[Senate Hearing 109-449]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-449
IRAQ IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 19, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
27-403 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary Rice to questions from:
Senator Lugar................................................ 69
Senator Biden................................................ 70
Senator Hagel................................................ 84
(iii)
IRAQ IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Voinovich,
Sununu, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee is very pleased to
welcome our Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. Today we will
continue our ongoing oversight of United States policies toward
Iraq. We're engaged in a difficult mission in Iraq. The
President and the Congress must be clear with the American
people about the stakes involved and the difficulties yet to
come.
Almost 2,000 heroic Americans have died in Iraq during the
past 2\1/2\ years. During the insurgency, thousands of Iraqi
Muslims have been killed by other Muslims. Each day, the Iraqi
people are living with the fear caused by these tragic and
senseless acts of violence, but they continue to show their
resilience.
This is the 30th full committee hearing on Iraq held by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee since January 2003. In
addition, we have held numerous other hearings that have
partially touched on the subject of Iraq. We have maintained
this focus because success in Iraq is critical to United States
national security. Permanent instability or civil war in Iraq
could set back American interests in the Middle East for a
generation, increasing anti-Americanism, multiplying the
threats from tyrants and terrorists, and reducing our
credibility in the world.
In late July, our committee held a series of three hearings
on Iraq. Our intent in those hearings was to go beyond
describing conditions in Iraq or highlighting strategies that
have not worked. Our goal was to systematically examine options
for improving security, advancing political development, and
demonstrating economic progress in Iraq. With the help of nine
distinguished experts, we considered whether changes in
military tactics, alliance strategy, resource allocations,
Iraqi military training, or other factors should be adopted.
And we asked whether there are ways to overcome ethnic and
sectarian divisions that would produce a workable, if
imperfect, consensus on the structure of Iraq's Government. The
experts, while expressing qualified optimism on some issues,
testified that there were few easy answers in Iraq.
The insurgents and terrorists continue violent attacks
intended to incite internal ethnic and religious conflict and
to provoke a civil war among Iraqis. Progress in training and
equipping Iraqi forces is painstaking work that does not lend
itself to shortcuts. Some of Iraq's neighbors, particularly
Syria and Iran, are interfering in Iraq for their own purposes.
Any final political settlement will have to address thorny
issues, such as who controls oil revenues, who runs the court
system, who leads the security forces, and who has the power to
tax.
Today's hearing provides the committee with the chance to
engage Secretary Rice on many of these subjects, as well as to
discuss the constitutional referendum that has just occurred in
Iraq. This past weekend, millions of Iraqis voted to pass a
constitution. The apparent success of the vote was a welcome
development, although it does not solve the fundamental
political problem of ethnic and sectarian fragmentation. A
majority of Sunnis opposed the Constitution, and voters in two
Sunni-dominated provinces overwhelmingly rejected the document.
Thus, even as passage of the Constitution allows elections for
a new government to go forward in December, the larger hope of
reaching a political settlement between all of the major ethnic
groups has not yet been realized. Further, we cannot assume
that the establishment of democratic institutions in Iraq, in
the short term, will yield a corresponding diminishment of the
insurgency.
The Constitution and Iraqi attitudes toward it reflect the
divisions within society. The Kurds and the Shiites who have
dominated the drafting of the Constitution have opted for a
weak central-government structure that maximizes their autonomy
in the regions where they predominate. Meanwhile, most Sunnis
reject such an arrangement as leaving them with few resources
and little power. These perceived inequities fuel the
insurgency by Sunni rejectionists and threaten civil conflict
that could mean the permanent division of Iraq.
It has become common in discussions of Iraq to say that
without security, little can be achieved politically or
economically. But it's also important to understand that there
is no purely military solution in Iraq. Success depends on
establishing a political process that gives all the major
ethnic groups a stake in the government.
It's notable that insurgent attacks in some Sunni areas
were intentionally suspended during the voting to allow Sunni
voters to go to the polls in the hopes of defeating the
Constitution at the ballot box. This demonstrated that a
substantial element of the insurgency is focused on the
political outcome in Iraq, not merely on nihilistic terrorist
philosophies.
For the next 2 months, until the December elections, the
task before the coalition is convincing the Sunni minority to
participate in the process, despite their distrust of the
Constitution. To this end, we must also prevail on the Shiites
and the Kurds to be flexible, even though they already have
much of what they want in the current Constitution.
We appreciate the creativity and the energy that our
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has applied to these objectives in
the runup to the vote last weekend. We're eager to hear from
Secretary Rice if more can be done to support his efforts.
The December elections stand as a rallying point for Iraqis
who want to make the political process work. The election of a
Parliament offers the prospect of tangible political power for
the Sunnis while demonstrating to all Iraqis that the benefits
of political self-determination have arrived.
During this period, we must explore whether we can convince
disaffected Sunnis, including the elements of the insurgency
that are focused on a rational political outcome, to negotiate
or otherwise replace violence with political means.
As we pursue these issues, we should recognize that most
Americans are focused on an exit strategy in Iraq. Even if
withdrawal time lines are deemed unwise because they might
provide a strategic advantage to the insurgency, the American
people need to more fully understand the basis upon which our
troops are likely to come home. That is part of the reason why
this committee has spent a great deal of time examining the
training of Iraqi forces and the progress of the Iraqi
political process, two elements that can lead to short-term
improvements in Iraq and a withdrawal of some American troops.
The American people also need realistic and clear
assessments of our progress in Iraq, even when the indicators
are sobering. Beyond Iraq, they need more information about how
the outcome in Iraq relates to United States national security
and the broader War on Terrorism. They also need to see an all-
out diplomatic effort aimed at addressing regional issues,
including maintaining the momentum of the Arab-Israeli peace
process. These are all vitally important issues to America's
foreign policy.
We are deeply grateful to Secretary Rice for joining us
today to address them, and we look forward to an enlightening
discussion with her.
I would like to yield now to the distinguished ranking
member of the committee, Senator Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this
hearing, and thank you for your diligence over the last several
years of bringing in as many informed voices as possible from
left, right, and center to deal with this issue.
I'd like the record to show, I did not see the chairman's
statement before he made it. You're going to find some
remarkable similarities in what I'm about to say and what the
chairman just said. As a matter of fact, it dawned on me, there
is a remarkable consensus--left, right, and center--leaders on
my side of the aisle, like Senator Feingold and others, to
leaders on the Republican side of the aisle, like Senator Hagel
and others--we all agree--whether we disagree with the
administration or not on how we got to Iraq, the circumstances
under which we got to Iraq, and how we proceeded when we first
got there; there is no doubt that there's a great deal at
stake. I don't know anybody who's suggesting that we should--to
use the phrase--it's a very trite phrase, but one that's very
popular--``cut and run,'' I've heard no one suggest that. But I
also heard the chairman today--and you'll hear me say--that the
American people need some benchmarks here as to: What's the
plan? What's the plan? How are we going to proceed?
And, Madam Secretary, your being here is very, very
important, and I truly welcome you here. You have always been
available to me personally, and I assume other members of the
committee when we have asked your attendance. But I would
respectfully suggest that at the moment when the American
public's patience is being tried, they're questioning the
collective judgment of their government and how we're
proceeding--and I don't just mean the President; I mean across
the board--someone of your stature--and there's few of your
stature and your credibility--needs to be seen frequently, in
my view, by the American people before the U.S. Congress, and
other leaders, as well, in the administration, making clear
what the facts are on the ground.
I would note, notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the
chairman, the last time, other than your confirmation hearing,
that we've had a senior administration official here
specifically talking about Iraq, in detail, was May 18, 2004.
May 18, 2004. And that was when Secretary Wolfowitz and
Secretary Armitage were here. And it's not for lack of trying,
I understand. I mean this sincerely. I have an inordinately
high regard, as all my colleagues do, for our chairman, and he
has done everything to bring in informed judgments, as well.
But I can't overemphasize, Madam Secretary, what I have had the
opportunity to say to the President and to you, as well as to
Mr. Hadley and others, that in my judgment the gap between the
rhetoric on Iraq and the reality the American people see on the
ground has created a genuine credibility chasm. Not personal,
in a sense. Credibility as to what we say about Iraq. Does it
comport at all with what they see?
One way to begin to regain the trust of the American
people, I think, is regular public accountability, and that's
why I'd like to see, literally, monthly hearings with senior
officials to report on both the progress and the problems. With
more than 140,000 American troops on the line, I think that's
the least we can do, and it's--it's not inconsistent--I'm
asking for a month at a time; I'm not married to that, but
regular--not inconsistent, Mr. Chairman, what you said in your
opening statement, of the need for the American people to know
the progress and the lack of progress and--warts and all.
The American people--I know you know this; I hope I'm not
sounding like I'm lecturing, Madam Secretary; you know this
better than I do--the American people are tough. They are
really tough. And if they think there's a coherent plan, if
they think there's a coherent rationale for what we're doing
and a coherent rationale for how we bring our troops home,
under what circumstances, they'll do anything. They will do
anything. And there's no partisan interest in Iraq. There's
only one interest, a national interest.
Your role is critical in advancing that national interest,
because now stabilizing Iraq, as the chairman has pointed out,
is a political and diplomatic challenge, equally as much as it
is a military challenge. I've not heard a single person,
including you, Madam Secretary, suggest there's a military
solution alone to the situation in Iraq.
So, we have someone of your stature, credibility, and
visibility who started off her career as Secretary of State by
saying, ``This is a time for diplomacy.'' And you've been
engaging in that, and to your credit. But I think it is really
front and center at this very, very moment.
Saturday, in my view, was a good day in Iraq. It was moving
to see Iraqis of all sex and all ethnicities, voting in large
numbers. But I hope that we've learned a lesson from previous
good days in Iraq. Each time, there seems to be a tendency,
when we've had previous good days in Iraq, to declare victory
prematurely. Whether it was with the fall of Baghdad or the
capture of Saddam, the transfer of sovereignty, or the
elections last January, each time one good day was followed by
a lot of totally predictable--totally predictable--bad days,
difficult days. So, while we should be encouraged by the
referendum, we must be clear-eyed about the hard, hard, hard
road ahead.
While the Constitution appears to have passed, it is not
yet the national compact that our able Ambassador to Iraq has
tried to forge. And I think the best move you all have made in
the last several years is sending Zal to Iraq. In fact, there's
a risk, as a consequence of the election, that Sunni bitterness
at having failed to defeat the draft will add even more fuel to
the insurgency and possibly lead to a full-blown civil war.
Now, I know some have said that this overwhelming show of
support for voting indicates that the insurgency is essentially
on its last legs. I hope I'm wrong. I predict it would be
rejuvenated--rejuvenated, as a--not diminished--as a
consequence of the overwhelming rejection, not of the
Constitution, in whole, but by the Sunnis, the majority of the
Sunnis. And apparently, although the numbers aren't in yet,
that I'm aware of, a fairly sizeable majority of Sunnis.
That's why, in my judgment, we must place a premium on two
overriding priorities. And, again, I apologize, I'm going to be
somewhat redundant with what the chairman had to say, and say
it slightly differently. We must intensify the efforts to bring
the Sunnis into the political process as our Ambassador has
been doing very, very well, but on his own.
Last week's agreement to establish a committee to further
amend the Constitution next year offers a ray of hope that we
might be able to--we, with others involved, might be able to,
in fact, form a consensus constitution. Last week's agreement
to establish it was, as I said, in large part, due to the
incredible negotiating skills of our Ambassador. But to
succeed, it seems to me we need a second equally important
change. We must fully engage the major powers and Iraq's
neighbors in a stabilization strategy, something we simply have
not done til now--and it is my hope that it's in training. I'm
not presuming to suggest what's happening, but it is my hope
that it's in training.
The major powers, with us in the lead, could form a contact
group, or whatever you want to call it, that would become
Iraq's main partner, taking some of the burden off of us. It
would show the Iraqis a united international front, which would
make it easy for them to make the hard compromise necessary for
the political process to trump the violence. Every Iraqi leader
we--I think all of us who have been to Iraq a number of times--
every Iraqi leader I have met with, Sunni or Kurd or Shi'a,
acknowledges they've got to make difficult compromises. But if
I can put it in trite political terms--and we're all
politicians--it's awfully hard to go back to a constituency
that has been brutalized, that--as the Shi'a have, or the
Kurds--who has gotten everything they want in a constitution,
and be their leader and say, ``No, we ought to give some of
that up. We ought to give some of that up for the Sunnis. We've
got to get the Sunnis in the deal.'' Give me a break. Politics
is local. Politics is politics is politics. To put it in crass
terms, those leaders who know they have to make concessions
have to go and say, ``The devil's making me do it. We have no
choice. The international community, the world, is looking at
us. We need to make further concessions.'' It's that simple and
that complicated, I think, Madam Secretary. And I think we
cannot do that alone, no matter how significant your diplomatic
skills or our Ambassador's skills.
We need to show the Iraqis a united international front,
which makes it easier for them to make the decisions they know
they have to make. And it's just that kind of strong
international pressure, I would argue, that forced the Shiites
and the Kurds to reverse their last-minute gambit to rig the
referendum in their favor. For all of those who say the United
Nations has no influence at all, I would note that the Iraqi
Parliament voted overwhelmingly to say that you had to have
two-thirds of those eligible to vote in a province to vote to
overturn the constitutional referendum. And you had the
embattled and, some would argue, not particularly impressive--I
don't share that view--Secretary General of the United Nations,
through a press person coming out and saying, ``No, that's not
good enough.'' And what happened? With your good offices and
others, immediately they turned that vote around. Tell me
international pressure doesn't matter. It matters. It matters.
And so, we also need, I think, a regional strategy, Madam
Secretary, to either force or induce Iraq's neighbors to act
more responsibly. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran,
Turkey, and Syria have tremendous influence with the
communities within Iraq. They can make a difference between an
Iraq on the road to stability or one toward chaos. Some argue
that such a strategy is naive. Well, the Clinton administration
was not naive in Bosnia when it successfully engaged the
Serbian leader, Milosevic, and another thug named Tudjman in
the Dayton process. They're both thugs. Thugs. We engaged them.
We got the Dayton process. It was the beginning of the end of
the chaos.
And this administration, through the significant efforts of
diplomacy was not naive when it engaged the Afghans' neighbors,
including Iran--including Iran--in bringing Afghan factions
into the Bonn Conference, producing what you rightfully have
shown and visited and acknowledged and showcased Mr. Karzai,
which was the last best hope there.
So, why would others join us? When I raise this, some of my
colleagues look at me and say, ``Why''--I've been beating on
this, I realize, for awhile--they say, ``Why would others join
us?'' Because they have as much at stake as we do in Iraq not
becoming a permanent source of instability in the heart of the
Middle East.
There are other important steps that I think we have to
take, Madam Secretary. We're doing a better job training Iraqi
security forces. It was a long time in coming. I know we've had
our ongoing differences in that, but we're underway. But we
still don't know how many Iraqi troops must be able to operate
independently or with minimal U.S. support to allow us to draw
down. You have a lot of stars sitting behind you, figuratively
and literally. We've got to know. We have a right to know.
What's the game plan? Like that old song, ``What's the plan,
Stan?'' Tell us, how many, trained at what level, to what
degree, are needed in order for us to reasonably look toward
drawing down? We're not setting timetables. We're not saying
``cut and run.'' We're saying give us a plan. ``Staying the
course'' is clearly something the American people will not
follow. Will not follow. So, tell us, what are the standards?
And, finally, we have to build the capacity of the Iraqi
Government to provide essential services. As you well know--and
I'm not blaming anybody--the Defense Ministry in Iraq is a
basketcase. We've had to essentially go in there and put our
uniforms in place running the show. They're a basketcase. The
Interior Department is a basketcase. There is no capacity to
govern at this point. There is none. And so, again, that's not
meant as a criticism; it's an observation. The American people
intuitively know it. We all know it, specifically. So, what's
the plan? What, specifically, is the plan?
The approval of the Constitution was an important hurdle,
but national elections and elite political deals won't lead to
stability, in my view, as long as average Iraqis can't turn on
the lights, can't drink the water, can't step out of their
homes without stepping into raw sewage, and can't let their
daughters leave the house for fear of being kidnapped. And now
we've learned that, because of incompetent management and high
security costs, that our $20 billion reconstruction effort is
about run out of money. Why have we failed so miserably to
deliver tangible improvements to the daily lives of the Iraqi
people? And what is the plan to turn the reconstruction effort
around? There has to be a plan. There may be one. I'm unaware
of it. And I have tried, assiduously as I can, to learn what it
is.
We must move with a sense of urgency, Madam Secretary, in
all these fronts. The less progress we make, the more Iraq
risks becoming what it was not before we went in, a pre-9/11
Afghanistan, a haven for radical jihadists in the center of the
Middle East. It would be a terrible irony--terrible irony--if
that were to happen. It would become, as someone said, a Bush-
fulfilling prophecy. Worse, it would be a terrible blow to
America's fundamental security interests.
So, I think what the American people really want to hear--
and I know I want to hear from the administration--is a plan to
bring our troops home, as soon and as safely as possible, while
preserving our fundamental security interests--and they are
real, and they are deep, those interests. We must not compound
the mistake that was made in invading Iraq without a plan, by
leaving Iraq without a plan to prevent from becoming a haven
for terror and the grist from which not only a civil war will
occur, but a regional war.
So, Madam Secretary, I hope you can provide some clarity
for such a plan today. I realize it's a big job. But, as I
said--I'd conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying I think the
American people--I know we all do; I don't mean just ``I''--the
American people are tough, they're resilient, they're smart.
They just want to know, What is the plan? What's the plan?
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph R. Biden., Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware
Madame Secretary, welcome. I'm glad you're here. It's important
that you're here. And let me tell you why.
In my judgment, the gap between the administration's rhetoric on
Iraq and the reality the American people see on the ground has created
a credibility chasm.
One way to help regain the trust of the American people is regular,
public accountability. That's why I'd like to see monthly hearings with
senior officials to report on both the progress and the problems. With
140,000 American troops on the line, that's the least we can all do.
There is no partisan interest in Iraq. There is only a national
interest. Your role is critical to advancing that national interest
because stabilizing Iraq is a political and diplomatic challenge as
much as it is a military challenge.
Saturday was a good day in Iraq. It was moving to see Iraqis of all
sects and ethnicities voting in large numbers.
But I hope that we have learned a lesson from previous good days in
Iraq.
Each time, there seemed to be a tendency to declare victory
prematurely--whether it was with the fall of Baghdad, the capture of
Saddam, the transfer of sovereignty, or the elections last January.
Each time, one good day was followed by a lot of difficult days.
So, while we should be encouraged by the referendum, we must be clear-
eyed about the very hard road ahead.
While the Constitution appears to have passed, it is not yet the
national compact that our able Ambassador to Iraq has tried to forge.
In fact, there is a risk that Sunni bitterness at having failed to
defeat the draft will add even more fuel to the insurgency, and
possibly lead to a full-blown civil war.
That is why, in my judgment, we must place a premium on two
overriding priorities.
First, we must intensify the effort to bring Sunnis into the
political process. Last week's agreement to establish a committee to
further amend the Constitution next year offers a ray of hope that this
can be achieved.
But to succeed, we need a second equally important change.
We must fully engage the major powers and Iraq's neighbors in a
stabilization strategy--something we simply have not done till now.
The major powers, with us in the lead, could form a contact group
that would become Iraq's main partner, taking some of the burden off of
us. It would show the Iraqis a united international front, which would
make it easier for them to make the hard compromises necessary for the
political process to trump violence.
It was just that kind of strong international pressure that forced
the Shiites and Kurds to reverse their last minute gambit to rig the
referendum in their favor.
We also need a regional strategy to either force or induce Iraq's
neighbors to act responsibly. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Iran, Turkey, and Syria have tremendous influence with the key
communities in Iraq. They can make the difference between an Iraq on
the road to stability--or toward chaos.
Some argue that such a strategy is naive. Well, the Clinton
administration was not naive in Bosnia when it successfully engaged the
Serbian leader Milosevic and the Croatian leader Tudjman in the Dayton
Peace Process. And this administration was not naive when it engaged
Afghanistan's neighbors--including Iran--in bringing Afghanistan's
factions into the Bonn Conference.
Why would others join us? Because they have as much of a stake as
we do in Iraq not becoming a permanent source of instability in the
heart of the Middle East.
There are other important steps we must take. We are doing a better
job of training Iraqi security forces.
But we still don't know how many Iraqi troops must be able to
operate independently or with minimal U.S. support to allow us to draw
down--and what the time line is for training those troops to those
standards.
Finally, we must build the capacity of the Iraqi Government to
provide essential services. The approval of the Constitution was an
important hurdle, but national elections and elite political deals
won't lead to stability as long as average Iraqis can't turn the lights
on, can't drink the water, can't step out of their homes without
stepping into raw sewage, and can't let their daughters leave the house
for fear of kidnapping.
And now we have learned that because of incompetent management and
high security costs, the $20 billion reconstruction effort is running
out of money.
Why have we failed so miserably to deliver tangible improvements in
the daily lives of the Iraqi people and what is the plan to turn the
reconstruction effort around?
We must move with a sense of urgency on all of these fronts. The
less progress we make, the more Iraq risks becoming what it was not
before we went in--a pre-9/11 Afghanistan--a haven for radical
jihadists in the center of the Middle East. That would be a terrible
irony. Worse, that would be a terrible blow to America's fundamental
security interests.
So I think what the American people really want to hear from the
administration is a plan to bring our troops home as soon and safely as
possible while preserving our fundamental security interests.
We must not compound the mistake that was made in invading Iraq
without a plan by leaving Iraq without a plan to prevent it from
becoming a haven for terror. I hope, Madame Secretary, that you can
provide clarity on such a plan today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Secretary Rice, we appreciate your patience in listening to
us. We very much look forward to listening to you, and we thank
you for your thoughtful prepared statement. Please deliver it
in full, if you wish to do so, or abbreviate it. If you choose
to abbreviate it, it will be accepted for the record, of
course, in full.
Secretary Rice.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for inviting me.
I would like to deliver this in full. It's my first
opportunity to talk to you specifically about Iraq.
I've spoken many times about why we are there, but I would
like to talk about how we assure victory. In short, with the
Iraqi Government, our political military strategy has to be to
clear, hold, and build. To clear areas from insurgent control,
to hold them securely, and to build durable national Iraqi
institutions.
In 2003, enforcing U.N. resolutions, we overthrew a brutal
dictator and liberated the nation. Our strategy then emphasized
the military defeat of the regime's forces and the creation of
a temporary government with the Coalition Provisional Authority
and an Iraqi Governing Council. In 2004, President Bush
outlined a five-step plan to end the occupation, transferring
sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, rebuilding Iraq's
infrastructure, getting more international support, preparing
for Iraq's first national election this past January, and
helping to establish security. Our soldiers and marines fought
battles, major battles, against the insurgency in places like
Najaf, Sadr City, and Fallujah.
In 2005, we emphasized transition--a security transition to
great reliance on Iraqi forces, and a political transition to a
permanent constitutional democracy. The just-concluded
referendum was a landmark in that process. Now we are preparing
for 2006.
First, we must help Iraqis as they hold another vital
election in December. Well over 9 million Iraqis voted on
Sunday. Whether Iraqis voted ``yes'' or ``no,'' they were
voting for an Iraqi nation and for Iraqi democracy. And all
their voices, pro and con, will be heard again in December. As
the referendum passes, those who voted ``no'' this time will
realize that their chosen representatives can then participate
in the review of the Constitution that was agreed upon last
week. This process will ultimately lead to Iraqis selecting a
lasting government for a 4-year term.
We must then have a decisive strategy to help that
government set a path toward democracy, stability, and
prosperity. Our Nation, our service men and women, are fighting
in Iraq at a pivotal time in world history. We must succeed. I
look forward to working together with you on winning.
We know our objectives. We and the Iraqi Government will
succeed if, together, we can break the back of the insurgency
so that Iraqis can finish it off without large-scale military
help from the United States, keep Iraq from becoming a safe
haven from which Islamic extremists can terrorize the region or
the world, demonstrate positive potential for democratic change
and free expression in the Arab and Muslim worlds, even under
the most difficult conditions, and turn the corner financially
and economically so there is a sense of hope and a visible path
toward self-reliance.
To achieve this we must know who we are fighting. Some of
these people are creatures of a deposed tyrant; others, a small
number of homegrown and imported Islamic extremists. They feed
on a portion of the population that is overwhelmed by feelings
of fear, resentment, and despair.
As I have said, our strategy is to clear, hold, and build.
The enemy's strategy is to infect, terrorize, and pull down.
They want to spread more fear, resentment, and despair,
inciting sectarian violence, as they did 2 weeks ago in Hillah,
when they blew up devout worshipers in a mosque and committed
this atrocity during the holy month of Ramadan. They attack
infrastructure, like electricity and water, so that average
Iraqis lose hope. They target foreigners. The enemy forces have
never won even a platoon-sized battle against our soldiers and
marines, but their ultimate target is the coalition center of
gravity, the will of America, of Britain, and of other
coalition members.
Let us say it plainly. The terrorists want us to get
discouraged and quit. They believe we do not have the will to
see this through. They talk openly about this in their writings
on their Web sites. And they attack the Iraqi Government,
targeting the most dedicated public servants of the new Iraq.
Mayors, physicians, teachers, policemen, and soldiers--none are
exempt.
Millions of Iraqis are putting their lives on the line
every single day to build a new nation, and the insurgents want
most to strike at them. Sadly, this strategy has some short-
term advantages, because it is easier to pull down than to
build up. It is easier to sell fear than to grow hope. But the
enemy's strategy has a fatal flaw. The enemy has no positive
vision for the future of Iraq. They offer no alternative that
could unite Iraq as a nation. And that is why most Iraqis
despise the insurgents.
The enemy leaders know that their movement is unpopular.
Zawahiri's July letter to Zarqawi reveals that he is,
``extremely concerned'' that, deprived of popular support, the
insurgents will ``be crushed in the shadows.'' ``We don't want
to repeat the mistakes of the Taliban,'' he warned, ``whose
regime collapsed in days because the people were passive or
hostile.'' Knowing how unpopular they are, the enemy leaders
also hate the idea of democracy. They will never let themselves
or their ideas face the test of democratic choice.
Let me turn now to our political military strategy. We are
moving from a stage of transition toward the strategy to
prepare a permanent Iraqi Government for a decisive victory.
The strategy that is being carried out has profited from the
insights of strategic thinkers, civilian and military, inside
and outside the government, who have reflected on our
experience and on insurgencies in other periods of history.
We know what we must do. With our Iraqi allies, we are
working to clear the toughest places--no sanctuaries for the
enemy--and to disrupt foreign support for the insurgents. We're
working to hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas
integrating political and economic outreach with our military
operations. We're working to build truly national institutions
by working with more capable provincial and local authorities.
We are challenging them to embody a national compact, not tools
of a particular sect or ethnic group. These Iraqi institutions
must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly
deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for
a better economic future.
None of these elements, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, can
be achieved by military action alone. None are purely civilian
either. This requires an integrated civil/military partnership.
Let me briefly review that partnership.
Clearing the toughest places, no sanctuaries: As we enlarge
security in major urban areas, and as insurgents retreat, they
should find no large area where they can reorganize and operate
freely. Recently, our forces have gone on the offensive. In Tal
Afar, near the Syrian border, and in the west, along the
Euphrates Valley, in places like al Qaim, Haditha, and Hit,
American and Iraqi forces are clearing away insurgents. As one
terrorist wrote to another, ``If the government extends its
control over the country, we will have to pack our bags and
break camp.''
Syria and Iran allow fighters and military assistance to
reach insurgents in Iraq. In the case of Syria, we are
concerned about cross-border infiltration, about unconstrained
travel networks, and about the suspicious young men who are
being waved through Damascus International Airport. As a part
of our strategy, we have taken military steps, as with our
offensive in Tal Afar, to cut off the flow of people or
supplies near that border. We are also taking new diplomatic
steps to convey the seriousness of our concerns. Syria--and,
indeed, Iran--must decide whether they wish to side with the
cause of war or with the cause of peace.
Second, to hold and enlarge secure areas: In the past, our
problem was that once an area was clear militarily, the Iraqi
security forces were unable to hold it. Now Iraqi units are
more capable. In August 2004, five Iraqi regular army
battalions were in combat. Today, 91 Iraqi regular army
battalions are in combat. A year ago, no American advisors were
embedded with these battalions. Now all of these battalions
have American advisors.
With more capable Iraqi forces, we can implement this
element of the strategy, holding secure areas, neighborhood by
neighborhood. And this process has already begun.
Compare the situation a year ago in places like Haifa
Street in Baghdad or Baghdad's Sadr City or downtown Mosul or
Najaf or Fallujah, with the situation today. Security along the
once notorious Airport Road in Baghdad has measurably improved.
Najaf, where American forces fought a major battle last year,
is now entirely under independent Iraqi military control.
As this strategy is being implemented, the military side
recedes, and the civilian part, like police stations and civic
leaders and economic development, move into the foreground. Our
transition strategy emphasized the building of the Iraqi Army.
Now our police-training efforts are receiving new levels of
attention.
Third, we must build truly national institutions. The
institutions of Saddam Hussein's government were violent and
corrupt, tearing apart the ties that ordinarily bind
communities together. The last 2 years have seen three
temporary governments govern Iraq, making it extremely
difficult to build national institutions, even under the best
of circumstances. The new government that will come can finally
set down real roots. To be effective, that government must
bridge sects and ethnic groups, and its institutions must not
become the tools of a particular sect or group.
Let me assure you, the United States will not try to pick
winners. We will support parties and politicians, in every
community, who are dedicated to peaceful participation in the
future of a democratic Iraq. The national institutions must
also sustain the security forces and bring rule of law to Iraq.
The national institutions must also visibly deliver essential
services. Thanks to you and other Members of Congress, the
United States has already invested billions of dollars to keep
electricity and fuel flowing across Iraq. In the transition
phase, we concentrated on capital investment, adding capacity
to a system that had deteriorated to the point of collapse. But
with freedom, the demand for electricity has gone up by 50
percent, and the capability we have added is not being fully
utilized because of constant insurgent attacks. We are, with
the Iraqis, developing new ways to add security to this
battered, but vital, system. And the Iraqis must reform their
energy policies and pricing in order to make the system
sustainable.
The national institutions must also offer the Iraqi people
hope for a better economic future. Millions of farmers, small
businessmen, and investors need a government that encourages
growth rather than fostering dependence on handouts from the
ruler. The next government will need to make some difficult,
but necessary, decisions about economic reform.
In sum, we and the Iraqis must seize the vital opportunity
provided by the establishment of a permanent government.
Now, what is required?
First, the Iraqis must continue to come together in order
to build their nation. The state of Iraq was constructed across
the fault lines of ancient civilizations, among Arabs and
Kurds, Sunni and Shi'a, Muslims and Christians. No one can
solve this problem for them. For years, these differences were
dealt with through violence and repression. Now Iraqis are
using compromise and politics.
Second, the Iraqi Government must forge more effective
partnerships with foreign governments, particularly in building
their Ministries and governmental capacity. On our side of this
partnership, the United States should sustain a maximum effort
to help the Iraqi Government succeed, tying it more clearly to
our immediate political military objectives. On Iraq's side,
the Government must show us, and other assisting countries,
that critical funds are being well spent, whatever their
source. They must show commitment to the professionalization of
their government and bureaucracy, and they must demonstrate the
willingness to make tough decisions.
Third, Iraq must forge stronger partnerships with the
international community beyond the United States. The Iraqis
have made it clear that they want the multinational military
coalition to remain. Among many contributors, the soldiers and
civilians of the United Kingdom deserve special gratitude for
their resolve, their skill, and their sacrifices. Now the
military support from the coalition must be matched by
diplomatic, economic, and political support from the entire
international community. Earlier this year, in Brussels and
Amman, scores of nations gathered to offer more support. NATO
has opened a training mission near Baghdad, and now, as Iraq
chooses a permanent constitutional government, it is time for
Iraq's neighbors to do more to help.
The major oil-producing states of the gulf have gained tens
of billions of dollars of additional revenue from rising oil
prices. They are considering how to invest these gains for the
future. These governments must be partners in shaping the
region's future.
We understand that across the region there are needs and
multilateral programs in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as Iraq. Rather than
consider them in a disjointed way, they, together, form part of
a broad regional effort in transforming the Arab and Muslim
world. We hope that the governments of the region, as well as
others in Europe and Asia, will examine these needs and then
invest decisively on an unprecedented scale, to become
continuing stakeholders in the future of Iraq and of the
region.
Finally, the U.S. Government must deepen and strengthen the
integration of our civilian and military activities. In Iraq,
we have established an effective partnership between the
Embassy and Ambassador Khalilzad, on the one hand, and the
multinational forces command and General Casey, on the other.
To be sure, civilian agencies have already made an enormous
effort. Hundreds of civilian employees and contractors have
lost their lives in Iraq. But more can be done to mobilize the
civilian agencies of our Government, especially to get more
people in the field, outside of Baghdad's International Zone to
follow up when the fighting stops. We will embed our diplomats,
police trainers, and aid workers more fully on military bases,
traveling with our soldiers and marines.
To execute our strategy, we will restructure a portion of
the U.S. mission in Iraq. Learning from successful precedents
used in Afghanistan, we will deploy Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in key parts of the country. These will be civil/military
teams working in concert with each of the major subordinate
commands, training police, setting up courts, and helping local
governments with essential services like sewage treatment or
irrigation. The first of these new PRTs will take the field
next month.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to succeed we need,
most, your help and your support and that of the America
people. We seek support across the aisle, from both Democrats
and Republicans. And I know that we all, as Americans, know the
importance of success in this mission. It is hard. It is hard
to imagine decisive victory when violent men continue their
attacks on Iraqi civilians and security forces and on American
and coalition soldiers and marines. And we honor the sacrifice,
because every individual has life stories and friends and
families and incalculable sorrow that has been left behind.
But, of course, there is a great deal at stake. A free Iraq
will be at the heart of a different kind of Middle East. We
must defeat the ideology of hatred, the ideology that forms the
roots of the extremist threat that we face. Iraq's struggle,
the region's struggle, is to show that there is a better way, a
freer way, to lasting peace.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss our strategy in Iraq.
I have spoken many times about why we are there. Today I want to
discuss how to assure victory.
In short, with the Iraqi Government, our strategy--the key--is to
clear, hold, and build: Clear areas from insurgent control, hold them
securely, and build durable, national Iraqi institutions.
In 2003, enforcing U.N. resolutions, we overthrew a brutal dictator
and liberated a nation. Our strategy emphasized the military defeat of
the regime's forces and creation of a temporary government with the
Coalition Provisional Authority and an Iraqi Governing Council.
In 2004, President Bush outlined a five-step plan to end the
occupation: Transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government,
rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, getting more international support,
preparing for Iraq's first national election this past January, and
helping establish security. Our soldiers and marines fought major
battles against the insurgency in places like Najaf, Sadr City, and
Fallujah.
In 2005, we emphasized transition: A security transition to greater
reliance on Iraqi forces and a political transition to a permanent,
constitutional democracy. The just-concluded referendum was a landmark
in that process.
Now we are preparing for 2006. First, we must help Iraqis as they
hold another vital election in December. Well over 9 million Iraqis
voted on Saturday. Whether Iraqis voted yes or no, they were voting for
an Iraqi nation, and for Iraqi democracy.
And all their voices, pro and con, will be heard again in December.
If the referendum passes, those who voted no this time will realize
that their chosen representatives can then participate in the review of
the Constitution that was agreed upon last week.
This process will ultimately lead to Iraqis selecting a lasting
government, for a 4-year term. We must then have a decisive strategy to
help that government set a path toward democracy, stability, and
prosperity.
Our Nation--our service men and women--are fighting in Iraq at a
pivotal time in world history. We must succeed. Let's work together on
how we will win.
OUR OBJECTIVES
We know our objectives. We and the Iraqi Government will succeed if
together we can:
--Break the back of the insurgency so that Iraqis can finish it off
without large-scale U.S. military help.
--Keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven from which Islamic extremists
can terrorize the region or the world.
--Demonstrate positive potential for democratic change and free
expression in the Arab and Muslim world, even under the most
difficult conditions.
--Turn the corner financially and economically, so there is a sense of
hope and a visible path toward self-reliance.
ASSESSING THE ENEMY
To achieve this, we must know who we are fighting. Some of them
creatures of a deposed tyrant, others a small number of homegrown and
imported Islamist extremists, feed on a portion of the population
overwhelmed by feelings of fear, resentment, and despair.
I have said our strategy is to clear, hold, and build. The enemy's
strategy is to infect, terrorize, and pull down.
They want to spread more fear, resentment, and despair--inciting
sectarian violence as they did 2 weeks ago in Hillah, when they blew up
devout worshippers in a mosque, and committed this atrocity during the
holy month of Ramadan. They attack infrastructure, like electricity and
water, so that average Iraqis will lose hope.
They target foreigners. The enemy forces have never won even a
platoon-size battle against our soldiers and marines. But their
ultimate target is the coalition's center of gravity: The will of
America, of Britain, or of other coalition members. Let us say it
plainly: The terrorists want us to get discouraged and quit. They
believe we do not have the will to see this through. They talk openly
about this on their Web sites and in their writings.
And they attack the Iraqi Government, targeting the most dedicated
public servants of the new Iraq. Mayors, physicians, teachers,
policemen, or soldiers--none are exempt. Millions of Iraqis put their
lives on the line every single day to build a new nation. The
insurgents want to strike them.
Sadly, the enemy strategy has a short-term advantage. It is easier
to pull down than to build up. It is easier to sow fear than to grow
hope.
But the enemy strategy has a fatal weakness. The enemy has no
positive vision for the future of Iraq. The enemy offers no alternative
that could unite the Iraqi nation. That is why most Iraqis despise the
insurgents.
The enemy leaders know their movement is unpopular. Zawahiri's July
letter to Zarqawi reveals he is ``extremely concerned'' that, deprived
of popular support, the insurgents will ``be crushed in the shadows.''
``We don't want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban,'' he warned,
whose regime ``collapsed in days, because the people were either
passive or hostile.''
Knowing how unpopular they are, the enemy leaders also hate the
idea of democracy. They will never let themselves or their ideas face
the test of democratic choice.
OUR STRATEGY
Let me now turn to our strategy. We are moving from a stage of
transition toward the strategy to prepare a permanent Iraqi Government
for a decisive victory.
The strategy that is being carried out has profited from the
insights of a number of strategic thinkers, civilian and military,
inside and outside of government, who have reflected on our experience
and on insurgencies in other periods of history.
With our Iraqi allies, we are working to:
--Clear the toughest places--no sanctuaries to the enemy--and disrupt
foreign support for the insurgents.
--Hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and
economic outreach with our military operations.
--Build truly national institutions working with more capable
provincial and local authorities. Embodying a national compact--not
tools of a particular sect or ethnic group--these Iraqi
institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law,
visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope
for a better economic future.
None of these elements can be achieved by military action alone.
None are purely civilian. All require an integrated civil-military
partnership. I will briefly review each of them.
Clear the toughest places--no sanctuaries. As we enlarge security
in major urban areas and as insurgents retreat, they should find no
large area where they can reorganize and operate freely. Recently our
forces have gone on the offensive. In Tall Afar, near the Syrian
border, and in the west along the Euphrates Valley in places like Al
Qaim, Haditha, and Hit, Iraqi and American forces are clearing away the
insurgents.
As one terrorist wrote to another: ``[I]f the government extends
its control over the country, we will have to pack our bags and break
camp.''
Syria and Iran allow fighters and military assistance to reach
insurgents in Iraq. In the case of Syria, we are concerned about cross-
border infiltration, about unconstrained travel networks, and about the
suspicious young men who are being waved through Damascus International
Airport.
As part of our strategy, we have taken military steps, as with our
offensive in Tal Afar, to cut off the flow of people or supplies near
the border. We have also begun taking new diplomatic steps to convey
the seriousness of our concerns. Syria and Iran must decide whether
they wish to side with the cause of war or with the cause of peace.
Hold and enlarge secure areas. In the past our problem was that
once an area was clear, the Iraqi security forces were unable to hold
it. Now, Iraqi units are more capable.
--In August 2004, five Iraqi regular army battalions were in combat.
Today, 91 Iraqi regular army battalions are in combat.
--A year ago, no American advisors were embedded with these battalions.
Now all of these battalions have American advisors.
With more capable Iraqi forces, we can implement this element of
the strategy--neighborhood by neighborhood. The process has already
begun.
--Compare the situation a year ago in places like Haifa Street in
Baghdad, or Baghdad's Sadr City, or downtown Mosul, or Najaf, or
Fallujah, and the situation today.
--Security along the once notorious airport road in Baghdad has
measurably improved. Najaf, where American forces fought a major
battle last year, is now entirely under independent Iraqi military
control.
As the strategy is implemented, the military side recedes and the
civilian part--like police stations, civic leaders, economic
development--move into the foreground. Our transition strategy
emphasized building of the Iraqi Army. Now our police training efforts
are receiving new levels of attention.
Build national institutions. The institutions of Saddam Hussein's
government were violent and corrupt, tearing apart the ties that
ordinarily bind communities together. The last 2 years have seen three
temporary governments govern Iraq, making it extremely difficult to
build national institutions even under the best of circumstances. The
new government to come can finally set down real roots.
To be effective, that government must bridge sects and ethnic
groups. And its institutions must not become the tools of a particular
sect or group.
The United States will not pick winners. We will support parties
and politicians in every community who are dedicated to peaceful
participation the future of a democratic Iraq.
The national institutions must sustain the security forces. They
also must bring the rule of law to Iraq.
The national institutions must visibly deliver essential services.
Thanks to you and other Members of Congress, the United States has
already invested billions of dollars to keep electricity and fuel
flowing across Iraq. In the transition phase, we concentrated on
capital investment, adding capacity to a system that had deteriorated
to the point of collapse. But, with freedom, the demand for electricity
has gone up by 50 percent and the capability we have added is not being
fully utilized because of constant insurgent attacks. We are developing
new ways to add security to this battered but vital system. And the
Iraqis must reform their energy policies and pricing to make the system
sustainable.
The national institutions must offer the Iraqi people hope for a
better economic future.
Millions of farmers, small businessmen, and investors need a
government that encourages growth rather than fostering dependence on
handouts from the ruler. The next government will need to make some
difficult but necessary decisions.
In sum, we and the Iraqis must seize the vital opportunity provided
by the establishment of a permanent government.
WHAT IS REQUIRED?
First, Iraqis must continue to come together in order to build
their nation. The state was constructed across the fault lines of
ancient civilizations, among Arabs and Kurds, Sunni and Shi'a, Muslims
and Christians. No one can solve this problem for them. For years these
differences were dealt with through violence and repression. Now Iraqis
are using compromise and politics.
Second, the Iraqi Government must forge a more effective
partnership with foreign governments, particularly in building their
Ministries and governmental capacity.
--On our side of the partnership, the United States should sustain a
maximum effort to help the Iraqi Government succeed, tying it more
clearly to our immediate political-military objectives.
--On Iraq's side, the government must show us and other assisting
countries that critical funds are being well spent--whatever their
source. They must show commitment to the professionalization of
their government and bureaucracy. And they must demonstrate the
willingness to make tough decisions.
Third, Iraq must forge stronger partnerships with the international
community beyond the United States.
The Iraqis have made it clear that they want the multinational
military coalition to remain. Among many contributors, the soldiers and
civilians of the United Kingdom deserve special gratitude for their
resolve, their skill, and their sacrifices.
This military support must be matched by diplomatic, economic, and
political support. Earlier this year, in Brussels and in Amman, scores
of nations gathered to offer more support. NATO has now opened a
training mission near Baghdad. And now, as Iraq chooses a permanent,
constitutional government, it is time for Iraq's neighbors to do much
more to help.
--The major oil producing states of the gulf have gained tens of
billions of dollars of additional revenue from rising oil prices.
They are considering how to invest these gains for the future.
--The governments must be partners in shaping the region's future.
--Across the region, there are needs and multilateral programs in the
Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as
well as Iraq. Rather than consider each in a disjointed way,
together they form part of a broader regional effort transforming
the Arab and Muslim world. We hope these governments, and others in
Europe and Asia, will examine these needs and then invest
decisively, on an unprecedented scale, to become continuing
stakeholders in the future of Iraq and their region.
Finally, we--the U.S. Government--must deepen and strengthen the
integration of our civilian and military activities.
--At the top in Iraq, we have established an effective partnership
between the Embassy and Ambassador Khalilzad on the one hand, and
the Multinational Forces command and General Casey on the other.
--To be sure, civilian agencies have already made an enormous effort.
Hundreds of civilian employees and contractors have lost their
lives in Iraq. But more can be done to mobilize the civilian
agencies of our government, especially to get more people in the
field, outside Baghdad's International Zone, to follow up when the
fighting stops.
--We will embed our diplomats, police trainers, and aid workers more
fully on military bases, traveling with our soldiers and marines.
--To execute our strategy we will restructure a portion of the U.S.
mission in Iraq. Learning from successful precedents used in
Afghanistan, we will deploy Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
in key parts of the country. These will be civil-military teams,
working in concert with each of the major subordinate commands,
training police, setting up courts, and helping local governments
with essential services like sewage treatment or irrigation. The
first of these new PRTs will take the field next month.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to succeed, we need most
your help and your support, and that of the American people. We seek
support across the aisle, from Democrats and Republicans alike.
I know this is hard. It is hard to imagine decisive victory when
violent men continue their attacks on Iraqi civilians and security
forces and on American or coalition soldiers and marines. Every
individual has life stories, friends, and families--and incalculable
sorrow for those left behind.
But there is a great deal at stake. A free Iraq will be at the
heart of a different kind of Middle East. We must defeat the ideology
of hatred, the ideology that forms the roots of the extremist threat we
face. Iraq's struggle--the region's struggle--is to show there is a
better way, a freer way, to lasting peace.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Rice.
Let me just mention that Secretary Rice can be with us only
until 1 o'clock. That is a long time away, but the time will go
rapidly as questions and answers ensue.
The Chair would like to suggest----
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, could I--when was the last
time Secretary Rice came before this committee? Could I
inquire?
The Chairman. I think, the confirmation process.
Senator Sarbanes. February of this year?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Now, we will attempt to have a 10-minute round so that all
members can ask questions and have answers. That will depend
upon the fairness that each member uses. If members are going
to exceed their 10 minutes, this is going to make it very
difficult for other members, who are more junior, to have their
questions. So, the Chair asks cooperation from the outset.
Please stay within the 10-minute limit, each one of you. Now,
this new apparatus lists the time in front of you, so it is not
ambiguous. Please pay heed.
Now, I will start with the first questions to Secretary
Rice.
Secretary, I would refer to an article by David Sanger in
the New York Times of October 17. The headline was,
``Redefining the War: The Administration's New Tone Signals a
Longer, Broader Conflict.'' This article takes up the dialog,
or the messages, between the two al-Qaeda leaders that you have
mentioned. It suggests that, in fact, Iraq is perceived as a
battleground in the overall War on Terror, and that those, at
least on the al-Qaeda side, or their allies, see the
possibility not only of discouraging us, but, likewise, of so
disrupting the Iraqi economy and the morale of people there,
that essentially they will take control. Now, I would agree
with your characterization. This is not a very constructive or
optimistic point of view. But, from their strategy, they may
feel that it's an effective one, that this is an area that is
in play, that, given the divisions between the people of Iraq,
who may or may not have an image of being Iraqi--as opposed to
being Kurds or Shiites or Sunnis--that conceivably terrorism
may win the day, and then, from there, radiate outward into the
surrounding territory, destabilizing others. The camps in
Afghanistan are no longer there, nor are various other
emplacements that may have given some basis for the movement.
Iraq could now be that basis.
Now, this is, to say the least, troubling. As you've
pointed out, these communications sometimes suggest that the
insurgents there are being rather clumsy in killing so many
people who are Iraqis, as opposed to aiming their fire entirely
at Americans. And it suggests that the strategy might work
better if they were humane with regard to Iraqis, and,
likewise, with regard to some of the other objectives they've
had.
If true, if this is a serious strategy by the al-Qaeda
movement and therefore the whole War Against Terror, then I
would like for you to address: How do we change our military
strategy or our diplomatic strategy? You have outlined the
course we have taken--namely, to secure various situations, to
try to enlarge that security to larger areas, to have a
cleansing process--hopefully, more and more with the
cooperation of Iraqis up front. But, at the same time, it's a
very complex strategy, and I'm not certain that I have ever, in
my own mind's eye, been able to envision exactly how it works,
except in day-by-day battles and the occasional thought that
this particular area really needs concentrated support.
Can you describe if this is the goal of the terrorists? Is
this going to be the base for the future? Our military people
have briefed us on a whole circle of terrorism in which you
have outposts like London or Madrid or European sites, where
cells loosely connected, or even individuals, create terror.
The terrorists may say, ``But, at the heart of this, at least
we're going to have a home base.'' How do we fight that?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that what this demonstrates is that--what is very
clear post-September 11 is that we are in a broad war against
terrorism, not a narrow one. This is not an issue of simply al-
Qaeda and Afghanistan. This is a question of going to the root
cause of the extremist ideology that led people to fly
airplanes into buildings on September 11, or led people to bomb
in London or in Bali or so on. And the root cause of that
extremist ideology is finding its place in a Middle East that
has a sense of hopelessness, that has not advanced very far,
where there is a freedom deficit in the Middle East that,
unfortunately, really for about 60 years, we chose to ignore to
try to deal and bring about stability. So, I think this does,
in effect, go right to the heart of: What kind of Middle East
is there going to be?
We have one vision of what the Middle East is going to look
like. It's going to be a Middle East that is modernizing,
progressive, where women's rights are assured, where Islam
finds its place alongside democracy, where there are stable and
democratic governments, where liberty is no longer denied to
the people. There is no doubt that that is a long-term
generational struggle.
The terrorist's view is that that long-term generational
struggle should produce a Middle East that is closed,
sectarian, where women have no rights, that looks, if you will,
like the Taliban, but in a broad region. In order to do that,
they have to expel us, they have to destabilize governments
with which they are--we are associated. And from, I sense,
Iraq, they also have to be sure that we don't win in the heart
of that Middle East. And I think that's what they're saying.
And so, the way that we frustrate their strategy for their
vision of the Middle East--and, obviously, it's a vision of the
Middle East that we could not tolerate, in terms of our own
security interests; we would be fighting terrorism for many,
many, many generations to come if, in fact, that kind of Middle
East emerged--we, indeed, have to win in Iraq, which becomes
one of the pillars of a democratic, stable, prosperous Middle
East in which the freedom deficit is not a cause for the rise
of extremism.
You mentioned, also, we have to make progress in the
Palestinian/Israeli issue, because that's another pillar. And,
third, we have to see broad reform in the Middle East, so that
beyond Iraq there is reform in places like Egypt and even in
places like Saudi Arabia.
Now, the Iraq-specific strategy has to be to defeat them on
that ground, and that means not allowing them to hold
territory. That means that once they have been expelled from
territory, you use the opportunity to bring in stable civilian
institutions, economic development. It's not just a matter of a
military strategy of expelling insurgents. It's a matter of
creating, then, a stable political and economic environment in
the wake of expelling those insurgents.
And, Mr. Chairman, what I was suggesting was that I think
our military, now that they have Iraqi security forces that are
more capable, is doing a very good job of clearing these
places. We now have Iraqi security forces that can hold in many
of these places. But we do need a more concerted civil/military
approach to the followup on the political and economic side,
and that's why we're considering a more integrated approach,
along the lines that we've used in Afghanistan.
But I have no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that they think that if
they can win in Iraq--and winning in Iraq to them means waiting
us out--if they can win in Iraq, then they will have
established the foundation for their vision of the Middle East.
That is what's at stake, and that's why we can't allow them to
succeed.
The Chairman. Now, at what point do we try to set some
markers for progress of the Iraqis? For example, you're talking
about waiting us out, but let's say that the Iraqis, after all
is said and done, really don't want to have a united country;
as a matter of fact, corruption abounds, the oil situation
doesn't really improve, lights never come back on. Now, this is
the sort of point in which some Americans would say, ``Why are
we there? These folks not only don't appreciate us, but they're
hashing the whole thing up. They literally don't want to have
the sort of Iraq that was envisioned by the British and the
French 50 years ago, when they raided there, in Syria and
Lebanon. As a matter of fact, the Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia
may very well be infecting the whole area. They don't respect
boundaries.'' At what point do we have some benchmarks for the
Iraqis to say, ``If you need us, succeed. Get on with it,'' as
opposed to simply being on our case for being in the way and
interfering with life, in general?
Secretary Rice. Right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the
Iraqis are demonstrating that they do, in fact, want a modern
and unified and democratic Iraq. That's why they went out 8\1/
2\ million strong in January, despite the threats, and more--
almost a million more, in this past referendum, despite the
threats. I think they're also demonstrating it in the fact
that, you know, there are all kinds of anecdotes about women
who talk about a better future for their kids by going to the
voting box. We've all heard these anecdotes. Now, it's true
that it's difficult, because Iraq was drawn on the fault line
of these ancient civilizations, and they have, in the past,
contained those differences by either repression or by
violence. Now they're trying politics and they're trying
compromise, and it's tough. And we will remember, in our own
experience, that once you try to do this by politics and
compromise, it will be messy and a bit untidy, and there will
be ups and downs, but, for the most part, they've moved along a
political schedule that has been very ambitious to get from the
transfer of sovereignty to interim elections to a
constitution--to a constitutional referendum--and now to
elections in December. I think they've done remarkably. They
have demonstrated to us that this is what they want to do.
Now, we are pressing them very hard on this--they have to
keep going. Senator Biden had a very interesting point. I
remember being in Iraq myself and talking to Shi'a and Kurds
and having to say to them--this was prior, of course, to the
Sunnis now really fully engaging--I remember saying to them,
``I know this is hard. We are telling you that people who you
think repressed you, who were responsible for the atrocities
against you, that you ought to open the political process. And,
by the way, the Sunnis didn't vote in the last election. Why
should you open the political process?'' ``But,'' I said to
them, ``Sunnis also suffered under Saddam Hussein. There were a
set of elite privileged Sunnis, high-ranking Ba'athists who
supported the regime, but you have a chance now for a unified
Iraq.'' I think everything suggests that that's what they want
to do, and we need to support them in it.
They are making progress along these benchmarks. Their
security forces did manage, through tremendous efforts, to
secure these elections better than the last elections. And, you
know, the most interesting thing is, every time Zarqawi, who is
the one who wants civil war--every time Zarqawi and his
fighters do something to--that is sectarian--to blow up a Shi'a
mosque or to go after a Kurdish party--they rally together to
say, ``No, that's not who we are.'' I think they're doing
remarkably well at trying to forge a united nation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
I'm going to ask you some very specific questions, if I
can. You've laid out some specifics here, everything from PRTs
to the nature of training to reconstruction. When does the
President believe, assuming his strategy is put in place, he'll
be able to begin to bring home American forces?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think that the President and his
commanders have been very clear that we don't want to set a
time schedule.
Senator Biden. Well, I'm not asking for a timetable. I mean
in the continuum here, assuming that the strategy you've laid
out works out as you hope it does and begins to take root,
where Iraqis are taking over more and more of the cities and
towns, where, in fact, there is a coalescence of civilian
competence, where there is an increase in the number of Iraqi
forces capable of working with--alone or with American forces.
If your strategy works, are we looking at being able to,
sometime next year, draw down American forces? Not totally. Are
we looking 2 years down the road? I mean, I've dealt, for 33
years as a U.S. Senator, in the military. They have these
plans. They never, never, never lay out a plan that doesn't
have a strategy attached to it and say, ``If this works, this
is what we're looking at.'' And I would respect--I know I'm a
broken record, with you particularly, over the last 3 years,
that I think one thing the Vietnam generation learned is, no
foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of
the American people. And we haven't gotten that informed
consent, in terms of them knowing what they're signing onto
from here on out.
So, I'm not looking for a date to get out of Iraq, but at
what point, assuming the strategy works, do you think we'll be
able to see some sign of bringing some American forces home?
Secretary Rice. Senator Biden, I don't want to hazard what
I think would be a guess, even if it were an assessment of when
that might be possible, because I think that the commanders
have done this in the right way. They, of course, are making
plans. They're looking at how the Iraqi forces are progressing.
They're looking at how many of these forces are really capable
of independent operations. And, by the way, by ``independent,''
we mean with its own logistics and indirect-fire support and
all of that. They--there are 91 Iraqi battalions that are in
the fight as the ``teeth,'' if you will, of the fight--that is,
the combat power.
Senator Biden. Right.
Secretary Rice. But the question is: Do they still need
American support, in terms of logistics?
Senator Biden. And how much do they need?
Secretary Rice. And how much do they need?
Senator Biden. Yeah.
Secretary Rice. It's not a surprising strategy to work
first on the combat power, the ``teeth,'' if you will, and then
to work on the enablers for that combat.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, I don't disagree. But I
would respectfully predict you'll hear repeatedly, today in the
questioning, this notion of wondering what the benchmarks are
here. What is the sense of when we know we're succeeding or not
succeeding? How do we measure that? And I would suggest that
you'll also hear that the Iraqis have to step up to the plate,
they have to get to the point where, as the chairman said: When
do we set benchmarks for them? And I'd respectfully suggest
that if we indicated to them that we were going to--if the
following things happened, we would be drawing down forces,
that would help our effort, not hurt our effort. It would
reinforce to the Iraqi people we don't plan on staying there
forever, and it would put an inordinate pressure on Iraqi
forces to step up to the plate. But I don't want to debate that
in the 10 minutes we have. That's why I asked the question.
Let me move to a second question. I know you know this,
because, as my mother would say, ``God love you,'' you'd see me
in your office, when you were National Security Advisor, on a
regular basis--and I'm not suggesting you won't see me now.
Secretary Rice. Anytime.
Senator Biden. But back in April 2004, I laid out, in a
speech, a proposal for the establishment of a contact group.
And I think a lot of people thought, ``Well, okay, that's a
Democrat speaking, even though he's talked a lot about this and
supported the President on this,'' and it didn't mean much. And
then former Secretary Kissinger and Schultz, in January 2005 in
the Washington Post, wrote an op-ed piece saying, ``An
international contact group should be formed to advise on the
political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. Such a step
would be a gesture of competent leadership, especially as
American security and financial contributions will remain
pivotal. Our European allies must not shame themselves in the
traditional alliance by continuing to stand aloof for even a
political process that, whatever their view of the recent
history, will affect their future even more than ours, nor
should we treat countries such as India and Russia, with their
large Muslim populations, as spectators to outcomes on which
their domestic stability may well depend.''
Now, I know you heard me say that a hundred times. I've
been banging at it. Others have. And your immediate past
predecessor--your immediate past predecessor, Secretary of
State Powell, recommended the creation of a contact group while
he was in office.
Now, what I don't understand is, why is the administration
hesitating to establish a contact group? And I have met with
Chirac, I have met with these foreign leaders. Depending on
what you offer them as participation--to the extent of their
participation, they all know they have a lot at stake. Why
haven't we done this?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I'd like to answer that, and
then I would like to come back, just for a moment, to your
first question.
Senator Biden. Sure.
Secretary Rice. We do, in effect, have a number of groups
that are meeting and working with the Iraqis on various
aspects. For instance, there have been meetings, as you know,
in Sharm el-Sheikh and in Brussels, of a large part of the
international community to offer political and economic support
to the Iraqis. Second, in advance of the referendum, Ambassador
Jeffries was out in the region with Iraq's neighbors and
talking to these neighbors.
Senator Biden. Did those neighbors include Iran and Syria?
Secretary Rice. We did not talk to the Iranians or the
Syrians. I'll come back to that.
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and so forth, the
neighbors, plus the----
Senator Biden. I only have 3 minutes left. Is there a
reason not to formalize this?
Secretary Rice. I think, Senator, the reason not to
formalize is that it allows everybody to play a role here
commensurate with what they're able to do. And I think,
actually, a formal contact group begins to exclude people, not
to include them.
Senator Biden. Well, I would----
Secretary Rice. I think that the Bonn process that you
talked about, that you appreciated, in Afghanistan, actually
did not have a contact-group character; it had an
international-community character. There was a ``Six-plus-
Two,'' but that, of course, predates the Bonn event.
Senator Biden. It also had major powers.
Secretary Rice. Well, we have major powers very involved,
in Great Britain and in Japan, and I think you will see----
Senator Biden. How about Russia, India, Pakistan, France?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. They were all represented at
Brussels, and they are all participating. The Iraqis are also
reaching out to them. The Iraqis have been in all of those
places.
But let me just say one more thing about the international
community.
Senator Biden. Sure.
Secretary Rice. There is no doubt that the international
community needs to be more involved with the Iraqis. There's no
doubt about it. Especially the neighbors. Now, they talk a
great deal about their worries about instability. What
Ambassador Jeffries did, and what Zal Khalilzad did before the
referendum, was to say to them, ``All right, you have a stake
in the stability, so what are you going to do about it?'' And,
in fact, they have engaged the Sunni parties, and they have
engaged the tribes, and they are working in that direction.
Senator Biden. Well, Madam Secretary, I guess the generic
point I have been trying to make for 2 years is that I think we
are better served if this is not a totally United States-run
operation--politically, economically, militarily--and that we
have an opportunity, because France, for example, as you know
as well as I do, is--14 percent of their population is Muslim,
without the civil rights that most Americans have. They are
very worried about failure in Iraq. They have not been very
responsible, but they're very worried. We've--just not seemed
to have put them in a position or a spot where we can force the
international community to basically take a piece of this
publicly for the world to see.
I referenced a British proposal in a speech to Brookings on
June 21 of this year, where the British said we should partner
individual countries with individual clusters of Iraqi
Ministries, where the civilians from those countries, who are
experts in energy or experts in education or experts--would
literally bring in--adopt, essentially, departments within the
Iraqi Government. I have not met a single solitary expert who's
visited the region--left, right, or center--who says any one of
the Iraqi agencies has enough Iraqi civilian capacity to make
that agency function. And so, I wonder, why have we not taken
up--I realize it's old now--why aren't we reaching out to these
other countries who have considerable administrative capacity,
essentially, to take over the agency?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we are reaching out, but, most
importantly, the Iraqis are reaching out. Let's remember, this
is a sovereign government, and they are reaching out. In fact,
the Brussels conference did give specific arrangements that
countries were prepared to take, with various Ministries and
with various departments.
Senator Biden. Can you tell us how many of those--how much
money the international community has poured in since then? How
many civilians they've brought into the country since then?
Secretary Rice. Since Madrid, the international pledges to
Iraq are about $13.5 billion.
Senator Biden. Not the pledges. How much is--you know,
``The check's in the mail.''
Secretary Rice. We're working very hard on the disbursement
of that. You know that's a problem, not just for Iraq, but
broadly for the international community.
Senator Biden. All right.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I do need to go back to your
question about how we benchmark, because we do have, with the
Iraqis, a joint committee that is looking specifically at
questions of what ``conditions based'' means, what Iraqi forces
need to look like in order to be able to operate either
independently or with minimal support. I think that the thing
that we are focusing very much on, including General Casey and
his people, is asking the questions: ``Are they making progress
in the strategy of being able to really hold the territory that
they've cleared? Are they making progress in being able to take
over whole segments of the country, as they have in the south,
for instance, in Najaf? Are they being able to take over
responsibility for some of the toughest places, like in the
road to the airport or Haifa Street, which was always
considered a dangerous place?'' They are taking over
responsibility now for some of the toughest places. Those are
good benchmarks. And I think, frankly, they're better
benchmarks such as: Can we point to things that they are
actually doing, and doing capably? rather than trying to have a
set of metrics that say, ``When we have so many of these and so
many of those, then we'll be able to transfer responsibility.''
I think that's how General Casey thinks about benchmarks, and I
think he's absolutely right.
Senator Biden. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary. I think
you've got to think bigger and bolder, or you're going to lose
the folks. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Secretary Rice,
welcome.
Madam Secretary, 3 weeks ago, the Saudi Arabian Foreign
Minister was here. You met with the Foreign Minister, as this
panel did. And I'm going to read the opening paragraph from the
New York Times newspaper headline, ``Saudi Minister Warns U.S.
Iraq May Face Disintegration.'' And it says, ``Prince Saud al-
Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, said Thursday that he had
been warning the Bush administration in recent days that Iraq
was hurtling toward disintegration, a development that he said
could drag the entire region into war.''
Would you care to comment on the Foreign Minister's
thoughts? Why would he make such a suggestion? Obviously, you
don't agree. But this panel would very much appreciate your
thoughts about it.
Secretary Rice. Sure, Senator Hagel.
I talked to Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal about that
statement. He says that that was not his intention, to suggest
that U.S. policy is somehow contributing to the
``disintegration of Iraq.''
With all due respect to the Foreign Minister, I think the
Iraqis are working very hard to prevent that disintegration by
trying to vote and trying to build national institutions and
trying to pass a Constitution, trying to get their economy in
order. I really think that the proper role for Saudi Arabia or
for any other country in the region is to help them, not
critique them.
I've made that point very clear to countries in the region.
I think they understand that. The Saudis were very helpful in
reaching out to Sunnis during this most recent runup to the
referendum. They, of course, have important tribal ties that
they can use to help to incorporate Sunnis into the process. Of
course, financial support to the Iraqis as they try to build
their infrastructure and their economy would be most welcome.
Certainly, we will be reaching out to members of the region to
see if we can secure greater financial support.
So, this is a matter of being able to do something about
the future. You don't just have to analyze it if you're Saudi
Arabia. You have the opportunity to do something about it. In
our conversations, the Saudis want to do something about what
they may view as negative trends in the region.
Senator Hagel. Well, this is a rather serious charge, and,
as I noted, Madam Secretary, the Foreign Minister met with this
panel and spoke rather clearly and plainly, even far deeper
than what he said publicly. And I'm, I suspect, like many of
us, concerned that a neighbor of Iraq who, as far as I know--
and maybe you're telling me something different--has not been
helping Iraq--I understand they have been helpful. If that's
not the case, you should clarify that. But this is rather
serious. They live in the region. This isn't theory for the
Saudis.
Secretary Rice. I've said that they have been very helpful
in the runup to the referendum, in reaching out to the Sunnis,
in reaching out to the tribes. The Saudis have the capacity to
help mitigate against what they may see as negative trends. And
that was my point, that the Saudis not just comment on them,
but actually actively be involved. I see now, in our
discussions with the Saudis, since Ambassador Jeffries was out
there, as Ambassador Khalilzad was in discussions with them, a
much more active Saudi role in trying to help the Iraqis solve
some of their problems.
Clearly, one of the roles that the Saudis, and others, will
need to play is that the United States has taken a large part
of the initial burden, in terms of financial support for the
Iraqi infrastructure, development for the training of the Iraqi
security forces, and so forth. The region will have to be more
supportive in that way, and I think they are prepared to be
more supportive in that way.
The other point that I would make is that Iraq needs
political support. We have been working with the Arab League
and with others to see if they will visit Iraq, if they will
send trade missions to Iraq. Iraq needs to be integrated into
the region and these are things that they can actively do, if
they do, in fact, have concerns about the way things are going.
But when I talked to Saud al-Faisal, he was very clear to
say that he had not intended to imply that our policies were
hurtling Iraq toward disintegration.
Senator Hagel. Would you, then--picking up on what you just
said, some of the testimony you gave, and especially in light
of what Senator Biden has talked about--support a United
Nations-sponsored Middle East regional security summit after
the election of the Government of Iraq in December, to try to
bring the partners in the Middle East together, with the United
States taking a secondary role?
Secretary Rice. Well, the United States did not take the
lead role at Brussels. In fact, the lead role at Brussels was
the Iraqi Government.
Senator Hagel. I'm not talking about Brussels. I'm asking
you a question about: Would you support a U.N.-sponsored Middle
East regional conference after the election? With the Middle
East players at the table.
Secretary Rice. My view of these things, Senator, is that
agenda is everything. And it is not that we have any problem
with having people together to discuss the future of Iraq. We
would want to make certain that any such agenda was, indeed, in
line with the Iraqis' movement toward democracy, toward women's
rights, and so forth.
Senator Hagel. Well, I suspect it would be, but you don't
have an answer for me on that.
Secretary Rice. I don't have a problem with the idea of an
international conference. Indeed, a number of us have talked
about a follow-on international conference of some kind to
Brussels.
Senator Hagel. May I ask----
Secretary Rice. My only point, Senator, is we have to be
careful to commit to something until we know what its agenda
might be.
Senator Hagel. You may know that your Ambassador,
Ambassador Bolton, answered a question about this yesterday
regarding: Are we talking with the Secretary General of the
United Nations about an accelerated, deepened U.N. role in Iraq
after those elections? And he said that the current discussions
were being held.
Secretary Rice. Yes, they are. About a deepened U.N. role,
I discussed that, with Secretary General Annan yesterday, when
I met him in New York, because we do want more U.N.
organizations involved. The United Nations has been terrific in
overseeing this referendum. They're going to be very involved
in the elections. But they need to be more involved in the
reconstruction and the life of the country, as well.
Senator Hagel. You mentioned, in your testimony, the Syria/
Iranian piece, and I think you said specifically in your
testimony that the United States had begun taking new
diplomatic steps to convey the seriousness of our concerns to
Iran and Syria. Are we talking to Iran directly? How are we
doing that? Can you explain what we're doing?
Secretary Rice. Well, in terms of Syria, you know that I
was just recently in France and Great Britain and in Moscow. We
talked about our concerns there. David Welch has recently been
in the region, talking with countries like Egypt and Saudi
Arabia about our concerns. We've made them known to the Syrians
publicly. We've also made them known through people. But this
is a period of time in which the international community is
deepening the isolation of Syria, for a number of reasons,
including Resolution 1559 and questions concerning what might
happen with the Melis Report. So, we want to be a part of a
broader diplomatic effort, not to simply look at our own
concerns.
Senator Hagel. But what are we doing? You mentioned that we
are doing--we're taking new steps, you say, diplomatic steps to
convey the seriousness.
Secretary Rice. Well, for one thing----
Senator Hagel. Are we talking directly to Iran?
Secretary Rice. The trips involving Syria were a part of
those new steps.
Now, with Iran, let me be very clear. We had, in
Afghanistan, under U.N. auspices and under the ``Six-plus-
Two,'' direct discussions between Ambassador Khalilzad and his
Iranian counterparts. That was in Afghanistan. We have
considered whether contacts with Iran that are specifically
related to Iraq might be useful between Ambassador Khalilzad
and his counterpart on the same basis that we had them,
essentially, in Afghanistan. We're considering whether that
might be useful. But we don't lack channels to the Iranians.
Senator Hagel. So, what are we doing differently, in this
regard, from what we were doing 6 months ago to convey, as you
say, the seriousness of our concern?
Secretary Rice. I think, for one thing, Senator, remember
this was related both to Iran and to Syria--the conditions in
which Syria is living have changed dramatically in the last 6
months. There is the deepening isolation of Syria regarding
other matters, not just Iraq, the clear concerns of the
Palestinians about the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the clear
concerns about the continued Syrian activity with Resolution
1559, is the context in which we can approach questions of our
concerns.
Senator Hagel. But wouldn't you say that also about Iran?
They just elected a new President, they have a new government.
Secretary Rice. Unfortunately, I think their new President
and their new government has looked as if it's going the other
way.
Senator Hagel. So, how are we, then----
Secretary Rice. The speech to the United Nations----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Relaying our new concerns?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Was hardly welcoming, Senator.
In terms of Iran, we are continuing to use the multiple
channels we have to Iran.
Senator Hagel. So, we have a new strategy? A new way to do
this?
Secretary Rice. What we have are new efforts, not new ways
to do it, but new efforts, which means that we are turning up,
if you will, the volume, diplomatically, on our concerns. We
have really been more focused in the near term on our concerns
about the Syrian border, because we think that there are things
there that could be done forthwith that would have an almost
immediate impact. And, again, the conditions now, and the
conditions 6 months ago, concerning Syria are simply very
different because of Syria's own diplomatic isolation.
Senator Hagel. Do you think the Iranians have significant
influence inside Iraq today?
Secretary Rice. I think the Iranians have influence inside
of Iraq. But the one thing that I would note is that I have not
seen any evidence that the Iraqis want to trade Saddam
Hussein's dictatorship and tyranny for Iranian-style tyranny.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know if Senator Sarbanes is--I guess he's not right
here, so he'll be coming back shortly.
Thank you, Madam Secretary. And thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for holding this hearing. My hope would be, by the way--let me
echo the concerns raised by, I think the--Senator Biden and
Senator Sarbanes--we can't go this length of time again, quite
candidly, from February, now, until mid-October, in having this
kind of a public discussion about a policy that is draining our
Treasury substantially. What is the number? I think somewhere
between $4 and $6 billion a month, not to mention the lives
that are being lost and soldiers being injured, as well as
Iraqi citizens paying a price. This is just unacceptable, that
we go this length of time without having a discussion about
this subject matter in a public forum. So, I would hope that in
the coming weeks and months, we can meet more frequently with
you, Madam Secretary, in settings like this, so that the
American public have an opportunity to hear the kinds of
questions and drawn-out discussion. If we're available for Meet
the Press and Face the Nation and other such programs, we ought
to be available to this committee to meet more frequently--over
an extended period of time, if necessary. I regret you're only
going to be here a couple of hours.
I was in Iraq last week, Madam Secretary, with Jack Reed,
the Senator from Rhode Island, a member of the Armed Services
Committee. And let me, first of all, say--which I think all of
us agree with--and that is the incredible job that our military
people are doing. I was impressed with them before I went, but
even more so meeting the commanding officers there and the
command structure, as well as the troops. They just do a
fabulous job. And that's--it's something we can't be unmindful
for. They're doing their job.
I'm a little concerned--let me pick up with Senator Hagel's
line of questioning. I have some others that I'd like to pursue
with you in a minute, but I think he has an important line of
questioning. While we were there, Qatar, going--before going to
Iraq, there were news accounts about some military plans
regarding Syria. Is there a White House Syrian group, for
instance, that's meeting? Are we planning some action in Syrian
that we ought to be aware of in this committee?
Secretary Rice. Senator, our policy toward Syria is on the
table; we want a change in Syrian behavior, we want a change in
Syrian behavior on the Iraqi border.
Senator Dodd. I understand that----
Secretary Rice. And we want a change in regards to Lebanon,
and in regards to the Palestinian/Israeli border.
Senator Dodd. Are we considering military action, if
necessary?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I'm not going to get into what the
President's options might be, but the course on which we are
now launched is a diplomatic course, vis-a-vis Syria. We are,
of course, engaged in military operations up west, near al Qaim
and the Euphrates area, in order to try and stem the flow of
insurgents who are coming across the Syrian border.
Senator Dodd. I understand all of that.
I'm talking about in Syria, now. You're not going to take
the military option off the table in Syria, is that what you're
telling me?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I don't think the President
ever takes any of his options off the table concerning anything
to do with military force. But the course that we are currently
on is a course to use our military power to try to stem the
tide of people who are coming in that area, to clear some of
those towns in which insurgents have been living, up in al
Qaim, in that region, and to put pressure on the Syrians,
diplomatically, to take steps that would make it easier to stem
the flow of the insurgents. That's the course that we're on.
Senator Dodd. What about Iran? What is their--to pursue the
line of questioning further, there's been growing concern about
militias in the south having closer ties with Iranians, in
fact, not being supportive, the efforts, particularly by our
British allies in Basra and places like that. You, sort of,
painted a happy-talk picture about how things are going here,
and yet the reports we're receiving are that it's very
troublesome what's occurring in the south.
Secretary Rice. I think I haven't addressed the south,
Senator. My only point was that the Iraqis show no interest in
becoming tools of Iran, just as they've thrown off Saddam
Hussein. In fact, there is considerable--as you know--tension
between Iranians and Iraqis, for a variety of historical and
cultural reasons. Now, that doesn't mean that Iran is not a
troubling presence in the south. It is a troubling presence in
the south. It has its friends and allies there. Indeed, we've
been concerned about support for militias and support for
insurgencies.
The south is the British area. The British, of course, have
diplomatic representation in Iran and can raise these issues
with the Iranians directly. We have used channels that we do
have with the Iranians. We are not without channels with the
Iranians. We don't have a broad diplomatic engagement with the
Iranians, but, of course, we have a Swiss channel, we have a
channel that we've used in other places. And, as I said, we've
even, on occasion, in Afghanistan, used the opportunity of the
``Six plus Two,'' under U.N. auspices, to talk directly to the
Iranians. So, we have channels to them. But the clear message
should be to the Iranians from the international community, and
I think it's coming not just from us, but from the neighbors,
as well, that people expect the Iranians to behave as
transparent neighbors, not as troublesome neighbors.
The best bulwark against Iranian influence in that region
is going to be the continued stabilization of the south, and
the continued evolution of the politics in the south away from
sectarian policies.
Senator Dodd. Well, again, the meetings we had in the
region--there's a great concern about what Iran's intentions
are. And I want to underscore the point that Senator Hagel
made. I hear you talking about the various contacts we have. I
don't think any of us are suggesting full diplomatic relations
with Iran at all, but if, in fact, politics and diplomacy are
going to be the way in which we try and achieve our goals in
Iraq and in the region, it seems to me that it's in our
interest to try and find a way to successfully pursue the
political and diplomatic track with Iran. As uncomfortable as
it is, and our concerns about it, it seems to me that we're
going to have greater results if we do that, and do it openly--
at least not shy away from the notion that we're engaged in
that process.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I believe that we can note that
Ambassador Khalilzad has some flexibility, as he did in
Afghanistan, to engage, through multilateral processes, his
Iranian counterpart.
Senator Dodd. Let me jump, if I can--I note in your
statement here you had, on page 8 of your testimony, describing
how much progress has been made in Iraq, and you talked about,
``The security along the once-notorious Airport Road in Baghdad
has measurably improved.'' Madam Secretary, I was there last
week, and there's still--I was there a year and a half ago. I
rode that road from the airport to the Green Zone. But Senator
Reed and I were not at all allowed to travel that road, nor did
we ask to do so. We were informed it was still rather dangerous
to be traveling it here. My point in bringing this up is not
just that particular point, but I think it's to be credible
about how the situation is in Iraq. To suggest somehow that the
security situation is vastly improved in this area, I think, is
wrong, and it's dangerous, in my view. You're trying to build
support for what's going on.
Which draws me to the question of how the Sunnis are--
whether or not they're feeling as though, politically, they can
engage in this process. As I understand it, despite the good
turnout on Saturday--and I applaud that--there was a
substantial no-vote by the Sunni population here. And, again,
you can--when that occurs in this country, obviously we
attribute it to being good politics and they're engaging in the
process. I think it's a rather--a significant jump to suggest
somehow that the Sunnis here have decided this is okay, because
they're going to be fairly treated under the draft
Constitution--or the Constitution that was approved of on
Saturday.
Haven't we, in a sense, allied ourselves too closely with
the Shi'a and Kurd elements? And isn't it still a major problem
for us, in terms of getting the Sunnis to feel as though they
can be a part of a future Iraq under the circumstances? And
shouldn't that no-vote by the Sunnis, despite the outpouring,
be a matter of greater concern than you've reflected in your
testimony?
Secretary Rice. Senator, first of all, on the question of
the improvement in security in some areas, it is possible to
note improvement and still say that there is a very difficult
security situation.
Senator Dodd. Well, that road isn't safe today. You know
that as well as I----
Secretary Rice. The point is that I think that General
Casey, in another testimony, talked about the fact there have
been no major attacks against them on that road since June, so
there has been an improvement.
Senator Dodd. You wouldn't be on that road--if you fly to--
when was the last time you were in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. I was there in April, and I hope to be back
again soon.
Senator Dodd. Well, I'm going to tell you right now, when
you go back soon, they're not going to let you drive along that
road.
Secretary Rice. I'm sure that's the case, Senator. But the
security along that road has been taken largely by Iraqis, and
it's simply to note that they are starting to take on some of
the most difficult tasks.
But let me go to the question of the Sunnis. Of course the
Sunnis voted overwhelmingly ``no.'' They made very clear that
that was going to be the case, although a number of Sunnis did
not vote against the Constitution, and a couple of major Sunni
parties, including the Iraqi Islamic Party, came out--rather
late in the day, unfortunately, but did come out in favor of
the Constitution.
Now, it is a balance in Iraq. The Sunnis are not the
majority in the country. The Shi'a are the majority in the
country. They participated heavily in the elections that
created the first interim government, as did the Kurds. The
Sunnis boycotted that initial election and, I think, believe
now they made a mistake in boycotting that initial election.
And so, what we have been trying to do ever since I was
there, when I talked about Sunni participation, and certainly
the tireless efforts that Zal Khalilzad has been putting in, is
to create space for the Sunnis to enter the political process
so that before many of the decisions that are critical to them
are made, they would be fully a part of the political process.
That's why the constitutional process has put off, to the next
national assembly, some of the major decisions concerning how
federal units--other than those that are in the Kurdish areas--
would be actually formed. That is, the law for that, the
formulation of that, the rules for that have been put off to
the next national assembly, when the Sunnis will be better
represented.
As was noted, there is now provision for the amendment of
the Constitution in order to take care of people's concerns
about the Constitution. So, what you really have is a very
delicate, but, I think, thus far, successful, balancing act of
recognizing that the Kurds and the Shi'a did participate
overwhelmingly in the interim elections, they did dominate the
transitional national assembly, but not forcing some of the
decisions that are most important to the Sunnis until the
Sunnis, now a part of the political process, can become more
involved. So, certain very important things have been put off.
Also, by the way, the question of future resources--the
division of future resources has been put off to the future.
It's a very difficult process. As I said, they were drawn
along the fault lines of all of these civilizations. They're
trying to deal with this new process.
But I think you're going to see the Sunnis participate, in
very large numbers, in the elections, because they now
recognize that their best bet for protecting their interests is
going to be to elect candidates that will protect those
interests in the election.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you. I'm going to have to come
back to that when we--in another round.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you, Madam Secretary.
I just returned from Liberia, where I participated in
election oversight with some of your team. And I want to
express my appreciation and admiration, including Ambassador
Booth and Assistant Secretary Frazier, the USAID team, and
everybody in the Embassy. They are doing good work.
I also want to extend my thanks and appreciation to the
U.N. election workers. They do amazing work in difficult
circumstances.
And I do want to follow up, this morning, on Senator Hagel
and Senator Dodd's question about Iran and Syria and some of
the discussion about possible military action. Under the Iraq
war resolution, we restricted any military action to Iraq. So,
would you agree that if anything were to occur on Syrian or
Iranian soil, you would have to return to Congress to get that
authorization?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't want to try and
circumscribe Presidential War Powers. And I think you'll
understand fully that the President retains those powers, in
the War on Terrorism and in the war in Iraq. But I will say to
you that, on the matter of both Syria and Iran, our course is
one that, on the one hand, is working on the Syrian border,
militarily, Euphrates and the like, to try and clear that area
of insurgent strongholds and to prevent the tracking of people
back across the border.
We are on a diplomatic course to try to get pressure and
help with the Syrians to get them to take very specific actions
that would stem the flow from that side of the border, and
that's the course that we're on.
Senator Chafee. So, that's a no.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I am not going to be in a position
of circumscribing the President's powers.
Senator Chafee. Madam Secretary.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee. Also in your statement you said that we're
not going to pick winners--in your statement--we're not going--
we're not going to pick winners.
Secretary Rice. That's right.
Senator Chafee. And in answer to Chairman Lugar's question,
he talked about a vision of the Middle East, which includes
women's rights----
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Please cease.
I thank you.
Please proceed.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Chafee. I'll start over. In your statement, your
prepared statement, you said, ``We're not going to pick winners
in elections.'' Yet, in answer to one of--Chairman Lugar's
questions, you said you have a vision for the Middle East that
includes women's rights and acceptance of Western engagement.
How do you reconcile those two, if elections do not include
those? This seemed to be a contradiction.
Secretary Rice. If the elections do not include what?
Senator Chafee. Women's rights or an engagement with the
West. In answer to Chairman Lugar's question, you said,
``That's our vision for the Middle East.''
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee. And then you said, ``We're not going to
pick winners in elections.''
Secretary Rice. I understand. We were very clear with the
Iraqis that we expected them to have--that our partnership
depended--as, by the way, it depends not just in Iraq, but
throughout the Middle East--on respect for human rights, on
respect for democracy. And, indeed, they've produced a
Constitution that does, in fact, respect the rights of women,
treats women as equal citizens in Iraq, gives, for instance,
Iraqi nationality through----
Senator Chafee. Let's look ahead. If there were elections--
--
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. That did not include that
vision wouldn't we be, then, picking winners?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I think what we mean by
``not picking winners'' is that we're not going to try to
arrange the politics of Iraq to come out with some particular
outcome. That would be, indeed, antidemocratic. But since we're
making very clear throughout the region that deep relationships
with the United States depend on democratic development--and
not just in Iraq, which is far ahead, in terms of democratic
development than any of its neighbors--I think our view of what
kinds of outcomes we would hope for and expect are there. I
think we have to trust the democratic process. I think we can
trust the process in which 25 percent of the seats in the
assembly are going to be for women. I think we can trust a
process in which women are Ministers, in which women's rights
are protected in the Constitution. Iraq seems to me to be much
further along this road than almost any other state in the
region.
Senator Chafee. We'll see. Also, in your prepared statement
you said, ``In 2004, President Bush outlined a five-step plan
to end the occupation. And that is transferring sovereignty to
an Iraqi interim government, rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure,
getting more international support, preparing for Iraq's first
national elections this past January, and establishing
security.'' Five steps. It seems, of those five steps--a five-
step plan to end the occupation--we're failing, if you will, on
three of them. And that would be rebuilding Iraq's
infrastructure, getting more international support, and helping
establish security. Yes, we've had the elections, and, yes, we
have transferred sovereignty. So, that would say we're going to
be there a long time. Would you agree?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I would put it a little
differently. The first two steps, you're right, we have
transferred sovereignty and ended the occupation, and there
have been elections in Iraq. But it does not mean that there
hasn't been forward movement on some of the other areas.
On the security front, I think we all agree that the way
that security is going to move forward is when we have capable
Iraqi security forces. And Iraqi security forces are becoming
more capable. They were very capable in this recent election.
They've been very capable in Tal Afar. They're increasingly
capable of taking and holding territory. So, we're making
progress on the security front, though I would be the first to
admit that security is still very difficult in Iraq, not the
least of which because violent men can always blow up, through
suicide bombs, innocent people. This is the case, by the way,
inside of some of the most stable states in the world. And so,
violent men are going to be able to grab the headlines and kill
innocents. The question is: Are Iraqi security forces coming
along to be able to stabilize the situation so there's not a
threat to the political process? And I think they are making
progress.
And in terms of support from the international community,
when the President spoke, we had not yet had the kind of
outpouring of support for Iraq that you did have at the
Brussels conference. I know that it, perhaps, didn't get that
much attention back here. But you had over 80 countries
pledging their support to Iraq in very specific ways, including
support for their police training. You have, for instance, a
police training academy in Jordan. You have Germans training
police in the UAE. You have a NATO training mission for
leadership of the armed forces inside of Iraq. Time and time
again, people are coming now to support for Iraq. We need more
help from the international community, but we have made
significant progress.
Senator Chafee. Well, we all wish that were true, but we
can't kid ourselves, either. And I think we're there for a long
time.
Now, you said--by those criteria, certainly. By those five
criteria, you said that the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and
confronting it, is a pillar to our success in the region. Those
are your words.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee. Now, I was at a dinner--I think it was
Gridiron or something like that--and humor was encouraged. And
the President ran a video of looking for weapons of mass
destruction, looking under chairs, looking under the table,
``Where are they? Where are the WMD?'' And, obviously, it was a
joke. There were no WMD. It was all a joke, and the laugh was
on us. Now the President's talking about ``the roadmap.'' And
he's saying, in his words, in May, ``Israel must remove
unauthorized outposts and stop settlement expansion.'' Is--are
we going to someday see the same movie? ``Where is the roadmap?
It must be under here somewhere. It's under this table. It's
under this chair.'' Or is we really--are we really working to
do what the President's saying? And that is, remove
unauthorized outposts and stop settlement expansion?
Secretary Rice. Well, interestingly, Senator, we've had the
only return of territory to the Palestinians in the entire
history of the conflict. The Israelis are out of the Gaza.
Senator Chafee. I'm asking about settlement expansion.
Secretary Rice. No, but if I may respond.
Senator Chafee. I'm asking that question.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I understand, and I will answer
that question, but we can't lose sight of the historic change
that has taken place, in that the Palestinians are actually now
in control of the Gaza. We're working with them on issues of
international egress and ingress, and matters of that kind. But
let's remember that the Israelis took a historic decision to
actually leave the territory.
Senator Chafee. While 8,000 settlers moved out of Gaza,
while 30,000 moved into the West Bank, in opposition to the
President's stated----
Secretary Rice. Actually----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Objectives.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Actually, Senator----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. That's----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Actually----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. That's why I'm asking the
question.
Secretary Rice. Actually, Senator, I don't think 30,000
have moved into disputed territories in the West Bank.
Senator Chafee. Probably more----
Secretary Rice. No, it's not more. In fact, you have had
settlements that we are concerned about in so-called E1 around
Jerusalem. We have told the Israelis, in no uncertain terms,
that that would contravene American policy. Indeed, we, by law,
deduct some of the resources that we are providing to the
Israelis as a part of their loan guarantees, because of
settlement activity. We are determined that there is not going
to be any prejudging of what a final status agreement might
look like.
But it's extremely important not to lose sight of the
larger picture here. The Israelis are out of the Gaza. There
are contacts and relationships between the Israelis and the
Palestinians that are unknown in recent years because of the
work that they did in the disengagement from the Gaza. We're
training Palestinian security forces. They're going to have
elections in January. This is an area that has started to move
ahead. I think we just have to acknowledge that while there
continue to be problems with settlement and even with the root
of the fence, that there also has been great progress because
of the Gaza withdrawal.
Senator Chafee. I only make the point because it's your
words that it's a pillar to our success in the----
Secretary Rice. Absolutely.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Middle East. And as you look
to these Palestinian elections ahead, it's going to be more and
more difficult for the moderate Abu Mazens of the world to
carry the day while these activities continue, in my view.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask a question, first, about this system here,
with beeps that go off and the red lights and so forth. How far
beyond your 10 minutes do you have to go before something comes
down from the ceiling----
[Laughter.]
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. And snatches you out of your
seat?
The Chairman. Well, we'll----
Senator Sarbanes. I just want to know whether that's also
in the offing.
The Chairman. It is in the offing. [Laughter.]
Yes, they're secondary effects.
Senator Sarbanes. Madam Secretary, do you think the
Secretary of State visiting with the Foreign Relations
Committee once a year in a public session to discuss U.S.
foreign policy is adequate visitation?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I would be glad to come more
often. And I'm one of the most open people you will find to
consultation, to briefings. Indeed, I would like very much to
come more often. Obviously, the committee has work. Obviously,
I'm on travel a great deal. We make available to you many
officials of the Department. But you can be certain, I enjoy
the process of testimony, and I'm very happy to come back more
often.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe we've been
extending invitations to the Secretary----
Secretary Rice. I think you have----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. And they haven't----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. There was one invitation that
had to be cancelled, Senator, because I had to travel. That's
the only invitation, of which I am aware, that I was unable to
accept. But I just want to assure you, I see no reason that we
cannot get together more often.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, in response to questions put to you
by my colleagues here today--and I want to make sure I'm not
drawing an inaccurate conclusion--you said that the
administration does entertain the possibility of using military
action against Syria or against Iran, and that it's your view
that the administration could undertake to do that without
obtaining from the Congress an authorization for such action.
Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I believe that what I said is that
the President doesn't take any of his options off the table,
and that I will not say anything that constrains his authority
as Commander in Chief. But the course on which we are currently
launched is a diplomatic course to try and bring international
pressure on both Syria and Iran to do the right thing
particularly on Syria.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that, but I also
understand that you're telling me that you also are reserving a
military option against either of those two countries, and that
you think you can exercise that military option without an
authorization from the Congress.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I just have to repeat, the
President never takes any option off the table. And he
shouldn't. As to his authority as Commander in Chief, I don't
want to say anything that might appear to abridge that. But
we're on a different course concerning Syria and Iran.
Senator Sarbanes. Leaving aside the President's authority,
do you think it would be wise to take such action without an
authorization from the Congress?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we are not on that course.
Senator Sarbanes. I'm not asking you now to try to give a
legal opinion with respect to his authorities, I'm asking you a
question as to whether it would be wise to take such action
without a congressional authorization.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I am not in a position to, nor do
I wish to, prejudge what the President might do in a
hypothetical situation. But I can tell you that we're currently
on a course that is diplomatic in character.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, when you say, in your statement,
that they must choose either the ``path of peace or the path of
war''--I think that's the quote. Let me see if I can find it
here. Do you recall that in your----
Secretary Rice. I do, Senator. I recall that.
Senator Sarbanes. Yeah.
Secretary Rice. The ``path of war,'' meaning the
continued----
Senator Sarbanes. ``Whether they wish to side with the
cause of war or with the cause of peace.''
Secretary Rice. That's right. The ``cause of war,'' being
the insurgents who are making war on the Iraqi people. That's
what that refers to.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, is Iran doing the same things that
Syria is doing?
Secretary Rice. The circumstances are different, Senator.
And we have been concerned about the Iranian activities that
may be supporting militias or insurgents in the south. It is a
somewhat different situation. The concern in Syria is actually
quite clear, which is that there are people who are coming in
through Damascus Airport and then crossing the border into
Iraq. And we believe that that can be rather easily cut off.
It's a more complicated situation with Iran, but it's worrying.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, on pages 7 and 8 of your statement,
you outline a very ambitious agenda for the countries in the
region, suggesting that they should take their oil revenues,
become partners in shaping the region's future, and then invest
very substantial sums. I mean, I don't know what you reason you
have to think that they will do that, and it does raise this
question of the reconstruction money that's going in.
Now, the United States has contributed, as I understand it,
tens of billions of dollars in reconstruction assistance in
Iraq. Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. That's correct.
Senator Sarbanes. How much has come from other donors?
Secretary Rice. The total pledge to Iraq, at this point, is
about $13.5 billion.
Senator Sarbanes. Right.
Secretary Rice. The reference that I was making in the
pages that you're referring to--now that we are moving to a
permanent Iraqi Government, that commitment, that financial
commitment, ought to be significantly increased.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, how much of the $13.5 billion has
actually been committed or disbursed?
Secretary Rice. I'll have to get that for you, Senator.
[The written answer submitted at a later date to the
requested information follows:]
According to our estimates, non-U.S. donors have disbursed about $3
billion so far from their treasuries for assistance in Iraq--generally
as deposits to the U.N. and World Bank trust funds, bilateral projects,
or contributions to U.N. agencies for implementations.
The Department will continue to work with other donors and with the
Government of Iraq to ensure that international assistance is as
timely, effective, and well coordinated as possible.
Secretary Rice. Some of it is from multilateral
institutions, for instance, the IMF and World Bank.
Senator Sarbanes. I have a figure of $3 billion. Does that
strike you as in the ballpark?
Secretary Rice. I won't quarrel with that number. It may
well be. But I'd just remind that most of them would say--and
we have been pushing back on this--that the security situation
makes it difficult for them to actually disburse the money and
make the projects work more quickly. But I believe that,
through discussion with them and through additional resources
to be made available, that they really should invest in Iraq.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I know you think they should. The
question I was asking is: What makes you think they will?
Let me address the ``freedom deficit'' that you made
reference to more than once so far in your testimony this
morning. What is it you envision? Even if Iraq works out the
way you're projecting--and, of course, there are lots of
questions being raised about that, and many difficulties--but,
beyond that, this tremendous freedom deficit that exists in the
Middle East, are we going to have to embark on similar missions
in order to correct the freedom deficit?
Secretary Rice. I think we're addressing the freedom
deficit. More importantly, people within the region--
nongovernmental organizations, citizens, opposition groups--are
taking advantage of the opening the President has provided with
his call for addressing the freedom deficit, to address it for
themselves.
Senator Sarbanes. But you have regimes that maintain
authoritarian or totalitarian control. How are we going to
address that question in order to restore the freedom deficit?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we are addressing it. We're
addressing it by making available to opposition and to citizens
who wish to challenge the political system, or challenge the
political ruling authorities, and making available assistance
for democratic development, and for party-building. It's also
the case that if you look, country by country in the region,
yes, in some places the progress is small or slow, but it is
progress. If you look at Egypt, which held--imperfect, to be
sure--elections.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I'm looking at other countries that
are much more constrained. And the question, of course, again,
is whether we are entertaining using our military forces to try
to address this freedom deficit.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think anybody thinks that
the question of reform in the Middle East is primarily a
military question.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, let me ask you this question,
because it was put to you by a number of my colleagues, and you
say, ``Well, I can't really respond to it.'' Do you think 5
years from now some American forces will have come out?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't want to speculate. I do
know that we're making progress with what the Iraqis themselves
are capable of doing. As they are able to do certain tasks, as
they are able to hold their own territory, they will not need
us to do that.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, let me make the question a little
easier. What about 10 years from now?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think that it's not appropriate
even to try and speculate on how many years from now there will
be a certain number of American forces in Iraq. What is
appropriate is to say the Iraqis have made progress, they're
making more progress. They're not going to need us there when
they can hold these places on their own.
Senator Sarbanes. I have to say to you, that leads me to
draw the conclusion that you're leaving open the possibility
that 10 years from now we will still have military forces in
Iraq.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't know how to speculate
about what will happen 10 years from now. But I do believe that
we are moving on a course in which Iraqi security forces are
rather rapidly able to take care of their own security
concerns. As the President has said, at that point we are not
going to need our forces there to do the things that Iraqis
themselves ought to be doing. I assume, along with everyone
else, that when the Iraqis are capable of doing that, then
Americans are going to come home.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. I do note that I went just over a minute,
and the thing didn't come down from the ceiling. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Yes, it's very humane. [Laughter.]
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, welcome. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing.
I think that the referendum and the turnout is a good,
positive benchmark of progress in Iraq, where the people of
Iraq, including Sunnis, now have a stake. I think this will
have a motivational impact on the people of Iraq, that they
have voted for this Constitution, will be constituting a
permanent government, and the seeds of liberty are taking root
there. It will be difficult, as it is in most countries that
have been repressed, to quickly or easily establish a free and
just society, but it seems to me that the components are there,
and this is a measurable benchmark that a lot of us like to
look for, for progress in Iraq.
Secretary Rice, our opposition there are these various
terrorist groups, whether they're remnants of Saddam's regime
or al-Qaeda terrorists. I'd like to get your view on how much
popular support these insurgents have. Are there indications
that demonstrate what level of support these terrorists have?
There were the Sunnis who came out in favor of ratification of
this Constitution and their headquarters were bombed. But the
question is: What measurements do you see, going forward, in
support, if there is support, for these insurgents? And how
well is the State Department and the Department of Defense
coordinating on a strategy to counteract these terrorists?
Secretary Rice. In answer to the second question, Senator
Allen, we are coordinating very closely, between General Casey
and Ambassador Khalilzad, but also with what I've described as
an effort to have even greater integration of our political and
military strategy so that we have civil/military teams in some
of these places that have actually been cleared by our military
forces.
As to the popularity of the insurgents, I think that, in
part, provides an answer to the question that's on everybody's
mind: When will the Iraqis be able to do this on their own? The
fact is that the insurgents are very unpopular. Every poll
shows it. Anecdotal evidence of fighting between members of
certain tribes and particularly the foreign fighters--
demonstrates it.
I think it's hard to imagine how they could possibly be
popular when what they do is slaughter innocent children or
innocent school teachers. Their goal is to try and tear things
down. We're trying to build things up. But they, themselves,
have spoken of their concerns of their unpopularity. Indeed,
they've tried to go after the heart of the democratic process
by trying to terrify people into not voting. And they failed.
They failed in January. And then, with even fewer attacks, they
failed at the time of the referendum. And I would predict
they're going to fail again in December.
So, the milestones that we should be watching are whether
the political process in Iraq is continuing ahead with more and
more Iraqis finding their place in that political process,
including Sunni participation, even though, clearly, for a
while, violent men will be able to make life miserable for
Iraqis by attacking their infrastructure or killing innocent
civilians. But they don't have a positive political program for
Iraq. And that's being revealed every day.
Senator Allen. I do believe that the Constitution shows the
people of Iraq that this is the sort of free and just society
that they want to live in for themselves, as well as those for
their children. The terrorists don't seem to have anything that
would inspire or win the hearts of the people of Iraq. They
don't want a Taliban-type government, nor do I think the vast
majority of them want to go back to the repression that existed
with Saddam Hussein's regime.
Are you satisfied that this Constitution includes what I
call the four pillars of a free and just society: Freedom of
religion, freedom of expression, private ownership of property,
and the rule of law? Do you consider this Constitution with
respect to these values to be acceptable?
Secretary Rice. It is a very good Constitution, Senator
Allen. It is a Constitution for Iraqis, of course, and it is a
Constitution that brings together democracy and Islam, which is
very important to that region. But on all of the issues that
you've raised--the rights of women, the freedom of religion,
the individual rights that need to be protected--this is,
indeed, a very good Constitution. The laws that will be passed
to implement, if you will, some of the principles of the
Constitution, some of that has been left--I think rightly so--
to future national assemblies, when they are more
representative. But there is no doubt that, in terms of the
Constitution itself, it is a good Constitution.
Senator Allen. As we proceed, there was a concern that
while there was a decrease in violence for this vote, this
ratification, compared to January 30, that there was a concern
that as we move toward December 15, when they're electing their
permanent government, that the terrorists would increase their
attacks. Now, with this progress that has been made, do we have
any changes in our strategy as to how we're going to go
forward? Not just us, but also, in addition, since this is a
Constitution ratified by the people, the Iraqis actually
governing themselves based upon their values, principles,
Constitution, will we see more international support from other
countries, other than the United States and the present
coalition partners?
Secretary Rice. Well, we do have----
Senator Allen. I know those are two questions, but----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Of course.
Senator Allen. I'm just--with this--you know, any sort of
change in strategy for the next 2 months, plus added support.
Secretary Rice. I think that you will see not so much a
change in strategy as an intensification of efforts to make
certain that the areas where insurgents are still concentrated,
that we continue to go after those. I think that's General
Casey's plan. Probably some of the decrease in violence has to
do with having gone after some of those areas. But, clearly,
the Iraqi security forces that played a major role in this last
election will be there, and there will be even more of them,
and perhaps they'll be a little bit more robust as we are
trying to put enabler capability also in the Iraqi forces to
allow them to do this job. I don't believe that people believe,
at this point, that we need to bring in more forces from the
outside to do this, but, rather, that the Iraqi forces are the
best forces. They played an important role in January, they
played an even more important role this October, and they'll
play an even more important role in protecting the electoral
process at the end of the year.
I don't rule out that there will be violence, and maybe
even a spike in violence, because the terrorists have made
clear in all of their communications that they see the vote and
democracy as the biggest threat to their success, because they
know they're unpopular, and they know that if things go to the
ballot box, then it's a bad thing for them. So, of course
they'll try and disrupt those elections.
Senator Allen. Well, the adjustments--I can understand how
the overall game plan is the same, but adjustments, as
circumstances on the ground and as----
Secretary Rice. Of course.
Senator Allen [continuing]. Progress goes forward, I think,
will have to be made, or would logically be made. And, as you
get more Iraqis standing up to secure their own communities and
their own regions and country, it would seem to me that we'd be
in more and more of a supportive role.
However, for a country to succeed in the global community,
the rest of the world does need to assist. You have everything
from the problems we have with the worries about Syria;
allowing terrorists to come in through Syria. They may be
coming from North Africa or elsewhere. There's a concern about
Iran and their influence. Then there's other countries I put in
a different category, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt,
which can, I think, be more helpful, and then, also, our NATO
allies, some of whom did not agree with our military action;
however, could be very helpful.
Do you see a use or an effort to try to get in these
different variations of countries--some in the neighborhood,
some important countries economically in the world--getting
them more involved now that there is this clearly Iraqi
Government and Constitution in place?
Secretary Rice. Yes. And that's what I was trying to
suggest, Senator, that we need to work harder again on,
particularly, the region. And it's principally political and
economic support. Frankly, I think, in terms of military
support to something like the elections and the like, as I
said, the Iraqi security forces are getting more capable.
That's really going to be their responsibility. As they get
more capable, it's very clear that the United States will not
have to take on those tasks. We don't want to stay when we
don't have to take on those tasks. But the region, and also our
allies, could provide more financial and political support to
the Iraqis. And we will be, and have been, working on exactly
that.
Senator Allen. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Let me call now on Senator Kerry.
Now, I'll ask members to please observe, as Senator Allen
did, that 10-minute situation so that we will be able to get to
all of our Senators.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I apologize for not being here for
testimony. I was up in Massachusetts looking at our dam. For
the moment, it's holding together, and, we hope, will.
The President has repeatedly summarized his Iraq plan in
the following way, ``As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.'' And in his speech to the Nation 2 weeks ago, he, again,
didn't lay out any kind of specific political or new diplomatic
initiative. Certainly, he--what he really said was, more--
quote, ``more sacrifice, more time, more resolve.'' He went on
to describe those who question his handling of the war as
``self-defeating pessimists.''
Now, writing in next month's Foreign Affairs, Melvin Laird,
the former Secretary of Defense under Richard Nixon during the
Vietnam war, says, ``Recent polls showing waning support for
the war are a sign to the President that he needs to level with
the American people. His west-Texas cowboy approach--shoot
first and ask questions later, or do the job and let the
results speak for themselves--is not working. As we learned in
Vietnam,'' Laird writes, ``When troops are dying, the Commander
in Chief cannot be coy, vague, or secretive.'' He goes on to
suggest that you, Madam Secretary, are in the best position to
perhaps help set the record straight.
So, let me ask you: Do you think the President needs to do
a better job to address what I don't think anybody would agree
is a self-defeating pessimist in Melvin Laird, in his
suggestion, as well as those of many other observers,
Republican and Democrat alike, about the level of support and
understanding of the American people and the specificity of how
you are going to deal with the political solution to Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I'm quite certain that we can
all--and I count myself first and foremost among them--be out
more, and do more, to address concerns or to address any
ambiguities that people may feel that there are about how we're
going to proceed to victory in this war. That's what I've tried
to lay out today in talking about----
Senator Kerry. Victory. How do you define ``victory''? What
is ``victory''?
Secretary Rice. When we have laid the foundation for an
Iraqi Government that is clearly moving along its political
path--and they are well along that political path now--a
permanent government that has begun to really deal with its
sectarian differences, as they are trying to do through this
Constitution and their process, when we see that there is an
insurgency--I'm a firm believer that this insurgency may be
able, for quite a long time, to commit--let me call them
cowardly violent acts against innocent people--that is, to blow
up children standing at a school bus----
Senator Kerry. We all understand what it is. And they would
do that----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. And they will do that.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. For a long time.
Secretary Rice. But if I could look at the way other
insurgencies have died, if you will, it is when they are
clearly no longer a threat to the political path and the
political stability of the country. I think that you could
suggest, for instance, that in Colombia there was a time when
people questioned whether or not the Colombian Government would
survive. Nobody questions that today, even though there is
still an insurgency that, from time to time, has kidnappings
and the like. Algeria is another case. And so, there is clearly
a political path that has been followed to a stable political
system, even with its problems--and, Senator, I'm sure you'd be
the first to agree with me, that we continued for a long time
in our own history to have political tensions and political
problems.
Senator Kerry. I understand, but, Madam Secretary, let's
get to this definition within the context of what you're
saying----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. For this government. What
you're saying begs a political solution, not a military----
Secretary Rice. That's correct.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Solution. But mostly what we've
been pursuing, up until recently, has been military--until,
perhaps, Ambassador Khalilzad, who I think most of us would
agree is doing an outstanding job under difficult
circumstances, but with limited ability, because he's basically
trying to resolve a fundamental difference between Shi'a and
Sunni. Shi'a, who are dominant in numbers, and will dominate
the government. Sunni, who want to return to power. Now,
there's nothing in the political equation, and nothing in the
Constitution, that resolves that fundamental--that fundamental
divide. How do you do that? What are your plans to do that?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I actually don't agree that
there's nothing in the Constitution that addresses that
fundamental divide. What addresses that fundamental divide is,
it allows people, first of all, to have the vote as
individuals, not as groups. And we have seen, since the start
of the referendum and as people are getting ready for December,
cross-cutting coalitions now developing in Iraq between some
Kurds and some Shi'a, who--I'll use the terms in quotes, ``more
secular Shi'a,'' some Sunnis who--for instance, the Iraqi
Islamic Party that supported the Constitution. I think you're
starting to see cross-cutting cleavages, and that's a very good
thing, because within those institutions--the national
assembly, the Presidency--they will have to use compromise and
politics to reconcile their differences.
Senator Kerry. But the fundamental differences, by any
acknowledgment, were postponed. They came together, they agreed
to have a committee that had the right to raise the fundamental
issues, but they haven't resolved the fundamental issues.
Secretary Rice. Senator, to ask them to resolve it within
several months, I think would have been superhuman.
Senator Kerry. Well, you're the ones who set the date for
the Constitution----
Secretary Rice. No.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. With them.
Secretary Rice. To ask them to get to a framework in which
they can work in an evolutionary way to the resolution of
differences that are centuries old, I think, is completely
reasonable.
Senator Kerry. Well, that is exactly the problem. But--
well, let me get to that with a question. I see the light's
already on. It's incredible how fast the time goes. But many of
our military leaders, Iraqi leaders, and the Iraqi people
themselves are now saying, in effect, that our military
presence is as much a part of the problem as it is the
solution. General Casey, our top commander, recently told the
Senate Armed Services Committee that our military presence,
``feeds the notion of occupation,'' and, ``extends the amount
of time that it will take for Iraqi security forces to become
self-reliant.''
The Iraq Sovereignty Committee, made up of elected members
of the Iraqi National Assembly, released a report in September
stating that the presence of U.S. troops prevents Iraq from
becoming fully sovereign.
A recent summary of numerous Iraqi public-opinion surveys
concluded that a majority of Iraqis, ``oppose the United States
presence in Iraq, and those who strongly oppose it greatly
outnumber those who strongly support it.''
So, what do you say to this growing sense--among our
military leaders, who have told it to us when we visit Iraq, to
the general, sort of, input of people who have spent a lifetime
studying the region--that the presence is adding to the numbers
of terrorists, adding to the perception of occupation, adding
to the problem, and that it doesn't deal with the real problem,
which is the political solution needed between Shi'a and Sunni?
Secretary Rice. Well, first of all, Senator, when you come
to the political solution, I think you have to see that these
people have come a long way in 2\1/2\ years.
Senator Kerry. I----
Secretary Rice. It is very important, because you asked
about a political solution. A political solution was not going
to be born overnight in Iraq.
Senator Kerry. That's not what you told America and that's
not what you told this committee.
Secretary Rice. Senator, as I've said before, we've had a
long political evolution in the United States. We didn't even
have it easy in Birmingham, let alone in Iraq.
Senator Kerry. That's not what you told America, Madam
Secretary.
Secretary Rice. I ask us to focus on the political process
that was laid out as a 2-year political process in the
transitional administrative law, and they have been walking
along in that political process.
Now, is there a fundamental difference between Shi'a and
Sunni? Many Iraqis will tell you that there is, in fact, not a
fundamental difference. What there is are different interests
that have to be reconciled and that have to be dealt with, both
about the past and about the future.
You're right, they have left, to a National Assembly that
will be more representative, the writing of certain rules about
how certain aspects of the Constitution will be carried out.
That's the political process. There's nothing wrong with
carrying out a political process in that way.
As to our military presence, our military presence there is
requested, under U.N. mandate now, by the Iraqi Government,
itself. And it requests it because it knows that whatever
people's views of our military presence there, our military
presence is needed until Iraqi forces are able to be more
responsible for their own security.
Senator Kerry. Well, Madam Secretary, if I can just say to
you, President Talibani, when he was here in Washington, had an
interview with the Washington Post in which he said, we could
withdraw 45-to-50,000 troops by the end of the year. He visited
the White House, and he changed his tune. General Casey went to
the Armed Services Committee and said we could withdraw troops
by Christmas. Then the President said, ``Well, I think that's
rumor or speculation.'' So, it seems as if you and the
administration have a point of view about withdrawing that is
quite different from Iraqis and quite different from our own
military.
Secretary Rice. Senator, we have a joint process with the
Iraqis to determine, specifically, what conditions can be met
by what forces. We want to be out of Iraq with our forces as
soon as possible. We have no desire to stay in Iraq. But we
also don't want to create a situation, in which we withdraw
prematurely and leave Iraqi forces incapable of dealing with
the insurgency that is made up of terrorists and Ba'athists,
essentially, who would try and overthrow their government.
Now, I laid out, earlier today, a set of steps we're trying
to take, which demonstrate that political stability, and
political control, rests with the Iraqi Government. It means
that you go into areas, kick the insurgents out and create a
secure environment, and then you create political and civil and
economic development in that region so that area can be held.
Senator Kerry. Right. Well----
Secretary Rice. That is the political military strategy,
and--by the way, most of the country is, of course, stable.
We're talking largely about the Sunni area.
Senator Kerry. Talking largely about Sunni. I understand
that.
Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. You know, I just think
that realistically, when you assess what you've just said, it
really doesn't deal with that fundamental difference that I
just described, which is--from every leader and every person
you talk to in the region, they are all worried about Iran and
Iran's influence with respect to the Shi'a. And the Shi'a have
been adamant about the Islamic component of the state and about
the federalization. The Sunni are adamant about the strong
center, and not being fundamentally defined in Islamic terms.
That is the fundamental difference here. And it seems to me
that no amount of troops, and no amount of talk about the
insurgency--and the insurgency according to every expert we
talk to in CIA briefings and everything--is fundamentally
Sunni. Fundamentally. Maybe 2 percent, slightly larger, are
foreign fighters. The Iraqis don't want foreign fighters in
there. In the end, the Shi'a and the Kurds will never tolerate
them being there. So, if you could resolve the Sunni/Shi'a
issue, which I think most people feel has not been addressed
significantly, that's the way you're going to end violence.
Secretary Rice. Senator, it's not conceivable that the
Sunnis and the Shi'as are going to overcome hundreds of years
of differences within a matter of a couple of years. But I
would hope we all believe enough in democratic processes to
believe that is really the only way that people resolve their
ethnic and other differences. It has certainly been the case in
much of the world that democratic institutions allow people to
resolve their differences.
By the way, the only other answer is that you repress one
or the other. The only other answer to ``don't let them work it
out through a democratic process'' is that the Sunni continue
to repress the Shi'a. I think that's not acceptable to American
values----
Senator Kerry. Of course it's not.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. And it's ultimately not
acceptable to stability in the Middle East. So there are really
only two choices.
Senator Kerry. I would suggest to you, that's not the only
other answer. With all due respect, that's not the only other
answer. The other answer is that you, the administration, and
the Sunni neighbors--mostly Sunni--get together. Why are they
so absent? The Sunni neighbors ought to be involved in getting
a compromise which the Kurds and Shi'a give up more than
they've been willing to give up. And if you don't do that, this
insurgency is not going to end.
Secretary Rice. Senator, that's precisely what's happening.
That's what Ambassador Khalilzad was in----
Senator Kerry. That's stunningly late in the happening----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Well, it is----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Madam Secretary.
Secretary Rice. Senator, for something that's been going on
a couple of hundred years, they're actually doing pretty well.
But, again----
Senator Kerry. Our presence there has not been for a couple
of hundred years.
Secretary Rice. But, Senator, if I may just say, what it is
we're replacing. We're replacing a situation in which this was
done by repression, so that the Sunnis repressed the Shi'a
majority and the Kurdish minority.
Senator Kerry. Correct.
Secretary Rice. That's not an acceptable outcome. And so,
the placement of political institutions, a constitution, an
assembly that will be elected with better Sunni representation
in December, is the way to give these people a framework in
which to resolve their differences.
I agree with you, their neighbors need to be fundamentally
involved in helping to close that divide. That's why we're
reaching out to the Saudis and reaching out to the UAE and to
others, to ask their support. They were very supportive in
helping on the referendum to do precisely that.
But it's not as if Iraq and the Middle East was stable
along the Shi'a/Sunni divide before the liberation of Iraq.
Senator Kerry. Of course not. I realize that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.
Thank you.
The Chairman. All right.
Now, I did not interrupt the dialog. It was important. But
it was 15 minutes.
Secretary Rice. Sorry.
The Chairman. And let me just say, please, if we're to have
fairness to all of our Senators, we need to try to stay within
the 10 minutes.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, could I just say something
about that quickly?
The Chairman. Yes, of course.
Senator Kerry. The reason it's so difficult is, this is the
first hearing we've had since, I think, March.
The Chairman. I appreciate it. That point has been made now
several times. And we are having a hearing, and we're trying to
stay within the rules.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I'm sorry I was gone over half an hour,
but I was meeting with Secretary Bodman to talk about a second
declaration of independence from oil so that we become more
independent from foreign sources of energy. I believe that
we're in jeopardy today because we are getting too much oil
from places that are not friendly to the United States. And I
think your testimony was wonderful today. You should come back
to the Foreign Relations Committee to testify every 3 or 4
months, because the American people need to understand what it
is that we're trying to do in Iraq.
I just received a letter from a father who lost his son in
Iraq, and he was responding to my letter of condolences. He
wrote, ``In the spirit of helping you gauge public opinion,
it's important to tell you that we do not consider the American
mission in Iraq noble at all.'' The letter goes on to say, ``We
hope Members of Congress begin to more seriously question this
tragic mistake and call an end to continued financial support
for a misguided effort that does not speak well for America and
the world.''
I think it's really important that the administration
continue to level with the American people about how important
it is that we are successful in Iraq, and that if we are not
successful in Iraq, that the conflict will spill over into the
Greater Middle East, because it is the goal of the
fundamentalists to take it over. The best way I explain it is
to say that we are fighting Muslim extremists, religious
fanatics, who have hijacked the Quran so they can make people
believe that jihad against the United States, and any people
that share our values, is the way to get to heaven.
One of the things that I'm really concerned about is how
this affects the motivation of the insurgents. Through the
chairman's auspices, we had a chance to meet with the King of
Jordan and several other leaders. The question I asked them and
ask today is: How do we convince the Muslims of the world that
suicide and killing women and children represents a violation
of the Quran, and that if you kill you don't go to heaven, you
go to hell? I don't think we are getting information about this
across to the American people.
I'll never forget when Secretary Rumsfeld was briefing us
in a private session, I asked him, ``What about Ayatollah Ali
al Sistani?'' I know, that without Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, we
would be in bad shape in Iraq. Al Sistani has been very
supportive of peace in Iraq, even though we've never spoken to
him.
What are we doing to reach out to the Muslim world to reach
the hearts and minds of millions of Muslims all over the world?
Because if we don't do that, God only knows how long this is
going to last.
Secretary Rice. Senator, it's an essential issue, because,
of course, this has to be within Islam, as well. Islam has got
to declare itself not for people who blow up innocent
schoolchildren, but for a peaceful route. And since we believe
that, as you said, these people have hijacked this great
religion and try to pervert its tenets, it's extremely
important argument.
Probably the most active person in this regard has been
King Abdullah of Jordan, who has been active in holding
conferences and meetings and seeking statements from
influential clerics and scholars about both the need for Shi'a
and Sunni Islam to come together, but also that it is not in
accordance with the principles of Islam to kill innocents or
take life. I think you're finally seeing more people speak up
from within Islam. And we're encouraging it. We're encouraging
people here, who, in the United States, are scholars of Islam
or have contacts with the broader Islamic community, to do
precisely that. There have been fatwahs that have actually been
issued by clerics in Iraq, saying that for a follower of Islam
to blow up innocent people is not a religious thing to do. But
we have to--they and we--have to do much, much more to get this
message out because Islam does not want to be tarred with the
image like al Zarqawi. That isn't good for Islam, and I don't
think that Islamic scholars or leaders want people to think
that's what Islam is about.
But they need more to speak out, and people are beginning
to speak out.
Senator Voinovich. And we're encouraging that to happen?
Secretary Rice. Absolutely. One of the things that Karen
Hughes has been doing is meeting with Muslims here in the
United States and Muslims abroad. She's in Indonesia, as we
speak, talking to those communities.
But the real leadership for this needs to come from within
the Muslim and Arab worlds. And, in that sense, I really do
applaud King Abdullah in what he's doing. I think we can be
good partners, because, of course, one thing that I remind
people is that the United States has a large Muslim population.
It is not as if we are isolated from the tenets of Islam.
Senator Voinovich. I've talked to Karen Hughes about the
fact that we need to do the job, right here in our country, of
dealing with anti-Semitism and xenophobia, which is growing in
our Nation, so we don't have a radicalization of our own Muslim
populations right here in the United States.
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Voinovich. In that same line, the State Department,
in terms of people that speak Farsi and Arabic, I know you've
got a problem recruiting linguists. We really need to get more
people in the Department to speak the language. I think it
would help us a great deal.
The other thing that bothers me, which deals with the issue
of help from our neighbors is that it seems to me that we're
not getting the help that we need from our allies. How do we
get it in their heads how important this is? Now, for instance,
our Italian brothers and sisters are going to withdraw 3,000
troops. Bulgaria, 400. Poland, 1,700. The Ukraine, 1,600. I
looked at a list of the amount of money that's been pledged so
far. A billion dollars. A billion dollars. And about half of it
is from the Japanese, in terms of reconstruction.
What kind of help are we getting from these people, in
terms of the reconstruction, because this is not just our
problem, it's theirs, too?
Secretary Rice. Senator, first of all, I think it may be
that $1 billion is for specific kinds of activities. But, in
fact, the total, internationally, is about $13.5 billion.
You're right, a significant chunk of that, by the way, came
from the Japanese.
Senator Voinovich. How much did you just say?
Secretary Rice. $13.5 billion, total. But that includes
multilateral organizations like the World Bank and the IMF. And
the Japanese are quite a large portion, actually, of the
remaining money, although for instance, I think there's been
about $500 million from Saudi Arabia and so forth.
My point to you is that, you are right, this is not just
our struggle. Iraq is a front line in the War on Terrorism. You
know, when we look back on September 11, we see that there was
an ideology of extremism that was growing and fulminating in
the Middle East that came to strike not just us, but places
like London and Madrid.
Senator Voinovich. Osama bin Laden declared war against the
United States in 1998, and we ignored it.
Secretary Rice. And that same war, by the way, is being
waged against London and Madrid and Bali and all kinds of
places. So, this should be a full international effort. We will
ask more from the international community. They are helping.
The countries that you named that may, in fact, withdraw some
of their forces, have pledged to do as much as they can, in
terms of training and other kinds of support to Iraq, which, at
this point, may be exactly what we need from them. So, they
have not just walked out on their obligations. Those countries
have been very clear that they want to continue to support the
mission.
But, of course, we need more support from the international
system, and we especially need more support from the neighbors.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I would suggest that you come up
here more often. I know the President has a lot of things on
his plate, but there's a lot of confusion out in the country
today, and we need to repeat over and over again why we're in
Iraq and what we're trying to accomplish. I think we have to
level with the American people that this is not going to be
over in 2 years. I refer to it as the ``fourth world war.'' The
first one as the First World War, the Second World, the cold
war, and now this is another world war. This is a formidable
opponent that we have, and we're not going to be able to walk
out of Iraq and it's going to be over with. This is going to
continue. And we have a major challenge ahead of us. And it
took us, what, 40 years to win the cold war? But millions of
people today are enjoying democracy that didn't enjoy it before
the cold war, and that's part of your vision and the
President's vision.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Secretary Rice. May I--if you don't mind, just----
The Chairman. Fine.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Because I wanted to just
follow up on what Senator Voinovich has said. It is a long
struggle. But on September 11, we learned that the Middle East
was not stable. In fact, there was a deep malignancy growing in
the Middle East. The freedom deficit, extremism, all of the
reasons that we know. But the fact of the matter is, it's not
as if the status quo was stable and holding. We had to make a
decision that we were going to go after the root cause of what
caused September 11. It's not just the people who flew those
planes into the buildings. It's the extremist ideology that led
them to fly those planes into buildings, or, as we've seen now,
blow up a subway in London, or blow up small schoolchildren in
Russia. This is a virulent and tough extremist ideology, an
ideology of hatred that has its roots in a Middle East which
has deep malignancies. If we tire and decide that we're going
to withdraw and leave the people of the Middle East to despair,
I can assure you that the people of the United States are going
to live in insecurity and fear for many, many decades to come.
If, instead, we can deliver on a different kind of Middle East,
of which a different kind of Iraq is an essential part, then we
have the chance to do, Senator Voinovich, what you talked about
in Europe.
I know people say the situations are different. But nobody,
60 years ago, imagined a Europe in which there would not be
major war again. Nobody imagined the reconciliation of Germany
and France. Nobody took it seriously. But because the United
States stayed true to its values, because we stayed and helped,
we did achieve that. And now no one can imagine major war again
in Europe.
It'll be the case in the Middle East, too. It's not going
to be a military operation of the kind we had to conduct
against a big Soviet Union, but it is a generational struggle
in the same way.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Rice. We always appreciate your presence
here, and I will join the chorus and say we really do hope
it'll be more often.
The title of this hearing is ``Iraq and U.S. Foreign
Policy.'' And that strikes me as a good start, because we need
to make sure that our Iraq policy is advancing our foreign
policy and national security goals, not obstructing them, as
seems to me to be the case currently.
The administration continues to speak about ``staying the
course in Iraq,'' with the apparent end goal being elimination
of the current insurgency and establishment of a peaceful
democratic state. And, obviously, that is a laudable ambition,
but it is not, and it cannot be, the basis for our foreign
policy or our national security strategy.
I feel that our current, largely single-minded and somewhat
self-defeating focus on Iraq is causing us to overlook what
should be our most fundamental goal, and that fundamental goal
is combating the global terrorist networks that continue to
threaten the United States. It's time to think about whether
our military presence in Iraq is consistent with that goal.
Increasing numbers of military experts are coming to the view
that it is not. As is the America public. It's becoming
increasingly clear that we have actually created a breeding
ground for terrorism in Iraq and that the indefinite presence
of tens of thousands of U.S. troops is often actually fueling--
fueling, not dampening--the insurgency.
Obviously, that is not the fault of the brave men and women
in uniform who are serving our country; it's the fault of the
people who sent them to Iraq without a clear idea of what their
mission was and how long it would take.
I give credit to the courage of the Senator from Ohio,
Senator Voinovich, for reading that letter from that family
member.
Madam Secretary, we owe our servicemembers some clarity and
leadership. And we owe this country some serious thinking about
how we can get our Iraq policy on track--on track so that it
helps, rather than hinders us, in the broader fight against
terrorism.
In that regard, Madam Secretary, I want to return to the
subject that Senator Biden and Senator Kerry were talking
about, which has to do with whether to withdraw the troops--
should we start withdrawing the troops. I want to hone it more
to the issue of whether it would be a good idea to have a
public flexible timetable that we would suggest to finish the
mission, achieve our goals, and bring the troops home. Notice I
said ``a flexible timetable,'' not a drop-dead date, not a
deadline, not ``cut and run.'' So, that's what my questions are
about.
And it's interesting that Senator Kerry quoted a very
Republican former Wisconsin Congressman who was Defense
Secretary under Richard Nixon, Melvin Laird. Let me quote
something else from that same article that Senator Kerry
mentioned.
Melvin Laird said, ``We owe it to the rest of people back
home to let them know that there is an exit strategy. And, more
important, we owe it to the Iraqi people.''
Our presence is what feeds the insurgency. And our gradual
withdrawal would feed the confidence and the ability of average
Iraqis to stand up to the insurgency.
I'd like your reaction to Melvin Laird's remarks.
Secretary Rice. I simply don't agree that it is our
presence that is feeding the insurgency. I think the insurgents
have a couple of aims. For some of them, one aim is to return
to a day when high-ranking Ba'athists were in power who
repressed, by force, Shi'a and Kurds. And, by the way, a fair
number of Sunnis, too, who were in political opposition. That's
one goal for some of them.
For others that means, yes, the fact that we liberated Iraq
is an irritant because they have a different view. They would
prefer the Iraq that we were dealing with under Saddam Hussein.
For the Zarqawi element of this, however, I would return to
what Senator Voinovich said. These people were not just pacific
people somewhere sitting around, and then we liberated Iraq and
they decided there was a jihad to fight. This jihad, this
violent extremist ideology has been developing in the heart of
the Middle East out of the absence of freedom and the absence
of hope for a very long time. It reached its full bloom--after
several initial starts, it reached its full bloom on September
11, when they flew those airplanes into those buildings.
Now, we are fighting the global War on Terrorism, because,
of course, we are tracking down and fighting the al-Qaeda
network. And I was just in Afghanistan, which used to be their
home base.
Senator Feingold. Well, Madam Secretary, I'm sorry, this
doesn't track with my question. My question was about the
relationship between our presence in Iraq, our military
presence, and the insurgency. And I want to tell you something,
because I was in--this isn't just armchair people here in the
United States--I was in Iraq in February, and I asked our
military commanders the nature of the insurgency. At the time,
they told me, as you were suggesting, a significant or major
role of foreign insurgents being the ones that were blowing
themselves up, and that, at that point, those who conducted
some of those kinds of attacks were less likely to be Iraqis.
This has changed. Your own people have told us that this has
now changed. And what--the point here is, is that the way we
are doing this is actually playing into the hands of the
insurgents.
I asked one of the top commanders in Iraq, I said, ``What
would happen if we suggested to the world that there is a
timeframe during which we will try to achieve this?'' His
response to me, which, of course, was off the record, was,
``Senator, nothing would take the wind out of the sails of the
insurgents more than providing a clear public plan and
timeframe for a remaining U.S. mission.''
So, what I want to know is not the general statements about
how we're fighting the war against terrorism, which, of course,
we all agree on. Why does the administration continue to refuse
even a flexible timetable for how long U.S. troops are likely
to be in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we'd like our discussions of
withdrawal and of bringing down the numbers of forces to be
results-based rather than time-based. In terms of results, we
know exactly what we want to achieve. We want Iraqi security
forces that can hold their territory, where insurgents can't
leave a city and then come back and terrorize the population.
That's one of the things that we need to stay and achieve.
Senator Feingold. Well, let me suggest on that point, Madam
Secretary, with all respect, that I think one of the reasons
you see that happening is that it's very credible for
insurgents, for terrorists outside of Iraq, terrorists within
Iraq, to convince people who are desperate that we're there to
stay. You know, the President himself, in one of his speeches,
said recently he didn't support necessarily putting more troops
into Iraq, for fear that people would think we are going to
stay there forever. Now, doesn't that same logic apply to the
issue of a public timetable? I think the analysis actually is
the reverse. The more you don't suggest that the so-called
American occupation is going to end, the easier it is for them
to recruit the insurgents.
Secretary Rice. Senator, we've been very clear that we
don't want to stay. That's a different matter than giving a
timetable for when we think we will leave. I have no doubt that
as the Iraqi security forces get better--and they are getting
better, and are holding territory, and they are doing these
things with minimal help--that we are going to be able to bring
down the levels of our forces. I have no doubt that that's
going to happen in a reasonable timeframe.
The problem is, Senator, if you start making the issue when
you will leave rather than what you have achieved, then you
focus the insurgency and everybody else on when you will leave.
If you focus this on what you will achieve, and recognize that
you want to do that within a reasonable timeframe--because we
don't want to stay. We've been very clear that we don't want to
stay.
Senator Feingold. Well, you see, Madam Secretary, that's
what undercuts our credibility. People naturally are a little
bit suspicious of a country that invades another country.
That's a reasonable thing, to be suspicious. We have good
intentions. But to the extent we don't suggest a vision, a
scenario of when we might achieve these goals and when we might
leave, naturally people become suspicious. They wonder if we're
not there for some other reason. And you've heard the reasons--
oil or domination in the Middle East.
I believe that this logic that the administration has is
the actual opposite of what would be most likely to take the
wind out of the sails of the insurgents. And I've got to tell
you, Madam Secretary, you and the President are an ever-
narrowing group of people who believe that this logic is
correct. Experts around the world, military experts, people I
talk to in Iraq, experts here, just about everyone agrees,
including Melvin Laird, that our approach, without talking
about a public timetable, is feeding the insurgency.
Secretary Rice. I understand your view of this, Senator. In
talking with the Iraqi Government, which, after all, has
probably most at stake here, the issue for them has been to
have a joint committee that looks at conditions-based
withdrawal.
Senator Feingold. Then why did President Talibani suggest
that there is a scenario of when we could bring the troops
back? He specifically talked about a timeframe.
Secretary Rice. Well, I think that the Iraqi Government--
the Minister of Defense, the Prime Minister, and others--are
engaged in a process that allows us to know when we have
achieved what we need to achieve. You do not want American
forces to leave and then find out that Iraqi forces are
incapable of holding their own territory. That's a mistake we
have made in the past.
Senator Feingold. Well, Mr. Chairman, the American people
are for a vision of when we can finish this. The Iraqi people
are for it. The Iraqi leaders are. Our generals in Iraq, when
they're allowed to talk about this, are. There are very few
left who believe that we should have a secret strategy that
does not indicate when we can finish this.
But I do thank you, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. May I just say, I don't
think we have a ``secret strategy,'' Senator. What we have is a
strategy that will be based on results. That's the issue.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for holding this hearing.
Madam Secretary, it's nice to see you, having sat in the
chair for a long time in my prior--I know the hour is dawning,
so I'll be brief. One of the benefits of being at the tail end
is that I--a lot has been asked already.
So, I appreciate very much your opening statement and the
roadmap that it lays out. And I do believe that it does offer a
vision for--a strategy, as well as how to accomplish it. And I
thank you for that. I think it ought to be shared. I agree with
Senator Voinovich that it's something we need to more clearly
disseminate to the American people.
I was recently with Secretary Rumsfeld visiting with some
troops in Florida, and one of the things that really struck me
was, out of the large number of troops that were there--many of
them, of course, had served in Iraq--CENTCOM, we're proud to
have in Florida--and one of the things that one of them brought
up was the--really heartfelt sort of passion--was, ``When we're
there, we understand our mission. We come back, and we are
shocked and dismayed about how little is being said in America
about the success of our mission, about the things that are
happening, about how the Iraqi people interact with us, how
they behave toward us, how they welcome us, and as well as the
successes that are being accomplished, whether it be in health,
whether it be in, frankly, creation of institutions, as well as
how well the Iraqi troops are performing.''
Now, I know this sounds completely out of place, because
this sounds like a positive question, but I really do wish that
you would share with us what you can about the frustration that
this young man felt about how little is said about the good
that they're accomplishing and how much they believe in their
mission. Because, not to belabor the question, but it is so
clear that there's a complete misdirection between basing
success upon when we withdraw troops as opposed to basing
success on when we've accomplished a certain mission, which you
clearly detail in your opening statement.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
When I talk to our troops, they express that they know what
it is that they're fighting for. They know that an Iraq that
finally achieves stability and achieves political
reconciliation and some measure of prosperity is going to be a
different kind of partner for the rest of the Middle East, and
that the Middle East is going to be different, and that
American children and grandchildren are then not going to live
in fear of this extremist ideology, which has its roots in this
very malignant water that is the Middle East.
I think that the mission is being achieved in many ways.
First of all, if you look at the political process, I know that
it's difficult, and that they've put off some hard decisions,
but, you know, with all due respect to us, we, unfortunately,
put off the decision about how to deal with slavery for more
than 100 years. And, unfortunately, it came back to haunt us.
Hopefully, they'll do better than we did. In our original
Constitution, my ancestors were three-fifths of a man. That
wasn't a very good compromise. They haven't done anything
nearly so outrageous.
And so, I think we need to be supportive of the political
process that they are engaged in. It's not just so that our
troops know that their mission is succeeding, but so that the
Iraqi people hear an expression of confidence in their ability
to overcome their differences. All they ever hear is that
somehow they want civil war. They don't want civil war. Zarqawi
wants civil war. We need to express confidence that the Iraqi
people, in this very difficult process, are working their way
through their differences rather than using repression and
violence. That is an extraordinary thing for Iraq.
Second, our forces are sustaining the development of Iraqi
forces that are fighting bravely, that are getting better and
better, that are securing their own towns, that are securing
their own roads, that are bringing stability to parts of the
country which have not been stable, so that our economic and
reconstruction plans can take place.
If you talk to some of the commanders out there who have
given sewage-treatment capability to a place, if you go to a
place like Fallujah, where now they have 70 percent of the
people with water and electricity, if you go to these towns in,
for instance, what used to be called Sadr City, that had raw
sewage running in the streets--and thanks to our people working
with Iraqis, has been cleaned up and people have been given a
better chance. The hundreds of schools that have been
rehabilitated, the transformation networks that have been
restored, the healthcare centers that are providing
immunization to a population that had fallen into the worst
ranks, in terms of child mortality and infant mortality, and in
terms of lack of immunization, certainly for anything that
approximated a developing country. We are doing a lot for the
Iraqi people, and I think our forces know that their mission,
in that sense, is making a difference in the lives of Iraqis.
But the real difference that it's making is allowing Iraqis to
pursue a political path, rather than a path of repression and
violence.
And I just want to repeat what I said to Senator Kerry.
Iraq was maintained by violence and repression. That's how
Shi'a and Kurds were kept from expressing their desires and
their interests. That was not acceptable. Now they're trying to
make a political compact between Sunnis and Shi'a and Kurds and
Turkemen and all others. And that political compact is
imperfect. Their Constitution is not perfect. They've left
certain things that have to be worked out later on.
But for a country that has been through what they've been
through the last 2\1/2\ years, they've made remarkable
progress. From our point of view, to stay with them and work
with them until they are a pillar of a different kind of Middle
East is going to make an enormous difference not just to their
security, but to our security. That's what really has to be
understood. It is not as if the Middle East was stable and
humming along and happily moving toward political
reconciliation and stability, and then we decided to liberate
Iraq. The Middle East was a malignant place that produced an
ideology of extremism so great that people flew airplanes into
our buildings one fine September morning.
We need to keep that in mind when we say, ``We caused
instability in the Middle East,'' or, ``We're creating
terrorists.'' What kind of Middle East do we think we were
dealing with? The status quo was not sustainable. And so,
Iraq--and, by the way, other cases, like Lebanon, like the vote
for women in Kuwait, like municipal elections in Saudi Arabia,
like the first Presidential elections in Egypt----
Senator Martinez. Palestinian Authority.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The Palestinian Authority,
which is now seeking real peace with Israel. This is a
different Middle East, already, than the one that produced
Mohamed Atta and the suicide bombers. And we have to stay with
it.
I want to assure you, I don't think that this is, largely,
going to be a military commitment for the United States. When I
talk about the cold war, I don't mean a military commitment of
the 50 years that we had to stay in Europe, because it's a
different kind of challenge. But we do have to stay committed,
and we have to stay committed to success, not just to an early
withdrawal.
Senator Martinez. At the risk of being corny, I do get
excited when I see the ink-stained finger and the smiling faces
of people as they've exercised their right to vote, as millions
of Iraqis had an opportunity to Sunday. I know you harken back
to your youth in Birmingham. I also have an interesting
growing-up experience, and I know that, for 46 years, the
people in the land where I come from have not had an
opportunity to go vote and to smile openly and point to a
stained finger. That, in and of itself, I think, is a measure
of success. The fact that over 60 percent of Iraqis have
rejected the path of simply the old way of violence, but have
chosen to engage in a political process, I think, is, frankly,
encouraging.
I thank you for your appearance today, and I'm going to
give back a minute and 13 seconds. I know you count the clock,
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Martinez. Following Notre Dame, I know the clock is
an important thing these days. [Laughter.]
Secretary Rice. Unfortunately, it should have run out.
[Laughter.]
Senator Martinez. I understand.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
Secretary Rice, if you would allow us, I'd like to give the
full 10 minutes to Senator Boxer.
Secretary Rice. Of course.
The Chairman. Well, now Senator Nelson has appeared.
Secretary Rice. Senator.
The Chairman. Yes?
Secretary Rice. I'm prepared to stay and take the questions
of the other Senators.
The Chairman. Very well. I would appreciate that.
And, Senator Boxer, you're recognized.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much. And thank you for
agreeing to stay for--so everyone can get their chance to ask
you a question.
I've given to your aide a CD-ROM that holds more than
100,000 names, with addresses, of those who signed a petition
asking for a change in the administration's Iraq policy, to
come up with a success strategy that will lead to the return of
our brave and courageous troops. It calls on the administration
to now give us credibility, responsibility, and accountability
in the war in Iraq.
Now, the views expressed in that petition reflect recent
polls. In a CBS News poll just the other day, 64 percent of
Americans don't believe the result of the war with Iraq was
worth the loss of American life and other costs, 57 percent
don't believe removing Saddam was worth it, 55 percent believe
the United States should not have taken military action against
Iraq, and 59 percent of Americans believe United States troops
should leave Iraq as soon as possible.
I believe those poll numbers reflect deep disillusionment
with this administration's false expectations and rosy
scenarios. Today I'd like to look at some of what I call the
``milestones of false expectation'' that we have been given by
this administration, which I believe have led to these polls.
First, the false expectation about the expected length of
the war. In February 2003, Rumsfeld--Secretary Rumsfeld said
the war, ``could last 6 days, 6 weeks, I doubt 6 months.'' The
truth is, we have 17,000 Americans dead and wounded, and still
counting.
Then the false expectations about the response of the Iraqi
people. Vice President Cheney said, ``My belief is we will, in
fact, be greeted as liberators.'' The truth is that attacks
against United States military personnel are common outside the
Green Zone, and when I was in Iraq, I guess, a month before you
were there, there was actually attacks inside the Green Zone 2
days or 3 days before.
Then the false expectations about the cost of the war.
Mitch Daniels, budget director, said, ``Iraq will be an
affordable endeavor, will not require sustained aid.'' The
truth is, we're up to $200 billion, and counting, while
deficits at home are soaring. Soaring.
There were false expectations about burden-sharing. USAID
Administrator Natsios said, ``The rest of the rebuilding of
Iraq will be done by other countries, but the American part
will only be $1.7 billion. We have no plans for any further
funding for this.'' We now know that the United States has
obligated $17.1 billion in reconstruction assistance for Iraq.
Foreign donors have obligated $2.7.
The administration created false expectations about finding
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In May 2003, President
Bush told Polish TV viewers, ``We found the weapons of mass
destruction,'' referring to two mobile trailers. The truth is
that Saddam Hussein did not have any WMD when the war began,
and the trailers were for hydrogen generation.
The administration created false expectations about the
strength of the insurgency. In May of this year, Vice President
Cheney said, ``I think the insurgents--they're in the last
throes, if you will, of this insurgency.'' Well, the truth is,
insurgent attacks have remained constant.
And I want to show you a chart. From the minute he said
that, insurgent attacks remained constant. We'll put that up.
Experts are telling us that our presence is fueling--fueling--
the insurgency. This is where Vice President Cheney made his
comments and we see the same, and a huge spike over here.
So, we've heard false expectations about the length of the
war. Let's put up the other chart. The length of the war, the
response of the Iraqi people, the cost of the war, burden-
sharing, WMDs, and the insurgency. I'm sure you cannot see
this, but this is just a list of all these things and the
quotes.
The administration created false expectations not just for
the American people, but also for the Iraqi people.
Listen to an Iraqi woman named Marwa, as told to 60
Minutes, ``We've had our own pain for I don't know how long,
for as long as I can remember, under Saddam's regime and now
under the United States occupation. If it isn't going to get
any better than this, then leave us to heal by ourselves. We
don't need foreign interference.``
Listen to Sammy, another Iraqi citizen, ``We never had
terrorism before the occupation and before the American Army
was here. We never had al-Qaeda. We never had Zarqawi. We never
had car bombs.''
And I'd ask unanimous consent to place in the record a
State Department listing of those countries that had al-Qaeda
right before 9/11. Noteworthy: Iraq is not on this list.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
[The State Department listing previously referred to
follows:]
Albania
Algeria
Afghanistan
Azerbaijan
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bosnia
Egypt
Eritrea
France
Germany
India
Iran
Ireland
Italy
Jordan
Kenya
Kosovo
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mauritania
Netherland
Pakistan
Philippines
Qatar
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Yemen
Senator Boxer. Madam Secretary, our country is sick at
heart of the spin and the false expectations. They want the
truth, and they deserve it. But when you were asked, this past
Sunday on Meet the Press, about the anxiety of the American
people, you said, ``We went to war in Iraq because we were
attacked on September 11.'' You said that again. Never mind
that Dick Cheney said Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with
September 11. The 9/11 Commission found no link. Your own State
Department said there wasn't one al-Qaeda cell inside there.
But yet, that's what you said.
You said, ``The fact of the matter is, when we were
attacked on September 11, we had a choice to make. We could
decide that the proximate cause was al-Qaeda and the people who
flew those planes into buildings, and, therefore, we would go
after al-Qaeda or perhaps the Taliban and our work would be
done, and we could try to defend ourselves, or we could take a
bolder approach, which was to say that we had to go after the
root cause of the kind of terrorism that was produced there,
and that meant a different kind of Middle East.''
Now, Secretary Rice, when I voted to go to war against
Osama bin Laden--and every Senator did after 9/11--it was never
our mission, to quote you, ``to form a different kind of Middle
East.'' It was our mission to go after those who attacked us,
to get Osama bin Laden, as the President said, ``dead or
alive.'' I voted for the use of force against those responsible
for 9/11. Now, in an unbelievable rewriting of history, you
talk about this bolder mission we undertook in response to 9/11
to transform the Middle East with Iraq as an anchor.
And I ask unanimous consent to place into the record the
war resolution that was passed by this Senate and the House
declaring war on those who attacked us. And, Mr. Chairman, not
one mention of Iraq or rebuilding a different Middle East.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
[The joint resolution previously referred to follows:]
S.J. Res. 23
JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces
against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the
United States
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were
committed against the United States and its citizens;
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the
United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United
States citizens both at home and abroad;
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence;
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States; and
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take
action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
United States: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Represenative of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Authorization for Use
of Military Force'.
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
orgzniations or persons.
(b) War Powers Resolution Reguirements.--
(1) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with
section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress
declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of
the War Powers Resolution.
(2) Applicability of Other Requirements.--Nothing in this
resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers
Resolution.
Senator Boxer. So, I want to ask you this question. Can you
provide for me documentation that building and rebuilding the
Middle East was the reason we went to war after 9/11? Can you
give me that documentation?
Secretary Rice. Senator, the question that I've raised is
whether or not the way to resolve what happened to us on
September 11, the way to deal with future threats of the kind
that we faced on September 11, is to simply assume that if we
take down al-Qaeda and go after Osama bin Laden and get him,
and, indeed, even change Afghanistan, that that will protect
us, in the long term, from the kind of attack that we faced on
September 11.
Senator Boxer. So, when you asked us to go to war--when
this President asked us to go to war, that's what you had in
mind? But you never told the U.S. Senate?
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Boxer. And you never told the----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator Boxer----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. American people?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator Boxer, the resolutions
stand on their own. My point is that the President and I and
others believe that the problem--the attack that we experienced
on September 11 is not just because Mohamed Atta and his
hijackers flew planes into buildings, it is because they were
representing an extremist ideology.
Senator Boxer. Excuse me----
Secretary Rice. I will be the first to say----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I'm not trying to get into the
mind of any of the people who attacked us. I want to capture
them, not get into their mind.
The point I'm making is, here, not what their mindset was,
but what our goal was in going after the people who attacked
us. And what you are saying here today is a way broader vision
of that. And either you didn't tell the American people that at
the time, you didn't tell the U.S. Senate that at the time,
because, let me tell you, if the people of the United States of
America knew at the time that our mission was to rebuild the
entire Middle East, which you have, several times, called a
malignancy, that part of the world, if that was what the war
was about, the first war, and even the second war, they would
have walked away from this administration long before they've
walked away. And they are gone.
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Boxer. They don't want----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. They don't want the job of----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator, I would like to
answer----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Rebuilding the Middle East on
the backs of our brave men and women and the taxpayers of the
United States of America. They want to go get the people who
attacked us and defend our own country from them in the future.
Secretary Rice. Senator, may I have an opportunity to
answer? Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Secretary Rice. Senator, the war resolutions stand on their
own. The war resolution against al-Qaeda was very clear, and it
led us to war in Afghanistan to try to deal with the near-term
camps that produced al-Qaeda.
Second, the Iraqi regime had been not just a regime that
was, according to all intelligence, and according to U.N.
resolution after U.N. resolution after U.N. resolution, a
threat because of its attachment to weapons of mass
destruction, but also because of its role in terrorism and also
because it had been a threat to its neighbors. Our first war
against Iraq was not because it had weapons of mass
destruction, but because it tried to annex Kuwait.
So, yes, it had been a force for instability in the region.
Everybody knew it. And if you look at the resolutions that the
United Nations had passed against Iraq, they are not just about
weapons of mass destruction, they are also about terrorism and
about the threat to Iraq's neighbors. We were in a state of war
with Iraq, flying missions over Iraq to keep their forces from
threatening their neighbors just before the 2003 action was
taken.
Now, Senator, I understand what the Senate voted for in the
resolution on al-Qaeda, and I know what the Senate voted for in
the resolution on Iraq. What I am describing to you the
administration's broader strategy for a Middle East that will
not produce these kinds of ideologies of extremism. Look at the
9/11 report on what the root causes of September 11 really
were, and they were the extremist ideology that produced these
people. Nineteen of them, of course, are dead, but even if you
caught every single one of them, you would still be dealing
with the extremist ideology that produced them, and there will
just be more of them to come. Until you deal with the root
cause, which, frankly, is the nature of the Middle East, it is
the fact that there is a freedom deficit. It is that those
extremist elements have been allowed to grow and prosper
because they have no legitimate channels of political dissent
and activity. Unless you deal with that overwhelming problem in
the Middle East and produce a different kind of Middle East,
you're going to be capturing individual terrorists until our
grandchildren are all too old to care.
So, what I'm describing to you, Senator, is not what you
voted for in the war resolution, but the broader strategy of
the administration, and, by the way, the broader strategy that
is shared by Prime Minister Blair and a number of reformists in
the Middle East itself, that America's goal has to be a Middle
East in which people are not denied freedom, in which women are
not denied their rights, in which repression is not the way in
which politics is managed, and in which, just as we did in
Europe, we provide a democratic foundation for a lasting peace.
That's what I'm describing to you.
Senator Boxer. Well, I know my time's up, I would just say
you make a great speech, but you miss the point I made, which
is that the American people were not told after 9/11 that the
purpose was to rebuild the Middle East when they sent their
sons and daughters to war. And 25 percent of the dead are from
my State. So, they have to be told the truth, they were not
told the truth, there's changing missions, changing reasons,
twisted language here, and I just say it's no wonder they
walked away from this administration.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, let me give you an analogy,
because I am trying to answer your point. And, by the way, I
honor, of course, the sacrifices that the American people have
made. We're from the same State. I know what has happened in
California.
But let me just note that we also didn't go and defeat
Adolf Hitler in order to produce a democratic Germany. We went
and defeated Adolf Hitler because he was a threat to peace and
security. We defeated Saddam----
Senator Boxer. I understand that. I lost relatives in the
holocaust. It has nothing to do with what we're talking about
today.
Secretary Rice. Senator, may I finish my answer to you?
Senator Boxer. To me. I think----
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, it's----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. You're----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. It's very----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. It's very intriguing----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator, I'm trying to answer
your question, and I'd appreciate an opportunity to do so.
We didn't go to World War II to defeat Adolf Hitler in
order to produce a democratic Germany, but we understood, after
the war, that unless we produced a democratic foundation for a
new Europe, we would be fighting wars in Europe time and time
again. And now we cannot imagine a Europe in which France and
Germany fight. Now we cannot imagine a Europe in which
America's going to have to go back and fight in a major war.
We went in to deal with Saddam Hussein because he was a
threat to peace and international security, as resolution after
resolution after resolution noted. But, having liberated Iraq,
it is our goal to form a democratic foundation so that you have
Iraq as a pillar of a different kind of Middle East. Because if
we really think that the Middle East was stable, then we can't
explain what produced this extremism and this ideology of
hatred. Dealing with that is what will give you long-term
peace, not catching terrorists one by one.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Thank you, Secretary.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have been in and out in
other committee meetings, so I'm going to defer to my
colleague, Senator Obama, and then I will pick up after him.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Could I just mention, Senator, I'm happy to stay, but I am
supposed to be briefing the House in just about 10 minutes.
Senator Nelson. Yes.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Rice.
I'm glad you are here. As has been noted, I think this dialog
was overdue. And I hope that we will have some additional
opportunities to talk about our strategy here.
Let me just pick up on the last colloquy between yourself
and Senator Boxer and attempt to clarify why Senator Boxer's
points weigh on the minds of many of us.
The breadth of the mission in Iraq is relevant, not just
looking backward, but also going forward. I was not in this
Chamber to vote on the resolutions. I can say that the
argument, initially, for going to war in Iraq seemed to be a
relatively narrow one: Saddam Hussein threatened stability in
the region, potentially possessed weapons of mass destruction,
and, if we did not get rid of him, could be part of a broader
terrorist network that threatened the security of the United
States.
Based on what I heard you say on Meet the Press, and what I
have heard you repeat today, it appears that we are now
involved in a broader mission; it is to construct a democratic
structure in an intact, cohesive Iraq that will then spread
democracy and freedom to other parts of the Middle East. It's a
difficult task. You acknowledge it. But it's one that you think
is absolutely necessary for our long-term security interests.
This broadening of the mission is disturbing and difficult
for those of us in the Senate to deal with because it requires
a leap of faith on our part that a mission of that breadth can
be accomplished in a reasonable timeframe, to use your words.
And when Senator Feingold or others on this panel ask what
exactly that meaningful timeframe is, what that reasonable
timeframe might be, the administration declines to provide any
sense of what that is. I heard you say, today at least, you
think it's going to be less than 50 years, which is
encouraging. But, beyond that, we don't know. What we hear is:
We're going to ``stay the course.''
Now, if the mission is that broad, and the measure of
result- or condition-based success is premised on us having
executed the transformation of Iraq into a stable, democratic,
multiethnic nation state that is not harboring any terrorist
activity, then the concern is that that could take a very long
time. Experts may have different estimates, in terms of how
long it will take, but my guess is even those experts upon
which you rely are indicating that that is a multiyear, even
multidecade, process that continues to involve billions of
dollars of American taxpayer money and potentially the
continuing death of our troops. That is why this issue of the
nature of this mission, and what constitutes success, is so
important.
You've tried to provide what that success would look like,
but I have to say it appears to be a moving target. I pay
extremely close attention to this, and it is still not clear to
me exactly what the scope of our mission and the definition of
success are.
Having used up half my time, let me go to a few key points
that you spoke about.
You indicated that our objectives would be to break the
back of the insurgency, keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven
for terrorists, demonstrate positive potential for democratic
change and free expression, and turn the corner financially and
economically so that there is a sense of hope.
Let me ask this. If we had an Iraq that was made up of a
Kurdish north, a Shi'a south, and a disgruntled Sunni center,
that constituted a loose federation and was not engaged in all-
out civil war, but wasn't practicing the sort of democracy that
we enjoy here in the United States, and there was still some
insurgent activity, but not at the current levels, would that
meet your criteria of success? Or, is our measure of success
something much broader: A coherent, multiethnic national
coalition government that has all the accoutrements of
democracy, as we understand it?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator Obama.
I would, first of all, note that the goal of overthrowing
Saddam Hussein was certainly linked to his ability to make
mischief and instability in the region. As we saw when we had
to fight him in a war in 1991. So, that's the first point. But
then, having overthrown him, we did face the question of:
``What would we leave?'' Because, of course, you don't just
overthrow or liberate a place and then have no idea of how it
moves forward from then, particularly in a society that is as
fractured and had been through a long period of
totalitarianism, like Iraq. So, that's the answer. It is not as
if it were: We had taken a broad mission somehow at the
beginning of the war. But having overthrown him, we did owe the
Iraqi people, their neighbors, and the international community
an answer as to what we thought the future looked like.
Now, I would distinguish between a short-term goal in which
I do think the involvement of our military forces is needed.
That short-term goal is to make Iraqi forces capable enough of
holding their own territory against insurgents so that there is
not, as I suggested in the case of Colombia, a threat to the
political stability of the Iraqi regime. In other words, there
will be some level of insurgency, I'm quite sure, for quite
some time to come. Can they pull off a kidnapping? Can they
have a bombing here, a bombing there? There are lots of
relatively stable governments in which insurgencies have
continued to do that kind of thing, but nobody would question
that there is a danger to them.
Senator Obama. OK. So, that's something very specific,
right? And----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Obama [continuing]. So, that is a meaningful goal
and what I consider a benchmark that I understand----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Obama [continuing]. Which is that the insurgency is
not capable of collapsing an Iraqi Government.
Secretary Rice. That's right.
Senator Obama. OK.
Secretary Rice. And the Iraqi forces are, themselves,
capable of ensuring that.
Senator Obama. All right.
Secretary Rice. And so, that's how I see our military
presence. And when we say ``break the back of the insurgency,''
that's what we mean.
Senator Obama. OK.
Secretary Rice. Now, when you come to the longer term goal
at that point, you would have laid a foundation for a context
of stability in which the Iraqis can work out their political
problems and their economic development and so forth.
When you talk about the longer term goal of stable,
democratic, multiethnic, unitary Iraq, that's going to take a
long time.
Senator Obama. OK.
Secretary Rice. But I see that as a political----
Senator Obama. That's a political problem, as opposed to a
military problem.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Not as a military problem.
Senator Obama. So, I guess--here's my point. We've talked
about how brave and effective our military is--as long as
they're given missions that make sense.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Obama. Of course, our military is always effective,
and they are always brave, and if there are problems with our
military efforts, it's not because of our fighting forces. It
is because we've given them missions that don't require
military solutions, but, rather political solutions. So, let me
just make this point, and maybe you can answer.
My understanding is that we currently have a series of
battalions made up of Kurdish forces, Shi'a militia forces, and
so forth. These are all being counted as 91 battalions. Correct
me if I'm wrong, but the vast majority of these battalions are
not multiethnic forces made up of Sunnis, Shi'as, and Kurds. In
fact, the Kurdish battalions, as I understand, don't even fly
an Iraqi flag. There may be all sorts of centrifugal forces
taking place politically that don't hold the country together.
If our concern is just making sure that the insurgency
doesn't bring down the government, how can we be certain that
it's not, in fact, the political failures of the process that
are collapsing the government and breaking things up into some
sort of loose federation or civil war, rather than the
insurgency? Do you understand my question? My point is that if
our military presence there is designed, in the short term,
solely to make sure that the insurgency doesn't bring down the
political process, what happens if the political process
collapses under its own weight? Are we committed to holding
Iraq together in perpetuity, even if the parties involved, the
Iraqi people, determine that they don't want to form the sort
of visionary Iraqi nation that yourself and the President seem
to envision?
Secretary Rice. Let me just say that our military presence
was there to make certain the insurgency could not--but also to
create Iraqi security forces that can do that. That's an
important part of our presence.
Senator Obama. I understand.
Secretary Rice. In terms of what kind of Iraq will emerge,
obviously the sectarianism and centrifugal forces would be a
threat, also, to a stable and unified Iraq.
Senator Obama. And, just to pinpoint this, I think the
concern that a lot of people have is that these are the more
relevant issues involved than the insurgency. It may be that
some of these centrifugal forces and ethnic divisions are going
to determine our success, and not the insurgency itself.
Secretary Rice. I would say that either is a threat to the
kind of success that we want. Obviously, if there's an armed
insurgency, they can overthrow a government.
Senator Obama. I understand.
Secretary Rice. That's a real threat. But the political
side, of course, is hard, and that's why we are working within
the context of the transitional administrative-law path that
was laid out, to get them to stable political institutions.
Now, I understand that there are centrifugal forces. And
yes, there are problems with the ethnic composition of the
armed forces. General Casey has gone on a personal effort to
recruit more Sunnis into the rank and file. The leadership is
actually quite representative, but it's into the rank and file.
But it's not principally, of course, a military task to work
the political side. It is a military task to provide a secure
environment in which politics can be worked. For instance, when
the Iraqi Islamic Party decided that it was going to support
the Constitution, the insurgency went after their offices. The
fact that they were unable to deter the Iraqi Islamic Party,
anyway, from supporting the Constitution is a good sign,
because it says that the insurgency isn't having that kind of
impact on the political circumstance.
But, yes, it is up to our diplomats and our politics and
our civil-society-building and our economic development and the
building of national institutions to nurture what I think are
actually centripetal, rather than centrifugal, forces in Iraq
that would hold them together. It's going to be a federation.
It is not going to be, I think, as tight a federal structure as
it might later be.
Senator Obama. I know I'm out of time, but you haven't
really answered my question. What happens if the politics don't
work in this thing? Does ``stay the course'' mean that we are
there to hold the country together even if the politics of it
dictate that, in fact, that's not what is possible?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think that there's
evidence, at this point, that that is what we're facing. I
think what we are there to do is to nurture, which, what I
think, are actually strong centripetal, not centrifugal,
forces. And I know we read a lot about sectarianism and civil
war, and yes, they're having to overcome their differences
through politics, not through violence and repression, which is
how they did it in the past, but there is a sense of being
Iraqi. Yes, there is a strong sense of being Shi'a or Sunni or
Kurd, but there is also a sense of being Iraqi. And if we do
this well--and I think we're starting to do it well--in a unity
of our political and the military strategy, I think we will
nurture those centripetal forces. Their neighbors want a
unified Iraq, and I think they can help with this process, as
well.
I understand that, yes, it might not work. But every day,
we have to get up and work at our hardest to make it work, and
everything, thus far, suggests that they're trying to hold
together, when it really did come time to think about changes
to this Constitution. Because the politics is actually not as
sectarian as it appears, there are a lot of cross-cutting
alliances and coalitions that are building. One of the things
that I think we and others can encourage is that the coalitions
and the politics for the December elections be cross-cutting,
not sectarian. And that's what we will work toward.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Obama. You're very generous. I wish I had more
time.
The Chairman. Senator----
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. Nelson. Senator Nelson.
Secretary Rice. Yes, we've got to go. I'm sorry, Senator,
We have 5 minutes, yes? We have to be at the House in 5
minutes, I'm told.
The Chairman. Can we take just the 5, please?
Secretary Rice. Of course; yes. Sure.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the frustration that you've heard here, Madam
Secretary, is that, for those of us who were here and voted for
the resolution authorizing the President to expend funds for
the purpose of invading Iraq, we were clearly given an
impression, at the time, that the interests of the United
States were severely threatened because of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. You've heard the stories about the
unmanned aerial vehicles even being poised by Saddam Hussein to
launch from ships off the east coast of the United States. But
we were not told about the disputes in the intelligence
community with regard to them--over whether those unmanned
aerial vehicles were for offensive purposes, or for
reconnaissance purposes. And so, I think the expression of
frustration that you've heard from the two previous Senators
comes from seeing that the reason we were given for invading
Iraq has now morphed into a much different reason.
And then we hear that, for example, there are 91 Iraqi Army
battalions in the fight. According to General Petreus, it's
actually 116. But General Petreus has also said that there are
different degrees of support, and there is only one battalion
that is fully independent and combat-ready.
And so, I think, at the end of the day, you and I would
come down at the same bottom line, which is that in order for
our troops to be able to train the Iraqi Army so it can
stabilize that country, we need the support of the American
people. I would urge clarity and transparency, as Senator Biden
has also mentioned, in your future comments about this
conflict.
The final thing that I would like to ask about--because it
is affecting the daily lives of people here right now--is
energy price spikes, a lot of which is caused by manipulation
by OPEC and the increased demand for oil in China. What have
you been doing, diplomatically, to persuade the leaders of
OPEC, at this time of very high energy prices, to increase
their production?
Secretary Rice. Senator, on the last question, we,
obviously, have been talking to the OPEC producers, and they, I
think, would agree that very high oil prices, while good for
budgets for them, are a threat to the international economy,
and so, therefore, concerned about that. I think it's also the
case that with oil prices very high, they have an incentive to
produce.
The problem is that there is very strong demand pressure,
as you mentioned, from places like China and India and other
places. And so, our strategy has to be, over the long term, as
the President's energy bill would do, to diversify us and, in
fact, the rest of the world away from just hydrocarbons as the
energy supply, because these very fast-growing dynamic
economies, like China, if they have to depend simply on oil for
energy, we're going to continue to have a demand crunch.
The Saudis have said that they would try to increase
production over the longer term, but I think most people
believe these countries are running pretty hard to try to take
advantage of the very high prices.
As to the first statement, Senator, I think that we were
very clear that we wanted to liberate Iraq because Saddam
Hussein was a threat to peace and stability. He had been
sanctioned by numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, not
to mention probably some of the toughest sanctions that have
ever been put on a single state, because people thought he was
a threat to international peace and security. We all thought he
had weapons of mass destruction. And certainly those were the
basis of most of the resolutions. He had materially supported
terrorism. That was in the resolutions. He had attacked his
neighbors. He had used weapons of mass destruction against his
own people and his neighbors. He was fighting us over the skies
of southern and northern Iraq. So, he was a threat.
Having overthrown him, though, it was important to have a
vision for what we thought Iraq should be, not to just say,
``We've overthrown him, and now it's over.''
And in structuring that vision, we went to our principles,
and our principles say that the world is safer when democracy
spreads, and the world is less safe when democracy is in
retreat. That's what we've always believed. We've been right
about it across the world--in Europe, where we made that the
basis for a new Germany; in Asia, where we made it the basis
for a new Japan--and we're going to be right about it in Iraq,
where we've made it the basis for a new Iraq and, ultimately,
the basis for a new Middle East.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I hope the
Secretary is right. But to continue this kind of operation you
have to have the American people with you. I wore the uniform
of this country during a time in which we did not have the
support of the American people, and that didn't turn out too
good. And we don't want it to turn out like it did last time.
Secretary Rice. I agree, Senator. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Thank you very much, Secretary Rice.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. We appreciate a great hearing.
And the hearing is adjourned, and hopefully our staff can
expedite your way to the House.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Lugar
Question. On Sunday, October 16, the Washington Post Outlook
section featured a story about some of the Arabic linguist challenges
our foreign service is facing. It suggested only 27 FSO's were top-
rated Arabic speakers. How many of those have done tours in Baghdad?
Why is that number so low? (Perhaps a full breakdown would be helpful.)
Answer. Twenty-nine active-duty Foreign Service Generalists
currently speak and read at least one dialect of Arabic at a level 4/4
or better. An additional 192 Foreign Service Generalists speak and read
Arabic at least at the 3/3 level but below the 4/4 level (3/3, 3/4, 4/
3, etc.). In total 196 Foreign Service Generalist positions require
proficiency in Arabic, 91 of which require 3/3 or better proficiency.
Of the 29 advanced Arabic speakers, 11 have served in Iraq in the
last 3 years. All but two relatively junior employees have served in an
Arabic country, and many have served a significant portion of their
careers in Arabic-speaking countries. Currently, 14 are serving in
Arabic-speaking countries (including Chief of Mission in Sudan) and
only six are serving overseas in non-Arabic speaking countries (one of
whom serves as U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad and one as U.S. Ambassador
to the Gambia).
Eight Arabic-speaking posts--including Baghdad, Khartoum, Beirut,
and three posts in Saudi Arabia--are ``unaccompanied'' posts requiring
most employees to be separated from their families for long periods of
time. The conditions at many of the other Arabic-speaking posts involve
a high level of hardship and limits on educational and other
opportunities. It is appropriate that Foreign Service employees, even
those with the most advanced Arabic skills, serve some of their careers
outside the Arabic-speaking world, for service need reasons and career
development as well as for personal considerations.
Question. Some State Department jobs on the ground in Iraq have not
been filled, such as those with the State Embedded Teams with the major
subordinate commands. Other positions have been filled by junior
personnel who have volunteered. It is great that so many of our young
FSO's have signed up for these challenging assignments, sometimes for
repeat engagements. Nevertheless, the importance of this mission
demands our best, and Ambassador Khalilzad's Provincial Reconstruction
Team plan will need such assets to succeed. Have you considered using
``directed assignments'' to fill these critical jobs? In what sort of
situation would you use that authority?
Answer. The Department agrees that filling these critical jobs is
of the utmost importance. The Department has been very successful in
staffing the Embassy in Baghdad, including a current 90-percent fill
rate for senior and mid-level positions in the Embassy (due to training
and transfers the fill rate at most missions is not typically as high).
Although we have not always been able to fill positions for the
Regional Embassy Offices (REOs) and the State Embedded Teams (SETs) as
far in advance as we would like, we have ultimately been able to fill
the vast majority of these positions, albeit sometimes with officers at
a lower personal grade than the position. In the REO/SETs we currently
have 92 percent of the 47 positions filled. All officers, and
particularly entry-level officers, being proposed for service in the
REO/SETs are vetted through several offices in the Department for
suitability, past performance and experience. In the case of entry-
level we also consider what life/work experiences they brought with
them into the Department.
Given our past successes, we have every confidence that the men and
women of the Foreign Service will continue to answer the call for our
best to serve in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Secretary has the authority
and tools in place to direct assignments should critical vacancies not
be filled through the normal assignment processes. The Department is
prepared to do so should it become necessary.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Biden
Question. Beyond the holding of elections, which I agree are very
important, what measures should the American people use to tell whether
or not our policies are succeeding in Iraq?
Answer. The Department of Defense, in close consultation with the
Department of State, has submitted an October 2005 Report to Congress,
``Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,'' in accordance with
Conference Report 109-72 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2005. I refer you to this report, which outlines USG efforts to develop
and use metrics in assessing progress toward achieving our objectives
in Iraq. The report's overview states ``the broad purpose of the
strategy is to assist in creating an Iraq that is at peace with its
neighbors, is an ally in the war on terror, has a representative
government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and has
security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny a safe haven
for terrorists in Iraq.''
The report may be viewed at the following website: http://
www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html. In addition,
we suggest you review the State Department's ``Iraq Weekly Status
Report'' available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/
2005/.
Question. Recently you said during an appearance on Fox News Sunday
that, ``There is no political base any longer for this insurgency,''
and that, ``The political process will sap the energy from this
insurgency because an insurgency cannot ultimately survive without a
political base.''
If there is no longer a political base for the insurgency,
how quickly should we expect it to diminish?
How should we measure whether or not the insurgency has a
political base?
Is it possible that the insurgency could stay at the same
level or even increase while at the same time Sunnis are
participating in the political process?
Do you have an estimate of how Sunnis voted on the
Constitution. Was it more like 90-10 against, or more like 60-
40 against? How do you read that?
Answer. The insurgency has relied on intimidation and terror as a
means of operating against the Iraqi people, Iraqi security forces, and
the coalition. Jihadist elements of the insurgency have correctly
identified democracy and the democratic process as the greatest threat
to their ambitions of ruling Iraq and using it as a base to attack
other regional states. Even Iraqis, who oppose what they see as
occupation, increasingly reject attacks that are more deadly to Iraqis
than coalition forces, widening a division between the terrorists and
those who have supported insurgent attacks against the coalition. As
more Iraqis are drawn into the political process and the building of a
free and democratic Iraq, the insurgency will be seen as increasingly
detrimental to the long-term interests of all Iraqis, including those
whose cities, towns, and villages the insurgency is now operating.
Evidence of the insurgency's loss of a political base was seen in the
turnout in the October 15, 2005, constitutional referendum and the
engagement of Sunni populations in peaceful political action. Turnout
in mostly Sunni Salah al-Din province exceeded that of many of the
provinces in the south, and turnout in mostly Sunni Al-Anbar province
was many times higher than what it was in January. While it is not
possible to give a precise estimate of its potential impact on the
insurgency, the December 15 election is likely to produce a Sunni Arab
leadership with a stake in the political system that is motivated to
oppose the insurgency, rather than tolerate or support it.
The October 15 referendum was a ``Yes'' or ``No'' vote, and the
ethnicity of voters is not recorded. The vote in mostly Sunni provinces
ranged from 3 percent in favor in Al-Anbar to 45 percent in favor in
Ninewa (Mosul). Endorsement of the draft constitution by the Iraqi
Islamic Party appears to have had an impact in persuading a number of
Sunnis, though not a majority, to vote in favor of the draft
constitution. Nationwide, most of the Sunni Arabs in Iraq who voted did
appear to have voted against the draft constitution. It is also true,
however, that most of Sunni Arabs voted in this referendum, a major
change in their position since the January election.
Question. I'd like to better understand the administration's
position on the federalism provisions of the Iraqi Constitution. The
President, in a recent speech, said the following: ``. . . democratic
federalism is the best hope for unifying a diverse population, because
a federal constitutional system respects the rights and religious
traditions of all citizens.'' This appeared to be a not so subtle
endorsement of the Constitution's federalism provisions. In recent
remarks at Princeton, you said: ``. . . it needs to remain a unified
Iraq, a united Iraq . . . it cannot be several Iraqs.'' While not
necessarily contradictory, you clearly emphasized the need for Iraq's
unity. Over the past several weeks, as I understand it, our Ambassador
has been largely focused on convincing Kurds and Shi'a to address Sunni
concerns. I think he has done a superb job after having been handed a
tall order.
But there appears to be a certain degree of schizophrenia in the
attitude toward federalism. Yesterday, a Washington Post editorial
said: ``It is certainly the case that . . . Zalmay Khalilzad has been
working as hard, or harder, than any Iraqi politician to forge an
agreement among Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. Yet at other times President
Bush and his senior aides publicly praise and defend the extreme form
of `federalism' written into the Constitution by Shiites and Kurds--
even though it is that agenda that fuels Sunni opposition and threatens
to tear the country apart.''
What is our position on the provisions related to federalism
in the current draft of the Iraqi Constitution?
Answer. The provisions of the Iraqi Constitution, including those
related to federalism, are for the Iraqi people to decide. We continue
to support the principles outlined in UNSCR 1546 and to work with the
Government of Iraq to develop a federal, democratic, pluralistic, and
unified Iraq.
Due to the horrific repression and violence visited upon the Iraqi
people by the former dictatorial regime, many Iraqis believe it is very
important to ensure that the Iraqi Government never again becomes a
tool of repression. The Iraqi draft constitution has several provisions
related to this objective, including those that establish a democratic
electoral system implemented by an independent electoral authority;
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and independent
judicial branches of the national government; and federalism through
local governments with defined authority that are directly answerable
to the local population.
Some Iraqis, in particular some Sunni Arabs, believe that the
federalism provisions in the draft constitution may lead Iraq to break
apart. I believe exactly the opposite. While much about federalism
remains to be decided by the Iraqi people as they interpret, implement,
and possibly amend their Constitution, the federalism articles and
other provisions will contribute to the belief by a number of Iraqi
communities that they need not attempt to break from Iraq to avoid a
repetition of Iraq's unfortunate history. In other words, it may be
these federalism provisions that keep Iraq together.
The Iraqi central government under the draft constitution is hardly
powerless. All regions and governorates must comply fully with the
provisions of the federal Constitution. All of Iraq's oil and gas
resources belong to all of the Iraqi people. The central government has
full and exclusive authority over the formulation of national security
policy, foreign policy, and fiscal/monetary policy. The national
legislature is responsible for promulgating a law that will define the
procedures to form any new regions.
In fact, evidence suggests that the various Iraqi communities are
participating in a unified Iraq: Iraqi Kurds, the community many
observers have seen as most likely to attempt to leave Iraq, are
instead heavily engaged in national politics. Iraqi Kurds serve as the
President, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and several other
senior posts in the national government. High voter turnout in the
predominantly Sunni western provinces during the constitutional
referendum demonstrated a willingness of Sunni Arab Iraqis to
participate in the political process.
Question. The Constitution doesn't permit amendments to the very
substantial powers of regions unless the regions agree.
Would the administration support the federalism provisions
staying as is, with implementing legislation that essentially
codifies those provisions as drafted?
Answer. The draft constitution states in Article 122 ``Articles of
the Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes away from
the powers of the regions that are not within the exclusive powers of
the federal authorities except by the consent of the legislative
authority of the concerned region and the approval of the majority of
its citizens in a general referendum.'' Separately, a provision in the
agreed October modifications to the Constitution suspends Article 122
of the Constitution until amendments arising out of a special and
temporary mechanism ``have been decided upon.''
We believe that the current draft constitution provides a basis for
Iraq to establish a federal and united state. How these provisions are
interpreted and implemented will determine the reality on the ground.
Again, these are matters for the Iraqi people to decide.
Question. What is the administration's position on the creation of
a strongly autonomous nine-province ``super region'' in southern Iraq
as one powerful Iraqi politician has proposed? What relationship would
you expect between that region and Iran?
Answer. This will be a decision for the Iraqi people. In making
this decision, they will need to consider, among other things, whether
such a large region would be the best way to ensure efficient and
responsive governance.
Under the draft constitution, the national government has exclusive
authority over the formulation of foreign policy. I do not believe that
Iraqis in the south, or anywhere else in Iraq, seek or would accept the
domination or interference of Iran in their country.
The United States understands that it is important that Iraq have
good and transparent relations with Iran.
Question. Which countries in the region support the current
federalism provisions in the Constitution? Which countries have
expressed concerns about them?
Answer. Most countries in the region have congratulated the Iraqi
people on the completion of the constitution drafting and the
referendum of a few days ago, but--appropriately--have not taken a
stance on the substance of individual provisions of the draft
constitution.
However, all of Iraq's neighbors agreed to the statement from the
June 2005 International Conference on Iraq in Brussels, which ``. . .
expressed support for Iraqi efforts to achieve a democratic, pluralist,
and unified Iraq, with a federal structure if so decided by the Iraqi
people.''
Question. Have you heard some Sunnis express support for a regional
entity based in western Iraq? What would be the likely political
orientation of a Sunni ``ministate''? Are you concerned that it might
have close ties to foreign jihadists as seems to be the case today in
key parts of western and central Iraq?
Answer. We have heard a few Iraqi Sunni Arabs discuss such a
possibility. Iraqis, including insurgents through their public
statements consistently reject ties to foreign jihadists. At this time,
I do not believe the formation of such a region would significantly
affect the larger political and security issues in Iraq: Iraqis much
reach a national accord that respects and represents the interests of
all Iraqis. We will continue to work with the GOI to encourage an
inclusive political process to that end.
Question. Many liberal, secular Iraqis who supported the war have
expressed deep disappointment over the Constitution. In addition to
concerns over federalism, they are worried about the door being opened
to the application of Shari'a and the possible limitations on women's
rights.
What steps do you intend to take to ensure that women do not
end up in a situation where they have fewer rights than they
did before the war?
Answer. Women in Iraq, and all Iraqis for that matter, now have
rights and freedoms not known to them under the former regime. Iraqis,
representing Iraq's diverse communities, were successful in forging a
compact that not only embodies fundamental democratic and human rights
principles, but also makes special mention of the rights and privileges
afforded to women. The Constitution provides that all Iraqis,
regardless of gender, are equal before the law and that there is equal
opportunity for all citizens. Both men and women have the right to
participate in public affairs and enjoy full political rights,
including voting, nomination for public office, and serving in public
office. In this Constitution, women are allowed to transmit citizenship
to their children--something many constitutions of other states in the
region do not provide. The Constitution contains a provision, similar
to the one in the Transitional Administrative Law, whereby the
electoral law for the Council of Representatives aims to achieve the
goal of women constituting no less than one-quarter of the Council's
members.
Our goal in Iraq remains to support Iraqis as they build democratic
institutions and a thriving civil society that promote and protect the
rights of all Iraqis on an equal basis. Through programs sponsored by
USAID and the Department of State, including the $10 million Iraqi
Women's Democracy Initiative, we are conducting activities designed to
improve the status of women and securing the rights of women in the new
democracy. Grantees under this Initiative have provided Iraqi women
with leadership training. A large proportion of these women were
included in registered political entity lists for the January 30
elections and at least 40 percent of women Transitional National
Assembly (TNA) members were trained with funds under this Initiative.
We continue to organize conferences for various women's groups to
facilitate and ensure their fully informed participation in the
political process. At the same time, we continue to provide
opportunities for public speaking, and training in media skills,
coalition-building, and networking, with a focus on legal, judicial,
and constitutional reform. We also supported the establishment of a
women's advocacy group, the purpose of which is to lobby Iraqi
Government officials, politicians, and community leaders to support
interpretations of legislation that would enshrine human rights
protections in the Iraqi Constitution, including the rights of women.
In addition, a USAID partner organized an Engendering the
Constitution Committee that includes members from government and
nongovernmental organizations. The committee worked to ensure the
inclusion of gender considerations in the draft constitution. We also
conducted a technical analysis of the Constitution, focusing on
numerous legal implications of its applications vis-a-vis women's
rights. A multiparty women's caucus has also been created to bring
women from different political parties together to seek agreement on
points related to protecting women's rights. USAID and the Department
of State will continue to find successful programs and establish new
programs that will focus on guaranteeing legislation that protects the
rights of all Iraqis. Our focus in the coming months is to continue to
support programs that empower women and ensure that they play an active
role in building a strong economically viable and pluralistic society.
This will include expansion of previous programs plus training of new
female Parliamentarians, support of judicial watchdog organizations,
judicial training, and access to cutting edge skills for women to
enhance their economic opportunities.
We recognize there is concern about interpretation and
implementation of some articles, specifically the role of the religious
and civil courts. Article 39 of the Constitution clearly states that
``Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status
according to their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices and that shall
be regulated by law.'' This article specifically provides freedom of
choice for all Iraqis with respect to their personal status. The
Constitution provides a sound basis for the protection of women's
rights, and while the Constitution leaves certain issues to the new
government to implement, we will continue to work with the Iraqi
Government to ensure the protection of the rights and principles
guaranteed in their Constitution. We intend to continue our engagement
with Iraqi Government, civil society, and women leaders as they
continue to advocate for the rights of Iraqi women.
Question. Eight months ago, I asked you about foreign offers to
train Iraqi Security Forces. Three months later, you replied that the
Iraqis had not yet responded to the French and Egyptian offers to train
substantial numbers of Iraqi Security Forces. My understanding is that
they still have not responded.
Please describe any steps the administration has taken to encourage
the Iraqi Government to accept these offers.
Could you provide an updated, comprehensive list of offers to train
Iraqi Security Forces, a description of the specific offers that were
made, and what steps we have taken in each instance to facilitate
delivery of the offer?
Answer. Many countries have made offers to train Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF), both inside and outside of Iraq. Iraqi Government
officials have stated their perception that out-country training is
disruptive and expressed their preference for in-country training of
ISF. We have supported the Iraqi Government preference for in-country
training, while we have encouraged Iraqi officials to also seriously
consider out-country training opportunities and we have emphasized to
donor countries that Iraq prefers in-country training. The Iraqi
Government has the final decision in bilateral agreements.
Nevertheless, the Government of Iraq has accepted some ISF training
opportunities outside of Iraq. We are aware of training in many of the
countries:
(1) Egypt is hosting ongoing ISF training.
(2) Germany has conducted, and continues to conduct training for
both the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) under bilateral agreements. The UAE provides
transportation and facilitates; Germany provides equipment and
instructors. Belgium has pledged to send 15 to 20 trainers to assist in
the effort and may increase that commitment.
(3) Greece has offered to train military doctors.
(4) Jordan provides pilot and crew training for the UH-1
helicopter, C-130 aircraft and other training for Iraqi officers and
senior Non-Commissioned Officers. Jordan also hosts the International
Police Training Center where police trainers from 16 countries
(including Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Jordan, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) teach
basic police skills.
(5) France has offered to provide gendarme training for the ISF.
(6) Italy has trained Iraqi staff officers at the Italian War
College. Italy's Chief of Police has expressed interest in training
Iraqi police in antiterrorism and organized crime; the Iraqis have not
made a policy decision on that offer.
(7) Malaysia has shown a willingness to provide ISF training.
Malaysia also offered to train Iraqi Government officials at their
Civil Service Institute and the Iraqi Government has agreed to send
some civil servants to Malaysia for training.
(8) King Mohammed VI of Morocco offered ISF training at all
Moroccan training centers and institutes.
(9) NATO has opened a training facility just outside of Baghdad,
where it conducts training for junior and senior officers. The
following countries have contributed officers to the NATO Training
Mission in Iraq (NTM-I): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States. However, all 26 NATO allies are providing equipment or
financial contributions to the mission. Iraqis also attend NATO schools
outside of Iraq.
NTM-I has also requested all 26 NATO allies to provide training
courses to the ISF under the following categories: Police and Strategy;
Intelligence; Management; Training; Finance, Budgeting and Programs;
Acquisition, Logistics and Equipment; Infrastructure; Communication,
Command and Control; General; Army; Air Force; and Public Affairs.
Furthermore, the United States is supporting this NATO training
requirement by encouraging non-NATO allied countries to make training
contributions as well.
(10) The Netherlands has conducted Junior Officer leadership
courses for Iraqis.
(11) Spain is currently training ISF on demining techniques.
(12) Slovakia is training ISF in specialized Military Police
training.
(13) Turkey has trained Iraqi officers in crowd and riot control
and is scheduled to offer courses this year in military observer
training, combating smuggling and trafficking, and internal security.
Turkey has also offered several courses for 2006, ranging from border
security to explosive ordnance detection.
Both MNF-I and our Embassy in Baghdad are ready to support any
offer by our allies to contribute to the MNF-I and MNSTC-I programs to
train the ISF. However, the Iraqi Government and its allies are free to
conclude their own bilateral agreements. We will offer the Iraqi
Government resources and expertise to assist them in evaluating and
facilitating bilateral training offers where possible.
Question. You stated in your testimony that ``Now our police
training efforts are receiving new levels of attention.'' Could you
elaborate? What are we doing differently? Please describe the training
program? Please describe the field training program for new recruits?
How many international police trainers are involved in the field
training program? How long is the program? What is the budget for the
police training program? How much has the United States contributed and
how much do we plan to contribute?
Answer. Our underlying objective of training 135,000 Iraqi police
by March 2007 remains unchanged. Basic police training continues at the
Jordan International Police Training Center and at several sites
throughout Iraq. The police training effort is moving to a new level in
several respects, however. Basic police skills training will be
expanded from 8 to 10 weeks in duration in the near future. Specialized
and technical training programs are being delivered to build police
institutional capacity for management, supervision, and a range of
required operational police skills. With the exception of Basra, where
British civilian police experts are mentoring Iraq civilian police, all
police technical assistance, training, and mentoring in Iraq is
furnished by 500 U.S. International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) and
259 U.S. international police trainers (IPTs). Operational difficulties
emanating from the insurgency have delayed full implementation of a
planned traditional field training program by the IPLOs. Alternatively,
using these personnel, CENTCOM has developed and is using innovative
field training and mentoring techniques suitable to the current
conditions. For example, the nascent CENTCOM Police Partnership Program
(P\3\) embeds IPLOs and IPTs within small military teams in order to
work with local police stations to deliver technical assistance and on-
the-ground training to operational police units in selected areas. In
conjunction with MNF-I, Embassy Baghdad is moving to develop and deploy
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) that will include additional
police and other criminal justice development advisors to assist police
stations and districts at the local level as well as prosecutors and
judges. The U.S. budget for the Iraq police training program in both
Jordan and Iraq for FY06 is $530.7 million. Since 2003, the United
States has expended more than $1.1 billion in training the Iraq police.
In addition, the U.S. military has supplied uniforms, weapons, and
refurbished police infrastructure.
Question. Two years ago, international donors gathered in Madrid
and made pledges for Iraq's reconstruction. Delivery of these pledges
has been slow and was the subject of discussions during the June
conference in Brussels.
(a) How much of the $13.6 billion pledged at the Madrid donors'
conference has been disbursed?
(b) What is the administration doing to encourage our allies to
make good on their promises.
Answer. According to our estimates, through the middle of October,
other donors have disbursed about $3 billion from their treasuries for
assistance in Iraq through deposits to the United Nations and World
Bank trust funds, through bilateral projects, or through U.N. agencies
for implementation.
The administration is actively engaged with the Iraqi Government
and with other donors to persuade donors to make good on their pledges
and encourage greater support for Iraq's transition. Senior
administration officials regularly raise the issue with our allies and
potential donors. In addition to these frequent contacts, there have
been four meetings of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility
for Iraq (IRFFI) since Madrid in October 2003: In Abu Dhabi, Doha,
Tokyo, and the Dead Sea, Jordan. These meetings have proved venues for
donors to engage with senior Iraqi Government officials and discuss
assistance strategies. At these meetings, donors have announced
disbursements, and made some additional pledges. We envision a
continuation of the IRFFI conferences and increased engagement with the
newly elected Iraqi Government early next year. The Department will
continue to work with other donors and with the Government of Iraq to
encourage timely, effective, and well-coordinated disbursements of
assistance.
Question. You stated in response to my question about a British
proposal to partner countries with individual Ministries or clusters of
Ministries, that ``the Brussels conference did give specific
arrangements that countries were prepared to take with various
Ministries, with various Departments, with various sectors of the
economy.'' Could you elaborate on these arrangements? Which countries
have partnered with which Iraqi Ministries? What is their strategy in
each case? How many personnel and financial resources have they devoted
to the effort?
Answer. A number of countries have expressed interest in helping
the Iraqis build their governing capacity, both at the national and
local level. At Brussels, and at the follow-on Dead Sea meeting of the
International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) Review
Board meeting, Iraq outlined its national development priorities,
including for capacity-building.
Iraq has followed up on these meetings by organizing, in
cooperation with the United Nations, an international donors'
coordination mechanism in Baghdad, which in turn has set up sectoral
working groups. These working groups have fostered a multilateral
approach, under which donors coordinate their policy and development
assistance in individual sectors. Four have begun to meet, in the areas
of health, education, electricity, and rule of law. One of the key
topics ITG representatives and donors discuss are specific ways to
build capacity.
We will continue to work with Iraq and our international partners
to develop programs. To date, several countries have expressed interest
in participating in capacity-building activities, including Canada, the
United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Poland, and the Netherlands, in addition
to support from the World Bank and United Nations. As Iraqi priorities
become clearer, we hope that donors will step forward and identify
Ministries with which they are willing to work on concrete projects,
and we will encourage such developments. To date, no final agreements
have been reached on such proposals.
Question. Which countries who are now part of the coalition with
military personnel in Iraq have informed you or the Iraqis that they
will be withdrawing their forces? Please provide a list, naming each
country, its contribution, and when it has indicated it will withdraw
its forces.
Answer. The coalition in Iraq has remained at or about 30 nations.
NATO is also on the ground in Iraq. Our coalition partners have been
steadfast, courageous, and determined despite the fact that many are
also overextended and facing increasing domestic pressure. All
coalition partners, including the United States, look forward to the
day when Iraqis can secure Iraq. Yet, together, we remain committed to
creating the conditions and stable environment that will permit all
troops to return home.
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg has declared that Norway
will withdraw its six officers from the Multinational Force-Iraq and
its eight officers from the NATO Training Mission-Iraq by the end of
the year. We are aware of no other nations that have plans to withdraw
from Iraq.
At the same time, in the past days, Latvia has extended their
mandate for a year, Korea has agreed to protect U.N. workers, Mongolia
has offered additional commitments, Singapore has again decided to
redeploy a Landing Ship Transport (LST) and the associated 100-or-so
soldiers, and Tonga has expressed a desire to rejoin the coalition in
2006.
Question. The upcoming December elections and the agreement to
create a committee next year to recommend amendments to the
Constitution offers a chance--perhaps the last chance--to fully engage
Sunnis in the political process. Whether or not it succeeds depends
upon the degree to which Sunnis are convinced they can have a
meaningful stake in Iraq and protect their interests through politics.
And that, in turn, depends upon convincing Shiites and Kurds that it is
in their interest to compromise.
Please describe your strategy for involving Sunnis in the
political process and breaking them off from the insurgency.
Please describe your strategy for convincing the Kurds and
Shiites to compromise with the Sunnis.
Answer. As Sunni Arab Iraqis see that their interests are protected
through the political process--and that supporting or tolerating the
insurgents and terrorists only yields violence and death, breakdown of
public services, economic devastation and lawlessness--they will
continue to increasingly turn against the insurgents and terrorists.
The most important means to achieve this goal is to ensure that all
Iraqis have the opportunity to participate in selecting their leaders
in the December election. The choice of these leaders, and the conduct
of the election, is the responsibility of Iraqis. The United States
will continue to assist the electoral and security authorities, as
requested, to see that all Iraqis are able to participate safely in the
election.
Fortunately, we can already see that Iraqi Sunni Arabs understand
the importance of their participation in the political process. Sunni
Arab representatives participated in the writing of the draft
constitution, and secured several compromises. In contrast to the
January elections, the Independent Electoral Committee of Iraq (IECI)
reported significantly larger turnouts in Sunni majority regions in the
recent referendum. Sunni leaders are also organizing themselves to
participate in the December election, and it appears Sunnis will join
other Iraqis in voting in high numbers in the election. Changes in the
Iraqi electoral process make it more likely that the new Parliament
will have representation from all elements of Iraqi society.
Iraqi leaders of all communities understand that is in all Iraqis'
interests to ensure that Sunni Arabs (and all Iraqis) are represented,
and feel they are represented, in the Iraqi Government. We will
continue to encourage Iraqi leaders, including the Shi'a and Kurds, to
increase the participation of all communities in the political process
and the government. Leaders and members of all communities have
consistently told us they understand the need for full participation by
all and are continuing to conduct cross-sectarian political dialog.
Question. A united international front would make it easier for
Iraqis to make the hard compromises necessary for the political process
to trump violence. It was just that kind of strong international
pressure that forced the Shiites and Kurds to reverse their last minute
gambit to rig the referendum in their favor.
Will our Ambassador continue to be the primary interlocutor
during political negotiations in the coming months, or will you
attempt to get others to join him so that the effort is not
seen as exclusively American?
Answer. The United States continues to engage all international
partners--including regional states, coalition members, the United
Nations, NATO, and the European Union--in support of the political
process in Iraq.
We are in close touch with the United Nations and United Kingdom,
among others in Baghdad and elsewhere, to determine joint positions and
approaches to Iraqis on issues of shared concern. The U.K. Ambassador
and the U.N. Representative in Iraq both played key roles in achieving
the compromises that led to agreement on the Constitution. U.N.
advisers continue to work closely with Iraqis in arranging the
elections and training national assembly members and staff.
From September 29 to October 10, the Secretary's Senior Advisor and
Coordinator for Iraq traveled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan,
UAE, and Qatar to encourage those countries to become more involved in
reconstruction and stability efforts within Iraq and to play a helpful
political and security role.
Question. You stated in your testimony that as part of the
administration's new strategy to ``clear, hold, and build,'' that we
would have to clear ``the toughest places--no sanctuaries--as we
enlarge security in major urban areas and as the insurgents retreat,
they should find no large area where they can reorganize and operate
freely.'' Which areas would you describe as the ``toughest?'' Which
areas remain to be cleared?
Answer. The insurgency is primarily a Sunni Arab phenomenon and is
not a national movement; it has a very narrow base in the country. It
continues to be composed of semiautonomous and fully autonomous groups
with a variety of motivations. The insurgency remains concentrated in
Baghdad, Ninevah, Al-Anbar and Salah ad Din provinces. Multi-National
Force-Iraq operations have disrupted a number of key insurgent cells,
limited their freedom of action, and maintained cooperation with
influential local leaders in order to keep reconstruction and
democracy-building moving forward. A significant factor enabling
progress against the insurgency is the dramatic increase in
intelligence tips received from the population in the past several
months.
Question. We are receiving reports from Iraq which suggest militias
remain more powerful than Iraqi security forces. Obviously, Iraq cannot
become a united and stable country if the de facto powers on the ground
are a patchwork of militias.
Has the influence of militias waned or increased in recent
months? Are militias more powerful than Iraqi security forces
in places such as Basra?
Which militias are active in Baghdad and which areas of the
city do they control?
Who is the primary provider of security for the President--
Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, or the Pesh Merga?
Who is the primary provider of security for members of SCIRI
in the government--is it Iraqi security forces or the Badr
organization?
Who has the primary power in the Sadr City--Iraqi security
forces or the Mahdi army?
To what extent are Iraqi security forces comprised of former
militia members?
How many Iraqi security force units consist primarily of one
ethnic or sectarian group? How many units rated at being Level
I or Level II consist of primarily one ethnic or sectarian
group? Please identify these units and their composition.
Answer. We agree Iraq cannot become a united and stable country if
the de facto powers on the ground are a patchwork of militias.
Recruitment of militiamen into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has
helped the situation in recent months somewhat; however, there must be
a gradual process of weaning security forces drawn from militias away
from loyalty to their ethnic or religious group and fostering sole
loyalty to the Government of Iraq.
Beginning October 1, 2005, the ISF assumed responsibility for Iraqi
Presidential security. The Badr organization provides security for
government officials that are members of the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). In Sadr City the ISF is in control,
though the Mahdi army continues to maintain a presence.
At this time, specific data reflecting ethnic or sectarian
composition of Iraqi units is unavailable. Iraqi security personnel are
assigned to regional units within the guidelines of the Iraqi
Constitution. Specifically, Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution states:
``The Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Services will be composed of the
components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their
balance and representation without discrimination or exclusion.''
Trained Iraqi security personnel are usually assigned to the region
from which they are recruited. This practice often results in a force
composition which reflects the region protected.
Question. We have seen reports of sectarian violence in places such
as Samarra, Basra, and the area south of Baghdad. Some Iraqi officials
have told the committee that there is ``ethnic cleansing'' underway.
Please describe the extent of sectarian violence in Iraq.
What is the trend? Which areas have been most affected? What
has been the scale of population shifts? What effect has this
sectarian violence had on polarizing politics?
Answer. We monitor sectarian violence closely. Such violence is
deplorable and unjustifiable. Given the number of actors in Iraq, it is
sometimes difficult to categorize specific incidents as sectarian
violence, insurgent activity, or criminal violence, and I would defer
to the intelligence community for an assessment of the trend. I would
note, however, that the areas most affected are, not surprisingly,
those areas in which Iraqis of different ethnicities or sects are
intermixed.
Violence that appears to be sectarian-driven is indeed polarizing.
We and Iraqi leaders fear that such attacks may provoke retaliation,
which does not seem to have happened on a large scale. We support Iraqi
Government, as well as Iraqi religious, community, and political
leaders, as they work to prevent both attacks and retaliation. It is
very helpful that leaders from throughout Iraq--as well as members of
the international community--have urged Iraqis to exercise restraint
and to work toward comity among all Iraqi communities. We continue to
urge Iraqi leaders to speak out against all sectarian acts of
violence--to make clear that any such acts are anathema to all.
Ending such violence will require continued progress on the
political and security fronts. All communities will need to believe
their interests and safety can be protected and advanced by politics,
not violence. In this context, we are also urging Iraqis to focus on
policy-based, rather than identity-based, politics. At the same time,
Iraqi security services and justice system will continue to improve
their ability to prevent such attacks and to hold responsible any
attackers through the legal system.
Question. Iraqi journalists who recently visited the United States
and met with the President described to the committee a state of fear
on the ground. They indicated that militias--not Iraqi security
forces--were the main power in the streets. They said that fear of
retribution from militias who answer to political parties was
negatively impacting press freedom to the point where they felt that
they could not criticize political figures, the political process, or
even the Constitution. In fact, they indicated that the only party they
felt safe in criticizing was the United States. The administration has
cited the number of Iraqi publications as a ``striking indicator of the
growth of commercial and independent media.''
Can you comment on the state of press freedom in Iraq today?
Answer. A free, professional, and impartial press is essential to
the development of institutions of democratic civil societies. Its role
as the watchdog over government and in ensuring public accountability
is crucial. Iraq's press will play a crucial role as the nascent
democracy continues to develop.
The latest available figures show that over 200 newspapers and
other publications are currently published and distributed in the
country. In addition, Iraqi viewers now have more choice of broadcast
media than ever before; they appear to be watching pan-Arab media which
carries significant Iraq-focused content, as well as approximately
three dozen terrestrial and satellite channels that are attracting
audiences inside Iraq and, to some extent, neighboring countries. Among
the satellite offerings, perhaps fully half are still broadcasting from
outside Iraq, due to a combination of security, economic, and
political, and technical professional limitations on media.
These statistics demonstrate that Iraqi press is now enjoying
unprecedented freedom, despite many challenges. The rights to speak,
publish, and broadcast are being exercised with little or no
interference by the government. Despite threats of violence,
journalists frequently and openly criticize the government, government
Ministers and senior officials, with a freedom that is rare in the
region. Iraqi Ministers and Commissions (such as the Special Tribunal
and the Electoral Commission) routinely submit to critical questioning
by Iraq's media.
However, challenges remain. Many journalists have only limited
professional training. The unsettled security situation has hindered
media efforts in some areas. At least 22 journalists and media
assistants were killed or abducted during the year. There was some
self-censorship due to intimidation by politically affiliated militias
and insurgents. Despite the enabling legal framework, the lack of
independent commercial financing resulted in many media outlets being
affiliated with political parties and candidates.
We are working with other donors and the Iraqi Government to advise
on media regulatory issues, promote security to facilitate media
coverage, and provide training to ensure that Iraq continues to enjoy a
competent free press.
Question. A recent article in the New York Times on October 15,
2005, indicated that American and Syrian forces have engaged in at
least one clash along the border. The article contained conflicting
accounts of whether U.S. forces have actually entered Syrian territory.
Have U.S. military personnel entered Syria since the
invasion of Iraq in March 2003? If the answer is yes, please
elaborate with specific details.
Please provide details on the clash between U.S. and Syrian
forces along the Iraq-Syrian border.
Please describe Syria's involvement in Iraq. What do you
believe is the most effective way to influence Syrian behavior?
Since the administration began criticizing Syria's role in
Iraq, has Syrian behavior improved or worsen?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding the New York
Times article about Syrian border crossings. I can say that MNF-I
forces continually operate along the Iraqi-Syrian border and are
currently conducting operations there. We remained deeply concerned
about the Syrian Government's failure to contribute to Iraq stability.
There is little evidence to indicate that the regime in Damascus has
taken serious steps to curtail the flow of terrorist elements from its
territory into Iraq or to cease the use of Syrian territory as a base
for former Iraqi regime elements. In fact, the Syrians have not
demonstrated a willingness to meaningfully address or assume
accountability for these issues as well as others that we have brought
to their attention, beginning with the then-Secretary Powell's visit to
Syria in May 2003. I have repeatedly called for Syrian action,
including at the Brussels Conference in June and as I stated in my
opening statement today. The international community, not just the
United States, has made its dissatisfaction with Syrian behavior known
on many occasions. In order to be a proper participant in this
international community, Syria must do more.
Question. Iran is said to have close ties to key actors in the
Iraqi Shi'a establishment. Reports indicate that Iran has engaged in an
intensive effort to extend its influence in southern Iraq in
particular. The British Government recently pointed to Iran as the
source of explosives technology which killed eight British soldiers.
Please describe Iran's role in Iraq.
What do you believe is Iran's strategic objective?
Does Iran have influence with elements of the Shi'a
community? Who are they?
How do you believe Iran's negative role can be curtailed?
How can it be induced to use its influence with the Shi'a to
play a more positive role?
Answer. CLASSIFIED.
Question. What has Turkey told us of its concerns in Iraq? How have
we responded?
Answer. Turkey shares our goal of a democratic, stable, and unified
Iraq, but is concerned that political divisions in Iraq will lead to an
independent Kurdish state. We are working with Turkey and with Iraq
against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)'s presence in Iraq.
We have also organized trilateral discussions that encourage direct
cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. We believe this approach
strengthens Iraqi Government sovereignty, which advances our goal of a
unified Iraq.
Question. One of the problems with our reconstruction efforts in
Iraq has been the large percentage of contracts that has gone to
expensive international contractors who have charged huge premiums for
security. By some estimates, these charges have amounted to 25-40
percent of the value of some contracts. Iraqi contractors, on the other
hand, are able to operate more freely. And using them has the benefit
of stimulating the local economy and boosting employment.
Can you provide detail on steps that you have taken to
transfer contracts to Iraqi businesses?
Of the more than $20 billion appropriated for reconstruction
activity in Iraq, what is the total value of contracts that
have gone to Iraqis in nonsecurity areas?
What contracts with international companies have you
cancelled in order to transfer business to Iraqis, and what was
their value?
Answer. We have accelerated efforts to shift to more cost-
effective, fixed-price contracts directly with local Iraqi firms. We
have also shifted more funds into a pilot program to provide grants
directly to capable Iraqi Ministries that enable Ministry staff to
manage projects directly, increasing Iraqi participation and lowering
project costs. The effects of these reforms will become clearer in the
coming months. According to the Embassy, no contracts have been
cancelled in order to transfer business to Iraqis.
The Project and Contracting Office has sought to maximize the use
of local Iraqi firms wherever possible. Between 40 to 50 percent of
PCO's IRRF construction projects completed or now underway have been
contracted directly to Iraqi firms. PCO expects an even higher
percentage of future projects to be contracted directly to Iraqi firms.
Iraqi firms receive between 20 and 25 percent of the dollar value of
construction projects underway or completed, either under direct
contracts or under subcontracts with Design-Build contractors.
Question. A USA Today story on October 10 said that U.S.
reconstruction resources are drying up, mostly due to skyrocketing
security costs.
How much of the money Congress appropriated for
reconstruction has been spent or obligated?
How much additional international assistance does Iraq
require in the coming year? In the next 3 years?
Does the administration plan to ask Congress for additional
resources for Iraq? If so, how much? If you have not decided,
when will you plan to make such a decision?
What is your current estimate of the cost of security as a
percentage of reconstruction contracts in Iraq?
What is the average security-related delay in reconstruction
spending?
If contracts are unable to be carried out due to security,
does the U.S. Government continue to pay the contractor? Please
provide an estimate of the amount of money which has been lost
due to delays in spending?
Answer. As of October 19, of the $20.9 billion in U.S. assistance
funds (IRRF I and IRRF II) allocated to reconstruction, we had
obligated to projects over $17.1 billion (82 percent) and disbursed
over $11.2 billion (54 percent).
The October 2003 Joint Needs Assessment prepared by the United
Nations and the World Bank prior to the 2003 Madrid Donors Conference
estimated Iraq's assistance needs to be approximately $56 billion.
While we have learned much and the situation on the ground has changed
since the time of this assessment, it illustrates that Iraq's
assistance needs are immense. We expect that Iraq will continue to
require major donor assistance over the next several years.
The IRRF programs have created a solid base on which to achieve our
long-term goal of a stable, prosperous, and democratic Iraq, but many
challenges remain. We expressed some of these needs in the President's
FY 2006 Budget request of $459 million, which the recent House-Senate
Foreign Operations appropriations conference funded at $61 million in
ESF and allowed the potential for some funding in INL. It is too early
to speculate on what the President may decide regarding future funding
requests.
The terms of individual contracts determine whether the U.S.
Government continues to pay contractors if they are unable to perform
their contracts due to security concerns. Some contracts provide that
they may be terminated if security risks are too high to permit
performance.
Currently, an estimated 16-22 percent of each IRRF construction
project goes to providing direct security for both the implementing
partner and the project itself. This represents an increase of 7-11
percent from originally estimated costs and does not include indirect
costs caused by delays related to security. We are currently refining
our understanding of these indirect costs, and plan to provide further
information on this subject in our next quarterly report to Congress on
the IRRF, due January 5, 2006.
Question. Please provide the committee with a breakdown by Iraqi
governorate of both obligated and committed U.S. funds across the
country. What is the strategy behind that spending? Is the strategy to
spend funds equitably? Is the strategy to spend more money in those
areas with greatest needs? Is more money spent in areas where the
security environment is more favorable to reconstruction or is the
strategy to spend more money and show more progress in those areas with
the greatest insurgent activity?
Answer. We seek to help foster a single national identity in Iraq
that brings about stability and cooperation across Iraq's diverse
political and cultural landscape. We are continuing to work to ensure
we make best use of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to
support Iraq's reconstruction. We have dedicated considerable resources
to addressing enormous national infrastructure needs in the energy,
water and sanitation, transportation, and education sectors. We have
also spent considerable sums on national democracy programs and Iraqi
security forces. These services will benefit all of Iraq's people.
U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts have not been restricted to
areas where the security environment is more favorable. Indeed, our
strategy includes undertaking major projects in areas where the
security environment is very challenging, such as Sadr City. We
continue to fund projects in these areas because we recognize the
importance of those projects to the overall success of our mission in
Iraq. The more we can do in these very challenging areas, the greater
the confidence the local populace will have in the Iraqi Government.
The Department will seek to respond to your request for a breakdown
of U.S. assistance programs, by governorate, more completely by the end
of November.
[Editor's note.--The answer submitted at a later date to the above
request follows:]
Last fall, the Department promised to respond to your request for a
breakdown of U.S. assistance programs by governorate. We are pleased to
provide the attached set of seven maps, which provide an indicative
picture of the distribution of construction programs in the following
sectors of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF): Electricity;
water and sanitation; justice, public safety, infrastructure and civil
society; oil; roads, bridges and construction (including school
projects); transportation and telecommunications; and health.
The totals in each of the sectors are current as of February 11,
2006, and do not include overhead or contingency reserve funds, or
projects which have not yet been obligated. They also do not include
construction contracts issued through the Multinational Strategic
Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which deal with the security sector of
the IRRF. The distribution may change as remaining IRRF funds are
obligated.
IRRF programs are designed, after consulting with Iraqi
authorities, first and foremost according to what is needed to
facilitate Iraq's transition to self-reliance and prosperity. Equitable
geographic distribution is a factor in this process, but is not the
sole determinant for any IRRF project.
[Editor's note.--The maps provided could not be converted for print
and will be maintained in the committee's permanent files.]
Question. I have heard reports that a U.S. Government contractor is
importing ice to Baghdad from Kuwait. And that 70 percent of that ice
melts by the time it reaches the Iraqi capital. Can you confirm this
and provide any details on this particular contract? If it is accurate
that we are importing ice by air, why are U.S. contractors not buying
Iraqi ice?
Answer. We have made inquiries and raised your question with the
Embassy in Baghdad, but we have not located any information about the
report you received concerning a U.S. Government contractor importing
ice from Kuwait to Iraq. We will gladly follow up any additional
information you provide us about this specific report.
Question. Could you please provide for the record, the current
status in each of the following areas, our goal in each area, and the
date by which you plan to achieve that goal.
1. Iraqi Police Force on duty trained to Level I
2. Iraqi Armed Forces on duty trained to Level I
3. Border Patrol on duty trained to Level I
4. Total Iraqi Security Forces on duty trained to Level I
5. Crude Oil Production
6. Crude Oil Exports in million barrels per day
7. Amount of electricity in MW generated nationwide
8. Amount of electricity in MW generated in Baghdad
9. Average hours of electricity per day nationwide
10. Average hours of electricity per day in Baghdad
11. Average megawatt hours generated
12. Iraqi unemployment
13. Total non-American aid disbursed to Iraqi reconstruction
14. Percentage of sewage treated nationwide
15. Sewage treatment projects completed
16. Percentage of drinking water that is potable
17. Water treatment projects completed
Answer.
1-4. Iraqi security forces
Standing up Iraqi security forces is an important part of the
administration's transition strategy in Iraq. With USG assistance, the
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces continue to make
progress in their ability to provide security for the Iraqi people.
Ministry of Interior
The Iraqi Police Force is trained to enforce the law, safeguard the
public, and provide internal security at the local level. Currently the
Iraqi Police Force is over 70,000 strong and projected to reach its
full complement of 135,000 by February 2007. Over 17,000 Border Police
have been trained and equipped, and the Government of Iraq has
authorized a total force of more than 28,000 Border Police, which
MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by May 2006. For police and border
forces, we do not apply the metrics used for Defense forces (Level I,
II, etc.).
Ministry of Defense
The training progress of Iraqi Armed Forces should be considered in
a broader context. The most accurate measure of progress is the number
of Iraqi units that lead planning and successful execution of
counterinsurgency operations with minimal assistance of coalition
forces (Level II). At this level, Iraqi units control their areas of
responsibility, and it is at this level where there has been steady
progress.
Currently more than 80,000 Iraqis have been trained as members of
the military forces. In several parts of Iraq, Iraqi forces have
already taken responsibility for security. One MOD battalion operates
fully independently of MNF-I forces and has the lead in one province.
Within 6 months, we expect a significant percentage of Iraqi MOD forces
will achieve Level II readiness.
5-6. Oil
Crude Oil Production
Iraqi production averaged 2.11 million barrels per day (BPD) for
the first 10 months of 2005, including an average of 1.94 million
barrels per day in October 2005. The goal is to produce 2.8 million BPD
by December 2006.
Crude Oil Exports
Iraq exported an average of 1.42 million BPD for the first 10
months of 2005, including an average of 1.24 million BPD in October
2005. The goal is to export 2.0 million BPD by December 2006.
Iraq's ability to meet production and export targets is impacted by
two factors:
Insurgent attacks, especially on the northern pipeline,
which have led to lower production and exports, and a resultant
$2.2 billion in foregone revenue for the first 9 months in
2005.
The deterioration of its oil and gas infrastructure over the
last 25 years, including mismanagement of reservoirs, corrosion
of pipelines and facilities, and damage after three wars and
looting.
We are working with the Iraqi Government to address infrastructure
security issues through the creation of dedicated security units
(Strategic Infrastructure Battalions) to protect key oil and energy
infrastructure nodes and routes, and by physically hardening key
infrastructure points. USG projects in the oil sector are intended to
eliminate logistical bottlenecks and to improve infrastructure for
production and exports. The two most important projects are the
rehabilitation of the Rumaila field to restore reservoir pressure and
the reconnection of pipelines across the Tigris River at the al-Fathah
crossing. These projects are scheduled to be completed in the second
quarter of 2006.
7-11. Electricity
Under USG programs ($5.2 billion in funds from IRRF 1 and 2),
nearly 1,660 megawatts (MW) of new electricity generation capacity has
been added, and we have increased the reliability of 1,100 MW in
generation. Power in Iraq has generally averaged over 12 hours per day
during July-November 2005, although power availability in Baghdad is
often lower due to insurgent attacks on transmission and fuel
infrastructures and to unequal power sharing by southern governorates.
The USG is working with the Ministry of Electricity to strengthen
technical skills and implement a fuel strategy to improve the
efficiency and sustainability of power plants.
Peak generation nationwide (megawatts, MW)
Peak generation nationwide for November 1-7 averaged 4,200 MW. The
goal for peak generation by end of December 2005 is 5,500 MW.
Peak generation in Baghdad area (MW)
Baghdad area generation includes five power plants near the city.
Because Iraq's electricity is one network (excluding imports), power
generated throughout the country supplies all geographical locations.
Peak generation for Baghdad for November 1-7 averaged 810 MW. There are
no set goals for Baghdad area plants. Current generation levels are
significantly below the plants capacities because of ongoing fall
maintenance, the overall deteriorated condition of the plants,
insufficient skills within the Ministry of Electricity to perform
required operations and maintenance, and the continued interdiction of
fuel supplies.
Hours of electricity per day nationwide
The daily hours of electricity nationwide for November 1-7 averaged
14.6 hours. The goal for hours of electricity by the end of December
2005 is 12 hours, although insurgent attacks may impact performance of
this sector.
Hours of electricity per day in Baghdad
Baghdad's daily hours of power, in general, have been severely
limited by continuing attacks on the high voltage transmission lines
and fuel supply infrastructure. The daily hours of power in Baghdad for
November 1-7 averaged 10.6 hours. The Iraqi Government's goal by the
end of December 2005 is 12 hours.
Electricity supplied nationwide (megawatt-hours, MWh)
The electricity supplied for November 1-7 averaged 91,000 MWh; the
goal by the end of December 2005 is 110,000 MWh.
12. Iraqi unemployment
We have not set a specific unemployment rate goal for Iraq. In
April 2004, the date of the most recent nationwide survey, the Central
Statistics Office estimated national unemployment at 22.5 percent
(including both job seekers and long-term unemployed). This survey
found much higher unemployment in some governorates, particularly among
the young.
Because unemployment provides a fertile breeding ground for
insurgents, we have made short-term job creation for youth a major
priority in our reconstruction assistance. IRRF projects directly
employ over 135,000 Iraqis at present. From August 2004 through
September 2005, USG managed reconstruction programs provided
approximately 4.6 million job opportunities to Iraqis, ranging from a
few weeks to 1 year in duration, making the USG one of the largest
employers in Iraq.
While short-term projects increase the number of employment
opportunities, creating longer term and full-time jobs is primarily the
task of Iraq's private sector. We are helping the Iraqi Government
address long-term job creation through programs aimed at strengthening
private sector development, lending programs and support for market-
oriented reforms.
13. Total non-American aid disbursed to Iraqi reconstruction
The entire international community will benefit from a stable,
democratic, prosperous Iraq, and so we encourage strong multilateral
support for Iraq's reconstruction. Our short-term goal is to ensure
full disbursement of the $13.5 billion pledged as quickly as possible.
The total non-American aid disbursed on Iraqi reconstruction, both to
the United Nations and World Bank trust funds and to bilateral
projects, was $3.14 billion as of October 19, 2005. We continue to
support Iraqi Government efforts to encourage countries and
international institutions to increase their pledges and disbursements
of funds already pledged. We are working to foster greater donor
coordination for assistance to Iraq.
14-17. Water
Percentage of sewage treated nationwide
Iraq's water and sanitation facilities currently operate at a
fraction of their prewar capacity due to years of neglect, electricity
shortages, and post-war looting. A June 2005 report from the Iraq
Ministry of Public Works and Municipalities (MMPW) states that sewage
treatment covers only 6 percent of the population, with the river
system receiving untreated waste from more than 20 million people. The
MMPW report estimates that 37 percent of all dwellings are connected to
a sewage system, mostly in the urban areas. According to the United
Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004
(ILCS 2004), 64 percent of households in Iraq are classified as having
``improved'' sanitation toilet facilities, which are defined as covered
dry pit latrines, latrines connected to a public sewage network, or
latrines connected to a septic tank.
Sewage treatment projects completed
Seven total major sewage or wastewater treatment facilities have
been rehabilitated to date in Iraq, including renovation of all three
sewage treatment plants in the city of Baghdad. The completion of
sewage and wastewater treatment projects to date has the capacity to
serve 7.3 million people in Iraq.
By the end of 2006, completion of additional U.S. projects are
expected to serve another 1.5 million Iraqis. Rehabilitation is
underway on a major sewage treatment plant in Karbala and is scheduled
for completion in February 2006. This treatment plant will have the
capacity to serve the population of Karbala, which is estimated at
approximately 550,000 people.
Percentage of drinking water that is potable
According to the June 2005 MMPW report, approximately 50 percent of
treated water that reaches a distribution system is lost due to
leakage.
There is little data available on water quality in Iraq, but the
MMPW report assumed that nearly all water used for drinking fails to
meet WHO standards due to poor operations and maintenance. According to
the ILCS 2004, which used the U.N. definition of safe sources for
drinking water, approximately 54 percent of households nationwide have
access to a safe and stable supply of drinking water, while 17 percent
of households have neither safe nor stable drinking water. Groundwater
in the governorate of Basrah is largely not drinkable due to its high
salinity. In the ILCS 2004, three in four households in Basrah were
reported as having unsafe drinking water.
Water treatment projects completed
Rehabilitation or expansion has been completed on five large-scale
water treatment plants and 14 compact water treatment plants, with the
capacity to serve 3.1 million Iraqis. A new water treatment plant is
being built in Nasiriyah, which will have the capacity to serve the
entire population of the city (approximately 550,000 people). USAID's
Rural Water Supply Initiative is underway and will provide wells,
treatment plants, or storage facilities for approximately 200,000
Iraqis living in rural areas where water is scarce or brackish.
Fourteen of the planned 49 rural water supply projects have been
completed.
In January 2005 USAID completed the $23 million rehabilitation of
the Sweet Water Canal to provide higher quality raw water to the Basrah
and Umm Qasr region, serving approximately 1.8 million Iraqis.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Hagel
Question. During our exchange, you noted that (1) the
administration is considering whether to pursue direct dialog with Iran
in the context of Iraq, similar to the Afghanistan context, and, (2)
Ambassador Khalilzad has some flexibility to engage through
multilateral processes his Iranian counterparts. (Note: As necessary,
please provide classified answers to fully respond to the questions.)
Does the administration intend to allow Ambassador Khalilzad to
engage his Iranian counterparts similar to the model in Afghanistan?
Has Ambassador Khalilzad engaged Iranian Government officials in
Iraq or elsewhere? What was discussed?
Answer. CLASSIFIED.
Question. In your testimony you announced that you will begin to
apply in Iraq the successful Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model
that was used in Afghanistan. This is good news.
Please give us a detailed description of this plan. How many teams
will there be? Which U.S. agencies will be represented? Where will the
teams be located? What is the time line for their deployment?
Answer. There will be 15 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (one in
each non-KRG province) and one Regional Reconstruction Team that covers
the three KRG provinces. They will be located in or near the provincial
capitals for the non-KRG provinces, and in Erbil for the RRT. The
Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and
the U.S. Agency for International Development will be represented in
the PRT program. It is likely that other agencies will be added to the
PRTs in the future. In addition, we are inviting our coalition partners
to place representatives in the PRTs.
The initial three ``proof of concept'' PRTs will be established by
mid-November in the provinces of Ninawa (Mosul), Tamim (Kirkuk), and
Babil (Hillah). We will stand up the additional PRTs in the coming
months.
Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has
determined that there is a reconstruction gap meaning that the FY 2003
and FY 2004 funds that Congress allocated for Iraq's reconstruction
will fail to achieve prewar levels of water, electricity, health and
oil networks in Iraq. In some cases, security costs for specific
projects reached 80 percent of a project's funds. At the same time,
corruption in Iraq is endemic. For example, the current Iraqi
Government has charged the Iraqi Defense Minister of the Interim
Government and others for embezzling more than $1 billion.
(a) Please describe in detail U.S. efforts, across the interagency,
to ensure that U.S. funds are being effectively and transparently spent
for the purpose of rebuilding Iraq.
(b) Does the administration intend to request additional
reconstruction funds from Congress for Iraq?
Answer. (a) The Department works closely with our implementing
partners, including USAID and DOD's Project Contracting Office, to
monitor vigorously contract compliance for all projects. As we noted in
the quarterly report on Iraq reconstruction of October 7, Embassy
Baghdad is working to improve its information management system to
better track the status of all contracts. This improved system will
enhance our ability to correct problems and prevent abuse.
In addition to our own internal monitoring, the Department
cooperates closely with both the GAO and with the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), which conduct their own
investigations into allegations of malfeasance to minimize abuse of
taxpayer funds. Beyond monitoring our projects, IRRF funds support
several projects to combat corruption in Iraq, including providing
technical training and operational support to the Commission on Public
Integrity, the agency in the Iraqi Government charged with fighting
corruption.
(b) The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction programs have created a
solid base on which to achieve our long-term goal of a stable,
prosperous, and democratic Iraq. For example, IRRF assistance has added
1,600 megawatts and rehabilitated facilities providing an additional
1,100 MW of electricity, which will increase Iraq's generation capacity
by roughly 50 percent over the estimated prewar levels. IRRF programs
have also provided clean water and sewage treatment to millions of
Iraqis denied services under the previous regime. Many challenges
remain to reconstruction. These include attacks by insurgents,
distortions in Iraq's economy caused by subsidies on food and fuel, the
limited, but growing, capacity of Iraqi Ministries and the need to keep
worn-out infrastructure operating. All of these factors have had an
effect on slowing down and, in some cases, reducing the output of the
reconstruction effort.
Our strategy requires sustained commitment of personnel and
financial resources. These are expressed in the FY06 budget request
($459 million), which we urge Congress to fund fully. The FY 2006
budget request is designed to ensure the successful continuation of
ongoing nonconstruction programs initially funded from the FY 2003 and
FY 2004 Supplemental IRRF funds, which we expect to be exhausted.
Additional foreign assistance beyond FY 2006 is currently under
discussion.