

**COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM: BECOM-
ING AMERICANS—U.S. IMMIGRANT INTEGRA-
TION**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,
CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

MAY 16, 2007

OPENING STATEMENT

	Page
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law	1
The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law	4
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary	6

WITNESSES

Mr. Gary Gerstle, Ph.D., Professor of History, Vanderbilt University	
Oral Testimony	9
Prepared Statement	12
Mr. Rubén G. Rumbaut, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of California, Irvine	
Oral Testimony	21
Prepared Statement	23
Mr. Donald Kerwin, Executive Director, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.	
Oral Testimony	50
Prepared Statement	51
Mr. John Fonte, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute	
Oral Testimony	55
Prepared Statement	57

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law	3
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary	7
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law	7

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Letter from a Majority of the Minority Members of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law requesting a Minority day of hearing to the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law	86
--	----

IV

	Page
Letter from Gary Gerstle, Ph.D., Professor of History, Vanderbilt University to the Honorable Steve King, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law	87
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Gary Gerstle, Ph.D., Professor of History, Vanderbilt University	90
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Rubén G. Rumbaut, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of California, Irvine	94
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Donald Kerwin, Executive Director, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.	108
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from John Fonte, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute	111

COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM: BE- COMING AMERICANS—U.S. IMMIGRANT IN- TEGRATION

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Zoe Lofgren (Chairwoman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Lofgren, Gutierrez, Berman, Jackson Lee, Waters, Sánchez, Ellison, Conyers, King, Goodlatte, and Gohmert.

Staff present: Ur Mendoza Jaddou, Najority Chief Counsel; J. Traci Hong, Majority Counsel; George Fishman, Minority Counsel; and Benjamin Staub, Professional Staff Member.

Ms. LOFGREN. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law will come to order.

I would like to welcome the Immigration Subcommittee Members, our witnesses, and members of the public who are here today for the Subcommittee's ninth hearing on comprehensive immigration reform.

We started our series of hearings at Ellis Island, where we examined the need for comprehensive immigration reform to secure our borders, to address economic and demographic concerns, and we reviewed our Nation's rich immigrant history.

We studied immigration reform from 1986 and 1996 in an effort to avoid the mistakes of the past. We have considered the problems with and proposed solutions for our current employment and work site verification systems.

In light of recent proposals by the White House to eliminate family priorities in immigration and replace it with a completely new and untested point system, we studied the contributions of family immigrants to America and various immigration point systems used around the world.

The genius of America has always been our strength as a society. People from all over the world come to America to become Americans with us.

When a new citizen raises her hand to become an American at her citizenship ceremony, she pledges her future to America. She

promises to defend our country and our Constitution. And she immediately inherits a grand history of her new country from George Washington to today.

Today, some fear that America has lost this exceptional status, and some contend that, unlike immigrants from other generations, immigrants today are not assimilating fast enough or at all.

One clear and objective sign of assimilation is the process by which immigrants master the English language. The census and various academic studies and research show that immigrants and their descendants are learning English at a rate comparable to the past waves of immigrants.

According to the 2005 American Community Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, 82 percent of immigrants 24 and older report that they speak English well or very well. Younger immigrants fare even better. Ninety-five percent of immigrants from 18 to 23 report speaking English well or very well. By the third generation, most grandchildren of immigrants can, in fact, speak only English, even in heavily Spanish-speaking areas of the country such as Southern California.

Our first witness, Professor Gerstle, explains that the Southern and Eastern Europeans who immigrated to the United States a century ago and are now held up as model immigrants were once depicted much as immigrants of today: unable and unwilling to assimilate. Yet, the professor explains, these European immigrants did well in joining American society.

He finds that these so-called new immigrants of then successfully integrated into the United States, despite such hostility, because of three factors: the ability of immigrants to participate in American democracy, the natural transition from immigrants to their children, with the ability of immigrants to achieve economic security.

He states that the, "ability of immigrants to participate in politics and to feel as though their votes made a difference was crucial to their engagement with and integration into America."

He also notes that an, "immigrant population that finds itself unable to move out of poverty or to gain the confidence that it can provide a decent life for their children is far more likely to descend into alienation than to embrace America."

What we can learn from this historical account is that including immigrants in mainstream American society and the economy is the quickest way to assimilation and integration.

If creating new Americans is the goal of our immigration policy, then we should ensure that comprehensive immigration reform reflects that objective.

Purely temporary worker programs with little opportunity for those who contribute to our economy to become full members of the country that they have helped to build run contrary to the goal of Americanism and assimilation, because such programs relegate people to a life in a permanent underclass.

Furthermore, under purely temporary worker programs, there is little incentive and little time to learn English if, after 2 years or 3 years of full-time work in the U.S., the only choice is returning home to a non-English-speaking country.

As we develop comprehensive immigration reform, we must not forget that mandating and facilitating the process for immigrants

to learn English is important but not sufficient in achieving the goal of assimilation and allowing new immigrants to become Americans.

The opportunity to become fully participating members of our polity, our civic society, and our economy is a key to, as Professor Gerstle so pointedly discusses in his written testimony, allowing new immigrants to become our new Americans.

I would now recognize the Ranking Member for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

I would like to welcome the Immigration Subcommittee Members, our witnesses, and members of the public to the Subcommittee's tenth hearing on comprehensive immigration reform.

We started our series of hearings at Ellis Island where we examined the need for comprehensive immigration reform to secure our borders, to address economic and demographic concerns, and we reviewed our nation's rich immigrant history. We have studied immigration reform from 1986 and 1996 in an effort to avoid the mistakes of the past. We've considered the problems with and proposed solutions for our current employment and worksite verification system. In light of recent proposals by the White House to eliminate family priorities in immigration and replace it with a completely new and untested point system, we studied the contributions of family immigrants to America and various immigration point systems used around the world.

Today we turn our attention to the integration of immigrants in our society. Some contend that unlike immigrants from other generations, immigrants today are not assimilating fast enough.

One clear and objective sign of assimilation is the process by which immigrants master the English language. The Census and various academic studies and research show that immigrants and their descendants are learning English at a rate comparable to past waves of immigrants. According to the 2005 American Community Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, 82% of immigrants 24 and older report that they speak English well or very well. Younger immigrants fare even better. 95% of immigrants from 18 to 23 report speaking English well or very well. By the third generation, most grandchildren of immigrants can in fact speak only English, even in heavily Spanish-speaking areas of the country, such as Southern California.

More importantly, our first witness, Professor Gerstle, explains that the southern and eastern Europeans who immigrated to the United States a century ago and are now held up as model immigrants, were once depicted much as immigrants of today—unable and unwilling to assimilate.

Yet, Professor Gerstle explains, these European immigrants did well in joining American society. He finds that these “new immigrants” successfully integrated into the United States despite such hostility because of three factors: 1) the ability of immigrants to participate in American Democracy, 2) natural transition from immigrants to their children; and 3) ability of immigrants to achieve economic security. He states that “[t]he ability of immigrants to participate in politics and to feel as though their votes made a difference was crucial to their engagement with and integration into America.” He also notes that “[a]n immigrant population that finds itself unable to move out of poverty or to gain the confidence that it can provide a decent life for their children is far more likely to descend into alienation than to embrace America.”

What we can learn from this historical account is that including immigrants in mainstream American society and the economy is the quickest way to assimilation and integration.

If assimilation is a goal of our immigration policy, then we should ensure that comprehensive immigration reform reflects that objective. Purely temporary worker programs with little opportunity for those who contribute to our economy to become full members of the country that they've helped to build run contrary to the goal of assimilation, because such programs relegate people to a life in a permanent underclass. Furthermore, under purely temporary worker programs, there is little

incentive and little time to learn English if, after two or three years of full-time work in the U.S., the only choice is returning home to a non-English-speaking country.

As we develop comprehensive immigration reform with an eye towards assimilation, we must not forget that mandating and facilitating the process for immigrants to learn English is important, but it is certainly not sufficient to accomplish assimilation. It is the opportunity to become fully participating members of our polity and our economy that is the key to successful immigrant assimilation, as Professor Gerstle so poignantly discusses in his written testimony.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Madam Chair.

As I expressed to the witnesses this morning, I appreciate you being here and committing your time to the knowledge base of this Congress, this panel, and the American people.

However, nothing in these hearings will replace hearings on national legislation when we can actually examine the language and have input on the impact of that language on the American life with that policy that might come from specific language.

But facing us on the back wall of this hearing room, we are looking at our national seal. And on the seal is our Nation's motto, "E Pluribus Unum." And that means, of course, out of many, one.

This motto was proposed by a Committee appointed by Congress on July 4, 1776. And on that Committee were John Adams, Ben Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson.

Lest there be any doubt about what meaning was intended by our founders in choosing that phrase, "E Pluribus Unum," I point out that the design they proposed for the seal was not the eagle originally as you see today, but rather a shield containing the six symbols for "the countries from which these states have been peopled."

The patriotic assimilation of new immigrants has been a primary objective of our immigration policy since our Nation's birth.

Washington recommended that assimilation into the mainstream of American life and values be encouraged so that immigrants and native-born Americans would soon become one people.

Only within the last generation or so have the terms assimilation and Americanization given way to cultural pluralism and multiculturalism.

The title of this hearing uses the word "integration," a term that is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as the bringing of people of different racial or ethnic groups into an unrestricted and equal association as in a society or organization or, alternatively, mostly we understand it to mean desegregation.

That term, however, does not capture the spirit of Americans. In a public speech after the publication of the 1995 report by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Barbara Jordan declared that the term Americanization earned a bad reputation when it was stolen by racists and xenophobes in the 1920's. But it is our word, and we are taking it back, according to Barbara Jordan.

She explained, "When using the term Americanization, the commission means the cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity, something that is possible regardless of the nationality or religious background of immigrants and their children. We view Americanization positively as the inclusion of all who wish to embrace the civic culture which holds our Nation together."

I agree with her on this policy. We need to refocus our priorities on helping those who are here legally now and help them embrace our new country by emphasizing the rapid learning of our common language of English by instilling core American values, the deals of our constitutional republic and by ensuring that immigrants' loyalty to America and not to the country from which they came is achieved.

There are tens of thousands of people who have marched in the streets of America under thousands of flags of foreign countries, chanting for another nation—this doesn't give me confidence that we have established the Americanization or the assimilation that we need to hold this country together under one cultural foundation.

Teddy Roosevelt spoke to it powerfully in a number of his writings and statements.

But I would skip forward and say that, on a different subject, the minority requested a hearing for last week because we were denied the opportunity to present a witness of our choice from the previous week.

What transpired was the use of the hearing process to demean the efforts of Mr. Willard Fair, one of our volunteer witnesses as well. He is the President and CEO of Urban League of Greater Miami, and he has worked for 40 years to help the lives of African-Americans and increase their employment.

He was not allowed to answer or respond to the questions that were peppered at him, and I believe that we need to treat you all with that level of respect and deference. And I insist that we do so.

But when I asked for unanimous consent for Mr. Fair to respond to those questions, there was an objection, and that is something that I hope does not happen again with any of the witnesses. I want to hear it from you myself.

And so with that, I would say also that there was a rebuttal to the Rector study, and I hope that we can have a panel here to allow Mr. Rector to be able to face his accusers. I read the rebuttal. I didn't find any facts in that rebuttal.

But what I do have here is a request for a minority hearing, Madam Chair, and I would ask unanimous consent that the letter be introduced into the record, and hopefully we can move forward with the proper edification of this panel and the people of this country as they observe our process here.

This is a very pivotal issue that is before us in this Congress. There is no putting the toothpaste back in the tube. We had better get it right. We can learn from history. We can learn from facts.

And as the Chair stated last week, we are entitled to our own opinions. We are not entitled to our own facts. The facts are in the Rector study. They do not include national interest or national defense in his conclusions. They are only there so that you can draw your own calculation if you choose, but not in Rector's conclusions.

I look forward to hearing from him, and I hope that we can have that kind of a hearing in the future.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I would yield back.

Ms. LOFGREN. Without objection, the letter will be made a part of the record and dealt with according to the rules.

[The letter referred to is inserted in the Appendix.]

Ms. LOFGREN. I would now recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. John Conyers, for his statement.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, and good morning, Madam Chairperson and Members of the Committee and our very important witnesses here.

This, to me—and I congratulate you, Ms. Lofgren—is a philosophical inquiry that we are making today. Are new immigrant groups any different from old immigrant groups? That is a great subject to kick around on a Wednesday morning.

And I am so happy to hear that the Ranking Subcommittee Member, Steve King, tell me that we need to refocus our energies on those who are doing their best to make it here, because that means he has come a little distance from an assertion that I remember him making that we have gotten so messed up in the immigration issue that even legal immigration is unworkable. And I am happy to know that that is a direction that he is moving in.

Now, are the new wave of immigrants different from the ones that came from Germany in 1751, or Ireland in 1856, or from China in 1882, or from Italy in 1896, or from Mexico in 1956, and now, of course, the Latino groups from Latin America?

And what I am thinking is that this discussion becomes critical to our understanding of what our job is about: reform, major reform, of the immigration law, because it is very easy to get caught in a time warp.

That is to say what we are looking at now—and some might say, “This is different, Conyers, don’t you get it? This isn’t the 18th century or the 19th century or the 20th century. This is different. And if you don’t understand that, we are not going to be able to get anywhere.”

And so this discussion amongst us and with our witnesses becomes important because it attempts to pull another layer off the onion that gets us to the importance of what it is we are going to do legislatively.

We have been given another week by the Senate. I think that is critical. I was very nervous when I came in to ask what finally happened late last night.

But it just occurred to me that the first person killed in Iraq was Lance Corporal Jose Antonio Gutierrez, an illegal immigrant, if you please, who was undocumented. Our country gave him a chance, a home, a career in the military, and he was just one of millions who have embraced America’s promise of freedom and opportunity.

And so, yes, I say, time and time again, we have worried about whether some people can assimilate satisfactorily into this so-called American melting pot. And time and time again, these fears have proven to be completely unfounded.

So I look forward to all of the witnesses, including the minority’s witness as well, to join us in this discussion this morning. And I thank you for this opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY

At an earlier hearing before this Subcommittee, one of the witnesses remarked that while America is a nation of immigrants, it is also a nation that loves to discuss immigration policy.

Time and time again, Americans have fretted about whether the next new group of immigrants would ever assimilate into American society and American values—the so-called American Melting Pot. But, time and time again, these fears have been proven to be completely unfounded.

In the current debate on immigration, for example, conservative commentator Selwyn Duke just yesterday inveighed against any immigration (legal or not). He warned, “[R]eplace our population with a Mexican or Moslem one and you no longer have a western civilization, you no longer have America. You have Mexico North or Iran West.”

As we have heard in other hearings before this Subcommittee, however, nothing can be further from the truth. Immigrants create jobs, fill niches in our economy, and display American values of family and patriotism. We find immigrants and their children in all aspects of American life, at church, in 4-H clubs or girl scouts, and in college. These contributions should be praised, not denigrated.

I would point out that the first American killed in Iraq, Lance Corporal Jose Antonio Gutierrez, was an immigrant. Corporal Gutierrez first arrived in the United States as an undocumented immigrant. America gave him a chance—a home, a career in the military, and something in which to believe. Corporal Gutierrez was one of the millions of immigrants who have embraced America’s promise of freedom and opportunity.

So too did immigrants and children of immigrants in the Asian and Hispanic communities served with distinction in World War II and other conflicts. Nevertheless, they have had to constantly fight for recognition of their sacrifice. The Hispanic Caucus has worked to draw our attention to this issue, and I join them in lauding the contributions of immigrant servicemembers to this country.

And if immigrants to our nation retain their heritage and bring it into the American experience, so much the better for our national culture.

We owe it to Corporal Gutierrez, and to all of those who will come after him, to devise an immigration system that is *controlled*, *orderly*, and *fair*. Just imagine all of the great things they will do for America.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.

Noting that we have witnesses to hear from, without objection, all Members of the Committee are invited to submit their statements for the record.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Today we continue these series of hearings dealing with comprehensive immigration reform. This subcommittee previously dealt with the shortfalls of the 1986 and 1996 immigration reforms, the difficulties employers face with employment verification and ways to improve the employment verification system. On Tuesday May 1, 2007 we explored the point system that the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand utilize, and on May 3, 2007 the focus of the discussion was on the U.S. economy, U.S. workers and immigration reform. Last week we took a look at another controversial aspect of the immigration debate, family based immigration. Today we continue the vital task of eliminating the myths and seeking the truth. Today’s hearing deals with probably the most crucial aspect underlying the immigration debate, an immigrant’s ability to integrate, and assimilate into American society.

Let me start by quoting my predecessor the late great Barbara Jordan: “We are a nation of immigrants, dedicated to the rule of law. That is our history—and it is our challenge to ourselves. It is literally a matter of who we are as a nation and who we become as a people.”

Allow me to talk about our nation’s history. I find that quote particularly interesting in light of the recent celebration of the 400 year anniversary of the settlement of Jamestown. Yes we are talking about a different time period, but imagine if that first group of individuals was met with the hostility and disregard for de-

gency that today's immigrant population faces. Imagine if these folks were demonized, and disparaged by a wide network of Native Americans, in the same manner that we demonize the current documented and undocumented population.

It was not to long ago that we held a field hearing underneath the shadow of the Statue of Liberty at Ellis Island. I remind my colleagues of the famous inscription on that monument of freedom, hope, and inspiration that many immigrants saw as they pulled into Ellis Island full of hopes and dreams, "*Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I left my lamp beside the golden door.*" Now we want to close this door because of the lies and the hysteria created by a few in the Nativist and Restrictionist camps.

There is an old saying, if you do not learn your history you are doomed to repeat it. There was a time when our nation had the same reservations about Italian and Irish immigrants that came to this country at the start of the 20th century. Fast forward to 2007 and one of the leading candidates for the Republican nomination for President, Rudy Guliani is the descendant of Italian immigrants, and Bill O'Reily an individual well respected by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle is the descendant of Irish immigrants, and no one would argue that they have had any problems assimilating into our society. In fact they represent the natural progression to full fledged Americans that occurs when the children of immigrants have kids and their kids have kids. I look down the aisle and I see Rep. Luis Gutierrez, Member of Congress and the child of immigrants. I look behind me and I have a staffer Ted Hutchinson, an attorney and the child of immigrants. Therefore it should be quite evident that immigrants have a long successful history of assimilation and achievement in this nation.

Let me take a moment to describe how my immigration legislation, H.R. 750, the "Save America Comprehensive Immigration Reform" addresses this issue of integration and assimilation. Save mandates that immigrants earn their legalization by 1) successfully completing a course on reading, writing, and speaking ordinary English words, and 2) showing that he has accepted the values and cultural life of the United States. Save also requires the completion of 40 community service hours. For children Save requires that school age kids are successfully pursuing an education. These are the values that make are nation great education, community service, and the acceptance of our system of democracy. With these requirements we can all be ensured that those who seek a better opportunity here in the United States will embrace this country as their own.

Likewise embracing the ideals and value systems of the United States is something that all immigrants have exemplified from Ellis Island to the sandy beaches of Key West, Florida. Are we no longer the melting pot? When the pilgrims came they did not leave their culture behind so you can not expect any group of immigrants, Latino, European, or African to leave their culture behind either. This mixture of cultures is what defines cities like New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and Chicago, and makes this nation wonderful. However no groups of immigrants come to this country as a collective whole with the purpose of disregarding the value system that they seek to be a part of. That does not make any sense, that is not true, and it is simply un-American.

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the hearing at any time.

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses here today to help us consider the important issues before us.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to Dr. Gary Gerstle, a Professor of History at Vanderbilt University. Dr. Gerstle's research has focused on the nexus between immigration, race, and nationhood. His co-authored college textbook, *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, will soon enter its fifth edition. He comes to Vanderbilt after teaching at the University of Maryland, the University of Pennsylvania, and the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris. In addition to his teaching and research responsibilities, he serves on the editorial board of the *Journal of American History*. He earned his doctorate degree in history from Harvard University.

We will next hear from Dr. Rubén G. Rumbaut, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, my home State, at Irvine. A

native of Havana, Cuba, Dr. Rumbaut has conducted world-renowned research on immigration, including his current work on the landmark Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, which began in 1991, and the large-scale study of immigration and intergenerational mobility in metropolitan Los Angeles. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, my alma mater, and the founding chair of the Section on International Migration of the American Sociological Association, and a member of the Committee on Population in the National Academy of Sciences. He received his bachelor's degree from Washington University in St. Louis, a master's degree from San Diego State University, and a master's and doctoral degree from Brandeis University.

I am pleased to next welcome Donald Kerwin, the executive director of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network Inc, or CLINIC, since 1993. CLINIC, a public interest legal corporation and a subsidiary of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supports a national network of 161 charitable legal programs for immigrants, from more than 260 locations across the Nation. Prior to his work at CLINIC, Mr. Kerwin practiced law as an associate with the Washington law firm of Patton Boggs. He serves as an advisor to the conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on Migration, a member of the American Bar Association's Commission on Immigration, and a fellow at the Migration Policy Institute. He earned his bachelor's degree from Georgetown University and his law degree from the University of Michigan Law School.

Finally, we are pleased to welcome the minority's witness, Dr. John Fonte, the Director of the Center for American Common Culture and Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute here in Washington. In addition to his work at the Hudson Institute, Dr. Fonte has worked as a senior researcher at the U.S. Department of Education and a program administrator at the National Endowment for the Humanities. He holds a bachelor's and master's degree from the University of Arizona and his Ph.D. in world history from the University of Chicago.

Each of you has written statements, which I have read with great interest, and they will all be made part of the record in their entirety. I would ask that each of you summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less, and to stay within that time you can see there is a little machine on the desk.

When the light turns yellow, it means that you have 1 minute. And when it turns red—this always surprises witnesses because the time flies—it means that 5 minutes are actually up, and we would ask that you summarize your last sentence so that we can hear from all the witnesses and then also get to questions.

So if we would begin, Dr. Gerstle?

**TESTIMONY OF GARY GERSTLE, Ph.D., PROFESSOR OF
HISTORY, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY**

Mr. GERSTLE. I wish to thank you for the invitation to appear before your Committee today.

Since its founding, the United States has arguably integrated more immigrants, both in absolute and relative terms, than any other nation.

In the years between the 1820's and 1920's, an estimated 35 million immigrants came to the United States. Approximately 40 million to 50 million more came between the 1920's and the 2000's, with most of those coming after 1965.

The immigrants who came in the first wave are thought to have been enormously successful in integrating themselves into American society.

We are here today because many Americans doubt the ability or willingness of the immigrants of the second wave, especially those who have come since 1965, to replicate the success of that earlier wave.

I am here to offer you the benefit of my historical knowledge regarding these earlier immigrants and to draw conclusions about what their experience means for today's immigrants.

My main points are as follows. First, that the integration process of earlier immigrants, especially the 20-plus million who came from Eastern and Southern Europe in the years from 1880 to 1920, has been mythologized as quick, easy, and unproblematic.

In fact, these immigrants were widely regarded then as many immigrants are regarded today, as radically different in culture and values from Americans and as lacking the desire and ability to integrate themselves into American society.

Their integration would ultimately be an outstanding success, but it took about 50 years. It required a generational transition in these immigrant communities, and engagement on the part of these immigrants with American democracy, and an opportunity for them to achieve economic security for themselves and their families.

My second point: are there too many immigrants present in American society today even to contemplate a successful campaign to integrate them all? My answer to that is no. Immigrant density was greater 100 years ago than it is today.

Twenty-four million came into a society in 1900 that numbered only 76 million people. To match that immigrant density today, we would have to admit four times as many immigrants a year and sustain that for a decade.¹

Third point: there is greater diversity culturally and economically among today's immigrants than those who came 100 years ago.

However, for the majority of today's immigrants who are poor and non-White, the distance of their values and cultural traditions from mainstream America is no greater than what separated native-born Americans and immigrants 100 years ago.

That we integrated the last wave should give us confidence that we can integrate this wave, too.

Fourth point: that confidence must be grounded in a realistic and robust sense of what successful immigrant incorporation requires.

Immigrant incorporation requires two generations in time and a generational transition within immigrant families and communities

¹In a May 22, 2007, letter to the Honorable Steve King, Gary Gerstle revised his prediction for how many immigrants would have to be admitted a year for the next decade in order for the immigrant density of the early 21st century to match the immigrant density of the early 20th century. Gerstle said the correct number is one million. The rationale for the revision was presented in substantial detail in the letter of May 22, 2007, a copy of which was filed with the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman.

during that time so that the power of the first generation recedes and the power of the second generation comes to the fore.

Successful immigrant integration also requires immigrant engagement with American democracy, becoming citizens and active participants in American politics. And it also requires the achievement of economic security.

The institutions that were once so important in the early 20th century in bringing immigrants into politics and aiding their quest for economic security—political parties and the labor movement—are no longer as well positioned to continue performing that role.

Either these institutions must find ways to broaden their involvement with immigrants, or other institutions such as the Catholic Church must step forward to take their place.

Fifth point, and my final point, engaging immigrants in American democracy and broadening the access of the immigrant poor to economic opportunity and security will, in the short term, yield as much contention as it will yield comity.

But if done right, it will work to bind together the foreign-born and immigrant-born into one American Nation and demonstrate yet again the remarkable ability of America to take in people from very different parts of the world, to make them into Americans, and in the process to reinvigorate the power of American ideals and the promise of American life for all who have had the good fortune to make themselves a home on U.S. soil.

We should try to make this happen again. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY GERSTLE

Testimony of Gary Gerstle
James Stahlman Professor of History
Department of History
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, Tennessee

Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law

Hearing on Congressional Immigration Reform:
Becoming Americans—U.S. Immigrant Integration
May 16, 2007

Dear Madame Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I wish to thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee today and to discuss with you matters pertaining to immigrant integration, past and present.

Since its founding, the United States has arguably integrated more immigrants, both in absolute and relative terms, than any other nation. In the years between the 1820s and 1920s, an estimated 35 million immigrants came to the United States. Approximately 40 to 50 million more came between the 1920s and 2010s, with most of those coming after 1965. The successful integration of immigrants and their descendants has been one of the defining features of American society, and, in my view, one of this country's greatest accomplishments. Can we find descendants of the immigrants who came in such large numbers one hundred years ago who today do not regard themselves as Americans? We can probably identify a few, but not many. Even those groups once known for their resistance to Americanization—Italians, for example—today count themselves and are considered by others as being among the America's most ardent patriots. Throughout the nation's history, moreover, newer Americans and their descendants have contributed a dynamic quality to our society through their Americanization. As President Woodrow Wilson proudly told a group of immigrants in 1915: America was "the only country in the world that experiences a constant and repeated rebirth," and the credit went entirely to the "great bodies of strong men and forward-looking women out of other lands" who decided to cast their lot with America.¹

In my testimony today, I have four aims: first, to acquaint you with the so-called "new immigrants" who came by the millions to the United States one hundred years ago and who were widely regarded as lacking the desire and ability to integrate themselves into American society; second, to discuss with you how these immigrants and their children confounded their critics by

¹ Woodrow Wilson, "Too Proud to Fight," Address to Several Thousand Foreign-Born Citizens, After Naturalization Ceremonies, Philadelphia, May 10, 1915, *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Authorized Edition, The New Democracy: Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Other Papers (1913-1917)*, Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, ed., 2 volumes (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1926), Vol. I, pp. 318-322.

becoming deeply and proudly American; third, to lay out for you what I think a successful process of immigrant integration requires; and fourth, to suggest to you ways this earlier experience of successful integration can guide an exploration of the prospects of integrating immigrants who are living in America today.

My most important point is twofold. First, that the United States has been enormously successful in making Americans out of immigrants, even among immigrant populations who were thought to have cultures and values radically different from America's own. Second, immigrant integration does not happen overnight. Typically it takes two generations and requires both engagement on the part of immigrants with American democracy and an opportunity for them to achieve economic security for themselves and their families. If we approach questions of immigration today with a realistic and robust sense for what a successful process of immigrant incorporation requires, we have reason to be optimistic that America will once again demonstrate its remarkable ability to absorb and integrate foreign-born millions.

I. The "New Immigrants" of One Hundred Years Ago

An estimated 24 million immigrants came to the United States between the 1880s and the 1920s. They entered a society that numbered only 76 million people in 1900. A large majority of these new immigrants came from Europe, and they came mostly from impoverished and rural areas of eastern and southern Europe: from Italy, Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Greece, and other proximate nations or parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Few of these immigrants were Protestant, then the dominant religion of the United States; most were Catholic, Christian Orthodox, or Jewish. The integration process of these turn-of-the-century immigrants, however, was not quick and it was not easy. Indeed, the label applied to these immigrants—"the new immigrants"—was meant to compare them unfavorably to the "old immigrants" who had come prior to 1880 from the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia and who were then thought to have been the model immigrants: industrious, freedom-loving, English-speaking, and ardently patriotic. If I could parachute you, the members of this Subcommittee into American society in a year when the "new immigration" was at its height—in 1910, for example, or 1920—you would encounter a pessimism about the possibilities of integrating these immigrants more intense than what exists in American society today. That the outcome was so positive and so at variance with the pessimistic expectations of 1910 or 1920 should caution us against giving ourselves over to pessimism today.

In the early years of the twentieth century, a majority of Americans were Protestants who cared deeply about the Protestant character of their society. Protestantism, in their eyes, had given America its mission, its democracy, its high regard for individual rights, and its moral character. These Americans worried that the largely Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish immigrants who dominated the ranks of the "new immigrants" would subvert cherished American ideals, and that the great American republic would decline or even come to an end.

America, at the time, was also a deeply racist society. Black-white segregation was at its height. Chinese immigrants had been largely barred from coming to the United States in 1882 and Japanese immigrants were largely barred in 1907. A naturalization law stipulated that only those immigrants who were free and white were eligible for citizenship, a law that effectively

prohibited almost all East and South Asians immigrants from becoming citizens between 1870 and 1952. For a twenty year period in the early twentieth century, the U.S. government attempted to rule that several peoples from the Middle East and West Asia, including Arabs and Armenians, were nonwhite and thus also ineligible for U.S. citizenship. In 1924, Congress stopped most eastern and southern Europeans from coming to the United States because these peoples were also now thought to be racially inferior and thus incapable of assimilating American civilization and democracy. This is how a member of Congress (Fred S. Purnell of Indiana, R) described eastern and southern European immigrants in 1924: “There is little or no similarity between the clear-thinking, self-governing stocks that sired the American people and this stream of irresponsible and broken wreckage that is pouring into the lifeblood of America the social and political diseases of the Old World.” Purnell quoted approvingly the words of a Dr. Ward, who claimed that Americans had deceived themselves into believing that “we could change inferior beings into superior ones.” Americans could not escape the laws of heredity, Ward argued. “We cannot make a heavy horse into a trotter by keeping him in racing stable. We can not make a well bred dog out of mongrel by teaching him tricks.” The acts that Ward dismissed as “tricks” including the learning by immigrants of the Gettysburg Address and the Declaration of Independence.²

Given these attitudes, it is not surprising that many immigrants felt unwelcome in the United States. Nevertheless, America was then what it is today: a society for the enterprising, for those who wanted to raise themselves up in the world. Many immigrants perceived America as a land in which they could improve their economic circumstances. They worked endless hours to make that happen. But would America become for them more than a place to work? Would it become their home, a place where they would feel comfortable, where they would raise their families, where they could come to consider themselves—and be considered by others as—Americans? Many immigrants doubted that this would ever be the case. Many intended to make some money in the United States and return home. In the early years of the 20th century, it is estimated that the repatriation rates (those who chose to return home) among Italian immigrants ran as high as 40 to 50 percent. Among immigrants from the Balkans in the years prior to the First World War, it is estimated that as many 80 percent returned home. Those who did not or could not return to their original lands often sent remittances to their families in Europe. For many of these immigrants, becoming U.S. citizens and learning English were goals that were secondary to the primary challenge of earning a living and raising the standard of one’s family, either in the United States or one’s home country. Yet these immigrants and their children did become integrated into America and deeply committed to America. How and when did this integration happen?

II. Integrating the “New Immigrants”

Three factors are particularly important for understanding the integration of the “new immigrants”: learning to practice American democracy; the transition in immigrant communities from the first to second generation; and the achievement of economic security.

Practicing American Democracy: As anti-immigrant sentiment grew in America across the early decades of the 20th century, immigrants who had been reluctant to enter American politics

² Congressional Record, March 17, 1924, p. 4389.

now believed that they had no alternative but to become so involved, if only to protect their most basic interests. In the 1920s, they began to naturalize and then to vote in large numbers. Immigrants wanted to elect representatives who supported their freedom to enter the United States, to pursue a trade or occupation of their choice, to school their children and raise their families in ways that corresponded to their cultural traditions and religious beliefs. They also wanted the government to end discrimination against immigrants in employment, housing, and education. Immigrants lost some major elections, as in 1928, when Herbert Hoover (R) defeated the pro-immigrant candidate, Al Smith (D), but they also scored some major victories, as when Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) won a landslide re-election in 1936 with the help of millions of new voters, many of them immigrant, casting their ballots for the first time. These immigrant voters believed that FDR was opening up American politics to immigrant participation in ways that few previous presidents had done. In response to this opening, these new immigrants and their children became an important part of the Democratic Party voting majority that would keep Democrats in the White House and in control of Congress for a majority of years between the mid-1930s and late 1960s.

Political parties were important in brokering the entrance of immigrants into American politics. The Democratic Party in particular played a pivotal role not just in registering immigrants to vote but in teaching them the practical arts of American politics—running for office, building constituencies, raising money for campaigns, getting out the vote, writing legislation and building coalitions. The “political boss” and “political machines” were central institutions in many American cities of the time, and both played important roles in bringing immigrants into politics. Although the national Republican Party was not as important as the Democratic Party in assisting immigrants, particular state and local Republican parties often were important players in this brokerage process.

The ability of immigrants to participate in politics and to feel as though their votes made a difference was crucial to their engagement with and integration into America. In the 1920s and 1930s, immigrants began to assert their Americanness and their right to participate in debates about America’s best interests. In the short term, this generated more political conflict than political consensus, as immigrant Americans often disagreed sharply with the native-born about what course to chart for America’s future, and whether (and how) to open up American workplaces, occupations, universities, and neighborhoods to the full participation of immigrants. But there can be no doubt that immigrant engagement in American politics, with all the conflict it entailed, worked to bind the native-born and foreign born together, and make both groups feel part of one American nation. And that engagement worked, too, to change America in ways that allowed Catholics and Jews to assert their claims on America and to assert that they had as much right to live in America, to speak on its behalf, and to access its opportunities as did long-settled populations of American Protestants.

Generational Transition: Equally important to the integration of the new immigrants was a shift in the balance of power within immigrant families from the first to second generation. This shift occurred sometime between the 1920s and the 1940s, as the immigrant generation aged and the second generation came into maturity. The children of immigrants (or those who had come to America as very small children) were comfortable with their Americanness in ways that their parents frequently had not been. Some of this second-generation Americanization occurred

invisibly, through the daily experiences of these children with American society—walking down the streets of their cities, scouring the ads in newspapers and magazines for alluring consumer goods, listening to the radio, going to the movies, playing sports, and discovering the latest innovation in American popular music. Popular culture in America has always been a great assimilator. Some of the second generation's Americanization occurred more formally, through institutions, most notably high schools (which significantly expanded their enrollments in the 1930s and 1940s) and the World War II military, which took more than sixteen million young Americans out of their homes and neighborhoods between 1941 and 1945, mixed them up with other young Americans from every region of the country, and then asked every one of them to give their life for their country.

Even prior to their entry into these powerful institutions, mother-tongue monolingualism had fallen dramatically among these young men and women. For the second generation, bilingualism or English monolingualism became the norm; the third generation, meanwhile, was almost entirely English monolingual. Most members of the third generation could not speak and not even understand the language of their grandparents. By this time, too, many private institutions in "new immigrant" ethnic communities—churches, synagogues, fraternal and charitable organizations, ethnic newspapers—had begun to see themselves as agents of Americanization, in part to keep the younger generation engaged with issues of concern to the ethnic community.

Economic Security: We should not underestimate the importance of economic security in persuading immigrants to cast their lot with America. The welfare of one's family was almost always a key consideration for the "new immigrants" of the early 20th century. While some immigrants found opportunities in America and prospered, many were stuck in low paying, unskilled jobs in American manufacturing and construction, with little promise of advancement and no security that they would be able to keep even these jobs. Many had to make do with wages that were chronically insufficient. Many lived with the fear that they would fail as breadwinners, that the American dream would never be theirs, and that their employers would toss them aside for yet younger and cheaper workers. When the Great Depression plunged the U.S. economy into crisis for twelve long years, this fear spread to the second generation who were trying to find their first jobs at a time when neither the private nor public sector was able to bring the nation's unemployment rate below 15 percent. In these dire circumstances, many immigrants and their children began to turn to collective institutions of economic self help, the most important of which was the labor movement.

Labor unions were Americanizing institutions during these years, convincing ethnic workers both that they had rights as American workers and that their ability to improve their circumstances would contribute to the overall well-being of American society. Labor movement advocates argued that wages must be raised to a decent level, that hours of work should not exceed human endurance, that the government must make some provision for those who lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and that those who had spent a life time at work should be rewarded by the government with an old age pension. The labor movement provided critical support for two of the most important government policies of the 1930s and 1940s, the Social Security Act and the GI Bill of Rights, both of which meant a great deal to the new immigrants and their children. One can make the case that the labor movement played a major role in

helping to lift immigrant workers and their children out of poverty and thereby in giving them a stake in the American dream.

To identify the labor movement as an important institution of immigrant incorporation is to venture onto controversial political terrain. But whatever one thinks of the proper role of labor unions, it remains the case that questions of economic security and opportunity must be part of our discussion of immigrant integration. An immigrant population that finds itself unable to move out of poverty or to gain the confidence that it can provide a decent life for their children is far more likely to descend into alienation than to embrace America.

By 1950s, the integration of the “new immigrants” and their children had been successfully accomplished. Most of the children and grandchildren of these immigrants were enthusiastic Americans. But the success of the process had taken forty to fifty years and had required immersion in the practice of American democracy, a transition in generational power from the first to the second generation, and the achievement of economic security.

III. Today’s Immigrants: Questions and Answers

Today’s immigrants are sometimes depicted by their critics as are far more different from “us” than were past waves of immigrants and as far less interested in integrating themselves into American society. The charge is also leveled that there are simply too many of immigrants residing in America today for this country to absorb and integrate. Below I examine each of these beliefs in light of the background I have provided on the “new immigrants” who came between the 1880s and 1920s.

1) **Are today’s immigrants too different from “us?”** Immigrants today are different from earlier waves of immigrants in the diversity of their origins, in the diversity of their economic backgrounds, and in the fact that a majority are nonwhite. At earlier periods of U.S. history, most immigrants came from Europe. Today they come from every continent, with South America (and Latin America more generally), Asia, and Africa being the largest sources. Today’s immigrants are also more diverse in economic backgrounds than any previous wave of immigrants. In earlier waves, the immigrants were overwhelmingly poor and generally lacking in education. Such individuals are amply represented in the ranks of immigrants today, but so too are those who are highly trained professionals, managers, and small retailers who have decided that their skills will be more fully used and rewarded in the United States than at home, and that the opportunities for their children will be greater here as well. Thus the proportions of professionals and managers in the immigrant streams coming from the Philippines, India, Taiwan, and Korea regularly reach or exceed fifty percent. These immigrants are generally thought not to be “problem immigrants” and so they don’t form a significant part of our discussion about immigration today. But these kinds of immigrants are well represented in today’s immigrant population, especially among those groups who have come from East and South Asia. They are generally thought to be important contributors to America, and so they should be included in any overall assessment of current immigration.

Discussion of today’s immigrants generally focuses on those who are at the poor end of the immigrant spectrum. Poverty alone, of course, is hardly a distinguishing feature of today’s

immigrants, since past groups of immigrants were overwhelmingly poor. What does distinguish today's immigrant poor is that they are nonEuropean. Coming from nonEuropean cultures, they are sometimes thought by their critics to lack the cultural attributes—what we commonly refer to as the values of “western civilization”—that allowed earlier waves of poor immigrants to climb out of their poverty, to embrace America's creed of freedom and individualism as their own, and to become active contributors to American enterprise and American democracy.

The irony of this critique is that the “Europeans” held up as model immigrants of yesteryear were, at the time of their immigration, depicted much as poor nonwhite immigrants are today: as so racially and culturally different from Americans, as so different from the earlier waves of immigrants who had come from western and northern Europe, that they could never close the gap between who they were and what “we,” America, wanted them to be. Because they were allegedly unassimilable, the United States made a fateful decision in the 1920s to all but close its immigrant gates to eastern and southern Europeans. America was successful in barring them from entry, but it was wrong to believe that they lacked the ability to integrate themselves into American society. As I have argued in earlier sections of this testimony, the millions of eastern and southern Europeans already here did Americanize, and today we celebrate them as exemplary Americans. Why repeat that earlier mistake today and designate large sections of the world's population as inappropriate material for inclusion in America? To do so is not only to discriminate on the grounds of race but also to confess our own lack of faith in the promise and transformative power of American freedom.

2) Are today's immigrants too little interested in integrating themselves into American society? It is true that many immigrants today retain strong ties to their homeland and that many return home or aspire to do so. Technological innovations have made travel back and forth relatively easy, and the communications revolution has made it possible to stay in constant and instantaneous touch with one's family and friends back home. Many immigrants are not eager to relinquish the cultures they brought with them. Among adult immigrants who work in unskilled occupations where literacy is not important (construction, agriculture, landscaping, and personal services), some are slow to learn English. But these patterns are hardly novel. To the contrary, they are similar to patterns evident among the European immigrants who came at the beginning of the twentieth century. They are patterns that tend to be characteristic of immigrant groups in which recent arrivals form a large part of the immigrant population.

If we want to develop an accurate picture of the progress of integration (or lack thereof), we should not be content to take snapshots of a group at a particular point in time. We should want to supplement those snapshots with an examination of immigrants across time and across generations. Studies done by social scientists are beginning to supply us with this kind of data, and they are revealing patterns of integration that are similar to those associated with European immigrants a hundred years ago. For example, among the children of Latino immigrants, the rates of Spanish monolingualism (those who speak only Spanish) are very low and the rates of English-Spanish bilingualism are very high. Moreover, English monolingualism has made surprising inroads among the children of Latino immigrants, so much that some Latino parents worry that their children are losing touch with their cultural roots. These patterns become even more pronounced among third generation immigrants. The patterns of language loss and

acquisition among today's immigrant generations, in other words, seem to be similar to those that shaped the lives of the European immigrants who came one hundred years ago.³

Successful integration depends not simply on language and generational transition but on immigrant engagement with American democracy and on the experience of economic opportunity, advancement, and security. Some social scientists have argued that institutions that were once so important in involving past generations of immigrants in American politics (political parties) and for helping them to achieve economic security (the labor movement) have either so changed in nature or have become so weak that they can no longer perform a similar function with today's immigrants. There is some truth to this argument, although the events of the past two years have demonstrated both that political parties still retain the capacity to mobilize immigrants and that labor unions, in cities such as Los Angeles where they remain strong, can still play an important role in promoting immigrant economic interests. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the successful integration of today's immigrants requires either that these older institutions find ways to broaden their involvement with immigrants or that other institutions step forward to engage immigrants in the practice of American democracy and to assist the poor among them with the pursuit of economic opportunity and security. Among Latino immigrants, the Catholic Church has demonstrated that it can become an important mechanism for immigrant integration. Ideally, institutions that assist immigrants in the pursuit of economic opportunity will bring them into alliance rather than conflict with the native-born poor.

3) Has the number of immigrants coming to America reached such a numerical level that integration has become impossible? In absolute terms, the number of immigrants is at all time high: approximately 35 million. A few years ago, the number arriving in a single year passed one million and topped the previous one year record that had been recorded in the early years of the twentieth century. In proportional terms, however, we have not yet reached the immigrant density that prevailed in America in the early twentieth century. The million who were arriving annually in those years were entering a society that possessed between one-fourth and one-third the population of America today. To reach that earlier level of immigrant density, America would have to admit three to four million immigrants a year and sustain that rate for a decade or more.

It is possible, of course, for a society to reach levels of saturation whereby the numbers coming overwhelm mechanisms of integration. Saturation can be a national phenomenon or one that affects a particular region or city. Current immigrant density in the United States, however, is not at an all time high. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that demography is destiny, and that, for the sake of integration, we must close the immigrant gates once a pre-selected immigration density index is reached. If we can put in place mechanisms or institutions that broaden immigrant immersion in the practice of American democracy and broaden the access of poor

³ Ruben G. Rumbaut, "Assimilation and its Discontents: Ironies and Paradoxes," in Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind, eds., *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), pp. 182-185; Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Legacies: The Stories of the Immigrant Second Generation* (University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 118-128; Tamar Jacoby, "The New Immigrants: A Progress Report," in Jacoby, ed., *Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What It Means to be American* (Basic Books, 2004), pp. 23-24.

immigrants to economic opportunity and security, then we can have every reason to believe that the integration of this wave of immigrants will be as successful as the last one was. The process will take time and we should expect it to be complex and contentious. But it can yield success, proving yet again the remarkable ability of America to take in people from very different parts of the world, to make them into Americans, and to allow them an important role in defining what it means to be an American.

Gary Gerstle's writings on questions of immigration and ethnicity in the twentieth century United States include the following:

Books:

E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation (Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), coedited with John Mollenkopf

American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth-Century (Princeton University Press, 2001)

Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 1989)

Articles:

"Immigration Nation: A Guide for the Perplexed," *Dissent* (Winter 2007), 113-118

"The Political Incorporation of Immigrant Groups: An Historical Perspective on the American Experience," in Philippa Strum, *American Arabs and Political Participation* (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006), 27-40.

"The Immigrant as Threat to American Security: A Historical Perspective," in John Tirman, ed., *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11* (The New Press, 2004), 87-108

"Immigration and Ethnicity in the American Century," in Harvard Sitkoff, ed., *Perspectives on Modern America: Making Sense of the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-295.

"Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans," *Journal of American History* 84 (September 1997), 524-558.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Dr. Rumbaut?

**TESTIMONY OF RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, Ph.D., PROFESSOR OF
SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE**

Mr. RUMBAUT. Chairwoman Lofgren, Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member King and Members of the Judiciary Committee and the Immigration Subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear at this hearing.

I could never have imagined when I arrived in this country on the eve of my 12th birthday, speaking no English at all, that one day 46 years later I would be speaking to a congressional Committee, in English, about the fate of immigrant languages in the U.S. and of immigrants' acquisition of English. But life, like history, is full of surprises and often unfolds like a telenovela on a Spanish-language T.V. channel in L.A.

I use that metaphor deliberately because two summers ago, in the Nielsen ratings of the 10-most-watched T.V. programs in the huge television market of greater Los Angeles, where I live and work, nine of the top 10 prime time programs were telenovelas, broadcast in Spanish, by KMEX, the Univision channel. It was "La Madrastra" Tuesday, "La Madrastra" Wednesday, "La Madrastra" Monday, "Apuesta Por Un Amor" Tuesday, and number nine was "CSI", and then "La Madrastra" Friday, which, you know, came in last.

Such anecdotes would seem to support the concerns that have been expressed by some that immigrant integration today, and especially their linguistic assimilation, in areas of geographic concentration is being slowed or even reversed to the point of threatening the predominance of English in the United States, above all, among Spanish-speaking Latin Americans, most notably Mexicans in Southern California and Cubans in South Florida.

However, as the evidence from the census itself, from the American Community Survey that was just cited by Chairwoman Lofgren, and from every major national and regional study shows, compellingly and incontrovertibly, including cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys carried out in Los Angeles and San Diego and Miami, the process of linguistic assimilation to English today is occurring perhaps more quickly than ever in U.S. history.

I have summarized that evidence in detail in my written statement, including an analysis of the determinants of English fluency, et cetera, so I need not repeat it here, except to highlight a few main points.

First, the evidence documents a pattern of very rapid language transition from the first to the second and third generations, a switch to English that is completed before the third generation for most immigrant groups, and by or before the third generation even for those of Mexican origin in Los Angeles and of Cuban origin in Miami.

The power of assimilative forces is nowhere clearer than in the linguistic switch across the generations.

But in addition to that, secondly, longitudinal studies, such as our own Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, which have followed a large sample of children of immigrants representing 77

different nationalities for more than 10 years in San Diego and Miami have documented the extraordinarily rapid switch to English in degrees of proficiency, preference and use for all groups.

Tables 6 and 7 in my written statement have specific information in that regard.

But just to give you a taste of it, by early adulthood, by their mid-20's, over 93 percent of the Mexicans in San Diego and 98 percent of the Cubans in Miami preferred English over Spanish. And for some of the other groups, it was 100 percent.

And third, we carried out an analysis of what we call linguistic life expectancies for all the main immigrant groups concentrated in Southern California from San Diego on the Mexican border to Los Angeles and demonstrated the generational point at which language death occurs.

Even for Mexican Spanish in Los Angeles, one of the largest Spanish-speaking cities in the world, where the adult immigrant parents may be watching "La Madrastra" on T.V. in one room, but their kids are watching "CSI" and "American Idol" in the room next door in English. Indeed, the parents may talk to them in Spanish but they will answer back in English.

Additional point: English proficiency has always been a key to socioeconomic mobility for immigrants and to their full participation in their adopted society.

The last person you need to tell that to is an immigrant, who came to the United States precisely with that in mind. Today is no different in that respect.

In fact, the United States has been described as a language graveyard because of its historical ability to absorb millions of immigrants, as Professor Gerstle mentioned, and to extinguish their mother tongues within a few generations. And Spanish appears to offer no threat to this reputation, unfortunately.

English has never been seriously threatened as the dominant language of the United States. And with nearly 250 million English monolinguals in the U.S. today, it is certainly not threatened today, not even in Southern California.

For that matter, English has become firmly established throughout the world as the premier international language of commerce, diplomacy, education, journalism, technology, the Internet, and mass culture.

Ms. LOFGREN. Dr. Rumbaut, your light is on. If you could wrap up, that would be—

Mr. RUMBAUT. What is endangered instead is the survivability of the non-English languages that immigrants bring with them to the United States, and whether the loss of such assets is desirable or not is, of course, another matter.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rumbaut follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT

**The Evolution of Language Competencies, Preferences and Use
Among Immigrants and their Children in the United States Today**

Rubén G. Rumbaut
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Is the United States becoming a polyglot country? The research literature suggests that multilingualism may not be such a bad idea, at least in terms of the intellectual abilities and skills associated with it, and because of its utility as an asset in a global economy. Yet some object to it on the basis of the need for "national identity" and "cultural homogeneity" in a nation that has absorbed millions of immigrants from all over the world, while others assert that contemporary immigrants are not assimilating linguistically, particularly Spanish-speakers from Latin America in areas of dense ethnic concentration such as Los Angeles, and that the proliferation of immigrant languages generally and of Spanish in particular may threaten the predominance of English in the United States.

Such social and political concerns over language issues date back to the origins of the nation. As early as 1751, Benjamin Franklin had put the matter plainly: "Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us, instead of our Anglifying them?" The point was underscored by Theodore Roosevelt during the peak years of immigration in the early 20th century: "We have room but for one language here, and that is the English language; for we intend to see that the crucible turns our people out as Americans, and not as dwellers in a polyglot boardinghouse." Most recently the point was stressed by Samuel P. Huntington (2004) in his controversial book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, in which he argued that the arrival of Latin American immigrants in large numbers during the last three decades of the 20th century threaten the core of American identity and culture in the 21st century. He asserts that Latin Americans are much less likely to speak English than earlier generations of European immigrants because they all speak a common language; they are regionally concentrated and residentially segregated within Spanish-speaking enclaves; and they are less interested in linguistic and cultural assimilation. According to Huntington, "there is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English" (2004: 256). Although Huntington's thesis was short on evidence and dismissed by scholars, it nonetheless achieved widespread public diffusion and has been tacitly accepted in many circles.

It is ironic that, while the United States has probably incorporated more bilingual people than any other nation in the world since the time of Franklin, American history is notable for its near mass-extinction of non-English languages. Contrary to what may seem to be true from a purely domestic angle, the use of two languages is not exceptional, but normal, in the experience of a good part of the world's population. Over six billion people speak an estimated six thousand languages in a world of some two hundred autonomous states. Thus, there are about thirty times as many languages as there are states; and the dominance of certain languages (such as Chinese,

Hindi, Russian, Spanish and English)—combined with global communications and transportation technologies, international trade, and immigration—contributes to the proliferation of bilingualism. Yet, though the United States has incorporated more bilingual people than any other country in the world, the American experience is remarkable for its near mass extinction of non-English languages: In no other country, among thirty-five nations compared in a detailed study by Lieberman and his colleagues, did the rate of mother tongue shift toward (English) monolingualism approach the rapidity of that found in the United States. Within the United States, some relatively isolated indigenous groups (such as the Navajo) have changed at a much slower rate; but language minority immigrants shifted to English at a rate far in excess of that obtained in all other countries—hence the reputation of the U.S. as a “graveyard for languages.”

Other studies of the languages of European and older Asian immigrant groups in the United States have documented a rapid process of intergenerational “anglicization” that is effectively completed by the third generation. The general historical pattern seems clear: Those in the first generation learned as much English as they needed to get by but continued to speak their mother tongue at home. The second generation grew up speaking the mother tongue at home but English away from home—perforce in the public schools and then in the wider society, given the institutional pressures for anglicization and the socioeconomic benefits of native fluency in English. The home language of their children, and hence the mother tongue of the third generation, was mostly English. As a classic essay saw it, immigrant families were often transformed “into two linguistic sub-groups segregated along generational lines . . . ethnic heritage, including the ethnic mother tongue, usually ceases to play any viable role in the life of the third generation . . . [the grandchildren] become literally outsiders to their ancestral heritage.”

Still, research on immigrant language retention up to the present has been hampered by a lack of data on language use or ability broken down by generation. Surveys focused on the children of immigrants, by definition, enable only a contrast between first and second generations. Moreover, because the U.S. Census Bureau eliminated the question on place of birth of parents after 1970 it is no longer possible to distinguish generations using census data, forcing researchers into crude native-foreign comparisons. It is all the more important to scrutinize the evidence concerning both the extent of bilingualism in the country and its resilience over time.

In this statement I examine the evolution of English and foreign language competencies, preferences and use among immigrants and their children in the United States. I first draw on the latest data from the U.S. census to sketch a language portrait of Immigrant America today, synthesize the findings of the principal contemporary studies measuring intergenerational language change, and focus attention on two new surveys which permit both a longitudinal and a cross-generational analysis of key policy questions: the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey. CILS followed a sample of 1.5- and second-generation youth in Southern California and South Florida for more than a decade from mid adolescence in 1992 to their mid twenties in 2001-03. The baseline sample of more than 5,000 was representative of 77 nationalities, including all of the principal immigrant nationalities in the U.S. today. The CILS data set permits both comparative and longitudinal analyses of language fluencies across the largest immigrant groups from widely different national, cultural and class origins, in distinct generational cohorts, and in different sites of incorporation where immigrants are densely

concentrated (San Diego on the Mexican border, and Miami, the city with the highest proportion of foreign-born in the country). The analysis will be extended with newly available data from the IIMMLA survey, which collected equivalent cross-sectional data on language from a multigenerational sample of nearly 5,000 respondents in their 20s and 30s, primarily from the 1.5- and second-generations but with sizable subsamples of third- and fourth-and-later generations, concentrated in the nation's premier immigrant metropolis, Los Angeles, which permit a hard test of Huntington's hypothesis. Before turning to those results, however, I begin by sketching a national profile of foreign and English language patterns over the past three censuses, and considering recent data on generational patterns of language loyalty and change.

A National Profile

What is the evidence concerning both the extent of bilingualism in the United States and its resilience over time? The 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses asked people aged 5 or older if they spoke a language other than English at home. In 2000, 47 million people or 18 percent of the 262.4 million aged five years or older answered in the affirmative. Those figures were up from 14 percent in 1990 (32 million) and 11 percent in 1980 (23 million). Because the question did not ask whether this was the "usual" language spoken at home or how frequently or well it was used relative to English, it probably elicited an over-estimate. Still, the data point to the presence of a substantial and growing minority of those who are not English monolinguals.

Moreover, despite recent dispersals to "new destinations," they were concentrated in areas of primary immigrant settlement—particularly along the Mexican border from Texas to California, and in large cities such as Chicago, Miami and New York. Among all the 3,141 counties in the United States, the median percentage of the population who spoke a language other than English at home was a mere 4.6 percent. That is, in half of all counties—a vast swath of the United States—more than 95 percent of the residents were English monolinguals. In some areas, however, bilingualism was prevalent—as was the case in Hialeah and Miami in South Florida; Santa Ana and East Los Angeles in Southern California; Laredo, McAllen, Brownsville and El Paso along the Texas-Mexico border; and Elizabeth, New Jersey, across the Hudson River from New York City, where two-thirds or more of the residents speak languages other than English (while also speaking English).

In 2000, of the 47 million who spoke a foreign language at home, more than 28 million spoke one language: Spanish. The other 18 million spoke scores of different languages, chiefly reflecting both past and present immigrant flows. These languages included Chinese (2 million); French, German, Italian, Tagalog, and Vietnamese (over 1 million each); and Korean, Russian, Polish, Arabic and Portuguese (over 500,000 each). Among all immigrants aged five years or older who came to the United States between 1990 and 2000, 88 percent spoke a language other than English at home. The figure declines to 74 percent among pre-1980 immigrants and to less than 9 percent among the native born. The vast majority of the total population, over 215 million, spoke *only* English – including over 17 percent of the immigrant population itself.

What does the census tell us about linguistic variability within national groups and about the evolution of bilingualism over time? [Table 1](#) presents data on home language use and related characteristics for the largest non-English immigrant cohorts; the total pre-1980, 1980-1989 and post-1990 foreign-born populations; and the native born.

Table 1.
Language Spoken at Home and Related Characteristics
for Selected U.S. Immigrant Groups and the Native-Born, 2000
 (ranked by the proportion of the foreign-born from
 non-English-speaking countries who spoke English only)

Country of Birth	Persons 5 or older (N)	Speaks English only at home (%)	Length of residence in U.S. (years)	College graduate ¹ (%)	High status profession ² (%)
Germany	698,651	40	34	27	50
Nigeria	134,041	22	11	58	52
Italy	475,109	21	38	14	36
Japan	339,948	17	17	43	56
Korea	856,488	15	15	43	48
Poland	471,336	13	23	22	31
Philippines	1,367,592	12	17	46	42
Russia	329,907	11	13	52	53
India	1,012,016	9	12	69	68
Arab Middle East	516,370	9	15	39	50
Iran	284,329	8	17	51	59
Colombia	508,482	6	14	22	29
Taiwan	324,228	6	15	67	69
Peru	273,096	6	14	23	29
Cuba	866,649	6	23	19	34
Haiti	418,834	6	15	14	22
Dominican Republic	680,511	6	15	9	19
Mexico	8,996,368	6	14	4	10
Cambodia	136,020	6	16	10	24
Nicaragua	222,690	5	15	14	23
Guatemala	471,744	5	12	6	12
El Salvador	807,555	5	13	5	12
China	976,090	5	14	42	50
Vietnam	984,327	5	14	19	30
Laos	204,414	5	16	8	18
Foreign-born: ³					
arrived 1990-2000	13,240,060	12	5	28	27
arrived 1980-1989	8,776,740	14	15	21	29
arrived before 1980	10,290,944	26	34	22	39
U.S.-born:	230,067,997	91	NA	25	40

¹ Persons 25 and older.

² Employed persons 16 and older.

³ Totals include immigrants from English-speaking countries.

Source: 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS.

Two main conclusions can be derived from these results. First, recently arrived immigrants tend to remain loyal to their native language, regardless of age and education. Although there is some evidence that nationalities with high proportions of college graduates and professionals shift toward English more rapidly, the vast majority of recent arrivals retains its own language at home. Second, time has a strong eroding effect on native language retention: As seen in the bottom rows of the table, only one-eighth of recently arrived immigrants use English only at home, but more than one-fourth of immigrants with longer U.S. residence do so.

Even more impressive is the rapidity with which English fluency is acquired by immigrant children, underscoring the importance of *age at arrival*. As shown in Table 2, among immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as children under 13 years of age and who speak another language at home, 87 percent could speak English "very well" or "well," compared to 63 percent of those who immigrated between the ages of 13 and 35 (in adolescence or early adulthood), and to only 42 percent of those who were 35 or older when they immigrated. *In general, age at arrival, in conjunction with time in the United States and level of education, are the most significant predictors of the acquisition of English fluency among immigrants of non-English origin.*

Table 2.
Correlates of English Speaking Ability of Immigrants from Non-English-Speaking Countries, 2000

Characteristics	Speaks English only at home (%)	If speaks non-English language: How well speaks English? ²	
		Very well or well (%)	Not well or at all (%)
Total: ¹	10	64	36
Age at U.S. arrival:			
35 years or older	7	42	58
13 to 34 years old	8	63	37
Under 13 years old	17	87	13
Year of U.S. arrival:			
1990-2000	7	56	44
1980-1989	7	67	33
Before 1980	16	75	25
Education: ³			
Not high school graduate	7	39	61
High school graduate	11	74	26
College graduate or more	12	89	11

¹ Persons 5 years or older from non-English-speaking countries only.

² Based on response to census question on English speaking ability asked of persons who spoke a language other than English at home.

³ Persons 25 years or older.


Source: 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS.


The effect of each of these three factors is specified in Table 3 for the largest immigrant nationalities – and vividly graphed in Chart 1 for Spanish speakers, the largest language minority population by far and presumptively the most mother-tongue retentive.

Table 3.
Ability to Speak English "Very Well" among Selected Immigrant Groups
who Speak a Language Other than English at Home,
by Age and Decade of U.S. Arrival, and by Educational Attainment

Country of Birth	Percent who speak English "very well" by:								
	Age at U.S. arrival			Decade of U.S. arrival			Education completed		
	0-12	13-34	35 and older	Before 1980	1980s	1990s	Less than high school	High school graduate	College graduate
Nigeria	80	88	77	92	89	82	48	81	94
Germany	84	82	65	82	86	73	64	83	88
India	81	75	45	78	71	67	20	53	83
Philippines	76	70	45	70	66	58	25	59	79
Arab Middle East	76	61	29	68	65	47	23	56	75
Iran	84	67	22	73	54	37	11	44	73
Italy	82	44	21	48	57	53	30	63	77
Haiti	68	45	20	52	47	37	23	49	69
Taiwan	77	39	13	55	46	30	12	22	48
Poland	80	43	17	47	44	36	22	36	59
Russia	75	50	16	54	47	38	18	27	40
Nicaragua	75	32	15	52	45	27	16	41	54
Peru	76	40	15	52	45	32	15	35	55
Japan	52	37	23	42	47	30	24	33	43
Cuba	83	31	9	46	31	20	12	47	56
Colombia	71	32	11	46	38	26	13	32	49
Korea	70	29	10	41	32	24	14	27	44
Laos	61	19	8	38	30	20	10	36	63
Dominican Republic	63	22	8	34	31	26	12	32	46
Cambodia	63	22	8	37	29	27	9	34	61
China	58	34	10	31	28	28	6	16	48
Vietnam	58	23	7	43	30	17	7	24	56
El Salvador	62	20	8	33	30	19	13	38	48
Guatemala	62	20	11	38	30	19	12	36	52
Mexico	53	15	9	33	27	18	13	37	49
Total ¹	65	35	20	49	40	31	16	43	64

¹ Excluding immigrants from English-speaking countries.
Source: 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS.





Generational Patterns: Cross Sectional Studies

The power of assimilative forces is nowhere clearer than in the linguistic shift across generations over time. Until recently, however, there were scarcely any systematic three-generation analyses of language maintenance and shift in the research literature. A 1973 study by David López (1978) involved a survey of a representative sample of 1,129 Mexican-origin couples in Los Angeles. His findings document a pattern of rapid language transition across the three generations that contradicts the assumption of unshakable Spanish language loyalty among Mexican-Americans. Among first-generation women, for example, he found that 84 percent used Spanish only at home, 14 percent used both languages, and only 2 percent used English solely. By the third generation, there was almost a complete reversal, with only 4 percent speaking Spanish at home, 12 percent using both, and 84 percent shifting to English only.

Figures for men were similar, except that the first to second-generation shift to English was still more marked. The study also attempted to examine the determinants and consequences of language transition. It found that generation had the strongest causal effect, exceeding by far those of age, rural origin, and other predictors. Spanish maintenance appears to have some positive occupational advantages--controlling for education and other factors--among the immigrant generation, but none for subsequent ones. Among the latter, residual Spanish monolingualism was associated with poor schooling and low socioeconomic status. López concluded that the appearance of high language loyalty among Mexican-Americans is due largely to the effect of continuing high immigration from the country of origin.

Three recent studies of intergenerational language shift provide convergent and compelling contemporary evidence of the three-generation model of mother-tongue erosion from the adult immigrant generation to that of their grandchildren. The first is an innovative analysis of the 2000 census by Richard Alba and his colleagues (2002) focusing on children 6 to 15. The second is a national survey of Hispanic adults conducted in 2002 by the Pew Hispanic Center (2004). And the third is a new study of immigration and intergenerational mobility in metropolitan Los Angeles [the IMMMLA study] (Rumbaut *et al.*, 2003, 2005).

The first of these studies analyzed the home languages of school-age children (ages 6 to 15) in newcomer families, as reported in the 2000 Census, linking children to their parents in the same household to permit distinguishing between the second generation (US-born children with at least one foreign-born parent) and the third (or a later) generation (US-born children whose parents are also US-born). Despite group differences in the degree of language shift, for every nationality without exception the following patterns held: The vast majority of first-generation immigrants who come to the U.S. as children speak English well, bilingualism is most common among second-generation children, who grow up in immigrant households and speak a foreign language at home, but are almost all proficient in English; English-only is the predominant pattern by the third generation; and what third-generation bilingualism exists is found especially in border communities such as Brownsville and El Paso, Texas, where the maintenance of Spanish has deep historical roots and is affected by proximity to Mexico, or in areas of high ethnic densities, such as found among Dominicans in New York and Cubans in Miami. Away from the border, Mexican-American children of the third generation are unlikely to be bilingual.

The second study entailed a national telephone survey of a representative sample of adults 18 and older in the 48 contiguous states, of whom 2,929 self-reported as Hispanic or Latino (with oversamples of Salvadorans, Dominicans, Colombians and Cubans). Unlike the

census (which asks only about spoken proficiency in English), the respondents were asked about their ability to speak and read in both English and Spanish. On the basis of their answers they were classified as Spanish dominant, bilingual, or English dominant. The breakdown of the results by generation—which parallel uncannily those of Lopez’s Los Angeles survey taken three decades earlier—are shown graphically in [Chart 2](#). First-generation adults were overwhelmingly Spanish dominant (72 percent), with a fourth classified as bilingual and only 4 percent as English dominant. That pattern was reversed by the third generation, with 78 percent being English dominant and 22 percent still classified as bilingual, but less than 1 percent could be deemed Spanish dominant. Among the second generation, Spanish dominance plummeted to only 7 percent. However, nearly half (47 percent) were classified as bilinguals and nearly as many as English dominant (46 percent) by the second generation.

Table 4.
Non-English Language Use, Proficiency, and Preference,
by Generational Cohort, Greater Los Angeles, 2004
 (IIMMLA survey, N=4,780)

Detailed Generational Cohorts		Growing up spoke a non-English language at home (%)	Speaks non-English language very well (%)	Prefers to speak English only at home (%)	N
1.0 generation	Foreign-born, arrived 13 or older	97.4	86.9	17.7	256
1.5 generation	Foreign-born, arrived 0-12 years old	92.9	46.6	60.7	1,491
2.0 generation	U.S.-born, 2 foreign-born parents	83.5	36.1	73.4	1,390
2.5 generation	U.S.-born, 1 foreign-born parent	46.5	17.3	92.5	428
3.0 generation	3-4 foreign-born grandparents	34.3	11.9	97.0	67
3.5 generation	1-2 foreign-born grandparents	18.7	3.1	98.3	289
4th+ generations	All 4 grandparents U.S.-born	10.4	2.0	99.0	859
Total sample		65.8	31.5	70.8	4,780

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Survey. Rumbaut et. al., 2005, 2006.

The third study entailed a comprehensive survey of 4,780 adults 20 to 40 years old in metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA). The sample is representative of “1.5-” (immigrants who came as children) and second-generation (U.S.-born with at least one foreign-born parent) Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and other groups of immigrant origin who have settled in the five-county area, as well as third and fourth (and later) generation whites, African Americans, and Mexican Americans. All were asked if they spoke a language other than English at home growing up, about their speaking, reading and writing proficiency in the non-English language, and their current language preferences and use. The results, broken down by detailed generational cohorts from the first to the fourth+ generations (those with no foreign-born grandparents), are summarized in [Table 4](#). They show clearly the generational progression in each of the language measures. For example, while over 90 percent of the foreign-born cohorts and over 80 percent of the U.S.-born with two foreign-born parents grew up speaking a non-English language at home, those proportions dropped to less than half among the U.S.-born with only one foreign-born parent, to between a fifth and a third among the third generation (depending on the number of foreign-born grandparents), and to a tenth by the fourth generation. However, their preferences for English increased rapidly

by the 1.5 and second generations, exceeding 90 percent among the U.S.-born with only one foreign-born parent and becoming virtually universally preferred by the third generation. Those preferences in turn reflect the rapid atrophy of speaking, reading and writing skills in the foreign language from one generation to the next. These data again provide confirmatory evidence that assimilation forces in American society are strongest in the linguistic area and that they operate most visibly across rather than within generations. We will return to the IIMMLA data below.

A limitation of these recent studies is that they are cross-sectional—that is, they are snapshots taken at one point in time, but do not follow specific individuals over time to ascertain the dynamics of acculturation and of bilingualism as they take place *within* a generation. I turn now to such a *longitudinal* study (the CILS study).

The Evolution of Language Competencies, Preferences, and Use: A Longitudinal Study

The CILS Survey. As mentioned earlier, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study followed for more than a decade the progress of a large panel of youths representing several dozen nationalities in two main areas of immigrant settlement in the United States: Southern California (San Diego) and South Florida (the Miami and Fort Lauderdale metropolitan areas). The baseline survey, conducted in Spring 1992, interviewed eligible students enrolled in the 8th and 9th grades of all the schools of the San Diego Unified School District (N=2,420). A parallel sample was drawn from the Dade and Broward County Unified School Districts in South Florida, and from two private schools in the Miami area (N=2,842). The sample was drawn in the junior high grades, when dropping out of school is rare, to avoid the potential bias of differential dropout rates between ethnic groups at the senior high school level. Students were eligible to enter the sample if they were U.S.-born but had at least one immigrant (foreign-born) parent, or if they themselves were foreign-born and had come to the U.S. at an early age (before age twelve). The resulting sample was evenly balanced between males and females, and between foreign-born and U.S.-born children of immigrants. Reflecting the geographical clustering of recent immigration, the principal nationalities represented in the San Diego sample are Mexican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Chinese, and smaller groups of other children of immigrants from Asia (mostly Korean, Japanese, and Indian) and Latin America (most of the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean). Miami receives mainly immigrants from the Caribbean—especially Cubans, Dominicans, Nicaraguans, Colombians and other Latin Americans, Haitians, Jamaicans and other English-speaking West Indians. The merged CILS sample from these two sites of incorporation encompass virtually all of the principal immigrant groups in the United States today, and well as the principal types of migration flows: professionals and entrepreneurs, labor migrants, and refugees.

Three years later (in 1995), a second survey of the same panel of children of immigrants was conducted. By this time the youths, who were originally interviewed when most were 14 or 15 years old, were now 17 to 18 years old and had reached the final year of high school (or had dropped out of school). And then during 2001-03, a decade after the original survey, a final follow-up was conducted. The respondents now ranged from 23 to 27 years of age, and most had to be contacted individually in their places of work or residence. In total, over a period of more than 24 months of fieldwork, CILS-III retrieved complete or partial information on 3,613 respondents. Table 5 presents the breakdown of the CILS-III sample by age, sex, nationality, and current residence. (For details on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the longitudinal sample, see Portes and Rumbaut 2005.)

Table 5.
Basic Characteristics of CILS-III Sample, 2001-2003

<i>Variable</i>	<i>South Florida</i>		<i>Southern California</i>	
	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
<u>Sex:</u>				
Male	958	49.7	803	47.3
Female	971	50.3	861	52.7
<u>National Origin:</u>				
Cuban	862	44.7	470	27.9
Nicaraguan	232	12.0	627	37.2
Colombian	159	8.2	232	13.8
Haitian	121	6.3	208	12.4
West Indian	170	8.8	38	2.3
Other Latin American	267	13.8	57	3.4
Other	118	6.2	52	3.1
<u>Age:</u>				
23	375	19.4	385	22.9
24	883	45.8	731	43.4
25	532	27.6	434	25.8
26 or more	139	7.2	134	7.9
<u>Current residence:</u>				
Miami/Ft. Lauderdale	1,530	79.3	1,201	73.5
Other Florida	111	5.8	315	19.3
Other US	192	10.0	111	6.8
Overseas	6	0.4	7	0.4
Residence Unknown	90	4.5	0	0.0
Totals:	1,929	100.0	1,684	100.0

Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, 3rd survey wave; Portes and Rumbaut 2005.

For our purposes here, we focus on the 3,071 respondents who came (or whose parents came) from *non-English* speaking countries, and for whom we have complete survey data on English and foreign language competencies, preferences, and use over the span of a decade. Excluded from this analysis are children of immigrants from English-speaking countries whose parents spoke only or predominantly English (from Jamaica and the Anglophone Caribbean, Canada and Great Britain).

Findings. In Tables 6 and 7, selected longitudinal findings are presented for the full CILS sample. I focus here on a range of linguistic outcomes of interest—English vs. foreign language

proficiency, preference, and use with significant others—across the decade from 1992 to about 2002 (2001-2003). While the decennial census collects data on English proficiency for persons who speak another language at home, no data are collected on their degree of proficiency in the foreign language or on their preferences and patterns of language use. Table 6 presents overall longitudinal results for language proficiency, preference and use broken down by four generational cohorts, based on the age at arrival for the *foreign-born*, and the nativity of parents for the *US-born*: 1.5 (ages 6-12 at arrival), 1.75 (ages 0-5 at arrival), 2.0 (US-born with 2 foreign-born parents), and 2.5 (US-born with only 1 foreign-born parent), as well as by language (Spanish vs. Asian languages) and location (Southern California vs. South Florida). Table 7 then presents the same linguistic outcomes for the principal nationalities in the sample—including five Spanish-speaking groups of interest (Mexicans in Southern California, Cubans and other Hispanics in South Florida), Haitians in South Florida, and key Asian groups (Filipinos, Chinese, Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian).

As Table 6 shows, there are very clear and strong differences among the four generational cohorts of children of immigrants (demonstrating the strong effect of age at arrival and parental nativity on language acquisition), even though at the baseline survey in 1992 the non-English language was spoken in the homes of over 95 percent of all of these teenage respondents (except for the 2.5ers, those with one US-born parent, in which case the proportion of households where a non-English language was spoken fell to 77 percent):

* The 1.5 generation (those who arrived between ages 6 and 12, of primary school age but before puberty) showed the lowest level of linguistic assimilation among the four cohorts, although the force of Anglicization clearly prevails over time: while only 42 percent spoke English *very well* in 1992, 77 percent did so in 2002; by contrast, their spoken and especially reading and writing proficiency in their mother tongue was well below their proficiency in English. As a result, while just over half said they preferred English in 1992, a decade later English was an almost universal choice (96 percent), and already used principally with spouses, close friends and co-workers.

* The 1.75ers (those who came to the U.S. as pre-school-age children under 6) follow in their patterns of linguistic acculturation: 79 percent spoke English very well in 1992, and 89 percent did so by 2002; their abilities in the parental foreign language were much poorer than their English skills; their preference for English accordingly increased from 72 to 88 to 97 percent across the three survey periods; yet their patterns of language use with their parents, spouse, and children also show a significant distance from the patterns exhibited by their U.S.-born co-ethnics (indeed, 3 out of 5 still speak with their parents in the mother tongue rather than English).

* The 2.0 generation (born in the U.S. of parents who are both foreign-born) come next in these rankings: about 90 percent reported speaking English very well at all three survey periods, but their preference for English increased from 81 percent in 1992, to 93 percent in 1995, and 98 percent by 2002, and their patterns of English use consistently fell behind the level reported by the 2.5ers, most notably with their parents (a third now speak with them in English only and another third in both English and the parental language, even though in 1992 a foreign language was the principal language spoken in their homes in 96 percent of the cases).

* Over 90 percent of the 2.5ers (born in the U.S., with one U.S.-born parent and one foreign-born parent) reported speaking English very well throughout the decade, and they overwhelmingly prefer English and use it with their spouse and close friends; two-thirds also report speaking only in English with their parents and (where applicable) their own children.

Table 6.
Language Proficiency, Preference, and Use among Young Adult Children of Immigrants:
Change Over Time, from 1992 (at age 14) to 2002 (at age 24), by Generational Cohort, Language Type, and Location
(CILS Longitudinal Sample)

Language Characteristics (in percent)	Survey Year (N =)	Total (3071)	Generational Cohort*			Language		Location		
			Foreign-born (1096)	US-born (1276)	2.0 (326)	2.5 (326)	Spanish (1892)	Asian Languages (494)	South Florida (1605)	Southern California (1466)
Language Proficiency:										
<i>Language spoken at home:</i>										
Foreign English	1992	96.7	98.7	94.3	96.0	76.7	97.3	96.5	91.1	96.4
		3.3	1.3	5.5	4.0	23.3	2.7	3.5	8.9	3.6
<i>English Language Fluency:</i>										
Speaks "very well":	1992	79.8	42.4	78.6	89.9	94.4	82.5	59.7	88.2	72.0
	1995	80.3	54.0	80.0	88.0	90.5	82.4	59.5	88.4	73.5
	2002	88.2	72.4	88.9	91.0	93.6	90.6	77.7	92.6	83.4
Reads "very well":	1992	75.4	44.7	72.3	85.7	90.4	76.1	55.5	83.5	68.4
	1995	80.3	54.0	80.0	88.0	90.5	82.4	59.5	88.4	73.5
	2002	88.8	72.4	89.1	91.9	93.9	90.9	76.5	93.2	83.9
Writes "very well":	1992	72.9	41.0	70.3	83.0	88.8	73.2	55.9	80.9	66.2
	1995	74.2	45.1	73.2	82.3	90.2	77.0	51.8	82.9	67.4
	2002	81.0	66.6	80.5	85.3	88.8	81.8	72.3	84.6	78.4
<i>Foreign Language Fluency:</i>										
Speaks "very well":	1992	33.0	50.4	37.4	27.1	11.5	40.9	33.0	33.1	29.7
	1995	33.7	49.3	36.0	30.0	10.6	44.0	29.4	35.1	29.0
	2002	46.0	55.8	52.6	43.7	22.1	60.1	34.8	57.1	33.9
Reads "very well":	1992	21.3	33.2	22.3	19.0	11.5	29.4	7.6	23.9	17.2
	1995	24.4	36.2	23.0	23.2	11.5	35.3	8.4	27.1	19.1
	2002	33.7	41.3	38.4	36.1	18.1	51.1	8.9	46.2	24.1
Writes "very well":	1992	17.2	29.0	17.6	15.0	8.2	23.5	6.1	18.5	14.5
	1995	17.5	25.6	16.4	17.8	5.7	25.8	5.6	19.3	14.0
	2002	23.7	34.9	24.1	23.4	10.8	33.4	7.5	27.0	20.1

Table 6, continued.

Language Characteristics (in percent)	Survey Year (N =)	Total (3071)	Generational Cohort*					Language		Location	
			Foreign-born 1.5 (373)	1.75 (1096)	2.0 (1276)	2.5 (326)	Spanish (1892)	Asian Languages (494)	South Florida (1605)	Southern California (1466)	
Language Preference:											
<i>Language prefers to speak:</i>											
English	1992	75.0	52.6	71.8	80.7	89.8	72.9	63.4	81.0	68.4	
English	1995	89.3	76.9	88.4	92.6	97.1	89.1	80.8	93.8	85.2	
English or both the same	2002	97.6	95.7	97.3	98.3	98.5	97.0	98.2	97.9	97.3	
Language uses with...											
<i>... own parents:</i> 2002											
Foreign language		43.8	55.7	62.2	32.6	11.5	52.6	58.7	50.6	36.5	
Both the same		27.6	23.4	22.9	34.0	22.8	32.0	23.6	33.0	21.7	
English only		28.6	20.9	14.9	33.4	65.7	15.4	17.8	16.3	41.8	
<i>... spouse or partner:</i> 2002											
Foreign language		6.5	17.1	6.2	4.3	2.7	8.5	5.8	5.1	7.7	
Both the same		23.8	29.8	27.0	22.0	13.6	30.6	24.0	28.0	20.3	
English only		69.7	53.1	66.7	73.7	83.6	61.0	70.2	66.9	72.0	
<i>... close friends:</i> 2002											
Foreign language		2.6	8.2	2.1	1.8	1.0	3.1	2.7	1.5	3.7	
Both the same		25.9	30.5	28.6	24.5	16.4	33.4	22.4	30.5	20.8	
English only		71.5	61.3	69.3	73.7	82.6	63.6	74.9	67.9	75.4	
<i>... co-workers:</i> 2002											
Foreign language		3.6	5.8	4.0	3.0	2.4	5.1	2.4	4.4	2.9	
Both the same		19.3	10.4	22.4	20.5	13.8	28.9	6.4	28.1	10.1	
English only		77.1	83.8	73.6	76.5	83.8	66.0	91.1	67.5	87.1	

Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), survey waves I (1992), II (1995) and III (2001-05), S. California and South Florida.

Note: For this analysis, sample excludes immigrants from English-speaking countries.
 * Generational cohorts: 1.5 = Foreign-born, 6-12 years at arrival in U.S. (middle childhood); 1.75 = Foreign-born, 0-5 years at U.S. arrival; 2.0 = U.S.-born, one parent foreign-born; 2.5 = U.S.-born, one parent foreign-born, one parent U.S.-born.

Table 7. continued:

Language Characteristics (in percent)	Survey Year (N =)	National Origin									
		Mexican (415)	Cuban (811)	Nicaraguan (227)	Colombian (155)	Dominican (65)	Haitian (97)	Filipino (588)	Vietnamese (195)	Laotian, Cambodian (187)	Chinese (51)
Language prefers to speak:											
English	1992	45.3	84.6	76.2	71.6	72.7	83.5	89.8	54.4	60.4	78.4
English	1995	75.3	94.7	92.3	92.9	81.3	94.0	96.6	77.7	77.6	86.3
English or both the same	2002	93.4	98.3	97.4	98.1	96.4	94.6	99.7	99.5	96.3	100.0
Language uses with....											
... <i>own parents</i> : 2002											
Foreign language		55.2	45.9	72.2	60.0	57.4	34.7	5.0	66.1	66.8	50.0
Both the same		32.0	35.8	24.7	28.7	25.9	44.2	13.9	20.8	28.3	16.0
English only		12.8	18.3	3.1	11.3	16.7	21.1	81.1	13.0	4.9	34.0
... <i>spouse or partner</i> : 2002											
Foreign language		16.8	4.0	4.9	4.8	10.0	4.5	1.8	7.7	5.8	4.5
Both the same		37.0	30.3	26.8	31.0	43.3	25.0	5.5	23.1	32.2	9.1
English only		46.2	65.8	68.3	64.3	46.7	70.5	92.7	69.2	62.0	86.4
... <i>close friends</i> : 2002											
Foreign language		8.5	0.8	2.7	1.3	5.5	3.1	0.9	2.7	3.8	2.0
Both the same		42.6	33.2	28.7	28.9	43.6	28.1	4.5	25.5	27.5	10.0
English only		48.9	66.1	68.6	69.8	50.9	68.8	94.7	71.8	68.7	88.0
... <i>co-workers</i> : 2002											
Foreign language		6.4	4.5	4.7	2.1	8.3	1.1	0.5	3.3	2.3	2.3
Both the same		26.9	32.3	29.4	25.7	27.1	8.0	1.6	6.6	6.9	4.5
English only		66.7	63.2	65.9	72.2	64.6	90.8	97.9	90.1	90.8	93.2

Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), survey waves I (1992), II (1995), and III (2001-03), Southern California and South Florida samples.
Note: For this analysis, sample excludes immigrants from English-speaking countries.

Similar generational patterns obtained, in reverse, for their proficiency in the mother tongue (the non-English language spoken at home), except that there was basically no change over time in their ability to speak the foreign language very well (proficiency levels remained unchanged during adolescence from 1992 to 1995, followed by a slight increase from 1995 to 2002 for all cohorts in their transitions to adulthood, most notably seen among the Spanish-speakers). Still, even among the 1.5ers, only about half could speak the mother tongue very well, as did a third of the 1.75ers, around a fourth of the 2.0 cohort, and only about a tenth of the 2.5ers. Their literacy skills were much worse, indicative of the fragility and instability of this bilingualism.

There are also clear differences by national origin, as Table 7 shows, with the starkest contrasts between Spanish speakers and the various Asian languages (with Filipinos standing out for its very rapid switch to English among all Asian-origin ethnic groups). Among the Asian-origin nationalities, with often tonal languages and entirely different alphabets, reading and writing literacy skills were in the single-digits, but even spoken proficiency was far behind their ability to speak English. All the Spanish-speakers (including the Colombians, Dominicans, Nicaraguans, Cubans and Mexicans) were by comparison much more fluent in Spanish than the Asian groups were in their mother tongues, but even among them their proficiency levels in English were much superior to those in Spanish, so that even among the Mexicans and the Cubans their linguistic preferences and patterns of use had switched decisively to English—i.e., even among the groups who would have been expected to have remained most loyal to Spanish, respectively, in San Diego, a Spanish-named city on the Mexican border with the busiest international border crossing in the world, and in the heart of Miami (dubbed “Havana USA”), where more than 3 out of every 4 residents are either foreign-born or of foreign-parentage, and the majority report speaking Spanish to some degree at home. Expressed preferences for English over the mother tongue ranged from 93.4 percent for the Mexicans to 98.3 percent for the Cubans, with other Hispanic groups in between; 94.6 percent for the Haitians; and virtually 100 percent for the Asian groups (only slightly less, 96.3 percent, for the poorest and least educated groups, the Laotians and Cambodians).

Linguistic Life Expectancies

To test Huntington’s assertion of linguistic retention among persons of Latin American as well as Asian origin, by far the two largest sources of immigration to the United States over the past 40 years, we merged the CILS-San Diego and IIMMLA data sets to generate an innovative analysis of “linguistic life expectancies.” Specifically, we use data on the degree to which immigrants and their descendants in different generational cohorts are able to speak and actually use their mother tongue to derive linguistic “survival curves” across the generations. These survival curves yield “mortality rates” to which we can apply life table methods to develop “linguistic life expectancies”—the average number of generations a mother tongue can be expected to survive in the United States after the arrival of an immigrant. In doing so, we hope to provide the public with an intuitively appealing way of understanding that Spanish in no way constitutes a threat to the continued predominance of English within the United States, because use of Spanish dies out rapidly across the generations, even in the area of highest Hispanic immigrant concentration in the United States.

The surveys we use were conducted in Southern California, a region adjacent to the Mexican border that was not only the nation’s largest net receiver of immigrants during the period 1970-2006, but one that also contained more Spanish-speakers and persons of Mexican

origin than any other megalopolitan area, and displayed a rising level of Hispanic residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1987; Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2002). By the year 2000 one of every five immigrants in the United States resided in the region's six contiguous counties (San Diego, Orange, Los Angeles, Ventura, Riverside and San Bernardino), including the largest communities of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Taiwanese, Koreans, Iranians, and Cambodians outside of their countries of origin. In the Los Angeles metropolitan area alone, according to Current Population Survey estimates, by the year 2000 the Mexican-origin population surpassed 5 million persons, including some 2.2 million born in Mexico, 2 million born in the U.S. of Mexican-born parents, and another million who were third generation or higher; and in the huge television market of Greater Los Angeles in the summer of 2005, 9 of the 10 most-watched prime-time programs were telenovelas broadcast in Spanish by KMEX, the Univisión channel (see López 2005). For these reasons our analysis offers a "hard test" of Huntington's hypothesis. If speaking Spanish does not persist across immigrant generations in the urban corridor stretching from San Diego on the Mexican border to Los Angeles, then it probably will not persist in other communities throughout the United States.


For purposes of this analysis the IIMMLA and CILS-San Diego data sets were merged (N=5,703), since they are based on representative samples of respondents evenly divided by gender, of the same approximate age (28.6 years for IIMMLA respondents and 24.2 years for CILS) and national origins (Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Koreans make up 78% of the merged sample, and other Latin American and Asian nationalities 10%), who were surveyed at about the same time (IIMMLA in 2004, CILS in 2001-2003) in the same metropolitan region (the six contiguous Southern California counties); and both surveys used identical measures of English and non-English language proficiency and preference, and of other relevant variables. By merging the two data sets we thus gain larger sample sizes for significant subgroups and greater precision and reliability for our estimates of linguistic life expectancies by group and generation (for methodological details on sampling and measurement, see the references cited below). The merged data sets reflect the diversity of contemporary immigration (immigrants and refugees, laborers and professionals, documented and undocumented), including significant subsamples of the least educated and poorest immigrants from Latin America (particularly from Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala) and Southeast Asia (especially from Laos and Cambodia).

To analyze linguistic variation across the generations, we defined generational categories following the approach of Rumbaut (2004). Those born outside the United States comprise the *first generation*, divided into two cohorts based on their age at arrival: the 1.0 generation of immigrants who arrived as adults (who will not concern us in this analysis), and the 1.5 generation of those who arrived as children (here restricted to those who arrived in the U.S. before age 15). The U.S.-born *second generation* is also divided into two cohorts: members of the 2.0 generation were born in the United States of two foreign-born parents, whereas members of the 2.5 generation were born in the United States of one foreign-born parent and one U.S.-born parent. The *third generation* consists of U.S.-born persons with two U.S.-born parents, but among them we distinguish the 3.0 cohort (those with 3 or 4 foreign-born grandparents) from the 3.5 cohort (with only 1 or 2 foreign-born grandparents). Finally, those in the *fourth generation* are respondents whose parents and grandparents were all born in the United States. These generational intervals effectively constitute meaningful representations of time in the life of a foreign language. We then apply life table methods to figure out how long languages can be expected to last in the United States.

For all groups of IIMMLA and CILS respondents (N=5,703) except Mexicans and European whites, immigration is so recent that sampling is infeasible beyond the 2.5 generation. Indeed, for those groups without exception, more than 70 percent of their total population in the U.S. is foreign-born, and of the remainder nearly all belong to the U.S.-born second generation. For those groups and their descendants in Southern California, members of the fourth generation have not yet been born and members of the third generation are small in number and still in infancy or childhood. Thus, Mexicans offer the strongest test of Huntington's hypothesis; and clearly, by his frequent mention of their situation and population size in the United States, they were the group most salient in his mind. In total, the merged IIMLA and CILS data set used in this analysis contains 1,642 respondents of Mexican origin above the 1.0 generation, including 423 in the 1.5 generation, 578 in the 2.0, 240 in the 2.5, 48 in the 3.0, 164 in the 3.5, and 189 in the 4.0 or higher generational cohorts. These cell sizes are large enough to provide robust estimates of linguistic life expectancies.

We measure the "survival" of immigrants' mother tongues using answers to two survey questions. The first asked how well a respondent spoke the language of his or her ancestors and those who did not answer "very well" were assigned the equivalent of a linguistic death certificate. We consider the mother tongue "dead" in the sense that the respondent has lost the ability to speak it with fluency. The second question asked which language the respondent preferred to speak in the household. If the respondent answered "English," then the mother tongue was considered to have "died" in the sense that it was no longer used within the intimate confines of family life. Those two criteria are reasonable predictors of language death.

Figure 1. Proportion who speak mother tongue very well by generation



Other data from the IIMMLA and CILS surveys, as we saw above, showed that the ability of children of immigrants to read or write a non-English language fares much worse than their ability to speak it, and that once literacy in a language dies, the remaining level of fluency in the language is much more likely to atrophy over time, and bilingualism becomes increasingly uneven and unstable. Moreover, it is in the home where a non-English mother tongue is most likely to be used, especially with immigrant parents who arrived as adults; among the 1.5 and higher generations in Southern California, communication with coworkers, close friends, and even spouses and children is far more likely to take place in English.

Figure 1 shows linguistic survival curves defined according to the first criterion. The x-axis gives generations spent in the United States in increments of 0.5, and the y-axis indicates the proportion of group members still speaking the mother tongue very well—i.e. the proportion among whom language fluency has “survived.” Given the sheer number and density of Spanish language speakers in Southern California, and the long history of Mexican settlement, we would logically expect the generational survival curves for Spanish-speaking groups to be above those of Asians and white Europeans, and this is indeed the case. At each generational point from 1.5 to 2.5 the proportion speaking Spanish is higher than the proportion speaking any other mother tongue.


In generation 2.5, 34.6% of Mexicans, 29.4% of Salvadorans and Guatemalans, and 12.5% of Other Latin Americans still speak Spanish very well. In contrast, the proportion speaking the mother tongue very well in generation 2.5 does not rise above 6% for any other group. In the third generation and beyond, we can only compare Mexicans and European whites. Despite the strong retention of the mother tongue among Mexicans through generation 2.5 (35% compared with just 3% of white Europeans, thereafter the survival curves begin to converge. At generation 3.0 only 17% of Mexicans still speak fluent Spanish and at 3.5 the figure drops to just 7%. By the time we arrive at the fourth generation, the proportion of Mexicans who speak Spanish very well is just 5%, compared to around 1% for white Europeans. In other words, given the linguistic death rates prevailing in Southern California, Mexican immigrants arriving today can expect only 5 of every 100 of their great grandchildren to speak fluent Spanish.

Linguistic ability is not linguistic use, however, and although some descendants of Mexican immigrants may retain the basic ability to speak Spanish, they may prefer to use English in most settings. If they prefer to speak English at home, for example, they are not likely to prefer Spanish in other settings and probably will only use it when the social situation appears to require a linguistic shift. Figure 2 thus presents survival curves where the “death” of the mother tongue occurs when a respondent in a particular generation states that he or she prefers to speak English at home. Although even according to this definition, Mexicans and Central Americans continue to display elevated survival curves compared with other groups, they no longer stand out as visually distinct in the graph, and other Latin Americans display a curve that is indistinguishable from that of the Vietnamese or the Koreans. Even among Mexicans, by the third generation 96% prefer to speak English at home.

Thereafter the graph levels off with just 3% expressing a preference for Spanish. Put another way, the probability is 97% that the great grandchildren of Mexican immigrants will not speak Spanish. With only three out of 100 persons of Mexican origin speaking Spanish after the third generation, the language is clearly on life support if not entirely dead. If the vast majority of Mexicans in Southern California cannot retain fluency in Spanish or a preference for its household use beyond the third generation, then its survival prospects elsewhere in the United

States are probably equally dim. Contrary to Huntington's assertions, even the nation's largest Spanish speaking enclave, within a border region that historically belonged to Mexico, Spanish for all intents and purposes appears to be well on the way to a quiet natural death by the third generation of U.S. residence.

Figure 2. Proportion who prefer to speak mother tongue at home by generation




In order to compare the survival prospects for different mother tongues across groups using a simple and easily interpretable metric, we employed life table methods to compute linguistic life expectancies based on the survival curves shown in Figures 1 and 2. In doing so, we follow a hypothetical cohort of ethnic group members as they "age" across the generations and experience the linguistic mortality rates prevailing in Southern California according to the HIMMLA and CILS data. Rather than a person aging year to year, duration here is measured in terms of half-generation increments. A language is "born" in the United States with the arrival of first generation immigrants and then it survives over time to the extent that people in different generations continue to retain the ability to speak it and use it within their households.

We can further extend the analogy between human life and death and linguistic life and death by applying the classic formulae of the life table (see Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2000) to compute "generational life expectancies" for the mother tongues spoken by different immigrant groups in Southern California. The only complete generational survival curves, of course, are for Mexicans and white Europeans. To enable computations of life expectancies among other immigrant origins we linearly extrapolate the most recent half generation and once the curve falls below a survival threshold of 0.05, we close out the life table in the next half-generational segment. The resulting life expectancies give the average number of generations a

foreign language can be expected to survive within the cultural and linguistic milieu of contemporary Southern California.

The bar chart in Figure 3 shows the life expectancies for the mother tongue of the various origin groups studied to this point. For each group, the left-hand bar shows the life expectancy computed when death is defined to occur when the respondent no longer prefers to speak it at home, and the right-hand bar shows the life expectancy computed when the respondent reports he or she cannot speak it very well. As can be seen, irrespective of which definition is considered, no mother tongue can be expected to survive beyond the third generation given the linguistic survival probabilities now prevailing in Southern California.

Figure 3. Linguistic life expectancies for selected immigrant groups



The most liberal definition of linguistic life—retaining the ability to speak a language as opposed to a preference for its daily use—yields a life expectancy of 3.08 generations for Mexican Spanish, 2.78 generations for the Spanish spoken by Guatemalans and Salvadorans, and 2.62 for that spoken by other Latin Americans. Under current conditions, therefore, the ability to speak Spanish very well can be expected to disappear sometime between the second and third generation for all Latin American groups in Southern California. Life expectancies are even lower when life is defined by a preference for its use at home. In terms of daily use, Spanish can be expected to die out after 1.96 generations among Mexicans, 2.09 generations among Guatemalans and Salvadorans, and 1.74 generations for other Latin Americans.

Among Asian groups, the two definitions of linguistic life and death generally do not yield very different life expectancies, and in some circumstances the speaking of the mother tongue at home yields a slightly higher expectation of life than the ability to speak it very well. Nonetheless, no matter which group or definition considered, the average Asian language can be expected to die out at or near the second generation. The lowest life expectancies are observed among immigrants from the Philippines, a former U.S. colony where English is widely spoken.

The average life expectancy for the mother tongue of Filipinos (usually Tagalog) is only around 1.3 generations for the preference-based definition and 1.6 generations for the ability-based definition. In general, however, life expectancies for Asian languages (including Chinese, Vietnamese and Korean) among immigrants in Southern California vary in the narrow range between 1.5 and 2.0 generations of U.S. residence, which is comparable to the range of linguistic life expectancies observed among white Europeans (1.49 to 1.95, depending on which definition is considered).

A Language Graveyard?

In this analysis we have drawn on newly available data from two surveys—the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles survey, and the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study in San Diego—to test Huntington’s assertion that Spanish is unlikely to go the way of other immigrant languages in the United States and succumb to English language dominance across the generations. Southern California offers an ideal critical test of his hypothesis because it is the largest Spanish-speaking enclave in the United States and houses some of the oldest and largest Mexican neighborhoods in the country, as well as the nation’s largest concentration of immigrants. We defined linguistic survival in two ways: a preference for speaking a mother tongue within the household and the ability to speak that language very well. We then computed survival curves in half-generation increments and applied life table methods to derive linguistic life expectancies.

Our findings directly contradict Huntington’s assertions. The United States has aptly been described as a “graveyard” for languages because of its historical ability to absorb immigrants by the millions and extinguish their mother tongues within a few generations (Portes and Rumbaut 2006), and Spanish appears to offer no threat to this reputation. Owing to the number and density of Spanish speakers in metropolitan Southern California, Mexicans and other Latin American groups retain a greater ability to speak their mother tongue very well compared with other groups, but thereafter ability drops sharply and converges toward the pattern observed for white Europeans. However, when survival is defined in terms of a preference for speaking Spanish at home, the survival curves for Mexicans and other Latin American groups look much more like those of Asians and white Europeans.

Consistent with the basic survival curves, the average life expectancy for Spanish among Mexicans in Southern California is just 1.96 generations using preference-based definitions of linguistic life and death and 3.08 generations using ability-based definitions. The respective figures for Salvadorans and Guatemalans are 2.09 and 2.7 generations, and for other Latin Americans 1.74 and 2.62 generations. For all other groups the corresponding linguistic life expectancies varied between 1.5 and 2.1 generations. Although the life expectancy of Spanish may be slightly greater among Mexicans in Southern California, its ultimate demise nonetheless seems assured by the third generation. Like taxes and biological death, linguistic death seems to be a sure thing in the United States, even for Mexicans living in Los Angeles, currently one of the largest Spanish speaking cities in the world.

This analysis carries the same caveat as any other study based on a period life table estimated from cross sectional data: it assumes that the linguistic behavior of today’s second, third, and fourth generation immigrants accurately forecasts the behavior of future generations. It is possible that Spanish will be retained more in the future because it is no longer negatively stigmatized in schools; because continuous immigration creates more opportunities to speak

Spanish in the future, or because Spanish-language media become increasingly prevalent over time. At this point, however, after at least 50 years of continuous Mexican migration into Southern California, Spanish appears to draw its last feeble breath in the third generation.

The death of immigrant languages in the United States is not only an empirical fact, but can also be considered as part of a larger and widespread global process of "language death" (Crystal 2000). Whether this is desirable or not, of course, is another question altogether. To the extent that language fluency is an asset and that knowledge of a foreign tongue represents a scarce resource in a global economy, immigrants' efforts to maintain this part of their cultural heritage and pass it on to their children seem worth supporting.

Table 8.
Attitudes About English and Foreign Languages in the United States (2000)
(2000 General Social Survey, MEUS Module, N=1,398)

	N	%		N	%
Speaking English as the common national language is what unites all Americans:			English is threatened if other languages are used frequently in large immigrant communities in the U.S.:		
Strongly agree	354	26	Strongly agree	120	9
Agree	670	50	Agree	318	24
Disagree	285	21	Disagree	692	51
Strongly disagree	37	3	Strongly disagree	217	16
Learning a foreign language is as valuable as learning math and science in school:			Children in the U.S. should learn a second language fluently before they finish high school:		
Strongly agree	278	21	Strongly agree	362	26
Agree	583	43	Agree	665	49
Disagree	422	31	Disagree	298	22
Strongly disagree	70	5	Strongly disagree	42	3
Bilingual education programs should be eliminated in American public schools:			Election ballots should be printed in other languages in areas where lots of people don't speak English:		
Strongly agree	80	6	Strongly agree	227	17
Agree	218	16	Agree	665	49
Disagree	665	50	Disagree	293	22
Strongly disagree	380	28	Strongly disagree	166	12

Source: Rumbaut and Alba (2001).

In fact, results from the General Social Survey taken in 2000 with a nationally representative sample of American adults, summarized in [Table 8](#) above, indicate that solid majorities of Americans want their own children to develop fluency in a second language before they graduate from high school (75 percent) and believe that learning a foreign language is as valuable as learning math and science in school (64 percent). They strongly disagreed (by 78 percent to 22 percent) that bilingual education programs should be eliminated in American public schools, and agreed (66 percent) that election ballots should be printed in other languages where needed. And by a two-thirds margin (67 percent), they disagreed with the statement that "English is threatened if other languages are used frequently in large immigrant communities in the U.S." Those results show much more open attitudes to language learning and bilingualism than one might find in a "language graveyard." However, 3 out of 4 (76 percent) also believe that "Speaking English as the common national language is what unites all Americans." Taken together, these responses, by large majorities, suggest that Americans favor not a subtractive but an additive language policy—English, naturally, but English-*plus*.

English proficiency has always been a key to socioeconomic mobility for immigrants, and to their full participation in their adoptive society. The findings reported here demonstrate the rapidity with which English is acquired by young immigrants and their US-born children—perhaps faster than at any time in U.S. history. It is worth noting that in the same year that Proposition 63 (the initiative declaring English as the state's official language) passed in California, over 40,000 immigrants were turned away from ESL classes in the Los Angeles Unified School District alone: the supply of services had not meet the vigorous demand for English training. Twenty years later in Los Angeles, that demand has not waned and continues to far exceed the supply.

Ironically, in recent years the lack of fluent bilinguals who can serve as reliable translators and interlocutors has even emerged as a national security concern, as it did in the days after September 11 (when intelligence agencies like the CIA, FBI and NSA found a dearth of bilingual speakers in newly critical languages), or last December 2006, when the Iraq Study Group in its bipartisan report, noting that of the 1,000 people who worked in the U.S. Embassy in Iraq only six spoke Arabic fluently, observed that “all of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of knowledge of language and cultural understanding...in a conflict that demands effective and efficient communication,” and recommended that the U.S. Government give high priority to professional language proficiency.

However, without strong social structural supports, the chances of sustaining fluent bilingualism in American communities seem slim. Given the immense pressure for linguistic conformity on immigrant children from peers, schools and the media, the preservation of fluent bilingualism in the U.S. beyond the first generation is an exceptional outcome. It is dependent both on the intellectual and economic resources of parents (such as well-educated immigrant professionals) and their efforts to transmit the mother tongue to their children, and on the presence of institutionally complete ethnic communities where literacy in a second language is taught in schools and its use is valued in business and the labor market (such as those found in large entrepreneurial enclaves). The combination of these factors is rare: Miami may provide the closest approximation in the U.S. today, but even there, as the data presented above show, the progressive anglicization of the Cuban second generation is evident.

Our conclusions thus reverse the concerns and alarms often found in some sectors of the popular literature, which call attention to the proliferation of foreign languages and to the supposed threat they pose to English dominance. Historical and contemporary evidence indicates that English has never been seriously threatened as the dominant language of the United States and that—with nearly a quarter of a billion monolingual English speakers—it is certainly not threatened today, not even in Southern California. For that matter, English has become firmly established throughout the world as the premier international language of commerce, diplomacy, education, journalism, aviation, technology, the Internet and mass culture. What is endangered instead is the survivability of the non-English languages that immigrants bring with them to the United States.

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Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kerwin?

**TESTIMONY OF DONALD KERWIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC.**

Mr. KERWIN. Madam Chairwoman, Chairman Conyers, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the importance of citizenship in immigrant integration.

There are more than 11 million lawful permanent residents in the United States who are eligible or who will soon be eligible to apply for citizenship. As you know, citizenship confers important rights and responsibilities. It is a precondition for full membership in our society.

In our experience, the naturalization process is also a focal point for a range of integration activities. These include English classes, citizenship classes, home ownership seminars, and provision of public health information.

Earlier this year, my agency released a report titled "A More Perfect Union: A National Citizenship Plan." The report is based on more than 100 interviews and the best thinking of an advisory group of 22 experts on this issue.

It details the resources, partnerships, and commitments that would be necessary to achieve the following goals. First, to create a federally led citizenship initiative that could play a central role in what we hope will be an emerging national immigrant integration policy.

Second, to increase naturalization numbers and rates so that more immigrants can contribute fully to our Nation.

Third, to make the naturalization process more meaningful by deepening the knowledge and commitment of immigrants to our Nation's history, political institutions, and democratic ideals.

Fourth, to increase opportunities for citizenship by expanding English-as-a-second-language and citizenship instruction.

Fifth, to address barriers to citizenship like proposed fee increases and security clearances that can drag on for 3 years or 4 years.

Sixth, to build stronger bonds between the native-born and naturalized.

And seventh, to forge strong public-private partnerships in support of all of these goals.

Our plan details how a wide range of stakeholders—faith communities; Federal, State and local government; business; labor; civic organizations and others—can promote citizenship.

While it includes hundreds of recommendations, I have included just 13 key proposals in my written testimony. For example, we propose that charitable agencies expand their citizenship services, particularly by offering more group naturalization processing sessions.

My agency now funds and supports naturalization sessions in 21 communities, a number that we hope to increase, some of those communities represented by you.

Many other networks, like the New American Initiative in Illinois, have also mobilized to do this work. These sessions, at modest cost, allow large numbers of immigrants to apply to naturalize.

They also help to prepare charitable agencies for the massive amounts of work they will need to assume if comprehensive immigration reform legislation is to pass and be successful.

We also recommend that the Office of Citizenship be funded sufficiently so that it can coordinate a national citizenship program and can support the work of community-based organizations.

Federal leadership and coordination will be essential to a national citizenship drive. The Office of Citizenship, which has a \$3 million budget and does not currently have grant-making authority, needs to be strengthened if it is to play this role.

We support increased funding for ESL and citizenship classes. Lack of proficiency in English and the shortage of such classes represent a major barrier to citizenship.

In addition, federally funded ESL classes do not typically cover civics or citizenship issues.

We also support the efforts of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to develop a more meaningful citizenship test, and we particularly support more meaningful preparation for this test.

Of course, we also hope that the revised test does not preclude worthy immigrants from taking this important step.

While immigration is a volatile issue, we have found broad and deep support for citizenship. We worry that the national debate over how many and what types of immigrants to accept may overshadow the many contributions that immigrants make to our Nation.

We also worry that this debate may obscure our need to promote immigrant integration and attachment to our Nation's core principles.

We believe that a national citizenship plan would represent a step in the right direction, and we pledge our gifts and resources to this important goal.

We thank you for taking on this issue.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kerwin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD KERWIN

Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Donald Kerwin and I am the Executive Director of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC). I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the role of citizenship in immigrant integration.

CLINIC, a subsidiary of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), supports a national network of 161 charitable legal programs for immigrants. These programs represent roughly 400,000 low-income immigrants each year, including lawful permanent residents who wish to become U.S. citizens. Over the last decade, CLINIC has directed programs that have assisted more than 80,000 immigrants to obtain citizenship. We now fund and support group naturalization processing events in 21 communities, including in communities represented by several Members on the Judiciary Committee. We hope to expand this number in the upcoming weeks.

Earlier this year, CLINIC published a report titled *A More Perfect Union: A National Citizenship Plan* which can be found at <http://www.cliniclegal.org/DNP/citzplan.html>. The report reflects extensive research, more than 100 interviews with immigration service and policy experts, and the best thinking of a 22-person advisory committee. It attempts to set forth the resources, activities, and partnerships that would be required to carry out a national citizenship plan. The report will form the basis of this testimony.

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

The strength and vitality of our nation will increasingly depend on the contributions of its 37 million foreign-born residents. We cannot afford to assume that the integration of a population of this magnitude and diversity will occur automatically or easily. As President Bush recognized in creating the Task Force on New Americans, integration will require sound policies, contributions from all the key sectors in society, and a coordinated strategy. Citizenship should play a central role in an immigrant integration strategy for four main reasons.

First, citizenship represents a pre-condition to the full membership of immigrants in our nation. Its benefits include the right to vote and to hold public office, timely family reunification, and enhanced employment and educational opportunities. It allows immigrants to contribute more fully to the good of our nation.

Second, the naturalization process represents a focal point for immigrant integration activities. Most importantly, it provides the occasion to educate immigrants on U.S. history, civic values and political institutions. This effort must go beyond preparing immigrants for the civics test. Naturalization—culminating in the oath of allegiance at the swearing-in ceremony—should lead immigrants to become better informed about the Constitution, fully committed to our democratic ideals, engaged in the political process, and represented in the political system. In a nation united by a common creed, this goal could not be more important. Citizenship programs also provide services as diverse as English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) instruction, citizenship classes, home-ownership seminars, and medical information. These activities contribute to greater proficiency in English, closer community ties, and integration into a wider circle of people and institutions.

Third, a national citizenship plan would address an immense need. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 8.5 million U.S. residents were eligible to naturalize in 2005 based on their years as lawful permanent residents, with an additional 2.8 million soon to be eligible (Passel, 2007, pp. 7–8). A national citizenship initiative would benefit millions of immigrants and their families.

Fourth, citizenship offers a unique opportunity for collaboration between different sectors of society. CLINIC developed *A More Perfect Union: A National Citizenship Plan* based on the input of experts with different competencies and perspectives. Although immigration can be a volatile issue, CLINIC has found wide and bi-partisan support for citizenship. Our plan details how key “stakeholders”—government at all levels, schools, faith communities, business, labor unions, civic organizations, and others—can contribute to a coordinated citizenship program. Of course, these institutions have historically served as vehicles for immigrant integration.

Immigrants also value citizenship. Fully 90 percent view citizenship as something “necessary and practical” or “a dream come true” (Farkas, Duffett and Johnson, 2003, p. 29). This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of immigrants want what most of the rest of us do in life: to pursue a livelihood, to support their families, to contribute to their nation, to live in security and to practice their faith.

While naturalization rates and numbers have increased in recent years, only 53 percent of those admitted as lawful permanent residents 11 to 20 years ago have naturalized (Passel, 2007, p. 15). Any citizenship plan would need to address why millions fail to apply to naturalize when they become eligible. Lack of proficiency in English represents the most common reason. Fifty-five (55) percent of immigrants who are otherwise eligible to naturalize and 67 percent of those who will soon be eligible have limited English proficiency (Passel, 2007, p. 11). In many communities, waiting lists for English classes stretch several months. Yet these programs represent the only structured way for many low-income immigrants to learn English.

Other barriers to citizenship include lack of knowledge about the legal requirements and benefits of naturalization, a paucity of professional assistance to guide immigrants through this process, the inability to afford the application fee (a problem that will increase if proposed fee increases go into effect), and application processing problems. As an example of the latter, FBI Director Mueller reported security delays of more than one year in 44,843 naturalization cases as of May 2006. While we support strong security clearance procedures, CLINIC’s network of charitable programs handles many naturalization cases that have been pending for three and even four years.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the widely acknowledged benefits of citizenship, the United States does surprisingly little to promote the naturalization process. *A More Perfect Union: A National Citizenship Plan* calls for a national mobilization in support of citizenship, identifying the roles of government, immigrant service agencies, and other sectors

of society. It describes a program that could serve as the linchpin of an emerging U.S. immigrant integration strategy. A few key recommendations follow.

First, immigration service providers should significantly expand their naturalization work, offering group workshops and related services. These events should be sponsored and supervised by charitable organizations with immigration attorneys or with staff “accredited” by the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition, they should use trained volunteers and follow stringent quality control standards for eligibility screening and application review.

CLINIC and other immigrant-service networks have significantly increased their commitment to naturalization services in recent months, both as a good in itself and as a way to prepare to implement immigration reform legislation. These workshops require charitable programs to rent space, to conduct community outreach, to serve large numbers of people, and to recruit and train volunteers (including pro bono attorneys). This work anticipates what they will need to do in order to ensure the success of comprehensive immigration reform legislation.

Second, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (USCIS’s) Office of Citizenship (OoC) should receive sufficient federal funding to coordinate a national citizenship program. At present, OoC’s annual budget of roughly \$3 million and its lack of grant-making authority significantly limit its activities. Similarly, USCIS should not be required to support its operations entirely on fee revenue. Adequate funding would allow USCIS to forego onerous fee increases that will deny access to citizenship to many immigrants. It would also help USCIS to reduce its backlogs, update its technology, and improve its customer services. USCIS should also be given greater access to fee-account revenue so that it can respond to sudden increases in applications.

Third, charitable agencies need additional resources to expand their significant work in this area. Of course, this need will increase dramatically if comprehensive immigration reform legislation passes. Federal support should be provided to networks of direct service providers that are engaged in naturalization outreach, intake, application assistance, ESL classes, citizenship instruction, and test preparation. Non-profit organizations that are “recognized” by the Board of Immigration Appeals or supervised by an attorney should be the preferred anchors in local collaborative programs. Charitable service agencies, including those in CLINIC’s network, stand ready to partner with the federal government on a national citizenship effort, as well as on implementation of comprehensive immigration reform legislation.

Fourth, the federal government should help to coordinate, increase, and sustain the citizenship work now being performed by others; it should not supplant existing efforts. State, local, philanthropic, and corporate interests should partner with the federal government—perhaps matching federal dollars—to expand naturalization services, including English language instruction. The Office of Citizenship should track funding from these sources and issue an annual report that publicizes the achievements of a national program.

Fifth, a national citizenship program should bring together the leadership, resources, and talents of the nation’s public and private sectors. It should also engage the native-born, naturalized, and future citizens in the program’s design and implementation. A national program should ensure that lawful permanent residents enjoy access to citizenship, regardless of their socio-economic status or ethnic background. It should make a special effort to reach those who naturalize at the lowest rates. However, it should also assure that sufficient services be provided to those who can self-file and who need less information and assistance.

Sixth, the Office of Citizenship’s budget should come chiefly from public funds; its dependence on USCIS application fees should be reduced. The OoC should steer corporate and foundation funding to charitable agencies; it should not compete for sparse private funding. The OoC should hire community liaison officers for each USCIS district to coordinate local initiatives, to conduct outreach, to share successful program models, and otherwise to build partnerships with charitable agencies.

Seventh, the Office of Citizenship should initiate a process to identify the research and demographic data that will be needed to conduct a national citizenship program. This data should be used to develop outreach strategies, to design media campaigns, to allocate funding, to build service capacity, to strengthen ESL and citizenship instruction, and to provide benchmarks and tools for evaluation. Similarly, immigration experts should convene a national citizenship conference to share new research, knowledge, program models, and best practices. It will be crucially important that any national citizenship program have a methodologically sound evaluation component. Program evaluation should document not only numbers of new citizens, but significant community interventions and steps contributing to citizenship. Protocols and controls should be developed to restrict government and grantee access to confidential information.

Eighth, USCIS should explain naturalization eligibility requirements in its approval notice for lawful permanent residence. In addition, the USCIS should make the OoC's guide titled *Welcome to the United States, A Guide for New Immigrants* available to all immigrants and refugees. USCIS should notify immigrants when they become eligible to apply for citizenship. It should refer applicants that fail the citizenship test to ESL and citizenship courses. In addition, the Office of Citizenship should partner with charitable agencies and networks to provide outreach on citizenship to immigrant communities. Appropriate content should be developed by experts in media messaging and by immigration advocates. Outreach should highlight naturalization requirements, as well as the benefits, rights, and responsibilities of citizenship.

Ninth, naturalization oath ceremonies should be the defining moment of the citizenship process and a key feature of a national citizenship program. USCIS should direct its district offices to offer same-day oath ceremonies if possible. The Office of Citizenship should expand its efforts to organize high-profile naturalization ceremonies, including those on days of national significance. Court- and USCIS-administered ceremonies should be open to the public and to service organizations. All oath ceremonies should conclude with voter registration. Local boards of election should oversee voter registration activities and encourage civic organizations to provide this service.

Tenth, ESL and citizenship instruction should be expanded through adult basic education classes and community-based organizations. Classes should be available at different English language levels, including short-term, high-impact instruction for advanced students and long-term, tailored instruction for students with low literacy. Standards should be established for both professional and volunteer instructors. Instructors should refer legal questions to immigration attorneys or accredited non-attorneys. ESL and citizenship curricula should cover the naturalization test and interview, but include broader content that fosters an informed and engaged citizenry.

Eleventh, USCIS should expand the availability of citizenship application fee waivers for low-income immigrants. It should liberalize its fee waiver policy, create a fee waiver application form to standardize the application process, explain the availability of waivers and the application process in its informational materials, establish an application filing discount for poor working families who wish to apply for citizenship together, and offer an option of paying the application fee in two installments.

Twelfth, USCIS should continue its efforts—which it began in earnest in 2002—to develop a more meaningful citizenship test. The revised test should adhere to the current legal requirements for level of difficulty and use of discretion, include consequential material on U.S. history and civics presented at a basic English level, and be able to accommodate applicants with special needs. It should not adversely impact vulnerable applicants or those who are members of specific ethnic, national or language groups.

Thirteenth, USCIS should train and monitor its officers to ensure proper implementation of the redesigned citizenship test. In addition, the Office of Citizenship should partner with nonprofit organizations to create: (1) a curriculum and study guide at basic and advanced English levels for use in preparing applicants for the citizenship test; (2) a teacher's guide; and (3) multi-modal citizenship promotion materials. It should also establish a clearinghouse of citizenship materials, fund training and technical assistance for ESL and citizenship teachers, and promote standards in citizenship education.

CONCLUSION

These recommendations form the basis of the more detailed analysis provided in *A More Perfect Union: A National Citizenship Plan*. CLINIC's network is fully committed to the integration of our nation's immigrants and their families. A national citizenship plan would make an indispensable contribution to this goal. It would also serve our nation's interest. We thank you for your leadership on this issue and encourage you to move ahead on this important issue.

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Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Kerwin.
And Dr. Fonte?

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN FONTE, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
HUDSON INSTITUTE**

Mr. FONTE. Thank you, Chairwoman Lofgren and Ranking Member King.

What do we mean by integration? Let's start by using a more vigorous term, assimilation. There are different types of assimilation: linguistic, economic, civic, patriotic.

Linguistic assimilation means the immigrant learns English. Economic assimilation means the immigrant does well materially. Civic integration means the immigrant is integrated into our political system, votes and has some involvement in civic affairs.

These forms of assimilation are necessary but not sufficient. We were reminded again with the Fort Dix conspiracy that there are naturalized citizens, permanent residents and illegal immigrants living in our country who speak English, are gainfully employed and would like to kill as many Americans as possible.

The type of assimilation that matters most is patriotic assimilation, political loyalty, and emotional attachment to the United States.

This was accomplished in the days of Ellis Island because America's leaders, including Democrat Woodrow Wilson and Republican Theodore Roosevelt, believed that immigrants should be Americanized.

They were self-confident leaders. They didn't use weasel words like "integration." They talked openly about Americanization.

July 4, 1915, President Woodrow Wilson declared National Americanization Day. The President and his cabinet addressed naturalization ceremonies around the Nation.

The most powerful speech was delivered by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in which Brandeis declared Americanization meant that the newcomer should possess the national consciousness of an American.

In the 1990's, the late Congresswoman Barbara Jordan called for revival of Americanization and a new Americanization movement.

Yesterday, I was at a conference where Henry Cisneros said the best term is "Americanization." Unfortunately, for decades, we have implemented anti-Americanization policies—multilingual ballots, bilingual education and Executive Order 13166. This hurts assimilation.

Traditionally, the greatest indicator of assimilation is intermarriage between immigrants and the native-born.

A major new study published in the *American Sociological Review* found a big decline in interethnic marriage. The author declared, "These declines are a significant departure from past trends and reflect the growth in the immigrant population," in which Latinos are marrying Latinos, Asians marrying Latinos—and the paths are reversed, so the 1970's and 1980's and 1990's were reversed.

The Pew Hispanic Survey found that 7 months after 9/11, only 34 percent of American citizens of Latino origin consider their primary identification as American first. On the other hand, 42 percent identified with their parents' country, Mexico, El Salvador, so on—24 percent, ethnic identity first.

Professor Rumbaut's excellent work on the children of immigrants showed that after 4 years of American high school, self-identification with America and as hyphenated Americans went down. Identification with parents and birth country went up.

An article in the *Chicago Tribune* Friday, April 6 about the person in charge of the New Americans Office is, I think, very revealing.

The State official declared, "The nation-state concept is changing, where you don't have to say I am Mexican or I am American. You can be a good Mexican citizen and a good American citizen, and it is not a conflict of interest. Sovereignty is flexible."

Well, a very different view was given by the President of the United States 100 years ago in 1907. President Theodore Roosevelt said, "If the immigrant comes here in good faith, assimilates himself to us, he shall be treated on exact equality with everyone else. But this is predicated upon that person becoming an American and nothing but an American. There can be no divided allegiance here. We have room for but one loyalty, and that is loyalty to the American people."

So we are presented with two very different views of the oath of allegiance and what this means in the *Chicago Tribune* article of 2007 and Theodore Roosevelt in 1907. We will have to choose. What should we do today?

Well, it makes no sense to enact comprehensive immigration reform which means a slow-motion amnesty, a massive increase in low-skilled immigration, further exacerbating our assimilation problem.

What we need first is comprehensive assimilation reform for those immigrants who are here legally.

One, first we should dismantle the anti-assimilation regime of foreign language ballots, voting in foreign countries by dual nationals, bilingual education and Executive Order 13166.

Second, we should follow Barbara Jordan and Henry Cisneros's lead and call for Americanization, not integration.

Third, we should enforce the oath of allegiance.

I have six or seven points. They are in the written statement. I can take questions on that.

We need comprehensive assimilation reform first. Comprehensive immigration reform is not comprehensive. That is the problem. It is basically not comprehensive. It doesn't deal with assimilation.

Comprehensive immigration reform is primarily about the special interest needs of particular businesses, not the interests of the American people as a whole. It ignores assimilation and puts the market over the Nation.

But Americans must remember, we are a Nation of citizens before we are a market of consumers. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fonte follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN FONTE

May 16, 2007
House Judiciary Committee, Immigration Subcommittee
Rayburn 2141 9:30 AM
Hearing on "Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Becoming Americans-US Immigrant Integration"

Testimony "It is Time for Americanization"
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Thank you Chairman Lofgren and Ranking Member King.

(I) What do we mean by Integration?

Let us start by using the more serious and vigorous term "assimilation." There are different types of assimilation: linguistic, economic, cultural, civic, and patriotic.

Linguistic assimilation means the immigrant learns English. Economic assimilation means the immigrant does well materially and, perhaps, joins the middle class. Cultural assimilation means that the immigrant acculturates to the nation's popular cultural norms (for both good and ill). Civic assimilation or civic integration means that the immigrant is integrated into our political system, votes, pays taxes, obeys the law, and participates in public life in some fashion.

These forms of assimilation are necessary, but not sufficient. We were reminded again last week, in the Fort Dix conspiracy that there are naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents, and illegal immigrants living in our country who speak English, are gainfully employed (even entrepreneurs) who would like to kill as many Americans as possible.

The type of assimilation that ultimately matters most of all is patriotic assimilation: political loyalty and emotional attachment to the United States.

What do we mean by patriotic assimilation? First of all, patriotic assimilation does not mean giving up all ethnic traditions, customs, cuisine, and birth languages. It has nothing to do with the food one eats, the religion one practices, the affection that one feels for the land of one's birth, and the second languages that one speaks. Multiethnicity and ethnic subcultures have enriched America and have always been part of our past since colonial days.

Historically, the immigration saga has involved some "give and take" between immigrants and the native-born. That is to say, immigrants have helped shape America even as this nation has Americanized them. On the other hand, this "two way street" is

not a fifty-fifty arrangement. Thus, on the issue of “who accommodates to whom,” obviously, most of the accommodating should come from the newcomers, not from the hosts.

So what is patriotic assimilation? (or as we shall soon discuss “Americanization”). Well, one could say that patriotic assimilation occurs when a newcomer essentially adopts American civic values, the American heritage, and the story of America (what academics call the “narrative”) as his or her own. It occurs, for example, when newcomers and their children begin to think of American history as “our” history not “their” history. To give a hypothetical example, imagine an eight-grade Korean-American female student studying the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

Does she think of those events in terms of “they” or “we”? Does she envision the creation of the Constitution in Philadelphia as something that “they” (white males of European descent) were involved in 200 years before her ancestors came to America, or does she imagine the Constitutional Convention as something that “we” Americans did as part of “our” history? Does she think in terms of “we” or “they”? “We” implies patriotic assimilation. If she thinks in terms of “we” she has done what millions of immigrants and immigrant children have done in the past. She has adopted America’s story as her story, and she has adopted America’s Founders—Madison, Hamilton, Franklin, Washington—as her ancestors. (This does not mean that she, like other Americans, will not continue to argue about our history and our heritage, nor ignore the times that America has acted ignobly).

(II) Our Historic Success with Americanization

Historically America has done assimilation well. As Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer put it, “America’s genius has always been assimilation, taking immigrants and turning them into Americans.”

This was done in the days of Ellis Island because America’s leaders including Democrat Woodrow Wilson and Republican Theodore Roosevelt believed that immigrants should be “Americanized.”

They were self-confident leaders. They were not embarrassed by the need to assimilate immigrants into our way of life and by explicitly telling newcomers that “this is what we expect you to do to become Americanized.” Indeed, they didn’t use weasel words like “integration,” that suggests a lack of self-confidence. They believed in “Americanization.”

For example, on July 4, 1915 President Woodrow Wilson declared National Americanization Day. The President and his cabinet addressed naturalization ceremonies around the nation on the subject of Americanization. The most powerful speech was delivered by future Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis at Faneuil Hall in Boston in which Brandeis declared that Americanization meant that the newcomer will “possess the national consciousness of an American.”

Let us listen to Louis Brandeis talk about Americanization to new immigrants in 1915:

What is Americanization? It manifests itself, in a superficial way, when the immigrant adopts the clothes, the manners and the customs generally prevailing here. Far more important is the manifestation presented when he substitutes for his mother tongue the English language as the common medium of speech. But the adoption of our language, manners and customs is only a small part of the process. To become Americanized the change wrought must be fundamental. However great his outward conformity, the immigrant is not Americanized unless his interests and affections have become deeply rooted here. And we properly demand of the immigrant even more than this - he must be brought into complete harmony with our ideals and aspirations and cooperate with us for their attainment. Only when this has been done will he possess the national consciousness of an American."

Wouldn't it be wonderful to hear an American national leader talk like Louis Brandeis today? President Wilson also gave a strong Americanization speech. While Brandeis spoke in Boston, Wilson made the following remarks in Philadelphia.

I certainly would not be one to even suggest that a man cease to love the home of his birth... these things are very sacred and ought not to be put out of our hearts—but it is one thing to love the place where you were born and it is another thing to dedicate yourself to the place to which you go. You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans. You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars and Stripes.

In a sense the views of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and Louis Brandeis on the need to foster assimilation go back to the Founders of our nation. Indeed, President George Washington explicitly stated the need to assimilate immigrants in a letter to Vice-President John Adams.

"...the policy or advantage of [immigration] taking place in a body (I mean the settling of them in a body) may be much questioned; for, by so doing, they retain the language, habits, and principles (good or bad) which they bring with them. Whereas by an intermixture with our people, they, or

their descendants, get assimilated to our customs, measures, laws: in a word soon become one people."

The Present Day: Americanization and Anti-Americanization

During the 1990s, one of the great members of the House of Representatives, the late Congresswoman Barbara Jordan called for a revival of the concept of Americanization and for a New Americanization movement. Jordan wrote an article in the New York Times on September 11, 1995 entitled the "The Americanization Ideal," in which she explicitly called for the Americanization of immigrants. We should heed her words today.

Unfortunately, for decades we have implemented what could truly be called anti-Americanization, anti-assimilation, and anti-integration policies—Multilingual ballots, bi-lingual education, executive order 13166 that insists on official multilingualism, immigrant dual allegiance including voting and running for office in foreign countries, and the promotion of multiculturalism over American unity in our public schools.

The anti-assimilation policies listed above did not place in a vacuum. They are all connected and related to the larger picture. All of these policies and attitudes have hurt assimilation.

(III) Let us examine how assimilation has become more problematic in recent years.

Traditionally the greatest indicator of assimilation is intermarriage among ethnic groups and between immigrants and native-born. Unfortunately a new major study published in the American Sociological Review by Ohio State Professor Zhenchao Qian found a big decline in inter-ethnic marriage. Professor Qian declared, "These declines ... are significant a departure from past trends" and "reflect the growth in the immigrant population" with Latinos marrying Latinos and Asians marrying Asians.

The survey found that even as recently as the 1970s and 1980s there was an increase in intermarriage between immigrants and native born citizens. In the 1990s however, this situation was reversed with intermarriage between immigrants and native-born declining. Mass low-skilled immigration was an implicit factor cited in the Ohio State University Research bulletin. The researchers pointed out the immigrants with higher education levels were more likely to marry outside their immediate ethnic group and the reverse was true for immigrants with less education. In recent years our immigration policy favors the less education and lower skilled.

My fellow witness, Professor Rumbaut has done some excellent work examining assimilation among the children of immigrants. With Professor Alejandro Portes he produced the "The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study," of over 5,000 students from 49 schools in the Miami, Florida and San Diego, California areas. Portes carried out the research in Miami. Their joint findings were published by the University of California Press in 2001 as *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. The parents of the students came from 77 different countries, although in the Miami area they were

primarily from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Columbia. In San Diego there were large numbers from Mexico, the Philippines, and Viet Nam.

Portes and Rumbaut pointed out that it is significant that although the youths' knowledge of English increased during their three or four years of school between the longitudinal interviews, their American identity decreased:

“Moreover, the direction of the shift is noteworthy. If the rapid shift to English... was to have been accompanied by a similar acculturative shift in ethnic identity, then we should have seen an increase over time in the proportion of youths identifying themselves as American, with or without a hyphen, and a decrease in the proportion retaining an attachment to a foreign national identity. But... results of the 1995 survey point in exactly the opposite direction.”

In other words, linguistic assimilation has increased, but patriotic assimilation has decreased. After four years of American high school the children of immigrants are less likely to consider themselves Americans. Moreover, the heightened salience (or importance) of the foreign identity was very strong. Portes and Rumbaut declare that:

Once again, foreign national identities command the strongest level of allegiance and attachment: over 71% of the youths so identifying considered that identity to be very important to them, followed by 57.2% hyphenates, 52.8% of the pan-ethnics, and only 42% of those identifying as plain American. The later [plain American] emerges as the ‘thinnest’ identity. Significantly, in the 1995 survey, almost all immigrants groups posted losses in plain American identities.... Even private-school Cubans, over a third of whom had identified as American in 1992, abandoned that identity almost entirely by 1995-1996.

In 2002 the Pew Hispanic Survey revealed that around seven months after 9/11 only 34% of American citizens of Hispanic origin consider their primary identification American. On the other hand, 42% identified first with their parent's country of origin (Mexico, El Salvador, etc) and 24% put ethnic (Latino, Hispanic) identity first.

An empirical survey of Muslims in Los Angeles was conducted in the 1990s by religious scholar Kambiz Ghanea Bassiri (a professor at Reed College). The study found that only one of ten Muslim immigrants surveyed felt more allegiance to the United States than to a foreign Muslim nation. Specifically, 45% of the Muslims surveyed had more loyalty to an Islamic nation-state than the United States; 32% said their loyalties “were about the same” between the US and a Muslim nation-state; 13% were “not sure” which loyalty was stronger; and 10% were more loyal to the United States than any Muslim nation.

All of this data suggests problems with assimilation.

In a *Chicago Tribune* article on April 7, the head of the Office of New Americans in Illinois, the person in charge of assimilation in the state, made the following statement.

"The nation-state concept is changing. You don't have to say, 'I am Mexican,' or, 'I am American.' You can be a good Mexican citizen and a good American citizen and not have that be a conflict of interest. Sovereignty is flexible."

He is a dual citizen who is actively involved in Mexican politics. He votes in both the US and Mexico and is active in political campaigns in both nations. His political allegiance is clearly divided. He will not choose one nation over the other.

One hundred years ago the President of the United States in 1907, Theodore Roosevelt, expressed a different point of view:

"... If the immigrant who comes here in good faith becomes an American and assimilates himself to us, he shall be treated on an exact equality with everyone else, for it is an outrage to discriminate against any such man because of creed, or birthplace, or origin. But this is predicated upon the man's becoming in very fact an American, and nothing but an American... There can be no divided allegiance here. we have room for but one sole loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people."

Those are two very different views of the meaning of the oath of allegiance in which the new citizens promises to "absolutely and entirely" renounce all allegiance to any foreign state.

(IV) What is to be done?

What do we do then, in a practical sense? For one thing, it makes no sense to enact so-called comprehensive immigration reform, which means both a slow motion amnesty and a massive increase in low skilled immigration further exacerbating our assimilation problems. What we do need is comprehensive assimilation reform for those immigrants who are here legally.

First, we have to dismantle the anti-assimilation regime of foreign language ballots, dual allegiance voting by American citizens in foreign countries, bi-lingual education, and executive order 13166.

Second, we should follow Barbara Jordan's lead and explicitly call for the Americanization of immigrants, not integration.

Third, we should enforce the oath of allegiance. The Oath should mean what it says:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or

*Mr. Fonte's statement records the date of the "Chicago *Tribune* article" as appearing on April 7. The correct date that the article appeared is April 6.

sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or a citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.

Clearly, if we are a serious people, naturalized citizens should not be voting and running for office in their birth nations.

Fourth, Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee has introduced bi-partisan legislation “to promote the patriotic integration of prospective citizens into the American way of life by providing civics, history and English as a second language courses.” There is a “specific emphasis” on “attachment to the principles of the Constitution” and to the “heroes of American history (including military heroes).” This initiative will be administered by the Office of Citizenship in the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Also, this legislation incorporates “a knowledge and understanding of the Oath of Allegiance into the history and government test given to applicants for citizenship.” This amendment passed the Senate last year by 91-1. Its enactment should be implemented with or without any “comprehensive” measure.

Fifth the mandate of the Office of Citizenship should be to assist our new fellow citizens in understanding the serious moral commitment that they are making in taking the Oath, and “bearing true faith and allegiance” to American liberal democracy.

Because we are a multiethnic, multiracial, multireligious country, our nationhood is not based on ethnicity, race, or religion, but, instead, on a shared loyalty to our constitutional republic and its liberal democratic principles. If immigration to America is going to continue to be the great success story that it has been in the past, it is essential that newcomers have an understanding of and attachment to our democratic republic, our heritage, and our civic principles.

To this end, the Office of Citizenship should strengthen the current educational materials used by applicants for American citizenship. Since the Oath of Allegiance is the culmination of the naturalization process, an examination of the Oath and what it means, “to bear true faith and allegiance” to the United States Constitution should be part of those educational materials, and should be included on any citizenship test. Further, the Office could (1) examine ways to make citizenship training and the swearing-in ceremony more meaningful; (2) cooperate with other government agencies that work with immigrants such as the U.S Department of Education’s English Literacy-Civics

program; and (3) continue to reexamine the citizenship test to see how it can be improved (as it is currently doing, so kudos to the Office of Citizenship on this point).

Sixth English Literacy Civics (formerly English as a Second Language-Civics or ESL-Civics) is a federal program that provides grants to teach English with a civics education emphasis to non-native speakers. The program is administered by the US Department of Education through the states. The money goes to adult education schools, community colleges, and non-governmental organizations to integrate civic instruction into English language learning.

Logically, EL-Civics is a program that should promote the Americanization of immigrants. As noted, in becoming American citizens, immigrants pledge, “True faith and allegiance” to American liberal democracy. This requires some knowledge of our history and our values. If the money expended annually on EL-Civics assisted our future fellow citizens in understanding America’s heritage and civic values, the money would be well spent. This appears to have been the intent of Congress in creating the program in the first place.

Unfortunately, there are problems with EL-Civics programs. In many federally funded EL-Civics classes “civics” is defined narrowly as pertaining almost exclusively to mundane day to day tasks such as how to take public transportation or make a doctor’s appointment. Obviously, these “life-coping skills” (as they are called in the jargon) could be part of EL-Civics classes, but the classes should focus primarily on American values, or what veteran civic educator Robert Pickus calls “Idea Civics.”

The problem is that many state guidelines for EL-Civics are rigid and inflexible. These state guidelines have been influenced heavily by language professionals; who define “civics” in a very narrow way, and resist the idea of teaching American values through English language training.

It is time to put American civic principles at the head of the taxpayer supported English Literacy Civics program. Federal guidelines to the states should be revised, insisting on the use of solid content materials that emphasize our American heritage, and our civic and patriotic values. In our post-9-11 world, “Idea Civics,” that will assist newcomers in understanding the meaning of “bearing true faith and allegiance” to our democratic republic must be emphasized.

In sum, it is time to promote the patriotic assimilation of immigrants into the mainstream of American life. Today as in the past, patriotic assimilation is a necessary component of any successful immigration policy. This does not mean that we should blindly replicate all the past Americanization policies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. But it does mean that we have much to learn from our great historical success. In the final analysis it means that we should draw on a usable past, exercise common sense, and develop an Americanization policy that will be consist with our principles and effective in today’s world.

(V) What about “Comprehensive Immigration Reform”

The irony is that so-called “comprehensive” immigration reform is not “comprehensive.” There are no serious assimilation components to the legislation. Moreover the eventual promised amnesty and the massive increase in low-skilled immigration promoted by this formula would weaken assimilation. Assimilation policy cannot be separated from immigration policy. We need comprehensive assimilation reform (for legal immigrants), before we need comprehensive immigration.

Unfortunately, comprehensive immigration reform is primarily about the special interest needs of particular businesses, not the interests of the American people as a whole. It ignores assimilation and puts the market over the nation, but Americans must always remember that we are a nation of citizens before we are a market of consumers.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Dr. Fonte.

We will now begin questioning by Members of the Committee, and I will start off. We have just 5 minutes apiece.

I would like to ask Dr. Rumbaut—Dr. Fonte just mentioned you and a study that you did about the affiliation of teenagers and their loyalty to the United States. Have you done any additional longitudinal studies on that subject?

Mr. RUMBAUT. Yes. Dr. Fonte was referring to data from the second wave of interviews from our CILS study, which were published in a book called *Legacies* that he was referring to.

We have continued to follow that sample of thousands of young people into their mid-20's, and we have continued to ask questions about language, about identity, about some of the issues that he has been talking about.

I would make a couple of comments in response to that. First, when you ask young people when they are 17 years old and 18 years ago what their identity is, and they are in high school and so on, their sense of self, their self definitions, their identities and so on reflect the context of an adolescent culture in high school, their peers and so on.

In the United States, that is heavily weighted to racial notions of racial identities which are made in the USA.

A lot of kids are using the national origin of their parents as a response to what their racial identity is, and they are not talking really about national identity or patriotic identities, but how they fit in the particular subculture of the high school where they happen to be at.

Ms. LOFGREN. Does that change after graduation?

Mr. RUMBAUT. It changes. By their mid-20's, we saw a complete reversal back to patterns that had been seen at the time one baseline survey, so that dissipates.

Second, some of the most striking responses to a national identity that we observed in 1995, which is what Dr. Fonte was referring to, was among Mexicans in Southern California.

We went into the field immediately after the passage of Prop 187 in California and it was in reaction to that, what we call reactive ethnicity, that an assertion of a national identity as Mexican was made even by U.S.-born Mexican-Americans because of perceived discrimination and prejudice against their nationality as a whole.

That again dissipates. When we asked the same question to Mexicans in Florida at the same time that Prop 187 was passed in California, we saw an assimilative pattern among Mexicans in Florida, but we didn't see that among those that were responding to conditions of discrimination and prejudice.

So a lot of what this debate about identities entails is a response to what the larger context in which they are assimilating—it is composed of.

Assimilation has never been about simply individual acculturation on the part of an immigrant. It has always entailed an absence of prejudice and discrimination on the part of the whole society. It takes two to assimilate. It takes two to tango.

It was Robert Park 100 years ago, one of the leading sociologists of assimilation in the country at the University of Chicago at the

time, who said that the most acculturated American at the time was the American Negro.

He said the American Negro is an English-only-speaking Protestant. And yet, he was the least assimilated in this society—

Ms. LOFGREN. Because of discrimination.

Mr. RUMBAUT [continuing]. Not because of a lack of acculturation but because of the caste restrictions that were imposed on him by the host country.

Ms. LOFGREN. I found your study on language absolutely fascinating, because it matches so much what I find at home, where my colleagues who are second generation are pulling their hair out because their kids are monolingual English and cannot speak to their grandparents.

And you really identified the death of foreign languages in the United States, which I think adds some other issues that—it would be nice if we had more people who could speak another language.

But do you see any chance that English will stop being the common language of the United States from your studies?

Mr. RUMBAUT. Absolutely not. In fact, you talk about what you see at home. My wife, who is of Mexican origin, and I have been trying to raise a bilingual child. If there is anyone committed to bilingualism in the United States and sees the benefits of it, it is me.

It was my wife and me against Michigan. And now we moved to Southern California and we thought he would be in a context where he is bilingual. We talk to him in Spanish, and he answers only in English.

Ms. LOFGREN. Right. My time is almost up.

I would like to ask Dr. Gerstle, is there a preset number where America should say, “We can’t accept any more immigrants because they would not become American because there are too many of them,” in your judgment?

Mr. GERSTLE. I don’t think there is a preset number. I made the point in my statement today and in the longer statement that immigration density was far greater 100 years ago than it is today.

Ms. LOFGREN. My time has expired, and I am going to try and be good about that.

Mr. King?

Mr. KING. Thank you, Madam Chair.

First, I would note that although when the process kicked off some time yesterday afternoon, by the time the testimony reached me, the chickens had gone to roost, so I didn’t have an opportunity to read thoroughly through all the testimony. I have scanned most of it.

Dr. Rumbaut, I understand that you have a lot of material here, and I appreciate that input, and hopefully I can review it after this hearing.

I would like to turn first to Dr. Gerstle and your statement about the numbers of immigrants and the percentage and the concentration.

If I recall, and I do, the U.S. census reports, the first ones we got on immigration were in 1820, and you go to that year yourself when you tabulate those numbers.

And I have done back to those PDF files and reviewed—and they are a little hard to see, but they are on the computer and you can

find them on the Internet—and totaled those numbers from 1820 until the year 2000, which would be our last census.

And there, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, we have 66.1 million immigrants in that number. That doesn't match up with the numbers in your testimony. Can you explain that discrepancy?

Mr. GERSTLE. Well, calculating the total number of immigrants who have come to this country turns out to be rather difficult because one has to account not only for those who came and stayed but for the very significant numbers who came and went home, so I think—

Mr. KING. Where do your numbers come from, though, please?

Mr. GERSTLE. They come from the census materials.

Mr. KING. Then why don't we match?

Mr. GERSTLE. Well, because there are instances in the past where those who have come have sometimes gone home, and sometimes those who came have also gone unrecorded and have been undocumented.

Mr. KING. But do you use some other information to add to that number? Because when I look at those numbers, they are finite numbers, so I don't see any latitude there to expand that number or subtract from it.

Mr. GERSTLE. I can get those—I don't have that data with me today, but—

Mr. KING. I would appreciate it if you would—

Mr. GERSTLE [continuing]. I can get those for you.

Mr. KING [continuing]. For the benefit of this Committee. And then I look at today, we are 11 percent immigrants, and that includes 35 million, 12 million of which are counted as illegal. And a lot of us believe that number is greater. That takes us up to 11 percent.

And if you go to the high water mark, the immigrant number concentration in the population is 14 percent roughly a century ago.

So I am having trouble understanding the statement that we would have to multiply our current immigration number by a factor of four to meet the concentration level at the high water mark.

Mr. GERSTLE. Well, I was referring to those who are coming in annually at the height of that immigration period, where the numbers approached or exceeded a million a year.

And a few years ago, the numbers coming into the United States were calculated to have reached that level. And that was advertised at the time as being the all-time high.

My point there is those million a year coming into the United States now are coming into a society of approximately 300 million people.

Mr. KING. That would be the legal ones.

Mr. GERSTLE. Yes, whereas those coming in—

Mr. KING. Excuse me, Dr. Gerstle. I do have to measure my time a little bit. But I appreciate your testimony and your answers.

And I would like to turn, if I could, to Mr. Kerwin, and in your testimony, your statement here that there is a real concentrated interest in naturalization—and if I look at the naturalization numbers—I go back to 1970 of those—and according to the USCIS, they

show that immigrants who were admitted prior to 1970 naturalized at a rate of 82 percent.

Those from 1970 to 1979 naturalized at a rate of 66 percent, and from 1980 to 1989, 45 percent. You see the trend. From 1900 to the year 2000, it fell to 13 percent.

So how can U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services have a number that shows a dramatic decline over a period of 30 years from 82 percent to 13 percent—how can that comport with your statement that there is an interest in naturalization?

Mr. KERWIN. Well, as I understand it, the most recent study by Pew Hispanic Center shows that there has actually been an increase in naturalization among lawful immigrants, legal permanent residents. It is not—

Mr. KING. Would you allow there is a lot of room for improvement?

Mr. KERWIN. Oh, absolutely. And that is the point of our study. And what we would like to do is we would like to take the entities that were involved and key in integrating immigrants in the past and get them together—the Federal Government, churches, charitable agencies, civic associations—

Mr. KING. Let me say, if I might, Mr. Kerwin, you make a lot of good points in your testimony.

Mr. KERWIN. Thank you.

Mr. KING. And I could take issue with some parts of it, but there are a lot of good points that I think we all need to review.

And I would like to quickly, if I could, turn to Dr. Fonte, and you referenced intermarriage, and I would ask this question.

The reduction in the amount of intermarriages that we have, interracial intermarriage—could that be—and what are your thoughts on it—being the result of the effects of multiculturalism that might tend to isolate young Americans in those ethnic enclaves rather than being further assimilated into the broader society where they would have contact with people of different areas of the society?

Mr. FONTE. Yes, I think that is part of it, and the research from a Ohio State University professor said the main point was we are bringing in large numbers of unskilled immigrants with low education, and people usually marry within their group in this particular category, so Latinos are marrying Latinos, and Asians are marrying Asians.

So this is a complete reversal in the 1990's from what we saw in the 1970's and 1980's. So it has something to do with numbers, and as you suggest, large numbers of unskilled folks are marrying each other.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Fonte.

I would yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you.

The Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Conyers, is recognized.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

This is a great discussion we are having. And if we could only find a way to get around the 5-minute rule, because there is so much. I have been looking very carefully, Dr. Fonte, to find something that you and I agree upon. We have got to have a starting point here.

And I may have it when you say that multiethnicity and ethnic subcultures have enriched America and have been part of our past since Colonial days.

Now, that is a good starting point, isn't it?

Mr. FONTE. We agree.

Mr. CONYERS. But the executive orders—intermarriage—it was against the law until 1967 when a Supreme Court case made it legal for couples to decide to cross the line. The Clinton executive order didn't bother me that much.

But let's get to what seems to be the heart of the matter in a couple minutes. English-language-only laws—that is what seems to be bugging a lot of people in the Congress and outside, too.

Now, would English-language-only laws help promote immigrants into Americanization? There, I used your term.

Mr. FONTE. And Barbara Jordan's term.

Mr. CONYERS. Who wants to try that?

Dr. Rumbaut?

Mr. RUMBAUT. I would argue that exactly the opposite would happen. Much as you saw with the instance of identity expressions and so on, the moment you try to coerce and to impose a rule on someone and tell them what you can and you cannot speak, you are going to engender a reaction to that.

The best way to Americanize, in Barbara Jordan's sense, is to treat the process of assimilation or Americanization as a seduction.

People will become American because they desire to. They don't become American or speak English because they are told to, or because they are required to.

All that would do is end up driving a wedge in immigrant families, between parents and children, and it would end up creating far more unintended but serious problems than you are trying to achieve.

Besides, there is no need for it when you look at the evidence that you have in front of you. There is no need to require people to speak a language when they are all moving toward it at historic speeds.

Mr. CONYERS. Dr. Gerstle, answer that, and talk with me about the impression I have had since the mid-1960's that innumerable swearing-in ceremonies of people becoming naturalized citizens—where the pride and the patriotism, the loyalty, the excitement, the dedication is so overpowering—I mean, you take that away, and then they have—in Detroit, you have—right outside the swearing-in ceremony, you can register to vote, right on the spot, as soon as you are given the oath.

Talk to me about that and the previous question with the time I have left.

Mr. GERSTLE. I second what Dr. Rumbaut said. We are struggling with this issue in Nashville, Tennessee, now, where an English-only ordinance was put forward by the city council, attracted hundreds of people to meetings. It was ultimately passed by the council and then vetoed by the mayor—splits among Democrats and Republicans in that place.

And I think the feeling was, and it is a feeling that I agree with, that it would be more of a barrier to integration and involving people in America than it would be a benefit.

Historically, there were efforts in the 1920's to have English-only laws. There were efforts to banish private schools where any language was taught other than English.

There was an effort to impose on public schools complete teaching of English every period of the day. The teaching of foreign languages was curtailed.

Several of these were thrown out by the courts. It did have this effect. It did mobilize the immigrant community and made them realize the importance of participating in politics, naturalizing, engaging American democracy, learning it, participating in it. And that, I believe, is their most important school.

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte?

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing. It is, I agree with the Chairman, very interesting.

Dr. Gerstle, I was very interested in your testimony regarding the capacity of our country to assimilate. And I am not sure that I disagree with you, but I am very concerned that it is not happening.

The evidence cited by the gentleman from Iowa regarding the dramatic downward trends of permanent residents applying for citizenship from 80 percent in the 1960's down to 13 percent in the last decade is very disturbing.

What do you attribute that to? Why are we failing to assimilate?

Mr. GERSTLE. The first thing I would say is that this country went through a really tough period in the 1960's and 1970's, where all kinds of people became very anti-American, native-born and foreign-born alike.

And this had to do with frustration over civil rights, a frustration over the Vietnam War. The origins of multiculturalism are as an anti-American creed—one's ethnicity, one's ethnic identity, is preferable to one's American identity.

So I think the decline in loyalty and belief in America happened across the board, and it happened among immigrants and the native-born.

Mr. GOODLATTE. During that decade, 82 percent of permanent residents who became eligible for citizenship during that decade applied for citizenship. In the 1980's, when you didn't have that, it was dramatically down.

In the 1990's, the so-called Clinton era, it was plummeting. And I don't know what it has been for the last decade, but those figures would seem to rebut, not support, your contention that—

Mr. GERSTLE. Well, I would be very interested to see—I don't have them handy—what the figures are for the last couple years, and to see if they have ticked upward in that regard.

A couple things are important. First, I think length of residence of time is very important in terms of naturalization. If we look at the historical period, we find very low rates of naturalization among European groups for very long periods of time.

In fact, if you look at the census and naturalization figures in 1920, you would find only a quarter of many of these Eastern and Southern European populations having naturalized, and many of

those people had been there 20 years or 25 years. The 1920's and 1930's are the big decades of naturalization.

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. We will take a look at that.

Let me ask you about another subject, dual citizenship. As you may know, the Supreme Court ruled a number of years ago that you couldn't deprive an individual of their citizenship in another country. They could maintain that even upon swearing allegiance to the United States.

Do you think that is a good thing or a bad thing? Does that help assimilation? Is it good that somebody is voting for elected officials in another country elsewhere in the world as well as participating in the United States?

Mr. GERSTLE. I think it is a worldwide phenomenon that most countries are moving toward this and reflects, I think, the degree to which people move around the world and are comfortable with that. I think it would be difficult to resist that.

I would say that the most—

Mr. GOODLATTE. Is it dual citizenship or is it no citizenship if effectively people are choosing in such low numbers to affiliate themselves with the United States?

Mr. GERSTLE. I don't think it is no citizenship. I think citizenship and integration—and I am very comfortable using the word Americanization. Assimilation is a more problematic term that maybe we can talk about later.

But these happen through institutions and through the engagement of immigrants in the practice of American politics.

If we find ways to do that, to bring them into American politics, give them a sense of a stake in the political system through their representatives, mobilize them in this way, that will lead to a deepening attachment to America and appreciation for this country's heritage of freedom.

Mr. GOODLATTE. I hope you are right.

Let me ask Dr. Fonte, would an official English language be helpful in promoting that assimilation?

Mr. FONTE. I think that that would be fine as a statement of *E Pluribus Unum*. I think there is no reason we shouldn't all be voting in English. That gives the signal that we are all in this together.

It hurts the immigrant and the ethnic group if the immigrant is only following the election—you could do this—following the foreign-language venue, but you wouldn't have a full range of the debates. You wouldn't have all the arguments out there. So it hurts the immigrant more than anyone else, I would think.

Mr. GOODLATTE. What about the issue of dual citizenship?

Mr. FONTE. I think dual allegiance is a problem. If someone is voting and holding office, running for office in a foreign country—Felix Frankfurter, one of our great Supreme Court justices, says this shows allegiance to a foreign power incompatible with allegiance to the United States.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Could we retest that in the Supreme Court?

Mr. FONTE. What we could do is pass legislation. Earl Warren, who favored this decision, said you couldn't lose your citizenship, but he said there could be laws against voting in a foreign country, serving in a foreign government.

So it could be made simply against the law by legislation, and not—someone wouldn't lose their citizenship, but they are unlikely to do it if it is against the law.

So measures could be taken. I think they should be taken, because this is going to be a major problem for us and in the past. We had a person elected to the Mexican Congress last—in 2004 who is an American citizen, and his loyalty now is obviously to the Mexican Congress.

Ms. LOFGREN. Dr. Fonte, if you could wrap up.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.

The gentleman, Mr. Luis Gutierrez of Illinois?

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you very much.

I want to thank all of the panel. I hope that the Ranking Member does find time to read Dr. Rumbaut's documentation that he sent before the Committee.

I think it is very important that the one time that we do have somebody from the Latino community come before this Committee that we at least read the testimony that he or she has submitted, given that most of the ire and focus has been on the Latino community and Latino immigrants, as though they were the only immigrants to the United States of America, when, indeed, we know that 40 percent of the undocumented never crossed that border.

They came here through a legal fashion—and that there are, indeed, millions of undocumented immigrants.

We watched LegalizeTheIrish.org come here before the Congress, and the Polish community, and the Ukrainian community, the Filipino community, from so many different other nations, enriching this great Nation. So I hope that we would take time.

I would like to also say to Dr. Rumbaut, thank you so much for coming and giving the personal testimony, and I just want to share with you, the only reason my daughters speak Spanish is because we enrolled them in Spanish immersion classes from kindergarten to eighth grade.

And I thank the public school system of Chicago for having those classes, because if it were up to me and my wife, who are bilingual but only speak English at home and rarely watch Univision or Telemundo—unless, of course, we want news that is relevant to our community in the evening, and we want to find out what really happened in our neighborhood and in our life—well, we put them on. But this is the experience.

I would hope that Members of the Committee would just take some time to visit immigrant communities and walk among the immigrant community, and they would find that if you want to pass English-only, that is fine.

It is a waste of time, a waste of money, to enforce it, because obviously—my parents didn't come here as immigrants. They came here as migrants from Puerto Rico, but they were monolingual. They only spoke Spanish.

And as we look at assimilation, I think we also have to look at segregation, the kind of society that we live in.

The fact is I became more assimilated as I grew older, because economic and social possibilities were afforded to me that were not afforded to me as a youth.

I grew up in a Puerto Rican neighborhood. Most everyone I knew was Puerto Rican—my parents, my family, the church I went to on Sunday, where my parents worked almost every—I mean, that is part of American society.

It is an unfortunate part of American society that segregation exists, but if we are going to deal with this “assimilation,” I think we should also look at the underlying bias and prejudice that sometimes raises its ugly head, unfortunately, in our great American society that stops people from becoming assimilated into American society.

As you become older—well, my kids are now going to college. And my grandson—we are going to have a real big problem with the grandson. Unfortunately, it is going to be a tough battle.

Mr. RUMBAUT. As they say in Brooklyn, “Fuggetaboutit.”

Mr. GUTIERREZ. “Fuggetaboutit.” We are going to have a tough problem. And I shared this with my colleagues on the other side to say fear not, my parents only spoke Spanish.

I obviously have some English proficiency that has allowed me to come here to the Congress of the United States. It may not be as great as Members on the other side of the aisle, but I try each and every day.

And my daughters—I assure you, we have spent an inordinate amount of money. I do it because I want to maintain that rich cultural history and linguistic history. But I also do it because I want to make sure the job opportunities and economic opportunities are available to them as things are posted in the newspaper, bilingual preferred, by a large American national corporation, so that American citizens can produce goods and distribute those goods throughout the world, and we can become a more prosperous Nation.

People do buy goods because they are advertised in another language. And as Dr. Rumbaut knows, Univision isn’t entirely owned by Latinos, much less Telemundo, which is owned by G.E. and NBC. I mean, so these corporations are not just Latino corporations.

I would like to say to all of the witnesses thank you so much, and I would hope that we would simply read the literature, because instead of English-only, I wish we could all get together, because I could join my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.

Let’s fund English classes. Let’s fund them and let’s open up centers, and you will find that they will be filled to capacity. People want to learn English in this country.

They aren’t given the ability to learn English, number one. Well, part of the reason is the segregation, and the other is access to educational opportunities.

I thank the witnesses.

And I want to thank the gentlelady from California, our Chairwoman, for putting this wonderful panel together.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Gohmert?

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

And I do appreciate my colleague’s comments about English classes. You probably have a very good idea there.

One of my closest friends in Tyler, Texas, said, you know, his parents, both of them, came from Mexico, and speaking English

was a struggle, but they opened two restaurants that are two of our best in Tyler. And they made clear that their children were to learn English, that if they were going to reach their potential in this country they needed to speak good English. And they speak probably better than I.

But it does seem that some well-meaning people encourage and want to allow people to continue to speak Spanish, which to me is almost a form of discrimination, because that would prevent individuals from reaching their potential.

And my friend, Mr. Ramirez, at home has been a city councilman and a county commissioner, and that wouldn't have happened had he not spoken such excellent English and been able to communicate ideas so effectively.

But I go back to some of those things that were said here, and I admire greatly, Dr. Rumbaut, your testimonial. My great-grandfather came over in the late 1700's, didn't speak English, but he did two things. He learned to speak English and he worked his tail off.

And within 25 years, he built one of the nicest homes in Cuero, Texas. It is still there with a historic marker on it.

I am curious, just as a hypothetical, if something tragic happened and all of us in this room were wiped out—although there are those that might say if I were wiped out it wouldn't be all that tragic, but for the rest it might be—this is being recorded.

Dr. Rumbaut, where would you want your loved ones to have your remains placed, whether cremation or burial? Where would you want them to place you? You have moved around. You have seen the best of all kinds of places. What do you think?

Mr. RUMBAUT. I can tell you that my brother is here. I have a sister in Texas that has an urn containing the ashes of my father.

And we are waiting for the politically appropriate moment in which, at his request, to take his ashes to Cienfuegos, which is a city in Cuba where he was born and where he first saw the sea, and so on. On the other hand, his name was Rubén Dario Rumbaut.

My son is named Rubén Dario Rumbaut after my father. He was born in Michigan. He is a Detroit Pistons fan, a Detroit Red Wings fan. He is a Detroit Tigers fan. We are in Anaheim now, but he doesn't follow the Angels. He doesn't follow the Ducks. He is, "The Red Wings, go, Red Wings," and so on.

He knows that his grandfather came from Cuba and so on, but he would have no attachment to that whatsoever. He would not want to be buried there. If anything, he would want to go back to Detroit.

We all form our own attachments in the context of our lives. There is no plot out there that says that immigrants want to go back and that they are fifth columns—

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, but I take it from your answer you hadn't made that decision yet yourself.

And I appreciate the discussion of other individuals.

Mr. RUMBAUT. Unimportant.

Mr. GOHMERT. Where you would want—

Mr. RUMBAUT. It is unimportant, what happens to me. What is important is what I do with my life. It is as I told Mr. Conyers, “Aspire to inspire before you expire”——

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. So that is what you want your loved ones to know.

If you go back to my question, it was—but you say it doesn’t matter.

Mr. RUMBAUT. It will be in the United States.

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. Well, there we go. We got to the answer eventually. Thank you.

But you know, I appreciate—Dr. Gerstle, you had indicated about immigration in the last century or so—how many of the individuals back 100 years ago—I know my great-grandfather would be in this group.

He put his stake down in Texas, and despite nearly all of his family being in Europe, he had no intention of going back there. Do you know how many in those days asked to be buried or had their remains sent back to their country of origin?

Mr. GERSTLE. No, I don’t think we have that kind of data. In fact, it is tremendously hard simply to find out who went back and how many.

We have historians looking at ship registers to find out when they came, and then other ship registers in the subsequent 5 years, 10 years, 15 years to find out when they went back. So it is incredibly hard to do that.

Not every group who came here looked to go back. It is just among the majority of Eastern and Southern Europeans who came for the first 10 years or 15 years, probably a majority were thinking of going back. Some went back and some didn’t make it.

Mr. GOHMERT. In conclusion, if I could—as a history major and a fan of history, I can’t help but wonder—as nations throughout world history rose and fell, often they were becoming more fractured from more widespread de-assimilation. And I can’t help but wonder if there weren’t experts back in those days saying, “It is not happening, and if it is, it is a good thing,” so——

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlelady from Texas?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairwoman, and I certainly thank the indulgence of the Ranking Member.

I thank the witnesses for their very thoughtful testimony. The lack of questions to any of you does not reflect the importance of your testimony.

But this is a very emotional roller coaster that we are on. It is a chicken and egg, Dr. Rumbaut, frankly. If we don’t have comprehensive immigration reform, we never get to where our colleagues are wanting us to go.

Many of us have legislative initiatives that really speak to some of their concerns, if we could get out of the start gate.

Our language in the Save America Comprehensive Immigration bill that I have, the STRIVE Act—all talk about—in the earned access to legalization talks about an English requirement, talks about—in particular, my bill talks about community service. And in fact, it has the word Americanization, words that we are not really running away from, and words that you are speaking to.

So, first of all, I would like you to just say yes or no. These are elements that populations would not run away from if we had comprehensive immigration reform—that people are not running away from learning English. They are not running away from—if you wanted to do community service, our Chairman of the full Committee already said the first person that lost their life in Iraq was an undocumented person.

When I traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I see the array—the potpourri of faces that represent the United States that are American, I have never seen any diminishing of patriotism among those young Hispanic soldiers, young Asian soldiers, young African-American soldiers.

So I guess just a yes or no, do you think the immigrant community, if a comprehensive immigration reform bill—would run away from the concept of English, Americanization, community service?

Mr. RUMBAUT. Absolutely not.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And let me probe you a little bit more, because this is an important question. And I wish the honorable Barbara Jordan that preceded me some few years back was here to speak for herself, because one thing that I knew her as in life was a person who grew, who looked at the landscape and would not stand for denying due process or fairness to anyone.

So she is not here to speak for herself, and the word “Americanization” and all of her language—I guess they don’t remember the words in this Committee that said, “We, the people,” will not be denied constitutional rights.

But moving forward, I raised teenagers. I raised them in an integrated high school, so call it, in Houston, Texas. There was the Latino-Hispanic table, the African-American table, the Caucasian table, the Asian table. And if anybody saw the movie *Freedom Writers*, that really captures what our young people are going through. And they achieve this identity.

If you remember the Black Power movement, if you remember the movement where I was in in college, all of us were going back to Africa, and we were citizens, but we were all going back. We were going to the motherland.

There is this emotional draw to your ethnicity. But I tell you, as somewhat of an adult over 21, the tragedy of 9/11—I didn’t see one dry eye, no matter what color you were.

I don’t know why we are struggling and caught in the quagmire of people’s identity, when identities give pride, are valuable for America. So could you just respond to this—I think you did talk about it—teenagers’ identity?

It is completely different from rejecting becoming Americanized, completely different.

And if there are other panelists—Mr. Kerwin, you want to speak, too, and Dr. Fonte—completely different from this concept of never learning English and never becoming American.

I will start with you, Dr. Rumbaut.

Mr. RUMBAUT. I would say very briefly—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you remember the Black Power movement and all of us—many of us of my culture going to the motherland?

Mr. RUMBAUT. I was marching—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We still do want to go.

Mr. RUMBAUT. I understand completely. I remember Barbara Jordan very, very well. You resemble her in many ways. And I would say simply, very briefly, that part of the problem is framing all these issues in either/or terms.

There is no contradiction in being proud of one's heritage and being proud of one's roots, in wanting to go back to Africa at the time that you were—the golden days—and at the same time being an American citizen concerned with the best interests of this country and wanting to give it all, including, as you mentioned and as Chairman Conyers mentioned, even one's very life.

There is simply no contradiction between the two, and we need to frame it in larger terms. So let me just stop there. I mean, I could say many other things, but there are other members of the panel who want to respond.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Go ahead, Dr. Kerwin, please.

Mr. KERWIN. Just to repeat, I think that it is absolutely true that the foreign-born want to learn English. The average wait for ESL classes by professionally credentialed people is now 6 months.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is a crisis.

Mr. KERWIN. It is a crisis, yes. And I don't think people dispute the need for patriotic assimilation. You know, there may be some out there that do, but I think in general it is understood that that is necessary.

It is also true what you say, that legal status is crucial to integration. There is no doubt about that.

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentelady's time has expired.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you.

Sorry, Dr. Fonte.

Mr. FONTE. Was I supposed to speak, or—

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, the gentelady's time is expired.

Mr. FONTE. Okay.

Ms. LOFGREN. But without objection, we will extend her time for 1 minute so Dr. Fonte can respond.

Mr. FONTE. Okay. As I said to Chairman Conyers, we agree that ethnic subcultures have always been an important part of American life.

But the key factor in immigration is when the new citizen takes the oath of allegiance—I absolutely and entirely renounce all allegiance to my foreign state or country, and so on.

In other words, it is a political transfer of allegiance. Someone is transferring political allegiance from the birth nation to the United States. So that is either/or. You are either loyal to the United States, as Theodore Roosevelt said, and no other country.

That is different from pride in ethnicity, which we all have.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Reclaiming my time, just 1 minute, I have never seen the two mixed together, apples and oranges, taking the oath and a denial of your culture being—let me just say this—taking the oath and having to reject your culture and having your culture being non-patriotic.

I don't think that makes sense at all. They take the oath and they still believe in singing the songs and understanding their culture. Believe me, they are still Americans. That is what America is—

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentelady's time has expired.

The gentlelady from California?

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I do have questions, but I have a few comments first, because I have been listening very intently to the conversation and to your testimony.

I want to tell you a story. It is about two immigrants that came from Mexico, probably would have been considered without skill, one who worked himself from a factory shop floor to being a successful small business owner, the other who raised seven children who all went to college and then, in her mid 40's, went back to school to get her GED, her A.A. and her B.A., her teaching credential, and still teaches today in the public school system.

Of the seven children that they raised, all of them went to college, two of them are now serving in Congress, and we are the first women of any relation to serve in Congress. I am talking about my family and my parents here.

So you can call it integration, or assimilation, or Americanization, or any other thing you want to call it, but it is an American success story that begins with immigrants.

Dr. Fonte, I take great issue with your assertion that English-only laws with respect to elections are necessary. My mother, who came to this country and became a teacher—she is a public school teacher.

She teaches other people's children English, sometimes finds it easier to understand the nuances of complex ballot initiatives if they are provided in the first language that she ever learned, Spanish.

This does not mean she is not fluent in English, because she is, she teaches it. But she is a more informed voter sometimes when she receives those materials in her native language.

So I don't think that takes anything away from her loyalty to this country, her love of this country, her desire to continue teaching English in this country.

And I really, really take issue with the idea that if we make English-only laws for voting that that is somehow going to create a more informed citizen or a more desirous citizen for voting, because my mother already has that desire.

Dr. Rumbaut, you mentioned telenovelas. I am a big fan of telenovelas. But even our telenovelas have been linguistically assimilated, because I used to watch "Betty La Fea" in Spanish, and we now have the English counterpart, "Ugly Betty," which is a huge, successful show. In fact, America Ferrera, who stars in that telenovela, the U.S. version, won a Golden Globe for her performance.

But I do want to get down to some of the questions.

Professor Rumbaut, I know that you have been studying immigrant integration and linguistic assimilation for approximately 30 years. Based on your research, do you believe that there is a danger that English is going to stop being the common language of the United States? Is there a real threat of that?

Mr. RUMBAUT. No. Well, as I mentioned, no. If anything, English is the official language of the Milky Way Galaxy already. And its headquarters are right here in the United States, and with 250

million English monolinguals, it has absolutely nothing to worry about.

However, as I mentioned, something that I think one might worry about is the fate of the immigrant languages that immigrants bring free of charge to the United States. This is a human capital asset in a global economy. It is a national asset.

It is even a national security asset. The Iraq Study Group mentioned that only six out of 1,000 American embassy personnel in Iraq are fluent in Arabic.

There is no contradiction in trying to be bilingual, and at the same time, as your mother, at being fluent in English.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I understand that, and I think it is interesting that in this country we don't want bilingual education, yet we require 4 years of a foreign language in order to get into college. I think that is a contradiction that I have never quite been able to understand.

I am interested in knowing a little bit more about how linguistic assimilation occurs. You mentioned that the way to encourage it is not to force somebody to speak in English only, but can you talk a little bit about linguistic assimilation?

Mr. RUMBAUT. Yes. Far and away, the number one determinant of becoming fluent in English and the acquisition of English fluency among immigrants is age at arrival.

There is a biology and a neurology of language acquisition. That is why children pick it up so quickly. That is why if you learn it after puberty, you may be able to learn English, but not without a telltale accent. And the older you are at arrival, the thicker your accent. You will sound like Desi Arnaz, you know.

So that alone will ensure the acquisition of English and speaking it and so on like a native. With the media, the pressure of peers and so on, that is going to take its way, and English is going to triumph no matter what.

If you arrive here, as an elderly person, however, there is no way, no matter how interested you are in learning English, that you will be able to command it, let alone speak it like a native.

Ms. SANCHEZ. May I ask the Chairwoman for unanimous consent for an additional 30 seconds to ask a very simple yes or no question?

Ms. LOFGREN. Without objection.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

And, Professor Rumbaut, last question. Is there any reason to believe that the immigrants that we have seen of today—the last couple of decades—are any less desirous of learning English than were the immigrants of the 1920's and 1930's?

Mr. RUMBAUT. If anything, I would say that immigration is the sincerest form of flattery.

Mr. GERSTLE. Can I add something brief to that? I want to emphasize how important longitudinal studies are of the sort that Dr. Rumbaut is doing.

If you look at a population at any point in time, it may appear to you that everyone is speaking Spanish or some other language. But if you break that population down for age and generation, you get a very different picture.

In 1918 or 1915 or 1910, if you got an impression walking down the street of any major American city in the Northeast, Midwest or West Coast, you might be overwhelmed by the degree to which people did not seem to be able to speak English.

But if you were to do the kind of longitudinal study that Dr. Rumbaut and his colleagues are doing for the present moment, you would see a similar kind of progress.

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentlelady's time has expired, and we will grant an additional 30 seconds so Dr. Fonte can—

Mr. FONTE. Just a word about 1918 and 1920. One thing we are forgetting is one of the reasons there was a great success in the immigration was there was a cutoff bill in 1924 that—I wouldn't have been for it; it kept my relatives literally out of the country.

But there was an immigration cutoff bill in 1924, so we basically had a pause from 1924 to 1965. We had low numbers of immigration that certainly helped the Americanization and assimilation process.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Ellison?

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Madam Chair.

My question, Dr. Fonte, is this. What year was the highest year of immigration in American recorded history? It is not a trick question.

Mr. FONTE. It was around, I think, the early 20th century.

Mr. ELLISON. And in that year, what percentage of people living in America spoke a language other than English as their first language?

Mr. FONTE. There was a very large percentage who did not speak English.

Mr. ELLISON. And America did okay, didn't it?

Mr. FONTE. Did okay, yes. I just said the immigration cutoff of 1924 had a lot to do with it.

Mr. ELLISON. Right.

Well, I mean, what do you think about that, Dr. Rumbaut? Was 1924 a year that sort of saved Americanism due to immigration?

Mr. RUMBAUT. Well, in the first place, the 1924 laws were not fully implemented until 1929. That is when the market crashed. It was the Great Depression that was most responsible for not letting people come into this country.

You can pass all sorts of immigration laws, and undocumented immigration might follow because of the demand by the American economy, et cetera.

If the issue is about language, however, then the passing of a law in 1924 is not what determined whether Italian-Americans became fluent in English or not.

What determined that, first and foremost, as I said, is age at arrival and generation. The second generation—at best, their Italian would be Italianish, like Spanglish. It would be that kind of a version.

And the grandchildren of them, regardless of whether you passed a law or not, they would be speaking English only, because of the assimilative forces in American society with respect to language and the issue that I mentioned before about the biology of language acquisition, the schools, the pressure from peers, the media and all of that.

Mr. ELLISON. Dr. Gerstle?

Mr. GERSTLE. I agree with that. I think the cessation of immigration in 1924 in terms of the Eastern and Southern Europeans—it did not affect any peoples from the Western Hemisphere, so we should be very clear about that, who continued to come in large numbers, unless they were not allowed to come by other means.

I think it was a factor only in terms of accelerating the transition demographically from the first to the second generation. And it also reminds us that the present day can never be precisely like the past.

There are other elements of that history that are also different. The World War I army—even more importantly, the World War II army, which took 16 million young men and a few women out of their homes everywhere across America, put them together with each other in a way that was also probably important in terms of their Americanization and integration.

My point is that we are unlikely to reproduce a 16-million-person conscription army in 2007, 2008 or 2009, but we have to think hard about those institutions that will perform the kind of service that these other institutions did 30 years, 40 years, 50 years ago.

Mr. ELLISON. You know, just an observation. I mean, part of what we seem to be debating today is what does it mean to be an American, and what impact does language have on that identity.

And you know, I think that the fact that we have at least a chance to have those assets that Dr. Rumbaut talked about, which is the multiplicity of languages that people bring here when they immigrate, is—doesn't diminish American identity, and actually may add to it.

And if American identity means anything, hopefully it means a respect for law, a respect for the first amendment to allow people to express themselves.

So I mean, we are the only country that I know of that is bound together by a Constitution as opposed to long tradition, history, and culture. And maybe that is what we need to be focusing on, and maybe you don't need to speak English to do that.

So, I mean, the founders of this country, did they say that we needed to speak English? And did they consider it?

Dr. Rumbaut, do you know if Washington and Jefferson and Franklin thought about the need to have a national language?

Mr. RUMBAUT. Actually, Thomas Jefferson spoke fluent Spanish, and—

Mr. FONTE. I have written on this. The founders definitely support English and a common culture. They have written on it extensively.

Mr. ELLISON. Well, why didn't they put it in the Constitution? I mean, they could have but they didn't.

Mr. FONTE. Yes, it wasn't necessary to put it in the Constitution.

Mr. ELLISON. Well, why not? I mean, they knew that—

Mr. FONTE. They wanted a minimal constitution, limited government.

Mr. ELLISON. But, Doctor, they put the things in there that needed to be there. Why didn't they put English?

Would anybody else like to venture a view? No?

Mr. RUMBAUT. There is no need to do so.

Mr. ELLISON. Maybe they considered it and rejected it because they thought that English was not a sine qua non of American identity. Perhaps that is true.

Mr. GERSTLE. I think they also did feel, though, that the freedom of the new world would be so intoxicating that people would want to learn English.

Mr. FONTE. Congressman King just quoted a letter from George Washington to John Adams in which he said he wants—the immigrants should be assimilated to our ways, our customs, our way of life, and we would become one people. Obviously, knowing English would be part of that.

Mr. ELLISON. They didn't put it in the Constitution.

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman's time has expired.

And we have come to the conclusion of this hearing. I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony today.

And without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions to you, which we will forward. And we ask that you answer as promptly as you can so that we can make your answers part of the record.

Without objection, the record will remain open for 5 legislative days for the submission of any other materials.

You know, Dr. Rumbaut, you mentioned as you started your testimony, what a country, really, that you came here as a young man, never expecting to be a witness here before the Congress.

Ms. Hong, the counsel for the Subcommittee, wrote me a little note saying she came as an immigrant at age 12, never dreaming that she would be the counsel to the Immigration Subcommittee in the United States Congress.

So we have much to be proud of in our wonderful country, and your testimony has been very helpful to us today.

I would like to extend an invitation to everyone here today to attend our next hearing on comprehensive immigration reform. We will have one tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. in this very same room during which we will explore the impacts of immigration on State and local communities.

Then on Friday morning at 9 a.m., we will focus again on comprehensive immigration reform as it relates to the future of undocumented students and reform.

With that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

LETTER FROM A MAJORITY OF THE MINORITY MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW REQUESTING A MINORITY DAY OF HEARING TO THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary

Washington, DC 20515-6216
One Hundred Tenth Congress

May 16, 2007


Honorable Zoe Lofgren
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security, & International Law
102 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515


Dear Chairwoman Lofgren,

Pursuant to House Rule XI clause (2)(j)(1), we hereby request that the minority Members of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security & International Law be granted a minority day of hearing on matters relating to "Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Becoming Americans - U.S. Immigrant Integration."


Although the testimony of the panel you have assembled will likely be valuable, it is essential that the Committee examine other perspectives. We feel that a minority day is our only option to ensure that we create a balanced record.

Pursuant to the House Rules, you will find the signatures of a majority of the minority Members of this Subcommittee below.










LETTER FROM GARY GERSTLE, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY TO THE HONORABLE STEVE KING, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Department of History

VANDERBILT  College of Arts and Science

May 22, 2007

Honorable Steve King
U.S. House of Representatives
1432 Longworth Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman King:

I am writing to follow-up the discussion we had during my appearance before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law on May 16, 2007.

As you may recall, I noted in my written testimony (page 1) that an estimated 35 million immigrants came to the United States between the 1820s and the 1920s, and that an estimated 40 to 50 million came between the 1920s and the 2010s. Altogether, then, I estimated that 75 to 85 million immigrants came to the United States between the 1820s and the 2010s. You asked me to reconcile that figure with the 66,089,431 figure that the U.S. Census reports as having come between 1820 and 2000. In this letter I offer not a reconciliation but a detailed argument for why the figure of 75-85 million is better than the 66 million one for estimating the total number of immigrants who have come to the United States since 1820. My calculations are largely based on data available in the electronic publications of the Department of Homeland Security, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2003*, and *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2004*, available on-line at: <http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk03Im.shtm>.

1) The 66,089,431 figure includes only those who came to the United States through 2000. To that total we must add the number who came between 2001 and 2003 (2,833,877) and the number estimated to have come between 2004 and 2007 (3,778,504¹). These additions bring the total to 72,701,812.

2) The total of 72,701,812 includes, for the twentieth century, only "immigrant aliens admitted for permanent residence."² Those are the words used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the agency in charge of immigration prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security) to refer to legal immigrants. To that total we must add illegal immigrants, whom the INS first began tracking in 1925. We do not have a precise figure on the number of illegal immigrants in the United States today, but most estimates put that number at somewhere between 10 and 12 million. For the purposes of this exercise, I have chosen the mid-point of 11

¹ This is my estimate. I have taken the average number of immigrants who came per year, 2001-2003, from Table 1: Immigration to the United States: Fiscal Years 1820-2003, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2003*, and multiplied by 4 (to cover the years 2004-2007).

² *Ibid.*, Note to Table 1, appearing at bottom of table.

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million (the figure used by the March 2005 Current Population Survey), bringing the total number of immigrants who have come to the U.S. since the 1820s to 83,701,812.³

3) We should also try to take some account of illegal immigrants of past years who lived a significant portion of time in the United States but who do not show up in immigrant statistics because they were never legal, never apprehended, and do not show up as part of the illegal population counts today (because they are no longer alive or no longer live in the United States). This number probably represents a small percentage of the overall illegal stream, but it's possible that, given the size of that stream, the number may have reached one million between 1925 and 2004. We can discern the size of that stream from the more than 46 million immigrants whom the United States apprehended and sent home between 1925 and 2004, and the ten to fifteen percent of the guest workers who are estimated to have left the Bracero program while in the United States between 1946 and 1964.⁴ Adding one million undetected illegals in earlier years of the 20th century pushes the total figure for immigrants coming to the U.S. between the 1820s to the 2010s to 84,701,812.

To sum up: Because the 66,089,431 figure does not include immigrants who have come since 2000 and because it does not include illegal immigrants, it is not the best figure to use in terms of estimating the number of immigrants who have come to the United States since the 1820s. My estimate of 75 to 85 million is a better one, as it is a 2007 figure rather than a 2000 one and it takes account of illegal immigration. Because of the imprecision of our data on illegal immigrants, I represent my estimate as falling within a 10 million person range. It seems prudent to work with an immigrant estimate at the midpoint of this range, meaning that the number of immigrants who have come to the United States since the 1820s approximates 80 million.

I also noted in my written testimony (p. 8) that, despite the large number of immigrants who have come to the U.S. since the 1920s, we have not yet reached the level of immigrant density that prevailed in America in the early twentieth century, when 24 million immigrants entered a society that was between one quarter and one third the size of America today. To reach the density that prevailed early in the twentieth century, I suggested that America would have to admit three to four million immigrants a year and sustain that rate for a decade or more. I based that estimate on the ratio of total immigrants in each of the two waves of immigration (1880-1924; 1965-2007) to the total population of America in the census year closest to the midpoint of each immigrant wave (24 million immigrants/76 million people in the U.S. in 1900; 39 million immigrants/249 million people in the U.S. in 1990).⁵ While these ratios remain a powerful

³ Jeffrey S. Passel, "Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey," May 7, 2007, *Pew Hispanic Center website*, <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61>


⁴ Table 35: Deportable Aliens Located: Fiscal Years, 1925-2004, *Year of Immigration Statistics: 2004*. On the Bracero program, see Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration* (New York: Russell Sage, 2003), chapter 3, and Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton University Press, 2004), chapter 4.

⁵ This 39 million figure includes those immigrants who arrived during the current wave, 1965 to 2007, legal and illegal; it does not include those who arrived between the 1920s and 1964. Deaths and departures explain why this 39 million figure is greater than the 35 million figure often cited as representing the total number of foreign-born living in the United States today. For efforts to estimate the total foreign-born population living in the U.S. in recent years, see A. Dianne Schmidley and J. Gregory Robinson, "Measuring the Foreign-Born Population in the

indicator of the greater proportional magnitude of immigration one hundred years ago, they do not take into account the smaller rate of natural population increase that prevails in the United States today than in the United States of one hundred years ago. This differential in natural increase renders the immigration population of today a proportionately more powerful player in determining overall U.S. population growth than was the case then. Thus, I need to revise downward my estimate of how many more immigrants are required for the United States of the early twenty first century to reach the level of immigrant density achieved early in the twentieth century. I now estimate that the United States would have to admit approximately one million per year for ten years (thereby raising the immigrant total to approximately 45-46 million in a population of 310-315 million people) in order to reach the immigrant density achieved in the early years of the twentieth century.

I wish to thank you for your careful reading of my testimony and for your queries. I believe that that data I have provided in this letter will be of interest to other members of the Immigration Subcommittee as well as yourself. With that in mind, I am sending a copy to Immigration Subcommittee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren with a request to make it available to every Subcommittee member.

Sincerely yours,



Gary Gerstle

James Stahlman Professor of History

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM GARY GERSTLE, PH.D., PROFESSOR
OF HISTORY, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Department of History

VANDERBILT  College of Arts and Science

July 6, 2007

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law
U.S. House of Representatives
2138 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Attn: Mr. Benjamin Staub

The Honorable Steve King
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law
U.S. House of Representatives
B-351C Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairwoman Lofgren and Congressman King:

I write in response to your letter of May 25, 2007, in which you requested that I answer additional questions posed by members of the Subcommittee on Immigration subsequent to my testimony before the Subcommittee on May 16, 2007. Since all the questions come from Congressman Steve King, I have included him in the header to the letter and am sending a copy of my responses directly to him.

Please note that I only received the May 25 letter on June 20. Since that did not leave me enough time to write responses in time for the June 29 date indicated in the letter, I requested an extension from Mr. Benjamin Staub, and he kindly granted me one until July 9.

I have done my best to answer the big and complex questions that Congressman King has posed. Because a letter format such as this one may not be the best vehicle for providing Congressman King with all the information he might desire, I would like to offer to meet personally with him at his Washington office, should he want to discuss these matters further.

Below I reproduce Congressman King's questions and offer my answers to them. Because questions 1 and 2 overlap, I answer them both together.

Question 1: "Is there such a thing as too much immigration? Legal immigration? Illegal immigration? Please give an example in history when a nation was too permissive in its immigration policies and discovered too late that it had gone too far. What would be too far, in your opinion in the United States?"

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Question 2: “How many immigrants are too many? Is there a limit to how many immigrants we can successfully assimilate? What are the criteria? What are the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate?”

I think it is possible for a society to admit too many immigrants but it is not possible to identify a number (either absolute or proportional) that can be used across different time periods in one country or across different countries to determine what constitutes “too many.” One country may have a low level of immigration and poor mechanisms for integrating immigrants, so that even a low level may come to be seen as “too many.” Another country may have high levels of immigration and strong mechanisms of integration, and thus absorb the high levels without too much strain. Historically, America fits the latter profile: high volume of immigration, strong mechanisms of integration.

The criteria for judging the success of integration or assimilation in the United States are those that I laid out in my written testimony of May 16, 2007: 1) Are immigrants learning to practice American democracy? 2) Is a generational transition occurring in immigrant communities whereby the balance of power is shifting from the first to second generation, and is it occurring in ways that encourage the embrace of Americanness and the speaking of English? 3) Is there sufficient economic opportunity in America to allow immigrants a chance to build a decent life for themselves and their children and thus to become believers in the American dream?

As to when we should become concerned that a high volume immigration policy has “gone too far”: My answer would be when the criteria for judging successful integration outlined in the previous paragraph are not being met. To those three criteria I add this important caveat (and one that also appears in my May 16 testimony): that typically it takes two generations to determine whether immigrant integration is proceeding successfully.

Is it possible, as Congressman King writes, to make the “wrong judgment...about how many immigrants we can assimilate?” Yes it is. I would add, however, that errors can occur not simply in admitting too many immigrants (what I take to be Congressman King’s concern) but also in admitting too few or in excluding groups because they are mistakenly thought to be uninterested in or incapable of assimilation. Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to prevent Chinese laborers from immigrating to America because of their alleged racial inferiority and unassimilability. In the 1924 Immigration Restriction Act, Congress allocated immigration quotas on the basis of racial desirability, with the “desired” peoples of northern and western Europe given the largest proportion of the available slots, the “undesired” peoples of eastern and southern Europe given very few, and nonEuropean peoples (outside the western hemisphere) given almost none at all. Both Chinese Exclusion and the racially structured quota system of 1924 law are today regarded as “wrong judgments.” Members of those once excluded or severely restricted groups and their descendants have shown themselves to be high quality and assimilable Americans. Given these past wrong judgments, we should be careful not to repeat them today by prematurely designating a large section of the world’s population as inappropriate material for inclusion in America.

As for the “maximum consequences” that can result from “wrong judgments...about how many immigrants we can assimilate.” Answers to this question are likely to vary widely; indeed the question is probably better addressed in a give-and-take conversation than in a letter of this sort. Nevertheless, I wish to mention now, for this possible future conversation, one “maximum consequence” that I do fear. It is the one I mentioned in my May 16 written testimony: that we will become so fearful of immigrants and so critical of their desire and ability to assimilate that we will lose our “faith in the promise and transformative power of American freedom.” Loss of that faith will hugely diminish us as a country.

3. How did previous generations of immigrants learn English without federal programs?

Some federal programs did exist in the early years of the twentieth century. The federal government’s Committee on Public Information rose to prominence during the years of World War I (1917-1918) primarily to engender support for the war and for America’s role in it. It also, however, had some success in promoting Americanization before being dismantled as soon as the war ended. Around the same time, the Bureau of Naturalization launched an education division that produced some good materials about how to learn English and how to prepare for becoming an American, but these materials are generally not thought to have been an influential force in promoting the speaking of English or in related Americanization initiatives.

The real work of teaching English and promoting Americanization among earlier generations of immigrants occurred at the level of state and local governments and in the private sector. A long essay would be required to review satisfactorily the work of these public and private institutions. Here I can only name the various institutions involved and say a very few words about the nature of their contributions. Public schools played a major role in promoting English among the second generation, and among those immigrants who came as young children. The influence of public schools as institutions of Americanization increased in the first half of the twentieth century as they extended the number of years during which they educated and superintended America’s youth. In 1900, a minority of Americans attended high school. By 1945 a majority did.

Amidst worries in the 1910s and 1920s that too many immigrants were attending private schools, mostly Catholic schools, where instruction in English was not sufficiently stressed, several states passed laws that either tried to curtail the teaching of foreign languages at these schools or tried to ban private religious schools altogether. The Supreme Court generally ruled that these laws were unconstitutional but not before these laws intensified Americanization pressures. By the 1930s and 1940s, the Catholic Church itself in the United States had become a major force for Americanization in its schools and in its communities. Religious and secular organizations in Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish immigrant communities played similar roles during this time.

As I noted in my written testimony of May 16, political parties and labor unions also became Americanizing institutions in the early decades of the 20th century. In some places, employers, such as Henry Ford, played important roles in teaching employees English (or in giving employees incentives to learn the language). And we should never underestimate the force of mass and popular culture in spurring the learning of English and in encouraging Americanization, especially once radio and “talking movies” established themselves in the 1920s as important

national media. Finally, the second generation came to understand early on that getting ahead economically in America required fluency in English—a message that I would suggest is still a powerful force among the ranks of the second generation of today’s immigrants.

4. Relying on data from the 1820 census and 2000 census, we reached discrepant figures for the comparable density of immigrants in the United States. Please provide your immigrant density figures for prior great waves of immigration as compared to the current density and explain how those figures are calculated.


This question was first put to me by Congressman King during my oral testimony on May 16, 2007. I told Congressman King that I would provide him with the figures and explanations he requested, and I did so in a letter sent to his office on May 22, 2007. I assume that Congressman King drafted this question before he received my May 22, 2007 letter, and that he now has a copy of my May 22 letter in his possession. In case he does not, I include a copy of that letter with this letter.

5. If the restrictions on immigration in 1924 did not include the Western Hemisphere, what numbers would you attribute to immigration from the Western Hemisphere during the four subsequent decades?

As you can gather from my letter of May 22, 2007, working out precise immigration statistics is a complicated business. As a starting point, let me suggest that you reference the Department of Homeland Security, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2006*, Table 2, columns L-P, lines 48 and 80, for one estimate of the number of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere between 1924 and 1965. The DHS counts 4,854,228 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere from 1920 to 1969, but that figure must be refined to exclude those coming from 1920 to 1924 and from 1965 to 1969 and to add immigrants coming illegally during the years from 1924 to 1965. I would think that an estimate of 5 million immigrants, plus or minus 500,000, can serve as a rough guide to immigration from the Western Hemisphere during the period 1924-65. If this matter becomes an important element of your committee discussions in the coming months, please let me know and I can help you refine the figure further.

I hope these answers to Congressman King will be useful to the Congressman and to other members of the Subcommittee in their deliberations about immigration reform.

Sincerely yours,



Gary Gerstle

James Stahlman Professor of History

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, PH.D.,
PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

**Responses To Questions From
Representative Steve King**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees,
Border Security, and International Law**

Rubén G. Rumbaut
University of California, Irvine

Questions from the Honorable Steve King:

1. Is there such a thing as too much immigration? Legal immigration? Illegal immigration? Please give an example in history when a nation was too permissive in its immigration policies and discovered too late that it had gone too far. What would be too far, in your opinion, for the U.S.?
2. How many immigrants are too many? Is there a limit to how many immigrants we can successfully assimilate? What are the criteria? What are the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate?
3. How did previous generations of immigrants learn English without federal programs?

Response to Q1.

Is there such a thing as too much immigration? Legal immigration? Illegal immigration? Please give an example in history when a nation was too permissive in its immigration policies and discovered too late that it had gone too far. What would be too far, in your opinion, for the U.S.?

This is ultimately a political question, calling for a political answer—it is not a social scientific question as such, although reasoned responses can be informed by comparative historical and empirical data, and to that end I will briefly provide an evidence-based analytical frame below. It is a political question because different social and economic interest groups in the U.S. (business interests, ranchers and growers, labor unions, ethnic lobbies, nativist ideologues, the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal*, etc.) would answer these questions in different ways: they would interpret the “causes” and “consequences” of immigration differently; define what they perceive to be “problems” resulting from immigration or immigration policies differently (including the meaning of “too permissive,” “too late,” and “too far”); calculate “needs” and “costs” and “benefits” differently (of what? to whom? over what period of time?); and reach different policy conclusions.

The regulation of immigration has varied greatly over the course of U.S. history, and the determination of what constitutes “legal” and “illegal” immigration has itself been a function of legislative decisions made in a political process in historically varying circumstances. For much of U.S. history there was no “illegal” immigration in the sense that is ascribed to it presently, for example; and “illegal” statuses today (as a result of overstaying a non-immigrant visa, or entry without inspection across a land border) are themselves subject to change via regularization or legalization under specifiable conditions. Nonetheless, throughout its history (extending back to the colonial era), the U.S. has sought to use immigration policy as a tool of nation building to engineer or “design” the kind of nation policymakers have sought (see Zolberg, 2006).

As the data below will illustrate, there is no preset threshold or “tipping point” that can be measured or derived from comparative international analysis of immigration flows and forms, or from national historical experience; rather, an understanding of the complexities and contingencies of particular historical contexts is a prerequisite for understanding the causes and consequences of international migration flows, including the situation facing the United States today with respect to the size and diversity of its foreign-born population (legal and illegal immigrants, refugees and asylees), the contexts of their migration and of their reception in the U.S., their modes of incorporation in the economy, polity, and society, and likely economic and demographic challenges that policymakers may need to address in the foreseeable future.

One way to consider whether the U.S. has “too much” immigration is to compare the size and proportion of the total U.S. immigrant population to the size and proportion of immigrant populations in other countries around the world. The most recent international statistics compiled by the United Nations provide the needed information as of July 2005 (see [Table 1](#)). Out of nearly 6.5 billion people in the world today, 191 million (just under 3%) were international migrants (legal and illegal); the rest, 97% of humanity, were “stayers” living in the countries where they were born. Moving to a foreign country is not easy, even under the most propitious circumstances. Still, the total global migrant stock is up from 177 million in 2000, 155 million in 1990, 99 million in 1980, and 81 million in 1970. The U.S. total, as will be shown

below, has been increasing likewise since 1970—i.e., it is part of a larger global phenomenon, not something that is unique to the U.S.

Trends in international migration in the contemporary era are very different from what was the case a century ago during that previous era of mass migration; in the post-World War II period, the flows of migrants have been going increasingly from the poorer, less developed countries (LDC) to the richer, more developed countries (MDC), and from younger to older countries. Thus, by 2005, only 1.3% of the populations of (younger) LDC regions were migrants, compared to 9.4% of the populations of (older) more developed countries, with aging native populations and shrinking labor forces. In general, these patterns reflect the nature of contemporary global inequality: a flow of capital from more developed to less developed countries, a flow of labor from LDCs to MDCs, and flows of refugees primarily from one developing country to another.

In absolute numbers, the United States remains by far the principal receiving country: in 2005 the foreign-born population of the U.S. reached 38 million (a fifth of the world's total immigrant population of 191 million). In relative terms, however, the picture is very different: only 12.9% of the U.S. population was foreign-born, a percentage *exceeded* by many other countries, as detailed in Table 1.

For example, the 2005 U.N. statistics showed a foreign-born population of 39.6% in Israel, 22.9% in Switzerland, 20.3% in Australia, 18.9% in Canada, and about 15% for Austria, Ireland and New Zealand. Closer to the U.S. norm (and above the overall MDC average of 9.4%) were: Sweden with 12.4%, Germany with 12.3%, Spain with 11.1%, France with 10.7%, the Netherlands with 10.1%, and Great Britain with 9.1%. The states with the highest migrant populations are mainly oil producers and small rich countries: for instance, among the U.S. Arab allies of the Gulf region, foreigners account for over a quarter of the populations of Saudi Arabia (25.9%) and Oman (24.5%), as well as for 78% of Qatar's, 71% of the United Arab Emirates, 62% of Kuwait, and 41% of Bahrain, as well as 39% of Jordan's (whose numbers have sharply increased since 2005 as a result of Iraqi refugee flows); in Singapore, the migrant population accounts for 43% of the total, and among the European microstates, foreigners make up the bulk of the populations of Andorra (78%) and Monaco (70%), and over a third of Luxembourg's, Liechtenstein's, and San Marino's.

If countries are negatively affected by “too much” immigration, one might expect to find that those countries with the highest percentages of immigrants in their populations would exhibit major economic or other social problems, while those countries with the lowest shares of foreigners would exhibit fewer such problems. But as shown, those countries with the most immigrants tend to be the richest countries (which is why they attract immigrants), and those with the least are the poorest (which almost by definition is why they do not attract immigrants).

Another way to consider whether the U.S. has “too much” immigration is to compare the size and proportion of its immigrant population today to the size and proportion of its immigrant population at other times in U.S. history. Table 2 provides the needed information, using decennial census data for the century from 1900 to 2000, plus the latest CPS estimates for 2005. As noted, in 2005 the 38 million foreign-born residents of the U.S. made up nearly 12.9 percent of the total population. In absolute numbers, those 38 million constitute the largest number of immigrants in U.S. history—having increased from 31 million in 2000, 20 million in 1990, and

14 million in 1980. In relative terms, however, the picture is quite different: the 12.9% of the U.S. population that is foreign-born today is *less* than the proportions registered in the late 19th century and in the early decades of the 20th century. The U.S. immigrant population peaked at 14.8% in 1890. In 1910, 14.7% of the population was foreign-born, 13.6% in 1900 and 13.2% in 1920. At current rates, the U.S. may catch up with the 1920 share by 2010, but it would still no higher than the relative proportions seen in the post-1850 period: in each decennial census from 1860 through 1920, immigrants comprised more than 13% of the population.

Although the mass migration of Southern and Eastern Europeans a century ago occasioned considerable anxiety in the U.S. about the effects of the newcomers on its rapidly industrializing economy, and on American cultural, social and political institutions, the long perspective of history has shown that the migration flows of that era greatly enhanced the position of the United States in the world economy, while at the same time the acculturation and assimilation of the immigrants and especially of their descendants was accomplished over a period of 3 or 4 generations. They gave rise to viable communities, infusing new blood in local labor markets, filling positions at different levels of the economy, and adding to the diversity of sounds, sights, and tastes of American cities. Today no one raises doubts about the descendants of those Italians, Greeks, Poles, Jews and Catholics, although for several decades they comprised a higher foreign-born share of the population than immigrants do today.

A third way to consider the question of “too much” is to compare the 50 states of the U.S. to each other, and especially those with the highest and the lowest proportion of immigrants, to see whether the concentration of the foreign-born in some states is deleterious in comparison with those states that have relatively few immigrants. [Table 3](#) provides the needed information for 2005—listing the top dozen states in rank order by their share of the state population that is foreign born, vs. the states with the lowest proportions of foreigners. The national foreign-born proportion of 12.8% is exceeded by eleven states—in some cases, significantly so. These states include the largest, richest and most dynamic economies of the U.S., led by California—the largest state by far, with a population of 36 million, of whom 28.2% were foreign-born (including the largest legal and illegal immigrant populations in the country), as well as the richest: if California were an independent country, its economy would rank eighth in the world, and it pays more to the federal system than it receives in direct monetary benefits. Other states of high immigration include New York, New Jersey, Florida, Texas, Nevada, and Arizona, as well as Hawaii (where immigrants account for 16% to 22% of their populations), and Maryland, Massachusetts and Rhode Island (where immigrants comprise 14%). At the other end, the states with the lowest proportion of immigrants are among the smallest and the poorest of the 50, led by West Virginia (less than 1% of its population is foreign born), Montana (1.8%), Wyoming and the Dakotas, and the Southern states of Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Kentucky and Arkansas (2.4% to 3.6%).

Interestingly, the states and localities with the *highest* proportion of immigrants have *lower* (and declining) violent crime rates, including homicides, than those with relatively few immigrants—contrary to public perceptions about immigration and crime. At the same time that immigration—especially undocumented immigration—has reached and surpassed historic highs over the past fifteen years, crime rates in the United States have *declined*, notably in cities with large immigrant populations (including cities with large numbers of undocumented immigrants such as Los Angeles and border cities like San Diego and El Paso, as well as New York,

Chicago, and Miami). The Uniform Crime Reports released each year by the Federal Bureau of Investigation demonstrate the decline of both violent crime and property crime at the same time that the foreign-born population has grown. From 1994 to 2005, the violent crime rate overall declined 34.2 percent, reaching the lowest level ever in 2005. In particular, homicide rates fell 37.8 percent to levels last seen in the late 1960s, robbery rates dropped 40.8 percent, and assault rates declined 31.9 percent. Moreover, the proportion of serious violent crimes committed by juveniles decreased during this period and the number of gun crimes stabilized at levels last seen in 1988 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006).

From the vantage of receiving countries, and of receiving states within the U.S., international migration meets particular needs—those are basic criteria for ascertaining “how much” and what kinds of immigration serve national interests. The economic growth prospects and fiscal health of a nation are dependent on its labor supply. In the post-industrial era, the U.S. labor market has become increasingly bifurcated into an upper tier of professional and technical occupations requiring advanced educational credentials, and a lower tier of manual occupations. The U.S. economy, bigger than the 15 largest European economies combined, is generating a huge labor demand at both ends of the labor market. However, recent analyses by economists and population scientists underscore a set of demographic challenges to future U.S. economic growth, and point to the scarcity of domestic workers to fill the bottom half: among the *native-born* population fertility rates are falling, workers are growing older and better educated (and increasingly apt to reject “the three Ds”—difficult, dirty, and dangerous jobs), and labor force participation rates are flattening. As the Congressional Budget Office put it in a November 2005 report: “The baby-boom generation’s exit from the labor force could well foreshadow a major shift in the role of foreign-born workers in the labor force. Unless native fertility rates increase, it is likely that most of the growth in the U.S. labor force will come from immigration by the middle of the century.” Without immigration, the U.S. labor force would be shrinking by an estimated 3% to 4% a year. Most economists believe that substantial immigration of both high-skill *and* low-skill workers is essential to assure robust economic growth, dampen inflationary pressures, and finance intergenerational transfer systems like Social Security and Medicare (all the more as the first of the baby boomers start turning 65 in 2011). By contrast, all of Europe and Japan will have a far more difficult problem than the U.S., because of well below replacement-level birth rates and the lack of expansionary immigration policies, combining to produce inverted age pyramids as well as very large fiscal imbalances in the health care and pension systems of those quickly aging countries.

From the vantage of sending countries, migration pressures as a result of global inequality are only mounting in a world that is more and more a place with a declining proportion of rich people and a growing proportion of poor people. Of the major migration divides in the world, the largest is the Rio Grande, separating the U.S. and Latin America. Rooted in colonialism, war and military occupation, labor recruitment and economic interaction, migration footholds are formed, family networks expand, remittances link communities across national borders, and all of this turns migration into a social process sustained by factors that are largely beyond the realm of government action or the economic impulses that originally generated it.

I cannot offer “an example in history when a nation was too permissive in its immigration policies and discovered too late that it had gone too far” (except perhaps to note the apocryphal story of a 19th century Indian chief who is said to have visited the White House and advised the

President to be careful with his immigration policies, as they had been careless with theirs). Again, there are many complexities and contingencies in any given historical context that would have to be specified to come up with a sensible academic response, let alone with a wise policy response. Obviously, as Alejandro Portes and I wrote in our book *Immigrant America* a decade ago, the United States cannot be the repository of all of the ambitious and of all of the displaced peoples from less lucky lands, and for that reason regulation and control of immigration flows remain necessary. The crux of the problem today is the size of and abuses linked to unauthorized immigration. Resolution of this problem will require more complex measures than simple border enforcement, a new set of imaginative policies grounded in the history of these flows.

In that regard, I would conclude by returning to the inherently political and enormously complicated nature of immigration reform processes (Rumbaut 1995). One of the lessons of the passage of IRCA in 1986 was that how a “problem” is perceived (in that instance too, “illegal immigration”)—including the conflicting ideologies, hidden and not-so-hidden agendas, and assumptions that underlie so many policy recommendations—largely dictates proposed solutions. Hence debates that serve to “define the situation” are critical to the policy process, and here is where rigorous research can make a difference in political discourse. To get a law passed, legislative policy-makers may then need to derail inherent conflicts via compromises which, while assuring the enactment of the policy, carry built-in contradictions that can plague the implementation process. And implementing such laws invariably leads to consequences that the legislators either intentionally overlooked or simply could not foresee—indeed, the complexity of immigration processes makes them difficult to grasp fully—and historically, immigration laws have been replete with unintended consequences.

Those are added reasons to reflect on the limits of public policies, particularly when what is sought is nothing less than to control a world on the move, with the U.S. as a main destination. Politics and policy-making, like life itself, are far more tangled, messy, uncertain, and contradictory than what public policies sometimes seem to suggest. Condemned to try to control a future they cannot predict by reacting to a past that will not be repeated, policymakers are nonetheless faced with an imperative need to act that cannot be ignored as a practical or political matter.

Response to Q2.

How many immigrants are too many? Is there a limit to how many immigrants we can successfully assimilate? What are the criteria? What are the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate?

The concerns posed by this second set of questions, which follow logically from the first, are subsumed by the key concept of “assimilation.” That master concept has a long history in American social science (indeed, American sociology emerged largely as a result of the study of European immigrants and their adaptations in big cities in the early 20th century, above all by what became known as the Chicago School of Sociology). At the same time, the notion of “assimilation” long ago seeped into the national narrative, offering an elemental explanation for a phenomenal accomplishment—the remarkable capacity of a self-professed nation of immigrants to absorb, like a giant global sponge, tens of millions of newcomers of all classes, cultures and countries from all over the world. And yet, few concepts have been so misused and misunderstood, mixing descriptions of what is observable with prescriptions of what is desirable, and hence conflating the real with the rhetorical. I will try to clarify the concept briefly in order to offer a more precise response to these questions.

As long ago as 1880, an editorial in the *New York Times* (May 15) declared: “There is a limit to our powers of assimilation and when it is exceeded the country suffers from something very like indigestion... We know how stubbornly conservative of his dirt and ignorance is the average immigrant who settles in New York... these wretched beings change their abode, but not their habits in coming to New York.” The editorial reflected the popular usage of the concept of assimilation on the eve of a new era of mass immigration, this time largely from Eastern and Southern Europe. But in Chicago a generation later, with immigration unabated and the large majority of that city’s residents, like New York’s, consisting of first- and second-generation immigrants—which led to a hue and cry about the allegedly inassimilable “new immigration” from pre-World War I Europe, as reflected in the many volumes of the 1911 Dillingham Commission—the leading sociologist on the subject, Robert Park, could write convincingly that:

“In America it has become proverbial that a Pole, Lithuanian, or Norwegian cannot be distinguished, in the second generation, from an American born of native parents... As a matter of fact, the ease and rapidity with which aliens, under existing conditions in the United States, have been able to assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of American life have enabled this country to swallow and digest every sort of normal human difference, except the purely external ones, like color of the skin” (1914; in Park and Burgess, 1924: 757-58).

What are the criteria?

Milton Gordon, in his seminal statement on *Assimilation in American Life* (1964), broke down the assimilation sequence into seven stages, of which “identificational assimilation”—a self-image as an American—was the end point of a process that began with cultural assimilation, proceeded through structural assimilation and intermarriage, and—critically—was accompanied by an *absence of prejudice and discrimination* in the “core society.” It takes two to tango—and to assimilate. No amount of linguistic acculturation (becoming fluent in English) and other aspects of “Americanization” can ensure assimilation if prejudice and discrimination against the group persist—e.g., if the group is categorically segregated, racially classified, and “regarded as

in some sense a stranger, a representative of an alien race”—which is why, Park wrote in 1930, the “English-speaking Protestant Negro, during his three hundred years in this country, has not been assimilated... not because he has preserved in America a foreign culture and an alien tradition, for with the exception of the Indian...no man in America is so entirely native to the soil.”

At the group level, then, assimilation may involve the absorption of one or more minority groups into the majority, or the merging of minority groups—such as the case of second-generation West Indians “becoming black Americans” (Waters, 1999; Kasinitz et al., 2001). At the individual level, assimilation denotes the cumulative changes that make individuals of one ethnic group more *acculturated*, *integrated*, and *identified* with the members of another—or, to put it in the terms of the national motto, by which an *unum* is forged from the *pluribus*.

That includes, at the cultural level, becoming fluent in English and becoming accustomed to “American ways,” and, at the legal level, becoming a citizen. The United States conceives of itself as a “nation of immigrants,” but it is, in fact, largely a “nation of citizens.” While one of every eight persons in the United States today is foreign-born and immigration constitutes a substantial share of annual population growth, the vast majority of persons residing in the United States are citizens who attained citizenship at birth. The rule of *jus soli* (citizenship of the place where one is born) is the fundamental United States membership principle. That is why the expression “second-generation immigrant” is an oxymoron, inasmuch as no one born in the U.S. is an “immigrant,” but a citizen. And for native-born citizens, acculturation or “cultural assimilation,” as that term is commonly used, is not generally an issue. Nearly all native-born Americans (and for that matter also immigrants who came to the United States as children) speak English as a primary language [see my written testimony, submitted at the May 16, 2007 hearing of your subcommittee], and they are socialized into the dominant culture. For immigrants who come as adults from non-English speaking countries, learning English is more difficult (especially the ability to speak it without an accent)—it is largely a function of age at arrival, level of education and time in the U.S.—but they acculturate as well, if to varying degrees and less rapidly than their children. As Park and Burgess put it:

“Not by the suppression of old memories, but by their incorporation in his new life is assimilation achieved... Assimilation cannot be promoted directly, but only indirectly, that is, by supplying the conditions that make for participation. There is no process but life itself that can effectually wipe out the immigrant's memory of his past. The inclusion of the immigrant in our common life may perhaps best be reached, therefore, in cooperation that looks not so much to the past as to the future. The second generation of the immigrant may share fully in our memories, but practically all that we can ask of the foreign-born is participation in our ideals, our wishes, and our common enterprises.” (1924: 739-40)

It takes more than “melting” to *unum-ize* the *pluribus*. It is a commonplace to observe that human beings adapt to their environments, but while everyone “melts” to one degree or another within their own social surrounds, especially children, those social surrounds can differ profoundly. Hostility, rejection, threats, prejudice, discrimination—those are forces that divide, not unite. In intergroup relations, assimilation and oppression don't mix. On the contrary, assimilation breeds under conditions of intimacy and mutual acceptance, as indexed by the warmth of the welcome and ultimately by intermarriage and the adoption of American self-

identities. But where social mobility is blocked and hindered by bigotry and stigmatization, members of lower status groups may react by reaffirming their shared identity. This process of forging a *reactive ethnicity* in the face of perceived threats, persecution and exclusion is not uncommon. Rather, it is another mode of ethnic identity formation, accounting for the “thickening” rather than the “thinning” of ethnicity (Rumbaut, 2005). Thus in *Italian or American?* (1943), a study of “the second generation in conflict” written when the United States was at war with Italy, Irvin Child saw the likelihood of their assimilation vs. ethnic retentiveness as a function of inclusionary vs. exclusionary contexts of reception and terms of membership. Against the background of World War II, he perceptively compared two main modes of reaction—the “*rebel*” (who assimilated into the American milieu) to the “*in-group*” type (who retained an Italian ethnicity)—and made an observation which can be extrapolated to other groups at other times (such as Arabs and Muslims post-9/11, and Mexican immigrants today):

“If during the present period, the general American population encourages people of Italian origin to regard themselves as Americans and really offers them the full rewards of membership in American society, the rebel reaction should be by far the most frequent, and adoption of American culture traits should therefore proceed at a tremendous rate. [But] if during this period of war, the non-Italian members of the population uniformly suspect Italian-Americans of treasonable activity and do not offer them the full rewards of membership in American society... the in-group reaction will be very frequent and a revival of Italian culture will therefore appear.” (pp. 196-97)

In a way, assimilation is realized through an unwitting process of seduction, not by coercion. Thus Ari Shavit (1997) points to the paradox that as American Jews find acceptance and success, they become “an endangered species:” “Curiously, it is precisely America’s virtues—its generosity, freedom and tolerance—that are now softly killing the last of the great Diasporas. It is because of its very virtues that America is in danger of becoming the most luxurious burial ground ever of Jewish cultural existence.”

Assimilation looks to the future, not to the past. It works its alchemy chiefly in the realm of the young, and the malleable next generation, but mostly superficially on those already formed adults who made the fateful decision to come, and who bring with them a dual frame of reference. It involves pervasive processes of change of which the protagonists may be no more conscious than fish are of water or we of the air we breathe—all the more so in a world that is changing seemingly faster than are the individuals who seek to adjust to it. Neither “assimilator” nor “assimilate” are fixed, static things, in any case, but permanently unfinished creations with vexing degrees of autonomy.

In view of the preceding discussion, then, I would venture the following in response to the question “what are the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate?” The history of this “nation of nations” has been, to a large extent, the history of the arrival, struggles, and absorption of its immigrants, and—assuming that the above-noted virtues of “generosity, freedom and tolerance” continue to function as “the great moral solvent” to promote inclusion—the available evidence points to a repetition of the historical record, not a sharp departure from it.

Response to Q3.**How did previous generations of immigrants learn English without federal programs?**

The laissez-faire way: sink or swim.

Learning a second language is, as noted previously and elaborated in my testimony, in significant ways a function of age at arrival, level of education, and length of exposure to English over time in the U.S. There are major differences in the manner and speed of language acquisition by immigrant children and adults, depending on a variety of learning contexts and resources (including, for children, the public schools, which have historically served as principal agencies of acculturation to American life and to the English language). For adult immigrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds who arrive in the U.S. past school age—and they constitute the majority of immigrants—the process of language acquisition evolves quite differently, is more difficult, and can best be promoted in the context of adult language instruction. Whether or not such instruction should be offered via federal programs or with federal support is of course a policy, and political, decision. In that regard I will venture just the following brief observations.

With rare exceptions (such as elderly immigrants brought to the U.S. by their adult children), English proficiency is key for immigrants' socioeconomic mobility and for their full participation in American life, from applying for a driver's license to passing the U.S. naturalized citizenship exam. Across the country, the demand for adult English instruction has greatly exceeded the supply for more than the past two decades. A new report, *Adult English Language Instruction in the United States: Determining Need and Investing Wisely* (McHugh et al., July 2007), states that promoting adult immigrants' acquisition of English is "arguably the most important integration challenge – and opportunity – facing city, state, and federal governments," and that "ensuring that immigrants have the opportunity to acquire strong English language and literacy skills is among the most neglected domestic policy issues in the nation today."

To the extent that the development of English competencies among adult immigrants is in the national interest as an investment in the future earnings and taxes paid by immigrants as well as in promoting policy goals of acculturation and assimilation, and that the desire and demand for such instruction is consistently clear on the part of immigrants, and to the extent that immigration is first and foremost a federal rather than local responsibility, it would seem logical to provide federal support to ensure the attainment of those objectives. In the absence of adult language instruction, the net effect of a laissez-faire "sink or swim" approach would be a significant delay and loss of immigrant human capital and financial capital accumulation, and the (avoidable) marginalization of many immigrants. A cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the relative gains of federal support for language programs for immigrants would seem appropriate to provide a factual basis for policy. The above cited report is one source for thinking systematically about this issue.

Table 1.

**International Data on Total Migrant Stock, 2005:
Percent of International Migrants in MDC and LDC Countries**

Major region or country	Total population as of July 1, 2005	
	Population (in thousands)	% international migrants
WORLD	6,464,750	2.95
More developed regions	1,285,189	9.40
Less developed regions	5,179,561	1.35
More developed countries: (by population size)		
United States of America	298,213	12.86
Japan	128,085	1.60
Germany	82,689	12.27
France	60,496	10.70
United Kingdom	59,668	9.06
Italy	58,093	4.34
Spain	43,064	11.12
Canada	32,268	18.92
Australia	20,155	20.33
Netherlands	16,299	10.05
Greece	11,120	8.76
Belgium	10,419	6.90
Sweden	9,041	12.36
Austria	8,189	15.06
Switzerland	7,252	22.88
Israel	6,725	39.57
Ireland	4,148	14.11
New Zealand	4,028	15.94
European micro-states:		
Luxembourg	465	37.35
Andorra	67	77.95
Monaco	35	69.92
Liechtenstein	35	33.94
San Marino	28	33.52

(continued)

Table 1, cont:

Less developed countries (by population size)	Total population as of July 1, 2005	
	Population (in thousands)	% international migrants
China	1,315,844	0.05
India	1,103,371	0.52
Indonesia	222,781	0.07
Brazil	186,405	0.34
Pakistan	157,935	2.06
Bangladesh	141,822	0.73
Nigeria	131,530	0.74
Mexico	107,029	0.60
Viet Nam	84,238	0.03
Ethiopia	77,431	0.72
Egypt	74,033	0.22
Turkey	73,193	1.81
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	69,515	2.82
Thailand	64,233	1.64
Democratic Republic of the Congo	57,549	0.94
Myanmar	50,519	0.23
Colombia	45,600	0.27
United Republic of Tanzania	38,329	2.07
GCC Arab states:		
Saudi Arabia	24,573	25.88
Jordan	5,703	39.01
United Arab Emirates	4,496	71.44
Kuwait	2,687	62.12
Oman	2,567	24.45
Qatar	813	78.34
Bahrain	727	40.66

Source: United Nations, 2005 revision.

Table 2.

U.S. Foreign-Born Population, 1900-2005

Census Year	Total U.S. population (in thousands)	% foreign-born
1900	10,445	13.6
1910	13,360	14.7
1920	14,020	13.2
1930	14,283	11.6
1940	11,657	8.8
1950	10,431	6.9
1960	9,738	5.5
1970	9,619	4.7
1980	14,080	6.2
1990	19,767	7.9
2000	31,108	11.1
2005*	38,320	12.9

* Source: U.S. decennial censuses, 1900-2000.

Note: The 2005 population estimate relies on the Current Population Surveys, 2004-2006, annual demographic files.

Table 3.

**U.S. Foreign-Born Population, by States, 2005:
States with Highest and Lowest Percent of Immigrants**

States	% Native	% Immigrant	Total population (in thousands)
Total U.S.	87.2	12.8	289,801
Highest % immigrant states:			
California	71.8	28.2	35,586
New York	78.4	21.6	19,081
Hawaii	79.8	20.2	1,252
Florida	80.8	19.2	17,175
New Jersey	80.9	19.1	8,643
Nevada	81.6	18.4	2,302
Arizona	83.1	16.9	5,708
Texas	83.8	16.2	22,132
Maryland	85.8	14.2	5,517
Massachusetts	85.9	14.1	6,385
Rhode Island	86.2	13.8	1,055
Illinois	88.0	12.0	12,584
Lowest % immigrant states:			
Arkansas	96.4	3.6	2,713
Kentucky	96.7	3.3	4,071
South Carolina	96.7	3.3	4,091
Louisiana	96.8	3.2	4,347
Alabama	97.1	2.9	4,475
Wyoming	97.2	2.8	496
South Dakota	97.4	2.6	754
Mississippi	97.5	2.5	2,841
North Dakota	97.6	2.4	629
Montana	98.2	1.8	916
West Virginia	99.1	0.9	1,783

Source: Current Population Surveys, 2004-2006, annual demographic files. The CPS is a household survey, and the estimates are for the civilian, non-institutionalized population of the U.S.

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM DONALD KERWIN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC.



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June 22, 2007

Rep. Zoe Lofgren
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and
International Law
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, D.C. 20515-6216

Dear Rep. Lofgren:

I thank you for the opportunity to testify on May 16th before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law. I just yesterday received your letter dated May 25, 2007, asking that I respond to three additional questions by the Honorable Steve King by June 29th. Rep. King's questions and my responses follow.

"(1) Is there such a thing as too much immigration? Legal immigration? Illegal immigration? Please give an example in history when a nation was too permissive in its immigration policies and discovered too late that it had gone too far. What would be too far, in your opinion, for the U.S.?"

The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) views migration in the context of its concern for the "common good." It recognizes the right and responsibility of the United States to control its borders, but does not believe that the "common good" can be achieved by turning away persons who need to migrate in order to support their families, to escape persecution, or otherwise to lead lives of dignity and safety. The USCCB does not support illegal immigration, but believes that U.S. immigration policy should be reformed in a manner that facilitates legal migration for deserving immigrants and that reflects U.S. labor needs and the importance of family unity. The USCCB supports a structured, humane and fair system of legal migration and the creation of a path to legal status for the nation's undocumented.

I am aware of individual examples from recent U.S. and European histories of foreign-born persons who have endangered host nations. Some of these cases are detailed in a comprehensive report I co-authored with Col. Margaret Stock titled *National Security and Immigration Policy*. The report is posted on the web-site for the Center for Combating

Terrorism at West Point

(http://www.ctc.usma.edu/research/National_Security_and_Immigration_Policy.pdf.) This report does not conclude that the United States should decrease immigrant admissions, and it carefully distinguishes between immigrants and national security threats. It does recognize the need for reform that would lead to an orderly, structured, and legal immigration flow, and that would allow identity and security checks to be conducted on all who enter.

In September 2006, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) released a report titled *Immigration and America's Future*, by an independent task force co-chaired by Spencer Abraham and Lee Hamilton. The report concluded that between FY 2001 and FY 2005, the net level of annual immigration to the United States was roughly 1.8 million persons. Roughly 500,000 of these immigrants annually entered the United States without inspection or authorization. A significant majority of the undocumented found work. Roughly 325,000 additional persons entered as temporary workers (including dependents), many of whom came to work in essentially permanent jobs. The MPI report concluded that 1.5 million would be a more reasonable level of legal admission each year, and proposed that this base-line figure be adjusted every two years based on changing U.S. economic and demographic conditions.

“(2) How many immigrants are too many? Is there a limit to how many immigrants we can successfully assimilate? What are the criteria? What are the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate?”

There probably cannot be one answer to this question. U.S. immigration policy appropriately tries to accomplish several goals, among them to strengthen the U.S. economy, to promote national security, to reunify families, and to protect persons at risk of persecution. It is particularly important that immigrants share U.S. civic values and contribute to the good of our nation.

In *A More Perfect Union: A National Citizenship Plan*, CLINIC highlighted the importance of citizenship, English language, and knowledge of U.S. history and civics to the process of immigrant integration. It would be reckless to assume that a diverse and growing population of 37 million immigrants will be incorporated easily or automatically into our nation's life. The United States' historic genius at integrating immigrants has been rooted in a relatively open job market, a participatory political system, strong mediating institutions (including family), and a legal framework that extends its core rights and protections to “persons,” not just to U.S. citizens.


However, the essential ingredient has been the conviction of successive waves of immigrants that they can become full members of our nation. Of course, how immigrants see the United States depends largely on how the United States views immigrants and conceives of itself. Many view the United States as the "creedal nation"; that is, a nation comprised of people from throughout the world that share a core commitment to constitutional democracy, civil rights, liberty, and equality. This vision of our nation remains an important factor in immigrant integration.

"(3) How did previous generations of immigrants learn English without federal programs?"

English language acquisition occurs more readily for people who enter the United States at younger ages. As I understand it, public schools have always played a crucial role in teaching immigrants English. In other words, there has always been a role for the government in "linguistic integration." This is not to say that the government's role – either for children in school or adults in English-as-a-Second (ESL) classes – does not need to be evaluated. Several faith-based language instruction programs – which are regularly funded by government agencies -- have played instrumental roles in educating non-English speaking immigrants. This point is not meant to diminish the role of broader social interaction (including employment) in language acquisition.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify and to respond to these follow-up questions.

Sincerely,



Donald Kerwin
Executive Director

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM JOHN FONTE, PH.D., SENIOR
FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

Answers from John Fonte, Ph.D. to the Honorable Steve King
For Hearing of May 16, 2007 on “Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Becoming
Americans-US Immigrant Integration”

Question 1. Is there such a thing as too much immigration? Legal immigration? Illegal immigration? Please give an example in history when a nation was too permissive in its immigration policies and discovered too late that it had gone too far? What would be too far, in your opinion, for the U.S.?

Clearly any amount of illegal immigration is, by definition, too much illegal immigration. But, yes, there is also “such a thing as too much legal immigration.” The clearest examples of nations that are “too permissive” in immigration policies and are discovering perhaps “too late” that they have gone “too far” are right before our very eyes: many of the nations of Western Europe today, including Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain.

There is, of course, the historical example of ancient Rome. It is well known that in later years the Roman empire had an essentially “open borders” policy and permitted large numbers of foreigners to enter Roman territory. These foreigners lived within their own enclaves; never assimilated to Roman ways; became very numerous; and eventually overthrew the Roman empire.

If the Roman example is too remote, we could clearly observe failed immigration policies in contemporary Europe. For the past several decades large numbers of immigrants from Muslim countries and developing nations have entered France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. They have not assimilated, but instead have caused the radical social transformation of those societies.

There is now a “critical mass” of unassimilated immigrants in Western Europe that has resulted in the following consequences.

- The French government officially declares that there are 751 “No-Go Zones” that French authorities do not enter. These “No-Go” or *Zones Urbaines Sensibles* (Sensitive Urban Zones) are controlled by immigrant Muslim clerics and gangs. No-Go zones exist throughout Europe in Malmo, Sweden, in England, Belgium, and elsewhere. (source MidEast Forum, Daniel Pipes, Philadelphia, Pa)
- The German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* (equivalent of Time or Newsweek) reported March 29, 2007 that immigrant Muslims in Germany are creating a “Muslim Parallel Society” within the nation that follows Islamic law instead of regular German law.
- The London *Daily Telegraph* reported November 11, 2006 that sharia (Islamic) law is “spreading” in immigrant communities throughout Britain.

- A *Washington Times* article March 14, 2007, “Islamicization of Antwerp,” describes how sex-segregated swimming pools and other aspects of Islamic law are being implemented in immigrant dominated areas of the city.

The following books give more details on the transformation of European societies brought about through massive (and unassimilated) immigration: *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* by Bruce Bawer (Doubleday, 2006); *Menace in Europe* by Claire Berlinski (Crown Forum, 2006); and *Londonistan* by Melanie Phillips (Encounter, 2006).

Question 2. How many immigrants are too many? Is there a limit to how many immigrants we can successfully assimilate? What are the criteria? What are the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate?

The last section of question one (“what would be too far, in your opinion, for the US) fits with question two. “Too far,” would occur when it would not be possible to assimilate immigrants because (1) the numbers are too great and (2) the assimilation process had completely broken down. I will spell out the details of the answer to this question in the next few paragraphs. Certainly the current immigration proposal in the Senate— which does not seriously ensure that the border is secure; provides eventual amnesty to 12-20 million illegal immigrants; and has no real assimilation measures—will exacerbate our current core problem.

That core problem is massive large-scale (mainly low-skilled) immigration both legal and illegal in concert with an essentially anti-assimilation policy regime that I described in my written testimony. To wit: (1) a de-facto policy that promotes official multilingualism as in Executive Order 13166 (which is codified in the Senate immigration bill); (2) encouragement of voting in foreign languages; (3) federal government support for bilingual education; (4) Dual allegiance voting in foreign countries by naturalized citizens; (5) promotion of multiculturalism in public education; and the encouragement of bilingualism by the private sector. None of these factors existed in the days of Ellis Island.

What criteria should we use in determining the number of immigrants that we should take in? Clearly, an immigration policy should never be considered separate from a successfully assimilation policy. The two must also go together. What metrics should we use to determine how well assimilation is succeeding? In my written testimony I discussed the types of assimilation including economic, linguistic, cultural, civic, and patriotic. Some metrics come to mind on issues of economic and linguistic assimilation. What do immigrant families earn in comparison with native-born in relationship to medium income, poverty rates? What is their rate of home ownership? What are their health care and educational costs in relationship to native-born? On civic and cultural assimilation, what is their law-abidingness comparison to natives including: contact with law enforcement, misdemeanor rates, felony rates, rates of incarceration and so on?

Two other metrics-criteria that could be employed in examining assimilation (both patriotic and cultural) would be (1) evidence of identification with America and (2) intermarriage with other Americans, rather than simply with other immigrants from one's own immediate ethnic group. In the past advocates of large scale immigration have always been able to point to evidence that immigrants who became citizens strongly identified with the United States and considered themselves primarily as Americans and increasingly intermarried with native born Americans, outside of their own ethnicity.

Unfortunately, in both of these areas the evidence from this criteria is that we have a crisis of assimilation today. Thus, on the question of "too far," we are at, or very near the tipping point, when it will be very difficult to turn back. I spelled out the evidence in detail in my written testimony.

The empirical evidence is: (1) According to Professors Rumbaut (Democratic witness at the hearing) and his colleague, the sociologist Alejandro Portes from their extensive longitudinal study of the children of immigrants—they found that patriotic identification with American identity decreases by around 20% after four years of high school and students identify more with their parents home country than the United States. (2) According to the Pew Hispanic survey around seven months after 9/11 only 34% of Latinos who were American citizens considered themselves Americans first. 42% considered their primary identification their parents home country and 24% considered themselves pan-ethnic Latinos or Hispanic.

(3) An empirical study of Muslims in Los Angeles in the 1990s found only 10% were more loyal to the United States than any Muslim country. (4) The latest study of intermarriage rates between immigrants and native-born Americans (the great indicator of cultural assimilation) reveals in a major new study (published in the American Sociological Review by Ohio State Professor Zhenchao Qian) that, for the first time in decades, intermarriage rates have declined. This tells us that assimilation is regressing not succeeding.

(5) The latest Pew Study of Muslims in America (not discussed in my written testimony) is very troubling. The survey of mostly (two-thirds) immigrants disclosed that 40% did not even believe that Arabs were involved in the 9/11 attacks. 26% of American Muslims under 30 said suicide bombings that defend Islam were justified. By 47% to 28%, the mostly immigrant group, considered themselves Muslims first, Americans second. Only 26% believed that the "war on terror" was a "sincere" effort.

All of the above suggest that we already have too much immigration to successfully assimilate the immigrants who are here. Thus, instead of increasing immigration as the current Senate bill does we should be making some cuts in (particularly low-skilled) immigration until we have a serious and successful assimilation process.

Obviously, "the maximum consequences if the wrong judgment is made about how many immigrants we can assimilate" would be the end of the American way of life and American constitutional democracy as we have known it, and its radical transformation

into a very different type of regime—a multi-national (not multi-ethnic like today, but multi-national with citizens separated from one another by nationality), official multi-lingual (with citizens unable to communicate with each other), post-constitutional, and post-democratic (with courts making most of the key decisions) state.

Let me add some antidotal evidence of the lack of assimilation. During the massive pro-illegal alien demonstrations in the spring of 2006 in opposition to the House bill 4437 the majority of the demonstrators in America's large cities were waving foreign, not American flags.

There was a particularly telling incident that was captured on video and in pictures. On March 27, 2006, American high school students (of mostly Mexican descent) in Whittier, California turned an American flag upside down, put a Mexican flag triumphantly on top of it, and then ran it up the flagpole. This picture and related pictures taken by *Whittier Daily News* photographers were posted by columnist Michele Malkin, sped around the internet, and widely debated.

Some argued that not too much should be made of this one incident, that it was, perhaps, just a display of youthful exuberance and ethnic pride. Unfortunately this was not an isolated incident but one of many that revealed not simply ethnic pride, or a lack of assimilation, but, more importantly, a hostility and visceral distaste for the symbols of American identity. In Los Angeles, American flags were burned; marchers held signs of the North American continent with the United States having a big "X" across it; and demonstrators waved hostile slogans including "this is stolen land." In Dallas, the *Morning News* reported that Michelle Marquez, an eight grade Mexican-American student joined the protest, but was, nevertheless, screamed at and taunted by her fellow students for daring to carry an American flag.

But we should not be surprised that the American-born children of immigrants are confused about their identity. Clearly, the incidents listed above have not occurred in an intellectual, political, and cultural vacuum. This is related to a much bigger story that has been underway for decades: (1) the promotion of multiculturalism over assimilation and (2) the denigration of our national identity by American elites.

Question 3. How did previous generations of immigrants learn English without federal programs?

In the past the idea that we should promote the learning of English by immigrants was part of the Americanization process. This "Americanization" project was promoted by leading American elites in politics (both major parties, men like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson), businesses, churches, and voluntary organizations. During the last major wave of immigration at the turn of the 20th century American leaders did not promote multiculturalism, diversity, bi-lingualism and all the rest; they promoted Americanization. There was no bi-lingual education, foreign language voting, executive order 13166, and corporations promoting bi-lingualism.

In 1907 the YMCA's New York chapter established evening classes for immigrants in English, naturalization, and US history and government. By the following year this program was extended to 130 cities and towns around the country, within five years there were over 300 YMCA programs. The YMCA would be the main organization behind private sector Americanization and English learning. In 1907 the state of New Jersey established English classes for immigrants.

Also in 1907 the North American Civic League for Immigrants was founded by philanthropists, social workers, and industrialists; it promoted Americanization. The League developed lectures and study material for immigrants with titles such as: "The Need for Learning English," "The Story of the American People," "George Washington," and the like.

In 1911 the Federal Immigration Commission issued a 42 volume report and concluded that assimilation had been slow and recommend strong involvement from civil society and the private sector. The Chairman of the Commission said: "All these newcomers need help. They need to be interested in American institutions, and it can only be done through a society of this nature, and by cooperation of churches, societies, and individuals by team work."

Big Business also promoted Americanization. This is described in a book, *The Movement to Americanize the Immigrants* by Edward George Hartmann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948). The author Hartmann writes, "practically every chamber of commerce or similar [business] organization of every municipality or significance containing an alien population had a special immigration committee taking a vigorous and active part on behalf of the Americanization of the immigrant." Compare American business in the past with business activities today in promoting Spanish usage (*e.g.*, "press one for English, two for Spanish") and acceptance of matricula consular documents.

Two other important books that review past Americanization efforts including English learning are: John J Miller, *The Unmaking of Americans: How Multiculturalism Has Undermined America's Assimilation Ethic* (New York: Free Press, 1998) and Noah Pickus, *True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).