[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: AN AGENCY IN NEED OF REBUILDING
=======================================================================
(110-142)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi GARY G. MILLER, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
NICK LAMPSON, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa York
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina Louisiana
MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
JOHN J. HALL, New York MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
VACANCY
(ii)
?
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chairwoman
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Virginia
Pennsylvania, Vice Chair CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee York
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota JOHN L. MICA, Florida
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Office............................... 5
Schenkel, Gary, Director, Federal Protective Service............. 23
Wright, David, President, Federal Protective Service Union....... 23
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Altmire, Hon. Jason, of Pennsylvania............................. 43
Carney, Hon. Christopher P., of Pennsylvania..................... 44
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia......... 46
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 50
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Goldstein, Mark L................................................ 52
Schenkel, Gary W................................................. 79
Wright, David L.................................................. 89
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5
HEARING ON THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: AN AGENCY IN NEED OF
REBUILDING
----------
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and
Emergency Management,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:10 p.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eleanor
Holmes Norton [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Ms. Norton. Good afternoon. We welcome today's witnesses
from the Government Accountability Office, the Federal
Protective Service and the FPS Union. GAO has completed its
much anticipated report on the condition of the Federal
Protective Service, or FPS.
At our February 8th, 2008 hearing on GAO's preliminary
findings, the Subcommittee heard chilling testimony from the
GAO that FPS had deteriorated so substantially that its
difficulties ``may expose Federal facilities to a greater risk
of crime or terrorist attack.'' The Subcommittee has not
forgotten that Federal facilities where Federal employees work,
in particular the Pentagon and the Alfred P. Murrah Oklahoma
City Federal Building, have been the choice targets of major
terrorist attacks in this Country--clearly because Federal
facilities are symbols of the United States Government.
The documented history of terrorist assaults on Federal
assets and consistent threats since 9/11 have required
continuing high levels of vigilance to protect both employees
and visitors who use our Federal facilities. In the post-9/11
and Oklahoma City world, Congress recognized the need for
bolstering police protection in and around the White House and
the Capitol Complex, and one surely would not want to
underestimate the importance of increased protection for the
Federal workforce as well.
When the Department of Homeland Security was formed in
2002, the FPS was transferred from GSA to the newly created
Department and placed within the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement unit, ICE, as it is known. The Committee expressed
its strong support for the transfer but insisted that FPS
officers and guards be used exclusively for and by the FPS.
Starting in February 2005, the Chairman and I have sent a
series of letters to the DHS, the Department of Homeland
Security, and held hearings questioning the use of funds, the
placement of FPS within ICE, and the major shift from a
protection-based workforce to an inspection workforce. We have
supported an increase in the number of FPS employees as well.
These concerns have strong bipartisan support. Both Chairman
Oberstar and Ranking Member Mica have expressed their own views
about the gravity of the FPS situation.
The final GAO report confirms in stark terms GAO's
preliminary findings reported at our February 2008 hearing. The
report says that the FPS has seen its budget decimated, morale
and staff plummet, and attrition skyrocket. The final report
confirms the bipartisan concern that the effectiveness of the
FPS has been compromised since its placement in Immigration and
Enforcement inside the Department of Homeland Security. A
February 18th, 2008 editorial in the Federal Times calls on
Congress to consider removing FPS from ICE.
Our Subcommittee has carefully tracked the downward
trajectory of the agency until it became clear that deeper
investigation than hearings were necessary, and we requested
the GAO report before us today. Among the many signs that an
investigation was in order was an ICE-endorsed proposal last
year to substantially reduce FPS officers across the Nation,
including providing no FPS officers in almost 50 cities.
Memoranda of Understanding, or MOUs, we were told, would be
developed with cities to make up for the absence of Federal
police officers. The GAO, in its preliminary review, found that
not one MOU had been signed and found numerous instances in
which the local jurisdictions had no knowledge at all of these
supposed memoranda.
During our April 2007 hearing, when this proposal was first
discussed, I voiced my concern that local police have little
reason to volunteer to assume unfunded mandates to protect
Federal sites, particularly at the same time that local police
are facing cuts in their own budgets and in Federal programs.
In GAO's final report we learn that the ICE management has
abandoned the idea of MOUs and will now rely on ``informal
relationships'' between FPS and local law enforcement entities.
It is fair to ask if this is any way to protect Federal
employees across the Nation in post-9/11 America. Is this any
way to ensure the protection and security of an inventory that
has a replacement value of $41 billion?
The GAO report leaves no doubt that the FPS, the Nation's
first Federal police force, established in 1790, has been
rocked by inadequate funding and staffing, leading to the
inability to complete its core mission of facility protection
of building security assessments and to complete building
security assessments in a timely and professional manner, and
to monitor and oversee the contract guards. We learn from the
report, ominously, that proactive patrols, the core work of a
police force, have been eliminated at many GSA facilities. This
decision was made in spite of the fact that the GAO reports
that ``multiple governmental entities acknowledge the
importance of proactive patrol in detecting and preventing
criminal incidents and terrorism-related activities.''
It appears that the ICE/FPS answer to funding problems and
management issues has been to change the nature of the
workforce from a protection-based police force to an
inspection-based workforce. In addition to this baffling
decision, ICE and FPS decided to add contracting duties to the
already overstretched inspector position.
As I reviewed the final report, I was struck by the
similarities between the demise of the Federal Emergency
Management Administration, or FEMA, and the ongoing destruction
of this once highly regarded police force. Upon transfer, each
of these entities suffered from a blurring of their mission's
oversight by DHS entities with almost no programmatic or
organizational similarities, leadership by management without
the necessary expertise, and, in the case of the FPS, paperwork
used in place of police work. The irony is too striking to be
missed: both FEMA and FPS were moved to DHS to enhance their
mission capacity for protection, only to suffer devastating
decline inside a Homeland Security agency.
The Subcommittee has witnessed the slow disintegration of a
workforce that once had a reputation as a highly effective and
motivated police force, providing an invaluable and necessary
service to both Federal employees and taxpayers. According to
the report, however, the FPS workforce has been reduced by
approximately 20 percent during a time when the number of
Federal buildings has increased from 8,800 to 9,000. Yet, the
GAO reports, while the Service was hemorrhaging officers, ICE
and FPS was actually hastening the reduction by offering
``early retirement, detailed assignments to other ICE and DHS
components, and not filling vacant positions.''
The Subcommittee commissioned this report to guide future
action. Our major concern now must be moving to shore up the
protection for hundreds of thousands of Federal employees and
property. DHS and ICE appear to believe that, without statutory
authorization, they can unilaterally change the core mission of
the FPS so that it no longer is a police force by any accepted
definition of the term. However, no one has told Federal
employees and visitors not to expect routine patrols and
protection from the FPS. If the FPS is no longer a primarily
protective police force, someone should inform Federal agency
heads and Federal employees, and certainly visitors throughout
the United States who make 10 million law enforcement calls
each year to the FPS, particularly considering that the 15,000
security guards on duty must remain stationary and do not
patrol, while the FPS, too, no longer patrols, for the most
part. FPS must tell us how it will be possible to continue, for
example, to make 4,000 arrests annually on charges of
committing crimes on Federal property.
These are not rhetorical questions or matters. We have been
prepared to work with FPS on corrective action since our
hearings first identified serious problems several years ago.
We have shown every desire to be partners, not adversaries. But
despite our hearings and the oversight of the Homeland Security
Committee, on which I also sit, Congress has been ignored, even
defied.
This Subcommittee, and now our Full Committee, are on
notice. We ignore this report at our peril and may put hundreds
of thousands of Federal employees at risk if we do. The report
mandates immediate action and response unless FPS can show us
otherwise. We will listen carefully to the agency's response.
We welcome all the witnesses. Each of you is essential to this
hearing. This is a very important, one of the most important
hearings of this entire year for this Subcommittee. We
appreciate the time each of you has taken and the effort you
have made in preparing testimony and coming this afternoon.
I am pleased now to ask the Ranking Member, Mr. Graves, if
he has any opening remarks.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this hearing
today.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here to
discuss this very important issue on the Federal Protection
Service.
I also particularly want to thank David Wright, from my
home State of Missouri, for being here. I appreciate your
efforts to improve the FPS and everything you have done to try
to make things better.
We know Federal buildings are proven targets for terrorism.
The devastating bombings in Oklahoma City and the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 show that Federal buildings are prime targets.
Despite the clear danger to Federal facilities, the GAO
concluded security at Federal buildings has decreased and the
risk of crime and terrorist attacks at Federal buildings has
increased in recent years. There are many factors that have
contributed to the increased risk: building security
assessments are unreliable, patrolling is down, security
equipment is broken, there are no reliable systems to assess
risk or performance. Meanwhile, the over one million people
that work and visit Federal buildings each year are poorly
protected.
The number of security countermeasures that are not working
is unacceptable, everything from security cameras, x-ray
machines, FPS radios reportedly broken and, in some cases, have
been for months and even years. For example, in one of the most
sensitive buildings in the Country, only 11 of 150 security
cameras are operating.
On top of this, FPS has eliminated patrolling of many
facilities. FPS's own policy handbook identifies patrolling as
necessary to prevent and deter crime and terrorist attacks.
Despite this, FPS has reduced patrols and the contract officers
are restricted to their fixed posts and can't make arrests.
There are real dangers to the lack of patrols. In one
region, there were 72 homicides within three blocks of a major
Federal office building. At other locations, FPS personnel
complained that some Federal day care centers are left
vulnerable to loitering and drug users.
DHS proposes relying more on local law enforcement to fill
gaps and policing Federal facilities; however, DHS is unclear
of what authority local police may have in responding to
incidents at Federal facilities, and there is no formal
agreement with them. For example, in 2006, the Kansas City
Police Department chased two armed robbery suspects into a
vacant Federal office complex in my home State. Given the size
and complexity of the facility, local police called FPS for
help. The FPS officers who responded were directed by their
superiors to unlock the gates and stand down. Local police were
left with no backup to apprehend armed robbers in an unfamiliar
Federal complex.
If FPS won't back up local police at Federal facilities,
why should we expect local law enforcement to help police
Federal buildings?
Another glaring problem is the unreliability of building
security assessments. According to GAO and an outside news
investigation, the FPS conducted building security assessments
without ever inspecting the buildings, recycled old security
assessments, and copied assessments from one building report to
another. In fact, GSA and other Federal agencies have begun to
hire outside security firms or other Federal agencies, like the
Army Corps of Engineers, to do their own assessments. In the
end, agencies wind up paying twice for the same service, a
prime example of Government waste.
In addition, while FPS was struggling to perform its basic
mission of protecting Federal buildings, FPS reassigned dozens
of key personnel to other functions within DHS. A news
investigation also revealed FPS was spending time and resources
on security assessments of several high-ranking Government
officials' private homes.
I am very concerned about the safety and security of the
people who work and visit our Federal buildings. Yet, given the
mission, the poor management, the lack of real data to measure
performance or to assess risk, I am concerned that throwing
more money and personnel at FPS is not going to solve the
agency's problems.
Again, Madam Chair, I would like to thank you for holding
this hearing.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony. Thank you all
for being here. I am hopeful that this hearing is going to help
focus some of what we need to do, I guess it is, to try and
improve FPS and also trying to improve on its primary mission
of protecting the people who visit the Federal buildings across
this Country, and I want to thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Graves.
Mr. Shuster, we are glad to have you, if you have any
remarks.
Mr. Shuster. No, thank you.
Ms. Norton. All right.
We would like to ask Mr. Goldstein, who did the report from
the GAO, if he might begin now.
TESTIMONY OF MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Madam Chair and Members of the
Subcommittee. We are pleased to be here today to discuss the
efforts of the Federal Protective Service in protecting Federal
employees, the public, and GSA facilities.
As you know, in 2003, FPS transferred from the General
Services Administration to the Department of Homeland Security
and is responsible for providing physical security and law
enforcement services to about 9,000 GSA facilities. Within DHS,
FPS is part of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
component, the largest investigative arm of DHS.
This testimony provides information and analysis on FPS's
operational challenges and actions it has taken to address
them, funding challenges FPS faces and actions it has taken to
address them, and how FPS measures the effectiveness of its
efforts to protect GSA facilities. This testimony is based on a
report we have issued today called Homeland Security: Federal
Protective Services Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its
Ability to Protect Federal Facilities.
My full testimony is summarized by the following:
Number one, FPS continues to face several operational
challenges that have hampered its ability to accomplish its
mission to protect GSA facilities, and the actions it has taken
may not fully resolve these challenges. Since the transfer,
while FPS has maintained 15,000 contract guards, its staff has
decreased by about 20 percent, from almost 1,400 employees at
the end of fiscal year 2004 to about 1,100 employees at the end
of fiscal year 2007.
This decrease in staff has contributed to diminished
security and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks
at many GSA facilities. For example, FPS has decreased or
eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in
each of its 11 regions. In addition, FPS officials at several
regions we visited said that its proactive patrol has, in the
past, allowed its officers and inspectors to identify and
apprehend individuals that were surveilling GSA facilities. In
contrast, when FPS is not able to patrol Federal buildings,
there is increased potential for illegal entry and other
criminal activity at Federal buildings.
Moreover, FPS has not resolved longstanding challenges such
as improving the oversight of its contract guard program. In
addition, FPS faces difficulties in ensuring the quality and
timeliness of its building security assessments, which are a
core component of FPS's physical security mission. For example,
one regional supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for
an address he personally visited, he realized that the
inspector completing the BSA had falsified the information
because the inspector referred to a large building, when the
actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA.
FPS has also experienced problems ensuring that security
countermeasures such as security cameras and magnetometers are
operational. To address some of these operational challenges,
FPS is currently changing to an inspector-based workforce which
seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely
primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and
physical security activities. FPS believes that this change
will ensure that its staff has the right mix of technical
skills and training needed to accomplish its mission.
FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors and
developing a new system for BSAs. However, these actions may
not fully address or resolve the operational challenges that
the agency faces, in part because the approach does not
emphasize law enforcement responsibilities.
Second, until recently, the security fees FPS charged to
tenant agencies have not been sufficient to cover costs and the
actions it has taken to address the shortfalls have had adverse
implications. Since transferring to DHS, DHS and FPS have
addressed these projected shortfalls in a variety of ways. For
example, DHS transferred emergency supplemental funding to FPS
and FPS has restricted hiring and travel, limited training and
overtime, and suspended employee performance awards.
According to FPS officials, these measures have had a
negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible
for FPS's overall attrition rate increasing from about 2
percent in fiscal year 2004 to about 14 percent in fiscal year
2007. FPS also increased the basic security fee charged to
tenant agencies from 35 cents per square foot in fiscal year
2005 to 62 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2008. Because
of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year that FPS
collections were sufficient to cover its costs. FPS also
projects that collections will cover their costs in fiscal year
2008.
However, its primary means of funding its operations is the
basic security fee, which is the same for Federal agencies
regardless of the perceived threat to any particular building
or agency. Therefore, the fee does not account for the risk
faced by particular buildings, and, depending on that risk, it
does not account for the level of service provided to tenant
agencies or the cost of providing those services. For example,
level I facilities may face less risk because they are
typically small storefront operations with a low level of
public contact.
However, these facilities are charged the same basic
security fee of 62 cents per square foot as a level IV facility
that has a high volume of public contact, may contain high-risk
law enforcement intelligence agencies and highly sensitive
government records. The report recommends incorporating a
security fee that takes into account the complexity or level of
effort of the service being performed for the higher level
security facilities.
Finally, FPS is limited in its ability to assess the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. To
determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect
GSA facilities, FPS has identified some output measures such as
determining whether security countermeasures, such as bollards
and cameras, have been deployed and are fully operational, the
amount of time it takes to respond to an incident, and the
percentage of BSAs it has completed. Output measures assess
activities, not the results of those activities.
However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to evaluate
the results and the net effect of its efforts to protect GSA
facilities. Outcome measures are important because they can
provide FPS with broader information and program results, such
as the extent to which its decisions to move to an inspector-
based workforce will enhance the security at GSA facilities.
In addition, FPS does not have a reliable data management
system that would allow to accurately track these measures or
important measures such as the number of crimes and other
incidents occurring at GSA facilities. Without such a system,
it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect Federal employees and
facilities, to allocate its limited resources, or to make
informed risk management decisions. According to FPS officials,
the agency is in the process of developing such a system and in
the future that will allow it to improve its data collection
and analysis of its performance.
In our report that we issued to this Subcommittee and other
Congressional Committees, we recommended, among other things,
that the Secretary of DHS direct the Director of FPS to develop
and implement a strategic approach to better manage its
staffing resources, to evaluate current and alternative funding
mechanisms, and to develop appropriate measures to assess
performance. DHS has agreed with these recommendations.
This concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer any
questions that you may have. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Goldstein. We have
tried to be a problem solver throughout this process. When we
saw ICE having a problem with contract guards. We didn't just
have a hearing in which we exposed, for example, the fact that
one of the contractors turned out to be a felon, we put in a
bill, but we worked with ICE and we had a very good
relationship with ICE in that working relationship, and we were
very pleased that, working with them over a period of just a
few weeks, ICE revised entirely its contracting, back pay--I
shouldn't say back pay because people were getting back pay,
but contractors weren't always getting their amounts.
So we have seen what can be done if the agency works with
the Subcommittee and we are going to try to approach this quite
devastating report in that spirit and try to get at what is the
source of the problem.
There seems to be a management and resource problem, Mr.
Goldstein. Listening to your testimony, I listened attentively
to the fee structure and the placement of this force, this
police force inside a DHS entity, in this case ICE, as perhaps
a fatal placement here. It appears that what was truly a cosmic
change for FPS is that they have had to get appropriated funds
for the basic fee portion of the FPS budget that came out of
the Building Fund, I believe, when FPS was a part of GSA.
Do you believe, looking at the various component parts of
this problem, that placing FPS in a more appropriate place in
DHS would help solve the problems of mission and funding? Is
FPS in the right place? Why in the world is it in ICE; what was
the thinking? And is it possible for FPS to support itself with
this kind of a fee structure?
Mr. Goldstein. I will answer in several ways, Madam Chair.
I think, first of all, when we did our interviews in seven of
the regions of FPS and we talked to about 167 different
individuals that were inspectors or officers or regional
administrators out in the field, virtually every single
individual that we asked the question that you just asked,
which is where FPS should be placed, is FPS placed in the right
location within DHS, almost every single individual said, no,
they did not believe it should be part of ICE. They gave a
variety of different responses of whether it ought to be more
broadly in the physical security section or somewhere else
within DHS.
One of the things that we are doing for this Committee now,
in the second part of our work on FPS, is we are going to look
systematically at exactly why it was placed there and whether
it should be placed there. But as I say, almost no one believed
that its placement in ICE was effective, based on the
interviews that we did.
Ms. Norton. If you think mechanically about where to place
something, whether it is Border Patrol there, so here are some
cops, throw them in with the other cops. But here you had a
very different kind of police force, different kind of fee
structure, not dependent upon appropriated funds, and they got
stuck and didn't seem to know what to do.
Mr. Goldstein. Also, ma'am, a number of not only the things
that they do, but the way they are treated in terms of training
and recruitment and all those kinds of things are very
different from many of the ICE officers, and that too we will
be looking at. There seems to be a bit of a second class
system, if you will, between ICE officers and FPS officers, as
reported to us by various FPS people in the field.
Ms. Norton. Can they go from one to the other?
Mr. Goldstein. They can necessarily go from one to the
other, and many, many people we talked to, both police officers
and inspectors, one of their principle concerns that we will be
looking into further is that they felt that they were not being
treated commensurate with other ICE officers.
Ms. Norton. In terms of pay or benefits or----
Mr. Goldstein. In terms of pay, in terms of training and
opportunity and those kinds of things, that is correct. That
they are under a different system and that was partly why their
morale is bad and partly why they weren't fully integrated into
ICE. As I say, we will be looking into that in the near future
for this Committee.
Ms. Norton. Well, it is truly lethal to put police forces
together and then have invidious distinctions among them. I
wonder, have there been problems with people wanting to get out
of FPS and join the border police or other parts of the Federal
police?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am. Because of the way that FPS has
been operating in the last couple of years, with its reduced
staff and budget and morale being as bad as it has been, a
number of officers have thought that they might go elsewhere
within DHS, and we have many instances of individuals being
told that they would not be able to transfer their law
enforcement responsibilities to another part of DHS.
Ms. Norton. Would the infrastructure and protection section
of DHS or, for that matter, perhaps operating independently, as
it did virtually at GSA--I mean, it was part of GSA, but there
never were these kinds of--of course, it was part of this
Committee--we never had any of these problems within GSA. Would
it be better in infrastructure and protection or would it be
better as a standalone entity in DHS, for example?
Mr. Goldstein. Many of the officers raised both of those
issues, that it might be best in IP or it might be better as a
standalone entity, and that is part of what we will look at to
try and ascertain what was the reasoning behind why it is in
ICE and what would be the best location for it. Some have
obviously also indicated that it might be better at GSA.
Ms. Norton. You spoke about retention pay and its effect on
keeping officers on, officers' morale. What is retention pay
and would you explain how that works here?
Mr. Goldstein. I was referring generally to pay levels and
other kinds of human capital effects that they receive in terms
of pensions and other things, and they are very different, I am
told, between what FPS gets and what ICE and other law
enforcement agencies get, and they are treated differently; and
this is partly what we will be looking at in the second phase,
here, of this work.
Ms. Norton. Congress is trying to deal with these problems
within a police force that we now know ought to be one,
certainly, it is my view. Out of the 19th century you have, for
example--I don't suggest this to be the case for Border Patrol
and FPS, but a lot of our thinking really has not jumped to the
21st century, with just the Library of Congress police and the
Supreme Court police and the Capitol police. You know, if there
was a threat on the Capitol Complex, having those divisions is
a threat to the people in the Capitol Complex. So now I guess
we are close to getting the Congressional police and the
Capitol police together, and we recognize that it raises all
kinds of issues. So your further investigation here is very
welcome.
You mentioned, as a basic weakness, that the fee charge is
regardless of risk.
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct.
Mr. Norton. Is this how the fee structure was set up prior
to Oklahoma City? How is risk determined? How is the fee charge
done? Everybody in the whole, every kind of facility pays the
same fee?
Mr. Goldstein. They do, they pay the same basic security
fee. They can pay additional fees in terms of building specific
fees or for security work authorizations that will provide
added features to the security of a building based on the
recommendations of a building security committee, but everyone
pays the same basic security fee regardless of whether they are
a level I building or a level IV building, and that does not
take into account----
Ms. Norton. The same fee for a level IV building as for a
level I building?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am, whether you are a storefront
or----
Ms. Norton. Even though you may need more officers and
security guards for a level IV building? Or does the fee take
account of that?
Mr. Goldstein. That fee does not take account for it, it is
a basic charge.
Ms. Norton. Regardless of the size of building?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. Who invented that?
Mr. Goldstein. Sixty-two cents per square foot whether you
are in a level I building or a level IV building.
Ms. Norton. Is that how it has always been? Of course, that
says a lot about pre-and post-9/11 right there.
Mr. Goldstein. One of the recommendations we made relates
to cost accounting, where we are recommending that FPS try to
get a better handle on what it costs to provide its security to
buildings across the spectrum so that it could create a
defensible system of security fees based on risk and the level
of buildings, as opposed to a blanket fee that has no equity in
it.
Ms. Norton. For example, does it make any sense that all
courthouses are deemed level IV, even if they are in a Federal
building in a county that is isolated somewhere or if it is New
York?
Mr. Goldstein. They are paying the same.
Ms. Norton. Does that make any sense, I am saying?
Mr. Goldstein. No, ma'am, we don't believe it does, which
gets to our recommendation.
Ms. Norton. I have a number of other questions. I am going
to go to the Ranking Member.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Goldstein, given all the problems you found in your
investigation with the Federal buildings and FPS, do you think
that the occupants in them and the visitors to them are safe?
Mr. Goldstein. That is a hard question to answer, sir. In
our conversations with 167 officers out in the field, we have
found them increasingly concerned over time that they don't
believe that they can provide the same level of security as
they have been able to in the past.
And as my testimony indicated, with problems with
countermeasures, with problems of not being able to provide
proactive patrols in most areas, and with problems with not
being able to rely on local jurisdictions to fill the gap if
FPS officers aren't available or if contract guards can't do
anything other than keep to their posts, that is very much
cause for concern in a period of post-9/11 activity. So we
would have to say yes, we are concerned that security of
Federal property and the people within them has deteriorated
and is not what it once was or could be.
Mr. Graves. Given what you just said about lack of patrols
and obviously you testified about the staffing issues--and I
think everybody today is probably going to talk about staffing
issues and the problems there--do you think it is a wise
decision for Homeland Security to move or to see FPS personnel
doing other assignments within DHS or tasking FPS personnel and
resources to do private homes? Do you think that makes sense,
given the fact that we have a staffing issue and moving these
resources and these personnel to other areas and doing other
things like private homes, doesn't that contribute, then, to
the problem of being able to provide adequate security?
Mr. Goldstein. Sure. Any time that the officers and
inspectors and the officials are taken off of their principal
duties and are asked to do something different, that is
creating a further burden and drain on the resources for those
remaining. We indicate several places in our report that when
special events occur or when there are high level trials at
Federal courthouses--for instance, we have one instance in the
report where there was a high level, very high visibility trial
a couple years ago, and 75 percent of that region's FPS
resources were sent to provide perimeter security to that
courthouse, leaving very few officers remaining to protect the
rest of the region. So these kinds of activities do very much
highlight the burdens being placed on the agency overall and
their ability to protect Federal property.
Ms. Norton. As far as the Federal Government is concerned,
there are no distinctions among regions as far as the mission
to protect according to risk, but clearly in this National
Capital Region we are obligated to have special concern. I wish
you would tell us your view of whether the National Capital
Region is sufficiently covered by routine patrols in the kinds
of facilities we have in this region in particular, almost all
of whom would be, of course, level IV facilities.
Mr. Goldstein. I can tell you, ma'am, that every single
region of FPS, including the National Capital Region, has far
fewer officers than they did even a couple of years ago, and
their ability to protect and to patrol and to react----
Ms. Norton. Are patrols done in buildings within--let us
take this region since you have the predominant Federal
presence here. We will take this to be an indicator of what
might be happening in other regions. Are there regular patrols?
Are FPS officers in this region, bearing in mind that the far
larger number of security guards cannot, as far as I
understand, patrol?
Mr. Goldstein. There are some patrols in this region. There
are not nearly as many as there used to be. And there are also
many facilities in the National Capital Region, like elsewhere,
that do not receive any proactive patrol at all, and many
Federal facilities that have no nighttime or weekend coverage
by FPS at all, just like throughout the rest of the Country.
The National Capital Region has suffered in the same way that
the other regions have.
Ms. Norton. So even in this region there are level IV
buildings without nighttime or weekend FPS coverage.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Now, what that means is that the only coverage,
if any, would be from stationary security guards?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct, or if there happens to be a
local metropolitan police officer nearby who may see something.
Ms. Norton. Trust me on that one. So that the theory is
that you can't get into the building passed the security
guards, so there couldn't be a crime within the building?
Mr. Goldstein. That would be part of the rationale. But one
of the biggest concerns remaining, of course, is that you would
be undetected if you were surveilling those level IV buildings
for terrorist purposes, and much of that work is done in
evenings or on the weekends, when potential terrorists will
know that there isn't really coverage and that nobody is
watching them.
Ms. Norton. Now, staff does have admission to do work in
level IV buildings here and throughout the Country, is that so?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct. And there are, in some
facilities, in one region we visited, there are a number of
facilities that I can think of where there are weekend hours
for the public. And in discussing the coverage of FPS, GAO
actually ended up being the entity that told an agency that I
have in mind that FPS was not covering their facility on the
weekend, and the agency was very surprised to learn that and
indicated that it might have to shut its doors on the weekend
as a result.
Ms. Norton. And that is even though it was open on the
weekends and visitors, that is to say, taxpayers and others
from the public----
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct. This was a level IV
building as well.
Ms. Norton. Well, you can understand our concern, Mr.
Goldstein. Let me ask you about the contract guard role. Now,
how many FPS personnel--leave aside the inspector and the
smaller number that do any patrols. How many FPS police are
there?
Mr. Goldstein. As of the end of 2007, there were 215 police
officers.
Ms. Norton. And how many security guards?
Mr. Goldstein. There are 15,000. That has remained
relatively stable, while the number of police officers has
dropped about 40 percent since 2004.
Ms. Norton. And there were how many in 2004?
Mr. Goldstein. 359 police officers in 2004.
Ms. Norton. Now, who supervises the contract security
guards?
Mr. Goldstein. It is a combination of the inspectors and
the police officers. The principal responsibility is for the
inspectors, because they have contract authority, but the
police officers help in checking out the stations in the
buildings as they go through. But it is principally the
inspectors. And as our report indicates, there are a number of
difficulties there, and because of the distance between Federal
facilities, as well as the decrease in staffing, many contract
guards have not seen an FPS official at their station in a long
time, and we had officials tell us that they hadn't visited
contract guard stations in some Federal facilities in a year or
18 months.
Ms. Norton. That who hadn't, the FPS had not visited?
Mr. Goldstein. Correct, in a year or 18 months to some
facilities. They are supposed to visit monthly, and it has
gotten to the point where many inspectors have been encouraged
to do their reviews by telephone.
Ms. Norton. And this would mean even during the regular
work week no FPS?
Mr. Goldstein. Right, for many buildings, because there are
a limited number of inspectors. Many buildings are in rural
areas or places that are far from where an FPS inspector lives,
so oftentimes there is no coverage or very limited coverage.
Ms. Norton. Are the contract guards peace officers?
Mr. Goldstein. No, ma'am, they are not.
Ms. Norton. So they do not have the power to arrest.
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. So a contract guard in a building which has not
been visited in a couple of months by a FPS officer or
inspector would have about the same power as I have to make an
arrest.
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. Does he have the power to pursue a criminal?
Mr. Goldstein. He can detain a perpetrator, but, based on
our experience and our discussions--and I believe we indicated
in our testimony--there are a number of instances we have
already--and this is before we have thoroughly investigated the
contract guard program, which we are about to do as well--that
contract guards are being told by their contract guard
companies to not get involved because of the liability.
We have in this report one instance that shows that, in
which an officer was chasing an individual through a Federal
building, a level IV Federal building. That individual had been
in the process of being detained, had a handcuff on one arm, in
the struggle lost most of his shirt; the perpetrator went
flying through the lobby of the building pursued by an FPS
officer. There were several contract guards, all of whom were
armed, in the lobby; they simply stepped aside. The individual
went flying out the front door, and was only caught several
blocks away by another FPS officer who happened to be going by
in a patrol car.
So, no, the contract guards, even when armed and in the
lobby, are not----
Ms. Norton. This is a bizarre kind of story. Why would
there be a liability problem for a security guard that was
maintained by the Federal Government? What is the liability
problem?
Mr. Goldstein. It is something we are going to investigate.
We haven't done the work to really get into that issue yet, but
it was raised in a number of the interviews we had. But we will
get back to the Committee on that issue.
Ms. Norton. This is mysterious to me, very mysterious, that
the Federal Government could have security guards for which it
had not accepted liability. So I am not----
Mr. Goldstein. I understand.
Ms. Norton. Well, the notion that this is a question--legal
matters like this get settled well before you decide to use a
workforce other than your own. This is extremely disturbing, I
say as a lawyer who does not relish litigation.
I am going to ask Mr. Shuster for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Goldstein, for being here today.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shuster. I believe in your report you pointed out that
many--I don't want to quantify this, but a lot of the
inspections were being conducted without inspectors actually
going to the site, doing it, I think it says, by e-mail? Is
that a significant number?
Mr. Goldstein. By telephone.
Mr. Shuster. A significant number?
Mr. Goldstein. There were instances where inspectors were
encouraged by their regional administrators to complete their
inspections of contract guards by telephone, since there was
either no money or time to complete them. One of the big
problems that we faced is--in one region this is a big issue.
They are supposed to, as I say, review contract guard posts
monthly. In one region that we visited, in one metropolitan
city, only 20 of the 68 facilities had been visited that month.
Mr. Shuster. Can you do an adequate job by doing it by
phone?
Mr. Goldstein. I can't imagine how you would be able to do
that, no, sir.
Mr. Shuster. You need to go out there. How long ago was
your report done? When did you find that out?
Mr. Goldstein. This was fairly recent. These were all
issues that were raised in our field work for the report that
we are releasing today.
Mr. Shuster. And was it just significant in that one
region, or was it widespread throughout the Country?
Mr. Goldstein. Well, the issue of reporting by telephone
was raised in more than one location. The one where I am
referring to, 20 out of the 68, just happened to be the log in
one region that we talked to.
Mr. Shuster. What do you think it takes to do an
assessment, hours, man-hours, days?
Mr. Goldstein. Usually, you try to check each month to be
able to determine if people are reporting, if they had their
certifications, if they are in the right places, the kind of
incidents that they have had. Inspectors are also required to
check time sheets for the contract guards as well.
Mr. Shuster. Right. I am talking more about building
security assessments.
Mr. Goldstein. Oh, the building security assessments.
Mr. Shuster. Yes, I am sorry.
Mr. Goldstein. There are a lot of things that go into it.
In fact, inspectors receive training to be able to do building
security assessments. Many of the inspectors and regional
officers indicated to us that the training for building
security assessments is not adequate and that refresher courses
are needed. FPS has begun to provide them, but many of the
field offices have not had a refresher course yet. And many of
the inspectors that we talked to said that they really don't
have a good grasp of the kinds of things that are supposed to
go into that security assessment.
Mr. Shuster. Let's back up a second. The building security
assessments, were they being done without actually going to the
building also?
Mr. Goldstein. There were some instances of that occurring.
There were some instances where building security assessments
were being simply cut and pasted from previous years, where
nothing had changed, and there had been some examples where
people weren't even doing that, where they were simply making
it up.
Mr. Shuster. And, in your view, you really can't do a
complete and adequate assessment unless you go to the building.
Mr. Goldstein. Even more than that, sir. There are time
frames that are actually recommended for them. A level IV
building assessment is supposed to take a couple weeks to
accomplish. Because of the problems that they have had in
maintaining a workforce that had the skills to do this and the
number of building assessments they have had to do, in many
instances they don't get more than a day or two, or sometimes a
couple of hours, in which they are supposed to do this.
Mr. Shuster. When you say weeks, is that one person?
Mr. Goldstein. One person.
Mr. Shuster. One person.
Mr. Goldstein. And a number of the tools that they need,
lighting assessment tools and the like, they don't have those
actual tools to complete those parts of the assessment because
they don't have the funds to pay for them.
Mr. Shuster. I note that some of the Federal agencies have
resorted to hiring private firms to do the BSA.
Mr. Goldstein. And other Government agencies as well, such
as the Corps of Engineers.
Mr. Shuster. And how does that work? What is your view on
that as far as can it be done effectively? Is it done
effectively?
Mr. Goldstein. Well, it can be done effectively. The
problem is they are already still paying for that. They are
paying twice.
Mr. Shuster. So they are paying the Federal Government
Service----
Mr. Goldstein. That is right, because they are already
paying FPS to do them.
Mr. Shuster. And I understand there are some reports that
these building security assessments, there is some pressure in
a particular region to speed them up because there is----
Mr. Goldstein. There is a major political event coming
later this year, so there is considerable pressure to have all
the building security assessments done by the end of this
month, I believe.
Mr. Shuster. And the impact on the quality of the
assessment is?
Mr. Goldstein. We haven't looked at that, but one would
assume that could be an issue.
Mr. Shuster. All right, I have no further questions. Thank
you.
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Goldstein, I would like the objective view,
your objective view of the effect that all of this has had on
the morale of, let us say, the average FPS officer.
Mr. Goldstein. Sure. I mean, morale is not good. I mean, it
is very simple: they don't have the equipment; officers don't
have career paths; and they, in many instances, have been told
to leave because of the decimation of the patrol function.
Ms. Norton. Now, they don't have career paths because?
Mr. Goldstein. Because they can't advance to the inspector
ranks.
Ms. Norton. And the reason they can't?
Mr. Goldstein. They don't have the training and the skills
base to do that, and FPS has not had the money to provide
training for that.
Ms. Norton. This is a police force in stalemate; it is just
there. It sounds like it is there in name only.
Mr. Goldstein. It is increasingly fragile, I think that is
correct. Inspectors are overworked and they are overwhelmed.
These are all people who want to do a good job, but they are
being hamstrung in many ways by the problems.
Ms. Norton. Every police force has people who get to the
retirement age. Are they recruiting officers, younger officers
to come in?
Mr. Goldstein. They have had a number of problems doing
that because, at least in the current environment, most people
know that FPS is not a place, at least if you want to be a
police officer, where you are going to be able to have a
career, because they are phasing out that function. If you want
to be an inspector and handle some of the other, sort of the
broad panoply of issues that we talked about, an inspector has
so many responsibilities and many of them are very overwhelmed
by this, and I think only the addition of additional inspectors
will help to start to alleviate that problem will you see a
change. People are, I think, understandably wary at this point
in time of joining the Federal Protective Service.
Ms. Norton. Well, if you were recruited for the Federal
Protective Service today, would you be recruited as a police
officer or as one of these inspectors?
Mr. Goldstein. My understanding is that they are not hiring
police officers, only inspectors, and that they are attaining
and seeing the police officer function phase out.
Ms. Norton. So you are saying to us that their goal is to
have no police officers and only inspectors?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct. We were told that both in
the field and at headquarters that that is the goal.
Ms. Norton. Who then would patrol?
Mr. Goldstein. There would really not be patrols. The law
enforcement function would be one part of the inspectors'
responsibility. But as we have indicated, the inspectors have
oversight of contract guards, building security assessments,
they are the contracting officer technical representatives,
they have law enforcement response, criminal investigations,
collecting contract guard time cards, and they are also
responsible for the building security committee support.
Ms. Norton. So it doesn't mention patrolling in there?
Mr. Goldstein. No, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. In that list?
Mr. Goldstein. No. There is law enforcement response, but,
again, that is only one of the many functions they have.
Ms. Norton. Well, response is, as I take it, once
somebody----
Mr. Goldstein. It is a response, it is not proactive, that
is correct.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Well, to say this is serious is to make a
vast understatement.
I am going to ask the Full Committee Chairman, Mr.
Oberstar, who has had a continuing serious interest in this
issue, whether he has any questions or any statement. I
appreciate his coming today.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for being
very vigilant and diligent in following up on this issue. And I
thank the gentleman from Missouri, the Ranking Member, for
pursuing the matter further following our hearing last year.
It was shocking when we received information about the
shortcomings that we heard, flaws and outright failures in the
protection of the Federal workforce in the Federal office
buildings across the Country. There are over 9,000 buildings
that GSA either owns or leases. That is some 367 million square
feet of Federal civilian office space. There is nearly $42
billion asset value in those properties. They are scattered in
every State all across the Nation.
And we have a Federal workforce of various sizes in various
communities, and the shocking thing that we heard last year was
that a sizeable portion of the Federal Protective Service had
been contracted out to private security guards that over the
past three years the workforce of police force has been cut 40
percent. Inspectors were cut 10 percent, at a time when we are
mounting a massive national Homeland Security initiative.
It seemed to me inconsistent with the mission of the
Homeland Security Department to have one of the components of
that agency cut its workforce, cut the number of inspectors and
contract work out at the very time when we did the opposite
with aviation. For years we had the security workforce at
airports contracted for by the airlines to the lowest bidder,
with reports of certain airport facilities, turnover as much as
four-fold or six-fold. They couldn't keep trained personnel on
station; they didn't have money to do and didn't do training or
retraining. The way up for security personnel at domestic
airports was a job at McDonald's in the airport terminal.
I served on the PanAm 103 Commission in the aftermath of
that tragedy, and we proposed a federalized workforce
comparable to that which existed in Germany in the course of
our inquiry overseas, but the then Bush I administration would
not hear of it. We backed off and included other measures that
we thought were of great significance, and when they didn't act
just introduced a bill incorporating in legislative language
the 63 recommendations of our commission, and eventually we got
those enacted.
Then came September 11th. Now we have the federalized
workforce, and it is in place and it is professional. You can
go to every airport around the Country and get the same
treatment. And I have been in about half the States, at any
rate, at least, all of the major airports, and now with my new
replacement metal hip I set off the alarms and I get the same
treatment at every airport, the same pat-down, the same
procedure, and that is wonderful.
But now that is what we need in the Federal office
buildings. I thought that after the alarming reports that we
heard last year, things would get better. But, in fact, more
private contract guards have been hired, according to your
report, to replace the Federal Protective Service workforce;
that armed guards and that contract authority guards took no
action while a suspect with no shirt and handcuffs ran through
the lobby of a Federal building; a GAO investigator witnessed a
person trying to enter a high security facility with illegal
weapons; contract guards allowed him to leave with the guns.
What is this? What kind of system is this?
I heard you say a moment ago that morale is deteriorating.
Have you found that throughout the system in various Federal
office buildings, that the existing Federal workforce morale
has deteriorated?
Mr. Goldstein. We found in our interviews throughout the
regions that we went to that morale was a significant problem
because of what FPS is facing and the challenges that they have
to overcome. Yes, sir, in all the regions that we visited that
was the case.
Mr. Oberstar. That is the same in the air traffic control
workforce. They have not had increase in personnel; they are
working longer hours; more hours at controls without respite;
instead of a break after two hours; they are working three
hours continuously at shift; not getting respite time, leave
time, retraining time; and morale is deteriorating. Plus, their
pay has been frozen at September 2006 levels. So if we are
again repeating that situation in the protective workforce----
Mr. Goldstein. It sounds very similar, sir, yes.
Mr. Oberstar. Who conducts the building security
assessment?
Mr. Goldstein. The inspectors do, sir. There are 541
inspectors within the Federal Protective Service, and among
their responsibilities that I mentioned a few minutes ago are
the building security assessments.
Mr. Oberstar. And do the members of the contract workforce
participate in those assessments?
Mr. Goldstein. No. Their job is solely to remain in fixed
posts and to secure the entrances and exits of the building.
Mr. Oberstar. Then when the assessment is completed, who
acts on the recommendations of the assessment?
Mr. Goldstein. The assessments are provided to a building
security committee. Every Federal building has a security
committee that is made up of a representative of each tenant
agency, and they get together on a regular basis and they
evaluate the security assessments and the kind of measures that
FPS is suggesting be put in place. In very few instances,
however, are the measures that FPS is recommending actually
implemented, for several reasons, one of which is that the
individuals who sit on a building security committee are lay
people, they do not have security expertise to determine what
should or should not be incorporated into a building security.
Second of all, they don't have the authority to provide the
funds to FPS to implement the measures; they have to go back to
their headquarters and get permission to do so, and very rarely
does that occur. Then, thirdly, when the measure is something
the Federal Protective Service itself would implement, regional
officials have told the inspectors not to include those
particular items as part of the recommendations because the
regional offices of FPS don't have the money to actually put
those things in place either.
So it has gotten kind of to be a crazy situation. They are
spending a lot of time and effort and money in completing
building security assessments that in many instances don't go
anywhere and nothing comes of them.
Mr. Oberstar. You anticipated my next two questions in your
answer, thank you. Thank you, but that is shocking. That is
astonishing to me that there is an assessment conducted and the
personnel responsible for implementing tell the FPS don't do
this, tell the building personnel don't do it because we don't
have the money to implement it?
Mr. Goldstein. Because we don't have the money or our
headquarters agency doesn't believe that it is something we
ought to do or be involved in. So it is security by committee
of lay people of, say, the Social Security Administration or
HHS, or whomever happens to be a building tenant. They are the
ones who make these decisions and, as I say, rarely do the
actual countermeasures, such as an additional magnetometer or
night patrol or something that would help improve security,
actually get implemented because of the cost or even
understanding what the threat might be.
Mr. Oberstar. Isn't that creating holes in our security
protection for Federal office buildings?
Mr. Goldstein. Sure it is. Because if the premise is that
the agency is trying to improve the security of Federal
buildings and you do a security assessment and you make
recommendations on how individual buildings might be better
secured, and then nobody takes any action for all the reasons I
have mentioned, then not only is the building not secure, but
you have also wasted public funds to try to achieve that
objective.
Mr. Oberstar. Did you find a differentiation among types of
Federal buildings, that is, courthouses in one category, Social
Security in others, veterans in others?
Mr. Goldstein. In terms of?
Mr. Oberstar. In terms of the security risk.
Mr. Goldstein. Well, there are four levels. There are
actually five building security level risks that were put in
place after the Oklahoma City bombing, the lowest being a level
I, which is usually a storefront, sort of where you might go in
for IRS or Social Security, and a level V, which is something
like the CIA Headquarters, which is not protected by FPS, they
only protect up to a level IV. But as we indicated earlier, the
basic security fees are paid by tenants regardless of the level
of security that a building has.
Mr. Oberstar. Following last year's hearing and our request
for GAO review, I stopped in to various Social Security offices
in my district and there is, in each one, a security officer,
usually a retired police officer from the community who has
been engaged by Federal Protective Service or, I think in one
case, by Social Security Administration--at least that is what
I think it is. But every day or at least in the larger
facilities almost every day there is some disgruntled person--
not a terrorist with a bomb strapped to the body to blow the
place up, but a disgruntled person who can make a scene and who
is, therefore, intimidating to citizens who are coming to the
facility for resolution of their various problems and to the
Social Security Administration personnel. In others it is at
least once a week there is some disgruntled person.
And I asked them, supposing somebody really intended to do
harm, come with a bomb strapped to their leg or their body. Oh,
we don't have a magnetometer here, we don't have an x-ray
machine. The larger facilities, where there is a courthouse
associated with the Federal building, they do have the x-ray
machines and magnetometers.
We have these various levels of risk. Just my own random
observation, backed by some years of experience in the
investigative business, found these gaps in security. How do
you rate the five levels of security standing for the Federal
buildings under FPS jurisdiction? Did you find fewer problems
at the lower security level Is and more at the level Vs, or
what did you find?
Mr. Goldstein. We had a similar experience as you did, Mr.
Oberstar, in terms of, with level I facilities such as Social
Security or IRS, there they just have a storefront, that they
are as vulnerable, if not more so, than the larger buildings
because, as you say, they rarely have a magnetometer, they
might have an off-duty police officer or a contract guard that
they have hired, but they do have significant incidents and
threats of incidents all the time.
And many Social Security offices that we talked to as part
of who are on building security committees and the like express
the same thing that you are saying as well. So they have
significant threats that they have to encounter without the
kind of resources that some of the larger buildings that do
have, say, magnetometers or additional guards or even perhaps
an FPS presence would have. Their recourse is to call local law
enforcement, just like any other citizen. That is what they
have.
Mr. Oberstar. And in some cases it takes a while for law
enforcement to respond.
Mr. Goldstein. Sure. And an FPS officer is likely to take a
much longer time. One of the things we did find, and our report
highlights, is in many instances it will take hours, sometimes
days, for FPS actually to respond to an incident because there
isn't a local FPS presence and they have to come from out of
State, or certainly out of a city. So the only response of any
consequence would be a local response.
Mr. Oberstar. Good heavens. That is outrageous. Now, when
there is an incident and the Federal Protective Service
contract guard comes on the scene, they don't have law
enforcement authority; they don't have ability to arrest. What
is the effect of their presence?
Mr. Goldstein. The contract guards at Federal buildings are
used to allow people in and out of buildings. They guard access
to the building, principally, and they watch people as they go
through x-ray machines and they monitor the magnetometers,
where they exist, as well.
But as we indicated in our report, there are a number of
issues associated with the contract guard program, and it is
something that we are starting to now look at. Now that we have
finished this report for the Committee, we are starting to look
at the contract guard program, and we will provide more
information at a later date.
But we did find a number of instances, just based on our
preliminary observations, of how the FPS monitors and oversees
the contract guards and the roles and responsibilities of the
contract guards themselves. So, yes, this is something that we
will take a further look at.
Mr. Oberstar. [Presiding] I ask Mr. Graves if he has any
further questions at this point. If not, then the Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goldstein, you mentioned that several Government
entities really find great importance in proactive foot
patrols. Which of these entities, could you specifically tell
us that?
Mr. Goldstein. Sure. We found the Department of Homeland
Security itself, including the Federal Protective Service,
which has specific policy handbook for patrolling, that they
have found that this is a very effective tool. We have also
found that the FBI has said the same thing.
And we would note that the 9/11 Commission, among other
entities, has also shown that potential terrorists are
frequently to be found, in our discussions with FPS, said the
same thing, that surveilling of Federal property is not
uncommon and that only using proactive patrols--to be outside
the building and not just at access points--is going to be the
principal way you are going to thwart this sort of thing.
And they gave a number of instances where they have in the
past, because they had proactive patrols, been able to thwart
potential terrorists who were surveilling a building,
suspicious people who were sitting in cars outside for several
days in a row in the same car, a variety of those kinds of
activities. And you are not going to get that kind of ability
to thwart those kinds of things if you don't have proactive
patrol and you are only relying on contract guards who are
sitting at an entrance checking IDs or checking people who are
going through x-ray machines.
Mr. Carney. How many agencies actually have the proactive
foot patrols?
Mr. Goldstein. I don't know the answer to that, but we can
try and find out and get back to you, sir.
Mr. Carney. Yes. I would like to know that.
Mr. Goldstein. The point is most of the Federal buildings
are protected by--there are 9,000 Federal buildings, which is
the bulk of the Federal portfolio, and they are protected by
FPS.
Mr. Carney. Okay. You also mentioned that developing the
use of resources based on risk management principles. What are
some of the principles that we ought to be employing here?
Mr. Goldstein. Well, one of the things that concerned us is
that it is difficult for FPS really to tell you where and how
they ought to be deploying their scarce resources based on
risk, because they don't have a full risk assessment model that
would be able to help you determine where crime or potential
terrorism is at its worst and, therefore, haven't deployed
resources to that kind of a model.
They have more people in cities than they do in rural areas
as one sort of broad-based measure, but the other problem
related to this is their data systems are not reliable at this
point in time and they are not able to tell you with any
specificity or reliability how much crime is actually occurring
where. Therefore, they can't tell you the current status of the
threats to Federal property because that information is highly
unreliable.
We tried to, not only based on how they define crime and
how crime is entered into their system, but there are very big
differences and discrepancies between regions and headquarters
in terms of how much crime a certain region is supposed to
have. We also found that because of the staffing shortfalls and
the fact that you have had such a decrease in the number of
police officers and inspectors, the crime simply isn't being
reported to the mega centers. What looks like a decrease in
crime is probably not a decrease in crime because they are
simply not being reported.
Mr. Carney. One more question, Madam Chair, if you don't
mind.
It is disturbing to know that the data problem exists, that
they don't have the data to make these determinations.
Mr. Goldstein. They are working on fixing those systems,
but it is going to take some time.
Mr. Carney. Right. My concern, though, is how is the
intelligence flow to know if there is a threat and how they
handle that?
Mr. Goldstein. We have heard mixed things about that, sir.
When we were in the field, we were told by a number of the
regions that they had very limited access to specific
intelligence information unless they were part of the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. That existed in several cities. But that,
other than that they were not provided access to a lot of
intelligence information. Our discussions at headquarters
seemed to indicate that that wasn't the case. Also, in fact, if
anything, there seems to be a little bit of a disconnect
between headquarters and the field with respect to how much
information they are getting from intelligence sources.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, I think.
Mr. Goldstein. Sorry.
Mr. Carney. No further questions at this time, Madam Chair.
Ms. Norton. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Carney. I am going
to let you go, Mr. Goldstein, but because of districts like Mr.
Carney's and, for that matter, I think perhaps Mr. Graves', I
have got to ask you about these informal relationships and
these MOUs. Now, in big cities like the District and New York,
we found very little in the way of proactive patrols and very
few FPS officers, but we, of course, learned from your report
that these MOUs, for MOUs between local police and FPS, instead
of FPS, were in fact not being used and they were relying on
informal relationships.
I have to ask you, before you go, whether you saw any
evidence of informal relationships between local police and
Federal facilities whereby local police were willing to be on
call, at least, for Federal facilities or in any other way help
to cover Federal facilities, instead of FPS.
Mr. Goldstein. In almost all the jurisdictions that we went
to, we spoke with local law enforcement, and most of them were
not even aware that the Federal Protective Service had
instituted its inspector-based system or that the FPS had
reduced or eliminated its evening and weekend hours. So they
had not been told that the kind of protection that Federal
property needed had changed, and had indicated to us--in fact,
they were being told by us, by GAO, FPS had not indicated, and
they were surprised----
Ms. Norton. Thank you. I just want to make sure for the
record, because we are not only interested in high-target
places like the District. This is a Federal police force for
every part of the United States, and at least 50 cities were to
be left with no FPS officers at all, and now we find that the
MOUs don't exist at all.
Yours has been a very sobering report, Mr. Goldstein. I
assure you that the Subcommittee will not only take it under
advisement, while the Full Committee Chairman was here we
discussed what we can do right now. Thank you very much.
Now I would like to call the next two witnesses.
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. The next witnesses are Gary Schenkel, who is
the Director of the Federal Protective Service, and David
Wright, the President of the FPS Union, which is AFGE Local
918.
I am going to begin with Mr. Schenkel.
TESTIMONY OF GARY SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE; AND DAVID WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE UNION
Mr. Schenkel. Chairwoman Norton, Ranking Member Graves,
distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to address the concerns raised in the report
issued by the Government Accountability Office and to discuss
the business improvements that FPS has made over the past three
years and our vision for the future.
As this Subcommittee is aware, auditors from the Government
Accounting Office recently had the opportunity to sample the
day-to-day work performance by the Federal Protective Service.
We appreciate the thoroughness of this audit and welcome the
recommendations for improving FPS.
Auditor work products are used throughout ICE for the
betterment of the agency, including within FPS. With this in
mind, I believe that it is necessary to address some of the
points raised in the GAO report. Some additional context is
needed.
The transfer of the FPS into the Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, ICE,
provided an opportunity for FPS to comprehensively assess its
mission and to ensure that its activities were focused on
enhancing the security of the Federal facilities it protects.
FPS has embarked on a strategic approach to ensure that its
operations are not only fully aligned with the goals and
objectives of DHS and ICE and its stakeholder, but that they
also move FPS towards greater compliance with the standards for
internal control as established by GAO.
Using this strategic approach and this Subcommittee's
support and guidance, we have significantly enhanced our
business processes, including our contracting functions. For
example, we have improved the procurement process for guard
services that, in the National Capital Region alone, we have
reduced the cost of three new contract security guard contracts
by $5.5 million in fiscal year 2008, savings that were passed
directly to the agency client.
This strategic approach has resulted in a number of
achievements, including, in 2007, FPS eliminated a backlog of
2200 invoices worth $92 million, some of which predated the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, all the way
back to 1999. Chairwoman Norton's attention to this issue was
particularly helpful to us in identifying this area for
improvement. To improve FPS invoice payment process, ICE/FPS
consolidated the entire process by requiring that all invoices
be sent to a single location.
Since the beginning of fiscal year 2008, FPS has paid 95
percent of all invoices within 30 days. In the month of May,
the percentage of payments paid within 30 days rose to 99.5
percent. Part of the success in the timeliness of the invoice
payments is the fact that we added our Contractor Officer
Technical Representation, COTR, training to our basic training
curriculum.
FPS improved working relationships with its internal and
external stakeholders through newsletters and regular
communications. FPS also provided customer service training to
employees and used satisfaction surveys to gage its success at
providing comprehensive security services that are meaningful
for FPS stakeholders. FPS formally chartered an Executive
Advisory Council, or EAC, to coordinate security strategies and
activities, policy and communication with Federal department
and agency occupants of GSA-controlled facilities.
FPS also conducted numbers of focus groups and meetings
with stakeholders to identify and resolve issues and to
identify systematic problems. The focus groups enabled us to
immediately identify a common concern of our clients in that
they want FPS personnel to increase the level of physical
security functions, such as contract guard oversight, quality
building security assessments, or BSAs, and higher visibility
throughout its facilities. We heard them and we agreed that the
physical security needs greater attention, but not at the
exclusion of our law enforcement function.
Among the most important improvements from a strategic
approach is our move to a Law Enforcement Security Officer, or
LESO, inspector-based workforce, which will meet these
customers' concerns while affording the added protection of law
enforcement presence. To put in proper perspective the
importance and advantage of transforming FPS's workforce, FPS
is responsible for protecting approximately 9,000 GSA owned and
leased buildings in 2003.
At that time, only 55 percent of FPS law enforcement staff
was qualified to conduct BSAs, a core FPS activity. As a
result, the assessment function received far less attention
than it required. Law enforcement staff qualified to conduct
BSAs were stretched too thin, producing assessments that were
inaccurate, incomplete, and untimely. Today, as FPS moves
closer to a LESO-based workforce, more than 80 percent of its
law enforcement staff is qualified to perform FPS's core
mission requirements. LESOs still retain law enforcement
authority and are able to conduct BSAs that are more accurate,
complete, and timely.
The advantages of the LESO-based workforce are
strategically aligned with the core mission of FPS: securing
facilities and safeguarding their occupants. The LESO position
incorporates the law enforcement duties of the Federal
facilities FPS protects. In addition, the LESO receives
extensive training in risk management, risk assessment, and
countermeasures to mitigate those risks. A LESO-based workforce
provides built-in flexibility to perform law enforcement and
physical security functions. A LESO can be at a GSA facility
performing an inspection or providing contract guard oversight
and, if the need arises, immediately provide police response to
a criminal activity.
FPS decided to integrate the entire security program by
making the contract security guard program a true extension of
its law enforcement activities by combining the
responsibilities. A LESO-based workforce allows FPS the
necessary flexibility to provide law enforcement and immediate
corrective action to all countermeasures, including our
contract security guards. Under the prior bifurcation of
security operations, law enforcement had little or no oversight
over the contract guard program or other integrated security
countermeasures.
Differences in the traditional police officer and LESO
position begin with basic training. The police officer receives
basic law enforcement instruction in the Uniform Police
Training Program, or UPTP, at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center. For the police officer, basic training ends
there. Basic training for the LESO only begins at UPTP.
Following completion of the basic law enforcement training
curriculum, the LESO Inspector is enrolled in the physical
security training program. This advanced course provides the
LESO extensive instruction in training and risk assessments,
threat analysis, risk management, risk mitigation, and the
latest technological advancements and countermeasures. To
improve FPS's contract oversight capability, we have also added
a training module that prepares the LESO to perform the duties
of the Contract Officer's Technical Representative, or COTR.
Notwithstanding the important issues and recommendations
offered by the GAO, we agree that more can be done, including
the following: a strategic risk-based approach to staffing is
needed, and we have begun the process of doing that using
several workload studies and analysis that have been conducted;
there is a need to clarify the responsibility of local law
enforcement and first responders, and we intend to work closely
with our law enforcement partners in this effort; we must
incorporate performance management into our law enforcement and
administrative activities; and update our current performance
measures.
To this end, FPS is acquiring a new Risk Assessment and
Management Program, also known as RAMP, to enhance its
operational capabilities for gathering data and developing
action plans to assess collective and individual performance.
The RAMP will provide a suite of tools designed to ease the
collection analysis and reporting of performance measure
information. With respect to our collection and use of data,
FPS will use RAMP, a secure Web-enabled tool, to conduct risk
assessments. By building in specific workflow and enhanced
reporting capabilities, FPS can use RAMP to identify security
vulnerabilities and to provide the data FPS needs to make
decisions as to workforce assignments, including conducting of
security assessments and providing of security.
I am extremely pleased to lead the proud and professional
men and women of the Federal Protective Service. I interact
with them every day and I can tell you that they are dedicated,
determined, and committed to developing and implementing and
maintaining security systems to ensure the facilities they are
charged with protecting are secure and their occupants are
safe. I am confident that they can be relied upon to ensure
that FPS will continue to meet the challenge of its homeland
security mission.
Thank you again, Chairwoman Norton and Ranking Member
Graves, for holding this important oversight hearing. I would
be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Schenkel.
Mr. Wright.
Mr. Wright. Chairwoman Norton, Ranking Member Graves,
Members of the Subcommittee, my name is David Wright. I am
President of AFG Local 918, the Federal Protective Service
Union. I have been an FPS law enforcement officer for the past
22 years. In the seven years since the September 11 attacks, I
have watched with growing frustration and outrage as the
Federal Protective Service has been allowed to deteriorate and
drift like a rudderless, sinking ship.
Madam Chair, every American should be shocked and
frightened by the GAO testimony we heard today. The sole
Federal agency charged with the critical mission of protecting
thousands of Federal buildings and millions of people from
terrorists and criminal attack has had its core mission
challenges, its funding cut by $700 million since 9/11, its
officer pay reduced by 10 percent, and its law enforcement
ranks nearly depleted.
If one of our local unions had performed in such a manner
with respect to carrying out its mission and responsibilities,
it would have been put into trusteeship. It is clear to us that
we need Congress to act as a trustee for the Federal Protective
Service.
It has only been through the intervention of this and other
Committees of Congress that we have stopped this dangerous and
irresponsibility trend. Meanwhile, in fiscal year 2008, FPS is
projected to have only 1,200 personnel and budgeted at
approximately $238 million nationwide for operational expenses,
while there are over 1,600 Capitol Police budgeted $281 million
to protect the Capitol and Congressional offices in a 12-block
area of Washington, D.C. The Secret Service has over 1,300
officers in its uniformed division to protect its assigned
facilities in Washington, D.C. The Veterans Health
Administration employs over 2,500 police officers to protect
154 medical centers nationwide.
I should also add that each of the above-mentioned agencies
use extensive proactive patrol by police officers to detect and
deter attack, the very critical activities that GAO has found
missing in FPS.
The questions we need to answer today are why was this
allowed to happen to FPS and what needs to be done. My written
testimony answers both of those questions in detail, so I would
ask that it be submitted for the record. I also want to make
four key points here this afternoon.
Regardless of why this agency has been allowed to ``twist
in the wind,'' as the Senate DHS Appropriations Committee put
it last year, we need to continue to rebuild the FPS in a rapid
manner. A comprehensive review and assessment of manpower
needs, as called for by GAO, and a request for sufficient
personnel to perform the mission must be produced by the agency
as quickly as possible. In the interim, Local 918 is asking
Congress to increase the current level of 1200 personnel--that
includes about 900 law enforcement--by about 400 in the fiscal
year 2009 DHS appropriations bill.
GAO pointed to the importance of a uniform Federal law
enforcement presence surrounding Federal buildings as an
essential security requirement to detect and deter attack by
terrorists and criminals. It is an approach embraced by all law
enforcement agencies across the Country. Yet, it is precisely
this component of proactive patrol that DHS and ICE have worked
so hard to eliminate.
The Union believes that eliminating police officers and
maintaining a depleted all-inspector workforce is a dangerous
mistake. While inspectors can and do perform law enforcement
tasks, they also have a very different set of responsibilities
on a day-to-day basis: overseeing the contract guard workforce;
performing building security assessments, which is very labor-
intensive; training employees in regards to workplace violence;
and other security issues, to name several. In the performance
of these duties, it is less likely that inspectors will uncover
criminal or terrorist activity. Such activity is far more often
revealed through community interaction and continuous law
enforcement uniform patrol, which are the primary
responsibilities of FPS police officers.
Three, in the post-9/11 world of today, it makes absolutely
no sense to rely on a square footage base fee to entirely
determine the funding for FPS. While the Union does not oppose
the continued funding of some optional FPS services through
this funding mechanism, we strongly believe that most
activities of FPS can and should be funded through annual
appropriations. I have to reiterate, as I have over the past
two years, the current funding formula is the root cause of the
problems at FPS and it is in desperate need of reform.
My fourth point, just within the past two years, FPS police
officers and other law enforcement officers have seen their pay
cut by 10 percent. Many have been told that their jobs were
being eliminated and we have watched as the agency's core
mission has been threatened by a misguided attempt of non-law
enforcement bureaucrats to eliminate critical FPS law
enforcement activities. I can tell you we have lost many
talented, experienced officers as a result, and it will not be
easy to attract them back or to hire new personnel to replace
them in any short manner of time.
Evidently, the agency is finding this out as it tries to
recruit new personnel for the positions required under last
year's appropriations bill. As you can imagine, morale is in
the tank. Your FPS law enforcement officers have borne the
brunt of recent FPS budget reductions and we need Congress to
step in. We have borne that brunt. We have taken the pay cuts;
we have been out there without the equipment, without the
supplies, without the uniforms. I have guys paying for uniforms
out of pocket, I have guys paying for equipment out of pocket,
and we will never see that money back.
Restoration of retention pay and the provision of law
enforcement retirement benefits are two changes that should be
implemented as part of any FPS building process. By the way,
retention pay, as alluded to, when they cut retention pay a
couple years ago, amounts to less than $5 million annually. As
a result of losing that 10 percent retention pay, we have lost
approximately 150 to 170 officers and inspectors.
Madam Chair, I believe the state of the FPS right now is
little different from that of the airline industry security
prior to 9/11. There, a reliance on poorly trained, un-
monitored contract guards with no law enforcement authority,
with security implementation by conflicting entities, an
unworkable funding structure, and a perception of security
through inspections, instead of protection by boots on the
ground Federal officers, proved disastrous. It should not have
happened then and it should not be allowed to happen now.
I will be glad to answer your questions.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Wright.
I am going to go first to the Ranking Member, Mr. Graves.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The core mission of FPS is to protect Federal buildings,
the people who work in them, obviously, the people who visit
them, and we all know, we all agree that Federal buildings are
obviously targets. The GAO study concluded that many Federal
buildings are more at risk of crime and terrorist attacks,
which basically shows that FPS isn't adequately fulfilling its
basic mission. Yet, during the time when we had some level IV
buildings that did not have building assessments completed, FPS
still had the time and resources to conduct security
assessments of private residences of Federal officials, and I
am surprised that nobody is talking about this.
My question, Mr. Schenkel, is how many of these assessments
of private residences did FPS perform and whose were they?
Mr. Schenkel. I am aware of six. I have a list. They were
performed. The most recent was probably two years ago, and they
go back as far a six years.
Mr. Graves. Who are they?
Mr. Schenkel. Senator Feinstein's residence; Assistant
Secretary Myers' residence; Robert Brown from FEMA; Mr. Alfonso
Jackson, former Secretary of HUD, I believe.
I am incorrect, sir, it was five. I apologize. I thought
there were six.
Mr. Graves. Were there specific threats that were
anticipated?
Mr. Schenkel. There were specific threats in the case of
Mr. Jackson, there were specific threats in the case of Ms.
Myers, and implicated threats in the case of Senator Feinstein.
I am not aware of anything on Mr. Brown, sir.
Mr. Graves. Who requested the assessments and who
authorized them?
Mr. Schenkel. They would have to have been authorized by
the regional director or whoever sat in this chair, sir. And
they would be requested normally either by the local law
enforcement entity responsible for that jurisdiction or another
Federal law enforcement agency that was aware of a threat.
Mr. Graves. Well, what is the protocol in approving
requests like this? I mean, what criteria do you use to
evaluate? How many requests do you get, for that matter? How
many were turned down?
Mr. Schenkel. I really have no idea. I can say that since
April 1st of last year I have not seen any requests. But the
normal protocol, if you would, would be a request from the law
enforcement agency primarily responsible for that individual.
In some cases it would be the Capitol Police, in some cases it
would be the local law enforcement. They would request through
a letter saying we request your assistance on a security
assessment of a residence and then it would have to be handled
on a case-by-case basis.
Mr. Graves. Is FPS reimbursed for all of these, for the
resources, the manpower, whatever is done?
Mr. Schenkel. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Graves. Well, do you think these assessments were
appropriate use of FPS resources?
Mr. Schenkel. Not having been in the chair at the time, I
would have to evaluate them very seriously, especially under
the constraints that we have right now with the limited
resources, sir.
Mr. Graves. I mean, everybody is talking about manpower
shortages and everybody is talking about all of these problems,
but, yet, we have got folks running around doing--not only
that, we are not even touching on the issues of FPS personnel
doing things other than what they are supposed to be doing in
homeland security.
I will ask Mr. Wright, too, do you think that is an
appropriate use of FPS personnel?
Mr. Wright. I can say that I have never seen any protocol
for assessments on private residences. A proper security
assessment I believe would average around 80 hours. You are
talking about an inspector at nearly $40 an hour, then you have
the management process, the review process from there. We are
talking probably $3500 for each of these assessments. These are
Federal officials. Certainly, these assessments could have been
conducted by other security professionals. Certainly, they
could have offered to reimburse. Apparently, that didn't
happen.
I find this absolutely disturbing if this happened. We have
known about the financial plight of FPS since we moved into
Department of Homeland Security. Matter of fact, we have known
about the financial plight since before March of 2003, when we
came into Homeland Security, so, to me, this is inexcusable. It
is a fraud, waste, and abuse issue.
Mr. Graves. Well, the fact that there is no protocol, as
you mentioned, too--and we haven't seen any protocol either--is
something that disturbs me in a huge way.
Mr. Wright. And from an agency, for Ms. Myers to have a
security assessment done on her residence with public funds,
and then to turn around and not endorse Law Enforcement
Officers Safety Act for Federal Protective Service officers so
we can protect ourselves while off duty, this is inexcusable.
Mr. Graves. We have got reports, too, doing assessments on
some private companies, chemical companies, for instance. Is
that correct, doing some outside assessment work?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not aware of anything like that, sir.
Mr. Graves. Detailed 39 inspectors for infrastructure
protection?
Mr. Schenkel. That is not private security work. Those
people, we got 39--actually, it is 30 right now, 30 inspectors
detailed to infrastructure protection in the chemical facility
sector, and they are doing inspections at chemical plants. They
are Federal employees, they are just detailed to infrastructure
protection and performing under the direction of infrastructure
protection.
Mr. Graves. But it is a private facility.
Mr. Schenkel. These are private facilities, yes, sir.
Mr. Graves. I appreciate it, Madam Chair. Obviously, we
have got problems that run pretty deep.
Ms. Norton. I think you brought out some of them.
Mr. Graves. I appreciate your testimony very much.
Ms. Norton. But the inspectors that the Ranking Member just
raised, the physical security specialists, these people could
be doing some of the inspections in Federal buildings, could
they not?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Well, why are they being detailed to private
chemical plants, who can hire their own people with expertise?
Why are we doing that?
Mr. Schenkel. Under the President's fiscal year 2008
budget, we only had enough resources to support a force of 950.
Under the same situation, we promised that no one would lose a
job. So those are fully reimbursable positions paid for by IP.
Ms. Norton. So this brings money to keep these people
working, these people who are necessary for the agency. In
fact, if truth be told, this change to inspector-based
workforce, Mr. Schenkel, is really driven by funding, isn't it?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes and no. I have to answer that truthfully
because as much as we have discussed here, the testimony from
Mr. Goldstein, the old GAO reports, we cite proactive patrol on
the law enforcement side as being a negative, and there are
multiple negatives on the physical security side. So with
limited resources in that aspect, yes, ma'am, I have to
concentrate my activities.
Ms. Norton. We are just trying to get to the bottom of
this. Now, here the testimony is that the security specialists
are bringing revenue to the agency that the agency cannot get
in any other way, because they are being hired out; therefore,
the agency is being reimbursed. If they were employed in the
agency, of course, the agency would have to take it out of
appropriations, which the agency does not have.
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. Now, I want to establish that these inspectors,
physical security specialists, could be doing some of the very
same work that law enforcement officers now used as inspectors
are doing, isn't that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. The people on the IP detail are
LESOs, they are all LESOs. The common term is inspector, but
they are all law enforcement security officers, not physical
security specialists.
Ms. Norton. I am trying to make sure. But could not the
physical security specialists be doing this work inside of
Federal buildings, were we able to afford them?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am
Ms. Norton. Instead of law enforcement officers.
Mr. Schenkel. I don't believe that they would have the
expertise. A regular physical security specialists,
unfortunately, when we came out of GSA, there were about 140
different position descriptions. The physical security
specialist title actually applies to a multiple faceted
responsibility. Some----
Ms. Norton. Well, you know, these are people who can adapt
themselves and get trained, apparently, pretty quickly by the
private sector to inspect chemical plants. They must have some
core knowledge.
Mr. Schenkel. Those are LESOs, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Excuse me?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry, we are confusing two different
positions here. The people that are at the IP detail that are
doing the physical inspections of the chemical plants are law
enforcement security officers, or inspectors, the same as we
would use for the BSAs.
Ms. Norton. They are law enforcement officers?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Who would be doing work inside the agency if we
could afford them?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. According to the GAO report--I am now reading
directly from the report. I think we just need to get this
straight. The GAO says that the FPS currently is in the process
of training to an all-inspector workforce and adding 150
inspectors to the workforce. Is that the case?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Now, that means that you are in the process of
converting from a police force, the core mission before this
change, to a group of inspectors who do not patrol.
Mr. Schenkel. I don't want to disagree with you, ma'am, but
that is not quite correct, because by going to a 100 percent
law inspector security officer force, I then have the
flexibility, as opposed to before, as I stated, 55 percent of
my force being able to do just the physical security parts or
being overburdened with the physical security parts, I can now
take 100----
Ms. Norton. But the primary function of the FPS officer is
not going to be the normal routine proactive patrol that we
associate with the regular police officer mission throughout
the United States. Is that not the case?
Mr. Schenkel. Part of their time they will be dedicated to
proactive patrol.
Ms. Norton. How much of their time?
Mr. Schenkel. Roughly 20 percent.
Ms. Norton. So for 9,000 buildings with stationary guards,
20 percent of the time of the police officer will be spent in
patrols.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Or simply responding and all that goes with
police work. Which?
Mr. Schenkel. No, in proactive patrol.
Ms. Norton. In proactive patrol.
Mr. Schenkel. Because we will be able to use the LESO in
both----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Wright, let me ask you. A police officer,
unlike a regular Federal worker, can retire earlier, isn't that
true? Is trained to carry a gun and is generally considered a
very specialized Federal employee or employee if employed by
others, is that right?
Mr. Wright. In the case of FPS, no. FPS police officers,
FPS inspectors, neither job classification has law enforcement
retirement benefits.
Ms. Norton. Neither? Sorry, would you speak into the
microphone?
Mr. Wright. Neither law enforcement officers, police
officers or inspectors, neither job series is entitled to
Federal law enforcement benefits with the Enhanced Retirement
Bill----
Ms. Norton. So when do they retire? When does FPS--do they
retire at the same retirement rate as everybody else?
Mr. Wright. Yes. With the exception of special agents,
which is another class.
Ms. Norton. In your judgment, do you need to be a trained
police officer to do the inspector function that has now become
the primary function of these officers?
Mr. Schenkel. In my judgment, the inspectors----
Ms. Norton. I am asking Mr. Wright.
Mr. Schenkel. Oh, I am sorry.
Ms. Norton. Then I will ask you.
Mr. Wright, do you think that your officers----
Mr. Wright. Yes.
Ms. Norton. And then Mr. Schenkel.
Mr. Wright. In years past, the inspector position as
idealized--basically, what you have, the original intent, as I
recall--I have been here for a while--was a number of FPS
police officers handling the majority of proactive patrol and
response duties. Like I say, this was in years past. We wanted
to supplement that core of police officers. Whereas, we had
unarmed physical security specialists in the past, you develop
a cadre of inspectors. So as your police officers are
patrolling, responding, you had this cadre of inspectors who
are performing building security assessments, making
recommendations for protection and so on, and be available for
call.
Ms. Norton. So what is the ratio of those doing these
building assessments and those patrolling, ideally?
Mr. Wright. That is to be determined by a workload
assessment.
Ms. Norton. Well, I am talking about the FPS. I am trying
to get some sense in a Federal facility.
Mr. Wright. In my ideal world, I would say two to one.
Ms. Norton. Two to one what?
Mr. Wright. More police officers than inspectors,
definitely.
Ms. Norton. Would you disagree with that, Mr. Schenkel? If
this were possible. I understand now the position you are in
now and the funding, but with all things being equal, if this
were possible, do you agree that in the post-9/11 world, where
we have enhanced security here to a fare-thee-well with a 50
percent increase in Capitol police, in this same post-9/11
world, where the Federal employee lives at the two to one
ratio, if we could afford it, would make sense?
Mr. Schenkel. Based on what the GSA/FPS MOA expects for
that basic security fee, I would say Mr. Wright is probably
underestimating the ratio.
Ms. Norton. Because of the climate in which we live.
I am going to go to Mr. Carney, give him a chance.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a few questions.
Mr. Wright, since 9/11, how many officers have resigned or
retired, gone to do other things? That are outside the sort of
normal retirement cycle.
Mr. Wright. As I recall, around 9/11 we had about 1500
employees, and I believe nearly 1200 officers and inspectors.
Today, the latest figure that I have, which is probably at
least a month old, we are down to 1,060 law enforcement.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Schenkel, you mentioned RAMP, the program
RAMP. When is that going to be ready to be deployed?
Mr. Schenkel. The contract is going to be awarded within
the next three weeks. We should have the pilot on the street in
January 2009.
Mr. Carney. Okay. How long is the pilot supposed to last,
do you know?
Mr. Schenkel. It is not determined yet, but we hope to have
it in everyone's hands by the end of 2009 or early 2010, this
being the reason: because we have six different systems that we
are dependent on right now, several of which don't belong to
us. That is why we need this system so desperately to make
those determinations, as Mr. Wright alluded to, for those
workload models and studies.
Mr. Carney. Okay, when you talk about your work, Mr.
Schenkel, with local authorities, you have a deconfliction
issue, everywhere, I imagine. What are you doing to provide
that deconfliction and how much do you actually rely on local
law enforcement officials?
Mr. Schenkel. In most areas, a great deal. With the
exception of some exclusive jurisdictional areas, we depend
primarily on local law enforcement. Say, for the State of
Maine, the State of Maine has never had more than three FPS
officers or inspectors. To think that there would be a
commensurate response as there would be, say, at 26 Federal
Plaza would never happen. So, consequently, we depend on these
mutually beneficial relationships. We have bomb dogs that we
work with local law enforcement. We do provide a physical
security assessment if they need one for a specific event or
facility. And that mutually beneficial and mutually supporting
effort has worked out quite well for us.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Mr. Wright, what is the state of morale with FPS officers?
Mr. Wright. As I said in my statement, it is absolutely in
the tank. I think the Union's efforts in keeping morale up and
assuring the employees that things have to get better has been
instrumental in keeping a lot of individuals around. I lost a
lot of good friends that have departed for other agencies. Like
I say, other than that, it is in the tank.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Schenkel, given a reasonable estimate, if
you could have the resources you needed--and I am not talking
about the gold plate and everything here, I am talking about
just the resources to do the job--how much more money do you
need, do you think?
Mr. Schenkel. The decision has to be made first on what our
customer agencies have to expect for that basic security fee.
Like I said, if it is 24 hour response, we would need 45,000
police officers to have 24 hour coverage at every one of our
9,000 facilities. Right now, that basic security fee gives an
expectation that Maine will have the same kind of response in
police presence as 26 Federal Plaza or NCR here, which is
limited on resources as well. So to throw a dollar out without
that starting point I think would be unfair.
Mr. Carney. Okay, well, let's make it fair. How close are
we to assessing that need?
Mr. Schenkel. Well, we are entering the negotiations right
now with GSA on our next MOA, so I think this is what the
accountability report stresses, is that there has got to be a
starting point and a fairness or equitable adjustment, if you
will, on what the basic security responsibilities of FPS are
for all 9,000 buildings, and then those that are level IV, say,
for instance, that require a greater level of attention or a
greater police presence.
Mr. Carney. This will be my final question, Madam Chair.
If you were someone who was intending to do the Country
harm, would you be happier today or more concerned?
Mr. Schenkel. I would be less concerned than I was a year
ago, but I am always concerned; that is why I am in this
business. The reason I say that is I think because we have been
focused now on that contact guard oversight, on that
countermeasure implementation, and the requirements that our
customers expect, I think that our buildings are in better
shape than they perhaps were a year and a half ago. But I think
there is always room for great improvement.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Wright, care to comment?
Mr. Wright. Personally, I believe that we are more at risk
today than prior to 9/11, similar to the days prior to the
Oklahoma City bombing.
Mr. Carney. No further questions.
Ms. Norton. It is very hard to understand how things get
better with the fewer staff you have patrolling buildings.
Maybe I live in another kind of world.
Mr. Schenkel, you spoke about in negotiation with GSA on
the fees. It hasn't seemed to have gotten us very far, but it
might if OMB were to take the lump sums that had been agreed
upon and if they became an indirect appropriation in a lump
sum. That would seem to be a common sense way of doing this.
Could we ask that that be done? Is there any reason why that
could not be done to try to at least clear up the getting the
fees where they are supposed to go?
Mr. Schenkel. I think that would be a good start because
that would give that baseline appropriation, if you will, for
those basic security requirements that FPS could offer, and
then there would be that additional charge for any other
building-specific charges which should include additional
police presence in some buildings.
Ms. Norton. Now are you willing to make that recommendation
to OMB?
Mr. Schenkel. I have already discussed this with them,
ma'am.
Ms. Norton. What has OMB said about this?
Mr. Schenkel. They haven't said much. I haven't got a
response.
Ms. Norton. The Committee, we are just looking for a more
efficient way to get at the fees question. They seemed to work
when they were at GSA. This is very bothersome that the switch,
where now it looks like appropriated funds come into the
picture, and we get serious budget problems in the agency that
weren't there before.
Mr. Wright, do you have any view on this? One lump sum?
Mr. Wright. Yes, that would be an absolute great first
step. We have to make those fees invisible to the agencies
because, as we speak, agencies are stepping away from FPS and
forming their own physical security programs.
Ms. Norton. Well, how are they able to do that? You mean
they are taking what they otherwise would give, what they used
to give to GSA, for example, and simply not giving the money at
all?
Is that true, Mr. Schenkel?
Mr. Schenkel. Well, the taxpayer is paying it twice is what
is happening. GSA is moving forward with a physical security
program that basically duplicates what FPS is doing.
Ms. Norton. Why have you delegated them the authority to do
this?
Mr. Schenkel. We have not. We have not delegated them the
authority, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Well, how are they able to?
How many agencies in this area, in the D.C. metropolitan
area, have what amount to must be some kind of implied
delegation authority to move away?
Do you know of any who are, in fact, moving away, Mr.
Wright? Can you name any?
Mr. Wright. The main one that causes me concern is the U.S.
Marshal Service and Administrator of the Courts. We now have a
pilot program in place which the Marshal Service has taken over
perimeter security or they are scheduled to here in the next
couple of months, taking over perimeter security at Federal
courthouses.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, that clearly could not have
happened without an MOU from FPS or somebody. You can't just
step in and say, okay, we are doing your job now.
And, by the way, I am worried about this being paid twice.
Mr. Wright. Right.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Wright. I will say on FPS's behalf, there is tremendous
pressure from the judiciary and the Administrator of the Courts
on these issues.
Ms. Norton. Again, here, we get back to GSA not doing its
job because the courts then run the FPS or whoever are the
guards. This is going to require Congress to look. This, of
course, is also in our jurisdiction because the courts are.
This is going to require really, once again, our trying to
get a hold of courts who also tried to build their own
buildings until we got a hold of that, and now they are trying
to guard their own buildings. This, obviously, complicates
these negotiations you are in.
But I need to know where the authority is coming and, Mr.
Schenkel, within 30 days, I need to know the names of any
agencies which are now doing their own security outside of the
now--I was about to say GSA--the FPS-administered security.
That is number one.
I want to know how many, who are they and by what authority
within 30 days, would you please submit to this Committee?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. We have already just completed an
inventory, and so we have that.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
But you don't know what the authority has been for doing
that?
Mr. Schenkel. Prior to FPS coming to the Department of
Homeland Security, these delegations of authority were granted
fairly easily by the GSA. We have not granted.
Ms. Norton. You think all of these are old authorities and
none of them have recently come?
Mr. Schenkel. None of them have been recent, no, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. They could be pulled back, however.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Well, it is very important to get that
information because this Committee has jurisdiction over the
courts, whomever it is who has done this.
Let me ask you, Mr. Schenkel, how has placing FPS in ICE
improved the performance of FPS?
Mr. Schenkel. In the financial realm primarily because we
deal with 800.
Ms. Norton. Well, of course, not until we got together
because there was quite a shambles there.
Mr. Schenkel. That is absolutely correct. Yes, ma'am. But,
as you know, we deal with about $800 million in contracts a
year. We are not staffed to handle that kind of a financial
challenge.
Ms. Norton. It would appear--and you may tell me different
and I would be glad to hear it--that infrastructure and the
Office of Infrastructure Protection may have a more closely
related mission, and they could handle the overhead issues that
FPS isn't equipped to handle?
Why was ICE chosen?
Mr. Schenkel. Ma'am, that happened long before I got here.
Ms. Norton. But you would think that the mission would be
understood enough to know why we are here rather than there.
Mr. Schenkel. The mission aligns itself. However,
Infrastructure Protection does not have the law enforcement
authority. I can only surmise that were put in ICE.
Ms. Norton. Border Control has law enforcement authority,
but it is altogether different from what FPS does, and those
distinctions are made even in the officers and in their
benefits and every other way, apparently.
So just putting things together, they call themselves
police forces, and that is what we fear. Is that how they got
put together?
Is the overhead problem dealing with that problem, why FPS
is not a stand-alone agency? Couldn't DHS then handle these
overhead problems, filling out the forms and the payroll?
Mr. Schenkel. I am talking primarily on the contract side,
ma'am. The HR system could certainly support our officers and
our mission support.
Ms. Norton. Oh, I see. You mean the contract officers.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am, and the contracts themselves. We
would have to have some kind of deep support system to support
our minimal mission support staff when dealing with these
contracts.
Ms. Norton. Has going to an inspector-based force done
anything about staffing except reduce it, anything about
funding except reduce it? Indeed, has it even allowed the
security assessments to be performed in a timely manner?
I am trying to find some benefit for having gone to this
inspector-based workforce.
Yes, Mr. Schenkel.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am, it has because we have been able
to now complete all of the overdue basic security assessments.
We have been able to work a work plan.
Ms. Norton. But the GAO does not say so. They say it is not
on a timely basis.
Mr. Schenkel. I would have to refute that, ma'am, and I
have the documentation to show it.
Ms. Norton. Okay. We are going to ask you to submit that
within 30 days. That is the kind of thing we want, if you
disagree with the GAO report, we will be pleased to get that
assessment. Go ahead.
You go to an inspector-based workforce and immediately,
look what happens. You reduce the staff. You make up for your
funding shortfall, and it is hard for us to see any other
benefit and certainly any other benefit to law enforcement as
such.
Mr. Schenkel. Well, the benefit to law enforcement, as Mr.
Wright has already discussed, we don't have 6c coverage. We
don't have a law enforcement retirement.
By moving our police officers to a LESO position, an
inspector position, we give them the opportunity to have a
career path where they can, instead of topping out at a GS-7 or
8 police officer, they can be promoted up to a GS-12. That is
attracting some or many, I should say, not just some of our
police officers.
Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Wright, is that true, the retirement
benefits? Do any other benefits enhance by moving?
Do your officers prefer this new dual structure?
Mr. Wright. Benefits are not enhanced. They are offered the
career opportunity to top out at a GS-12 and potentially a
career track to 13, 14, 15.
Ms. Norton. So there is some benefit to the employee.
Mr. Wright. Correct, but it is not, as we call in law
enforcement, 6c or 12d benefits is not included in that
Ms. Norton. What is the reluctance to make the Federal
Protective Service Officer equivalent of other officers?
Mr. Schenkel. There is no reluctant, ma'am. We would love
to have 6c coverage.
Ms. Norton. I can't understand the difference between the
Capitol Police. I can't help but to make this invidious
comparison between the various police forces. I am not sure I
like what I see here.
Mr. Wright. I think historically it has been tied to the
language of the law. As it was developed initially, to my
understanding, it was aimed towards criminal investigators.
Long-term investigations being a requirement of that original
law.
Ms. Norton. Which original law? I am sorry. Which original
law?
Mr. Wright. I would have to submit that to you. I can look
up.
Ms. Norton. I am sorry. I didn't hear. Would you start
again because I didn't understand the distinction you were
making?
Mr. Wright. The reluctance for giving Federal Protective
Service the 6c-12d law enforcement officer benefits, it has
always been disputed by OPM, number one.
The definition of our law enforcement, our police officers
never fit the definition given in 6c and 12d because that law,
that original law focused on long-term investigations. It was
designed for criminal investigators and special agents.
As it has developed throughout the years, that law has
incorporated everything from detention to protection of public
officials, basically everything but a first responder.
Ms. Norton. Initially, you say there were criminal
investigations. Like investigators and nothing more, is that
it?
Mr. Wright. The history that I understand as to how that
law was developed was aimed toward criminal investigators.
Ms. Norton. But these are peace officers, carry guns and do
whatever else other peace officers do.
Mr. Wright. Absolutely.
Ms. Norton. You heard our concern, Mr. Schenkel, about
these MOUs and, by the way, we heard your testimony about the
mutual relationships that have been developed in some places
where there are shallow Federal facilities. In the first place,
I think that is very efficient and commend the agency for that.
But, of course, the cities or jurisdictions we were talking
about, the 50 that were to lose all FPS officers, had them
before and didn't have mutual relationships. You heard the
testimony that not only were there no MOUs, some of them had
not heard of MOUs. They weren't in these other relationships
you described earlier with Mr. Carney.
For all intents and purposes, in these 50 cities, do any
kind of formal relationships of any kind exist between the
local police department and the agency, the Federal Agency?
Mr. Schenkel. As far as an MOU or an MOA signed with a law
enforcement?
Ms. Norton. Or any other thing you can cite. So informal
relationships doesn't mean anything that the Federal employee
and the agency can rely upon?
Mr. Schenkel. Other than the fact that 81 percent of the
9,000 buildings are leased properties. So, consequently, local
law enforcement is obligated to respond and to protect those
facilities.
As far as an MOU or an MOA, we do not have those.
Ms. Norton. Well, how is it that the testimony was that
they had not understood that they were to respond to those
properties?
It might be a leased property, but if it is a Federal
Agency called the XYZ Agency and you are a local officer, you
think it is the XYZ Federal Agency. Unless you know that you
are supposed to respond, the fact that it is leased to a
Federal Agency doesn't mean it isn't Federal property.
Mr. Schenkel. I am not disagreeing with you at all, ma'am,
because I didn't even the Federal Protective Service existed
when I was with the Chicago Police Department, but I think that
is indicative of the paucity of the agency. It is not that
people are ignoring the Federal Protective Service, but because
they have always responded to those facilities, whether they be
Federal or not, they didn't even know we existed.
Ms. Norton. Are you telling me that the Chicago Police
Department responded to Federal facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, name the kinds of Federal
facilities that the local police department felt they should
respond to in Chicago.
Mr. Schenkel. Any other than the main Federal buildings and
courthouse downtown.
Ms. Norton. So, in point of fact, you believe that they
have a responsibility to respond and they will respond, and you
don't need to have FPS officers associated with these
structures.
Mr. Schenkel. I didn't say that, and I would never say
that. I think we do need Federal police officers or Federal law
enforcement security officers involved because that builds
those relationships and provides that in-depth knowledge and
that leveled security, if you will.
Ms. Norton. So you are then?
Mr. Schenkel. I am a proponent of Federal law enforcement.
Ms. Norton. Then you think that these 50 cities or
jurisdictions should be covered?
Mr. Schenkel. If we have the resources, absolutely, yes,
ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Can you testify here today who can be expected
to respond in those 50 jurisdictions which are now not covered
by MOUs or in any other formal way?
Do you know for a fact that the local police would respond?
Mr. Schenkel. I would have to go city by city, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Have you gone city by city?
Mr. Schenkel, it seems to me that there is an affirmative
duty here. Given the GAO report that tells us that these local
police officers don't understand that there was to be an MOU or
that they were to respond, there is now an affirmative duty on
the part of FPS to make sure that these 50 jurisdictions are
covered. How are you making sure they are covered?
Mr. Schenkel. Because I rely on the 81 percent of Federal
properties that are leased, and then we have to. Our entire
knowledge----
Ms. Norton. See, we are going in circles now because the
testimony from the GAO was that these people didn't even know
that there were supposed to be MOUs, and you are relying on the
fact that they know that they are supposed to go in. You see
why I would be nervous if I were in those 50 jurisdictions, to
hear the contradiction between you and the GAO on that score?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not trying to contradict. I am just
trying to add, I guess, a sense of perspective here is that
local law enforcement patrols, responds to nearly all of the
facilities, whether they be Federal or not, in their local
jurisdiction. It certainly could be enhanced by the presence or
an increase in numbers of Federal law enforcement officers.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, the Subcommittee is going to have
to ask you to submit evidence within 30 days that in those 50
jurisdictions, local law enforcement has been informed that
they may enter a Federal facility.
This is very important to note. We had some testimony from
the GAO that the FPS opened the facility and let in the local
law enforcement officer, thereby apparently giving them
permission.
But you are telling me they have permission and they should
know they have permission and they should know that you are
relying on them if there is a call and, moreover, that these
Federal facilities know that who they are supposed to call is
the local police department. That is your testimony here today?
Mr. Schenkel. No, ma'am, not at all. The Federal facilities
know to call the mega center if there is an alarm or if there
is an intrusion or if there is a problem and then based on
availability of Federal police officers.
Ms. Norton. There are no Federal police officers, we now
know, in those 50 jurisdictions, Mr. Schenkel.
Mr. Schenkel. Then the mega centers contact local law
enforcement, and local law enforcement makes the response.
Ms. Norton. So it seems to me if that is the case and I am
in a Federal building, a Federal courthouse or something, I
think I want to call the local cops myself rather than to use
you as the pass-through.
Mr. Schenkel. In many cases.
Ms. Norton. Because you won't have any help to give to me
and only the local law enforcement? Do you realize how chaotic
this is, Mr. Schenkel?
Mr. Schenkel, I need to know. This Subcommittee needs to
know within 30 days who the 50 jurisdictions are, whether they
understand and whether you have informed them that they are
principally to rely on local law enforcement, whether the local
law enforcement knows that they have been informed and that
they have permission to enter Federal facilities. Within 30
days, we need that information.
We will not close this session in this state of affairs,
just not knowing. There have been too many questions raised by
the report. We need to know, particularly in those 50
jurisdictions, do they know that they are not covered because
there is not Federal police there?
Do they know? Therefore, have you informed them? Therefore,
you obviously should inform them that they must call the local
police.
The local police, you will have to inform that the local
police know and understand that they are to respond to these
calls. You will have to inform us that they have permission and
understand they have permission to enter a Federal facility.
Mr. Schenkel. I don't think that can be done, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Excuse me?
Mr. Schenkel. I don't think that can be done.
Ms. Norton. Why?
Mr. Schenkel. Because it would be dependent literally on
each and every individual facility within each and every----
Ms. Norton. They all come out of your jurisdiction. We are
talking about FPS jurisdiction. Where you used to have
officers, you don't have officers now, and you are telling me
that you are depending upon the fact that they are leased
buildings and they can call the local cops if they only call
you first.
Now I am trying to find out whether we can get together a
system that would work there and would make us feel that these
employees are being protected.
We don't have any testimony from you that the locals will
respond. Your testimony is based on the fact that these are
leased buildings. This leaves us in a totally problematic
position here with respect to at least those 50 positions, and
we would hate to move from others where there may be only 1 or
2 FPS officers.
I don't know what to tell you. I think you need to come in
and talk to staff because either you have to work out a system
whereby they know they are supposed to respond or you have to
respond. You have the authority if it is a Federal facility.
There is no way to get away from your responsibility.
Mr. Schenkel. If you put a note----
Ms. Norton. If you are here testifying you are not going to
accept that responsibility, you then have the responsibility to
make sure that somebody will.
Mr. Schenkel. In that context.
Ms. Norton. We have no reason to believe that the local
police officers or the local police understand or have been
informed that they have permission to enter and that they are
being depended upon to enter. I don't even know that you have
the authority to do it, to tell you the honest to goodness
truth.
Mr. Schenkel. Okay.
Ms. Norton. You see my problem, Mr. Schenkel. I am going to
have staff be in touch with you. This is a dangerous situation,
sir.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Finally, liability, just before I run to vote,
I can vote in the Committee as a whole.
Liability, a confused notion that we could have people,
contractors who have obviously have been contracted by the
Federal Government but believe they cannot do part of their job
because they personally would incur liability. Would you
explain, please? They, the contractor.
Mr. Schenkel. Other than with the GAO report, that is the
first I have heard of that, but they are held to
responsibilities to retain and to react, the contractors and
the contract guards. So we have to address that on a case by
case basis on that individual contractor which we will be more
than happy to do if the GAO provides the names of the
contractor.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Wright, do you know anything about this?
Mr. Wright. Yes. It has been pretty historical.
I think, as I testified last year, each security company,
each security guard has differing commissioning requirements.
So, if he is a guard in Kansas City, he has to go to Kansas
City PD and get a commission. That commission sets his
authority on what he is able to do on any property, to include
Federal property.
That being said, contractors are private companies. I am
not anti-free enterprise, but companies and individuals acting
in that capacity, they don't have a career, a Federal career to
worry about. They don't have the backup of the U.S. Attorney or
the Department of Justice.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Wright, I understand that. I am a lawyer,
and that is why I understand that this could be corrected. I
understand what you are saying. They are State-regulated.
Mr. Wright. Right.
Ms. Norton. We hire them, we, the Federal Government. It is
something called Federal Supremacy. The notion that a Federal
contractor might not perform his stated duties because of
liability is a clear and present danger to the assignment he
has.
Mr. Schenkel, I am going to ask you within 30 days to have
your General Counsel. Would it be the General Counsel of ICE?
Mr. Schenkel. OPLA, they call it, Office of Principal Legal
Advisor.
Ms. Norton. The General Counsel, to get us a clarifying
memo. I want him to read the GAO examples of where contractors
felt they could not move forward to perform the duties in their
contract for fear of liability, and I would like a legal
memorandum describing that situation and what they propose to
do about it.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much for this. This has been
very important testimony to a hearing that will require us to
take some action, some action before this session of Congress
closes. We must take the action because the Committee now is on
notice.
We have cross-examined the witnesses. You have done the
best you could in answering it. Some of it is not in your
control, and we understand. Some of it has to do with funding.
Some of it has to do with management. All of it will have to do
with everybody's responsibility if we leave this session of
Congress without doing something about it.
I thank you very much for this testimony, and this hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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