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**FROM COALITION TO ISAF COMMAND IN AFGHAN-
ISTAN: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE
TRANSITION**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

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FROM COALITION TO ISAF COMMAND IN AF- GHANISTAN: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE TRANSITION

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Voinovich, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today the committee meets to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and the role being played by NATO's International Security and Assistance Force, ISAF. We are honored to welcome our good friend, General Jim Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to share his insights on NATO's operations in Afghanistan. General Jones has testified several times before our committee, most recently in February of 2006. As always, we look forward to engaging him on a topic of critical importance to United States national security.

Recently Taliban attacks in Afghanistan have occurred with greater frequency and coordination. They have extended well beyond the south and east, where most of the fighting has been located. Although the hunt for al-Qaeda terrorists continues, the primary threat to the stability of Afghanistan is Taliban insurgents who are challenging NATO forces in greater numbers, sowing dissent among Afghans, cooperating with narcotics trade, and complicating security efforts in ways that inhibit the rule of law and reconstruction.

The Afghan people suffered under the Taliban. Most Afghans have welcomed the advances in personal freedom, political participation, and educational opportunities that have come during the last 5 years. The recent increase in violence in Afghanistan clearly is not evidence of a popular uprising, but to the degree that there is discontent, disillusionment, or fear among the Afghan people due to their security situation, trust in the Afghan Government and NATO will dissipate.

(1)

Insecurity stemming from insurgent activity by Taliban forces also causes Afghans in some regions to seek the protection of tribal leaders and warlords, which in turn undercuts the authority of the Afghan Government and increases the risk of civil conflict between tribal factions.

Given these dynamics, we must dispel any doubts about the commitment of the West to Afghans' emergence as a stable and free society. With this in mind, it is imperative that NATO countries fulfill their commitments to Afghanistan. NATO is assuming increasing responsibility for this difficult mission. NATO has long provided security in the north and west of Afghanistan. Last month ISAF added the critical southern region to its responsibilities. The eastern sector of Afghanistan is scheduled to be turned over to ISAF by year's end.

However, the recent reluctance in NATO capitals to meet the requests of alliance leaders for troops and resources has complicated this process. Following many months of intensive discussions with allies, last week General Jones publicly called for an increase in NATO forces in Afghanistan. His voice was echoed by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who commented, and I quote: "I want to ask nations to do what they promised, and we're not there yet." End of quote.

General Jones estimated that an additional 2,500 NATO troops would be needed for ISAF. Thus far Poland's offer of 1,000 initial troops is the only concrete response to that appeal.

There should be no doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO. The September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda still operates there and the fate of the country remains symbolic. If the most prominent and successful alliance in modern history were to fail in its first operation outside of Europe due to lack of will by its members, the efficacy of NATO and the ability of the international community to take joint action against the terrorist threat would be called into question. Moreover, Afghanistan has a legitimately elected government and a long-suffering people, both of which deserve a chance to succeed without the threat of violent upheaval.

The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the cold war, the gravest threats to Europe and North America originate from other regions of the world. This requires Europeans and North Americans to be bolder in remaking our alliances, forging new structures and changing our thinking. We must reorient many of our national security institutions, of which NATO is one of the most important. To be fully relevant to the security and wellbeing of the people of its member nations, NATO must think and act globally.

I believe strongly that NATO is capable of meeting those challenges in Afghanistan. NATO commanders have demonstrated that they understand the complexity of the mission. They know that success in Afghanistan depends on the attitudes of the people, the progress of reconstruction, and the development of the economy as much as it depends on battlefield successes.

The NATO commanders must have the resources to provide security and they must have the flexibility to use troops to meet Afghanistan's most critical security needs.

Beyond NATO, it is vital that the Afghan Compact which was signed by 60 members of the international community and the Afghan Government be fully funded and implemented. This compact established a relationship whereby donors would sustain support for the Afghan Government while it implements its national development strategy.

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how NATO is responding to recent Taliban tactics. We also would like to learn how NATO forces are coordinating with independently led United States troops and the Afghan army. What role will U.S. forces and the coalition play when ISAF takes over the final sector? We are also interested in how NATO is addressing the challenges of accelerating reconstruction and contending with the growing drug trade.

After the testimony of General Jones, we will hear from a second witness, Dr. Barnard Rubin, Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Dr. Rubin is a leading expert on Central Asia and state-building. Among other roles, he has served as special advisor to Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations Special Representative of the Security General for Afghanistan. United States Senators have had the benefit of his counsel through the Aspen Institute program very recently.

We welcome our witnesses. We look forward to an enlightening discussion. I would just simply say, General Jones, we are so pleased that you are here. We are hopeful this will not be your last appearance as our General in charge of this situation. If it is, why, it is a very special time. But would you please proceed. Your statement will be made a part of the record in full and please proceed in any way that you wish.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. As you know from our long association, this is really a personal pleasure as well as a professional responsibility to be here. I thank you and the committee for giving me this time to talk about NATO's most ambitious undertaking perhaps in the history of the alliance, certainly one of the most interesting ones and one of the most challenging ones.

Just by way of opening comments, Mr. Chairman, may I just call your attention to the slide that I have put up there just to introduce what NATO is doing operationally in this very dynamic and interesting new century. Out of area for NATO now means considerably more than it ever did in the past. We have 38,000 NATO soldiers deployed today on three different continents, from the Baltics, where we do an air policing mission, to a 16,000-man unit keeping a safe and secure environment in Kosovo under KFOR, with three NATO headquarters elsewhere in the western Balkans, a very—Active Endeavor, a very important mission called Active

Endeavor in the Mediterranean—which is NATO’s only Article 5 mission, a counterterrorism mission, very successful in keeping the Mediterranean as free as possible from terrorist activities and asymmetric threats that face us all; a small mission, but helpful mission, in support of the African Union in Darfur, where we do capacity building and strategic lift of African troops into that sad region; a very helpful mission in Iraq, where we not only train aspiring Iraqi officers in an academy setting, but also provide a very helpful mission in equipping the Iraqi army and helping coordinate the education and training of and assistance to Iraqi military in different capitals around the world in the alliance.

We also have a NATO response force that is arguably NATO’s most transformational operational capability coming into being this year, strategic reserve forces and operational reserve forces on standby. This brings us full circle to ISAF in Afghanistan.

The ISAF mission, as you know, started in 2003 with our situation in the capital, a small footprint. We expanded to the northern region in 2004, then to the west in 2005, and on 1 July of this year we took responsibility for the southern region from the coalition. In the not too distant future, I feel confident that NATO will also expand to the eastern region, which will complete the circle, if you will, in a counterclockwise manner, and NATO will have responsibility for stability and security through the totality of the land mass of Afghanistan, with a very special relationship with Operation Active Endeavor, which will be the United States-led coalition that will keep a separate and distinct mission at the higher end of the counterterrorist operation. While the rest, all of us in Afghanistan, have to practice counterinsurgency, the counterterrorism mission, which is more kinetic and mostly focused along the borders, will continue under a United States-led coalition under the leadership of General John Abizaid of the United States Central Command.

I might point out that in getting to this state we have had nothing but good relations and great teamwork between NATO forces and the United States Central Command and all of its subordinate commands in achieving this state of affairs and the situation that we currently find ourselves in in Afghanistan. It has been a model of teamwork, cooperation, of comrades in arms working together to solve very difficult problems, and I am quite confident that it will continue that way in the future.

Over the last 60 days since the transfer of authority to NATO of the southern region, opposing militant forces have tried to test NATO to see if we have the will and the capability to stand and fight, and the evidence is in. The overwhelming answer is yes. This past weekend we concluded Operation Medusa, which was an operation that was necessary in order to not only defeat the insurgents located in the vicinity of Kandahar, but also necessary to do so in order to establish the conditions of reconstruction and development activities to move forward in the province. This was a multinational operation in southern Afghanistan, involving forces from Canada, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Romania, the United States, Denmark, and Estonia, and Poland—I am sorry, and Portugal. They have performed extraordinarily well.

We always pause to honor the ultimate sacrifice that our soldiers make on the battlefield and this battle was no exception. There were casualties. There were NATO soldiers wounded and killed, and we would like to express our condolences to the families and to the countries who provided such gallant, gallant young people who willingly went to this distant land to try to make matters better for people who have not had much hope and not had much opportunity. Their sacrifice makes us want to redouble our efforts to make sure that we do achieve success in Afghanistan so that their sacrifice will have been worth it.

While we have been engaged in offensive operations in the southern region since the beginning of our responsibility there, I believe that the reason this happened was simply because this was a region where permanent troops had never been seen before, and as NATO has committed to put 6,000 troops on the ground and is in the process of doing that we found that in this particular region, which is the traditional home of the Taliban, a sector of the country where opium production, narcotic trafficking, is at the epicenter of the effort, it is a region that was defined by criminality and lawlessness, many ineffective or corrupt national leaders at the regional level, ineffective police, and lack of presence of the Afghan army.

In short, this was a part of the country that had not seen the benefits of reconstruction and the people who have an appetite for such reconstruction I think were very happy to see the force come in. But before we could start the reconstruction we had to engage in this test I think that NATO was subjected to, and that they passed brilliantly and successfully.

I do believe, Mr. Chairman, as you and I have talked before, that ultimate success in Afghanistan is not simply a military one. We are working with the international community and the Karzai Government to make sure that our military efforts are immediately followed very quickly with reconstruction and development activities in order to meet the expectations of the Afghan people, who have demonstrated in two national elections, one for President and one for parliament, that they overwhelmingly understand this effort and they are overwhelmingly anxious to see the benefits of their new-found freedoms and opportunities.

It is clear from the outset that progress in education, agriculture, economic development, public services, and health has to go hand-in-hand with providing a stable and secure environment. The Afghan authorities and ISAF are now focusing on the key tasks of ensuring that reconstruction and development can take place in accordance with the priorities identified by the local authorities themselves.

I would like to put up a third slide just to briefly capture the effort that nations are making in Afghanistan. We have 37 nations involved in this mission, approximately 20,000 NATO troops committed. Most of it is under the command and control of NATO, with a small percentage remaining under national control, and these would simply be the national support elements.

But I think 37 countries, united in this manner to do this very important mission at this particular time in NATO, is extremely impressive, and we can only celebrate this coming together of na-

tions to do this very important task. And I am quite confident that we are going to be successful.

One of the most important aspects of the long-term security in Afghanistan is the development of the Afghan national security forces, both the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police. By far the Afghan national army is the most successful pillar of our reconstruction efforts to date. I would like to move to another slide and show you essentially five of the main pillars of security sector reform and say a few words about each one if I might.

Today the Afghan national army is about 30,000 strong and playing a pivotal role in the security of Afghanistan. Our commitment is to produce an army of approximately 70,000 soldiers. I believe, we believe, that this is the essential goal and we are on our way to achieving it.

NATO nations recognize the importance of this mission and have begun fielding NATO operational, mentor, and liaison teams, or OMLTs, that are similar to and will augment the U.S. embedded training teams. Currently NATO has 15 such teams offered by troop contributing nations, with 7 of them completely fielded and 17 more remaining to be fielded.

Additionally, NATO is working on a proposal to provide additional equipment and training to the Afghan national army. This effort will be similar to our efforts in Iraq and will be an additive to the United State's ongoing efforts to train and equip the Afghan national army. The more rapidly we can build a capable and sufficiently robust Afghan national army, the faster we will have conditions for success.

On this score, may I say that it is evident to me and to soldiers in the field that the Afghan people are proud of this developing army. They identify with it and the Afghan army has not done anything but contribute to its reputation as an emerging strong and capable institution in Afghanistan.

The ISAF contribution to the Afghan national police training remains within means and capabilities, as detailed in our operations plan. While we are making some progress, it is my judgment that much more needs to be done in the training of police forces to make sure that we bring adequate equipment, adequate training, sufficiency in numbers, adequate pay, we fight against corruption. We need more emphasis on this very important pillar.

With regard to judicial reform, judicial reform is not a NATO task in Afghanistan, but it is so important to everything that is going on in Afghanistan. I must emphasize that judicial reform is one of the pillars that needs probably the most attention in the shortest amount of time. Some progress has been made, but the courts and prosecution remain distrusted, overly corrupt, and resource starved. One of the problems with judicial reform is the low pay of prosecutors, which makes them susceptible to corruption.

I recently had a meeting with the attorney general of Afghanistan, who told me that prosecutors' average pay was \$65 a month. By comparison, an interpreter working for the United Nations makes 500 euros a month. This is simply a situation that cannot be allowed to stand if we are serious about judicial reform.

A top Afghan judge earns less than \$100 a month and that is less than it costs to rent an apartment in Kabul, which now aver-

ages about \$150 to \$200 a month, considerably less than Taliban are paying local youths to support their military operations, which is estimated at \$250 a month. With such disincentives, the temptation for corrupt practices will continue. So along with police reform and much more effort, judicial reform to me stands out as one of the key pillars that needs to be reenergized.

Finally, perhaps the overarching problem and the one that worries me the most is the problem of narcotics. Afghanistan does not need to be a narcostate, but it is unfortunately well on its way. The parts of Afghanistan which are currently producing the largest poppy crops are not those that are traditionally known for the growth of such a product. We need to find the right means to ensure that farmers can economically grow and sell legal produce, in addition to developing an overarching and understandable way ahead in the overall fight against narcotics.

Ninety percent of the narcotics products find their way to European capitals, are sold in the European markets. The money comes back to Afghanistan and other places where terrorism is evident and manufactures the IEDs and kills or wounds our soldiers.

U.N. estimates suggest that the crop this year will exceed previous levels by as much as 59 percent. So this is a problem and a situation that is going in the wrong direction.

If I could make just simply one wrap-up statement, that training the police forces, jump-starting the judicial reform, and developing an effective counternarcotics program are hand-in-hand three of the most important things that need to be done in Afghanistan in the near future.

There is a need for ever-closer cooperation and coordination between NATO and the Government of Afghanistan, the other nations involved in security sector reform, as well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations operating in the country. President Karzai has recognized this and created a policy action group to act as a key policy and decision making body. This body is Afghan-led and chaired by the president. It strives to coordinate the actions of the government, the international community, in an effort to achieve mutual support and much greater effect than was achieved previously.

The policy action group is designed to reach down to the provincial, district, and community level in order to provide integrated programs to implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan people. We believe that this policy and this group has a good chance of succeeding and will contribute to the enhanced cohesion and coordination that thus far has been absent in the delivery of international relief.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, there has been dramatic progress throughout Afghanistan over the past 5 years. Through the efforts of the international community, Afghans should no longer be considered a failed state, but rather a fragile state. Even with this progress, though, efforts must be significantly increased if we are to ensure long-term success. As NATO takes responsibility for the security of all of Afghanistan, the leadership and resources role of the United States remains as important as it has ever been. With this continued support, I believe that NATO will ultimately set the

conditions for Afghanistan to continue in its path toward development.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

[EDITORS NOTE.—The slides mentioned were not reproducible in this hearing but will be maintained in the committee's permanent record.]

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today in order to provide you with an update on NATO's role and mission in Afghanistan.

Before I begin my remarks on NATO's current operations in Afghanistan, I would like to highlight several major operations in which the alliance is currently involved and in doing so, provide you with the strategic context and background against which all of our efforts in Afghanistan are balanced. Today the alliance is engaged with some 38,000 troops deployed in missions and operations on three continents.

NATO OPERATIONS

NATO continues its mission in the Balkans, notably in Kosovo, where we expect the United Nations Status Talks to produce recommendations in the future. We retain strong and capable forces (16,000) in the province in order to ensure we maintain a safe and secure environment during these potentially volatile political negotiations.

Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's only Article 5 mission, is our primary antiterrorism operation in the Mediterranean. This operation aims to disrupt, deter, and defend against terrorism on the high seas, and over the past 4 years, it has proven a credible deterrent. This week, NATO achieved the historic integration, under NATO command and control, of the Russian Federation warship *Pitliviy* into NATO's maritime operations.

In Iraq, NATO continues its training and equipping mission in support of Iraqi Security Forces. Our main effort remains the training of army officers inside Iraq. From the basic officer commissioning course to War College classes, NATO is engaged in training the future leaders of the Iraqi armed forces. The second aspect of our mission in Iraq is to assist in the equipping of the armed forces and to date, NATO nations have provided arms and equipment ranging from small arms ammunition to T-72 tanks. Finally, the alliance continues to provide training opportunities for Iraqi security force personnel outside of Iraq at national training facilities or NATO institutions such as the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO school at Oberammergau, Germany.

In Africa, we retain a small training mission in support of the African Union in Ethiopia in order to build capacity among African forces headquartered in Addis Ababa and Darfur. NATO will continue to provide strategic lift into and out of Darfur for the nations committing forces to the African Union mission in Sudan.

Finally, we continue the development of the NATO response force, which is unquestionably the most transformational, operational capability we have in the alliance. In preparation for the NATO response force's full operational capability, we recently completed a major deployment exercise to the Cape Verde Islands off the west coast of Africa as a proof of concept that NATO can rapidly deploy and execute operations in austere conditions at strategic distances. While we have made great strides in transforming the forces assigned to the NATO response force, long-term force generation for the NRF has not been fully resourced by the alliance. As such, we may not be able to declare full operational capability by 01 October as envisaged at the Prague Summit in 2002.

Turning to Afghanistan, NATO's International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) is the main effort of the alliance, and is composed of 19,500 soldiers from 37 nations (26 NATO and 11 non-NATO nations). Today, approximately 1,300 personnel assigned to ISAF are from the United States. This number will grow significantly when the final stage of ISAF expansion—stage 4—is complete. Multinationality is a key characteristic and strength in ISAF and partner nations are a significant presence and bring considerable experience.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)

As previously discussed with this committee, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is not new. Beginning in 2003, with NATO's assumption of responsibility for Kabul, NATO has assisted the Afghan Government in the maintenance of security; facilitated the development of government structures and extension of its control; and assisted the Government of Afghanistan with reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.

LTG David Richards (U.K. Army) is currently the commander, ISAF (COMISAF) and the senior NATO military commander on the ground. COMISAF is responsible for commanding all of the NATO forces in Afghanistan and works very closely with the Afghan Minister of Defense, the Afghan national army and, to a lesser extent, the Afghan national police. The position of COMISAF is scheduled to rotate in February 2007 to the United States lead.

The NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan is the NATO secretary general's personal representative. The SCR's role in working with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to ensure adequate attention is being given to nonsecurity issues. Both COMISAF and the SCR play a very close role in coordinating with the international community, including the United Nations, European Union, and non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) OPERATIONS

As NATO has expanded throughout Afghanistan, we have established regional commands, forward support bases, and the provincial reconstruction teams or PRTs throughout the country. These teams enable NATO to increase ISAF presence and operate primarily on a permissive basis, concentrating on stabilization through the provision of a secure environment, allowing the international community (IC) to reconstruct areas that might otherwise be inaccessible to them. The Government of Afghanistan has welcomed ISAF expansion and the tangible stability and reconstruction the PRTs bring to provinces.

Since I last appeared before the committee, NATO has assumed responsibility for the southern region. Aware of the volatile security conditions in the southern region, NATO nations moved into this region with robust rules of engagement and more forces than had previously been present under the coalition.

With the transition of authority for Region South at the end of July, NATO's efforts have shifted from the primarily reconstruction and development-oriented activities as found in northern and western Afghanistan to operations focused on counterinsurgency operations. Over the last 60 days, the opposing militant forces appear to be testing NATO to see if it has the will and the capability to stand and fight, and the evidence so far is that the answer is overwhelmingly "yes." This past weekend, NATO concluded Operation MEDUSA, an operation designed to defeat insurgents located in Kandahar Province in order to establish the conditions for reconstruction and development activities to move forward in the Province. The countries involved in operations in southern Afghanistan (Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Romania, the United States, Denmark, Estonia, and Portugal) have performed extraordinarily well.

While we have been engaged in offensive operations almost continuously since assuming responsibility for Region South, I am convinced that the solution in Afghanistan is not a military one. We are working with the international community and the Karzai Government to make sure that our military efforts are matched very quickly with reconstruction and development activities in order to meet the expectations of the Afghan people. It has been clear from the outset that progress in education, agriculture, economic development, public services, and health care has to go hand-in-hand with providing a stable, secure environment. The Afghan authorities and ISAF are now focusing on the key task of ensuring that reconstruction and development can take place, in accordance with the priorities identified by the local authorities themselves.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY/AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

One of the most important aspects of long-term security is the development of Afghan national security forces—both the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police.

The Afghan national army (ANA) is about 30,000 strong and is playing a vital role in the security of Afghanistan. The U.S. commitment to produce 50,000–70,000 ANA is essential. NATO nations recognize the importance of this mission and have begun fielding NATO operational mentor and liaison teams or "OMLTs" that are similar to and will replace U.S. embedded training teams (ETTs).

Currently, 15 NATO OMLTs have been offered by troop contributing nations (TCNs) with 7 completely fielded. Additionally, NATO is working on a proposal to provide additional equipment and training to the ANA. This effort will be similar to our efforts in Iraq and will be in addition to the United States' ongoing efforts to train and equip the ANA. The more rapidly we can build a capable and sufficiently robust ANA, the faster we will set the conditions for success.

ISAF's contribution to Afghan national police training remains within means and capabilities as cited in our operations plan. Progress continues to be made on ANP pay. A trial ANP salary payment program seems to have been a success; with all police officers being paid 100 percent of their salary at an Afghan-operated banking facility. The intention is to expand the program where the banking capacity exists. This has, in our opinion, had a positive impact on the ANP.

JUDICIAL REFORM

Closely linked to ANP development is judicial reform. While judicial reform is not an ISAF task, ISAF cannot be successful unless the rule of law is seen as working effectively and swiftly. Although some progress has been made in judicial reform, the courts and prosecution remain distrusted, corrupt, and resource-starved. One of the problems with judicial reform is the low pay of prosecutors, which make them susceptible to corruption. Currently, a top and considerably less than the Taliban are paying local youths to support their military operations. With such disincentives, the temptations for corrupt practice will continue.

COUNTER NARCOTICS

Finally, we must tackle the problem of narcotics. Afghanistan need not be a narco-state. The parts of Afghanistan currently producing the largest poppy crops are those that traditionally did not grow poppies. We need to find the means to ensure farmers can economically grow and sell legal produce.

Preliminary results of the 5-year counter-narcotics program for the 2005–2006 growing season indicate a dramatic increase in opium production and hectares under cultivation. The headline figures show a rapidly deteriorating situation, particularly in the southern provinces. The figures produced by the U.N. support warnings from 12 months ago that the drug trade in the south, and particularly in Helmand, was increasingly aligning itself to the insurgency.

As well as being able to use the opium issue as a means of gaining support from farming communities, there was a clear financial imperative for the insurgency. Potential revenues will have given their cause a considerable boost, considering that indications show that money is the primary motivation for their fighters and allows the insurgents to purchase arms and ammunition.

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MoCN) has established five counter narcotics (CN) working groups in an attempt to "operationalize" the Afghan National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS). Headquarters ISAF staff is represented on four of these working groups. While the National Drug Control Strategy is aligned with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), it is clear that the Government of Afghanistan must do better in combating drugs. The Alternative Livelihoods (AL) program should go hand-in-hand with the efforts in eradication and the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP). Although many programs are ongoing, farmers complain of inadequate compensation which undermines the program's credibility. More "cash for work" projects must be started, new agriculture techniques should be implemented, and infrastructure for irrigation must be available, together with material resources. For the counter-narcotics initiative to succeed the Alternative Livelihoods program must be connected to the wider development efforts in support of the ANDS and given greater priority. Simply replacing one crop for another may not be sufficient to give a previously narcotics-based local economy the support structure needed to fully develop or even survive without extensive assistance.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

There is a need for ever-closer cooperation and coordination between ISAF, the Government of Afghanistan, the other nations involved security sector reform, as well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations operating in the country.

President Karzai has recognized this and created a small policy action group (PAG) to act as a key policy and decision making body. This body is Afghan-led and chaired by the President. The PAG strives to coordinate the actions of the government/international community to achieve mutual support and much greater effect than could be achieved independently. The PAG is designed to reach down to the provincial, district, and community level in order to provide integrated programs to implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan people. We believe that with

the full and active support of the international community, this initiative can have a positive and long-lasting effect.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion there has been dramatic progress throughout Afghanistan over the past 5 years. Through the efforts of the international community, Afghanistan should no longer be considered a failed state but rather a fragile state. Even with this progress, efforts must be significantly increased if we are to ensure long-term success. As NATO takes responsibility for the security of all of Afghanistan, the leadership role and the resourcing role of the United States remains as important as it has ever been. With this continued support, I believe that NATO will ultimately set the conditions for Afghanistan to continue its development.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Jones.

We will now have questioning by members. We will have a 10-minute question period for each one of us. Let me begin the questioning by noting, as you pointed out, the overall poverty of the people of Afghanistan, which I suspect is recognized by most Americans as we think about the country, but perhaps not in the same way that you have so graphically illustrated. For instance, the salaries of the prosecutors and the judges, the problems of substitution for narcotics that really have not worked very well.

Let me just ask, as all of this is sketched out and members read more and more about Afghanistan, the problems become so daunting that there is a feeling, not of confusion or frustration, but almost of general despair as to how all of these objectives are ever to be met in an area of the world that has not seen much peace, with conflict forces, not just Afghans but other powers.

What I would like for you to try to describe just organizationally is, granted that progress has been made—you noted a 30,000-man army, progress being made on police—at the same time most critics of the whole situation would say on the development front the ability of people to find jobs, find legitimate income, is really suffering. This is due in part, some critics would say, to our own contribution to this. Appropriations have been much less than was required from what we saw. But they likewise have not led to a great deal of other generous donors, for what would appear to be a very, very expensive project.

If there were a business plan for Afghanistan, for example, the question is who would fund it? And, I suppose, second—who would administer it at this point, given the problems of the central government and its outreach? It is obviously the cross-section of security, in which the aid of the warlords is sought and some would even say the aid of the Taliban is sought, as opposed to there being anarchy or wholesale criminality in various areas.

In other words, who is in charge of some comprehensive way in which more income comes, more development? If there is to be substitution for the drugs, who really provides the planning for this and the execution of the plans? Finally, what level of generosity or development funds should we expect that we are going to need, over what period of time, if this is not to be a situation in which people finally say, well, we gave it a try and in essence people are better off, but on the other hand we have many other objectives, we have got to move on, and there are lots of other people in need?

We heard, for instance, in the Lebanese situation in this committee last week, an estimate by a very well-informed witness that

\$5 billion might be required simply to repair the country after the damages of the recent war, with \$230 million coming from our country, but some of that reprogrammed, even a hint that some of the reprogramming might be coming out of Afghanistan.

We are trying to organize our thoughts as to how this is going to get done at the development level as well as the security level and how much money it is going to cost and what kind of anticipation should we have for support.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. I am a little bit at a disadvantage because my NATO role is to oversee the efforts to stabilize and provide the environment under which reconstruction can begin. NATO does not have, beyond the administering of provincial reconstruction teams, of which we have 14, the coalition has 9, 23 total in the country, the reconstruction and aid package from nations is actually funneled through the United Nations Afghanistan mission.

If you would look at that slide and imagine the blue top to those pillars as being a U.N. organization, U.N.-led, that is the overarching coordination body that is designed to coordinate and direct the international relief aid.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that also judicial reform, that the United Nations does that in addition to the economic reconstruction?

General JONES. Yes, sir. You will see in the pillars there under "Counternarcotics," United Kingdom lead; "Judicial Reform," Italy; "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," Japan; "Training the Afghan National Army," United States; and "Training the Police Force" is Germany.

These countries have agreed to be the lead nations. That does not mean that they do it all by themselves, and I have a feeling that sometimes, particularly in the area of counternarcotics reform, such a comprehensive and complex problem, that there has been a tendency to kind of say, well, that is the United Kingdom's problem. It is not and it cannot be solved by any one nation.

In my opening remarks I tried to illustrate where those five pillars are. The roof on the pillars seems to indicate stability in the pillars, but actually the only pillar that is really doing well in my view is training the Afghan national army. No. 2, I think, is the Japan-led DDR pillar, which is doing reasonably well. I would say that the other three are in need of strong support and should be producing more than they are producing or more than they have produced to date.

The CHAIRMAN. Who at the U.N., then, is coordinating these five situations? Who is in charge at the top of this?

General JONES. Well, there is a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations who runs the UNAMA, United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, and he is the titular head of the U.N. and provides the overall framework for nations and nongovernmental organizations and relations with the Karzai Government to coordinate the international aid and relief effort in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how do we gain some responsibility from him? In other words, who is he accountable to? We probably cannot call him before a committee like this, but on the other hand we probably should. As you point out modestly, the United States is leading the way in training an army, but there are five pillars. As

you say, you get the impression that this roof is held up, but if three or four pillars are almost nonexistent or faltering the whole thing collapses.

So this is, I think, not well understood by any of us. That is why I am trying to draw this organizationally. Who is responsible and how do we bring some accountability to this whole process? Absent that, the contributions by other nations are likely to continue to falter and their general interest in any of this likewise is going to be negligible in some cases; the British particularly with the narcotics. One would say, my goodness, were you born yesterday; half of the GNP is in this; how do you expect us to resolve this?

And as you say, it is not just the British. Others ought to be helping them on counternarcotics. They are the lead group. But who pushes anybody to help the British? Who in the U.N. is in charge, so that we finally get some cohesion in all of this?

General JONES. Well, Mr. Chairman, you put your finger on it. I think the structures are generally there and we simply need to find the ways to make sure that, No. 1, there is sufficiency in the aid. The estimate, the Afghan estimate over what is required for 5 years, I am told is about \$27 billion over a 5-year period. To date \$13 billion has been accounted for and committed and \$11 billion has been disbursed. About 30 percent of that is U.S. donations.

So in terms of the requirement of \$27 billion, the money raised is about \$13 billion, so we are about halfway there. So clearly you cannot, at this rate you cannot do everything that you want. It does not mean that you cannot do some really good things.

My observation after almost 4 years of watching this problem is that we need more focus and we need to find ways, for example, to make sure that the government that we are trying to help is also doing what it can, is also doing what it can to, for instance, attack corruption, to begin to put a plan in place, that has to be Afghan-led, but to fight the narcotics problem.

The international community has to support this and has to get behind it. But when we figure out how to do that, when we get more cohesion and we get the international aid focus to do the four or five really important things that need to be done, then I think the road to success in Afghanistan will be clear.

I deeply believe that this is not a military problem and there is not a military solution here. The military plays an important role, just as we did in the south just recently to establish the conditions. But there has to be an immediate effect of the fight to show the people of Afghanistan that they are—we can deliver on the promises, the government is going to be able to have outreach throughout the country.

Strategic communications from the government to the people in my view should be enhanced and we should do better. I believe that we should, to the extent that we can, provide guidance and advice to the young ministries that support this government. In some cases, in terms of their department of defense, we are doing reasonably well. In some others we are not.

But it is the cohesion of the effort that I think needs to be enhanced. I am hopeful that this policy action group and the development of Afghan development zones, which is another effort to focus

the aid to where it does the most good at the right time, at the right place, will be successful.

But I guess to the extent that there is good news, this is doable in my view. It is achievable. It is not about more troops, it is not about raising armies. I think the troop levels are satisfactory and if we can fix some of these basic problems and focus the international aid effort and have some metrics by which we measure our progress each year, instead of having to come in and report that we are losing grounds in the war on narcotics every year, which is the Achilles heel in my view of the reconstruction, overall reconstruction effort in this country, then I think we can make some progress.

So I am optimistic these are solvable and I am sure that people are working on it right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Let me just mention that the General will need to leave us at 11 o'clock. There is ample time for each one of us at this point, although sometimes folks join us during the course of that time. But we will do the best we can.

Senator Dodd.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER DODD, U.S. SENATOR
FROM CONNECTICUT**

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am going to ask consent to have an opening set of comments be made a part of the record if that is appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record.

Senator DODD. General, it is good to see you. I am a fan of General Jones. We have known him and worked with him on a number of issues over the years and we are fortunate indeed to have you doing the job you are doing. So I thank you for your efforts.

I want to thank the chairman again. These are very valuable and important hearings and I thank the chairman immensely for giving us the chance to raise some of these issues.

Let me if I can, General, sort of tie this in. I was looking at the numbers in Europe, the support for NATO. There has been some decline of popular, public support for the institution. I know the requests are outstanding for some additional troops that you have made and I want to raise that with you as well. We are watching, obviously, a significant, at least maybe, if you would use the word, significant upsurge in insurgence, Taliban insurgent activity this year, and a lot of at least similarities between the kinds of activities we are watching now in Afghanistan that we have witnessed in Iraq.

The question I want to raise with you, because I think it is impossible to stovepipe these issues in the sense of sort of separating out what is the reaction, why are we not getting more support, and to what extent do you attribute the difficulties in Iraq we are experiencing with what you are encountering in Afghanistan? Share with us, because you are dealing with your colleagues all the time in the European community, who I presume are sharing some of the attitudes and reflections? And I suspect that what you are getting in reaction to what our requests are with regard to Afghani-

stan is reflected by what is occurring in Iraq, the lack of the kind of support that we have seen there.

Could you share with us, how is that going on and to what extent is there any linkage between what is happening in the activities in Afghanistan and Iraq?

General JONES. I think there is genuine support, political support across the 37 countries that find themselves in Afghanistan. That support for Afghanistan has existed almost from the outset. So in that sense it is a little bit different than the difficulty we went through internationally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the debate with regard to Iraq.

I think one of the things that makes it difficult for countries is the fact that during the last 4 or 5 years, as the political appetite to do more has gone up, to do more in Afghanistan, to start a mission in Iraq, to maintain the Kosovo troop levels at 16,000, to embark on Operation Active Endeavor, to train and equip and NATO response force—all that has been very good and symbolic of a NATO that is developing and changing and growing.

At the same time, it has been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the budgets of many of the countries in NATO, budgets for national security. The average budget in NATO percentage of GDP for national security is now 1.7 percent of GDP across the 26 nations. The agreed-upon target, the minimum that was agreed upon at the Prague Summit in 2002 was 2 percent of GDP. So we are actually going the wrong way. We have more missions and less resources.

The Afghanistan situation or the Afghanistan development is interesting because it does have some strong points in terms of unity. The question of the generation of troops actually has taken a turn for the worse—I am sorry, for the better—since the last couple of weeks with Poland's announcement of sending the battalion and special forces. The Romanians have let us use an operational reserve battalion. The Canadians are going to augment their forces. We are looking to lift some of the national restrictions on the troops that are in Afghanistan, which restricts the commander's ability to use the troops the way he would like to. We have a few other nations that I cannot, I am not at liberty to mention yet because they have not made the national decision, but we have others that are coming on line.

So in the last 10 days or so we have been moving in a very positive direction. But I think that the countries that are providing their forces and their money want obviously to see that it is going for the right thing, and they want to see reconstruction, they want to see development, they want to see the promises that were made to the people come to pass. I think there will be support for this mission in Afghanistan for quite a while within the alliance. As a matter of fact, we still have one more section to bring in under NATO, the eastern section of the country, which will happen in the not too distant future.

But if we can focus our energies on the things that absolutely need to be done, then I think the investment in Afghanistan will pay off quicker and we will be there for a shorter period of time.

Senator DODD. Let me try this again. I am curious as to whether or not there is any spillage in terms of political reaction, whether

or not there is any correlation you see at all between the kind of activities that have increased with the Taliban in Afghanistan and the kind of activities we have watched for a longer period of time in Iraq. Is there some relationship there?

While I have asked that question, let me also—I know there are some differences about the rules of engagement and some of our allies are requesting, I gather, certain rules of engagement regarding their troops in Afghanistan. To what extent is that posing a difficulty?

But I want to come back to this Iraq-Afghanistan issue, because my sense is these numbers in Europe of popular support for the role of NATO declining has some correlation between the attitudes about Iraq, and I am curious whether or not you agree with that.

General JONES. It would be hard for me to make the correlation. I think if there is a correlation it is simply because of the amount of money that is going to support both missions, plus national missions. So I think the publics are a little bit unclear as to what NATO is and what it is doing. We have not done a good job of explaining ourselves.

I do not know that there is a political spillover between the two. My belief is that Afghanistan is well understood and well supported.

You had another—oh, the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement for Afghanistan are very clear, very adequate, agreed to by all 26 countries. So that is not an issue. What is an issue for me sometimes and for commanders is nations provide their forces, but they also have a list of restrictions on how we can use those forces. We call them caveats. I think caveats are very limiting. I think they actually make our problems more difficult and they actually contribute to—countries whose troops have excessive number of caveats project weakness and make them more vulnerable. So I am fighting to remove as many caveats as possible.

Senator DODD. I should have mentioned, by the way, and I apologize for not doing so, how deeply all of us, how appreciative we are of the role that U.S. forces are playing there and the sacrifices they are enduring. None of us are unmindful of the fact that about 340 of our fellow citizens have lost their lives in Afghanistan and many more injured in the process. I think any discussion should always begin by thanking these troops for the tremendous sacrifice that they paid.

Tell me about the Taliban. Is there any correlation between what is going on in Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of the military activities? They look like there are some very—are these copycats or is there some connection between what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is there some connection that we ought to be aware of?

General JONES. I think there might be some copycat connection, but I think the reason, part of the reason for the uptick in violence, particularly in the south, is because until recently we have never had any permanent forces in that part of the country. When the coalition led—the U.S.-led coalition was operating in the country, these operations in the south were mostly short-term duration special forces, very kinetic, and we did not have the mass to simply occupy a part of that territory.

This time, with 6,000 NATO troops there who come into these provinces and are going to stay there and they are going to do the reconstruction that is worthwhile, it is the first time we have had that permanent presence. What has happened I think, particularly in the south, is the home of the Taliban traditionally, the home, the epicenter of the narcotics production, there has been criminality, there has been corrupt governance, lack of police. This is the first time that we have had a permanent presence.

So we have gone through the tough period here, at least in this part of the province. We have been successful fighting the Taliban, causing him to retreat. Actually the Taliban adopted tactics we had not seen. They actually chose to stand and fight in a conventional way. They paid a huge price for that. I do not think we will see them trying that again.

But it was a major turning point, at least—I will not say in terms of Afghanistan, but in terms of that particular region. A major statement was answered, and we are going to get on with it.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator Hagel.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM
NEBRASKA**

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Jones. I suspect this may be your last formal appearance as our NATO commander before this committee and I, I am sure as well as all my colleagues, want to express our deep appreciation for your service, your leadership. You are one of the preeminent military leaders of our time, but your reach is far beyond the military dynamic of our geopolitical interest in the world, and for your wide-lens understanding of the issues we appreciate it. You have made us a far stronger country and you have made NATO a much better institution because of your leadership. Please convey our thanks to your colleagues, some seated behind you, but also as well in Brussels and across the scope of NATO's reach. Thank you, General Jones.

I would like to go to the eastern border of Afghanistan and if you could explain what role Pakistan is playing in supporting ISAF's efforts, in particular along the eastern border, and then I want to go a little deeper into that as well.

General JONES. Senator Hagel, I just returned from a visit to Islamabad, my second one as the NATO commander, and had a good opportunity to talk with the senior military of the Pakistani armed forces. They explained to me in detail their assessment of the recently completed arrangements with the tribal regions. If the words that they used actually come to pass, then things could be much better along the borders. The tribal authorities have decided that they would expel foreigners, for example, limit cross-border crossings, respect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the border itself.

If all of those words are backed up and agreed to, then we should see a positive development. I intend to go back in about 30 days

to Islamabad. We are watching very closely to see what happens along the border over these next—this next month, and then we will have another discussion when I return on what we see on the Afghan side.

I must say that I was impressed by the willingness of the Pakistani military authorities to want to have a more developed and heightened relationship with NATO, particularly on border issues. Pakistan is a member of the Tripartite Commission along with Afghanistan and NATO and COC-Alpha to discuss military matters affecting the border. So we are building the network between the Afghanistan, Pakistan, and now NATO to better know each other and to better understand exactly what it is that needs to be done on both sides of the border.

So my initial meeting was encouraging. The words I heard were good and now we need to see if we can back up the words with demonstrated performance.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Do you agree with the assessment of some that the Taliban headquarters is somewhere in the region of Quetta?

General JONES. That is generally accepted, yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. Give us a little bit of your response to the assessment, of the recent agreement that Pakistan has signed with the tribes in that part of Pakistan, and specifically the Waziristan region?

General JONES. Well, as I said, my assessment is that if all the elements of the agreement are in fact lived up to by the signatories, then the situation on the border should improve. The question is now, is to observe. What we are doing now is observing, watching, recording, so that when we go back in 30 days to Islamabad we can have a more focused discussion as to what we see in fact on the ground.

This is measurable. You can tell what is going on on the borders. You can tell by what is going on in Afghanistan whether there is any change. We will be able to observe that. We will be able to have some dialog with the Pakistani authorities, and then we can take it from there.

Senator HAGEL. Would you consider this agreement by the Pakistani Government as significant in regard to the commitments that were accompanied in that agreement, especially commitments to NATO and to our efforts to deal with the Taliban?

General JONES. Well, I think the words are significant in the agreement. For example, the tribes have agreed that there will be no foreign troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, there will be no cross-border operations, they will not challenge the Pakistani Government's authority, they recognize the territories—the territorial boundary of Pakistan, and there will be no Talibanization of the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas. They also have agreed that, as I mentioned, no foreign troops—by that I mean foreigners—will be expelled.

If they are able to live up to the terms of those agreements, the border should be a much quieter region. We are in the process now of observing very closely what is going on and what the effect is on the Afghani side of the border, and we will know that in probably the next month or so.

Senator HAGEL. Included in your graphic here that you have presented, and you engaged each of the five pillars in your testimony—the fifth, train police forces, led by Germany, you did not spend a lot of time on that issue. You were, if I interpret your comments correctly, rather positive in your analysis and assessment of the training of the Afghan army. There are, as you know, significant reports about corruption, the inability or unwillingness of the Afghan police to do their jobs, not unlike the same problems we are facing in Iraq in trying to build the police forces there.

I would appreciate your assessment of that effort, if we are going to be required to put more resources into that effort. How would you assess it? Obviously that is a significant problem that we are going to continue to face, not unlike again what I said is happening in Iraq.

General JONES. Yes, sir. I think the three pillars that need much more energy than they already have is the police reform and training, judicial reform, and counternarcotics. The three are somewhat linked. The counternarcotics and the dependency of Afghanistan on the opium trade fuels all of the problems elsewhere in the society, from corruption of the judicial process, corruption of the police force, corruption at the highest levels in the society, in addition to fueling the insurgency with cash.

So that is clearly—those three pillars are clearly important and worthy of the international community's attention as a matter of the highest priority. Failure to address those three pillars will mean that we will be in Afghanistan for a much longer period of time than is necessary.

The United States has contributed a lot of money to training the police pillar to assist the German-led efforts there. Much more needs to be done. There is not an adequate number of policemen, and there is even quite a substantial portion of the police force that is underpaid and cannot compete with the \$250 or so that the Taliban is willing to pay to offset their numbers and to compensate them for the money they do not have to support their families.

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe, General, that the Afghan Government is going to have to be far more aggressive in prosecuting drug dealers, others who it is my understanding that the government is looking the other way and allowing a lot of this to happen? It is obviously risky. But unless the Afghan Government is willing to do more—or is that interpretation correct?

General JONES. I think it is a correct interpretation. I think the Afghan—the new government has to show that, on corruption, that it is uncompromising and that it is willing to go after the narcotics cartels and to prosecute and convict those who are guilty and to be severe with the punishment they award. That is something that has got to be hand-in-hand accompany—that has got to hand-in-hand accompany any infusion of effort that the international community comes up with to institute those reforms.

The Karzai Government does have a prominent role to play and that message, when they start doing it on a regular basis, will go a long way toward signaling to the people that this is—we are serious about this. But until we start it, it is not going to be recognized as serious. Words are hollow in this particular, in these particular efforts right now. We need action.

Senator HAGEL. General, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

I am pleased that we have been joined by more Senators as you have been continuing your testimony. Our predicament for Senators who have joined us is that the General has travel assignments and he will need to leave by 11 o'clock. So I hope I will not infringe on anyone's right in suggesting maybe an 8-minute limit for the four Senators that we have remaining. If you need more time, why, please proceed. But for the moment, why, do the best you can.

Senator Kerry.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, thanks. Welcome. Thanks for the job you are doing and thank you also for the time to visit the other day on the telephone. I appreciate it very, very much. I see the five pillars here and it is part of the public testimony.

I have always felt that Afghanistan is the real center of the war on terror, not Iraq. And it is troubling to me that we have seven times the numbers of troops in Iraq that we do in Afghanistan and that suicide, suicide attempts I think are up triple. Roadside bombs are up double. You yourself have said, General, that narcotics is at the core of everything that can go wrong in Afghanistan if not properly tackled. But we are not making progress. We are losing ground.

President Karzai has said that our approach to narcotics, counternarcotics, has failed, and the U.N.'s top counternarcotics official said yesterday that NATO forces have to somehow help the Afghan army to fight the opium trade.

When I was in Afghanistan and met with President Karzai earlier in the year, I asked him about the narco situation and whether or not Afghanistan is now a narcoeconomy, and he said yes, he agreed. I think our experts agree. I think you would agree, it is a narcoeconomy.

At what point does it become a narco state? And if our efforts have currently failed and that is the center of everything that can go wrong, what is going to change?

General JONES. I do not know what the tipover point is, but when 50 percent, over 50 percent of your economy is tied to the narcotrafficking portion of it, you are well on your way. I do not know exactly when you become a narco state by definition. But it is clear that the influence of narcotics on all organs of Afghan society, emerging Afghan society, is there. It fuels the insurgency, it contributes to the corruption. It is omnipresent and it is something that, frankly, the family of nations ought to be worried about.

I think one of the things I mentioned to you in our conversation was that 90 percent of the products are sold in European capitals.

Senator KERRY. Well, with all of the troop level that we have there, what is the problem in engaging in a massive crop destruction effort? Are they afraid of the instability that will occur in the population, so they are in a sense locked?

General JONES. It is a vicious circle, because I think what is needed is a comprehensive international plan that everybody signs up to that is multifaceted. If we simply focus on crop eradication, then you are affecting the livelihood of a significant portion of the country. So you have to have crop substitution. You have to have means of getting alternate crops to the markets, which means you have to build roads that may not exist.

There is a whole series of dominoes that line up. But absent a clearly defined, well thought out, agreed upon, financed and resourced plan, you wind up doing a little bit of everything and nothing very well.

Senator KERRY. That is what really concerns me, General. Here we are, President Karzai said, quote: "The same enemies that blew up themselves"—that is his quote—"in the Twin Towers in America are still around." The plot against these airliners that was stopped in London was hatched in Afghanistan. Yet the center of changing this is to have economic success and reform success. And yet 40 percent of the Afghan population is unemployed right now, before you even do crop destruction.

Ninety percent lack regular electricity. And yet this administration has appropriated nearly four times more in reconstruction funds for Iraq than Afghanistan, and in fact aid money was cut by 30 percent this year. So I would assume that greater construction efforts and greater focus in pulling together this comprehensive eradication or substitution plan would significantly bolster your efforts of our troops on the ground.

General JONES. I completely agree. I think that the military aspect of what we are doing is important, but the long-term reconstruction is tied to how well we do in those pillars.

Senator KERRY. So if the stakes are as high as everybody says, if the President says this is a battle for civilization and so forth, why are we not doing this?

General JONES. I think that—I think we are doing, we are doing quite a bit. Just to put a positive spin on this, we have 6 million Afghan children that are going to school today. Two million of them are girls. We have rebuilt over 3,000 kilometers of roads. Now, 80 percent of the Afghan people have access to some form of health care. There are interesting measures of progress out there.

Senator KERRY. Can I just interrupt for one second. I do not mean to cut you off at all, but the time is limited. I agree and I want to pay tribute to that. I think you and efforts on the ground have really been quite remarkable in a lot of respects. But what you are telling us, what President Karzai is telling us, what experts are telling us on the ground, is that all of that—and it is good—is at huge risk because of what is happening with the three pillars of the five that are affected by the narcotics, by the criminality, by the lack of judicial reform, the lack of competency within the police force.

I think you said you have something like, is it, 40,000 troops now?

General JONES. There is 20,000 NATO troops and—

Senator KERRY. No, of the Afghan army, trained.

General JONES. Oh, I am sorry. About 30,000, yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. So 30,000 now. That is not going to be able to do what is necessary if your economy is lost to this other effort, correct?

General JONES. That is correct. I think you do need an Afghan army. I think you need the internal police force. That has got to be fixed. Judicial reform, you have got to be able to prosecute the people who are causing these difficulties in the narcotics. To me, I think that talking about this is important. I think it will have the effect in the international community to focus those people whose jobs it is to bring this about.

I appear today as a NATO commander. My NATO responsibilities stop at stability and security and the management of the provincial reconstruction teams. There is an entire other sector that I talk about, but I do not have an assigned mission, in for instance, judicial reform. But I know that if we do not have judicial reform the security of the country is going to be jeopardized. So we have to talk about it, and I think we have to bring more international focus and energy to it.

I must say that if we do that I am optimistic that this will be a success story. So I am optimistic about where Afghanistan can be in a few years.

Senator KERRY. If we do this now?

General JONES. If we do this, if we do this, and if we are successful at doing this. If we are not successful—

Senator KERRY. What about the effort on Osama bin Laden? The Waziristan deal seems really troubling and a lot of people seem troubled by it, and most believe that, while some things are stated about what will happen, the expectations are considerably lower than that.

Are you satisfied that you are able to do everything that you want to do, would like to do, believe is necessary to do to capture or kill Osama bin Laden?

General JONES. This is the delicate part of my appearance here. As a NATO commander, my mission from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing a safe and secure environment for reconstruction.

Senator KERRY. I know CENTCOM is doing that.

General JONES. And that is why I need to make that distinction, that the ISAF mission and the Operation Enduring Freedom mission, led by CENTCOM, that is the one that has the kinetic, the more kinetic counterterrorist mission. So I am not involved in the active border participations. NATO's focus is more on security, stability, and reconstruction, which is not to say that if we ever came across Mr. bin Laden that we would not apprehend him. We would. If we had indications that he might be in one of our areas, would we go try to get him? We probably would.

Senator KERRY. And you do not want to venture to share with the committee just from your experience and judgment whether or not you think we are able to do all that is necessary or we would like to do?

General JONES. Well, I can tell you that I know John Abizaid, General Abizaid, has spent a considerable amount of time working with the Pakistani authorities. We have large numbers of troops up in the border areas and we have done everything we can to—I

think we are doing everything we can to locate him and locate other leaders and to discourage the border from being a sieve through which Taliban fighters come across to Afghanistan and contribute to the problems that we have there.

So I think that over the next 30 to 60 days, while we give the Pakistani authorities a chance to test their new agreements in the border regions, I think the next 30 to 60 days will be interesting to see how effective we are going to be.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Chafee.

STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

General Jones, thank you for your testimony. I associate myself with Senator Hagel's praise and gratitude for your service.

Following up on the narcotics issue, you testified that the poppy growing is in areas where it has not grown before, particularly the southern regions. Why is that?

General JONES. Simply it is the cash crop of choice. Our lack of ability right now to discourage the producers, to alter the behavior of the cartels, is indicative. Until we meet with more success and find alternate means of people earning a livelihood and find a way in which we can turn the economic situation around in some parts of the country, this is going to continue to be a problem.

Senator CHAFEE. Why has it changed, that the south did not grow poppies, now they are? Is there any particular reason?

General JONES. I think it is simply, simply a function of demand and the ability of these farmers to get money in advance of the planting season from the cartels, for example. And until we find the means to discourage that, punish it, prosecute it, limit it—and I think beyond the borders of Afghanistan, by the way, I think the European markets, which is the destination point, should be very concerned about the amount that is actually getting onto the streets of European capitals.

But until we find the international solutions to bring this to, not a stop immediately, but to start reversing the trend, I think we are going to continue to have difficulties.

Senator CHAFEE. I am just curious as to—I understand the big problem, but why the south? Is it more conducive to lawlessness or more Taliban in the south?

General JONES. Well, I think the south, the southern part of the country, has been one of the parts of the country where we have not had a permanent presence of any large number of troops. Most of our activities there have been small, temporary, special forces-type activities. This is the first time that roughly 6,000 troops have moved into the area, with more to come. The Afghan army is down there now. We are cleaning out the corrupt governance. We are trying to get good police chiefs. We are going to start reconstruction with an impressive amount, starting virtually as we speak.

So this is a part of the country that did not have a lot of presence. So as a result the narcotics had a safe haven, just as the

Taliban was able to live there quietly, and now they cannot. So we are going through this period of tension. We are doing quite well in terms of asserting ourselves and our authority. So I hope that good things will start happening in the south.

Senator CHAFEE. Is there an issue that this is, the Pashtuns are more conducive to the Taliban as opposed to the north might be, the Tajiks are less?

General JONES. This is more of a traditional home of the Taliban than other parts of the country, and the infiltration routes come to this area.

Senator CHAFEE. To go to another subject, is there any influence of Iran in anything that is happening in Afghanistan?

General JONES. The Iranian influence in Afghanistan has mostly been along the border and is mostly economic. Most of the contacts that have been had along the border have to do with economic issues and actually an expression on the part of the Iranian border guards concerning the drug trade. Of course, one of the major drug routes goes through Iran, but it also goes up in other directions as well. So it is a problem for all of the countries surrounding Iran—I am sorry, surrounding Afghanistan. So there are some common problems here that could be worked on.

But it is an economic relationship in the west, notably around Herat.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR
FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing.

General Jones, thank you for appearing in front of the committee and for your tremendous service. I know you are busy, so let me get to a couple of comments.

First, I would like to second Senator Dodd's comments and take a moment to express how thankful I am and we are for the dedication and professionalism of the many Americans serving in Afghanistan. We have some of our best men and women serving in the U.S. military and the State, NATO, USAID, DEA, and other critical departments and agencies that, I agree, are trying to make and are in many cases making a true difference. I hope you will pass that message along to them.

I have some questions, but first I would like to note the fact that I think we are getting two very different pictures from Afghanistan right now. We are seeing signs of progress, important political developments that include a new parliament and a new role for women in government, and an exponential increase in the number of children attending schools, which you mentioned.

But we are also seeing some very troubling trends: The comeback of the Taliban and the destabilizing of southern Afghanistan. Opium production levels are up to the highest levels ever, despite significant efforts to reduce them, and violence is creeping back

into Kabul, as we saw with the deadly car bomb very close to the United States embassy last week.

These recent developments are disturbing. I believe we need to reevaluate our current strategy in Afghanistan and reassess the level of resources needed to invest there to achieve long-term stability and security. As we all know, Afghanistan does have the potential for being a flagship success in the international fight against terrorist networks. It could also easily become, I am afraid, another long-term engagement in which the U.S. Government has no discernible strategy for success. We absolutely have to avoid that, as I know you agree.

But General, I want to ask you a couple of questions that sort of relate to the five pillars here that you have established and try to connect up the reconstruction with the security situation. Senator Chafee was getting at this. I am particularly interested in learning from you what has and has not been effective in our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, particularly in the south.

The United States and the international community have provided a significant amount of development and humanitarian, economic, and other forms of assistance there for the last few years. But what does the resurgence of the Taliban in the south suggest about the actual effectiveness of our reconstruction efforts? What is working and what is not?

General JONES. The southern region, Senator, has been one of the regions where we have had the least amount of presence and therefore the least amount of reconstruction. It is a region that has been, not only been characterized by the absence of permanent security forces, but also poor governance, corruption, ineffective police forces, and generally a presence of Taliban or Taliban sympathizers, until a few months ago when NATO put in, is starting to put in a force that will total about 6,000–7,000 troops.

This is the first time we have done that in this part of the country and, not surprisingly, we met with some resistance. Operation Medusa, which recently concluded successfully for NATO, was the first almost conventional ground combat mission that NATO has been involved in in many, many years. The Taliban chose to stand and fight and paid a high price for that tactical error.

We are now following up really in the south with a very comprehensive package of reconstruction. Between May and September of this year in the south we will have spent—we have 85 projects in many sectors of reform, from agriculture to capacity-building, education, energy, environment, governance, health, security, completion—working on the ring road, \$62 million scheduled for that, over \$100 million going into another section of the road and a dam construction.

But before we get on with things like that, we have to set the conditions under which they can be successful, and that is what this recent upsurge in fighting was about, to establish without question that we have the capability of doing this and that we are going to get on with making reconstruction reach this part of the country as well.

Compared to the other parts of the country, this has been lagging. We are now there to try to jump start it.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate your mentioning some of the reconstruction efforts. I just wanted to follow up by kind of looking at it the other way around, the way in which reconstruction, one would hope, would help stability, as opposed to the other way around. So I am wondering, are our reconstruction efforts being evaluated for their overall effectiveness in reducing stability?

If you take one metric that you and I both have talked about here—the number of Taliban attacks in the south—it seems that things are not going so well in terms of that. Is it fair to connect these two things and what are we doing to reorient or redesign our efforts, or is it simply a question of having enough troops to create a scenario where that can work?

General JONES. I think you cannot have, in this case, you cannot have security without reconstruction. You cannot have reconstruction without security. So in our theology with the NATO forces the two go hand-in-hand.

In the south we had to establish the security and now we can have reconstruction and we can start. But this section of the country does lag behind the others in terms of economic investment for the reasons I tried to mention, the fact that it is an area where we have not visited and we have not been. We are there now. With the expansion of the Afghan army, if we can get the police force up and operating, if we can conduct judicial reform and attack the narcotics problem, I think you are going to see a very quick turnaround in how people will perceive who is going to win this battle.

I think somewhere along the line there are maybe 60 or 70 percent of the people of Afghanistan just simply trying to eke out an existence and want, they genuinely want peace and an opportunity for their children to lead a better life than they did. They are going to go with whatever side they perceive is going to win, and I think that this is still winnable. We are not losing this, but there are some things that I think we could do in the international reconstruction effort with more focus, more clarity, more dedication, and more rapidly which will allow us to have an exit strategy that will become more visible quicker.

Senator FEINGOLD. I really appreciated your comments about this. I noticed your call for additional troops. I want you to know that I support that. I saw that there was some announcement today with regard to this. I also just want it noted for the record that no one that I know of has called for a timetable to withdraw our troops from this place, as I have done with regard to Iraq, because I do believe this is a situation that can succeed and we need to do what we can to make it succeed.

I thank you, General.

General JONES. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Voinovich.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR
FROM OHIO**

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. I recall that when we met in Brussels we talked about lots of things and one of them, as you know, that is on my heart and mind is what is happening in Kosovo. From the information that I have received, there are militia, Serbian militia, gathering in the north, in Mitrovica and the northern towns, and have said that if Kosovo is declared independent that they are going to secede from Kosovo. We are concerned that we could have an outbreak there. Also there is some concern about some of the enclaves in the southern part, where they are concerned that they may be the victims of some extremists on the Kosovar side.

I would hope that you are looking at that and making sure that we have the troops that are necessary so everyone knows that if you try and do something in this regard it is going to be put down immediately. I have also talked with Secretary Rumsfeld about it in terms of the Defense Department's commitment to it. So that is one thing.

Second, we are going to be getting together here in November with the NATO interparliamentary group, and I think it would be really helpful to us if we got an appraisal from you of where we stand in terms of their participation in their GDP—you have mentioned it already, but other things that we ought to be doing in NATO that are not being done, so that we can fulfil our obligations.

So often what happens is the ministerials never talk to the parliamentarians, and the parliamentarians really are the ones that are charged with the budgets and doing some of these things. So it would be really good if we can get that information to these folks.

The other thing that I was impressed with is your approach to dealing with this new enemy that we have out that flies under no flag. In other words, we have an unconventional enemy, and your concept of thinking outside of the box and how to deal with this enemy. I have to say, at least from my perspective, and I know other Members of the Senate, we are uneasy about whether or not we are fighting this war in the correct way.

If I recall, when we talked, it was about a question of allocation of resources, about getting the Defense Department, the State Department, USAID, and all of these together to think about some kind of a strategy on how we can be more effective that may be unlike some of the things that we have done in the past.

I note that you have these provisional reconstruction teams now in Afghanistan and I would be very interested to have you share with us how effective they are and how that fits in with this concept of maybe doing things differently. If you look at the chart here, we are talking about counternarcotics, we are talking about judicial reform. Japan has disarmament, demobilization, reintegration. A lot of these things have got nothing to do with armament. They have got to do with some other things. I would be interested in your sharing with us how you think they are coming along and how we can enhance that approach.

General JONES. Senator, thank you very much. A quick word on Kosovo. We have 55 maneuver companies deployed in all of Kosovo, 16,000 troops in total. I believe that this force is much better trained, much better equipped, fewer number of caveats than ever before. We have troops north of the Ivar. We are talking all of the

time with not only the Kosovar Serbs but the Albanians as well. We are working very closely with developing the human rapport that we need on the ground to try to minimize any outbreak of violence.

All I can say is that I think we are as prepared as we can be and we are trying to do those things that we can do as KFOR to minimize that possibility of violence. So I think we are in as good a position as we can be and we continue to work this problem every day.

I would be very, very happy to do anything to support the inter-parliamentary group. I think it is extremely important that parliamentarians understand not only what NATO is doing, but what the new NATO is like, what it does, what it stands for, and why should our publics be as interested in the NATO in the 21st century as it was in the 20th century.

I believe that NATO is a very healthy, growing organization that is only going to become more important in time. There are certain things that I think we should do to help NATO in its transformation. There is no question in my mind that one of the things that we must do better than we are doing is to explain the value of NATO to our people on both sides of the Atlantic, because it is a unique organization and it deserves to be supported.

With the question of the new enemy and how to combat the new enemy, I think that one of the premiums in terms of shaping and affecting the areas where we wish to see a certain outcome has to do with the integration of essentially the interagency, that the solution set against these enemies is not just a military solution, but it is actually how well do we bring all instruments of national power to focus simultaneously in an orchestrated way to bring about the desired effects.

One of the examples of a success story I think is the United States' PRTs in Afghanistan—provincial reconstruction teams. What makes these reconstruction teams so effective is that they are empowered. These commanders of these PRTs, usually at the rank of lieutenant colonel, have money, have the independent authority as to how to allocate that money, and they bring about immediate effects in the region to build a bridge, open a school, dig a well, turn on some electricity, pave a road, coordinate local government officials, help the training of the local police, and give a sense of comfort and reassurance out in the hinterlands where some day the government will be able to get out there and replace the PRTs.

We will know we are reaching a success point in Afghanistan when the government says we do not think this PRT is necessary any more—we have got it. But until that day happens, those PRTs and those commanders and those people that are working out there, sometimes at significant risk, are really worth—I think a PRT is worth a battalion. Those 60 to 80 to 100 people that are working out there are worth 5,000 troops.

Proactive engagement is always cheaper than reactive engagement. I would rather have 100 people dedicated, doing a certain thing every single day for 365 days, than 10,000 troops for 60 days.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to say thank you very much for your service. I know that you are going to be tipping your

hat one of these days and I would like to say to you, General, that I hope—I am sure that you have been working within the system to get your thoughts across about how we deal with this new enemy, but I would hope that once you leave that you are not reluctant to speak out and perhaps do some white papers to try and get your message across to Members of Congress and to the American public, because I think it is really needed at this time.

Thank you, thank you, thank you for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. I join my colleague, Senator Voinovich, once again, General, in thanking you. I just have to recall—and I hope you are not embarrassed by the recollection—that we toured Europe together in the early 1980s. You were then a major, not a four-star general. I was a very young Senator. We are a bit older now, but your service has been just remarkable and we just so much appreciate your coming today.

We thank you for your comment that our hearing might in a small way provide a conversation that others might listen to, including folks at the United Nations, people in other countries, people in our own government who are trying to coordinate. That was our purpose in asking you and Mr. Barnett to come today, so we could have this focus and have a wider audience through C-SPAN and other media efforts that will also engage in the topic.

General JONES. Senator, if I could also thank you for not only our long-term relationship, but also just for the energy that you have brought to NATO as well with your personal commitment to re-explaining NATO and getting people to understand why NATO is, although a different organization in this new century, is one that potentially can make just as great a contribution as it did in the 21st century. Your voice has been very supportive and very helpful. It is felt on both sides of the Atlantic and we definitely appreciate the support you have given us. It has meant a lot and we thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that encouragement.

We will now let you head off in your travel plans with best wishes.

We welcome now Dr. Barnett Rubin. Dr. Rubin is the author of the Council on Foreign Relations special report entitled “Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy,” which was published in March of this year. He has recently revisited Afghanistan, July 29 through August 8, to supplement information from that report and hopefully to supplement our information today about this very important country and our mission and the mission of other countries.

Dr. Rubin, we welcome you. Your statement is a remarkable document and will be made a part of the record in full, and you may proceed however you would like to, either in summary or in delivering portions of the statement.

**STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, DIRECTOR OF STUDIES
AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY**

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and for inviting me to take part. I appreciate it. I will make some remarks on a few themes that I would like to highlight,

and as I was listening to the exchange with General Jones I also made a note of a few points that were raised by the Senators here and by him that I could elaborate on some.

First, let me say that, while my statement and my summary here are full of somewhat somber prognostications and analyses, none of this is meant to denigrate the accomplishments that have occurred and the sacrifices made, I should note, not only by soldiers, but also by civilians who have given their lives in this effort, both Afghan and international.

In fact, one of the people I saw on my trip, Governor Hakim Taniwa of Paktia, was assassinated by a suicide bomb just about 10 days ago, and I wrote an article about that that appeared in the Washington Post last Sunday, quoting him primarily.

I think the point is that, rather than asking whether a glass is half full or half empty, we should be concerned first about how stable the table is on which it is standing. While we have accomplished a lot, at the moment the base in Afghanistan is extremely weak. Partly that is because of some of the effects of Iraq, partly it is for other reasons which I will discuss.

First, overall people in the region, both those who would like to work with us to some extent and those who are working against us, make an evaluation of how serious and committed we are, that the United States is. Overall most people in Afghanistan and around the region in my estimation do not believe that succeeding in Afghanistan is a very high priority of the United States. The basis for that is not what we say, but what we do. It is based on their observation that we have put 10 times as much effort into the war on Iraq, that we have undercut—that we have very much underspent on Afghanistan, that, as General Jones said, we did not put troops into the very areas that were the heartland of the Taliban, and in general indicated that we were not committed there. They have acted as a result of that analysis.

Second, I wanted to emphasize what also came up, that Afghanistan is extremely poor. But let me—I think perhaps we do not appreciate how poor Afghanistan is. Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world except for a handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, like Burundi and Sierra Leone. Now, when I mention those two countries that indicates how such extreme poverty leads to violent conflict.

The fact that the country is so extremely poor translates into an extremely weak government. The total revenues of the Government of Afghanistan are approximately 5 percent of its minuscule legal GDP. Therefore, when we talk about the Government of Afghanistan taking strong measures to do something or other, like arresting some of the most powerful people in the country, we must bear in mind what resources it has and how little assistance we have given it in doing that.

When we talk about the Government of Afghanistan, for instance, not taking strong measures against drug traffickers, we must bear in mind that many of those drug traffickers were empowered by the United States, who provided them with assistance to come into effective power, and that even in cases when President Karzai wanted to remove some of them from power his hand was stayed by some agencies of the United States Government who still

found those people useful. So there is more of a picture than sometimes is presented.

The next point is this problem in Afghanistan—I cannot emphasize this too much—is not a problem in Afghanistan, besides the fact that of course it is connected to global terrorism. It is a joint problem of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The global center of terrorism now is in Pakistan. That is where the plot in Britain was hatched. That is where Osama bin Laden is.

I would also draw your attention to something very important that General Jones said very briefly in response to a question by Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel asked him, is it true that the headquarters of the Taliban is in Quetta. General Jones said that is generally accepted. Now, what does that mean? It means the headquarters of the Taliban is in the capital city of one of the four provinces of Pakistan. The headquarters of the Taliban is not in a mountain cave somewhere. It is not along the border. It is in the capital of one of Pakistan's provinces, and the Government of Pakistan, according to the unified assessment of the security agencies, Afghan and international, in Kabul, is that the Government of Pakistan has done virtually nothing to disrupt the command and control of the Taliban, which is based in Pakistan.

Now, I recently received, in anticipation of this testimony, a message from a very senior diplomat from a NATO troop contributing country who is in Kabul. He said the following to me. As you know, next week President Bush is going to meet with President Musharraf and President Karzai together. President Musharraf I believe is in Washington today.

Now, this diplomat wrote to me: "All eyes are now on the 27 September meeting in Washington and the bilateral talks that will precede it. Without the use of overwhelming diplomatic force by the U.S. President against President Musharraf, little progress can be expected. There needs to be rapid arrests of the top 50 Taliban commanders in and around Quetta, full stop. Anything less will not do. Pakistani protests that they lack the capacity are spurious.

"The Iran issue and Pakistani domestic politics argue against the United States using the big diplomatic stick, but we need it now. Otherwise, a slide"—meaning the slide in security and stability in Afghanistan—"will continue."

Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Taliban have their headquarters and command and control in Pakistan and a safe haven there is not the only reason there is an insurgency in Afghanistan. There are massive failings on the part of the Government of Afghanistan, as is only to be expected since it is the weakest government in the world. But no insurgency has been defeated when it has a safe haven abroad. So shutting down this safe haven is the key to addressing those massive internal problems in Afghanistan.

On internal security, I fully endorse what General Jones said about the importance of the rule of law, police, and judiciary. If I may note, there is a general problem in U.S. policy with regard to post-conflict nation-building or state-building which transcends this administration, though perhaps it is more serious in this administration, which is we tend to focus on democratization, that is on elections, a constitution, and so on. We very much neglect the

building of state institutions which are needed to make that relevant.

It does not matter, if you freely elect your legislators, if there are no institutions to enforce the laws that they pass or through whom the executive can assure that those laws are faithfully carried out. So without police, judiciary, and so on, democracy is a hollow and meaningless shell, and that increasingly is how people in Afghanistan perceive it.

Next, on narcotics. I would like—sometimes when people call for a stronger counternarcotics policy, which I fully endorse, they focus on crop eradication as if crop eradication were the central point of counternarcotics. I would submit that that is an error. First, we have to be clear about what is the goal of our counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan, where does the harm come from. We are not trying to or we should not be trying to solve the world's problem of drug addiction in Afghanistan. If we, with all our capacity, cannot stop drug addiction in the United States, we are certainly not going to use law enforcement successfully to eliminate half the economy of the poorest and best armed country in the world.

Therefore we must focus on the real harm which comes from drug money. Now, 80 percent of the drug money inside Afghanistan, regardless of the—90 percent of the total income from drugs goes outside of Afghanistan. Inside Afghanistan, 80 percent of the drug money is in the hands of traffickers and warlords, not farmers. When we eradicate crops, the price of poppy goes up and the traffickers who have stocks become richer.

Therefore we should be focusing on the warlords and traffickers, on interdiction and so on, while we are helping the poor farmers. That is also consistent with our efforts, with our political interests of winning the farmers over and isolating those that are against us.

Furthermore, it is a mistake to consider the drug problem in Afghanistan as something that is isolated in the major poppy-growing areas. For instance, now there is fighting in Helmand Province, which is the major poppy producing area in the world. Because you cannot—because there is fighting going on, it is not possible to implement a counternarcotics strategy in Helmand. We need to implement rural development throughout Afghanistan, especially in the areas where there is no poppy, in order to show people what is possible and build an alternative economy.

Finally, a word about Iran. Iran, of all the countries around Afghanistan, is making the strongest counternarcotics effort. We have a very strong common interest with Iran in making that counternarcotics effort. That, among other things in Afghanistan, are areas where we have common interests with Iran, which I submit we should be pursuing just as we simultaneously pursue those areas where we have conflict of interest with Iran.

If I may issue a warning, anyone who tries to sell you intelligence reports that Iran is destabilizing Afghanistan is misrepresenting the facts. The destabilization of Afghanistan insofar as it is coming from abroad is coming from Pakistan, regardless of the fact that President Musharraf speaks good English, wears a suit, and says things that we like to hear.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rubin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BARNETT R. RUBIN, DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

"The pyramid of Afghanistan government's legitimacy should not be brought down due to our inefficiency in knowing the enemy, knowing ourselves and applying resources effectively."—Saleh, 2006.¹

In the past 6 months, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan and further threatened the international effort there. The handover of command from the United States-led coalition to NATO means that Afghanistan is now not only the first battleground of the so-called "war on terror," but a testing ground for the future of the Atlantic alliance. The Taliban-led insurgency based in Pakistan has shown new capabilities in the south and east, challenging both the United States and NATO, while suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their successful use by the Iraqi insurgents, have sown terror in Kabul and other areas as well.² A particularly daring attack on a Coalition convoy killed 16 people, including two United States soldiers, close to the United States embassy, in one of the most heavily defended areas of Kabul on September 8.

On May 29, in Kabul, an accidental crash of a United States military vehicle that killed an Afghan sparked a riot in which 17 people were killed. Rioters, who chanted slogans against the United States, President Karzai, and foreigners in general, attacked NGOs, diplomatic residences, brothels, hotels and restaurants where they thought alcohol was served, media offices, businesses, and the parliament. These riots exposed the incapacity of the police, many of whom disappeared, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence, even in the capital. This event exacerbated ethno-factional tensions within the governing elite, as the President accused opposition leaders of exploiting acts of violence by demonstrators largely from Panjsher, home of the leading group of the Northern alliance, charges that Panjsheri leaders denied.³ The riots showed violent opposition to the government and the United States, not from the Taliban, but also from members of a group that had led the resistance to the Taliban.

With many trends pointing in the wrong direction, it is time to rethink strategy and significantly increase both the level of resources available and the effectiveness of their use. As the largest troop contributor and aid donor, the United States has to lead this transformation. For decades United States policy makers of all administrations, however, have underestimated the stakes for the United States and the world in Afghanistan, and they continue to do so today.

Contrary to the analysis of the Bush administration, whose response to September 11 wandered off to Iraq and dreams of a "New Middle East," the main center of global terrorism is in Pakistan, especially the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. In the words of one military commander, "Until we transform the tribal belt, the United States is at risk." Far from achieving this objective, in 2001 the United States-led coalition pushed the core leadership of al-Qaida and the Taliban out of Afghanistan into Pakistan without a strategy for consolidating this tactical victory. Thereafter, while the Bush administration focused on unrelated or overblown threats elsewhere, it failed to provide those Taliban who did not want to fight for al-Qaida with a way back to Afghanistan, instead adopting a policy of incommunicado detention in Guantanamo, Bagram, and "black sites," making refuge in Pakistan a more attractive option. Drawing in part on such fugitives and in part on newly minted recruits from militant madrasas and training camps that continued to operate without impediment, the Taliban reconstituted their command structure, recruitment networks, and support bases in Pakistan, while Afghans waited in vain for the major reconstruction effort they expected to build their state and improve their lives. As a result, a cross-border insurgency is now exploiting the weaknesses of an impoverished society and an ineffective government to threaten the achievements of the last 5 years.

The frustration of those on the ground is palpable.

A Western diplomat who has been in Afghanistan for 3 years opened our meeting with an outburst: "I have never been so depressed. The insurgency is triumphant," he said, accusing the United States and the entire international community in Af-

¹A. Saleh, *Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan*, National Directorate of Security, Kabul Afghanistan, May 2006. I obtained a copy of this document from a U.S. source in Washington, DC.

²Hekmat Karzai and Seth Jones, "How to curb suicide terrorism in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 18, 2006.

³The accident occurred in Khairkhana, an area of Kabul largely populated by Tajiks from regions north of the capital.

ghanistan of "appeasement" of Pakistan, from where Taliban leaders direct the insurgency and terrorist attacks. "Things are looking very dark," wrote an Afghan-American woman who is risking her life working in one of the most dangerous areas of southern Afghanistan, where the burgeoning opium trade supports insurgency, criminality, and lawlessness. An elder from Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan said that government efforts against the insurgency are weak because communities will not share information with the authorities: "The people don't trust any of the people in government offices." An unemployed engineer who lives in Kabul and an elder from the northern province of Baghlan echoed the sentiment: "The people have totally lost trust in the government," said the former; "the people have no hope for this government now," said the latter. "There is a big distance between the current system and Islamic virtues," said an elder from Paktia in eastern Afghanistan, citing the bribery of judges.⁴

A former minister, now a leader in the parliament, commented, "The conditions in Afghanistan are ripe for fundamentalism. Our situation was not resolved before Iraq started. Iraq has not been resolved, and now there is fighting in Palestine and Lebanon. Then maybe Iran. . . . We pay the price for all of it." "So many people have left the country recently," recounted a U.N. official, "that the government has run out of passports." An elder from the southern province of Uruzgan, who had sheltered Hamid Karzai when he was working underground against the Taliban, told how he was later arrested by Americans who placed a hood on his head, whisked him away, and then released him. He shrugged off the indignity: "I understand that in this country if you do good, you will receive evil in return. This is our tradition." He added, however, "What we have realized is that the foreigners are not really helping us. We think that the foreigners do not want Afghanistan to be rebuilt."

Yet no one advocated giving up. The same elders who expressed frustration with the corruption of the government and its distance from the people also said, "We have been with the Taliban and have seen their cruelty. People don't want them back." Fruit traders from Qandahar who complained that, "The Taliban beat us and ask for food, and then the government beats us for helping the Taliban," also said that President Karzai was the country's best leader in 30 years—a modest endorsement, given the competition, but still significant. One military leader opined, "My working assumption is that the international community needs to double its resources. We can't do it on the margins. We have no hedge against domestic and regional counter-forces." But, he concluded, "It's still ours to lose."

INTENSIFIED THREATS

With access to a safe haven for its leadership, training, supplies, funding, and recruitment in Pakistan, with additional funding from Arab donors in the Persian Gulf, the Taliban-led insurgency has increased its effectiveness and both broadened and deepened its presence. The government and international forces have prevailed in virtually all tactical engagements. The weakness of the government and the reconstruction effort, however, has often prevented consolidation of tactical gains, while the failure to deny the insurgency its safe haven in Pakistan has blocked strategic victory. The invasion of Iraq under false premises and the United States' unstinting support for Israel's staggering reprisals against Lebanon have handed the insurgency additional propaganda victories, further weakening the United States' allies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The increased tempo of suicide bombings and attacks on school buildings even outside the insurgency's main area of operation has spread insecurity into Kabul itself. One suicide bomber was stopped in Kabul by police during my visit; and a major attack on September 8 killed 16 people in the most secure area of the city.

The Taliban's recent offensives were partly responses to changes initiated by the international forces. The United States-led coalition has handed off command of the southern region of Afghanistan to NATO, which was already in charge in the north and west. The NATO force has deployed to areas, notably Helmand province, where the coalition had neither ousted the Taliban nor made substantive efforts to stem the drug trade (Helmand now produces about half of the world's total supply of opium). The Taliban offensives in the south have aimed to press public opinion in the principal non-United States NATO troop contributing countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands) to force a withdrawal. This is NATO's first military operation, the success of which is essential to the future of the alliance; as

⁴I would like to thank Hamed Wardak for organizing meetings with elders through his movement, Fidayini Sulh (Sacrificers for Peace). Wardak did not attend the meetings and bears no responsibility for the views expressed.

one United States official put it, "The failure of NATO in Afghanistan is not an option."

The Taliban have increased the size of their units, their maneuverability, and their intelligence capabilities to establish a large and resilient presence in the rural areas of the south. The resiliency of their presence, the effectiveness of some of their institutions, and their ruthless retribution against those charged with collaboration has neutralized much of the population. They have established a parallel administration in some areas and they occasionally take control of outlying districts. Though some of their officials (such as provincial governors) are based in Pakistan, people are increasingly patronizing Taliban courts, seen as more effective and fair than the corrupt official system.

International military officials in Afghanistan state that intelligence confirms that the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is providing aid to the Quetta shura (council), the main center of Taliban strategic command and control in southern Afghanistan. Quetta is the capital of the province of Baluchistan, where Pakistani military dealt a blow to a Baluch ethnic nationalist insurgency and killed one of its key political leaders, the 79-year-old former Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti, while leaving the Taliban command center untouched.

In Kabul on September 7, General Musharraf virtually admitted these charges. According to the New York Times, "General Musharraf said that his government had rounded up al-Qaeda supporters in Pakistan's cities and had pursued foreign fighters in the frontier tribal areas, but he said the focus has now shifted to dealing with the Taliban. . . . 'We have to see where their command structure is, who is their commander, and we must destroy the command structure,'" [said General Musharraf].⁵

Another Taliban shura, directing operations in eastern Afghanistan, is based in the Pakistani tribal agencies of north and south Waziristan. It has consolidated its alliance with Pakistani Taliban, as well as foreign jihadi fighters from Uzbekistan and elsewhere. Just one day before Musharraf's statement in Kabul, Pakistani authorities signed a peace deal with the local Taliban in north Waziristan. The Taliban are expected not to cross over into Afghanistan to attack United States and Afghan forces and refrain from killing local tribal leaders, while the foreign militants (Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs affiliated with al-Qaida) are expected to either live peacefully or leave the region in peace. Within hours of the signing ceremony, a legislator from the region told media that there never were any foreign militants in the region. In neighboring south Waziristan tribal district, similar peace deals in 2004 empowered the Taliban to the extent that they now control the region. The agreement was widely perceived as a confession of failure by the Pakistani military that conceded the Taliban a haven in return for a face-saving agreement that will not be implemented.

Further north, veteran Islamist leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a favorite of the ISI since 1973, operates from Peshawar and the Bajaur and Momand tribal agencies adjacent to northeast Afghanistan.

The insurgency cannot be explained solely by its sanctuary in Pakistan, but few insurgencies with safe havens abroad have ever been defeated.⁶ While bad governance and corruption are indeed rampant in southern and eastern Afghanistan, conditions are no better in northern and western Afghanistan, where poverty, narcotics, corruption, and criminality have bred insecurity and violent clashes over resources, but not an anti-government insurgency.

While ending foreign sanctuary for the Taliban is necessary, it will not be sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan. The state and economy need urgent reform and assistance. While no statistics are available, people in Kabul and throughout the country complain that crime is increasing, and that the police are the main criminals. The formation of the Afghan National Army, a professional force now approaching 35,000 men, has been one of the success stories of the past 5 years. One reason for the army's professionalism has been that nearly all infantry are fresh recruits. Many of the over 60,000 men who have been demobilized from militias have joined the police, private security firms, or organized crime, and sometimes all three. One former mujahidin commander who became a general in the ministry of the interior is widely reported (including by his former mujahidin colleagues) to be a major figure in organized crime, who was responsible for the murder of a cabinet minister in February 2002. He is also a partner in the local branch of a U.S.-based firm, which provides many international offices with security guards, most of them fight-

⁵ Carlotta Gall, "Pakistani Leader Admits Taliban Cross Into Afghanistan," New York Times, September 7, 2006.

⁶ Seth Jones, *Averting failure in Afghanistan*, Survival, Spring 2006.

ers from this commander's militia and subsequently his employees in the ministry of the interior.

Researchers on narcotics trafficking report that, as commanders demobilized from the ministry of defense have found positions in the ministry of the interior, the latter became the main body providing protection to drug traffickers. Positions as police chief in poppy-producing districts are sold to the highest bidder; the going rate was reported to be \$100,000 for a 6-month appointment to a position with a salary of \$60 per month.

Such a corrupt police force, which also lacks training and basic equipment (batons, tear gas, water cannons, plastic shields, secure communications) utterly failed when confronted with a few hundred rioters. In combination with his continuing contention with the chairman of the lower house of parliament, Muhammad Yunus Qanuni, a major figure from the leading faction of the Northern alliance whom President Karzai suspected of exploiting the riots, the President appointed members of a rival Northern alliance group to key police positions, including police chief of Kabul.⁷ In order to do so, the president overrode the ranking of candidates based on merit that the new process of MOI reform required for high-level police appointees. He did so with the assent of U.S. officials, who claim that they needed to gain approval of others on the list in order to improve security in insurgency-affected areas of the south and that they lacked information on the new appointees. President Karzai argues that he is forced into such unpalatable balancing acts because the international community failed for years to respond to his requests for adequate resources for the police. Whatever the reasons, many Afghans interpret the appointment of Amanullah Guzar as police chief of Kabul and Basir Salangi as police commander of Nangarhar, as placing organized crime in charge of both the security of Kabul and the capital's key supply route from Pakistan.

Afghan traders and elders reported several kidnappings of rich businessmen or their sons, in some cases leading to the payment of large ransoms, and in other cases ending in the murder of the captive. Most report that the kidnappers wore police uniforms and used vehicles with blackened windows like those used by officials. On August 24, robbers wearing police uniforms robbed a bank van of \$60,000 in cash within easy walking distance of the MOI headquarters in Central Kabul. Such incidents have led to the departure of Afghan investors, contributing to an economic slowdown that is aggravating unemployment and discontent.

One difference between Iraq and Afghanistan has been that, while Iraq has suffered an economic collapse as a result of the United States invasion, Afghanistan averaged real non-drug annual growth rates over 15 percent. The country was so poor (the world's poorest country outside of sub-Saharan Africa) that the expenditures of foreign forces and organizations combined with the end of a drought, a relatively small amount of aid, and narcotics profits could power a recovery from a 23-year war.

But as a World Bank official put it, "It has not been reliable, sustainable growth." Afghans emphasized how unemployment feeds conflict: "Those Afghans who are fighting, it is all because of unemployment," said a fruit trader from Qandahar. And this year the bubble economy has been punctured. Real estate prices and rents are dropping in Kabul, and occupancy rates are down. Fruit and vegetable sellers report a decline in demand of about 20 percent. Construction workers and members of the building trades in Kabul reported a decline in employment, leading to a drop in wages by about 20 percent. A drought in some parts of the country has also led to displacement and a decline in agricultural employment, for which the record opium poppy crop only partially compensated.

A major economic issue that is aggravating relations between Afghans and the international community is the supply of electricity to Kabul. In the past 5 years, no major power projects have been completed. A plan to bring power to Kabul from Central Asia is 2-3 years from completion. As the city's population expands toward 5 million (up from 2.3 million 5 years ago), Kabulis today have less electricity than they did 5 years ago. While foreigners and the rich power air conditioners, hot water heaters, high-speed Internet, and satellite TV with private generators, average Kabulis are now ending a summer without fans, and fearing a winter without heaters.

For the past 2 years, Kabul got through the winter with power supplied by diesel generators, whose fuel was purchased by the United States. This year the United

⁷Some of the rioters, who appeared to be mainly from Panjsher, carried pictures of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud and chanted anti-Karzai slogans. Qanuni firmly denies any involvement and states that the rioters also tried to attack the parliament. The new appointees, while previously allied with Massoud, came from the Shamali plain between Panjsher and Kabul and assured Karzai of their loyalty during the riots.

States made no such allocation, claiming that Afghanistan did not ask for it. Regardless of who is at fault, without the purchase of diesel, Kabul will have even less power in the next 2 years than in the past.

The narcotics economy, however, is booming. According to the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), production of opium poppy with a record crop of 6,100 metric tons this year surpassed last year's by 49 percent, overtaking the previous record crop of 1999, before the Taliban ban.⁸ This massive increase in production belies the claims of progress made on the basis of a 5 percent decrease last year. The Taliban exploited the counterproductive policy of crop eradication pressed on an unwilling Afghan Government by the United States. They gained the support of farmers in Helmand and elsewhere by providing protection against eradication. As I have argued elsewhere, eradication before significant economic development is ineffective and counterproductive.⁹ While the Taliban protect small farmers and sharecroppers from eradication, not a single high government official has been prosecuted for drug-related corruption, though many known traffickers occupy high office.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For several years, the United States responded to President Karzai's repeated warnings about the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan by assuring him that Pakistan was cooperating, that public statements were counterproductive, and that the United States would soon take care of the problem. Assurances that the United States would soon mop up the "remnants" of the Taliban and al-Qaida have proved false. Nor did the United States or others respond with adequate resources or programs to strengthen the Afghan state and its relations to the communities in a way that would make Afghanistan more resistant to the Taliban. President Karzai's strategy of temporizing with corrupt and abusive power-holders has also weakened the state building effort, but he claims he has had inadequate support and resources to undertake a stronger policy. New approaches and more resources are required on both fronts.

ENDING SANCTUARY IN PAKISTAN

Western and Afghan officials differ over the extent to which Pakistan's aid to the Taliban is ordered or tolerated by the highest levels of the military, but they have reached a consensus, in the words of one senior military leader, that Pakistani leaders "could disrupt the senior levels of [Taliban] command and control," but that they do not do so. President Musharraf virtually admitted in Kabul that they had not even tried. Disruption of command and control is the key to strategic victory, not control over infiltration, a tactical issue to which Pakistan consistently tries to divert discussion. A recent agreement by Afghanistan and Pakistan to conduct joint patrols on the Durand Line (which Afghanistan does not recognize as a border) to combat infiltration may help build the relationship, but it will not end the sanctuary in Pakistan.¹⁰

The failure by Pakistan even to try to disrupt the Taliban's command and control in Quetta is a major threat to international peace and security. But pressure to stop these activities is not enough. The Pakistani military's alliance with Islamist militant groups is a response to perceived threats, a way of managing an outmoded border regime, and the basis of the domestic legitimacy of the state.

To confront the immediate threat requires serious pressure. The first condition for serious pressure is to convey a consistent message. There is no need to berate Pakistan in public, but United States officials should at least stop congratulating Islamabad for something it has not done. CENTCOM Combatant Commander General John Abizaid, for instance, stated in Kabul on August 27 that he "absolutely does not believe" that Pakistan is helping the Taliban.¹¹

Efforts are already under way by the four troop contributors in southern Afghanistan (the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada) and by NATO as a whole, to devise a common demarche. This effort should be expanded to include Russia and China as well. The central message of this demarche should be that failure to take forceful action against the Taliban command in Baluchistan—

⁸ Carlotta Gall, "Opium harvest at record level in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, September 2, 2006.

⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, *Road to Ruin—Afghanistan's booming opium industry*, Center on International Cooperation and Center for American Progress, October 7, 2004.

¹⁰ Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: U.S. Reports 'Breakthrough' on Afghan-Pakistan Security Cooperation," RFE/RL, August 25, 2006.

¹¹ Fisman Abrashi, "Abizaid; Pakistan not aiding Taliban," *The Associated Press*, August 27, 2006.

at least as strong as the action taken against the Baluch ethnic insurgency, which led to the killing of former Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti—constitutes a threat to international peace and security as defined in the U.N. Charter. Pakistan, whose leaders seek parity with their rival, India, in part by acting as a full participant in the international community through contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations and the fight against al-Qaida, will seek to avoid such a designation, with the various consequences that might flow from it. Pakistan should not benefit from United States military assistance and international aid and debt relief while it fails even to try to dismantle the command structure of the Taliban.

Threats, explicit or implicit, are not enough. A realistic assessment of Pakistan's role does not require moving Pakistan from the "with us" to the "against us" column in the war on terror account books, but recognizing that Pakistan's policy derives from its leaders' perceptions, interests, and capabilities, not from ours. The haven and support the Taliban receives in Pakistan derive in part from the hostility that has characterized relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan for as long as both have existed. That hostility, in turn, is partly driven by century-long grievances of Afghanistan, the threat that Pakistan perceives from India, and the precarious nature of Pakistan's national unity, especially the dissidence of the Pashtun and Baluch, which Afghanistan has often supported.¹²

The unified front that all major powers must show to Pakistan in opposition to its harboring of the Taliban command centers must be matched by offers to recognize the country's international status in return for accountability for past nuclear proliferation, and to address its conflicts with its neighbors. The United States, NATO, and others should encourage the Afghan Government to initiate a dialog over the domestically sensitive issue of recognition of the Durand Line between the countries as a border, in return for secure trade and transport corridors to Pakistani ports. Transforming the border region into a frontier of cooperation rather than conflict will require political reforms and development efforts in the tribal territories, which will require further assistance, but, to repeat one United States senior leader's words, "Until we transform the tribal belt, the United States is at risk." The United States should also weigh in with India and Afghanistan to assure that they make extra efforts to assure Pakistan that their bilateral relations will not threaten Islamabad.

Such a shift in United States policy toward Pakistan requires a transformation from supporting President Musharraf to supporting democracy. Pakistan's people have shown in all national elections that they support centrist parties, not the Islamist parties on which the military has relied. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti by the army has sparked revulsion throughout the political spectrum, weakening the military's position and strengthening calls within Pakistan to resolve internal and external disputes through political means, rather than violence. The reassertion of the civilian political center, as well as of Pakistan's business class, which is profiting from the reconstruction of Afghanistan, provides an opportunity to move beyond the United States' history of reliance on military rulers toward a more stable relationship with a Pakistani nation moving toward peace with its neighbors and with itself.

STRENGTHENING THE STATE

Creating a reasonably effective state in Afghanistan is a long-term project that will also require an end to major armed conflict, economic development, and the gradual replacement of narcotics by other economic activities. Recent crises, however, have exposed internal weaknesses that require both long-term programs and transitional measures.

The two fatal weak points in Afghanistan's Government today are the ministry of the interior and the judiciary. Both are pervaded by corruption and lack basic skills, equipment, and resources. Without effective and honest administrators, police, or judges, the state can do little to provide internal security.

Within the last year, Coalition military forces have devised a plan for the thoroughgoing reform of the MOI. The Coalition estimates that this plan is 3 years behind the similar program for the ministry of defense, and that it will take at least a year before Afghans see any effects on the ground.

In Afghanistan, the president and minister of interior appoint all administrative and police officials throughout the country. The Afghanistan Compact requires the government to establish, by the end of September, a mechanism to vet such appointments for competence and integrity. Finding competent people willing to risk their

¹²Rubin and Siddique, "Ending the Afghanistan-Pakistan Stalemate," USIP Special Report, September 2006.

lives in a rural district for \$60–\$70 a month will remain difficult, but such a mechanism should help avoid appointments such as those hastily made in June.

Government officials have identified the biggest gap in the administration as the district level. Elders (community leaders) from over 10 provinces agreed, repeatedly complaining that the government never consults them. Some ministers have proposed paying 5 to 10 elders and ulama (learned clergy) in each district to act as the eyes and ears of government, to be brought to meet governors and the president, to have authority over small projects, and influence what is preached in the mosques. They estimate the cost of such a program at about \$5 million per year.

These leaders could also help recruit 200 young men from each district to serve as auxiliary police. They would receive basic police training and equipment to serve under a police commander who has gone through the reform process. Unlike militias, auxiliary policeman would be paid individually, and the commander would be a professional from outside the district. The elders would be answerable for their behavior.

Courts, too, may require some temporary auxiliary institutions. Community leaders complained constantly about judicial corruption. Many demanded the implementation of shari'a law, which they contrasted not to secular law, but to corruption. As an elder from Paktia said, "Islam says that if you find a thief, he has to be punished. If a murderer is arrested, he has to be tried and executed. In our country, if a murderer is put in prison, after 6 months he bribes the judge and escapes. If a member of parliament is killed, as in Laghman, his murderer is released after 3–4 months in prison because of bribery."

Lack of law enforcement undermines the basic legitimacy of the government. Enforcement by the government of the decisions of Islamic courts has always constituted a basic pillar of the state's legitimacy in Afghanistan, and failure to do so brands a government as un-Islamic.

The August 5 swearing in of a new Supreme Court, which administers the entire judicial system, will make judicial reform possible, but training a corps of prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers will take years. The only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement that actually exist in much of the country consist of informal village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of shari'a. During the years required for reform, the only genuine alternatives before Afghan society will be enforcement of such customary or Islamic law, or no law. The Afghan Government and its international supporters will therefore have to find transitional ways to incorporate such procedures into the legal system by recognizing them and subjecting them to judicial or administrative review. Such a program would also put more local Islamic leaders—over 1,200 of whom have been dropped from the government payroll this year—back under government supervision.

Attempts to inject aid into the government have met a major bottleneck: Last year the government managed to spend only 44 percent of money it received for development projects. The ministry of rural rehabilitation and development accounted for nearly half of the government's development spending, while key ministries like agriculture, energy and water, and public works could not execute their budgets. According to the ministry of finance, donor countries spent about \$500 million on poorly designed and uncoordinated technical assistance, to little effect. The World Bank is designing a facility that will enable the government to hire the technical advisors it needs, rather than trying to coordinate advisors sent by donors in accord with their own priorities and domestic constituencies. The United States should support this initiative as well as a major crash program to increase the implementation capacity of line ministries.

THE ECONOMY AND NARCOTICS

Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world except for a handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Policy makers focusing on "killing terrorists" or "holding democratic elections" too often ignore this fundamental fact, which affects everything we try to do there. As numerous studies have documented over the years, Afghanistan has never received the investment of resources needed to stabilize it. International military commanders, who confront the results of this poverty every day, estimate that we need to "double" our resources. Doubling the economic resources going to Afghanistan would still leave it far behind Iraq, and such aid would be far more productive in Afghanistan. Major needs are accelerated road building, purchase of diesel for immediate power production, expansion of cross-border electricity purchase including deals with Pakistan for the south and east, investment in major water projects to improve the productivity of agriculture, development of

the infrastructure needed for mineral exploitation, and a massive program of skills building for both the public and private sector.

Afghanistan desperately needs to take on the threat from its narcotics economy in a way consistent with its overall struggle for security and stability. United States policy consisted first of aiding all commanders who fought the Taliban, regardless of their involvement in drug trafficking, and then, when the domestic war on drugs lobby raised the issue, to pressure the Afghan Government to engage in crop eradication. To Afghans this policy looks like rewarding rich drug dealers and punishing poor farmers, a perception skillfully exploited by the Taliban.

The international drug control regime, which criminalizes narcotics, does not reduce drug use, but it does produce huge profits for criminals and the armed groups and corrupt officials who protect them. Our drug policy grants huge subsidies to our enemies. As long as we maintain our ideological commitment to a policy that funds our enemies, however, the second-best option in Afghanistan is to treat narcotics as a security and development issue. The total export value of opiates produced in Afghanistan has ranged in recent years from 30 to 50 percent of the legal economy. Such an industry cannot be abolished by law enforcement. The immediate priorities are massive rural development in both poppy-growing and nonpoppy-growing areas, including roads and cold storage to make other products marketable; programs for employment creation through rural industries; and thoroughgoing reform of the ministry of the interior and other government agencies to root out the major figures involved with narcotics, regardless of political or family connections.

News of this year's record crop is likely to increase pressure from the U.S. Congress for eradication, including aerial spraying. Such a program would be disastrously self-defeating. If we want to succeed in Afghanistan, we have to help the rural poor (which is almost everyone) and isolate the leading traffickers and the corrupt officials who support them.

IS THE GLASS HALF-FULL?

Some policy makers and observers claim that critics of the effort in Afghanistan have excessive expectations and focus on challenges rather than achievements. They want to talk about how the glass is half-full, not half-empty. As this analysis shows, the glass is much less than half full. In any case, it does not matter how full the glass is, if someone manages to tip it over or pull out the table on which it is resting.

The Afghan intelligence analysis quoted at the head of this report referred implicitly to the saying of Sun Tzu: "Know your enemy, know yourself; One hundred battles, one hundred victories."

United States policy makers have misjudged Afghanistan and misjudged Pakistan; most of all, they have misjudged their own capacity to carry out major strategic changes on the cheap in an area they do not understand. While the Bush administration has sown war and strengthened Iran while claiming to create a "New Middle East," it has failed to transform the region where the global terrorist threat began and persists. If the United States wants to succeed, we need to focus on this core task. To repeat once again, "Until we transform the tribal belt, the United States is at risk."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Rubin.

We will have once again a 10-minute period of questioning by Senators who are present.

Let me just say at the outset that you have placed a high focus, and deliberately so, on Pakistan and the thought that there may be as many as 50 leaders that are in that area that might be apprehended according to the communication that you receive. What is the basis of your intelligence or other reports that would lead you to believe that Quetta, in fact, is the headquarters, that there are that many persons of authority who act as a basis for destabilization of the neighboring country?

Dr. RUBIN. The statement I read to you is not my analysis. It is a statement of a senior western analyst from a NATO troop contributing country that has access to all intelligence reports of all agencies. Without—I cannot divulge some confidential communications that I have had with people in Kabul. Let me just say that while I was in Afghanistan I met with President Karzai, the com-

mander of the coalition, the commander of NATO, the head of the NATO intelligence agency, the U.S. ambassador, the U.N. special representative of the Secretary General, and many other people, and I did not find anyone who disagreed with that assessment.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you mention in your paper that even if—and this is a big if—the destabilization created by this nexus of al-Qaeda in Pakistan could be eradicated or even controlled, then you move to the basic point you made, that Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, rivaling at the bottom in per capita income only in some sub-Saharan African countries. Then as a part of that, I think you said only 5 percent of the gross national product, which is a very small figure, is apparently utilized by the government. That is the budget that President Karzai and his legislature have. Is that correct?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, their actual budget for expenditure is somewhat larger because of foreign assistance. But basically, out of their own resources they have enough money to buy everybody in the country a case of Coca-Cola and then there is nothing left for schools, defense, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. So there really is a huge dependency upon these foreign funds, from whichever sources they may come. We have talked a little bit with General Jones about the insufficiency of those contributions, although he mentioned a \$27 billion budget request to the international community over a 5-year period of time, indicating maybe \$13 billion of that has been identified, maybe even \$11 billion already expended.

I raise this point because it seems to me most Americans taking a look at Afghanistan would not know just off the top of the head how poor the country is, how limited are the resources of this democracy that is now charged with providing services, and how dependent upon the international community, which we found in our previous testimony has rather fractionated chains of command.

This is not meant to be terribly confusing because it arose from Enduring Freedom, the military operation of the United States. That continues. Now we have the ISAF operation of NATO involving the 37 countries that General Jones mentioned. But then also, as he pointed out in his chart, this overall ceiling and roof which is the United Nations command, has apparently administrative responsibility for each of the five pillars, only one of which the United States has a major responsibility over, although we contribute to each of the others.

But there are at least three different situations there with which this Government in Afghanistan must cooperate or contend, as the case may be. Because of deficiencies in the training of police or security, as you say, it is very hard to eradicate drugs in an area in which conflict is proceeding, with maybe a reliance of some Afghans upon, if not Taliban, others, warlords or what have you, that provide security that the legitimate forces are not providing.

Into all of this then, in your paper you mention that there is a severe shortage of electricity. This has been mentioned in Iraq frequently as very, very demoralizing.

But describe, if you can, just that factor alone, keeping the lights on in the country?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, if you like I can provide a little bit more background on the general reconstruction situation very briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

Dr. RUBIN. First, the figures—let me clarify the figures that I had passed to General Jones. The estimate of \$27.6 billion is the estimate of the Government of Afghanistan, aided by international financial institutions, for its reconstruction needs looking forward for the next 5 years.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Dr. RUBIN. There are some pledges for that. The \$13 billion is the amount of funds that have been committed, that is contracts signed, since the government of President Karzai came to power. That is looking backward. So far, \$11 billion of that has actually been disbursed.

Now, much of that, first of all, was not spent on reconstruction. Much of it was spent on postwar humanitarian operations. That is the reason that we have had no new power plants, that we have very late start of road construction, relatively few road constructions, no major water projects in a country where water is the most scarce input into agriculture, which is the major economic activity, and so on. That is, the reconstruction funds are inadequate.

Second is the efficiency of the way those reconstruction funds are used is very poor. Part of that I have to say is due to U.S. legislation which requires that our aid funds be spent on U.S. contractors, and that tremendously inflates the cost because U.S. contractors are not really able to operate in Afghanistan. So they spend a lot of money on overhead and then they just do subcontracting.

As far as coordination is concerned, I will not go into some technical details. There is a fund through the World Bank to provide a trust fund—budgetary support—for the Afghan Government. As you know as members of our national legislature, one of your most important functions is passing the budget and oversight of public expenditure. That is your basic function actually. When a public expenditure is appropriated and carried out by foreigners, the legislature has very little to do actually.

So it is important that, even if it is being funded by foreign aid, to the extent possible it be put through the budgetary mechanism so they can develop accountability and the capability of implementation. Again, some of our legislation prevents us from appropriating funds in that direction. We have made an international commitment in the Afghanistan Compact to try to move more in that direction and I hope we will do that.

As far as electricity is concerned—oh, let me just say also, the model for coordinating this now, it is not under U.N. administration. Since the Government of Afghanistan is now fully established and has a constitutional structure and all three branches operating, if not particularly well, they are now in charge and there is a joint international Afghan body called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, which is in charge of all this theoretically.

Now, on electricity, there is a severe shortage of electricity. Some of the major cities purchase it from abroad, Herat from Iran, Mazar-e Sharif from Uzbekistan. On the one hand, Kabul city, the capital, which is the real political problem, will according to plan

get electricity in 2 or 3 years via transfer from Central Asia, where there is a lot of hydropower. In the period until then, the only way to keep the lights on will be to continue to purchase diesel to run some very inefficient power plants.

The United States was doing that. We have cut back on that this year. We have to get that money there this month or there will not be fuel for this winter. I do not have up-to-date information on where that stands, but that is key. There were riots in Kabul May 29. If there is no electricity this winter there could be much more severe riots.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have clarified a little bit the chain of command. But with this government plus the coordinating group, say from the U.N., is there some overall business plan for how these five pillars General Jones described and that you have touched upon are to be administered? Is there some way in terms of our oversight that we could understand who is supposed to do what?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, the Afghan Government—and I actually worked on this project as an advisor—has issued its interim Afghan national development strategy—

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Dr. RUBIN [continuing]. Which was submitted to the London conference last January. That is available online. I can assist you in seeing that, and there is an implementation strategy attached to that. It still needs to be much better developed, but it is there for you to look at.

The CHAIRMAN. And funded, so we have some idea.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. It has been costed approximately. But I should note that it is difficult to estimate the costs because the cost depends on the mechanism of delivery. A school built by USAID costs \$125,000. A school built by the Afghan Government costs \$40,000 to \$50,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Sarbanes.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL R. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator SARBANES. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rubin, we are very pleased to have you here. I have long held the view that we diverted our attention and resources away from Afghanistan far too early and that we are increasingly paying a price for that. It seems to me that they have put a government into place. They have chosen a leader through a constitutional process, which commands some credibility, and we need to provide stronger and continuing support in order to try to make a success out of it, and I am very much worried about what is taking place.

Let me ask you, to what do you attribute the significant upsurge in Taliban insurgent activity that we have seen in recent times?

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you, Senator.

The Taliban were not defeated; they were displaced, and they went to Pakistan. In Pakistan, they have reorganized themselves with very little hindrance, both in the tribal territories and in the areas they originally organized themselves. The Taliban were always a joint Afghan-Pakistani operation. As General Musharraf

said in Kabul last week, the Government of Pakistan supported the Taliban. They helped create them and fund them. Their base—and in fact they have more political support in Pakistan than they do in Afghanistan.

In addition—and of course, the United States focused solely on a narrowly defined, or mainly on a narrowly defined counter-terrorism mission, namely looking from time to time for the top leaders of al-Qaeda, did not hold Pakistan's feet to the fire about harboring the Taliban.

Now, in addition, the war in Iraq has created a new terrorist safe haven, a new proving ground and testing ground for tactics and strategy, and we have seen, even in news reports, as well as people tell me in intelligence reports, that there has been an exchange of information and knowledge between the two fronts, which has resulted in the use of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, the astronomical increase in them and of suicide attacks, and also the strategic objective of attacking non-American NATO troop contributors in order to weaken their political will, which worked to some extent in Iraq because of the lack of support, but is not working in Afghanistan.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if you were put in charge of the Afghan policy of our government, what would be your five-point plan to try to address this situation? What should we be moving to do to address this situation, which I think is of growing dimensions and growing concern?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, first I should say that I believe that the war in Iraq is not related to the war—has no relationship to the attack on us on September 11. I am mentioning this because the fact that our government has projected it as part of the war has unfortunately had a contaminating second order effect on the real theater in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in that unfortunately it has radicalized the Taliban and pushed them closer to global jihadis, with whom they had a troubled, somewhat troubled relationship in the past.

So first I would try to refocus on the real politically, militarily, and in every way on the true source of global terrorism, which is in that region, and change our policies in the Middle East. That would have an effect in the area there.

Second, within the theater itself I would confidentially—so perhaps I should not say it here—but I would confidentially explain to Pakistan that it is very difficult for us to continue to give them military assistance and debt relief while they are harboring the people who are killing our troops, and that they have to be at least as active in taking down the Quetta shura as they were in combating the insurgency, the Baluch nationalist insurgency in the same province, which resulted in their killing of a respected civilian leader, Nowab Akbar Bukti.

I would overall at least double the amount of resources that we are spending on reconstruction in Afghanistan and explore how we could put more of those through the government budget.

Third, I would—and here I want to commend the coalition for now having developed a coherent plan for reform of the police, but that will take several years before effects are really seen on the ground. I would develop an interim plan for both strengthening the police and strengthening the judiciary on an emergency basis by

using as a transitional basis certain community institutions in Afghanistan, which would require a relatively small amount of funding—I spell this out in my paper—in order to support the creation of community policing and community-based dispute resolution and other kinds of justice mechanisms, which could then be linked to the judicial system.

Fifth, fourth, I would focus on—I would work with the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime to develop an internationally accepted list of drug kingpins and major drug traffickers in Afghanistan, have that adopted by the U.N. Security Council, and issue sanctions against them, combined with a political initiative within Afghanistan offering a conditional amnesty if they will bring their money into legitimate investment and make some kind of restitution, in a way analogous to transitional justice measures after a period of war on conflict when you do not seek to punish every crime, but have some kind of measures of reconciliation and restitution.

Then finally, I would focus a great deal of the increased reconstruction assistance on the basic elements of infrastructure for employment creation and rural development.

Senator SARBANES. That all suggests to me that in your judgment the structures that are there to try to remedy the situation are acceptable or workable, because you have talked about moving more resources through the Government of Afghanistan, the coalition effort, and so forth. Is that a correct perception on my part?

Dr. RUBIN. In part. Of course, you limited me to five points. Of course all of those, in particular the Afghan Government requires major reform measures. I might note there is a document, the Afghanistan Compact, which the United States played a very important role in drafting and agreeing to, as well as the United Nations and 60 other countries and institutions, which lays out a program for the next 5 years, including detailed benchmarks on this reform.

So the overall chapeau, the overall theme, I would say, is implementing the Afghanistan Compact. But obviously there are some things that need to be prioritized and those are the ones in my opinion that I mentioned.

Senator SARBANES. What is your reading on the coalition forces and how they are proceeding and their capabilities?

Dr. RUBIN. Of course I am not a military analyst. In my view, while we made serious errors in the beginning, analogous in a way to errors made in Iraq of not having enough forces and also not having the right mandate—we had no mandate—no force had the mandate to provide security for Afghans afterward. That has changed, I think largely due to the initiative of our commanders on the ground, who came to understand the situation better than some people in this town.

At the moment, the coalition has shifted to a more appropriate type of footing, and of course is also handing off to NATO. I think both the coalition and NATO commanders would agree, and I think General Jones said this, that at this point the major task is not a military one. It is political and economic. The military can help create some of the conditions for that, but if the civilian and diplomatic efforts are not there to follow through then the tactical victories of which he spoke recently will not be translated into strategic success.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From a strategic point of view, would you have delayed going into Iraq, understanding that it might take the attention away from Afghanistan? In other words, if we had a decision to make, we could have gone any time we wanted to, the WMD came along, people got hyperventilated, we got to go in there, we got to do the job—as I look at it, if you step back, that could have been done some other time.

So, in your opinion, was that a mistake to go in there, because it dissipated our resources and took the focus off of Afghanistan?

Dr. RUBIN. First, of course, I do not have a vote on the record to document what I thought at the time, but I believed that containment was working and there was no need to invade Iraq at any time, nor was there a legitimate reason to do so. I believe that when you are waging a war in which your national security is at stake you must identify your enemies very carefully.

When we were attacked by Japan in 1941, we did not declare general war against totalitarianism and attack the Soviet Union at the same time. We were allied with the Soviet Union, which was not a particularly nice or democratic regime.

Senator VOINOVICH. The answer to that is that you would not have done it under either WMD reasons or under change of regime. Okay.

Dr. RUBIN. May I add one other point?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes.

Dr. RUBIN. Which is, we are engaged in a political battle for our legitimacy as the leader of the world, and part of what has weakened us and has undermined us for instance success in NATO is that our prestige and credibility is now at an all-time low. That is particularly the case in the Muslim world, where at the moment Osama bin Laden is more popular than our President in, for instance, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Now, that means that—and part of the reason for that is many people, including Muslims, accepted that we had a legitimate right to attack, to counterattack against the people who attacked us, but when we then attacked a country that had nothing to do with September 11, but that had a lot of oil and that was in a sense a strategic opponent of us on some political issues, in a sense we were carrying out, we were implementing the image of us that al-Qaeda was trying to project, and that caused us to lose a great deal of credibility and, frankly, it makes the administration's rhetoric about what we are trying to accomplish in the world not credible to the overwhelming majority of people in the Muslim world and elsewhere.

Senator VOINOVICH. Second, you made it very clear that if we are going to be successful against the Taliban that President Musharraf and the Pakistanis are really going to have to cooperate with us and get serious. What argues against their not doing that? In other words, is Musharraf fearful that if he really gets in and does the job against the Taliban that he is going to jeopardize his life or his future, political future, on the one hand? On the other

is, what incentive does he have to go in there and do what we want him to do?

Dr. RUBIN. I thank you for asking that question, because I would not like to, under the pressure of time, leave the impression that I am broadly against Pakistan or against President Musharraf. I believe that President Musharraf is personally courageous and he is not influenced by fears of what might happen to him personally. But Pakistan's national interest is much more complicated than sometimes we understand.

Pakistan has been, ever since its inception, locked in a conflict with India, a country which is eight times larger and more economically dynamic and also a fellow owner of nuclear weapons. In addition, Afghanistan has never recognized the line separating Afghanistan from Pakistan and there has always been a hostile relationship between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even the Taliban refuse to recognize that border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan's key internal problem has been integrating the ethnic minorities that live along the border with Afghanistan, the Baluch and the Pashtuns, and it fears that—and Afghanistan has at times in the past, sometimes with Soviet assistance, stirred up trouble in that area.

For all of these reasons, Pakistan has used the funding and support of mujahedin, jihadi groups, and what we call terrorists as an instrument, as a force multiplier. They have managed to keep 700,000 Indian troops tied down in Kashmir, away from the border with Punjab, at a very low cost by use of these groups. Similarly, they imposed a high cost on the Soviet Union and so on.

Therefore this is something that has become very well integrated into their foreign policy because of some real security concerns that they have. We have to help them address those security concerns with regard to both India and Afghanistan.

Senator VOINOVICH. I take it from what you have said that you feel that the resources that are really needed coming from the United States ought to be redoubled in terms of reconstruction to indicate a real seriousness about really making a difference in Afghanistan.

Then, how important is it to our allies—I am pleased that they have been able to join us there and send their troops, but how urgent is it for them in terms of their own economic or their own security interests to be there and that it be successful? Or is this just something they are doing to show their colors and they are not as committed to seeing that Afghanistan be successful?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I appreciate that question as well because it enables me to clarify something. What I actually meant is the total international resources devoted to Afghanistan should be doubled. That would mean doubling our contribution, but it would mean doubling everyone else's as well, not just ours.

I think if you look at the overall foreign policy commitments of many of our allies there, you will see that it is a much higher priority for them than it is for us, relative to other things. For instance, Afghanistan is by far the largest international commitment of the Government of Canada, both in terms of foreign assistance and in terms of troops. The same is true for the Netherlands. The

same is true for the United Kingdom with the exception of Iraq. I believe it may also be true to some extent for Germany. Certainly it is one of the largest military operations that they have, though it is small. So it is important for them.

Senator VOINOVICH. It is important. And why is it important for them?

Dr. RUBIN. I think mainly it is important to them because of their relationship with us, because they see that—they believe that a secure United States is essential to their own security. And despite the very strong disagreements that many of them have over Iraq and other aspects of our policy, they really very much do want to stand with the United States whenever they can.

Some of them also have been attacked, of course.

Senator VOINOVICH. Also they—do you think that they are going to stay at the wheel on this when they start encountering deaths and so forth? Some of them I think thought they were going over there and do a little peacekeeping and now they are in areas where this is real serious and they are losing troops there. Do you think they are going to have the willpower, the staying power, to say we are going to stay in there in spite of the fact that we are losing people and maybe back home it might be unpopular?

Dr. RUBIN. Certainly there is controversy over it in some countries. But—and I have traveled to many of these countries. I should also say Spain, it is very important for them. The governments in these countries are making very serious efforts to explain the importance of this to their people. That is why President Karzai is addressing the Canadian parliament today.

My impression is that, while I cannot predict exactly what will happen, that the governments and the majorities there are firmly—the governments are very firmly committed to doing this. The people do not always understand exactly the reasons for it, but the governments are making efforts to explain it because it is an important commitment to them.

Senator VOINOVICH. I will be interested. As I mentioned, we will be at that NATO parliamentary meeting. It might be good to look at an aspect of which countries are there and talk to their parliamentarians and try to get a feel for how committed they are to this and do they understand the importance to their respective countries.

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I have addressed the NATO interparliamentary assembly actually on two occasions, and I have found that there was a rather high level of commitment, though they had a number of questions quite similar to the ones that you have posed today.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much.

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Voinovich, for your questions, and likewise for your service on the interparliamentary work with NATO. I would add that, as we all know, there will be a summit of NATO nations in Riga in the latter part of November in which my understanding is this is likely to be a part of the agenda. We have been having some informal meetings to try to think through what ought to happen at that meeting.

But one thing that will happen, I suspect, is the discussion that General Jones alluded to this morning, and that is that the mili-

tary budgets total of many of our NATO allies have continued to diminish as a percentage of their gross national product, and that is not a new factor. This has been adrift for a while. So even when there is commitment to do some things, the resources, particularly with expeditionary forces that can go outside the borders of the country, are still very, very limited. This is a predicament for NATO as an organization, quite apart from its commitment in Afghanistan.

But I appreciate the point you have made in response, because it is a very important one in terms of the continuity. The thing that keeps running through my mind as I listen to this, and I do not want to be adhering simply to the budget, is that it is the most important aspect, but the needs are so tremendous here in terms of money and, as you have said, beyond that, how the money is spent organizationally, how it actually hits the ground in Afghanistan, how it buttresses the self-government of that country and its fledgling democracy and the sophistication of that distribution.

You have mentioned an overall plan coming from the Government itself, of Afghanistan, which you have referenced today. But it would seem to me this is going to be a very important aspect of our continuing debate. Otherwise we are likely to have debate on the floor or hearings in which we lament certain parts of what we have talked about today—lack of training of police or security people, why the warlords are still playing such a role, whatever happened to the al-Qaeda, and so forth. These are very, very important items, but underlying all of this has to be the institution-building that is going to require money, and from a country, as you started out with, that is extremely poor and that has from its own resources so little to deal with, although we all hope that will grow. I think in your paper you mention you can have exponentially large rises in the percentage of GNP in a country when the base is that small. So that is an encouraging factor.

But I thank you very much for your paper and your testimony. They have been most informative and helpful to us.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one last thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Senator VOINOVICH. You alluded to the issue of the drug problem in the United States and I got the impression that some of these drugs are coming into the United States.

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I perhaps should have said the developed world. I believe actually the bulk of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan are consumed in Iran and Pakistan.

Senator VOINOVICH. So that is why the Iranians are so interested in making sure it stops.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. The reason I bring it up is I just had our local FBI director visit with me from Cincinnati and he said, "Senator, the issue of terrorism is one that we are gravely concerned about." But he said, "The biggest issue that we have got here in the United States that we are not paying attention to is the drug problem, and that our resources are being kind of spread out and we really have got to look at that." It is still there and we need to deal with it and we are not directing our attention to it.

I think you remember the other hearing we had a year or so ago where we had the folks in here and they were talking about how active the Russian mafia is in the United States and seemed to be doing about whatever they wanted to do because we do not have the resources to deal with that problem.

So from my perspective you are saying the biggest market is in those countries you just mentioned.

Dr. RUBIN. That is in physical quantity. The biggest market in money is in Europe and of course in the United States.

If I may add, if you do not mind my mentioning something that I heard in the other house yesterday, Dr. Walt, a Republican from Texas, mentioned at the hearing yesterday that in his view we had failed to learn the lessons of Prohibition, which of course provided the startup capital for organized crime in the United States, and that in effect by turning drug use into a crime we are funding organized crime and insurgency around the world, and it may be that we need to look at other methods of regulation and treatment.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. It is a fascinating thought that you just imparted, that although the bulk of the drugs may be utilized by Iran and Pakistan, that the greatest value for those that are not imbibed by these countries comes from Europe and the United States. Why? Because the people surely do not receive it for free, but what is the distribution? Why are Pakistan and Iran so afflicted by drugs?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, they are closer. Basically, the price—the cost of production is a negligible portion of the price of narcotics.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is transportation.

Dr. RUBIN. No, no. It is risk because it is illegal. If it were not illegal it would not be—it would be worth hardly anything. It is only its illegality that makes it so valuable.

The CHAIRMAN. Another fascinating topic.

Well, we thank you again for your helpfulness, Dr. Rubin.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

