[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
H.R. 3197, SECURITY HANDLING OF
AMMONIUM NITRATE
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 14, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-59
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Committee on Homeland Security
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 13
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 71
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the Virgin Islands............................................. 70
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 69
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 72
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congresss From the
State of Connecticut........................................... 70
The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress From the
State if Pennsylvania.......................................... 38
Witnesses
Mr. Gary W. Black, President, Georgia Agribusiness Council, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 54
Prepared Statement............................................. 56
Mr. James W. McMahon, Director, New York State Office of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
Mr. William Paul O'Neill, Jr., President, International Raw
Materials:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode
Island:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
Mr. Carl Wallace, Plant Manager, Terra Mississippi Nitrogen,
Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 63
Prepared Statement............................................. 65
H.R. 3197, SECURITY HANDLING OF AMMONIUM NITRATE ACT OF 2005
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Wednesday, December 14, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Simmons, Dent, Weldon,
Langevin, Norton, Christensen and Thompson (Ex Officio).
Mr. Linder. The subcommittee will come to order.
The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack is here today to
hear testimony on H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium
Nitrate Act of 2005.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Linder. I would like to thank and welcome our witnesses
for appearing before the subcommittee today.
On April 19th, 1995, the world looked in horror at the
images of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, which was destroyed when nearly 5,000 pounds of ammonium
nitrate, mixed with motor fuel, was delivered in a rental truck
and detonated in the building's parking lot. On that day, 167
lives, including the lives of 19 children at the building's
daycare facility, were lost in what was at the time the worst
terrorist attack on American soil.
The ammonium nitrate used in that attack is an inexpensive
and easily accessible fertilizer used around the world and is
very popular with farmers due to its high nitrogen content. In
fact, 2.7 million tons of agricultural ammonium nitrate alone
was traded internationally in 2001. It is also utilized as an
explosive agent by miners looking to blast coal out of rock.
Ammonium nitrate is also used, unfortunately, as a popular
compound for terrorist bombings, including Oklahoma City, the
1998 East African Embassy bombings, the November, 2003,
bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, and was suspected in the October,
2002, Bali bombing.
Countries with histories of terrorism, including the
Philippines, Colombia and Ireland, have banned the use of
ammonium nitrate completely. A number of European Union
countries have either banned or restricted its use. Turkey
joined the EU in regulating sales of ammonium nitrate in 2004
in the wake of ammonium nitrate bombings there.
There appears to be no doubt as well in the minds of
Australian officials in the wake of the Bali bombings and the
bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta that if al-Qa'ida
were able to acquire and deploy any weapon to cause mass
devastation it would do so. Considering this, they have also
agreed to place restrictions on ammonium nitrate fertilizers
within Australian borders.
Here at home, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, California and Nevada have implemented their
own regulations of ammonium nitrate.
Ten years after Oklahoma City, however, the United States
Government has done little to prevent the repeat of this
horrific tragedy. It is still too easy to acquire ammonium
nitrate for terrorist use in this country.
Later today, the subcommittee will mark up H.R. 3197, the
Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005, which
authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to regulate the
purchase of ammonium nitrate by registering sellers and buyers
of this potentially dangerous material. This represent the
first serious effort on the part of the Federal Government to
prevent future attacks of this nature on the American people.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on the
implications of this regulation, whether they agree that we
should regulate ammonium nitrate fertilizer and whether this
bill represents a positive step to our preventing future
terrorist acts.
I am hopeful that these and other questions will be
answered as we review this important U.S. homeland security
issue; and I yield to my friend from Rhode Island, the ranking
member of the subcommittee, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairman Linder.
I would like to take this opportunity to welcome our panel.
I look forward to their input on the legislation that is before
us today.
In particular, I am pleased that Dr. Jimmie Oxley is among
our distinguished witnesses this morning. Dr. Oxley is not only
a world-renowned explosives expert but a very well regarded
chemistry professor at the University of Rhode Island, an
institution that I have the great privilege of representing in
Congress. Welcome, Dr. Oxley.
I have had the opportunity to visit Dr. Oxley in her lab to
learn about the land mine detection technology research that
she is undertaking through the URI forensic science
partnership. Certainly she is an asset to URI, and I know that
she is going to be a great asset to today's hearing as well.
To many of us, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was our first
introduction to the devastating impact ammonium nitrate can
have in the hands of a terrorist. Since that time, fertilizer
bombs have been used to deadly effect, in 2002, by the Islamic
group linked to al-Qa'ida outside the nightclub in Bali,
Indonesia, and in 2003 by an al-Qa'ida cell in Istanbul,
Turkey.
The risks that ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer, so
critical to the agricultural operation of many of our Nation's
farmers, will be used by a terrorist in an improvised explosive
device must be confronted and reduced.
A June, 2005, analysis conducted by Syracuse University's
Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism makes
clear why Federal leadership is so vital. The authors of this
report, entitled Legal Controls on Explosive Materials, found
that only four States--Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
New Jersey--had established security regulations for ammonium
nitrate.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to ask that
we include that report in the record.
Mr. Linder. Without objection.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Langevin. Since the time of the report, New York,
California, and Michigan, have passed ammonium nitrate laws of
their own.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. McMahon, New York's
homeland security director, how the rollout of New York's law
is going; and I understand that it took effect on November
30th.
While I commend these States for taking the initiative, I
cannot help but think that the job of securing ammonium nitrate
should be a Federal concern. Specifically, I believe it could
be a Department of Homeland Security concern. It is my
understanding that the legislation that will soon be considered
in the committee, H.R. 3197, puts the Department in charge of
this effort to ensure that ammonium nitrate is still available
to farmers, even as we try to keep it away from terrorists. I
think that is important.
I commend Ranking Member Thompson as well as Mr. Weldon for
authoring this legislation. I certainly look forward to hearing
the testimony of our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from
Pennsylvania for an introduction.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the distinguished chairman and ranking
member for this hearing and mark-up.
It gives me great pleasure to introduce a constituent of
mine who actually brought this issue in legislative form to me.
It is rare that an industry group brings an issue to Congress
for regulation. In this case, it was an industry who did
exactly that.
I have a special interest in this issue, because a year
after the Murrah Building bombing I chaired a hearing where the
lead witness was Chief Morris. Chief morris is the fire chief
of Oklahoma City and a personal friend of mine, and Chief
Morris give us the lessons that he learned and the need for us
to support people like the Oklahoma City Fire Department to
respond to disasters like the one that occurred with the Murrah
Building.
So I was very happy when Tip O'Neill came to me and said,
Curt, we have got an area that the industry will support, an
issue that needs to be dealt with at the Federal level. Tip is
a personal friend of mine. He is an international fertilizer
business leader, a member of the Fertilizer Institute. He is a
Wharton School grad from the University of Pennsylvania and is
also a graduate and was an instructor for the U.S. Army
Artillery Officers Candidate School, and he served as executive
officer of an artillery battery in Vietnam.
Tip is a distinguished American, in my opinion hero and
role model. And so, Tip, I want to thank you personally and let
you know that we are pleased that you brought this to our
attention; and I know with John's leadership and Bennie's
support and Jim's support, we will move this legislation
quickly in the Congress.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Our guests today are Dr. Jimmie Oxley, a professor of
Chemistry at the University of Rhode Island and a recognized
expert in explosives. She has worked with the FBI simulating
the 1993 actions. I want to thank Professor Oxley.
Mr. James McMahon is the Director of the New York State
Office of Homeland Security, which was created after the
attacks of September 11th and charged with coordinating and
enhancing anti-terrorist efforts.
Gary Black is President of Georgia Agribusiness Council,
the State's trade association for the entire food and fiber
industry. He also serves as the Chairman of the Economic
Development Committee on the Governor's Rural Development
Council. He is also a friend of too many years and hopefully
will be the next commissioner of agriculture in Georgia a year
from today.
Mr. William O'Neill, Tip O'Neill, a name we well know, is a
member of the Agriculture Retailers Association Board of
Directors and President of International Raw Materials Limited
in Pennsylvania.
Carl Wallace is a Plant Manager of Terra Mississippi
Nitrogen, Inc. He is testifying on behalf of The Fertilizer
Institute. Thank you, Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Oxley-- Ms. Oxley, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. JIMMIE C. OXLEY
Ms. Oxley. Thank you for that kind introduction and for the
opportunity to speak to you today. I am a Professor of
Chemistry at the University of Rhode Island, and I have been
working with explosives for almost 20 years, starting with
ammonium nitrate, and that is one of the few that I have been
able to study through detonations on the ton scale.
Let me make a few remarks about explosives. One of the
hardest problems I have is looking at a chemical and predicting
whether it will be explosive or not. The requirements to be an
explosive is that the material must release gas and heat very
rapidly when initiated. It is that ``very rapidly'' that is
hard to predict.
DOT has regulations that say if a material has certain
groups like NO2 in it and releases a certain amount of heat,
then you must go through Series 1 testing. Series 1 testing is
now codified in a U.N. book on how to do the testing. But
because you cannot make tons of a new material safely, you test
on a couple of pounds scale and therefore many materials pass
on the pound scale that would not pass on the ton scale. That
is simply a fact. The ammonium nitrate test is not a
nonexplosive.
Now in terms of this legislation, I think we need to
consider availability. Terrorists use the material that is
available. In the U.S. and in Ireland, ammonium nitrate is
available. Many other parts of the world, for example, Israel,
where solid ammonium nitrate is not allowed for sale, the
terrorists use urea nitrate; and indeed in World Trade 1, in
1993, you saw urea nitrate used. You saw the millennium bomber
in 1999 attempt to use urea nitrate bombs. Shining Path in
Peru, urea nitrate. Bali bomb, sodium chlorate. It depends on
the availability in the region.
So one of my recommendations to you is if you stop and
restrict ammonium nitrate, think ahead to where the terrorists
and criminals are going to be going next. By thinking ahead to
that, I mean, think about materials that are available in large
quantities. We are not worried about small bombs. Indeed,
materials like ammonium nitrate for fuel oil or ammonium
nitrate sugar, which is what the Irish Republican Army was
using, are so insensitive that you really cannot make small
bombs effectively with them.
People do not make briefcase bombs with ANFO. They use
military explosives for that. They make truck or car bombs. So
you are interested in ton scale.
I suggest that on the legislation you have a lower quantity
limit simply to facilitate seeing the data of what you are
really interested in, which is where thousands of pounds are
going, or hundreds of pounds. But certainly you are not
interested in the pound scale on this material. It would take
an incredible effort to make any kind of effective bomb.
The British in their legislation have written one ton.
Their legislation governs one ton or more for straight ammonium
nitrate and for the 28 percent of regulated materials, 50 ton.
So that is how they are handling quantity.
And while I mention that, I should suggest that consulting
the international arena that is also dealing with this project
would be worthwhile. I have been working with the British on
their inerting project since 1995.
In mentioning the problem with testing, I am certainly not
suggesting that we have to test all materials on the one-ton
scale, but what we need to do is to find some methodology that
allows us to tell on the small scale what is happening on the
large scale.
One of the stories I like to tell comes from World War II
where a famous chemist said, give me enough peanut butter, and
I will blow up the world. And I like to add to that, but Skippy
never funded that research. His point was, size matters. And
that is important.
The last comment I understand has been fixed in markup, is
to make sure that your regulation is exempting explosive grade
ammonium nitrate, because that is already more strictly
regulated at the present time. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you very much, Dr. Oxley.
[The statement of Ms. Oxley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Oxley is Professor of Chemistry at the University of Rhode
Island. Her field of research is the study of explosives and other
energetic materials. She has studied the behavior of most explosives,
but ammonium nitrate (AN) she has examined from the milligram to the
ton scale. Dr. Oxley has worked with various military laboratories and
law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Over the last decade, she has
worked with the British Forensic Explosive Laboratory (dstl) \1\ on
projects ranging from attempts to inert ammonium nitrate to those
examining ways to enhance its explosive potential.
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\1\ dstl is a British government at Fort Halsed--Defense Science
and Technology Laboratory.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVITY
For a chemical to be an explosive it must undergo a rapid, self-
contained, chemical reaction that releases energy and heat. Most
explosives achieve this by oxidation. Oxidation produces heat and gas,
generally carbon dioxide or monoxide and water. The detonation gases do
the work of an explosive. Explosive power comes from the rapidity of
the reaction that supports the detonation wave. Although burning is
also oxidation resulting in heat and gas, the reaction is too slow to
create a detonation wave. Explosives can sustain rapid oxidation
because they contain their own oxygen--either as part of the molecule,
as in military explosives (TNT, RDX, PETN) \2\ or in intimate mixtures
of oxidizers and fuels, as in composite explosives such as ammonium
nitrate (AN) with fuel oil (FO).
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\2\ TNT 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene; AN ammonium nitrate; PETN
pentaerythritol tetranitrate; HMX octahydro-1,3,5,7,-tetranitro-
1,3,4,5-tetrazocine; RDX hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-s-triazine; HMTD
hexamethylene triperoxide diamine; TATP triacetone triperoxide. RDX is
the active ingredient in C4; PETN is the active ingredient in sheet
explosive and most detonating cord.
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The number of potential oxidizers for use in composite explosives
is large, but practical considerations, i.e. availability, limit the
potential threat. The number of potential fuels, however, is nearly
limitless--combustible non-explosives, e.g. rosin, sulfur, charcoal,
coal, flour, sugar, oil, paraffin as well as fuels that are explosive
in their own right, e,g, nitromethane and hydrazine. To date terrorists
have used fuel oil (ANFO) or icing sugar (AN/S) in combination with AN.
While chemical make up is important, the configuration of the
explosive device is also critical. Rapid energy release is necessary to
``support'' the detonation front, much like a piston; therefore, the
configuration of the chemical must be such that the wave is not
quenched by dissipation at the edges of the device.\3\ The concept of
``critical diameter'' addresses the limit where the explosive charge is
too small to support a detonation wave. Thus, 200g of a military
explosive in a cylindrical configuration is probably detonable; but the
same amount of that material sprinkled across a table top is probably
not.
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\3\ A shock wave traveling through an explosive charge will be
reflected at the edges of the charge where it hits a high-density
region (much like water hitting the wall of a swimming pool). The
reflected waves (rarefaction waves) degrade the shock wave, so that at
such edges the wave is slowed and an overall curvature of the wave
develops. If the diameter of the explosive is narrow, the rarefaction
waves may be sufficient to kill the shock wave. The minimum diameter at
which an explosive can support detonation is termed the ``critical
diameter.''
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Most military and composite explosives require a detonator, made of
highly sensitive explosive, to initiate a detonation. In addition,
composite explosives, being particularly insensitive, often require a
booster and a detonator to initiate.\4\ In the past, these requirements
restricted who could make explosive devices to those who could acquire
detonators and boosters by theft or good black-market contacts.
Nowadays, most terrorists and some teenagers are aware that the solid
peroxide explosives can be readily used in this capacity.
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\4\ To detonate an explosive charge, a detonator containing a
``primary'' explosive, sensitive to mild stimulation (impact, friction,
heat), is used to create a shock wave. This shock wave is directed into
the ``secondary'' explosive, the main charge. In military devices the
secondary explosive (e.g. TNT, RDX, HMX, PETN or formulations thereof)
is sufficiently insensitive that it can be initiated only by such a
shock wave. Most AN formulations are even more insensitive than
military explosives. They require an amplification of the shock wave
from the detonator; thus, a booster, a secondary explosive, is placed
between the detonator and the AN charge.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Availability of a material is a major factor in its use by
terrorists. Creating a bomb from military explosives requires theft of
the explosive; black-market connections to purchase the explosive, or a
skilled synthetic chemist and lab facility. Composite explosives
require as little as stirring the oxidizer and fuel together. Either
type of bomb requires acquisition of detonators, and composite
explosives usually require boosters, as well. The availability of all
these factors dictates the nature of the explosive device.
Fuels are ubiquitous, and oxidizers are widely available, having
major roles in purification and bleaching. It is likely that a number
of oxidizers, on a sufficiently large-scale, could be formulated into
composite explosives. The terrorist choice is, to a large degree,
governed by regional availability.
Terrorist use of ammonium nitrate (AN) began in the bombing
campaign of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (1969 to
1994). During that period there were 14,000 bombing incidents, most
involving commercial explosives or sodium chlorate/nitrobenzene. At the
peak of the campaign in the early 1970's, the British government issued
a ban on the sale of chlorate, nitrobenzene, and pure AN in Northern
Ireland. Nevertheless, large AN fertilizer bombs were used in the City
of London. Approximately 1000 pounds were used at St Mary le Axe (April
1992) and about 3000 pound at Bishops Gate (April 1993). In other
countries, AN has been used less frequently in terrorist bombings; a
notable exception were the African embassy bombings (Aug. 7, 1998). In
the United States (U.S.) about 18 billion pounds of AN are produced
annually. Of that, about 5 billion pounds are made and used for
commercial explosives; the rest goes to the fertilizer market. Because
the preparation of AN explosives is straightforward and well-known and
because the bombing of the Murrah Federal building (Oklahoma City,
April 1995) was devastating, the U.S. followed the British in funding
research attempting to desensitize AN. No outstanding successes have
been reported from that effort though, at a modest level, research
continues.
In Israel, where sales of solid AN are prohibited, rather than
evaporate the water from commercially available AN solution, terrorists
have chosen to use urea nitrate. For a number of years, urea nitrate
has been a favorite of Arabic terrorists. It was used in the bombing of
the World Trade Center (Feb. 1993). Urea intended to be made into urea
nitrate was brought across the U.S.-Canadian border by the would-be
millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam. The Shining Path used urea nitrate so
frequently in bombings that in 1992 sales of urea were banned in Peru.
Potassium chlorate, like AN, is one of the few oxidizers readily
available in bulk. In the U.S. 1.2 billion pounds of chlorate salt are
used annually by the pulp and paper industry and agriculture. Before AN
became the oxidizer of choice in large charges, chlorate was used.
Replaced by AN for large devices, it continued to be recommended in the
``do-it-yourself'' literature for use in small, anti-personnel devices.
The Bali bombing (Oct. 12, 2002) once again demonstrated its explosive
potential on a large-scale.
Dozens of peroxide compounds are used as free-radical initiators by
the polymer industry or in bleaching processes. Although a degree of
hazard is associated with the handling of most peroxides, TATP and HMTD
are unusual in that their three peroxide functionalities give them
explosive potential. TATP has about 88%, and HMTD, about 60% of TNT
blast strength.\5\ The unusual danger in these peroxides is not their
blast strength; it is their ease of initiation (due to the peroxide
linkage) and the ease with which terrorists have acquired and used the
materials for their synthesis. Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber,
intended to use TATP to initiate a PETN charge (Dec. 2001). HMTD was
prepared and carried into the U.S. by Ahmed Ressam with the intention
of using it to initiate urea nitrate bombs (Dec. 1999). Peroxide
explosives have also been used as the main charge (e.g. the London
bombings of July 2005 and countless suicide vests and car bombs in
Israel). These solid peroxides require a special degree of skill to
synthesize successfully and safely. In contrast, concentrated hydrogen
peroxide can be used without synthesis. The aborted bombing in Karachi
(Mar. 15, 2004) suggest that terrorists are well aware of its
potential.
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\5\ ``TNT equivalence'' is a rough method of comparing explosive
power. Often, it is obtained by comparing the blast pressure of an
explosive charge to that of the same amount of TNT with all other
factors being held equal.
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Recommendation: There should be a worldwide survey of availability
of oxidizers, and methods of tracking purchase and transport of large
quantities of oxidizers should be developed. Such information would
highlight unusual patterns of activity and aid in predicting and
preventing incidents.
2. Only large-quantities of oxidizer need be considered a threat.
Because AN formulations tend to be insensitive a fair amount is
required to support detonation.\3\ Briefcase bombs of ANFO have not
been used, rather AN is formulated into effective car or truck bombs.
To make an AN-based device, the formulator must have large quantities
of AN and also means to initiate and boost it. It is wasted effort and
masks the important data to track every small sale of AN. The British
in their various regulations \6\ have addressed the quantity issue in
terms of ``sufficient material to have an explosive effect'' or in
quantities greater than ``1 tonne.''
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\6\ See documents at Internet site http://www.hse.gov.uk/
explosives/ammonium.
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Recommendation: There should be a lower limit on the amount of
oxidizer of concern in this legislation. Not only does it require
Herculean effort to detonate AN on a small-scale, but in the U.S. the
widespread availability of smokeless and black powders makes them more
likely candidates for small bomb construction.
3. Tracking purchasers of bulk oxidizer is a modest step toward
restricting illegitimate use. Countermeasures are obvious. Credit card
companies already have a start on the problem of fraudulent use.
Recommendation: Require credit card purchase for large quantities
(e.g. 1 ton) of oxidizer. This makes use of some of the built-in checks
and information found in credit cards.
4. International collaboration should be sought.
Recommendation: The British have faced a serious AN threat for over
two decades. Open dialog between all levels working on this problem.
5. Consider other potential threat materials. Once one material
becomes harder to obtain, others may be substituted.
Recommendation: Consider the explosive potential of large
quantities of oxidizers and other energetic, non-explosives. Develop
better methods to indicate potential explosivity of large quantities.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) Test Series 1 is used to
classify chemicals as explosive or non-explosive for purposes of
transportation.\7\ However, the DOT test series uses no more than 2
pounds of the candidate material. Tested on that scale, AN and other
materials pass as non-explosives. Tested on a larger scale, some
detonate. In general, materials which require ton-quantities to
detonate do so at low (30-40%) TNT equivalencies.\5\ Nevertheless, many
such chemicals with one third TNT equivalence of 3000 tons is 1 kiloton
TNT equivalence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods: Manual of
Tests and Criteria,'' 3rd ed. United Nations, N.Y. 1999.
6. Exempt explosive-grade AN from this legislation. Some grades of
AN are classified as explosives under DOT regulations because of their
specific chemical and physical properties.
Recommendation: The bill needs a clause to specify that any grades
of AN that are classified as explosives under DOT regulations will
continue to be controlled under the existing and stricter explosives
regulations rather than this new law aimed at control of fertilizer-
grade AN.Folio
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Mr. Linder. Mr. McMahon.
STATEMENT OF JAMES W. McMAHON, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Chairman Linder, and good morning,
Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee. It is a
pleasure for me to be able to speak to you today about what we
have recently enacted in New York dealing with ammonium
nitrate.
As the chairman said, we are all well aware of the use by
terrorists, both domestic and otherwise. Certainly Oklahoma
City, that we are all aware of. But it goes back longer than
that. I think my first introduction to it was when I was a
young trooper in New York State. On August 24th, 1970, we
remember seeing the pictures and the reports of a van filled
with ammonium nitrate and fuel oil that was detonated next to a
building on the University of Wisconsin-Madison campus that
killed a physics researcher and caused massive damage to that
facility.
Then since then and then certainly now, subsequent to 9/11,
where people are much more interested, we have seen many
instances around the world in different countries, including
Great Britain and France and other areas. We always know about
the attacks and the damage caused, but there has been many
foiled attacks, most recently earlier in the year in Britain,
Great Britain. They foiled an attack with eight terrorists who
had 1,320 pounds of ammonium nitrate stored in a self-storage
warehouse in West London.
Most recently, with Joel Henry Hinrichs, III, the Oklahoma
University student who killed himself this year outside a
stadium with 84,000 spectators in it, as publicly reported, he
had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase ammonium nitrate in
the days preceding the incident. So we can only think what he
might have done with that.
Ammonium nitrate, as has been said, is one of the most
common commercially available ingredients traditionally
exploited by terrorist makers. Unfortunately, instructions for
producing ammonium nitrate explosive mixtures have been
incorporated in the training manuals and produced both
domestically and internationally by terrorists and widely
disseminated over the Internet.
In the aftermath of 9/11, New York's Governor, George
Pataki, has made prevention of terrorism New York's number one
priority. Our State legislature has enacted some of the most
stringent antiterrorism laws in the Nation and has statutorily
required the identification and reduction of vulnerabilities to
terror attacks in our critical infrastructure, with specific
emphasis in sectors like energy, toxic chemical sites and
general aviation.
This past year, we struck a balance between commerce and
security to require that ammonium nitrate is properly secured
by retailers in our State and buyers of this material are
properly identified, yet at the same time ensure the continued
proper commercial trade in fertilizer products.
On August 28th, 2005, Governor Pataki signed into law
certain measure that are now required surrounding the sale of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer products. Under this law, effective
only weeks ago, on November 28th, and accompanying regulations
issued by our State Department of Agriculture and Markets, the
latter promulgated in consultation with New York's Office of
Homeland Security, retailers of ammonium nitrate fertilizer are
now required to do five basic but important things.
First, they must register with the Agriculture and Markets
Department and publicly display their registration certificate.
Second, ammonium nitrate retailers must comply with certain
baseline security requirements that include providing
reasonable protection against vandalism, theft or unauthorized
access, ensuring that storage facilities are inspected daily
for signs of attempted entry, vandalism and structural
integrity and that they are fenced or otherwise enclosed and
locked when unattended. In addition, retailers must also employ
proper inventory controls for this sensitive material.
Third, retailers must obtain required forms of
governmental-issued picture identification from all purchasers.
Fourth, retailers must record the name, address, and
telephone number of the purchaser, along with the intended use
and quantities of ammonium nitrate purchased.
And, fifth, retailers must also maintain this retail sale
information for a 2-year period and make it accessible on
demand to the Office of Homeland Security and to the Department
of Agriculture and Markets.
A copy of the law, regulations and associated forms has
been appended to my written testimony.
We did not do this in a vacuum. With the support of the New
York State Office of Homeland Security, the New York State
Department of Agriculture and Markets conferred with the
industry and their counterparts in other States to identify
ammonium nitrate materials of concern and to ascertain what
successful practices have been put in place.
Input was also solicited by the Office of Homeland Security
from a variety of law enforcement and explosives-related
organizations in the United States and abroad, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the New York City Police
Department, the Institute of Makers of Explosives, and members
of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and
Investigators from the United States, Canada and overseas. We
received positive feedback on the measures we were planning and
implementing.
We believe these new common-sense measures are a valuable
step to not only assist homeland security at home and in our
communities but to prevent criminal use of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer.
I hope you will find the measures New York State has taken
helpful in your deliberations in the mark-up session following
this hearing which will consider H.R. 3197.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. McMahon follows:]
Prepared Statement of James W. McMahon
INTRODUCTION
Good morning Chairman Linder and members of the Subcommittee on
Nuclear and Biological Attack. My name is James McMahon and I am the
Director of the New York State Office of Homeland Security. I applaud
and thank you and other members of Congress for addressing this
critical issue.
Use of Ammonium Nitrate As A Weapon
The use of ammonium nitrate as a weapon by terrorists,
unfortunately, is not new.
In the early morning hours of August 24, 1970, a van filled with
ammonium nitrate and fuel oil was detonated next to a building on the
University of Wisconsin-Madison campus housing the Army Mathematics
Research Center, killing a physics researcher and causing massive
damage to the facility.
We all know that on April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a
Ryder truck containing a 4800 pound bomb of consisting of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer, fuel oil and nitro-methane, in front of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 American men,
women, and children.
Internationally, the picture is just as troublesome.
In October 2000, authorities in Singapore foiled an al-Qa'ida plan
to drive trucks each loaded with a ton of ammonium nitrate, purchased
by al-Qa'ida operatives through a Kuala Lumpur clinical pathology
company, into the US, Australian, British and Israeli embassies in
Singapore. On March 30, 2004, British anti-terrorism police arrested
eight men suspected of planning a terrorist attack and confiscated
1,320 pounds of ammonium nitrate from a self-storage warehouse in West
London. For decades, the United Kingdom has experienced numerous high
consequence Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombings involving
the conversion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer into deadly and damaging
high explosives. Notable bombings include attacks at the Baltic
Exchange, Bishopsgate, Canary Wharf and Omagh.
Most recently, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, an Oklahoma University
student, was killed in October of this year when an explosive device he
built detonated as he sat on a bench 100 yards from a stadium filled
more than 84,000 spectators. Of particular interest is the fact that
the investigation into his apparent suicide shows Hinrichs had
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase ammonium nitrate in the days
preceding the incident. If he had been successful there is no telling
what devastation he may have caused.
Ammonium nitrate is, of course, one of the most common,
commercially available ingredients traditionally exploited by terrorist
bomb makers throughout the years and continuing in the new millennium.
It can be mixed with common diesel fuel to create an extremely potent
and deadly improvised explosive mixture. Instructions for producing
ammonium nitrate explosive mixtures have been incorporated into
training manuals produced by both domestic and international terrorists
and widely disseminated over the Internet.
There is considerable and heightened concern these prior attacks
and plots will serve to inspire acutely isolated and unbalanced ``lone
wolves'' to utilize relatively easy to get ammonium nitrate to carry
out highly destructive attacks with virtually no indication, prior
warning or affiliation to known terrorist organizations.
New York State Ammonium Nitrate Legislation
In the aftermath of September 11th, Governor Pataki has made
prevention of terrorism New York's number one priority. Our State
Legislature has enacted some of the most stringent anti-terrorism laws
in the nation and has statutorily required the identification and
reduction of vulnerabilities to terror attack in our critical
infrastructure with a specific emphasis in sectors like energy, toxic
chemicals sites and general aviation security. This past year we struck
a delicate balance between commerce and security to require that
ammonium nitrate is properly secured by retailers in our state and
buyers of this material are properly identified, yet at the same time
ensure the continued proper commercial trade in fertilizer products.
On August 28, 2005, Governor Pataki signed into law certain
measures that are now required surrounding the sale of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer products. These include the registration of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer retailers, a requirement that certain records be created and
maintained of all such retail sales, along with specific baseline
security standards for ammonium nitrate retailers to safeguard this
product from misuse.
Under this law, effective only weeks ago on November 28th, and
accompanying regulations issued by the State Department of Agriculture
and Markets, the latter promulgated in consultation with New York's
Office of Homeland Security, retailers of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
are now required to do five basic but vitally important things:
First, they must register with the Agriculture and
Markets Department and publicly display their registration
certificate.
Second, ammonium nitrate retailers must comply with
certain baseline security requirements that include providing
reasonable protection against vandalism, theft or unauthorized
access, ensuring that storage facilities are inspected daily
for signs of attempted entry, vandalism and structural
integrity and that they are fenced or otherwise enclosed and
locked when unattended. In addition, retailers must also employ
proper inventory controls for this sensitive material.
Third, retailers must obtain required forms of
governmental-issued picture identification from all purchasers.
Fourth, retailers must record the name, address and
telephone number of the purchaser, along with the intended use
and quantities of ammonium nitrate purchased; and
Fifth, retailers must also maintain this retail sale
information for a two-year period and make it accessible, on
demand to the Office of Homeland Security and Department of
Agriculture and Markets.
A copy of the law, regulations and associated forms has been
appended to my written testimony as previously submitted for your
review.
In the past, the ability to trace purchases of ammonium nitrate was
a game of chance--now we have established a firm methodology for data
collection and enabled an ability to develop patterns and thus
``connect the dots.'' This system of verifying and recording identities
and amounts of ammonium nitrate purchases will serve as an essential
investigatory tool that did not exist before this law was signed.
We did not do this in a vacuum.
We used the pre-existing state statutory framework that already
required the registration of ammonium nitrate wholesale distributors in
New York with the state Department of Agriculture and Markets to
enhance security with this new legislation at the point of obvious need
and greatest potential exposure--where ammonium nitrate is sold on the
open retail market.
With the support of the New York State Office of Homeland Security,
the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets conferred with
the industry and their counterparts in other states to identify
ammonium nitrate materials of concern and to ascertain what successful
practices have been put into place. Input was also solicited from a
variety of law enforcement and explosives-related organizations in the
United States and abroad, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
the New York City Police Department, the Institute of Makers of
Explosives (IME) and members of the International Association of Bomb
Technicians and Investigators (IABTI) from the United States, Canada
and overseas. We received positive feedback on the measures we were
planning and implementing.
We believe these new common-sense measures are a valuable first
step to not only assist homeland security at home and in our
communities to prevent the criminal use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer,
but also in encouraging the implementation of best practices by the
industry to more effectively deter the potential misuse of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer and thus make us all more secure.
Conclusion
I hope you will find the measures New York State has taken helpful
in your deliberations in the markup session following this hearing,
which will consider H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate
Act of 2005. I do however, leave you with this final thought--while New
York State has recognized and begun to address the potential misuse of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer--it is essential to keep in mind that
evildoers, of course, do not recognize borders. National rules and
standards across the board in all 50 states as a matter of federal law
must be set in order to truly make this effort successful.
Thank you again.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Black.
STATEMENT OF GARY W. BLACK PRESIDENT, GEORGIA AGRIBUSINESS
COUNCIL, INC.
Mr. Black. Good morning.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Black.
I am President of the Georgia Agribusiness Council, located in
Commerce, Georgia. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before your subcommittee this morning on the House Homeland
Security Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attacks, regarding H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of
Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.
The Georgia Agribusiness Council is a chamber-like
organization with a 40-year history of promoting sound policy
for the breadth of Georgia's agricultural industry.
Mr. Chairman and members, today I find myself in a rare and
unenviable policy dilemma. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have
met with you and your staff dozens of times over the course of
our careers as a spokesman for Georgia farmers and food
producers and rural business. Many of our meetings have focused
on how we can work together to relieve Georgia farmers and
agribusinesses of overreaching Federal regulations and the
unnecessary bureaucracy and burdensome paperwork that usually
follows it.
The last thing that Georgia farmers need is another
regulation. The last thing Georgia livestock and food producers
need is a more burdensome bureaucracy and paperwork. However,
today I am here to state my support for the basic tenets of
H.R. 3197. It is obvious that regulation of this vital
agricultural input is on the horizon. Further, I believe the
best way to institute the most amicable solution to regulatory
challenges, Mr. Chairman, is to come to the table early in the
process. That is my purpose for being here today.
As you may know, ammonium nitrate fertilizer is an
excellent plant nutrient for Georgia's temperate climate and
clay soils. More than 59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is used
annually in our State on a variety of row crop and livestock
farms. Because this important plant nutrient is so effective on
our crops and soils, Georgia is the tenth highest State
regarding ammonium nitrate fertilizer consumption in the United
States.
I believe this important legislation establishes a
framework for providing the Georgia Department of Agriculture
and the Federal Department of Homeland Security the important
security information they need. I believe the legislation sets
important guidelines for improving our Nation's security. Yet,
passage of a final version, Mr. Chairman, must accomplish these
goals without placing unreasonable burdens on Georgia farmers
and agricultural retailers.
My greatest concern with the legislation--and I want to
again commend your staff. I understand we have moved forward
with different issues with the subcommittee's markup procedures
here this morning, and my comments are going back to the
original legislation. But I did want to point out some of those
concerns that we did have.
I do support maintaining the inspection authority at the
State level, since State inspectors already perform duties
designed to ensure the integrity and quality of fertilizer
products. The bill seeks to register ammonium nitrate
fertilizer producers, sellers, purchasers and users, with the
objective of keeping this necessary agriculture plant nutrient
in the hands of food producers, rather than in the hands of
those with criminal intent.
A totally new systemic registration plan may not be
necessary. Many retailers already voluntarily record sales
data, including the driver's license information of the
purchaser. I believe simple actions to standardize forms and
electronic reports throughout the existing system would
sufficiently serve the public purpose.
My members would rather not deal with a new set of Federal
regulators visiting their facilities. Federal block funding for
enforcement at the State level by State departments of
agricultural would be my preference. While a subjective fine
allows for situational judgments to take place, the $50,000
maximum fine looms as a daunting threat over farmers and other
small businesses. Well-meaning business owners will on occasion
make mistakes, and zealous enforcers sometimes seek to gain an
upper hand. Please consider a more reasonable fine structure
based on frequency and severity of violations.
Mr. Chairman, with amendments to accommodate the concerns I
have outlined, I believe H.R. 3197 would meet the objectives of
the Department of Homeland Security and help keep this valuable
agricultural fertilizer in use for continued food production in
Georgia and in this Nation. We in agriculture want to
contribute to initiatives that continue State and Federal
efforts to maintain and improve national security for the
United States and its citizens.
To conclude, allow me again, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and
members of the subcommittee for your leadership in addressing
this critically important issue of secure handling of ammonium
nitrate agricultural fertilizers. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Black. It is my understanding
that there will be an amendment in the nature of a substitute
that will deal with many of your issues.
[The statement of Mr. Black follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary W. Black
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Black,
President of the Georgia Agribusiness Council located in Commerce
Georgia. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attacks regarding H.R. 3197, the ``Secure Handling of
Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.''
Furthermore, I would like to thank you Chairman Linder for
scheduling this important hearing and for your leadership in addressing
the critical issue of advancing ammonium nitrate security measures,
which are so vital to the U.S. plant food industry, its many local
retail agribusiness outlets and the farmers and livestock producers
they serve.
Georgia Agribusiness Council
The Georgia Agribusiness Council (GAC) is a Chamber-like
organization with a 40-year history of promoting sound policy for the
breadth of Georgia's agricultural industry. Our members range from
farmers to input suppliers and from processors to those in
transportation of food and fiber. Promoting environmental stewardship
and educating the public about the importance of agriculture are the
hallmark objectives of our organization.
Mr. Chairman, today I find myself in a rare and unenviable policy
dilemma. As you know I have met with you and your staff dozens of times
over the years as a spokesman for Georgia farmers, food producers and
rural businesses. Many of our meetings have focused on how we could
work together to relieve Georgia farmers and agribusinesses of
overreaching federal regulation and the unnecessary bureaucracy and
burdensome paperwork that usually follows it.
The last thing Georgia farmers need is another regulation. The last
thing Georgia livestock and food producers need is more burdensome
bureaucracy and paperwork. However, today I am here to state my support
of the basic tenets of H.R. 3197, The Secure Handling of Ammonium
Nitrate Act. I believe regulation of this vital agricultural input is
on the horizon. Further, I believe the best way to institute the most
amicable solution to regulatory challenges, Mr. Chairman, is to come to
the table early in the process. That is my purpose for being here
today.
As you may know, ammonium nitrate fertilizer is an excellent plant
nutrient for Georgia's temperate climate and clay soils. More than
59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is used annually in our state on a
variety of row crop and livestock farms. The product is a premiere
source of supplementary nitrogen when used alone. The product is also a
key element in a host of prescriptive fertilizer blends. Because this
important plant nutrient is so effective on our crops and soils,
Georgia is the 10th highest state (see attached 2004 Commercial
Fertilizer Report) regarding ammonium nitrate fertilizer consumption in
the United States.
I believe this important legislation establishes a framework for
providing the Georgia Department of Agriculture and the federal
Department of Homeland Security the important security information they
need. I believe the legislation sets important guidelines for improving
our nation's security. Yet, passage of a final version, Mr. Chairman,
must accomplish these goals without placing an unreasonable burden on
Georgia farmers.
H.R. 3197, The Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act
On June 13, 2005, Representatives Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Bennie G.
Thompson (D-Miss.), as well as other key members of congress,
introduced H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of
2005.
The legislation before you gives the Department of Homeland
Security the authority to create a regulatory system for ammonium
nitrate-based fertilizers. The bill contains the following provisions:
The ``Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act'' grants the
Department of Homeland Security the power to regulate those who
produce, sell, and store ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer.
Specifically, this bill would allow the Department, in consultation
with the Department of Agriculture, to develop regulations that do the
following:
1. Create a registry of facilities that handle ammonium nitrate
fertilizer;
2. Limit the sale and storage of ammonium nitrate-based
fertilizer to facilities that register with the Department; and
3. Condition the sale of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer on
recording the name, address, telephone number, and registration
number of the purchaser.
My greatest concern with the legislation centers on the proposed
relationship between the Department of Homeland Security, state
departments of agriculture and the regulated community. I would prefer
that the states maintain the inspection authority since state
inspectors already perform duties designed to ensure the integrity and
quality of fertilizer products.
The bill seeks to register ammonium nitrate fertilizer producers,
sellers, purchasers and users, with the objective of keeping this
necessary agriculture plant nutrient in the hands of food producers
rather than in the hands of individuals with criminal intent. A totally
new systemic registration plan may not be necessary. Many retailers
already voluntarily record sales data including the driver's license
information of the purchaser. I believe simple actions to standardize
forms and electronic reports throughout the existing system would
sufficiently serve the public purpose.
My members would rather not deal with a new set of federal
regulators visiting their facilities. Federal block funding for
enforcement at the state level by state departments of agriculture
would be my preference. While a subjective fine structure allows for
situational judgments to take place, the $50,000 maximum fine looms as
a daunting threat over farmers and other small businesses. Well-meaning
business owners will on occasion make mistakes, and zealous enforcers
sometimes seek to gain an upper hand. Please consider a more reasonable
fine structure based on frequency and severity of the violation.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, with amendments to accommodate the concerns I have
outlined, I believe H.R. 3197 would meet the objectives of the
Department of Homeland Security and help keep this valuable
agricultural fertilizer in use for continued food production in Georgia
and in this nation. We in agriculture want to contribute to initiatives
that continue state and federal efforts to maintain and improve
national security for the United States and its citizens.
To conclude, allow me to again thank you Chairman Linder and
members of the subcommittee for your leadership in addressing the
critically important issue of secure handling of ammonium nitrate
agricultural fertilizers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
Top 20 Ammonium Nitrate Consuming States--2004
Missouri 292,934
Tennessee 146,149
Alabama 105,100
Texas 103,555
California 92,352
Kentucky 74,361
Oklahoma 62,640
Idaho 60,752
Kansas 60,460
Mississippi 59,121
Georgia 47,842
Louisiana 39,341
Arkansas 36,767
Oregon 30,590
Nebraska 30,138
Washington 30,030
North Carolina 29,733
Wyoming 24,605
Florida 21,943
Iowa 21,866
Source: 2004 Commercial Fertilizer Report
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Black,
President of the Georgia Agribusiness Council located in Commerce
Georgia. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attacks regarding H.R. 3197, the ``Secure Handling of
Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.''
The Georgia Agribusiness Council (GAC) is a Chamber-like
organization with a 40-year history of promoting sound policy for the
breadth of Georgia's agricultural industry.
Mr. Chairman, today I find myself in a rare and unenviable policy
dilemma. As you know I have met with you and your staff dozens of times
over the years as a spokesman for Georgia farmers, food producers and
rural businesses. Many of our meetings have focused on how we could
work together to relieve Georgia farmers and agribusinesses of
overreaching federal regulation and the unnecessary bureaucracy and
burdensome paperwork that usually follows it.
The last thing Georgia farmers need is another regulation. The last
thing Georgia livestock and food producers need is more burdensome
bureaucracy and paperwork. However, today I am here to state my support
of the basic tenets of H.R. 3197, ``The Secure Handling of Ammonium
Nitrate Act.'' I believe regulation of this vital agricultural input is
on the horizon. Further, I believe the best way to institute the most
amicable solution to regulatory challenges, Mr. Chairman, is to come to
the table early in the process. That is my purpose for being here
today.
As you may know, ammonium nitrate fertilizer is an excellent plant
nutrient for Georgia's temperate climate and clay soils. More than
59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is used annually in our state on a
variety of row crop and livestock farms. Because this important plant
nutrient is so effective on our crops and soils, Georgia is the 10th
highest state regarding ammonium nitrate fertilizer consumption in the
United States. (2004 Commercial Fertilizer Report attached)
I believe this important legislation establishes a framework for
providing the Georgia Department of Agriculture and the federal
Department of Homeland Security the important security information they
need. I believe the legislation sets important guidelines for improving
our nation's security. Yet, passage of a final version, Mr. Chairman,
must accomplish these goals without placing an unreasonable burden on
Georgia farmers and agricultural retailers.
My greatest concern with the legislation centers on the proposed
relationship between the Department of Homeland Security, state
departments of agriculture and the regulated community. I would prefer
that the states maintain the inspection authority since state
inspectors already perform duties designed to ensure the integrity and
quality of fertilizer products. The bill seeks to register ammonium
nitrate fertilizer producers, sellers, purchasers and users, with the
objective of keeping this necessary agriculture plant nutrient in the
hands of food producers rather than in the hands of individuals with
criminal intent. A totally new systemic registration plan may not be
necessary. Many retailers already voluntarily record sales data
including the driver's license information of the purchaser. I believe
simple actions to standardize forms and electronic reports throughout
the existing system would sufficiently serve the public purpose.
My members would rather not deal with a new set of federal
regulators visiting their facilities. Federal block funding for
enforcement at the state level by state departments of agriculture
would be my preference. While a subjective fine structure allows for
situational judgements to take place, the $50,000 maximum fine looms as
a daunting threat over farmers and other small businesses. Well-meaning
business owners will on occasion make mistakes, and zealous enforcers
sometimes seek to gain an upper hand. Please consider a more reasonable
fine structure based on frequency and severity of the violation.
Mr. Chairman, with amendments to accommodate the concerns I have
outlined, I believe H.R. 3197 would meet the objectives of the
Department of Homeland Security and help keep this valuable
agricultural fertilizer in use for continued food production in Georgia
and in this nation. We in agriculture want to contribute to initiatives
that continue state and federal efforts to maintain and improve
national security for the United States and its citizens.
To conclude, allow me to again thank you Chairman Linder and
members of the subcommittee for your leadership in addressing the
critically important issue of secure handling of ammonium nitrate
agricultural fertilizers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
Mr. Linder. Mr. O'Neill.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PAUL O'NEILL, JR., PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL RAW MATERIALS
Mr. O'Neill. Chairman Linder and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on
behalf of the Agricultural Retailers Association concerning
H.R. 3197.
I am Tip O'Neill, the President of International Raw
Materials, which is headquartered in Philadelphia. Our company
is an importer and domestic wholesale distributor of fertilizer
products. The ARA represents a significant majority of
America's agricultural retailers and distributors in
Washington, D.C.
Retail dealers provide essential crop input material to
America's farmers. This is a responsibility of growing
importance, because, as America develops new biosources of
energy, America is going to be relying on its farmers not only
to grow its crops but also to grow its fuels. We need,
therefore, to make sure that we give our farmers an adequate
and safe supply of agricultural inputs, including ammonium
nitrate fertilizer, that they will need to accomplish these
critical missions.
I currently serve on the ARA's Board of Directors and the
ARA's Public Policy Committee. I am a constituent of the
sponsor of this legislation, U.S. Representative Curt Weldon.
We appreciate the leadership that Representative Weldon and
Representative Bernie Thompson have shown on this issue by
sponsoring the legislation we are discussing here today.
As we all know, plants need nutrients to grow, primarily
nitrogen, phosphate and potash, each in some available form;
hence the need for fertilizer in crop production agriculture.
Variations in the crop, weather, temperature and soil help
determine the amount and types of fertilizers utilized.
As Mr. Black mentioned, ammonium nitrate is primarily used
on pasture lands and specialty crops. The principal advantage
of using this product as a fertilizer is that crops can
immediately utilize part of its nitrogen content in the form of
nitrate. While this formulation was discovered in 1659, it has
only been in the last 60 years that it has significantly been
used worldwide as an important plant nutrient.
Its use as an explosive was not discovered until the end of
World War I and reaffirmed with the tragic explosions in Texas
City in 1947. As we all well know today, both domestic and
foreign terrorists have illegally used ammonium nitrate in
bombings such as those that took place on April 19th, 1995, the
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and October 12th, 2002, in
Bali, Indonesia. These bombings took many innocent lives.
As a personal aside, I should mention that my cousin's son,
Joe Milligan, was one of the seven Americans killed in the Bali
tragedy. He was a newly minted college graduate on one last
surfing trip before pursuing a career.
In response to these potential threats, agriculture
retailers, distributors and manufacturers have and continue to
be proactive in voluntarily addressing security concerns
related to the storage, handling, transportation of
agricultural fertilizers, such as ammonium nitrate.
Our industry is working with the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security on security related issues. Many within our
industry, with the support of the ARA, the Fertilizer
Institute, have utilized the security vulnerability assessment
tool to obtain recommendations to improve overall security of
their facilities.
ARA and others within our Nation's agricultural industry
are committed to working with Congress and the administration
on effective measures such as H.R. 3197 that will help prevent
terrorists and other criminals from gaining access to products
like ammonium nitrate fertilizers. A number of States mentioned
this morning, including New York, California, Oklahoma, Nevada,
and South Carolina, have enacted registration and record-
keeping laws for ammonium nitrate fertilizer with the support
of our industry. While these State programs are working well
and to our knowledge have not placed too great a burden on
retailers or their farmer customers, a national more unified
approach is needed to address this matter.
It is not easy for an industry to support traditional
Federal regulations. However, in this case, we believe it is
necessary to help maintain ammonium nitrate's continued
availability for use on agricultural operations heavily
dependent on this plant nutrient.
The Weldon-Thompson bill as introduced would put in place
fair and equitable Federal regulations that address security
concerns related to the production, storage, sale and
distribution of solid ammonium nitrate fertilizer. H.R. 3197
authorizes DHS to enter into cooperative agreements with State
departments of agriculture or other State agencies that
regulate plant nutrients to ensure that any person who
produces, stores, or sells or distributes solid ammonium
nitrate registers their facility and maintains records of sale
or distribution, including the names, addresses, telephone
numbers and registration numbers of purchasers. Purchasers
would also be required to register this proposal.
ARA is working with the TFI in support of this important
legislation, and we look forward to working on this bill with
this committee and this bill's sponsors on securing its
enactment.
In this context, I would like to tell a short story.
Fifteen years ago I attended a lecture series given by the late
Peter Drucker. At the time he observed that America does not
legislate social change, America litigates social change. I
would hope that today we can all rise to the late professor's
challenge.
In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the Agriculture
Retailers Association greatly appreciates this opportunity to
testify on this important issue. We respectfully request your
support for the enactment of H.R. 3197. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. O'Neill.
[The statement of Mr. O'Neill follows:]
Prepared Statement of William P. O'Neill, Jr.
Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and other members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on behalf of
the Agricultural Retailers Association (ARA) regarding the ``Securing
Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005'' (H.R. 3197). My name is Tip
O'Neill. I am the President of International Raw Materials,
headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Our company is an importer
and wholesale distributor of fertilizer products. I am here today on
behalf of the ARA, which represents the interests of agricultural
retailers and distributors in Washington, D.C. I currently serve on the
ARA Board of Directors and the association's Public Policy Committee.
ARA represents a significant majority our nation's retail dealers who
provide essential crop input materials to America's farmers, including
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. In this capacity ARA is vitally interested
in any federal laws or regulations affecting the sale and use of key
agricultural fertilizer products such as ammonium nitrate.
We appreciate the leadership shown by U.S. Representatives Curt
Weldon (R-PA) and Bennie Thompson (D-MS) by sponsoring this important
legislation. In this testimony, I will provide an overview of ARA, our
industry, the use of ammonium nitrate as a fertilizer, how the illegal
use of this product has impacted me personally, and in this context the
strong need for enactment of the legislation we are discussing here
today.
OVERVIEW OF ARA AND AG RETAILERS
From the perspective of an overview, in 2002, there were an
estimated 10,586 agricultural retail outlets in the United States.\1\
The overall number of retail outlets is lower today and has been
declining due to a number of factors taking place within the industry
including: consolidation, increased domestic and global competition,
higher operating costs, and low profit margins. ARA members range in
size from family or farmer cooperative owned businesses, to large
companies with many outlets located in multiple states. Many of these
facilities are located in small, rural communities.
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\1\ Doane's Ag Professional Magazine, Summer 2003, p. 40-41
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As we all know, plants need nutrients to grow, primarily nitrogen,
phosphate and potash, each in some available form; hence the need for
fertilizers in crop production agriculture. Soils do not retain
nitrogen from year to year, therefore, nitrogen fertilizer must be
added during each planting season to ensure optimum growth and yield
conditions. Demand for fertilizers tends to be seasonal, depending on
when crops are planted. Variations in the crop, weather, temperature
and soil help determine the amount and types of fertilizers utilized.
It is estimated that farmers in crop production ultimately use more
than 85 percent of fertilizer consumed in the United States. The
remaining fertilizer is used on golf courses, landscaping, nurseries or
home use.
Ammonium nitrate fertilizer is primarily used on pasturelands and
specialty crops produced in the United States. The principal advantage
of using this product as a fertilizer is that crops can immediately
utilize part of its nitrogen content in the form of nitrate. Ammonium
nitrate was first synthesized by Johann Glauber in 1659, when he
combined ammonium carbonate and nitric acid, but it has really been
only within the last 60 years that ammonium nitrate has been
significantly used worldwide as a important plant nutrient. Its use as
an explosive was not discovered until the end of World War I, and
reaffirmed with the tragic ship explosions in Texas City in 1947. As we
all well know today, both domestic and foreign terrorists have
illegally used ammonium nitrate fertilizer in bombings such as those
which took place on April 19 1995 at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and on October 12, 2002 in Bali,
Indonesia. As a personal aside I should mention that my cousin's son
Joe Milligan was one of the seven Americans killed in the Bali tragedy.
INDUSTRY WORKING TO ADDRESS SECURITY ISSUES
In response to this potential threat, Ag retailers and distributors
have and continue to be pro-active in addressing security concerns
related to the storage, handling and transportation of agricultural
fertilizers. It is important for Congress and the Administration to
know that our nation's agricultural industry is committed to support
effective measures that will prevent terrorists or other criminals from
gaining access to ammonium nitrate fertilizer or other crop production
materials. In fact, DHS has and continues to work with the private
sector to identify risks, build systems to communicate those risks, and
to prepare plans to keep those risks from becoming terrorist's targets.
Our industry has taken a very proactive role in dealing with DHS and
has participated in the development of the sector working groups.
ARA is a supporter of Asmark's Security Vulnerability Assessment
(SVA) program. The Asmark SVA tool is licensed to ARA and is currently
being utilized by member and non-member companies. ARA is working with
CropLife America (CLA) and The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) under the
``Agri-Business Security Working Group'' and state associations to
promote security measures and the SVA program. To date this SVA has
been utilized by nearly 2,500 retailers. ARA and Asmark earlier this
year reached agreement with Clemson University to make the SVA tool
available to all Ag retail facilities in the state of South Carolina.
This web-based software enables retail facilities to conduct a security
vulnerability assessment of their facilities and receive
recommendations to improve overall security.
ARA and its members are committed to providing increased security
for solid ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Several states such as New York,
California, Oklahoma, Nevada and South Carolina have enacted
registration and record keeping laws for this product with the support
of the state agribusiness association. It is our understanding that
these state ammonium nitrate fertilizer registration programs have
worked very well and not placed too great a burden on retailers or
their farmer customers. While as you might expect it is not easy for us
as an industry to support additional regulations, in this case we
believe it is necessary to help maintain Ammonium Nitrate's continued
availability for use on agricultural operations heavily dependent on
this plant nutrient product.
ARA is therefore supportive of efforts by Congressmen Curt Weldon
(R-PA) and Bennie Thompson (D-MS) to put in place fair and equitable
federal regulations that address any security concerns related to the
production, storage, sale and distribution of solid ammonium nitrate
fertilizer. H.R. 3197 authorizes DHS to enter into cooperative
agreements with state departments of agriculture or other state
agencies that regulate plant nutrients to ensure that any person who
produces, stores, sells or distributes solid ammonium nitrate
fertilizer registers their facility and maintains records of sale or
distribution including the name, address, telephone and registration
numbers of purchasers. Also, purchasers would be required to register
under this proposal. ARA is working closely with the TFI and sponsors
of the Senate and House bills to ensure that the interests of
agricultural retailers are represented and has a voice at the table
with Congress and the Administration as this legislation moves forward
in the House and Senate and any subsequent regulations that are
implemented.
ARA supports a common sense, fair and simplified federal
registration system for ammonium nitrate fertilizer in order to ensure
the product's continued availability for sale, purchase and use by
America's agricultural industry. ARA believes it is important for
retailers to maintain the ability to sell ammonium nitrate fertilizer
if they so desire to their long standing and known farmer customers, as
well as ensuring their customers maintain the ability to purchase the
product for use on their farming operations. Over the past year many
domestic manufacturers and distributors have publicly announced they
will no longer be producing or selling ammonium nitrate due to security
and liability concerns. There are now only two domestic manufacturers
making this fertilizer product, with at least some of this shortfall,
being replaced by imports. We believe that enactment of H.R. 3197 will
help provide increased vigilance in the handling, sale and use of this
product and provide some assurances for the industry against any
potential liabilities that would otherwise exist without a federal
registration system in place.
We would also request support for the establishment of a security
tax credit that would allow eligible agricultural businesses to use
their own financial resources to take the necessary steps installing
state of the art security measures that better protects ammonium
nitrate and other crop production materials and the American public
from the potential threat of terrorism or other illegal activities.
Rep. Ron Lewis (R-KY) introduced the ``Agricultural Business Security
Tax Credit Act of 2005'' (H.R. 713) with the support of ARA, TFI, CLA,
Chemical Producers & Distributors Association (CPDA), and the National
Agricultural Aviation Association (NAAA). ARA urges committee members
to also support this important legislation by co-sponsoring H.R. 713.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we would like to reiterate that the Agricultural
Retailers Association greatly appreciates this opportunity to testify
on this important issue. We respectfully urge this committee to pass
H.R. 3197.
Mr. Linder. The Chair would now like to recognize the
gentleman from Mississippi for the purpose of introducing our
final panelist.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the courtesy.
I have, I guess, a dual distinction of introducing Mr. Carl
Wallace. He is a constituent, but he is also a hunting buddy of
mine. So we have real reason to have him here. He is the plant
manager of one of the production facilities that we are talking
about regulating, and I think he brings another perspective to
the testimony here today.
He operates a plant with 220-odd employees, who also have
the distinction of being the highest paid employees in this
county because of this facility; and it has been around for a
good number of years. So we are happy to have Mr. Wallace here
as a witness and look forward to his testimony.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Wallace.
STATEMENT OF CARL WALLACE, PLANT MANAGER, TERRA MISSISSIPPI
NITROGEN, INC.
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Terra and the
Fertilizer Institute, TFI, of which Terra is a member, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before this group in
support of H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate
Act of 2005. TFI is the leading voice of the Nation's
fertilizer industry, representing the public policy,
communication and statistical needs of fertilizer producers,
retailers and transporters.
Chairman Linder, I would like to thank you for scheduling
this important hearing and for your leadership in addressing
the critical issue of advancing ammonium nitrate security
measures.
I would like to thank my Representative, Congressman
Thompson, whose district the plant is located in, for his
leadership as the chief sponsor in this important legislation
and for inviting me here today to testify.
Terra Industries is a leading international producer of
nitrogen products which we sell to industrial customers and
agribusiness retailers for sale to farmers. Terra employs
approximately 1,200 people in North America and the United
Kingdom and is headquartered in Sioux, City, Iowa. Terra owns
and operates seven nitrogen manufacturing facilities, four of
which are in the midwestern and southern United States.
Our Yazoo City ammonium nitrate plant has been in operation
for more than 50 years. This facility provides a major boost to
the local economy, providing good-paying and stable job
opportunities.
As the Congressman mentions, at our Yazoo facility, we
employee 200 full-time employees with an annual payroll of
$12.5 million. We have an additional 20 security-related
contract employees associated with the facility. Terra
Mississippi Nitrogen has an annual production capacity of
500,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia, the basic ingredient for
most nitrate fertilizers and many industrial products. We
upgrade this ammonia to 775,000 tons of ammonium nitrate,
600,000 tons of urea ammonium nitrate, commonly called UAN,
7,000 tons of urea.
Ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the focus of this hearing, is
vital to the U.S. plant food industry and many local retail
agribusiness outlets and the farmers and livestock producers
they serve. Ammonium nitrate is valued by our Nation's farmers
for its use on pasture lands, citrus and specialty crops and
for its use in no-till farming. In 2004, Mississippi farmers,
like Georgia farmers, consumed about 60,000 tops of ammonium
nitrate. Nationwide during that same period agricultural
consumption of ammonium nitrate totaled 1.5 million tons.
After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the fertilizer
industry undertook several voluntary efforts to prevent
ammonium nitrate from getting into the wrong hands. TFI
partnered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, its member companies, State fertilizer associations
and the State fertilizer control officials within the State
departments of agriculture to promote fertilizer security. The
outreach program called Be Aware for America and Be Secure for
America were aimed at securing our products, particularly
ammonium nitrate, in our places of business. After the
terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the fertilizer
industry launched America's Security Begins with You, a new
program, which has been endorsed by ATF, the Department of
Homeland Security and the Association of American Plant Food
Control Officials who regulate fertilizer at the State level.
The campaign urges retailers and producers to develop and
implement security plans, record sales and alert law
enforcement to any suspicious activity.
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, TFI's board
of directors endorsed a voluntary security code of management
practices, which Terra has made mandatory at all of our
facilities. Accordingly, our Yazoo City plant has conducted a
security vulnerable assessment and developed a security plan
based on that assessment. To further strengthen our product
security requirements, we also require proof of delivery for
all shipments of ammonium nitrate within 24 hours. We have
recently had our security plan audited by an independent third
party auditor.
We at Terra believe that the provisions contained in H.R.
3197 further strengthen ammonium nitrate security by providing
a uniform national system for registration and recordkeeping.
We do not believe this legislation would be overly burdensome
to handlers of ammonium nitrate or our farmer customers. By
giving the Department of Homeland Security the authority to
work with State departments of agriculture to create, maintain
and enforce the program, this legislation uses an existing and
effective State fertilizer regulatory system to further secure
ammonium nitrate.
Mr. Chairman, Terra Industries and TFI recommend that H.R.
3197 be passed as introduced by the subcommittee and the full
House Homeland Security Committee. Similar legislation is
pending in the U.S. Senate, and we hope the Senate will follow
with passage of their bill. We believe this is necessary to
protect the continued use of ammonium nitrate for agricultural
purposes.
Thank you today for your time and for this opportunity to
have our views heard.
[The statement of Mr. Wallace follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl Wallace
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Carl Wallace,
plant manager at Terra Mississippi Nitrogen, Inc., doing business as
Terra Industries, located in Yazoo City, Mississippi.
On behalf of Terra and The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) of which
Terra is a member, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the
House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attacks in support of H.R. 3197, the ``Secure
Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.'' TFI is the leading voice of
the nation's fertilizer industry, representing the public policy,
communication and statistical needs of fertilizer producers, retailers
and transporters.
Chairman Linder, I would like to thank you for scheduling this
important hearing and for your leadership in addressing the critical
issue of advancing ammonium nitrate security measures. And I would like
to thank my representative, Congressman Thompson, in whose district the
plant I manage is located, for his leadership as a chief sponsor of
this important legislation and for inviting me here today to testify.
Terra Industries is a leading international producer of nitrogen
products which we sell to industrial customers and agribusiness
retailers for sale to farmers. Terra employs approximately 1,200 people
in North America and the United Kingdom and is headquartered in Sioux
City, Iowa. Terra owns and operates seven nitrogen manufacturing
facilities, four of which are in the midwestern and southern United
States.
Our Yazoo City ammonium nitrate plant has been in operation for
more than 50 years. This facility provides a major boost to the local
economy, providing good-paying and stable job opportunities. At our
Yazoo City facility, we employ 201 fulltime employees with an annual
payroll of $12.5 million. We have 19 additional security related
contract employees. Terra Mississippi Nitrogen has an annual production
capacity of 500,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia, the basic ingredient for
most nitrogen fertilizers and many industrial products. We upgrade this
ammonia to 775,000 tons of ammonium nitrate; 600,000 tons of urea
ammonium nitrate (UAN), and 7,000 tons of urea.
Ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the focus of this hearing, is vital to
the U.S. plant food industry, its many local retail agribusiness
outlets and the farmers and livestock producers they serve. Ammonium
nitrate is valued by our nation's farmers for its uses on pasture
lands, citrus and specialty crops and for its use in no-till farming.
In 2004 Mississippi farmers consumed 59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate.
Nationwide during the same period consumption of ammonium nitrate
totaled 1.5 million tons.
After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 the fertilizer industry
undertook several voluntary efforts to prevent ammonium nitrate from
getting into the wrong hands. TFI partnered with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; its member companies; state
fertilizer associations and the state fertilizer control officials
within the state departments of agriculture to promote the fertilizer
security. The outreach programs called ``Be Aware for America'' and
``Be Secure for America'' were aimed at securing our products,
particularly ammonium nitrate, in our places of business. After the
terrorist attack on Sept. 11, 2001, the fertilizer industry launched
America's Security Begins with You, a new program, which has been
endorsed by ATF, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Association of American Plan Food Control Officials, who regulate
fertilizer at the state level. The campaign urges retailers and
producers to develop and implement security plans, record sales and
alert law enforcement to any suspicious activity.
After the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, TFI's Board of Directors
endorsed a voluntary security code of management practices which Terra
has made mandatory at all of our facilities. Accordingly, our Yazoo
City plant has conducted a security vulnerability assessment and
developed a security plan based on that assessment. To further
strengthen our product security efforts, we also require proof of
delivery for all shipments of ammonium nitrate within 24 hours. We have
recently had our security plan audited by an independent third party
auditor.
We at Terra believe that the provisions contained in H.R. 3197
further strengthen ammonium nitrate security by providing a uniform
national system for registration and recordkeeping. We do not believe
this legislation would be overly burdensome to handlers of ammonium
nitrate or our farmer customers. By giving the Department of Homeland
Security the authority to work with state departments of agriculture to
create, maintain and enforce the program, this legislation uses an
existing and effective state fertilizer regulatory system to further
secure ammonium nitrate.
Mr. Chairman, Terra Industries and TFI recommend that H.R. 3197 be
passed as introduced by this subcommittee and the full House Homeland
Security Committee. Similar legislation is pending in the U.S. Senate
and we hope the Senate will follow with passage of their bill. We
believe this is necessary to protect the continued use of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer for agricultural purposes.
Thank you for your time today and for providing this opportunity to
have our views heard.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all.
Mr. Wallace, what is the typical purchase for a farmer in a
year of ammonium nitrate in terms of tonnage?
Mr. Wallace. It can vary greatly. Because we have some
farmers that might have only 100 acres, up to large corporate
facilities of 10,000 acres.
Mr. Linder. What would 100 acres require?
Mr. Wallace. How many units of nitrogen per acre? Again,
that varies greatly by crop and personal preference and the
economics of the year.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Black, do you have a shot at that?
Mr. Black. Well, yes, sir. If you look at a small producer,
let us say a northeast Georgia producer up where we are from,
70 acres, and they do 200 pounds to an acre, maybe as a late
wintertime application, preparation for the spring, so that is
70 acres times 200 pounds per acre.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Oxley, educate us on the weight and the
damage. You suggested that we should lower the quantity for
reporting. How much damage does one ton do and how much damage
does 10 pounds do?
Ms. Oxley. Well, 10 pounds in this room, fragment, would
probably blast a hole in that wall sitting here where I am. If
we have a ton, we are going to severely damage the whole
building.
The reason I am suggesting that we put a lower limit is so
that we do not have to worry about the small stuff, is that if
all I want to do is kill a few people, there are lots of
unregulated materials, and I am thinking smokeless powder, that
I can do that.
Mr. Linder. You are not saying that is fine. You are not
saying that is acceptable, I know, to kill just a few people.
Ms. Oxley. Yes. That's right. I am saying, what is the
goal? We certainly want to stop the mass destruction.
I remember after the Oklahoma City bombing that the press
was being kind of quiet about reporting it, and they reported
it as a fertilizer bomb. You maybe remember the Washington Post
reported a fellow trying to kill his girlfriend with potting
soil. That certainly was a fertilizer bomb. But with
individual-type bombs, you have lots of other choices.
Mr. Linder. If I, a passenger, brought five pounds strapped
around his body on an airplane, would it do serious damage?
Ms. Oxley. Certainly five pounds would do serious damage.
The problem is that to initiate five pounds of ammonium nitrate
ANFO is extremely difficult. You have to have a booster that is
a commercial material. So you would probably want to have a
half pound or so of a military explosive to initiate it, and
you have to have a detonator.
That would not be the choice. If you wanted to do that kind
of damage, you would do something like Richard Reed, where you
used a peroxide explosive or he had a military explosive, PETN.
Mr. Linder. Mr. O'Neill, do you agree with Mr. Black that
the best thing to do is to let the States continue to do the
oversight, with standards set by the agencies?
Mr. O'Neill. Yes, we do.
Mr. Linder. And that would keep from having excess numbers
of investigators coming out to each farm site?
Mr. O'Neill. There is also the process established. What we
are looking for is a minimum standard.
Mr. Linder. Mr. McMahon, is it your judgment that this bill
is sufficient to meet the tests that New York has passed on
November 28th?
Mr. McMahon. Yes, I believe so. The thing that is important
is that it gives the Secretary, only on the application of the
Governor, the right to allow people, law enforcement or whoever
in the individual States, to have access to the records.
Initially, most investigations or inquiries are going to be
conducted by State or local law enforcement; and they have many
more resources than the Federal. They deal with the fertilizer
industry. They deal with the farmers in many ways. So I think
that component would be critical.
I do agree that they should be standardized. Because if one
State has laws and another State does not, that does not make
sense either. And that is what we have seen with the chemical
bills, like we have the chemical bill in New York. Surrounding
States, New Jersey finally just passed one. I think you are
going to see that piecemeal approach for a lot of these
vulnerabilities unless there is some Federal legislation like
this.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
The Chair would like to ask unanimous consent to allow Mr.
Weldon to sit on the committee, give an opening statement if he
chooses, and to question the panel.
Now I recognize Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the panel again for your testimony today. It has
been very enlightening and educational.
My first question for Dr. Oxley, in your report, you
discuss efforts to eliminate the explosive properties of
ammonium nitrate. First, do you have Federal support for that
research? And if you could just tell us the status of those
efforts.
Ms. Oxley. The Federal funding for that came immediately
after Oklahoma City, and I believe ATF got $18 million to look
at inerting ammonium nitrate. They established a National
Research Council Committee, which a report has now been issued;
and they funded various efforts. Their line of research
followed very closely the British effort, because the British
had already started a program some 10 years earlier and were
doing testing here in the States, because they do not have that
much real estate. I don't believe that program is funded at
this time. We are certainly not funded over it, and I think I
would hear if other folks are.
Mr. Langevin. Can you elaborate for the committee? Do you
see great promise in being able to remove the explosive effects
of ammonium nitrate? Is this something we should redouble our
effort to do, so that ammonium nitrate would be available to
farmers for commercial use but obviously we have taken steps to
protect ourselves and would no longer have the explosive
effect?
Ms. Oxley. To date, I have not seen a technology with great
promise. However, I have had a new technology just presented to
me, and I haven't had time to evaluate it. So I would hesitate
to say. But we should try.
Mr. Langevin. Since your report was released in 1998, have
you been disappointed with the lack of Federal response to the
risk posed by ammonium nitrate?
Ms. Oxley. Well, I guess when you turn on those NRC
committees you are not really expecting a response. So I wasn't
disappointed.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. McMahon, does New Yorkw give you the
power to compel compliance, and what enforcement powers do you
have?
Mr. McMahon. There is no penalties involved with that.
Permits could be revoked by the Commissioner of Agriculture,
but there is no civil penalties or criminal penalties. We are
relying on the industry's voluntary compliance, which I think
we are going to have a very high rate of.
Some of our other bills dealing with the chemical
assessment, our general aviation bill that deals with general
aviation facilities, had no penalties. There is over 500 of
those. We have got compliance with that by almost 100 percent
without penalties. So we are looking at partnership with the
industry.
Mr. Langevin. And can you elaborate on what the New York
law envisions as reasonable protections against vandalism,
theft and unauthorized access to ammonium nitrate?
Mr. McMahon. Yes. It would be in a security area with a
fence or secured building when it is unattended on it. And then
we would also expect and it requires that there be a frequent
inventory. Because there has been--in many instances, theft has
been involved with ammonium nitrate by terrorists or criminals
on that. So that is the main components of it.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. O'Neill, if I could ask you, can you just
walk us through the standard process for distribution of
ammonium nitrate once it is produced or imported? Does it get
delivered to retailers in large drums or is it in bags and bar
coded for sale?
Mr. O'Neill. I would say, Mr. Langevin, that the vast
majority of this product is distributed in bulk from producers
like Terra. On the domestic side, it would be delivered by rail
car or by truck. Very little of it is distributed by bags.
Farmers do not use bags in America. I think the industry as a
whole, because of the security threat, has reduced the
distribution of bags voluntarily.
The other product stream is, the reason for this serious
consideration of this bill, is as some manufacturers have gone
out of the business and a number of people have stopped
distributing the product, the demand has shifted to imports.
The imports are coming from primarily the former Soviet Union
and producers beyond the jurisdiction of the Congress, coming
in by boatloads in the Mississippi River into our ports.
To put it in context, the Texas City explosion, those ships
that blew up were about 2,500 tons. The ships that are coming
in today are 10 times that size. 25,000 tons, 20,000 tons would
be a reasonable size shipload of the ammonium nitrate coming
in.
Now there is Coast Guard regulations, but those ships are
soft targets to terrorists. So once the terrorists could
commandeer or pirate one of these ships, then you have a whole
different circumstance, because you have got a thousand tons of
fuel oil on these vessels, and it is contained in their holds.
So it is very quickly that we could have a very dangerous
circumstance.
So it is important that the committee, you know, looks at
this carefully and realizes that we have domestic producers
like Terra that is very responsible, but we have a shifting in
the supply chain here that needs to be looked at regularly.
Mr. Langevin. Good point. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take the
entire time.
As a sponsor of the bill with Mr. Thompson, I appreciate
again your leadership and that of Mr. Langevin for supporting
Bennie Thompson and I on this important legislation. To me, it
is a very vital issue, one I want to reiterate here publicly,
is that we have industry coming forward to government saying
help us regulate this product so that in fact we can keep it
out of the hands of the bad guys.
Too often, we criticize the private sector for not wanting
to do the right thing; and this is probably the best example I
can think of where the private sector came to Congress and
said, look, we want to work with you. We do not want to harm
our farmers, our distributors, our economy, but this is a
problem that America has had to deal with, and we in fact want
to be supportive.
So I want to just publicly thank the industry groups who
have come together on this initiative, and we look forward to
working together.
I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Congressman Weldon.
I, too, want to thank you gentlemen and lady for being here
today; and Mr. O'Neill in particular, I want to thank you for
taking such a leadership role on this very important
initiative.
I have asked to have my name added as a cosponsor to the
legislation that is strongly supported by Mr. Weldon and Mr.
Thompson of Mississippi.
Again, I just commend you for your extraordinary
leadership. It is--as Representative Weldon just said, it is
not often that industry comes to us with an issue like this and
is willing to work with us. For that, I thank you.
Unfortunately, I cannot stay for the balance of the
hearing. I just wanted to express my thanks and gratitude to
all of you.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, you might
want to consider doing something at your level or the full
committee level to name this legislation perhaps in honor of
some of the victims that paid the ultimate price for this
disaster in Oklahoma City. That would be a fitting tribute,
maybe, to their memory. But I leave that judgment to you.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Linder. Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you
for this hearing.
I do not have any questions at this point. I think many of
mine have been asked by the prior members of the panel. But I
want to thank you all for being here and thank you for the
words of caution about the other explosives that we need to be
aware of and concerned about as well and the recommendations
that all of you have made in improving the legislation. I
understand that many of those are incorporated in the
substitute.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. They are.
Mr. Simmons.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I look forward to supporting this legislation, but I did
have a couple of questions. I would like to focus a little bit
on the expertise of Dr. Oxley, if you have a moment.
Years ago, during what my mother referred to as my wasted
youth, I worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. I was a
paramilitary operative. As a consequence of that assignment, I
spent a lot of time working with explosives.
I remember on one occasion working with a bag of ammonium
nitrate. We used some sort of commercially available fuel and
generated a very nice explosion that did a lot of damage to a
building. But we also took a bag of flour and sequenced the
detonation of a bag of flour and blew out the windows in one
side of a barn. The way it was done was the bag was exploded
into a fine particulate material, and then the sequenced
detonation came a few seconds later, ignited the flour and blew
out the windows, the doors of this barn.
I notice in reading through your materials here that
composite explosives require as little as stirring and oxidizer
and fuel together, such as sawdust and other materials.
Clearly, ammonium nitrate works better. It combusts faster.
It has got oxidizers within the material itself, which helps,
but there are many other things that are commercially available
that can be used for explosive purposes. So I guess what I am
getting at here is, while I support this bill and I support
regulation, I wonder if there are not some ways, using your
expertise or the expertise of other people who are in the
scientific community, of perhaps manufacturing ammonium
nitrate, urea nitrate and other materials in a way that
inhibits their use as an explosive from a chemical standpoint.
Is that possible or is that just too complicated?
Ms. Oxley. It is extremely difficult in terms of diluting
it, which is the attempt in Ireland. That material is diluted
with Dolomite, yet the Irish Republican Army continued to use
it even after it was diluted. It was a matter of it was
available in their hometowns so they could take it and import
it to London and use it in Bishopsgate, which they had 30,000
pounds. So the dilution has not proved a solution to the
problem.
There are some attempts now that I am aware of to make it a
double salt. I do not if that is going to--it seems to make the
material more stable.
And if you alter the materials so that instead of having to
have--I mentioned that setting off 5 pounds is very difficult.
But if instead of having 100 pounds before you can get a decent
detonation, if you had to have 1,000 pounds, that is one more
hurdle.
That is all we are doing really in our combating terrorism,
is setting another hurdle. They can always figure out a way
around it. I did not mean to be discouraging when I said they
could figure out a way around it. I want to be ahead of them.
Mr. Simmons. I think that's reality. Israel, I believe,
outlaws ammonium nitrate. They use urea nitrate. But that also
can be used for explosive purposes in some configurations.
And so I agree with your basic premise that if we regulate
one material successfully, I also agree that in my State of
Connecticut I don't want a bunch of Federal regulators coming
down. Set out the Federal standards; let the State enforce it.
But I also agree that people who are determined to do these
things will find other ways of getting materials, so we create
a regulation regime for ammonium nitrate and we may have to add
to that at some future date.
Are there any agricultural countries around the world that
have solved the problem?
Ms. Oxley. The problem has not been solved, but I suggest
that we do some more international dialogue. The problem that
Mr. O'Neill brought up of the boatloads coming in is something
I think that the United States needs to take a lead role in,
tracking commodity chemicals. It is going to be a huge problem
when the boatloads of ammonium nitrate change hands maybe six
times while they are out in the ocean.
But if we can track variations in our stock market,
certainly we can track how these oxidizers are bought and sold
worldwide, because basically we can't stop the use of
oxidizers. People need them for purifying their water, for
doing bleaching, in this case for fertilizer. What we can do is
take a role in tracking where they are going for legitimate
use.
So if we control it here and we have got uncontrolled
material coming in or going somewhere else, to go after U.S.
interests, it is still a problem.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you for those questions and I thank
the witnesses for coming here today. I appreciate it. I yield
back.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, ranking
member. I appreciate the hearing. I have a written statement
for the record.
Mr. Linder. Without objection.
Mr. Thompson. In light of what Mr. Simmons talked about, we
have sent DHS a request earlier in the year asking them to work
with some of the major companies who develop a potential, less
dangerous ammonium nitrate possibility. But we have not been
able to get much movement out of that, and from what I
understand, the industry doesn't really have a lot of problem
with it if it is a new technology that won't cost a lot, but we
just have to prove it.
I think it would make good sense for us to kind of go on
record saying, Why not look at it. And I think this would be an
opportunity. I think Honeywell is one of the companies that is
kind of pioneering this effort. But anything to help us be
safer would be encouraged.
Two comments: Mr. McMahon, can you tell me whether or not
the New York model has created any unnecessary burden on those
users of the product?
Mr. McMahon. The law was just passed on November 28th, so
it is too early to tell, but I think in the outreach that was
done by our Department of Agriculture and markets to the
industry, I don't think it is. The purchaser form has, I think,
21 categories on it; seven of those could be filled out by the
distributor in advance. So--I think it would probably take
about 2 minutes to fill out the form, so I am not sure that
would be undue, but I think that is something, as you look at
it, that you should consider in looking at those States that
have forms in.
Now Nevada and South Carolina have had theirs--and
Oklahoma--have had their laws in place a lot longer. Ours is
very close. We did outreach with those. Those laws are all very
similar, so they might be able to say better than us because we
are just rolling ours out now.
Mr. Thompson. Did you do yours in consultation with
industry?
Mr. McMahon. Yes. Department of Agriculture and Markets
with industry, we did with law enforcement agencies actually on
an international level as the Office of Homeland Security; and
the bill calls for the Department of Agriculture and Markets
and the State office of homeland security to consult with each
other, which we did throughout the process on that.
Mr. Thompson. I think the intent of the legislation was to
work with the industry, but also give us some accountability
for the product and not to, if you please, add an additional
layer. We are very sensitive to that. We made sure that this
law did not preempt any existing State law, so that if there
were States who wanted to do more, they could feel absolutely
comfortable in doing that and not trying to contest that.
But we just felt the need to have some accountability built
into the existing system.
Mr. Wallace, do you think the accountability that is
proposed in this legislation is reasonable?
Mr. Wallace. I do. And I think that it does not place an
undue burden on the end consumer.
We voluntarily put into place many security measures,
including our delivery confirmation program which requires the
customer to respond with a positive delivery note. We had some
concern as to how that would be received in the farming
industry and were pleasantly surprised that it was well
received almost unanimously.
Mr. Thompson. Yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Linder. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I was
not able to be here and hear the testimony.
I would be interested to know whether you know if the
present state of regulation has left the industry vital to
liability of any kind. Were there any cases that indicate that
exposure?
Mr. Linder. Anybody want to take a shot at that?
Mr. Wallace. Well, from our standpoint, again, we have put
in place measures to track our product after it leaves our gate
both on a truck and rail, which would be common transport for
us. From a delivery confirmation, we have security measures in
place to assure that the proper person is picking up the proper
product; and then also, within the rail system, the proper
tracking of product from source to destination.
Mr. Black. I will comment just on a perceived liability.
I manage also within our group a self-funded workers
compensation insurance program for agribusiness. Some of the
products, we are continuing to see pressure from excess
insurance market just on the potential liability or potential
exposure to some of these type things, so insurance markets and
the excess--the potential liability that would come of that, we
have seen a little pressure from that.
Ms. Norton. Typically--and industry is a more even playing
field for industry if there is some regulation. Some will be
more--perhaps because of liability, perhaps because they are
more safety conscious, because they want, indeed, to do the
right thing--will be more inclined than others, and of course,
there are costs associated with that.
And to leave it to industry to decide whether to spend the
money is one thing. When the government says, look, everybody
ought to be accountable to a certain degree, some of that
competitive pressure, at least it seems to me, is removed in
what is responding to what is required of the industry by the
Federal Government.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Ms. Norton.
Thank you all for being here. We are grateful for your
contributions. The hearing is adjourned.
Members of the subcommittee, we are going to, in 5 minutes,
reconvene and mark up this legislation rather than this
afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene in approximately 5 minutes.]