osama bin Laden visited the camp
three times during Lindh's training period and during one of these
visits, Lindh actually had a five minute conversation with bin Laden.
After he completed his training, Lindh declined to participate in plots
against the United States, Israel, or Europe in favor of fighting
against the Northern Alliance.\7\ In November 2001, Lindh surrendered
to Northern Alliance troops.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ USA v. Lindh, ``Sentencing Memorandum,'' 4.
\8\ USA v. Lindh, ``Indictment.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In late 2002, Lindh agreed to plea guilty to supplying services to
the Taliban and carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony
and was sentenced to twenty years in prison.\9\ Lindh will be eligible
for parole in 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Kaplan, ``Hundreds Of Americans Have Followed The Path To
Jihad.''
The Lackawanna Six
The Lackawanna Six may have been influenced by a lecture given by
an extremist imam named Juma al-Dosari at a Lackawanna, New York mosque
in 2001.\10\ The mosque did not invite al-Dosari to speak again due to
his radical beliefs.\11\ In April 2001, the men decided to travel to an
al Qaeda guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and then went to an al
Qaeda training camp where they received weapons training. While they
were at the camp, Bin Laden visited and gave a speech to all of the
trainees.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Michael Powell, ``No Choice But Guilty,'' Washington Post,
July 29, 2003.
\11\ Ibid.
\12\ U.S. v. Al-Bakri, 02-M-108. ``Criminal Complaint,'' (WD NY
September 13, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The young men involved in the case were not always known to harbor
extremist views. Neighbors recalled that ``As teens, they liked to
drive fast, party and pick up girls. But. . .sometime during or after
high school, the young men became, in varying degrees, more devout.
They stopped drinking, swore off sex and began praying five times a day
at the local mosque.'' \13\ Federal investigators believe that al-
Dosari helped persuade the men to travel to Afghanistan.\14\ According
to Rodney O. Personius, the attorney who represented one of the six,
al-Dosari told the men ``that Mecca wouldn't do, that they needed jihad
training if they wanted to save their souls.'' \15\ The imam was unable
to testify at the trial of the Lackawanna cell members because he was
in U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center where he still
remains.\16\ Kamal Derwish, a charismatic man described as the cell's
ringleader, further compelled his companions to attend the training
camp.\17\ Additionally, cell member Yahya Goba later indicated that
radical websites--specifically material from Qoqaz.net, the Chechen
mujahideen website--also motivated his participation.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``Defense Says Terror Suspects No Threat'' NBC, September 19,
2002.
\14\ ``Seventh Member of `Lackawanna Six' in Custody,'' Associated
Press, January 29, 2004.
\15\ Powell, ``No Choice But Guilty.''
\16\ Powell, ``No Choice But Guilty.'', David Muir, ``Suicide Pact;
Guantanamo Suicides,''' ABC World News Tonight, June 11,2006.
\17\ Betsy Z. Russell, ``Al Qaeda recruits say images on Web sites
part of allure,'' Spokane Review, May 21, 2004.
\18\ Patrick Orr, ``Hussayen defense gets surprise help; Testimony
of key witness is blow to prosecution,'' Idaho Statesman, May 25, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2002, the six men were arrested and indicted on
charges of providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization.\19\ All of the men pled guilty to charges of material
support and were sentenced to prison terms of seven to ten years.\20\ A
seventh member of the cell, Jaber Elbaneh, was arrested in Yemen in
late 2003,\21\ but is believed to have escaped from prison in February
2006.\22\ Kamal Derwish, was killed in a CIA missile strike near Marib,
Yemen in November 2002.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ USA v Yahya Goba, Sahim Alwan, Shafal Mosed, Yassein Taher,
and Faysal Gala, 02-M-107. ``Decision and Order.'' p. 3 (WD NY October
8, 2002).
\20\ ``Sahim Alwan Sentenced For Providing Material Support to Al
Qaeda,'' USDOJ Press Release, December 17, 2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/December/03_crm_699.htm (Accessed September 18, 2003).
\21\ ``Seventh Member of `Lackawanna Six' in Custody,'' Associated
Press, January 29, 2004.
\22\ ``Man added to `Most Wanted Terrorist' list,'' UPI, February
26, 2006.
\23\ John Lumpkin, ``Yemeni-American Killed in Airstrike Was
Alleged Leader of Buffalo Cell,'' Associated Press, November 12, 2002.
Virginia Paintball Jihad
In June 2003 eleven men, nine of whom are U.S. citizens, were
indicted for their involvement with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Specially
Designated Terrorist Organization.\24\ In a superseding indictment in
September 2003 the men were further charged with conspiracy to levy war
against the United States and conspiracy to provide material support to
al Qaeda.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ USA v. Royer, et al, 03-CR-296. ``Indictment.'' (EDVA June 25,
2003).
\25\ ``U.S. charges seven with `Virginia jihad,'' United Press
International, September 26, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A member of the group, Randall Royer, a.k.a. Ismail Royer, who pled
guilty to weapons and explosives charges in January 2004,\26\ had
helped form and recruit other men from the suburbs of Washington, D.C.,
to train as mujahideen with LeT. Their training--which included
paintball war games intended to simulate combat--began in the United
States and continued at camps in Pakistan.\27\ For two years, the group
trained at firing ranges in Virginia and Pennsylvania, and seven of the
defendants traveled to Pakistan.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Two Defendants in Virginia Jihad Case Plead Guilty to
Weapons Charges, Will Cooperate with Ongoing Investigations,'' USDOJ
Press Release, January 16, 2004, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/
January/04_crm_030.htm (Accessed September 18, 2006).
\27\ ``Defendants Convicted in Northern Virginia Jihad Trial,''
USDOJ Press Release, March 4, 2004, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/
March/04_crm_139.htm (Accessed September 18, 2006).
\28\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the indictment alleges that the network was involved with
LeT, according a court filing, the cell began playing paintball as
early as 2000 to train for possible jihad in Chechnya, because,
according to Nabil Gharbieh, one of the founders of the paintball
group, ``Chechnya was a very `hot topic' among Muslims.'' \29\ Al-
Timimi was integral in encouraging the members to travel to Afghanistan
after 9/11, but both Randall Royer and Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, had taken an
active role in the jihad prior to 9/11. Al-Hamdi stated that since the
age of 12 he had aspired to die as a martyr and traveled with Royer in
2000 to a LeT training camp in Pakistan.\30\ Royer, the son of a
Baptist and a former Catholic nun, converted to Islam at the age of 19.
From the beginning, he was extremely involved with issues facing
Muslims around the world, so much so that in the mid 1990s, he traveled
to Bosnia to fight with a unit that supported Bosnian soldiers.\31\
Seifullah Chapman, and former Marine and member of the ``Virginia jihad
network,'' is also a convert to Islam, having been introduced to the
faith by his second wife.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ USA v. Masoud Khan, et al., 03-CR-296. ``Memorandum Opinion.''
p. 18 (EDVA March 4, 2004).
\30\ Ibid, 28.
\31\ Mary Beth Sheridan, Caryle Murphy and Jerry Markon, ``Va.
'Jihad' Suspects: 11 Men, Two Views,'' The Washington Post, August 8,
2003.
\32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It appears the plot took hold after 9/11 when members of the
``Virginia jihad network,'' gathered in Northern Virginia where the
spiritual leader of their prayer group, Ali Al-Timimi,\33\ told the
other men, ``the time had come for them to go abroad to join the
mujahideen engaged in violent jihad in Afghanistan.''\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ USA v. Al Timimi, 04-CR-385. ``Indictment.'' (ED VA September
23, 2004).
\34\ Ibid, 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to witness testimonies, after September 11, 2001, ``Al-
Timimi stated that the attacks may not be Islamically permissible, but
that they were not a tragedy, because they were brought on by American
foreign policy.'' \35\ Witnesses also testified that Al-Timimi was not
permitted to give sermons at Dar al Arqam, a Northern Virginia mosque,
after his comments on 9/11 which may have explained the reason why on
September 16, 2001, cell member Yong Kwon ``organized a meeting at the
urging of Al-Timimi to address how Muslims could protect themselves,
and invited only those brothers who had participated in paintball
training and owned weapons.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ USA v. Masoud Khan, et al, ``Memorandum Opinion,'' 31-32.
\36\ Ibid, 32-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Timimi, the last member of the cell to be indicted (in September
2004), was convicted in April 2005 for inciting terrorist activity,
attempting to contribute services to the Taliban, and on explosives and
other firearms charges. Al-Timimi was sentenced to life in prison.\37\
Of the others in the cell, six have pled guilty, three were convicted,
and two were acquitted.\38\ In June 2006, the last defendant linked to
the ``Virginia jihad network, Ali Asad Chandia, was convicted of
material support of terrorism.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ USA v. Al Timimi, 04-CR-385. ``Judgment.'' (EDVA July 13,
2005).
\38\ ``Defendants Convicted in Northern Virginia Jihad Trial,''
USDOJ Press Release.
\39\ ``Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years for Providing Material
Support to Terror Group,'' United States Attorney's Office, Eastern
District of Virginia, August 25, 2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/
Pressreleases/08-AugustPDFArchive/06/20060825chandianr.pdf (Accessed
September 18, 2006).
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali
In November 2005, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a Texan by birth, was
sentenced to 30 years in prison for joining an al Qaeda cell in Saudi
Arabia and plotting with al Qaeda operatives to personally carry out
the assassination of President Bush.\40\ In December 2002, while
pursuing religious studies in Saudi Arabia, Abu Ali joined a
clandestine terrorist cell with ties to al Qaeda.\41\ According to
court documents, Abu Ali received training from members of the al-Qaeda
cell in weapons, explosives, and document forgery, and discussed plans
to smuggle Saudi al Qaeda members into the United States through Mexico
to carry out terrorist operations within the country.\42\ Abu Ali was
raised in Falls Church, Virginia and worshipped at the Dar al-Hijrah
mosque.\43\ Abu Ali attended high school at the Islamic Saudi Academy
(ISA) in Alexandria, which receives substantial funding from the Saudi
government,\44\ and graduated valedictorian of his class in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Ahmed Omar Abu Ali Sentenced to Prison on Terrorism Charges,''
U.S. Department of State Press Release, March 29, 2006.
\41\ USA v. Abu Ali, 05 CR 53. ``Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Suppress'' (ED VA September 19, 2005).
\42\ USA v. Abu Ali, 1:05CR53. ``Superseding Indictment'' (ED VA
September 8, 2005).
\43\ Jerry Markon, ``Va. Man Convicted In Plot to Kill Bush;
Defendant Claimed Confession Coerced,'' St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
November 23, 2005.
\44\ Matthew Barakat, ``Saudi Academy Disputes Radical
Reputation,'' Associated Press, May 18, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abu Ali was not the only terrorist or extremist from this Virginia
high school, founded in 1984.\45\ Another former student, Mohammad
Osman Idris, was charged with lying in immigration forms about his
association with Hamas.\46\ Idris and another ISA student named
Mohammad El-Yacoubi were both prevented from entering Israel after a
letter was found in their possession that has been described as a
farewell letter for a suicide bombing mission from El-Yacoubi's younger
brother.\47\ The letter read, ``When I heard what you were going to
carry out, my heart was filled with the feeling of grief and joy
because you are the closest human being to my heart.'' It continued,
``I have no right to prevent you from your migration to Allah and his
holy messenger, but it is incumbent on me to encourage you and help you
because Islam urges jihad for the sake of Allah.'' \48\ The comptroller
of the school, Ismail Selim Elbarasse, has been described as an
assistant to a high-level Hamas operative.\49\ Court documents from a
related case claim that Elbarasse shared an account used to launder
money for Hamas with Mousa Abu Marzook, a Hamas official currently
headquartered in Damascus.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Ibid.
\46\ Ibid.
\47\ MIchael Hedges, ``Goodbye Letter,'' Houston Chronicle, May 27,
2002.
\48\ Ibid.
\49\ ``Alleged Hamas figure arrested in Md. taping Bay Bridge,''
Associated Press, August 24, 2004.
\50\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the Islamic Saudi Academy, Abu Ali spent a year at the
Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) in
Fairfax.\51\ The IIASA, founded in 1989 as a non-profit educational
institution affiliated with Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic
University (IMSIU) of Saudi Arabia, also receives funding from the
Saudi government.\52\ In 2003, eleven scholars at IIASA were asked to
leave by the US government.\53\ In the summer of 2004, FBI, Customs,
and IRS agents raided the school.\54\ Publications by the IIASA
received much attention in a report by Freedom House--a non-partisan
GNO that promotes human rights and religious freedom--on Saudi hate
literature in mosques. IIASA publications are replete with anti-
Semitism in addition to condemnations of liberal democracy, freedom of
thought, Western society, and Zionism.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Caryle Murphy and John Mintz, ``Va. Man's Months in Saudi
Arabia Go Unexplained,'' The Washington Post, November 22, 2003.
\52\ Susan Schmidt, ``Saudi Group's Leader Critical of Clerics,''
Washington Post, December 11, 2003.; David B. Ottoway, ``U.S. Eyes
Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities,'' Washington Post, August 19,
2004.
\53\ Ottoway, ``U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities.''
\54\ Ibid.
\55\ Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques
(Washington, DC: Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom House, 2005)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2003, Abu Ali was arrested by Saudi authorities along with
several others in connection with the bombing of a residential compound
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 34 people, including nine
Americans.\56\ Abu Ali admitted to his Saudi jailers that he came up
with the idea to assassinate President George W. Bush on his own: ``My
idea was. . .that I would walk on the street as the President walked
by, and I would get close enough to shoot him, or I would use a car
bomb.'' \57\ He compared himself to Mohammed Atta, who led the cell
that carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks: ``I wanted to be the
brain, the planner, just like Mohammed Atta and Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ USA v. Abu Ali, 05 CR 53. ``Indictment'' (ED VA February 2,
2005).
\57\ USA v. Abu Ali, ``Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.''
\58\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Abu Ali's home in Falls Church, where he lived with his family,
authorities found a number of items that spoke to the level of his
radicalization. These items included a six-page document on different
types of surveillance methods used by the government and ways to avoid
such surveillance; an undated two-page document commending Taliban
leader Mullah Omar and the 9/11 attacks that criticized U.S. military
action in Afghanistan; audio tapes in Arabic supporting ``violent
jihad, the killing of Jews, and a battle by Muslims against Christians
and Jews;'' \59\ and a book written by al Qaeda's deputy leader Ayman
Al Zawahiri that ``characterizes democracy as a new religion that must
be destroyed by war, describes anyone who supports democracy as an
infidel, and condemns the Muslim Brotherhood for renouncing violent
jihad as a means to establish an Islamic state.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ USA v. Abu Ali, ``Indictment.''
\60\ Ibid.
Folsom State Prison, California
On August 31, 2005, a federal grand jury in San Ana, California
indicted four men for their alleged roles in a conspiracy to levy war
against the United States government through terrorism.\61\ The
conspiracy allegedly involved a plot to attack U.S. military facilities
as well as Israeli government and Jewish facilities in the Los Angeles
area.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ USA v. Kevin James, et al., 05-CR-214. ``Indictment.'' (CDCA
August 31, 2005).
\62\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The terrorist conspiracy was hatched in California's Folsom State
Prison by an inmate who founded the clandestine, prison version of a
militant Islamic organization known as Jam'iyyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh
(JIS) and compelled JIS members to attack the infidel enemies of
Islam.\63\ The indictment further alleges that members of the
conspiracy committed armed robberies of gas stations in order to
finance their terrorist operation.\64\ As FBI Director, Robert S.
Mueller, III noted, this case involved a homegrown cell founded in a
prison that saw themselves as ``al Qaeda of California'' and attempted
to engage in crime locally to finance its terrorist activities.\65\ If
convicted of all charges, the defendants face a maximum sentence of
life in prison.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Ibid., 2.
\64\ Ibid., 5, 7--10.
\65\ ``Unity: The Greatest Weapon Against Terrorism; Remarks by
Robert S. Mueller, III Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,''
James Fox Memorial Lecture, New York, April 26, 2006. (Accessed
September 18, 2006).
\66\ ``Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy
to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets,'' USDOJ Press Release,
August 31, 2005.
Miami-Based Cell
On June 23, 2006, in Miami, Florida, seven suspected al Qaeda
sympathizers were indicted on charges of conspiring to support al Qaeda
by plotting attacks on targets that included the Sears Tower in
Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, Florida, and other
government buildings in Miami-Dade County.\67\ It is important to note
that while the men are thought to have sought to take part in the
militant Islamist war against the United States, they were not
Islamists in any traditional sense, but followers of a cult called the
Seas of David, which reportedly drew on elements of Christianity and
Judaism as well as Islam, and is allegedly tied to the ideologies of
the Moorish Science Temple of America,\68\ ``an early 20th century
religion founded by the Noble Drew Ali, an African-American circus
magician who claimed he was raised by Cherokee Indians and learned
`high magic' in Egypt. Ali went on to style himself an `angel' and
prophet of Allah.'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ USA v. Batiste, et al., 06-CR-20373, ``Indictment'' (SD NY
June 23, 2006).
\68\ Frank Main, ``Dad: Sears Tower Suspect under Spell of Man,''
Chicago Sun-Times, June 25, 2006; Paul Thompson and Sara Baxter,
``Bizarre Cult of Sears Tower `Plotter,'' Sunday Times, June 25, 2006.
\69\ Thompson and Baxter, ``Bizarre Cult of Sears Tower `Plotter.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the indictment, Narseal Batiste, the group's
ringleader, expressed the desire to wage a ``full ground war'' against
the United States. The indictment further alleged that the individuals
stated the urge to ``kill all the devils we can'' in planned attacks
they hoped would ``be just as good or greater than 9/11.'' \70\ The
cell came to the attention of law enforcement when Batiste sought to
recruit an individual who was traveling to the Middle East to assist
him in locating foreign Islamic extremists to fund his mission. This
individual alerted the FBI, who arranged a meeting between Batiste and
an informant of Arab descent who presented himself to Batiste as an al
Qaeda operative. . During several meetings with the informant in
December 2005, Batiste requested boots, uniforms, guns, radios,
vehicles, and $50,000 in cash to help construct an ``Islamic Army'' to
wage jihad.\71\ In a March 2006 meeting, each individual in the cell
swore an oath of loyalty to al Qaeda. Just prior to the oath, which was
covertly recorded by the FBI, Batiste told the informant that he
``admired the work bin Laden was doing.''\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ SA v. Batiste, et al., ``Indictment.''
\71\ Ibid.
\72\ USA v. Batiste, et al., 06-CR-20373, ``Government's Motion for
Pretrial Detention'' (SD NY June 29, 2006).; ``Seven Florida Men
Charged with Conspiring to Support al Qaeda, Attack Targets in the
United States,'' USDOJ Press Release, June 23, 2006.
Adam Gadahn
Adam Gadahn, a convert to Islam, grew up on a farm in California.
He was born Adam Pearlman to a Catholic mother and a Jewish father who
later converted to Christianity, taking the name Gadahn.\73\ As a young
man, he was interested in death-metal music and hosted a show on the
environment on a student television station.\74\ In 1997, at the age of
17, he converted to Islam under the tutelage of a purportedly moderate
religious leader named Haitham "Danny" Bundakji and was hired as a
security guard at the Islamic Society of Orange County.\75\ Bundakji
claimed that Gadahn was then befriended by a group of Pakistani
nationals he described as ``fundamentalist'' who were outspoken in
their criticism of moderation and Bundakji's interfaith activities,
calling him ``Danny the Jew.''\76\ One of the group was Hisham Diab, a
well-connected al Qaeda operative who once hosted the blind sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman at his home.\77\ After Bundakji banned these men from the
mosque, Gadahn stormed angrily into Bundakji's office, slapped him in
the face, and accused him of not being a true Muslim. Shortly after
this incident, Gadahn left for Pakistan and kept in touch with his
family only occasionally.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Steven Stalinsky, ``A Jewish Musician's Son Joins Al Qaeda's
Ranks; The MEMRI Report,'' New York Sun, September 13, 2006, http://
www.nysun.com/article/39535 (Accessed September 15, 2006).; Peggy Lowe,
``Gadahn tape urges conversion to Islam; Terror expert calls former
O.C. man ideal convert for al-Qaida's purposes,'' Orange County
Register, September 3, 2006.
\74\ Brian Ross, ``Married to al Qaeda; Woman Unsuspectingly Weds
Terrorist,'' Primetime Live, ABC, December 23, 2004.
\75\ Stalinsky, ``A Jewish Musician's Son Joins Al Qaeda's
Ranks.''; Spencer Ackerman, ``Why American Muslims haven't turned to
terrorism,'' New Republic, December 12, 2005.
\76\ Ackerman, ``Why American Muslims haven't turned to
terrorism.''
\77\ Ross, ``Married to al Qaeda; Woman Unsuspectingly Weds
Terrorist.''
\78\ Ackerman, ``Why American Muslims haven't turned to
terrorism.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gadahn later traveled to Afghanistan where he attended al Qaeda
training camps and served as an al Qaeda translator.\79\ During his
ongoing career as a terrorist, he has spent time with the captured al
Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah and John Walker Lindh.\80\ Another associate
of Gadahn's, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11
attacks, allegedly wanted to use Gadahn in a plot to bomb Baltimore gas
stations.\81\ In May 2004, the FBI issued a BOLO (be on the lookout)
for Gadahn and he was later added to the FBI's most wanted list.\82\ In
December 2004, Gadahn resurfaced as Azzam al-Amriki, or Azzam the
American, on an al Qaeda videotape threatening attacks against the
United States that would far surpass those of 9/11.\83\ In the tape, he
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Salah Naswari, ``Latest al-Qaida message seen as PR bid,''
Associated Press, September 3, 2006.; Evan Thomas, Daniel Klaidman, and
Michael Isikoff, ``Enemies among Us,'' Newsweek, June 7, 2004.
\80\ Ibid.
\81\ Thomas, Klaidman, and Isikoff, ``Enemies among Us.''
\82\ ``Seeking Information RE: Adam Gadahn,'' FBI, http://
www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/gadahn.htm (Accessed August 19, 2005).;
Stalinsky, ``A Jewish Musician's Son Joins Al Qaeda's Ranks.''
\83\ Amy Argetsinger, ``Muslim Teen Made Conversion to Fury;
Intelligence Sources Say Californian Was on Tape,'' Washington Post,
December 2, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People of America, I remind you of the weighty words of our
leaders, Osama Bin Ladin and Dr. Ayman Al Zawahri, that what
took place on September 11 was but the opening salvo of the
global war on America, and that Allah willing, the magnitude
and ferocity of what is coming your way will make you forget
about September 11.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ As Sahab videotape of ``Azzam the American,'' identified by US
intelligence as Adam Gadahn (Aired by ABC News, October 28, 2004)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gadahn made another appearance on September 11, 2005 in a video in
which he called on the West to remove its, ``current leaders and
governments and their anti-Islam, anti-Muslim policies.'' \85\ He
threatened, ``Yesterday, London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and
Melbourne, God willing.'' \86\ He also made an appearance in an al
Qaeda video released on the first anniversary of the London transit
bombings, in which he condemned American leadership and the American
people who elected them. In the message, Gadahn decried the ``crimes''
of American and British forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. He blamed
America for carrying out the majority of what he sees as atrocities
against Muslims and blames the British for ``coaching from the
sidelines and lending a helping hand whenever possible'' and being
``the one who taught America how to kill and oppress Muslims in the
first place.'' \87\ Gadahn takes care to emphasize the legitimacy of
attacking civilians as opposed to solely military targets.\88\ Over the
summer of 2006, an essay was removed from the website of the Muslim
Student Association (MSA) of the University of Southern California. The
author of that essay was ``Adam Pearlman.'' In the essay, a young
Gadahn transitioning into Islam wrote, ``As I began reading English
translations of the Qur'an, I became more and more convinced of the
truth and authenticity of Allah's teachings. . . .Having been around
Muslims in my formative years, I knew well that they were not the
bloodthirsty, barbaric terrorists that the news media and the
televangelists paint them to be.'' While it is true that there is only
an unfortunate segment of extremist Muslims who meet the description of
``bloodthirsty, barbaric terrorists,'' \89\ Adam Gadahn unfortunately
chose to join their ranks, stating in the As-Sahab release on the
anniversary of the 7/7 attacks, ``When we bomb their cities and
civilians. . .no sane Muslim should shed tears for them.'' \90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Ackerman, ``Why American Muslims haven't turned to
terrorism.''
\86\ Ibid
\87\ As Sahab video, July 8, 2006.
\88\ Ibid.
\89\ Stalinsky, ``A Jewish Musician's Son Joins Al Qaeda's Ranks.''
\90\ As Sahab video, July 8, 2006.
Agents of Radicalization
While there are many different factors that contribute to
radicalization and the development of terrorist plots, two in
particular stand out as acutely noteworthy: religious leaders and the
Internet. Below, certain imams connected to terrorist activity and
extremist rhetoric and the role of the Internet in radicalization and
terror-plot development are discussed.
Imams and Spiritual Leaders
Ali Al-Timimi
Ali Al-Timimi was the primary lecturer at Dar al Arqam Islamic
Center in Falls Church, Virginia from 2000--2001.\91\ As explained
earlier in this testimony, he was convicted in April 2005 for inciting
terrorist activity, attempting to contribute services to the Taliban,
and on explosives and other firearms charges, and was subsequently
sentenced to life in prison.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ USA v. Al Timimi, ``Indictment.''
\92\ USA v. Al Timimi, 04-CR-385, ``Judgment,'' (EDVA July 13,
2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to his indictment, Al-Timimi told a group of young men,
later to be convicted for involvement with the terrorist group Lashkar
e Taiba that ``American troops soon to be deployed in Afghanistan would
be legitimate targets of the violent jihad in which his listeners had a
duty to engage.'' He also told the men to ``obtain jihad training from
Lashkar e Taiba because its belief system was good and it focused on
combat,'' and provided information on how to reach the Lashkar e Taiba
camp undetected.\93\ Yong Kwon, one of the convicted paintball
jihadists, testified at Al-Timimi's trial that his lectures had ``fired
him up'' and was a ``big factor'' in his decision to go to Afghanistan
and fight with the Taliban, although his trip was never realized.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ USA v. Al Timimi, ``Indictment.''
\94\ USA v. Al Timimi, 04-CR-385. ``Trial Transcript'' p. 17 (ED VA
September 23, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Timimi, like Virginia jihad cell members Royer, Kwon, and
Chapman, grew up as a secular individual. Although Al-Timimi was born
Muslim, as a young child he celebrated Christmas, and it was not until
his early years of high school, when his family moved to Saudi Arabia,
that he became more religious.
While in Saudi Arabia, Al-Timimi was mentored by a Saudi trained
imam named Bilal Philips.\95\ Philips, a Jamaican born, ex-communist,
convert to Islam who grew up in Canada was Al-Timimi's Islamic Studies
teacher at Manaret Riyadh High School in the early 1980s.\96\ According
to Philips, ``The clash of civilizations is a reality,'' and ``Western
culture led by the United States is an enemy of Islam.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ November 30, 2004 letter of appeal from Abu Amina Bilal
Philips on behalf of Ali Al-Timimi circulated in the US and the UK.
\96\ Ibid.
\97\ John Mintz and Gregory L. Vistica, ``Muslim Troops Loyalty a
Delicate Question,'' Washington Post November 2, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, Philips ran a program to convert US soldiers to Islam
during the first Persian Gulf War. According to a 2003 Washington Post
article, Bilal Philips, reported that the program was led by ``a
special team whose members spoke fluent English,'' \98\ educated in
broadcasting and psychology. These conversion specialists financed
pilgrimages and would later send Muslim clerics in the United States to
their homes. He also encouraged some converts from this program to
fight in Bosnia in the 1990s, which led to FBI investigations.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Ibid.
\99\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a 2004 letter of appeal circulated in sympathetic circles in the
US and the UK, Philips encouraged Muslims to assist Al-Timimi
``financially, morally or politically.''\100\ According to Philips,
``whatever the charges against him [Al-Timimi] may be, from an Islamic
perspective they are false and contrived in order to silence the Da'wah
to correct Islaam.'' \101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Letter from Abu Amina Bilal Philips.
\101\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon returning to the United States, Al-Timimi received a
bachelor's degree in biology and computer science and a Ph.D in
computational biology.\102\ Simultaneously he continued his missionary
work, retaining the severe interpretations that he was introduced to
abroad. For example, when asked, by an audience member during a lecture
he gave whether it is permissible for a Sunni to pray with a Shiite,
Al-Timimi responded: ``Ok, you cannot pray behind any of these people.
In fact if we were in an Islamic state these people their, their heads
should be, you know, lopped off, that's what, you know, should be done
to these people. They deserve nothing better than to just cut their
necks, if we were in an Islamic country. To be [UI word] to make the
chance to make repentance and if they do not repent to cut their necks,
that's what these people deserve.'' \103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ James Dao, ``Muslim Cleric Found Guilty in the Virginia Jihad
Case,'' New York Times, April 27, 2005.
\103\ Audio recording of lecture by Ali Al-Timimi.
Fawaz Damrah
Fawaz Damrah was the Imam at the Islamic Center of Cleveland.\104\
Damrah also was a close associate with Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader
Sami al-Arian. In fact, Damrah actively raised funds for PIJ in the
United States.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ USA v. Fawaz Damra, 03-CR-484. 334 F. Supp. 2d 967. (ND OH
September 13, 2004).
\105\ USA v. Fawaz Damra, 03-CR-484. ``Memorandum Opinion.'' (ND OH
August, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a conference held in Chicago in 1991, Damrah promoted violence
amongst the attendees, urging to ``. . .point their gun toward the
enemy, toward the children of pigs and monkeys, the Jews.' \106\ Damrah
also raised money for violent jihad at another conference, ``The Jihad
is still going on in Palestine. The intifada is calling on you. Donate
$500. Who would add to that $500? Who would add $500?'' \107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ ICP event commemorating the ``Great Intifada'' at Currie High
School, Chicago, IL, Sept. 29, 1991
\107\ ``People In Cleveland Take A Closer Look At A Muslim Leader
After The September 11th Attacks.'' National Public Radio (NPR),
Morning Edition, January 18, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Damrah, defending the use of violence in the Palestinian
territories, stated, ``The Palestinians are being terrorized and being
victims of state sponsored terrorism. . .And they have the right to
defend themselves just like they did then, like they did now.'' \108\
At a 1989 discussion panel moderated by Sami al-Arian, Damrah stated,
``Terrorism and terrorism alone is the path to liberation.'' \109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Elizabeth Sullivan and Robert L. Smith, ``Parma Imam Says
Palestinians Have Right To Take Up Arms'' Plain Dealer, September 27,
2001.
\109\ Elaine Silvestrini, ``Video Evidence In Al-Arian Trial Shows
Anti-Israel Rhetoric,'' Tampa Tribune, July 27, 2005, http://
news.tbo.com/news/MGB5AT9XMBE.html (Accessed September 18, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Damrah was also identified as a co-conspirator in the 1993 World
Trade Center Bombing.\110\ Damrah was affiliated with the Al Kifah
Refugee Center,\111\ a predecessor organization to al Qaeda.\112\
Damrah is currently awaiting deportation for failing to disclose his
membership to a terrorist organization on his application for
citizenship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ USA v. Elgabrowny, et al, 93-CR-181. ``List of 173 Possible
Co-Conspirators Submitted by Mary Jo White.'' (SD NY February 2, 1995).
\111\ USA v. Damrah, 03-CR-484. ``Indictment.'' p. 2 (ND OH Dec.
18, 2003).
\112\ ``Additional Background Information on Charities Designated
Under Executive Order 13224,'' United States Treasury Department,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/
charities_execorder_13224-i.shtml#m (Accessed August 12, 2005).
Mohammed El-Mezain
Mohammed El-Mezain formerly served as the imam of the Islamic
Center of Passaic County and as the former Chairman of the Holy Land
Foundation.\113\ In July 2004, Mezain was indicted for material support
to a terrorist organization.\114\ According to a November 5, 2001 FBI
Memorandum:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ Joel Mowbray, ``Corzine, Pascrell Attended Brunch With Links
to Radical Islamic Groups,'' The New York Sun, March 29, 2004, http://
daily.nysun.com/Repository/
getFiles.asp?Style=OliveXLib:ArticleToMail&Type=text/html&Path=NYS/
2004/03/29&ID=Ar00600 (Accessed September 18, 2006).
\114\ ``Holy Land Foundation, Leaders, Accused Of Providing
Material Support To Hamas Terrorist Organization,'' USDOJ Press
Release, July 27, 2004, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/
04_crm_514.htm (Accessed September 18, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
an FBI source who has provided reliable information in the past
reported that during a speech at the Islamic Center of Passaic
County (ICPC) in November, 1994, Mohammad El-Mezain, the
HLFRD's current Director of Endowments and former Chairman of
the HLFRD Board, admitted that some of the money collected by
the ICPC and the HLFRD goes to HAMAS or HAMAS activities in
Israel. El-Mezain also defended HAMAS and the activities
carried out by HAMAS.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ ``Action Memorandum, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development International Emergency Economic Powers Act,'' From Dale
Watson, Assistant Director FBI Counterterrorism Division to Richard
Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department
of Treasury, November 5, 2001, 46. (Watson Memorandum)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the same memorandum, El-Mezain attended a Muslim Arab
Youth Association (MAYA) conference from December 30, 1994 to January
2, 1995 in Los Angeles, where an individual named Sheikh Muhammad Siyam
was the keynote speaker. Siyam was introduced as ``Head of operations
of Al Jihad Al Islamia in Gaza, the HAMAS military wing.'' His
leadership in Hamas is confirmed with a flyer of the Islamic Circle of
North America (ICNA) advertising its 1990 convention. On that flyer he
is advertised as ``Dr. Mohammed Siyam, Islamic scholar and head of
Intifadah [uprising], Hamas Movement in Palestine.'' \116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Flyer, ICNA 15th Annual Convention, 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the MAYA convention Siyam stated, "I've been told to restrict or
restrain what I say. . .I hope no one is recording me or taking any
pictures, as none are allowed. . .because I'm going to speak the truth
to you. It's simple. Finish off the Israelis. Kill them all!
Exterminate them! No peace ever! Do not bother to talk politics.''
\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Watson Memorandum, 46--47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same memorandum states that following Siyam's speech, El-Mezain
exhorted the crowd to contribute money, subsequently announcing that
$207,000 had been for ``the cause.'' \118\ At that conference, El-
Mezain reportedly stated that during 1994 he raised $1,800,000 inside
the United States for Hamas.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Ibid.
\119\ Ibid.
Adnan Bayazid
The imams addressed above have either been indicted or convicted of
terrorism or are tied to a terrorist group. However, there are other
imams who have preyed on their congregants and followers with
incendiary rhetoric.
Adnan Bayazid served as the Imam of the Islamic Center of Greater
Kansas City as well as on its board of directors.\120\ In October 2002,
Adnan Bayazid spoke to a Kansas City Art Institute class about jihad.
The professor of the class noted ``No one asked specifically about
September 11, but [Adnan Bayazid] started going on a tirade. . .and for
30 minutes proceeded to tell us that there were no Islamic
fundamentalists on the (hijacked) planes; that they had all been framed
by U.S. and Israel; that the planes were flying by remote control by
the Israeli government or secret police; that every Jewish person was
told not to go to work that day at the World Trade Center. He blamed
Israel for the whole thing, but he also said numerous times Jews not
just Israel or the Israeli government, but that it was a Jewish
conspiracy. He said that specifically numerous times.'' \121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Rick Hellman, ``Blood libel: Muslim speaker at local college
blames Israelis, Jews for 9/11.'' The Kansas City Jewish Chronicle.
January 17, 2003.
\121\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Bayazid was contacted by the media, he confirmed the account:
``That's what I believe, yes.'' He furthermore added, ``The planes who
did the attack, the passenger and the pilots, their name is a public
record, and none of them is a Muslim. So the 20 names or the 19 names
of those Saudis they take, some of them are still alive in Saudi
Arabia. Some of them were dead. It is not true.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The vast majority of imams and Islamic spiritual leaders play a
necessary and beneficial role in communities in which they serve, but a
minority of this profession has taken advantage of their positions of
trust and the vulnerability of American-Muslim community. These men
have used their pulpits to preach malicious conspiracy theories and
falsely paint the Global War on Terrorism as a war against Islam in
order to alienate the Muslim community and engender radicalism and
extremist thought. Any successful strategy to counter the influence of
radicalism must employ imams who reject extremism and terrorism.
Internet
Another factor affecting the radicalization process is the
Internet. It is common knowledge that the Internet is a resource widely
implemented by terrorists and extremists. The Internet has become an
indispensable multifaceted operational tool for terrorists in terms of
psychological warfare, publicity, propaganda, data mining, fundraising,
recruitment, mobilization, networking, sharing information, planning,
and coordination.\123\ Several of these functions can combine to serve
the larger function of radicalization, which is crucial to the success
of terrorists and extremists who propagate militant Islamism--
particularly those who act on behalf of the ideology propagated by al
Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Gabriel Weimann, ``www.terror.net; How Modern Terrorism Uses
the Internet,'' Special Report 116, United States Institute of Peace,
March 2004, 5--10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks of
September 11, 2001 forced an historically and strategically significant
shift on the part of al Qaeda that reverberated throughout the larger
jihadi movement. The successful invasion decimated the hierarchy and
configuration of al Qaeda, which was centralized in Afghanistan. Al
Qaeda was forced to devolve to an ideological presence and surrender
the greater portion of operational control outward to various affiliate
groups. While these affiliate groups continued to direct jihad around
the world, the ideology of al Qaeda continued to spread and led to the
formation of various provisional cells,\124\ several of which have been
homegrown. Instead of a centralized organization, al Qaeda has become a
franchised idea. While many prominent jihadist thinkers agitated over
the circumstances that forced this strategic shift, some--such as
Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, popularly known as Abu Musab al-Suri--had
promoted the strategic necessity of this change for the wider Salafi
jihadist movement for some time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Yoram Schwietzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, Al-Qaeda and the
Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies, November 2005), 18--19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The nature and structure of the Internet serves the contemporary
jihadi movement perfectly. It is a diffuse resource that can be
utilized at almost any location to communicate any type of information.
This resource is all too often utilized to convey and promote Islamist
militancy and isolationism, which has had a radicalizing effect on
individuals in almost every society with an Islamic population. As FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III pointed out last June:
Radical fundamentalists are particularly difficult to pinpoint
in cyberspace. There are between 5,000 to 6,000 extremist
websites on the Internet, encouraging extremists to initiate
their own radicalization and to cultivate relationships with
other like-minded persons.
Although we have destroyed many terrorist training camps in the
past five years, extremists increasingly turn to the Internet
for virtual instruction. Of course, not every extremist will
become a terrorist. But the radicalization process has become
more rapid, more widespread, and anonymous in this Internet
age, making detection that much more difficult.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation, City
Club of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, June 23, 2006, http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm (Accessed September 11, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This sort of cyber-radicalization has tragically been demonstrated
time and time again around the world, but most infamously and recently
in Western countries--the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United
States.
Exploitation of the Internet by terrorists and extremists for
purposes of radicalization is finally getting the attention it demands
from law enforcement, policymakers, and--most importantly--the public.
By simply logging online, terrorists and extremists from Indonesia to
Indiana are able to post articles, exchange information, and exchange
thoughts and beliefs, often theologically flawed or distorted, on
radical websites and in chat rooms. While there is an ever-growing
trend towards the globalization of all thought and ideology, this
communication of ideas regarding the harsher strains of Islam has led
to an increase in the ease, level, and speed of radicalization and the
networking of radicals that could not occur without the enabling medium
of the Internet.
As noted by FBI Director Mueller, there is a plethora of extremist
websites on the Internet that radicalize and educate an untold number
of aspiring terrorists. Some of these websites and online forums
provide explicit instructions on how to contribute to violent jihad.
Others disseminate the extremist thought that often serves as the
central ingredient in the radicalization process. Websites in the first
category are dangerous for obvious reasons and continue to proliferate
at an alarming rate. Websites in the second category present a more
subtle and perhaps more dangerous threat. Once they are identified,
websites of the first category can occasionally be shut down or be
traced to the individuals behind them in order to provide actionable
intelligence to the pertinent authorities. These websites convey
information on combat tactics, explosives, chemical and biological
weaponry, espionage, attending a terrorist training camp, and executing
operations. Websites of the second category are purveyors of a
different sort of information--the sort that is intangible and focuses
on theology and ideology designed to lead its visitors down the path of
isolationism and extremism, shaping them into terrorists.
One example of a website in the first category was Qoqaz.net. One
of the two main sites of Azzam Publications, Qoqaz.net was the English
language website for the Chechen mujahideen.\126\ This website, hosted
by an Internet service provider in Connecticut for seven years until
2003,\127\ was utilized to raise funds for the mujahideen in Chechnya.
The Qoqaz.net homepage, quoting Osama bin Laden's mentor, Abdullah
Azzam, reads, ``Jihad and the rifle alone. NO negotiations, NO
conferences and NO dialogue.'' \128\ Pages on Qoqaz.net detailed how
one might donate to, train for, and join the jihad in Chechnya.\129\
Qoqaz.net also played a role in motivating Lackawanna Six cell member
Yahya Goba.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ Web archive of Azzam Publications, http://web.archive.org/
web/20000818175151/63.249.218.164/html/chechnyafacts.htm (accessed
February 28, 2006).
\127\ USA v. Ahmad, et al., 04-CR-301, ``Indictment,'' (D CT
October 6, 2004).
\128\ Web archive of Azzam Publications, http://web.archive.org/
web/20000621135807/www.qoqaz.net/ (accessed August 10, 2005).
\129\ Web archive of Azzam Publications, http://web.archive.org/
web/20000818175151/63.249.218.164/html/chechnyafacts.htm (accessed
February 28, 2006).;
Web archive of Azzam Publications, http://web.archive.org/web/
20000818175151/http://63.249.218.164/html/chechnyafacts.htm#faqs
(accessed February 28, 2006).;
Web Archive of Azzam Publications, http://web.archive.org/web /
20000816204345/63.249.218.164/html/chechnyajihadtrain.htm (accessed
August 10, 2005).
\130\ Patrick Orr, ``Hussayen defense gets surprise help; Testimony
of key witness is blow to prosecution,'' Idaho Statesman, May 25, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Qoqaz.net is no longer operational, thousands of websites,
forums, and cyber how-to manuals have taken its place. A recent posting
on a militant Islamic forum about the bacterial botulinum toxin, which
causes the deadly disease known as botulism, is one of a seemingly
endless string of examples that should draw our attention to resources
on the Internet that could allow radicalized individuals to execute a
lethal plot. The post, published on an extremist forum hosted in the
Middle East, details the preparation and preservation of the biological
weapon botulinum toxin, the most potent toxin known today, and one of
the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions (CDC) six Category A
Bioterrorism Agents. After a brief, but ominous introduction in which
the author, ``We are lurking in wait for you. Allah will torment you
himself or use us to do so. You can plot, but we are plotting as
well,'' he includes facts about the bacteria, how to produce the toxin,
lethal doses, experiments and observations, and possible methods of
dissemination.\131\ The availability of such literature on the Internet
provides individuals who are not trained scientists the opportunity to
produce biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, though perhaps
crude in form. Additionally, the easy distribution of information
pertaining to various forms of attacks illuminates alternative and
innovative methods of terrorism that might not be otherwise considered.
In the case of the Al Qaeda affiliated individuals who were accused of
planning to produce ricin in an apartment in London, the group was in
possession of a recipe for making the toxin taken off the
Internet.\132\ Equipment to produce biological threat agents, such as
the castor beans from which ricin is processed, as well as makeshift
laboratory materials are also available on the Internet. This
technology provides the information to allow aspiring terrorists around
the world, including those in the United States, to consider and
produce biological, chemical, and radiological weapons that would
otherwise be inconceivable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ ``Toxins of the Next Phase,'' Forum Posting, June 2006. The
forum will remained unnamed for security reasons.
\132\ Milton Leitenberg, ``Assessing the Biological Weapons and
Bioterrorism Threat'' Strategic Studies Institute, December, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combating the operations of websites in this first category will
prove to be crucial and effective in the fight against terrorism,
however these efforts are largely reactive in nature. In order to
achieve a meaningful victory in this long war against Islamic
extremism, it will be necessary to take proactive measures, such as
eliminating or lessening the influence of websites in the second
category. A central challenge in this effort will be drawing the line
between extreme-orthodox Islamic isolationism that cannot necessarily
be restricted in a democratic society and ``unacceptable forms of
radical-Islamic isolationism.'' \133\ It will undoubtedly be difficult,
if not impossible, to achieve a cessation of the flow of extremist
thought on the Internet, nonetheless efforts must be undertaken to
reduce the allure of the fundamentalist message.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ From dawa to jihad; The various threats from radical Islam to
the democratic legal order (The Hague: General Intelligence and
Security Service, December 2004), 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A dark corner of another website, MySpace.com, has essentially
become a late-model innovation in this second category of extremist
websites. MySpace, the popular online social networking site, is a
cyber-refuge for people around the globe to keep in touch with old
friends and make new ones. It is especially popular among American
university students and young adults, but the subjects discussed in
certain circles on this popular website go beyond social activities
consisting of friendship and fun. There is a healthy and growing
population on MySpace of Islamist extremists and their sympathizers.
Through monitoring these networks and the individuals of which they
consist, it is evident that there is a possibly dangerous level of
radicalization occurring on one of America's most popular websites.
Like other MySpace users, these individuals post extensively in
their blogs and write notes on their friends' profiles; however,
instead of commenting on a party, telling a joke, or making social
plans, they angrily condemn America, swear support for Osama bin Laden,
and express graphic desires to inflict violence upon innocents at home
and abroad. Some even identify themselves as active terrorists and
claim to have participated in attacks against American soldiers in
Iraq, providing horrific photographs as evidence. These extremists who
ascribe to the belief systems of groups like al Qaeda, Hamas, and
Hizballah are largely adolescents and young adults. Apart from their
jihadist inclinations, they share common similarities with others in
their demographic. They often enjoy popular television shows, video
games, and sports. The majority of these self-professed militants live
in America--the land in which they were raised. Websites such as
MySpace enable its users to connect with peers with greater ease, even
if those peers are turning to violent extremist ideologies. While
MySpace is not responsible for these growing radical networks, the
service is a medium exploited to facilitate them.
Authorities around the world have already seen the heavy hand of
the Internet in the development of homegrown terrorist cells. For
domestic cells in London, Australia, Canada, the United States and
elsewhere, cyber-radicalization and the use of the Internet's other
resources mentioned above have reached new heights. In the case of the
alleged terrorist cell arrested in the Toronto area early in June 2006,
Qayyum Abdul Jamal, a 43-year old bus driver that served as a caretaker
and prayer leader at the Al-Rahman Islamic Center, where the cell
members worshipped, was an influential figure in the radicalization of
the plotters, who were largely juveniles and young adults.\134\
However, the investigation into this cell began in 2004 when
intelligence officers monitoring an Internet chat room observed cell
members promoting anti-Western sentiment.\135\ Through the Internet,
the cell members had connections with extremists all over the world.
The arrests of the seventeen terrorism suspects in Toronto was the
latest in a series of arrests and raids in Europe and North America--
that began in Bosnia with a cell of two men who planned on attacking
the British embassy in Sarajevo--all connected to a worldwide Internet
terrorism network with links to al Qaeda in Iraq among other terrorist
elements, including the now-detained terrorist Internet operative known
as Irhabi 007.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Rebecca Cook Dube, ``Canada faces `jihad generation,' ''
Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 2006.
\135\ Michel Comte, ``Canadian bomb plot suspects appear in
court,'' Agence France Presse, June 6, 2006.
\136\ ``Worldwide web of terrorism suspects exposed,'' Australian,
June 8, 2006.
Conclusion
Radicalism and homegrown terrorism pose unique challenges to the
complex homeland security environment. The core of this threat is an
extremist ideology that transcends borders. Until 9/11, the U.S.
focused its efforts on the terrorist threat from overseas. However, as
evident from these instances, extremism is as much of an internal
battle as an external one. We, along with our allies, must be vigilant
in combating this ideology at home as well as abroad with a multi-
pronged campaign that relies on addressing root causes, but not at the
expense of locating and incapacitating terrorist cells, with the result
of isolating, retarding, and halting radicalization.
The growing pollution of the Internet by militant Islamist ideology
is a particularly acute hazard that will continue to propel
radicalization. There are no easy solutions to this crisis and
innovative strategies are needed. Infamous terrorist Internet
operatives, like Irhabi 007, can be tracked and arrested, but the
ideology will continue to seep out on websites, online forums, and chat
rooms. Currently, the most viable option available is to work to
insulate Muslim communities in the West from this radicalizing
influence through the empowerment of constructive and truly moderate
Muslim leaders.
While government agencies and law enforcement authorities must
engage the American Muslim community to address the root causes of
radicalization, officials must take greater care to avoid legitimizing
certain elements--whether radical imams or certain groups--within the
organized Muslim community who act as agents of radicalization.
These radical groups and Islamic leaders falsely present themselves
as moderates and make it their mission to push a narrative to their
community that the US government's campaign against terrorism is,
rather, a generalized ``war against Islam'' that must be shunned,
discouraged, and monitored. This characterization serves to demonize
the efforts of the US government and, by extension, the West, which
ultimately serves to radicalize and alienate Muslims in the United
States, creating fertile ground for extremists to operate and recruit
followers.
To a large degree, the narrative propagated by these groups is a
corollary of the primary message of radical Islam at large: That there
is a conspiracy by the West to subjugate Islam. This self-victimization
fuels paranoia that Muslims are being selectively targeted for racist
reasons, because of ``special interests,'' or due to anti-Muslim bias
in Western foreign policy. This, in turn, inflames self-alienation and
degrades any positive connections between Western Muslim communities
and their host state. It is therefore not surprising to see a common
claim in most of the terrorist attacks the West has witnessed since 9/
11, from the ``Virginia jihad network to the cell that executed the
London transit bombings: that they were committing acts of violence to
avenge Western atrocities against Muslims.
Too often, the US Government empowers the very groups that are
instilling alienation from the United States and the West. Many of the
leaders of these groups falsely claim to speak on behalf of most Muslim
Americans while they attempt to neutralize other voices within the
Muslim community. The ``dialoguing'' that goes on--with group leaders
who demand to be the only representatives of the Muslim community with
whom the government should meet--has serious and far-reaching
consequences. The extent to which the FBI, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the State Department have legitimized radical groups
masquerading as ``moderate'' warrants close oversight by Congress.
This same self-victimization formula has been applied by Islamic
groups in Great Britain and Australia. The leaders of these countries,
Prime Ministers John Howard and Tony Blair, at their own political
expense, have recently articulated the dangers of empowering these
groups that reinforce mistrust and hatred of the West. The British
Prime Minister recently stated:
Look, we've got a problem even in our own Muslim communities in
Europe, who will half-buy into some of the propaganda that's
pushed at it--the purpose of America is to suppress Islam,
Britain has joined with America in the suppression of Islam.
And one of the things we've got to stop doing is stop
apologizing for our own positions. Muslims in America, as far
as I'm aware of, are free to worship; Muslims in Britain are
free to worship. We are plural societies. It's nonsense, the
propaganda is nonsense. And we're not going to defeat this
ideology until we in the West go out with sufficient confidence
in our own position and say, this is wrong. It's not just wrong
in its methods, it's wrong in its ideas, it's wrong in its
ideology, it's wrong in every single wretched reactionary thing
about it. And it will be a long struggle, I'm afraid. But
there's no alternative but to stay the course with it. And we
will.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ ``President Bush and Prime Minister Blair of the United
Kingdom Participate in Press Availability,'' The White House Office of
Press Secretary, July 28, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/07/20060728-1.html (Accessed September 18, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. government should seek out dialogue and cooperation with
true Muslim moderates, who have neither supported terrorism nor
justified their actions and who seek the integration of Muslims into
the American family, rather than self-isolation. Lending legitimacy to
extremist imams and organizations only reinforces to the American
Muslim community that these groups do, in fact, speak for them.
Additionally, law enforcement agencies should continue vigilantly
monitoring known pockets of extremism in the United States and abroad,
including the trafficking of Saudi religious materials--known for
promoting both violent jihad and gross intolerance of Christians, Jews
and the West--in U.S. mosques and Islamic schools.
U.S. government programs and official engagement can provide only a
limited amount of success. A greater effort on the part of the Muslim
community must be undertaken to counter a growing trend that sees jihad
as the new counterculture for a generation caught between two cultures
that are often at odds. Circumstances demand that these efforts go
beyond condemnations of terrorist attacks and conditional statements of
support.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you all very much for your testimony. It
has been extremely interesting and informative.
And we are joined by our ranking member, the distinguished
gentlelady from California, who has been deeply engaged in
another committee on some very serious work. And so, I would
like to yield my time for questions to her, give her the
opportunity to--
Ms. Lofgren. Well, thank you. That is very gracious, Mr.
Chairman.
I do offer my apologies. The Judiciary Committee was
marking up the tribunals bill, as well as the wiretapping bill,
and naturally I had to become involved in that. So I offer my
apologies.
I have been able to read the testimony and be briefed on
it. And, if I may, I would like to focus in on Mr. Woodward's
testimony, because I think there are global issues and then
there are some things that you can do right now that can help.
And when the chairman and I, along with some of our other
members, went up to Toronto this spring, we had a meeting with
members of the Muslim community, talking about radicalization.
And I remember very well, one of the individuals there, who was
a professional person, describe his father being humiliated.
And this gentleman had tears in his eyes, because his father,
who was a very respected person in the Toronto community, came
up on a name check. And he wasn't a terrorist; everyone knew
that. But he missed his plane, and it was embarrassing. And we
thought about that.
And then, shortly after that, we went to the Toronto
airport and watched the system in play. And the name check,
would anybody named Mohammed Khan misses their plane, is what
we were told. And, in fact, with frequent travelers, we are
told that sometimes if they knew the person they would call
ahead, because they knew this person wasn't a terrorist but
they had to go through this same routine every single time for
the same people over and over again. Even if it was a baby,
even if it was a 100-year-old, there was no discretion.
And in August, I spent a morning overseas at a consular
office to see on the visa issuance side. And they complained
about the same thing. And I will just tell one story, and then
I would like Mr. Woodward to say how we might solve this.
This consular official said, ``We say that we are not
against Muslims, and I believe that is true. But if you look at
how we act, it is easy to see how people could reach a
different conclusion.''
And he gave an example of a young man who was the son of a
very prominent person in the country he was in who had been
admitted to a very fine college in the United States, applied
for the student visa, his name triggered the name check, but
they knew that it wasn't this kid. It was in the newspapers, it
was very embarrassing for the United States. It took 6 weeks to
get the kid cleared. Finally, this kid was cleared, went off to
college. He had to come and reapply for his student visa the
next year. Same thing all over again. Because nothing is
stored. It is all as if, every single time, it is brand-new.
And it seems to me there ought to be some biometric way to
solve this problem so that we stop people who should be stopped
but that we don't keep spending time and effort on people who
we have cleared. Because it has an impact not only on wasting
our time, diverting us from who we ought to be focusing on, but
it has a very negative impact on people who feel that they are
being singled out for no good reason.
Can you come up or give us some advice on a technology
solution to that, Mr. Woodward?
Mr. Woodward. I am happy to, ma'am. And realize, when a
former intelligence officer gives an attorney technical
advice--
[Laughter.]
Ms. Lofgren. We will love it.
Mr. Woodward. I do it all the time.
No, I think, basically, biometric technologies are a tool.
They are only a tool. It is not the proverbial silver bullet.
They are not perfect. However, I think they are a useful tool
in this, what I call, the identity management part.
And what I mean by that, to take your example of the visa
applicant, someone applies for a visa to come to the United
States, we want to establish that identity. Well, how do we
establish that identity? Well, we ask them questions, we have
them fill out an application. Part of that establishment of
identity should be providing biometric data that we can then
search against relevant databases to see if we can make any
matches that would show links to behavior--for example, having
a criminal record.
There was actually a case of a foreigner applying for a
visa in a foreign country where data was searched and matched
to fingerprints indicating that that person had previously been
a detainee in military custody in Iraq. Well, that wasn't
disclosed on the visa application.
Ms. Lofgren. Of course not.
Mr. Woodward. We can use this biometric data search to
establish the identity.
Then once we do that, as best as we can judge, ``You
qualify for a visa, we want you to go to the United States, we
want you to enjoy your American experience,'' that is where we
need to help the person. I guess you would call this the
identity user.
And one of the ways we can do that is to take the
biometric, and you could pick your biometric du jour--I am not
here to give you the technological solution, but a fingerprint,
an iris, et cetera, et cetera--is there some way we can take
that and associate it with that person by, for example, putting
a template or representation of that data on the person's visa,
a chip on a smart card, in the passport and so on?
So when the person now comes to the port of entry, I am
here as a foreigner with a valid visa, I want to enjoy America.
He or she can establish that identity by doing a one-to-one:
Here is my biometric sample. Here is the biometric template the
U.S. government has confirmed by establishing my identity. Do
they match? I think we make that person's life a little bit
easier.
Are we there yet? No. I think the concept is for the U.S.
government to get there. But I am not certain we are moving as
quickly as we should. Because I very much am sympathetic to the
point you raised where, once people have done as good a job as
they can at saying, ``I am a legitimate traveler,'' ``I am a
legitimate visa seeker,'' and so on, we should try to make
things a little bit easier for that person to be able to enjoy
the American experience.
Ms. Lofgren. I will say--and I see my time is up, and we
will have votes sometime between 3:00 and 3:30--the line
officers at the airport and in the consulate office are
enormously frustrated, because they know they are wasting time.
They know these individuals; they know who they are. But they
are never allowed to connect identity with the name, so they
keep doing--they are doing tasks that provide no value, while
creating ill will--
Mr. Woodward. And part of that, ma'am, just quickly, is we
are still in a paradigm of doing name-based searches. Sometimes
we use a number, Social Security number, et cetera. That
paradigm shift will come when we recognize the biometric as a
way to get at unique identity, and we can do more searching
that way. That I think would help visa officers, help
inspectors at the point of entry. It would certainly help the
United States military operating in places like Iraq.
Ms. Lofgren. I don't want to abuse my time, but--
Mr. Simmons. Please, take your time.
Ms. Lofgren. --the chairman suggested maybe other witnesses
might comment on this.
Mr. Simmons. Hearing none, I have a question I want to ask.
Dr. Phares, you made the interesting comment, I believe,
that we have to identify the beginning of the process. We have
to be able to figure out when the click is taking place, if you
will.
And then several of you concluded your testimony by making
reference to engaging in a dialogue with Muslim organizations.
I am a believer, given my background and my experience--I
lived in the Far East for 7 years. I speak Chinese, and I used
to speak some Vietnamese. I always felt that my experience in a
foreign country was not worth much if I couldn't talk the
language, live in the community, eat the food, and fully and
completely engage, to the extent possible as an American, in
the social, political and economic life of the community. And
the reward to me was understanding another culture.
I wonder, somehow, if we have taken full advantage of those
opportunities here in the United States, in reaching out to the
Muslim community and better integrating our political
activities with them, social and economic activities. And that
is the first part of my question.
Then the second question is, there is a lot of talk about
the Internet, which is very interesting to me. We invented the
Internet. It was our brainchild, if you will. It is a fantastic
tool for communication. But isn't it ironic that this fantastic
tool for communication has been taken over by a group that
essentially wants to destroy the very culture that came up with
this fantastic tool? And why can't we use the same tool to push
back, to promote our point of view? Why is that not the case?
And then finally, is the U.S. media helping or hurting in
this process? That is a tough one.
[Laughter.]
You may not want to answer that one. But these are the
three points I would like to draw out a little bit.
Don't be shy.
Mr. Phares. Yes. Quickly, couple points here, with regard
to the actual title of the initial inquiry about
radicalization, and then I will tie this in to your important
question.
There is a thesis in Washington and many capitals that are
dealing with terrorism that, originally, there is frustration
in communities; that is how it starts. Then there is a
radicalization because of this frustration. Nobody explains how
the radicalization occurs out of the frustration, though, and
that is an important academic question. And immediately, it
becomes terrorism.
A young man or a young woman who are frustrated with the
U.S. sending qualitative bombs to Israel overnight becomes a
terrorist jihadi is the thesis. Or, in England, some of the
members of the Muslim community are not getting the exact
rights that other communities, not necessarily the Anglos but
Hindus or East Europeans. Therefore, the next day they become
terrorists.
I argue with this theory.
I do state that, at the beginning, the big bang is
jihadism. There is an ideology that comes first. A, either it
creates a frustration by explaining to the community, or to the
weakest members of the community--here comes the psychological
investigation, what have you--but before the psychological
investigation, there is an investigation of what initiate that
frustration and transformed it into terrorism. Or, what I call,
hijacking frustration.
Frustration exists. But then comes that radical cleric or
that ideologue or that cadre online, not online, in the
classroom, in the mosque, anywhere, and then explains this
frustration, that it is an attack against Islam, for example.
But more important than that, it explains to those
individuals that you are here on a mission. It aggrandizes the
personality of that person.
And here comes the last stage, which is, in order for you
to help the whole community, imagined community--in French,
communite imaginaire--then you have to perform that martyrdom,
so on and so forth.
So, from that perspective, I would conclude that most of
our energies--and we have no other alternative for now--most of
our energies are put on the last 10 percent of the process.
From the where the individual wants to do terrorism on, we have
90 percent of our energies on the last 10 percent of the making
of a jihadist.
Where the jihadist has been made is the click that
convinced him or her that, ``I have to do it.'' And that is
where I have moved to request to identify the ideology.
Let me show you an object here, Mr. Chairman. This bloated
in the mind of an individual. This is an audiotape. This is one
of the 105 audiotapes which were released at the case of
terrorism in Detroit in 2003, which I have reviewed--105
audiotapes. This is the weapon of mass radicalization.
That is an example of individuals who basically were not
jihadists and, because of this material and literature and what
came with them, become jihadists. The rest is only a process of
indoctrination into doing that terrorist activity.
Internet, quickly, jihadism is using Internet, but what is
not happening is that the counterjihadist forces--democracy
groups, human rights groups--are not using Internet enough.
They are sampling, though. I mean, in the Middle East, there
are Web sites that are very recent that are beginning to
counter the jihadists. And their consequences, their effects
are very interesting. What we need to do is let the American
public, American Congress understand that there are
alternatives to the Internet use of jihadism.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, I found your questions
excellent and right on the mark.
In terms of working with the Muslim community, I think we
have an awful lot more we need to be doing. Not just the
Muslim-American community, but the Arab-American community. And
we need to expand that beyond the United States. Hopefully we
can learn some lessons that others have learned the hard way
and have the scar tissue for it, that we can inoculate
ourselves before it becomes a crisis.
I think one of the challenges is, if we look at it through
a counterterrorism lens alone, it is going to create a
defensive posture automatically. So we need to actually look at
the radicalization questions in a broader tapestry and try to
isolate and marginalize those individuals, which, to some
extent, does get to the role of the Internet, as well.
The United States wouldn't have much credibility to the
people we are trying to touch if we use the Internet. What we
actually need to be able to do is give the silent majority the
voice to speak up and deal with the--to some extent, give them
the tools to better help themselves.
Just think about what took down the Sicilian Mafia. It was
not the fact that the carabinieri was so successful. It was the
fact that they finally killed a judge, Falcone, who was very
popular with the people, that they lost the hearts and the
minds and the trust and the confidence of the people.
And we need to be looking to that, if there is a Martin
Luther King, to some extent, that we need, in terms of that
moderate voice, or whether we need a Gandhi, or whether we need
someone who has credibility with the people. That can't
necessarily be done from the United States.
But let me also jump on one other thing from the Internet.
One of the things that is most unique that we have seen vis-a-
vis these virtual ummas and the Internet chat rooms and relay
sessions and the like is that people actually bond closer on
the Internet than they do person-to-person, which is so ironic.
They don't know who they are talking to. The anonymity is a
potential tool that we should be using more from a law
enforcement, from a tactical standpoint. Just like we don't
know who is behind the clickety-clack of the keyboard, they
shouldn't either. So I do think that that is a tool we need to
be looking at much more closely.
I also think one of the most concerning trends is, that
reaffirms avarine attitudes. It gives them a sense of uniting,
and these bonds get stronger and stronger, and they basically
get bolder and bolder, and it empowers one another. It unites
them. It is kind of interesting.
We have seen it, you mentioned, with juvenile predators and
sexual predators. It could be six people, but if they have the
same view they get stronger and stronger and bolder and bolder,
and then they start acting on those ideas. That is the point--
where do you go from the virtual, where they meet in an
Internet relay chat room, to then go to do jihad, to actually
operationalize it? That is where I think we have some points we
need to think about more.
Mr. Simmons. And actually, your point is absolutely
correct. In our work with police organizations in Connecticut
and elsewhere, tracking the chat rooms that attract the
Internet predators, they do reinforce each other. And there was
a time when that predator was a guy in a trenchcoat or standing
at a bus stop or at a community center, waiting for the kids to
come around.
Today, it can be highly educated, sophisticated, middle-
class, white-collar folks who are using the technology and
reinforcing each other. And, in some respects, that is the
bingo, too, for reasonable well-to-do, second-generation
Muslims who hear the click.
Mr. Emerson?
Mr. Emerson. Yes, I think you raised an excellent question,
and it is a very sensitive one, but we have to answer it
honestly, which is, what type of Islam do we want to legitimize
in the United States? Which type of group do we want to
legitimize?
Dialogue has the purpose of trying to foster some
commonality in a higher degree. Unfortunately, we have
witnessed, in my organization, U.S. government sanctioning and
legitimizing certain groups that are tethered to Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, or other radical Islamic organizations. And,
unfortunately, that reinforces their legitimacy in front of the
larger Islamic community.
What we would like to see, really, is to seek out
legitimate, authentic, genuine moderates, leaders and
organizations, that will dispel the community of any notion
that there is a war against Islam. Because, to the extent that
these groups reinforce that their rights are being denied, that
there is a war against Islam, it only reinforces their notion
that the United States is an enemy, providing susceptibility
ultimately to a terrorist plot.
Mr. Simmons. I think that is a really good point. I come
from New England, as you know. We used to burn witches in New
England.
[Laughter.]
Yes, yes, we would burn them. We would put them in dunking
stools, you know, the dunking stools, because we did that,
there were witches out there, and it was a witch hunt. And I
think that it is incredibly important that we not fall into the
trap of a witch hunt here in the United States.
Following 9/11, I immediately called friends in my Muslim
community and said, ``If you encounter any adverse commentary,
yourselves in your professional life, your wives in the
community, your children at school, call my office.'' We had
two incidents; we put an end to it.
A week ago, the Islamic center in New London got
threatening phone calls. We immediately got the FBI in to
investigate.
I think it is incredibly important that we ensure that the
Muslim community knows that they are part of the American
community and that it is really a small sliver of folks who,
for whatever reason, are hearing the click and are thinking of
doing damage. And that we need their help in identifying the
click. They might hear the click before we do. And that is the
challenge. That is the huge challenge.
So I thank you all for your testimony and for beginning the
process of trying to figure this out. And I suspect, at some
future hearing, we will get a little more deeply into how we
can shape and form our public policy to appropriately address
this.
And I think the biometric issue is very, very important.
Because the Muslim community that we met in Toronto was
unanimous in expressing their concern about small insults on an
almost daily basis. One of them married to an American whose
family lived in Maine, and they would visit the family once a
month in Maine, and once a month on the way to Maine he would
have to sit for 4 hours. And this went on year after year. It
was absurd. And so, there has to be, I think, a way also of
bringing technology into the equation.
The word ``preliminary'' was used an hour or so ago. I
think that we have made a good step in the right direction.
I thank you all for your inputs. And if you have additional
material to submit for the record of the hearing, please be my
guest. Thank you all very much.
Without objection, we are now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]