[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H.R. 503
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-8
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California JOE BARTON, Texas
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts Ranking Minority Member
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey FRED UPTON, Michigan
BART GORDON, Tennessee CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
ANNA G. ESHOO, California ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
BART STUPAK, Michigan BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
GENE GREEN, Texas JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Vice Chairman Mississippi
LOIS CAPPS, California VITO FOSSELLA, New York
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania STEVE BUYER, Indiana
JANE HARMAN, California GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
TOM ALLEN, Maine JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARY BONO, California
HILDA L. SOLIS, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska
JAY INSLEE, Washington MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
Professional Staff
Dennis B. Fitzgibbons, Chief of Staff
Gregg A. Rothschild, Chief Counsel
Sharon E. Davis, Chief Clerk
Bud Albright, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania FRED UPTON, Michigan
JANE HARMAN, California Ranking Minority Member
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
JAY INSLEE, Washington CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BARON P. HILL, Indiana NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
FRANK PALLONE, Jr, New Jersey HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
BART GORDON, Tennessee CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois Mississippi
ANNA G. ESHOO, California VITO FOSELLA, New York
BART STUPAK, Michigan GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York MARY BONO, California
GENE GREEN, Texas GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LOIS CAPPS, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska
HILDA L. SOLIS, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
H.R. 251, To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit
manipulation of caller identification information, and for
other purposes................................................. 17
Engel, Hon. Eliot, a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York, prepared statement................................... 4
Markey, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, opening statement............... 1
Upton, Hon. Fred, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 2
Witnesses
Knight, Allison, staff counsel, Electronic Privacy Information
Center......................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Monteith, Kris, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission..................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Pies, Staci, vice president, PointOne, president, Voice on the
Net Coalition.................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 29
THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID ACT
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
and the Internet,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in
room 2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward J.
Markey (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Doyle, Engel, Green,
Solis, Upton, Shimkus, Walden, and Terry.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Markey. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to
this panel's first hearing. We have a very active agenda
planned for the subcommittee, and I am pleased to be sitting
next to my good friend, Fred Upton, as we begin this process.
We will try to retain the same level of comedy that existed
when he was chairman. I believe that is the way the
telecommunications issues should be conducted.
Today we begin with legislation that was unanimously
approved by the committee and the House in the last Congress
when it was sponsored by former Chairman Joe Barton and my
committee colleague Congressman Eliot Engel from New York. They
have teamed up again this year and reintroduced the bill, and
today we hope to gather updated testimony and approve the bill
through the subcommittee.
This legislation addresses caller ID spoofing. Spoofing is
when a caller masks or changes the caller ID information on
their call in a way that disguises the true origination number
of the caller. In many instances, a call recipient may be
subject to pretexting through spoofing, which can lead to
fraud, personal ID theft, harassment, or otherwise put the
safety of the call recipient in danger.
It is important that we explore and analyze the use of
spoofing to commit crimes and otherwise harm the public
interest. On the other hand, lest we think that spoofing always
has nefarious aims, we must recognize that there may be
circumstances when a person's safety may be put in danger if
their true and accurate call origination information is
disclosed as well. What we see seek in caller ID policy is
balance. This has been the case since we held hearings in the
early 1990's on caller ID when this committee sought to take
into account emerging caller ID technology in a way that also
allowed callers to block their origination number on a per call
or per line basis. Technology also allowed call recipients to
refuse to receive calls by anyone who is blocking their caller
ID information from going through.
Last year we adjusted the legislation to ensure adequately
achieved historic balance so that we look at consumer privacy
and security. For instance, Members of Congress often have
direct lines in their offices. In order to ensure that such
lines do not become generally public and therefore remain
useful to us, it may be necessary to keep such direct numbers
confidential and have the outgoing caller ID information
indicate a different number at which our offices can be reached
to return calls. That gives the recipient a legitimate phone
number to call back but keeps confidential lines private. There
are many doctors, psychiatrists, lawyer, and other
professionals who would similarly like to keep direct,
confidential lines private in this way who have no intention of
misleading anyone. In addition, there may be instances, for
example, when a woman at a shelter seeks to reach her children
at home when spoofing is important to safeguard someone's
safety. Moreover, informants to law enforcement tip lines or
whistle blowers have additional reasons for why their calling
information should remain private. We should not outlaw any of
these practices, and if the legislation that we are now
considering needed clarification, we have now put that
clarification in so that spoofing is put into context that
would address those areas where the intent is to actually
defraud or harass a called party. That is the goal of the
legislation.
Again I want to commend my colleagues, Joe Barton and Eliot
Engel, for their great work, and I now turn to recognize my
good friend, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. I thank the chairman, and I too look forward to
working with you over the next 2 years before we get to get
that gavel back over here, but take care of it. You can see
that we did. In the last 12 years, a lot of chips in this thing
as well worn. But I appreciate certainly your leadership and
efforts to convene today's hearing and then markup a little bit
later when this hearing is over. I am going to ask that my full
statement be put into the record, and I am not going to give a
definition of spoofing. You did a very good job. This is a
bipartisan bill, and I will remind my colleagues that it passed
by voice last year in the House on the House floor. Sadly, the
Senate did not take it up; otherwise, it would have been a
public law. And I commend Mr. Barton again and certainly my
good friend, Mr. Engel, for their continued leadership on this
very important issue.
Let me just convey a couple of different instances where
spoofing was used, which clearly shows the need for this
legislation. AARP alerted its members to a prevalence scam
where spoofers get the local courthouse phone number to appear
on folks' caller ID screens, and then they tell the recipients
of the calls that they are judicial officials in order to get
that victim's personal information, whether it be a Social
Security number, driver's license, et cetera. Other reported
case involving a swat team that surrounded an apartment
building after police received a call from a woman who said she
was being held hostage in one of those apartments. As it turned
out, it was a false alarm. Caller ID was spoofed to make it
look like it was coming from that apartment, someone's idea of
a bad prank. In other instances, criminals are stealing credit
card numbers, getting the phone number of the actual card
holder, and then using those credit cards to get unauthorized
wire transfers, PIN numbers, a whole host of things that damage
that individual's personal information, a real violation. And,
of course, many of us are familiar with our own credit card
companies which may ask us to call from home phones to
authenticate and then activate that new card. And if the cards
are stolen out of the mail, then criminals may be able to spoof
our home phone numbers and authenticate and activate that new
card from the convenience from their home or motel room or from
whatever rock they might crawl under.
Unfortunately, spoofing does appear to be growing, and
there is no law that protects the American public from it. This
legislation, the Truth in Caller ID Act, would make it illegal.
More specifically, it would make it unlawful for any person to
cause any caller identification service to transmit misleading
or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent
to defraud or cause harm. The unfortunate reality is that our
age of information has resulted in an explosion of identify
theft. And while new technologies have provided us with
tremendous advancements and benefits, technology has also
provided greater opportunities to criminals as well.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and for
the markup, and I would like to think that we could move this
to the House floor soon with the leadership of the gentleman
from Massachusetts . I yield back my time.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Pittsburgh.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this bill has
been well introduced, so in my first official action as vice
chairman of your subcommittee, I will----
Mr. Markey. By the way, I would like to make that public
announcement to all the members, that the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, is going to serve as a supremely
competent and knowledgeable vice-chairman of this committee.
Mr. Doyle. Well said, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Doyle. I am going to follow your lead from earlier this
morning, Mr. Chairman, and waive my opening statement so we can
get to our speakers.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. Let me then recognize the gentleman
from New York, the author of this legislation, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit
my statement to the record, but I just want to make a couple of
comments.
First, thank you. I am truly honored that you are taking
this bill at our first hearing and markup, and I really
appreciate it. When it became clear to me about the problems of
spoofing, I went over to then Chairman Barton and asked him if
we could do this bill. And so we submitted the bill in the last
Congress as the Barton-Engel bill, but due to the changes, I
like the way it is submitted in this Congress as the Engel-
Barton bill. And I thank my good friend for cosponsoring it
again this year as well as Chairman Upton for supporting it.
We held hearings on this bill last year, and the statement
that you made, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Upton's statements really
capsulize what the hearings told us. The fact that there are
instances where we may not want the real number to show and
that there are many horror stories that we know and it can go,
on and on in terms of political campaigns and trickery where
people from one campaign can pretend they are calling from the
opposition's campaign and do all kinds of things to get voters
angry at the opposition.
So this is truly a bill whose time has come, and I am very
grateful that we have tremendous consensus. And I am going to
submit this, and I look forward to hearing the testimony and
doing the markup with you. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eliot Engel, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New York
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for quickly scheduling
this hearing. The bill before us today is a good bill and one
that I was happy to re-introduce in this Congress with my
friend and ranking member, Mr. Barton.
For years now, I have been working with my colleagues on
issues of privacy and identity theft. Each and every time we
plug one hole, crafty criminals come up with another way to
commit fraud.
Currently, it is easy, cheap, and legal to spoof caller ID.
These services can be used for many malicious purposes. A
criminal can make a call that appears to be originating from
the recipient's neighborhood bank, his credit card company, or
the Social Security Administration.
I've read news reports that criminals are using these
technologies to get people to give out private information they
would never give out except that they think they are receiving
a legitimate call from their bank or even local court house.
I also have read about some of our colleagues being victims
in their capacity as Members of the House. At that point, it
became apparent to me there are people who seek to use these
technologies to strike at the heart of our democracy.
Leaving fake messages that are insulting or incendiary on a
person's voicemail that identifies the caller as an elected
official or candidate for public office threatens the very
nature of our electoral process.
The Truth in Caller ID Act will give us another tool to
combat identity theft and even election fraud.
I thank the chairman for his attention to this matter, look
forward to hearing from the witnesses, and yield back.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. And, yes, this is the 20th
anniversary, this month, of my becoming chairman of this
subcommittee 20 years ago. So it is an honor for me to have
this bill be the first bill on the 20th anniversary that we
will be processing. The gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, and
I am glad you brought up that there are some beneficial uses. I
kind of forgot about when people call us on our cell phones,
member to member, it is a different number that pops up on our
cell phones, even in this system. So we all want to go after
the bad actors, but there are some credible positive uses, and
we want to maintain that balance. I think you will try to do
that. I appreciate your efforts, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Markey. The gentle lady from California.
Ms. Solis. Thank you, and congratulations to you, Mr.
Chairman, and also for bringing this very timely piece of
legislation forward. I want to tell you that, as a longtime
advocate on domestic violence issues, I am pleased to see that
the legislation helps to clarify that law to protect those
victims. So thank you very much, and I will submit my statement
for the record.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Oregon.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually thought
when I saw something about spoofing on our list today that it
had more to do with the full committee chairman's comment about
DTB yesterday and maybe changing the date. But since it is on
this, I really don't have an opening statement. I supported
this bill last time, and I will look forward to supporting it
again.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. Terry. I will waive. Happy anniversary, by the way.
Mr. Markey. Thank you so much. I was a young man once ago.
So let us now turn to our incredibly impressive panel of
witnesses. That would be Ms. Allison Knight, staff attorney
from the Electronic Privacy Information Center. She is staff
counsel at that organization, a graduate of the University of
Western Ontario. She has written extensively on this subject,
and we appreciate very much her being here.
We have Ms. Staci Pies, who is vice-president and Point One
president, testifying on behalf of the VON Coalition. She has
15 years of experience in communications, legal and regulatory
experience, and she also served at the FCC as deputy division
chief in a network services division, and senior attorney in
the FCC's common carrier bureau.
And Ms. Kris Monteith, chief of the FCC enforcement bureau.
She is the chief of that bureau. She has held numerous jobs in
the FCC including overseeing the commission's interaction with
local, state, and tribal governments. She has also served as
the chief of policy for the wireless telecommunications bureau
and deputy chief of the Farmer Common Carrier Bureau's
competitive pricing division.
So I think what we will do is we will recognize the
witnesses in the order that I introduced them, and then we will
finish up with the FCC giving us their summary view of this
issue. So, Ms. Knight, you have 5 minutes. Please begin.
STATEMENT OF ALLISON KNIGHT, STAFF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR OF
PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT AT THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER
Ms. Knight. Good afternoon. Chairman Markey, Ranking Member
Upton, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on caller ID spoofing and H.R.251,
The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007.
My name is Allison Knight, and I am staff counsel and
director of privacy and human rights project at the Electronic
Privacy Information Center. EPIC is a nonpartisan research
organization based on Washington that seeks to focus public
attention on the emerging civil liberties issues and to protect
privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.
I would like to discuss two separate and important privacy
interests related to the issue of caller ID spoofing. The first
is the right of callers to limit the disclosure of their phone
numbers in order to protect their privacy and, in some cases,
their safety. The second is the right for call recipients to be
free from pretexting and other fraud that can lead to the loss
of their privacy and the threats of stalking, identify theft,
and harassment.
Before caller ID services were offered, telephone customers
generally had the ability to control the circumstances under
which their phone numbers were disclosed to others. Many
individuals have legitimate reasons to report a different
number than the one presented on caller ID, as was remarked in
the opening comments. For example, a person may wish to keep
their direct line private when making phone calls from within
an organization. And in some circumstances, disclosure of a
person's telephone number may also put his or her safety at
risk. Domestic violence survivors, shelters, and other safe
homes need to preserve their confidentiality of their phone
numbers. They may need to contact abusers without exposing
their location in order to arrange custody or other legitimate
matters. They also may need to contact other third parties,
such as businesses, that may have very permissive privacy
policies and would then share collected telephone numbers with
lists or data brokers. In all of these situations, preserving
anonymity is necessary for their safety.
Caller ID blocking may seem like a viable means for
allowing callers to protect their anonymity while not
misleading recipients. However, caller ID blocking is not a
complete solution. A caller can be identified through other
means, such as the automatic number identification system, and
some recipients prevent receiving blocked calls. And
indications are that numbers of individuals who are doing this
is growing. In the case of a domestic violence survivor,
attempting to safely reach a required phone number, an
individual would have to use spoofing for the innocent purpose
of preserving the confidentiality of his or her number.
We also can't ignore the privacy interest of those who
decline to accept calls from unknown numbers. If an individual
has habitually received harassment calls from a caller ID
blocked number, we should not permit the harasser to use
spoofing as a means to circumvent the individual's screening.
Caller ID spoofing can also create privacy risks. Last
year, EPIC brought to Congress's attention the problem of
pretexting consumers' phone records. Pretexting is a technique
by which a bad actor can obtain an individual's personal
information by impersonating a trusted entity. For these
reasons, the practice of spoofing for the purpose of fraud or
harm should be curtailed. Preventing spoofing for harmful
reasons will also hold illegitimate spoofers accountable.
Spoofing caller ID numbers can create a real risk to
individuals who might be defrauded or harmed by illegitimate
uses of the technology. At the same time, it is important not
to punish those who have a legitimate reason to conceal their
actual telephone numbers.
EPIC supports H.R.251 as currently drafted because
including an intent requirement, The Truth in Caller ID Act of
2007 distinguishes between appropriate and inappropriate caller
ID spoofing and also preserves legitimate law enforcement
techniques. Finally, we would also like to call the
subcommittee's attention to our ongoing concern about the
revelation that the National Security Agency may have
constructed a massive database of telephone records of American
consumers. We again ask members to support EPIC's
recommendation that the FCC undertake an investigation of the
possibly improper disclosure telephone records by telephone
companies that are subject to the privacy obligations contained
in the Communications Act. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Knight appears at the
conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Markey. Thank you. Ms. Pies.
STATEMENT OF STACI PIES, VICE PRESIDENT, POINT ONE, AND
PRESIDENT, THE VOICE ON THE NET COALITION
Ms. Pies. Thank you, Chairman Markey, Vice Chair Doyle,
Ranking Member Upton, and members of the subcommittee. My name
is Staci Pies. I am vice president of Point One, a VoIP
provider, and president of the Voice on the Net or VON
Coalition, the voice for the VoIP industry.
Misleading people through the misuse of caller ID, whether
for a prank, a scam, or worse, is unacceptable. And on behalf
of the VON Coalition, I thank the committee for its leadership
in addressing this issue.
VoIP is burgeoning in popularity with businesses and
consumers because it can do so much more than plain old
telephone service. VoIP allows consumers to take control over
the communications experience, to manage how they use those
services, and to decide when and where they receive calls.
Lower costs coupled with a seemingly endless list of new
possibilities are making VoIP one of the hottest Internet and
broadband technologies today. Today's VoIP services are simply
a means to have a conversation. They are portals to a world of
information that enriches the communications experience and
adds new dimensions to the idea of a conversation.
Studies have shown that with the right policy framework and
continued advancement, VoIP-driven competition has the
potential to save consumers more than $100 billion over the
next 5 years. For businesses, VoIP is lowering costs,
increasing mobility, enabling collaboration, integrating voice
and data in entirely new ways, boosting productivity, and
giving companies and competitive advantage, and the best is yet
ahead.
Many of the great benefits of VoIP to consumers and
business users depends on accurate and non-misleading
identification of the calling party. If I program my VoIP
service to ensure that calls from my son's school are
simultaneously rung on all of my phones, I don't want to answer
it and find out that some telemarketer has spoofed the number
to fool me into believing it is a priority call.
To protect the usefulness of their services, VoIP providers
have a strong interest in having caller ID be accurate and non-
misleading. The VON Coalition has been at the forefront of
promoting best practices to enable consumers to protect their
personal data, moving early to adopt and post consumer
guidelines for protecting billing records. Since then,
businesses that control personal data, consumers, and the IP
industry have taken significant steps to self-police fraudulent
access to personal data. The VON Coalition agrees with
previously presented congressional testimony that caller ID
fraud perpetrators must be penalized. Law enforcement should
have the tools to protect U.S. citizens from individuals that
fraudulently manipulate phone numbers to commit a crime against
a person or a crime against property. Spoofing to defraud or
harass or for unlawful commercial gain cannot and should not
ever be condoned or tolerated. Congress is right to focus its
attention on those who would do so.
As this committee addresses deceptive spoofing, we urge you
to continue to carefully balance to goal of thwarting criminal
behavior with the public interest imperative to ensure that
innovation flourishes and that applications and services
delivered over broadband are available to all Americans. As
Chairman Markey so eloquently described in his opening
statement, the ability to consumers to control various aspects
of their communication experience presents exciting
opportunities for the disabled, offers unsurpassed privacy
protection, and enables businesses and consumers to communicate
in increasingly efficient and powerful ways.
The Truth in Caller ID Act, with the focus on the intent to
commit fraud or other crimes, effectively balances these two
important objectives by facilitating prosecution while not
thwarting or prohibiting innovative tools that have legitimate
consumer empowering benefits. The bill recognizes that caller
identification information may be modified for telemarketers to
comply with the TCPA. This is not the only legitimate need to
change caller ID.
I would like to share five examples. First VoIP services
offer tremendous potential for persons with disabilities to
communicate more effectively. One recent Web application
permits users to call any phone number in the U.S. or Canada,
and the service reads to the called party the message that the
originating user inputs into a Web-based form. Users of the
application who are speech impaired can now send voice
messages. Similarly, blind users can now take advantage of
instant messaging services, where previously they would have
been precluded from doing so because of sight limitations.
Second, one of the benefits of VoIP is to help consumers
better protect their own privacy. For instance, Web sites that
allow consumers to post solicitations for lawful commercial
purposes may also permit consumers to provide a temporary
callback number that is different from their assigned number.
One service explains the application in this way. The desire to
communicate cannot be crippled by privacy. The application
unleashes the true potential of the global community by making
it a safer place.
Third, as recognized by Chairman Markey and Ms. Knight,
there are some situations in which caller ID information can
actually endanger individual safety. The classic situation is
the battered spouse. In some instances, blocking the delivery
of caller ID information might be sufficient; however, because
technological innovations also facilitate the unblocking of
caller ID, any legislation should be careful about presuming
that blocking will always be adequate protection.
Four, certain new communication services do not organically
generate or transmit caller ID, but in order to connect to the
public telephone network, the service may need to insert
something that looks like a traditional phone number. Many of
these innovative services, which offer tremendous ways to
communicate, do not utilize the same numbering and labeling
practices as yesterday's phone services and should not be
deemed illegitimate because of this.
A final exciting new application is the ability for
consumers to make click-to-dial calls while viewing broadband-
based content. Utilizing such an application, a viewer can
click a single button on her standard remote and pull up a menu
that offers a variety of products and services, including
contacting her local member of Congress. The constituent can
locate the contact information for the member's office and then
click on a button that enables her to reach the office through
a VoIP connection.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pies appears at the
conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Markey. Excellent job. Thank you. I appreciate it. I
wanted you to get through all five of those. Ms. Monteith.
STATEMENT OF KRIS MONTIETH, CHIEF, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Ms. Monteith. Good afternoon, Chairman Markey, Ranking
Member Upton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to speak with you about the problem of caller
identification spoofing.
As you know, caller ID services let customers identify who
is calling them by displaying the caller's telephone number or
other information on the customer's equipment before the
customer picks up the phone. Caller ID spoofing refers to a
practice in which the caller ID information transmitted with
the telephone call is manipulated in a manner that misleads the
call recipient about the identity of the caller.
The commission is deeply concerned about reports that
caller ID information is being manipulated for fraudulent or
other deceptive purposes, and the impact of those practices on
the public trust and confidence in the telecommunications
industry. We are particularly concerned about how this practice
may affect consumers as well as public safety and law
enforcement communities. As a technical matter, caller ID
spoofing happens by manipulating the data elements that travel
with the phone call. Phone calls on the public switch telephone
network, or the PSTN, are routed to their destinations by means
of a specialized protocol called the signaling system seven, or
SS7. SS7 conveys information associated with a call, such as
the telephone number of the caller. The SS7 information for a
call is provided by the carrier that the caller uses to place
the call. Caller ID then displays that caller's number to the
called party. Caller ID spoofing is accomplished by
manipulating the SS7 information associated with the call.
The commission addressed caller ID on the PSTN in 1995 with
rule 64.1601, which generally requires all carriers using SS7
to transmit the calling party number associated with an
interstate call to interconnecting carriers. The same
commission rule also requires telemarketers to transmit
accurate caller ID information. The development of Internet and
IP technologies has made caller ID spoofing easier than it used
to be. Now, entities using IP technology can generate false
calling party information and pass it into the PSTN via SS7.
Caller ID spoofing can potentially threaten our public
safety. For example, spoofers can fabricate emergency calls and
call as local law enforcement and public safety agencies to
deploy their resources needlessly. Caller ID spoofing also can
potentially threaten consumers. Spoofing can be used, for
example, by the unscrupulous to defraud consumers by making
calls appear as if they are from legitimate businesses or
government offices.
The commission's enforcement bureau has been actively
investigating the issue of caller ID spoofing since the summer
of 2005, when information regarding junk fax spoofing came to
our attention. To date, the bureau has initiated investigations
of 12 companies engaged in the marketing and selling of caller
ID spoofing services to customers. One investigation resulted
in a citation against a telemarketer, Intelligent Alternatives,
for rule violations, including violations of the caller ID
rules under section 64.1601. We have sent formal letters of
inquiry to the other companies and at the same time, served
most of them with subpoenas to compel them to respond to our
inquiries. In some cases, we have issued subsequent letters of
inquiry to uncover additional evidence of possible violations
of the Communications Act. Our inquiry letter seek information
about the company's alleged spoofing methods, including
detailed technical explanations and the types of technologies
utilized, the identities of other companies that assist in
providing the spoofing services, the purposes for the services,
and information about subscribers, and whether the offered
services can be used to spoof emergency services information or
otherwise affect those critical first responders.
We continue to seek relevant information to assist us in
fully understanding these issues and whether violations of the
Communications Act or our rules have occurred. But our
enforcement options may be limited by some of these entities
who are not directly regulated by the commission. At the same
time, we have held meetings with numerous industry
representatives, including wire line, wireless, and voiceover
Internet protocol based companies to determine the impact of
caller ID spoofing on their consumers and networks.
In addition, we have coordinated closely with state
agencies, the Federal Trade Commission, and other interested
organizations, such as the National Emergency Number
Association, regarding their efforts to address and identify
solutions to this problem. The enforcement bureau is committed
to continuing to gather and analyze information about these
companies' practices, their networks, their businesses, their
customers, and other germane information.
In conclusion, the intentional manipulation of caller ID
information, especially for the purpose of fraud or deception,
is a troubling development in the telecommunications industry.
The commission looks forward to working with Congress, this
committee, to ensure that the public maintains its confidence
in the telecommunications industry. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Montieth appears at the
conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Markey. Thank you. We thank each of the witnesses. That
now concludes the time for testimony by our witnesses, and now
the chair will recognize himself for a question of the
witnesses.
Ms. Knight, do you feel that the changes that have been
made in the legislation take into account the context of the
call so that now the bill goes after the bad actors without
hindering legitimate uses of technology?
Ms. Knight. Yes, the intent either to defraud or to cause
harm adequately and rightly covers the illegitimate uses and
still protects the legitimate uses of caller ID spoofing.
Mr. Markey. OK, great. I have no other questions. Mr.
Upton.
Mr. Upton. Do you think it addresses everything that we
should in this bill?
Ms. Monteith. Yes, I think what would be important with
respect to intent is that Congress and the committee provide as
much in the way of legislative history as possible to inform
the commission of the applicable standard under the intent
standard.
Mr. Upton. I have no further questions. Thank you.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Monteith,
in your testimony, you mentioned that the commission has
coordinated with state agencies regarding the efforts of the
state agencies to identify solutions to this problem. Can you
give some examples of what the states are doing to solve the
problem?
Ms. Monteith. I know we have worked closely with the
Florida attorney general's office and I believe with members of
the Nayrook. I don't have any specific examples. We do
participate with the Nayrook members on a monthly call that is
aimed at addressing consumer protection types of issues. But I
would be happy to get specific details to respond to your
question.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. I appreciate that. Ms. Pies, you gave
a line of good examples of the new technology, the VoIP
providers. It is really exciting, and obviously many people use
these things. My kids can tell you more about them than I can,
but there is no standard, is that true, for VoIP providers when
it comes to caller ID?
Ms. Pies. If I understand the question, you are asking
whether there is an industry-wide accepted technical standard
for transmission of caller ID.
Mr. Engel. Yes.
Ms. Pies. There are several different protocols that are
used to provide VoIP services. Really depends on the type of
service that is being provided, the type of network, whether or
not it is connecting to the PSTN. And there are practices that
some providers use. As Kris explained in her testimony, if you
are connecting with the PSTN, there are different requirements
in order to be able to pass. If you are utilizing SS7 base
signaling, there is different information that has to be
passed. Some providers where calls originate IP, rather than
originating on the PSTN, as I described in my testimony, the
networks do not organically generate caller ID that is what we
think of in the traditional plain old telephone service world.
So they may, for instance, insert a number such as 0001234 in
order to allow the call to connect, but that call does not have
a traditional phone number associated with it.
Mr. Engel. Do most programs let someone manually enter any
caller ID info they want?
Ms. Pies. I can't answer whether most do or do not. What
VoIP does that is so empowering for businesses and consumers is
it essentially moves functionality that used to be in the hands
of the large companies. So, for instance, setting up a PBX
system. I can now download software and set up a PBX system
from my home, and I can serve a small business straight from my
home. I do not have to contract through Verizon. So the ability
to do that also enables me to control some of the
functionalities that the phone company would have controlled in
the past, such as establishing the caller ID. I know that there
are a number of consumer residential VoIP services that ask the
consumer to select a phone number and fix that selection from
the get-go, and the caller does not have the ability to
manipulate it as they go on.
Mr. Engel. Is the industry working towards any standard
that you know on how to handle things so that things would be
uniform?
Ms. Pies. The industry is, as far as I know, and there are
technical organizations and engineers that may be working on
issues that I am not aware of. Establishing a caller ID so that
calls look like plain old telephone service is probably not
high on the priority list. Most of the industry standards that
are being worked on allow the old network to communicate with
the next generation network. And sort of making up a caller ID
parameter so that it looks like an old phone call does not
serve any beneficial purpose when the networks can talk to each
other without that.
Mr. Engel. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow
up on this range. There is always unintended consequences when
we move legislation, and it has struck me that we have defined
that there is legitimate reasons to spoof for protection. We
have been involved a lot with the 911 issue and enhanced 911
and identification of location. Is there a concern, especially
VoIP, which is we are not totally deployed. We are still having
issues with how someone uses the VoIP service. And they call
911. How do we know where they are at? And we are trying to
push that out. Let us take someone who is spoofing legitimately
to protect their location. What if they then try to make an
emergency service call? Are they in the system, or are they
not? Can they be identified, or can they not be identified
either using traditional land line, cellular or VoIP? Is this
something we need to talk through, or am I not technologically
knowledgeable enough to say it is not an issue?
Ms. Pies. I would like to answer.
Mr. Markey. Yes.
Ms. Pies. That is a very good question, and actually the
way that a VoIP caller or a cellular caller contacts the right
PSAP, the correct PSAP for the location where the person is
located, is there is a system called PANI or Pseudo Automatic
Number Identification. And that number is input into a database
or a server so that when my calls go in, for instance, I have a
202 number in my office in Maryland. My call will go into the
911 system, and because we have a very old 911 system that
actually does not work very particularly efficiently, you have
to fool the system to letting it believe that the call is
coming from the right geographic location. So there is a Pseudo
ANI that is associated then with my call that tells the PSAP
that I am in Maryland as opposed to DC. So in fact, that is a
legitimate spoofing capability that needs to be protected to
enable the 911 call to go to the right PSAP. It is not
something that needs to be prevented because both mobile calls
or VoIP calls, any type of service that can be used from a
different location from what a traditional phone service would
be used, needs to have that sort of pseudo phone number to be
able to tell the PSAP where to go and which PSAP to answer.
Mr. Shimkus. So no matter what number you change it to or
the identification of the Pseudo ANI number will direct you to
the location?
Ms. Pies. Correct.
Mr. Shimkus. Great. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Monteith, first of
all, it looks like this bill we have here in the subcommittee
is a slam-dunk, and we appreciate your help in the process. I
just thought while we have you here, I would like to have you
tell us how an enforcement action happens. Walk us through it.
And do you start it? Does the chairman's office start it? Tell
us how it works.
Ms. Monteith. Sure. An enforcement action can be initiated
through a number of different procedures. One may be that we
would investigate an issue that comes to our attention that is
troubling and may be a violation of the Communications Act.
Secondly, we certainly could be asked by the chairman, other
commissioners, to help to investigate issues. And thirdly, we
are very often complaint-driven. A complaint is filed with the
commission alleging a violation of the Communications Act, and
we investigate to ensure that there is not or to determine that
there is.
Once we initiate an investigation, our general fact finding
process is to send letters of inquiry to the subject of our
investigation, asking them to provide us with information
concerning the underlying issues. They are compelled to
respond. If they are a non-regulated entity, we sometimes serve
a subpoena as well as issuing the formal letter of inquiry to
ensure that they will respond to our inquiry. From there, if
our investigation reveals that there has been a violation of
the Communications Act, our general process with respect to a
regulated entity is to issue what we call a notice of apparent
liability. That is a finding that we believe there has been a
violation, and we propose, in many instances, a forfeiture
along with that finding. The entity then has an opportunity to
respond to us and indicate to us that either factually or
legally we do not understand the case or the facts before us,
the law before us. From there, we go to a forfeiture order that
may be--if we are dealing with a non-regulated entity or a
entity that does not have an application or an application or a
license or a permit from the commission, before we can go to
the notice of apparent liability stage, we are required by
statute to issue a citation. And before we could then go to the
notice of apparent liability stage and impose a forfeiture or a
fine, we would have to find a repeat violation by that same
entity of the same underlying Communications Act provision or
our rules. So that is in essence the process.
Mr. Doyle. When would the chairman or other commissioners
get involved in an enforcement action, or do they ever?
Ms. Monteith. Involved with respect to asking us to
investigate or involved in the investigation?
Mr. Doyle. In the investigation.
Ms. Monteith. The bureau, of course, would coordinate with
the chairman's office and with the commissioners to share
information about our investigations. And depending upon
whether the investigation is something that the bureau could
handle on delegated authority or whether we had to present the
item for the commission's full consideration, the commissioners
may be more or less involved in the investigation.
Certainly if it is an item that is being presented to the
commission for vote, the bureau would be responding to the
commissioners and the chairman and the kinds of questions that
they may have to assure themselves that they are, and they
fully understand the facts and the laws surrounding the
investigation.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Oregon.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don't have
any questions. I think they have been well addressed and look
forward to moving into the markup.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. Terry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have one
question. It is the same one that I asked last time, and I
think we made sure that this appropriate use was protected, and
that is within our teleservices industry. Two of the top three
of which are headquartered in my district. So I just want to
ask Kris if you could verify that from your reading that a
teleservices company that uses their client's name and number
as the caller ID number is an accepted practice and is not one
that would be considered defrauding or harming.
Ms. Monteith. Yes, I believe that is correct under our
rules.
Mr. Terry. That would be our intent. Thank you.
Mr. Markey. With the gentleman yielding back, the time for
questions by the members of the subcommittee has expired. That
concludes the hearing. All members have 10 days, if they wish,
to submit questions to the witnesses, and the committee clerk
will notify the members as to how that process works. And
without objection, this subcommittee is now adjourned. And we
will now have the meeting once again. OK, so all the witnesses,
if you would like, we thank you so much for your excellent
testimony. And we will take a 1-minute break. We will recognize
the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.
Again, I apologize. I was just down the hall. I am actually
trying to work with the Ecuador ambassador with an energy
company, so you understand that, Mr. Chairman. But I just have
some questions for Ms. Monteith. Commercial telemarketers are
required to transmit accurate caller ID information that
applies whether the calls are made in person or whether they
are using automated calls. Is that correct?
Ms. Monteith. Yes, I believe so.
Mr. Green. OK, if a nonprofit, such as a political action
committee or a political party or a 571 organization makes
automated calls to voters, does the current FCC rules prohibit
them from using inaccurate caller ID info if it is nonprofits
or political campaigns?
Ms. Monteith. I don't believe exempt organizations are
covered under our rules.
Mr. Green. OK, the committee memo agrees with that and says
that there is no broad mandate however to the correct caller ID
information be transmitted for non-commercial calls. That is
the only thing. The draft bill we have today prohibits the
sending of inaccurate caller ID info with the intent to defraud
or cause harm. Does this language prohibit automated political
calls with inaccurate caller ID info? Does that definition of
with intent to defraud or cause harm, would that apply to non-
profits or political campaigns?
Ms. Monteith. I would prefer to, if you don't mind, with
all due respect, look at the question before I answer.
Mr. Green. OK, we will be glad to submit that.
Ms. Monteith. Thank you. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman,
generally intent to defraud is relatively clear for a standard,
but when you add to it intent to cause harm, it is less clear.
And I would hope that the FCC would interpret that standard,
which causes harm, how much intent is needed to qualify? And so
that is an open-ended, but we will submit that to you. And I
know we have a markup set for this bill, and I have an
amendment that will address it. But I will hold to the full
committee, but I think there is some concern about that. And I
want to make sure we don't have a loophole that can be done by
non-profits or even political campaigns because our
constituents can get mad when that caller ID is false. And
whether it is me calling them or the Democratic Party or some
non-profit group. And your organization has been very helpful
in identifying some justified reasons for allowing callers to
withhold and hide caller ID info, such as people making
anonymous tips to newspapers and legitimate investigations, and
also women's shelters, for example. We now have an intent
standard in the bill, and I am concerned that organizations
making deceptive political calls using fake caller ID
information would not be covered. Is it your understanding this
bill would include non-profit or political organizations?
Ms. Monteith. Well, I think that the standard deception is
different than either fraud or to cause harm, and I think that
the standard that has been articulated in the bill does clearly
delineate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of spoofing.
Mr. Green. OK, can you think of any legitimate reason
someone or some group that is making hundreds or even thousands
of calls on an automated system would use a false caller ID?
And this is open to anyone. I guess because I think the bill is
a great bill. In fact, I know it has been both my colleague
counsel Eliot and ranking member Barton, I just worry that we
are leaving maybe a loophole here that we are not going to
address. And we will have to come back at some future time.
Ms. Monteith. Well, again I think that the focus rightly is
on the intent.
Mr. Green. OK, and not the causes harm?
Ms. Monteith. Well, either the intent to defraud or to
cause harm.
Mr. Green. OK, so the intent to defraud would be the
primary, and then to cause harm is actually in addition to it.
You don't have to meet both tests.
Ms. Monteith. Right, the wording of the bill has an or. I
would see to defraud as being more traditional fraud where
there would be a calculable monetary damage that would be
associated with it, whereas harm, I think, would be more along
the lines of a physical harm to deal with some of the issues
that I have read about in terms of safety.
Mr. Green. OK. Well, I guess the fraud issue, because if
again for example, the Democratic Party is only calling
Republican primary voters, what would you think that would be?
Would that be intent to defraud with their caller ID not
showing it is the Democratic Party?
Ms. Monteith. Well, again, I think that deception and fraud
are two different standards. I won't try to make any kind of
judgment on how the bill will eventually be interpreted;
however.
Mr. Green. We don't want anybody to interpret it. We want
to put it in the language so they don't have to.
Ms. Monteith. I mean I need further details on this.
Mr. Green. OK.
Ms. Monteith. At a later date, if you would like. Again, I
would like to restate that EPIC does support the language
either intent to defraud or to cause harm. We think that
adequately makes a distinction between different uses.
Mr. Green. But again someone could still be using local
calls just to deceive, and because defraud they are not, I mean
except for maybe selling them an idea instead of a product----
Ms. Monteith. Well, again if that doesn't meet the language
either to defraud or to cause harm, then it wouldn't be caught
within the bill. And it would therefore be a legitimate use.
Ms. Green. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again.
Mr. Markey. OK, and we look forward to working with the
gentleman from Texas between the subcommittee and the full
committee on his concerns. With that, the gentleman's time has
expired. And again all time for questions by members of the
subcommittee has expired, and this portion of the hearing has
concluded. And we once again thank the witnesses for their
excellent testimony, and we will recess for a minute while the
witnesses clear the table. And our staff counsel can move into
place so that we can begin a markup of this legislation.
[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded to
other business.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Statement of Kris Anne Monteith
Good morning, Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton, and
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
speak about the problem of caller identification (caller ID)
spoofing.
As you know, caller ID services let customers identify who
is calling them before they answer a call by displaying the
caller's telephone number or other information--such as a name
or business name--on the customer's equipment before the
customer picks up the phone. ``Caller ID spoofing'' refers to a
practice in which the caller ID information transmitted with a
telephone call is manipulated in a manner that misleads the
call recipient about the identity of the caller. The use of
Internet technology to make phone calls has apparently made
caller ID spoofing even easier. The Commission is deeply
concerned about reports that caller ID information is being
manipulated for fraudulent or other deceptive purposes and the
impact of those practices on the public trust and confidence in
the telecommunications industry. We are particularly concerned
about how this practice may affect consumers as well as public
safety and law enforcement communities.
In my testimony, I will first provide a brief technical
background on caller ID spoofing. Then, I will describe the
Commission's rules addressing caller ID services and the steps
the Commission is taking to make sure that providers are fully
meeting their obligations under the Communications Act and the
Commission's rules and orders.
As a technical matter, caller ID spoofing happens by
manipulating the data elements that travel with a phone call.
Phone calls on the public switched telephone network, or PSTN,
are routed to their destinations by means of a specialized
protocol called the Signaling System 7, or SS7. SS7 conveys
information associated with a call such as the telephone number
of the caller. The SS7 information for a call is provided by
the carrier that the caller uses to place the call. Caller ID
then displays that caller's number to the called party. Caller
ID spoofing is accomplished by manipulating the SS7 information
associated with the call.
The Commission addressed caller ID on the PSTN in 1995 with
rule 64.1601, which generally requires all carriers using SS7
to transmit the calling party number associated with an
interstate call to interconnecting carriers. The same
Commission rule also requires telemarketers to transmit
accurate caller ID information.
The development of Internet and IP technologies has made
caller ID spoofing easier than it used to be. Now, entities
using IP technology can generate false calling party
information and pass it into the PSTN via SS7. Caller ID
spoofing can potentially threaten our public safety. For
example, spoofers can fabricate emergency calls and cause local
law enforcement and public safety agencies to deploy their
resources needlessly. Caller ID spoofing can potentially
threaten consumers. For example, spoofing can be used by the
unscrupulous to defraud consumers by making calls appear as if
they are from legitimate businesses or government offices.
The Commission's Enforcement Bureau (Bureau) has been
actively investigating the issue of caller ID spoofing since
the summer of 2005 when information regarding junk fax spoofing
came to our attention. To date, the Bureau has initiated
investigations of twelve companies engaged in the marketing and
selling of caller ID spoofing services to customers. One
investigation resulted in a citation against a telemarketer,
Intelligent Alternatives, for rule violations, including
violations of the caller ID rules under section 64.1601. We
have sent formal letters of inquiry to the other companies and,
at the same time, served most of them subpoenas to compel them
to respond to our inquiries. In some cases, we have issued
subsequent letters of inquiry to uncover additional evidence of
possible violations of the Communications Act.
Our inquiry letters seek information about the companies'
alleged spoofing methods, including detailed technical
explanations and the types of technology utilized, the identity
of other companies that assist in providing the spoofing
services, the purpose for the services and information about
subscribers, and whether the offered services can be used to
spoof emergency services information or otherwise affect those
critical first responders. We continue to seek relevant
information to assist us in fully understanding these issues
and whether violations of the Communications Act or our rules
have occurred, but our enforcement options may be limited as
some of these entities are not directly regulated by the
Commission.
At the same time, we have held meetings with numerous
industry representatives, including wireline, wireless, and
voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)-based companies, to
determine the impact of caller ID spoofing on their consumers
and networks. In addition, we have coordinately closely with
state agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and other
interested organizations, such as the National Emergency Number
Association, regarding their efforts to address and identify
solutions to this problem.
The Enforcement Bureau is committed to continuing to gather
and analyze information about these companies' practices, their
networks, their businesses, their customers, and other germane
information. In addition, as the Commission indicated to some
members of this Committee last year, the Commission may not
have sufficient authority to fully address this issue. Thus,
legislation that clarified the Commission's authority in this
area would be helpful.
In conclusion, the intentional manipulation of caller ID
information, especially for the purpose of fraud or deception,
is a troubling development in the telecommunications industry.
The Commission looks forward to working with this Committee,
and other Members of Congress, to ensure the public maintains
its confidence in the telecommunications industry. Thank you
for the opportunity to speak with you today.
----------
Statement of Staci L. Pies
Thank you, Chairman Markey, Vice Chair Doyle, Ranking
Member Upton, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Staci
Pies. I am Vice President, Governmental and
Regulatory Affairs of Point One, a VoIP provider, and
President of the Voice on The Net or VON Coalition--the voice
for the VoIP industry. On behalf of the VON Coalition, I thank
the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify about this
important issue. Misleading people through the misuse of caller
ID, whether for a prank, a scam, or worse, is unacceptable, and
we thank the Committee for its leadership in addressing the
issue. VoIP is burgeoning in popularity with consumers because
it can do so much more than Plain Old Telephone Service. VoIP
allows consumers to take control over their communications
experience, to manage how they use those services and to decide
when and where they want to receive calls. Lower costs, coupled
with a seemingly endless list of new possibilities are making
VoIP one of the hottest Internet and broadband technologies
today. Internet voice communications is changing the way we
communicate, stay connected to our friends, family and
colleagues, and how we live. Today's VoIP services aren't
simply a means to have a conversation; they're portals to a
world of information that enriches the communications
experience and adds new dimensions to the idea of
``conversation.''
Studies have shown that with the right policy framework and
continued advancement, VoIP driven competition has the
potential to save consumers more than $100 billion over the
next 5 years. Families are gaining unprecedented independence
as well as new flexibility and features not possible in
yesterday's telephone network. Features such as choosing your
area code, and the ability to use a VoIP service through any
broadband connection are just some of the ways that consumers
are benefiting. At the same time, connectivity, quality and
reliability have improved to equal if not surpass that of the
legacy phone network. For businesses, VoIP is lowering costs,
increasing mobility, enabling collaboration, integrating voice
and data in entirely new ways, boosting productivity by as much
as 15 percent, and giving companies a competitive advantage.
And the best is yet ahead. The next wave of VoIP driven
benefits promises to facilitate revolutionary improvements in
the way we communicate. Soon a voice component can be added to
any type of device, application or service that uses a
microprocessor or touches the Internet. Already, making a call
can be just a click away. Consumers can pay less, but get more.
Communication is no longer tethered to a specific device or
location. Workers can take their work phone home to spend more
time with loved ones. Our armed forces can video conference
with families back home--no longer having to choose between
serving their families or serving their country. Free
downloadable software keeps far-flung families connected, and
enables children to learn a foreign language and doctors the
latest medical procedures from experts around the globe. By
disconnecting voice from the underlying infrastructure, voice
innovation can now take place at Internet speed.
Many of the great benefits of VoIP to consumers and
business users depend on accurate and non-misleading
identification of the calling party. If I program my VoIP
service to ensure that calls from my son's school are
simultaneously rung on all of my phones, I don't want to answer
it and find out that some telemarketer has spoofed the number
to fool me into believing it is a priority call. And businesses
that use caller ID to call up a customer's account record so
that it is immediately available to the customer service
representative won't find the record very useful if it is the
wrong record because the caller ID has been spoofed. To protect
the usefulness of their services, VoIP providers have a strong
interest in having caller ID be accurate and nonmisleading.
The VON Coalition has been at the forefront of promoting
best practices to enable consumers to protect their personal
data. For instance, the Coalition moved early to adopt and post
consumer guidelines for protecting billing records. Since then,
businesses that control personal data, consumers, and the IP
industry have taken significant steps to self police fraudulent
access to personal data.
The VON Coalition agrees with previously presented
Congressional testimony that callerID fraud perpetrators must
be penalized. Strong action must be taken against those that
intentionally spoof caller ID with the intent to commit fraud,
deceive, harass or otherwise create threats to life and limb.
Law enforcement should have the tools to protect U.S. citizens
from criminals fraudulently manipulating phone numbers to
engage in identity theft to commit financial crimes. Similarly,
criminals that modify caller ID to commit other crimes, such as
harassing or stalking victims, should be prosecuted swiftly and
effectively. Spoofing to defraud or harass, or for unlawful
commercial gain cannot and should not ever be condoned or
tolerated.
Congress is right to focus its attention on those who would
do so. As Congress addresses deceptive spoofing, we urge you to
keep in mind that the ability to change caller ID information--
where the purpose is not to fraudulently mislead or deceive--
has the potential to offer consumers a transformative
communications experience. Policy makers
must carefully balance the goal of thwarting harmful
behavior with the public interest imperative to ensure that
innovation flourishes and applications and services delivered
over broadband are available to all Americans. The ability of
consumers to control various aspects of their communications
experience presents exciting opportunities for the disabled,
offers unsurpassed privacy protection, and enables businesses
and consumers to communicate in increasingly efficient and
powerful ways. The ``Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007'' as
written, effectively balances these two important objectives--
by facilitating prosecution of the fraud, while not thwarting
or prohibiting innovative tools that have legitimate consumer
empowering benefits. The bill recognizes, for example, that law
enforcement may need to mask the true identity of an
originating telephone number. This is not the only legitimate
need to change caller ID information. I'd like to share five
examples:
First, VoIP services offer tremendous potential
for persons with disabilities to communicate more effectively.
VoIP integrates the phone, voice mail, audio conferencing, e-
mail, instant messaging, and Web applications on one secure,
seamless network. Workers can use their PC, laptop, or handheld
as a VoIP phone from virtually anywhere, with the same phone
number, which benefits telecommuters, including those whose
mobility is impaired and must work from home. One recent Web-
based application permits users to call any phone number in the
US or Canada and the service reads to the called party the
message that the originating user inputs into the Web-based
form. Users of the application who are speech impaired can now
send voice messages simply by providing a phone number to dial
and their own caller ID. Similarly, blind users can now take
advantage of instant messaging services where previously they
would have been precluded from doing so because of sight
limitations. Importantly, the user can input her home, mobile,
or office phone number, regardless of where the user is located
(or where the call originates) when she sends the message,
something that would be prohibited by legislation that
criminalizes any change in caller ID without a reference to
intent.
Second, one of the benefits of VoIP is that it can
help a consumer better protect his own privacy and manage which
of his personal information he presents to the world,
irrespective of which communications device he utilizes to
initiate a call. Consumers may want to direct return calls to a
home or business landline, rather than a wireless number, for
example. Calls for different purposes (personal versus
business) may merit different telephonic return addresses, as
one might do with ordinary mail. For instance, Web sites that
allow consumers to post solicitations for lawful commercial
purposes may also permit consumers to provide a temporary call
back number that is different from their assigned caller ID.
This beneficial privacy service may require a legitimate change
in caller ID. One service explains the application in this way:
``The desire to communicate can not be crippled by concerns
about privacy. [This application] unleashes the true potential
of a global community by making it a safer place.'' While these
applications manipulate caller ID, they do so for privacy
protection and security. The VON Coalition does not sanction
masquerading as another for fraudulent or deceitful purposes.
Third, there are some situations in which caller
ID information can endanger individual safety. The classic
situation is the battered spouse. In some instances, blocking
the delivery of caller ID information might be sufficient.
However, because technological innovations permit users to
``unblock'' caller ID, any legislation, as well as law
enforcement authorities, should be careful about presuming that
blocking will always be adequate.
Fourth, certain new communication services do not
organically generate or transmit a traditional caller ID, but
in order to connect to the public telephone network, the
service may need to insert something that looks like a
traditional phone number. Many of these innovative services,
which offer tremendous new ways to communicate, do not utilize
the same numbering and labeling practices as yesterday's phone
services and should not be deemed illegitimate simply because
the technology permits the caller ID to be changed. Users
without traditional telephone numbers, users with several
numbers, users wanting to move numbers to their calling device
and network of choice--these users are all potentially affected
by technology that decouples devices from the caller ID that
effectively used to be the address of the phone, and such users
do not intend to defraud or cause harm. H.R. 251 appropriately
focuses on the right class of services.
A final, exciting application that I will share
with you today is the ability for consumers to make click to
dial calls while viewing broadband-based content such as IP-TV.
Utilizing such an application, a viewer can click a single
button on his standard TV remote control and pull up a menu
that offers a variety of products and services--ranging from
news, games, fantasy sports scores, traffic, shopping, and
entertainment, to billing applications. From there, the viewer
can locate a business of interest in the area and can then
click on a button that enables the viewer to speak to the local
business through a VoIP connection. Although the call
technically originates through the VoIP service provider, the
viewer can input his own caller ID for call-back purposes. Such
innovative and rich communications experiences should not be
eliminated through overly broad legislation or regulation.
I'd like to close with three additional thoughts. First,
spoofing of caller ID is not new. Tools have been widely
available for years to spoof caller ID on traditional networks.
One method, sometimes referred to as Orangeboxing, offers the
ability to spoof caller ID using a downloadable sound and a
common tape recorder. Moreover, many large businesses operating
a PBX system have, for quite some time, ``spoofed'' caller ID
so that it appears as if all calls originating on the PBX come
from the same central number. Second, fighting fraudulent and
deceptive changes in caller ID is only part of the solution.
Companies handling sensitive customer information must also
make sure they are handling that information with care. While
caller ID can help a business retrieve a customer's account
record, as long as caller ID can technically be spoofed (which
will be the case even with new legislation) the business needs
to handle disclosure of those records with the utmost care--
making consumer privacy their top priority. One security expert
explained the technology is not to blame for the fraudulent
use. Society is. Society has grown far too reliant on caller ID
as a form of identification. Both individuals and corporate
America use caller ID to decide whom to trust. Unfortunately,
too many individuals have suffered because of this misplaced
trust. As Chairman Dingell and Ranking Member Barton recognized
in introducing ``The Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone
Records Act'' to prohibit pretexting of phone records and to
enhance security requirements for customer proprietary network
information, it is incumbent upon companies that are entrusted
with personal information to do more to protect the privacy and
security of their customers.
Third, misleading people through the misuse of caller ID,
whether for a prank, a scam, or worse, is unacceptable. This
committee is right to focus on those who intend to mislead. At
the same time, though, legislation should not impose liability
on traditional carriers and VoIP services providers who merely
transmit what may turn out to be fraudulently altered caller ID
information. Policy makers should not be mislead into believing
that technology innovators are to blame for criminal behavior.
Networks and network service providers may be unable and should
not be required to become ``content police'' or to discern
legitimate and illegitimate uses of network services. Instead,
service providers are best able to assist in the efforts to
fight spoofing by keeping accurate records and making those
records available, as appropriate, to proper authorities.
In focusing on those few people who would abuse caller ID
technology, Congress can address the very real problem of
deceptive spoofing effectively, in a cost-efficient manner that
protects the proper use of this technology, and enables
competitive and transformative innovation. VoIP service
providers, who have made real strides in leveraging the power
of the Internet and caller ID to provide robust services to
consumers, fully support measures to protect the integrity of
caller ID functionality. Together with this Committee's
efforts, the proliferation of VoIP services will create
unsurpassed opportunities for consumers and even greater growth
in broadband services. The VON Coalition believes that VoIP is
positioned to help make communicating more affordable,
businesses more productive, jobs more plentiful, the Internet
more valuable, and Americans more safe and secure.
Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions.