[Senate Hearing 109-1138]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-1138
HURRICANE KATRINA
AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 29, 2005............................... 1
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 4
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 38
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 3
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Sununu...................................... 4
Witnesses
Boyd, David G., Ph.D., Director, Office for Interoperability and
Compatibility, Department of Homeland Security................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Carter, Willis, First Vice President, Association of Public
Safety Communications Officials, International (APCO); Chief of
Communications, Shreveport Fire Department..................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Moran, Kenneth, Acting Director, Office of Homeland Security,
Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission.......... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Orr, Dereck, Program Manager, Public Safety Communications
Systems, National Institute of Standards and Technology........ 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Appendix
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared
statement...................................................... 41
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, prepared statement. 41
HURRICANE KATRINA AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
The Chairman. We have a whole number of conflicts this
morning, gentlemen, not the least of which is the final
statements on the floor for the nomination of Judge Roberts,
but also we have several conference committees meeting. And I
doubt we're going to have great attendance here today. But the
Senator from California and I might be able to stir it up a
little bit.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We're going to have government witnesses this
morning, and the afternoon witnesses will be industry
witnesses. The afternoon session is scheduled to start at 2:30.
The recent hurricanes have shown that many first responders
just cannot talk with one another, because their radios and
communication networks have been inoperable. Achieving
interoperability requires a great many things--coordination,
planning, and training; expert equipment; proper standards; and
the spectrum to make certain they have the best available
communications.
Now, this is important, because, on a specific date, the
broadcasters will be required to give their first responders 24
MHz of new spectrum in a 700 MHz band, including a portion of
that for interoperability, exclusively. This Committee is
working on that bill. We hope to be able to consider it next
week. And we hope that will bring about some additional funds
that we may be able to use to deal with the interoperability
problems.
And I do want to thank the Louisiana delegation for their
participation in this hearing. Senator Vitter agreed to chair
the afternoon portion, because we have an appropriations bill
on the floor this afternoon.
Let me turn to Senator Boxer to see if she has any
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Could you just repeat? You said there's
going to be a bill that deals with interoperability. Could you
just--I'm sorry, I was looking at my statement. I didn't hear
the details of what you said.
The Chairman. If you're talking about the DTP bill, we're
still wondering whether we can get the other bill done in time
to take it up at the same time.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this
hearing to shine a light on a shocking deficiency in our
emergency communications system. And the time to find a
solution is now. It was really yesterday. As a matter of fact,
it was the day before yesterday, and we still haven't done it.
We didn't learn our lesson after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing. We didn't learn it after September 11. The wildfires
raging in California almost 2 years ago didn't teach us. And,
parenthetically, I'm sad to report we've got a wildfire raging
out of control, 9,000 acres, as we speak here, near Los
Angeles, in the--not the very populated areas, but threatening
populated areas. And, of course, as you mentioned, Hurricane
Katrina shone a light on this.
First-responders to all these disasters were so challenged
by the lack of interoperable communications that hundreds of
lives were unnecessarily and tragically lost. And some of those
lives are first responders themselves. Enough is enough. We
don't need any more failures.
I'd like to just show you--and I only have 2 minutes left
in my remarks--a chart here, Mr. Chairman. And I'd like the
Chairman to take a look at this. If there was an accident on
the Golden Gate Bridge, something really terrible, an emergency
on the Golden Gate Bridge--and we know that our bridges have
been targeted by al Qaeda, to just mention that--there are 17
different agencies that will respond to such--and they're all
terrific. And they include the U.S. Coast Guard, they include
local people, State people, and the rest--fire departments,
police, highway patrol. Every one of these agencies is stellar.
But most of them can't talk to one another. It's just really
wrong. We have to fix it, it seems to me.
The Chairman. Senator, would you allow me to interrupt you?
Senator Boxer. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you know why? They all buy their radios
from the lowest bidder.
Senator Boxer. Well, maybe we have to look into that.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Boxer. I tried to get funds for interoperable
communications systems as part of the Rail Security bill. This
Committee responded, everyone on this committee. But, somehow
or other, it was dropped over in the House. And then, a really
wonderful thing happened. In the intelligence bill--reform
bill, with Senator McCain's help, we did pass an authorizing
program for $300 million a year, and again it was dropped, in
conference.
So, we cannot seem to go right over that goal line, and
that's what we need to do. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, because
you are effective and such an important Member of the Senate,
with your help we will not ignore this anymore. If there are
problems with procurement, if we have to look at those things,
absolutely we should.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Our first panelist, Dr. Kenneth Moran, who's the Acting
Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement
Bureau, of the Federal Communications Commission; Dr. David
Boyd, who is the Director of the Office for Interoperability
and Compatibility, Department of Homeland Security; Willis
Carter, of the Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials, APCO, and the Chief of Communications of the
Shreveport Fire Department; and Dereck Orr, the Program Manager
of the Public Safety Communications Systems, National Institute
of Standards and Technology. I'm sorry if I read them as
they're not seated at the table.
First, we will call on Senator Rockefeller to see if he has
an opening statement.
Senator Rockefeller. Oh, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I didn't see you.
Senator Rockefeller. I yield to Senator Sununu.
The Chairman. Were you here first? Sorry.
Senator Sununu. Under no circumstances would that be
appropriate. Go ahead, Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Just to be very brief, the Conference
of Mayors 2004 surveyed 192 cities: 44 percent reported an
accident within the preceding year in which the lack of
interoperable communications made response difficult, 49
percent of the cities are not interoperable with State police,
60 percent are not interoperable with their State Emergency
Operations Centers, 83 percent are not interoperable with the
Federal law enforcement agencies--to wit, FBI, ATF, Border
Patrol, et cetera--89 percent believe that funding is the most
significant way out of that.
We did have a couple of votes on the issue, which failed
last year. And what happened in the Gulf Coast, I'm seeing on a
much, much smaller scale in West Virginia. Everything is
communication. Everything is communication. Leaders can't be
leaders, mayors can't be mayors, governors can't be governors,
county commissioners can't be county commissioners, much less
EMS, unless they have a system that works and unless they can
talk to each other.
I just think what's happening, Mr. Chairman, is just an
enormous statement that if we want America to be strong, we've
got to start right here in our own country, and we've got to
start with the protection of our people. And that's called
protecting our people in times of disasters of various sorts.
And that's not just weather, that's--that can do with dirty
war, you know, dirty bombs, things of that sort.
So, this is a very important hearing. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Sununu?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is not my area of expertise, but I think, like most
Americans, I assumed that the Federal support and assistance
regarding interoperability had a bigger impact, at least than
it appears to have had in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. I
note, in one of the statements presented today, that the figure
of $1.5 billion is highlighted, money that's already been made
available to state and local governments to deal with this
problem. I know billions more have been made available for
equipment grants through the COPS FAST and other equipment-
based programs. There has been dramatic assistance to state and
local agencies to deal with interoperability. And it is very
unclear to me why we are so far behind the curve, or seem to be
so far behind the curve, still today. I think everything that I
have seen and read, and personal visits I have made with public
safety officials at the state and local level indicate this is
not new technology, that we are not trying to reinvent the
wheel here. We're trying to develop or implement basic
standards, basic systems so that we have the most seamless
interaction between first responders and public safety
officials at Federal, State, and local level.
And I hope that the testimony today will provide some
honest, objective clarity as to why we haven't done more to
achieve progress in this area with all of the money that's
already been made available.
Yes, there may be need for additional resources. I think
first we need an honest accounting of how the money that has
been made available for this purpose has been used, and why
more hasn't been done with it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Could we now proceed with the statements?
Senator Dorgan, do you wish to make an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. No, thank you. Not at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Our first witness is Kenneth Moran.
Mr. Moran?
STATEMENT OF KENNETH MORAN, ACTING DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Moran. Good morning, Chairman Stevens and distinguished
Members of the Committee.
My name is Ken Moran, and I serve as the Director of the
Federal Communications Commission's Office of Homeland
Security. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the ongoing
efforts of the Commission to promote and facilitate effective
public safety communication, as well as interoperability.
The Commission has taken several steps over the last few
years to promote interoperability, which we define as radio
communications between public safety agencies, usually of
different jurisdictions, in furtherance of both day-to-day and
emergency operations. To further interoperability, the
Commission has provided additional spectrum to public safety
entities, we've promoted technological developments that
enhance interoperability, and we have provided our expertise
and input on a number of interagency efforts.
The Commission has designed approximately 97 MHz of
spectrum for mobile public safety use throughout the country.
This includes spectrum in the 150 MHz band, the 450, 700, 800
MHz bands, and the 4.9 GHz band.
The Chairman. We can't quite hear you. Can you pull that
mike toward you a little bit?
Mr. Moran. OK. Sorry, Senator.
In addition, the Commission has designated certain channels
in these bands specifically for interoperability. Frequencies
designated for interoperability include channels in the 150
MHz, 450 MHz, 700 MHz, and 800 MHz bands.
In addition, although not specifically designated for
interoperability, the 4.9 GHz band rules foster
interoperability by providing a regulatory framework where
traditional public safety entities can pursue strategic
partnerships with others, including critical infrastructure
entities, as necessary for the completion of their missions.
Also, once the 800-MHz transition is complete, public safety
entities will also have access to another 4.5 MHz of spectrum
in the 800 band.
The Commission also has developed policies and rules to
promote the sharing of spectrum. For example, the Commission's
rules permit the shared use of radio stations where licensees
may share their facilities on a nonprofit, cost-shared--with
other public safety organizations, including Federal Government
entities.
In addition to facility interoperability on a regional
basis, the Commission has reallocated television spectrum for
public safety use in several cities. For example, the
Commission recently reallocated spectrum in New York City.
The Commission has also modified its rules to eliminate
regulatory barriers to help speed introduction of software-
defined radio technology. Radios traditionally have been built
with unalterable hardware components that perform specific
functions. SDR technology allows radios to cover mobile
frequency bands and signal formats by simply sending different
software instructions to a microprocessor, instead of using
additional frequently bulky and heavy parts. Because software-
defined radios can use multiple frequency bands, including
those designated for interoperability, they can be an important
vehicle for improving interoperability for public safety
communications systems.
Although this technology is not yet widely available for
public safety use, we are aware, through the SDR forum, that
public safety entities and industry are actively exploring
these applications.
The Commission works with other Federal agencies in
promoting public safety communications and interoperability.
For example, the Commission has worked with the Department of
Homeland Security's National Communication System and
telecommunications providers to establish a regulatory
framework that would facilitate wireless priority access
service. Wireless priority services are especially important
during major disasters and emergencies when wireless networks
are often congested. Under the wireless priority active service
rules, authorized national security and emergency preparedness
personnel, such as first responders, may obtain access to the
next-available wireless channels to originate calls.
The Commission has also been working closely with the
Information Administration and the Department of Homeland
Security's NCS and SAFECOM to pursue initiatives that would
advance the common goal of improving public safety
communications interoperability. As a result of this
collaboration, Federal, State, and local governments have
entered into strategic partnerships to plan, fund, and
implement shared communications systems.
As directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, the Commission is conducting a study to
assess the spectrum needs of emergency-response providers. As
part of this study, the Commission, NTIA, and DHS have
established a working group to facilitate the Commission's
assessment of the short-term and long-term needs for allocation
of additional portions of spectrum for Federal, State, and
local emergency-response providers.
In light of recent events, we are also looking closely to
determine what steps we can take to address this critical need.
Recently, Chairman Martin announced his intention to create an
independent expert panel to review the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the communications infrastructure. This panel will
be composed of public safety and communications industry
representatives, and will make recommendations to the
Commission regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness,
network reliability, and communications among first responders,
such as police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. This
panel will specifically be tasked with making recommendations
regarding interoperability.
In closing, the Commission will continue to work with other
Federal agencies in the public safety community to identify
ways in which it can promote and facilitate enhanced
interoperability.
I'd be happy to respond to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moran follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth Moran, Acting Director, Office of
Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:
Good morning. I am Kenneth Moran, Acting Director of the Federal
Communications Commission (Commission) Enforcement Bureau's Office of
Homeland Security. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Emergency Alert System, or EAS.
The Commission is well aware that an effective public alert and
warning system is an essential element of emergency preparedness, and
that such a system is impossible without effective communication and
coordination within the Federal Government, as well as with the active
participation of the states and the private sector. Accordingly, the
Commission has been working with other Federal agencies, state
governments, and industry to ensure that the American public is
provided with a robust, efficient, and technologically current alert
and warning system.
Background
The forerunner of our current Emergency Alert System originated in
the early days of the Cold War when President Truman established the
``CONELRAD'' system as a means to warn the public of an imminent
attack. Since that time, CONELRAD has given way to the Emergency
Broadcast System, which in 1994 was replaced by EAS. From the early
CONELRAD days to the present, the Commission has played a critical role
in ensuring that the President of the United States would be able to
communicate with the American public in the event of a national
emergency. Today's EAS uses analog radio and television broadcast
stations, as well as wired and wireless cable systems, to deliver a
national Presidential message. When activated, EAS would override all
other broadcasts or cable transmissions, national and local, to deliver
an audio Presidential message. This system is mandatory at the national
level, but is also available on a voluntary basis for states and
localities to deliver local emergency notifications.
The Commission, in conjunction with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Weather Service (NWS),
implements EAS at the Federal level. Our respective roles currently are
based on a 1981 Memorandum of Understanding between FEMA, NWS, and the
Commission, on a 1984 Executive Order, and on a 1995 Presidential
Statement of Requirements.
The Commission's EAS rules are focused on national activation, and
the delivery of a Presidential message. The Commission's rules
prescribe: (1) technical standards for EAS; (2) procedures for radio
and television broadcast stations and cable systems to follow in the
event EAS is activated; and (3) EAS testing protocols. Under the rules,
national activation of EAS for a Presidential message is designed to
provide the President the capability to transmit from any location at
any time within ten minutes of the system's activation, and would take
priority over any other message and preempt other messages in progress.
Currently, only analog radio and television stations, and wired and
wireless cable television systems, are required to implement the
national EAS. Other systems, such as digital television (DTV), Direct
Broadcast Satellite television (DBS), Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite
systems, paging, Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service (SDARS), and In-
Band-On-Channel Digital Audio Broadcasting (IBOC DAB) are currently not
required to participate in EAS.
The decision to activate the national-level EAS rests solely with
the President. FEMA acts as the White House's executive agent for the
development, operations, and maintenance of the national level EAS and
is responsible for implementation of the national level activation of
EAS, as well as EAS tests and exercises.
EAS is essentially a hierarchical distribution system. FEMA has
designated 34 radio broadcast stations as Primary Entry Point (PEP)
stations. At the request of the President, FEMA would distribute the
``Presidential Level'' messages to these PEP stations. The PEP stations
are monitored in turn by other stations in the hierarchical chain.
Commission rules require broadcast stations and cable systems to
monitor at least two of the EAS sources for Presidential alerts that
are specified in their state EAS plans. Initiation of an EAS message,
whether at the national, state, or local level, is accomplished via
dedicated EAS equipment. The EAS equipment provides a method for
automatic interruption of regular programming and is capable of
providing warnings in the primary language that is used by the station
or cable system.
Along with its primary role as a national public warning system,
EAS--and other emergency notification mechanisms--are part of an
overall public alert and warning system, over which FEMA exercises
jurisdiction. EAS use, as part of such a public warning system at the
state and local levels, while encouraged, is voluntary. Nevertheless,
the public receives most of its alert and warning information through
the broadcasters' and cable systems' voluntary activations of the EAS
system on behalf of state and local emergency managers.
Current Issues and the Commission's Rulemaking Proceeding
As noted above, the public relies heavily on EAS for emergency
information. EAS therefore serves a critical purpose, but it currently
only applies to analog radio and television stations, and wired and
wireless cable television systems. In August 2004, the Commission began
a rulemaking proceeding to review whether we need to either update EAS
or replace it with a more comprehensive and effective warning system.
In initiating its rulemaking, the Commission encouraged commenters
to consider recommendations from two public/private partnerships that
have studied EAS issues extensively: the Media Security and Reliability
Council (MSRC), an industry-led Federal Advisory Committee comprised of
representatives from the radio, television, multi-channel video, public
safety, and disabilities communities, and the Partnership for Public
Warning (PPW), a not-for-profit, public/private partnership that was
incorporated with the goal of promoting and enhancing effective,
integrated dissemination of public warnings.
The Commission has received comments from numerous interested
individuals, Federal entities, state and local emergency planning
organizations, and various sectors of the telecommunications
industries. We have coordinated with DHS and its component, FEMA, and
with the Department of Commerce and its component, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Weather Service, and
we will continue to do so.
The overarching question addressed in the proceeding is whether EAS
in its present form is the most effective mechanism for warning the
American public of an emergency, and, if not, how EAS can be improved.
Most of the parties who commented agree that our warning system should
be improved. Most--including MSRC and PPW--also advocate upgrading,
rather than replacing EAS, to take advantage of the existing EAS
infrastructure.
The Commission's rulemaking proceeding addresses a number of
specific and timely issues. For instance, the Commission noted that
some parties argue that the purely voluntary nature of EAS at the state
and local level results in an inconsistent application of EAS as an
effective component of an overall public alert and warning system. To
address these arguments, the Commission is examining whether permissive
state and local EAS participation remains appropriate today, and
whether uniform national guidelines should apply to state and local EAS
implementation. Some parties who commented on this issue support
continuing voluntary participation, at least for the present, while the
Commission considers broader changes to EAS. Some parties also stated
that participation, though voluntary, is widespread. These parties
generally support continuing the voluntary nature of EAS.
The Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) initiating
the open proceeding focused on the fact that EAS is currently mandated
only for analog television and radio, and for cable systems, which
represent an increasingly smaller part of our information sources. The
Commission is considering whether and how EAS obligations should be
extended to services not currently covered--e.g., digital television
and radio, and satellite radio and television. Many commenters support
the Commission's efforts to extend the EAS rules to digital
broadcasters.
The NPRM also asked questions about whether the technical
capabilities of EAS can or should be applied to other communications
platforms. Along with digital broadcast, new digital wireless
technologies, including cellular telephony and personal digital
assistants, are rapidly redefining the communications landscape, making
available to the public warning technologies that are far more flexible
and effective than the analog broadcast mechanism currently employed by
EAS. The Commission is considering whether there should be an effort to
use such technologies to form a comprehensive national public warning
system capable of reaching virtually everyone all the time by combining
EAS with alternative public alert and warning systems. We received a
number of comments about methods, such as cell phone broadcasting, that
could expand the reach of our warning systems in the future. In their
comments, DHS and FEMA also noted that they are investigating new
technologies for this purpose.
The Commission also is examining security and reliability issues
relevant to EAS and on the important question of how best to supply an
effective public warning system to the disabled community and non-
English speakers. The Commission is also considering the role of
various Federal Government departments and agencies, as well as local
authorities, in implementing EAS.
In addition, the Commission is involved in other initiatives,
beyond its rulemaking proceeding, to address the effectiveness of our
Nation's warning systems. For instance, the Commission is participating
in the Task Force on Effective Warnings Materials, a group of Federal
departments and agencies that has been assembled to examine existing
and planned disaster warning and communications systems, and to make
recommendations to ensure that these systems are effective. We will
continue to share our expertise and views, and to seek the expertise
and views of others, on these important issues.
Conclusion
The Commission looks forward to working with Congress, our
colleagues at other Federal, State, and tribal agencies, and the public
to ensure that we can provide an effective and technologically advanced
warning system to our citizens. The Commission also is aware that the
Congress is taking an active interest in the issue of public alert and
warning, and stands ready to provide whatever technical assistance that
the Congress would find helpful in this regard.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Boyd, we had you next. You're part of Homeland
Security, also, aren't you?
Dr. Boyd. Yes, sir, I am.
The Chairman. Well, will you proceed, please?
STATEMENT OF DAVID G. BOYD, Ph.D., DIRECTOR,
OFFICE FOR INTEROPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Boyd. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Committee, for the invitation to speak to you
today.
Interoperability requires, before all else, simple
operability. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, in the absence
of a reliable network across which responders within an agency
can effectively communicate, interoperability is both
irrelevant and impossible. Some seem to believe the
introduction of new technologies alone can solve our
interoperability problems. But adding equipment addresses only
part of what a fully robust, reliable, and interoperable public
safety communications system requires.
For example, when we lose towers, first responders have
only their mobile or portable units available, so range is
dramatically reduced, and control of the incident is severely
compromised. Portable units permit some short-range
communications, provided it's been planned and trained for,
until the proprietary battery packs begin to fail and cannot be
charged because the chargers are typically attached to the
power grid. 9-1-1 centers are tied to the wired telephone
networks, and so is the cellular system, which depends on cell
phones that also use proprietary batteries. No single fix alone
can address all these elements, and, more importantly, the
planning and organizational elements.
Many solutions have been offered, and many claims have been
made for each solution. But none is a silver bullet. Satellite
phones are extremely useful for command elements, but often
hopelessly impractical for individual first responders. They
require training and signals can be blocked by vegetation,
buildings, terrain, and even weather. They also use batteries
that need recharging. And a first responder in the middle of a
rescue or up to his armpits in water will find the antenna
hard, or impossible, to aim.
Van or trailer-mounted communications systems dropped into
the incident nearly always offer significantly less coverage
than the original system, and may require significant training
to use.
And all of these, without solid prior planning, will add to
the difficulties of achieving interoperability once operability
is achieved.
We believe what we've developed to support interoperability
can also help first responders successfully navigate any
communications emergency. We, in the public safety community,
have identified six key building blocks required to achieve
interoperability: governance, standard operating procedures,
technology, training and exercises, routine use of
interoperable systems, and crosscutting all of these is the
sixth, and probably most important element, a high degree of
leadership, planning, and collaboration, with a commitment to
an investment in sustainability.
To help public safety agencies, and especially the policy
levels of government, understand the interrelationship of all
of these factors, we developed a tool called the
``interoperability continuum.'' This planning tool explains how
all these elements relate to each other, and makes clear all of
these elements need to be addressed before, not during, an
emergency.
Interoperability is not a new issue. It was a problem in
Washington, D.C., when the Air Florida flight crashed into the
Potomac in 1982; in New York City, when the Twin Towers were
first attacked in 1993; in 1995 when the Murrah Building was
destroyed in Oklahoma City; and in 1999, at Columbine. Too many
public safety personnel cannot communicate by radio because
their equipment is still incompatible or the frequencies
they're assigned are different. They operate on ten different
frequency bands, among communications systems that are often
proprietary and too often 30 or more years old. Over 90 percent
of the Nation's public safety wireless infrastructure is
financed, owned, operated, and maintained by the more than
60,000 individual local jurisdictions--police, fire, and
emergency medical services--that serve the public.
National efforts to fix the problem have historically been
erratic, uncertain, and, until recently, uncoordinated. Worse,
the efforts have too often been designed without the direct
involvement of the people with the greatest stake in effective
communications, the first responders themselves. The attacks on
September 11, 2001, made clear this had to change.
Since September 11, significant progress has been made in
interoperability, thanks to the priorities both the
Administration and Congress have placed on it. In 2001, SAFECOM
was established as a Presidential Management Initiative. In
2004, the Department established the Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility to further strengthen and
integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts. And in
the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress gave it a legislative
charter.
While fixing the Nation's interoperability problems will
require a sustained effort, we recognize that we cannot wait to
move things forward. That's why SAFECOM has initiated a number
of near-term initiatives, including working with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to accelerate the
development of standards, the interoperability continuum, and
statewide planning tools: RapidCom, the program ably led by
Dereck Orr of the NIST Office of Law Enforcement Standards
while he was attached to my office, a public safety
architectural framework, creation of a P-25 performance testing
program, development of coordinated grant guidance across all
Federal grant programs, creation of a national baseline, and
identification of public safety spectrum needs. Mr. Orr will
provide more detail on some of these.
This Nation is heavily invested in an existing
infrastructure that is too often inadequate to the basic
communications requirements of individual agencies and not
interoperable.
We must continue to pursue a comprehensive strategy that
takes into account technical and cultural issues associated
with improving interoperability, which recognizes the
challenges associated with incorporating legacy systems and
practices in constantly changing technology and cultural
environments and which encourages strong local leadership in
ensuring that the needs of the frontline of emergency
responders, the first responders, are met.
Though many challenges remain, we believe we've
accomplished a great deal in the short time DHS has managed the
program, but we believe a lot remains to be done.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Boyd follows:]
Prepared Statement of David G. Boyd, Ph.D., Director, Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility, Department of Homeland Security
Introduction
Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee, for the invitation to speak to you today.
Today's testimony will focus on SAFECOM, a communications program
of the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), which
resides in the Office of Systems Engineering and Development, Science
and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
SAFECOM provides development, testing, evaluation, guidance, research
and assistance for local, tribal, state, and Federal public safety
agencies working to improve public safety response through more
effective and efficient interoperable wireless communications. (By
public safety we mean fire, police, emergency medical services,
emergency managers, and others who have emergency response missions).
Although SAFECOM is working with practitioners to develop long-term
strategic initiatives, without which the Nation will never solve the
interoperability problem, we all know terrorists, natural disasters and
other emergencies will not wait for a comprehensive national solution
so the program has been designed with near-, mid- and long-term goals.
Communications interoperability refers to the ability of public
safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio
communications systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one another
on demand, in real time, as authorized. Unfortunately, the Nation is
heavily invested in an existing infrastructure made up largely of
systems that are too often incompatible. To change this, efforts within
the Federal Government to address the interoperability problem are
being coordinated by SAFECOM and incorporate the needs of local, state,
and Federal practitioners. But there are no immediate, silver bullet
fixes to the financial, technical and cultural challenges that face us.
As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) acknowledged in a July
2004 report, communications interoperability is a long-term problem
with no one-size-fits-all solution.
Public Safety Communications Environment
Interoperability is not a new issue; it has plagued the public
safety community for decades. It was a problem in Washington, D.C.,
when the Air Florida flight crashed into the Potomac in 1982. It was a
problem in New York City when the Twin Towers were first attacked in
1993. It was a problem in 1995 when the Murrah Building was destroyed
in Oklahoma City, and in 1999 at Columbine. The reality is that today,
too many public safety personnel cannot communicate by radio with
personnel from other agencies or disciplines because their equipment is
still incompatible, or the frequencies they are assigned are different.
They operate on 10 different frequency bands and run communications
systems that are often proprietary, and that are too often 30 or more
years old, in an era when the technology lifecycle is only 18 to 24
months. Over 90 percent of the Nation's public safety wireless
infrastructure is financed, owned, operated, and maintained by the more
than 60,000 local jurisdictions that provide emergency services to the
public and only a very tiny fraction of this funding is Federal.
National efforts to fix the problem have historically been erratic,
uncertain, and until recently, uncoordinated. The attacks on September
11, 2001, made clear this had to change.
Since September 11, 2001, significant progress has been made to
improve communications interoperability for the public safety
community. Yet it is apparent that more must be achieved. Much of this
progress can be attributed to the priority that both the Administration
and Congress have placed on solving the problem of communications
interoperability. In 2001, SAFECOM was established as a Presidential
Management Initiative and charged with strengthening interoperability
at all levels of government by coordinating Federal programs,
initiating a comprehensive standards program, and developing a national
architecture. In 2004, the Department established OIC to further
strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to
improve local, tribal, state, and Federal public safety preparedness
and response. OIC was directed to:
Identify and certify all DHS programs that touch on
interoperability;
Support the creation of interoperability standards;
Establish a comprehensive research, development, testing,
and evaluation (RDT&E) program for improving public safety
interoperability;
Integrate coordinated grant guidance across all DHS grant
making agencies that touch on public safety interoperability;
Oversee the development and implementation of technical
assistance for public safety interoperability;
Conduct pilot demonstrations;
Create an interagency interoperability coordination council;
and
Establish an effective outreach program.
Long-Term Vision
Practitioners helped SAFECOM articulate a long term vision for
interoperability which projects that, not later than 2023, first
responders will operate on a national system-of-systems using
standards-based equipment that provides the capability to respond to an
incident anywhere in the country, using their own equipment, on any
network, and on dedicated public safety spectrum. They will be able to
communicate with each other as authorized via voice, data, and video on
demand and in real time. Making this vision flesh will require work in
five critical success areas, including:
1. A common set of guidelines and criteria for public safety
communications systems in conjunction with a national
architecture framework;
2. Coordinated testing and evaluation processes to ensure
communications equipment meets critical requirements;
3. Standardization of equipment fortified by interim grant
guidance measures;
4. Coordinated spectrum policy that meets the needs of the
public safety community; and
5. Certification of state communications plans.
None of these initiatives will be accomplished overnight, but many
of them are already beginning to strengthen interoperability in the
public safety community.
Near-Term Initiatives
While fixing the Nation's interoperability problem will require a
sustained effort, we recognize that we must quickly ensure sufficient
interoperability at all levels of government to meet emergencies of any
kind. To do this, DHS and SAFECOM has initiated a number of near-term
initiatives, including development of the Interoperability Continuum,
development of statewide planning tools, execution of the RapidCom
Initiative, publication of a national statement of requirements,
creation of a conformance testing program, development of coordinated
grant guidance for inclusion in every Federal grant program, creation
of a national baseline, identification of public safety spectrum needs,
development of emergency response plans for immediate communications
capabilities, and coordination with Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness' (SLGCP) Interoperable
Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP).
Statement of Requirements and a National Architecture Framework
Interoperability plans to support responses to an incident need to
be developed based on a common set of guidelines and criteria for
public safety communications systems and these should be aligned with a
national architecture framework. Only when these guidelines are
universally recognized and followed will first responders and the
larger public safety community be able to communicate effectively. To
that end, SAFECOM published Version 1.0 of the first ever comprehensive
Public Safety Statement of Requirements for Communications and
Interoperability (SoR). Developed with public safety practitioner
input, the SoR defines the functional requirements for public safety
communications. Subsequent versions will further refine these technical
requirements so that industry will have a blueprint to which to build
technologies that address public safety's needs. This SoR also serves
as the basis for developing a national architecture framework for
communications interoperability. SAFECOM is working to develop a Public
Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) that, with the SoR, will serve as
a tool to help the Nation's first responder agencies understand the
technical requirements and national migration path toward fully
interoperable communications systems without imposing requirements that
stifle innovation.
Coordinated Testing and Evaluation of Equipment
The next step in achieving national communications interoperability
is the development of coordinated testing and evaluation processes to
ensure communications equipment meets the critical needs of first
responders. Public safety is faced with many complex procurement
decisions and frequently has to hope that the equipment they buy will
do what it claims. To ensure that public safety is able to truly trust
the claims made by vendors, communications equipment needs to be tested
and evaluated based on first responder needs and capabilities. To do
this, SAFECOM created a testing and evaluation working group to help
ensure that methodologies for testing and evaluation of
interoperability products are technically sound and comparable across
testing laboratories. The working group members are practitioners and
subject matter experts from law enforcement, fire services, and
emergency medical services. These members help review and develop test
criteria and serve the program by determining which products should be
evaluated.
Standardization of Equipment Fortified by Interim Grant Guidance
Standardization of equipment fortified by interim grant guidance
measures is an essential step in achieving communications
interoperability. The equipment must adhere to communications standards
that allow for improved interoperability. As standards are created,
funding solutions must also be implemented to help jurisdictions meet
interoperability goals and requirements. To better coordinate the
funding of interoperability solutions, such as purchasing new
equipment, developing state plans, or other activities, we resolved a
major hurdle in achieving interoperability: conflicting Federal grant
guidance. In the past, Federal grant programs for public safety
communications were not coordinated and too often resulted in the use
of limited Federal resources to create systems that made
interoperability even more difficult to achieve.
Our coordinated grant guidance outlines eligibility for grants, the
purposes for which grants can be used, and guidelines for implementing
a wireless communications system in order to help maximize the
efficiency with which public safety communications related grant
dollars are allocated and spent. To ensure consistency in
interoperability grant solicitations, this guidance has been included
in grant programs administered by the Department of Justice and other
agencies within DHS. Within DHS, the Office for State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) reports that it has
provided more than $1.5 billion in direct funding to local
jurisdictions, urban areas, and states. SLGCP has three primary grant
programs that have incorporated SAFECOM's grant guidance on issues
regarding communications interoperability. These programs are the State
Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant
Program, and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.
Many of the system procurements and enhancements supported by this
funding are still being implemented. More thorough monitoring of these
projects is required to ascertain whether they achieve their intended
goals.
It is important to note, however, that although SAFECOM has
developed consensus guidance and tools to improve the grant making
process, the program does not directly manage or provide funding to
local or state agencies for communications projects. Grant guidance is
an important step toward improving national interoperability because it
helps to align public safety communications related grant dollars with
the national effort to improve interoperability at all levels of
government.
OMB also requires all Federal agencies demonstrate their programs
are fully aligned with SAFECOM guidance in developing their own
communications plans.
National Baseline of Public Safety Communications
The National Interoperability Baseline study will provide the
Nation's first statistically significant, quantitative measurement of
the current state of public safety communications interoperability. The
development of the survey methodology was initiated in January 2005 and
the resulting study will provide an understanding of the current state
of interoperability nationwide upon completion. Additionally, it will
serve as a tool to measure future improvements made through local,
state, and Federal public safety communications initiatives.
The survey instrument developed for Interoperability Baseline will
allow SAFECOM to identify areas with interoperability shortfalls, track
the impact of Federal programs and measure the success of these
programs, establish an ongoing process and mechanism to measure the
state of interoperability on a recurring basis, and develop an
interoperability baseline self-assessment tool for local and state
public safety agencies.
Coordinated Spectrum Policy That Meets the Needs of Public Safety
Radio spectrum is a finite resource--there is only so much
available and it is shared by public safety, radio broadcasters,
government users, and other commercial and private consumers. The large
demand for this resource can lead to overcrowding, which, in turn can
cause delays in or disruption of communication for public safety. The
Federal Communications Commission has allocated certain frequencies to
public safety, but these allocations are fragmented, creating
challenges for communications among different agencies and
jurisdictions. In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in consultation with DHS and the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) to conduct a study to assess the
spectrum needs for local, state, and Federal first responders, which is
due in December 2005. SAFECOM is currently assessing public safety
spectrum needs in support of the President's national spectrum
management initiative. DHS, in consultation with the Department of
Commerce and other relevant agencies, is developing a Spectrum Needs
Plan out of these assessments which will be delivered to the President
by the end of November 2005.
Certification of State Communications Plans
Interoperability requires, before all else, simple operability--
that is, communications within the local agency. As Hurricane Katrina
demonstrated, in the absence of a reliable network across which
responders within an agency can effectively communicate,
interoperability is both irrelevant and impossible. Strengthening and
ensuring basic level public safety communications capabilities,
therefore, is the first task. But progressing from agency-specific
operability towards multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary
interoperability requires attention to more than technology.
Some believe the introduction of new technologies alone can solve
our interoperability problems. But adding equipment addresses only one
part of what a fully robust, reliable, and interoperable public safety
communications system requires. With input from the public safety
community, we have identified five key building blocks required to
achieve interoperability. Governance, Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP), Technology, Training and Exercises, routine use (Usage) of
interoperable systems, and regular Maintenance must all be present for
interoperability to be possible. To help public safety agencies and
especially the policy levels of government understand the
interrelationship of all of these factors, we developed a tool called
the ``Interoperability Continuum.'' This planning tool explains how all
these elements relate to each other. For example, if a city within a
region procures new equipment it may have a technical interoperability
capability, but unless it has also conducted exercises to test
procedures (and find points of failure) and concepts of operation, and
developed policies agreeable to the entire region, it is unlikely the
new equipment can be effectively integrated into regional
interoperability plans. As states develop their emergency
communications plans, we recommend that they address all the elements
of the Interoperability Continuum.
Statewide Planning Tools
Statewide communications plans are often unsuccessful because the
top-down approach fails to consider the requirements of the first
responders who are the primary users and who control the most of the
wireless infrastructure.
In 2004, SAFECOM partnered with the Commonwealth of Virginia and
the Department of Justice to develop a strategic plan for improving
statewide interoperable communications for the state. The effort was
based on SAFECOM's ``bottom-up,'' locally-driven approach. The planning
process included six regional focus group sessions, which culminated in
a final strategic planning session. The focus group sessions captured
perspectives from numerous local public safety representatives
throughout the Commonwealth; these perspectives were used in the final
strategic planning session in which recommendations for key initiatives
were developed as part of a statewide strategic plan for improving
public safety communications and interoperability.
Based on lessons learned from the Virginia planning process,
SAFECOM published the Statewide Communications Interoperability
Planning (SCIP) Methodology as a model for integrating practitioner
input into a successful statewide strategic plan to every state. The
SCIP Methodology serves as one approach for states to consider as they
initiate statewide communications planning efforts.
We are also implementing Section 7304 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), which
authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out at least two
Regional Communications Interoperability Pilots (RCIP). In accordance
with the Congressional criteria for determining the location of the
pilot sites, as well as criteria outlined by the program itself,
SAFECOM selected the State of Nevada and the Commonwealth of Kentucky
as RCIP locations. SAFECOM, in coordination with the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness' Interoperable
Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP), is helping both
states implement the SCIP methodology.
Building on lessons learned from the SCIP Methodology and earlier
SAFECOM initiatives, the RCIP projects will help us identify models for
improving communications and interoperability that take into account
the wide range of challenges across the nation. When the projects are
complete, Nevada and Kentucky will each have improved interoperability
plans and we will be able to use the lessons learned to better develop
or strengthen replicable tools and methodologies which will be made
available to public safety practitioners, as well as to local and state
governments. An interim report regarding the progress of the pilot
projects has been submitted to Congress. A final report will be
provided to Congress in June 2006.
We believe statewide emergency communications plans are fundamental
to an effective response to a catastrophic event. As states continue to
develop their own plans, SAFECOM recommends that they do so in
coordination with SAFECOM methodologies and guidance.
RapidCom
On July 22, 2004, President Bush formally announced the RapidCom
initiative, a program designed to ensure that a minimum level of public
safety interoperability would be in place in ten high-threat urban
areas by September 30, 2004.
In coordination with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP), the Department of Justice's 25
Cities Program, and the DHS Wireless Management Office, SAFECOM worked
closely with public safety leaders in ten high-risk urban areas
centered in Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jersey City, Los Angeles, Miami,
New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and the Washington Metropolitan
Area to assess their communications interoperability capacity and
needs, and to identify and implement solutions. In keeping with the
SAFECOM ``bottom-up'' approach, local officials drove the design and
implementation of solutions in their jurisdictions.
With the on-time completion of the RapidCom project, incident
commanders in each of the urban areas now have confirmed they have the
ability to adequately communicate with each other and their respective
command centers within one hour of an incident.
Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP)
A key component in achieving interoperable communications across
the Nation is providing on-site technical assistance to states and
urban areas. SLGCP funds ICTAP, a technical assistance program designed
to enhance interoperable communications between local, state, and
Federal first responders and public safety officials. The program
provides free support to states and urban areas with the goal of
enabling local public safety officials to communicate across
disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems,
exchanging voice and/or data with one another on demand, in real time,
as authorized.
Conclusion
These initiatives are only part of what the SAFECOM program has
undertaken to advance communications interoperability across the
Nation. This Nation is heavily invested in an existing infrastructure
that is too often inadequate to the basic communications requirements
of individual agencies and not interoperable. We must continue to
pursue a comprehensive strategy that takes into account technical and
cultural issues associated with improving interoperability, which
recognizes the challenges associated with incorporating legacy
equipment and practices in constantly changing technology and cultural
environments, and which ensures that the needs of the frontline of
emergency response--the first responders--are met. Though many
challenges remain, we believe we have accomplished a great deal in the
short time DHS has managed this program.
We are confident that with your continuing support and the
assistance of our many Federal partners, we will continue to move
towards a world where lives and property are never lost because public
safety agencies are unable to communicate or lack compatible equipment
and training resources.
Appendix I: OIC Authorities From the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004
Congress, with the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-458) less than a year ago, gave OIC
and SAFECOM legislative authority to carry out its responsibilities.
Before passage of this Act, responsibility for addressing
interoperability was spread across three different agencies. Section
7303 of the Act directed SAFECOM to:
coordinate with other Federal agencies to establish a
comprehensive national approach to achieving public safety
interoperable communications;
develop, with Federal agencies and state and local
authorities, minimum capabilities for communications
interoperability for Federal, state, and local public safety
agencies;
accelerate voluntary consensus standards for public safety
interoperable communications;
develop and implement flexible open architectures for short-
and long-term solutions to public safety interoperable
communications;
identify priorities for research, development, and testing
and evaluation within DHS and assist other Federal agencies in
doing the same with regard to public safety interoperable
communications;
provide technical assistance to state and localities
regarding planning, acquisition strategies, and other functions
necessary to achieve public safety communications
interoperability;
develop and disseminate best practices to improve public
safety communications interoperability;
develop appropriate performance measures and milestones to
measure the Nation's progress to achieving public safety
communications interoperability;
provide technical guidance, training, and other assistance
to support the rapid establishment of consistent, secure, and
effective interoperable communications capabilities in the
event of an emergency in urban and other areas determined by
the Secretary to be at consistently high levels of risk from
terrorist attack; and
develop minimum interoperable communications capabilities
for emergency response providers.
Appendix II: Tools and Methods Based on Local and State Pilots
Communications Tabletop Exercise Methodology, a process for a
communications-focused tabletop exercise replicable across urban areas.
Tabletop Exercise After-Action Report, a template for capturing key
findings and identifying gaps following each tabletop exercise.
Interoperability Pocket Guide, a process for creating an area-
specific interoperability pocket guide to ensure local public safety
officials are aware of current capabilities available in their areas.
Templates for Improving Interoperability, including governance
charter, standard operating procedure (SOP), and memorandum of
agreement (MOA) templates to help communities improve interoperability.
Operational Guide for the Interoperability Continuum--Lessons
Learned from RapidCom, which outlines the importance of each element of
the Interoperability Continuum, provides common challenges to consider
when working towards improved interoperability, and recommends key
actions to increase an area's capabilities.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Chief Carter, Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials International, and Chief of Communications,
Shreveport, Louisiana, Fire Department. Thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF WILLIS CARTER, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,
ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS
OFFICIALS, INTERNATIONAL (APCO); CHIEF OF
COMMUNICATIONS, SHREVEPORT FIRE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Chairman Stevens and Members of the
Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you here today.
My name is Willis Carter. I'm the First Vice President of
APCO, the Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials. I'm also Chief of Communications for the Shreveport,
Louisiana, Fire Department. In addition to appearing on behalf
of APCO, I note that the following national organizations have
indicated their support for my testimony here today: The
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National
Association of Counties, the National Leagues of Cities, and
the Congressional Fire Services Institute.
We are very pleased that Congress is considering how it can
promote public safety communications. Recent events have
demonstrated the importance of incident command and control,
which obviously requires effective and efficient
communications. We want to emphasize that communications
solutions need to focus not only on major disasters, such as
Katrina and 9/11, but also on the day-to-day communications
requirements of public safety agencies. We must also work to
identify the real problems and develop carefully planned
approaches to solve those problems. This is no time to throw
money at ill-conceived Band-Aid solutions. We also caution that
solutions not be thrust upon state and local governments
without consideration of cost.
There are three broad areas where assistance is needed.
First, planning, coordination, and training. Second, sufficient
radio spectrum for robust interoperable radio communications.
And third, funding to help state and local government agencies
acquire the skills and the equipment they need to provide the
best-possible communications capability.
My hometown of Shreveport, which is in northwest Louisiana,
escaped the wrath of Katrina. However, this past weekend, we
did have serious wind damage and extensive power outages,
thanks to Hurricane Rita. Throughout both hurricanes, our
communications system, which has interoperability with some 50
agencies, worked extremely well. Of course, other areas in the
Gulf Coast region saw much more devastation and experienced
more serious communications problems.
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, I had the opportunity to
go on a fact-finding mission to many of the affected areas. And
this is more fully described in my written statement. I saw
devastation and despair in every direction. I also saw the same
basic problems in all areas: lack of coordinated incident
command, lack of direct support for communications centers and
their personnel, and the inability to communicate.
The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina either destroyed or
seriously damaged many public safety communications facilities.
Typically, public safety systems are designed to withstand the
worst that nature or man can offer. And it's very unusual for
public safety systems to fail, even after commercial systems go
down. Katrina was a real exception to that. Nevertheless,
Katrina is a warning that public safety systems need to take
all reasonable steps to ensure survivability.
A lack of interoperability was a major problem both during
and following Katrina. However, the breakdown of basic
operability was also a serious concern. First responders could
not communicate, in many cases, with their own agencies, let
alone personnel from other jurisdictions.
Maintaining operability and achieving interoperability are
complex tasks, with no single answer for all public safety
agencies or regions. Possible solutions to this problem can
include better training--better planning and training,
compatible radio equipment, patches to tie radio networks
together, radio systems that operate in the same radio
frequency band, more spectrum for interoperability channels,
and, in some cases, all of the above.
One of the most important steps that Congress can take is
to establish an early and firm date for the clearing of TV
stations from the 700 MHz band. That, in turn, will free up
spectrum which was allocated for public safety use back in
1998.
My written statement spells out some of the benefits of
this spectrum. However, to summarize, the spectrum will help to
alleviate serious congestion on many existing public safety
radio systems. It will provide capacity for new communications
tools. And it will promote enhanced interoperability, both on a
daily basis and during major emergencies.
Congress can also assist by providing funding to support
training, planning, and coordination. Funding is also needed to
enhance communications system survivability, and help state and
local governments acquire new equipment for robust
interoperable communications systems.
Mr. Chairman, just as September 11, 2001 helped us to focus
the Nation on the communications issues facing our first
responders, Hurricane Katrina has revealed that much still
needs to be accomplished in order to provide the public safety
personnel with the tools that they need to protect the safety
of life and property. We look forward to working with the
Congress and other parties toward this crucial effort.
Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before
you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Willis Carter, First Vice President, Association
of Public-Safety Communications Officials, International (APCO); Chief
of Communications, Shreveport Fire Department
Thank you Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the
Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today, and for your
long-standing interest in the communications issues facing our Nation's
first responders.
My name is Willis Carter and I am the First Vice President of APCO
International, the Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials. I am also Chief of Communications for the Shreveport,
Louisiana Fire Department. I have served a total of 34 years with the
Department, the last 20 of which have been in my current position. In
addition to appearing on behalf of APCO International, I note that the
following national organizations have indicated their support for my
testimony here today and have requested that their support be noted in
the record: International Association of Chiefs of Police,
International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Association of
Counties, National Leagues of Cities, and the Congressional Fire
Services Institute.
APCO International is the Nation's oldest and largest public safety
communications organization, with over 14,000 individual members who
manage and operate communications systems and facilities for police,
fire, emergency medical and other state and local government public
safety agencies.
APCO International has been very active in helping to respond to
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. We have been working closely with
the public safety agencies in the affected areas, first, to provide
whatever assistance we can to the individuals and agencies involved,
and second, to gather information so that we may learn from this
disaster and be better prepared in the future. Through a variety of
mechanisms, our members from across the Nation have also been coming to
the aid of their colleagues in the hardest hit areas, providing both
professional and personal assistance whenever possible.
Through its role as a FCC-certified frequency coordinator, APCO
International has helped to secure radio communications frequencies for
emergency response agencies in the affected areas, and to assist
agencies that must repair or replace damaged facilities. I note that
APCO International has done so while waiving its normal frequency
coordination fees.
Fortunately, my hometown of Shreveport, which is in northwest
Louisiana, escaped the wrath of Katrina. We were not so lucky with
Hurricane Rita, which did cause some damage and significant power
outages in the Shreveport area. I am pleased to report that our public
safety communications system in Shreveport worked very well after both
of the recent hurricanes. However, as we all know, there were serious
communications problems in many of the areas that were more directly
affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Shortly after Katrina struck, I had the opportunity to go on a
fact-finding mission to many of the affected areas. I have also had
extensive communication with my colleagues from other public safety
agencies throughout Louisiana. My statement today will summarize some
of my observations, offer other information that APCO International has
gathered, and present some general concerns that APCO International has
as we move forward to improve public safety communications
capabilities. I want to emphasize that our solutions need to focus not
just on major disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, but also
on the day-to-day communications requirements of public safety
agencies. We must also work to identify the real problems and develop
carefully planned approaches to solve those problems. This is no time
to throw money at ill-conceived ``band-aid'' solutions. I also caution
that solutions not be thrust upon state and local governments without
consideration of cost.
On Monday September 5, I traveled to St. Tammany Parish, which is
located on the north side of Lake Pontchartrain. There I toured seven
dispatch centers. The devastation that I witnessed was unimaginable.
Public safety call takers and dispatchers operating at Public Safety
Answering Points, or PSAPs, were working and living in their
communications centers. Some had lost their homes, and most had
suffered significant damage, but all were on the job and still
attempting to provide help and assistance to the thousands of citizens
in need. Communications capabilities were at best very limited. The
primary tower site which supports the City of Slidell radio system had
been damaged, but was still affording limited service. The entire area
of Slidell, Louisiana was without power and relying on emergency backup
power sources. The Covington area had some power restored. 9-1-1 was
totally out of service.
I departed St. Tammany Parish on Tuesday, and traveled to St.
Charles Parish, which is adjacent to Jefferson Parish and on the west
side of New Orleans proper. This area did not endure the direct blunt
of the storm, and although sustaining somewhat less damage than what I
had seen the day before, they were nonetheless facing significant
challenges with limited radio communications, and a total outage of 9-
1-1. I was to find that the worst was yet to come. The Jefferson Parish
Communications Center was in much more dire circumstances.
Communication to field units was very limited, access to 9-1-1 was
completely out, and the call takers and dispatchers were experiencing
the impact of the stress of working, sleeping, and eating in their
dispatch center since the storm hit five days earlier. The Fire
Dispatch Commander told me that he had lost five dispatch personnel
since the storm due to the fact that the stress associated with this
tragic event had prompted them to simply walk out. My attempts to reach
the New Orleans Police dispatch center and the New Orleans Fire
dispatch center were unsuccessful. Flooding prevented access to either
of these centers which had both been evacuated. There was no 9-1-1
service, and the majority of public safety radio communications were
not functioning.
As has been reported elsewhere, a major communications problem
occurred when the New Orleans 800 MHz radio system went down, and
repairs were delayed for several days. My understanding is that the
system would normally have provided a mutual aid backbone for
surrounding jurisdictions and linkage to the Louisiana state radio
system (which also suffered some damage in the area). Aside from the
impact of the New Orleans radio system, the relief efforts were plagued
in many areas by a lack of interoperability between radio equipment
used by various first responders.
My department in Shreveport operates on an 800 MHz system that
services all police, fire, EMS and other agencies in Caddo Parish, and
provides good interoperability on a daily basis within the region.
However, when members of my department were detailed to the New Orleans
area, they were unable to operate our radios on the Louisiana State 800
MHz network due to software incompatibility. This problem can be fixed,
for about $800 per radio, but requires funding from State or Federal
sources.
Another problem that I was told about involved a local agency in
the New Orleans area that actually disconnected equipment designed to
patch its system with another in the area, as they were fearful of
system overloads.
In all, I visited four parishes and had the opportunity to visit a
total of nine communications centers. I saw devastation and despair in
every direction, and I also saw the same basic problems in all areas.
Lack of coordinated incident command and control, lack of direct
support for communications centers and their personnel, and the
inability to communicate were obvious problems in every area that I
visited.
There were several factors that contributed to the public safety
communications outages in all of these areas. The damage caused by the
hurricane winds either destroyed or seriously damaged many primary
tower and transmitter sites. The ensuing power outage which engulfed
the area required the use of emergency power generators, many of which
had been damaged or destroyed by flying debris and rising water. Many
of those that remained in operation were faced with exhausted fuel
supply either by disruption of natural gas supply lines, or the fact
that there was no way to get diesel fuel into them as the result of
flooding. Some communications sites were simply swallowed up by the
floodwaters. Bell South central offices, which served as 9-1-1 tandems,
were flooded, which created outages of 9-1-1 service in as many as 13
parishes.
My experiences in the affected areas reflect just some of the
communications problems that became evident in the wake of Katrina.
Based upon what we know of those problems, and of our knowledge of
emergency communications needs in general, we would like to offer the
following recommendations:
Significant improvements in local, regional, and national
interoperability are essential.
As noted above, interoperability was a major issue in the response
to Katrina, just as it was in responses to other major emergencies, and
as it is a on a daily basis across the Nation. Note, however, that for
Katrina, interoperability problems were masked to some degree by the
larger and in many ways more serious breakdown of ``operability'' that
occurred due to the destruction of facilities or power outages. First
responders could not communicate in many cases within their own
agencies, let alone with personnel from other jurisdictions.
It is also important to understand that achieving interoperability
is complex, without simple solutions. Sometimes the need is for better
planning and training; sometimes the need is for compatible radio
equipment; sometimes the need is for ``patches'' to tie together radio
networks; sometimes the need is for radio systems to operate in the
same radio frequency band; sometimes the need is for more spectrum for
interoperability channels; and sometimes it is all of the above.
There also needs to be a recognition that there are different types
of interoperability: for day-to-day local and ``regional'' incidents
that require multi-agency responses, and for major emergencies (such as
Katrina) where emergency responders may be from far and wide. The
specific solutions vary, and must be carefully planned and tailored to
each situation. As discussed below, one key element of the ``solution''
is the nationwide clearing of the 700 MHz band.
In his testimony last week, FCC Chairman Martin mentioned the
potential for ``smart'' radios that can operate on different frequency
bands. We agree that such technology should be encouraged as part of
the long-term solution for interoperability. However, we caution that
such technology, at least for portable units, is still in development,
and probably a long way from being available at affordable costs. For
the foreseeable future, we need interoperability solutions that take
into consideration the enormous imbedded base of public safety
equipment, currently available technologies, and the limited budgets of
state and local governments.
Finally, on the interoperability issue, I want to note our strong
support for the DHS SAFECOM Program. SAFECOM is doing very important
and useful work to address interoperability, and it deserves the
continued support of Congress. Importantly, SAFECOM has incorporated
state and local government organizations and public safety
practitioners into the process, rather than relying on a top-down
approach that ignores the real-life needs and concerns of first
responders.
Planning and training for disasters are essential, and plans
need to be properly executed when disasters strike.
Katrina and its aftermath showed us once again that disaster
response efforts, including communications capabilities, must be
planned well in advance. Equally important, relevant personnel need to
be trained and prepared to implement disaster plans. Funding needs to
be made available specifically for such planning and training.
There must be common incident command structures at all
levels of the emergency response effort.
I saw firsthand the widely-reported breakdowns in emergency
response command structures. Tragically, far too many personnel who
were ready and equipped to lend assistance were left without adequate
direction, communication, or information.
Funding must be available to ensure that public safety
communications networks are built and maintained to withstand
worse-case scenarios. Plans and funds must also be in place to
restore facilities that, despite best efforts, are disrupted.
Typically, public safety systems are designed to withstand the
worst that nature or man can offer, and it is very unusual for public
safety systems to fail, even after commercial communications networks
go down. Katrina was a rare exception. At present, we do not know the
degree to which the system outages caused by Katrina could have been
avoided. Nevertheless, Katrina is a warning that public safety systems
need to take all reasonable steps to ensure survivability. That will
require funding and other assistance from Federal, State, and local
governments.
Last week's hearing also included discussion of using satellite
technology in emergency relief efforts when existing networks fail. We
agree that satellites can and should be part of the solution,
especially as alternative means of interconnecting to the national
telephone network. However, we do not see satellite service as a
replacement for terrestrial mobile radio networks. Satellite phones are
limited by power issues and, more importantly, generally do not work
inside of buildings.
There must be a ``hard date'' for nationwide public safety
access to the 700 MHz band, which is now blocked in many areas
by analog television stations.
An early ``hard date,'' as close to the end of 2006 as possible, is
essential for public safety agencies to be able to plan for and fund
new radio systems using the 700 MHz band. Portions of that spectrum
were allocated for public safety in 1998, but remain blocked by
incumbent television stations. Mr. Chairman, this committee has already
spent considerable time on this issue and the related transition to
digital television. However, I would like to take this opportunity to
emphasize briefly why this spectrum is so important for public safety.
The public safety spectrum in the 700 MHz band would help to
alleviate serious congestion on many existing public safety radio
systems, especially in major metropolitan areas. Many current public
safety systems operate with too few channels and insufficient capacity.
That congestion can endanger the lives of first responders and the
public, and it prevents deployment of new communications tools.
The 700 MHz band will also facilitate interoperability, both on a
daily basis and for major emergencies. The band is adjacent to the
existing 800 MHz public safety band, and will allow for relatively easy
interoperability between the two bands (700/800 MHz equipment is
already available in the marketplace). The new public safety spectrum
will also allow for new and expanded multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional
radio systems, which is perhaps the best long-term solution for
interoperability. Finally, the FCC rules set aside 2.6 MHz of spectrum
within the 700 MHz band for dedicated national interoperability
channels, with a requirement that all 700 MHz radio equipment be
programmed to operate on these channels pursuant to a digital
interoperability standard.
Once the Congress fixes a hard date, agencies will be able to move
forward to plan, fund and construct radio systems in the 700 MHz band.
The FCC has already established rules for the new spectrum, state
governments have already received state-wide licenses, some equipment
is already available (and other equipment will be, once manufacturers
have the certainty needed to justify R&D), and regional planning is
well underway. For some existing 800 MHz systems, the 700 MHz channels
will also provide opportunities for rapid expansion without the need to
build new systems.
As a footnote, Louisiana is exploring whether 700 MHz channels and
equipment could be a key element of a new radio system for the area.
Fortunately, the 700 MHz public safety channels are not blocked by TV
stations in Louisiana. The same cannot be said for most metropolitan
areas of the country.
There is a need for additional 700 MHz band spectrum for
mobile broadband operations to provide high speed video and
data to and among public safety personnel and agencies in the
field.
Last year, Congress instructed DHS and the FCC to study this issue,
and a report is due in December.
Additional funding is needed to assist public safety
agencies in their acquisition of state-of-the-art interoperable
communications equipment.
Many agencies need assistance to implement both short-term and
long-term interoperable solutions. One small example is the software
upgrades needed for my department's radios to operate on the state-wide
radio network. Funding should also include training and staffing.
PSAPs and other emergency communications centers must be
considered as core elements of the first response structure,
and the staff of those facilities needs the support of all
levels of government.
Much attention has properly been focused on the brave first
responders on the streets of the affected areas, who have worked hard
to save lives and address the turmoil and destruction created by
Hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately, not enough attention has been placed
on the equally brave and committed personnel who receive 9-1-1 calls,
dispatch emergency personnel, and manage communications centers under
enormous pressures. They too need our support.
Telephone central offices supporting 9-1-1 tandems must be
``mirrored'' in locations sufficiently remote to allow for
quick restoration of 9-1-1 services.
As I noted above, as many as thirteen PSAPs may have been disrupted
largely because the relevant Bell South central stations were flooded.
Congress should provide funds to assist PSAPs in their
upgrades for wireless E9-1-1 and other technologies.
We urge Congress to go beyond merely funding a program office.
Significant and meaningful grant funds should also be made available.
We also note that suggestions that PSAPs move towards IP-based
technologies often ignore the huge cost that would be imposed upon
cash-strapped state and local governments.
Mr. Chairman, just as September 11, 2001, helped to focus the
Nation on the communications issues facing our first responders,
Hurricane Katrina has revealed that much still needs to be accomplished
to provide public safety personnel with the communications tools they
need to protect the safety of life and property. We look forward to
working with the Congress, the FCC, and other parties in this critical
effort.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Chief.
Our next witness is Dereck Orr, Project Manager of the
Public Safety Communications, National Institute of Standards
and Technology.
Mr. Orr?
STATEMENT OF DERECK ORR, PROGRAM MANAGER, PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND
TECHNOLOGY (NIST)
Mr. Orr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was fortunate to have had the great privilege to serve
the Senate as a professional staff member of the Appropriations
Committee under Senator Fritz Hollings. I am, therefore,
sincerely honored to again be able to be here this morning with
you and the esteemed members of this committee.
NIST's Public Safety Communications Program serves as the
technical lead for several of the Administration's initiatives
focusing on communications, most importantly, the SAFECOM
program led by Dr. Boyd. Although NIST is helping to improve
public safety communications through a number of efforts, many
of which Dr. Boyd spoke of, I will focus the remainder of my
remarks this morning on the state of standards for public
safety communications systems.
Interoperability for public safety communications is
defined as the ability to share information via voice, data,
on-demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized. The
public safety community expects that this level of
interoperability will be available using equipment from
multiple manufacturers, be transparent to the user, require
little or no special knowledge of the system, and not be
dependent on common frequency assignments. Obviously, this is
not what we have today. And, achieving this definition of
interoperability in the future will not be possible without the
existence of standards.
Of course, public safety radio users have recognized this
for some time. Approximately 15 years ago, representatives from
local, State, and Federal public safety associations and
agencies joined together to address the absence of available
standards. They did this for two primary purposes. First, was
to ensure that interoperability could be achieved assuming the
use of equipment from multiple manufacturers. Second, through
standards, the public safety community wanted to be able to
take advantage of cost reductions associated with the more
competitive land mobile radio market.
The public safety community partnered with the
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) to serve as the
standards development organization for this effort. Thus,
Project 25, or P-25, as we know it today, was launched.
A commonly misunderstood aspect of P-25 is that it is
comprised of a single standard. Instead, it is a suite of
standards that specify the eight interfaces between the various
components of a land mobile radio system.
Over the last 15 years, only one of the P-25 interfaces,
the Common Air Interface that deals with the functions of the
handheld units, has been advanced to a level where it would
help satisfy the goals of P-25. But, it alone, cannot provide
the level of interoperability public safety is calling for. The
remainder of the interfaces either remain undefined or lack
enough specificity to allow for a common implementation of the
interface; and, therefore, remain proprietary.
An MOU formalizing the relationship between the public
safety users and TIA created a steering committee comprised
only of public safety and government representatives, and
invested that committee with the sole authority to designate a
P-25 standard, and did not limit it to only TIA-adopted
standards. This is important, because that gives the control of
the process to the radio users, and those users have called for
immediate results.
The Co-Chair of the P-25 steering committee recently
informed the membership of TIA that an agreed-upon Inter-RF-
Subsystem-Interface, the ISSI document will be required by
January of 2006. The ISSI is extremely important, in that it is
the interface standard that will ultimately allow P-25 systems
operated by different public safety entities to connect into
one seamless network, when necessary. If this January deadline
is not met, the steering committee will vote to begin an
alternate process for developing an ISSI standard. The steering
committee's plan is to issue a call for proposals to fully
define an open ISSI standard, select the best proposal, and
designate it as the P-25 standard.
This same option can be exercised for all other remaining
interfaces as well, if the steering committee is not satisfied
with the progress within the TIA process. NIST will continue
providing technical and engineering support to the steering
committee so that it can meet its goals and timelines.
In addition, Mr. Chairman, over the last 2 years NIST, with
funds from the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice, has tested a number of the handheld P-25
radios that claim to meet the available Common-Air Interface
standard. Using the test procedures called for in the standard,
NIST found that none of the available radios met all aspects of
the standard.
Therefore, NIST, with the support of SAFECOM and the P-25
steering committee, is developing a P-25 Conformity Assessment
Program. NIST is preparing and documenting standardized test
protocols for the most important aspects of the Common-Air
Interface standard. The standardized test protocols will then
be provided to NIST's National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program, which can accredit third-party
laboratories across the country interested in offering these
testing capabilities.
These conformance tests would go a long way in assuring the
public safety community that the equipment being purchased
meets the P-25 standard.
In summation, Mr. Chairman, there are positive steps being
taken by leaders within the public safety community, key
Federal programs, the Congress, and industry to significantly
change the current environment and move the state of standards
for public safety forward. This time next year, there should be
newly adopted P-25 interface standards that can be tied to
grants and procurements, and radio users will have a mechanism
in place to begin to ensure that the products they are
purchasing truly do what is called for in the applicable
standard.
Again, I am honored to be here before this committee today,
and I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Orr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dereck Orr, Program Manager, Public Safety
Communications Systems, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
Thank you, Chairman Stevens and members of the Committee, I serve
as the Program Manager for Public Safety Communications Systems in the
Office of Law Enforcement Standards at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST, a non-regulatory agency within
the U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration, serves
industry, academia, and other parts of the government by developing and
promoting measurements, standards, and technology to enhance
productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the quality of life.
NIST's public safety communications program serves as the technical
lead for several Administration initiatives focusing on communications,
most importantly, the SAFECOM Program led by Dr. Boyd. NIST is involved
in many of the key SAFECOM initiatives, including the Statement of
Requirements, Public Safety Architecture Framework, testing and
evaluation, and standards development. The strong partnership between
SAFECOM and NIST is an excellent example within the Administration of
multi-agency coordination and collaboration, and is something for which
we at NIST are very proud.
I will focus the remainder of my remarks this morning on the state
of standards for public safety communications systems.
Interoperability for public safety communications is defined as
``the ability to share information via voice and data signals on
demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized.'' The public
safety community expects that this level of interoperability will be
available using equipment from multiple manufacturers, that they are
transparent to the user, requiring little or no special knowledge of
the system, and that they are not dependent on common frequency
assignments.
Achieving this definition of interoperability is not possible
without the existence of standards that will define how the various
components of a public safety communications system will interoperate,
regardless of manufacturer. In fact, I would venture to say that in the
absence of standards, achieving this level of interoperability would be
impossible.
Public safety users have recognized this for some time.
Approximately fifteen years ago, representatives from local, state, and
Federal public safety associations and agencies joined together to
address the absence of available standards. They did this for two
primary purposes. First was to ensure that interoperability could be
achieved, assuming the use of equipment from multiple manufacturers.
Second, through standards, the public safety community wanted to be
able to take advantage of cost reductions associated with a more
competitive land mobile radio market.
Understanding the difficulty in specifying the complex operations
of the various components of a land mobile radio system, the public
safety community partnered with the Telecommunications Industry
Association (TIA) to serve as the standards development organization
(SDO) for this effort. Thus Project 25, or P-25 as we know it today,
was launched.
A commonly misunderstood aspect of P-25 is that it is comprised of
a single standard. Instead, it is a suite of standards that specify the
eight interfaces between the various components of a land mobile radio
system (handheld to handheld, handheld to mobile unit, mobile unit to
tower, etc.):
Common air interface--this interface defines the wireless
access between mobile and portable radios and between the
subscriber (portable and mobile) radios and the fixed or base
station radios;
Subscriber data peripheral interface--this interface
characterizes the signaling for data transfer that must take
place between the subscriber radios and the data devices that
may be connected to the subscriber radio;
Fixed station interface--this interface describes the
signaling and messages between the RFSS and the fixed station
by defining the voice and data packets (that are sent from/to
the subscriber(s) over the common air interface) and all of the
command and control messages used to administer the fixed
station as well as the subscribers that are communicating
through the fixed station;
Console interface--this interface is similar to the fixed
station interface but it defines all the signaling and messages
between the RFSS and the console, the position that a
dispatcher or a supervisor would occupy to provide commands and
support to the personnel in the field;
Network management interface--this interface to the RFSS
allows administrators to control and monitor network fault
management and network performance management.
Data network interface--this interface describes the RF
subsystem's connections to computers, data networks, external
data sources, etc.;
Telephone interconnect interface--this interface between the
RFSS and the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) allows
field personnel to make connections through the public switched
telephone network by using their radios rather than using
cellular telephones;
Inter RF subsystem interface--this interface permits users
in one system to communicate with users in a different system,
from one jurisdiction to another, from one agency to another,
from one city to another, etc.
Over the last fifteen years only one of the P-25 interfaces, the
Common Air Interface that deals with the functions of the handheld
units (i.e., walkie-talkie), has been advanced to a level where it
would help satisfy one or both of the goals of P-25. The remainder of
the interfaces either remains undefined, or lacks enough specificity to
allow for a common implementation of the interface; in other words,
each manufacturer's implementation of the interface is different and
proprietary, thus, resulting in systems that do not meet the
``interoperability'' requirements as defined by the steering committee.
I would like to emphasize that the Common Air Interface is a major
step forward and extremely important. It provides a level of
interoperability and competition in the handheld market that was not
available before. However, it alone cannot satisfy the definition of
interoperability that the public safety community is calling for.
An MOU formalizing the relationship between the public safety users
and TIA, created a Steering Committee comprised only of public safety
and government representatives and invested that committee with the
sole authority to designate a P-25 standard. In addition, the MOU
stipulates that the Steering Committee has wide latitude in defining
and adopting P-25 standards, and does not limit it to only TIA adopted
standards.
To reinforce the need to expeditiously move forward on all
remaining P-25 interface standards as prioritized by the Steering
Committee, the Co-Chair of the P-25 Steering Committee informed the
membership of TIA that an agreed upon Inter-RF-Subsystem Interface
(ISSI) document will be required by January of 2006. If this deadline
is not met the Steering Committee would vote to begin an alternate
process for developing an ISSI standard. The Steering Committee's plan
would be to issue a call for proposals to define an open ISSI standard,
select the best proposal and designate it the P-25 ISSI standard.
It needs to be made clear that it is everyone's desire that a
consensus on these standards is needed and that formal TIA standards be
adopted, and that the remaining P-25 interface standards be forthcoming
within a time frame that satisfies the needs of public safety users and
policymakers at all levels of government.
It is not only important that the various P-25 interfaces are
completed in a timely manner, but that a mechanism exist to ensure that
products built to the standard, meet all of the requirements of the
standard.
Over the last two years, NIST, with funds from the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, has tested a number of
the hand held P-25 radios that claim to meet the available Common Air
Interface Standard. Using the test procedures called for in the
standard, NIST found that none of the available radios met all aspects
of the standard.
NIST, with the support of SAFECOM and the P-25 Steering Committee,
is developing a P-25 Conformity Assessment Program. NIST is preparing
and documenting standardized test protocols for the most important
aspects of the Common Air Interface Standard. The standardized test
protocols will then be provided to NIST's National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP), which can accredit third party
laboratories across the country interested in offering these testing
capabilities. These test protocols would go a long way in assuring the
public safety community that the equipment being purchased meets the P-
25 standard.
NIST is working closely with the P-25 Steering Committee and
manufacturers to ensure that the test procedures are correct and that
the results are accurate. In addition, not all aspects of the P-25
common air interface will be immediately available for testing through
this program. To begin with, NIST is focusing on some basic functional
tests of the radios, which will allow us to get the Conformity
Assessment Program up and running. We will then begin to add
interoperability tests, as well as tests for more complex radio
functions.
In summation, Mr. Chairman, there are positive steps being taken by
leaders within the public safety community, key Federal programs, the
Congress and industry to significantly change the current environment
and move the state of standards for public safety forward. This time
next year, there should be new adopted P-25 interface standards and
manufacturers will have begun to plan new products lines that
incorporate the new standards. Local, state, and Federal agencies
procuring P-25 equipment will have a mechanism in place to ensure that
the products they are purchasing truly do what is called for in the
applicable standard. In conjunction with the other efforts Dr. Boyd
spoke of, I am confident that we are making significant headway in the
pursuit of communications interoperability.
NIST looks forward to working with this committee, Congress, our
Federal partners, state and local public safety officials, and leaders
in industry to make this happen. Again, I am honored to be here before
this committee today, and I will be happy to answer any questions that
you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
This is a difficult problem for us, because of how much it
really interrelates to the difficulty of the spectrum bill
we're going to act on this year. I'm trying to get the exact
figures, but we were given the figures from CBO that indicate
the return to the Government, for the Treasury, would be
considerably higher--four to five times higher--if we postponed
that date until 2009. We have an enormous demand that this take
place no later than 2007, and hopefully in 2006. I don't know
yet what the answer is going to be, but clearly we've been
required by the budget resolution of this year to raise $4.8
billion by action of this committee, and the only possible way
to do that is by passing the spectrum bill. We hope that will
be part of the reconciliation process and that will become law.
If it is not, there will be no funds for interoperability
within the coming years.
So, I know we're all wanting to work on that. I've been
informed by our staff that the estimate for just radios and
equipment for interoperability would be over $15 billion. So
far, our programs call for providing funds through the Justice
Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
COPS Program. And I'm told that there has been a substantial
amount, around $92.7 million this year alone, allocated to
enforcement agencies on that program. In addition, there was
money that came out of other funds. I don't know the exact
total of those, but I'm told somewhere around $900 million, so
far, to deal with interoperability.
But, Mr. Orr, I should interrupt to tell you this--you
mentioned our dear friend, who's no longer with us, Senator
Hollings. I don't know if you were the staffer, but he came
back one time and told me he had been in Hilton Head, and a
staffer had come up to him and said, ``Senator, you've got to
go back to Charleston. They're telling lies about you in
Charleston.'' And Fritz told him, ``No, I'm going to stay right
here, they're telling the truth about me here.''
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We miss his wit, and we miss his help. And he
would be of great help to us on this one now.
But can any of you tell us, What is the ability of local
agencies to meet these needs? How much money do we really see
that we have to have in the near term, say 5 years, from the
Federal Government? Dr. Boyd, do you have any idea?
Dr. Boyd. As you can imagine, that's a really tough
question to answer. And the reason it's a tough question to
answer is that there's no place in the United States you can go
to, to find a picture of what the state of interoperability is
in the United States. That's why we're undertaking a major
baseline study that will produce results, probably around the
middle of next year, that will give us the first genuinely
statistically reliable picture of the state of interoperability
across the country.
NIST is involved in that activity. We're working closely
with the Justice Department and others in doing this work, so
that for the first time, we will be able to give you real
grounded information about what that status is.
The Chairman. We're going to have a hearing this afternoon
from some of the companies that are involved in manufacturing
these systems. I shall not be able to be here, because of the
Defense bill on the floor. But from what Mr. Orr says, there's
little probability we're going to have ``a system'' that we
could say everyone should use, within the near term. Is that
right, Mr. Orr?
Mr. Orr. That would be correct. I think we'll have progress
and movement toward more complete standards regarding P-25, but
it is still some time before we'll see a full suite of P-25
standards that will be applied.
The Chairman. My time's almost up, but, Chief, you're the
one that's in the trenches on this one. And you're here
representing, as I understand, the International Association,
right? APCO?
Mr. Carter. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What is the suggestion from your people? What
should we do? Should we mandate a series of items and say that
those should be purchased with Federal funds? Should we get
involved at all in delineating what will be acceptable use of
Federal funds, as far as this interoperability question is
concerned?
Mr. Carter. I believe our perspective, from public safety,
is that there may not be any one system that's going to
accomplish interoperability nationwide. SAFECOM is doing some
tremendous work to identify a variety of issues that we can
pull together. But I believe that standards probably will be
the answer. Someone's going to have to step up to the plate and
say, ``This is the standard, and this is what we're going to
do.''
The Chairman. Well, we've got standards now, but we haven't
got technology to meet the standards.
Dr. Boyd?
Dr. Boyd. Yes, sir, if I might add to that. For some time
there are going to be a variety of systems that aren't going to
work directly with each other, simply because the total
installed base in the field right now is probably--and this is
very conservative--somewhere in excess of $60 billion. The $15
billion figure you referred to earlier is based on a study
conducted 10 years ago that talked only about the portable
units and the radios in the car.
So, what that means is that we have to look at a system-of-
systems approach. That is, How are we going to make a lot of
systems work together? We think we can do that, and the way
we're directing the standards, working with NIST and the public
safety community, is through common grant guidance, which the
public safety community helped us put together, and which helps
answer the questions: What will work here? What can you live
with, given what you have now and what you know's going to be
in place for quite a while?--so that we can use the common
grant guidance to help steer all of the Federal grants. That
guidance is now incorporated in every Federal grant program. As
the standards come available, they'll be locked into that
guidance as we continue to tighten the guidance around the
standards process.
The Chairman. Well, Chief, isn't the problem----
I'm running over time, because I've just been called to the
Homeland Security Conference on Appropriations, so I'm going to
leave. I asked Senator Sununu to Chair. This will be my last
question.
Isn't the problem really that if you have a disaster, like
Katrina or Rita, or even 9/11, when we call in responders from
outside of the zone to come assist and really replace some of
those that may be missing or unable to do their job, for one
reason or another, isolated by storms or whatever, that the
people that come in, they have to be interoperable with what's
left there, don't they? I mean, it is a national problem, isn't
it?
Dr. Boyd. It's absolutely a national problem. But one of
the points we want to make, and the public safety community
will expand on this, is that a lot of the elements of
interoperability already are there. What we first have to get
in place are things like governance agreements and how we're
going to work together. The agreements on this----
The Chairman. Well, let me tell you this. I've been a pilot
now for a long time. And when I fly, I get in a plane, and I go
from Alaska to California. I just punch different numbers, and
I'm totally interoperable wherever I am. I've never been in a
plane that I couldn't reach the ground with, wherever I was,
because that's the system of aircraft radios. Why don't we use
radios like that for first responders? Why shouldn't you be
able to say, you're on channel A if you're in California,
you're on channel C if you're in Alaska, wherever--why can't
you have this? Mr. Orr, why don't we have those kinds of radios
for these people?
Mr. Orr. That was the object--as I said in my opening
statement, that was the object of Project 25. I think the issue
is that industry has not come to consensus on this issue over
the last 15 years, and the bottom line is, it needs closure. We
need to finish these standards. Industry needs to come to
consensus. Or some other action is going to be taken, as I was
talking about during my opening remarks. There are alternative
methods to make these standards, through the steering
committee. But the bottom line is, industry, to date, has not
come to consensus on creating those radios.
The Chairman. The weather bureau has now given us radio
availability that we can turn on wherever we are, as a pilot,
and get local weather.
Dr. Boyd. If I may, sir.
The Chairman. That's interoperability.
Dr. Boyd. I also have a commercial pilot's license, sir. If
I may suggest, aviation is on a single band. In any given area,
only a few hundred communicators are likely to be involved, and
they're under a control system where they talk to the
controlled operator. So, they talk under certain circumstances
in a relatively small area. So, as control areas, you cross--
you know, whether you're on ground control or whether you're on
approach, each of those are specified for a region, and they
handle a relatively small number of stations.
The public safety community, on the other hand, represents
60,000 individual systems trying to control things and manage
things within their own area of responsibility and representing
some three million individual public safety operators. So that
channels which can be identified in a region to handle a few
hundred aircraft, when a channel is applied, for example, in
his department, because the adjacent folks can't have that same
channel without lots of prior coordination to pull together how
that's going to work.
You never wind up----
The Chairman. It's not the technology problem that he's
talking about, then.
Dr. Boyd. Technology is only a piece of it.
The Chairman. It's a volume of use problem.
Dr. Boyd. Well, it's a combination of issues, I mean, with
technology at the center. But most of the things required to
achieve interoperability in the near term already exist. They
require serious agreements, planning, governance kinds of
arrangements across jurisdictions to work. In RapidCom, for
example, in ten cities, we were able to establish an emergency
command level of interoperability in each city with no new
resources, simply by working with these communities, and the
communities around each of those cities, to come together to
agree on how they're going to approach these things. For
example, in the aviation community----
The Chairman. Well, I've got to leave, but if you move some
of those people over to Chief Carter's area, they wouldn't be
interoperable with him, would they?
Dr. Boyd. If they've worked out these agreements in
advance, they can be. And if we've identified what kind of
patching equipment's going to be required, they can be.
The Chairman. Is there any need for further involvement by
the Federal Government, Mr. Orr, in mandating that this come to
a closure?
Mr. Orr. Certainly, at NIST we haven't talked about
mandating coming, but we are providing all of our resources to
give the users involved in Project 25 the technical and
engineering resources to finish this out, and, with the support
of people and programs like Dr. Boyd and SAFECOM, who will then
take those standards that the P-25 steering committee
designates and put it in the grant guidance, therefore putting
the weight of Federal grants and procurement behind those
standards, I do think we can move this forward in a much
shorter amount of time than has been.
The Chairman. I'd call the Committee's attention to the
SAFECOM interoperability continuum chart that you have
available. I think it's very informative, and we thank you for
that.
Thank you very much.
Senator Sununu, will you start?
Senator Sununu [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Not to panic. Senator Boxer and Senator Lautenberg, I don't
know which of you were here next, but I'll certainly turn to
Senator Boxer, then Senator Lautenberg for questioning.
Go right ahead.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much. The only reason is that
I've got another obligation that started 3 minutes ago. So, I
will be brief.
I think, since Senator Stevens told a Fritz Hollings story,
I'm going to tell one, too, before he leaves, very quickly.
Fritz, one day, turned to me, he says, ``You know why my
wife and I get along so well?'' And, of course, like a good
straight person, I said, ``Why?'' He said, ``We're both in love
with the same person.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. And we really do miss him. I was in love
with him, too, but--anyway.
Here's the situation. I think we need more spectrum, better
equipment, and better coordination. Does anyone disagree that
those three things are important?
[No response.]
Senator Boxer. OK. And as I look at it, more spectrum, Mr.
Chairman, I think that it does fall on us to make that happen.
And we can make that happen as we look at this whole digital
question. So, that's one.
Better equipment. We have to help. We cannot unload a $15
billion problem on the locals. And one that is really--this
issue is dictated by our national circumstance. It's our
national circumstance that we're a target of terrorists. It's
our national circumstance if we have a disaster. This isn't
something any State should feel responsible for.
The third one is better coordination, and that's up to the
locals. They have to tell us how we can help them do that.
So, I guess my frustration, a little bit--I heard in the
Chairman's voice, although sometimes we think we're in
agreement, and it turns out we're not, but we might be--in
this. Why is it going to take us to 2023, Dr. Boyd--2023--Lord
knows where we'll all be then--to get this done? Is there
anything we can do, as your helpers, to get this done sooner?
Dr. Boyd. Well, first, let me make clear that 2023 was
never identified as the date by which these things would
happen. The date comes out of a meeting that we had with the
public safety community, where we said, ``Look, forget
everything that exists right now that you're thinking about,
and tell us what the perfect world would be, and let's take
2023 and say, by then, how would you like the world to look?
What exactly are all the capabilities you'd like to have?''
That doesn't mean we're not interested in trying to make that
happen----
Senator Boxer. Well, I hear----
Dr. Boyd.--sooner.
Senator Boxer.--you. I'm glad you--my own view is, we don't
have that much patience, those of us here. So, even if it isn't
the perfect world, you know, we need to get to some better
world, which leads me to my last question, of Chief Carter,
which deals with what happened on the ground. In your written
testimony, you said that all emergency response agencies in
your parish in Louisiana operate on an 800 MHz radio system
that provides good interoperability throughout the region. Is
that right?
Mr. Carter. That's correct.
Senator Boxer. However, when some of your personnel went to
help in New Orleans, following Hurricane Katrina, they were
unable to operate their radios on the State systems due to
software incompatibility, a problem that can only be fixed for
$800 per radio, approximately. Is that correct?
Mr. Carter. Yes, ma'am, that's correct.
Senator Boxer. OK. If your department were to receive--and
it might not be your department--if the appropriate departments
were to receive sufficient funds to fix all your radios, at
$800 apiece, would that be a good thing for you?
Mr. Carter. It would be a great thing for us, in the event
that we deploy personnel and equipment to an area like New
Orleans, for instance, that is so far outside the operational
boundaries of our system, yes, ma'am, absolutely.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, the reason I asked that
question is, a lot of times our eyes glaze over when we hear
2023. Here is someone on the ground, Chief Carter, telling us,
for $800 apiece, they can solve a major problem. I don't know
why the Senate voted down, three times, money for this. Once
was my amendment. So, I--it hurt my heart. I lost by one or two
votes. I forget. One or two votes. Ridiculous. We need to do
more, and not wait until 2023.
And I just want to thank the whole panel, because I think
you're smart, you're good, and we're going to need you. And why
industry can't get their act together is something I don't get.
But, certainly, if we, as a Congress, could come together and
say, ``This is a priority,'' that should be enough incentive,
in a capitalistic society, for them to step up to the plate
with something that's going to help us through all this.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Our order got a little mixed here, and because there's
pressure with so many things going on, I don't want any of you,
at the witness table, to feel that there's lack of interest.
There's lack of time, but there's no lack of interest. And I
thank you for your testimony.
And coming from New Jersey, where we lost 700 people on 9/
11, and a large part of the loss was attributed to the fact
that we couldn't communicate, and we had people running
upstairs, rescue people--firefighters, emergency service
people, and police, trying to get upstairs to help people, and
it cost lots of lives of those servicepeople. So, we're
particularly in tune with the question of interoperability.
And I want to ask Chief Carter--and, again, thanks for your
incisive testimony. Being on the ground there helps identify
the problems, and rather quickly. Some cities, there's a
wireless network, allows police anywhere in the city to send/
receive data, including photographs, car information,
fingerprints to and from headquarters in real-time. Now,
municipal WiFi, are you familiar with that, Chief Carter? It's
the community's ability to have a communications system that
may not be available from the conventional commercial channels.
Municipal WiFi offers the best opportunity for this kind of
technology to spread across the country, and yet some States
are blocking cities from setting up their own network.
Are you familiar enough with the WiFi systems to comment on
whether or not the municipal networks offer a greater
opportunity--more timely--for advancing police communications,
at least? That means that they're going to be told what's going
on, or in communication with those who are on the street or
those who are on the particular assignment at that moment.
Mr. Carter. In all honesty, I am not familiar enough with
that technology to speak to it.
Senator Lautenberg. OK. We're looking very closely at that.
And, Mr. Chairman, I'm very hopeful about something that's
happening. And I know that you, in particular, Senator Sununu,
are very interested in the technology side of things. And that
we have the prospect being developed right now of having a
satellite communications system through cell phones,
instruments as simple as that, that won't worry about the
height of the towers that might be destroyed--the cell towers--
in a particular moment. So, we're fairly optimistic, very
hopeful that that can be part of a solution to the problem.
You know, I come out of the computer industry, and we tried
to do whatever we could to advance the technology, et cetera,
on our own, but we depended on different elements--manufacture,
design, et cetera--to make it all happen. But here we have a
problem so complex that I think the government has to be very
careful in establishing standards that industry can meet and
talk about without fear of violating any of the rules. And so,
we're encouraged by that.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, who couldn't be here; asks
this question, Mr. Orr. An issue that you raise in your
testimony is a need for some form of quality control to ensure
that the devices marketed and sold as compliant with certain
public safety standards are, in fact, compliant. To the point I
was earlier making. ``Indeed, my staff,'' he says, ``has
informed me that you have shared with them a demonstration of
how certain public safety radios performed in compliance tests
with P-25 standards. And could you tell us something about that
testing, and perhaps even give us a brief demonstration of how
it works?''
Mr. Orr. Sure. And it was done in a laboratory in Boulder,
Colorado, in the Department of Commerce labs. And,
simplistically, setting up that test, what it does is, Project
25 radios were developed to be the next generation of digital
radios. Currently, the largest percentage of radios out there
today, of course, are analog radios. Project 25 is meant to be
the next generation digital radio. However--public safety, the
manufacturers all understand there's going to be a migration to
those digital radios, and there will be a lot of time between
now and 2023, or whatever the time is, where you're going to
have a mix of analog and digital radios. And the purpose of
Project 25, and a part of the requirements of Project 25, is
that it is backward compatible and can operate with--both in
the digital environment and the analog environment. And so, you
should be able--and are supposed to be able, with a Project 25
radio, to be able to operate right--in contiguous bands and
contiguous channels with an analog radio and an analog channel,
and without having any interference between the digital and the
analog channels.
What this test is, is of two radios, one operating in--
well, they're operating in analog mode, and they're getting a
digital interference signal, and it shows you what would happen
currently with the P-25 radios if they were operating in a
situation where there were digital and analog channels adjacent
to each other. And, again, in the statement requirements for
Project 25, these radios should have no problem doing what
they're supposed to do, which is being audible.
And so, the first sound file I'll play, you will actually
be able to hear the voice.
[Audio played.]
Mr. Orr. So, that's a person in wideband analog mode on a
Project 25 radio, getting some minimal interference from an
adjacent channel operating in digital mode. You can still hear
the voice.
The next radio is another Project 25 radio, same
circumstances.
[Audio played.]
Mr. Orr. So, obviously there's a wide variation in how the
standard is being implemented. Now, this demonstration isn't
meant to show that there are radios out there that are causing
lives lost. Obviously, very few radios out there today are
Project 25, so you don't have a situation where you have a
whole lot of ultra-wide--or wideband--or analog and digital
radios operating in adjacent channels. However, as we start to
migrate to digital, you will start to have that, and buyers
won't even know whether or not their radio is going to allow
them to operate the way they expect it to operate.
And so, what we're doing is creating a conformance testing
program, along with SAFECOM, that will allow public safety to
make correct buying decisions based on what their needs are
from the radio, and understand how they operate.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that an opening statement that I would have made be included in
the record.
And I assume that the record will be kept open for
questions. We've run out of time, and I don't want to overuse
mine.
Senator Sununu. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman,
9/11 revealed serious problems with our ability to communicate
during a disaster.
When firefighters and police couldn't talk to one another, we all
became familiar with the term ``inter-operability.''
Hurricane Katrina gave us another wakeup call.
It reminded us that before we can have inter-operability during a
disaster, we need operability.
After last month's deadly storm, almost all of the communications
systems that we take for granted were shut down in the affected region.
The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous damage.
According to BellSouth, the largest wireline provider in the region,
more than three million phone lines were knocked out of service.
Local wireless networks also sustained considerable damage as
thousands of cell sites and many wireless switches were knocked out of
service.
Radio and TV broadcasters play an important role in providing
information during an emergency. But of the 41 broadcast radio stations
located in New Orleans and the surrounding area, only two AM and two FM
stations remained on the air immediately after the storm.
This event made clear that we need a backup plan for communications
during a disaster.
We need ``redundancy'' in networks, including the 9-1-1 emergency
system, and we need alternative sources of power.
I would encourage this committee and the FCC to consider how we put
in place redundant systems that can withstand disasters--both natural
and terrorist.
These could include satellite communications and VoIP telephone
service such as that provided by Vonage, and other technologies.
The big lesson that we must learn from this disaster is that we can
never be too prepared.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sununu. Let me ask a few questions here about the
P-25 standard. I don't know a great deal about some of the
technological developments that you're discussing, but you
talked a lot about conformance testing and standard development
and certification. This is a process that began 15 years ago,
correct?
Mr. Orr. Correct.
Senator Sununu. And I will use the word ``you'' here, but I
understand ``you'' haven't been working on it the whole time.
You're not responsible for all of this. There are obviously a
lot of people. So, I don't want you to take my line of
questioning personally.
How much money has been spent on the project over the last
15 years, roughly?
Mr. Orr. I really can't answer that, because the project
itself is an industry project. It's completely industry-driven.
However, it does have that public safety contingent that I
talked about. From a Federal perspective of how much support
we've been given, I would estimate maybe $2-3 million. And
we've only been involved lightly up until----
Senator Sununu. So, the Federal support is relatively
modest. Obviously----
Mr. Orr. Right.
Senator Sununu.--the big cost is going to be in replacing
all of these radios.
Mr. Orr. Yes.
Senator Sununu. There are eight interfaces that you're
trying to standardize. Only one of the eight has been developed
so far, correct?
Mr. Orr. Correct.
Senator Sununu. How much longer is it going to take to
develop the other seven?
Mr. Orr. What we've done is, we've worked with and assisted
the public safety community, the steering community involved in
P-25--to prioritize the remaining interfaces, which ones are
most important that need to be covered. They have declared to
the industry, ``Stop working on all other interfaces except the
following.'' And so, right now, the next one teed up--there are
two teed up. There's actually a fixed-station interface. But
the most important one is the ISSI I spoke about in my opening
statement. And that--the fixed-station, they expect to have a
standard, or at least a de facto standard, done October, so
next month, which is a major achievement for Project 25. And
then the ISSI, which is a very major achievement, they're
expecting to have a document that can be balloted and voted on
by January--done by January and balloted and voted by March.
Senator Sununu. Realistically, a couple more over the next
12 to 18 months.
Mr. Orr. I would be very happy if we got three over the
next----
Senator Sununu. OK.
Mr. Orr.--12 months.
Senator Sununu. So, we're talking about a time frame of,
frankly, years to complete all eight. And then, obviously, the
purchase of compliant equipment, radio equipment's going to be
required. Did you have an estimate for the total cost for
people to comply with this standard and meet the standard?
Mr. Orr. It should be fairly low. First of all, the current
plans for the conformance testing is that NIST----
Senator Sununu. No, no, no, I'm talking about replacing the
radios.
Mr. Orr. Oh.
Senator Sununu. We're talking about billions----
Mr. Orr. No, no. We----
Senator Sununu.--of dollars----
Mr. Orr. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Sununu.--$10, $15, $20 billion, something like
that. OK. I mean, my question is, for all of this work that has
been done, starting a 15-year time frame--granted, the
development's going on now--whether or not the whole approach
is, quite frankly, outdated. You know, this is a device that
has IP capability. And, granted, this is not a public safety
communication device. But the idea is that this can communicate
to anyone else with an IP address, anywhere in the world, let
alone anywhere in the country. And, obviously, depending on my
access to the IP network, it could be WiFi, it could be the
municipal network Frank Lautenberg is talking about, it could
be a local area network on a wireless, it could also be a wire-
based. But it's an IP device. The IP protocol has obviously
proven itself to be pretty robust, pretty capable. It's an
existing interface standard, if you will, that can be enhanced
by different features.
It seems to me it would be a little bit less expensive, a
little bit more straightforward, to implement a system using
that kind of an interface, rather than try to develop,
standardize, test, adopt standards, and then have to have
everyone spend a great deal of money to replace all of these
radios. What is wrong with that thinking?
And, Dr. Boyd, why don't we let Mr. Orr respond, but I'm
certainly very interested in your response to that, as well.
Mr. Orr. They will probably be very similar, I would
imagine. I would just say that, on your statement, much of
Project 25, as it moves forward, is IP-based. We are basing it
on available IP standards, and it will be based on the kind of
technologies that you're thinking of, as well.
Senator Sununu. So, given that, why is this taking so long,
and why are we presupposing that so many devices out there have
to be, sort of, switched out or will be rendered non-
compatible? Obviously, there are a lot of radios out there that
aren't IP-compatible. But why are the costs of implementation
assumed to be so high, given that there's such a large and
growing number of IP-compatible networks out there now?
Mr. Orr. The hope is that once a system like Project 25,
based on IP, is implemented, it will actually bring down the
costs, and they will be able to reap the benefits of the kind
of cheaper equipment that people--that consumers today are able
to take advantage of in the marketplace.
Senator Sununu. Dr. Boyd?
Dr. Boyd. The IP-based approach that the commercial
networks use is predicated on a number of things that don't fit
well in the public safety environment. One is an infrastructure
which is largely wired or fiber or connected on that basis, so
that they don't have weak signal problems and they don't have
time-of-arrival problems over large distances, as you will tend
to have in IP radio--many of those things haven't yet been
adequately----
Senator Sununu. Time-of-arrival problems?
Dr. Boyd. OK----
Senator Sununu. Are you talking about----
Dr. Boyd.--if you have a packet----
Senator Sununu.--wait packet?
Dr. Boyd.--if you have a series of packets, the series of
packets are transmitted from a device. A packet is really what
IP is transmitting. That the order in which they arrive, and
how often they arrive, begins to create all kinds of problems.
Some are issues associated with collisions. Those are managed
by routers and by servers in the cellular system. And cellular
systems are designed around an infrastructure that has a
relatively short range. Cellular is in a fairly small box.
The public safety guys, on the other hand, have to serve
the entire county. And they can't--they have some trouble in
relying on a commercial infrastructure, which is probably one
of the first things that will collapse, because these are
infrastructures that are traditionally built to about a 10
percent overcapacity. In fact, we exceed that normally during
rush hour every afternoon.
Senator Sununu. Well, I understand your point about not
necessarily wanting to rely on an exclusively commercial
infrastructure, but I seem to say--or you seem to say that
there are latency problems that wouldn't make an IP system
effective over an area larger than a county.
Dr. Boyd. No, I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is,
there are more technical problems there than--in this kind of
environment than you're going to find in the cellular or the
wired environment.
I think the critical point I'd make is that, whatever
system you decide to put in place has to meet their
requirements. What I told industry recently was, there are lots
of opportunities for commercial activities, whether it's IP-
based or satellite systems or others----
Senator Sununu. But what----
Dr. Boyd.--that help provide----
Senator Sununu. I'm sorry. I apologize for interrupting,
but you seem to use the words ``commercial'' and ``IP''
interchangeably.
Dr. Boyd. No.
Senator Sununu. And just because something is IP doesn't
mean it's commercial.
Dr. Boyd. No. That's correct.
Senator Sununu. OK.
Dr. Boyd. But if you go to IP, remember that there are very
few IP-capable radios currently in the field.
Senator Sununu. I suppose----
Dr. Boyd. In public safety.
Senator Sununu.--in public safety. And, I mean, quite
frankly, I have to wonder if that's, in part, because of all of
the micro-management and manipulation that's--well intended,
but all of the micro-management and manipulation that comes
from--whether it's Federal level or State level--but us trying
to force a standard on them, and whether or not that
discourages some of the innovation and adoption of new
technologies when they're available. I don't know that that's
the case, but I think it's a question that is certainly worth
asking.
Dr. Boyd. I think you've made the most critical point to be
made here. I think, in fact, you've made it----
Senator Sununu. Well, now you're just----
Dr. Boyd. No, I think you've made----
Senator Sununu.--drawing on flattery.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Boyd. You have made exactly the case that we've been
arguing for, for some time--and I think Chief Willis and others
will agree--and that is that we believe this has to be driven
by the first responders themselves, that it's not appropriate
to tell them what they have to have. We should be listening to
them. We should be listening to what their requirements are.
Then we should be responding to that. And that's the way we've
built the entire SAFECOM program, so that Chief Willis and
APCO, for example, are critical players in helping to do
exactly those things.
But, I agree with you, it has got to be driven at that
level. It can't be pushed down on them.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Dr. Boyd.
Senator Pryor?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask, if I can, about just a mechanical aspect of
what we saw in Katrina. It's my understanding that some of the
systems that were in place down there on the Gulf Coast, as I
understand it, were designed to withstand a hurricane, and to
survive a hurricane. And my impression is, many of these
systems, that were supposedly hurricane proof, failed. In fact,
I saw some towers--you all have seen the pictures where all the
towers are just bent over, broken in half, basically. And so,
my question, for whoever wants to take it, is, first, Is that
assumption correct, that there are systems down there in place
that were supposed to be hurricane proof? And, second, if
that's the case, what happened to them? Why did they fail?
So, who wants to answer that?
Mr. Carter. I believe that there were a number of systems
in south Louisiana. As a matter of fact, all those systems were
designed to be hurricane proof to some degree. I'm not totally
sure that they were designed to be hurricane-proof to the
degree that Katrina hit us. As far as the damage, the wind, of
course, is one of the causes that damaged the radio networks.
Following the wind, the break of the levees caused the
flooding, which, of course, then knocked the power out. So,
there were a number of issues that caused many of those sites
to fail. The wind, of course, initially, for a lot of them. And
I, too, saw--when I went on my trip down there, radio towers
that were basically broken in half. So, I can only assume that,
although those towers were designed for hurricane-force winds,
they were not designed for a Category 4 or 5, which is what we
actually got.
Senator Pryor. When I see that, I think, if they are
designed for hurricane-force winds, you know, I'd be curious
about seeing the specs on what they were designed for. And,
second, I'd be curious about what the marketing was for the
companies that sold these systems to the localities down there,
to the various companies and governments, et cetera.
And, third, I would want to know about any--not so much
design defects, in that maybe they weren't designed properly--
and maybe they weren't, but I'd want to know about that--but
I'd also want to know if there were issues of rust or wear-and-
tear or lack of maintenance, you know, those types of things.
Now, are you familiar with--can you answer any of those
questions for me?
Mr. Carter. No, sir, probably not, especially not
specifically to the systems in the south part of the State.
Senator Pryor. OK. Does anybody else want to take a stab at
any of that? Any impressions that you have?
Dr. Boyd. Of course, these systems are managed locally, so
that's the right place to go to, to ask that kind of question.
Senator Pryor. Right. In other words, we'll have to get
inside of the facts of each specific case to see.
Also, my impression is that some of the systems failed
maybe due to lack of planning, and, to some extent, lack of
design, because--I've heard something very practical--that
generators were down on the ground level, even in basements,
and they flooded. And, you know, of course, they lost their
power source. Are you all familiar with those stories, as well?
Are those stories true? And, you know----
Dr. Boyd. I can tell you, there's a major effort in the
Department to collect lessons learned and that kind of
information. And so, the Department is going to be talking
about the kinds of things they found. But it's still a little
early for us to know what those things are. Right now, it's the
recovery effort that's most important.
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Well, we've heard a lot of--like you, we've heard a lot of
anecdotal stories about things that went right and things that
went wrong. And so, part of what we are doing here is the
oversight of all this.
One thing, by the way, I want to say--I know we have to
take a break here in just a moment, Mr. Chairman, because we
have to vote on Judge Roberts here, momentarily--but one thing
I'd like to say is, some of the companies have really done a
great job after Katrina to try to, not just restore services to
their people, but also some of the nuts and bolts of even
suspending billing during this time, you know, things like
that. And some of these companies, I think, really do deserve
quite a bit of credit for the actions they've taken in the
aftermath of Katrina.
Mr. Chairman, I do have a few more questions, but maybe it
might be better if we submit those for the record, given the
shortness of our time here.
Senator Pryor. And supposedly, as I understand it, the
leadership would like us to be over there before the vote
starts.
Senator Sununu. The Senator is correct. And, without
objection, the record will be held open for 2 weeks, so that
Members may submit additional questions.
Senator Sununu. Any other comments or questions, Senator
Pryor?
Senator Pryor. No, thank you.
Senator Sununu. I had one final question for Mr. Moran. How
much spectrum is available exclusively for public safety use?
Is 97 MHz the right number?
Mr. Moran. At the present time it's not the right number,
because the 24 MHz in the 700 band, at this point, in many
parts of the country, is not usable exclusively for public
safety because of the broadcast issues----
Senator Sununu. OK.
Mr. Moran.--that you've mentioned earlier.
Senator Sununu. So, that'll be a correct number once we
complete our work and----
Mr. Moran. Yes, it will be.
Senator Sununu.--pass a----
Mr. Moran. Yes, it would be.
Senator Sununu.--a transition bill.
Thank you very much. Thank you, to all of our witnesses.
The hearing's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's two hearings on
communications in disasters.
Last week, Members of this committee raised multiple communications
issues and proposed various solutions.
I have focused many of my efforts on a couple proposals that I
think could make a huge difference to our Nation's emergency 9-1-1
system and make our citizens safer during disasters.
One of the tragedies caused by Hurricane Katrina was the crippling
of the 9-1-1 emergency network. Key 9-1-1 centers were either knocked
out by water or were overloaded with calls. This left citizens with no
way to call for help and it severely hampered rescue efforts.
Because the current 9-1-1 system doesn't have built-in
redundancies, once a local 9-1-1 center fails, there is no backup. But
digital technology can fix this problem.
S. 1063 (which I introduced and is cosponsored by Senators Burns,
Snowe, Clinton, and Kerry) would require the Federal Government and
industry to develop a plan to quickly move the Nation's emergency
networks from the old analog system to a more robust, Internet-based
network. This updated system would allow emergency phone calls to be
automatically rerouted from a damaged 9-1-1 call center to the next
nearest call center. LIVES WILL BE SAVED.
This bill also ensures that the millions of people who use Internet
phone service would be able to have full E-9-1-1 capabilities.
I thank the Co-Chairs of this committee for their supportive words
about S. 1063, which was introduced last May. The recent hurricanes
show that it's time for this committee to pass this bill and move it to
the full Senate.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses, and I thank the Chair.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
Today, the Committee continues its examination of the effectiveness
of our Nation's communications networks in the wake of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita and now turns its attention to the communications
challenges faced by first responders in times of crisis as a result of
the devastation caused to the physical infrastructure and the lack of
interoperable equipment.
While today's hearing will inevitably focus on how to ensure
communications ``interoperability,'' among first responders, we must
not lose sight of the fact that New Orleans had in place an
interoperable communications system, but when the basic communications
capabilities failed that system was rendered useless. Therefore, even
if interoperable communications systems are developed and deployed,
they will provide little help if the communications network itself does
not survive the disaster.
A key step to ensuring that the Nation is prepared for the next
disaster requires us not only to focus on obtaining the latest and
greatest technology, but also on building and maintaining resilient
networks. I hope that the witnesses today will help us understand what
steps can be taken to ensure that terrestrial networks are constructed
with foresight to anticipate and harden against failures. Additionally,
this Nation must plan for worst-case scenarios by integrating redundant
systems, both terrestrial and satellite, for situations where the best
laid plans fail to prevent communications outages.
Turning to the crisis-level lack of interoperability that has
plagued our first responders since September 11, Congress must make
policy decisions that will stimulate the development and deployment of
emergency ready, interoperable, redundant wired, wireless and satellite
networks. The lack of interoperability cannot blithely be blamed on a
single issue. This breakdown is occurring on several levels.
To ensure robust interoperability, in the most basic terms, there
are several key elements that must be addressed. First, we need to
ensure that proper planning, coordination and training exercises are
implemented in advance of a disaster. To have emergency readiness, we
must be emergency tested. Second, we need technology that is capable of
communicating seamlessly between and among the affected first
responders at the local, state and Federal level, regardless of
equipment or frequencies utilized. Third, we need to allocate the
necessary spectrum to enable robust communications systems to be built.
Fourth, we must establish a system of quality control to ensure the
technology developed for use in these systems is reliable. Finally, we
need to provide funding to deploy and maintain these systems. None of
these elements alone will solve our interoperability failures. They
must all be addressed in a coordinated manner or leave our Nation
vulnerable in the face of future disasters whether natural or man-made.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.