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**DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI POLICE  
SERVICE**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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## **DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, May 24, 2007.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:11 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Marty Meehan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. MEEHAN. Good morning. Today the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations meets to continue its examination of the development of Iraqi Security Forces. The focus of today's hearing is Iraqi Police Service, or IPS.

The discussion of the Iraqi Security Forces tends to focus on the Iraqi army and the national police, but there is also a large Iraqi Police Service force that is intended to carry out a community policing function. They are the traffic cops, the patrolmen and the local beat cops who are essential to the counterinsurgency effort as well as establishment of the rule of law. We have witnesses here today who have been working directly with the IPS and can tell us about their experiences in advising and mentoring them.

Before we get to our witnesses, I want to bring the subcommittee up to date on the status of the Defense Department's compliance with our first document request, given the discussion that we had in the subcommittee on Tuesday.

On March 20th, Mr. Akin and I asked for four documents that we considered essential to studying the development of the Iraqi Security Forces. Among other documents, we asked for the classified April 2006 Joint Multinational Forces-Iraq and U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan as well as its predecessors and any subsequent revisions to it. Yesterday, we received some of the documents we requested including part of the Joint Campaign Plan. We anticipate receiving the campaign plan annexes shortly.

The bad news is, before we received a copy, we already read yesterday's Washington Post article outlining the details of the plan that will replace the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan. In other words, March 20th we asked for the documents and yesterday we read about it in the Washington Post; and I am concerned that the press had access to this before anyone in Congress saw it, and I do believe the DOD should pursue the leakers to the full extent of the law.

That having been said, we have been assured that once Secretary Gates signs off on the strategy, it will be delivered to us immediately.

The new plan, if approved by Secretary Gates, appears to contain a notable shift. As reported in the Post, the new plan shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi Security Forces. The Post goes on to say that one of the sources of the article—and apparently there are many sources, some quoted by name—have said that the United States drive to make Iraqi forces independent has already limited U.S. leverage.

Needless to say, the subcommittee will need additional information regarding the new plan and in particular, its reported annex on ISF policy.

Moving to today, we had hoped to have two panels of witnesses. We had asked the Department of Defense to provide appropriate witnesses who could talk about the DOD plans and efforts to establish, plan and assess the progress of the Iraqi Police Service. I asked specifically that witnesses be able to provide testimony on the following issues:

The IPS's role in and contributions to stabilizing the security conditions in Iraq; IPS's role in the counterinsurgency effort; and how the IPS is managed between the Ministry of Interior and provincial governments.

Unfortunately, the DOD responded that the one witness who could meet the subcommittee's need for this first panel is Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, and since General Dempsey could not be here today, we asked for witnesses who have been very involved in the development of ISF and IPS who are located in the Washington area. Specifically, we asked if General George Casey could testify.

Before becoming Army Chief of Staff, General Casey was the commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq and he reportedly declared the year 2006 as the "Year of the Police."

We also asked for General Chiarelli, who currently is serving at the Pentagon. General Chiarelli was the previous commander of the Multinational Corps in Iraq. The Multinational Corps commander assumes the operation and control of the ISF units once they have been formed, and he could have provided his insight into the importance of developing a capable and professional police force.

I think either general could have helped us better understand the evolution and development of the ISF and the IPS. So there will be no first panel today to discuss the Department's plans to establish the IPS.

In reference to our requests for this past Tuesday and today, Secretary Gates assures us that General Dempsey will appear before the subcommittee on June 12th. After hearing about the plans, policy and progress of IPS development, we wanted to hear about how this actually works on the ground.

We appreciate that, for our second panel, the Department has allowed us those people who have hands-on experience to join us. I would ask witnesses for the second panel to join us at the witness table now.

We are very pleased to have several witnesses today who can discuss their personal experiences in the development of IPS. General Richard Swengros oversees the training of the Army police transition teams as the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School at Ford Leonard Wood Missouri. He also established the Police Partner Program when he served in Iraq as Commander of the 42nd Military Police Brigade from November of 2004 to November 2005.

Colonel Robert Coates served as Assistant Chief of Staff for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and was responsible for supporting the transition teams working with ISF in Al Anbar Province. Now he is the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Training/Experimentation Group and is overseeing Police Transition Team training for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert McCarthy, also from the Marine Corps, has returned this past February after serving as a Police Transition Team leader in Al Anbar.

We also have 1st Lieutenant Cadetta Bridges, who serves as the Headquarters Detachment Commander of the 372nd MP Battalion of the DC National Guard. Lieutenant Bridges returned from Iraq in February after serving as a Police Transition Team coordinator in Baghdad.

Finally, joining us is Lieutenant Colonel Brad Felling of the Air Force who just returned from four months in Iraq last Wednesday. We are pleased that, on late notice, Colonel Felling, after returning Wednesday, is here before this committee.

I want to thank all of you for your outstanding service to the United States and thank all of you for being here. And we look forward to your testimony.

I would note that Colonel Swengros and Colonel Coates have prepared statements that will be made a part of the record; and we will turn to you two gentlemen for any brief opening statements that you can make, following Mr. Akin.

To encourage discussion, we would like to follow the same procedures that we have been following in the committee, and that is that we will dispense with the five-minute rule during the hearing, so there can be some give-and-take with the outstanding witnesses that we have. I would also like to remind everyone that this is an open hearing so no classified information should be discussed.

Before I turn to Mr. Akin for any opening remarks, I would like to take a moment to share news from Iraq. It drives home, I think, how critical and dangerous the mission that we are discussing is. Last week an Air Force staff sergeant, John Self, was killed in Iraq; and he was a part of a police training team much like the ones that we are discussing here today. And all of our thoughts are with his family. He was on his fourth tour in Iraq.

Now I would like to turn to my partner on this committee, Mr. Todd Akin, for any remarks that he would have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND IN-  
VESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning to our witnesses. Thank you all for coming. We are looking forward to your comments.

Over the course of this investigation, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Iraqi Police Service, the IPS, nominally part of the Iraqi Security Forces, is really a unique organization that requires its own analysis and discussions separate from the Iraqi army or the National Police. Despite being critical to our effort in Iraq and the fact that nearly half the security forces we have trained belong to the Iraqi Police Service, it has been remarkably difficult to get information about the efforts of the police transition teams. Along that vein, I want to thank the Department for supporting this important hearing and the ones to follow in June.

If defeating sectarianism and marginalizing militias are paramount to success in Iraq, then the Iraqi Police Service that ensures law and order and has the respect and trust of the local communities is absolutely essential. A community that relies on the IPS for safety is a community that will not turn to militias.

It seems to me, as the strategic framework for prioritizing our police training effort, the police transition teams are an essential piece of the effort to execute this strategy. I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses on this.

Some of the issues I would like for the witnesses to touch on will be:

First, the competency of the police stations your PTT worked with, and the extent the Ministry of Interior involved itself in the work of these police stations;

Second, whether the IPS you worked with was able to carry out nominal law-and-order police work or they were forced to support counterinsurgency operations;

Three, the extent of militia infiltration in the police stations you oversaw; and

Four, how the chain of command supported your efforts.

Once again, thank you all for joining us. We are looking forward to your testimony.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Akin.

Colonel Swengros and Colonel Coates, if you could proceed with your opening statements.



**STATEMENT OF COL. RICHARD W. SWENGROS, ASSISTANT  
COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL, U.S.  
ARMY; COL. ROBERT J. COATES, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR TRAINING AND EXPERIMENTATION GROUP, FIRST MA-  
RINE EXPEDITIONARY, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND LT. COL.  
ROBERT E. MCCARTHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FIFTH MA-  
RINE REGIMENT**

**STATEMENT OF COL. RICHARD W. SWENGROS**

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir. Thank you Chairman Meehan Congressman Akin, distinguished members of the committee. It is my pleasure to appear before this committee today and give my testimony on the police transition teams and the work of our soldiers in Iraq and at the U.S. Army Military Police School as we support their transition team efforts.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you have my opening statement, and if I could, I will go ahead and summarize to allow more time.

I have been in the Army nearly 31 years, all in the military police. I started out as a private. As I attained the rank of staff sergeant I went to OCS, commissioned as a second lieutenant. I have had every military police type of duty the Army offers, in corrections, detention operations, military police companies and our Criminal Investigation Command.

I do keep in contact with the senior military police leaders that are in Iraq today, and in Afghanistan, as we move forward to develop and enhance the transition team efforts from our bases here in the United States.

In my experiences in Kosovo and now in Iraq I observed that building police capabilities in a Third World nation that is encumbered by fallen regimes and police that were part of the oppressive societies is absolutely the most complex thing I have ever done in my life. I have done it twice in my first rotation in Kosovo and then in a third rotation Iraq.

My first day after the transition of authority as brigade commander, I went to a squadron on the west side of Tigris River in Baghdad and said, I am the new brigade commander. What can I do to help you in your mission? At that point, it wasn't a transition team; it was a program, it was military police squads operating in the police stations. And the squad leader, without missing a beat, said, You have got to fix the headquarters.

You can't just fix the police stations. It has got to be a top-down—from the top all the way down to the bottom approach to how we fix the problems.

So I took that in. The next day, I am out on the east side of the Tigris, found a platoon leader out there, asked the same question. These are different units, different commanders, different brigades they are working for, and this lieutenant almost verbatim said the same thing. She said, You have to fix the hierarchy. You have to fix the structures at the same time you are fixing the police stations because what is happening, as we develop the police station capability, there are transfers, there are pay problems, there are a whole number of things that pull away from what the police stations are trying to do.

So I went back to my staff, and we sat down and we basically figured out, in order to do this, we had to partner with more than just our squads; we had to partner with our brigade battalion staffs. And we formed in early 2005 with General Chiarelli and Brigadier General Jones the Police Partnership Program. It was centered specifically at this point in Baghdad, and then by the time I left—in Iraq, when I first started, we had about 70 teams I could put out in my entire brigade, and now you are facing almost 230 police transition teams out there. Their number is still growing; about 85 percent of the stations are being partnered with in one fashion or another as they go through and address the various problems and situations that are out in Iraq.

As a result of our working with the current police transition teams over there, military police school was trying to level the playing field. When you go over there as a new unit it is more than just a transition from a right-seat ride to a left-seat ride. There is a transition process in learning, one month, two months, three months, whatever that dynamic is, to figure out what forms you have to fill out.

So we develop a training support package and we now teach it as a five-day course. We teach, both residents and a military training team, we go out to the units and we will train them on Police Transition Team. And it is a package of slides and briefings that will allow units to train on what the PTT program is about, so when they get in country, all that learning aspect is diminished and they can concentrate really on who is operating in the area and how they can make effectiveness quickly at the same time that the enemy, if you will, operates to undermine or to take advantage of that scene that typically takes place when we transition units.

Challenges continue to be the environment, the groups vying for population control; that is, organized crime, criminals, insurgents, terrorists, political or tribal parties. The number of PTTs, the number of interpreters with each PTT, all those get out the program.

This part of the program is the best chance for success, but it will take time. It is an expensive effort under trying circumstances.

There are a great majority of Iraqis and Iraqi police who are grateful for our efforts and are trying to effect change. And we saw that. We see it in their efforts. We see it in their eyes. Through my current job, again, I stay in contact. And it is the same feedback we are getting from folks who are returning. I think you will hear that today from the panel.

I would like to thank this committee again for your time and interest in the Police Transition Team program, and I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you Colonel.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Swengros can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Colonel Coates.

#### **STATEMENT OF COL. ROBERT J. COATES**

Colonel COATES. Sir, Chairman, Congressman Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you this morning to discuss the Marine Corps advisory efforts in the Iraqi police development in Al Anbar Province. First, on be-

half of all marines and sailors and their families, I want to thank you for your continued support off our Corps as we continue to fight on in the war on terror.

In February 2006 the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, or I MEF, created a separate staff section, the G-10, to oversee not only all Iraqi Security Force development in Al Anbar Province but the formal training of all U.S. Marine Corps and transition teams stemming from I MEF.

As you are aware, we have transition teams assigned to the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police Service, and the Border Protection Service. Through the IPS, February 2006, approximately 2,143 policemen were assigned to Anbar Province with an additional 1,599 in training. However, many of these assigned policemen were not actively working.

There are 10 police districts identified in Al Anbar Province, but only four of these police districts were operating at that time, with a total of 14 police stations.

Two of these districts in many of the stations were barely functioning. The provincial headquarters was not operational. The only truly functioning police force is the City of Fallujah.

The Iraqi Police initiative in Al Anbar to date provides the Coalition the most direct method of Sunni engagement for the populace. Iraqi Police are nationally controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, the MOI, and are organized along military lines with regard to rank structures, and distinguished between sworn officers and policemen. I might add, officers are the ones that have the real authority, the arrest authority and such, and the policemen are more like an enlisted rank structure.

The Principal Director of the Police, or the PDoP, is appointed for each province and works directly for the governor of the Province, while adhering to ministerial policies and regulations. The chief of police appointed in each district is responsible for the management of all stations within the district.

Iraqi Police recruiting in Al Anbar faced many challenges during most of 2006. Al Qaeda was conducting a ruthless murder and intimidation campaign against the then-fledgling Iraqi Police, causing much of the local populace to adopt a wait-and-see attitude with regard to Iraqi Police, this wait-and-see attitude exacerbated by tribal affiliations where prospective recruits must obtain permission from the Sheiks to join the Iraqi Police.

The recruiting process heavily taxed Coalition Forces to provide adequate security, as recruiting locations made attractive targets for the insurgents. Of course this created great pause in the minds of potential recruits. Many of those individuals brave enough to enter recruiting stations were rejected due to literacy or lack of proper identification. Once properly screened, the recruit must graduate from a preapproved police academy such as the Baghdad Police Force or the Jordanian International Police Training Center, JIPTC. Upon graduation, the MOI issues hiring orders for new policemen and assigns them to a home province. Policemen who formerly served in the IP could also rejoin the service by attending a three-week transition integration program refresher course.

From February 2006 to February 2007, all equipment issued to the IP was from Coalition Forces. During that first half of 2006,

Iraqi Police lacked basic equipment, to include vehicles, weapons, body armor, radios and communications infrastructure. This impacted operations throughout the year. Logistics support was also an issue. An example of this was a lack of fuel for the Iraqi Police vehicles. There is no MOI funding for Iraqi fuel nor is there any infrastructure to hold and distribute fuel.

Problems associated with Iraqi equipment was eventually overcome when large shipments of gear were delivered to the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar in the last half of 2006.

Iraqi Police in Al Anbar Province lacked ministerial support from central government and was unfailingly prioritized last, as with all other major government programs. Local government tribal support, however, provided the impetus to expand the Iraqi Police in the province, allowing it to grow to its current size.

Perhaps the greatest factor in sustaining Iraqi Police is pay. When I MEF arrived in Al Anbar Province, police hadn't been paid in four months. The PDoP was arrested for stealing Iraqi Police (IP) salaries. Baghdad Treasury withheld all police funds from Al Anbar. Extensive Coalition involvement was required to restart the pay process because the Baghdad Treasury did not trust provincial police officials to do so. Restarting the pay process was essential to recruiting Iraqi Police.

Iraqi Police Service was not designed similarly to fight an insurgency but is an essential element to fighting the insurgency. This required Coalition and Iraqi Army Forces to set conditions that would allow the Iraqi Police to conduct day-to-day operations. Coalition and Iraqi units also provided quick reaction forces for the Iraqi Police in emergency situations. Today there are many locations throughout al Anbar where our Iraqi Police have established security to a level for allowing schools and shops to open for the first time in years.

There are no existing criminal courts or judges in Al Anbar Province. This has created obvious problems for the police as there is no established system of justice outside the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. The CCCI's focus was on the prosecution of insurgents, which neglected the prosecution of common criminals. This greatly hampered police operations.

There are no existing prisons in Al Anbar Province. Police could turn the insurgents over to the Coalition for detention, and the regional detention facility only possessed small jails within the police stations to hold common criminals. These were almost always, always, always overcrowded.

Construction of Iraqi Police facilities was problematic. Threats and attacks against contractors slowed or halted many of these projects. In addition, proof of land ownership further delayed many projects as titles and deeds to most land did not exist, making this requirement nearly impossible to satisfy.

Al Anbar Iraqi Police are mentored by both U.S. Army and Marine Police Transition Teams or PTTs. Many of these teams proved to be difficult initially, and a U.S. Army Military Police (MP) battalion was originally tasked to source these teams but was diverted to Baghdad, leaving only a company in place to provide PTTs. I MEF created 15 additional PTTs from personnel from staff positions and line units to fill the gap.

During the initial stages of the PTT program PTTs received local generalized adviser training. As the PTT program developed, incoming advisors began to receive more specialized PTT-centric instruction at Camp Fallujah, followed by more detailed on site ten-day training with outgoing PTTs. Today I MEF maintains a dedicated Advisory Training Group board at Camp Pendleton to train and prepare all transition teams as well as issuing a PTT handbook.

And, sir, I brought an example of that handbook for your staff. And it has been distributed and in no way, sir, is the "dummies" portion in there warranted at any anybody—

Mr. MEEHAN. It is not just for the Congress, anyone that gets the book—

Colonel COATES. Absolutely not, sir. Upon I MEF's transfer of authority to II MEF on 9 February 2007, Al Anbar had approximately 10,250 assigned IP. And that is school-qualified IP, sir, formally trained, with approximately 9,211 walking the beat. Provincial headquarters in all ten districts were operational with a total of 40 active police stations. The IP are being paid on time each month, and also receive additional funds for operations and maintenance. The IP are invaluable not only for the security they provide, but also for the ground level intelligence on local insurgent activities.

During December 2006 to February 2007, four graduating police academies, each ranging in size from 550 to 1,300, reported to more than 40 police locations throughout Al Anbar, equipped with complete equipment kits and vehicles, as well as on good pay status.

The Iraqi Police officer has been the subject of much violence in Al Anbar. Often one to two police officers are killed daily or murdered on a daily basis. That is an indicator of what their impact has been upon the al Qaeda insurgency. No question in recent months the IP is taking the fight to the insurgency in Al Anbar Province.

Additionally, in February of 2007, I MEF installed a commercial satellite Internet system covering all police stations in Al Anbar, providing first-ever coverage to the Province, resulting in a capability to coordinate and share information.

Iraqi Police Service in Al Anbar Province has proven to be a good news story. Much of the recent decline in violence there can be directly attributed to their increased presence in the Province as well as a form of Sunni engagement by both Coalition Forces and the government in Iraq. I can provide you today with many examples of bravery on the battlefield that I know of firsthand.

Again, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have as well as providing any additional information that you require.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much Colonel.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Coates can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Colonel Swengros and Coates, you have been involved in the evolution of the PTT program from an informal approach to a more formal approach. Can you describe for the subcommittee how the program has evolved and what progress you have seen in the IPS and how that has evolved?

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as I said, when we got over there what I saw was a lot of policing effort but it wasn't synchronized and it wasn't addressing it from the top to bottom. So from the very start, we had efforts out there to train stations that I would classify as very desynchronized; everybody doing the right thing, but it wasn't connected. So we really concentrated on that.

And I took my brigade staff and my logistics officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) and they went out and built the capability in the Baghdad Maintenance Facility. And that included calling back to Chrysler and Chevrolet and getting parts lists for vehicles that were sent over by contributing nations but didn't come with the right parts sets to repair the damages from the insurgency. First day in we had—ball peen hammers was all they had. And that is the complexity I was talking about. So that is the logistics side.

I can talk about the accountability system, the weapons, when we got there. I think our mission in 2004 was really—late 2004, we had lost the police stations in Mosul, we had lost police stations in a lot of areas. And so our initial focus entering 2005 was the January 2005 elections and getting the police to really be able to defend themselves.

I think today you will see that most police stations can and do defend themselves from attack by the insurgents, and that was not happening at the onset. It took our intelligence folks. And they helped develop a criminal intelligence. When the police were disbanded, all their expertise went away. Most of your police leadership in Iraq is Army. And, in fact, the year I was there, the only former policeman that was a Province police chief was the Baghdad police chief, General Asad. Everybody else was Army.

So it was the leadership management piece of it, but in terms of policing, it wasn't there. And that was the same basically as you go through the stations. It was very difficult to find some seasoned police folks, because they were run out of the country and they were able to stabilize that a little bit.

We brought our operations folks and set up command centers to try to get at the same thing that he talked about in Al Anbar that we were doing about a year and a half earlier: communications across Baghdad where they could actually track where people were, somewhat of a 9/11 system, the tips lines.

The Iraqis are calling the Iraqi Police now and not the Coalition tip line to provide information on insurgent or criminal activity in an area.

Our personnel section in brigade and battalions would go out and work the personnel and pay issues. From my perspective, and I have worked with the Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs in my year there, trying to work that piece of it. But as you can tell, we are starting to get spread between brigades trying to work Mosul and trying to work Baghdad, being those are our two top priorities, and then trying to work with the Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs.

But we worked on the pay system and the fuel system and what we saw was when the government transitioned later on that year in 2005, a lot of the folks that we had been working with then were removed or replaced by other party members. And we had to basi-

cally start, not really from over, but we had to start pretty close to ground zero again, getting through all the pay problems, the badging problems, the weapons problems.

A lot of people will talk about the partnership program and ask how it works, and I think the clearest example is: I went into Baghdad, I had a lot of questions coming from me, from the Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I). We operated under 18 Airborne Corps, saying okay, show me this logistics accountability system. So I said, okay, you give me a security—a serial number of AK-47 that you issued to me, and I will use the Iraqis to track it down and tell you where it is. And we were able to track down in 2005—if we issued a weapon we could track it down to a certain station.

What we found is as we were going through and tracking computers and weapons and vehicles, there are a lot of folks would get those, and, because of that distrust, they would not issue them out to stations that they didn't trust. So they were kept in the Iraqi Police warehouses. So we had to go down there and stoke the fire over that system. And that is, again, in a nutshell, some of the complexity.

But all of it was a success because it was all working in various stages. I think the issue is that we really have to keep at it for a lot of different reasons. We have to keep at that program. But the Iraqis are capable of doing it.

Mr. MEEHAN. Colonel, do you have anything to add to that?

Colonel COATES. In regards to the transition teams, Mr. Chairman, you know at first it was very informal. We had a formalized period of instruction, but I will tell you, you can be very proud of the marines, the soldiers, and the sailors assigned to those teams. And Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy can speak firsthand.

Our goal was to set conditions that would allow the police to thrive and grow which obviously gets initial security established. And that was a challenge. But in parts of Al Anbar which have very unique challenges, what you will find today is not uncommon—and we didn't have this when we first got there—to have an Iraqi Police section accompany an Iraqi Army unit and a Coalition unit and have a combined patrol through neighborhoods. And that was what was really a key success, because there was much mistrust between the Iraqi Army and the IPS initially. And each considered each other terrorists.

So the vehicle with which we brought about that trust or bringing that coordination together was the PTT team and the associations that the PTT team could have with a partnered unit, and bringing that joint coordination together, which resulted in better intelligence to where the police went on patrols with the military and they could point the street-level bad guys out immediately and tell them what is right, what is left, and so on so forth.

So that was, you know, the real vehicle of getting that done was the in emplacement of those PTT teams. And also those PTT teams gave us true visibility of what was going on at the lowest levels and then bringing it up.

For the ministerial thing, we had no functioning provincial police headquarters. Our first step of trying to get that provincial police established or establishing the provincial police so we could get that ministerial engagement I will tell you, sir, it is very broken

at that level. You know, they consider the Government of Baghdad as the other side of the world. They do not get much in the way of day-to-day support. We are getting salaries. But the establishment of our provincial headquarters and engaging ministerial level is absolutely key to sustaining the future.

Mr. MEEHAN. Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy and Lieutenant Bridges, I wonder if you would introduce yourself and then tell us where you served. But I am interested in you describing for the subcommittee what a typical day for a PTT working with the IPS would be like.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Good morning, Chairman. Lieutenant Colonel Bob McCarthy from the great Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I was in Al Habbaniya.

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you know how many Bob McCarthys I know in Massachusetts?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Probably 110, sir.

But Colonel Coates threw me into Al Habbaniya that needed some adult leadership. There were two squads, military police squads, that were working with a very corrupt lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi Police Service. And it was a function of leadership dealing with those folks. Unannounced calls, zero 5 to zero 7 to check posts. Basic leadership supervisory role. Are you manning your towers? Are you manning your Entry Control Points (ECPs)? Are you dressed professionally? Are you wearing your uniform properly? Are you carrying your weapon properly to make things safe? You would have negligent discharges all over the place and it was unsafe for the soldiers and the marines. We fixed that immediately.

We would screen and vet their rosters over and over and over again, because you had ghost policemen on the rosters. I mean, the administrative burden for the soldiers and marines was gigantic. But you know, basically the task, man training and equipment, lead, teach, and mentor 24 hours a day. The Military Police Force, they never left the station. They waited for a call.

In a counterinsurgency environment, they have to be on the streets because they are there to provide the basic security for the locals.

We taught them to do dismounted combat patrols. Let's walk outside your station. Show them how to walk the beat.

We stand off. They walk in front and get them comfortable showing the blue, showing the police uniform on the streets. And the people started to recognize their efforts and started to actually bring information regarding criminal activity and insurgent activity to the stations.

Mr. MEEHAN. Can I ask, how did the international police officers, contractors, how do they fit into this equation?

Colonel MCCARTHY. The way we broke it down into functional areas we trained the leadership, you know, to operate along functional lines as a staff and do their admin, do their logistics, do their intelligence, their communications. We taught them basic police and soldierly skills and virtues. And that's where the police officers came in, you know; our International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs), they would teach investigations, the conduct of investigation, over and over and over again. Sensitive site exploitation, how to gather and maintain a chain of custody on evidence.



And staying on top of that—I mean, we taught the investigative process every day for six months.

Because if I said Chairman Meehan was a bad man, and Colonel Coates said Chairman Meehan was a bad man, the report would be that you are a very bad man because we have two statements that you are a bad man.

Mr. MEEHAN. Sounds like my local newspaper.

Colonel MCCARTHY. But they did great, great work, with just how to set up a dispatch center; because if they launched a patrol, they had no battle-tracking capability. It was God willing. Insha'allah.

You just launched a patrol, and into a very bad neighborhood; what is the plan, who is the quick reaction force? Now, when are they checking in, how are you tracking this on a map? How are you, you know, registering this for your historical records? They didn't track that. So we taught them all those things.

Mr. MEEHAN. Lieutenant Bridges.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Good morning.

Mr. MEEHAN. Basically the question is describe, if you would, a typical day for the PTT working with the IPS and what it would be like.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Good morning, Chairman Meehan Mr. Akin and distinguished panel. Thank you all for allowing me to be here. I am Lieutenant Bridges, and I was a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) commander in the 322nd.

A typical morning for us was getting my team up 04, convoying out of the gate, getting to the IP station, to find no one there. Meaning, sir, everyone was fast asleep.

So our job was to try and discipline the IPs at our subprovincial headquarters. We had a lot of discipline issues. So we couldn't even talk about infrastructure or classroom training until we finally got them to a place of discipline.

Once we got them to put on their uniform, sir, we started classroom instruction. We started to try and teach them things, just as Colonel McCarthy just noted, just basic policing, basic reporting.

The reporting system within the station, we managed over 5,000 IPs for nine districts, and the reporting system was: Who is at work today? So all of the officers—I had nine officers, 06s, there in their Iraqi chain, they would come to me and say we have 10 people here, we have 20 people here.

And actually sir, they wouldn't have those people there. Typical.

Let's talk about the afternoon. We would go into the operation section. Our job was to try and make sure that these Iraqis knew how to read the maps. We would bring maps for them that were made for us at the division level, but they did not know how to read their own maps. So that was a big issue for us, getting them to know where their patrols and IPs were being dispatched so that they could track them. So we had a lot of issues there.

Well into the evening our IPs would leave at two o'clock. So we had a hard time trying to get them to learn how to stay at the station, do overnight operations. We had a lot of issues in the patrol issues, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. Lieutenant, do you know whether the IPs that were present were trained by the Coalition? Were they Coalition-trained?

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Are you speaking of the formal training?

Mr. MEEHAN. Yes.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. All of my IPs, sir, had been to the Jordan Academy or the Baghdad Academy. There were some who had not received training because they had been IPs for maybe 20 years, so they did receive refresher training from those academies.

Mr. MEEHAN. One of the things the members of the committee—we took a recent trip to Iraq and we toured the JIPTC in Jordan, and it was stunning to me and the other members of our delegation. The fact that they couldn't tell us whatever happened to those people who graduated from what appeared to me to be a pretty high-quality police training facility.

Before I was elected to Congress I ran a very large district attorney's office. And the police training operation itself, we were very impressed with it. But the notion of not knowing who you are training, whether they show up for work, how long they stay, whether they move up in the ranks, or whether they were, you know, Iraqi Police officers or al Qaeda, was very concerning, I think, to all of us, keeping track of who we are training and where they end up.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Yes, sir. That process is very frustrating for us. I have worked alongside the 463rd MP commander and we would see the recruiting process, sir, from start to end. And I can tell you if we sent over 80 IPs to Jordan or Baghdad Academy, we could not account but, I will say, for maybe 50 percent of those IPs at the end of the 8-week training, and we just could not get a pulse on what activity was happening at the school that allowed us not to, you know, battle-track these IPs.

We vetted them, sir. We would go to the recruitment center and ensure that these civilians would go through the process, take the test, the doctor say they are good to go, they cough. They are good, sir. We wait for them to go to training, we can't find them at the end of the course. Maybe like I said, we send 80, we can only account for 40, and I don't even want to impress upon you the badging process, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. I am interested if anybody else had comments on this when you think—I think it was mentioned, there were 50,000 Iraqi Police that had been trained; the cost to the United States was significant. And again, an impressive facility, but not having any idea whether we were training insurgents, al Qaeda, or people that really want to be Iraqi security. And the only way we could identify them, many would come in and give names and no way really to identify them until we got their identification. Then there were instances, if they came back for training, and you would know, you have already been here for training once. But I would like to hear from all the panelists on this.

Colonel SWENGROS. Mr. Chairman, we also had responsibility for the Baghdad Police College when I first got there. When I first got there it was eight weeks and now it is ten weeks. But, as Colonel Coates was saying, you start looking at training and you start looking at what the curriculum is. It is good training but the first cou-

ple of weeks are human rights-type training, little to do with police work. And we spend a couple weeks on training them how to survive, a lot of time on the ranges and stuff like that, and when you get down to policing, out of the ten weeks, you may get four weeks out of it.

I did try to address the same problem we had in 2005. You send folks to the Academy and they would be expected to go back to a certain location, because that is where they recruited from. But the Iraqi Minister of Interior had a different way of doing business. They would make the assignments. When we were making the assignments we could track it; and we knew, we had accountability systems. When they track things they do things by paper, and it is handwritten, and a lot of things get lost. But they will make decisions. And it will be decisions that we may not agree with, but that was their decision.

The other dynamic of it is that they did have to fill certain provinces. Ninevah Province at one point had 40 percent at some stations. And then you go out to other provinces and they would only have 60 percent. So I said, okay, let's try to fill up this other province. You go to fill them up and say here is your assignment instructions; and it is like a New York State trooper, you graduate, you may not go back to Buffalo, you may go to the New York City area. They wouldn't go. There is no way I am going to go to work in Mosul if I live in Baghdad. I won't survive back there, and plus I am not driving back and forth to take care of my family. So there is a tremendous dynamic there that we don't have to deal with.

All those pieces lead to exactly what Lieutenant Bridges said. It is extremely difficult to track them. They do not have a National ID card, as many times as they have tried to do that. There are many, many common names out there. And to us a lot of them really do cause us difficulties in distinguishing who is who.

That dynamic in and of itself makes it extremely difficult, the entire process.

Colonel COATES. Sir, Mr. Chairman, and, again Al Anbar got kind of a later start, but in the recruiting process nobody was admitted into it unless they had the proper ID card or papers. We vetted and we conducted biometric identification of everybody in that process, and, because Al Anbar is unique, most of them would only join if they could go to their home areas or hometowns. That was one of the conditions. That was the appeal of the police force, that they could stay at home rather than be nationally assigned.

The other thing was that they preferred to go to the JIPTC Academy and they found it to be very professional, but because they were in the Sunni Province, Jordan was a very appealing place to go.

When they returned, we had handlers assigned. We picked them up at Baghdad or Al Asad. They were Coalition-escorted or -driven to their police districts, to police stations, and almost in all cases the PTT team was there to receive them, to make sure they were processed at the station. So we also maintained our own rostering and tracking of all those assigned because we tied it to the payroll process.

If you do not have a graduation certificate with an identification of hiring order, you weren't on that, we screened the pay rosters, your name was not added to that payroll.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Colonel. Before I go to Mr. Akin, I don't want to leave out Lieutenant Colonel Felling. And welcome back from Iraq.

I understand that you were on a military transition team rather than a Police Transition Team but worked directly with the Iraqi IPS. Can you describe your experiences with the IPS?

Colonel FELLING. Yes, sir, good morning. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Brad Felling, and it is a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman. Having just come back last Wednesday, I was intimately familiar with the military transition team operations in the Ninawa and the MND Center-South Province.

Being the Air Force gentleman on the military transition team staff, my primary role was air support, but there is a very fine line in this Coalition area between PTTs and MTTs. A lot of the MTT functions are served with the PTTs as well. It is almost a graduation, if you will, from PTT up to the MTT areas and the military transition teams are doing fantastic work.

My responsibility was to make sure that they had whatever they needed outside the wire; specifically to make sure that, one, they were protected; two, they felt comfortable; and to, three, make sure that they had any air support that they possibly needed, be it rotary wing or fixed wing.

The primary effort there pre-plus-up was construction and then post-plus-up was to make sure that we could assimilate out into the local neighborhood, and that is where the PTT and MTT members were essential, because they were part of the local neighborhoods.

Mothers, fathers, daughters, sons, you name it, we went out there and we assimilated with them. And as an Air Force aviator, my job was to make sure that I could impart as much aviation expertise as I possibly could.

Not being a security policeman, my job was to make sure that their security policemen were able to maintain their expertise along with whatever communications we could provide them. So, it was very, very meaningful work down there. And in a multinational environment in the Coalition sector, be it Polish, El Salvadoran, Mongolian, et cetera, and, specifically, the Mongolians with their security expertise, were extremely helpful to our effort down in Diwaniyah.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is fascinating what I am hearing all of you describe is sort of building from the ground up on everything. Just starting out, you got to be awake and you got to be on the job, and it is absolutely amazing. And it sounds like progress, you know. Hearing from where we started and where we are moving, it seems like we made considerable progress. It is at least a picture of things moving forward.

In Al Anbar, is the situation now, in the areas where we have pretty good cooperation with the local Sheiks and all, are the police stations and all—is that starting to work reasonably well, and are they locally supported and respected, Colonel Coates?

Colonel COATES. Yes, sir. In Al Anbar what truly, you know, turned the situation with the police, again, was engagement with the Sheiks and the local tribal officials. And I think probably, you know, they saw that they could help shape their future by cooperating and so on. It has been a big turnaround, particularly in Ramadi, sir, and in the area where Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy was, in Habbaniya and in Chaldea, where foreign fighters and bad guys walked the streets during the day.

And what changed the complex of that place was, again, the integration of the police, our Iraqi Army units with Coalition in overwatch or in Reserve for them and a clearing operation took place where an Iraqi Army unit would go in, establish initial security, it would be backfilled by police, and we would drive on to the next street.

But there was no question that the recent events in Al Anbar have been through the tribal and Sheik engagement. That is what has brought the numbers to join and the quality people as well.

Again, I think they were very much on a wait-and-see type posture. See how things were going to go. Maybe guys were sitting on the fence deciding what side they were going to take, but no question, recent tribal engagement with the Sheiks is what brought the numbers to come join.

Mr. AKIN. So you are talking about Ramadi which has been the biggest success story because the Sheiks are on board; is that correct?

Colonel COATES. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. AKIN. My son was in Fallujah first half of 2005, and I don't think there was any real cooperation from the Sheiks at that point is what I recall.

Colonel COATES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. AKIN. So in the places where the Sheiks are working with us, do we now have local police? Are they functioning reasonably well, would you say?

Colonel COATES. Absolutely, sir. And what is happening is the numbers have shown up and security has been established and a way of life, with children going to school, shops reopening, no question.

Mr. AKIN. Is that starting to carry over into some of the other areas of Al Anbar? Are they still full of bad guys and completely resistant?

Colonel COATES. Al Qaeda, where it was heavy fighting in 2004, sir, there is probably not much reason to have Coalition Forces there now. We have a Iraqi battalion brigade headquartered out there. But the police forces run the show completely. Very little or no violence at all. Ramadi is a turning point, as we are squeezing on the Euphrates River. The foreign fighters or the insurgents are moving toward the center, to the Haditha triangle, but as we left we had numbers joining from Haditha and those areas, come to join the police forces.

The challenge in those areas was that MOI had established limits on the number and the size of the police forces in that area based on paid salaries and structure. And often now these police forces wanted to exceed their authorized strengths, and trying to explain to them you are only going to have a set number of salaries

to achieve those numbers; we have to get MOI to fund a higher authorization.

Mr. AKIN. How about Fallujah? Is that more under control now or is that still dicey?

Colonel COATES. Sir, I think it has probably backslided a bit. Initially we had a very strong chief of police in there, as you know, in 2004. When we took Fallujah in November, the Iraqi Government put police in there. We had a joined—we had a very strong police chief in there with a deputy. The deputy was killed. The chief of police was promoted, went to Baghdad, and probably the personalities and strength of the leadership in Fallujah probably let the police force itself backslide.

However, when I left, they got a very strong chief of police back in there. But I think Fallujah, sir, is probably backsliding in my opinion.

Mr. AKIN. Would you like to add anything else, Lieutenant Colonel?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, sir. When I got to Habbaniya there were 400 Iraqi Police and probably half of those were school-trained. From November until January 1, we shipped 400 police to the Jordanian Police Academy. And when I left in April, there were 800 Iraqi Police on the rolls, all supported by the Sheiks.

As I left, the day before I left, a couple of head Sheiks from our western sector came in and said, Can you make more police? Now, I had already been authorized to break our ceiling twice, and I was told to cease and desist on the recruiting, but with more successes I believe they can get more police in that region.

Now, when I got there, no one would work with the police. They had Army units and police units sitting next to each other. The Sunni kids from the local neighborhood and the Shia kids stationed there, they got along to get along but that is about it.

After a few months of engaging the Army and the police at the same time, having security and planning meetings, we started off with the Army teaching that—you know, giving them some marksmanship courses. Started going into civil military engagements by, you know, running the medical engagements out in town with police, you know, cordoned Army setting in. You know, the Iraqi Army running the CMV with some Coalition support but all with an Iraqi face.

Then we started to plan combined interagency traffic control points, entry control points. They started to work that way. Then they started to go out on joint combined patrols, combined combat patrols to get security presence out in the bad towns.

Now, one night this old guy went along and brought two policemen. The Army planned the patrol and this is a bad neighborhood. The two police sergeants I brought, they said yeah, the places you want to go cordon off, and don't do that. Let's go here, here, and here. There are bad guys here. And on the course we chased a couple diggers down the road who were trying to emplace an IED. The soldiers lined these people up against the wall, and the police said you need to talk to him, you need to talk to him, you need to talk to him.

After that, the other battalions, the Iraqi Bronze started requesting police to come on patrols with them. We were pushing patrols

out with the Coalition Force and the Battalion Task Force to the West. We were pushing out Iraqi patrols and Iraqi Police patrols with the Army to our south. So by the time I had left, we had the marines, the soldiers, the IPIs, doing God's work out there. The IPIs had worked with three Iraqi battalions, the Iraqi brigade, three rifle companies from the Marine Corps and the Army National Guard battalion south of us. That is partnership. That is cooperation, that is engagement.

And the Iraqi Army wants to work with the Iraqi Police big time, because propping them up for success is their exit strategy, too, so they can push out further to the border, to the hinterlands, and the police can provide the security.

Now as come, you know, right around March, we under cover of Camp Habbiniyah, and the, you know, the two camps around Camp Habbiniyah with just police providing security, the Army had been able to extend themselves throughout that district with the police just providing security on the outer boundaries of the camp which was a gigantic leap forward.

Mr. AKIN. So I think what I am hearing you say, and I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take too much time, I think what I am hearing you say the approach you were using in Al Anbar in terms of partnershiping with all of your—putting all of your resources together in building a sense of cooperation and teamwork, that sounds an awful lot like what we are trying to do in Baghdad with the surge and everything. It is the same basic kind of strategy of pulling all of the resources together which then reduces the sectarian kind of problems. It gets you the information that you need and the training all across the board so that people can't—would you say that is probably correct?

Colonel MCCARTHY. That is exactly correct, sir, and the thing is it is working in my little slice of heaven, and the Iraqi Security Forces are winning this fight. And with patience, I mean, when I got there in September and if I had told you all that stuff was going to happen, you would have laughed me out of the room. I would have laughed myself out of the room. But you have to be patient. It took 6 months for them to arrest one insurgent. But then they were arresting 50 at a time. So it works with patience.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. I ended up with several questions, and I will try to ask my questions quickly, and if you all can err on the side of brevity then we can get to Mr. Jones and Ms. Davis.

When the concept of the war in Iraq first came about, one of the things that was said was that the Iraqi people were reasonably well educated and had a sense of wanting to fully participate in the modern world and they should do well. My information received from one of my constituents who spent a year in Iraq, he is a police chief in Arkansas, training Iraqis, was there. He was really surprised with the low literacy rate, the number of people that can't read or write in Arabic, and that it was a real challenge.

Is that your experience?

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir.

My experience and it still is now is they have heart. They will go up there and they will do everything they can to defend their country but—and the large part, especially as you start talking about getting them from certain tribal areas and such when you get outside of Baghdad.

Dr. SNYDER. This was in the Basra area. But that it made it very difficult when you start pulling out police manuals or training manuals and it all had to be verbal. He said maybe about a fourth grade education, which fourth grade reading isn't bad, but is that your experience also, Colonel Coates?

Colonel COATES. In Al Anbar.

Once you get west of Fallujah, it is a very farm-based community in which education competes with the requirement to farm. So a lot of people wanted to join but didn't have the reading and writing, and that was the same for the Army.

Dr. SNYDER. So those folks would not make it.

Colonel COATES. And we tried to engage the government of Iraq, and they were pretty hard over. They weren't going to change those requirements. It hurt not only the police recruiting but also the military recruitment. The easy part you had to have 22 teeth. They could satisfy that. But the reading—we opened a kind of a prep school for reading, and we had kind of a pre-recruiting class, and we would teach them to read capacity exam.

Dr. SNYDER. Reading in Arabic.

Colonel COATES. Most of the test was in reading. They didn't have to write. But in Al Anbar, as the region as a whole, the education system really falls off as you get deeper into the farmlands.

Dr. SNYDER. One of the other concerns that my constituent had was the frustration he experienced that every month he thought it was about a 75- to 80-page report that he had to do, and he thought if he could spend more time training and less time filling out these pages every month, that the whole country would have been better off, and he uses a specific example. He had to do a monthly report on the inventory of the furniture. Now the furniture was adequate. It wasn't fancy. But it was adequate. But he said the furniture didn't change, and yet every month he had to fill out this new form.

Is that, Lieutenant Bridges, or any of you, is that still your experience?

Colonel MCCARTHY. The police station monthly report, it is a big beast, sir, but it is a check in the box. But it also helps focus your efforts on what you are going to work on that month. If—

Dr. SNYDER. One of your trainers said it did not help focus efforts. It took time away and didn't find the benefit of it. But a 75-, 80-page monthly report.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Assigning the responsibility to one person, making them the action officer on that one, they contract that, they can piece off the IPLOs, the, you know, our U.S. police officers would take a section, the logistics guys would take a section and you parcel it off along functional lines. It takes, you know, an hour and a half to fill out and you combine it all and you are done in three hours. It is not too bad.

Dr. SNYDER. So that is helpful information.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, sir.



Dr. SNYDER. Has the committee had that information made available? I mean, if you all find it helpful, perhaps we would find it helpful to get, you know, copies of one month of all of the reports filled out and then the composite over the last year of the following trends. Have we had that information available? We have it. And do we have—the 75, 80 pages of each?

Yes. Okay.

The issue, Colonel Coates, I wanted to ask you, as you have made progress in Al Anbar in your recruiting and working with the tribal leaders, what is the current status? I think you touched on this either in your written statement or orally, but what is the current status? Do you have concerns about—is the policing to enforce the laws or is the policing to do the will of the tribe?

Colonel COATES. Yes, sir. And that has always been our concern. One thing we really insisted was a formal training of a police officer. I understand that he is going to be a representative of the government of Iraq and not a militia member.

How they have done their tribal business in the past when they recruited for the army in the Saddam stage or recruited for the police, they went to the Sheikhs and the Sheikhs would provide the recruits. And it is pretty hard to break them of that way of doing business.

But you know, clearly, you know, professionalization of the police forces or military forces is our number one goal, and we insisted they are going to go to formal education and training of a JIPTC or BTC, get back and then, you know, we try to accommodate, you know, where they recruited from, you know, placing them there in the town with the police. And so we paid very close attention. Again, our PIT teams were the vehicles to measure the metrics of what their police station was doing to—and if the warning lights came on, you know, we would apply the pressure and make sure that we could shape it to the direction we wanted to, but militias was the last thing we wanted.

Dr. SNYDER. Lieutenant Bridges, would you describe for me, please, your experience as a woman MP both from the directions you receive from your superiors in our military force and what you were told to do or advised to do with regards to being a woman in Iraqi culture and then how that worked out in practice and what your thoughts are about that whole issue of being a woman officer serving in the capacity you did.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Yes, sir. I spoke on this a few days ago, but as I received the training at Fort Dix at the mobilization station, we were told that, in the classes, not to be too friendly or even overtly seen because the men in the country would not be receptive to us as women.

So my instruction or my battalion commander's instruction was not really have me out there being forward but have me on the team. But what we found, sir, is the exact opposite—and it is really a means of trust or a matter of trust—was able to gain the respect of the police chief general at the central headquarters as well as the officers and NCOs that worked with them and being a minority woman they really felt like we had a lot in common. They knew a lot about our society so we just talked about things on just a—just on a common level, sir. Didn't have anything to do with the

military. You know, asking me about my family. And once they really realized I was really a real person, someone just like them, it was easy to really work with them.

So it was an easy choice, sir, and once we overcame—once I overcame the barrier of being a woman, I found that it had nothing to do with my gender but what I knew as a soldier and their belief in me and my belief in them.

Dr. SNYDER. Were the directions you received before going into this capacity, is that something you had to kind of ignore? I mean, should the directions you had been given been changed for women who are coming through going in that capacity tomorrow?

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Sir, you can see that even if it wasn't spoken, you could see that the direction that the coalition forces was going, it was changing greatly.

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Felling, you described yourself as an aviator. Colonel Swengros, your bio, you seem to be an MP from the get-go and have made that as a career. For people in the military who are not MPs but who have been recruited in this issue of being on police transition teams, is that a help, hindrance, or neutral with regard to career advance?

Is there any grumbling about any of the folks who are assigned to these teams, that it might hold them back?

Colonel MCCARTHY. It was an honor to serve with the soldiers, sailors and Marines out there, sir. It was a unique opportunity. That is all that matters.

Dr. SNYDER. Nobody felt they were going to be held back.

And Colonel Swengros, you described that was the most difficult thing you have ever been involved in. How much of the difficulty was related to the language training of the American troops, or—which is a frustration that we all have, whether it is as physicians or business people, and we have had that for a couple of hundred of years, but it has been brought home in the last five years.

How much of that could have been overcome if we did a better job of training our troops in foreign language skills?

Colonel SWENGROS. Sir, I am not sure how much better it could be. I mean, you are talking dialects. And I think what we are trying to concentrate on is the basic language piece, and we are getting at that piece. But the other piece we are really paying attention to is the cultural awareness, but it is more than just an awareness, it is understanding body languages. And there are actually some courses we have been working with FLETC down in Georgia and then on our own trying to look at it.

There are ways that you can talk to people, look at people and get an idea of just how truthful they are, how truthful they are not being.

And so we are actually trying to work a little bit more than—along those lines understanding the dynamics of body language and expressions and how their expressions are different than ours.

What we used was our interpreters, and as you get very close, especially my level, because I had interpreters who were American citizens, and I had one that had grown up in Baghdad and left after the 1991 Gulf War and came to the United States and he was coming back to serve. But he would point out to me, because I could understand, after a few months, I could understand the basic

language. I knew kind of what the police chief was saying. But he would tell me, pull me aside afterwards and say well, he was really saying it in this manner or saying it in that manner.

So that is a dynamic I am not sure we can get at throughout training.

Dr. SNYDER. I am not sure we tried very hard, though.

I mean, we had a Cinco de Mayo festival a few weeks ago in Arkansas, and I think the speakers that spoke in Spanish were better received than the ones who spoke in English and had a Spanish translator. I think that is true, and I don't think we put enough investment in the military in all kinds of languages.

Colonel Coates, you mentioned you could give us anecdotal stories of the bravery in Iraq.

Colonel COATES. Certainly, sir.

I can tell you on a daily basis I was in Ramadi where a police station was hit, and now that—the vehicle bombs are dump truck size. Basically loading a dump truck up with a ton or two of explosives and ramming it. It doesn't even have to get in within the perimeter. Just even if it goes outside the wall, the size and the magnitude of the explosion encompasses the whole complex.

But I have seen a couple of those firsthand, and you saw the police stand their ground, did not run, did not break. They stood there. The chief of police was in Ramadi, a lieutenant colonel or colonel. He personally—he had about a 40-man assault with no U.S. Coalition-Iraqi Army thing on an apartment complex where the insurgents were holding people in there basically as hostages.

We had Lieutenant Colonel Reed, who is chief of police of the highway patrol in Al Anbar Province. He personally was out there every day. We got him his vehicles and his fuels, and without any urging, he established patrols and routes between Ramadi and Rutbah and brought back tons of munitions with the people who were transporting it. There is a place called Humid's Garage, it is just on the outskirts of Fallujah. It is a gathering place of military age people at the truck, kind of pull-over place. One day on his own initiative he decided well, let us go raid it after the U.S. forces had done it twice and came up empty handed. He arrested something like 36 foreign fighters and probably on the order of a hundred insurgents that were mixed in with a group of a thousand there.

So I can tell you that they have all of the abilities. A lot of what it came down to is what Lieutenant McCarthy said was leadership. They had somebody that led by example, that was strong. They were absolutely stone cold brave in the battle.

But, you know, their success is based on getting the right leadership at the right place at the right time.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I wanted to say to you gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, you are great. I sit here in bewilderment to think about how difficult your job is. And yet, as you have acknowledged, it has been slow, but there has been some progress. But I sit here thinking where this country is today. I wasn't going to do this, Mr. Chairman, but I want to read part of a quote because I think that the American people want this

Congress to listen to you and make our decisions as to where are we going.

General Matthew Ridgeway wrote a book called *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgeway*, 1956.

I am only going to read part of a paragraph.

To me, nothing could more tragically demonstrate our complete and utter moral bankruptcy than for us to deliberately initiate a prevented war. Once we take that absolutely fatal step, our civilization will be doomed.

The reason I bring that up is because I think the American people have great love and affection and appreciation for those of you in uniform. I don't think there is any question about that. But when I listen here, you are talking about different cultures. You are talking about Shiites, you are talking about Sunnis, you are talking about Kurds, you are talking about what many of us think is a civil war. Some say sectarian, we think it is a civil war. Right or wrong, that is what we think.

And then to listen to what you have accomplished and you have accomplished, there is no question about it, because you have taken an impossible, an impossible situation and you are giving the light a possibility. And it is a light at this point.

Each one of you have spoken extremely well and knowledgeable on your job and what you do.

What would you say to the American people as to how much time do we need to give to this effort to stand up a police force?

Colonel SWENGROS. That is a very fair question, sir. I personally—you know, we go through these same questions. And I will personally say I appreciate folks asking the tough questions because at the end of the day, if I am going to be told to go out and do something, I at least want that decision to be an informed decision.

Right, wrong or indifferent, as history might look at it 10, 15 years from now, for me, going out there and doing what I did every day for a year, 7 days a week with a squad right in the middle of Baghdad or other places, and I guess I would tell folks just because it is hard doesn't mean it is impossible. Just because it is a long process doesn't mean it is a wrong process. I think the question we have all asked is what do we want at the end, what are the ramifications of not doing something?

I talked to our soldiers about this. You know, what can they really effect and how do they go about doing it, and every one of them, you know, as they go through, especially having lived it, they really do see the progress. They see the lights in the eyes of the children. They see the faces of the female population who, for the most part, didn't really have a life as we know it.

You see the direction they are trying to head in with all of the difficulties out there, and it kind of makes you stop and think from a "doer" level. I really believe we are on the right track, and we will continue down that track. We will continue to improve.

We are fighting an enemy. That enemy is out there, and it is real. You can call it terrorists. You can call it insurgents. There are different pieces of it. And every one of them are vying for population control or control of that area.

And those are dynamics that are causing us to adjust and to relook different—and go back to different ways of doing things before. And that is the complexity that I have talked about as well as the complexity of building a police force from nothing.

So we do search for those answers, and we do try to find ways to effect change quickly. And I think most of the soldiers really do, when they get out of there, believe that they contributed to something, which, you know, from our standpoint is a good thing. We do see the progress.

Mr. JONES. Let me just real quickly, I won't take too much of your time.

Everything you said, I mean, again, I would agree with you. You are the professional. But when I came to Congress, this country was \$4 trillion in debt. We are close to now over 10 trillion. According to David Walker, the true debt of this Nation, if you take in all of the obligations and liabilities and brought them in this year to pay the bill this year would be \$50 trillion. We are spending roughly \$9.2 billion a month in Iraq. The American taxpayers are going to have to pay the bill.

There is much frustration in this country because we felt, many of us, that the real war on terrorism was in Afghanistan. Bin Laden was our enemy. And we, in Iraq, said okay, we won't go into that.

But the point is I know you can't say well, five years from now I expect this to happen. But if you could, and each one of you, and I am taking too much time and I will be through in just a second, would you just say, you know, Congressmen, we are going to be there ten years before we see a police force in the communities, the provinces or the country that can pretty much stand on its own. And I realize this is not really fair to ask you. But I am telling you that the American people, I feel their frustration. The American people have got to know that there is a fourth quarter to this game. Because if we stay in the second quarter, using a football analogy, and a third quarter and never see the fourth quarter, I don't know if this country can afford the blood and the money as it relates to Iraq.

If you could just tell me, and your best guess, that you know what you are dealing with, you all articulated that. But tell me when in the world do you say to the American people I think we are getting a fairly decent, a fairly decent, not the best, but a decent police force? Some of the provinces or across the nation? I mean, the American people have a right. They are paying the price. The families are giving their sons and daughters. They have a right to know that there is a definition of success. That is the only—if you can answer that, fine. If you can't, I understand.

Colonel SWENGROS. Yes, sir. I really cannot answer that in terms of time. I mean, I just—there is no crystal ball out there.

I will tell you that having watched this very closely over four years from our business and then listening to the Al Anbar, because that was not a priority for us back then, if we are making progress then I see a brighter light at the end of the tunnel, and I see a bright light at the end of the tunnel. How much effort we are willing to continue to impart in that area will determine how long we are going to be there.

We started, again, we are only talking 2 years from a concept of 70 teams, so now 230 to 300 teams, whatever that number is right now, and we are seeing that significant progress.

The insurgents and the terrorists and the organized crimes all operate off of a similar aspect, and they go for the seams. They go where they are not going to be harassed by police, where they are not going to be harassed by an army. They will operate in areas that are not patrolled just like your criminals here in the United States, and I think we are getting after that right now with these surges and these increases.

We are getting after it. We are putting pressure in areas, and you can tell by the way the enemy is responding that we are having an effect. We, not only just the coalition forces, but the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army. They are the ones really being targeted right now. As the difference, if you remember in 2004, 2005, a lot of attacks, a lot of major attacks on the civilian populace. Right now taking the brunt of it is the Iraqi army and the Iraqi Security Police.

I cannot put a time on it. I apologize. I just can't.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

I have taken too much time, but thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Colonel.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, and I want to echo my colleagues' comments. The military has just performed extraordinarily. I think the concern that we all have, and I have expressed this before, is that we are a military at war and not a nation at war.

So all of the burden has really fallen on you and on the families of our military.

Could you talk a little bit about what we have done to try and track and identify the people who are serving as the police?

You mentioned obviously pay and how you can track that. But I am concerned about the folks who don't show up. Do we know who they are? Do we know what they are doing? Are they, as far as you know, engaged in militias, and do we even have officers or individuals in the Iraqi police force who are engaging in other activities when they are not on the beat? What do we know about that? What kinds of efforts are being made to track that? Do you think it is important? Should we know?

Colonel COATES. Absolutely, ma'am.

First and foremost, what we are about is accountability. And, you know, our PTT teams down there, they have accountability, holding the Iraqi's completely responsible for what their responsibilities are to their society, their integrity and so on and so forth. We have had bad cops, we have had bad chiefs of police. When we find out, we instantly move to have them removed or in case of—for example, the chief of police of Sha'aban, who was the provincial chief of police, he stole the payroll one day, and he was thrown in jail, mysteriously released from jail and murdered two days later. Never recovered the money but the accountability is what we are about.

There is no question there are police that have been behind probably insurgent activities and so forth. We, you know—

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. How are we doing the tracking?

Colonel COATES. First of all, we do biometrics. Every police officer in Al Anbar is biometrically recorded and put in a database. And we hold the key to that database.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So if you mentioned that initially the Iraqi police arrested one insurgent and now it is more like 50 or in a short period of time, of the insurgents that they are arresting, how many of them were identified biometrically to have been part of the police corps or in the military.

Colonel COATES. I can give you one specific example. Our highway patrol went and arrested people on a highway that were basically robbing cars going back and forth. They had no police officers in Ramadi. They got their identification, the badges, and they also were identified in the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT) system. They were arrested by the highway police which, you know, obviously got our attention, and we tried to address that very quickly.

I will tell you that is out there on a daily basis, and we are doing our best again to hold their system and them individually accountable to what they should be doing.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Lieutenant Bridges, in your experience, what do you think people were doing when they weren't on the jobs.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. To speak specifically, Mrs. Davis, I can't say exactly what they were doing, but I know they weren't at work. I can say that we did have suspicions, but no evidence of some of the IPs being involved in militias. We would go to different IP stations or we would even communicate within the coalition forces chain to ensure did you know this person, do you think he was involved, have you heard, maybe I would speak to one of the MIT or PIT team members, give a name to them to see what they have heard.

So we were actively engaged in trying to identify some of our persons with whom we suspected.

But once again, ma'am, we never really, you know, got any hard evidence, and, of course, they are not going to say we are a part of it. But my police chief had given us a list of names that he felt like was a part of the Mahdi militia and we were able to get those policemen not fired but transferred. Because everyone knows in Iraq when you do something wrong, you don't just necessarily get fired.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If they don't get fired, where do they go? Do they join the militia?

Lieutenant BRIDGES. It has been my experience—I have never seen one of the IPs fired. I have always seen them transferred to other stations, stations that may not be in their home area. But I have never experienced where an IP has been actually fired.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think what you are saying then is they are still in the system essentially. They may be a part of a militia, but they are transferred to another post.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Yes, ma'am. And that was one of our on-ground frustrations as platoon leaders and commander. You are trying to get this guy moved because you really have strong suspicions, no evidence, that he may be a part of the militia or even part of the insurgency. You can't prove it. So you bring it to the general. He brings—feels the same way. Brings it to the Baghdad

police. They transfer it. He may be a cousin to the police chief of the Baghdad headquarters. So the problem still exists, ma'am, but it just got transferred to somewhere else maybe further out so that that police chief no longer had to deal with it, and that was a big frustration.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you have a window on what is happening once the insurgents are captured, what is going on there, where are they? Are they in jail? Do we have a role to play in that?

Colonel SWENGROS. Ma'am, are you talking about the Iraqi—from the Iraqi system when they are captured by the Iraqis?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes.

Colonel SWENGROS. I don't think there is any specific system out there. I mean, that is one of the dynamics of turning things over to the host nation for the Iraqis. You lose some of that visibility but as was talked—there is an increasing work on the judicial system, it is a triad out there. The law enforcement, the penal system, and there is an Military Membership Status Identifier (MMSI) focus right now, is those three arms and making sure that those cross-talk between to know what is going on.

We implemented some policies where the four folks who are released, we sent the information to the Minister of Interior into the deputy minister of police affairs to do the cross-list check, and if they could spot a name of somebody that we were about to release because we didn't have anything more on them or whatever the situation was, then we did that prisoner transfer stuff. So there is some of that that is going on out there.

But I don't know of any tracking mechanism.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Did you want to say something, Colonel McCarthy?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, ma'am.

When our police would arrest somebody, our advisors, soldiers, sailors, Marines, would go down there and do the biometric picture on them. We would also take a picture on them and put their name on the picture and put it through our channels.

Now the investigative process, you know, due process for Iraqis is in 24 hours, they have to have a package against the suspect ready to go before an investigative person. Our equivalent of a District Attorney (DA). Then—there are no judges. They are hiding underground. They can't be found. So the mayor or the police chief can sign off to allow them to continue the investigation for another week.

Now, if they have enough information there, a package to put before a magistrate, they can hold that guy until a magistrate appears.

The burden is, you know, in the Muslim culture. They have to treat the prisoners, you know, like family. So it is a burden on their system, and they want to release them, but they can't exercise rule of law when they are continuing to—

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess the question is how does all of that, which is complicated and embedded cultural issues, how does that impact the work that you do and how—is there anything in the training that would be helpful to all of you to have been able to deal with that?



Colonel MCCARTHY. Actually, with our U.S. police officers over there, the IPLOs. They actually work with the investigators to help them run the investigation properly. They ask these questions, let us put this evidence together. Have you logged it in? How are we tracking this so you can put together a, you know, a solid package before a judge? We use it as a training opportunity. We use it to, you know, ensure that they are practicing appropriate human rights behavior in the holding facilities and it keeps bad guys off the streets.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. One other question, and I am—I know that I certainly could go on. I think this has been very interesting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the issue of translators. It is my understanding that Marines are training with translators even before they are going versus the Army, which is expected to find their translators in field. Is that true? Is that a problem? And do you usually have enough translators?

And Lieutenant Bridges as well, how did you feel about translators and whether you had the support that you needed?

Colonel COATES. If I may, as the committee noted, probably the biggest disadvantage that a transition team has, whether it is a military police or border, is the language. No question you are at a disadvantage and you are kind of doing things through a third person. All of the translators are, for the most part, contractors in Al Anbar, which is a Sunni province, all of the translators are Shia. And of course very quickly you have an Iranian working for you, you know, just describe some of the atmosphere when you are dealing with the locals when they see that.

What we have done here real recently and one we are about to start, we are bringing our translators that are going to be paired up with their teams. They are coming to California, they go through the six-week course with their transition team and then they will go forward with their teams. So they have a pre-employment training package.

In addition to that, we are about to establish a language lab in our transition. We have our own building that will be in there so that there will be a language threshold mark every day through the six weeks that all members are going to have to hit. We are not going to make them native speakers. We are not going to make them conversational in anything. But they will be evaluated to task and to standard, and to graduate the course they are going to have to hit a certain level of Arabic. And with the translator there and the language lab, we hope to use the vehicle of absorbing some of those cultural differences that have been described.

In Al Anbar, the dialect is different from town to village. You know where somebody comes from just by his accent or the words he uses. You know, you can tell the difference between somebody from Ramadi, Fallujah, or Al Qa'im. We used to have it years ago in certain parts of our cities and the States.

Colonel SWENGROS. Ma'am, our training is somewhat along the same line. And I know we went over there and in preparing to go over there in 2004, our soldiers got 40 hours of Arabic training. We brought over linguists that work to help us through the translator piece together—I know each iteration—I was at Fort Lewis when

we were doing this—we tapped into that capability. So and I know it occurred to me to meet the divisions and what have you.

So it is more localized. We try to expose our folks to that dynamic of working with translators and what have you.

We do meet up with a majority of our translators in theater because they are Iraqis. Those that are part of the military that come over with the translators, they are linked up with the unit as well. That was early on, but I couldn't give you an exact time.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. Mrs. Davis, we have four linguists that we worked with and we did fall in on them and we found out a lot of information about what they knew based on our relationship with the outgoing unit. I can tell you that we had a great relationship with the interpreters. We had no issues of corruptness or them sharing different information with the Iraqi police. We never felt like we were set up because they went out with us daily.

We came in trying to let them know that we appreciate what they do. We appreciate all of the information that they give us.

So from our outgoing unit, it is imperative of us to listen to what they had to say about the existing linguists and once you show respect, once you show that you kind of trust them, maybe you don't totally trust them all the way, but you are trying to show them the semblance of trust so you can get whatever necessary information that you can to support the IP's movement. So we had a good experience with our linguists. We had no issue with them. No cause to believe that they were not on our team.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

Colonel FELLING. I am a reservist so I went over with my eyes wide open. I am a full-time law enforcement officer. When I went over, I had no idea that I was going to be working with Iraqis and Poles and Romanians, and you are asking specifically about translation. I would have never thought that it would work. Because you have Iraqis who also speak those languages. And trying to get things done in that environment is very, very difficult. But something that I thought would not work, it worked. It worked, difficult at times but it worked and it was—the translators and the interpreters who are really sacrificing themselves physically and taking themselves out of the environment that they are used to without the interpreters. It would be an impossible task.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you all very much.

Mr. MEEHAN. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you for coming before us today.

I am sorry. They closed down the Capitol compound for something going on in Cannon and didn't let me through. So I didn't get to hear your opening statements. I know some made some and some didn't.

I want to associate myself with the initial comments of Ms. Davis, in particular the ones that talked about what a great job our military is doing. Because we, I think, to a large extent, almost everybody believes that that is the case. But, you know, we have argued that this is not about the military any longer, that it is about political and institutional capability by the Iraqi government and its people and the economic situation that exists in Iraq. And I just would like to put some comments, Mr. Chairman, into the record.

With all due respect, Colonel Swengros, you spoke about our troops being over there and, you know, learning that, you know, women somehow have more rights now and the new system that the Iraq people are under. The reality is that just in March I was back in Iraq talking to women's rights groups there, and the fact of the matter is women had more rights in Iraq under Saddam than they have under the current constitution.

In fact, one of the women, very well known lawyer, woman lawyer in Baghdad, said to me, my current rights under the constitution that you all have given us now is that I have the same rights as somebody who is mentally disabled or a child.

So I want to put that on the record because it speaks to this whole issue of amending the constitution which the Democrats have pushed for as one of the products, one of the timetables, one of the milestones that we need to see in place in order to continue moving forward and putting our resources in and your lives on the line to get things done in Iraq.

So the amendment of the Constitution is incredibly important. One, of course, the women know they are not going to get it through because they don't have enough representation there and issues go on, but they have less rights under the current constitution of Iraq than they did under Saddam because, remember, Saddam was secular. He did not put an Islamic overview on the constitution that he had at the time.

This speaks to a lot of these issues of again going back to the political and the institutional and the economic.

We keep reading in the newspaper and this is the case that there is really not a banking system in Iraq. So the police officers do the work, they get paid, now they got to go home wherever it is. They go home and some of them don't return and some of them are gone for a long time and some, many, many of them I would suggest this is where they are.

So again, it is an institution problem that we have. We have got to get a banking system going in Iraq in order for us to be able to augment the great work that you are doing, and that the rest of our troops have put their lives on the line every day.

This whole issue of the rule of law that the Lieutenant Colonel spoke to, which is again, so important. I mean, you can apprehend as many people as you can but if you don't have judges, you don't have magistrates, you don't have an ability to bring them forward, again, it is an institution problem and, you know, it is a big problem for us.

We have got to get the local government and the provincial government on the line hitting milestones to put those institutions in place. It is a very difficult to do. It is not an easy thing. We look at Kosovo, and we are still nation building. I am not saying it is easy but we are seeing no improvement in the situation.

So you can be doing a great job or the Iraqi policemen that you are training can be doing a great job, but it can be going nowhere. It can be a revolving door the next day out on the street against you.

This issue of the Arabic language and probably the only—anybody who has lived for a long time in a Muslim country is probably one of the few who has training in Arabic, and I would just say

that is an incredible need for our military, and I think it would just improve our chances of being able to operate in these Muslim/Arabic speaking areas.

And last, I would like to put on the record, Mr. Chairman, that this whole issue of accountability, and this also goes to our military, how do you account, where are these people, who have we trained? Where have they gone? Where are they? That is an incredibly important issue, and I would say we are doing a terrible job at it.

I just mention again back to the recent trip that I took in March where I went and was talking to General Fell, who is of course the operating general under Petraeus for the four provinces, including Baghdad, and I asked him how many security and police from the Iraqi side do you have in those four provinces? And he said to me, said to me 37,568 to the number. I told him that just wasn't possible. There had to be a lot more. Why? Because if you look at the numbers we have trained, either everybody has gone home or the fact is that they are not working.

And in talking to Petraeus less than an hour later, of course Petraeus said he was wrong. You know, maybe he didn't understand the question. Oh, no. We went completely through it. This whole issue of who we have trained, if they are on board, if they are helping, if they are working. If they are working against us, where are they, is an incredibly important one. And it is one that we have been asking about now for the last four years since this whole thing began.

So if there is anything that I could ask the military to do is to figure out how do we account for these people we are training.

And that is it. I really have no questions of the panel today.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Any of the panelists want to comment?

Colonel COATES. In Al Anbar, there has been a large number of them killed as well. So there you talk about—the accountability is everything but to include in those numbers are the numbers that have been killed in the line of duty as well.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I don't have a problem. It is just that the military can't give me those numbers. You can't give me an accountability. I know because I keep asking. How many police have we trained? Where have they come from? Who are they? What groups do they belong to? Where do you have them stationed? Why did they run away? Did you take your weapons with you?

You really don't have an accountability system and I think this is something that is going to come back to bite us. We can do a great job, but you could be training the enemy in the long run.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

It is tradition in this subcommittee to have the staff counsel have an opportunity to ask some questions. So I would like to ask Susan McKenna, staff counsel, if she has some questions.

Ms. MCKENNA. As you all know, last year, 2006, was the year of the police and the emphasis was on the generation of the IPS force. 2007 was the year of leadership and logistics, and I was wondering if you could comment on what that means on the street for the IPS.

Colonel SWENGROS. I can tell you what I think it means in terms of how we operate. There are—getting at some of the institutions out there, there is a tremendous amount of accountability in terms of logistics. And part of that PMSR we talked about earlier where 68 pages, it started out at 200 pages. It has to get at the questions that leadership is asking. How many of this is issued? Where is it? How were these people acting? What is your assessment of the leadership capabilities?

So all of this, that is part of the assessments and the decisions to move to really put some emphasis, not that we are not going to take care of the police in 2007, but we are trying to get at the evolving issues. As you get a better police, you need better logistic systems in place. You get the police training in there. We are looking at now the second piece of that, and that is what we would consider as field training. Once you get out of the academy, you have certain training that you go through.

Ms. MCKENNA. Are you seeing specific initiatives at the station, district and provincial level, that represent the execution of the year of leadership and logistics for the IPS?

Colonel SWENGROS. I can tell you what Colonel Mike Lucius, who is the MP brigade commander who is operating in Baghdad. The answer is yes. And we started a little bit of this in 2005, leadership training, where we actually brought in the various leaders and he is doing that now, and we put them through some leadership training like leadership training seminars that we would do here in our own military. And that is seeing some pretty positive results.

The logistics is something we continue to work on, and I know he is working hard with the Iraqis and in addressing some of the fuel problems and what have you that Lieutenant Bridges talked about. But I don't have the specifics on that.

Colonel COATES. Yes. Part of what you brought up earlier was the settings and the conditions. You have to have a process in which the training and education system produces the police officer who can report and then has the proper equipment in place with a facility that supports his mission. And in Al Anbar, we have only been able to achieve that probably in the last six or seven months. That has been very challenging out there to where you can send people to the police academies. They come back. They have very limited equipment or they don't have any vehicles or they didn't have the communications infrastructure to do what they were required to do.

And we are achieving that synchronization. The logistics portion of it is big. I think you know also lending to that accountability, to all of that that has been invested in this program.

So but the leadership is absolutely huge. Our best districts have the strongest leaders. We have some of them coming back to the United States to attend the FBI Academy and to enhance their professionalism, and that will be the solution to the long term.

Ms. MCKENNA. So is there a formal plan in place to develop that leadership for the IPS, and if so, who is responsible for it and where could we find it?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I don't know the answer to that right now, ma'am. I know of no plan.

Colonel SWENGROS. I do know that part of the police plan, the Iraqi police plan, is to really get that Baghdad police college. It used to be a three-year college and they want that thing—in fact, I think they have pretty much built it up. I am not sure of the status, but from their standpoint, they recognize the leadership and the technical development of their police. They are planning to go to a three-year police academy if they are not there yet.

Ms. MCKENNA. Do the police transition teams have any input into who is selected to be a part of the—to be trained for the leadership? I mean, I know a lot of this has shifted over to the Iraqis so I am just interested to hear what your impact is on that selection.

Colonel COATES. We had, ma'am, there is a nomination process through the governor through the provincial chief of police. He will submit that nomination to the MOI and the MOI will give its final blessing to it. But essentially, it lies within the purview of the governor to do that.

Now again, there is a lot of negotiation, tribal influences and the sheikhs, and so on and so forth, to get to that consensus. Al Anbar had a very hard time getting a consensus between a governor and many of the chiefs of police that he nominated. They wanted somebody else, and that was always a daily battle on that.

Colonel FELLING. I think these gentlemen are being humble. I will speak on their behalf of being an outsider looking in. It takes—you asked about leadership, physical and moral courage. And these gentlemen and this young lady, they have got it and that is what it takes. To be a MIT and PIT team leader, to put your life in somebody's hands, being a law enforcement officer, I know there is a culture and these individuals put their lives in another culture's hands to train and to lead, and these individuals are the embodiment of leadership.

Ms. MCKENNA. I am sorry if I was confusing, and I didn't mean our service members. I meant how are we developing the leadership of the IPS, and I imagine that they, many of them, are very courageous as well given the attrition that they suffer.

Lieutenant BRIDGES. I would like to speak to that as well.

When you talk about the year of the police, you envision closing the P3 book, if you will, and you are opening up the PTT book because the police partnership program went out when we were coming in and was phasing out. And when you talk about the year of the police, we envisioned trying at first to get an infrastructure of which we can be safe once we are there because we can't train them if our soldiers don't feel safe. So once we got the infrastructure to somewhat bearable to even train, we started to focus on, like I said in the beginning, just the basics of discipline, do they have on a uniform like Colonel McCarthy mentioned. Just those basic things.

But once we got inside, Ms. McKenna, we really found out that there was some huge disparities between officers and NCOs. I mean, officers had uniforms whereas they did not feel that their peers or subordinates, there was a great need for them to have that. So we had to fix those issues. And just getting different areas set up was the most difficult in terms of personnel. Those pay problems.

I, literally, my convoy literally went to the banks, we picked the money up from the bank, brought the money back to the IP station. Once we got the accounting officer set up, we had all of the IPs and a long line around the building. Okay. How many days were you at work. We had the legal officers there to tell us oh, no, they weren't there. So let us dock this pay. We are literally detracting money from his salary.

So it was very difficult to try to implement policing into the year of the police before even working on the basics.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I could follow up for a second. I can't imagine—I mean, what you started with and where you are now. So I applaud that.

But I just wanted to share because this is what is out in the kind of public consumption, and I am wondering about the reality on the ground for your Iraqis as well.

There was a story this morning on NPR about the traffic cop basically and the job that they have to do, no lights are working, and I still am wondering why don't they have any traffic lights working in some areas in some bad intersections, but that basically, you know, they can't stop Americans. Every one is plowing through the intersections because they have to move very quickly, and we are aware of why.

So how do you train someone to be a traffic cop in the middle of what sounds like tremendous chaos? And again, this is the story on NPR today. They have had some good reporters who have been pretty realistic. How do you deal with that, and again, what can we take away from that and what we are trying to do here? Any comments?

Colonel SWENGROS. I would say—I worked with the traffic police. It is the national traffic police headquarters, it is in Baghdad. They operate both Baghdad and the other traffic police in each of the various provinces.

And in terms of professionalism and technological awareness and development, they were—don't take this too literally—the model for what we were trying to do get the Iraqi police to. They actually had computer systems that somebody saved before all of the records were destroyed, and they were going through there and trying to—in the year of time we worked on it, we finally got where a traffic policeman could call at an intersection and say I have got this vehicle or this person, can you do a background check. Something like our National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check, and they would have to go to a separate computer and try to bring up those records, but that is the way they were working. They actually had it.

The traffic police were probably one of the most effective police because nobody would mess with them because they kept the traffic flowing. And the nuances of military convoys rushing through convoys, they understood that and we never—and I worked in Baghdad all the time, they saw a convoy come, they actually kept traffic cleared so we could move through.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So you think the reality on the ground for Iraqis is one of confidence and at least—

Colonel SWENGROS. I think irrespective of traffic police, again, because it allows people to move about. So I think traffic police in

my dealing with them for a year, I think in the entire year they had one policeman killed. One traffic policeman killed. And I was having about 120, 160 every 2 weeks of the regular police killed. And they were out there. They were out there in numbers.

So I think maybe from an Iraqi person standpoint they say oh, the traffic is not good. It is not tied up but, you know, in the priority of things I am not sure how much of that really was a burden versus an inconvenience. But that is my perspective.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay, thank you. I was just curious because that is what is out in the public, and it is helpful to have. If you have a different point of view that is right on, I would like to—I was appreciative of that.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you for your testimony, and I am sorry I was late arriving.

So the questions I may ask could be redundant, but most of these cases are probably better repeating some of this.

I was over in Iraq during the year of the police, 2006, and we had as a special focal point of our trip over there to inquire into what was happening, what plans were being laid. It seems to me if you had some basic goals, such as the number of who will process through police training, you attain those goals; is that correct? I mean, the object was to train 200,000, the coalition was to train the lion's share of those and the Iraqis themselves were training some.

But as I understand what you are reporting is that the numbers were attained. A couple hundred thousand troops, police were actually trained for that responsibility.

Is that right or is that wrong?

Colonel COATES. In 2006, sir, for Al Anbar Province we pretty much came within about a thousand of the set goal of 11,330. So we had the training pipeline and stuff. We were getting very close to meeting that goal for that year.

Mr. SPRATT. Is that generally true for every year? The 200,000 man goal was sufficiently attained?

Colonel SWENGROS. I don't specifically have that—I would kind of agree with Colonel Coates. I think the numbers were fairly close. The dynamic that is out there is a number of killed and wounded in action that have to be replaced. I think you will see some figures where we were not able to reach the numbers because the numbers are changing. So I kind of agree with Colonel Coates. I think so, say yeah, they actually met every goal.

Mr. SPRATT. I am just saying your miracle goals. You are still short police in most places in Al Anbar. But in other places as well?

Colonel SWENGROS. I think the question for sure is were you short trained police, and I think the answer is yes. It is always that opportunity over need and that continues. I think the number when we were there we were 74,000 or something. I wish we had put through more trained. That is why building the additional police academies—

Mr. SPRATT. What are the most notable deficiencies in the forces that are actually there dressed down, reporting for duty, but never-



theless not adequate for the job? What are the most glaring deficiencies?

Colonel COATES. I think in the IPS service, the ministerial level to execute security force policy through the police, we have got a pretty good foundation going in Al Anbar at the police station and the district level. The provincial thing we are making progress. It is not where it should be yet. But the engagement with the ministerial level in Baghdad and all of the support and everything you need to administer a police department nationally, I think right now is probably the biggest lacking or the biggest challenge right out there now.

Mr. SPRATT. One of the apprehensions then, I guess in 2006, I guess it was, was they were concerned about the performance of the MOI, Minister of Interior, and corruption at the highest level, and they were determined about militia infiltration. At the lowest levels they were concerned about militia infiltration. Is that still a major concern, corruption in the MOI and militia infiltration in the likes of local police departments?

Colonel SWENGROS. I don't have any direct information on that. I have talked to brigade commanders out there and he did not address that as a major concern that he is working on. But I don't have any information, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Is there a basic division of labor amongst the security forces so that the border patrol will patrol the border and the armed forces actually engage in counterinsurgency or anti-insurgency and the police deal with crime, murder, assault an battery, rape, fraud, things of that nature?

Colonel COATES. All of them contribute to overall security and the challenge has been to bring them all together. So there is a synchronization of capabilities that allow them to contribute to the overall security. There is a separate border, protective service, that clearly is defined. The IPS is clearly defined and the Iraqi Army is clearly defined.

Our real challenge out there is in bringing them together and the sharing of information between the two of them. Ideally, in the city in—except in Ramadi, if the police were responsible for the internal security on a day-to-day street security, the Army would position itself on the outside.

To reinforce or support or to make sure that the conditions remained to—

Mr. SPRATT. Are they, being the local police, oftentimes being pre-empted and pressed into service or with the Iraqi armed forces. For example, if there is a firefight or something of that nature, are they being diverted from their basic mission, which is to enforce civil laws and criminal laws?

Colonel COATES. I think what they are mainly enforcing, sir, is that of the establishment of security. Bob, you can comment on the criminal activity.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Sir, right now the criminal activity is insurgency. That is the danger on the street. And if you are worried about getting blown up at mosque, you are not worried about the pickpocket in the crowd.

And we lost a station. We lost eight policemen. We lost 60 citizens now, right after mosque on a Saturday. The police responded well.

Mr. SPRATT. Is there a distinction made between kidnapping, let's say, or a major theft or breaking and entering and fighting the insurgency and, if the police aren't allowed to concentrate on what they are doing, what you are saying is that the main problem is violence.

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, sir and, in the Habbaniyah district where I was, tribal law, shari'a law, and then civil law is a distant show. And any theft and they are pointing fingers at each other, it goes to Sheikh Hamad and Sheikh Hamad determines it and they do reconciliations.

Mr. SPRATT. So what do the police do then, do they augment the national armed forces?

Colonel MCCARTHY. They man entry control points into the villages, they man their stations, they man towers, they do security patrols up and down the different routes and in and about the villages. They maintain a security presence on the street to keep the insurgents underground because people can't go to the store without the police there. They can't go to school without the police there because the army is focused elsewhere and the coalition is obviously in their own battle space. Where I was, I was in an Iraqi army battle space where that was superimposed on a police jurisdiction. You know, so you have command and control issues, you have battle space apportionment issues all the time. So you have to work together in the counterinsurgency fight or you are going to fail.

Mr. SPRATT. To what extent are civil police functions operable, possible, if you don't have a judicial system and a penal system in place that is functional? Is that a problem that they arrest people, put them in jail and don't have a system of justice that can routinely process them?

Colonel SWENGROS. Sir, as Ms. Sanchez said before, this is more than—the solution has to be more than a security piece. The security piece is tremendously important but there are those, that triad that you have to get to in any society, especially in one such as Iraq with insurgents, the penal, the judicial and the law enforcement piece of it. So yes, it is a problem and it is a problem that they have been addressing from the start. As simple as in a police station, we go in there and try and track who is sitting in the local jail cell for what reason and did they meet the certain timelines that had been established by the Iraqi government for keeping people under investigation or in jail and those types of things. So that, is it a problem, overcrowding, if they don't get to the judicial, it just compiles as you go through that. But does that, how much does that really affect the security battle, the insurgents battle, again I will agree with Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy that you don't separate the army, you don't separate the police.

When you do that, the more seams you have in your operations, the more that the insurgents or the organized crime is going to operate in, and it is trying to close down those seams.

One of the things that the army has pursued over this last year with JIEDDO, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) defeat orga-

nization, is the police intelligence operations. And that is taking the law enforcement mindset from looking at whether it is an IED or another criminal activity—stolen cars or those types of things—and trying to figure out where the dots can be connected and if you address it from a policing mindset to get at the insurgent activity. And they are finding some success in that. It is less than a year old. It is hinged on bringing in retired or other senior law enforcement with criminal investigative type experience to go in there, and they are putting it in there within the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to get at the police intelligence to complement the military intelligence, so when the commander looks at what is going on on the ground you have both pieces and you make sure you are not missing any.

So we are seeing some tremendous strides in that. And as you operate with the Iraqi police, when we started out you may never see an Iraqi with an army sitting down at a table to plan an operation or conduct an operation, and each one of us have many stories where they do that now to get at that security picture. So I see some positive stuff in those areas.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony and for your service to our country.

Mr. MEEHAN. Any other questions? Let me just say that all of us who traveled to meet with our men and women around the world, whether it be Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo or even in the United States, we are always impressed but this panel this morning has been outstanding. And I think I speak for all the members when I say we thank you from the bottom of our hearts for your service to your country. We are in awe of the job that you are all are doing every day for the United States of America. So thank you very much for your service, and thank you very much for testifying before us this morning. Thanks.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



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**A P P E N D I X**

MAY 24, 2007

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MAY 24, 2007

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**Opening Statement of Chairman Martin Meehan  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
Hearing on the Iraqi Police Service  
May 24, 2007**

Good morning, today the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations meets to continue its examination of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The focus of today's hearing is the Iraqi Police Service or IPS.

The discussion of the ISF tends to focus on the Iraqi Army and the National Police, but there is also a large Iraqi Police Service force that is intended to carry out a community policing function. They are the traffic cops, the patrolmen, and the local beat cops who are essential to the counterinsurgency effort as well as establishment of the Rule of Law. We have witnesses here today who have been working directly with the IPS and can tell us about their experiences in advising and mentoring them.

Before we get to our witnesses, I want to bring the subcommittee up-to-date on the status of the Defense Department's compliance with our first document request, given our discussion on Tuesday.

On March 20th, Mr. Akin and I asked for four documents we considered essential to studying the development of the Iraqi Security Forces. Among other documents, we asked for the classified April 2006 Joint Multinational Forces-Iraq and U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan, as well as its predecessors and any subsequent revisions to it.

Yesterday, we received some of the documents we requested, including part of the Joint Campaign Plan.

We anticipate receiving the Campaign Plan annexes shortly. The bad news is that before we received a copy we had already read yesterday's Washington Post article outlining the details of the plan that will replace the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan.

I am concerned that the press had access to this before anyone in Congress saw it. The DOD should pursue the leakers to the full extent of the law. We've been assured that once Secretary Gates signs-off on this strategy, it will be delivered to us immediately.

The new plan, if approved by Secretary Gates, appears to contain a notable shift. As reported in the Post, the new plan shifts “the immediate emphasis of military operations *away* from transitioning to Iraqi security forces.”

The Post goes on to say that one of the sources for the article -- and apparently there were many sources -- some quoted by name -- said that the “U.S. drive to make Iraqi forces independent has already limited U.S. leverage.”

Needless to say, the Subcommittee will need additional information regarding the new plan and, in particular, its reported annex on ISF policy.

Moving to today, we had hoped to have two panels of witnesses. I asked DOD to provide appropriate witnesses who could talk about DOD plans and efforts to establish, train, and assess the progress of the Iraqi Police Service.

I specifically asked that the witnesses be able to provide testimony on the following issues: the IPS’s role in and contribution to stabilizing the security conditions in Iraq; IPS’s role in the counterinsurgency effort; and how the IPS is managed between the Ministry of Interior and provincial governments.

Unfortunately, DOD responded that “the one witness that could meet the Subcommittee’s needs for the first panel...is Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey.”

Since General Dempsey could not be here today, we asked for witnesses who have been very involved in the development of the ISF and the IPS and are located in the Washington area.

Specifically, we asked if General George Casey could testify. Before becoming the Army Chief of Staff, General Casey was the commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq and he reportedly declared the year 2006 as the “Year of the Police.” We also asked for General Chiarelli, also currently serving in the Pentagon.

General Chiarelli was the previous commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq. The MNC-I commander assumes operational control of ISF units once they have been formed and could have provided his insight into the importance of developing a capable and professional police force.

I think either general could have helped us better understand the evolution and development of the ISF and the IPS. So there will be no first panel today to discuss the Department's plan to establish the IPS. In reference to our requests for this past Tuesday and today, Secretary Gates assures us that General Dempsey will appear before the subcommittee on June 12.

After hearing about the plans, policy and progress of the IPS development, we wanted to hear about how this actually works on the ground. We appreciate that for our second panel, DOD has allowed more junior personnel to join us.

I would ask our witnesses for the second panel to join us at the witness table.

We are very pleased to have several witnesses today who can discuss their personal experiences in the development of the IPS.

Colonel Richard Swengros oversees the training of Army Police Transition Teams as the Assistant Commandant of the US Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

He also helped establish the Police Partner Program when he served in Iraq as the Commander of the 42<sup>nd</sup> Military Police Brigade from November 2004 to November 2005.

Colonel Robert Coates served as an Assistant Chief of Staff for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force and was responsible for supporting the transition teams working with the ISF in Al Anbar province.

Now he is the Assistant Chief of Staff for the Training/Experimentation Group and is overseeing Police Transition Team training for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert McCarthy, also from the Marine Corps, who returned this past February after serving as a Police Transition Team leader in Al Anbar.

We also have 1<sup>st</sup> Lieutenant Cadetta Bridges, who serves as the Headquarters Detachment Commander of the 372nd MP Battalion of the DC National Guard.

Lieutenant Bridges returned from Iraq in February after serving as a Police Transition Team coordinator in Baghdad.

Finally, joining us is Lieutenant Colonel Brad Felling of the Air Force, who just returned from four months in Iraq last Wednesday.

Welcome and thank to all of you for your service and for being here today. We look forward to your testimony.

I would note that Colonel Swengros and Colonel Coates have prepared statements that will be made a part of the record and we'll turn to you two gentlemen for any brief opening statements you care to make following Mr. Akin.

To encourage discussion, we will follow the same procedures today as we have in our previous sessions. We will dispense with the 5-minute rule during today's hearing, but I would ask my colleagues to be sensitive and not monopolize the witnesses.

I would like to remind everyone that this is an open hearing so no classified information will be discussed.

Before I turn to Mr. Akin for any opening remarks that he might have, I would like to take a moment to share news from Iraq that drives home how crucial and dangerous the mission that we are discussing is. Last week, an Air Force Staff Sergeant, John Self, was killed in Iraq.

He was a part of a police training team, much like the ones that we are discussing today, and he was serving his fourth tour in Iraq. My thoughts are with his family.

Mr. Akin?

**Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin  
House Armed Services Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee  
Hearing on the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)  
May 24, 2007**

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Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today - I look forward to hearing your statements.

Over the course of this investigation it has become increasingly apparent that the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)-- though nominally part of the ISF -- is really a unique organization that requires its own analysis and discussion separate from the Iraqi Army and National Police.

Despite being critical to our effort in Iraq and that nearly half of the security forces we've trained are IPS,, it's been remarkably

difficult to get information about the PTT effort. I want to thank the Department for supporting this hearing.

If defeating sectarianism and marginalizing militia is paramount to success in Iraq then an Iraqi Police Service that ensures law and order and has the respect and trust of their community is absolutely required. A community that relies upon the IPS for safety is a community that WILL NOT turn to the militias.

This seems to me the strategic framework for prioritizing our police training effort.

The Police Transition Teams (PTTs) are an essential piece of the effort to execute this strategy. I'm looking forward to hearing from our witnesses about their experiences as members of PTTs.

Some of the issues I'd like the witnesses to touch on are:

- 1) the competency of the police stations your PTT worked with & the extent the Ministry of Interior involved itself in the work of these police stations;
- 2) whether the IPS you worked with were able to carry out normal law and order police work or if they were forced to support counterinsurgency operations;
- 3) The extent of militia infiltration in the police stations you oversaw; and
- 4) How the chain of command supported your efforts.

Once again, thank you for being here today.

[Yield to Chairman Meehan]

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RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

COLONEL RICHARD W. SWENGROS  
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

ON IRAQI POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS

MAY 24, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY  
THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



STATEMENT BY  
COLONEL RICHARD W. SWENGROS  
UNITED STATES ARMY

Thank you Chairman Meehan, distinguished members of the committee, it is my pleasure to appear before this committee today and give my testimony on the Police Transition Team and the work of our Soldiers in Iraq and at the US Army Military Police School in support of the Police Transition Team efforts.

I entered the Army in 1976 as a Military Policeman (MP), Private, and moved through the enlisted ranks to Staff Sergeant, Squad Leader and Section Chief. In 1982, I attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned a 2LT in the Military Police Corps. My assignments were typical and included company command of a division MP company; command of an installation detention facility; an assignment as Battalion Executive Officer that included a tour in Bosnia with the initial deploying elements; an assignment on the Joint Staff in the Counternarcotics Division of the J3; battalion commander, 793d MP Battalion in Germany that included a deployment with the first elements into Kosovo in June 1999; command of the 42d Military Police Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA that included duties as installation Provost Marshal and included a deployment to Iraq November 2004-November 2005. I am currently the Assistant Commandant of the MP School at Fort Leonard Wood, MO where we train all military police.

In my battalion's tour in Kosovo, we were charged with re-establishing the Kosovo Police force and worked hand in hand with the UNMIK police. We also worked extensively in controlling two of the major border crossing sites in our area of operations. Terms such as Rule of Law, Transition of Primacy, and police partnership programs were in use. Additionally, there was a distinct need for judicial, penal and police or law enforcement synchronization and mutually supporting efforts.

In Iraq, my brigade was initially responsible for supporting US Army forces mainly in Baghdad and Mosul in an attempt to stabilize and build the Iraqi

Police as well as the responsibility for securing Camp Cropper and the People's Mujahadeen of Iran (PMOI) in Camp Ashraf Iraq. At the end of our deployment, my brigade was responsible for the Police Partner Program (P3) that we developed and implemented throughout Iraq, to include coordination with the British efforts in Southern Iraq. This P3 program was the precursor of today's current Police Transition Team efforts. We could field, in the beginning, approximately 70 Police Partnership Teams.

With our experiences in Kosovo, and now in Iraq, we observed that the dismantled government had released all criminals and mental institution patients, property records were destroyed or moved, and Organized Crime, insurgents, former regime elements, and local political/tribal groups were vying for power and control of the populace. We also, as a collective coalition body, military and otherwise, struggled with how much and how soon authority to the developing government should be transferred. We observed that there were many seams throughout the area of operations and our areas of responsibilities were not aligned with the Iraq Police's areas of responsibilities; essentially, we had a very decentralized policing effort and there were seams throughout the country of which criminals and other elements were operating.

My first day after the transfer of authority, I went to a squad leader in West Baghdad and I asked—as new brigade commander in theater, what can I do to help you (the squad leader) in your mission. In a few minutes, the squad leader described that we could continue to train Iraqi police in all the basics, but what would really help was to fix the police headquarters at district and province level. The next day, in East Baghdad, I asked an MP platoon leader, from a different unit and working for a different Brigade Combat Team (BCT), the same question and she gave me nearly verbatim the same response as the squad leader. Within a week, my leadership and I surmised we had two significant obstacles to overcome—shortage of the required numbers of Military Police to “train” the Iraqi Police, and we were not fully going to have an effect unless we addressed training and partnership experiences with every echelon of the Iraqi Police (IP) system.

With the January 2005 elections quickly approaching, I laid out to MG Chiarelli, the 1<sup>st</sup> Cav Division Commander and his ADC, then BG Jones a partnership plan that had our brigade headquarters partnering with the Baghdad Police Chief, our two battalions in Baghdad partnering with the two IP Directorates, and my company commanders partnering with the District Police Headquarters and the squads and platoons partnering with police stations. This gave us synchronization (for policing) in our area of operations.

What really made our partnership different is that we brought to bear all the assets available in MP battalion and brigade staffs. While I was working with the Police Chief, my personnel or human resources staff worked with the Iraqi Police on recruiting, pay, assignments, and other personnel actions. My S2 or Intelligence Section, worked with the IPs on police intelligence and crime analysis. My S3 or Operations Section worked with the Iraqi Police headquarters on establishing operations centers and began helping them plan future operations. My S4 or Logistics Section worked daily with the logistics folks. My battalions used their staffs in the same partnership fashion with their Iraqi Police Counterparts. We tied in very closely with the efforts of the Maneuver commanders, CPATT, and MNSTC-I as we set about the police training team efforts.

Today, you will find more than 230 Police Training Teams (PTTs) that cover down on over 310 police stations and the numbers are growing. PTTs target police in-service training, emphasize rule of law, and work diligently to effect police administration, logistics, maintenance, police intelligence and operations, jail operations, and Force Protection. PTTs are tailored to the specific IPS echelon of command being worked, location, threat, and other related requirements.

A recent step the US Army Military Police School just completed was the establishment of a Police Transition Team Training Support Package (PTT TSP). The TSP sets the conditions for the incoming PTT elements to understand the most recent policing dynamics in Iraq, familiarize with the latest procedures and reports they will assume, and therefore reduce the transition time in theater.

This transition time, the time to get acquainted to the battlespace—the procedures, personalities and challenges has always been a critical time. During the transition period, momentum can be lost and seams can develop that allow insurgents or other groups to gain momentum and take the initiative. The TSP is a five day course where units who are going to Iraq to conduct a PTT mission, send their key leaders to. The key leaders take information and training materiel back to their units to train their Soldiers for deployment. The base TSP was developed from key personnel and experts that had just returned from Iraq. We then worked closely with the current elements in Iraq to get the latest forms, the latest procedures, and the latest challenges to the units so they can train their personnel and reduce that transition time while enhancing their effectiveness once on the ground.

The Iraqi Police stations must have the capability to operate under the rule of law construct; capable of apprehending, processing, and supporting investigations, adjudication, and incarceration. Building the effectiveness of the triad; the penal, judicial and law enforcement systems will ensure achievement of community security and community trust.

In conclusion, the challenges continue to be the environment, the groups vying for population control (organized crime, criminals, insurgents, terrorists groups, political/tribal parties), the number of PTTs, and the numbers of interpreters with each PTT. This partner program is the best chance for success, but will take time. It is an extensive effort under trying circumstances. There are a great majority of Iraqis and Iraqi police who are forever grateful for our efforts and are trying to effect change. You see it in their efforts and you see it in their eyes.

I'd like to thank this committee for your time and interest in the Police Transition Team program and will be happy to answer your questions.

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INVESTIGATIONS  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE**

**STATEMENT OF  
COLONEL ROBERT J. COATES  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
BEFORE THE  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
– IRAQI POLICE STATUS REPORT –  
ON  
24 MAY 2007**

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY  
THE OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF  
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

COLONEL ROBERT J. COATES

Colonel Coates was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1977 upon graduation from the University of South Carolina.

As a company grade officer, he served in the operational forces with Company F 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (1977-80), Company A 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1980-81), Company B 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (11th MEU(SOC)) (1988-1990), and the 1st Marines Regimental Enhanced Training Section (RETS) (1987-1988). Assignments included: Rifle Platoon Commander, Weapons Platoon Commander, Rifle Company Executive Officer, Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, Officer in Charge of RETS, and Rifle Company Commander (1988-1990).

As a field grade officer, he served as Training Officer for the 1st Marine Division, Operations Officer for the 15th MEU(SOC) for deployment to the CENTCOM AOR (1995-1996) and Executive Officer/ Maritime Special Purpose Force Commander for a subsequent deployment to the CENTCOM AOR (1997), as Deputy AC/S G-7 I MEF (1997-1998), Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (1998-2000) and Officer in Charge of the Special Operations Training Group, I MEF (2000-2003). From 2003-2006 Colonel Coates was selected to activate and as the first Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment One (MCSOCOM Det 1). In 2004, he deployed to the IRAQI THEATER of OPERATIONS (ITO) for combat operations in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II). Upon deactivation of MCSOCOM Det One in 2006, Col Coates was ordered to I MEF (FWD) for deployment to Al Anbar, Iraq and participation in OIF 05-07 as the AC/S G-10 (Iraqi Security Forces). Upon return from Iraq in 2007, Col Coates was assigned and is currently serving as the AC/S for Training/Experimentation Group

In the supporting establishment, he served as the Officer in Charge of the Amphibious Reconnaissance School at Landing Force Training Command, Coronado, CA (1982-85), as an infantry battalion advisor for combat and special operations in El Salvador (1986-87), and with other U.S. Government Agencies involved in Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence/Special Operations (1991-1994).

Colonel Coates is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School (1985-86) and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (1990-1991). His personal decorations include: Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Purple Heart Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, and the Combat Action Ribbon with Gold Star.

Chairman Meehan, Congressman Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss Iraqi Police (IP) development in the Al Anbar Province

In February 2006, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) created a separate staff section, the G-10, to oversee all Iraqi Security Force (ISF) development. This section worked closely with the Multi-National Support Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) on all issues related to the ISF. Our G-10 was divided into three separate sections; Iraqi Army development, Iraqi Police development, and Border Protection Service development. The Iraqi Police section worked closely with the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) which was a component of MNSTC-I. CPATT helped to oversee development of the police and border forces throughout Iraq.

When I MEF arrived in Feb 2006, the police force in Al Anbar had approximately 2143 assigned policemen with an additional 1599 in training. However, a large number of these 2143 policemen were not actively working. Four out of ten police districts were operating with only fourteen Police Stations. Two of these districts, however, were operational in name only (Ramadi and Habbaniyah) and many of the stations were barely functioning. The Provincial headquarters was not functioning and was not in contact with any of its districts or MOI. The only truly functioning police force was within the city of Fallujah.

#### **Iraqi Police**

Unlike the United States, the Iraqi Police are a nationally controlled organization under the Ministry of the Interior. Each Province operates its own police force under the control of a Provincial Director of Police (PDoP). This PDoP worked directly for the

Governor but was bound by MOI policies and regulations. Within Al Anbar the province was further divided into ten separate police districts. Each district had an appointed police chief that managed the assigned stations within his district. Another difference is that the Iraqi Police force was structured similar to a military rank structure. It had both officer and enlisted ranks. Unlike US police forces where all police are sworn officers, the Iraqis were divided into Police Officers and Policemen (enlisted).

### **Recruiting**

Recruiting for Iraqi Police was difficult at best during most of 2006. There was a very active and effective murder and intimidation campaign against the police forces in Al Anbar. This campaign involved threats and assassination of policemen and police officers, potential recruits as well as their families. This greatly hindered any effort to make this force more active and operational or any recruiting efforts to grow the police force. This helped foster an attitude by many of the Iraqis, including those in the police force, to adopt a “wait and see” attitude with respect to the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar. However, this was just was one factor.

Along with this was simply the danger involved in the job of a policeman. The force was very small and could barely support itself during normal operations, let alone if responding to policemen being attacked. The lack of proper equipment was also a factor. The lack of body armor and weapons are two prime examples. Another large effect was the Arab/tribal culture that was prevalent throughout the province. All activities within a tribe or family must be approved by the tribal leader or Sheik. Many of these leaders had adopted the “wait and see” attitude mentioned earlier and therefore many Iraqis were not prone to join. Even when Iraqis were willing to join, the recruiting process itself was



very dangerous. The process of gathering, screening, and then transporting large numbers of recruits required a large amount of coalition and Iraqi security. This created a large target that was often attacked. The basic requirements established by MOI for an Iraqi Policeman were fairly simple by US standards but difficult for many Iraqis. The largest disqualifier was basic literacy. Many Iraqis in Al Anbar could not read and write at a 4<sup>th</sup> grade level. Another large disqualifier was a lack of proper identification. The national identification card (Jensia card) was required for each applicant as proof of citizenship and proper age. However there had not been an operating Jensia office in Al Anbar since March 2003. This created a large number of fake or fraudulent Jensia cards at every recruiting drive.

### **Training**

Graduation from an MOI approved police training academy is a requirement for all Police within Iraq. Upon graduation from an academy, MOI issues hiring orders that officially appoint them as policemen in the Iraqi Police force and assign them to their home province. This academy was 8 to 10 weeks long (10 weeks with weekends 8 weeks without).

Unlike most other provinces within Iraq, Al Anbar does not have its own Police Training Academy. This made the training for new police recruits very difficult for all police within Al Anbar. Most Iraqis from Al Anbar were not comfortable leaving their homes for a longer period of time. The logistics of safely moving large numbers of Iraqis to and from schools outside of Al Anbar each month was difficult at best. Two available police academies were used by Al Anbar to train all new Recruits:

The Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC) located in Aman Jordan was a US sponsored academy that trained approximately 1800 recruits per eight week class. A new class began each month. This was the preferred course for Al Anbar due to the safer environment, shorter class length, better facilities, and better overall treatment of the students.

The Baghdad Police College (BPC) located in Baghdad was a US and Iraqi run program that taught approximately 2000 recruits per class. A new class began each month. This course was problematic for Al Anbar recruits for several reasons. The academy was originally designed to train only their police officers. Many of the instructors looked down upon the policemen recruits (enlisted) training at this facility and often treated them poorly. Secondly, the Al Anbar recruits were treated worse because they were not from Baghdad and were looked down upon especially because they were from Al Anbar. Also, the course was 10 weeks, vice the 8 week course in Jordan. The weekends that were provided with the longer course were not enjoyable for the Al Anbar recruits because they were not from Baghdad and were not able to go home or even out into town without risking their lives. They remained on the academy grounds instead, with very little to do.

*Also, there is the Transitional Integration Program (TIP).* This was a three week refresher program for former police that had served prior to March 2003. The emphasis was on rule of law and refreshing police basics. There was a separate course for officers and policemen.

The BPC also offered advanced courses for qualified policemen and police officers. Courses such as crime scene investigations, interrogations, supervisors' courses, and junior leadership courses are an example of some of the courses offered. Some of the

same issues with the basic recruit training at the BPC also affected these courses as well as logistical and security issues for transporting small numbers of Iraqi Police from Al Anbar to Baghdad.

#### **Equipment and Logistical Support**

From Feb 2006 to Feb 2007, all equipment issued to the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar came from Coalition Forces. Most of this was from CPATT/MNSTC-I with a small amount from directly from I MEF. During the first half of 2006, the lack of basic equipment hindered some of the operations for the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar and continued to impact operations throughout the year. One example was vehicles. The lack of police vehicles greatly limited their maneuverability and response. Even when vehicles were available, they lacked any armor protection. The Iraqi Police would patrol an area in a Chevy pickup truck while the Iraqi Army would patrol the same area in an armored HMMWV. Through the hard work and resourcefulness of individual Marines and units, I MEF provided armor plating for some of these vehicles. Efforts by I MEF to have all vehicles armored prior to issue was not supported by MNSTC-I. MNSTC-I was attempting to have the Iraqi MOI armor its own vehicles but the Iraqi bureaucracy was too slow to respond effectively. This is indicative of many of the equipment problems faced by the police. The equipment provided is based on normal civilian policing and not combat operations. Fuel was also an issue that grew as the police gained more vehicles. MOI did not have a plan to provide fuel support for the IP in Al Anbar. Even if a plan and appropriate funding were available, Al Anbar did not have secure facilities for holding and distributing this fuel. Additionally, the lack of it across the province created a large black market for fuel. Corruption within the police often resulted in the police

stealing and selling their own fuel, often from their own gas tank. The delays and problems with equipping the police were eventually overcome and large amounts of gear and equipment were delivered to the IP in Al Anbar during that last half of 2006.

Although large portions of this equipment that was given to the Iraqi Police is currently unaccounted for and is not at the police stations.

### **Political Support**

#### *Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI)*

The MOI was not involved with many of the events within Al Anbar Province. The prevailing attitude among many of the Iraqi's in Al Anbar was that the government in Baghdad did not care about them.

Local government/tribal support was an important part in the eventual growth and success of the police in Al Anbar. Through the support of local political leaders and tribal engagement by US forces, the number of monthly police recruits grew. Gaining the support of the local leaders in each area was extremely important to the effectiveness of the police in every area of the province.

### **Iraqi Police Pay**

When I MEF first arrived, the Al Anbar police force has not been paid for about 3 to 4 months. Part of the problem was with the Provincial Government itself and the Provincial Treasury. Pay for the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar was supposed to be handled through the Provincial Treasury. The Provincial Police Chief and the Al Anbar Treasury were stealing large portions of this money. The Provincial Police Chief was arrested and the Baghdad treasury withheld all police funds from Al Anbar. They withheld these

funds which resulted in the Al Anbar police not being paid for months. It took heavy coalition involvement in order to get this process moving again. I MEF had to send representatives to MOI, MOF, and the Baghdad treasury in order to get IPs paid. These representatives had to receive the money and transport it to each police district. The Police Training Teams (PTTs) were directly involved in the pay oversight as well to ensure that each policeman was paid. It was common practice for the chief and his officers to take part or all of his pay. This direct involvement continued through I MEF's time in Iraq with monthly trips to Baghdad to pick up the pay in cash from the Baghdad treasury and deliver it to each district. The Baghdad treasury refused to distribute these funds through the Provincial treasury and insisted on I MEF and Coalition Forces involvement. They trusted I MEF to escort the money but did not trust the provincial treasury or the provincial police chief and his officers.

MOI requires that all active police must have hiring orders in order to be paid. The process for obtaining hiring orders is relatively simple but often bogged down by the slow bureaucracy within MOI. The slowness of this process often slowed the pay for these men as it sometimes took until two months after their graduation from the police academy to get the required orders.

The lack of pay for almost four months made recruiting very difficult. Once these problems were resolved, many Iraqis began to volunteer for the police force and many more existing IPs were willing to return to duty.

#### **US/Coalition in overwatch with IA**

In order to help stand up the police forces across Al Anbar, I MEF implemented the tactic of using US and Iraqi Army (IA) forces in an overwatch/supporting role for

Police that had begun to operate on their own. Coalition forces and IA would often provide the quick reaction force for the police in an emergency or operate nearby in order to provide adjacent support. I MEF learned that without providing this support, the fledgling police forces would often flounder and fail. This was seen most dramatically in the city of Haditha. In 2004, when Marine forces were moved from there to support operations in Fallujah the police forces crumbled. The police forces were relentlessly attacked by insurgent forces and could not stand on their own. Through a lot of hard work by multiple Marine battalions, most notably 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 3<sup>rd</sup> Marines, did the police eventually return. It took until the end of 2006 before there was a semblance of an operating force.

#### **Rule of Law/Judicial System**

##### *Courts*

There were no existing criminal courts within Al Anbar. This created obvious problems for the police as there was no established Iraqi justice system for anyone who was arrested. The only recourse was the use of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) with the assistance of I MEF. CCCI's focus was on the prosecution of insurgents. This left out any prosecution for normal criminal activities. The lack of any criminal justice system greatly hampered all aspects of police operations.

##### *Prisons*

There were also no existing prisons within Al Anbar. This also created obvious problems for holding anyone arrested by the IP. Unless they were an insurgent, the IP's could not turn them over to the US for detention in a US Regional Detention Facility (RDF). The small jails within each police station were almost always overcrowded with

prisoners. The IPs were reluctant to let these often dangerous criminal free, but did not have a larger facility to which to transfer them or a judicial system to even hear their case.

#### **Facilities/Police Stations**

Murder and Intimidation was used very effectively by insurgents against the contractors across Al Anbar province. Threats and attacks against contractors or the suppliers of these contractors were very effective in halting or slowing many of the construction projects.

Additionally, during 2006, the Iraqi government required proof of land ownership by MOI for each property where a police station was constructed. Construction was greatly delayed at many sites due to this requirement which was all but impossible for most locations. Titles and deeds for most of the land, especially government owned land, did not exist for Al Anbar. This completely halted construction at almost all locations.

#### **Police Transition Teams**

Al Anbar province had US Army and US Marine Corps Police Transition Teams. Three different sized teams were established based on their assignment. A station level team consisted of 10 men, a district level team had 12 men, and the provincial PTT 15 men. This includes an eight man security team for each. Each team also had several International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) to assist with police specific training and development. The team leader was an officer or staff non-commissioned officer. These teams were very undersized for the scope of their mission.

The initial plan was to provide I MEF with a US Army MP Battalion to source the required number of PTTs. Forces were diverted to Baghdad to support operations there and only one MP Company was provided to I MEF for PTTs. In order to meet mission

requirements, I MEF created fifteen PTTs out of hide. This had obvious effects on other I MEF missions and support.

The initial Marine Corps teams were provided from within 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 14<sup>th</sup> Marines. They were created on short notice and did not receive any standardized PTT training prior to deployment. The teams that replaced them in early summer 2006 received some advisor team training, but very little training regarding the police transition mission. An additional six teams were created in theater from individual augments from deployed units and headquarters. These teams received four days of training at Camp Fallujah and then were paired with an existing, experienced PTT for a minimum ten day training period on the ground. Today, I MEF has a dedicated Advisor Training Group (ATG) to train and prepare all Transition Teams. There is currently a six week training program that provides specific training for all Police Transition Teams to include training at the Marine Corps Mojave Viper Exercise in 29 Palms. This exercise simulates working with and developing an Iraqi Police.

It was not until the end of I MEF's tenure that a PTT handbook was created to help the PTTs in the performance of their mission. Until this time, direction and basic concepts were provided through informal means. The intent of this book is to provide a ready, pocket sized reference for all members of the PTT.

### **Conclusion**

Upon I MEF transfer of authority to II MEF on 9 Feb, 2007, Al Anbar had 10,251 police assigned with approximately 9,211 working. There was an additional 837 recruits in training. Additionally, all ten police districts are operational with forty active Police stations. Many of these stations and districts are now operating and directly contributing



to the counterinsurgency efforts in Al Anbar. The IP have been invaluable in many areas not only for the security they provide but also for the ground level intelligence on local activities.


The Provincial Headquarters is operational with phone and e-mail communications with all ten districts and the Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad.

All IPs are getting paid on time each month and additional monthly operations and maintenance funds were also procured.

Large amounts of equipment were delivered to the Iraqi Police, including 8243 AK-47s, 4680 pistols, 552 PKM Machineguns, 6052 ballistic vests with SAPI plates, over 14,000 uniforms, 905 police vehicles, and millions of rounds of ammunition.


The construction of an Al Anbar Police Academy has begun and is expected to be operational by this summer. This school will train recruits and eventually teach more advanced leadership and policing courses.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.



# MNF-W Iraqi Police Districts Al Anbar

Province 29 APRIL 07





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**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE  
RECORD**

MAY 24, 2007

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. On page 9 of your testimony, you write that "I MEF had to send representatives to MOI, MOF, and the Baghdad treasury in order to get IPs paid." Did you try to engage MNSTC-I or CPATT or the MOI Transition Team to assist with this? What was their response?

Colonel COATES. We were heavily engaged with MOI-TT and CPATT when I MEF first began dealing with this issue in the spring of 2006. Upon arrival in Al Anbar in Feb. 06, I MEF sent a full time liaison officer (LNO) to work at CPATT representing and ensuring that CPATT understood the unique issues of Al Anbar. As such, this LNO was designated as the action officer by CPATT along with a few other individuals on the CPATT staff to initiate the restarting of the payment of salaries to the Iraqi Police in Al Anbar. I MEF always sent representatives to Baghdad with our Iraqi counterparts to ensure the pay process was executed (The Anbar Provincial Committee of Three-Senior Iraqi Police officials tasked with the execution of the pay roll). For the initial trip to Baghdad during mid-June 2006 to broker the initial meeting with MOI & MOF officials, there was a large delegation from the Coalition to include the MOI-TT representatives that were primarily from their finance division. After this first meeting, the log jam was cleared and the Iraqi Police of Al Anbar were issued their salaries. The number of representatives dropped off for each subsequent salary execution drill. For the next several pay drills/trips to Baghdad, I MEF representatives/LNO along with Mohammed (Iraqi/American who worked at MOI-TT as an advisor and had a finance/accounting degree), with a Lt. Col. from MOI-TT (finance background) walked and coordinated the pay day drill for Al Anbar directly with MOI, MOF and the Central bank. This also included the transporting of the salaries to Al Anbar by the Coalition.

Mr. MEEHAN. On page 9 of your testimony, you also mention that "the process for obtaining hiring orders is relatively simple but often bogged down by the slow bureaucracy within MOL." Does CPATT or the MOI transition team have a plan for fixing the "hiring orders" after-training delay?

Colonel COATES. By Jan. 07, CPATT was reorganized and remissioned into the MOI-TT. I am not aware of any plan for the Iraqis to change the process for issuing "Hiring Orders". The I MEF LNO/representatives would initiate the action by sending graduating class rosters to coalition counterparts with in the MOI and in most cases, hiring orders were issued within a 10 day period by MOI. During our tenure, the I MEF Liaison Officer brokered the hiring orders process by walking the request for orders office to office with MOI Iraqi counterparts. The Iraqis were always slow in dealing with anything and seemed very apprehensive in changing their current bureaucratic ways.

Mr. MEEHAN. Since JIPTC is no longer training IPs and Al Anbar's Police College is not yet operational, are all recruits attending the Baghdad Police College with all the attendant difficulties you identify in your testimony (page 6)? Has the USMC chain of command engaged with the MNSTC-I and CPATT chain of command to try to continue to send recruits to Jordan until Al Anbar's college is open, particularly given the security and sectarian issues? If so, what was CPATT's response?

Colonel COATES. I MEF immediately raised the operational impact of the loss of JIPTC and issues with the Bagdad Police College in Nov. 2006. I MEF requested in writing that the decision to close JIPTC be reconsidered and that JIPTC remain open. MNSTC-I with the endorsement of CPATT delayed the closing of JIPTC for two months which in turn provided I MEF with two additional class dates at JIPTC. The additional classes provided the opportunity to train over 1500 Iraqi Police in Al Anbar. In concert with the aforementioned, CPATT funded the construction of an interim Police Academy for Al Anbar which opened in early June 07 and will graduate the first class of 550 police recruits in mid August 07.

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